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'U\iil<1i!UHii!Ul 


BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 


1.31 


Department 
of  State 


jm    of  state  ^^  J    ^ 

bulletin 


he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  84  /  Number  2085 


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April  1984 

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Vice  President  in  Europe 
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The  Secretary/9 

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Dpparttneni  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  84  /  Number  2085  /  April  1984 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  ha.s  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


Department  of  State  BULLETIN  (ISSN  0041-Y( 
is  published  monthly  (plus  annual  index)  by  the 
Department  of  State,  2201  C  Street  NW, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520.  Second-class  postage 
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POSTMASTER:  Send  address  changes  to 
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NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
of  the  Department  of  State  Billetin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bm.i.ETiN  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  I 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C 
20402 


CONTENTS 


The  President 

1  Relations  With  the  U.S.S.R. 

2  News  Conference  of  February  22 

{Excerpts) 

The  Vice  President 

5       Trip  to  Europe  and  the  U.S.S.R. 

The  Secretary 

9       The  U.S.  and  Africa  in  the  1980s 
12       Question-and-Answer  Session  Fol- 
lowing World  Affairs  Council 
Address 
15      Human  Rights  and  the  Moral 
Dimension  of  U.S.  Foreign 
Policy 
19       Visit  to  Latin  America 
28       Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley" 
30       Interview  on  "The  MacNeil/Lehrer 
News  Hour" 

Interview 

34       Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's 
Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley" 

Africa 

36       U.S.,  Angola,  South  Africa  Discuss 
Peace  (Joint  Communique) 


East  Asia 


37 


Recent  Situation  in  the  Philippines 
{John  C.  Monjo) 


Europe 

39       The  Transatlantic  Relationship: 
A  Long-Term  Perspective 
{Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger) 

43  Death  of  Soviet  President 

Andropov  {Secretary  Shultz, 
Wiite  House  Statement) 

44  Assistant  Secretary  Burt's  Inter- 

view for  "Worldnet" 
51       Visit  of  Yugoslav  President  (Presi- 
dent Reagan,  Mika  Spiljak) 

Human  Rights 

53       Country  Reports  on  Human 
Rights  Practices  for  1983 

International  Law 

58  Board  of  Appellate  Review  To 

Publish  Decisions 

Middle  East 

59  Defense  Secretary  Weinberger's 

Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 
{Excerpts) 

60  U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  {Letter  to 

the  Congress) 

61  Lebanon  Cancels  Agreement  With 

Israel  (Department  Statement) 

62  Visit  of  King  Hussein  of  Jordan 

(King  Hussein  I,  President 
Reagan) 

63  President  Meets  With  Two  Arab 

Leaders  (King  Hussein  I, 
Mohamed  Hosni  Mubarak, 
President  Reagan) 

64  Chemical  Weapons  and  the  Iran- 

Iraq  War  (Department  State- 
ment) 

65  U.S.  Opposes  Moving  Embassy  to 

Jerusalem  (Lawrence  S. 
Eagleburger) 


Nuclear  Policy 

66  Nuclear  Cooperation  With 

EUR  ATOM  (Letter  to  the 
Congress) 

Science  &  Technology 

67  U.S.  International  Activities  in 

Science  and  Technology  (Message 
to  the  Congress) 

United  Nations 

68  U.S.  Participation  in  the  United 

Nations  (Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick) 

Western  Hemisphere 

71  Central  America  Initiative  Pro- 

posed (President  Reagan) 

72  Central  America  Democracy, 

Peace,  and  Development  Initia- 
tive (Langhome  A.  Motley) 

75       Central  America  Initiative  Legis- 
lation (Message  to  the  Congress) 

77       Elections  in  El  Salvador 
(Thomas  R.  Pickering) 

Treaties 

79       Current  Actions 

Chronology 

81       February  1984 

Press  Releases 

84       Department  of  State 

Publications 

84  Department  of  State 

85  GPO  Subscriptions 

Index 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Relations  With  the  U.S.S.R. 


by  President  Reagan 


Radio  address  to  the  7iatio7i 
on  February  11,  198J^.^ 


I'd  like  to  speak  to  you  about  a  subject 
always  on  the  minds  of  Americans,  but 
of  particular  interest  today  in  view  of  the 
death  of  Soviet  leader  Yuriy 
Andropov— our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Changes  of  leadership  have  not  hap- 
pened often  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Yuriy 
Andropov  was  only  the  sixth  Communist 
Party  leader  in  the  66  years  since  the 
Russian  Revolution.  In  recent  months, 
he'd  been  totally  absent  from  public  view 
so  his  death  did  not  come  as  a  shock  to 
the  world.  Nevertheless,  the  importance 
of  the  U.S.-Soviet  relationship  makes  his 
passing  away  a  time  for  reflection  on 
where  that  relationship  is  heading. 

The  changes  in  Moscow  are  an  ojjpor- 
tunity  for  both  nations  to  examine 
closely  the  current  state  of  our  relations 
and  to  think  about  the  future.  We  know 
that  our  relationship  is  not  what  we 
would  hke  it  to  be.  We've  made  no 
secret  of  our  views  as  to  the  reasons 
why.  What  is  needed  now  is  for  both 
sides  to  sit  down  and  find  ways  of  solv- 
ing some  of  the  problems  that  divide  us. 

In  expressing  my  condolences  to  Mr. 
Andropov's  family  and  to  the  Soviet 
Government,  I  emphasized  once  again 
America's  desire  for  genuine  cooperation 
between  our  two  countries.  Together  we 
can  help  make  the  world  a  better,  more 
peaceful  place.  This  was  also  the 
message  for  the  Soviet  people  in  my  ad- 
dress on  Soviet-American  relations  last 
month.  In  that  speech,  as  in  my  private 
communications  with  the  late  Chairman 
Andropov,  I  stressed  our  commitment  to 
a  serious  and  intensive  dialogue  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  one  aimed  at  building  a 
more  constructive  U.S.-Soviet  Union 
relationship. 

This  commitment  remains  firm,  and 
Vice  President  Bu.sh  will  lead  our  delega- 
tion to  Moscow  for  Mr.  Andropov's 
funeral.  He  will  be  accompanied  by 
Senate  Majority  Leader  Howard  Baker 
and  our  Ambassador  in  Moscow,  Arthur 


Hartman.  I  hope  there  will  be  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  Vice  President  to  meet 
with  the  new  General  Secretary. 

As  we  engage  in  discussions  with 
Soviet  leaders,  we  recognize  the  fun- 
damental differences  in  our  values  and  in 
our  perspectives  on  many  international 
issues.  We  must  be  realistic  and  not  ex- 
pect that  these  differences  can  be  wished 
away.  But  reahsm  should  also  remind  us 
that  our  two  peoples  share  common 
bonds  and  interests.  We  are  both 
relatively  young  nations  with  rich  ethnic 
traditions  and  a  pioneer  philosophy.  We 
have  both  experienced  the  terrible 
trauma  of  war.  We  have  fought  side-by- 
side  in  the  victory  over  Nazi  Germany. 
And,  while  our  governments  have  very 
different  views,  our  sons  and  daughters 
have  never  fought  each  other.  We  must 
make  sure  they  never  do. 

Avoiding  war  and  reducing  arms  is  a 
starting  point  in  our  relationship  with 
the  Soviet  Union. 

But  we  seek  to  accomplish  more. 
With  a  good-faith  effort  on  both  sides,  I 
believe  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  could  begin  rising  above  the 
mistrust  and  ill-will  that  cloud  our  rela- 
tions. We  could  establish  a  basis  for 
greater  mutual  understanding  and  con- 
structive cooperation,  and  there's  no  bet- 
ter time  to  make  that  good-faith  effort 
than  now. 

At  this  time  of  transition  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  our  two  nations  should 
look  to  the  future.  We  should  find  ways 
to  work  together  to  meet  the  challenge 
of  preserving  peace.  Living  in  this 
nuclear  age  makes  it  imperative  that  we 
talk  to  each  other,  discuss  our  dif- 
ferences, and  seek  solutions  to  the  many 
problems  that  divide  us. 

America  is  ready.  We  would  welcome 
negotiations.  And  I  repeat  today  what  I 
have  said  before.  We're  prepared  to 
meet  the  Soviets  halfway  in  the  search 
foi-  mutually  acceptable  agreements.  I 
hope  the  leaders  of  the  Soviet  Union  will 


5ril  1984 


THE  PRESIDENT 


work  with  us  in  that  same  spirit.  I  invite 
them  to  take  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunities at  hand  to  establish  a  more 
stable  and  constructive  relationship.  If 
the  Soviet  Government  wants  peace, 
then  there  v^ll  be  peace. 

In  recent  days,  millions  of  citizens  in- 
side the  Soviet  Union,  the  United  States, 
and  countries  throughout  the  world  have 
been  brought  together  by  one  great 
event— the  Winter  Olympics.  The  com- 
petition is  fierce,  and  we  cheer  for  the 
men  and  women  on  our  respective  teams. 
But  we  can,  and  should,  celebrate  the 
triumphs  of  all  athletes  who  compete  in 
the  true  spirit  of  sportsmanship  and  give 
the  very  best  of  themselves. 


And  when  each  race  or  event  is  done 
and  our  teams  come  together  in  friend- 
ship, we  will  remember  that  we  are 
meant  to  be  one  family  of  nations. 

We  who  are  leaders  in  government 
have  an  obligation  to  strive  for  coopera- 
tion every  bit  as  hard  as  our  athletes 
who  reach  within  for  the  greatest  efforts 
of  their  lives.  If  the  Soviet  Government 
would  join  us  in  this  spirit,  then  together 
we  could  build  a  safer  and  far  better 
world  for  the  human  family,  not  just  for 
today  but  for  generations  to  come. 


•Broadcast  from  Rancho  del  Cielo  near 
Santa  Barbara,  Calif,  (text  from  White  House 
press  release).  ■ 


News  Conference  of  February  22  (Excerpts) 


Excerpts  from  President  Reagan 's 
news  conference  of  February  22,  198Jt.^ 


Q.  The  Marines  you  sent  to 
Lebanon  17  months  ago  are  now  being 
withdrawn  on  your  orders.  Considering 
their  inability  to  achieve  their  peace- 
keeping mission  and  the  casualties 
they  suffered,  has  the  United  States 
lost  credibility  in  the  region?  Has 
Syria  won?  And  where  do  we  go  from 
here? 

A.  In  the  first  place,  no,  I  don't 
think,  first  of  all,  that  you  can  say  we 
have  lost  as  yet.  I  know  that  things  don't 
look  bright,  as  bright  as  they  have  at 
some  times  in  this  last  year  and  a  half 
since  they've  been  there,  but  I  think  it's 
time  to  review  a  little  history  here  and 
what  this  mission  was  and  is. 

A  year  and  a  half  or  so  ago,  we  and 
some  of  our  allies— the  United  Kingdom, 
France,  and  Italy— decided  on  this  idea 
of  a  multinational  force,  all  of  us  to  con- 
tribute troops  to  go  there  on  a  stabilizing 
mission,  not  a  combat  mission  at  all.  And 
I  would  like  to  recall  what  the  situation 
was.  There've  been  five  wars  in  the  last 
36  years  between  Syria  and  Israel.  Israel 
had  crossed  the  Lebanese  border  be- 
cause of  ten-orist  attacks  across  its 
northern  border,  attacks  on  its  civilians, 
and  Israel  had  advanced  all  the  way  to 
Beirut. 

There  were  somewhere  between 
10,000  and  15,000  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization]  terrorists  in  Beirut, 
and  a  pitched  war  was  being  fought  right 


there  in  the  streets  with  thousands  of 
casualties  among  civilians.  Syria  was  also 
on  Lebanese  soil.  Since  1975  Lebanon 
had  been  fighting  a  kind  of  civil  war 
among  its  own  people.  There  was  very 
little  in  the  way  of  a  government  in 
Lebanon  by  this  time.  The  PLO— finally 
there  was  an  indication  that  they  would 
be  willing  to  depart  from  Lebanon,  but 
they  were  fearful  of  stopping  fighting  for 
fear  that  they  would  then,  if  tried  in  an 
orderly  way  to  get  out,  the\-  would  be 
massacred.  This,  again,  was  one  of  the 
reasons  for  our  stabilizing  force  going  in 
from  the  four  countries. 

We  went  in  with  the  idea  that  as 
they  left,  then  the  other  two  coun- 
tries—Syria and  Isi-ael— could  withdraw. 
Then,  as  a  government  was  put  in  place 
in  Lebanon— and  we  helped  and  intended 
from  the  beginning  to  help  them  restore 
their  military  capability  not  only  with 
weapons  but  with  training  and  all— that 
then,  as  Lebanon  with  a  government  was 
able  to  move  out  into  the  areas  that  had 
been  occupied  by  Syria  and  Israel  and 
where  were  the  factions  that  had  been 
part  of  the  internecine  warfare,  the  force 
put  in  by  ourselves  and  the  allies  would 
have  constituted  behind  their  advance  a 
stabilizing  force  there. 

That  was  the  mission.  We  w^anted  to 
prevent  a  war  between  Syria  and  Israel. 
It  was  a  part  and  brought  about  by  our 
proposal  for  an  overall  peace  settlement 
in  the  Middle  East,  where  we  were  go- 
ing to  try  and  bring,  once  and  for  all,  the 
Arab  nations  and  Israel  together,  to  do 
what  Egypt  before  them  had  done. 


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KeMar 


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lid  lou 


lie  I 
Great  progress  was  made  in  the  first    ,] 

year.  First  of  all,  the  PLO  did  leave.  Thr^ 
Israelis  did  start  a  phased  withdrawal 
and  evidenced  their  intention  to  move 
back  toward  theu-  owii  borders.  Syria 
then  reneged— having  said  that  it  would 
leave— and  refused  to  leave,  even  thougl^eb «'f* 
they  were  asked  by  the  present  Govern- 
ment of  Lebanon.  The  first  President 
was  the  brother  of  this  present  Presi- 
dent. He  was  assassinated  shortly  after 
he  took  office,  and  a  number  of  his 
Cabinet  officials  were  murdered.  He  wai4t 
elected,  this  President,  as  was  his 
brother,  under  the  laws  of  that  country. 

A  few  months  ago,  late  summer  or 
early  fall,  because  of  the  progress— re- 
member the  talks  that  had  started  in 
Geneva  about  broadening  the  base  of  tb 
government,  to  take  in  those  factions 
that  had  been  fighting  against  Lebanon 
and  bring  them  in  to  be  a  part  of  the 
government,  so  that  it  was  broad-based 
and  gave  every  element  in  the  country 
representation.  Those  meetings  went  on 
I  think  there  was  progress  in  that. 

The  Government  of  Lebanon  then  ai 
rived  at  an  agreement  with  Israel  for 
peace  between  them  and  a  withdrawal  c 
Israel  and  protection  of  the  northern 
border  so  that  the  terrorist  attacks  that 
had  prompted  theii-  invasion  would  no 
longer  exist.  As  this  much  success  came 
to  be,  terrorist  attacks  began  against  th 
members  of  the  multinational  force  on 
the  part  of  those  who  don't  want  a 
peaceful  settlement  and  who  don't  want 
a  solution  to  the  problem.  And  I  think 
this  is  an  indication  of  the  success  that 
this  stabilizing  force  was  having,  that  th 
efforts  were  made  and  the  great  traged; 
took  place  with  our  Marines  with  the 
suicide  attack  there. 

We  still  have  an  Ambassador  at 
Large  there  who  is  commuting  among 
Damascus,  Beirut,  and  Tel  Aviv,  trying 
to  help  wherever  we  can  in  bringing 
about  a  peaceful  settlement.  I  have  no 
hesitation  in  saying  that  I  have  no  regre 
of  the  fact  that  we  went  in  there  with 
the  idea  of  trying  to  bring  peace  to  that 
troubled  country. 

We  are  redeploying,  because  once  th 
terrorist  attacks  started,  there  was  no 
way  that  we  could  really  contiibute  to 
the  original  mission  by  staying  there  as 
target  just  hunkering  down  and  waiting 
for  further  attacks.  So,  the  forces  have 
been  moved,  redeployed— ours  as  w^ell  as 
others,  and  ours  are  going  to  be  on  the 
vessels  offshore. 

But  as  long  as  there's  a  chance  for  a 
peaceful  solution,  we're  going  to  try  andlossi 
see  if  there's  anv  contribution  we  can      fliej, 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ercepti 
ig.Do 
isasiro 
his  pull 


iiiisofi 


slay 


iiiiUiiiiiitiiiiiU 


THE  PRESIDENT 


ake  to  achieving  that.  And  as  long  as 
at  chance  exists,  I'm  not  going  to  give 

and  say,  "Well,  it's  all  over."  And 
e're  not  bugging  out;  we're  just  going 

a  little  more  defensible  position. 

Q.  You  said  that  the  terrorist  at- 
icks  were  a  factor  in  the  withdrawal. 
968  that  mean  that  terrorist  attacks 
46  that  can  succeed  in  the  Middle 
ast  and  elsewhere? 

A.  No,  I  said  that  about  those  who 
■ged  us  to  simply  bug  out  and  come  all 
e  way  home,  and  I  said  that  that  would 

an  admission.  But  I  don't  think  that 
uply  redeploying  to  a  more  defensible 
sition,  because  terrorist  attacks— no 
e  has  still  found  a  truly  foolproof 
fense  against  these  surprise  attacks, 
rticularly  when  the  attackers  are  will- 
g  to  give  their  own  lives. 

So,  no,  we're  on  hand.  We  still  will 
ive  Marines  there  defending,  as  is 
istomary  of  the  Marines,  our  Embassy 
id  our  Embassy  personnel  there.  And 
e  have  been  discussing  with  the 
emayel  forces  sending  some  training 
ams  in  that  have  been  specializing  in 
ings  like  terrorism  for  further  training 
ivalo    their  forces. 

Q.  On  February  2,  you  told  the 
^all  Street  Journal  that  if  we  pulled 
ut  of  Lebanon,  it  would  be  disastrous 
!sults  worldwide  for  us.  And  you  also 
iid  you  weren't  going  to  cut  and  run 
k'en  though  there  is  a  widespread 
erception  that  that's  what  we're  do- 
ig.  Do  you  think  we  will  have  now 
isastrous  results  worldwide  because  of 
lis  pullout? 

A.  I  don't  think  so,  because  I  think 
lat  those  people  who  make  decisions 
nd  so  forth,  and  who  have  to  make 
nem  based  on  what  is  going  on,  they're 
ot  going  to  see  this  as  cutting  and  run- 
ing,  because,  as  I  say,  they  are  on  the 
hips,  and  that  naval  task  force  is  going 
3  stay  where  it  is.  And  so,  I  don't  think 
hat  they're  going  to  view  this  in  the 
isastrous  way  that  I  had— because  when 
was  speaking  then,  I  was  talking  in 
eply  to  those  who  were  urging  us  to 
ust  pick  up  and  go  home  without  any 
egard  to  whether  our  allies  were  going 
0  do  the  same  thing  or  not.  We've 
tayed  in  consultation  with  them.  We're 
cting  together  and  in  sync  with  them. 

Q.  Under  what  circumstance  would 
'ou  send  the  Marines  back  in? 

A.  That's  a  hypothetical  that  I  don't 
mow  whether  I  could  answer.  Let  me 
ay  this.  If  they  could  improve  the 
)Ossibility  of  carrying  out  their  mission, 
hen,  yes,  that  would  be  a  reason  for 
ending  them  in. 


igrd) 


etir 


Q.  When  our  Marine  compound 
was  bombed,  a  lot  of  the  parents  of 
those  young  men  said  that  they 
wondered  what  was  the  reason  for  the 
mission,  and  you've  tried  to  explain 
the  mission  tonight.  But  can  you  say 
to  those  parents,  now  that  you've  with- 
drawn the  marines  to  the  ships,  why 
more  than  260  young  men  died  there? 

A.  I  have  talked  to  a  great  many  of 
the  families— the  widows,  and  the 
parents— of  the  men  who  died  there  in 
that  one  terrible  holocaust,  and  I  have 
been  amazed  at  their  attitude,  which  was 
one  of  complete  confidence  that  it  was  a 
worthwhile  mission.  And  most  of  them 
based  that  on  the  letters  that  they  were 
receiving  from  their  sons  and  husbands, 
who  said  they  behoved  in  thy  mission, 
that  they  were  there,  that  it  was  a 
worthwhile  mission.  And  many  of  them 
expressed  a  pride  in  being  there. 

I'm  sure  that  now  some  of  the 
younger  men  who  are  not  really  aware 
that  this  is  a  redeployment  more  than  a 
coming  home  thing  and  have  been 
quoted  as  saying  that  they're  sorry  that 
they  were  not  able  to  complete  their  mis- 
sion. I  don't  see  their  mission  as  being 
over  yet.  And  I  don't  think  people 
knowledgeable  over  there  with  what's 
going  on  see  it  as  over  yet. 

Q.  The  Secretary  of  State  has  been 
one  of  those  who  is  said  to  be  very  dis- 
couraged and  has  said  that  in  Lebanon 
the  light  at  the  end  of  the  tunnel  can 
be  the  train  coming  at  you.  Can  you 
tell  us  whether  you  share  that  dis- 
couragement? And  would  you  accept  a 
resignation  from  George  Shultz,  who, 
some  people  feel,  has  failed  in  this 
policy? 

A.  No,  I  wouldn't.  And  he  has  not 
failed.  And  I  have  seen  that  talk,  and  I 
think  it's  disgraceful,  frankly.  I  think  he 
has  done  a  splendid  job.  And  I  have 
every  confidence  in  the  world  in  him. 
And  I  hope  he  doesn't  have  any  thoughts 
about  leaving  us  at  this  point. 

The  idea  for  the  mission  happened  to 
be  mine— sitting  in  the  Situation  Room  in 
a  meeting  with  all  of  the  people  who  are 
concerned  in  these  affairs.  And  he  and 
our  Ambassadors,  beginning  with  Phil 
Habib  and  then  Bud  McFarlane  and  now 
Don  Rumsfeld— all  of  these  have  been  do- 
ing a  splendid  job  there.  And  we're  go- 
ing to  continue,  as  I  say,  as  long  as  there 
is  a  chance. 

Q.  Our  policy  on  naval  shelling  has 
been  that  it's  in  response  to  attacks 
against  our  Marines  on  the  ground. 


Now  that  the  Marines  are  being  with- 
drawn to  the  safety  of  ships,  does  this 
mean  that  there  will  be  an  end  to  U.S. 
shelling  of  Lebanon? 

A.  There  hasn't  been  some  shelling 
for  quite  a  while.  But  remember,  the 
most  recent  shelling  was  not  because  of 
attacks  on  the  Marines  at  the  ab-port;  it 
was  because  of  shelling  of  our  Embassy. 
That's  U.S.  territory.  And  our  Embassy 
personnel  for  a  number  of  days  were  liv- 
ing in  the  basement.  And  for  whatever 
protection  that  could  be— there  was  one 
direct  hit  on,  I  think  it  was  the 
residence;  I'm  not  sure  whether  it  was 
that  or  the  Embassy  headquarters— and 
that's  what  we  were  responding  to. 
But  we  are  behaving  with  restraint 
now.  We  are  flying  reconnaissance 
flights,  and  there  have  been  some  in- 
stances of  firing  on  them— without  result, 
I'm  pleased  to  say.  And  we  have  not 
responded,  because  we  think  this  is  a 
time  for  restraint  and  for  hoping  to  cool 
things  down. 

Q.  Did  you  say  earlier— or  suggest 
earlier— that  there  may  now  be  some 
question  about  whether  U.S.  troops 
will  be  sent  in  to  train  the  Gemayel 
government  forces? 

A.  This  has  been  one  of  the  things 
that  we're  planning.  And  we're  watching 
developments  here  as  to  when  that 
might  be— they  might  be  too  busy  right 
now  to  be  trained.  We're  waiting  until 
we  can  coordinate  with  Oiem. 

Q.  This  week  the  Senate  will  con- 
sider amendments  to  the  Export  Ad- 
ministration Act.  One  will  be  to  lift 
the  ban  on  the  export  of  Alaskan  oil, 
allowing  it  to  be  sold  to  markets  in  the 
Far  East.  If  a  change  in  the  law  were 
to  take  place,  it  would  reduce  our 
trade  deficit  with  Japan;  it  would 
reduce  the  Federal  deficit  by 
generating  some  new  revenues  from  in- 
creased domestic  exploration  and  pro- 
duction; provide  safer  and  cheaper 
transportation  instead  of  going 
through  the  Panama  Canal— and  there 
are  many  other  things.  Your  Ad- 
ministration has  privately  supported 
this.  Will  you  campaign  aggressively 
when  it's  being  considered  by  Con- 
gress? 

A.  We're  still  looking  at  and  studying 
this.  There  are  still  some  problems  about 
it.  And,  I  share  the  view  that  it  would  be 
an  asset  to  the  United  States  to  do  this. 


April  1984 


Wi 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Q.  Why  did  you  not  initiate  some 
action  sooner  on  withdrawing  the 
Marines  from  Beirut?  And  what's  your 
response  to  the  people  who  have  sug- 
gested—a number  of  critics— that  it 
takes  too  long  for  you  to  hear  the 
debate  between  your  advisers  and  ar- 
rive at  a  consensus,  and  who  ask, 
therefore,  whether  you  are,  in  fact, 
really  running  things  and  whether  you 
are  a  full-time  President?  What  do  you 
say? 

A.  I've  read  a  little  of  the  fiction 
that's  been  going  around  about  that, 
also.  I  can  tell  you,  no,  there  was  certain 
ly  thorough  discussion,  and  for  a  long 
time,  ever  since  the  suicide  bombing,  as 
to  whether  there  was  a  way  in  which  we 
could  keep  our  forces  there,  not  only  our 
selves  but,  again,  as  I  say,  in  sync  with 
the  other  nations'  forces  and  that  might 
reduce  the  possibilities  of  and  the 
vulnerability  from  terrorist  attacks. 

And  we  were  looking  at  eveiything. 
And  from  the  very  first,  one  of  the  alter- 
natives was  putting  them  on  the  ships. 
We  held  out  for  a  while,  because  we 
were  concerned  that  people  over  there 
might  see  that  as  leaving,  as  abandoning 
the  mission,  and  we  didn't  want  that. 

We  finally  did  arrive  in  the  belief 
that  we  could  do  this.  We  talked  to  the 
Gemayel  government;  we  talked  to  our 
allies;  and  we  had  made  a  decision  that 
this  looked  like  the  most  logical  thing  to 
do,  a  phased  withdrawal  to  the  ships, 
keeping  our  training  detachment  there 
that  has  been  working  with  the 
Lebanese  Army  and  all.  And  so,  it 
wasn't  a  case  of  delay;  it  was  a  case  of 
looking  at  the  situation  and  wanting  to 
make  the  right  decision. 

As  to  that  other  fiction  about 
whether  I  sit  back  and  then  somebody 
tells  me  what  to  do:  That's  a  lack  of 
understanding  of  how  our  system  has 
been  working  here.  And  I  will  admit  I 
don't  think  any  Administration,  to  my 
knowledge,  has  ever  exactly  worked 
with  the  Cabinet  and  the  staff  the  way 
we  have. 

First  of  all,  I  think  we've  got  one  of 
the  finest  staffs  and  one  of  the  finest 
Cabinets  that  has  been  in  this  city  in 
many,  many  years.  And  I  want  people 
around  me  who  are  independent-minded. 
I  want  to  hear  all  sides  of  everything. 
We  have  regular  Cabinet  meetings  and 
things  we  call  the  Cabinet  Council 
meetings,  where  it's  a  portion  of  the 
Cabinet  based  on  the  particular  issue 
where  it  wouldn't  particularly  be  of  in- 
terest to  the  others. 


In  those  meetings,  I  hear  all  sides.  It 
could  best  be  compared  to  a  board  of 
directors  or  a  board  of  regents  or  gover- 
nors of  an  institution  other  than 
business.  And  the  debate  rages,  and  it 
isn't  just  limited  to  one  Cabinet  officer 
who  thinks  that  the  problem  is  in  his 
particular  area.  I  hear  and  get  the  input, 
and  the  debate  sometimes  rages.  It's 
nice  if  you  can  get  a  consensus,  that's 
easy,  but  many  times,  I  have  to  make  a 
decision  in  which  I  come  down,  obvi- 
ously, against  some  of  the  advocates  in 
the  Cabinet  and  on  the  side  of  others. 
But  it  goes  back  and  forth.  The  loser  this 
week  may  be  the  winner  next  week.  But 
this  is  the  way  the  decisions  are  made. 

The  only  difference  between  a  board 
of  directors  then  and  our  Cabinet  meet- 
ings is,  when  it  comes  time  for  decision, 
we  don't  take  a  vote.  The  decision  is 
mine,  and  I  make  it  on  the  basis  of  the 
information  that  I  have  heard.  And  if 
they  haven't  given  me  enough  infoi-ma- 
tion,  I  make  them  come  back  again,  and 
we  talk  some  more. 

Q.  Last  week  you  said  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  must  be  resolved 
through  negotiations  involving  an  ex- 
change of  territory  for  peace.  Were 
you  telling  Israel  to  reverse  its  settle- 
ment activity  in  the  West  Bank? 

A.  No,  from  the  very  beginning— and 
the  Israelis  know  this— I  have  told  them 
that  I  thought  with  an  effort  that  must 
be  made  out  there  for  an  overall  peace  in 
the  area,  that  it  was  not  helpful  to  go 
forward  with  what  they  were  doing.  I 
think  that  the  peace  process  that  we  en- 
vision is  based  on  the  Camp  David  proc- 
ess, the  UN  Resolutions  242  and  338. 
And  I  had  never  referred  to  them  as  il- 
legal, as  some  did.  But  I  did  say  that  I 
thought  they  were  not  helpful,  because 
obviously  the  peace  process,  when  the 
negotiations  come  between  the  Arab 
States  and  Israel,  it  is  going  to  have  to 
involve  territorial  changes  in  return  for 
secure,  peaceful  borders.  And  so,  no,  I 
just  think  that  we  would've  had  a  better 
chance. 

Q.  The  war  between  Iraq  and  Iran 
is  heating  up  in  a  rather  perilous  way, 
and  I'd  like  to  ask  what  the  depth  of 
your  concerns  are  about  the  possibility 
that  this  war  would  lead  to  the  closing 
of  the  Strait  of  Hormuz  and  cut  off  the 
supply  of  oil  to  Japan,  Western 
Europe,  and-ourselves,  and  to  what 
lengths  you're  prepared  to  go  to  keep 
the  strait  open. 


A.  What  you  have  just  suggested— 
Iran,  itself,  had  voiced  that  threat  some 
time  ago,  that  if  Iraq  did  certain  things, 
they  would  close  the  Strait  of  Hormuz. 
And  I  took  a  stand  then  and  made  a 
statement  that  there  was  no  way  that 
we— and  I'm  sure  this  is  true  of  our 
allies— could  stand  by  and  see  that 
sealane  denied  to  shipping,  and  par- 
ticularly, the  tankers  that  are  essential 
to  Japan,  to  our  Western  allies  in 
Europe,  and,  to  a  lesser  e.xtent,  our- 
selves. We're  not  importing  as  much  as 
they  require.  But  there's  no  way  that  w 
could  allow  that  channel  to  be  closed. 

And  we've  had  a  naval  force  for  a 
long  time,  virtually  permanently  sta- 
tioned in  the  Arabian  Sea,  and  so  have 
some  of  our  allies.  But  we'll  keep  that 
open  to  shipping. 

Q.  Do  you  have  anything  different  ^ 
to  say  to  Mr.  Chernenko  in  Moscow      f 
than  you  had  to  say  to  his  predecessor 
Mr.  Andropov?  Anything  new  to  en- 
courage them  to  talk  with  the  United 
States? 

A.  Yes,  and  on  the  reports  that  the 
Vice  President  brought  back  after  a  ver; 
fruitful  meeting  there.  We're  very 
hopeful  in  this  latest  announcement  that 
he  had  made  that  he  was  willing  to  agre^ 
to  onsite  inspection  with  regard  to 
chemical  waifare.  We  think  this  is  a  gooi 
sign,  and  we  have  let  him  know  we  want 
better  relations.  We  want  to  sit  dowTi 
and  try  to  resolve  some  of  the  pi'oblems 
that  we  have. 


10 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  27,  1984. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  k\\ 


ilitlilai'•i~il::liil^lll^:^i^lilir.:^l^llil:^:mr.l^^ i'^T;..,.iiUHllll^ 


HE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


Vice  President's  Trip 
to  Europe  and  the  U.S.S.R. 


Vice  President  Bush  departed 

Washington,  D.C.,  February  10,  1984; 

to  visit  the  United  Kingdom  (February  11-12), 

Luxembourg  (February  12-13),  the 

Soviet  Union  (February  13-14),  Italy 

and  Vatican  City  (February  14-15), 

and  France  (February  15). 


"Britain  and  America  share 
a  common  commitment  to 
seeking  peace  with  the 
Soviets  from  a  position  of 
strength  .  .  .  to  the  peaceful 
fostering  of  democratic  insti- 
tutions around  the  world  .  .  . 
to  an  open  and  stable  inter- 
national economic 
system.  ..." 

London 
February  12,  1984 


With  Prime  Minister  Thatcher. 


photos  by  David  Valdez) 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


^ 


"Luxembourg  is  a  full  and  proud  partner  in  the  defense  of 
the  Western  allies  .  .  .  and  participates  in  our  common  deter- 
mination to  preserve  peace  through  strength.  ..." 


Luxembourg 
February  13,  1984 


Standing  before  a  portrait  of  Prince 
Walram  Von  Nassau  Usingen  (1635-1702 
in  the  Grand  Ducal  Palace  are 
Hereditary  Grand  Duke  Henri,  Grand 
Duchess  Josephine-Charlotte,  Vice 
President  Bush,  Grand  Duke  Jean, 
Mrs.  Bush,  and  Hereditary  Grand 
Duchess  Maria  Teresa. 


r 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


■-M 


»Plan 
iaker, 
Wer. 


I4 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


'7  wish  to  express  our  condolences  on  the  death  of  Chairman 
Andropov  .  .  .  I  have  led  this  American  delegation  to  Moscow 
on  this  solemn  occasion  to  symbolize  my  nation's  regard  for 
the  people  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  to  signify  the  desire  of  the 
United  States  to  continue  to  work  for  positive  relations 
between  our  two  countries." 


Moscow 
February  13,  1984 


fitting  at  the  left  side  of  the  table  (from  the 
op)  are  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  Soviet 
Jnion  Arthur  A.  Hartman,  Senator  Howard 
Saker,  Vice  President  Bush,  and  Dimitri 
^rensburger,  the  Vice  President's  inter- 
jreter. 


'\pril  1984 


Sitting  at  the  right  side  of  the  table  (from  the  top)  are  Andrei  Alexandrov-Agentov,  a 
member  of  the  group  of  advisers  to  the  General  Secretary;  Foreign  Minister  Andrei 
Gromyko;  General  Secretary  Konstantin  U.  Chemenko;  Viktor  Sukhodrev,  the  Russian  in- 
terpreter; and  Soviet  Ambassador  to  the  United  States  Anatoliy  F.  Dobrynin. 


f 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


HE! 


"Italy's  soldiers  have  performed  their  assignments  in 
Lebanon  with  restraint  and  with  bravery,  as  have  all 
members  of  the  multinational  force.  .  .  .  After  the  bombing  i 
the  U.S.  Marine  headquarters  in  Beirut,  the  soldiers  of  Italy 
and  the  United  States  worked  side  by  side,  digging  feverishL 
to  find  their  comrades." 

Rome 
February  15,  198 


[he 


Sw 


toyAi 
2tare 
tm 
dstof' 
im 
Krest 
irsista 

Bt25j 

ulintr 
age.  It 
B[i 
jttie 
lriia,i 


With  Francesco  C'ossiga,  President  of  the 
Italian  Senate  (top)  and  His  Holiness  Pope 
John  Paul  H. 


itliidiiii 
nergj'i 
eaial 
i)viets, 
indA 

M,t( 

ipen 

Seci 

toiionii 

leinti 

en 


torici 


"...  all  Americans  admire 
the  valor  of  the  French 
troops  in  Beirut.  French  and 
American  soldiers  have  both 
been  the  subjects  of  terrorist 
attacks.  .  .  .  America  honors 
the  courage  of  French 
military  men." 


Paris 

February  15,  1984 


Left  to  riRht  are  Alec  Toumayan,  the  Vice 
President's  interpreter;  Vice  President 
Bush;  Christopher  Thiery,  President 
Mitterrand's  interpreter;  and  President 
Mitterrand. 


HE  SECRETARY 


The  U.S.  and  Africa  in  tlie  1980s 


"P 


iih 


Secretary  Shultz 's  address  before  the 
iostmi  World  Affairs  Council  on 
'ehruary  1,5,  198i.^ 

[any  Americans  have  images  of  Africa 
lat  are  anachronistic,  partial,  and  often 
laccurate.  The  perception  of  Africa  that 
iost  of  us  grew  up  with— unknown 
nds  somehow  exotic  and  divorced  from 
le  rest  of  the  world— has  unfortunately 
srsisted  in  some  quarters  despite  the 
.st  25  years  of  Africa's  independence 
ad  increasing  presence  on  the  world 
:age.  It  is  a  misperception  that  ignores 
impelling  realities.  One  out  of  every 
;ght  people  in  the  world  now  lives  in 
frica,  and  this  proportion  is  growing, 
frica  south  of  the  Sahara— which  is  my 
rincipal  concern  this  evening— is  taking 
n  increasing  importance  in  several 
aspects. 

First,  we  have  a  significant 
eopolitical  stake  in  the  security  of  the 
Dntinent  and  the  seas  surrounding  it. 
iff  its  shores  lie  important  trade  routes, 
icluding  those  carrying  most  of  the 
nergy  resources  needed  by  our  Euro- 
ean  allies.  We  are  affected  when 
oviets,  Cubans,  and  Libyans  seek  to  ex- 
and  their  influence  on  the  continent  by 
orce,  to  the  detriment  of  both  African 
ndependence  and  Western  interests. 

Second,  Africa  is  part  of  the  global 
conomic  system.  If  Africa's  economies 
re  in  trouble,  the  reverberations  are 
elt  here.  Our  exports  to  Africa  have 
Iropped  by  50%  in  the  last  3  years; 
\.merican  financial  institutions  have  felt 
he  pinch  of  African  inability  to  repay 
loans.  And  Africa  is  a  major  source  of 
aw  materials  crucial  to  the  world 
'conomy. 

Third,  Africa  is  important  to  us 
lolitically  because  the  nations  of  Africa 
ire  now  major  players  in  world 
li|il(imacy.  They  comprise  nearly  one- 
bird  of  the  membership  of  the  United 
^lations,  where  they  form  the  most 
ohesive  voting  bloc  in  the  General 
Assembly. 

Finally,  Africa  is  important  to  us, 
Tiost  of  all,  in  human  terms.  Eleven  per- 
|;ent  of  America's  population  traces  its 
oots  to  Africa;  all  of  us  live  in  a  society 
profoundly  influenced  by  this  human  and 
ultural  heritage.  The  revolution  of 
Africa's  independence  coincided  with  the 
;ivil  rights  revolution  in  this  country. 
Perhaps  it  was  not  a  coincidence.  Both 
livere  among  the  great  moral  events  of 


etii 'April  1984 


this  century:  a  rebirth  of  freedom,  sum- 
moning all  of  us  to  a  recognition  of  our 
common  humanity.  Just  as  the  continued 
progress  of  civil  rights  is  important  to 
the  moral  well-being  of  this  country,  so 
too  the  human  drama  of  Africa— its 
political  and  economic  future— is  impor- 
tant to  the  kind  of  world  we  want  our 
children  and  grandchildren  to  inherit. 

Africa's  Economic  Crisis 

Sub-Saharan  Africa  includes  45  coun- 
tries with  an  estimated  population  of 
nearly  400  million  occupying  over  9 
million  square  miles.  It  is  a  continent  of 
enormous  diversity.  Yet  today,  virtually 
all  sub-Saharan  nations  are  in  an 
economic  crisis  of  stark  proportions. 
This  is  Africa's  most  urgent  problem. 

Per  capita  food  production  has  fallen 
by  20%  in  the  last  20  years.  Rapid  infla- 
tion has  had  a  devastating  effect.  Each 
African  over  the  past  3  years  has  seen 
his  real  income  decrease  by  2%-3%  a 
year.  Prolonged  drought  has  wreaked 
ecological  havoc  across  the  continent, 
from  the  western  Sahel  to  Mozambique 
in  the  east.  Famine  threatens  tens  of 
thousands,  and  malnutrition  debilitates 
millions.  Refugees  number  about  2 
million,  or  one-quarter  of  the  world's 
total,  with  an  equal  number  of  people 
displaced  in  their  own  countries  by 
drought,  civil  strife,  or  other  hardship. 
It  is  a  vast  human  tragedy. 

World  recession  has  touched  every 
nation,  but  to  African  countries  it  has 
dealt  a  body  blow.  Six  pounds  of  Zam- 
bian  copper,  for  example,  would  buy  a 
barrel  of  oil  in  1970;  today  it  takes  43 
pounds  of  copper  per  barrel.  Chronic 
balance-of-payments  deficits— the  result 
of  low  prices  for  African  exports  coupled 
with  high  prices  for  imports— have 
caused  mounting  debt  and  the  virtual 
bankruptcy  of  several  national  treas- 
uries. The  skyrocketing  price  of  oil  in 
the  last  decade  distorted  the  economies 
of  the  continent's  few  oil  producers  and 
devastated  its  many  petroleum  im- 
porters. Meanwhile,  the  continent's 
population  continues  to  grow  at  a  rate  of 
2%-3%  a  year  and  can  expect  almost  to 
double  by  the  year  2000. 

Recovery  in  the  United  States  and 
other  major  economies  will  help  Africa, 
but  it  will  not  be  enough  to  change  the 
situation  fundamentally  or  to  make 
Africa  less  vulnerable  to  future  buffeting 
by  world  economic  forces.  This  is 


because  some  of  the  most  important 
causes  of  Africa's  economic  stagnation 
are  home  grown.  A  World  Bank  report 
states  bluntly  that: 

The  immediate  and  continuing  economic 
crisis  in  Africa  is  overwhelmingly  a  produc- 
tion crisis.  It  is  a  crisis  which  has  risen  from 
the  widespead  adoption  of  .  .  .  inappropriate 
production  incentives. 

Aiming  at  rapid  development, 
African  countries  tried  to  mobilize 
scarce  resources  by  relying  on  govern- 
ment controls  and  state-supported  indus- 
trialization. But  subsidies,  price  controls, 
and  other  regulations  have  burdened  na- 
tional budgets  and  skewed  the  allocation 
of  resources.  Agriculture,  the  backbone 
of  most  African  economies,  suffered 
from  neglect  and  disincentives  to  expand 
or  to  raise  production.  The  private  sec- 
tor was  often  subjected  to  state  inter- 
ventions and,  moreover,  bore  the  brunt 
of  taxation  to  support  burgeoning 
bureaucracies. 

In  several  African  states,  the 
government  payroll  eats  up  more  than 
half  the  national  budget.  The  cumulative 
effect  of  an  excess  of  government  has 
been  stagnation  instead  of  development. 
Higher  deficit  spending,  higher  external 
debt,  increased  urban  migration,  infla- 
tion, and  declining  investment  are  the 
results,  conducive  only  to  social  and 
political  tensions  and  a  deteriorating 
climate  for  material  progress. 

Africa  is  now  the  weakest  compon- 
ent of  our  interdependent  global 
economy.  Declining  African  markets  and 
growing  regional  insolvency  are  a 
significant  drag  on  global  recovery,  with 
a  particular  impact  on  Europe.  In  short, 
the  West  cannot  afford— and  we  will  not 
sit  idly  by  and  watch— the  accelerating 
decline  of  Africa's  economy. 

The  Search  for  Solutions 

How  can  these  awesome  problems  be 
solved?  We  have  to  start  with  three 
basic  truths. 

The  first  basic  truth  is  that  our 
common  humanity  compels  us  to  re- 
spond to  the  specter  of  famine  across 
sub-Saharan  Africa.  At  President 
Reagan's  direction,  we  have  already  pro- 
vided record  levels  of  food  assistance. 
We  now  are  asking  the  Congress  for  a 
supplemental  $90  million  in  emergency 
food  supplies.  We  committed  over 
200,000  tons  of  food  during  the  first  4 
months  of  this  fiscal  year.  Requests  for 


THE  SECRETARY 


an  additional  150,000  tons  are  in  hand 
from  African  governments  and  requests 
are  expected  for  an  equal  amount  this 
year. 

But  looking  to  the  future,  there  is 
need  to  stem  the  long-term  decline  in 
food  production  that  is  undermining 
African  economies.  There  is  need  to 
boost  productivity  across  the  board. 

The  second  basic  truth,  in  other 
words,  is  that  nothing  the  United  States 
and  other  aid  donors  can  do  for  Africans 
will  have  half  the  impact  of  what 
Africans  can  do  for  themselves.  We  will 
do  our  part  in  providing  assistance 
where  it  can  be  effective,  but  without 
disciplined  efforts  by  Africans,  very 
little  of  it  will  be  effective. 

The  third  basic  truth  is  just  as 
there  are  limits  to  what  foreign  govern- 
ments can  do,  there  are  limits  to  what 
national  governments  can  do.  Although 
development  is  a  complex  process,  the 
requisites  for  growth  are  not  a  mystery: 
Africa  is  likely  to  break  out  of  its 
stagnation  only  if  reforms  are  under- 
taken to  restore  incentives  to  produce. 
This  means  allowing  Africa's  farmers  to 
receive  the  prices  their  crops  command 
in  the  market.  It  means  letting  the 
private  sector  do  what  it  can  and  con- 
serving government  resources  for  what 
only  it  can  do.  It  means  better  fiscal  and 
monetary  management. 

Fortunately,  many  African  govern- 
ments now  realize  both  the  depth  of  the 
crisis  and  the  sources  of  the  problem. 
Some  have  begun  to  introduce  more 
realistic  economic  policies.  The  Reagan 
Administration  intends  to  respond  to 
those  who  are  doing  so. 

We  have  requested  $1  billion  for 
food  aid  and  economic  assistance  for 
Africa  in  fiscal  year  (FY)  1985.  This  is  a 
25%  increase  above  FY  1983.  Our  devel- 
opment assistance  programs  are  cast  for 
the  long  term.  They  are  tailored  to  pro- 
mote self-sufficiency  and  local  initiative. 
They  are  not  designed  to  perpetuate  on 
an  international  scale  the  dependency  on 
government  that  has  so  added  to  the 
problem. 

New  U.S.  Economic  Policy  Initiative 

Beyond  this  basic  assistance,  the  Presi- 
dent is  proposing  a  new  special  effort: 
an  Economic  Policy  Initiative  for  Africa. 
As  we  announced  on  January  30,  we  ex- 
pect to  ask  the  Congress  for  a  5-year, 
$500-million  program,  beginning  with 
$75  milHon  for  FY  1985.  The  program 
will  offer  tangible  support  for  those 
countries  prepared  to  undertake  the 
policy  reforms  needed  to  improve  pro- 
ductivity. We  will  not  allocate  these 


10 


funds  in  advance,  but  rather  we  will  re- 
spond to  constructive  reforms  where 
and  when  they  are  undertaken. 

We  are  asking  the  international  com- 
munity to  join  us.  The  aid-giving  coun- 
tries, indeed,  must  do  a  better  job. 
There  are  multiple  projects  and  multiple 
donors  operating,  as  often  as  not,  with 
little  coordination  and,  on  occasion,  ill 
advisedly.  More  than  one  white  elephant 
plods  the  African  landscape.  We  are 
urging  the  World  Bank  to  expand  its 
coordinating  role  among  donors  and  to 
take  the  lead  with  African  governments 
in  evolving  policy  reforms. 

In  addition  to  emergency  food  aid, 
ongoing  economic  assistance,  and  the 
Economic  Policy  Initiative,  the  Adminis- 
tration is  planning  other  measures  to 
help  Africa  become  a  more  dynamic  part 
of  the  global  economic  system. 

•  We  will  continue  to  stress  private- 
sector  development  in  Africa.  Where 
desired,  we  will  provide  concessional 
loans  for  African  entrepreneurs;  we  will 
offer  technical  assistance  in  adapting 
laws  and  institutions  to  attract  invest- 
ment, preparing  prefeasibility  studies 
for  projects,  and  promoting  awareness 
of  investment  opportunities  in  Africa. 

•  One  of  Africa's  greatest  re- 
sources—the bounty  of  the  seas  which 
ring  the  continent— has  up  to  now  been 
inadequately  exploited.  We  plan  to  help 
some  West  African  countries  create  and 
improve  their  fisheries  management  pro- 
grams, including,  for  example,  measures 
to  reduce  the  spoilage  that  destroys  half 
the  fish  brought  ashore. 

•  The  President  has  already  recom- 
mended to  Congress  that  it  extend  the 
generalized  system  of  preferences  and 
exempt  least  developed  countries  from 
some  of  the  more  onerous  international 
trade  regulations.  African  countries 
need  to  diversify  their  exports,  and  we 
will  help  them  do  so.  Trade,  we  hope, 
will  be  a  powerful  factor  for  growth. 
Already,  the  $6-billion  U.S.  trade  deficit 
with  sub-Saharan  Africa  is  acting  as  an 
enormous  contribution  to  African 
economic  expansion,  far  more  substan- 
tial than  official  or  multilateral  aid. 

•  We  shall  increase  our  support  for 
African  regional  economic  organizations 
such  as  the  African  Development  Bank 
and  Fund. 

•  We  will  continue  and  expand  our 
multiyear  food  assistance  programs. 
These  programs  encourage  African 
governments  to  use  the  proceeds  from 
sales  of  foodstuffs  to  finance  long-term 
agricultural  development,  and  they  are 
linked  to  policy  reforms  that  encourage 
greater  local  food  production. 


•  We  will  participate  fully  in  the 
ICARA  II  conference  [the  second  Inter- 
national Conference  for  Assistance  to 
Refugees  in  Africa]  in  July  of  this  year, 
an  international  effort  to  find  enduring 
solutions  to  Africa's  refugee  problems. 

Regional  Security 

Tonight,  I  have  focused  on  the  role  we 
have  to  play  in  confronting  Africa's 
economic  crisis.  But  I  cannot  ignore  the 
other  concerns.  Africa  needs  stability 
and  an  end  to  conflict  to  get  on  wdth  the 
important  tasks  of  national  develop- 
ment. Many  African  nations  face  real 
security'  threats.  New  and  fragile 
political  institutions  are  particularly 
vulnerable.  Where  economies  falter  and 
fail  to  provide  the  basics  of  existence 
and  hopes  for  a  better  future,  political 
instability  can  result.  It  is  difficult  for 
democracy  to  flourish;  authoritarian 
solutions  may  appear  more  attractive 
but  often  only  serve  to  make  problems 
worse  while  circumscribing  human  and 
political  rights. 

In  this  environment,  outside  powers 
are  tempted  to  exploit  instability.  There 
is  no  excuse  for  some  35,000  Cuban 
troops  in  Africa— trained,  equipped, 
financed,  and  transported  by  the  Soviet 
Union— inserting  themselves  into  local 
conflicts,  and  thereby  internationalizing 
local  problems.  This  Soviet/Cuban  med- 
dling has  no  precedent;  it  distorts 
Africa's  nonalignment;  it  injects  an  East 
West  dimension  where  none  should  be, 
making  fair  solutions  harder  to  achieve. 

We  do  not  view  Africa  through  the 
prism  of  East- West  rivalry'.  On  the  othei 
hand,  Africa  does  not  exist  on  some 
other  planet.  It  is  very  much  a  part  of 
today's  world.  Africa  helps  to  shape  the 
global  structure— through  its  economic 
expansion  or  decline,  by  its  weight  in  in- 
ternational forums,  through  its  expand- 
ing web  of  bilateral  and  multilateral 
links  with  the  major  powers,  and 
through  its  conflicts.  At  the  same  time, 
it  is  shaped  by  the  global  structure— by 
the  shifts  in  the  global  balance  of  power, 
by  the  broader  marketplace  of  ideas  and 
technologies,  and  by  the  readiness  of 
predators  and  partners  to  contribute  to 
or  detract  from  its  development.  We, 
and  Africa,  ignore  these  facts  at  our 
peril. 

We  are  not  the  gendarmes  of  Africa 
But  to  stand  by  and  do  nothing  when 
friendly  states  are  threatened  by  our 
own  adversaries  would  only  erode  our 
credibility  as  a  bulwark  against  aggres- 
sion not  only  in  Africa  but  elsewhere. 
Therefore,  we  have  been  ready,  togetheif 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


THE  SECRETARY 


with  others,  to  provide  training  and 
arms  to  help  our  friends  defend 
themselves. 

And  we  act  rapidly  when  the  situa- 
tion demands.  Last  summer,  when  Chad 
was  again  invaded  by  Libyan  troops,  we 
rushed  military  supplies  to  the  legiti- 
mate government  there  and  helped  halt 
the  Libyan  advance.  Libya's  destabiliza- 
tion  efforts  have  come  to  be  an  unfor- 
tunate fact  of  African  existence.  It  is  an 
unacceptable  fact.  We  will  continue  to 
work  with  others  to  help  African  states 
resist  Qadhafi's  overt  aggression  and 
covert  subversion. 

In  West  and  Central  Africa  as  well 
as  in  the  Horn— that  critically  important 
area  which  sits  on  Africa's  right 
shoulder  along  the  Red  Sea— we  help 
our  friends,  and  we  protect  our  own 
strategic  interests.  We  encourage  the 
regional  parties  to  seek  their  own 
peaceful  solutions  to  local  conflicts. 

We  continue  to  emphasize,  as  we 
should,  economic  and  humanitarian 
assistance  over  military  aid.  This  year 
the  ratio  will  continue  at  five  to  one. 
The  Soviets,  of  course,  provide  minimal 
economic  assistance  to  sub-Saharan 
Africa  and  rarely  participate  in 
humanitarian  relief.  They  seek  to  buy 
their  influence  in  Africa  through  the 
provision  of  arms.  In  the  past  decade, 
Moscow  has  contributed  less  than  1%  of 
Africa's  foreign  economic  assistance  but 
has  sold  or  provided  75%  of  its  weapons. 

Southern  Africa 

Our  policy  of  promoting  peaceful  solu- 
tions to  regional  conflicts  applies,  as  a 
priority,  to  southern  Africa.  Our 
strategy  in  southern  Africa  is  to  work 
with  the  parties  concerned  to  promote 
fundamental  and  far-reaching  change  in 
three  areas: 

•  To  build  an  overall  framework  for 
regional  security; 

•  To  bring  about  an  independent 
Namibia;  and 

•  To  encourage  positive  change  in 
the  apartheid  policy  of  South  Africa 
itself. 

Regional  security  is  essential 
because  our  goals  in  the  region  are  best 
served  by  a  climate  of  coexistence  in 
which  the  sovereignty  and  security  of  all 
states  are  respected.  Economic  reform 
and  development,  political  pluralism, 
removal  of  outside  forces,  peaceful 
change  in  South  Africa,  and  Namibian 
independence  are  more  likely  to  be 
achieved  in  conditions  of  strengthened 
security  and  reduced  violence. 


iliei 


The  United  States  has  no  military 
bases  or  troops  in  southern  Africa— and 
never  has.  In  stark  contrast,  Moscow 
and  Havana  have  sent  nearly  25,000 
Cuban  troops  to  Angola  alone,  com- 
pounding the  problem  of  insecurity  in 
southern  Africa. 

Our  diplomacy  has  not  groped  for 
quick  fixes  or  instant  remedies  to  com- 
plex and  deeply  rooted  problems.  Our 
role  is  that  of  a  catalyst,  an  honest 
broker.  We  have  made  clear  we  will  ex- 
ert ourselves  where  we  are  welcome. 
And  welcome  we  are.  Today,  none  of 
the  region's  leaders— whether  in  Lusaka 
or  Pretoria,  in  Dar  es  Salaam  or 
Maputo— is  asking  that  we  disengage. 
They  all  seek  more,  not  less,  American 
participation  in  helping  negotiate  solu- 
tions. 

It  is  too  soon  to  predict  break- 
throughs. Southern  Africa  today  is  at  an 
early,  pioneering  stage  on  the  road  of 
peaceful  change.  The  countries  of  the 
area  must  build  that  road;  no  one  can  do 
it  for  them.  There  are  many  bridges  to 
be  built  and  deep  gulfs  of  suspicion, 
fear,  and  hatred  to  be  overcome.  But 
there  are  encouraging  signs.  We  see  a 
growing  realism  on  all  sides  about  the 
risks  of  open-ended  conflict.  Military 
solutions  offer  no  hope.  We  detect  a 
welcome  glimmer  of  recognition  that 
there  are,  indeed,  common  interests  that 
bind  the  states  of  southern  Africa 
together.  After  several  years  of  tension 
and  threats,  openings  for  peace  are 
being  explored  and  developed  with  the 
active  and  energetic  encouragement  of 
the  United  States. 

We  have  helped  foster  a  dialogue, 
for  example,  between  South  Africa  and 
Mozambique.  Ours  is  a  balanced  role 
whose  only  tilt  is  toward  the  principles 
of  peaceful  settlement  and  respect  for 
territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty- 
principles  enshrined  in  the  Charters  of 
the  United  Nations  and  the  Organization 
of  African  Unity.  We  have  made  clear  to 
both  sides  that  our  goal  is  to  nurture 
mutual  security.  In  such  a  climate  we 
are  prepared  to  do  our  part  to  assist  in 
Mozambique's  development  and  to 
bolster  its  chances  for  genuine  nonalign- 
ment.  And  we  have  moved  swiftly  to 
respond  to  the  cyclones  and  drought 
that  have  repeatedly  brought  Mozam- 
bique to  the  edge  of  disaster. 

Our  strengthened  relationship  with 
Mozambique  has  developed  against  a 
backdrop  of  concrete  progress  in  its 
dialogue  with  South  Africa.  Today, 
leaders  of  the  two  countries  are  ham- 
mering out  a  basis  of  understanding  and 
cooperation  in  the  fields  of  security, 
transport,  trade,  energy,  and  tourism. 


April  1984 


Let  me  emphasize  that  these  are 
fragile  beginnings.  But  they  symbolize 
what  could  become  a  broader  pattern. 
We  are  helping  to  keep  open  existing 
channels  of  communication  or  to  build 
new  ones  among  other  neighbors  as 
well— South  Africa,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho,  Malawi,  Botswana,  and 
Swaziland.  We  are  uniquely  placed  to 
play  this  facilitating  role:  unique  among 
outside  powers,  we  are  able  to  talk  to  all 
the  diverse  elements  of  the  region.  The 
broader  pattern  can  take  hold  if  it  is 
based  on  the  perception  of  enhanced 
security  and  mutual  respect. 

South  Africa  recently  announced  its 
intent  to  reopen  talks  with  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  on  safe- 
guard arrangements  for  its  commercial 
nuclear  enrichment  facilities  and  to 
adhere  to  the  London  Supplier  Group 
guidelines  for  export  of  sensitive 
materials.  These  moves  flow  from  and 
can  contribute  to  an  environment  of 
strengthened  security.  They  did  not  hap- 
pen by  accident.  They  are  the  direct 
result  of  our  open  and  active  policy  of 
constructive  engagement. 

I  have  mentioned  our  efforts  to 
bring  about  Namibian  independence, 
respect  for  borders,  and  the  removal  of 
Cuban  forces  from  Angola.  These  re- 
main key  objectives.  We  and  our  four 
Western  partners— Britain,  France, 
Canada,  and  Germany— working  closely 
with  the  UN  Secretary  General  and  the 
parties  in  southern  Africa  have  painstak- 
ingly resolved,  one  by  one,  the  last 
issues  remaining  in  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  435.  That  plan,  when  im- 
plemented, will  lead  Namibia  to  in- 
dependence. In  parallel,  we  are  seeking 
to  create  conditions  of  greater  con- 
fidence and  security  that  could  trigger 
the  necessary  decisions  by  Angola  and 
South  Africa  that  would  set  the  process 
in  motion. 

Recent  events  suggest  a  clearly 
positive  evolution.  A  disengagement  of 
forces  in  southern  Angola  is  underway. 
Directly  and  indirectly,  the  key  parties 
are  communicating  ideas  and  proposals 
to  move  the  negotiations  forward. 
Having  defined  the  agenda  and  served 
as  a  catalyst,  we  are  facilitating  a  step- 
by-step  process  that  could— and  I  em- 
phasize could— \ead  to  further  progress. 
We  have  not  yet  reached  a  settlement. 
Progress  is  fragile,  and  the  situation 
remains  complex.  Our  task  is  to  con- 
solidate what  has  started  and  build 
upon  it  in  the  weeks  and  months  ahead. 
This  is  the  work  of  persistent,  quiet 
diplomacy. 


11 


THE  SECRETARY 


Our  efforts  for  peaceful  change  have 
not  neglected  South  Africa's  internal 
policies.  President  Reagan  has  called 
apartheid  "repugnant."  It  is  also  a 
source  of  tension  and  instability  in  the 
whole  region.  Thus,  we  have  a  moral 
and  a  practical  interest  in  seeing  the 
peaceful  emergence  of  a  more  equitable 
system.  To  that  end,  this  Administration 
has  sought  to  work  with  peaceful  ele- 
ments across  the  political  spectrum  in 
South  Africa  in  support  of  constructive 
change. 

We  have  not  pursued  this  goal  in  a 
vacuum.  We  have  tailored  our  programs, 
our  diplomatic  exchanges,  and  our 
rhetoric  to  the  facts.  Let  us  be  candid 
with  each  other.  Changes  are  oc- 
curring—in black  education  and  housing, 
in  labor  law  and  trade  unionism,  in  black 
urban  residency  rights,  in  the  extension 
of  certain  political  rights  to  the  colored 
and  Asian  communities.  South  Africa's 
white  electorate  has  given  solid  backing 
to  a  government  that  defines  itself  as 
committed  to  evolutionary  change. 

These  steps  are  not  by  themselves 
solutions;  they  reflect  a  series  of 
unilateral  moves,  not  a  process  of 
negotiation  among  South  Africans.  The 
majority  of  South  Africans  remains 
without  the  fundamental  human  right  of 
citizenship  in  their  own  country.  Blacks 
are  denied  national  political  rights  and 
cannot  yet  compete  on  an  equal  footing 
in  South  Africa's  dynamic  economy.  Ar- 
bitrary forced  removals  have  uprooted 
long-settled  communities.  I  could  go  on 
with  the  positive  and  negative  sides  of 
the  balance  sheet.  But  the  fact  of  change 
is  clear. 

We  have  no  blueprint  of  our  own  for 
what  should  replace  apartheid;  that  is 
for  South  Africans  to  work  out  for 
themselves.  But  we  are  right  to 
underscore  that  change  is  imperative. 
We  are  right  to  insist  that  all  South 
Africans— black,  white,  and  colored— 
participate  in  this  process,  and  it  is  our 
obligation  to  lend  whatever  support  we 
can  to  those  who  seek  peaceful  change. 
And  we  are  right  to  recognize  that  a 
process  of  change  has  indeed  begun, 
however  imperfect  it  may  be  and 
however  arduous  it  sometimes  appears. 

The  United  States  has  sought  to 
assist  the  process  of  change  by  en- 
couraging American  labor  unions  to 
assist  in  the  development  of  black  labor 
unions,  by  programs  to  assist  black 
managers  and  entrepreneurs,  and  by 
promoting  over  $26  million  in  scholar- 
ship assistance  for  young  black  South 
Africans.  We  have  substantially  ex- 
panded our  support  to  civil  and  human 


rights  organizations.  With  the  en- 
couragement of  the  Congress,  we  are 
designing  new  programs  to  strengthen 
legal  institutions  and  legal  skills.  And 
we  have  backed  the  impressive  efforts  of 
American  businesses  to  provide  equal 
treatment  and  expanded  opportunities 
for  all  their  workers,  regardless  of  race. 

Economic  development  itself  is  a 
powerful  engine  for  social  and  political 
evolution.  Those  who  advocate  disinvest- 
ment and  economic  sanctions  would  pull 
the  rug  out  from  under  those  South 
Africans  who  have  taken  the  first  con- 
crete steps  toward  a  more  equal  and 
more  equitable  society. 

In  the  West  we  value  life,  freedom, 
progress,  and  peace;  the  only  course 
consistent  with  these  values  is  to  engage 
ourselves  as  a  force  for  constructive, 
peaceful  change.  It  is  not  to  egg  on  the 
forces  of  polarization,  heightening  the 
tensions  that  could  destabilize  the  entire 
region.  It  is  not  our  business  to  cheer 


on,  from  the  sidelines,  a  race  war  in 
southern  Africa— or  to  accelerate  trends 
that  will  inexorably  bring  such  a  conflict 
about.  We  should  recognize  our  limits: 
we  can  support  and  encourage  change, 
but  we  cannot  replace  local  initiative,  in- 
stitutions, and  vision. 

Tomorrow's  Agenda 

If  I  may  leave  you  with  one  message,  it 
would  be  that  America  takes  Africa  and 
its  problems  seriously.  We  see  a  direct 
relationship  between  Africa's  political 
and  economic  stability  and  the  health  of 
the  Western  world.  We  are  committed 
to  working  with  our  African  friends,  ano 
with  the  international  community,  to 
help  Africa  overcome  its  problems. 

It  is  in  our  self-interest  that  we  do 
so.  And  it  is  morally  right.  It  is  in  the 
best  tradition  of  America. 


'Press  release  47  of  Feb.  16.  1984. 


Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
World  Affairs  Council  Address 


Secretary  Shiiltz  held  a  question-and- 
answer  session  with  the  audience  at  the 
conclusion  of  his  address  before  the 
Boston  World  Affairs  Council  on 
February  15,  198i.^ 

Q.  Please  share  with  us  your  personal 
assessment  of  Mr.  Chernenko  and 
what  his  incumbency  will  mean  to 
U.S. -Soviet  relations,  particularly  with 
respect  to  arms  talks. 

A.  Of  course,  we  have  many  write- 
ups  of  Mr.  Chernenko,  but  our  knowl- 
edge of  him  is  limited  as  it  is  of  other 
Soviet  leaders.  He  has  been  a  part  of  the 
Soviet  leadership  for  a  long  time,  has 
been  a  part  of  the  policies  that  have 
evolved  there,  particularly  in  the 
Brezhnev  era,  so  the  presumption  is  that 
he  is  more  or  less  in  agreement  with 
them. 

We,  of  course,  take  every  oppor- 
tunity—particularly one  where  a  new 
leader  emerges  on  the  scene— to  express 
our  readiness  to  engage  in  a  constructive 
dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  to  do 
everything  we  can  to  solve,  or  at  least 
put  into  better  condition,  the  many  prob- 
lems that  we  have  between  us. 

The  most  constructive  thing  we  can 
do,  I  think,  is  to  do  that  and  be  ready  to 
follow  through  on  it.  Our  behavior,  we 
can  have  some  control  over.  It's  hard  for 


12 


us  to  control  theirs,  but  if  we  are  there 
in  good  faith  and  at  the  same  time  mind- 
ful of  our  own  interests,  perhaps  some- 
thing worthwhile  can  be  started. 

That  is  the  message  that  President 
Reagan  delivered  himself  last  January, 
and  recognizing  that  there  might  be 
some  changes  in  the  Soviet  Union,  he 
chose  to  e.xpress  it  in  a  public  speech  so 
everybody  there  could  read  it.  'That  is 
the  message  Vice  President  Bush  took 
with  him  to  Moscow  and  which  he 
delivered  in  oral  form  and  in  a  letter 
from  the  President  1,0  Mr.  Chernenko  in 
his  meeting  day  before  yesterday,  I 
guess  it  was. 

Q.  Why  did  not  President  Reagan 
or  you  go  to  Moscow?  But,  beyond 
that,  wouldn't  it  be  useful  to  have  a 
meeting  between  our  President  and  the 
Soviet  leader? 

A.  Speaking  of  summitry,  there  was 
scheduled  to  come  to  the  United  States 
on  Monday  and  Tuesday  two  of  our 
leading  friends  in  the  Arab  world— King 
Hussein  of  Jordan  and  President 
Mubarak  of  Egypt.  So  the  President  had 
to  consider,  among  other  things,  whether 
to  engage  in  the  rather  intensive  and  ex- 
tensive discussions  we  had  with  those 
two  leaders  or  to  go  to  Moscow,  pay  his 
respects,  and  have  a  30-minute  meeting, 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


iJlB 


THE  SECRETARY 


IS  it  turned  out,  with  Mr.  Cheriienko.  I 
,hinlv  the  President  made  the  right 
Set  :hoice. 

That  doesn't  in  any  way  suggest  that 
he  isn't  ready  for  a  dialogue  with  the 
Soviet  leadership.  He  has  expressed 
himself  many  times  as  being  very  much 
in  favor  of  such  a  meeting  if  the  work 
that  precedes  it  gives  a  reasonable  in- 
dication that  something  significant  can  be 
achieved. 

It  is  inevitable  that  if  there  is  a 
meeting  between  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Secretary  General 
af  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  that  people's  e.xpectations  will  be 
aiK  built  to  a  very  high  level.  I  think  that  we 
should  have  some  idea  before  under- 
taking such  a  meeting  that  they  can  be, 
at  least  in  some  manner,  fulfilled. 

It  may  be  very  well  that  those  condi- 
tions can  be  created,  and,  if  so,  I'm  sure 
the  President  will  have  such  a  meeting. 
He's  very  good  at  personal  interaction, 
and  I  have  yet  to  see— I've  sat  in  on 
countless  meetings  with  the  President 
and  visiting  heads  of  state— and  there's  a 
great  chaitn  about  President  Reagan, 
and  also  force  and  conviction,  and  he 
comes  across. 

So  if  the  time  comes  for  a  meeting,  I 
think  it  will  be  a  good  thing  just  because 
of  the  way  the  President  handles  himself. 

I  might  say,  just  in  case  I  don't  get  a 
question  about  Africa  Daughter]  that  the 
President  has  met  with  20  heads  of  state 
from  Africa  during  his  term  of  office  so 
far. 

Q.  Do  you  see  a  light  at  the  end  of 
the  tunnel  in  Lebanon?  Can  the  pres- 
ent regime  of  President  Gemayel  be 
saved?  And  what  are  the  expectations 
of  a  UN  force  being  deployed  in  Beirut 
instead  of  the  multinational  force? 

A.  I  hesitate,  but  I  can't  resist  using 
that  old  image  that  the  light  you  see  at 
the  end  of  the  tunnel  may  be  the  train 
coming  toward  you.  [Laughter] 

The  situation  in  Lebanon  is  marked 
by  violence  and  is  in  no  way  satisfactory 
and  not  at  all  what  we  have  been  trying 
to  help  bring  about.  Lebanon  is  a  coun- 
try that  has  been  beset  by  problems  for 
many,  many  years,  magnified  in  the  last 
10  years  by  the  presence  of  the  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization]  and 
its  terror  groups  and  armaments, 
creating  a  state  wdthin  a  state.  So 
Lebanon  is  and  has  been  a  troubled  land. 

We  hoped  that  there  was  some 
chance,  beginning  about  a  year  or  so  ago, 
that  something  more  constructive  and 
stable  could  develop,  and  if  that  were  so, 
then  it  would  contribute  another  building 


April  1984 


block  in  the  structure  of  stability  and 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  And  so  it  was 
a  situation  that  called  out  for  help, 
literally,  from  them  and  to  which  we 
responded. 

It  would  be  rash  to  say  anything  par- 
ticularly optimistic  at  this  point  in  time, 
but  the  twists  and  turns  in  Lebanon  are 
such  that  it's  very  difficult  to  predict. 
And  I  suppose  just  as  you  work  on 
things  and  they  seem  just  about  to  jell 
and  then  your  hopes  are  dashed,  so  it  is 
conceivable,  at  least  that  in  this  unpleas- 
ant juncture  where  we  are,  something 
positive  may  develop  if  people  just  get 
fed  up  enough  with  the  conditions  under 
which  they  exist. 

As  for  President  Gemayel,  I  would 
first  like  to  pay  tribute  to  a  very 
courageous  individual  who  has  under- 
taken the  task  of  presidency  of  a  war- 
torn  and  occupied  country,  where  threats 
to  life  are  common  and  all  too  commonly 
are  effected.  He's  a  courageous  person 
who  is  fighting  hard  for  his  country. 

It  is  clearly  important,  if  there  is  to 
be  a  sovereign  and  united  Lebanon,  that 
there  be  a  broadened  base  for  President 
Gemayel's  government,  and  he  has  been 
trying  to  bring  that  about,  but  so  far 
hasn't  been  successful  in  arranging  the 
deals  among  the  various  leaders  that 
would  bring  this  into  being. 

There  is  no  question  about  the  fact 
that  the  violence  and  the  strife  and  the 
negativism,  insofar  as  President 
Gemayel's  efforts,  are  instigated  and 
supported  by  Syria.  In  this  sense,  Syria 
is  the  problem. 

I  think  there  are  opportunities  for 
President  Gemayel,  and  just  in  what 
direction  he  goes  and  how  that  evolves 
very  much  remains  to  be  seen.  It's  a 
tough  situation.  Now,  your  third  ques- 
tion? 

Q.  Was  the  replacement  of  the 
multinational  force  by  a  UN  force. 

A.  Our  beUef  is  that  the  UN  force— 
and  there  is  a  force  of  some  6,000  or 
7,000  UN  troops  in  southern  Lebanon, 
basically  with  an  inoperative  mandate,  a 
tribute  to  the  countries  that  have  put  up 
that  force  that  they  stay  with  it— we 
think  there  is  an  important  role  that  the 
UN  force  could  play  throughout 
Lebanon.  I  think  particularly  around  the 
Palestinian  refugee  camps,  because  the 
people  in  those  camps  are  not  well  liked 
by  the  surrounding  population  as  we  saw 
in  Sabra  and  Shatila.  And  so  I  think  that 
there's  a  definite  role  for  the  UN  there, 
and  there  are  other  things  the  UN  force 
can  do  in  taking  up  positions  in  key  posts 
and  so  on. 


Whether  in  that  role  or  especially  if 
there  is  any  role  in  Beirut,  it  depends 
upon  whether  or  not  a  situation  of 
stability  can  be  created  into  which  they 
can  come.  It's  conceivable  that  the 
possibility  that  they  might  come  can  help 
create  that  stability;  nevertheless,  the 
UN  force  is  not  a  way  of  eliminating  it- 
self but  rather  it's  a  precondition  for  the 
UN  force  being  able  to  come  there. 

The  multinational  force  will  un- 
doubtedly be  of  lesser  numbers  on  the 
ground  in  Lebanon,  in  any  case,  as  the 
British  have  removed  their  forces,  and 
we  will  move  our  Marines  onto  ships, 
although  we  have  a  very  considerable 
number  of  Americans  who  are  there  in 
training  roles  and  other  ways  of  trying 
to  be  helpful,  and,  of  course,  in  maintain- 
ing the  security  of  our  regular  personnel 
there.  So  there  is  a  U.S.  presence,  and 
that  is  there  at  this  time. 

Q.  Does  this  Administration  have 
the  courage  to  engage  the  Syrians 
militarily  and  defeat  them  on  the 
ground  in  Lebanon,  or  will  we  retreat 
and  suffer  another  military  defeat 
[laughter]. 

A.  Wow!  The  U.S.  forces  did  not  go 
there  to  undertake  a  military  mission. 
They  were  not  designed  for  that,  and  we 
have  no  intention  of  trying  to  mount  the 
kind  of  military  effort  that  it  would  take 
to  have  the  United  States  dominate 
Lebanon  militarily. 

I  don't  suppose  there's  any  doubt 
that  if  we  decided  we  really  wanted  to 
do  that,  we  could  do  it.  But  we  don't 
have  any  idea  at  all  that  that's  the  right 
thing  to  do.  Our  forces  have  been  there 
at  the  urgent  request  of  the  Government 
of  Lebanon,  originally  after  the 
massacres  at  Sabra  and  Shatila,  to 
separate  Beirut  from  the  Israeli  forces 
and  to  provide  some  measure  of  security 
in  Beirut  and  around  the  camps  in  Beirut 
and  around  the  airport,  and  performed 
that  mission  very  well. 

In  recent  months,  it  has  been  increas- 
ingly difficult  because  of  the  factional 
strife  and  the  Syrian  instigation  of 
violence  surrounding  it  in  which  we 
have,  to  some  degree,  been  caught  up. 
But  if  the  question  is  a  dare,  we  don't 
bite.  It's  not  our  intention  to  try  to 
dominate  events  in  Lebanon  or  in  the 
Middle  East  by  military  means. 

I  think  the  history  of  the  Middle 
East  is  that  violence— particularly  the 
tactics  of  terror  that  we  see— have  led  to 
nothing,  only  bitterness  and  bloodshed. 
Our  emphasis,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  it 
is  way  past  time  for  people  to  concen- 
trate on  political  solutions  and  trying  to 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


work  out  in  a  peaceful  way  a  better  pat- 
tern of  existence  for  themselves.  And 
that  is  what  we're  trying  to  help  out 
with. 

Q.  President  Mubarak  said  yester- 
day we  should  talk  to  Yasir  Arafat.  I 
think  it  makes  sense.  Don't  you? 

A.  The  conditions  under  which  the 
United  States  will  talk  to  Mr.  Arafat  and 
members  of  the  PLO  have  been  stated 
by  the  President,  and  for  that  matter  by 
his  predecessors  and  probably  by  Joe 
Sisco  [former  Under  Secretary  of  State 
for  Political  Affairs],  many  times; 
namely,  that  if  he  recognizes  UN  Resolu- 
tion 242  as  the  basis  for  a  peaceful 
resolution  of  the  Palestinian  issues  and  if 
he  acknowledges  the  right  of  the  State  of 
Israel  to  exist,  we'll  be  glad  to  talk  to 
him. 

We  share  the  view  of  Israel  that  it 
makes  no  sense  to  talk  to  somebody  who 
states  that  his  intention  is  to  eliminate 
the  State  of  Israel  and  who  has  a  history 
of  trying  to  employ  violent  means  to  that 
end. 

The  United  States  helped  bring 
about  the  evacuation  of  the  PLO  and 
Mr.  Arafat  from  Beii-ut  a  little  over  a 
year  ago,  and  in  an  indirect  way  from 
Tripoli  here  recently.  We  hear  many 
comments  that  Mr.  Arafat  is  ready  to 
forego  the  violent  solution  and  seek  a 
political  action.  If  so,  he  knows  what  to 
say  in  order  to  talk  with  us,  and  we 
would  welcome  that  kind  of  dialogue. 

Q.  What  is  the  hope  for  peace  in  El 
Salvador? 

A.  The  fu-st  hope  for  peace  is  in  the 
emergence  of  democracy  and  the  rule  (5f 
law.  I  think  those  are  fundamental 
tenets.  There  is  a  democratically  elected 
Constituent  Assembly,  and  before  the 
spring  is  over  we  believe  there  will  be  a 
democratically  elected  president.  At  the 
same  time,  the  processes  that  we 
associate  with  the  rule  of  law  have  been 
badly  deficient  in  El  Salvador,  and  in  a 
great  many  ways  we  have  been  ti-ying  to 
help  the  great  majority  of  the  people 
there  who  want  to  do  so  construct  the 
basis  of  a  judicial  system  that  suits  their 
w'ays  and  which  provides  a  better 
measure  of  justice. 

There  have  been  some  encouraging 
signs  even  in  recent  days  in  this  regard, 
but  yet  there  is  much  to  be  done.  So  I 
think  the  first  point  is  democracy  and 
the  rule  of  law. 

The  second  point  is  that  there  need 
to  be  conditions  under  which  economic 
development  can  take  place,  and  the  bi- 
partisan commission  to  which  Henry 
Kissinger  gave  brilliant  leadership  made 


some  vei-y  potent  recommendations  in 
that  regard.  That's  the  second  thing. 

I  think  the  third  thing  that  we  must 
recognize— and  I  know  many  people 
don't  like  to  recognize  but  it's  there— you 
can't  have  economic  development,  and 
it's  very  difficult  to  have  political  reform, 
when  you  have  a  guerrilla  movement 
supported  very  heavily  by  outside  forces 
trying  to  shoot  their  way  in  to  your 
government.  And  so  I  think  it's  essential 
if  we  are  going  to  place  value  on 
democratic  development  and  we're  going 
to  place  value  and  prospect  on  economic 
development,  that  we  also  help  them  pro- 
vide a  shield  of  security  so  that  these 
things  can  flourish.  And  this  is  some- 
thing that  we  have  had  great  difficulty  in 
persuading  the  American  people  to  do. 
It's  done  not  strongly  enough,  not  with 
enough  certainty  for  those  in  the 
Salvadoran  military,  but  it  is  absolutely 
essential  if  the  main  objectives  that  we 
seek  are  going  to  be  achieved.  It  is  a 
very  doable  proposition  if  we  have  the 
clarity  of  view  and  the  willpower  and 
strength  to  carry  it  through. 

It  is  not  in  the  interests  of  the 
United  States,  and  very  much  against 
our  vital  interests,  to  have  emerge  in 
Central  America  a  system  of  government 
akin  to  and  allied  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Cuba.  The  importance  of  these  in- 
terests was  stressed  by  the  bipartisan 
commission,  and  I  think  it  is  something 
that  we  must  take  very  seriously. 

I  know  this  is  a  very  controversial 
area,  and  I  would  beg  of  you,  all  of  you 
who  are  worried  and  interested  in  this, 
that  you  take  the  time  and  the  trouble  to 
read  the  report  of  the  bipartisan  commis- 
sion. It's  a  very  unusual  report. 

The  people  who  made  up  that  com- 
mission started  in  with  widely  varying 
views.  The  President  didn't  pick  a  bunch 
of  people  who  all  sought  the  same  thing; 
quite  the  contrary.  They  also  are  people 
of  varying  political  persuasions,  impor- 
tant people  in  both  the  Democratic  and 
Republican  Parties.  They  worked  hard 
on  that  report.  Henry  Kissinger  really 
engaged  them  in  the  process,  and  they 
spent  countless  days  and  days  on  it  per- 
sonally. It  was  not  a  report  put  together 
by  a  staff  and  then  argued  over  by  the 
members.  It  was  produced  by  the 
members  themselves,  and  they  sat  in  the 
space  we  allocated  them  in  the  State 
Department.  Many  weekends  I'd  go 
down  there  on  a  Saturday  afternoon  or  a 
Sunday  morning,  they'd  be  down  there 
arguing  with  each  other.  So  they  really 
put  an  effort  into  it. 


So  I  think  given  the  effort  they  put 
in  and  the  importance  of  the  subject,  you 
owe  it  to  them  to  get  their  report  and 
read  it. 

Q.  We're  sponsoring  a  guerrilla 
war  against  Nicaragua.  The  San- 
dinistas have  offered  negotiations. 
Why  do  we  refuse  to  negotiate? 

A.  First  of  all,  the  Sandinistas  have 
betrayed  their  own  revolution  and  have 
put  into  place  in  Nicaragua  a  regime  that 
should  be  repugnant  to  us.  I've  had  good 
friends  who  experienced  Germany  in  the 
1930s  go  there  and  come  back  and  say, 
"I've  visited  many  communist  countries, 
but  Nicaragua  doesn't  feel  like  that.  It 
feels  like  Nazi  Germany." 

So  I  don't  think  it's  any— shouldn't 
be  any  surprise  that  there  are  a  lot  of 
dropouts  from  the  Sandinista  revolution 
who  are  objecting,  and  the  Nicaraguans 
are  feeling  the  effect  of  their  own 
behavior. 

Insofar  as  negotiations  are  con- 
cerned, there  is  a  negotiating  process  in 
place.  It  goes  under  the  name  of  the 
Contadora  process  since  it  got  started  by 
the  ideas  of  four  countries— Mexico, 
Venezuela,  Colombia,  and  Panama— 
which  met  on  Contadora  Island,  and  it 
engages  the  five  Central  American  coun- 
tries—they're all  taking  part— and  we 
think  that's  a  good  process.  We  think  the 
problem  is  essentially  regional  in  nature, 
and  we  support  that  process  and  en- 
courage it,  try  to  help  it  along  as  best  we 
can. 

That  process  has  produced  a  21-point 
set  of  principles,  and  if  those  principles 
were  adopted  and  made  operational, 
you'd  have  a  pretty  good  situation.  In 
"the  last  meeting  of  the  group,  they  set 
out  three  working  groups,  the  tasks  of 
which  were  to  try  to  make  these  prin- 
ciples into  something  operational. 

Whether  this  process  is  going  to 
come  of  anything,  of  course,  remains  to 
be  seen,  but  we  think  that  is  the  right 
foi-um  right  now  for  these  discussions  to 
take  place  among  the  countries  con- 
cerned, and  we  encour;jge  it.  Nicaragua 
is  part  of  it.  and  we  think  they  ought  to 
engage  with  the  others  and  agree  to 
such  things  as  democratic  pluralism, 
agree  to  such  things  as  having  a  level  of 
armaments  that  is  at  least  half  way  in 
keeping  with  defensive  requii-ements  and 
not  the  huge  level  of  armaments  they 
have  which  can  only  be  justified  if  you 
have  offensive  intentions,  agi-ee  to  the 
idea  of  not  shipping  munitions  and  other 
supplies  across  borders,  and  so  on  and  so 
on  through  the  21  points.  I  think  there's 
an  answer  there. 


irons  SI 

Itkano" 

iktrei" 

.U 

JVreoi 


spkere. 
to  in 
.taerica 


ikenyi 


lis,  to 
nnJei 


out  ft 
Siirina 
tries,! 
preiiy 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


iiuummmiMaua 


"''■"■""""■"""^""^ 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Why  do  we  always  end  up  on  the 
wrong  side  in  Central  America,  in 
Lebanon,  in  the  Philippines,  and  else- 
where in  the  world? 

A.  I  think  we're  on  the  right  side. 
We're  on  the  side  of  democracy,  we're  on 
the  side  of  freedom,  we're  on  the  side  of 
economic  development.  There  is  a  fever 
of  democracy  running  through  our  hemi- 
sphere. It's  exciting.  I  just  spent  about  8 
days  in  Central  America,  in  South 
America,  in  the  Caribbean,  and  people- 
particularly  peopte  living  in  countries 
that  have  existed  under  dictatorship, 
when  you  talk  to  them,  they're  so  ex- 
cited. Or  not  only  in  the  area  that  I  men- 
tioned; take  Portugal  and  Spain.  I  don't 
know  whether  any  of  you  have  visited 
and  talked  to  people  there.  They're  so 
excited.  They  say,  "We  have  freedom. 
It's  wonderful!" 

I  don't  think  we  Americans  have  any 
appreciation  of  what  it  means  to  have 
freedom.  It's  like  the  air  we  breathe  to 
us,  but  to  people  who  haven't  had  it,  it's 
wonderful.  And  by  this  time  we  can  say 
that  in  our  hemisphere,  there  are  living 
under  conditions  of  democracy  or  states 
which  are  moving  inexorably  to  democ- 
racy over  90%  of  the  population.  Sticking 
out  like  a  sore  thumb— Cuba,  Nicaragua, 
Suriname,  Chile.  Very  different  coun- 
tries, but  leave  that  to  the  side,  it's  a 
pretty  good  picture,  and  we're  on  the 
right  side  of  these  issues  in  sticking  with 
these  principles. 


Human  Rights  and  the  Moral 
Dimension  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 


'Press  release  47  of  Feb.  16,  1984. 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  at  the 
86th  annual  Washington  Day  banquet  of 
the  Creve  Couer  Club  of  Illinois  in 
Peoria  on  February  22,  198AJ 

I  would  like  to  speak  to  you  today  about 
human  rights  and  the  moral  dimension 
of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

Americans  have  always  been  an  in- 
trospective people.  Most  other  nations 
do  not  go  through  the  endless  exercise 
of  trying  to  analyze  themselves  as  we 
do.  We  are  always  asking  what  kind  of 
people  we  are.  This  is  probably  a  result 
of  our  history.  Unlike  most  other  na- 
tions, we  are  not  defined  by  an  ancient 
common  tradition  or  heritage  or  by 
ethnic  homogeneity.  Unlike  most  other 
countries,  America  is  a  nation  conscious- 
ly created  and  made  up  of  men  and 
women  from  many  different  cultures 
and  origins.  What  unifies  us  is  not  a 
common  origin  but  a  common  set  of 
ideals:  freedom,  constitutional 
democracy,  racial  and  religious 
tolerance.  We  Americans  thus  define 
ourselves  not  by  where  we  come  from 
but  by  where  we  are  headed:  our  goals, 
our  values,  our  principles,  which  mark 
the  kind  of  society  we  strive  to  create. 

This  accounts  in  good  part,  I  believe, 
for  the  extraordinary  vitality  of  this 
country.  Democracy  is  a  great  liberator 
of  the  human  spirit,  giving  free  rein  to 
the  talents  and  aspirations  of  in- 
dividuals, offering  every  man  and 
woman  the  opportunity  to  realize  his  or 
her  fullest  potential.  This  ideal  of 
freedom  has  been  a  beacon  to  im- 
migrants from  many  lands. 

We  are  a  people  that  never  felt 
bound  by  the  past  but  always  had  con- 
fidence that  we  could  shape  our  future. 
We  also  set  high  standards  for 
ourselves.  In  our  own  society,  from  Jef- 
ferson to  Lincoln  to  the  modern  day, 
there  have  always  been  keepers  of  our 
conscience  who  measured  our  perfor- 
mance against  our  ideals  and  insisted 
that  we  do  better.  The  revolution  in  civil 
rights  is  perhaps  the  most  dramatic  re- 
cent example,  and  it  has  given  impetus 
to  other  revolutions,  such  as  in  women's 
rights.  We  are  blessed  with  a  society 
that  is  constantly  renewing  and  improv- 
ing itself  by  virtue  of  the  standards  it 
has  set. 

In  foreign  affairs,  we  do  the  same. 
In  the  19th  century,  when  we  had  the 
luxury  of  not  being  actively  involved  in 


world  politics,  we,  nevertheless,  saw 
ourselves  as  a  moral  example  to  others. 
We  were  proud  when  liberators  like 
Simon  Bolivar  in  Latin  America  or 
Polish  patriots  in  Europe  invoked  the 
ideals  of  the  American  Revolution.  In 
the  20th  century,  since  Woodrow 
Wilson,  we  have  defined  our  role  in  the 
world  in  terms  of  moral  principles  that 
we  were  determined  to  uphold  and  ad- 
vance. We  have  never  been  comfortable 
with  the  bare  concept  of  maintaining  the 
balance  of  power,  even  though  this  is 
clearly  part  of  our  responsibility. 

Americans  can  be  proud  of  the  good 
we  have  accomplished  in  foreign  affairs. 

•  We  have  fought  and  sacrificed  for 
the  freedom  of  others. 

•  We  helped  Europe  and  Japan 
rebuild  after  World  War  II. 

•  We  have  given  generously  to  pro- 
mote economic  development. 

•  We  have  been  a  haven  for 
refugees. 

Thus,  moral  values  and  a  commitment  to 
human  dignity  have  been  not  an  appen- 
dage to  our  foreign  policy  but  an  essen- 
tial part  of  it,  and  a  powerful  impulse 
driving  it.  These  values  are  the  very 
bonds  that  unite  us  with  our  closest 
allies,  and  they  are  the  very  issues  that 
divide  us  from  our  adversaries.  The  fun- 
damental difference  between  East  and 
West  is  not  in  economic  or  social  policy, 
though  those  policies  differ  radically,  but 
in  the  moral  principles  on  which  they  are 
based.  It  is  the  difference  between 
tyranny  and  freedom— an  age-old  strug- 
gle in  which  the  United  States  never 
could,  and  cannot  today,  remain  neutral. 

But  there  has  always  been  tension 
between  our  ideals  and  the  messy 
realities  of  the  world.  Any  foreign  policy 
must  weave  together  diverse  strands  of 
national  interest:  pohtical  objectives, 
military  security,  economic  management. 
All  these  other  goals  are  important  to 
people's  lives  and  well-being.  They  all 
have  moral  validity,  and  they  often  con- 
front us  with  real  choices  to  make.  As 
the  strongest  free  nation,  the  United 
States  has  a  complex  responsibility  to 
help  maintain  international  peace  and 
security  and  the  global  economic  system. 

At  the  same  time,  as  one  nation 
among  many,  we  do  not  have  the  power 
to  remake  the  planet.  An  awareness  of 
our  limits  is  said  to  be  one  of  the  lessons 
we  learned  from  Vietnam.  In  any  case, 


THE  SECRETARY 


Americans  are  also  a  practical  people 
and  are  interested  in  producing  results. 
Foreign  policy  thus  often  presents  us 
with  moral  issues  that  are  not  easy  to 
resolve.  Moral  questions  are  more  dif- 
ficult to  answer  than  other  kinds  of 
questions,  not  easier.  How  we  respond 
to  these  dilemmas  is  a  real  test  of  our 
maturity  and  also  of  our  commitment. 

Approaches  to  Human  Rights  Policy 

There  are  several  different  ways  of  ap- 
proaching human  rights  issues,  and 
some  are  better  than  others.  One  thing 
should  be  clear.  Human  rights  policy 
should  not  be  a  formula  for  escapism  or 
a  set  of  excuses  for  evading  problems. 
Human  rights  policy  cannot  mean  simply 
dissociating  or  distancing  ourselves  from 
regimes  whose  practices  we  find  defi- 
cient. Too  much  of  what  passes  for 


friendly  to  us  is  subjected  to  more  exact- 
ing scrutiny  than  others;  our  security 
ties  with  it  are  attacked;  once  such  a 
government  faces  an  internal  or  external 
threat,  its  moral  defects  are  spotlighted 
as  an  excuse  to  desert  it.  This  is  not  my 
view  of  human  rights  policy  either. 

At  issue  here  is  not  so  much  a  tac- 
tical disagreement  over  human  rights 
policy  but  fundamentally  different  con- 
ceptions of  America  and  its  impact  on 
the  world.  What  gives  passion  to  this 
human  rights  debate  is  that  it  is  a  sur- 
rogate for  a  more  significant  underlying 
contest  over  the  future  of  American 
foreign  policy. 

There  should  be  no  doubt  of  Presi- 
dent Reagan's  approach— not  isola- 
tionism or  guilt  or  paralysis  but,  on  the 
contrary,  a  commitment  to  active 
engagement,  confidently  working  for 


There  should  he  no  doubt  of  President  Reagan's 
approach— not  isolationism  or  guilt  or  paralysis  but 
...  a  commitment  to  active  engagement,  confidently 
working  for  our  values  as  well  as  our  interests  in  the 
real  world,  acting  proudly  as  the  champion  of 
freedom. 


human  rights  policy  has  taken  the  form 
of  shunning  those  we  find  do  not  live  up 
to  internationally  accepted  standards. 
But  this  to  me  is  a  "cop-out";  it  seems 
more  concerned  with  making  us  feel  bet- 
ter than  with  having  an  impact  on  the 
situation  we  deplore.  It  is  really  a  form 
of  isolationism.  If  some  liberals  advocate 
cutting  off  relationships  with  right-wing 
regimes— and  some  conservatives  seek 
to  cut  off  dealings  with  left-wing 
regimes— we  could  be  left  with  practical- 
ly no  foreign  policy  at  all.  This  is  not  my 
idea  of  how  to  advance  the  cause  of 
human  rights. 

One  unattractive  example  of  this  ap- 
proach derives  from  theories  of 
American  guilt,  originating  in  our 
domestic  debate  over  Vietnam.  There 
are  those  eager  to  limit  or  restrain 
American  power  because  they  concluded 
from  Vietnam  that  any  exercise  of 
American  power  overseas  was  bound  to 
end  in  disaster  or  that  America  was 
itself  a  supporter  or  purveyor  of  evil  in 
the  world.  Human  rights  policy  was  seen 
by  some  as  a  way  of  restricting 
American  engagement  abroad.  Perverse- 
ly, in  this  way  of  thinking,  a  government 


our  values  as  well  as  our  interests  in  the 
real  world,  acting  proudly  as  the  cham- 
pion of  freedom.  The  President  has  said 
that  "human  rights  means  working  at 
problems,  not  walking  away  from  them." 
If  we  truly  care  about  our  values,  we 
must  be  engaged  in  their  defense— 
whether  in  Afghanistan  and  Poland,  the 
Philippines  and  El  Salvador,  or  Grenada. 
This  is  the  President's  philosophy:  We 
are  proud  of  our  country  and  of  what  it 
stands  for.  We  have  confidence  in  our 
ability  to  do  good.  We  draw  our  inspira- 
tion from  the  fundamental  decency  of 
the  American  people.  We  find  in  our 
ideals  a  star  to  steer  by,  as  we  try  to 
move  our  ship  of  state  through  the 
troubled  waters  of  a  complex  world. 

So  we  consider  ourselves  activists  in 
the  struggle  for  human  rights.  As  the 
President  declared  to  the  British  Parlia- 
ment on  June  8,  1982:  "We  must  be 
staunch  in  our  conviction  that  freedom  is 
not  the  sole  prerogative  of  a  lucky  few 
but  the  inalienable  and  universal  right  of 
all  human  beings." 


16 


Goals  and  Techniques  of 
Human  Rights  Policy 

That  was  philosophy.  But  on  a  daily 
basis,  we  face  practical  issues  and  prob- 
lems of  human  rights  policy.  On  one 
level,  human  rights  policy  aims  at 
specific  goals.  We  try,  for  example,  to 
use  our  influence  to  improve  judicial  or 
police  practices  in  many  countries— to 
stop  murders,  to  eliminate  torture  or 
brutality,  to  obtain  the  release  of 
dissidents  or  political  prisoners,  to  end 
persecution  on  racial  or  other  grounds, 
to  permit  free  emigration,  and  so  forth. 
Many  American  officials,  including  Vice 
President  Bush  and  myself,  have  gone  to 
El  Salvador  and  denounced  the  death 
squads  not  only  privately  but  publicly- 
all  of  which  is  having  a  positive  effect. 
We  have  sought  to  promote  an  honest 
and  thorough  investigation  of  the 
murder  of  Philippine  opposition  leader 
Benigno  Aquino. 

President  Reagan,  during  his  visit  to 
the  Republic  of  Korea  last  November, 
publicly  stated  his  belief  in  the  impor- 
tance of  political  liberalization.  But  we 
have  also  made  our  thoughts  on  specific 
cases  known  privately,  and  several  of 
these  approaches  have  been  successful. 
In  our  contacts  with  the  Soviets,  we 
have  pressed  for  the  release  of  human 
rights  activists  and  for  freedom  of 
emigration.  There  are  literally  hundreds 
of  such  examples  of  American  action. 
Sometimes  we  make  progress;  some- 
times we  do  not— proving  only  that  we 
still  have  much  to  do.  In  this  context,  I 
must  pay  tribute  to  your  distinguished 
Senator,  Chuck  Percy  [Sen.  Charles  H. 
Percy,  R.-Ill.].  No  one  in  the  Senate  has 
played  a  more  important  role  than 
Chuck  Percy  in  the  struggle  for  the 
right  of  emigration  for  Soviet  Jewry  and 
other  oppressed  peoples,  for  religious 
freedoms,  and  for  the  release  of 
prisoners  of  conscience. 

The  techniques  of  exerting  our  in- 
fluence are  well  known.  We  try,  without 
letup,  to  sensitize  other  governments  to 
human  rights  concerns.  Every  year  we 
put  on  the  public  record  a  large  volume 
of  country  reports  examining  the  prac- 
tices of  other  countries  in  thorough  and 
candid  detail— the  rights  of  citizens  to  be 
free  from  violations  of  the  integrity  of 
the  person  and  the  rights  of  citizens  to 
enjoy  basic  civil  and  political  liberties. 
The  1984  report  has  just  been  pub- 
lished—nearly 1,500  pages  of  facts  about 
human  rights  around  the  world,  some- 
thing no  other  country  undertakes. 
Twice  each  year,  we  also  send  the  con- 
gressional Helsinki  commission  a  public 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


report  thoroughly  reviewing  the  record 
of  Soviet  and  East  European  compliance 
with  the  human  rights  provisions  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act. 

Wherever  feasible,  we  try  to 
ameliorate  abuses  through  the  kind  of 
frank  diplomatic  exchanges  often  re- 
ferred to  as  "quiet  diplomacy."  But 
where  our  positive  influence  is  minimal, 
or  where  other  approaches  are  unavail- 
ing, we  may  have  no  choice  but  to  use 
other,  more  concrete  kinds  of  leverage 
with  regimes  whose  practices  we  cannot 
accept. 

We  may  deny  economic  and  military 
assistance,  withhold  diplomatic  support, 
vote  against  multilateral  loans,  refuse 
licenses  for  crime  control  equipment,  or 
take  other  punitive  steps.  Where  ap- 
propriate, we  resort  to  public  pressures 
and  public  statements  denouncing  such 
actions  as  we  have  done  in  the  case  of 
the  Salvadoran  death  squads,  Iranian 
persecution  of  the  Bahais,  South  African 
apartheid,  and  Soviet  repression  in 
Afghanistan. 

Multilateral  organizations  are 
another  instrument  of  our  human  rights 
policy.  In  the  UN  Commission  on 
Human  Rights,  we  supported  a  resolu- 
tion criticizing  martial  law  in 
Poland— the  first  resolution  there 
against  a  Communist  country.  The 
United  States  has  been  active  and 
vigorous  in  regional  conferences  and 
organizations,  such  as  the  Helsinki  proc- 
ess and  the  Inter-American  Commission 
on  Human  Rights.  We  regret  that  some 
multilateral  organizations  have  distorted 
the  purposes  they  were  designed  to 
serve-such  as  UNESCO  [UN  Educa- 
tional, Scientific,  and  Cultural  Organiza- 
tion], which  has  not  been  living  up  to  its 
responsibility  to  defend  freedom  of 
speech,  intellectual  freedom,  and  human 
rights  in  general. 

Friendly  governments  are  often 
more  amenable  to  traditional  diplomacy 
than  to  open  challenge,  and  we  therefore 
prefer  persuasion  over  public  denuncia- 
tions. But  if  we  were  never  seriously 
concerned  about  human  rights  abuses  in 
friendly  countries,  our  policy  would  be 
one-sided  and  cynical. 

Thus,  while  the  Soviet  Union  and  its 
proxies  present  the  most  profound  and 
farreaching  danger  to  human  rights,  we 
cannot  let  it  appear— falsely— that  this  is 
our  only  human  rights  concern.  It  is  not. 

Dilemmas  of  Human  Rights  Policy 

Clearly,  there  are  limits  to  our  ability  to 
remake  the  world.  In  the  end,  sovereign 
governments  will  make  their  own  deci- 


sions, despite  external  pressure.  Where 
a  system  of  government  is  built  on 
repression,  human  rights  will  inevitably 
be  subordinated  to  the  perceived  re- 
quirements of  political  survival.  The 
sheer  diversity  and  complexity  of  other 
nations'  internal  situations,  and  the 
problem  of  coping  with  them  in  a 
dangerous  world,  are  additional  limits. 
How  we  use  our  influence  and  how  we 
reconcile  political  and  moral  interests 
are  questions  that  call  not  for  dogmatic 
conclusions  but  for  painstaking,  sober 
analysis— and  no  little  humility. 

The  dilemmas  we  face  are  many. 
What,  for  instance,  is  the  relationship 
between  human  rights  concerns  and  the 
considerations  of  regional  or  interna- 
tional security  on  which  the  independ- 
ence and  freedom  of  so  many  nations 
directly  depend?  This  issue  recurs  in  a 
variety  of  forms. 

There  are  countries  whose  internal 
practices  we  sometimes  question  but 
which  face  genuine  security  threats  from 
outside— like  South  Korea— or  whose 
cooperation  with  us  helps  protect  the 
security  of  scores  of  other  nations— like 
the  Philippines.  But  it  is  also  true  that  in 
many  cases  a  concern  for  human  rights 
on  our  part  may  be  the  best  guarantee 
of  a  long-term  friendly  relationship  with 


Terrorism  itself  is  a 
threat  to  human  rights 
and  to  the  basic  right  to 
civil  peace  and  security 
which  a  society  owes  its 
citizens.  We  deplore  all 
governmental  abuses  of 
rights,  whatever  the 
excuse. 


that  country.  There  are  countries  whose 
long-term  security  will  probably  be 
enhanced  if  they  have  a  more  solid  base 
of  popular  support  and  domestic  unity. 
Yet  there  are  also  cases  where  regional 
insecurity  weakens  the  chances  for 
liberalization  and  where  American 
assurance  of  security  support  provides  a 
better  climate  for  an  evolution  to 
democracy.  Human  rights  issues  occur 
in  a  context,  and  there  is  no  simple 
answer. 


In  the  Middle  East,  to  take  a  very 
different  example,  we  have  no  doubt  of 
Israel's  commitment  to  human  rights 
and  democratic  values.  It  is  those  very 
values  we  appeal  to  when  we  express 
our  concern  for  the  human  rights  and 
quality  of  life  of  the  Palestinian  people 
in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza— a  concern 
that  exists  side  by  side  with  our 
understanding  of  Israel's  security  needs 
and  our  conviction  that  the  basic  prob- 
lem can  only  be  resolved  through 
negotiation. 

Another  question  that  arises  is:  Do 
we  know  enough  about  the  culture  and 
internal  dynamics  of  other  societies  to 
be  sure  of  the  consequence  of  pressures 
we  might  bring?  If  we  distance  ourselves 
from  a  friendly  but  repressive  govern- 
ment, in  a  fluid  situation,  will  this  help 
strengthen  forces  of  moderation,  or 
might  it  make  things  worse?  Pressures 
on  human  rights  grounds  against  the 
Shah,  Somoza,  or  South  Vietnam  had 
justification  but  may  also  have  ac- 
celerated a  powerful  trend  of  events 
over  which  we  had  little  influence,  end- 
ing up  with  regimes  that  pose  a  far 
greater  menace  not  only  to  human 
rights  in  their  own  country  but  also  to 
the  safety  and  freedom  of  all  their 
neighbors. 

In  some  countries,  harsh  measures 
of  repression  have  been  caused— indeed, 
deliberately  provoked— by  terrorists, 
who  waged  deliberate  warfare  not  only 
against  the  institutions  of  society- 
political  leaders,  judges,  administrators, 
newspaper  editors,  as  well  as  against 
police  and  military  officials— but  against 
ordinary  citizens.  Terrorism  itself  is  a 
threat  to  human  rights  and  to  the  basic 
right  to  civil  peace  and  security  which  a 
society  owes  its  citizens.  We  deplore  all 
governmental  abuses  of  rights,  whatever 
the  excuse.  But  we  cannot  be  blind  to 
the  extremist  forces  that  pose  such  a 
monumental  and  increasing  threat  to 
free  government  precisely  because 
democracies  are  not  well  equipped  to 
meet  this  threat.  We  must  find  lawful 
and  legitimate  means  to  protect  civilized 
life  itself  from  the  growing  problem  of 
terrorism. 

The  role  of  Congress  is  another 
question.  There  is  no  doubt  that  con- 
gressional concerns  and  pressures  have 
played  a  very  positive  role  in  giving  im- 
petus and  backing  to  our  efforts  to  in- 
fluence other  governments'  behavior. 
This  congressional  pressure  can 
strengthen  the  hand  of  the  executive 
branch  in  its  efforts  of  diplomacy.  At 
the  same  time,  there  can  be  complica- 
tions if  the  legislative  instrument  is  too 


THE  SECRETARY 


inflexible  or  heavy-handed,  or,  even 
more,  if  Congress  attempts  to  take  on 
the  administrative  responsibility  for  ex- 
ecuting policy.  Legislation  requires  that 
we  withhold  aid  in  extreme  circum- 
stances. If  narrowly  interpreted,  this 
can  lead  us  rapidly  to  a  "stop-go"  policy 
of  fits  and  starts,  all  or  nothing— making 
it  very  difficult  to  structure  incentives  in 


thorough  repression  but  also  because  of 
their  permanence  and  their  global  ambi- 
tions. In  the  last  decade  we  have  seen 
several  military  regimes  and  dictator- 
ships of  the  right  evolve  into 
democracies— from  Portugal,  Spain,  and 
Greece  to  Turkey  and  Argentina.  No 
Communist  state  has  evolved  in  such  a 
manner— though  Poland  attempted  to. 


The  cause  of  human  rights  is  at  the  core  of 
American  foreign  policy  because  it  is  central  to 
America's  conception  of  itself.  These  values  are 
hardly  an  American  invention,  but  America  has 
perhaps  been  unique  in  its  commitment  to  base  its 
foreign  policy  on  the  pursuit  of  such  ideals. 


a  way  that  will  really  fulfill  the  law's 
own  wider  mandate:  to  "promote  and  en- 
courage increased  respect  for  human 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  ..." 

In  the  case  of  El  Salvador,  the 
positive  impact  the  Administration  has 
had  in  its  recent  pressures  against  death 
squads  should  be  a  reminder  that  cer- 
tification in  its  previous  form  is  not  the 
only,  or  even  the  most  effective,  pro- 
cedure for  giving  expression  to  our  ob- 
jectives. Sometimes  a  change  in  ap- 
proach is  the  most  worthwhile  course. 
We  are  ready  to  work  cooperatively 
with  the  Congress  on  this  issue,  but  it 
should  be  clear  that  the  answers  are  not 
simple. 

Finally,  the  phenomenon  of 
totalitarianism  poses  special  problems. 
Sociologists  and  political  theorists  have 
recognized  for  decades  that  there  is  a 
difference  between  traditional,  in- 
digenous dictatorships  and  the  more  per- 
vasively repressive  totalitarian  states, 
fortified  by  modern  technology,  mass 
parties,  and  messianic  ideology.  Certain- 
ly, both  are  alien  to  our  democratic 
ideals.  But  in  this  year  of  George 
Orwell,  1984,  we  cannot  be  oblivious  to 
the  new  20th  centrury  phenomenon. 
Suppression  of  religion  because  it 
represents  an  autonomous  force  in  a 
society;  abuse  of  psychiatric  institutions 
as  intruments  of  repression;  the  use  of 
prison  labor  on  a  mass  scale  for  industrial 
construction— these  and  other  practices 
are  typical  of  the  modem  Marixst- 
Leninist  state.  Totalitarian  regimes  pose 
special  problems  not  only  because  of  their 
more  systematic  and 


And  the  Soviet  Union,  most  impor- 
tantly and  uniquely,  is  driven  not  only 
by  Russian  history  and  Soviet  state  in- 
terest but  also  by  what  remains  of  its 
revolutionary  ideology  to  spread  its 
system  by  force,  backed  up  by  the 
greatest  military  power  of  any  tyranny 
in  history. 

I  raise  these  issues  not  to  assert 
answers  but  to  pose  questions.  These 
are  complexities  that  a  truly  moral  na- 
tion must  face  up  to  if  its  goal  is  to  help 
make  the  world  a  better  place. 

Human  Rights  and  Democracy 

The  Reagan  Administration  approaches 
the  human  rights  question  on  a  deeper 
level.  Responding  to  specific  juridical 
abuses  and  individual  cases,  as  they  hap- 
pen, is  important,  but  they  are  really  the 
surface  of  the  problem  we  are  dealing 
with.  The  essence  of  the  problem  is  the 
kind  of  political  structure  that  makes 
human  rights  abuses  possible.  We  have  a 
duty  not  only  to  react  to  specific  cases 
but  also  to  understand,  and  seek  to 
shape,  the  basic  structural  conditions  in 
which  human  rights  are  more  likely  to 
flourish. 

This  is  why  President  Reagan  has 
placed  so  much  emphasis  on  democracy: 
on  encouraging  the  building  of  pluralistic 
institutions  that  will  lead  a  society  to 
evolve  toward  free  and  democratic 
forms  of  government.  This  is  long-term, 
positive,  active  strategy  for  human 
rights  policy. 

It  is  not  a  Utopian  idea  at  all.  For 
decades,  the  American  labor  movement 


has  worked  hard  in  many  countries 
assisting  the  growth  and  strengthening 
of  free  labor  unions— giving  support  and 
advice,  teaching  the  skills  of  organizing 
and  operating.  In  Western  Europe  after 
World  War  II,  it  was  the  free  labor 
unions,  helped  in  many  cases  by  free 
unions  here,  that  prevented  Communist 
parties  from  taking  over  in  several  coun- 
tries. Today,  free  political  parties  in 
Western  Europe  give  similar  fraternal 
assistance  to  budding  parties  and 
political  groups  in  developing  countries, 
helping  these  institutions  survive  or 
grow  in  societies  where  democratic  pro- 
cedures are  not  as  firmly  entrenched  as 
in  our  own. 

The  new  National  Endowment  for 
Democracy,  proposed  by  President 
Reagan  and  now  funded  with  the  bipar- 
tisan support  of  the  Congress, 
represents  an  imaginative  and  practical 
American  effort  to  help  develop  the 
tools  of  democracy.  Just  as  our  tradi- 
tional aid  programs  try  to  teach 
economic  and  agricultural  skills,  so  our 
new  programs  will  try  to  transfer  skills 
in  organizing  elections,  in  campaigning, 
in  legal  reform,  and  other  skills  which 
we  take  for  granted  but  which  are  basic 
to  free,  pluralistic  societies. 

Through  the  endowment,  our  two 
major  political  parties,  along  with  labor, 
business,  and  other  private  groups,  will 
assist  countries  and  groups  that  seek  to 
develop  democratic  institutions  and 
practices  in  their  own  societies.  The 
President  is  also  directing  AID  [Agency 
for  International  Development],  USIA 
[U.S.  Information  Agency],  and  other 
agencies  to  strengthen  their  programs 
for  democracy,  such  as  support  for  free 
labor  movements,  training  of  journalists, 
and  strengthening  judicial  institutions 
and  procedures.  Sen.  Percy  also 
deserves  particular  credit  here  for  his 
cosponsorship  of  the  Kassebaum-Percy 
Human  Rights  Fund  for  South  Africa, 
which  will  channel  $1.5  million  to  private 
and  community  organizations  in  South 
Africa  working  for  human  rights. 

It  may  not  seem  romantic  or  heroic 
to  train  African  magistrates  in  Zim- 
babwe, provide  technical  help  to  the 
Liberian  Constitution  Commission,  help 
publish  a  revised  penal  code  in  Zaire, 
help  finance  the  education  and  research 
program  of  the  Inter-American  Institute 
of  Human  Rights  in  Costa  Rica,  or  help 
provide  international  observers  for  free 
elections  in  El  Salvador— but  these  pro- 
grams help  create  the  institutional 
preconditions  for  democracy.  Democracy 
and  the  rule  of  law  are  the  only  endur- 
ing guarantee  of  human  rights. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


""■— -TB 


THE  SECRETARY 


We  should  never  lose  faith  in  the 
power  of  the  democratic  idea. 
Democracies  may  be  a  minority  in  the 
world  at  large,  but  it  is  not  true  that 
they  must  always  be  so.  Freedom  is  not 
a  culture-bound  Western  invention  but 
an  aspiration  of  peoples  every- 
where—from Barbados  to  Botswana, 
from  India  to  Japan. 

In  Latin  America,  for  example, 
where  the  news  is  so  much  dominated 
by  conflict,  there  is,  in  fact,  an  extraor- 
dinary trend  toward  democracy. 
Twenty-seven  nations  of  Latin  America 
and  thf  Caribbean  are  either  democratic 
or  are  formally  embarked  on  a  transition 
to  democracy— representing  almost  90% 
of  the  region's  population,  as  compared 
with  some  50%  less  than  10  years  ago. 
And  the  trend  has  been  accelerating. 

Between  1976  and  1980,  two  Latin 
American  nations,  Ecuador  and  Peru, 
elected  civilian  presidents  who  suc- 
cessfully replaced  military  presidents. 
Since  1981,  however.  El  Salvador,  Hon- 
duras, Bolivia,  and  most  recently  Argen- 
tina have  moved  from  military  rule  to 
popularly  elected  civilian  governments. 

Brazil  is  far  along  the  same  path. 
The  people  of  Grenada  have  had 
restored  to  them  the  right  to  be  the  ar- 
biters of  their  own  political  future. 
Uruguay  has  a  timetable  for  a  transition 
to  democracy,  and  its  parties  have 
returned  to  independent  activity. 
Pressure  for  return  to  civilian  rule  is  be- 
ing felt  in  Chile  and  Guatemala.  This 
leaves  only  Cuba,  a  Marxist-Leninist 
state;  Nicaragua,  which  has  been  steadi- 
ly moving  in  that  direction;  and  a  hand- 
ful of  dictatorships  outside  this  pattern. 

This  trend  toward  democracy,  which 
reflects  the  most  profound  aspirations  of 
the  people  of  Latin  America,  has  re- 
ceived wholehearted  and  effective  en- 
couragement from  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration. Dictatorship  in  any  form, 
leftist  or  rightist,  is  anathema  in  this 
hemisphere,  and  all  states  within  the 
region  have  a  responsibility  to  see  that 
dictatorship  gives  way  to  genuine 
pluralist  democracy. 

Nor  is  the  trend  toward  democracy 
confined  to  Latin  America.  In  the  Philip- 
pines, for  example,  the  democratic  tradi- 
tion of  that  republic  is  evident  in  the 
strong  popular  pressure  for  free  elec- 
tions and  a  revitalized  Congress.  The 
government  has  begun  to  respond  to 
these  aspirations,  and  we  are  encourag- 
ing it  to  continue  this  hopeful  process  so 
important  to  the  long-term  stability  of 
the  Philippines.  Likewise  in  the  Republic 
of  Korea,  we  are  encouraged  by  Presi- 
dent Chun's  [Doo  Hwan]  commitment  to 


April  1984 


undertake  in  the  next  few  years  the  first 
peaceful,  constitutional  transfer  of 
power  in  Korea's  modern  history. 

The  Moral  Commitment 
of  the  United  States 

A  policy  dedicated  to  human  rights  will 
always  face  hard  choices.  In  El 
Salvador,  we  are  supporting  the 
moderates  of  the  center,  who  are  under 
pressure  from  extremists  of  both  right 
and  left;  if  we  withdrew  our  support,  the 
moderates  would  be  the  victims,  as 
would  be  the  cause  of  human  rights  in 
that  beleaguered  country.  The  road  will 
be  long  and  hard,  but  we  cannot  walk 
away  from  our  principles. 

The  cause  of  human  rights  is  at  the 
core  of  American  foreign  policy  because 
it  is  central  to  America's  conception  of 
itself.  These  values  are  hardly  an 
American  invention,  but  America  has 
perhaps  been  unique  in  its  commitment 
to  base  its  foreign  policy  on  the  pursuit 
of  such  ideals.  It  should  be  an  ever- 
lasting source  of  pride  to  Americans 
that  we  have  used  our  vast  power  to 


such  noble  ends.  If  we  have  sometimes 
fallen  short,  that  is  not  a  reason  to 
flagellate  ourselves  but  to  remind 
ourselves  of  how  much  there  remains  to 
do. 

This  is  what  America  has  always 
represented  to  other  nations  and  other 
peoples.  But  if  we  abandoned  the  effort, 
we  would  not  only  be  letting  others 
down,  we  would  be  letting  ourselves 
down. 

Our  human  rights  policy  is  a 
pragmatic  policy  which  aims  not  at  strik- 
ing poses  but  as  having  a  practical  effect 
on  the  well-being  of  real  people.  It  is  a 
tough-minded  policy,  which  faces  the 
world  as  it  is,  not  as  we  might  wish  or 
imagine  it  to  be.  At  the  same  time,  it  is 
an  idealistic  policy,  which  expresses  the 
continuing  commitment  of  the  United 
States  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and  the 
alleviation  of  suffering.  It  is  precisely 
this  combination  of  practicality  and 
idealism  that  has  marked  American 
statesmanship  at  its  best.  It  is  the  par- 
ticular genius  of  the  American  people. 


'Press  release  51  of  Feb.  24,  1984. 


Secretary  Shultz  Visits 
Latin  America 


Secretary  Shultz  departed 
Washington,  D.C.,  January  31,  198Jt,  to 
visit  El  Salvador  (January  31), 
Venezuela  (February  1-3),  Brazil 
(Febnmry  3-7),  Grenada  (Febniary  7). 
and  Barbados  (February  7-8).  He  re- 
turned to  Washington  on  February  8. 

Following  are  the  Secretary's 
remarks  he  made  on  various  occasions 
djirin.g  the  trip. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
SAN  SALVADOR, 
JAN.  31,  1984' 

I  wish  to  express  my  appreciation  to 
President  Magana  and  his  colleagues  for 
receiving  me  and  for  all  of  the  informa- 
tion they  provided,  and  also  for  organiz- 
ing the  luncheon  that  I  have  just  taken 
part  in  with  all  six  candidates  for  Presi- 
dent. I  had  a  chance  to  hear  from  each  of 
them  at  lunch,  and  I  heard  six  eloquent 
statements  in  support  of  the  democratic 
process,  in  support  of  the  government  of 
El  Salvador,  and  in  support  of  the  people 
of  El  Salvador. 


Q.  Someone  had  asked  what  results 
the  Salvadorans  [inaudible]? 

A.  I  had  a  session  with  the  Presi- 
dent, the  Defense  Minister,  and  the 
Foreign  Minister,  and  we  discussed  the 
elections,  we  discussed  the  problems  of 
the  system  of  justice,  the  death  squads. 
We  discussed  the  military  situation,  and 
I  heard  about  the  strong  efforts  being 
made  and  the  improvements  in  the  situa- 
tion that  seem  to  be  taking  place.  We 
discussed  the  Contadora  pi'ocess,  and  in 
the  luncheon  I  had  social  conversations 
with  each  of  the  candidates  and  then  we 
had  a  general  discussion.  I  mentioned  the 
things  that  each  candidate  said— each  one 
spoke,  and  I  spoke  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States,  saying  we  truly  believe  in 
the  democratic  process.  We  are  not 
neutral  about  the  process;  we  are  neutral 
about  the  outcome.  We  think  that  the  im- 
portant thing  is  the  country  and  that 
everybody  will  accept  whatever  the  ver- 
dict of  the  people  is  in  a  fair  election.  We 
also  expressed  our  grief  and  our  concern 
about  the  recent  killing  of  an  American, 
apparently  by  terror  from  the  left. 


19 


THE  SECRETARY 


While  in  San  Salvador,  Secretary  Shultz  met  with  Minister  of  Defense  Gen.  Carlos  Vides 
Casanova  (far  left),  President  Alvaro  Magana,  and  U.S.  Ambassador  to  El  Salvador 
Thomas  R.  Pickering  (far  right). 


Q.  Did  you  tell  President  Magana 
how  much  money  President  Reagan 
has  [inaudible]  for  supplemental 
military  aid  this  year?  What  did  the 
Salvadorans  say  they  could  do  with 
this  additional  money  to  break  the 
military  statement  that  seems  to  be 
going  on? 

A.  We  discussed  the  bipartisan  com- 
mission and  its  report  and  the 
President's  support  for  that  report, 
which  does  project  large,  additional 
elements  of  assistance  to  El  Salvador 
and  other  countries  of  Central  America. 

How  can  this  be  used?  It  is  certainly 
the  case  that  a  reasonable  security  situa- 
tion is  a  necessary  condition  for  economic 
development,  social  progress,  and  the 
emergence  of  the  kind  of  political  institu- 
tions that  everyone  wants.  It's  a 
necessary  condition;  those  things  can't 
happen  without  security,  but  it  isn't  a 
sufficient  condition.  And  so,  we  support, 
in  our  program  and  in  our  effort  here,  all 
of  those  additional  things  that  are  the 
essential  ingredients  to  economic 
development,  and  those  cost  money.  All 
elements  of  the  program  were  discussed. 

Q.  Yesterday  in  Colombia,  Am- 
bassador Stone  [Ambassador  at  Large 
and  special  representative  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  Central  America]  said  that 
there  were  problems  and  disagreements 


with  the  Contadora  group.  What  are 
these  disagreements,  and  what  do  they 
consist  of  ? 

A.  Senator  Stone  is  here  and  I  looked 
over  at  him  and  he  shook  his  head,  so  I 
think  the  question  is  on  the  wrong  track. 
Let  me  say,  as  far  as  the  Contadora 
process  is  concerned,  we  support  it,  we 
work  with  it,  the  President  supports  it. 
The  President  has  appointed  an  out- 
standing American,  Senator  Stone,  to 
help  with  those  negotiations.  We  think 
there  is  progress  being  made,  and  we 
hope  that  that  will  continue  and  perhaps 
help  bring  stability  to  this  region. 

Q.  Did  you  raise  the  subject  of  the 
investigation  of  the  slayings  of  the 
four  American  churehwomen  and  [in- 
audible]? 

A.  We  discussed  those  cases,  and  we 
discussed  the  processes  in  which  they 
are  in.  Progress  is  being  made— it  is 
painfully  slow,  but  it's  there.  But  we  did 
discuss  each  one  of  those  cases. 

Q.  Are  you  satisfied  with  that 
progress? 

A.  Of  course,  I  would  wish  that 
things  moved  faster;  it's  been  a  long 
time.  However,  the  cases  are  in  process 
and  action  is  underway. 

Q.  Would  it  pose  a  problem  to 
American  policy  if  Major  D'Aubuisson 
were  elected? 


20 
bHHIfllililHi 


A.  We  believe  in  a  democratic  proc- 
ess, and  we  believe  in  fair  and  open  elec- 
tions. We  believe  that  under  those  cir- 
cumstances you  accept  the  verdict, 
whatever  it  may  be,  of  the  people  who 
do  the  voting. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  of  U.S.  aid  ending 
upon  the  open  marketplace  here? 

A.  Are  you  speaking  of  this  in- 
vestigation of  the  112  cases  that's  been 
reported?  I  guess  there  are  two  cases  in- 
volved. Some  AID  [Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development]  food  appeared  on 
the  marketplace  yesterday  and  our 
people  went  and  corrected  that  situation 
and  removed  it  in  incredibly  fast  action 
on  the  part  of  the  Ambassador. 

Q.  Could  you  describe  the  conversa- 
tion you  had  with  Major  D'Aubuisson 
today? 

A.  Yes,  I  had  a  perfectly  straightfor- 
ward discussion  with  him,  as  I  did  with 
the  other  candidates,  about  such  things 
as  the  nature  of  the  campaign,  theii'  ex- 
pectations about  voter  turnout,  and  the 
kind  of  sense  of  people's  attitude  toward 
the  election  that  they're  having.  In  the 
general  session  at  lunch  where  each 
Presidential  candidate  spoke,  he  as  did 
the  others  spoke  in  defense  of  the 
democratic  process  and  on  behalf  of  the 
importance  of  the  country  and  its  in- 
terests and  the  interests  of  the  people. 

The  United  States  is  neutral  with 
respect  to  who  wins  the  elections,  but  we 
are  not  neutral— we  are  very  much  in 
favor  of  the  democratic  process,  con- 
ducted in  a  fair  and  free  manner,  free 
from  coercion,  open  to  those  who  choose 
to  run,  with  access  by  everybody  to  the 
people,  to  the  media,  and  able  to  express 
their  views  and  opinions  and  put  the 
issues  to  the  voters  as  they  choose.  We 
are  passionately  in  favor  of  the  process, 
but  we  have  no  candidate  in  the  election 
as  such. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 

CARACAS, 

FEB.  2,  1984* 

Today  v\e  celebrate  democracy  in 
Venezuela,  mature  democracy.  But  also, 
as  the  President  said  in  his  stirring  ad- 
dress, democracy  in  Latin  America, 
democracy  in  our  hemisphere,  democracy 
as  a  force  in  the  world  of  supreme  impor- 
tance. The  winners,  of  course,  ai'e  the 
people,  and  I  congratulate  the  people  of 
Venezuela  on  this  great  day. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  role  for  the 
United  Nations  in  the  Falklands/ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


masiiisiiiiiiaaa 


THE  SECRETARY 


Malvinas  Islands  as  far  as  the  security 
or  replacement  of  the  British  troops  in 
the  islands? 

A.  We  have  supported  resolutions  in 
the  United  Nations  and  in  the  OAS 
[Organization  of  American  States]  which 
call  for  peaceful,  negotiated  solutions  to 
problems,  including  that  one,  and  that  is 
our  position.  We  hope  that  the  parties 
can  work  at  that  issue  themselves. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  about  the  ses- 
sion this  morning  with  the  four  Cen- 
tral American  countries,  what  was  said 
in  this  encounter? 

A.  The  meeting  emerged  sort  of 
spontaneously  during  the  reception  last 
night  as  various  people  suggested  it,  and 
we  got  it  organized.  Of  course,  that's  one 
of  the  benefits  of  occasions  like  this. 
People  gather  together,  and  you  have  a 
chance  to  meet  and  talk. 

As  far  as  the  content  of  the  discus- 
sions is  concerned,  of  course,  it's  up  to 
each  country  to  state  its  own  viewpoint. 
I  can  state  what  I  had  to  contribute  in 
the  meeting,  which  was,  first  of  all,  the 
great  impression  that  was  made  on  me 
by  the  visit  to  El  Salvador,  in  particular 
the  luncheon  where  I  heard  all  six  can- 
didates for  president  give  eloquent  sup- 
port to  the  democratic  process.  I  must 
say,  it  plays  into  the  situation  here,  and 
the  progress  of  democracy  in  this  region. 
I  summarized  for  them  the  way  in  which 
the  Administration  is  approaching  the 
report  of  the  bipai-tisan  commission  and 
our  effort  to  encompass  it  together  as  a 
package,  and  the  plans  of  the  President 
to  put  this  back  into  the  process  of  put- 
ting that  package  over  and  getting  con- 
gressional support  for  it.  Of  course,  it  is 
bipartisan  in  its  composition,  the  commis- 
sion is,  so  we  have  good  hope  that  it  will 
materialize.  Of  course,  in  the  process 
itself— the  Contadora  process— we  are 
now  in  the  stage  of  working  groups  that 
in  a  sense  are  seeking  to  transform  the 
general  principles  of  the  21  points  into 
more  operational  matters,  and  all  of  the 
countries  which  took  part  in  the 
breakfast  meeting  are  involved  in  that. 
We  discussed  that  subject  and  its  impor- 
tance. 

Q.  Does  it  disturb  you,  does  it 
bother  you  the  harder  line  adopted  by 
Saudi  Arabia?  Do  you  think  that  this 
could  erode  the  support  that  they  have 
for  the  presence  of  Marine  troops  in 
Lebanon? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  you're  talking 
about.  I've  been  busy  all  day  and  you 
have  been  scratching  around. 


April  1984 


Q.  What  happened  is  that  the 
Crown  Prince  spoke  with  a  group 
yesterday  and  said  that  the  United 
States  and  Israel  ought  to  get  out  of 
Lebanon.  He  said  that  he  didn't  even 
know  why  they  were  there.  It  seems  to 
me  that  this  would  erode  the  position, 
the  posture  of  your  government  saying 
that  they  need  to  be  there  to  pursue 
the  credibility  that  they  need  to  have 
with  the  moderate  Arab  governments. 

A.  The  United  States  is  there  at  the 
expressed  urgent  invitation  of  the 
Government  of  Lebanon,  and  it  stays 
there  at  the  urgent  request  of  the 
Government  of  Lebanon.  I  think  it's  im- 
portant to  remind  ourselves  that  thei-e  is 
a  legitimate  Government  of  Lebanon  pro- 
duced out  of  the  parliament  of  Lebanon 
and  it  is  that  government  that  has  asked 
for  our  support,  and  we  have  given  it. 

As  far  as  the  attitudes  of  other  coun- 
tries are  concerned,  in  the  region,  of 
course,  we've  had  many  conversations 
with  the  heads  of  government  in  Saudi 
Arabia,  .Jordan,  Egypt,  and  so  forth,  and 
the  uniform  advice  we  get  is  that  we 
should  stay  there.  But  we  have  no  inten- 
tion of  staying  there  forever.  We're 
there  to  help  achieve  a  purpose.  We  are 
there  along  with  the  forces  of  many 
other  countries.  And  that  purpose  is  to 
see  emerge  a  Lebanon  that  has  no 
foreign  forces  in  it;  no  Israeli  forces,  not 
Syrian  forces,  not  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization]  forces,  not  Iranian 
forces,  not  Libyan  forces,  and  not  forces 
from  the  MNF  [multinational  force]. 

Our  objective  is  to  create  something 
in  Lebanon  that  can  be  peaceful  and 
stable,  and  I  think  that  is  what,  from  all 
the  indications  that  I've  heard,  the  Saudi 
Arabian  Government  wants  too. 

So  far  as  the  Israeli  forces  are  con- 
cerned, Israel  is  the  one  major  country 
with  forces  in  the  region  that  has  ex- 
plicitly agreed  to  withdraw  totally.  Now 
what  is  needed  in  Lebanon  is  an  agree- 
ment for  Syi'ia  to  withdraw  as  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  has  asked  them 
to  do. 

Q.  The  Contadora  group  has 
adopted  principles  that  are  against  any 
military  .solution.  The  bipartisan  com- 
mission, however,  has  suggested  that 
an  increase  in  military  aid  be  given  to 
El  Salvador  and  other  countries.  How 
can  the  United  States  say  that  it  con- 
tinues to  support  Contadora? 


A.  The  Contadora  21  principles  are 
comprehensive  in  scope  just  as  the 
recommendations  of  the  bipartisan 
Kissinger  commission  are  comprehensive 
in  scope.  The  big  point  in  all  of  this  is 
that  there  are  a  number  of  factors  that 
have  to  operate  together,  and  if  one  falls 
they  all  fall.  There  must  be  secui-ity; 
there  must  be  economic  development; 
there  must  be  democi-acy  and  political 
conditions  that  are  humane  in  the  way 
people  are  treated,  and  access  to  a 
legitimate  judicial  sy.stem.  Those  are  the 
things  that  are  needed.  If  you  take  away 
the  security  shield  in  the  face  of  the 
Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan  aggression,  an 
effort  to  upset  the  region,  then  you  can't 
have  economic  development;  you  don't 
have  the  kind  of  political  system  that  we 
are  honoring  here  in  Venzuela  today;  you 
substitute  for  it  a  totalitarian  and 
repressive  system.  All  of  these  things 
have  to  go  together. 

Security  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
the  objectives  we  seek,  but  it  is  not  a 
sufficient  condition.  We  need  the  political 
conditions,  we  need  the  economic  condi- 
tions that  will  lead  to  the  kind  of  life  that 
people  want.  We  must  have  all  of  these 
together  or  else  we  do  not  achieve  our 
objectives. 

Q.  Returning  to  the  question  of  the 
Falklands,  what  is  your  assessment  of 
the  suggestion  made  yesterday  by 
President  Alfonsin  that  a  UN  peace 
force  may  be  sent  to  the  islands  as  a 
guarantee  for  Argentina? 

A.  Our  position  is  as  I  stated  it.  We 
support  a  peaceful  resolution  of  disputes 
of  this  kind,  and  we  support  a  pi'ocess  of 
negotiations  involving  the  British  and 
the  Ai'gentines.  As  far  as  responses  to 
the  suggestions  that  one  or  the  other 
makes,  it  is  up  to  the  other  party  to  re- 
spond, we  will  be  interested  observers. 

Q.  It  is  well  known  that  the  United 
States  supports  the  efforts  of 
Contadora  in  searching  for  peace  and 
stability  in  Central  America.  Would 
your  country  agree  with  the  idea  of 
having  the  Contadora  group  monitor- 
ing the  coming  election  in  Nicaragua? 

A.  First  of  all,  of  course,  there  are  a 
lot  of  questions  that  need  to  be  asked 
about  the  announced  elections  in 
Nicaragua.  Under  what  conditions  will 
they  be  held?  Will  there  be  the  kind  of 
structure  that  allows  opposition  political 
parties  to  operate?  Will  there  be  freedom 
of  the  press  and  access  to  the  press  by 
candidates  so  that  their  positions  can  be 
put  before  people?  Will  there  be  freedom 
to  assemble  and  wall  political  parties  be 
allowed  to  be  formed  and  to  assemble 


21 


THE  SECRETARY 


people  and  talk  to  them  and  urge  their 
support  and  so  on?  There  are  a  whole  set 
of  questions  about  the  structure  of  any 
election  which  are  being  struggled  with 
in  other  countries. 

And,  of  course,  then  there  is  the  con- 
duct of  the  election  itself,  an  assurance 
that  the  election  is  fair,  that  the  people 
who  ought  to  vote  have  the  ability  to  do 
so  and  that  the  votes  are  counted  prop- 
erly and  accounted  for  in  the  proper 
manner. 

Whether  the  Contadora  group  as 
such  is  a  reasonable  sponsoring  agency 
for  all  of  these  activities  would  be  a 
question  mark;  there  are  others  that 
have  done  it.  But  the  important  thing  is 
that  if  there  has  to  be  an  electoral  proc- 
ess that  it  be  observed  not  only  at  the 
moment  when  people  vote  but  also  all 
the  preliminary  aspects  of  it  which  make 
an  election  really  mean  something.  An 
election  just  as  an  election  doesn't 
necessarily  mean  anything.  There  are 
elections  held  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
all  they  mean  is  that  the  idea  of  an  elec- 
tion is  so  powerful  that  even  though  they 
don't  respect  it  as  a  process,  they  feel 
they  have  to  use  it.  I  think  that  is  the 
nature  of  the  whole  process  that  needs 
observation,  not  just  the  moment  of 
voting. 

Q.  Don't  you  think  that  the  deci- 
sion of  the  United  Kingdom  to  fortify 
the  Falklands/Malvinas  might  cause  a 
danger  to  all  of  Latin  America,  all  of 
South  America,  because  the  Soviet 
Union  might  decide  to  respond  by 
building  a  base  in  Africa,  on  the 
African  coast,  for  example? 

A.  There  is  a  dispute  between  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Argentina  about 
the  Falklands.  Our  position  is  that  this  is 
the  sort  of  dispute  that  should  be  settled 
as  others,  by  peaceful  means,  and  we 
supported  the  UN  and  OAS  resolutions 
to  encourage  that.  You  can  ask  me  that 
question  in  any  way  you  want,  and  I  will 
give  you  the  same  answer. 

Q.  There  are  reports  in  Washington 
today,  both  from  the  Defense  Depart- 
ment and  the  Hill,  saying  that  you  are 
the  principal  stumbling  block  in  get- 
ting the  Marines  out  of  Lebanon. 
Would  you  like  to  comment  on  this? 

A.  The  principal  stumbling  block  in 
getting  the  Marines  out  of  Lebanon  are 
those  people  who  seek  to  make  it  diffi- 
cult to  create  stability  in  Lebanon,  to  im- 
plement the  broader  governmental  ar- 
rangements that  President  Gemayel 
seeks,  who  do  not  agree  to  withdraw 
their  forces  and  thereby  thwart  the  idea 
of  a  sovereign  Lebanon  free  of  foreign 


forces.  It  is  that  fact  that  those  things 
haven't  emerged  that  keeps  the  Marines 
in  Lebanon,  that  keeps  the  multinational 
force  in  Lebanon,  and  we  want  to  see 
progress  toward  those  ends.  We  are 
there  at  the  invitation  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Lebanon  to  help  bring  that  kind 
of  stability,  and  it's  the  opponents  of  the 
stability  that  are  the  reason  why  the 
MNF  continues  to  be  there  and  con- 
tinues to  seek  that  mission. 

Q.  Commander  Daniel  Ortega  got 
some  big  headlines  yesterday  saying 
that  besides  the  formal  recommenda- 
tions in  the  report,  that  privately  the 
Kissinger  commission  had  recom- 
mended an  invasion  of  Nicaragrua  and 
of  El  Salvador  by  the  United  States  in 
order  to  protect  its  interests  in  Central 
America. 

A.  I  have  been  at  all  the  meetings 
that  the  commisioners  have  had  with  the 
President;  they  must  have  been  well 
publicized.  The  allegation  must  be  a  fig- 
ment of  his  imagination.  At  the  same 
time,  there  is  a  very  important  message 
there.  In  order  to  keep  conjuring  up  that 
image,  Mr.  Ortega  and  his  colleagues 
must  be  worried,  and  if  I  were  them,  I 
would  be  worried  too.  After  all  they  are 
the  people  who  betrayed  their  revolu- 
tion. They  are  the  people  who  have 
harassed  the  church  and  the  Pope.  They 
are  the  people  who  declared  an  amnesty 
and  then  found  that  they  had  to  see  Mis- 
quito  Indians  leave,  being  harassed  as 
they  left.  They  are  the  people  who  have 
suppressed  the  press.  They  are  the 
people  who  have  built  up  an  armed  force 
that  goes  far  beyond  anything  that 
anyone  could  conceivably  think  is  needed 
for  their  own  defense  and  internal  secu 
rity.  So  they  have  a  lot  to  apologize  for 
and,  as  I  say,  as  they  look  at  what  they 
have  done  and   compare  it,  let's  say, 
with  what  is  being  celebrated  here  in 
Venezuela,  it's  no  wonder  they're  wor- 
ried. Thev  should  be. 


REMARKS, 
BRASILIA, 
FEB.  6.  19843 

We  complete  today  the  task  assigned  to 
us  just  over  1  year  ago  by  our 
Presidents  to  explore  ways  of  expanding 
our  cooperation.  We  have  done  so  by 
working  on  five  areas  of  great  impor- 
tance to  both  countries— economic  issues, 
nuclear  energy,  science  and  technology, 
space,  and  industrial/militarj'  activities. 


These  areas  are  of  great  interest  in 
part  because  they  contain  issues  that 
have  troubled  our  relations  for  some 
time.  Seeking  an  understanding  on  issues 
that  were,  in  some  instances,  a  source  of 
persistent  misunderstanding  was  not  an 
easy  task.  The  mission  we  were  assigned 
was  an  ambitious  one.  It  could  have  been 
conceived  only  by  leaders  of  vision  who 
would  not  allow  themselves  to  be 
discouraged  by  pessimists  recalling 
divergent  interests  and  old  grievances. 

You  and  I,  as  cochairmen,  accepted 
this  responsibility  and  launched  the  proc- 
ess after  careful  preparation.  We  both 
put  able  people  to  work.  We  encouraged 
their  efforts.  In  some  cases,  we  made 
hard  decisions  in  order  to  ensure  their 
progress.  Now  that  we  have  concluded 
our  work,  I  believe  we  can  be  proud  of 
our  accomplishments. 

First,  the  economic  group:  Here  our 
delegations  approached  their  subject 
with  differing  perspectives;  one  with  the 
perspective  of  a  developing  country,  the 
other  with  the  perspective  of  an  in- 
dustrialized country.  But  both  sides 
recognized  the  seriousness  of  the  world 
economic  situation.  In  vei-y  frank  and 
direct  discussions,  they  succeeded  in  nar- 
rowing the  differences  and  expanding 
the  areas  of  agreement.  They  agreed 
that: 

•  Protectionism  is  harmful  to  both 
countries  and  to  the  entii-e  trading 
world; 

•  We  should  seek  to  expand  trade  in 
both  dii'ections;  and 

•  We  must  strive  to  reduce  inflation 
and  interest  rates  and  to  strengthen  in- 
ternational financial  institutions. 

Our  positions  on  a  number  of 
economic  issues  still  do  not  coincide.  We 
have  learned,  however,  that  our  views 
are  less  far  apart  than  at  first  they 
seemed.  Having  set  a  framework  and 
having  acknowledged  the  importance  of 
harmonizing  our  views,  we  should  con- 
tinue to  work  together  in  a  determined 
effort  to  resolve  our  differences. 

Second,  the  nuclear  working  group 
found  new  possibilities  for  cooperation  in 
nuclear  energy.  Our  experts  found  a 
means  to  eliminate  the  longstanding  fric- 
tion surrounding  the  resupply  of  fuel  for 
ANGRA  1  and  agreed  on  a  procedure  to 
rework  defective  fuel  elements  that  had 
been  stored  for  some  years  in  Brazil. 
They  also  enumerated  several  projects  of 
mutual  interest  on  which  Brazilian  and 
American  experts  could  work  together. 
Most  importantly,  the  discussion  im- 
proved our  understanding  of  each  other's 


22 


jT^BUHmjumimmnimni 


THE  SECRETARY 


nuclear  objectives.  The  personal  relations 
established  in  the  process  and  the  joint 
efforts  to  be  undertaken  will  lead  to  a 
major  increase  in  contacts  during  the 
coming  months. 

Third,  the  industrial/military  group 
reached  an  understanding  that  creates  a 
basis  for  greater  cooperation  between 
our  industrial  sectors.  This  understand- 
ing will  facilitate  the  inter-governmental 
consideration  of  technology  transfers 
and,  thereby,  facilitate  the  binational 
programs. 

Fourth,  the  working  group  on  science 
and  technology  negotiated  a  new  agree- 
ment that  will: 

•  E.xpand  private  sector  industrial 
cooperation  in  research  and  development; 

•  Strengthen  cooperation  between 
government  agencies  in  agriculture, 
health,  oceanography,  natural  resources, 
basic  sciences,  environment,  engineering, 
and  industrial  technology;  and 

•  Lead  to  the  creation  of  a  bilateral 
commission  to  oversee  a  general  expan- 
sion of  science  and  technology  coopera- 
tion between  the  United  States  and 
Brazil. 

Fifth,  and  finally,  the  space  group 
outlined  a  program  for  practical  activities 
vital  to  modern  life— weather  forecasting, 
remote  sensing,  and  atmospheric  science. 
A  Brazilian  payload  specialist  is  expected 
to  perform  experiments  with  Brazilian 
equipment  aboard  our  space  shuttle 
before  the  end  of  the  decade.  The  hope 
President  Reagan  expressed  during  his 
visit  14  months  ago  will  be  realized. 

With  the  work  accomplished  so  far, 
we  believe  the  way  has  been  opened  to 
move  rapidly  from  a  broad  policy  of 
cooperation  to  specific  projects  of  benefit 
to  both  countries.  We  could  foresee,  for 
example,  technical  cooperation  in 
oceanographic  exploration,  including 
deep  ocean  drilling.  Brazil  last  fall 
became  a  consultative  party  to  the 
Antarctic  Treaty,  and  we  are  looking  for- 
ward to  cooperative  research  in  the 
Antarctic.  The  United  States  and  Brazil 
are  currently  defining  the  terms  of 
reference  for  cooperation  in  mapping, 
charting,  and  geodesy.  We  are  also  in- 
terested in  joint  energy  technology 
research,  particularly  in  coal  gasification. 

The  industrial/military  understanding 
opens  new  fields  for  joint  endeavor. 
Where  it  will  lead  depends  on  the  in- 
genuity of  those  in  our  two  governments 
and  in  our  private  sectors  who  have  long 
wanted  to  explore  possibilities  of 
cooperation. 


April  1984 


In  trade  and  finance,  we  are  working 
closely  to  harmonize  and  expand  our 
relations.  Because  the  United  States  is 
already  the  largest  market  for  Brazilian 
exports,  I  am  convinced  that  Brazil  will 
expand  its  sales  to  the  United  States, 
particularly  now  that  our  economy  is 
again  steadily  expanding.  Similarly,  we 
e.xpect  that  tj.S.  exports  to  Brazil  will 
also  begin  to  expand  once  more.  Trade 
must  flow  in  both  directions  if  it  is  to 
have  a  firm  basis. 

In  finance,  we  and  many  others  are 
cooperating  to  support  Brazil's  efforts  to 
overcome  its  short-term  liquidity  crisis. 
Considering  the  good  judgment  and 
responsible  attitudes  I  have  seen  from 
everyone  concerned,  I  am  confident  that 
Brazil  will  find  a  satisfactory  solution  to 
its  financial  difficulty. 

We  all  can  take  satisfaction  in  the 
completion  of  our  task.  The  ac- 
complishments of  the  working  groups 
will  serve  both  countries.  More  impor- 
tant, for  the  longer  term,  we  have 
proved  that  President  Figueiredo  was 
right  when  he  said  in  1982  that  our  coun- 
tries, though  at  different  positions  in  the 
international  order,  can  engage  in  con- 
structive dialogue.  The  United  States 
and  Brazil,  he  correctly  judged,  know 
how  to  take  into  account  each  other's 
situation,  realistically  harmonizing  their 
respective  interests  and  objectives. 

I  congratulate  everyone  who  par- 
ticipated in  the  working  groups  and  hope 
their  spirit  and  skill  will  help  us  all  to 
build  on  the  ground  they  have  broken. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
ST.  GEORGE'S, 
FEB.  7,  1984^ 

I'd  like  to  express  my  appreciation  to  the 
Governor  General  and  the  chairman  of 
the  Advisory  Council  and  members  for 
what  they  are  doing  and  the  quick  effort 
they  are  making  to  rearrange  the  situa- 
tion here  in  Grenada  and  to  move  this 
country  forward  in  a  democratic  manner 
and  give  it  a  chance  for  economic  vitality 
and  the  kind  of  progress  that  this  lovely 
setting  certainly  deserves.  I  felt  it  a 
privilege  to  meet  with  them  and  hear 
their  comments,  not  only  about  what 
they  plan  to  do  but  about  their  ex- 
periences, particularly  the  Governor 
General  went  through  in  his  own  ordeal 
in  bringing  the  situation  to  its  present 
spot.  He  expresses,  as  others  did,  great 
appreciation  to  the  United  States,  to  the 
President,  and  they  did  so  with  elo- 
quence and  great  sincerity  and  meaning. 
But  I  had  to  say  for  my  part  that  I  ap- 
preciated very  much  all  that  they  have 
done  and  are  doing. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  discussion 
you've  had  regarding  the  feasibility  of 
making  the  airport  here  of  a  greater 
degree  of  implement  role  of  the  United 
States? 

A.  The  question  of  completion  of  the 
airport  is  very  much  on  everyone's  mind 
and  it  was  discussed  everywhere  I  went. 
The  situation  is  that  a  study  team  has 


In  Brasilia,  the  Secretary  held  discussions 
with  President  Joao  Figueiredo. 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


been  here  and  has  evaluated  what  needs 
to  be  done  and  its  costs  and  the  potential 
of  it.  That  report  is  now  cii-culating  in 
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget 
and  the  White  House.  It  was  done  under 
AID  direction,  and  we  expect  we  would 
come  to  a  conclusion  about  it.  I  must  say, 
from  my  own  standpoint  having  landed 
there  and  looked  around  a  little,  it's  cer- 
tainly a  facility  that  is  needed  here  in 
one  way  or  another  and  I'm  sure  it  will 
be  completed. 

Q.  Thirty-six  Americans  have  been 
evacuated  from  Beirut.  Do  you  expect 
to  evacuate  any  more  Americans? 

A.  Dependents  have  left— almost  all 
left.  I  think  the  problem  is  not  so  much 
their— certainly  isn't  at  all  —concern 
about  risk  to  them  but  I  think  in  the  at- 
mosphere in  Lebanon  right  now,  wath 
the  tactics  of  terror  against  individuals 
that  the  presence  of  dependents  just  of- 
fered the  opportunity  for  hostages,  and 
we  felt  it  was  an  opportunity  we  just 
didn't  want  to  [inaudible]. 

Q.  Will  there  be  any  more  evacua- 
tions? 

A.  No.  That  has  taken  place  for  the 
reason  that  I  described. 

Q.  What  would  your  thinking  be 
about  a  Caribbean  and  East  Caribbean 
security  force,  a  collective  security 
force?  Would  Grenada  be  a  member  or 
should  it? 

A.  Grenada,  of  course,  has  been  a 
member  of  the  East  Caribbean  group 
that  formed  their  own  treaty  organiza- 
tion into  which  we  responded,  so  I 
presume  that  Grenada  would  be  a  part  of 
whatever  emerges.  It  is,  I  think,  clear 
that  it's  difficult  for  a  small  island, 
smaller  than  Grenada,  to  form  their  own 
security  force,  and  so  it  makes  sense  that 
what  you  can't  do  alone  perhaps  you  can 
do  on  a  collective  basis.  But  precisely 
what  the  details  of  that  should  be  and 
how  it  should  work  is  primarily  up  to  the 
people  of  this  region.  Certainly  the 
United  States  will  be  a  very  interested 
part  of  the  discussion,  and  we  want  to  be 
helpful. 

Q.  How  much  money  has  the 
United  States  [inaudible]  in  Grenada? 

A.  I  don't  have  a  number  off  the  top 
of  my  head  on  that.  If  you  spoke  of  it 
comprehensively,  you  would  have  to  in- 
clude the  cost  of  the  rescue  operation 
and  then  the  funds  that  have  gone  into 
immediate  aid,  and  then  there  are  some 
substantial  funds  that  are  uncommitted 
at  this  point.  But  it  will  be  [inaudible]  I 


In  Grenada  Secretary  Shultz  is  .shown  the  Point  Salines  airport  by  U.S.  Ambassador 
Charles  A.  Gillespie,  Jr. 


guess.  I  don't  have  a  number  in  my  head 
but  it  certainly  is  in  the  many  millions  of 
dollars. 

Q.  Will  the  United  States  maintain 
a  military  presence  here  after  the  elec- 
tions are  held? 

A.  All  the  combat  forces  of  the 
United  States  have  long  since  left  and 
the  number  of  U.S.  personnel  is  down  to 
280  on  the  ground.  "Then  thei-e  is  a  Coast 
Guard  contingent  adding  another  100—75 
to  100— and  they  are  on  the  ground  but 
they  are  in  the  vicinity,  if  you  can  catch 
them  or  not.  But  that's  the  number  that 
are  here.  Their  primary  mission  is  to 
help  maintain  security  conditions  on  the 
island.  Our  desire  is  not  to  stay  here  in 
that  posture.  The  sooner  we  can  be 
replaced  by  people  from  other  islands 
nearby  or  from  other  countries  or  as 
time  goes  on  by  Grenadians  trained  in 
police-type  work,  the  better.  And  we 
want  to  see  that  take  place  as  promptly 
as  possible.  I  don't  have  an  estimate  on 
when  that  would  be. 

Q.  The  same  Marine  unit  that 
landed  in  north  Grenada  and  came 
south  is  the  same  that's  in  Beirut.  Do 
you  see  our  projection  of  an  American 
force,  for  instance  this  Marine  unit,  as 
foreign  policy  tools  that  can  be  used  in 
the  future  such  as  President  Reagan 
[inaudible]? 

A.  The  Marines,  any  particular  unit 
of  Marines,  have  a  special  experience  like 
this  one  did,  but  I  don't  think  that 
should  single  out  this  unit  as  something 


special.  All  Marines  are  special,  including 
the  unit  you  mentioned. 

Certainly  the  question  of  the  use  of 
force  is  something  that  must  be  con- 
sidered always  very  carefully.  The 
armed  forces  mission,  primarily,  is  a  mis- 
sion of  deterrence,  and  that  is  the 
primai-y  effort  we  make.  I  do  think  that 
there  are  a  great  many  situations  likely 
around  the  world  where  the  situation  is 
rather  ambiguous  as  to  who  the  good 
guys  are  and  who  the  bad  guys  are, 
where  we  have  considerable  interests 
and  where  military  capability  as  well  as 
diplomacy  both  have  potential  roles  and 
where  the  interests  of  our  country  can 
be  served  if  we  are  able  to  sustain  a 
coordinated  effort.  And  I  think  it's  one  of 
the  questions  we  have  to  ask  ourselves— 
whether  or  not  it's  possible,  not  in  large- 
scale  situations  but  in  very  particular 
rather  ambiguous  situations,  if  we  know 
how  to  play  a  role.  And  the  Marines,  of 
course,  are  among  the  units  that  would 
be  useful  in  that  regard,  but  they  would 
not  be  the  only  ones  by  any  means  in  the 
armed  forces. 

Q.  Did  the  Grenadian  leadership  of- 
fer you  any  assurance  concerning  an 
election  timetable? 

A.  They  want  to  have  elections  as 
soon  as  it's  possible  to  have  them  on  a 
sensible  basis.  The  process  is  going  for- 
ward in  a  very  impressive  way.  A  com- 
missioner has  been  named.  There  will 
shortly  be  a  process  identified  for  regis- 
tration. The  registration  activity  itself 
will  be  getting  going  probably  in  March, 


*of' 


24 


i.l.».U..».HH,.«..».«....— 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


as  I  understand  it.  Of  course,  the  process 
of  registration  then  tends  to  bring  for- 
ward political  activity  and,  as  the  Gover- 
nor General  said,  he  hopes  that  an  elec- 
tion—or he  stated  flatly  that  an  election 
would  be  held  before  the  end  of  the  yeai-. 
Precisely  when  that  would  be,  I  think  he 
feels  and  I  would  share  that  view,  he 
doesn't  want  to  set  an  exact  date  until 
he  sees  how  the  processes  that  are  in 
motion  are  going.  But  it's  very  clear  that 
he  is  dedicated  to  putting  a  democratic 
government  in  place  as  soon  as  possible. 

Q.  Did  you  get  an  exact  date  as  to 
when  the  American  troops  will  be  pull- 
ing out?  And  during  the  meeting  which 
you  had  today,  was  there  any  request 
from  Grenada  to  you  for  additional 
security  and  how  that  security  be  car- 
ried out? 

A.  There  are  no  American  troops 
here  in  a  combat  sense.  They  have  all 
been  withdrawn  long  since.  I  think  in  the 
middle  of  December,  they  were  all 
withdrawn.  What  remains  are  a  rela- 
tively small  number  which  are  here 
on  request  to  help  maintain  security  con- 
ditions, and  I  said  in  response  to  the 
previous  question  1  don't  have  a  date  to 
state  as  to  when  they  will  leave.  It 
depends  on  when  adequate  replacements 
can  be  put  in  place. 

Q.  Many  Grenadians  are  concerned 
about  the  status  of  Bernard  Coard  and 
other  alleged  people  implicated.  Have 
you  had  any  discussion  with  officials 
here  about  what  happens  to  them? 

A.  The  Governor  Genei-al  brought  up 
the  subject  of  detainees  and  wishes  to 
see  that  as  soon  as  possible  there  are 
none  who  are  detained  without  charges. 
There  is  a  process  under  way  to  see  that 
information  is  developed  properly  that 
bears  upon  the  potential  charges  against 
those  who  are  being  detained.  And  the 
Governor  General's  desire,  as  he  ex- 
pressed it  to  me,  is  to  have  this  process 
be  completed  as  soon  as  possible  and  at 
the  time  to  conduct  it  in  an  orderly  and 
careful  way  and  that's  what's  going  for- 
ward. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  week  ago  last  Mon- 
day the  decision  to  keep  the  troops  un- 
til elections  [inaudible]. 

A.  The  discussion  we  had  about 
security— obviously  it's  necessary  in  any 
organized  community  to  have  a  way  of 
keeping  law  and  order.  That's  the  first 
role  of  government  and  the  sooner  it  can 
be  taken  over  by  the  Grenadians 
themselves  the  better. 


As  far  as  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned, as  soon  as  somebody  else  can 
assume  this  burden  the  closer  to 
Grenada  the  better— we'll  be  pleased 
with  that.  We  didn't  discuss  a  date,  or  I 
wasn't  asked  to  make  a  commitment  that 
our  current  forces  would  stay  until  the 
elections.  It  was  more  in  terms  of  a  com- 
mon agi'eement  that  security  is  impor- 
tant, and  in  one  way  or  the  other  it  will 
be  maintained. 

Q.  Grenada  is  a  subject  that  a  lot 
of  Americans  read  about  and  saw  it  on 
television,  yourself  included.  How  does 
it  differ  in  reality  from  what  you 
imagined? 

A.  It's  nicer;  it's  really  a  lovely  place. 
I  suppose  physically,  the  terrain  is  more 
rugged  than  I  imagined.  But,  of  course,  I 
have  only  seen  a  portion  of  it.  But  it  cer- 
tainly is  a  lovely  piece  of  real  estate. 

Q.  The  full  study  says  [inaudible] 
certainly  is  needed  here.  This  seems  to 
conflict  with  the  President  in  his  "star 
wars"  speech  accusing  the  airport  of 
having  no  needs  other  than  as  a 
military  base. 

A.  I  think  what  you  referred  to  as 
the  "star  wars"  speech  dealt  with  a  dif- 
ferent subject.  But  he  did  make  a  speech 
in  which  the  airport  was  shown.  The 
question  is  not  about  an  airport  of  this 
sort;  it's  a  que.stion  of  what  it  is  to  be 
used  for.  And  the  President's  statement 
in  the  speech  was  that  this  airport  was 
being  built  for  purposes  of  a  military 
base  and  a  militai-y  operation. 
I  think  that  we  must  all  agree  that  when 
you  look  at  what  was  captured  here  and 
the  tremendous  volume  of  armaments 
and  uniforms  and  so  forth,  it  was  clear 
that  wasn't  designed  for  protecting  the 
security  of  Grenada.  It  was  designed  to 
carry  on  aggressive  action— that  which 
seems  to  me  vindicates  what  the  Presi- 
dent said.  Now  the  regime  here  is  dif- 
ferent. And  there  is  no  aggressive  intent 
involved.  The  airport  is  needed  for  the 
purpose  of  having  the  kind  of  airplanes 
that  could  carry  tourists  and  others  to 
places  like  this  and  land— they  can't  land 
at  the  other  airport.  So  it's  needed  for 
that  pui-po.se.  As  I  understand  it,  the 
idea  of  the  airport  goes  way  back  foi-  this 
purpose. 

Q.  What's  the  security  threat  at  the 
moment  you  were  talking  about? 

A.  The  security  problem  is  the  same 
kind  of  problem  we  have  in  Washington 
or  New  York  or  anywhere  else.  An 
orderly  society  has  to  have  means  of 
maintaining  law  and  order.  So  you  have 
to  have  a  police  force  and  an  ability  to 


see  that  orderly  conrlitions  are  main- 
tained. I  think  it's  just  as  simple  as  that. 
I  don't  know  of  any  concern  that  there 
are  people  in  the  hills  or  what  not  that 
ai'e  going  to  attack  the  island  or  any  no- 
tion of  an  invasion  or  something  of  that 
kind,  although  to  the  e.xtent  that 
anybody  might  worry  about  that,  I  sup- 
pose that's  one  of  the  functions  of  our 
Coast  Guard. 

Q.  What  are  the  plans  of  the 
United  States  for  security  in  the  whole 
Caribbean  area? 

A.  Our  plans  are  to  discuss  this  issue 
with  the  people  who  live  here,  and  since 
we're  neighbors  and  we  have  been  in- 
volved, obviou.sly,  in  this  particular 
operation,  we'll  be  very  interested  par- 
ticipants in  that  discussion.  I  believe  that 
secui'ity,  obviously,  has  a  military  dimen- 
sion to  it.  But  deep  down  security  has  to 
do  with  the  political  condition  under 
which  people  live— whether  they're  free, 
whether  they're  able  to  express 
themselves  and  live  a  life  that  they  want 
to,  and  whether  or  not  they're  able  to 
realize  the  opportunities  and  abilities 
that  they  have.  Political  conditions  and 
economic  conditions  are  essential 
elements  in  security  as  well  as  what  im- 
mediately comes  to  mind— namely  the 
military  side  of  it. 


LUNCHEON  TOAST, 
BRH)GETOWN, 
FEB.  8,  19845 

The  spirit  and  the  content  of  our 
meeting  this  morning  should  ring 
throughout  the  hemisphere.  Democracy 
and  the  rule  of  law,  economic  develop- 
ment and  well-being  for  our  countries 
and  peoples,  security  and  a  shield 
against  aggression— these  objectives 
were  our  agenda.  They  are  very  much 
the  agenda  throughout  the  Americas. 

I  came  here  to  address  these  issues 
in  a  spirit  of  partnership.  I  found 
strength,  leadership,  and  hope.  I  found 
you  to  be  genuine  partners,  as  you  were 
in  our  joint  rescue  mission  for  Grenada. 

Good  partners  make  good  neighbors. 
President  Reagan  is  determined  that  the 
United  States  will  be  a  good  partner 
here  in  the  Caribbean  and  in  every  part 
of  this  hemisphere. 

Each  of  our  countries  is  unique,  but 
there  is  a  powerful  sense  in  which  our 
problems  are  common  and  their  solu- 
tions related.  We  all  must  coordinate 
our  actions  and  help  each  other  if  we  are 
to  make  progress. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Today  is  the  culmination  of  a  trip 
that  took  me  to  Central  and  South 
America  and  now  to  the  Caribbean.  Dur- 
ing the  last  8  days,  I  have  met  with 
political  leaders  and  businessmen,  with 
journalists  and  military  men,  and  with 
all  of  our  ambassadors  to  Central  and 
South  America. 

I  would  like  to  share  with  you  some 
reflections  on  where  the  hemisphere 
stands  today  and  what  lies  ahead. 

Democracy 

My  first  thought  goes  to  the  importance 
of  democracy.  Two  years  ago,  address- 
ing the  Organization  of  American  States 
to  announce  the  Caribbean  Basin  Ini- 
tiative, President  Reagan  said  that  if 
they  work  together: 

.  .  .  our  many  nations  can  live  in  peace, 
each  with  its  own  customs  and  language  and 
culture  but  sharing  a  love  for  freedom  and  a 
determination  to  resist  outside  ideologies  that 
would  take  us  back  to  colonialism. 

I  want  to  emphasize  the  President's 
last  phrase:  "sharing  a  love  for  freedom 
and  a  determination  to  resist  outside 
ideologies  that  would  take  us  back  to 
colonialism."  If  there  is  one  thing  that 
all  the  nations  of  the  hemisphere  have  in 
common,  it  is  that  every  single  country 
in  this  hemisphere  was  at  one  time  a 
colony.  When  Latin  Americans  fought 
for  independence  in  the  19th  century, 
the  United  States,  remembering  its  own 
revolution,  felt  a  sense  of  solidarity  with 
them.  And  as  the  island  nations  of  the 
Caribbean  have  earned  their  independ- 
ence over  this  past  generation,  that 
solidarity  has  been  renewed. 

We  have  learned  that  independence 
does  not  automatically  bring  democracy 
and  freedom  in  its  wake.  Our  own  na- 
tion, like  many  others  in  the  Americas, 
tolerated  slavery  for  almost  a  century. 
But  we  also  know  that  a  society  that 
guarantees  all  its  citizens  equality  under 
the  law,  civil  rights,  social  justice,  and 
human  dignity  can  fulfill  the  promise  of 
national  independence. 

We  can  take  pride  in  the  fact  that 
today  more  than  90%  of  all  the  people  of 
this  New  World  live  under  democracies 
or  under  regimes  in  transition  to 
democracy.  The  recent  elections  in 
Argentina  were  a  dramatic  reconfirma- 
tion of  this  general  trend. 

Yet  the  job  of  building  democracy  is 
not  finished.  We  must  strengthen 
freedom,  expand  economic  well-being, 
and  defend  ourselves  against  the  new 
colonialism  of  communism.  I  tell  you 
now  that  the  success  of  the  democratic 
enterprise  in  this  hemisphere  is  not  a 


26 
BHIiilililiiiiiiliieiBiiiiayill 


matter  of  indifference  to  the  United 
States.  Democracy  is  at  once  the  founda- 
tion and  the  objective  of  our  coopera- 
tion. 

All  of  us  in  this  room  share  the  bond 
of  democratic  solidarity.  We  all  live  it. 
And  we  all  know  that  without  democ- 
racy, our  cooperation  in  Grenada,  and  all 
that  it  means  for  regional  security, 
would  have  lacked  the  popular  support  it 
receives  in  each  of  our  countries. 

Nor  is  democracy's  appeal  limited  to 
those  who  already  have  it.  It  remains 
the  standard  even  when  the  struggle  for 
it  is  most  arduous.  In  El  Salvador  last 
week,  I  found  that  the  yearning  of  de- 
cent people  for  democracy  is  strong  and 
their  spirit  unbroken.  I  found  a  country 
and  a  government  that  want  democracy 
and  are  committed  to  achieving  it.  The 
candidates  for  the  presidency  of  El 
Salvador  all  told  me  how  they  have  been 
campaigning  throughout  the  country  and 
working  to  achieve  the  fullest  and 
widest  participation  possible. 

The  United  States  supports  open 
elections  without  reservation.  We  want 
in  Central  America  what  we  want 
here— peace  guaranteed  by  democracy. 
We  want  to  see  every  citizen  free  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  political  life  of  his  or  her 
country,  without  fear,  threat,  or  in- 
timidation. 

In  support  of  this  principle,  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador,  before  the 
1982  Constituent  Assembly  elections,  of- 
fered automatic  legal  registration  to  the 
political  parties  associated  with  the 
guerrillas.  Before  scheduling  next 
month's  presidential  elections,  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador  renewed  the 
offer  to  discuss  with  the  political  front 
of  the  different  guerrilla  groups  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  their  participa- 
tion. 

Will  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas  and 
Nicaragua's  comandantes  finally  stop 
their  violence  and  submit  to  the  verdict 
of  the  people?  Will  the  comandantes 
abandon  the  menacing  military  buildup 
that  threatens  both  Nicaraguans  and 
their  neighbors?  Will  they  be  as  bold  as 
El  Salvador  and  place  the  decision  of 
who  is  to  govern  genuinely  in  the  hands 
of  the  people?  Will  they  cast  off  the 
cynical  alliances  that  have  injected  the 
East-West  conflict  into  the  region? 

To  ensure  peace  and  economic  prog- 
ress. Central  America  needs  democracy. 
What  happened  last  fall  here  in  the 
eastern  Caribbean  is  telling.  In  Grenada, 
a  system  comparable  to  Nicaragua's 
ultimately  proved  so  unstable  and  so 
divisive  that  it  led  to  the  murder  of  the 
Prime  Minister  by  a  military  faction 
loyal  to  the  Deputy  Prime  Minister. 


Both  factions  were  antidemocratic;  both 
sought  power  without  legal  limit  or 
popular  consent.  Enamored  of  power 
and  blinded  by  the  illusions  of  a  false 
revolution  and  false  alliances,  the  New 
JEWEL  Movement  imposed  an  alien  dic- 
tatorship. 

It  is  in  everyone's  interest  that  this 
not  happen  in  Nicaragua.  It  is  in 
Nicaragua's  own  interest  to  keep  the 
pledges  made  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS)  in  1979  and  to 
give  practical  force  to  the  21  substantive 
objectives  they  agreed  to  negotiate  in 
the  Contadora  process. 

The  history  of  Venezuela,  a  founder 
of  Contadora,  confirms  that  Central 
America  can  build  democracy.  Venezuela 
forged  its  democracy  in  a  long  and 
courageous  struggle  against  extremists 
of  both  right  and  left.  Throughout  the 
1960s,  Venezuela  held  elections  while 
under  assault  by  armed  guerrillas  sup- 
ported by  Cuba.  But  Venezuelans  were 
not  intimidated.  Just  as  they  had  thrown 
off  dictatorship,  they  resisted  Cuban 
subversion.  They  elected  a  succession  of 
democratic  leaders  and  made  Venezuela 
a  leader  of  democracy  throughout  the 
Americas. 

We  in  the  United  States  support 
every  nation  in  the  hemisphere  that 
struggles  for  freedom.  And  we  are  confi- 
dent that,  as  in  Venezuela  yesterday  and 
Argentina  today,  those  who  work  for 
democracy  will  prevail— in  Grenada,  in 
El  Salvador,  in  Nicaragua,  and 
throughout  the  hemisphere. 

Economic  Development 

My  second  set  of  observations  concerns 
economic  development.  The  enemies  of 
democracy  often  point  to  underdevelop- 
ment and  economic  hardship  as  argu- 
ments to  justify  violence  and  dictator- 
ship. But  they've  got  it  backward. 
Violence  destroys  development.  And  ex- 
perience around  the  world  teaches  that 
totalitarian  solutions  are  bankrupt- 
economically  as  well  as  morally.  It  is  the 
democratic  and  open  societies  that  are 
the  success  stories  of  the  developing 
world. 

The  challenges  of  development  are 
formidable.  In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the 
hemisphere's  developing  countries  grew 
faster  than  either  the  United  States  or 
Europe.  Important  gains  were  regis- 
tered despite  rapid  population  growth. 
Today,  however,  the  recession  has  hit 
most  countries  in  the  hemisphere  very 
hard.  It  has  made  debt  service  an 
onerous  burden.  And  in  just  a  few  years 
it  has  begun  to  eat  away  many  of  the 
social  gains  of  decades  of  growth. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 


THE  SECRETARY 


In  my  discussions  of  economic 
issues,  I  found  both  concern  and 
realism—  concern  that  economic  ad- 
justments will  have  serious  social  conse- 
quences and  that  no  country  can  sustain 
austerity  indefinitely;  realism  that  ad- 
justments are,  nevertheless,  unavoidable 
and  that  policies  must  be  economically 
sound. 

Increased  investment  in  productivity 
is  a  need  that  everyone— from  govern- 
ments to  bankers— must  keep  in  mind. 
Equity  investment  is  a  good  counter- 
balance to  debt  in  meeting  the  overall 
capital  aeeds  of  growth. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to 
helping  to  manage  the  debt  crisis  effec- 
tively and  equitably.  And  we  are  confi- 
dent that  the  global  economic  recovery, 
now  clearly  underway,  will  help  carry 
many  countries  out  of  their  current  dif- 
ficulties. The  continued  openness  of 
the  U.S.  market— in  spite  of  trade 
deficits— is  contributing  importantly  to 
stability  abroad.  The  strong  recovery 
now  apparent  in  the  United  States  will 
provide  additional  strength  to  our 
neighbors. 

The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  gives 
us  all  fresh  tools  and  opportunities  to  at- 
tack the  problems  of  development.  The 
Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 
Development  Initiative  should  signifi- 
cantly increase  the  resources  available  in 
defense  of  development  in  Central 
America,  where  it  is  now  most  acutely 
threatened.  And  together  we  must  show 
similar  imagination  and  realism  in  pur- 
suit of  development  here  in  the  eastern 
Caribbean.  Democratic  solidarity  means 
we  cannot  be  indifferent  to  the  economic 
problems  of  our  neighbors.  The  United 
States  will  be  a  good  partner. 

Collective  Security 

Economic  progress  depends  on  an  en- 
vironment of  security  and  confidence. 
This  brings  me  to  a  third  set  of  reflec- 
tions—on the  need  for  collective 
security. 

The  enemies  of  democracy  and 
development  are  the  same  throughout 
the  hemisphere.  They  are  the  violent  ex- 
tremes—the violent  left,  subservient  to 
Cuba  and  international  totalitarianism, 
and  the  violent  right,  with  its  futile 
resistance  to  modern  progress.  The  far 
left  depends  on  outside  arms,  training, 
and  propaganda;  the  far  right  depends 
on  secrecy,  intimidation,  and  abuse  of 
power. 

The  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
on  Central  America  underscored  its  con- 
viction that  indigenous  revolution  is  no 
threat  to  the  United  States.  The  threat 


from  Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  the 
perversion  of  revolution,  a  betrayal  of 
democracy  that  is  rooted  in  intimidation 
and  force.  We  have  nothing  to  fear  from 
honest  political  or  economic  competition, 
least  of  all  from  Cuba  or  the  Soviet 
Union.  But,  as  Grenada  demonstrated, 
we  must  defend  ourselves  against  the 
organized  violence  of  communism,  which 
preaches  pluralism  for  others  while  im- 
posing a  single  party  state  and  censor- 
ship at  home. 

In  building  our  defenses,  we  must  all 
take  care  to  strengthen  democracy  and 
to  minimize  any  diversion  of  resources 
from  development.  We  must  all  nego- 
tiate differences  and  show  mutual 
restraint.  But  we  must  also  maintain 
professional  security  forces  that  are 
capable  of  protecting  our  peoples  and 
the  rule  of  law  from  the  enemies  of 
democracy.  And  we  must  all  see  to  it 
that  our  cooperation  in  behalf  of  collec- 
tive security  is  adjusted  to  fit  our 
respective  needs  and  capabilities. 

Our  Commitment 

Yesterday,  I  had  the  pleasure  of  joining 
in  the  celebration  of  the  10th  anniver- 
sary of  Grenada's  independence.  My 
talks  with  the  Governor  General  and 
members  of  the  interim  government, 
and  the  memorable  and  moving  welcome 
we  received  from  ordinary  citizens, 
made  clear  that  the  changes  that  have 
come  about  since  our  joint  action  are 
widely  and  enthusiastically  supported. 
We  owe  it  to  the  people  of  Grenada  to 
follow  through:  to  help  them  to  turn 
their  hopes  for  democracy  and  freedom 
into  a  lasting  reality. 

In  Grenada  and  throughout  the 
hemisphere,  the  United  States  wants  to 
be  a  good  partner.  We  want  our 
assistance  to  foster  self-reliance,  not  a 
new  dependence.  We  will  help,  not  im- 
pose solutions. 

Once  again,  the  key  is  democracy. 
Foreign  Minister  Guerreiro  of  Brazil 
rightly  pointed  out  this  week  that 
"Democratic  principles  do  not  require 
the  imposition  of  a  standard  uniformity 
or  unanimity."  As  he  said,  what  they  do 
require  is  mutual  respect  and  solidarity. 

On  the  political  front,  we  must  con- 
tinue to  nurture  the  habits  and  pro- 
cedures of  democracy.  Democracy  in- 
creasingly describes  the  present.  We 
must  perfect  and  protect  it  so  that  it 
will  endure.  The  National  Endowment 
for  Democracy,  recently  established  in 
the  United  States,  provides  a  new 
means  for  strengthening  solidarity 
among  democratic  forces  in  the 
hemisphere. 


In  economic  matters,  we  must  all 
keep  our  markets  open.  Freedom  of 
economic  choice  and  enterprise  are 
natural  regulators  and  natural  liberators 
of  talent,  ability,  and   progress.  And  we 
must  persevere  in  our  cooperation  for 
development.  We  in  the  United  States 
must  ensure  that  our  assistance  matches 
real  needs  and  that  once  we  undertake 
policies  for  the  long  term,  we  carry 
through  without  interruptions  or  neglect. 

Above  all,  we  must  together  main- 
tain our  resolve  in  the  defense  of 
democracy.  The  vocation  of  this 
hemisphere  is  to  prove  that  the  New 
World  can  produce  a  unique  civilization 
based  on  peace,  freedom,  and  justice.  It 
is  this  vision  that  unites  us.  Our  solidari- 
ty can  make  it  a  reality  for  all  the 
peoples  of  the  Americas. 


'Press  release  32  of  Feb.  6,  1984, 

^Press  release  33  of  Feb.  6. 

^Pre-ss  release  37  of  Feb.  15. 

■•Press  release  40  of  Feb.  8. 

^Made  at  a  luncheon  attended  by  the 
leaders  of  Barbados,  Jamaica,  and  the 
Organization  of  Eastern  Caribbean  States 
(press  release  49  of  Feb.  17).  ■ 


April  1984 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary's  Interview  on 

"This  Week  With  David  Brinkley" 


Secretary  Schidtz  was  interviewed  on 
ABC-TVs  "This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley"  on  Jarmary  22,  198J,,  by 
David  Brinkley  and  Sam  Dofialdson, 
ABC  News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC 
Neivs  Analyst.^ 

Q.  You  heard  Mr.  Brzezinski 
[Zbigniew  Brzezinski,  former  national 
security  adviser  to  President  Carter],  a 
minute  ago,  say  in  his  opinion  the 
Russians  didn't  really  want  any 
substantial  arms  agreement.  Do  you 
agree  with  that? 

A.  It  all  depends  on  what  area  of 
discussion  you're  talking  about.  We  have 
pretty  good  discussions  going  on  now  on 
the  "hotline;"  that's  a  form  of  arms 
agreement.  Mr.  Gromyko,  when  I  met 
with  him  in  Stockholm,  suggested  that 
we  resume  the  discussions  of  the  MBFR 
[mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions], 
that  is,  the  troop  level  discussions  in 
Vienna— conventional  forces.  We  resume 
on  March  16th,  and  we  have  examined 
that  from  our  standpoint.  We've  let  them 
know  that  we  think  that  date  for 
resumption  is  agreeable. 

The  conference  we  both  attended  in 
Stockholm  is  a  kind  of  arms  control  con- 
ference and  that's  going  on.  The  con- 
ference in  Geneva  on  chemical  weapons 
is  taking  place.  They  made  a  proposal 
which  we  don't  think  is  a  very  good  pro- 
posal, but  nevertheless  we  responded  to 
it.  We  have  some  further  things  to  say. 

In  the  field  of  nuclear  arms,  they 
have  declined  to  set  a  date  for  resump- 
tion of  the  strategic  arms  talks  and  have 
said  they  have  left  the  intermediate- 
range  talks.  It  depends  on  what  kind  of 
arms  control  you're  talking  about. 

Q.  The  answer  then  is  yes  and  no,  I 
gather? 

A.  I  think  that's  the  answer  kind  of 
across  the  board.  There  are  some 
positive  things;  there  are  some  negative 
things.  It's  kind  of  a  mixed  picture. 

Q.  There's  a  rumor  going  around 
that  the  Reagan  .Administration  is  so 
eager  to  get  some  kind  of  arms  control 
agreement  that  it's  going  to  retreat 
from  a  position  held  by  other  Ad- 
ministrations with  regard  to  the 
MBFR  talks,  that  is,  an  insistence  on 
data  on  manpower  deployments  from 
the  Soviet  Union  before  manpower 
agreements,  new  levels,  are  agreed 
upon. 


.\nd  people  say  it  is  particularly 
necessary,  because  we  now  have  all 
this  evidence  of  Soviet  cheating.  Man- 
power agreements  are  very  hard  to 
verify.  And  right  now,  we  say  the 
Soviet  Union  has  220,000  more  forces 
than  the  Soviet  Union  admits.  Are  you 
going  to  insist  on  data  prior  to  a  man- 
power agreement? 

A.  How  we  will  conduct  those 
negotiations,  of  course,  will  emerge  in 
Vienna.  But  I  would  say  that  the  key  in 
that  negotiation,  as  in  the  othei'S,  is  ade- 
quate measures  to  verify  that  what  is 
undertaken  actually  does  take  place.  I 
think  that  the  most  important  thing  in  all 
of  these  agreements  is  reasonably  ac- 
curate verification,  and  that  vvoukl  be  a 
key.  Obviously,  linked  to  that  is  the 
question  of  an  ability  to  determine  how 
many  forces  there  actually  are;  that  is, 
data. 

Q.  You  seemed  to  surprise  a  lot  of 
people,  including  those  in  the  Ad- 
ministration, with  your  proposal  in 
Stockholm  about  a  worldwide  ban  on 
chemical  weapons.  .\nd  a  number  of 
people  in  this  .Administration  seem  to 
feel  that's  about  as  hard  to  verify  as 
anything.  How  would  you  begin  to 
verify  that? 

A.  There  are  certain  things  that  you 
can  verify  and  certain  things  that  are  dif- 
ficult. You  can  verify  whether  or  not 
known  stockpiles  of  chemical  weapons 
are  abolished.  You  can  do  a  certain 
amount  of  verification  of  theii-  movement 
around  and  so  on. 

There  are  verification  measures  that 
can  be  taken.  Insofar  as  chemical 
weapons  are  concerned,  I  think,  number 
one,  the  regional  approach  that  the 
Soviet  Union  proposed— a  Europe-free 
chemical  weapons  zone— in  effect,  doesn't 
meet  the  test  because  chemical  weapons 
are  easily  moved. 

Second,  verification  is  hard  and  is  a 
key,  as  I  said  before,  and  there's  a  cer- 
tain amount  that  can  be  done. 

Q.  The  Administration's  theory 
about  the  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  and  perhaps  the  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  talks 
all  along  has  been  that  this  country 
needed  to  build  up  its  strength  and 
needed  to  deploy  along  the  two-track 
system  that  N.\TO  agreed  on,  the 
Pershing  and  the  cruise  missiles.  .And 


when  we  did  that,  the  Soviets  would 
understand  that  they  needed  to  deal 
with  us  seriously.  They  would  reach 
agreements  with  us  that  were 
equitable. 

Is  that  still  your  theory,  and,  if  so, 
when  will  the  Soviets  come  back  to  the 
table? 

A.  No,  the  theory  of  the  alliance  was 
different. 

Q.  I  mean  the  Reagan  .Administra- 
tion's theory  about  building  up  our 
defenses. 

A.  There  was  a  decision  made  in  1979 
by  the  North  Atlantic  alliance,  and  the 
Reagan  Administration  has  basically  pur- 
sued that  decision.  The  observation,  first 
of  all,  was  that  the  Soviets  were  deploy- 
ing inteiTnediate-range  missiles  aimed  at 
Europe  in  great  numbers  and  then 
subsequently  intermediate-range  missiles 
aimed  at  China  and  Japan  and  elsewhere. 

So  the  alliance  said,  "We  can't  just 
sit  here  and  have  that  happen.  We  have 
to  provide  ourselves  with  an  adequate 
deterrent  capability."  We  set  out  to  do 
that,  but  while  we're  doing  that,  we 
should  do  everjlhing  we  can  to  negotiate 
an  acceptable  equal  level  in  these.  A 
negotiation  was  started,  having  that  in 
mind.  As  it  turned  out,  it  wasn't 
possible— at  least  hasn't  been  so  far— to 
arrive  at  any  conclusion. 

But  the  theory  wasn't  to  do 
something  in  order  to  get  an  agreement. 
The  theory  always  has  to  be  that  you 
have  to  equip  yourself  with  a  deterrent 
capability  to  look  after  your  interests, 
and  no  doubt  it's  true  that  if  you  do  that, 
you're  more  likely  to  get  a  reasonable 
agreement  than  if  you  don't. 

Q.  I  muddied  the  water  by  bringing 
in  the  two-track  system.  Let  me  ask 
my  question  directly  in  terms  of  Presi- 
dent Reagan's  theory  about  rearming 
America.  He  said  in  a  speech  just  the 
other  day— 

A.  It's  not  a  theory,  it's  an  objective. 

Q.  All  right,  he  said  the  other  day 
that  we've  done  it.  Now  we  are 
prepared— I  paraphrase  but  I  think  ac- 
curately—now we  are  in  the  position 
and  prepared  to  deal  with  the  Soviet 
Union  from  the  standpoint  of  arms 
reductions.  Do  you  feel  you  are  and 
will  the  Soviets  come  back  to  the 
table?  -And  if  so,  when? 

A.  We  feel  we're  in  a  much  better 
position  now  than  we  were  a  few  years 
ago.  We  have  confirmed  and  have  on 
track  all  the  major  weapons  systems  that 
have  been  set  out,  and  there's  a  much 
better  feel  in  the  whole  defense 


28 


■HHHHBH 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


establishment  and  bipartisan  support  for 
it,  even  though  there  ai'e  lots  of 
arguments  about  the  level  of  the  budget. 
That's  a  much  stronger  position  from 
which  to  talk  than  one  in  which  there  is 
a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  about  our 
defense  capabilities  and  world  power. 

Q.  Will  the  Soviets  come  back  to 
the  table  and,  if  so,  when? 

A.  I  pointed  out  that  they  are  at  the 
table  along  a  number  of  fronts,  and  they 
are  not  at  the  table  on  the  nuclear  arms 
talk. 

Q.  May  I  just  press  for  an  answer 
and  if  you  care  not  to  answer,  I  will 
accept  that;  will  they  come  back  to  the 
INF  and  START  negotiations  and.  if 
so,  when? 

A.  I  don't  know  whether  they'll  come 
back  or  not.  That's  something  that  they 
have  to  determine.  We  can  take  care  of 
our  position,  and  our  position  is  to  be 
realistic  about  what  they're  doing,  to  be 
strong  in  our  own  capabilities,  and  to  be 
ready  to  engage  in  a  reasonable  negotia- 
tion. And  that's  what  we  can  control. 

Q.  But  why  do  we  care?  The  SALT 
process— the  strategic  arms  proc- 
ess—began about  15  years  ago  at  a 
time  when  the  strategic  balance  was  in 
the  U.S.  favor.  In  the  intervening  15 
years,  the  Soviet  Union  has  deployed 
7,000  more  modern  warheads,  and 
there's  a  general  agreement,  particu- 
larly in  your  Administration,  that  the 
strategic  balance  has  shifted  against 
us.  After  15  years  of  this,  punctuated 
by  the  documentation  of  the  cheating, 
why  do  we  care  so  much  about  arms 
control  talks? 

A.  It's  a  subject  that  we  should  pur- 
sue, and  it's  something  from  which  we 
can  attain  some  constructive  results.  But 
I  think  the  lesson  that  is  brought  out  by 
the  comments  you  made— both  the  addi- 
tions to  their  arsenal  and  the  problems  of 
adhering  to  agreements— is  that  you  do 
have  to  have  clear  and,  I  think,  rela- 
tively simple  agreements.  You  have  to 
have  strong  measures  for  verification, 
and  you  can't  put  your  ultimate  depend- 
ence on  arms  control.  You  have  to  put 
your  ultimate  dependence  on  your  own 
ability  to  take  care  of  yourself. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  a  ques- 
tion that  weighs  heavily  on  the  minds 
of  the  American  people  and, 
understandably  so,  the  fear  of  nuclear 
war.  During  the  political  campaign, 
which  we  are  already  in,  there  will  be 
a  great  deal  of  discussion  about  the 
cold  war,  the  colder  relations  with  the 


Soviet  Union,  which  will  be  frighten- 
ing to  people.  What  would  be  your 
response  to  that?  You're  not  running 
for  office,  I  understand,  but  if  you 
were,  what  would  you  say  about  it? 

A.  Just  what  President  Reagan  .said 
the  other  day  in  his  address;  that 
because  we  are  strong  we  are  safer.  And 
because  we  are  strong,  we're  bettei-  able 
to  try  to  work  out  reasonable  agree- 
ments with  the  other  side.  And  because 
we're  strong,  we're  able  to  be 
reasonable.  All  of  these  things  add  uj)  to 
a  situation  from  which,  I  think,  the 
American  people  should  take  some  heart. 

Q.  In  your  view,  the  threat  of 
nuclear  war  is  diminished? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  so.  I  think  that  deter- 
i-ent  strength  diminishes  the  temptation 
of  somebody  to  use  their  strength 
against  you. 

Q.  Another  way  that  foreign  policy 
is  entering  the  campaign  with  regard 
to  Lebanon,  do  you  think  it  was  a 
mistake  in  the  summer  of  1982  for  us 
to  encourage,  to  put  it  politely,  the 
Israelis  to  stop  before,  as  some  people 
say,  the  Israelis  finished  the  job,  chas- 
ing the  Syrians  out  of  Lebanon? 

A.  The  situation  was  that  you  had 
the  city  of  Beirut  being  shelled.  You  had 
a  tremendous  number  of  civilians- 
Lebanese— being  killed.  And  I  think  that 
situation  in  Lebanon,  in  Beirut,  cried  out 
for  help  and  the  United  States  was  able 
to  provide  some  heljD  in  that  situation. 
For  that  matter,  Israel  did  stop  its  offen- 
sive in  Lebanon. 

You  remember  that  the  original  an- 
nouncement of  the  Israelis  was  that  they 
were  going  in,  which  they  did,  against 
our  advice,  as  I  understand  it.  I  was  not 
around  at  the  time.  But  they  would  only 
go  in  so  far.  However,  they  just  kept 
right  on  going  and  nobody  knew  quite 
where  they  were  going  to  wind  up. 

Q.  This  weekend,  Walid  Jumblatt, 
the  Druze  leader,  said  that  he  will  not 
accept  Amin  Gemayel  as  the  President 
of  Lebanon,  that  he  must  go.  What 
does  that  do  to  the  possibility  of  a  suc- 
cessful peace  settlement  there? 

A.  He  traveled  to  Moscow,  he  came 
back  to  Syria,  and  he  made  a  statement 
calling  for  the  resignation  of  President 
Gemayel.  I  think  you  put  those  things 
together  and  you  see  where  he's  coming 
from.  President  Gemayel  was  put  there 
by  the  legitimate  process  in  Lebanon  of 
election  through  a  Parliament,  and  he 
represents  the  legitimate  government 
there.  I  think  that  the  efforts  that  he's 
making  and  that  we  would  like  to  see 


others  participate  in  to  broaden  the  base 
of  that  government  are  an  important  ele- 
ment in  this  picture. 

Q.  Are  we  going  to  support 
Gemayel  all  the  way  down  the  line?  Is 
our  allegiance  to  Gemayel,  or  is  our 
allegiance  to  a  process  which  may  turn 
up  someone  else? 

A.  Our  allegiance  is  to  the  legitimate 
Government  of  Lebanon,  produced  by  a 
process  that's  been  there.  We  have 
counselled  with  him  about  the  broaden- 
ing of  the  ba.se  of  his  government,  which 
he  would  like  to  do.  That  process  would 
make  Lebanon  a  more  governable  place. 

Q.  Is  Jumblatt  speaking  with 
Syrian  acquiescence?  Does  this  tell  us 
something  about  the  Syrian  interven- 
tion here? 

A.  He  spoke  from  Damascus  after 
returning  from  Moscow,  so  it  looks  as 
though  those  well-known  influences  on 
him  are  having  an  impact.  This  is  their 
progi-am  and  no  doubt  his  as  well. 

Q.  As  you  know,  there  is  a  rising, 
not  to  say,  feverish  course  of  demand 
in  Congress,  elsewhere,  from  both  par- 
ties, in  fact,  that  it's  time  to  take  the 
Marines  out  of  Lebanon.  What  is  your 
view  on  that? 

A.  There  is  a  chorus  to  some  extent, 
and  certainly  you  can  read  about  it  in  the 
papers  every  day.  It  was  interesting  to 
me  to  see  Senators  Tower  and  Warner, 
who  went  to  the  Middle  East,  as  they 
said,  skeptical.  And  they  came  back  con- 
vinced that  it  was  very  important  for  the 
United  States  to  continue  to  resolve  and 
to  maintain  its  presence  in  Lebanon  and 
in  the  Middle  East.  There  may  be  some 
swing  in  the  pendulum  coming  in  the 
other  direction.  It  remains  to  be  seen. 

Q.  The  Syrians  have  every  reason 
to  believe  that  the  United  States, 
however,  won't  be  hard  to  outwait  in 
this  regard.  What  incentive— 

A.  They've  said  that  quite  a  lot.  In 
fact,  [Syrian  Foreign  Minister]  Khaddam 
has  said  to  our  negotiators,  "The  United 
States  is  short  of  breath.  You  can  always 
wait  them  out."  And  he  remembers  some 
of  our  earlier  times. 

Q.  Is  it  part  of  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration's plan  to  show  that  we're 
not  short  of  breath,  and  does  that 
mean  leaving  them  in  for  a  long  time 
just  to  show  that? 

A.  It's  important  to  show  the  world 
that  we  have  resolve.  But  we  also  have 
to  pay  attention  primarily  to  our  objec- 
tives there.  And  our  objectives  are  to 
make  what  contribution  we  can  mainly 


April  1984 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


through  our  diplomacy  but  also  through 
the  presence  of  our  forces  along  with  the 
forces  of  other  countries  for  the  emer- 
gence of  a  more  stable  and  sovereign 
Lebanon.  That's  what  we're  there  for. 

Q.  On  Friday,  several  Administra- 
tion officials  pointed  to  the  danger  of  a 
kamikaze-type  attack  on  our  forces- 
planes  run  by,  maybe,  Iranian-trained 
pilots.  Islamic  fundamentalists,  the 
terrorist  groups.  And  at  least  one 
senior  official  suggested  we  might  be 
considering— if  we  see  that  attack  just 
about  to  take  place— making  a  preemp- 
tive strike  to  safeguard  our  forces.  Is 
that  something  we  might  do? 

A.  Yes.  I  think  we  have  to  be  very 
conscious  of  the  rise  of  terrorism,  not 
only  in  Lebanon  but  around  the  world. 
And  the  fact  that  it  is  increasingly  evi- 
dent, that  it  has  a  base  in  a  state,  it  isn't 
some  random  crazy  group,  it's  something 
that's  organized,  systematic;  people 
getting  trained  for  it.  And  in  the  case  of 
Lebanon,  we  see  increasingly  these 
things  originating  in  Iran.  We  see  them 
taking  place,  necessarily  with  the  ac- 
quiescence of  Syria.  We  see  who  this 
group  is.  There's  Syria,  there's  Iran, 
there's  Libya,  and  there's  the  Soviet 
Union. 

And  I  think  the  emergence  of  terror 
as  a  kind  of  weapon  of  war  by  states  is 


something  that  we  have  to  be  very  con- 
cerned about.  An  example  in  another 
part  of  the  world  was  the  North  Korean 
assault  on  the  South  Koi-ean  Government 
in  a  third  country— in  Rangoon— where 
they  murdered  a  large  portion  of  the 
South  Korean  Government. 

Q.  Yes,  but  in  that  case,  we  asked 
South  Korea  to  show  some  restraint 
from  the  standpoint  of  any  precipitous 
strike  military  action.  If  we  use  our 
forces  to  make  a  preemptive  strike  on 
these  terrorist  bases  to  safeguard  our 
forces,  what  will  you  say  to  people 
who  say  that  we  are  involving  our- 
selves to  a  deeper  extent  in  the  Middle 
Eastern  war? 

A.  It's  not  involving  ourselves  deeper 
in  a  Middle  Eastern  war  to  defend 
ourselves  and  our  citizens  against  these 
tactics  of  terrorism.  These  tactics  ai'e 
aimed  at  America  generally.  We  had  the 
tragic  murder  of  the  President  of 
American  University  of  Beijrut  the  other 
day,  a  person  who  literally  has  given  his 
life  to  the  betterment  of  the  Middle 
East.  It  is  going  to  individuals  and  it's 
going  to  organized  governments.  It  in- 
volves not  just  us  but  others,  and  it's  an 
attack  on  civilization. 


'Press  release  .31  of  Feb.  4,  1984. 


Secretary's  Interview  on 

"The  MacNeil/Lehrer  News  Hour" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
the  Public  Broadcasting  System's  "The 
MacNeil/Lehrer  Neivs  Hour" 
on  Febrttary  23,  198i.  by  Charlene 
Hunter-Gait  and  Robert  MacNeil.^ 

Q.  Last  night  President  Reagan 
said  in  his  news  conference  that  the 
Marines  would  still  have  a  role  to  play 
in  Lebanon,  even  though  they  were  be- 
ing redeployed  to  the  ships  offshore. 
What  exactly  is  that  role? 

A.  They  are  there— offshore— and 
they  represent  a  continuing  U.S. 
presence.  They  support  our  policy  of  try- 
ing to  bring  about,  as  best  we  can,  the 
removal  of  all  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon  and  the  emergence  of  a 
sovereign  Lebanon  in  charge  of  its  own 
territory  and  with  arrangements  that  en- 
sure the  security  of  Israel's  northern 
border. 


Q.  How  can  they  do  that  kind  of 
support  if  they  are  confined  to  the 
ships  and  presumably  not  firing? 

A.  They're  not  there  to  undertake  a 
military  mission,  but  they're  there  in  the 
event  that  something  happens  that  will 
make  it  desirable  for  them  to  be  used  in 
a  manner  such  as  they  were  used  in  the 
fii'st  place. 

You  remember  that  they  came  back 
in  the  second  time— they  went  in  the 
first  time  to  provide  the  conditions  under 
which  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  could  be  gotten  out  of 
Beirut.  They  accomplished  that  mission 
successfully,  along  with  the  other 
members  of  the  multinational  force. 

They  came  in  the  second  time  to  pro- 
vide a  division  of  the  forces  present  and 
to  set  up  conditions  around  Beirut  for 
stability  and  protection  around  the  Sabra 
and  Shatila  camps.  What  may  happen  in 
Lebanon,  we  don't  know,  but  it  may  be 


that  there  will  be  a  good  purpose  of  that 
kind  which  the  Marines  will  be  called 
upon  to  serve. 

Q.  The  President  did  say  specifi- 
cally that  the  Marines  might  go  back 
into  Beirut  if  the  possibility  of  improv- 
ing their  chances  of  fulfilling  their 
mission  were  to  reoccur.  What  specif- 
ically was  he  talking  about  in  terms  of 
the  mission? 

A.  He  was  basically  just  saying,  as 
I've  said  here  that  there  are  a  lot  of  dif- 
ferent possible  things  that  may  happen, 
and  in  order  to  be  helpful  you  have  to  be 
Johnny-on-the-spot,  and  that's  the  Ma- 
rines' I'ole,  I  might  say  typically,  I  don't 
think  people  are  aware  of  this,  that  we 
do  have  a  deplojonent  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  the  Marine  amphibious  unit 
that's  there  is  deployed  and  has  been  for 
a  long  time  around  in  the  Mediterranean. 
It's  now  lying  offshore  Lebanon. 

Q.  There  tended  to  be,  over  a  time, 
a  lot  of  confusion  about  just  what  the 
mission  there  was.  I  mean,  do  you 
understand  the  reason  for  that  confu- 
sion, and  can  you  shed  any  light  on 
that? 

A.  The  problem,  I  suppose,  is  that 
you  have  to  start  with  a  large  pictui'e  of 
our  interests  in  the  Middle  East  which 
are  very  great.  These  have  tended  to  get 
focused,  to  a  certain  extent,  on  Lebanon 
in  recent  times,  and  the  Marines  are 
there  to  support  our  objectives  in 
Lebanon. 

The  anomaly  occurs  because  we  think 
of  Marines  as  "gung-ho,  bring  in  the 
Marines,"  and  they  have  an  offensive 
military  mission,  but  that  has  not  been 
their  mission  in  this  case.  It's  been  a 
mission  to  help  ensui'e  stability  and 
peace  in  that  area,  and  it  succeeded  in 
very  considerable  part,  although  in  re- 
cent months,  with  the  rise  of  violence, 
they've  been  caught  up  in  it,  and  we 
have  found  that  a  better  place  for  them 
to  be  deployed  is  on  ships. 

Q.  You  said  yesterday,  in  testifying 
before  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee,  that  the  situation  in 
Lebanon  was  deteriorating.  What  do 
you  think  it  would  take  at  this  point  to 
rescue  the  country? 

A.  The  parties  to  the  firing— and 
much  of  it  is  instigated  by  Syria— need  to 
decide  they've  had  enough,  and  let's 
have  a  cease-fire.  We  brought  that  about 
at  one  time,  and  there  was  a  cease-fire 
for  awhile,  but  it  has  erupted  again.  So 
first  there  needs  to  be  a  cease-fire. 

Second,  there  needs  to  be  a  broader 
Government  of  Lebanon.  President 
Gemayel  has  been  trying  to  bring  that 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin        *pri 


THE  SECRETARY 


about,  and  the  various  factions  have  been 
jockeying  around  and  as  yet  have  not 
been  willing  to  join  in  that  broader 
government. 

But,  obviously,  you  want  to  broaden 
the  base  of  that  government  and  enable 
the  government  to  take  control  and 
maintain  law  and  order  in  the  areas  that 
aren't  occupied.  And  then  we  want  to 
get  all  of  the  foreign  forces  out  and  let 
Lebanon  emerge  as  a  sovereign  state. 

Q.  What's  your  assessment  of  the 
plan  that  the  Saudis  have  proffered 
and  that  the  Syrians  reportedly  have 
gone  along  with?  I  mean,  do  you  think 
that  this  is  something  that  can  bring 
what  you've  just  said  about? 

A.  That  plan  has  a  lot  of  change  in  it 
all  the  time.  Every  time  we  see  it,  it's  a 
little  different  plan,  and  the  Saudis  are 
trying  very  hard  to  play  a  constructive 
role,  and  it  may  or  may  not  emerge  as 
something  that  is  worthwhile. 

Q.  One  of  the  points  of  it,  as  I 
understand,  involves  abrogating  the 
May  17  security  treaty  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel  which  the  United 
States  has  supported.  Would  you  be  in 
favor  of  President  Gemayel  giving  up 
that  agreement  in  exchange  for  peace? 

A.  That  agreement  is  between  Israel 
and  Lebanon.  We  witnessed  it.  I  helped 
to  bring  it  about.  I  think  it's  a  good 
agreement,  and  it  provides  for  security 
arrangements  on  Israel's  northern 
border.  It  provides  for  total  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  Lebanon,  and  it  opens 
the  door  to  the  possibility  of  some 
reasonable  relationship  between  Israel 
and  Lebanon.  So  I  think  it's  a  good 
agi-eement.  But.  of  course,  it  belongs  to 
Israel  and  Lebanon,  and  it's  up  to  them 
to  decide  what  they  want  to  do  with  it. 

I  would  say  only  this:  Those  who  a^:!- 
vocate  the  abrogation  of  that  agreement 
must  bear  some  responsibility  for  finding 
an  alternative  formula  for  bringing  about 
Israeli  withdrawal. 

Q.  What  sense  of  personal  regret  do 
you  have  about  the  turn  of  events  in 
Lebanon?  You've  invested  a  lot  time 
and  energy  in  this  situation. 

A.  Everyone  regrets  the  loss  of  life, 
the  loss  of  American  lives  there— our 
Marines  and  others— and  the  loss  of  life 
of  the  Lebanese.  So  wherever  you  look 
in  the  world  and  you  see  that,  you're 
sorry  about  it— I  am,  certainly.  One  of 
the  great  things,  I  think,  about  America 
is  that  when  we  see  problems  of  that 
kind,  we  respond.  And  even  if  we  find 
ourselves  in  a  situation  where  the  odds 
are  not  too  good,  we'll  still  try.  And  I 


April  1984 


think  we  can  be  proud  as  Americans  that 
we've  tried  to  bring  about  something 
better  in  Lebanon. 

Q.  Your  number  two  at  the  State 
Department.  Kenneth  Dam.  speaking 
in  the  Far  East  today,  said.  "We've 
made  a  courageous  effort,  and  simply 
because  we've  failed  doesn't  mean  it 
wasn't  worth  the  effort."  Would  you 
agree  with  that  formulation  of  it? 

A.  I  wouldn't  say  that  we've  failed; 
we  haven't  succeeded,  but  the  wheel  is 
still  turning,  and  we're  there.  Our 
diplomatic  effort  is  represented  by  a 
very  strong  Ambassador,  Reg 
Bartholomew,  and  we'll  stay  engaged  in 
the  process  and  do  what  we  can  to  help 
bring  about  the  sort  of  resnlt  that  we've 
sought  all  along. 

Q.  Time  magazine  this  week  quotes 
a  White  House  official,  unnamed,  as 
saying  that  George,  meaning  you,  is 
ticked  off  at  us,  meaning  the  White 
House,  because,  for  reasons  of  political 
expediency,  they  were  more  willing  to 
see  Gemayel  abrogate  or  scuttle  this 
agreement  with  Israel  than  you  were. 
Do  you  have  any  comment  on  that? 

A.  I'm  always  worried  about  anony- 
mous "theys"  and  the  "White  House."  I 
used  to  work  in  the  White  House  some 
years  ago.  I  don't  know  how  many  hun- 
dreds of  people  work  there. 

Q.  But  are  you  "ticked  off? 

A.  I  work  for  the  President,  and  if 
somebody  tells  me  something  the  Presi- 
dent says,  I  respond  to  that.  I've  had 
many  discussions  about  this  with  the 
President,  and  he  and  I  see  this  matter 
exactly  the  same  way.  So  that's  the 
White  House,  as  far  as  I'm  concerned. 

Q.  So  you're  not  "ticked  off? 

A.  I  think  that  that  agreement  is  a 
good  agreement,  but  it  is  up  to  the  par- 
ties to  decide  what  they  want  to  do 
about  it.  There  have  been  people  who 
have  a  different  point  of  view  than  I 
have,  and  we've  had  some  arguments 
about  it.  but  that's  normal.  In  fact,  I 
think  it  would  be  alarming  if  you  had  a 
government  where  people  didn't  have 
some  diffei-ences  of  opinion. 

Q.  It  just  seemed  that  there  was  a 
different  emphasis  last  week.  Early  in 
the  day  President  Reagan  came  out 
and  said  something  like  you're  saying 
now,  that  there  was  agreement  be- 
tween the  two  parties,  and  he  seemed 
rather  casually  to  accept  the  in- 
evitability of  its  being  abrogated.  And 
then  a  few  hours  later  you  made  a 
statement  at  the  State  Department, 
making  a  very  forceful  U.S.  defense 


and  backing  of  the  agreement.  I  just 
wonder  why  that  difference  of  em- 
phasis within  a  few  hours  of  each 
other? 

A.  You  have  to  look  at  the  full  ques- 
tion that  the  President  was  asked  to  .see 
the  consistency  of  what  we  each  said. 
And  I  might  say  that  what  I  said  was 
carefully  written  out  and  was  reviewed 
by  the  President  and  cleared  by  the 
President.  So  I  just  didn't  sound  off  on 
my  own;  I  had  the  President's  complete 
blessing  on  the  words  that  I  spoke. 

Q.  He  said  last  night  in  answer  to  a 
question  at  his  news  conference  that 
he  hoped  you  weren't  considering  leav- 
ing. Are  you? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Why  would  he  have  to  express  a 
hope  like  that  in  public?  Wouldn't  he 
just  know  for  sure  that  you  weren't? 

A.  He  does  know  for  sure,  and  I 
don't  know  where  all  of  these  rumors 
about  my  leaving  came  from.  They  had 
absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  me  and 
nothing  to  do  with  the  President.  Just 
the  sort  of  thing  that  people  tend  to  cook 
up  around  Washington,  but  there's  ab- 
solutely nothing  to  it. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  stay  on  if 
there's  a  second  term? 

A.  I  have  to  be  invited  by  the  Presi- 
dent before  I  can  make  any  statement  of 
that  kind,  but  I  came  here  to  serve  the 
President,  I'm  one  of  the  President's 
guys,  and  I  will  be  sticking  with  him. 
But  I  don't  want  to  say  anything  now 
that  in  any  way  precludes  or  prejudices 
his  ability  to  decide  whatever  he  wants 
about  who  should  be  in  this  great  post 
for  a  second  term. 

Q.  But  if  he  asked  you.  would  you 
be  willing  to  stay  on.  or  would  you 
prefer  to  go  and  do  something  else? 

A.  If  I  answered  that  question,  I'd 
be  putting  him  in  a  spot,  so  I  think  I'd 
just  leave  it  that  I'm  here  to  serve  the 
President  and  do  what  he  wants  me  to 
do,  and  I'll  just  leave  it  at  that. 

Q.  Some  commentators  have  sug- 
gested that  because  you  invested  so 
much  time  and  your  own  prestige  in 
helping  Israel  and  Lebanon  to  negoti- 
ate the  May  17  agreement,  that  it's  a 
matter  of  personal  pride  to  you  not  to 
see  it  abrogated. 

A.  I  did  invest  a  lot  of  time  in  it,  and 
so  did  others  in  our  government.  But  we 
have  to  look  upon  it  as  a  document  of 
state,  and  it's  something  between  Israel 
and  Lebanon.  I  think  it's  a  good  agree- 


THE  SECRETARY 


ment,  independent  of  whether  I  had 
anything  to  do  with  it  or  not.  and  I  hope 
that  I'm  grown  up  enough  not  to  get 
myself  all  entangled  in  some  sort  of  ego 
trip  in  something  like  that. 

Q.  Back  in  October,  on  the  24th. 
you  said,  "If  we  are  driven  out  of 
Lebanon,  radical  and  rejectionist 
elements  will  have  scored  a  major  vic- 
tory." Do  you  see  that  now  as  a 
danger,  to  the  extent  that  the  United 
States  has  been  driven  back,  if  not  out? 
Have  those  elements  scored  a  major 
victory,  and  is  that  the  direction  of 
your  anxiety  about  what  may  happen 
this  evening? 

A.  One  of  the  major  problems  that 
we  see  in  Lebanon  is  the  emergence  of 
state-sponsored  terrorism,  and  I  believe 
this  is  something  that  we  must  take  very 
seriously  in  this  country,  and  we  really 
haven't  faced  up  to  it. 

We've  had  a  number  of  deaths  of  our 
Marines  and  other  personnel  in  Lebanon, 
but  these  have  been  dramatically  punc- 
tuated by  two  tragic  acts  of  massive  ter- 
rorism. These  are  state- supported  acts  in 
which  large  numbers  of  Americans  lost 
their  lives,  one  in  our  Embassy  and  one 
in  the  Marine  compound. 

This  is  a  kind  of  warfare,  really,  that 
is  something  different  for  us.  It's  not 
enough,  I  don't  believe,  to  defend 
yourself  against  this  form  of  terrorism. 
We  have  to  improve  our  intelligence 
capability,  and  we  have  to  think  through 
how,  within  the  concept  of  the  rule  of 
law  which  we  hold  so  deai",  we  can  take 
a  more  aggressive  posture  toward  what 
is  a  worldwide  and  very  undesirable 
trend. 

It,  of  course,  is  not  only  the  two  big 
acts  of  terrorism  that  took  place  but  the 
murder  of  the  President  of  the  American 
University  of  Beirut  and  many  other 
acts.  Fore.xample,  much  has  been  made 
about  the  fact  that  the  Lebanese  Armed 
Force  has  been  having  difficulty  holding 
itself  together,  and  I  think  under  the  cir- 
cumstances it's  held  together  remarkably 
well.  But  here's  the  kind  of  thing  that 
happens:  An  officer  2  days  ago  received 
a  call  from  a  terrorist  saying.  "If  you 
don't  leave  the  Lebanese  armed  force  ^ 
within  an  hour,  your  son  will  be  shot." 
The  phone  is  hung  up.  An  hour  later  he 
gets  a  call  from  a  hospital.  His  son  has 
been  shot.  That's  terror,  and  people  pay 
attention  to  it. 

This  is  one  of  the  lessons  that 
emerges  out  of  Lebanon,  and  I  think  it's 
something  we  must  think  about  very 
much  harder  than  we  ever  have  before. 


32 


Q.  Can  we  turn  for  a  few  moments 
to  events  in  Central  America?  I'd  like 
to  get  your  reaction  to  the  Nicaraguan 
Government's  announcement  that  they 
were  going  to  hold  elections  a  year 
earlier  than  planned— November  1984, 
in  fact. 

A.  They  keep  changing  their  minds 
about  when  they're  going  to  hold  an  elec- 
tion, but  I  think  elections  are  basically 
good  if  conducted  in  a  proper  way.  There 
are  lots  of  elections  held  in  this  world, 
such  as  those  in  the  Soviet  Union,  that 
don't  mean  much,  but  elections  in  many 
countries  do  mean  a  great  deal,  and  we 
favor  that  kind  of  a  process. 

Q.  How  far  does  this  announce- 
ment-at  least  that  they're  going  to 
hold  elections,  and  the  announcement 
that  they  will  be  freeing  up  the  press 
and  liberalizing  other  things  for  the 
opposition— how  far  does  that  go  in 
satisfying  U.S.  concerns  about  the 
direction  of  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment? 

A.  The  direction  is  fine,  but  the  ex- 
tent to  which  they're  going  is  certainly 
an  open  question  whether  there  will  be  a 
genuine  open  press  situation,  whether 
competing  candidates  will  have  the  time 
and  opportunity  to  oi-ganize  political  par- 
ties and  have  the  right  of  assembly,  and 
have  the  right  of  open  criticism  of  the 
government,  and  all  of  these  things  that 
are  part  of  life  as  we  know  it  in  an  open 
and  democratic  system.  If  those  things 
happen,  they'll  be  quite  a  long  distance 
from  this  current  situation  in  Nicaragua, 
and  I  think  we'll  be  watching  very 
carefully  to  see  what  does  happen. 

Q.  To  the  extent  that  these  are 
among  the  things  that  the  United 
States  has  said  it  wants  to  see  in 
Nicaragua,  I  mean,  would  you  ac- 
knowledge that  there  is  some  progress 
being  made  because  of  U.S.  pressure? 

A.  Whether  it's  because  of  U.S. 
pressure  or  not,  I  don't  know.  I  think 
thei-e  is.  particularly  in  South  America 
and  in  our  hemisphere,  a  very  strong 
trend  toward  democracy,  and  the 
Nicaraguans  are  feeling  it.  They're  one 
of  the  few  isolated  places  now  that 
doesn't  express  a  belief  in  democracy, 
Cuba  being  an  outstanding  other 
example. 

So  they  may  be  feeling  that  trend, 
but  the  actual  conduct  of  a  genuine  elec- 
tion where  opposition  has  a  chance  to 
organize  and  alternative  candidates  are 
put  forward  and  the  process  is  conducted 
in  an  orderly  way  and  a  fair  way,  they're 
a  long  way  from  that. 


Q.  Are  you  encouraged  at  all  about 
what  they  have  said  they're  going  to 
do? 

A.  If  they  follow  through  on  it.  If  the 
reality  will  follow  the  rhetoric,  that's  all 
a  plus. 

Q.  What  would  it  take  for  the 
United  States  to  stop  aiding  the  anti- 
Sandinista  insurgents,  the  Contras, 
waging  a  guerrilla  campaign  against 
the  country  from  Honduras? 

A.  Of  course,  the  problem  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  has  is  that 
there  are  a  lot  of  Nicaraguans  who  don't 
like  at  all  what  they're  doing.  There  are 
a  lot  of  people  who  participated  in  the 
original  Sandinista  revolution  back  in 
1979  who  have  become  very  disen- 
chanted, and  it's  easy  to  see  why  that 
should  be  so. 

And  so  the  problem  of  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  is  not  the 
United  States;  it's  themselves  and  the 
conditions  that  they're  creating  that  are 
leading  people  who  have  been 
Nicaraguans  and  are  Nicaraguans  to 
have  the  attitude  that  the  Contras  have. 

Q.  So  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  support  the  Contras  until  that 
point? 

A.  I'm  trying  not  to  answer  your 
question  in  a  gentle  way  but  to  point  out 
what  the  real  thrust  behind  the  Contras 
is.  namely,  theii-  dissatisfaction  with  the 
way  in  which  they're  being  treated  by 
the  Nicaraguan  Govenmient. 

Q.  Turning  briefly  to  El  Salvador, 
just  a  little  while  ago,  all  of  the  eight 
members  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  voted  to  tie  aid  to  E! 
Salvador  to  the  country's  progress  on 
human  rights  which  you  have  been  op- 
posed to.  What's  your  reaction  to  that 
move,  and  what  do  you  think  is  wrong 
with  that? 

A.  I've  never  been  opposed  to  that.  I 
think  that  it's  essential  that  we  in  our 
foreign  policy  generally,  as  well  as  in  El 
Salvador,  conduct  our  foreign  policy  in  a 
manner  as  consistent  as  we  can  with  the 
values  that  we  hold  as  the  tenets  of  our 
own  society.  That  must  include  not  only 
democracy"  but  the  rule  of  law.  proper 
judicial  procedures,  and  in  El  Salvador 
doing  something  about  the  death  squads. 

Actually,  over  the  past  3  to  4  years, 
the  number  of  killings  has  declined  very, 
very  sharply,  but  it's  still  not  satisfac- 
tory because  there  are  too  many  still  go- 
ing on.  And  we  have  spoken  about  that 
very  sharply,  we  have  worked  on  that, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  even  in  recent 
months  there's  been  some  real  progress. 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 
wmmmmmrmm 


point  II 

got  to 

ttss! 

I 

vou«s 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  question  isn't  whether  we  are 
for  or  against  that— we're  all  against  that 
in  this  country;  the  question  is,  at  a 
given  moment  of  time,  what's  the  most 
effective  way  to  deal  with  it,  and  that's 
the  only  argument. 

Q.  So  are  you  saying  that  at  this 
point  in  time  the  most  effective  way  is 
not  to  tie  aid  to  human  rights  prog- 
ress? 

A.  I  think  it's  a  question  of  whether 
you  want  to  tie  it  in  the  sense  of  putting 
down  a  certain  set  of  dates  periodically 
where  a  decision— a  yes/no  type  deci- 
sion—is going  to  be  made,  or  whether 
you  want  to  certainly  tie  those  two 
things  together  but  provide  for  greater 
administrative  flexibility  in  administering 
that  concept.  And  I  think  that  there  are 
times  when  probably  set  dates  work,  and 
I  think  we've  gotten  some  mileage  out  of 
that. 

But  I  do  have  a  question  on  my  mind 
about  whether  or  not  a  different  way  of 
going  about  it  wouldn't  be  more  effec- 
tive. But  in  the  end  I  think  we  are  going 
to  want  to  somehow  work  this  around 
and  come  to  agreement  and  decide  what 
is  the  most  effective  way  to  implement 
what  we  all  agree  on.  There's  no  dis- 
agreement about  the  importance  of  deal- 
ing with  human  rights  problems. 

Q.  How  would  you  describe  your 
optimism  about  the  possibilities  raised 
by  having  a  new  leadership  in  Moscow, 
the  possibilities  of  improved  relations? 

A.  There's  always  some  new 
possibilities  posed  by  new  leadership.  I 
think  basically  we  have  to  remember 
that  the  new  leader  has  been  part  and 
parcel  of  the  leadership  of  the  Soviet 
Union  for  a  considerable  period,  and  so  I 
think  basically  we  can  assume  a  certain 
measure  of  continuity. 

I  think  it's  important  for  us  to  ex- 
amine our  own  posture  which  is  that  we 
need  to  be  realistic  all  the  time,  don't  kid 
yourself— that  we  have  to  keep  saying 
that  to  ourselves,  don't  let  the  wish  be 
the  father  to  the  thought  here.  We  have 
to  look  to  our  strength— our  military 
strength,  our  economic  strength— our 
sense  of  purpose,  reference  to  these 
human  rights  concerns  that  we  talked 
about  with  respect  to  El  Salvador,  and 
we  have  to  be  ready  to  talk  and 
negotiate.  And  if  we  can  find  reasonable 
agreements  to  make,  to  be  ready  to 
make  them  and  work  hard  to  do  that. 

That  is  the  posture  of  the  President, 
and  in  the  meetings  the  Vice  President 
and  Senator  Baker  and  our  Ambassador 
Hartman  had  with  the  new  Soviet 
leadership,  it  seemed  that  they  are  ex- 


pressing a  similar  viewpoint.  So  now  we 
have  to  roll  up  our  sleeves  and  test  out 
these  intentions,  and  perhaps  they  feel 
the  same  way.  If  both  sides  are  able  to 
approach  this  in  good  faith,  maybe  we'll 
be  able  to  accomplish  something.  It  re- 
mains to  be  seen,  however. 

Q.  When  you  saw  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  for  5  hours  in  Stockholm,  it 
was  reported  that  you  were  going  to 
propose  to  him  that  some  of  the  more 
difficult  negotiations  like  arms  control 
might  be  pursued  in  private  and  away 
from  the  glare  of  publicity  and  pur- 
sued, perhaps,  across  a  broader  range 
of  issues  including  human  rights.  Did 
you,  in  fact,  suggest  that,  and  would 
that  be  the  forum  for  testing  out  the 
new  leadership? 

A.  First  of  all,  we  always  try  to  keep 
before  the  Soviet  Union,  in  our  discus- 
sions with  them,  our  full  agenda  of 
things,  which  include  arms  control  and 
which,  of  course,  there  are  many  aspects 
of  that  subject;  which  include  regional 
issues  such  as  Afghanistan,  Central 
America,  and  other  such  places;  which 
include  bilateral  problems;  and  which  in- 
clude something  that  they  don't  like  to 
discuss  with  us  at  all,  namely,  our  con- 
cerns about  human  rights  and  human 
treatment  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

So  all  those  things  we  have  before 
us.  We  think  that  there  is  a  role  for  very 
private  discussions  as  well  as  the  public 
negotiations  that  we  see  going  on  in 
Geneva  and  Vienna  and  Stockholm  and 
other  places.  And  they  go  on,  and  in  the 
course  of  discussions  between  me  and 
Mr.  Gromyko,  between  our  Ambassadors 
and  respective  Foreign  Ministers,  and  in 
other  ways. 

It  certainly  is  true  that  the  glare  of 
publicity  makes  it  difficult  to  work  on 
some  of  these  delicate  issues,  so  we  seek 
a  way  to  remove  that. 

Q.  So  are  such  talks  going  on  now? 

A.  You  mentioned  my  talk  with  Mr. 
Gromyko.  I  see  the  Soviet  Ambassador 
from  time  to  time,  our  Ambassador  sees 
Mr.  Gromyko  in  Moscow,  and  we  try  to 
have  a  dialogue  going. 

Q.  How  do  you  favor  getting  the 
Soviets  back  to  the  nuclear  arms  talks, 
in  particular  the  ones  on  medium-  or 
intermediate-range  missiles  in  Europe? 

A.  Those  are  talks  in  which  we  have 
put  forward  strong  and  good  negotiating 
positions,  both  in  the  intermediate-range 
talks  and  in  the  strategic  talks.  And  we 
are  in  a  posture  of  readiness  for  give  and 
take— 


Q.  But  is  your  posture  just  to  wait? 

A.  And  I  think  that  for  you  to  say 
that  because  the  Soviet  Union  walks 
away,  we  should  change  our  position  and 
offer  them  something  to  come  back 
would  be— that's  poor  negotiating 
posture. 

Q.  So  the  United  States  is  just  go- 
ing to  wait? 

A.  We  will  continue  to  be  in  a  posi- 
tion of  ready  for  give  and  take  and  with 
reasonable  positions  on  the  table- 
remember,  in  the  intermediate-range 
talks,  the  positions  we've  taken  are  not 
simply  something  that  the  United  States 
thought  up.  We're  negotiating  on  behalf 
of  our  allies,  and  the  positions  have  been 
closely  coordinated  with  them  and  have 
met  the  test  of  reasonableness  of  a  lot  of 
other  countries. 

Q.  I  see.  But  you  don't  contemplate 
new  initiatives  at  present  to  get  them 
back  to  the  talks? 

A.  We  think  it's  a  very  bad  idea  if 
somebody  walks  out  of  talks  to  say,  "All 
right,  we'll  change  our  position  in  order 
to  get  you  back." 


'Press  release  52  of  Feb.  24,  1984. 


INTERVIEW 


Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's 
Interview  on  "This  Week 
With  David  Brinkley" 


Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs 
Laivretice  S.  Eagleburger  was  inter- 
viewed on  ABC-TV's  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley"  on  February  12,  198U, 
by  David  Brinkley  and  Sam  Donaldson, 
ABC  News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC 
News  analyst. 

Q.  Do  you  expect  any  real  difference  in 
Soviet- American  relations  as  a  result 
of  the  change  in  the  Kremlin,  whatever 
it  turns  out  to  be? 

A.  Basically,  I  think  no,  particularly 
on  the  assumption  that  Chemenko  is  the 
chosen— 

Q.  That's  the  story. 

A.  —and  I  think  we  have  to  assume, 
on  the  basis  of  what  we  have  now,  that 
that's  likely,  although  not  certain.  I  don't 
think  there's  likely  to  be  much  change  in 
U.S. -Soviet  relationships.  I  think, 
frankly,  and  it's  one  point  that  I  don't 
think  was  made  adequately  earlier  in  the 
program.  We've  seen  evidence  over  the 
course  of  the  last  year  that  by  and  large 
the  Soviet  decisionmaking  process  has 
been  in  neutral,  at  best.  We've  had 
mi.xed  signals  from  the  Soviets  for  more 
than  a  year  now,  partly  I  think  because 
Andropov  was  coming  into  power  and 
then  became  sick.  I  don't  think,  for  a 
while  at  least,  that's  Ukely  to  change.  We 
are  in  another  transition. 

Chernenko,  if  he  is  the  man,  is  going 
to  have  to  take  some  months  to  solidify 
his  power.  He  comes,  I  think,  from  that 
part  of  the  governing  mechanism  that  is 
pretty  cautious  and  conservative  in 
terms  of  change.  By  and  large  we're  go- 
ing to  see  a  Soviet  policy  that  is  not 
much  different  from  what  we've  seen 
over  the  last  several  years.  And  not  very 
well  articulated. 

Q.  When  you  say  "mixed  signals," 
do  you  mean  conflicting  signals  that 
suggested  there  was  some  confusion 
and  di.sordcr  there? 

A.  I  couldn't  say  it  better.  I  think 
they  have  been  confused  and  disorderly 
for  most  of  1983.  I  think  at  one  point,  we 
would  get  one  set  of  signals  that  in- 
dicated perhaps  some  things  could  be 
done,  and  then  very  shortly  thereafter 
there  would  be  a  hard  move  to  the  right, 
to  the  tougher  answer. 

I  think  they  have  been  confu.sed,  and 
I  think  their  leadership  has  been  at  sixes 


34 


and  sevens  with  each  other,  and  I  sup- 
pose that's  not  unusual,  given  a  new 
leader  and  then  given  the  illness. 

Q.  On  the  one  hand,  we're  told  a 
leader  is  not  all  that  important 
because  he  is  a  part  of  a  collective 
leadership  group.  If  that  is  the  case, 
why  couldn't  they  get  together  and 
agree  on  what  their  policies  are? 

A.  I  don't  agree  with  the  point  that  a 
leader  doesn't  make  any  difference.  I 
think  he  makes  some  difference.  I  think 
in  the  Brezhnev  era— when  Brezhnev 
particularly  was  at  his  height  of  his 
powers— it  was  clear  that  Brezhnev  made 
a  difference.  I  think  what  we've  seen 
thereafter  is  a  much  more  collective 
leadership,  but  a  collective  leadership 
that  does  not  always  agree  with  itself 
And  as  a  consequence,  the  signals  have 
been  mixed. 

Q.  There's  an  obvious  political  in- 
centive for  an  American  President  in 
an  election  year  to  have  a  summit 
meeting,  but  this  Administration  has 
set  a  fairly  exacting  standard,  the 
meaning  of  which  I  would  like  you  to 
clarify.  It  is  that  the  summit,  in  order 
to  be  held,  must  have  a  chance  for 
serious,  substantive  success.  Does  that 
mean  agreements,  pieces  of  paper, 
arms  control?  What  does  that  mean, 
substantively? 

A.  I  don't  think  it  necessarily  means 
that,  although  obviously  that  would  be 
one  way  to  define  it.  I  should  say  that 
the  position  hasn't  changed,  and  I  don't 
think  that  there  will  be  any  change  in 
the  signals  when  the  Vice  President  is  in 
Moscow  for  the  funeral.  We  are  clear  on 
where  we  are  on  a  summit,  and  it  hasn't 
changed. 

It  doesn't  necessarily  mean 
agreements,  although  obviously  that's 
one  possible  definition.  What  it  does 
mean  is  that  if  they  meet,  we  must  e.v 
pect  that  when  they  finish  with  that 
meeting  that  some  way  or  another  there 
will  have  been  some  substantive  result, 
the  point  being,  it  is  not  in  our  view  sen- 
sible to  have  a  summit  if  all  you  do  is  sit 
there  and  talk  to  each  other. 

Q.  What  does  the  adjective 
"substantive"  imply?  Is  a  change  in 
atmosphere  substance  enough? 


zamm 


A.  No.  Let  me  try  to  give  you  an  ex- 
ample, and  it's  just  pulled  out  of  the  air. 
For  example,  it  might  well  be  that  the 
two  could  meet  and  talk  about  southern 
Africa,  and  if  in  the  process  they  were 
able  to  come  to  some  conclusions  on  how 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
ought  to  conduct  themselves  in  the  con- 
text of  what's  going  on  in  southern 
Afi-ica,  I  suppose  I  would  call  that  a 
substantive  result,  though  nothing  might 
be  written  down  on  a  piece  of  paper.  But 
talk  for  the  sake  of  talk  just  does  not 
seem  to  us  to  be  sensible. 

Q.  Is  it  correct  that  Vice  President 
Bush  has  a  mandate  to  feel  out  the 
Soviet  leadership,  or  leader,  if  there  is 
one  by  Tuesday,  on  this  question  of  a 
summit? 

A.  The  basic  answer  to  that  question 
has  to  be  no.  He  is  going  there  to  repre- 
sent the  United  States,  to  tell  the  Soviet 
Union  that  the  policies  that  this  Ad- 
ministration has  espoused  for  .3  years 
continue  in  effect.  Now  I  am  not  saying 
that  the  Vice  President  may  not,  in  the 
course  of  conversations,  talk  about  the 
possibilities  of  the  leaders  getting 
together,  if  it  is  possible  to  arrive  at 
some  substantive  outcome. 

Q.  You  describe  a  situation  in 
which  you  expect  a  period  of  pause  as 
far  as  the  Soviet  ability  to  move  for- 
ward. 

A.  I  would  say  a  continuation  of  an 
inability  to  move  forward. 

Q.  .\11  right,  but  you  said  that  if  we 
have  a  new  leader,  he'll  have  to  con- 
solidate his  power.  If  it  is  a  collective 
leadership  that  goes  on  for  a  period  of 
months,  you  don't  think  there's  going 
to  be  a  way  for  the  Soviets  to  move 
forward.  So  my  question  is  this.  Does 
it  make  sense  for  the  United  States  to 
offer  something  at  this  point,  say,  in 
the  deployment  of  missiles  in  Europe? 
We'll  stop  for  a  while  until  you  can  get 
your  act  together  and  then  we'll  go 
back  to  the  conference  table. 

A.  Speaking  for  myself  I  think  it 
makes  no  sense  whatsoever.  We  have 
been,  for  more  than  a  yeai',  really  coming 
to  a  culmination  with  the  President's 
speech  several  weeks  ago,  we  have  laid 
out  to  the  Soviet  Union  for  some  time  a 
pi'ogram  for  trying  to  deal  with  the  ma- 
jor issues  that  exist  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  That  is  still 
our  program.  We're  ready  to  go  back  to 
the  negotiating  table  on  INF 
[intermediate-range  nuclear  forces]  and 
START  [strategic  arms  reduction  talks] 
tomorrow  moming,  if  that's  what  they 
want,  we're  ready  to  move  with  those 
steps.  To  offer  something  now  to  the 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INTERVIEW 


Soviet  Union  in  addition  to  what  we 
already  have  on  the  table  I  think  simply 
gives  Moscow  the  wTong  signal.  They 
know  what  we  want.  They  know  what 
we  are  prepared  to  do.  I  don't  know 
why— 

Q.  They  are  not  in  charge,  ap- 
parently, to  the  extent  that  they  can 
make  a  decision  to  move  back  from 
their  position. 

A.  It  is  an  interesting  fact  that 
people  can  argue  that  since  they  are  not 
in  charge,  we  need  to  make  more  conces- 
sions. I  don't  understand  that  argument 
at  all. 

Q.  There  is  a  rumor  in  this  town 
that  there  is  an  open  and  active  back 
channel  in  which  we  are  proposing  and 
receiving  arms  control  proposals— 

A.  It's  not  true. 

Q.  Okay,  flatly  denied. 

A.  Not  true. 

Q.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  Union's  foreign  policy,  for 
several  years,  has  been  a  total  failure, 
from  their  own  standpoint— expansion 
into  Afghanistan,  Africa,  trying  to 
separate  us  from  our  European  allies, 
all  failed— do  you  see  that  they  will 
persist  in  this,  or  might  they  not  see, 
with  a  new  leader,  it's  time  to  try 
something  else? 

A.  One  has  to  hope  that  they  will  see 
that  they  need  to  try  something  else. 
Part  of  the  problem  I  think  is  that 
bureaucracy  is  so  ponderous,  and  in  the 
absence  of  somebody  who  is  clearly, 
forcefully  in  charge,  it  is  so  difficult  to 
move  it  off  paths  that  are  sort  of  worn  in 
the  road,  if  you  will,  I  think  it  is  unlikely 
for  some  period  of  time  that  we  will  see 
major  changes  in  one  direction  or  the 
other. 

Therefore,  I  think  it  is  also  terribly 
important  that  the  United  States  make 
clear  where  we  stand,  make  clear  that 
we  are  prepared  to  continue  with 
negotiations  and  that  we  are  trying  to 
find  solutions,  but  also  don't  get  into  this 
panic  rushing  toward  offering  new  solu- 
tions to  problems,  because  they  won't 
work. 

Q.  In  a  century  of  change  and  flux, 
one  of  the  few  constants  is  the  purpose 
of  the  Soviet  state  and  its  foreign 
policy.  You  say  at  one  point  that  the 
leaders  have  been  at  sixes  and  sevens. 
What  are  they  disagreeing  about?  You 
say  it  takes  a  while  for  them  to  move 
out  of  a  rut.  What  evidence  do  we  have 
that  they  want  to  change? 

A.  Again,  I  think  there's  a  difference 
between  the  strategy,  although  even 
there  I  think  the  Soviets  don't  have 


April  1984 


much  of  a  strategy,  and  the  tactics.  I 
think  a  lot  of  the  debate  has  been,  one, 
whether  continuing  to  carry  out  foreign 
policy  programs  which  have  patently  not 
worked,  whether  that  doesn't  mean  that 
there  needs  to  be  some  shifts  and  some 
changes,  with  some  I  suppose  arguing 
that  you  need  to  be  a  little  bit  easier  in 
your  dealings  with  the  United  States.  I 
think  consistently  when  that  argument 
has  taken  place  in  1983,  the  hardliners 
have  won  the  argument,  but  I  think 
thei'e  ai-e  probably  some  who  say,  but 
we've  got  to  shift,  we've  got  to  deal  with 
the  United  States  in  a  different  way.  I 
think  those  are  where  the  arguments 
have  been,  not  on  the  long-term  objec- 
tive, no. 

Q.  There  was  some  discussion  in 
Washington  in  the  last  day  or  two 
about  whether  the  President.  Mr. 
Reagan,  should  go  to  the  funeral.  It 
was  decided  he  would  not  go.  What 
was  the  thinking  that  went  into  that 
decision? 

A.  Here  again,  I  think,  one,  the  rela- 
tionship with  the  Soviets  and  with  Mr. 
Andropov  over  the  course  of  the  last 
year  have  not  been  particularly  close. 
Two,  the  Vice  President  represented  us 
at  the  last  funeral.  It  was  appropriate 
this  time.  For  the  President  to  go  now 
would  have  implied  all  sorts  of  things  in 
terms  of  the  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union  that  simply  aren't  true,  and, 
therefore,  it  was  thought  by  the  Presi- 
dent best  that  he  stay  here. 

Q.  It  might  also  have  seemed  to 
have  been  politically  motivated. 

A.  Obviously  that's  going  to  be  an 
issue  any  time  this  year  at  all. 

Q.  Clear  up  a  little  bit  of  confusion 
on  Lebanon.  Is  it  correct  that  the 
Marines  are  coming  out  of  Lebanon, 
going  to  be  put  on  those  ships  within  a 
month,  except  for  a  couple  of  hundred 
who  will  have  garrison  duty  for  the 
Embassy  and  Ambassador's  residence? 

A.  I  wish  I  could  clear  up  your  confu- 
sion. The  best  I  can  say  at  this  point  is 
that  we  are  consulting  with  our  MNF 
[multinational  force]  partners.  We  are 
consulting  with  the  Lebanese  Govern- 
ment. We  will  try  to  move  those  Marines 
from  the  shore  to  the  ships  with  all  due 
and  deliberate  speed,  but  as  quickly  as 
we  can.  But  I  cannot  at  this  point  give 
you  a  specific  timeframe. 

Q.  There  is  no  timetable? 

A.  I'm  not  saying  there  isn't  a 
timetable.  I'm  saying  we're  discussing 
this  whole  question  with  our  allies  and 
with  the  Lebanese,  and  until  we  finish 
those  consultations  I  wouldn't  want  to  go 
any  further. 


Q.  Is  part  of  that  discussion  a 
discussion  over  whether  we  can  put 
together  a  UN  force?  The  Syrians  have 
suggested,  I  believe,  that  perhaps  they 
would  now  go  for  that. 

A.  Part  of  the  discussion  is  not  about 
the  question  of  a  UN  force,  part  of  this 
consultation.  That  isn't  to  say  that  the 
question  of  a  UN  force  isn't  under  con- 
sideration and  I— 

Q.  Is  it  under  consideration? 

A.  It  is  under  consideration,  has  been 
for  months,  and  I  notice  now  that  the 
Syrians  are  talking  about  perhaps  a  UN 
force  would  be  possible.  I  have,  myself,  a 
problem  with  that,  which  is  that  basically 
I  think  you  are  going  to  find  it  difficult 
to  get  people,  countries,  to  contribute  to 
a  UN  force  until  there  is  a  situation  in 
Lebanon  that  is  stabilized.  These  coun- 
tries are  not  going  to  want  to  put  people 
into  that  maelstrom,  to  be  shot  at.  When 
things  have  stabilized,  I  think  that  then 
you  will  find  that  it's  possible  to  get  con- 
tributors to  a  UN  force,  which  doesn't  go 
to  the  question  about  whether  or  not  a 
UN  force  now  might  make  sense.  It's 
simply,  I'm  not  sure  you  can  put  one 
together. 

Q.  You  mean  the  Scandinavians 
would  not  be  eager  to  succeed  us  at  the 
Beirut  Airport? 

A.  I  think  that's  probably  right. 

Q.  Last  Thursday,  I  believe,  a  week 
before,  the  President  told  the  editors  of 
The  Wall  Street  Journal  that  the 
presence  of  our  Marines  in  Lebanon 
was  important  for  the  survival  of 
Lebanon,  U.S.  credibility,  and  the 
hope  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  Six 
days  later,  the  announcement  is  made 
that  they  are  going  to  come  out  and  be 
redeployed.  When  was  that  decision 
made?  Was  it  made  on  Sunday,  on 
Saturday?  I  mean,  how  close  to  the  in- 
terview? 

A.  First  of  all,  I  said  the  same  thing 
to  a  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
hearing  at  about  the  same  time.  Without 
trying  to  get  into  the  exact  dates— when 
the  President  said  what  he  said,  and 
when  I  said  what  I  said,  decisions  had 
not  been  made. 

But  there's  a  more  fundamental  point 
here,  I  think,  which  is  that  we  would 
argue  strenuously  that,  as  [Secretary  of 
Defense]  Cap  Weinberger  did  earlier  on 
your  program,  that  we  are  redeploying 
those  Marines  from  the  land  to  the  ships. 
They  are  not  leaving  Lebanon.  So  that 
our  argument  is  that,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, we  are  putting  them  in  a  dif- 
ferent location,  but  they  are  still  in 


35 


AFRICA 


Lebanon  and  the  fleet  is  still  there; 
therefore,  we  have  not  redeployed  out  of 
Lebanon. 

Q.  On  Saturday,  the  President  said, 
in  his  radio  address,  he  was  not  going 
to  cut  and  run  in  Lebanon. 

A.  So  did  I. 

Q.  That's  right,  and  your  credibil- 
ity has  been  attacked  by  people  on 
Capitol  Hill,  and  I  think  one  reason 
was  that  we  were  told— reports  at  the 
White  House— that  the  decision  was 
made  in  principle  to  remove  the 
Marines,  on  February  1st.  Was  that  an 
untrue— 

A.  Don't  hold  me  to  the  dates.  I 
think  the  February  1st  date  is,  in  fact, 
quite  wrong.  But  that,  again,  is  not  the 
point. 

Q.  Then  why  were  we  told  that? 
Simply  to  be  misled  into  thinking  that 
this  was  an  orderly  process  that  had 
been  gone  through? 

A.  Why  were  you  told  what? 

Q.  That  the  decision  in  principle 
had  been  made  by  the  President  on 
February  1st? 

A.  The  issue  and  the  question  of  how 
we  might  redeploy  was  looked  at  for  a 
fairly  long  period  of  time.  There  is  no 
argument  about  that  at  all.  Decisions 
were  made  after  the  President  had  made 
his  statements.  But  I  come  back  to  say- 
ing again,  you  can't  redefine  for  us  what 
we  consider  to  be  presence  in  Lebanon, 
and  on  those  ships  is  still  presence  in 
Lebanon.  It  is  not  cutting  and  running. 

Q.  How  far  do  the  ships  have  to  go 
from  Lebanon  to  be  not  in  Lebanon? 

A.  I  can't  answer  that  question.  They 
are  off  the  shore  in  Lebanon.  They  are 
where  the  Marines  could  be  put  back  in 
a  short  period  of  time  and  where  the 
New  Jersey  and  a  lot  of  other  ships  can 
fire  as  they  have  been  doing. 

Q.  Why  continue  to  fire  at  Syria 
and  Syria-occupied  positions  when,  in 
fact,  Syria  is  one  of  the  major  players 
necessary  to  put  together  a  government 
in  Lebanon? 

A.  Until  the  Syrians  change  the  en- 
tire way  in  which  they  have  approached 
the  issue  of  Lebanon,  they  are  going  to 
have  to  be  dealt  with  when  they  fire  at 
us  or  threaten  our  people  in  Beirut. 
We're  going  to  fire  back.  We've  made 
that  clear,  and  I  don't  know  why 
everybody  is  so  surprised  about  that. 

Q.  We  got  a  statement— just  came 
in  a  minute  ago  from  Dama.scus— from 
the  Syrian  Foreign  Minister  that 
Syria's  patience  is  not  unlimited.  Does 


U.S.,  Angola,  South 
Africa  Discuss  Peace 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
FEB.  16.  1984' 

On  February  16,  1984,  delegations  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  Angola,  the 
Republic  of  South  Africa,  and  the  United 
States  of  America  met  in  Lusaka  to 
discuss  steps  to  further  the  process  of 
peace  in  southern  Africa.  The  Angolan 
delegation  was  headed  by  Minister  of  In- 
terior Alexandre  Rodriguez,  the  South 
Afi-ican  delegation  was  headed  by 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  R.F.  Botha, 
and  the  American  delegation  was  led  by 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  [for  African 
Affaii-s]  Chester  A.  Crocker.  Responding 
to  President  Kaunda's  assessment  that  a 
historic  opportunity  now  exists  to  make 
progress,  the  conference  achieved  the 
following  results: 

•  Creation  of  a  joint  South 
African/ Angolan  commission  to  monitor 
the  disengagement  process  in  southern 
Angola  and  to  detect,  investigate,  and 
report  any  alleged  violations  of  the  com- 
mitments of  the  parties; 

•  The  first  meeting  of  the  joint  com- 
mission took  place  in  Lusaka  on 
February  16.  Further  meetings  will  be 
held  in  other  mutually  agreed  locations 


at  the  convenience  of  the  parties; 

•  It  was  agreed  that  a  small  number 
of  American  representatives  would  par- 
ticipate in  the  activities  of  the  joint  com- 
mission at  the  i-equest  of  the  parties.  The 
delegations  agreed  that  the  task  of  the 
joint  commission  in  the  weeks  ahead  is  to 
facilitate  the  successful  completion  of  the 
disengagement  process  and  to  establish 
an  effective  cessation  of  hostilities.  The 
delegations  are  aware  of  the  many  com- 
plex and  unresolved  issues  which  must 
still  be  addressed  in  the  search  for  solu- 
tions to  the  problems  of  the  region.  They 
agi-ee,  however,  that  the  Lusaka  meeting 
constitutes  an  important  and  construc- 
tive step  toward  the  peaceful  resolution 
of  the  problems  of  the  region,  including 
the  question  of  the  implementation  of 
UN  Secui'ity  Council  Resolution  435. 

The  participants  express  their  deep 
appreciation  to  President  Kaunda  and 
the  Government  and  people  of  Zambia 
and  for  the  generous  hospitality  and  ex- 
cellent arrangements  provided  in  connec- 
tion with  the  conference. 


'Released  in  Lusaka  and  made  available 
to  news  con-espondents  by  acting  Department 
spokesman  Alan  Romberg.  ■ 


that  frighten,  startle,  or  upset  you  in 
any  way? 

A.  Mr.  Khaddam  is  noted  for  his 
statements,  I  guess,  but  the  basic  point, 
I  think,  is  that  the  Syrians  have  been, 
are  now,  and  I  suspect  will  continue  to 
be  for  some  period  of  time  the  basic 
problem  with  finding  a  solution  to  the 
tragedy  of  Lebanon.  I  don't  much  care 
whether  his  patience  is  close  to  ex- 
hausted or  not;  it  is  largely  irrelevant. 
They  have  been  acting  like  a  bull  in  a 
china  closet  for  some  weeks  now,  and  I 
don't  think  this  changes  anything. 

Q.  One  solution  to  the  tragedy  of 
Lebanon  is  to  get  rid  of  Lebanon.  That 
is,  granted  that  the  President— 

A.  The  Lebanese  might  not  like  that. 

Q.  They  might  not.  but  the  Presi- 
dent says  the  Syrians  are  bent  on  ter- 
ritorial conquest.  A  principle  of 
American  policy,  not  just  in  the  Middle 
East  but  everywhere,  has  been  the  in- 
tegrity of  exi.sting  states. 

Given  the  fact  that  Syria  has  an 
awful  lot  of  Lebanon,  that  possession 
of  nine-tenths  of  ownership,  that  they 


claim  all  of  Lebanon  to  begin  with  for 
greater  Syria,  are  you  ruling  out  flatly 
American  acceptance  of  the  partition 
of  Lebanon? 

A.  I  am  not  in  a  position  to  rule  it  in 
or  out.  I,  myself,  believe  that  if  you  look 
at  U.S.  policy  with  regard  to  Lebanon 
over  the  course  of  the  last  months,  we 
have  made  it  clear  that  our  objective  and 
certainly  our  desire  is  a  Lebanon  that  is 
free.  I  can't  say  that  we're  going  to  ac- 
cept a  partition  of  Lebanon.  Clearly,  our 
statements  and  our  policy  has  been  in 
another  direction. 

I  also  have  to  say  that,  you  know, 
there  is  a  certain  degi-ee  to  which  we  can 
control  events  and  obviously  there  is  a 
limit  beyond  which  we  cannot.  I  don't 
know  what's  going  to  happen.  I  can 
simply  say  we're  not  for  a  partitioned 
Lebanon. 

Q.  What  do  we  have  to  control 
events  besides  the  guns  of  the  fleet? 

A.  Basically  we  have  the  guns  of  the 
fleet.  We  have,  hopefully,  the  ability 
still-although  I  agree  with  you  that 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


chances  are  slimmer— the  ability  of 
Gemayel  to  put  together  a  broader  based 
government,  and  we  have  obviously  the 
Israelis  sitting  there.  They  are  not  irrele- 
vant to  this  question.  And  one  has  to 
hope  that  as  Mr.  Assad  and  his  rather 
mouthy  Foreign  Minister  look  to  the 
future,  they  may  recognize  that  Syria's 
longer  term  interests  require  some  sort 
of  accommodation. 

Q.  What  is  the  Israeli  relevance? 
They've  been  irrelevant  so  far— 20 
kilometers  away  from  our  Marines, 
and  of  no  particular  relevance. 

A.  I  don't  think  it's  true  that  they 
have  been  iri-elevant.  I  think  the  Syrians 
do  not  consider  them  irrelevant.  The  way 
in  which  the  Israelis  act  and  now  will 
react  to  events  in  Lebanon  I  think  is 
something  the  Syrians  clearly  have  to 
take  account  of. 

Q.  Do  you  anticipate  that  President 
Gemayel  will  not  abrogate  the  May 
17th  agreement  with  Israel,  the 
withdrawal  agreement,  and  would  we 
support  an  abrogation  of  it? 

A.  The  U.S.  ixisition  with  regard  to 
the  May  17th  agi'eement  is  clear:  We 
helped  arrive  at  that  agreement;  we  sup- 
port that  agreement.  I  suppose  that  if 
the  Lebanese  and  the  Israelis  themselves 
indicate  a  desire  to  change  that  agree- 
ment or  in  some  way  to  deal  with  it,  we 
are  not  going  to  stand  in  the  way  of  it. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  as  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  we  have  said  it  time  and 
again,  that  May  17th  agreement  is 
something  we  are  associated  with  and 
we're  not  going  to  walk  away  from  it. 

Q.  The  Israelis  say  they  don't  want 
it  abrogated.  But  that  leaves  President 
Gemayel  twisting  in  the  wind,  doesn't 
it? 

A.  I  don't  know  that  it  leaves  Presi- 
dent Gemayel  twisting  in  the  wind  for 
several  reasons.  The  first  of  which  is  the 
May  17th  agi'eement  as  far  as  the 
Syrians  are  concerned  is  in  my  judgment 
a  phony.  And  if  there  were  no  May  17th 
agreement,  Mr.  Assad  and  Mr.  Khaddam 
would  be  looking  for  some  other  excuse. 
Right  now  they're  using  the  May  17th 
agreement.  What  we  need  to  remember 
is  that  that  May  17th  agi'eement  was  an 
attempt  between  Israel  and  Lebanon  to 
arrive  at  a  settlement.  And  the  Syrian 
objection  to  May  17  is  clearly  that  no 
Arab  state  ought  to  sign  an  agreement 
with  Israel.  Now  one  has  to  ask  oneself 
whether  that  is  sensible  from  an 
American  point  of  view,  and  I  happen  to 
think  not.  ■ 


Recent  Situation  in  the  Philippines 


by  John  C.  Monjo 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  07i 
February  7,  198Jt.  Mr.  Monjo  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  address  today  the  situa- 
tion in  the  Philippines  and  the  state  of 
U.S. -Philippine  relations.  I  intend  to 
cover  today  developments  since  my  last 
appearance  before  the  committee  in 
September  not  long  after  the  tragic 
assassination  of  former  Senator  Benigno 
S.  Aquino.  I  shall  speak  of  political, 
financial,  and  economic  developments,  in- 
cluding the  assassination  investigation 
and  preparations  for  the  May  1984 
parliamentary  election.  I  shall  touch  on 
U.S.  policies  in  the  wake  of  these 
developments.  My  presentation  will  also 
address  the  major  areas  of  interest  the 
committee  indicated  in  its  letter  of  invita- 
tion. 

Political  Developments  Since 
the  Aquino  Assassination 

Since  my  earlier  appearance  before  you, 
there  has  been  a  series  of  important 
developments  which  have  invigorated  the 
Philippine  political  scene.  Appreciable 
progress  has  been  made.  However,  there 
is  still  some  way  to  go,  and  it  is  still  far 
from  certain  that  the  opposition  will  par- 
ticipate in  the  May  parliamentary  elec- 
tion. 

Perhaps  the  most  striking  political 
development  in  the  Philippines  following 
the  Aquino  assassination  is  the  entrance 
into  active  politics  of  organized  groups  of 
businessmen  and  professionals.  They 
have  engaged  in  dialogue  with  Pi-esident 
Marcos  personally  and  with  New  Society 
Movement  (KBL)  party  leaders,  they 
deal  with  the  opposition,  and  they  speak 
out  on  the  issues.  They  organize  peaceful 
demonstrations.  Some  have  helped  to 
oi'ganize  and  launch  a  new  new^spaper, 
Veritas,  with  ties  to  the  Catholic  Church. 

These  newly  politicized  groups  have 
spearheaded  attempts  to  resolve  political 
problems  through  the  give  and  take  of 
negotiations  involving  the  government, 
the  opposition,  and  representatives  of 
the  private  sector.  The  negotiations  seem 
to  be  going  on  at  several  different  levels 
simultaneously  and  are  aimed  primarily 
at  clarifying  the  ground  rules  for  the 


May  1984  parliamentary  election.  In- 
evitably, this  involves  the  parametei's 
governing  participation  in  the  election  by 
the  moderate  political  opposition,  as  well 
as  the  political  strategies  of  both  the 
government  and  the  opposition. 

The  negotiations  began  last  year  with 
a  backdrop  of  peaceful,  frequent,  well- 
organized,  and  well-attended  demonstra- 
tions in  urban  areas,  primarily  in  Manila, 
which  called  for  orderly  political  change 
in  the  wake  of  the  Aquino  assassination. 
The  government  has  also  shown 
restraint  and  generally  refrained  from 
using  force  to  deal  with  the  demonstra- 
tions. To  their  great  credit,  all  parties  to 
the  political  debate  have  avoided 
violence,  which  they  rightly  recognize 
would  further  disrupt  the  prospects  for 
restoring  political  and  economic  stability. 
The  Catholic  Church,  in  paiticular,  has 
stressed  the  need  for  national  reconcilia- 
tion among  the  various  conflicting 
groups.  The  steady  drumbeat  of  street 
politics  Philippine-style,  with  its 
manifestations  of  political  humor  and 
yellow  confetti,  subsided  during  the  holi- 
day season  but  picked  up  again  just  last 
week  with  a  very  large  and  peaceful 
demonstration  in  Manila  led  by  Senator 
Aquino's  brother,  Agapito. 

Another  indication  of  change  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  assassination  is  in  the 
sphere  of  press  freedom.  A  significant 
expansion  in  the  limits  of  press  freedom 
has  occurred  since  September  with  the 
proliferation  of  press  organs  carrying 
sharp  criticism  of  government  policy  and 
generally  more  balanced  treatment  of 
issues  in  the  major  dailies.  Some  e.x- 
am])les:  Malaya,  an  opposition  sister 
publication  of  the  closed  down  We 
Forum,  now  has  a  larger  circulation  na- 
tionwide than  We  Forum  ever  did. 
Business  Day  provides  independent 
coverage  and  critical  commentary  to  a 
nationwide  readership,  as  does  the 
newest  newspaper,  Veritas. 

Meanwhile,  although  the  communist 
New  People's  Army  (NPA)  insurgency 
continues  its  steady  growth  in  various 
pai'ts  of  the  country,  as  it  has  for  several 
years,  we  do  not  view  the  NPA  as  a 
serious,  near-term  political  threat,  nor  do 
the  events  ensuing  from  the  Aquino 
assassination  appear  in  themselves  to 
have  bolstered  support  for  the  com- 
munist movement  in  the  Philippines. 

The  Marcos  government  has  re- 
sponded positively  to  several  of  the  im- 
portant demands  of  the  opposition  and 
the  middle  class  business  community. 


April  1984 


37 


EAST  ASIA 


Some  of  these  decisions  were  made  after 
vigorous  intense  debate  within  the  KBL 
party  and  after  initial  opposition  on  the 
pai-t  of  President  Marcos.  These  include: 

•  A  new  presidential  succession 
mechanism  which  in  any  future  election 
will  restore  the  vice  presidency; 

•  Province-based  elections  for  parlia- 
ment; 

•  Agi-eement  to  conduct  a  new  voter 
registration  nationwide;  and 

•  Suspension  until  June  1  of  the  issu- 
ance of  preventive  detention  orders, 
which  permit  an-est  without  warrant  and 
allow  persons  to  be  held  without  bail  un- 
til the  President  orders  release. 

The  government  has  agi-eed  in  prin- 
ciple to  several  other  measures,  including 
appointments  of  additional  members  to 
the  Election  Commission  upon  the 
recommendation  of  various  gi-oups, 
electoral  code  amendments,  abolition  of 
bloc  voting,  allowing  individuals  to 
change  party  affiliation,  and  accreditation 
of  political  parties. 

These  conciliatory  moves,  which 
responded  to  public  pressure,  have 
helped  to  defuse  the  tense  political  at- 
mosphere in  Manila  in  recent  months.  In 
particular,  the  new  presidential  succes- 
sion mechanism,  while  it  did  not  please 
everyone,  served  to  remove  the  issue 
from"  active  contention,  at  least  for  the 
time  being,  with  apparent  benefits  for 
the  political  stability  of  the  country  as 
well. 

The  opposition's  demands  for  political 
reform  are  more  far-reaching,  however. 
As  a  condition  for  their  agi-eement  to 
participate  in  the  parliamentary  election, 
leaders  of  key  moderate  opposition 
groups,  including  some  who  earlier  were 
advocating  participation,  as  well  as  those 
advocating  boycott,  have  asked  President 
Marcos  to  repeal  all  the  presidential 
decrees  which  bestow  on  the  Philippine 
President  martial  law-type  powers.  They 
demand  the  outright  repeal  of  the  Presi- 
dent's authority  to  legislate  by  decree, 
restoration  of  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus,  repeal  of  all  other  decrees 
dealing  with  national  security,  and  agree- 
ment to  several  other  measures.  The  op- 
position leaders  have  stated  that,  if  these 
demands  are  not  met  by  February  14, 
the  opposition  will  actively  boycott  the 
election. 

In  sum.  we  are,  therefore,  in  a 
delicate  period  of  negotiation  involving 
the  government,  the  opposition,  and  the 
newly  politicized  business  leaders. 


Aquino  Assassination 
Investigation 

The  Agrava  board  of  inquiry  into  the 
Aquino  assassination  appears  from  all  in- 
dications to  be  proceeding  conscien- 
tiously and  expeditiously  with  its  inquiry 
and  seems  committed  to  pursuing  the 
evidence  wherever  it  leads.  As  a  result, 
its  reputation  among  Filipinos  has  stead- 
ily improved  since  its  composition  was 
announced  in  October  1983,  and  it  now 
appears  to  enjoy  considerable  public 
credibility.  The  ultimate  test  will  come, 
of  course,  when  the  board  completes  its 
hearing  and  reports  its  findings  simul- 
taneously to  the  Philippine  Government 
and  the  "public.  This  is  not  likely  to  hap- 
pen for  some  time. 

The  United  States  is  on  record  as  ex- 
pecting the  Philippine  Government  to  act 
swiftly  and  vigorously  to  track  down 
Senator  Aquino's  murderers.  We  are, 
therefore,  following  the  progi-ess  of  the 
inquiry  with  gi-eat  interest. 

Economic  Developments 

While  there  have  been  positive 
developments  in  the  political  arena  since 
last  I  appeared  before  you.  the  economic 
situation  has  seriously  deteriorated. 

As  a  result  of  the  political  unrest 
following  the  Aquino  assassination, 
plus  the  growing  signs  that  the  Philip- 
pine balance-of-payments  deficit  would 
greatly  exceed  government  estimates, 
trade  "financing  by  foreign  banks  began 
to  evaporate  in  the  third  quarter  of  1983. 
Fiscal  and  balance-of-payments  problems 
had  been  aggi-avated  during  all  of  1982 
and  1983  by  low  commodity  prices  for 
Philippine  "exports,  high  interest  rates  on 
external  borrowing,  slowed  export 
growth,  depressed  domestic  demand,  and 
reduced  private  investment  activity. 
The  situation  grew  more  acute  in 
October,  when  the  Philippines  was 
forced  further  to  devalue  the  peso,  de- 
clared a  moratorium  on  payments  of 
private  debt  principal,  and  later  sought 
rescheduling  of  all  foreign  debt.  Devalua- 
tion placed  upward  pressure  on  prices  at 
home,  and  inflation  climbed  to  double 
digit  levels  at  the  end  of  1983.  Inputs  are 
down  sharply,  factories  are  closing  or 
laying  off  workers.  Total  outstanding 
foreign  debt  as  of  mid-October  1983  was 
$24.6  billion. 

The  Philippine  Government  clearly 
faces  foi-midable  problems,  but  other 
countries  are  facing  and  dealing  suc- 
cessfully with  problems  of  a  similar 
nature.  The  first  order  of  business  will 
be  to  conclude  the  lengthy  discussions 


between  the  Intei-national  Monetary 
Fund  and  the  Government  of  the  Philip- 
pines for  a  standby  agi'eement.  This 
agreement  and  the  foreign  debt  resched- 
uling it  should  make  possible  will  likely 
entail  certain  painful,  but  necessai-y, 
austerity  measures  that  are  not  politi- 
cally welcome  anywhere.  However,  once 
the  standby  is  in  place,  debt  reschedul- 
ing can  proceed,  and  that  will  open  up 
the  possibility  for  access  to  new  foreign 
commercial  and  government  financing 
that  will  be  needed  to  reinvigorate  the 
economy.  In  the  short  terni,  however, 
present"  economic  hardships  and  rismg 
unemplojTnent  figui'es  are  hkely  to 
become  major  issues  during  the  election 
campaign. 

Close  Bilateral  Relationship 

Because  the  ties  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Philippines  are  long  and 
deep,  it  is  vital  that  we  underline  at  the 
outset  the  need  for  a  policy  that  looks  to 
the  longer  term  in  our  relationship.  Our 
bilateral  ties  today  rest  on  the  founda- 
tion of  shared  history,  common  suffering 
during  wai",  close  people-to-people  ties,  a 
solid  record  of  cooperation  in  economic 
development,  and  healthy  trade  and  in- 
vestment. Our  close  security  partnership, 
manifested  in  the  existence  of  U.S. 
military  facilities  at  Clark  and  Subic  and 
our  Mutual  Defense  Treaty,  is  another 
ingredient  in  the  relationship.  Our  in- 
terests, shared  over  the  years  by  suc- 
cessive Administrations  in  Washington 
and  Manila,  have  taken  on  a  new  impor- 
tance in  the  1980's,  particularly  in  view 
of  the  Soviet  buildup  in  the  South  China 
Sea  and  Vietnam. 

Over  the  past  years,  our  security  ties 
with  the  Philippines  have  been  excellent. 
This  is  the  principal  reason  we  concluded 
the  review  of  our  Military  Bases  Agree- 
ment so  rapidly  and  amicably  last  spring. 
It  behooves  us  to  preserve  the  quality  of 
these  ties  with  an  old  ally.  By  doing  so, 
we  avoid  having  our  military  facilities 
become  a  major  focus  of  political  debate 
within  the  Philippines,  always  a  possibil- 
ity during  unsettled  political  times  but 
one  that  we  have  successfully  avoided 
during  the  past  months.  Except  among  a 
small  minority  of  opposition-oriented 
Filipino  nationalists,  anti-Americanism 
has  not  figm-ed  prominently  in  the 
political  debate  of  recent  months. 


38 


'etin 


^SKi 


EUROPE 


U.S.  Policy 

Throughout  the  difficult,  even  traumatic, 
past  6  months  of  Philippine  history,  our 
policy  toward  this  important  ally  has  re- 
mained steadfast.  With  an  eye  toward  all 
of  our  long-term  interests,  we  have 
spoken  out  consistently,  both  publicly 
and  through  active  private  diplomacy, 
along  the  following  lines. 

•  The  United  States  believes  firmly 
that  a  free  and  fair  electoral  process  in 
which  Filipinos  can  place  their  confidence 
is  the  key  to  I'esolution  of  the  political 
problems  left  in  the  wake  of  the  Aquino 
assassination.  A  fail-  election  will  do 
much  to  bind  the  political  wounds  that 
are  still  open.  We  trust  that  responsible 
Philippine  leaders  from  the  govei-nment, 
the  opposition,  and  the  private  sector 
will  make  those  extra  efforts  needed  to 
make  this  electoral  process  a  genuine 
milestone  in  the  political  normalization 
process.  If  this  election  is  successful,  it 
could  be  the  vehicle  for  bringing  into 
democratic  political  life  a  whole  new 
generation  of  office  holders. 

•  The  United  States  looks  forward 
with  keen  interest  to  the  outcome  of  the 
work  of  the  Agrava  board,  as  it  con- 
tinues resolutely  in  its  investigation  of 
the  Aquino  assassination.  The  board  has 
already  established  a  sound  record  of  ac- 
complishment. We  believe  its  work  has 
contributed  significantly  to  lowering  the 
political  temperature  of  the  country  over 
the  past  months.  We  e.xpect  it  to  pursue 
its  investigation  vigorously  to  its  logical 
conclusion. 

•  We  are  keenly  aware  that  no 
amount  of  political  reform  can  prosper  in 
an  atmosphere  of  severe  economic  dislo- 
cation—and the  reverse  is  also  true. 
Economic  distress  can  only  assist  radical 
elements  inimical  to  our  fundamental  in- 
terest in  a  stable  Philippines.  For  that 
reason,  we  have  attempted  to  respond  to 
the  Philippines'  economic  needs  by  seek- 
ing, within  the  limits  of  U.S.  law  and 
resources,  to  make  available  to  the 
Philippine  economy  the  liquidity  needed 
to  resolve  the  immediate  crisis.  We  have 
done  this  through  accelerated  economic 
support  fund  disbursements,  provision  of 
U.S.  E.xport-Import  Bank  lines  of  in- 
surance guarantees  to  facilitate  sales  of 
industrial  pi-oducts  and  agricultural  com- 
modities, and  provision  of  Commodity 
Credit  Corp.  credits  to  finance  agricul- 
tural trade.  We  intend  to  do  more,  par- 
ticularly after  the  IMF  concludes  its  ne- 
gotiations with  the  Philippine  Govern- 
ment. 


•  Finally,  we  continue  to  engage  in 
active  diplomacy  in  human  rights.  Our 
annual  human  rights  report  indicates 
that  the  human  rights  situation  in  the 
Philippines  remains  mixed,  with  con- 
tinued problems,  particularly  with  tor- 
ture and  summary  executions  which  take 
place  largely  in  areas  where  the  in- 
surgency is  active,  and  marked  improve- 
ment in  the  areas  of  press  freedom  and 
political  activity. 

We  remain  convinced  that  the 
Philippines  has  a  depth  of  talent  in  all 
sectors  capable  of  dealing  with  its 
political  and  economic  difficulties.  The 
country  is  blessed  with  abundant  natural 
resources,  a  favorable  geographic  loca- 


tion in  a  part  of  the  world  that  has 
registered  enormous  progress  in  recent 
years,  and  an  industrious  and  hardwork- 
ing labor  foi-ce.  Filipinos  must  continue 
to  make  hard  decisions  to  restore  con- 
fidence, to  resolve  the  current  problems, 
and  to  enable  economic  growth  to 
resume.  U.S.  policy  will  be  to  assist  the 
Philippines  in  this  effort  to  the  extent 
that  we  can,  as  Filipinos  determine  for 
themselves  the  political  and  economic 
future  of  their  countrv. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.H 


The  Transatlantic  Relationship: 
A  Long-Term  Perspective 


by  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

Address  as  prepared  for  delivery 
before  the  National  Newspaper  Associa- 
tion on  March  7,  198i.  Ambassador 
Eagleburger  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs. 

A  few  weeks  ago  I  made  what  some 
would  describe  as  the  mistake  of  think- 
ing aloud  before  an  audience  about  some 
of  the  challenges  the  transatlantic  rela- 
tionship will  face  through  the  rest  of  the 
20th  century.  Press  reports  then  charac- 
terized my  extemporaneous  remarks  as 
critical  of  our  West  European  allies, 
which  in  turn  led  to  a  host  of  adverse 
comment  on  my  intelligence,  judgment, 
and  paternity  by  any  number  of  high- 
ranking  European  officials  and  even  an 
opposition  leader  or  two.  In  one  of  the 
kinder  comments,  Le  Monde  remarked 
that  I  didn't  "even  have  the  excuse  of 
being  one  of  the  Califomians. ..." 

So  I  am  here  today  to  try  again.  My 
purpose  is  to  examine  the  challenges— 
and  I  believe  there  are  some— to  the  con- 
tinuance of  a  strong  transatlantic  rela- 
tionship over  the  course  of  the  remainder 
of  the  20th  century-.  It  is  not  my  thesis 
that  the  North  Atlantic  alliance  is  now 
in  crisis.  It  is  my  contention  that  the 
final  15  years  of  the  20th  century  will  be 
years  of  substantial— perhaps  profound- 
change,  and  that  it  is  time,  now,  for 
those  who  believe  as  I  do  that  a  strong 
transatlantic  partnership  will  remain 


essential  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  and 
stability,  to  begin  to  examine  together 
what  is  likely  to  change  and  how  best  to 
adjust  to  those  changes. 

The  problem  as  I  see  it  is  this:  the 
Atlantic  alliance  is  and  will  remain  our 
most  important  political  and  security  in- 
terest. Yet  in  the  course  of  the  next 
decades,  our  global  foreign  policy  im- 
peratives will  increasingly  demand  our 
attention,  our  time,  and  our  imagination. 
We  can,  I  believe,  assume  the  continu- 
ance of  an  unwavering  American  commit- 
ment to  the  defense  of  Europe.  We  can, 
as  well,  assume  a  continuation  of  a  Euro- 
pean commitment  to  our  alliance  partner- 
ship. But  what  we  cannot— or  at  least 
should  not— assume  is  that  governments 
on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic  will  always 
readily  adjust  to  changing  circumstances. 
An  adjustment  will  be  made,  but  its  ade- 
quacy and  the  ease  of  the  transition  will 
depend  heavily  on  how  soon  the  West 
imderstands— collectively— that  we  face 
new  times. 

M^or  Changes 

Let  me  start  by  describing  a  few  of  the 
major  changes  I  see  taking  place  in  the 
coming  years.  Some  are  simply  and 
readily  apparent,  others  neither  so 
simple  nor  so  clearly  perceived.  Demo- 
graphic changes  in  the  United  States,  for 
example,  are  easily  understood.  We  have 


April  1984 


EUROPE 


had  a  Pacific  coast  since  1819,  and  since 
our  first  census  our  demographic  center 
has  been  shifting  westward— a  process 
that  will  continue  and  carry  with  it  a 
continuing  shift  in  our  political  center  of 
gravity  as  well.  Yet  even  this  fact  does 
not  fully  illustrate  the  importance  of  our 
west  coast.  California,  for  example, 
would  have  one  of  the  world's  largest 
gross  national  products  were  it  an  in- 
dependent nation.  Growing,  dynamic 
cities  such  as  Los  Angeles  and  San 
Diego,  the  San  Francisco  Bay  area, 
Seattle,  and  Portland  challenge  or  sur- 
pass the  east  coast  cities  of  New  York, 
Boston,  Philadelphia,  and  Baltimore  as 
commercial  centers. 

Equally  clearly,  it  is  logical  that  our 
west  coast's  economic  and  commercial 
growth  would  increase  the  importance  to 
us  of  a  part  of  the  world  that,  with  to- 
day's communications,  lies  virtually  at 
our  doorstep.  Yet  the  recent  history  of 
Pacific  economic  dynamism  is  by  no 
means  simply  an  American  phenomenon. 
Asia's  economies  are  today  among  the 
world's  most  prosperous.  Japan's  auto- 
mobiles, steel,  and  electronic  goods  are 
sold  throughout  the  world.  Dynamic 
market  economies  in  the  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] countries,  in  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
and  Hong  Kong  produce  quality  products 
at  prices  that  assure  their  ability  to  com- 
pete in  world  markets.  China  offers  a 
vast  potential  as  it  opens  its  economy  to 
the  world. 

It  is  little  remarked,  but  nonetheless 
a  remarkable  fact,  that  since  1978  we 
have  traded  more  with  the  Pacific  Basin 
than  vdth  Europe;  in  1982  the  difference 
amounted  to  about  $13  billion.  The 
American  and  Japanese  economies  ac- 
count for  about  one-third  of  the  world's 
total  gross  national  product.  Last  year, 
Japan  was  the  second  largest  buyer  of 
American  products  (after  Canada)— and 
yet  only  one  of  several  increasingly  im- 
portant Asian  trading  partners. 

Moreover,  the  United  States  and 
Japan  are  emerging— for  the  immediate 
future,  at  least— as  the  two  most  sig^iifi- 
cant  players  in  the  field  of  high-technol- 
ogy development— a  field  that  is  Ukely  to 
define  fast-paced  economic  development 
and  prosperity  in  the  years  ahead.  As  we 
enter  the  21st  century,  the  United  States 
and  Japan  are  likely  to  be  either  the 
world's  major  economic  competitors  or 
important  economic  partners. 

We  will  face  in  the  coming  years  the 
challenge  of  creating  and  maintaining  in- 
stitutional links  with  Asian  friends  ap- 
propriate to  their  needs  and  to  ours. 


Those  links  will  not  be  identical  to  those 
we  forged  with  our  European  friends,  as 
they  will  reflect  the  differences  in  the 
relationships.  Closer  ties  with  Asia,  for 
example,  cannot  duphcate  our  broad, 
historical  relationship  with  Europe.  But 
our  increasingly  shared  economic, 
poUtical,  and  security  concerns  in  Asia 
vdll  almost  certainly  bring  with  them  the 
creation  of  new  institutional  arrange- 
ments for  dealing  more  effectively  with 
those  concerns. 

I  remarked  earlier  that  some 
changes,  such  as  the  demography  of  the 
United  States,  are  easily  seen  and  their 
consequences  readily  understood.  Others 
are  not  so  readily  apparent.  The  nature 
of  the  transatlantic  relationship  over  the 
next  15  years,  for  example,  can,  at  this 
point,  be  only  dimly  perceived. 

The  NATO  alliance,  which  next 
month  celebrates  its  35th  birthday,  has 
assured  more  than  a  generation  of  peace 
in  Europe— itself  a  rare  occurrence  in 
Europe's  20th  century  history— by  re- 
minding friends  and  adversaries  alike 
that  we  will  consider  an  attack  on  them 
as  an  attack  on  ourselves.  President 
Reagan  has  recently  reaffirmed  our  com- 
mitment by  deploying— in  concert  with 
our  allies— a  new  generation  of  inter- 
mediate nuclear  missiles  that  will  com- 
plete the  chain  of  deterrence  and  ensure 
that  Western  Europe's  security  will  re- 
main coupled  to  our  own. 

I  need,  here,  to  underline  that 
American  recognition  that  defending 
Western  Europe  is  also  the  defense  of 
our  own  country  marked  a  revolutionary 
change  in  our  foreign  policy.  It  was  not, 
at  first,  a  premise  with  which  Americans 
were  entirely  comfortable.  For  many, 
like  myself,  growing  up  in  the  Middle 
West,  it  irrevocably  extended  our 
destinies  and  our  sense  of  personal  and 
national  security  far  beyond  our  natural 
frontiers.  This  premise  has  proved  to  be 
the  fundamental  link  between  the  United 
States  and  Europe. 

There  have  been  periodic  crises  in 
the  history  of  the  alliance  over  how  to 
enhance  our  mutual  security;  there  will 
assuredly  be  more  in  the  future.  We  may 
disagree  with  some  of  our  European 
allies  on  precisely  how  to  couple  or  rein- 
force this  bond— but  the  essential 
premise  that  peace  in  the  Western  world 
is  indivisible  has  never  come  into  ques- 
tion. And  no  installation  of  any  weapons 
system  can  be  a  substitute  for  that  fun- 
damental assumption. 

Yet  Europe's  importance  to  us  goes 
beyond  our  security  needs  alone.  We  also 
share  a  culture,  a  history,  and  several  of 
their  languages.  Ideas  cross  the  Atlantic 


so  quickly  in  both  directions  that  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  fathom  from  which  side  they 
originated. 

Finally,  there  is  the  political  aspect 
of  our  transatlantic  culture.  Our  systems 
of  government  may  vary,  but  we  join  the 
nations  of  Western  Europe  in  dedication 
to  liberal  democratic  principles  that  en- 
sure the  freedom  and  dignity  of  the  in- 
dividual, and  government  on  the  basis  of 
popular  consent.  We  inherited  these 
values  from  Western  Europe,  and  we 
have  contributed  heavily  to  their  sur- 
vival and  viability  in  an  often  hostile 
world. 

Europe  and  Europeans  have  had,  and 
still  have,  a  major  impact  on  our  political 
thinking.  Here  were  return  to  the  impor- 
tance of  the  transatlantic  dialogue. 
Although  our  diplomacy  will  never  com- 
pletely satisfy  our  European  friends  any 
more  than  it  will  ever  satisfy  ourselves, 
European  influence  on  our  foreign  policy 
has  been  far  more  important  than  is  com- 
monly perceived.  It  has,  on  the  whole, 
led  over  the  years  to  a  far  more  nuanced, 
far  more  sophisticated  approach  on  our 
part  than  would  have  been  the  case  were 
we  left  strictly  to  our  own  devices.  It  is 
an  influence  that  has  been  most  effec- 
tively exercised  behind  closed  doors— in 
the  NATO  CouncO,  at  the  annual  seven- 
nation  summits,  in  the  constant  meetings 
between  American  presidents  and  Euro- 
pean leaders,  and  in  the  host  of  meetings 
between  American  and  European  of- 
ficials that  take  place  on  almost  a  daily 
basis.  It  is  a  process  that  has  worked 
because  we  have  operated  from  a  basis 
of  shared  values  and  objectives,  common 
interests  and  hopes,  and  mutual  danger 
and  sacrifice. 

This  is  precious  capital— an  unpre- 
cedented resource  of  the  transatlantic 
partnership  which  Americans  and  Euro- 
peans alike  must  seek  to  preserve  for  the 
generations  yet  to  come.  And  since  I 
believe  we  may  run  the  risk,  in  the 
decades  of  the  1980s  and  1990s,  of  losing 
some  of  that  intimacy,  now  is  the  time  to 
look  to  preserving  it.  I  say  "now,"  since 
the  alliance,  as  I  indicated  earlier,  is  not 
today  in  a  state  of  crisis.  Indeed,  the  con- 
trary is  true;  we  have  survived,  over- 
come, and  resolved  most  of  the  difficult 
issues  between  us  during  the  past  year, 
and  the  climate  of  relations  today  is 
warm  and  workmanlike. 

Need  To  Address  Problems 

So  let  me  take  this  time  of  relative  calm 
in  the  alliance  to  tell  you  of  the  problems 
I  see  ahead:  problems  which  if  left  to 
evolve,  unperceived  and  untended,  may 
grow  in  complexity  and  consequence. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Thirty  years  ago  Atlanticists  foresaw 
a  united  Europe  overcoming  its  age-old 
divisions  to  play  a  global  role  near  if  not 
equal  to  that  of  the  superpowers. 
Western  Europe's  combined  population 
exceeded  ours  and  that  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  Its  rebuilt  industrial  base  would 
underwrite  its  prosperity;  its  politicians 
and  intellectuals  approached  their  prob- 
lems with  confidence  and  in  a  spirit  of 
building  a  new  and  different  Europe. 
Americans,  although  a  bit  wary  perhaps 
of  this  emerging  giant,  welcomed  re- 
newed West  European  prosperity  and 
the  prospect  of  its  larger  involvement  in 
world  affairs,  because  we  knew  we  held 
no  monopoly  on  wisdom  and  because  we 
shared  with  West  Europeans  common 
values  and  objectives.  Much  more  joined 
than  divided  us. 

Today,  however,  we  see  a  Europe 
that  has  become  less  certain  of  its  future, 
more  uncertain  about  the  wisdom  of 
postwar  policies,  more  focused  on  its  own 
problems  and,  therefore,  less  prepared  to 
look  at  the  world  whole.  In  addition,  a 
goodly  portion  of  Europe's  younger 
generation  apparently  increasingly  ques- 
tions the  utility  of  many  of  the  institu- 
tions and  instrumentalities  that  have 
been  so  fundamental  to  the  Atlantic 
alliance. 

The  United  States  has  been,  for  more 
than  a  generation  of  Europeans,  the  land 
of  dreams,  of  achieving  the  impossible.  It 
remains  so  today,  for  many.  But  it  is 
probably  also  true  that  there  is  a  level  of 
disillusionment  and  bitterness— most 
clearly  evident  amongst  the  young— 
because  neither  America,  in  particular, 
nor  Western  institutions  in  general,  have 
been  able  to  fulfill  all  those  hopes  and 
dreams.  And  perhaps  most  unfortunate, 
this  disillusionment  sometimes  goes 
beyond  the  young— to  not  so  young 
leaders  with  enough  experience  to  know 
better. 

This  bitterness  and  disillusion  is,  to 
some  degree,  true  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic.  Too  often  political  parties  out  of 
office  tend  to  take  political  stances  on 
foreign  policy  that  throw  into  the  peren- 
nial debate  the  question  of  consistency 
on  one  side  of  the  Atlantic  or  the  other. 
It  is,  however,  some  consolation  to 
realize  that  when  political  "outs"  become 
the  political  "ins,"  they  have  tended  to 
come  to  grips  vrith  reahty  and  reaffirm 
the  overriding  imperatives  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance. 

While  it  can,  therefore,  be  argued 
that  my  concerns  about  the  attitudes  of 
European  youth  and  the  vagaries  of  op- 
position political  leaders  can  be  over- 


April  1984 


done— since  the  process  of  aging  and  the 
responsibilities  of  power  tend  to  change 
perspectives— it  is  less  easy  to  put  aside 
concerns  about  what  I  see  as  changing 
transatlantic  perceptions  of  the  world 
scene. 

I  have  often  discussed  with  Euro- 
pean friends  the  different  requirements 
for  a  nation  with  global  responsibilities 
to  those  with  more  regional  concerns. 
And  the  use  of  the  word  global  is  not 
meant  in  any  arrogant  fashion.  Nor  is  it 
to  deny  the  interests  that  several  Euro- 
pean nations  retain  in  areas  of  the  world 
beyond  their  continent.  But  the  sheer 
scope  of  American  interests  engages  us 
in  a  different  set  of  perspectives  and  im- 
peratives. I  am  persuaded  that  despite 
periodic  inconsistencies  (mainly  on  our 
part)  and  even  more  frequent  crises  of 
policy  disagreement  (emanating  fre- 
quently from  the  European  side), 
members  of  the  alliance  can  still  forge  a 
strong  consensus  on  most  issues  of  im- 
portance. As  the  Warsaw  Pact  so  clearly 
demonstrates,  partnership  without  visi- 
ble differences  is  not  a  partnership  of 
equals;  nor  is  it  a  partnership  that 
possesses  the  dynamic  qualities  so 
necessary  to  making  the  required  ad- 
justments to  changing  circumstances. 
But  an  alliance  in  which  there  is  an  ero- 
sion of  understanding  of  the  reasons  for 
those  differences— including  most  par- 
ticularly a  tolerance  of  the  necessities  of 
geography  and  responsibility— cannot  be 
counted  upon  to  retain  today's  vigor  in 
the  face  of  tomorrow's  challenges. 

U.S.  Policy  Framework 

Europeans  often  argue— and  their  point 
is  well  taken— that  detente  has  been 
largely  successful  in  its  European  con- 
text. And  it  is  certainly  clear  to 
Americans  that  tensions  in  the  heart  of 
Europe— with  Berlin  as  but  one  ex- 
ample—have lessened  significantly.  Nor 
can  we  lightly  ignore  European  efforts  to 
bridge  the  economic,  political,  and 
cultural  division  of  Europe— and  how 
crucial  they  believe  these  efforts  to  be  to 
their  long-term  vision  of  the  security  of 
Western  Europe. 

But  these  considerations  are,  and 
must  be,  only  some  of  the  elements  in 
the  American  policy  framework.  We  see 
East- West  rivalry  in  a  broader  context. 
Even  a  cursory  study  of  recent  events  in 
Afghanistan,  the  Middle  East,  southern 
Afi-ica,  or  Latin  America  persuades  us 
that  detente  has  not  been  a  success  in 
areas  outside  of  Europe.  From  our 
perspective,  the  Soviet  role  in  these 
areas  has  not,  to  put  it  mildly,  con- 
tributed to  stability. 


EUROPE 


From  the  many  conversations  I  have 
had  with  Europeans  discussing  our 
respective  views  of,  and  relations  viath, 
the  Soviet  Union,  I  have  not  found  them 
to  be  ignorant  of,  or  prepared  to  ignore, 
the  nature  of  the  Soviet  system.  There  is 
often,  however,  a  broad  gap  in  our 
evaluation  of  the  Soviet  threat.  There  is 
basic  agreement  within  the  alliance  on 
the  avoidance  of  war;  there  are  different 
and  differing  voices  in  and  vrithin  the 
European  members  of  the  alliance,  on 
precisely  how  to  reduce  the  level  of  ten- 
sions. These  disagreements  can  serve 
either  to  polarize  our  positions  or  as  an 
example  of  how  alliance  differences  can 
be  contained  within  a  unified  policy.  If 
they  are  to  serve  the  latter  purpose  it 
will  be  necessary  for  both  Europeans 
and  Americans  to  recognize  that  there 
are  legitimate  reasons  of  geography  and 
responsibility  that  will  often  require 
nuanced  differences  of  approach  toward 
the  same  general  goals. 

Other  kinds  of  transatlantic  dif- 
ference, unfortunately,  leave  more 
bruised  feelings— and  perhaps  demon- 
strate the  degree  to  which  we  and  our 
European  allies  have  begun  to  diverge 
on  basic  issues.  Two  years  ago  the 
British  effort  to  regain  the  Falkland 
Islands  posed  for  the  United  States  a 
more  difficult  choice  than  most  Euro- 
peans yet  recognize.  Yet  we  made  our 
choice.  A  few  months  ago  I  had  reason 
to  remember  that  decision  when  we 
learned,  with  profound  regret,  that  as 
our  Marines  landed  in  Grenada,  our 
European  friends  moved  swiftly  and 
publicly  to  condemn  the  action.  That 
Europeans  view  the  liberation  of 
Grenada  with  less  enthusiasm  than 
Americans  or  Grenadians  do,  is,  I  admit, 
fully  within  the  normal  and  acceptable 
range  of  alliance  differences.  But  where, 
at  that  moment,  was  the  alliance  solidar- 
ity that  had  meant  so  much  to  us  a  year 
earlier?  Where  was  the  recognition  that 
the  United  States  might  be  justified  in 
moving  to  protect  what  it  believed  to  be 
its  national  interests?  At  the  very  least, 
could  not  our  fi-iends  have  suspended 
judgment  until  the  emerging  situation 
became  clearer? 

In  the  case  of  Grenada  we  moved  in 
concert  with  Caribbean  nations  who 
recognized  the  threat  to  their  own 
security  that  the  regime  in  Grenada 
posed.  The  United  States  has,  since  the 
close  of  World  War  II,  grown  increas- 
ingly conscious  of  that  curse  of  all  great 
powers— unilateralism— and  has  sought  to 
resist  its  temptations.  We  long  ago 
discovered  that  there  is  a  very  fine  line 
between  unilateralism  on  the  one  hand 


41 


'i';n'iiji 


EUROPE 


I 


and  leadership  on  the  other  and  have 
tried  very  hard  to  avoid  the  one  and  em- 
brace the  other.  But  the  distinction 
becomes  increasingly  hard  to  maintain 
when  our  principal  friends  and  allies  do 
not  recognize  that  the  breadth  of  our  m- 
terests  sometimes  leads  us  to  a  different 
evaluation  of  threats  to  those  interests 
than  is  held  by  others. 

The  Prime  Minister  of  the  youngest 
democracy  in  Europe,  Felipe  Gonzalez  of 
Spain,  recently  touched  upon  another, 
related,  problem  that  has  come  to  con- 
cern some  Americans  of  late.  "Some- 
times," he  said,  "we,  the  Sparash,  have 
the  feeling  that  we  trust  more  m  the 
destiny  of  Europe  than  other  countries 
ab-eady  integrated  into  the  group  ot  __ 
European  institutions."  "The  fact  is,    he 
added,  "that  to  a  large  extent  Europe  to 
day  remains  obsessed  with  its  own  prob- 
lems. This  is  something  that  needs  to  be 
overcome." 

The  danger  with  this  growmg  ten- 
dency to  look  inward  is  that  it  may  rem- 
force  the  potential  negative  consequences 
that  can  result  from  the  changing  trans- 
atlantic  perceptions  of  the  world  that  1 
have  earlier  described.  Either  tendency, 
by  itself,  can  be  difficult  enough  to 
counter;  both,  moving  together,  each  ex- 
acerbating the  other,  could  prove  to  be  a 
wicked  brew  indeed. 

This  absorption  with  its  mtemal  con- 
cerns is  in  great  measure  a  consequence 
of  current  economic  conditions  m  Europe 
and  therefore  hopefully  will  dimmish  as 
prosperity  returns.  But  the  tendency  to 
lav  the  blame  for  recession  largely  at  the 
door  of  the  United  States  and  our  high 
interest  rates  presents  another  kind  of 
problem.  What  must  be  avoided  m  this 
transatlantic  dialogue  over  economic 
issues  is  a  too  facile  resort  to  the    blame 
America  first"  syndrome.  For  to  do  so  is 
to  obscure  more  fundamental  failmgs 
that  stand  in  the  way  of  economic 
recovery.  In  the  end,  Europeans, 
possessing  collectively  a  gross  national 
product  larger  than  that  of  the  United 
States,  need  to  ask  themselves  whether 
it  can  really  be  true  that  their  economic 
recovery  depends,  in  the  main,  on  the 
prime  rate  in  the  United  States. 

I  have  cited  these  problems  because 
I  deeply  believe  they  need  to  be  dis- 
cussed between  friends  while  they  are 
still  manageable  issues.  I  do  not  believe 
they  demonstrate  a  fundamental  rift  be- 
tween the  two  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  Nor 
do  I  believe  they  are  insurmountable.  In 
fact,  the  manner  in  which  we  were  able, 
together,  to  put  our  disagreement  over 
pipeline  sanctions  behind  us  demon- 


strates the  contrary.  Rather,  I  cite  them 
because  I  fear  that  left  unchecked,  these 
trends  plus  our  own  increasing  concern 
with  our  affairs  in  other  parts  of  the 
world-Central  America,  the  Pacific,  the 
Middle  East,  to  name  but  a  few-can 
over  time,  diminish  the  character  of  the 
transatlantic  relationship.  And  that 
would  be  a  tragedy,  for  a  strong  alliance 
is  now,  and  will  continue  to  be  for 
decades  to  come,  the  keystone  of  our 
own-and  the  West's-security  and 

stsbilitv 

Thus,  now  may  well  be  the  appropri- 
ate moment  for  all  of  us,  Europeans  and 
Americans,  to  take  a  new  look  at  where 
we  should  be  going  together  and  how  we 
should  get  there.  Perhaps,  as  was  re- 
cently indicated  in  the  Wall  Street 
Journal,  we  might  forego  the  traditional 
choices  between  less  and  more  involve- 
ment and  direct  ourselves  instead  to  a 
"smarter"  involvement.  The  two  pillars 
of  a  "smarter"  relationship,  in  my  opm- 
ion,  are:  increasing  respect  for  the  dif- 
ferences in  our  alliance,  and  a  more  coor- 
dinated approach-across  the  board-to 
all  political,  economic,  and  security  issues 
with  our  European  allies. 


Third.  How  can  the  developed  worid 
cope  more  effectively  with  the  large, 
urgent,  and  as  yet  unmanageable  ques- 
tions of  development  in  the  less  devel- 
oped countries? 

Fourth.  How  can  we  overcome  the 
increasing  pressures  toward  protec- 
tionism  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  and 
in  Japan?  More  constructively,  how  can 
the  world's  major  trading  nations  reduce 
the  barriers  to  a  ft-eer  trade  between  us.' 

These  are  but  a  few  of  the  many 
questions  that  we  should  be  workmg  on 
iointly.  But  whatever  our  agenda,  its 
purpose  ought  to  be  to  bring  the  two 
sides  of  the  partnership  together  to 
resolve  problems,  reverse  trends  that 
left  unchecked  will  pull  us  apart,  and-m 
the  last  analysis-move  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  toward  greater  equality  of  ef- 
fort, outlook,  and  strength.  To  quote 
again  from  the  Wall  Street  Journal:    A 
genuine  superpower  doesn't  need 
hegemonic  influence  with  a  weak  set  of 
client  states,  but  a  true  aUiance  with 
other  great  nations." 

The  greatness  is  there,  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic.  It  is  our  job  to  find  the 
means,  together,  to  let  it  flourish.  ■ 


Alliance  Agenda 

I  will  be  the  first  to  admit  that  I  have  no 
magic  formula  for  resolving  the  strams 
that  will  surely  bear  down  on  all  of  us  in 
the  coming  decades.  But  I  do  believe 
that  beginning  the  dialogue  is  the  key  to 
the  eventual  discovery  of  answers.  1  he 
agenda  must  be  broad:  the  fora  m  which 
that  agenda  could  be  discussed  are 
many  And  if  I  were  asked  to  suggest 
some  of  the  subjects  that  might  be  con- 
sidered I  would  propose: 

First.  How  can  we  enhance  trans- 
atlantic cooperation  in  the  development 
of  high  technology?  Painful  and  costly  as 
it  may  be,  we  must  recognize  that  if  any 
pari,  of  our  alliance  lags  seriously  behmd 
another  in  this  field  for  any  period  of 
time,  it  will  seriously  diminish  our  over- 
all effectiveness. 

Second.  The  importance  of  moving 
now  to  the  broadening  of  alliance  defense 
procurement  policies.  The  United 
States-pari^icularly  the  Congress-has, 
for  too  long,  asked  its  allies  to  share 
more  of  the  burden  of  the  common 
defense  without,  at  the  same  time, 
recognizing  that  European  mdustry 
must,  if  this  is  to  be  the  case,  pari;icipate 
fully  in  the  manufacture  of  defense 
items. 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


■WBimUHk 


EUROPE 


Death  of  Soviet  President  Andropov 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  10,  1984' 

The  President  has  sent  a  message  ex- 
pressing his  condolences  to  Mr. 
Kuznetsov,  the  Acting  Soviet  Chief  of 
State,  on  the  death  of  Chairman 
Andropov.  In  his  message  the  President 
emphasized  to  the  people  and  Govern- 
ment of  the  U.S.S.R.  his  desire  for 
cooperation  between  the  two  countries  in 
the  search  for  a  more  peaceful  world. 
As  the  President  reaffirmed  in  his 
addi-ess  of  January  16,  the  United  States 
has  sought  and  will  continue  to  seek  a 
constructive  and  realistic  dialogue  with 
the  Soviet  Union  aimed  at  building  a 
more  productive  and  stable  relationship. 
Our  objective  is  not  dialogue  for  its  own 
sake,  but  a  dialogue  that  produces  real 
solutions  to  the  many  concrete  problems 
that  divide  us. 

There  are,  to  be  sure,  fundamental 
differences  between  the  American  and 
Soviet  systems  and  our  respective 
political  beliefs.  But  the  American  and 
Soviet  peoples  have  a  common  interest  in 
the  avoidance  of  war  and  the  reduction 
of  arms.  It  is  this  need  to  preserve  and 
strengthen  the  peace  that  is  at  the  heart 
of  U.S.  policy. 

The  President's  policy  towai-d  the 
Soviet  Union  seeks  to  achieve  progress 
in  three  broad  areas:  developing  ways  to 
eliminate  the  use  and  the  threat  of  force 
in  international  relations;  significantly 
reducing  the  vast  arms  stockpiles  in  the 
world,  particularly  nuclear  weapons;  and 
establishing  a  better  working  relation- 
ship with  Moscow,  characterized  by 
greater  cooperation  and  understanding 
and  based  on  mutual  restraint  and 
respect. 

At  this  time  of  transition  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  our  two  nations  should 
look  to  the  future  in  order  to  find  ways 
to  realize  these  goals.  In  the  nuclear  age, 
there  is  no  alternative  to  dialogue. 

The  United  States  hopes  that  the 
Soviet  leader  will  work  with  us  in  this 
si)irit  and  take  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunities at  hand  to  find  common  ground 
and  establish  a  mutually  beneficial  rela- 
tionship. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT. 
FEB.  10,  19842 

The  President  has  expressed  his  per- 
sonal condolences  to  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship on  the  death  of  Chairman  An- 
dropov, and  I  have  sent  a  similar 
message  to  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko. 

At  this  time  of  transition  in  Moscow, 
let  me  reaffirm  the  basic  principles  of 
our  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union.  We 
remain  ready  for  a  constructive  and 
realistic  dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
In  this  nuclear  age,  the  United  States 
will  work  to  build  a  more  stable  and 
more  positive  relationship.  As  the  Presi- 
dent has  stressed,  we  seek  to  tlnd  solu- 
tions to  real  problems,  not  just  to  im- 
prove the  atmosphere  of  our  relations. 
This  applies,  in  particular,  to  the  task  of 
reaching  equitable  and  verifiable 
agreements  for  arms  reduction  and 
reducing  the  risk  of  war. 

The  President  has  made  clear  to  the 
people  and  Government  of  the  Soviet 
Union  his  desire  for  constructive 
cooperation  in  the  search  for  peace.  We 
invite  the  Soviet  leadership  to  work  with 
us  to  that  end.  There  are  opportunities 
at  hand.  Let  us  find  common  ground,  and 
let  us  make  the  world  a  safer  place. 


Q.  Will  President  Reagan  lead  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  Moscow? 

A.  We  have  received  no  word  from 
the  Soviet  Union  as  yet  as  to  the  time  or 
arrangements  for  the  funeral,  and  the 
President  will  make  his  decision  after  we 
receive  that  information. 

Q.  What  effect,  do  you  think  the 
death  of  Mr.  Andropov  could  have  in 
altering  the  relations— the  current 
chilly  relations— between  the  two  coun- 
tries? 

A.  We  can  reaffirm,  with  the  great- 
est seriousness  of  purpose,  our  own 
readiness  to  engage  with  the  Soviet  lead- 
ership in  solving  problems  and  develop- 
ing those  things  that  are  needed  to  make 
the  world  a  safer  place.  We  invite  their 
response  and  we  hope  very  much  that 
whoever  emerges  as  the  new  leader,  or 
leadership  group,  will  want  to  respond  in 
kind. 

Q.  Do  you  think  the  President 
should  invite  a  meeting  with  the  new 
leader  at  the  right  time? 

A.  The  President  will  decide  about 
whether  he  will  attend  the  funeral, 
depending  upon  the  arrangements  that 
they  suggest;  and  he  has  had  the  posi- 
tion all  along  that  he's  prepared  to  meet 
with  the  Soviet  leadership  if  there  is  a 
reasonable  opportunity  for  some  substan- 
tive accomplishment.  No  doubt  that  re- 
mains his  position  now. 


President  Reagan  went  to  the  Soviet  Em- 
bassy after  the  death  of  President  Andropov 
to  sign  the  condolence  book. 


April  1984 


EUROPE 


Q.  Are  you  concerned  that  a  pos- 
sible power  struKKle  in  the  Kremlin 
will  further  slow  down  progress  on 
arms  negotiations,  other  major  issues, 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union? 

A.  We  have  no  information  about  the 
process  of  selecting  a  new  leader.  That  is 
something  the  Soviet  Union  will  do. 
From  our  standpoint,  we  have  our 
strength,  we  have  our  detei-mination  to 
defend  our  interests  and  our  values,  and 
we  are  prepared  to  deal  constructively 
with  the  leadership  that  is  put  forward 
by  the  Soviet  Union.  Their  own  proc- 
esses will  determine  who  they  will  put 
forward. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  President 
Reagan  should,  in  fact,  go,  as  some 
have  suggested,  as  a  signal  of 
readiness  to  reopen  a  dialogue  with  the 
Kremlin  leadership? 

A.  The  President  has  been  and  is 
prepared  to  continue  and  expand  the 
dialogue  with  the  Soviet  leadership. 
There  is  a  very  extensive  dialogue  right 
now,  but  it  needs  to  be  expanded,  if 
possible,  and  made  more  productive,  and 
the  President  is  prepared  to  do  that. 

Q.  Do  you  anticipate  that  with  the 
change  of  leadership  in  the  Soviet 
Union  it  would  be  even  possible  to 
resume  serious  arms  negotiations  dur- 
ing 1984? 

A.  First  of  all,  there  are  serious  arms 
negotiations  going  on  right  now. 

Q.  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  talks? 

A.  Insofar  as  the  intermediate-range 
and  sti-ategic  nuclear  weapons  are  con- 
cerned, there  is  nothing  going  on,  and  I 
see  no  reason  why  those  talks  couldn't 
be  resumed.  Certainly,  we  are  prepared 
to  do  so  if  the  Soviet  leadership  comes 
forw-ard  with  an  equal  willingness. 

Q.  You've  said  that  the  President's 
decision  may  hinge  on  whether  some 
substantive  accomplishment  could  be 
achieved  by  his  going  to  Moscow.  Does 
that  mean,  in  fact,  that  the  Soviets 
will  have  to  have  chosen  a  new^  leader 
in  order  for  the  President  to  go,  that 
he  would  go  only  if  he  could  have  a 
substantive  discussion  with  that 
leader? 

A.  There  are  two  separate  things 
floating  around  here,  and  let's  distin- 
guish them.  One  is  the  question  of 
whether  or  not  the  President  would  go 
to  the  funeral,  and,  of  cour.se,  on  such  an 
occasion,  there  would  undoubtedly  be  a 
meeting  but  not  an  opportunity  for  an 
extended  and  full  discussion  of  anything. 


44 


As  I  said,  we  have  had  no  infoi-ma- 
tion  as  yet  on  the  funeral  ari'angements 
and  what  the  Soviet  Union  intends  to  do 
about  it,  and  .so  the  President  will  not 
make  any  statement  about  that  until  he 
has  those  arrangements. 

The  other  question  was,  at  some  time 
in  the  future  would  the  President  be 
willing  to  meet  with  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship, and  I  think  I'll  just  restate  my 
answer,  and  it  is  that,  yes,  certainly, 
gladly.  But  it's  important  that  the 
ground  be  prepared  in  such  a  way  that 
there  would  be  chance  for  a  significant 
result  from  the  meeting. 

Q.  Did  the  Soviet  Union  inform  this 
government  ahead  of  the  formal  an- 
nouncement of  the  death  of  Mr. 
.Andropov? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Because  the  Soviets  have  not 
chosen  a  leader,  is  the  world  a  more 
tense  place  right  now  because  of  that 
uncertainty? 

A.  We  don't  know  whether  they've 
chosen  a  leader  or  not.  They  may  have 


and  as  yet  not  announced  the  leader,  so 
we'll  see  about  that.  But  as  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  we  deal  with  the  Foreign 
Ministry  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  a  func- 
tioning government. 

Q.  Are  you  planning  on  going  to 
the  Soviet  Embassy? 

A.  Yes,  indeed,  when  they  have  a 
book  of  condolences,  and  I  will  go  when 
they  are  prepared.  Insofar  as  I  know 
they're  not  ready  for  that. 

Q.  So  you  have  no  plans  to  see  Mr. 
Dobrynin  [Soviet  .\mbassador  to  the 
United  States]  immediately? 

A.  I  have  called  Ambassador 
Dobrynin  and  expressed  my  condolences 
to  him  personally,  and  when  they  are 
prejiared  to  receive  visitors,  I  will  go 
there. 


'Read  to  reporters  assembled  at  the 
Sheraton  Hotel  in  Santa  Bai-bara  by  principal 
deputy  press  secretary  to  the  President 
Lan-y"  Speakes  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  13,  1984). 

^Press  release  4.3.  ■ 


Assistant  Secretary  Burt's 
Interview  for  "Worldnet" 


Assistant  Secretary  for  European 
and  Canadian  Affairs  Richard  R.  Bu-rt 
was  interviewed  in  Paris  on  January  31. 
198i,  by  news  correspondents  in  Bonn, 
Brussels,  Genem,  The  Hague,  London, 
Paris,  Rome,  and  Stockholm.  The  inter- 
view was  later  broadcast  on  "Worldnet," 
a  satellite  TV  program  of  the  U.S.  Infor- 
mation Service. 

Q.  We  have  been  having  some 
interesting,  though  mixed,  signals  be- 
tween Washington  and  Moscow.  It 
began  with  statements  by  President 
Reagan  and  Mr.  Andropov  that  seemed 
to  be  groping  toward  a  resumption  of 
dialogue,  and  then  came  a  harsh  Soviet 
allegation  against  the  United  States 
for  violations  of  arms  control  treaties, 
following,  of  course,  earlier  U.S. 
charges  of  Soviet  violations. 

And  then  yesterday,  .Ambassador 
Rowny,  the  chief  U.S.  delegate  to  the 
strategic  arms  reduction  talks  (START) 
in  Geneva,  said  that  there  was  the 
possibility  of  a  breakthrough  if  the 
talks  resume  because  of  trade-offs  that 
would  be  of  interest  to  both  powers. 


My  question  to  you  is  what  sense 
are  we  to  make  of  this?  How  do  you 
sum  it  up? 

A.  I  think  the  situation  in  the 
U.S.-Soviet  relationships  now  is  genu- 
inely complicated.  It  cannot  be  summed 
up  with  a  few  words,  whether  we  call  it 
"confrontation"  or  "detente."  It  is  clear 
that  we  have  some  important  differences. 
You  mentioned  the  issue  of  arms  control 
compliance.  As  you  know,  the  President 
has  sent  a  report  to  the  Congress  detail- 
ing some  violations,  or  probable  viola- 
tions, that  the  Soviets  have  committed. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  dif- 
ferences with  the  Soviets  on  regional 
issues.  For  example,  there  are  Soviet 
military  advisers  in  the  Middle  East— in 
Syria.  We  disagree  with  Soviet  human 
rights  policies.  And  we  very  much  think 
the  Soviet  Union  should  come  back  to 
the  negotiating  table. 

While  we  have  these  differences,  we 
also  believe  that  it's  important  to  talk. 
The  Secretary  of  State,  when  he  was  in 
Stockholm  recently,  both  in  the  speech 
he  gave  publicly  and  in  the  private 
meeting  with  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko, 
made  it  very  clear  that  we  are  prepared 
to  talk,  that  we're  prepared  to  meet  the 
Soviets  halfway.  Whether  or  not  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


Soviets  are  prepared,  it  is  difficult  to  say 
at  this  stage.  We  will  have  to  see. 

Q.  Do  you  foresee  any  fixed  date 
between  now  and  the  presidential  elec- 
tions in  November  for  talks  with  the 
Soviet  Union? 

A.  If  you  are  asking  me  whether  I 
think  the  Soviet  Union  will  return  to  the 
START  or  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  negotiations  between  now 
and  the  presidential  elections,  of  course  I 
have  to  say  I  do  not  know.  We  are 
prepared  to  begin  those  negotiations 
right  away.  What  the  Soviets  are 
prepared  to  do  is  not  clear.  We  have 
seen  some  recent  statements  that  sug- 
gest the  Soviet  Union  is  toning  dowTi  its 
rhetoric  somewhat,  that  they,  like  the 
President,  are  supporting  the  notion  of 
dialogue. 

There  are  some  people  who  suggest 
that  the  Russians  would  not  want  to 
come  back  to  the  table  because  this 
might  aid  the  President's  reelection  ef- 
fort. Thei-e  are  other  suggestions  that 
say  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  recognize 
that  it  is  in  Its  interest  to  return  to  the 
negotiating  table. 

What  is  important  for  us  right 
now— speaking  as  a  U.S.  official  but  also 
as  an  alliance  official— is  not  to  try  to 
speculate  about  future  Soviet  behavior; 
rather  just  make  very  clear  our  position. 
That  is,  we  are  prepared  to  begin  those 
negotiations  as  soon  as  possible,  and  if 
we  can  sit  down  behind  the  negotiating 
table,  we  are  prepared  to  engage  in  the 
neceessary  trade-offs  that  could  open  up 
new  opportunities  for  an  agreement. 

Q.  In  1976,  when  the  SS-20s  started 
to  be  deployed,  you  wrote  in  a  paper 
about  new  weapons  technology, 
"Debate  and  Direction,"  that  improved 
conventional  defense  by  new  weapons 
technology  might  lead  to  reduced 
pressure  on  the  United  States  for  ex- 
tended deterrence.  But  new  weapons 
technology  and  conventional  ar- 
maments have  only  had  a  small  impact 
compared  with  the  nuclear  debate. 

Since  nuclear  weapons  still  deter- 
mine the  strategic  thinking,  what  kind 
of  impact  would  the  vision  of  the 
future,  the  development  of  ballistic 
missile  defense  have?  Will  it  be  incre- 
mental, as  in  the  conventional  new 
weapons  technology  field?  Or  revolu- 
tionary? What  kind  of  NATO  involve- 
ment could  you  foresee,  and  what 
likely  Soviet  reaction  at  the 
negotiating  table? 

A.  First  of  all,  let  me  say  that  I  am 
pleased  that  at  least  one  person  read 


that  paper  that  I  wrote  many  years  ago. 
And  let  me  say  a  word,  though,  about 
conventional  defense.  Your  question  is 
correct  in  talking  about  the  importance 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  the  continuing 
importance  of  a  sti'ategy  of  detei-rence. 

It's  true  that  nuclear  weapons  alone 
are  not  sufficient  for  adequate  deter- 
rence, and  the  alliance  must  look  at  new 
technologies  in  the  conventional  area  to 
bolster  deterrence.  Conventional  defense 
is  as  important  as  nuclear  deterrence  in 
protecting  the  security  of  the  alliance. 

Your  question  went  on,  then,- to  ad- 
dress the  issue  of  ballistic  missile 
defense.  The  President  of  the  United 
States  has  stated  that  the  United  States 
needs  to  launch  a  research  and  develop- 
ment effort  in  the  area  of  advanced 
ballistic  missile  defense  concepts,  in  part 
because  the  Soviet  Union  is  spending  a 
great  deal  of  money  on  this  subject.  And 
we  must  protect  against  any  break- 
through that  the  Soviet  Union  might 
make. 

But  also,  looking  toward  the  future 
into  the  21st  century,  we  have  to  in- 
vestigate the  possibilities  that  all  of  our 
countries  could  be  less  vulnerable  to 
nuclear  attack.  But  I  want  to  emphasize 
that  this  is  a  research  and  development 
effort.  There  has  been  no  change  in  U.S. 
deterrence  strategy,  no  planned  changes 
in  alliance  strategy,  and  all  of  the  ac- 
tivities that  the  United  States  is  now 
undertaking  are  consistent  with  the  1972 
ABM  Treaty  [Antiballistic  Missile 
Treaty]. 

Q.  Do  you  think  the  Soviet  Union 
should  be  more  involved  in  the  search 
for  a  settlement  in  the  Middle  East 
—and  more  specifically  in  Lebanon 
—in  view  of  its  connection  with  Syria? 
Do  you  think  it  would  be  wiser  to  con- 
tinue the  past  American  policy  of  keep- 
ing the  Soviets  at  arm's  length  in  the 
Middle  East? 

A.  That's  a  very  interesting  question, 
and  I  think  the  answer  has  to  focus 
always  on  the  issue  of  whether  or  not 
the  Soviet  Union  has  a  constructive, 
responsible  role  to  play  in  the  Middle 
East.  Unfortunately,  that  has  not  been 
the  case  in  recent  months. 

You  mentioned  the  Soviet  involve- 
ment in  Syria.  We've  seen  the  shipment 
of  advanced  weapons  to  Syria,  and  we've 
seen  the  presence  in  Syria  of  substantial 
numbers  of  Soviet  military  advisers. 
That  has  been  a  destabilizing  develop- 
ment. It  has  not  made  the  process  of  the 
withdrawal  of  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon  any  easier.  And  it  has  not  made 


the  process  of  the  reconciliation  of  the 
various  factions  within  Lebanon  any 
easier. 

We  would  hope  that  the  Soviet  Union 
would  use  whatever  influence  it  has  with 
Syria  to  play  a  constructive  role,  to  pro- 
vide for  the  withdrawal  of  its  forces  as 
the  Israelis  have  agreed  with  the 
Lebanese  Government  to  do. 

We  are  prepared  to  discuss  questions 
like  the  Middle  East  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  we  are  yet  to  see  the  Soviet 
Union  willing  to  play  the  responsible  role 
that  is  necessary  for  it  to  be  brought  into 
the  process  itself 

Q.  Knowing  that  the  Soviets  would 
rather  see  somebody  else  in  the  White 
House  than  Mr.  Reagan,  do  you 
foresee  any  worsening  of  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  now  that  Mr.  Reagan  has 
announced  that  he  will  be  a  candidate 
for  the  next  presidential  election? 

A.  Fh-st  of  all,  you  say  that  we  know 
that  the  Soviets  would  rather  see  some- 
one else  in  the  White  House.  I  am  not 
sure  that  is  entirely  correct.  Certainly  no 
Soviet  official  has  made  that  statement 
to  me. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  too  much  about 
what  is  Soviet  thinking  about  American 
domestic  politics.  I  would  just  point  out 
that  the  Soviet  Union,  in  the  past,  has 
not  been  terribly  sophisticated  in  making 
political  predictions  about  American 
politics  or  West  European  politics.  For 
example,  the  Soviet  Union  made  several 
comments  about  the  German  election  in 
the  spring  of  1983,  which  tended  to 
backfire  for  Soviet  interests.  And  for  all 
we  know,  the  Soviet  Union  may  have 
already  decided  that  Ronald  Reagan  will 
be  reelected,  and  if  that  is  the  case,  then 
they  would  certainly  make  judgments  on 
policy  in  a  very  different  light  than  if 
they  hope  someone  else  is  elected. 

So  it's  dangerous.  We  don't  try  to 
base  our  policy  on  the  internal  machina- 
tions of  developments  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  For  one  thing,  we  don't  know  too 
much  about  them.  And  I  tend  to  doubt 
that  the  Soviet  Union  itself  does.  What 
we  have  to  do  in  our  policy  toward  the 
Soviets  is  recognize  that  they  have  a 
government,  that  they  are  making  deci- 
sions. We  have  to  think  about  what  their 
options  are  and  try  to  engage  them  on 
issues  that  appear  to  us  to  meet  their  in- 
terests. 

Q.  When  do  you  think  the  Soviets 
will  propose  the  merging  of  the  Geneva 
talks-START  and  INF-and  if  nothing 
takes  place,  could  it  mean  the  taking 


April  1984 


45 


EUROPE 


into  account  of  French  and  British 
nuclear  forces,  as  asked  by  the 
Soviets? 

A.  I  am  glad  that  you  raised  the  sub- 
ject of  merger,  because  there  has  been  a 
great  deal  written  about  that  subject.  I 
think  it  is  time  that  we  clarified  at  least 
the  U.S.  position  on  the  subject. 

To  begin  with,  nobody  has  pro- 
posed—either the  United  States  or  the 
Soviet  Union— the  merger  of  the  START 
and  INF  negotiations.  And  again  looking 
toward  the  future,  of  course,  we  don't 
know  what  the  Soviets  might  propose. 
They  have  told  us  they  are  reviewing 
their  positions  on  the  two  negotiations, 
and  we  are  ready  and  waiting  to  hear 
what  theu"  views  are.  But  so  far,  we 
have  not  received  any  formal  proposal 
along  those  lines. 

The  U.S.  position  is  that  we  think 
the  current  framework  for  negotiating 
nuclear  arms  control— that  is  a  separate 
INF  negotiating  and  a  separate  START 
negotiation— is  perfectly  adequate  for  dis- 
cussing these  issues.  We  do  not  believe 
that  a  merger  would  necessarily  be  a 
panacea  to  the  arms  control  problem. 

The  fundamental  obstacles  that  have 
blocked  agreement  in  those  two  negotia- 
tions would  remain;  in  the  INF  negotia- 
tion, the  fact  the  Soviet  Union  has  not 
accepted  the  right  of  U.S.  missile  deploy- 
ment, and  in  the  START  negotiation,  tlie 
fact  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  been  un- 
willing to  cut  back  its  ballistic  missile 
forces  to  the  extent  we  think  would  be 
stabilizing.  A  merger  would  not  neces- 
sarily address  those  problems. 

If  the  Soviet  Union  has  new  ideas, 
new  ideas  about  the  relationship  of 
START  and  INF,  we  will,  of  course,  be 
prepared  to  discuss  them  with  it.  But  a 
merger  right  now  is  not  on  the 
U.S.-Soviet  agenda.  It  is  not  a  topic  for 
discussion. 

Certainly  the  whole  question  of 
British  and  French  forces  is  one  that  we 
have  been  clear  on  all  along.  British  and 
French  forces  are  not  substitutes  for 
U.S.  forces  in  Europe,  and  in  any 
bilateral  negotiation,  we  will  not  discuss 
limitation  on  those  forces. 

Q.  The  last  ministerial  session  in 
December,  the  Foreign  Ministers,  in- 
cluding of  course  Mr.  Shultz,  agreed 
on  releasing,  apart  from  the  final  com- 
munique, the  Brussels  declaration.  [In- 
audible] was  to  explore  systematically 
or  to  announce  that  the  NATO 
ministers  were  ready  to  explore  all 
channels  that  could  lead  to  an  im- 
provement of  East- West  relations,  thus 
to  a  revival  of  detente. 


A.  I  am  not  too  sure  what  the  ques- 
tion was.  But  what  I  will  say  is  I  think 
you  have  had  a  systematic  effort  by  the 
governments  of  the  alliance  to  improve 
the  character  and  the  quality  of  the 
East-West  dialogue.  You  mentioned  the 
Brussels  declaration  at  the  NATO 
ministerial  in  December.  That  was 
followed  up,  of  course,  by  a  speech  by 
President  Reagan  where  he  stated  his 
desire  to  have  a  more  genuine  dialogue 
with  the  Soviet  Union. 

Secretary  of  State  George  Shultz,  in 
Stockholm,  struck  the  same  theme  in  his 
address  at  the  CDE  conference  [Con- 
ference on  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disannament  in 
Europe].  And  then,  of  course.  Secretary 
Shultz  and  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
had  a  5-hour  meeting. 

I  think  that  the  alliance  is  postured 
where  it  should  be.  That  i§,  we  are 
continuing  with  the  policies  that  are 
necessary  to  protect  our  safety.  But  at 
the  same  time,  we  are  on  the  offensive 
with  the  Soviets.  We  are  telling  the 
Soviet  Union  that  we  are  ready  to 
negotiate,  we  are  ready  to  talk,  and  we 
are  urging  the  Soviet  Union  to  return  to 
the  negotiating  table.  I  think  this  is 
precisely  the  policy  that  the  majority  of 
the  Western  public  wants  and  is  getting. 

Q.  The  Soviets  have  stated  again 
recently  that  the  French  and  British 
nuclear  forces  have  to  be  counted 
against  the  SS-20s.  We  know  it  is  a 
negotiating  device.  But  we  also  know 
from  official  sources  that  the  French 
and  British  nuclear  programs  foresee  a 
total  of  about  2,000  nuclear  weapons 
when  they  are  completed  in  a  number 
of  years.  This  will  be  a  real  deterrent. 

The  news  is  making  the  rounds  in 
European  circles  that  the  French  and 
British  deterrent  might  become  the 
future  European  nuclear  umbrella, 
replacing  the  American  umbrella.  I 
feel  some  perplexity.  How  do  you  see  it 
from  Paris  now? 

A.  Of  course,  if  we  were  to  move  to  a 
new  system  of  European  security  and,  as 
your  question  suggested,  French  and 
British  nuclear  forces  would  take  over 
from  the  U.S.  strategic  deterrent,  the 
job  of  deterring  an  attack  against 
Europe,  then  the  arms  control  equation 
would  radically  be  changed. 

But  that  is  certainly  not  the  policies 
of  either  the  Governments  of  France  or 
Britain  right  now,  and  into  the 
foreseeable  future  those  forces  are 
designed  to  be  a  deterrent  against  a 
direct  strike  against  Britain  or  France. 
They  do  not  play  an  extended  deterrent 


role.  They  do  not  provide  the  nuclear 
umbrella  that  U.S.  forces  do. 

Thus,  trying  to  see  British  and 
French  forces  as  a  substitute  or  as  the 
same  in  a  negotiation  between  U.S. 
Pershings  and  cruise  missiles  and  the 
British  and  French  forces  is  a  major  er- 
ror. Those  U.S.  forces  provide  the 
necessary  link  between  the  secwity  of 
Europe  and  the  American  strategic 
deterrent.  British  and  French  forces  do 
not  play  that  role. 

For  the  foreseeable  future  we  cannot, 
then,  negotiate  over  these  forces, 
because  they  do  not  provide  the  same 
function.  As  your  question  itself 
i-ecognized,  it  is  not  so  much  that  the 
Soviet  Union  seems  concerned  about  the 
growth  of  British  and  French  nuclear 
capabilities.  All  along  in  the  negotiations, 
the  Soviet  Union  has  never  insisted— in 
INF— that  Britain  or  France  reduce  the 
size  of  their  nuclear  arsenals.  In  fact,  it 
is  said  that  those  arsenals  could  grow. 
Really  what  the  Soviet  Union  has  done 
has  pointed  at  or  signaled  out  the  British 
and  French  forces  as  an  excuse  to  argue 
that  the  United  States  should  not  deploy 
a  single  missile  in  Europe.  And  this  is,  of 
course,  what  we  have  objected  to  in  the 
negotiations.  What  has  emerged  in  the 
negotiations  as  the  single  most  important 
obstacle— what  President  Reagan  has 
called  the  half-zero  option— is  the  fact 
that  the  Soviet  Union  wants  to  retain  a 
substantial  force  of  SS-20  missiles 
du-ected  against  Europe,  while  the 
United  States  would  not  be  permitted  to 
deploy  a  single  system. 

Q.  President  Reagan  has  recently 
announced  that  he  will  seek  a  second 
term.  In  the  past  presidential  election 
campaigns,  they  have  had  an  impact 
on  American  foreign  policy.  Do  you 
think  we  Europeans  have  a  reason  to 
expect  any  kind  of  flip-flopping  this 
year  in  U.S.  foreign  policy? 

A.  Absolutely  not.  I  think  that  is  a 
President  who  has  learned,  who  believes 
very  strongly,  that  the  best  way  to  get 
reelected,  the  best  politics,  is  being  a 
good  President.  And  I  do  not  believe 
that  you  ai'e  to  see  any  fundamental 
modifications  of  U.S.  policy,  any  flip- 
flops,  or  inconsistencies  designed  for 
reelection  purposes.  I  think  that  the  ma- 
jority of  the  American  people  support 
the  President,  support  his  policies,  sup- 
port the  arms  control  policies  and  his 
security  policies,  and  I  think  he  will  see 
those  policies  through  to  the  November 
election. 


46 


■rniHMiwMiiiM 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Q.  You  have  already  mentioned  the 
meeting  in  Stockholm  between  Mr. 
Shultz  and  Mr.  Gromyko.  and  you,  of 
course,  were  in  that  meeting.  Could 
you  mention  any  specific  steps  that 
might  stem  from  it? 

A.  We  have  already  seen  one  step 
which,  as  you  know,  was  the  agi-eement 
by  the  NATO  countries  to  resume 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  on 
March  16th  in  Vienna  on  conventional 
force  reductions. 

That  was  an  issue  that  came  up  in 
that  session,  and  we  were  encouraged 
that  in  the  non-nuclear  arms  control 
area,  the  Soviet  Union  now  has  agreed 
to  negotiate  actively,  not  only  in  Vienna 
but  in  the  Stockholm  negotiations.  The 
Soviet  Union  has  also  said  that  it  is 
prepared  to  discuss  chemical  weapons 
arms  control,  although  we  have  dif- 
ferences there.  Those  are  negotiations 
that  are  going  ahead. 

As  the  Secretary  of  State  has  said, 
the  Soviets  did  not  come  forward  with 
any  new  ideas  or  proposals  on  the 
nuclear  negotiations.  We  are,  thus,  in  a 
position  of  waiting  for  the  Soviets  to 
make  up  their  minds  on  how  they  want 
to  pursue  these  talks,  and  we  will  be 
ready  to  sit  down  and  talk  about  that. 

But  I  think  the  most  important  out- 
come of  the  meeting  between  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  the  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  was  the  fact  that  they 
had  an  opportunity  to  listen  to  one 
another  talk  about  important  issues  and 
to  exchange  views.  Very  often  in  these 
kinds  of  U.S. -Soviet  discussions,  one  gets 
a  sterile  repetition  of  arguments  that  you 
can  read  in  the  newspapers.  It  is  fair  to 
say  that  on  subjects  like  arms  control 
and  on  regional  issues  like  the  Middle 
East  or  Afghanistan  and  on  the  bilateral 
relationship  that  the  two  Foreign 
Ministers  were  able  to  talk  and  exchange 
views. 

That  is  not  to  say  that  they  agreed. 
Oftentimes  they  did  not.  But  we  think 
that  at  the  moment  in  the  East- West 
relationship,  it  is  very  useful,  even  when 
they  do  not  agree,  to  at  least  have  the 
opportunity  to  explain  their  perspectives. 

Q.  There  was  some  suggestion  after 
Ambassador  Rowny's  remarks  yester- 
day that  he  might  be  proposing  trade- 
offs between  some  of  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  the  INF  talks-that  is,  the 
deployment  of  cruise  missiles  in 
Europe— for  some  elements  of  the  stra- 
tegic talks.  Is  this  the  correct  interpre- 
tation? And  if  not,  could  you  tell  us 
something  of  the  trade-offs  you  had  in 
mind? 


A.  No,  I  am  afraid  that  his  remarks 
have  been  somewhat  misintei-preted.  As 
I  pointed  out  before,  we  think  that  the 
two  negotiations  should  be  pursued 
separately.  We  think  that  we  should  get 
back  to  the  INF  negotiations  and  talk 
about  the  issues  within  the  INF  spec- 
trum of  systems.  And  we  should  get 
back  to  the  START  negotiations  and  talk 
about  those  systems. 

We  are  not  at  the  present  time  en- 
visaging any  trade-offs,  any  deals,  that 
would  lead  to  reductions  in  one  area  in 
return  for  reductions  in  the  other.  We 
have  said  that  if  the  Soviet  Union  has 
some  ideas  along  these  lines,  we  would 
be  prepared  to  listen  to  them.  As  I  said 
before,  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  given 
us  any  ideas.  It  is  far  too  premature  to 
talk  about  trade-offs  between  the  two 
negotiations  or,  as  an  earlier  questioner 
pointed  out,  a  merger  between  the  two 
negotiations. 

What  Ambassador  Rowny  was  dis- 
cussing was  trade-offs  within  the  context 
of  the  strategic  arms  negotiations  them- 
selves. As  many  of  the  journalists  in  this 
group  that  we  have  assembled  today 
recognize,  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic 
forces  are  not  mere  images  of  one 
another.  They  are  different.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  certain  sti-engths  and  advan- 
tages, particularly  in  its  large  land-based 
missile  force,  the  heavy  missiles,  the 
SS-18  missiles,  SS-19  missiles,  that  have 
a  substantial  number  of  multiple 
warheads. 

And  the  United  States,  for  its  part, 
has  certain  advantages,  in  particular  in 
the  bomber  area  with  new  bombers  like 
the  B-1  coming  into  the  force,  and  with 
systems  like  air-launched  cruise  missiles. 

What  we  are  suggesting,  and  what 
Ambassador  Rowiiy  was  saying,  is  that 
we  are  willing,  in  our  negotiating  posi- 
tion, to  recognize  those  trade-offs.  That 
is,  if  the  Soviet  Union  is  walling  to  accept 
limitations  in  the  area  of  its  strength,  we 
will  be  prepared  to  accept  limitations  in 
the  areas  of  our  strength.  That  is  an  im- 
portant step  forward,  because,  as  you 
know,  we  were  criticized  earlier  on  as 
singling  out  Soviet  areas  of  advantage. 

As  the  President  has  said,  most 
recently  in  his  speech  on  U.S.-Soviet 
relations,  we  do  think  we  should  meet 
the  Soviet  Union  halfway.  If  the  Soviet 
Union  comes  back  to  the  negotiating 
table  in  Geneva,  we  think  there  will  be 
opportunities  in  those  negotiations. 

Q.  Is  there  a  prospect  in  the  MBFR 
[mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions] 
talks,  which,  after  all,  have  been  going 
on  for  more  than  a  decade  with  little 
progress?  Or  are  both  Washington  and 


EUROPE 


Moscow  regarding  this  as  a  kind  of  in- 
sulated channel  for  exploring  wider 
dialogues? 

A.  No,  we  are  certainly  not  looking 
at  the  Vienna  talks  as  an  opportunity  to 
discuss  other  issues.  We  have  other 
negotiations  underway.  In  addition  to  the 
Vienna  negotiations,  which  will  get 
underway  in  March,  we  have  a  new- 
Stockholm  negotiation,  which  offers  a 
new  interesting  venue  for  talking  about 
confidence-building  measures,  and  we 
have  the  Conference  on  Disarmament  in 
Geneva,  where  we  are.  among  other 
things,  talking  about  chemical  weapons. 

The  real  point  is  that  the  Vienna 
talks  have  gone  on  for  10  years.  They 
have  not  made  much  progress.  And  what 
we  would  like  to  do  is  see  if,  after  all 
that  time,  it  would  not  be  possible  to 
give  them  some  new  impetus.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  made  some  suggestions  in  the 
area  of  verification.  They  do  not  go  as 
far  as  NATO  would  like  those  sugges- 
tions to  go,  but  we  are  prepared  to  talk 
about  them. 

We  would  like  to  see  if,  after  all  this 
time,  we  could  not  do  something  to  bring 
about  a  balanced  situation  in  conven- 
tional forces  in  Europe. 

Q.  Would  you  think  it  feasible  that 
if  the  Soviet  Union  could  be  persuaded 
to  dismantle  a  certain  number  of 
SS-20s  for  a  time  period,  say,  for  3 
months  or  for  half  a  year,  that  NATO 
would  then  interrupt  its  deployment 
schedule  correspondingly?  And  would 
that  be  a  possible  way  to  reach  lower 
levels  that  have  earlier  been  aimed  at 
an  interim  proposal?  Or  would  you 
rather  think  that  the  threat  of  an 
uninterrupted  deployment  schedule  is 
the  best  way  to  get  Moscow  back  to 
the  negotiating  table? 

A.  Let  me  make  a  general  comment. 
It  is  useful  and  very  important  that  we 
think  through  possible  negotiating  steps 
that  could  be  taken  to  i-esult  in  progress 
in  the  negotiations.  But  we,  at  the  same 
time,  have  to  recognize  the  dangers  in 
the  West  of  negotiating  with  ourselves. 
We  are  constantly  throwing  up  negotia- 
tions ideas  and  talking  about  them  in  an 
effort  to  see  if  we  can't  make  progi-ess. 
And  as  I  say,  that  is  a  very  healthy  ex- 
ercise. But  in  the  final  analysis,  we  have 
to  sit  down  and  talk  with  the  Soviets  and 
negotiate  with  the  Soviets. 

We  believe  very  strongly  that  the 
single  most  important  incentive  for  the 
Soviet  Union  to  do  anything  about 
limiting  its  deployment  of  the  SS-20 
missile  is  its  clear  understanding  that  in 
the  absence  of  any  talks  in  Geneva,  and 


April  1984 


47 


EUROPE 


in  the  absence  of  any  agi-eement  in 
Geneva,  the  alliance  will  go  ahead  and 
deploy  all  572  of  the  ground-launched 
cruise  missUes  and  the  Pershing  lis. 

The  second  that  we  indicated  to  the 
Soviet  Union  that  we  were  not  going  to 
go  forward  with  the  progi-amed  deploy- 
ment on  schedule,  the  Soviet  Union 
would  simply  have  no  incentive  to  come 
back  to  Geneva.  After  all,  we  should  all 
ask  ourselves,  why  did  they  leave  those 
negotiations?  They  tried,  while  the 
negotiations  were  underway,  to  derail 
the  deplojTnent  program.  And  they 
failed.  By  leaving  the  negotiations,  they 
are  clearly  attempting  to  raise  the 
anxiety  level  in  Western  Europe  and 
elsewhere  in  an  effort  to  stop  that 
development. 

The  best  thing  the  alliance  can  do  is 
demonstrate  very  clearly  to  the  Soviet 
Union  that  there  is  only  one  way  to  stop 
that  deployment,  and  that  is  by  achieving 
an  effective,  verifiable  arms  control  in 
Geneva. 

Q.  What  is  your  opinion  on  these 
confidence-building  measures  Romania 
has  proposed  in  Stockholm?  And  in 
general,  Romania's  position  in  the 
Warsaw  Pact? 

A.  The  first  thing  I  would  like  to  say 
is  that  the  confidence-building  measures 
that  I  would  like  to  talk  about  are  the 
confidence-building  measures  that  NATO 
has  presented  in  Stockholm,  because 
they  are  feasible,  they  are  concrete,  and 
they  would  do  something  to  lessen  the 
risk  of  surprise  attack  in  Europe.  We 
have  focused  for  so  long  on  levels  of 
weaponry,  and  that  of  course,  is  a  very 
appropriate  subject  for  arms  control.  But 
we  also  have  to  recognize  [inaudible]  sub- 
ject for  arms  control.  We  also  have  to 
recognize  that  weaponry  casts  a  political 
shadow.  And  how  countries  use  those 
weapons,  how  they  move  their  troops  in 
a  crisis  situation,  can  have  a  decisive  im- 
pact on  whether  a  war  will  take  place  or 
whether  it  does  not. 

NATO  has  come  up  with  some  sim- 
ple, verifiable,  practical  measures  that 
would  go  a  long  way  to  build  confidence 
in  Europe.  Those  measures,  focusing  on 
the  conventional  forces  and  the  use  by 
countries  of  those  forces,  are  the  best 
way  to  launch  the  CDE  process. 

On  Romania's  general  foreign  policy 
orientation,  Romania  is  a  sovereign  coun- 
try. Like  any  other  sovereign  country,  it 
has  the  right  to  make  its  own  foreign 
policy.  We  respect  that  right,  and  we 
woufd  not  interfere  with  its  efforts  to 
launch  initiatives  in  the  areas  of  arms 
control  or  any  other  area  for  that  matter 


48 


Q.  The  Canadian  Prime  Minister, 
Pierre  Trudeau,  said  during  a  seminar 
last  weekend  in  Switzerland  that  the 
United  States  might  not  risk  using 
nuclear  weapons  to  save  Western 
Europe  from  a  conventional  Soviet  in- 
vasion. What  is  your  comment  on  that? 

A.  I  have  not  read  a  transcript  of 
precisely  what  the  Prime  Minister  said.  I 
read  a  few  Canadian  press  articles 
earlier  today.  But  without  referring 
specifically  "to  the  Prime  Minister's 
remarks,  I  would  just  make  the  simple 
statement  that  every  U.S.  President,  in- 
cluding the  current  one,  has  made  it 
very  clear  that  the  United  States  is 
prepared  to  go  to  war  to  prevent  a  major 
attack  in  Europe.  And  that  remains  the 
U.S.  policy. 

The  policy  is  one  of  deterrence.  We 
are  not  trying  to  fight  a  conflict  in 
Europe.  There  would  never  be  an  effort 
to  fight  a  limited  conflict  in  Europe.  But 
to  deter  a  conflict  by  making  it  very 
clear,  both  through  the  presence  of  U.S. 
forces  in  Europe  and,  if  necessary, 
through  the  presence  of  U.S.  INF 
missiles  in  Europe,  that  the  United 
States  will  be  fully  engaged  in  any  con- 
flict in  Europe,  if  such  a  conflict  were  to 
take  place. 

Q.  There  is  one  place  where  you  ac- 
tually do  negotiate  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  that  is  right  here  in 
Stockholm.  I  would  like  to  go  back  to 
the  Stockholm  conference.  At  the  con- 
ference, the  West  and  some  of  the 
neutral  countries  insist  that  the  goal 
must  be  concrete  and  verifiable  agree- 
ments concerning  confidence-building 
measures.  Could  you  foresee  a  situa- 
tion in  which  such  measures  are  traded 
with  more  declaratory  agreements  that 
the  East  wants  to  get  an  agreement? 

A.  It  is  always  difficult  to  predict 
what  might  happen  in  the  future.  I  just 
would  make  this  simple  point. 

What  we  should  try  to  achieve  in 
Stockholm,  as  well  as  in  the  other 
negotiations  and  in  the  Geneva  negotia- 
tions if  the  Soviets  come  back  and  in  the 
Vienna  negotiations,  are  agreements  that 
genuinely  reduce  the  risks  of  conflict. 
Soviet  proposals  calling  for  the  non-use 
of  force,  other  proposals  calling  for 
nuclear  free  zones,  do  nothing  to  actually 
reduce  the  risk  of  conflict. 

What  we  need  to  do  is  negotiate 
agreements  in  the  nuclear  and  the  con- 
ventional areas  that  actually  have  an  im- 
pact on  the  size  of  military  forces  or  the 
ability  of  countries  to  use  those  forces,  or 
at  least  the  responsibilities  that  govern- 
ments have  to  provide  information  about 
their  military  capabilities.  Those  are 


SBBBB 


feasible,  concrete,  measures.  Rhetorical, 
declaratory  measures  do  not  reduce  the 
risks  of  conflict,  but  even  worse,  they 
can  suggest  that  somehow  the  risk  of 
war  and  the  conflict  is  no  longer  there. 
That  is  a  very  dangerous  outcome.  It  is 
an  outcome  which  we  want  to  avoid. 

Q.  Did  the  United  States  prepare 
new  proposals  to  the  Soviet  Union  to 
get  the  arms  control  talks  going  again? 
What  could  those  new  proposals  be? 

A.  The  answer  is  very  simple;  it  is 
no.  And  that  is  why  we,  of  course,  are 
prepared  to  return  to  the  negotiating 
table.  We  are  prepared,  if  we  get  back  to 
the  negotiating  table  and  the  Soviets  are 
there,  to  talk  about  ways  to  move  the 
negotiations  ahead.  I  mentioned  Am- 
bassador Rowny's  discussion  of  trade- 
offs in  START  negotiations,  looking  at 
their  areas  of  advantage  and  ours.  But 
we  do  not  believe  we  should  make  con- 
cessions merely  to  get  the  Soviets  back 
to  the  negotiating  table. 

Why?  Because  it  will  not  work.  If  the 
Soviet  Union  knows  that  the  longer  they 
stay  away  from  the  table,  the  more  con- 
cessions will  be  made  by  the  United 
States  and  other  Western  powers,  they 
will  not  come  back.  It  is  just  that  simple. 
I  think  what  we  have  to  do  is  make  it 
clear  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  we  are 
ready  to  talk  to  them;  we  are  ready  to 
work  with  them  to  make  progress;  but 
we  are  not  ready  to  make  concessions 
merely  for  the  honor  of  sitting  down 
with  them  across  a  table. 

Q.  I  was  not  speaking  of  conces- 
sions but  of  proposals,  which  is  not 
quite  the  same. 

A.  We  have  good  proposals  on  the 
table.  We  think  the  proposals  in  the  INF 
negotiations  that  were  made  last 
fall-proposals  that  talked  about  regional 
limitations  on  INF  missiles,  that  raised 
the  possibility  of  limiting  aircraft,  that 
talked  about  reductions  of  the  Pershing 
II— all  of  these  created  good  oppor- 
tunities for  progi-ess. 

We  think  that  the  proposals  we  have 
on  the  table  are  adequate.  What  we  need 
is  to  get  the  Soviets  back  to  the  table  so 
we  can  talk  about  them. 

Q.  The  United  States  considers  that 
Europe  is  its  ally.  But  can  a  strong 
alliance  be  realized  with  economically 
vulnerable  partners?  My  question  is 
what  then  are  the  measures  which 
President  Reagan  intends  to  take  to 
reduce  the  deficit  of  the  American 
budget  and  to  bring  the  dollar  down  to 
a  reasonable  rate  for  Europe  and 
especially  for  France? 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


A.  I  certainly  agree  with  the  assump- 
tion which  is  you  cannot  have  a  strong 
alliance  without  a  strong  economic  pro- 
gram on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
Where  we  might  disagree  is  on  what  are 
the  implications  of  U.S.  economic  policy 
for  Western  Eurojie. 

I  think  that  a  strong  dollar,  in  some 
respects,  has  been  an  advantage  for  the 
European  economies.  For  one  thing,  it 
has  certainly  made  it  easier  for  West 
European  economies  to  compete  with  the 
United  States  in  third  areas  for  e.xports. 

The  United  States  is  going  to  run, 
this  year,  somewhere  in  the  area  of 
$70,000  million  in  our  trade  deficit.  And 
that  money  is  going  to  be  made  by  other 
countries.  To  some  extent,  you  could 
argue  that  some  of  the  early  signs  of  a 
recovery  that  we  see  in  Gei-many  and 
Britain  are  a  result  of  the  strength  of  the 
U.S.  dollar. 

Another  policy  area  that  is  terribly 
important  is  the  area  of  protectionism. 
So  far  both  the  United  States  and  the 
Europeans  have  avoided  a  debilitating, 
dangerous  trade  war  in  the  area  of 
agriculture  and  in  other  areas.  It  is  very 
important  that  we  work  to  avoid  such  a 
trade  war  in  the  future.  This  is  the 
responsibility  of  both  sides.  I  understand 
your  concerns  about  the  deficit.  The 
President  of  the  United  States  shares 
those  concerns  about  the  deficit,  and  he 
wants  to  work  with  the  Congress  to  do 
something  about  the  deficit. 

Q.  I  have  a  question  regarding  the 
CDE  Stockholm  conference.  Does  this 
conference  provide  a  new  channel,  a 
new  desk  also,  for  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union?  What  is  your  assessment  of  the 
Stockholm  conference  and  its  impact 
on  the  negotiating  process?  Does  this 
conference  give  more  weight  to  Euro- 
pean security  interests  in  American 
politics? 

A.  The  first  thing  I  would  say  is  yes, 
it  does.  The  very  fact  that  you  have  a 
conference  focusing  on  European  secu- 
rity, from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Urals,  will 
have  an  impact  on  American  policy,  and 
I  think  a  good  impact.  It  will  focus  our 
attention  on  the  security  problems  in 
that  special  region. 

I  think  that  already,  while  in  its  very 
early  days  of  the  conference  itself,  we  in 
the  United  States  have  been  struck  by 
the  very  constructive  atmosphere  that 
exists  in  Stockholm.  When  I  was  in 
Stockholm  with  the  Secretary  of  State, 
we  felt  a  very  constructive  atmosphere 
in  the  discussions  among  the  NATO 
ministers  and  also  with  the  neutrals,  as 


well  as  the  Eastern  countries.  There 
seems  to  be  a  good  spirit  there,  a 
recognition  that  when  other  aspects  of 
the  East- West  relationship  are  somewhat 
strained,  that  it  is  important  that  people 
take  a  constructive  attitude  toward  the 
Stockholm  conference.  That  is  certainly 
our  perspective  there. 

That  said,  I  just  would  like  to  make 
very  clear  that  we  do  not  view  the 
Stockholm  conference  as  a  surrogate 
negotiation  for  the  Geneva  talks  or  the 
Vienna  talks.  We  think  the  focus  in  the 
Stockholm  conference  should  be  on  the 
confidence-building  measures,  and  we 
have  asked  our  Ambassador  there- 
James  Goodby— to  work  closely  not  only 
with  the  allies  but  to  work  with  his 
Soviet  counterpart  to  see  if  it  isn't  pos- 
sible to  make  some  progress  in  this  par- 
ticular negotiation. 

Q.  Will  the  United  States  relax  its 
sanctions  against  the  Polish  Govern- 
ment in  the  near  future?  What  are  the 
present  requirements  for  that? 

A.  On  the  question  of  Poland,  I 
would  say  our  policy  has  evolved 
somewhat  over  last  year.  Our  general 
policy  toward  Poland  has  been  that  we 
are  prepared  to  seek  an  improved  rela- 
tionship with  the  authorities  in  Warsaw, 
in  response  to  tangible  steps  that  they 
take  in  dealing  both  with  union 
movements  and  the  church  and  activists 
who  have  been  imprisoned.  There  have 
been  some  developments,  such  as  the 
successful  visit  by  the  Pope  and  the 
release  of  political  prisoners,  which  has 
enabled  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  take  a  decision  in  principle  to 
begin  discussions  with  other  Western 
countries  on  the  question  of  debt 
rescheduling. 

More  recently  we  have  stated  a  will- 
ingness to  begin  discussions  with  Poland 
on  the  question  of  a  fishing  allocation  in 
U.S.  waters,  and  we  have  also  discussed 
in  princijDle  the  possibility  of  taking  other 
steps  such  as  providing  the  Polish 
charter  airline  access  to  the  United 
States.  This  is  a  measured  policy.  It  is 
designed  on  the  one  hand  to  recognize 
improvements  in  the  Polish  situation  but 
on  the  other  hand  to  make  it  very  clear 
to  the  Polish  authorities  that  we  do  not 
approve  of  the  systematic  suppression  of 
the  Solidarity  movement  and  the  Polish 
people  who  have  sought  more  freedom  in 
their  system. 

Q.  The  double-track  decision  of 
1979  said  it  expects  that  the  INF 
negotiations  should  be  carried  out  in 
the  framework  of  SALT  II.  Why  are 
vou  now  so  reluctant  to  merge  START 
and  INF? 


A.  The  INF  negotiations,  as  dis- 
cussed by  the  allies  in  1981  and  1982, 
were  also  addressed  in  the  framework  of 
START.  That  language,  agreed  to  in 
1979,  talked  about  INF  in  a  framework. 
It  does  not  suggest  a  merger  of  the 
negotiations.  What  it  does  suggest  is  a 
recognition  that  in  a  larger  sense,  the 
two  negotiations  need  to  be  seen  in  the 
same  context,  and  in  Geneva,  they  have 
been  seen  in  the  same  context. 

For  example,  in  Washington  we  ad- 
dress both  START  and  INF  issues  in  a 
way  that  we  understand  the  interrela- 
tionships. In  Geneva,  when  the  negotia- 
tions were  underway,  Paul  Nitze  [head  of 
the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  INF  negotia- 
tions] and  Ed  Rowny  consulted  closely 
together.  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the 
INF  negotiations  did  take  place  in  a 
START  framework.  That  is  a  very  dif- 
ferent thing  than  saying  that  they  should 
be  merged. 

The  problem  is  that  we  have  two 
separate  negotiations.  We  have  devel- 
oped negotiating  proposals  for  those  two 
separate  negotiations;  we  think  they  are 
good  proposals.  If  the  Soviet  Union  has  a 
different  idea,  a  different  approach,  we 
will  be  prepared  to  discuss  it  with  them. 

We  have  done  a  lot  of  work  in  these 
two  negotiations.  We  have  made  some 
progi'ess.  We  think  the  current 
framework  is  perfectly  adequate  to  reach 
agreements  if  the  Soviet  Union  would 
come  back  to  the  negotiating  table. 

Q.  You  have  dismissed  the  idea 
that  the  Franco-British  nuclear  um- 
brella might  replace  the  American 
umbrella.  What  about  the  chemical 
umbrella?  The  Soviets  have  proposed  a 
European  zone  free  of  chemical 
weapons,  and  I  am  thinking  of  nerve 
gases,  these  terrible  mass  destruction 
weapons.  The  Europeans,  except 
perhaps  the  French,  have  no  ner\'e 
gases.  Many  think  a  European  free 
zone  would  be  good.  What  do  you 
think  of  this  Soviet  proposal? 

A.  We  have  made  our  view  on  this 
abundantly  clear.  We  would  like  a  global 
free  zone  on  chemical  weapons.  The 
problem  with  a  European  free  zone  on 
chemical  weapons  is  really  the  same  as 
the  problem  with  the  nuclear  free  zone, 
and  that  is  a  European  free  zone  pro- 
hibits the  deplojTTient  of  different 
weapons  in  that  zone.  It  does  not  stop  or 
prohibit  the  ability  of  the  Soviet  Union 
to  launch  weapons  from  outside  that 
area,  in  the  Soviet  territory,  into 
Europe. 


mm 


EUROPE 


What  we  have  said  to  the  Soviets  is 
that  yes,  we  agree  on  the  need  to  ban 
the  protection  and  stockpiling  of  these 
weapons,  but  let's  not  just  limit  it  to 
Europe.  Let's  do  it  worldwide.  For  one 
thing,  it  would  be  easier  to  verify  if  we 
could  include  the  entire  territory  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  as  well  as  the  United 
States. 

But  it  is  also  important  to  recognize 
that  in  the  chemical  weapons  area  verifi- 
cation will  be  a  very,  very  difficult  prob- 
lem We  are  working  on  that  problem  at 
the  Conference  on  Disarmament  m 
Geneva,  and  we  are  hoping,  as  Secretary 
of  State  Shultz  made  clear  in  Sweden, 
that  in  the  near  future,  we  will  table  a 
draft  treaty  which  will  lay  out  the  details 
for  how  we  would  go  about  banning 
chemical  weapons  on  a  worldwide  basis. 
Q.  A  NATO  report  yesterday  said 
that  the  rate  of  growth  of  Soviet 
militarv  spending  declined  over  the 
last  half  of  the  1970s  to  around  2%. 
from  hetween  4%  and  m  over  the  first 
half  of  that  decade.  Do  you  have  any 
indications  that  that  slowdown  in 
Soviet  military  spending  has  continued 
into  the  1980s,  and,  if  so,  how  does  this 
change,  and  how  do  you  expect  this  to 
change  U.S.  perceptions  of  Soviet 
militarv  might  and  intention? 

A.  Let  me  say  first  of  all  that  I  have 
not  had  the  opportunity  to  look  at  this 
specific  NATO  report.  I  suspect  that  it  is 
based  on  reports  that  were  done  by  the 
American  intelligence  community  about  a 
year  ago  and  received  some  publicity  at 

that  time.  ,    .^  *v. 

Basically  the  feelings  were  that  the 
Soviet  Union  was  beginning  to  spend 
slightly  less  on  the  procurement  of 
weapons  systems,  mainly  as  it  spent 
more  on  research  and  development.  Ihat 
is  the  basic  pattern  we  see  in  the  Soviet 
defense  effort;  that  they  are  ending,  at 
this  phase,  a  phase  of  procurement  of  a 
whole  family  of  weapons  systems  in  dil- 
ferent  areas,  and  they  are  beginning  to 
look  toward  the  future  and  investing 
more  in  the  research  and  development 

area.  , 

We  do  not  see  any  fundamental 
change  in  the  overall  thrust  of  the  Soviet 
defense  effort.  Even  if  Soviet  growth  in 
spending  declines  to  2%  per  year,  in  real 
terms,  I  would  want  to  point  out  that 
during  the  1970s,  for  example,  the  U.S. 
defense  effort  declined  1%  in  real  ternis. 

What  we  see  is  a  steady  pattern  of 
Soviet  growth.  It  is  difficult  to 
predict-to  look  too  far  into  the 
future-but  I  think  that  the  American  in- 
telligence community  has  concluded  that 


there  will  certainly  be  real  constraints  on 
Soviet  defense  spending,  given  the  prob- 
lems of  the  Soviet  economy,  that  the 
Soviet  military  will  still  be  able  to  count 
on  an  increased  level  of  spending  year 
after  year  during  the  decade  of  the 
1980s! 

Q.  How  imperative-if  we  go  back 
to  INF-is  Geneva  as  the  negotiating 
place,  and  how  imperative  is  any 
specific  negotiating  place?  In  other 
words,  that  the  whole  field  of 
geographical,  technical  problems,  and 
definition  matters  must  have  been 
covered  there  in  the  last  2  years.  But  if 
we  think  about  that  in  the  course  of 
1984,  a  sort  of  direct  diplomatic  and 
political  negotiations  between 
Washington  and  Moscow  would  start, 
especiallv  since  that  would  not  compel 
the  Soviet  Union  to  return  physically 
to  Geneva  and  accept  a  loss  in 
prestige. 

A.  I  don't  know  precisely  what  you 
have  in  mind,  but  I  think  it  is  important 
to  recognize  that  we  do  discuss  these 
issues  in  other  channels.  The  Secretary 
of  State,  for  example,  sees  Soviet 
Ambassador  Dobrynin  in  Washington. 
Our  Ambassador  in  Moscow,  Am- 
bassador Hartman,  regularly  sees  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko.  Earlier  this 
afternoon  we  discussed  the  recent  5-hour 
meeting  between  Secretary  Shultz  and 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko.  There  could 
conceivably  be  future  meetings  between 
these  two  "later  in  the  year.  We  do  have 
venues  for  talking  about  these  issues. 
High-level  political  discussion  is  impor- 
tant to  encourage  progress  in  the 
negotiations.  . 

But  they  certainly  do  not  substitute 
for  the  negotiations  themselves.  It  is  im- 
portant, after  all,  to  discuss  these     _ 
technical  issues.  In  arms  control,  as  m  a 
lot  of  other  very  complex  areas,  the  devil 
is  in  the  details.  And  it  is  important  if 
we  are  going  to  make  progress  in  the 
negotiations  not  only  that  senior  political 
officials  discuss  these  issues  and  talk 
about  them  but  it  is  also  important  that 
the  negotiators  themselves  get  back  to 
the  table. 


Q.  At  a  recent  experts'  meeting 
within  NATO  in  Brussels,  there  was  a 
discussion  about  a  neutralization 
of  West  European  countries.  The  term 
"Swedenization"  was  used.  Could  you 
comment  on  this? 

A   I  don't  comment  on  "Swedeniza- 
tion," "Finlandization,"  or  "Americaniza- 
tion." 


Q.  You  have  talked  about  the  im- 
portance of  conventional  defense,  or 
the  improvement  of  it,  in  Europe.  One 
of  the  problems  that  arises,  particu- 
larly for  Europeans  and  particularly  in 
the  "light  of  the  strong  dollar,  is  that 
they  have  to  produce  so  many  of  their 
new  weapons  from  the  United  States. 
Can  you  talk  to  us  about  what  plans 
the  Administration  has  to  enable  Euro- 
peans to  have  access  to  U.S.  advanced 
technology  in  new  weapons  and  to 
share  the  costs  of  procuring  these 
weapons  for  the  alliance? 

A.  It  is  a  problem  that  a  lot  of  time 
and  effort  have  been  spent  talking 
about-the  so-called  two-way  street,  the 
desii-e  of  our  European  allies  to  have 
greater  access  to  the  American  arms 
market.  It  is  absolutely  correct  that  not 
enough  progi-ess  has  been  made  in  the 
recent  past  in  this  area. 

We  are  looking  at  this  problem  now. 
As  you  may  know,  our  new  Ambassador 
to  NATO,  David  Abshire,  is  very  in- 
terested in  the  whole  NATO  resource 
problem,  and  he  is  talking  not  only  to 
NATO  officials  but  to  Members  of  Con- 
gress about  this  issue. 

We  are  making  some  progress.  For 
example,  in  many  major  weapons  system 
purchases  now-the  European  purchases 
from  the  United  States-there  are  offsets 
where  a  good  portion,  if  not  all,  of  the 
money  that  government  spends  to  ac- 
quirea  new  conventional  weapons 
system  is  spent  in  the  country  that  is 
making  the  purchase. 

An  example  of  this  was  a  recent  deal 
for  the  conventional  Patriot  air  defense 
system  in  Germany.  These  kinds  of 
developments  offset  payments- seekmg 
ways  to  encourage  a  greater  two-way 
street  in  the  defense  market-these  are 
developments  that  should  be  encouraged. 
They  will  have  to  be  encouraged  if  our 
European  allies  are  going  to  continue  to 
spend  more  and  do  what  is  necessary  to 
maintain  a  strong  conventional  defense. 

Q.  We  know  there  is  a  rather  inten- 
sive and  critical  discussion  of  NATO 
strategy  here  in  this  country,  which 
centers,  to  a  large  extent,  on  the  first- 
use  threat  of  nuclear  weapons  by 
NATO.  If  we  could  establish  a  stable 
conventional  balance  in  Europe,  do 
you  think  that  NATO  could  renounce 
the  first-use  threat? 

A.  NATO  strategy  is  that  we  will  not 
use  nuclear  weapons  first.  NATO 
strategy  is  that  the  Soviet  Union  cannot 
rule  out  the  possibility  that  in  the  event 
of  a  large-scale  conventional  attack  that 
nuclear  weapons  would  be  used. 


50 


noDUi 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


With  that  clai-ification,  what  you 
have  to  ask  yourself  is,  would  announc- 
ing a  no  first-use  policy  strengthen  or 
weaken  deterrence?  You  are  correct  that 
if  we  could  do  more  to  enhance  our  con- 
ventional capabilities  and  create  a  con- 


ventional balance  in  Europe,  and  this  is  a 
worthy  objective— the  cost  of  that  might 
surprise  some  people— there  is  still,  of 
course,  the  real  possibility  of  Soviet 
nuclear  blackmail. 


1  think  that  what  we  need  to  do  now 
is  recognize  that  we  have  a  strategy  of 
deterrence,  based  now  on  the  need  to 
maintain  a  strong  conventional  capability 
and  a  credible  nuclear  capability.  That 
strategy  has  worked  for  30  years.B 


Visit  of  Yugoslav  President 


President  Mika  Spiljak  of  the 
Socialist  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia, 
made  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washingtoti,  D.C.,  January  31- 
February  2,  198U,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  President  Spiljak 
after  their  meeting  on  February  1.^ 

President  Reagan 

It's  been  a  great  pleasure  for  me  and  for 
all  of  us  to  be  able  to  welcome  President 
Spiljak  of  Yugoslavia  and  to  confer  with 
him  on  issues  of  importance  to  both  our 
countries. 

Relations  between  Yugoslavia  and 
the  United  States  are  good.  President 
Spiljak' s  visit  follows  a  long  and  well- 
established  tradition  of  consultation  and 
cooperation.  The  United  States  strongly 
supports  Yugoslavia's  independence, 
unity,  and  territorial  integrity.  Further, 
we  respect  its  policy  of  nonalignment. 
Further,  we  respect  this  man  who  has 
done  so  much  in  these  recent  years  for 
his  country. 

Despite  understandable  differences, 
consultations  between  us  provide  a 
unique  and  valuable  perspective,  and  to- 
day's meeting  was  no  exception.  I  ex- 
pressed to  the  President  our  continued 
support  for  his  government's  efforts  to 
meet  its  serious  economic  challenges. 
We'll  do  our  part  to  help  in  cooperation 
with  other  Western  governments,  inter- 
national financial  institutions,  and  com- 
mercial banks.  Vigorous  economic 
recovery  in  the  United  States  will  itself 
help  Yugoslavia  by  creating  new  oppor- 
tunities for  mutually  beneficial  commer- 
cial activity  and  the  strengthening  of 
bilateral  trade. 

Yugoslavia,  like  other  nations  of 
Europe,  hopes  for  progress  in  arms  con- 
trol negotiations  between  the  United 


States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  I  conveyed 
to  President  Spiljak  our  deeper  commit- 
ment to  reach  equitable,  verifiable 
agreements  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Such 
agreements  would  be  in  our  interest,  the 
Soviet  Union's  interest,  and  in  the  in- 
terest of  all  mankind.  We're  flexible  and 
realistic  in  pursuit  of  this  goal  and  share 
the  President's  hope  that  the  negotia- 
tions will  resume  in  the  near  future. 

Today,  we  also  discussed  the  serious 
menace  of  international  terrorism  and 
underscored  our  intention  to  cooperate  in 
opposing  it  wherever  it  occurs  and  for 
whatevei-  reasons.  The  United  States 
deplores  all  ten-orist  attacks  against 
Yugoslav  diplomatic  counsellor  and  other 
representatives,  and  we  will  not  tolerate 
such  attacks  on  our  territory. 

The  American  people  join  me  in  con- 
veying our  best  wishes  to  the  people  of 
Yugoslavia  for  the  success  of  this  year's 
Winter  Olympic  Games,  which  will  begin 
next  week  in  Sarajevo.  Like  our  Los 
Angeles  Olympic  Organizing  Committee, 
the  Yugoslav  Olympic  Committee  has  in- 
vested tremendous  human  and  material 


resources  in  putting  the  games  together. 
As  the  two  host  countries  for  the  1984 
games,  we  have  reason  to  be  proud  of 
these  endeavors. 

It's  especially  fitting  that  in  this 
Olympic  year,  we're  signing  a 
U.S.-Yugoslav  tourism  agreement.  We 
hope  that  the  agreement  to  be  signed 
tomorrow  will  lead  to  an  increase  in 
tourism  and  good  will  between  our  two 
countries. 

President  Spiljak  has  been  an  espec- 
ially welcome  guest,  and  I  look  forward  to 
frequent  consultations  with  him.  And  I'm 
confident  that  our  bilateral  relations  will 
continue  to  grow  and  flourish.  It's  been 
good  to  have  you  here. 

President  Spiljak^ 

First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  express  my 
pleasure  with  the  opportunity  to  visit  the 
United  States  of  America  and  exchange 
views  with  President  Reagan  on  the 
possibilities  for  promoting  further  our 
bilateral  cooperation  and  on  some  impor- 
tant international  issues. 


April  1984 


EUROPE 


I  would  like  to  point  out  that  the 
talks  with  President  Reagan  were  held 
in  a  friendly  and  candid  atmosphere  of 
full,  mutual  respect  which  characterizes 
the  relations  between  our  two  countries 
and  peoples.  President  Reagan  and  I 
share  the  view  that  a  practice  of  dialogue 
in  meetings  between  the  highest  repre- 
sentatives of  our  two  countries,  regard- 
less of  the  well-known  diffei-ences  in  our 
positions  and  views  in  some  international 
issues,  continues  to  greatly  contribute  to 
a  bettei"  mutual  understanding  and  stable 
cooperation  in  all  fields  of  mutual  in- 
terest. The  principles  of  equality,  in- 
dependence, and  noninterference  as  a 
mutually  accepted  basis  for  bilateral  rela- 
tions and  cooperation  were  reaffirmed  in 
our  talks  today. 

I'm  glad  to  note  that  our  talks  con- 
firmed once  again  that  the  overall 
Yugoslav-American  relations  have  been 
developing  successfully  and  that  there 
exist  ample  possibilities  for  their  even 
more  comprehensive  promotion  in  the 
long  run. 

As  President  Reagan  displayed  the 
interest,  I  briefed  him  on  the  essence  of 
the  Yugoslav  long-term  program  for 
economic  stabilization.  The  achievement 
of  our  targets  will  offer  a  broader  basis 
for  an  overall  economic  cooperation  with 
all  countries  and  in  which  the  United 
States  of  America  is  one  of  the  most 
significant  partners.  In  this  context,  I 
would  like  to  emphasize  that  we  attach 
great  importance  to  the  results  achieved, 
as  well  as  to  the  prospects  to  develop 
further  mutual,  economic  cooperation  in 
all  areas.  In  this  respect,  special  atten- 
tion should  be  devoted  to  industrial, 
technological,  financial  cooperation,  as 
well  as  joint  ventures. 

President  Reagan  reiterated  the 
resolve  of  the  U.S.  administration  to  pre- 
vent the  terrorists  and  other  hostile  ac- 
tivities against  Yugoslavia  which  are,  at 
the  same  time,  directed  against  the  good 
Yugoslav-American  relations  and 
cooperation. 

I  had  a  very  useful  exchange  of 
views  with  President  Reagan  on  press- 
ing international  issues.  Thus  we 
acquired  a  greater  knowledge  of,  and 
gained  a  better  insight  in,  the  positions 
and  activities  of  our  two  countries  on  the 
international  scene.  We  share  the  con- 
cern over  the  present  dangerous 
developments  and  further  deterioration 
of  the  situation  in  the  world. 

We  agreed  that  the  policy  of  the 
release  of  intemational  tensions  in 
negotiation  has  no  alteraative.  We,  for 
our  part,  pointed  in  particular  to  the 
need  for  strengthening  international  con- 
fidence and  creating  an  atmosphere 


Yugoslavia— A  Profile 


People 

Noun  and  adjective:  VuK<islav(s|.  Population 
(IHiSl  est.):  TZA  million.  Annual  growth 
rate:  \"/i<.  Clearly  defined  ethnic  groups: 

Serli.s  .Sti'!';,,  Croats  Lid'!:!.  Bosnian  MusHnis 
y'Ki.  Macedonians  fi%,  Slovenes  8%.  Alba- 
nians H%.  Montenegrin  Serbs  3'Ki. 
Hunjjarians  2%.  Turks  d..")"^..  Religions: 
Kastern  Orthodox  (Serbian  ami  Macedonian). 
Koniaii  t'atholie,  Muslim.  Languages:  Serbo- 
Croatian.  Slovenian.  Macedonian.  Albanian, 
Hungarian.  Education:  .4 //f-y/i/'nirr — !l!l'S,  m 
primary  scIkioI  (1979).  Lilcniri/—H:^"/.,. 
Health:  hijiinl  morhilili/  /vj/i  — li^.S/l  .(KHI 
(19S1).  Lij'i-  I'Xjit'cldiirfi — men  <W  yrs..  women 
73  yrs.  Work  force  (.5,786.000):  Aijnnil- 
liiri — 3(»'R..  hi(liistry—lU%. 

Geography 

Area:  2.56.409  s().  km.  (99,001)  sq.  mi.);  aliout 
two-thirds  the  size  of  California.  Cities: 
r„/„/„/  — Belgrade  (pop.  1,300.000).  Other 
.■/7/r.v— Zagreb  (700.000),  Sk(>|)je  (44().()00). 
Sarajevo  (400,000),  Ljubljana  (3()(),000).  Ter- 
rain: One-third  lowland  hills  and  plains,  with 
remainder  mostly  mountainous.  Climate: 
Ciiiisl  —  hot  m  summer,  rainy  and  mild  in 
winter.  Inhnid — warm  in  summer,  cold  in 
w  inter. 

Government 

Type:  Federal  republu    Independence: 
Dec-ember  1.  191,s,  Constitution:  February 
197-4, 

Branches:  Ej-cculiti- — president  of  the 
Presideniv  (chief  of  stati'.  rotated  annually 
from  among  the  collective  l)ody).  (ireniier 
(lieail  of  government  and  president  of  the 
Federal  Kxecutive  Council.  4-vr  Icnnl. 


/,i7rs7.//(/r —bicameral  /Xssemlily  (30,s 
delegates).  Federal  Kxecutive  Council 
(cabinet;  As.semlily's  executive  arm). 
.Iiiiliciiil — Constitutional  Court.  Federal 
Supreme  Court. 

•Administrative  subdivisions:  (i  re|iublics. 
-  autononiou.-.  pro\iiices. 

Political  party:  Lea^iie  of  Communists  of 
Yujioshuia.  Suffrage:  Cniversal  overage  18. 

Defense  expenditures  (1983  est.):  'k'>"/« 
ulCNl' 

Economy 

GNP  (1981):  .$.■>!. .5  billion.  Annual  tiNF 
growth  rate  (1981-82):  2.2'^.   Per  capita 
GNP  (1981):  .$2,300.  .\vg.  inflation  rate 

(1982):  40'^.. 

Natural  resources:  Coal,  copper,  bauxite, 
timber,  iron,  antimony,  chromium,  lead,  zinc, 
asbestos,  mercury. 

Agriculture  (13'!^,  of  (d)!'):  L<n,il—{WV„ 
arable.  .33'K,  of  which  is  plowlaml.  Prml- 
iirls — corn,  wheat,  tobacco,  sugar  beets, 
livestock. 

Industries  (37%  of  CD!'):  VVoo.l.  proc- 
es.sed  food,  nonferrous  metals,  machinery, 
textiles. 

Trade  (1982):  AV/,„w.s— $10.2  billion: 
agricultural  products  (including  proi-essed 
meats),  wooden  furniture,  leather  goods  and 
shoes,  textiles.  shi|)S.  mineral  ores,  metal 
jiroducts.  and  tobacco.  A/</./o/-  wnrkcls— 
I  SSK.  ItaK.  FKC.  Czechoslovakia.  //»- 
pitrls — .Si:i.3  billion:  machinery  and  metal 
proiUicts,  chemicals,  iron,  [letroleum.  coking 
coal,  steel,  and  agricultural  products.  . \//;yoc 
,,.„„, -/..s—l  SSK.  FKC.  ItaK.  IS. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  June 
1983,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor: 
.J.  Darnell  Adams.  ■ 


favorable  for  the  renewal  of  dialogue  as  a 
precondition  for  the  settlement  of  the 
acute  international  political  and  economic 
problems. 

I  also  informed  President  Reagan  of 
our  assessments  of  the  East-West  rela- 
tions, the  situation  in  Europe,  and  of  our 
deep  concern  over  the  continuation  of  the 
arms  race,  in  particular.  We  presented 
our  views  on  the  problems  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  developed  and  the 
developing  countries,  as  well  as  our 
assessments  of  some  acute  hotbeds  of 
crisis  such  as  the  Middle  East  and  Near 
East,  southern  Africa,  and  others.  We 
find  it  to  the  need  of  i-esolving  them  by 
peaceful  means  in  compliance  with  the 
principles  and  purposes  of  the  Charter  of 


the  United  Nations.  In  this  context,  we 
pointed  to  the  activities  and  initiatives  of 
the  nonaligned  countries  at  solving  the 
outstanding  international  problems. 

I'm  confident  that  my  visit  and  the 
fruitful  and  meaningful  talks  I  had  with 
President  Reagan  will  give  a  fresh  boost 
to  an  even  more  comprehensive  develop- 
ment of  cooperation  between  our  two 
countries,  thus  contributing  to  interna- 
tional understanding  in  general. 


'Made  to  repoiters  assembled  at  the 
South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (text  from 
Weeklv  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  6,  1984). 

^Pi'esident  Spiljak  read  the  opening  and 
closing  portions  of  his  statement  in  Serbo- 
Croatian;  his  inteipreter  read  the  complete 
statement  in  English.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Country  Reports  on 

Human  Rights  Practices  for  1983 


FoUoiving  is  the  introduction  from 
Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Prac- 
tices for  1983,  which  was  prepared  by  the 
Department  of  State  and  submitted  to  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  and 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
in  February  198\. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE 
PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS 

For  the  last  two  years  the  introduction 
has  contained  an  exposition  of  United 
States  human  rights  policy  as  for- 
mulated in  the  Reagan  Administration. 
The  relationship  between  democracy  and 
human  rights  is  at  the  core  of  that 
human  rights  policy.  The  purpose  of  the 
present  introduction  is  to  examine  that 
relationship  in  greater  depth. 

The  Experience  of 
Human  Rights  Work 

Over  the  past  three  years,  the  United 
States  Government  has  employed  a 
broad  range  of  instruments  and  tech- 
niques in  responding  to  specific  cases  of 
human  rights  violations.  In  dealing  with 
friendly  governments,  we  have  engaged 
in  the  kind  of  frank  diplomatic  ex- 
changes often  referred  to  as  "quiet 
diplomacy."  Where  diplomatic  ap- 
proaches have  not  availed,  or  where  our 
influence  with  a  foreign  government  is 
minimal,  we  have  dissociated  ourselves 
from  odious  human  rights  practices  by 
denying  economic  and  military  assist- 
ance, voting  against  multilateral  loans, 
and  denying  diplomatic  support.  Where 
appropriate,  we  have  distanced 
ourselves  from  human  rights  violators 
by  public  pressures  and  statements  de- 
nouncing their  actions.  In  most  cases, 
we  have  employed  a  mixture  of  tradi- 
tional diplomacy  and  public  affirmation 
of  American  interest  in  the  issue. 

The  success  of  these  efforts  has 
varied  with  the  degree  of  leverage  we 
have  in  a  given  country,  the  political  en- 
vironment, and  the  energy  and  skill  of 
our  diplomatic  representatives. 

Diplomatic  exchanges  on  behalf  of 
dissidents,  and  other  victims  of  human 
rights  abuse,  are  by  their  very  nature 
confidential.  Although  we  cannot  public- 
ly claim  credit,  American  representa- 
tions have  often  been  instrumental  in 


halting  human  rights  violations  against 
dissidents  by  governments  with  whom 
we  enjoy  some  common  interests. 
Perhaps  the  phrase  "quiet  diplomacy" 
does  not  fully  convey  either  the  intensity 
of  American  efforts,  or  the  depth  of  our 
concern,  on  behalf  of  human  rights  vic- 
tims, yet  in  many  cases,  this  kind  of  in- 
tercession has  proven  an  effective 
response  to  human  rights  violations.  Let 
us  be  clear  that  "quiet  diplomacy"  refers 
only  to  confidentiality  of  the  diplomatic 
channels  we  use,  rwt  to  the  intensity  of 
our  representations. 

Compassion  requires  us  to  intervene 
in  specific  cases.  When  we  have  done  so, 
we  have  often  had  successes.  Such  suc- 
cesses are  important  because  they 
relieve  suffering;  in  a  few  cases  they  can 
also  have  a  major  symbolic  impact  on  a 
country  and  serve  as  a  precedent  for 
future  improvements.  But  it  is  impor- 
tant to  acknowledge  the  frustrations  of 
this  kind  of  work.  All  too  often,  the  best 
efforts  of  any  government  can  secure 
the  release  of  a  political  prisoner  only  to 
see  another  political  prisoner  arrested; 
they  can  persuade  a  government  to  sus- 
pend the  practice  of  torture  only  to  see 
it  renewed  later  on;  they  can  secure  per- 
mission for  someone  to  leave  his  country 
only  to  see  the  next  citizen  who  seeks  to 
leave  denied  this  right.  We  intervene, 
knowing  very  well  that  our  interventions 
may  fail  to  prevent  new  violations  of  the 
same  type. 

In  this  regard,  the  human  rights 
work  traditionally  done  by  the  State 
Department  differs  from  most  other 
kinds  of  work  undertaken  in  foreign 
policy.  In  other  areas,  diplomatic  effort 
frequently  culminates  in  major  trans- 
formations: an  arms  control  treaty,  a 
treaty  resolving  a  major  conflict,  an 
alliance  between  ourselves  and  another 
country,  a  diplomatic  opening  to  a 
heretofore  hostile  country,  a  successful 


Copies  of  the  Report 

The  complete  volume  documents  human 
rights  practices  in  more  than  160  countries  of 
the  world.  It  may  be  purchased  for  $23.00 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  Remittance  must  accompany 
order.  ■ 


military  action  in  defense  of  our  friends, 
a  new  aid  program.  These  are  actions 
that  may  change  the  international 
system.  Our  case-by-case  human  rights 
work,  in  its  very  specific  nature,  cannot 
effect  such  changes.  Of  all  the  areas  of 
traditional  human  rights  work,  it  is 
perhaps  only  in  the  international 
organizations,  where  we  can  sometimes 
obtain  a  vote  publicly  identifying  a  ma- 
jor human  rights  violation,  that  our 
work  is  most  marked  by  spectacular 
events  similar  to  those  that  can  take 
place  in  other  areas  of  foreign  policy. 
Thus,  the  criteria  of  success  in  human 
rights  work  are  inherently  less  clear, 
and  human  rights  work  is  inherently 
more  frustrating  for  those  doing  it  than 
other  branches  of  diplomacy. 

Democracy  and  Human  Rights 

For  this  reason,  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion has  developed  a  two-track  human 
rights  policy.  The  first  track  is  embodied 
in  the  way  we  oppose  specific  human 
rights  violations  over  the  short  term. 
Thus,  to  take  only  public  activities,  we 
have  spoken  out  against  such  gross  af- 
fronts to  human  rights  as  the  incarcera- 
tion of  Soviet  dissidents  in  psychiatric 
wards  and  the  resurgence  of  officially 
sponsored  anti-Semitism  in  the  Soviet 
Union;  the  barbaric  persecution  of 
adherents  of  the  Baha'i  faith  in  Iran;  the 
institutionalization  of  racial  injustice  by 
the  apartheid  system  in  South  Africa; 
the  destruction  of  the  free  trade  union 
movement,  Solidarity,  in  Poland;  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  "death  squads"  in  El 
Salvador;  the  persecution  of  the  Miskito 
Indians  in  Nicaragua;  and  the  use  of 
outlawed  toxic  weapons  by  Soviet  forces 
in  Afghanistan  and  by  Vietnamese 
forces  in  Kampuchea.  In  these  and  other 
cases  of  human  rights  abuse,  we  have 
made  use  of  such  influence  as  we 
possess  to  help  individual  victims. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  ad- 
dressed the  long  range  need  to  create  a 
system  of  government  which  institu- 
tionalizes the  protection  of  human 
rights.  For  just  as  the  creation  of  an 
economic  system  which  promotes 
growth  and  prosperity  is  a  better  long 
term  solution  to  the  problem  of  poverty 
than  repeated  acts  of  charity,  so,  too, 
the  creation  of  a  system  of  government 
which  safeguards  human  rights  is  a  bet- 
ter long  range  response  to  the  problem 
of  human  rights  abuse  than  repeated, 
case-by-case  diplomatic  representations. 

This,  then,  is  the  second  track  of 
United  States  human  rights  policy:  the 
long  term  development  of  democratic 
governments,  which  are  the  surest 


April  1984 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


safeguard  of  human  rights.  President 
Reagan  has  made  the  encouragement  of 
democracy  throughout  the  world  a  cen- 
tral goal.  Too  often  our  human  rights 
policy  has  been  simply  reactive,  respond- 
ing to  violations  after  they  have  oc- 
curred rather  than  working  to  prevent 
them.  The  President  has  sought  to  go 
beyond  this  to  an  active,  positive  human 
rights  policy. 

He  outlined  his  conception  in  a 
speech  to  Parliament  in  London  in  June, 


The  impetus  behind  the  second  track 
of  our  human  rights  policy  is  the 
recognition  that  a  close  connection  exists 
between  a  democratic  form  of  govern- 
ment and  respect  for  human  rights.  As 
both  the  State  Department's  Country 
Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices,  and 
the  reports  of  independent  human  rights 
groups,  such  as  Freedom  House,  have 
repeatedly  demonstrated,  most  democ- 
racies have  excellent  human  rights 
records.  Nor  is  this  merely  a  coin- 


.  .  /'quiet  diplomacy"  refers  only  to  confidentiality 
of  the  diplomatic  channels  we  use,  not  to  the  inten- 
sity of  our  representations. 


1982,  when  he  announced  that  the 
chairmen  of  the  national  Republican  and 
Democratic  parties  were  initiating  a 
study  to  determine  how  the  United 
States  could  best  contribute  to  the 
global  campaign  for  democracy.  That 
study  has  now  been  completed,  and  its 
recommendations  have  been  supported 
by  Congress.  The  result  has  been  the 
establishment  of  a  National  Endowment 
for  Democracy,  which  will  greatly  ex- 
pand the  involvement  of  our  two  major 
political  parties,  as  well  as  labor, 
business  and  other  private  institutions, 
in  programs  designed  to  promote  demo- 
cratic institutions  and  practices  abroad. 
Such  programs  will  be  insulated  from 
United  States  Government  control,  and 
will  respond  to  the  needs  of  men  and 
women  working  for  democracy  in  their 
own  societies. 

Even  before  funding  the  National 
Endowment  for  Democracy,  Congress 
had  established  one  human  rights  pro- 
gram on  the  positive  side.  Section  116(e) 
of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  provides 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  funding  for  programs  and  ac- 
tivities which  encourage  or  promote  in- 
creased adherence  to  civil  and  political 
rights  in  countries  eligible  for  United 
States  bilateral  assistance.  In  Fiscal 
Year  1983  AID  funded  51  activities 
totalling  $1,853,466.  Activities  included 
support  for  the  development  of  guide- 
lines for  election  observers,  support  for 
human  rights  education  and  training 
programs,  and  support  for  programs 
aimed  at  assisting  government  and 
private  legal  institutions  abroad. 


cidence.  Democracy,  after  all,  is  a  form 
of  government  which  is  based  on  the 
freely  given  consent  of  the  governed. 
But  consent  can  only  be  freely  given  if 
the  means  for  the  free  expression  of 
consent,  or  of  dissent,  exist;  such  means 
include  freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of 
press,  freedom  of  assembly  and  associa- 
tion, an  independent  judiciary,  and  free 
elections.  Thus,  respect  for  human 
rights  is  built  into  the  very  foundations 
of  the  democratic  form  of  government. 

All  this  is  not  to  say  that  serious 
human  rights  violations  can  never  take 
place  in  a  democracy.  But  because  free, 
competitive  and  periodic  elections  make 
the  government  accountable  for  its  ac- 
tions to  the  electorate,  such  violations  as 
do  occur  tend  to  be  self-correcting  over 
time.  As  Thomas  Jefferson  pointed  out 
in  his  First  Inaugural  Address,  free  elec- 
tions are  "a  mild  and  safe  corrective  of 
abuses  which  are  lopped  off  by  the 
sword  of  the  revolution  where  peaceable 
remedies  are  unprovided."  In  its  ca- 
pacity to  initiate  a  thorough-going  proc- 
ess of  peaceful  reform,  democracy  dif- 
fers fundamentally  from  all  other  forms 
of  government.  Democracy  is  therefore 
the  nearest  thing  we  have  to  a  guar- 
antee of  human  rights. 

Moreover,  democratic  government  is 
also  a  precondition  to  the  achievement 
of  social  justice.  Recent  events  in  Poland 
vividly  confirm  this.  A  basic  grievance 
voiced  by  Solidarity  was  that  members 
of  the  Polish  Communist  Party  had 
ready  access  to  the  best  food  stores,  the 
best  medical  care,  and  the  best  shops, 
while  the  ordinary  Polish  worker  had  ac- 
cess to  none  of  these  things.  The  Com- 


munist ruling  class  in  Poland,  aided  and 
abetted  by  the  Communist  ruling  class  in 
the  Soviet  Union,  responded  to  this 
grievance  by  imposing  martial  law, 
outlawing  Solidarity,  and  holding  its 
leader,  Lech  Walesa,  incommunicado  for 
many  months.  Today,  Poland  remains 
bitterly  divided  between  the  rulers  and 
the  ruled.  That  this  has  occurred  in  a 
self-proclaimed  "Workers'  State"  only 
serves  to  underscore  the  absolute 
necessity  of  making  the  government  ac- 
countable to  the  governed.  For,  to  quote 
Jefferson  once  more,  "Every  govern- 
ment degenerates  when  trusted  to  the 
rulers  of  the  people  alone." 

Democracy  and  Minority  Rights 

It  is  so  true  that  democracy  guarantees 
human  rights  that  it  requires  an  effort 
to  bring  to  mind  the  apparent  excep- 
tions. Minority  rights  are  the  greatest  of 
these.  For  long  periods  in  the  United 
States,  as  in  other  democracies,  the 
rights  of  minorities  were  systematically 
violated  by  the  majority.  It  is  no  acci- 
dent that  this  is  the  greatest  exception 
to  the  effectiveness  of  democracy  as  a 
guarantee  of  human  rights.  If  democ- 
racy makes  the  government  responsible 
to  the  will  of  the  majority,  it  can,  in 
theory,  also  become  the  vehicle  whereby 
the  majority  disenfranchises  the  minori- 
ty. To  prevent  this  from  happening,  a 
means  must  be  devised  to  reconcile  ma- 
jority rule  with  minority  rights.  As 
James  Madison  warned  in  Federalist 
Paper  No.  10,  the  democratic  form  of 
government  might  enable  a  majority  "to 
sacrifice  to  its  ruling  passion  or  interest 
both  the  public  good  and  the  rights  of 
other  citizens.  To  secure  the  public  good 
and  private  rights  against  the  danger  of 
such  a  faction,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
preserve  the  spirit  and  the  form  of 
popular  government,  is  then  the  great 
object"  of  the  authors  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 

In  the  understanding  of  American 
statesmen  who  wrestled  with  this  prob- 
lem, two  elements  of  democratic  political 
life  can  be  brought  into  play  against  the 
deprivation  of  minority  rights.  The  first 
is  equality.  Democratic  political  life  im- 
plies natural  equality,  and  this  is 
ultimately  incompatible  with  the  subor- 
dination of  minorities.  Abraham  Lincoln 
thus  regarded  equality  as  the  central 
principle  of  American  democracy: 

Public  opinion,  on  any  subject,  always  has 
a  "central  idea,"  from  which  all  its  minor 
thoughts  radiate.  That  "central  idea"  in  our 
political  public  opinion  at  the  beginning  was, 
and  until  recently  has  continued  to  be,  "the 


ai 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


equality  of  men."  And  although  it  has  alv>  ays 
submitted  patiently  to  whatever  of  inequality 
there  seemed  to  be  as  a  matter  of  actual 
necessity,  its  constant  working  has  been  a 
steady  progress  toward  the  practical  equality 
of  all  men. 

The  second  democratic  guard 
against  the  loss  of  minority  rights  is 
more  practical.  In  order  to  secure 
minority  rights  against  an  overbearing 
majority,  the  makers  of  the  American 
Revolution  set  out  to  encourage  what 
James  Madison  called  "a  multiplicity  of 
interests"  throughout  the  United  States. 
When  society  consists  of  a  "great  variety 
of  interests,  parties,  and  sects,"  wrote 
Madison  in  Federalist  Paper  No.  51,  "a 
coalition  of  the  majority  of  the  whole 
society  could  seldom  take  place  on  any 
other  principles  than  those  of  justice  and 
the  general  good."  With  society  "broken 
into  so  many  parts,  interests  and  classes 
of  citizens,"  Madision  concluded,  "the 
rights  of  individuals,  or  of  the  minority, 
will  be  in  little  danger  from  interested 
combinations  of  the  majority."  In  short, 
the  security  of  minority  rights  depends 
on  the  diversity  of  interests  in  society: 
the  greater  the  diversity,  the  more 
secure  the  rights. 

This  diversity  tends  to  guarantee 
human  rights  in  another  and  even  more 
practical  way.  Democracy  works  by 
making  respect  for  human  rights  not 
only  a  matter  of  principles  but  of  in- 
terests. A  free  press  has  a  natural  in- 
terest in  securing  freedom  of  opinion,  as 
free  churches  have  in  securing  freedom 
of  religion.  Lawyers  who  are  accus- 
tomed to  independence  are  naturally  in- 
sistent on  the  right  to  a  fair  trial. 
Teachers  who  are  accustomed  to  pro- 
fessing their  own  opinions  are  likely  to 
insist  on  academic  freedom. 

This,  then,  is  the  formula  devised  by 
the  framers  of  the  American  democratic 
constitution  to  reconcile  majority  rule 
with  minority  rights:  democratic  govern- 
ment in  the  political  sphere,  diversity 
and  pluralism  in  the  social  sphere,  both 
operating  under  the  principle  of  equality. 

With  this  situation  we  should  com- 
pare minority  rights  under  communism. 
The  principles  of  the  Bolshevik  Revolu- 
tion were  thoroughly  internationalist 
and  egalitarian,  but  the  greatest  real 
equality  between  the  nationalities  of  the 
Soviet  Union  existed  in  the  1920's.  Since 
then  minority  rights  have  been  sys- 
tematically, even  brutally,  eroded. 

In  the  early  years  of  Soviet  history 
the  party  organizations  in  many  of  the 
national  republics  were  dominated  by 
local  people,  and  were  able  in  certain 
cases  to  work  out  indigenous  versions  of 


April  1984 


communism.  At  the  national  level,  there 
were  strict  restraints  on  "Great  Russian 
chauvinism,"  and  many  of  the  Soviet 
leaders  in  Moscow  were  neither  Rus- 
sians nor  Slavs.  Subsequently,  there 
were  massive  purges  of  the  local  Com- 
munist parties,  together  with  the  purg- 
ing of  many  indigenous  elements  from 
the  national  literatures  and  from  the 
languages  themselves.  Today  the  Rus- 
sian people  are  given  a  special  status 
above  the  others,  and  any  expression  of 
national  distinctiveness  is  potentially 
open  to  criticism  as  "bourgeois  na- 
tionalism." The  national  republics  have 
Russian  Second  Secretaries  to  assure 
their  fidelity  to  central  policy,  and  it  is 
taken  for  granted  that  the  General 
Secretary  must  be  a  Russian  or  at  least 
a  Slav. 

This  fact  presents  a  vivid  contrast  to 
the  position  of  minority  rights  in 
democratic  countries,  where  the  original 
principles  of  equality  have  again  and 
again  been  restored.  Abraham  Lincoln 
did  not  discover  his  opposition  to  slavery 
as  something  new,  but  rediscovered  the 
implication  of  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence when  it  declared  that  all 
men  are  created  equal. 

Indeed,  the  principles  of  equal  rights 
were  not  only  restored  again  and  again, 
but  restored  in  a  more  exact  form.  At 
the  time  of  the  American  Revolution, 
women  and  most  blacks  did  not  share  in 
voting.  But  their  right  to  do  so  was 
somehow  latent  in  the  principle  that  all 
men  are  created  equal.  It  took  about  a 
hundred  and  fifty  years  for  women  to  be 
admitted  to  democratic  self-governance 


Perhaps  the  answer  lies  in  the  fact 
that  in  the  Soviet  Union  the  realization 
of  political  principles  is  entrusted  entire- 
ly to  a  central  government.  And  that 
central  government  organizes  and 
directs  all  activity  within  the  country. 
Thus  there  can  be  no  writers  who  freely 
point  out  the  oppression  of  minorities, 
no  civil  rights  groups  to  point  out  the 
forgetting  of  the  founding  principles  of 
the  regime,  no  new  party  founded— as 
the  Republican  Party  was  founded  dur- 
ing the  1850's— to  challenge  injustice  to 
minorities.  There  are,  in  the  Soviet 
order,  no  groups,  factions,  and  organiza- 
tions which  themselves  interpret,  resort 
to,  and  reassert  the  political  ideals  of  the 
regime.  In  the  absence  of  such  diversity 
the  interpretation  of  the  regime's  found- 
ing principles  is  the  interpretation  given 
by  the  central  government.  Of  course,  as 
time  passes  that  government  will  be 
pressed  by  various  tactical  necessities  to 
compromise  its  original  principles.  Hav- 
ing compromised  its  principles  for  tac- 
tical reasons,  a  government  which  is  the 
authoritative  interpreter  of  national 
tradition  will  be  compelled  to  reinterpret 
and  corrupt  that  tradition  to  conform  to 
its  tactical  needs. 

It  is  different  when  the  society,  and 
not  the  government,  is  the  guardian  of 
the  country's  principles.  Independent 
organizations,  groups,  and  factions  are 
free  to  reassert  the  founding  principles, 
such  as  equality  or  religious  freedom,  in 
a  pure  form.  It  is  then  for  the  demo- 
cratic political  process  to  compromise 
among  these  statements  of  principles 
when  they  conflict,  and  not  for  the 


.  .  .  today  democracy  has  seized  the  imagination  of 
the  world  to  such  an  extent  that  even  the  most 
despotic  regime  feels  obliged  to  refer  to  the  people 
as  the  source  of  its  legitimacy,  and  to  hold  periodic 
elections,  however  bogus. 


in  the  United  States.  It  took  a  century 
to  resolve  the  question  of  black  suffrage 
constitutionally,  and  nearly  two  cen- 
turies for  full  voting  rights  to  be 
guaranteed.  But  these  changes  were 
made,  and  they  were  made  by  returning 
to  the  principles  of  natural  equality 
enunciated  at  the  founding.  What  is  the 
reason  for  this  evident  contrast  between 
two  systems,  one  in  which  the  founding 
principles  were  progressively  eroded  and 
compromised,  the  other  in  which  they 
unfolded  and  developed? 


government  to  do  so.  Thus  the  historical 
fact— the  vitality  and  growth  of  the 
founding  principles  in  democracies  and 
their  erosion  in  totalitarian  regimes- 
should  not  be  so  surprising.  It  follows 
from  the  diversity  of  the  society,  which 
Madison  recommended  and  which 
modern  democracies  embody  in  practice. 
The  measure  of  its  success  may  be 
gauged  by  the  fact  that  whereas  before 
the  American  Revolution,  democratic 
government  was  held  in  such  disrepute 
that  Madison  felt  obliged  to  rescue  it 


55 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


"from  the  opprobrium  under  which  it  has 
so  long  labored,"  today  democracy  has 
seized  the  imagination  of  the  world  to 
such  an  extent  that  even  the  most 
despotic  regime  feels  obliged  to  refer  to 
the  people  as  the  source  of  its 
legitimacy,  and  to  hold  periodic  elec- 
tions, however  bogus. 

Diversity  and  Human  Rights 

In  framing  its  current  human  rights 
policy,  the  United  States  Government 
has  tried  to  draw  on  the  tradition  of 
democratic  thinking.  Thus,  one  of  the 
goals  of  our  democracy  initiative  is  to 
encourage  diversity  and  pluralism  in 
non-democratic  societies.  We  believe 
that  once  a  "multiplicity  of  interests" 
begins  to  flourish  in  the  economic 
sphere,  the  educational  sphere,  the 
religious  sphere,  the  cultural  sphere,  and 
the  social  sphere,  it  becomes  increasing- 
ly difficult  for  non-democratic  govern- 
ments to  exclude  a  similar  degree  of 
diversity  in  the  political  sphere. 
Democratic  legitimacy— the  notion  that 
"the  people"  must  somehow  rule— is  a 
powerful  force  in  the  modern  world,  but 
it  will  never  be  effectively  embodied  in 
institutions  until  there  is  a  "great  va- 
riety of  interests,  parties  and  sects." 
Looking  around  the  world,  there  are 
some  grounds  for  the  generalization  that 
democracy  has  been  more  successful  in 


abandonment  of  diversity  in  the  political 
sphere  never  led  to  the  abrogation  of 
diversity  in  the  social  sphere— would 
seem  to  confirm  the  accuracy  of  this 
view.  By  encouraging  social  diversity, 
the  United  States  is  now  helping  to  pro- 
mote the  transformation  of  non-demo- 
cratic regimes  into  democratic  ones. 

Unfortunately,  not  all  dictatorships 
are  prepared  to  tolerate  a  measure  of 
diversity  in  the  non-political  sphere.  The 
twentieth  century  has  witnessed  a  new 
phenomenon,  the  emergence  of  totali- 
tarian dictatorship,  in  its  Communist 
and  Fascist  varieties.  Totalitarian 
regimes,  besides  maintaining  a  monopoly 
on  political  activity,  also  claim  the 
authority  to  direct  all  economic,  social 
and  cultural  developments  towards  the 
attainment  of  a  Utopian  image  of  man's 
future.  In  Communist  or  Fascist  states, 
society  is  not  permitted  to  exist  in  its 
diversity  as  an  autonomous  entity, 
capable  of  exerting  pressure  on  the 
regime.  After  the  Second  World  War  ex- 
tinguished the  Fascist  totalitarian 
regimes.  Communist  regimes  remain  the 
most  hostile  to  internal  diversity.  It  is 
no  coincidence,  then,  that  while  a 
number  of  non-Communist  dictatorships 
have  evolved  into  democratic  regimes, 
the  world  has  yet  to  witness  the 
peaceful  transformation  of  a  single  Com- 
munist dictatorship  into  a  democracy. 
Poland— an  apparent  exception  to  this 
generalization— is  the  only  Soviet  bloc 


.  .  .  there  are  some  grounds  for  the  generalization 
that  democracy  has  been  more  successful  in  estab- 
lishing itself  in  countries  where  there  were  multiple 
centers  of  power  than  in  countries  where  social  ac- 
tivity was  organized  from  a  center  that  dominated 
the  whole  life  of  the  nation. 


establishing  itself  in  countries  where 
there  were  multiple  centers  of  power 
than  in  countries  where  social  activity 
was  organized  from  a  center  that 
dominated  the  whole  life  of  the  nation. 
For  example,  democracy  has  tended  to 
be  more  successful  in  countries  that  had 
a  tradition  of  feudalism  than  in  those 
where  absolute  monarchy  was  impor- 
tant: more  successful  in  Japan  than  in 
China,  in  Nigeria  than  in  Uganda.  The 
return  to  democratic  government  in  re- 
cent years  in  Spain,  Portugal,  Greece 
and  Argentina— countries  where  the 


56 


state  without  a  system  of  collectivized 
agriculture,  as  well  as  the  one  with  the 
strongest  independent  church. 

This  distinction  between  Communist 
and  non-Communist  dictatorships  has 
obvious  implications  for  human  rights 
policy.  All  dictatorships— both  on  the  left 
and  the  right— engage  in  serious  human 
rights  violations.  All  human  rights  viola- 
tions, in  turn,  deserve  to  be  condemned. 
But  while  non-Communist  dictatorships 
are  capable,  to  varying  degrees,  of 
evolving  into  democracies,  Communist 
dictatorships  are  singularly  resistant  to 


democratization.  Because  Communist 
and  non-Communist  dictatorships  differ 
so  radically  in  their  potentialities  for  the 
future,  it  follows  that  preventing  Com- 
munist dictatorships  from  establishing 
themselves  ought  to  be  an  especially 
high  priority  of  any  realistic  and  serious 
human  rights  policy. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  similar  human 
rights  violations  by  Communist  and  non- 
Communist  governments  ought  to  be 
treated  differently.  But  in  a  situation  of 
instability,  where  a  government  such  as 
Somoza's  or  the  Shah's  may  shatter  and 
be  succeeded  by  another  very  different 
form  of  government,  these  distinctions 
become  relevant.  When  we  take  our 
bearings  not  only  by  the  human  rights 
symptoms  but  by  their  causes,  the  dif- 
ference between  types  of  political 
systems  can  become  crucial. 

Why  It  Is  Not  Futile 
To  Support  Democracy 

Thus  the  experience  of  practical  human 
rights  work  strengthens  the  analysis 
that  leads  us  from  human  rights  case 
work  by  itself,  toward  addressing 
underlying  systemic  problems.  It  shows 
that  if  we  are  going  to  produce  major 
changes  in  human  rights  conditions,  we 
can  only  do  so  by  changing  political 
systems— by  encouraging  democracy. 
The  preceding  analysis  does  not  in  itself 
show  that  the  encouragement  of  democ- 
racy is  a  feasible  undertaking.  To  see 
why  it  is,  we  need  to  look  beyond  our 
own  times.  When  we  seek,  on  top  of 
eliminating  human  rights  violations  in 
specific  cases,  to  change  entire  systems, 
it  might  seem  that  we  go  beyond  the  dif- 
ficult to  the  truly  Utopian.  Such  a  conclu- 
sion would  be  absolutely  correct  if  we 
ignored  the  difference  between  the  long 
term  and  the  short  term.  At  any  par- 
ticular time  in  the  past  it  was  indeed 
Utopian  to  believe  that  absolute  mon- 
archy, slavery,  or  serfdom  could  be 
abolished.  But  all  these  things  were 
abolished.  If  we  see  only  our  particular 
moment  in  history,  things  will  seem  im- 
pregnable that  are  already  being  eroded 
by  unseen  but  vast  tides  of  history.  In 
fact,  any  efforts  we  make  on  behalf  of 
democracy,  small  as  they  may  be,  are 
sustained  by  democracy's  gradual  expan- 
sion since  the  days  of  the  American 
Revolution.  In  1790,  there  existed  only 
two  democratic  republics:  the  United 
States  and  part  of  Switzerland.  By  1909, 
there  were  a  number  of  constitutional 
monarchies,  but  the  tenacity  of  the  old 
order  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  there 
were  still  only  three  republics  outside 
the  Western  Hemisphere:  France,  Swit- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


itse'J 


zerland  and  Liberia.  Today,  there  are 
fifty  genuine  democracies,  comprising 
about  a  third  of  the  world's  population, 
and  enjoying  both  the  full  panoply  of 
political  and  civil  liberties  and— taken  as 
a  group— the  world's  highest  standard  of 
economic  well-being. 

Whenever  a  non-democratic  country 
embarks  upon  a  process  of  political 
reform,  democracy  is  always  on  the 
agenda.  Today,  with  the  exception  of  a 
handful  of  remote  monarchies,  all 
governments  claim  to  base  their 
legitimacy  on  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned. Democracy  confers  the  most 
powerful  form  of  legitimacy  in  the 
modern  world.  Our  times  display  a 
remarkable  paradox:  the  victory  of 
democracy  is  virtually  complete  in  prin- 
ciple, but  still  limited  in  practice.  This 
paradox  should  teach  us  something  both 
about  the  weakness  of  democracy  and 
about  its  strength. 

The  only  alternative  to  democracy  as 
a  contemporary  system  of  legitimacy  is 
Marxism-Leninism.  Developing  coun- 
tries, when  they  choose  their  institutions 
and  officers,  choose  either  the  forms  of 
democracy  or  those  of  Marxism- 
Leninism.  They  have  either  a  President 
or  a  General  Secretary,  either  a  Parlia- 
ment or  a  Central  Committee,  or  some 
combination.  While  democracy  em- 
powers the  people  through  the  operation 
of  free  institutions,  Marxism-Leninism 
empowers  a  tiny  elite;  while  democracy 
welcomes  and  encourages  social  diversi- 
ty, Marxism-Leninism  seeks  to  eradicate 
it;  while  democracy  stresses  the  in- 
alienable rights  of  its  citizens,  Marxism- 
Leninsim  emphasizes  their  duties— par- 
ticularly their  duty  not  to  engage  in 
■  whatever  activity  the  Party  deems 
'counter-revolutionary."  Yet  even  while 
Marxism-Leninism  departs  so  fundamen- 
:ally  from  democratic  theory  and  prac- 
tice, it,  too,  has  been  compelled  by  the 
strength  of  the  democratic  idea  to  adopt 
;he  rhetoric  of  democracy  and  pretend 
;hat  it  responds  to  the  popular  will. 

It  follows  that  the  task  of  believers 
n  democracy  is  not  to  impose  democ- 
racy on  a  world  bitterly  opposed  to  it, 
3ut  rather  to  help  fulfill  the  expectations 
;hat  every  people  acknowledges  for 
tself.  These  expectations  are  contained 
n  such  documents  as  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  pro- 
laimed  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
Jnited  Nations  in  1948,  "as  a  common 
standard  of  achievement  for  all  peoples 
ind  all  nations."  No  people  knowingly 
•esigns  the  right  to  choose  its  own 
iestiny.  No  one  would  voluntarily  choose 
JO  be  deprived  of  his  or  her  human 


S«* 


rights.  Yet  despite  these  self-evident 
truths,  there  are  a  number  of  wide- 
spread fallacies  about  democracy  which 
often  make  us  misunderstand  its  appeal, 
and  misjudge  its  possibilities. 

Three  Fallacies  About  Democracy 

Perhaps  the  most  widely  held  fallacy 
about  the  democratic  form  of  govern- 
ment is  that  it  is  an  exclusively  North 
Atlantic  phenomenon.  The  facts,  of 
course,  are  otherwise.  Neither  India  nor 
Japan,  Costa  Rica  nor  Botswana, 
Senegal  nor  Fiji  belong  to  the  North 
Atlantic  constellation  of  states;  all  are 
thriving  democracies. 


cuse  for  reluctance  to  affirm  their  own 
democratic  principles. 

A  related  fallacy  about  the  demo- 
cratic form  of  government  is  that  it  can 
only  take  hold  in  wealthy  societies.  Yet 
when  Switzerland  and  the  United  States 
established  democratic  governments, 
both  were  poor  agrarian  countries.  To- 
day, while  many  democracies  are  ad- 
vanced industrial  states,  some  are  not. 
That  democracy  issues  from  great 
wealth  would  surprise  Indians  or  Bar- 
badians or  Botswanans!  By  freeing  un- 
tapped social  energies  and  providing  op- 
portunities for  their  exercise,  democracy 
often  facilitates  the  creation  of  wealth. 


Perhaps  the  most  widely  held  fallacfiesj  about 
the  democratic  form  of  government  is  that  it  is  an 
exclusively  North  Atlantic  phenomenon.  .  .  .  that  it 
can  only  take  hold  in  wealthy  societies  .  .  .  that  its 
promotion  is  incompatible  with  peace,  because  ad- 
vocacy of  democracy  means  interference  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  other  countries. 


Nor  is  democracy  in  such  countries 
necessarily  an  import  from  the  North 
Atlantic  area.  Many  peoples  have  some 
form  of  democracy  as  part  of  their 
heritage.  In  1700  there  were  more  ex- 
tensive areas  of  democracy  in  Africa 
than  in  Europe,  because  the  societies 
called  "primitive"  by  colonialism  carried 
on  their  decision  making  by  democratic 
means.  Conversely,  there  was  probably 
never  as  great  a  loss  of  human  freedom 
in  a  short  period  of  time  as  in  the  years 
1884  to  1900,  when  these  societies  came 
under  colonial  administration  from  out- 
side. Yet  the  tenacity  with  which  the 
thesis  about  the  North  Atlantic  nature 
of  democracy  is  held  suggests  that  it  is 
based  on  an  underlying  presupposition: 
the  relativist  assumption  that  freedom's 
appeal  does  not  derive  from  something 
inherent  in  human  nature,  but  is  merely 
the  result  of  a  particular  form  of 
cultural  conditioning.  The  fact,  however, 
that  so  many  people  from  different 
cultures  have  taken  enormous  risks  to 
escape  from  closed  societies  to  free 
societies  makes  this  notion  difficult  to 
sustain.  Perhaps  this  idea  has  as  its 
ultimate  source,  not  the  observation  of 
the  world  but  the  self-doubt  of  the  North 
Atlantic  democracies,  which  seek  an  ex- 


Nothing  indicates,  however,  that  a 
wealthy  society  is  an  absolute  precondi- 
tion for  the  establishment  of  democracy. 

A  third  fallacy  about  democracy  is 
that  its  promotion  is  incompatible  with 
peace,  because  advocacy  of  democracy 
means  interference  in  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  other  countries.  In  fact,  it  is  not 
the  advocacy  of  human  rights,  but  the 
denial  of  human  rights  that  is  the 
greater  source  of  tension  in  world 
politics.  As  Secretary  of  State  George 
Shultz  recently  stated. 

In  Europe,  as  elsewhere,  governments 
that  are  not  at  peace  with  their  own  people 
are  unlikely  to  be  on  good  terms  with  their 
neighbors.  The  only  significant  use  of 
military  force  on  the  continent  of  Europe 
since  1945  has  been  by  the  Soviet  Union 
against  its  East  European  "allies."  As  long  as 
this  unnatural  relationship  continues  between 
the  USSR  and  its  East  European  neighbors, 
it  is  bound  to  be  a  source  of  instability  in 
Europe. 

How  many  wars  have  begun  at  the 
hands  of  armies  of  occupation,  how 
many  have  begun  due  to  the  denial  of 
self-determination  to  peoples,  to  failures 
to  accord  citizens  the  right  to  govern 
themselves?  In  our  time,  at  least, 
democracies  have  been  less  aggressive, 


April  1984 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


less  oriented  toward  military  power  than 
other  systems.  The  most  stable  zones  of 
the  world— Western  Europe  and  North 
America— are  zones  of  democracy. 
History  has  also  shown  that  alliances 
with  democracies  tend  to  be  more  stable, 
because  a  single  man  does  not  have  the 
power  to  reverse  long-standing  relation- 
ships embedded  in  a  wider  social  reality. 
Thus,  a  democratic  international  en- 
vironment is  more  stable  and  predict- 
able, and  produces  fewer  tensions  and 
crises.  Like  all  the  other  aims  of  foreign 
policy,  the  encouragement  of  democracy 
can,  of  course,  become  a  source  of  ten- 
sion and  danger  if  it  is  sought  too  quick- 
ly or  by  the  wrong  means.  Precisely 
because  it  is  a  whole  system,  any  at- 
tempt to  impose  democracy  all  at  once 
on  a  society  where  its  foundations  do 
not  exist  would  be  a  profound  mistake. 
Likewise,  the  creation  of  democracy 
must  be  a  gradual  process;  the  very 
reason  for  turning  human  rights  efforts 
in  this  direction  is  the  inadequacy  of 
what  we  can  achieve  in  the  short  term. 

A  Time  of  Choice  for 
Democratic  Nations 

These  widespread  fallacies  may  be  large- 
ly responsible  for  the  fact  that  one  of 
the  most  hopeful  developments  in  recent 
years— the  march  of  democracy  in  Latin 
America— has  gone  largely  unnoticed. 
The  recent  inauguration  of  President 
Alfonsin  of  Argentina  is  only  the  latest 
in  a  series  of  victories  for  democracy  in 
Latin  America.  Apart  from  Cuba, 
Suriname,  Haiti,  Guyana  and  Paraguay, 
the  other  twenty-seven  nations  of  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  are  either 
basically  democratic,  or  at  least  nominal- 
ly embarked  on  the  transition  to  full 
democracy.  This  process  has  accelerated 
over  the  last  three  years.  Between  1976 
and  1980,  only  one  Latin  American  na- 
tion, Ecuador,  elected  a  civilian  presi- 
dent to  replace  the  military.  Since  1980, 
however,  nine  Latin  American  nations 
have  either  held  free  elections,  or 
declared  their  intention  of  doing  so  soon: 
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  El  Salvador, 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Panama,  Peru 
and  Uruguay.  Even  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua,  having  reneged  on  earlier 
promises  to  hold  free  elections,  now 
claims  to  be  planning  them  for  1985. 
While  the  honor  for  this  achieve- 
ment belongs  entirely  to  the  people  of 
Latin  America,  the  United  States  has 
played  a  constructive  role  in  this  proc- 
ess. Given  the  influence  which  the 
United  States  has  in  its  hemisphere,  it  is 
less  likely  that  many  military  govern- 
ments would  have  embarked  on  a  transi- 


58 


tion  to  democracy  if  the  United  States 
had  been  urging  caution  in  this  course. 
In  fact.  United  States  policy  over  the 
last  three  years  has  been  the  precise  op- 
posite. In  countries  which  had  set 
timetables  for  transition  to  democracy, 
the  United  States  has  consistently  urged 
adhering  to  these  timetables  or  ac- 
celerating them.  In  countries  where 
fragile  democratic  governments  have 
been  established  and  there  have  been 
rumors  or  initiatives  of  coups  against 
democracy,  the  United  States  has 
mobilized  its  diplomatic  influence  to  sup- 
port democratic  continuity.  The 
heightened  concern  of  the  United  States 
for  hemispheric  security  in  the  last  three 
years  has  not  hindered,  but  rather 
helped,  movement  toward  democracy  in 
Latin  America.  Transition  to  democracy 
invariably  involves  uncertainty  and  risk, 
as  seen  from  the  standpoint  of  those 
who  are  relinquishing  power.  Such  fears 
are  likely  to  be  aggravated  by  a  United 
States  that  seems  inconsistent,  unpredic- 
table, inclined  to  abandon  its  friends  to 
Soviet  or  Cuban  pressure.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  risks  and  uncertainties  are 
diminished  by  an  American  foreign 
policy  that  makes  it  clear  that  the 
United  States  can  be  counted  on  to  pro- 
tect its  interests  and  its  friends. 

The  United  States  is  not  alone,  of 
course,  in  its  efforts  to  foster  democ- 


racy. As  President  Reagan  stated  in  his 
address  to  the  Members  of  Parliament  in 
London,  "Over  the  past  several  decades, 
Western  European  and  other  Social 
Democrats,  Christian  Democrats,  and 
leaders  have  offered  open  assistance  to 
fraternal,  political,  and  social  institutions 
to  bring  about  peaceful  and  democratic 
progress.  Appropriately,  for  a  vigorous 
new  democracy,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany's  political  foundations  have 
become  a  major  force  in  this  effort." 

The  United  States  has  now  joined 
many  of  its  allies  in  an  effort  to  realize 
our  common  goal.  We  recognize  that 
such  an  effort  necessarily  contains  many 
unresolved  dilemmas,  but  one  point  is 
unarguable:  if  the  United  States  and  its 
allies  can  encourage  the  growth  of 
democracy,  we  will  strengthen  our- 
selves. Conversely,  American  strength 
and  self-confidence  are  crucial  precondi- 
tions to  an  effective  human  rights  policy. 
The  democratic  world  is  presented,  not 
by  its  own  will,  but  by  events  in  the 
areas  that  are  not  yet  democratic,  with 
a  choice  about  what  its  attitude  toward 
democracy  is  going  to  be.  We  can  either 
stand  aside,  and  allow  the  conflicts  rag- 
ing in  that  part  of  the  world  to  take 
their  course,  or  we  can  choose  to  act  in 
defense  of  our  deepest  values  and  com- 
mitments. The  decision  is  ours  to 
make.  ■ 


Board  of  Appellate  Review 
To  Publish  Decisions 


The  Department  of  State  on  January  30, 
1984,  announced  that  selected  decisions 
of  the  Board  of  Appellate  Review  on  ap- 
peals from  administrative  determinations 
of  the  Department  of  State  of  loss  of  na- 
tionality and  denials  of  passport  facilities 
will  henceforth  be  published  as  a  matter 
of  public  record. 

Publication  will  commence  with  the 
board's  decision  of  January  11,  1984,  in 
the  matter  of  R.  J.  Mc  C,  wherein  the 
board  affirmed  the  Department's  detei'- 
mination  of  loss  of  appellant's  nationality. 

The  Board  of  Appellate  Review,  a 
quasijudicial,  autonomous  body,  hears 
and  decides  appeals  taken  by  individuals 
from  administrative  determinations  made 
by  the  Department  of  State  in  cases  in- 
volving loss  of  U.S.  nationality;  the 
denial,  restriction,  or  refusal  of  passport 
facilities  on  grounds  other  than  nonciti- 
zenship;  certain  contract  cases;  and  such 
other  cases  as  may  be  refeiTed  to  the 
board  by  the  Secretary  of  State.  It  was 


created  essentially  to  provide  a  final  ad- 
ministrative review  procedure  consistent 
with  the  requu'ements  of  due  process. 

The  board's  decisions  are  final  within 
the  Department  and  ai'e  not  subject  to 
further  administrative  review  by  any  of 
its  officials. 

The  board  considers  and  deteiTnines 
each  appeal  on  its  pai'ticular  facts  and 
circumstances.  The  board's  decisions, 
therefoi'e,  are  not,  as  a  rule,  considered 
precedential. 

A  person  who  has  been  the  subject  of 
an  adverse  decision  of  the  board  in  an 
appeal  from  an  administrative  determina- 
tion of  loss  of  nationality  or  denial  of  a 
passport  on  grounds  other  than  nonciti- 
zenship  may  institute  proceedings  in  a 
U.S.  District  Court  where  the  matter  is 
heard  de  novo. 

The  board  e.xists  by  virtue  of  Part  7 
of  Title  22,  Code  of  Federal  Regulations. 
For  administrative  purposes  it  is  located 
in  the  Office  of  the  Legal  Adviser  of  the 
Department  of  State. 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletir 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Since  its  establishment,  the  board 
has  heard  almost  exclusively  appeals 
taken  from  determinations  of  loss  of  na- 
tionality. Under  law,  the  Secretary  of 
State  is  responsible  for  the  determina- 
tion of  U.S.  nationality  of  a  person  out- 
side the  United  States  and  for  the  is- 
suance of  passports.  An  essential  re- 
quirement in  the  perfonnance  of  these 
responsibilities  is  due  process.  The  board 
thus  provides  an  administj-ative  remedy 
in  the  form  of  a  quasijudicial  heai-ing  or 
review  to  one  who  was  the  subject  of  an 
adverse  determination  on  nationality  or 
restrictive  action  with  respect  to  a 
passport. 

The  board  consists  of  two  regular 
members,  one  of  whom,  Alan  G.  James, 
is  chaii-man,  and  eight  ad  hoc  members 
who  are  senior  officials  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  who  serve  on  the 
board  in  addition  to  their  regularly  as- 
signed duties.  All  members  are  required 
to  be  attorneys  in  good  standing,  ad- 
mitted to  practice  in  any  state,  the 
District  of  Columbia,  or  any  territory  or 
possession  of  the  United  States.  By 
regulation,  all  members  of  the  board  are 
designated  by  the  Legal  Adviser  of  the 
Department  of  State.  In  considering  and 
deciding  an  appeal,  a  three-member 
panel  constitutes  the  board. 

In  conformity  with  the  Privacy  Act, 
5  U.S.C.  552a,  and  Section  51.33  of 
Title  22,  Code  of  Federal  Regulations,  in- 
formation identifying  the  appellant  or 
other  private  persons  associated  with  an 
appeal  will  be  excised  prior  to  publica- 
tion of  the  decisions.  In  all  material 
respects,  the  published  decisions  will  be 
as  rendered  by  the  board.  The  decisions 
will  be  issued  in  loose-leaf  form. 

All  decisions,  appropriately  excised  in 
the  intei-ests  of  privacy,  that  have  been 
rendered  by  the  board  are  available  for 
inspection  by  appellants  and  interested 
counsel  in  the  board's  offices. 

Copies  of  the  board's  decision  of 
January  11,  1984,  and  decisions  published 
subsequently,  may  be  obtained  by  calling 
or  writing  to  the  Public  Information 
Service,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Room 
4827A,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520.  Telephone  (202) 
632-6575. 

Inquiries  about  the  role  of  the  board 
and  its  procedures  may  be  directed  to 
the  Chairman,  Alan  G.  James,  State 
Annex-1,  Room  W-115,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


Defense  Secretary  Weinberger's 
Interview  on  "IVIeet  the  Press" 


Press  release  24  of  Jan.  .30,  1984. 


April  1984 


Secretary  of  Defense  Caspar  W. 
Weinberger  was  interviewed  on 
NBC-TV's  "Meet  the  Press"  on 
Februanj  12.  1984,  by  Bill  Monroe,  Jack 
Reynolds,  and  John  Dancy,  NBC  News; 
Bruce  W.  Nelan,  Time;  and  Carl  T. 
Rowan,  the  Chicago  Sun-Times.  Follow- 
ing are  excerpts  from  that  interview. 

Q.  When  will  the  Marines  begin  com- 
ing out  of  their  positions  near  Beirut? 

A.  The  first  few  have  already  been 
moved  over  to  the  ships,  the  ones  who 
had  no  direct  operational  duties  in  con- 
nection with  the  perimeter  positions. 
And,  again,  depending  on  the  final  deci- 
sions, and  these  can  only  come  after  con- 
sultation with  the  other  members  of  the 
multinational  force  (MNF),  substantial 
numbers  .should  be  out  by  the  end  of  this 
month,  and  probably  it's  perfectly  feasi- 
ble that  the  entire  operation  can  be  com- 
pleted within  less  than  30  days.  But  the 
actual  date  depends  on  consultations 
with  the  other  members  of  the  multi- 
national force. 

Q.  It's  possible  that  they  will  all  be 
out  within  30  days? 

A.  It  can  be  done,  oh,  yes.  There's  no 
logistical  or  operational  problem  that 
would  prevent  that. 

Q.  Would  you  like  to  see  them  all 
out  in  30  days? 

A.  I  think  there's  no  question  about 
that,  yes.  I  think  they  would  be  a  much 
more  effective  and  in  a  much  safer  posi- 
tion for  them  on  the  ships— a  place  from 
which  they  could  be  a  lot  more  effective 
in  trying  to  carry  out  the  basic  mission 
for  which  they  entered  about  16  months 
ago. 

Q.  What  will  happen  about  protec- 
tion of  that  airport? 

A.  That's  one  of  the  things  we're 
discussing  with  the  other  members  of 
the  multinational  force  and  the  Lebanese 
armed  force.  The  Lebanese  armed  force 
is  an  effective  force.  They  have  had  some 
defections  in  the  last  few  days,  but  it  is 
still  an  effective  army,  and  they  could 
substitute  for  the  Marines  around  the 
ail-port. 

The  principal  mission  of  the  Marines 
is  not  to  safeguard  the  airport.  The 
Lebanese  Armed  Forces  themselves 
have  been  participating  in  that  in  the 
last  few  months. 


Q.  Would  you  comment  on  what 
[House]  Speaker  Tip  O'Neill  said  about 
the  new  policy  of  U.S.  Navy  guns  shell- 
ing positions  in  Syrian-controlled  terri- 
tory? He  said  that  it  was  absolutely 
not  compatible  with  the  congressional 
resolution  passed  a  few  months  ago. 

A.  I  have  to  say  we  just  think  he's 
plain  wrong,  because  we  think  that  the 
congressional  mandate  is  that  we  should 
protect  the  multinational  force  and  cer- 
tainly protect  the  Marines  and  that  we 
should  protect  American  lives  and 
American  interests  in  that  whole  area. 
The  shelling  was  coming  dh-ectly  in  on 
the  Ambassador's  residence,  on  the  Em- 
bassy area,  and  on  the  multinational 
force  position.  And  these  are  not  new 
rules  with  respect  to  the  shelling.  This  is 
shelling  that  we  do  in  retaliation  or  to 
try  to  silence  the  shelling  that  is  coming 
from  Syrian-controlled  positions  that  falls 
on  the  Marines  or  falls  on  the  Embassy, 
falls  on  American  positions,  endangers 
American  or  multinational  force  lives. 
And  that's  not  only  not  a  new  position; 
it's  a  position  that  I  would  hope  and 
assume  all  of  us  would  want  to  have 
followed. 

Q.  How  badly  has  our  failure  in 
Beirut  hurt  us  in  the  eyes  of  the  Arabs 
in  the  area,  the  moderate  Arabs  that 
we'd  like  to  influence? 

A.  I  don't  think  you  can  classify  the 
activities  that  we've  undertaken  in 
Beirut  as  a  failure  at  all,  nor  is  the  mat- 
ter over.  We  still  have  basically  the  same 
objectives.  Our  first  objective  was  to  get 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion] out  of  Beirut  and  avoid  that  kind  of 
house-to-house  fighting  within  the  city. 
That  was  accomplished  about  almost  a 
year-and-a-half  ago,  and  it  was  accom- 
pUshed  in  less  than  30  days.  After  that, 
there  were  assassinations  of  the  suc- 
ceeding president  in  Lebanon,  and  there 
were  a  tremendous  number  of  riots  and 
all  kinds  of  massacres  that  took  place  in 
the  refugee  camps.  There  have  been  a 
great  many  changes  in  the  ground  situa- 
tion. I  wouldn't  classify  our  activities 
there  as  a  failure  at  all. 

I  think  that  we  still  have  the  hopes 
of  getting  some  kind  of  a  relatively 
unified  and  strong  Lebanese  govern- 
ment, which,  in  turn,  could  be  a  major 
factor  at  trying  to  maintain  peace  in  the 
entire  Mideast.  It  takes  steadfastness 
and  it  takes  a  great  deal  of  patience. 


1 


MIDDLE  EAST 


But  you  have  to  look  at  the  alter- 
natives. And  the  alternatives  would  be  to 
have  the  Soviet-controlled  enclave 
throughout  the  whole  of  Lebanon,  and  I 
don't  think  anyone  believes  that  would 
be  a  good  thing  for  any  of  us. 

Q.  But  isn't  it  true  that  you  and 
the  informed  chiefs  advised  against 
putting  the  Marines  back  in  on  the 
second  go-round? 

A.  There  are  various  ways  of  accom- 
plishing many  of  these  policies,  and  I 
don't  discuss"  the  advice  that  I've  given 
to  the  President. 

But  what  we  have  now  is  a  situation 
in  which  the  ground  situation  has 
changed,  the  basic  ideas  for  which  the 
multinational  force  went  in  have 
changed,  but  the  objectives  remain  the 
same.  And  the  objectives  can  best  be 
served  by  having  a  Marine  force  onboard 
ship  where  the  power  of  the  American 
fleet  can  lend  a  great  deal  of  credence  to 
the  importance  of  seeking  a  unified,  un- 
occupied Lebanon.  And  it  is,  again,  much 
better  to  try  to  do  it  now  than  to  sit  by 
passively  and  let  the  alternative  occur, 
which  would  be  a  completely  Soviet- 
dominated  enclave  right  in  Lebanon  at  a 
critically  important  part  of  the  world. 

Q.  The  Syrians  dominated  that 
country  for  about  7  years  before  the 
Israelis  invaded,  and  we  didn't  find 
that  the  Syrian  presence  was  in- 
tolerable. Now  we  do.  Why  is  that? 

A.  I  think  very  simply,  because  the 
Syrian  presence  is  now  enormously  com- 
plicated by,  or  worsened  by,  the  Soviet 
domination  of  Syria.  You  have  to  bear  in 
mind  that  there  is  a  large  number  of 
Soviet  troops  in  Syria.  They  have  resup- 
plied  them  for  all  of  the  weapons  that 
were  destroyed  in  Syria's  war  with 
Israel.  And  they  are  now  in  a  situation 
that  is,  I  think,  perhaps  more  Soviet- 
dominated  than  even  Egypt  was  a  few 
years  ago  before  President  Sadat  turned 
the  Soviets  out  of  Egypt. 

Q.  You  say  you  are  redeploying  the 
Marines  back  to  the  ships  where  they 
can  be  more  effective.  More  effective 
doing  what? 

A.  You  have  to  bear  in  mind  the 
basic,  original  reason  for  the  multina- 
tional force  to  go  in.  The  multinational 
force  did  not  go  in  to  fight  a  war  for 
Lebanon  or  anything  of  the  kind.  It  went 
in  for  a  very  limited  purjioso  of  pro- 
viding a  stabilizing  interi)osition  force 
between  the  troops  that  we  hoped  and 
expected  would  be  withdrawing;  that  is, 
the  Syrian  forces,  the  Israeli  forces,  and 
the  PLO. 


60 


Now  the  PLO  is  out  and  pretty  well 
broken  as  a  military  force.  What  it  is  is 
just  an  adjunct  of  the  Syrian  Army  now. 
The  Israelis  signed  an  agreement  to 
leave.  The  Syrians  did  not.  The  multi- 
national force  was  never  designed  mili- 
tarily to  defeat  the  Syrians  or  to  fight 
the  Israelis  or  anything  else.  It  was  de- 
signed to  try  to  give  confidence  that 
withdrawing  forces  could  withdraw  and 
the  agi-eement  would  be  kept. 

Q.  But  my  question  has  not  been 
answered.  What  is  it  the  Marines  will 
do  more  effectively  once  they're  back 
on  those  ships? 

A.  The  normal  position  for  the 
Marine  amphibious  units  is  onboard  ship. 
And  when  the  conditions  are  available 
again,  when  the  condition  should  arise 
that  if  we  can  get  an  agreement  by 
Syria— and  many  people  are  working  on 
that  now— to  withdraw  and  the  Israelis 
continue  to  adhere  to  their  agi-eement  to 
withdraw,  then,  at  that  time,  there  will 
again  be  a  necessity  for  an  interposition 
of  a  neutral  peacekeeping  force.  And  if 
the  conclusion  is  that  the  multinational 
force  should  be  used  again  for  that  pur- 
pose, the  Marines  will  be  available  for 
that. 


U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  14,  1984' 

I  am  providing  herewith  a  further  report  with 
respect  to  the  .situation  of  Lebanon  and  the 
participation  of  the  United  States  Armed 
Forces  in  the  Multinational  Force.  This 
report,  prepared  by  the  Secretaries  of  State 
and  Defense  and  covering  the  period  from 
December  12,  1983  to  February  13,  1984,  is 
consistent  with  Section  4  of  the  Multinational 
Force  in  Lebanon  Resolution.  This  report  also 
includes  the  infomiation  called  for  by  the 
House  version  of  the  Resolution  and  is  sub- 
mitted consistent  with  its  more  restrictive 
time  limits. 

Congressional  support  for  our  continued 
participation  in  the  Multinational  Force  re- 
mains critical  to  peace,  national  reconciliation, 
and  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon.  We  will  continue  to  keep  you  in- 
formed as  to  further  developments  with 
respect  to  this  situation. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Re.^can 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  .Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Reijresentatives,  and  Strom  Thuniiond.  Presi- 
dent pro  tempore  of  the  Senate  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  20,  1984).  ■ 


Q.  When  Deputy  Secretary  of  State 
Dam  went  up  to  the  Senate  the  other 
day,  he  was  asked  can  you  conceive  of 
circumstances  where  you'll  send  those 
Marines  back  into  Beirut.  He  didn't 
have  an  answer.  Now  you're  telling  me 
that  you  do  conceive  of  sending  them 
back. 

A.  I  told  you  under  the  very  limited 
circumstances  that  I  described,  which 
were  the  exact  circumstances  under 
which  they  went  in  in  the  fir.'^t  place 
about  16  months  ago.  But  the  ground 
conditions  and  all  of  the  other  assump- 
tions that  everybody  hoped  would  occur 
have  not.  And  those  assumptions  were 
that  the  Syrians  would  do  what  they 
said,  that  "they  wanted  to  withdraw,  that 
they  would  agree,  that  the  Israelis  would 
agree,  and  that  the  PLO  would  be  out. 
The  PLO  is  out,  practically  speaking;  the 
Syrians  have  not  agreed.  But  this  isn't  to 
say  that  they  can't.  If  and  when  they  do, 
there  will  be  a  need  for  a  force  to  give 
confidence  to  the  withdrawing  of  troops 
that  these  agreements  would  be  kept.  At 
that  time,  why  then  you  would  need 
some  neutral  force,  and  it  could  well  be 
the  Marines  as  part  of  it.  It  could  well  be 
fourth  or  fifth  or  sixth  countries;  we 
don't  know  yet.  But  they  will  be  there 
and  they  will  be  available  should  they  be 
needed,  and  the  Sixth  Fleet  will  be 
there.  The  United  States  is  not  leaving 
the  area  in  any  sense.  When  you  have 
one  battleship,  two  carriers,  and  2.3  com- 
batant vessels,  you  haven't  left  the  area. 

Q.  However  long  it  takes,  they're 
going  to  stay  there,  is  that  it? 

A.  You're  asking  me  to  make  predic- 
tions about  the  most  unpredictable  part 
of  the  world  that  there  is.  All  I'm  saying 
is  that  the  policy  and  the  necessities  re- 
main the  same.  How  we  achieve  them 
may,  indeed,  differ  from  time  to  time, 
and  different  policies  may  have  to  be 
adopted.  But  the  basic  thing  that  we've 
got  to  keep  our  mind  on  is  that  we  don't 
want  to  have  a  spot  as  volatile,  as 
troubled,  and  as  likely  to  break  out  into 
a  major  conflict  as  Lebanon  without  try- 
ing our  best  to  do  something  to  ease  that 
whole  problem,  and  that's  what  we  are 
going  to  continue  to  do. 

Q.  Could  you  clear-up  some  confu- 
sion about  the  strategy  behind  the  use 
of  that  naval  gunfire,  which  has  been 
enormous.  We  were  told  first  it  was  to 
protect  the  Marines,  then  it  was  to  in- 
clude the  multinational  force,  then 
there  was  shelling  on  the  Embassy  and 
the  Ambassador's  residence,  and  it  was 
in  retaliation  for  that.  Is  there  a 
broader  context  in  which  that's  being 
used? 


BBliiiiiiiiiiiUiiiliiiiiiBBiiBIillieiiiiilil 


■BBBBBBDOBDm 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


A.  No.  The  way  you  phrase  it,  it 
sounds  as  if  this  was  a  whole  series  of 
different  decisions.  Actually,  it's  the 
same  basic  decision.  What  happened  was 
that  thei-e  was  increasing  use  of  Syrian- 
based  gunfire— gunfire  from  Syrian- 
controlled  areas  that  attacked,  first,  the 
Marine  position,  then  other  multinational 
force  positions,  the  Ambassador's 
residence,  and  then  portions  of  Beirut 
where  there  were  American  citizens  and 
American  interests. 

As  these  changing  conditions  were 
met,  the  same  rules  were  applied,  but 
they  did  require  that  we  use  gunfire  that 
we  hoped  would  silence  the  Syrian  ar- 
tillery positions  in  Syrian-controlled 
areas  of  Lebanon.  And  thus  far,  they  do 
seem  to  be  considerably  more  silent  than 
they  were  before  the  New  Jersey  and 
the  others  fired. 

Q.  But  is  the  concept  also  to  sup- 
port the  Gemayel  government,  in  terms 
of  that? 

A.  The  concept  is  to  support  a 
regularly,  legitimately  elected  govern- 
ment of  Lebanon.  We  have  constantly 
and  consistently  urged  President 
Gemayel  to  broaden  the  base  of  his 
government,  to  include  several  of  these 
different  factions  that  are  involved.  The 
army,  for  example,  doe-sn't  do  that.  The 
army  is  the  only  truly  multiconfessional 
[sic]  unit  in  Lebanon.  And  we've  con- 
stantly urged  that  President  Gemayel 
broaden  his  own  government  so  that  he 
can  have  a  broader  base  of  support. 

What  we  seek  is  the  support  of  a 
legitimate  government  that  can,  indeed, 
produce  peace  and  an  unoccupied, 
sovereign  condition  for  Lebanon. 

The  firing,  however,  is  not  in  support 
of  any  particular  governmental  unit  or 
faction.  The  firing  is  just  as  I  said,  to  try 
to  silence  fire  that  is  endangering 
Marines,  multinational  forces,  American 
interests  in  Beirut. 


Q.  When  the  Marines  first  went  in 
to  Beirut,  you  were  roundly  criticized 
for  giving  them  such  a  broad  mandate 
that  they  could  not  possibly  carry  it 
out;  that  is,  to  support  the  Gemayel 
government  there.  Do  you  think,  in 
retrospect,  that  that  was  a  mistake? 

A.  That,  I  don't  believe,  was  their 
mandate.  Their  mandate,  as  I  remember 
it,  was  that  they  were  to  go  in  and  serve 
with  the  other  three  nations  as  an  inter- 
position force,  to  give  some  confidence  to 
the  withdrawing  forces  of  Syria  and 
Israel,  as  we  hoped;  that  the  agreements 
would  be  kept;  and  that  they  could,  in- 
deed, withdraw.  When  you're  locked 


together  in  military  combat,  as  those 
countries  were,  you're  very  vulnerable  if 
you  start  to  withdraw  and  if  one  side 
doesn't  keep  the  agreement. 

The  force  was  designed  to  do  that, 
and  it  was  designated  to  give  some  tem- 
porary breathing  space  to  a  government 
—a  new  government— that  had  come  in 
following  the  assassination  of  the  present 
President's  brother.  They  didn't  have 
any  mandate  that  they  were  to  go  in  and 
defend  that  government.  They  didn't 
have  any  mandate  that  they  were  to  go 
in  and  clear  Lebanon  of  foreign  forces.  If 
they  had  a  mandate  like  that,  they  would 
have  had  to  be  at  least  15  to  20  times  as 
large  as  they  are  now.  There  was  never 
any  suggestion  that  they  should  do  that. 
And  moving  them  from  shore  back  to 
ships  will  enable  them,  as  I've  mentioned 
earlier,  sometime  if  the  withdrawal 
agreements  are  ever  secured,  to  resume 
that  original  mission. 

Now  it's  very  difficult  for  them  to  do 
that  because  the  ground  conditions  have 
changed  so  and  all  of  these  tremendous 
number  of  factions  have  come  up  and 


turned  practically  every  street  corner  in- 
to an  armed  battle. 


Q.  Now  that  we're  withdrawing  our 
forces  from  Beirut,  what  military  role 
do  we  want  the  Israelis  to  play  in  that 
part  of  the  world? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  agenda  for  the 
Israelis,  and  I  don't  know  of  anybody 
else  who  has.  I  think  what  we  want  most 
is  to  have  the  foreign  forces  out  of 
Lebanon,  all  completely,  and  the  Israelis 
did  agree  to  go  when  the  Syrians  left. 
And  that,  I  think,  is  the  thing  that  we 
desii-e  most.  Again,  we've  all  sort  of 
overlooked  in  the  rush  of  events  the  pur- 
pose of  all  of  this.  The  pui'pose  was  to 
get  Lebanon  cleared  and  sovereign  and 
free  of  conflict  so  that  we  could  go  on  to 
the  broader  a.spects  of  the  President's 
Mideast  peace  initiative,  which  was  to 
deal  with  the  very  difficult  problems  of 
the  West  Bank,  and  recognition  and 
security  for  Israel's  borders,  and  the  im- 
portance of  trying  to  get  a  peaceful  at- 
mosphere after  some  2,000  years  of  con- 
tinual strife  that  has  been,  in  effect, 
almost  the  seed  of  wars  for  too  long. 


Lebanon  Cancels  Agreement  With  Israel 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  5,  1984' 

The  Government  of  Lebanon  has  said  it 
has  cancelled  the  Cabinet  decision  which 
approved  the  unratified  May  17  agree- 
ment [with  Israel]  and,  thereby,  removed 
the  authority  of  President  Gemayel  to 
exchange  the  instruments  for  the 
ratification  of  the  agreement. 

The  United  States  regrets  this  deci- 
sion. The  United  States  played  a  facilitat- 
ing role  in  the  negotiations  that  produced 
that  accord  and  was  a  witness  to  its 
signature.  That  proposed  agreement  still 
represents  the  only  agreed  formula  for 
ensuring  both  Israel's  withdrawal  from 
Lebanon  and  Israel's  legitimate  security 
interests  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
Lebanese  sovereignty.  Lebanon  needs 
peaceful,  coojierative  relations  with  all 
its  neighbors.  Those  who  were  responsi- 
ble for  the  rejection  of  the  agreement 
must  now  bear  the  responsibility  to  find 
an  alternative  negotiated  formula  to  bring 
about  Israeli  withdrawal. 

At  the  same  time,  the  LInited  States 
does  not  intend  to  abandon  the  people  or 
the  legitimate  Government  of  Lebanon. 
Diplomacy  continues,  with  the  aim  of 


ending  the  fighting  and  reaching  a 
political  solution  to  Lebanon's  conflicts. 
We  will  contribute  to  this  process. 

Similarly,  we  stand  ready  to  continue 
appropriate  economic  and  military  assist- 
ance, but  decisions  on  these  issues  will 
be  taken  as  the  situation  unfolds.  In  any 
event,  we  will  continue  to  take  all  ap- 
propriate measures  to  ensure  that  U.S. 
personnel  and  property  are  fully  pro- 
tected. 

Our  long-term  goals  remain— the 
restoration  of  a  sovereign,  independent, 
unified  Lebanon;  the  removal  of  all 
foreign  forces;  and  the  security  of 
Israel's  northern  border.  We  oppose  the 
partition  of  Lebanon,  which  could  only 
lead  to  even  greater  instability. 

The  Middle  East  is  a  region  of  vital 
importance  to  the  United  States  and  our 
friends  and  allies.  The  United  States  will 
continue  to  be  deeply  concerned  and  in- 
volved in  efforts  to  resolve  the  Arab- 
Israeli  problem  and  other  critical  issues 
in  the  Middle  East,  including  the  crisis  in 
the  gulf. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


April  1984 


61 


•I  :!'i'lt;'!!";'|(;'"HJII 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Q.  You're  not  seeking  some  form  of 
strategic  cooperation,  to  coin  a  phrase, 
in  which  the  Israelis  might  deal  mili- 
tarily with  the  Syrians  and  any  PLO 
who  might  be  headed  south? 

A.  I  think  what  we  are  seeking  is 
just  what  I  said.  It  is  a  peaceful,  unoc- 
cupied, sovereign  Lebanon  that  will 
enable  us  to  go  and  deal  with  the 
broader,  even  thornier  issues  of  the 
Mideast.  We  don't  ask  anybody  to  fight 
anybody  else,  or  anything  of  the  kind. 
Quite  the  contrary.  We  would  like  to  see 
the  forces  that  are  in  Lebanon  do  exactly 
what  theii-  governments  have  said. 

All  of  the  Syrian  statements  have 
always  been  that  they  wanted  to  with- 
draw. The  Israeli  statements  have  been 
that  they  wanted  to  withdraw.  PLO, 
when  it  was  still  a  force,  said  that,  and  ^ 
they're  no  longer  a  military  force,  I  don't 
think,  of  any  consequence.  But  the  im- 
portant thing  is  to  pursue  those  objec- 
tives, and  I  don't  think  you're  going  to 
solve  those  by  asking  one  side  to  fight 
another  side. 

Q.  When  you  and  others  went  up 
on  the  Hill  last  week,  there  was  so 
much  frustration  that  Representative 
Trent  Lott,  the  Republican  Whip,  said, 
"You  people  are  out  of  touch  with 
reality."  Isn't  it  a  reality  that  there  is 
no  way  those  Marines  can  go  back  into 
Lebanon  as  peacemakers,  that  the  only 
way  they  can  go  back  is  as  combat 
fighters? 

A.  No,  they  would  not  go  back  as 
combat  fighters,  because  they  never 
went  in  as  combat  fighters.  They  went  in 
as  part  of  a  multinational  force,  and  the 
confusion  that  Mr.  Lott  was  speaking 
about-and  I  have  high  respect  for 
him— was  simply  the  problem  that  we 
are  not  able,  as  a  member  of  a  multina- 
tional force,  to  go  up  and  announce  on  a 
particular  day  that  we're  going  to  do 
something  within  a  given  time  period 
without  having  had  the  consultations 
that  take  time  and  effort  with  three 
other  nations-Britain,  Italy,  and  France. 
They  are  our  partners  in  this.  They  have 
suffered  grievous  losses,  too,  and  they 
deserve  and  have  a  need  to  be  consulted, 
and  that's  required  if  we  want  to  have 
continuing  future  relationships  with 
those  countries,  which  we  clearly  have  to 
do.  So  there  wasn't  any  confusion.  As 
I've  said  earlier,  there's  no  mechanical  or 
logistical  problem.  The  Marines  can  be 
out  in  a  few  days,  but  it  is  essential  that 
we  work  out  arrangements  for  others  to 
hold  the  airport  and  work  out  arrange- 
ments that  our  partners  would  find 
satisfactory  in  the  multinational  foi-ce. 


Visit  of  King  Hussein 
of  Jordan 


His  Majesty  King  Hussein  I  of  the 
Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  made  an 
official  working  visit  to  Washington, 
D.C.,  February  12-U,  198J,,  to  meet  mth 
President  Reagan  and  other  government 
officials. 

FoUomng  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  His  Majesty  after 
their  meeting  on  February  13.^ 

President  Reagan 

King  Hussein  and  I  met  today  in  the 
spirit  of  good  will  and  cooperation  that 
characterizes  the  relationship  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Hashemite 
Kingdom  of  Jordan.  Cooperation  between 
us  is  increasingly  vital  in  the  face  of  the 
tragic  violence  in  Lebanon,  a  growing 
terrorist  threat,  and  the  ominous  cloud  of 
war  that  hovers  over  much  of  the  Middle 
East. 

Today  we  witness  bloodshed  and  con- 
flict between  Iran  and  Iraq,  in  Chad,  in 
the  Western  Sahara,  and  Lebanon.  And 
now,  as  never  before,  it  behooves  people 
of  good  will  to  work  together  for  peace 
and  stability. 

King  Hussein  has  led  Jordan  with 
strength  and  wisdom  these  last  three 
decades.  He's  an  experienced  statesman, 
and  his  insights  are  valuable  to  us  as 
well  as  to  the  people  of  Jordan.  His 
Majesty  was  an  important  force  behind 
the  UN  Resolution  242,  which  continues 
to  be  the  starting  point  for  tangible 
Middle  East  peace  efforts,  including  my 
own  peace  initiative  of  September  1, 
1982. 

King  Hussein  has  proven  himself  a 
responsible  leader  and  a  reliable  friend 
on  many  occasions.  His  support  for 
friends  "in  the  gulf  region  has  demon- 
strated his  capacity  for  deeds  as  well  as 
words.  The  economic  progress  of  his 
people,  the  political  equality,  and  the 
religious  tolerance  found  in  Jordan  are  a 
tribute  to  the  benevolence  of  his  reign, 
and  I  am  grateful  for  his  counsel. 

His  Majesty's  visit  strengthens  the 
bonds  of  friendship  that  link  Jordan  and 
the  United  States.  America's  commit- 
ment to  help  Jordan  meet  its  security 
needs  remains  firm  and  unwavering. 
Today  we  spoke  of  a  number  of 
bilateral  "concerns,  but  the  focus  of  our 
meeting  was  on  the  issues  affecting 
regional  peace.  We  both  believe  that 
while  the  challenges  remain  formidable, 
the  opportunities  for  a  broader  peace  are 
still  present.  We  also  agree  that  ter- 


rorism cannot  be  tolerated  and  that  the 

leaders  of  all  states  must  stand  together 

against  this  new  barbarism  that 

threatens  civilization. 

States  that  condone  terrorism  under- 
mine their  own  legitimacy.  In  these 
times  of  trial,  disillusionment  would  be 
easy.  But  my  meeting  today  with  King 
Hussein  has"  reaffirmed  to  me  that  the 
good  and  decent  people  of  this  world  can 
and  will  work  together  and  that  progi-ess 
can  be  made  toward  the  perplexing  prob- 
lem of  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

King  Hussein 

Once  again  it's  a  privilege  and  a  pleasure 
for  me  to  have  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  vou  as  the  leader  of  the  United 
State's  of  America,  as  a  man  I  respect 
and  admire,  as  a  friend.  And  I  would  like 
to  say  that  these  feelings  are  shared  by 
my  government  and  my  people-the  feel- 
ings'of  pride  in  the  fact  that  our  goals 
and  aims  are  one  and  the  same;  our 
ideas,  our  principles,  our  belonging  to 
the  family  of  free  people  throughout  the 
world. 

The  challenges  before  us  are,  indeed, 
tremendous,  but  the  determination  is 
there  to  strive  for  a  better  tomorrow. 
This  is  a  cause  to  which  we  are 
dedicated  in  Jordan-the  cause  of  a 
stable  area,  the  cause  of  establishing, 
eventually,  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in 
the  area,  "the  cause  of  a  better  future  for 
generations  to  come. 

On  all  subjects  that  you  were  kind 
enough  to  address,  I  could  not  in  all 
honesty  sav  that  I  could  have  presented 
my  vie"ws  any  differently.  I  thank  you 
for  the  opportunity  and  the  chance  to 
discuss  problems  of  the  moment  and  to 
share  with  you  the  vision  of  the  future 
and  to  reaffirm  our  commitment  to  our 
common  goals  of  a  better  future  within 
our  area  and  within  the  world  and  for 
the  establishment  of  a  just  and  durable 
peace. 

We  are  proud  of  our  friendship,  and 
we  will  do  all  we  can  to  see  it  grow  and 
flourish  in  every  way  and  in  every  area. 
Thank  you  once  again  for  the  wonderful 
opportiinity  of  meeting  with  you.  God 
bless  you,  "and  thanks  again  for  all  your 
kindnesses  to  me. 


•Made  to  reporters  assembled  on  the 
South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (text  fi-om 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  20,  1984).  ■ 


62 


IBHE 


of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


►resident  Meets  With  Two  Arab  Leaders 


His  Majesty  King  Hussein  I  of 
Jordan  and  President  Mohamed  Hosni 
Mubarak  met  with  President  Reagan  at 
the  Wiiite  House  on  February  U.  1981,. 
Following  are  remarks  made  by  the 
three  leaders  at  the  conclusion  of  that 
meeting.^ 

President  Reagan 

I  have  been  honored  today  to  welcome 
and  confer  with  King  Hussein  and  Presi- 
dent Mubarak.  Theii"  visit  highlights  the  2 
friendship  between  the  United  States  £ 
and  the  two  important  countries  they  |, 
lead.  Our  countries  share  common  in-  £ 
terests  in  developing  practical  solutions  g 
to  the  problems  of  the  Middle  East.  The  s 
good  will  and  trust  between  us  promise  a  | 
solid  foundation  for  overcomng  the  for-  J 
midable  obstacles  to  peace  and  progress  | 
in  the  region.  ^ 

Our  discussions  today  have  reaf-  I 

firmed  that  Egyjjt  and  Jordan  will  re- 
main leaders  in  efforts  to  bring  peace 
and  security  to  the  Middle  East.  King 
Hussein  and  President  Mubarak  have 
demonstrated  foresight,  realism,  and 
resolve,  which  are  essential  if  the  peace 
process  is  to  succeed. 

We  discussed  in  detail  the  oppor- 
tunities for  progress  in  the  Middle  East. 
Recent  events  in  the  area  make  it  even 
more  urgent  to  keep  the  broader  peace 
process  moving.  The  tragic  events  in 
Lebanon  show  that  the  occupation  of  ter- 
ritory by  outside  forces  does  not  lead  to 
peace  but  rather  to  continued  conflict 
and  turmoil.  I  wish  today,  therefore,  to 
reaffirm  my  commitment  and  that  of  our 
government  to  the  principles  I  set  forth 
in  September  of  1982,  and  in  particular 
to  the  principle  that  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict must  be  resolved  through  negotia- 
tions involving  an  exchange  of  territory 
for  peace. 

The  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  proves 
what  can  be  accomplished  when  states 
have  the  will  to  take  risks  for  peace.  And 
I'm  confident  that  further  steps  toward 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  are  possible. 
For  our  part,  the  United  States  is  ready 
to  do  all  it  can  to  keep  the  process  mov- 
ing forward. 

King  Hussein,  President  Mubarak 
are  men  I  greatly  admire,  and  I'm  grate- 
ful to  them  for  having  come  here  to 
speak  as  friends  and  to  reconfirm  our 
common  purposes  in  the  enduring 
struggle  for  peace. 


April  1984 


King  Hussein 

I'd  like  to  thank  you  for  your  great  kind- 
ness in  enabling  me  and  my  brother, 
President  Mubarak,  to  meet  with  you  to- 
day and  to  discuss  all  aspects  of  the 
problems  which  we  face  in  our  area  of 
the  world;  and  our  common  goals  and  ob- 
jectives for  a  better  future  for  all  in  that 
area— of  establishment  of  a  just  and  com- 
prehensive peace  for  greater  stability 
and  for  a  better  life  for  generations  to 
come. 

I'm  very  grateful  for  the  opportunity 
to  have  had  this  chance  to  hear  your 
views  and  the  views  of  President 
Mubarak  on  all  matters  and  to  contribute 
what  I  could  for  the  purpose  of  achieving 
better  understanding  of  oui"  respective 
positions  as  we  move  ahead  with  hope 
and  determination  and  with  a  commit- 
ment to  do  our  utmost  for  a  better 
future  in  the  area  from  which  we  come 
and  for  a  just  and  comprehensive  peace. 
I  will  carry  back  with  me,  the  impres- 
sions I  gained  of  your  determination  and 
that  of  the  United  States  to  contribute 
its  full  share  to  help  all  concerned 
achieve  their  objectives. 

We  are  pi-oud  of  our  friendship.  It  is 
of  long  standing.  We  are  hopeful  that 
this  friendship  will  develop  and  evolve 
and  that,  based  on  trust  and  confidence 
and  with  determination,  we  shall  over- 
come what  appear  and  have  appeared  to 
be  for  a  long  period  of  time  insurmount- 


able obstacles.  After  all,  the  cause  we 
are  striving  to  serve  is  the  cause  of 
people,  their  future,  their  rights,  human 
dignity,  and,  at  the  same  time,  their 
freedom  and  a  better  life,  which  is  theu- 
right. 

I  thank  you  once  again  for  many 
kindnesses,  and  I  thank  you,  my  brother. 
President  Mubarak,  and  wish  you  every 
continued  success.  And  I  would  like  to 
say  that  this  has  been  a  visit  I  shall 
always  remember.  I'll  treasure  the 
memories  of  this  visit  and  the  wonderful 
opportunity  it  has  given  me  to  meet  with 
you  both.  Thank  you  very,  very  much  in- 
deed for  your  many  courtesies  and  kind- 
nesses and  the  warmth  of  youi-  welcome. 

President  Mubarak 

I  was  very  pleased  to  meet  once  again 
with  our  good  friend.  President  Reagan 
and  discuss  with  him  issues  of  great  con- 
cern to  our  nations.  We  did  so  in  the 
spu-it  of  friendship  and  cooperation  that 
dominates  the  relationship  between 
Egypt  and  the  United  States. 

I  find  it  most  rewarding  to  consult 
regularly  with  President  Reagan  and  ex- 
change views  with  him  on  matters  of 
mutual  interest.  He  is  a  statesman  of 
great  courage  and  wisdom.  He  has  a  pro- 
found sense  of  mission  and  responsibility. 
Our  bilateral  relations  constitute  a  shin- 
ing model  for  understanding  and  the 
cooperation  among  nations.  We  are 


63 


MIDDLE  EAST 


determined  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of 
friendship  that  link  our  peoples.  The 
talks  we  held  today  will  ceilainly  add  to 
this  evergrowing  friendship  and  mutual 
understanding. 

I  would  like  to  seize  this  opportunity 
to  thank  the  American  people  for 
cooperating  with  us  in  the  vigorous  ef- 
forts we  are  e.xerting  to  improve  the 
quality  of  life  for  our  masses.  We  are 
striving  to  refonn  our  economic  system 
and  increase  production  and  productiv- 
ity. We  are  struggling  to  restore  security 
and  stability  to  the  Middle  East  and 
Africa,  Egypt  has  a  pivotal  role  to  play 
and  a  mission  to  fulfill.  It  is  determined 
to  do  so  with  vigor  and  dedication.  We 
are  devoted  to  strengthening  the  struc- 
ture of  peace  in  our  region  and  through- 
out the  world. 

The  situation  in  Lebanon  today  is  in- 
tolerable. The  escalation  of  violence  and 
the  bloodshed  is  a  threat  to  us  all.  Every 
nation  is  called  upon  to  help.  The  peace- 
keeping role  of  the  United  Nations  must 
be  expanded  and  reinforced.  The  parti- 
tion of  this  war-torn  country  should  be 
prevented  at  any  cost.  The  Lebanese 
people  have  a  right  to  live  and  prospei- 
like  all  other  nations. 

The  key  to  a  viable  solution  is  the 
prompt  and  unconditional  withdrawal  of 
Israeli  forces.  The  Israeli  invasion  is  the 
root  and  the  cause  of  the  present  sad 
situation  in  the  area.  No  problem  can  be 
solved  through  foreign  intervention  and 
the  use  of  force. 

The  Lebanese  crisis  is  a  stark 
reminder  of  the  centrality  of  the  Pales- 
tinian problem.  That  question  must  be 
addressed  frontally  and  without  delay. 
Our  purpose  is  to  create  the  necessary 
conditions  for  coexistence  and  the  mutual 
recognition  between  the  Palestinians  and 
the  Israelis.  This  coexistence  must  be 
based  on  justice  and  the  recognition  of 
rights.  Fu'st  and  foremost,  the  right  of 
the  Palestinian  people's  self- 
determination  should  be  honored  and  ex- 
ercised. This  is  the  clue  to  peace  and 
security  for  all  nations,  including  Israel. 

The  Palestinian  people  are  entitled  to 
your  support  and  understanding.  There 
is  no  substitute  for  a  direct  dialogue  with 
them  through  their  chosen  represen- 
tative, the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization].  Such  dialogue  will  im- 
mensely serve  the  cause  of  peace  to 
which  we  are  both  committed.  Mr. 
Arafat  is  a  responsible  leader  who  has 
demonstrated  tremendous  courage  under 
the  most  difficult  circumstances.  A 
dialogue  with  him  would  reassure  the 
Palestinian  people  and  rekindle  their 
hope  for  a  better  future. 


64 


No  other  nation  can  speak  for  the 
Palestinians.  No  other  entity  has  a  man- 
date to  lay  out  theii-  requirements  for 
peace,  and  no  other  nation  is  more  quali- 
fied than  the  American  people,  lending 
their  support  and  backing. 

The  war  between  Iran  and  Iraq  is 
another  sad  chapter  in  the  history  of  the 
Middle  East.  We  should  spare  no  effort 
to  bring  it  to  an  end  immediately.  No 
one  can  possibly  benefit  from  the 
continuation  of  bloodshed  between 
peoples  who  are  linked  together  through 
the  strongest  cultural  and  spiritual 
bonds.  To  restore  peace  between  these 
neighbors,  certain  concrete  steps  should 
be  taken  by  those  who  are  genuinely 
concerned.  The  mere  expression  of  good 
will  is  no  help  in  the  face  of  continued 
fighting  and  escalated  tension. 

I  came  here  also  to  plead  the  case  for 
Africa.  The  African  people  need  your  at- 
tention and  understanding.  They  are 
struggling  against  formidable  odds. 
Economic  crises  and  natural  disasters 
are  strangling  their  efforts  for  develop- 
ment and  social  transformation.  Helping 
them  is  not  only  a  moral  obligation;  it  is 
a  practical  necessity  for  building  a  better 
world  in  which  all  nations  live  in  peace 
and  cooperate  for  their  common  good. 

We  are  seeking  your  help  in  order  to 
secure  the  unconditional  independence  of 


Namibia.  The  continuation  of  the  present 
situation  is  unacceptable  to  all  African 
nations.  The  minority  regime  of  South 
Africa  must  know  that  the  United  States 
cannot  support  its  policy  of  aggression 
and  violation  of  human  rights. 

It  was  a  happy  coincidence  that  I 
met  here  with  His  Majesty  King  Hussein 
and  pursued  with  him  our  ongoing  con- 
sultation. We  believe  that  Jordan  has  an 
impoitant  role  to  play  in  solidifying  the 
stiaieture  of  peace.  It  is  an  element  of 
stability  and  security  in  the  Middle  East. 
Therefore,  we  support  the  dialogue  be- 
tween Jordan  and  the  PLO.  This  is  a 
positive  step  toward  peace.  In  the 
months  ahead,  we  will  be  intensifying 
our  contents  with  our  partners  in  the 
peace  process  with  a  view  of  accelerating 
progress. 

I  have  extended  an  invitation  to 
President  Reagan  to  visit  Egypt  at  the 
earliest  possible  date.  This  will  give  our 
people  an  opportunity  to  demonstrate 
the  depth  of  their  sentiments  toward  the 
President  and  evei'v  Ameiican. 


'Made  to  reporters  assembled  in  the  East 
Room  of  the  White  House  (te.xt  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Feb.  20.  1984).  ■ 


Chemical  Weapons  and  the  Iran-Iraq  War 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  5,  1984' 

The  United  States  has  concluded  that 
the  available  evidence  indicates  that  Iraq 
has  used  lethal  chemical  weapons.  The 
United  States  strongly  condemns  the 
prohibited  use  of  chemical  weapons 
wherever  it  occurs.  There  can  be  no 
justification  for  their  use  by  any  country. 

The  United  States  has  been  working 
for  many  years  with  other  nations  to 
establish  a  treaty  banning  production 
and  stockpiling  of  lethal  and  incapacitat- 
ing chemical  weapons  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  present  international  pro- 
hibitions against  their  use.  The  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  recent  conflicts,  in- 
cluding the  Iran-Iraq  war,  only  adds  to 
the  urgency  of  this  undertaking. 

While  condemning  Iraq's  resort  to 
chemical  weapons,  the  United  States  also 
calls  on  the  Government  of  Iran  to  ac- 
cept the  good  offices  offered  by  a  num- 


ber of  countries  and  international 
oi-ganizations  to  put  an  end  to  the  blood- 
shed. The  United  States  finds  the  pres- 
ent Iranian  regime's  intransigent  refusal 
to  deviate  from  its  avowed  objective  of 
eliminating  the  legitimate  government  of 
neighboring  Iraq  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  accepted  norms  of  behavior  among 
nations. 

The  United  States  deplores  the 
tragic  and  needless  loss  of  both  Iranian 
and  Iraqi  lives,  especially  through  at- 
tacks on  civilian  populations.  We  urge 
both  states  to  respect  their  obligations 
under  international  conventions  designed] 
to  mitigate  the  human  suffering  of  war- 
fai-e,  particularly  those  banning  the  use 
of  chemical  weapons  and  requiring  the 
humane  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war 
and  protection  of  civilians. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


■^mBBBaaaaa 


Viitj 


MIDDLE  EAST 


U.S.  Opposes  Moving 
Embassy  to  Jerusalem 

by  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

Statement  before  the  Setmte  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  February  23, 
IQSJf.  Ambassador  Eagleburger  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Political  Affairs.^ 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  the  committee  the  Administration's 
position  on  S.  2031.  As  you  know,  this 
bill  provides  for  the  U.S  Embassy  and 
Ambassador's  residence  in  Israel  to  be 
moved  to  the  city  of  Jerusalem. 

This  committee  has  already  received 
Secretary  Shultz's  letter  expressing  the 
strong  opposition  of  the  Administration 
to  this  bill.  Before  I  outline  the  reasons 
for  our  opposition,  let  me  take  a  few 
moments  to  provide  the  context  in  which 
this  proposal  arises. 

The  United  States  has  been  and  re- 
mains Israel's  staunchest  supporter.  In 
1948  when  Israel  proclaimed  its  indepen- 
dence, the  United  States  was  the  first 
country  to  extend  it  recognition.  We 
quickly  established  diplomatic  relations 
and  e.stablished  our  embassy  at  Israel's 
seat  of  government,  Tel  Aviv.  There  our 
embassy  has  remained,  during  the  Ad- 
ministrations of  eight  Presidents.  Dating 
from  well  before  the  establishment  of  the 
State  of  Israel,  we  have  maintained  a 
consulate  general  in  Jerusalem  which 
reports  directly  to  the  Department.  This 
is  in  accord  with  arrangements  in  special 
circumstances  elsewhere,  such  as  Hong 
Kong. 

Why  has  it  been  consistent  with  U.S 
policy,  during  Democratic  and 
Republican  Administrations,  to  retain 
our  embassy  in  Tel  Aviv?  In  short, 
because  the  location  of  our  embassy  is  in- 
timately related  to  the  efforts  of  the 
United  States  to  secure  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  In  this 
regard,  U.S.  efforts  have  stressed  peace 
through  negotiations.  Our  willingness  to 
resist  attempts  to  settle  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  through  force  or  through  uni- 
lateral actions  has  preserved  our  ability 
to  play  a  coiisti'uctive  role  in  settling  the 
conflict.  Moving  our  embassy  to 
Jerusalem  would  inevitably  convey  a 
message  that  the  United  States  accepted 
the  position  of  one  party  to  the  issue, 
when,  in  fact,  a  resolution  of  that  issue- 
that  is,  a  resolution  of  the  issue  that  can 
stand  the  test  of  time— can  only  be  found 
in  the  framework  of  a  final  settlement 
reached  through  negotiations. 


The  status  of  Jerusalem  is  an  integi-al 
part  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  While 
we  fully  understand  the  depth  of  attach- 
ment of  Israelis  to  the  city  of  Jerusalem, 
we  have  a  responsibility  to  bear  in  mind 
the  special  significance  which  the  city 
holds  as  well  for  Jews,  Moslems,  and 
Christians  throughout  the  world.  That  is 
a  compelling  fact  that  cannot  be  lightly 
put  aside.  We  would  not  have  achieved 
the  Camp  David  accords  if  the  United 
States  had  adopted  the  position  of  either 
party  on  the  question  of  Jerusalem.  This 
explains  President  Carter's  separate  let- 
ter attached  to  the  Camp  David  accords 
which  reaffirmed  the  U.S.  position  that 
the  status  of  Jerusalem  be  resolved 
through  negotiations.  That  position  con- 
tinues to  be  U.S.  policy  today. 

Our  policy  on  this  issue  has  been 
resolute  for  more  than  three  decades.  In 
1949,  when  the  IsraeHs  began  moving 
their  government  to  Jerusalem,  we  in- 
formed them  that  we  could  not  accept  a 
unilateral  claim  to  the  city.  Again,  in 
1960,  we  informed  Jordan  of  our  opposi- 
tion to  its  intention  to  make  the  eastern 
part  of  the  city  Jordan's  second  capital. 
And  in  1967,  when  Israel  occupied  the 
eastern  sector,  we  opposed  Israeli  ac- 
tions to  place  all  of  Jerusalem  under 
Israeli  law,  jurisdiction,  and  administra- 
tion. Most  recently,  President  Reagan 
stated  in  his  September  1,  1982,  Middle 
East  peace  initiative  that  ".  . .  we  remain 
convinced  that  Jerusalem  must  remain 
undivided,  but  its  final  status  should  be 
decided  through  negotiations." 

A  change  in  the  U.S.  position  on  the 
status  of  Jerusalem  would  seriously 
undermine  our  ability  to  play  an  effective 
role  in  the  Middle  East  peace  process. 
Indeed,  moving  our  embassy  to 
Jerusalem  would  widely  be  perceived  as 
an  effort  by  the  United  States  to  pre- 
empt negotiations  altogether  by  pre- 
judging a  crucial  issue.  In  short,  to  move 
our  embassy  to  Jerusalem  now  would 
almost  certainly  gravely  damage  the 
prospects  for  a  negotiated  settlement;  at 
a  minimum,  it  would  seriously  com- 
promise the  ability  of  the  United  States 
to  continue  to  play  a  constructive  role  in 
bringing  the  parties  to  the  negotiating 
table. 


In  addition,  the  proposed  legislation 
would  be  a  direct  interference  in  the 
President's  constitutional  authority  to 
conduct  foreign  affairs.  As  stated  in 
Secretary  Shultz's  letter,  we  are  con- 
cerned that,  regardless  of  its  merits,  the 
bill  raises  serious  constitutional  questions 
of  a  sejjaration  of  powers  nature.  The 
President  historically  has  been  respon- 
sible for  conducting  diplomatic  relations 
on  behalf  of  the  United  States,  including 
the  determination  of  where  and  through 
what  means  to  conduct  such  relations. 
Legislation  directing  him  to  relocate  an 
embassy  would  be  in  direct  conflict  with 
this  principle.  By  further  seeking  to  com- 
pel him  to  recognize  all  of  Jerusalem  as 
part  of  Israel,  it  would  impair  his  ability 
to  determine  the  recognition  policy  of  the 
United  States.  In  seeking  to  force  the 
President's  hand,  the  proposed  legisla- 
tion, in  our  view,  would  exceed  the 
proper  scope  of  legislative  action. 

I  am  told,  although  I  find  it  hard  to 
credit,  that  some  have  argued  that  in  re- 
taining our  embassy  in  Tel  Aviv,  we 
raise  doubts  concerning  American 
recognition  of  Israel  as  a  sovereign  state. 
That  argues  in  the  face  of  too  many 
years  of  history  to  be  taken  seriously. 
The  United  States  and  Israel  have,  since 
1948,  shared  a  special  friendship,  special 
closeness— a  special  relationship,  if  you 
will— that  is  known  as  such  throughout 
the  world.  There  cannot  be  any  doubt 
about  our  commitment  to  Israel. 

Some  proponents  of  this  legislation 
appai'ently  also  argue  that  U.S.  policy  is 
not  in  accord  with  reality,  that  Jerusalem 
is  Israel's  capital,  and  that  by  failing  to 
locate  our  embassy  there  we  are  denying 
Israel  a  sovereign  prerogative.  But  this 
begs  the  fundamenal  question,  at  least 
from  the  perspective  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  the  essence  of  the  Jerusalem 
issue— or  at  least  America's  decades-old 
position  thereon— that  it  should  not  be 
resolved  by  the  unilateral  actions  of  any 
party. 

It  has  also  been  suggested  that  con- 
ducting diplomatic  relations  through  our 
embassy  in  Tel  Aviv  imposes  practical 
impediments,  since  many  Israeli  Govern- 
ment offices  are  now  located  in 
Jerusalem.  That  is,  no  doubt,  true.  But 
we  have  been  able  to  manage  and  will 
continue  to  be  able  to  do  so.  In  any 
event,  I  doubt  that  even  the  strongest  of 
S.203rs  proponents  would  argue  that 
their  principal  purpose  for  putting  the 
legislation  forward  is  to  improve  the  effi- 
ciency of  our  diplomatic  establishment  in 
Israel. 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


I  have  spoken  here  on  behalf  of  the 
Administration  of  which  I  am  a  part.  But 
were  I  speaking  simply  on  my  own 
behalf,  I  would  take  no  different  a  line. 
It  is  because  I  care  about  my  country's 
relationship  with  Israel  and  my  country's 
ability  to  continue  to  play  a  crucial  role 
in  the  search  for  that  which  the  people  of 
Israel  so  richly  deserve— peace— that  I 
oppose  this  legislation. 

I  cannot  deny  the  frustration  many 
Americans  and  most  Israelis  must  feel 
because  of  our  position.  Nor  do  I,  or  this 
Administration,  take  this  frustration 
lightly.  We  regi-et  it. 


But  in  the  last  analysis,  it  is  a  just 
and  lasting  peace  for  Israel  that  will 
bring  with  it  a  solution  to  this  vexing 
problem  of  the  status  of  Jerusalem.  It  is 
the  calling,  and  the  commitment,  of  the 
United  States  to  help  bring  about  that 
just  and  lasting  peace.  Indeed,  I  believe 
we  are  indispensable  to  the  achievement 
of  such  a  result.  And,  therefore,  I  must 
oppose  passage  of  S.2031. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOM 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  23,  1984' 


The  United  States  has  been  engaged  in 
nuclear  cooperation  with  the  European  Com- 
munity for  many  years.  This  cooperation  was 
initiated  under  agreements  concluded  over 
two  decades  ago  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Eui'opean  Atomic  Energy  Community 
(EURATOM)  which  extend  until'December 
31,  1995.  Since  the  inception  of  this  coopera- 
tion, the  Community  has  adhered  to  all  its 
obligations  under  those  agi-eements. 

The  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978 
amended  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  to  establish 
a  new  nuclear  e.xport  criteria,  including  a  re- 
quirement that  the  United  States  have  a  right 
to  consent  to  the  reprocessing  of  fuel  ex- 
ported from  the  United  States.  Our  present 
agreements  for  cooperation  with  EURATOM 
do  not  contain  such  a  right.  To  avoid  disrupt- 
ing cooperation  with  EURATOM,  a  proviso 
was  included  in  the  law  to  enable  continued 
cooperation  until  March  10,  1980,  and  negotia- 
tions concerning  our  cooperation  agreements. 

The  law  also  provides  that  nuclear  coopera- 
tion with  EURATOM  can  be  extended  on  an 
annual  basis  after  March  10,  1980,  upon  deter- 
mination by  the  President  that  failure  to 
cooperate  would  seriously  prejudice  the 
achievement  of  United  States  nonproliferation 
objectives  or  otherwise  jeopardize  the  common 
defense  and  security  and  after  notification  to 
the  Congress.  President  Carter  made  such  a 
determination  four  years  ago  and  signed  Ex- 
ecutive 12193,  permitting  continued  nuclear 
cooperation  with  EURATOM  until  March  10, 
1981.  I  made  such  determinations  in  1981,  1982 
and  1983  and  signed  Executive  Orders  122905, 
12351  and  12409  permitting  continued  nuclear 
cooperation  through  March  10,  1984. 


The  United  States  has  engaged  in  five 
rounds  of  talks  with  EURATOM  regarding 
the  renegotiation  of  the  US-EURATOM 
agi-eements  for  cooperation.  These  were  con- 
ducted in  November  1978,  September  1979, 
April  1980,  .January  1982  and  November  1983. 
The  European  Community  is  now  considering 
U.S.  proposals  relating  to  our  cooperation 
agreements,  and  progress  in  the  talks  appears 
to  be  possible. 

I  believe  that  it  is  essential  that  coopera- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the  Com- 
munity continue  and  likewise  that  we  work 
closely  with  oui-  Allies  to  counter  the  threat 
of  nuclear  explosives  proliferation.  A  disi-up- 
tion  of  nuclear  cooperation  would  not  only 
eliminate  any  chance  of  progi-ess  in  oiu-  talks 
with  EURATOM  related  to  our  agreements, 
it  would  also  cause  serious  problems  in  our 
overall  relationships.  Accordingly,  I  have 
detei-mined  that  failure  to  continue  peaceful 
nuclear  cooperation  with  EURATOM  would 
be  seriously  prejudicial  to  the  achievement  of 
United  States  nonproliferation  objectives  and 
would  jeopardize  the  common  defense  and 
security  of  the  United  States.  I  intend  to  sign 
an  Executive  Order  to  extend  the  waiver  of 
the  application  of  the  relevant  export 
criterion  of  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act 
for  an  additional  twelve  months  from  March 
10,  1984. 

Sincerely, 

Rox.ALD  Reag.^n 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  George  Bush,  President 
of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  27, 
1984).  ■ 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


■■.^^■»M,»..T'  1  [.II 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 

U.S.  International  Activities 
In  Science  and  Technology 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  17,  1984' 

In  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  Title 
V  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Authorization  Act 
for  Fiscal  Year  1979  (Public  Law  95-426),  I 
am  transmitting  the  1983  annual  report  on  the 
United  States  Government's  international  ac- 
tivities in  the  fields  of  science  and  technology. 
As  in  the  past,  this  report  has  been  prepared 
by  the  Department  of  State  in  collaboration 
with  other  concerned  agencies  of  the  Federal 
government. 

I  would  like  to  take  this  opportunity,  first 
of  all,  to  express  again  my  personal  regret  on 
the  passing  of  Congi-essman  Clement  J. 
Zablocki.  As  Chairman  of  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  and  of  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Af- 
fairs, Congi-essman  Zablocki  made  many 
significant  contributions  to  this  Nation's  pur- 
suit of  foreign  relations  spanning  several  ad- 
ministrations. None  of  these,  however,  was 
more  important  than  his  tireless  efforts  to  see 
that  scientific  progress  toward  economic 
growth  both  for  our  Nation  and  others  across 
the  globe  and  incoiporated  that  understand- 
ing into  the  Title  V  legislation  of  which  he 
was  the  prime  architect.  On  behalf  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  I  want  to  ex- 
press the  gratitude  of  the  Nation  for  his  many 
years  of  distinguished  service. 

Science  and  technology  have  been  key  to 
the  economic  and  social  development  of  the 
United  States.  Political  liberty  and  free  enter- 
prise provide  a  fertile  environment  to 
American  scientists  and  engineers  who  have 
given  us  a  standard  of  living  unequaled  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  We  are  certain  that 
science  and  technology  offer  similar  hope  to 
all  nations  committed  to  the  pursuit  of 
realistic  and  sustained  economic  development. 
The  United  States  has  increasingly  made 
cooperative  scientific  and  technological  ar- 
rangements important  to  our  developmental 
assistance  efforts  to  Third  World  countries 
and  of  strengthened  bilateral  relations  with 
other  industrialized  nations. 


During  1983  we  were  successful  in  our  ef- 
forts to  encourage  inteniational  science  and 
technology  cooperation.  There  were  many 
positive  developments  which  are  set  out  in 
detail  in  this  report.  Of  particular  importance, 
though,  are  several  of  our  bilateral  relations. 
It  is  important  to  develop  a  strong  bilateral 
relationship  with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  while  maintaining  our  friendship  with 
the  democratic  nations  of  Asia.  Broad-based 
science  and  technology  agreements  are  a  vital 
part  of  our  efforts  to  build  this  relationship. 
The  role  of  science  and  technology  plays  a 
similar  role  in  Latin  America  This  is  particu- 
larly true  in  our  bilateral  relations  with  Brazil 
and  Mexico.  I  am  certain  that  these  nations 
attach  as  much  importance  to  scientific  and 
technology  cooperation  as  we  do.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  pursue  the  opportunities  for  in- 
creased cooperation. 

Perhaps  the  most  disturbing  development 
of  1983  in  the  field  of  science  and  technology 
has  been  our  reluctant,  but  necessary,  deci- 
sion to  give  notice  of  our  intent  to  withdraw 
from  participation  in  UNESCO.  Our  persis- 
tent efforts  over  the  past  three  years  to  con- 
vince the  UNESCO  bureaucracy  in  Paris  to 
address  the  Agency's  serious  problems  of  ad- 
ministrative and  fiscal  mismanagement  and  to 
reorient  its  direction  to  pursue  once  again 
only  the  mission  envisioned  in  its  charter 
have  failed.  We  see  no  viable  option  but  to 
sever  our  ties  with  this  Agency  if  its  overt 
hostility  to  American  values  and  its  increasing 
substantive  impotence  and  procedural  abuse 
are  not  satisfactorily  corrected.  We  will  strive 
to  minimize  any  significant  adverse  effect  on 
beneficial  science  and  technology  activities  at 
UNESCO  by  making  alternative  arrange- 
ments for  U.S.  participation  in  such  pro- 
grams. 

Our  scientific  and  technological  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  Poland  have  been 
adversely  affected  by  disappointing  Soviet  at- 
titudes and  actions.  In  our  Title  V  Report  for 
1982,  I  made  it  clear  that  cooperation  depends 
upon  the  steps  the  Soviet  Govenmient  takes 
to  comply  with  recognized  nonns  of  interna- 
tional behavior.  Soviet  behavior  still  falls  far 


short  of  this  standard,  and  our  position  re- 
mains unchanged.  We  will  continue  to  care- 
fully observe  Soviet  behavior  and  adjust  our 
science  and  technology  cooperation  ac- 
cordingly. 

In  the  overall  international  arena,  we  can 
be  proud  of  our  scientific  leadership.  It  can  go 
a  long  way  in  helping  the  cause  of  freedom  and 
economic  growth  around  the  world.  The  inter- 
national programs  described  in  this  report 
benefit  our  Nation  and  our  cooperative  part- 
ners, and  are  a  source  of  good  will  around  the 
world. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  20,  1984. 


April  1984 


67 


UNITED  NATIONS 


U.S.  Participation  in  the  United  Nations 


by  Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreiffn  Operations  of  the  Senate  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  2, 
198Jf  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick  is  U.S. 
Permanent  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations.^ 


As  always,  it  is  a  great  pleasure  and  a 
pi-ivilege  for  me  to  testify  before  this 
committee  with  regard  to  U.S.  participa- 
tion in  the  United  Nations.  Today  is  a 
particularly  auspicious  occasion  since  it 
marks  the  first  congi-essional  inquii-y 
relative  to  implementation  of  Section 
101(b)  of  the  continuing  resolution  of 
November  14,  1983,  as  well  as  Section  117 
of  the  State  Department  Authorization 
Act  for  fiscal  years  1984  and  1985.  The 
continuing  resolution  requires  that  the 
U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations  furnish  to  Congress 
country-by-country  reports  on  voting  pat- 
terns and  practices  at  the  United  Nations 
during  the  previous  year;  the  State 
Department  Authorization  Act  calls  upon 
the  Secretary  of  State  to  furnish  annual 
reports  regarding  the  policies  which  each 
member  country  of  the  United  Nations 
pursues  in  international  oi'ganizations  of 
which  the  United  States  is  a  member. 

I  want  to  make  clear  that  I  welcome 
and  endorse  fully  these  reporting  re- 
quirements. Indeed,  I  firmly  believe 
that,  as  regularly  applicable  provisions  of 
law  governing  the  functions  of  the  State 
Department  and  the  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations, 
these  legislative  enactments  will  provide 
an  important  tool  for  Congress  in  the 
fulfillment  of  its  oversight  respon- 
sibilities concerning  the  conduct  of  U.S. 
foreign  relations. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  overstate  the 
importance  of  close  and  continuing  atten- 
tion by  Congress  to  events  at  the  United 
Nations.  After  all,  through  their  repre- 
sentatives in  Congress,  the  American 
people  contribute  over  1.5  billion  ta.x 
dollars  annually  toward  the  UN  budget, 
and  they  contribute  additional  billions  an- 
nually in  various  forms  to  many  of  the 
nations  who  play  important  roles  in  the 
activities  of  the  United  Nations.  Our 
financial  support  of  the  United  Nations 
and  the  assistance  we  provide  to  other 
nations  symbolize  not  only  our  continuing 
commitment  to  the  principles  of  the  UN 


Charter  but  our  dedication  to  world 
peace  and  the  improvement  of  the  qual- 
ity of  life  in  nations  less  fortunate  than 
ours.  Congress'  role  in  the  decisions 
governing  this  formulation  of  the  policies 
and  allocation  of  these  monies  is  of 
necessity  very  large. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  it  is  of 
paramount  importance  that  congressional 
decisions  regarding  UN  funding  and 
financial  support  to  other  countries  be 
well-informed  judgments  and  that  they 
reflect  the  wishes  of  an  informed  elec- 
torate. These  principles  are  not  peculiar 
to  matters  of  foreign  relations;  they  are 
fundamental  to  our  democratic  form  of 
government. 

To  an  extent  greater  than  often 
realized,  what  occurs  at  the  United  Na- 
tions involves  central  issues  of  world 
politics  and  frequently  touches  upon  vital 
U.S.  national  goals  and  interests.  It 
therefore  is  obvious  that  the  conduct  of 
other  UN  members  with  regard  to  these 
goals  and  interests  is  very  important  to 
us.  It  constitutes  a  significant  dimension 
of  our  relations  with  other  countries  to 
be  considered  with  the  utmost 
seriousness  and  gravity. 

Annual  reviews  of  UN  voting  pat- 
terns and  practices  provide  this  commit- 
tee, as  well  as  the  electorate  in  general, 
with  a  reliable,  systematic  basis  for 
assessing  the  attitudes,  the  policies,  and 
the  decisions  of  UN  members  on  the 
salient  questions  of  our  time  that  come 
before  the  UN  General  Assembly  and 
Security  Council  for  consideration  and 
action.  Here  we  have  the  hard  evidence 
of  what  has  happened  on  issues  of  impor- 
tance to  us.  From  it,  we  can  make 
judgments  concerning  those  whose 
values  and  views  are  harmonious  with 
our  own,  and  whose  policies  are  opposed 
to  ours,  and  those  who  fall  in  between. 
Beyond  views,  of  course,  come  interests 
—often  vital  interests.  So  it  is  important 
that  we  take  due  note  of  actions  which 
comport  with,  or  are  opposed  to,  what 
we  regard  as  vital  interests. 

The  United  Nations  is  a  complex 
arena  whose  dynamics  differ  significantly 
fi-om  relations  in  other  arenas.  Distinc- 
tive patterns  of  international  politics 
have  developed  in  UN  arenas  which 
often  seem  to  have  little  relation  to  our 
bilateral  relations.  Often,  far  too  often, 
only  casual,  intermittent,  and  inadequate 
efforts  have  been  made  to  integrate  U.S. 


policies  and  relations  with  other  nations 
inside  the  United  Nations  to  U.S. 
policies  and  relations  with  those  same  na- 
tions outside  the  United  Nations.  Yet, 
UN  interactions  and  decisions  have  im- 
portant effects  on  our  ability  to  achieve 
our  goals  outside  the  United  Nations. 
Often,  relations  in  the  UN  fora  shape  the 
context  and  limit  the  options  available  to 
the  United  States  in  the  world. 

In  examining  the  voting  record  of 
member  states  in  the  United  Nations  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  relations  in 
the  United  Nations  are  only  one  dimen- 
sion of  our  relations  with  other  countries 
and  often  are  not  the  most  important 
aspect  of  these  relations.  Economic, 
strategic,  and  moral  factors  may  be  and 
often  are  more  important  to  U.S.  in- 
terests, policy,  and  pohcymakers  than  a 
country's  behavior  inside  the  United  Na- 
tions. However,  at  the  same  time,  if  a 
given  country's  relations  inside  the 
United  Nations  are  not  all  important,  or 
even  the  most  important  factor  in  our 
relations  with  it,  neither  can  relations  in- 
side the  United  Nations  be  considered 
trivial. 

If  the  decisions  and  policies  of  the 
key  bodies  of  the  United  Nations  matter, 
then  the  votes  of  member  nations  mat- 
ter. If  UN  decisions  make  little  or  no  dif- 
ference to  our  interests,  then  the  United 
States  should  surely  devote  less  money 
and  enei-gy  to  our  UN  participation. 

Votes  in  the  General  Assembly  and 
the  Security  Council  provide  mandates 
and  guidance  to  the  Secretary  General 
and  the  Secretariat,  and  the  diverse 
worldwide  operations  of  its  subgroups. 
UN  decisions  allocate  funds,  call  con- 
ferences, and  authorize  programs. 

Since  the  UN  system  has  a  combined 
budget  of  over  $4  billion  and  it  employs 
over  50,000  individuals,  decisions 
concerning  the  use  of  these  worldwide 
resources  are  significant  indeed. 

UN  voting  practice  data  require 
analysis  to  be  useful.  Merely  because  a 
country  votes  with  us  on  some  issues 
does  not  necessarily  signify  friendship  or 
shared  objectives.  Countries  with  a  low 
incidence  of  compatible  votes  are  not 
necessarily  foes.  Indeed,  on  some  issues 
of  importance  to  us,  our  treaty  allies  and 
those  with  whom  we  hold  strategic  and 
other  objectives  in  common  may  vote 
against  us.  We  must  not  ignore  the  full 


JBiero 
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Department  of  State  Bullet! 


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UNITED  NATIONS 


weight  of  the  contextual  circumstances  in 
which  any  vote  is  cast.  Nevertheless, 
with  all  these  caveats  in  mind,  significant 
patterns  of  political  conduct  and  at- 
titudes do  emei'ge  from  these  data. 

Votes  Focus  World  Attention 

The  agendas  of  the  principal  UN  bodies 
have  a  unique  influence  on  the  percep- 
tion of  global  problems  because,  to  an  e.x- 
tent  not  appreciated  in  the  United 
States,  discussions,  debates,  and  votes  in 
the  United  Nations  are  followed  in  the 
world  press.  Subjects  discussed  in  majoi- 
UN  fora  come  to  be  widely  i-egarded  as 
important.  Because  of  this  capacity  to 
focus  attention  on  some  subjects  and  ig- 
nore others,  the  agendas  of  major  UN 
Drganizations  influence  the  definition  of 
what  is  and  what  is  not  important  in  the 
world;  what  is  a  problem,  what  is  a  prob- 
lem worthy  of  "world"  attention.  For  ex- 
ample, Cuba  has  worked  hard  to  have 
Puerto  Rico  on  the  agenda  of  past 
General  Assemblies  as  a  problem  of 
decolonization"  to  embarrass  the 
United  States  and  to  create  a  problem 
where  none  exists.  For  the  reverse 
reasons,  the  Soviet  Union  and  its 
associated  states  try  to  keep  off  the 
agenda  subjects  such  as  the  repression  in 
Poland,  the  Libyan  invasion  of  Chad,  the 
lowning  of  the  Korean  airliner,  the 
Rangoon  bombing. 

When,  year  after  year.  Security 
Council  resolutions  focus  on  Israeli 
'practices"  as  violations  of  the  fourth 
Geneva  convention  and  ignore  greater 
violations  of  other  countries,  there  is  a 
powerful  tendency  for  many  to  come  to 
believe  that  Israel  is  especially  guilty  of 
gross  human  rights  abuses.  Progres- 
sively, Israel  comes  to  be  perceived  as  a 
pariah.  Continuing  focus  of  UN  bodies  on 
the  Palestinian  question  has  kept  Pales- 
tinian problems  higher  on  the  agenda  of 
world  politics  than  the  plight  of  more 
numerous  refugee  populations  and  has 
won  more  generous  financial  support  than 
for  other  refugee  populations. 


Votes  Define  "World  Opinion" 
on  Major  Issues 

The  decisions  of  the  United  Nations  are 
widely  interpreted  as  reflecting  "world 
opinion"  and  are  endowed  with  substan- 
tial moral  and  intellectual  force.  The 
cumulative  impact  of  decisions  of  UN 
bodies  influence  opinions  all  over  the 
world  about  what  is  legitimate,  what  is 
acceptable,  who  is  lawless  and  who  is 
repressive,  what  countries  are  and  are 


not  capable  of  pi'otecting  themselves  anri 
their  friends  in  the  world  body. 

Each  year  large  majorities  of  the 
General  Assembly  put  on  record  their 
disapproval  of  the  occupation  of 
Afghanistan  and  Kampuchea  and  their 
request  for  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces.  Even  though  these  resolutions  do 
not  name  the  occupying  power,  their 
meaning  is  clear  and  it  is  understood  by 
everyone.  It  makes  clear  that  the  major- 
ity of  member  states  understand  what 
has  happened  and  is  happening  in  those 
two  countries,  that  they  disapprove,  and 
that  Soviet  influence  in  the  United  Na- 
tions, though  indubitably  great,  is  not 
always  large  enough  to  prevent  the  ex- 
(jression  of  general  disapproval. 

UN  bodies  can  damage  a  country's 
reputation.  The  determined  effort  to 
make  Israel  a  pariah  state  reflects  the 
conviction  of  her  adversaries  that  such 
delegitimization  would  be  damaging. 
When  resolutions  are  passed  by  the 
Security  Council  that  make  demands  in- 
compatible with  a  nation's  basic  in- 
terests, they  will  almost  surely  be 
ignored.  But  refusal  to  respect  a  Secur- 
ity Council  resolution  leaves  a  country 
open  to  the  charge  that  it  is  an  "interna- 
tional outlaw,"  "not  a  peaceloving 
nation,"  and,  therefore,  eligible  for  fur- 
ther sanctions.  Thus,  Isi-ael,  having  been 
requested  by  Security  Council  action  to 
withdraw  all  its  troops  from  Lebanon,  is 
"guilty"  of  noncompliance,  while  Syria  is 
"not  guilty"  because  thei'e  were  never 
enough  votes  in  the  Security  Council  to 
demand  Syria's  withdrawal.  The  fact  of 
noncompliance  becomes  yet  another 
ground  for  censuring  Israel  in  the 
United  Nations  regardless  of  the  fact 
that  Israel  agreed  to  a  timetable  foi'  joint 
withdrawal  of  its  troops  from  Lebanon 
and  actually  began  a  withdrawal  which 
Syria  refused  even  to  discuss. 

When  the  Soviet  Union  is  able  to 
protect  itself  against  being  criticized  by 
name— no  matter  how  flagrant  its  viola- 
tions of  the  UN  Charter— it  establishes 
itself  as  skillful,  effective,  and  influential, 
a  power  to  be  reckoned  with  in  what  is 
regularly  called  the  international  com- 
munity. When  its  client  states  and  allies 
ai-e  able  to  escape  criticism— no  matter 
how  flagrantly  they  violate  the  UN 
Charter— the  Soviets  are  judged  to  be  in- 
fluential, useful  friends.  Soviet  success 
and  influence  in  the  United  Nations  then 
becomes  an  additional  incentive  for  sen- 
.sitivity  to  Soviet  views  and  for  associa- 
tion with  the  Soviet  bloc.  Conversely, 
when  the  United  States  and  its  friends 
are  subjected  to  harsh  and  often  unfaii- 


attack,  the  Lfnited  States  appears  to  be 
devoid  of  influence  and  association  with 
it  becomes  undesirable  if  not  dangerous. 
LIN  votes  affect  both  the  image  and  the 
reality  of  power  in  the  UN  system  and 
beyond  it. 

What  UN  Votes  Tell  Us  About 
the  Countries  Who  Cast  Them 

Thei-e  is  much  votes  cannot  tell  us.  The 
votes  of  a  congressman  do  not  necessar- 
ily tell  us  where  and  how  he  stands 
within  his  party  or  within  the  Congress, 
nor  what  he  cares  most  deeply  about, 
nor  about  his  relation  with  his  peers,  nor 
about  the  views  of  his  constituency  or 
his  legislative  assistant.  A  vote  does  not 
even  tell  us  to  which  party  a  con- 
gressman belongs.  A  congressman  may 
argue  even  that  his  votes  do  not  ac- 
curately reflect  his  true  values  and 
preferences  but,  instead,  the  pressures 
in  an  election  year  of  his  constituency, 
his  party,  the  financial  pressures  on  him, 
and  the  issues  he  was  forced  to  vote  on. 
But  cumulatively  a  congressman's  votes 
tell  us  in  a  general  way  about  where  he 
stands  on  various  kinds  of  issues,  what 
he  stands  for,  and  whom  he  stands  with. 

Similarly  in  the  United  Nations,  a 
country's  votes  do  not  tell  us  many 
things.  Votes  may  not  depend  just  on 
the  country's  objective  position  and 
needs,  nor  its  subjective  values  and 
identifications,  but  on  what  some 
authoritative  person  decided  was  in  his 
own  best  interest  or  his  country's  best 
interest  in  a  particular  place,  at  a  par- 
ticular time.  The  cumulative  record, 
however,  tells  us  what  a  government 
judges  to  be  in  its  best  interest.  When 
an  African  government  votes  with  the 
majority  of  Africans,  or  with  the  majoi-- 
ity  of  the  nonaligned  government  group, 
for  a  resolution  that  is  unfairly  critical  of 
the  United  States  for  violating  the  South 
African  arms  embargo,  for  example,  that 
African  state  is  not  necessarily  express- 
ing its  hostility  to  the  United  States;  it 
may  simply  believe  there  will  be  more 
unpleasant  (personal  or  official)  conse- 
quences for  voting  no  than  voting  yes. 

Over  time,  however,  a  country's 
votes  reflect  its  choices  about  values  and 
priorities. 

There  are  certain  interesting  paral- 
lels between  the  country-by-country 
reports  on  human  rights  practices  under 
the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961  and 
the  UN  voting  practice  reports,  as  re- 
quired by  last  year's  legislative  enact- 
ment. Both  reflect  an  effort  by  Congress 
to  take  account  in  its  consideration  of 
foreign  assistance  decisions  the  policies 


April  1984 


UNITED  NATIONS 


and  practices  of  other  countries  with 
regard  to  the  moral  and  poUtical  goals 
which  guide  U.S.  policy.  Both  provide 
data  which  must  be  evaluated  with  sen- 
sitivity and  understanding.  Like  the 
human  rights  reports,  the  data  on  UN 
voting  practices  the  reports  provide  can 
be  quite  valuable  in  contributing  to  bet- 
ter informed,  more  intelligent  decisions. 

Congress,  as  always,  will  be  free  to 
decide  to  grant  or  withhold.  But  in 
reaching  its  decisions.  Congress  will 
have,  by  virtue  of  the  UN  voting 
reports,  the  assistance  of  information 
which  may  be  highly  relevant  in  any 
given  case.  The  public  will  similarly  have 
an  understandable  basis  for  judgments 
that  are  more  reliable  than  generalized 
impressions. 

As  I  have  indicated,  these  reports 
are  not  very  different  in  their  purpose 
than  data  supplied  to  Congress  in  a  host 
of  domestic  contexts,  as  part  of  the 
legislative  process.  There  is  nothing 
unique  in  Congress'  quest  for  the  en- 
lightenment provided  by  relevant  infor- 
mation. If  any  country  feels  that  the 
reports  do  not  faithfully  reflect  its 
policies,  attitudes,  and  decisions,  it  is,  of 
course,  free  to  speak  out  as  it  sees  fit. 

Our  nation  has  never  been  mean  or 
vindictive  in  its  conduct  of  foreign  rela- 
tions. It  has,  on  the  contrary,  been 
generous  to  a  fault  and  understanding  in 
the  extreme.  That  has  been  the 
American  style.  I  believe  it  will  continue 
to  be  so— though  perhaps  with  greater 
sensitivity  and  closer  attention  to  the 
hard  realities  of  the  world  in  which  we 
live.  These  reports  should  be  a  helpful 
adjunct  in  that  process. 

Some  Generalizations  and  Conclusions 

First,  the  U.S.  weakness  in  UN  arenas 
is  of  longstanding  duration.  It  dates  back 
to  the  1960s  and  apparently  is  rooted  in 
the  transformation  of  UN  membership 
by  the  influx  of  many  new  nations,  many 
of  which  are  not  democratic,  and  the 
failure  of  the  United  States  to  take  part 
in  the  developing  "party  system"  inside 
the  United  Nations.  It  also  reflects  a 
U.S.  habit  of  acting  as  though  another 
country's  behavior  toward  our  values 
and  interests  inside  the  United  Nations 
were  not  relevant  to  their  relationship 
with  us. 

Second,  the  position  of  the  United 
States  in  the  United  Nations  is  not 
nearly  as  strong  as  our  economic  and 
military  strength  might  suggest.  That  is 
another  way  of  saying  U.S.  strength  and 
resources  in  the  world  have  not  been 
translated  into  influence  inside  the 
United  Nations. 


70 


Third,  rising  Soviet  influence  has  ac- 
companied declining  U.S.  influence  inside 
UN  fora.  This  has  been  achieved  by  in- 
tegration of  Soviet  influence  with  the 
major  blocs  (through  their  client  states) 
and  in  the  UN  permanent  bureaucracy 
and  weak  coordination  among  the  person- 
nel and  policies  of  the  democracies  and 
prodemocratic  forces. 

Fourth,  the  strength  of  the  Soviet 
Union  inside  the  United  Nations  is  based 
on  the  transfer  into  the  United  Nations 
of  power  relations  outside  the  United 
Nations.  Soviet  dominance  of  Eastern 
Europe  is  translated  into  a  solid  bloc  of 
votes  in  the  United  Nations.  Soviet 
client  states  always  support  Soviet  posi- 
tions and  strategies  inside  the  United 
Nations. 

Conclusions  from  the  experience  of 
the  past  3  years  suggest  that  it  should 
be  possible  to  enhance  U.S.  abUity  to 
maximize  democratic  values  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  UN  Charter  and  to  protect 
our  interests  and  reputation  in  UN 
arenas  providing: 

•  The  United  States  and  its  represen- 
tatives are  clear  and  make  clear  to 
others  that  we  take  a  serious  interest  in 
decisions  in  these  arenas  and  no  longer 
are  willing  to  shrug  off  UN  interactions 
as  without  importance; 

•  That  we  integrate  regular  com- 
munication on  UN  affairs  into  our  normal 
bilateral  relations  with  other  countries; 

•  That  we  take  special  measures  to 
infoiTTi  other  countries  about  issues  of 
special  concern  to  us;  and 

•  That  we  make  clear  inside  the 
United  Nations  that  we  are  prepared  to 
respect  our  friends'  and  associates'  basic 
values  and  interests  but  expect  that  such 
respect  should  be  mutual. 

The  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States,  in  the  United  Nations  as  out  of 
it,  should  affirm  our  commitment  to 
sti-engthening  international  peace,  to  pro- 
moting democratic  values  including 
respect  for  human  rights,  to  encouraging 
development,  and  to  strengthening  in- 
stitutions that  provide  for  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  conflict. 

When  the  United  States  is  weak  and 
without  influence  in  international  arenas, 
the  possibilities  of  promoting  these 
values  in  those  arenas  are  diminished. 
When  the  United  States  and  the  other 
democracies  are  influential,  democratic 
values  and  institutions  are  strengthened 
as  well.  It  is  not  enlightened  or  generous 
or  responsible  for  the  United  States  to 
be  or  seem  to  be  indifferent  to  what 


transpires  in  gi'eat  international  fora.  It 
is  not  genei-ous  or  responsible  to  act  as 
though  we  did  not  cai-e  about  decisions 
in  international  bodies.  It  is  our  duty  to 
try  in  all  appropriate  ways  to  strengthen 
freedom  and  human  rights  and  to  pro- 
mote the  values  of  the  UN  Charter— the 
reason  for  our  initial  sponsorship  of,  and 
present  membership  in  the  United  Na- 
tions. 


•The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

"3 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Central  America  Initiative  Proposed 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
FEB.  3,  1984' 

In  the  coming  days,  we'll  send  legislation 
to  the  Congi-ess  based  on  a  remai'kable 
bipartisan  consensus  of  the  National 
Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America.  And  I  urge  prompt  congi-es- 
sional  action  and  support. 

Last  April,  in  an  address  to  a  joint 
session  of  the  Congress,  I  spoke  to  the 
American  people  about  what  is  at  stake 
in  Central  America  and  asked  for  bipar- 
tisan cooi)eration  in  our  efforts  to  help 
make  a  better  life  for  the  people  of  that 
region.  Shortly  after  that  speech,  the 
late  Senator  Henry  Jackson  called  for 
the  appointment  of  a  bipartisan  commis- 
sion to  chart  a  long-term  course  for 
democracy,  economic  improvement,  and 
peace  in  Central  Amei'ica.  And  as  Scoop 
Jackson  so  rightly  observed,  "Whatever 
policy  options  might  be  available  to  us, 
ignoring  threats  to  the  stability  of 
Central  America  and  refusing  to  engage 
ourselves  in  the  problems  of  the  region 
are  not  among  them." 

It  was  against  this  background  that  I 
did  establish  the  National  Bipartisan 
Commission  on  Central  America.  Its  mis- 
sion was  to  recommend  a  long-teiTn  pol- 
icy appropriate  to  the  economic,  social, 
political,  and  military  challenges  to  the 
region. 

The  distinguished  Americans  who 
served  on  that  commission  have  per- 
formed a  great  service  to  all  Americans. 
All  of  us— when  I  say  all  Americans— «// 
of  us  from  Point  Barrow  to  Tierra  del 
Fuego.  Henry  Kissinger  and  the  commis- 
sion members  and  senior  counselors:  My 
appreciation  for  a  tough  job  well  done. 

Our  proposed  legislation,  the  Central 
America  Democracy,  Peace,  and  Devel- 
opment Initiative  Act,  is  based  on  the 
commission's  analysis  and  embodies  its 
recommendations,  and  it's  in  the  spirit  of 
Senator  Jackson  who  first  proposed  the 
idea  of  a  bipartisan  commission  and 
sei'ved  until  his  death  as  one  of  its  senior 
counselors.  He  represented  something 
very  special  in  American  politics.  Scoop 
Jackson  stood  for  national  security  and 
human  rights  because  he  knew  that  one 
without  the  other  is  meaningless.  He 
said  what  he  believed  and  stuck  to  it 
with  vision,  integrity,  and  grace. 

The  legislation  does  not  offer  a  quick 
fix  to  the  crisis  in  Central  America; 
there  is  none.  Our  plan  offers  a  com- 
prehensive program  to  support  demo- 


April  1984 


President  Reagan  with  (left  to  right)  Richard  McP^arland,  national  security  adviser;  Robert 
Strauss,  a  member  of  the  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central  America;  and  Dr. 
Henry  A.  Kissinger,  chairman  of  the  national  commission. 


cratic  development,  improve  human 
rights,  and  bring  peace  to  this  troubled 
region  that's  so  close  to  home. 

The  approach  is  right.  It  includes  a 
mix  of  developmental,  political,  diplo- 
matic, and  security  initiatives,  equitably 
and  humanely  pursued.  We  either  do 
them  all,  or  we  jeopardize  the  chance  for 
real  progress  in  the  region.  The  plan 
i-esponds  to  decades  of  inequity  and  in- 
difference through  its  support  of 
democracy,  reform,  and  human  freedom. 
It  responds  to  the  economic  challenges  of 
the  region. 

The  legislation  calls  for  $400  million 
in  supplementary  economic  assistance  for 
fiscal  year  1984.  And  during  the  next  5 
years,  economic  assistance  will  amount  to 
$5.9  billion  in  appropi-iated  funds  and  $2 
billion  in  insurance  and  guarantees. 

To  support  the  security  of  the 
region's  threatened  nations,  the  legisla- 
tion will  provide  $515  million  over  the 
next  2  years.  At  the  same  time,  it  will 
require  semiannual  reports  to  the  Con- 
gress assessing  El  Salvadoran  policies 
for  achieving  political  and  economic 
development  and  conditions  of  security. 

To  support  dialogue  and  negotiations 
both  among  the  countries  of  the  region 
and  within  each  country,  the  legislation 


provides  guidance  for  cooperation  with 
the  Central  American  countries  in 
establishing,  then  working  with,  the  Cen- 
tral American  Development  Organiza- 
tion. 

Our  plan  is  for  the  long  haul.  It  won't 
be  easy,  and  it  won't  be  cheap.  But  it 
can  be  done.  And  for  strategic  and  moral 
reasons,  it  must  be  done.  I  ask  the  Con- 
gress to  study  the  commission  report 
and  to  give  our  legislative  proposal  its 
urgent  attention  and  bipartisan  support. 
It  is  not  an  impossible  drearii.  We  have 
the  resources  to  do  it.  This  initiative 
serves  the  interest  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  The  beleaguered  people  in 
Central  America  want  our  help.  Our 
enemies,  extremists  of  the  left  and  the 
right,  would  be  delighted  if  we  refused 
to  give  it.  And  if  we  don't  help  now, 
we'll  surely  pay  dearly  in  the  future. 

With  the  support  of  the  Congress,  we 
will  not  let  down  all  those  in  Central 
America  who  yearn  for  democracy  and 
peace.  And  in  so  doing,  we'll  not  let 
ourselves  down. 


'Made  in  the  East  Room  of  the  White 
House  to  Members  of  Congress,  members  of 
the  diplomatic  community,  and  Administration 
officials  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  6,  1Q84).  ■ 


71 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Central  America  Democracy,  Peace, 
and  Development  Initiative 


by  Langhome  A.  Motley 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
February  21,  198i.  Ambassador  Motley 
is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
American  Affairs.' 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  you  to 
testify  on  the  vitally  important  Central 
America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 
Development  Initiative  Act  of  1984. 

The  exhaustive  study  made  by  the 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Cen- 
tral America  has  enabled  us  to  prepare  a 
comprehensive  response  to  the  many- 
sided  crisis  in  Central  America.  The  Ad- 
ministration and  the  Congress  are  now 
in  a  position  to  forge  a  complete  pro- 
gram of  action  that  meets  both  im- 
mediate operational  needs  and  the  re- 
quirements of  a  long-term  strategy. 

The  bill  the  President  has  just 
transmitted  to  the  Congress  embodies 
those  recommendations  made  by  the 
bipartisan  commission  which  cannot  be 
implemented  without  legislation.  As  you 
know,  the  President  will  implement  by 
executive  action  those  commission 
recommendations  that  do  not  require 
new  legislation.  He  urges  prompt  con- 
gressional action  and  support  for  this 
bill. 

This  legislative  package  will  help  to 
stabilize  economies  and  societies  plagued 
by  injustice  and  violence.  At  the  same 
time,  it  will  enable  us  to  take  the  offen- 
sive against  poverty  and  to  foster 
democratic  development,  to  increase 
respect  for  human  rights,  and  to  help 
bring  lasting  peace  to  this  troubled 
region  so  close  to  the  United  States. 

This  prepared  statement  addresses: 

•  The  report  of  the  bipartisan  com- 
mission; 

•  The  major  elements  of  the  legisla- 
tion; and 

•  Some  questions  of  policy  and  im- 
plementation. 

The  Report  of  the  Bipartisan 
Commission 

Perhaps  the  most  striking  aspect  of  the 
commission's  report  is  its  honesty— its 
candor  in  facing  up  to  the  complexities 
of  Central  America.  The  commission 
could  have  focused  superficially  on  one 


72 


or  two  "critical  issues"  which,  if  ad- 
dressed in  isolation,  might  have  created 
the  illusion  of  a  broader  solution. 

To  its  credit,  the  commission  refused 
to  oversimplify.  It  acknowledged  that 
Central  America's  problems  are  com- 
plex, severe,  and  deeply  rooted,  con- 
cluding flatly  that  they  add  up  to  a 
"seamless  web"  from  which  no  quick 
fixes  or  shortcuts  will  free  us.  The  U.S. 
interests  involved,  it  pointed  out,  are 
both  moral  and  strategic.  And  they  are 
threatened  by  human  rights  abuse  and 
by  economic  misery  as  well  as  by  Cuban 
and  Soviet  intervention. 

The  commission's  recommendations 
are  as  comprehensive  and  direct  as  its 
analysis.  It  could  have  insisted  on  its 
mandate  to  deal  with  long-term  issues 
and  avoided  the  difficult  questions  we 
face  now.  It  could  have  summarized  the 
policies  already  being  pursued  by  the 
Administration  and  given  us  credit  for 
being  on  the  right  track.  And  it  could 
have  simply  praised  the  peace  efforts  of 
the  Central  American  countries  and  the 
central  importance  of  negotiations 
like  those  underway  in  the  Contadora 
process. 

But  the  commission  was  both 
unanimous  and  unambiguous  in  con- 
cluding that  the  long  term  will  be  far 
less  manageable  if  we  fail  to  deal  with 
existing  challenges.  It  called  for  U.S. 
support  for  regional  efforts  like  Con- 
tadora but  said  that  the  United  States 
also  has  a  special  responsibility  to  con- 
tribute actively  to  the  creation  of 
economic,  security,  and  political  condi- 
tions required  for  peace.  It  concluded 
that  we  are  not  doing  enough  and 
recommended  that  the  Administration 
and  the  Congress  cooperate  to  ensure 
that  we  provide  the  resources  we  and 
our  Central  American  friends  need  to 
work  successfully  together  to  attain  a 
lasting  peace  built  solidly  on  democracy 
and  development. 

The  commission  refused  to  accept 
precooked  judgments  and  conventional 
platitudes.  Bipartisan  in  composition  and 
nonpartisan  in  mandate,  the  commission 
approached  its  task  with  total  in- 
dependence. Mr.  Chairman  [Michael  D. 
Barnes],  you  and  I  can  both  testify  to 
the  commission's  thoroughness  and  in- 
dependence. We  were  both  asked  many 
questions.  We  were  asked  to  identify  the 
problems  and  to  explain  what  we 


thought  was  needed  to  deal  with  them. 
But  we  were  never  asked  whether  this 
or  that  recommendation  would  "sell." 
We  were  never  asked  to  compromise  our 
views  for  reasons  of  political  or  ad- 
ministrative expediency. 

The  commission's  discussions  with 
Central  and  Latin  American  leaders 
eliminated  the  screens  created  by 
distance,  paperwork,  and  partisan 
preconceptions  and  exposed  its  members 
to  the  region's  realities.  They  saw  for 
themselves  what  is  happening  in  El 
Salvador  and  in  Nicaragua  and 
throughout  the  isthmus. 

From  these  experiences  the  commis- 
sion developed  a  perspective  on  Central 
America  that  combines: 

•  An  enlightened  understanding  of 
the  capacity  of  social  and  economic 
frustration  to  undermine  stability  and 
feed  on  itself  to  create  yet  more  un- 
happiness  and  more  instability; 

•  A  technical  knowledge  of  how 
world  economic  developments  can  in- 
fluence, and  at  times  devastate,  strug- 
gling economies  and  an  equally  informed 
insight  into  how  those  economies  can 
renew  their  growth; 

•  A  sophisticated  understanding  of 
the  tactics  and  tools  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Cuba,  who  would  exploit  these 
vulnerabilities  and  ultimately  threaten 
us;  and  lastly, 

•  A  truly  American  insight  for 
responding  to  the  economic  and  political 
realities  of  Central  America  in  a  way 
that  conforms  to  our  neighbors'  aspira- 
tions for  peace,  democracy,  and  pros- 
perity. 

As  a  result,  what  emerges  from  the 
commission's  report  is  the  Central 
American  dynamic  itself.  It  is  a  dynamic 
in  which  communism,  violence,  and  dic- 
tatorship feed  on  misery,  injustice,  and 
an  unfortunate  past.  It  is  a  destructive 
dynamic  that  oppresses  the  people  of 
Central  America  and  will,  unless  altered, 
increasingly  endanger  the  rest  of  the 
hemisphere. 

The  Central  America  Democracy, 
Peace,  and  Development  Initiative 
Act  of  1984 

To  break  this  destructive  dynamic  will 
require  action  in  support  of  democratic 
self-determination,  economic  and  social 
development  that  fairly  benefits  all,  and 
cooperation  in  meeting  threats  to  the 
security  of  the  region.  That  is  the  con- 
sensus of  the  bipartisan  commission.  It 
is  the  basis  of  the  legislative  package 
now  before  you. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
■timiiHii— WW 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Specifically,  this  is  what  the  Presi- 
dent proposes  to  implement  the  recom- 
^  mendations  of  the  bipartisan  commis- 
sion. 

Economic  Assistance.  Recognizing 
that  economic  deterioration  aggravates 
social  and  political  unrest,  the  commis- 
sion recommended  an  additional  $400 
million  this  year  for  emergency  stabiliza- 
tion to  set  the  stage  for  long-term 
development. 

Our  supplemental  request  for  FY 
1984  is  for  $400  million  in  emergency 
funds  to  halt  sharp  declines  in  gross 
•■!  domestic  product  (GDP),  per  capita  in- 
come, and  employment.  During  the  last 
several  years,  per  capita  GDP  has  fallen 
Dy  35%  "in  El  Salvador,  23%  in  Costa 
Rica,  14%  in  Guatemala,  and  12%  in 
Honduras.  In  4  years.  El  Salvador  has 
ost  15  years  of  economic  development. 

The  commission  recommended 
ilmost  doubling  our  projected  economic 
lid  to  roughly  $8  billion  over  the  next  5 
years.  This  amount,  which  looks  large 
antil  compared  to  the  region's  needs, 
»vould  support  a  comprehensive  strategy 
to  promote  democratization,  economic 
growth,  human  development,  and 
security. 

Our  implementation  plan  for  fiscal 
year  (FY)  1985-89  calls  for  a  total  of 
$5.9  billion  in  appropriated  funds  and 
off-budget  guarantee  authorities  to  allow 
for  $2  billion  in  insurance  and  guar- 
antees, the  latter  including  housing  in- 
vestment guarantees  and  a  trade  credit 
insurance  program  to  be  administered  by 
the  Export-Import  Bank. 

For  FY  1985,  we  propose  a  program 
involving  $1.1  billion  in  appropriated 
funds  and  $600  million  in  insurance  and 
guarantees.  Depending  on  country  per- 
formance, we  estimate  that  the  major 
beneficiaries  of  direct,  bilateral  aid  in 
FY  1985  would  be  El  Salvador  ($341 
million),  Costa  Rica  ($208  million),  Hon- 
duras ($139  million),  and  Guatemala  ($96 
million).  El  Salvador,  which  has  suffered 
over  $800  million  in  guerrilla  destruc- 
tion, would  be  the  largest  single  re- 
cipient. Two  other  countries,  however, 
would  receive  more  on  a  per  capita 
basis. 

From  a  functional  standpoint,  this 
FY  1985  proposal  includes: 

•  About  $550  million  in  balance-of- 
payments  support  to  finance  the  import 
of  critical  goods  by  the  private  sector; 

•  $120  million  in  Public  Law  480 
food  assistance,  with  local  currency  pro- 
ceeds used  to  reinforce  programs  in,  for 
example,  education  and  health; 


April  1984 


•  Major  labor-intensive  construction 
of  infrastructure  and  housing; 

•  Significantly  increased  support  for 
education,  including  literacy  and  teacher 
corps  training  and  scholarships; 

•  Major  funding  to  develop  commer- 
cial agriculture,  the  backbone  of  the 
Central  American  economies,  including 
assistance  to  broaden  ownership  pat- 
terns and  to  increase  the  availability  of 
credit; 

•  Increase  funding  for  activities  in 
Central  America  by  the  private  National 
Endowment  for  Democracy; 

•  Funds  to  strengthen  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  in  the  region  as  the 
surest  way  to  safeguard  individual  liber- 
ties and  human  rights;  and 

•  Support  for  the  Central  American 
Common  Market  and  its  companion  Cen- 
tral American  Bank  for  Economic  In- 
tegration to  revitalize  intraregional 
trade  and  restore  economic  production 
and  employment. 

Military  Assistance.  Peace  is  essen- 
tial to  economic  and  humanitarian  prog- 
ress in  Central  America.  Without  securi- 
ty, the  best  economic  programs  and  the 
wisest  diplomacy  will  be  unable  to  stop 
the  opponents  of  democracy. 

The  commission  recommended  sig- 
nificantly increased  levels  of  military  aid 
to  El  Salvador,  warning  specifically 
against  providing  "too  little  to  wage  the 
war  successfully." 

The  President's  proposal  is  as 
follows: 

•  For  El  Salvador:  $178.7  million  in 
FY  1984  supplemental  assistance  and 
$132.5  million  for  1985.  Added  to  the 
$64.8  million  available  under  this  year's 
continuing  resolution,  the  FY  1984-85 
program  for  El  Salvador  would  total 
$376  million.  This  program  would  be 
concentrated  in  FY  1984  in  order  to 
break  the  military  stalemate  and  provide 
as  soon  as  possible  a  firmer  basis  for 
economic  recovery  and  democratic  na- 
tional reconciliation  in  El  Salvador. 

•  For  the  rest  of  Central  America: 
$80.35  million  in  FY  1984  supplemental 
military  assistance  and  $123.4  million 
for  FY  1985.  The  lion's  share  would  be 
allocated  to  Honduras,  a  democracy  that 
still  faces  frequent  violations  of  its  na- 
tional territory  by  Salvadoran  guerrillas 
seeking  refuge  and  using  Honduras  as  a 
supply  route,  as  well  as  by  Honduran 
guerrillas  infiltrated  from  Nicaragua. 
Honduras  also  faces  a  direct  military 
threat  from  Nicaragua,  which  has  built 
up  armed  forces  at  least  five  times 
larger  than  Somoza's  National  Guard 


and  has  received  some  $250  million  in 
military  assistance  from  the  Soviet  bloc 
since  1979. 

The  commission  recommends  that 
military  aid  to  El  Salvador  should, 
through  legislation  requiring  periodic 
reports,  be  made  contingent  upon 
demonstrated  progress  toward  human 
rights  objectives,  including  free  elections 
and  reduction  in  death-squad  activities. 
There  is  agreement  among  the  ex- 
ecutive, the  Congress,  and  the  commis- 
sion that  human  rights  progress  is 
essential  in  El  Salvador  to  ensure  a  suc- 
cessful outcome  of  war  and  to  protect 
U.S.  security  and  moral  interests.  There 
is  also  a  consensus  that  U.S.  assistance 
should  actively  be  used  to  achieve  these 
objectives. 

As  this  committee  knows,  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  and  the  Congress  have 
not  always  seen  eye  to  eye  on  how  best 
to  achieve  this  shared  goal.  My  ex- 
ecutive branch  colleagues  and  I  are  firm- 
ly convinced  that  a  statutory  formula  re- 
quiring determinations  at  arbitrary  pre- 
set intervals  on  an  "all-or-nothing"  basis 
is  not  an  effective  approach.  Experience 
shows  that  such  a  formula  may  actually 
trigger  hostile  action  by  guerrilla  forces 
and  focus  attention  on  the  certification 
process  rather  than  on  the  underlying 
problems  and  their  remedies. 

We  must  find  a  means  to  condition 
our  assistance  in  ways  that  work.  This 
requires  the  flexibility  to  respond  to 
specific  circumstances  as  they  exist  at  a 
given  moment.  Recent  advances,  which 
have  taken  place  in  the  absence  of  a 
legislated  certification  requirement, 
demonstrate  that  alternatives  do  exist. 
We  are  ready  to  work  closely  with 
the  Congress  to  ensure  continuing 
human  rights  progress  while  preserving 
the  President's  ability  to  pursue  an  ef- 
fective foreign  policy. 

Central  American  Development 
Organization  (CADO).  The  commission 
recommended  creation  of  a  Central 
American  Development  Organization  to 
give  multilateral  form  and  substance  to 
economic  development  efforts. 

In  line  with  the  commission's  recom- 
mendation, the  proposed  legislation  sets 
forth  principles  to  guide  the  negotiations 
for  establishing  this  new  institution  in 
conjunction  with  the  Central  American 
countries  and  other  donors. 

The  President  has  indicated  that  he 
intends  to  respect  the  principles  set 
forth  in  the  legislation,  both  in  his 
negotiations  and  in  subsequent  U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  CADO.  In  line  with  these 
principles: 


73 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


•  CADO  would  provide  an  effective 
forum  for  an  open  dialogue  on  Central 
American  political,  economic,  and  social 
development,  and  a  continuous  review  of 
local  policies  and  of  the  uses  to  which 
foreign  assistance  is  put. 

•  Participation  would  be  open  to  the 
United  States,  other  donors,  and  those 
Central  American  countries  that  commit 
themselves  to,  among  other  things, 
peace  and  mutual  security,  maintaining 
or  making  progress  toward  human 
rights  development,  building  democracy, 
and  encouraging  economic  growth 
through  policy  reforms.  CADO  would  in- 
clude representatives  from  both  the 
public  and  private  sectors,  from  labor 
and  business,  and  be  supported  by  a 
small  professional  staff. 

•  CADO  would  make  recommenda- 
tions on  political,  economic,  and  social 
development  objectives;  mobilization  of 
resources  and  external  resource  needs; 
and  economic  policies  and  structures. 
CADO  would  evaluate  country  perform- 
ance and  progress  in  meeting  objectives. 

•  In  this  regard,  disbursement  of 
25%  of  economic  assistance  funds 
authorized  under  this  act  and  allocated 
for  each  Central  American  country 
would  be  deferred  until  both  the  United 
States  and  CADO  have  approved.  Con- 
sistent with  the  Constitution,  ultimate 
control  of  U.S.  aid  funds  would  remain 
with  Congress  and  the  President. 

Multiyear  Funding.  To  ensure  ef- 
fective planning  and  predictability,  the 
proposed  economic  assistance  departs 
from  the  conventional  practice  of  seek- 
ing authorizations  for  1  or  2  years.  We 
are  seeking  an  authorization  that  will  go 
beyond  FY  1985  and  extend  through  FY 
1989.  In  addition,  we  are  requesting  that 
appropriations  under  this  authorization 
be  made  available  beyond  a  single  fiscal 
year. 

The  reason  for  this  innovation  is 
that  the  bill  represents  a  5-year  pro- 
gram. This  is  what  was  developed  by  the 
commission,  and  it  is  supported  by  our 
own  analysis.  This  approach  has  the  fun- 
damental virtue  of  enabling  everyone 
concerned— both  in  the  United  States 
and  in  Central  America— to  know  what 
could  become  available  if  performance 
standards  are  met. 


Policy  and  Implementation 

Many  questions  have  arisen  about  this 
program. 

•  Are  we  asking  for  too  much? 

•  Will  our  assistance  be  used  effec- 
tively? 


•  Are  we  seeking  a  military  solution 
in  El  Salvador? 

•  Shouldn't  increased  assistance 
follow  a  regional  settlement? 

•  Will  these  additional  resources 
solve  the  problem? 

Let  me  take  each  in  turn. 

Are  we  asking  for  too  much?  No. 

In  fact,  the  sums  are  modest  in  relation 
to  need.  As  the  bipartisan  commission 
underlined,  the  need  for  external 
assistance  is  enormous.  Physical  in- 
frastructure has  been  damaged,  health 
and  education  systems  need  expansion, 
and  investment  in  productive  capacity  is 
essential  to  employ  the  region's  growing 
labor  force. 

There  are  those  who  counsel  that  we 
should  provide  less  economic  assistance. 
But  is  less  than  15%  of  our  proposed 
global  economic  aid  budget  for  FY  1985 
too  large  a  price  to  pay  to  alleviate  suf- 
fering and  serve  our  interests  in  Central 
America? 

Others  advocate  a  reduction  in 
military  assistance.  Yet  there  is  no 
reduction  in  the  arms,  training,  and 
other  support  flowing  to  the  other  side, 
a  side  that  has  rejected  democracy  and 
pluralism  and  utilizes  violence  as  its 
chosen  means  to  power. 

Still  others  recommend  that  we 
withdraw  altogether,  because  the  situa- 
tion is  supposedly  too  tough  for  us, 
because  regional  forces  of  moderation 
and  democracy  are  allegedly  too  weak, 
or  because  they  discount  the  manifest  in- 
tentions of  the  antidemocratic  forces  at 
work.  The  United  States  cannot,  how- 
ever, afford  to  withdraw  and  abandon 
Central  America  to  poverty  and  com- 
munism. 

Lastly,  there  are  those  who  are  will- 
ing to  do  something  to  help,  but  not 
enough.  They  don't  want  to  shoulder  the 
political  consequences  if  those  we  sup- 
port lose,  but  they  are  not  willing  to 
concede  the  assistance  needed  for  them 
to  win.  They  refused  to  make  a  genuine 
commitment  and  continue  to  seek  "quick 
fixes"  that  fail  to  address  the  fundamen- 
tal issues  of  peace,  democracy,  security, 
and  honest  reform.  The  commission 
rightly  singles  out  this  approach  as  the 
most  pernicious. 

Assistance  of  $8  billion  over  5  years 
would  be  equivalent  to  about  5%  of  the 
gross  domestic  product  of  the  region. 
This  is  less  than  the  aid  previously  made 
available  to  some  other  parts  of  the 
world. 

Another  useful  measure  of  the  abili- 
ty of  Central  America  to  absorb  these 
proposed  levels  of  assistance  is  the 


shortfall  in  export  earnings  from  coffee 
and  sugar  due  to  lower  prices,  plus 
higher  costs  for  imported  oil.  This  net 
hard  currency  loss  amounts  to  about 
$1.5  billion  per  year— the  same  general 
magnitude  as  the  proposed  assistance. 

Moreover,  considerable  excess 
capacity  could  quickly  and  easily  be 
brought  back  into  play,  generating  in- 
creased employment  and  output.  Private 
firms  need  only  working  capital  and  im- 
ported inputs;  in  the  public  sector,  high- 
priority  investment  programs  that  have 
been  suspended  or  cut  back  because  of 
austerity  programs  lack  only  financial 
support  to  be  reactivated. 

Will  the  assistance  be  used  effec- 
tively? In  the  near  term,  the  bulk  of  our 
resources  will  go  to  private-sector  ac- 
tivities, not  expansion  of  government 
bureaucracies.  In  the  longer  term,  we 
will  also  be  providing  the  institution- 
building  help,  training,  and  technical 
assistance  that  will  allow  our  neighbors 
to  carry  out  larger  scale  programs  more 
efficiently. 

Local  policy  reform  will  be  required 
to  receive  and  ensure  effective  use  of 
our  funds.  We  will  not  subsidize  ineffi- 
ciency and  will  strive  to  create  oppor- 
tunities and  incentives  for  private-sector 
investment.  We  hope  that  CADO  will  be 
an  effective  mechanism  to  this  end.  A 
key  objective  of  CADO  will  be  to  consult 
the  private  sector  to  identify  activities 
that  will  most  increase  productivity: 
neither  government  bureaucracy  nor 
handouts  but  the  cutting  edge  of  local 
production. 

Capital  flight  was  a  serious  problem 
for  3-4  years  beginning  about  1979.  | 

More  recently,  however,  the  central 
banks  of  the  region  have  recognized  the 
seriousness  of  the  problem  and  are  suc- 
cessfully working  to  prevent  capital 
flight. 

Our  AID  [Agency  for  International 
Development]  missions  also  are  pro- 
viding useful  advice  and  technical 
assistance  to  help  Central  American 
monetary  authorities  meet  the  challenge 
As  a  result,  outflows  have  been  greatly 
reduced. 

Are  we  seeking  a  military  solution 
in  El  Salvador?  No.  As  President 
Reagan  said  last  March,  "the  real  solu- 
tion can  only  be  a  political  one,"  with  th 
Salvadoran  people  deciding  their  own 
destiny  through  free  and  fair  elections. 
That  is  not  a  "military  solution."  The 
military  assistance  we  are  requesting 
would  provide  the  wherewithal  for  the 
Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  to  break  the 
current  stalemate  and  take  and  sustain 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


uaaaam 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Central  America  Initiative  Legislation 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  17,  1984' 

I  herewith  transmit  proposed  legislation  that 
embodies  the  consensus  arrived  at  by  the  Na- 
tional Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America.  Its  unifying  thread  is  the  spirit  of 
the  late  Senator  Henry  M.  Jackson— to  ad- 
vance the  twin  purposes  of  national  security 
and  human  development. 

Peace  and  individual  betterment  are 
universal  purposes.  They  are  at  the  heart  of 
the  American  dream.  Yet,  today  in  Central 
America  these  goals  are  not  realized.  Poverty 
and  violence  are  widespread.  As  a  conse- 
quence, democratic  forces  are  not  able  to 
flourish,  and  those  who  seek  to  disrupt 
freedom  and  opportunity  threaten  the  heai-t 
of  those  nations. 

Throughout  our  history,  our  leaders  have 
put  country  before  party  on  issues  in  foreign 
affairs  important  to  the  national  interest.  The 
Commission  identifies  the  situation  in  Central 
America  as  this  kind  of  issue.  The  12  Commis- 
sioners—Democrats and  Republicans 
alike— conclude  "that  Central  America  is  both 
vital  and  vulnerable,  and  that  whatever  other 
ci-ises  may  arise  to  claim  the  nation's  atten- 
tion, the  United  States  cannot  afford  to  turn 
away  from  that  threatened  region." 

We  face  an  inescapable  reality:  we  must 
come  to  the  support  of  our  neighbors.  The 
democratic  elements  in  Central  America  need 
our  help.  For  them  to  overcome  the  problems 
of  accumulated  historical  inequities  and  im- 
mediate armed  threats  will  take  time,  effort, 
and  resources.  We  must  support  those  efforts. 

As  the  Commission  recommends,  our 
policy  must  be  based  on  the  principles  of 
democratic  self-determination,  economic  and 
social  improvement  that  fairly  benefits  all, 
and  cooperation  in  meeting  threats  to  the 
security  of  the  region. 

Accordingly,  I  propose  the  "Central 
America  Democracy,  Peace  and  Development 
Initiative  Act  of  1984."  This  act  calls  for  an 
increased  commitment  of  resources  beginning 
immediately  and  extending  regularly  over  the 
ne.xt  five  years.  This  assistance  is  necessary 
to  support  the  balance  of  economic,  political, 
diplomatic,  and  security  measures  that  will  be 
pursued  simultaneously. 


I  propose  authorization  for  an  $8  billion, 
five-year  reconstruction  and  development  pro- 
gram for  Central  America,  composed  of  $6 
billion  in  direct  appropriations  and  $2  billion 
in  insurance  and  guarantee  authority.  For 
fiscal  year  1985  the  figures  are  SLlbillion 
and  $600  million,  respectively.  In  addition,  the 
plan  calls  for  $400  million  in  supplemental  ap- 
propriations for  an  emergency  economic 
stabilization  program  for  fiscal  year  1984. 

These  resources  will  support  agricultural 
development,  education,  health  services,  ex- 
port promotion,  land  reform,  housing, 
humanitarian  relief,  trade  credit  insurance, 
aid  for  small  businesses,  and  other  activities. 
Because  democracy  is  essential  to  effective 
development,  special  attention  will  be  given 
to  increasing  scholarships,  leadership  training, 
educational  exchanges,  and  support  for  the 
growth  of  democratic  institutions. 

Regional  institutions  such  as  the  Central 
American  Common  Market  (CACM)  and  the 
Central  American  Bank  for  Economic  Integra- 
tion (CABEI)  made  a  major  contribution  to 
the  region's  economic  growth  in  the  1960's 
and  early  70's.  I  am  proposing  a  substantial 
assistance  program  to  revitalize  these  institu- 
tions and  thereby  stimulate  intra-regional 
trade  and  economic  activity. 

To  enable  the  countries  of  Central 
America  to  paitidpate  directly  in  the  plan- 
ning of  these  efforts,  I  shall  explore  the  crea- 
tion of  a  Central  American  Development 
Organization  (CADO).  This  would  enable 
political  and  private  leaders  from  both  the 
United  States  and  Central  America  to  review 
objectives  and  progress,  and  make  recommen- 
dations on  the  nature  and  levels  of  our 
assistance  efforts.  The  organization  would,  in 
effect,  help  to  oversee  and  coordinate  the  ma- 
jor efforts  that  must  be  made.  The  legislation 
I  am  proposing  sets  out  a  series  of  principles 
to  guide  the  negotiations  for  the  establish- 
ment of  this  new  regional  institution.  I  intend 
to  respect  those  principles  in  these  negotia- 
tions and  in  our  subsequent  participation  in 
CADO.  As  the  Commission  recognized,  the 
ultimate  control  of  aid  funds  will  always  rest 
with  the  donors.  Consistent  with  the  Con- 
stitution and  this  precept,  final  disposition  of 
funds  appropriated  under  this  legislation  will 
be  subject  to  the  ultimate  control  of  the  Con- 
gress and  the  President. 


The  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
specifically  recommends  significantly  in- 
creased levels  of  military  aid  to  the  region, 
especially  El  Salvador.  In  the  words  of  the 
report,  "the  worst  possible  policy  for  El 
Salvador  is  to  provide  just  enough  aid  to  keep 
the  war  going,  but  too  little  to  wage  it  suc- 
cessfully." I  propose  authorization  for  the 
region  for  fiscal  year  1984  and  a  $256  million 
program  for  fiscal  year  1985. 

U.S.  military  assistance  is  vital  to  shield 
progress  on  human  rights  and  democratization 
against  violence  from  extremes  of  both  left 
and  right.  I  shall  ensure  that  this  assistance  is 
provided  under  conditions  necessary  to  foster 
human  rights  and  political  and  economic 
development,  and  our  Administration  will  con- 
sult with  the  Members  of  the  Congress  to 
make  certain  that  our  assistance  is  used  fairly 
and  effectively. 

No  new  laws  are  needed  to  carry  out 
many  of  the  Commission's  recommendations. 
There  is,  for  example,  a  consensus  on  an  in- 
tegral part  of  our  strategy  in  Central 
America:  support  for  actions  implementing 
the  21  Contadora  objectives  to  help  bring 
about  peace.  The  Contadora  objectives  are  in 
Central  America's  interest  and  in  ours. 
Similarly,  we  are  urging  other  nations  to  in- 
crease their  assistance  to  the  area. 

I  believe  it  is  no  accident  that  the  Com- 
mission reached  many  of  the  same  conclusions 
about  comprehensive  solutions  to  Central 
America's  problems  as  have  the  participants 
in  the  Contadora  process.  As  Dr.  Kissinger 
noted  in  his  January  10  letter  to  me,  "the 
best  route  to  consensus  on  U.S.  policy  toward 
Central  America  is  by  exposure  to  the 
realities  of  Central  America." 

The  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America  has  done  its  work.  Now  it  is 
our  turn.  Unless  we  act— quickly,  humanely, 
and  firmly— we  shall  face  a  crisis  that  is  much 
worse  for  everyone  concerned.  We  owe  it  to 
our  children  to  make  sure  that  our  neighbors 
have  a  chance  to  live  decent  lives  in  freedom. 
I,  therefore,  ask  that  the  enclosed  legisla- 
tion be  given  your  urgent  attention  and  early 
and  favorable  action. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  20,  1984. 


'.pril  1984 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


the  initiative  to  provide  a  stronger  shield 
for  protecting  political  and  economic 
development.  This  would  increase  the  in- 
centives for  the  FDR/FMLN  [Revolu- 
tionary Democratic  Front/Farabundo 
Marti  Liberation  Front]  to  enter  into 
serious  discussions  with  the  Salvadoran 
Peace  Commission  about  participation  m 
elections.  We  doubt  this  will  happen  un- 
til the  FDR/FMLN  becomes  convinced  it 
cannot  prevail  militarily.  Passage  of  our 
proposed  assistance  package,  however, 
could  be  a  deciding  factor  in  ensuring 
participation  of  important  elements  ot 
the  far  left  in  the  1385  municipal  and 
legislative  elections. 

Though  the  amount  of  proposed  mili- 
tary assistance  is  larger  than  that  pro- 
vided  previously,  we  should  bear  m  mind 
that  the  current  military  stalemate  may 
be  partly  due  to  the  inadequacy  and 
uncertainty  of  past  assistance.  To  con- 
tinue an  inadequate  level  of  assistance 
may  be  tantamount  to  prolonging  the 

war. 

The  amount  of  military  assistance 
for  El  Salvador  should  also  be  kept  in 
perspective:  total  FY  1984  military 
assistance  for  El  Salvador  (that  provided 
in  the  continuing  resolution  plus  the 
supplemental  request)  is  3.6%  of  our 
worldwide  military  assistance,  and  the 
FY  1985  request  for  El  Salvador  is  2.1% 
of  the  global  figure.  The  bipartisan  com- 
mission stated  that  "there  is  ...  no 
logical  argument  for  giving  some 
[military]  aid  but  not  enough."  We  can 
afford  the  amount  we  are  requesting, 
whether  in  terms  of  our  important  in- 
terests in  Central  America  or  of  our 
worldwide  responsibilities. 

Shouldn't  increased  economic  aid 
accompany  or  follow  an  overall 
regional  settlement?  The  economic 
assistance  which  we  are  requesting  is 
essential  support  for  any  negotiated 
settlement.  If  we  want  to  give  peace  a 
chance,  we  must  begin  now  to  rebuild 
the  economies  of  Central  America  to 
create  the  climate  for  peace. 

At  some  point  in  the  future,  if  all 
the  parties  are  ready  for  settlement,  the 
peace  process  could  proceed  very  rapid- 
ly With  our  full  support,  Contadora  has 
already  prepared  the  groundwork  for  an 
agreement  in  its  excellent  21-point  Docu- 
ment of  Objectives.  But  successful 
negotiations  must  reflect  operational 
realities.  The  economies  of  Central 
America,  fragile  from  the  beginning, 
have  been  subjected  to  the  stress  of 
economic  crisis  and  violence.  If  a 
regional  peace  agreement  is  signed,  even 
with  the  best  intentions  of  all  the  par- 


& 


ties,  it  will  not  succeed  if  the  nations  of 
the  region  are  suffering  from  economic 
collapse. 


Will  these  additional  resources 
solve  the  problem?  Resources  alone  will 
not  solve  the  Central  American  crisis. 
But  resource  predictability  can  enable 
our  diplomacy  to  take  more  effective  ad- 
vantage of  the  interplay  between  dif- 
ferent policy  instruments  to  channel 
events  toward  peaceful  solutions,  in- 
cluding negotiated  solutions  wherever 
possible.  , 

What  is  needed,  in  addition  to  the 
provision  of  adequate  levels  of  economic 
and  military  assistance,  is  demonstration 
by  the  U.S.  of  a  long-term  commitment; 
the  adoption  by  Central  American 
governments  of  appropriate  economic, 
political,  and  social  policies/reforms;  and 
an  active  and  long-term  diplomacy  tor 
peace. 

Conclusion 

This  comprehensive  policy  will  require 
considerable  effort  and  sacrifice.  There 
are  those  who  are  inclined  to  support 
only  economic  assistance.  There  are 
others  who  are  inclined  to  support  only 
military  assistance.  There  is.  however 
no  realistic  alternative  to  the  balanced 
approach  in  the  proposals  before  you. 

The  crisis  is  acute.  Our  neighbors  m 
Central  America  urgently  need  the  help 
of  the  only  country  capable  of  making 
the  difference.  We  have  a  responsibility. 
U  S.  moral  and  strategic  interests  are 
both  engaged  in  an  area  in  which  we 
have  historically  been  involved.  Doing 
nothing  or  doing  too  little  are  not 
responsible  alternatives. 

Our  initiative  is  based  on  sound 
analysis.  It  is  rooted  in  the  consensus 
judgment  that  the  area's  problems  have 
both  indigenous  and  extraregional 
causes.  „,  .     , 

Our  goals  are  realistic.  The  region  s 
most  progressive,  democratic  forces 
strongly  believe  that  we  can  work 
together  successfully  to  strengthen  the 
moderate  center  in  Central  America. 
These  same  people  are  convinced  that 
our  active  participation  will  serve  both 
to  defeat  communism  and  to  bolster 
respect  for  human  freedom  in  this 
critical  part  of  our  hemisphere. 

The  approach  is  right.  There  is 
broad  agreement  that  effective  action 
must  include  a  mix  of  developmental, 
political,  diplomatic,  and  security 
elements  and  that  these  elements  must 
be  pursued  simultaneously,  equitably. 


and  humanely.  There  is  no  such  thing  as 
a  wholly  "economic,"  a  wholly  "political," 
or  a  wholly  "military"  solution  to  Central 
America's  problems.  Economies  must  be 
protected  as  well  as  developed.  Govern- 
ments must  be  worth  defending.  Home- 
grown poverty  and  Cuban-directed  guer- 
rilla warfare  are  allies  of  each  other;  our 
policies  must  take  aim  at  both. 

The  approach  proposed  by  the  bipar- 
tisan commission  and  adopted  by  the 
President  does  call  for  greater  U.S.  in- 
volvement in  the  region,  but  it  is  a  con- 
structive involvement  that  will  eventual- 
ly enable  Central  Americans  to  stand  on 
their  own  and  live  at  peace  with  one 
another.  This  kind  of  involvement  now 
will  eliminate  the  need  for  greater  in- 
volvement later. 

What  the  bipartisan  commission  and 
the  President  propose  is  not  impossible. 
It  is  a  realistic  and  humane  response  to 
a  real  crisis  in  a  particularly  troubled 
setting.  We  have  the  resources  to  do  it. 
The  people  in  Central  America  want  us 
to  do  it.  Our  enemies— extremists  of  the 
left  and  the  right-will  be  delighted  if 
we  hesitate. 

I  hope  that  your  consideration  of  the 
bill  will  be  infused  by  the  bipartisan 
commission's  unanimous  conclusion,  a 
conclusion  that  guided  its  preparation 
and  which  is  worth  quoting  in  full: 

The  Commission  has  concluded  that  the 
security  interests  of  the  United  States  are 
importantly  engaged  in  Central  America;  thai 
these  interests  require  a  significantly  larger 
program  of  military  assistance,  as  well  as 
greatly  expanded  support  for  economic 
growth  and  social  reform;  that  there  must  be 
an  end  to  the  massive  violation  of  human 
rights  if  security  is  to  be  achieved  in  Central 
America;  and  that  external  support  of  the  m- 
surgency  must  be  neutralized  for  the  same 
purpose. 


^!km 


r*o/ 


lintesi 


jiecon 
lecline 
it 
ft 
pacit; 
mu 
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Tk 
ortai 
key? 
id  it 
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'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  ot 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Elections  in  El  Salvador 


by  Thomas  R.  Pickering 

Address  before  the  Corporate  Round 
Table  of  the  World  Affairs  Council  on 
March  1,  1981,-  Mr.  Pickering  is  U.S. 
Embassador  to  El  Salvador. 

:n  25  days  El  Salvador  will  hold  direct 
lections  for  a  president  and  a  vice  presi- 
ient.  Under  pressures  of  a  civil  war, 
frave  economic  difficulties,  major  efforts 
,0  deal  with  a  crisis  in  human  rights,  and 
in  economy  which  has  suffered  a  25% 
iecline  in  4  years,  this  will  be  no  easy 
ask. 

These  elections  will  tax  El  Salvador's 
;apacity  to  evolve  as  a  democracy.  Many 
lave  seen  the  problems;  few  have  looked 
it  the  potential  and  the  possibilities.  To- 
lay  I  want  to  talk  with  you  about  the 
lections,  why  El  Salvador  is  holding 
hem,  the  timing  of  those  elections,  the 
ireparations  for  the  process,  and  how 
he  Salvadorans  themselves  will  conduct 
his  effort. 

These  elections  will  be  not  only  im- 
ortant  for  the  future  of  El  Salvador— 
hey  will  determine  its  next  president 
nd  its  course  for  the  next  5  years.  They 
/ill  also  set  a  standard  by  which  other 
Central  American  elections  will  be 
udged. 

Nicaragua  has  announced  elections 
'or  November;  Guatemala  is  considering 
ilections  in  mid-summer. 

In  El  Salvador,  all  parties  are 
j^uaranteed  free  access  to  the  media.  In 
El  Salvador,  all  those  who  wish  to  par- 
ticipate, including  the  guerrillas,  have 
Deen  invited  to  join  the  democratic  proc- 
ss.  In  El  Salvador,  the  government  has 
;aken  major  steps  to  open  the  door  to  all 
:iualified  voters  in  an  internationally 
observed  process  with  clear  and  careful 
steps  to  prevent  fraud. 

Nicaragua,  in  contrast,  has  come  only 
Dart  way  in  the  process.  Salvadorans  are 
;ertain  that  the  standards  that  they  have 
jstablished  can  meet  the  careful  scrutiny 
jf  the  entire  outside  world.  Let  us  hope, 
too,  that  the  Nicaraguans  will  develop  a 
process  that  will  be  equally  free,  fair, 
3pen,  and  democratic. 

The  United  States  has  made  clear 
that  it  supports— indeed,  applauds— the 
holding  of  elections  in  El  Salvador.  At 
the  same  time,  it  has  declared  its  full 
neutrality  with  regard  to  the  parties  and 
the  candidates.  Finally,  the  United 
States  has  stated  that  it  will  accept  the 


April  1984 


results  of  a  free  and  fair  democratic  elec- 
tion in  El  Salvador.  The  United  States 
will  gauge  and  develop  its  policies  with 
respect  to  the  winner  of  the  Salvadoran 
elections— whomever  he  may  be— accord- 
ing to  the  policies  he  puts  into  action. 
The  United  States  will  not  support  a 
president  or  govei'nment  or  party  in  this 
process  which  is  not  willing  to  be  held 
accountable  through  succeeding-  free  and 
fair  elections.  In  our  judgment  all  parties 
currently  competing  in  the  Salvadoran 
elections  meet  this  test. 

Why  Elections? 

The  leader  of  the  jjolitical  wing  of  the 
guerrillas,  Guillei-mo  Ungo,  has  said  that 
"elections  will  not  be  a  solution,  but  will 
instead  worsen  the  situation,  because 
they  respond  to  the  interests  of  the  U.S. 
Administration  and  not  to  the  interests 
of  the  Salvadoran  people." 

Elections  have  been  a  difficult  point 
for  the  guerrillas  to  accept.  If  the  voters 
freely  express  their  will,  how  can  the 
voters  lose?  The  guerrillas  have  been 
free  and  are  still  free  to  participate  in 
Salvadoran  elections.  The  fact  is  and  has 
been  that  the  guerrillas  have  been  em- 
barrassed by  theii'  opposition  to  the  1982 
elections  and  have  openly  admitted  that 
embarrassment  in  recent  statements— a 
backhanded  admission  of  the  importance 
which  the  El  Salvador  electoral  process 
has  achieved  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

Already  some  guerrilla  factions  and 
military  groups  are  expressing  doubts 
and  disagreements  with  Guillermo  Ungo. 
One  group  has  issued  a  declaration  foi-- 
bidding  four  villages  in  El  Salvador  to 
participate  in  the  polling. 

The  clear  fact  is  that  the  guerrillas 
know  that  they  are  unlikely  to  win  any 
significant  percentage  of  the  vote. 
Among  the  guerrillas  and  their  key 
leaders  are  many  militants  who  would 
prefer  to  continue  to  fight  and  to  kill 
rather  than  to  accept  this  popular 
verdict. 

The  basis  for  guerrilla  opposition  to 
the  elections  is  clear.  But  what  are  the 
reasons  for  believing  that  elections  in  El 
Salvador  can  make  for  constructive 
change? 

The  first  point  is  that,  while  elections 
of  and  by  themselves  will  not  solve  all 
problems,  they  are  another  important 
step  forward  on  the  difficult  path  toward 
democracy.  Just  as  the  United  States 
strongly  supports  and  advocates  elec- 


tions in  Chile,  in  Nicaragua,  and  in 
Guatemala,  so  too  we  support  the  exer- 
cise of  popular  democracy  in  El  Salvador. 
We  know  of  no  better  way  to  achieve 
that  objective  than  having  the  people 
choose  their  next  president  and  vice 
president. 

This  process  in  El  Salvador  has  been 
a  long  and  difficult  road.  For  over  50 
years  the  winner  of  El  Salvador's 
presidential  elections  was  knovra  in  ad- 
vance. When  the  reforming  group  of 
military  officers  took  over  the  govern- 
ment in  1979,  the  old  process  collapsed. 
In  its  place  the  new  military  leaders,  in 
accord  with  the  Christian  Democratic 
Party,  carried  out  elections  in  1982.  The 
purpose  of  those  elections  was  to  choose 
a  body  to  write  a  new  constitution,  ap- 
point a  government,  and  enact  necessary 
laws.  At  the  time  of  those  elections, 
Salvadoran  leaders  pledged  themselves 
to  democratic  elections  within  2  years. 
The  new  elections  carry  out  that  pledge. 

The  elections  will  mark  another  step 
in  separating  the  military  from  the 
political  process  in  El  Salvador.  A  new, 
popularly  elected  president  will  become 
commander  in  chief.  The  military  are 
pledged  not  to  interfere  in  the  electoral 
process,  to  protect  and  defend  that  proc- 
ess, and  to  accept  its  results.  Thus  far 
they  have  given  every  indication  that 
they  are  doing  so,  and  we  expect  that 
they  will  carry  out  their  pledge. 

Finally,  elections  now  will  select  a 
man  who  can  provide  a  platform  and  a 
program  for  El  Salvador  for  the  future. 
This  approach  will  mark  a  distinct 
change  from  the  present  transitional 
government  in  which  the  president  was 
appointed  by  the  Legislative  Assembly. 
The  new  Constitution  of  El  Salvador  re- 
quires that  the  president  be  selected  by 
clear  majority.  'This  requirement  means 
that  he  can  justifiably  claim  to  have  a 
popular  mandate  for  his  programs  and 
policies,  something  that  has  not  been 
known  in  El  Salvador  for  quite  a  few 
years. 

Some  have  suggested  that  they 
should  "postpone"  elections  in  El 
Salvador.  Others  have  indicated  an  in- 
terest in  "power  sharing"  with  the  guer- 
rillas. In  my  experience  in  El  Salvador,  I 
have  found  very  few  who  support  these 
suggestions.  The  elections  of  1982  were 
extremely  popular,  enjoying  an  80%  turn- 
out; it  is  too  early  to  predict  what  the 
results  might  be  this  year.  However,  all 
of  the  political  parties  tell  us  that  their 
members  indicate  that  there  will  be  a 
large  turnout  again  in  the  1984  elections. 
Those  who  want  to  postpone,  delay  or 
engage  in  power  sharing  take 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


heavy  responsibility  on  their  shoulders  in 
trying  to  deny  to  a  very  large  percent- 
age of  the  Salvadoran  people  their  right 
to  vote  and  to  choose  their  future. 

El  Salvador  aspires  to  and  clearly  is 
entitled  to  the  kind  of  government  to 
which  we  also  believe  we  are  entitled.  It 
is  an  expression  of  some  intolerance,  and 
perhaps  even  worse,  to  claim  that  we  can 
ignore  the  will  of  the  Salvadoran  people 
because  we  know  what  is  best  for  El 
Salvador. 

Elections  in  El  Salvador  wall  not  be 
risk  free.  Neither  I  nor  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment favors  a  party  or  a  candidate.  We 
don't  know  how  they  are  going  to  come 
out;  indeed,  at  this  date  it  is  a  very  close 
race.  The  candidates  are  each  very  dif- 
ferent. Their  programs  provide  for  a 
wide  range  of  choices.  The  present 
government  is  not  running  for  reelection. 
Elections  themselves  could  give  a  can- 
didate the  authority  to  pursue  a  more 
vigorous  dialogue  with  the  left,  seeking 
their  participation  in  the  elections  to  be 
held  next  year  for  a  new  national 
assembly  and  for  mayors. 

Why  Now? 

I've  already  indicated  the  commitment  of 
past  and  present  governments  to  hold 
elections  on  a  regular  basis.  One  of  the 
hallmarks  of  democracy  is  knowing  that 
after  a  time  the  people  will  once  again 
have  an  opportunity  to  select  a  new 
government.  El  Salvador  is  now  ready  to 
take  this  important  step. 

The  elections  themselves  will  add 
another  base  for  establishing  the  rule  of 
law  in  El  Salvador.  They  will  adhere  to 
standards  established  in  the  nation's  new 
Constitution  and  to  the  recently  passed 
electoral  law.  We  believe  they  can  and 
will  be  conducted  in  a  free,  fair,  and  im- 
partial manner. 

Observers  from  many  countries  have 
been  invited,  as  in  1982,  to  view  and 
verify  the  conduct  of  these  elections.  El 
Salvador  is  ready  for  it  and  welcomes 
careful  international  scrutiny  of  its  elec- 
toral process.  El  Salvador  also  welcomes 
the  fact  that  many  hundreds  of  reporters 
and  other  journalists  will  be  present  in 
their  country  to  see  the  electoral  process 
unfold;  in  1982  even  some  of  the  most 
skeptical  journalists  admitted  the 
fairness  of  the  process. 

No  one  makes  the  claim  that  this  will 
be  an  easy  process  nor  that  it  will  be 
trouble  free.  The  fact  that  the  army  will 
actively  have  to  engage  itself  to  protect 
the  elections  is  a  clear  indication  that  the 
guerrillas,  whatever  they  say,  are  ex- 


pected to  conduct  an  increasingly 
punishing  level  of  military  activity  at 
election  time. 

The  time  is  right  for  El  Salvador  and 
its  people  to  demonstrate  that  they  are 
not  prepared  to  allow  a  small  group  of 
armed  guerrillas,  supported  by  less  than 
the  5%  of  the  people— according  to  the 
guerrillas'  claim— to  veto  their 
democratic  development. 

How  Are  the  Elections 
Going  To  Be  Conducted? 

The  presidential  election  campaign  is  in 
full  swing.  Americans  would  be  at  home 
with  the  rhetoric,  the  enthusiasm,  the 
fanfare,  and  even  the  invective 
characteristic  of  a  tough  political  battle. 
Press,  radio,  and  television  coverage  is 
extensive.  Advertising  is  widespread. 
Posters  and  painted  party  emblems  ap- 
pear on  the  walls,  on  the  streets,  and  on 
the  electric  light  poles.  The  candidates 
are  in  the  countryside  and  in  the  cities 
with  rallies  of  up  to  15,000  supporters. 

The  independent  Central  Elections 
Council  is  putting  together  El  Salvador's 
first  valid  electoral  registry.  The  United 
States  has  provided  $3  million  in 
assistance  for  the  computer  equipment 
and  software  to  do  this.  The  Salvadorans 
themselves  have  launched  a  massive  ef- 
fort to  get  the  registry  in  shape  by  elec- 
tion day. 

The  registry  is  based  on  the  national 
identity  card  system.  Over  2.4  million 
identification  card  entries  have  been  put 
into  the  system.  Over  the  last  several 
months,  over  600  people  have  been  work- 
ing 24  hours  a  day  photocopying, 
microfilming,  and  entering  municipal 
birth  and  death  records  into  the  com- 
puter to  check  the  identity  card  informa- 
tion and  remove  invalid  entries.  Simi- 
larly, an  effective  program  has  been  used 
to  weed  out  duplicate  identification 
cards.  It  is  expected  that  somewhere 
between  1.5-2  million  Salvadorans  will 
be  eligible  to  go  to  the  polls  on  March  25. 
The  registry  will  be  used  to  check  their 
eligibOity.  By  assigning  voters  to  voting 
places,  the  register  should  help  to  reduce 
the  waiting  time  and  long  lines  of  1982. 
It  will  also  be  available  should  a  second, 
run-off  election  be  required  and  for  the 
elections  scheduled  for  1985. 

On  voting  day  each  voter  will  be  told 
in  advance  where  he  is  to  vote.  The  Elec- 
tion Council,  the  parties,  and  local  of- 
ficials will  see  to  that.  Special  arrange- 
ments will  be  made  for  those  large 
numbers  of  Salvadorans  who  wish  to 
vote  away  from  their  home  districts. 


M 


At  the  polls  the  voter's  name  will  be 
checked  against  the  register.  His  finger 
and  identity  card  will  be  marked  with  a 
special  visible  and  indelible  ink  to  pre- 
vent double  voting.  The  voter  will  be 
given  a  ballot  displaying  the  various  par 
ty  symbols.  He  will  mark  an  "X"  across 
the  party  symbol  of  the  party  of  his 
choice.  He  will  then  fold  the  ballot  and 
put  it  in  a  box  made  of  hard,  transparent  a^ 
plastic.  Although  he  will  mark  the  ballot  nfic 
in  secret  before  it  is  folded,  the  rest  of 
the  process  will  take  place  in  full  view  of  Jievelo 
the  poll  watchers  of  the  various  parties. 
Their  duty  is  to  verify  on  behalf  of  their 
party  that  the  registered  voter  receives 
only  one  ballot,  casts  only  one  vote,  and 
that  the  vote  is  placed  in  the  ballot  box. 

Except  for  the  use  of  the  registry 
and  the  visible  ink,  this  is  the  same  proc- 
ess that  worked  so  well  in  1982. 

Similarly,  the  counting  and  transmis- 
sion of  official  results  will  follow  a  strict 
procedure.  After  the  polls  close,  at 
sunset  where  there  is  no  electricity  and 
at  6  p.m.  where  there  is,  the  sealed 
ballot  boxes  will  be  broken  open  by  the 
poll  watchers.  The  box  cannot  be  opened 
without  physically  damaging  its  sides. 
The  poll  watchers  will  count  the  ballots 
in  each  other's  presence,  draw  up  an  of- 
ficial report,  and  agree  to  and  sign  the 
report.  Each  party  poll  watcher  wall  hav' 
his  own  copy. 

The  reports  from  each  ballot  box  will 
be  sent  up  the  line  to  the  Central  Elec- 
tions CouncO  for  computation  and  final 
tallying.  Each  of  the  steps  will  be  carriei 
out  under  the  eyes  of  the  party  poll 
watchers.  In  case  of  a  challenge,  the  poll  jjelau 
watchers'  copies  of  the  official  report  wil 
be  consulted.  If  copies  conflict,  the  ma- 
jority rules. 

It  is  a  system  designed  to  be  simple  Ijctdfj 
and  at  the  same  time  to  prevent  fraud; 
to  inspire  confidence  and  to  avoid  being 
unwieldy. 

I  have  already  mentioned  the  invita- 
tions to  international  observers  and  the 
fact  that  El  Salvador  will  welcome  the 
press.  We  expect  that  they  and  the 
observers  will  carefully  probe  for 
vulnerabilities  in  the  process  as  they  did 
in  1982.  I  am  told  that  there  were  more 
than  1,500  journalists  from  all  over  the 
world  covering  the  1982  elections. 
Although  I  was  not  there  at  the  time, 
many  people  who  were  there  have 
assured  me  that  the  massive  turnout  am  |ir 
the  high  standard  of  honesty  of  those 
elections  were  impressive  to  all.  So,  too, 
has  been  the  absence  of  any  substan- 
tiated charges  of  electoral  malfeasance  o 
fraud. 


i 

Oi 

jerri 


fcth 
(cord 
iesof 
ettrn 

ill)'! 

■Iters, 


ilar 
ieirit 


itivil 

ftWO' 


jvebt 
Kiriti 


mliilie 
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7B 


Department  of  State  Bullet! 


ewl 


Vhat  About  Other  Problems? 

•roviding  security  for  the  elections  will 
le  as  important  and  as  difficult  as  ensur- 
ig  that  they  are  honest  and  free  of 
raud. 

On  January  25,  Mario  Aguinada,  a 
lierrilla  spokesman,  said  in  Bogota  that, 
vhi[e  the  guerrillas  would  not  militarily 
arget  the  elections,  the  war  would  con- 
inue— "some  bridges  may  fall,  or  some 
raffic  may  be  stopped."  As  they  did  in 
982,  the  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  have 
leveloped  an  effective  plan  to  deal  with 
his  threat.  In  1982  election  returns  were 
ecorded  from  90%  of  the  261  municipali- 
ies  of  El  Salvador,  and  those  for  which 
etums  were  not  recorded  constituted 
nly  a  tiny  percentage  of  the  registered 
oters.  These  security  precautions  will 
equire  intense  activity  by  the 
alvadoran  military  at  a  time  when  all  of 
ur  military  assistance  has  been  obli- 
ated.  Especially  if  a  second  round  of 
oting  is  required,  the  Salvadoran 
lilitary  will  have  to  carefully  husband 
heir  munitions  and  equipment  in  order 
0  ensure  that  the  voting  takes  place  in 
s  free  an  environment  as  possible. 

The  guerrillas,  despite  their 
tatements,  have  intensified  their  attacks 
n  civilians,  including  the  recent  murder 
f  two  deputies  to  the  Legislative 
tof  Lssembly.  A  guerrilla  communique  called 
he  first  murder  "a  response"  to  the 
oming  elections.  Military  commanders 
ave  been  ordered  to  guarantee  the 
ecurity  of  the  elections,  to  be  responsive 
the  legitimate  concerns  of  the  political 
arties,  and  to  offer  full  support  within 
he  law  to  keep  the  process  "free,  legiti- 
liiate,  and  pure." 

The  military  themselves,  as  a  sign  of 
heir  own  effort  to  avoid  influencing  the 
lectoral  process,  have  decided  not  to  ex- 
rcise  their  constitutional  right  to  vote. 

Conclusion 

n  closing,  I  would  like  to  leave  with  you 
few  key  thoughts.  No  country  is  ever 
eally  "ready"  for  an  election  in  the 
lind  of  all  of  its  citizens.  One  attribute 
f  fair  elections  is  that  they  take  place 
espite  the  idea  of  "readiness"  which 
ould  be  used  to  distort  the  process. 

El  Salvador  is  bravely  entering  this 
rocess  in  the  midst  of  a  heated  civil 
far.  One  hundred  and  twenty  years  ago 
ti  ur  own  country  faced  a  similar  chal- 
;nge.  There  was  hot  debate  over 
ostponing  the  elections.  After  the  elec- 
ions  were  held,  the  winner  stated: 


TREATIES 


...Lf  the  rebellion  could  force  us  to  forego 
or  postpone  a  national  election,  it  might  fairly 
claim  to  have  already  conquered  and  ruined 
us.  .  .  .  But  the  election,  along  with  its  in- 
cidental and  undesirable  strife,  has  done  good 
too.  It  has  demonstrated  that  a  people's 
government  can  sustain  a  national  election  in 
the  midst  of  a  great  civil  war.  Until  now,  it 
has  not  been  knowTi  to  the  world  that  this 
was  a  possibility. 

The  speaker  of  course  was  Abraham 
Lincoln,  reelected  president  during  our 
nation's  greatest  crisis.  A  man  who 
emerged  as  one  of  our  greatest  healers. 
A  man  generous  in  victory  with  a  vision 
of  a  reunited  nation. 

We  often  forget  that  democracy  re- 
quires heros— the  silent  heros  who 
believe  that  ballot  boxes,  not  bullets, 
resolve  issues  and  stand  the  test  of  time. 
El  Salvador  will  face  a  serious  and  im- 
portant test  on  March  25.  Our  own  faith 
in  democracy  should  lead  us  to  believe 
that,  in  spite  of  all  the  challenges  El 
Salvador  will  emerge  stronger,  surer, 
and  reconfirmed  in  its  determination  to 
advance  the  course  of  peace  and 
democracy.  ■ 


Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Antarctic  treaty.  Signed  at  Washington  Dec. 

1,  1959.  Entered  into  force  June  23,  1961. 

TIAS  4780. 

Accession  deposited:  Hungary, 

.Jan.  27,  1984. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  futherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Oslo  June 
20,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  16,  1978  for 
VIII  6-8  and  10-4;  Sept.  1,  1980  for  VIII  3-4. 
TIAS  10486. 

Acceptance  deposited:  F.R.G., 
Jan.  26,  1984  for  VIII-9. 

Atomic  Energy 

Agreement  between  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  and  the  Governments  of 
Canada,  Jamaica,  and  the  United  States  of 
America  concerning  the  transfer  of  enriched 
uranium  for  a  low  power  research  reactor, 
with  annexes  and  exchange  of  notes.  Signed 
at  Vienna  Jan.  25,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  25,  1984. 

Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(TIAS  1591),  with  annex.  Done  at  Montreal 
Sept.  30,  1977."  Acceptance  deposited: 
Turkey,  Feb.  23,  1984. 


Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
Entei-ed  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Honduras,  Dec.  28, 
1983;  Ivory  Coast,  Sri  Lanka,  Dec.  30,  1983. 

Commodities— Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 

for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 

Geneva  June  27,  1980.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Comoros,  Jan.  27, 

1984. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international 
transport  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR 
caniets,  with  annexes,  as  amended.  Done  at 
Geneva  Nov.  14,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  20,  1978;  for  the  U.S.  Mar.  18,  1982. 
Accession  deposited:  Israel,  Feb.  14,  1984. 

Finance— African  Development  Bank 

Agreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
ment Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Khartoum 
Aug.  4,  1963,  as  amended  at  Abidjan  May  17, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1982;  for  the 
U.S.  Jan.  31,  1983. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Spain,  Feb.  13,  1984. 
Accession  deposited:  Portugal,  Dec.  15,  1983. 

Nuclear  Weapons— Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  Julv  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force  Mar. 
5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 

Accession  deposited:  Sao  Tome  &  Principe, 
July  20,  1983. 

Patents— Microorganisms 

Budapest  treaty  on  the  international  recogni- 
tion of  the  deposit  of  microorganisms  for  the 
puipose  of  patent  procedure,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Budapest  Apr.  28,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  19,  1980.  TIAS  9768. 
Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  Jan.  26,  1984. 

Prisoner  Transfer 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  per- 
sons. Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21,  1983.' 
Signature:  U.K.  Aug.  25,  1983. 

Property— Industrial 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  in- 
dustrial property  of  Mar.  20,  1883,  as  revised. 
Done  at  Stockholm  Julv  14,  1967.  Entered  in- 
to force  Apr  26,  1970;  for  the  U.S.  Sept.  5, 
1970,  except  for  Arts.  1-12  entered  into  force 
May  19,  1970,  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1973. 
TIAS  6923,  7727. 

Notification  of  accession:  Rwanda,  Dec.  1, 
1983. 

Trade 

Protocol  of  provisional  application  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
Concluded  at  Geneva  Oct.  20,  1947.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1948.  TIAS  1700. 
De  facto  application:  Brunei,  Dec.  31,  1983. 


TREATIES 


Arrangement  regarding  international  trade  in 
textiles.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  20,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1.  1974.  TIAS  7840. 
Accession  deposited:  China,  Jan.  18,  1984. 

Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regard- 
ing international  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec.  20, 
1973,  as  extended  (TIAS  7840,  8939).  Done  at 
Geneva  Dec.  22,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
1,  1982.  TIAS  10323. 

Accession  deposited:  China,  Jan.  18,  1984. 
Approval  deposited: Yugoslavia,  Sept.  26, 
1983. 

United  Nations 

Convention  on  the  privileges  and  immunities 
of  the  United  Nations.  Adopted  at  New  York 
Feb.  13,  1946.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  17, 
1946;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  29,  1970.  TIAS  6900. 
Accession  deposited:  Uruguay,  Feb.  16,  1984. 

Wheat 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
wheat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered  in- 
to force  July  1,  1983. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Algeria,  Spain,  Feb. 
14,  1984;  U.K.,  Feb.  22,  1984.^ 
Accessions  deposited:  Ecuador,  Dec.  29,  1983; 
Syrian  Arab  Rep.,  Jan.  30,  1984. 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
food  aid  convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015).  Done 
at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  July  1,  1983. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Spain,  Feb.  14,  1984; 
U.K.,  Feb.  22,  1984.3 

Wine 

Agreement  for  the  creation,  in  Paris,  of  an  In- 
ternational Wine  Office.  Done  at  Paris  Nov. 
29,  1924.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  29,  1927. 
Notification  of  accession  deposited:  U.S.,  Jan. 
25,  1984;  effective  July  25,  1984. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 
discrimination  against  women.  Adopted  at 
New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  3,  1981.'' 
Ratification  deposited:  Brazil,  Feb.  1,  1984. 

World  Health  Organization 

Amendments  to  Arts.  24  and  25  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  World  Health  Organization 
(TIAS  1808).  Adopted  at  Geneva  May  17, 
1976,  by  the  29th  World  Health  Assembly. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Canada,  Jan.  20,  1984; 
Malaysia,  Jan.  25,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  20,  1984. 


World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Antigua  &  Barbuda, 
Nov.  1,  1983. 


BILATERAL 

Algeria 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
cooperation  and  trade  in  the  field  of 
agriculture,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Algiers 
Feb.  2,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  2,  1984. 

Belgium 

Agreement  concerning  the  status  of  forces  of 
the  U.S.  ground-launched  cruise  missile  unit. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Brussels 
Feb.  13,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  13, 
1984. 
Brazil 

Agreement  relating  to  industrial  and  military 
cooperation,  with  memorandum  of  under- 
standing. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Brasilia  Feb.  6,  1984'.  Entered  into  force  Feb. 
6,  1984. 
Canada 

Agi-eement  relating  to  the  AM  broadcasting 
service  in  the  medium  frequency  band,  with 
annexes.  Signed  at  Ottawa  Jan.  17,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  17,  1984. 
Supersedes:  Agreement  of  Mar.  31  and  June 

12,  1967,  as  amended  (TIAS  62(58,  6626). 
China 

Arrangement  relating  to  a  visa  system  for  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  of  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  Feb.  16,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  16,  1984. 
Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Sept. 
28,  1977  (TIAS  8944).  with  memorandum  of 
understanding.  Signed  at  Santo  Domingo  Jan. 

13,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  13,  1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
cooperation  in  geological  sciences.  Signed  at 
Santo  Domingo  Jan.  23,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  .Jan.  23,  1984. 
Egypt 

First  amendment  to  the  grant  agreement  of 
Aug.  19,  1981  (TIAS  10242),  for  basic  educa- 
tion. Signed  at  Cairo  Nov.  10,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Nov.  10,  1983. 

Third  amendment  to  the  grant  agreement  of 
Aug.  29,  1979  (TIAS  9699)  as  amended,  for 
Alexandria  w-astewater  system  expansion. 
Signed  at  Cairo  Nov.  10,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  Nov.  10,  1983. 

International  express  mail  agreement  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Cairo  and 
Washington  Dec.  3  and  22,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  1,  1984. 
Honduras 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Tegucigalpa  Dec.  16,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  16,  1983. 


80 


Hungary 

Program  of  cooperation  and  exchanges  in 
culture,  education,  science,  and  technology  for 
1984  and  1985,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Budapest  Dec.  12,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  scientific 
and  technical  cooperation  in  earth  sciences. 
Signed  at  Reston  and  Budapest  Jan.  6  and  20, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  20,  1984. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Oct. 
13  and  Nov.  9,  1982  (TIAS  10580),  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  tex- 
tiles and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Jakarta  Jan.  24  and  27, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  27,  1984. 

Israel 

Grant  agreement  to  support  the  economic  and 
political  stability  of  Israel.  Signed  at 
Washington  Dec.  29,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  29,  1983. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  coopera- 
tion in  the  fields  of  social  sciences  and  human 
development.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
Jerusalem  Jan.  12  and  16,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  16,  1984. 

Italy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  cooperatior 
in  earth  sciences.  Signed  at  Reston  and  Rome 
Nov.  7  and  Dec.  1,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  1,  1983. 

Liberia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug. 
13,  1980,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities (TIAS  9841).  Signed  at  Monrovia 
Dec.  15,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  15, 
1983. 

Macao 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts, with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Hong  Kong  and  Macao  Dec.  28, 
1983,  and  Jan.  9,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  9,  1984;  effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Mexico 

Agreement  on  the  development  and  facilita- 
tion of  tourism.  Signed  at  Mexico  Apr.  18, 
1983. 

Entered  into  force:  Jan  17,  1984. 
Supersedes:  Agreement  of  May  4, 1978  (TIAS 
9468). 

Agreement  for  cooperation  on  environmental 
programs  and  transboundary  problems. 
Signed  at  La  Paz  (Mexico)  Aug.  14,  1983. 
Entered  into  force:  Feb.  16,  1984. 
Supersedes:  Agreement  of  June  14  and  19, 
1978  (TIAS  9264). 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  2,  1977  (TIAS  8952),  relating  to  addi- 
tional cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the 
illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  e.\- 
change  of  letters  at  Mexico  Jan.  4,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  4,  1984. 


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Morocco 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guaran- 
teed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S  Government 
and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Rabat  Dec.  30,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  10,  1984. 

Agreement  relating  to  agreement  of  May  17, 
1976,  for  sale  of  agricultural  commodities 
(TIAS  8309),  with  memorandum  of  under- 
standing. Signed  at  Rabat  Feb.  2,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  2,  1984. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  amending  the  project  loan  agree- 
ment of  May  23,  1983  (TIAS  10724),  for  rural 
electrification.  Signed  at  Islamabad  Dec.  19, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  19,  1983. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  memorandum  of 
consultation  of  the  agreement  concerning  air 
transport  services  of  Sept.  16,  1982  (TIAS 
10443).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Manila  Nov.  23,  1983  and  Jan.  23,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  23,  1984. 

Portugal 

Agreement  relating  to  economic  and  militai-y 
assistance.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Lisbon  Dec.  13,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Feb. 
4,  1984. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  continued  use  of 
facilities  in  the  Azores  by  U.S.  forces  under 
the  agreement  of  Sept.  6,  1951,  as  amended 
TIAS  3087,  7254,  10050).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Lisbon  Dec.  13,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  4,  1984. 

Singapore 

Agreement  concerning  general  security  of 
military  information.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Singapore  June  25,  1982,  and  Mai-.  9, 

1983.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  9,  1983. 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over 
vessels  utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore  Oil 
Port.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Singapore  Sept.'l,  1983,  and  Jan.  16,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  17,  1984. 

Switzerland 

Memorandum  of  consultation  concerning  in- 
terim measures  on  air  transport  services, 
with  annex.  Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  1, 

1984.  Enters  into  force  when  confirmed  by 
diplomatic  note. 

Togo 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to  or 
^aranteed  by  the  U.S.  Government  through 
the  Export-Import  Bank.  Signed  at  Lome 
Nov.  29,  1983, 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  31,  1984. 


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Yugoslavia 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
tourism.  Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  2,  1984. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  last  note  by 
which  the  contracting  parties  inform  one 
another  that  their  internal  procedures  have 
been  satisfied. 

Zambia 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  ceitain  debts  owed  to  or 
guaranteed  by  the  U.S.  Government  and  its 
agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Lusaka 
Dec.  19,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  10, 
1984. 


'Not  in  force. 

^Applicable  to  Bailiwicks  of  Guemsey  and 
Jersey,  Isle  of  Man,  Bermuda,  British  Virgin 
Islands,  Gibraltar,  Hong  Kong,  Montserrat, 
St.  Helena,  and  dependencies. 

'Applicable  to  Bailiwick  of  Guernsey. 

"Not  in  force  for  the  U.S.  ■ 


February  1984 


February  1 

President  Reagan  offers  no  comment  on  a 
House  Democrats  draft  resolution  pressing 
him  to  begin  "prompt  and  orderly 
withdrawal"  of  U.S.  Marines  from  Beirut. 
Deputy  White  House  spokesman  Larry 
Speakes  says  the  resolution  "could  encourage 
intransigence  on  the  part  of  the  Syrians  and 
clearly  undermine  the  peace  process."  Any 
statement  indicating  a  "lack  of  solidarity"  in 
the  United  States,  he  asserts,  "can  encourage 
the  Syrians  to  dig  in  and  hold  on." 


February  2 

In  response  to  a  congressional  call  for  the 
"prompt  and  orderly"  withdrawal  of  troops 
from  Beirut,  State  Department  officials  say 
that  such  action  would  embolden  "the  forces 
of  radicalism  and  extremism"  in  the  Middle 
East.  The  resolution  could  also  lead  to  the 
commitment  of  more  American  troops  in  the 
region  "in  even  more  dangerous  cir- 
cumstances," asserts  Under  Secretary 
Eagleburger. 

In  Beirut,  heavy  fighting  erupts  between 
Lebanese  army  troops  and  Druze  and  Shia 
Muslim  militiamen.  The  fighting  occurs  during 
a  deadlock  in  efforts  to  get  the  Lebanese 
Government,  the  Druze  and  Shia  opposition, 
and  the  Syrians  to  agree  on  a  security  plan  to 
separate  the  warring  factions  and  begin  mov- 
ing toward  reconciliation.  State  Department 
officials  report  that  there  were  no  incidents 
that  day  involving  U.S.  Marines  and  call  on 
"all  parties  to  respect  the  cease-fire"  and  to 
"spare  innocent  civilian  lives." 


February  2-3 

U.S. -Netherlands  representatives  meet  in  The 
Hague  to  discuss  recent  developments  in  in- 
ternational communications.  Topics  include 
international  and  regional  organizations  in- 
volved in  telecommunications  and  information 
issues;  international  satellite  issues;  and 
developments  in  telecommunications  policy. 
U.S.  delegation  is  headed  by  Ambassador 
Diana  Lady  Dougan,  Coordinator  for  Interna- 
tional Communication  and  Information  Policy. 


February  3 

President  Reagan  says  his  proposed  legisla- 
tion on  Central  America,  implementing  the 
bipartisan  commission's  recommendations, 
will  offer  "a  comprehensive  program  to  sup- 
port democratic  development,  improve  human 
rights,  and  bring  peace  to  this  troubled  region 
so  close  to  home."  In  remarks  to  Members  of 
Congress,  the  diplomatic  community,  and  Ad- 
ministration officials  at  the  White  House,  the 
President,  urging  prompt  congressional  action 
and  support  for  the  initiative,  says  it  "serves 
the  interest  of  the  United  States  and  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere."  The  legislation  calls 
for  $400  milUon  in  supplementary  economic 
assistance  for  FY  1984.  Dui-ing  the  next  5 
years,  economic  assistance  will  amount  to  $5.9 
billion  in  appropriated  funds  and  $2  billion  in 
insurance  and  guarantees. 


February  5 

Lebanon's  Muslim  Prime  Minister,  Shafig  al- 
Wazzan,  and  his  cabinet  resign.  President 
Gemayel  accepts  the  resignation  and  an- 
nounces an  eight-point  program  for  national 
reconciliation. 


February  6 

U.S.-Brazil  sign  a  new  bilateral  science  and 
technology  agreement.  In  scientific  coopera- 
tion, the  agreement  covers  oil  and  gas 
surveys,  evaluation  of  coal  resources  and 
water-data  exchange;  in  space  cooperation, 
ongoing  projects  such  as  geodynamics,  at- 
mospheric, and  space  science  research,  remote 
sensing,  environmental  observations, 
technology  utilization  research  and  rescue 
satellites,  and  advance  communications  and 
planned  Brazilian  use  of  the  space  shuttle,  are 
covered. 

The  40th  session  of  the  UN  Human 
Rights  Commission  opens  in  Geneva.  The  ses- 
sion focuses  on  allegations  of  human  rights 
violations  worldwide  and  addresses  such  con- 
cerns as  the  human  rights  situation  in  Central 
America,  Afghanistan,  Kampuchea,  and 
Poland  as  well  as  Soviet  abuse  of  psychiatry. 
Richard  Schifter,  U.S.  representative  to  the 
Human  Rights  Commission,  heads  the  U.S. 
delegation. 

Political  and  military  situation  worsens  in 
Beirut  as  intense  fighting  erupts  following  a 
curfew  imposed  at  1  p.m.  Beirut  time.  Deputy 
White  House  spokesman  Larry  Speakes  con- 
finns  reports  that  the  U.S.  Marine  contingent 
comes  under  hostile  fire  from  small  arms  and 
mortar.  Marines  return  fire  and  are  supported 


April  1984 


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CHRONOLOGY 


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by  naval  gunfire  from  ships  offshore. 

Acting  State  Department  spol<esman  Alan 
Romberg  says  the  Syrians  are  responsible  for 
the  current  deterioration  in  Lebanon  but 
declines  to  assign  "specific  weight"  to  that 
responsibility.  The  U.S.  ".shares  the  goals" 
announced  in  President  Gemayel's  eight-point 
plan  which  includes: 

•  Political  and  administrative  reforms; 

•  Reconvening  the  political  reconciliation 
talks  in  Geneva  on  Feb.  28; 

•  Acceptance  of  Prime  Minister  Wazzan's 
resignation; 

•  Formation  of  a  government  of  national 
unity; 

•  Preparation  for  Lebanese  Armed  Forces 
deployment  to  the  south  and  the  north; 

•  Comprehensive  and  total  cease-fire  with 
an  obser\'er  committee; 

•  Intensified  Lebanese-Syrian  consulta- 
tions; and 

•  Complete  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces. 

"Deploring  the  continued  shelling  of  inno- 
cent civilians,"  President  Reagan  calls  on  the 
Syrian  Government  to  "cease  this  activity." 
The  President  also  welcomes  Gemayel's  ef- 
forts to  "stop  the  fighting  and  to  resume  the 
talks  in  Geneva"  and  reiterates  the  U.S.  com- 
mitment to  the  "unity,  independence,  and 
sovereignty  of  Lebanon"  and  continued  sup- 
port to  its  government  and  people. 

State  Depaitment  officials  say  the  U.S. 
was  informed  "early  last  week"  that  four 
American  officers  serving  with  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  Ethiopia  were  asked  to  leave  that 
country.  The  four  Americans  are  Eniest 
Brant,  First  Secretary;  Paul  Bradley,  Second 
Secretary;  Timothy  Wells,  Commercial  Of- 
ficer; and  Robert  Kragie,  Vice  Consul. 
Department  Deputy  Spokesman  Romberg 
says,  "We  told  the  Ethiopians  they  would 
have  to  withdraw  two  of  their  diplomats  in 
Washington.  One  [Belay  Tsadik]  has  left.  The 
other  [Gelagay  Zawde]  has  severed  his  con- 
nections with  the  Ethiopian  Government  and 
has  asked  to  remain  in  the  LTnited  States." 

February  7 

President  Reagan  announces  the  following 

decisions  on  U.S.  policy  in  Lebanon. 

•  Under  the  e.xisting  MNF  mandate,  he 
authorizes  [announced  Feb.  6]  U.S.  naval 
forces  to  provide  gunfire  and  air  support 
"against  any  units  firing  into  greater  Beirut 
from  parts  of  Lebanon  controlled  by  SjTia,  as 
well  as  against  any  units  directly  attacking 
American  or  MNF  personnel  and  facilities." 

•  When  the  Lebanese  Government 
becomes  a  "broadly  based  representative 
government,"  the  U.S.  will  "vigorously  ac- 
celerate the  training,  equipping,  and  support 
of  the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces"  by  "speeding 
up  delivery  of  equipment,  improving  the  flow 
of  information  to  help  counter  ho.stile  bom- 
bardments, and  intensifying  training  in 
counterterrorism." 


•  A  plan  for  redeployment  of  the  Marines 
from  Beirut  airport  to  their  ships  offshore  will 
begin  "shortly"  and  "proceed  in  stages."  U.S. 
military  personnel  will  remain  on  the  ground 
to  train  and  equip  the  Lebanese  Army  and  to 
protect  remaining  personnel.  Naval  and 
Marine  forces  offshore  will  continue  to  "pro- 
vide support  for  the  protection  of  American 
and  other  MNF  personnel.  ..." 


February  8 

State  Department  issues  a  travel  advisory 
warning  that  "the  situation  in  Lebanon  re- 
mains hazardous"  and  advises  that  "all 
Americans  should  avoid  travel  to  Lebanon  at 
this  time."  It  continues  that  "in  view  of  the 
worsened  security  situation,  dependents  of 
U.S.  Government  employees  have  left  the 
country,  but  the  embassy  in  Beirut  remains  in 
operation." 

Department  Deputy  Spokesman  Alan 
Romberg  says  a  drawdown  of  U.S.  personnel 
in  Beirut  is  continuing,  and  191  U.S.  Govern- 
ment employees,  including  106  temporary 
duty  military  trainers,  remain  in  the  city.  He 
says  that  on  Feb.  7,  41  Americans  departed 
Beirut  for  Cyprus.  Of  those,  24  were  U.S. 
Government  employees,  and  17  were 
dependents.  Forty-nine  Americans  left  on 
Feb.  8.  Romberg  estimates  that  approxi- 
mately 1,350  U.S.  citizens  are  in  Beirut. 

He  also  confirms  that  the  battleship 
U.S.S.  New  Jersey  fires  16-inch  guns  at 
SjTian-controUed  targets. 


February  9 

State  Department  releases  fourth  set  of 
Grenada  documents  relating  to  the  following 
subjects: 

•  "Minutes  of  key  organizational  units  of 
the  National  Jewel  Movement;" 

•  "Economic,  technical  and  military 
assistance  and  educational  and  cultural  ex- 
change involving  Grenada  and  such  nations  as 
Bulgaria,  Cuba,  Czechoslovakia,  the  G.D.R., 
Libya,  and  the  Soviet  Union;" 

•  "Several  churches  on  Grenada;"  and 

•  "SociaUst  International." 


February  10 

Soviet  leadership  officially  announces  the 
death  of  Yuriy  V.  Andropov.  President 
Reagan,  in  his  message  of  condolence  to  Mr. 
Kuznetsov,  the  acting  Soviet  chief  of  state, 
emphasizes  to  the  people  and  Government  of 
the  U.S.S. R.  his  desire  that  the  two  countries 
cooperate  in  the  search  for  a  more  peaceful 
world.  Secretarj'  Shultz  sends  a  similar 
message  of  condolence  to  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  reaffirming  the  basic  prin- 
ciples of  U.S.  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union. 
President  Reagan  designates  Vice  President 
Bush  to  lead  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the 
funeral. 

State  Department  releases  1983  annual 
report  on  human  rights.  The  report  em- 
phasizes two  goals  of  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion policy: 


•  Improving  "human  rights  practices  in 
numerous  countries— to  eliminate  torture  or 
brutaUty,  to  secure  religious  freedom,  to  pro- 
mote free  elections.  .  .  ."  and 

•  Seeking  a  "pubUc  association  of  the 
United  States  with  the  cause  of  liberty." 


February  10-11 

Some  350  U.S.  citizens  and  almost  600  citizens) 
of  other  nations  are  evacuated  from  Beirut. 
The  U.S.  Embassy  announces  that  "because 
of  the  unsettled  conditions  in  Lebanon"  it 
would  evacuate  any  Americans  or  Lebanese 
who  are  in  the  process  of  taking  up  American 
citizenship. 


February  10-15 

Vice  President  Bush  makes  an  official  work- 
ing visit  to  Europe  which  includes  visits  to 
the  United  Kingdom  (Feb.  11-12),  Luxem- 
bourg (Feb.  12-13),  the  Soviet  Union  (Feb. 
13-14)  where  he  heads  U.S.  delegation  attend- 
ing Andropov's  funeral,  Italy  and  the 
Vatican  (Feb.  14-15),  and  France  (Feb.  15). 


February  11-14 

Eg\iJtian  President  Mohamed  Hosni  Mubarak 
makes  an  official  working  visit  to  Washington 
D.C.,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan  and 
other  government  officials. 


February  12-14 

His  Majesty  King  Hussein  I  of  Jordan  makes 
an  official  w-orking  visit  to  Washington,  D.C., 
to  meet  \\ith  President  Reagan  and  other 
government  officials. 


February  13 

Communist  Party's  Central  Committee 
chooses  Konstantin  U.  Chemenko  to  succeed 
Yuriy  V.  Andi-opov  as  its  General  Secretary. 

President  Ricardo  de  la  Espriella  of 
Panama  resigns.  He  is  replaced  by  Vice  Presi 
dent  Jorge  lUueca. 


February  14 

Responding  to  the  Panamanian  President's 
resignation.  State  Department  spokesman 
John  Hughes  says  the  U.S.  is  pleased  that  thi 
Panamanian  elections  will  be  held  as  planned 
on  May  6,  President  lUueca,  Hughes  says, 
"reaffirmed  the  Panamanian  Government's 
commitment  to  hold  the  elections  as  sched- 
uled. We  have  no  reason  to  doubt  that  it  will 
be  done.  We  are  gratified  that  the  electoral 
process,  to  which  we  place  great  importance 
in  all  countries  in  the  region,  will  proceed." 


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February  15 

In  a  letter  to  the  Congress  (Feb.  14),  Presi- 
dent Reagan  forwards  a  further  report  on  th<( 
situation  in  Lebanon.  The  report,  prepared  b;j 
the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense  and 
made  public  Feb.  15,  covers  the  period 
Dec.  12,  1983,  to  Feb.  13,  1984. 


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cilBi   permit; 

•  "To  respond  to  those  who  attack  or 
threaten  the  safety  of  our  personnel;  and 

•  "To  redeploy  our  Marine  detachment 
onto  ships." 

The  Secretary  reiterates  continued  U.S. 
support  for  "withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces" 
as  well  as  for  the  May  17  agreement  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel. 

Leamon  Hunt,  retired  Foreign  Service  of- 
ficer and  Director  General  of  the  multina- 
tional force  and  observers  in  the  Sinai,  is 
assassinated  in  Rome.  Secretai-y  Shultz  con- 
demns the  terrorist  attack  in  the  strongest 
terms  saying  "his  sacrifice  must  inspire  us  to 
rededicate  ourselves  to  the  cause  of  peace  and 
to  defiance  of  forces  of  terror." 


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CHRONOLOGY 


Secretary  Shultz  says  that  "Syrian- 
sponsored  violence  against  the  Government 
[of  Lebanon]  has  presented  us  with  difficult 
choices  in  view  of  the  legislative  and  other 
constraints  under  which  our  forces  are 
operating.  We  are  nonetheless  proceeding: 

•  "To  provide  materiel  support  to  the 
Lebanese  Armed  Forces  as  circumstances 


February  16 

Lebanese  President  Gemayel  reportedly  . 
agrees  to  an  eight-point  plan  said  to  be  spon- 
sored by  Saudi  Arabia  which  includes  abroga- 
tion of  the  May  17  peace  agreement  with 
Israel.  Acting  State  Department  spokesman 
Alan  Romberg  reiterates  U.S.  support  for  the 
May  17  agreement. 

Speaking  during  an  urgent  meeting  of  the 
UN  Security  Council,  U.S.  Ambassador  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick  says  the  U.S.  supports  "authen- 
tic, international  peacekeeping  efforts  in 
Lebanon"  and  will  support  a  "reasonable  pro- 
posal" for  a  UN  role  in  easing  the  situation. 
The  U.S.  is  ready  to  enter  into  serious  discus- 
sion, without  preconditions,  concerning  "the 
composition  and  deployment  of  UN  forces, 
preferably  throughout  Lebanon,"  she  asserts. 


February  17 

Lebanese  opposition  leaders  and  Syria 
reportedly  reject  the  Saudi  eight-point  plan 
presented  by  Lebanese  President  Gemayel 
and  insist  on  the  prior,  unconditional  abroga- 
tion of  the  May  17  agi-eement  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel.  President  Reagan, 
asserting  it  is  "unfair"  to  say  his  Lebanon 
policies  had  failed,  accuses  Syria  of  being  the 
"stumbling  block"  to  a  settlement  in 
Lebanon. 

White  House  announces  the  resignation  of 
Richard  Stone,  the  President's  special  envoy 
and  Ambassador  at  Large  for  Central 
America.  Harry  Schlaudeman,  former  Am- 
bassador to  Venezuela,  is  named  his  suc- 
cessor. 

President  Reagan  transmits  the  Central 
America  Democracy,  Peace  and  Development 
Initiative  Act  of  1984  to  the  Congress.  The 
legislation  would  implement  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
on  Central  America.  The  legislation  proposes 
$400  million  in  FY  1984  supplemental 
economic  assistance  and  $1.12  billion  in  FY 


1985  assistance.  Military  assistance  is  $259 
million  in  additional  assistance  in  FY  1984  and 
$256  million  in  FY  1985. 

President  Reagan  gives  final  approval  to 
the  redeployment  of  U.S.  Marines  from 
Beirut  to  U.S.  ships  offshore.  White  House  of- 
ficials say  (Feb.  16)  that  the  first  Marines 
would  begin  redeploying  within  2-3  days,  and 
all  of  the  Marines  in  the  U.S.  contingent 
would  be  back  on  the  ships  within  30  days. 


February  21 

U.S.  Marine  contingent  in  Beirut  begins  for- 
mally moving  to  U.S.  Sixth  Fleet  vessels  off- 
shore. 

U.S.  submits  new  evidence  of  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  Laos,  Kampuchea,  and 
Afghanistan  to  the  United  Nations.  Since  sub- 
mitting its  last  report  in  August  1983,  the 
U.S.  has  continued  to  analyze  and  review  the 
reports  of  attacks  and  to  analyze  samples  as 
well.  The  4-page  report  says  that  while  there 
appears  to  have  been  a  sharp  decrease  of  at- 
tacks in  Afghanistan  and  a  decrease  in  the 
lethality  of  attacks  in  Laos  and  Kampuchea, 
evidence  shows  continued  use  of  an  uniden- 
tified, nonlethal  agent  or  agents  in  Laos  and 
Kampuchea. 


February  22-25 

New  Zealand  Prime  Minister  Sir  Robert  C. 
Muldoon  makes  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 


February  23 

State  Department  denounces  the  Feb.  22 
bomb  attack  against  a  housing  complex  of  the 
Soviet  Union's  mission  to  the  United  Nations. 
"This  disgraceful,  cowardly  attack  brings 
disrepute  upon  the  United  States"  says 
Department  spokesman  John  Hughes.  Hughes 
continues  that  "if  it  was,  in  fact,  committed 
by  a  group  which  purports  to  support  Jewish 
emigration  from  the  Soviet  Union,  the  group 
is  doing  a  disservice  to  that  cause."  The  U.S. 
Government  has  "long  supported  and  con- 
tinues to  support  the  right  of  Soviet  Jews  to 
emigrate  to  the  country  of  their  choice"  and 
"condemns  this  act  of  terrorism  against  the 
Soviet  UN  mission  complex,"  he  asserts. 

Hughes  also  says  that  administrative  sup- 
port staff  has  arrived  in  Windhoek,  the 
capital  of  Namibia,  to  open  a  Ll.S.  liaison  of- 
fice. The  office  will  be  headed  by  William 
Twaddell,  formerly  Charge  d'Affaires 
(1980-83)  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Maputo, 
Mozambique.  "Our  role,"  he  says,  "will  be 
limited  to  assisting  with  the  disengagement  of 
forces  now  under  way  in  southern  Angola."  A 
Department  of  State  operation,  the  office's 
sole  purpose  is  "to  be  a  presence  between  the 
Angolans  and  the  South  Africans  as  need  be 
for  the  passing  of  messages.  .  .  ." 

President  Reagan  announces  the  follovring 
individuals  as  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation 
who  will  attend  the  independence  celebrations 
of  Brunei: 


•  Deputy  Secretary  Kenneth  W.  Dam  to 
head  the  delegation; 

•  Dr.  Alfred  Balitzer,  Claremont,  Cal.; 

•  Mary  Davis,  Los  Angeles,  Cal.; 

•  John  C.  Fitch,  Houston,  Tex.; 

•  John  H.  Schoettler,  Parker,  Colo.; 

•  William  R.  Sutton,  Fair  Oaks,  Cal. 


February  27 

State  Department  spokesman  John  Hughes 
confirms  that  U.S.  Marines  turned  over  con- 
trol of  Beirut's  International  Airport  Feb.  26 
to  units  of  the  Lebanese  Army.  While  the 
Marines  have  been  redeployed,  he  notes, 
"there  are  still  U.S.  military  and  diplomatic 
personnel  and  facilities  in  Lebanon  that  we 
still  must  protect."  Some  150  Marines  remain 
to  protect  the  U.S.  Embassy  and  the  Am- 
bassador's residence  along  with  about  25 
State  Department  employees  and  about  80 
U.S.  Army  military  trainers. 


February  27-March  5 

Austrian  President  Rudolf  Kirchschlaeger 
makes  a  state  visit  to  the  United  States,  and 
to  Washington,  D.C.,  Feb.  27-29,  to  meet 
with  President  Reagan  and  other  government 
officials. 


February  28-March  2 

Moroccan  Prime  Minister  Mohamed  Karim- 
Lamrani,  accompanied  by  five  members  of  the 
Moroccan  Cabinet,  including  the  Ministers  of 
Information,  Economic  Planning,  Finance, 
Commerce,  and  Agriculture,  makes  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  to  meet 
with  President  Reagan  and  other  government 
officials. 


February  29 

Soviet  Union  vetoes  a  French  proposal  in  the 
LTN  Security  Council  which  would  have 
authorized  an  international  contingent  to 
replace  the  American  and  European  troops  of 
the  multinational  force  in  Beirut.  The  vote 
was  13  to  2  (the  Ukraine  also  voted  against). 

Syrian  President  Assad  and  Lebanese 
President  Gemayel  meet  in  Damascus  to 
discuss  Lebanon.  Department  of  State 
spokesman  John  Hughes,  responding  to  ques- 
tions concerning  possible  cancellation  of  the 
May  17  agreement,  says,  "I  think  the  fact  of 
the  matter  is  that  President  Gemayel  is  in 
Damascus  and  we,  like  you,  will  have  to  wait 
to  see  what  developments  ensue.  We  have 
consistently  thought  this  was  a  good  agi'ee- 
ment  and  are  aware  of  discussions  and  sug- 
gestions and  reports  that  one  side  might 
abrogate  that  treaty.  That  would  be  a  reality. 
It  doesn't  alter  our  analysis,  our  feeling  that 
it  was  and  is  a  good  agreement." 

State  Department  announces  appointment 
of  Ambassador  Loren  E.  Lawrence  as  the 
new  U.S.  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Grenada.  He 
replaces  Charles  A.  Gillespie,  Jr. 

Canadian  Prime  Minister  Pierre  Trudeau 
announces  a  decision  to  resign.  ■ 


PRESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


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Subject 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 

International  Telegraph 

and  Telephone  Consultative 

Committee  (CCITT), 

study  group  B,  Feb.  23. 
Shipping  Coordinating  Committee 

(SCO,  Subcommittee  on 

Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS), 

working  group  on  radio  com- 

mimications,  Feb.  28. 
1984  foreign  fishing  allocations. 
Shultz:  interview  on  "This  Week 

with  David  Brinkley,"  Jan.  22. 
Shultz:  news  conference,  San 

Salvador,  Jan.  31. 
Shultz:  news  conference, 

Caracas,  Feb.  2. 
Shultz:  arrival  statement, 

Brasilia,  Feb.  5. 
Shultz:  remai-ks.  Brasilia,  Feb.  6. 
Shultz:  toast,  Brasilia.  Feb.  6. 
Shultz:  remai'ks,  Brasilia,  Feb.  6. 
Shultz:  news  conference, 

Brasilia,  Feb.  6. 
Shultz:  anival  statement, 

Bridgetown,  Feb.  7. 
Shultz:  news  conference,  St. 

George's,  Feb.  7. 
Program  for  the  official  working 

visit  to  Washington  of  Egyptian 

President  Mohamed  Hosni 

Mubarak,  Feb.  11-14. 
Program  for  the  official  working 

visit  to  Washington  of 

Jordanian  King  Hussein  L 

Feb.  12-14. 
Shultz:  statement  and  news 

briefing  on  the  death  of 

Soviet  President  Andropov. 
West  Coast  Pacific  salmon 

negotiations, 
sec.  National  Committee  for 

the  Prevention  of  Marine 

Pollution,  Mar.  6. 
Shultz:  statement  and  question- 

and-answer  session  on 

Lebanon. 
Shultz:  address  and  question- 

and-answer  session  on  Africa, 

World  Affairs  Council, 

Boston,  Feb.  15. 
Program  for  the  official  working 

visit  to  Washington  of 

New  Zealand  Prime  Minister 

Muldoon,  Feb.  22-25. 
Shultz:  toast,  Bridgetown, 

Feb.  8. 
Shultz:  news  conference, 

Bridgetown,  Feb.  8. 
Shultz:  address  before  the 

Creve  Coeur  Club  of  Illinois 

on  human  rights,  Peoria, 

Feb.  22. 


^■flHHHHHHU 


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*57  2/27 

*58  2/27 

*59  2/27 

*60  2/27 


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Shultz:  interview  on  "The 
MacNeil/Lehrer  News  Hour," 
Feb.  23. 

Thomas  W.M.  Smith  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Nigeria, 
Feb.  17  (biographic  data). 

CCITT,  modem  working  party 
of  study  group  D,  Mar.  8. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Radio  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCIR),  study 
group  1,  Mar.  14. 

Progi-am  for  the  state  visit 
to  the  U.S.  of  Austrian 
President  Kirchschlaeger, 
Feb.  27-Mar.  5. 
Program  for  the  official  work- 
ing visit  to  Washington  of 
Moroccan  Prime  Minister 
Mohamed  Karim-Lamrani, 
Feb.  28-Mar.  2. 
sec,  SOLAS,  working  gi-oup 
on  standards  of  training  and 
watchkeeping.  Mar.  28. 
CCITT,  study  group  A, 
Mar.  27. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, Mar.  22 
Fine  Arts  Committee,  Mar. 

17. 
sec,  SOLAS,  Mar.  26. 
Progi-am  for  the  official 
working  visit  to  Washington 
of  West  German  Chancellor 
Helmut  Kohl,  Mar.  3-6. 
Regional  foreign  policy 
conference,  Birmingham, 
Mar.  22. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 

Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  Publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Free  multiple  copies  may  be  obtained  by 
writing  to  the  Office  of  Opinion  Analysis  and 
Plans,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 
of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

Democratic  Solidarity  in  the  Americas,  lunch- 
eon remarks  to  leaders  of  Barbados, 
Jamaica,  and  the  Organization  of  Eastern 
Caribbean  States,  Bridgetown,  Feb.  8, 
1984  (Current  Policy  #550). 

The  U.S.  and  Africa  in  the  1980s,  Boston 
World  Affairs  Council,  Feb.  15,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #549). 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy  Objectives, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Feb.  9 
1984  (Cun-ent  Policy  #548). 

Canada 

U.S.-Canada  Relations  (GIST,  Feb.  1984). 

East  Asia 

U.S. -Japan  Relations  in  Perspective, 

Deputv  Secretary  Dam,  Japan  Society, 
New  York,  Feb.  6,  1984  (Cun-ent  Policy 
#.547). 

The  U.S.  and  Korea:  Auspicious  Prospects, 
Assistant  Secretary  Wolfowitz,  Asia 
Society,  New  York,  Jan.  31,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #543). 

Economics 

International  Economic  Issues,  Under 
Secretary  Wallis,  Joint  Economic 
Committee  of  Congress,  Feb.  7,  1984 
(Current  Policv  #545). 

U.S.  Trade  Policy  (GIST,  Feb.  1984). 

Controlling  Transfer  of  Technologv  (GIST, 
Feb.  1984). 

Europe 

The  Atlantic  Relationship,  Assistant 

Secretary  Burt,  Subcommittee  on  Europe 
and  the  Middle  East,  House  Foreign 
Affau-s  Committee,  Feb.  7,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #.544). 

Food 

World  Food  Security  (GIST,  Feb.  1984). 

Middle  East 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Lebanon,  L'nder 

Secretary  Eagleburger,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee.  Feb.  2,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #542). 

U.S.  Interests  in  Lebanon,  Assistant 
Secretary  Muiphy,  Subcommittee  on 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Jan.  26,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #540).  ■ 


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NDEX 

Vpril  1984 

Volume  84,  No.  2085 


frica.  The  U.S.  and  Africa  in  the 

1980s(Shultz) 9 

merican  Principles 

ountrv  Reports  on  Human  Rights 

Practices  for  1983 53 

uman  Rights  and  the  Moral  Dimension 

of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  15 

ngola.  U.S.,  Angola,  South  Africa  Discuss 

Peace  {joint  communique) 36 

rms  Control 

ssistant  Secretary  Burt's  Interview 

for  "Worldnet"" 44 

ecretary's    Interview    on    "This    Week 

With  David  Brinkley" 28 

razil.     Secretary     Shultz     Visits     Latin 

America 19 

ongress 

entral  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 

Development  Initiative  (Motley) 72 

entral  America  Initiative  Legislation 

(message  to  the  Congress) 75 

entral  America  Initiative  Proposed 

(Reagan) 71 

auntry  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices 

for  1983 ,53 

uman  Rights  and  the  Moral  Dimension  of 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 15 

iclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOM 

(letter  to  the  Congress) 66 

ecent  Situation  in  the  Philippines 

(Monjo) 37 

.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  (letter  to  the 

Congress) 60 

S.  International  Activities  in  Science 

and  Technology  (message  to  the 

Congress) 67 

.S.  Opposes  Moving  Embassy  to  Jerusalem 

(Eagleburger) ' 65 

S.  Participation  in  the  United  Nations 

(Kirkpatrick) 68 

epartment  and  Foreign  Service.  U.S. 

C)j:)poses  Moving  Embassy  to  Jerusalem 

(Eagleburger) 


65 


conomics 

sistant  .Seoi-etarv  Burt's  Intei-\'iew  for 

"Wuiidnet" 44 

le  U.S.  and  Africa  in  the  1980s(Shultz) 9 

gypt.  President  Meets  With  Two  Arab 

(Hussein,  Mubarak,  Reagan) 63 

I  Salvador 

lections  in  El  Salvador  (Pickering) 77 

jestion-and- Answer  Session  Following 
World  Affairs  Council  Address  (Shultz) . .  12 

cretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin  America 19 

cretarv's  Interview  on  "The  MacNeiVLehrer 

News  Hour" .30 

urope 

-  ssistant  Secretary  Burt's  Interview  for 
"Worldnet" 44 

le  Transatlantic  Relationship:  A  Long-Term 
Perspective  (Eagleburger) 39 

ice  President's  Trip  to  Europe  and 
theU.S.S.R 5 

areign  Assistance 

-  antral  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 
Development  Initiative  (Motley) 72 

antral  America  Initiative  Legislation 
(message  to  the  Congi'ess) 75 

antral  America  Initiative  Proposed 
(Reagan) 71 

cretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin  America 19 

renada.  Secretary  Shultz  Visits 
Latin  America 19 


Human  Rights 

Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices 

for  1983 53 

Human  Rights  and  the  Moral  Dimension  of 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 15 

International  Law.  Board  of  Appellate- 
Review  To  Publish  Decisions   58 

Iran.  Chemical  Weapons  and  the  Iran-Iraq 

War  (Department  statement) 64 

Iraq.  Chemical  Weapons  and  the  Iran-Iraq 

War  (Department  statement)  64 

Israel 

Lebanon  Cancels  Agreement  With  Israel 

(Department  statement) 61 

U.S.  Opposes  Moving  Embassy  to  Jerusalem 

(Eagleburger) " 65 

Jordan 

President  Meets  With  Two  Arab  Leaders 

(Hussein,  Mubarak,  Reagan) 63 

Visit  of  King  Hussein  of  Jordan  (Hussein, 

Reagan) 62 

Lebanon 

Defense  Secretary  Weinberger's  Interview 

on  "Meet  the  Press"  (e.xcerpts) ,59 

Lebanon  Cancels  Agreement  With  Israel 

(Department  statement) 61 

President's  News  Conference  of  February  22 

(e.xcerpts)  ! . . .  2 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  World 

Affairs  Council  Address  (Shultz) 12 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "The  MacNeil/ 

Lehrer  News  Hour" 30 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week 

With  David  Brinkley" 28 

Under  Secretary  Eaglehurger's  Interview  on 

"This  Week  With  David  Brinkley" 34 

U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  (letter  to  the 

Congress) 60 

Middle  East 

Human  Rights  and  the  Moral  Dimension  of 

U.S.  Foreign  Policv  (Shultz) 15 

President  Meets  With  Tw^o  Arab  Leaders 

(Hussein,  Mubarak,  Reagan) 63 

President's  News  Conference  of 

February  22  (excerpts) 2 

Military  Affairs 

Chemical  Weapons  and  the  Iran-Iraq  War 

(Department  statement) 64 

Defense  Secretary  Weinberger's  Interview  on 

"Meet  the  Press"  (excerpts) .59 

President's  News  Conference  of  February 

22  (excerpts) 2 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "The  MacNeil/Lehrer 

News  Hour" 30 

Nicaragua 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  World 

Affairs  Council  Address  (Shultz) 12 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "The  MacNeiL/Lehrer 

News  Hour" ,30 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  The 
Transatlantic  Relationship:  A  Long-Tei-m 

Per.spective  (Flagleburger) 39 

Nuclear  Policv.  Nuclear  Cooperation  With 

EURATOM  (letter  to  the  Congress)  ...  .66 
Passports.  Board  of  Appellate  Review  To 

Publish'Decisions    58 

Philippines.  Recent  Situation  in  the 

Philippines  (Monjo) 37 

Presidential  Documents 

Central  America  Initiative  Legislation 

(message  to  the  Congress) 75 

Central  America  Initiative  Proposed 71 

Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOM  (letter 

to  the  Congress) 66 

President  Meets  With  Two  Arab  Leaders 

(Hus.sein,  Mubarak,  Reagan) 63 

President's  News  Conference  of  February  22 

(e.xceriDts)  '. . .  .2 

Relations  With  the  U.S.S.R.  (Reagan) 1 

U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  (letter  to  the 

Congress) 60 


U.S.  International  Activities  in  Science  and 

Technology  (message  to  the  Congress).  .  .67 
Visit  of  King  Hussein  of  Jordan  (Hussein, 

Reagan) 62 

Visit  of  Yugoslav  President  (Reagan, 

Spiljak)  51 

Publications 

Department  of  State  84 

GPO  Subscriptions 85 

Science  and  Technology.  I'.S.  International 

Activities  in  Science  and  Technology 

(message  to  the  Congress) 67 

Security  Assistance 

Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 

Development  Initiative  (Motley) 72 

Central  America  Initiative  Legislation 

(message  to  the  Congress) 75 

Central  America  Initiative  Proposed 

(Reagan) 71 

South  Africa.  U.S.,  Angola,  South  Africa 

Discuss  Peace  (joint  communique)   36 

Terrorism 

Human  Rights  and  the  Moral  Dimension  of 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 15 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley" 28 

Trade.  President's  News  Conference  of 

February  22  (excerjjts) 2 

Treaties.  Current  Actions '79 

U.S.S.R. 

Assistant  Secretary  Burt's  Interview  for 

"Woridnet" 44 

Death  of  Soviet  President  Andropov  (Shultz, 

White  House  statement) 43 

President's  News  Conference  of  February  22 

(excerpts)  2 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 

World  Affairs  Council  Address 

(Shultz)  12 

Relations  With  the  U.S.S.R.  (Reaean) 1 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "The  MacNeil/ 

Lehrer  News  Hour" 30 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week 

With  David  Brinkley" 28 

Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

"This  Week\Vith  David  Brinkley" 34 

Vice  President's  Trip  to  Europe  and  the 

U.S.S.R 5 

United  Nations.  U.S.  Participation  in  the 

United  Nations  (Kirkpatrick) * 68 

Venezuela.  Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin 

America 19 

Western  Hemisphere 

Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 

Development  Initiative  (Motley) 72 

Central  America  Initiative  Legislation 

(message  to  the  Congress) 75 

Central  America  Initiative  Proposed 

(Reagan) 71 

Human  Rights  and  the  Moral  Dimension  of 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 15 

Yugoslavia.  Visit  of  Yugoslav  President 

(Reagan,  Spiljak) 51 


Name  Index 

Burt,  Richard  R 44 

Bush,  Vice  President 5 

Eagleburger,  Lawrence-S^ 34,39,65 

King  Hussein  1 62,63 

Kirkpatrick,  Jeane  J 68 

Monjo,  John  C 37 

Motley,  Langhorne  A 72 

Mubarak,  Mohamed  Ho.sni 63 

Pickering,  Thomas  R 77 

Reagan,  President 1,2,51,60,62,63 

66,67,71,75 

Shultz,  Secretary 9,12,15,19,28,30,43 

Spiljak,  Mika 51 

Weinberger,  Caspar  W 59 


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Department 


V   of  State -m-m  J   ^ 

buUet§n 


The  Official  Montinly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  84  /  Number  2086 


May  1984 


■  ■mii])inLiinii,iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiJi]iiPPPiiHPl>^^^MWI^^^WWH>PIPHilliitimnilllMpMtl>ll1 


Cover: 


President  Reagan 
Secretar>-  Shultz 


Dppartntpnt  of  Sin  it* 

bulletin 


Volume  84/ Number  2086/May  1984 


The  Department  OF  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
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agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
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graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

A.ssistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  t'omniunication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
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For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
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mi 


CONTENTS 


The  President 


1 


11 


American  Foreign  Policy 
Challenges  in  the  1980s 

Democratic  Ideals  and 
U.S. -Israel  Relations 

News  Conference  of  April  4 
(Excerpts) 

Central  America 


The  Secretary 


12 


15 


17 


22 


37 
40 


Power  and  Diplomacy  in  the 
1980s 

FY  1984  Supplemental  and  FY 
1985  Authorization  Requests 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy 
Objectives 

International  Security  and 
Cooperation  Development  Pro- 
gram (Report  to  the  Congress) 

News  Conference  of  March  20 

Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Africa 

43         FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  Sub-Sahara  Africa 
(Princeton  Lyman) 

Arms  Control 

49  Security  Policy  and  Arms  Con- 

trol (Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger) 

50  MBFR  Talks  Resume 

(President  Reagan) 

East  Asia 

52         FY  Assistance  Requests  for 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
(Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 

Europe 

59         FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  Europe  (Richard  R.  Burt) 

Foreign  Assistance 

62         FY  1985  Request  for  Economic 
Assistance  Programs  (M.  Peter 
McPkerson) 

Middle  East 

66         FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  the  Middle  East 
(Richard  W.  Murphy) 

68         U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  (Letter 
to  the  Congress) 


Military  Affairs 

71         Strategic  Defense  Initiative 

(Department  of  Defense  Fact 
Sheet) 

Narcotics 


FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  Narcotics  (Clyde  D.  Taylor) 


72 


Pacific 

74  Administration  Urges  Approval 

of  Compact  of  Free  Association 
(Message  to  the  Congress) 

Security  Assistance 

75  FY  1985  Security  Assistance 

Requests  (William 
Schneider,  Jr.) 

South  Asia 

77         FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  South  Asia  (Howard  B. 
Schaffer) 

82  Afghanistan  Day,  1974 

(Secretary  Shultz, 
Proclamation) 

United  Nations 

83  FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 

for  Organizations  and  Programs 
(Gregory  J.  Newell) 

Treaties 

87         Current  Actions 

Chronology 

89         March  1984 

Press  Releases 

93         Department  of  State 

Publications 

93  Department  of  State 

94  Background  Notes 

Index 


Ui0 

Air 
CH 


I'd  le  to  ado 
faskipwill! 


IVo  Great  G 

Altaerican 


America's  tr 


tlmeljto 
Ameria"! 
eveiyt'here 

A  Troubled 

Tragically,  t 
itoentalgo 
very  trouble 


liave,tooof 

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teiretora 

world  is4, 

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^  1984 


THE  PRESIDENT 


American  Foreign  Policy 
Challenges  in  the  1980s 


by  President  Reagan 


Address  before  the 

Center  for  Strategic 

and  International  Studies 

on  April  6,  1981^.'^ 


I'd  like  to  address  your  theme  of  bipar- 
tisanship with  a  view  toward  America's 
foreign  policy  challenges  for  the  1980s. 


IDEALISM  AND  REALISM 

Two  Great  Goals 

All  Americans  share  two  great  goals  for 
foreign  policy:  a  safer  world  and  a  world 
in  which  individual  rights  can  be  re- 
spected and  precious  values  may  flourish. 

These  goals  are  at  the  heart  of 
America's  traditional  ideahsm  and  our 
aspirations  for  world  peace.  Yet,  while 
cherished  by  us,  they  do  not  belong  ex- 
clusively to  us.  They're  not  "made  in 
America."  They're  shared  by  people 
everywhere. 

A  Troubled  World 

Tragically,  the  world  in  which  these  fun- 
damental goals  are  so  widely  shared  is  a 
very  troubled  world.  While  we  and  our 
allies  may  enjoy  peace  and  prosperity, 
many  citizens  of  the  industrial  world  con- 
tinue to  live  in  fear  of  conflict  and  the 
threat  of  nuclear  war.  And  all  around  the 
globe,  terrorists  threaten  innocent  people 
and  civilized  values.  And  in  developing 
countries,  the  dreams  of  human  progress 
have,  too  often,  been  lost  to  violent  rev- 
olution and  dictatorship. 

Quite  obviously,  the  widespread 
desire  for  a  safer  and  more  humane 
world  is— by  itself— not  enough  to  create 
such  a  world.  In  pursuing  our  worthy 
goals,  we  must  go  beyond  honorable  in- 
tentions and  good  will  to  practical  means. 


Key  Principles 

We  must  be  guided  by  these  key  prin- 
ciples. 

Realism.  The  world  is  not  as  we 
wish  it  would  be.  Reality  is  often  harsh. 
We  will  not  make  it  less  so  if  we  do  not 
first  see  it  for  what  it  is. 

Streng:th.  We  know  that  strength 
alone  is  not  enough,  but  without  it  there 
can  be  no  effective  diplomacy  and  ne- 
gotiations; no  secure  democracy  and 
peace.  Conversely,  weakness  or  hopeful 
passivity  are  only  self-defeating.  They  in- 
vite the  very  aggression  and  instability 
that  they  would  seek  to  avoid. 

New  Economic  Growth.  This  is 
the  underlying  base  that  ensures  our 
strength  and  permits  human  potential  to 
flourish.  Neither  strength  nor  creativity 
can  be  achieved  or  sustained  without 
economic  growth— both  at  home  and 
abroad. 

Intelligence.  Our  policies  cannot  be 
effective  unless  the  information  on  which 
they're  based  is  accurate,  timely,  and 
complete. 

Shared  Responsibility  With  Allies. 
Our  friends  and  allies  share  the  heavy 
responsibility  for  the  protection  of 
freedom.  We  seek  and  need  their  part- 
nership, sharing  burdens  in  pursuit  of 
our  common  goals. 

Nonaggression.  We  have  no  terri- 
torial ambitions.  We  occupy  no  foreign 
lands.  We  build  our  strength  only  to 
assure  deterrence  and  to  secure  our  in- 
terests if  deterrence  fails. 

Dialogue  With  Adversaries.  Though 
we  must  be  honest  in  recognizing  fun- 
damental differences  with  our  adver- 
saries, we  must  always  be  willing  to 
resolve  these  differences  by  peaceful 


Bipartisanship  at  Home.  In  our 

two-party  democracy,  an  effective 
foreign  policy  must  begin  with  bipar- 
tisanship, and  the  sharing  of  responsibili- 
ty for  a  safer  and  more  humane  world 
must  begin  at  home. 


AMERICAN  RENEWAL 

Restored  Deterrence:  "American 
Leadership  Is  Back" 

During  the  past  3  years,  we've  been 
steadily  rebuilding  America's  capacity  to 
advance  our  foreign  policy  goals  through 
renewed  attention  to  these  vital  prin- 
ciples. Many  threats  remain,  and  peace 
may  still  seem  precarious.  But  America 
is  safer  and  more  secure  today  because 
the  people  of  this  great  nation  have  re-, 
stored  the  foundation  of  its  strength. 

We  began  with  renewed  realism— a 
clear-eyed  understanding  of  the  world 
we  live  in  and  of  our  inescapable  global 
responsibilities.  Our  industries  depend  on 
the  importation  of  energy  and  minerals 
from  distant  lands.  Our  prosperity  re- 
quires a  sound  international  financial 
system  and  free  and  open  trading  mar- 
kets. And  our  security  is  inseparable 
from  the  security  of  our  friends  and 
neighbors. 

I  believe  Americans  today  see  the 
world  with  realism  and  maturity.  The 
great  majority  of  our  people  do  not 
believe  the  stark  differences  between 
democracy  and  totalitarianism  can  be 
wished  away.  They  understand  that 
keeping  America  secure  begins  with 
keeping  America  strong  and  free. 

When  we  took  office  in  1981,  the 
Soviet  Union  had  been  engaged  for  20 
years  in  the  most  massive  military  build- 
up in  history.  Clearly,  their  goal  was  not 
to  catch  us  but  to  surpass  us.  Yet,  the 
United  States  remained  a  virtual  specta- 
tor in  the  1970s,  a  decade  of  neglect  that 
took  a  severe  toll  on  our  defense  capabil- 
ities. 

With  bipartisan  support,  we  em- 
barked immediately  on  a  major  defense 
rebuilding  program.  We've  made  good 
progress  in  restoring  the  morale  of  our 
men  and  women  in  uniform,  restocking 
spare  parts  and  ammunition,  replacing 
obsolescent  equipment  and  facilities,  im- 
proving basic  training  and  readiness, 


THE  PRESIDENT 


and  pushing  forward  with  long-overdue 
weapons'  programs. 

The  simple  fact  is  that  in  the  last  half 
of  the  1970s  we  were  not  deterring,  as 
events  from  Angola  to  Afghanistan  made 
clear.  Today  we  are,  and  that  fact  has  fun- 
damentally altered  the  future  for  millions 
of  human  beings.  Gone  are  the  days  when 
the  United  States  was  perceived  as  a  rud- 
derless superpower,  a  helpless  hostage  to 
world  events.  American  leadership  is 
back.  Peace  through  strength  is  not  a 
slogan,  it's  a  fact  of  life.  And  we  will  not 
return  to  the  days  of  handwringing, 
defeatism,  decline,  and  despair. 

We  have  also  upgraded  significantly 
our  intelligence  capabilities— restoring 
morale  in  the  intelligence  agencies  and  in- 


A  Stark  Contrast 

Our  principles  don't  involve  just  rebuild- 
ing our  strength;  they  also  tell  us  how  to 
use  it.  We  remain  true  to  the  principle  of 
nonaggression.  On  an  occasion  when 
the  United  States,  at  the  request  of  its 
neighbors,  did  use  force— in  Grenada— 
we  acted  decisively  but  only  after  it  was 
clear  a  bloodthirsty  regime  had  put 
American  and  Grenadian  lives  in  danger 
and  the  security  of  neighboring  islands  in 
danger.  As  soon  as  stability  and  freedom 
were  restored  on  the  island, 
we  left.  The  Soviet  Union  had  no  such 
legitimate  justification  for  its  massive  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan  4  years  ago.  And 
today,  over  100,000  occupation  troops  re- 
main there.  The  United  States,  by  stark 


Challenge  number  one  is  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
nuclear  war  and  to  reduce  the  levels  of  nuclear  ar- 
maments in  a  way  that  also  reduces  the  risk  they 
will  ever  be  used. 


creasing  our  capability  to  detect,  analyze, 
and  counter  hostile  intelligence  threats. 

Economic  Recovery 

Economic  strength,  the  underlying  base 
of  support  for  our  defense  buildup,  has 
received  a  dramatic  new  boost.  We've 
transformed  a  no-growth  economy,  crip- 
pled by  disincentives,  double-digit  infla- 
tion, 21.5%  interest  rates,  plunging  pro- 
ductivity, and  a  weak  dollar,  into  a 
dynamic  growth  economy,  bolstered  by 
new  incentives,  stable  prices,  lower  in- 
terest rates,  a  rebirth  of  productivity,  and 
restored  our  confidence  in  our  currency. 
Renewed  strength  at  home  has  been 
accompanied  by  closer  partnerships  with 
America's  friends  and  allies.  Far  from 
buckling  under  Soviet  intimidation,  the 
unity  of  the  NATO  alliance  has  held  fiiTn, 
and  we  are  moving  foi-ward  to  modernize 
our  strategic  deterrent.  The  leader  of 
America's  oldest  ally,  French  President 
Francois  Mitterrand,  recently  reminded 
us  that:  "Peace— like  liberty— is  never 
given  ...  the  pursuit  of  both  is  a  continual 
one. ...  In  the  turbulent  times  we  live  in, 
solidarity  among  friends  is  essential." 


contrast,  occupies  no  foreign  nation,  nor 
do  we  seek  to. 

Though  we  and  the  Soviet  Union  dif- 
fer markedly,  living  in  this  nuclear  age 
makes  it  imperative  that  we  talk  with 
each  other.  If  the  new  Soviet  leadership 
truly  is  devoted  to  building  a  safer  and 
more  humane  world,  rather  than  e.xpand- 
ing  armed  conquests,  it  will  find  a  sympa- 
thetic partner  in  the  West. 

In  pursuing  these  practical  principles, 
we  have  throughout  sought  to  revive  the 
spirit  that  was  once  the  hallmark  of  our 
postwar  foreign  policy— bipartisan 
cooperation  between  the  executive  and 
the  legislative  branches  of  our  govern- 
ment. 

Much  has  been  accomplished,  but 
much  remains  to  be  done.  If  Republicans 
and  Democrats  wUl  join  together  to  con- 
front four  great  challenges  to  American 
foreign  policy  in  the  1980s,  then  we  can 
and  will  make  great  strides  toward  a 
safer  and  more  humane  world. 


FOUR  GREAT  CHALLENGES 

Challenge  Number  One 

Challenge  number  one  is  to  reduce  the 
risk  of  nuclear  war  and  to  reduce  the 
levels  of  nuclear  armaments  in  a  way  that 
also  reduces  the  risk  they  will  ever  be 


used.  We  have  no  higher  challenge,  for  a 
nuclear  war  cannot  be  won  and  must 
never  be  fought.  But  merely  to  be  against 
nuclear  war  is  not  enough  to  prevent  it. 

For  35  years,  the  defense  policy  of  the 
United  Stales  and  its  NATO  allies  has 
been  based  on  one  simple  premise:  we  do 
not  start  wars.  We  maintain  our  conven- 
tional and  strategic  strength  to  deter  ag- 
gression by  convincing  any  potential  ag- 
gressor that  war  could  bring  no  benefit, 
only  disaster.  Deterrence  has  been  and 
will  remain  in  the  cornerstone  of  our  na- 
tional security  policy  to  defend  freedom 
and  preserve  peace. 

But,  as  I  mentioned,  the  1970s  were 
marked  by  neglect  of  our  defenses,  and 
nuclear  safety  was  no  exception.  Too 
many  forgot  John  Kennedy's  warning 
that  only  when  our  arms  are  certain 
beyond  doubt  can  we  be  certain  beyond 
doubt  they  will  never  be  used.  By  the 
beginning  of  this  decade,  we  faced  three 
growing  problems:  the  Soviet  SS-20 
monopoly  in  Europe  and  Asia;  the  vul- 
nerability of  our  land-based  ICBM  [inter- 
continental ballistic  missile]  force;  and  the 
failure  of  arms  control  agreements  to  slow 
the  overall  growth  in  strategic  weapons. 
The  Carter  Administration  acknowledged 
these  problems.  In  fact,  almost  everj'one 
did. 

There  is  a  widespread,  but  mistaken, 
impression  that  aiTns  agreements  auto- 
matically produce  arms  control.  In  1969, 
when  SALT  I  [strategic  arms  limitation 
talks]  negotiations  began,  the  Soviet 
Union  had  about  1,500  strategic  nuclear 
weapons.  Today,  the  Soviet  nuclear 
arsenal  can  grow  to  over  15,000  nuclear 
weapons  and  still  stay  within  all  past 
arms  control  agreements,  including  the 
SALT  I  and  SALT  II  guidelines. 

The  practical  means  for  reducing  the 
risks  of  nuclear  war  must,  therefore, 
follow  two  parallel  paths— credible  deter- 
rence and  real  arms  reductions  with  ef- 
fective verification.  It  is  on  this  basis  that 
we've  responded  to  the  problems  I  just 
described.  This  is  why  we've  moved  for- 
ward to  implement  NATO's  dual-track 
decision  of  1979,  while  actually  reducing 
the  number  of  nuclear  weapons  in 
Europe.  It  is  also  why  we  have  sought 
bipartisan  support  for  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  Scowcroft  commission  and  the 
"build-down"  concept,  and  why  we've 
proposed  deep  reductions  in  strategic 
forces  as  the  strategic  arms  reduction 
talks  (START). 

Without  exception,  every  arms  con- 
trol proposal  that  we  have  offered  would 
reverse  the  aiTns  buildup  and  help  bring  a 
more  stable  balance  at  lower  force  levels. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


At  the  START  talks,  we  seek 
to  reduce  substantially  the  number  of 
ballistic  missile  warheads,  reduce  the 
destructive  capacity  of  nuclear  missiles, 
and  establish  limits  on  bombers  and 
cruise  missiles  below  the  levels  of 
SALT  II:  at  the  talks  on  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces  (INF),  our 
negotiators  have  tabled  four  initiatives  to 
address  Soviet  concerns  and  improve  pros- 
pects for  a  fair  and  equitable  agreement 
that  would  reduce  or  eliminate  an  entire 
class  of  such  nuclear  amis.  Our  flexibility 
in  the  START  and  INF  negotiations  has 
been  demonstrated  by  numerous 
modifications  to  our  positions.  But  they 
have  been  met  only  by  the  silence  of 
Soviet  walkouts. 

At  the  mutual  and  balanced  force 
reduction  talks  in  Vienna,  we  and  our 
NATO  partners  presented  a  treaty  that 
would  reduce  conventional  forces  to  par- 
ity at  lower  levels.  To  reduce  the  risks  of 
war  in  time  of  crisis,  we  have  proposed 
to  the  Soviet  Union  important  measures 
to  improve  direct  communications  and  in- 
crease mutual  confidence.  And  just  re- 
cently, I  directed  Vice  President  Bush  to 
go  to  the  Conference  on  Disarmament  in 
Geneva  to  present  a  new  American  in- 
itiative: a  worldwide  ban  on  the  produc- 
tion, possession,  and  use  of  chemical 
weapons. 

Our  strategic  policy  represents  a 
careful  response  to  a  nuclear  agenda 
upon  which  even  our  critics  agreed. 
Many  who  would  break  the  bonds  of  bi- 
partisanship, claiming  they  know  how  to 
bring  greater  security,  seem  to  ignore 
the  likely  consequences  of  their  own  pro- 
posals. 

Those  who  wanted  a  last-minute 
moratorium  on  INF  deployment  would 
have  betrayed  our  allies  and  reduced  the 
chances  for  a  safer  Europe;  those  who 
would  try  to  implement  a  unilateral 
freeze  would  find  it  unverifiable  and  de- 
stabilizing, because  it  would  prevent 
restoration  of  a  stable  balance  that  keeps 
the  peace;  and  those  who  would  advocate 
unilateral  cancellation  of  the  Peacekeeper 
missile  would  ignore  a  central  recommen- 
dation of  the  bipartisan  Scowcroft  report 
and  leave  the  Soviets  with  little  incen- 
tive to  negotiate  meaningful  reductions. 
Indeed,  the  Soviets  would  be  rewarded 
for  leaving  the  bargaining  table. 

These  simplistic  solutions,  and  others 
put  forward  by  our  critics,  would  take 
meaningful  agreements  and  increased 
security  much  further  from  our  grasp. 
Our  critics  can  best  help  us  move  closer 
to  the  goals  we  share  by  accepting  prac- 
tical means  to  achieve  them.  Granted,  it 
is  easy  to  support  a  strong  defense;  it's 
much  harder  to  support  a  strong  defense 


May  1984 
I^HQBBBBBBBBaBB 


budget.  And  granted,  it  is  easy  to  call  for 
arms  agreements;  it's  more  difficult  to 
support  patient,  firm,  fair  negotiations 
with  those  who  want  to  see  how  much 
we  will  compromise  with  ourselves  first. 
Bipartisanship  can  only  work  if  both 
sides  face  up  to  real-world  problems  and 
meet  them  with  real-world  solutions. 

Challenge  Number  Two 

Our  safety  and  security  depend  on  more 
than  credible  deterrence  and  nuclear 
arms  reductions.  Constructive  regional 
development  is  also  essential.  Therefore, 
our  second  great  challenge  is  strengthen- 
ing the  basis  for  stability  in  troubled  and 
strategically  sensitive  regions. 

Regional  tensions  often  begin  in  long- 
standing social,  political,  and  economic 
inequities  and  in  ethnic  and  religious  dis- 
putes. But  throughout  the  1970s,  in- 
creased Soviet  support  for  terrorism,  in- 
surgency, and  aggression,  coupled  with  a 
perception  of  weakening  U.S.  power  and 
resolve,  greatly  exacerbated  these  ten- 
sions. 

The  results  were  not  surprising:  the 
massacres  of  Kampuchea  followed  by  the 
Vietnamese  invasion;  the  Soviet  invasion 
of  Afghanistan;  the  rise  of  Iranian  ex- 
tremism and  the  holding  of  Americans 
hostage;  Libyan  coercion  in  Africa;  So- 
viet and  Cuban  military  involvement  in 
Angola  and  Ethiopia;  their  subversion  in 
Central  America;  and  the  rise  of  state- 
supported  terrorism. 


aid,  security  assistance,  and  diplomatic 
mediation  tailored  to  the  needs  of  each 
region. 

It  is  also  obvious  we  alone  cannot 
save  embattled  governments  or  control 
terrorism.  But  doing  nothing  only  en- 
sures far  greater  problems  down  the 
road.  So  we  strive  to  expand  cooperation 
with  states  who  support  our  common  in- 
terests, to  help  friendly  nations  in  dan- 
ger, and  to  seize  major  opportunities  for 
peacekeeping. 

Perhaps  the  best  example  of  this 
comprehensive  approach  is  the  report 
and  recommendations  of  the  National 
Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America.  It  is  from  this  report  that  we 
drew  our  proposals  for  bringing  peaceful 
development  to  Central  America.  They 
are  now  before  the  Congress  and  will  be 
debated  at  length. 

I  welcome  a  debate.  But,  if  it's  to  be 
productive,  we  must  put  aside  mythology 
and  uninformed  rhetoric.  Some,  for  ex- 
ample, insist  that  the  root  of  regional 
violence  is  poverty  but  npt  communism. 
Well,  three-fourths  of  our  request  and  of 
our  current  program  is  for  economic  and 
humanitarian  assistance.  America  is  a 
good  and  generous  nation.  But,  eco- 
nomic aid  alone  cannot  stop  Cuban  and 
Soviet-sponsored  guerrillas  determined 
to  terrorize,  bum,  bomb,  and  destroy 
everything  from  bridges  and  industries 
to  electric  power  and  transportation. 
And  neither  individual  rights  nor  eco- 


.  .  .our  second  great  challenge  is  strengthening  the 
basis  for  stability  in  troubled  and  strategically  sen- 
sitive regions. 


Taken  together,  these  events  defined 
a  pattern  of  mounting  instability  and 
violence  that  the  United  States  could  not 
ignore.  And  we  have  not.  As  with  de- 
fense, by  the  beginning  of  the  1980s, 
there  was  an  emerging  consensus  in  this 
country  that  we  had  to  do  better  in  deal- 
ing with  problems  that  affect  our  vital  in- 
terests. 

Obviously  no  single  abstract  policy 
could  deal  successfully  with  all  problems 
or  all  regions.  But  as  a  general  matter, 
effective  regional  stabilization  requires  a 
balanced  approach— a  mix  of  economic 


nomic  health  can  be  advanced  if  stability 
is  not  secured. 

Other  critics  say  we  shouldn't  see  the 
problems  of  this  or  any  other  region  as 
an  East- West  struggle.  Our  policies  in 
Central  America  and  elsewhere  are,  in 
fact,  designed  precisely  to  keep  East- 
West  tensions  from  spreading,  from  in- 
truding into  the  lives  of  nations  that  are 
struggling  with  great  problems  of  their 
own.  Events  in  southern  Africa  are 
showing  what  persistent  mediation  and 
an  ability  to  talk  to  all  sides  can  ac- 
complish. The  states  of  this  region  have 
been  poised  for  war  for  decades,  but 


BiiuHuuiiuHiiiiuiiiiuiiiiimiimi 


mumimmmuum 


THE  PRESIDENT 


there  is  new  hope  for  peace.  South  Af- 
rica, Angola,  and  Mozambique  are  im- 
plementing agreements  to  break  the  cy- 
cle of  violence.  Our  Administration  has 
been  active  in  this  process,  and  we  will 
stay  involved,  trying  to  bring  an  inde- 
pendent Namibia  into  being,  end  foreign 
military  interference,  and  keep  the 
region  free  from  East-West  conflict.  I 
have  hope  that  peace  and  democratic 
reform  can  be  enjoyed  by  all  the  peoples 
of  southern  Africa. 

In  Central  America  we've  also  seen 
progress.  El  Salvador's  presidential 
elections  express  that  nation's  desire  to 
govern  itself  in  peace.  Yet  the  future  of 
the  region  remains  open.  We  have  a 
choice:  either  we  help  America's  friends 
defend  themselves  and  give  democracy  a 
chance  or  we  abandon  our  responsibil- 
ities and  let  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba 
shape  the  destiny  of  our  hemisphere.  If 
this  happens,  the  East-West  conflict  will 
only  become  broader  and  much  more 
dangerous. 

In  dealing  with  regional  instability, 
we  have  to  understand  how  it  is  related 
to  other  problems.  Insecurity  and  re- 
gional violence  are  among  the  driving 
forces  of  nuclear  proliferation.  Peace- 
keeping in  troubled  regions  and  strength- 
ening barriers  to  nuclear  proliferation  are 
two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  Stability  and 
safeguards  go  together. 


our  friends,  can  help  stop  the  spread  of 
violence.  I  have  said,  for  example,  that 
we  will  keep  open  the  Strait  of  Hormuz, 
the  vital  lifeline  through  which  so  much 
oil  flows  to  the  United  States  and  other 
industrial  democracies.  Making  this  clear 
beforehand— and  making  it  credible- 
makes  such  a  crisis  much  less  likely. 

We  must  work  with  quiet  persistence 
and  without  illusions.  We  may  suffer  set- 
backs, but  we  must  not  jump  to  the  con- 
clusion that  we  can  defend  our  interests 
without  ever  committing  ourselves.  Nor 
should  other  nations  believe  that  mere 
setbacks  will  turn  America  inward  again. 
We  know  our  responsibilities,  and  we 
must  live  up  to  them. 

Because  effective  regional  problem 
solving  requires  a  balanced  and  sus- 
tained approach,  it  is  essential  that  the 
Congress  give  full,  not  piecemeal,  sup- 
port. Indeed,  where  we  have  foundered 
in  regional  stabilization,  it  has  been 
because  the  Congress  has  failed  to  pro- 
vide such  support.  Halfway  measures- 
refusing  to  take  responsibility  for  means- 
produce  the  worst  possible  results.  I'll 
return  to  this  point  when  I  discuss  the 
fourth  challenge  in  just  a  few  minutes. 

Challenge  Number  Three 

Expanding  opportunities  for  economic 
development  and  personal  freedom  is  our 


Expanding  opportunities  for  economic  develop- 
ment and  personal  freedom  is  our  third  great 
challenge. 


No  one  says  this  approach  is  cheap, 
quick,  or  easy.  But  the  cost  of  this  com- 
mitment is  bargain  basement  compared 
to  the  tremendous  sacrifices  we  will  have 
to  make  if  we  do  nothing  or  do  too  little. 
The  Kissinger  commission  warned  that 
an  outbreak  of  Cuban-type  regimes  in 
Central  America  will  bring  subversion 
closer  to  our  ovra  borders  and  the 
specter  of  millions  of  uprooted  refugees 
fleeing  in  desperation  to  the  north. 

In  the  Middle  East,  which  has  so 
rarely  known  peace,  we  seek  a  similar 
mix  of  economic  aid,  diplomatic  media- 
tion, and  military  assistance  and  coopera- 
tion. These  will,  we  believe,  make  the 
use  of  U.S.  forces  unnecessary  and  make 
the  risk  of  East- West  conflict  less.  But 
given  the  importance  of  the  region,  we 
must  also  be  ready  to  act  when  the 
presence  of  American  power,  and  that  of 


third  great  challenge.  The  American  con- 
cept of  peace  is  more  than  absence  of 
war.  We  favor  the  flowering  of  economic 
growth  and  individual  liberty  in  a  world 
of  peace.  And  this,  too,  is  a  goal  to  which 
most  Americans  subscribe.  Our  political 
leaders  must  be  judged  by  whether  the 
means  they  offer  will  help  us  to  reach  it. 
Our  belief  in  individual  freedom  and 
opportunity  is  rooted  in  practical  experi- 
ence: free  people  build  free  markets  that 
ignite  dynamic  development  for  every- 
one. And  in  America,  incentives,  risk 
taking,  and  entrepreneurship  are  re- 
awakening the  spirit  of  capitalism  and 
strengthening  economic  expansion  and 
human  progress  throughout  the  world. 
Our  goal  has  always  been  to  restore 
and  sustain  noninflationary  worldwide 
growth,  thereby  ending  for  good  the 
stagflation  of  the  1970s,  which  saw  a 


drastic  weakening  of  the  fabric  of  the 
world  economy. 

We  take  our  leadership  responsibil- 
ities seriously,  but  we  alone  cannot  put 
the  world's  economic  house  in  order.  At 
Williamsburg,  the  industrial  countries 
consolidated  their  views  on  economic 
policy.  The  proof  is  not  in  the  communi- 
que; it's  in  the  results.  France  is  reduc- 
ing inflation  and  seeking  greater  flexibil- 
ity in  its  economy;  Japan  is  slowly,  to  be 
sure,  but  steadily— we  will  insist— liber- 
alizing its  trade  and  capital  markets; 
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  are 
moving  forward  on  a  steady  course  of 
low  inflation  and  moderate,  sustained 
growth. 

Just  as  we  believe  that  incentives  are 
key  to  greater  grovrth  in  America  and 
throughout  the  world,  so,  too,  must  we 
resist  the  sugar-coated  poison  of  protec- 
tionism everywhere  it  exists.  Here  at 
home,  we're  opposing  inflationary,  self- 
defeating  bills  like  domestic  content.  At 
the  London  economic  summit  in  June,  I 
hope  that  we  can  lay  the  groundwork  for 
a  new  round  of  negotiations  that  will 
open  markets  for  our  exports  of  goods 
and  services  and  stimulate  greater 
growth,  efficiency,  and  jobs  for  all. 

And  we're  advancing  other  key  initia- 
tives to  promote  more  powerful  world- 
wade  growth  by  expanding  trade  and 
investment  relationships.  The  dynamic 
growth  of  Pacific  Basin  nations  has  made 
them  the  fastest  growing  markets  for 
our  goods,  services,  and  capital.  Last 
year,  I  visited  Japan  and  Korea,  two  of 
America's  most  important  allies,  to  forge 
closer  partnerships.  And  this  month  I 
will  visit  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
another  of  the  increasingly  significant 
relationships  that  we  hold  in  the  Pacific. 
I  see  America  and  our  Pacific  neighbors 
as  nations  of  the  future,  going  forward 
together  in  a  mighty  enterprise  to  build 
dynamic  growth  economies  and  a  safer 
world. 

We're  helping  developing  countries 
grow  by  presenting  a  fresh  view  of  de- 
velopment—the magic  of  the  market- 
place—to spark  greater  growth  and  par- 
ticipation in  the  international  economy. 
Developing  nations  earn  twice  as  much 
from  exports  to  the  United  States  as 
they  received  in  aid  from  all  the  other 
nations  combined. 

And  practical  proposals  Uke  the  Car- 
ibbean Basin  Initiative  wall  strengthen 
the  private  sectors  of  some  20  Caribbean 
neighbors,  while  guaranteeing  fairer 
treatment  for  U.S.  companies  and  na- 
tionals and  increasing  demand  for 
American  exports. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


We've  recently  sent  to  the  Congress 
i  new  economic  policy  initiative  for  Af- 
rica. It,  too,  is  designed  to  support  the 
jrowth  of  private  enterprise  in  African 
ountries  by  encouraging  structural  eco- 
nomic change  and  international  trade. 
We've  also  asked  the  Congress  to  in- 
srease  humanitarian  assistance  to  Africa 
to  combat  the  devastating  effects  of  ex- 
treme drought. 

In  building  a  strong  global  recovery, 
jf  course,  nothing  is  more  important 
han  to  keep  the  wheels  of  world  com- 
Tierce  turning  and  create  jobs  without 
enewing  the  spiral  of  inflation.  The  In- 
ternational Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  is  a 
inchpin  in  our  efforts  to  restore  a  sound 
vvorld  economy  and  resolve  the  debt 
Droblems  of  many  developing  countries. 
With  bipartisan  support,  we  imple- 
■nented  a  major  increase  in  IMF  re- 
sources. In  cooperation  with  the  IMF, 
ive're  working  to  prevent  the  problems 
Df  individual  debtor  nations  from  dis- 
rupting the  stability  and  strength  of  the 
ntire  international  financial  system.  It 
ivas  this  goal  that  brought  nations  of 
aorth  and  south  together  to  help  resolve 
:he  debt  difficulties  of  the  new  demo- 
ratic  Government  of  Argentina. 

Because  we  know  that  democratic 
governments  are  the  best  guarantors  of 
human  rights,  and  that  economic  growth 
will  always  flourish  when  men  and 
women  are  free,  we  seek  to  promote  not 
just  material  products  but  the  values  of 
faith  and  human  dignity  for  which  Amer- 
ica and  all  democratic  nations  stand- 
values  which  embody  the  culmination  of 
5,000  years  of  Western  civilization. 

When  I  addressed  the  British  Parlia- 
ment in  June  of  1982,  I  called  for  a  bold 
and  lasting  effort  to  assist  people  strug- 
gling for  human  rights.  We've  estab- 
lished the  National  Endowment  for  De- 
mocracy, a  partnership  of  people  from  all 
walks  of  life  dedicated  to  spreading  the 
positive  message  of  democracy.  To  suc- 
ceed, we  must  oppose  the  doublespeak  of 
totalitarian  propaganda.  And  so  we're 
modernizing  the  Voice  of  America  and 
our  other  broadcasting  facilities,  and  we 
are  working  to  start  up  Radio  Marti,  a 
voice  of  truth  to  the  imprisoned  people  of 
Cuba. 

Americans  have  always  wanted  to 
see  the  spread  of  democratic  institutions, 
and  that  goal  is  coming  closer.  In  our 
own  hemisphere,  26  countries  of  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  are  either 
democracies  or  formally  embarked  on  a 
democratic  transition.  This  represents 
90%  of  the  region's  population,  up  from 
under  50%  a  decade  ago. 


Trust  the  people,  this  is  the  crucial 
lesson  of  history  and  America's  message 
to  the  world.  We  must  be  staunch  in  our 
conviction  that  freedom  is  not  the  sole 
possession  of  a  chosen  few,  but  the  uni- 
versal right  of  men  and  women  every- 
where. President  Truman  said,  "If  we 
should  pay  merely  lip  service  to  inspiring 
ideals,  and  later  do  violence  to  simple 
justice,  we  would  draw  down  upon  us 
the  bitter  wrath  of  generations  yet  un- 


sequent  second  guessing  about  whether 
to  keep  our  men  there  severely  under- 
mined our  policy.  It  hindered  the  ability 
of  our  diplomats  to  negotiate,  encouraged 
more  intransigence  from  the  Syrians,  and 
prolonged  the  violence.  Similarly,  con- 
gressional wavering  on  support  for  the 
Jackson  plan,  which  reflects  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  National  Bipartisan 
Commission  on  Central  America,  can 
only  encourage  the  enemies  of  democracy 
who  are  determined  to  wear  us  down. 


.  .  .our  fourth  great  challenge  [is  to]  restore  bipar- 
tisan consensus  in  support  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 


bom."  Let  us  go  forward  together,  faith- 
ful friends  of  democracy  and  democratic 
values,  confident  in  our  conviction  that 
the  tide  of  the  future  is  a  freedom  tide. 
But  let  us  go  forward  with  practical 
means. 

Challenge  Number  Four 

This  brings  me  to  our  fourth  great  chal- 
lenge: we  must  restore  bipartisan  con- 
sensus in  support  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 
We  must  restore  America's  honorable 
tradition  of  partisan  politics  stopping  at 
the  water's  edge.  Republicans  and 
Democrats  standing  united  in  patriotism 
and  speaking  with  one  voice  as  responsi- 
ble trustees  for  peace,  democracy,  in- 
dividual liberty,  and  the  rule  of  law. 

In  the  1970s  we  saw  a  rash  of  con- 
gressional initiatives  to  limit  the  presi- 
dent's authority  in  the  areas  of  trade, 
human  rights,  arms  sales,  foreign  assist- 
ance, intelligence  operations,  and  the  dis- 
patch of  troops  in  time  of  crisis.  Over  100 
separate  prohibitions  and  restrictions  on 
executive  branch  authority  to  formulate 
and  implement  foreign  policy  were 
enacted. 

The  most  far-reaching  consequence  of 
the  past  decade's  congressional  activism 
is  this:  bipartisan  consensus  building  has 
become  a  central  responsibility  of  con- 
gressional leadership  as  well  as  of  execu- 
tive leadership.  If  we're  to  have  a  sus- 
tainable foreign  policy,  the  Congress 
must  support  the  practical  details  of  pol- 
icy, not  just  the  general  goals. 

We  have  demonstrated  the  capacity 
for  such  jointly  responsible  leadership  in 
certain  areas.  But  we  have  seen  setbacks 
for  bipartisanship,  too.  I  believe  that 
once  we  established  bipartisan  agree- 
ment on  our  course  in  Lebanon,  the  sub- 


To  understand  and  solve  this  prob- 
lem of  joint  responsibility,  we  have  to  go 
beyond  the  familiar  questions  as  to  who 
should  be  stronger,  the  president  or  the 
Congress.  The  more  basic  problem  is:  in 
this  "post-Vietnam  era,"  Congress  has 
not  yet  developed  capacities  for  coher- 
ent, responsible  action  needed  to  carry 
out  the  new  foreign  policy  powers  it  has 
taken  for  itself.  To  meet  the  challenges 
of  this  decade,  we  need  a  strong  Presi- 
dent and  a  strong  Congress. 

Unfortunately,  many  in  the  Congress 
seem  to  believe  they're  stUl  in  the 
troubled  Vietnam  era,  with  their  only 
task  to  be  vocal  critics  and  not  respon- 
sible partners  in  developing  positive, 
practical  programs  to  solve  real  prob- 
lems. 

Much  was  learned  from  Vietnam— les- 
sons ranging  from  increased  appreciation 
of  the  need  for  careful  discrimination  in 
the  use  of  U.S.  force  or  military  assist- 
ance to  increased  appreciation  of  the 
need  for  domestic  support  for  any  such 
military  element  of  policy.  MUitary  force, 
either  direct  or  indirect,  must  remain  an 
available  part  of  America's  foreign  pol- 
icy. But,  clearly,  the  Congress  is  less 
than  wholly  comfortable  with  both  the 
need  for  a  military  element  in  foreign 
policy  and  its  own  responsibility  to  deal 
with  that  element. 

Presidents  must  recognize  Congress 
as  a  more  significant  partner  in  foreign 
policymaking,  and,  as  we  have  tried  to 
do,  seek  new  means  to  reach  bipartisan 
executive-legislative  consensus.  But  leg- 
islators must  realize  that  they,  too,  are 
partners.  They  have  a  responsibility  to 
go  beyond  mere  criticism  to  consensus 
building  that  will  produce  positive,  prac- 
tical, and  effective  action. 


May  1984 


■WilHIIimilllHIIilllllJUIIIII 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Bipartisan  consensus  is  not  an  end  in 
itself.  Sound  and  experienced  U.S.  for- 
eign policy  leadership  must  always 
reflect  a  deep  understanding  of  funda- 
mental American  interests,  values,  and 
principles. 

Consensus  on  the  broad  goals  of  a 
safer  and  more  humane  world  is  easy  to 
achieve.  The  harder  part  is  making  pro- 
gress in  developing  concrete,  realistic 
means  to  reach  these  goals.  We've  made 
some  progress.  But  there  is  still  a  con- 
gressional reluctance  to  assume  responsi- 
bility for  positive,  bipartisan  action  to  go 
with  their  newly  claimed  powers. 

We've  set  excellent  examples  with 
the  bipartisan  Scowcroft  commission,  bi- 
partisan support  for  IMF  funding,  and 
the  bipartisan  work  of  the  Kissinger 
commission.  But  it's  time  to  lift  our  ef- 
forts to  a  higher  level  of  cooperation; 
time  to  meet  together,  with  realism  and 
idealism,  America's  great  challenges  for 
the  1980s. 

We  have  the  right  to  dream  great 
dreams,  the  opportunity  to  strive  for  a 
world  at  peace  enriched  by  human  dig- 
nity, and  the  responsibility  to  work  as 
partners,  so  that  we  might  leave  these 
blessed  gifts  to  our  children  and  to  our 
children's  children. 

We  might  remember  the  example  of 
a  legislator  who  lived  in  a  particularly 
turbulent  era,  Henry  Clay.  Abraham 
Lincoln  called  him  "my  beau  ideal  of  a 
statesman."  He  knew  Clay's  loftiness  of 
spirit  and  vision  never  lost  sight  of  his 
country's  interest,  and  that,  election  year 
or  not.  Clay  would  set  love  of  country 
above  all  political  considerations. 

The  stakes  for  America  for  peace  and 
for  freedom  demand  every  bit  as  much 
from  us  in  1984  and  beyond— this  is  our 
challenge. 


iText  from  White  House  press  release.  I 


Democratic  Ideals  and 
U.S.-lsrael  Relations 


Excerpts  from  President  Reagan 's 
remarks  before  the  Young  Leadership 
Conference  of  the  United  Jevrish  Appeal 
on  March  13,  198i.^ 


In  your  lives,  you  must  overcome  great 
challenges.  I  know  you  draw  strength  and 
inspiration  from  the  well  of  a  rich 
spiritual  heritage,  from  the  fundamental 
values  of  faith  and  family,  work, 
neighborhood,  and  peace. 

Two  centuries  ago  those  values  led 
Americans  to  build  democratic  institu- 
tions and  begin  their  Constitution  with 
those  courageous  and  historic  words, 
"We,  the  people  . .  . ."  And  today  our 
democratic  institutions  and  ideals  unite  all 
Americans,  regardless  of  color  or  creed. 
Yet  as  we  enjoy  the  freedom  that 
America  offers,  we  must  remember  that 
millions  on  Earth  are  denied  a  voice  in 
government  and  must  struggle  for  their 
rights.  They  live  under  brutal  dictator- 
ships or  communist  regimes  that 
systematically  suppress  human  rights. 

Under  communism,  Jews,  in  par- 
ticular, suffer  cruel  persecution.  Here  in 
our  own  hemisphere,  the  communist  San- 
dinista  regime  in  Nicaragua  has  used 
threats  and  harassment  to  force  vh-tually 
every  Nicaraguan  Jew  to  flee  his  country. 

In  the  Soviet  Union  Jews  are  virtually 
forbidden  to  teach  Hebrew  to  their  chil- 
dren, are  limited  to  a  small  number  of 
synagogues,  and  cannot  publish  books  of 
Hebrew  liturgy.  Emigration  of  Jews  from 
the  Soviet  Union  has  been  brought  to  a 
near  standstill.  Prominent  Jews  like  losif 
Begun  have  been  arraigned  in  mock  trials 
and  given  harsh  sentences.  Hebrew 
scholars  like  Lev  Furman  have  seen  their 
teaching  materials  robbed  and  their 
homes  ransacked.  And  Jewish  dissidents 
like  Anatoli  Shcharanskiy  have  been  put 
in  mental  wards  or  thrown  in  jail.  We 
must  support  Soviet  Jews  in  their  strug- 
gle for  basic  rights,  and  I  urge  all 
Americans  to  observe  the  International 
Day  of  Concern  for  Soviet  Jews  this 
Thursday,  day  aftei-  tomorrow,  March 
15th. 


To  promote  our  democratic  ideals 
abroad,  we  must  also  meet  great 
challenges,  and  I  see  three  that  are  para- 
mount. 


Utjimplyt"" 
(,iivalentt« 

„,l'iir,fliotelii 


First,  we  must  keep  America  strong. 
During  the  1970s  the  United  States  made 
a  conscious  choice  to  restrict  its  military 
development,  fervently  hoping  the 
Soviets  would  respond  in  kind.  During 
those  10  years,  our  spending  on  defense 
dropped  over  20%  in  real  terms.  We 
canceled  major  weapons  programs,  re- 
duced our  nuclear  stockpile  to  its  lowest 
level  in  20  years,  and  slackened  in  the 
training  of  our  armed  forces.  Between 
1968  and  1978,  we  cut  our  navy— the 
fleet— by  more  than  half. 

But"  far  from  responding  to  om-  good 
intentions  with  restraint,  the  Soviets 
launched  the  most  massive  military 
buildup  in  world  history.  From  1974  to 
1980,  they  outproduced  us  in  practically 
every  category  of  weapons:  3  times  more 
tanks,  twice  as  many  tactical  combat  aii-- 
craft,  5  times  more  ICBM's  [intercon- 
tinental ballistic  missiles],  and  15  times 
more  ballistic  missile  submarines.  By  198(i 
total  Soviet  military  investment  was  more 
than  IV2  times  ours. 

President  Carter's  Secretary  of 
Defense,  Harold  Brown,  put  it  very  well. 
He  acknowledged  a  bitter  lesson  about 
Soviet  practice  in  saying,  "When  we 
build,  they  build.  When  we  don't  build, 
they  buUd." 

Since  taking  office,  our  Administra- 
tion has  made  significant  headway  in 
rebuilding  our  defenses  and  making 
America  more  secure.  Perhaps  you 
remember  the  29th  Psalm  in  which  King 
David  said,  "The  Lord  will  give  strength 
to  His  people;  the  Lord  will  bless  His  peo- 
ple with  peace."  Today  America  once 
again  recognizes  that  peace  and  strength 
are  inseparable. 

But  we've  only  begun  to  repaii-  past 
damage.  Make  no  mistake:  If  we  heed 
those  who  would  cripple  America's 
rebuilding  program,  we  will  undermine 
our  own  security  and  the  security  of  our 
closest  friends,  like  Israel,  and  I  am  not 
prepared  to  let  that  happen.  After  two 
decades  of  military  expansion  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  a  decade  of  neglect  by 
the  United  States,  we're  struggling  not  tO' 


Eiisiaii«*' 
a  word' 


jlresponsi 
peak  out  in 
gaers.W 
lain  silent. 
OarAiliiiii 
uiivigorousl) 
olJewsaiiiiot 


recfive.™'' 
■anriglits 
ladiir,  we're  i 


rfect,\vevi 
IntkeUi 


cancerouigr 


ofLwlas" 


anotkermas 
andtkat'ssc 


kilw. 


les$«nofhis 
Sienceisni 
anti-Mi 
l'X.\iii 
oar  leader  ( 


perastence 
onegetsan, 
Israel  is  evi 
I'X.theUr 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


-jm 


todoj 
our  NATO 


Kay  \^ 


THE  PRESIDENT 


regain  the  superiority  we  once  enjoyed 
but  simply  to  restore  the  military 
equivalence  we  need  to  keep  the  peace. 

A  second  great  challenge  is  to  defend 
and  pi-omote  human  rights  throughout 
the  world.  Aleksandi-  Herzen,  the  great 
Russian  writer,  warned,  "To  shrink  from 
saying  a  word  in  defense  of  the  oppressed 
is  as  bad  as  any  crime. . . ."  We  who  are 
blessed  by  the  fruits  of  liberty  have  a  per- 
sonal responsibility  and  a  moral  obligation 
to  speak  out  in  defense  of  our  brothers 
and  sisters.  We  must  not  and  we  will  not 
remain  silent. 

Our  Administration  has  repeatedly 
and  vigorously  protested  the  persecution 
of  Jews  and  others  in  the  Soviet  Union 
and  other  communist  nations.  We're  also 
using  our  influence  with  countries  that 
receive  American  assistance  to  give 
human  rights  firm  support.  In  El  Sal- 
vador, we're  insisting  that  the  leaders 
take  steps  to  end  human  rights  abuse. 
And  although  El  Salvador  is  far  from 
perfect,  we've  seen  marked  progress. 

In  the  United  Nations,  Iran's 
representative  once  called  Israel,  "a 
cancerous  growth,"  and  Libya's 
representative  has  referred  to  the  people 
of  Israel  as  "the  most  vile  people  upon 
Earth."  This  so-called  anti-Zionism  is  just 
another  mask  for  vicious  anti-Semitism, 
and  that's  something  the  United  States 
will  not  tolerate. 

As  I  wi-ote  last  month  to  Stanley 
Blend,  the  president  of  the  Jewish 
Federation  of  San  Antonio,  ". . .  the 
lesson  of  history  is  overwhelmingly  clear. 
Silence  is  never  an  acceptable  response  to 
anti-Semitism." 

UN  Ambassador  Jeane  Kirkpatrick  is 
our  leader  on  this.  And  let  me  assure  you 
of  one  thing  about  Jeane:  She  is  a  very 
tenacious  woman.  She  has  defended 
Israel  and  stood  up  for  human  rights  with 
persistence  and  courage.  But  just  so  no 
one  gets  any  ideas,  I  will  be  bhmt:  If 
Israel  is  ever  forced  to  walk  out  of  the 
UN,  the  United  States  and  Israel  will 
walk  out  together. 

Standing  steadfast  with  our  allies  in 
support  of  greater  economic  growth  and 
of  peace  with  freedom  is  our  third  great 
challenge.  Our  Administi-ation  is  working 
hard  to  do  just  that.  In  Europe  we  and 
our  NATO  allies  have  shown  the  Soviets 
our  willingness  to  negotiate  and  our  un- 
shakable resolve  to  defend  Western 
Europe.  In  the  Far  East,  we  are 
strengthening  our  ties  to  the  Asian 
democracies  and  developing  our  relations 
with  China.  In  Central  America  we  have 
supported  democracy  and  fostered 


economic  development.  And  in  the  Middle 
East  we  have  strengthened  our  relations 
with  a  nation  close  to  your  heart  and 
mine— the  State  of  Israel. 

Let  me  take  a  moment  to  describe  our 
relations  with  Israel  and  our  efforts  in  the 
Middle  East.  Israel  and  the  United  Stales 
are  bound  together  by  the  ties  of  friend- 
ship, shared  ideals,  and  mutual  interests. 
We're  allies  in  the  defense  of  freedom  in 
the  Middle  East.  The  United  States  was 
the  first  nation  to  recognize  the  State  of 
Israel,  and  ever  since,  om-  support  for 
Israel  has  remained  unflinching.  Today, 
when  even  our  NATO  allies  vote  with  us 
in  the  United  Nations  only  some  six  out  of 
ten  votes,  the  alliance  between  the 
United  States  and  Israel  is  so  strong  that 
we  vote  together  more  than  nine  times 
out  of  ten. 

Since  I  took  office,  the  U.S.-Israeli 
relationship  has  grown  closer  than  ever 
before  in  three  crucial  ways. 

First,  the  U.S.-Israeli  strategic  rela- 
tionship has  been  elevated  and  formal- 
ized. This  is  the  first  time  in  Israel's 
history  that  a  formal  strategic  relation- 
ship has  existed.  The  new  American- 
Israeh  Joint  Political-Military  Group  is 
working  to  decide  how  the  United  States 
and  Israel  can  counter  the  threat  that 
growing  Soviet  involvement  in  the  Middle 
East  poses  to  our  mutual  interests.  Our 
cooperation  adds  to  deterrence  and  im- 
proves and  protects  the  prospects  for 
peace  and  security.  The  negotiations  have 
been  positive,  and  they're  moving  for- 
ward. 

Second,  we're  negotiating  to  establish 
a  free  trade  area  between  the  United 
States  and  Israel,  and  this  will  launch  a 
new  era  of  closer  economic  relations  be- 
tween our  countries.  By  substantially 
eliminating  duties  and  nontariff  barriers 
between  our  nations,  we  will  enable 
American  producers  to  sell  and  compete 
in  Israel  while  providing  Israeli  manufac- 
turers unimpeded  access  to  the  free 
world's  largest  market. 

Third,  the  United  States  will  soon  be 
giving  Israel  military  aid  on  a  grant,  not  a 
loan,  basis.  We  have  re.structured  our 
1985  foreign  aid  package,  and  Israel  v\ill 
now  receive  economic  aid  totaling  $850 
million  and  a  military  grant  of  some  $1.4 
billion.  This  will  ensure  that  Israel  main- 
tains its  qualitative  military  edge. 

All  in  all,  the  friendship  between 
Israel  and  the  United  States  is  closer  and 
stronger  today  than  ever  before.  And  I 
intend  to  keep  it  that  way. 

In  the  Middle  East,  as  a  whole,  the 
United  States  has  three  aims. 

First,  we  must  deter  the  Soviet 
threat.  As  the  crossroads  among  three 


continents  and  the  source  of  oil  for  much 
of  the  industrialized  world,  the  Middle 
East  is  of  enormous  strategic  importance. 
Were  the  Soviets  to  control  the  region— 
and  they  have  expanded  their  influence 
there  in  a  number  of  ways,  notably,  by 
stationing  7,000  troops  and  advisers  in 
Syria— the  entire  world  would  be 
vulnerable  to  economic  blackmail.  Their 
brutal  war  against  the  Afghan  people  con- 
tinues with  increasing  ferocity.  We  must 
not  allow  them  to  dominate  the  region. 

Second,  we  must  prevent  a  widening 
of  the  conflict  in  the  Persian  Gulf  which 
could  threaten  the  sealanes  carrying 
much  of  the  free  world's  oil.  It  could  also 
damage  the  infrastructure  that  pumps  the 
oil  out  of  the  ground,  and  we  must  not 
permit  this  to  happen. 

Third,  we  seek  to  go  on  promoting 
peace  between  Israel  and  its  Arab 
neighbors.  In  response  to  the  growth  of 
Syrian  power  and  the  rise  of  the  Iranian 
threat,  we  must  help  to  protect  moderate 
Arabs  who  seek  peace  from  the  radical 
pressures  that  have  done  such  harm  in 
Lebanon. 

Syria  is  trying  to  lead  a  radical  effort 
to  dominate  the  region  through  terroi'ism 
and  intimidation  aimed,  in  paiticular,  at 
America's  friends.  One  such  friend  we 
continue  to  urge  to  negotiate  with  Israel 
is  King  Hussein  of  Jordan.  Today  Jordan 
is  crucial  to  the  peace  process,  and  for 
that  very  reason,  Jordan,  like  Israel,  is 
confronted  by  Syria  and  faces  military 
threats  and  terrorist  attacks. 

Since  the  security  of  Jordan  is  crucial 
to  the  security  of  the  entire  region,  it  is  in 
America's  strategic  interest,  and  I  believe 
it  is  in  Israel's  strategic  interest,  foi-  us  to 
help  meet  Jordan's  legitimate  needs  for 
defense  against  the  growing  power  of 
Syria  and  Iran.  Such  assistance  to  Jordan 
does  not  threaten  Israel,  but  enhances 
the  prospects  for  Mideast  peace  by  reduc- 
ing the  dangers  of  the  radical  threat. 

This  is  an  historic  moment  in  the  Mid- 
dle East.  Syria  must  decide  whether  to 
allow  Lebanon  to  retain  control  over  its 
own  destiny  or  condemn  it  to  occupation. 
Syria  forced  the  Lebanese  Government  to 
renounce  the  May  17th  agreement  with 
Israel  precisely  because  it  was  a  good 
agreement.  Those  who  hsve  chosen  this 
course  will  have  to  find  other  ways  to 
secure  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces. 
Arab  governments  and  the  Palestinian 
Arabs  must  decide  whether  to  reach 
peace  with  Israel  through  direct  negotia- 
tions. And  if  Arab  negotiators  step  for- 
ward, Israel  must  decide  if  it  will  take  the 
risks  necessary  to  attain  the  real  security 


May  1984 


THE  PRESIDENT 


thai  comes  only  with  genuine  peace.  I 
have  no  doubt  thai  given  thai  choice,  the 
Israelis  will  once  again  have  the  courage 
to  choose  peace. 

I'm  convinced  that  the  initiative  that  I 
presented  on  September  Isl,  1982,  re- 
mains the  best  option  for  all  the  parties. 
It  is  squarely  based  on  the  Camp  David 
framework  and  UN  Security  Council 
Re.<olution  242.  It  is  lime  for  the  Arab 
world  to  negotiate  directly  with  Israel 
and  to  recognize  Israel's  righl  to  exist. 

We  hope  that  the  Government  of 
Israel  will  understand  that  continued  set- 
tlement activity  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  will  make  the  peace  process  more 
difficult.  Peace  can  only  come  about 
through  the  give-and-take  of  direct 
negotiations.  These  negotiations  will  deal 
with  many  issues,  including  the  status  of 
Jerusalem,  voting  rights,  land  use,  and 
security.  If  there's  to  be  any  hope  for 
these  negotiations,  however,  we  must 
preserve  our  credibility  as  a  fairminded 
broker  seeking  a  comprehensive  solution. 
Only  the  United  States  can  advance  this 
process.  And  we  must  not  undermine  our 
role. 

And  permit  me  to  reaffirm  a 
longstanding  American  commitment:  So 
long  as  the  PLO  [Palestine  Libei-ation 
Organization]  refuses  to  recognize  Israel's 
right  to  exist  and  to  accept  Security 
Council  Resolutions  242  and  338,  the 
United  States  will  neither  recognize  nor 
negotiate  with  the  PLO. 

Only  2  weeks  ago,  terrorists  planted 
hand  grenades  outside  a  store  on  a 
crowded  street  in  Jerusalem.  When  they 
exploded,  21  shoppers  and  passersby 
were  injured,  some  seriously.  Yasir 
Arafat,  on  behalf  of  the  PLO  praised  the 
attack  on  innocent  civilians.  He  had  the 
gall  to  call  it  a  "military  operation."  Ter- 
rorism, whether  by  government  or  in- 
dividuals, is  repulsive,  and  peaceful  coex- 
istence can  never  come  from  in- 
discriminate violence. 

If  I  could  leave  you  with  one  thought 
today  it  would  be  this:  Even  though  in 
the  Middle  East  and  elsewhere  the  world 
seems  hostile  to  democratic  ideals,  it's  the 
free  men  and  women  on  this  Earth  who 
are  making  history. 

Here  in  the  United  Stales  we've  only 
seen  the  beginning  of  what  a  free  and  a 
brave  people  can  do.  Today  America  is 
leading  a  revolution  even  more  sweeping 
than  the  Industrial  Revolution  of  a  cen- 
tury ago.  It's  a  revolution  ranging  from 
tiny  microchips  to  voyages  into  the  vast, 
dark  spaces  of  space;  fi-om  home  com- 
puters that  can  put  the  great  music,  film, 
and  literature  at  a  family's  fingertips  to 
new  medical  breakthroughs  that  can  add 


years  to  our  lives,  even  helping  the  lame 
to  walk  and  the  blind  to  see. 

In  Israel  free  men  and  women  are 
every  day  demonstrating  the  power  of 
courage  and  faith.  Back  in  1948  when 
Israel  was  founded,  pimdits  claimed  the 
new  country  could  never  survive.  Today, 
no  one  questions  that  Israel  is  a  land  of 
stability  and  democracy  in  a  region  of 
tyranny  and  unrest. 


This  Sunday,  as  Jews  the  world  over 
observe  Purim,  they'll  celebrate  not  only 
the  ancient  deliverance  of  Jews  from  the 
wicked  but  a  modem  joy  as  well— the 
miracle  of  the  State  of  Israel. 


•  Made  at  the  Washington  Hilton  Hotel 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Mar.  19,  1984).H 


News  Conference  of  April  4  (Excerpts) 


Excerpts  from  Presidejiis  Reagan's 
news  conference  of  April  k.  198Jt} 

In  2  weeks,  I  will  send  Vice  President 
Bush  to  Geneva  to  present  to  the  40-na- 
tion  Conference  on  Disarmament  a  bold, 
American  initiative  for  a  comprehensive 
worldwide  ban  on  chemical  weapons.  Our 
proposal  would  prohibit  the  production, 
possession,  and  use  of  chemical  weapons. 

The  short  cdHiings  of  early  chemical 
weapons  treaties  have  been  made 
tragically  clear  in  recent  years.  Chemical 
weapons  have  been  used  against 
defenseless  peoples  in  Afghanistan,  in 
Southeast  Asia,  and  in  the  conflict  be- 
tween Iran  and  Iraq.  The  use  of  the  terri- 
ble weapons  also  has  serious  implications 
for  our  own  security. 

The  Soviet  Union's  e.xtensive  arsenal 
of  chemical  weapons  threatens  U.S. 
forces.  It  requires  the  LInited  States  to 
maintain  a  limited  retaliatory  capability  of 
its  own  until  we  achieve  an  effective  ban. 
We  must  be  able  to  deter  a  chemical  at- 
tack against  us  or  our  allies.  And  without 
a  modern  and  credible  deterrent,  the 
prospects  for  achieving  a  comprehensive 
ban  would  be  nil. 

Our  comprehensive  treaty  proposal 
can  bring  the  day  closer  when  the  world 
will  prohibit  all  chemical  weapons.  But 
verification  of  a  chemical  weapons  ban 
won't  be  easy.  Only  an  effective  monitor- 
ing and  enforcement  package  can  ensure 
international  confidence  in  such  an  agi-ee- 
ment.  The  United  States  is,  therefore, 
developing  bold  and  sound  verification 
procedures. 

This  latest  initiative  reflects  my 
continuing  strong  commitment  to  arms 
control.  Our  Administration  seeks  to 
move  forward  in  several  areas.  I'm 
pleased,  for  example,  that  the  United 
Stales  is  also  participating  in  a  promising 
new  multilateral  negotiation  dealing  with 


confidence-building  measures  in  Europe 
and,  in  the  recently  resumed  East-West 
talks,  in  reducing  conventional  forces  in 
Europe. 

We're  working  closely  with  our 
NATO  allies  to  try  to  make  progress  in  all 
these  areas.  I  can't  report  these  promis- 
ing developments,  however,  without  ex- 
pi'essing  my  deep,  personal  regret  that 
the  Soviet  Union  still  has  not  returned  to 
the  two  negotiations  on  nuclear  arms 
reductions— the  START  [strategic  reduc- 
tion talks]  and  the  INF  [intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces]  talks  which  it 
walked  away  from  late  last  year. 

The  United  States  and  many  othei- 
countries  have  urged  repeatedly  that  the 
Soviets  return  to  these  talks.  So  far  they 
have  ignored  the  will  of  the  world.  I  hope 
that  the  Soviet  leadership  will  respond  to 
our  new  initiatives,  not  only  by 
negotiating  seriously  on  chemical 
weapons  but  also  by  joining  us  in  the 
urgent  task  of  achieving  real  reductions 
in  nuclear  arms.  The  Vice  President's 
mission  is  a  vital  one,  and  we  wish  him 
Godspeed. 

Q.  The  Secretary  of  State,  George 
Shultz,  is  advocating  a  wider,  greater 
use  of  military  force,  a  show  of  force, 
around  the  world  and,  also,  preemptive 
strikes  against  potential  terrorists.  If 
you  slam  the  door  on  negotiations  for 
killer  satellites,  which  could  lead  to  a 
arms  race  in  space,  my  question  is,  how 
do  these  moves  ser\e  the  cause  of  peace 
and  do  you  think  that  the  country  is 
really  ready  for  wider  involvement, 
military  involvement,  around  the 
world? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  George  meant  to 
imply  anything  of  that  kind  or  that  we're 
going  to  get  more  militant  or  anything.  I 
think  he  was  trying  to  express  to  those 
people  who  have  been  so  concerned  about 
arms  and  whether  there's  an  arms  race, 
and  that  is  that  your  military  strength  is 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


lasiiiplatfs 

ten' wiling  t 
refardtoout 

tliaiit.<«fo' 
Tiiicha 
ibie.Aiid 

Q.Vou'r 
wthinfiii" 
lotryonflie 
youonlliek 

'  llnW 
\fesiy,w( 
forevMCS 
such  a  treaty 
you  lave  the 
iiavelieenth' 
any  treaties  I 
ivehavemth 
tionproceJui 


ban  chemicf 
posalanothi 
greii-what 
last  3  years 
torchemica 
lay  if  our  a( 
gpcebi 
ildon' 
indiipift' 
atwehavi 
;a[Dns  for 
hasamassiv 
inmanyarei 
warfare. 

If  there  i 
place  where 
powerofadi 
Mofchem 
World  War! 


iningio 
il'sjust 


tWove, 


SiiliHlli) 


THE  PRESIDENT 


■ess  ill  a 


medio 


a  definite  part  of  diplomacy  and  I  think 
this  is  what  he  was  ti-ying  to  explain. 

With  regard  to  the  space  weapons, 
this  is  a  situation  in  which  the  Soviet 
Union  is  ahead  of  us  and  already  has  and 
has  in  place  such  a  weapon.  We'are  still  in 
the  stage  of  studying  such  a  thing.  The 
great  problem  that  we  have— and  we're 
very  willing  to  enter  into  a  treaty  with 
regard  to  outlawing  such  weapons,  except 
that  it  so  far  seems  almost  impossible  to 
verify  such  a  weapon,  if  not  actually  im- 
possible. And  if  that's  true,  then  we, 
again,  must  have  a  deterrent. 

Q.  You're  one  who  always  says 
nothing  is  impossible,  and  you're  going 
to  try  on  chemical  weapons.  Why  don't 
you  on  the  killer  satellites? 

A.  In  both  of  them,  we  are  trying,  but 
as  we  say,  we  have  to  face  the  reality  that 
before  you  can  place  any  confidence  "in 
such  a  treaty,  you  must  be  confident  that 
you  have  the  one  thing  that  the  Soviets 
have  been  the  most  reluctant  to  give  in 
any  treaties  that  we've  ever  had,  or  that 
we  have  with  them,  and  that  is  verifica- 
tion procedures. 

Q.  With  regard  to  your  proposal  to 
ban  chemical  weapons,  isn't  this  pro- 
posal another  way  to  get  Con- 
gress-what  they've  failed  to  do  for  the 
last  3  years  which  is  appropriate  money 
for  chemical  weapons?  And  what  do  we 
say  if  our  adversaries  accuse  us  of  talk- 
ing peace  but  preparing  for  war? 

A.  I  don't  think  the  accusation  would 
stand  up  if  they  said  that.  The  situation  is 
that  we  haven't  produced  any  such 
weapons  for  15  years.  The  Soviet  Union 
has  a  massive  arsenal  and  is  ahead  of  us 
in  many  areas  having  to  do  with  chemical 
warfare. 

If  there  is  ever  one  example  or  one 
place  where  there  is  an  example  of  the 
power  of  a  deterrent  force,  it  is  in  the 
field  of  chemical  weapons.  And  I  hand  you 
World  War  II  when  all  the  nations  had 
them  and  no  one  used  them,  even  in  the 
most  desperate  moments  when  defeat 
was  staring  at  them  because  they  knew 
that  the  others  had  them  and  could  use 
them  in  return. 

The  second  thing  is  if  we're  going  to 
have  a  chemical  warfare  ban  or  a  treaty 
banning  them,  you've  got  to  have 
something  to  bargain  with.  And,  there- 
fore, it's  just  the  same  as  it  is  with  the 
other  weapons.  They  must  know  that  the 
alternative  to  banning  them  is  to  then 
face  the  fact  that  we're  going  to  build  a 
deterrent. 


^^gv/     1QQ/! 


Q.  Last  October  you  said  the 
presence  of  U.S.  Marines  in  Lebanon 
was  central  to  our  credibility  on  a 
global  scale.  And  now  you've  with- 
drawn them  and  terminated  our 
presence  in  the  MNF  [multinational 
forces],  to  what  extent  have  we  lost 
credibility— 

A.  We  may  have  lost  some  with  some 
people.  The  situation's  changed.  It  was 
true  when  I  said  that,  but  I  can,  I  think, 
explain.  I'll  try  to  make  it  as  brief  as  I  can 
what  the  situation,  or  what  the  change 
was. 

We  and  three  of  our  allies— our  four 
governments-decided  that  in  an  effort  to 
straighten  out  the  situation  that  was  so 
out  of  control  in  Lebanon,  that  we  would 
send  in  a  combination  force,  a  multiple 
force  not  to  participate  in  a  war  but  to  be 
on  hand  to  help  provide  stability  while  the 
Lebanese  were  allowed  then  to  create  a 
government. 

You  will  remember,  a  civil  war  had 
been  going  on  there  for  about  10  years. 
And  at  the  time  this  was  decided,  the 
Israelis  were  at  the  border  of  Beirut; 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion]-10,000- 15,000  of  them  were  fighting 
from  within  the  heart  of  Beirut;  the 
Syrians  were  also  involved. 

The  idea  was  that  if  a  government 
could  be  created  in  Lebanon  and  then  we 
could  help  them  recreate  their  military 
and  the  foreign  forces  withdraw,  then  as 
their  military  moved  out  into  the  areas 
previously  occupied  by  the  foreign 
powers  to  hopefully  pacify  the  internecine 
fighting  groups,  the  militias  that  were 
fighting  each  other  as  well  as  the  official 
forces  of  Lebanon— that  the  multinational 
force  would  be  a  kind  of  stable  peacekeep- 
ing force  behind  keeping  order  while  they 
went  out  to  do  that  job  because  they 
wouldn't  have  the  manpower  to  do  both. 

This  was  the  task.  The  first  success 
was  the  leaving  of  Lebanon  of  some 
10,000-15,000  PLO  who  up  until  then 
were  unwilling  to  surrender,  even  though 
they  faced  defeat,  because  they  feared  a 
massacre  at  the  hands  of  those  who  were 
fighting  them.  So  with  the  multinational 
force  there  to  guarantee  against  that, 
they  were  ushered  out. 

The  government  was  formed,  of 
Lebanon.  The  same  government  that  to- 
day is  negotiating  and  has  been  holding 
meetings  in  Geneva  and  elsewhere  to 
bring  about  a  peaceful  settlement. 

We  did  train— and  there  was  no  atten- 
tion paid  to  this.  Our  army  had  a  unit  in 
there  training  the  Lebanese  military  and 
equijjping  them  and  made  a  vei-y  capable 


military.  What  did  happen-the  deterioi-a- 
tion  when  Syria  insisted  on  staying  in  and 
backing  some  of  the  rebel  radical  forces 
there,  was  that  with  religious  and  ethnic 
differences,  some  units  of  the  army  re- 
fused to  take  up  arms  against  some  of 
their  same  ethnic  background  or  religious 
background.  The  Government  of  Lebanon 
went  forward  then  in  trying  to  bring 
together  the  kind  of  a  consensus  govem- 
ment-the  radical  elements  and  all-and 
take  them  into  a  broadened  based  govern- 
ment. In  the  meantime,  because  the 
multinational  force  had  been  successful, 
to  that  extent,  it  was  determined  by  those 
who  don't  want  that  kind  of  a  solution  in 
Lebanon  that  they  had  to  put  the 
pressure  on  to  get  our  forces  and  the 
others  out. 

And  with  the  terrorist  attacks  that 
brought  such  tragedy,  our  forces  dug  in, 
but  once  dug  in,  while  this  was  offering 
security  to  them  from  the  kind  of  attacks 
they'd  been  subjected  to,  they  were  no 
longer  visible  as  the  kind  of  force  they 
were  supposed  to  be.  And  so,  with  agree- 
ment with  our  allies,  we  redeployed;  some 
of  them  redeployed  to  other  areas.  But 
then,  as  these  efforts  went  forward  on 
their  own  for  peace,  it  was  agreed  that 
there  was  no  longer  any  point  in  the  four 
governments  keeping  their  forces  there. 
And  we  withdrew. 

We  are  still  engaged  diplomatically 
with  anything  we  can  do  to  help.  And' 
there  are  those  in  the  area  who  say  that 
they  doubt  that  there  can  be  any  solution 
or  peace  without  our  help.  And  "so  we'll  do 
that. 

Q.  You  began  your  answer  by  say- 
ing we  lost  some  credibility.  Are  you  to 
blame  for  that?  Or,  like  Secretary 
Shultz.  do  you  blame  Congress? 

A.  I  have  to  say  this,  and  then  I'll 
move  on  to  another  subject.  I  have  to  say 
that  this  was  one  of  the  things— and  they 
must  take  a  responsibility.  When  you're" 
engaged  in  this  kind  of  a  "diplomatic  at- 
tempt, and  you  have  forces  there,  and 
there  is  an  effort  made  to  oust  them,  a 
debate  as  public  as  was  conducted  here 
raging  with  the  Congress  demanding— 
"Oh,  take  our,  bring  our  men  home,  take 
them  away."  All  this  can  do  is  stimulate 
the  terrorists  and  urge  them  on  to  further 
attacks  because  they  see  a  pos.sibility  of 
success  in  getting  the  force  out  which  is 
keeping  them  from  having  their  way.  It 
should  be  understood  by  everyone  in 
government  that  once  this  is  committed, 
you  have  rendered  them  ineffective  when 
you  conduct  that  kind  of  a  debate  in 
public. 


...,.„„,»^x„.JBHHIIWIIIIUWIIIM 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Q.  The  Senate  today  unanimously 
adopted  a  proposal  to  withdraw  U.S. 
military  aid  from  El  Salvador  if  the 
(Tovernment  there  is  overthrown  by  a 
military  coup.  Some  people  have  sug- 
gested that  that  might  happen  if  Mr. 
Duarte  is  elected.  Do  you  support  the 
proposal  that  passed  the  Senate  today? 
And  would  you  veto  it  if  it  came  to  your 
desk? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  talk  about 
whether  to  veto  or  not.  but  I  think  here 
again,  this  is  not  helpful  in  what  we're 
trying  to  accomplish,  and  I  think  it's 
something  that— I  just  don't  think  they 
should  be  doing  it  at  this  time. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  you  don't  sup- 
port it? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Secretary  of  State  Shultz  says 
one  of  the  problems  in  Lebanon  is  the 
War  Powers  Act  and  Congress  is  always 
meddling  in  foreign  policy,  that  neither 
our  foes  nor  our  friends  know  who's  in 
charge.  How  much  of  a  problem  do  you 
have  with  the  War  Powers  Act  and 
would  you  like  to  see  a  Supreme  Court 
test  whether  or  not  it's  constitutional? 

A.  There's  been  no  talk  of  such  a  test 
or  doing  anything  of  that  kind,  but  I  do 
have  to  say  this.  In  the  last  10  years,  the 
Congress  has  imposed  about  1.50  restric- 
tions on  the  President's  power  in  interna- 
tional diplomacy,  I  think  that  the  Con- 
stitution made  it  pretty  plain  way  back  in 
the  beginning  as  to  how  diplomacy  was  to 
be  conducted,  and  I  just  don't  think  that  a 
committee  of  535  individuals,  no  matter 
how  well-intentioned,  can  offer  what  is 
needed  in  actions  of  this  kind  or  where 
there  is  a  necessity. 

Do  you  know  that  prior  to  the  Viet- 
namese war,  while  this  country  had  only 
had  four  declared  wars.  Presidents  of  this 
country  had  found  it  necessary  to  use 
military  forces  125  times  in  our  history? 

Q.  People  do  cite  Vietnam  where  a 
President  waged  an  undeclared  war  for 
years,  and  they  say  without  the  War 
Powers  Act  that's  going  to  continue. 

A.  I'll  tell  you,  this  is  the  time  for  me 
to  say  "  I  told  you  so."  For  a  long  time, 
and  even  before  I  became  governor,  I  was 
saying  that  the  war  in  Vietnam  had 
reached  a  position  or  a  state  in  which  we 
should  have  asked  for  a  declaration  of  war 
and  called  it  a  war. 


Q.  Recently  the  U.S.-backed  op- 
ponents of  the  Sandinista  regime  have 
gone  beyond  their  warfare  on  land  to 
mining  ports  off  the  Nicaraguan  coast. 


Are  you  concerned  that  these  mines 
there,  which  neutral  freighters  or 
others  could  hit,  run  a  risk  of  widening 
the  war  in  Central  America?  And  do 
you  think  there's  any  point  in  which  we 
ought  to  try  to  call  a  halt  to  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  Contras? 

A.  No,  our  interest  in  Nicaragua,  I'm 
not  going  to  comment  on  that  one  way  or 
the  other  or  the  tactics  that  are  used  in  a 
war  of  that  kind.  Our  interest  in  Nica- 
ragua is  one  and  one  only.  The  present 
Government  of  Nicaragua  is  exporting 
revolution  to  El  Salvador,  its  neighbor. 
and  is  helping,  supporting,  arming,  and 
training  the  guei-rillas  who  are  trying  to 
overthrow  a  duly  elected  government. 
And  as  long  as  they  do  that,  w-e're  going 
to  try  and  inconvenience  that  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  until  they  quit  that 
kind  of  action. 

Q.  We  are  training  troops  down 
there  in  Honduras.  Do  you  see,  from 
your  perspective,  a  danger  of  a  wider 
war  in  Central  America  at  this  point? 

A.  No,  I  think  these  maneuvers  are 
something  we've  done  before.  They're  not 
something  unusual  or  aimed  at  anyone 
down  there.  They  are  combined  exercises 
that  we  hold  with  our  owni  units  and  we 
have— one  unit  goes  through  some  of 
these  and  gets  the  training,  we  send 
another  one  down  to  do  the  same  thing. 
And  that's  all  they  are  is  war  games. 

Q.  Until  recently  your  Administra- 
tion had  handled  trade  disputes  with 
Japan  with  relatively  little  public  fan- 
fare. But  over  the  last  few  days,  three 
of  your  Cabinet  members  and  several 
other  Administration  officials  have 
spoken  out  publicly  and  firmly  in 
criticizing  Japan.  Why  the  change  in 
strategy? 

A.  It's  not  a  change  in  strategy.  It's 
just  talking  frankly  about  what's  going 
on.  It's  like  any  government  with  its 
various  interests  and  its  bureaucracies 
and  so  forth.  We're  not  making  as  much 
progress  as  we  would  like  to  make  with 
regard  to  the  things  that  I  had  discussed 
in  Japan  with  Prime  Minister  Nakasone 
and  here  at  the  Williamsburg  summit.  I 
know  where  he  stands.  And  I  know  that 
he  sincerely  and  honestly  wants  better 
trade  relations  and  some  of  the  obstacles 
removed  that  are  impairing  free  and  fan- 
trade  between  us.  But  then  there  are 
other  elements,  and  they're  subject  to 
political  pressure  and  public  opinion 
pressure  the  same  as  we  are  in  our  own 
country.  And  I  think  what  you've  been 
hearing  are  some  complaints  about  those 
who  are  trying  to  negotiate  these  things. 


10 


Q.  You've  been  saying  recently  that 
you're  trying  to  encourage  moderate 
Arab  leaders  to  join  the  Middle  East 
peace  process.  Yet  King  Hussein,  the 
key  moderate  Arab,  seems  to  have  shut 
the  door  rather  firmly.  In  view  of  that, 
what  is  your  future  course  for  guiding 
your  1982  peace  plan,  and  how  do  you 
intend  to  try  to  remove  the  obstacles  on 
that  course? 

A.  That  continues  to  be  our  plan,  and 
I  believe  that  King  Hussein  still  feels  and 
believes  that  he  w-ould  have  to  be  an  im- 
portant part,  being  the  next-door 
neighbor  to  Israel,  in  bringing  about  such 
negotiations.  And  I  continue  to  believe  in 
this.  This  is  the  answer.  It's  what  started 
us  from  the  very  beginning  in  the  Middle 
East  to  continue  the  Camp  David  process 
to  persuade  other  nations  to  do  w'hat 
Egypt  did  in  making  that  peace. 

At  the  present  moment,  you  have  a 
group  of  Arab  nations  that  have  never 
retreated  from  that  Israel  does  not  have  a 
right  to  exist  as  a  nation,  and  we're  try- 
ing to  persuade  them  that  we  can  be 
even-handed  and  that  we're  not  tr\ing  to 
dictate  any  peace  of  any  kind.  We  simply 
want  to  be  of  help  if  we  can;  an  in- 
termediary in  bringing  about  a  negotia- 
tion that  will  erase  the  issues  and  the 
problems  that  have  kept  them  apart  so 
that  they  can  settle  back  and  live  in  peace 
together.  And  we're  going  to  continue  to 
try  to  do  that. 

Q.  The  Soviet  Union  is  currently 
engaged  in  perhaps  its  largest  military 
exercise  ever  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  An 
exercise  that  involves  some  40  vessels, 
including  submarines,  destroyers,  and  a 
nuclear  powered  battle  cruiser.  I 
wonder  if  you  could  tell  us  what  you 
think  the  Soviet  Union  is  up  to  in  all  of 
this? 

A.  I  think  it's  spring  in  Russia  as  well 
as  the  United  States,  and  that's  when  you 
have  war  games  and  maneuvers.  We've 
been  having  some  of  our  owti.  We  always 
tell  when  we're  going  to  have  them.  We 
wish  they'd  tell  us. 

But  I  think  this  is  nothing  more  than 
that.  Your  war  games  are  actually— 
whoever's  conducting  them— based  on 
your  ovni  thoughts  as  to  what  contingen- 
cies could  arise  that  would  find  you  in  an 
emergency  situation,  and  so  you  set  out  to 
train  or  practice  for  that. 

Some  40  ships,  I  know,  sounds  like  an 
awful  lot,  but  when  you  stop  to  think 
we're  talking  about  a  navy  of  almost  1,000 
ships,  it  kind  of  comes  down  in  size  a  little 
bit.  No,  I  think  these  are  regular  and 
routine  maneuvers  that  usually  begin  in 
the  spring  of  the  year  for  most  of  us. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Q.  So  you  don't  think  that  the 
Soviet  Union  is  trying  to  send  us  any 
particular  signal? 

A.  No,  I  really  don't.  Nor  are  we  try- 
ing to  send  them  a  signal  with  our  own 
war  games. 

Q.  Getting  back  to  your  earlier 
statement  that  you  felt  for  some  time 
that  we  should  have  declared  war  dur- 
ing the  Vietnam  period,  against  whom 
would  we  have  declared  war,  and  if  we 
had  done  so,  wouldn't  that  have  wid- 
ened the  war  and  gotten  us  stuck  into 
an  even  greater  quagmire? 

A.  I  can  only  say  with  regard  to 
that— I  said  that  at  a  time  when  it  was  go- 
ing on  because  of  what  was  going  on  here 
in  our  country,  in  which  none  of  the  rules 
of  warfare  could  apply  with  regard  to 
lending  comfort  and  aid  to  the  enemy. 
Who  we  would  have  declared  war  against 
would  have  been  a  country— North  Viet- 


Central  America 


President  Reagan's  radio  address  to 
the  nation  on  March  2i,  198U^ 

Tomorrow  is  an  historic  day  for  the 
beleaguered  nation  of  El  Salvador.  Scores 
of  international  obsei-vers  will  watch  as 
the  people  of  El  Salvador  risk  their  lives 
to  exercise  a  right  we  take  for 
granted— the  right  to  vote  for  their  Presi- 
dent. 

This  right  of  choice  is  not  something 
that  is  common  in  all  of  Central  America. 
It  contrasts  shaiply,  for  example,  with 
Nicaragua,  where  the  Sandinistas  staged 
a  revolution  in  1979  promising  free  elec- 
tions, freedom  of  the  press,  freedom  of 
religion.  Despite  these  promises,  the  San- 
dinistas have  consistently  broken  their 
word,  and  the  elections  that  they've  an- 
nounced for  November  seemed  designed 
only  to  consolidate  their  control. 

Unlike  El  Salvador,  the  Nicaraguans 
don't  want  international  oversight  of  their 
campaign  and  elections.  When  the  mem- 
bers of  the  National  Bipartisan  Commis- 
sion on  Central  America  visited 
Nicaragua,  the  Sandinista  dictators 
briefed  them  with  Soviet  intelligence  and 
said  the  United  States  is  the  source  of  all 
evil. 

In  El  Salvador  the  members  heard  ap- 
preciation for  our  country's  efforts  to  pro- 
mote peace,  democracy,  and  development. 
El  Salvador  is  an  emerging  democracy 
plagued  by  a  communist  insurgency  and 


nam.  The  settlement  of  French  Indochina 
created  two  nations— South  Vietnam  and 
North  Vietnam.  They  were  two  separate 
nations.  In  fact  back  through  history, 
they  had  pretty  much  been  separate  coun 
tries  before.  You  say  that  because  of  the 
situation  of  the  time.  Whether  I  would 
still  feel  the  same  way  or  not— I  know 
that  there  was  great  concern  about  the 
possibility  of  a  war  widening,  just  as 
there  was  in  Korea  that  prevented  us 
from  allowing  General  MacArthur  to  lead 
us  to  a  victory  in  Korea.  Evei\vone 
thought  that  if  you— you  have  to  fight  a 
war  without  winning  it,  or  you  might  find 
yourself  in  a  bigger  war.  Maybe  General 
MacArthur  was  right.  There  is  no 
substitute  for  victory. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


human  rights  abuses  which  must  stop, 
but  a  nation  which  is  sti'ongly  pro- 
American  and  struggling  to  make  self- 
government  succeed. 

Nicaragua  is  a  communist  dictatorship 
armed  to  the  teeth,  tied  to  Cuba  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  which  oppi'esses  its  people 
and  threatens  its  neighbors. 

The  stability  of  our  Latin  friends— 
indeed,  the  security  of  our  own 
borders— depends  upon  which  tyjje  of 
society  prevails— the  imperfect 
democracy  seeking  to  improve  or  the 
communist  dictatorship  seeking  to  ex- 
pand. 

The  bipartisan  commission  warned 
that  new  communist  regimes  could  be  ex- 
pected to  fall  into  the  same  pattern  as 
Nicaragua;  namely,  expand  their  armed 
forces,  bring  in  large  numbers  of  Cuban 
and  Soviet  bloc  advisers,  and  increase  the 
repression  of  their  own  people  and  the 
subversion  of  their  neighbors.  And  the 
commission  warned  that  a  rising  tide  of 
communism  would  likely  produce 
refugees,  perhaps  millions  of  them,  many 
of  whom  would  flee  to  the  United  States. 

These  tragic  events  are  not  written  in 
stone,  but  they  will  happen  if  we  do 
nothing  or  even  too  little.  Based  on  the 
recommendations  of  the  commission,  I 
sent  the  Congress  in  February  a  proposal 
to  encourage  democratic  institutions,  im- 


prove living  conditions,  and  help  our 
friends  in  Central  America  resist  com- 
munist threats  Three-fouiths  of  our  re- 
quest is  for  economic  and  humanitarian 
assistance. 

And  that  brings  me  to  an  important 
point:  The  people  who  argue  that  the  root 
of  violence  and  instability  is  poverty,  not 
communism,  are  ignoring  the  obvious. 
But  all  the  economic  aid  in  the  world 
won't  be  worth  a  dime  if  communist  guer- 
rillas are  determined  and  have  the 
freedom  to  terrorize  and  to  burn,  bomb, 
and  destroy  everything  from  bridges  and 
industries  to  power  and  transportation 
systems.  So  in  addition  to  economic  and 
humanitarian  assistance,  we  must  also 
provide  adequate  levels  of  security 
assistance  to  permit  our  friends  to  protect 
themselves  from  Cuban  and  Soviet  sup- 
ported subversion. 

Military  assistance  is  crucial  right 
now  to  El  Salvador.  The  Salvadoran  peo- 
ple repudiated  the  guerrillas  when  they 
last  voted  in  1982,  but  continued  Soviet- 
Cuban-Nicaraguan  support  for  the  guer- 
rillas, combined  with  the  failure  of  our 
Congress  to  provide  the  level  of  military 
aid  I've  requested,  have  put  El  Salvador 
in  an  extremely  vulnerable  position.  The 
guerrillas  have  been  seizing  the  identifica- 
tion cards  that  allow  citizens  to  vote.  One 
of  El  Salvador's  principal  guerrilla  com- 
manders has  pledged  an  all-out  effort  to 
disrupt  the  elections.  And,  should  there 
be  a  need  for  an  election  run-off  in  late 
April  or  May,  these  same  guerrillas,  who 
have  already  assassinated  elected  con- 
gressmen in  El  Salvador,  will  do  every- 
thing they  can  to  disrupt  that  election  as 
well. 

We're  looking  at  an  emergency  situa- 
tion. So  I've  asked  Congress  to  provide 
immediate  security  assistance  for  El 
Salvador  while  the  comprehensive  bipar- 
tisan legislation  makes  its  way  through 
the  Congress  over  the  next  several 
months. 

This  is  the  moment  of  truth.  There  is 
no  time  to  lose.  If  the  Congress  acts 
responsibly,  while  the  cost  is  still  not 
great,  then  democracy  in  Central 
America  will  have  a  chance.  If  the  Con- 
gress refuses  to  act,  the  cost  will  be  far 
greater.  The  enemies  of  democracy  will 
intensify  their  violence,' more  lives  will  be 
lost,  and  real  danger  will  come  closer  and 
closer  to  our  shores.  This  is  no  time  for 
partisan  politics. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  2,  1984.1 


May  1984 


,i.«»imimiuuiniiwuiiu«......uu»»iiwiiiuiiiii— — IP 


JIHI 


THE  SECRETARY 


Power  and  Diplomacy  in  the  1980s 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
Trilateral  Commission  on  April  3,  198^.^ 

Over  20  years  ago,  President  John 

Kennedy  pledged  that  the  United  States 
would  "pay  any  price,  bear  any  burden, 
meet  any  hardship,  support  any  friend, 
oppose  any  foe,  in  order  to  assure  the 
survival  and  the  success  of  liberty."  We 
know  now  that  the  scope  of  that  commit- 
ment is  too  broad— though  the  self-confi- 
dence and  courage  in  those  words  were 
typically  American  and  most  admirable. 
More  i-ecently,  another  Administration 
took  the  view  that  our  fear  of  commu- 
nism was  "inordinate"  and  that  there 
were  very  compUcated  social,  economic, 
religious,  and  other  factors  at  work  in 
the  world  that  we  had  little  ability  to  af- 
fect. This,  in  my  view,  is  a  counsel  of 
helplessness  that  substantially  underesti- 
mates the  United  States  and  its  ability 
to  influence  events. 

Somewhere  between  these  two  poles 
lies  the  natural  and  sensible  scope  of 
American  foreign  policy.  We  know  that 
we  are  not  omnipotent  and  that  we  must 
set  priorities.  We  cannot  pay  any  price 
or  bear  any  burden.  We  must  discrimi- 
nate; we  must  be  prudent  and  careful; 
we  must  respond  in  ways  appropriate  to 
the  challenge  and  engage  our  power  only 
when  very  important  strategic  stakes  are 
involved.  Not  every  situation  can  be 


advance  them.  Thus  we  as  a  nation  are 
perpetually  asking  ourselves  how  to 
reconcile  our  morality  and  our  practical 
sense,  how  to  pursue  noble  goals  in  a 
complex  and  imperfect  world,  how  to 
relate  our  strength  to  our  purposes— in 
sum,  how  to  relate  power  and  diplomacy. 

We  meet  this  evening  amid  the  ex- 
citement of  America's  quadrennial  exer- 
cise of  self-renewal,  in  which  we  as  a 
country  reexamine  ourselves  and  our  in- 
ternational objectives.  It  is  an  unending 
process— almost  as  unending  as  the  presi- 
dential campaign  season.  But  there  are 
some  constants  in  our  policy,  such  as  our 
alliance  with  the  industrial  democracies, 
as  embodied  in  the  distinguished  gather- 
ing. This  partnership— the  cornerstone  of 
our  foreign  policy  for  35  years— itself 
reflects  our  ability  to  combine  our  moral 
commitment  to  democracy  and  our  prac- 
tical awareness  of  the  crucial  importance 
of  maintaining  the  global  balance  of 
power.  So  I  consider  this  an  appropriate 
forum  at  which  to  shai-e  some  thoughts 
on  the  relationship  between  power  and 
diplomacy  in  the  last  two  decades  of  the 
20th  century. 

The  World  We  Face 

By  the  accident  of  history,  the  role  of 
world  leadership  fell  to  the  United 
States  just  at  the  moment  when  the  old 


Americans,  being  a  moral  people,  want  their 
foreign  policy  to  reflect  the  values  we  espouse  as  a 
nation.  But  Americans,  being  a  practical  people,  also 
want  their  foreign  policy  to  be  effective. 


salvaged  by  American  exertion  even 
when  important  values  or  interests  are 
at  stake. 

At  the  same  time,  we  know  from  his- 
tory that  courage  and  vision  and  deter- 
mination can  change  reality.  We  can  af- 
fect events,  and  we  all  know  it.  The 
American  people  expect  this  of  their 
leaders.  And  the  future  of  the  free  world 
depends  on  it. 

Americans,  being  a  moral  people, 
want  their  foreign  policy  to  reflect  the 
values  we  espouse  as  a  nation.  But 
Americans,  being  a  practical  people,  also 
want  their  foreign  policy  to  be  effective. 
If  we  truly  care  about  our  values,  we 
must  be  prepared  to  defend  them  and 


12 


international  order  had  been  destroyed 
by  two  world  wars  but  no  new  stable 
system  had  developed  to  replace  it.  A 
century  ago,  the  international  system 
was  centered  on  Europe  and  consisted  of 
only  a  few  major  players.  Today,  in 
terms  of  military  strength,  the  dominant 
countries  are  two  major  powers  that  had 
been,  in  one  sense  or  another,  on  the 
edge  or  outside  European  diplomacy.  But 
economic  power  is  now  widely  dispersed. 
Asia  is  taking  on  increasing  significance. 
The  former  colonial  empires  have  been 
dismantled,  and  there  are  now  more  than 
160  independent  nations  on  the  world 
scene.  Much  of  the  developing  world  it- 
self is  torn  by  a  continuing  struggle  be- 
tween the  forces  of  moderation  and 


forces  of  radicalism.  Most  of  the  ma- 
jor international  conflicts  since  1945 
have  taken  place  there— from  Korea  to 
Vietnam  to  the  Middle  East  to  Central 
America.  Moreover,  the  Soviet  Union 
continues  to  exploit  nuclear  fear  as  a 
political  weapon  and  to  exploit  instabil- 
ities wherever  they  have  the  opportunity 
to  do  so. 

On  a  planet  grown  smaller  because  of 
global  communications,  grown  more 
turbulent  because  of  the  diffusion  of 
power— all  the  while  overshadowed  by 
nuclear  weapons— the  task  of  achieving 
stability,  security,  and  progress  is  a  pro- 
found challenge  for  mankind.  In  an  age 
menaced  by  nuclear  proliferation  and 
state-sponsored  terrorism,  tendencies 
toward  anarchy  are  bound  to  be  a  source 
of  real  dangers. 

It  is  absurd  to  think  that  America 
can  walk  away  from  these  problems. 
This  is  a  world  of  great  potential  danger. 
There  is  no  safety  in  isolationism.  We 
have  a  major,  direct  stake  in  the  health 
of  the  world  economy;  our  prosperity, 
our  security,  and  our  alliances  can  be  af- 
fected by  threats  to  security  in  many 
parts  of  the  world;  and  the  fate  of  our 
fellow  human  beings  will  always  impinge 
on  our  moral  consciousness.  Certainly 
the  United  States  is  not  the  world's 
policeman.  But  we  are  the  world's 
strongest  free  nation,  and,  therefore,  the 
preservation  of  our  values,  our  prin- 
ciples, and  our  hopes  for  a  better  world 
rests  in  great  measure,  inevitably,  on  our 
shoulders. 

Power  and  Diplomacy 

In  this  environment,  our  principal  goal  is 
what  President  Reagan  has  called  "the 
most  basic  duty  that  any  President  and 
any  people  share— the  duty   to  protect 
and  strengthen  the  peace."  History 
teaches,  however,  that  peace  is  not 
achieved  merely  by  wishing  for  it.  Noble 
aspirations  are  not  self-fulfilling.  Our  aim 
must  always  be  to  shape  events  and  not 
be  the  victim  of  events.  In  this  fast- 
moving  and  turbulent  world,  to  sit  in  a 
reactive  posture  is  to  risk  being  over- 
whelmed or  to  allow  others,  who  may 
not  wish  us  well,  to  decide  the  world's 
future. 

The  Great  Seal  of  the  United  States, 
as  you  know,  shows  the  American  eagle 
clutching  arrows  in  one  claw  and  olive 
branches  in  the  other.  Some  of  you  may 
have  seen  the  Great  Seal  on  some  of  the 
china  and  other  antique  objects  in  the 
White  House  or  in  the  ceremonial  rooms 
on  the  eighth  fioor  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment. On  some  of  the  older  items,  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


iBV  other  wi 


THE  SECRETARY 


eagle  looks  toward  the  arrows;  on  others, 
toward  the  olive  branches.  It  was  Presi- 
dent Truman  who  set  it  straight:  he  saw 
to  it  that  the  eagle  always  looked  toward 
the  olive  branches— showing  that  America 
sought  peace.  But  the  eagle  still  holds 
onto  those  aiTOWS. 

This  is  a  way  of  saying  that  our  fore- 
fathers understood  quite  well  that  power 
and  diplomacy  always  go  together.  It  is 
even  clearer  today  that  a  world  of  peace 
md  security  will  not  come  about  without 
nuiiiiy  exertion  or  without  facing  up  to  some 
tough  choices.  Certainly  power  must 
it  ilways  be  guided  by  pui-pose,  but  the 
lard  reality  is  that  diplomacy  not  backed 
Dy  strength  is  ineffectual.  That  is  why, 
for  example,  the  United  States  has  suc- 
ceeded many  times  in  its  mediation  when 
■nany  other  well-intentional  mediators 
lave  failed.  Leverage,  as  well  as  good 
ivill,  is  required. 

Americans  have  sometimes  tended  to 
;hink  that  power  and  diplomacy  are  two 
iistinct  alternatives.  To  take  a  very  re- 
cent example,  the  Long  commission 
"eport  on  the  bombing  of  our  Marine 
Darracks  in  Beirut  urged  that  we  work 
larder  to  pursue  what  it  spoke  of  as 
'diplomatic  alternatives,"  as  opposed  to 
'military  options."  This  reflects  a  fun- 
damental misunderstanding— not  only  of 
3ur  intensive  diplomatic  efforts  through- 
out the  period  but  of  the  relationship  be- 
tween power  and  diplomacy.  Sometimes, 
regrettable  as  it  may  be,  political  con- 
lict  degenerates  into  a  test  of  strength. 
It  was  precisely  our  military  role  in 
Lebanon  that  was  problematical,  not  our 
diplomatic  exertion.  Our  military  role 
ivas  hamstrung  by  legislative  and  other 
nhibitions;  the  Syrians  were  not  in- 
;erested  in  diplomatic  compromise  so 
ong  as  the  prospect  of  hegemony  was 
lot  foreclosed.  They  could  judge  from 
Dur  domestic  debate  that  our  staying 
power  was  limited. 

In  arms  control,  also,  successful 
[legotiation  depends  on  the  perception  of 

military  balance.  Only  if  the  Soviet 
leaders  see  the  West  as  determined  to 
modernize  its  own  forces  will  they  see  an 
incentive  to  negotiate  agreements  estab- 
lishing equal,  verifiable,  and  lower  levels 
of  armaments. 

The  lesson  is  that  power  and  diplo- 
macy are  not  alternatives.  They  must  go 
together,  or  we  will  accomplish  very  lit- 
tle in  this  world. 

The  relationship  between  them  is  a 
complex  one,  and  it  presents  us  with 
both  practical  and  moral  issues.  Let  me 
address  a  few  of  those  issues.  One  is  the 
variety  of  the  challenges  we  face.  A  sec- 
ond is  the  moral  complexity  of  our 
response.  A  third  is  the  problem  of  man- 
aging the  process  in  a  democracy. 


The  Range  of  Challenges 

Perhaps  because  of  our  long  isolation 
from  the  turmoil  of  world  politics,  Ameri- 
cans have  tended  to  believe  that  war  and 
peace,  too,  were  two  totally  distinct 
phenomena:  we  were  either  in  a  blissful 
state  of  peace,  or  else  (as  in  World 
Wars  I  and  II)  we  embarked  on  an  all- 
out  quest  for  total  victory,  after  which 


not  engage  in  military  conflict  without  a 
clear  and  precise  military  mission,  solid 
public  backing,  and  enough  resources  to 
finish  the  job.  This  is  undeniably  true. 
But  does  it  mean  there  are  no  situations 
where  a  discrete  assertion  of  power  is 
needed  or  appropriate  for  limited  pur- 
poses? Unlikely.  Whether  it  is  crisis 
management  or  power  projection  or  a 


...  in  the  1980s  and  beyond^  most  likely  we  will 
never  see  a  state  of  total  war  or  a  state  of  total  peace. 


we  wanted  to  retreat  back  into  inward- 
looking  innocence,  avoiding  "power 
poUtics"  and  all  it  represented.  During 
World  War  II,  while  single-mindedly 
seeking  the  unconditional  surrender  of 
our  enemies,  we  paid  too  little  heed  to 
the  emerging  postwar  balance  of  power. 

Similarly,  since  1945  we  have  experi- 
enced what  we  saw  as  a  period  of  clear- 
cut  cold  war,  relieved  by  a  period  of 
seeming  detente  which  raised  exagger- 
ated expectations  in  some  quarters. 
Today  we  must  see  the  East-West  rela- 
tionship as  more  complex,  with  the  two 
sides  engaging  in  trade  and  pursuing 
arms  control  even  as  they  pursue  incom- 
patible aims.  It  is  not  as  crisis  prone  or 
starkly  confrontational  as  the  old  cold 
war;  but  neither  is  it  a  normal  relation- 
ship of  peace  or  comfortable  coexistence. 

Thus,  in  the  1980s  and  beyond,  most 
likely  we  will  never  see  a  state  of  total 
war  or  a  state  of  total  peace.  We  face  in- 
stead a  spectrum  of  often  ambiguous 
challenges  to  our  interests. 

We  are  relatively  well  prepared  to 
deter  an  all-out  war  or  a  Soviet  attack  on 
our  West  European  and  Japanese  allies; 
that's  why  these  are  the  least  hkely  con- 
tingencies. But,  day  in  and  day  out,  we 
will  continue  to  see  a  wide  range  of  con- 
flicts that  fall  in  a  gray  area  between  ma- 
jor war  and  millennial  peace.  The  coming 
years  can  be  counted  upon  to  generate 
their  share  of  crises  and  local  outbreaks 
of  violence.  Some  of  them— not  all  of 
them— will  affect  our  interests.  Terror- 
ism—particularly state-sponsored  terror- 
ism—is already  a  contemporary  weapon 
directed  at  America's  interests, 
America's  values,  and  America's  allies. 
We  must  be  sure  we  are  as  well  pre- 
pared and  organized  for  this  interme- 
diate range  of  challenges. 

If  we  are  to  protect  our  interests, 
values,  and  allies,  we  must  be  engaged. 
And  our  power  must  be  engaged. 

It  is  often  said  that  the  lesson  of 
Vietnam  is  that  the  United  States  should 


show  of  force  or  peacekeeping  or  a 
localized  military  action,  there  will 
always  be  instances  that  fall  short  of  an 
all-out  national  commitment  on  the  scale 
of  World  War  II.  The  need  to  avoid  no- 
win  situations  cannot  mean  that  we  turn 
automatically  away  from  hard-to-win 
situations  that  call  for  prudent  involve- 
ment. These  will  always  involve  risks; 
we  will  not  always  have  the  luxury  of  be- 
ing able  to  choose  the  most  advantageous 
circumstances.  And  our  adversaries  can 
be  expected  to  play  rough. 

The  Soviets  are  students  of 
Clausewitz,  who  taught  that  war  is  a 
continuation  of  politics  by  other  means. 
It  is  highly  unlikely  that  we  can  respond 
to  gray-area  challenges  without  adapting 
power  to  poUtical  circumstances  or  on  a 
psychologically  satisfying,  all-or-nothing 
basis.  This  is  just  not  the  kind  of  reality 
we  are  likely  to  be  facing  in  the  1980s,  or 
1990s,  or  beyond.  Few  cases  will  be  as 
clear  or  as  quick  as  Grenada.  On  the  con- 
trary, most  other  cases  will  be  a  lot 
tougher. 

We  have  no  choice,  moreover,  but  to 
address  ourselves  boldly  to  the  challenge 
of  terrorism.  State-sponsored  teiTonsm 
is  really  a  form  of  warfare.  Motivated  by 
ideology  and  political  hostility,  it  is  a 
weapon  of  unconventional  war  against 
democratic  societies,  taking  advantage  of 
the  openness  of  these  societies.  How  do 
we  combat  this  challenge?  Certainly  we 
must  take  security  precautions  to  protect 
our  people  and  our  facilities;  certainly  we 
must  strengthen  our  intelligence 
capabilities  to  alert  ourselves  to  the 
threats.  But  it  is  increasingly  doubtful 
that  a  purely  passive  strategy  can  even 
begin  to  cope  with  the  problem.  This 
raises  a  host  of  questions  for  a  free  soci- 
ety: in  what  circumstances— and  how- 
should  we  respond?  When— and  how- 
should  we  take  preventive  or  preemptive 
action  against  known  terrorist  groups? 


May  1984 


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THE  SECRETARY 


What  evidence  do  we  insist  upon  before 
taking  such  steps? 

As  the  threat  mounts— and  as  the  in- 
volvement of  such  countries  as  Iran, 
Syria,  Libya,  and  North  Korea  has 
become  more  and  more  evident— then  it 


pend  on  us  be  subjugated  by  brute  force 
if  we  have  the  capacity  to  prevent  it. 
There  is,  in  addition,  another  ugly 
residue  of  our  Vietnam  debate:  the  no- 
tion, in  some  quarters,  that  America  is 
the  guilty  party,  that  the  use  of  our 


.  .  .  any  use  of  force  involves  moral  issues. 
American  military  power  should  be  resorted  to  only 
if  the  stakes  justify  it,  if  other  means  are  not 
available,  and  then  only  in  a  manner  appropriate  to 
the  objective.  But  we  cannot  opt  out  of  every  contest. 


is  more  and  more  appropriate  that  the 
nations  of  the  West  face  up  to  the  need 
for  active  defense  against  terrorism. 
Once  it  becomes  established  that  ter- 
rorism works— that  it  achieves  its 
political  objectives— its  practitioners  will 
be  bolder,  and  the  threat  to  us  will  be  all 
the  greater. 

The  Moral  Issues 

Of  course,  any  use  of  force  involves 
moral  issues.  American  military  power 
should  be  resorted  to  only  if  the  stakes 
justify  it,  if  other  means  are  not 
available,  and  then  only  in  a  manner  ap- 
propriate to  the  objective.  But  we  cannot 
opt  out  of  every  contest.  If  we  do,  the 
world's  future  will  be  determined  by 
others-most  likely  by  those  who  are  the 
most  brutal,  the  most  unscrupulous,  and 
the  most  hostile  to  our  deeply  held  prin- 
ciples. The  New  Republic  stated  it  well  a 
few  weeks  ago: 

[T]he  American  people  know  that  force 
and  the  threat  of  force  are  central  to  the 
foreign  policy  of  our  adversaries,  and  they  ex- 
pect their  President  to  be  able  to  deter  and 
defeat  such  tactics. 

As  we  hear  now  in  the  debate  over 
military  aid  to  Central  America,  those 
who  shrink  from  engagement  can  always 
find  an  alibi  for  inaction.  Often  it  takes 
the  form  of  close  scrutiny  of  any  moral 
defects  in  the  friend  or  ally  whom  we  are 
proposing  to  assist.  Or  it  is  argued  that 
the  conflict  has  deep  social  and  economic 
origins  which  we  really  have  to  address 
first  before  we  have  a  right  to  do 
anything  else. 

But  rather  than  remain  engaged  in 
order  to  tackle  these  problems— as  we 
are  trying  to  do— some  people  turn  these 
concerns  into  formulas  for  abdication, 
formulas  that  would  allow  the  enemies  of 
freedom  to  decide  the  outcome.  To  me,  it 
is  highly  immoral  to  let  friends  who  de- 


power  is  a  source  of  evil  and,  therefore, 
the  main  task  in  foreign  policy  is  to 
restrain  America's  freedom  to  act.  It  is 
inconceivable  to  me  that  the  American 
people  believe  any  of  this.  It  is  certainly 
not  President  Reagan's  philosophy. 

Without  being  boastful  or  arrogant, 
the  American  people  know  that  their 
country  has  been  a  powerful  force  for 
good  in  the  world.  We  helped  Europe 
and  Asia-including  defeated  enemies- 
rebuild  after  the  war,  and  we  helped  pro- 
vide a  security  shield  behind  which  they 
could  build  democracy  and  freedom  as 
well  as  prosperity.  Americans  have  often 
died  and  sacrificed  for  the  freedom  of 
others.  We  have  provided  around  $165 
billion  in  economic  assistance  for  the 
developing  worid.  We  have  played  a  vital 
facilitating  role  in  the  Middle  East  peace 
process,  in  the  unfolding  diplomacy  of 
southern  Africa,  as  well  as  in  many  other 
diplomatic  efforts  around  the  globe. 

We  have  used  our  power  for  good 
and  worthy  ends.  In  Grenada,  we  helped 
restore  self-determination  to  the  people 
of  Grenada,  so  that  they  could  choose 
their  own  future.  Some  have  tried  to 
compare  what  we  did  in  Grenada  to  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  We 
welcome  such  comparison.  Contrast,  for 
example,  the  propsects  for  free  elections 
in  the  two  countries.  In  Grenada,  they 
will  be  held  this  year;  in  Afghanistan, 
when?  Contrast  the  number  of  American 
combat  troops  now  in  Grenada  5  months 
after  the  operation  with  the  number  of 
Soviet  troops  in  Afghanistan  55  months 
after  their  invasion.  The  number  in 
Grenada  is  0;  the  number  in  Afghan- 
istan is  over  100,000. 

More  often,  the  issue  is  not  the  direct 
use  of  American  military  power  but 
military  assistance  to  friends  to  help 
them  defend  themselves.  Around  the 
world,  security  support  for  friends  is  a 
way  to  prevent  crises;  it  bolsters  our 
friends  so  they  can  deter  challenges.  And 


14 


it  is  a  way  of  avoiding  the  involvement  of 
American  forces,  because  it  is  only  when 
our  friends'  efforts  in  their  own  defense 
are  being  overwhelmed  that  we  are  faced 
with  the  agonizing  decision  whether  to 
involve  ourselves  more  directly.  Security 
assistance  is  thus  an  essential  tool  of 
foreign  policy.  It  is  an  instrument  for  _ 
deterring  those  who  would  impose  their 
will  by  force  and  for  making  political 
solutions  possible.  It  gets  far  less  sup- 
port in  this  country  than  it  deserves. 

Central  America  is  a  good  example. 
The  real  moral  question  in  Central 
America  is  not  do  we  believe  in  military 
solutions,  but  do  we  believe  in  ourselves? 
Do  we  believe  that  our  security  and  the 
security  of  our  neighbors  has  moral 
validity?  Do  we  have  faith  in  our  own 
democratic  values?  Do  we  believe  that 
Marxist-Leninist  solutions  are  an- 
tidemocratic and  that  we  have  a  moral 
right  to  try  to  stop  those  who  are  trying 
to  impose  them  by  force?  Sure,  economic 
and  social  problems  underlie  many  of 
these  conflicts.  But  in  El  Salvador,  the 
communist  guerrillas  are  waging  war 
directly  agamst  the  economy,  blowing  up 
bridges  and  power  stations,  deliberately 
trying  to  wreck  the  country's  economy. 

The  conflict  in  Central  America  is  not 
a  debate  between  social  theorists;  it  is 
one  of  those  situations  I  mentioned 
where  the  outcome  of  political  competi- 
tion will  depend  in  large  measure  on  the 
balance  of  military  strength.  In  El 
Salvador,  the  United  SUtes  is  support- 
ing moderates  who  believe  in  democracy 
and  who  are  resisting  the  enemies  of 
democracy  on  both  the  extreme  right 
and  the  extreme  left.  If  we  withdrew  our 
support,  the  moderates,  caught  in  the 
crossfire,  would  be  the  first  victims-as 
would  be  the  cause  of  human  rights  and 
the  prospects  for  economic  development. 
And  anyone  who  believes  that  military 
support  for  our  friends  isn't  crucial  to  a 
just  outcome  is  living  in  a  dream  world. 
And  anyone  who  believes  that  military 
support  can  be  effective  when  it's  given 
on  an  uncertain  installment  plan  is  not 
facing  reality. 

Accountability  Without  Paralysis 

The  third  issue  I  want  to  mention  is  the 
question  of  how  this  country,  as  a 
democracy,  conducts  itself  in  the  face  of 
such  challenges. 

Over  the  last  35  years,  the  evolution 
of  the  international  system  was  bound  to 
erode  the  predominant  position  the 
United  States  enjoyed  immediately  after 
Worid  War  II.  But  it  seems  to  me  that 
in  this  disorderiy  and  dangerous  new 
world,  the  loss  of  American  predomi- 
nance puts  an  even  greater  premium  on 
consistency,  determination,  and 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


coherence  in  the  conduct  of  our  foreign 
policy.  We  have  less  margin  for  error 
than  we  used  to  have. 

This  change  in  our  external  cir- 
cumstances, however,  coincided  histori- 
cally with  a  kind  of  cultural  revolution  at 
home  that  has  made  it  harder  for  us  to 
achieve  the  consistency,  determination, 
and  coherence  that  we  need.  The  last  15 
years  left  a  legacy  of  contention  between 
the  executive  and  legislative  branches 
and  a  web  of  restrictions  on  executive  ac- 
tion embedded  permanently  in  our  laws. 
At  the  same  time,  the  diffusion  of  power 
within  the  Congress  means  that  a  presi- 
dent has  a  hard  time  when  he  wants  to 
negotiate  with  the  Congress,  because 
congressional  leaders  have  lost  their 
dominance  of  the  process  and  often  can- 
not produce  a  consensus  or  sometimes 
even  a  decision. 

The  net  result,  as  you  well  know,  is 
an  enormous  problem  for  American  for- 
eign policy— a  loss  of  coherence  and  re- 
curring uncertainty  in  the  minds  of 
friend  and  foe  about  the  aims  and  con- 
stancy of  the  United  States. 

Particularly  in  the  war  powers  field, 
where  direct  use  of  our  power  is  at 
issue,  the  stakes  are  high.  Yet  the  war 
powers  resolution  sets  arbitrary  60-day 
deadlines  that  practically  invite  an  adver- 
sary to  wait  us  out.  Our  Commander  in 
Chief  is  locked  in  battle  at  home  at  the 
same  time  he  is  trying  to  act  effectively 
abroad.  Under  the  resolution,  even  inac- 
tion by  the  Congress  can  force  the  Presi- 
dent to  remove  American  forces  from  an 
area  of  chaUenge,  which,  as  former  Presi- 
dent Ford  has  put  it,  undermines  the 
President  even  when  the  Congress  can't 
get  up  the  courage  to  take  a  position. 
Such  constraints  on  timely  action  may 
only  invite  greater  challenges  down  the 
road.  In  Lebanon  our  adversaries' 
perception  that  we  lacked  staying  power 
undercut  the  prospects  for  successful 
negotiation.  As  the  distinguished  Major- 
ity Leader,  Senator  Howard  Baker,  said 
on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  4  weeks  ago: 

[W]e  cannot  continue  to  begin  each 
military  involvement  abroad  with  a  prolonged, 
tedious  and  divisive  negotiation  between  the 
executive  and  the  legislative  branches  of 
government.  The  world  and  its  many 
challenges  to  our  interests  simply  do  not 
allow  us  that  luxury. 

I  do  not  propose  changes  in  our  con- 
stitutional system.  But  some  legislative 
changes  may  be  called  for.  And  I  pro- 
pose, at  a  minimum,  that  all  of  us,  in 
both  Congress  and  the  executive  branch, 
exercise  our  prerogatives  with  a  due 
regard  to  the  national  need  for  an  effec- 
tive foreign  policy.  Congress  has  the 
right,  indeed  the  duty,  to  debate  and 
criticize,  to  authorize  and  appropriate 
funds  and  share  in  setting  the  broad 


lines  of  policy.  But  micromanagement  by 
a  committee  of  535  independent-minded 
individuals  is  a  grossly  inefficient  and  in- 
effective way  to  run  any  important 
enterjjrise.  The  fact  is  that  depriving  the 
President  of  fiexibility  weakens  our  coun- 
try. Yet  a  host  of  restrictions  on  the 
President's  ability  to  act  are  now  built 
into  our  laws  and  our  procedures.  Surely 
there  is  a  better  way  for  the  President 
and  the  Congress  to  exercise  their 
prerogatives  without  hobbling  this  coun- 
try in  the  face  of  assaults  on  free-world 
interests  abroad.  Surely  there  can  be  ac- 
countability without  paralysis.  The  sad 
truth  is  that  many  of  our  difficulties  over 
the  last  15  years  have  been  self-imposed. 

The  issue  is  fundamental.  If  the  pur- 
pose of  our  power  is  to  prevent  war,  or 
injustice,  then  ideally  we  want  to 
discourage  such  occurrences  rather  than 
have  to  use  our  power  in  a  physical 
sense.  But  this  can  happen  only  if  there 
is  assurance  that  our  power  would  be 
used  if  necessary. 

A  reputation  for  reUabUity  becomes, 
then,  a  major  asset— giving  friends  a 
sense  of  security  and  adversaries  a  sense 
of  caution.  A  reputation  for  living  up  to 
our  commitments  can,  in  fact,  make  it 
less  likely  that  pledges  of  support  will 
have  to  be  carried  out.  Crisis  manage- 
ment is  most  successful  when  a  favorable 
outcome  is  attained  without  firing  a  shot. 
Credibility  is  an  intangible,  but  it  is  no 
less  real.  The  same  is  true  of  a  loss  of 
credibility.  A  failure  to  support  a  friend 
always  involves  a  price.  Credibility,  once 
lost,  has  to  be  reeamed. 


Facing  the  Future 

The  dilemmas  and  hard  choices  will  not 
go  away,  no  matter  who  is  president. 
They  are  not  partisan  problems.  Anyone 
who  claims  to  have  simple  answers  is 
talking  nonsense. 

The  United  States  faces  a  time  of 
chaUenge  ahead  as  great  as  any  in  recent 
memory.  We  have  a  diplomacy  that  has 
moved  toward  peace  through  negotiation. 
We  have  rebuilt  our  strength  so  that  we 
can  defend  our  interests  and  dissuade 
others  from  violence.  We  have  allies 
whom  we  value  and  respect.  Our  need  is 
to  recognize  both  our  challenge  and  our 
potential. 

Americans  are  not  a  timid  people.  A 
foreign  policy  worthy  of  America  must 
not  be  a  policy  of  isolationism  or  guilt 
but  a  commitment  to  active  engagement. 
We  can  be  proud  of  this  country,  of  what 
it  stands  for,  and  what  it  has  accom- 
phshed.  Our  morality  should  be  a  source 
of  courage  when  we  make  hard  decisions, 
not  a  set  of  excuses  for  self-paralysis. 

President  Reagan  declared  to  the 
British  Parliament  nearly  2  years  ago: 
"We  must  be  staunch  in  our  conviction 
that  freedom  is  not  the  sole  prerogative 
of  a  lucky  few  but  the  inalienable  and 
universal  right  of  all  human  beings."  As 
long  as  Americans  hold  to  this  beUef,  we 
will  be  actively  engaged  in  the  world. 
We  will  use  our  power  and  our 
diplomatic  skill  in  the  service  of  peace 
and  of  our  ideals.  We  have  our  work  cut 
out  for  us.  But  we  will  not  shrink  from 
our  responsibility. 


'  Press  release  97.1 


FY  1984  Supplemental  and  FY  1985 
Authorization  Requests 


Secretary  Shultz 's  statement  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  Commerce,  Justice, 
State,  and  Judiciary  of  the  Senate  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  28, 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appeal"  before  you  to 
present  the  Department  of  State's  re- 
quest for  1984  supplemental  appropria- 
tions and  the  budget  for  1985. 

During  the  past  year,  the  worldwide 
environment  for  the  Department  has 
become  dangerous,  costly,  and  difficult  to 
support.  In  this  complex  and  all  too  often 
hostile  setting,  the  Depai-tment  must  seek 
increases  in  the  resources  required  to 
carry  out  the  di])l()matic  and  consular 
responsibilities  of  the  United  States.  The 
President's  I'ecjuest  foi-  much  needed  in- 


creases for  the  Department  recognizes 
the  vital  role  foreign  policy  plays  in  con- 
tributing to  our  national  security. 

This  request  will  continue  operations 
of  the  Department  of  State  at  existing 
levels  and  jarovifle  limited  growth  in  vital 
substantive  and  support  areas.  It  was 
developed  in  conjunction  with  other 
foreign  affairs  agencies,  is  based  on  an  in- 
tensive resource  review,  and  represents  a 
cost  =  effective  approach  to  meeting  this 
country's  foreign  policy  and  national 
security  goals. 

Total  Budget  Request 

For  1985  the  Department  is  requesting 
appropriations  totaling  $2,338,951,000. 
This  represents  an  increase  of 


May  1984 


■BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 


THE  SECRETARY 


$235,057,000  and  497  positions  above  the 
1984  appropriations,  after  adding  pro- 
posed supplementals  totaling  238  posi- 
tions and  $49,587,000.  Most  of  our  re- 
quested increases  are  required  to  con- 
tinue programs  supported  by  this  commit- 
tee in  previous  years. 

About  52'?^'  of  the  total  increase  for 
the  Department's  1985  operating  budget 
is  needed  to  continue  operations  at  1984 
levels.  This  increase  is  first  needed  to 
keep  pace  with  higher  overseas  operating 
costs  where  inflation  often  exceeds  that  in 
the  United  States.  Other  increases  are 
workload  related  such  as  for  passport  and 
consular  activities,  overseas  adminis- 
trative support  to  other  foreign  affairs 
agencies,  cost  increases  required  to  sup- 
port our  domestic-based  employees,  and 
continuation  of  previously  approved 
foreign  buildings  projects. 

The  remaining  48%  of  the  Depart- 
ment's requested  increase  is  for  programs 
which  will  continue  to  renew  our  opera- 
tional capabilities  and  strengthen  several 
areas  of  crucial  importance  to  our  global 
capability.  Failure  to  make  these  in- 
vestments not  only  jeopardizes  the  effec- 
tive conduct  of  foreign  affairs  but  also  in- 
creases the  size  of  such  necessary  in- 
vestments in  the  future. 

Two  of  the  most  important  issues  fac- 
ing the  Department  are  the  reporting  and 
analysis  of  foreign  affairs  information  and 
the  security  of  our  people  and  properties 
abroad.  Our  request  contains  major  ini- 
tiatives in  both  of  these  areas. 

First,  the  budget  will  strengthen  our 
reporting  and  analysis  of  foreign  political 
and  economic  events.  This  is  our  most 
essential  function.  For  this  purpose,  we 
are  requesting  146  positions  and  $9 
mill'on  in  a  1984  supplemental  appropria- 
tion and  an  additional  eight  posi^'ons  and 
$800,000  as  part  of  the  1985  request.  We 
must  improve  our  ability  to  report  and 
analyze  the  significanc;  of  foreign  political 
and  economic  events  and  how  they  relate 
tu  American  national  security  interests. 
Indeed,  the  crucial  relationship  of  the 
Department's  information  collection  and 
analysis  program  to  this  country's  foreign 
policy  decision  process  was  a  central  ele- 
ment in  our  budget  review  process  with 
the  President.  To  this  end,  the  Depart- 
ment's request  is  needed  to  meet  im- 
mediate specific  needs  for  additional 
reporting  and  analysis.  These  needs  were 
identified  through  exhaustive  internal 
and  interagency  executive  branch  review 
of  available  information  and  the  national 
security  requirements  for  additional  infor- 
mation. 

Our  conclusion  is  that  we  must  im- 
prove the  foreign  affairs  information  and 


16 


analysis  available  to  the  Department,  the 
National  Security  Council,  and  the  Presi- 
dent. 

Second,  in  conjunction  with  the  other 
security-related  projects  contained  in  this 
request,  we  plan  two  major  security  im- 
provement initiatives,  one  immediate  and 
one  longer  range.  First  we  are  reassess- 
ing our  priorities  to  accelerate  the  im- 
plementation of  improved  security 
measures  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  Second,  I 
will  convene  a  high-level  advisory  panel  to 
conduct  a  comprehensive  examination  of 
our  worldwide  security  strategy. 

We  must  continue  to  improve,  with 
your  assistance,  the  security  of  our  people 
and  property  overseas.  The  recent  series 
of  vehicle  bombings  in  the  Middle  East 
represents  a  serious  escalation  in  the 
security  threat— in  addition  to  the  wide 
spectrum  of  existing  concerns— to  U.S. 
personnel  and  facilities  overseas.  In  1983 
alone,  three  such  suicide  bombings 
against  U.S.  installations— the  U.S.  Em- 
bassies in  Beirut  (April)  and  Kuwait 
(December)  and  the  Marine  Corps  head- 
quarters at  the  Beirut  airport  (October)— 
accounted  for  over  300  deaths  and  scores 
of  injuries.  The  most  recent  intelligence 
estimates  offer  no  reason  to  believe  that 
this  threat  will  diminish.  On  the  contrary, 
we  can  only  assume  that  the  overall 
threat  level  against  our  overseas  ac- 
tivities, particularly  in  the  Middle  East 
region,  wUl  grow  even  further,  fueled  by 
such  events  as  the  continuing  civil  conflict 
in  Lebanon  and  the  Iran-Iraq  war.  An  ad- 
ditional and  extremely  disturbing  de 
velopment  is  the  recent  assassination  of 
MFO  [multinational  force  and  observers] 
Director  General  Hunt  in  Rome  and  the 
evidence  that  suggests  a  connection  be- 
tween a  revived  Red  Brigade  in  Italy  and 
the  role  of  the  United  States  in  Middle 
Eastern  affau's. 

Other  important  initiatives  are 
needed  to: 

•  Improve  the  security,  reliability, 
and  cost-effectiveness  of  the  Depart- 
ment's communications  systems; 

•  Provide  new  office  and  housing 
facilities  where  needed  and  continue  to 
upgrade  and  restore  our  inventory  of 
overseas  property  valued  at  an  estimated 
$5  billion;  and 

•  Expand  the  Department's 
worldwide  information  processing  capa- 
bility. 

1984  Supplemental  Appropriations 

The  proposed  1984  supplemental  ap- 
propriations total  238  positions  and  $50.1 
million  and  are  requu-ed  for  the  following 
urgent  unbudgeted  needs: 


•  146  positions  and  $9  million  to  fund 
135  reporting  and  analysis  and  11  interna- 
tional communications  policy  positions. 
These  resources  form  the  basis  of  our  ma- 
jor initiative  to  strengthen  political  and 
economic  reporting  and  analysis  efforts; 

•  49  positions  and  $4.2  million  to  han- 
dle unanticipated  increases  in  passport 
workload  levels.  In  1982  and  1983,  the  ex- 
traordinary strength  of  the  dollar  pro- 
duced significant  increases  in  the  demand 
for  passports,  well  beyond  budgeted 
rates,  the  cumulative  impact  of  these 
unanticipated  passport  workload  in- 
creases is  a  severe  shortfall  in  the 
resources  needed  to  process  the  projected 
passport  workload  during  1984; 

•  $10.5  million  for  urgent  security  re- 
quirements; 

•  36  positions  (including  20  local  na- 
tionals) and  $5.1  million  to  open  a  mission 
in  Grenada.  The  mission  will  be  headed 
by  a  charge  and  will  include  a  small  staff 
to  assist  as  appropriate  the  economic 
development  of  Grenada; 

•  $10.4  million  to  fund  the  January 
1984  Federal  pay  raise; 

•  $1.8  million  to  modernize  the  Coor- 
dinating Committee  for  Multilateral 
Security  Export  Controls  (COCOM) 
facilities  in  Paris  so  that  COCOM  can  im- 
prove its  capabilities  in  line  with  the  in- 
creased emphasis  on  strategic  trade  con- 
trols; 

•  7  positions  and  $1.5  million  to  sup- 
port the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Con- 
ference on  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament  in 
Europe  (CDE)  in  Stockholm  and  fulfill  the 
President's  commitment  to  support  fully 
the  Helsinki  nuclear  disarmament  proc- 
ess; 

•  $2.5  million  to  handle  unanticipated 
increases  in  protective  security  and  com- 
munications support  for  the  1984  Summer 
Olympics  in  Los  Angeles;  and 

•  $4.6  million  to  finance  the  unfunded 
liability  of  the  Foreign  Service  retirement 
fund  created  by  the  January  1984  Federal 
salary  increase. 

Major  Components  of 
the  1985  Funding  Request 

After  including  these  proposed  sup- 
plementals, our  1985  request,  as  I  in- 
dicated above,  reflects  a  net  increase  of 
$235,057,000  and  497  positions  over  1984. 

The  1985  request  reflects  changes  in 
four  major  operating  areas. 

First,  in  the  salaries  and  expenses  ap- 
propriation, there  is  a  net  increase  of 
$162.6  million.  This  increase  is  requested 
primarily  to  cover  overseas  wage  and 
price  inflation,  workload  increases,  built- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


in  security  cost  increases,  and  critical  im- 
provements for  the  Department's  opera- 
tions in  the  areas  of  security,  reporting 
and  analysis,  consular  activities,  profes- 
sional development,  post  openings,  infor- 
mation systems,  communications,  and  ad- 
ministrative support. 

Second,  the  regular  and  special  cur- 
rency foreign  buildings  appropriations  in- 
clude a  total  net  increase  of  $50.2  million. 
In  addition  to  new  development  and  con- 
struction projects,  the  1985  foreign 
buildings  budget  includes  the  .second  in- 
stallment in  a  multiyear  renewal  program 
to  maintain  the  Department's  worldwide 
inventory  of  property.  Included  in  the 
basic  program  level  of  these  appropria- 
tions are  resources  to  fund  initial  develop- 
ment and  or  construction  of  office  and 
housing  facilities  in  nine  countries. 

Third,  we  are  proposing  two  new  ap- 
propriations requiring  budget  authority 
of  $14.5  million  as  follows: 

•  $9.5  million  to  provide  reim- 
bursements, in  case  of  extraordinary 
need,  to  state  and  local  governments  and 
to  secure  services  of  private  firms  for  in- 
creased protection  of  foreign  missions  and 
officials  in  the  United  States;  and 

•  $5  million  to  provide  research  opjjor- 
tunities,  through  gi'ant  support,  in 
specialties  of  high  interest  to  the  profes- 
sional Soviet-East  European  studies  com- 
munity and  to  U.S.  policymakers. 

Fourth,  there  is  a  total  net  increase 
of  $7.8  million  among  all  other  appropria- 
tions. This  growth  results  from  increases 
for  contributions  to  international  orga- 
nizations ($6.8  million),  international  con- 
ferences and  contingencies  ($2.3  million), 
international  commissions  ($3.7  million), 
and  other  appropriations  ($1.3  million)  off- 
set by  adjustments  to  buying  power 
maintenance  ( -$4.6  million)  and  the  pay- 
ment to  the  Foreign  Service  retirement 
and  disability  fund  (-$1.7  million). 

In  addition,  this  request  includes  a 
one-time  off-budget  appropriation  of  $110 
million  of  U.S. -owned  Indian  rupees.  This 
appropriation  will  establish  a  binational 
U.S.-India  fund  for  cooperative  scientific, 
educational,  and  cultural  activities.  The 
fund  will  provide  an  effective  means  of 
furthering  long-term  cooperation  and 
friendly  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  India. 

Major  Components  of 
the  Position  Request 

The  Department's  1985  request  totals 
17,324  positions,  a  net  increase  of  497 
positions  over  the  1984  level. 


Of  the  497  positions  inci'ea.se,  301  posi- 
tions are  for  built-in  changes,  largely  for 
consular  and  passport  workload  as  well  as 
administrative  support  requirements. 

The  remaining  196  positions  are 
needed  for  new  initiatives  including: 

•  48  positions  for  opening  six 
po.sts— Wuhan,  People's  Republic  of 
China;  Windhoek,  Nambia;  Luanda, 
Angola;  Moroni,  Comoros;  and  resident 
representative  offices  in  Ponape  and  Ma- 
juro,  Micronesia,  along  with  an  associated 
office  of  Micronesian  Affairs  in 
Washington,  D.C. 

•  8  positions  to  strengthen  the 
substantive  reporting  and  analysis 
capability  of  the  Department; 

•  11  positions  to  improve  consular  and 
passport  activities; 

•  17  ])ositions  for  expanded  profes- 
sional development; 


port; 


'  28  positions  for  communications  sup- 


•  27  po.sitions  for  information  systems; 
and 

•  57  positions  for  security,  legal  sup- 
port, the  development  of  a  new  property 
management  system  for  our  facilities 
abroad,  and  for  support  of  air  pollution 
studies  on  the  Canadian  border. 

Last  fall  I  ui-ged  the  President  to 
make  a  commitment,  in  a  difficult  budget 
situation,  to  a  stronger  Department  of 
State  and  Foreign  Service.  He  agreed, 
and  the  result  is  the  budget  before  you.  I 
ask  you  and  your  subcommittee  to  give  it 
your  strongest  support. 


>  Press  release  91  of  Mar.  29,  1984.  The 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.B 


Foreign  Aid  and 
U.S.  Policy  Objectives 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Hmise  Fwreiffti  Affairs  Committee  on 
February  9,  198Jt.^ 

Last  year  when  I  met  with  you,  I  sought 
to  demonstrate  how  U.S.  assistance  to 
developing  countries  serves  our  national 
interests.  In  the  intervening  months, 
two  commissions  of  citizens  and 
Members  of  Congress  have  examined 
our  overseas  programs.  The  Commission 
on  Security  and  Economic  Assistance, 
headed  by  Frank  C.  Carlucci,  reviewed 
our  total  foreign  assistance  program. 
The  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America,  headed  by  Henry  A. 
Kissinger,  reviewed  our  national  goals 
and  needs  for  assistance  in  Central 
America.  More  than  two  dozen  Members 
of  Congress  served  with  these  two  com- 
missions as  members,  ex  officio 
members,  or  senior  counselors. 

We  are  indebted  to  these  members 
and  all  commission  participants  for  their 
excellent  work.  We  are  particularly 
gratified  that  these  citizens— Republi- 
cans, Democrats,  liberals,  conservatives, 
businessmen,  labor  leaders,  and  aca- 
demics—reached a  clear  consensus  on 
the  importance  of  foreign  assistance. 

The  Carlucci  commission  concluded: 
"The  instrumentalities  of  foreign  assist- 
ance are  potent  and  essential  tools  that 
advance  our  interests.  ...  On  balance,  it 


May  1984 


is  the  judgment  of  the  Commission  that 
U.S.  assistance  programs  make  an  indis- 
pensable contribution  to  achieving 
foreign  policy  objectives." 

Both  commissions  concluded  that 
economic  and  military  assistance  are 
equally  servants  of  our  national  in- 
terests. The  Carlucci  commission  notes 
that  rising  standards  of  living  in  the 
Third  World  are  vital  to  internal  stabili- 
ty and  external  defense.  Conversely, 
threats  to  stability  impede  development. 

In  a  similar  vein,  the  bipartisan  com- 
mission characterizes  the  problems  of 
Central  America  as  a  "seamless  web" 
which  can't  be  defined  solely  in 
economic,  political,  social,  or  security 
terms. 

Both  commissions  believe  that  cur- 
rent levels  of  foreign  aid  are  inadequate. 
According  to  the  Carlucci  commission, 
"in  real  terms  .  .  .  U.S.  assistance  ex- 
penditures over  the  last  five  years  have 
averaged  some  21  percent  below  those 
of  a  comparable  period  ten  years  ago." 
The  commission  states:  "To  meet  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives,  significant  in- 
creases in  real  levels  of  assistance  will 
be  required."  The  bipartisan  commission, 
having  focused  on  the  problems  of  one 
region,  also  concludes  that  significantly 
more  resources  are  needed  to  meet  our 
national  interests  there. 


17 


maBaaam 


THE  SECRETARY 


In  my  testimony  today,  I  want  to 
build  on  the  foundations  laid  by  these 
two  commissions.  Our  foreign  assistance 
program  serves  four  U.S.  interests: 

•  Our  interest  in  a  growing  world 
economy  which  enhances  the  well-being 
of  citizens  in  both  the  developing  and 
the  industrialized  world; 

•  Our  interest  in  security— protect- 
ing our  vital  interests  abroad,  strength- 
ening our  friends,  contributing  to 
regional  stability,  and  backstopping  our 
diplomatic  efforts  for  peaceful  solutions 
to  regional  problems; 

•  Our  interest  in  building  democracy 
and  promoting  adherence  to  human 
rights  and  the  rule  of  law;  and 

•  Our  humanitarian  interest  in 
alleviating  suffering  and  easing  the  im- 
mediate consequences  of  catastrophe  on 
the  very  poor. 

A  world  of  stability  and  progress 
cannot  be  built  by  the  United  States 
alone.  Therefore,  strengthening  our 
friends  must  be  a  central  component  of 
our  foreign  policy  in  both  the  economic 
and  security  dimensions.  There  is  always 
the  temptation  to  cut  corners  here  and 
there  in  the  aid  budget.  It  is  unwise  to 
give  in  to  this  temptation;  it  is  penny- 
wise  and  pound  foolish.  Strengthening 
our  friends  is  generally  an  effective  way 
to  avoid  major  problems  down  the 
road— problems  that  could  end  up 
costing  us  much  more  in  resources  and 
sacrifice. 


assistance  will  be  distributed  geographic- 
ally in  FY  1985. 

In  military  assistance,  we  have  made 
a  significant  change  so  that  we  can 
lower  interest  rates  on  military  assist- 
ance loans  to  poor  or  debt-burdened 
countries.  Over  the  past  decade  military 
assistance  has  increasingly  been  provid- 
ed as  "off-budget"  loans  with  interest 
rates  at  cost  of  money  to  the  [Depart- 
ment of  the  U.S.]  Treasury.  As  a  result, 
the  Carlucci  commission  reports  that  the 
21  countries  receiving  substantial 
military  and  economic  assistance  in  1982 
received  an  effective  interest  rate— in- 
cluding both  grants  and  loans— of 
approximately  9%  for  military  assistance 
and  1%  for  economic  assistance.  This 
discrepancy  has  meant  that  in  some 
countries  military  assistance  repayments 
have  become  or  threaten  to  become  a 
large  fraction  of  total  debt  service.  For 
others,  repayment  of  military  assistance 
loans  takes  up  foreign  exchange  needed 
for  economic  growth. 

In  response,  we  have  moved  all  mili- 
tary assistance  "on  budget"— a  step 
which  Congress  has  long  urged.  By  so 
doing,  we  are  able  to  provide  military 
assistance  loans  either  at  a  concessional 
rate  or  at  the  cost  of  money  to  the 
Treasury  depending  on  the  economic 
situation  of  individual  countries.  You 
will  note  on  Chart  C  how  we  have  in- 
creased the  concessionality  of  military 
assistance  in  FY  1985  compared  to 


previous  years.  This  decision  is  a  key 
step  toward  one  of  our  critical  goals— 
the  more  effective  integration  of  our 
military  and  economic  assistance. 


Central  America,  the  Caribbean, 
and  South  America 

The  National  Bipartisan  Commission  [on 
Central  America]  concluded  its  study 
"persuaded  that  Central  America  is  both 
vital  and  vulnerable  and  that  whatever 
other  crises  may  arise  to  claim  the  na- 
tion's attention,  the  United  States  can- 
not afford  to  turn  away  from  that 
threatened  region.  Central  America's 
crisis  is  our  crisis." 

The  commission  emphasized  that  the 
countries  of  Central  America— our 
neighbors— are  in  mid-passage  from  the 
predominantly  authoritarian  societies  of 
the  past  to  what— with  determination 
and  help— can  become  predominantly 
pluralistic,  democratic  societies  in  the 
future.  That  passage  is  marked  today  by 
warfare,  poverty,  and  political  turmoil, 
which  breed  extremism  and  violence 
from  the  left  and  the  right.  It  creates 
conditions  which  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union  seek  to  exploit  for  their  own 
strategic  and  political  purposes. 

The  United  States  has  a  profound  in- 
terest in  helping  the  people  of  Central 
America  move  from  these  travails  to  a 
future  of  greater  economic  and  social 
justice.  Our  interests  will  be  served  by 


Overview  of  1985  Budget 
and  1984  Supplemental 

The  foreign  assistance  program  for 
FY  1985  totals  $15.8  billion,  of  which 
$1.5  billion  is  multilateral  aid  and  $14.3 
billion  is  bilateral  aid.  This  includes  $9.4 
billion  in  economic  assistance  and  $6.4 
billion  in  military  assistance.  Chart  A  [see 
p.  31]  shows  the  relative  proportions  of 
economic  and  mOitary  assistance  in  the 
foreign  aid  program  since  1974. 

For  FY  1984,  we  are  seeking  supple- 
mental funds  of  $1.1  billion,  including 
$400  million  for  emergency  economic 
assistance  to  Central  America  and  $259 
million  for  military  aid  to  the  region. 

Our  economic  aid  in  FY  1985  will 
focus  on  increasing  food  production  and 
reducing  hunger;  improving  health, 
especially  reducing  infant  and  child  mor- 
tality; slowing  population  growth  rates; 
spreading  education  and  literacy;  and 
improving  host-country  financial  struc- 
tures. Chart  B  shows  how  our  economic 


Chart  B 


A.I.D.  Economic  Assistance 

By  Region 
FY  1985 


I  Development  Assistance 
WM  Economic  Support  Fund 
\  Z\  PL  480  Title  I 
I        I  PL  480  Title  II 


Asia  Latin  AiTiencan  Nea 

&  Caribbean  &  Eui 


East  Central 

rope  Programs 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Chart  C 


other 

Concessional 

2.6% 


Military  Assistance  Concessionality 


1981  Actual 


1983  Actual 


Non-Concessionnl 
81.4% 


Noil  Concessional 
71.5% 


Non-Concessionai 
33.5% 


helping  alleviate  economic  grievance  in 
the  region.  We  have  a  vital  interest  in 
helping  our  friends  block  the  Soviet 
Union  from  consolidating  a  foothold  in 
Central  America.  And  most  basically, 
progress  in  this  hemisphere  means  the 
advancement  of  our  most  basic  values: 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law.  This  is 
the  kind  of  world  we  want  our  children 
to  inherit. 

President  Reagan  last  week  quoted 
Sen.  Henry  Jackson  when  he  recom- 
mended establishment  of  the  bipartisan 
commission:  "Whatever  policy  options 
might  be  available  to  us,  ignoring 
threats  to  the  stability  of  Central 
America  and  refusing  to  engage 
ourselves  in  the  problems  of  the  region 
are  not  among  them." 

The  bipartisan  commission  recom- 
mended, and  we  concur,  that  our 
engagement  in  the  region  should  be 
comprehensive:  a  mix  of  developmental, 
political,  diplomatic,  and  security 
measures.  Because  many  of  Central 
America's  problems  are  rooted  in  pover- 
ty, our  largest  commitment  of  resources 
will  be  for  economic  reconstruction  and 
revitalization. 

Of  the  supplemental  funds  we  are 
requesting  for  Central  America  in  FY 
1984,  $400  million-or  61%-is  for 
emergency  economic  assistance.  In  addi- 
tion, we  are  proposing  a  5-year  $8  billion 
program  for  economic  stabilization, 
reconstruction,  and  long-term  develop- 
ment. This  includes  $6  billion  in  direct 


appropriations  and  $2  billion  in  in- 
surance and  guarantee  authority.  These 
funds  will  support  agricultural  develop- 
ment, education,  health  services,  export 
promotion,  land  reform,  housing,  and 
humanitarian  relief,  as  well  as  trade 
credit  insurance  and  aid  for  small 
businesses. 

We  endorse  the  commission's  pro- 
posal to  establish  a  Central  American 
development  organization  composed  of 
representatives  from  the  Central 
American  countries  themselves.  Its  in- 
dependent recommendations  will  affect 
our  determinations  on  the  level  and 
structure  of  our  economic  assistance. 

We  will  also  follow  through  vigor- 
ously on  the  commission's  conclusion 
that  the  United  States  must  support  th( 
strengthening  of  democracy  in  the 
region.  We  are  proposing  aid  to 
democratic,  educational,  and  cross- 
cultural  institutions,  as  well  as  increased 
funding  for  scholarships,  leadership 
training,  and  educational  exchange. 

The  commission  also  recognizes  that 
in  the  case  of  El  Salvador,  economic  aid 
and  support  for  democracy  are  not  by 
themselves  sufficient.  It  recommends 
significantly  increased  military  aid  for 
El  Salvador.  To  see  only  indigenous 
social  upheaval  in  that  country,  for  ex- 
ample, is  as  shortsighted  as  to  recognize 
only  the  role  of  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  Our  aid  supports  the  moderate 
center  against  extremists  of  both  the 
left  and  right.  If  we  give  inadequate 


help,  it  is  the  moderates  who  will  be  the 
victims.  In  the  words  of  the  commission 
report;  "the  worst  possible  policy  for  El 
Salvador  is  to  provide  just  enough  aid  to 
keep  the  war  going,  but  too  little  to 
wage  it  successfully." 

At  the  same  time,  the  commission 
concludes,  and  we  agree,  that  without 
continued  progress  on  human  rights  and 
democratic  reform  in  El  Salvador,  as 
well  as  elsewhere  in  Central  America, 
our  policies  will  not  succeed.  We  agree 
that  U.S.  military  assistance  should  be 
conditioned  on  this  progress.  Salvadoran 
leaders  have  been  made  aware  of  this 
fact  repeatedly;  we  are  submitting 
periodic  reports  to  the  Congress  on  the 
human  rights  situation  in  that  country. 
We  also  believe,  however,  that  any 
legislation  which  imposes  absolute  and 
inflexible  restrictions  on  the  President's 
ability  to  protect  national  security  in- 
terests would  jeopardize  our  efforts  to 
bring  about  lasting  improvement  in  the 
observance  of  human  rights. 

Finally,  there  is  a  consensus  be- 
tween the  commission  and  the  Adminis- 
tration on  another  integral  part  of  our 
strategy  in  Central  America:  support  for 
the  efforts  of  the  Contadora  countries  to 
bring  peace  to  the  region.  The  Con- 
tadora objectives  are  in  Central 
America's  interest  and  in  ours.  The 
President's  program  for  Central 
America  is  ambitious  and  comprehen- 
sive—consistent with  the  challenges  we 
face.  We  urge  your  support. 

I  have  talked  at  length  today  about 
Central  America.  But  it  would  be  truly 
wrong  to  ignore  the  same  kinds  of  in- 
terplay between  economic  growth, 
security,  and  democracy  elsewhere  in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 

WTiat  we  found  in  Grenada,  for  ex- 
ample, demonstrates  how  indigenous 
grievances  can  be  misappropriated  for 
strategic  ends  and  turned  against  the 
people.  Earlier  this  week,  I  had  the 
pleasure  of  joining  the  celebration  of  the 
10th  anniversay  of  Grenada's  independ- 
ence. It  was  joyful— a  rebirth  of  freedom 
and  economic  hope.  It  underscored  that 
freedom  and  economic  progress  depend 
on  an  environment  of  security.  The 
enemies  of  democracy  and  development 
are  the  violent  extremes  of  the  left  and 
right.  The  task  of  blunting  these  ex- 
tremes takes  not  only  efforts  to 
strengthen  democracy  and  promote  eco- 
nomic growth  but  also  requires  profes- 
sional security  forces  and  a  system  of 
collective  security  which  can  protect  peo- 
ple and  the  rule  of  law.  Our  security 
assistance— as  our  economic  assist- 
ance—is vital  to  building  a  hemisphere 


May  1984 


19 


BBBBBBBBBmBDE 


SBBDCBBBBBnBBDmBB 


THE  SECRETARY 


which  is  self-reliant  and  able  to  fulfill  the 
aspirations  of  its  people.  Your  support 
for  these  programs  serves  the  fun- 
damental interests  of  all  the  citizens  of 
this  hemisphere— our  neighbors'  and  our 
own. 

Africa 

I  turn  now  to  Africa,  which  faces  a 
much  different,  although  perhaps  equally 
serious,  crisis.  Drought  is  widespread. 
As  some  Members  of  Congress— most 
recently  Sen.  Danforth  [John  C. 
Danforth,  R.-Mo.]-have  eloquently 
reported,  starvation  stalks  the  continent. 
In  response,  the  United  States  has  com- 
mitted nearly  200,000  tons  of  food  from 
our  emergency  Title  II  reserve. 

But  we  now  have  requests  from 
African  governments  for  an  additional 
150,000  tons,  and  expect  further  re- 
quests for  130,000  more  tons  this  year. 
We  are,  therefore,  requesting  Congress 
to  approve  an  additional  $90  million  in 
PL  480,  Title  II  for  Africa  for  FY  1984. 
WTien  people  are  dying,  common  decen- 
cy compels  us  to  respond. 

Drought  may  be  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  food  crisis,  but  Africa's  dif- 
ficulties have  deeper  origins.  Food  pro- 
duction per  capita  has  fallen  by  over 
20%  since  the  1960s.  During  the  past 
decade,  15  countries  had  negative 
growth  rates.  Export  earnings  are 
down,  and  import  prices  are  up;  ex- 
cessive debt  burdens  many  African  coun- 
tries. 

There  are  many  reasons  for  Africa's 
economic  problems,  but  a  primary  cause 
lies  in  Africa  itself.  Briefly  put,  many 
African  countries  have  followed  policies 
which  don't  produce  growth.  Pervasive 
state  controls,  bloated  state  enterprises 
and  bureaucracies,  overvalued  curren- 
cies, and  disincentives  for  agriculture 
have  all  had  the  effect  of  stifling  the 
private  sector  and  individual  initiative. 
The  requisites  for  economic  growth 
in  Africa  are  many.  But  Africa  needs  to 
replace  policies  that  won't  work  with 
those  that  will.  There  is  increasing 
recognition  of  this  fact  in  Africa,  and  a 
number  of  countries  are  undertaking 
policy  reforms. 

To  encourage  this  process,  the  Presi- 
dent is  proposing  beginning  in  FY  1985, 
an  economic  policy  initiative  for  Africa. 
This  effort  has  three  components. 

First,  we  are  proposing  a  5-year, 
$500  million  program,  beginning  with 
$75  million  for  1985,  as  a  new  fund 
specifically  to  assist  African  countries 
establish  and  implement  growth-oriented 
economic  policies.  We  will  give  par- 


ticular attention  to  reforms  which  in- 
crease food  production. 

Second,  we  are  working  with  other 
donors— particularly  the  Worid  Bank- 
to  coordinate  our  aid  efforts  better  and 
provide  more  unified  support  for  policy 
reform  in  Africa. 

Third,  we  will  continue  to  direct  our 
ongoing  development  assistance  to  help- 
ing build  the  skills  and  institutions  need- 
ed to  carry  out  better  policies  effective- 
ly- 
Continued  economic  crisis  in  Africa 
can  generate  or  amplify  security  prob- 
lems. Libya  continues  its  efforts  to 
subvert  governments  and  install  puppet 
regimes  in  Chad  and  elsewhere.  There 
are  the  continuing  conflicts  in  southern 
Africa  which  we  and  our  allies  are  seek- 
ing to  resolve  through  negotiations. 

However,  unlike  Central  America, 
the  security  problems  in  Africa  to  date 
require  only  modest  military  assistance 
from  the  United  States.  The  prime  need 
there  is  to  reinvigorate  economic 
growth.  There  is  no  reason  to  despair 
about  the  future.  Several  African  coun- 
tries have  made  progress.  With  more  ef- 
fective policies  and  continued  investment 
by  Africans,  the  United  States,  and 
other  donors,  Africa  can  resume  the 
progress  which  marked  its  first  years  of 
independence. 

The  Middle  East  and  Surrounding 
Regions  and  Southern  Europe 

We  now  turn  our  attention  toward  an 
area  where  security  has  become  the 
predominant  concern.  A  line  on  the  map 
from  Spain  and  Portugal  in  the  west  to 
Pakistan  in  the  east  passes  through  or 
near  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  the 
Mediterranean,  Libya,  the  Suez  Canal 
and  Egypt,  the  State  of  Israel,  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  oil  fields,  and  the  southwestern 
border  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  is  an  unparalleled  braid  of  in- 
terests vital  to  the  United  States, 
Western  Europe,  Japan,  and  the  free 
worid.  Yet,  there  is  no  area  so  pregnant 
with  threats  to  peace— not  just  regional 
peace  but  world  peace.  Peace  is  not  yet 
achieved  between  Israel  and  all  its 
neighbors;  Iran  and  Iraq  remain  at  war; 
the  Soviet  Union  is  occupying  Afghan- 
istan. About  half  of  our  total  FY  1985 
foreign  assistance  request  is  slated  for 
this  broad  area. 

Our  highest  priority  continues  to  be 
a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  Israel  and  Egypt,  at  peace  now 
for  almost  5  years,  have  thus  far  been 
our  principal  partners.  Our  programs 
with  these  two  states  have  three  aims: 
nourishing  the  economic  growth  which 


underpins  their  security;  sustaining  the 
military  forces  they  need  for  defense; 
and  in  the  process,  providing  the  con- 
fidence and  security  they  need  to  con- 
tinue their  support  for  the  peace 
process. 

We  have  made  significant  changes  in 
the  military  assistance  programs  for 
Israel  and  Egypt  this  year.  To  reduce 
the  debt  service  burden  associated  with 
heavy  defense  requirements,  we  are 
recommending  that  all  military 
assistance  to  these  two  countries  be 
grants,  not  loans.  Because  grants  are 
more  valuable  than  loans  and  because  of 
the  cash  flow  requirements  of  these  pro- 
grams, we  have  reduced  our  military 
assistance  requests  for  both  countries 
below  the  levels  made  available  in  recent 
years.  We  have  discussed  these  pro- 
posals thoroughly  with  Israel  and  Egypt, 
and  there  is  general  agreement  that 
these  levels  and  terms  support  our 
mutual  goals. 

In  Lebanon,  as  the  President  said  on 
Tuesday  [Feb.  7],  the  bloodshed  we  have 
witnessed  over  the  last  several  days  has 
demonstrated  the  length  to  which  the 
forces  of  violence  and  intimidation  are 
prepared  to  go  to  prevent  a  peaceful 
reconciliation  process  from  taking  place. 

The  measures  the  President  has 
outlined  reorient  U.S.  political  and 
military  resources  in  Lebanon  in  a  way 
that  will  strengthen  our  ability  to  do  our 
job  we  set  out  to  do  and  to  sustain  our 
efforts  over  the  long  term.  The  United 
States  will  remain  fully  engaged.  We 
will  continue  our  efforts  to  bring  all 
sides  to  the  bargaining  table.  We  will 
continue  to  press  the  Lebanese  Govern- 
ment and  the  opposition  alike  to  move 
toward  political  accommodation. 

Consistent  with  our  policy,  we  will 
focus  on  ways  to  strengthen  the  govern- 
ment's armed  forces  as  a  key  element  in 
a  stable  Lebanon.  The  funds  we  have  re- 
quested in  the  current  budget  are  part 
of  that  continuing  program.  Depending 
on  the  progress  we  make  and  the 
capabilities  of  the  armed  forces,  we  may 
have  to  request  additional  funds  later  in 
the  year. 

Our  program  for  the  Middle  East 
focuses  also  on  Jordan,  whose  role  will 
be  crucial  in  taking  the  next  major  step 
toward  peace.  Most  of  the  funds  we  pro- 
pose for  Jordan  in  FY  1985  will  go  for 
military  assistance  to  help  that  country 
meet  its  defense  needs.  The  Kingdom  of 
Jordan  is  a  moderate  Arab  government 
that  has  long  been  a  friend  of  the  United 
States.  It  now  faces  a  severe  challenge 
from  Syria  and  other  radical  forces, 
precisely  because  of  its  constructive 
policies. 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  oil-producing  states  in 
Southwest  Asia  are  xoiJnerable  to  out- 
side threats  and  internal  subversion  by 
externally  supported  elements.  Nearby 
in  Africa,  Sudan  and  Somalia  face  also 
the  threats  of  instability  which  arise 
from  poverty.  Our  programs  in  these 
areas  seek  to  counter  these  pressures 
and  instabilities.  At  the  same  time,  we 
are  supporting  countries  that  provide 
access  to  the  facilities  which  our  forces 
would  need  in  order  to  operate  in  the 
area  should  that  ever  be  necessary. 

There  is  no  disputing  the  importance 
of  Persian  Gulf  oil  to  Western  economic 
and  strategic  interests.  The  best  way  to 
protect  these  interests  is  to  work  with 
countries  in  the  region  to  help  them 
build  their  economies  and  to  support 
their  efforts  to  provide  for  their  own 
security. 

Europe 

Our  NATO  [North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization]  allies  Turkey,  Greece, 
Spain,  and  Portugal  provide  a  shield 
both  for  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
southern  flank  of  Europe,  as  well  as  a 
bridge  to  the  Middle  East  and  South- 
west Asia.  U.S.  security  assistance  is 
essential  if  these  countries  are  to  meet 
their  alliance  responsibilities.  Turkey's 
strategic  position  is  central.  There  has 
been  encouraging  progress  in  that  coun- 
try. The  infusions  of  aid  from  the  United 
States  and  Europe  in  the  past  few  years 
have  helped  Turkey  recover  from  its 
near  bankruptcy  in  the  late  1970s.  The 
Ozal  government  has  announced  reforms 
to  encourage  market  forces  and  competi- 
tion to  increase  exports.  These  should 
further  enhance  Turkey's  prospects.  Our 
interest  lies  in  continuing  to  support 
Turkey's  growth,  and  we  propose  $175 
million  in  ESF  [economic  support  funds] 
for  FY  1985. 

In  addition,  we  propose  in  1985 
about  $1.8  billion  to  support  ongoing 
military  modernization  programs  in 
Turkey,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Greece. 
Greece  and  Turkey  lag  behind  other 
NATO  countries  in  military  strength  and 
urgently  need  modernization.  U.S.  rights 
to  use  critical  Portuguese  facilities  in 
the  Azores  were  extended  in  Decem- 
ber 1983.  The  Azores  base  is  pivotal  if 
the  United  States  is  to  react  effectively 
to  military  challenges  in  Europe  or  to 
threats  to  Western  security  from  outside 
NATO. 

Our  principal  objectives  in  the 
security  assistance  program  for  Portugal 
are  to  support  the  continuing  consolida- 
tion of  its  democratic  institutions,  to 
help  Portugal  modernize  its  military. 


and  to  assist  Portugal  as  it  confronts 
continuing  economic  problems.  Spain,  a 
NATO  ally  since  1982,  also  provides  the 
United  States  access  to  air  and  naval 
facilities.  By  contributing  to  Spanish 
military  modernization,  U.S.  assistance 
encourages  the  depoliticization  of  the 
Spanish  armed  forces  as  well  as  their 
modernization. 

Asia 

The  pictures  I  have  been  painting  in  this 
rapid  tour  around  the  globe  brighten 
when  we  turn  to  Asia.  Despite  oil 
shocks,  inflation,  and  recession,  growth 
in  Southeast  Asia  continued  in  the 
1970s.  Thailand,  the  Philippines,  and  In- 
donesia all  grew  in  the  6%-7%  range 
during  the  decade.  For  some  20  years, 
the  East  Asian  countries  have  sustained 
higher  growth  rates  than  any  other  part 
of  the  world,  although  all  countries  have 
been  affected  by  the  recession. 

South  Asia,  where  the  majority  of 
the  world's  poor  live,  has  also  seen 
reasonable  improvements,  particularly  in 
agricultural  production.  There  are  some 
dark  spots.  In  recent  years,  the  Philip- 
pines has  increased  its  external  debt  and 
growth  has  lagged.  Sri  Lanka  suffered  a 
setback  in  1983  following  communal 
violence.  But,  assuming  continued  in- 
flows of  capital,  sound  policies,  and  a 
good  "pull"  from  restored  economic 
health  in  the  West,  economic  growth  will 
continue  in  Asia. 

And  what  do  we  learn  from  this 
record  of  progress?  We  learn  that 
growth  improves  well-being  for  those  at 
the  low  end  of  the  income  distribution 
spectrum.  For  instance,  according  to  a 
World  Bank  estimate,  absolute  poverty 
in  Thailand  has  dropped  from  57%  in 
the  early  1960s  to  30%  in  the  mid-1970s. 
Moreover,  available  evidence  suggests 
that  where  economic  growth  is  rapid, 
the  lowest  40%  of  income  earners  have 
moderately  increased  their  share  of  total 
income  over  time. 

The  Asian  experience  provides 
lessons  for  countries  in  Africa  and  other 
parts  of  the  world.  We  have  found  the 
benefits  to  lower-income  groups  from 
growth  to  be  greatest  where  the  follow- 
ing conditions  obtain. 

•  Growth  is  broadly  based  and 
agricultural  prices  favor  producers 
rather  than  consumers. 

•  Productive  investment  is  labor- 
intensive. 

•  Government  interference  in 
markets  and  prices  is  minimized. 

•  Population  growth  rates  are  low, 
and  educational  attainment  levels  are 
better  than  average. 


And  we  have  also  learned  how  rapid 
growth  in  Third  World  countries 
benefits  us  both  as  producers  and  con- 
sumers. The  East  Asian  countries  now 
account  for  about  one-sixth  of  world 
trade.  U.S.  investment  in  the  region 
now  exceeds  $26  billion  and  is  growing. 

The  population  of  Asia— even  ex- 
cluding China— exceeds  that  of  Africa, 
the  Near  East,  and  Latin  America  com- 
bined. Continued  growth  there  will  be  an 
enormous  contribution  to  world  pros- 
perity and  stability.  Our  aid  programs  in 
Asia  are  concentrated  in  South  Asia  and 
Indonesia.  They  emphasize  technical 
assistance  in  fields  such  as  agriculture 
research.  Whether  we  speak  of  this  aid 
as  simply  an  investment  in  the  future  or 
more  pointedly  as  an  investment  in  an 
immense  future  market,  we  will  reap 
great  returns  from  continuing  to  assist 
growth  in  the  region. 

Precisely  because  the  stakes  are  so 
high  both  in  economic  and  strategic 
terms  and  because  serious  threats  re- 
main, we  continue  to  provide  military 
assistance  in  the  region.  Our  aid  to 
Thailand  and  Korea  deters  direct 
military  threats  to  these  countries  from, 
respectively,  Vietnam,  which  now  has 
the  world's  third  largest  standing  army, 
and  North  Korea,  which  spends  over 
20%  of  its  GNP  on  its  military.  Our 
assistance  to  the  Philippines  helps  main- 
tain the  U.S.  bases  there  which 
undergird  our  strategic  position  in  the 
Pacific.  Our  relationship  with  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] is  an  important  pillar  of  stability 
in  Southeast  Asia. 

Multilateral  Development  Banks 
(MDBS) 

In  FY  1983,  lending  by  the  World  Bank 
and  its  regional  counterparts  totaled 
$20.4  billion,  up  from  $16.8  billion  in 
FY  1982.  That  this  lending  program  was 
sustained  with  a  paid-in  contribution 
from  the  United  States  of  $1.5  billion 
testifies  to  the  advantages  of  using  the 
MDBs  to  share  the  burden  of  providing 
aid.  The  MDBs  are  also  leaders  in  pro- 
viding advice  on  sound  market-oriented 
economic  policies. 

We  consider  our  participation  in  the 
MDBs  as  a  crucial  part  of  our  assistance 
policy.  I  want  to  stress  in  particular  the 
important  role  played  by  the  Interna- 
tional Development  Association  (IDA)  in 
promoting  development  in  the  poorest 
countries.  We  have  just  completed 
negotiations  for  the  seventh  replenish- 
ment of  IDA'S  resources.  In  our  judg- 
ment, this  replenishment  provides  a 
basis  for  a  strong  IDA  program  in  sub- 
Saharan  Africa  to  work  in  conjunction 


May  1984 


21 


mnmnauaa 


THE  SECRETARY 


with  our  Africa  initiative.  We  are  re- 
questing the  final  $150  nnillion  for  IDA 
VI  in  our  FY  1984  supplemental  pro- 
posal and  $750  million  for  IDA  VII  in 
our  P"Y  1985  budget  proposal.  Our 
pledge  to  IDA  VII  has  been  widely 
discussed  in  the  Congress  and  should 
enjoy  broad  support  here. 

Conclusion 

You  and  the  other  members  of  the 
Carlucci  commission  concluded  that  the 
foreign  aid  program  is  vital  to  our  na- 
tional interests.  I  have  tried  to  show 
why  this  is  so  region  by  region. 

You  also  recommended  improve- 
ments in  the  program,  particularly  more 
effective  integration  of  military  and 
economic  assistance  and  development  of 
means  to  speak  to  the  Congress  about 
the  program  as  a  whole  rather  than  its 
individual  parts.  I  have  reviewed  all 
your  recommendations  and  have  asked 
for  immediate  followup  on  most.  Many 
were  already  on  this  Administration's 
agenda  of  improvements. 

I  did  not  agree  with  the  commis- 
sion's recommendation  for  a  new  mutual 
development  and  security  administration 
because  I  felt  that  the  commission's 
main  aims— better  integration  of  our 
assistance  programs  and  a  more  unified 
voice  in  representing  these  programs  to 
the  Congress— could  be  achieved  within 
our  existing  structure  and  without  the 
disruptions  of  a  major  reorganization.  I 
have  asked  the  appropriate  offices  to 
prepare  a  plan  for  doing  this  by  early 
March. 

The  Carlucci  commission  produced  a 
bipartisan  consensus  as  to  the  value  of 
our  foreign  assistance  program.  We  will 
do  our  part  to  improve  the  program  as 
recommended.  We  hope  Congress  will 
respond  in  kind  by  supporting  and  pass- 
ing the  budget  requests  which  we  have 
made. 


International  Security  and 
Development  Cooperation  Program 


'  Press  release  67  of  Mar.  8.  1984.  The  com- 
plete transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Go\-ernment  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Transmittal  Letter 


TO  THE  CONGRESS  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES: 

The  Program  for  International  Security 
and  Development  Cooperation  presented 
here  constitutes  the  predominant  portion 
of  what  is,  in  effect,  the  foreign  policy 
budget  of  the  United  States.  It  is  that 
portion  of  the  total  Federal  budget  which 
directly  protects  and  furthers  U.S.  na- 
tional interests  abroad.  These  interests 
run  the  gamut  from  situations  in  which 
we  contribute  to  the  military  capabilities 
of  a  friendly  or  allied  country  against  a 
common  threat  to  circumstances  in  which 
we  act  to  assure  the  maintenance  of  a 
strong,  stable  international  economic 
system. 

America's  stake  in  a  stable  interna- 
tional political  and  economic  environ- 
ment, which  has  always  been  large,  con- 
tinues to  grow.  For  e.xample,  our  exports 
of  goods  and  services  as  a  percentage  of 
our  gross  national  product  grew  from 
6.5%  in  1972  to  11.3%  in  1982.  The  impor- 
tance of  our  trade  with  developing  coun- 
tries has  grown  even  more  quickly,  so 
that  by  1980  developing  countries  were 
purchasing  40%  of  U.S.  exports— more 
than  those  bought  by  Western  Europe, 
Eastern  Europe,  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
China  combined.  Today  1  of  every  20 
workers  and  1  of  every  5  acres  of  our 
farmland  produce  for  'Third  World  mar- 
kets. More  than  40%  of  our  imports  are 
supplied  by  developing  countries.  As 
part  of  this  total,  those  countries  supply 
more  than  half  of  our  supplies  of  some  14 
strategic  materials,  including  bauxite, 
tin,  and  cobalt. 

The  means  available  to  us  to  promote 
and  maintain  the  kind  of  stable  interna- 
tional environment  we  need  are  varied, 
ranging  from  keeping  our  market  open 
to  developing-country  exports  to  projec- 
ting a  strong  U.S.  defense  posture  to 
help  deter  acts  of  adventurism  by  our 
adversaries.  Some  of  the  most  effective 
means  we  have  to  promote  stability  are 
the  varied  programs  of  foreign  assistance 
we  have  developed,  ranging  from  direct 
military  aid  to  pay  for  training  or 
weapons,  to  short-term  economic 
stabilization  support,  to  long-term 


development  assistance.  Each  country's 
assistance  package  is  carefully  designed 
to  meet  the  specific  problems— in  many 
cases,  the  threats— faced  by  our  friends 
and  allies.  In  most  cases,  the  assistance 
we  give  today  is  designed  to  avoid  the 
development  of  a  more  serious  prob- 
lem—with a  more  expensive  solu- 
tion—tomorrow. 

Effectively  protecting  and  advancing 
American  interests,  particularly  in  the 
poorer  countries,  takes  considerable 
resources— for  technical  assistance  and 
training,  for  the  modem  technology  of 
production,  for  the  human  investment 
which  will  pay  off  in  a  growing  economic 
pie.  It  serves  our  own  interests,  further- 
more, to  help  ensure  their  military'  com- 
petence, thus  helping  them  to  resist 
hostile  encroachments  without  our  hav- 
ing to  send  American  forces.  Our  adver- 
saries will  rarely  choose  to  pose  their 
challenges  in  places  where  we  are 
strong.  But  they  will  challenge  us  where 
weak  links  in  the  chain  exist.  It  is  in  our 
clear  national  interest  to  help  strengthen 
those  links,  and  to  do  so  requires 
resources. 

It  is  these  resources  which  the  Presi- 
dent's International  Security  and  Devel- 
opment Cooperation  Program  for  FY 
1985  proposes  to  the  Congress.  The  link 
between  U.S.  national  interests  and  the 
proposed  resources  is  established  in  the 
way  in  which  the  Administration 
assembles  and  reviews  this  program. 
There  are  three  essential  elements. 

•  At  the  outset  we  develop  and  pro- 
mulgate a  statement  of  our  current 
foreign  policy  priorities— the  major  na- 
tional objectives  around  which  our 
foreign  policy  is  focused. 

•  The  appropriate  bureaus  and  agen- 
cies then  prepare  country  and  program 
proposals  which,  in  their  view,  are 
needed  to  support  our  foreign  policy 
priorities. 

•  Those  programs  are  then  assem- 
bled and  undergo  rigorous  high-level 
State  Department  and  interagency 
review  prior  to  their  presentation  to  the 
President  for  his  approval. 

This  process  is  designed  to  en- 
sure—insofar as  is  possible— that  our 
scarce  resources  are  allocated  as  effi- 
ciently as  possible  to  our  highest  priority 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


foreign  policy  goals.  Those  priorities, 
with  respect  to  this  budget  proposal, 
should  by  now  be  well  known  and  well 
understood. 

In  the  Middle  East  and  Southwest 
Asia,  we  seek  to  further  the  peace  proc- 
ess and  enhance  the  security  of  free- 
world  access  to  the  region's  oil.  Since 
both  of  these  objectives  concern  the 
same  part  of  the  world  and  engage  the 
interests  of  many  of  the  same  countries, 
they  are,  in  large  part,  intertwined. 
Thus,  our  programs  in  many,  if  not  most, 
countries  in  the  Middle  East— from 
North  Africa  to  Southwest  Asia— are  to  a 
significant  degree  important  or  even 
crucial  to  both  of  our  objectives. 

In  the  Central  American  region,  we 
seek  to  protect  our  political,  security, 
and  economic  interests  by  furthering  the 
development  of  democratic  institutions 
and  free-market  economic  institutions 
which  will  ensure  the  establishment  and 
protection  of  civU  liberties  and  human 
rights.  We  are  convinced  that  this  is  in 
the  demonstrable  interest  of  the  people 
in  the  region,  as  well  as  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Western  world.  It  is 
clear,  however,  that  there  are  countries 
and  political  movements  which  seek  to 
exploit  legitimate  domestic  grievances 
for  opposite  goals— totaUtarianism  in  the 
political  sphere  and  state  monopoly  in 
the  economic  sphere.  This  opposition  is, 
of  course,  not  limited  to  peaceful  political 
methods,  hence  the  need  for  a  major  ef- 
fort to  bolster  the  military  capacities  of 
friendly  countries  in  the  region.  Most  of 
our  assistance  to  this  region,  however,  is 
economic  aid  designed  to  help  overcome 
major  obstacles  to  the  resumption  of  sus- 
tainable equitable  growth. 

Our  Central  American  and  Caribbean 
region  program  in  FY  1984,  including 
our  supplemental  requests,  is  74%  eco- 
nomic assistance,  and  our  FY  1985  re- 
quest—which reflects  not  only  the  Ad- 
ministration's preferences  but  also  the 
recommendations  of  the  National  Bipar- 
tisan Commission  on  Central  America— is 
more  than  84%  economic.  The  smaller 
military  assistance  proportion  does  not 
imply,  however,  that  it  is  any  less  impor- 
tant. Economic  stabilization  and  recovery 
depend  upon  the  existence  of  an  effective 
military  shield  against  military  aggres- 
sion and  subversion. 

Our  principal  foreign  policy  goal  in 
Europe  pertinent  to  this  resource  pro- 
posal is  to  continue  to  strengthen 
NATO's  southern  flank.  Most  of  our 
NATO  allies  are  fully  industrialized  coun- 
tries and  do  not  require  U.S.  assistance 
of  the  kind  provided  for  in  this  budget 
request.  However,  some  of  the  southern 


flank  countries— which  provide  critical 
bases  and  transit  rights  for  U.S.  forces 
and  which  requii-e  our  help  so  that  they 
can  better  fulfill  theu-  alliance  responsi- 
bilities—do need  such  support.  Their  pro- 
grams are  among  our  highest  priorities. 

It  is  also  important  that  we  continue 
to  strengthen  our  alliances  and  friend- 
ships along  the  periphery  of  Asia,  from 
the  Republic  of  Korea  in  the  north  to  our 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  friends  in  the  south,  some 
of  whom  face  hostile  military  forces  on 
their  borders. 

As  I  made  clear  in  presenting  the  FY 
1984  program,  our  resource  needs  for  the 
conduct  of  foreign  policy  remain 
modest— less  than  2%  of  the  Federal 
budget— yet  there  should  be  no  doubt  as 
to  their  importance.  In  many  areas  these 
programs  are  very  cost-effective  substi- 
tutes for  much  larger  direct  U.S.  defense 
expenditures.  In  other  areas  they  effec- 
tively complement  our  direct  military  ef- 
forts, helping  to  sustain  the  economies  of 
important  friendly  countries.  In  all  cases, 
these  programs  contribute  to  the  well- 
being  of  the  American  people,  as  our  eco- 
nomic intercourse  with  many  of  these 
countries  and  the  regions  within  which 
they  are  located  continues  to  grow. 

The  President's  FY  1985  Interna- 
tional Security  and  Development  Co- 
operation Program  is  prudent,  closely  tai- 
lored to  our  most  urgent  foreign  and 
security  policy  priorities,  and  deserves 
the  concurrence  of  the  Congress  and  the 
full  support  of  the  American  people. 

George  P.  Shultz 


Introduction 

This  over/iew  presents  the  President's 
proposed  FY  1984  supplemental  request, 
the  FY  1985  International  Security  and 
Development  Cooperation  Program,  and 
the  foreign  and  national  security  strategy 
and  priorities  which  shape  these  requests. 
More  detailed  congressional  presentations 
for  the  security,  development,  and 
multilateral  cooperation  programs  are 
submitted  to  the  Congress  separately. 

As  in  previous  presentations,  this  Ad- 
ministration has  sought  to  integrate  the 
various  programs— bilateral  and 
multilateral,  economic  and  military— into 
an  effective  and  efficient  instrument  of 
U.S.  national  policy  and  interests.  That 
process  is  now  in  its  fourth  year  and  has 
produced  its  third  full  International 
Security  and  Development  Cooperation 
Program  request. 


The  essential  elements  of  this  budget 
preparation  process  include: 

•  The  foreign  policy  framework 
established  by  the  Secretary  of  State, 
which  sets  forth  the  foreign  poUcy  priori- 
ties which  are  to  guide  the  preparation 
of  the  budget; 

•  The  preparation  of  specific  country 
programs  to  support  our  pursuit  of  the 
above  priorities; 

•  'The  integration  of  all  proposed  pro- 
grams within  a  review  process  involving 
full  interagency  participation  and  final 
approval  by  the  Secretary  of  State; 

•  The  presentation  of  the  Secretary's 
proposed  program  for  review  by  the  Of- 
fice of  Management  and  Budget,  by  the 
Budget  Review  Board,  and  ultimately  by 
the  President; 

•  The  submission  of  the  President's 
proposed  program  to  the  Congress. 

This  process  has  again  produced  a 
prudent  and  carefully  designed  program 
tailored  to  support  our  highest  foreign 
policy  priorities  and  the  continuing  re- 
quirement for  restraint  in  this  period  of 
continuing  fiscal  stringency. 


FY  1984  Supplemental 
Request 

As  has  been  the  case  for  the  past  several 
years,  funds  provided  in  last  November's 
Continuing  Resolution  do  not  meet  all  of 
the  requirements  of  our  foreign  policy. 
Therefore,  the  President  requests  some 
urgent  additions  to  the  FY  1984  pro- 
gram, which  the  Congress  approved. 

The  report  of  the  National  Bipartisan 
Commission  on  Central  America  pro- 
poses, and  the  President  concurs,  that 
the  United  States  provide  significantly 
larger  amounts  of  assistance  to  promote 
democratization,  economic  growth,  hu- 
man rights,  and  security  in  the  isthmus. 
Our  largest  commitment  of  resources  will 
be  devoted  to  the  reconstruction  and 
revitalization  of  Central  America's 
economies.  Our  proposal  for  economic 
assistance  requests  a  total  amount  for 
FY  1984  that  would  nearly  double  the 
level  ah-eady  authorized  by  the  Continu- 
ing Resolution.  It  reflects  the  immediate, 
urgent  needs  identified  in  the  commis- 
sion's analysis.  This  magnitude  of  as- 
sistance is  needed  in  the  near  term  to 
prevent  further  decline  in  living  stand- 
ards in  the  region  and  over  the  medium 
term  to  enable  the  region  to  achieve  per 
capita  economic  growth  on  the  order  of 
about  3%  per  year  by  the  end  of  the 
decade. 


May  1984 


BBBflB&£!!r: 


23 

•nmmrmrm 


:':''i!™ 


THE  SECRETARY 


On  the  military  side,  the  commission 
recommended  significant  increased  as- 
sistance for  El  Salvador  and  other  Cen- 
tral American  countries.  It  did  not 
specify  precise  amounts,  but  it  noted  the 
estimate  by  the  Department  of  Defense 
that  approximately  $400  million  is 
needed  for  FY  1984-85.  Our  FY  1984 
supplemental  request  of  $259  million  is 
consistent  with  the  commission's  think- 
ing; recipients,  in  addition  to  El  Salva- 
dor, will  be  Honduras,  Costa  Rica,  Pan- 
ama, and  the  Regional  Military  Training 
Center. 


TABLE  1 

Supplemental  Request  for  Central 

America,  FY  1984 

(Appropriated  Funds,  $  millions) 

Functional  Development 

Assistance 

73.0 

Economic  Support  Fund 

290.5 

PL  480 

25.0 

AID  Operating  Expenses 

2.5 

U.S.  Information  Agency 

7.0 

Peace  Corps 

2.0 

Subtotal— Economic 

400.0 

MAP 

259.05 

Subtotal— Military 

259.05 

TOTAL 

659.05 

Africa  faces  a  food-supply  crisis 
which  began  in  1982-83  when  drought 
and  insects  caused  extensive  crop  dam- 
age. Disruption  of  farming  activities  and 
transport  links  due  to  internal  strife  has 
meant  substantially  reduced  food  produc- 
tion in  the  face  of  continuing  population 
growth.  Urgent  assistance  from  the  in- 
ternational donor  community  is  required 
to  avoid  widespread  human  suffering. 
The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 
(FAO)  estimates  that  700,000  metric  tons 
are  needed  immediately  to  help  alleviate 
this  situation.  The  FAO  estimates  that 
the  total  food  aid  gap  for  the  emergency 
is  1.7  mDlion  metric  tons.  As  a  prudent 
but  essential  contribution  to  this  urgent 
humanitarian  effort,  the  President  has 
requested  a  supplemental  of  $90  million 
for  PL  480  Title  II. 

The  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA)  is  the  central  instrument 
in  the  international  effort  to  restrain  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  and  is,  there- 
fore, a  critical  element  in  support  of  U.S. 
nonproliferation  policy.  The  Continuing 
Resolution  cut  $3.7  million  from  the  U.S. 


contribution  which  supports  the  critical 
safeguards  and  technical  assistance  pro- 
grams of  the  agency.  A  reduction  of  this 
magnitude  (about  20%  of  the  U.S.  contri- 
bution) raises  real  questions  about  the 
depth  of  the  U.S.  commitment  to  non- 
proliferation,  particularly  as  we  approach 
the  1985  review  conference  on  the  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty.  We  request  restora- 
tion of  $3.7  million  to  the  FY  1984  pro- 
gram and  approval  of  the  full  request  for 
FY  1985. 

The  Continuing  Resolution  for  FY 
1984  also  reduced  the  operating  expense 
account  of  the  Agency  for  International 
Development  (AID)  by  some  $17  million. 
This  account  pays  the  necessary  adminis- 
trative costs  of  the  development  assist- 
ance program,  the  economic  support 
fund,  and  the  PL  480  programs.  Only 
limited  cuts  could  be  made  here  before 
the  programs  themselves  would  be  af- 
fected. The  congressional  action  resulted 
in  a  thorough  executive  branch  review  of 
this  issue,  which  produced  some  $5.5 
million  in  management  efficiencies,  defer- 
rals, and  cancellations  of  some  planned 
activities  which  could  be  absorbed  short 
of  serious  negative  impact  upon  the 
authorized  programs  themselves.  There- 
fore, the  Administration  requests  the 
restoration  of  $11  million  of  the  FY  1984 
congressional  reduction. 

Our  participation  in  the  multilateral 
development  banks  (MDBs)  continues  to 
be  a  crucial  part  of  our  assistance  policy. 
The  MDBs  are  leaders  in  providing  sohd 
advice  on— and  in  tailoring  their  assist- 
ance for  support  of— sound  market- 
oriented  economic  policies.  The  MDBs 
provide  an  efficient  mechanism  for  shar- 
ing among  the  free  world's  donor  nations 
a  part  of  the  burden  of  providing  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  developing  countries. 
For  these  reasons,  our  support  for  the 
MDBs  must  continue  to  be  strong.  The 
FY  1984  Continuing  Resolution  passed  in 
November  has  left  significant  shortfalls 
in  funding  our  current  commitments  to 
these  important  institutions.  Our  request 
for  an  additional  $319.6  million  in  the  FY 
1984  supplemental  request  will  substan- 
tially close  those  gaps  and  reaffirm  our 
commitment  for  continued  strong,  but 
prudent,  lending  programs  by  these 
institutions. 

For  migration  and  refugee  assistance, 
the  Continuing  Resolution  level  of  $323 
million  left  the  Department  unable  to 
respond  to  new  requirements  totaling 
$14.65  million.  These  requirements  in- 
clude program  cost  increases  for  Thai- 
Kampuchean  border  relief,  African  as- 
sistance programs  of  the  United  Nations 


TABLE  II 

Supplemental  Request  (Including 
Central  America),  FY  1984 

($  millions) 


Multilateral  Banks 

319.6 

International  Organizations 

and  Programs 

3.7 

Development  Assistance 

87.9 

PL  480 

115.0 

Economic  Support  Fund 

290.5 

Peace  Corps 

2.0 

Refugees 

14.7 

Military  Assistance  Program 

259.1 

TOTAL 

1,092.4 

High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR),  the  emergency  situation  in 
Lebanon,  and  Central  American  pro- 
grams for  refugees  and  displaced  per- 
sons. These  funds  are  necessary  for  the 
United  States  to  continue  to  meet  for- 
eign policy  commitments  and  to  address 
urgent  human  needs. 


FY  1985  Program 

The  International  Security  and  Develop- 
ment Cooperation  Program  consists  of 
several  different  types  of  programs 
authorized  under  the  law  for  particular 
purposes. 

Multilateral  programs  provide  a  vehi- 
cle through  which  the  United  States  can: 

•  Share  equitably  with  other  donors 
the  burden  of  providing  concessional 
assistance  to  developing  countries;  and 

•  Influence  the  allocation  of  these 
resources  toward  recipients  and  in  sup- 
port of  policies  consistent  with  U.S.  pur- 
poses and  interests. 

Bilateral  programs— that  is,  those 
based  upon  direct  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  particular  recipient 
countries— support  U.S.  objectives  more 
directly.  They  can  provide  either  military 
support  (training,  technical  assistance, 
and  construction  or  the  financing  of 
weapons  and  military  equipment  pur- 
chases) or  economic  support  either  by 
funding  specific  economic  development 
programs  (in  areas  such  as  health,  edu- 
cation, training,  and  food  production)  or 
by  providing  essential  budgetary  support 
in  critical  circumstances,  permitting  the 
continuation  of  essential  government  pro- 
grams. 

This  mix  of  programs  provides,  in  ef- 
fect, a  variety  of  instruments  that  can  be 
used  in  the  pursuit  of  U.S.  foreign  policy 


24 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


objectives.  Fcr  any  particular  country, 
we  try  to  shape  a  mix  of  programs  most 
efficiently  tailored  to  that  country's  most 
urgent  needs.  The  overall  program  con- 
stitutes the  principal  concrete  instrument 
of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

Table  III  (page  26)  shows  the  pro- 
gram proposed  to  the  Congress  for  FY 
1985,  along  with  the  President's  requests 
for  the  first  3  years  of  his  Administra- 
tion. 

Virtually  aU  of  the  funds  which  are 
allocated  bilaterally  to  the  procurement 
of  goods  and  services  are  required  by 
law  or  policy  to  be  expended  in  the 
United  States.  They  clearly  contribute 
directly  to  American  economic  activity 
and  provide  jobs  to  American  workers. 

Most  of  the  funds  that  are  allocated 
to  the  payment  of  salaries  and  other 
personnel-related  costs  in  this  program, 
are  paid  to  American  citizens,  again 
directly  contributing  to  American 
economic  activity. 

A  large  proportion  of  the  assistance 
under  these  programs  is  in  the  form  of 
loans  to  be  repaid,  with  interest,  to  the 
U.S.  Treasury. 

The  International  Security  and  De- 
velopment Cooperation  Program,  there- 
fore, is  not  only  the  principal  tangible  in- 
strument of  U.S.  foreign  policy  but  also  a 
program  with  substantial  favorable  im- 
pact upon  the  U.S.  economy. 


FOREIGN  POLICY  FRAMEWORK 

Our  major  resource  demands  abroad 
are  predominantly  in  regions  of  crisis 
and  areas  where  we  face  crises  which 
threaten  U.S.  and  free-world  interests. 

Middle  East  and  Southwest  Asia 

In  the  Middle  East  and  Southwest  Asia 
we  continue  to  pursue  the  twin  objec- 
tives of  furthering  the  Middle  East  peace 
process  and  working  to  secure  un- 
impeded access  for  all  to  the  petroleum 
of  the  Persian  Gulf.  These  goals  are,  of 
course,  intertwined  as  the  result  of  geog- 
raphy, since  from  North  Africa  to  South 
Asia  many  of  the  same  countries  are 
critical  to  our  pursuit  of  both  objec- 
tives—whether by  providing  or  helping 
us  to  provide  a  deterrent  military  pres- 
ence or  by  themselves  playing  active  and 
important  roles  in  the  search  for  peace  in 
the  region.  The  importance  of  these  twin 
goals  is  attested  to  by  the'  fact  that  our 
programs  directed  toward  these  goals  ac- 
count for  almost  40%  of  the  proposed  FY 
1985  program. 

Our  highest  priority  continues  to  be 
to  bring  a  just  and  lasting  end  to  the 


May  1984 

l^BDBBBBBaBBSBBBSaBBraB 


conflict  and  turmoil  which  has  disturbed 
the  Middle  East  for  so  long.  There  are 
no  quick  and  easy  solutions  for  peace  in 
the  region.  However,  we  will  persevere 
with  our  efforts  and  with  the  President's 
Middle  East  peace  initiative  of  Septem- 
ber 1,  1982.  Our  assistance  plays  an  im- 
portant role  in  furthering  the  peace 
process. 

Ten  years  ago  we  helped  negotiate 
the  disengagement  of  Egyptian  and 
Israeli  Armed  Forces.  They  have  not 
clashed  since.  Five  years  ago  a  peace 
treaty  ended  30  years  of  war  between 
Egypt  and  Israel.  Israel  and  Egypt  re- 
main our  principal  partners  in  the  quest 
for  a  wider  peace,  and  these  two  nations 
are  the  largest  recipients  of  our  proposed 
foreign  assistance  for  FY  1985.  This 
assistance  is  aimed  at  ensuring  their 
security  and  strengthening  their 
economies,  which  are  essential  to  their 
continuing  on  the  path  to  a  larger  peace 
settlement. 

Similar,  although  smaller  programs, 
are  planned  for  Lebanon  and  Jordan,  also 
important  participants  in  our  quest  for  a 
Middle  East  peace.  Lack  of  progress 
toward  a  more  peaceful,  stable  Lebanon 
vrill  erode  the  chances  for  peace  and 
stability  elsewhere  in  the  region.  In  its 
quest  for  reconciliation,  Lebanon  needs 
our  support,  both  moral  and  material. 
Jordan  requires  our  continued  support  to 
build  the  necessary  confidence  to  join  the 
peace  process.  Our  program  also  seeks  to 
improve  the  quality  of  Palestinian  life  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and  to  encour- 
age economic  and  social  cooperation  in 
the  region. 

The  Persian  Gulf  region,  a  critical 
source  of  energy  to  the  free  world,  is 
simultaneously  threatened  by  Soviet  en- 
croachment through  Afghanistan  and  by 
radical  forces  from  within.  About  25%  of 
the  free  world's  oil  imports  originate  in 
the  Persian  Gulf.  Through  our  assistance 
we  help  to  improve  the  security  of  these 
countries  and  to  maintain  the  availability 
of  these  vital  oil  supplies.  Certain  of  our 
programs  are  directed  at  supporting 
those  countries  in  the  region  which  pro- 
vide important  access  to  mOitary 
facilities  and  transit  rights  into  the 
region  for  U.S.  forces  to  be  used  in  time 
of  crisis.  In  addition  to  the  security  con- 
cerns which  these  countries  face,  some  of 
them,  e.g.,  Morocco  and  the  Yemen  Arab 
Republic,  have  very  serious  economic 
problems. 


Central  America  and  the  Caribbean 

In  the  Central  American  and  Caribbean 
region,  we  find  a  growing  challenge  to 
emerging  democratization  from  insur- 
gency and  terrorism  encouraged  and  sup- 
ported from  outside  the  region  and 
through  regional  proxies.  Thus,  our  ef- 
forts, while  remaining  overwhelmingly 
economic,  must  nevertheless  include  mili- 
tary resources  adequate  to  provide  a 
shield  behind  which  the  processes  of  de- 
mocratization and  the  reestablishment  of 
economic  stability  and  ultimately  growth 
can  continue. 

National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America.  The  crisis  in  this  re- 
gion and  the  controversy  over  the  U.S. 
response  led  the  President  to  appoint  the 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Cen- 
tral America  under  the  chairmanship  of 
the  Honorable  Henry  A.  Kissinger. 

That  commission  was  charged  by  the 
President  with  developing  recommenda- 
tions on  a  long-term  U.S.  policy  that 
would  best  respond  to  the  challenges  of 
social,  economic,  and  democratic  develop- 
ment in  the  region  and  to  internal  and 
external  threats  to  its  stability.  Earlier 
this  year  the  commission  presented  its 
report  to  the  President,  who  has  ac- 
cepted, in  principle,  all  of  its  recommen- 
dations. The  Administration  conducted  a 
thorough  analysis  of  the  report  and  has 
developed  proposals  for  a  comprehensive 
program  to  meet  the  acute  crisis  of  Cen- 
tral America,  based  upon  the  commis- 
sion's work. 

The  bipartisan  commission  found,  as 
it  studied  the  region  and  its  crisis,  that 
the  long-term  challenge  also  requires 
short-term  actions.  In  many  respects  the 
crisis  is  so  acute,  and  the  time  for 
response  so  limited,  that  immediate  ac- 
tions are  a  necessary  element  of  any 
long-term  policy. 

Although  the  roots  of  the  crisis  are 
indigenous— poverty,  injustice,  and  closed 
political  systems— worldwide  economic 
recession  and  Cuban/Soviet/Nicaraguan 
intervention  have  brought  Central 
America  to  a  crisis  level.  The  United 
States  must  address  this  crisis  im- 
mediately and  simultaneously  in  all  its 
aspects.  An  ultimate  solution  will,  of 
course,  depend  on  economic  progress  and 
social  and  political  reform.  But  insurgen- 
cies must  be  checked  if  lasting  progress 
is  to  be  made  on  these  fronts. 

Indigenous  reform,  even  indigenous 
revolution,  is  no  threat  to  the  United 
States.  But  the  intrusion  of  outside 
powers  exploiting  local  grievances  for 
political  and  strategic  advantage  is  a 
serious  threat.  The  United  States  has 


25 


i't'MPWM'P'PWfWPPPP 


(  :i"!  !H 


THE  SECRETARY 


fundamental  interests  at  stake:  Soviet/ 
Cuban  success  and  the  resulting  collapse 
in  Central  America  would  substantially 
increase  the  military  threat  to  us  and 
others  within  this  hemisphere.  It  would, 
thus,  compel  a  substantial  increase  in  our 
security  concerns  along  our  southern 
borders  or  the  redeployment  of  forces  to 
the  detriment  of  vital  interests  else- 
where. We  have  a  deep  and  historic  in- 
terest in  the  promotion  and  presen'ation 
of  democracy.  Pluralistic  societies  are 
what  Central  Americans  want  and  are 
essential  to  lasting  solutions.  In  this  case 
our  ideals  and  our  strategic  interests 
coincide.  Although  there  is  an  urgent 
need  for  action,  quick  solutions  are 
unlikely.  We  must  be  prepared  for  a 
lengthy  effort. 

Strengthening  NATO's  Southern  Flank 

The  southern  flank  of  NATO  is  im- 
portant to  its  overall  defense  posture 
against  the  Soviet/Warsaw  Pact  threat  to 
continental  Europe.  However,  as  the 
facts  of  geography  make  clear,  the  na- 
tions from  Portugal  to  Turkey  along  the 
northern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean  are 
equally  important  to  defense  against 
Warsaw  Pact/Soviet  threats  in  the  Medi- 
terranean region  and  the  Middle  East. 

The  importance  of  these  countries, 
however,  is  coupled  with  the  fact  that 
they  are  among  the  economically  weaker 
and  less  developed  of  our  NATO  part- 
ners. Thus,  there  is  an  urgent  need 
for  support  from  their  more  economi 
cally  developed  partners  if  these  key 
southern-tier  countries  are  to  meet  their 
NATO  responsibilities  effectively. 

Moreover,  helping  finance  military 
modernization  in  these  countries  is 
clearly  in  the  common  interest.  Our  ac- 
cess to  bases  in  Portugal,  Spain,  Turkey, 
and  Greece  constitutes  an  integral  ele- 
ment of  our  capacity  to  deploy  and  sus- 
tain forces  in  Europe  and  Southwest 
Asia.  Just  as  important  are  the  military 
missions  the  forces  of  each  country  per- 
form in  the  NATO  alliance.  Our  support 
for  their  effective  contribution  to 
NATO's  military  posture  is  thus  among 
the  most  cost-effective  national  security 
investments  which  we  can  make,  from 
the  standpoint  not  only  of  our  European 
interests  but  from  the  clear  standpoint  of 
our  interests  in  North  Africa,  the  Middle 
East,  and  the  entire  Mediterranean 
region. 


TABLE  III 

International  Security  and  Development  Cooperation 
Program  Requests,  FY  1982-85' 

(Budget  Aulhojity,  $  millions) 


International  Security  Assistance 

Economic  Support  Fund 

Grant  Military  Assistance  Program  and 
Foreign  Military  Sales  Financing 
Program^ 

Foreign  Military  Sales  (off-budget 
guaranteed  loans) 

International  Military  Education  and  Train- 
ing, Peacekeeping  Operations,  and 
Antiterrorism  Assistance 

FMS  Guarantee  Reserve  Fund 

Offsetting  Receipts 

Subtotal 

Foreign  Economic  and  Financial  Assistance 

Development  Assistance  Program 

PL  480  Food  Programs 

Multilateral  Development  Banks 

Other' 

Offsetting  Receipts 

Subtotal 

Total  Budget  Authority 
Total  Off-Budget  Financing 
TOTAL  PROGRAM 


927 

1,652 

2,084 

6,024 

(3.320) 

(4,163) 

(4,401) 

(0) 

189 

0 

-194 

77 

0 

-155 

108 

0 

-126 

115 

274 

-117 

3,486 

4,590 

5,252 

9,734 

1,711 
1,000 
1,262 
823 
-327 
4,529 

1,840 
1,028 
1,537 
823 
-430 
4,798 

2,022 
1,167 
1,644 
830 
-460 
5,203 

2,267 
1,355 
1,236 
1,068 
-463 
5,463 

8,015 
(3,320) 
11,335 

9,388 
(4.163) 
13,551 

10,455 
(4,401) 
14,856 

15,197 

(0) 

15,197 

'The  President's  revised  requests.  Figures  may  not  total  due  to  rounding. 

^For  FY  1985  all  military  financing  is  proposed  to  be  on  budget,  approximately  80% 
to  be  at  nearmarket  rates. 

'Includes  migration  and  refugee  assistance,  Peace  Corps,  international  organiza- 
tions and  programs,  narcotics  control  program,  miscellaneous  minor  programs,  and,  for 
FY  1985,  the  Micronesia  Compact. 


Protecting  Pacific  Interests 

The  Pacific  region  is  of  major  political, 
strategic,  and  economic  importance  to 
the  United  States.  We  have  important 
treaty  relationships  with  Japan,  South 
Korea,  the  Philippines,  Thailand,  and  our 
ANZUS  partners,  Australia  and  New 
Zealand.  We  also  have  important  and 
growing  economic  and  commercial  inter- 
ests in  the  area,  with  petroleum  both 
originating  in  and  passing  through  the 
region.  U.S.  trade  with  this  region  now 
surpasses  that  with  Western  Europe  by 
an  ever-increasing  margin. 

In  Northeast  Asia  a  significantly 
strengthened  North  Korea  must  be  mili- 
tarily balanced  by  the  Republic  of  Korea 
in  order  to  continue  to  deter  war.  To  the 
south,  a  Soviet-supported,  180,000-man 
Vietnamese  Army  remains  in  Kam- 
puchea and  threatens  Thailand's  secu- 
rity. Apart  from  our  Manila  Pact  commit- 
ment, it  is  essential  to  maintain  our  sup- 
port for  this  front-line  ASEAN  state. 


Our  assistance  to  Thailand  is  viewed  as 
the  litmus  test  of  American  support  by 
all  the  ASEAN  states. 

The  Philippines,  Indonesia,  and 
Malaysia  are  located  astride  strategic 
sealanes  vital  to  U.S.  and  Western  in- 
terests. Indonesia  is  an  important  source 
of  petroleum.  The  Philippines  provides 
the  United  States  with  essential  military 
facilities.  All  three  play  a  major  role  in 
ASEAN.  Our  security  and  economic 
assistance  contributes  to  their  stability, 
economic  progress,  and  political  develop- 
ment. Furthermore,  our  refugee  pro- 
gram, including  support  for  the  resettle- 
ment of  large  numbers  of  refugees  who 
have  fled  to  these  countries,  is  also 
especially  important  in  this  area. 

Pursuing  U.S.  Interests  in  Africa 

Africa  in  1984  is  a  continent  troubled 
from  within  and  threatened  from  with- 
out. It  is  beset  by  severe  food  shortages 
and  malnutrition,  by  falling  export  reve- 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


nues  and  rising  import  bills,  and  by 
crushing  burdens  of  debt  service.  Many 
African  nations  are  targets  of  subversion 
by  Soviet-,  Cuban-,  and  Libyan- 
supported  dissidents— as  the  current  Lib- 
yan invasion  of  Chad  so  vividly  demon- 
strates. Our  policy  approach  to  Africa 
must  address  each  of  these  unpleasant 
realities,  for  each  directly  affects  our 
policy  interests  in  the  continent. 

For  this  fiscal  year  $90  million  in  ad- 
ditional PL  480  Title  II  authority  is  re- 
quested for  Africa.  The  President  and 
Members  of  Congress  have  discussed 
why  that  assistance  is  desperately 
needed  to  confront  the  tragic  effects  of 
drought.  People  are  dying  now  for  want 
of  adequate  food.  The  United  States  can, 
and  must,  help. 

The  immediate  food  crisis,  however, 
is  but  one  symptom  of  a  much  larger 
problem.  Africa's  economic  crisis  is  of 
such  dimensions  that  it  now  impinges  on 
every  aspect  of  our  relations  in  the  area. 
Underlying  Africa's  inability  to  cope 
with  the  many  economic  setbacks  now 
confronting  it  is  a  generally  poor  system 
of  economic  policies  not  oriented  toward 
producer  incentives  and  growth.  Produc- 
tion in  Africa— including  food  produc- 
tion—is not  keeping  pace  with  population 
grow^th.  Nearly  20  countries  in  Africa 
have  resorted  to  assistance  by  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  to  avoid 
economic  collapse,  and  many  of  these 
same  countries  have  also  required  large 
debt  rescheduling. 

Economic  Policy  Initiative.  The 

key  to  restoration  of  economic  stability 
and  growth  in  Africa  is  increased  reli- 
ance on  the  private  sector.  State  control, 
state  corporations,  and  state  farms  have 
proven  to  be  millstones.  To  undertake 
such  fundamental  redirections  of  policy 
as  divestiture  of  state  corporations,  de- 
control of  prices,  restoration  of  reason- 
able exchange  rates,  and  incentives  for 
private  enterprise  will  be  difficult.  Over 
the  long  term,  however,  such  reform  is 
essential.  Our  regular  economic  assist- 
ance programs,  including  vital  economic 
support  fund  (ESF)  programs,  have 
already  been  recast  to  promote  this  goal, 
and  some  African  countries  are  now 
ready  to  take  the  necessary  measures. 
However,  they  will  require  extra  assist- 
ance if  they  are  to  do  this  successfully. 
The  Economic  Policy  Initiative  for 
Africa  is  a  framework  to  provide  that 
assistance.  Through  close  cooperation 
with  other  donors,  and  with  vigorous 
leadership  from  the  World  Bank,  the  ini- 
tiative envisages  providing  additional 
support  for  selected  countries  where 


significant  reforms  are  a  real  possibility. 
We  intend  to  provide  $500  million  over  5 
years  as  a  catalyst  to  energize  African 
governments,  other  donors,  and  the 
World  Bank  toward  a  joint  effort  using 
new  resources  to  make  possible  new  and 
major  economic  reforms.  The  first  U.S. 
contribution  we  seek  toward  this  plan  is 
$75  million  for  FY  1985. 

Countries  to  be  included  in  the  initia- 
tive have  not  been  preselected.  The  in- 
tention is  to  begin  this  new  effort  in  a 
small  number  of  countries  which  can 
establish  a  comprehensive  policy  frame- 
work for  reform.  Success  in  those  coun- 
tries would  demonstrate  to  others  what 
can  be  accomplished  through  a  coopera- 
tive effort. 

Other  Assistance.  The  southern 
Africa  region— stretching  from  Zaire  to 
South  Africa— is  threatened  by  both  in- 
ternal and  external  instability.  Our 
security  assistance  for  this  region  is  de- 
signed to  help  friendly  African  nations 
cope  with  the  economic  and  military 
threats  to  their  security.  Border  conflict 
and  internal  subversion  in  these  mineral- 
rich  and  key  states  threaten  the  stability 
of  the  entire  region  and  give  the  Soviet 
bloc  and  others  targets  ripe  for  exploita- 
tion. The  peaceful  Namibian  transition  to 
independence  is  at  the  heart  of  our 
southern  Africa  policy.  While  we  work 
with  the  nations  directly  involved  in  this 
process,  we  must  also  work  with  and 
support  the  nations  on  the  periphery, 
primaiily  Botswana  and  Zaire,  in  order 
to  help  them  cope  with  their  economic 
and  military  threats.  A  reawakening  of 
dormant  conflicts  such  as  Shaba  or  an 
escalation  of  the  border  skirmishes  be- 
tween southern  African  states  would 
provide  significant  opportunities  for  the 
Soviets  and  Cubans  in  that  region. 

Severe  economic  depression  con- 
tinues to  endanger  every  nation  in  West 
Africa.  Even  the  once-prosperous  nations 
of  Nigeria  and  the  Ivory  Coast  have 
been  hard  hit  by  the  recent  worldwide 
recession.  These  nations  also  are  faced 
with  external  subversion,  notably  overt 
and  covert  Libyan  attempts  to  destabi- 
lize or  actually  overthrow  governments 
in  the  region.  We  continue  to  provide 
modest  international  military  education 
and  training  (IMET)  funds  to  virtually  all 
of  the  countries  in  West  Africa  while 
concentrating  our  equipment  programs 
in  Liberia,  Senegal,  Niger,  Cameroon, 
and  Chad— countries  where  we  have  im- 
portant interests  or  which  are  directly 
threatened  by  Libya. 

Because  of  the  fiscal  plight  of  our 
African  friends,  we  have  undertaken  a 
restructuring  of  our  African  military  as- 


sistance from  loan  foreign  military  sales 
(FMS)  to  grant  military  assistance  pro- 
gram (MAP),  despite  the  tight  fiscal  con- 
straints on  MAP.  This  includes  our  pro- 
grams in  the  Horn  and  East  Africa, 
where  substantial  U.S.  interests  related 
to  Persian  Gulf  access  are  at  stake  in 
Kenya,  Somalia,  and  Sudan. 

Assisting  Economic  Growth  in 
Low-Income  Developing  Countries 

The  low-income  developing  countries  are 
characterized  by  widespread  poverty  and 
limited  economic  infrastructure.  As  a 
result,  they  have  little  ability  to  obtain 
or  service  financial  flows  from  the  inter- 
national private  sector.  They  depend 
upon  concessional  assistance  to  support 
their  development  efforts.  The  United 
States  and  other  donors,  therefore, 
direct  the  bulk  of  their  development  and 
food  aid  to  the  world's  poorer  countries. 
At  Cancun,  President  Reagan  committed 
the  United  States  to  maintaining  assist- 
ance levels  to  these  nations. 

The  promotion  of  economic  develop- 
ment serves  our  economic,  commercial, 
political,  security,  and  humanitarian  ob- 
jectives. Many  less  developed  countries 
possess  important  agricultural  and  min- 
eral resources.  By  improving  the  skills  of 
their  people  and  the  effectiveness  of 
their  institutions,  our  assistance  im- 
proves the  prospects  for  mutually  advan- 
tageous trade  and  investment.  The  devel- 
oping world  already  constitutes  a  large 
and  growing  market  for  U.S.  goods  and 
services.  From  a  political  perspective, 
the  poorer  countries  are  often  an  impor- 
tant voice  in  world  forums,  and  some  are 
strategically  located  near  important  sea- 
lanes,  lines  of  communication,  or  other 
important  U.S.  friends  and  allies. 

Other  Considerations  in  U.S. 
Assistance  Planning 

One  of  the  most  important  challenges  our 
nation  faces  is  the  need  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  The  success 
of  our  efforts  depends  in  large  part  upon 
our  abUity  to  enhance  regional  and  global 
stability  and  thus  reduce  those  security- 
related  incentives  that  can  lead  countries 
to  seek  nuclear-weapons  capabilities. 
U.S.  assistance  can  contribute  to  pre- 
venting the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
by  helping  recipients  address  specific 
security  concerns,  as  well  as  by  enhanc- 
ing U.S.  influence  with  recipients.  A 
critical  component  in  this  effort  involves 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
because  of  its  ongoing  effort  to  extend 
and  facilitate  international  safeguards 


May  1984 

^MBBiBBBBBBBnmaawa 


THE  SECRETARY 


against  misuse  of  civilian  nuclear  power 
programs  throughout  the  world. 

High-priced  oil  imports  remain  a  ma- 
jor constraint  on  economic  development 
for  many  countries.  While  oil  prices  have 
stabilized  generally,  the  fact  that  they 
are  denominated  in  dollars  increases  the 
burden  for  countries  whose  currency  is 
decreasing  in  value  vis-a-vis  the  dollar. 
The  resulting  threat  to  the  economic 
stability  of  these  nations  makes  it  impor- 
tant that  we  continue  our  efforts  to  de- 
crease their  reliance  on  oil  imports 
through  development  and  application  of 
suitable  alternative  energy  technologies. 

Protecting  the  global  environment  is 
another  important  concern  for  the 
United  States  and  clearly  requires  the 
cooperation  of  other  nations.  U.S.  bilat- 
eral assistance,  to  the  extent  feasible, 
helps  developing  countries  to  maintain 
the  quality  of  the  air,  water,  and  land 
and  to  sustain  the  integrity  of  the 
natural  resource  base  on  which  their 
long-term  economic  development 
depends. 

In  general,  U.S.  programs  of  coopera- 
tion also  consider  the  extent  of  democ- 
racy and  freedom  in  each  country,  the 
effectiveness  of  each  country's  ovra 
development  efforts,  its  policies  toward 
the  United  States,  its  record  of  support 
for  the  United  States  in  the  United  Na- 
tions and  other  international  organiza- 
tions, its  human  rights  record,  its  efforts 
to  control  illegal  narcotics,  and,  of 
course,  available  U.S.  resources. 


INTERNATIONAL  SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE  PROGRAMS 

International  security  assistance  pro- 
grams are  vital  instruments  of  U.S.  na- 
tional security  and  foreign  policy,  serving 
to  strengthen  alUed  and  friendly  coun- 
tries where  the  United  States  has  special 
security  concerns.  Through  these  pro- 
grams, the  United  States  assists  other 
countries  in  acquiring,  training  for,  and 
using  the  modem  military  equipment 
necessary  for  their  defense  and  promotes 
economic  and  political  stability  through 
balance-of-payments  support  and  project 
assistance. 

For  FY  1985  the  President  is  re- 
questing $9.7  billion  in  security  assist- 
ance-related budget  authority.  The  shift 
of  the  FMS  financing  program  from  "off 
budget"  to  "on  budget"  is  the  principal 
reason  for  the  $4.5-billion  increase  in 
budget  authority  over  the  FY  1984  re- 
quest. 


Moving  the  FMS  Progrram  On  Budget 

In  the  wake  of  the  American  withdrawal 
from  Southeast  Asia  in  the  early  1970s, 
it  appeared  that  the  growing  economic 
capabilities  of  many  countries  receiving 
U.S.  military  financing  coupled  with  a 
lessened  U.S.  security  requirement  for 
military  assistance  in  the  Third  World 
would  permit  the  gradual  shift  from 
grant  military  assistance  to  credit  and 
ultimately  cash  arms  sales  where  U.S. 
security  interests  dictated  that  they 
continue. 

That  optimistic  view  of  world  stabil- 
ity and  security  proved  to  be  off  the 
mark.  Third  World  economic  growth  suf- 
fered a  sharp  reversal  as  a  result  of  the 
oil  price  spiral  of  the  1970s  and  the  paral- 
lel worldwide  recession  of  more  recent 
years.  A  number  of  our  key  friends  and 
allies  in  the  Third  World,  as  well  as  in 
more  economically  advanced  regions,  face 
very  severe  debt-burden  problems  that 
prevent  adequate  common  security  ef- 
forts without  more  concessional  military 
financing,  not  to  mention  extraordinary 
financial  and  economic  support.  The 
challenge  we  face  is  to  sustain  the  min- 
imal necessary  military  modernization  ef- 
fort—and in  virtually  all  the  key  cases  it 
is  just  that,  since  many  military  estab- 
lishments are  shrinking— without  con- 
tributing further  economic  burdens. 
These  circumstances  clearly  require  an 
urgent  response,  as  the  Congress  now 
well  understands.  Yet  Administration 
requests  for  increased  grant  levels  have 
met  with  relatively  limited  success. 

The  bipartisan  Commission  on  Secu- 
rity and  Economic  Assistance  took  note 
of  this  growing  problem  and  strongly 
recommended  a  growth  in  concessional 
military  assistance. 

For  FY  1985,  the  Administration  pro- 
poses two  initiatives  in  this  regard: 

•  Placing  the  entire  FMS  financing 
program  on  budget,  thus  requiring 
authorization  and  appropriation  of  funds 
for  the  entire  program;  and 

•  Providing,  in  addition  to  forgiven 
credits  for  Israel  and  Egypt,  $538.5 
million  of  the  total  program  at  conces- 
sional interest  rates  to  16  countries. 

The  proposed  concessional  credits 
will  minimize  further  exacerbation  of  the 
debt  problems  in  certain  critical  coun- 
tries whose  security  is  important  to  U.S. 
interests.  Economic  need  and  the  ability 
to  repay  are  the  primary  criteria  in 
determining  the  allocation  of  concessional 
assistance.  These  initiatives  will  provide 
the  flexibility  to  tailor  security  assistance 
programs  to  the  economic  situation  of 


recipient  countries  by  providing  an  ap- 
propriate mix  of  grant,  concessional,  and 
market-rate  financing. 

The  total  FMS  credit  request  for  FY 
1985  is  $5.1  billion  for  26  countries,  in- 
cluding the  $538.5  million  in  concessional 
interest  rate  credits,  and  $1.4  and  $1,175 
billion  in  forgiven  credits  for  Israel  and 
Egypt  respectively.  The  entire  FMS  pro- 
gram for  Israel  and  Egypt  would  be  in 
the  form  of  forgiven  credits.  While  the 
total  program  for  both  countries  is  lower 
than  that  in  FY  1984,  the  "all-forgiven" 
FY  1985  programs  will  provide  signifi- 
cantly better  long-term  economic  benefits 
to  both  countries. 

Israel  will  receive  27%  of  the  total 
request.  Egypt,  the  second  largest  recipi- 
ent, will  receive  23%.  An  additional  30% 
of  the  program  is  requested  for  the  five 
countries  with  which  the  United  States 
currently  has  formal  defense  cooperation 
agreements  (i.e.,  Greece,  Philippines, 
Portugal,  Spain,  and  Turkey).  The  re- 
maining 20%  (about  $1  billion)  is  re- 
quested for  19  other  countries,  including 
those  which  provide  access  to  important 
facilities  (e.g.,  Oman,  Kenya,  and  Morocco) 
and  countries  with  hostile  neighbors  pos- 
ing a  military  threat  (e.g.,  Thailand,  Jor- 
dan, Tunisia,  El  Salvador,  Yemen  Arab 
Republic,  Pakistan,  and  South  Korea). 

Proposed  recipients  of  concessional 
credits  include  Turkey,  Jordan,  Domin- 
ican Republic,  Morocco,  Tunisia,  Indo- 
nesia, PhOippines,  Botswana,  Cameroon, 
Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  Panama, 
Guatemala,  and  El  Salvador. 

Summary  of  Programs 

The  foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  fi- 
nancing program  enables  eligible  foreign 
governments  to  purchase  defense  ar- 
ticles, services,  and  training.  For  FY 
1985  $5.1  billion  is  being  requested,  a  net 
decrease  of  $616  million  from  the  FY 
1984  level.  More  than  half  the  total  is 
allocated  to  Israel,  Egypt,  and  Turkey. 

The  military  assistance  program 

(MAP)  provides  grant  financing  for 
defense  articles,  services,  and  training  to 
eligible  foreign  governments.  The  Presi- 
dent's request  for  FY  1985  includes  $924 
million  in  budget  authority  for  the  mili- 
tary assistance  programs  of  which  $107 
million  is  for  reimbursement  for  section 
506a  drawdowns  from  Defense  Depart- 
ment stocks  and  for  general  costs.  More 
than  75%  of  the  remainder  goes  to  the 
following  countries:  Turkey,  Portugal,  El 
Salvador,  Sudan,  Honduras,  Morocco, 
and  Somalia. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
mm 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  economic  support  fund  (ESF) 
program  provides  flexible  economic 
assistance  including  balance-of-payments 
support,  infrastructure  assistance,  and 
development  projects  of  direct  benefit  to 
the  poor,  on  a  grant  or  loan  basis,  to 
countries  of  special  political  and  security 
interest  to  the  United  States.  The  ESF 
program  is  administered  by  the  Agency 
for  International  Development.  For  FY 
1985  the  Administration  requests  $3,438 
billion— $254  million  more  than  the  Presi- 
dent's revised  FY  1984  request.  Of  this 
total,  almost  50%  is  proposed  for  Israel 
and  Egypt.  Some  70%  of  this  total  goes 
to  these  two  plus  eight  other  countries 
primarily  in  Central  America  and  the 
Persian  Gulf/Indian  Ocean  region. 

The  international  military  education 
and  training  (IMET)  program  provides 
professional  military  training  and  educa- 
tion in  the  United  States  and  overseas  to 
foreign  military  personnel.  It  also  ac- 
quaints them  with  U.S.  social,  economic, 
and  political  institutions,  including  our 
human  rights  concerns.  Proposed  grants, 
totaling  $61  million  in  budget  authority, 
are  requested  in  1985.  The  President's 
request  would  allow  the  training  of  per- 
sonnel from  95  countries.  The  largest  10 
programs  are  in  Turkey,  Spain,  Portugal, 
Indonesia,  Thailand,  Egypt,  Jordan, 
South  Korea,  the  Philippines,  and  Kenya, 
accounting  for  almost  $25  million  or  40% 
of  the  total. 

Peacekeeping  operations  enable  the 
United  States  to  participate  in  the  multi- 
lateral operations  necessary  to  help  avoid 
international  conflict.  Currently,  the 
United  States  provides  voluntary  contri- 
butions to  the  Multinational  Force  and 
Observers  in  the  Sinai  as  part  of  the 
Camp  David  agreements,  the  UN  Force 
in  Cyprus,  and  the  Caribbean  peace 
force  in  Grenada.  Total  budget  authority 
proposed  for  these  peacekeeping  pro- 
grams in  1985  is  $49  million.  The  Ad- 
ministration also  proposes  legislation  pro- 
viding for  $25  million  in  emergency 
drawdovra  authority  for  peacekeeping 
operations. 


FOREIGN  ECONOMIC  AND 
FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE 

Foreign  economic  and  financial  assistance 
supports  the  foreign  policy  interests  of 
the  United  States  by  promoting  eco- 
nomic development  aimed  at  meeting 
basic  human  needs  in  many  Third  World 
countries.  The  United  States  provides 
such  assistance  both  bilaterally  and 
through  multilateral  institutions. 


Bilateral  Assistance 

Bilateral  development  assistance  is  ad- 
ministered by  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development.  This  assistance 
seeks  to  promote  U.S.  interests  in  the 
developing  world  through  the  promotion 
of  long-term  equitable  grovki;h  in  the 
developing  countries.  Within  the  frame- 
work of  the  existing  legislative  mandate 
on  foreign  assistance,  the  President  has 
established  the  following  policies  to  guide 
the  formulation  of  country  programs: 

•  Implementation  of  effective  and  ef- 
ficient economic  policies  by  the  devel- 
oping countries; 

•  Strengthening  of  the  indigenous 
private  sector  in  the  development 
process; 

•  Creating  and  strengthening  the  in- 
stitutional and  technological  capacities  of 
the  developing  countries;  and 

•  Encouraging  diffusion  of  technol- 
ogy and  the  expansion  of  research  and 
development,  particularly  through 
cooperative  efforts  between  U.S.  and 
developing-country  scientists. 

This  approach  stems  from  the  recog- 
nition that  the  economic  performance  of 
the  developing  countries  is  critically 
dependent  upon  their  own  economic 
policies.  The  greatest  strides  toward  self- 
sustaining  growth  have  occurred  in  those 
countries  that  have  relied  to  the  greatest 
extent  on  market  forces  and  have 
enough  private  initiative  and  sufficiently 
viable  institutions  to  develop  and  apply 
technology  to  their  development  effort. 

Development  assistance  helps 
foreign  nations  to  meet  basic  human 
needs  through  sustained,  broadly  based 
economic  growth.  Grant  and  loan  funds 
are  provided  for  goods  and  services, 
mostly  American,  in  key  development 
fields  of  food  production,  education  and 
training,  and  population  and  health, 
where  the  United  States  has  a  compara- 
tive technical  advantage  and  expertise. 
Those  areas  also  have  the  greatest 
potential  for  long-term  development  to 
benefit  the  poor  in  recipient  countries. 
The  program  reflects  the  Administra- 
tion's emphasis  upon  policy  dialogue, 
private  enterprise,  technology  transfer, 
and  institutional  development,  and  com- 
plements nonassistance  measures  such  as 
trade,  investment,  private  bank  financ- 
ing, and  other  forms  of  nonconcessional 
support  for  development.  The  FY  1985 
proposal  of  $2,267  billion  represents  an 
increase  of  $245  million  over  the  revised 
FY  1984  request. 


Public  Law  480  (Food  for  Peace) 

Title  I  concessional  food  sales  permit  a 
flexible  response  to  the  pressing  eco- 
nomic needs  of  recipient  countries. 
Title  II  provides  food  on  a  grant  basis. 
These  programs  also  provide  support  in 
times  of  natural  disasters,  support 
market  development  for  U.S.  agricultural 
products,  and  provide  leverage  for 
agricultural  self-help  measures.  Greater 
emphasis  is  being  placed  on  integrating 
these  humanitarian  programs,  aimed  at 
the  serious  food-deficit  countries,  with 
our  overall  economic  development,  mar- 
ket development,  and  other  foreign  pol- 
icy objectives.  Title  III  provides  support 
for  longer  term  programs  in  agricultural 
and  rural  development.  The  President's 
PL  480  request  is  for  $1.36  billion. 

Migration  and  refugee  assistance 

comprises  both  refugee  assistance  over- 
seas and  resettlement  to  the  United 
States.  In  FY  1985  the  Administration 
seeks  $341  million,  an  increase  of  about 
$4  million  over  the  FY  1984  adjusted  re- 
quest. The  program  continues  to  focus  on 
both  humanitarian  and  foreign  policy  con- 
siderations associated  with  refugee  pop- 
ulations and  movements. 

The  Administration  wall  continue  to 
support  major  assistance  programs  in 
such  politically  important  areas  as  South- 
east Asia,  Pakistan,  the  Horn  of  Africa, 
Central  America,  and  the  Middle  East. 
Most  assistance  is  provided  through 
multilateral  channels  such  as  the  UN 
High  Commissioner  for  Refugees,  the  In- 
ternational Committee  of  the  Red  Cross, 
and  the  Intergovernmental  Committee 
for  Migration.  U.S.  funding  for  these  pro- 
grams helps  meet  basic  human  needs 
while  seeking  longer  term  solutions  such 
as  voluntary  repatriation,  resettlement  in 
the  country  of  asylum,  or  resettlement  in 
third  countries. 

The  Administration  seeks  to  resolve 
refugee  problems  without  resort  to  large 
programs  for  resettlement  to  the  United 
States  but  will  continue  to  provide  re- 
settlement opportunities  to  maintain  first 
asylum  for  refugees  and  to  aid  refugees 
with  links  to  the  United  States.  The  Ad- 
ministration also  seeks  to  encourage 
other  nations  to  assume  a  greater  level 
of  responsibility  for  resettlement  of  refu- 
gees. Refugee  resettlement  in  this  coun- 
try is  expected  to  be  72,000  persons  in 
FY  1984  and  the  same  level  in  FY  1985. 

Narcotics  control  assistance  aims  to 
control  the  flow  of  illicit  narcotic  and 
other  dangerous  drugs  through  bilateral 
and  multOateral  assistance  programs. 
The  control  strategy  emphasizes  eradica- 
tion of  narcotic  drugs  at  their  source 


May  1984 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


with  assistance  also  directed  toward  im- 
proving law  enforcement.  The  Adminis- 
tration proposes  $50.2  million  for  FY 
1985.  While  reinforcing  important  proj- 
ects to  control  heroin  production  and 
trafficking  in  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Burma, 
and  Thailand,  and  trafficking  in  Turkey, 
this  budget  level  also  permits  increased 
emphasis  upon  control  of  cocaine  and 
marijuana  from  South  America  and  in- 
cludes the  U.S.  contribution  to  the  UN 
Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control. 

The  Inter-American  Foundation 

(lAF)  was  established  by  Congress  in 
1969  as  an  autonomous  government  cor- 
poration. It  extends  grants  to  local 
private  groups  in  the  Caribbean  and 
Latin  America,  particularly  those  tradi- 
tionally outside  the  mainstream  of  U.S. 
development  assistance  programs.  The 
lAF  promotes  more  equitable,  respon- 
sive, and  participatory  approaches  to 
development  and  foreign  assistance  in 
the  region  through  grants  supporting 
self-help  projects. 

The  Peace  Corps  embodies  the 
American  spirit  of  self-reliance,  volun 
tarism,  and  personal  initiative.  By  help- 
ing others  to  help  themselves,  by  pro- 
viding targeted  technical  assistance  with 
lasting  impact,  and  by  serving  as  a 
catalyst  in  the  development  process, 
Peace  Corps  volunteers  personify  this 
Administration's  approach  toward  devel- 
oping nations.  By  utilizing  the  voluntary 
service  of  individual  Americans,  it  is  also 
one  of  the  least  costly  and  most  visible 
ways  to  provide  direct  technical  assist- 
ance to  developing  countries.  The  Ad- 
ministration proposes  $124  million  in 
1985,  an  increase  of  some  5%  over  the  re- 
vised FY  1984  request. 

Multilateral  Assistance 

Multilateral  assistance  enables  us  to 
multiply  the  impact  of  our  bilateral  pro- 
grams with  contributions  from  other 
donors.  Donor  contributions  are  further 
leveraged  in  hard  loan  windows  through 
multilateral  development  bank  (MDB) 
borrowing  on  capital  markets.  Multi- 
lateral institutions  also  can  encourage 
policy  reforms  and  projects  in  areas  that 
may  be  too  sensitive  for  bilateral  discus- 
sion and  can  encourage  global  or  regional 
approaches  to  problems  that  do  not  lend 
themselves  to  bilateral  solutions. 

Multilateral  Development  Banks 

Multilateral  development  bank  programs 
are  an  important  complement  to  U.S. 
bilateral  assistance.  For  example: 


30 


•  In  1983,  the  MDBs  provided  $584.3 
million  to  three  important  Caribbean 
Basin  countries— Jamaica,  Guatemala, 
and  Honduras— more  than  double  the 
U.S.  economic  and  military  assistance; 

•  Five  key  countries  near  the  Per- 
sian Gulf— Kenya,  Pakistan,  Mauritius, 
Seychelles,  and  Sudan— received  over  $1 
billion  from  the  MDBs  in  1981  and  $835.7 
million  from  U.S.  bilateral  programs;  and 

•  MDBs  provided  assistance  of  more 
than  $1.5  billion  to  five  countries  where 
the  United  States  maintains  basing  ar- 
rangements—Kenya, Somalia,  Oman, 
Thailand,  and  the  Philippines— about 
three  times  our  $516  million  bilateral 
program. 

While  the  Administration  decided  to 
honor  existing  U.S.  commitments  to 
multilateral  institutions  in  order  to 
preserve  credibility  abroad,  it  has  not 
adopted  a  "business-as-usual"  approach 
to  the  MDBs.  The  President  decided  not 
to  enter  into  new  replenishment  agree- 
ments until  a  comprehensive  assessment 
of  the  extent  and  nature  of  U.S.  partici- 
pation in  the  banks  had  been  completed. 

The  assessment  was  completed  in 
1982  and  concluded  that  the  MDBs  can 
make  an  important  and  cost-effective 
contribution  to  growth  and  stability  by 
promoting  a  market-oriented  interna- 
tional economic  system.  Therefore,  a 
leading  U.S.  role  in  these  banks  is 
justified  by  our  fundamental  interest  in 
a  more  stable  and  secure  world. 

The  assessment  recommended  that 
the  United  States  should  begin  to  reduce 
our  participation  in  the  soft  loan  win- 
dows in  real  terms  and  phase  down  the 
level  of  paid-in  capital  in  hard  loan 
windows.  The  Administration  has  been 
successfully  pursuing  this  objective  in 
replenishment  negotiations.  We  also  are 
implementing  recommendations  to  en- 
courage more  emphasis  on  private  initia- 
tives, increased  cofinancing  with  com- 
mercial banks  and  other  private 
investors,  more  effective  policy  condi- 
tionality,  a  greater  concentration  of 
concessional  resources  on  the  poorest 
countries  without  access  to  alternative 
sources  of  funds,  and  a  more  consistent 
maturation/graduation  policy  aimed  at 
gradually  moving  countries  out  of  the 
ranks  of  those  needing  assistance. 

International  Bank  for  Reconstruc- 
tion and  Development  (IBRD)  finances 
lending  operations— $11.3  billion  in  FY 
1983— primarily  from  borrowing  in  the 
world  capital  markets  and  from  retained 
earnings  and  loan  repayments.  Loans  are 
repayable  over  20  years  or  less,  including 
a  5-year  grace  period.  The  IBRD  interest 


rate  is  based  on  its  own  cost  of  borrow- 
ing. Loans  are  directed  toward  countries 
at  the  relatively  more  advanced  stages  of 
economic  development,  generally  re- 
ferred to  as  middle-income  developing 
countries. 

International  Development  Associa- 
tion (IDA)  lends  only  to  the  poorest 
developing  countries,  those  with  an  an- 
nual per  capita  income  of  $805  or  less  in 
1982  doUars;  93%  of  IDA  funds  went  to 
countries  with  per  capita  incomes  below 
$410  in  1983.  IDA  loans  have  50-year 
maturities  including  a  10-year  grace 
period.  They  carry  no  interest,  but  there 
is  a  minimal  annual  service  charge. 

Inter- American  Development  Bank 
(IDE)  provides  development  assistance 
to  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  coun- 
tries. Like  other  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks,  the  IDB  provides  resources 
on  both  market-related  and  concessional 
terms.  The  IDB's  hard  loan  window 
utOizes  capital-market  borrowings  to 
fund  the  majority  of  its  lending  program. 
The  Fund  for  Special  Operations  pro- 
vides concessional  financing.  Each  dollar 
of  the  U.S.  contribution  is  matched  by 
about  $2  from  other  donors. 

Inter-American  Investment  Cor- 
poration (IIC).  The  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  (IDB)  is  proposing 
the  creation  of  an  investment  corpora- 
tion, along  the  lines  of  the  International 
Finance  Corporation  of  the  World  Bank. 
The  purpose  of  the  IIC  would  be  to  pro- 
mote the  economic  development  of  the 
regional  developing  members  by  en- 
couraging the  establishment,  expansion, 
and  modernization  of  private  enterprises 
and  of  market-oriented  mixed  enterprises 
controlled  by  the  private  sector,  giving 
priority  to  small-  and  medium-scale 
enterprises.  IDB  management  seeks  to 
fund  the  IIC  at  a  minimum  of  $200 
million,  of  which  the  United  States  would 
provide  $50-$60  million  over  4  years 
beginning  in  FY  1985. 

The  Asian  Development  Bank 
(ADD)  supports  development  in  the 
countries  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  The 
ADB,  particularly  through  its  conces- 
sional window,  the  Asian  Development 
Fund  (ADF),  has  placed  increased  em- 
phasis on  lending  for  projects  intended 
to  meet  the  needs  of  the  poorest  people 
in  these  countries.  Projects  for  agricul- 
ture and  agroindustry  have  recently  ac- 
counted for  approximately  one-third  of 
all  ADB  and  ADF  lending,  with  energy 
comprising  about  one-quarter.  The 
largest  borrowers  from  the  ADB  and 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


ADF  are  Indonesia,  Philippines,  South 
Korea,  Thailand,  Pakistan,  and 
Bangladesh. 

African  Development  Bank  and 
Fund  (AFDB,  AFDF)  were  founded  in 
1963  and  1973,  respectively.  The  United 
States  joined  the  fund,  the  concessional 
lending  affiliate  of  the  African  Develop- 
ment Bank,  in  1976.  The  AFDF  lends  to 
the  poorest  African  countries.  During 
FY  1983,  this  amounted  to  $238  million 
distributed  among  18  African  nations. 
Late  in  1982,  membership  in  the  bank 
was  opened  to  non-African  states,  and 
the  United  States  became  a  member  on 
February  8,  1983. 

International  Organizations 
find  Programs 

International  organizations  and  pro- 
grams support  certain  voluntarily  funded 
development,  humanitarian,  and  scientific 
assistance  programs  of  the  United  Na- 
tions and  the  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS).  U.S.  contributions  provide 
the  basis  for  U.S.  efforts  to  improve  the 
effectiveness  and  influence  the  direction 
of  these  important  multilateral  programs. 
U.S.  contributions  to  these  programs  are 
important  for  maintaining  U.S.  influence 
in  the  United  Nations  and  the  OAS 
regarding  others  matters  as  well. 

More  than  80%  of  the  requested 
funds  are  for  three  major  UN  pro- 
grams—the UN  Development  Program, 
UN  Children's  Fund,  and  the  Interna- 
tional Fund  for  Agricultural  Develop- 
ment. U.S.  contributions  to  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency,  UN 
Environment  Program,  UN  Capital 
Development  Fund,  smaller  UN  pro- 
grams, and  OAS  development  assistance 
programs  represent  significant  but  more 
specialized  assistance  funded  by  this  ac- 
count. Funding  is  requested  for  one  new 
initiative  in  the  account,  the  Investment 
Promotion  Service  Office  of  the  UN  In- 
dustrial Development  Organization  in 
New  York,  whose  purpose  is  to  train  in- 
vestment promotion  officers  from  devel- 
oping countries  and  to  support  their  ef- 
forts to  attract  commercial  investors. 

The  International  Fund  for  Agrri- 
cultural  Development  (IFAD)  provides 
concessional  agricultural  loans  and  grants 
in  member  developing  states  to  help  ten- 
ant and  small  farmers  expand  food  pro- 
duction, improve  nutrition,  and  combat 
rural  poverty.  The  loans  are  often 
cofinanced  with  multilateral  banks,  UN 
agencies,  and  bilateral  donors  including 
OPEC  countries.  Almost  all  IFAD  loans 
have  been  allocated  to  countries  with  an- 
nual per  capita  incomes  of  under  $500  (in 


1978  dollars).  Countries  pay  interest 
charges  reflecting  their  levels  of  per 
capita  income.  Negotiations  on  IFAD's 
first  replenishment  (IFAD  I)  were  com- 
pleted in  1982  with  members  of  OPEC 
and  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  agreeing 
to  share  the  same  relative  burden  as 
they  did  in  the  institution's  initial  fund- 
ing. The  U.S.  pledge  under  IFAD  I  is 
$180  million.  The  United  States  has 
already  paid  $90  million  of  this  pledge 
and  $50  million  more  toward  the  pledge 
is  requested  for  FY  1985. 

The  UN  Development  Program 

(UNDP),  which  provides  technical  assist- 
ance to  some  15()  countries  and  terri- 
tories, exercises  leadership  within  UN 
specialized  agencies  and  programs  to 
bring  a  mix  of  resources  and  technical 
help  to  bear  upon  economic  development 
programs.  The  activities  of  the  UNDP 
are  financed  entirely  through  voluntary 
contributions. 

The  UN  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF) 

focuses  on  delivering  basic  services  to 
mothers  and  children  of  the  Thu-d  World. 
UNICEF's  current  programs  in  110 
countries  are  financed  entirely  through 
the  voluntary  contributions  of  member 
states  and  from  private  sources. 

The  Organization  of  American 

States  (OAS),  which  is  not  part  of  the 
UN  system,  conducts  programs  that  sup- 


port technical  cooperation  contributing  to 
the  economic  and  social  development  of 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  In  re- 
cent years,  several  Latin  American  coun- 
tries have  become  net  contributors  to 
OAS  development  programs. 

The  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA)  fulfills  an  important  role 
for  U.S.  nonproliferation  interests  by 
operating  the  international  safeguards 
system  against  nuclear-weapons  prolifer- 
ation and  by  providing  technical  assist- 
ance in  the  peaceful  development  of 
nuclear  energy. 


Report  of  the  Commis- 
sion on  Security  and 
Economic  Assistance 

On  February  22,  1983,  the  Secretary  of 
State  announced  the  formation  of  the 
Commission  on  Security  and  Economic 
Assistance,  under  the  chairmanship  of 
the  Honorable  Frank  C.  Carlucci,  to 
review  the  goals  and  activities  of  United 
States  foreign  assistance  efforts.  This 
commission  was  broadly  bipartisan  and 
included  a  wide  representation  from  both 
Houses  of  Congress  as  well  as  from  the 
private  sector.  It  was  cochaired  by 
Joseph  Lane  Kirkland,  Lawrence  H. 
Silberman,  and  Dr.  Clifton  R.  Wharton, 


U.S.  Foreign  Economic  and 
Military  Assistance,  FY  1974-85 


1974   1975   1976   1977   1978   1979   1980   1 '18 1 

Fiscal  Year 


1983       1984        1981 


May  1984 


mWBBHmmilllllLIUllllLlllilUH 


THE  SECRETARY 


Jr.  The  commission  presented  its  report 
to  the  Secretary  in  November  1983. 
After  reviewing  it's  recommendations, 
the  Secretary  of  State  presented  the 
report  to  the  President  in  February 
1984. 

The  commission  recognized  at  the 
outset  that  the  United  States,  through 
its  support  of  the  economic  and  security 
capabilities  of  friendly  countries,  seeks  to 
further  free,  humane,  and  open  societies 
in  a  secure,  prosperous  world.  American 
efforts  abroad  are  directed  toward  assur- 
ing our  national  security,  promoting  the 
democratic  rights  and  ideals  upon  which 
our  society  is  based,  and  fostering  our 
diplomatic,  economic,  and  commercial 
interests. 

The  commission  recognized,  however, 
that  concerns  about  the  lack  of  popular 
and  legislative  support,  real  resource 
levels  which  have  stagnated  if  not  de- 
clined over  the  years,  and  skepticism 
regarding  program  effectiveness— factors 
which  led  to  the  creation  of  the  commis- 
sion—all imposed  serious  limits  upon  the 
effectiveness  of  our  assistance  programs 
as  instruments  of  U.S.  foreign  and 
security  policy.  The  commission's 
charter,  therefore,  was  to  examine  all 
aspects  of  U.S.  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams and  to  propose  ways  in  which 
these  programs  could  make  a  greater 
contribution  to  meeting  U.S.  national 
objectives. 

The  commission  found  that  support 
for  foreign  assistance  had  broken  dovra 
and  polarized,  as  advocates  for  military 
or  economic  programs  tend  to  oppose 
rather  than  support  each  other.  Budget- 
ary limitations  forcing  difficult  trade-offs 
among  domestic  and  international  pro- 
grams have  further  exacerbated  the 
problem.  Widespread  misunderstanding 
regarding  the  nature  and  objectives  of 
specific  foreign  assistance  programs 
means  that  the  general  public  no  longer 
perceives  these  efforts  as  coherently 
serving  valid  U.S.  national  interests. 
Program  management  has  become  in- 
creasingly encumbered  by  legislative  re- 
quirements, while  recent  efforts  to  inte- 
grate security  and  economic  assistance 
policy  and  programs  should  be  continued. 

The  keystone  to  the  Carlucci  commis- 
sion's recommendations  is  the  conclusion 
that  economic  and  military  assistance 
must  be  closely  integrated  since  eco- 
nomic growth  and  rising  standards  of  liv- 
ing are  vital  to  internal  stability  and  ef- 
fective external  defense.  Conversely, 
threats  to  stability  impede  economic 
development  and  prosperity.  The  future 
effectiveness  of  the  foreig^i  assistance 
program  rests  on  the  concept  that  secu- 


Economic  Assistance  as  a  Percentage  of  Total 
Foreign  Assistance,  FY  1946-85 


j—i—i Ill 


I  I  I I i—i I I  I  I 


1965 

iscal  Year 


rity  and  growth  are  mutually  reinforcing 
and  that  both  are  fundamental  to  the  ad- 
vancement of  U.S.  interests.  On  balance, 
the  commission  determined  that  U.S. 
assistance  programs  make  an  indispen- 
sable contribution  to  achieving  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives. 

U.S.  foreign  assistance  as  a  whole 
has  been  declining.  In  real  terms  (when 
adjusted  for  inflation),  U.S.  assistance 
expenditures  over  the  last  5  years  have 
averaged  some  21%  below  those  of  a 
comparable  period  10  years  ago.  Mihtary 
assistance,  especially  in  terms  of  its 
"grant  element,"  has  fallen  dispro- 
portionately. Although  the  trend  has 
changed  in  recent  years,  in  1975  the  pro- 
portion of  concessional  economic  and  mili- 
tary assistance  was  roughly  equal.  By 
1983,  five  dollars  of  economic  assistance 
was  given  on  concessional  terms  for 
every  dollar  of  grant  military  assistance. 
Excluding  support  to  Israel  and  Egypt, 
most  of  our  military  assistance  in  recent 
years  has  been  provided  at  the  cost  of 
money  to  the  U.S.  Treasury,  yet  there 
are  friendly  countries  with  legitimate 
security  needs  that  simply  cannot  afford 
to  borrow  for  necessary  military  equip- 
ment and  services  on  these  terms. 

The  commission  recognized  that  the 
balance  between  economic  and  security 
assistance  continues  to  be  one  of  the 
most  divisive  issues  affecting  the  foreign 
assistance  program.  That  debate  has 
become  sterile  and  unproductive  at  best 


and  damaging  to  U.S.  interests  at  worst. 
The  commission  returned  repeatedly  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  optimum  mix  of 
programs  could  only  be  reached  on  a 
country-by-country  basis  where  local  con- 
ditions and  U.S.  interests  would  deter- 
mine requirements. 

The  countries  of  the  world  are  highly 
interdependent  and  continue  to  become 
more  so.  In  this  setting,  the  commission 
concluded,  the  United  States  cannot 
escape  the  importance  of  international 
lending,  trade  relations,  collective  secu- 
rity, and  foreign  assistance.  Because  our 
foreign  assistance  efforts  must  respond 
to  a  changing  environment  that 
threatens  American  security  and  pros- 
perity in  every  part  of  the  world,  the 
commission  offered,  among  others,  the 
following  recommendations: 

•  The  commission  urged  that  the 
congressional  leadership  and  the  Presi- 
dent jointly  endorse  the  conclusion  that 
foreign  security  and  economic  coopera- 
tion programs  are  mutually  supportive 
and  constitute  an  essential  instrument  of 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States 
and  that  they  broaden  efforts  to  inform 
the  American  public  of  the  importance  of 
our  foreign  assistance  programs. 

•  It  also  made  clear  that  to  meet 
U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives,  significant 
increases  in  real  levels  of  assistance  will 
be  required,  particularly  in  regions  such 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


as  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Central  Amer- 
ica and  the  Caribbean  where  special 
challenges  face  the  United  States  in  the 
forseeable  future. 

•  The  commission  endorsed  the  posi- 
tion that  programs  should  contribute  to 
the  evolution  of  policies  that  will  result 
in  open,  self-sustaining,  and  democratic 
societies.  While  human  resource  develop- 
ment and  institution-building  are  essen- 
tial to  development  and  security,  greater 
emphasis  also  should  be  given  to  science 
and  technology-related  development  as- 
sistance that  also  could  be  available,  on  a 
mutually  cooperative  basis,  to  middle- 
income  and  newly  industrialized 
countries. 

•  The  commission  also  endorsed  the 
use  of  bilateral  and  multilateral  coopera- 
tion programs  to  encourage  the  growth 
of  indigenous  private  sectors  and  U.S. 
private-sector  contributions  to  the  devel- 
opment process.  The  commission  called 
for  maintenance  of  the  flexibility  of  the 
ESF  program  and,  in  the  administration 
of  the  development  assistance  account,  to 
ensure  that  long-term  development  needs 
are  met  in  ways  consistent  with  the 
short-term  economic  and  financial  con- 
straints that  are  facing  many  developing 
countries.  Whenever  possible,  PL  480 
resources  should  be  used  in  connection 
with  other  forms  of  economic  assistance 
to  maximize  development  impact. 

•  The  commission  concluded  that 
greater  concessionality  was  needed  in 
military  assistance  in  order  to  reduce  the 
debt  repayment  burden  of  poorer  countries 
facing  serious  security  requirements. 

The  Administration  fully  endorses 
the  overall  approach  and  general  conclu- 
sions of  the  commission  and  has  incor- 
porated most  of  the  specific  recommenda- 
tions into  the  President's  Security  and 
Development  Cooperation  Program  for 
FY  1985.  ■ 


May  1984 


APPENDIX  A 


Foreign  Economic  and  Military  Assista 

nee,  FY  1984  and  1985' 

($  millions) 

FY  19B4 

FY  1984 

FY  1984 

Continuing 

Supplemental 

Revised 

FY  1985 

Resolution 

Request 

Request 

Request 

ECONOMIC 

Multilateral 

Multilateral  Banks 

1,324.4 

319.6 

1,644.0 

1,235.6 

International  Organizations  and  Programs 

314.2 

3.7 

317.9 

241.8 

Subtotal 

1,638.5 

323.3 

1,961.8 

1,477.4 

Bilateral 

Development  Assistance 

1,934.2 

87.9 

2,022.1 

2,267.5 

PL  480 

1,052.0 

115.0 

1,167.0 

1,355.0 

Economic  Support  Fund 

2,893.3 

290.5 

3,183.8 

3,438.1 

Peace  Corps 

115.0 

2.0 

117.0 

124.0 

Refugees 

323.0 

14.7 

337.7 

341.5 

Narcotics 

41.2 

41.2 

50.2 

Micronesia  Compact 

0 

0 

295.5 

Antiterrorism 

2.5 

2.5 

5.0 

Peacekeeping 

56.2 

56.2 

49.0 

Other  (including  African  Development 

Foundation  and  Inter-A.nerican 

Foundation) 

16.0 
6,433.3 

16.0 
6,943.4 

15.0 

Subtotal 

510.0 

7,940.7 

TOTAL  (ECONOMIC) 


MILITARY 


8,071.9 


833.3 


TOTAL  (GROSS) 

Offsetting  Receipts 

Agency  for  International  Development 
Foreign  Military  Sales 

TOTAL  (NET) 


586.5 
-460.5 
-  126.0 

13,763.2 


586.5 

-  460.5 

-  726.0 


'Figures  may  not  total  due  to  rounding. 


8,905.2        9,418.1 


Foreign  Military  Sales  Guarantees 

Off  Budget 

(4,401.3) 

(4,401.3) 

(0) 

On  Budget 
Concessional 
Forgiven 
Market 

1,315.0 
0.0 

1.315.0 
0.0 

1,315.0 
0.0 

1.315.0 
0.0 

5,100.0 

53S.5 

2,575.0 

1.986.5 

Military  Assistance  Program 
International  Military  Education 

and  Training 
Guarantee  Reserve  Fund 

510.0 

51.5 

0 

6,277.8 

259.1 

769.1 

51.5 

0 

6,536.8 

924.5 

60.9 
274.0 

TOTAL  (MILITARY) 

259.1 

6,359.4 

14,349.7  1,092.4  15,442.0       15,777.5 


580.1 
-463.1 
-117.0 


1,092.4  14,855.6       15,197.4 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


APPENDIX  B 


FY  1985  Bilateral  Assistance  Program  Requests 

(Budget  Authority.  $  millions) 


Develop- 

Conces- 

Market- 

ment 

sional 

Rate 

Assist- 
ance 

PL  480 

ESF 

IMET 

MAP 

FMS 
Loans 

FMS 
Loans 

Title  1 

Title  II 

TOTAL 

Middle  East  and  Southwest  Asia 

Egypt 

_ 

225.000 

18.349 

750.000 

2.000 



1,175.000 



2,170.349 

Israel 

— 

— 

— 

850.000 

— 

— 

1,400.000 

— 

2,250.000 

Jordan 

— 

— 

0.087 

20.000 

2.000 

— 

47.500 

47.500 

117.087 

Lebanon 

— 

— 

— 

20.000 

0.800 

— 

_ 

15.000 

35.800 

Regional  Middle  East 

3.000 

— 

2.288 

15.000 

— 

— 

— 

— 

20.288 

Algeria 

— 

— 

— 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

0.050 

Djibouti 

— 

— 

1.046 

3.500 

0.100 

2.500 

— 

— 

7.146 

Kenya 

30.000 

10.000 

5.139 

55.000 

1.800 

23.000 

— 

— 

124.939 

Madagascar 

2.000 

6.000 

2.312 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

10.362 

Mauritius 

— 

3.500 

0.233 

2.000 

— 

— 

— 

— 

5.733 

Morocco 

19.000 

40.000 

12.504 

15.000 

1.700 

40.000 

10.000 

— 

138.204 

Oman 

— 

— 

— 

20.000 

0.100 

— 

— 

45.000 

65.100 

Pakistan 

50.000 

50.000 

3.996 

200.000 

1.000 

— 

100.000 

225.000 

629.996 

Seychelles 

— 

— 

0.292 

2.000 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

2.342 

Somalia 

22.000 

20.000 

1.830 

35.000 

1.250 

40.000 

— 

— 

120.080 

Sudan 

28.000 

50.000 

2.451 

120.000 

1.700 

69.000 

— 

— 

271.151 

Tunisia 

— 

5.000 

0.854 

3.000 

1.700 

15.000 

25.000 

25.000 

75.554 

Yemen 

30.000 

5.000 

0.067 

— 

1.500 

10.000 

— 

— 

46.567 

Total 

184.000 

414.500 

51.448 

2,110.500 

15.800 

199.500 

2,757.500 

357.500 

6,090.748 

Central  America  and  the  Caribbean 


Belize 

6.000 

Costa  Rica 

20.000 

El  Salvador 

80.000 

Guatemala 

40.000 

Honduras 

45.000 

Panama 

19.800 

Regional  Organization 

for  Central  American 

Programs 

62.000 

Regional  Military 

Training  Center 

— 

Bahamas 

_ 

Dominican  Republic 

30.000 

Eastern  Caribbean 

32.000 

Guyana 

— 

Haiti 

24.000 

Jamaica 

28.000 

Suriname 

— 

Trinidad  &  Tobago 

— 

Total 

386.800 

— 

— 

4.000 

0.100 

0.500 

_ 

28.000 

— 

160.000 

0.200 

9.800 

_ 

44.027 

7.073 

210.000 

1.500 

116.000 

15.000 

16.047 

5.353 

35.000 

0.300 

— 

10.000 

15.135 

3.865 

75.000 

1.200 

61.300 

_ 

— 

0.488 

20.000 

0.600 

14.400 

5.000 

— 

— 

— 

0.050 

22.000 

2.895 

45.000 

0.750 

— 

0.130 

20.000 

0.300 

— 

0.048 

— 

0.050 

15.000 

10.081 

5.000 

0.450 

30.000 

0.100 

70.000 

0.250 

— 

— 

— 

0.080 

— 

— 

— 

0.050 

70.209 

30.033 

780.600 

5.880 

20.000 


3.000 
5.000 


0.300 
5.000 


235.300 


5.000 


35.000 


10.600 
218.000 
473.600 
106.700 
201.500 

60.288 


198.600 

20.000 

0.050 

108.645 

57.430 

0.098 

54.831 

133.350 

0.080 

0.050 


—  1,643.822 


Europe  and  NATO's  Southern  Flanl< 


Austria 

Cyprus 

Finland 

Greece 

Iceland 

Portugal 

Spain 

Turkey 

Yugoslavia 

Total 


3.000 


0.060 


— 

0.060 

— 

— 

1.700 

— 

— 

0.025 

— 

80.000 

3.000 

70.000 

12.000 

3.000 

— 

75.000 

4.000 

230.000 

— 

0.150 

— 

250.000 


250.000 


— 

0.060 

— 

3.000 

— 

0.060 

500.000 

501.700 

— 

0.025 

55.000 

208.000 

400.000 

415.000 

275.000 

934.000 

— 

0.150 

1,230.000     2,061.995 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


■tHHHH 


"""■■'"■ 


THE  SECRETARY 


APPENDIX  B— Continued 


Develop- 

meni 

Assist- 

ance 

Pacific/Asia 

Asian  Region 

19.500 

Brunei 

— 

Burma 

15.000 

Fiji 

— 

Indonesia 

65.000 

South  Korea 

— 

Malaysia 

— 

Papua  New  Guinea 

— 

Philippines 

39.000 

Singapore 

— 

Solomon  Islands 

— 

South  Pacific 

6.000 

Thailand 

27.000 

Tonga 

— 

Conces- 
sional 
FMS 
Loans 


Market- 

Rate 

FMS 

Loans 

TOTAL 



19.500 

— 

0.030 

— 

15.300 

— 

0.080 

20.000 

155.441 

230.000 

232.000 

10.000 

11.000 

— 

0.050 

30.000 

230.959 

— 

0.050 

— 

0.030 

— 

7.000 

98.000 

137.400 

— 

0.030 

388.000 

808.870 

9.959 


Total 


171.500 


— 

0.030 

— 

— 

0.300 

— 

— 

0.080 

— 

_ 

2.700 

— 

_ 

2.000 

— 

— 

1.000 

— 

— 

0.050 

— 

5.000 

2.000 

25.000 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

0.030 

— 

1.000 

— 

— 

5.000 

2.400 

5.000 

— 

0.030 

— 

)1.000 

10.670 

30.000 

50.000 


South  Asia 


Bangladesh 

Bhutan 

India 

Maldives 

Nepal 

Sri  Lanka 

Total 


82.000 
87.000 

75.000 

22.873 

0.605 

125.034 

15.000 
41.500 

26.000 

1.106 
6.114 

225.500 

101.000 

155.732 

0.250 

0.300 
0.025 
0.100 
0.150 

0.825 


180.123 
0.6.05 
212.334 
0.025 
16.206 
73.764 

483.057 


South  America 


Argentina 

Bolivia 

Brazil 

Chile 

Colombia 

Ecuador 

South  American  Region 

Mexico 

Pan  American  College 

of  the  Americas 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 

Total 


20.000  11.941 

—  0.071 


10.000 
21.500 


30.000 


73.500 


2.000 


20.000  13.887 


40.000  26.693  2.000 


0.050 
0.100 
0.050 
0.050 
0.900 
0.700 

0.250 

6.000 
0.050 
0.850 
0.060 
0.050 
9.110 


3.000 


_ 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

47.041 

_ 

_ 

0.121 

_ 

_ 

0.050 

4.000 

4.000 

8.900 

2.000 

2.000 

15.494 

_ 

— 

23.500 

- 

- 

0.250 





6.000 

— 

— 

0.050 

5.000 

5.000 

74.737 

— 

— 

0.060 

— 

— 

0.050 

3.000  11.000  11.000 


May  1984 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 

APPENDIX  B— Continued 

DwMlop- 

Conces- 

Market 

mem 

sional 

Rate 

Aulst- 
anc« 

PL  480 

ESF 

IMET 

MAP 

FMS 
Loans 

FMS 
Loans 

TOTAL 

Thlel 

Thie  II 

Africa 

Southern  Africa 

Angola 



_ 

0.194 

— 

— 

_ 

— 

_ 

0.194 

Botswana 

— 

— 

2.015 

10.000 

0.300 

4.000 

5.000 

— 

21.315 

Lesotho 

10.300 

— 

7.189 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

17.489 

Malawi 

10.000 

— 

0.348 

— 

0.200 

1.000 

— 

— 

11.548 

Southern  African  Region 

— 

— 

— 

37.000 

— 

— 

— 

— 

37.000 

Swaziland 

7.900 

— 

0.442 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

8.392 

Tanzania 

— 

— 

1.272 

— 

0.075 

— 

— 

— 

1.347 

Zaire 

12.000 

15.000 

1.079 

15.000 

1.400 

15.000 

— 

— 

59.479 

Zambia 

— 

10.000 

— 

20.000 

— 

— 

— 

— 

30.000 

Zimbabwe 

15.000 

— 

— 

15.000 

0.150 

— 

— 

— 

30.150 

West  Africa 

Cameroon 

20.400 

_ 

0.821 

_ 

0.200 

— 

5.000 

_ 

26.421 

Cape  Verde 

2.000 

— 

3.680 

— 

0.060 

— 

— 

— 

5.740 

Chad 

5.000 

— 

0.909 

10.000 

0.150 

5.000 

— 

— 

21.059 

Congo 

1.000 

— 

— 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

1.050 

Equatorial  Guinea 

1.000 

— 

0.676 

— 

0.060 

— 

— 

— 

1.736 

Gabon 

_ 

_ 

— 

— 

0.100 

— 

— 

— 

0.100 

Gambia 

4.000 

_ 

1.099 

— 

0.060 

— 

— 

— 

5.159 

Ghana 

1.000 

— 

7.142 

— 

0.325 

— 

— 

— 

8.467 

Guinea 

2.600 

6.000 

0.304 

— 

0.100 

3.000 

— 

— 

12.004 

Guinea-Bissau 

2.000 

_ 

0.804 

— 

0.075 

— 

— 

— 

2.879 

Ivory  Coast 

_ 

— 

— 

— 

0.075 

— 

— 

— 

0.075 

Liberia 

14.500 

16.000 

0.109 

45.000 

1.200 

15.000 

— 

— 

91.809 

Niger 

18.000 

_ 

0.379 

7.000 

0.200 

5.000 

— 

— 

30.579 

Sao  Tome 

_ 

— 

0.163 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

0.163 

Senegal 

17.000 

8.000 

5.618 

15.000 

0.500 

3.000 

— 

— 

49.118 

Togo 

3.000 

— 

2.803 

— 

0.075 

— 

— 

— 

5.878 

Upper  Volta 

7.000 

— 

10.177 

— 

0.150 

— 

— 

— 

17.327 

Otf}er  Programs 

Africa  Civic  Action 

_ 

_ 

_ 

— 

— 

5.000 

— 

— 

5.000 

Africa  Regional 

51.499 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

51.499 

Economic  Policy  Initiative 

75.000 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

75.000 

Benin 

— 

_ 

1.869 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

1.919 

Burundi 

4.300 

— 

2.067 

— 

0.090 

— 

— 

— 

6.457 

Central  African  Republic 

2.000 

— 

0.167 

— 

0.100 

— 

— 

— 

2.267 

Comoros 

0.400 

— 

0.413 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

0.813 

Ethiopia 

_ 

_ 

3.711 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

3.711 

Mall 

10.000 

_ 

2.481 

— 

0.125 

— 

— 

— 

12.606 

Mauritania 

3.500 

_ 

6.221 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

9.771 

Rwanda 

5.500 

_ 

4.088 

— 

0.060 

— 

— 

— 

9.648 

Sahel  Region 

31.000 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

31.000 

Sierra  Leone 

1.300 

4.000 

1.644 

— 

0.050 

— 

— 

— 

6.994 

Uganda 

10.000 

— 

— 

— 

0.100 

— 

— 

— 

10.100 

Total 

348.199 

59.000 

69.884 

174.000 

6.180 

56.000 

10.000 

723.263 

36 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 

THE  SECRETARY 


News  Conference  of  March  20 


Secretary  Shultz  held  a  news  con- 
ference at  the  Department  of  State  on 
March  20,  IQSJ,.'' 

In  San  Salvador  a  few  weeks  ago,  I 
minced  no  words  in  saying  that  death 
squads  and  terror  have  no  place  in  a 
democracy.  The  time  has  come  to  be 
equally  blunt  about  what  needs  to  be 
done  here  in  Washington  to  prevent  new 
Cubas  in  Central  America. 

This  Administration,  the  last  Ad- 
ministration, and  a  12-member  bipartisan 
commission,  which  studied  Centi-al 
America  for  5  months,  have  all  concluded 
that  important  U.S.  interests  are  at 
stake.  If  regimes  responsive  to  Moscow 
and  Havana,  and  hostile  to  the  United 
States,  are  installed  in  Central  America, 
we  will  pay  a  high  price  for  a  long,  long 
time. 

The  irony  is  that  the  price  to  avoid 
new  Cubas  is  still  relatively  small  and 
that  we  can  still  pay  it  by  supi)orting  a 
pohcy  that  is  fully  consistent  with  our 
ideals  and  with  a  search  for  political  solu- 
tions. 

The  people  of  El  Salvador  vote  Sun- 
day for  president  and  vice  president.  The 
choices  are  real,  and  the  balloting  will  be 
fair.  The  outcome  is  not  a  foregone  conclu- 
sion. Whoever  takes  office  in  June  will 
have  the  legitimacy  of  proven  support 
from  the  people  of  El  Salvador.  We  and 
everyone  else  will  have  to  recognize  that 
fact  in  evaluating  our  policies  and  in- 
terests. 

The  election,  however,  is  not  being 
fought  just  among  candidates  who  have 
agreed  to  support  the  voters'  decision.  It 
is  being  violently  opposed  by  a  guerrilla 
minority  that  refuses  to  put  its  program 
to  the  test  of  the  ballot  box.  The  guer- 
rillas have  pulled  some  spectacular  raids, 
but  the  army  has  been  doing  what 
counts— protecting  the  cities,  the  harvest, 
and  the  people's  right  to  choose.  Despite 
an  upsurge  of  guerrilla  terrorism  against 
elected  officials,  civilian  deaths  from  all 
political  causes  for  the  month  of  February 
were  the  lowest  in  several  years— less 
than  one-third  those  of  February  a  year 
ago  and  one-tenth  those  of  3  to  4  years 
ago. 

There  is  nothing  unexpected  about 
the  need  for  more  aid  to  El  Salvador.  We 
knew,  and  the  Congress  knew,  that  the 
assistance  authorized  last  fall  would  run 
out  this  spring.  It  was  understood  that 
we  would  reevaluate  our  needs  after  the 
bipartisan  commission  had  made  its  find- 
ings. 


In  January,  the  bipartisan  commission 
recommended  unanimously  that  we  pro- 
vide El  Salvador  "significantly  increased 
levels  of  military  aid  as  quickly  as  possi- 
ble" [emphasis  in  original  report].  In 
February  the  President  sent  Congress  a 
supplemental  request  for  El  Salvador  as 
part  of  his  comprehensive  progi-am  to  im- 
plement the  bipartisan  commission's 
recommendations.  It  is  now  obvious  that 
Congress  will  not  act  on  this  legislation 
before  June  at  the  earliest,  and  deliveries 
will  take  time  after  that. 

Events  in  Central  America  simply 
will  not  wait  that  long.  There  is  a  gap 
between  what  is  needed  on  the  ground 
and  the  pace  of  the  legi-slative  calendar. 
So  we  identit"ied  what  is  needed  now  to 
help  El  Salvador  continue  on  its  chosen 
path  to  democracy  and  to  keep  the 
pressure  on  Nicaragua  to  negotiate. 

The  national  interest  is  clear.  I  call 
upon  the  Congress  to  approve  the  $93 
million  in  emergency  security  assistance 
for  El  Salvador  so  that  its  armed  forces 
can  protect  the  people  and  the  leaders 
they  choose.  And  I  also  call  upon  the  Con- 
gress to  recognize  the  validity  of  the 
struggle  of  those  Nicaraguans  who  are 
resisting  totalitarianism.  To  delay  these 
funds  is  to  hinder  prospects  for  peace  and 
negotiations,  to  prolong  suffering,  and  to 
strengthen  the  hand  of  our  adversaries. 

Q.  Do  you  intend  to  go  through  with 
the  Jordan  Stinger  sale  in  light  of  King 
Hussein's  recent  remarks? 

A.  First  of  all,  on  the  question  of  Jor- 
danian security,  we  support  the  impor- 
tance of  security  for  Jordan  and  our  other 
friends  in  the  Middle  East.  In  making 
that  effective,  of  course,  the  President 
takes  his  position,  and  we  have  to 
mobilize  congressional  support  for  any 
position  on  that  subject.  And  we  will  con- 
tinue to  work  with  the  Congress  to  find, 
in  every  way  we  can,  the  means  of  help- 
ing Jordan  make  itself  as  secure  as  possi- 
ble in  the  region.  Just  how  that  will  play 
itself  out  remains  to  be  seen,  but  our  ob- 
jective will  be  to  help  King  Hussein  and 
the  Jordanians  provide  for  their  security. 

Q.  Do  you  think  his  views  are,  in 
any  way,  symptomatic  of  other  coun- 
tries' views  about  U.S.  Middle  East 
policy,  other  countries  such  as  Saudi 
Arabia? 

A.  I  think  that,  obviously,  as  we  have 
not  achieved  the  results  that  we  sought  in 
Lebanon,  there  is  a  tendency  to  question 
us,  no  doubt  about  it. 


I  would  say,  insofar  as  Lebanon  is 
concerned,  that  the  wheel  continues  to 
turn.  We  don't  put  a  period  after 
Lebanon.  We're  there;  we  intend  to  re- 
main engaged.  I'd  say  we  put  a  comma 
there  or  maybe  a  semicolon.  The  United 
States  has  been  an  important  factor  in  the 
region  for  a  long  time  because  we  have 
important  interests  there  and  because  we 
have  been  a  factor  for  peace  and  because 
we  have  been  concerned  about  the  secu- 
rity interests  of  all  states  in  the  region. 

So  I  would  expect  that  while,  of 
course,  people  are  constantly  looking 
around  and  questioning  this,  that,  and  the 
other  factor,  that  in  the  end  the  essential- 
ity of  the  U.S.  role  will  be  apparent  to  all. 

Q.  King  Hussein  says  American 
policy  in  the  Middle  East  has  failed 
because  the  United  States  has  allegedly 
taken  Israel's  side  in  conflicts  with  the 
Arabs.  He  says  he  won't  participate  in 
the  Reagan  peace  initiative  as  a  result. 
Is  the  Administration  planning  any  new 
initiative  to  bring  Hussein  into  the 
talks,  including  possibly  putting  more 
pressure  on  Israel  to  stop  settlements 
activity? 

A.  I  think  it  has  to  be  clear  to  every- 
body that  from  the  U.S.  point  of  view,  we 
care  about  stability  and  peace  and  secu- 
rity in  the  region.  And  we  are  prepared 
to  help,  and  we  have  expended  a  lot  of 
energy  to  help.  But  primarily  it  is  up  to 
the  parties  in  the  region  to  find  their  way 
to  security  and  peace  and,  for  that  mat- 
ter, better  quality  of  life  goals  that 
everyone  seeks.  We're  there  to  help 
them. 

Somehow  or  other  we  have  to  get 
over  this  notion  that  every  time  things 
don't  go  just  to  everybodys'  satisfaction 
in  the  Middle  East,  il's  the  U.S.  fault  or 
it's  up  to  the  United  States  to  do 
something  about  it. 

We  are  active.  We  will  help.  But 
others  must  come  forward  as  well.  In  the 
end  any  solution  that  works  will  work 
primarily  because  the  parties  to  it  were 
out  there,  are  involved  in  it,  and  are 
determined  to  make  it  work. 

Q.  Do  you  share  to  any  degree  the 
view  that  Henry  Kissinger  expressed 
last  Sunday,  that  perhaps  this  is  the 
right  time  for  the  United  States  and  the 
Middle  East  to  do  nothing? 

A.  We  don't  do  nothing.  We  will  con- 
sult with  our  friends.  We  are,  of  course, 
active  in  providing  security  assistance 
and  economic  assistance  to  countries  in 
the  region.  So  we  will  be  doing  those 
things. 

King  Hussein  has  obviously  said  that 
he  doesn't  intend  to  step  forward  and 


May  1984 


37 


mmmmuuummtnm 


THE  SECRETARY 


start  a  process  of  negotiation  with  Israel 
in  the  near  future,  so  he  said  that.  We  ac- 
cept that.  On  the  other  hand,  we  will  con- 
tinue to  be  engaged,  and  we'll  be  pre- 
pared to  be  helpful  as  the  situation 
evolves. 

Q.  As  you  know.  King  Hussein  was 
central  to  the  President's  Middle  East 
peace  plan.  What,  if  anything,  is  left  of 
the  Reagan  plan  now,  and  what  hopes, 
if  any,  do  you  have  for  building  a  wider 
peace  in  the  region? 

A.  Obviously,  if  security  and  stability 
and  peace  in  the  Middle  East  are  to  be  at- 
tained, it  is  necessary  that  the  countries 
there  and  their  leaders  somehow  in  the 
end  sit  down  with  each  other  and  work 
out  the  conditions  under  which  those  ob- 
jectives will  be  achieved. 

As  far  as  the  President's  proposals 
are  concerned,  they  depend  upon  every- 
body, in  a  sense.  They  depend  upon  there 
being  a  process  of  negotiation.  But  the 
proposals  themselves,  in  their  own  terms, 
are  as  valid  today  as  they  were  when  the 
President  spelled  them  out.  And  so 
they're  there,  and  when  people  start  talk- 
ing about  an  agenda  for  a  greater  sense  of 
stability  and  peace  in  the  area,  I  suspect 
they're  going  to  come  back  and  talk  about 
these  same  ideas. 

Q.  What  hopes,  if  any,  do  you  have 
now  for  seeing  the  development  of  a 
wider  peace  in  the  region? 

A.  There  doesn't  seem  to  be  any  im- 
mediate—like this  month,  this  week— op- 
portunity for  things  to  move  forward  in  a 
genuinely  strong  way,  and  perhaps  for  a 
longer  time  than  that. 

Nevertheless,  as  I  already  said,  we'll 
continue  to  be  there.  We  work  through 
our  Ambassadors.  We  have  important 
security  and  economic  assistance  pro- 
grams. We'll  be  engaged  in  whatever 
develops  in  Lebanon.  Our  Ambassador 
there  is  contacted  by  everybody,  and  so 
on.  So  in  that  sense  we  will  just  have  to 
see  what  happens,  and  we'll  be  prepared 
for  it  as  it  comes. 

Q.  It's  not  clear  to  me  just  exactly 
what  it  is  you're  going  to  do  or  not  go- 
ing to  do  in  connection  with  the  Jorda- 
nian military  aid  package.  You  say 
you'll  have  to  continue  to  work  with 
the  Congress  and  see  how  it  will  play 
itself  out.  Are  you  or  are  you  not  plan- 
ning to  proceed  with  the  Stinger  sale, 
for  example? 

A.  The  President's  proposals  are 
before  the  Congress.  There  are  a  variety 
of  other  issues  that  have  been  raised  in 
the  Congress  that  have  to  do  with  sta- 
bility and  developments  in  the  Middle 


East,  particularly  the  proposal  that  the 
U.S.  Embassy  should  be  moved  to 
Jerusalem.  All  these  things  are  there,  and 
they're  being  discussed. 

My  point  is  that  the  President  has 
been,  and  remains,  committed  to  be 
helpful  to  helping  Jordan  in  its  security 
interests.  He's  put  forward  a  proposal.  I 
think  it's  fail'  to  say,  with  respect  to  the 
Stinger  that  you  asked  about,  that  the 
President  was  ready  to  put  on  a  major  ef- 
fort to  get  that  approved.  There's  no 
que.stion  about  the  fact  that  King 
Hussein's  statements  constitute  a  very 
serious  setback  to  the  chances  of  congres- 
sional approval  of  that. 

Nevertheless,  we'll  continue  to  work 
on  the  security  interests  and  all  of  these 
proposals  and  try  to  bring  about  a  result 
that  does  as  much  as  possible  to  achieve 
the  result  we  seek. 

Q.  You  mentioned  moving  the  em- 
bassy from  Tel  Aviv  to  Jerusalem.  If  the 
Senate  voted  to  do  that  do  you  think 
that  would  be  damaging  or  threatening 
to  U.S.  interests  in  the  Middle  East? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  it  would  be  very 
damaging.  The  question  of  Jerusalem,  of 
course,  involves  the  old  city  of  Jerusalem 
and  it  involves  the  deep  religious  sites 
and  connotations  of  that  city.  When  you 
touch  that,  you  touch  a  raw  nerve  run- 
ning across  the  Muslim  world  and,  for 
that  matter,  something  that  is  way 
beyond  political  matters  and  goes  into 
deep  religious  roots. 

So  I  think  that  it's  a  question  that  we 
would  do  well  to  stay  away  from.  And  so 
the  President  opposes  that.  I  oppose  that 
strongly,  as  does  the  President,  and  we 
hope  that  in  the  end  the  Congress  won't 
vote  that  way. 

I  might  take  note  of  the  fact  that  as  a 
constitutional  question,  this  is  not  the 
main  point;  but  as  a  constitutional  ques- 
tion, there  certainly  is  an  issue  about 
whether  or  not  it  is  the  prerogative  of 
Congress  to  say  where  an  embassy  will 
be  located. 

Q.  You  have  been  urged  by  a 
number  of  European  leaders  to  do 
something  to  resume  the  arms  control 
dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union.  You 
have  also  had  reports  of  meetings  be- 
tween your  Ambassador  in  Moscow  and 
your  meetings  with  Ambassador 
Dobrynin  here.  Are  there  any  signs  now 
that  the  arms  control  negotiations  will 
resume? 

A.  First  of  all,  there  are  many  arms 
control  negotiations  that  are  very  much  in 
process.  The  MBFR  [mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions]  talks  started  up  again  on 


March  16.  The  meeting  in  Stockholm,  the 
CDE  [Conference  on  Confidence-  and 
Security-Building  Measures  and  Disarma- 
ment in  Europe],  is  going  forward  and 
those  discussions  are  very  much  under- 
way. There  are  meetings  in  Geneva,  par- 
ticularly focusing  on  the  use  of  chemical 
weapons.  We  think  that's  a  very  impor- 
tant subject,  and  we  intend  to  put  for- 
ward, the  President  intends  to  put  for- 
ward, a  treaty  on  the  subject.  It's  a  mat- 
ter of  great  significance. 

There  ai-e  things  that  are  on  the 
periphery  of  arms  control,  such  as  the 
Hot-Line  discussion  that  are  going  for- 
ward and  there  are  others.  So  my  point  is 
that  when  you  talk  about  arms  control 
discussions,  there  are  many  of  them. 

I  presume  you're  speaking  of  the 
discussions  of  intermediate-range  nuclear 
weapons  and  strategic  nuclear  weapons. 
With  respect  to  those,  the  United  States 
has  strong  proposals  on  the  table,  forth- 
coming. Our  negotiators  have  been  there 
in  a  spirit  of  give-and-take,  and  we're 
prepared  to  resume  those  talks  at  any 
time.  I  have  no  indication  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  prepared  to  return  to  those 
talks. 

Q.  Have  you  had  a  chance  to  study 
the  communique  that  came  out  of 
Havana  last  night  between  the  Angolan 
President  and  Fidel  Castro,  and 
whether  that  seems  to  move  forward 
the  chances  for  bringing  about  a  solu- 
tion to  the  problems  in  southern  Africa? 

A.  That  communique  seems  to  in- 
dicate, fu-st  of  all,  that  the  Cubans  and 
the  Angolans  were  discussing  the  right 
subject,  namely,  Cuban  troop  withdrawal. 
I  think  that's  a  positive  development  if 
that  gets  underway. 

Certainly,  it's  connected,  as  they  said 
in  their  communique,  with  the  issue  of 
Namibian  independence,  which  we  seek. 
We  have  been  very  much  in  favor  of  the 
moves  going  on  in  the  region  in  which 
South  Africa  has  been  pulling  back  in  a 
general  kind  of  disengagement.  And  I 
think  also  most  significantly  the  agree- 
ment between  South  Africa  and  Mozam- 
bique last  Friday  was  a  historic  event. 

So  there  are  some  very  positive  signs 
in  Southern  Afi'ica.  And  if  the  outcome  of 
the  Angolan/Cuban  talks  is  that  there  is 
progi-ess  being  made  toward  Cuban  troop 
withdrawal,  I  think  that's  positive. 

Q.  There  are  some  obser\'ers  who 
think  that  the  most  imminent  threat  to 
stability  lies  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war  and 
the  possibility  now  that  Iran  may 
simply  overwhelm  Iraq.  Do  you  share 
that  view?  Secondly,  as  I  recall,  you 
once  indicated  that  this  was  an  area 
where  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


States  might  have  a  common  interest. 
Are  you  pursuing  the  opportunity  or,  if 
there  is  any,  to  deal  with  the  Soviet 
Union  on  trying  to  limit  the  effects  of 
that  war? 

A.  First  of  all,  on  the  Iran-Iraq  wai-,  it 
is  a  huge  tragedy  for  both  countries  with 
tremendous  losses,  really  just  a  slaugh- 
ter, and  you  can  only  weep  for  the  people 
involved. 

Second,  insofar  as  containing  it,  we 
and  others  have  worked  in  the  United 
Nations  and  in  other  diplomatic  ways  to 
keep  the  war  from  spreading  itself,  so  to 
speak,  into  third  countries  and  into  the 
gulf  itself,  as  has  sometimes  been 
threatened. 

The  United  States  and  our  friends  are 
determined  that  the  international  water- 
ways will  remain  open.  Insofar  as  the 
Soviet  Union  is  concerned,  various 
statements  have  been  made,  coming  out 
of  TASS  and  other  places,  about  what  our 
intentions  are,  and,  of  course,  we  have  let 
the  Soviet  Union  know  directly  what  our 
objectives  are  and  the  limits  of  them. 

Going  beyond  that,  it  is  our  opinion,  in 
view  of  the  basic  difficulty  of  closing  the 
strait,  that  in  one  way  or  another,  even  if 
an  effort  is  made,  it  will  be  manageable. 
It  will  not  be  possible  to  cause  a  genu- 
inely long-term  disruption  in  the  flow  of 
oil  supplies. 

Second,  that  we  now  have  on  hand, 
and  so  do  others  in  other  countries,  very 
large  stocks  deliberately  put  there  as  a 
matter  of  national  policy,  so  that  we're 
much  better  able  to  cope  with  any  short- 
term  interruption  that  may  come  about, 
and  to  see  to  it  that  that  doesn't  result  in 
a  major  explosion  in  the  oil  markets  and  a 
major  disruption  of  our  own  economy. 

The  point  is,  from  our  standpoint  and 
the  standpoint  of  the  West  generally, 
we're  working  hard  to  keep  this  problem 
in  manageable  proportions. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  about  El 
Salvador.  The  armed  forces  are  con- 
tinually on  the  defensive  against  guer- 
rilla troops.  There  continue  to  be 
charges  that  the  officials  are  linked  to 
the  death  squads  there.  In  Nicaragua 
the  continued  resistance  still  has  made 
only  what  the  State  Department  calls 
"tactical  changes"  in  the  Sandinista's 
behavior.  What  evidence  do  you  have 
that  additional  money  will  be  spent 
more  effectively  or  will  achieve  the 
goals  you  have  in  mind  for  that  region? 

A.  I  think  the  Salvador  Armed  Forces 
are  effective  and  have  been  basically  do- 
ing a  better  and  better  job.  One  recent 
piece  of  evidence  of  a  different  sort  than 
is  usually  cited  is  that  of  .some  260,  I  think 
it  is,  municipalities  where  ballot  bo.xes 
will  be  placed  for  the  election;  for  awhile 


it  was  thought  that  there  were  70  places 
where  you  couldn't  guarantee  the  secu- 
rity of  those,  due  to  guerrilla  activity. 
That  estimate  is  now  scaled  down  to 
around  20,  due  to  the  efforts  of  the  armed 
forces  to  secure  security  for  this  election. 
And  I  might  say  those  20  are  in  lightly 
populated  areas  and  provisions  ai"e  being 
made  so  that  people  there  can  vote. 

But  I  think  it  is  the  case  that  the 
Salvador  Armed  Forces  are  giving  a 
credible  account  of  themselves  and  will  do 
better  and  better  if  they  get  our  support. 
We  have  to  recognize  that,  granting  all  of 
the  difficulties  they  have,  it's  still  the  case 
that  we  have  a  process  here  in  our  sup- 
port for  them  of  creating  a  kind  of  max- 
imum of  uncertainty  in  their  minds  about 
what  the  flow  of  resources  is  going  to  be, 
and  that  causes  great  difficulties  in  plan- 
ning. And  take  the  situation  right  now— 
they  have  to  make  a  choice.  Do  we  take 
the  resources  we  have  and  operate  at  a 
very  meager,  low  level  so  as  to  stretch 
them  out,  or  do  we  say  we  have  to  go  all 
out  to  protect  this  election  and  spend 
what  we've  got  to  do  it  and  take  the 
chance  on  simply  running  out?  And  that's 
not  a  good  position  to  place  them  in. 

I  think  they're  giving  a  much  better 
account  of  themselves  than  the  nature  of 
your  question  implied. 

Q.  If  the  Congress  refuses  to  act  in 
a  timely  fashion  on  the  Admini- 
stration's request,  is  the  Administra- 
tion prepared  to  use  its  emergency 
powers— .506  determination.  Section 
21(d)— in  order  to  provide  aid  for  the 
Salvadoran  military? 

A.  Our  effort  is  to  get  the  Congi'ess  to 
vote  for  this  money— it's  needed— and 
that  is  our  concern,  and  I  think  that  it  is 
something  that  the  Congress  ought  to 
step  up  to  and  step  up  to  promptly,  and 
that's  where  we're  going  to  place  our  em- 
phasis. And  we  will  proceed  in  a  fashion 
in  which  we  expect  to  get  favorable  votes 
on  that  money. 

Q.  Over  the  weekend  the  United 
States  sent  some  AW  ACS  planes  to  the 
area  of  the  Sudan,  and  it's  reported 
that  a  warning  has  been  sent  to  Libya 
regarding  the  activities  in  the  Sudan. 
Could  you  tell  us  if  there  was  such  a 
warning,  what  were  they  warned  about, 
and  how  do  you  see  the  situation?  Is  it 
in  your  view,  the  Sudan,  part  of  some 
broader  attack,  perhaps  by  Ethiopia 
and  Libya,  as  has  been  claimed?  Is  it 
evidence  of  some  Libyan  activism? 
What  do  you  expect  to  happen  there? 

A.  We  have  sent  AWACS  to  the 
region  at  the  request  of  the  countries 
there.  It  is  a  fact  that  Libya  did  attack  in 


the  Sudan,  unprovoked  aggressive  behav- 
ior. It's  also  a  fact  that  Libya  apparently 
managed  an  act  of  terror  in  London,  or  at 
least  the  British  authorities  expelled 
some  Libyans  for  that,  and  perhaps  a 
related  attack  took  place  in  Chad  re- 
cently. 

We  see  a  pattern  of  behavior  on  the 
part  of  Libya  that  is  outside  the  pale  of  in- 
ternationally acceptable  behavior.  We 
have  sent  our  AWACS  to  the  region  at 
request,  and  they  are  there  in  a  support- 
ive role,  and  we  have  wanted  the  Libyans 
and  others  to  know  that  fact  and  to  know 
what  their  role  is. 

Q.  Did  the  United  States  send  a 
warning  to  Libya? 

A.  The  Libyans  should  know  that 
those  planes  are  there,  and  they  should 
not  be  interfered  with. 

Q.  Is  the  political  campaign  in  the 
United  States  now  affecting  the  im- 
plementation of  foreign  policy?  .4re  you 
fmding  out,  for  example,  that  countries 
such  as  the  Soviet  Union,  countries  in 
the  Middle  East  or  Central  America, 
wherever,  are  adopting  a  wait-and-see 
attitude  to  see  the  outcome  in 
November  before  they  commit  them- 
selves and,  in  fact,  you  yourself  are  be- 
ing thrust  into  a  holding  pattern? 

A.  At  first  when  you  started,  I  was 
going  to  say,  "What  political  campaign?" 
I  thought  you  were  talking  about  the  one 
in  El  Salvador,  and  there  does  seem  to  be 
a  tendency  in  the  Congress  to  want  to 
know  about  the  outcome  of  that  election. 

I  think  the  important  thing  is  to  focus 
on  the  electoral  process  itself— that's 
what  we  support— and  I  think  all  the  can- 
didates ought  to  be  in  a  position  of  sup- 
porting whoever  does  get  elected. 

In  terms  of  our  own  election,  people 
ai-e  debating  foreign  policy,  and  that's  all 
right.  But  I  hope  that  as  it  proceeds,  the 
broad  and  fundamental  thrust  of  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy,  which  has  great 
elements  of  continuity  in  it,  will  wind  up 
having  general  support  with  some  debate 
around  the  edges. 

The  purpose  of  the  bipartisan  commis- 
sion was  in  part  to  find  a  bipartisan  state- 
ment on  the  subject  of  Central  America, 
just  as  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  Scow- 
croft  commission  was -to  find  bipartisan 
support  for  the  modernization  of  the  triad 
of  forces  and  for  the  arms  control  ini- 
tiatives with  the  Congress  and  in  con- 
sultation with  our  allies,  as  the  case  may 
be. 

We  will  continue  to  work  at  it  that 
way  and  hope  that  partisan  considera- 
tions don't  wind  up  playing  a  part  in  our 
own  elections. 


May  1984 


39 


BBBBnBBDSBBBBlin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Are  you  finding  that  the 
Kremlin,  in  fact,  is  holding  off  on  INF 
and  strategic  arms  negotiations- 
holding  off  a  resumption— because  they 
do  not,  from  their  point  of  view,  want 
to  help  the  President  achieve  a  break- 
through in  arms  control? 

A.  Of  course,  I  don't  know  what  the 
considerations  in  the  Kremlin  are  about 
these  matters,  although  from  statements 
that  are  made,  it's  pretty  clear  that 
Ronald  Reagan  is  not  their  candidate  for 


President.  But  what  their  considerations 
are  in  holding  off  and  whether  they  will 
decide  to  come  back  to  the  negotiating 
tables  remains  to  be  seen. 

What  we  do  know  is  that  we  will  be 
there,  that  we  will  be  reasonable,  that  we 
will  continue  to  have  an  attitude  of  good 
faith  and  give-and-take  in  these  negotia- 
tions as  we  have  before. 


'Press  release  82.1 


Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
NBC-TV's  "Meet  the  Press"  on  April  1, 
198Jt,  by  Marvin  Kalb  and  Bill  Monroe, 
NBC  News;  Leslie  Gelb,  The  New  York 
Times;  Karen  DeYoung,  The  Washington 
Post;  a7id  John  Wallach,  Hearst 
newspapers.^ 

Q.  The  Senate  is  expected  to  pass  a 
$62  million  emergency  military  aid  bill 
for  El  Salvador,  but  there  is  talk  that 
the  House  could  delay  consideration  of 
it  until  mid-May,  until  after  the  runoff 
election  in  El  Salvador.  Would  that 
seriously  bother  you,  a  5-  or  6-week 
delay? 

A.  Yes,  it  would. 

Q.  Why? 

A.  Because  the  money  is  needed.  The 
money  supports  the  effort  of  the  Salvador 
Government  to  attain  a  secure  election 
and  to  protect  the  efforts  they're  making 
for  political  reform  and  economic  develop- 
ment. So  we  should  provide  those  funds, 
and  additional  funds,  and  do  it  promptly. 

Q.  Delaying  those  funds  would 
jeopardize  the  runoff  election? 

A.  Of  course,  because  they  are  close 
to  the  end  of  the  resources  they  have,  and 
if  you're  in  that  situation  as  a  military 
operation,  you  have  a  choice.  Do  you  just 
spend  everything  and  then  faU  off  a  cUff, 
or  do  you  piece  it  out  on  a  smaller  scale 
and  then  you  know  you're  not  going  to  be 
as  effective  as  you  could  be. 

We  have  a  stake  in  those  elections. 
We  have  a  stake  in  political  reform  in  El 
Salvador.  We  have  a  stake  in  economic 
development  in  that  country,  and  we 
ought  to  be  willing  to  step  up  to  it. 

Q.  Your  critics  say  that  the 
Salvadoran  Government  still  refuses  to 
prosecute  any  political  murderers,  that 
no  matter  who  is  elected,  the  army  is 


going  to  stay  in  control,  and  that  after 
3  years  left-wing  guerrillas  are  stronger 
than  ever.  They  are  saying,  in  effect, 
that  U.S.  policy  is  failing  and  that  more 
aid  would  be  wasted.  What  is  your 
answer  to  that? 

A.  Those  statements  are  just  false, 
across  the  board.  The  election  itself  is  one 
fact  that  is  hard  to  get  around,  and  the 
fact  that  the  election  was  held  under 
relatively  secure  conditions.  Certainly 
there  is  guerrilla  warfare  going  on  in  El 
Salvador,  but  the  situation  is  better  than 
it  has  been.  Certainly  there  are  problems 
insofar  as  the  system  of  justice  is  con- 
cerned, but  it  is  better  than  it  was,  and 
things  are  happening.  There  are  always 
some  setbacks.  There  was  one  just  here 
yesterday  that  we  don't  like.  So  there  are 
setbacks,  but  there  is  also  a  lot  of  prog- 
res.s. 

Q.  You  have  been  very  critical  in  re- 
cent weeks  of  the  role  of  Congress  in 
handling  foreign  policy,  saying  that  it 
is  making  it  virtually  impossible  for  the 
Administration  to  pursue  a  consistent 
course.  Congress  has  a  constitutional 
responsibility  and  right  to  declare  war 
and  be  involved  in  other  ways.  If  you 
were  a  senator  who  strongly  disagreed 
with  Administration  policy,  how  would 
you  want  to  express  your  differences? 

A.  I  would  say  so,  and  I  think  that  ob- 
viously there— the  problem  is  what  is  the 
right  interaction  between  the  President 
and  the  Congress  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  policy?  Both  are  naturally  vitally 
concerned  with  a  topic  of  this  kind.  So  it 
is  appropriate  to  have  a  way  to  debate, 
and  certainly  in  our  democracy  people 
will  criticize.  But  it  is  also  important  that 
we  have  a  capacity  to  be  decisive  and 
then  to  carry  through  on  the  decisions 
that  we  make,  so  that  we  have  a  chance  to 
be  consistent  and  have  a  constancy  to 


what  we  do.  And  the  situation  that  we're 
in  right  now,  I  don't  say  that  it  is  imposs- 
ible, but  I  think  it  makes  it  difficult 
because  there  is  very  little  capacity  to  be 
decisive.  And  you  have  to  be  decisive  if 
you're  going  to  manage  anything  well. 

Q.  When  Congrress  expresses  its 
view  by  a  majority  you  get  one  view,  for 
example,  on  the  importance  of  civil 
rights  in  Central  .America.  This  Ad- 
ministration has  been  very  inconsistent 
on  many  policies  too,  just  like  Congress 
has.  Why  is  the  Administration  in- 
herently more  right  in  what  it  wants  to 
do  in  Lebanon  or  Central  America  than 
Congress'  approach? 

A.  I  don't  think  the  Administration 
has  been  inconsistent,  but  that  is  not 
really  what  I'm  driving  at.  What  I'm  driv- 
ing at  is  to  have  a  capacity  to  make  a  deci- 
sion, and  then  have  that  decision  stick 
and  have  a  chance  for  it  to  work  and  to  be 
carried  through.  That's  the  problem. 

Q.  Going  back  to  Central  America 
directly  for  just  a  moment,  there  ap- 
peared to  be  some  confusion  last  week 
in  Administration  statements  over  the 
extent  to  which  U.S.  military  aid  was 
falling  into  the  hands  of  leftist  rebels 
there  and  also  the  extent  to  which  U.S. 
military  advisers  were  involved  in  com- 
bat situations.  Could  you  perhaps 
clarify  how  much  of  our  military  aid  is 
going  to  the  rebels  in  El  Salvador? 

A.  Hardly  any,  in  proportionate 
terms,  of  the  aid  that  we  provide  falls  into 
the  hands  of  the  guerrillas.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  terms  of  the  materiel  that  they 
have  at  hand,  a  portion  of  it  is  captured. 
The  confusion  came  from  a  statement  that 
was  made  about,  I  think,  50%  of  the  arms 
that  the  guerrillas  had  coming  from  what 
was  captured,  or  otherwise  obtained. 
That  statement  reflected  only  a  very 
small  period  of  time  in  a  segment  of  El 
Salvador. 

As  the  facts  are  as  I  understand 
them,  and  nobody  can  know  precisely,  but 
only  a  fraction  of  the  arms  that  the  guer- 
rillas have  comes  from  what  is  captured, 
and  a  very  small  fraction,  like  probably 
less  than  10%,  of  the  supplies  come  from 
that.  That  is,  the  ammunition  and  the  pro- 
visions, and  so  forth. 

Q.  Mr.  Ikle  [Under  Secretary  of 
Defense  for  Policy  Fred  C.  Ikle],  in  his 
testimony  I  think  said  more  than  40% 
of  the  arms  that  the  guerrillas  had 
came  from— 

A.  Yes,  that's  what  I  said.  That  state- 
ment was  a  description  of  what  was  found 
out  over  a  very  small  period  of  time  in  a 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


small  part  of  El  Salvador  and  is  not 
characterization  of  the  overall  situation, 
which  is  as  I've  tried  to  describe  it. 

Q.  Could  you  make  a  percentage 
characterization  of  the  overall  situa- 
tion? 

A.  It's  hard  to  give  a  number.  1  said 
in  terms  of  the  essential  flow  right  now, 
which  is  ammunition  and  supplies  of  one 
kind  or  another,  as  far  as  I  know  the 
number  is  less  than  10%.  The  weapons 
and  things  of  that  kind,  mostly  they  have 
those.  So  that  is  not  as  much  of  a  problem 
for  them. 

Q.  Former  President  Nixon,  who  is 
hardly  a  left-wing  critic  of  this  Ad- 
ministration, yesterday  said  that 
without  a  new  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  there  is  no  chance  for 
peace  to  survive  in  the  world.  The  im- 
passe between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviets  is  as  big  as  ever.  If  you  could  sit 
down  with  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
today  what  would  you  tell  him? 

A.  I've  sat  down  with  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  quite  a  few  times,  and 
we've  had  a  sometimes  tempestuous, 
sometimes  straightforward,  and  here  and 
there  reasonably  constructive  discussions 
across  a  broad  range  of  issues.  I  think  it 
is  very  important  for  the  United  States  to 
continue  to  do  what  it  is  doing,  namely,  to 
be  careful  that  we  keep  our  strength,  not 
only  our  military  strength  but  our 
economic  strength,  and  our  resolve  and 
strength  of  purpose,  but  also  to  be  in  a 
posture  of  reasonableness  and  to  be 
testing  and  probing  all  the  time  to  find 
substantive  areas  of  significance  that  the 
Soviet  Union  may  want  to  work  out  prob- 
lems with  us  on. 

Q.  Your  critics  charge  that  precisely 
in  that  order,  you  put  the  priority  on 
building  America's  defense  and  you 
relegate  to  a  lower  priority  improving 
relations  with  the  Soviets.  Substan- 
tively, is  there  anything  that  the  United 
States  could  do  or  should  do  now  to 
prove  that  it  really  wants  a  more  mean- 
ingful dialogue  with  the  Soviets? 

A.  Let  me  comment  first  about  the 
importance  of  paying  close  attention  to 
our  own  national  security  interests.  The 
day  we  decide  that,  that  those  interests 
have  a  low  priority,  is  the  day  we  go 
down  the  drain.  We  have  to  be  ready  to 
defend  ourselves,  and  make  no  mistake 
about  it. 

As  far  as  the  priorities  are  concerned, 
I  think  it  is  kind  of  an  artificial  thing  in  a 
sense,  because  the  two  things  go  to- 
gether, without  a  doubt.  It  is  the  fact  that 
we're  strong  that  gives  us  a  chance  to 


deal  effectively  with  the  Soviet  Union.  If 
we  were  weak,  there  would  be  very  little 
going  for  us  in  any  negotiations,  so  the 
two  things  go  together. 

Q.  But  isn't  the  problem  that  this 
Administration  hasn't  dealt  with  the 
Soviet  Union?  As  the  Democrats  in  one 
of  their  ads  point  out,  showing  every 
President  since  General  Eisenhower, 
this  is  the  first  Administration  that 
hasn't  reached  an  arms  control  agree- 
ment with  the  Russians. 

A.  One  of  the  greatest  mistakes  you 
can  make  in  any  negotiation  is  to  get 
yourself  in  a  position  where  the  other  side 
can  see  that  you  need  an  agreement  and  it 
doesn't,  and  as  soon  as  they've  got  you 
there,  they'll  squeeze  you  to  death.  So  I 
think  the  President  has  been  absolutely 
right  to  keep  his  cool,  be  calm  about  it  but 
also  to  be  reasonable.  The  positions  we 
have  on  the  table  aci-oss  the  board  of  a 
vei-y  wide  range  of  things  we're  discuss- 
ing with  the  Soviet  Union  are  reasonable 
positions,  and  we're  there  in  a  spirit  of 
give  and  take.  But  we're  not  there  in  a 
spirit  of  give  away  the  store,  and  that's 
what  you  have  to  be  careful  about. 

Q.  Two  or  3  months  ago,  you,  the 
President,  and  the  entire  Administra- 
tion were  saying  that  the  presence  of 
Armed  forces  in  Lebanon  was  the  key 
to  stability  in  Lebanon,  as  well  as  the 
key  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  Now 
the  United  States  has  ended  its  involve- 
ment with  the  multinational  force. 
Were  you  wrong  2  months  ago  and  right 
now,  right  then,  wrong  now?  It's  hard 
to  imagine  both. 

A.  I  think  it  is  correct  to  say  that 
what  has  happened  in  Lebanon  is  a  disap- 
pointment to  us.  We  have  important  in- 
terests there  and  important  interests  in 
the  Middle  East.  I  think  those  interests 
would  have  been  advanced  had  we  been 
able  to  bring  about,  or  help  others  bring 
about  with  our  help,  the  sort  of  objectives 
that  we  sought.  We'll  continue  to  seek 
those  objectives.  They're  just  as  impor- 
tant now  as  they  have  been,  but  we'll 
have  to  change  our  tactics. 

Q.  Change  tactics,  but  isn't  it  a 
radical  step  to  put  such  a  tremendous 
emphasis  just  a  few  short  weeks  ago  on 
the  presence  of  the  Marines  there,  and 
the  importance  of  that  presence,  and  to- 
day to  make  the  absence  of  the  Marines 
seem  almost  a  virtue? 

A.  We're  not  making  it  a  virtue.  I 
think  that  the  existence  of  U.S.  staying 
power  and  forcefulness  was  an  important 
ingredient,  and  if  we  could  have  main- 
tained it  in  a  strong  fashion,  perhaps  the 
results  would  be  different  than  they  are 
today. 


Q.  So  the  pulling  out  of  the  forces 
indicated  a  lack  of  resolve?  What  is  the 
other  side  of  the  coin  then? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  you  mean  by 
the  other  side  of  the  coin. 

Q.  If  the  presence  would  have 
demonstrated  credibility  and  consist- 
ency in  policy,  what  does  it  mean  to 
pull  the  forces  out?  A  lack  of  credibil- 
ity, a  lack  of  consistency? 

A.  There  is  a  lack  of  credibility  in  pull- 
ing the  forces  out,  or  an  apparent  lack  of 
credibility,  and  we  have  suffered  a  lot  for 
that  in  the  Middle  East.  Now,  what  we 
set  out  to  do  was  to  redeploy  the  Marines, 
and  I  think  it  was  a  very  sensible  move, 
to  redeploy  the  Marines,  putting  them  on 
ships,  and  at  the  same  time  to  take  even 
further  measures  to  help  the  Lebanese 
Armed  Force  develop  itself  and  also, 
given  the  way  the  situation  in  Beirut  was 
shifting,  in  which  terrorism  was  rising  as 
a  threat  to  everybody,  including 
ourselves,  to  put  much  more  emphasis  on 
training  and  efforts  to  deal  with  the  ter- 
rorist threat. 

As  that  process  was  unfolding,  the 
situation  in  Lebanon  sort  of  deteriorated. 
So  the  redeployment  that  we  had  in  mind 
never  really  quite  matei-ialized.  But  it  is  a 
problem  to  have  a  terrorist  act  pei'- 
petrated  against  the  United  States  and 
then  to  have  all  of  this  second  guessing 
and  changing  of  mind  on  the  part  of  the 
Congress,  no  doubt  reflecting  many 
people's  views,  and  having  the  Marines 
then  leave.  We've  got  to  be  clear  with 
ourselves  about  that. 

Q.  Thirty-seven  senators,  211  con- 
gressmen. Senator  Gary  Hart,  former 
Vice  President  Mondale,  all  favor  a 
shift  in  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Israel  from 
Tel  Aviv  to  Jerusalem.  The  President 
has  suggested,  but  he  has  not  made  it 
entirely  clear,  that  he  would  veto  any 
legislation  requiring  such  a  shift. 
Would  he,  in  fact,  veto  it? 

A.  I  think  the  main  point  is  that  those 
who  are  advocating  that  shift  I  can't 
believe  have  really  thought  the  matter 
over  very  cai-efully.  It  would  not  serve 
the  intei-ests  of  the  United  States  to  move 
our  embassy.  It  would  be  a  gigantic  ag- 
gravation to  important  religions,  par- 
ticularly the  Muslims,  the  Islamic 
religion,  and  it  would  thereby  damage  the 
interests  of  the  United  States.  It  would 
damage  our  ability  to  be  effective  in  the 
peace  process,  and  so  I  think  in  a  general 
way  would  be  a  mistake;  a  bad  move  to 
make.  That  is  the  point,  and  I'm  glad  to 
say  that  the  President  has  kept  his  head 
about  him  in  all  this  and  is  staying  with 
that  position. 


May  1984 


mmmummuumnmmmfmnu.mm 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Would  the  President  veto  legisla- 
tion requiring  such  a  shift? 

A.  I  can  tell  you  that  the  President  is 
very  much  opposed  to  it  and  will  not 
move  that  embassy.  What  he  will  do  in  a 
particular  piece  of  legislation,  I  don't 
think  it  is  wise  for  me  to  predict,  but  I 
know  that  he'll  oi)pose  that  move.  He  has 
said  so  publicly,  and  he  also  said  it  to  me 
in  our  private  conversations. 

Q.  Even  if  such  legislation  passes, 
whether  or  not  there  is  a  veto,  he  would 
find  a  way  not  to  move  the  embassy. 

A.  I  think  first  of  all  it  would  be  very 
bad  for  the  United  States  if  such  legisla- 
tion passes,  even  if  it  doesn't  become  law, 
even  if  the  President  vetoes  it,  even  if  he 
refuses  to  move  the  embassy.  It's  a  very 
bad  signal  across  the  world  if  something 
like  that  takes  place.  And  my  impression 
is  that  people  in  the  Congi-ess  are  more 
and  more  having  second  thoughts  about 
this  and  looking  around  for  some  way  in 
which  they  might  defuse  this  issue. 

Q.  You  said  a  moment  ago  that  it 
was  Congress  that  changed  its  mind  on 
Lebanon.  But  isn't  it  also  true  that 
there  were  changes  of  mind  within  the 
Administration  itself,  condemning 
people  who  wanted  to  call  for 
withdrawal  in  Congress  and  then 
deciding  on  withdrawal  of  the  Ad- 
ministration itself?  And  didn't  you. 
yourself,  oppose  this  precipitous  kind  of 
withdrawal? 

A.  There  are  many  views  within  the 
Administration  on  most  topics,  and  I 
think  that's  healthy,  that  there's  a  good 
strong  debate.  By  the  time  the  President 
made  the  decision  he  made,  the  situation 
itself  had  changed  a  lot.  One  of  the 
reasons  why  it  changed  was  that  it  was 
perfectly  apparent  to  the  Syrians,  by 
reading  our  newspapers  and  watching  our 
television  reporting  accurately  on  what 
was  taking  place  in  the  Congress,  that  all 
they  had  to  do  was  keep  pushing  and 
pretty  soon  the  United  States  would,  as 
they  said,  be  short  of  breath  and  would 
drop  out.  And  that  changed  the  situation, 
that  perception. 

Q.  This  raises  a  broader  and  more 
fundamental  question.  Presidents  for 
the  last  two  decades  have  been  com- 
plaining about  Congress— Democratic 
Presidents  and  Republican  Presidents. 
What's  the  problem  here?  Is  it  with  the 
product,  the  policy  itself?  Or  the  proc- 
ess? Is  the  process  fundamentally 
flawed  ? 

A.  I  think  there  will  be  tension,  and 
that  was  the  objective  of  having  a  system 
of  checks  and  balances  that's  built  into 
our  Constitution.  And  1  think  it's  good. 


And  we  should  debate  these  things.  I  do, 
however,  beheve  that  there  has  to  be  in 
this  process,  in  the  end,  a  capacity  for 
decisiveness.  And  once  a  decision  is  made, 
to  allow  that  decision  to  be  implemented 
and  carried  forward  in  a  consistent  way. 

We  can't  be  always  creating  the 
image,  "Well,  we  decided  this  today,  but 
a  week  from  now  maybe  we'll  have 
another  vote  and  have  a  different  out- 
come. 

Q.  Did  the  Administration  show 
decisiveness  in  Lebanon  just  because 
there  were  newspaper  articles  in  the 
press  and  some  questioning  in  Con- 
gress? Why  didn't  you  stick  it  out 
anyway? 

A.  We  did  stick  it  out  until  it  was  ap- 
parent that  the  situation  had  changed  to 
the  point  where  the  kind  of  redeployment 
I  described  a  moment  ago  was  the  sensi- 
ble way  to  proceed.  However,  over  the 
preceding  months,  as  one  could  see  by 
following  the  negotiations  going  on,  it  was 
the  uncertainty  created  by  the  situation 
in  the  United  States  that  helped.  I  don't 
say  it  was  totally  responsible,  but  helped 
to  change  the  situation. 

Q.  Under  the  general  subject  of 
chemical  weapons,  a  prominent  scien- 
tist last  week  claimed  that  he  had 
gathered  material  in  Southeast  Asia 
proving,  as  far  as  he  was  concerned, 
that  what  the  Administration  had 
claimed  was  yellow  rain  used  against 
people  in  Southeast  Asia  was,  in  fact, 
bee  excrement.  Is  there  any  possibility 
that  any  of  the  samples  originally  col- 
lected by  the  Administration  were,  in 
fact,  bee  excrement? 

A.  This  keeps  coming  up  from  time  to 
time  from  various  scientists;  these  points 
have  been  investigated  very  thoroughly. 
This  has  been  gone  into  in  great  detail. 
It's  been  examined  by  our  NATO  allies, 
by  people  all  around  the  world,  and  I 
don't  think  there  is  any  real  question 
about  the  fact  that  chemical  warfare  was 
used  in  Southeast  Asia,  it  has  been  used 
in  Afghanistan,  and  that's  a  tragedy.  We 
see  that  it  is  also  being  used  in  the  Iran- 
Iraq  war,  and  I  don't  think  there's  any 
question  about  that.  So  the  problem  of  the 
use  of  chemical  weapons  is  a  very  serious 
problem.  And  we  shouldn't  trivialize  it 
with  this  kind  of  nickel  and  diming  of 
what  are  validated,  firm  findings.  And 
we'd  better  concentrate  on  doing  every- 
thing we  can  to  keep  this  problem  under 
control. 

Q.  I  know  you're  deeply  concerned 
about  the  issue  of  state-supported  ter- 
rorism, particularly  the  kind  that  Iran 
and  Syria  exported  to  Lebanon.  The 


United  States  has  tried  to  cover  up  but, 
I  guess,  made  not  much  of  a  secret  of 
the  provision  of  mines  to  the  rebels 
fighting  the  Sandinistas  in  Nicaragua. 
In  fact,  also  providing  maps  of  the 
depths  and  channels  of  the  ports.  Isn't 
that  the  same  thing?  Isn't  that  state- 
supported  terrorism? 

A.  As  far  as  Nicaragua  is  concerned, 
Nicaragua  has  a  problem,  because  it  has 
stolen  its  own  revolution.  It  has  not  been 
true  to  what  it  set  out  to  do.  So  it  has 
created,  within  its  own  country,  people 
who  are  bitterly  disappointed  at  what  is 
happening  in  that  country.  They've  also 
been  persecuting  people,  like  the  Meskito 
Indians.  There  are  refugees— there  are 
100,000  of  them  in  Costa  Rica.  vSo  they've 
created  a  problem  for  themselves  and  a 
reaction.  And  they're  having  to  live  with 
it. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  about  Senator 
Hart's  suggestion  that  the  United 
States  should  pull  out  of  Central 
America? 

A.  It's  ridiculous.  My  gosh,  this  is  an 
area  of  vital  significance  to  the  United 
States.  It's  an  area  where  we're  on  the 
right  side  of  things,  where  we  are 
supporting  democracy,  where  we're  sup- 
porting the  rule  of  law,  where  there  are 
lots  of  people  whom  we  want  to  help  in 
their  economic  development,  and  we'd 
better  stick  with  it. 


'  Press  release  108  of  Apr.  9,  1984.1 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

■BHHI 


AFRICA 


FY  1985  Foreign  Assistance  Requests 
for  Sub-Sahara  Africa 


by  Princeton  Lyman 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  February  7,  198i.  Mr. 
Lyman  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
present  to  this  committee  the  underlying 
philosophy  and  objectives  of  the  Ad- 
ministration's proposals  for  assistance  to 
Africa  in  FY  1985  and  for  the  FY  1984 
supplemental  request  for  additional  food 
aid  to  Africa. 


Overview 

Our  Africa  policy  is  an  activist  one,  based 
on  an  appreciation  of  the  importance  of 
the  continent  to  the  United  States.  We 
are  involved  in  joint  efforts  with  others— 
our  allies,  international  financial  institu- 
tions, and,  most  importantly,  African 
states  themselves— to  promote  Africa's 
development  and  progress.  We  do  not 
delude  ourselves  into  believing  that  we 
are  the  only  actor  on  this  stage.  Rather 
we  are  aware  that  we  must  work  with 
others  in  cooperative  ventures.  In  fact,  as 
you  know,  the  United  States  is  not  the 
principal  bilateral  donor  to  Africa.  We 
rank  behind  France  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  The  World  Bank 
contributes  more  than  we  do.  All  of  this 
places  a  high  priority  on  donor  coordina- 
tion, a  principal  focus  of  the  Economic 
Policy  Initiative  (EPI)  which  we  are  pro- 
posing in  this  budget  and  which  I  will  ex- 
plain further  in  a  few  moments. 

Our  activities  are  multifaceted.  We 
are  prepared  to  use  our  diplomatic  skills, 
where  possible,  to  lessen  regional  ten- 
sions in  Africa,  tensions  which  can  be  ex- 
ploited by  our  own  adversaries  for  their 
own  purposes  and  to  the  detriment  of 
peace  in  Africa.  Our  efforts  within  the 
contact  group  to  bring  Namibia  to  in- 
dependence under  the  terms  of  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  435,  to  pro- 
mote peace  among  the  states  of  southern 
Africa,  and  to  enhance  the  possibilities  for 
peaceful  change  within  South  Africa  are 
important  examples  of  our  diplomatic  ap- 
proach. 

We  also  realize,  as  does  this  commit- 
tee, that  tangible  resources  must  be  com- 
mitted by  the  United  States  to  promote 


development  and  stability  in  Africa.  Our 
assistance  efforts  cover  a  broad  spectrum 
from  short-term  emergency  food  and 
disaster  relief  to  longer  range  develop- 
mental programs,  from  economic  assist- 
ance to  security  assistance.  We  see  all  of 
these  efforts  as  part  of  a  unified  approach 
which  recognizes  the  interrelatedness  of 
Africa's  developmental  concerns. 

A  principal  focus  of  our  concern  and 
efforts  is  the  economic  situation  which  ex- 
ists today  in  Africa.  While  the  word 
"crisis"  is  often  overutilized,  it  is  not  an 
exaggeration  to  talk  about  an  African 
economic  crisis  which  has  profound 
political  and  social  impacts  on  all  Africans. 
This  is  not  solely  the  view  of  the  United 
States  Government.  It  is  equally  the  view 
of  the  Organization  of  African  unity 
(OAU),  the  statement  of  African  leaders 
in  the  Lagos  plan  of  action,  the  African 
Development  Bank,  the  World  Bank, 
other  major  donors,  and,  most  important 
of  all,  virtually  are,  to  be  sure,  shadings  of 
emphasis  and  different  stresses  on  what 
should  be  done  but  none  question  the 
seriousness  of  the  situation  and  the  need 
for  major  changes  in  policy.  We  do  not 
claim  to  have  the  ultimate  answers,  but 
we  are  determined  to  play  a  constructive 
and  activist  role  in  searching  for  solu- 
tions. 

Numbers  sometimes  have  a  deaden- 
ing effect  on  real  perceptions,  and  nothing 
has  a  greater  impact  than  seeing 
something  personally.  I  have  spent  the 
past  20  years  working  on  development, 
the  last  12  on  African  problems,  have 
lived  there  and  visited  frequently.  The 
contrast  between  what  is  taking  place  in 
Africa  and  elsewhere  in  the  world  is  pro- 
foundly disturbing  and  the  situation 
shows  little  sign  of  improving.  During  the 
decade  of  the  1970s,  a  time  of  boom  for 
many,  per  capita  income  in  almost  all 
African  countries  declined.  At  the  end  of 
the  decade,  average  per  capita  income 
was  $411,  and  for  the  low  income  coun- 
tries it  was  much  less.  Food  production 
per  capita  declined  by  10%  over  the 
decade.  The  1980s  have  begun  no  better. 
In  1981  and  1982,  GDP  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa,  excluding  Nigeria,  grew  by 
less  than  2%.  If  one  includes  Nigeria,  the 
growth  rate  was  about  zero.  This  means 
that  per  capita  income  is  still  dropping  in 
the  1980s  and  in  some  cases  plummeting. 
Food  production  continues  to  stagnate 


and  food  imports  to  grow,  but  the  latter  is 
no  solution  in  the  absence  of  adequate 
foreign  exchange  to  pay  for  imports. 

In  a  report  issued  last  year,  the 
Economic  Commission  for  Africa  stated 
that:  "The  picture  that  emerges  from  the 
analysis  of  the  perspective  of  the  African 
region  by  the  year  2008  under  the 
historical  trend  scenario  is  almost  a 
nightmare." 

It  is  always  appealing  to  search  for  a 
single  "villain,  "  just  as  it  is  natural  to 
look  for  a  signal  panacea,  but  both  rarely 
exi.st,  and  they  certainly  don't  apply  to 
Africa.  Drought,  world  recession,  high  in- 
terest rates,  and  deteriorating  terms  of 
trade  have  all  contributed  to  the  current 
crisis,  and  there  is  the  temptation  to 
blame  calamities  on  outside  forces.  The 
truth  is  probably  more  blurred.  Certainly 
external  factors  have  had  a  major  impact 
though  world  economic  recovery  will  help 
in  this  regard.  However,  the  key  to 
change  in  Africa  remains  the  domestic 
economic  policy  framework  in  each  coun- 
try. 

I  agree  with  the  World  Bank  which 
characterized  the  African  economic  crisis 
overwhelmingly  as  a  production  crisis.  To 
quote:  "It  is  a  crisis  which  has  arisen 
from  the  widespread  adoption  of  struc- 
tures of  prices  and  incomes  which  have 
provided  inappropriate  production  incen- 
tives. In  particular  they  have  provided  in- 
adequate incentives  to  agricultural  pro- 
ducers and  this  has  been  aggi-avated  by 
the  development  of  costly  and  inefficient 
marketing  systems  for  both  inputs  and 
outputs." 

None  of  this  is  intended  to  minimize 
the  extent  of  the  inherent  difficulties 
Africans  face  in  the  task  of  national 
development.  Africa  is  diverse  and  vast. 
It  is  a  region  of  Balkanized  economics 
almost  all  with  vei-y  limited  internal 
markets,  with  unbalanced  resource  bases 
which  can  often  only  be  linked  by  very 
high-cost  transport. 

Measured  by  the  balance  of  payments, 
debts,  production  levels,  and  other 
economic  indicators,  1983. probably  pro- 
duced few  positive  signs.  However,  we  do 
see  significant  though  gradual  changes  in 
attitudes  and  policies  which,  we  believe, 
hold  great  hope  for  the  future.  Whether 
one  is  talking  about  Somalia,  Senegal, 
Sudan,  Guinea,  Zambia,  Ghana,  Zaii-e,  or 
Mali;  to  name  only  a  few,  there  is  a  search 


May  1984 


AFRICA 


for  new  and  pragmatic  policies  which  are 
less  ideological  and  more  effective.  This  is 
reflected  in  more  realistic  exchange  rates, 
changes  in  pricing  policies  to  allow 
greater  income  for  farmers  and  other  pro- 
ducers, cutbacks  in  government  expen- 
ditures which  do  not  advance  develop- 
ment, and  many  other  actions,  all  de- 
signed to  change  the  economic  situation. 
The  process  is  slow  and  painful,  and  it 
takes  great  political  courage  for  many 
governments  to  initiate  these  changes. 
This  is  particularly  true  because  Africa's 
present  economic  problems  are  cumula- 
tive and  complex.  The  process  is,  none- 
theless, underway  in  many  African  coun- 
tries, and  it  is  one  to  which  we  should 
lend  support 

Economic  Assistance 

Our  specific  economic  and  security 
assistance  proposals  are  carefully  con- 
structed to  complement  each  other  to  the 
degree  possible  and  to  respond  to  Africa's 
most  pressing  needs.  Thus  our  food  pro- 
grams address  immediate,  often  emer- 
gency, requirements,  but  local  currencies 
which  some  of  these  programs  generate 
are  used  for  economic  development,  and 
policy  reform  requirements  are  tied  to 
certain  of  the  non-emergency  programs. 
We  are  requesting  separately  a  $90 
million  supplemental  for  this  fiscal  year 
for  emergency  food  assistance  for  Africa. 
It  is  our  judgment  that  this  is  sufficient  to 
meet  our  share  of  pending  requests. 

Development  assistance  in  Africa  is  a 
major  instrument  for  progress  and  for  im- 
proved economic  management.  Economic 
support  funds  (ESF)  are  used  both  for 
long-term  development  and  for  shorter- 
term  support  to  countries  of  particular 
importance  to  the  United  States.  Military 
equipment  and  training  programs  foster 
stability  and  security  in  threatened 
friendly  countries.  Five  of  every  six 
dollars  of  aid  we  give  to  Africa  is 
economic  rather  than  military.  This  is  not 
to  suggest  that  the  security  assistance  is 
less  relevant  but  rather  that  the  conti- 
nent's needs  are  overwhelmingly 
economic. 

In  PL  480  for  FY  1985,  we  are  re- 
questing $148.5  million  for  the  Title  I  con- 
cessional sales  program  and  $83.2  million 
for  Title  II  humanitarian  food  aid  (plus 
emergency  food  aid).  These  levels  repre- 
sent an  increase  of  12%  in  Title  I  and  a 
decrease  in  Title  II  from  the  much  higher 
levels  emerging  for  1984  as  the  full  scope 
of  Africa's  immediate  food  crisis  emerges. 
We  are  hopeful  that  the  drought  will 
break  by  FY  1985.  If  it  does  not,  we  ex- 
pect to  be  back  for  additional  Title  II 
resources  at  that  time. 


Our  FY  1985  request  for  development 
assistance  for  sub-Saharan  Africa  totals 
$355.2  million,  including  the  Sahel  pro- 
gram. This  is  a  12.5%  increase  over  the 
1983  level  and  a  2.5%.  increase  over  the 
current  year.  This  figure  does  not  include 
the  $75  million  of  development  assistance 
requested  as  initial  year  funding  for  the 
Economic  Policy  Initiative  for  Africa. 

We  are  requesting  $391.5  million  in 
economic  support  funds  for  FY  1985,  an 
increase  of  47%  over  1983  and  of  16%  over 
the  current  year  level.  As  Africa's 
economic  crisis  grows  deeper,  the  need 
for  flexible  assistance  gi'ows  greater.  In 
Africa,  ESF  is  generally  used  to  deter 
critical  economic  deterioration  in  coun- 
tries of  particular  importance  to  the 
United  States.  Depending  on  the  country 
context,  ESF  can  be  used  for  direct  finan- 
cial support,  for  commodity  imports,  or 
for  developmental  activities. 

For  instance,  our  ESP  support  in 
Djibouti,  which  is  of  strategic  interest  to 
us  and  to  our  Western  allies,  funds 
development  activities  in  fisheries,  skills 
training,  health,  nutrition,  and  housing. 
In  Sudan  our  ESF  purchases  essential 
commodity  imports  to  help  Sudan  over- 
come a  foreign  exchange  crisis,  provide 
inputs  for  local  production,  and  support 
economic  reforms  within  the  context  of  an 
agreed  international  progi-am  coordinated 
by  the  World  Bank.  In  Senegal  ESF 
finances  commodity  imports  and  a  rural 
roads  maintenance  progi-am.  In  Liberia  it 
provides  support  to  the  Liberian  Govern- 
ment as  it  copes  wdth  severe  financial 
problems  and  as  it  proceeds  along  the 
path  to  a  restoration  of  constitutional  rule 
ne.xt  year.  In  Zambia  our  ESF  supports 
development  activities  in  agricultural 
training  and  institutional  development 
and  provides  essential  commodity  im- 
ports. 

Economic  Policy  Initiative  (EPI) 

A  major  new  element  of  our  proposal  for 
this  fiscal  year  is  the  Economic  Policy  Ini- 
tiative. What  is  it  and  how  is  it  similar  to 
and  different  from  our  other  assistance 
programs?  The  essential  structure  of  our 
request  to  Congress  is  that  we  expect  to 
seek  $500  million  over  a  5-year  period, 
with  a  $75  million  request  in  FY  1985. 
Unlike  other  assistance  funding,  these  ap- 
propriations would  not  be  allocated  in 
advance  to  specific  countries  or  specific 
activities.  While  we  have  reached  no  deci- 
sions on  any  specific  prospective 
recipient,  we  plan  to  limit  the  total 
number  of  recipients  to  a  few  countries 
each  year.  There  is  no  magic  number,  but 
a  large  number  would  tend  to  dissipate 
the  purpose  of  the  initiative. 


As  I  noted  earlier,  many  African 
countries  are  in  the  process  of  attempting 
to  introduce  significant  economic  policy 
reforms.  Each  country's  problems  are  dif- 
ferent, and  we  do  not  seek  to  impose  rigid 
guidelines.  Given  the  overwhelmingly 
agricultural  nature  of  Africa,  one  could 
expect  most  EPI  activities  to  be  in  this 
sector.  We  might  wish  to  support  a 
government's  decision  to  turn  existing 
centrally  controlled  and  inefficient 
cooperatives  into  true  cooperatives  con- 
trolled by  their  members.  In  such  a  case, 
we  might  offer  to  finance  technical 
assistance  or  provide  inputs,  spare  parts, 
etc.  Or,  where  a  country  decided  to  in- 
troduce more  realistic  pricing  policies 
which  should  induce  greater  agricultural 
production  but  faiTn-to-market  roads  and 
transport  had  disintegrated,  we  might 
contribute  to  their  rehabilitation.  Our 
assistance,  therefore,  would  usually  be 
sector  directed. 

I  would  stress  that  we  are  under  no  il- 
lusions that  our  $75  million  will  solve  the 
problems  of  Africa  or  even  of  selected 
countries.  They  will,  however,  be  syn- 
chronized with  our  aid  efforts  which  are 
ten  times  the  size  of  the  EPI.  Moreover, 
and  key  to  the  success  of  the  initiative,  is 
its  multilateral  dimension.  The  World 
Bank  and  many  major  donors  share  our 
view  on  the  need  for  policy  reform  in  con- 
nection with  outside  assistance.  We 
already  have  multilateral  groups  in  about 
20  African  countries,  but  theii-  effec- 
tiveness varies  wadely.  We  only  give 
10-15%  of  total  assistance  to  Africa- 
somewhat  more  if  multilateral  contribu- 
tions are  considered— and  so  we  must 
work  with  others  more  effectively  if  prog- 
ress is  to  be  made.  We  shall  take  their 
views  into  consideration  and  be  prepared 
to  adjust  our  activities,  as  we  hope  others 
will  also  be  prepared  to  do.  The  EPI  can 
only  serve  its  intended  catalytic  purpose 
if  the  community  of  donors  works  closely 
together  and  with  the  African  countries 
which  become  involved.  We  have  not 
preselected  those  countries.  Theii"  selec- 
tion will  be  based  on  criteria  such  as  the 
climate  for  effective  reform,  the  commit- 
ment to  such  reforms  of  the  political 
leadership,  and  the  probability  that  coor- 
dinated donor  support  and  some  in- 
cremental donor  resources  could  create 
an  environment  within  which  the  reforms 
envisaged  can  be  achieved.  The  World 
Bank  has  agreed  to  play  a  leading  role  in 
donor  coordination;  other  donors  with 
which  we  have  discussed  the  initiative  in 
general  terms  are  supportive. 

To  summarize  the  EPI  is  both  similar 
to  and  different  from  other  forms  of 
assistance.  Its  uniqueness  is  its  flexibility. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA 


potential  responsiveness  to  African 
needs,  and  multilateral  character.  Yet  it 
is  an  extension  of  and  ingredient  of  our 
overall  effort.  It  would  be  the  capstone  to 
efforts  already  underway  in  some  African 
countries  to  implement  reforms  to  reduce 
the  role  of  the  state,  increase  incentives 
to  production,  and  begin  the  difficult 
process  of  i-estructuring.  I  hope  that  you 
will  find  it  as  positive  as  and  stimulating 
as  have  the  Africans  and  other  govern- 
ments with  which  we  have  consulted. 

Refugee  Relief 

No  discussion  of  Africa  can  ignore  the 
question  of  refugees.  As  in  past  years,  the 
tJ.S.  Government  will  be  a  major  con- 
tributor to  the  solution  of  refugee  prob- 
lems in  Africa  in  FY  1985.  The  State 
Department  budget  request  includes  a 
total  of  approximately  $60  million  for 
refugees  in  Africa;  to  that  should  be 
added  the  estimated  $10  million  which  the 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  e.xpects  to  spend  in  refugee  food 
assistance  and  money  remaining  from  the 
previous  special  authorizations  for 
refugee  resettlement,  which  will  depend 
on  actual  expenditures  during  the  re- 
mainder of  FY  1984.  The  funding  now 
planned  is  sufficient,  in  combination  with 
the  efforts  of  other  donors,  to  meet  relief 
needs,  absent  any  new,  large,  refugee 
movements. 

In  most  cases  (the  major  exceptions 
being  the  recent  movement  of  Banyar- 
wandan  refugees  from  Uganda  into 
Rwanda  and  Tanzania  and  the  recently  in- 
creased flows  of  Ethiopians  into  Sudan) 
the  refugee  situation  in  Africa  has 
stabilized  somewhat  and  has  passed  the 
stage  of  emergency  relief.  Our  efforts 
must  focus  more  on  enhancing  the  pros- 
pects for  voluntary  repatriation  and  on  in- 
tegrating refugee  programs  into  the 
overall  development  needs  of  the  coun- 
tries of  first  asylum,  where  prospects  for 
repatriation  are  poor. 

The  coordination  of  a  multidonor 
response  and  a  focus  on  infrastructure 
and  development  in  countries  of  asylum 
are  major  elements  of  the  upcoming  sec- 
ond International  Conference  on 
Assistance  to  Refugees  in  Africa 
(ICARA  II). 

Security  Assistance 

Just  as  Africa's  economy  is  an  integral 
part  of  the  global  system,  Africa's 
political  stability  is  affected  both  by  inter- 
nal problems  and  by  non- African  in- 
fluences. Dangerous  security  threats  con- 


tinue to  affect  African  nations  already 
hard  hit  by  the  adverse  climate  and 
economic  conditions. 

Our  efforts  and  those  of  our  allies  and 
friends  to  help  African  nations  to  over- 
come their  economic  problems  do  not 
exist,  in  a  political  vacuum.  Where  serious 
security  problems  exist,  they,  too,  must 
be  addressed  effectively  or  else  there  is 
little  point  in  pursuing  economic 
recovery.  Our  balanced  approach  to 
assisting  our  African  friends  recognizes 
this  reality.  We  consult  with  them  and 
our  allies  to  detennine  how  best  to  meet 
threats  of  e.xtemal  aggression,  and  in 
several  cases  externally  instigated 
subversion,  with  the  least  disruption  to 
the  human  and  material  resources  being 
mobilized  for  economic  recovery  and 
development. 

Our  FY  1985  security  assistance  re- 
quests reflect  this  carefully  balanced  ap- 
proach rather  dramatically. 

Fii'st,  our  military  assistance  requests 
are  heavily  concentrated  in  the  areas  of 
greatest  strategic  concern,  mainly 
eastern  and  southern  Africa,  for  which  we 
have  made  over  80%  of  our  military 
assistance  program  (MAP)  requests. 

Second,  in  a  few  countries— Sudan, 
Somalia,  Kenya,  and  Liberia— we  play  a 
prominent  security  assistance  role,  but  in 
most  countries  we  supplement  largei- 
security  assistance  programs  provided  by 
our  allies,  such  as  in  Chad,  Niger, 
Senegal,  and  Zaire. 

Third,  in  FY  1985  we  completed  the 
sharp  switch  from  foreign  military  (FMS) 
loan  to  MAP  grant  assistance  begun  in 
FY  1983  in  response  to  the  deep  financial 
crisis  our  African  friends  face.  In  FY  1983 
we  sought  $37.7  million  in  FMS  loans  for 
eight  countries,  in  FY  1984  we  have  $29.5 
million  in  FMS  loans  for  six  countries, 
while  for  FY  1985  we  seek  only  $10 
million  total  FMS  loans  for  just  two  coun- 
tries. In  effect,  MAP  has  now  replaced 
FMS  loans. 

Fourth,  our  foreign  assistance  re- 
quests remain  overwhelmingly  economic 
($1,053  billion;  83.3%)  over  military 
($211.63  million;  16.7%),  with  a  ratio  of 
more  than  5  to  1  in  FY  1985. 

As  with  economic  assistance, 
however,  our  Western  allies  cannot  bear 
the  African  security  assistance  burden 
alone.  The  security  assistance  portion  of 
our  assistance  is  a  basic  part  of  the  foun- 
dation of  cooperation  on  which  rests  the 
larger,  combined  Western  effort  to  help 
Africa  survive  economically. 

We  are  also  careful  as  to  the  tj-pe  of 
equipment  provided  and  the  need  for 
basic  defensive  capabilities,  not  offensive 
weaponry.  In  Sudan,  Somalia,  Kenya, 
Zaire,  Liberia,  and  elsewhere  on  the  con- 
tinent, American  assistance  has  helped 


African  armies  in  the  crucial  areas  of 
training  and  logistics.  We  are  encouraged 
by  progress  in  the  longstanding  problems 
with  the  F-5  squadron  in  Kenya  and  the 
C-130  program  in  Zaire.  Significant  im- 
provements in  the  logistical  and  main- 
tenance procedures  of  the  Somali  Army 
are  another  area  of  positive  change 
brought  about  by  our  programs. 

Two  1985  initiatives  waiTant  mention. 
First,  recognizing  the  important  role  that 
African  armies  can  play  in  national 
development— by  providing  engineering, 
construction,  disaster  relief,  and  health 
services  to  the  civilian  population— we  are 
proposing  a  modest  program  of  civic  ac- 
tion activities. 

Included  within  the  civic  action  ini- 
tiative is  a  program  to  assist  African  na- 
tions to  patrol  and  protect  their  fishing 
grounds.  As  we  all  know,  many  African 
coastal  states  do  not  have  the  necessary 
facilities  to  protect  their  ow^^  exclusive 
economic  zones  from  poaching  and  over- 
fishing by  others,  notably  Soviet  bloc  na- 
tions. A  limited  amount  of  funds  will  be 
directed  toward  assisting  these  nations  to 
improve  their  patrolling  and  enforcement 
capabilities.  This  program  will  be  coor- 
dinated with  developmental  assistance  ef- 
forts designed  to  give  the  same  nations 
greater  ability  to  take  advantage  them- 
selves of  their  own  ocean  resources. 

The  other  1985  initiative,  as  I  men- 
tioned earlier,  is  placing  the  majority  of 
our  security  assistance  in  the  form  of 
grant  aid  under  the  MAP  and  less  under 
FMS  credits.  In  conjunction  with  this 
switch  to  MAP  is  an  Administration  pro- 
posal to  put  a  portion  of  FMS  credits  on 
budget,  thereby  allowing  the  Administra- 
tion to  offer  concessional  credits  to  those 
countries  which  can  afford  to  repay  loans, 
but  not  high  market  interest  rates. 

An  analysis  of  the  Administration's 
request  for  military  assistance  for  Africa 
reveals  that,  with  the  exception  of  inter- 
national military  education  and  training 
(IMET),  our  request  has  actually  declined 
from  FY  1983.  In  1983  we  requested  $234 
million  in  military  assistance;  we  received 
$117  million.  In  1984  we  requested  $201.5 
million  and  received  $149  million,  an  in- 
crease over  1983  but  still  short  of  the  re- 
quested level.  Nevertheless  an  important 
feature  of  the  1983  progi-am  was  that  we 
began  to  make  the  switch  to  MAP  grants 
from  FMS  credits.  This  trend  continued 
in  1984,  and  in  1985  we  are  requesting 
almost  all  grant  assistance.  For  1985  we 
have  proposed  $109.5  million  in  MAP  and 
$10  million  in  FMS  concessional  credits. 
This  total  is  actually  $1  million  less  than 
the  1984  requests;  it  is,  however,  an  in- 
crease of  approximately  $51  million  over 
the  actual  1984  allocation. 


May  1984 


mmmmmmi 


AFRICA 


The  exception  to  this  trend  is  in  the 
IMET  account.  In  1983  we  requested  $8.7 
million  and  received  $7.3  million;  in  1984 
we  requested  $9.8  million  and  received 
$8.8  milion.  We  are  requesting  $11.1 
million  for  1985.  We  continue  to  feel  very 
strongly  that  IMET  is  our  most  valuable 
tool  in  dealing  with  the  African  military 
establishments.  Not  only  do  we  have  a 
chance  to  interact  with  and  train  officers 
and  noncommissioned  officers  in  the 
United  States,  but  we  are  able  to  field 
mobile  training  teams  to  go  out  to  in- 
dividual countries  to  train  a  large  number 
of  military  in  the  basic  skills  required  to 
organize  and  maintain  an  ai-med  force. 
This  training  reduces  the  costs  of  the 
military  establishments  and  adds  to  then- 
sen.se  of  pride  and  professionalism.  We 
have  received  nothing  but  praise  in  Africa 
for  the  IMET  program.  We  hope  that 
Congi-ess  will  continue  to  fund  the  pro- 
gram at  the  request  level. 

Sub-Regional  Perspective 

The  congressional  presentation  docu- 
ments for  development  and  security 
assistance  provide  you  with  overview 
summaries  for  Africa  and  descriptions  of 
individual  country  programs.  Since, 
however,  sub-Saharan  Africa  is  so  large 
and  involves  so  many  countries,  it  might 
be  useful  now  to  look  at  some  key  fea- 
tures of  these  programs  from  the  perspec- 
tive of  the  subregions  of  western,  central, 
eastern,  and  southern  Africa.  My  brief 
overview  will  highlight  our  security 
assistance  goals  and  progi-ams  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  underlying  goals  of  our 
economic  assistance.  We  should  also  bear 
in  mind  that  in  most  African  countries  our 
assistance  programs  supplement  larger 
ones  provided  by  our  allies,  the  World 
Bank  and  IMF,  and  several  major  Arab 
donors. 

West  Africa.  West  Africa  is  an  area 
of  endemic  poverty  and  political  instabil- 
ity whose  continued  deterioration  could 
have  serious  consequences  for  our  in- 
terests. Major  U.S.  objectives  in  the  area 
are  to: 

•  Assi.st  in  long-temi  development 
and  the  immediate  crisis  of  hunger  when 
it  occurs; 

•  Promote  regional  political  stability 
by  helping  governments  to  resist  exter- 
nal—mainly Libyan— adventurism  and  de- 
stabilization; 

•  Foster  our  continued  access  to  im- 
portant raw  materials  and  markets  (e.g., 
Nigeria,  which  is  both  an  important  and 
relatively  secure  major  source  of  oil  and 


an  important  locus  of  U.S.  investments; 
Guinea  with  its  important  bauxite 
reserves);  and 

•  Continue  our  access  to  important 
sea  and  air  sites  and  facilities. 

While  the  American  presence  and  aid 
levels  in  the  16  countries  of  West  Africa 
generally  are  not  large  compared  with 
other  Western  and  Arab  donors,  they  are 
significant.  In  Senegal,  for  example,  our 
progi-ams  are  designed  to  bolster  a 
friendly  democratic  government.  In  addi- 
tion to  providing  Senegal  the  largest 
amount  of  U.S.  development  assistance  in 
francophone  Africa,  we  are  using  ESF  to 
assist  Senegal  to  meet  balance-of- 
payments  and  cuiTent  account  deficits 
consistent  with  Senegal's  IMF  standby 
perfoiTnance.  Our  assistance  programs, 
which  have  also  been  coordinated  with 
France,  Senegal's  largest  donor,  are 
designed  to  enable  the  Senegalese  to 
undertake  significant  economic  reforms, 
particularly  in  the  agi-icultural  sector.  We 
also  seek  to  continue  a  modest  but  highly 
valued  $3  million  MAP  program  in  FY 
1985  to  augment  Senegal's  capability  to 
resist  Libyan  subversion.  Our  highly  suc- 
cessful IMET  progi'am  trains  about  30  of 
ficers  of  Senegal's  apolitical,  professional 
aiTned  forces  in  the  United  States.  We 
believe  that  this  mix  of  programs  in  FY 
1985  will  assist  this  friend  of  the  United 
States  to  initiate  policy  reforms  and  to 
preserve  stability  in  the  key  area  in 
Africa. 

In  Liberia,  where  the  United  States  is 
by  far  the  largest  aid  donor,  our  ESF, 
development  assistance,  and  MAP  pro- 
grams have  enabled  the  government  to 
withstand  serious  deflationary  pressure 
caused  by  a  precipitous  fall  in  demand  for 
its  major  exports.  Our  assistance  pro- 
grams to  Liberia  are  part  of  a  carefully 
balanced  approach  aimed  at  promoting 
economic  recovery  and  political  stability 
in  a  nation  that  has  close  ties  with  the 
United  States.  Our  ESF  is  disbursed  in 
close  cooperation  with  the  IMF. 

U.S.  and  IMF  assistance  on  the 
economic  front  has  also  allowed  the 
Liberian  Government  to  make  progress  in 
its  goal  of  returning  the  country  to 
civilian,  constitutional  government  by 
April  1985.  An  elections  timetable  has 
been  announced  and  a  new  constitution 
drafted.  The  United  States  and  other 
Western  nations  are  assisting  this  effort 
through  technical  and  financial  assistance. 
Through  the  MAP-funded  military  hous- 
ing construction  program,  we  hope  to 
eliminate  a  grievance  that  contributed  to 
the  1980  coup  and  encourage  the  retuni 
to  civilian  rule. 


Our  other  development  assistance 
programs  are  concentrated  in  food  pro- 
duction programs  designed  to  induce 
needed  policy  reforms  and  reduce  the 
need  for  food  imports.  Evidence  of  impor- 
tant policy  reform  can  be  seen  in  coun- 
tries such  as  Senegal,  Mali,  and  Niger  and 
the  beginnings  of  policy  reform  in  such 
countries  as  Sierra  Leone  and  Guinea 
Bissau. 

In  Ghana,  where  strained  political 
relations  necessitated  a  suspension  of  aid 
programs,  the  government  has  now  im- 
plemented difficult  economic  reforms  in 
cooperation  with  the  IMF.  Our  recently 
reinstated  aid  program  is  providing  im- 
portant assistance  in  food  production,  and 
U.S.  emergency  food  aid  is  playing  a  ma- 
jor role  in  averting  widespread,  drought- 
induced  famine.  Emergency  food  aid  is 
also  playing  a  major  role  in  Mauritania, 
Senegal,  and  elsewhere  in  the  Sahel. 

In  all  of  the  examples  cited  there  is  a 
common  thread— of  helping  poor  people 
and  vulnerable  governments  to  better 
help  themselves  by  undertaking  needed 
policy  reform,  concentrating  development 
efforts  on  increased  food  production,  and 
providing,  where  needed,  military  assist- 
ance to  help  resist  outside  efforts  at 
destabilization. 

Central  Africa.  Our  security  and 
political  objectives  in  the  central  African 
region  are  to: 

•  Help  maintain  political  stability  and 
foster  friendly  relations; 

•  Assist  governments  to  resist  Soviet 
and  Libyan  destabilization,  particularly  in 
Chad;  and 

•  Provide  key  countries  vnth  security 
assistance  needed  for  legitimate  self- 
defense. 

Our  economic  objectives  are  to  assist 
governments  in  pursuing  effective 
economic  and  development  poUcies,  en- 
courage food  production,  and  provide 
emergency  food  aid  where  needed. 

The  United  States  has  a  major  policy 
stake  in  ensuring  an  independent  Chad  in 
the  face  of  direct  Libyan  aggression. 
Libyan  occupation  of  Chad  in  1980-81 
created  serious  fears  throughout  the 
region  and  led  to  strong  African  reaction. 
Unfortunately,  Libya  entered  Chad  again 
in  force  in  1983  threatening  the  recog- 
nized government.  Our  security 
assistance  support  for  Chad  is  designed  to 
complement  the  efforts  of  France,  which 
has  the  primary  role  in  assisting  Chad's 
security.  Because  of  its  shattered 
economic  base,  Chad  needs  fast  disburs- 
ing ESF  to  restore  civilian  services  and 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


development  activity,  as  well  as  MAP  to 
strengthen  its  capabilities  to  face  con- 
tinued Libyan-sponsored  attacks. 

On  the  security  front,  Zaire  has  been 
a  firm  friend  and  has  supported  United 
States  policies;  it  contributes  substan- 
tially to  stability  in  central  Africa.  It  cur- 
rently has  troops  in  Chad  to  help  that 
nation  defend  itself  from  the  Libyan  inva- 
sion. The  visits  to  Zaire  of  Israeli  Presi- 
dent Herzog  last  month  and  Egyptian 
President  Mubarak  this  month  attest  to 
Zaire's  valued  support  for  the  Camp 
David  peace  process.  A  neighbor  of 
conflict-ridden  Angola,  Zaire  is  equally  a 
critical  country  in  the  search  for  peaceful 
resolution  of  southern  African  conflicts. 
Zaire's  military  has  long  been  under- 
funded, and  our  MAP  program  is  de- 
signed to  get  Zaire  programs  back  on 
their  feet,  particularly  in  the  key  airlift 
area. 

Zaire  has  taken  major  steps  to  reform 
its  economy.  The  marketing  of  copper  and 
cobalt  has  been  reorganized  to  ensure 
that  the  state  mining  enterprise, 
Gecamines,  receives  the  revenues  from 
its  exports  so  that  it  can  rebuild  its 
capital  base  and  undertake  new  in- 
vestments. Early  last  year  Zaii-e's  an- 
ticorruption  campaign  resulted  in  the 
dismissal  of  a  number  of  civil  servants.  In 
1983  Zaire  also  successfully  implemented 
several  key  reforms  sought  by  the  IMF. 
These  include  an  80%  devaluation  of  the 
Zaire  and  a  floating  e.xchange  rate  de- 
signed to  prevent  the  Zaire  from  becom- 
ing overvalued  again,  controls  on  wage  in- 
creases, and  the  liberalization  of  price 
controls.  The  budget  deficit  has  been 
brought  under  control  in  spite  of  low  ta.x 
revenues  because  of  severely  depressed 
copper  and  cobalt  prices.  The  success  of 
these  reforms  led  the  IMF  to  approve 
$350  million  in  new  drawings  for  Zaire 
and  official  creditors  to  reschedule  Zaire's 
debt  in  December.  Later  in  December  the 
World  Bank  sponsored  a  consultative 
group  on  Zaire  during  which  it  urged 
donors  to  lend  more  support  to  the  prog- 
ress being  made. 

Now  that  Zaire  has  taken  these  steps 
to  help  itself,  our  FY  1985  request  is  to 
help  Zaire  to  continue  to  meet  its  reform 
goals.  By  doing  so,  we  help  prevent  the 
refoiTn  effort  from  stalling  and  lay  the 
groundwork  for  longer  term  and  more 
equitable  economic  development. 

Cameroon  provides  the  example  of 
building  on  success.  It  is  one  of  the  few 
countries  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  which  is 
self-sufficient  in  food  production.  Its 
policies  have  been  conducive  to  sound 
development  programs,  including  em- 
phasis on  the  private  sector  and  active  en- 


couragement of  foreign  investment. 
Cameroon's  petroleum  resources  have 
contributed  in  large  measure  to  the  coun- 
try's relative  prosperity,  but  since  its 
petroleum  reserves  are  limited, 
Cameroon's  long-term  economic  viability 
rests  on  agriculture.  Thus,  we  have 
targeted  our  development  assistance  in 
Cameroon  to  ensuring  continued  self- 
sufficiency  in  food  production.  Projects 
are  focused  on  two  related  sectors- 
agriculture  and  rural  education. 

With  a  proposed  budget  of  $20  million 
in  FY  1984  and  $21.42  million  in  FY  1985, 
our  economic  aid  emphasis  is  on  the  con- 
struction of  an  agricultural  university  and 
the  design  of  its  programs,  as  well  as 
work  in  primary  education  with  children 
who  will  be  staying  in  the  rural  areas 
rather  than  migi-ating  to  the  cities  and 
seeking  higher  education  there. 

Our  FY  1985  security  assistance  pro- 
gram is  modest  ($5  million  FMS  loans, 
$200,000  IMET)  aimed  at  technical  train- 
ing and  ground  transport  vehicles. 
Cameroon  borders  on  Chad,  and  seeks  to 
impi'ove  the  mobility  and  efficiency  of  its 
modest  defense  forces. 

IMET  progi-ams  in  most  of  the  central 
African  countries  are  designed  to  provide 
United  States  examples,  training,  and 
skills  to  key  military  leaders. 

East  Africa.  East  Africa  plays  an  in- 
tegral part  in  our  security  cooperation  ar- 
rangements for  the  protection  of  U.S.  in- 
terests in  Southwest  Asia.  The  continuing 
support  of  the  countries  of  this  region  is 
critical  for  the  success  in  meeting  our 
strategic  objectives. 

Our  economic  and  security  assistance 
is  programmed  to  strengthen  the  growth 
and  internal  stability  of  East  African 
countries  and  improve  their  ability  to  de- 
fend themselves  against  external  aggres- 
sion. A  number  of  countries— including 
Kenya,  Sudan,  Somalia,  and  Madagas- 
car—have undertaken  tight,  much  needed 
economic  adjustment  progi-ams  to 
establish  a  stronger  basis  for  self- 
sustaining  growth.  Two  coun- 
tries—Somalia and  Madagascar— are  in 
the  process  of  correcting  severe  economic 
distortions  under  socialized  regimes.  This 
month,  for  example,  Somalia  announced 
plans  to  switch  to  free  market  production 
and  pricing  for  agriculture.  Our 
assistance  is  crucial  to  assuring  the  suc- 
cess of  these  reforms  in  promoting  longer 
term  economic  recovery.  It  relies,  in 
several  cases,  on  quick-disbursing  ESF 
grants  which  close  balance-of-payments 
gaps  and  provide  the  catalysts  for  finan- 
cial assistance  from  other  donors  as  well 


AFRICA 


as  assistance  complementary  to  that  from 
international  organizations  such  as  the 
IMF  and  Worid  Bank. 

Our  progi-am  in  Sudan  is  an  excellent 
example  of  how  U.S.  assistance,  as  part  of 
a  concerted  international  effort,  is  effec- 
tively meeting  immediate  needs  while 
promoting  longer  term  economic  reform. 

For  the  last  2  years,  the  United 
States  has  played  a  leading  role  in  an  ex- 
traordinary international  effort,  both 
among  official  donors  in  the  World  Bank- 
chaired  consultative  group  and  among 
bilateral  creditors  in  the  Paris  Club, 
which  has  mobilized  resources  to  enable 
Sudan  to  meet  recurring  payments  for  im- 
ports essential  to  development  and  other 
obligations.  Through  quick-disbursing 
commodity  import  program  funds  and, 
when  necessary,  cash  grants,  we  have 
played  a  central  role  in  helping  Sudan 
closely  manage  its  economic  resources 
within  the  guidelines  of  its  IMF  and  con- 
sultative group  programs.  Our  ESF  and 
PL  480  assistance  has  been  conditioned 
on  the  Sudanese  undertaking  basic 
economic  reforms  to  expand  opportunities 
and  competitiveness  in  the  private  sector, 
liberalize  commodity  pricing,  and  provide 
incentives  for  export  production. 

Our  development  assistance  projects, 
meanwhile,  have  addressed  the  problem 
of  expanding  productivity,  especially  in 
the  agricultural  sector,  and  improving 
public  sector  management  to  strengthen 
leadership  skills  for  longer  term  growth. 
In  response  the  Sudanese  Government 
has  removed  budget  subsidies  on  con- 
sumer commodities  and  devalued  the  of- 
ficial exchange  rate  45%.  Farm  gate 
prices  on  government-operated  irrigation 
were  increased  substantially  and  cost 
distortions  eliminated  to  stimulate  cotton 
production,  the  major  export  crop.  The 
government's  strict  adherence  to  a  World 
Bank-approved  investment  program  has 
focused  public  investment  in  essential 
areas.  These  are  major  short-  and  long- 
term  structural  reform  accomplishments 
for  the  country  which,  in  terms  of  propor- 
tional magnitude  of  debt,  is  the  African 
equivalent  to  Brazil  or  Mexico  in  Latin 
America.  Our  FY  1985  requests  build  on 
these  achievements.  They  enable  us  to 
continue  to  play  a  leading  role  in  the  in- 
ternational effort  to  assist  Sudan  to  come 
back  from  the  abyss  of  banki-uptcy  and 
default  to  undertaking  the  long  and  dif- 
ficult road  to  recovery. 

Continual  instability  and  external 
threats  in  the  region  increase  the 
pressure  on  East  African  countries  to 
develop  effective  defensive  forces.  Sudan 
continues  to  be  threatened  by  subversion 
from  within  and  without  by  forces  and 


May  1984 
^mmmmmm 


47 


:i   ':".U:  ';'!(;', i't-^f'/:. 


'M 


AFRICA 


elements  supported  by  Libya.  The  grow- 
ing security  problem  on  two  borders  and 
in  the  south— by  dissidents  and  ban- 
dits—exacerbates the  internal  political 
tasks  of  the  government.  Our  security 
assistance  in  1985  is  vital  for  Sudan  to 
control  its  borders  and  manage  its  own 
destiny. 

Somalia  is  still  engaged  in  an  active 
border  conflict  with  Ethiopia.  Ethiopian 
troops  still  occupy  two  Somali  villages, 
Ethiopians  recently  bombed  a  Somah 
town,  and  tensions  remain  great.  Our 
assistance  to  Somalia  is  no  threat  to  other 
countries  but  essential  to  Somalia  in 
covering  its  long  borders  and  deterring 
insurgent  and  external  attacks. 

Kenya  occupies  an  important  position 
on  the  Indian  Ocean  in  proximity  to  world 
energy  sources  in  Southwest  Asia.  Our 
national  security  objective  is  to  ensure 
our  continued  access  to  the  region  in  time 
of  crisis.  To  do  this,  we  must  continue  to 
contribute  to  Kenya's  economic  develop- 
ment, stability,  and  military  prepared- 
ness. Kenya  permits  U.S.  Navy  ships  ac- 
cess to  its  port  facilities,  the  only  modern 
working  port  between  Durban  and  Port 
Said.  This  access  provides  our  vessels 
with  fuel,  provisions,  repair  facilities,  and 
crew  liberty  and  has  made  a  major  con- 
tribution toward  the  continued  deploy- 
ment of  our  naval  forces  in  the  western 
Indian  Ocean. 

In  contrast  to  many  African  nations, 
Kenya  has  a  mixed  economy,  and  its 
governmental  traditions  are  patterned 
after  the  Western  democratic  model. 
Kenya,  like  most  other  African  countries, 
however,  is  struggling  through  a  severe 
economic  crisis,  brought  on  by  the  world- 
wide recession  coupled  with  Kenya's  own 
serious  economic  structural  weaknesses. 
Kenya  has  taken  tough  measures  to  cure 
its  critical  balance-of-payments  and 
foreign  exchange  deficits  through  devalu- 
ation, import  reductions,  and  budget  cuts. 


Fortunately,  assistance  from  the  World 
Bank,  the  IMF,  and  the  world  donor  com- 
munity in  support  of  Kenya's  short-  and 
long-term  reform  efforts  is  proving  suc- 
cessful, as  affirmed  in  the  recent  con- 
sultative group  meeting. 

Southern  Africa.  Southern  Africa  is 
of  substantial  strategic  and  economic  im- 
portance to  the  United  States.  We  are 
engaged  there  in  a  major  diplomatic  effort 
to  bring  about  the  independence  of 
Namibia  under  UN  Secui-ity  Council 
Resolution  435  and  a  situation  of  peace 
among  countries  suffering  from  a  cycle  of 
violence.  We  have  seen  progress  in  these 
objectives  and  in  our  relationships  with 
all  the  countries  of  the  region  aimed  at 
achieving  this  objective.  But  we  have  still 
major  efforts  ahead  of  us.  The  area  has 
vast  development  potential.  However, 
this  potential  can  never  be  achieved  as 
long  as  the  problem  of  war,  economic 
disruption,  racism,  and  foreign  interven- 
tion persist.  Our  objectives  in  the  region 
are  designed  to  address  these  problems 
through  enhanced  regional  security, 
economic  development,  peaceful  change, 
and  a  movement  in  South  Africa  away 
from  apartheid  and  toward  a  system  of 
governance  based  on  the  consent  of  all 
the  governed.  Our  assistance  programs 
are  targeted  at  achieving  these  goals  and 
allowing  the  area  to  resolve  its  difficulties 
and  develop  without  outside  interference, 
especially  from  Soviet  bloc  nations. 

In  Zambia  the  government  has  under- 
taken a  series  of  difficult  economic  re- 
forms necessitated  by  the  depressed 
world  mineral  prices  and  the  decline  in 
other  sectors  such  as  agriculture.  Om* 
proposed  aid  program  for  FY  1985  would 
continue  to  assist  Zambia's  economic 
recovery  through  the  commodity  import 
program  and  development  of  the 
agricultural  sector. 

In  Zimbabwe,  our  aid  is  helping  this 
new  country  to  recover  from  a  lengthy 


war  and  to  stay  on  a  sound  economic 
footing.  Our  efforts  are  focused  on  the 
private  sector,  where  an  invaluable  com- 
modity import  program  has  alleviated 
balance-of-pajTnents  and  foreign  ex- 
change limitations  that  otherwise  would 
have  stalled  industrial  and  commercial 
recovery. 

In  Mozambique  we  are  beginning  an 
assistance  program  through  our  regional 
program  and  deepening  our  involvement 
in  combatting  the  famine  from  drought 
and  cyclone.  Mozambique  has  become  one 
of  the  largest  recipients  worldwide  of 
U.S.  emergency  assistance. 

Our  security  assistance  program  in 
Botswana  is  helping  to  build  a  small,  effi- 
cient, and  mobile  defense  force  capable  of 
maintaining  territorial  integrity  by  con- 
trolling movement  across  its  long 
borders. 

Throughout  the  region  we  are  helping 
the  majority-ruled  nations  of  the  area  to 
improve  regional  economic  integration  by- 
developing  better  infrastructure. 

In  South  Africa  we  will  continue  to 
focus  our  efforts  on  human  development 
and  the  provision  of  educational  oppor- 
tunities for  those  who  have  been  disad- 
vantaged by  apartheid.  These  projects 
cuiTently  include  scholarships  for  aca- 
demic training  in-country  and  in  the 
United  States,  managerial  and  trade 
union  training,  and  significant  self-help 
and  human  rights  projects.  We  also  are 
considering  other  possible  programs 
aimed  at  the  same  important  goals. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  bv  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Security  Policy 
and  Arms  Control 

by  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

Address  before  a  regional  foreign 
policy  conference  in  Birmingham  on 
March  22,  198U-  Ambassador 
Eagleburger  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs. 

Security  policy  and  arms  control  are 
complex,  difficult,  and  often  extremely 
boring  subjects.  You  have  undoubtedly 
read  the  numbers  and  seen  the  graphs 
and  clever  illustrations  in  newspapers, 
magazines,  and  on  television  that  try  to 
explain  these  numbers.  But  numbers  and 
graphs  inevitably  fail  to  explain  that  in 
arms  control  negotiations  we  often  com- 
pare apples  and  oranges,  or  more  pre- 
cisely, planes,  missiles,  and  submarines; 
that  we  are  negotiating  the  well-being 
and  perhaps  even  the  survival  of  inde- 
pendent nations;  and  that  in  doing  so  we 
encompass  very  real  human  hopes  and 
fears. 

Arms  control  negotiations— indeed, 
armaments  levels  as  a  whole— are  basi- 
cally a  reflection  of  the  broader  reality  of 
relations  between  nations,  rather  than 
the  determinant  of  those  relations.  They 
reflect  the  way  in  which  we  view  our 
place  in  the  world,  as  well  as  our  percep- 
tion of  how  world  events  and  trends  af- 
fect us  now  or  may  affect  us  in  the 
future.  Although  there  is  a  tendency  to 
compartmentalize  arms  control  and  al- 
though its  newsworthiness  has  made  it  a 
premier  object  of  our  attentions,  we 
should  not  make  the  mistake  of  confus- 
ing it  with  the  totality  of  foreign  policy. 
Rather,  arms  control  is  but  one  com- 
ponent—albeit an  important  one— of  a 
broadly  based  policy  that  must  encom- 
pass not  only  our  bilateral  relations  vdth 
a  competing  superpower  but  our  global 
interests  as  well. 

Today,  I  would  like  to  leave  the 
numbers  and  the  graphs  to  the  technical 
experts  and  speak  about  the  principles 
which  shape  our  approach  to  security 
policy,  and  how  those  principles  are  re- 
flected in  some  specific  positions  of  this 
Administration.  I  will  focus  on  nuclear 
issues,  because  these  are  understandably 
of  greatest  public  concern. 

In  doing  so,  I  cannot  stress  too 
strongly  that  arms  control  is  not  an 
alternative  to  modernizing  our  nuclear 
forces.  Rather,  maintaining  adequate 


nuclear  forces  on  the  one  hand— and  this 
includes  replacing  older,  obsolete  technol- 
ogies—and achieving  sound  arms  control 
agreements  on  the  other  are  mutually 
dependent  and  mutually  reinforcing 
policies.  Sound,  verifiable  arms  control 
agreements  can  make  force  planning 
more  predictable,  and,  therefore,  help  us 
make  better  decisions  about  what  kinds 
of  weapons  we  need.  Yet  a  clear  commit- 
ment on  our  part  to  match  Soviet  force 
improvements  is  a  necessary  incentive  to 
Soviet  seriousness  in  arms  control  nego- 
tiations. The  experience  of  massive 
Soviet  buildups  during  a  period  of  U.S. 
restraint  in  the  late  1960s  and  early 
1970s  makes  all  too  clear  that  Moscow 
will  seize  unilateral  advantage  if  possible. 

Principles  Shaping  U.S.  Policy 

Let  me  now  come  to  the  principles  I 
promised. 

The  first  is  that  military  power  is 
an  essential  part  of  diplomacy.  This  is 
always  a  difficult  principle  for  us  as 
Americans  to  accept.  One  hears— for  in- 
stance, from  critics  of  our  Middle  East 
policy— that  we  must  look  for  diplomatic 
rather  than  military  solutions  to  interna- 
tional problems.  But  we  must  get  it 
through  our  heads  that  history  has  long 
since  taught  that  diplomacy  does  not  and 
cannot  exist  in  isolation  from  national 
power.  Power,  of  course,  takes  several 
forms— economic,  political,  social,  moral, 
and  military— and  diplomacy  at  its  best 
entails  the  most  effective  use  of  aU  of 
these  factors  in  combination.  But  mili- 
tary power  is  an  inescapable  part  of  the 
equation. 

The  actual  use  of  military  force  must, 
of  course,  be  a  last  resort  for  the  United 
States.  But  it  must  be  clear  to  all  that 
we  are  prepared,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, to  use  that  force.  Our  own  vul- 
nerability to  nuclear  blackmail,  the  sus- 
ceptibility of  our  friends  to  intimidation, 
the  image  of  U.S.  strength,  and  the  per- 
ception of  U.S.  commitments,  all  rest  in 
part  on  the  credibility  of  U.S.  military 
forces. 

This  is  especially  so  given  the  nature 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  whose  economy  is 
weak  and  faltering;  whose  society  sets  an 
example  for  virtually  no  one  in  our  con- 
temporary world;  and  whose  moral  be- 


havior will  win  it  no  peace  prizes  except 
the  ones  it  has  invented  for  itself. 
Because  of  such  limitations,  military 
force— whether  actually  applied,  as  in 
Afghanistan  and  Eastern  Europe  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  elsewhere  by  its  prox- 
ies, or  merely  threatened— play  an  over- 
whelming role  in  Soviet  diplomacy.  Thus 
in  a  world  in  which  the  Soviet  Union  is 
one  of  the  two  most  powerful  actors, 
military  force  continues  vitally  to  shape 
international  politics. 

The  second,  and  for  Americans 
most  fundamental,  principle  of  secu- 
rity policy,  is  that  our  purpose  is  to 
prevent  war,  and  especially  nuclear 
war,  from  occurring.  As  President 
Reagan  has  said  time  and  again,  a  nu- 
clear war  cannot  be  won  and  must  never 
be  fought. 

Preventing  war  is  every  bit  as  much 
the  goal  of  our  force  modernization  pro- 
grams as  of  our  arms  control  efforts.  The 
policy  of  deterrence— of  maintaining 
forces  which  make  clear  to  any  potential 
aggressor  that  the  cost  to  him  of  starting 
a  war  would  be  far  greater  than  any- 
thing he  could  hope  to  gain— has  not 
changed  throughout  the  postwar  period. 

However  uncomfortable  the  balance 
of  terror  may  make  us,  we  should  never 
forget  how  well  it  has  worked.  As  Henry 
Kissinger  recently  reminded  a  group  of 
Western  leaders,  it  has  been  no  accident 
that  all  wars  in  the  nuclear  age  have  oc- 
curred where  there  were  no  American 
nuclear  weapons.  Since  1945  the 
American  deterrent  has  helped  prevent 
direct  conflict  between  ourselves  and  the 
Soviet  Union  and  brought  Europe  the 
longest  period  of  peace  in  the  20th  cen- 
tury. If  the  avoidance  of  nuclear  war  is  a 
moral  imperative,  and  if  the  maintenance 
of  a  nuclear  deterrent  is  in  large  mea- 
sure responsible  for  the  fact  that  we 
have  not  had  to  fight  a  nuclear  war,  then 
how  is  it  possible  for  some  to  argue  that 
nuclear  deterrence  is  an  immoral  policy? 

This  brings  me  to  my  third  princi- 
ple and  to  one  of  the  great  ironies  of 
security  policy:  that  to  preserve  peace 
we  must  continually  improve  our  war- 
fighting  capability.  One  hears  a  good 
deal  of  talk  these  days  about  nuclear 
"overkill"  and  invidious' comparisons  be- 
tween the  most  powerful  strategic 
nuclear  weapons  which  deter  war  and 
more  limited  nuclear  weapons  allegedly 
intended  for  actually  fighting  one.  Such 
comments  seem  to  reflect  a  conviction 
that  aU  we  need  to  ensure  deterrence  is 
a  few  nuclear  weapons— perhaps  on 
bombers  or  submarines— which  could  sur- 
vive a  Soviet  attack  and  then  reach 
Moscow. 


May  1984 


■UUUiHIIIUIIIIIIIIUJIIIIIM 


1 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Clear  U.S.  nuclear  superiority 
through  the  1960s  did  lend  credibility  to 
our  threat  to  use  our  strategic  nuclear 
forces  in  response  to  any  aggression 
against  ourselves  or  our  allies.  But  as 
the  Soviet  Union  attained  nuclear  equal- 
ity across  the  board-and  some  impor- 
tant advanteges-it  became  less  credible 
to  threaten  massive  U.S.  nuclear  reta,lia- 
tion  in  response  to  a  relatively  limited 
Soviet  conventional  or  even  nuclear 
probe  against  U.S.  forces  or  allies 
anywhere  around  the  globe.  Thus 
deterrence-preventing  war-has  come  to 
require  a  range  of  nuclear  and  conven- 
tional forces-warfighting  forces,  if  you 
wnll-whose  possible  use  would  seem 
credible  in  the  variety  of  situations  we 
might  face. 

The  fourth  principle  which  guides 
U.S.  security  policy  is  that  the  present 
and  projected  levels  of  nuclear 
weapons  are  profoundly  unsatisfac- 
tory. There  is,  I  deeply  believe,  no 
sound  alternative,  in  the  nuclear  age,  to 
a  poUcy  of  deterrence.  We  cannot  dism- 
vent  nuclear  weapons  or  make  them  go 
away  with  slogans.  But  we  can,  with  pa- 
tience and  skill,  negotiate  mutual  reduc- 
tions in  their  members  while  maintammg 
credible  deterrence. 


Nuclear  Deterrence 

When  the  Reagan  Administration  took 
office,  the  Soviet  Union  was  engaged  in  a 
sustained  and  impressive  mUitar>-  buUd- 
up  far  surpassing  any  legitimate  defen- 
sive needs.  Moscow  seemed  bent  on  go- 
ing beyond  overall  parity  with  U.S. 
forces  to  acquire  a  measure  of  superior- 
ity. Substantial  quantitative  and  qualita- 
tive increases  in  Soviet  strategic 
weapons  raised  the  possibility  that  a 
Soviet  first  strike  might  destroy  the 
large  majority  of  U.S.  land-based  inter- 
continental ballistic  missiles  (ICBMs). 
This  obviously  posed  a  major  challenge 
to  the  fundamental  principle  of  deter- 
rence: that  neither  side  should  be  able  to 
deprive  the  other  of  the  ability  to  retali- 
ate for  a  nuclear  attack.  Equally  worry- 
ing to  our  European  allies  was  Soviet 
deployment  of  the  SS-20  missile-a 
highly  accurate  mobile  weapon  which  can 
reach  all  of  Western  Europe  from  sanc- 
tuaries within  the  Soviet  Union. 
Moscow's  objective,  through  these  SS-20 
deployments,  clearly  was  to  create  trans- 
atlantic strains  by  posing  a  threat  to 
Europe  that  could  only  be  responded  to 
by  the  use  of  the  U.S.-based  strategic 
deterrent.  Europeans  facing  this  Soviet 
threat  would  inevitably  ask-and,  indeed. 


MBFR  Talks  Resume 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  16,  1984> 

I  am  pleased  to  note  the  resumption  in 
Vienna  today  of  the  negotiations  on  con- 
ventional force  reductions  in  Europe, 
known  as  the  MBFR  talks.  The  U.S. 
representative,  Ambassador  Morton 
Abramowitz,  and  his  NATO  colleagues 
will  be  working  closely  together  in  seek- 
ing early  progress  toward  an  agreement 
to  reduce  NATO  and  Warsaw  Pact  forces 
in  central  Europe  to  a  substantially  lower 
and  equal  level. 

The  Western  participants  in  MBFR 
are  united  in  theu'  pursuit  of  positive 
results.  I  call  upon  the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  other  nations  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  to 
join  us  in  a  good-faith  effort  to  achieve 
real  progress. 

The  MBFR  talks  are  an  important 
part  of  the  East- West  security  and  arms 
control  dialogue.  The  resumption  of 
MBFR  coincides  with  the  conclusion  to- 
day of  the  first  round  of  the  CDE  [Con- 
ference on  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament  in 
Europe]  talks  in  Stockholm,  which  deal 


with  military  confidence-building 
measures  in  Europe.  Here,  too,  the 
Western  nations  are  working  closely 
together.  During  the  initial  round,  we 
have  tabled  a  comprehensive  package  of 
proposed  measures  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
war. 

I  welcome  these  developments  and 
sincerely  hope  that  General  Secretary 
Chernenko  and  other  members  of  the  new 
Soviet  leadership  will  approach  these  ne- 
gotiations in  a  similarly  positive  spirit.  I 
also  urge  the  Soviet  Union  to  return  to 
the  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  and  START  [strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion talks]  negotiations,  where  very  im- 
portant work  in  the  cause  of  building  a 
more  secure  and  peaceful  world  has  been 
suspended  by  them.  These  crucial 
negotiations  can  succeed  if  the  Soviet 
Union  wants  them  to  succeed.  We  are 
certainly  ready  to  do  our  part.  It  is  in  the 
interest  of  all  mankind  that  these  vital  ef- 
forts be  resumed  now. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  19,  1984. 


did  ask-if  the  United  States  would  be 
willing  to  respond  in  such  a  massive  way 
to  a  Soviet  attack  limited  to  Europe. 

Thus,  in  response  to  the  Soviet 
SS-20  deployment,  NATO  collectively 
decided  on  a  unique  response:  an  offer  to 
negotiate  mutual  restraint  in  this  new 
category  of  weapons  coupled  with  a  firm 
decision  to  match  the  Soviet  buildup,  if 
negotiations  failed,  by  modernizing  its 
own  intermediate-range  nuclear  weapons. 
The  latter  was  not  just  a  rhetorical 
threat.  Work  on  the  missiles  and  prepa- 
rations for  their  deployment  in  Europe 
began.  But,  because  the  NATO  missiles 
would  not  be  ready  for  4  years,  Moscow 
had  ample  time  to  prevent  their  deploy- 
ment through  negotiation. 

This  reaction  to  the  SS-20  threat  is 
representative  of  the  Reagan  Adminis- 
tration's general  approach  to  the  difficult 
issue  of  nuclear  deterrence.  It  is  a  two- 
fold policy: 

First,  a  comprehensive  effort  to 
modernize  our  strategic  nuclear  weapons 
-land-based  intercontinental  baUistic 
missiles,  submarine-launched  missiles, 
and  bombers-and  to  continue  implemen- 
tation of  NATO's  1979  decision  to  deploy 
U.S.  weapons  in  Europe  to  balance 
Moscow's  SS-20s; 

Second,  offers  of  deep  cuts  m  U.S. 
and  Soviet  nuclear  systems  across  the 
board  and  especially  in  those  systems 
which,  by  seeming  to  threaten  a  first 
strike  are  most  destabilizing. 

Our  force  improvements  are  designed 
both  to  improve  the  survivability  of  our 
nuclear  deteirent  in  the  face  of  a  grow- 
ing Soviet  threat  and  to  make  clear  to 
Moscow  that  we  will  not  allow  it  a  mili- 
tary advantage  that  could  be  used  for 
purposes  of  blackmail.  At  the  same  time, 
we  are  offering  Moscow  relief  from  the 
economic  and  other  burdens  of  the  arms 
race  through  mutual  and  verifiable 
reductions  in  all  categories  of  nuclear 
weapons,  but  especially  those  which 
seem  most  threatening  to  the  retaliatory 
capability  of  each  side. 

We  are  not  trying  to  disarm  the 
Soviet  Union  or  to  gain  advantage  over 
it.  Our  arms  control  proposals  would  not 
deprive  it  of  any  weapons  that  would  be 
useful  in  its  defense,  even  if  its  propa- 
ganda about  an  aggressive,  war-monger- 
ing  United  States  were  true.  Quite  the 
contrary:  our  proposals  for  mutual  re- 
straint in  the  most  threatening  weapons 
should,  by  enhancing  the  survivability  of 
Soviet  as  well  as  U.S.  deterrent  forces, 
make  both  of  us  feel  more  secure. 

In  the  strategic  arms  reduction  talks, 
or  START,  we  have  proposed  substantial 


50 


..  Li^^.^^-^JMUMBi'! 


Department  o*  ^•-♦- 


ARMS  CONTROL 


reductions  in  deployed  missiles,  with  par- 
ticular emphasis  on  reductions  in  the 
most  threatening  or  destabilizing 
systems,  reductions  in  deployed  ballistic 
missile  warheads  by  one-third,  and  limits 
below  SALT  II  [strategic  amis  limitation 
talks]  levels  on  the  air-launched  cruise 
missiles  which  Moscow  claims  to  find  so 
threatening. 

After  consultations  with  key  congres- 
sional leaders,  we  incorporated  into  our 
START  proposal  the  principle  of  a  mu- 
tual, guaranteed  build-down  of  strategic 
forces.  The  principle  of  build-down  is 
simple.  Some  old  weapons  would  have  to 
be  withdrawn  for  any  new  ones 
deployed.  And  the  "penalty"— the  num- 
ber to  be  withdrawn— would  be  greater 
for  deployment  of  new  weapons  which 
might  seem  to  threaten  a  first  strike  at- 
tack. Thus,  as  both  the  United  States 
and  Soviet  Union  modernize  theii" 
nuclear  forces,  there  would  be  a  power- 
ful incentive  to  shift  to  less  destabilizing 
new  systems. 

In  the  negotiations  on  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces,  or  INF,  we  have 
proposed  scrapping  Moscow's  new 
SS-20s  and  older  SS-4s  and  5s,  in  return 
for  scrapping  NATO's  actual  and 
planned  deployments  of  new  inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  weapons.  This 
bold  proposal  would  have  resulted  in  the 
first-ever  elimination  of  an  entire  class  of 
nuclear  weapons  from  the  face  of  the 
earth.  When  that  proved  too  bold  for 
Moscow,  we  offered  an  interim  proposal 
to  limit  both  sides'  INF  deployments  to 
an  equal,  mutually  agreed  number  below 
NATO's  planned  deployments  of  572. 

The  results  to  date  in  both  INF  and 
START  negotiations  have,  as  you  know, 
been  disappointing. 

With  regard  to  INF,  Moscow  wasted 
the  4  years  that  elapsed  between 
NATO's  announced  intention  to  modern- 
ize its  forces  if  a  negotiated  settlement 
could  not  be  reached  and  the  arrival  of 
the  first  new  U.S.  missiles  in  Europe.  It 
used  this  time  not  to  negotiate  seriously 
but  rather  to  play  on  West  European 
public  opinion  in  the  hope  that  it  could 
use  the  fear  of  nuclear  weapons  to  split 
the  alliance  and  thereby  prevent  us  from 
proceeding  with  deployments.  In  the 
INF  talks  themselves,  the  unifying 
theme  in  various  Soviet  proposals  was 
that  no  U.S.  nuclear  missiles  belong  in 
Europe,  no  matter  what  the  Soviets 
might  do.  This  is  part  of  a  long-term 
Soviet  effort  to  exclude  the  United 
States,  not  only  from  the  nuclear  defense 
of  Europe  but  also— since  most  of  our  air- 
craft which  can  carry  nuclear  weapons 


play  vital  conventional  defense  roles  as 
well— to  push  us  out  of  Europe 
altogether. 

The  failure  of  Moscow's  effort  led,  as 
we  all  know,  to  the  Soviet  breakoff  of 
the  negotiations.  Whether  time  will  lead 
the  Soviets  to  a  wiser  course,  with  a 
return  to  the  negotiating  table,  remains 
to  be  seen.  But,  in  the  meantime,  it  is 
important  that  Western  publics  keep 
clearly  in  mind  that  it  is  the  Soviets  who 
broke  off  the  negotiations  and  are  con- 
tinuing their  wholly  unnecessary  INF 
buildup,  while  it  is  the  United  States 
that  is  prepared  to  return  immediately  to 
the  negotiating  table. 

The  Soviet  record  in  START  was,  for 
a  time,  a  little  better.  Some  real,  if  still 
limited,  progress  had  been  achieved 
before  Moscow  interrupted  those  negoti- 
ations, too,  in  protest  against  the  be- 
ginning of  NATO's  INF  deployments. 
The  Soviets  had  acknowledged  the  need 
for  some  reductions  below  the  SALT  II 
levels  for  missiles  and  bombers. 
Moscow's  START  proposals  would,  how- 
ever, have  perpetuated  its  advantage  in 
throw-weight,  or  destructive  power,  and 
probably  would  not  have  required  reduc- 
tions in  its  ballistic  missile  warheads,  as 
opposed  to  launchers.  In  fact,  it  could 
allow  a  great  increase  in  the  number  of 
warheads.  But,  in  any  event,  this  is,  for 
now,  academic.  The  Soviets,  as  you 
know,  have  not  returned  to  the  START 
negotiations  since  they  left  Geneva  last 
year.  It  is,  again,  the  United  States  that 
seeks  to  continue  to  negotiate. 

U.S.-Soviet  Relations 

Let  me  take  a  moment  here  to  say  some- 
thing about  the  particular  frustrations 
this  Administration  has  had  in  dealing 
with  the  Soviets  over  the  past  3  years. 
During  the  presidency  of  Ronald 
Reagan,  we  have  had  to  contend  with 
three  Soviet  leaders.  This  flux  in  the 
Kremlin  has  severely  hampered  the  give- 
and-take  of  diplomacy  in  general  and  of 
our  arms  control  negotiations  in 
particular. 

When  this  Administration  took  office, 
it  found  an  aging  and  ailing  Brezhnev.  A 
shrewd  and  calculating  leader  at  his 
best— these  qualities  are  not  necessarily 
negative  in  a  negotiating  adversary- 
Brezhnev  was  far  from  the  top  of  his 
powers  in  1981  and  1982.  Moreover,  his 
colleagues  on  the  Politburo  were  well 
aware  of  his  mortality  and  positioning 
themselves  for  the  succession. 

Andropov  never  took  complete  con- 
trol of  the  Soviet  state  and  was  seriously 
ill  for  much  of  his  short  tenure.  Cher- 


nenko  has  yet  to  establish  himself,  and 
we  may  well  face  an  interval  of  political 
consolidation  before  the  Kremlin  is  ready 
to  turn  its  full  attentions  to  arms  control 
talks. 

This  sustained  period  of  Soviet  suc- 
cession politics,  in  my  opinion,  has  had  a 
major  impact  on  the  ability  of  the  Soviet 
Union  to  make  decisions.  Productive 
negotiations  require  flexibility,  and  flex- 
ibility requires  leadership  that  is  willing 
to  make  difficult  decisions  and  accept 
responsibility  for  them.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  not  had  such  leadership  dur- 
ing the  Reagan  Administration.  Virtually 
without  exception,  each  time  the  Soviets 
have  been  faced  with  difficult  choices  we 
have  witnessed  a  period  of  apparent  in- 
ternal debate,  followed,  inevitably,  by 
hard-line  decisions  clearly  dictated  by  the 
most  conservative  elements  in  the 
Politburo. 

At  the  very  least  the  past  4  years 
have  challenged  the  popular  assumption 
that  we  can  put  our  influence  to  effective 
use  during  periods  of  Soviet  political 
fluidity.  Soviet  politics  is  not  likely  soon 
again  to  be  as  fluid  as  it  has  been  during 
the  past  3  years;  and  this  Administration 
has  worked  very  hard  to  put  forward 
sensible  arms  control  proposals.  Yet,  for 
now,  at  least,  all  we  have  to  show  for  it 
is  a  Soviet  walkout  from  the  two  most 
important  arms  control  negotiations, 
START  and  INF.  The  last  3  years  have 
indicated  that,  if  anything,  the  Soviet 
decisionmaking  apparatus— in  the  ab- 
sence of  strong  leadership  that  is  pre- 
pared to  exercise  its  authority— is  likely 
to  seek  refuge  in  a  bureaucratically  safe 
but  substantively  sterile  hard  line. 

This  Soviet  paralysis  is  particularly 
frustrating  when  we  are  the  ones  ac- 
cused of  not  being  forthcoming  in  arms 
negotiations.  The  record  shows  that  we 
have  responded  constructively  and  imag- 
inatively to  the  challenges  of  arms  con- 
trol. It  is  the  Soviets  who  have  shown 
neither  flexibility  nor  commitment  to  the 
cause  of  reducing  tensions. 

Flexibility  and  the 
U.S.  Approach 

When  arms  control  negotiations  resume, 
and  I  am  convinced  that  sooner  or  later 
the  Soviets  will  come  to  realize  that  they 
must  resume,  we  will  give  careful  con- 
sideration to  any  serious  Soviet  propos- 
als. Indeed,  one  distinguishing  feature  of 
the  Reagan  Administration's  approach  to 
arms  control  has  been  its  flexibility.  Both 
our  START  and  our  INF  proposals  have 
evolved  over  time  in  carefully  considered 
response  to  Soviet  descriptions  of  their 
security  perceptions  and  needs.  When 


May  1984 

■DSmSBBOBBBBIBBBI 


Ikiliikiiii 


51 


EAST  ASIA 


negotiations  begin  again,  we  will  enter 
them  in  that  same  spirit. 

There  are  some  things,  however, 
about  which  we  will  not  be  flexible.  Let 
me  list  them. 

•  One  is  our  commitment  to  begin- 
ning a  process  of  substantial  reductions. 
I  understand  the  appeal  of  calls  to  freeze 
nuclear  weapons  first,  then  reduce  them. 
But  I  am  utterly  convinced  that  it  would 
not  work  that  way.  A  freeze,  by  locking 
in  existing  Soviet  military  advantages 
and  preventing  us  from  modernizing  our 
forces,  would  reduce— perhaps  eliminate 
—Soviet  incentives  to  negotiate.  A  freeze 
on  all  nuclear  weapons  would,  moreover, 
prevent  both  the  Soviets  and  the  United 
States  from  shifting  to  less  threatening, 
clearly  retaliatory  systems.  Thus,  a  nu- 
clear freeze  would  work  against  the  very 
objective  its  proponents  espouse— a 
lessening  of  the  threat  of  nuclear  war. 

•  The  second  point  on  which  we  will 
be  inflexible  is  in  focusing  on  approaches 
that  will  actually  improve  stability  in  our 
strategic  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  must  begin  to  shift  from  more 
threatening  nuclear  weapons  to  those 
clearly  intended  only  for  retaliation. 

•  Third,  we  will  insist  on  balanced 
agreements  which  result  in  substantial 
equality  between  the  superpowers.  In 
START,  where  we  are  negotiating  about 
a  wide  variety  of  very  different  weapons 
systems  and  where  each  side  has  its  own 
historical  strengths  and  preferences,  we 
have  repeatedly  made  clear  our  willing- 
ness to  consider  trade-offs  between  areas 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  advantage.  In  INF, 
where  the  weapons  on  the  table  are 
more  comparable  to  each  other,  we  have, 
in  effect,  told  Moscow  to  pick  a  number— 
the  lower  the  better— so  long  as  it  is  an 
equal  number  for  both  sides.  But  the 
principle  of  equal  rights  and  limits  is  not 
negotiable. 

•  Fourth,  any  agreements  we  sign 
must  be  verifiable.  Verification  becomes 
more  difficult  and  complicated  as  nuclear 
weapons  grow  more  complex,  and  espe- 
cially as  we  focus  on  qualitative  aspects  of 
the  arms  race.  But  arms  control  is  far  too 
important  to  be  a  matter  of  trust. 

Winston  Churchill  aptly  expressed  a 
realistic  approach  to  arms  control  and 
deterrence  when  he  wrote  that: 

Moralists  may  find  it  a  melancholy  thought 
that  peace  can  find  no  nobler  foundations  than 
mutual  terror.  But  for  my  part  I  shall  be  con- 
tent if  these  foundations  are  solid,  because 
they  will  give  us  the  extra  time  and  the  new 
breathing  space  for  the  supreme  effort  which 
has  to  be  made  for  a  world  settlement. 


The  attempt  to  deal  with  the  relation- 
ship between  arms  and  human  passions 
has  been  a  consuming  one  for  our  cen- 
tury. We  have  no  choice  but  to  learn  from 
rather  than  to  repeat  the  mistakes  of  the 
past,  for  we  no  longer  enjoy  the  luxury  of 
a  broad  margin  for  error  that  earlier 
generations  possessed.  The  existence  of 
nuclear  weapons  has  changed  aU  that.  We 
must,  today,  be  clear  about  what  we  seek; 
equally,  we  must  be  clear  about  the  fun- 
damental differences  between  ourselves 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  Otherwise,  we  may 
end  up  by  heightening  tensions  rather 
than  consolidating  the  peace— imperfect 
as  it  is— that  we  now  enjoy. 

No  one  has  expressed  this  irony  bet- 
ter than  the  American  political  philoso- 
pher Walter  Lippmann.  Writing  in 
1943-as  the  tide  of  the  Second  Worid 
War  began  to  turn  in  our  favor,  but  while 
the  outcome  was  by  no  means  cer- 
tain—Lippmann  was  understandably  bit- 
ter as  he  analyzed  the  costs  of  haphazard, 
shortsighted  Western  disarmament  in  the 
years  following  the  First  World  War. 

Lippmann  noted  that:  "The  genera- 
tion which  most  sincerely  and  elaborately 
declared  that  peace  is  the  extreme  end  of 
foreign  policy  got  not  peace,  but  a  most 
devastating  war."  Advocates  of  disarma- 
ment, Lippmann  wrote,  were  "tragically 
successful  in  disarming  the  nations  that 
believed  in  disarmament."  His  implica- 
tions were  clear:  only  one  side  disarmed, 


due  to  pressures  exerted  by  its  own 
people.  The  other  side,  free  of  those 
pressures,  rearmed  and  thought  itself 
free  to  pursue  its  aggressive  intentions. 

Advocates  of  disarmament  made  two 
tactical  errors  and  one  strategic  error 
during  the  period  that  Lippmann  ana- 
lyzed. Tactically,  they  led  the  fascist 
states  to  believe  that  democracies  were 
unwilling,  in  the  end,  to  defend  their 
values;  and,  when  the  democracies  were 
forced  to  act,  the  policies  of  shortsighted 
disarmament  forced  them  to  act  from 
positions  of  weakness.  The  larger,  strate- 
gic mistake  was  ignoring  the  political  dif- 
ferences between  the  democracies  and 
their  enemies,  in  naive  belief  that  these 
political  differences  would  disappear  once 
they  put  down  their  arms.  Thus,  a  bad 
arms  agreement  was  infmitely  worse 
than  no  agreement  at  aU. 

Agreements  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  will  be 
ultimately  successful  only  if  they  take 
full  account  of  the  differences  between 
us.  Our  conventional  and  nuclear 
arsenals  do  not  divide  us;  rather,  they 
exist  because  other  issues  divide  us. 

The  question  is  not  closed.  We  are 
still  committed  to  negotiating  agree- 
ments to  reduce  both  strategic  and  inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  weapons.  It  is 
now  up  to  the  Soviets  to  embrace, 
sincerely,  a  simOar  commitment.  ■ 


FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on 
March  22,  198i.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs.^ 

I  am  delighted  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
present  our  FY  1985  foreign  assistance 
proposal  for  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific. 

U.S.  INTERESTS  AND  OBJECTIVES 

Our  past  investments  in  the  economies 
and  security  of  our  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
friends  have  paid  enormous  dividends. 
For  20  some  years.  East  Asian  countries 


have  sustained  higher  economic  growth 
rates  than  any  other  part  of  the  world. 
They  now  account  for  one-sixth  of  world 
trade,  and  their  share  is  growing.  Our  an- 
nual trade  with  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
exceeds  that  with  any  other  region.  U.S. 
investments  in  the  region  now  exceed  $26 
billion  and  continue  to  increase.  And 
despite  formidable  challenges  to  their 
security  which  persist  to  this  day,  most  of 
our  friends  have  achieved  a  degree  of  in- 
ternal stability  and  national  resolve  rare 
in  other  parts  of  the  world. 

However,  just  as  important  as  the 
volume  of  trade  is  the  extent  to  which 
East  Asian  economies  have  come  to  sym- 
bolize the  dynamism  of  the  free  market 
system.  Records  for  the  largest  and 
longest  sustained  growth  rates  are  held 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


by  nations  from  this  region.  Such  coun- 
tries span  the  spectrum  from  lesser 
developed  and  industriaHzing  to  industrial 
economies.  It  is  worth  noting  the  extent 
to  which  they  have  accomplished  eco- 
nomic development  while  maintaining 
political  stability  as  well  as  cultural  iden- 
tity. These  countries  have  accepted  the 
common  features— positive  and  nega- 
tive—which accompany  modernization. 
This  is  in  sharj)  conti-ast  to  the  dreary, 
rigid  mold  the  neighboring  command 
economies  have  imposed  on  their  people. 

There  are  also  pressing  economic 
problems  to  confront  despite  the  gen- 
erally bright  jjicture  of  the  past  several 
years.  The  world  recession  brought  sharp 
declines  in  income  for  the  many  Asian  and 
Pacific  exporters  of  primary  commodities, 
and  we  have  only  begun  to  see  an  up- 
swing in  these  markets.  The  Philippines 
economy  is  going  through  a  particularly 
difficult  period.  Growth  has  been  uneven 
in  several  countries,  and  pressing  politico- 
economic  problems  remain. 

We  have  a  great  stake  in  the  pros- 
perity and  security  of  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  nations.  Our  FY  1985  assistance 
programs  are  designed  to  protect  this 
stake  and  to  expand  it  to  those  areas 
which  are  less  prosperous  and  less  secure. 

Our  foreign  assistance  proposals  have 
also  been  developed  in  the  context  of  a 
disturbing  buildup  of  Soviet  military 
strength  over  the  past  few  years.  Unable 
to  match  the  vitality  and  progress  of  our 
friends  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  the 
Soviet  Union,  North  Korea,  and  Vietnam 
are  threatening  the  region  with  military 
buildups  that  far  exceed  their  defensive 
needs.  Huge  numerical  increases  in  land, 
sea,  and  air  foi-ces  have  been  buttressed 
with  qualitative  improvements  which  are 
becoming  significant  during  this  decade. 

Soviet  ground  forces  east  of  the  Urals 
increased  from  20  to  over  50  divisions 
since  1965,  including  deployments  on  the 
Sino-Soviet  border.  Soviet  air  forces  in 
the  four  eastern-most  military  districts 
now  have  more  than  3,000  combat  air- 
craft. The  Soviet  Pacific  fleet  is  now  the 
largest  fleet  in  the  Soviet  Navy  and  con- 
tains approximately  one-thii-d  of  all  Soviet 
submarines,  one-fourth  of  all  principal 
surface  combatants,  and  one-third  of  all 
naval  aircraft. 

Soviet  ability  to  project  power  is  fur- 
ther enhanced  by  forward  deployment  in 
Vietnam.  Soviet  surface  combatants  and 
attack  submarines  normally  found  at  Cam 
Ranh,  combined  with  aircraft  deploy- 
ments, present  a  clear  and  current  danger 
to  free  world  sealanes. 

Recent  evidence  demonstrates  that 
the  Soviet  buildup  continued  during  this 


past  year.  The  Soviet  Union  has  for  the 
first  time  deployed  its  Badger  bombers  to 
Cam  Ranh  Bay.  And  following  its  down- 
ing of  the  Korean  airliner,  it  stationed 
MiG-23  fighters  in  the  Japan  Northern 
Territories  occupied  by  the  Soviets  since 
World  War  II.  Its  SS-20  intermediate 
nuclear  missile  force  in  Asia  has  grow7i 
rapidly  from  99  launchers  in  February 
last  year  to  135  today. 

Apart  from  the  Soviet  threat,  the 
regional  military  threats  have  continued 
to  increase  at  a  disturbing  rate.  Vietnam 
has  doubled  the  size  of  its  standing  army 
since  1979  and  now,  with  more  than  a 
million  men  under  arms,  possesses  the 
third  largest  standing  army  in  the  world. 
Improvements  in  firepower,  command 
and  control,  and  weaponry  have  con- 
tinued apace  with  the  numerical  in- 
creases. In  addition  the  Vietnamese  have 
assembled  forces  along  the  Thai- 
Kampuchean  border  which  suggest  they 
may  again  this  year  attack  Kampuchean 
refugee  settlements  on  the  border. 

North  Korea  continues  to  spend  at 
least  20%  of  its  GNP  on  its  military  forces 
in  an  apparent  effort  to  increase  further 
its  numerical  superiority  over  the  South 
in  land  and  air  forces.  They  have  further- 
more in  Rangoon  descended  to  barbaric 
behavior  against  their  southern  coun- 
trymen, which  casts  grave  doubts  over 
theii-  protestations  of  peaceful  long-term 
intentions  and  which  violated  the 
sovereignty  of  a  neutral  country. 

In  view  of  these  economic  and  secu- 
rity challenges,  we  believe  our  resources 
should  be  allocated  to  accomplish  the 
following  objectives: 

•  To  strengthen  human  rights  and  the 
commitment  to  democracy  and  free 
markets  in  the  region; 

•  To  reduce  poverty  and  economic 
and  social  inequalities  which  foster 
violence  and  invite  external  interference; 

•  To  assure  access  to  the  markets  and 
raw  material  of  the  region; 

•  To  maintain  close,  cooperative  rela- 
tionships with  countries  in  strategic  prox- 
imity to  key  sealanes  of  communication; 
and 

•  To  protect  the  front-line  states 
(Korea  and  Thailand),  enhance  our  treaty 
relationships  (with  Korea,  the  Philippines, 
and  Thailand),  and  maintain  use  of 
military  facilities  in  the  Philippines. 

Accompanying  these  major  goals  are 
a  number  of  other  important  objectives 
such  as  effectively  coping  with  refugee 
flows  and  reducing  narcotics  cultivation 
and  trafficking. 


REGIONAL  PROGRAM  OVERVIEW 

As  has  been  the  case  since  FY  1983,  the 
development  and  security  assistance  pro- 
grams are  integrated  components  of  a 
single  program.  All  components  are 
directly  related  to  U.S.  interests  in  East 
Asia  and  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans. 

The  FY  1985  bilateral  foreign 
assistance  request  for  East  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  totals  approximately  $793  million 
and  would  be  an  increase  of  some  13.1% 
over  the  FY  1984  allocations  of  just  over 
$701  million.  Our  total  request  for 
economic  assistance— development 
assistance,  PL  480,  and  economic  support 
funds  (ESF)-is  for  $314.8  million  and 
would  represent  an  increase  of  about  22%i 
over  the  FY  1984  allocations  of  $258.1. 

Our  request  for  military  assist- 
ance—foreign military  sales  (FMS), 
military  assistance  progi'am  (MAP),  and 
international  military  education  and  train- 
ing (IMET)— on  the  other  hand  would 
total  $478.6  million  for  FY  1985  and 
represents  an  increase  of  only  8%  over 
the  FY  1984  allocations  of  $443.1. 

Because  of  the  strength  of  the  East 
Asian  countries  themselves,  the  level  of 
effort  required  of  us  in  the  region  is  pro- 
portionately a  very  small  share  of  the 
U.S.  worldwide  effort,  even  though  the 
region  itself  is  as  important  to  U.S.  in- 
terests as  any  other  region  of  the  world. 
The  East  Asian  share  of  the  FY  1985 
worldwide  bilateral  foreign  assistance  re- 
quest is  some  5.1%. 

East  Asia's  share  of  the  worldwide 
economic  and  military  assistance  alloca- 
tions for  FY  1985  would  be  approximately 
5%  and  8%,  respectively.  Korea,  facing 
the  most  formidable  regional  military 
threat,  requires  the  largest  allocation  of 
military  assistance. 

Perhaps  more  important  than  the 
arithmetic  balance  between  economic  and 
military  assistance  is  the  manner  in  which 
we  target  our  scarce  resources  to  meet 
those  problems  which  are  most  closely 
linked  to  our  national  interests. 

The  largest  recipients  of  development 
assistance  are  Thailand,  a  treaty  ally  and 
front-line  state;  the  Philippines,  also  a 
treaty  ally  and  the  host  country  for  im- 
portant joint  defense  facilities;  and  In- 
donesia, which  in  area  and  population  con- 
stitutes roughly  half  of  Southeast  Asia. 
All  of  these  states  have  shown  the 
capability  of  putting  development 
assistance  to  good  use.  They  also  sit 
astride  or  near  key  sea  lanes  of  com- 
munication. 

Notwithstanding  our  great  stake  in 
the  region,  its  vast  size,  and  the  for- 
midable threats  to  its  prosperity  and 


May  1984 


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53 


EAST  ASIA 


security,  our  FY  1985  request  levels  for 
most  program  recipients  are  essentially 
straight-lined  from  the  FY  1984  allocation 
with  little  or  no  compensation  for  infla- 
tion. We  are  requesting  a  6.2%  increase  in 
Indonesia's  total  request  level,  chiefly  to 
augment  its  PL  480  program,  a  proposal 
to  increase  Burma's  development 
assistance  by  $2.5  million,  and  modest 
IMET  increases  in  several  countries. 

The  Philippines  is  the  only  country  in 
the  region  for  which  we  are  seeking 
substantial  increases.  In  the  Philippines, 
we  have  I'equested  a  total  increase  in 
bilateral  assistance  programs  of  nearly 
$80  million  to  bring  the  total  program 
level  from  $151  million  in  FY  1984  to 
nearly  $231  million  for  FY  1985. 

This  level  is,  as  you  know,  in  accord- 
ance with  President  Reagan's  "best- 
effort"  pledge  to  seek  $900  million  of 
assistance  over  a  5-year  period  following 
the  review  of  our  Military  Bases  Agi-ee- 
ment  last  spring.  These  bases  have  im- 
mense strategic  value  for  the  United 
States.  Moreover,  the  U.S.  presence  and 
assistance  can  help  the  Philippines  to 
cope  more  effectively  with  its  difficult 
economic  and  security  pi-oblems. 

Some  92%  of  our  securitv  assistance 
(FMS,  MAP,  IMET,  ESF)  request  for  the 
region  is  allocated  to  Korea,  the  Philip- 
pines, and  Thailand.  This  assistance  helps 
to  deter  direct  military  threats  to  Korea 
and  Thailand  and  to  enhance  the  U.S. 
strategic  posture  in  Asia,  the  Pacific,  and 
Indian  Oceans  by  maintaining  the  use  of 
military  bases  in  the  Philippines. 

Our  FY  1985  military  assistance  re- 
cjuest  recognizes  that  countries  with  low 
per  capita  incomes  and  severe  debt  serv- 
icing problems  may  require  some  form  of 
concessional  financing.  The  Philippines 
fits  this  category,  and  we  have,  therefore, 
requested  that  half  of  the  FMS  ci-edits 
proposed  for  the  Philippines  be  offered  at 
a  concessional  interest  rate  of  5%.  Conces- 
sionality  for  the  Philippines  takes  into  ac- 
count the  serious  and  mounting  economic 
difficulties  it  is  experiencing. 

In  Indonesia  a  loss  of  export  earnings 
and  a  current  account  deficit  of  about  $6.5 
billion  last  year  also  indicates  the  need  for 
concessional  financing.  In  addition,  in  an 
effort  to  hold  down  our  overall  levels 
while  providing  necessary  assistance  to  a 
nonaligned  state  with  which  we  have  a 
very  important  relationship,  we  have  pro- 
posed reducing  Indonesia's  total  FMS 
levels  by  $5  million  from  FY  1984. 

Considering  the  extremely  heavy 
military  purchasing  requirements  forced 
on  South  Korea  by  the  continuing  North 
Korean  military  buildup,  we  are  re- 
questing 10/20  loan  terms  for  South 


54 

LLXiMJ* 


Korea.  This  fomi  of  concessionality  ex- 
tends the  loan  terms  for  a  country  to  pro- 
vide a  10-year  grace  period  in  which  only 
interest  is  paid  followed  by  a  20-year 
repayment  period.  In  this  way  we  can 
demonstrate  our  interest  in  helping  South 
Korea  deter  anothei-  attack  by  North 
Korea  w^hile  still  holding  our  FY  1985 
FMS  request  level  down  to  last  year's. 

Southeast  Asia 

Philippines.  The  Philippines  has  recently 
experienced  the  shock  of  the  Aquino 
assassination,  followed  by  demonstra- 
tions, some  political  changes,  and  growing 
economic  problems.  We  have  spoken  out 
clearly  on  these  issues.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment has  expressed  its  outrage  over 
Aquino's  murder,  and  we  have  urged  that 
it  be  investigated  quickly  and  vigorously 
with  a  view  to  bringing  the  perpetrators 
to  justice.  An  independent  board,  which 
has  gained  wide  respect  in  the  Philip- 
pines, is  now  investigating  this  crime. 

We  have  expressed  our  strong  desire 
for  rapid  political  normalization;  in  par- 
ticular, we  have  stressed  the  importance 
we  attach  to  the  Philippines'  holding  free 
and  impartial  elections  in  order  to  have  a 
clear  expression  of  the  public  will  and  to 
encourage  the  growth  of  a  new  genera- 
tion of  political  leaders. 

There  has  been  progress  in  this  area. 
A  new  presidential  succession  mechanism 
is  in  place.  In  response  to  opposition 
demands,  provinces  rather  than  regions 
will  be  the  new  geographic  units  for  elec- 
tions, and  a  new  voter  registration  will 
take  place.  A  new  election  code,  which  is 
acceptable  to  key  elements  of  the  opposi- 
tion, has  been  approved.  Many  key  op- 
position groups  are  presenting  candi- 
dates. Additionally,  President  Marcos  has 
agreed  to  appoint  some  new  independent 
members  on  the  election  commission. 

For  FY  1985,  we  are  placing  our  em- 
phasis in  the  Philippines  on  ESF.  We  are 
requesting  $180  million  in  economic  and 
security  assistance,  of  which  $95  million  is 
in  ESF.  We  have  substantially  increased 
economic  assistance.  Our  ESF  request  for 
the  FY  1985-89  period  is  $475  million,  up 
from  $200  million  in  the  previous  5-year 
period.  We  more  than  doubled  ESF,  an 
increase  of  137%. 

We  have  significantly  increased  our 
ESF  partly  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that 
providing  government  services  to  address 
the  economic  and  social  conditions  in  rural 
areas  is  vitally  important.  This  is  a  reality 
which  the  Philippine  Government  also 
recognizes.  ESF  takes  on  added  impor- 
tance because  of  the  deteriorating 
economy  during  the  past  year. 


Discussions  with  the  Philippine 
Government  concerning  the  use  of  ESF 
have  not  yet  been  concluded,  but  we  ex- 
pect that  half  of  the  funds  will  be  devoted 
to  a  continuation  of  such  development 
projects  as  school  consti-uction,  feeder 
roads,  and  municipal  development  in 
areas  adjacent  to  Clark  Air  Force  Base, 
infrastructure  development  in  provinces 
near  our  bases,  rural  energy  develop- 
ment, and  construction  of  market 
facilities,  roads,  and  schools  throughout 
the  Philippines.  The  other  half  of  the  FY 
1985  ESF  program  will  be  devoted  to  a 
new  activity:  local  currency  supporting 
the  Philippine  Government's  contribution 
to  ongoing  Agency  for  International 
Development  (AID),  World  Bank,  and 
Asian  Development  Bank  activities. 

We  are  requesting  $39  million  in 
development  assistance  and  $9.75  million 
in  PL  480  Title  II  (excluding  World  Food 
Progi-am  donations  of  $209,000).  The 
global  recession,  with  low  commodity 
prices  and  high  interest  rates  for  external 
borrowing,  have  slowed  exjDort  and  eco- 
nomic growth.  Depressed  domestic 
demand  and  investment  activity  have  fur- 
ther aggi-avated  fiscal  and  balance-of- 
payments  problems.  Rural  areas  and 
poverty  groups  have  been  particularly 
hard  hit  by  the  economic  slowdown. 

Some  4  million  households  in  the 
Philippines  are  considered  below  the 
poverty  line.  The  development  assistance 
program  focuses  on  the  poorer  regions  of 
the  country  with  emphasis  on  agricultural 
production,  rural  employment  generation, 
and  family  plaiming.  PL  480  assistance 
also  has  been  centered  in  rural  areas. 
These  programs  contribute  to  develop- 
ment and  stability  in  the  Philippines. 

The  value  of  our  military  facilities  in 
the  Philippines  remains  unchanged.  For- 
tunately throughout  the  recent  difficul- 
ties, the  attitude  of  the  Philippine  people 
toward  the  United  States  has  i-emained 
constant,  and  support  for  our  military 
presence  continues  without  any  signifi- 
cant change. 

The  requested  security  assistance 
levels  for  the  Philippines  are  closely 
linked  to  the  5-year  review  of  the  Military 
Bases  Agreement  conducted  in  April-May 
1983.  On  the  day  the  review  was  suc- 
cessfully completed,  President  Reagan,  in 
a  letter  to  President  Marcos,  made  a 
"best  efforts"  pledge  to  seek  $900  million 
in  security  assistance  for  FY  1985-89. 

Military  cooperation  is  an  integi-al 
part  of  the  U.S.-Philippine  relationship 
and  has  been  so  since  the  independence  of 
that  nation.  We  use  facilities  which  are 
located  on  Philippine  bases,  work  closely 
with  our  military  hosts,  and  enjoy 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


unhampered  use  of  these  facilities.  The 
Philippines  has  always  procured  the  bulk 
of  its  military  equipment  from  the  United 
States. 

For  a  number  of  years,  the  military's 
share  of  the  national  budget  in  the  Philip- 
pines has  been  smaller  than  that  of  any 
other  Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN)  member.  Although  the 
size  of  the  military  establishment  has 
gi'own  in  the  past  decade,  its  arsenal  re- 
mains very  obsolete.  Yet,  it  is  the  Philip- 
pines, alone  among  ASEAN  countries, 
that  faces  serious,  active  insurgencies. 

The  communist-sponsored  insurgency, 
if  unchecked,  would  inflict  suffering  on 
the  Philippine  people  and  ultimately 
threaten  U.S.  interests.  In  addition,  while 
the  Philippines  does  not  face  any  immi- 
nent foreign  threat,  the  Soviet  military 
presence  in  the  region  has  increased,  and 
the  Philippines  does  require  a  modest 
deterrent  capability. 

We  have  significantly  increased  our 
request  for  IMET  to  $2  miUion.  Philippine 
Government  financial  constraints  have 
resulted  in  a  les.sening  of  the  Philippines' 
contribution  to  the  program,  whose  value 
to  both  countries  has,  if  anything,  grown. 
In  this  period  of  change  and  upheaval  in 
the  Philippines,  it  is  more  important  than 
ever  that  we  strengthen  the  existing 
close  personal  ties  with  its  younger 
military  leaders,  whose  professionalism 
has  been  one  of  the  country's  strengths. 

We  have  included  MAP  in  the  Philip- 
pine program  for  the  first  time  in  4  years, 
the  recognition  of  the  serious  economic 
situation  there.  We  expect  the  Philippine 
Government  to  request  use  of  MAP  and 
FMS  financing  for-  helicopters,  trucks, 
and  armored  vehicles;  communications 
and  engineering  equipment;  new  patrol 
vessels;  retrofitting  of  ships;  and  spare 
parts  for  major  items  of  equipment. 

We  are  requesting  $25  million  in  MAP 
and  $60  million  in  FMS.  The  combined 
FMS/MAP  total  of  $85  million  compares 
with  $50  million  last  year.  Our  FY 
1985-89  request  is  for  FMS/MAP  of  $425 
million  compared  with  $300  million  the 
previous  years,  an  increase  of  42%.  These 
increases  are  less  than  they  appear 
because  inflation  has  eroded  the  Philip- 
pine package  which  had  maintained  con- 
stant levels  since  1979.  Moreover,  Philip- 
pine needs  increased  significantly  in  in- 
tervening years,  and  the  Philippine 
Government  suffered  severe  budgetary 
difficulties. 

Thailand.  Thailand  has  been  a  close 
treaty  ally  for  decades.  Our  support  for 
Thailand's  continued  development  and 
security  is  seen  as  a  gauge  of  the  Ameri- 
can commitment  to  Thailand  and  to 
ASEAN  generally. 


On  its  eastern  border,  Thailand  faces 
a  strong,  well-proven  Vietnamese  military 
threat,  in  position  there  since  late  1978. 
This  has  prompted  an  overdue  moderniza- 
tion of  Thailand's  military  forces  designed 
to  provide  a  deterrent  to  further  Viet- 
namese aggression.  The  Thai  must  be  ac- 
corded a  high  priority  in  the  allocation  of 
assistance  to  enable  them  to  enhance 
their  self-reliance. 

Our  MAP  request  is  $5  million,  the 
same  as  for  last  year.  This  is  the  only 
form  of  concessionality  in  our  Thai 
assistance  package  which  can  go  for 
equipment  purchases. 

We  are  requesting  $98  million  in  FMS 
funding,  an  increase  of  $4  million  over  last 
year's  amount.  These  funds  will  go  for  a 
long  overdue  upgrading  of  Thai  Air  Force 
equipment;  for  the  army's  acquisition  of 
additional  armor,  radar,  armored  person- 
nel carriers,  and  howitzers;  and  navy 
missiles  for  new  patrol  craft  it  has 
ordered. 

For  IMET  funds,  we  are  asking  $2.4 
million,  an  increase  of  $200,000  over  FY 
1984.  These  funds  will  cover  necessary 
training  for  newly  acquired  equipment. 
The  Thai  invariably  make  good  use  of 
IMET  and  are  eager  to  acquire  the 
technical  skills  needed  to  use  and  main- 
tain modern  equipment. 

The  Thai  economy,  even  while  sad- 
dled with  heavy  defense  requirements, 
has  performed  reasonably  well.  Social  and 
economic  development  needs  are  not  be- 
ing ignored  because  of  defense  spending. 
Thailand's  free  market  economy  and  open 
society  have  thus  far  been  able  to  balance 
these  interests  skillfully.  Security 
assistance  from  the  United  States  has 
been  pivotal. 

Our  development  assistance  request 
of  $27  million  represents  a  modest 
decrease  from  last  year's  figure  of  $29.3 
million.  It  contributes,  however,  to 
Thailand's  continued  emphasis  on  balanc- 
ing necessary  defense  expenditures  with 
domestic  development  expenditures.  Part 
of  this  assistance  will  go  to  projects 
designed  to  deal  with  rural  poverty  in  the 
northeast,  where  the  communist  in- 
surgency once  flourished.  A  new  AID 
strategy  emphasizing  science  and 
technology  is  being  developed  for 
Thailand  as  well. 

Thailand,  with  our  help,  is  determined 
not  to  abandon  these  villagers.  ESF  funds 
also  directly  contribute  to  the  upholding 
of  Thailand's  policy  of  first  asylum  for 
refugees,  by  assisting  refugee  impact  on 
Thai  border  villages. 

Despite  some  pushoff  problems,  the 
Thai  have  continued  to  support  the 
refugee  program.  They  have  granted  first 


EAST  ASIA 


asylum  to  over  600,000  refugees  since 
1975,  including  80,000  boat  people,  and 
have  132,000  in  refugee  camps  now 
awaiting  resettlement,  thereby  con- 
tributing significantly  to  international  ef- 
forts to  cope  with  aggressive  Vietnamese 
policies. 

The  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  (UNHCR)-Thai  antipiracy  pro- 
gram, to  which  we  contribute,  has  not 
produced  the  results  we  had  hoped  for. 
Although  there  is  active  patrolling— air 
and  sea— by  the  Royal  Thai  Navy,  no 
pirates  have  been  apprehended  since  the 
inception  of  the  program.  Piracy  attacks 
also  still  occur  on  many  refugee  boats  but 
the  incidence  has  decreased  from  about 
70-80%  in  1982  to  50-60%  in  late  1983.  A 
UNHCR  assessment  team  has  reviewed, 
the  program  and  suggested  a  number  of 
improvements  that  we  support.  The 
Royal  Thai  Government  is  considering 
these  proposals. 

On  its  eastern  border,  Thailand  faces 
a  strong,  well-proven  Vietnamese  military 
threat,  in  position  there  since  late  1978. 
This  has  prompted  an  overdue  moderniza- 
tion of  Thailand's  military  forces.  This 
modernization,  which  has  had  our  sup- 
port, will  not  make  Thailand  a  match  for 
the  Vietnamese.  It  will,  however,  in  con- 
junction with  other  efforts,  provide  a 
deterrent  to  further  Vietnamese  aggres- 
sion. In  order  to  provide  a  credible  deter- 
rent which  will  enable  Thailand  to  become 
more  self-sufficient  in  an  emergency,  the 
Thai  must  be  accorded  a  high  priority  in 
the  allocation  of  assistance. 

Indonesia.  The  geostrategic 
significance  of  Indonesia's  location  and 
size  and  its  standing  as  a  moderate  among 
nonaligned  nations  and  in  the  Islamic 
world  add  to  the  importance  of  our  rela- 
tionship. Development  and  security 
assistance  to  Indonesia  is  also  consistent 
with  our  strong  support  for  ASEAN, 
which  represents  the  best  hope  for  peace 
and  stability  in  Southeast  Asia. 

A  strong  and  moderately  growing 
development  assistance  program  in  In- 
donesia is  necessary  to  increase  man- 
power and  management  skills,  to  advance 
agi'icultural  research,  to  continue  to 
upgrade  Indonesia's  educational  system, 
and  to  promote  the  private  sector's  role  in 
economic  development. 

Development  assistance  of  $65  million 
is  being  requested  for  Indonesia  for  FY 
1985,  an  increase  of  $1  million  over  the 
FY  1984  allocation.  An  increase  in  PL 
480,  Title  I  assistance  to  $40  million  is  re- 
quested in  recognition  that  rice  and  grain 
supplies  have  been  diminished  by  late 
rains  and  droughts  in  some  areas.  Food 


May  1984 


BBBBBBBBBBBBBni 


EAST  ASIA 


stocks  need  to  be  maintained  at  accept- 
able levels  in  order  to  forestall  hardship 
and  social  unrest,  as  well  as  to  provide 
adecjuate  emergency  shipments  to  im- 
poverished areas.  A  PL  480,  Title  II  re- 
quest of  a  little  over  $7.7  million  supports 
voluntary  agency  pi'ograms  and  the 
World  Food  Program. 

The  reciuested  FY  1985  security 
assistance  progi-am  for  Indonesia  consists 
of  $2.7  million  in  IMET  funding,  plus  $40 
million  in  FMS  du-ect  loans,  half  of  this 
amount  at  concessional  interest  rates  and 
half  at  treasury  rates.  This  mix  of  conces- 
sional and  treasury  rates  is  considered 
necessary  to  assist  Indonesia  in  recover- 
ing from  the  effects  of  the  worldwide 
recession  and  serious  budgetary  shortfalls 
due  to  declining  oil  and  non-oil  export 
revenue  in  1981-82.  In  addition  to  the 
FMS  credit  program,  Indonesia  is  ex- 
pected to  purchase  some  equipment 
through  FMS  cash  procedures. 

Indonesia's  military  forces  remain 
critically  short  of  ciualified  technicians, 
program  managers,  and  officers.  Most 
U.S.  training  will  be  in  technical  fields 
related  to  these  shortages.  The  level  of 
funding  requested  should  permit  between 
250  and  300  military  students  to  attend 
our  armed  forces  schools  in  FY  1985. 

IMET  deserves  the  highest  priority 
support  because  of  the  important  role 
played  by  the  professional  military  in  In- 
donesian society,  the  utility  of  the  pro- 
gram in  furthering  our  foreign  relations 
objectives,  and  the  desirability  of  mutual 
service-to-service  contacts. 

Although  Indonesia's  recent  economic 
problems  have  caused  a  slowdown  in 
military  force  modernization,  U.S.  secu- 
rity assistance  has  helped  to  sustain  a 
number  of  important  programs,  including 
aircraft  maintenance  and  spare  parts, 
ship  overhaul  and  spare  parts,  im- 
provements in  air  and  sea  defense 
systems,  the  purchase  of  war  reserve 
munitions,  and,  most  importantly,  ad- 
vanced professional  training  for  the  In- 
donesian Army,  Navy,  and  Au-  Force. 

Malaysia.  U.S.-Malaysian  relations 
are  good  and  were  enhanced  by  the 
January  visit  to  Washington  of  Prime 
Minister  Mahathir  bin  Mohamad. 
Malaysia's  continued  political  stability 
and  economic  development  are  important 
to  peace  and  stability  in  Southeast  Asia. 
The  Malaysians  have  also  expressed  in- 
terest in  continued  defense  cooperation 
with  the  United  States  within  the  context 
of  their  nonaligned  status. 

Strategically  located  on  the  Strait  of 
Malacca  and  faced  with  Soviet-backed 
Vietnamese  forces  occupying  nearby 


Kampuchea,  Malaysia  is  a  responsible 
member  of  the  Islamic  Conference  and 
Nonaligned  Movement.  Malaysia  has 
played  a  constructive  role  in  international 
affairs  and  has  forcefully  advanced 
ASEAN's  strategy  to  bring  about  a 
withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  forces  from 
Kampuchea. 

IMET  plays  a  significant  role  in  the 
U.S.-Malaysian  military  relationship  by 
providing  a  framework  in  which  mutually 
beneficial  professional  relationships  are 
established.  The  IMET  request  of  $1 
million  is  a  slight  increase  from  the 
$900,000  level  of  FY  1984.  The  IMET  pro- 
gram also  provides  an  important  means 
for  the  Malaysian  Armed  Forces  to  meet 
their  training  needs  as  they  attempt  to 
adjust  to  a  more  conventional  force  struc- 
ture and  sophisticated  weaponry. 

The  $10  million  FMS  request  level  for 
Malaysia  in  FY  1985  is  an  increase  from 
the  FY  1983  level  of  $4  million  and  would 
restore  the  program  to  its  FY  1982  level. 
Although  Malaysia  has  not  in  the  past 
made  extensive  use  of  FMS  credits,  addi- 
tional purchases  are  now  likely  as  its 
economy  improves  and  the  restrictions  of 
the  government  austerity  progi-am  are 
eased.  Possible  purchases  include  trans- 
port aircraft,  naval  vessels  capable  of 
patrohng  its  exclusive  economic  zone,  and 
weapon  systems  designed  to  enhance  the 
modernization  of  Malaysia's  Armed 
Forces. 

Singapore.  The  U.S.  enjoys  extensive 
commercial  relations  with  Singapore, 
which  is  the  site  for  many  U.S.  business 
regional  headquarters.  Although  formally 
nonaligned,  Singapore  shares  U.S. 
strategic  perceptions  and  goals,  and  its 
positions  in  international  fora  support  in- 
terests common  to  both  our  countries. 

Physically  a  tiny  city-state,  Singapore 
has  come  to  play  a  role  in  Southeast  Asia 
completely  out  of  proportion  to  its  size. 
Strategically  located  at  the  juncture  of 
the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans,  Singapore 
permits  valuable  access  for  our  military 
forces  to  its  modern  ship  and  aircraft  sup- 
port facilities.  It  opposes  an  increased 
Soviet  presence  in  Southeast  Asia  and 
supports  a  continuing  regional  security 
role  for  the  United  States  as  a  barrier  to 
Soviet  expansion. 

For  FY  1985  we  are  again  requesting 
an  IMET  progi-am  of  $50,000.  This 
modest  amount  of  assistance  serves  to 
demonstrate  our  continuing  interest  in 
Singapore's  security  and  helps  ensure 
that  its  armed  forces  continue  to  look  to 
the  United  States  for  training  and  equip- 
ment purchases. 


Brunei.  Brunei  became  fully  inde- 
pendent January  1,  1984,  and  has  subse- 
quently become  a  member  of  ASEAN.  As 
ASEAN  is  the  focus  of  U.S.  policy  in 
Southeast  Asia,  close  ties  with  all  its  in- 
dividual members  are  important. 

Oil-rich  Brunei  offers  significant  com- 
mercial opportunities  for  U.S.  business 
and  investment.  In  addition  the  Brunei 
defense  force  which  consists  of  the  Royal 
Brunei  Malay  Regiment,  numbering  ap- 
proximately 3,000  men,  has  expressed  in- 
terest in  close  ties  with  the  U.S.  Armed 
Forces. 

Our  security  assistance  request  for 
FY  1985  consists  solely  of  $30,000  in 
IMET.  This  is  designed  to  furnish  re- 
quired training  as  the  Bruneian  Armed 
Forces  prepare  to  assume  greater  respon- 
sibility. Further  assistance  will  not  be  re- 
quu'ed,  but  it  is  possible  that  Brunei  may 
in  time  consider  FMS  cash  purchases. 

ASEAN.  The  cornerstone  of  our 
policy  in  Southeast  Asia  is  support  for  the 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations, 
which  has  been  a  highly  effective  force  for 
stability  and  prosperity  in  the  region.  In 
addition  to  the  bilateral  assistance  pro- 
grams to  its  six  members,  we  have 
developed  a  limited  but  high  quality 
cooperative  regional  assistance  program 
as  a  further  indication  of  our  commitment 
to  the  organization.  Focusing  on  areas  of 
special  concern  to  ASEAN,  we  have 
funded  technical  assistance  activities  in 
watershed  management,  energy  and  plant 
quarantine,  as  well  as  visits  to  the  United 
States  by  media  leaders.  We  are  just  ini- 
tiating a  new  program  for  small  business 
requested  by  ASEAN,  and  we  will  also 
suppoit  a  U.S.  private  sector  effort  to 
enhance  technology  cooperation  with  the 
ASEAN  business  sector.  We  are  re- 
questing $4.8  million  for  this  progi-am,  a 
slight  inci'ease  over  our  FY  1984  request 
of  $4.5  million. 

Burma.  Our  principal  objectives  in 
Burma  are  to  help  prevent  the  cultivation 
and  trafficking  of  illicit  Bunnese  narcotics 
to  international  markets  and  to  encourage 
Bui-ma's  evolution  toward  a  stable,  pros- 
perous, and  more  open  society  which  will 
contribute  to  stability  in  Southeast  Asia. 

Burma's  leadership  remains  commit- 
ted to  nonalignment,  socialism,  and  self- 
reliance.  However,  within  that  context,  it 
has  moved  toward  closer  cooperation  with 
the  West,  including  the  United 
States,  particularly  in  such  areas  as 
development,  advanced  technical  training, 
and  educational  exchanges.  Burma 
recently  broke  diplomatic  relations  with 
North  Korea  over  the  October  9,  1988, 
terrorist  bombing  in  Rangoon  which  was 
carried  out  by  North  Korean  commandos. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


As  part  of  its  opening  to  the  West,  the 
Burmese  Government  has  welcomed  ex- 
panded bilateral  cooperation  with  the 
United  States  in  areas  such  as  narcotics 
control,  where  we  are  assisting  Burmese 
efforts  to  suppress  opium  cultivation  and 
trafficking.  Both  our  narcotics  and  our 
development  assistance  programs  have 
responded  to  specific  Burmese  requests 
and  have  led  to  a  gradual  strengthening 
of  our  bilateral  relations. 

The  $15  million  in  development 
assistance  proposed  for  FY  1985  will 
enable  AID  to  continue  its  support  of 
Burmese  efforts  to  improve  rural  primary 
health  care,  to  increase  the  production  of 
food  and  oilseed  crops,  and  to  modernize 
oilseeds  processing  and  distribution.  It 
will  also  provide  funds  for  a  new 
agricultural  research  and  development 
project. 

The  modest  budget  increase  proposed 
($2.5  million  over  the  FY  1984  level)  will 
maintain  the  momentum  of  our  recently 
established  AID  program,  assist  BuiTnese 
development  efforts  in  a  promising  new 
area,  and  demonstrate  to  the  Burmese 
that  we  are  serious  about  helping  them  to 
meet  their  development  needs. 

The  proposed  increase  in  IMET  fund- 
ing to  $300,000  for  FY  1985  will  provide 
additional  training  opportunities  in  the 
United  States  for  Burmese  military  of 
fleers.  The  Burmese  Ministry  of  Defense 
attaches  considerable  importance  to  this 
program  and  has  taken  pains  to  select  its 
most  promising  officers  for  training  in  the 
United  States.  Since  1981  approximately 
50  such  officers  have  gained  exposure  to 
U.S.  concepts  and  methods  by  attending 
courses  in  helicopter  maintenance,  field 
artillery,  and  other  subjects.  Since  the 
military  plays  a  central  role  in  contem- 
porary Burma,  IMET  training  should 
have  a  favorable  long-term  impact  on 
Burmese  attitudes  toward  the  United 
States. 

Laos.  Bilateral  developmental 
assistance  to  Laos  is  at  present  prohibited 
by  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act.  The  Ad- 
ministration has  told  officials  of  the  Lao 
People's  Democratic  Republic  that  action 
to  lift  the  congressional  ban  on  assistance 
would  be  possible  only  once  a  pattern  of 
sustained  cooperation  had  been  estab- 
lished toward  resolving  the  fate  of 
Americans  missing  in  Laos  from  the  war 
in  Indochina. 

Such  a  pattern  of  sustained  coopera- 
tion has  not  yet  been  established, 
although  we  are  encouraged  by  recent 
progress  on  this  issue,  including  the 
December  1983  crash  site  survey  by  the 
Joint  Casualty  Resolution  Center.  If 


future  progress  develops  into  a  pattern  of 
sustained  cooperation,  the  Administration 
would  consult  with  members  of  Congress 
on  the  question  of  lifting  the  ban  on 
assistance  to  Laos. 

Korea 

Continued  peace  and  stability  in  North- 
east Asia  is  essential  to  our  own  security. 
The  prevention  of  North  Korean  aggres- 
sion against  South  Korea  is  indispensable 
for  peace  and  stability  in  the  region  and 
the  world.  For  the  past  30  years,  the 
U.S.-R.O.K.  alliance  has  been  successful 
in  its  central  aim— deterring  aggression 
and  preventing  a  recurrence  of  hostilities 
on  the  Korean  Peninsula.  This  absence  of 
hostilities— marked  though  it  has  been 
from  time  to  time  by  examples  of  North 
Korean  aggression  such  as  the  Pueblo  in- 
cident, the  raid  on  the  Blue  House,  or, 
more  recently,  the  North  Korean  attack 
in  Rangoon— has  allowed  great  economic 
and  social  progress  in  South  Korea. 

In  spite  of  South  Korea's  impressive 
development,  the  need  for  continued  U.S. 
security  assistance  is  as  strong  as  ever. 
In  the  past  decade.  North  Korea,  which 
we  estimate  spends  over  20%  of  its  GNP 
on  armaments,  has  carried  out  a  major 
force  buildup  which  has  seriously  affected 
the  military  balance  on  the  peninsula. 

North  Korea  has  about  25%  more 
armed  forces  than  the  South  and  2V2 
times  as  many  armored  personnel  car- 
riers, artillery  pieces,  and  tanks.  North 
Korean  tanks  are  larger  and  more 
modem  than  those  of  the  R.O.K.  The 
North  also  maintains  a  100,000-man  com- 
mando force,  probably  the  largest  such 
force  in  the  world.  With  major  elements 
of  its  forces  only  35  miles  from  Seoul,  the 
North  could  launch  an  attack  with  very 
little  notice. 

To  counter  this  threat,  the  R.O.K. , 
which  spends  6%  of  its  GNP  on  defense, 
is  engaged  in  a  major  force  improvement 
program  designed  to  increase  warning 
time,  augment  its  effective  firepower,  and 
enhance  its  air  defense  capability.  The 
progi'am,  which  includes  coproduction  of 
the  F-5  and  acquisition  of  the  F-16,  TOW 
missiles  [tube  launched,  optically  tracked, 
wire-guided  antitank  missiles],  and  Hawk 
modifications,  will  cost  several  billion 
dollars  during  the  FY  1982-86  period, 
with  almost  half  slated  for  procurement 
from  the  United  States. 

To  assist  the  vital  efforts  of  this  front- 
line ally,  we  provided  a  total  of  $185 
million  in  FMS  credits  in  FY  1983  and 
plan  to  provide  $230  million  in  FY  1984.  It 
is  worth  noting  in  this  regard  that  during 
FY  1982,  the  R.O.K.  paid  some  $254 


million  to  the  U.S.  Government  in  prin- 
cipal and  interest  charges  for  previous 
loans,  e.xceeding  by  about  $88  million  the 
amount  of  new  credits  provided  in  that 
year. 

To  ease  the  burden  Korea  faces  in 
maintaining  a  credible  deterrent,  we  are 
proposing  $230  million  FMS  credits  for 
the  R.O.K.,  the  same  amount  it  should 
receive  in  FY  1984.  We  also  are  seeking 
legislation  to  provide  a  10-year  grace  and 
20-year  repayment  terms  for  Korea.  This 
will  enable  Korea  to  devote  a  larger  pro- 
portion of  each  year's  allocation  to  actual 
weapons  purchases,  thereby  permitting 
the  force  improvement  program  to  pro- 
ceed on  schedule. 

Our  Korean  ally  is  doing  its  utmost 
for  its  own  security.  It  is  clearly  in  the 
American  interest  to  help  Korea  meet  its 
force  improvement  goals  and  mutual 
security  objectives.  We  should  bear  in 
mind  that  Korean  combat  forces,  whose 
capabilities  are  enhanced  by  FMS  credits, 
are  stationed  with  our  own  forces  along 
the  DMZ  and  would  operate  with  us 
under  a  joint  command  in  time  of  war. 
Thus,  we  have  a  very  direct  stake  in  the 
force  improvement  efforts  of  this  front- 
line ally. 

Pacific  Islands 

Since  World  War  II,  the  Pacific  Islands 
have  undergone  great  changes,  and  in  the 
past  20  years  most  have  become 
independent  states.  Our  relations  with 
them  are  friendly;  we  share  to  a 
remarkable  degi'ee  a  belief  in  democratic 
government  and  devotion  to  individual 
liberties.  It  is  in  the  U.S.  interest  to 
assist  island  governments  in  their  efforts 
to  promote  economic  growth. 

For  FY  1985  we  have  requested  $6 
million  in  development  assistance  to  sup- 
port a  region-wide  program  with  em- 
phasis on  improving  agricultural  rural 
development  and  fishing  techniques  and 
to  promote  regional  cooperation  in  this 
area  of  small  populations  and  small 
markets. 

World  War  II  also  demonstrated  the 
importance  of  the  Pacific  Islands  to  our 
security.  These  islands  lie  across  the  Hnes 
of  communication  between  the  U.S.  west 
coast  and  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and 
Southeast  Asia.  Our  military  assistance 
would  consist  of  small  IMET  programs 
with  a  total  dollar  value  of  $190,000. 

Fiji.  Fiji  is  a  functioning  democracy 
and  a  leader  in  regional  organizations. 
Our  bilateral  relations  are  excellent.  Fiji 
also  makes  important  contributions  to  in- 
ternational peacekeeping  efforts.  The 


May  1984 


Ki    '      I  '''  III* 


1 


EAST  ASIA 


Royal  Fiji  Military  Forces  maintains 
more  troops  with  the  Sinai  multilateral 
force  and  observers  (MFO)  and  with  the 
UN  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL) 
than  are  on  duty  in  Fiji  itself. 

Our  $80,000  IMET  pi-ogram  re- 
quested for  FY  1985  represents  no  in- 
crease over  FY  1984's  funding  level.  The 
money  would  assist  the  Royal  Fiji 
Military  Forces  in  acquii-ing  needed  pro- 
fessional and  technical  skills  to  better 
operate  a  small  but  modern  defense  force. 

Papua  New  Guinea.  The  United 
States  has  enjoyed  friendly  relations  with 
Papua  New  Guinea  before  and  since  its 
independence  from  Australia  in  1975.  The 
country's  size,  strategic  location,  and 
resources  make  it  a  major  actor  in  the 
South  Pacific. 

Papua  New  Guinea,  which  maintains 
the  largest  defense  force  in  the  Pacific 
Island  region,  is  expected  to  use  its 
IMET  grant  to  provide  training  in  im- 
proving logistics,  management,  and  ad- 
ministrative capabilities  and  search  and 
rescue  techniques.  The  proposed  FY  1985 
IMET  program  of  $50,000  represents  an 
increase  of  $20,000  over  last  year's  alloca- 
tion. 

Tonga.  Tonga  continues  to  be  a 
reliable  friend  for  the  United  States  in 
the  South  Pacific.  The  Tongan  Govern- 
ment has  welcomed  port  calls  by  the  U.S. 
Navy  and  has  stated  its  willingness  to 
host'nuclear  powered  vessels  even  when 
other  island  governments,  concerned  over 
an  upsurge  in  public  sensitivity  to  nuclear 
matters,  have  been  reluctant  to  do  so. 
The  proposed  FY  1985  IMET  funds  are 
expected  to  be  used  for  training  in 
management  and  maintenance  and  repair 
skills.  The  IMET  program  of  $30,000 
represents  no  increase  over  FY  1984. 

Solomon  Islands.  The  Solomon 
Islands,  independent  since  1978,  is  the 
second  largest  of  the  Pacific  Islands 
states  in  area  and  the  third  largest  in 
population.  Its  foreign  policy  has  been 
markedly  pro-Western.  The  government 
is  attempting  to  upgrade  its  rudimentary 
defense  force  with  the  objectives  of 
assisting  in  creating  skills  necessary  for 
effective  control  and  maintenance  of 
security  and  management  of  forces.  The 
requested  FY  1985  IMET  level  is  $30,000 
and,  as  a  new  progi-am,  represents  a 
positive  U.S.  response  to  the  expressed 
interest  of  the  Solomon  Islands  in  obtain- 
ing assistance  in  upgrading  their  military 
skills. 


Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific 
Islands.  The  United  States  has  ad- 
ministered the  Trust  Territory  of  the 
Pacific  Islands  (TTPI)  since  World  War  II 
and,  since  1947,  under  a  trusteeship 
agreement  with  the  United  Nations. 
Since  1969  we  have  been  negotiating  with 
the  leadership  of  the  TTPI  for  new 
political  relationships. 

Last  year  two  of  the  island  govern- 
ments—the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia  (FSM)  and  the  Republic  of  the 
Marshall  Islands-completed  all  the  nec- 
essary procedures  to  enter  into  a  new  and 
unique  relationship  with  the  United 
States,  that  of  freely  associated  states. 
The  Administration  is  submitting  the 
Compact  of  Free  Association  to  this  Con- 
gress in  order  to  complete  the  process  on 
our  side  and  initiate  the  new  relationship 
with  the  FSM  and  the  Marshalls. 
For  FY  1985  we  will  request 
$295,490,000  for  the  compact  upon  the 
enactment  of  the  necessary  authorizing 
legislation. 

The  compact  will  regulate  the  rela- 
tionships between  the  United  States  and 
the  Marshall  Islands  and  the  FSM.  Under 
the  compact,  the  United  States  is  granted 
full  powers  and  authority  for  defense  and 
security  matters,  including  the  right  to 
establish  military  bases  and  support  ac- 
tivities, throughout  the  freely  associated 
states.  The  compact  specifies  the  amounts 
and  attendant  objectives  and  purposes  of 
U.S.  grant  and  service  assistance  to  each 
of  the  freely  associated  states. 

The  overall  policy  goals  of  the  United 
States  with  regard  to  the  compact  are 
based  on  a  review  of  U.S.  policy  by  the 
senior  interagency  group  on  foreign 
policy  and  were  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent'on  September  21,  1981.  An  impor- 
tant policy  goal  of  the  United  States  is  to 
see  political  stability  in  the  freely 
associated  states.  The  compact  also  im- 
plements long-term  U.S.  national  security 
requirements  and  provides  the  basis  for 
the  accomplishment  of  shorter  term  con- 
tingency basing  and  logistic  needs.  The 
compact  accomplishes  the  equally  impor- 
tant goal  of  political  stability  through  pro- 
vision of  annual  grant  assistance. 

The  first  year  estimate  exceeds  by 
$152.8  million  the  second  year  estimate 
and  exceeds  by  $146.2  million  the  average 
annual  budget  estimate.  This  is  due  to  the 
inclusion  of  several  one-time  payments, 
the  most  significant  of  which  is  a  one-time 
$150  million  payment  for  the  settlement 
of  all  claims  resulting  from  the  U.S. 
nuclear  weapons  testing  program  in  the 
Marshall  Islands. 


China 

I  now  want  to  emphasize  the  importance 
the  Administration  places  on  completing 
action  on  proposed  legislative  changes  for 
China. 

Our  expanding  economic,  scientific, 
and  cultural  ties  have  been  mutually 
beneficial  and  have  become  a  very  impor- 
tant element  of  our  overall  relationship. 
Our  commercial  relations  are  particularly 
healthy  and  hold  great  promise  for  both 
countries.  Since  the  establishment  of 
diplomatic  relations  in  January  1979, 
trade  with  China  has  grown  dramatically 
resulting  in  a  U.S.  trade  surplus  of  ap- 
proximately $6  billion  in  5  years.  While 
two-way  trade  declined  in  both  1982  and 

1983  from  the  record  high  of  $5.5  billion  in 
1981,  we  expect  bilateral  trade  to  bounce 
back' to  between  $5.5  and  $7  billion  in 

1984  with  an  anticipated  increase  of  high 
technology  exports  to  China. 

We  share  a  broad  range  of  official  ex- 
changes-over 100  Chinese  delegations 
visit  the  United  States  each  month— and 
over  10,000  Chinese  students  now  study 
in  the  United  States.  The  21  protocols 
under  the  U.S.-China  science  and 
technology  agreement  have  promoted 
valuable  exchanges  in  such  widely  vary- 
ing fields  as  earthquake  studies, 
hydropower,  and  health. 

Our  rapprochement  with  China  over 
the  past  decade  has  also  made  important 
contributions  to  global  and  regional  peace 
and  stability.  China  shares  our  deep  con- 
cern about  Soviet  aggression  in  Afghan- 
istan and  the  Soviet-backed  occupation  of 
Kampuchea.  U.S.-China  relations  have 
meshed  well  with  our  existing  alliances 
and  security  relationships  in  Asia  and 
Europe.  The  recent  visit  of  Chinese 
Premier  Zhao  Ziyang  helped  to 
underscore  the  importance  of  a  stable  and 
enduring  U.S.-China  relationship. 

Consistent  with  our  growing  relation- 
ship. The  President,  in  June  1981,  decided 
to  seek  legislative  change  to  laws  that 
link  China  with  the  Soviet  bloc.  I  am 
pleased  to  note  that,  with  your  assistance, 
important  progress  was  made  in  this  ef- 
fort during  the  past  2  years  in  clarifying 
the  provisions  of  the  Agricultural  Trade 
Development  and  Assistance  Act  and  by 
lifting  the  prohibition  on  importation  of 
Chinese  furskins. 

The  proposal  to  eliminate  the  prohibi- 
tion of  foreign  assistance  to  China,  which 
was  submitted  to  the  Congi-ess  in  FY 
1983  and  again  in  our  1984  authorization 
bill,  received  favorable  consideration  in 
both  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  and 
House  Foreign  Affaii-s  Committees. 


58 


rtmont  nf  St3tp  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


However,  in  both  years,  the  overall  bill 
was  not  passed  for  reasons  uiii-elated  to 
China.  We  have  resubmitted  the  proposal 
concerning  China  in  this  year's  foreign 
assistance  bill. 

Amendment  of  the  Foreign  Assist- 
ance Act  would  allow  China  to  participate 
in  ongoing  AID  technical  assistance  pro- 
grams, under  current  funding  levels,  in 
the  same  manner  as  do  most  other  coun- 
tries. We  previously  provided  the  com- 
mittee staff  a  paper  outlining  the  type  of 
ongoing  projects  for  which  we  would  con- 
sider China's  participation.  I  would  stress 
that  Chinese  participation  in  these  pro- 
grams will  not  threaten  AID  programs 
with  other  countries  but  will  contribute  to 
China's  development  through  e.xisting 
AID  research  and  training  projects  while 
familiarizing  the  P.R.C.  with  commercial- 
ly available  U.S.  technology. 

Our  motive  in  seeking  this  change  is 
the  same  as  2  years  ago;  the  President 
wants  to  remove  an  anachronism  in  our 
laws  that  links  China  with  the  Soviet  bloc 
countries.  We  have  no  plans  for  bilateral 
assistance  programs,  although  some 
Chinese  have  e.xpressed  interest  in  low 
interest  loans.  Any  such  programs  would 
have  to  be  authorized  and  appropriated 
by  the  Congress. 


CONCLUSION 

In  conclusion  our  FY  1985  foreign 
assistance  request  is  designed  to  protect 
and  reinforce  the  great  strides  our  friends 
have  made  in  bringing  prosperity  and 
security  to  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific. 
Although  the  thi'eats  to  this  progress 
have  grown,  we  have  limited  our  request 
to  levels  essential  to  our  interests. 
Economic  and  military  assistance  pi'o- 
grams  are,  we  believe,  well  balanced  and 
both  are  targeted  against  economic  prob- 
lem areas  and  critical  military  threats. 
We  would  most  welcome  this  committee's 
support. 


FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  Europe 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  bv  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  Richard  K.  Burt 

StateitiCHt  hcfhre  the  Si(bconniiittee 
on  Eunijiciiii  mid  Middle  FJdst  Affairx  of 
the  Hoiisf  Fiircigii  Affairx  Cnnntiittee  on 
February  6,  19,%.  Mr.  Burt  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  European  and  Canadian 
Affairs.^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  speak  to  you  today  on  behalf  of  secu- 
rity assistance  requirements  for  the  Eu- 
ropean region  in  fiscal  year  1985.  Although 

the  counti'ies  of  the  Atlantic  alliance 
weathered  in  1983  a  major  challenge  to 
their  unity,  we  must  accept  the  fact  that 
1984  and  futui-e  years  will  bring  addi- 
tional challenges.  Fortunately,  the  vast 
majority  of  our  European  friends  and 
allies  possess  the  capacity  to  fulfill  their 
responsibilities  and  help  us  meet  these 
challenges  without  any  direct  U.S. 
assistance;  a  few,  however,  cannot  and 
need  our  help  if  they  are  to  be  able  to  do 
their  share  in  safeguarding  U.S.  and 
Western  interests. 

The  four  allies  which  do  require 
special  assistance  are  to  be  found  along 
the  northern  edge  of  the  Mediterranean. 
These  four  allies— Spain,  Portugal, 
Greece,  and  Turkey— constitute  much  of 
NATO's  southern  flank.  This  region  is 
critical  for  the  defense  of  the  central  front 
and  Europe  more  generally.  At  the  same 
time,  the  southern  flank  is  uniquely  im- 
portant for  another  reason— as  a  bridge 
across  Europe  linking  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Middle  East  and  Southwest  Asia.  As 
NATO  Foreign  and  Defense  Ministers 
regularly  note.  Western  interests  outside 
the  formal  treaty  area  can  and  do  affect 
the  well-being  of  every  alliance  member. 
The  countries  of  the  southern  flank,  by 
vLi'tue  of  their  location  along  major  East- 
West  air  and  sea  routes,  have  the  poten- 
tial to  make  a  special  contribution  to  this 
increasingly  important  dimension  of 
Western  security.  It  is  U.S.  assistance 
programs  which  can  turn  this  potential 
into  reality. 

But  in  speaking  of  the  future,  we 
ought  not  overlook  the  accomplishments 
of  the  recent  past.  Over  the  past  decade, 
each  of  these  four  countries  has  made  a 
difficult  but  crucial  transition  toward 
democracy.  Each  has  strengthened  its 
association  with  the  values  and  institu- 
tions of  the  West.  Each  has  negotiated  a 
major  base  agreement  with  the  United 


States.  And  in  each  and  every  case,  I 
believe  that  U.S.  .security  assistance  pro- 
grams have  constituted  an  integral  part 
of  this  evolution.  Our  economic  and 
military  assistance  programs  have  proven 
to  be  an  essential  foreign  policy  instru- 
ment. 

Portugal 

A  charter  member  of  NATO,  Portugal  is 
a  long-time,  steadfast,  and  reliable  ally  of 
the  United  States.  The  Portuguese 
Government  actively  supports  Western 
policies  in  international  fora,  most  notably 
on  Iran,  Afghanistan,  and  Poland.  Por- 
tugal holds  a  strategic  position  of  great 
importance  for  NATO  reinforcement  and 
resupply  and  including  non-NATO  con- 
tingencies. The  Lajes  Air  Base  is  critical 
to  these  missions.  Although  concei-ned 
that  expanded  U.S.  use  of  their  facilities 
for  non-NATO  purposes  could  expose 
Portugal  to  increased  military  and 
economic  risks,  Portugal  has  been  highly 
cooperative  in  allowing  use  of  its  bases, 
provided  that  theii-  relatively  modest 
military  and  economic  needs  can  be  taken 
into  account.  A  new  mutual  defense 
agreement  signed  in  December  1983  pro- 
vides the  United  States  continued  access 
to  the  critical  Lajes  facilities  and  reaf- 
firms the  strength  and  vitality  of  our 
security  relationship. 

Portugal  has  come  a  long  way  in 
establishing  a  working  democracy  since 
the  1974  revolution.  Portuguese  political 
parties,  both  in  government  and  in  op- 
position (with  the  exception  of  the  com- 
munists), are  pro- Western  and  agree  that 
Portugal  should  make  a  more  substantial, 
active  military  contribution  to  NATO. 
The  country's  Stalinist  Communist  Party, 
meanwhile,  has  been  thoroughly  dis- 
credited and,  while  controlling  almost 
20%  of  the  electorate,  has  no  chance  of 
participating  in  the  government.  We  sup- 
port Portugal's  increased  participation  in 
NATO  along  with  other  alliance  partners 
and  want  to  help  in  the  long-range  Por- 
tuguese military  modernization  effort. 

Military  modernization  has  a  long  way 
to  go,  however,  since  until  the  1974 
revolution  the  Portuguese  Armed  Forces 
were  largely  a  colonial  force,  heavy  on 
foot-soldiers  and  light  arms.  The  army 
has  been  restructured  to  more  modern 
proportions,  and  the  process  of  acquiring 
modern  equipment  has  begun,  in  accord- 


May   1984 


59 


EUROPE 


ance  with  NATO  force  goals.  It  is,  never- 
theless, clear  that  Portugal  will  not  be 
able  to  bear  the  burden  alone.  In  recogni- 
tion of  this,  we  and  other  NATO  partners 
are  cooperating  in  an  ad  hoc  committee  of 
NATO  to  coordinate  assistance  efforts. 

Portugal  is  one  of  the  poorest  NATO 
members,  experiencing  serious  economic 
difficulties  in  the  midst  of  a  stringent 
austerity  program  set  up  by  agreement 
with  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF).  In  addition,  the  country  is  facing  a 
major  adjustment  as  it  prepares  to  enter 
the  European  Communities  (EC).  It  is  in 
our  best  interest  to  provide  increased 
levels  of  economic  support  fund  (ESF) 
grants  to  support  the  Azores  and  the 
mainland  economies,  and  sufficient 
amounts  of  military  assistance  program 
(MAP)  grant  assistance  to  help  Portugal 
achieve  NATO  readiness  and  fulfill  its 
obligations  in  Europe  and  the  Atlantic. 

For  FY  1985,  we  have  requested  an 
ESF  grant  of  $80  million,  a  MAP  grant  of 
$70  million,  and  foreign  military  sales 
(FMS)  credits  of  $5.5  million  along  with  $3 
million  international  military  education 
and  training  (IMET)  funds.  This  level 
would  help  Portugal  to  obtain  U.S.  equip- 
ment for  three  antisubmarine  warfare 
frigates  (partially  fulfilling  our  commit- 
ment to  help  modernize  the  Portuguese 
Navy),  provide  funds  to  complete  the  ac- 
quisition of  a  second  squadron  of  A-7P 
aircraft,  vital  electronic  warfare  equip- 
ment for  the  NATO-dedicated  brigade, 
and  military  personnel  training.  The  ESF 
is  intended  to  provide  vital  budget  sup- 
port for  the  economically  pressed  Azores 
as  well  as  economic  assistance  to  the 
mainland.  In  addition,  it  will  help  finance 
the  establishment  of  a  Luso- American 
Development  Foundation,  intended  to  be 
a  clearinghouse  for  technical  assistance  to 
Portugal  after  the  phase  out  of  current 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  operations. 

Spain 

Since  the  death  of  Franco  in  1975,  Spain 
has  successfully  established  a  fully  func- 
tioning democracy,  while  working  to  in- 
tegrate more  fully  with  the  West,  in- 
cluding membership  in  NATO  and  the 
EC.  In  conjunction  with  a  democratic 
Portugal,  Spain's  remarkable  progress  in 
establishing  a  free  society  and  in  reducing 
the  communists  to  only  a  marginal 
political  force  has  helped  to  secure 
NATO's  southern  flank  and  enhanced 
alliance  strength. 

The  U.S. -Spanish  bilateral  security 
relationship  dates  back  to  1953  and  has 


been  confirmed  through  a  series  of 
agreements  regarding  U.S.  use  of 
Spanish  military  facilities  and  U.S. 
assistance  for  Spanish  military  modern- 
ization. Since  Spain's  entry  into  NATO 
and  its  peaceful  transition  to  democracy, 
it  has  also  become  an  important  alliance 
partner.  The  basis  for  our  security 
cooperation  has  thus  been  broadened. 
Modernization  of  the  Spanish  military 
farces,  which  strengthens  the  common 
defense  as  well  as  encourages  an  institu- 
tional role  for  the  military  similar  to  that 
played  by  the  military  in  other  Western 
democracies,  has  gained  new  importance. 
Our  security  assistance  relationship  has 
thus  become  even  more  significant. 

Following  national  elections  in  Spain 
in  1982,  the  newly  elected  socialist 
government,  in  the  face  of  considerable 
popular  sentiment  against  NATO,  "froze" 
the  process  of  military  integration  into 
the  alliance  pending  a  popular  referen- 
dum. No  date  for  a  referendum  has  been 
set,  but  the  authorities  are  now  evalu- 
ating membership  and  military  integra- 
tion partly  in  terms  of  what  benefits  they 
offer  the  Spanish  military's  modernization 
effort.  While  we  consider  the  ultimate 
decision  to  be  a  matter  for  Spain  alone  to 
decide,  it  is  important  that  our  assistance 
effort  make  clear  the  value  of  NATO  par- 
ticipation. 

Under  the  1983  Agreement  on 
Friendship,  Defense,  and  Cooperation, 
Spain  provides  the  United  States  con- 
tinued access  to  vital  air  and  naval 
facilities  which  will  be  crucial  in  the  event 
of  a  European  conflict.  The  agreement 
also  establishes  an  institutional 
framework— the  U.S.-Spanish  Council  and 
the  various  committees  which  operate 
under  its  aegis— for  the  development  and 
implementation  of  our  broad  political, 
economic,  cultural,  and  scientific  coopera- 
tion with  Spain.  We,  in  turn,  are  pledged 
to  "best  efforts"  in  assisting  Spain  to 
upgrade  its  military  equipment,  profes- 
sionalize its  forces,  and  bring  them  up  to 
NATO  standards. 

At  a  minimum,  it  is  vital  that  we 
maintain  our  current  "best  efforts"  com- 
mitment for  FY  1985,  which  would  be  to 
continue  at  FY  1984  assistance  levels  of 
$400  million  in  FMS  credits  and  $12 
million  in  ESF  grants,  and  to  seek  $3 
million  in  IMET.  The  ESF  grant  would 
fund  scientific-cultural  exchanges  and  pro- 
grams designed  to  counterbalance  the 
large  military  component  of  our  relations. 
The  IMET  program  is  aimed  at  the  pro- 
fessional development  of  the  Spanish 
military.  FMS  guaranteed  credits  are 
scheduled  to  fund  air  defense  and  missile 


systems,  continued  funding  for  the  pur- 
chase of  F-18  fighter  aircraft,  cargo/ 
transport  helicopters.  Harpoon  missiles, 
ship  construction,  and  other  weapons 
systems. 

Greece 

The  strategic  importance  of  Greece  is  well 
recognized.  Bordering  on  the  Warsaw 
Pact,  Greece  would  block  any  pact  thrust 
southward  toward  the  Mediterranean 
through  Thrace  and  would  join  with 
Turkey  in  resisting  any  Soviet  effort  to 
seize  control  of  the  Dardanelles.  At  the 
same  time,  Greece  is  in  a  position  to  con- 
trol the  sea  and  air  lanes  of  the  eastern 
Mediterranean  and  is  one  of  the  several 
countries  controlling  access  to  the  Middle 
East.  Greece  is  thus  a  key  ally  on  the 
southern  flank  of  NATO." 

In  addition  to  these  strategic  in- 
terests, our  defense  relationship  with 
Greece  must  be  placed  in  the  broader  con- 
text of  a  traditional  friendship  which  is 
very  important  to  the  United  States.  It  is 
our  intention  to  work  to  deepen  the 
understanding  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. While  at  times  we  have  significant 
differences  with  Greece,  these  must  be 
considered  in  the  larger  context  of  rela- 
tions between  two  democratic  allies 
whose  perspectives  can  differ  but  also 
coincide. 

The  most  important  development  in 
our  defense  relationship  last  year  was  the 
conclusion  of  the  new  Defense  and 
Economic  Cooperation  Agreement.  The 
agreement  was  formally  signed 
September  8  and  entered  into  force 
December  20  following  Greek  parliamen- 
tary approval.  The  Congi'ess  helped  make 
this  agreement  possible  by  indicating  its 
willingness  to  increase  our  secuiity 
assistance  progi-am  to  Greece  in  the  con- 
text of  a  defense  relationship  reaffirmed 
by  conclusion  of  a  satisfactory  agreement. 
This  accord  provides  for  the  continuation 
of  the  activities  previously  conducted  in 
Greece  on  a  mutually  agreeable  basis.  The 
agreement  will  be  valid  until  terminated 
by  written  notice  by  either  side,  which 
can  be  given  at  the  end  of  5  years  or 
thei-eafter.  This  arrangement  is  com- 
parable to  agreements  we  have  with 
other  allies.  We  believe  this  agreement 
strengthens  NATO  and  benefits  the 
United  States  and  Greece. 

The  security  assistance  we  are  re- 
questing for  Greece  is  an  integi-al  part  of 
a  close  defense  relationship  which  in- 
cludes our  common  membership  in  NATO 
as  well  as  U.S.  use  of  military  facilities  in 
Greece.  U.S.  assistance  is  needed  to  im- 


60 


s^ammaa 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
IBBBBHBIBI 


prove  capability  to  carry  out  its  assigned 
tasks  under  NATO.  Greece  has  made  con- 
siderable pi'oiiress  in  recent  years,  utiliz- 
ing its  own  foreign  exchange  resources  as 
well  as  U.S.  loan  guarantees.  The  Greek 
percent  of  GNP  devoted  to  military  e.\- 
penditures  is  among  the  highest  in 
NATO.  However,  U.S.  assistance  con- 
tinues to  be  needed.  Like  other  European 
allies,  Greece  is  suffering  from  inflation, 
unemployment,  and  a  balance-of- 
payments  problem.  The  repayment  terms 
for  our  military  assistance  loans  to  Greece 
are  the  best  available  to  any  nation  under 
our  nonconcessional  FMS  program. 

For  Greece  we  propose  to  maintain 
the  level  of  FMS  funds  at  $500  million  as 
was  allocated  for  FY  1984  to  permit  the 
purchase  of  military  equipment,  ammuni- 
tion, and  spare  parts— including  aircraft, 
communications,  and  radar  equipment— 
and  missiles.  We  also  propose  $1.7  million 
for  IMET,  which  is  important  to  the 
Greek  Armed  Forces  at  both  the  profes- 
sional and  technical  levels. 

Turkey 

Our  assistance  program  for  Turkey  re- 
mains one  of  the  largest  in  the  world, 
reflecting  both  that  country's  importance 
and  its  potential.  We  are  proposing  a  pro- 
gram for  Turkey  identical  in  size  to  last 
year's  proposal,  but  doing  so  recognizes 
that  it  will  leave  significant  shortcomings, 
both  in  terms  of  Turkish  needs  and  what 
we  would  like  to  see  occur  there. 
Nonetheless,  it  is  a  program  which  will 
permit  us  to  continue  to  assist  the  Turks 
with  major  military  modernization  pro- 
grams and  provide  an  important  element 
of  assistance  to  their  imaginative 
economic  I'eforms. 

Although  Turkey's  strategic  impor- 
tance has  been  reiterated  many  times  to 
this  committee,  I  would  like  to  mention  it 
once  again  briefly.  Turkey,  with  both  land 
and  sea  frontiers  with  the  U.S.S.R.  and 
Bulgaria  and  holding  the  key  to  Soviet  ac- 
cess to  the  Mediterranean,  is  the  anchor 
of  the  southeast  flank  of  NATO.  In  addi- 
tion, Turkey  shares  borders  with  Iran, 
Iraq,  and  Syria  and  is  exploring  a  new, 
more  active  role  in  Islamic  affairs.  Given 
the  impact  of  all  three  countries  on  cur- 
rent unrest  in  the  Middle  East,  Turkey's 
potential  role  takes  on  added  significance. 
Our  dialogue  and  cooperation  with 
Turkey  on  Middle  East  issues  has 
increased  significantly,  based  on  the  good 
and  productive  bilateral  relationship  we 
have  developed.  Security  assistance 
remains  an  important  basis  of  that 
relationship. 

Turkey's  political  system  is  undergo- 
ing a  positive  transformation  toward  full 
parliamentary  democracy.  The  govern- 


ment elected  in  November  1983  is  active- 
ly developing  and  carrying  out  new  and 
inn(ivati\('  i)()licies.  Municipal  elections 
scheduled  for  March  25  will  include  all 
legal  political  parties,  a  further  indication 
that  movement  toward  full  democracy  re- 
mains on  schedule.  Having  supported 
Turkey  during  the  past  few  difficult  years 
as  it  struggled  to  overcome  political  chaos 
and  economic  bankruptcy,  it  is  important 
that  we  continue  to  strongly  support  the 
new  government  and  the  return  to  full 
democracy. 

Turkey's  economic  recovery  in  recent 
years  is  justly  lauded  as  an  e.xample  of 
how  international  cooperation  and  a  com- 
mitted country  can  overcome  staggering 
financial  problems.  At  the  same  time,  the 
economy  remains  fragile  and  requires  out- 
side support  for  the  next  year  to  two. 
This  year  will  be  especially  important. 
Repayment  of  previously  rescheduled 
debt  will  add  significantly  to  short-term 
debt  service;  and  the  important  economic 
reforms  announced  by  the  new  govern- 
ment, which  ultimately  *:hould  increase 
the  economy's  productivity  and  com- 
petitiveness, will  also  put  short-term 
pressure  on  the  balance  of  payments.  Our 
ESF  assistance  to  Turkey  has  decreased 
dramatically  in  recent  years,  but  it  is  very 
important  that  we  not  decrease  it  further 
at  this  critical  juncture. 

For  Turkey,  our  request  is  for  $755 
million  in  military  assistance— $230  in 
MAP,  $250  in  concessional  FMS  loans, 
and  $275  in  FMS  guarantees-$175  million 
in  ESF  and  $4  million  in  IMET  funds. 
Some  of  our  military  assistance  will  con- 
tinue to  provide  maintenance  and  support 
of  aging  equipment  which  cannot  yet  be 
replaced.  The  greater  portion  will  be  used 
for  modernization  of  Turkish  Armed 
Forces'  equipment.  Major  programs  in- 
clude M-48  tank  upgrade,  helicopter  ac- 
quisition, naval  weapon  procurement,  and 
continuation  of  the  important  F-16  pro- 
gram begun  in  FY  1984.  These  are  key 
l)riigrams  which  will  make  major  strides 
in  helping  Turkey  meet  NATO  com- 
mitments which,  in  turn,  contribute 
directly  to  U.S.  national  defense.  They 
fall  far  short,  however,  of  enabling 
Turkey  to  overcome  all  of  its  equipment 
shortcomings  in  a  reasonable  timeframe. 


EUROPE 


Cyprus 

This  Administration,  from  its  very  first 
days,  has  placed  a  high  priority  on  the 
achievement  of  a  just  settlement.  We  are 
committed  to  that  goal,  for  as  long  as 
Cyprus  is  divided  and  its  status  uncer- 
tain, it  constitutes  a  humanitarian  concern 
and  remains  a  serious  barrier  to  good 
relations  between  Greece  and  Turkey. 
The  November  15  declaration  of 
statehood  by  the  Turkish  Cy]jriots  was 
unhelpful  to  the  search  for  a  fair  and  final 
negotiated  settlement.  We  condemned  the 
move  and  called  for  its  reversal.  We  also 
supported  UN  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 541,  passed  November  18,  which  also 
called  for  reversal  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot 
action.  In  January  we  welcomed  an- 
nouncements by  the  Turkish  Cypriots  of  a 
group  of  goodwill  measures  and  by  the 
Government  of  Turkey  of  their  removal  of 
1 ,500  troops  from  Cyprus.  We  also 
responded  favoi-ably  to  President 
Kyprianou's  proposed  framework  for  a 
comprehensive  settlement— a  proposal 
containing  positive  elements.  We  are  now 
actively  encouraging  both  sides  to  react 
to  the  other's  proposals  in  a  way  which 
can  lead  to  a  comprehensive  solution  of 
the  outstanding  issues. 

The  $3  million  requested  for  Cyprus 
would  be  applied  to  the  existing  Cyprus- 
America  scholarship  program  which  pro- 
vides American  university  educations  to 
young  Cypriots  of  both  communities. 
Cyprus  is  without  universities  of  its  own 
and  this  program  provides  a  very  popular 
alternative  to  Soviet  bloc  study.  We 
believe  this  to  be  a  modest  but  significant 
demonstration  of  continuing  American  in- 
terest in  the  welfare  of  the  people  of 
Cyprus;  as  such,  it  constitutes  a  worthy 
complement  to  our  diplomatic  endeavors. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.B 


May  1984 


61 


IHWBiiiilWifHtBlHftlllBi^^ 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 

FY  1985  Request  for 
Economic  Assistance  Programs 

by  M.  Peter  McPhenon 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
m  Foreiffn/yperations  of  the  Senate  Ap- 
propria  tions  Committee  on  March  8 
198i   Mr  McPherson  is  Administrator  of 
the  Agency  for  International  Develop, 
ment  (AID)  and  Acting  Director  of  the  In- 
ternational Development  Cooperation 
Agency  GDCA).^ 


It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  here  once  again  to 
present  the  Administration's  annual  pro- 
posal for  foreign  economic  assistance  1 
want  to  express  my  appreciation  to  the 
committee  for  its  past  support  of  the 
foreign  assistance  program.  I  look  tor- 
ward  to  our  continued  cooperation  under 
vour  leadership. 

Foreign  assistance  has  been  and  con- 
tinues to  be  in  the  best  interests  of  the 
United  States.  For  that  reason,  it  has 
been  supported  by  your  committee  and 
continues  to  be  an  important  part  ot  the 
Administration's  foreign  policy. 

The  historical  trend  has  been  to 
broaden  the  statutory  mandate  for 
foreign  assistance,  since  its  inception  with 
the  Marshall  Plan.  Successive  accretions 
include  postwar  reconstruction,  food  tor 
peace,  and  basic  human  needs. 

I  have  pursued  an  integrated  ap- 
proach to  foreign  assistance,  combining 
growth  with  equity  as  an  operational  goal. 
My  philosophy  is  to  help  others  to  help 
themselves.  Foreign  assistance  is  a 
limited  resource.  There  is  no  substitute  m 
the  long  run  for  development  that  is 
broadly  based  and  self-sustaming.  Such 
development  is  not  simply  economic. 
Development  requires  inter  aha 
spreading  knowledge  and  the  promotion 
of  flourishing  institutions  as  well  as  grow- 
ing economies. 

We  have  set  forth  four  pillars  or 
means  to  implement  our  programs. 

•  Policy  Dialogue  and  Reform.  This 
brings  to  the  fore  the  notion  that  long- 
term  equitable  growth  depends  clearly  on 
the  nature  of  policies  followed  by  develop- 
ing countries.  We  seek  to  achieve  agree- 
ment with  host  country  governments  on 
the  nature  of  key  poUcy  constramts  to 
basic  development  and  on  practical 
changes  that  can  be  addressed. 

•  Institutional  Development.  We 
have  come  to  recognize  that  faulty  institu 
tional  frameworks  can  impede  develop- 
ment and  that  increased  centralization 


62 


and  bureaucratization  can  be  major 
obstacles  to  progress.  Our  approach,  thus, 
has  been  modified  to  include  the  idea  that 
what  is  sometimes  required  is  reducing 
the  size  of  institutions,  decentrabzmg  and 
encouraging  greater  reliance  o"  Pn^'^te 
and  voluntary,  rather  than  pubhc,  institu- 
tions. 

.  Technology  Transfer.  In  this  area, 
we  are  seeking  dramatic  breakthroughs 
in  such  areas  as  biomedical  research, 
agriculture,  and  family  planning.  Our  em- 
phasis is  on  finding  solutions  to  age-old 
problems  through  inexpensive  methods 
that  can  be  widely  disseminated.  AID  m- 
tends  to  be  a  leader  in  supportmg  new 
technologies. 

.  Greater  Use  of  the  Private  Sector. 
We  are  also  stressing  the  contributions 
that  the  private  sector  can  make  to  solv- 
ing key  development  problems,  based  on 
the  conviction  that  there  are  many  things 
government  cannot  do  or  cannot  do  wdl. 
For  example,  we  are  testing  pilot  efforts 
for  indigenous  private  sector  involvement 
in  areas  such  as  the  distribution  of 
agricultural  inputs  and  the  manufacture 
and  marketing  of  inputs  for  health  and 
population  programs. 

The  past  3  years  have  involved 
change  as  well  as  continuity  in  our  foreign 
assistance.  And  there  is  progress  to 

report.  ec.^  ^„ 

AID  and  the  Department  of  State 
have  worked  closely  to  integrate  our 
foreign  assistance  and  our  foreign 
nolicy-to  relate  our  assistance  efforts 
more  directly  to  foreign  policy  interests. 
This  coordination  is  reflected  not  only  in 
the  details  of  our  budgetary  requests  but 
also  in  the  repori^s  of  the  Commission  on 
Security  and  Economic  Assistance 
(Cariucci  commission)  and  the  National 
Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America.  I  shall  say  more  about  those 
reports  in  later  pages  of  this  statement. 
AID  has  followed  through  on  the  mi- 
tiatives  of  President  Reagan  at  the  Can- 
cun  conference.  Presidential  task  forces 
have  been  sent  to  several  countries,  and 
their  repori^s  have  helped  guide  ensuing 
poUcy  dialogues.  The  Caribbean  Basm 
Initiative  has  been  launched,  and  its  im- 
portance for  our  relations  with  that 
strategic  region  is  now  widely  recognized. 
PL  480  has  been  more  fully  integrated 
into  our  development  programming 
without  diminishing  its  humamtanan 
character.  Title  II  commodities,  for  exam- 
ple are  being  used  to  develop  cooper- 


atives in  India,  to  promote  agriculture  in 
Jamaica,  and  to  help  reforestation  m 

Congress  has  increased  our  flexibility 
in  responding  to  crises  and  opportunities. 
Particularly  noteworthy  is  the  new 
revolving  fund  which  will  allow  AID  to 
develop  new  financing  mechanisms  and 
increase  its  support  of  private  sector  ac- 
tivities We  have  made  a  good  start  m 
this  du-ection  through  the  authority  pro- 
vided to  us  this  year. 

AID'S  voluntarv  family  plannmg  pro- 
grams are  increasingly  using  private  sec- 
tor marketing.  The  market  reaches  out  to 
customers  and  localities  which  are  not 
reached  by  governmental  progi-ams.  The 
private  sector  also  competes  successfully 
with  governmental  progi-ams  that  are 
free  of  charge,  for  example,  m 
Bangladesh.  The  net  effects  are  an  in- 
crease  in  individual  choice,  a  decrease  in 
governmental  subsidies,  and  an  improve- 
ment in  program  effectiveness 

AID  has  taken  the  lead  m  the  dis- 
semination of  oral  rehydration  therapy. 
This  simple  therapy  promises  to  reduce 
substantially  the  millions  of  deaths  of  in- 
fants and  small  children.  We  recen  ly 
sponsored  an  international  conference  on 
this  therapy,  and  we  are  introducing  it  in 
social  marketing  systems-private  as  well 
as  public-in  several  developmg  coun- 

^' "' AID  continues  to  support  research  on 
an  antimalarial  vaccine.  This  pioneering 
effort  is  increasingly  successful.  Clinical 
testing  with  human  subjects  is  expected 
to  begin  in  198.5.  If  all  goes  well,  distribu- 
tion  should  begin  m  1990. 

We  have  recognized  the  extraor- 
dinary  needs  of  sub-Sahara  Africa  and 
Central  America.  New  initiatives  to  meet 
those  needs  are  outlined  in  later  pages  of 
this  statement.  Those  initiatives  reflect 
the  input  of  members  of  this  commit  ee  as 
well  as  the  Commission  on  Secunty  and 
Economic  Assistance  and  the  National 
Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 

'"aid  has  broadened  and  deepened  its 
relations  with  corporations  as  well  as 
universities  in  the  United  States.  Cor- 
porate expertise  has  proven  to  be  par- 
ticulariv  helpful  in  recommending 
remedies  for  the  environmental  impact  ot 
some  industries  in  developing  countries 
AID  and  universities  are  increasing  their 
cooperation  with  the  new  memorandum  o1 


Depart  nnf 


Bulletir 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


understanding  and  joint  Career  Corps.  A 
major  effort  is  now  underway  to  expand 
the  involvement  of  historically  black  col- 
leges and  universities  in  our  programs. 

AID  has  increased  its  ti-aining  of 
students  fi-om  developing  countries  in  the 
United  States.  We  sponsored  almost  8,000 
students  in  FY  1982,  over  9,000  in  FY 

1983,  and  over  10,000  (projected)  in  FY 

1984.  This  reverses  a  trend  of  the  1970s. 
A  strategic  planning  process  was  ini- 
tiated 2  years  ago  to  give  a  sense  of  direc- 
tion not  only  to  our  regional  bureaus  but 
also  to  the  entire  agency.  The  preliminary 
results  of  that  planning  process  are 
reflected  in  later  pages  of  this  statement. 
The  final  results  are  to  be  shared  in  the 
coming  weetts  with  your  committee. 

We  are  establishing  an  early-warning 
system  with  the  international  develop- 
ment banks,  and  we  are  pressing  in  a 
variety  of  fora  for  more  coordination  with 
other  donors.  This  effort  recently  bore 
fi-uit  with  the  adoption  of  its  first 
guidelines  for  donor  coordination  by  the 
Development  Assistance  Committee  of 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development  (OECD). 

I  am  pleased  to  have  been  able  to 
report  progress  in  these  areas.  Let  me 
now  turn  to  a  review  of  the  current  situa- 
tion. 

World  Economy 

During  the  past  year,  there  have  been  im- 
portant developments  which  affect  our 
program  for  FY  1985.  First,  the  interna- 
tional economic  picture  is  changing,  with 
both  positive  and  less  encouraging 
aspects.  Second,  two  major  commissions 
have  issued  reports  making  important 
recommendations  on  certain  aspects  of 
our  foreign  assistance  effort.  I  would  like 
to  address  each  of  these  points  briefly. 

At  the  time  of  my  appearance  before 
this  committee  last  year,  I  testified  that 
nations  around  the  world,  particularly 
those  in  the  Third  World,  were  confront- 
ing serious  economic  problems  brought  on 
by  the  global  recession.  They  had  ex- 
perienced a  sharp  decline  in  demand  for 
their  e.xports,  compounded  by  high  in- 
terest rates  which  increased  the  cost  of 
borrowing  to  meet  their  rapidly  growing 
balance-of-payments  deficits.  The  result 
was  rising  levels  of  debt  and  debt- 
servicing  burdens  and  a  decline  in  the 
level  of  private  lending.  For  many  of 
these  developing  countries,  problems 
were  aggravated  by  their  own  inap- 
propriate economic  policies. 


Today  the  situation  has  begun  to 
stabilize,  and  some  of  these  same  coun- 
tries are  showing  hopeful  signs  of 
recovery.  A  number  have  undertaken  ad- 
justment progi-ams,  often  in  conjunction 
with  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF),  aimed  at  achieving  a  sustainable 
balance-of-payments  position.  For  some 
recovery  is  due  in  part  to  policy  reforms 
which  we  and  other  donors  have  helped  to 
put  in  place  through  policy  dialogue  ef- 
foits  in  the  development  arena. 

Several  recent  events  offer  hope  of 
sustained  improvement  in  less  developed 
country  (LDC)  economic  performance. 
First,  the  developing  countries  them- 
selves are  increasingly  recognizing  the 
value  of  sound  economic  policies  and  the 
importance  of  adjustment  programs  to 
their  long-term  economic  prospects.  Sec- 
ond, economic  recovery,  led  by  the 
United  States  and  other  developed  coun- 
tries, began  to  take  hold  during  the  latter 
part  of  1983.  We  can  expect  it  to  continue 
and  spread  in  1984.  Third,  interest  rates 
have  fallen  significantly,  world  market  oil 
prices  have  declined,  and  LDC  commod- 
ity prices  have  experienced  some  in- 
creases. As  a  result  of  these  positive 
trends,  aided  by  a  significant  cutback  in 
LDC  imports,  the  balance-of-payments 
situation  of  the  developing  countries  as  a 
whole  improved  last  year.  The  LDCs' 
total  balance-of-payments  deficit,  though 
still  significant,  was  about  one-third  less 
than  a  couple  of  years  ago. 

The  worldwide  economic  recovery,  as 
it  strengthens  and  spreads,  will  be  impor- 
tant to  the  economic  prospects  of  the 
developing  countries— particularly  the 
middle  and  higher  income  developing 
countries  with  a  greater  capacity  to  ad- 
just and  respond  to  the  economic  oppor- 
tunity provided  by  the  recovery  in  the 
developed  countries. 

Even  with  the  improvement  in 
economic  conditions,  though,  many 
developing  countries,  particularly  the 
poorest,  will  continue  to  face  serious 
economic  difficulties  and  will  continue  to 
require  substantial  foreign  assistance. 
For  many  of  them,  recovei-y  has  yet  to 
blossom.  Even  in  those  which  have  begun 
appropriate  adjustments,  the  first  step 
has  often  required  substantial  reductions 
in  domestic  credit,  in  government 
development  expenditures,  and  in  im- 
ports needed  for  investment.  All  of  this 
constrains  economic  performance,  par- 
ticularly over  the  short  run. 

For  the  low-income  countries  facing 
severe  economic  problems,  with  limited 
capacity  to  attract  or  service  private 
flows,  and  with  extremely  hmited  human. 


physical,  and  institutional  infrastructure 
needed  to  address  their  basic  develop- 
ment problems,  development  a.ssistance 
will  remain  critically  important.  Economic 
assistance  will  also  be  critical  in  helping 
countries  avoid  serious  economic  and 
political  disruption  while  needed  .stabiliza- 
tion and  adjustment  programs  are  being 
undertaken.  Indeed,  the  challenge  we 
face  is  to  assist  the  developing  world  to 
address  its  current  economic  problems 
while  at  the  same  time  assisting  in  laying 
the  foundation  for  long-term  sustainable 
development.  In  short ,  there  is  cau.se  for 
hope,  but  the  job  is  far  from  over. 

Assisting  developing  countries  to  con- 
front these  massive  economic  problems 
effectively,  with  the  Hmited  resources 
available,  requires  a  carefully  thought  out 
foreign  assistance  program  and  greater 
suppoil  from  the  public  than  has  been  the 
case  in  recent  years.  It  was  for  that 
reason  that  Secretary  Shultz  last  year 
called  for  creation  of  the  Commission  on 
Security  and  Economic  Assistance.  He 
charged  it  with  the  task  of  reviewing  the 
foreign  assistance  program  and  making 
recommendations  for  improving  its  focus 
and  administration,  and  for  increasing  its 
public  support. 

The  commission,  on  which  you  and 
members  of  your  committee  served,  has 
served  a  very  useful  purpose  in  focusing 
greater  attention  on  the  necessity  for  a 
strong  foreign  assistance  program.  I  need 
not  take  time  here  to  review  in  detail  the 
findings  and  recommendations  of  the  com- 
mission, since  members  of  this  committee 
played  a  very  active  part  in  their  formula- 
tion. I  would  hke  to  cite,  however,  a  few 
of  the  ways  in  which  we  are  moving  to  im- 
plement those  recommendations. 

The  commission  called  for  increases  in 
the  foreign  assistance  budget  to  help 
meet  our  foreign  policy  objectives.  It  also 
pointed  out  the  need  for  carefully  in- 
tegrated programs  in  sub-Saharan  Africa, 
the  Caribbean,  and  Central  America.  In 
response  to  these  recommendations  as 
well  as  those  of  the  National  Bipartisan 
Commission  on  Central  America,  we  are 
proposing  new  initiatives  entailing  signifi- 
cant increases  in  funding  for  both  of  these 
i-egions.  I  will  go  into  that  in  more  detail 
in  just  a  moment. 

Consistent  with  the  commission's  af- 
firmation of  the  importance  of  a  total 
country  approach  to  program  develop- 
ment, over  the  past  3  years  we  have 
developed  and  improved  upon  an  in- 
tegrated budget  process  to  allocate 
resources  in  each  country  so  as  to  ensure 
the  best  mix  of  overall  assistance  to  meet 
foreign  policy  interests.  We  are  following 
the  recommendations  of  the  commission 


May  1984 


63 


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FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


to  increase  emphasis  on  policy  refonn.  in- 
stitutional development,  technology 
ti-ansfer,  and  involvement  of  the  private 
sector  as  means  of  fostering  development. 
We  also  are  taking  steps  to  respond  to 
the  commission's  call  to  increase  the  flex- 
ibility of  the  development  assistance  pro- 
gram and  to  maintain  that  of  the  economic 
support  fund  (ESF).  We  have  also  sought 
to  increase  the  use  of  PL  480  to  meet 
development  objectives.  And  we  are  look- 
ing at  other  ways  in  which  we  can  follow- 
up  on  the  commission's  recommendations. 

Sub-Sahara  Africa 

Another  major  concern  has  been  the 
tremendous  challenge  to  stimulate  strong 
growth  in  Africa.  Measured  by  almost 
any  indicator  of  development— income,  in- 
fant mortality,  literacy,  malnutrition,  or 
life  span— the  situation  in  Africa  is  more 
serious  than  elsewhere.  During  the  past 
decade  the  economic  performance  of  the 
region  has  been  particularly  poor— 15 
countries  recorded  negative  gi'owth  rates. 
Sub-Sahara  Africa  is  the  only  region  in 
the  world  where  per  capita  food  produc- 
tion has  declined  over  the  last  20  years. 
Moreover  the  poor  economic  performance 
has  been  exacerbated  recently  by  severe 
drought,  seriously  affecting  food  produc- 
tion, causing  growing  food  shortages  con- 
tinent wide,  and  widespread  hunger  and 
malnutrition.  The  Food  and  Agriculture 
Organization  (FAO)  has  identified  24 
countries  which  are  most  seriously  af- 
fected and  in  need  of  urgent  emergency 
food  aid. 

To  help  respond  to  the  worsening 
situation  in  Africa,  we  are  taking  several 
steps.  One,  we  are  allocating  a  larger 
share  of  our  cun-ent  year  program  to 
African  countries— to  date  we  have  pro- 
vided 218,000  metric  tons  of  PL  480,  Title 
II  food  aid  valued  at  $85  million  (including 
ocean  freight  costs)  in  response  to 
emergency  requests.  Two,  because  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  problem,  we  are  re- 
questing an  FY  1984  PL  480  food  aid  sup- 
plemental of  $90  million  to  augment  cur- 
rent allocations.  These  steps  will  respond 
positively  to  today's  emergency. 

We  also  wish  to  address  long-term 
problems.  Thus  as  part  of  our  FY  1985  re- 
quest for  the  development  assistance  pro- 
gram, we  are  seeking  congressional  ap- 
proval of  a  new  Economic  Policy  Ini- 
tiative (EPI)  for  Africa.  The  initiative  is 
planned  as  a  5-year,  $500  million  fund. 
For  FY  1985,  we  are  requesting  an 
authorization  and  appropriation  of  $75 
million.  The  purpose  of  this  new  initiative 
is  to  foster  economic  policy  reforms  which 
are  essential  to  any  reversal  of  the  cur- 


64 


rent  downward  trend  in  many  African 
countries.  The  resources  of  this  special 
fund  will  be  used  to  bolster  those  coun- 
tries which  are  prepared  and  able  to 
establish  a  comprehensive  economic 
policy  framework  conducive  to  growth 
and  long-term  development.  Resources 
will  be  used  to  suppoi't  implementation  of 
the  reform  package  once  promulgated. 
Assistance  from  this  fund  will  be  tied  to 
major  policy  reform  measures  and  fo- 
cused predominantly  on  the  agricultural 
sector.  We  expect  that  such  a  fund  will 
help  significantly  to  strengthen  the  policy 
dialogue  between  donors  and  recipients 
and  to  improve  coordination  among 
donors. 

Central  America 

Another  major  development  has  been  the 
recent  release  of  the  much-awaited  report 
by  the  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
on  Central  America,  chaired  by  former 
Secretary  of  State  Kissinger.  By  now, 
many  of  you  are  familiar,  I  am  sure,  with 
the  essentials  of  the  commission's  find- 
ings, so  I  will  touch  on  them  only  briefly 
at  this  time. 

Confirming  the  widely  held  percep- 
tion of  a  crisis  of  acute  proportions  in  a 
region  of  fundamental  importance  to  the 
United  States,  the  commission  calls  for  a 
program  to  meet  basic  human  needs,  help 
achieve  peace,  and  promote  democracy.  It 
proposes  a  comprehensive  approach  to 
economic  development  in  the  region  and 
reinvigoration  of  the  Central  American 
Common  Market,  all  tied  to  major  policy 
reforms.  It  has  recommended  mounting  a 
large-scale,  long-term  assistance  program 
to  help  stabilize  the  Central  American 
economies,  rebuild  infrastructure,  provide 
trade  credits,  and  encourage  rescheduling 
of  multilateral  debt.  The  commission  has 
also  proposed  a  new  organizational  struc- 
ture to  administer  a  portion  of  the  pro- 
posed program. 

In  response  to  the  commission's 
recommendations,  we  are  requesting 
authorization  of  a  major  new  program  of 
assistance  to  Central  America.  The  pro- 
gram's strategy  concentrates  on  four  fun- 
damental elements:  economic  stabiliza- 
tion, creation  of  a  basis  for  long-term 
growth,  promotion  of  equity,  and 
strengthened  democratic  institutions  and 
respect  for  human  rights. 

Accordingly,  the  program's  major 
goals  are,  first,  to  end  the  downward 
spiral  of  production  in  the  region  by  next 
year.  Second,  over  the  course  of  the  pro- 
gram, we  want  to  help  the  countries  of 
the  region  achieve  an  annual  economic 
growth  rate  of  at  least  6%,  creating  more 


than  250,000  new  jobs  each  year  through 
export-led  growth.  Third,  we  seek  to 
foster  an  increase  in  agricultural  produc- 
tion of  4%  per  year  by  1989,  generating 
an  additional  80,000  jobs  and  increasing 
food  availability  and  agi-oindustrial  e.\- 
ports.  Fourth,  we  want  to  see  substan- 
tially greater  benefits  of  economic  growth 
accrue  to  all  sectors  of  the  populace  to 
better  meet  theii'  basic  human  needs— in- 
creased primary  school  enrollment,  re- 
duced infant  mortality,  greater  availabil- 
ity of  modem  family  planning  services,  in- 
creased low-income  housing,  and  better 
access  to  clean  water  and  sanitation 
facilities.  We  also  want  to  foster  the 
strengthening  of  democratic  institutions 
and  progress  toward  participatory 
democracy  and  legal  systems  which 
respect  human  rights. 

To  achieve  these  goals,  we  request 
authorization  of  an  $8.3  billion  program  of 
economic  assistance  and  guarantees  for 
Central  America  to  be  made  available 
over  the  next  6  years. 

For  the  first  phase  of  its  implementa- 
tion, we  are  requesting  a  supplemental 
appropriation  of  $400  million  in  FY  1984, 
including  $290  million  in  ESF,  $73  million 
in  development  assistance,  $25  million  in 
PL  480  commodities,  and  $12  million  for 
other  agencies  and  for  increased  AID 
operating  expenses. 

For  FY  1985  we  are  requesting  an  ap- 
propriation of  $1.12  billion,  consisting  of 
$(>41  million  in  ESF.  $272.8  million  in 
development  assistance,  $10  million  for 
housing  guaranty  reserves,  $120  million 
in  PL  480  commodities,  and  $77  million 
for  other  programs  and  AID  operating 
expenses,  plus  $600  million  in  guaranty 
authority  to  support  private  lending  to 
the  region. 

As  the  bipartisan  commission  recom- 
mended, the  assistance  would  be  provided 
on  a  collaborative  basis.  Our  program 
would  be  closely  tied  to  commitments  for 
economic  and  social  reforms  by  the  recip- 
ient governments. 

I  know  that  there  is  a  major  question 
in  the  minds  of  some  with  respect  to  the 
capacity  of  the  Central  American  coun- 
tries to  absorb  productively  the  level  of 
assistance  which  we  are  proposing.  Let 
me  assure  the  committee  that  this  is  a 
matter  which  we  have  considered  care- 
fully in  our  planning,  and  I  would  like  to 
share  with  you  our  thinking  on  it. 

While  our  program  is  ambitious,  I  am 
convinced  that  it  is  both  essentia!  and 
feasible.  I  believe,  in  fact,  that  a  more 
modest  program  might  be  undercut  by 
the  political  uncertainty,  insurgency,  low- 
commodity  prices,  and  economic  depres- 
sion that  now  characterize  the  region. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


First,  with  respect  to  the  overall  size 
of  the  program,  the  assistance  we  are  pro- 
posing for  FY  1985  i-epresents  less  than 
5%  of  the  region's  GNP  and  is  less  than 
the  $1.5  billion  shortfall  in  export  earn- 
ings which  have  resulted  from  lower  cof- 
fee and  sugar  prices  and  higher  costs  for 
imported  oil.  We  have  provided  higher 
levels  of  aid  relative  to  GNP  in  other 
parts  of  the  world,  like  South  Korea  and 
Taiwan,  and  much  larger  amounts  during 
the  Marshall  Plan. 

On  the  issue  of  the  management 
capacity  of  the  Central  American  govern- 
ments, while  we  recognize  that  serious 
deficiencies  do  exist,  we  are  taking 
several  steps  to  prevent  such  problems 
from  limiting  our  impact.  For  one  thing, 
the  largest  part  of  the  assistance  will  go 
to  the  private  sector  rather  than  to 
government  programs.  For  another,  as 
part  of  our  effort,  we  will  provide 
substantial  technical  assistance  and  train- 
ing for  government  officials  to  streamline 
opei'ations  and  increase  efficiency.  Third, 
significant  capacity  for  expansion  is 
already  in  place  since  government  in- 
vestments and  social  programs  have  been 
dramatically  cut  back  as  a  result  of  the 
region's  financial  problems. 

With  regard  to  specific  bottlenecks, 
we  recognize  that  aid  expansion  has  been 
hindered  in  some  areas  by  such  problems 
as  clogged  ports  or  shortages  of  trucks  to 
move  commodities.  This  is  simply  not  the 
case  in  Central  America,  where  produc- 
tion has  artificially  shrunk  as  a  result  of 
economic  depression.  For  the  next 
several  years,  considerable  excess  capac- 
ity will  exist.  Over  the  longer  term, 
where  we  can  make  plans  to  address 
potential  bottlenecks  before  they  arise, 
the  need  for  investment  is  enormous. 
Physical  infrastructure  is  undeveloped, 
health  and  education  systems  need  expan- 
sion, and  investment  in  productive  capaci- 
ty is  essential  to  employ  the  region's 
growing  labor  force.  These  all  require 
resources. 

Finally,  I  would  note  that  our  own 
past  experience  with  assistance  programs 
in  the  region  suggests  that  we  can  build 
up  a  larger  program,  given  the  kind  of 
commitment  to  economic,  social,  and 
political  reform  that  we  will  seek  as  a 
precondition  to  such  assistance.  We  have 
found  that  our  programs  have  tended  to 
be  implemented  fairly  quickly  in  Central 
America  compared  with  other  regions  of 
the  woi-ld.  Less  than  20%  of  our  pipeline 
of  undi-sbursed  funds  was  obligated  more 
than  3  years  ago,  and  some  of  this  was  for 
projects  where  long  lead  times  were  fore- 
seen in  project  design. 

I  believe  that  the  central  determinant 
of  absorptive  capacity  is  government 


policies.  Policy  reforms  are  crucial  to  ef- 
fective use  of  our  funds  and  those  of  host 
countries.  The  key  is  to  avoid  subsidizing 
inefficiency  and  to  create  opportunities 
and  incentives  for  private  sector  invest- 
ment. In  agriculture,  adequate  prices  and 
access  to  land  with  secure  titles  will 
stimulate  investment  and  production  by 
the  people  who  understand  best  hov\'  to 
do  this— the  individual  farmers.  In  in- 
dustry good  policies  will  mobilize  in- 
dividual entrepreneurs  to  make  the  right 
decisions  concerning  increased  employ- 
ment and  production.  The  Central 
American  Development  Organization 
(CADO),  which  we  support,  can  be  a  vehi- 
cle for  assuring  that  our  assistance  is,  in- 
deed, tied  to  good  performance  on  the 
whole  range  of  policies— economic,  social, 
and  political— essential  for  the  success  of 
the  Central  America  program. 

The  stakes  are  high  in  Central 
America,  and  the  success  of  this  effort  is 
vital  to  our  foreign  policy  interests.  For  it 
to  succeed,  the  proposed  program  will  re- 
quire sti-ong  bipartisan  congressional  sup- 
port. We  will  welcome  the  opportunity  to 
discuss  with  the  members  of  this  commit- 
tee and  others  in  Congress  the  details  of 
the  program  as  they  are  fleshed  out  and 
to  seek  your  guidance  as  to  how  it  can 
best  be  implemented. 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  overall  AID 
program. 

General  Strategy 

Our  programs  should  be  aimed  at  over- 
coming the  basic  problems  of  hunger,  il- 
literacy, lack  of  training,  disease,  and  pre- 
mature death.  We  cannot,  of  course, 
assist  developing  nations  to  achieve  such 
standards  through  our  pi'ograms  alone. 
Indeed  the  principal  impetus  for  sur- 
mounting these  problems  must  come  from 
the  developing  countries  themselves.  The 
programs  of  other  donors  are  a  critical 
element  in  achieving  progress. 

There  are  essentially  six  key  develop- 
ment areas  on  which  we  are  focusing  AID 
resources: 

•  Attacking  hunger; 

•  Addressing  health  problems,  espe- 
cially the  high  levels  of  infant  and  child 
mortality  in  the  Third  World; 

•  Addressing  high  rates  of  population 
growth; 

•  Increasing  literacy,  education,  and 
training  opportunities; 

•  Reducing  unemployment  and 
underemployment;  and 

•  Improving  host  country  financial 
structures. 


Many  of  these  are  a  continuation  of 
past  efforts,  but  we  are  striving  to  give 
better  focus  to  our  efforts  and  to  establish 
a  clearer  vision  of  what  this  agency  is, 
and  should  be,  concerned  with.  Moreover, 
we  are  emphasizing  as  basic  means  of  im- 
plementation the  four  pillars  of  agency 
policy:  policy  reform,  technology  transfer, 
institutional  development,  and  greater 
use  of  the  private  sector. 

Through  policy  dialogue,  we  seek  to 
achieve  agreement  with  host  country 
governments  on  the  nature  of  key  policy 
constraints  to  basic  development  and  on 
practical  changes  that  can  be  made.  Right 
policies  are  essential  to  achieve  develop- 
ment progress. 

Institutional  development,  thi-ough 
which  we  strive  to  help  create  and  im- 
prove the  institutional  capacities  of  the 
peoples  of  the  developing  countries,  has 
been  part  of  AID's  approach  since  its 
beginnings.  Over  time  we  have  come  to 
recognize  that  faulty  institutional 
frameworks  can  impede  development  and 
that  increased  centralization  and 
bureaucratization  can  be  major  obstacles 
to  progress.  As  a  result,  our  approach  to 
institutional  development  has  been  modi- 
fied to  include  the  idea  that  sometimes 
what  is  required  is  decentralizing  institu- 
tions rather  than  centralizing  them  and 
encouraging  greater  reliance  on  private 
and  voluntary— rather  than  public— insti- 
tutions. In  this  regard,  we  will  continue  to 
strengthen  our  partnership  with  U.S. 
private  and  voluntary  organizations  and 
draw  on  their  unique  capacities  in  such 
areas  as  small-scale  enterprise,  health 
delivery  systems,  and  community 
development. 

We  ai-e  also  stressing  the  contribution 
that  the  private  sector  and  the  use  of 
market  power  can  make  to  solving  key 
development  problems.  We  believe  there 
are  many  things  that  government  cannot 
do,  or  cannot  do  well.  In  particular  we 
plan  to  test  pilot  efforts  for  private  sector 
involvement  in  areas  where  government 
has  often  been  unsuccessful— such  as 
distribution  of  agricultural  inputs.  We 
will  be  testing  the  capabilities  of  in- 
digenous private  sectors  to  manufacture 
and  market  inputs  for  health  and  popula- 
tion programs. 

In  the  area  of  technology  transfer,  we 
hojDe  to  achieve  dramatic  breakthroughs 
in  such  areas  as  biomedical  research, 
agriculture,  and  family  ])lanning.  "New 
technologies"  frequently  connote  com- 
plex, expensive  applications  to  solve 
esoteric  problems.  But  technology  also 
may  be  used  to  find  solutions  to  age-old 
problems  through  inexpensive  methods 


May  1984 


^mmmwumutHmmimmmmmmm 


MIDDLE   EAST 


that  can  be  disseminated  to  people 
everywhere.  An  example  is  the 
breakthrough  in  oral  rehydi-ation 
therapy,  which  I  mentioned  earlier. 

AID  intends  to  be  a  leader  in  sup- 
porting the  development  and  dissemina- 
tion of  such  new  technologies.  Sustained 
development  requii'es  an  indigenous 
capacity  to  adopt,  create,  and  apply  a  con- 
tinuing stream  of  appropriate  tech- 
nologies to  the  problems  of  health,  popu- 
lation growth,  hunger,  illiteracy, 
unemployment,  and  labor  productivity. 
Moreover  their  dissemination  and  actual 
utilization  requires  that  they  be 
economically  and  financially  sound, 
capable  of  withstanding  the  test  of  the 
market. 

Research  thus  takes  on  added  impor- 
tance, and  AID  intends  to  give  greater 
emphasis  to  it  as  a  fulcrum  of  tech- 
nological transfer.  We  have  identified 
four  critical  research  areas  that  will 
receive  major  AID  attention  in  the  com- 
ing years:  agriculture,  health,  family  plan- 
ning, and  fuelwood  production  and  utiliza- 
tion. 

The  developments  I  have  just  out- 
lined have  had  a  major  part  in  shaping 
our  proposed  program  for  FY  198.5  and 
will  influence  the  way  in  which  that  pro- 
gram is  caiTied  out.  Let  me  turn  now  to 
the  details  of  the  FY  1985  request. 

Request 

For  FY  1985  we  are  proposing  a  program 
of  $8.9  billion  for  foreign  economic 
assistance,  including  amounts  we  are  re- 
questing as  part  of  our  overall  proposal 
for  Central  America.  In  addition,  to  re- 
spond to  several  pressing  requirements 
this  year,  we  are  requesting  several  FY 
1984  supplemental  appropriations.  These 
include  an  urgent  $90  million  PL  480, 
Title  II  food  aid  supplemental  for  Africa 
to  respond  to  the  dire  food  shortage  in 
that  region,  $.320  million  in  supplemental 
for  the  multilateral  banks,  and  a  $400 
million  supplemental  for  Central  America. 

The  Central  America  supplemental 
consists  of  $290.5  million  for  ESF,  most  of 
which  is  for  urgently  needed  balance-of- 
payments  support;  $73  million  for  func- 
tional development  assistance;  and  a  total 
of  $11.5  million  for  AID  operating  ex- 
penses, the  Peace  Corps,  and  U.S.  Infor- 
mation Agency. 

The  FY  1985  request  for  bilateral 
assistance  includes  $2.2  billion  for 
development  assistance,  $3.4  billion  for 
the  ESF,  $21  million  for  the  trade  and 
development  program,  and  $1.3  billion  in 
budget  authority  for  the  PL  480  Food  for 
Peace  program. 


66 


Our  development  assistance  request 
includes  $1.6  billion  for  the  functional 
development  assistance  accounts.  Of  this 
amount,  $20  million  would  be  allocated  to 
the  private  enterprise  revolving  fund. 
The  development  assistance  request  also 
includes  $97.5  million  for  the  Sahel 
development  program,  $75  million  for  the 
new  Economic  Policy  Initiative  for  Africa 
which  I  mentioned  earlier,  $10  million  for 
support  of  American  schools  and  hospitals 
abroad,  $25  million  for  the  international 
disaster  assistance  program,  and  $404 
million  for  AID  operating  expenses.  And 
it  includes  $34  million  for  the  Foreign 
Service  retirement  fund,  for  which  fund- 
ing is  already  authorized. 

I  would  like  to  point  out  that,  with 
respect  to  our  development  assistance  re- 
quest, we  are  proposing  a  reduction  in  the 
minimum  loan  level  required  for  allocation 
within  our  functional  accounts.  This  will 
give  us  needed  flexibility  in  the  program- 
ming of  our  resources  and  avoid  the 
possibility  of  having  to  provide  loans  to 
any  of  the  least  developed  countries  such 
as  has  been  required  this  year  in 
Bangladesh  as  a  result  of  the  current  loan 
floor. 

The  ESF,  consistent  with  the  pro- 
gram of  the  past  several  years,  has  over 
half  of  its  resources  allocated  to  Israel 
and  Egyjjt  to  continue  our  support  for  the 
search  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  The 


FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  the  Middle  East 


request  also  includes  expanded  assistance 
to  the  Caribbean  Basin  countries  to 
restore  economic  growth  to  this  troubled 
region,  support  for  continuing  efforts  to 
stem  the  spread  of  economic  and  political 
disruption  in  Africa,  and  to  advance  our 
security  and  development-oriented  pro- 
grams in  Pakistan  and  the  Philippines. 

For  multilateral  assistance  in  FY 
1985,  we  are  requesting  a  total  of  $1.5 
bilhon.  This  includes  $1.2  billion  for  U.S. 
contributions  to  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks.  The  request  also  includes 
$242  million  for  international  organiza- 
tions and  programs,  of  which  $50  million 
is  for  support  of  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development  (IF AD)  and 
$192  million  is  for  voluntary  contributions 
to  UN  development  programs,  including 
$120  million  for  the  UN  Development 
Program  (UNDP)  and  $27  million  for  the 
UN  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF). 

I  look  forward  to  working  with  the 
committee  in  carrying  out  our  proposals. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  "Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.H 


by  Richard  W.  Murphy 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  15, 
198U-  Ambassador  Murphy  is  Assistant 
Secretary  of  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs. 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  testify  to- 
day in  support  of  the  Administration's 
proposals  for  FY  1985  economic  and 
security  assistance  for  the  Near  East. 

The  Administration's  proposal 
reflects  the  realities  of  our  foreign  policy 
and  national  security  objectives  in  this 
vital  region.  In  each  country,  our 
assistance  programs  are  intended  to  nur- 
ture relationships  of  mutual  interest  and 
trust  and  to  assist  these  governments  in 
strengthening  their  security  and  further- 
ing their  economic  progress. 


Our  programs  support  objectives  in 
the  region  which  are  vital  to  our  own 
peace,  security,  and  well-being. 

•  We  are  actively  pursuing  a  just 
and  lasting  Middle  East  peace. 

•  We  are  engaged  in  maintaining 
unimpeded  access  to  the  crucial  oil 
resources  of  the  Persian  Gulf. 

•  Our  assistance  to  Lebanon  aims  to 
help  the  Lebanese  Government  restore 
peace  and  regain  sovereignty  over  the 
country. 

•  We  are  working  with  friendly 
countries  to  safeguard  our  vital  interests 
in  North  Africa,  Southwest  Asia,  and  the 
Persian  Gulf. 

•  We  are  searching  for  peace  in 
Afghanistan  which  would  include  the 
withdrawal  of  Soviet  military  forces  and 
the  restoration  of  Afghanistan  in- 
dependence. 

In  our  efforts  to  advance  the  Middle 
East  peace  process  and  to  promote  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


resolution  of  conflicts  elsewhere  in  the 
region,  we  recognize  that  the  spirit  of  ac- 
commodation can  grow  more  readily  if 
friendly  states  feel  confident  of  their  abili- 
ty to  provide  for  their  own  security  and 
for  the  economic  and  social  needs  of  their 
people. 

An  important  change  that  the  Ad- 
ministration is  proposing  for  the  FY  1985 
foreign  assistance  involves  a  shift  of  the 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  financing 
program  to  "on  budget,"  thus  requiring 
authorization  and  appropriation  of  funds 
for  the  entire  program.  We  are  seeking 
this  change  so  that  we  will  be  able  to  offer 
FMS  credits  at  a  concessional  rate  as  an 
alternative  to  market  rates  to  avoid  ex- 
acerbating the  debt  burden  of  many  of 
our  friends.  Congress  has  repeatedly  ex- 
pressed concern  about  the  mounting  debt 
problems  of  many  developing  countries, 
where  there  has  been  a  significant  rise  in 
recent  years  of  the  debt-servicing 
burdens.  An  increasing  number  of  coun- 
tries are  seeking  debt-service  relief  from 
both  official  and  private  creditors.  In  the 
Middle  East,  Morocco  rescheduled  its 
govemment-to-govemment  debt  last 
October. 

FMS  debt  service  is  significant  in 
terms  of  overall  debt,  particularly  in  the 
case  of  Israel  and  Egypt.  The  increasing 
burden  of  debt  service  has  a  negative  im- 
pact on  both  economies.  For  this  reason, 
as  part  of  this  "on  budget"  proposal,  the 
FY  1985  request  would  provide  Israel 
and  Egypt  all  their  FMS  credits  on  a 
forgiven  or  grant  basis. 

In  addition,  on-budget  lending  will 
provide  the  Administration  with  greater 
flexibility  in  adjusting  the  amount  of  con- 
cessionality  in  individual  programs  of 
other  countries.  Economic  need  and  the 
ability  of  a  country  to  repay  will  be  the 
primary  criteria  in  determining  who 
receives  concessional  FMS  interest  rates 
just  as  it  is  in  determining  who  receives 
grant  military  assistance.  We  now  plan  to 
provide  these  loans  at  a  5%  interest  rate, 
to  be  reviewed  at  the  time  funds  are 
allocated.  Jordan,  Tunisia,  and  Morocco 
are  among  the  13  countries  worldwide 
which  would  receive  part  or  all  (Morocco) 
of  their  FMS  credits  at  concessional  rates. 

The  levels  and  terms  of  our  proposed 
assistance  have  been  carefully  developed 
vdthin  the  constraints  of  our  budget 
stringencies  and  the  President's  economic 
program  and  are  the  amounts  needed  to 
meet  essential  requirements  of  the  coun- 
tries to  this  region. 

Our  FY  1985  foreign  assistance  re- 
quest for  the  Near  East  vdll  fund  six  ma- 
jor programs: 


May  1984 


•  $2,790  mUlion  in  FMS  credits,  in- 
cluding $2,575  million  in  forgiven  credits 
for  Israel  and  Egypt; 

•  $65  million  in  grant  military 
assistance  programs  (MAP); 

•  $9.85  million  in  international 
military  education  and  training  (IMET); 

•  $1,693  million  in  economic  support 
funds  (ESF); 

•  $52  million  in  development 
assistance;  and 

•  $620.2  million  in  PL  480  food 
assistance. 

Middle  East  Peace 

Our  highest  priority  continues  to  be  fur- 
thering the  Middle  East  peace  process  to 
bring  a  just  and  lasting  end  to  the  conflict 
and  turmoil  which  has  disturbed  this  area 
for  so  long.  There  are  no  quick  and  easy 
solutions  for  peace  in  the  region. 
However,  we  will  persevere  with  our  ef- 
forts and  with  the  President's  Middle 
East  peace  initiative  of  September  1, 
1982.  Our  assistance  plays  an  important 
role  in  furthering  the  peace  process. 

Ten  years  ago,  we  helped  negotiate 
the  disengagement  of  Egyptian  and 
Israeli  Armed  Forces.  They  have  not 
clashed  since.  Five  years  ago,  a  peace 
treaty  ended  30  years  of  war  between 
Egypt  and  Israel.  Israel  and  Egypt  re- 
main our  principal  partners  in  the  quest 
for  peace,  and  these  two  nations  are  the 
largest  recipients  of  our  proposed  foreign 
assistance  for  FY  1985.  This  assistance  is 
aimed  at  ensuring  their  security  and 
strengthening  their  economies,  both 
essential  to  their  continuing  on  the  path 
to  a  broader  peace  settlement. 

Similar  programs,  although  smaller  in 
amounts,  are  planned  for  Lebanon  and 
Jordan,  also  important  participants  in  our 
quest  for  a  Middle  East  peace.  Lack  of 
progress  toward  a  more  peaceful,  stable 
Lebanon  will  erode  the  chances  for  peace 
and  stability  elsewhere  in  the  region.  In 
its  quests  for  reconciliation,  Lebanon 
needs  support,  both  moral  and  material. 
Jordan  requires  our  continued  support  to 
buOd  the  necessary  confidence  to  join  the 
peace  process.  Our  program  also  seeks  to 
improve  the  quality  of  Palestinian  life  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and  to  encour- 
age economic  and  social  cooperation  in  the 
region. 

Israel 

The  United  States  has  a  historic  commit- 
ment to  Israel's  security  and  economic 
well-being  extending  over  the  past  three 
decades.  Our  assistance  provides  a  tangi- 
ble demonstration  of  the  strength  and 
durability  of  that  commitment  and  seeks 


kummttm 


to  give  Israel  the  confidence  to  take  the 
risks  necessary  to  pursue  the  peace 
process. 

To  assist  Israel  in  maintaining  its 
qualitative  edge  in  military  capability 
over  potential  aggressors,  a  $1.4  billion 
FMS  credit  level  is  requested.  For  the 
first  time,  this  FMS  request  would  con- 
sist exclusively  of  forgiven  credits,  i.e., 
grant  funds.  This  change  is  being  pro- 
posed to  respond  to  the  negative  impact 
of  the  increasing  burden  of  debt  service 
on  the  Israeli  economy.  The  overall  level 
of  FMS  credits  proposed  for  Israel  would 
decline  from  levels  appropriated  in  previ- 
ous years  because  of  the  greater  financial 
value  of  an  all  grant  program.  Israel's  mil- 
itary needs  have  been  analyzed  by  both 
governments,  and  we  each  agree  that  the 
terms  and  level  of  the  FY  1985  FMS  re- 
quest for  Israel  will  achieve  our  mutual 
goals. 

The  proposed  $850  million  ESF  pro- 
gram also  is  to  be  all  grant.  The  major 
portion  will  be  provided  on  a  cash  trans- 
fer basis  to  support  Israel's  balance  of 
payments;  these  funds  permit  Israel  to 
import  essential  civilian  goods  and  serv- 
ices without  drawing  down  its  foreign 
exchange  reserves.  In  addition,  $65  mil- 
lion of  the  request  will  be  used  to  aug- 
ment endowments  for  four  existing 
U.S.-Israeli  binational  foundations.  These 
foundations  (Binational  Industrial  Re- 
search and  Development  Foundation,  Bi- 
national Science  Foundation,  Binational 
Agricultural  Research  and  Development 
Fund,  and  the  U.S.-Israeli  Educational 
Foundation)  undertake  a  variety  of  pro- 
grams in  education  and  research  which 
contribute  to  the  technological  base  upon 
which  Israel  intends  to  build  its  future 
growth. 

It  has,  however,  become  increasingly 
clear  that  helping  Israel  to  restore  its 
basic  economic  strength  and  balance  is 
not  and  cannot  be  solely  a  function  of  the 
level  of  U.S.  assistance.  In  other  words, 
a  somewhat  higher  level  of  ESF,  as  the 
Congress  legislated  last  year  in  the  con- 
tinuing resolution,  whDe  welcomed  by 
Israel  because  every  dollar  helps,  will  not 
address  the  basic  problems  that  beset  the 
Israeli  economy.  What  is  needed  instead 
is  our  steadfast  encouragement  to  the 
Israeli  Government  as  it  devises  economic 
programs  that  can  rid  the  country  of  the 
twin  perils  of  high  inflation  and  an  in- 
creasingly difficult  external  accounts  situ- 
ation. Our  total  assistance,  when  we  take 
into  account  the  interest  savings  associ- 
ated with  a  shift  to  an  all-grant  FMS  pro- 
gram, is  almost  equivalent  to  what  the 
Congress  appropriated  last  year  for 
Israel.  In  addition  to  its  economic  benefit, 
it  serves  as  a  political  statement  of  our 


67 


MIDDLE  EAST 


strong  support  for  Israel  and,  particularly 
in  the  endowments  proposed,  directly  ad- 
dresses our  concern  for  Israel's  future. 

Egypt 

Egypt  is  key  to  our  regional  political  and 
strategic  policies.  Egypt  is  an  active  part- 
ner in  the  Middle  East  peace  process,  and 
continued  Egyptian  support  is  crucial  to 
its  ultimate  success.  The  Mubarak  gov- 
ernment publicly  and  actively  supports 
the  Camp  David  accords  and  the  Presi- 
dent's September  1,  1982,  peace  initiative. 
It  was  also  supportive  of  our  efforts  to 
foster  stability  in  Lebanon. 

During  the  past  year,  Egypt  has  been 
helpful  in  deterring  radical  destabilization 
efforts  directed  at  neighboring  countries, 
such  as  Sudan  and  Chad.  Egypt's  impor- 
tance as  a  stabilizing  force  continues  to  in- 
crease as  tensions  remain  high  elsewhere 
in  the  region.  U.S.-Egyptian  military  ex- 
ercises have  served  to  enhance  both  coun- 
tries' ability  to  preserve  stability  in  the 
region.  The  recent  trend  toward  im- 
proved relations  between  Egypt  and  mod- 
erate Arab  states  is  evidence  of  Egypt's 
importance  as  a  bulwark  against  radical 
forces  which  reject  the  idea  of  a  negoti- 
ated settlement  with  Israel.  Our  sus- 
tained assistance  reinforces  the  accom- 
plishments made  through  the  Camp 
David  process  and  supports  regional 
stability. 

The  request  for  $1,175  billion  in  for- 
given FMS  credits  for  FY  1985  reflects 
our  commitment  to  a  long-term  military 
supply  relationship  with  Egypt  to  help  it 
modernize  its  forces  and  replace  obsolete 
Soviet-supplied  equipment.  Our  military 
assistance  relationship  with  Egypt  is  a 
key  part  of  our  efforts  to  maintain  the 
regional  balance  of  forces  which  has  been 
in  danger  of  shifting  in  favor  of  Soviet- 
supplied  radicals  like  Libya  and  Syria. 
The  change  to  an  all  grant  program  has 
been  made  in  recognition  that  military 
modernization  will  not  benefit  regional 
stability  if  it  is  accomplished  by  amassing 
debts  which  could  undermine  Egypt's 
ability  to  sustain  economic  growth.  FMS 
for  FY  1985  will  be  devoted  mainly  to 
progress  payments  on  F-16  and  E-2C  air- 
craft, tanks,  armored  personnel  carriers, 
and  air  defense  radars  as  well  as  to 
follow-on  support  for  U.S.  equipment  sup- 
plied over  the  past  few  years. 

Our  economic  assistance  helps  main- 
tain the  continued  economic  growth  which 
is  essential  to  Egypt's  stability.  Our  pro- 
gram is  designed  to  support  economic  pol- 
icies which  address  the  existing  con- 
straints on  development.  Over  the  past 


U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  30,  1984' 

Since  the  date  of  my  last  report  to  you  on  the 
participation  of  United  States  Armed  Forces 
in  the  Multinational  Force  (MNF)  in  Lebanon, 
I  have  decided  that  the  U.S.  will  terminate  its 
participation  in  the  MNF.  In  accordance  with 
my  desire  that  Congress  be  kept  informed  on 
these  matters,  and  consistent  with  Section  4  of 
the  Multinational  Force  in  Lebanon  Res- 
olution, I  am  hereby  providing  a  final  report 
on  our  participation  in  the  MNF. 

U.S.  foreign  policy  interests  in  Lebanon 
have  not  changed,  and  remain  as  stated  in  my 
last  report  to  Congress  on  February  13.  The 
U.S.  is  committed  to  the  goals  of  the  restora- 
tion of  a  sovereign,  independent  and  united 
Lebanon,  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces, 
and  the  security  of  Israel's  northern  border. 
However,  the  continuation  of  our  participation 
in  the  MNF  is  no  longer  a  necessary  or  appro- 
priate means  of  achieving  these  goals.  We 
have  discussed  our  decision  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Lebanon  and  the  other  MNF  par- 
ticipants, and  the  other  MNF  countries  have 
made  similar  decisions. 

The  U.S.  military  personnel  who  made  up 
the  U.S.  MNF  contingent  were  earlier 
redeployed  to  U.S.  ships  offshore.  Likewise, 
the  MNF  personnel  of  other  national  con- 
tingents have  either  already  departed 
Lebanon  or  are  in  the  process  of  departing. 
As  you  know,  prior  to  their  earlier  rede- 
ployment to  ships  offshore,  U.S.  MNF  per- 
sonnel had  come  under  intermittent  hostile  fu-e 
as  a  result  of  continued  fighting  in  the  Beirut 
area,  including  the  round  of  serious  fighting 
that  occurred  in  late  February.  On  February 
25-26,  and  again  on  February  29,  U.S.  war- 
ships returned  fire  against  artillery  and  rocket 
positions  in  Syrian-controlled  territory  that 
had  fu-ed  on  U.S.  military  and  diplomatic  loca- 
tions and  on  U.S.  reconnaissance  flights. 

During  the  overall  course  of  our  participa- 
tion in  the  MNF,  U.S.  forces  suffered  a  total  of 
264  killed  (of  which  4  non-MNF  personnel  were 
killed  in  the  April  1983  bombing  of  the  U.S. 
Embassy),  and  137  wounded  in  action.  (Three 
of  these  were  wounded  in  the  period  since  my 
last  report  to  Congress  on  February  13.)  The 
estimated  cost  of  U.S.  participation  in  the 
MNF  for  FY  1984  was  a  total  of  $14.6  million 
for  the  U.S.  Marine  Corps  deployment,  $44.9 
million  for  U.S.  Navy  support,  and  $243,000 
for  U.S.  Army  support. 


These  were  heavy  burdens  and  griev- 
ous losses  for  our  country.  We  owe  a 
great  debt  of  gratitude  to  those  military 
and  diplomatic  personnel  of  the  United 
States  and  other  MNF  countries  who 
served  their  countries  so  proudly  to  give 
the  people  of  Lebanon  a  chance  to  achieve 
peace  and  national  reconciliation. 

The  United  States  has  not  abandoned 
Lebanon.  The  U.S.  Embassy  in  Beirut  re- 
mains in  full  and  active  operation  and  a 
Marine  detachment  of  approximately  100 
personnel  drawn  from  the  Marine  unit 
afloat  remains  to  provide  additional  exter- 
nal security  for  our  diplomatic  mission.  In 
addition,  a  limited  number  of  U.S.  mili- 
tary personnel  (equipped  with  personal 
weapons  for  self-defense)  will  remain  to 
provide  military  training  and  security 
assistance  liaison  to  the  Lebanese  Armed 
Forces.  These  personnel  will  not  be  part 
of  any  multinational  force;  they  will  be 
deployed  under  the  authority  of  the  For- 
eign Assistance  and  Arms  Export  Control 
Acts,  and  my  Constitutional  authority 
with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  foreign 
relations  and  as  Commander-in-Chief  of 
U.S.  Forces.  I  do  not  intend  or  expect, 
under  present  circumstances,  that  these 
personnel  will  become  involved  in  hostil- 
ities; nonetheless,  U.S.  naval  and  air 
forces  in  the  Mediterranean  area,  includ- 
ing the  U.S.  Marines  redeployed  from 
Lebanon,  are  available  to  protect  our 
military  and  diplomatic  personnel  should 
that  need  ever  arise. 

1  appreciate  the  support  for  this  vital 
effort  that  Congress  provided  last  October 
in  adopting  the  Multinational  Force  in 
Lebanon  Resolution.  I  hope  that  Con- 
gress will  support  the  programs  of  eco- 
nomic and  security  assistance  that  are  es- 
sential for  the  future  of  Lebanon  and  the 
Middle  East.  I  will  keep  Congress  in- 
formed on  events  in  Lebanon,  and  on  the 
U.S.  role  in  encouraging  peace  and  stabili- 
ty in  the  area. 
Sincerely, 

RONALD  REAGAN 

•Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  Strom  Thurmond,  President 
'pro  tempore  of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of  Apr. 
2,  1984).  ■ 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


IXmn 


MIDDLE  EAST 


year,  the  Egyptian  Government  has 
moved  deliberately  toward  economic  re- 
form, raising  prices,  and  liberalizing  for- 
eign exchange  regulations.  Our  proposed 
economic  aid  program  includes  $243  mil- 
lion in  PL  480  food  assistance  and  grant 
ESF  of  $750  million.  The  ESF  program 
consists  of  a  $300  million  commodity  im- 
port program,  which  will  enable  Egypt  to 
import  U.S.  manufactured  goods  and  com- 
modities, and  $450  million  in  project  and 
sector  assistance.  Emphasis  will  be  on  re- 
habilitation and  expansion  of  urban  water 
and  sewer  systems,  increasing  agricul- 
tural and  industrial  production,  and  insti- 
tution building. 

Lebanon 

Although  we  are  watching  the  situation  in 
Lebanon  closely,  it  is  still  difficult  to 
predict  how  events  will  evolve.  We  re- 
main committed  to  the  achievement  of 
long-term  stability  and  believe  that  U.S. 
economic  and  military  support,  properly 
channeled,  can  assist  in  the  attainment  of 
this  goal. 

We  do  not  intend  to  abandon  either 
the  people  or  the  Government  of 
Lebanon;  security  and  economic  assist- 
ance are  an  important  element  of  our 
policy  toward  Lebanon. 

Our  military  assistance  consists  of 
FMS  credits  and  IMET.  The  FY  1985  re- 
quest is  for  $15  million  in  FMS  credits. 
This  is  a  minimum  level  for  follow-on  sup- 
port for  U.S.-origin  equipment.  When  the 
situation  in  Lebanon  stabilizes,  more 
funds  may  be  needed  to  assist  the 
Lebanese  Government  in  its  efforts  to 
continue  the  expansion  and  modernization 
of  the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces.  Given  the 
rapidly  evolving  situation  in  Lebanon,  it 
is  impossible  to  state  at  this  time  that  ad- 
ditional assistance  may  be  needed.  To  pro- 
vide training  to  bolster  the  Lebanese 
Armed  Forces,  $800,000  in  IMET  monies 
is  required. 

The  ESF  request  of  $20  million  for 
FY  1985  assumes  that  the  $150  million  ap- 
propriated as  no-year  funds  in  FY  1983 
will  be  fully  obligated.  The  FY  1985  ESF 
program  as  presented  in  the  congres- 
sional presentation  document  will  be  con- 
centrated on  three  sectors— housing, 
health,  and  government  revenue  genera- 
tion. However,  some  of  these  funds  may 
also  be  needed  to  replace  $5  million  taken 
from  the  $150  million  appropriation  for 
reUef  activities  and  $7.6  milhon  for  the 
American  University  in  Beirut  due  to  re- 
cent war  damage. 


Jordan 

A  stable  and  secure  Jordan  is  essential  to 
further  the  President's  Middle  East  peace 
initiative.  Our  security  and  economic  as- 
sistance encourages  King  Hussein's  confi- 
dence in  the  U.S.  commitment  to  the  se- 
curity of  Jordan  as  he  seeks  a  formula  to 
enable  him  to  join  peace  negotiations. 

The  proposed  FY  1985  assistance  pro- 
gram for  Jordan  consists  of  $95  million  in 
FMS  credits,  $20  million  in  ESF,  $87,000 
in  PL  480,  Title  II  through  the  World 
Food  Program,  and  $2  million  in  IMET. 
Jordan  has  a  growing  need  for  more 
modem  armament  as  the  result  of  the 
massive  Soviet  arms  transfers  to  Syria. 
FMS  financing  assists  Jordan  to  acquire 
those  weapons  most  critical  to  its  legit- 
imate self-defense  needs.  In  view  of 
Jordan's  economic  problems,  coupled  with 
reduced  levels  of  aid  from  Arab  oil  ex- 
porters, half  of  the  proposed  FMS  credits 
would  be  provided  at  concessional  rates. 

Given  the  threat  from  Syria,  which 
has  a  significant  advantage  in  armor  and 
air  power,  the  FMS  credits  will  most 
likely  be  used  to  acquire  releasable  air 
defense  and  antiarmor  weapons.  Other 
items  to  be  purchased  include  vehicles, 
communications  equipment,  ammunition, 
and  follow-on  support  for  the  U.S.-origin 
equipment  already  in  the  Jordanian  in- 
ventory. The  training  funds  under  IMET 
enhance  the  professional  capability  of 
Jordan's  Armed  Forces  and  assists 
Jordan  in  continuing  its  training  and  ad- 
visory role  in  the  region. 

Jordan's  economy  is  heavily  depend- 
ent upon  world  prices  of  its  major  raw 
materials  exports,  earnings  of  its  ex- 
patriate work  force,  and  annual  rainfall. 
Export  prices  of  phosphates  and  potash 
remain  close  to  Jordan's  production  costs. 
The  general  slowdown  in  economic  devel- 
opment projects  in  the  Persian  Gulf  has 
reduced  worker  remittances,  which  nor- 
mally make  a  major  contribution  to 
Jordan's  balance  of  payments.  A  current 
drought  is  straining  the  irrigation 
systems  of  the  Jordan  Valley,  with  poten- 
tially disastrous  results  for  Jordanian 
agricultural  exports.  By  improving 
Jordanian  technical  and  managerial  capa- 
bilities through  our  ESF  assistance,  we 
help  Jordan  to  deal  with  these  and  with 
future  problems. 

Our  ESF  programs  will  stress  tech- 
nology transfer  and  technical  assistance 
in  such  areas  as  rainfed  agriculture  and 
renewable  energy  sources.  Work  will  con- 
tinue on  important  water  development 
projects. 


Regional  Program 

The  regional  program  request  for  FY  1985 
consists  of  $15  million  in  ESF,  13  million 
in  development  assistance,  and  $2.29  mil- 
lion in  PL  480,  Title  II. 

The  ESF  proposal  furthers  the  Mid- 
dle East  peace  process  by  addressing  ob- 
jectives that  cannot  be  met  through  con- 
ventional bilateral  programs.  This  grant 
assistance  will  finance  two  major 
activities: 

•  $9  million  will  be  used  for  develop- 
ment projects  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza.  By  financing  these  projects,  which 
are  implemented  by  U.S.  private  volun- 
tary organizations,  the  United  States 
seeks  to  improve  the  quality  of  Pales- 
tinian life  in  these  territories; 

•  $5  million  will  support  the  regional 
cooperation  program,  which  consists  of  a 
variety  of  joint  projects  involving  Israeli 
and  Egyptian  participation.  We  seek  to 
use  these  funds  in  a  manner  that  promotes 
contacts  between  Israeli  universities, 
government  ministries,  and  private 
organizations  and  their  counterparts  in 
Egypt.  Cooperative  projects  help  pro- 
mote relationships  between  Israelis  and 
their  Arab  neighbors,  thus  helping  to 
break  down  barriers  between  people. 

•  $3  million  in  development  assistance 
funds  will  finance  six  ongoing  regional 
projects  as  well  as  project  design  and 
evaluation. 

Southwest  Asia-Persian  Gulf- 
North  Africa 

The  Southwest  Asia-Persian  Gulf-North 
Africa  region,  a  critical  source  of  energy 
to  the  free  world,  is  simultaneously  threat- 
ened by  Soviet  encroachment  through 
Afghanistan  by  radical  forces  from  within 
and  by  the  increasing  intensity  of  the 
Iran-Iraq  war.  About  40%  of  the  free 
world's  oil  imports  originate  in  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Through  our  assistance,  we 
help  to  improve  the  security  of  these 
countries  and  to  maintain  the  availability 
of  these  vital  oil  supplies.  Our  programs 
are  directed  at  supporting  those  countries 
in  the  region  which  provide  important 
access  to  military  facilities  as  well  as  other 
nations  which  provide  transit  rights  into 
the  region  for  U.S.  forces  t'o  be  used  in 
time  of  crisis.  In  addition  to  the  security 
concerns  which  these  countries  face,  some 
of  them,  i.e.,  Morocco  and  Yemen,  have 
very  serious  economic  problems. 

Oman.  Oman,  strategically  located  at 
the  entrance  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  is 
cooperating  closely  with  the  United 
States  in  our  common  objective  of  main- 


elir   May  1984 


MIDDLE  EAST 


taining  security  and  stability  in  that  vital 
area  and  freedom  of  navigation  through 
the  Strait  of  Hormuz  and  its  approaches. 
Oman's  agreement  to  permit  access  to  its 
facilities  represents  a  major  contribution 
to  American  force  projection  capability  in 
Southwest  Asia  and  an  important  public 
expression  of  local  support  for  our 
presence  in  the  region.  The  military  sup- 
ply and  training  relationship  between  the 
two  countries  contributes  to  Oman's  con- 
tinued willingness  to  cooperate  with  the 
United  States  in  security  matters. 

In  an  effort  to  broaden  our  relation- 
ship with  Oman  beyond  its  security 
aspects,  the  U.S. -Oman  Joint  Commission 
was  estabhshed  in  1980  in  conjunction 
with  the  facilities  access  agreement.  ESF 
assistance  funds  the  U.S.  contribution  to 
this  joint  commission  which  provides 
technical  and  capital  assistance  for  the 
development  of  infrastructure  and  the 
non-oil  sectors  of  Oman's  economy. 

Our  FY  1985  request  for  Oman  in- 
cludes $45  million  in  FMS  credits,  $20  mil- 
Uon  in  ESF,  and  $100,000  in  IMET.  The 
military  equipment  purchased  from  the 
United  States  through  the  FMS  program 
helps  Oman  strengthen  its  defense  in  the 
face  of  threats  from  Soviet-supplied  South 
Yemen  and  from  Iran.  The  small  IMET 
program  will  provide  advanced  training 
for  officers  in  the  Sultan's  armed  forces. 

Of  the  $20  million  in  ESF,  $15  million 
will  be  used  for  school  construction.  Ap- 
proximately $4  million  will  go  toward 
funding  the  joint  commission's  scholar- 
ship and  training  project  which  brings 
Omani  students  to  the  United  States  for 
studies  as  well  as  providing  in-country 
training  programs.  These  projects  are  in- 
tended to  meet  Oman's  acute  trained 
manpower  shortage.  Remaining  funds 
will  be  spent  on  joint  commission  opera- 
tions, technical  assistance,  and  feasibility 
and  design  studies,  primarily  in  the  area 
of  water  resources. 

Yemen.  The  proposed  FY  1985  assist- 
ance program  for  the  Yemen  Arab 
Republic  is  necessary  to  strengthen  a 
bilateral  assistance  program  which  offers 
a  visible  alternative  to  Yeman's  present 
heavy  dependence  on  Soviet  assistance. 
The  strategic  location  of  the  Yemen  Arab 
RepubHc,  its  porous  border  with  Saudi 
Arabia,  and  the  large  numbers  of  Yemenis 
working  in  the  oil  states  of  the  peninsula 
underscore  the  importance  of  Yemen  in 
regional  stability  and,  hence,  to  U.S.  in- 
terests in  the  area.  Furthermore,  Yemen 
is  a  "buffer"  between  the  Marxist 
People's  Democratic  Republic  of  Yemen 
and  Saudi  Arabia. 


For  Yemen  our  FY  1985  request  con- 
sists of  $30  million  in  development  assist- 
ance, $10  million  in  MAP,  $1.5  million  in 
IMET,  and  $5  million  in  PL  480,  Title  I. 

This  strategically  located  country  is 
one  of  the  poorest  and  least  developed  in 
the  Middle  East.  We  are  proposing  a 
small  increase  in  development  assistance 
in  recognition  of  Yemen's  increasingly 
severe  economic  situation  due  to  a  decline 
in  Arab  donor  assistance  as  weU  as  a  de- 
crease in  worker  remittances.  The  Yemen 
Government  also  had  to  cope  with  a  dev- 
astating earthquake  in  December  1982 
which  left  up  to  400,000  homeless.  Our 
projects  are  concentrated  in  the  agricul- 
ture, education,  and  health  sectors. 

MAP  funds  will  be  used  to  fund  follow- 
on  support  for  U.S. -origin  military  equip- 
ment as  well  as  to  purchase  ammunition. 
We  are  requesting  grant  assistance  be- 
cause Yemen  has  been  financially  unable 
to  draw  on  credits  for  the  past  2  years. 
The  IMET  program  seeks  to  expose  as 
many  Yemeni  military  personnel  as  possi- 
ble to  training  in  the  United  States, 
although  some  training,  in  particular 
English-language  instruction,  takes  place 
in  country. 

Morocco.  Morocco  is  of  key  strategic 
importance  to  the  United  States  and  has  a 
longstanding  record  of  cooperation  and 
friendship.  Morocco  has  consistently 
taken  moderate,  constructive  positions  on 
issues  of  mutual  concern.  Over  the  past 
3  years,  the  United  States  and  Morocco 
have  reaffirmed  the  closeness  of  relations 
with  the  establishment  of  Joint  Economic 
and  Military  Commissions,  the  agreement 
of  King  Hassan  to  provide  transit  access, 
and  numerous  exchanges  of  high-level  of- 
ficial visitors. 

Morocco  is  in  severe  financial  straits 
and  is  again  confronting  a  drought  dis- 
aster. As  part  of  an  International  Mone- 
tary Fund  (IMF)  economic  reform  pack- 
age, the  Moroccan  Govei-nment  has  begun 
a  program  of  austerity  measui'es  designed 
to  bring  its  balance  of  pajinents  into 
equilibrium  by  1987.  Reduction  of  food 
subsidies  was  initiated  at  the  beginning  of 
August  without  incident.  In  mid-January, 
however,  six  cities  in  Morocco  were 
shaken  by  rioting.  Although  the  incidents 
were  not  directly  linked,  they  have  a  com- 
mon stimulus  in  economic  considera- 
tions—rising prices,  lack  of  employment 
prospects  for  the  half  of  the  population 
which  is  under  20,  and  the  perception  of 
austerity  which  lies  ahead  for  the  popula- 
tion. In  response  to  the  disturbances, 
King  Hassan  announced  there  would  be 
no  further  price  inci-eases.  This  decision 
opens  the  question  of  alternative  methods 


of  cutting  government  expenditures  in 
order  to  meet  the  IMF  austerity  package. 

For  Morocco  the  Administration  is  re- 
questing $19  million  in  development 
assistance,  $15  million  in  ESF,  and  $52.5 
million  in  PL  480  food  assistance.  These 
different  forms  of  economic  assistance  are 
intended  to  assist  Morocco  in  this  period 
of  economic  austerity  and  budgetary 
stringency.  If  the  present  drought  con- 
tinues, more  assistance  may  be  needed. 
Development  assistance  will  be  focused 
on  agriculture,  population,  and  energy. 
The  ESF  will  be  used  for  projects  de- 
signed to  increase  water  supplies  through 
continuation  of  a  snow  pack  augmentation 
project,  a  complete  funding  of  an  energy- 
project,  and  for  quick  dispersing  assist- 
ance to  the  agricultural  sector,  which  is 
suffering  from  acute  drought.  The  PL  480 
assistance  will  provide  balance-of- 
payments  support. 

As  a  key  country  in  North  Africa,  it  is 
in  our  interest  to  see  Morocco  maintain  a 
suitable  level  of  militai-y  preparedness. 
An  increase  of  MAP  to  $40  million  and 
some  concessional  FMS  credits  are  being 
proposed  in  recognition  of  Morocco's 
severe  economic  problems.  MAP  and 
FMS  credits  will  aid  the  Moroccan 
Government  in  its  maintenance  and 
modernization  programs,  including  air 
surveillance  equipment  and  antiaiTnor 
weapons.  Training  for  Moroccan  military 
personnel  in  communications,  logistics, 
and  maintenance  will  be  provided  by  $1.7 
million  in  IMET  funding. 

Tunisia.  A  longtime  friend  of  the 
United  States  and  an  Arab  moderate, 
Tunisia  looks  to  the  United  States  both 
for  security  assistance  in  meeting  Libyan 
threats  to  its  security  and  for  support  for 
continued  Tunisian  economic  develop- 
ment. As  a  sign  of  our  support  for  Tunisian 
stability  following  the  early  January  riots 
over  higher  bread  prices,  we  have  offered 
the  Tunisian  Government  an  additional  $5 
million  of  PL  480  food  assistance  in 
FY  1984.  These  disturbances  were  a  re- 
flection of  the  increasingly  difficult  eco- 
nomic situation  that  Tunisia  now  faces  as 
it  is  squeezed  by  declining  receipts  from 
exports  and  tourism,  mounting  external 
debt,  continued  drought,  and  a  per- 
sistently high  unemployment  rate.  The 
proposed  ESF  of  $3  million  for  FY  1985  is 
needed  to  fund  an  ongoing  program  for 
Tunisian  graduate  students  in  the  United 
States,  as  Tunisia  seeks  to  reorient  its 
technical  sector  from  French  to  U.S. 
products  and  technology.  To  assist 
Tunisia  in  coping  with  the  impact  of  the 
drought,  we  are  requesting  $5.85  million 
in  PL  480  food  assistance. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


For  military  assistance,  the  FY  1985 
request  includes  $50  million  in  FMS 
credits,  $15  million  in  MAP,  and  $1.7  mil- 
Uon  in  IMET.  Of  the  FMS  credits,  $25 
million  would  be  provided  at  concessional 
rates  of  financing.  The  FMS  credits  and 
MAP  are  needed  to  enable  Tunisia  to 
complete  its  purchases  under  a  3-year 
security  assistance  package,  begun  in 
FY  1982,  which  includes  F-5  aircraft. 
Chaparral  missiles,  and  M-60  tanks. 
FY  1985  security  assistance  wUl  also  be 
used  for  the  purchase  of  necessary  tank 
support  equipment.  Payments  will  begin 
on  two  C-130  transports.  IMET  funding 
will  permit  professional  training  for  Tuni- 
sian officers  as  well  as  technical  training 


required  to  support  recently  acquii'ed 
U.S.  equipment. 

In  summary,  we  consider  our  FY  1985 
submission  to  be  consistent  with  pro- 
grams which  the  Congress  supported  in 
previous  years,  justifiable  in  teiTns  of  the 
multifaceted  political,  economic,  and  se- 
curity requirements  of  the  Middle  East 
and  realistic  in  the  conte.xt  of  our  budg- 
etai-y  constraints. 


'The  complete  tran.script  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  "Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Strategic  Defense  Initiative 


FACT  SHEET, 
MAR.  9,  1984» 

For  the  past  3  years,  the  Reagan  Admin- 
istration has  sought  to  restore  the  balance 
of  forces  necessary  to  maintain  peace  and 
stabOity  by  modernizing  the  strategic 
deterrent,  while  at  the  same  time  press- 
ing for  significant,  verifiable  arms  reduc- 
tions. 

This  year  President  Reagan  has  in- 
cluded in  the  defense  budget  a  research 
program  that  explores  the  possibility  of 
strengthening  deterrence  further  by  tak- 
ing advantage  of  recent  advances  in  tech- 
nology that  could,  in  the  long  term,  pro- 
vide an  effective  defense  against  ballistic 
missiles.  This  new  program  focuses  on  ex- 
isting research  and  development  pro- 
grams, totaling  nearly  $1.8  billion  (88% 
Department  of  Defense,  12%  Department 
of  Energy)  in  FY  1985,  in  five  technology 
areas  that  offer  the  greatest  promise  for 
defense  against  missiles.  It  also  includes 
an  additional  funding  increment  of  about 
$250  million  to  augment  these  and  exploit 
other  new  technological  opportunities. 

In  consolidating  these  efforts,  the 
strategic  defense  initiative  seeks  to  de- 
velop sound  technical  options  that  could 
allow  future  Presidents  to  decide  whether 
to  develop  an  effective  defense  against 
ballistic  missiles.  While  such  a  research 
effort  would  not  affect  current  arms  con- 
trol treaties.  President  Reagan  also  di- 
rected a  full  and  continuing  assessment  of 
the  future  implications  of  developing  stra- 
tegic defenses  for  our  defense  posture, 
deterrence  strategy,  and  arms  reduction 
program. 


The  strategic  defense  initiative  is  de- 
signed to  work  toward  the  long-term  na- 
tional goal,  set  by  President  Reagan  in  a 
speech  to  the  American  people  last 
March,  of  putting  an  end  to  the  threat  of 
ballistic  missiles.  To  determine  the  techni- 
cal feasibility  and  strategic  implications  of 
pursuing  that  goal,  the  Defense  Depart- 
ment formed  two  study  groups  of  scien- 
tists and  national  security  experts.  The 
reports  of  those  studies,  submitted  in 
October  1983,  form  the  basis  for  the  pro- 
posed strategic  defense  program. 

The  defensive  technologies  study, 
headed  by  Dr.  James  Fletcher,  the 
former  Director  of  the  National  Aero- 
nautics and  Space  Administration 
(NASA),  concluded  that  promising  new 
technologies  are  becoming  available  that 
justify  a  long-term  research  effort  to  iden- 
tify future  technical  options  concerning 
the  development  of  a  defense  against  bal- 
listic missiles.  Exploring  the  implications 
of  strategic  defense,  two  future  security 
strategic  studies— one  interagency  and 
one  contractor— concluded  that  defensive 
systems  could  strengthen  stability  and 
deterrence  and  enhance  prospects  for 
arms  reductions. 

The  studies  recognized  that  there  are 
uncertainties  that  will  not  be  resolved 
until  more  is  known  about  the  technical 
characteristics  and  capabilities  of  defen- 
sive systems  and  the  response  of  the 
Soviet  Union  to  U.S.  initiatives.  These 
uncertainties  notwithstanding,  the 
studies  concluded  that  it  was  essential 
that  options  for  the  deployment  of  ad- 
vanced ballistic  missile  defenses  be  estab- 
lished and  requirements  permit  us  no  al- 


ternative because  the  decision  to  begin 
ballistic  missile  defense  deployment  is  not 
solely  a  U.S.  decision. 

For  a  number  of  years,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  pursued  advanced  ballistic  mis- 
sile defense  technologies  and  is  the  only 
country  maintaining  an  operational  sys- 
tem of  terminal  balhstic  missile  defense. 
Unilateral  Soviet  deployment  of  an  ad- 
vanced system  capable  of  effectively 
countering  Western  ballistic  missiles- 
added  to  their  already  impressive  air  and 
passive  defense  capabilities— would  jeop- 
ardize deterrence  because  the  United 
States  would  no  longer  be  able  to  pose  a 
credible  threat  of  retaliation. 

By  the  1980s,  technology  progressed 
to  the  point  where  a  focused  research  pro- 
gram for  developing  effective  defensive 
systems  is  a  feasible  proposition.  For  ex- 
ample, one  of  the  fundamental  ingredients 
in  a  strategic  defense  system  is  the  ability 
to  make  millions  of  logical  decisions  per 
second.  Recent  advancements  in  data- 
processing  capability  make  possible  for 
the  first  time  the  real-time  surveillance, 
acquisition,  and  tracking  of  large  numbers 
of  strategic  missiles  and  warheads.  Mini- 
aturized data-processing  capabilities  also 
provide  for  basing  options  that  were  in- 
conceivable a  decade  ago.  Recent  prog- 
ress in  directed-energy  technologies, 
more  sophisticated  sensors,  and  enhanced 
survivability,  when  added  to  our  com- 
puting capability,  now  allow  us  to  think 
about  a  research  program  with  real  po- 
tential to  answering  the  technical  ques- 
tions that  are  crucial  to  an  effective 
strategic  defense  capabOity. 

In  spite  of  these  encouraging 
developments,  we  want  to  emphasize  that 
the  strategic  defense  initiative  is  not  a 
weapons  system  development  and  deploy- 
ment program,  but  rather  a  broad-based- 
centraUy  managed  research  effort  to  iden- 
tify and  develop  the  key  technologies 
necessary  for  an  effective  strategic 
defense.  The  research  will  be  initially 
focused  on  technologies  for  sensing  and 
tracking  missiles,  technologies  for 
weapons  to  be  used  against  missiles  and 
warheads,  technological  support  for  con- 
trol of  such  a  system,  and  on  technologies 
to  ensure  the  survivability  of  the  system. 
The  specific  research  efforts  will  be 
organized  in  five  areas: 

•  Surveillance,  acquisition,  tracking, 
and  kill  assessment; 

•  Directed  energy  technologies; 

•  Kinetic  energy  technologies; 


May  1984 


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IfUUIfUlfUIDIi 


NARCOTICS 


•  Systems  concepts,  battle  manage- 
ment and  command,  control,  and  com- 
munication; and 

•  Survivability,  weapons,  lethality, 
and  support  systems. 

It  is  highly  unlikely  that  our  research 
efforts  would  lead  to  a  single  system  that 
could  intercept  and  defend  flawlessly 
against  all  missiles  and  all  attacks.  There 
is  probably  no  such  "magic  bullet."  What 
we  anticipate  is  a  defense  network,  a 
series  of  systems  not  necessarily  based  on 
the  same  technology  or  physical  prin- 
ciples, which  taken  together  will  provide 
an  effective  defense  against  ballistic 
missiles.  Such  a  set  of  systems  will  almost 
surely  be  layered;  that  is,  designed  to 
cover  the  full  trajectory  of  a  ballistic 
missile.  This  layered  system  offers  the 
potential  for  a  highly  effective  defense  of 
the  United  States  and  allied  countries. 
Obviously  our  research  effort  must  over- 
come numerous  complex  technical 
challenges.  By  beginning  a  broad-based 
research  effort  now,  future  Presidents 
and  future  Congresses  will  have  the  op- 
tion of  deciding  whether  to  proceed  with 
the  actual  development  of  the  most  prom- 
ising strategic  defense  systems. 

In  proposing  that  we  begin  a  research 
effort  to  develop  defensive  technologies, 
the  President  is  hoping  to  develop  an  ad- 
ditional means  of  maintaining  peace,  along 
with  offensive  strategic  forces  and  arms 
reduction,  that  could  provide  a  stable  and 
secure  environment  for  our  nation  and 
our  allies  in  the  next  century.  Strategic 
defense,  when  combined  with  stabilizing 
offensive  force  modernization  and  mutual 
overall  nuclear  arms  reductions,  holds  the 
promise  of  lowering  substantially  the 
utility  of  ballistic  missiles.  This  initiative 
will  provide  future  Presidents  important 
tools  and  options  with  which  to  stabilize 
future  crises. 


FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 
for  Narcotics  Control 


'Department  of  Defense  press  release 
117-84.  ■ 


by  Clyde  D.  Taylor 

Statement  before  the  House  Appro- 
priations Committee  on  March  22,  1981. 
Mr.  Taylor  is  Depiity  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Narcotics  Matters.^ 

The  President  is  requesting  an  appropria- 
tion of  $50.2  million  for  the  Department's 
international  narcotics  control  program 
managed  by  the  Bureau  of  International 
Narcotics  Matters.  If  enacted  by  the  Con- 
gress, the  appropriation  would  be  $9  mil- 
lion over  the  amount  actually  appropri- 
ated for  FY  1984  under  the  continuing 
resolution. 

The  Department  proposes  to  allocate 
$40.5  million,  or  81%  of  the  budget  re- 
quest, to  country  programs,  including 
$29.4  million  for  Latin  America,  $8.1  mil- 
lion for  East  Asia,  and  $3  million  for 
Southwest  Asia.  Most  country  programs 
would  remain  at  the  1984  level  or  increase 
slightly,  with  the  largest  increase  being 
an  additional  $6.8  million  to  support  a 
crop  control  program  in  Colombia  which 
we  hope  to  negotiate  this  year. 

Latin  America 

The  Department  proposes  to  allocate 
$29.5  million  or  59%  of  the  budget  re- 
quest, in  Latin  America,  which  is  the 
single  source  of  cocaine,  the  primary 
source  of  imported  marijuana,  and,  in 
1982,  was  the  source  of  about  34%  of  U.S. 
heroin  imports. 

The  program  request  of  $10.3  million 
for  Colombia  is  based  on  achieving  the 
goal  of  negotiating  agreements  to  assist 
Colombia  in  a  comprehensive  marijuana 
eradication  program  and  an  expanded 
coca  control  program. 

The  Department  believes  that  the 
Betancur  administration  is  committed  to 
narcotics  control  and  looks  forward  to  a 
test  program  this  spring  in  which  the 
Colombians  will  conduct  pilot  eradication 
projects  in  both  the  coca  and  cannabis 
growing  areas.  We  hope  these  pilot  proj- 
ects vnll  be  the  forerunners  of  a  sus- 
tained, comprehensive  eradication  project 
in  Colombia.  We  have  been  encouraged 
by  our  meetings  last  fall  with  a  Colombian 
technical  team  which  visited  Mexico  and 
the  United  States  to  discuss  herbicidal 
eradication  methods  and  by  our  continu- 
ing discussions  with  Colombian  officials  in 
Bogota. 


There  is  increasing  concern  about  drug 
abuse  in  Colombia.  Last  September,  a  na- 
tional conference,  which  the  Department 
supported,  was  held  in  Bogota  to  discuss 
treatment  and  prevention  responses  to 
the  escalating  problem  of  domestic  drug 
abuse.  In  particular  there  is  mounting 
concern  about  the  increasing  use  of 
"basuco,"  which  is  a  marijuana  or  tobacco 
cigarette  mixed  with  coca  paste.  Colom- 
bians are  also  concerned  about  the  heavy 
loss  of  police  lives  to  drug  traffickers,  the 
involvement  of  insurgent  groups  in  drug 
trafficking,  and  the  attempts  by  narcotics 
traffickers  to  influence  the  political  sys- 
tem, including  the  national  Congress. 

In  1982  Colombia  produced  about  67% 
of  our  marijuana  supply  and  up  to  75%  of 
our  cocaine  supply;  Colombia  has  also 
been  the  major  transit  point  for  meth- 
aqualone  entering  the  United  States.  The 
preliminary  estimate  by  the  National 
Narcotics  Intelligence  Consumers  Com- 
mittee (NNICC)  is  that  Colombia's  gross 
production  of  maryuana  increased  to  a 
new  range  of  12,500-15,000  metric  tons  in 
1983  and  that  gross  production  of  coca 
leaf  increased  from  5,000  to  12,800  metric 
tons.  However,  Colombian  manual  eradi- 
cation and  interdiction  efforts  also 
increased.  The  committee  has  not  yet 
finalized  its  import  estimates  for  1983. 

With  U.S.  support,  Colombia  seized 
3,310  metric  tons  of  marijuana  in  1981,  a 
345%  increase  over  1980,  and  66  million 
units  of  methaqualone,  a  380%  increase. 
In  1982  Colombian  officials  seized  anothei 
3,409  metric  tons  of  marijuana,  41  million 
units  of  methaqualone,  and  881  kilograms 
of  cocaine.  The  authorities  also  shut  dowr 
277  cocaine  laboratories.  In  1983  the 
Colombians  seized  3,934  metric  tons  of 
maryuana  and  2,800  kUograms  of  coca 
leaf,  while  manually  eradicating  1,981  hec 
tares  of  coca  leaf  and  1,048  hectares  of 
cannabis  cultivation. 

Colombia's  antinarcotics  group  last 
week  smashed  a  coca  processing  center  it 
its  remote  eastern  plains  of  unprece- 
dented proportions— a  virtual  cocaine 
company  towTi  with  electric  power,  bar- 
racks for  over  100  workers,  complete  wit 
weeks  of  food  supplies. 

Preliminary  reports  from  the  Colom- 
bian National  Police  report  seizures 
and/or  destruction  at  this  "cocaine  town" 
and  nearby  processing  encampments  of 
10-14  laboratories,  10  metric  tons  of  co- 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


fov 


NARCOTICS 


caine  hydrochloride  and  base,  10,800 
drums  of  precursor  chemicals  and  fuel, 
seven  aircraft,  and  an  assortment  of 
weapons.  Some  40  people  were  arrested. 
The  site  was  guarded  by  members  of  the 
FARC,  Colombia's  notorious  Marxist 
guerrilla  group,  which  obtains  financing 
from  the  drug  trade. 

Colombia  has  gained  substantial  con- 
trol of  imports  of  base  substances  used  to 
produce  methaqualone,  while  curbing  ex- 
ports of  this  drug. 

On  August  11,  1983,  the  United  States 
signed  agreements  with  the  Government 
of  Bolivia,  which  have  the  long-term  ob- 
jective of  reducing  that  country's  coca 
cultivation  to  levels  needed  for  legitimate 
purposes.  The  agreements  include  U.S. 
assistance  in  crop  eradication,  in  develop- 
ing police  strike  forces  to  establish  law 
and  order  in  the  Chapare  growing  region, 
and  in  establishing  a  system  for  managing 
the  licit  coca  production  industry.  Train- 
ing of  the  special  police  forces  and  other 
outfitting  has  been  completed.  Our  1985 
request  of  $5.5  million  is  projected  upon  a 
continuation  of  the  control  efforts  under- 
taken in  1984. 

The  indications  are  that  Bolivian  coca 
production  increased  by  a  significant 
amount  in  1983,  a  result  of  extensive  coca 
plantings  several  years  ago.  The  1982 
NNICC  estimate  was  that  Bolivian  illicit 
coca  leaf  production  was  in  a  range  of 
39,000-44,000  metric  tons;  the  prelimin- 
ary NNICC  estimate  is  that  production  of 
coca  leaf  was  at  least  at  that  level  in  1983. 

Implementation  of  the  U.S.-supported 
crop  control  program  in  Peru  was  not 
begun  until  April  1983;  an  estimated  703 
hectares  of  coca  were  eradicated  last 
year.  This  activity  is  pursuant  to  an 
August  1981  agreement  with  Peru  on  a 
coca  eradication  project  which  would  be 
undertaken  concurrent  with  a  5-year 
rural  development  program  sponsored  by 
the  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment (AID).  The  Department  has  budg- 
eted $3.5  million  for  FY  1985,  when  the 
agreement  calls  for  eradication  of  an  ad- 
ditional 4,000  hectares.  The  budget  also 
includes  support  for  Peruvian  narcotics 
enforcement  agencies. 

The  NNICC  preliminary  estimate  is 
that  illicit  coca  cultivation  in  Peru  in  1983 
was  at  least  at  the  1982  level  of  36,000 
metric  tons,  with  total  production  of 
about  50,000  metric  tons.  The  Peruvian 
Government  has  estimated  total  produc- 
tion as  high  as  60,000  metric  tons. 

The  Department  is  requesting  $8.9 
million  to  support  Mexico's  narcotic  con- 
trol programs.  Mexico  once  supplied  the 
bulk  of  the  heroin  imported  into  this  coun- 
try, but  a  U.S.-supported  Mexican  aerial 


May  1984 

^BSBBSBSBBBBBBBBaBB 


eradication  program  has  substantially  re- 
duced heroin  production  from  its  high 
levels  in  the  mid-1970s.  In  response  to 
government  control  efforts,  traffickers 
are  attempting  to  expand,  camouflage, 
and  diversify  cultivation.  The  Mexican 
Attorney  General's  office  reports  in- 
creased levels  of  opium  poppy  and  canna- 
bis eradication  in  1983;  the  U.S. -assisted 
program  eradicated  2,472  hectares  of 
opium  poppy  in  1983,  compared  with  1,211 
hectares  in  1982,  and  2,674  hectares  of 
cannabis  compared  with  886  hectares  in 
1982. 

The  Department  is  also  requesting  $1 
million  for  a  Latin  American  and  Carib- 
bean regional  program.  U.S.  law  enforce- 
ment agencies,  including  the  Drug 
Enforcement  Administration  (DEA),  U.S. 
Customs,  and  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  are 
continuing  an  effort  to  halt  the  flow  of 
drugs  from  Latin  America  to  the  United 
States.  The  Department  contributes  to 
this  effort  by  supporting  selected  law  en- 
forcement antinarcotic  activities. 

Southwest  Asia 

More  than  half  of  the  heroin  entering  the 
United  States  is  refined  from  Southwest 
Asian  opium.  Because  we  do  not  have 
agreements  with  Iran  and  Afghanistan, 
for  reasons  unrelated  to  narcotics  control, 
U.S.  efforts  center  on  Pakistan  as  a  pro- 
ducer, refiner,  and  transit  point  of  opium 
and  heroin. 

A  combination  of  drought,  low  prices, 
government  action,  and  U.S.-  and  UN- 
assisted  rural  development  programs 
have  reduced  Pakistani  opium  production, 
which  peaked  in  1979  at  an  estimated  800 
metric  tons,  to  45-60  metric  tons  in  1983. 
However,  raw  opium  continues  to  flow  in- 
to Pakistani  heroin  laboratories  from 
Afghanistan,  where  1983  opium  produc- 
tion is  estimated  at  400-575  metric  tons. 

The  $2  million  requested  for  Pakistan 
narcotics  control  in  FY  1985  provides  con- 
tinued support  for  the  reduction  of  poppy 
cultivation  and  for  enforcement  efforts 
against  heroin  processing  and  trafficking. 
By  1982  the  government  had  eliminated 
opium  poppy  cultivation  in  the  "settled" 
(completely  incorporated)  areas  of  the 
Northwest  Frontier  Province,  except 
Gadoon.  In  1982  the  first  of  a  series  of 
agreements  was  signed  with  the  Pakistani 
Government  to  curb  opium  poppy  cultiva- 
tion and  end  heroin  production  in  the 
"merged"  (partially  incorporated)  areas  of 
the  province.  The  government  eradicated 
opium  poppy  in  the  Buner  area  in  1982— 
the  first  such  effort  in  a  "merged"  area. 
In  early  1982,  the  Pakistan  Government 


seized  a  heroin  laboratory  in  the  prov- 
ince—for the  first  time  since  1978— over- 
coming armed  tribal  resistance.  Begin- 
ning in  late  November  1982,  tribal  leaders 
oversaw  the  surrender  to  authorities  of 
equipment  from  41  other  labs  in  the 
Khyber  agency. 

The  agreement  is  that  Pakistan  will 
enforce  the  poppy  ban  in  areas  where  de- 
velopmental assistance  is  provided.  The 
Department-funded  rural  development 
project  initiated  in  the  Malakand  agency 
of  the  Northwest  Frontier  Province  is 
designed  to  encourage  fanners  to  adopt 
alternative  crops  and  income  sources  and 
to  provide  infrastructure  support  in 
neglected  areas  so  as  to  facilitate  the  en- 
forcement of  the  Pakistani  ban  against 
opium  poppy  cultivation.  Reports  indicate 
that  acreage  under  opium  poppy  cultiva- 
tion in  the  area  of  the  Malakand  agency 
development  project  has  declined  sub- 
stantially from  the  1981-82  crop  year  as  a 
result  of  government  enforcement  efforts, 
inducements  to  cultivate  alternative  cash 
crops,  as  well  as  depressed  opium  prices. 
The  program  intention  is  to  eliminate  re- 
maining opium  poppy  cultivation  in  the 
Malakand  during  the  1984-85  season. 

The  Malakand  was  but  one  of  several 
key  growing  areas  in  Pakistan.  The  goal 
is  enforcement  of  the  Pakistani  ban 
throughout  the  province  growing  areas. 

In  FY  1983  AID  began  a  similar  nar- 
cotics i-elated  development  project  in  the 
Gadoon- Amazai  area;  this  area  was  esti- 
mated to  account  for  about  half  of  the 
1982-83  opium  production  and  should  be 
opium  free  in  the  1986-87  crop  year. 

Discussions  have  begun  on  approaches 
to  poppy  control  in  remaining  "merged" 
areas  like  the  Dir.  In  late  1983,  the  gov- 
ernment announced  it  was  extending  its 
narcotics  laws  into  the  "tribal"  (virtually 
autonomous)  areas,  the  source  of  as  much 
as  20%  of  Pakistani  opium  production. 
Pakistan  has  also  accepted  "poppy 
clauses"  which  commit  the  government 
to  keep  appropriate  AID  economic  as- 
sistance project  areas  free  of  opium 
cultivation. 

The  bureau  continues  commodity  and 
training  assistance  to  Pakistani  narcotics 
enforcement  agencies  to  upgrade  their 
capabilities. 

While  controlling  its  own  opium  pro- 
duction, Turkey  remains  a  key  transit 
center  for  Southwest  Asian  opium  and 
heroin,  and  we  request  $900,()00  to  up- 
grade its  enforcement  capabilities. 


PACIFIC 


Southeast  Asia 

The  amount  of  heroin  entering  the  United 
States  from  Southeast  Asia  was  estimated 
by  the  NNICC  at  14%  of  the  total  con- 
sumed in  our  country  in  1982.  The  Golden 
Triangle  produced  707  tons  of  opium  in 
the  1982  crop-year,  and  production  is  esti- 
mated at  the  670  metric  ton  level  for  1983. 
Preliminary  NNICC  estimates  are  that 
Burmese  production  was  at  the  600-metric- 
ton  level  for  both  1982  and  1983,  but  in 
1983  Lao  production  declined  from  50  to 
35  metric  tons,  whOe  Thai  production  de- 
clined from  57  to  35  metric  tons.  How- 
ever, the  area  cultivated  in  opium  poppy 
in  Thailand  reportedly  increased  in  the 
1983-84  crop  cycle.  Southeast  Asian  traf- 
fickers are  attempting  to  capture  greater 
shares  of  the  U.S.  and  other  heroin 
markets. 

The  Department's  priority  in  its  dis- 
cussions with  these  governments  con- 
tinues to  focus  on  crop  control.  However, 
the  regional  program  must  include  inter- 
diction and  suppression  of  heroin  labs  as 
well  as  crop  control,  because  we  cannot 
operate  a  crop  control  program  in  Laos, 
and  most  poppy  growing  areas  of  Burma 
remain  outside  of  government  control. 

The  Royal  Thai  Government  has 
mounted  sizable  military  operations  since 
January  1982  against  the  Shan  United 
Army,  the  principal  trafficking  group  on 
the  Thai-Burmese  border,  and  is  continu- 
ing the  pressure  against  it  and  other  illicit 
drug  trafficking  groups  with  narcotics- 
targeted  military  companies  permanently 
deployed  in  the  area.  These  actions  have 
disrupted  trafficking  and  refining  activ- 
ities and  recently  included  some  eradica- 
tion of  opium  poppy.  The  government  has 
also  been  effective  in  reducing  the  avail- 
ability of  precursor  chemicals  used  in  con- 
verting opium  to  heroin,  which  contrib- 
uted to  reduced  production  of  heroin  and 
morphine  bases.  However,  these 
chemicals  are  increasingly  available  from 
other  sources  in  the  region.  We  are  en- 
couraging tighter  controls  throughout  the 
region  on  precursor  chemicals  and  seek- 
ing cooperation  in  tracing  and  seizing  the 
financial  assets  of  drug  traffickers. 

The  Department  will  continue  to  sup- 
port crop  control  related  development 
assistance  projects  when  there  is  a  con- 
current Thai  commitment  to  crop  control. 
While  the  Royal  Thai  Government  has  not 
yet  eradicated  opium  poppy  in  areas 
where  it  has  received  crop  substitution 
assistance,  nor  established  a  national 
policy  on  eradication,  the  Thai  have 
begun,  with  U.S.  assistance,  civilian- 
police-military  command  projects  to  cur- 
tail cultivation  as  part  of  a  program  of 


74 


transitional  assistance  to  selected 
villages.  The  Department  has  budgeted 
$2.8  mUlion  for  Thailand. 

The  $5  million  budgeted  for  Burma 
will  increase  support  for  the  Burmese  Air 
Force's  capability  to  airlift  ground  forces 
engaged  in  poppy  eradication  and  inter- 
diction operations,  expand  training  pro- 
grams, and  improve  telecommunications. 
The  Burmese  report  increased  opium  sei- 
zures (6  metric  tons)  and  manual  opium 
poppy  destruction  (equivalent  of  44 
metric  tons)  in  1983,  including  eradication 
in  areas  under  the  control  of  the  Burmese 
Communist  Party.  The  Burmese  also  de- 
stroyed nine  heroin  laboratories  in  1983. 

International  Organizations 

Since  its  founding  in  1971  with  U.S.  spon- 
sorship, the  UN  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse 


Control  (UNFDAC)  has  been  a  vehicle  for 
implementation  of  crop  control,  enforce- 
ment, and  demand  reduction  programs. 
The  fund  has  carried  out  projects  in  some 
areas  when  the  United  States  could  not 
because  of  political  and  other  considera- 
tions. In  other  areas,  its  work  comple- 
ments that  of  the  United  States  and  other 
bilateral  projects,  with  the  additional 
benefit  of  diffusing  the  political  character 
of  drug  control.  Major  donors  to  the  fund 
recently  reached  a  consensus  wdth  the 
fund's  management  that  all  UNFDAC 
development  projects  will  contain  drug 
control  enforcement  provisions  and  that 
such  economic  assistance  be  linked  to 
commitments  by  recipient  governments 
to  eliminate  illicit  narcotics  crops  within  a 
specified  time.  The  Department  has 
budgeted  $2.7  million  as  the  U.S.  con- 
tribution to  UNFDAC  in  FY  1985. 


Administration  Urges  Approval 
of  Compact  of  Free  Association 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  30,  1984' 

There  is  enclosed  a  draft  of  a  Joint  Reso- 
lution to  approve  the  "Compact  of  Free  Associ- 
ation," the  negotiated  instrument  setting  forth 
the  future  political  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  two  political  jurisdictions  of 
the  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands. 

The  Compact  of  Free  Association  is  the 
result  of  more  than  fourteen  years  of  con- 
tinuous and  comprehensive  negotiations,  span- 
ning the  administrations  of  four  Presidents. 
The  transmission  of  the  proposed  Joint  Resolu- 
tion to  you  today  marks  the  last  step  in  the 
Compact  approval  process. 

The  full  text  of  the  Compact  is  part  of  the 
draft  Joint  Resolution,  which  I  request  be  in- 
troduced, referred  to  the  appropriate  commit- 
tees for  consideration,  and  enacted.  I  also  re- 
quest that  the  Congress  note  the  agreements 
subsidiary  to  the  Compact.  Also  enclosed  is  a 
section-by-section  analysis  to  facilitate  your 
consideration  of  the  Compact. 

The  defense  and  land  use  provisions  of  the 
Compact  extend  indefinitely  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  foreclose  access  to  the  area  to 
third  countries  for  military  purposes.  These 
provisions  are  of  great  importance  to  our 
strategic  position  in  the  Pacific  and  enable  us 
to  continue  preserving  regional  security  and 
peace. 

Since  1947,  the  islands  of  Micronesia  have 
been  administered  by  the  United  States  under 
a  Trusteeship  Agreement  with  the  United  Na- 
tions Security  Council.  This  Compact  of  Free 
Association  with  the  governments  of  the  Fed- 
rated  States  of  Micronesia  and  the  Republic  of 
the  Marshall  Islands  would  fulfill  our  commit- 


ment under  that  agreement  to  bring  about 
self -government.  Upon  termination  of  the 
Trusteeship  Agreement,  another  political 
jurisdiction  of  the  Trust  Territory  of  the 
Pacific  Islands,  the  Northern  Mariana  Islands, 
will  become  a  commonwealth  of  the  United 
States. 

The  Compact  of  Free  Association 
was  signed  for  the  United  States  by  Am- 
bassador Fred  M.  Zeder,  11,  on  October  1, 
1982,  with  the  Federated  States  of  Micronesia, 
and  on  June  25,  1983,  with  the  Republic  of  the 
Marshall  Islands.  It  is  the  result  of  negotia- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  broadly 
representative  groups  of  delegates  from  the 
prospective  freely  associated  states. 

In  1983,  United  Nations-observed  plebi- 
scites produced  high  voter  participation,  and 
the  Compact  was  approved  by  impressive  ma- 
jorities, in  addition  to  approval  in  the  plebi- 
scites, the  Compact  has  been  approved  by  the 
governments  of  the  Republic  of  the  Marshall 
Islands  and  the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia  in  accordance  with  their  constitu- 
tional processes. 

Enactment  of  the  draft  Joint  Resolution 
approving  the  Compact  of  Free  Association 
would  be  a  major  step  leading  to  the  termina- 
tion of  the  Trusteeship  Agreement  with  the 
United  Nations  Security  Council,  which  the 
United  States  entered  into  by  Joint  Resolution 
on  July  18,  1947.  Therefore,  I  urge  the  Con- 
gress to  approve  the  Compact  of  Free  Associa- 
tion. 

RONALD  REAGAN 


•Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  2,  1984.1 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


The  Department  has  urged  greater 
drug  control  contributions  and  diplomatic 
efforts  by  Australia,  Canada,  Japan,  New 
Zealand,  and  Saudia  Arabia,  as  well  as  by 
European  nations,  with  emphasis  on  crop 
control  in  both  Asian  sectors  and  Euro- 
pean support  for  an  UNFDAC  coca  con- 
trol program.  The  latter  objective  was 
significantly  achieved  in  1983  when  the 
Government  of  Italy  pledged  $40  mOlion 
over  5  years  to  UNFDAC  to  support  coca 
control  programs  in  South  America. 

Summary 

In  sum  the  Department  is  pursuing  the 
Administration's  strategy  of  increasing 


crop  control  and  interdiction  in  the  source 
countries.  The  requested  increase  for  FY 
1985  centers  on  the  coca  and  maryuana 
threat  from  South  America,  while  ex- 
panding the  efforts  to  reduce  the  influx  of 
heroin  from  Southwest  and  Southeast 
Asia.  In  addition,  the  Department  is  step- 
ping up  its  diplomatic  and  financial  efforts 
to  increase  multilateral  contributions  to 
UN  programs  which  can  result  in  more 
universally  supported  projects. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1985  Security  Assistance  Requests 


by  William  Schneider,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  8, 
198Jt.  Mr.  Schneider  is  Under  Secretary 
for  Security,  Science,  and  Technology.^ 

There  are  three  difficult,  vitally  impor- 
tant issues  facing  our  security  assistance 
program  this  year. 

First,  in  our  own  hemisphere,  Soviet 
and  Cuban-backed  insurgents  continue  to 
exploit  decades-old  social  and  economic 
tensions.  Their  efforts  to  undermine  the 
governments  of  Central  America  jeopard- 
ize the  democratic  and  economic  reforms 
being  made  by  every  one  of  our  aid  part- 
ners in  Central  America.  The  battle  in  El 
Salvador  against  outrageous  acts  by  both 
the  left  and  the  extreme  right  is  far  from 
over,  but  the  trend  is  clearly  toward  plu- 
ralistic, democratic  institutions.  United 
States  assistance  is  critical  to  continua- 
tion of  this  trend,  not  only  in  El  Salvador 
but  elsewhere  in  Central  America.  The 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Cen- 
tral America  has  described  the  strategic 
importance  of  this  region  and  recommend- 
ed significant  increases  of  both  economic 
and  security  assistance.  Both  are  essen- 
tial if  either  is  to  succeed. 

Second,  recent  events  in  the  Middle 
East  make  clear  that  tensions  remain 
acute.  Crisis  in  the  region  threatens  U.S. 
and  Western  interests.  While  the  costs  to 
the  United  States  already  are  high,  we 


cannot  waiver  in  our  efforts  to  promote  a 
broader  peace  in  the  region.  Our  decision 
to  provide  all  military  assistance  for 
Israel  and  Egypt  on  a  grant  basis  in  FY 
1985  reflects  our  determination  that  the 
costs  of  military  preparedness  and  vigi- 
lance to  these  countries  not  come  at  the 
expense  of  their  economic  well-being. 

Third,  a  less  visible,  but  equally 
serious,  crisis  looms  in  the  growing  debt 
burdens  of  many  developing  countries. 
The  Commission  on  Security  and  Eco- 
nomic Assistance  focused  on  this  problem. 
It  noted  that  many  countries  borrowed 
heavily  for  development  during  the  1970s, 
mistakenly  assuming  rising  world  prices 
for  their  commodity  exports.  Thus  now 
they  face  dangerously  high  debt  levels. 
The  increased  economic  assistance  that 
we  are  proposing  is  not,  on  its  own,  suffi- 
cient. Many  of  these  countries,  including 
such  important  security  assistance  part- 
ners as  Turkey,  Sudan,  Morocco,  and 
Tunisia,  face  a  Hobson's  choice— either 
military  preparedness  at  the  cost  of  more 
debt  and  economic  insecurity  or  fiscal 
conservatism  with  its  price  of  heightened 
military  vulnerability.  Either  alternative 
threatens  U.S.  interests. 

The  Carlucci  commission  recom- 
mended that  more  of  our  security  assist- 
ance be  offered  at  concessional  terms. 
The  Administration  proposal  to  place  all 
Foreign  Military  Sales  (FMS)  loans  on- 
budget  is  also  a  step  recommended  by 
many  in  Congress.  In  previous  years,  the 
money  for  FMS  loans  was  off-budget. 


Treasury  borrowed  the  required  amounts 
and  made  the  funds  available  to  the 
Federal  Financing  Bank  (FFB)  which 
made  the  loans  at  market  rates.  These 
loans  were  then  guaranteed  by  the  De- 
partment of  Defense.  The  impact  on  over- 
all foreign  military  assistance  activity  and 
the  effect  on  the  credit  market  were  the 
same  as  they  would  have  been  if  the  loans 
had  been  financed  on-budget. 

Our  proposal  to  place  FMS  loans  on 
budget  will  thus  bring  into  the  open  what 
has  heretofore  been  partially  obscured  by 
depending  on  the  off-budget  FFB  mecha- 
nism and,  most  importantly,  will  allow  us 
to  offer  lower,  concessional  rates  of  in- 
terest to  selected  countries.  Because  con- 
cessional loans  are  more  "valuable"  than 
market  rate  loans,  we  have  been  able  to 
reduce  country  programs  proposed  in  FY 
1985  by  approximately  $500  million  from 
FY  1984. 

Value  and  Purpose  of  Security 
Assistance 

The  Administration  is  requesting  $15.8 
billion  for  foreign  assistance  of  which  $9.8 
billion  is  security  assistance,  both  military 
and  economic.  Security  Assistance  pro- 
vides direct  benefits  to  the  U.S. 

•  The  United  States  cannot  afford  to 
maintain  a  force  structure  and  capabilities 
to  defend  the  free  world  alone.  We  must 
depend  upon  allies  to  deter  local  and  re- 
gional threats  to  our  common  interests. 
At  a  minimum  this  gives  the  United 
States  time  to  consider  and  prepare  an 
appropriate  response  to  aggression. 

•  We  factor  the  capabilities  of  our 
allies  into  our  planning  and  procurement, 
resulting  in  economies  for  both  our  allies 
and  for  us. 

•  Because  the  military  assistance  pro- 
grams are  managed  by  the  Department  of 
Defense  in  conjunction  with  U.S.  procure- 
ment, both  the  United  States  and  the 
foreign  buyer  reap  the  benefits  of  con- 
solidated planning  and  economies  of  pro- 
duction. 

•  Since  almost  all  military  assistance 
is  spent  on  U.S.  manufactured  items, 
there  is  a  direct  benefit  in  jobs  for  Ameri- 
can workers. 

•  Security  assistance  also  provides 
direct  strategic  benefits  to  the  United 
States.  Some  of  our  largest  assistance 
programs  (e.g.,  Israel  and  Egypt)  help 
countries  deter  aggressive  neighbors. 
Other  large  programs  go  to  countries, 
such  as  Portugal  and  the  Philippines,  with 
which  we  have  concluded  vital  base 
rights,  transit,  and  access  agreements  for 


May  1984 


UUHIIIUIHIiiUHU 


wmswammmaa^mmim 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


our  own  armed  forces.  Of  the  military 
assistance  requested  in  1985,  91%  is  for 
countries  in  these  categories. 

FY  1984  Supplemental 

The  Administration's  emergency  request 
for  supplemental  funds  for  Central 
America  totals  $659.1  million. 

As  the  Kissinger  commission  noted, 
the  roots  of  Central  America's  troubles  lie 
in  social  inequity,  unrepresentative 
politics,  weak  legal  institutions,  disre- 
spect for  human  rights,  and  other  prob- 
lems of  societies  in  urgent  need  of 
reform.  These  problems  have  been  com- 
pounded by  the  international  economic 
shocks  of  the  past  several  years. 

Over  60%  of  the  total  supplemental 
Central  American  assistance  request  is 
for  economic  assistance.  Economic  sup- 
port fund  (ESF)  assistance  will  be  used  to 
help  reverse  the  sharp  declines  in  GDP, 
per  capita  consumption,  and  employment 
and  to  finance  crucial  imports  of  raw 
materials  and  spare  parts.  Local  currency 
generated  by  ESF  will  fund  credit  pro- 
grams for  the  private  sector  and  projects 
in  housing,  health,  education,  and  agricul- 
tural development.  Our  nonproject 
assistance  v^l  be  conditioned  on  im- 
plementation of  reforms  crucial  to  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  our  assistance  and  to  the 
establishment  of  policies  which  will  en- 
sure sustainable  economic  growth. 

The  commission  warned  that  without 
enhanced  security,  economic  assistance 
and  diplomatic  efforts  will  be  under- 
mined, but  the  commission  stressed  that 
"the  worst  possible  policy  for  El  Salvador 
is  to  provide  just  enough  aid  to  keep  the 
war  going,  but  too  little  to  wage  it 
successfully."  We  are,  therefore,  re- 
questing $259  million  in  supplemental 
military  assistance  program  (MAP)  grants 
for  FY  1984. 

Honduras  also  faces  an  incipient  in- 
surgency movement  and  is  rightly  con- 
cerned about  the  massive  military  buildup 
in  neighboring  Nicaragua.  We  are  re- 
questing that  Honduras  receive  $72.5 
million  in  ESF  assistance  to  complement 
its  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
agreement  and  cushion  the  economic  ad- 
justments it  is  making  and  $37.5  million  in 
military  assistance. 

Twenty-five  million  dollars  would  be 
destined  for  the  Regional  Military  Train- 
ing Center  (RMTC),  established  in 
Honduras  in  1983.  Training  is  one  of  the 
most  important  aspects  of  our  Central 
America  military  assistance.  The  RMTC 
is  a  valuable  low-cost  way  to  provide 
larger  scale  training  to  Honduran  and 
Salvadoran  troops  and  possibly  other 


76 


forces  from  the  region  in  a  realistic  en- 
vironment. 

FY  1985  Request 

As  the  bipartisan  commission  noted.  Cen- 
tral American  problems  will  not  be  over- 
come overnight,  and  in  FY  1985  we  will 
expand  our  economic  effort  in  Central 
America.  Military  assistance  relative  to 
economic  aid  for  that  area  will  decline, 
assuming  the  supplemental  passes,  and 
the  ratio  of  economic  to  military  aid  wOl 
be  more  than  4-1. 

Security  Assistance  Programs.  FMS 

is  the  largest  of  the  five  security 
assistance  programs  for  which  the  Ad- 
ministration is  requesting  $5.1  billion. 
Thirty -nine  percent,  or  $1.99  billion, 
would  be  provided  at  the  Treasury  rate  of 
interest  to  10  countries.  Another  $538.5 
million,  or  11%  would  be  provided  to  16 
countries  at  concessional  interest  rates. 
Economic  need  and  the  ability  of  a  coun- 
try to  repay  will  be  the  primary  criteria 
in  determining  who  receives  concessional 
FMS  interest  rates  just  as  it  is  in  deter- 
mining who  receives  grant  military 
assistance.  Countries  we  are  proposing 
for  concessional  rates  include  Turkey,  El 
Salvador,  Jordan,  the  Philippines,  and 
Morocco. 

In  FY  1985  all  FMS  financing  for 
Israel  and  Egypt  would  be  forgiven.  In 
both  countries  debt  payments,  including 
especially  FMS  repayments,  are  a  major 
economic  constraint.  By  shifting  to  aU 
grant  programs,  we  slow  the  spiraling  in- 
crease in  FMS  repayments  and  can  ac- 
tually reduce  program  size  without  affect- 
ing its  integrity. 

The  other  large  program  is  the  eco- 
nomic support  fund  (ESF)  which  com- 
prises approximately  35%,  or  $3.44  bil- 
lion, of  our  total  program  for  FY  1985.  In 
the  face  of  tight  credit  markets,  low  com- 
modity prices,  and  high  debt  service  re- 
quirements, ESF  promotes  political  and 
economic  stability  in  countries  of  special 
economic,  political,  or  security  interest  to 
the  United  States. 

The  mOitary  assistance  program 
(MAP)  provides  grant  funding  for  pur- 
chases of  defense  articles  and  services. 
We  are  requesting  $924.5  million  for  coun- 
tries which  would  find  it  difficult  to  re- 
pay. 

International  military  education  and 
training  (IMET)  provides  grant  funds  for 
professional  military  training.  At  $60.9 
million,  IMET  represents  less  than  1%— 
only  a  small  fraction— of  our  FY  1985  re- 
quest. Nevertheless,  it  is  one  of  our  most 
cost-effective  programs. 


The  small  peacekeeping  operation  ac- 
count provides  support  for  multilateral 
peacekeeping  activities  in  the  Sinai, 
Cyprus,  and  Grenada.  We  are  requesting 
$49  million  for  FY  1985. 

Regional  Programs.  In  addition  to 
programs  in  Central  America  and  Israel 
and  Egypt  that  I  have  already  discussed, 
there  are  a  number  of  others  also  impor- 
tant to  our  own  defense  preparedness  and 
national  security  objectives.  I  will  not 
repeat  the  Secretary's  description  of  our 
security  objectives  now  except  to  reiter- 
ate that  our  programs  continue  to  be  di- 
rected at  promoting  stability  in  the  Mid- 
dle East;  to  countering  Soviet  encroach- 
ment through  Afghanistan  and  Libyan 
subversion  in  Northern  Africa;  to  facili- 
tating negotiation  of  military'  access  and 
transit  rights  for  U.S.  forces  in 
Southwest  Asia  and  base  rights  agree- 
ments in  Europe;  to  assisting  military 
modernization  and  economic  stability  in 
Europe;  to  protecting  the  front-line  states 
of  Korea  and  Thailand  from  threats  posed 
by  North  Korea,  Vietnam,  and  the  Soviet 
Union;  to  promoting  negotiation  and 
peaceful  resolution  of  conflict  in  Africa; 
and  to  helping  Caribbean  countries  to 
meet  the  challenge  of  independence  at  a 
time  when  they  face  the  worst  economic 
recession  the  area  has  experienced  since 
the  1930s. 

Conclusion 

Today  I  have  touched  on  the  highlights  of 
our  FY  1984  Central  America  supplemen- 
tal and  our  FY  1985  security  assistance 
program.  The  Administration  has  attempt- 
ed to  implement  recommendations  which 
the  members  of  the  Carlucci  commission, 
including  several  members  of  this  sub- 
committee, made  with  regard  to  security 
assistance. 

We  believe  that  a  better  mix  of 
economic  and  military  assistance  has  been 
achieved  in  the  overall  foreign  aid  pro- 
gram proposals  for  this  year. 

The  Administration  has  also  respond- 
ed to  the  concerns  of  the  Kissinger  com- 
mission about  security  and  economic 
needs  in  Central  America.  We  hope  that 
Congress  will  give  both  the  1984  sup- 
plemental and  the  proposed  1985  program 
full  support. 


Jflji 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  wiB  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.B  patt 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


■Y  1985  Assistance  Requests 
or  South  Asia 


been 


lOUTH  ASIA 


y  Howard  B.  Schaffer 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
n  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
louse  Foreign  Affairs  Coyrunittee  on 
'ebruary  6,  198k.  Mr.  Schaffer  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
nd  South  Asian  Affairs.^ 

'hank  you  very  much  for  the  privilege  of 
estifying  before  the  subcommittee 
egarding  the  Administration's  proposed 
Dreign  assistance  program  for  South  Asia 
1  FY  1985. 1  will  do  my  best  to  address 
our  interests,  as  expressed  by  the  Chair- 
lan,  with  particular  emphasis  on: 

•  The  role  of  our  aid  program  in 
upporting  U.S.  interests  and  objectives 
1  the  region; 

•  The  levels,  mix,  and  design  of  each 
ountry  program;  and 

The  special  considerations  that 
lust  be  taken  into  account  with  respect 
0  our  effort  in  Pakistan. 

"olitical  and  Economic  Overview 

is  a  region.  South  Asia  remains  beset  by 
lifficult  political,  social,  and  economic 
roblems.  To  the  west,  Afghanistan  con- 
inues  to  suffer  under  the  domination  of 
oviet  occupying  forces  whose  efforts 
lave,  if  anything,  intensified  over  the 
)ast  year. 

The  geographical  position  of  Pakistan 
s  a  front-line  state  raises  special  prob- 
ms  of  national  security  which  complicate 
he  movement  toward  political  and  econo- 
tiic  development.  Pakistan  remains  key 
0  efforts  to  prevent  the  consolidation  of 
ioviet  power  in  Afghanistan  and  to  bring 
bout  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet  forces  as 
lart  of  a  negotiated  political  settlement. 

Further  to  the  east,  the  pivotal  nation 
f  India  faces  problems  of  its  own  as  it 
eeks  to  implement  longstanding  goals  of 
ocial  and  economic  development  while  ac- 
ommodating  a  diversity  of  regional  in- 
erests;  fortunately,  it  is  able  to  draw 
ipon  the  fundamental  strength  of 
lemocratic  institutions  dating  back  to  in- 
lependence. 

Like  India,  Sri  Lanka  has  taken 
ignificant  steps  in  the  direction  of 
iberalizing  its  economy  and  providing  a 
greater  role  to  the  private  sector. 


Economic  progress  has  been  sidetracked 
temporarily  by  the  communal  disturb- 
ances of  last  summer,  but  we  hope  and 
expect  that  it  will  resume  in  due  course. 
The  Sri  Lankan  Government  is  taking 
steps  to  resolve  communal  differences 
through  peaceful  negotiations  and  in  this 
effort  it,  too,  is  well  served  by  its  strong 
democratic  traditions. 

Bangladesh  continues  to  experience 
recurrent  episodes  of  political  instability; 
the  martial  law  administration  is  attempt- 
ing to  maintain  political  order,  develop 
political  institutions,  and  revitalize  the 
economy  through  liberalization  and  other 
measures. 

Finally,  Nepal  pursues  its  orderly 
transition  toward  increased  popular  par- 
ticipation in  political  life  at  the  national 
and  local  level.  Like  Bangladesh— indeed, 
like  all  countries  in  the  region— Nepal  has 
a  long  way  to  go  in  bringing  living  stand- 
ards up  to  an  acceptable  level  and  con- 
tinues to  look  to  the  United  States  and 
other  advanced  countries  for  bilateral  and 
multilateral  assistance. 

U.S.  Interests  and  Objectives 

U.S.  objectives  in  South  Asia  remain 
essentially  unchanged  from  previous 
years.  We  want  to  encourage  the  growth 
of  stable,  strong,  independent  states 
which  live  in  peace  with  one  another  free 
of  outside  interference.  We  support  the 
development  of  sound  political  institu- 
tions, responsive  to  popular  will.  We  seek 
to  contribute  to  the  efforts  the  govern- 
ments of  the  South  Asian  countries  are 
making  to  develop  themselves  economical- 
ly and  to  bring  about  higher  living  stand- 
ards for  their  people  in  a  region  which  is 
among  the  world's  poorest  and  most 
populous.  We  want  to  deter  Soviet  expan- 
sionism, especially  in  light  of  the  strategic 
importance  of  the  area. 

These  regional  policy  goals  mesh  with 
and  reinforce  wider  U.S.  objectives  such 
as  the  prevention  of  the  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons,  the  extension  of  human 
rights  and  democracy,  the  resolution  of 
regional  conflicts,  the  reduction  of  nar- 
cotics traffic,  and  the  expansion  of  oppor- 
tunities for  American  trade  and  invest- 
ment. In  order  to  pursue  these  goals  with 
any  effectiveness,  it  is  important  to  main- 
tain an  atmosphere  of  trust  and  good  will 


^ay  1984 


with  all  countries  in  the  region,  through 
cooperative  interaction  in  the  full  range  of 
economic,  cultural,  educational,  and  scien- 
tific activities. 


Foreign  Assistance  and 
the  Proposed  Program 

U.S.  interests,  as  well  as  the  interests  of 
the  recipient  countries  themselves,  are 
well  served  by  the  carefully  designed  mix 
of  our  programs  in  South  Asia.  The 
Pakistan  program,  for  example,  responds 
to  security  challenges  that  must  be  met  to 
preserve  that  country's  territorial  integri- 
ty and  to  protect  U.S.  interests  in  a 
strategically  vital  crossroads  of  south, 
west,  and  central  Asia.  In  Bangladesh, 
Sri  Lanka,  and  Nepal,  the  emphasis  is  on 
meeting  humanitarian  and  basic  develop- 
ment needs,  while  in  India  the  program  is 
gradually  evolving  to  incorporate  a 
greater  degree  of  technological  and  in- 
stitutional development— reflecting  a 
more  collaborative  relationship,  closely 
attuned  to  changing  needs  and  rich  in  prom- 
ise for  future  cooperation  in  a  wide 
range  of  scientific  and  commercial  applica- 
tions. In  all  cases,  our  programs  not  only 
serve  broad  political  and  development 
goals  but  also  open  up  an  avenue  for 
wdder  dialogue,  leading  to  a  strengthen- 
ing of  our  overall  relations  with  the  coun- 
tries of  the  region. 

While  country  programs  are  carefully 
tailored  to  address  specific  interests  in 
each  country,  one  common  element  in  all 
of  our  programs  is  a  small  sum  that  has 
been  set  aside  for  international  military 
education  and  training  (IMET).  Over  the 
years,  we  have  found  IMET  to  be  an  ex- 
tremely cost-effective  means  of  develop- 
ing ties  of  personal  friendship  and  profes- 
sional cooperation  between  the  U.S.  armed 
services  and  their  colleagues  overseas. 
Many  South  Asian  military  officers  who 
now  enjoy  senior  responsibility  received 
training  through  IMET  earlier  in  their 
careers,  with  benefit  both  to  their  profes- 
sional competence  and  their  understand- 
ing of  American  policies  and  values.  We 
want  to  continue  and  modestly  expand 
this  valuable  program  in  South  Asia. 

Proposed  Assistance  Levels 
and  Country  Programs 

Our  proposed  FY  1985  levels  for  South 
Asia  have  been  set  with  the  need  for 
budget  austerity  very  much  in  mind.  Tak- 
ing account  of  all  countries,  except 
Pakistan,  we  are  proposing  a  total  budget 
appropriation  of  $483.1  million,  which 
represents  slightly  more  than  a  1%  in- 
crease, in  nominal  terms,  over  the 


77 


SOUTH  ASIA 


estimated  FY  1984  levels.  Of  that 
amount,  $225.5  million  is  earmarked  for 
development  assistnace,  $256.7  million  for 
PL  480  food  aid,  and  $825,000  for  IMET. 
Changes  in  individual  country  totals  are 
limited.  The  largest  increase  is  in  the 
Bangladesh  figures,  which  rise  from 
$164.4  miUion  to  a  proposed  $180.1 
million.  This  increase,  about  10%,  is 
justified  in  light  of  the  positive  economic 
self-help  reforms  recently  undertaken  by 
Bangladesh  and  serves  to  bolster  our 
assistance  which  had  been  declining  in 
real  terms  over  recent  years. 

The  Pakistan  program  involves  cer- 
tain special  considerations,  which  I  will 
cover  in  some  detail  later  in  this  testi- 
mony. We  are  requesting  $325  million  in 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credits  and 
$304  million  in  a  mix  of  economic  assist- 
ance programs.  These  totals,  which 
reflect  an  8.5%  increase  over  the  FY  1984 
estimates,  are  in  accordance  with  the 
multiyear  Pakistan  assistance  program 
agreed  to  with  the  Pakistan  Government 
in  late  1981  and  involving,  as  you'll  re- 
call, close  consultation  with  Congress.  We 
are  also  requesting  $1  million  in  IMET  for 
Pakistan,  compared  with  $800,000  for  FY 
1984. 

Taking  all  South  Asia  programs  to- 
gether, including  Pakistan,  and  factoring 
in  security  as  well  as  economic  assistance, 
our  FY  1985  budget  request  for  the 
region  amounts  to  $1.1  billion.  This 
represents  7%  of  the  Administration's 
total  request  worldwide— about  the  same 
share  going  to  South  Asia  in  FY  1984. 

Our  economic  assistance  programs  in 
South  Asia  account  for  about  4%  of  total 
capital  spending  in  the  region.  Contribu- 
tions from  other  sources  are  very  roughly 
as  follows: 

Other  bilateral  donors— 11% 
Multilateral  Development  Banks— 18% 
Domestic  Resources— 67% 

Thus,  our  bilateral  programs  comple- 
ment a  much  larger  international  effort 
undertaken  by  other  bilateral  donors  as 
well  as  by  the  multilateral  development 
banks,  to  which  the  United  States  is  a  ma- 
jor contributor.  During  the  period  1978- 
82,  the  United  States  was  the  second 
largest  bilateral  donor  of  economic  assist- 
ance to  Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  India,  and 
Sri  Lanka  and  the  fourth  largest  bilateral 
donor  to  Nepal.  In  most  cases,  Japan  top- 
ped the  list  of  foreign  donors. 

Multilateral  development  banks  play  a 
vital  role  in  South  Asia,  matching  the  con- 
tribution of  all  bilateral  aid  donors  as  a 
group.  The  special  value  of  multilateral 
organizations  such  as  the  International 


78 


Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Develop- 
ment (IBRD),  the  International  Develop- 
ment Association  (IDA),  and  the  Asian 
Development  Bank  (ADB)  lies  in  their  ex- 
pertise in  developing  good  projects  and 
seeing  them  through  to  successful  frui- 
tion. This  year  the  Administration  is  re- 
questing a  total  of  $1.2  billion  as  our 
worldwide  FY  1985  contribution  to  all 
multilateral  development  banks,  including 
$750  million  for  the  IDA-VII  replenish- 
ment. In  addition  we  are  requesting 
about  $320  million  under  the  FY  1984  sup- 
plemental. 

Let  me  now  provide  a  more  detailed 
review  of  individual  country  programs  in 
the  context  of  U.S.  interests  and  signifi- 
cant political  and  economic  developments. 

India.  The  largest  and  most  powerful 
nation  in  South  Asia,  India  plays  a  pivotal 
role  in  determining  the  prospects  for 
peace  and  stability  in  the  region.  With  its 
accession  to  the  leadership  of  the  Non- 
aligned  Movement,  it  has  enhanced  its 
role  in  international  affairs.  Despite 
recurring  communal  and  regional  ten- 
sions, India  remains  fundamentally 
strong  and  stable  and  can  draw  upon  the 
strength  of  well-entrenched  democratic 
institutions.  Mrs.  Gandhi  and  the  Con- 
gress (I)  Party,  in  power  at  New  Delhi 
and  in  most  states  since  1980,  face  new 
elections  which  must  be  scheduled  before 
January  1985.  Whatever  the  outcome  of 
those  elections,  the  massive  balloting  will 
again  demonstrate  India's  determination 
to  progress  through  the  effective  opera- 
tion of  its  democratic  system.  We  rec- 
ognize the  key  role  that  system  has 
played  in  giving  India  the  stability  and 
unity  so  important  to  the  stability  and 
security  of  South  Asia,  a  major  U.S.  ob- 
jective. U.S.  interests  are  well  served  by 
India's  remaining  stable  and  united,  as 
we  are  confident  it  will. 

In  the  past  few  years,  India  has 
moved  gradually,  but  firmly,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  liberalizing  imports  and  decontrol- 
ling private  sector  activity,  with  a  view  to 
upgrading  domestic  technology  and  inject- 
ng  new  vigor  into  the  economy.  To  help 
finance  the  adjustment,  India  obtained 
special  drawing  rights  (SDR)  from  the 
IMF  extended  financing  facility  in  the 
amount  of  $5  billion  in  1981.  Since  then, 
its  economic  performance  has  been  well 
within  IMF  guidelines;  in  fact,  thanks  to 
an  unexpectedly  strong  balance-of-pay- 
ments  performance,  India  has  announced 
that  it  will  forego  the  final  SDR  $1.1  billion 
tranche  of  the  extended  financing  facility. 
Obviously,  fundamental  problems  remain  in 


India's  economy,  but  we  think  the  nation  is 
moving  in  the  right  direction. 

With  economic  liberalization  in  India, 
new  opportunities  have  opened  up  for  an 
expansion  of  our  bilateral  relations  in  the 
areas  of  trade,  investment,  and  scientific 
exchange.  We  have  done  our  best,  with 
some  success,  to  take  advantage  of  these 
opportunities.  The  United  States  is  cur- 
rently India's  number  one  source  of  new 
foreign  collaboration  agreements  and  is 
about  even  with  the  Soviet  Union  as  In- 
dia's number  one  trading  partner.  Build- 
ing upon  this  foundation,  we  have  sought 
to  further  improve  our  relations  through 
an  exchange  of  high-level  visits  in  both 
directions,  the  heightened  activities  of  the 
Indo-U.S.  Joint  Commission  designed  to 
promote  cooperation  in  various  fields,  and 
an  expansion  of  cultural,  educational,  and 
scientific  exchanges.  The  centerpiece  of 
this  latter  effort  is  a  proposed  $110 
million  binational  endowment,  which  is 
designed  to  conserve  our  dwindling  sup- 
ply of  U.S.-held  excess  rupees  in  India,  by 
setting  up  an  interest-bearing  facility  to 
fund  valuable  joint  study  and  exchange 
programs  for  the  next  two  decades. 

These  efforts  reflect  a  conscious  U.S. 
policy  of  seeking  fresh  avenues  to  develop 
a  constructive  relationship  with  India 
despite  differences  on  important  interna- 
tional and  regional  issues.  These  dif- 
ferences are  likely  to  persist;  given  the 
vastly  differing  perspectives  and  ex- 
periences of  the  two  countries,  it  would 
be  unrealistic  to  expect  otherwise.  We 
seek  to  deal  with  them  through  candid  ex- 
changes, such  as  Secretary  Shultz  had  in 
New  Delhi  last  summer.  We  do  not  intend 
to  let  them  stand  in  the  way  of  efforts  in 
more  promising  areas. 

For  FY  1985,  we  are  proposing  a  pro- 
gram in  India  consisting  of  $87  million  in 
development  assistance,  $125  million  in 
PL  480,  Title  II,  and  an  IMET  program  o 
$300,000.  The  development  assistance 
segment  focuses  on  several  areas  that  we 
have  identified  as  providing  the  best 
return  for  our  aid  dollars— irrigation, 
agricultural  research,  forestry,  family 
planning,  health,  and  nutrition.  The  PL 
480,  Title  II  program  provides  urgently 
needed  food  supplies  to  feed  the  45%  of 
India's  population  which  is  still  below  the 
nutrition-based  poverty  line.  The  overall 
package  is  well-targeted,  we  think,  at  In- 
dia's development  needs  and  at  our  own 
interests  in  the  region. 

Bangladesh.  A  young  and  rapidly 
evolving  country,  Bangladesh  is  still  try- 
ing to  establish  viable  national  institu- 
tions and  to  provide  for  its  impoverished 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


SOUTH  ASIA 


millions.  Since  gaining  independence  in  a 
1971  war  which  threatened  the  security 
and  stability  of  the  entire  subcontinent, 
|Bangladesh  has  experienced  periods  of 
both  political  calm  and  upheaval  and  both 
economic  progress  and  disruption.  Here, 
as  in  South  Asia  as  a  whole,  the  United 
States  pursues  policies  aimed  at  achieving 
the  interrelated  goals  of  political  stability 
and  economic  development.  Besides  help- 
ing to  meet  our  longstanding  humanitar- 
ian concern  for  the  people  of  Bangladesh, 
U.S.  food  and  development  assistance 
constitutes  the  major  means  by  which  we 
can  work  toward  these  objectives. 

Gradually  evolving  over  the  past 
dozen  years  from  an  emergency  relief  ef- 
fort into  a  longer  term  development  pro- 
gram, U.S.  assistance  presently  supports 
the  Bangladesh  Government's  develop- 
ment strategy  in  priority  areas  such  as 
family  planning,  agriculture,  and  rural 
development.  Our  proposed  program  for 
FY  1985  consists  of  $82  million  in  develop- 
ment assistance,  $97.9  million  in  PL  480 
food  and  commodity  assistance,  and 
$250,000  in  support  of  a  modest  but 
valuable  IMET  program. 

As  a  developing  country  which  has 
undertaken  a  number  of  bold  economic 
self-help  measures,  Bangladesh  has 
earned  and  deserves  our  continued  sup- 
port. During  the  Bangladesh  head  of 
government's  visit  to  Washington  in  Oc- 
tober 1983,  President  Reagan  and  other 
senior  U.S.  officials  welcomed 
Bangladesh's  liberalizing  economic 
reforms  aimed  at  reinstating  budgetary 
discipline,  stimulating  private  sector 
activity,  and  thereby  rejuvenating 
economic  development. 

The  United  States  has  also  welcomed 
and  encouraged  Bangladesh's  efforts  to 
move  peacefully  from  martial  law  to 
representative  political  institutions.  In 
1983  the  martial  law  government  re- 
moved restrictions  on  political  activity 
but  later  felt  compelled  to  reinstate  a  par- 
tial ban  following  a  recurrence  of  political 
violence.  Nonetheless,  the  government 
has  reaffirmed  publicly  its  intention  to 
proceed  with  the  series  of  local,  presiden- 
tial, and  parliamentary  elections  which 
began  in  December  1983  and  are  sched- 
uled to  continue  throughout  much  of  1984 
The  United  States  continues  to  view  the 
restoration  of  representative  institutions 
as  key  to  long-term  political  stability  in 
Bangladesh. 

Finally,  the  United  States  values 
Bangladesh's  traditionally  moderate  for- 
eign policy  and  its  constructive  approach 
to  many  issues  of  common  concern  in  mul- 
tilateral fora  such  as  the  United  Nations, 
the  Organization  of  the  Islamic  Confer- 


May  1984 


U.S.  Assistance  Levels 

($  Millions) 

FY  1983 

(Actual) 

FY  1984 

(Est.) 

FY  1985 

(Req.) 

Bangladesh 

Development  Assistance 
PL  480,  Title  I/I II 
PL  480,  Title  II 
IMET 

78.9 
60.0 
33.426 
.212 

76.895 
65.0 
22.287 
.25 

82.0 
75.0 
22.873 
.25 

Total 

172.5 

164.4 

180.1 

India 

Development  Assistance 
PL  480,  Title  II 
IMET 

89.0 
120.5 
.146 

86.0 

137.9 

.2 

87.0 
125.034 
.300 

Total 

209.6 

224.1 

212.3 

Nepal 

Development  Assistance 
PL  480,  Title  II 
IMET 

13.8 

2.8 
.075 

13.5 

1.5 
.095 

15.0 
1.106 
.100 

Total 

16.7 

15.1 

16.2 

Pakistan 

ESF 

Development  Assistance 

PL  480,  Title  I 

PL  480,  Title  II 

FMS 

IMET 

200.0 

50.0 

28.3 

260.0 

.8 

225.0 

50.0 

4.6 

300.0 

.8 

200.0 

50.0 

50.0 

3.996 

325.0 

1.0 

Total 

539.1 

580.4 

630.0 

Sri  Lanka 

Development  Assistance 
PL  480,  Title  I 
PL  480,  Title  II 
IMET 

50.695 
22.5 
8.213 
.105 

40.3 
25.0 
6.851 
.105 

41.5 
26.0 
6.114 
.150 

ToUl 

81.5 

72.3 

73.8 

Maldives 

IMET 

.021 

.025 

.025 

Total 

.021 

.025 

.025 

Bhutan 

PL  480,  Title  II 
Total 

.916 
.916 

.903 
.903 

.605 
.605 

Grand  Total 

1,020.4 

1.057.2 

1,113.1 

ence,  the  Nonaligned  Movement,  and  the 
Group  of  77.  Bangladesh's  steadfast  con- 
demnation of  the  Soviet  occupation  of 
Afghanistan  and  the  Vietnamese  domina- 
tion of  Kampuchea  has  been  exemplary. 
Although  positions  adopted  by  our  two 
governments  can  hardly  be  expected  to 
coincide  on  every  international  issue, 
Bangladesh  has  acted  as  a  reasonable  and 


responsible  member  of  the  community  of 
nations  and  deserves  our  continued  sup- 
port. 

Nepal.  The  aim  of  U.S.  assistance  to 
Nepal  is  to  promote  economic  and  political 
development,  with  a  view  to  contributing 
to  stability  in  Nepal  and  thereby  in  the 
region  as  a  whole.  Nepal's  geographical 
position  between  China  and  India  makes 


SOUTH  ASIA 


the  maintenance  of  its  domestic  stability 
particularly  important  in  a  regional  con- 
text. Last  year  the  Nepalese  political 
system  continued  to  adapt  to  the  1980 
constitutional  reforms,  which  broadened 
popular  participation  and  increased  the 
role  of  the  national  legislature.  For  the 
first  time,  an  incumbent  Prime  Minister 
was  dismissed  by  that  body  in  a  no-con- 
fidence  motion,  and  a  new  leader  and 
Council  of  Ministers  were  installed  in  an 
orderly  and  rapid  transition. 

U.S.-Nepal  bilateral  relations  remain 
excellent  and  were  further  strengthened 
by  the  state  visit  of  King  Birendra  last 
December.  At  that  time  we  expressed  to 
the  King  our  satisfaction  with  the  moder- 
ate and  responsible  foreign  policies  Nepal 
has  followed  in  the  context  of  its  long- 
standing nonaligned  approach.  We  were 
also  pleased  with  Nepal's  decision  once 
again  to  participate  in  international  peace- 
keeping forces  when  it  could  usefully  do 
so. 

As  it  moves  forward  to  develop  more 
representative  political  institutions  in  ac- 
cordance with  its  national  character, 
Nepal  continues  to  face  economic  difficul- 
ties. Rapid  population  growth,  limited 
natural  resources,  and  increasing  environ- 
mental degradation  continue  to  inhibit  the 
Nepalese  economic  development  effort.  A 
good  harvest  last  year  was  a  welcome 
development.  Under  the  new-  Prime  Min- 
ister, the  government  has  announced  new 
policies  to  improve  the  balance  of  trade, 
increase  the  distribution  of  agricultural 
inputs,  and  promote  private  investment. 

For  FY  1985  we  are  requesting  $15 
million  for  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment (AID)  programs,  $1.1  million  in 
PL  480,  Title  II  grants  through  the  World 
Food  Program,  and  $100,000  for  IMET. 
The  AID  program  in  Nepal  works  in  di- 
rect support  of  our  policy  goals  through 
cooperation  with  the  Nepalese  Govern- 
ment in  the  priority  areas  of  rural  devel- 
opment, resource  conservation,  and 
health  and  family  planning.  The  $1.5  mil- 
hon  increase  from  FY  1984  will  permit 
continuation  of  present  programs  as  well 
as  new  programs  in  agricultural  research 
and  training,  an  area  which  is  particularly 
important  to  Nepal  where  90%  of  the 
work  force  is  engaged  in  agriculture. 

Sri  Lanka.  A  parliamentary  democ- 
racy, Sri  Lanka  has  maintained  its  demo- 
cratic traditions  despite  severe  communal 
tensions.  A  serious  outbreak  of  communal 
violence  last  year  put  great  stresses  on 
the  stability  of  the  country,  but  long-es- 
tablished democratic  institutions  there  re- 
main intact. 


80 


Sri  Lanka  is  committed  to  a  moderate, 
nonaligned  foreign  policy.  It  plays  a  con- 
structive role  in  the  United  Nations  and 
the  Nonaligned  Movement.  We  have  ap- 
plauded its  policies  on  such  key  issues 
as  aggression  in  Afghanistan  and 
Kampuchea. 

Since  1977,  when  the  current  govern- 
ment took  office  under  President  J.  R. 
Jayewardene,  Sri  Lanka  has  given 
greater  play  to  the  role  of  the  private  sec- 
tor in  the  economy.  The  nation  has  a  good 
foundation  of  social  well-being  on  which  to 
build:  despite  its  low  per  capita  GNP,  Sri 
Lanka  has  a  literacy  rate  of  about  85%,  an 
infant  mortality  rate  of  just  32  per  thou- 
sand, and  a  life  expectancy  of  69  years. 
But  earlier  government  policies,  while 
contributing  to  social  well-being,  stifled 
private  enterprise  and  slowed  down  eco- 
nomic development.  With  its  new-  market- 
oriented  policies,  the  government  has 
been  able  to  boost  growth  levels  in  the 
face  of  depressed  world  economic  condi- 
tions. Sri  Lanka  has  reduced  government 
subsidies  and  controls  and  has  encour- 
aged foreign  investment.  Sustaining 
popular  approval  for  such  policies  in  a 
democratic  country  requires  demon- 
strated growth  and  improved  economic 
opportunities  for  the  average  citizen;  for- 
eign aid  helps  by  generating  employment, 
opening  new  lands  and  improving  the  pro- 
ductivity of  farmers,  and  creating  new  in- 
dustries. 

The  communal  violence  of  last  July 
took  its  toll  on  the  economy.  The  impact  is 
difficult  to  measure,  but  grow-th  for  the 
year  may  have  been  1%  less  because  of 
the  disruption  and  damage.  The  govern- 
ment since  then  has  been  especially  pre- 
occupied with  the  effort  to  reconcile  com- 
munal differences  to  assure  that  this  kind 
of  violence  does  not  recur.  An  important 
goal  of  our  economic  assistance  is  to 
demonstrate  our  continued  support  for 
Sri  Lanka  as  it  seeks  to  restore  communal 
harmony  (which  is  key  to  its  political  sta- 
bility and  economic  advance)  and  our  con- 
fidence in  the  wisdom  of  the  development 
policies  of  the  government. 

For  FY  1985  we  are  proposing  for  Sri 
Lanka  $41.5  million  in  development  assist- 
ance, $32.1  million  in  PL  480,  and  $150 
thousand  in  IMET.  Our  assistance  pro- 
motes our  foreign  policy  objectives  by 
creating  an  envii'onment  favorable  to  con- 
structive and  moderate  policies  in  Sri 
Lanka,  both  foreign  and  domestic. 

Pakistan.  Our  rationale  for  our  as- 
sistance program  in  Pakistan  remains 
substantially  unchanged  from  the  time,  in 
1981,  when  we  sought  and  received  the 
support  of  Congress  for  the  revitalization 
of  our  security  and  economic  relationship 


with  that  front  line  state.  We  have 
waiTnly  appreciated  the  backing  we  have 
received  from  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and 
from  this  committee  in  the  ensuing  years. 
That  support  has  been  vital  in  making  it 
possible  for  us  to  implement,  at  very  close 
to  full  funding,  the  initial  3  years  of  our 
5-6  year  program  of  military  and  economic 
assistance.  As  a  result  of  this  consistent 
progress  in  moving  forward  with  the 
multiyear  program  and  other  efforts  we 
have  undertaken,  such  as  the  provision  of 
modem  military  equipment,  the  inten- 
sification of  our  dialogue  with  Pakistan's 
leaders  and  senior  officials,  and  the  recent 
establishment  of  a  U.S.-Pakistan  Joint 
Commission,  we  are  well  on  our  way  to 
establishing  the  atmosphere  of  confidence 
and  trust  which  we  regard  as  key  to  a 
truly  effective  U.S.-Pakistan  relationship. 

The  stability  and  security  of  Pakistan 
contribute  significantly  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  U.S.  objectives  in  South  and 
Southwest  Asia.  We  continue  to  believe, 
as  I  testified  before  this  committee  last 
year,  that  a  stable  Pakistan,  one  of  the 
world's  largest  Islamic  states,  can  serve 
as  an  anchor  for  the  entire  region,  lend- 
ing its  considerable  weight  and  influence 
to  the  cause  of  regional  peace  and  har- 
mony. Conversely  an  unstable,  insecure 
Pakistan  adds  to  regional  tensions  and  in- 
vites outside  interference. 

Pakistan's  role  is  crucial  with  regard 
to  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  The 
multiyear  program  for  which  we  are 
again  seeking  your  support  was  designed 
to  bolster  Pakistan  as  it  confronted  the 
challenges  posed  by  this  Soviet  action. 
Four  cruel  years  after  the  invasion,  the 
continuing  implementation  of  the  pro- 
gram remains  key  to  Pakistan's  ability  to 
pursue  its  courageous  and  principled  op- 
position to  Moscow's  brutal  efforts  to  sub- 
jugate the  Afghan  people.  Without 
Pakistan's  leadership  on  the  Afghanistan 
issue  in  international  forums,  its  willing- 
ness to  offer  hospitality  and  support  to 
millions  of  Afghans  who  have  fled  their 
country,  and  its  refusal  to  be  cowed  by 
Soviet  bullying  or  bought  by  Soviet  blan- 
dishments, Moscow  would  have  been  able 
to  consolidate  its  hold.  Afghanistan  would 
have  faded  from  the  world's  agenda,  a 
forgotten  victim  of  Soviet  expansionism. 

Pakistan's  opposition  to  the  Soviet  oc- 
cupation has  had  a  high  cost.  Aside  from 
the  burden  of  2-3  million  refugees,  air- 
craft and  artillery  from  Afghanistan  have 
bombarded  Pakistani  territory  causing  in- 
juries and  deaths  and  Soviet-supported 
terrorists,  operating  at  times  from 
Afghanistan,  have  carried  out  an  aircraft 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SOUTH  ASIA 


i^jacking,  acts  of  sabotage,  and  assassina- 
tions. Pakistan  has  been  subjected  to  a 
■elentless  Soviet  propaganda  and  disinfor- 
Tiation  campaign. 

I      Soviet  hostility  toward  Pakistan 
results  largely  from  Moscow's  frustration 
3ver  its  inabOity  to  suppress  the  increas- 
ngly  effective  Afghan  resistance  or  to 
:ow  Pakistan  into  accepting  the  Soviet 
oosition.  The  military  stalemate  in 
Afghanistan  continues:  The  Soviets  con- 
;rol  their  military  bases,  major  transpor- 
^tion  routes  and,  at  least  during  day- 
ight,  most  parts  of  most  major  cities.  The 
resistance  operates  virtually  at  will  in  the 
countryside  and  is  capable  of  operating  in 
the  cities,  as  the  recent  increase  of  assas- 
sinations of  communist  officials  in  Kabul 
clearly  indicates. 

The  freedom  fighters  did  well  during 
1983,  particularly  against  communist  sup 
ply  convoys  last  summer.  Autumn  cam- 
paigns in  Paktia  and  Paktika  and  a  De- 
ember  engagement  with  Soviet  and 
regime  forces  near  the  town  of  Guldara 
also  resulted  in  resistance  successes.  Un 
less  the  Soviets  very  substantially  in- 
crease their  effort  in  Afghanistan,  they 
will  not  defeat  the  freedom  fighters  in  the 
foreseeable  future. 

Both  Pakistan  and  the  United  States 
remain  fully  committed  to  finding  a  politi- 
lal  solution  which  will  end  the  agony  of 
the  Afghan  people  and  allow  them  to 
determine  their  owm  fate.  As  you  know, 
Pakistan  has  energetically  participated  in 
the  UN-sponsored  indirect  talks  on 
Afghanistan.  The  United  States  also 
strongly  supports  the  UN  negotiating 
process,  and  we  have  clearly  endorsed  the 
concepts  we  understand  form  the  basis  of 
the  current  draft  text,  which  would  pro- 
vide for  a  fully  integrated  settlement.  We 
have  stated  that  in  our  view  such  a  settle- 
ment must  include  the  basic  elements 
spelled  out  in  five  UN  General  Assembly 
resolutions  on  Afghanistan— the  with- 
drawal of  Soviet  troops,  the  independent 
and  nonaligned  status  of  Afghanistan, 
determination  by  the  Afghan  people  of 
their  own  form  of  government,  and  the 
secure  return  of  the  refugees.  We  have 
welcomed  the  progress  made  to  date  and 
hope  for  further  forward  movement  with 
the  proposed  resumption  of  consultations 
in  the  spring.  The  sticking  point  remains 
the  unwillingness  of  the  Soviet  Union  to 
seriously  address  the  question  of  a  with- 
drawal schedule,  which  is  an  essential  in- 
gredient of  any  solution. 

The  actions  of  the  Soviets  indicate 
that  they  have  not  given  up  on  conquer- 
ing Afghanistan.  As  long  as  Soviet 
behavior  does  not  change,  there  seems  lit- 
tle immediate  prospect  of  resolving  the 


May  1984 


crisis.  Nevertheless,  both  we  and  the 
Pakistanis  will  continue  to  press  for  a 
peaceful  political  settlement. 

Any  such  solutions  must  take  into  ac- 
count the  desires  of  the  millions  of 
Afghans  forced  to  flee  their  homes  by  the 
communist  coup  and  the  subsequent 
Soviet  invasion.  The  Afghans  Pakistan 
hosts  constitute  the  largest  single  body  of 
refugees  in  the  world.  The  Government 
and  people  of  Pakistan  deserve  high 
praise  for  the  warm  and  generous  wel- 
come they  have  given  the  Afghan  refu- 
gees. Despite  the  strain  such  a  large 
number  of  refugees  places  upon  the 
resources  ol  a  poor  country  like  Pakistan, 
trouble  between  the  refugees  and  the 
local  population  has  remained  remarkably 
rare.  The  United  States  is  proud  to  have 
contributed  over  $320  million  in  cash, 
food,  transportation,  and  other  relief  sup- 
plies to  Afghan  refugee  relief  since  the  in- 
ternational relief  program  began  in  1980. 
A  number  of  other  countries— such  as 
Canada,  Great  Britain,  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  Japan,  Australia,  France, 
and  Saudi  Arabia— continue  to  make  large 
donations  to  the  relief  effort.  In  addition 
to  governments  and  international  organi- 
zations, a  number  of  private  voluntary 
agencies  have  made  notable  contribu- 
tions to  the  program.  Despite  the  interna- 
tional community's  generosity,  however, 
Pakistan  continues  to  bear  the  brunt  of 
the  refugee  burden. 

While  the  need  to  bolster  Pakistan  fol- 
lowing the  Afghanistan  invasion  was  key 
to  our  decision  to  revitalize  our  assistance 
programs  in  Pakistan,  these  programs 
help  in  the  achievement  of  several  impor- 
tant U.S.  objectives.  Closely  related  to 
Pakistan's  national  security  is  its  econom- 
ic development  and  internal  stabihty,  key 
interconnected  goals  of  our  assistance 
programs. 

Pakistan  recorded  its  sixth  con- 
secutive year  of  rapid  economic  growth 
during  1982-83.  Real  GDP  increased 
about  6%,  and  per  capita  income  grew 
over  3%.  Much  of  this  growth  is, 
however,  the  result  of  additions  to 
capacity— added  irrigated  land  in 
agriculture,  and  new  public  sector  in- 
dustries—rather than  increased  efficien- 
cy. In  order  to  sustain  this  high  rate  of 
growth  in  the  coming  years,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Pakistan  intends  to  devote  more 
attention  to  increasing  agricultural  yields 
and  encouraging  private  sector  invest- 
ment. It  is  hoped  that  reforms  aimed  at 
deregulating  the  economy  and  other 
measures  will  stimulate  mobilization  of 
resources  in  the  private  sector.  Although 
it  has  eiyoyed  a  recent  positive  shift  in  its 


balance  of  payments,  Pakistan  remains 
dependent  on  worker  remittances  and 
vulnerable  to  even  slight  changes  in  ex- 
ogenous factors,  particularly  swings  in  its 
trade  account  and  shifts  in  world  oil 
prices.  Pakistan  imports  90%  of  its 
petroleum  requirements. 

With  these  vulnerabilities  in  view,  our 
economic  assistance  program  provides 
Pakistan  with  short-term  balance-of- 
payments  support  and  helps  stimulate 
long-term  economic  and  social  develop- 
ment. Our  20  ongoing  and  planned  devel- 
opment projects  are  heavily  concentrated 
in  the  agriculture,  population,  health,  and 
energy  sectors  with  a  special  initiative  in 
private  sector  development. 

We  recognize  that  while  economic 
progress  is  important  in  bolstering  pros- 
pects for  stability,  the  development  and 
strengthening  of  representative  institu- 
tions also  plays  a  significant  role.  Such 
political  actions  also  have  an  intrinsic 
value,  as  do  the  fostering  of  human  and 
civil  rights,  and  enhance  the  possibility  of 
achieving  warm  relations  with  the  United 
States.  In  this  connection,  we  were 
encouraged  by  President  Zia's  August  12 
announcement  of  his  intention  to  return 
Pakistan  to  a  more  representative  form  of 
government.  Recent  disturbances  in  one 
part  of  Pakistan,  which  began  soon  after- 
ward, have  since  subsided.  We  are  also 
encouraged  by  the  recent  release  of  a 
number  of  political  detainees.  We  hope 
that  the  Government  and  people  of 
Pakistan  vdll  be  able  to  manage  the  tran- 
sition to  more  representative  institutions 
peacefully  and  equitably. 

Our  economic  assistance  program  also 
supports  Pakistani  efforts  to  suppress 
opium  production  and  to  interdict  the 
traffic  in  illicit  narcotics.  Narcotics  is  a 
sensitive  area  in  our  relations  with 
Pakistan.  Over  half  of  the  heroin  con- 
sumed in  the  United  States  comes  from 
opium  cultivated  in  Southwest  Asia,  much 
of  it  from  Pakistan.  Over  the  past  2  years, 
Pakistan  has  also  become  a  major  source 
(>f  refined  heroin. 

Mindful  of  its  obligations  to  the  inter- 
national community  and  deeply  concerned 
about  the  alarming  growth  of  heroin  ad- 
diction in  Pakistan,  the  Government  of 
Pakistan  is  taking  significant  steps  to  con- 
trol narcotics  production  and  prevent 
trafficking  in  opium  and  heroin.  A  ban  on 
opium  growing  is  enforced  in  areas  under 
central  government  control,  and  the  gov- 
ernment has  agreed  to  enforce  the  ban  in 
growing  areas  where  it  receives  economic 
assistance  from  the  United  States  and 
other  donors.  It  has  also  agreed  to  de- 
stroy heroin  labs  immediately  upon  identi- 


mmmi 


SOUTH  ASIA 


fication,  and  over  40  of  these  labs  were 
closed  last  year.  Interdiction  efforts  by 
Pakistani  authorities  have  produced 
record  narcotics  seizures,  although  they 
recognize  that  progress  is  needed  in  pros- 
ecuting major  traffickers  and  syndicates. 

Most  importantly,  the  Government  of 
Pakistan  has  promulgated  new  legislation 
substantially  toughening  penalties  for 
narcotics  violations.  These  new  laws  are 
applicable  in  areas  of  the  country  hereto- 
fore not  under  central  control.  The  gov- 
ernment has  submitted  a  special  develop- 
ment and  enforcement  plan  for  multi- 
donor  consideration  and  has  thus  sig- 
nalled its  desire  to  eradicate  poppy  culti- 
vation throughout  Pakistan,  even  in  the 
tribal  areas  where  central  government 
control  has  hitherto  been  exercised  in- 
directly. 

We  are  particularly  pleased  that,  as  a 
measure  of  the  increasing  cooperation 
between  our  two  governments  in  narcot- 
ics control,  the  Pakistanis  have  joined  us 
in  forming  a  special  narcotics  working 
group  under  our  joint  commission.  While 
much  more  needs  to  be  done,  we  are  satis- 
fied that  the  Government  of  Pakistan  is 
firmly  committed  to  controlling  the  pro- 
duction and  trafficking  of  narcotics. 

The  assistance  program  also  contrib- 
utes to  U.S.  nuclear  nonproliferation 
goals.  We  believe  strongly  that  a  program 
of  support  which  enhances  Pakistan's 
sense  of  security  helps  remove  the  princi- 
pal underlying  incentive  for  the  acquisi- 
tion of  a  nuclear  weapons  capability.  The 
Government  of  Pakistan  understands  our 
deep  concern  over  this  issue.  We  have 
made  clear  that  the  relationship  between 
our  two  countries,  and  the  program  of 
military  and  economic  assistance  on  which 
it  rests,  are  ultimately  inconsistent  with 
Pakistan's  development  of  a  nuclear  ex- 
plosives device.  President  Zia  has  stated 
publicly  that  Pakistan  will  not  manufac- 
ture a  nuclear  explosives  device. 

We  are  aware,  of  course,  of  concerns 
about  the  impact  upon  Indo-U.S.  and 
Indo-Pakistani  ties  of  our  defense  supply 
relationship  with  Pakistan.  The  Indian 
Government  at  times  has  expressed  ap- 
prehension about  that  relationship.  Our 
supply  of  economic  and  military  assist- 
ance to  Pakistan  is  not  aimed  against  In- 
dia. Despite  some  misinformed  public 
speculation,  the  moderate  number  of 
weapons  we  are  providing  Pakistan  will 
not  upset  the  current  balance  of  military 
power  in  the  region,  which  heavily  favors 
India. 

Regrettably,  there  has  been  some  in- 
crease in  tension  between  India  and 
Pakistan  in  1983.  We  do  not  believe  that 
this  can  reasonably  be  associated  with  our 


82 


security  relationship  with  Pakistan,  which 
was  put  into  place  well  before.  In  any 
event,  these  tensions  should  not  obscure 
the  efforts  made  by  both  countries  to  bet- 
ter bilateral  relations.  In  January  in- 
augural meetings  were  held  by  elements 
of  the  new  Indo-Pakistan  Joint  Commis- 
sion. There  have  been  continuing  ex- 
changes at  the  official  and  private  level 
with  a  view  to  enhancing  mutually  benefi- 
cial cooperation  in  a  range  of  fields.  The 
two  countries  are  also  cooperating  in  the 
South  Asia  regional  cooperation  organiza- 
tion, a  promising  new  development  in  the 
area.  The  United  States  continues  to  en- 
courage India  and  Pakistan  to  draw 
closer.  We  will  do  whatever  we  realistical- 
ly can  to  further  the  process  of  normaliza- 
tion between  these  two  valued  friends. 

Conclusion 

In  summary,  the  Administration  and  the 
Congress  can  take  satisfaction  from  the 


Afghanistan  Day,  1984 


considerable  progress  that  we  have  seen 
in  South  Asia  and  in  our  own  contribution 
to  that  progress.  We  believe  economic 
development  in  the  region  benefits  the 
people  of  the  United  States  as  much  as  it 
does  the  people  of  South  Asia.  There  are, 
of  course,  limits  to  the  contribution  we 
can  make.  But  to  the  extent  possible,  we 
should  stand  ready  to  assist  this  region— 
which  contains  about  one-fourth  of  the 
world's  population— in  its  search  for 
peace,  prosperity,  and  stability.  It  is  im- 
portant for  both  the  Administration  and 
the  Congress  to  continue  providing  what 
support  we  can  to  this  process. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.H 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  21,  1984» 

March  21,  the  traditional  Afghan  New 
Year's  celebration,  is  once  again  being  ob- 
served in  the  United  States  as  Afghani- 
stan Day.  As  in  previous  years,  various 
private  organizations,  as  well  as  the  U.S. 
Government,  are  marking  this  day  to  em- 
phasize that  the  struggle  of  the  Afghan 
people  against  the  Soviet  invader  con- 
tinues, just  as  American  solidarity  with 
the  Afghan  cause  also  continues. 

President  Reagan  is  issuing  a  procla- 
mation from  the  White  House,  designat- 
ing March  21  as  Afghanistan  Day.  With  it 
he  is  expressing  America's  admiration  for 
the  heroism  and  bravery  of  the  Afghan 
people.  An  Afghanistan  Day  forum  is  be- 
ing organized  on  Capitol  HUl,  at  which 
the  Counselor  of  the  State  Department, 
Edwin  J.  Derwinski,  will  outline  the 
constancy  of  U.S.  policy  toward 
Afghanistan.  I  understand  that  in 
Washington  and  New  York,  marches  and 
demonstrations  will  also  take  place. 

The  Department  of  State  welcomes 
such  manifestations  of  public  support  for 
the  Afghan  resistance,  or  mujahidin. 
Their  sustained  countrywide  struggle 
against  tyranny  and  oppression  is  worthy 
of  our  esteem.  Their  courage  and  deter- 
mination is  an  inspiration  to  us  all.  I 
-•emember  with  great  feeling  my  visit  to 
an  Afghan  refugee  camp  in  Peshawar, 


Pakistan,  last  July,  where  I  had  the 
privilege  of  meeting  with  a  group  of 
Afghan  refugee  leaders.  Their  steady 
resolve  and  quiet  dignity  moved  me  to 
say  then,  as  I  repeat  for  you,  "We  are 
with  you  ....  I  share  your  confidence 
that  in  the  end  freedom  will  prevail,  we 
will  prevail." 

The  goal  of  the  U.S.  policy  toward  Af 
ghanistan  remains  a  negotiated  political 
settlement,  based  upon  the  complete 
withdrawal  of  Soviet  forces  and  the  other 
essential  points  spelled  out  in  five  UN 
General  Assembly  resolutions  of  Afghani- 
stan. My  wish  for  all  Afghans  in  this  New 
Year  would  be  that  this  settlement  could 
be  achieved  as  quickly  as  possible.  I  wish 
that  Afghanistan  could  know  peace,  free- 
dom, and  the  return  of  all  its  sons  and 
daughters  who  have  fled  oppression  for 
refuge  abroad. 


PROCLAMATION  5165, 
MAR.  20.  1984* 

For  much  of  the  world  spring  is  now  begin- 
ning. It  is  a  time  of  new  life,  renewal,  fresh- 
ness, and  hope. 

For  the  people  of  Afghanistan,  March  21  is 
the  traditional  celebration  of  the  New  Year, 
the  beginning  of  the  cycle  of  life.  It  is  a  period 
of  rejoicing  and  celebration  for  life's  regenera- 
tion as  a  gift  of  God. 

But  today,  for  most  of  the  people  of 
Afghanistan,  the  March  21  New  Year  brings 
only  the  renewal  of  fighting,  destruction, 


Department  of  State  Bulleth 


UNITED  NATIONS 


nd  death.  For  more  than  four  years,  the  armed 
jrces  of  the  Soviet  Union  have  occupied  Af- 
fhanistan.  More  than  100,000  Soviet  soldiers 
low  occupy  that  beleaguered  country.  The 
verwhelming  majority  of  the  Afghan  people 
re  struggling  against  the  Soviet  occupation 
roops  and  the  puppet  regime  headed  by 
tabrak  Karmal.  It  is  a  regime  that  is  main- 
ained  only  by  Soviet  force. 

Afghan  resistance  to  Mar.xist  rule  grew 
ramatically  after  the  Soviet  invasion,  and  it 
las  now  spread  throughout  the  country.  A 
olution  to  the  Afghanistan  problem  must 
jegin  with  the  removal  of  the  Soviet  troops.  A 
egotiated  political  settlement  can  be  achieved 
the  Soviet  Union  agrees  to  withdraw  its 
lilitary  forces  of  occupation. 

The  goal  of  United  States  pohcy  remains 
lear  and  consistent.  We  seek  the  removal  of 
Soviet  military  forces  so  that  the  Afghan  peo- 
le  can  live  freely  in  their  own  country  and  are 
ftfble  to  choose  their  own  way  of  life  and 
overnment. 

Hope,  it  is  said,  springs  eternal.  We  con- 

inue  to  hope  that  a  negotiated  settlement  can 

e  found,  a  settlement  which  fulfills  the  condi- 

ions  spelled  out  five  times  in  resolutions  re- 

oundingly  endorsed  by  the  General  Assembly 

f  the  United  Nations. 

These  resolutions,  passed  by  the 
verwhelming  majority  of  the  world's  nations, 
all  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  foreign 
roops  from  Afghanistan;  reaffirm  the  right  of 
he  Afghan  people  to  determine  their  own 
3rm  of  government  and  to  choose  their 
eonomic,  political,  and  social  system;  reiterate 
hat  the  preservation  of  the  sovereignty,  ter- 
itorial  integrity,  political  independence,  and 
onaligned  character  of  Afghanistan  is  essen- 
ial  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  problem;  and 
all  for  the  creation  of  the  conditions  which 
I'ould  enable  the  Afghan  refugees  to  return 
oluntarily  to  their  homes  in  safety  and  honor. 

We  stand  in  admiration  of  the  indomitable 
I'll!  and  courage  of  the  Afghan  people  who  con- 
inue  their  resistance  to  tyranny.  All  freedom- 
Bving  people  around  the  globe  should  be  in- 
pired  by  the  Afghan  people's  struggle  to  be 

and  the  heavy  sacrifices  they  bear  for 
ibeity. 

Afghanistan  Day  will  serve  to  recall  the 
undamental  principles  involved  when  a  people 
itruggles  for  the  freedom  to  determine  its  own 
uture  and  the  right  to  be  free  of  foreign  in- 
erference.  Let  us  therefore  resolve  to  pay 
ribute  to  the  brave  Afghan  people  by  observ- 
ng  March  21,  1984  as  Afghanistan  Day.  Let  us 
)ledge  our  continuing  admiration  for  their 
ause  and  for  their  perseverance,  and  lend  our 
upport  to  the  Afghan  refugees  in  Pakistan. 

Let  us  redouble  our  determination  to  help 
ind  a  negotiated  settlement  that  will  enable 
he  Afghan  people  to  again  welcome  spring 
Ivithout  the  suffering  brought  by  war,  but  with 
til 21  IS  ;elebration  and  joy. 


irdAI 


NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  RONALD  REAGAN, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  do 
hereby  proclaim  March  21,  1984,  as 
Afghanistan  Day. 

IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  20th  day  of  March,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  eighty- 


four,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  two  hundred  and 
eighth. 

RONALD  REAGAN 


•Press  release  88  of  Mar.  23,  1984. 

*Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 

Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  26.  ■ 


FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for 
Organizations  and  Programs 


by  Gregory  J.  Newell 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House 
Appropriations  Committee  on  April  i, 
198U.  Mr.  Newell  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Organization  Affairs. » 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  this  com- 
mittee to  present  the  President's  request 
for  FY  1985  contributions  to  certain  vol- 
untarily funded  organizations  and  pro- 
grams of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS). 
Before  describing  this  request  in  detail.  I 
would  like  to  first  discuss  this  administra- 
tion's approach  toward  the  UN  system. 
The  Bureau  for  International  Organiza- 
tion Affairs  continues  to  guide  itself  by 
the  five  priorities  introduced  almost  2 
years  ago.  The  progress  made  in  pursuit 
of  these  priorities  has  been  encouraging. 

U.S.  Priorities 

The  first  priority— the  reassertion  of 
American  leadership  in  international  or- 
ganization—is to  break  out  of  the 
"damage-limitation"  strategy  that  has 
come  to  characterize  many  of  our  multi- 
lateral policies  and  move  instead  toward  a 
more  constructive  relationship,  one  that 
reflects  the  strong  commitment  of  the 
President  to  the  UN  system.  We  recog- 
nized at  the  outset  that  progress  would 
be  gradual  and  difficult  since  it  means 
turning  international  organizations  away 
from  fruitless  ideological  and  politically 
inspired  debates  toward  constructive 
tasks. 

A  number  of  actions  have  been  taken 
to  reassert  our  leadership.  First  and 
foremost  among  these  is  our  determina- 
tion to  speak  out  on  issues  that  are  impor- 
tant to  our  national  interests  and  that 
could  threaten  the  future  of  the  UN  sys- 
tem if  allowed  to  continue  unchecked. 
Thus  we  steadfastly  uphold  the  principle 
of  "universality"  and  in  the  name  of  this 


principle  defeated  major  challenges  to 
Israel's  participation  in  the  UN  General 
Assembly,  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA),  and  in  the  Inter- 
national Telecommunication  Union  (ITU). 
We  have  also  succeeded  in  turning  back 
measures  to  involve  the  UN  General 
Assembly  in  issues  that  are  none  of  its 
business.  For  example,  we  blocked  efforts 
by  the  Soviet  Union  and  others  to  have 
the  General  Assembly  discuss  the  ongo- 
ing process  of  terminating  the  U.S. 
Pacific  Islands  trusteeship.  We  turned 
aside  a  Malaysian  proposal  which  would 
have  brought  into  question  the  fundamen- 
tal principles  underlying  the  Antarctica 
Treaty.  And  our  impact  is  not  just  tran- 
sitory. Our  success  in  stopping  an  effort 
by  Cuba  in  1982  to  have  the  General 
Assembly  discuss  Puerto  Rico  in  the  con- 
text of  colonialism  dissuaded  the  Cubans 
from  making  a  similar  effort  in  1983. 

The  firm  position  taken  against  "polit- 
icization"  and  inflammatory  rhetoric  has 
had  a  sobering  effect  throughout  the  UN 
system  and  has  made  member  nations 
more  reluctant  to  support  radical  pro- 
posals and  more  willing  to  consider  prac- 
tical solutions  to  their  problems.  Now 
that  we  have  succeeded  in  attracting  the 
attention  of  international  organizations, 
our  task  for  the  coming  year  will  be  to  ad- 
vance constructive  proposals  which  re- 
spond in  practical  ways  to  legitimate  in- 
ternational and  Third  World  problems. 

We  have  made  considerable  progress 
in  promoting  the  President's  budget 
policy  of  zero  net  program  growth  and 
significant  absorption  of  nondiscre- 
tionary  cost  increases— our  second  policy 
priority.  With  the  support  of  our  allies, 
we  achieved  substantial  reductions  in  the 
real  growth  of  the  budgets  of  nearly  all  in- 
ternational organizations  and  have  halted 
the  runaway  trend  of  their  rising 
budgets.  The  UN  Educational,  Scientific 
and  Cultural  Organization  (UNESCO) 
was  the  glaring  exception. 


Iletif 


VI  ay  1984 


IkttittUiiMMk 


1 


UNITED   NATIONS 


More  typical  are  the  examples  of 
restraint.  The  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion's (WHO)  1984-85  budget  reflects  a 
decrease  in  the  progi-am  budget  of  three- 
tenths  of  1%  as  compared  with  a  2.^5 /<- 
percent  increase  in  program  growth  in 
the  previous  biennium.  The  budget  of  the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (t  AU) 
projects  only  50%  progi-am  growth  for  the 
1984-85  biennium.  Down  from  an  8% 
growth  in  1982-83.  The  International 
Labor  Organization's  (ILO)  budget  con- 
tains a  program  growth  of  less  than  2%  as 
compared  with  9%  in  the  previous  bien- 
nium  The  1984-85  budget  for  the  United 
Nations,  approved  just  last  December, 
provides  for  less  than  1%  net  program 
growth-half  what  was  initially  approved 
for  the  1982-83  biennium. 

Our  strong  stand  on  zero  net  program 
growth  for  assessed  budgets  was  taken 
not  only  to  bring  about  fiscal  restramt 
but  also  to  force  international  organiza- 
tions into  reprogramming  resources  from 
unproductive  activities  to  worthwhile  pro- 
grams that  will  show  results.  We  have 
sought  to  ensure  that  the  U.S.  contribu- 
tions are  used  for  programs  that  comcide 
with  our  national  priorities  and  satisfy  the 
real  needs  of  the  international  commu- 

"^  Ve  have  laid  good  groundwork  for 
continuing  our  effective  efforts  in  pursuit 
of  U  S.  budget  policy  objectives  during 
the  next  round  of  decisions  on  interna-^ 
tional  organization  assessed  budgets.  On 
March  20  and  21, 1984, 1  led  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  Geneva  group  consulta- 
tive level  meeting.  Our  goal  for  this 
meeting  was  to  secure  an  agreed  joint 
policy  statement  regarding  the  budgets  ot 
the  UN  specialized  agencies  for  the  sec- 
ond half  of  the  1980s.  We  achieved  our 
goal.  For  the  second  half  of  this  decade, 
the  group's  policy  is  one  of  continued 
restraint  toward  UN  agency  budget 
growth.  The  group  maintained  its  general 
commitment  to  zero  real  growth  and  em- 
phasized the  need  for  maximum  absorp- 
tion of  inflationary  costs  and  exchange 
rate  fluctuations  in  the  budgets  of  inter- 
national organizations. 

For  our  third  priority  we  set  our- 
selves the  goal  of  reducing  the  size  of 
U  S  delegations  to  international  con- 
ferences by  30%.  The  figures  show  that 
the  number  of  delegates  was  reduced 
from  2,785  in  FY  1980  to  1,941  m  1983-a 
30  31%  reduction.  At  the  same  time,  we 
pressed  for  a  reduction  in  the  number  and 
length  of  international  conferences.  As  a 
result  of  our  effort,  the  United  Nations  m- 
structed  its  committee  on  conferences  to 
work  with  officers  of  subsidiary  bodies  ot 
the  United  Nations  to  shorten  conference 


sessions.  In  addition  a  number  of  interna- 
tional organizations  agreed  to  reduce  the 
length  and  number  of  their  conferences. 
We  will,  of  course,  continue  to  see  savings 
in  our  participation  in  international  con- 
ferences, but  while  doing  so  we  also  want 
to  ensure  that  the  delegations  we  are 
sending  to  these  conferences  are  highly 
qualified  and  well-prepared. 

Just  beginning  to  show  results  are  the 
initiatives  we  have  taken  to  achieve  our 
fourth  priority-to  increase  the  number  ot 
U  S.  nationals  in  international  organiza- 
tions, particulariy  in  policymaking  posi- 
tions For  example,  the  Amencan  ad- 
ministrator of  the  UN  Development  Pro- 
gram (UNDP)  was  reappointed  for 
another  term.  An  American  was  named 
Deputy  Commissioner  of  the  UN  Reliet 
and  Works  Agency  (UNRWA)  for 
Palestine  Refugees  in  the  Near  East. 
Another  was  appointed  Deputy  Ex- 
ecutive Director  of  the  UN  Environment 
Program  (UNEP).  In  UNICEF,  whose 
Executive  Director  has  always  been  an 
American,  a  recent  appointment  leaves 
two  of  UNICEF's  regional  bureaus  under 
the  direction  of  Americans. 

The  record  for  this  year  shows,  how- 
ever, that  the  total  number  of  Americans 
in  international  organizations  increased 
only  slightly.  We  hope  to  do  much  better 
in  the  coming  year  when  the  changes  we 
have  made  in  the  recruitment  and  place- 
ment of  qualified  Americans  have  time  to 
take  effect.  These  changes  entail  the 
strengthening  of  interagency  coordmation 
procedures  for  recruiting  and  the  devel- 
opment of  new  tactics  for  placing  our  can- 
didates with  international  organizations. 

Our  fifth  and  final  priority-to  m- 
crease  the  role  of  the  private  sector  in  the 
programs  and  activities  of  international 
organizations  to  rely  more  on  private 
enterprise  for  solving  development  prob- 
lems, and,  second,  to  persuade  the  U.S. 
private  sector  to  become  more  involved  in 
multilateral  activities.  We  have  seen  some 
progress  in  both  of  these  areas  over  the 
past  year.  For  example,  we  were  able  to 
bring  together  the  resources  of  a  number 
of  U.S.  telecommunication  companies  to 
train  developing  country  officials  in  the 
use  of  American  technology-.  The  UNEP 
is  cosponsoring  with  industry  a  private 
sector  conference  to  showcase  environ- 
mental technology.  U.S.  industrial 
firms-including  TENNECO,  U.S.  Steel, 
Gulf,  and  3-M  Corporation-have  led  the 
organization  of  the  conference.  We  have 
created  closer  working  relationships  be- 
tween WHO  and  U.S.  professional  health 
groups  and  the  pharmaceutical  industry. 


Despite  these  examples,  however,  we 
are  just  beginning  to  take  advantage  of 
the  immense  potential  and  relevance  of 
the  private  sector  to  the  solution  of  global 
and  Third  Worid  problems.  In  recognition 
of  this  still  unrealized  potential,  we  have 
recently  established  in  the  bureau  a  posi- 
tion for  a  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Private  Sector  Affairs  whose  responsi- 
bility will  be  to  find  new  ways  in  which 
we  can  bring  the  expertise  and  vigor  of 
the  private  sector  to  bear  on  the  activities 
and  programs  of  international  organiza- 
tions. 


ireal 


oiri) 


iieci 


I'N 


International  Ogranizations 
and  Programs  Budget 

The  President's  FY  1985  request  of 
$241.8  million  for  the  international  orgam 
zations  and  programs  account  is  at  ap- 
proximately the  same  level  as  the  t  Y 
1984  request.  It  includes  two  additional 
programs,  funding  for  which  in  1984  had 
been  requested  in  other  accounts.  In 
response  to  congressional  practice,  we 
have  shifted  into  this  account  the  request 
for  the  International  Fund  for 
Agricultural  Development  (IFAD)-$W 
million  for  FY  1985.  We  are  also  includmi 
the  request  for  funding  the  UN  Industrie 
Development  Organization  (UNIDO) 
Industrial  Investment  Promotion  Sen'ic( 
The  U.S.  contribution  to  the  organiza 
tions  in  this  account  must  be  considered 
in  relation  to  all  other  claims  on  the 
budget  and  to  the  available  revenues. 
Tradeoffs  must  be  made  among  program 
competing  for  limited  resources.  This  re- 
quest reflects  a  careful  balance  between 
the  President's  goals  of  budgetary 
stringency  and  his  determination  that  th 
United  States  continue  to  lead  and  sup- 
port the  organizations  in  this  account.  W 
beUeve  that  this  level  is  adequate  to 
demonstrate  the  continued  U.S.  commit- 
ment to  these  voluntarily  funded  agen- 
cies to  assure  the  United  States  its  long 
standing  leadership  role,  and  to  restram 
pressure  for  increased  technical  assist- 
ance funded  in  the  assessed  budgets  of 
UN  agencies.  _         ,     *     j 

The  multilateral  agencies  to  be  tunac 
by  this  request  serve  U.S.  foreign  pohcy 
objectives  in  a  number  of  ways. 

•  They  promote  economic  growth  in 
poorer  countries,  hopefully  fostering 
social  and  political  stability. 

•  They  advance  American  ideals  anc 
serve  to  ensure  that  the  development  of 
important  Third  Worid  nations  takes 
place  in  the  framework  of  the  Western 
economic  system. 


84 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


UNITED   NATIONS 


•  They  demonstrate  American  sup- 
)ort  for  humanitarian  ideals. 

•  They  provide  a  Western  influence 
!w  n  areas  of  strategic  importance. 

More  than  80%  of  the  requested  funds 
ire  for  three  major  UN  programs— the 
UNDP,  UNICEF,  and  IFAD.  These 
;hree  programs  serve  basic  human  needs 
;hroughout  the  developing  world.  That 
he  heads  of  both  UNDP  and  UNICEF, 
IS  w^ell  as  the  Vice  President  of  IFAD, 
ire  all  American  citizens  indicates  the 
mportance  of  U.S.  leadership  in  these 
)rganizations  and  their  responsiveness  to 
)ur  interests. 

In  regard  to  the  agency  receiving  the 
argest  contribution,  the  U.S.  Govem- 
nent  has  long  supported  the  UNDP  as 
;he  central  funding  and  coordinating 
nechanism  for  multilateral  grant  tech- 
lical  assistance.  The  program,  utilizing 
;he  best  of  the  vast  e.xpertise  of  the 
United  Nations,  brings  to  bear  an  impor- 
ant,  multisectoral  approach  to  develop- 
nent  problems.  By  centralizing  planning, 
idministration,  and  field  coordination, 
UNDP  is  in  a  position  to  effect  the  most 
economical  use  of  the  funds  placed  at  its 
lisposal. 

We  should  also  cite  the  humanitarian 
ichievements  of  UNICEF.  Under  the 
able  leadership  of  Jim  Grant,  UNICEF 
:as  undertaken  "a  health  revolution  for 
:hildren."  Under  this  program,  UNICEF 
s  promoting  and  coordinating  the  adop- 
;ion  throughout  the  developing  world  of 
ow-cost  techniques  for  reducing  child 
Tiortality.  The  long-term  objective  is  to 
•educe  by  half  the  number  of  children  dy- 
ng— estimated  at  40,000  a  day.  This  pro- 
-am has  drawn  expressions  of  support 
Tom  the  President,  the  Congress,  and  an 
inprecedented  number  of  world  leaders. 

IFAD's  laudable  goal  is  to  help  poor 
'armers  increase  agricultural  production 
n  food  deficit  developing  countries.  Es- 
tablished in  1977  with  strong  U.S.  sup- 
3ort,  IFAD  is  unique  among  international 
development  institutions  in  that  the 
Drganization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries  (OPEC)  nations  and  the  major 
[„„(je  Western  donors  participate  on  a  basis  of 
j(,.  learly  equal  contributions. 

Representing  more  specialized  assist- 
ance are  the  programs  of  the  IAEA, 
.liiin  UNEP,  and  the  development  assistance 
3rogram  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS).  The  IAEA  is,  of  course, 
l;s«ii  critical  to  U.S.  nonproliferation  interests. 
Our  contribution  to  the  agency  is  vital  to 
strengthen  the  international  system  of 
safeguards  on  nuclear  materials  and 
facilities  in  over  50  countries  and  to  main- 


May  1984 


tain  a  healthy  technical  assistance  pro- 
gram. Testifying  to  the  high  priority  ac- 
corded to  the  IAEA  is  the  Administra- 
tion's intention  to  seek  a  supplemental  ap- 
propriation in  the  FY  1984  budget  of  $3.7 
million  for  the  IAEA,  which  would  re-     . 
store  the  full  amount  originally  reguested 
by  the  Administration.  Our  support  for 
the  OAS  development  program  reflects 
the  importance  we  attach  to  promoting 
social  stability  and  economic  progress  in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  nations. 

UN  Development  Program  (UNDP). 
The  President  is  requesting  $120  million 
as  our  contribution  to  UNDP.  This 
organization,  with  its  extensive  network 
of  116  developing  country  field  offices,  re- 
mains the  main  channel  for  technical  co- 
operation in  the  UN  system.  Administer- 
ing projects  amounting  to  over  $750 
million  a  year,  UNDP  is  responsible  for 
program  delivery  in  more  fields  in  more 
developing  countries  and  territories  (152) 
than  any  other  development  assistance 
organization  in  the  world.  UNDP  projects 
cover  a  broad  range,  including  expansion 
of  industrial  and  commercial  sectors,  in- 
creasing argicultural  production,  and  the 
enhancement  of  aid  absorption  capacity 
through  the  training  of  local  people. 

Specifically  the  $120  million  is  needed 
to: 

•  Maintain  the  comprehensive  system 
of  UNDP  field  representatives.  The 
UNDP's  resident  representatives  are  the 
principal  UN  spokesmen  in  nearly  every 
developing  country.  They  perform  field 
functions  for  nearly  all  UN  agencies  and 
the  Secretariat,  achieving  economies  of 
scale  and  improved  efficiency  for  the  UN 
system  as  a  whole  through  their 
coordinating  and  catalytic  activities; 

•  Stave  off  the  growth  of  technical 
assistance  funded  by  the  regular  budgets 
of  UN  specialized  agencies.  Owing  to  the 
worldwide  recession,  UNDP  found  itself 
with  resources  permitting  programming 
at  only  55%  of  the  level  originally 
planned.  However,  recent  anticipated  in- 
creases in  contributions  from  donors,  par- 
ticularly the  United  States,  have  enabled 
UNDP  to  authorize  programming  at  80% 
of  planned  levels  for  those  countries 
classified  as  least  developed.  This  modest 
improvement  should  discourage  efforts  to 
seek  compensating  assistance  through 
budgets  funded  from  assessments  on 
member  states; 

•  Maintain  top  level  U.S.  manage- 
ment in  the  organization.  We  are  gratified 
with  the  reappointment  of  Brad  Morse  as 
UNDP  Administrator  after  his  term  ex- 
pired in  1983;  and 


•  Continue  a  coordinated  approach  to 
UN  system  development  via  one  central 
agency. 

International  Fund  for  Agricultural 
Development  (IFAD).  The  Administra- 
tion's FY  1985  budget  request  of  $50 
million  reflects  a  difficult  balance  between 
support  for  IFAD's  programs  and  the 
reality  of  budget  constraints.  The  re- 
quested contribution  would  bring  our  pay- 
ment for  the  first  replenishment  to  $90 
million  out  of  a  total  $180  million  pledged 
by  the  United  States  and  authorized  in 
1981  by  Congress. 

IFAD's  twin  purposes  are  to  engage 
the  OPEC  countries  with  Western  donors 
in  a  significant  development  effort  and  to 
focus  international  development  assist- 
ance on  increasing  food  production  in  the 
poorer  developing  countries.  The  fund's 
activities  are  directed  specifically  at  small 
farmers  and  the  landless  poor  through 
concessional  loans  and  grants  for  projects 
which  are  concentrated  in  food  deficit 
countries. 

U.S.  support  for  IFAD  reflects  the 
Administration's  continuing  commitment 
to  the  agricultural  development  objective 
enunciated  at  Cancun,  as  well  as  the  con- 
cern the  Administration  shares  with  the 
Congress  and  other  groups  that  U.S.  eco- 
nomic assistance  support  programs  that 
directly  benefit  needy  people  in  develop- 
ing countries.  IFAD  serves  four  inter- 
related U.S.  interests: 

•  Promoting  agricultural  develop- 
ment in  the  poorer  countries; 

•  Engaging  OPEC  in  constructive 
economic  cooperation  wdth  the  West; 

•  Stimulating  greater  opportunities 
for  private  sector  initiative  on  the  part 
of  small  farmers;  and 

•  Improving  relations  with  the  devel- 
oping nations  as  a  group  by  supporting  a 
practical  international  effort  in  which  less 
developed  countries  participate. 

UN  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF).  An 

FY  1985  request  of  $27  million  for 
UNICEF  is  necessary  to  respond  to  the 
needs  of  children  and  mothers  in  develop- 
ing countries.  UNICEF  is  unique  in  pro- 
viding long-term  humanitarian  develop- 
ment assistance  for  children,  maximizing 
popular  participation  and  self-help  efforts 
at  the  village  level.  It  does  this  in 
cooperation  with  the  host  country  govern- 
ment and  often  with  bilateral  and  other 
multilateral  cfrganizations.  UNICEF  pro- 
vides training  at  the  local  level,  supplies 
and  equipment  for  projects,  and  advocacy 
for  poor  children  on  an  international  level. 


UNITED   NATIONS 


We  strongly  support  UNICEF's  ma- 
jor international  initiative— to  promote  a 
health  revolution  for  children.  Under  this 
program,  UNICEF  is  coordinating  the  ef- 
forts of  multilateral  and  bilateral  donors, 
developing  country  governments,  and 
local  communities  to  promote  the  adop- 
tion of  medical  techniques  designed  to 
reduce  child  mortality.  These  techniques 
involve  low-cost,  heat-stable  vaccines,  oral 
rehydration  therapy  for  diarrhea,  the  use 
of  infant  growth  charts  to  detect 
malnutrition,  the  promotion  of  breast 
feeding,  and  the  spacing  of  children.  This 
approach  reinforces  our  bilateral  develop- 
mental efforts. 

International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA).  Concern  over  the 
dangers  to  world  peace  of  further  pro- 
liferation of  nuclear  weapons  has  inten- 
sified the  focus  on  IAEA's  vital  safe- 
guards, which  play  a  central  role  in  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty.  The  United 
States  continues  to  take  steps  to 
strengthen  the  agency's  role  in  the  ap- 
plication of  international  safeguards  to 
prevent  the  diversion  of  nuclear  materials 
from  peaceful  to  military  purposes.  The 
developing  countries— over  two-thirds  of 
the  membership— do  not  fully  share  this 
emphasis.  Theii-  primary  interest  is  the 
IAEA's  technical  assistance  program. 
Our  proposed  $20.5  million  voluntai^  con- 
tribution is  designed  to  help  fund  both 
programs,  thus  maintaining  an  overall 
balance  in  order  to  sustain  the  developing 
countries'  request  for  a  $3,686  million  FY 
1984  supplemental  appropriation  for 
IAEA  also  is  required  to  maintain  this 
overall  balance. 

OAS  Development  Assistance  Pro- 
g^ram.  The  OAS  is  a  valuable  institution 
through  which  we  promote  important  na- 
tional interests  in  this  hemisphere— in 
particular,  political  solidarity  and  col- 
laboration, the  enhancement  of  human 
rights,  and  containment  of  conflict 
through  peacekeeping.  Although  the 
other  member  countries  are  concerned 
with  the  same  issues,  they  tend  to  be 
preoccupied  with  theii*  own  economic 
development.  Consequently  they  tend  to 
assess  our  commitment  to  inter-American 
solidarity  in  large  part  by  the  level  of 
our  support  for  OAS  economic  develop- 
ment programs. 

We  believe  that  the  requested  $15.5 
million  is  a  meaningful  contribution  to 
Latin  American  development  needs  and 
will  be  seen  as  a  testimony  to  U.S.  leader- 
ship. These  monies  should  ensure  that  the 
United  States  will  continue  to  influence 
the  use  of  OAS  funds  and  preserve  our 


86 


leadership  in  the  development  field 
throughout  the  hemisphere.  It  is  worthy 
of  note  that  the  more  developed  countries 
in  the  region  have  begun  to  assume  more 
of  the  development  burden  and  are 
strengthening  thereby  cooperation  among 
the  member  countries. 

UN  Environment  Program  (UNEP). 

The  United  States  was  an  initial  sup- 
porter of  UNEP's  ci-eation  in  1972  and 
contributed  some  30%  of  its  total 
resources  for  the  1978-82  period.  Most 
UNEP  programs  are  devoted  to  global 
environmental  problems  in  which  the 
United  States  has  fundamental  interests 
but  which  by  their  nature  require  a 
multilateral  approach.  These  problems  in- 
clude pollution  in  rivers  and  oceans,  ac- 
cumulation of  carbon  dioxide  in  the  at- 
mosphere, possible  depletion  of  the  strat- 
ospheric ozone  layer,  desertifica- 
tion, and  deforestation.  UNEP  is  an  im- 
portant mechanism  for  stimulating  and 
orchestrating  action  on  such  problems. 

A  $3  million  U.S.  contribution  to  this 
program  will  allow  developing  countries 
to  take  advantage  of  UNEP's  efforts  to 
build  environmental  safeguards  into  new- 
development  projects  and  promote  ra- 
tional resource  management.  In  the  long 
run,  the  United  States  will  be  a  prime 
beneficiary  of  the  support  we  give  UNEP 
today. 

World  Meteorological  Organization 
(WMO)  Voluntary  Cooperation  Pro- 
gram. The  global  operation  of  the  World 
Weather  Watch  of  the  WMO  Voluntary 
Cooperation  Program  is  of  direct  benefit 
to  the  United  States.  Before  its  establish- 
ment, adequate  weather  data  had  been 
unavailable  from  over  80%  of  the  Earth's 
surface— primarily  the  oceans  and  the 
developing  countries.  Data  from  these 
areas  are  becoming  available  as  a  result  of 
the  Voluntary  Cooperation  Program  ef- 
forts and  are  being  used  to  help  improve 
forecasts  of  short-range  precipitation  and 
temperature,  as  well  as  long-term 
weather  patterns.  The  information  is  used 
by  the  general  public,  civilian  industries, 
and  our  defense  establishment.  The  data 
from  this  program  are  also  used  for 
research  purposes  to  improve  the  opera- 
tional system  and  to  help  predict  climate 
fluctations. 

The  program  supports  the  participa- 
tion of  developing  countries  in  the  pro- 
gram by  providing  and  installing  equip- 
ment and  training  personnel  to  operate  it. 
The  request  of  $2  million  will  sustain  this 
work. 


UN  Capital  Development  Fund 

(UNCDF).  Established  to  promote  small 
scale  local  industries  and  production 
within  developing  countries  by  applying 
the  most  appropriate  technology', 
UNCDF  provides  financing  for  those 
projects  considered  too  small  for  external 
private  or  multilateral  bank  attention. 
UNCDF  projects  are  relatively  small  in 
order  to  enlist  the  widest  local  participa- 
tion and  make  maximum  use  of  local 
resources,  giving  beneficiaries  increased 
motivation  and  early  results.  UNCDF 
welcomes  the  cooperation  of  private 
enterprise  in  the  development  process  as 
exemplified  by  Libby's  involvement  with 
a  UNCDF-financed  small-holder 
asparagus  project  in  Lesotho.  We  are  re- 
questing $2  million  as  the  U.S.  contribu- 
tion to  UNCDF  in  FY  1985. 

UN  Education  and  Training  Pro- 
gram for  Southern  Africa  (UNETPSA). 

We  are  requesting  $1  million  for  this  pro- 
gram, which  supports  the  peaceful  transi- 
tion of  southern  Africa  to  majority  rule,  a 
major  U.S.  interest.  Scholarships  are  of- 
fered at  secondary  and  university  levels 
to  black  students  denied  access  to  such 
education  in  their  homelands.  Many  of  th 
grantees  study  in  the  United  States. 
Their  training  here  and  in  other  Western 
countries  should  enable  them  to  obtain 
firsthand  impressions  of  Western  con- 
cepts and  ideals  in  action— concepts  whicl 
will  later  assist  them  to  assume  responsi- 
ble positions  in  government,  business, 
and  education. 

UN  Voluntarj'  Fund  for  the  Decade 
for  Women  (VFDFW).  This  specialized 
fund  supports  projects  which  benefit  the 
most  economically  disadvantaged  women 
in  the  least  developed  countries.  The  em- 
phasis is  on  activities  which  improve 
women's  income-generating  skills  and 
thus  their  ability  to  contribute  to  the  wel 
being  of  their  families,  communities,  and 
countries.  U.S.  support  of  these  activitie; 
identified  us  with  the  social  and  economic 
advancement  of  women  worldwide  and  n 
inforces  our  bilateral  policy  to  encourage 
their  intergration  in  overall  development 

The  fund  sponsors  a  diversity  of  proj 
ects  which  include  community  shops,  fue' 
and  energj'  development  training,  brick 
industry'  for  rural  women,  and  marketing 
of  handicrafts.  A  $500,000  U.S.  contribu- 
tion to  the  fund  in  FY  1985  will  help  sus- 
tain and  expand  this  wide  range  of  proj- 
ects. 


ji 


ie 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


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ecade 


pills- 


Convention  on  International  Trade 
I  Endangered  Species  (CITES).  This 
!00,000  request  will  largely  cover  the 
.S.  targeted  portion  of  the  CITES  secre- 
iriat's  1984-85  biennial  budget.  This  con- 
ibution  will  support  international 
ildlife  conservation  measures.  CITES  is 
le  preeminent  wildlife  conservation  trea- 
.  It  has  established  machinery  for  pro- 
cting  endangered  species  of  flora  and 
una  against  overexploitation  through  in- 
iSj  imational  trade.  The  United  States 
IF     ayed  a  leading  role  in  the  creation  of 
ITES. 

UNIDO  Industrial  Investment  Pro- 
otion  Service.  The  investment  promo- 
on  service  of  UNIDO  was  founded  in 
)78  to  train  officials  from  developing 
mntries  in  attracting  private  investment 
ipital  for  industrial  facilities  in  their 
Dme  countries.  The  service  serves  U.S. 
terests  in  several  ways.  It  promotes  the 
ie  of  private  investment  capital  in  the 
-ocess  of  industrial  development.  It  pro- 
des  potential  U.S.  investors  with  a  se- 
ction of  opportunities  in  the  developing 
>untnes.  Finally,  it  stimulates  the 
■•ivate  sector  in  developing  countries. 

The  first  such  Investment  Promotion 
ervice  office  was  in  New  York.  The  New 
ork  office  is  the  only  one  of  seven  offices 
Dt  fully  funded  by  the  host  government. 
ur  request  for  $100,000  for  FY  1985  is  at 

same  level  as  in  FY  1984.  Additional 
jurces  of  funding  for  the  New  York  of- 
ce  include  the  UNDP,  UNIDO,  the 
^rld  Bank,  and  recipient  countries. 


In  summary,  we  believe  this  request 
)r  the  International  Organizations  and 
rograms  account  takes  into  considera- 
on  the  need  for  budgetary  stringency 
et  protects  our  political,  economic,  and 
jcurity  interests.  We  believe  continued 
f.S.  support  for  the  programs  of  the  ac- 
3unt  is  vital  to  the  leadership  role  our 
ation  should  play  in  the  multilateral  and 
itemational  arenas.  We  hope  the  Con- 
ress  and  this  committee  agree  and  wUl 
.  upport  the  full  request. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
ill  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
vailable  from  the  Superintendent  of 
•ocuments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  princiijles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Buenos 
Aires  .July  7.  1981.' 

Nfltificatiun  of  approvaL  South  Africa,  Mar.  1, 
1984forXI-lt7xi-3. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally,  Oct.  1,  1983. 
Notifications  of  provisional  applicatinn 
HepnsiteH-  Honduras,  Sept.  22,  1983;  Nigeria, 
Peru,  Sept.  29,  1983. 

Ratifirations  rippositer)-  Burundi,  Jan.  6,  1984; 
Colombia,  Dec.  21.  1983;  Cyprus,  Jan.  13,  1984; 
Indonesia,  Trinidad  &  Tobago,  Sept.  29,  1983; 
Nicaragua,  Sept.  23,  19^3;  Peru,  Dec.  20,  1983; 
U.K.,  Dec.  22,  1983.^ 

Commodities-Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund  for 
Commodities.  Done  at  Geneva  June  27,  1980.' 
Ratifications  dCTiositeri:  Nicaragua,  Mar.  5, 
1984;  Western  Samoa,  Mar.  6,  1984. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  en- 
dangered species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora,  with 
appendices.  Done  at  Washington  Mar.  3,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  July  1,  1975.  TIAS  8249. 
Acce.ssions  deposited:  Benin,  Feb.  1984; 
Trinidad  &  Tobago,  Jan.  19,  1984. 

Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 1973, 
on  international  trade  in  endangered  species  of 
wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  8249).  Adopted  at 
Bonn  June  22,  1979.' 
Accession  HepositeH!  Panama,  Oct.  28,  1983. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  civil  aspects  of  international 
child  abduction.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct.  25, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  1,  1983.^ 
Extended:  By  Canada  to  Nova  Scotia,  May  1, 
1984." 

Marine  Pollution 

Protocol  relating  to  intervention  on  the  high 
seas  in  cases  of  pollution  by  substances  other 
than  oil.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  30,  1983.  TIAS  10561. 
Ratification  deposited:  Denmark,  May  9,  1983. 
Accession  deposited:  Australia,  Nov.  7,  1983.' 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 

convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution  from 

ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  1978. 

Entered  into  force  Oct.  2,  1983. 

Approval  deposited:  Netherlands,  '•'  June  30, 

1983. 

Accessions  deposited-  China,*  July  1,  1983; 

Finland,  Sept.  20,  1983;  Israel,*  Aug.  31,  1983; 

Lebanon,  July  18,  1983;  Saint  Vincent  &  the 

Grenadines,  Oct.  28,  1983;  U.S.S.R.*  Nov.  3, 

1983. 


Nuclear  Material— Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 
nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vien- 
na Oct.  26,  1979.' 
Signature:  Australia,  Feb.  22, 1984. 

Organization  of  American  States 

Charter  of  the  Organization  of  American 
SUtes.  Signed  at  BogoU  Apr.  30,  1948. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  13,  1951.  TIAS  2361. 

Protocol  of  Amendment  to  the  Charter  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States.  Signed  at 
Buenos  Aires  Feb.  27,  1%7.  Entered  into  force 
Feb,  27,  1970.  TIAS  6847. 
Signature  and  ratification  deposited-  Saint 
Christopher-Nevis,  Mar.  12,  1984. 

Prisoner  Transfer 

Convention  on  the  tran.sfer  of  sentenced  per- 
sons. Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21,  1983.' 
Signature-  Cyprus,  Feb.  27,  1984. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of 

all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Adopted  at 

New  York  Dec.  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force 

Jan.  4,  1969.3 

Notification  of  succession:  Suriname,  Mar.  15, 

1984. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the  protection 
of  victims  of  international  armed  conflicts  (Pro- 
tocol I),  with  annexes.  Adopted  at  Geneva 
June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.= 
Accessions  deposited:  Bolivia,  Dec.  8,  1983; 
Costa  Rica,  Dec.  15,  1983. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the  protection 
of  victims  of  nonintemational  armed  conflicts 
(Protocol  II).  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.= 
Accessions  deposited:  Bolivia,  Dec.  8,  1983; 
Costa  Rica,  Dec.  15,  1983;  France,  Feb.  24, 
1984.' 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London  Nov. 
1,  1974.  Entered  into  force  May  24,  1980.  TIAS 
9700. 

Ratification  deposited:  Portugal,  Nov.  7  1983. 
Approval  deposited:  Bulgaria,  Nov.  2,  1983. 
Accessions  deposited-  Algeria,  Nov.  3,  1983; 
Australia,  Aug.  17,  1983;  Jamaica,  Oct.  14, 
1983;  Ireland,  Lebanon,  Nov.  29,  1983; 
Malaysia,  Oct.  19,  1983;  Saint  Vincent  &  the 
Grenadines,  Oct.  28,  1983;  Sri  Lanka,  Aug.  .30, 
1983;  United  Arab  Emirates,  Dec.  15,  1983. 

Trade 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  Article  VII 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade,  with  protocol  (customs  valuation).  Done 
at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979,  and  Nov.  1,  1981. 
TIAS  10402. 
Acceptance:  Malawi,  Nov.  22,  1983* 


WMamL. 


87 


TREATIES 


Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regarding 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec.  20,  1973, 
a«  extended  (TIAS  7840,  8939).  Done  at 
Geneva  Dec.  22,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
1,  1982.  TIAS  10323. 

Accfptancp  depo.sitpd:  Dominican  Republic, 
Feb.  9,  1984. 

Weapons 

Convention  on  prohibitions  or  restrictions  on 
the  use  of  certain  conventional  weapons  which 
may  be  deemed  to  be  excessively  injurious  or 
to  have  indiscriminate  effects,  with  annexed 
protocols.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  10,  1980. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  2,  1983.^ 
Ratification  and  acceptance  deposited:  India, 
Mar.  1,  1984. 

Wheat 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
wheat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered  in- 
to force  July  1,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Portugal,  Mar.  28,  1984. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 

discrimination  against  women.  Done  at  New 

York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  3, 

1981.3 

Apcpssinn  rippnaitpd-  Kenya,  Mar.  9,  1984. 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Feb. 
28,  1978,  {TIAS  8995)  regarding  management 
and  operation  of  the  Joint  Geological  and 
Geophysical  Research  Station  at  Alice  Springs, 
Australia.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Canberra  Feb.  17,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  17, 1984. 

Bahamas 

Agreement  concerning  relief  from  double  taxa- 
tion on  earnings  derived  from  the  operation  of 
ships  and  aircraft.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Nassau  Dec.  13,  1983,  and  Jan.  18, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  18,  1984. 

Belgium 

Agreement  concerning  the  status  of  a  U.S. 
ground-launched  cruise  missile  (GLCM)  unit  to 
be  located  in  Belgium.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Brussels  Feb.  13,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  13,  1984. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Feb.  19,  1981,  on  maritime 
transport  (TIAS  10098).  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Sofia  Feb.  7  and  13,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  13,  1984. 

Canada 

Understanding  on  safeguards  relating  to  pro- 
cedures under  Article  XIX  of  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  with  related 
letter.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  Feb.  17,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  17,  1984. 


Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Sept. 
21,  1972,  on  the  establishment  of  a 
Canada-U.S.  committee  on  water  quality  in  the 
St.  John  River  (TIAS  7470),  with  annex.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa  Feb.  22, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  22,  1984. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  renewing  the  agreement  of 
September  22,  1980,  relating  to  trade  in  cot- 
ton, wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex- 
tile products,  with  annex.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  San  Jose  Feb.  7,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  7,  1984;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1984. 

Agreement  renewing  agreement  of  Sept.  22, 
1980,  on  a  consultative  mechanism  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  tex- 
tiles and  textile  products,  with  annex.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  San  Jose  Feb.  7,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  7,  1984;  effective 
Jan.  1, 1984. 

Egypt 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  June  7, 
1974  (TIAS  7855).  Signed  at  Cairo  Jan.  23, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  23,  1984. 

Greece 

Air  transport  services  agreement,  as  amended. 
Signed  at  Athens  Mar.  27,  1946.  Entered  into 
force  May  22,  1947.  TIAS  1626,  5982,  6606. 
Notice  of  termination:  Given  by  Greece,  Feb. 
7,  1984;  effective  Feb.  7,  1985. 

Hungary 

Agreement  extending  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  May  20,  1972,  as  amended  and  extend- 
ed (TIAS  7577,  8096,  10704).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Budapest  Dec.  28,  1983,  and 
Feb.  22,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  22, 
1984;  effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Feb. 
15  and  25,  1983,  relating  to  trade  in  wool  tex- 
tile products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Budapest  Feb.  13  and  24",  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  24,  1984. 

Japan 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  May  2, 
1975,  as  extended,  concerning  an  international 
observer  scheme  for  whaling  operations  from 
land  stations  in  the  North  Pacific  Ocean  (TIAS 
8088).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo 
Mar.  16,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  16, 
1984. 

Agreement  continuing  in  effect  the  agreement 
of  Dec.  19,  1980,  (TIAS  9961)  relating  to 
government  procurement  in  the  field  of 
telecommunications,  with  related  letters.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
Jan.  30.  1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  30,  1984; 
effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Madagascar 

Agreement  for  sale  of  agricultural  commodi- 
ties, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug.  19,  1981 
(TIAS  10218).  Signed  at  Antananarivo  Mar.  7, 
1984. 


Mexico 

Agreement  extending  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  Aug.  15, 1960,  as  extended  and 
amended  (TIAS  4675,  7167),  and  the  agree- 
ment of  Jan.  20,  1978,  relating  to  reduced  air 
fares  and  charter  air  service  (TIAS  10115).  Ef-' 
fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico  Dec.  13 
and  16,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  16,  1983; 
effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
July  31,  1970,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAJ 
6941,  7927),  for  a  cooperative  meteorological 
program  in  Mexico.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  Jan.  26  and 
Feb.  10,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  10, 
1984;  effective  Feb.  1,  1984. 

New  Zealand 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  27,  1974,  (TIAS  7806)  for  scientific  and 
technological  cooperation.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Feb.  27,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  27,  1984. 

Papua  New  Guinea 

Air  transport  agreement.  Signed  at  Port 
Moresby  Mar.  30,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
June  27,  1979.  TIAS  9520. 
Notice  of  termination:  Given  by  Papua  New 
Guinea,  Feb.  6,  1984;  effective  Feb.  9,  1985. 

Peru 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  r 
scheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guaran- 
teed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Government 
and  its  agencies,  with  implementing  agree- 
ment. Signed  at  Lima  Nov.  29,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  9,  1984. 

St.  Christopher-Nevis 

Agreement  for  the  furnishing  of  commodities 
and  services  in  connection  with  the  peacekee 
ing  force  for  Grenada.  Effected  by  exchange 
notes  at  St.  John's  and  Basseterre  Jan.  19  an 
20,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  20,  1984. 

Somalia 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Mar.  2 
1978  (TIAS  9222).  Signed  at  Mogadishu 
Feb.  29,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  29, 
1984. 

Spain 

General  security  of  military  information  agrt 
ment,  with  protocol  on  security  procedures  f 
industrial  operations  with  appendices.  Signei 
at  Washington  Mar.  12,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  12,  1984 

Sudan 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guara 
teed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Government 
and  its  agencies.  Signed  at  Khartoum  Jan.  21 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  27,  1984. 


88 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


CHRONOLOGY 


Swaziland 

J '^^"lAgreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
international  military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  program.  Effected  by  e.xchange  of 
notes  at  Mbabane  Jan.  10  and  Feb.  28,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  28,  1984. 

Sweden 

Joint  letter  from  the  Government  of  Sweden 
Tu  ind  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to 
- .    the  Director  General  of  the  General  Agree- 
,, ,'   nent  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  concerning  restric- 
,,1     tions  on  imports  of  specialty  steel,  with  note 
II     md  anne.xes.  Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  20, 

1983.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  20,  1983. 

Switzerland 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  in- 
jjj   ;erim  measures  on  air  transport  services,  with 
,.     mnexes.  Signed  at  Davos  Mar.  13,  1984. 
UJI  Entered  into  force  Mar.  13,  1984. 

t'ugoslavia 

i\greement  amending  and  extending  the 
,  agreement  of  Oct.  26  and  27,  1978,  as  amended 
,j  ind  extended  (TIAS  9447,  10041),  concerning 
;rade  in  men's  and  boys'  wool  and  manmade 
'iber  suits.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Belgrade  Feb.  21  and  27,  1984.  Entered  into 
brce  Feb.  27,  1984. 


Lh 


'%t 


m 


•Not  in  force. 

^Applicable  to  the  Bailiwicks  of  Guernsey 
and  Jersey. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

"With  reservation(s)  and  declaration(s). 

=With  declaration. 

«Does  not  accept  optional  Annexes  III,  IV, 
.nd  V  of  the  1973  convention.  ■ 


United  Kingdom 

Agreement  on  social  security.  Signed  at 
London  Feb.  13,  1984.  Enters  into  force  on  the 
irst  day  of  the  second  month  following  the 
Tionth  in  which  each  government  has  received 
"rom  the  other  written  notification  that  all 
statutory  and  constitutional  requirements 
have  been  complied  with,  e.xcept  Part  III  shall 

nter  into  force  on  the  first  day  of  the  thirty- 
sixth  month  after  entry  into  force  of  other 

arts  of  the  agreement. 

Administrative  agreement  for  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  agreement  on  social  security  of 
Feb.  13,  1984.  Signed  at  London  Feb.  13,  1984. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  entry  into 
'orce  of  agreement  of  Feb.  13,  1984. 


March  1984 


March  1 

At  the  conclusion  of  2  days  of  talks  in 
Damascus  between  Presidents  Gemayel  and 
Assad,  Syria's  official  news  agency  describes' 
the  two  leaders  as  being  in  complete  agree- 
ment on  the  ways  and  means  of  reinforcing 
Lebanon's  Arab  unity,  identity,  and  independ- 
ence. 

Following  the  PLO  chairman's  visit  to  Am- 
man, King  Hussein  and  PLO  leader  Arafat 
issue  a  joint  statement  on  ways  to  coordinate 
policies  on  regaining  the  occupied  West  Bank 
from  Israel. 

At  the  donors'  meeting,  the  U.S.  pledges 
$2  million  to  the  UN  program  of  humanitarian 
assistance  to  the  Kampuchean  people.  This 
pledge  brings  the  U.S.  contribution  to  $4 
million  so  far  in  1984. 

March  2 

Lebanese  and  Syrian  officials  say  the  under- 
standing reached  by  Presidents  Gemayel  and 
Assad  calls  for  cancellation  of  the  troop  with- 
drawal accord  Lebanon  reached  with  Israel  on 
May  17,  1983,  the  resumption  of  Lebanese 
political  reconciliation  talks,  and  the  formation 
of  a  government  of  national  unity  that  would 
include  all  major  political  factions.  The  final 
decision  on  cancelling  the  May  17  agreement 
awaits  Lebanon's  official  consultations  with 
the  U.S.  and  Israel. 

In  an  address  to  the  Supreme  Soviet, 
General  Secretary  Chemenko  urges  the  U.S. 
to  take  actions  that  would  signal  a  start  of  a 
drastic  change  in  U.S.-Soviet  relations.  As  ex- 
amples he  cites  U.S.  ratification  of  two 
treaties— the  limitation  of  underground  nuclear 
weapons  tests  and  nuclear  explosions  for 
peaceful  purposes.  He  also  poses  the 
possibilities  of  concluding  treaties  banning 
nuclear  tests,  renouncing  the  militarization  of 
outer  space,  freezing  nuclear  weapons,  and 
banning  chemical  weapons.  Chemenko  also  at- 
tacks as  U.S.  policy  blatant  militarism,  claims 
to  world  dominance,  resistance  to  progress, 
and  violations  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  of 
the  people,  including  the  "invasion"  of 
Lebanon,  the  occupation  of  Grenada,  and  the 
undeclared  war  against  Nicaragua. 

Vice  President  Umer  al-Tayeb  of  Sudan 
meets  with  Vice  President  Bush  and  Secretary 
Shultz  in  Washington. 

At  the  request  of  some  Central  American 
governments,  a  U.S.  team  travels  to  Central 
America  in  early  March  to  discuss  technical 
aspects  of  security  issues  with  representatives 
on  the  security  working  commission. 

White  House  announces  that  the  U.S.  will 
contribute  $19  million  toward  completion  of 
the  airport  at  Point  Salines  as  an  aid  to  the 
revitalization  of  Grenada's  tourist  industry  and 
agricultural  and  industrial  development. 

March  3-6 

West  German  Chancellor  Kohl  makes  an  of 
ficial  working  visit  to  Washington. 


March  4 

As  fighting  continues  along  the  Iran-Iraq 
border,  Iran  accuses  Iraq  of  using  chemical 
weapons  and  asks  the  UN  to  begin  an  in- 
vestigation. There  is  no  independent  confirma- 
tion of  the  accusation. 

March  5 

Lebanon  formally  announces  its  decision  to 
cancel  its  May  17  troop  withdrawal  agreement 
with  Israel.  U.S.  expresses  regret  over  the 
decision  and  states  that  "tho.se  who  were 
responsible  for  the  rejection  of  the  agreement 
must  now  bear  the  responsibility  to  find  an 
alternative  negotiated  formula  to  bring  about 
Israeli  withdrawal."  At  the  same  time,  the 
U.S.  does  not  intend  to  abandon  the  people  or 
legitimate  Government  of  Lebanon;  diplomatic 
efforts  will  continue  with  the  aim  of  ending  the 
fighting  and  reaching  a  political  solution  to 
Lebanon's  conflicts. 

U.S.  states  that  available  evidence  in- 
dicates Iraq  has  used  lethal  chemical  weapons 
against  Iran  and  "strongly  condemns  the  pro- 
hibited use  of  chemical  weapons  wherever  it 
occurs.  There  can  be  no  justification  for  their 
use  by  any  country."  U.S.  also  calls  on  Iran  to 
"put  an  end  to  the  bloodshed"  and  finds  the 
Iranian  regime's  "intransigent  refusal  to 
deviate  from  its  avowed  objective  of  elimi- 
nating the  legitimate  government  of  neigh- 
boring Iraq  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  ac- 
cepted norms  of  behavior  among  nations." 

Warsaw  Pact  countries  propose  talks  with 
NATO  members  on  a  mutual  commitment  not 
to  increase  military  spending. 

March  6 

Lebanese  Government  formally  invites  Chris- 
tian and  Muslim  political  leaders  to  a  recon- 
ciliation conference  to  be  reconvened  in 
Switzerland. 

ICAO  Governing  Council  condemns  the 
Soviet  Union  for  shooting  down  a  Korean 
civilian  airliner  last  September,  killing  269  peo- 
ple. It  adopts  a  U.S.  resolution  of  a  report  that 
found  Soviet  authorities  did  not  trj'  hard 
enough  to  identify  the  airliner  and  that  the 
plane  was  not  on  a  spy  mission.  It  also  rebukes 
the  Soviets  for  withholding  information  from 
ICAO  investigators. 

Defense  Department  announces  that  the 
U.S.S.  Independence  and  several  escort 
vessels  will  soon  leave  the  coast  of  Lebanon  to 
participate  in  NATO  exercises  in  the  North 
Atlantic.  One  aircraft  carrier,  the  U.S.S.  John 
F.  Kennedy,  will  remain  in  the  area. 

Canadian  environmental  officials  make 
public  their  decision  to  proceed  independently 
to  try  to  cut  industrial  emissions  linked  to  acid- 
rain  pollution  by  50%  in  the  next  decade. 

UN  Human  Rights  Commission  adopts  a 
convention  outlawing  torture  that  establishes 
a  "universal  jurisdiction"  for  the  crime  of  tor- 
ture. A  state  which  becomes  a  party  to  the 
convention  will  have  the  choice  of  prosecuting 
torturers  or  extraditing  them  to  another  coun- 
try for  prosecution.  The  convention  states  that 
torture  cannot  be  justified  by  a  state  of  war  or 
other  national  emergency,  that  statements  ob- 
tained through  torture  cannot  be  used  as 


May  1984 


89 


Tf  f«f  ffmuimiiH 


iiiiuiiimiiHmiiiMiiW 


CHRONOLOGY 


evidence,  and  that  law  enforcement  and 
medical  personnel,  public  officials,  and  others 
involved  in  the  custody,  interrogation,  or 
treatment  of  individuals  subjected  to  arrest, 
detention,  or  imprisonment  should  be  educated 
and  informed  regarding  the  prohibition  of  tor- 
ture. 

March? 

Syria's  Cabinet  resigns,  and  President  Assad 
asks  the  outgoing  Prime  Minister  to  form  a 
new  government. 

March  8 

The  Administration  asks  Congress  to  approve 
a  strategic  defense  initiative  that  would  ex- 
plore recent  advances  in  technology  aimed  a 
providing  an  effective  defense  against  ballistic 
missiles.  The  program  focuses  on  e.\isting 
research  and  development  totaling  nearly  $1.8 
billion  in  FY  1985  in  five  technology  areas  and 
an  additional  $250  million  that  would  augment 
existing  efforts  and  exploit  other  new 
technological  opportunities. 

White  House  announces  the  Administra- 
tion has  decided  to  seek  $93  million  in  military 
assistance  for  El  Salvador  by  supporting  an 
amendment  to  appropriation  legislation  now 
before  the  Senate.  The  Administration 
beheves  the  aid  is  urgently  needed  to  provide 
the  necessary  security  for  the  electoral  process 
in  El  Salvador  beginning  with  the  March  25 
presidential  election.  The  $93  million  is  part  of 
an  earlier  supplemental  budget  request  of  $179 
million. 

Senate  Appropriations  Committee  rejects 
an  Administration  proposal  to  provide  $21 
million  in  additional  aid  for  Nicaraguan  rebel 
forces. 

UN  Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar 
announces  that  a  group  of  experts  will  go  to 
Iran  under  UN  auspices  to  investigate  Iran's 
allegations  that  Iraq  is  using  chemical 
weapons. 

March  9 

U.S.  officials  say  U.S.  military  activity  in  Cen- 
tral America  is  being  increased  to  include  new- 
small-scale  military  maneuvers  in  Honduras, 
increasing  the  number  of  U.S.  military  ad- 
visers in  Honduras  to  1,700,  and  arming  U.S. 
advisers  in  El  Salvador  with  heavier  weapons 
to  protect  themselves.  These  actions  are  being 
taken,  says  Department  spokesman  Hughes, 
because  "we  think  it  is  clear  that  the  guer- 
rillas, or  at  least  segments  within  them,  wish 
to  see  the  [presidential]  elections  take  place 
within  an  atmosphere  of  terrorism." 

In  remarks  to  the  UN  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission, U.S.  representative  Schifter  accuses 
the  Soviet  Union  of  continuing  its  practice  of 
racism  against  ethnic  minorities  within  its 
borders.  As  examples,  he  lists  the  forced  exile 
of  the  Crimean  Tatars;  the  attempted  "Russifi- 
cation"  of  the  Estonian,  Latvian,  and  Lithua- 
nian peoples;  and  the  government-sponsored 
policy  of  anti-Semitism  against  Soviet  Jews. 


March  10 

In  a  letter  to  the  chairmen  of  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  and  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committees,  Secretary  Shultz  opposes  pro- 
posed bills  mandating  a  move  of  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  Israel  from  Tel  Aviv  to  Jerusalem. 

March  11 

A  new  Cabinet  and  three  new  vice  presidents 
are  appointed  in  Syria. 

South  Africa  proposes  convening  a  regional 
peace  conference  of  representatives  of  the 
South  African  Government,  various  poUtical 
parties  in  Namibia,  the  Namibian  insurgents 
based  in  Angola,  and  the  South  African-backed 
guerrilla  forces  opposed  to  the  Angolan 
Government.  The  idea  is  rejected  by  the 
Angolan  Government  and  Namibian  in- 
surgents. 

March  12 

Lebanese  reconciliation  talks  reconvene  in 
Lausanne.  Participants  include  the  Lebanese 
Government  and  eight  senior  Lebanese 
Muslim  and  Christian  leaders;  Syria  and  Saudi 
Arabia  are  represented  by  observers. 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  says 
of  South  Africa's  proposed  peace  conference 
that  the  U.S.  prefers  to  continue  seeking  a 
solution  to  the  problems  in  southern  Africa 
through  the  step-by-step  approach  now  under- 
way, which  is  to  culminate  in  independence  for 
Namibia  under  a  UN  plan. 

In  remarks  made  during  a  meeting  with 
the  West  German  opposition  leader,  Soviet 
General  Secretary  Chernenko  says  that  talks 
with  the  U.S.  on  limiting  strategic  and 
medium-range  nuclear  weapons  can  be  re- 
sumed if  the  U.S.  removes  the  "obstacles 
which  it  created  by  fielding  its  new  missiles  in 
Europe."  The  State  Department  rejects  the 
Soviet  contention  that  the  U.S.  has  created 
"obstacles"  and  states  that  "we  have  made 
clear  that  we  are  prepared  to  halt,  modify,  or 
reverse  U.S.  long-range  INF  missile 
deployments  if  any  equitable  agreement  can  be 
reached." 

President  Reagan  and  Secretary  Shultz 
meet  with  Foreign  Ministers  Edgardo  Paz 
Bamaica  of  Honduras  and  Carlos  Jose  Gutier- 
rez of  Costa  Rica  in  Washington. 

Soviet  Union  and  China  open  a  new  round 
of  discussions  on  the  normalization  of  their 
relations. 

Joao  Clemente  Baena  Soares  of  Brazil  is 
elected  Secretary  General  of  the  OAS. 

St.  Christopher-Nevis  is  admitted  to  the 
OAS  as  the  32d  member. 

March  13-16 

President  Mario  Soares  of  Portugal  makes  an 
official  working  visit  to  Washington. 

March  13 

Lebanese  leaders,  meeting  in  Lausanne,  issue 
a  conference  statement  that  agreement  has 
been  reached  on  a  cease-fu-e  in  Beirut. 

In  remarks  before  the  young  leadership 
conference  of  the  United  Jewish  Appeal,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  says  "the  U.S. -Israeli  relation- 


ship has  grown  closer  than  ever  before  in 
three  critical  ways";  the  strategic  relationship 
"has  been  elevated  and  formalized,"  negotia- 
tions are  underway  "to  estabUsh  a  free  trade 
area  between  the  United  States  and  Israel," 
and  the  U.S.  "will  soon  be  giving  Israel 
military  aid  on  a  grant,  not  loan,  basis." 

Administration  officials  say  that  the  U.S. 
supports  King  Hussein's  efforts  to  create  the 
conditions  that  would  enable  Jordan  to  enter 
negotiations  with  Israel  on  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza. 

President  Kaunda  (Zambia)  offers  to  orga- 
nize a  meeting  between  officials  of  the  South 
African  Government  and  the  six  front-line 
states  in  an  effort  to  further  the  cause  of  ma- 
jority rule  in  the  region. 

Acting  State  Department  spokesman 
Romberg  says  the  U.S.  estimates  there  are 
between  2,500  and  3,500  Cuban  military  and 
security  advisers  in  Nicaragua,  up  from  the 
previous  estimate  of  2,000. 

Senate  Intelligence  Committee  approves 
an  Administration  proposal  to  provide  $21 
million  in  additional  aid  for  Nicraguan  rebel 
forces. 

UNESCO  officials  in  Paris  says  that  a  U.S 
congressional  team  could  conduct  an  investiga 
tion  of  the  organization  only  if  the  formal  re- 
quest comes  from  the  Reagan  Administration. 

UN  Human  Rights  Commission  votes  to 
publish  a  report  on  mental  health  violations 
and  to  give  it  the  widest  possible  distribution. 
The  report  covers  not  only  the  physical  and 
other  forms  of  ill-treatment  of  patients  in  men 
tal  hospitals  but  also  the  abuse  of  psychiatric 
medicine  for  poUtical  purposes,  such  as  the  in- 
ternment in  mental  institutions  of  sane 
dissidents. 

The  following  newly  appointed  am- 
bassadors present  their  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Reagan:  Doulaye  Corentin  Ki  of  Upper 
Volta;  Marcos  Martinez  Mendieta  of  Paraguay 
Wafula  Wabuge  of  Kenya;  Pengiran  Haji 
Idriss  of  Brunei;  William  Valentine  Herbet  of 
St.  Christopher-Nevis;  Kayatyani  Shankar 
Bajpai  of  India;  and  Walter  Ravenna  of 
Uruguay. 

March  14-16 

Prime  Minister  Garret  FitzGerald  of  Ireland 
makes  an  official  visit  to  Washington. 

March  14 

A  Security  Arrangements  Committee,  which 
includes  representatives  of  the  Lebanese 
Armed  Forces  and  the  principal  Lebanese 
militias,  resumes  meeting  in  Beirut  to  oversei- 
the  cease-fire  arrangements  announced  Mar. 
13  at  the  reconciliation  conference  in 
Lausanne.  Discussions  continue  in  Lausanne 
on  internal  political  reform. 

Foreign  Ministers  of  the  Arab  League, 
meeting  in  Baghdad,  pass  a  resolution  con- 
demning Iran  for  refusing  to  negotiate  with 
Iraq  and  calling  on  Iran's  suppliers  to  halt 
such  activity.  The  resolution  also  calls  for  the 
creation  of  a  seven-nation  group  of  foreign 
ministers  to  make  efforts  to  end  the  Iran-Iraq 
war. 


90 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 
-TTwmniiHi 


ffven 
o'wk 

a 

Win 


CHRONOLOGY 


In  a  published  interview,  Jordan's  King 
Hussein  says  he  will  not  participate  in  negotia- 
lions  with  Israel  and  says  the  United  States, 
because  of  its  support  for  Israel,  has  damaged 
its  credibility  as  a  mediator  in  the  Arab-Israel 
-(innict. 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  says 
htTi'  is  no  indication  that  South  Africa  is 
'.seeking  to  circumvent"  UN  Security  Council 
■Jesiilution  435  by  putting  forward  its  proposal 
(ir  a  regional  conference  on  southern  Africa. 
'In  their  joint  statement  following  their 
lamiai-y  meeting  in  Lusaka,  South  African  and 
\i!t:iilan  representatives  reaffinned  that 
_\esulution  435  remains  the  accepted  basis  for 
,  Namibia  settlement." 

Senate  Appropriations  Committee  votes  to 
pprove  $93  million  in  emergency  aid  to  El 
Salvador  and  $21  million  in  additional  aid  to 
>Jicaraguan  rebels. 

U.S.  and  23  other  industrialized  nations 
jresent  UNESCO  Director  General  with  a  Ust 
f  changes  they  would  like  that  agency  to  put 
nto  effect  this  year,  including  the  voting 
lystem  and  the  politicalization  of  issues 
)rought  before  the  agency. 

sii;  March  15 

:n  response  to  the  Mar.  14  statement  by  King 
Ilia  ilussein,  State  Department  spokesman 

rlughes  says  that  "for  over  three  decades,  the 
Jnited  States  has  followed  a  consistent  and 
principled  policy  of  promoting  Arab-Israeli 
legotiations.  Both  sides  must  know  there  is  no 
^■issibility  of  progress  toward  peace  in  the 
ibsence  of  negotiation."  He  also  states  that 
the  United  States  is  supportive  of  Jordan's 
security  and  continues  to  uphold  the  views 
utlined  in  the  President's  September  1  ini- 
iative  for  Arab-Israeli  peace,  including  our 
)osition  on  the  status  of  Jerusalem  and  on  set- 
lements.  American  support  for  Jordan  has 
aken  the  form  not  only  of  security  assistance 
)ut  also  of  action  in  times  of  stress." 

In  a  statement  on  this  "International  Day 
)f  Concern  for  Soviet  Jews,"  President 
leagan  says  the  U.S.  has  emphasized  to 
ioviet  authorities  many  times  that  it  supports 
he  right  of  Soviet  Jews  to  practice  their 
lultural  traditions  freely  and  to  emigrate  from 
he  Soviet  Union  if  they  so  choose. 

As  required  by  law,  Secretary  Shultz 
lends  a  report  to  the  Congress  on  the  Ad- 
ninistration's  efforts  to  achieve  peace  in  Cen- 
ral  America. 

UN  Human  Rights  Commission  adopts  a 
■esolution  calling  for  the  appointment  of  a 
pecial  rapporteur  with  a  mandate  to  examine 
he  human  rights  situation  in  Afghanistan.  The 
Afghan  obsei-ver  rejects  the  measure  and  in- 
licates  the  Kabul  government  will  not 
looperate  with  the  inquiry. 


tf  arch  16 

iouth  Africa  and  Mozambique  sign  a  non- 
iggression  pact  committing  both  nations  to 
jrevent  the  use  of  their  territories  by  foreign 
ir  independent  military  forces  to  commit  acts 
""^  if  terrorism  or  aggression  against  the  other. 
The  African  National  Congress  denounces  the 
jact  and  pledges  to  step  up  its  fight  against 
;he  South  African  Government. 


BylletiVlay  1984 


Bombs  are  dropped  on  Omdurman,  Sudan. 
Reports  are  that  the  aircraft  involved  was  a 
Soviet-built  TU-22  supersonic  bomber,  and 
Libya  is  the  only  country  in  the  region  known 
to  have  such  aircraft  in  its  inventory. 

In  a  statement  noting  the  resumption  of 
MBFR  talks  in  Vie:ina,  President  Reagan  urges 
the  Soviet  Union  "to  return  to  the  INF  and 
START  negotiations,  where  very  important 
work  in  the  cause  of  building  a  more  secure 
and  peaceful  world  has  been  suspended  by 
them." 

After  9  weeks  of  formal  meetings,  the  CDE 
talks  in  Stockholm  recess  for  2  months. 

U.S.  diplomat  William  Buckley  is  kidnapped 
in  Beirut.  No  one  claims  responsibility. 

March  17 

According  to  Turkish  press  reports,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  told  Turkey  that  its  increased 
military  cooperation  with  the  United  States  is 
creating  a  threat  against  Russia  and  has  asked 
whether  Turkey  is  considering  installing  cruise 
or  Pershing  missiles  on  its  soil.  In  response  a 
Turkish  Foreign  Ministry  official  states  that 
NATO  agi-eements  do  not  call  for  INF  missiles 
on  Turkish  territory. 

In  a  radio  broadcast,  the  military  leader  of 
a  major  Salvadoran  guerrilla  group  warns  that 
insurgents  would  "deepen"  the  war  before, 
during,  and  after  the  presidential  election 
scheduled  for  Mar.  25. 

March  18 

Jordan's  King  Hussein  says  that  while  his 
country  badly  needs  U.S.  weapons  and 
military  aid,  he  would  search  for  arms 
elsewhere  if  the  U.S.  terms  were  demeaning 
to  his  country. 

March  19 

In  the  wake  of  the  Mar.  16  attack  on  Omdur- 
man, Sudan,  by  a  Soviet-made  Libyan  bomber, 
State  Department  acting  spokesman  says  the 
United  States  sent  two  AWACS  planes  to 
Egypt  to  help  bolster  the  air  defense  systems 
of  Egypt  and  Sudan,  both  of  which  requested 
the  assistance.  Sudan  asks  for  an  urgent  ses- 
sion of  the  UN  Security  Council  to  consider 
the  attack. 

Presidents  Fidel  Castro  (Cuba)  and  Jose 
Eduardo  dos  Santos  (Angola)  sign  a  communi- 
que in  Havana  establishing  tei-ms  for  Cuban 
troops  to  withdraw  from  Angola.  The  terms  in- 
clude an  end  to  South  African  support  for 
Angolan  rebel  forces  and  a  South  African  com- 
mitment to  a  UN  formula  for  Namibian  in- 
dependence. 

State  Department  officials  say  that  the  ap- 
pearance of  Soviet-inspired  forgeries  and  disin- 
formation aimed  at  discrediting  the  United 
States  and  its  allies  has  increased  in  the  Third 
World,  especially  in  Africa. 

March  20 

Lebanese  reconciliation  talks  end  in  Lausanne 
with  no  agreement  on  the  principal  issues  of 
internal  reforms.  An  unsigned  conference  com- 
munique calls  for  consolidation  of  the  cease-fire 
in  Beirut  and  formation  of  a  committee  to  draft 
a  new  Lebanese  constitution. 


In  Beirut  meanwhile,  sporadic  fighting  c(m- 
tinues.  According  to  one  report,  20  people 
have  been  killed  and  80  more  have  been 
wounded  since  the  reconciliation  talks  began 
March  12. 

South  Africa  objects  to  the  Cuba-Angola 
communique  of  Mar.  19  and  asks  Angola  to 
clarify  its  attitude  toward  an  earlier  agree- 
ment with  South  Africa  concerning  the 
establishment  of  a  joint  monitoring  commission 
to  oversee  the  South  African  withdrawal  from 
Angola  in  conjunction  with  a  freeze  on  military 
operations  by  SWAPO  insurgents. 

In  a  news  conference,  Secretary  Shultz: 

•  Urges  Congress  to  act  promptly  on  the 
Administration's  request  for  $93  million  in 
emergency  military  assistance  for  El  Salvador; 

•  Says  the  United  States  will  remain  en- 
gaged in  the  search  for  peace,  security,  and 
stability  in  the  Middle  East; 

•  Describes  the  Iran-Iraq  war  as  a  huge 
tragedy  for  both  sides; 

•  Praises  the  Mar.  16  South  Africa- 
Mozambique  nonaggression  pact  as  an  historic 
event  and  positive  sign; 

•  Denounces  Libya  for  its  pattern  of 
behavior  in  Africa  and  elsewhere;  and 

•  Says  there  is  no  indication  the  Soviet 
Union  is  prepared  to  return  to  the  INF  or 
START  negotiations. 

President  Reagan  and  Vice  President  Bush 
meet  with  Brazilian  Vice  President  Antonio 
Aureliano  Chaves  de  Mendonca. 

A  summit  of  the  heads  of  government  of 
the  10  EC  members  ends  after  2  days  in 
Brussels  when  members  fail  to  agree  on  a 
longstanding  dispute  over  Britain's  demand 
for  a  rebate  on  the  EC's  annual  budget  and  for 
changes  in  the  EC  farm  policy. 

A  Soviet  oil  tanker  hits  a  mine  in  the 
Nicaraguan  port  of  Sandino.  It  sustains  serious 
damage  and  injures  five  crew  members. 
Nicaraguan  rebels  claim  to  have  mined  ports 
as  a  warning  to  foreign  ships  to  stay  away. 

U.S.  Navy  announces  that  a  Soviet 
helicopter  carrier  and  an  advanced  guided- 
missile  destroyer  had  arrived  in  the  Carib- 
bean. 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  Colombia  announces 
that  on  Mar.  10  Colombian  police  seized  13.8 
tons  of  cocaine  at  a  remote  jungle  processing 
plant.  The  DEA  in  Washington  says  it  was  the 
largest  drug  raid  ever. 

March  21-28 

President  Francois  Mitterrand  (France)  makes 
a  state  visit  to  the  United  States.  While  in 
Washington  (Mar.  21-24),  he  meets  with  Presi- 
dent Reagan  twice  and  addresses  a  joint  ses- 
sion of  the  Congress. 

March  21 

White  House  announces  that  the  President  has 
decided  not  to  proceed  with  the  sale  of  Stinger 
missiles  to  Jordan  and  Saudi  Arabia  based  on 
prospects  that  the  request  would  not  be  ap- 
proved by  the  Congress. 


91 


CHRONOLOGY 


In  a  protest  note  handed  to  the  U.S. 
Charge  in  Moscow  by  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko,  the  Soviet  Union  blames  the  United 
States  for  the  Mar.  20  incident  in  which  a 
Soviet  oil  tanker  hit  a  mine  at  Puerto  Sandino, 
Nicaragua.  The  note  says  the  United  States 
"is  guilty  of  violating  one  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  international  law,  the  right  of 
freedom  of  navigation."  Acting  State  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Romberg  rejects  the  charge 
and  says  "regional  dangers  and  tensions  result 
from  Soviet  encouragement  of  conflict  in  Cen- 
tral America  and  the  Caribbean,  and, 
therefore,  the  Soviets  are  hardly  in  a  position 
to  blame  others  for  an  increase  in  violence 
there." 

A  Soviet  nuclear-powered  submarine  and 
the  aircraft  carrier  U.S.S.  Kitty  Hawk  collide 
in  the  Sea  of  Japan.  The  carrier  suffers  minor 
damage;  the  submarine  is  assisted  by  other 
Soviet  vessels  in  the  area. 

President  Chiang  Ching-kuo  of  Taiwan  is 
reelected  to  a  second  6-year  term  by  a  nearly 
unanimous  vote  of  the  National  Assembly. 

Fire  sweeps  through  one  wing  of  the 
UNESCO  headquarters  building  in  Paris.  In- 
vestigators later  say  it  was  arson  and  the  in- 
tent was  to  destroy  the  entire  building. 
Documents  relevant  to  a  projected  U.S.  con- 
gressional inquiry  into  UNESCO's  workings 
are  not  damaged. 

Afghanistan  Day  is  observed  in  the 
United  States.  In  his  proclamation.  President 
Reagan  says  "a  solution  to  the  Afghanistan 
problem  must  begin  with  the  removal  of  Soviet 
troops." 

March  22 

White  House  aggrees  to  a  bipartisan  Senate 
compromise  that  will  reduce  an  emergency  aid 
package  to  El  Salvador  from  $93  million  to 
$61.75  million  and  delay  a  vote  until  after 
the  El  Salvador  presidential  election. 

March  23 

Acting  State  Department  spokesman  Romberg 
announces  that  the  State  Department  is  form- 
ing a  panel  to  monitor  changes  in  UNESCO  in 
1984  with  a  view  to  assisting  the  Secretary  in 
determining  whether  to  recommend  that  the 
U.S.  decision  to  withdraw  be  reviewed. 

March  24 

French  Defense  Ministry  announces  that  the 
French  contingent  of  the  MNF  in  Beirut  will 
leave  by  Mar.  31. 

U.S.  paratroopers  begin  3  days  of 
maneuvers  with  Honduran  airborne  troops  in 
central  Honduras. 

A  helicopter  crashes  in  South  Korea  during 
joint  military  exercises  killing  29  U.S.  and 
Korean  servicemen. 

March  25 

Salvadorans  go  to  the  polls  to  vote  from  among 
eight  presidential  candidates.  In  some  areas 
their  efforts  are  hindered  by  shortages  of 
ballots  and  ballot  boxes  and  by  widespread 
confusion  over  election  rules.  Last  night  leftist 
guerrillas  bombed  several  electric  transmis- 


sion towers  leaving  80%  of  the  country  without 
power  for  12  hours.  Election  Council  officials 
say  guerrilla  acts  appear  to  have  only  a  minor 
affect  on  the  voting.  Final  results  are  not  ex- 
pected for  several  days. 

Observers  from  29  nations,  including  the 
United  States,  are  in  El  Salvador  to  lend  inter- 
national credibility  to  the  government's  asser- 
tion that  the  voting  is  fair  and  honest. 

March  26 

In  Baghdad  Egyptian  Foreign  Minister  Kamal 
Hassan  AU  says  Egypt  is  prepared  to  provide 
military  support  to  Iraq  in  the  war  against 
Iran,  if  required. 

U.S.  Consul  General  in  Strasbourg  Robert 
0.  Homme  suffers  minor  gunshot  wounds  in  an 
apparent  assassination  attempt.  A  group  call- 
ing itself  the  Lebanese  Armed  Revolutionary 
Faction  claims  responsibility. 

UN  team  of  experts  reports  that  there  is 
substantial  evidence  that  chemical  weapons,  in 
the  form  of  mustard  gas  and  nerve  agents,  had 
been  used  in  the  Iran-Iraq  border  areas.  Their 
investigation  found  no  evidence  of  "yellow- 
rain." 

President  Sekou  Toure  (Guinea)  dies  in  a 
Cleveland  hospital  while  undergoing  emergen- 
cy surgery  for  a  heart  condition.  Prime 
Minister  Lansana  Beavogui  becomes  interim 
head  of  government. 

March  27 

While  the  votes  are  still  being  tabulated  in  El 
Salvador's  presidential  election,  the  interna- 
tional observers  agree  that  the  voter  turnout 
was  massive  despite  attempts  by  guerrillas  to 
disrupt  the  election.  A  run-off  election  is  ex- 
pected unless  one  candidate  receives  more 
than  50%  of  the  vote. 

During  a  UN  Security  Council  debate.  Am- 
bassador Kirkpatrick  terms  Libya  as  a 
"master  of  violence"  and  that  its  recent  bomb- 
ing of  a  Sudanese  city  was  one  more  incident 
in  a  series  of  aggressive  attacks.  Citing  recent 
bombings  in  London  and  on  a  French  airliner 
as  the  work  of  Libyan-financed  terrorists,  she 
says  Libya  trains,  finances,  and  encourages 
terrorist  groups  in  Europe,  the  Far  East,  and 
Latin  America. 

EC  foreign  ministers,  meeting  in  emergen- 
cy session  in  Brussels,  again  fail  to  resolve 
their  differences  over  finances  and  farm  sub- 
sidies. 

Thai  military  authorities  say  Vietnamese 
forces  have  launched  a  heavy  attack  on 
resistance  forces  in  Kampuchea,  forcing 
thousands  of  Kampuchean  refugees  to  flee  into 
Thailand. 

March  28 

Residential  areas  of  Beirut  are  subject  to  the 
most  intense  shelling  since  the  fighting  in  ear- 
ly February.  President  Gemayel  calls  a 
meeting  of  the  newly  formed  high-level 
political-military  committee. 


March  29 

Lebanese  internal  security  police  and  40 
volunteer  French  truce  observers  take  control 
of  positions  in  Beirut  given  up  by  the  depart- 
ing French  contingent  of  the  MNF.  The  posi- 
tions are  along  the  "green  line."  the  confronta- 
tion zone  separating  east  and  west  Beirut. 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  El  Salvador  Pickering 
says  that  about  75%  of  all  Salvadorans  eligible 
to  vote  cast  their  ballots  for  President  on  Mar. 
25,  despite  confusion  and  delays  at  voting 
places. 

Senate  approves  a  compromise  $62  million 
emergency  military  aid  package  for  El 
Salvador. 

i 
March  30 

In  a  letter  to  the  Congress,  President  Reagan 
formally  ends  U.S.  participation  in  the  MNF  in 
Lebanon  as  "no  longer  a  necessary  or  ap- 
propriate means"  of  achieving  U.S.  goals  of 
the  restoration  of  a  sovereign,  independent, 
and  united  Lebanon;  the  withdrawal  of  all 
foreign  forces;  and  the  security  of  Israel's 
northern  border. 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  an- 
nounces that  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Com- 
merce have  instituted  controls  on  the  export  to 
Iran  and  Iraq  of  five  chemical  compounds  that 
can  be  used  in  the  manufacture  of  chemical 
weapons. 

U.S.  Treasury  Department  announces  an 
agreement  whereby  four  Latin  American  coun- 
tries (Brazil,  Mexico,  Colombia,  and 
Venezuela)  and  11  banks  will  loan  Argentina 
$500  million  to  help  pay  overdue  interest 
payments  to  banks. 

March  31 

Treasury  Secretary  Regan  says  that  when 
Argentina  and  the  IMF  negotiate  a  new  agree- 
ment on  Argentina's  economic  policies  and 
payments  schedule,  the  United  States  will  lend 
$300  million  so  that  Argentina  can  repay  the 
four  Latin  American  countries. 

EC  agriculture  ministers,  meeting  in 
Brussels,  agree  to  cut  milk  production  and  the 
general  level  of  farm  prices  with  the  aim  of 
halting  increasing  farm  spending  and  putting 
EC  finances  on  a  sounder  footing. 

Honduras'  Ministry  of  the  Presidency  an- 
nounces that  Gen.  Gustavo  Alvarez  Martinez, 
commander  of  the  armed  forces  and  a  staunch 
supporter  of  the  United  States,  has  been  asked 
to  resign  and  leave  the  country. 

South  Africa  and  Swaziland  reveal  that  in 
Feb.  1982,  they  signed  a  peace  agreement 
similar  to  a  recent  nonaggression  pact  be- 
tween South  Africa  and  Mozambique. 

The  last  of  the  MNF-300  French 
troops— leaves  Lebanon.H 


W 


(1* 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  l 


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n  J/ 


'RESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


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•ess  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
ashington,  D.C.  20520. 


6 


3/6 


8   3/8 


0   3/8 


3/8 


3/8 


3/8 


Subject 

Shultz:  remarks  and  question- 
and-answer  session  at  the 
Conservative  Political  Action 
Conference,  Mar.  2. 
6       3/7        Shultz:  remarks  before  the 

American  Legion  Auxiliary, 
Mar.  2. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee, Feb.  9. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Budget  Committee, 
Feb.  21. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee,  Feb.  22. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Appropriations  Sub- 
committee on  Foreign  Opera- 
tions, Mar.  1. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
House  Appropriations  Sub- 
committee on  Foreign  Opera- 
tions, Mar.  6. 
Gulf  of  Maine  maritime  bound- 
ary case  set  for  argument  be- 
fore the  ICJ. 
Advisory  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Intellectual  Prop- 
erty, Apr.  5. 
Shipping  Coordinating  Commit- 
tee (SCC),  Subcommittee  on 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea 
(SOLAS),  working  group  on 
stability,  load  lines,  and 
safety  of  fishing  vessels. 
Mar.  27. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the  Inter- 
national Telegraph  and  Tele- 
phone Consultative  Com- 
mittee (CCITT),  integrated 
services  digital  network  tech- 
nical working  group,  Apr.  2-6. 
Program  for  the  official  work- 
ing visit  of  Portuguese  Prime 
Minister  Mario  Soares, 
Mar.  13-16. 
Program  for  the  official  work- 
ing visit  of  Irish  Prime  Minis- 
ter Garret  FitzGerald, 
Mar.  14-16. 
Program  for  the  state  visit  of 
French  President  Francois 
Mitterrand,  Mar.  21-28. 
Oceans  and  International  Envi- 
ronmental and  Scientific  Af- 
fairs Advisory  Committee, 
Apr.  12. 
SCC,  National  Committee  for 
the  Prevention  of  Marine  Pol- 
lution, Apr.  12. 


3/8 


3/12 


3/20 


3/20 


*81     3/20       SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  radio  communications, 
Apr.  19. 
82       3/20       Shultz:  news  conference. 
*83       3/22       Appointment  of  Charles  N. 
Grower  as  a  member  of  the 
Iran-United  States  Claims 
Tribunal  (biographic  data). 
*84       3/22      Appointment  of  Richard  M. 

Mosk  as  substitute  arbitrator 
on  the  Iran-United  States 
Claims  Tribunal  (biographic 
data). 
*85       3/22       Appointment  of  Carl  F.Salans 
as  substitute  arbitrator  on  the 
Iran-United  States  Claims 
Tribunal  (biographic  data). 
*86       3/22      Appointment  of  WUliamH. 

Levit,  Jr.,  as  substitute  arbi- 
trator on  the  Iran-United 
States  Claims  Tribunal  (bio- 
graphic data). 

87  3/22      Shultz:  luncheon  toast  for 

French  President  Mitterrand. 

88  3/23       Shultz:  statement  on 

Afghanistan  Day,  Mar.  21. 

*89       3/23      Shultz:  statement  on  Depart- 
ment personnel  changes. 

*90       3/26      Advisory  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Investment,  Technol- 
ogy, and  Development, 
Apr.  16 
91       3/29       Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Appropriations  Sub- 
committee on  Commerce, 
Justice,  State,  and  Judiciary, 
Mar.  28. 

*92       3/29       Shultz:  statement  before  the 
House  Appropriations  Sub- 
committee on  Commerce, 
Justice,  State,  and  Judiciary, 
Mar.  27. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
.the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Free  multiple  copies  may  obtained  by 
writing  to  the  Office  of  Opinion  Analysis  and 
Plans,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

Human  Rights  and  the  Moral  Dimension  of 
U.S.  Foreign  Pohcy,  86th  annual  Washing- 
ton Day  banquet  of  the  Creve  Coeur  Club  of 
IlHnois,  Peoria,  Feb.  22,  1984  (Current  Policv 
#558). 

Economics 

Foreign  Policy:  Its  Impact  on  Agricultural 
Trade,  Under  Secretary  Wallis,  Board  of 
Directors  of  the  U.S.  Feed  Grains  Council, 
Houston,  Mar.  7, 1984  (Current  Policy  #557). 

International  Antitrust  Enforcement  (GIST 
Mar.  1984). 

OECD's  Arrangements  on  Export  Credits 
(GIST,  Mar.  1984). 

Europe 

The  Transatlantic  Relationship:  A  Long-Term 
Perspective,  Under  Secretary  Eagleburger, 
National  Newspaper  Asso.,  Mar.  7,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #556). 

Implementation  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act, 
Fifteenth  Semiannual  Report,  June  1 
1983-Nov.  30,  1983,  Feb.  1984  (Special 
Report  #113). 

Human  Rights 

1983  Human  Rights  Report,  excerpts  from 
"Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Prac- 
tices for  1983"  prepared  by  the  Dept.  of 
State  and  submitted  to  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  and  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Feb.  1984  (Special 
Report  #114). 

Military  Affairs 

Chemical  Weapons  Use  in  Southeast  Asia  and 
Afghanistan,  U.S.  submission  to  the  UN 
Secretary  General,  Feb.  21,  1984  (Current 
Policy  #553). 

United  Nations 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  United  Nations,  Am- 
bassador Kirkpatrick,  Subcommittee  on  For- 
eign Operations,  Senate  Appropriations 
Committee,  Mar.  2,  1984  (Current  Policv 
#555). 

Western  Hemisphere 

A  National  Response  to  the  Crisis  in  Central 
America,  Assistant  Secretary  Motley,  Sub- 
committee on  Foreign  Operations,  House 
Appropriations  Committee,  Mar.  27,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #559). 


93 


miiiHiJimiiiiiiiiMiJimimrr"" 


PUBLICATIONS 


Elections  in  El  Salvador,  Ambassador 
Pickering,  Corporate  Round  Table,  World 
Affairs  CouncU,  Mar.  1,  1984  (Current  Policy 
#554). 

Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and  De- 
velopment Initiative,  Assistant  Secretary 
Motley,  Subcommittee  on  Western  Hemi- 
sphere Affairs,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee, Feb.  21,  1984  (Current  Policy  #552). 

El  Salvador:  Revolution  or  Reform?,  based  on 
oral  and  written  testimony  of  Assistant 
Secretary  Motley,  Subcommittees  on 
Human  Rights  and  International  Organiza- 
tions and  on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Jan.  26, 
1984  (Cun-ent  Policy  #546). 

Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and  De- 
velopment Initiative  (GIST,  Mar.  1984).  ■ 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  summaries 
of  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  about  170  countries 
(e.xcluding  the  United  States)  and  of  selected 
international  organizations.  Recent  revisions 
are: 

Syria  (Jan.  1984) 
Grenada  (Feb.  1984) 
Laos  (Feb.  1984) 
Mali  (Feb.  1984) 
Sierra  Leone  (Feb.  1984) 
Tanzania  (Feb.  1984) 
United  Kingdom  (Feb.  1984) 
France  (Mar.  1984). 

A  free  single  copy  of  one  of  the  above  (and 
an  index  of  the  entire  series)  may  be  obtained 
from  the  Correspondence  Management  Divi- 
sion, Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  about  60  Background  Notes  a  year,  a 
subscription  is  available  from  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402,  for 
$34.00  (domestic)  and  $42.50  (foreign).  Check 
or  money  order,  made  payable  to  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  must  accompany 
order.  ■ 


94 


NDEX 


Hay  1984 

olume  84,  No.  2086 


fghanistan.  Afghanistan  Day,  1984 

(Shultz,  proclamation) 82 

frica 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Sub- 
Sahara  Africa  (Lyman)  43 

iireien  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy  Objectives 

(Shultz)  17 

cretary's  News  Conference  of  March 

20 37 

merican  Principles 
Kiiierican  Foreign  Policy  Challenges  in 

the  1980s(Reagan) 1 

5wer  and  Diplomacy  in  the  1980s 

(Shultz)  12 

ans  Control 

merican  Foreign  Policy  Challenges  in 

the  1980s(Reagan) 1 

emocratic  Ideals  and  U.S.-Israel 

Relations  (Reagan) 6 

BFR  Talks  Resume  (Reagan) 50 

resident  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 

April  4  (excerpts) 8 

3cretary's  News  Conference  of 

March20 37 

5curity  Policy  and  Arms  Control 

(Eagleburger) 49 

ongress 

dministration  Urges  Approval  of  Compact 

of  Free  Association  (message  to  the 

Congress) 74 

Y  1984  Supplemental  and  FY  1985 
Authorization  Requests  (Shultz) 15 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  East 

Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 52 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Europe 
(Burt) 59 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 
East(Murphy)  66 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Narcotics 
Control  (Taylor) 72 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Organizations 
and  Programs  (Newell) 83 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  South 
Asia(Schaffer) 77 

Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Sub- 
Sahara  Africa  (Lyman)  43 

Y  1985  Request  for  Economic  Assistance 
Programs  (McPherson) 62 

Y  1985  Security  Assistance  Requests 
(Schneider) 75 

oreign  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy  Objectives 

(Shultz)  17 

itemational  Security  and  Development 

Cooperation  Program  (Secretary's 

report  to  the  Congress) 22 

LS.  Forces  in  Lebanon  (letter  to  the 

Congress) 68 

tepartment  and  Foreign  Service.  FY  1984 

Supplemental  and  FY  1985  Authorization 

Requests  (Shultz) 15 

ast  Asia 

'Y  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 

and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 52 

'oreign  Aid  and  U.S.  PoUcy  Objectives 

(Shultz) 17 

Economics.  American  Foreign  Policy 

Challenges  in  the  1980s  (Reagan) 1 

)\  Salvador 

resident  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 

April  4  (excerpts) 8 

lecretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 

Press" 40 


Europe 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Europe 

(Burt) 59 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy  Objectives 

(Shultz)  17 

Foreign  Assistance 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  East 

Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 52 

FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for  Europe 

(Burt) 59 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 

East(Murphy)  66 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Organizations 

and  Programs  (Newell) 83 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  South  Asia 

(Schaffer) 77 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Sub- 
Sahara  Africa  (Lyman)  43 

FY  1985  Request  for  Economic  Assistance 

Programs  (McPherson) 62 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy  Objectives 

(Shultz)  " 17 

International  Security  and  Development 

Cooperation  Program  (Secretary's 

report  to  the  Congress) 22 

Human  Rights.  Democratic  Ideals  and 

U.S.-Israel  Relations(Reagan) 6 

International  Organizations  and 

Conferences.  FY  1985  As.sistance 

Requests  for  Organizations  and 

Programs  (Newell) 83 

Israel 

Democratic  Ideals  and  U.S.-Israel 

Relations  (Reagan) 6 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 

Press" 40 

Japan.  President  Reagan's  News 

Conference  of  April  4  (excerpts) 8 

Lebanon 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 

April  4  (excerpts) 8 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 

Press" 40 

U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  (letter  to  the 

Congress) 68 

Marshall  Islands.  Administration  Urges 

Approval  of  Compact  of  Free  Association 

(message  to  the  Congress) 74 

Micronesia.  Administration  Urges  Approval 

of  Compact  of  Free  Association  (message 

to  the  (Jongress) 74 

Middle  East 

American  Foreign  PoUcy  Challenges  in  the 

1380s(Reagan) 1 

Democratic  Ideals  and  U.S.-Israel 

Relations  (Reagan) 6 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 

East  (Murphy)  66 

Foreign  Aid  and  IJ.S.  Policy  Objectives 

(Shultz)  17 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  March  20  . .  ..37 

Military  Affairs 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 

Press' 40 

Strategic  Defense  Initiative(fact  sheet) 71 

U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  fletter  to  the 

Congress) 68 

Narcotics.  FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for 

Narcotics  Control  (Taylor) 72 

Nicaragua 

Pre.sident  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 

April  4  (excerpts) 8 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 

Press" 40 

Organization  of  American  States.  FY  1985 

Assistance  Reouests  for  Organizations 

and  Programs  (Newell) 83 

Pacific.  FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz)  ...  .52 
Presidential  Documents 
Afghanistan  Day,  1984  (Shultz, 

proclamation) 82 


Administration  Urges  Approval  of  Compact 

of  Free  Association  (message  to  the 

Congress) 74 

American  Foreign  Policy  Challenges  in  the 

1980s 1 

Central  America 11 

Democratic  Ideals  and  U.S.-Israel  Relations  .  .6 

MBFR  Talks  Resume 50 

News  Conference  of  April  4  (excerpts) 8 

U.S.  Forces  in  Lebanon  (letter  to  the 

Congress) 68 

Publications 

Department  of  State 93 

Background  Notes 94 

Refugees.  FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for 

Sub-Sahara  A  frica  (Lyman) 43 

Security  Assistance 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 

and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 52 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Europe 

(Burt) 59 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 

East(Murphy)  66 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  South  Asia 

(Schaffer) 77 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Sub-Sahara 

Africa(Lyman) 43 

FY  1985  Security  Assistance  Requests 

(Schneider) 75 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy  Objectives 

(Shultz)  17 

International  Security  and  Development 

Cooperation  Program  (Secretary's 

report  to  the  Congress) 22 

Power  and  Diplomacy  in  the  1980s  (Shultz) ...  12 
South  Asia.  FY  1985  Assistance  Requests 

for  South  Asia  (Schaffer) 77 

Terrorism.  Power  and  Diplomacy  in  the 

1980s(Shultz) 12 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 87 

U.S.S.R. 

American  Foreign  Policy  Challenges  in 

the  19808(Reagan) 1 

Democratic  Ideals  and  U.S.-Israel  Relations 

(Reagan) 6 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 

April  4  (excerpts) 8 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 

Press" 40 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  March  20  . .  .37 
Security  Policy  and  Arms  Control 

(Eagleburger) 49 

United  Nations 

Administration  Urges  Approval  of  Compact 

of  Free  Association  (message  to  the 

Congress) 74 

FY  1985  Assistance  Requests  for  Organizations 

and  Programs  (Newell) 83 

Western  Hemisphere 

American  Foreign  PoUcy  Challenges  in  the 

1980s(Reagan) 1 

Central  America(Reagan) 11 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  Policy  Objectives 

(Schultz) 17 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  March  20 . .  .37 

Nam«  Index 

Burt,  Richard  R 59 

Eagleburger,  Lawrence  S 49 

Lyman,  Princeton 43 

McPherson,  M.  Peter 62 

Murphy,  RichardW 66 

Newell,  Gregory  J 83 

Reagan,  President 1,6,8,11,50,68,74,82 

Schaffer,  Howard  B 77 

Schneider,  William  Jr 75 

Shultz,  Secretary 12,15,17,22,37,40,82 

Taylor,  Clyde  D 72 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 52 


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.1 


Departnu»n  i 
of  Stalv 


buUetBu 


1.3'. 

re  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  FoTeTgn  pQlTcy  /Volume  84  /  Number  2087 


resident  Kea^an 
Visits  China/ 1 


m\mmm}m\m\mmmmmtmimmimmam^^ 


^ 


Cover: 

Near  the  city  of  Xi'an,  the  President  and 
Mrs.  Reagan  toured  an  excavated  vault  of 
terra  cotta  warriors  and  horses  guarding 
the  tomb  of  Qin  Shihuangdi  (221-210  B.C.), 
the  Qin  Dynasty  emperor  who  unified 
China  and  linked  together  the  segments  of 
the  Great  Wall.  Discovered  in  1974  by  local 
farmers  digging  an  irrigation  well,  one 
vault  holds  an  estimated  6,000  life-size 
figures  facing  east  in  rectangular  battle  for- 
mation. 

(White  House  photo  by  Mar>'  Anne  Fackelman) 


Dppartmvnt  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  84  /  Number  2087  /  June  1984 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  worl<  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 


be! 

I  I 
1  f 
I  ( 


JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affaii  l|g  | 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 


NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 


PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 


SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


I  i 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
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For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  I 
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lep 


CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


he  President 


U.S.  Interests  in 
Central  America 

President  Meets  With 
Pope  John  Paul  II 

Central  America 


he  Secretary 

I       Realism  and  Responsibility: 

The  U.S.  Approach  to  Arms 

Control 
I      Trade,  Interdependence,  and 

Conflicts  of  Jurisdiction 
'       Secretary  Visits  Korea  and 

Japan 

frica 

I      Visit  of  Botswana  President 

(Quett  K.  J.  Masire,  President 
Reagan) 

rms  Control 

I  U.S.  Proposes  Banning  Chemical 
Weapons  (Vice  President.  Bush. 
Summary  of  U.S.  Draft  Treaty) 

START  in  a  Historical  Perspec- 
tive (Edward  L.  Rowny) 

U.S.  Proposes  Initiative  at  the 
MBFR  Talks  (President  Reagan) 

CDE  Negotiations  Resume  in 
Stockhobn  (President  Reagan) 

Arms  Control  for  Antisatellite 
Systems  (Letter  to  the  Congress) 


III  km 


lepartment 

ermfc       Foreign  Service  Day,  1984 

(President  Reagan,  Secretary 
Shultz) 


President  Reagan  Visits  China  {Addresses,  Toasts, 
Interview,  Remarks,  and  Text  of  Treaty) 


Europe 

50       Visit  of  Austrian  President 

(Rudolf  Kirchschlager,  President 

Reagan) 
53       Visit  of  West  German  Chancellor 

Kohl  (Helmut  Kohl,  President 

Reagan) 

55  Visit  of  Portuguese  Prime 

Minister  Soares  (President 
Reagan,  Mario  Soares) 

56  Visit  of  French  President 

Mitterrand  (Francois  Mitterrand, 
President  Reagan,  Secretary 
Shultz) 

59  Visit  of  Irish  Prime  Minister 

(President  Reagan) 

Middle  East 

60  Visit  of  Moroccan  Prime  Minister 

Military  Affairs 

61  Report  of  the  Commission  on 

Strategic  Forces  (President 
Reagan) 

62  Chemical  Weapons  Use  in  South- 

east Asia  and  Afghanistan  (U.S. 
Report) 

Pacific 

63  Visit  of  Prime  Minister  of  New 

Zealand  (Robert  C.  Muldoon, 
President  Reagan) 

South  Asia 

64  Soviet  Occupation  of  Afghanistan 

(President  Reagan) 

Terrorism 


65 


65 


International  Terrorism  (White 

House  Statement) 
President  Proposes  Legislation  to 

Counter  Terrorism  (Message  to 

the  Congress) 


Western  Hemisphere 

67       U.S.  Efforts  to  Achieve  Peace  in 
Central  America  (Secretary's 
Letter  to  the  Congress  and 
Report) 

74  A  National  Response  to  the  Crisis 
in  Central  America  (Langhome  A. 
Motley) 

77  U.S.  Aid  to  El  Salvador  (White 

House  Statement) 

78  Preliminary  ICJ  Ruling  on 

Nicaraguan  Request  (Department 
Statement) 
81       U.S.  Relations  With  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua  (James  H.  Michel) 

85  U.S.  Policy  in  Central  America 

(White  House  Statement) 

Treaties 

86  Current  Actions 

Chronology 

88       April  1984 

Press  Releases 

91       Department  of  State 
91       USUN 

Publications 

93       Department  of  State 

93  Foreign  Relations  Volume 

Released 

94  International  Law  Digest,  1979 

Index 


EDITOR'S  NOTE 

This  issue  is  being  released  late  due  to 
unusual  production  problems.  We  regret 
any  inconvenience  and  expect  to  be  on 
schedule  with  the  July  issue. 


President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  visited  the  Great 
Wall  at  Badaling,  39  miles  northwest  of 
Beijing.  From  as  early  as  the  5th  century 
B.C.,  the  rival  states  in  central  China  built 
walls  to  protect  themselves  from  each  other 
and  from  the  barbarians.  When  Qin 
Shihuangdi  unified  the  empire  in  221  B.C., 
he  linked  the  existing  fortifications  on  the 
northern  frontier.  Contemporary  texts 
record  that  300,000  men  worked  for  10  years 
to  carry  out  his  plans  for  this  wall,  known 
to  the  Chinese  as  the  "10,000  Li  Long 
Wall."  Over  the  next  1,500  years,  the 
strategic  importance  and  military  effective- 
ness of  the  wall  waxed  and  waned.  One  of 
the  first  acts  of  the  Ming  Dynasty 
(1368-1644)  was  to  rebuild  the  Great  Wall,  a 
task  that  took  more  than  100  years.  When 
finally  completed,  it  extended  2,484  miles. 
Under  the  Qing  Dynasty  (1644-1911),  the 
wall  again  fell  into  decay.  Today  three  sec- 
tions have  been  restored.  The  portion  most 
frequently  visited  offers  a  fine  example  of 
Ming  military  architecture. 


If 


(White  House  photo  by  Pete  Souza) 


^■■1 


Department  of  State  Bullet    teii 


Vi3ir5  China 


Vi^ifj  China 


President  Reagan  arrived  in  China  on  April  26,  1984. 

where  he  visited  Beijing,  Xi'an,  and  Shanghai. 

He  returned  to  the  United  States  on  May  1. 

Following  are  remarks  he  made 

on  various  occasions  during  the  trip'^ 


ieijln^ 


Lddress  Before 
lommunity  Leaders, 
treat  Hall  of  the  People, 
tpril  27,  19842 


honored  to  come  before  you  today, 
e  first  American  President  ever  to  ad- 
'ess  your  nation  from  the  Great  Hall  of 
e  People. 
My  wife  Nancy  and  I  have  looked  for- 
d  to  visiting  the  people  and  treasures 
your  great  and  historic  land,  one  of  the 
rld's  oldest  civilizations.  We  have 
arveled  at  Beijing's  sweeping  vistas, 
id  we  have  felt  the  warmth  of  your 
JspitaUty  touch  our  hearts.  We 
ily  regret  that  our  visit  will  be  so  brief. 
Ti  afraid  it  will  be  as  a  Tang  Dynasty 
)et  once  wrote:  "looking  at  the  flowers 
hile  riding  horseback."  But  you  have 
lother  saying  from  the  book  of  Han 
hich  describes  how  Nancy  and  I  feel: 
To  see  a  thing  once  is  better  than  hear- 
g  about  it  a  hundred  times." 


Twelve  years  ago  former  President 
Nixon  arrived  in  Beijing,  stepped  down 
from  Air  Force  One,  and  shook  hands 
with  former  Premier  Zhou  Enlai.  Premier 
Zhou  would  later  tell  him:  "Your  hand- 
shake came  over  the  vastest  ocean  in  the 
world— 25  years  of  no  communication." 
With  one  handshake,  America  and  China 
each  turned  a  new  page  in  their  histories. 

I  believe  that  history  beckons  again. 
We  have  begun  to  write  a  new  chapter 
for  peace  and  progress  in  our  histories, 
with  America  and  China  going  forward 
hand  in  hand— xieshou  bingjvn. 

We  must  always  be  realistic  about  our 
relationship,  frankly  acknowledging  the 
fundamental  differences  in  ideology  and 
institutions  between  our  two  societies. 
Yes,  let  us  acknowledge  those  differ- 
ences. Let  us  never  minimize  them.  But 
let  us  not  be  dominated  by  them. 

I  have  not  come  to  China  to  hold  forth 
on  what  divides  us,  but  to  build  on  what 
binds  us.  I  have  not  come  to  dwell  on  a 
closed-door  past,  but  to  urge  that  Ameri- 
cans and  Chinese  look  to  the  future, 
because  together  we  can  and  will  make 
tomorrow  a  better  day. 


When  Premier  Zhao  was  in  the 
United  States,  he  told  us:  "China  has 
opened  its  door  and  will  never  close  it 
again."  Permit  me  to  assure  you  today, 
America's  door  is  open  to  you;  and  when 
you  walk  through,  we'll  welcome  you  as 
our  neighbors  and  our  friends. 

We  may  live  at  nearly  opposite  ends 
of  the  world.  We  may  be  distinctly  dif- 
fei'ent  in  language,  customs,  and  political 
beliefs.  But  on  many  vital  questions  of  our 
time,  there  is  little  difference  between  the 
American  and  Chinese  people.  Indeed,  I 
believe  if  we  were  to  ask  citizens  all  over 
this  world  what  they  desire  most  for  their 
children  and  for  theij-  children's  children, 
their  answer,  in  English,  Chinese,  or  any 
language,  would  likely  be  the  same:  we 
want  peace;  we  want  freedom;  we  want  a 
better  life.  Their  dreams,  so  simply 
stated,  represent  mankind's  deepest 
aspii'ations  for  security  and  personal 
fulfillment.  And  helping  them  make  their 
dreams  come  true  is  what  our  jobs  are  all 
about. 

We  can  work  together  as  equals  in  a 
spirit  of  mutual  respect  and  mutual 
benefit.  I  believe  in  Chinese  you  say  Hu 
jing  h  u  hui. 


letiune  1984 


MMMIWfifWIiWtiiltBllllliH^^ 


im 


Well,  America  and  China  are  both 
great  nations.  And  we  have  a  special 
responsibility  to  preserve  world  peace. 

To  help  fulfill  that  responsibility,  the 
United  States  is  rebuilding  its  defenses, 
which  had  been  neglected  for  more  than 
a  decade.  Our  people  realize  this  effort 
is  crucial  if  we're  to  deter  aggression 
against  America,  our  allies,  and  other 
friends.  But  we  threaten  no  nation. 
America's  troops  are  not  massed  on 
China's  borders.  And  we  occupy  no  lands. 
The  only  foreign  land  we  occupy  any- 
where in  the  world  is  beneath  gravesites 
where  Americans  shed  their  blood  for 


peace  and  freedom.  Nor  do  we  commit 
wanton  acts,  such  as  shooting  269  inno- 
cent people  out  of  the  sky  for  the  so-called 
cause  of  sacred  airspace. 

America  and  China  both  condemn 
military  expansionism,  the  brutal  occupa- 
tion of  Afghanistan,  the  crushing  of  Kam- 
puchea; and  we  share  a  stake  in  preserv- 
ing peace  on  the  Korean  Peninsula. 

I  think  our  two  peoples  agree  there 
can  be  only  one  sane  policy  to  preserve 
our  precious  civilization  in  this  modem 
nuclear  age:  a  nuclear  war  cannot  be  won 
and  must  never  be  fought.  And  that's 
why  we've  proposed  to  the  Soviet  Union 


iprc^ldeni"  K^a^an'^  Ifinemry 


BEIJING 

April  26  (Thursday) 

Official  arrival  ceremony,  East  Court, 

Great  Hall  of  the  People 
Meets  with  President  and  Mrs.  Li  Xiannian, 

Hebei  HaU,  Great  Hall  of  the  People 
Attends  dinner  hosted  by  President  Li, 

Yang  Yuan  Hall,  Diaoyutai  Guest  House 

April  27  (Friday) 

Meets  with  Premier  Zhao  Ziyang,  Eastern 

Great  Hall,  Great  Hall  of  the  People 
Addresses  Chinese  community  leaders, 

Great  Hall  of  the  People 
Meets  with  Premier  Zhao,  Eastern  Great 

Hall,  Great  Hall  of  the  People 
Meets  with  General  Secretary  Hu  Yaobang, 

Western  Great  Hall,  Great  Hall  of  the 

People 
Attends  banquet  hosted  by  Premier  Zhao, 

East  Banquet  Hall,  Great  Hall  of  the  People 

April  28  (Saturday) 

Tapes  radio  address  for  broadcast  to  the 

United  States 
Holds  interview  for  Chinese  television, 

Diaoyutai  State  Guest  House 
Meets  with  Chairman  Deng  Xiaoping,  Eastern 

Great  HaU,  Great  Hall  of  the  People 
Attends  working  luncheon  hosted  by 

Chairman  Deng,  Fujian  Hall,  Great  Hall  of 

the  People 
Visits  the  Great  Wall 


Attends  reception  with  American  community. 

Great  Wall  Hotel 
Hosts  dinner  for  Premier  Zhao,  Grand 

Ballroom,  Great  Wall  Hotel 

XIAN 

April  29  (Sunday) 

Visits  Qin  terra  cotta  figures  museum  and 

tours  excavation  area 
Visits  free  market  site 

BEIJING 

April  30  (Monday) 

Treaty  signing  ceremony  and  official  fare- 
well. Great  Hall  of  the  People 

SHANGHAI 

April  30  (Monday) 

Tours  Foxboro  Company 

Attends  reception  hosted  by  Fudan  University 

President  Madame  Xie  Xide 
Holds  question-and-answer  session  with 

students,  Fudan  University 
Addresses  students  and  faculty,  Fudan 

University 
Attends  banquet  hosted  by  Mayor  Wang 

Daohan,  Shanghai  Exhibition  Hall 

May  1  (Tuesday) 

Tours  child  care  center  and  visits  with 

resident  family.  Rainbow  Bridge  Township 
Departs  China  ■ 


meaningful  negotiations  that  go  beyond 
rhetoric  to  actual  arms  reductions  and 
why  we  must  all  work  for  the  day  when 
nuclear  weapons  will  be  banished  from 
the  face  of  the  earth. 

America's  interest  in  China,  our 
friendship  for  your  people,  and  our 
respect  for  China's  many  contributions  to 
the  progress  of  civilization  date  back  to 
the  beginning  of  our  own  history.  You 
might  be  interested  to  know  that  personaJAanuti 


dinner  settings  used  by  our  first  three 
Presidents— (jeorge  Washington,  John 
Adams,  and  Thomas  Jefferson— were  of 
Chinese  origin,  evidence  of  our  Founding 
Fathers'  attraction  for  your  country's 
high  artistic  standards. 

Back  in  1784,  when  the  first  Americar  ^nierica 
trading  ship,  the  Empress  ofChiim, 
entered  your  waters,  my  country  was 
unknown  to  you.  We  were  a  new  republic 
eager  to  win  a  place  in  international  com- 
merce. A  slightly  homesick  American 
sailor  recorded  that  first  day  in  a  letter 
home. 

"My  dear  father,"  he  wrote,  "if  ever 
you  receive  this  letter,  it  will  acquaint 
you,  that  after  a  passage  of  6  months  and 
7  days  we  came  to  anchor  at  Wampoo. . . 
The  Chinese  had  never  heard  of  us,  but 
we  introduced  ourselves  as  a  new  Nation 
gave  them  our  history  with  a  description 
of  our  country,  the  importance  and 
necessity  of  a  trade  here  to  the  advantage 
of  both,  which  they  appear  perfectly  to 
understand  and  wish." 

Well,  since  those  early  days,  our 
countries  have  both  profited  from  the  ex- 
change of  people,  goods,  and  ideas. 
Chinese  settlers  helped  tame  our  conti- 
nent during  the  19th  century.  Today, 
their  families,  descendants  join  other 
Americans  in  cooperating  with  you  to 
build  a  new  prosperity  in  China. 


ras-l 


lemm 

Mgtil 


Dceap 
fiiscou 


teiyom 
iiiiinol 


Geon 


mm 
onsent. 
lomisliei 
mebeei 
lipiitj'ol 
#bon 
iieChii 
lie  eyes  I 
i'ereven 


The  American  Heritage 

How  did  America,  which  began  as  an  im- 
poverished country  and  a  melting  pot,  at 
tracting  immigrants  from  every  comer  o 
the  globe,  pull  together  and  become  the 
leading  economic  nation  in  the  world? 
How  did  we  go  in  so  short  a  time  from  li\i 
ing  by  candlelight  to  exploring  the  fron 
tiers  of  the  universe  by  satellite,  from 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


litKeyi 

T^stik, 
few  on 
aifeoi 
'fhiffiiat 
lioieivh, 
bithei 
Wherbe 


T 


Vi3if5  China 


tehdlo 
on'.  You 


rsuliree 


j-wereot 


iich  farmer  laboring  with  horse  and  hoe 
ir  an  entire  year  just  to  feed  four  people, 
running  his  farm  with  the  most  modem 
lachinery  and  producing  enough  to  feed 
people,  making  America  the  bread- 
tsket  of  the  world? 

Well,  we're  people  who've  always 
;lieved  the  heritage  of  our  past  is  the 
ed  that  brings  forth  the  harvest  of  our 
ture.  And  from  our  roots  we  have 
■awn  tremendous  power  from  two  great 
rces— faith  and  freedom.  America  was 
unded  by  people  who  sought  freedom  to 
orship  God  and  to  trust  in  Him  to  guide 
em  in  their  daily  lives  with  wisdom, 

«Btrys  irength,  goodness,  and  compassion. 
Our  passion  for  freedom  led  to  the 

■stAnieiiii|merican  Revolution,  the  first  great 

jrising  for  human  rights  and  independ- 
ice  against  colonial  rule.  We  knew  each 
'us  could  not  enjoy  liberty  for  ourselves 
tonfiless  we  were  willing  to  share  it  with 
;eryone  else.  And  we  knew  our  freedom 

in  a  to   )uld  not  truly  be  safe  unless  all  of  us 
ere  protected  by  a  body  of  laws  that 

ite,"ifevei|-eated  us  equally. 

George  Washington  told  us  we  would 
aiiie  bound  together  in  a  sacred  brother- 
Dod  of  free  men.  Abraham  Lincob  de- 
ned  the  heart  of  American  democracy 

newNatid  hen  he  said,  "No  man  is  good  enough  to 
ovem  another  man  without  that  other's 

)nsent "  These  great  principles  have 

advantsi  ourished  the  soul  of  America,  and  they 
ave  been  enriched  by  values  such  as  the 
ignity  of  work,  the  friendship  of 
eighbors,  and  the  warmth  of  family. 
like  China,  our  people  see  the  future  in 
le  eyes  of  our  children.  And  like  China, 
e  revere  our  elders.  To  be  as  good  as 
or  fathers  and  mothers,  we  must 
8  better. 


of  lis,  tat 


;rfettlyio 

ivs.osr 

framtliees 

Meas. 


linottef 


he  Key  to  Dynamic  Development 


Trust  the  people"— these  three  words 
re  not  only  the  heart  and  soul  of  Amer- 
an  history,  but  the  most  powerful  force 
;,al  )r  human  progress  in  the  world  today. 
wrnefi  'hose  who  ignore  this  vital  truth  will  con- 
emn  their  countries  to  fall  farther  and 
irther  behind  in  the  world's  competition 
)r  economic  leadership  in  the  1980s  and 
rtlieif*  eyond,  because  look  around  us,  the 
ocieties  that  have  made  the  most  spec- 


tacular progress  in  the  shortest  period  of 
time  are  not  the  most  rigidly  organized 
nor  even  the  richest  in  natural  resources. 
No,  it's  where  people  have  been  allowed 
to  create,  compete,  and  buUd,  where 
they've  been  permitted  to  think  for 
themselves,  make  economic  decisions,  and 
benefit  from  their  own  risks  that  societies 
have  become  the  most  prosperous,  pro- 
gressive, dynamic,  and  free.  Nothing 
could  be  more  basic  to  the  spirit  of  prog- 
ress for  a  farmer,  laborer,  or  merchant 
than  economic  reward  for  legitimate  risk 
and  honest  toil. 

A  little  over  a  century  ago,  Ulysses  S. 
Grant,  who  was  then  a  former  President, 
visited  your  country  and  saw  China's 
great  potential.  "I  see  dawning. . . ," 
Grant  wrote,  "the  beginning  of  a  change. 
When  it  does  come,  China  will  rapidly 
become  a  powerful  and  rich  nation .... 
The  population  is  industrious,  frugal, 
intelligent,  and  quick  to  learn." 

Well,  today,  China's  economy  crackles 
with  the  dynamics  of  change:  e.xpansion  of 
individual  incentives  for  farmers  in  your 
new  responsibility  system;  new  bonuses 
for  workers  and  more  disciplined  manage- 
ment in  terms  of  profits  and  losses;  im- 
proved methods  of  market  distribution; 
opening  your  economy  to  the  world 
through  China's  membership  in  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund,  the  World  Bank, 
and  through  your  invitation  to  trade  and 
invest,  especially  in  your  four  special 
economic  zones;  and  your  commitment  to 
attract  capital  and  scientific  knowledge  to 
create  a  high  technology  base  for  the 
future.  All  this  reflects  China's  new  role 
in  the  international  economic  community 
and  your  determination  to  modernize 
your  economy  and  raise  the  standard  of 
living  of  your  people. 

Unlike  some  governments  which  fear 
change  and  fear  the  future,  China  is 
beginning  to  reach  out  toward  new 
horizons,  and  we  salute  your  courage. 

Progress,  Premier  Zhao  has  told  us, 
"lies  in  our  efforts  to  emancipate  our 
thinking  in  a  bold  way— to  carry  out 
reform  with  determination,  to  make  new 
inventions  with  courage,  and  to  break 
with  the  economic  molds  and  conven- 
tions of  all  descriptions  which  fetter  the 
development  of  the  productive  force." 


Well,  we  Americans  have  always  con- 
sidered ourselves  pioneers,  so  we  ap- 
preciate such  vitality  and  optimism. 

Today,  I  bring  you  a  message  from 
my  countrymen.  As  China  moves  forward 
in  this  new  path,  America  welcomes  the 
opportunity  to  walk  by  your  side. 

Incidentally,  I  know  Premier  Zhao 
has  demonstrated  mastery  of  his  subject. 
When  he  was  directing  agricultural 
policies  in  Sichuan,  the  peasants  went 
from  food  shortages  and  forced  imports  to 
bumper  harvests  and  rising  exports.  In 
fact,  I'm  told  that  because  of  the  work  he 
did,  it  is  said  in  Sichuan  Province,  "If  you 
want  rice,  go  see  Zhao." 

Well,  China's  growth  is  in  China's 
hands.  You  will  choose  your  own  path  to 
development.  But  we're  not  surprised  to 
see  the  fresh  breezes  of  incentives  and 
innovation  sweeping  positive  changes 
across  China.  And  behind  the  statistics  of 
economic  growth  are  reports  of  personal 
success  stories  pointing  to  a  new  spirit  of 
progress.  Chairman  Deng  has  a  saying, 
"Seek  truth  from  facts."  Well,  today  in 
China,  the  reality  of  more  small  enter- 
prises doing  a  thriving  business,  more 
families  profiting  from  their  own  hard 
work  and  the  bigger  harvests  they  pro- 
duce, and  more  investment  in  science  and 
technology  points  to  more  opportunity  for 
all.  President  John  Kennedy  often  used  a 
metaphor  to  describe  such  progress:  "A 
rising  tide  lifts  all  boats." 

In  the  United  States,  as  I  mentioned 
earlier,  we've  always  believed  deeply  that 
incentives  are  key  and  that  free  people 
build  free  markets  that  ignite  dynamic 
development  for  everyone.  For  a  time, 
America's  government  had  drifted  away 
from  this  key  principle,  and  our  economic 
growth  suffered. 

When  we  took  office  in  January  1981, 
we  said  to  the  people:  "Let  us  make  a 
new  beginning.  From  now  on,  if  you  work 
harder  and  earn  more  than  before,  your 
reward  will  be  greater  than  it  was.  We're 
putting  America's  future  in  your  hands. 
You  can  spark  the  spirit  of  enterprise. 
You  can  get  America  moving  again."  And 
they  have. 

In  3  short  years,  the  American  people 
have  revived  a  dynamic  growth  economy 
bolstered  by  incentives  of  lower  tax  rates, 


June  1984 


stable  prices,  reduced  interest  rates,  a 
rebirth  of  productivity,  and  restored  con- 
fidence in  our  currency. 

Hope  is  high.  Confidence  is  strong. 
America's  future  looks  bright  again.  With 
a  strong  technological  base  pioneering 
sunrise  industries  and  modernizing  older 
ones,  the  United  States  is  beginning  an 
economic  renaissance  and  helping  pull 
other  nations  toward  worldwide  recovery. 

U.S.-China  Cooperation 

I  see  America  and  our  Pacific  neighbors 
going  forward  in  a  mighty  enterprise  to 
build  strong  economies  and  a  safer  world. 

The  United  States  and  China  have  a 
historic  opportunity.  We  can  expand  our 
economic  and  scientific  cooperation, 
strengthen  the  ties  between  our  peoples, 
and  take  an  important  step  toward  peace 
and  a  better  life.  And  there  is  much  we 
can  share. 

We  think  progress  in  four  areas  is 
particularly  promising:  trade,  technology, 
investment,  and  exchanges  of  scientific 
and  managerial  expertise. 

In  a  few  short  years,  two-way  trade 
has  risen  sharply.  The  United  States  is 
now  China's  third  largest  trading  part- 
ner. Our  bOateral  trade  shows  great 
promise  for  the  future,  particularly  in 
areas  such  as  machinery,  technology,  oil 
equipment,  petroleum,  agricultural  and 
manufacturing  products. 

Last  June,  I  instructed  our  govern- 
ment to  liberalize  controls  over  the  export 
to  China  of  high-technology  products, 
such  as  computers  and  laboratory  in- 
struments. Our  policies  on  technology 
transfer  will  continue  to  evolve  along  with 
our  overall  relationship  and  the  develop- 
ment of  broader  cooperation  between  us. 
May  I  emphasize  to  the  members  of  the 
scientific  community  here  today:  the 
relaxing  of  export  controls  reflects  my 
determination  that  China  be  treated  as 
a  friendly,  nonallied  nation  and  that  the 
United  States  be  fully  prepared  to  coop- 
erate in  your  modernization. 

During  Premier  Zhao's  visit  to  our 
country,  we  took  another  step  forward, 
signing  the  United  States-China  Indus- 
trial and  Technological  Cooperation  Ac- 
cord. Our  Joint  Commission  on  Commerce 


and  Trade  will  discuss  implementation  of 
the  accord  during  their  next  meeting  in 
Washington  in  May.  We  will  focus  our  ef 
forts  on  the  sectors  to  which  China  has  at- 
tached greatest  priority.  Our  trade  and 
development  program  will  facilitate  our 
progress. 

Expanding  cooperative  ventures 
is  another  area  of  promising  growth: 
American  firms  have  invested  almost 
$700  million  in  joint  ventures  and  offshore 
oil  exploration  in  China,  making  the 
United  States  your  largest  foreign  in- 
vestor. We  welcome  your  determination 
to  improve  conditions  for  foreign  business 
in  China.  Streamlining  bureaucratic  pro- 
cedures, establishing  a  more  predictable 
system  for  investment  through  domestic 
legislation  and  international  agreements, 
reforming  prices  to  make  them  interna- 
tionally competitive,  and  providing 
foreign  business  people  with  the  offices, 
housing,  and  schools  they  and  their 
families  need  to  work  effectively,  will 
stimulate  more  American  investment. 

For  your  part,  some  50  Chinese  firms 
have  established  offices  or  branches  in 
the  United  States,  and  China  has  invested 
in  several  joint  ventures  in  our  country. 

We  intend  to  strengthen  these  trends. 
When  Treasury  Secretary  Regan  was 
here  last  month  for  the  meeting  of  the 
Joint  Economic  Committee,  he  concluded 
a  bilateral  tax  agreement.  Monday,  our 
two  countries  will  sign  this  agreement 
which,  I'm  pleased  to  report,  will  increase 
incentives  for  even  closer  cooperation  be- 
tween American  and  Chinese  firms.  And 
we're  continuing  to  work  toward  conclu- 
sion of  bilateral  agreements  on  greater 
investment  protection  and  many  other 
areas  of  cooperation. 

I  am  particularly  proud  that  the 
United  States  and  China  have  reached 
agreement  on  cooperation  in  the  peaceful 
uses  of  atomic  energy.  As  many  of  you 
know,  the  negotiations  between  our  two 
countries  go  back  almost  to  the  beginning 
of  my  Administration.  We  have  held  a 
total  of  six  sessions  in  Washington  and 
Beijing.  We  made  great  progress  during 
Premier  Zhao's  visit,  and  our  negotiations 
have  just  now  concluded  successfully.  The 
result:  an  agreement  for  cooperation  in 
peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy. 


I  understand  that  several  of  the  peo-     ^" 
pie  here  made  major  contributions  to  this  Scientei 
effort,  which  meets  the  requirements  of 
both  sides.  Once  approval  is  complete,  it 
will  open  broad  opportunities  for  joint 
work  in  development  of  the  energy  base 
which  China  needs  for  its  modernization. 
Scientists,  engineers,  business  leaders, 
and  officials  of  both  countries  interested 
in  peaceful  nuclear  energy  will  welcome 
this  agreement.  China  has  one  of  the 
world's  most  ambitious  programs  for  ex- 
pansion of  electric  power  generation,  anc 
I  believe  that  America's  energy  technol- 
ogy—not  just  in  nuclear  energy  but  aero 
the  board— is  second  to  none,  and  perhaf 
most  suitable  for  China's  varied  needs. 

Our  agreement  is  founded  on  impor- 
tant nonproliferation  standards.  We  hav 
noticed  recent  statements  of  China's  nor 
proliferation  policies,  particularly  those 
by  Premier  Zhao  in  Washington  and 
Beijing  over  the  past  several  months. 
Premier  Zhao  and  I  have  discussed  thes' 
matters  directly.  I  can  tell  you  that  our 
countries  share  the  same  basic  principle; 
of  preserving  world  peace  and  preventir 
the  destabilizing  spread  of  nuclear  ex- 
plosives. Neither  of  us  will  encourage  pr 
liferation  nor  assist  any  other  country  tc 
acquire  or  develop  any  nuclear  explosive 
device.  Our  cooperation  in  the  peaceful 
uses  of  nuclear  energy  wOl  be  based  on 
shared  principles  of  nonproliferation. 

There  is  also  great  potential  in  our 
joint  efforts  to  increase  managerial  and 
scientific  expertise.  I  know  that  many  of 
you  have  heard  through  the  Chinese 
press  about  the  good  work  of  the  9-mont 
Dalian  program  of  management  training 
for  industry,  science,  and  technology. 
More  than  750  graduates  have  received 
training  in  modem  methods  of  industrial 
management.  And  I'm  told  some  of  you 
are  graduates  of  that  program.  Well, 
I'm  delighted  to  announce  that  we  have 
agreed  to  establish  a  special  new  progra 
there  offering  a  full  3-year  master's 
degree  in  business  administration.  The 
deg^ree  will  be  awarded  by  the  State 
University  of  New  York.  We're  to  sharelomewlier 
with  you  the  knowledge  that  is  America 
key  technology— management  and  scienoi 
skills  to  develop  a  nation.  (Bclii 


icientists 


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Department  of  State  Bulle:' 


Vijirs  China 


Under  our  Joint  Commission  on 
ott  science  and  Technology,  we  have  a  very 
)roductive  agreement  with  exchange 
)rograms  in  21  specific  areas.  We're  shar- 
ng  the  benefits  of  research  in  medicine, 
;nergy,  and  other  technical  fields.  Our 
dentists  are  learning  a  great  deal  from 
ach  other  in  public  health,  agricultural 
ciences,  and  many  other  areas. 

Men  and  women  of  vision  already  see 
hat  working  in  the  zero  gravity  environ- 
nent  of  space  offers  dazzling  oppor- 
unities  to  improve  life  on  Earth.  Ex- 
)eriments  done  on  our  space  shuttle  have 
hown  that  life-saving  medicines  can  be 
nanufactured  in  space  with  four  times 
he  purity  of  the  same  medicines  on 
arth.  And  they  can  be  made  over  400 
-imes  more  rapidly,  so  1  month's  produc- 
ion  of  medicines  in  space  yields  as  much 
is  30  years'  production  on  the  ground. 

We  also  look  forward  to  being  able  to 
nanufacture  large  crystals  of  exceptional 
)urity  in  space.  These  crystals  are  the 
)asis  of  the  semiconductor  chips  which 
■un  modem  computers.  By  manufacturing 
hem  in  zero  gravity,  we  can  make  new 
itrides  toward  producing  larger,  faster 
omputers—  the  so-caUed  supercom- 
puters—and  ultimately  reduce  the  cost 
)f  computer  manufacturing.  We  look 
'orward  to  exploring  with  China  the 
jossibilities  of  cooperating  in  the  develop- 
nent  of  space  on  behalf  of  all  our  fellow 
:itizens. 

In  the  humanities  and  social  sciences, 
lundreds  of  American  and  Chinese 
scholars  have  visited  each  others'  coun- 
tries to  teach  and  study  subjects  ranging 
"rom  law  and  economics  to  poetry  and 
listory.  For  our  part,  we  welcome  this 
lew  Pacific  tide.  Let  it  roll  peacefully  on, 
;arrying  a  two-way  flow  of  people  and 
deas  that  can  break  down  barriers  of 
suspicion  and  mistrust  and  build  up  bonds 
Df  cooperation  and  shared  optimism. 

The  future  is  ours  to  build.  Surmount- 
Jig  the  risks  and  the  fears  of  some  may 
ae  difficult,  but  I'm  convinced  the  chal- 
enge  is  worth  it.  The  greatest  victories 
:ome  when  people  dare  to  be  great,  when 
they  summon  their  spirits  to  brave  the 
x,i  unknown  and  go  forward  together  to 
reach  a  greater  good. 


June  1984 


To  help  save  the  panda,  an  endangered  species  native  only  to  China,  American  school- 
children donated  money  which  Mrs.  Reagan  presented  to  Chinese  officials.  Here  at  the 
Beijing  Zoo,  she  pets  a  baby  panda. 


So  often,  we  see  individual  actions  of 
courage  and  love  in  everyday  life  that 
give  us  faith  to  believe  in  ourselves  and 
hope  for  a  better  future.  In  1981,  a  bright, 
young  American  student,  John  Zeldman, 
came  here  to  study  China  and  to  seek 
new  friends.  He  was  a  boy  of  great  heart 
and  enthusiasm,  and  riding  his  bicycle  on 
Bering's  streets,  conversing  and  camping 
with  artists  and  students,  he  fell  in  love 
with  your  country.  Tragically,  he  was 
struck  ill  on  his  20th  birthday  and  later 
died.  But  his  tragedy  brought  forth 
new  life. 

John's  family  and  friends  have  estab- 
lished a  Chinese  studies  program  at  the 
Sidwell  Friends  School  in  Washington. 
Hundreds  have  contributed,  and  the  pro- 


gram now  attracts  young  people  from 
public  and  private  schools  and  serves  as 
a  model  for  other  schools  all  across 
America.  Earlier  this  year.  Premier  Zhao 
visited  the  school.  This  summer  the  entire 
class  will  come  to  China  as  his  guests  to 
meet  their  student  contemporaries. 

From  the  great  grief  of  one  boy's 
death  came  a  seed.  And  from  that  seed 
has  grown  a  tree  of  understanding— a  tree 
that  now  blossoms  with  the  beauty  of 
friendship  and  cooperation.  If  our  people 
could  go  forward  in  this  same  spirit,  plan- 
ting not  one  tree,  but  millions,  and  then 
tending  each  so  it  may  grow  sturdy  and 
tall— then  the  dream  of  a  single  youth 
might  grow  into  the  golden  dreams  of  all 
mankind. 


Toast  at  Welcoming 
Banquet  Hosted  by 
Premier  Zhao  Ziyang, 
April  27,  19843 


Since  we  arrived  yesterday,  the  gracious- 
ness  with  which  we  have  been  received 
has  been  truly  heartwarming.  A  Chinese 
proverb  best  describes  my  feelings: 
"When  the  visitor  arrives,  it  is  as  if  re- 
turning home." 

Having  ab-eady  known  Premier  Zhao, 
one  of  the  purposes  of  my  visit  was  to 
make  new  friends.  But  I  find,  especially 
after  meeting  President  Li  and  General 
Secretary  Hu,  that  instead  of  making 
friends,  I  am  among  friends. 

This  has  been  a  stimulating  day.  Much 
was  accomplished,  not  the  least  of  which 
was  the  renewal  of  the  personal  rapport 
we  established  during  your  memorable 
visit  to  the  United  States.  Your  visit  per- 
mitted you  to  judge  for  yourself  the  inten- 
tions of  the  American  people.  I  hope  the 
good  will  you  experienced,  just  as  I  en- 
joyed from  your  people  today,  confirmed 
to  you  that  our  citizens  want  our  coun- 
tries to  work  in  harmony. 

The  American  and  Chinese  Govern- 
ments have  responded  to  that  wish  in  a 
series  of  formal  communiques  which  set 
forth  the  fundamental  principles  of  our 
relationship— the  1972  Shanghai  commu- 
nique, the  January  1, 1979,  communique 
establishing  diplomatic  relations,  and  the 
August  17, 1982,  communique  negotiated 
by  my  Administration. 

By  any  accounting  the  cooperation 
between  China  and  the  United  States 
already  has  been  a  boon  to  our  people. 
We  have  both  gained.  In  the  last  few 
years,  two-way  trade  has  taken  off.  There 
has  been  a  veritable  explosion  of  student, 
science,  business,  and  tourist  exchanges 
between  our  peoples.  Joint  business  ven- 
tures which  profit  all  concerned  are 
multiplying. 

We  would  be  less  than  candid  if  we 
minimized  the  significance  of  the  benefits 
we  each  receive  from  our  good  relations. 
Standing  together,  we  can  expand  the 
trade  and  commercial  ties  that  increase 


the  quality  of  life  in  both  countries.  Stand- 
ing together,  we  can  further  peace  and 
security.  Great  nations,  if  adversaries, 
cannot  draw  from  each  other's  strength. 

The  commitment  to  stand  as  friends 
has  been  made.  The  promise  is  sohd.  The 
challenges  that  remain,  however,  will 
take  both  patience  and  mutual  under- 
standing. I  have  suggested  and,  with  your 
permission,  say  again  this  evening:  Let  us 
use  as  our  guide  the  principle  of  hujing 
hu  /iMi— mutual  respect,  mutual  benefit. 
This  principle  has  within  it  both  dignity 
and  fairness. 

Another  source  from  which  to  draw  is 
our  knowlege  of  each  other,  a  well  of 
familiarity  which  increases  in  depth  with 
every  passing  day. 

We  are  each  working  hard  to  learn 
more  about  the  delicate  and  detailed 
workings  of  the  other's  system— ours 
with  its  complex  legal  procedures  based 
on  the  separation  of  powers,  and  yours 
with  its  own  intricate  patterns.  Insights 
into  why  and  how  decisions  are  made  can 
help  both  of  us  appreciate  our  agreements 
and  accept  in  good  faith  our  disagree- 
ments. 

From  what  we  see,  Premier  Zhao,  my 
countrymen  are  enthused  by  what  is  hap- 
pening in  China.  Your  modernization  pro- 
gram, an  ambitious  undertaking,  makes 
our  future  relationship  even  more  promis- 
ing. You  are  striving  to  quadruple  your 
production  by  the  year  2000,  and  the  eyes 
of  the  world  are  watching  as  you  progress 
on  this  peaceful  and  productive  course. 
The  American  people  wish  you  success 
and  offer  you  our  cooperation  in  this 
great  endeavor. 

Americans,  more  than  others,  admire 
those  who  set  great  goals  and  strive  to 
improve  their  lot.  When  that  first 
American  merchant  ship  set  sail  for  China 
200  years  ago,  our  forefathers  were 
citizens  of  a  weak  republic  living  in  an 
unexplored  and  undeveloped  land.  We 
Americans  are  proud  of  our  accomplish- 
ments in  these  last  200  years,  just  as  you 
are  rightfully  proud  of  the  enormous  con- 
tributions Chinese  civilization  has  made 
to  mankind. 

As  China  moves  forward  to  modernize 
and  develop  its  economy,  the  United 
States  is  eager  to  join  in  a  cooperative  ef- 


fort to  share  the  American  capabilities 
that  helped  turn  our  country  from  a  vast 
wilderness  into  an  industrial  giant.  Those 
American  capabilities  flow  from  the 
creative  enterprise  our  society  en- 
courages. Our  progress  is  based  on  what 
we  have  found  to  work.  If  it  did  not  work. 
the  American  people,  who  are  pragmatic 
by  nature,  would  likely  have  abandoned  it 
long  ago. 

China  today,  I  understand,  is  taking 
its  ovm  practical  approach.  By  increasing 
incentives  and  decentralizing  decision- 
making, you  are  promoting  innovation, 
creativity,  and  a  better  ability  to  adapt  to 
local  conditions.  The  responsibility 
system  in  agriculture  has  spurred  in- 
creases in  food  production  throughout 
China,  and  the  special  economic  zones  arei 
providing  dramatic  examples  of  how  in- 
centives can  raise  productivity  and  offer 
bountiful  opportunities  for  a  better  life. 

In  your  drive  for  modernization,  you 
have  our  best  wishes.  If  you  ask  our  ad- 
vice, we  can  only  answer  with  truth  as  wi 
see  it.  But  let  me  assure  you,  we  want 
you  to  succeed.  Having  1  billion  people- 
nearly  a  quarter  of  mankind— healthy, 
well  fed,  clothed,  and  housed,  educated, 
and  given  the  opportunity  for  a  higher 
standard  of  living  is  in  the  interest  of 
good  and  decent  people  everywhere.  It  is 
certainly  in  the  interest  of  the  American 
people,  who  wish  to  trade  and  be  friends 
with  the  Chinese  people. 

Premier  Zhao,  as  we're  all  well  awan 
our  cooperation  is  based  on  more  than 
simply  the  desire  to  improve  our 
economies.  Today  the  peace  of  the  world 
is  threatened  by  a  major  power  that  is 
focusing  its  resources  and  energies  not  oi 
economic  progress  but,  instead,  on 
military  power. 

The  shift  in  military  might  of  the  last 
decade  has  made  trust  and  friendship  be- 
tween us  even  more  vital.  I  know  it  is 
your  desire,  and  that  of  the  United  State 
as  well,  that  peace  be  preserved.  We  seel 
to  better  the  quality  of  life  of  our  people, 
and  that  can  be  done  only  in  a  peaceful  ei 
vironment.  War  is  the  great  destroyer  of 
all  the  hopes  of  mankind. 

To  preserve  the  peace  and  protect  ou 
own  sovereignty  and  independence,  we 
stand  together  in  opposing  expansionism 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


■W 


icnptioi 


Eastai 


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tmtbe 
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April  26 
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Vijlrj  China 


and  hegemony.  We  stand  together  in  sup- 
port of  the  independence  of  Afghanistan 
and  Kampuchea.  Both  of  us  seek  to  pro- 
mote peace  and  reconciliation  through 
dialogue  between  South  and  North  on  the 
Korean  Peninsula.  Both  of  us  seek  the 
early  independence  of  Namibia  and  an 
end  to  outside  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  southern  Africa.  Although  our  pre- 
scriptions for  getting  there  are  quite  dif- 
ferent, we  share  a  common  desire  for  a 
fesolution  of  the  turmoil  in  the  Middle 
}ast  and  Central  America.  Both  of  us 
seek  an  end  to  the  use  of  chemical 
weapons  and  agree  on  the  necessity  of 
reducing  nuclear  arms. 

A  strong  China,  dedicated  to  peace, 
clearly  is  in  the  best  interest  of  interna- 
tional stability  and  in  the  best  interest  of 
the  United  States.  A  robust  and  enduring 
friendship  will  bolster  the  security  of  both 
our  countries  without  compromising  the 
independence  of  either.  It  will  be  the 
trust  between  us  that  will  keep  us  and 
the  world  at  peace.  In  this,  let  us  be  of 


While  in  Beijing,  the  President  and  Mrs. 
Reagan  stayed  at  the  Diaoyutai  State  Guest 
House  ("The  Fishing  Pavilion"),  where  on 
April  26  he  responded  to  a  toast  at  a  dinner 
held  in  the  Yang  Yuan  Hall  and  hosted  by 
President  Li  Xiannian.  Located  on  a 
100-acre  compound,  Diaoyutai  dates  to  the 
12th  century  non-Chinese  Jin  Dynasty  when 
Emperor  Zhang  Zhong  used  the  imperial 
parkland  for  fishing.  Villas  constructed 
there  were  used  as  early  as  the  13th  century 
For  emperors  and  their  families  to  relax  out- 
side the  walled  city  of  Bering  and  to  enter- 
tain poets  and  calligraphers.  Qing  Dynasty 
Emperor  Qianlong,  a  contemporary  of 
George  Washington,  expanded  the  pond  into 
Yuyuan  Lake  and  built  the  Palace  of 
Tongleyuan  ("Garden  of  Shared 
Happiness"),  now  enclosed  within  gray 
walls  to  the  southwest  of  the  presidential 
villa.  The  government  converted  the 
Diaoyutai  Park  into  a  state  guest  house 
compound  in  1959  and  built  15  new  villas  to 
complement  the  older  structures.  The  blue- 
tiled  presidential  villa  is  decorated  primarily 
™in  Chinese  style,  including  the  traditional 
moon  gate  linking  the  downstairs  parlor  and 
dining  room  and  the  large  indoor  garden 
with  its  four  seasons  hall. 


June  1984 


(White  House  photo  by  Bill  Fiti-Patrick) 


n 


the  same  mind.  And  as  a  saying  from 
"The  Book  of  Changes"  goes,  "If  two  peo- 
ple are  of  the  same  mind,  their  sharpness 
can  cut  through  metal." 

It  is  the  hope  and  prayer  of  the 
American  people  that  someday  there  will 
no  longer  be  a  need  for  our  nation  to  use 
any  of  its  resources  to  produce  weapons 
of  any  kind.  The  Chinese  and  American 
people  are  now  showing  the  world  by  our 
example  that  there  is  a  better  way  than 
hatred  and  violence. 

Many  of  us  in  this  room  have  seen 
much  history  in  our  lifetime.  My  own  life- 
time spans  one-third  of  the  history  of  the 
American  Republic.  Over  the  many  years 
that  God  has  permitted  me  to  live,  I  have 
observed  the  changing  nature  of  the  rela- 
tionship between  our  two  countries. 

At  times,  our  feelings  toward  each 
other  were  hostile  and  negative.  Today 
we  have  the  opportunity  to  keep  our 
countries  on  a  path  of  genuine  good  will 
that  will  reap  rewards  for  generations  to 
come.  Let  us  not  shy  from  the  task.  It  will 
not  be  easy;  yet,  let  us  move  forward  so 
that  someday  when  the  young  people  of 
our  countries  reach  a  ripe  old  age,  they 
will  look  back,  and  there  will  be  no 
memory  of  a  time  when  there  was  any- 
thing else  but  friendship  and  good  feel- 
ings between  the  Chinese  and  American 
people.  That  is  a  gift  we  can  give  to  them. 

In  our  shared  spirit  of  friendship, 
peace,  and  cooperation,  I  am  delighted  to 
note  that  both  President  Li  and  General 
Secretary  Hu  have  accepted  our  invita- 
tion to  visit  the  United  States.  We  look 
forward  to  reciprocating  the  warm  hospi- 
tality that  we've  been  shown  in  your 
beautiful  country. 

And  in  that  same  spirit,  permit  me, 
Premier  Zhao,  to  propose  a  toast.  To  your 
health,  Mr.  Premier,  to  the  health  of 
President  and  Mrs.  Li  who  so  graciously 
acted  as  our  hosts  yesterday,  to  the 
health  of  Chairman  Deng,  General 
Secretary  Hu,  and  the  other  distin- 
guished Chinese  citizens  it  is  my  privi- 
lege to  meet  this  week,  and  to  the  friend- 
ship and  cooperation  between  our  two 
countries. 


Interview  on 
Chinese  Television, 
April  28,  1984^ 

Q.  This  year  marks  the  bicentennial  of 
the  beginning  of  Sino-U.S.  contacts  and 
the  fifth  anniversary  of  the  establish- 
ment of  diplomatic  relations  between 
China  and  the  United  States.  This  visit 
at  this  time  is,  therefore,  of  exceptional 
significance.  This  is  your  first  visit  to 
China.  Would  you  please  tell  us  your 
impression  of  the  visit? 

A.  Thank  you,  and  may  I  say  how 
pleased  I  am  to  visit  your  great  and 
historic  country.  As  a  boy  going  to  school 
in  a  small  town  in  our  Midwest,  I  used  to 
dream  of  coming  here.  In  those  days, 
China  seemed  a  million  miles  away,  and 
today  modem  jet  travel  gives  us  the 
privilege  of  seeing  China,  meeting  your 
hard-working  people  and  learning  more 
about  the  progress  that  you're  making, 
and  visiting  the  many  treasures  of  your 
civilization— one  of  the  oldest  in  the 
world. 

Permit  me  first  to  thank  you  on  behalf 
of  Nancy  and  myself  for  the  warmth  of 
your  welcome.  We  journey  to  your  coun- 
try to  make  friends,  but  already  you've 
made  us  feel  that  we  are  among  friends, 
and  you  have  touched  our  hearts.  Our 
only  regret  is  our  visit  will  be  so  brief. 
It's  a  little  like,  as  a  Tang  Dynasty  poet 
once  wrote,  "looking  at  the  flowers  while 
riding  on  horseback."  But  I  mentioned  at 
the  Great  Hall  yesterday  that  you  have 
another  saying  from  the  book  of  Han  that 
describes  how  Nancy  and  I  feel:  "To  see  a 
thing  once  is  better  than  hearing  about  it 
a  hundred  times." 

Our  visit  this  year  marks  the  200th 
anniversary  since  the  first  American  mer- 
chant ship  called  at  a  Chinese  port.  Two 
hundred  years  for  your  civilization  seems 
like  the  blink  of  an  eye,  but  for  Ameri- 
cans they  span  the  entire  history  of  our 
Repubhc.  Yes,  your  country  is  old  while 
ours  is  young,  and,  yes,  we  speak  dif- 
ferent languages,  have  different  customs, 
and  our  governments  hold  different  politi- 
cal beliefs.  But  I  believe  if  you  could  look 
beyond  labels  and  into  the  homes  and 


hearts  of  our  people,  you'd  find  they 
share  many  basic  values,  values  with  youii 
own— values  like  the  dignity  of  work,  the 
importance  of  opportunity,  the  love  and 
strength  of  family,  reverence  for  elders, 
the  dream  of  leaving  a  better  life  for  our 
children  and  our  children's  chDdren,  and 
finally  our  simple,  heartfelt  desire  to  be 
friends  and  to  live  together  in  peace.  ^ 
Americans  are  people  of  peace.  It's 
important  you  know  that.  We  pose  no 


threat  to  China  or  any  nation.  We  have  n>  ^^^^^ 


ingfom 

And 
jnymor 

Q.T 

four  vis 
!t«aiiya 
[,S,reli 
:retest( 
kerici 


troops  massed  on  your  borders.  We  oc- 
cupy no  lands.  After  Worid  War  II,  we 
were  the  only  undamaged  industrial 
power,  the  only  nation  to  harness  the 
atom,  and  the  only  people  with  the  powei 
to  conquer  the  world.  But  we  didn't  con- 
quer anybody.  We  used  our  power  to 
write  a  new  chapter  in  history  by  helping  £ 
rebuild  the  war-ravaged  economies  of 
both  friends  and  foes.  We  love  peace  and 
we  cherish  freedom,  because  we've 
learned  time  and  again  in  place  after 
place  that  economic  growth  and  human 
progress  make  their  greatest  strides  _ 
when  people  are  secure  and  free  to  think 
speak,  worship,  choose  their  own  way, 
and  reach  for  the  stars. 

We  admire  the  progress  your  govern 
ment  has  made  in  opening  China's  eco- 
nomy to  the  worid  and  in  providing  more 
opportunities  for  your  people  to  better 
their  lives.  And  we've  told  your  leaders 
that  as  the  world's  leading  economy,  the 
United  States  welcomes  the  chance  to 
walk  by  China's  side,  sharing  our  techno 
ogy  and  encouraging  a  greater  flow  of 
people,  products,  and  ideas  between  our 
two  countries. 

Like  China,  the  United  States  is  a 
Pacific  nation.  A  prosperous  future  is  be 
ing  built  in  the  Pacific,  and  we're  now 
your  nation's  third  largest  trading  part- 
ner. We're  working  together  to  improve 
industrial,  technological  cooperation, 
increased  trade  and  investment,  and  ex- 
pand educational  and  cultural  exchanges 

Let  us  resolve  that  communication, 
not  confrontation;  and  commerce,  not 
conflict,  will  always  govern  Chinese- 
American  relations.  If  we  do,  there  is  r 


A. 


iigyou 


lentoi 


oiirselv 


mr,i 


opmei 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


iiterj 


r 


n,m 


rpven 


ice  to 

riectai 

,o\vof 


If  part- 


:e,  w' 


Vijirs  China 


limit  to  the  progress  we  can  make  by  go- 
)'  ing  forward  hand  in  hand — xieshou  bing- 
A,[\i  j{yi  [walk  together  hand  in  hand]. 

And  now  I'd  be  delighted  to  answer 
iny  more  of  your  questions. 

Q.  The  Chinese  public  expect  that 
our  visit  will  give  an  impetus  to  the 
teady  and  the  sustained  growth  of  Sino- 
J.S.  relations.  In  your  view,  what  con- 
rete  steps  should  the  Chinese  and 
jpi  Imerican  sides  take  to  promote  the  fur- 
her  development  of  Sino-U.S.  relations? 

A.  We've  take  a  number  already; 
he  progress  that  we  have  made  with  re- 
gard to  trade  agreements,  that  we're  dis- 
ussing  right  now  with  regard  to  protect- 
ng  your  people  and  ours  against  double 
axation.  We  have  arrived  at  an  agree- 
nent  on  nuclear  cooperation  for  peaceful 
nergy,  and  at  the  same  time  we  have 
igreed  to  prevent  as  much  as  we  can  by 
mrselves  nuclear  proliferation  of 
veapons  to  other  countries. 

But  we've  had,  I  believe,  five  mem- 
bers of  our  Cabinet  here  in  the  last 
several  months  meeting  with  their  coun- 
«rparts  in  your  government,  working  out 
everything  from  commerce  and  trade  re- 
ations.  Our  Secretary  of  Defense  has 
leen  here,  our  Secretary  of  State.  We're 
,„  iiscussing  energy  problems. 

We'll  continue  along  that  path,  finding 
ill  these  areas  of  agreement  and  coopera- 
Aon.  And,  as  I  say,  we've  made  great 
Drogress  already. 

Q.  Both  you  and  the  Chinese  leaders 
lave  expressed  the  desire  for  further  de- 
velopment of  Sino-U.S.  relations. 
Everyone  knows  that  the  issue  of 
Taiwan  is  a  major  obstacle  to  the  devel- 
ireisb*  jpment  of  our  bilateral  relations.  It  is 
ilso  an  important  matter  affecting  the 
national  feelings  of  1  billion  Chinese 
people.  Could  you  please  tell  us  how  the 
United  States  intends  to  gradually 
remove  this  obstacle? 

A.  We  believe  that  this  is  a  problem  of 
Chinese  people  on  both  sides  of  the  straits 
to  work  out  for  themselves.  It  is  true  that 
we  have  a  long  historical  relationship,  a 
Friendship  with  the  people  on  Taiwan.  We 
DeUeve  that  the  solution  when  it  comes 
should  be  peaceful,  and  we  do  not  believe 
that  we  should  involve  ourselves  in  this 
internal  affair. 


Our  position,  however,  has  been 
that— with  the  utmost  sincerity.  We  want 
to  go  forward  with  friendship  for  the  peo- 
ple of  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  At 
the  same  time,  we  don't  believe  that  it 
would  be  right  to  cast  aside  longtime,  old 
friends  in  order  to  make  new  friends.  But 
we  will  do  anything  we  can  to  encourage 
the  peaceful  solution  of  this  problem  by 
the  peoples  of  China. 

Q.  There  is  a  great  potential  for 
Sino-U.S.  economic  cooperation.  What 
measures  are  the  U.S.  Government  pre- 
pared to  adopt  to  promote  further  eco- 
nomic and  technological  cooperation 
between  the  two  countries? 

A.  I  believe  I  answered  that  in  part 
on  your  previous  question  here.  We  are 
going  forward.  We  have  made  great 
strides  in  providing  high  technology  in- 
formation and  high  technology  itself  in 
trade  with  the  People's  Repubhc  of 
China,  and  we  have  an  agricultural  agree- 
ment now  with  regard  to  our  grain  sales 
to  you.  But  we  also  have  worked  out 
agreements  covering  other  forms  of 
trade. 

There  are  still  some  leftover  prohibi- 
tions in  some  of  our  own  laws,  but  we  are 
working  with  our  owti  Congress  to  elimi- 
nate those  and  have  made  great  progress 
with  that.  And  so,  again,  it's  a  case  of 
continuing  on  the  path  that  has  already 
been  started. 

Q.  We  would  like  to  invite  you  to 
speak  about  your  prediction  for  the 
prospects  for  the  growth  of  Sino-U.S. 
relations  in  the  future. 

A.  I  am  very  optimistic  about  this 
growth  of  the  relations  that  have  already 
been  started.  And  I  think  in  your  two 
previous  questions,  I  left  out  one  of  the 
most  important  things  that  should  be 
mentioned  and  that  is  the  development  of 
relations  in  education,  the  exchange  of 
students. 

Just  before  I  left  the  United  States  to 
come  here,  I  met  with  a  group  of  your 
students  who  are  attending  our  colleges 
in  the  United  States.  There  are  some 
12,000  in  all,  and  we,  at  the  same  time, 
are  looking  forward  to  an  exchange— our 
own  students  coming  here.  Of  course,  we 
also  have  a  visitation  in  which  roughly  a 


hundred  thousand  of  our  people  visit  your 
country  now  with  great  interest  and  en- 
joyment. 

So  this,  I  think,  is  one  of  the  great 
things  for  the  future,  as  our  young  people 
get  to  know  each  other.  I  have  always 
said  that  our  troubles  begin  when  people 
are  talking  about  each  other  instead  of  to 
each  other.  And  if  we  can  have  our  young 
people  talking  to  each  other,  I'm  very  op- 
timistic about  the  future. 


Remarks  at  a 
Dinner  Honoring 
Premier  Zhao  Ziyang, 
April  28,  19845 


Nancy  and  I  are  delighted  to  welcome 
you  here  tonight.  We  hope  to  return  in  at 
least  a  small  way  the  kind  hospitality  that 
has  been  extended  to  us  since  we  set  foot 
in  this  magnificent  city. 

For  Americans,  the  very  mention  of 
China  holds  a  sense  of  aUure.  It  conjures 
up  images  of  the  Yangtze  River  alive 
with  traditional /a «c/iM<iw,  and  modem 
steamers,  with  the  wide  deserts  of  the 
north,  of  the  bamboo  forests  in  the  south- 
west that  are  home  to  pandas,  golden 
monkeys,  and  so  many  other  animals 
native  only  to  China,  of  the  rich,  produc- 
tive fields  and  farmlands  of  the  east,  and 
of  the  huge  cities  like  Beijing  and 
Shanghai. 

All  these  provide  a  sharp  contrast 
with  America  and  remind  us  of  China's 
sweep  and  vitality.  Yet  what  strikes  us 
most,  perhaps,  is  the  sense  of  China's 
history.  Chinese  records  date  back  3,500 
years.  Kingdoms  rose  and  fell  in  China 
long  before  we  in  the  West  saw  the  rise 
and  fall  of  Rome.  And  your  people  were 
creating  and  building  architectural 
wonders  more  than  a  thousand  years  be- 
fore Christopher  Columbus  discovered 
America. 

By  contrast,  it  was  barely  four  cen- 
turies ago  that  the  first  European  settlers 
landed  on  our  eastern  coast.  'These  hardy 
men  and  women  and  those  who  followed 


lune  1984 


WBHBlllHIMIitlBHl»WHWHIIHWWilill»ilHlllilMHm 


■"■""""""""■■ 


them  came  from  virtually  every  nation  in 
Europe.  They  felled  trees,  planted  crops, 
built  towns,  and  established  legislatures. 
Later  many  thousands  came  from  China 
and  joined  the  pioneers  who  were  estab- 
lishing farms  and  towns  in  the  American 
West. 

I  have  to  interject  here  and  think  if 
they  had  only  come  earlier  and  the  earli- 
est had  come  from  across  the  Pacific  in- 
stead of  the  Atlantic,  the  Capitol  would 
now  be  in  CaUfomia.  [Laughter] 

But  together  these  diverse  peoples 
buUt  a  great  and  free  nation.  Today  that 
nation  represents  a  powerful  force  for 
peace  in  the  world  and  is  leading  a  tech- 
nological revolution  that  ranges  from  tiny 
microchips  to  voyages  through  the  vast- 
ness  of  space. 

Our  national  experience  has  instilled 
in  all  Americans  certain  fundamental  be- 
liefs. It  has  taught  us  that  for  a  nation 
to  prosper,  there  must  be  peace,  and  that 
for  men  and  women  to  work  together, 
they  must  respect  each  other's  rights. 
And  just  as  these  beliefs  guide  our  deal- 
ings with  one  another,  they've  guided  us 
from  the  first  in  our  dealings  with  other 
nations. 

Just  over  a  century  ago,  Ulysses  S. 
Grant,  then  a  former  President,  came  to 
China  and  described  America's  foreign 
policy  goals  to  the  Chinese  leaders  of  thai 


President  Reagan's  meetings  with  Chinese 
officials  in  Beijing  took  place  in  the  Great 
Hall  of  the  People.  Built  in  just  10  months 
during  1958-59  on  the  west  side  of 
Tiananmen  Square,  it  covers  an  area  of 
60,000  sq.  yards,  making  it  the  largest 
building  in  Beijing.  The  Great  Hall  of  the 
People  also  is  the  site  of  the  National 
People's  Congress. 

In  the  top  photo,  the  President  shakes 
hands  with  Premier  Zhao  Ziyang. 

The  center  photo  shows  the  President 
with  General  Secretary  of  the  Communist 
Party  Hu  Yaobang.  Others  in  the  group  an 
James  Brown,  the  President's  interpreter; 
Lian  Zhengbao,  the  notetaker;  and  Yang 
Jiechi,  the  General  Secretary's  interpreter. 

The  photo  below  is  of  the  President  wit 
Chairman  Deng  Xiaoping  and  their  inter- 
preters, James  Brown  (left)  and  Shi  Yanhu 
(right). 


10 


lik    BA    Mj 


Department  of  State  Bulled 


ierfieli 
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nierprele'; 

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Shi 


Vijirj  China 


ime.  "We  believe,"  he  said,  "that  fair 
)lay,  consideration  for  the  rights  of 
)thers,  and  respect  for  international  law 
vill  always  command  the  respect  of  na- 
ions  and  lead  to  peace.  I  know  of  no 
ither  consideration  that  enters  into  our 
oreign  relations." 

The  policy  that  President  Grant  de- 
icribed  then  remains  our  policy  now.  For 
learly  four  decades,  the  United  States 
md  its  allies  have  kept  the  peace  in 
urope.  Throughout  the  world,  the 
Jnited  States  is  supporting  the  causes  of 
lational  self-determination  and  economic 
)rogress.  And  in  the  interest  of  peace  for 
)ur  children  and  our  children's  children, 
ve're  working  to  achieve  an  equitable 
ind  balanced  reduction  of  nuclear  arms. 

Our  aims  and  commitments  are  fully 
consistent  with  the  sovereignty,  independ- 
ence, and  economic  development  of  all 
lations,  including  China.  We  seek  no  ex- 
pansion but  the  expansion  of  good  will 
md  opportunity;  no  victory  but  the  vic- 
;ory  of  peace. 

China  and  the  United  States  differ 
narkedly  in  their  values,  forms  of  govem- 
nent,  and  economic  systems.  To  ignore  or 
inderstate  our  differences  would  be  to  do 
m  injustice  to  both.  But  we  both  believe 
hat  despite  our  differences,  our  people 
ire  united  in  their  desire  to  resist  foreign 
hreats,  raise  their  families  in  prosperity 
ind  peace,  and  go  as  far  in  this  life  as 
;heir  intelligence  and  imagination  might 
:ake  them.  We  hold  more  than  enough  in 
ommon  to  provide  firm  ground  on  which 
ive  can  work  together  for  the  benefit  of 

30th. 

In  the  12  years  since  the  long  silence 
Detween  our  nations  was  broken  by  the 
signing  of  the  Shanghai  communique, 
China  and  America  have  begun  a  produc- 
tive partnership.  Our  cooperation  has 
belped  to  provide  a  counterbalance  to  ag- 
ajessive  world  forces.  In  recent  years,  we 
have  formed  new  and  important  bonds  in 
other  fields  as  well,  expanding  our  cul- 
tural and  academic  exchanges. 

One  figure  tells  a  big  part  of  the 
story.  Just  5  years  ago,  there  were  no 
more  than  a  handful  of  Chinese  and 
J  Americans  studying  in  each  other's  coun- 
tries. Since  then,  several  hundred  Ameri- 
y^h«  can  scholars  have  come  to  China,  and 


more  than  10,000  Chinese  students  have 
gone  to  America.  These  students  are 
forming  the  ties  of  friendship  and 
understanding  on  which  the  future  of  our 
relationship  depends. 

At  the  same  time,  our  two  nations 
have  begun  economic  exchanges  that  are 
growing  in  importance  every  day.  Today 
China  exports  tons  of  foodstuffs,  raw 
materials,  and  manufactured  goods  to  the 
United  States  each  year.  America  in  turn 
supplies  China  with  grain,  transportation 
equipment,  and  scientific  insti-uments, 
and  the  United  States  is  helping  China  to 
acquire  the  capital  and  technology  so 
vital  to  a  growing  economy.  Already  some 
of  the  many  joint  Chinese- American  busi- 
ness ventures  have  begun  to  bear  fruit. 
This  magnificent  hotel  is  the  outcome  of 
just  such  a  joint  venture. 

As  our  relationship  has  matured,  both 
our  nations  have  undergone  important 
changes.  In  the  past  12  years,  we  in  the 
United  States  have  had  four  Presidential 
administrations.  Each  has  worked  stead- 
fastly to  improve  the  Chinese-American 
friendship.  Here  in  China,  you  too  have 
had  changes  in  leadership.  But  you,  too, 
have  remained  firmly  committed  to  the 
friendship  between  our  nations.  We  in  the 
United  States  are  particularly  pleased  by 
the  new  emphasis  on  economic  develop- 
ment. We  congratulate  you,  Mr.  Premier, 
and  the  other  Chinese  leaders  who  have 
worked  so  diligently  and  boldly  to  im- 
prove the  lives  of  the  Chinese  people.  We 
recognize  that  it  took  courage  to  set 
these  policies  in  place.  And  you  have  our 
pledge  to  give  you  our  full  cooperation  as 
you  modernize  your  nation's  economy. 

To  view  China  and  the  United  States 
as  immense  lands  a  world  apart  is  to  see 
one  aspect  of  the  truth.  But  in  this  cen- 
tury, there's  another  view  that  is  even 
more  meaningful.  It  is  the  view  of  a  small 
green  and  blue  ball  spinning  in  the  dark- 
ness of  space— a  sight  that  has  so  deeply 
moved  all  who  have  seen  it.  That  view  is  a 
view  of  the  future,  for  it  shows  one 
planet,  our  planet,  where  all  nations  seem 
as  close  neighbors.  Our  two  nations  are 
firmly  committed  to  that  future. 


June  1984 


Ladies  and  gentlemen,  please  join  me 
in  a  toast.  To  your  health,  Mr.  Premier;  to 
the  health  of  President  Li,  General  Secre- 
tary Hu,  Chairman  Deng,  and  the  other 
Chinese  leaders  I've  been  privileged  to 
meet;  and  to  the  everlasting  friendship  of 
the  Chinese  and  American  people. 

And  if  I  say  the  final  word  that  I  was 
going  to  say  with  the  glass  that  I  wOl  hold 
in  my  hand— I'm  afraid  we  can't  do  it.  I 
was  going  to  say  gan  bei  [bottoms  up]. 
[Laughter] 


Radio  Address 
to  the  Nation, 
April  29,  19848 


I'm  sure  you've  heard  that  Nancy  and  I 
are  traveling  a  long  way  from  home  this 
week.  We've  already  flown  more  than 
9,000  miles,  stopping  off  in  the  beautiful 
islands  of  Hawaii  to  visit  the  citizens  of 
our  50th  State;  and  then  across  the  inter- 
national dateline  to  Guam,  where  the  rays 
of  each  sunrise  first  touch  the  Stars  and 
Stripes;  and  then  on  to  our  primary  desti- 
nation, China,  one  of  the  world's  oldest 
civilizations  and  a  country  of  great  im- 
portance in  today's  Pacific  community  of 
nations. 

This  is  our  second  trip  to  Asia  in  the 
last  6  months.  It  demonstrates  our 
awareness  of  America's  responsibility  as 
a  Pacific  leader  in  the  search  for  regional 
security  and  economic  well-being.  The 
stability  and  prosperity  of  this  region  are 
of  crucial  importance  to  the  United 
States.  The  nations  comprising  the  Pacific 
Basin  represent  our  fastest  growing  trad- 
ing markets.  Many  say  that  the  21st  cen- 
tury will  be  the  century  of  the  Pacific. 

Our  relations  with  China  have  con- 
tinued to  develop  through  the  last  four 
Administrations,  ever  since  President 
Nixon  made  his  historic  journey  here  in 
1972.  In  1978  the  Chinese  leadership 
decided  to  chart  a  new  course  for  their 
country,  permitting  more  economic 
freedom  for  the  people  in  an  effort  to 
modernize  their  economy.  Not  surpris- 
ingly, the  results  have  been  positive. 


11 


Today  China's  efforts  to  modernize, 
foster  the  spirit  of  enterprise,  open  its 
doors  to  the  West,  and  expand  areas  of 
mutual  cooperation  while  opposing  Soviet 
aggression  make  it  a  nation  of  increasing 
importance  to  America  and  to  prospects 
for  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  Pacific. 

When  Nancy  and  I  arrived  in  Beijing, 
we  were  touched  by  the  friendly  hospital- 
ity of  the  Chinese  people,  and  we've  been 
delighted  to  see  the  sweeping  vistas,  the 
bustling  activity,  and  the  many  hallmarks 
of  history  in  this  great,  old  city. 

In  Beijing,  narrow  residential  streets, 
traditional  one-story  houses,  and  treas- 
ures like  the  Forbidden  City,  a  former 
Imperial  Palace,  first  erected  in  1420,  are 
interspersed  with  modern  highrises  and 
wide  avenues.  The  streets  are  normally 
filled  with  people  riding  bicycles.  All  of 
you  who  like  bike  riding  would  love 
Beijing. 

From  the  first  moment,  our  schedule 
has  been  fully  packed.  I've  ab*eady  had 
extensive  meetings  with  the  Chinese 
leaders— President  Li,  Prime  Minister 
Zhao,  General  Secretary  Hu,  and  Chair- 
man Deng.  I  had  the  honor  of  addressing 
a  large  group  of  Chinese  and  American 
leaders  in  science  and  industry  in  the 
Great  Hall  of  the  People,  and  I've  spoken 
to  the  people  of  China  over  Chinese  tele- 
vision. 

We've  also  squeezed  in  some  side 
trips— first,  to  the  magnificent  Great 
Wall,  built  by  the  Chinese  more  than 
2,000  years  ago  to  protect  their  country 
from  outside  invaders;  and  tomorrow  to 
the  ancient  city  of  Xi'an,  an  archaeo- 
logical treasure  considered  the  cradle  of 
Chinese  civilization  and  located  in  a  fertile 
plain  near  the  Yellow  River. 

In  all  our  meetings  and  appearances, 
I've  stressed  one  overriding  point— dif- 
ferent as  to  our  two  forms  of  govern- 
ment—different as  they  may  be,  the  com- 
mon interests  that  bind  our  two  peoples 
are  even  greater;  namely,  our  determina- 
tion to  build  a  better  life  and  to  resist 
aggressors  who  violate  the  rights  of  law- 
abiding  nations  and  endanger  world 
peace. 

When  people  have  the  opportunity  to 
communicate,  cooperate,  and  engage  in 


12 


commerce,  they  can  often  produce  aston- 
ishing results.  We've  already  agreed  to 
cooperate  more  closely  in  the  areas  of 
trade,  technology,  investment,  and  ex- 
change of  scientific  and  managerial  exper- 
tise. And  we've  reached  an  important 
agreement  on  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy  for  economic  development. 

Our  last  stop  in  China  will  be 
Shanghai,  a  center  of  culture  and  com- 
merce. We  plan  to  visit  the  Shanghai  Fox- 
boro  Company,  where  Americans  and 
Chinese  are  making  high-techology  equip- 
ment to  help  advance  China's  industries. 
And  I'll  also  visit  with  the  students  at 
Fudan  University  and  speak  to  them 
about  the  meaning  of  America,  the  chal- 
lenges our  people  face,  and  the  dreams 
we  share. 

We  can  learn  much  from  the  rich 
history  of  China  and  from  the  wisdom  and 
character  of  its  people.  And  I've  told  the 
Chinese  that  Americans  are  people  of 
peace,  filled  with  the  spirit  of  innovation 
and  a  passion  for  progress  to  make  tomor- 
row better  than  today. 

Our  two  nations  are  poised  to  take  an 
historic  step  forward  on  the  path  of 
peaceful  cooperation  and  economic 
development.  I'm  confident  that  our  trip 
will  be  a  significant  success,  resulting  in  a 
stronger  U.S. -China  relationship  than 
before.  For  Americans,  this  will  mean 
more  jobs  and  a  better  chance  for  a 
peaceful  world. 


Remarks  at  Treaty 
Signing  Ceremony 
and  Departure, 
April  30,  1984' 


The  developing  relationship  between 
China  and  the  United  States  has  been  one 
of  the  principal  events  of  postwar  diplo- 
macy. And  today  we're  taking  further 
steps  to  broaden  and  strengthen  the  ties 
based  on  shared  principles  of  mutual 
respect  and  mutual  benefit.  We're  con- 
cluding new  accords  that  will  facilitate 
trade  and  investment,  enhance  the  ex- 
change of  people  and  ideas  between  our 


countries,  expand  the  prospects  for 
cooperation  in  developing  China's  nuclear 
energy  capability,  and  help  address 
China's  critical  need  for  developing 
skilled  managers. 

First,  we're  signing  a  tax  agreement 
that  will  make  it  easier  for  Chinese  and 
American  firms  to  engage  in  trade  and 
cooperate  in  joint  ventures.  With  this 
agreement,  private  investors  in  profes- 
sional exchanges  can  make  a  stronger 
contribution  to  Chinese  development  and 
to  the  benefit  of  both  of  our  nations. 

We're  also  signing  the  implementing 
accord  for  the  cultural  agreement  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  China.  Our 
visit  has  reinforced  our  appreciation  for 
Chinese  hospitality  and  for  China's  an- 
cient and  honorable  culture.  I'm  delightec 
that  now  millions  of  other  Americans  will 
be  able  to  see  the  artistic  and  cultural 
achievements  of  the  Chinese  people. 

This  accord  will  open  my  own  coun- 
try's rich  heritage  to  the  Chinese  people. 
And  under  the  terms  of  the  agreement, 
an  exhibit  from  the  Brooklyn  Museum  of 
Art  is  just  now  opening  here  in  Beijing. 
We're  pleased  that  many  Chinese  people 
will  be  able  to  see  more  American  art  anc 
culture  and  learn  more  about  our  people 
and  our  country. 

Ambassador  Richard  Kennedy  and 
State  Science  and  Technology  Commis- 
sioner Jia  Weiwen  are  initialing  the  text 
of  an  agreement,  as  the  Premier  told  us, 
for  cooperation  between  the  United 
States  and  China  in  the  peaceful  use  of 
nuclear  energy.  We  congratulate  the 
negotiators  for  their  hard  work  and 
diligence.  This  agreement  will  permit 
American  firms  and  experts  to  help  Chinl  ^ 
meet  the  ambitious  energy  goals  of  its 
modernization  program.  Our  agreement  i 
based  on  our  shared  desire  to  prevent  th 
proliferation  of  nuclear  explosives  in  the 
world.  And  it  brings  a  new  dimension  of 
peaceful  cooperation  to  our  relationship. 

Finally,  we  are  signing  a  protocol 
which  extends  the  successful  Dalien  pro- 
gram and  creates  a  special  new  3-year 
course  in  management. 

The  Chinese  people  are  known  to 
Americans  as  people  of  admirable  pa- 
tience and  endless  courtesy.  Throughout 
our  stay  here,  we  have  seen  both  of  tho&Hiijf 


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k'irtues.  Let  us  hope  that  as  contacts 
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mplementing  Accord  for 

Cultural  Exchange  in  1984  and  1985 

Jnder  the  Cultural  Agreement 

Jetween  the  Government  of 

he  United  States  of  America  and 

he  Government  of  the 

*eople'8  Republic  of  China 

!'he  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  People's 
lepublic  of  China  (hereafter  referred  to  as 
'both  sides"),  desirous  of  enhancing  friendly 
elations  between  the  peoples  of  the  two  coun- 
ries,  and  strengthening  cultural  cooperation 
letween  the  two  countries,  based  on  the  prin- 
iples  of  mutual  respect  for  sovereignty,  of 
quality,  reciprocity  and  mutual  benefit,  and  in 
iccordance  with  the  Cultural  Agreement 
igned  on  January  31,  1979,  by  the  two  govern- 
nents,  have  agreed  on  the  following  program 
f  cultural  exchange  between  the  two  coun- 
ries  for  the  period  1984  and  1985. 


President  Reagan,  Premier  Zhao,  Secretary  Shultz,  and  President  Li. 


Culture  and  the  Arts 

An  official  American  Cultural  Delegation, 
irhich  might  include  but  would  not  be  limited 
0  participants  from  the  United  States  Infor- 
JpC*  nation  Agency,  will  visit  China. 

2.  An  official  Chinese  Cultural  Delegation 
vH]  visit  the  United  States  in  the  fall  of  1985 
o  discuss  and  sign  the  1986-1987  Implement- 
ig  Accord  to  the  U.S.-China  Cultural  Agree- 
fient. 

3.  Both  sides  will  send  one  high  quality 
mall  scale  performing  arts  group  to  the  other 
ountry  for  visits  and  performances  during  the 
fe  of  the  Accord.  During  such  visits,  artists 
nay  participate  in  workshops  and  give 
lemonstrations  and  master  classes.  The 
pacifies  for  sending  performing  arts  groups 
nil  be  decided  through  specific  agreements 
igned  by  relevant  organizations  designated  by 
■ach  side  respectively.  Both  sides  agree  to  ex- 
:hange  views  and  propose  suggestions  on  the 

j|i  June  1984 


types  of  performing  arts  groups  to  be  ex- 
changed during  the  life  of  the  next  imple- 
menting accord,  so  that  preparations  can  begin 
early. 

4.  Both  sides  will  hold  one  high  quality  art 
exhibit  in  the  othfer  country  during  the  life  of 
the  Accord.  This  will  be  carried  out  by  the 
U.S.  side  with  the  exhibit  "Town  and  Country: 
Images  of  Urban  and  Rural  Life  in  America, 
Paintings  from  the  Brooklyn  Museum"  in 
China  in  1984,  and  by  the  Chinese  side  with 
the  exhibit  "Chinese  Traditional  Painting: 
Five  Modem  Masters"  in  the  United  States  in 
1984  and  1985.  The  specifics  for  sending  art 
exhibits  will  be  decided  through  specific 
agreements  signed  by  relevant  organizations 
designated  by  each  side  respectively.  Both 
sides  agree  to  exchange  views  and  propose 
suggestions  on  the  types  of  art  exhibits  to  be 
exchanged  during  the  life  of  the  next  imple- 
menting accord,  so  that  preparations  can  begin 
early. 

5.  Both  sides  will  encourage  the  exchange 
of  films,  including  the  exchange  of  Film 
Weeks,  and  film  delegations  to  participate  in 
Film  Week  activities.  Both  sides  agree  that  ex- 
change projects  in  this  field  will  be  decided 
through  specific  agreements  signed  by  rele- 
vant organizations  designated  by  each  side 
respectively. 


6.  Both  sides  will  encourage  the  sending  of 
artists  and  experts  in  fields  such  as  music, 
dance,  drama,  painting,  sculpture,  arts  and 
crafts,  photography  and  film  to  the  other  coun- 
try for  visits,  short-term  lectures,  professional 
exchanges  and  possible  performances  and  ex- 
hibits. 

IL  Journalism,  Broadcasting 
and  Television 

1.  Both  sides  will  continue  to  encourage  per- 
sonnel and  professional  exchanges  and  facili- 
tate the  exchange  of  scripts  and  materials  be- 
tween the  Voice  of  America  and  Radio  Beijing. 

2.  The  Director  of  the  Voice  of  America 
and  the  Director  of  Radio  Beijing  will  each 
lead  a  delegation  for  an  exchange  of  visits  and 
the  Voice  of  America  and  Radio  Beijing  will 
exchange  broadcasters  for  visits  and  profes- 
sional exchange  during  the  life  of  the  Accord. 

3.  Both  sides  will  encourage  and  facilitate 
the  exchange  of  personnel  and  materials  in  the 
fields  of  print  journalism,  television,  and  radio. 
Both  sides  agree  that  exchange  projects  in 
these  fields  will  be  decided  through  separate 
discussion  between  relevant  organizations 
from  both  countries. 


13 


■lUMMIMIIIHill 


III.  Literature,  Translation 
and  Publication 

Both  sides  will  encourage  the  exchange  of 
writers,  translators  and  publishers  in  order  to 
further  mutual  understanding  of  each  other's 
culture,  historj'  and  society. 

IV.  Libraries  and  Archives 

1.  Both  sides  will  continue  to  facilitate  the  ex- 
change of  personnel,  publications,  and  library 
materials  between  the  Library  of  Congress 
and  the  National  Library  of  China,  as  well  as 
between  other  libraries  in  the  two  countries. 

2.  Both  sides  will  continue  to  facilitate  the 
exchange  of  personnel  and  archival  materials 
between  the  National  Archives  and  Records 
Service  of  the  United  States  and  other 
American  archival  organizations  and  the 
Chinese  National  Archives  Bureau. 

V.  Education,  Social  Sciences 
and  Sports 

Both  sides  agree  that  exchange  projects  in 
education,  the  social  sciences  and  sports  will 
be  decided  through  separate  discussions  be- 
tween relevant  organizations  from  both  coun- 
tries. 

VI.  Parks  and  Related  Matters 

Both  sides  will  encourage  continued  exchange 
of  personnel  and  professional  cooperation  be- 
tween the  National  Park  Service  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Bureau  of  Landscape  Architec- 
ture under  the  Ministry  of  Urban  and  Rural 
Construction  and  Environmental  Protection  of 
China.  Both  sides  agree  that  specific  exchange 
projects  will  be  decided  through  separate 
discussions  between  the  two  above-mentioned 
organizations. 

VII.  Private  Exchanges 

Both  sides  will  encourage  and  promote  the  ex- 
pansion of  non-governmental  cultural  ex- 
changes to  facilitate  the  future  development  of 
friendly  relations  between  the  peoples  of  the 
two  countries. 

VIII.  Financial  Provisions 

1.  Both  sides  agree  that  the  necessary  ex- 
penses for  mutual  visits  by  official  delegations 
or  individuals  for  official  projects  under  this 
Accord  will  be  borne  as  follows: 

(A)  The  sending  side  will  bear  the  two-way 
international  travel  expenses  of  the  delega- 
tions or  individuals. 


(B)  The  receiving  side  will  bear  the  ex- 
penses of  board  and  lodging,  transportation, 
and  medical  care  or  medical  insurance, 
necessary  to  ensure  the  continuation  of  the 
program,  when  the  delegation  or  individual  is 
in  its  territory. 

2.  Both  sides  agree  that  payment  of  ex- 
penses for  exchanges  under  this  Accord  involv- 
ing exhibits,  such  as  works  of  art,  handicrafts, 
historical  or  archaeological  objects,  space  ob- 
jects, and  other  objects  of  special  value  or  ar- 
tistic interest,  including  expenses  for  accompa- 
nying staff,  will  be  decided  through  specific 
agreements  signed  separately  and  based  on 
the  differing  conditions  in  the  two  countries. 

3.  Both  sides  agree  that  the  financial  provi- 
sions for  official  projects  under  this  Accord 
which  involve  mutual  exchange  of  delegations 
of  performing  artists,  including  staff  accompa- 
nying the  delegations,  will  be  as  follows: 

(A)  The  sending  side  will  bear  the  delega- 
tions' two-way  international  travel  expenses  or 
the  expenses  from  the  receiving  side  to  a  third 
country,  as  well  as  the  international  transpor- 
tation expenses  of  the  properties,  costumes, 
musical  instruments,  etc. 

(B)  The  organization  or  organizations  des- 
ignated by  the  receiving  side  as  host  organiza- 
tion(s)  will  bear  the  expenses  of  the  delega- 
tions' board  and  lodging,  travel,  and  medical 
care  or  medical  insurance  necessary  to  ensure 
the  continuation  of  the  program  within  the 
receiving  country,  and  transportation  e.x- 
penses  of  the  properties,  costumes,  musical  in- 
struments, etc.,  while  in  the  receiving  country, 
and  provide  the  necessary  interpreters. 

(C)  Other  financial  matters  will  be  negotiated 
separately. 

4.  If  either  side  encounters  financial  dif- 
ficulties in  the  course  of  carrying  out  an  in- 
dividual project,  a  suitable  adjustment  or 
postponement  of  the  project  will  be  decided 
upon  by  consultation  between  the  two  sides. 

IX.  Entry  Into  Effect 

The  present  Accord  will  enter  into  effect  on 
the  day  of  signature. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  Bering  on  this  30th 
day  of  April  1984,  in  the  English  and  Chinese 
languages,  both  texts  being  equally  authentic. 

For  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America: 

Ronald  Reagan 

For  the  Government  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China: 

ZHAOZIYANG 


5h^n^hai 


Address  Before  Students 
and  Faculty, 
Fudan  University, 
April  30,  1984» 


We've  been  in  your  country  only  5  days, 
but  already  we've  seen  the  wonders  of  a 
lifetime— the  Great  Wall  of  China,  a  struc- 
ture so  huge  and  marvelous  that  it  can  be 
seen  from  space;  the  ancient  city  of  Xi'an 
and  the  Tomb  of  the  Great  Emperor  and 
the  buried  army  that  guards  him  stUl. 
These  are  the  wonders  of  ages  past.  But 
today,  I  want  to  talk  to  you,  the  young 
people  of  a  great  university,  about  the 
future— about  oiu*  future  together  and 
how  we  can  transform  human  life  on  this 
planet  if  we  bring  as  much  wisdom  and 
curiosity  to  each  other  as  we  bring  to  our 
scholarly  pursuits. 

I  want  to  begin,  though,  with  some 
greetings.  I  bring  you  greetings  not  only 
from  my  countrymen  but  from  one  of 
your  countrymen.  Some  of  you  know  Ye 
Yang,  who  was  a  student  here.  He 
graduated  from  Fudan  and  became  a 
teacher  of  English  at  this  university.  Nov 
he  is  at  Harvard  University  in  the  Unitec 
States,  where  he  is  studying  for  a  doc- 
torate in  comparative  literature. 

My  staff  spoke  to  him  before  we  left. 
Mr.  Ye  wants  you  to  know  he's  doing 
fine.  He's  working  hard  on  his  spring 
term  papers,  and  his  thoughts  turn  to  yoi 
often.  He  asked  me  to  deliver  a  message 
to  his  former  students,  colleagues, 
friends,  and  family.  He  asked  me  to  say 
for  him,  and  I  hope  I  can,  "Wo  xiang  nia: 
dajia." 

He  wants  you  to  know  that  he  looks 
forward  to  returning  to  Fudan  to  teach. 
And  President  Xie,  he  said  to  tell  you  he 
misses  your  friendship  and  encourage- 
ment. And  Mr.  Ye  says  you  are  a  very 
great  woman  and  a  great  educator.  You 
will  be  proud  to  know  that  he  received 
straight  A's  last  term.  And  when  we  con 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


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gratulated  him,  he  said:  "I  have  nothing 
to  be  proud  of  myself;  I  am  so  proud  of 
my  university." 

I'd  like  to  say  a  few  words  about  our 
China-U.S.  educational  exchange  pro- 
grams. It's  not  entirely  new,  this  ex- 
changing of  students.  Your  President  Xie 
earned  a  degree  from  Smith  College  in 
the  United  States.  Smith  is  also  my  wife 
Nancy's  alma  mater.  And  President  Xie 
also  attended  M.I.T.,  Massachusetts  In- 
stitute of  Technology,  one  of  our  greatest 
universities  of  science,  engineering,  and 
technology. 

But  in  the  past  few  years,  our  two 
countries  have  enjoyed  an  explosion  in 
the  number  of  student  exchanges.  Five 
years  ago,  you  numbered  your  students 
studying  abroad  in  the  hundreds.  Since 
:hen,  20,000  Chinese  scholars  have 
studied  throughout  the  world,  and  more 
than  half  of  them  have  come  to  American 
schools.  More  than  100  American  colleges 
and  universities  now  have  educational  ex- 
changes with  nearly  as  many  Chinese  in- 
stitutions. 

We  have  committed  more  resources 
to  our  Fulbright  program  in  China  than  in 
any  other  country.  Two  of  the  American 
professors  teaching  here  at  Fudan  are 
Fulbright  professors.  And  there  are  20 
American  students  studying  vdth  you, 
and  we're  very  proud  of  them. 

American  students  come  to  China  to 
earn  many  things— how  you  monitor  and 
predict  earthquakes,  how  you've  made 
such  strides  in  researching  the  cause  and 
treatment  of  cancer.  We  have  much  to 
learn  from  you  in  neurosurgery  and  in 
your  use  of  herbs  in  medicine.  And  we 
welcome  the  chance  to  study  your 
language,  your  history,  and  your  society. 

You,  in  turn,  have  shown  that  you're 
jager  to  learn,  to  come  to  American 
schools  and  study  electronics  and  com- 
puter sciences,  math  and  engineering, 
physics,  management,  and  the 
humanities.  We  have  much  to  share  in 
these  fields,  and  we're  eager  to  benefit 
from  your  curiosity.  Much  of  this  sharing 
is  recent,  only  5  years  old.  But  the  areas 
3f  our  mutual  cooperation  continue  to  ex- 
pand. We've  already  agreed  to  cooperate 
more  closely  in  trade,  technology,  invest- 
ment, and  exchanges  of  scientific  and 


lune  1984 


managerial  expertise.  And  we  have  just 
concluded  an  important  agreement  to 
help  advance  our  technological  and 
economic  development  through  the 
peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy. 

That  term— peaceful  use  of  nuclear 
energy— is  key.  Our  agreement  rests 
upon  important  principles  of  nonprolifera- 
tion.  Neither  of  our  countries  will  en- 
courage nuclear  proliferation  nor  assist 
any  other  country  to  acquire  or  develop 
any  nuclear  explosive  device. 

We  live  in  a  troubled  world,  and  the 
United  States  and  China,  as  two  great  na- 
tions, share  a  special  responsibility  to 
help  reduce  the  risks  of  war.  We  both 


agree  that  there  can  be  only  one  sane 
policy  to  preserve  our  precious  civiliza- 
tion in  this  modem  age:  a  nuclear  war 
cannot  be  won  and  must  never  be  fought. 
And  no  matter  how  great  the  obstacles 
may  seem,  we  must  never  stop  our  efforts 
to  reduce  the  weapons  of  war.  We  must 
never  stop  at  all  until  we  see  the  day 
when  nuclear  arms  have  been  banished 
from  the  face  of  this  Earth. 

With  peaceful  cooperation  as  our 
guide,  the  possibilities  for  future  progress 
are  great.  For  example,  we  look  forward 
to  exploring  with  China  the  possibilities 
of  cooperating  in  the  development  of 
space  on  behalf  of  our  fellow  citizens. 


In  his  address  before  the  faculty  and  students  of  Fudan  University,  President  Reagan  told 
them  that  "the  scholars  at  all  the  universities  in  China  and  America  have  a  jfreat  role  to 
play  In  both  our  countries'  futures."  Founded  In  1905  by  professors  and  students  who 
sought  to  acquire  modem  knowledge  without  the  assistance  of  foreign  missionaries,  Fudan 
("New  Dawn")  has  developed  Into  one  of  the  top  two  comprehensive  universities  in  China. 
It  has  recently  established  departments  of  world  economy.  International  politics,  and  Inter- 
national journalism,  as  well  as  research  Institutes  whose  students  work  In  such  fields  as 
genetics,  mathematics,  modem  physics,  and  Chinese  literature. 


15 


Our  astronauts  have  found  that  by 
working  in  the  zero  gravity  environment 
of  space,  we  wUI  be  able  to  manufacture 
life-saving  medicines  with  far  greater 
purity  and  efficiency— medicines  that  wUl 
treat  diseases  of  heart  attack  and  stroke 
that  afflict  millions  of  us.  We  will  learn 
how  to  manufacture  Factor  8,  a  rare  and 
expensive  medicine  used  to  treat  hemo- 
philiacs. We  can  research  the  Beta  Cell, 
which  produces  insulin,  and  which  could 
provide  mankind's  first  permanent  cure 
for  diabetes. 

New  satellites  can  be  launched  for  use 
in  navigation,  weather  forecasting,  broad- 
casting, and  computer  technology.  We 
already  have  the  technology  to  make  the 
extraordinary  commonplace.  We  hope  to 
see  the  day  when  a  Chinese  scientist 
working  out  an  engineering  problem  in 
Fudan  will  be  able  to  hook  into  the  help  of 
a  scientist  at  a  computer  at  M.I.T.  And 
the  scientist  in  Boston  will  be  able  to  call 
on  the  expertise  of  the  scientist  in 
Shanghai,  and  all  of  it  in  a  matter  of 
seconds. 

My  young  friends,  this  is  the  way  of 
the  future.  By  pooling  our  talents  and 
resources,  we  can  make  space  a  new  fron- 
tier of  peace. 

Your  government's  policy  of  forging 
closer  ties  in  the  free  exchange  of 
knowledge  has  not  only  enlivened  your 
economy,  it  has  opened  the  way  to  a  new 
convergence  of  Chinese  and  American  in- 
terests. You  have  opened  the  door,  and 
let  me  assure  you  that  ours  is  also  open. 

Now,  all  of  this  is  particularly  exciting 
in  light  of  the  recent  history  of  our  two 
countines.  For  many  years,  there  was  no 
closeness  between  us.  The  silence  took  its 
toll.  A  dozen  years  ago,  it  began  to 
change.  Together,  we  made  it  change. 
And  now  in  the  past  5  years,  your  policy 
of  opening  to  the  outside  world  has 
helped  us  begin  to  know  each  other  better 
than  we  ever  had  before. 

But  that  process  has  just  begun.  To 
many  Americans,  China  is  still  a  faraway 
place,  unknown,  unseen,  and  fascinating. 
And  we  are  fascinated. 

I  wonder  if  you're  aware  of  the  many 
ways  China  has  touched  American  life? 
The  signs  of  your  influence  and  success 


abound.  If  I  were  spending  this  afternoon 
in  Washington,  I  might  look  out  the  win- 
dow and  see  a  man  and  woman  strolling 
along  Pennsylvania  Avenue  wearing 
Chinese  silk.  They  might  be  on  their  way 
to  our  National  Portrait  Gallery  to  see  the 
Chinese  art  exhibit.  And  from  there, 
perhaps  they  would  stroll  to  our  National 
Gallery  to  see  the  new  building  designed 
by  the  Chinese- American  architect,  I.M. 
Pei.  After  that,  they  might  end  their  day 
dining  in  a  restaurant  that  serves 
Chinese  cuisine. 

We  associate  China  with  vitality, 
enormous  vitality,  and  something  that 
doesn't  always  go  along  with  that— 
subtlety,  the  subtlety  of  discerning  and 
intelligent  minds. 

Premier  Zhao  saw  something  of  the 
American  attitude  toward  China  when  he 
visited  us  in  January.  He  said  after  a  few- 
days  in  our  countrj'  that  he  never  ex- 
pected such  profound  feelings  of  friend- 
ship among  the  American  people  for  the 
Chinese  people. 

Well,  let  me  say,  I'm  happy  to  return 
the  compliment.  I  have  found  the  people 
of  China  to  be  just  as  warm  and  friendly 
toward  us,  and  it's  made  us  very  glad. 

But  meeting  you  and  talking  to  you 
has  only  made  me  want  to  know  more. 
And  I  sense  that  you  feel  the  same  way 
about  Americans.  You,  too,  wish  to 
know  more. 

The  American  Tradition  and 
National  Character 

I  would  like  to  tell  you  something  about 
us  and  also  share  something  of  my  own 
values. 

First  of  all,  America  is  really  many 
Americas.  We  call  ourselves  a  nation  of 
immigrants,  and  that's  truly  what  we  are. 
We  have  drawn  people  from  every  comer 
of  the  Earth.  We're  composed  of  virtually 
every  race  and  religion  and  not  in  small 
.lumbers,  but  large.  We  have  a  statue  in 
New  York  Harbor  that  speaks  of  this— a 
statue  of  a  woman  holding  a  torch  of 
welcome  to  those  who  enter  our  country 
to  become  Americans.  She  has  greeted 
millions  upon  millions  of  immigrants  to 
our  country.  She  welcomes  them  still.  She 
represents  our  open  door. 


All  of  the  immigrants  who  came  to  us 
brought  their  ovm  music,  literature, 
customs,  and  ideas.  And  the  marvelous 
thing,  a  thing  of  which  we're  proud,  is 
they  did  not  have  to  relinquish  these 
things  in  order  to  fit  in.  In  fact,  what 
they  brought  to  America  became  Ameri- 
can. And  this  diversity  has  more  than 
enriched  us;  it  has  literally  shaped  us. 

This  tradition— the  tradition  of  new 
immigrants  adding  to  the  sum  total  of 
what  we  ai'e- is  not  a  thing  of  the  past. 
New  immigrants  are  still  bringing  their 
talents  and  improving  the  quality  of 
American  life.  Let  me  name  a  few.  I  think 
you'll  know  theii-  names. 

In  America,  Wang  computers  have 
become  a  fixture  in  offices  throughout  the 
country.  They  are  the  product  of  the 
energy  and  brilliance  of  Mr.  An  Wang, 
who  himself  is  the  product  of  a  Shanghai 
university. 

The  faces  of  our  cities  shine  with  the 
gleaming  buildings  of  Mr.  I.M.  Pei,  who 
first  became  interested  in  architecture  as 
a  student  here  in  Shanghai. 

What  we  know  of  the  universe  and 
the  fundamental  nature  of  matter  has 
been  expanded  by  the  Nobel  Prize  win- 
ning scientist.  Dr.  Lee  Tsung-Dao,  who 
was  born  in  Shanghai. 

We  admii-e  these  men,  we  honor 
them,  and  we  salute  you  for  what  you 
gave  them  that  helped  make  them  great. 

Sometimes  in  America,  some  of  our 
people  may  disagree  with  each  other.  We 
ai-e  often  a  highly  disputatious  nation. 
We  rather  like  to  argue.  We  are  free  to 
disagree  among  ourselves,  and  we  do. 
But  we  always  hold  together  as  a  society. 
We've  held  together  for  more  than  200 
years,  because  we're  united  by  certain 
things  in  which  we  all  believe,  things  to 
which  we've  quietly  pledged  our  deepest 
loyalties.  I  draw  your  special  attention  to 
what  I'm  about  to  say,  because  it's  so 
important  to  an  understanding  of  my 
country. 

We  believe  in  the  dignity  of  each  mar 
woman,  and  child.  Our  entire  system  is 
founded  on  an  appreciation  of  the  special 
genius  of  each  individual  and  of  his  specii 
right  to  make  his  own  decisions  and  lead 
his  own  life. 


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Vijirj  China 


before  his  formal  address  at  Fudan  University  in  Shanghai,  the  President,  accompanied  by 
Jniversity  President  Madame  Xie  Xide.  held  a  brief  question-and-answer  session  with  a 
jroup  of  students  in  one  of  their  classrooms.  The  6,500  students  are  recruited  from  all  over 
hina  and  represent  the  best  of  those  who  take  the  national  college  entrance  examinations. 


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We  believe— and  we  believe  it  so 
deeply  that  Americans  know  these  words 
by  heart— we  believe  "that  all  Men  are 
created  equal,  that  they  are  endowed  by 
their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable 
Rights,  that  among  those  are  Life,  Liber- 
ty and  the  Pursuit  of  Happiness."  Take 
an  American  student  or  teacher  aside 
later  today  and  ask  if  he  or  she  hasn't 
committed  those  words  to  memory.  They 
are  from  the  document  by  which  we 
created  our  nation,  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence. 

We  elect  our  government  by  the  vote 
of  the  people.  That  is  how  we  choose  our 
Congress  and  our  President.  We  say  of 
our  country,  "Here  the  People  Rule,"  and 
it  is  so. 

Let  me  tell  you  something  of  the 
\.merican  character.  You  might  think 
hat  with  such  a  varied  nation  there 
louldn't  be  one  character,  but  in  many 
iindamental  ways  there  is. 

We  are  a  fairminded  people.  We're 

aught  not  to  take  what  belongs  to  others. 

tfany  of  us,  as  I  said,  are  the  children  and 


June  1984 


grandchildren  and  great-grandchildren  of 
immigrants,  and  from  them  we  learned 
something  of  hard  labor.  As  a  nation  we 
toiled  up  from  poverty,  and  no  people  on 
Earth  are  more  worthy  to  be  trusted  than 
those  who  have  worked  hard  for  what 
they  have.  None  is  less  inclined  to  take 
what  is  not  theirs. 

We're  idealists.  Americans  love 
freedom,  and  we've  fought  and  died  to 
protect  the  freedom  of  others.  When  the 
armies  of  fascism  swept  Europe  four 
decades  ago,  the  American  people  fought 
at  great  cost  to  defend  the  countries 
under  assault. 

When  the  armies  of  fascism  swept 
Asia,  we  fought  with  you  to  stop 
them.  And  some  of  you  Hstening  today 
remember  those  days,  remember  when 
our  General  Jimmy  Doolittle  and  his 
squadron  came  halfway  around  the  world 
to  help.  Some  of  those  pilots  landed  in 
China.  You  remember  those  brave  young 
men.  You  hid  them  and  cared  for  them 
and  bound  up  their  wounds.  You  saved 
many  of  their  lives. 


When  the  Second  World  War  was 
won,  the  United  States  voluntarily 
withdrew  from  the  faraway  places  in 
which  we  had  fought.  We  kept  no  perma- 
nent armies  of  occupation.  We  didn't  take 
an  inch  of  territory,  nor  do  we  occupy 
one  today.  Our  record  of  respect  for  the 
freedom  and  independence  of  others 
is  clear. 

We're  a  compassionate  people.  When 
the  war  ended  we  helped  rebuild  our 
allies— and  our  enemies  as  well.  We  did 
this  because  we  wanted  to  help  the  inno- 
cent victims  of  bad  governments  and  bad 
policies,  and  because,  if  they  prospered, 
peace  would  be  more  secure. 

We're  an  optimistic  people.  Like  you, 
we  inherited  a  vast  land  of  endless  skies, 
tall  mountains,  rich  fields,  and  open 
prairies.  It  made  us  see  the  possibilities  in 
everything.  It  made  us  hopeful.  And  we 
devised  an  economic  system  that  re- 
warded individual  efforts,  that  gave  us 
good  reason  for  hope. 

We  love  peace.  We  hate  war.  We 
think— and  always  have— that  war  is  a 
great  sin,  a  woeful  waste.  We  wish  to  be 
at  peace  with  our  neighbors.  We  want  to 
live  in  harmony  with  friends. 

There  is  one  other  part  of  our  national 
character  I  wish  to  speak  of.  Religion  and 
faith  are  very  important  to  us.  We're  a 
nation  of  many  religions.  But  most 
Americans  derive  their  religious  belief 
from  the  Bible— the  Bible  of  Moses  who 
delivered  a  people  from  slavery;  the  Bible 
of  Jesus  Christ  who  told  us  to  love  thy 
neighbor  as  thyself,  to  do  unto  your 
neighbor  as  you  would  have  him  do 
unto  you. 

And  this,  too,  has  formed  us.  It's  why 
we  wish  well  for  others.  It's  why  it 
grieves  us  when  we  hear  of  people  who 
cannot  live  up  to  their  full  potential  and 
who  cannot  live  in  peace. 

A  Maturing  Relationship 

We  invite  you  to  know  us.  That  is  the 
beginning  of  friendship  between  people. 
And  friendship  between  people  is  the 
basis  for  friendship  between  govern- 
ments. 

The  silence  between  our  governments 
has  ended.  In  the  past  12  years,  our  peo- 


HMIIiUIIIIH 


17 


pie  have  become  reacquainted,  and  now 
our  relationship  is  maturing.  And  we're 
at  the  point  where  we  can  build  the  basis 
for  a  lasting  friendship. 

Now,  you  know,  as  I  do,  that  there's 
much  that  naturally  divides  us:  time  and 
space,  different  languages  and  values,  dif- 
ferent cultures  and  histories,  and  political 
systems  that  are  fundamentally  different. 
It  would  be  foolish  not  to  acknowledge 
these  differences.  There's  no  point  in 
hiding  the  truth  for  the  sake  of  a  friend- 
ship, for  a  friendship  based  on  fiction 
will  not  long  withstand  the  rigors  of 
this  world. 

But  let  us,  for  a  moment,  put  aside 
the  words  that  name  our  differences  and 
think  what  we  have  in  common.  We  are 
two  great  and  huge  nations  on  opposite 
sides  of  the  globe.  We  are  both  countries 
of  great  vitality  and  strength.  You  are  the 
most  populous  country  on  Earth;  we  are 
the  most  technologically  developed.  Each 
of  us  holds  a  special  weight  in  our  respec- 
tive sides  of  the  world. 

There  exists  between  us  a  kind  of 
equipoise.  Those  of  you  who  are  engineer- 
ing students  will  perhaps  appreciate  that 
term.  It  speaks  of  a  fine  and  special 
balance. 

Already  there  are  some  political  con- 
cerns that  align  us,  and  there  are  some 
important  questions  on  which  we  both 
agree.  Both  the  United  States  and  China 
oppose  the  brutal  and  illegal  occupations 
of  Kampuchea.  Both  the  United  States 
and  China  have  stood  together  in  con- 
demning the  evil  and  unlawful  invasion  of 
Afghanistan.  Both  the  United  States  and 
China  now  share  a  stake  in  preserving 
peace  on  the  Korean  Peninsula,  and  we 
share  a  stake  in  preserving  peace  in  this 
area  of  the  world. 

Neither  of  us  is  an  expansionist 
power.  We  do  not  desire  your  land,  nor 
you  ours.  We  do  not  challenge  your 
borders.  We  do  not  provoke  your  anx- 
ieties. In  fact,  both  the  United  States  and 
China  are  forced  to  arm  themselves 
against  those  who  do. 

The  United  States  is  now  undertaking 
a  major  strengthening  of  our  defenses. 
It's  an  expensive  effort,  but  we  make  it  to 
protect  the  peace,  knowing  that  a  strong 
America  is  a  safeguard  for  the  independ- 
ence and  peace  of  others. 


Both  the  United  States  and  China  are 
rich  in  human  resources  and  human 
talent.  What  wonders  lie  before  us  if  we 
practice  the  advice,  To7ig  li  he  zuo— 
Connect  strength  and  work  together. 

Over  the  past  12  years,  American  and 
Chinese  leaders  have  met  frequently  to 
discuss  a  host  of  issues.  Often  we  have 
found  agreement,  but  even  when  we  have 
not,  we've  gained  insight  into  each  other 
and  we've  learned  to  appreciate  the 
other's  perspectives  on  the  world. 

This  process  wOl  continue,  and  it  will 
flourish  if  we  remember  certain  things. 
We  must  neither  ignore  our  problems  nor 
overstate  them.  We  must  never  exag- 
gerate our  difficulties  or  send  alarms  for 
small  reasons.  We  must  remember  that  it 
is  a  delicate  thing  to  oppose  the  wishes  of 
a  friend,  and  when  we're  forced  to  do  so, 
we  must  be  understanding  with  each 
other. 

I  hope  that  when  history  looks  back 
upon  this  new  chapter  in  our  relationship, 
these  will  be  remembered  as  days  when 
America  and  China  accepted  the 
challenge  to  strengthen  the  ties  that  bind 
us,  to  cooperate  for  greater  prosperity 
among  our  people,  and  to  strive  for  a 
more  secure  and  just  peace  in  the  world. 

You,  the  students  at  Fudan  Universi- 
ty, and  the  scholars  at  all  the  universities 
in  China  and  America  have  a  great  role  to 
play  in  both  our  countries'  futures.  From 
your  ranks  will  come  the  understanding 
and  skill  the  world  will  require  in  decades 
to  come.  Today's  leaders  can  pave  the 
way  of  the  future.  That  is  our  respon- 
sibility. But  it  is  always  the  younger 
generation  who  will  make  the  future.  It  is 
you  who  will  decide  if  a  continuing,  per- 
sonal friendship  can  span  the  generations 
and  the  differences  that  divide  us.  In  such 
friendship  lies  the  hope  of  the  world. 

When  he  was  a  very  young  man,  Zhou 
Enlai  wrote  a  poem  for  a  schoolmate  who 
was  leaving  to  study  abroad.  Zhou  ap- 
preciated the  responsibilities  that 
separated  them,  but  he  also  remembered 
fondly  the  qualities  that  made  them 
friends.  And  his  poem  ends: 

Promise,  I  pray,  that  someday 
When  task  done,  we  go  back  fanning. 
We'll  surely  rent  a  plot  of  ground 
And  as  pairing  neighbors,  let's  live. 


Well,  let  us,  as  pairing  neighbors,  live. 
I've  been  happy  to  speak  to  you  here,  to 
meet  you  in  this  city  that  is  so  rich  in 
significance  for  both  our  countries. 
Shanghai  is  a  city  of  scholarship,  a  city  of 
learning.  Shanghai  has  been  a  window  to 
the  West.  It  is  a  city  in  which  my  country 
and  yours  issued  the  communique  that 
began  our  modem  friendship.  It  is  the 
city  where  the  Yangtze  meets  the  East 
China  Sea,  which,  itself,  becomes  the 
Pacific,  which  touches  our  shores. 

The  Yangtze  is  a  swift  and  turbulent 
river,  one  of  the  great  rivers  of  the  world 
My  young  friends,  history  is  a  river  that 
may  take  us  as  it  will.  But  we  have  the 
power  to  navigate,  to  choose  direction, 
and  make  our  passage  together.  The  wine 
is  up,  the  current  is  swift,  and  opportuni- 
ty for  a  long  and  finiitful  journey  awaits 
us. 

Generations  hence  will  honor  us  for 
having  begun  the  voyage,  for  moving  on 
together  and  escaping  the  fate  of  the 
buried  armies  of  Xi'an— the  buried  war- 
riors who  stood  for  centuries  frozen  in 
time,  frozen  in  an  unknowing  enmity. 

We  have  made  our  choice.  Our  new 
journey  will  continue.  And  may  it  always 
continue  in  peace  and  in  friendship. 


Toast  at  Banquet 
Hosted  by 

Mayor  Wang  Daohan, 
April  30,  1984» 


It's  a  pleasure  to  be  here  in  Shanghai,  a 
center  of  culture  and  commerce  where 
enterprising  men  and  women  look  to  the 
future  with  confidence  and  hope. 

Twelve  years  ago,  as  we've  been  tol 
in  this  city,  the  American  and  Chinese 
Governments  issued  the  Shanghai  com 
munique.  And  this  agreement  pledged  t 
broaden  the  understanding  between  oui 
peoples.  We  agreed  that  cooperation  in 
trade,  science,  and  culture  would  benefi 
both  nations.  And  we  announced  that  m 
malization  of  relations  between  China  ai 
the  United  States  would  advance  the  in 
terests  of  all  countries. 


Wjiist 

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Vi5ir5  China 


We've  come  a  long  way  since 
February  1972.  And  I'm  honored  to  com- 
memorate tonight  this  historic  reconcilia- 
tion and  to  mark  the  progress  that  we've 
made. 

Twelve  years  ago,  America  and  China 
each  turned  a  new  page  in  their  histories. 
Today  America  and  China  share  the  com- 
mitment to  go  forward  together  to  write  a 
new  chapter  of  peace  and  progress  for  our 
people. 

My  trip  to  China  has  been  as  impor- 
tant and  as  enlightened  as  any  I've  taken 
as  President.  My  discussions  with  your 
leaders— President  Li,  Premier  Zhao, 
General  Secretary  Hu,  and  Chairman 
Deng— were  productive  and  far-ranging.  I 
welcome  the  opportunity  to  make  new 
friendships  and  to  enhance  the  personal 
relationship  we  have  already  established. 
Only  through  such  steps  can  we  deepen 
the  understanding  between  our  two  great 
countries;  broaden  our  political,  economic, 
and  cultural  relations;  and  stand  firm 
against  expansionist  aggression. 

China  is  a  fabled  land  in  America. 
SchoolchOdren  across  our  country  have 
read  about  your  ancient  history,  the 
Great  Wall,  and  the  discovery  of  the 
treasures  at  Xi'an.  To  see  these  wonders 
in  person  is  a  moving  and  impressing  ex- 
perience. To  me,  it  is  even  more  im- 
pressive to  meet  the  Chinese  people  of  to- 
day. To  see  and  feel  your  energy,  vitality, 
and  hopes  for  a  better  tomorrow  gives  me 
confidence  in  China's  future. 

Earlier  today,  I  had  the  opportunity 
to  meet  with  students  and  faculty 
members  of  Fudan  University.  The 
students  I  talked  to  are  serious  about 
their  learning.  They  want  to  know  more, 
not  just  about  my  country  but  about  the 
world  that  we  all  inhabit  together. 
They're  serious  about  their  responsibOity 
for  their  country's  development  and  well- 
being.  China  is  fortunate  to  have  such 
talented  young  people  to  be  its  leaders  for 
tomorrow. 

This  afternoon  I  also  met  with  the 
workers  and  managers  of  the  Shanghai 
Foxboro  Company,  a  joint  venture  be- 
tween an  American  and  a  Chinese  com- 
pany. There,  Americans  and  Chinese  are 
working  side  by  side  to  make  high  tech- 
nology equipment  that  will  help  advance 


June  1984 


China's  industries,  just  as  these  new 
technologies  are  helping  advance 
America's  industries. 

I'm  greatly  encouraged  to  note  that 
the  factory  I  visited  today  represents 
only  one  of  the  many  forms  of  economic 
and  technological  cooperation  between 
American  and  Chinese  firms  here  in 
Shanghai.  We're  seeing  cooperative  ac- 
tivities in  such  diverse  fields  as  advanced 
technology,  glass-making,  civil  aircraft 
parts  assembly,  athletic  shoe  production, 
pharmaceuticals,  essential  oils,  offshore 
petroleum,  and  engineering,  electrical 
machinery,  and  audio-visual  products. 
Soon,  with  the  support  of  both  Shanghai 
and  national  authorities,  we  can  expect 
our  cooperation  to  increase. 

My  visit  to  China  leaves  me  confident 
that  U.S. -China  relations  are  good  and 
getting  better.  Our  relationship  is  firmly 
grounded  on  realism,  mutual  respect,  and 
a  shared  determination  to  expand  our 
economies,  provide  greater  opportunities 
for  our  people,  and  resist  those  who 
threaten  peace. 


During  a  tour  of  the  Shanghai  Fo.xboro 
Corp.  assembly  facility,  the  President  tried 
his  hand  at  soldering.  After  4  years  of 
negotiation  between  the  Foxboro  Co.  of 
Massachusetts  and  the  Shanghai  Instrumen- 
tation Corp.,  the  facility  opened  in  April 
1983  to  manufacture  process  control  in- 
struments. The  corporation  was  China's 
first  industrial  joint  venture  with  a  U.S. 
partner. 


Tomorrow,  we  leave  to  return  to  the 
United  States.  The  famous  poet  Alfred 
Lord  Tennyson  wrote,  "I  am  a  part  of  all 
that  I  have  met."  The  people  and  places 
of  China  that  Nancy  and  I  have  met  and 
seen  will  always  remain  a  part  of  us.  May 
I  thank  the  leaders  and  the  people  of 
China  for  your  warm  hospitality  and  offer 
this  toast:  To  the  health  of  Mayor  Wang, 
to  the  health  of  the  other  distinguished 
guests  here  this  evening,  and  to  enduring 
friendship  between  the  Chinese  and 
American  people.  Gan  bie  [Bottoms  up]. 


19 


Unired  ^ta^t(^^ 


Arrival  Remarks, 
Fairbanks, 
May  1,  1984i« 

Thank  you  very  much,  and  thank  you 
very  much,  Frank  [Senator  Frank  H. 
Murkowski].  Let  me  just  say  I'm  proud  of 
Alaska's  congressional  delegation  and 
grateful  for  their  help  and  support  and  for 
the  way  they  represent  their  State  in 
Washington.  And  on  behalf  of  Nancy  and 
myself,  and  from  the  bottom  of  our 
hearts,  thank  you  all  for  your  very  warm 
welcome. 

It's  been  a  fascinating  and  rewarding 
10  days,  and  now  our  long  journey  is 
nearly  over.  I  was  interested  to  read  one 
report  on  whether  the  meetings  were  a 
success  or  not  this  morning.  It  seems  that 
TASS,  the  Russian  news  agency,  says 
that  I  was  a  failure  at  trying  to  eat  a 
pigeon  egg  with  my  chopsticks.  [Laugh- 
ter] And  as  usual,  TASS  was  wrong. 
[Laughter]  It  wasn't  a  pigeon  egg;  it  was 
a  quail  egg.  And  I  got  it  on  the  second 
stab.  [Laughter] 

But  we  traveled  almost  20,000  miles 
to  Hawaii,  Guam,  and  finally,  China-to 
the  cities  of  Beijing,  Xi'an,  and  Shanghai. 
We  saw  the  wonders  of  that  country  and 
the  fine  antiquities  of  the  old  civilization. 
But  I  think  the  best  moment  was  late  last 
night— or  I  should  say,  early  this  morn- 
ing. 

Now,  I  had  it  all  in  mind  that  I  was 
going  to  talk  about  coming  through  the 
darkness  and  then  finally  seeing  the 
lights  of  the  coast  of  Alaska  down  be- 
low—Daughter]— and  the  coastline  there, 
and  that  we  knew  that  we  were  seeing 
America  again,  and  we  were  home.  Well, 
there  was  a  cloud  cover  all  the  way  over 
the  Pacific  Ocean.  [Laughter]  So,  the 
lights  that  we  saw  were  the  lights  of  Fair 
banks,  and  believe  me,  we  knew  we  were 
home,  and  it  was  just  fine. 

There's  a  poem  that  was  popular 
when  I  was  a  boy.  It  was  a  poem  about 


20 


the  American  soldiers  returning  from  the 
trenches  in  the  First  World  War.  They 
admired  the  grandeur  and  the  oldness  of 
Europe,  but  their  hearts  longed  for  the 
newness  of  their  own  country.  And  upon 
their  return,  in  that  poem  they  said: 
So  it's  home  again  and  home  again,  America 

for  me. 
My  heart  is  turning  home  again  and  there  I 

long  to  be. 
The  blessed  land  of  room  enough  beyond  the 

ocean  bars, 
Where  the  air  is  full  of  sunlight  and  the  flag  is 
full  of  stars. 

It's  good  to  be  back  in  our  blessed 
land. 

We  went  to  China  to  advance  the 
prospects  for  stability  and  peace  through- 
out the  world.  And  we  went  to  illustrate, 
by  our  presence,  our  sincere  desire  for 
good  relations.  We  went  to  meet  again 
with  the  Chinese  and  review  our  concerns 
and  our  differences.  And  we  went  to 
China  to  further  define  our  own  two  coun- 
tries' relationship-and,  by  defining  it, 
advance  it. 

And  I  feel  that  we  have  progress  to 
report.  I  had  long  and  thoughtful  meet- 
ings with  the  Chinese  leadership,  compre- 
hensive meetings.  We  each  listened  care- 
fully to  what  the  other  had  to  say.  We  dis- 
cussed and  agreed  to  cooperate  more 
closely  in  the  areas  of  trade,  investment, 
technology,  and  exchanges  of  scientific 
and  managerial  expertise.  We  concluded 
an  important  agreement  on  the  peaceful 
uses  of  nuclear  energy.  We  agreed  that  in 
this  imperfect  world,  peace  in  its  most 
perfect  form  cannot  always  be  reached— 
but  it  must  always  be  our  goal.  And  we, 
the  people  of  China  and  the  United 
States,  must  make  our  best  efforts  to 
bring  greater  harmony  between  our  two 
countries. 

It's  a  good  thing  for  the  world  when 
those  who  are  not  allies  remain  open  to 
each  other.  And  it's  good  to  remember 
that  competitors  sometimes  have  mutual 
interests,  and  those  interests  can  make 
them  friends. 

I  told  the  Chinese  leaders,  as  I  told 
the  students  at  Shanghai  University 
yesterday,  that  we  must  continue  to 
acknowledge  our  differences,  for  a  friend- 
ship based  on  fiction  will  not  long  with- 


stand the  rigors  of  the  world.  But  we 
agreed  that  there  is  much  to  be  gained 
from  mutual  respect.  And  there's  much  to 
be  gained  on  both  sides  from  expanded 
opportunities  in  trade  and  commerce  and 
cultural  relations. 

I  was  heartened  by  some  of  the  things 
that  we  saw.  The  Chinese  have  begun 
opening  up  their  economy,  allowing  more 
farmers  and  workers  to  keep  and  sell  on 
their  own  some  of  the  fruits  of  their  labor. 
The  first  injection  of  free  market  spirit 
has  already  enlivened  the  Chinese 
economy.  I  believe  it  has  also  made  a  con- 
tribution to  human  happiness  in  China 
and  opened  the  way  to  a  more  just 
society. 

Yesterday,  before  we  left,  we  sat  in  a 
Chinese  home  at  one  of  the  now-called 
townships— they  were  once  caUed  com- 
munes-the  farm  communes  where  they 
raise  the  foodstuffs  for  all  of  China,  but 
now  there  is  a  difference.  They  owe  a  por- 
tion of  what  they  produce  to  the  govern- 
ment, but  then  over  and  above  that,  they 
can  produce  on  their  own  and  sell  in  a 
free  marketplace.  And  in  this  home,  it 
was  most  interesting.  This  young  couple, 
their  little  son,  his  mother  and  father  liv- 
ing with  them,  and  he  was  telling  us  all 
these  things— and  he  built  that  home 
himself,  and  a  very  fine  job  it  was-and 
then  told  us  of  how  they're  saving  and 
what  they're  saving  to  buy  next.  It  could 
have  been  in  any  home  in  America,  talk- 
ing about  the  problems  of  making  ends 
meet  and  that  they  were  saving  for  this 
or  that  for  their  future. 

And  I  was  also  impressed,  not  only  by 
them  but  by  all  of  the  Chinese  that  we 
met— by  their  curiosity  about  us.  Many  of 
the  Chinese  people  still  don't  understand 
how  our  democracy  works  or  what  impels 
us  as  a  people.  So,  I  did  something 
unusual.  I  tried  to  explain  what  America 
is  and  who  we  are-to  explain  to  them  oui 
faith  in  God  and  our  love,  our  true  love, 
for  freedom.  They'll  never  understand  us 
until  they  understand  that. 

It  was  a  breathUking  experience  and 
in  some  ways,  I  think,  a  groundbreaking 
experience.  But  for  us  now,  it's  very  fit- 
ting that  we  return  home  here  to 
Alaska— the  only  one  of  our  States  that  is 
equidistant  to  Asia  and  Washington,  a 


Department  of  State  Bulleti    ki 


J  lis 


westward-facing  State,  and  a  State,  may  I 
say,  from  which  we've  received  strong 
support. 

When  I  was  in  Beijing,  I  explained  to 
the  Chinese  that  our  attempt  to  build  up 
our  defenses,  after  more  than  a  decade  of 
almost  constant  neglect,  is  an  attempt  to 
preserve  the  peace  and  preserve  freedom 
in  the  world.  No  one  has  helped  us  more 
in  our  efforts  to  rebuild  our  strength  than 
the  members  of  your  Alaskan  congres- 
sional delegation.  And  I  thank  them,  as 
always,  for  their  efforts  and  their  good 
sense. 

It's  been  good  to  talk  to  you  and  to 
see  you  and  to  be  welcomed  by  you. 
Every  time  I  come  to  Alaska  I  think  of 
Robert  Service,  and  I  always  threaten  to 
recite  "The  Shooting  of  Dan  McGrew"— 
[laughter]— which  I  can  do,  believe  it  or 
not.  But  I  won't  subject  you  to  it  or  those 
tired  and  bedraggled  persons  over 
there— my  friends  in  the  press.  They've 
been  working  very  hard  the  past  10  days 
to  bring  you  at  home  the  look  and  sound 
of  China;  and  they're  tired,  so  we'd  like  to 
give  them  a  chance  to  rest.  Maybe  at  the 
next  press  conference  I'll  recite  it. 
[Laughter] 

But  it's  wonderful  to  be  here,  and  I 
thank  you  again  for  your  very  warm 
greetings.  We'll  take  them  with  us  tomor- 
row when  we  meet  here  in  Fairbanks 
with  a  great  man  of  peace— Pope  John 
Paul  II,  who  is  also  on  his  way  to  Asia,  to 
South  Korea.  His  continuing  mission  of 
peace  is  a  service  to  all  humanity,  and  I 
look  forward  to  seeing  and  having  a  few 
moments  with  him  again,  as  we  had  once 
before  in  Rome. 

But  again,  God  bless  you  all.  It's  just 
wonderful  to  be  here,  to  see  you  all  again. 
And  all  I  can  say,  as  far  as  Nancy  and  I 
are  concerned,  we'll  be  back. 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  7,  1984,  which 
also  includes  remarks  made  during  the  visit 
that  are  not  printed  there. 

*Made  in  the  auditorium  of  the  Great  Hall 
of  the  People.  Zhou  Peiyuan,  a  distinguished 
Chinese  scientist,  hosted  the  event,  which  was 
attended  by  500-600  Chinese  guests  who 
either  have  been  involved  in  the  various 
aspects  of  U.S. -China  cooperation  directly 
related  to  China's  modernization  program  or 
who  study  Sino-U.S.  relations. 


June  1984 


China  ^ A  profile 


People 

Noun  and  adjective:  Chinese  (sing,  and  pi.) 
Population  (1982):  Just  over  1,008  billion. 
Annual  growth  rate  (1982):  1.5%.  Ethnic 
groups:  Han  Chinese,  93.3%;  others  include 
Zhuang,  Uygur,  Hui,  Yi,  Tibetan,  Miao,  Man- 
chu,  Mongol,  Buyi,  Korean.  Religions:  Of- 
ficially atheist,  but  there  are  Muslims,  Bud- 
dhists, Laniaists,  Christians,  and  adherents  to 
Chinese  folk  religions  (varying  amalgams  of 
Buddhism,  Confucianism,  Daoism,  and 
ancestor  worship).  Language:  Standard 
Chinese  (Putonghua)  or  Mandarin  (hased  on 
the  Beijing  dialect).  Education:  Years  mm- 
pulsory—b;  1990  goal  is  universal  elemen- 
tary school  education.  First  grade  enroll- 
ment—9Z%.  Literacy— over  75%.  Life  ex- 
pectancy—68.  Work  force  (447.1  million): 
Agriculture— 74.4%.  Industry  and  com- 
merce—16.1%.  Other— 10.G%. 

Geography 

Area:  9.6  million  sq.  km.  (3.7  million  sq.  mi.); 
US  is  9.3  million  sq.  km.  Land:  Agricul- 
tural—11%.  Forest  and  woodland— 12.7%. 
Cities:  Capital- Beijing  (pop.  5.6  million). 
Other  afics— Shanghai  (6.3  million),  Tianjin 
(5.1  million),  Guangzhou  (3.1  million), 
Shenyang  (4  million),  Wuhan  (3.2  million), 
Chengdu  (2.5  million).  Terrain:  Varied. 
Climate:  Varied  continental. 

Economy 

GNP  (1981):  $301  billion.  Annual  growth 
rate  (1980-82):  7.4%.  Per  capita  GNP  (1982): 
$298.  Avg.  inflation  rate  (1982  Chinese 
estimate):  2.2%. 


Natural  resources:  Coal,  iron,  petroleum, 
mercury,  tin,  tungsten,  antimony, 
manganese,  molybdenum,  vanadium, 
magnetite,  aluminum,  lead,  zinc,  uranium, 
world's  largest  hydroelectric  potential. 

Agriculture:  Products— rice,  wheat, 
other  grains,  cotton.  Arable  land— 11%. 

Industries:  Iron,  steel,  coal,  machinery, 
light  industrial  products,  armaments, 
petroleum.  Gross  value  of  industrial  output 
(1982):  $294.2  billion.  Heavy/light  industry 
proportion  is  about  equal. 

Trade  (1982):  Exports- $23.5  billion: 
agricultural  goods,  textiles,  light  industrial 
products,  nonferrous  metals,  petroleum,  iron, 
steel,  machine  tools,  and  weapons.  Im- 
por^5— $20.8  billion:  grain,  chemical  fer- 
tilizer, industrial  raw  materials,  machinery 
and  equipment.  Major  markets— Hong  Kong, 
Japan,  US,  Singapore,  FRG.  Major  sup- 
pliers—isLpan.  US,  Hong  Kong,  FRG, 
Canada. 

Average  exchange  rate  (1982):  1.895 
yuan  =  US$1. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

irN  and  its  specialized  agencies,  INMARSAT, 
INTELSAT,  International  Committee  of  the 
Red  Cross,  and  others. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of 
December  1983,  published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State. 
Editor:  J.  Darnell  Adams.  ■ 


^Made  in  the  Banquet  Hall  of  the  Great 
Hall  of  the  People  in  response  to  a  toast  by 
Premier  Zhao. 

■•Held  in  the  Garden  Room  at  the  Diaoyutai 
State  Guest  House  where  President  and  Mrs. 
Reagan  stayed  during  their  visit  to  Beijing. 
This  interview  was  taped  for  later  broadcast 
on  Chinese  television. 

"Held  in  the  Grand  Ballroom  of  the  Great 
Wall  Hotel  which  the  President  hosted  for 
Premier  Zhao. 


^Recorded  at  the  Diaoyutai  State  Guest 
House  for  broadcast  in  the  United  States. 

'Made  in  the  Western  Hall  of  the  Great 
Hall  of  the  People. 

'Made  in  the  auditorium  of  the  universitv. 

"Made  at  the  Shanghai  Industrial  Exhibi- 
tion Hall  in  response  to  a  toast  by  Mayor 
Wang  Daohan. 

'"Made  at  a  "welcome  home"  rally  at  the 
Patty  Athletic  Center  at  the  University  of 
Alaska.  ■ 


21 


THE  PRESIDENT 


U.S.  Interests 

in  Central  America 


President  Reagan's  televised  address 
to  the  nation,  on  May  9,  198k> 

My  fellow  Americans,  last  week  I  was  in 
Beijing  and  Shanghai-3  weeks  from  now 
I'll  be  preparing  to  leave  for  Dublin,  Nor- 
mandy, and  the  annual  economic  summit 
in  London.  . 

I'm  pleased  that  our  trip  to  China  was 
a  success.  I  had  long  and  thoughtful 
meetings  with  the  Chinese  leadership. 
Though  our  two  countries  are  very  dif- 
ferent, we  are  building  a  strong  relation- 
ship in  a  genuine  spirit  of  cooperation; 
and  that's  good  for  the  cause  of  peace. 
This  was  our  second  trip  to  Asia  in 
the  last  6  months.  It  demonstrates  our 
awareness  of  America's  responsibility  for 
leadership  in  the  Pacific  Basin-an  area  of 
tremendous  economic  vitality.  I  believe 
our  relations  with  our  Asian  allies  and 
friends  have  never  been  better. 

The  Fate  of  Central  America 

But  that  isn't  what  I  want  to  talk  to  you 
about.  I  asked  for  this  time  to  tell  you  of 
some  basic  decisions  which  are  yours  to 
make.  I  believe  it  is  my  constitutional 
responsibility  to  place  these  matters 
before  you.  they  have  to  do  with  your  na- 
tional security,  and  that  security  is  the 
single  most  important  function  of  the 
Federal  Government.  In  that  context,  it's 
my  duty  to  anticipate  problems,  warn  of 
dangers,  and  act  so  as  to  keep  ham  away 
from  our  shores. 

Our  diplomatic  objectives  will  not  be 
attained  by  good  will  and  noble  aspira- 
tions alone.  In  the  last  15  years  the 
growth  of  Soviet  militai^  power  has 
meant  a  radical  change  in  the  nature  of 
the  worid  we  live  in.  This  does  not  mean, 
as  some  would  have  us  believe,  that 
we're  in  imminent  danger  of  nuclear  war. 
We're  not. 

As  long  as  we  maintain  the  strategic 
balance  and  make  it  more  stable  by  reduc 
ing  the  level  of  weapons  on  both  sides, 
then  we  can  count  on  the  basic  prudence 
of  the  Soviet  leaders  to  avoid  that  kind  of 
challenge  to  us.  They  are  presently 
challenging  us  with  a  different  kind  of 
weapon:  subversion  and  the  use  of  sur- 


rogate forces-Cubans,  for  example. 
We've  seen  it  intensifying  during  the  last 
10  years  as  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  sur- 
rogates moved  to  establish  control  over 
Vietnam,  Laos,  Kampuchea,  Angola, 
Ethiopia,  South  Yemen,  Afghanistan,  anci 
recently,  closer  to  home  in  Nicaragua  and 
now  El  Salvador.  It's  the  fate  of  this 
region.  Central  America,  that  I  want  to 
talk  to  vou  about  tonight. 

The  issue  is  our  effort  to  promote 
democracy  and  economic  well-being  in  the 
face  of  Cuban  and  Nicaraguan  aggression, 
aided  and  abetted  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
It  is  definitely  not  about  plans  to  send 
American  troops  into  combat  in  Central 
America.  Each  year,  the  Soviet  Union 
provides  Cuba  with  $4  billion  m  assist, 
ance-  and  it  sends  tons  of  weapons  to  fo- 
ment revolution  here  in  our  hemisphere. 

The  defense  policy  of  the  United 
States  is  based  on  a  simple  premise:  we 
do  not  start  wars.  We  will  never  be  the 
aggressor.  We  maintain  our  strength  m 
order  to  deter  and  defend  against  aggres- 
sion-to  preserve  freedom  and  peace.  We 
help  our  friends  defend  themselves. 

Central  America  is  a  region  of  great 
importance  to  the  United  States.  And  it 
is  so  close-San  Salvador  is  closer  to 
Houston,  Texas,  than  Houston  is  to 
Washington,  D.C.  Central  America  is 
America;  it's  at  our  doorstep.  And  it  has 
become  the  stage  for  a  bold  attempt  by 
the  Soviet  Union,  Cuba,  and  Nicaragua  to 
install  communism  by  force  throughout 
the  hemisphere. 

When  half  of  our  shipping  tonnage 
and  imported  oil  passes  through  Canb- 
bean  shipping  lanes,  and  neariy  ha^  ot  all 
our  foreign  trade  passes  through  the 
Panama  Canal  and  Caribbean  waters, 
America's  economy  and  well-being  are 
at  stake. 

Right  now  in  El  Salvador,  Cuban- 
supported  aggression  has  forced  more 
than  400,000  men,  women,  and  children  to 
flee  their  homes.  And  in  all  of  Central 
America,  more  than  800,000  have  fled, 
many,  if  not  most,  hving  in  unbehevable 
hardship.  Concerns  about  the  prospect  ot 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  refugees  fleeing 
communist  oppression  to  seek  entry  into 
our  country  are  well  founded. 


What  we  see  in  El  Salvador  is  an  at- 
tempt to  destabilize  the  entire  region  and 
eventually  move  chaos  and  anarchy 
toward  the  American  border. 

As  the  National  Bipartisan  Commis- 
sion on  Central  America,  chaired  by 
Henry  Kissinger,  agreed,  if  we  do  nothing 
or  if  we  continue  to  provide  too  little  help, 
our  choice  will  be  a  communist  Central 
America  with  additional  communist 
military  bases  on  the  mainland  of  this 
hemisphere  and  communist  subversion 
spreading  southward  and  northward. 
This  communist  subversion  poses  the 
threat  that  100  million  people  from 
Panama  to  the  open  border  on  our  south 
could  come  under  the  control  of  pro- 
Soviet  regimes. 

If  we  come  to  our  senses  too  late, 
when  our  vital  interests  are  even  more 
directly  threatened,  and  after  a  lack  of 
American  support  causes  our  friends  to 
lose  the  ability  to  defend  themselves,  thei 
the  risks  to  our  security  and  our  way  of 
life  will  be  infinitely  greater. 

But  there  is  a  way  to  avoid  these 
risks,  recommended  by  the  National 
Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America.  It  requires  long-tem  American 
support  for  democratic  development, 
economic  and  security  assistance,  and 
strong-willed  diplomacy. 

There  have  been  a  number  of 
high-level  bilateral  meetings  with  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  where  we've 
presented  specific  proposals  for  peace.  I 
have  appointed  two  special  ambassadors 
who  have  made  more  than  10  tnps  to  the 
region  in  pursuit  of  peace  during  the  last 
year  And  Central  America's  democratic 
neighbors-Mexico,  Venezuela,  Colombia 
and  Panama-have  launched  a  compre- 
hensive initiative  for  peace  through  whal 
is  known  as  the  Contadora  process.  The 
United  States  fully  supports  the  objec- 
tives of  that  process. 

We  can  and  must  help  Central 
America.  It's  in  our  national  interest  to 
do  so;  and,  morally,  it's  the  only  right 
thing  to  do.  But,  helping  means  domg 
eri«tff/!-enough  to  protect  our  security 
and  enough  to  protect  the  lives  of  our 
neighbors  so  that  they  may  live  in  peace 
and  democracy  without  the  threat  of  com 
munist  aggression  and  subversion.  This 
has  been  the  poUcy  of  our  Admmistratio 
for  more  than  3  years. 

But  making  this  choice  requires  a 
commitment  from  all  of  us,  our  Ad- 
ministration, the  American  people,  and 
the  Congress.  So  far,  we  have  not  yet 
made  that  commitment.  We've  provided 
just  enough  aid  to  avoid  outright  disastf 


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22 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


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THE  PRESIDENT 


Cuban  Presence  in  Nicaragua 

10,000 


aut  not  enough  to  resolve  the  crisis;  so 
51  Salvador  is  being  left  to  slowly  bleed 
,0  death. 

Part  of  the  problem,  I  suspect,  is  not 
,hat  Central  America  isn't  important,  but 
;hat  some  people  think  our  Administra- 
ion  may  be  exaggerating  the  threat  we 
e.  Well,  if  that's  true,  let  me  put  that 
ssue  to  rest. 

The  Real  Nature  of  the  Sandinista 
Regime 

I  want  to  tell  you  a  few  things  tonight 
about  the  real  nature  of  the  Sandinista 
regime  in  Nicaragua. 

The  Sandinistas  who  rule  Nicaragua 
are  communists  whose  relationship  and 
ties  to  Fidel  Castro  of  Cuba  go  back  a 
quarter  of  a  century.  A  number  of  the 
Sandinistas  were  trained  in  camps  sup- 
ported by  Cuba,  the  Soviet  bloc,  and  the 
PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organization]. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  Cuba,  the 
Sandinistas,  the  Salvadoran  communist 
of  ton  guerrillas,  and  the  PLO  have  all  worked 
together  for  many  years.  In  1978,  the 
Sandinistas  and  elements  of  the  PLO 
joined  in  a  "declaration  of  war" 
against  Israel. 

The  Cuban-backed  Sandinistas  made  a 
major  attempt  to  topple  the  Somoza 
regime  in  Nicaragua  in  the  fall  of  1978. 
rhey  failed.  They  were  then  called  to 
Havana,  where  Castro  cynically  in- 
tructed  them  in  the  ways  of  successful 


communist  insurrection.  He  told  them  to 
tell  the  world  they  were  fighting  for 
political  democracy,  not  communism.  But 
most  important,  he  instructed  them  to 
form  a  broad  alliance  with  the  genuinely 
democratic  opposition  to  the  Somoza 
regime.  Castro  e,xplained  this  would 
deceive  Western  public  opinion,  confuse 
potential  critics,  and  make  it  difficult  for 
Westei-n  democracies  to  oppose  the 
Nicaraguan  revolution  without  causing 
great  dissent  at  home. 

You  see,  that's  how  Castro  managed 
his  revolution.  And  we  have  to  confess  he 
fooled  a  lot  of  people  here  in  our  own 
country— or  don't  you  remember  when  he 
was  referred  to  in  some  of  our  press  as 
the  George  Washington  of  Cuba? 

The  Sandinistas  listened  and  learned. 
They  returned  to  Nicai'agua  and  prom- 
ised to  establish  democracy.  The 
Organization  of  American  States  (0  AS), 
on  June  23,  1979,  passed  a  resolution 
stating  that  the  solution  for  peace  in 
Nicaragua  required  that  Somoza  step 
down  and  that  free  elections  be  held  as 
soon  as  possible  to  establish  a  truly 
democratic  government  that  would 
guarantee  peace,  freedom,  and  justice. 
The  Sandinistas  then  promised  the  OAS 
in  writing  that  they  would  do  these 
things.  Somoza  left,  and  the  Sandinistas 
came  to  power.  This  was  a  negotiated  set- 
tlement based  on  power  sharing  between 
communists  and  genuine  democrats  like 
the  one  some  have  proposed  for  El 
Salvador  today.  Because  of  these  prom- 
ises, the  previous  U.S.  Administration 
and  other  Western  governments  tried,  in 
a  hopeful  way,  to  encourage  Sandinista 
success. 

It  took  some  time  to  realize  what  was 
actually  taking  place;  that  almost  from 
the  moment  the  Sandinistas  and  their 
cadre  of  50  Cuban  covert  advisers  took 
power  in  Managua  in  July  of  1979,  the  in- 
ternal repression  of  democratic  groups, 
trade  unions,  and  civic  groups  began. 
Right  to  dissent  was  denied.  Freedom  of 
the  press  and  freedom  of  assembly  be- 
came virtually  nonexistent.  There  was  an 
outright  refusal  to  hold  genuine  elections 
coupled  with  the  continual  promise  to  do 
so.  Their  latest  promise  is  for  elections  by 
November  1984.  In  the  meantime,  there 
has  been  an  attempt  to  wipe  out  an  entire 
culture,  the  Miskito  Indians,  thousands  of 
whom  have  been  slaughtered  or  herded 
into  detention  camps  where  they  have 
been  stai^ved  and  abused.  Their  villages, 
churches,  and  crops  have  been  burned. 

The  Sandinistas  engaged  in  anti- 
Semitic  acts  against  the  Jewish  communi- 


June  1984 


ty.  And  they  per.secuted  the  Catholic 
Church  and  publicly  humiliated  individual 
priests.  When  Pope  John  Paul  II  visited 
Nicaragua  last  year,  the  Sandinistas 
organized  public  demonstrations,  hurling 
insults  at  him  and  his  message  of  peace. 
On  this  last  Good  Friday,  some  100,000 
Catholic  faithfuls  staged  a  demonstration 
of  defiance.  You  may  be  hearing  about 
that  demonstration  for  the  first  time  right 
now.  It  wasn't  widely  reported. 
Nicaraguan  Bishop  Pablo  Antonio  Vega 
recently  said:  "We  are  living  with  a 
totalitarian  ideology  that  no  one  wants  in 
this  country"— this  country  being 
Nicaragua. 

The  Sandinista  rule  is  a  communist 
reign  of  terror.  Many  of  those  who  fought 
alongside  the  Sandinistas  saw  theii- 
revolution  betrayed;  they  were  denied 
power  in  the  new  government;  some  were 
imprisoned,  others  exiled.  Thousands  who 
fought  with  the  Sandinistas  have  taken 
up  arms  against  them  and  are  now  called 
the  contras.  They  are  freedom  fighters. 

What  the  Sandinistas  have  done  to 
Nicaragua  is  a  tragedy.  But  we 
Americans  must  understand  and  come  to 
grips  with  the  fact  that  the  Sandinistas 
are  not  content  to  biijtalize  their  own 
land.  They  seek  to  export  their  ten-or  to 
every  other  country  in  the  region. 

I  ask  you  to  listen  closely  to  the 
following  quotation:  "We  have  the 
brilliant  revolutionary  example  of 

Nicaragua The  struggle  in  El 

Salvador  is  very  advanced:  the  same  in 
Guatemala,  and  Honduras  is  developing 

quickly Very  soon  Central  America 

will  be  one  revolutionary  entity . . . . " 
That  statement  was  made  by  a 
Salvadoran  guerrilla  leader  in  March 
of  1981. 

Shortly  after  taking  power,  the  San- 
dinistas—in partnership  with  Cuba  and 
the  Soviet  Union— began  suppoi'ting  ag- 
gression and  terrorism  against  El 
Salvador,  Honduras,  Costa  Rica,  and 
Guatemala.  They  opened  training  camps 
for  guerrillas  from  El  Salvador  so  they 
could  return  to  their  country  and  attack 
its  government.  Those  camps  still 
operate.  Nicaragua  is  still  the  head- 
quarters for  communist  guerrilla  move- 
ments. And  Nicaraguan  agents  and 
diplomats  have  been  caught  in  Costa  Rica 
and  Honduras  supervising  attacks  carried 
out  by  communist  terrorists. 

The  role  that  Cuba  has  long  per- 
fomied  for  the  Soviet  Union  is  now  also 
being  played  by  the  Sandinistas.  They 
have  become  Cuba's  Cubans.  Weapons, 
supplies,  and  funds  are  shipped  from  the 


23 


rammmmnmaBS 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Soviet  bloc  to  Cuba,  from  Cuba  to 
Nicaragua,  from  Nicaragua  to  the 
Salvadoran  guerrillas.  These  facts  were 
confiiTTied  last  year  by  the  House  Intel- 
ligence Committee. 

The  Sandinista  regime  has  been  wag- 
ing war  against  its  neighbors  since 
August  of  1979.  This  has  included  militai^ 
raids  into  Honduras  and  Costa  Rica  which 
still  continue  today. 

And  they're  getting  a  great  deal  of 
help  from  their  friends.  There  were  165 
Cuban  personnel  in  Nicaragua  in  1979. 
Today  that  force  has  grown  to  10,000. 
And  we're  being  criticized  for  having  55 
military  trainers  in  El  Salvador.  Man- 
power support  is  also  coming  from  other 
parts  of  the  terror  networi^:  the  PLO  has 
sent  men,  and  so  has  Libya's  dictator 
Qadhafi.  Communist  countries  are  pro- 
viding new  militai-y  assistance,  including 
tanks,  artillery,  rocket  launchers,  and 
help  in  the  construction  of  militai^y  bases 
and  support  facilities. 

Just  last  week  a  Soviet  ship  began 
unloading  heavy-duty  military  trucks  in 
Nicai'agua's  Corinto  harbor.  Another 
Soviet  ship  is  on  its  way  with  more  tioicks 
and  155  Soviet  jeeps. 

Nicaragua's  own  military  forces  have 
grown  enoitnously.  Since  1979,  their 
trained  forces  have  increased  from  10,000 
to  over  100,000.  Why  does  Nicaragua 
need  all  this  power?  Why  did  this  country 
of  only  2.8  million  people  build  this  large 
militai-y  force? 

They  claim  the  buildup  is  the  result  of 
the  anti-Sandinista  forces.  That's  a  lie. 
The  Sandinista  military  buildup  began  2V2 
years  before  the  anti-Sandinista  freedom 
fighters  had  taken  up  amis. 

They  claim  the  buildup  is  because 
they  are  threatened  by  their  neighbors. 


Nicaraguan  Forces 


That,  too,  is  a  lie.  Nicaragua's  next  door 
neighbor,  Costa  Rica,  doesn't  even  have 
an  army.  Another  neighbor,  Honduras, 
has  aiTned  forces  of  only  16,000. 

The  Sandinistas  claim  the  buildup  is 
in  response  to  American  aggression.  And 
that  is  the  most  cynical  lie  of  all.  The 
truth  is  they  announced  at  their  first  an- 
niversai-y,  in  July  1980,  that  their  revolu- 
tion was  going  to  spread  beyond  their 
own  borders. 

When  the  Sandinistas  were  fighting 
the  Somoza  regime,  the  U.S.  policy  was 
hands  off.  We  did  not  attempt  to  prop  up 
Somoza.  The  United  States  did  everj'- 
thing  to  show  its  openness  toward  the 
Sandinistas,  its  friendliness,  its  will- 
ingness to  become  friends.  The  Carter 
Administration  provided  more  economic 
assistance  to  the  Sandinistas  in  their  first 
18  months  than  any  other  country  did. 
But  in  January'  1981,  having  concluded 
that  the  Sandinistas  were  arniing  the 
Salvadoran  guerrillas,  the  Carter 
Administration  sent  military  aid  to 
El  Salvador. 

As  soon  as  I  took  office,  we  attempted 
to  show  friendship  to  the  Sandinistas  and 
provided  economic  aid  to  Nicaragua.  But 
it  did  no  good.  They  kept  on  exporting 
terrorism.  The  words  of  their  official  par- 
ty anthem  describe  us,  the  United  States, 
as  the  enemy  of  all  mankind. 

So  much  for  our  sincere  but  unrealis- 
tic hopes  that  if  only  we'd  try  harder  to 
be  friends,  Nicaragua  would  flourish  in 
the  glow  of  our  friendship  and  install 
liberty  and  freedom  for  their  people. 

The  truth  is:  they  haven't. 

Back  in  1958,  Fidel  Castro  pledged 
that,  once  his  revolution  had  triumphed, 
he  would  start  a  much  longer  and  bigger 
war— a  war  against  the  Americans.  That 
war,  Castro  said,  "will  be  my  true 
destiny."  For  26  years,  during  Republi- 
can and  Democratic  Administrations, 
Castro  has  kept  to  his  own  path  of  revolu- 
tionary violence.  Today,  Cuba  even  pro- 
vides safe  passage  for  dnig  traffickers 
who  poison  our  children.  In  return,  of 
course,  Cuba  gets  hard  cash  to  buy  more 
weapons  of  war. 

We're  in  the  midst  of  what  President 
John  F.  Kennedy  called  "a  long  twilight 
struggle"  to  defend  freedom  in  the  world. 
He  understood  the  problem  of  Central 
Amei'ica.  He  understood  Castro.  And  he 
understood  the  long-teiTn  goals  of  the 
Soviet  Union  in  this  region. 

Twenty-three  years  ago.  President 
Kennedy  warned  against  the  threat  of 
communist  penetration  in  our  hemi- 
sphere. He  said:  "I  want  it  cleai'ly 
understood  that  this  government  will  not 


hesitate  in  meeting  its  primary  obliga- 
tions which  are  to  the  security  of  our  na- 
tion." And  the  House  and  Senate  sup- 
ported him  overwhelmingly  by  passing  a 
law  calling  on  the  United  States  to  pre- 
vent Cuba  from  extending  its  aggressive 
or  subversive  activities  to  any  part  of  this 
hemisphere.  Were  John  Kennedy  alive  to- 
day, I  think  he  would  be  appalled  by  the 
gullibility  of  some  who  invoke  his  name. 

The  Need  for  U.S.  Support 

I  have  told  you  that  Cuba's  and  Nica- 
ragua's present  target  is  El  Salvador. 
And  I  want  to  talk  to  you  about  that  coun- 
try because  there  is  a  lot  of  misunder- 
standing about  it. 

El  Salvador,  too,  had  a  revolution 
several  years  ago,  and  is  now  struggling 
valiantly  to  achieve  a  workable  demo- 
cracy and,  at  the  same  time,  to  achieve  a 
stable  economic  system  and  to  redress 
historical  injustices.  But  El  Salvador's 
yeaming  for  democracy  has  been 
thwarted  by  Cuban-ti'ained  and  -armed 
guerrillas,  leading  a  campaign  of  violence 
against  people  and  destruction  of  bridges, 
roads,  power  stations,  trucks,  buses,  and 
other  vital  elements  of  their  economy. 
Destroying  this  infrastructure  has 
brought  more  unemployment  and  poverty 
to  the  people  of  El  Salvador. 

Some  argue  that  El  Salvador  has  only 
political  extremes— the  violent  left  and 
the  violent  right— and  that  we  must 
choose  between  them.  That's  just  not 
true.  Democratic  political  parties  range 
fi-om  the  democratic  left,  to  center,  to  con 
servative.  Trade  unions,  religious  organi- 
zations, civic  groups,  and  business 
associations  are  numerous  and  flourish- 
ing. There  is  a  small,  violent  rightwing  as 
opposed  to  democracy  as  are  the  guerril- 
las, but  they  are  not  part  of  the  govern- 
ment. We  have  consistently  opposed  both 
extremes,  and  so  has  the  Government  of 
El  Salvador.  Last  December,  I  sent  Vice 
President  Bush  to  El  Salvador  with  a  pei 
sonal  letter  in  which  I  again  made  clear 
my  strong  opposition  to  both  violent  ex 
tremes.  And  this  had  a  positive  effect. 

Land  reform  is  moving  foi-ward.  Sinci 
March  1980,  the  program  has  benefited 
more  than  550,000  peasants  or  about  a 
quarter  of  the  rural  population.  But  mam 
can't  fai-m  their  land:  they'll  be  killed  by 
the  guerrillas  if  they  do. 

The  people  of  Central  America  want 
democracy  and  fi-eedom.  They  want  and 
hope  for  a  better  future.  Costa  Rica  is  a 
well  established  and  healthy  democi-acy. 


24 


Department  of  '-1  ttp  Rniieti 


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THE  PRESIDENT 


1983  Economic  and 
Military  Assistance 


Soviet-Bloc 
Assistance 
to  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua 


U.S.  Assistance 
to  Central  America 


Honduras  made  a  peaceful  transition  to 
democracy  in  1982.  And  in  Guatemala, 
political  parties  and  trade  unions  are  func- 
tioning. An  election  is  scheduled  for  July 
there,  with  a  real  prospect  that  that  coun- 
try can  return  to  full  constitutional 
government  in  1985. 

In  fact,  26  of  33  Latin  American  coun- 
tries are  democracies  or  stinving  to 
become  democracies.  But  they're 
vulnerable. 

By  aiding  the  communist  guerrillas  in 
El  Salvador,  Nicaragua's  unelected 
government  is  trying  to  overthrow  the 
duly  elected  government  of  a  neighboring 
country.  Like  Nicaragua,  the  Government 
of  El  Salvador  was  boi-n  of  revolution,  but 
unlike  Nicaragua  it  has  held  three  elec- 
tions, the  most  recent  a  presidential  elec- 
tion last  -Sunday.  It  has  made  great  prog- 
ress toward  democracy.  In  this  last  elec- 
tion, 80%  of  the  people  of  El  Salvador 
braved  communist  threats  and  guerrilla 
violence  to  vote  for  peace  and  freedom. 

Let  me  give  another  e.xample  of  the 
diffei-ence  between  the  two  countries— El 
Salvador  and  Nicaragua.  The  Govern- 
ment of  El  Salvador  has  offered  amnesty 
to  the  guerrillas  and  asked  them  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  elections  and  democratic 
processes.  The  guerrillas  refused;  they 
want  to  shoot  theii'  way  into  power  and 
establish  totalitarian  rule. 

By  contrast,  the  contras,  the  freedom 
fighters  in  Nicaragua,  have  offered  to  lay 
down  their  weapons  and  take  part  in 
democratic  elections;  but  there  the 
communist  Sandinista  government  has 
refused. 


June  1984 


————"—■— 


That's  why  the  United  States  must 
support  both  the  elected  Government  of 
El  Salvador  and  the  democratic  aspira- 
tions of  the  Nicaraguan  people. 

If  the  communists  can  start  war 
against  the  people  of  El  Salvador,  then  El 
Salvador  and  its  friends  are  surely  justi- 
fied in  defending  themselves  by  blocking 
the  flow  of  arms.  If  the  Soviet  Union  can 
aid  and  abet  subversion  in  our 
hemisphere,  then  the  United  States  has  a 
legal  right  and  a  moral  duty  to  help  resist 
it.  This  is  not  only  in  our  strategic  in- 
terest; it  is  morally  right.  It  would  be  pro- 
foundly immoral  to  let  peace-loving 
friends  depending  on  our  help  be  over- 
whelmed by  brute  force  if  we  have  any 
capacity  to  prevent  it. 

If  our  political  process  pulls  together, 
Soviet-  and  Cuban-suppoi'ted  aggression 
can  be  defeated.  On  this,  the  centennial 
anniversary  of  President  Hari-y  Truman's 
birth,  it's  fitting  to  recall  his  words 
spoken  to  a  joint  session  of  the  Congress 
in  a  similar  situation:  "The  free  peoples  of 
the  world  look  to  us  for  support  in  main- 
taining their  freedoms.  If  we  falter 

we  may  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world, 
and  we  shall  surely  endanger  the  welfare 
of  this  nation." 

The  speech  was  given  in  1947.  The 
problem  then  was  2  years  of  Soviet- 
supported  indirect  aggression  against 
Greece.  The  communists  were  close  to 
victory.  President  Truman  called  on  the 
Congress  to  provide  decisive  aid  to  the 
Greek  Government.  Both  parties  rallied 
behind  President  Truman's  call.  Democra- 
tic forces  succeeded  and  Greece  became  a 
parliamentary'  democracy. 

Communist  subversion  is  not  an  ir- 
reversible tide.  We've  seen  it  rolled  back 
in  Venezuela  and,  most  recently,  in 
Grenada.  And  where  democracy  flour- 
ishes, human  rights  and  peace  are  more 
secure.  The  tide  of  the  future  can  be  a 
freedom  tide.  All  it  takes  is  the  will  and 
I'esourees  to  get  the  job  done. 

In  April  1983,  I  addressed  a  joint  ses- 
sion of  the  Congress  and  asked  for  bipar- 
tisan cooperation  on  behalf  of  our  policies 
to  protect  liberty  and  democracy  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Shortly  after  that  speech, 
the  late  Democratic  Senator  Henry 
Jackson  encouraged  the  appointment  of  a 
blue-ribbon,  bipartisan  commission  to 
chart  a  long-term  course  for  democracy, 
economic  improvement,  and  peace  in 
Central  America.  I  appointed  12  distin- 
guished Americans  from  both  political 
parties  to  the  National  Bipartisan  Com- 
mission on  Central  Amei'ica. 

The  bipartisan  commission  rendered 
an  important  service  to  all  Americans— all 


of  us  from  pole  to  pole  in  this  Western 
Hemisphere.  Last  January,  the  commis- 
sion presented  positive  recommendations 
to  support  democratic  development,  im- 
prove living  conditions,  and  bring  the 
long-sought  dream  for  peace  to  this 
troubled  region  so  close  to  home.  The 
recommendations  reinforce  the  spii'it  of 
our  Administration's  policies  that  help  to 
our  neighbors  should  be  primarily  eco- 
nomic and  humanitarian  but  must  also  in- 
clude sufficient  military  aid. 

In  February,  I  submitted  a  com- 
prehensive legislative  propo.sal  to  the 
Congress  which  would  implement  the 
commission's  recommendations.  And 
because  this  report  presented  a  bipar- 
tisan consensus,  I  am  hopeful  that  the 
Congress  will  take  prompt  action.  This 
proposal  calls  for  an  increased  commit- 
ment of  resources  beginning  immediately 
and  extending  regularly  over  the  next  5 
years.  The  program  is  a  balanced  com- 
bination of  support  for  democracy,  eco- 
nomic development,  diplomacy,  and 
security  measures,  with  70%  of  the 
dollars  to  be  used  for  economic  and  social 
development.  This  program  can  get  the 
job  done. 

The  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
on  Central  America  has  done  its  work. 
Our  Administration  has  done  its  work. 
We  now  await  action  by  the  Congress. 
Meanwhile,  evidence  mounts  of  Cuba's  in- 
tentions to  double  its  suppoprt  to  the 
Salvadoran  guerrillas  and  bring  down 
that  newly  elected  government  in  the  fall. 
Unless  we  provide  the  resources,  the 
communists  will  likely  succeed. 

Let's  remember,  the  Soviet  bloc  gave 
Cuba  and  Nicaragua  $4.9  billion  in  assis- 
tance last  year,  while  the  United  States 
provided  all  its  friends  throughout  all  of 
Central  America  with  only  a  fraction  of 
that  amount. 

The  simple  questions  are:  will  we  sup- 
port freedom  in  this  hemisphei'e  or  not? 
Will  we  defend  our  vital  interests  in  this 
hemisphere  or  not?  Will  we  stop  the 
spread  of  communism  in  this  hemisphere 
or  not?  Will  we  act  while  there  is  still 
time? 

There  are  tho.se  in  this  country  who 
would  yield  to  the  temptation  to  do 
nothing.  They  are  the  new  isolationists, 
vei-y  much  like  the  isolationists  of  the  late 
1930s,  who  knew  what  was  happening  in 
Europe  but  chose  not  to  face  the  terrible 
challenge  history  had  given  them.  They 
preferred  a  policy  of  wishful  thinking  that 
if  they  only  gave  up  one  moi'e  country, 
allowed  just  one  more  international  trans- 
gression, then  surely,  sooner  or  later,  the 
aggressor's  appetite  would  be  satisfied. 


25 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Well,  they  didn't  stop  the  aggressors; 
they  emboldened  them.  They  didn't  pre- 
vent war;  they  assured  it. 

Legislation  is  now  before  the  Con- 
gress that  will  carry  out  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  National  Bipartisan  Commis- 
sion. Requests  for  interim  appropriations 
to  give  the  soldiers  fighting  for  their 
country  in  El  Salvador  and  the  freedom- 
loving  people  of  Central  America  the  tools 
they  need  also  await  action  by  the  House 
of  Representatives. 

For  the  last  4  years,  only  half  of  the 
military  aid  requested  for  El  Salvador  has 
been  provided— even  though  total  aid  for 
El  Salvador  is  only  5%  of  our  worldwide 
assistance.  I  am  asking  the  Congress  to 
provide  the  funds  I  requested  for  fiscal 
year  1984  and  also  to  enact  the  entire 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  plan  for 
democracy,  economic  development,  and 
peace  in  Central  America. 

As  I  talk  to  you  tonight,  there  are 
young  Salvadoran  soldiers  in  the  field  fac- 
ing the  terrorists  and  guerrillas  in  El 
Salvador  with  the  clips  in  their  rifles  the 
only  ammunition  they  have.  The  lack  of 
evacuation  helicopters  for  the  wounded 
and  the  lack  of  medical  supplies  if  they're 
evacuated  have  resulted  in  one  out  of 
three  of  the  wounded  dying.  This  is  no 
way  to  support  friends— particulai'ly 
when  supporting  them  is  supporting 
ourselves. 

Last  week,  as  we  returned  across  the 
vast  Pacific  to  Alaska,  I  could  not  help 
being  struck  again  by  how  blessed  has 
been  our  land.  For  200  years,  the  oceans 
have  protected  us  from  much  that  has 
troubled  the  woi-ld.  But  clearly,  our  world 
is  shrinking.  We  cannot  pretend  other- 
wise if  we  wish  to  protect  our  freedom, 
our  economic  vitality,  and  our  precious 
way  of  life. 

It's  up  to  all  of  us,  the  Administration, 
you  as  citizens,  and  your  representatives 
in  the  Congress.  The  people  of  Central 
America  can  succeed  if  we  provide  the 
assistance  I  have  proposed.  We  Ameri- 
cans should  be  proud  of  what  we're  trying 
to  do  in  Central  America,  and  proud  of 
what,  together  with  our  friends,  we  can 
do  in  Central  America,  to  support  demo- 
cracy, human  rights,  and  economic 
growth,  while  preserving  peace  so  close 
to  home.  Let  us  show  the  world  that  we 
want  no  hostile,  communist  colonies  here 
in  the  Americas:  South,  Central,  or 
North. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  14, 1984. 


President  Meets  With 
Pope  John  Paul  II 


«•* 


'>^-' 


On  May  2,  1984,  President  Reagan  met  with 
His  Holiness  Pope  John  Paul  II  in  Fair- 
banks. The  President  was  returning  from 
China  and  His  Holiness  was  en  route  to 
Asia.  They  exchanged  views  on  arms  con- 
trol, East-West  relations,  and  regional  and 
humanitarian  issues.  The  President  offered 
to  send  a  presidential  mission  to  Rome  to 
discuss  economic  development  and  humani- 
tarian assistance  with  Vatican  officials.  The 


mission  would  explain  U.S.  foreign 
assistance  and  economic  and  humanitarian 
programs.  In  turn,  the  Vatican  would  brief 
the  mission  on  its  development  and 
humanitarian  activities  throughout  the 
world.  The  goal  of  the  presidential  mission 
would  be  to  begin  a  dialogue  that  could  lead 
to  U.S. -Vatican  cooperation  in  the  effort  to 
alleviate  hunger  and  disease  and  to  promote 
peace  worldwide.  ■ 


Sitan 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Central  America 


President  Reagan's  radio  address  to 
the  nation  on  April  U,  198i.^ 

Much  has  been  made  of  late  regarding  our 
proper  role  in  Central  America  and,  in 
particular,  toward  Nicaragua.  Unfor- 
tunately, much  of  the  debate  has  ignored 
the  most  relevant  facts.  Central  America 
has  become  the  stage  for  a  bold  attempt 
by  the  Soviet  Union,  Cuba,  and 
Nicaragua  to  install  communism,  by  force, 
throughout  this  hemishpere. 

The  struggling  democracies  of  Costa 
Rica,  Honduras,  and  El  Salvador  are  be- 
ing threatened  by  a  Soviet  bloc  and 
Cuban-supported  Sandinista  army  and 
security  force  in  Nicaragua  that  has 
grown  from  about  10,000  under  the 
previous  government  to  more  than 
100,000  in  less  than  5  years. 

Last  year  alone,  the  Soviet  bloc 
delivered  over  $100  million  in  military 
hardware.  The  Sandinistas  have 
established  a  powerful  force  of  artillery, 
multiple  rocket-launchers,  and  tanks  in  an 
arsenal  that  exceeds  that  of  all  the  other 
countries  in  the  region  put  together. 

More  than  40  new  military  bases  and 
support  facilities  have  been  constructed 
in  Nicaragua— all  with  Soviet  bloc  and 
Cuban  support— and  an  investment  of 
over  $300  million.  In  addition  to  money 
and  guns,  there  are  now  more  than  2,500 
Cuban  and  Soviet  military  personnel  in 
Nicaragua,  another  5,000  so-called  civilian 
advisers,  as  well  as  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization],  East  German, 
and  Libyan  assistance  to  the  Sandinistas. 

And  that's  not  all.  Our  friends  in  the 
region  must  also  face  the  export  of  sub- 
version across  their  borders  that  under- 
mines democratic  development,  polarizes 
institutions,  and  wrecks  their  economies. 
This  terrorist  violence  has  been  felt  by 
all  of  Nicaragua's  neighbors,  not  just  El 
Salvador.  There  have  been  bombings  in 


peaceful  Costa  Rica  and  numerous  at- 
tempts to  penetrate  Honduras— most 
recently  last  summer,  when  the  San- 
dinistas infiltrated  an  entire  guerrilla 
colony  which  has  been  trained  and  equip- 
ped in  Cuba  and  Nicaragua. 

El  Salvador,  struggling  to  hold  demo- 
cratic elections  and  improve  the  condi- 
tions of  its  people,  has  been  the  main 
target  of  Nicaragua's  covert  aggression. 
Despite  promises  to  stop,  the  Sandinistas 
still  train  and  direct  terrorists  in  El 
Salvador  and  provide  weapons  and  am- 
munitions they  use  against  the 
Salvadoran  people.  If  it  weren't  for 
Nicaragua,  El  Salvador's  problems  would 
be  manageable,  and  we  could  concentrate 
on  economic  and  social  improvements. 

Much  of  the  Sandinista  terror  has 
been  aimed  at  the  Nicaraguan  people 
themselves.  The  Sandinistas  who  govern 
Nicaragua  have  savagely  murdered,  im- 
prisoned, and  driven  from  their  homeland 
tens  of  thousands  of  Miskito,  Rama,  and 
Suma  Indians.  Religious  persecution 
against  Christians  has  increased,  and  the 
Jewish  community  has  fled  the  country. 
The  press  is  censored,  and  activities  of 
labor  and  business  are  restricted. 

The  Sandinistas  have  announced  elec- 
tions for  November,  but  don't  hold  your 
breath.  Will  new  parties  be  permitted? 
Will  they  have  full  access  to  the  press, 
TV,  and  radio?  Will  there  be  unbiased 
observers?  Will  every  adult  Nicaraguan 
be  allowed  to  vote?  Given  their  record  of 
repression,  we  should  not  wonder  that 
the  opposition,  denied  other  means  of  ex- 
pression, has  taken  up  arms. 

We've  maintained  a  consistent  policy 
toward  the  Sandinista  regime,  hoping 
they  can  be  brought  back  from  the  brink 
peacefully  through  negotiations.  We're 
working  through  the  Contadora  process 
for  a  verifiable  multilateral  agreement. 


one  that  ensures  the  Sandinistas  ter- 
minate their  export  of  subversion,  reduce 
the  size  of  their  military  forces,  imple- 
ment their  democratic  commitments  to 
the  Organization  of  American  States,  and 
remove  Soviet  bloc  and  Cuban  military 
personnel. 

But  the  Sandinistas,  uncomfortable 
with  the  scrutiny  and  concern  of  their 
neighbors,  have  gone  shopping  for  a  more 
sympathetic  hearing.  They  took  their  case 
to  the  United  Nations,  and  now  to  the  In- 
ternational Court  of  Justice.  This  does  lit- 
tle to  advance  a  negotiated  solution,  but  it 
makes  sense  if  you're  trying  to  evade  the 
spotlight  of  responsibility. 

What  I've  said  today  is  not  pleasant 
to  hear.  But  it's  important  that  you  know 
Central  America  is  vital  to  our  interests 
and  to  our  security.  It  not  only  contains 
the  Panama  Canal,  it  sits  astride  some  of 
the  most  important  sealanes  in  the 
world— sealanes  in  which  a  Soviet-Cuban 
naval  force  held  combat  maneuvers  just 
this  week. 

The  region  also  contains  millions  of 
people  who  want  and  deserve  to  be  free. 
We  cannot  turn  our  backs  on  this  crisis  at 
our  doorstep.  Nearly  23  years  ago.  Presi- 
dent Kennedy  warned  against  the  threat 
of  communist  penetration  in  our  hemi- 
sphere. He  said,  "I  want  it  clearly  under- 
stood that  this  government  will  not 
hesitate  in  meeting  its  primary  obliga- 
tions which  are  to  the  security  of  our  na- 
tion." We  can  do  no  less  today. 

I  have,  therefore,  after  consultation 
with  the  Congress,  decided  to  use  one  of 
my  legal  authorities  to  provide  money  to 
help  the  Government  of  El  Salvador  de- 
fend itself. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  23,  1984. 


June  1984 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


Realism  and  Responsibility: 

The  U.S.  Approach  to  Arms  Control 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
League  of  Women  Voters  in  Detroit  on 
May  U.  198Jt^ 

No  issue  is  of  greater  importance  to  the 
American  people  than  the  issue  of  war 
and  peace.  It  is  the  gravest  responsibility 
of  any  president,  any  administration,  to 
defend  the  peace,  so  that  our  ideals  of 
freedom  and  justice  can  thrive  in  an  envi- 
ronment of  security. 

History  has  seen  fit  to  bestow  on  our 
country  a  very  special  challenge.  The 
moment  when  the  United  States  took  its 
place  as  a  leader  and  permanent  actor  on 
the  stage  of  international  politics — at  the 
end  of  the  Second  World  War — coincided 
with  the  dawn  of  the  nuclear  age.  Fi-om 
that  point,  there  was  no  turning  back. 
America  could  no  longer  attempt  to  iso- 
late itself  from  world  affairs — not  when 
nations  possessed  the  means  to  destroy 
each  other  on  a  scale  unimagined  in 
history. 

But  with  the  dawn  of  the  nuclear 
age,  there  also  came  efforts — and  with  a 
special  urgency — to  limit  or  control  this 
new  weaponry.  The  United  States  led  the 
way,  proposing  in  the  Baruch  Plan  of 
1946  to  eliminate  nuclear  weapons  and 


control.  I'll  begin  with  a  realistic  look  at 
the  role  of  arms  control  in  our  overall 
strategy  for  peace  and  security.  Then  I 
want  to  say  something  about  the  various 
negotiations  on  our  agenda.  Finally,  I'd 
like  to  tell  you  what  I  see  as  the  prere- 
quisites for  progress  toward  our  arms 
control  objectives. 


ARMS  CONTROL  AS  A  DIMENSION 
OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS 

Preserving  peace  means  more  than 
avoiding  catastrophe.  As  President 
Reagan  has  put  it:  "We  must  both  defend 
freedom  and  preserve  the  peace.  We 
must  stand  true  to  our  principles  and  our 
friends  while  preventing  a  holocaust." 
There  is  no  escape  from  this  dual  respon- 
sibility. We  cannot  conduct  national  secu- 
rity policy  as  if  the  special  danger  of 
nuclear  weapons  did  not  e.xist.  But  in  our 
pursuit  of  peace  and  arms  control,  we 
must  not  abdicate  our  responsibility  to 
defend  our  values  in  a  world  where  free 
societies  are  the  exception  rather  than 
the  norm. 

The  intense  rivalry  today  between 
East  and  West  has  been  disciplined,  in 


We  cannot  conduct  national  security  policy  as  if  the 
special  danger  of  nuclear  weapons  did  not  exist. 


place  nuclear  energy  under  an  interna- 
tional authority.  The  plan  was  rejected 
by  the  Soviet  leaders. 

Today,  this  aspiration  to  banish  the 
specter  of  nuclear  war  is  shared  by  all 
civilized  human  beings.  We  are  faced 
today  with  a  basic  truth:  "A  nuclear  war 
cannot  be  won  and  must  never  be 
fought."  That's  a  quote  from  Ronald 
Reagan.  Guided  by  this  truth,  the  United 
States  has  been  seeking  to  enhance  its 
national  security  not  only  by  strengthen- 
ing its  defenses  and  its  alliances  but 
also— with  equal  vigor — by  negotiating 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  nations 
on  the  most  ambitious  arms  control 
agenda  in  history. 

I  want  to  speak  to  you  today  about 
this  Administration's  approach  to  arms 


the  nuclear  age,  by  the  specter  of  mutual 
destruction;  but  the  rivalry  has  not 
ended.  In  any  previous  age,  so  funda- 
mental a  clash  of  national  interests  and 
moral  perceptions  might  well  have  led  to 
general  war.  In  the  nuclear  age,  this  can- 
not be  permitted,  and  both  sides  know  it. 

In  light  of  that  continuing  rivalry, 
and  the  profound  mistrust  that  it  engen- 
ders, there  are  many  skeptics  who  ques- 
tion the  value  of  the  arms  control 
process.  "Since  we  simply  can't  trust  the 
Soviets  to  honor  agreements,"  they  say, 
"why  bother  to  try  to  negotiate  with 
them?"  There  are  others  who  question 
our  own  commitment  to  the  process,  as 
though  a  strong  defense  and  workable 
arms  control  agreements  were  mutually 
exclusive  rather  than  mutually  rein- 
forcing objectives. 


Well,  we  are  committed  to  arms  con- 
trol, but  that  commitment  is  not  based  on 
naivete  or  wishful  thinking.  It  is  based 
on  the  conviction  that,  whatever  the  dif- 
ferences between  us,  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  have  a  pi-ofound 
and  overriding  common  interest  in  the 
avoidance  of  nuclear  war  and  the  survival 
of  the  human  race.  A  responsible  national 
security  policy  must  include  both  strong 
deterrence  and  active  pursuit  of  arms 
control  to  restrain  competition  and  make 
the  world  safer.  This  is  our  policy. 

The  effort  to  control  weapons,  of 
course,  is  not  a  product  of  the  nuclear 
age.  History  has  seen  many  attempts  to 
negotiate  limits  on  numbers  or  character- 
istics of  major  armaments.  The  goals 
were — and  are — worthy  goals:  to  be  able 
to  shift  resources  to  other,  more  produc- 
tive uses,  and  to  add  a  measure  of 
restraint,  predictability,  and  safety  to  a 
world  of  poUtical  rivalries.  Before  World 
War  I,  Britain  and  Germany  negotiated 
on  ways  of  limiting  naval  construction. 
Between  World  Wars  I  and  II,  there 
were  extensive  multilatei'al  negotiations 
to  limit  the  building  of  capital  ships, 
including  a  major  naval  disarmament 
agreement  signed  in  Washington  in  1922. 
The  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  of  1928  even 
attempted  to  ban  war  itself  as  an  instru- 
ment of  policy. 

These  efforts,  we  well  know,  failed 
to  prevent  war.  There  is  a  lesson  here: 
the  endeavor  to  control  armaments  does 
not  operate  in  a  vacuum.  It  is  a  dimen- 
sion of  international  politics,  and  it  can- 
not be  divorced  from  its  political  context. 
Arms  control  cannot  resolve  the  ideologi- 
cal and  geopolitical  conflicts  that  lead  to 
competitive  arming  in  the  fii'st  place.  By 
itself  it  cannot  deliver  security,  or  pre- 
vent war,  and  we  should  not  impose  on 
the  fragile  process  of  arms  control  bur- 
dens it  cannot  carry  and  expectations  it 
cannot  fulfill.  While  arms  control  agi-ee- 
ments  themselves  can  contribute  to 
reducing  tensions,  basic  stability  must 
underlie  political  relations  between  the 
superpowers  or  else  the  process  of  arms 
control  may  not  even  survive.  The 
SALT  II  [strategic  arms  limitation  talks] 
Treaty,  for  example,  which  had  many 
other  difficulties,  was  withdrawn  from 
Senate  consideration  at  the  request  of 
President  Carter  after  the  controversy 
generated  by  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan. 

Therefore,  while  we  pursue  arms 
control  with  gi-eat  energy',  we  must  bear 
in  mind  that  progress  depends  on  many 
factors  beyond  the  substance  of  the  pro- 
posals or  the  ingenuity  of  the  negotiators. 
For  arms  control  to  succeed,  we  must 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


also  work  to  shape  the  conditions  that 
make  success  possible:  we  must  maintain 
the  balance  of  power,  we  must  ensure  the 
cohesion  of  our  alliances,  and  we  must 
both  recognize  the  legitimate  security 
concerns  of  our  adversaries  and  be  realis- 
tic about  their  ambitions.  On  this  secure 
foundation,  we  must  seek  to  engage  our 
adversaries  in  concrete  efforts  to  resolve 
political  problems. 

COMPLEXITY  OF  ARMS  CONTROL 

Because  of  this  clash  of  interests  and 
values,  arms  control  negotiations 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  are  a  difficult  and  laborious 
process  and  have  always  been  so.  Ever 
since  nuclear  arms  control  negotiations 
began  in  earnest  some  20  years  ago,  the 
Soviets'  perception  of  their  military 
requirements,  and  their  aversion  to  thor- 
ough measures  of  verification,  have  been 
significant  obstacles  to  agreement. 

No  wonder,  then,  that  all  our  arms 
control  negotiations  with  them  have  been 
protracted.  The  1963  Limited  Nuclear 
Test  Ban  Treaty  was  preceded  by  8  years 
of  negotiation  and  discussion.  The  1968 
Nonproliferation  Treaty  took  4  years  to 
negotiate.  The  SALT  I  accords  of  1972 
took  almost  3  years  of  effort,  and  negoti- 
ations for  the  SALT  II  Treaty  lasted 
nearly  7  years. 

Even  with  good  faith  on  both  sides, 
there  are  differences  of  perspective— de- 
riving from  history,  geogi-aphy,  strategic 
doctrine,  alliance  obligations,  and  com- 
parative military  advantage— which  com- 
plicate the  task  of  compromise.  The 
Soviets  have  long  had  an  advantage  in 
larger,  more  powerful  intercontinental 
ballistic  missiles  (ICBMs);  the  United 
States  took  advantage  of  its  technological 
superiority  by  developing  missile- 
carrying  submarines,  smaller  warheads, 
and  a  more  broadly  based  deterrent. 
These  asymmetries  in  force  structure 
and  capabilities  are  not  merely  of  aca- 
demic interest.  It  is  enormously  difficult 
to  define  equality,  for  example,  between 
very  different  kinds  of  forces.  The  prob- 
'^^  lemis  compounded  by  other  factors  such 
as  the  extent  of  air  defenses,  civil 
defenses,  and  hardening  of  silos  and  of 
command  and  control,  in  which  the  two 
sides'  forces  also  differ. 

The  task  of  arms  control  has  been 
further  complicated  by  a  continuing  revo- 
lution in  technology.  Many  of  our  stra- 
tegic assumptions  have  been  made 
obsolete  by  technological  changes  in  the 
past  decades.  Not  only  is  there  no  "quick 
fix"  in  arms  control  but  there  is  no  "per- 
manent fix"  either. 


Ceilings  on  numbers  of  strategic  mis- 
sile launchers  may  have  been  more  mean- 
ingful in  an  era  of  single  warheads.  Now, 
in  an  age  of  heavy  intercontinental  mis- 
siles, each  capable  of  carrying  large  num- 
bers of  accurate  warheads,  limits  on 
missiles  alone  are  no  longer  sufficient. 
Significant  reductions  in  numbers  of  war- 
heads, and  Soviet  movement  away  from 
reliance  on  heavy  ICBMs,  are  needed  for 
strategic  stability.  This  is  the  essence  of 
our  proposal  in  the  strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion talks  (or  START),  and  it  is  also  an 
important  message  of  the  bipartisan 
Scowcroft  commission's  report  on  the 
future  of  our  strategic  forces. 


CURRENT  U.S.  GOALS  IN  ARMS 
CONTROL 

Previous  arms  control  agreements  have 
limited  only  partial  aspects  of  nuclear 
arsenals,  permitting  development  and 
deployment  to  proceed  in  other  areas. 
Both  sides  have  pursued  technological 
innovation  and  expansion  in  areas  not 
covered  or  inadequately  covered  by 
agi-eements  with  the  result  that  after 
each  new  agreement  there  have  been 
more  nuclear  weapons,  not  fewer.  The 
experience  of  the  past  has  now  brought 
us  to  a  more  mature  phase  of  the  arms 
control  process,  in  which  we  are  com- 
pelled to  tackle  the  real  problems  of 
nuclear  stability  more  comprehensively 
and  directly  than  ever  before.  At  the 
same  time,"  our  efforts  to  control  non- 
nuclear  weapons  are  proceeding  on  all 
fronts. 

Four  Basic  Objectives 

In  all  our  arms  control  efforts  today,  we 
are  guided  by  four  basic  objectives: 
reductions,  equality,  stability,  and  veri- 
fiability. 

Reductions.  The  agreements  we 
seek  should  actually  constrain  the  mili- 
tary capabilities  of  the  parties  by  reduc- 
ing'weapons  and  forces  substantially,  not 
merely  freezing  them  at  existing  or 
higher  levels  as  most  previous  agree- 
ments have  done. 

Equality.  These  reductions  should 
result  in  equal  or  equivalent  levels  of 
forces  on  both  sides.  An  agreement  that 
legitimizes  an  unequal  balance  of  forces 
creates  instability  and  may  increase  the 
risk  of  eventual  conflict. 

Stability.  Arms  control  measures 
must  genuinely  enhance  the  stability  of 
deterrence  in  crises.  This  means  that 
after  reductions,  each  side's  retaliatory 
force  should  be  secure  enough  to  survive 
if  the  other  side  strikes  first.  Hence, 


under  stable  conditions,  the  temptation 
to  fire  first  in  a  crisis  or  confrontation 
will  be  minimized. 

Verifiability.  Finally,  arms  control 
agreements  must  include  provisions  for 
effective  verification  of  compliance  by  all 
parties.  Experience  has  shown  that 
agreements  lacking  such  provisions 
become  a  source  of  tension  and  mistrust, 
rather  than  reinforcing  the  prospects  for 
peace.  The  President's  recent  finding  of 
Soviet  violations  or  probable  violations  of 
a  number  of  arms  control  obligations 
underlines  that  effective  verification  is 
essential. 

Arms  Control  Agenda 

With  these  objectives  as  our  guideposts, 
the  Reagan  Administration  has  under- 
taken an  unprecedented  range  of  negotia- 
tions aimed  at  reducing  the  danger  of  war 
and  building  international  confidence  and 
security.  In  almost  every  case,  the  basic 
framework  and  concepts  of  these  negotia- 
tions have  been  the  result  of  Western  ini- 
tiatives, developed  in  close  consultation 
among  our  allies  and  friends  around  the 
world. 

START  Our  proposals  in  the  stra- 
tegic arms  reduction  talks  are  designed 
to  reduce  the  role  in  our  respective  arse- 
nals of  baUistic  missiles,  especially  land- 
based  intercontinental  ballistic  missiles. 
The  Soviet  Union  today  holds  a  threefold 
advantage  over  the  United  States  in 
ICBM  warheads.  Excessive  reliance  on 
these  weapons  could  increase  the  danger 
of  triggering  a  nuclear  exchange  because 
the  larger  yields,  higher  accuracy,  more 
rapid  response  time — and  relative  vul- 
nerability— of  these  missiles  make  them 
simultaneously  more  vulnerable  to  a  first 
strike  and  more  capable  of  being  used  in 
a  preemptive  strike  against  elements  of 
the  other  side's  strategic  deterrent. 

Since  we  announced  our  first  propos- 
als in  May  1982,  we  have  made  a  serious 
effort  to  meet  Soviet  concerns  and  to 
reflect  evolving  strategic  concepts  such 
as  those  articulated  by  the  Scowcroft 
commission.  The  core  of  our  proposal  is 
to  reduce  the  total  number  of  ballistic 
missile  nuclear  warheads  by  approxi- 
mately one-third,  leaving  5,000  on  each 
side.  As  a  way  of  dealing  with  the  prob- 
lem of  differing  force  structures,  we  are 
willing  to  negotiate  trade-offs  with  the 
Soviets  between  areas  of  differing  inter- 
est and  advantage.  After  consulting  with 
key  Members  of  Congress,  we  also  incor- 
porated the  concept  of  "build-down"  into 
our  position.  This  proposal  would  link 


29 


June  1984 


H^I^BHIUIIUBUUIUIIIH 


THE  SECRETARY 


I 


modernization  of  missiles  to  reductions  in 
warheads  and  would  make  mandatory  a 
minimum  annual  59!^  reduction  in  ballistic 
missile  warheads  down  to  equal  levels. 

Throughout  the  negotiations  in  1982 
and  1983,  however,  the  Soviets  seemed 
determined  to  hang  on  to  the  great 
advantage  in  destructive  power  of  their 
missiles.  In  fact,  their  proposals  would 
have  permitted  them  actually  to  continue 
increasing  the  number  of  their  warheads. 
They  also  dismissed  the  concept  of  build- 
down.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  there  was 
some  progress  made  over  the  five  START 
negotiating  sessions.  In  response  to  alter- 
ations in  our  original  proposal,  they 
offered  some  constructive  changes  in 
their  position.  With  our  introduction  of 
the  trade-offs  concept,  we  seemed  on  the 
threshold  of  significant  progress.  But 
unfortunately,  the  Soviets  tied  progress 
in  START  to  having  their  way  in  the 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (or 
INF)  negotiations;  last  December  they 
suspended  indefinitely  their  participation 
in  START  in  frustration  over  their  inabil- 
ity to  prevent  the  deployment  in  Western 
Europe  of  Pershing  1 1  and  ground- 
launched  cruise  missiles. 


But,  as  in  START,  the  Soviet  objec- 
tive was  evidently  to  preserve  the  imbal- 
ance in  their  favor.  In  this  case,  the 
existing  "imbalance"  was  a  monopoly: 
more  than  1,000  Soviet  SS-20  war- " 
heads — with  the  number  increasing 
steadily — versus  none  for  the  United 
States.  The  last  idea  they  surfaced,  just 
before  breaking  off  the  talks,  was  that 
each  side  reduce  actual  or  planned 
deployments  by  an  "equal  number"  of 
572 — still  leaving  700  warheads  in 
Europe  and  Asia  for  the  U.S.S.R.  and 
zero  for  the  United  States. 

The  Soviets'  declared  reason  for 
withdrawing  from  both  negotiations  was 
that  INF  deplo.\Tnents  had  begun  in 
Western  Europe.  But  during  the  preced- 
ing 2  years,  the  Soviets  had  deployed 
over  100  SS-20s  with  more  than  300  war- 
heads; yet  the  United  States  continued  to 
negotiate.  In  contrast  to  the  Soviet 
buildup,  NATO  has  been  reducing  the 
number  of  nuclear  weapons  in  Europe. 
By  the  time  our  INF  deployments  are 
completed,  at  least  five  nuclear  warheads 
will  have  been  withdrawn  from  Europe 
for  each  U.S.  missile  deployed. 


.  .  .  since  nuclear  arms  control  negotiations 
began  in  earnest  some  20  years  ago,  the  Soviets' 
perception  of  their  military  requirements,  and  their 
aversion  to  thorough  measures  of  verification,  have 
been  significant  obstacles  to  agreement. 


INF.  A  Soviet  walkout  from  the  INF 
talks  a  month  earlier  also  brought  those 
talks  to  a  halt,  and  the  Soviets  have  so 
far  refused  to  return  without  unaccept- 
able preconditions.  Since  our  objective  in 
those  talks  was  to  eliminate  that  entire 
category  of  longer  range  INF  missiles, 
we  would  have  preferred  not  to  have  to 
deploy  any  such  missiles  of  our  own. 
President  Reagan's  initial  proposal — and 
still  our  preferred  outcome — was  to  can- 
cel NATO's  planned  deployments  of 
cruise  and  Pershing  II  missiles  in 
exchange  for  complete  elimination  of 
Soviet  SS-20  missiles.  In  an  effort  to 
break  a  year-long  stalemate,  we  then  put 
forward  an  interim  proposal  for  substan- 
tial reductions  in  our  planned  deploy- 
ments if  Moscow  would  cut  back  to  an 
equal  number  of  warheads.  Then,  last 
September,  we  made  further  modifica- 
tions in  our  proposal  in  order  to  meet 
stated  Soviet  concerns. 


30 


We  are  ready  to  resume  negotia- 
tions—in both  START  and  INF— at  any 
time  and  without  preconditions.  Our  pro- 
posals are  fair,  balanced,  and  workable. 
They  remain  on  the  table.  The  Soviets 
should  need  no  new  concessions  to  lure 
them  back  to  Geneva.  If  they  decide  to 
return — and  we  hope  they  will — the 
Soviets  will  continue  to  find  us  and  our 
allies  serious  and  forthcoming  negotiat- 
ing partners. 

Nonproliferation.  President  Reagan 
has  also  made  it  a  fundamental  objective 
to  seek  to  prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  to  countries  that  do  not  now 
have  them.  We  have  a  vigorous,  twofold 
approach  to  the  problem  of  proliferation. 
First,  we  seek  to  create  and  strengthen 
comprehensive  safeguards  on  exports  of 
nuclear  technology.  We  are  working  to 
strengthen  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  and  its  safe- 
guards system.  At  the  same  time,  we 
strive  to  reduce  the  motivation  for 


acquiring  nuclear  weapons  by  improving 
regional  and  global  stability  and  by  pro- 
moting understanding  of  the  legitimate 
security  concerns  of  other  states. 

These  efforts  have  already  contrib- 
uted importantly  to  strengthening  the 
global  nonproliferation  regime.  One  sig- 
nificant achievement  is  the  clarification  of 
China's  nonproliferation  policies  during 
our  negotiation  of  the  nuclear  energy 
cooperation  agi-eement  that  was  initialed 
during  the  President's  trip  to  China.  In 
January,  China  joined  the  International 
Atomic  Energj'  Agency  and  said  that  it 
would  thereafter  require  IAEA  safe- 
guards on  its  nuclear  exports  to  states 
that  do  not  possess  nuclear  weapons. 
Premier  Zhao,  in  his  January  10  state- 
ment at  the  White  House,  declared:  "We 
do  not  engage  in  nuclear  proliferation 
ourselves,  nor  do  we  help  other  countries 
develop  nuclear  weapons." 

MBFR.  Complementing  our  efforts 
to  reduce  the  danger  of  nuclear  confron- 
tation, the  Western  allies  have  since  1973 
been  conducting  talks  with  the  Warsaw 
Pact  nations  on  the  mutual  and  balanced 
reduction  of  conventional  forces  in 
Europe.  Our  goal  has  been  to  reduce  the 
conventional  forces  confronting  each 
other  there  to  a  lower,  equal  level.  Prog- 
ress has  been  frustrated  by  the  discrep- 
ancy between  manpower  figures 
provided  by  Eastern  negotiators  and 
Western  estimates  of  actual  manpower. 
Last  month,  along  with  the  other  NATO 
participants,  we  put  forth  a  new  initia- 
tive aimed  at  resolving  this  discrepancy 
and  paving  the  way  for  verifiable  reduc- 
tions to  parity.  We  hope  that  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  other  Warsaw  Pact  partici- 
pants will  seize  this  opportunity  to  break 
the  impasse  at  Vienna. 

Chemical  Weapons.  The  problem  of 
chemical  weapons  is  now  taking  on  a  spe- 
cial urgency.  Ever  since  these  weapons 
were  used — to  horrible  effect — in  World 
War  I,  the  world  community  has  agreed 
upon  and  observed  a  code  of  legal 
restraint.  Now  after  nearly  60  years,  this 
code  of  restraint  is  in  danger  of  breaking 
down.  After  exhaustive  analysis,  we 
have  convincing  evidence  that  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  allies  have  been  using 
chemical  and  toxin  weapons  against  civil- 
ian populations  in  Afghanistan  and  South 
east  Asia.  More  recently,  mustard  gas 
and  other  chemical  agents  have  been 
employed  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war. 

The  United  States  has,  therefore, 
taken  the  lead  in  efforts  to  strengthen 
existing  agreements  governing  chemical 
weapons — and  to  seek  the  total  elimina- 
tion of  those  weapons.  Just  last  month. 


Department  of  State  Bulietlr 


■iintris 


:,  ibis 


THE  SECRETARY 


'^ice  President  Bush  presented  to  the 
Conference  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  a 
raft  treaty  for  a  comprehensive  ban  on 
heir  development,  production,  stock- 
lihng,  transfer,  and  use.  Because  of  the 
asily  concealable  nature  of  chemical 
i^eapons,  the  draft  treaty  contains 
etailed  provisions  for  verification, 
icluding  systematic  international  onsite 
ispections.  Because  verification  is  fre- 
uently  the  most  troublesome  aspect  of 
rms  control  negotiation,  we  are  cau- 
lously  encouraged  by  recent  signs  of 
Soviet  willingness  to  address  some  of  the 
erification  challenges.  The  world  com- 
fiunity  must  act  effectively  in  banning 
hemical  weapons,  before  e.xisting 
estraints  break  down  completely  and  the 
lorrors  of  chemical  warfare  are  once 
(gain  loosed  upon  the  world. 

Confidence-Building  Measures.  In 

iddition,  there  is  a  general  category  of 
•onfidence-building  measures  which  we 
lursue  in  order  to  diminish  the  risk  of 
var  by  surprise  attack,  accident,  or  mis- 
alculation.  Without  fanfare,  we  and  the 
Soviets  have  been  holding  a  series  of  con- 
tructive  meetings  on  upgrading  the  "hot 
ine"  direct  communications  link  between 
Washington  and  Moscow.  In  the  START 
ind  INF  negotiations,  the  U.S.  side 
abled  a  set  of  proposals  for  prior  notifi- 
cation of  balhstic  missile  launches,  prior 
lotification  of  major  military  exercises, 
md  expanded  exchanges  of  data  on  mili- 
ary forces.  In  the  Helsinki  process, 
ncluding  the  Stockholm  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Europe,  the  United 
states  and  the  allies  have  pursued — and 
vill  continue  to  pursue — measures  of  this 
dnd  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war.  In  addi- 
,ion.  East  and  West  are  already  routinely 
exchanging  notifications  of  strategic 
xercises  that  might  be  misinterpreted. 
This  practice  should  be  expanded  and 
-nore  of  it  made  mandatory. 

Space  Weapons.  The  United  States 
las  long  believed  that  the  arms  competi- 
tion should  not  be  extended  to  space.  For 
;hat  reason,  we  have  sponsored  or  joined 
several  treaties  advancing  this  objective. 
The  1963  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty 
Danned,  among  other  things,  testing  of 
nuclear  weapons  in  outer  space.  That  was 
followed  in  1967  by  the  agreement  on 
peaceful  uses  of  outer  space,  which  for- 
bids placing  any  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  in  space.  We  are  continuing 
to  explore  whether  these  restrictions 
should  be  strengthened,  including  the 
question  of  arms  control  for  antisatellite 


weapons.  A  report  of  our  initial  findings 
was  presented  to  the  Congi*ess  in  March. 
So  far  we  have  not  been  able  to  identify 
proposals  to  ban  antisatellite  weapons 
that  would  be  adequately  verifiable  and 
serve  our  overall  goal  of  deterring  con- 
flicts. We  are,  however,  continuing  to  try 
to  identify  measures  that  would  ban  or 
limit  specific  weapons  systems,  while 
meeting  our  verification  concerns. 

Let  me  mention,  in  this  conte.xt,  the 
question  of  space-based  missile  defenses. 
President  Reagan  has  proposed  a  stra- 
tegic defense  initiative — a  research  pro- 
gram designed  to  explore  the  possibility 
that  security  and  stability  might  be 
enhanced  by  a  system  that  could  inter- 
cept and  destroy  ballistic  missiles  before 
they  reached  our  or  our  allies'  territory. 
This  research  effort  is  fully  consistent 
with  all  our  treaty  obligations.  It  could 
lead  to  an  informed  decision  sometime  in 
the  next  decade  on  the  question  of 
whether  such  defensive  systems  are  gen- 
uinely feasible  and  practical.  Shortly 
after  the  President  announced  the  initia- 
tive last  year,  the  Soviets  proposed  that 
scientists  from  the  two  countries  meet  to 
discuss  the  implications  of  these  new 
technologies.  We  proposed,  in  turn,  that 
experts  of  our  two  governments — in- 
cluding scientific  experts — meeting  in 
the  context  of  appropriate  arms  control 
forums  would  be  a  more  appropriate  and 
effective  vehicle  for  such  discussion.  We 
have  recently  renewed  our  offer,  and  it 
still  stands. 

Deterrence  and  Modernization 

Even  as  we  pursue  these  arms  control 
goals,  our  first  Une  of  defense,  as  far  into 
the  future  as  we  can  see,  will  remain  the 
deterrence  provided  by  our  armed 
forces.  Thus  the  goals  of  stability  and 
security  we  seek  to  advance  through 
arms  control  can  also  be  advanced  by 
steps  that  we  and  our  allies  can  take  uni- 
laterally. 

Strengthening  our  conventional 
forces,  for  example,  is  a  way  of  reducing 
our  reliance  on  nuclear  weapons  and 
reducing  the  risk  of  any  conflict  that 
could  escalate  into  nuclear  war.  Our  stra- 
tegic modernization  program,  of  which 
the  MX  missile  is  a  critical  element,  has 
been  important  to  the  maintenance  of  a 
strong  deterrent  and  thus  to  the  building 
of  a  solid  foundation  for  progi'ess  in  arms 
control.  We  can  also  modernize  our  own 
nuclear  deterrent  forces  in  ways  that 
enhance  stability,  such  as  the  develop- 


June  1984 


ment  of  a  small,  single-warhead  ICBM 
that  can  lead  both  sides  away  from  a 
trend,  especially  on  the  part  of  the  Sovi- 
ets, toward  reliance  on  destabilizing 
multiwarhead  ICBMs. 


PREREQUISITES  FOR  PROGRESS 

As  I  said  earlier,  success  or  failure  in 
achieving  our  objectives  depends  on  more 
than  the  technical  feasibility  of  the  pro- 
posals or  the  skill  of  the  negotiators.  Our 
efforts  to  create  a  more  secure  and 
peaceful  world  cannot  succeed  unless  cer- 
tain important  principles  are  upheld. 
These  are  prerequisites  for  progress  in 
arms  control. 

First,  we  must  maintain  a  credible 
deterrent,  based  on  restoring  a  balance 
of  military  forces.  If  we  allow  the  balance 
to  deteriorate  badly,  we  cannot  expect 
our  negotiators  to  restore  it,  no  matter 
how  skilled  and  determined  they  may  be. 
Arms  control  will  simply  not  survive  in 
conditions  of  inequality,  real  or  per- 
ceived; this  is  a  fact  of  life  proven  by  the 
experience  of  the  1970s. 

Second,  the  unity  of  our  alliances  is 
both  a  prerequisite  for  success  and  a 
basic  interest  we  will  not  sacrifice.  This 
is  why  the  unanimity  displayed  at  the 
Williamsburg  summit  a  year  ago  was  so 
important.  The  Soviets  seek  to  exploit 
arms  control  negotiations  as  a  tactic  to 
divide  the  West.  They  would  hke  to 
establish  a  veto  over  NATO  weapons 
deployments.  They  would  like  to  main- 
tain a  monopoly  of  longer  range  INF  mis- 
siles in  order  to  achieve  political 
dominance  in  Europe.  These  things  we 
cannot  and  will  not  let  them  do.  Thus,  we 
have  proceeded,  and  will  continue  to  pro- 
ceed, in  the  closest  consultation  with  our 
allies  and  friends  in  both  Europe  and 
Asia. 

Third,  experience  teaches  that  the 
arms  control  process  cannot  survive  con- 
stant Soviet  assaults  on  Western  inter- 
ests around  the  globe.  The  future  of  arms 
control,  therefore,  will  depend  in  part  on 
a  Soviet  willingness  to  help  defuse  ten- 
sions and  regional  conflicts,  rather  than 
exacerbate  them.  The  problem  is  not  only 
that  these  expansionist  Soviet  actions 
sour  the  atmosphere  but  that  they  run 
the  risk  of  confrontations  that  can  erupt 
into  war.  The  increased  stability  we  are 
trying  to  build  into  the  superpower  rela- 
tionship through  arms  reduction  is  bound 
to  be  undermined  when  the  Soviets  are 
irresponsible  in  other  regions  of  the 
world. 


31 


jMimiiiuumiimjiiimgi 


t  nttfHBIIJt  WBB^lBi 


THE  SECRETARY 


Fourth,  stability  can  be  enhanced  by 
identifying  and  focusing  on  common 
interests  shared  by  the  two  sides,  rather 
than  concentrating  solely  on  what  divides 
us.  Although  we  will  continued  to  pursue 
divergent  political  goals,  we  have  come 
together  in  arms  control  forums  in  recog- 
nition of  our  common  interest  in  reducing 
the  risk  of  war  and  clarifying  the  ground 
rules  of  international  conduct.  Whether 
through  major  arms  control  agreements 
or  confidence-building  measures,  we  can 
give  concrete  expression  to  this  common 


"can-do"  spirit.  Usually  these  qualities 
are  a  source  of  strength — but  in  a  negoti- 
ation they  can  be  a  handicap.  If  one  side 
seems  too  eager  or  desperate  for  an 
agreement,  the  other  side  has  no  reason 
to  offer  a  compromise  and  every  reason 
to  hold  back,  waiting  for  the  more  eager 
side  to  yield  first.  It  is  paradoxical  but 
true:  standing  firm  is  sometimes  the  pre- 
requisite for  moving  forward. 

Just  as  cohesion  among  the  allies  is 
crucial  to  the  West's  bargaining  position 
in  INF,  MBFR,  and  all  negotiations 


Ultimate  success  in  our  arms  reduction  efforts 
will  depend  on  ...  a  credible  deterrent,  strong 
alliances,  responsible  international  behavior  by  the 
Soviets,  and  a  willingness  to  compromise  in  recogni- 
tion of  our  overriding  mutual  interest  in  the  survival 
of  civilization. 


interest  and  make  the  world  a  safer 
place.  Preventing  nuclear  proliferation  is 
another  objective  in  which  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  a  com- 
mon stake  and  is  an  area  with  considera- 
ble potential  for  greater  cooperation. 
And,  as  an  important  bonus,  the  savings 
of  world  resources  could  be  significant. 

Ultimate  success  in  our  arms  reduc- 
tion efforts  will  depend  on  all  these  con- 
ditions: a  credible  deterrent,  strong 
alliances,  responsible  international 
behavior  by  the  Soviets,  and  a  willing- 
ness to  compromise  in  recognition  of  our 
overriding  mutual  interest  in  the  sur- 
vival of  civilization.  But  these  conditions, 
in  turn,  depend  in  the  last  analysis  on  the 
qualities  that  we  as  a  nation  bring  to  the 
enterprise:  patience,  perseverance,  and 
national  unity. 

We  Americans  are  sometimes  an 
impatient  people.  It  is  a  reflection  of  our 
traditional  optimism,  dynamism,  and 


affecting  our  allies  and  friends,  so  unity 
in  this  country  is  critical  to  our  hopes  for 
progress  in  all  these  negotiations.  If 
America  appears  divided,  if  the  Soviets 
conclude  that  domestic  political  pi'essures 
will  undercut  our  negotiating  position, 
they  will  dig  in  their  heels  even  deeper. 
The  constructive  bipartisan  spirit  shown 
by  the  Congress  in  support  of  arms  con- 
trol and  our  strategic  modernization  pro- 
grams is  a  model  of  what  is  needed. 
Those  who  have  supported  those  pro- 
grams deserve  our  gratitude;  they  have 
advanced  the  prospects  for  progi-ess  in 
arms  control. 

If  the  Soviet  Union  rejoins  the  nego- 
tiating process,  and  shows  that  it  is  will- 
ing to  advance  balanced  proposals,  I  can 
tell  you  here  and  now  that  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  respond  in  a  con- 
structive spirit. 


CONCLUSION 

For  all  the  difficulties,  strategic  arms 
control  negotiations  have  been  virtually 
continuous  since  the  first  SAUT  talks 
began  in  1969.  The  dialogue  has  contin- 
ued between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States  even  in  times  of  tension 
and  through  major  changes  of  leadership 
on  both  sides.  The  Soviets  have  tempo- 
rarily brought  part  of  this  dialogue  to  a 
halt,  but  some  discussions  ai'e  continuing. 
We  stand  ready,  with  reasonable  propos- 
als, to  go  forward  with  all  these  negotia- 
tions in  a  spirit  of  give-and-take. 

All  American  Presidents  since  the 
dawn  of  the  nuclear  age  have  committed 
themselves  to  the  effort  to  reduce  the 
dangers  of  war.  They  have  all  taken,  in 
essence,  the  same  path:  maintaining  our 
mihtary  strength,  working  with  our 
allies,  and  negotiating  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  Ronald  Reagan  follows  in  this  tra- 
dition. No  President  can  be  oblivious  to 
what  is  at  stake.  We  have  learned  many 
valuable  lessons  from  the  arms  control 
efforts  of  the  past.  We  are  reahstic,  and 
we  are  tackling  the  toughest  issues 
boldly,  comprehensively,  and  without  illu- 
sions. No  President  has  been  moi-e  will- 
ing to  face  up  to  the  real  challenge  of 
peace  and  security  than  Ronald  Reagan. 

Let  the  national  debate,  therefore, 
be  conducted  at  a  level  of  serious,  con- 
structive dialogue  worthy  of  the  momen- 
tous importance  of  the  subject.  At  stake 
is  the  future  of  all  of  us,  and  on  this  issue 
we  are  not  Republicans  or  Democrats  but 
Americans.  If  the  President,  the  Con- 
gress, and  the  nation  work  together,  we 
will  be  a  formidable  force  for  the  reduc- 
tion of  both  armaments  and  the  danger  of 
war,  for  the  defense  of  freedom,  and  for 
the  preservation  of  peace. 

The  problems  are  too  urgent  and  the 
dangers  too  great  to  put  off  searching  for 
solutions  until  we  and  the  Soviets  have 
resolved  all  of  our  pohtical  differences. 
By  defending  our  values,  while  emphasiz- 
ing the  common  interests  of  oui'selves 
and  our  adversaries,  I  believe  we  can 
find  a  way  to  reduce  the  dangers.  Then, 
as  President  Reagan  has  said,  "we  can 
pass  on  to  our  posterity  the  gift  of  peace; 
that,  and  freedom,  are  the  gi-eatest  gifts 
that  one  generation  can  bequeath  to 
another." 


'Press  release  132. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Trade,  Interdependence, 
and  Conflicts  of  Jurisdiction 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
South  Carolina  Bar  Association  in 
Columbia  on  May  5.  1984^ 

This  is  a  year  of  some  important  anniver- 
saries. Next  month,  on  June  6,  President 
Reagan  will  pay  a  visit  to  the  Normandy 
beaches  on  the  40th  anniversary  of 
D-Day.  For  those  of  us  vi'ith  an  economic 
bent,  this  year  is  also  the  40th  anniver- 
sary of  Bretton  Woods— the  historic  con- 
ference of  free  nations  that  laid  the  foun- 
dation of  the  postwar  economic  system. 

The  essence  of  these  postwar  arrange- 
ments was  to  institutionalize  cooperation 
in  trade  and  finance  in  order  to  avoid  the 
disastrous  mistakes  of  the  1930s  that  had 
exacerbated  and  spread  the  Great 
Depression.  The  industrial  democracies 
committed  themselves  to  an  open  world 
economic  system  that  promoted  trade  and 
the  free  flow  of  goods,  services,  and  in- 
vestment. They  created  new  mechanisms 
of  multinational  action  and  new  habits  of 
economic  policy.  The  result  has  been  a 
generation  of  global  economic  expansion 
unprecedented  in  human  history. 

Over  time,  this  postwar  system  has 
a(^usted,  of  course,  to  new  situations. 
The  end  of  colonial  empires  brought  into 
the  global  system  scores  of  new  nations 
which  seek  to  develop  and  share  in  the 
new  prosperity.  Oil  shocks,  monetary 
disputes,  and  protectionist  pressures 
have  created  stresses  in  the  system.  My 
subject  this  morning  is  another  dimension 
of  problems,  often  overlooked,  which 
potentially  could  be  more  serious  than 
any  of  the  others.  Ironically  it  is,  in  a 
sense,  a  product  of  the  system's  success. 

You  lawyers  know  it  as  the  problem 
of  "extraterritoriality"  or  more  accurate- 
ly as  conflicts  of  jurisdiction.  Sometimes 
the  United  States  and  other  countries 
need  to  apply  their  laws  or  regulations  to 
persons  or  conduct  beyond  their  national 
boundaries.  International  disputes  can 
arise  as  a  result;  sometimes,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  pipeline  sanctions  we  imposed  after 
martial  law  was  declared  in  Poland,  the 
legal  disputes  reflect  disagreement  on 
foreign  policy. 

My  message  today  is  twofold. 

•  In  an  interdependent  world,  such 
problems  are  bound  to  proliferate, 
because  they  are  inevitably  generated  by 


the  expanding  economic  and  legal  interac- 
tion among  major  trading  partners  in  the 
expanding  world  economy. 

•  Secondly,  unless  they  are  managed 
or  mitigated  by  the  community  of  nations, 
these  conflicts  of  jurisdiction  have  the 
potential  to  interfere  seriously  with  the 
smooth  functioning  of  international  econo- 
mic relations  that  is  essential  to  continued 
global  recovery. 

So  you  can  see  why  a  Secretary  of 
State,  trained  as  an  economist,  has  chosen 
such  a  topic  to  discuss  before  a  distin- 
guished bar  association. 

Dimensions  of  the  Problem 

Let  me  give  you  a  few  examples  of  what  I 
am  talking  about. 

•  An  American  company  claiming 
injury  by  foreign  companies  operating  in 
our  market  as  a  cartel  may  bring  an  anti- 
trust suit  against  those  companies,  yet 
their  cartel  may  be  permitted,  or  even  en- 
couraged, by  their  own  governments. 

•  An  American  grand  jury  investi- 
gating the  laundering  of  drug  money  and 
tax  violations  may  subpoena  documents  of 
a  bank  operating  in  a  Caribbean  banking 
haven— a  country  that  prohibits  the  dis- 
closure of  such  information. 

•  In  our  country,  12  states  have 
adopted  the  unitary  tax  system,  which 
taxes  a  local  subsidiary  not  only  on  the 
basis  of  its  own  operations  but  also  taking 
into  account  the  operations  of  the  corpor- 
ate parent  and  other  subsidiaries.  For- 
eign companies  and  their  governments 
are  protesting  vigorously,  because  such  a 
system  can  lead  to  double  taxation. 

•  The  Commission  of  the  European 
Community,  on  the  other  hand,  is  con- 
sidering regulations  that  would  require 
European  subsidiaries  of  American  firms 
to  discose  what  the  firms  consider  sensi- 
tive business  information— plans  for 
investment  and  plant  closings,  for  exam- 
ple, even  including  those  outside  Europe. 

•  Finally,  our  allies  may  object 
strenuously  when  the  United  States 
attempts  to  prevent  foreign  subsidiaries 
and  licensees  of  American  companies 
from  exporting  certain  equipment  or 
technology  to  the  Soviet  Union  or  other 
countries  for  reasons  related  to  our 
foreign  policy  objectives. 


These  examples  show  you  the  variety 
of  different  issues  that  can  give  rise  to 
questions  of  conflicts  of  jurisdiction.  And 
they  suggest  why,  with  the  best  of  inten- 
tions, we  are  likely  to  run  into  many  prob- 
lems of  this  kind. 

Conflicts  Over  Economic  Issues 

The  volume  of  international  transactions 
has  grown  tremendously  in  the  last  three 
decades.  The  contribution  of  international 
trade  as  a  proportion  of  American  gross 
national  product  has  doubled  since  1945. 
American  exports  increased  from  $43 
billion  to  more  than  $200  bilhon  in  the 
1970s  alone.  The  value  of  world  trade 
more  than  doubled  during  that  period. 
American  direct  investment  abroad  as  of 
1982  totaled  some  $221  billion;  foreign 
direct  investment  in  the  United  States  in 
the  same  year  stood  at  $102  billion. 

One  symbol  of  this  age  of  economic 
interdependence  is  the  multinational  cor- 
poration. The  conditions  that  produced 
the  explosion  in  trade  across  national 
boundaries  have  led  to  a  similar  interna- 
tionalization of  industry.  Thirty  years 
ago,  most  American  industrial  firms  con- 
ducted their  operations  top  to  bottom 
within  the  United  States.  Today,  those 
same  operations  are  often  spread  out 
across  the  globe,  whether  to  produce  com- 
ponents at  the  lowest  price  or  to  produce 
goods  closer  to  potential  markets.  Today, 
virtually  every  line  of  trade  and  industry 
has  been  affected— and  advanced— by 
the  spread  and  growth  of  multinational 
enterprises. 

In  this  environment  of  commercial 
and  industrial  expansion,  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing that  the  United  States— and  other 
nations— often  find  it  necessary  to  apply 
their  laws,  regulations,  and  policies  to  ac- 
tivities abroad  that  have  substantial  and 
direct  effects  on  their  own  economies,  in- 
terests, and  citizens.  Needless  to  say,  our 
assessment  of  our  need  to  reach  persons 
or  property  abroad  often  runs  up  against 
other  nations'  conceptions  of  their 
sovereignty  and  interests  and,  if  not 
handled  skillfully  and  sensitively,  can 
escalate  into  legal  and  political  disputes. 

Our  relations  with  our  neighbor 
Canada  provide  the  best  illustration  of 


June  1984 


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>ffMMPMMi!WP?">f'W«f»»»"( 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  potential  for  trouble— which,  in  this 
case,  I'm  happy  to  say,  is  pretty  well 
under  control.  Americans  own  approx- 
imately 45%  of  Canadian  industry.  In 
1982,  trade  with  the  United  States  con- 
stituted almost  one-quarter  of  Canada's 
gross  national  product.  Approximately 
70%  of  Canada's  oil  and  gas,  37%  of  its 
mining,  and  47%  of  its  manufacturing  is 
controlled  from  abroad.  Speaking  from 
this  perspective,  Canadian  Ambassador 
Alan  Gotlieb  has  characterized  our  at- 
tempts to  exercise  jurisdiction  over  per- 
sons or  entities  in  Canada  as  calling  into 
question  "the  ability  of  a  national 
government  to  impose  its  laws  and 
policies — that  is,  to  govern — within  its 
national  boundaries." 

Just  after  I  was  confirmed  as  Secre- 
tary of  State,  I  traveled  to  Ottawa  for 
2-day  talks  with  my  Canadian  counter- 
part, External  Affairs  Minister  Allan 
MacEachen.  After  our  talks,  we  an- 
nounced our  intention  to  meet  at  least 
four  tim.es  each  year  to  discuss  bilateral 
and  multilateral  issues.  We  have  already 
met  seven  times,  and  issues  of  extraterri- 
toriality have  invariably  been  at  the  top 
of  our  list.  These  issues  range  from  bank- 
ing and  taxation  to  export  controls  and 
antitrust  regulations. 

Canada  is  not  our  only  ally  concerned 
about  these  issues.  In  the  past  year  we 
have  received  more  than  25  formal  diplo- 
matic demarches  on  the  subject  from 
many  of  our  closest  allies  and  trading 
partners.  One  of  their  major  concerns  is 
the  unitary  tax,  now  in  use  in  12 
American  states.  In  my  tenure  at  the 
State  Department,  few  issues  have  pro- 
voked so  broad  and  intense  a  reaction 
from  foreign  nations.  Fourteen  countries 
submitted  a  joint  diplomatic  communica- 
tion to  the  Department  of  State  over 
this  issue. 

These  countries— the  10  members  of 
the  European  Community  plus  Japan, 
Canada,  Svdtzerland,  and  Australia, 
representing  84%  of  total  foreign  direct 
investment  in  the  United  States  (that's 
$85  billion)— had  three  complaints.  They 
complained  about  the  administrative 
burden  of  compliance  and  about  the 
potential  for  double  taxation.  And  they 
warned  that  we  must  anticipate  adoption 
of  unitary  taxation  by  developing  nations 
which  are  heavily  in  debt  and  looking 
desperately  for  new  sources  of  revenue. 
As  the  world's  largest  foreign  direct  in- 
vestor, the  United  States  will  be  a  big 
loser  if  the  practice  becomes  widespread. 
Developing  nations,  I  might  add,  would 
be  even  bigger  losers  in  the  long  run, 
since  they  would  scare  away  investors. 


Although  on  a  technical  level  it  can  be 
debated  whether  unitary  taxation  really 
involves  "extraterritoriality,"  it  is  per- 
ceived that  way  on  a  political  level.  Thus  I 
am  pleased  to  see  that  the  Unitary  Tax 
Working  Group  of  Federal,  state,  and 
business  representatives— established  at 
the  President's  direction— has  reached  a 
consensus  in  favor  of  limiting  unitary  tax- 
ation to  the  "water's  edge."  Despite  prob- 
lems yet  to  be  overcome,  we  think 
substantial  progress  has  been  made 
toward  finding  a  practical  solution. 

National  Security  and 
Foreign  Policy  Conflicts 

As  controversial  as  these  conflicts  over 
trade  and  financial  issues  can  be,  the 
potential  for  sharp  controversy  is  even 
greater  when  the  disputes  involve  major 
foreign  policy  concerns.  As  the  largest 
free  nation,  the  United  States  must  use 
the  fuU  range  of  tools  at  its  disposal  to 
meet  its  responsibility  for  preserving 
peace  and  defending  freedom. 

You  all  remember  the  case  of  the 
pipeline  sanctions.  When  martial  law  was 
imposed  in  Poland  in  1981,  President 
Reagan  applied  economic  sanctions  to 
show  that  "business  as  usual"  could  not 
continue  with  those  who  oppress  the 
Polish  people.  We  prohibited  exports  of 
oil  and  gas  equipment  and  technology  to 
the  Soviet  Union  by  firms  within  the 
United  States  and  by  foreign  firms  using 
American-made  components  or  U.S. 
technology.  Eventually  we  also  prohibited 
exports  of  wholly  foreign-made  com- 
modities by  subsidiaries  of  U.S.  firms 
abroad.  This  caused  a  major  dispute  be- 
tween us  and  our  trading  partners,  who 
complained  of  the  extraterritorial  reach  of 
the  sanctions  and  the  retroactive  inter- 
ruption of  contracts  already  signed. 

Our  Export  Administration  Act, 
which  is  now  up  for  renewal,  authorizes 
the  government  to  impose  controls  on  ex- 
ports of  equipment  or  technology  on 
grounds  of  either  national  security  or 
foreign  policy.  That  authority  extends  not 
only  to  entities  within  the  United  States 
but  to  any  entity,  wherever  located,  that 
is  subject  to  U.S.  jurisdiction.  We  con- 
sider this  to  include  foreign  subsidiaries 
of  U.S.  firms,  although  such  authority  has 
rarely  been  exercised.  The  act  also  pro- 
vides authority  for  controls  on  reexports 
and  for  controls  on  the  export  abroad  of 
foreign  products  using  U.S.  components 
or  technology. 

Thanks  to  the  allied  consensus  on  the 
need  to  keep  militarily  useful  technology 


from  falling  into  the  hands  of  our  adver- 
saries, implementation  of  so-called  "na- 
tional security"  controls  has  not  generally 
created  problems  over  extraterritoriality. 
Each  allied  government  enforces  similar 
controls,  and  policies  are  kept  in  harmony 
through  the  Coordinating  Committee  for 
Multilateral  Security  Export  Controls  or 
COCOM.  It  doesn't  make  sense  to  spend 
billions  of  dollars  on  defense  but  at  the 
same  time  help  our  adversary  build  up 
the  very  military  machine  that  we  are 
spending  the  billions  to  defend  against. 

When  it  comes  to  use  of  export  con- 
trols to  impose  sanctions  on  foreign  policy 
grounds,  which  we  resort  to  very  sparing- 
ly, no  such  consensus  e.xists.  Our  efforts 
under  the  Export  Administration  Act  to 
compel  U.S.  firms  outside  the  United 
States  to  adhere  to  our  foreign  policy  con- 
trols have  stirred  up  new  controversy. 
This  is  in  part  because  some  of  our  aUies 
do  not  share  our  belief  in  the  efficacy  of 
economic  sanctions,  in  part  because  of  dif- 
fering strategic  perspectives,  and  in  part 
because  their  domestic  economic  interests 
would  have  been  more  adversely  affected 
than  ours. 

In  our  current  effort  to  extend  and 
amend  the  Export  Administration  Act, 
we  have  given  careful  consideration  to 
some  of  the  provisions  that  made  the 
pipeline  sanctions  so  controversial. 
SpecificaDy,  the  Administration  supports 
clarifying  the  criteria  for  controls  on  so- 
called  "foreign  policy"  grounds,  taking  ac- 
count of  the  principle  of  sanctity  of  con- 
tracts in  this  area.  At  the  same  time, 
resolution  of  the  pipeline  dispute  has 
demonstrated  the  benefits  of  a  coopera- 
tive allied  approach  to  economic  relations 
with  the  Soviet  bloc. 

When  I  was  in  private  business,  I  was 
concerned  about  the  practice  of  using 
foreign  trade  as  a  tactical  instrument  of 
foreign  policy.  I  called  it  "light-switch 
diplomacy"— the  attempt  to  turn  trade  on 
and  off  as  a  foreign  policy  device.  The 
problem  is  twofold.  First,  the  United 
States  is  no  longer  in  such  a  dominant 
position  in  world  trade  that  our  unOateral- 
ly  imposed  sanctions  have  as  powerful  a 
political  effect  as  is  intended.  Moreover, 
America's  rehability  as  a  supplier  is 
eroded;  other  countries  simply  change 
suppliers  or  design  U.S.  components  out 
of  the  goods  they  manufacture.  The  U.S. 
economy  suffers  unless  our  main  trading 
partners  go  along  with  us.  Foreign  air- 
craft manufacturers,  for  example,  are 
already  avoiding  U.S. -made  high-tech- 
nology navigational  devices  for  fear  that 
some  day  new  U.S.  export  controls  might 
be  imposed,  preventing  sales  or  drying  up 
supplies  of  parts. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


■B    MA    mj     « 


THE  SECRETARY 


Now  that  I  am  Secretary  of  State,  I 
continue  to  have  the  same  concerns.  But  I 
know,  too,  that  there  are  cases  beyond 
the  strict  legal  definition  of  "national 
security"  that  pose  a  serious  challenge  to 
our  broader  security  and  other  foreign 
relations  interests.  In  these  cases,  econo- 
mic and  commercial  interests  cannot  be 
the  sole  concern  of  policy.  Dealing  with 
Libya  and  Iran  is  an  example;  and  we 
must  be  able  to  prevent  U.S.  commerce 
from  being  the  source  of  chemicals  used 
unlawfully  in  regional  conflicts. 

For  these  kinds  of  cases,  it  seems  to 
me  imperative  for  the  President  to  have 
discretionaiy  authority  to  use  national 
security  and  foreign  policy  controls  on  a 
selective  basis.  Although  such  controls 
can  have  painful  side  effects,  the  alter- 
natives available  for  responding  to 
threatening  international  developments 
can  sometimes  have  even  higher  costs. 
We  have  thought  a  lot  about  the  proper 
balance  and  have  tried  to  build  such  a 
balance  into  the  President's  proposal  for 
amending  the  Export  Administration 
Act.  This  approach  merits  congres- 
sional support. 

But  it  is  clear  that  problems  will  re- 
main. As  the  world  economy  grows  more 
interdependent,  as  the  machinery  of 
business  regulation  grows  more  complex, 
as  the  Soviet  Union  steps  up  its  drive  to 
acquire  advanced  technology  that  it  can- 
not produce  itself,  the  opportunity  for  dif- 
ferences is  bound  to  grow.  Any  one  of  the 
major  trading  countries  is  likely,  on  some 
occasion  in  the  future,  to  feel  that  its  na- 
tional interest  or  public  policy  cannot  be 
served  without  an  assertion  of  jurisdic- 
tion that  leads  to  a  disagreement  with  its 
partners.  And,  if  the  disputes  get  out  of 
hand,  they  could  do  damage  to  this  open 
system  of  trade  and  investment  and 
become  an  obstacle  to  further  economic 
growth,  as  I  have  said.  Disputes  over 
extraterritoriality  could  become  a  bigger 
threat  to  our  economic  interests  than  the 
present  concerns  about  tariffs,  quotas, 
and  exchange  rates.  On  a  political  level, 
they  can  become  a  serious  irritant  in 
relations  with  our  allies  and  thus  even 
weaken  the  moral  foundation  of  our 
common  defense. 

So  extraterritoriality  is  not  an 
esoteric,  technical  matter.  It  is  high 
among  my  concerns  as  I  go  about  the  job 
of  managing  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
United  States. 


The  Necessity  for  a  Solution 

It  is,  in  fact,  a  matter  of  some  urgency. 
Increasingly,  conflicts  of  jurisdiction  are 
resulting  in  defensive  and  retaliatory 
actions  on  the  part  of  some  foreign 
governments. 

A  number  of  countries  have  enacted 
"blocking"  statutes  seeking  to  forbid  in- 
dividuals or  companies  from  complying 
with  U.S.  law  or  regulation.  In  1980,  for 
example,  Britain  enacted  the  Protection 
of  Trading  Interests  Act.  This  law  em- 
powers the  British  Government  to  order 
companies  in  Britain  not  to  comply  with 
foreign  subpoenas  and  discovery  orders, 
as  well  as  foreign  laws,  regulations,  or 
court  orders  that  threaten  to  damage 
British  trading  interests.  The  act  also 
authorizes  a  British  company  to  retaliate 
against  private  treble-damage  antitrust 
awards  by  filing  a  countersuit  in  British 
courts. 

In  addition,  the  prospect  of  applica- 
tion of  our  laws  to  offshore  conduct  is 
beginning  to  result  in  new  barriers  to  in- 
vestment. Acquisitions  and  mergers  have 
also  been  impeded,  and  foreign  manufac- 
turers are  beginning  to  seek  alternative 
sources  of  supply  to  replace  U.S.  sources 
that  are  considered  unreliable. 

•  The  threat  of  U.S.  export  controls 
has,  indeed,  inspired  foreign  purchasers 
to  design  around  or  circumvent  the  use  of 
U.S.  components  in  their  products.  An 
Italian  firm,  for  example,  uses  General 
Electric  rotors  in  turbines  it  manufac- 
tures for  the  Soviet  pipeline  project.  Ear- 
ly this  year,  it  notified  GE  that  it  wanted 
the  license  to  manufacture  the  rotors  in 
Italy  or  else  it  would  manufacture  them 
without  GE  aproval  by  using  technical 
knowledge  developed  over  the  years  of 
using  GE  components. 

•  The  unitary  tax  has  made  foreign 
companies  think  twice  about  building 
plants  in  the  United  States.  A  few  months 
ago,  the  president  of  Fujitsu  was 
reported  in  The  Washington  Post  as  say- 
ing that  his  company  is  delaying  plans  to 
build  a  plant  in  California  to  see  whether 
that  state  repeals  its  unitary  tax  law. 
Sony  has  stated  that  it  decided  to  expand 
new  U.S.  investment  here  in  South 
Carolina  rather  than  California  because  of 
California's  unitary  tax.  (South  Carolina, 

I  must  say,  has  a  remarkable  record  of  at- 
tracting some  $3.5  billion  in  foreign  in- 
vestment in  the  last  dozen  years  or  so.) 

•  Speaking  more  broadly,  we  have 
had  a  number  of  suggestions  from  friends 
and  allies  in  recent  years  that  application 
of  American  law  where  it  conflicts  with 


their  policies  can  only  serve  to  damage 
adherence  to  an  investment  principle  we 
have  long  cherished:  national  treatment 
for  American-owned  companies  abroad. 

These  may  be  only  the  tip  of  the 
iceberg.  The  threat  of  extensive  applica- 
tion of  domestic  law— be  it  U.S.  or  Euro- 
pean law— to  entities  or  persons  abroad 
has  the  potential  to  harm  the  fabric  of  the 
global  economic  system.  And  disputes  of 
this  kind  pose  a  danger  of  poisoning 
political  cooperation  among  the 
democracies,  whose  solidarity  and  cohe- 
sion are  the  underpinning  of  the  security, 
freedom,  and  prosperity  of  all  of  us.  It  is 
imperative,  therefore,  that  we  manage 
the  problem  of  conflicts  of  jurisdiction. 

The  Search  for  Solutions 

As  we  search  for  solutions,  we  can  start 
by  examining  an  analogy  from  our  own 
history.  As  lawyers,  you  have  much  ex- 
perience with  dealing  with  conflicts  of 
laws  among  the  several  states.  And  you 
remember  that  as  this  country  grew  from 
a  collection  of  "free  and  independent 
states"  under  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence to  its  status  as  a  "more 
perfect  union"  under  the  Constitution, 
this  growth  was  accompanied  by  a 
political  struggle  over  the  effort  to  cen- 
tralize and  strengthen  national  control 
over  interstate  commerce. 

It's  not  news  to  the  people  of  South 
Carolina  that  the  growth  of  our  country 
gave  rise  to  a  continuing  tension  between 
the  sovereign  states  and  the  Federal 
Government.  In  the  economic  sphere,  not- 
withstanding the  centralizing  clauses  of 
the  Constitution,  conflicts  of  jurisdiction 
arose  from  the  states'  attempt  to  regulate 
and  tax  the  railroads  in  the  late  1800s. 
America's  railroads,  indeed,  were  an  ear- 
ly example  of  multjjurisdictional  enter- 
prises. Their  growth  made  the  United 
States  a  truly  "national"  market  for  the 
first  time.  Understanding  the  importance 
of  economic  integration,  the  Supreme 
Court  decided  in  several  landmark  cases, 
dealing  with  shipping  and  interstate  com- 
merce, that  conflicts  of  jurisdiction  among 
the  several  states  could  not  stand  in  the 
way  of  national  prosperity.  Today,  the 
United  States  can  be  viewed  as  the 
largest  free-trade  area  in  the  world. 

In  the  United  States  we  have  been 
fortunate  that  the  friction  generated  by 
conflicts  of  juristiction  has  been  eased  by 
a  strong  Federal  system.  In  the  interna- 
tional arena,  differences  among  nations 
are  not  so  easily  resolved.  As  a  result. 


June  1984 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 


I 


what  may  first  appear  to  be  a  clash  of 
legal  principles  can  quickly  escalate  into  a 
major  diplomatic  incident.  International 
law,  instead  of  mitigating  conflict,  can 
become  a  battleground  until  the  underly- 
ing dispute  is  eased  by  creative 
diplomacy.  The  need  for  such  solutions  is 
becoming  more  urgent  as  conflicts  of 
jurisdiction  multiply  in  our  economically 
interdependent  world. 

The  question  we  face,  however,  is  not 
whether  extraterritorial  reach  should  be 
permissible  but  rather  how  and  when  it 
should  be  done.  Thanks  to  the  wonders  of 
modem  electronics,  corporations  and  in- 
dividuals can  frustrate  important  national 
regulations  and  laws  by  transferring 
assets,  data,  and  documents  across  oceans 
with  a  telephone  call  or  the  push  of  a  com- 
puter button.  In  such  a  world,  where 
transactions  often  involve  parties  in 
several  nations,  rigid  territorial  limits  to 
jurisdiction  are,  in  fact,  not  practicable. 

Even  some  of  the  most  eminent  critics 
among  our  allies  recognize  this.  Canadian 
Ambassador  GotUeb  has  stated: 

It  is  clear  that  in  our  interdependent  world 
a  purely  territorial  approach  to  sovereignty- 
one  that  completely  separates  national  juris- 
dictions—is  not  workable;  some  extrater- 
ritoriality is  inevitable  and,  sometimes,  even 
desirable. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  essential  that  the 
industrialized  world  find  ways  of  contain- 
ing or  mitigating  or  resolving  some  of  the 
problems.  The  United  States  cannot 
disclaim  its  authority  to  act  where  needed 
in  defense  of  our  national  security, 
foreign  policy,  or  law  enforcement  in- 
terests. However,  we  are  prepared  to  do 
our  part  in  fmding  cooperative  solutions. 
We  are  prepared  to  be  responsive  to  the 
concerns  of  others.  If  our  allies  and 
trading  partners  join  with  us  in  the  same 
spirit,  we  can  make  progress. 

The  first  element  of  our  approach  is 
to  strive  to  resolve  the  policy  differences 
that  underlie  many  of  these  conflicts  of 
jurisdiction.  The  pipeline  dispute,  for  ex- 
ample, was  resolved  through  diplomacy: 
the  United  States  lifted  the  sanctions 
while  the  industrial  democracies  began 
working  out  a  new  consensus  on  the  im- 
portant strategic  issues  of  East-West 
trade.  Harmonizing  policies  is  not  easy. 
Our  allies  are  strong,  self-confident,  and 
independent  minded;  and  they  do  not 
automatically  agree  with  American 
prescriptions. 


Even  where  policies  are  not  totally 
congruent,  it  may  be  possible  at  least  to 
bring  them  closer  together  in  some  areas, 
or  to  agree  on  some  ground  rules  that 
allow  us  to  meet  our  legitimate  needs. 
Some  examples  include  regulating  com- 
petition, pursuing  foreign  insider  trading 
in  our  securities  markets,  and  protecting 
what  we  consider  to  be  our  sensitive 
technology.  A  good  case  in  point  is  the 
cooperation  we  recently  received  from 
several  foreign  governments  in  intercept- 
ing sensitive  computers  that  were  being 
diverted  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

Second,  where  pohcies  do  not  mesh, 
countries  should  seek  to  abide  by  the 
principle  of  international  comity:  they 
should  exercise  their  jurisdiction  only 
after  trying  to  take  foreign  interests  into 
account,  and  they  should  be  prepared  to 
talk  through  potentially  significant  prob- 
lems with  friendly  governments  at  the 
earliest  practicable  stage. 

Sometimes,  the  answer  may  be  a  for- 
mal international  agreement.  We  have  tax 
treaties  with  35  nations,  for  example,  in- 
cluding all  the  major  industrial  countries. 
I  have  just  returned  from  China,  where 
the  President  signed  a  tax  treaty  that  will 
enter  into  force  after  ratification.  These 
have  the  effect  of  harmonizing  national 
systems  and  fostering  international  com- 
merce, and  they  usually  establish  pro- 
cedures for  enforcement  cooperation. 

Similarly,  we  and  our  partners  have 
been  expanding  formal  arrangements  for 
mutual  assistance  in  the  law  enforcement 
area.  Three  such  formal  treaties  are 
already  in  force,  three  more  have  been 
signed  and  are  awaiting  ratification,  and 
several  more  are  under  negotiation. 

We  are  also  discussing  ways  to 
develop  further  our  informal  ar- 
rangements of  advance  notice,  consulta- 
tion, and  cooperation  with  foreign  govern- 
ments where  appropriate  and  feasible. 
Under  OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development]  guidelines 
regarding  antitrust  enforcement,  in  place 
since  1967,  the  United  States  has  notified 
or  consulted  with  foreign  governments 
approximately  490  times  regarding  an- 
titrust cases,  including  the  well-known 
Uranium  and  Laker  matters.  With  West 
Germany,  Australia,  and  Canada,  we 
have  expanded  these  guidelines  into 
bilateral  agreements  or  arrangements. 

We  have  cooperative  procedures  as 
well  for  some  of  the  independent 
regulatory  agencies.  The  Federal  Trade 
Commission  (FTC),  for  instance,  par- 
ticipates in  the  antitrust  notice  and  con- 


36 


sultation  program  I  mentioned  earlier. 
And  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Com- 
mission (SEC)  has  entered  into  a 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  with 
Switzerland,  through  which  we  can  obtain 
information  in  Switzerland  that  we  need 
in  investigating  insider  trading  and  other 
securities  violations. 

Third,  we  are  working  to  improve 
coordination  within  the  U.S.  Government. 
Within  the  executive  branch  we  are 
studying  procedures  through  which  other 
agencies  inform  and,  if  appropriate,  con- 
sult with  the  Department  of  State  when 
contemplating  actions  that  may  touch 
foreign  sensitivities  about  conflicts  of 
jurisdiction.  The  State  Department  has 
already  played  a  constructive  role  in 
assisting,  for  example,  the  SEC,  the  FTC, 
and  the  Justice  Department. 

Fourth,  we  are  considering  the 
development  of  bilateral  and  multilateral 
mechanisms  for  prior  notice,  consulta- 
tion, and  cooperation  with  other  govern- 
ments. In  the  OECD,  we  are  working  out 
a  set  of  general  considerations  and  prac- 
tical approaches  for  dealing  with  cases  of 
conflicts  of  jurisdiction  relating  to 
multinational  corporations.  Discussions 
are  taking  place  also  in  the  UN  frame- 
work with  both  developing  and  indus- 
trialized countries.  We  have  had  exten- 
sive bilateral  consultations  with  Britain 
and  Canada,  and  we  are  ready  to  consider 
such  appropriate  and  mutually  beneficial 
arrangements  with  other  interested 
friendly  countries. 

Such  measures  will  not  end  conflicts 
of  jurisdiction,  but  they  are  an  earnest  of 
this  country's  determination  to  do  what  it 
can  to  avoid  conflicts  where  we  can  and  to 
minimize  the  harm  that  the  unavoidable 
conflicts  can  do.  The  United  States,  for  its 
part,  will  continue  to  maintain  that  it  is 
entitled  under  international  law  to  exer- 
cise its  jurisdiction  over  conduct  outside 
the  United  States  in  certain  situations. 
We  will  continue  to  preserve  the 
statuton,^  authority  to  do  so.  But  we  will 
exercise  the  authority  with  discretion  and 
restraint,  balancing  all  the  important  in- 
terests involved,  American  and  foreign, 
immediate  and  long-term,  economic  and 
political. 

Problem  Solving 

The  essence  of  our  approach  is  to  reduce 
the  problem  from  an  issue  of  principle  to  a 
practice  of  problem  solving.  This  is 
because,  in  the  final  analysis,  there  is  a 
higher  principle  at  stake:  the  political  uni- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


..  iu  ■,•.  ■  . 


THE  SECRETARY 


ty  of  the  democratic  nations.  That  unity, 
as  I  said  earlier,  is  the  key  to  our  common 
security,  freedom,  and  prosperity.  The 
system  of  law  that  we  and  our  allies  so 
cherish  and  the  free  economic  system  that 
so  nourishes  us  are  under  severe 
challenge  from  adversaries  who  would  im- 
pose their  own  system  by  brute  force.  If 
the  free  nations  do  not  stand  solidly 
together  on  the  fundamental  issues,  we  all 
risk  losing  much  that  is  precious— far 
more  precious  than  the  subject  matter  of 
any  particular  dispute. 


To  solve  these  problems,  we  need 
creative  thinking  on  the  part  of  the 
American  legal  community,  businessmen 
and  economists,  government  officials, 
foreign  policy  experts— and  their  counter- 
parts abroad.  I  know  that  with  imagina- 
tion and  dedication,  we  in  the  free  world 
can  surmount  these  obstacles.  Too  much 
is  at  stake  for  us  to  do  othervrise. 


'Press  release  123  of  May  7,  1984. 


Secretary  Visits  Korea  and  Japan 


Secretary  Shultz  left  the  presidential 
party  in  Shanghai,  China,  on  May  1, 
198U,  to  visit  Seoul  (May  1-2)  and  Tokyo 
(May  2).  He  returned  to  the  United  States 
on  May  2. 

Following  is  the  Secretary's  toast  at 
the  dinner  in  his  honor  hosted  by  Korean 
Foreign  Minister  Lee  Wcm  Kyung  in 
Seoul  on  May  1} 

I  see  many  friends  that  I  have  met 
before,  even  including  someone  from  my 
tour  of  duty  in  government  many  years 
ago  in  the  Finance  Ministry  business,  so  I 
feel  very  much  at  home.  In  fact,  this  is 
the  third  visit  that  I  have  made  to  Korea 
as  Secretary  of  State,  and  I  was  trying  to 
think  if  there  is  another  country  that  I 
have  visited  three  times  in  that  period. 
But,  at  any  rate,  it  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to 
be  here  again  and  be  with  you  and  to 
have  a  chance  to  share  with  you  the  views 
that  developed  as  a  result  of  the  Presi- 
dent's most  recent  trip  to  the  Pacific 
region  and  to  China. 

The  President's  recent  trip  to  China 
is  part  of  his  overall  policy  toward  the 
Pacific  region— a  policy  that  included  the 
President's  successful  trip  to  Korea  and 
Japan  last  fall.  These  presidential  trips 
are  only  the  most  visible  element  of  a 
healthy  two-way  flow  of  officials  between 
our  countries  that  began  with  President 
Chun's  visit  to  Washington  in  1981,  prac- 
tically immediately  after  President 
Reagan's  inaugiiration.  This  frequent 
transpacific  travel  reflects  the  ever- 
growing importance  and  complexity  of 
relations  between  us,  a  trend  that  will 
only  accelerate. 


Evidence  of  this  abounds.  Last  year, 
your  exports  increased  12%,  mostly  due 
to  increased  shipments  to  the  United 
States.  Foreign  banks  in  Korea  will  soon 
be  permitted  increased  access  to  your 
currency  market.  New  regulations  will 
bring  increased  foreign  investment,  much 
of  it  American,  and  tariffs  are  gradually 
lowering  on  items  of  interest  to  U.S.  ex- 
porters. 

In  the  political  sphere,  at  the  top  of 
our  agenda,  as  always,  is  the  deterrent.  I 
think  I  should  read  that  again,  because  it 
is  so  fundamental— the  maintenance  of  a 
firm  alliance  and  a  strong  deterrent. 
Americans  are  well  aware  of  the  great 
burdens  your  people  endure  in  meeting 
the  threat  from  the  North  and  responding 
to  the  North's  excessive  mihtary  buildup. 
I  speak  for  President  Reagan,  as  well  as 
for  myself,  when  I  say  that  the  U.S.  com- 
mitment to  Korea  and  to  our  mutual  goals 
of  peace,  stability,  and  prosperity  are  firm 
and  unshakeable. 

We  have  not  forgotten,  nor  would  we 
let  the  world  forget.  North  Korea's  sense- 
less and  tragic  attack  in  Rangoon.  I 
might  say  that  I  have  been  told  on  some 
occasions  that  it  is  time  to  let  bygones  be 
bygones  and  to  go  on,  and  I  know  that  life 
is  such  that  you  do  go  on.  But  I  have  had 
to  respond  to  that,  just  as  a  personal  mat- 
ter. It  happened  to  be  that  I  knew  your 
predecessor  and  felt  he  was  a  good  friend. 
We  knew  his  wife.  My  wife  called  on  her 
when  we  were  last  in  Korea.  That 
tragedy  weighs  on  our  hearts.  We  look 
forward  to  the  responsible  and  seasoned 
approach  you  have  taken  in  the  wake  of 
this  tragedy,  as  in  the  wake  of  the  loss  of 


Korean  Air  Lines  Flight  007,  and  we  have 
worked  with  you  to  condemn  those  re- 
sponsible. 

It  is  in  this  context,  with  respect  and 
friendship  and  with  a  healthy  air  of  skep- 
ticism, that  we  join  you  in  the  search  for  a 
reduction  of  tension  on  the  peninsula.  We 
believe  your  proposals  for  concrete 
measures  to  reduce  tensions  can  play  an 
important  role  in  this  process.  We  will 
continue  to  work  closely  with  you  in  ex- 
ploring possible  opportunities  to  reduce 
tension  and  build  a  more  stable  peace,  and 
we  welcome  your  efforts  to  strengthen 
democracy  at  home. 

You  have  taken  many  encouraging 
steps  even  since  my  last  visit.  It  is  a 
reminder  to  us  all  that  democracy  re- 
quires mutual  respect  and  dialogue,  a 
duty  that  faUs  on  both  those  who  govern 
and  the  people.  The  firm  bonds  that  unite 
the  Korean  and  American  people  have 
stood  us  in  good  stead  over  the  past  years 
as  we've  coped  with  changes  and 
tragedies.  The  United  States  and  the 
international  community  applaud  the  pa- 
tience, statesmanship,  and  good  will  your 
government  has  shown  in  the  pursuit  of 
peace,  just  as  we  admire  your  strength 
and  determination  to  deter  war.  The 
international  sporting  events  that  will  be 
held  here,  leading  to  the  Olympics  in 
1988,  attest  to  a  growing  respect  of  all 
quantities.  Our  formal  discussions  wUl 
further  strengthen  the  partnership  be- 
tween our  two  great  countries  and  our 
ability  to  meet  the  challenges  of  peace, 
prosperity,  and  justice  to  which  we  are 
devoted. 

Last  fall  I  accompanied  President 
Reagan  as  he  visited  our  soldiers  at  the 
DMZ.  I  remember  our  boys  would  say 
their  unit's  motto,  "Rock  Steady,"  as 
they  saluted  their  officers.  I  don't  know 
any  better  words  for  our  commitment  to 
your  people,  or  confidence  in  you  as  allies, 
than  these  words,  "Rock  Steady." 

Please  join  me  in  a  toast  to  President 
Chun,  to  Foreign  Minister  Lee,  to  the  Re- 
public of  Korea,  and  to  the  noble  partner- 
ship between  our  two  great  countries. 


'Press  release  122  of  May  4,  1984. 


June  1984 


AFRICA 


Visit  of  Botswana  President 


nations  of  the  region,  internationally 
recognized  independence  for  Namibia, 
self-determination  for  the  people  of  the 
area,  and  a  peaceful  change  in  South 

Africa.  ,        ,•     j  • 

Botswana,  which  has  long  lived  in 
peace  with  its  neighbors  without  com- 
promising its  democratic  and  nonracial 
principles,  has  proven  how  much  can  be 
accomplished.  Its  democratic  standards 
have  served  Botswana  and  the  region 
well  As  a  leader  of  one  of  the  front-hne 
states,  President  Masire's  views  have 
been  particularW  instructive  to  me. 

The  United  States  and  Botswana  are 
tied  by  our  dedication  to  democracy  and 
respect  for  individual  rights.  These  are 
the  bonds  that  unite  aU  good  and  decent 
people.  I  would  like  to  offer  my  best 
wishes  and  those  of  the  American  people 
for  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  people- 
of  Botswana.  And  I'm  pleased  that  you 
were  able  to  accept  our  invitation  to  com& 
to  Washington,  and  I  look  forward  to 
meeting  with  you  again. 


Ibeintr 


elsewhere, 


litigacoiii 
Wear! 


vcswrs*' 
Botswana 
tkeyarei 
noproble 
There  an 
ofam',s( 


'ami 
lion  is,' 


(Whit*  House  photo  by  Pete  Souza) 


President  Quett  K.  J.  Masire  of  the 
Republic  of  Botswana  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washingt.mi,  D.C.,  May 
7-10,  198k,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Follomng  are  remarks  made  by  the 
two  Presidents  after  their  meeting  on 
May  9.' 

President  Reagan 

It's  been  my  very  great  pleasure  to  meet 
today  with  President  Masire  ot 
Botswana.  . 

The  President's  leadership  as  Vice 
President  and  President  has  been  impor- 
tant to  his  nation  since  its  independence 
over  17  years  ago.  He  follows  m  the 
distinguished  footsteps  of  Seretse 
Khama,  a  friend  of  the  United  States  and 
a  tireless  worker  for  peace  in  Africa  and 
nrogress  for  Botswana.  Botswana  s  suc- 
cess as  a  free  and  democratic  nation  owes 
much  to  the  wise  leadership  of  President 
Masire  and  his  predecessor. 

I've  enjoyed  the  opporturaty  to  ex- 
change views  on  matters  of  mutual  m- 
terest  to  our  two  nations.  Our  discussions 
covered  a  wide  range  of  topics,  includmg 
bilateral  and  regional  issues.  And  it  goes 
without  saying,  our  exchange  was  open 
and  friendly.  ,      ,    .     •  v^ 

I  appreciate  the  President  s  msights 
into  the  issues  of  importance  to  the 
African  Continent.  We  admu-e  the 
economic  strides  that  Botswana  has  made 


33 


since  independence.  It  has  managed  its 
resources  with  skill  and  improved  the 
standard  of  living  of  its  people.  And  that 
progress,  due  in  large  pari,  to  prudent 
financial  planning  and  receptivity  to  in- 
vestment, is  an  example  to  others  in 
Africa  who  seek  to  better  the  lives  of 
their  people. 

President  Masire  descnbed  to  me  the 
serious  problems  Botswana  is  facing  as  a 
result  of  the  severe  drought  that  has 
plagued  southern  Africa  for  3  years  now. 
And  I,  of  course,  expressed  my  heartfelt 
concern  and  that  of  the  American  people 
for  the  tragedy  wrought  by  this  natural 
disaster.  Together,  we  explored  ways 
that  American  aid  can  alleviate  at  least 
some  of  this  suffering.  . 

We  have  also  used  this  occasion  to 
discuss  the  political  situation  in  southern 
Africa,  and  I  assured  President  Masire 
that  the  United  States  wUl  continue  to 
seek  peaceful  solutions  to  the  problems  of 
that  volatile  part  of  the  worid.  This  will 
not  be  an  easy  task.  However,  we  believe 
that  the  recent  accord  between  South 
Africa  and  Mozambique,  as  well  as  the 
disengagement  offerees  in  Angola,  are 
encouraging  signs.  Both  Botswana  and 
the  United  States  want  peace  among  the 


President  Masire 

We  are  here  at  the  invitation  of  the 
President  and  the  people  of  the  United 
SUtes.  We  are  very  grateful  that  this  in- 
vitation has  been  extended  to  us  because, 
as  the  President  has  said,  this  has  given 
us  the  opportunity  to  talk  together  on 
matters  of  mutual  interest  and  to  brief 
the  President  and  his  colleagues  on  sonie 
of  the  goings  on  in  our  part  of  the  world. 
Ours  is  a  long  association.  Since  inde- 
pendence, Botswana  has  had  a  very 
amicable  relationship  with  the  United 
States.  We  have  had  Peace  Corps 
volunteers  who  have  worked  there.  Some 
of  them  initially  went  there  for  2  years, 
but  ended  up  staying  for  10  years  or  so. 
We  have  found  not  only  Peace  Corps  but 
other  American  personnel  to  be  very 
useful  in  our  development  effort. 

As  you  know,  we  are  a  democracy. 
Perhaps  we  are  a  little  too  democratic, 
because  while  here,  you  have  only  the 
RepubUcan  Party  and  the  Democratic 
Party  back  home,  we  have  something 
like  sbc  parties.  And  we,  much  as  people 
have  said  democracy  cannot  work  in 
Africa,  I  think  we  should  thank  God  that 
in  Botswana  so  far  it  has  worked.  And  I 
think  one  of  the  reasons  it  has  worked  is 
that  there  has  been  mutual  trust  and 
mutual  respect.  The  opposition  is  treated 
seriously,  because  we  see  it  as  the  means 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


epeopl 
ilyou 


:  this  in 
becaiis) 


J  We 


AFRICA 


to  be  a  multiparty  state.  And  we  know  if 
we  treated  the  opposition  shabbily,  we 
will  be  in  trouble  when  it  is  their  turn  to 
run  the  show.  [Laughter]  We,  unlike 
elsewhere,  consult  on  matters  of  national 
interest,  national  security  and— with  the 
opposition.  And  so  far,  as  I  said,  we  have 
found  this  to  be  perhaps  the  best  of  run- 
ning a  country. 

We  are  an  open  economy,  market-led 
economy.  People  are  free  to  invest. 
That's  one  of  the  things  we  have  talked 
about,  that  if  there  are  American  in- 
vestors who  would  like  to  come  over  to 
Botswana  and  invest,  they  must  know 
they  are  very  much  welcome.  There  are 
no  problems  about  capital  repatriation. 
There  are  no  problems  about  repatriation 
of  any,  so  far,  of  expatriate  stuff.  There 
are  no  problems  of  racial  discrimination, 
because,  being  next  to  South  Africa  and 
knowing  just  how  bad  racial  discrimina- 
tion is,  we  know  is  just  as  bad  when  prac- 
ticed by  whites  as  when  practiced  by 
blacks.  And,  therefore,  we  avoid  at  all 
cost  to  be  discriminatory. 

We  have  enjoyed  our  stay  here.  We 
have  tasted  of  the  traditional  American 
hospitality,  and  we  go  back  home  very 
pleased  with  the  outcome  of  our  visit. 

They  say,  "Least  said,  soonest 
mended." 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  14,  1984).  ■ 


Botswana— A  Profile 


People 

Nationality:  Ncmrt  and  adjective — Motswana 
(sing.),  Batswana  (pi.).  Population  (1980): 
936,600.  Annual  growth  rate:  4.5%.  Ethnic 
groups:  Batswana,  other  African  groups, 
whites  (about  1%).  Religions:  Indigenous 
beliefs  (majority),  Christianity  (15%). 
Languages:  English  (official),  Setswana. 
Education:  Primary  school  attendance  (ad- 
justed)— 93%.  Literacy — in  Setswana,  35%; 
in  English,  24%.  Health:  Infant  mortality 
rafe— about  83.3/1,000.  Life  expect- 
ancy—i9. 9  yrs.  Work  force  (formal  sector, 
1980-81):  103,600. 

Geography 

Area:  600,372  sq.  km.  (231,804  sq.  mi.); 
about  the  size  of  Texas.  Cities:  Capital — 
Gaborone  (pop.  59,700).  Other  cities — Fran- 
cistown  (31,100),  Lobatse  (19,000),  Selebi- 
Pikwe  (30,200),  Orapa  (5,200).  Terrain: 
Desert  and  savanna.  Climate:  Mostly  sub- 
tropical. 


Government 

Type:  Republic,  parliamentary  democracy. 
Constitution:  March  1965.  Independence: 

September  30,  1966. 

Branches:  Executive— president  (chief  of 
state  and  head  of  government),  cabinet. 
Legislative — unicameral  National  Assembly. 
Judicial — High  Court,  Court  of  Appeal,  local 
customary  courts. 

Subdivisions:  Four  town  councils  and 
nine  district  councils.  Central  District,  seat 
Serowe;  Ghanzi  District,  Ghanzi;  Kgalagadi 
District,  Tsabong;  Kgatleng  District, 
Mochudi;  Kweneng  District,  Molepolole; 
Northeast  District,  Tatitown;  Southeast 


District,  Ramotswa;  Southern  District, 
Kanye;  and  Northwest  District,  Maun. 

Political  parties:  Botswana  Democratic 
Party  (BDP),  Botswana  National  Front 
(BNF),  Botswana  Independence  Party  (BIP), 
Botswana  People's  Party  (BPP),  Botswana 
Progressive  Union  (BPU),  Botswana  Social 
Democratic  Party  (BSDP),  Botswana  Liberal 
Party  (BLP).  Suffrage:  Universal  adult. 

National  recurrent  budget  (Yr.  ending 
Mar.  31,  1980):  $221  million;  development  ex- 
penditures, about  $109  million,  more  than 
one-half  financed  by  international  donors. 
Defense  (Mar.  31,  1980):  $11  million,  6%  of 
budget. 

Flag:  Blue  field  divided  by  horizontal 
black  band  with  narrow  white  stripe  on  either 
side. 

Economy 

GDP  (1982)':  $620  million.  Avg.  annual  per 
capita  growth  rate  of  real  GNP:  3.5%.  Per 
capita  GDP*:  $1,067.2  (1981). 

Natural  Resources:  Diamonds,  copper, 
nickel,  salt,  soda  ash,  potash,  coal. 

Agriculture  (11%  of  GDP):  Livestock, 
sorghum,  corn,  millet,  cowpeas,  beans. 

Industries  (mining  32%  of  1981  GDP): 
Diamonds,  copper,  nickel,  salt,  soda  ash, 
potash,  coal,  frozen  beef,  tourism. 

Trade  (1981):  fiiports— $444.5  million 
(f.o.b.):  meat  products,  diamonds,  nickel,  cop- 
per, hides  and  skins.  Partners — Switzerland, 
US,  Southern  African  Customs  Union,  UK. 
Imports — $610.8  million  (c.i.f ):  machinery, 
transport  equipment,  manufactured  goods, 
food,  chemicals,  mineral  fuels.  Major  sup- 
pliers—  Southern  African  Customs  Union, 
Zimbabwe,  US,  UK. 

Economic  aid  received:  Total— $Si9 
million  (1969-77).  US  aid— $128.S  million 
(1965-82). 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN  and  most  of  its  specialized  agencies. 
Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU),  Com- 
monwealth of  Nations,  Southern  African 
Customs  Union.  Nonaligned  Movement,  Lome 
Convention  (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific/ 
European  Economic  Community). 


*GDP  figures  for  fiscal  year,  July-June, 
at  current  prices. 

Taken  from  the  Backgrcmnd  Notes  of  May 
1983,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af 
fairs.  Department  of  State.  Editor:  J.  Darnell 
Adams.  ■ 


June  1984 


WWIIHHMIIIHIiWIIIIHIIIHIIIIItlUIIHIIIIIIwmiUUMimilllUIIIIHIII' 


ARMS  CONTROL 


U.S.  Proposes  Banning 
Chemical  Weapons 


by  Vice  President  Bush 

Address  before  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament  (CD)  in  Geneva  on  April  18, 
198U. 

It  is  an  honor  to  come  before  this  confer- 
ence again  today,  on  behalf  of  our  Presi- 
dent, to  reaffirm  our  strong  commitment 
to  arms  control. 

And  I  have  come  to  reaffirm,  as 
well,  a  resolve  that  has  dominated  the 
American  position  in  all  arms  control 
discussions  over  the  last  year:  the  resolve 
that  the  growth  in  the  number  of  the 
most  dreaded  weapons  of  modem  warfare 
must  not  simply  be  slowed;  it  must  be 
reversed.  In  the  matter  before  us— 
chemical  weapons— they  must  be  banned, 
totally  banned. 

I  have  brought  with  me  today  the 
latest  expression  of  that  firm  U.S. 
resolve— a  draft  treaty  banning  entirely 
the  possession,  production,  acquisition, 
retention,  or  transfer  of  chemical 
weapons. 

This  draft  treaty  includes  an  entirely 
new  concept  for  overcoming  the  great  ob- 
stacle that  has  impeded  progress  in  the 
past  toward  a  full  chemical  weapons  ban- 
namely,  the  obstacle  of  verification.  This 
new  concept  is  part  of  a  package  of  sound 
and  reasonable  procedures  to  verify  com- 
pliance with  all  the  draft  treaty's  terms. 

Except  on  close  inspection,  chemical 
weapons,  these  insidious  chemical 
weapons,  are  virtually  identical  in  ap- 
pearance to  ordinary  weapons;  plants  for 
producing  chemicals  for  weapons  are  dif- 
ficult to  distinguish  from  plants  producing 
chemicals  for  industry  and,  in  fact,  some 
chemicals  with  peaceful  utility  are  struc- 
turally similar  to  some  chemicals  used  in 
warfare.  So  verification  is  particularly  dif- 
ficult with  chemical  weapons. 

Review  of  Concerns 

Our  new  concept  is  an  arms  control  verifi- 
cation procedure  that  we  call  the  "open 
invitation."  But  before  I  outline  this  un- 
precedented procedure,  let  me  review 
some  of  the  concerns  that  have  led  the 
United  States  to  propose  such  a  step. 

When  I  appeared  before  you  in 
February  last  year,  I  quoted  Franklin 


40 


Roosevelt's  comment  that  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  "has  been  outlawed  by 
the  general  opinion  of  civilized  mankind." 
Unfortunately,  despite  the  horror  that 
these  weapons  evoke,  really  in  all  decent 
men  and  women;  despite  specific  prohibi- 
tions such  as  the  Geneva  protocol  of 
1925  and  the  1972  Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention,  there  have  been 
repeated  instances  of  use  over  the  past 
six  decades,  against  combatants  and  inno- 
cent civilians  alike— always,  I  might  note, 
against  those  least  able  to  defend  them- 
selves or  retaliate  against  such  an  attack. 

In  the  last  3  years  alone,  the  world 
has  heard  frequent  reports  of  violations  of 
these  agreements  from  such  places  as 
Southeast  Asia,  Afghanistan,  and  the 
Middle  East.  One  important  reason  that 
chemical  weapons  use  continues  is  that 
neither  the  1925  Geneva  protocol  nor  the 
1972  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons  Con- 
vention includes  any  form  of  effective 
verification  or  enforcement. 

Parties  signed  a  piece  of  paper,  at- 
tached some  stamps  and  some  seals  of 
their  own.  Arsenals  remained,  ready  for 
use  against  any  who  lacked  a  deterrent. 

The  United  States  has  advocated  rein- 
forcement of  the  existing  agreements. 
We,  together  with  other  countries,  have 
long  supported  proposals  to  direct  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations 
to  initiate  investigations  of  reported 
violations. 

We  regret  that  some  UN  members 
have  disputed  the  need  for  such  investiga- 
tions and  have,  to  date,  prevented  or 
impeded  inquiries.  We  believe  that  inter- 
national investigations  of  this  sort  could 
serve  as  a  step  toward  the  kind  of  open- 
ness required  for  a  comprehensive  chem- 
ical weapons  treaty  that  would  work. 

Surely  the  consequences  of  the  ab- 
sence of  effective  verification,  as  seen  in 
the  reports  of  continued  use  of  chemical 
weapons,  can  only  provoke  profound 
concerns  among  all  of  us  today. 


First,  there  is  this  unspeakable  hor- 
ror visited  upon  the  victims  of  such  weap- 
ons, many  of  them  innocents  simply 
caught  up  in  the  path  of  war. 

Second,  the  use  of  chemical  weapons 
violates  existing  international  agreements 
and  so  undermines  the  arms  control 
process. 

Finally,  and  perhaps  most  disturbing, 
there  is  the  chance  that,  as  reports  of  use 
continued,  the  world  might  actually  get 
callous,  get  hardened  to  this  news.  It 
might  come  numbly  to  accept  these  weap- 
ons and  to  abandon  efforts  to  rid  future 
generations  of  this  peril. 

We  owe  it  to  ourselves  and  to  our 
children  to  prevent  this  from  happening. 

For  more  than  a  decade,  the  United 
States  has  exercised  restraint  in  the  field 
of  chemical  weapons,  and  we  will  continue 
to  do  so.  We  desire  an  arms  control  solu- 
tion to  the  chemical  weapons  threat.  But 
our  restraint  has  not  induced  all  other 
states  to  exercise  comparable  restraint. 

And  this  is  why  we  are  taking  steps 
to  prepare  for  the  possibility  that  modem 
chemical  weapons  might  have  to  be  pro- 
duced in  the  absence  of  a  comprehensive 
ban.  However,  we  must  and  will  do  all 
that  we  can  to  achieve  a  treaty  that  elim- 
inates any  need  for  new  production. 

The  U.S.  Proposal 

The  President  asked  me  to  come  here 
again  this  year  to  stress  the  urgency  of 
this  issue.  He  believes  that  we  must  do  aU 
we  can  to  eliminate  existing  stocks  of 
chemical  weapons  and  the  facilities  that 
produce  them.  He  wants  to  ensure  that 
such  weapons  will  never  be  developed  or 
used  again. 

Now  to  that  end,  the  President  has 
asked  me  to  present  to  this  conference  to- 
day the  U.S.  draft  text  of  a  comprehen- 
sive treaty  banning  chemical  weapons, 
and  I  ask  that  this  draft  be  circulated  as 
an  official  document  of  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament. 

The  provisions  of  the  draft  treaty 
closely  follow  the  "detailed  views"  my 
government  presented  to  this  conference 
last  year.  They  also  incorporate  the  views 
of  many  other  delegations  who  have  given 
us  the  benefit  of  their  thoughts. 

This  treaty  would  prohibit  the  devel- 
opment, the  production,  the  stockpiling, 
the  acquisition,  the  retention,  or  transfer 
of  chemical  weapons.  The  principal 
criterion  for  distinguishing  between  per- 
mitted and  banned  activities  would  be  the 
purpose  for  which  an  activity  is  being  con- 
ducted. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I 


■  U     ■>.    Um      I 


ARMS  CONTROL 


In  recognition  of  the  need  for  con- 
fidence in  such  an  agreement,  the  draft 
also  contains  sound  and  reasonable  pro- 
cedures—among these,  "open  invitation" 
inspections— for  verifying  compliance 
with  all  its  provisions. 

For  a  chemical  weapons  ban  to  work, 
each  party  must  have  confidence  that 
the  other  parties  are  abiding  by  it.  This 
elementary,  common  sense  principle  is 
the  essence  of  what  we  mean  by  verifica- 
tion. No  sensible  government  enters  into 
those  international  contracts  known 
as  treaties  unless  it  can  ascertain— or 
verify— that  it  is  getting  what  it  con- 
tracted for. 

Lack  of  effective  verification  and  com- 
pliance mechanisms  has  been  a  major 
obstacle  to  achieving  a  true  and  effective 
ban  on  these  weapons. 

As  I  mentioned  at  the  beginning,  the 
technical  similarities  between  chemical 
weapons  production  facilities  and  com- 
mercial production  facilities,  the  similari- 
ty between  chemical  weapons  agents  and 
chemicals  for  peaceful  uses,  and  the  sim- 
ilarity between  chemical  munitions  and 
conventional  munitions  makes  discrimina- 
tion impossible  without  very,  very  close 
observation. 

And,  perhaps  most  importantly,  strict 
verification  is  needed  to  protect  those 
who  do  not  possess  chemical  weapons,  or 
are  willing  to  give  them  up,  from  those 
who  might  maintain  possession  surrep- 
titiously. 

The  goal  of  our  proposal  is  a  treaty  to 
require  states  to  declare  the  sizes  and 
locations  of  their  chemical  weapons  stocks 
and  production  facilities,  to  destroy  the 
stocks  and  facilities,  and  to  foreswear 
creating  new  chemical  weapons.  If  they 
are  to  sign  a  contract,  states  must  have 
confidence,  in  particular,  that  they  can 
know: 

First,  that  all  declared  stocks  have 
been  destroyed; 

Second,  that  all  declared  production 
facilities  have  been  destroyed; 

Third,  that  the  declared  stocks  reaUy 
do  constitute  all  the  stocks;  and 

Fourth,  that  the  declared  facilities 
are  all  the  facilities. 

Without  such  firm  assurance— and  I 
think  everyone  here  knows  this— we 
cannot  claim  to  have  banned  chemical 
weapons.  In  this  regard,  my  government 
has  taken  note  of  the  Soviet  Union's  an- 
nounced willingness  to  consider  accepting 
the  continuous  stationing  of  international 
inspection  teams  at  the  locations  where 
declared  stockpiles  are  to  be  destroyed. 
We  welcome  that. 


Summary  of  U.S.  Draft 
Chemical  Weapons  Ban 


Overall  U.S.  Approach 

•  Complete  worldwide  ban  on  chemical 
weapons. 

•  Rigorous  verification  by  a  combination  of  na- 
tional and  international  measures,  including 
systematic  international  onsite  inspection. 

•  A  special  anywhere-anytime  onsite  inspec- 
tion procedure  to  permit  treaty  parties 
unimpeded  access  to  suspected  sites  and 
facilities  owned  or  controlled  by  the  govern- 
ments of  other  treaty  parties. 

•  Based  on  our  "detailed  views"  paper 
(CD/343)  presented  at  the  CD  in  February 
1983. 

•  Incorporates  ideas  presented  by  many  other 
delegations. 

Scope  of  the  Prohibition 

•  The  treaty  would  prohibit: 

—  Development,  production,  stockpiling, 
acquisition,  retention,  or  transfer  of 
chemical  weapons; 

—  Other  preparations  for  use  of  chemical 
weapons;  and 

—  Use  of  chemical  weapons. 

•  The  principal  criterion  for  distinguishing 
between  permitted  and  banned  activities 
would  be  the  purpose  for  which  an  activity  is 
being  conducted.  This  general  "purpose" 
criterion  would  be  supplemented  with  toxici- 
ty criteria  and  lists. 

•  Lethal  and  incapacitating  chemicals,  and 
their  precursors,  would  be  covered. 

Chemical  Weapons  Stockpiles 

•  Declared  in  detail  within  30  days. 

•  Inspected  promptly  to  confirm  the  declara- 
tion. Monitored  until  destruction  by  onsite 
instruments  and  periodic  inspection. 

•  Destroyed  within  10  years. 

•  Destruction  verified  by  continuous  monitor- 
ing with  onsite  instruments  and  continuous 
presence  of  international  inspectors. 

Chemical  Weapons  Production  Facilities 

•  Declared  in  detail  within  30  days. 

•  Inspected  promptly  to  confirm  the  declara- 
tion. 

•  Monitored  until  destruction  by  onsite  in- 
struments and  periodic  international  onsite 
inspection. 


•  Destroyed  within  10  years. 

•  Destruction  verified  by  monitoring  with  on- 
site  instruments  and  periodic  international 
onsite  inspection. 

Permitted  Activities 

•  Activities  to  protect  against  chemical  attack 
would  be  permitted  to  continue: 

—  Production  of  supertoxic  lethal 
chemicals  and  key  precursors  for  pro- 
tective purposes  restricted  to  a  single 
small-scale  facility; 

—  Quantities  of  such  chemicals  strictly 
limited;  and 

—  Single  permitted  facility  subject  to 
monitoring  with  onsite  instruments 
and  periodic  international  onsite  in- 
spection. 

•  Specific  provisions  would  deal  with 
chemicals  which  pose  a  particular  risk: 

—  Production  and  use  of  specified  super- 
toxic  lethal  chemicals  restricted; 

—  Production  of  specified  precursors  and 
toxic  chemicals  subject  to  systematic 
international  onsite  verification;  and 

—  Data  exchanged  on  production  and  use 
of  other  specified  precursors  and  toxic 
chemicals. 

•  The  convention  would  be  implemented  in  a 
manner  designed  to  avoid  hindering 
legitimate  activities.  Systematic  interna- 
tional onsite  verification  would  be  man- 
datory for: 

—  Checking  the  declarations  of  chemical- 
weapons  stockpiles  and  production 
facilities; 

—  Monitoring  stockpiles  and  facilities  un- 
til they  are  destroyed; 

—  Confirming  the  destruction  of 
stockpiles  and  facilities; 

—  Monitoring  small-scale  permitted  pro- 
duction of  supertoxic  lethal  chemicals 
and  key  precursors  for  protective  pur- 
poses; and 

-Monitoring  commercial  production  of 
specified  chemicals  that  pose  a  par- 
ticular risk. 

•  A  special  anywhere-anytime  onsite  inspec- 
tion procedure  would  be  established  to  per- 
mit treaty  parties  unimpeded  access  to 
suspected  sites  and  facilities  owned  or  con- 
trolled by  the  governments  of  other  treaty 
parties.  ■ 


41 


iiiiiiiiiiiHimiii 


ARMS  CONTROL 


I 


We  are  encouraged  by  this  recogni- 
tion of  the  indispensability  of  onsite  in- 
spection, a  matter  tabled  right  here  in 
this  room,  I  think  by  Ambassador 
Issraelyan  [Soviet  Ambassador  to  the 
Conference  on  Disarmament].  The  Soviet 
Union's  announcement  has  advanced  the 
negotiations  tow  ard  establishing  con- 
fidence in  the  first  of  the  four  critical  re- 
quirements—that is,  that  all  declared 
stocks  be  destroyed. 

To  address  the  second  of  the  four 
criteria— that  all  declared  production 
facilities  be  destroyed— we  propose  a 
similar,  continuous,  onsite  monitoring  and 
periodic  inspection. 

The  verification  difficulties  inherent 
in  the  problem  of  undeclared  sites— deter- 
mining that  there  are  no  hidden  stocks 
and  no  clandestine  production  facilities— 
that  remains  our  most  formidable  chal- 
lenge. It  is  formidable  because  the  prob- 
lem of  undeclared  sites  can  be  resolved 
only  if  states  commit  themselves  to  a 
new  but  absolutely  necessary  degree  of 
openness. 

Let's  face  reality.  Chemical  weapons 
are  not  difficult  to  hide,  and  they're  not 
difficult  to  produce  in  a  clandestine  man- 
ner. Many  states  have  the  capacity  to 
do  this.  We  can  rid  the  world  of  these 
weapons  only  if  we  make  it  impossible  for 
anyone,  for  ourselves,  to  do  such  things 
without  detection. 

The  opportunity  for  undetected  viola- 
tions is  the  undoing  of  arms  control.  If 
that  opportunity  persists,  it  would  render 
whatever  chemcial  weapons  ban  we  con- 
clude illusory  and,  really,  would  set  back 
the  cause  of  peace. 

And  so,  for  this  reason,  the  U.S. 
Government  is  putting  forward  the  un- 
precedented "open  invitation"  verifica- 
tion proposal  to  which  I  referred  earlier. 
As  part  of  a  chemical-weapons  ban,  the 
United  States  is  willing  to  join  other  par- 
ties in  a  mutual  obligation  to  open  for  in- 
ternational inspection  on  short  notice  all 
of  its  military  or  government-owned  or 
government-controlled  facilities. 

This  pledge  to  an  "open  invitation" 
for  inspections  is  not  made  lightly.  We 
make  it  because  it  is  indispensable  to  an 
effective  chemical  weapons  ban.  The 
essence  of  verification  is  deterrence  of 
violations  through  the  risk  of  detection. 
The  "open  invitation"  procedures  will  in- 
crease the  chances  that  violations  will  be 
detected  and  the  chances  that,  in  the 
event  of  violations,  the  evidence  neces- 
sary for  an  appropriate  international 
response  can  be  collected.  That  is  the 
heart  of  deterring  violations. 


42 


If  the  international  community  recog- 
nizes that  such  a  provision  is  the  sine  qua 
non  of  an  effective  chemical  weapons  ban 
and  joins  us  in  subscribing  to  it,  we  will 
not  only  have  realized  the  noble  longing 
for  a  treaty  that  actually  bans  chemical 
weapons  but  we  will  have  changed  in  an 
altogether  salutary  manner  the  way 
governments  do  business. 

We  will  have  set  a  bold  example  for 
overcoming  barriers  that  impede  effective 
arms  control  in  other  areas.  And  we  will 
have  engendered  the  kind  of  openness 
among  nations  that  dissipates  un- 
grounded suspicions  and  allows  peace  to 
breathe  and  allows  peace  to  thrive. 

We  recognize  that  all  governments 
have  secrets.  Some  speak  as  if  openness 
and  effective  verification  cut  against  their 
interests  alone.  But  openness  entaDs 
burdens  for  every  state,  every  single 
state,  including  the  United  States.  Open- 
ness of  the  kind  we  are  proposing  for  the 
chemical  weapons  ban  would  come  at  a 
price. 

But  an  effective  ban  on  chemical 
weapons  requires  the  kind  of  "open  in- 
vitation" inspections  we  propose.  We,  our 
President,  the  U.S.  Government  are  will- 
ing to  pay  the  price  of  such  openness.  The 
enormous  value  of  an  effective  ban  war- 
rants our  doing  so. 

I  know  that  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
this  body  is  eager  for  the  process  of  ne- 
gotiating a  chemical  weapons  ban  to  begin 
to  unfold.  We  hope  and  trust  that  the 
seriousness  of  this  work,  its  urgency,  and, 
perhaps  most  of  all,  the  humane  aspira- 
tions of  the  peoples  represented  here  will 
spur  all  in  this  conference  toward  an 
early  and  successful  agreement. 

We  do  not  underestimate  the  dif- 
ficulties this  task  presents.  I  have  said 
that  the  key  to  an  effective  convention— 
a  convention  that  could  eliminate  the 
possibility  of  chemical  warfare  forever— is 
enforcement  of  compliance  through  effec- 
tive verification. 

Our  emphasis  on  this  point  (and  our 
"open  invitation"  verification  proposal) 
springs  from  a  desire  that  the  ban  work- 
work  permanently,  work  effectively  to 
provide  the  security  all  of  us  seek. 

America's  Commitment 
to  Arms  Control 

The  United  States  is  encouraged  that 
these  negotiations  to  ban  chemical  weap- 
ons have  already  achieved  broad  interna- 
tional support.  It  is  significant  as  well 
that  work  on  this  treaty  is  widely 


recognized  to  offer  a  promising  opportuni- 
ty for  enhancing  not  only  East-West 
cooperation  but  also  cooperation  among 
aU  nations. 

Our  delegation  looks  forward  to  ser- 
ious consultations  with  the  Soviet  delega- 
tion, and  to  detailed  discussions  with  all 
other  participants,  on  the  elaboration  of 
these  provisions  and  other  necessary 
aspects  of  an  effective  agreement.  Our 
aim  in  these  negotiations  will  be  a  prac- 
tical one— to  work  hard  and  in  good  faith; 
to  buOd  mutual  confidence  that,  frankly, 
is  lacking  right  now;  to  achieve  real 
results. 

The  President  has  asked  me  again  (I 
saw  him  just  before  I  left  for  Geneva)  to 
assure  you  again  that  the  American  com- 
mitment to  work  for  effective  arms  con- 
trol extends  to  all  of  the  work  of  this  con- 
ference and  to  reassure  you  that  it  ex- 
tends to  the  work  beyond  this  conference 
as  well.  We  are  pleased  to  be  making 
progress  in  the  multilateral  negotiations 
in  Stockholm  on  confidence-building 
measures  in  Europe;  pleased  to  have 
resumed  East- West  talks  in  Vienna  on 
reducing  conventional  forces  in  Europe. 

Our  commitment  to  results  is  equally 
strong  on  the  all-important  issue  of 
nuclear  arms  control,  where  the  United 
States  believes  it  is  essential  to  accelerate 
effective,  verifiable  agreements.  And,  as  I 
think  most  people  here  know,  we'd  seek 
deep  reductions  in  the  world's  nuclear 
arsenals  and  the  greater  international 
stability  that  would  follow  that. 

Here,  today,  I  again  invite  the  Soviet 
Union  to  return  to  the  two  nuclear  arms 
negotiations  it  suspended  5  months  ago 
and  to  resume  with  us  the  crucial  task  of 
reducing  nuclear  arms.  The  United  States 
remains  ready  to  explore  all  ideas,  with- 
out preconditions,  at  any  time  the  Soviet 
Union  chooses  to  renew  the  dialogue.  We 
feel  strongly  about  it;  and  in  this  commit- 
tee—whose day-to-day  work  is  dedicated 
in  a  multilateral  way  to  arms  reduction— I 
just  feel  that  I  had  to  make  that  point:  we 
are  ready,  here,  bilaterally,  whatever 
form  it  takes. 

As  the  President  said  in  his  Janu- 
ary 16  address  on  U.S.-Soviet  relations: 
"cooperation  begins  with  communica- 
tions." This  concept  is  part  of  our  entire 
approach  to  East-West  relations  and  to  all 
issues  on  the  East-West  agenda— be  it 
arms  control,  regional  problems,  human 
rights,  or  an  improvement  in  mutual 
understanding.  We  are  ready— as  the 
President  has  made  clear  in  word  and 
deed  and  action— to  tackle  the  difficult 
work  of  genuine  cooperation. 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


America  has,  in  fact,  reduced  the 
overall  size  of  its  own  nuclear  arsenals 
over  the  last  two  decades.  But  we  are 
ready  to  work  for  solutions  and  results— 
in  Geneva,  in  Vienna,  in  Stockholm,  or  in- 
deed in  any  place  where  men  and  women 
of  good  faith  are  willing  to  sit  down  and 
negotiate  in  earnest. 

Since  my  visit  here  last  year,  the 
United  States  has  labored  long  and 
thought  very  carefully  about  the  contents 
of  this  treaty.  We  really  are  hopeful  that 
other  countries  will  carefully  study  it  and 
join  us  in  serious  negotiations. 

I  am  saddened  that  some— without 
even  seeing  a  draft— have  already  chosen 
to  issue  statements  charging  that  the  in- 
troduction of  this  treaty  text  here  today 
is  the  result  of  simple  political  motivation. 
I  hope  that  we  can  convince  those  who 
have  those  reservations,  made  those 
statements,  that  we  are  sincere  and  that 
they  will  come  to  see,  through  the  negoti- 
ations, our  sincerity.  Isn't  it  time  that  we 
focused  on  the  concrete  and  open  and 
universal— on  the  desire  of  aU  peoples  for 
reducing  the  weapons  and  risks  of  war? 

The  United  States  has  repeatedly 
over  the  last  several  years  demonstrated 
its  determination  not  simply  to  slow  the 
rate  of  growth  of  the  world's  arsenals  but 
to  reduce  these  arsenals. 

I  mentioned  we  have  reduced  the 
overall  size  of  our  own  nuclear  arsenals 
over  the  last  two  decades.  I  don't  think  a 
lot  of  people  even  in  my  own  country 
understand  this.  But  the  number  of 
nuclear  weapons  in  the  American  inven- 
tory was  one-third  higher  in  1967  than 
in  1983;  while  from  1960  to  last  year, 
American  nuclear  megatonnage  dropped 
by  75%. 

In  the  last  year,  we've  heard  a  lot  of 
talk  about  the  NATO  modernization  pro- 
gram. In  1979  the  NATO  countries 
decided  to  seek  arms  control  negotiations 
but,  in  the  absence  of  an  arms  control 
agreement,  to  deploy  572  Pershing  II  and 
ground-launched  cruise  missiles. 

But  agreement  or  no  agreement,  the 
NATO  countries  decided  at  the  same  time 
to  remove  1,000  nuclear  weapons  from 
Europe.  These  1,000  weapons  are  now 
gone.  Last  year  at  Montebello,  the  NATO 
allies  decided  to  reduce  their  arsenal  by 
another  1,400  nuclear  weapons.  And 
whenever  a  Pershing  II  or  ground- 
launched  cruise  missOe  is  put  in  place,  an 
existing  weapon  will  be  taken  out  of 
service. 


The  result  of  all  this  is  that  absent  a 
treaty,  NATO  will  deploy  the  entire  572 
new  missiles.  NATO  will  still  have  re- 
moved five  nuclear  weapons  for  every  one 
that  has  been  added. 

In  the  nuclear  arms  control  talks 
over  the  last  several  years,  America  has 
sought  multilateral  agreements  that 
would  make  even  deeper  cuts  possible. 

In  the  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces  (INF)  talks  2>/i  years  ago,  we  pro- 
posed the  "zero  option."  The  "zero  op- 
tion" would  eliminate  the  entire  class  of 
land-based  INF  missiles.  Later,  we  in- 
dicated our  willingness  to  agree  to  an  in- 
terim step  involving  more  limited  reduc- 
tions. 

In  the  strategic  arms  reduction  talks 
(START)  that  you  are  all  familiar  with, 
we  proposed  nearly  2  years  ago  a  one- 
third  reduction  in  the  number  of  war- 
heads on  Soviet  and  American  ballistic 
missiles.  We  subsequently  also  proposed 
alternative  paths  of  "buildmg  down"  and 
of  "trading  off  in  order  to  move  the 
negotiations  forward. 

We  regret  profoundly  that  the  Soviet 
Union  chose  to  leave,  to  walk  out  of  the 
START  and  the  INF  negotiations,  even 
while  they  continued  their  unprecedented 
and  unparalleled  deployment  of  strategic 
and  INF  systems.  We  know  that  we  are 
joined  by  others  here  at  the  Conference 
on  Disarmament  in  urging  the  Soviet 
leaders  to  come  back,  resume  these  im- 
portant negotiations  on  which  so  much  of 
the  world's  hopes  depend. 

At  the  same  time  we  look  forward  to 
genuine  progress  in  the  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions  negotiations 
that  are  going  on  in  Vienna  and  in  Stock- 
holm at  those  important  talks,  the  Con- 
ference on  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament  in 
Europe. 

We  seek  effective  and  equitable  cuts 
in  the  world's  nuclear,  conventional,  and 
chemical  forces.  We  want  to  prevent  their 
use.  That  is  our  goal  and  the  determina- 
tion to  which  we  shall  continue  to  dedi- 
cate ourselves. 

We  are  determined  that  future  gener- 
ations will  not  look  back  on  these  and  the 
other  arms  control  negotiations  of  our 
time,  as  we  look  back  on  ones  of  genera- 
tions past,  and  shrug  and  say:  "Of  course, 
all  they  did  was,  perhaps,  to  slow  the  pace 
of  the  arms  race  of  that  period.  They 
didn't  stop  it  or  reverse  it;  and  they  pro- 
bably couldn't  have."  We  are  determined 
to  do  better  than  that. 


Conclusion 

In  conclusion,  let  me  just  say  something 
about  chemical  weapons.  There  is  a  need, 
as  I  said  in  these  comments,  to  reduce 
tension.  But  if  ever,  if  ever  in  the  history 
of  mankind  there  was  something  on  which 
people  from  every  single  country— not  we 
government  officials  or  our  excellencies 
or  all  of  that,  but  let  us  put  it  in  terms  of 
the  people— in  my  view,  a  father  and  a 
grandfather,  getting  older  (I  served  with 
many  of  you  around  this  table  when  I  was 
a  father  but  not  a  grandfather).  But  in  my 
view,  there  is  nothing,  there  is  no  dif- 
ference between  a  family  walking  along 
the  streets  of  Vladivostock  or  Leningrad 
or  Peoria,  Illinois,  or  Paris  or  London  or 
Caracas,  wherever  else  it  is,  Belgrade— no 
difference:  every  single  family,  a  child  if 
he  knows  about  it,  is  scared  to  death  of 
chemical  weapons.  And  we  have  come 
here  today  with  a  proposal  that  is  very, 
very  broad.  It  reaches  way  out,  goes  way 
beyond  what  I  would  have  believed  my 
own  country  (and  we  pride  ourselves  on 
openness)— but  way  beyond  what  we 
would  have  done  a  few  years  ago.  A  lot 
of  that  is  in  response  to  the  feeling  of 
people. 

I  have  traveled  to  Africa,  and  people 
mentioned  it  there.  In  all  these  different 
continents,  concern  about  all  kinds  of 
things— East-West,  nuclear  weapons,  and 
all  of  this;  but  everywhere  there  is  agree- 
ment on  chemical  weapons.  So  that  is  why 
I  personally  sound  like  I  do. 

But  as  the  second-highest  official  in 
the  United  States  of  America,  I  came  to 
this  conference  today.  We  are  not  sug- 
gesting there  will  be  no  criticism  of  what 
we  have  suggested.  We  are  not  saying 
that  we  are  perfect,  that  everything  must 
be  exactly  the  way,  and  will  end  up  exact- 
ly the  way,  that  that  treaty  is  drafted. 
But  I  just  didn't  want  to  leave  here 
without  telling  some  former  colleagues, 
some  new  friends,  some  with  whom  my 
country  may  have  differences,  that  we 
come  here  in  a  spirit  of  good  will.  And  we 
come  here  trying  to  address  ourselves  to 
perhaps  the  most  fundamental  question 
on  arms  existing  in  the  world  today— that 
is,  how  do  we,  as  civilized,  rational  people, 
eliminate,  ban  in  entirety  in  a  verifiable 
way,  all  chemical  weapons  from  the  face 
of  the  Earth.  ■ 


June  1984 


43 


HWWIIBWtWtiMBiffBiiiHIillH^^ 


T  I  )  1 1  PPIff  B»WWWW"W 


ARMS  CONTROL 


START  in  a  Historical  Perspective 


by  Edward  L.  Rowny 

Address  before  the  Kiwanis  Club  in 
Atlanta  on  April  10,  198U.  Ambassador 
Roumy  is  chief  negotiator  for  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  strategic  arms  reduction 
talks  (START). 

When  the  most  recent  round  of  START 
ended  on  December  8,  1983,  the  Soviet 
delegation  faUed  to  agree  to  a  date  for 
resuming  the  talks.  The  Soviets  said  they 
needed  to  "reassess"  the  situation  in  light 
of  the  deployment  of  U.S.  Pershing  II 
and  ground-launched  cruise  missiles  in 
Europe.  The  U.S.  delegation  had  pro- 
posed that  we  return  to  the  negotiating 
table  on  February  8.  To  date,  we  have 
received  no  response.  Two  months  of  ne- 
eotiating  time  have  been  lost  because  of 
the  Soviet  refusal  to  agree  to  return  to 

Geneva.  ,     o     •  f 

This  delay,  imposed  by  the  Soviet 
Union,  has  caused  many  to  ask  whether 
there  is  any  reaUstie  possibUity  of  an 
arms  agreement  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  I  beheve 
there  is,  but  to  understand  where  we  are 
at  this  time  I  want  to  step  back  a  bit  from 
the  trees  to  look  at  the  forest.  To  do  this, 
we  must  first  look  at  the  differences 
between  the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet  ap- 
proaches to  negotiations.  These  are  large- 
ly determined  by  our  different  histoncal 
and  cultural  heritages. 

Differences  Between  the 
U.S.  and  the  Soviet  Union 


In  reviewing  the  long  record  of  Russian 
history,  several  points  seem  clear.  Ihe 
first  is  that  the  major  differences  we  have 
with  the  Soviet  Union  reflect  fundamental 
differences  in  our  historical  expenence 
and  our  moral  values.  Thirty-five  years 
ago  in  graduate  school  I  learned  that 
there  are  more  differences  than  similari- 
ties in  our  systems.  But  it  was  not  until 
the  last  10  years,  while  I  was  negotiating 
directly  with  the  Soviets,  that  the  pomt 
was  driven  home.  The  differences  be- 
tween our  two  societies  are  often  over- 
looked, and  we  Americans  tend  to  mirror 
image.  The  biggest  difference  between  us 
is  that  we  do  not  share  the  same  goals 
and  objectives.  It  would  make  our  rela- 


tions much  easier  if  the  Soviets  were 
more  like  us.  But,  in  fact,  history  has 
shaped  our  thinking  in  ways  which  makes 
it  differ  radically  from  that  in  the  Soviet 
Union. 

The  key  fact  of  Russian  political  lite 
for  over  a  millennium  has  been  the  central- 
ization of  state  power  in  the  hands  of 
autocratic  rulers.  Under  Soviet  power,  as 
under  the  tsars,  the  rights  and  needs  of 
individuals  have  been  subordinated  to  the 
needs  of  the  state.  Whether  it  be  tsars 
like  Ivan  IV  and  Peter  the  Great,  or 
General  Secretaries  of  the  Communist 
Party  like  Joseph  Stalin  or  Leonid 
Brezhnev,  Russian  leaders  have  had  no 
need  to  answer  to  the  governed.  UnUke 
American  Presidents,  Soviet  leaders  are 
not  subject  to  critical  examination.  From 
the  very  beginning,  ours  has  been  and  is  a 
government  formed  by  the  consent  of  the 
governed.  The  Russians,  under  the  tsars 
and  now  under  the  Soviets,  have  had 
government  imposed  upon  them  from  the 
top.  One  needs  but  to  reflect  on  the  ways 
we  go  about  choosing  our  president  by 
caucuses,  primaries,  and  finally  by  secret 
ballot.  The  Soviets,  by  contrast,  just  last 
month  reported  that  99%  of  the  eligible 
voters  turned  out  for  their  "elections 
and  that  the  single  list  of  candidates  on 
the  ballot  was  elected-surprise-unani- 

mously.  .    ,      J 

The  differences  in  the  histoncal  and 
cultural  experience  of  Americans-indeed 
all  Westerners,  as  compared  to  the  Rus- 
sians-is reflected  in  our  respective  ap- 
proaches to  negotiating.  We  Americans 
are  impatient;  the  Russians,  on  the  other 
hand,  display  an  extraordinary  degree  of 
patience.  The  difference  stems  from  our 
historical  roots.  America  has  been  the 
land  of  opportunity  and  change:  "if  you 
don't  like  it,  change  it."  By  contrast, 
Russia  is  a  land  of  continuity.  Russians 
tend  to  think  in  terms  of  years  and 
generations,  whereas  we  Americans  thmk 
in  terms  of  days  and  months.  In  negotia- 
tions, as  in  other  things,  the  Soviets  take 
the  long  view  while  we  Americans,  by 
contrast,  are  problem  solvers  who  want 
quick  results.  ^^t  c  o     •  * 

Given  the  present  state  of  U.S.-Soviet 
relations,  we  need  more  than  ever  to 
maintain  a  sense  of  patience.  The  Soviets 
are  involved,  along  with  us  and  our  allies. 


in  the  ongoing  negotiations  on  European 
security  issues  in  Stockholm,  in  the  talks 
on  chemical  weapons  and  other  issues  m 
the  UN  Committee  on  Disarmament  in 
Geneva,  and  in  the  negotiations  on  con- 
ventional forces  in  Vienna.  But  the  cur- 
rent Soviet  refusal  to  negotiate  reduc- 
tions in  strategic  offensive  arms  bilateral- 
ly is  yet  again  an  attempt  to  play  on 
Western  impatience  and  anxiety.  By 
blaming  the  lack  of  talks  on  us,  the 
Soviets  are  trying  to  pressure  us  to  offer 
concessions  to  get  them  back  to  the  tab  e. 
They  hope  thereby  to  achieve  their  goals 
at  minimum  cost.  As  long  as  tht  Soviets 
feel  they  can  gain  by  waiting,  they  will 
wait.  Steadfastness  and  resolve, 
therefore,  are  absolutely  essential  in 
negotiating  with  the  Soviets. 

There  is  another  major  difference  be- 
tween our  two  societies.  That  is,  the  de- 
ferent approaches  to  freedom  of  speech 
and  information.  Put  simply,  our  society 
is  open  and  free;  Soviet  society-hke 
tsarist  society  before  it-is  pervasively 
secretive  and  closed.  The  Russians  have 
never  experienced  the  freedoms  of  speech 
and  assembly  which  we  Americans  take 
for  granted.  Therefore,  we  must 
recognize  that  our  open  society  creates 
certain  handicaps  in  negotiatmg  verifiable 
agreements  with  the  U.S.S.R.  The 
Soviets  play  their  cards  close  to  the  chest; 
we  play  ours  face  up  on  the  table.  The 
Soviets  can  satisfy  many  of  their  verifica- 
tion needs  simply  by  reading  our  daily 
press  We,  of  course,  have  no  remotely 
comparable  access  to  information  on  the 
inner  workings  of  the  Soviet  Government. 

It  is  crucial,  however,  that  we  not 
allow  this  difference  to  undermine  our 
ability  to  verify  Soviet  compliance  with 
signed  agreements.  Inadequate  verifica- 
tion was  one  of  the  major  flaws  of  the 
SALT  II  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks]  Treaty.  This  Administration  has 
made  it  clear  that  we  wUl  insist  that  any 
START  agreement  be  effectively  venti- 

There  are  encouraging  signs  that  this 
insistence  on  effective  verification  is  bear- 
ing some  fruit.  For  example,  the  Soviets 
in  the  START  talks  have  indicated  a  will- 
ingness to  consider  cooperative  measures 
to  supplement  so-called  national  technical 
means.  They  have  thus  signaled  a  will- 
ingness to  go  beyond  reliance  just  on 
sateUites  and  the  like,  which  have  tradi- 
tionally been  used  to  verify  arms  control 
agreements.  In  the  multUateral  talks  on 
chemical  weapons,  the  Soviets  have  in- 
dicated a  wUlingness  to  agree  to  an  on- 
site  presence  with  regard  to  weapons 
destruction.  We  welcome  these  hmts  ot 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


p^- lit  the  i 


44 


ARMS  CONTROL 


greater  openness  and  hope  that  this 
means  a  more  responsive  attitude  on  the 
part  of  the  Soviets  regarding  verification. 
The  Soviets  must  understand  that  we  will 
settle  for  nothing  less  than  a  fully  and 
effectively  verifiable  agreement. 

In  the  same  vein,  a  great  strength 
of  American  society  is  that  those  who 
govern  must  respond  to  the  governed.  In 
the  process,  with  the  participation  of  an 
aggressively  free  press,  the  innermost 
deliberations  of  the  U.S.  Government 
become  public  knowledge.  The  strength 
which  derives  from  our  critical  and  ques- 
tioning nature  becomes  a  handicap,  how- 
ever, when  it  comes  to  negotiating  with  a 
closed,  secretive  society  such  as  that  of 
the  Soviet  Union.  An  alert  Soviet  leader- 
ship can  come  disturbingly  close  to  di- 
vining our  bottom  negotiating  line  by 
reading  any  of  our  major  daily  news- 
papers and  periodicals  or  by  listening  to 
our  television  broadcasts. 

We,  by  contrast,  have  no  way  of 
knowing  what  considerations  have  gone 
into  Soviet  positions.  I,  for  one,  welcome 
public  discussion  on  these  subjects  and 
believe  that  democracy  can  only  succeed 
where  there  is  an  informed  public  opinion. 
That's  why  I'm  here  today.  In  the  long 
run,  the  strength  our  society  draws  from 
its  openness  and  freedom  far  exceeds  any 
the  Soviets  derive  from  their  absolute 
control.  However,  in  the  tactical  sense 
this  difference  provides  some  highly  in- 
teresting and  excruciatingly  difficult  chal- 
lenges for  an  arms  negotiator. 

Another  factor  which  influences  the 
way  the  Soviets  view  the  world  is  the 
deep-seated  Russian  sense  of  inferiority. 
In  my  10  years  of  negotiating  with  the 
Soviets,  I  have  seen  this  feeling  of  in- 
feriority reflected  in  swings  between 
bravado  and  bluster.  On  the  one  hand, 
they  boast  over  Soviet  scientific  suc- 
cesses; on  the  other  hand,  they  display 
deeply  rooted  apprehension  over  the 
capacity  of  American  technology. 

In  arms  control  negotiations,  this 
sense  of  inferiority  is  perhaps  best  re- 
flected in  the  frequency  with  which  the 
Soviets  refer  to  their  principle  of  "equal- 
ity and  equal  security."  While  this  term 
sounds  fair  enough  on  the  surface,  one 
sees  that  it  is  an  Orwellian  formulation 
denoting  the  Soviet  right  to  superiority. 
To  have  "equal  security,"  the  Soviets  say 
they  must  have  forces  equivalent  to  the 
total  of  those  of  all  potential  adversaries. 
Placed  in  the  bilateral  framework,  this 
means  that  the  Soviet  forces  must  equal 
the  combined  power  of  the  United  States 


and  anyone  else  the  Soviets  might  con- 
sider a  threat  to  their  security,  for  exam- 
ple, China  and  our  NATO  allies.  Under 
their  formulation,  therefore,  the  United 
States  must  be  inferior  to  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Prospects  for  Agreement 

Thus  far  I  have  focused  on  the  differences 
between  our  two  nations  and  peoples  in 
order  to  illustrate  the  difficulties  we  face 
in  negotiating  with  the  Soviets.  In  any 
negotiations,  whether  it  be  between 
spouses  over  allowing  their  youngster  to 
use  the  family  car  or  between  nations  con- 
cerned with  their  security,  there  must  be 
a  common  goal.  It  is  my  firm  belief  that 
despite  our  sharply  different  objectives 


in  many  areas,  we  do  share  one  common 
goal;  we  both  want  to  prevent  the  out- 
break of  a  nuclear  war.  Indeed,  it  is  our 
mutual  belief  that  a  nuclear  war  must  be 
avoided  which  makes  an  arms  control 
agreement  not  only  possible  but  probable. 
First  and  foremost,  the  Soviets  do  not 
want  to  suffer  the  devastating  conse- 
quences of  a  nuclear  war.  Anyone  who 
has  dealt  with  the  Soviets  knows  that 
when  faced  with  risks,  the  Soviets  are 
cautious  and  pragmatic.  While  the  Soviets 
would  like  to  achieve  their  foreign  policy 
objectives  by  threatening  the  use  of 
nuclear  force,  they  recognize  that  at- 
tempting to  make  good  that  threat  carries 
with  it  the  seeds  of  their  own  destruction. 
Many  examples  abound  where  the  Soviets 


U.S.  START  Negotiator 


Edward  L.  Rowny  was  bom  in  Baltimore  on 
April  3, 1917.  He  graduated  from  Johns 
Hopkins  University  (1937)  and  from  the  U.S. 
Military  Academy  (1941)  as  an  officer  in  the 
Corps  of  Engineers.  He  earned  two  master's 
degrees  from  Yale  in  1949  and  received  his 
Ph.D.  in  international  studies  from  American 
University  in  1977.  He  speaks  Russian  and 
French. 

His  military  service  includes  assignments 
in  Africa,  Europe,  and  Asia.  During  World 
War  11,  he  commanded  units  from  company  to 
regimental  size  in  African  and  Italian  cam- 
paigns. During  the  Korean  war,  he  was  one  of 
the  planners  of  the  Inchon  invasion  and  acted 


as  official  spokesman  for  Gen.  Douglas 
MacArthur.  He  later  commanded  the  38th  In- 
fantry Regiment  and  fought  in  seven  Korean 
campaigns. 

Gen.  Rowny  served  for  a  year  in  Vietnam 
(1962-63),  where  he  established  the  Army  Con- 
cept Team,  charged  with  developing  and 
testing  new  Army  concepts  for  counterinsur- 
gency  operations.  From  1965  to  1969,  he  held  a 
number  of  important  Army  positions  in  Ger- 
many, including  command  of  the  24th  Infantry 
Division  and  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  U.S. 
European  Command. 

He  returned  to  Korea  in  1970,  commanding 
I  Corps,  and  the  following  year  was  assigned 
to  Brussels  as  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  NATO 
Military  Committee  where  he  was  the  first 
chairman  of  the  working  group  on  the  mutual 
and  balanced  force  reduction  (MBFR)  negotia- 
tions. 

From  1973  to  1979,  Gen.  Rowny  repre- 
sented the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  at  the  strategic 
arms  limitation  talks  (SALT),  serving  longer 
than  any  other  U.S.  delegate  in  SALT  II  and 
negotiating  for  more  than  1,000  hours  with  the 
Soviets.  He  retired  from  the  U.S.  Army  on 
June  30,  1979. 

During  the  1980  presidential  campaign, 
Gen.  Rowny  served  as  cochairman  of  the 
Reagan  Defense  Advisory  Committee.  In  the 
transition  period,  he  served  as  an  adviser  for 
European  affairs  and  arms  control  for  the  In- 
terim Foreign  Policy  Advisory  Board  and  as 
head  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  Tran- 
sition Team.  He  was  a  fellow  at  the  Woodrow 
Wilson  Center  of  the  Smithsonian  Institution 
when  President  Reagan  nominated  him  for  his 
present  position. 

Ambassador  Rowny  was  appointed  chief 
U.S.  arms  control  and  disarmament  negotiator 
and  head  of  the  U.S.  delegation  on  strategic 
arms  reduction  negotiations  on  Aug.  14, 
1981.  ■ 


June  1984 


45 


WWIlllUUUUBUmmiRHIiliHIIIIPIIIMIIli™ 


ARMS  CONTROL 


I 


have  fueled  and  exploited  crisis  situa- 
tions. But  they  do  this  only  when  they 
believe  the  risk  of  nuclear  war  is  small.  It 
is  my  judgment  that  the  Soviets  do,  in 
fact,  realize  that  nuclear  war  is  not  a 
viable— in  the  literal  sense  of  the  word 
viable— option. 

In  an  address  just  this  past  Friday, 
President  Reagan  called  restoration  of  a 
bipartisan  consensus  on  foreign  policy  one 
of  the  four  great  challenges  to  American 
foreign  policy  in  the  1980s.  In  START  we 
have  relied  heavily  on  bipartisan  advice 
and  support.  Since  last  October  the  mem- 
ber at  large  on  the  U.S.  START  delega- 
tion has  been  R.  James  Woolsey,  a  well- 
qualified  and  respected  professional  who 
served  as  Under  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in 
a  Democratic  administration.  Signifi- 
cantly, the  President  placed  as  the  first  of 
these  four  challenges  reducing  the  risk  of 


nuclear  war  by  reducing  the  levels  of 
nuclear  armaments  in  a  way  that  also 
reduces  the  risk  they  will  ever  be  used. 
One  of  the  reasons  I  gain  confidence  that 
an  agreement  is  possible  is  because  of 
the  strong  support  and  high  priority 
the  President  gives  to  arms  reductions. 
Another  is  because  we  have  had  a  high 
degree  of  congressional  and  public  sup- 
port for  President  Reagan's  two-track  ef- 
forts of  taking  care  of  our  defenses  while 
pursuing  arms  control. 

These  steps  to  redress  10  years  of 
neglect  of  our  defenses  are  essential  to 
our  security.  But  they  also  serve  the  im- 
portant purpose  of  making  it  possible  to 
reach  an  agreement.  The  Soviets  are, 
above  all,  pragmatists.  As  the  Soviets 
repeatedly  tell  us,  they  will  not  give  up 
something  for  nothing.  My  many  years  of 
studying  and  negotiating  with  them  per- 


U.S.  Proposes  Initiative 
at  the  MBFR  Talks 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
APR.  19,  19841 

I  am  very  pleased  to  announce  another 
major  initiative  in  arms  control.  Earlier 
today  in  Vienna,  the  U.S.  and  our  NATO 
allies  tabled  a  new  proposal  aimed  at 
breaking  the  impasse  that  has  long  stalled 
the  negotiations  between  NATO  and  the 
Warsaw  Pact  on  reducing  conventional 
forces  in  Europe.  This  important  initia- 
tive in  the  talks  on  mutual  and  bal- 
anced force  reductions— known  as 
MBFR— was  developed  in  close  consulta- 
tions with  our  allies,  and  it  reflects 
their  significant  contributions. 

Since  the  MBFR  talks  began  in  1973, 
we  have  sought  an  agreement  to  reduce 
to  equal,  verifiable  levels  the  conven- 
tional force  personnel  of  the  two  sides 
which  face  each  other  in  central  Europe. 
Although  the  Warsaw  Pact  has  a  signifi- 
cant manpower  advantage  in  Europe,  it 
has  been  unwilling  to  acknowledge  the 
imbalance.  Without  agreement  on  the 
total  number  of  forces  on  each  side,  there 
can  be  no  agreement  on  the  number  that 
must  be  reduced  to  obtain  equal  levels. 

This  data  issue  is  one  major  unre- 
solved problem  in  the  MBFR  negotia- 
tions. The  other  issue  is  the  continuing 
unwillingness  of  the  Eastern  side  to 
agree  on  effective  verification  provisions. 
Today's  proposal  is  designed  to  move  the 
talks  forward  in  both  areas. 


This  new  proposal  in  the  MBFR  nego- 
tiations comes  just  a  day  after  the  Ameri- 
can initiative  for  a  comprehensive  world- 
wide ban  on  chemical  weapons.  This  was 
presented  personally  by  Vice  President 
Bush  yesterday  in  Geneva  to  the 
40-nation  Conference  on  Disarmament.  I 
hope  these  twin  initiatives  will  lead  to 
real  progress  in  both  negotiations. 

We  are  bargaining  in  good  faith.  With 
equal  willingness  on  the  other  side,  real 
progress  can  be  achieved  quickly.  I  have 
no  higher  priority  than  reducing  arms  to 
equal  and  more  stable  levels  and,  where 
we  can,  banning  them  altogether. 

Having  made  these  significant  new 
moves  this  week  in  chemical  and  conven- 
tional arms  control,  I  want  to  emphasize 
once  again  my  strong  desire  to  get  on 
with  the  urgent  business  of  reducing 
nuclear  arms.  We  call  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  to  respond  to  the  repeatedly  ex- 
pressed desire  of  the  world  community  by 
returning  to  the  two  nuclear  negotiating 
tables,  START  [strategic  arms  reduction 
talks]  and  INF  [Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear  Forces],  which  they  left  5  months 
ago.  When  they  do  this,  they  will  find  the 
United  States  to  be  an  accommodating 
and  creative  partner  in  seeking  nuclear 
reductions,  just  as  we  and  our  allies  have 
shown  ourselves  to  be  in  the  negotiations 
on  chemical  and  conventional  forces. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  30,  1984. 


suade  me  that  we  can  get  an  agreement 
which  incorporates  the  substantial  reduc- 
tions we  seek  only  by  a  continued  Ameri- 
can resolve  to  modernize  our  forces.  This 
is  the  central  paradox  of  arms  control 
negotiations  with  the  U.S.S.R.  which  is 
ignored  by  many  advocates  of  simplistic 
solutions  such  as  a  freeze:  to  obtain  a 
meaningful  agreement  with  the  Soviets 
we  must  demonstrate  the  resolve  to  take 
care  of  our  own  security. 

I  gain  further  confidence  that  an 
agreement  is  possible  because  of  the 
soundness  of  our  START  proposal.  Our 
proposal  would  reduce  the  roughly  7,500 
missile  warheads  on  each  side  by  one- 
third  to  equal  levels  of  5,000.  Thus,  since 
both  nations  would  have  to  reduce  by 
roughly  the  same  number  of  warheads, 
there  is  something  in  our  proposal  for  the 
Soviets  as  well  as  for  ourselves.  Our 
START  proposal,  unlike  SALT  II,  would 
reduce  not  only  launchers  but  the  war- 
heads themselves;  since  launchers  cannot 
kill  whereas  warheads  can,  a  ballistic 
missile  launcher  can  be  likened  to  a  rifle 
tube,  the  warhead  to  the  bullets  it  fires. 
Thus,  it  is  the  number  and  size  of  war- 
heads which  represent  the  destructive  po- 
tential of  a  ballistic  missile  nuclear  force. 
I  am  encouraged  that  the  Soviets  have 
joined  us  in  recognizing  the  fallacy  of 
limiting  launchers  alone  and  breaking 
with  the  SALT  II  methods  of  limiting 
arms  by  limiting  the  number  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  not  simply  launchers. 

In  July  of  1983  we  made  major  modi- 
fications in  our  proposal  to  meet  the  prin- 
cipal concerns  the  Soviets  had  expressed 
about  our  original  proposal.  We  made  our 
proposal  less  restrictive,  collapsed  the 
two  phases  into  one,  and  put  everything 
on  the  table.  I  am  encouraged  that  the 
Soviets  also  moved  to  narrow  the  dif- 
ferences by  dropping  several  of  their  pro- 
posals which  we  considered  to  be  un- 
realistic. Thus  there  has  been  more  prog- 
ress at  the  negotiating  table  in  Geneva 
than  is  generally  recognized. 

Last  October,  following  extensive  con- 
sultation with  Members  of  Congress,  we 
introduced  the  build-down  concept.  This 
would  have  both  sides  reduce  their  wea- 
pons while  permitting  modernization  in  a 
manner  which  would  lead  to  a  more  stable 
balance  of  the  remaining  forces.  In  addi- 
tion to  assuring  deterrence,  the  Reagan 
START  proposal  places  great  emphasis 
on  enhancing  stability  in  times  of  crisis. 
This  build-down  concept  adds  to  deter- 
rence and  crisis  stability.  It  is  especially 
significant  because  it  enjoys  the  advan- 
tage of  the  President's  objective  in  all  our 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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ARMS  CONTROL 


foreign  policy  areas:  a  strong  bipartisan 
support  in  the  Congress. 

Taking  a  higlily  important  step,  the 
President  authorized  me  in  October  of 
last  year  to  explore  various  ways  of  trad- 
ing off  areas  of  U.S.  advantages  and  in- 
terests against  areas  of  Soviet  advantages 
and  interests.  The  development  of  our 
respective  force  structures  has  not,  of 
course,  been  the  same,  with  the  result 
that  we  and  the  Soviets  both  have  put 
emphasis— and  have  gained  certain  advan- 
tage—in specific  areas.  What  we  are  sug- 
gesting with  trade-offs  is  that  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  relinquish,  or  dimin- 
ish, its  advantages— for  example,  in  heavy 
bombers  and  cruise  missiles— in  exchange 
for  compensating  Soviet  actions  in  an  area 
of  their  strength,  such  as  the  destructive 
capability  of  ballistic  missiles.  Such  trade- 
offs are,  after  all,  the  essence  of  negotia- 
tions. In  other  words,  the  useful  work  we 
had  done  in  the  START  negotiations 
prior  to  last  October  brought  us  to  the 
point  where  we  could  fruitfully  explore 
the  concept  of  trade-offs  as  a  way  to  move 
toward  an  agreement.  Unfortunately,  the 
Soviets  were  not  willing  to  engage  in  such 
an  exploration  during  the  last  START 
session.  And  now,  of  course,  we  can't  do 
so  because  the  Soviet  Union  declines  to 
return  to  the  bargaining  table. 

On  April  8,  2  months  exactly  after  the 
date  we  had  proposed  for  resumption  of 
START  negotiations,  Soviet  Party  Chair- 
man Chemenko  had  some  further  com- 
ments on  U.S.-Soviet  relations  and  arms 
control  prospects.  As  for  the  United 
States,  the  President  hopes  for  a  climate 
in  which  we  can  solve  problems  across  the 
spectrum  of  U.S.-Soviet  relations.  The 
most  important  of  these  is  solving  prob- 
lems in  the  arms  control  area. 

Is  there  any  reason  to  believe,  there- 
fore, that  we  will  be  able  to  move  toward 
an  arms  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union?  I  believe  there  is.  Even  before  the 
death  in  February  of  General  Secretary 
Andropov,  President  Reagan  extended  an 
olive  branch  to  the  Soviet  leadership.  He 
made  it  clear  that  we  wish  an  improve- 
ment in  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
Since  Andropov's  death,  the  Soviets  in 
their  public  statements  have,  to  some  ex- 
tent, lowered  the  level  of  criticism  and 
condemnation  of  the  United  States. 

This  improvement  in  Soviet  rhetoric 
has  not,  however,  translated  into  a  will- 
ingness of  the  Soviet  Union  to  return  to 
the  negotiating  table  on  nuclear  matters. 


The  United  States,  for  its  part,  has  made 
it  clear  to  the  Soviet  leadership,  both  in 
public  statements  and  through  diplomatic 
channels,  that  we  remain  ready  to  return 
to  the  negotiations  at  any  time,  without 
preconditions. 

Alexis  de  Tocqueville,  in  his  commen- 
tary on  the  United  States  and  Russia 
over  140  years  ago,  noted: 

Their  point  of  departure  is  different  and 
their  paths  diverse;  nevertheless,  each  seems 
carried  by  some  secret  design  of  providence 
one  day  to  hold  in  his  hands  the  destinies  of 
half  the  world. 

Competition  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  inevitable. 
But  we  Americans  need  to  handle  care- 
fully the  destiny  entrusted  to  us  by  provi- 
dence. We  can  only  do  this  if  we  fully 
realize  the  differences  between  us  and  the 
Russians.  Only  through  such  a  realization 
can  we  hope  to  compete  in  peaceful  areas 
rather  than  ones  which  risk  the  outbreak 
of  nuclear  war. 

United  States  and  Soviet  political  and 
economic  systems  are  very  different  and 
will  probably  always  be  in  competition 
with  one  another.  Moreover,  there  is  a 
difference  between  perfect  peace  and  real 
peace.  As  Richard  Nixon  put  it,  perfect 
peace  is  achieved  in  two  places  only:  in 
the  grave  and  at  the  typewriter.  We  can- 
not achieve  real  peace  by  writing  in 
idealistic  terms.  Rather,  real  peace  lies  in 
working  out  the  problems  which  impinge 
on  our  respective  national  self-interests. 
But  we  have  a  joint  responsibility  to 
guarantee  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  to 
each  other,  that  this  continuing  competi- 
tion will  be  accompanied  by  a  search  for 
realistic  and  down-to-earth  solutions,  a 
search  which  will  take  place  in  an  atmos- 
phere characterized  by  sober  and  careful 
management  of  our  relationship.  We  must 
retain  a  mutual  respect  for  each  other's 
legitimate  security  interests.  We  cannot 
indulge  in  idealistic  flights  of  fancy. 

The  United  States  recognizes  this  and 
stands  ready  to  return  to  the  table  to 
negotiate  an  equitable  and  verifiable  arms 
control  agreement.  Had  the  Soviets  re- 
turned to  Geneva  in  early  February  as  we 
proposed,  we  would  now  be  completing 
another  2-month  negotiating  session  in 
which  we  could  have  addressed  the  trade- 
offs I  described  earlier.  Instead,  we  are 
marking  time,  waiting  for  the  Soviets  to 
decide  to  even  begin  negotiating. 


President  Reagan  raised  this  issue 
yet  again  in  his  Wednesday  evening  press 
conference  when  he  said  the  Soviets 
"have  ignored  the  will  of  the  world"  by 
refusing  to  resume  negotiations.  He  once 
again  called  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  "join 
us  in  the  urgent  task  of  achieving  real 
reductions  in  nuclear  arms." 

Both  sides  should  cooperate  rather 
than  threaten,  negotiate  rather  than 
remonstrate.  In  this  way,  we  can  secure 
the  present  for  ourselves  and  the  future 
for  our  children.  Neither  we  nor  the 
Soviets  can  shirk  the  awesome  responsi- 
bility we  have  as  major  world  powers  to 
guarantee  the  peace.  ■ 


CDE  Negotiations 
Resume  in  Stockholm 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAY  5,  1984' 

The  second  round  of  the  Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe- 
known  as  CDE— will  begin  in  Stockholm 
next  Tuesday,  May  8, 1984. 

The  CDE  arises  out  of  the  "Helsinki 
process,"  in  which  we  and  our  allies  seek 
balanced  progress  in  both  the  security 
and  human  rights  areas.  The  CDE  nego- 
tiations began  last  January  and  are  a 
promising  new  part  of  the  dialogue  on 
European  security  issues.  The  par- 
ticipating countries  include  the  United 
States,  Canada,  our  European  allies,  the 
European  neutral  states,  and  the 
members  of  the  Warsaw  Pact. 

The  CDE  is  .-an  essentially  new  ap- 
proach to  European  security.  We  and  our 
allies  seek  an  agreement  on  practical, 
meaningful  ways  to  reduce  the  risk  of  sur- 
prise attack  and  to  reduce  the  uncertainty 
and  potential  for  misunderstandings  over 
military  activity  in  both  the  East  and 
West.  Western  unity  has  been  and  will 
continue  to  be  a  crucial  factor  in  the 
progress  we  achieve. 

During  the  recess,  we  have  consulted 
closely  with  our  allies  and  other  par- 
ticipating nations.  At  my  request,  our 
Ambassador  to  the  CDE-James  Goodby- 
has  just  completed  senior-level  consulta- 
tions in  several  capitals,  including 
Moscow.  He  had  a  full  and  useful  ex- 
change of  views  with  Soviet  officials. 


47 


June  1984 


omBBBmaaaasE. 


fMIIWUfiPJIUIIlNMt' 


ARMS  CONTROL 


It  is  important  now  to  engage  in 
serious  negotiations  on  the  concrete  pro- 
posals which  the  West  presented  during 
the  first  round.  Those  proposals  are 
designed  to: 

•  Increase  mutual  knowledge  and 
understanding  of  military  forces  and  ac- 
tivities in  Europe; 

•  Reduce  the  chance  of  war  by 
miscalculation; 

•  Enhance  tne  ability  of  all  to  deal 
with  potential  crises;  and 

•  Minimize  the  possibDity  that 
military  activities  could  be  used  for 
political  intimidation. 

The  Western  nations  are  ready  for  a 
serious  dialogue  on  these  issues.  We  hope 
this  is  true  of  the  East  as  well. 

Our  proposals  in  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference are  part  of  our  larger  efforts  to 
move  forward,  in  a  spirit  of  genuine 
cooperation,  on  arms  control  and  East- 
West  relations.  Two  weeks  ago,  at  the 
Conference  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva, 
Vice  President  Bush  presented  a  new 
American  proposal  for  a  comprehensive 
worldwide  ban  on  chemical  weapons.  The 
same  week,  we  and  our  NATO  allies 
presented  a  new  proposal  at  the  MBFR 
[mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction] 
talks  in  Vienna.  This  initiative  is  designed 
to  break  the  impasse  in  the  negotiations 
on  reducing  conventional  forces  in  central 
Europe. 

We  are  striving  hard  for  real  progress 
in  all  three  negotiations.  But  it  is  also 
vitally  important  to  get  on  with  the 
urgent  business  of  reducing  nuclear  arms. 
I  strongly  hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  will 
heed  the  wishes  of  the  international  com- 
munity-and  of  its  own  people— and 
return  to  the  negotiations  on  strategic 
and  intermediate-range  nuclear  forces. 

The  opportunity  for  meaningful  prog- 
ress in  arms  control  exists.  The  Soviet 
leaders  should  take  advantage  of  it.  Our 
representatives  are  ready  to  return  to  the 
two  negotiating  tables  on  nuclear  arms, 
and  we  will  negotiate  in  good  faith.  As  I 
have  said  before,  whenever  the  Soviet 
Union  is  ready  to  do  likewise,  we  will 
meet  them  halfway. 


Arms  Control  for  Antisatellite  Systems 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  31, 1984' 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit  this  report  on  my  Ad- 
ministration's policy  on  arms  control  for  an- 
tisatellite systems  as  required  in  the  Con- 
ference Report  for  the  Department  of  Defense 
Appropriations  Act  for  Fiscal  Year  1984. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to  the  ex- 
ploration and  use  of  space  by  all  nations  for 
peaceful  purposes  and  for  the  benefit  of  man- 
kind. Among  the  activities  conducted  by  the 
United  States  in  space  is  the  pursuit  of  funda- 
mental national  security  objectives.  Arms  con- 
trol arrangements  for  space  would  serve  these 
objectives  if  they  contributed  to  our  overall 
deterrence  posture  and  reduce  the  risk  of  con- 
flict. 

With  this  in  mind,  I  announced  on  July  4, 
1982,  the  basic  posture  of  this  Administration 
which  I  now  reaffirm: 

"The  United  States  will  continue  to  study 
space  arms  control  options.  The  United  States 
will  consider  verifiable  and  equitable  arms  con- 
trol measures  that  would  ban  or  otherwise 
limit  testing  and  deployment  of  specific 
weapons  systems,  should  those  measures  be 
compatible  with  United  States  national 
security." 

Guided  by  these  criteria,  the  United  States 
has  been  studying  a  range  of  possible  options 
for  space  arms  control,  with  a  view  to  possible 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
nations,  if  such  negotiations  would  serve  U.S. 
interests.  Within  the  U.S.  Government,  this 
work  is  being  conducted  by  an  Interdepart- 
mental Group  chaired  by  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Arms  Control 
and  Disarmament  Agency.  The  United  States 
is  also  prepared  to  examine  space  arms  control 
issues  in  the  Conference  on  Disarmament 
(CD).  However,  no  arrangements  or  agree- 
ments beyond  those  already  governing  mil- 


•Text  from  White  House  press  release.  I 


itary  activities  in  outer  space  have  been  found 
to  date  that  are  judged  to  be  in  the  overall  in- 
terest of  the  United  States  and  its  Allies.  The 
factors  that  impede  the  identification  of 
effective  ASAT  arms  control  measures  include 
significant  difficulties  of  verification,  diverse 
sources  of  threats  to  U.S.  and  Allied  satellites, 
and  threats  posed  by  Soviet  targeting  and  re- 
connaissance satellites  that  undermine  conven- 
tional and  nuclear  deterrence. 

Notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  the 
United  States  is  continuing  to  study  space 
arms  control,  in  search  of  selected  limits  on 
specific  types  of  space  systems  or  activities  in 
space  that  could  satisfactorily  deal  with  prob- 
lems, such  as  those  described  above.  Until  we 
have  determined  whether  there  are,  in  fact, 
practical  solutions  to  these  problems,  I  do  not 
believe  it  would  be  productive  to  engage  in  for- 
mal international  negotiations.  The  United 
States  remains  ready,  however,  to  examine 
the  problems  and  potential  of  space  arms  con- 
trol at  the  Conference  on  Disarmament  in 
Geneva.  ^  ,. 

The  attached  Report  on  U.S.  Pohcy  on  An- 
tisateUite  Arms  Control  sets  forth  in  greater 
detail  the  views  of  my  Administration  on  this 
important  issue.  It  is  unclassified  and  is 
suitable  for  general  release.  As  you  are  aware, 
information  regarding  certain  U.S.  and  Soviet 
space  activities  involves  sensitive  information. 
Accordingly,  I  am  also  transmitting  a  classified 
Report  providing  such  information  under 
separate  cover.  In  preparing  both  Reports, 
every  effort  was  made  to  respond  to  the  ques- 
tions asked  by  various  Committees  and 
Members  of  Congress. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr. ,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  George  Bush,  President 
of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  9, 
1984).  ■ 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


DEPARTMENT 


Foreign  Service  Day,  1984 


On  the  occasion  of  the  19th  annual 
Foreign  Service  Day,  held  at  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  on  May  7,  198Jt,  Secretary 
Shultz  read  a  statement  by  President 
Reagan  and  then  officiated  at  a 
ceremony  honoring  four  U.S.  diplomatic 
personnel  who  were  killed  in  the  line  of 
duty  during  the  past  year.^ 


First  I  have  the  privilege  to  read  a  state- 
ment from  the  President. 

To  the  members  of  the  Foreign  Service  and 
their  families:  Slightly  over  a  year  ago,  I  went 
to  Andrews  Air  Force  Base  to  pay  my  heart- 
felt respects  to  your  fallen  comrades,  victims 
of  the  terrorist  bombing  of  the  American  Em- 
bassy in  Beirut.  As  I  talked  to  each  family,  I 
was  touched  by  their  grief  from  the  youngest 
child  to  the  oldest  grandparent.  It  was,  as  I 
said  on  that  occasion,  "the  longest  journey  of 
my  presidency." 

That  sad  event  brought  home  to  me  the 
great  irony  of  your  profession— as  diplomats 
you  abhore  violence  and  pursue  peace  and  yet 
you  often  are  the  targets  of  terrorism  and  un- 
controlled hate. 

This  past  year,  we  have  witnessed  a  con- 
tinuation of  acts  of  terrorism  against  the 
representatives  of  our  country  and  especially 
against  members  of  the  Foreign  Service  com- 
munity. More  than  ever  before,  the  satisfac- 
tion and  the  joys  of  serving  your  country 
abroad  are  burdened  by  the  ever-present 
danger  of  irrational  violence. 

This  is  a  situation  we  cannot  and  will  not 
tolerate.  Let  me  assure  you  that  we  will  make 
every  effort  to  defend  our  diplomats  by 
strengthening  security  measures  and  enhanc- 
ing our  intelligence  capabilities  and,  if 


necessary,  by  more  active  defensive  measures. 
Terrorism  must  not  be  allowed  to  succeed.  If 
it  does,  the  victims  will  be  not  only  diplomats 
or  Americans  but  the  cause  of  freedom  itself 

As  you  gather  on  the  occasion  of  your  19th 
Foreign  Service  Day,  I  am  very  proud  to  ex- 
press to  you  our  nation's  deepest  appreciation 
for  your  sacrifice  and  service  to  our  country. 

All  Americans  who  love  this  country  and 
who  take  pride  in  our  history  are  honored  by 
the  work  of  the  American  Foreign  Service  and 
especially  by  your  selfless  dedication  to  the 
cause  of  peace. 

Signed,  Ronald  Reagan. 

The  frequency  with  which  names  are 
added  to  this  memorial  plaque— 17  in  just 
the  last  18  months— is  a  painful  reminder 
of  the  dangers  faced  by  members  of  the 
Foreign  Service  and  their  families.  Today 
we  add  the  names  of  four  more  of  our 
country's  heroes. 

On  this  occasion,  I  offer  my  sincerest 
sympathy  to  the  families  and  colleagues 
of  Foreign  Service  officer  Dennis  W. 
Keogh,  Lt.  Col.  Kenneth  Crabtree,  Capt. 
George  K.  Tsantes,  and  Foreign  Service 
officer  Leamon  R.  Hunt. 

Dennis  Keogh  and  Kenneth  Crabtree 
perished  in  the  service  of  our  country  on 
a  mission  to  bring  about  peace  in 
southern  Africa. 

Dennis  Keogh  was  a  highly  talented 
professional  who  volunteered  to  under- 
take his  last  Foreign  Service  mission  to 
Namibia  as  head  of  our  Liaison  Office  to 
the  Joint  Angola-South  Africa  Military 
Commission.  He  was  a  leader  among  the 
handful  of  American  Foreign  Service  of- 


ficers concentrating  on  the  political  and 
social  problems  of  southern  Africa. 

Kenneth  Crabtree  was  an  honored 
career  Army  officer  with  extensive  ex- 
perience in  southern  Africa.  Likewise  a 
volunteer,  he  brought  over  20  years  of 
professional  service  to  our  Liaison  Office 
and  to  the  military  commission  in  that 
region. 

Capt.  Tsantes  served  in  the  U.S. 
Navy  with  honor  and  distinction  for  28 
years.  In  the  course  of  his  career,  he 
served  aboard  nuclear-powered  surface 
vessels,  including  duty  as  chief  engineer 
on  the  Enterprise  and  as  commander  of 
the  destroyer  William.  M.  Wood.  The 
captain  was  gunned  down  while  being 
driven  to  his  office  where  he  was  serving 
as  chief  of  the  naval  section  of  the  U.S. 
Military  Advisory  Group  at  our  Embassy 
in  Athens. 

Ray  Hunt  had  a  long  and  distin- 
guished career  in  the  Foreign  Service.  At 
the  request  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  he 
came  out  of  retirement  to  oversee  the 
creation  of  the  Sinai  multinational  force 
and  observers  (MFO).  Ray  was  serving 
as  the  MFO's  first  director  when  he  was 
struck  down  by  a  band  of  terrorists  in 
Rome. 

The  irony  of  the  deaths  of  all  these 
tireless  workers  for  peace  is  a  sad  and 
terrible  commentary  on  the  irrational 
forces  with  which  peacemakers  must  con- 
tend today. 

In  the  face  of  this  growing  menace,  I 
want  to  tell  you  that,  as  far  as  I  am  con- 
cerned, this  Department  will  spare  no  ef- 
fort for  the  safety  of  Foreign  Service 
employees.  Our  Office  of  Security  is  work- 
ing all-out  on  enhancing  the  security  of 


Since  1780  more  than  150  Americans  have 
died  or  been  killed  while  on  active  duty  with 
the  ForeigTi  Service.  Some  fell  victim  to 
tropical  disease,  earthquakes,  or  volcanic 
eruptions;  many  others  died  a  hero's  death 
in  the  midst  of  war,  while  saving  lives,  or  at 
the  hands  of  assassins.  To  honor  those  who 
lost  their  lives  "under  heroic  or  tragnc  cir- 
cumstances," the  American  Foreign  Service 
Association  in  1933  dedicated  a  plaque.  It 
and  a  second  one  unveiled  in  1973  are  in  the 
diplomatic  lobby  of  the  Department  of 
State.  In  recent  years,  the  names  of  those 
who  have  died  of  disease  contracted  at 
tropical  posts  have  not  been  added,  yet  the 
list  continues  to  lengthen.  On  May  7,  1984, 
Secretary  Shultz  officiated  at  the  unveiling 
ceremony  of  the  memorial  plaque  on  which 
the  names  of  the  four  most  recent  victims 
are  inscribed.  The  Secretary  stands  beside 
the  flag;  Dennis  K.  Hays,  President  of  the 
American  Foreign  Service  Association,  is  at 
the  podium. 


(Department  of  Slate  photo) 


June  1984 


49 


«l»MIHIii«HlliiiWllfiiltllil^^ 


EUROPE 


our  facilities  around  the  world,  and  we 
are  cooperating  closely  with  friendly 
governments  to  track  down  and  combat 
terrorism.  No  one,  of  course,  can 
guarantee  complete  protection  from 
senseless  terrorist  attacks,  but  we  will 
never  stop  trying,  and  we  will  never 
shrink  from  our  commitment  to  the 
search  for  peace.  This  commitment  to 
peace  keeps  faith  with  our  colleagues  who 
have  died  in  a  high  calling  and  a  magnifi- 
cent cause. 

As  we  remember  our  friends  today 
with  heavy  heart,  let  us  remember  that  a 
vigorous,  undaunted  America  remains 
the  best  hope  for  peace  and  freedom  on 
this  planet,  and  you,  the  American 
Foreign  Service,  are  the  bearers  of  that 
hope. 

And  now  it  is  my  privilege  to  present 
the  Secretary's  Award  posthumously  to 
Dennis  Keogh.  His  family  is  here,  and 
maybe  you  could  step  over  this  way, 
Molly.  I  think  you  are  going  to  receive 
this  on  behalf  of  the  family,  so  if  you 
would  just  step  up  here,  I  would  like  to 
read  the  award: 

The  Department  of  State,  United  States  of 
America,  the  Secretary's  Award,  Dennis  W. 
Keogh.  On  April  15,  1984,  Dennis  Keogh  gave 
his  life  in  the  service  of  his  country  and  in  the 
cause  of  peace  in  a  far  away  African  land.  He 
was  wise  beyond  his  years,  compassionate  and 
responsible,  and  strived  in  his  work  in 
southern  Africa  to  help  bring  about  peace  in 
that  tortured  region.  When  he  died,  he  was  on 
an  official  mission  which,  it  was  hoped,  would 
lead  to  independence  for  Namibia  and  move- 
ment toward  a  lessening  of  the  cycles  of 
violence  that  have  swept  over  southern  Africa 
for  more  than  two  decades.  He  was  a  gentle 
warrior  in  the  noblest  of  man's  endeavors: 
peace,  freedom,  and  an  opportunity  for  men  to 
live  their  lives  in  circumstances  of  their  own 
choosing.  April  1984. 


Visit  of  Austrian  President 


•Press  release  125  of  May  8,  1984. 


President  Rudolf  Kirchschlager  of  the 
Republic  of  Austria  made  a  state  visit  to 
the  United  States  February  27-March  5, 
198Jt.  While  in  Washington,  D.C., 
February  27-29,  he  met  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  at  the 
arrival  cceremony  and  the  dinner  toasts 
by  the  two  Presidents.^ 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY, 
FEB.  28,  1984^ 

President  Reagan 

Nancy  and  I  are  delighted  to  welcome 
you  and  your  party  to  the  United  States. 
I  take  special  pride  in  greeting  you,  since 
this  is  the  first  time  an  American  Presi- 
dent has  had  the  privilege  of  hosting  an 
Austrian  state  visit. 

Americans  have  deep  admiration  for 
Austria,  its  industrious  people,  and  its 
rich  culture.  When  we  think  of  Austria, 
we  picture  snowcapped  mountains  and 
deep,  fertile  valleys,  and  churches, 
museums,  and  monuments  of  cities  like 
Salzburg  and  Vienna.  Austria  is  truly  a 
nation  of  breathtaking  beauty  and  noble 
history.  And  Americans  have  a  deep 
respect  for  Austria's  part  in  foreign  af- 
fairs. 

We  recognize  the  crucial  role  your  na- 
tion has  played  in  maintaining  peace  in 
central  Europe  and  working  for  peace 
throughout  the  world.  But  we  are  drawn 
to  you  by  more  than  admiration  and 
respect.  We  revere  shared  values  of 
democracy,  personal  freedom,  human 
dignity,  and  the  rule  of  law— values  as  an- 
cient as  Salzburg  Cathedral  and  as  soar- 
ing and  noble  as  the  Austrian  Alps. 

Your  reconstruction  of  your  society 
from  the  physical  and  political  rubble  of 
World  War  II  and  your  creative  use  of 
neutrality  to  create  a  pluralistic  society 
and  political  system  stand  as  an  inspira- 
tion for  the  rest  of  the  world.  As  a 
signatory  of  your  state  treaty  and, 
therefore,  a  guarantor  of  your  sover- 
eignty, the  United  States  salutes  your  ac- 
comphshments  and  supports  your  active 
neutrality. 

Looking  to  the  future,  we  want  to 
make  certain  that  the  understanding  be- 
tween our  two  peoples  is  passed  on  to  the 
younger  generation  of  Austrians  and 
Americans.  And  toward  that  end,  we  will 
begin  this  year  a  pilot  program  of  youth 


50 


exchanges  with  plans  to  e.xpand  the  pro- 
gram in  future  years.  Allowing  young 
Austrians  and  Americans  to  spend  time  in 
each  other's  countries  will  multiply  the 
ties  of  firsthand  knowledge  and  friendship 
so  important  to  our  close  and  warm  rela- 
tions. It  will  mean  that  many  young 
Austrians  and  Americans  will  forever 
carry  something  of  the  other's  country  in 
their  hearts. 

In  addition  to  promoting  these  new 
youth  exchanges,  your  visit  will  help  ce- 
ment our  ties  through  enhanced  coopera- 
tion in  science  and  research.  Minister 
Fischer  and  my  science  adviser.  Dr. 
Keyworth,  will  be  exchanging  letters  this 
afternoon  which  will  give  a  new  impetus 
to  mutually  beneficial  cooperation  on 
basic  research.  Scientists  and  researchers 
from  both  our  countries  will  now  have 
new  reasons  to  increase  their  joint 
research  projects,  pooling  their  knowl- 
edge for  the  benefit  of  Austrians, 
Americans,  and  all  mankind. 

In  your  meetings  today  and  in  your 
visits  to  many  parts  of  the  United  States, 
I  know  that  you  wOl  experience  the  depth 
of  the  good  will  that  we  Americans  feel 
toward  Austria.  I'm  delighted  that  you 
will  have  the  opportunity  to  meet 
Americans  across  our  land  and  experience 
the  variety  of  our  culture  and  the  warmth 
of  our  hospitality.  The  people  of  the  cities 
that  you'll  visit  eagerly  await  the  oppor- 
tunity to  share  this,  the  first  state  visit  by 
an  Austrian  President,  with  you.  And 
together  all  Americans  are  proud  to  say, 
Wir  heisseyi  Sie  herzlich  willkommen. 
[We  bid  you  a  warm  welcome.] 

We  welcome  you,  and  we  cherish  your 
friendship.  May  God  bless  you  and  Mrs. 
Kirchschlager. 

President  Kirchschlager 

Thank  you  very  much  for  your  warm 
words  of  welcome,  and  thank  you  very 
much  for  your  kind  invitation  to  officially 
visit  this  great  country. 

Your  invitation  was  more  appreciated 
since  this  is  for  me  and  for  all  of  Austria  a 
truly  historic  event.  It  is,  indeed,  the  first 
official  visit  of  an  Austrian  head  of  state 
to  the  United  States  since  the 
establishing  of  relations  between  Vienna 
and  Washington  about  200  years  ago. 

In  the  heart  and  in  the  mind  of  the 
Austrian  people,  the  relations  between 
our  two  countries  are  inviolably  anchored 
by  two  facts.  First,  we  feel  closely  linked 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


through  our  mutual  adherence  to  the  fun- 
damental values  of  democratic  Western 
pluralism.  Second,  we  have  not  forgotten 
how  much  the  American  people  have  con- 
tributed through  the  Marshall  Plan  to  the 
rebuilding  and  to  the  building  of  our 
economy  after  World  War  II. 

Reflecting  this  basic  attitude  of  the 
Austrian  people,  I  came  here  today  as  a 
true  friend,  advocating  the  promotion  of 
friendship  between  Western  Europe  and 
the  United  States  but  also  advocating  the 
dialogue  between  East  and  West.  The 
history  of  my  country  has  proven  that  it 
is  only  through  a  constructive  dialogue 
that  our  living  with  each  other  in  peace  is 
ensured.  Recent  messages  from  across 
both  sides  of  the  ideological  borderlines 
seem  to  give  hope  for  mutual  understand- 
ing and  coexistence. 

I'm  looking  forward  with  great  in- 
terest to  an  exchange  of  views  with  you, 
with  Vice  President  Bush,  and  with 
Secretary  Shultz  concerning  the  present 
political  and  economic  global  situation. 
For  me,  as  an  Austrian,  it  is  of  particular 
value  to  see  the  American  perspectives  in 
direct  contact. 

Also  being  a  small  country,  Austria  is 
situated  geopohtically  in  a  sensitive  area, 
and  its  historical  ties  with  the  peoples 
across  the  borders  have  also  a  particular 
political  importance.  Consequently, 
Austria  has  a  role  to  play  in 
demonstrating  to  all  of  our  neighbors  a 
living  and  well-functioning,  free 
democracy  with  all  of  its  principles 
America  stands  for. 

I'm  truly  happy  to  be  your  guest  in 
your  great  country,  and  I'm  confident 
that  my  visit  will  bring  our  two  peoples 
even  closer  together.  It  is  particularly  the 
young  people  we  have  to  turn  to  in  our  ef- 
forts to  ensure  our  values  also  for  the 
future.  I  am,  therefore,  very  pleased  that 
it  is  planned,  as  you  stated  today,  to  in- 
clude Austria  in  the  youth  exchange  pro- 
gram, which  you  decided  to  intensify  to 
the  benefit  of  international  relations  in 
general,  and  of  Austro-American  friend- 
ship in  particular. 


DINNER  TOASTS, 
FEB.  28,  1984» 

President  Reagan 

I  said  this  morning,  and  I  would  like  to 
say  again,  how  happy  and  proud  that 
Nancy  and  I  are  to  welcome  you  to  the 
United  States  for  the  first  state  visit  by 
an  Austrian  President.  I  consider  your 
visit  a  celebration  of  our  common  bonds 
and  our  common  purpose. 


President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  with  President  and  Mrs.  Kirchschlager  at  the  White  House. 


Before  I  say  anything  else,  I  want  you 
to  know  that  one  of  the  best  loved  of  all 
Austrian-Americans  is  with  us  tonight. 
Baroness  von  Trapp. 

The  Baroness  and  her  family  fled 
Austria  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of 
World  War  II,  and  their  story  has  become 
known  to  millions  in  the  wonderful  play 
and  film  "The  Sound  of  Music."  Since  ar- 
riving in  the  United  States,  the  Baroness 
has  come  to  stand  for  Austrian  integrity, 
wit,  and  charm.  And  perhaps  more  than 
any  other  single  American,  she's  contrib- 
uted to  th"  deep  friendship  that  our  two 
nations  enjoy.  So,  Baroness,  on  behalf  of 
the  American  people,  I  thank  you. 

As  a  neutral  country  between  East 
and  West,  Austria  has  played  a  construc- 
tive role  in  international  and  human  rela- 


tions and  earned  the  respect  of  all  na- 
tions. During  World  War  II,  thousands  of 
people  like  the  Von  Trapps  were  forced  to 
flee  Austria,  but  today,  your  nation  offers 
asylum  to  those  who  are  fleeing  tyranny 
and  human  suffering.  Austria  is  a  shining 
example  of  compassion  and  courage. 

Our  countries,  united  not  by  militaiy 
alliance  but  by  shared  beliefs,  have  a  com- 
mon conviction  that  there  are  basic  values 
which  transcend  every  system  of  govern- 
ment. Among  these  are  the  dignity  of 
man,  liberty  and  justice,  and  the  corner- 
stone of  all  of  our  values,  an  unshakable 
belief  in  God.  We  have  deep  respect  for 
your  neutrality.  We  are  proud  to  guaran- 
tee your  sovereignty,  and  we  take  great 
comfort  in  the  knowledge  that  Austria  is 
a  steadfast  member  of  the  community  of 
Western  democracies. 


June  1984 


51 


IIIIHIimmHllimHHWHIIIIIllllHiMIIHIIHimilllHIIM4l»HmUIHHRWfWmti 


EUROPE 


I 


Given  your  history  and  geogi'aphy, 
Austria  is  vitally  interested  in  the  state  of 
East-West  relations.  From  the  beginning 
of  my  tenure  in  office,  I  have  emphasized 
that  in  our  dealings  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  we  should  be  guided  by  realism, 
proceed  from  a  position  of  strength,  and 
be  ready  at  all  times  to  engage  in  efforts 
to  reach  equitable  and  verifiable  agree- 
ments. Your  country's  very  existence  as  a 
free  and  independent  nation  proves  what 
patient,  persistent  negotiations  with  the 
Soviets  can  produce.  We  welcome  the 
wisdom  of  your  counsel  and  rest  assured 
that  we  will  continue  this  policy  in  the 
hope  that  it  will  yield  the  results  for 
which  the  world  yearns. 

This  morning,  I  spoke  about  creating 
a  new  tie  between  our  peoples.  In  the 
past  year,  Vice  President  Bush's  visit  to 
Vienna,  the  reopening  of  our  consulate  in 
Salzburg,  and  the  appointment  of  Helene 
von  Damm  to  be  our  Ambassador  to 
Austria  have  shown  our  commitment  to 
build  stronger  and  more  vital  links  be- 
tween our  governments  and  our  peoples. 
But  the  bonds  of  true  friendship  can 
never  be  too  many  or  too  strong.  And  we 
will  create  still  more  through  youth  e.x- 
changes  and  enhanced  cooperation  in 
scientific  and  technological  research. 

We're  grateful  for  your  visit.  The  peo- 
ple of  America  look  forward  to  hosting 
you  and  your  party  across  our  country. 
Your  visit  is  a  celebration  of  something 
real,  tangible,  and  enduring:  the  friend- 
ship between  the  people  of  Austria  and 
the  people  of  the  tfnited  States.  At  one 
point  in  "The  Sound  of  Music,"  the 
character  who  plays  Baron  von  Trapp 
sings  a  song  about  the  edelweiss,  an 
Austrian  flower.  And  before  the  song 
ends,  the  lyrics  become  a  prayer  for 
Austria  itself.  It  is  a  prayer  Americans 
join  in— "Blossom  of  snow,  may  you  bloom 
and  grow— and  bless  your  homeland 
forever." 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  would  you 
please  join  me  in  a  toast  to  the  President 
of  Austria  and  Mrs.  Kirchschlager  and  to 
the  friendship  and  freedom  that  our  two 
peoples  enjoy. 

President  Kirchschlager 

It  is,  indeed,  a  great  privilege  to  be  your 
guest  today  here  in  the  White  House.  And 
believe  me,  it  is  a  moving  evening  for  all 
Austrians  present  here— a  moving  eve- 
ning by  the  words,  your  address  to  us, 
and  by  the  music  you  offered  to  us. 

I  would  like  to  thank  you  most  sin- 
cerely for  this  gracious  and  warm  hospi- 


tality you  are  extending  to  us  and  for  all 
the  friendship  we  felt  here  in  Washington 
and  in  the  United  States.  I  express  this 
thanks  also  in  the  name  of  my  wife  and  on 
behalf  of  the  members  of  the  Austrian 
Government  in  my  company  as  well  as  in 
the  name  of  the  other  Austrian  guests 
today.  And  I  am  joining  you  to  express 
my  real  pleasure  that  Baroness  von 
Trapp  is  here  with  us.  In  Austria,  too, 
you  have  a  wonderful  reputation.  You 
know  it,  I  hope. 

It's  true— and  I  may  repeat  what  I 
said  this  morning— I'm  profoundly  appre- 
ciative that  you  have  invited  me  to  pay 
this  official  visit  to  the  United  States.  For 
me  and  for  all  of  Austria,  this  is  a  truly 
historic  event.  It  is,  indeed,  the  first  of- 
ficial visit  of  an  Austrian  head  of  state  to 
the  United  States  since  relations  between 
Vienna  and  Washington  were  established 
formally  146  and  informally  200  years  ago. 

This  should  not  lead  to  wrong  conclu- 
sions. The  relations  between  our  two 
countries  have  been  always  very  good, 
considering  the  fundamentally  different 
structures  of  our  countries  until  1918.  It 
was  on  the  model  of  your  Supreme  Court, 
for  instance,  as  established  under  your 
Constitution,  that  the  Austrian  Empire  in 
1869  established  its  own  Reichsgericht. 
And  again,  in  1919,  Austria  was  the  first 
country  in  Europe  to  adopt,  on  the  exam- 
ple of  the  United  States,  the  principle  of 
full  judicial  review. 

But  it  was  during  World  War  II,  and 
especially  in  the  period  after  the  war,  that 


the  hearts  of  the  Austrian  people  went 
out  to  America,  and  the  image  of  the 
United  States  in  my  country  was  forged 
by  the  Marshall  Plan,  which  played  such  a 
decisive  part  in  the  rebuilding  of  Austria 
and  with  which  it  has  remained  linked 
ever  since.  Only  recently  we  celebrated  in 
Vienna  the  35th  anniversary  of  the  sign- 
ing of  the  agreement  on  American  tempo- 
rary assistance  to  Austria  and  on  eco- 
nomic cooperation,  and  we  will  never 
forget  this  event. 

In  those  years,  the  trust  between 
Austria  and  the  United  States  was 
strengthened  by  10  years  of  tough  negoti- 
ations over  the  Austrian  state  treaty  and 
the  strong  commitment  of  the  Austrian 
people  to  democratic  ideals.  The  conclu- 
sion of  the  state  treaty  and  the  recovery 
of  Austria's  full  freedom  in  1955  have  led 
to  a  long-lasting  period  of  excellent  rela- 
tions, which  has  continued  to  this  day. 

In  the  late  1930s,  freedom  and  demo- 
cratic life  and  America's  willingness  to  of- 
fer asylum  to  political  and  racial  refugees 
attracted  many  of  Austria's  best  sons  and 
daughters,  who  have  found  a  new  home  in 
your  great  country  but  have  also  helped 
as  pioneers  to  buUd  it  up.  Most  Ameri- 
cans will  be  surprised  to  learn  that  at  the 
middle  of  this  century,  only  four  countries 
had  supplied  more  distinguished  Ameri- 
cans listed  in  "Who's  Who  in  America" 
than  the  small  country  of  ours,  Austria.  It 
may,  indeed,  be  unexpected  that  a  land- 
locked country  of  central  Europe,  speak- 
ing a  different  language  from  that  of 


Austria— A  Profile 


People 

Noun  and  adjective:  Austrian(s).  Population 
(July  1982):  7.6  million.  Annual  growth  rate: 
0.1%.  Ethnic  groups:  German  98.1%,  Croa- 
tian, Slovene.  Religion:  Roman  Catholic  85%. 
Language:  Gemian  9.5%. 

Geography 

Area:  83,835  sq.  km.  (32,369  sq.  mi.);  slightly 
smaller  than  Maine.  Cities:  Capita/— Vienna 
(pop.  1.5  million).  O^/ferci/ies-Graz  (240,000), 
Linz  (200,000),  Salzburg  (138,000),  Innsbiiick 
(116.000). 

Economy 

GNP  (1980):  $62.16  billion.  Per  capita  income 
(1980):  $8,280. 

Official  exchange  rate:  17.9  Austrian 
schillings  =  US$1. 


Natural  resources:  Iron  ore,  petroleum, 
timber,  magnesite,  aluminum,  coal,  lignite, 
cement,  copper. 

Agriculture  (4.6%  of  1979  GDP): 
Livestock,  forest  products,  grains,  sugar 
beets,  potatoes. 

Industry  (61%  of  1979  GDP):  Iron  and 
steel,  chemicals,  capital  equipment,  consumer 
goods. 

Trade  (1980):  Exports-$11.2  billion:  iron 
and  steel  products,  timber,  paper,  textiles, 
electrotechnical  machinery,  constiTiction  and 
industrial  machineiy.  chemical  products.  Im- 
ports—$23A  billion:  machinery,  vehicles, 
chemicals,  iron  and  steel,  metal  goods,  fuels, 
raw  materials,  foodstuffs.  Principal  trading 
partvers-EC,  EFTA,  US,  CEMA. 


Taken  fi-om  the  Background  Notes  of  August 
1983.  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Editor:  J.  Darnell 
Adams.  ■ 


52 


EUROPE 


America— you  see  it  in  my  speaking— as 
small  as  the  State  of  Maine  and  less 
populous  than  the  city  of  New  York, 
should  have  been  one  of  the  major  con- 
tributors to  American  life  and  culture. 
But  to  us,  it  is  additional  proof  of  our 
community  of  interests. 

You  exercise  your  high  office  at  a 
time  of  global  political  tension  and  crises, 
many  of  which  are  also  of  vital  importance 
to  my  country.  Austria,  as  a  permanently 
neutral  country,  makes  every  effort  to 
contribute  toward  the  maintenance  of 
world  peace  by  promoting  understanding 
in  the  geopolitical  area  in  which  history- 
has  placed  us.  And  by  trying  to  secure 
friendly  relations  with  all  our  neighbors, 
we  are  trying  to  remain  an  element  in 
Europe's  stability  and  security,  to  be  a 
haven  for  refugees  as  well  as  a  clear  voice 
in  support  of  human  rights. 

As  a  small  country,  we  have  a  vested 
and,  indeed,  a  vital  interest  in  upholding 
the  rule  of  law  in  world  politics  and  the 
principle  of  universality  in  international 
organizations.  In  all  these  respects,  the 
world  can  continue  to  count  on  us  in  the 
future. 

Our  two  countries  are  and  will  remam 
closely  linked  through  their  mutual 
adherence  to  the  fundamental  values  of 
democratic  Western  pluralism  to  which 
the  Austrian  people  have  dedicated  them- 
selves in  all  elections  since  1945.  In  my 
view,  this  is  the  best  basis  for  a  mutual  in- 
terest in  a  longlasting  friendship.  Our 
common  pledge  for  an  increased  support 
to  youth  exchange  programs  will  addi- 
tionally promote  mutual  understanding 
and  help  to  deepen  our  relations  also  in 
the  next  generation. 

As  an  expression  of  this  hope,  and  as 
a  token  of  our  heartfelt  friendship,  I 
would  like  to  extend  to  you  and  to  Mrs. 
Reagan  a  cordial  invitation  to  pay  a  visit 
to  Austria,  be  it  officially  or  unofficially, 
whatever  is  more  convenient  to  you. 
[Laughter] 

With  repeated  cordial  thanks  for  your 
hospitality  and  with  my  sincere  good 
wishes  for  the  prosperity  of  the  United 
States  and  the  American  people,  I  invite 
you  all  to  join  me  in  a  toast  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America  and 
Mrs.  Reagan. 


Visit  of  West  German 
Chancellor  Kohl 


iTexts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  5,  1984. 

^Held  in  the  East  Room  of  the  White 

House.  .     .         T,  r»u 

3Made  in  the  State  Dinmg  Room  ot  the 
White  House.  ■ 


Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  made  an 
official  working  visit  to  Washington, 
D.C.,  March  3-6,  198k,  to  meet  with 
President  Reagan  and  other  government 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Chancellor  Kohl 
after  their  meeting  on  March  5.' 

President  Reagan 

We've  been  honored  to  have  Chancellor 
Kohl  as  a  guest  today.  German-American 
partnership  remains  a  positive,  dynamic, 
and  vital  force  in  the  free  worid's  strug- 
gle for  peace,  security,  and  prosperity. 
The  personal  relationship  between  the 
Chancellor  and  myself  e.xemplifies  the 
close  ties  between  our  two  countries. 

Today,  I  was  most  pleased  to  discuss 
with  him  issues  of  bilateral  and  interna- 
tional significance.  Our  talks  focused  on 
the  need  for  Western  leadership  in  deal- 
ing with  the  changing  world  of  the  1980s. 
We  both  agreed  that  1983  was  a  cru- 
cial year  for  the  NATO  aUiance.  The 
leaders  of  the  Western  democracies  stood 
firm  in  the  face  of  an  intense  Soviet  cam- 
paign of  intimidation  aimed  at  blocking 
NATO  deployment  of  new  intermediate- 
range  missiles.  To  its  common  credit,  the 
alliance  demonstrated  its  determination 
to  restore  the  military  balance  in  Europe 
and  maintain  a  credible  nuclear  deter- 
rence and  emerge  stronger  from  the 
challenge.  Thanks  to  the  courage  and  vi- 
sion of  leaders  like  Chancellor  Kohl,  we 
can  point  to  the  past  year  with  pride  and 
look  to  the  future  with  confidence. 

Both  Chancellor  Kohl  and  myself 
would  prefer  to  achieve  a  nuclear  balance 
through  arms  reduction.  Today,  I  recon- 
firmed my  willingness,  eagerness  to  con- 
tinue efforts  to  reach  arms  reduction 
agreements  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Both 
Chancellor  Kohl  and  I  agreed  that,  with 
new  leadership  in  the  Kremlin,  an  oppor- 
tunity exists  for  real  progress  in  relations 
between  East  and  West.  However,  in  the 
face  of  Soviet  intransigence  at  the 
negotiating  table-a  table  which  we  re- 
main ready  to  return  to  any  time— the 


alliance  will  continue  to  strengthen  its 
conventional  and  nuclear  deterrent. 

In  the  declaration  of  Brussels  last 
December,  the  NATO  Foreign  Ministers 
affirmed  our  offer  to  establish  construc- 
tive contacts  and  dialogue  with  the 
Soviets.  I  reaffirmed  to  Chancellor  Kohl 
today  my  personal  commitment  to  explore 
every  possible  avenue  for  improvement  of 
relations  with  the  East.  And  I'm  ready  to 
meet  personally  with  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship if  such  a  meeting  is  well  prepared 
and  holds  promise  of  fruitful  results. 

Chancellor  Kohl  and  I  also  discussed 
the  strengthening  of  Western  economies 
and  the  peaceful  cooperation  between  our 
peoples.  We're  especially  optimistic  about 
the  increasing  team  effort  our  countries 
are  demonstrating  in  the  exploration  of 
space.  The  November  mission  of  the  shut- 
tle was  the  first  to  include  a  non-Ameri- 
can astronaut,  a  German.  And  I  was  de- 
lighted that  the  communications  hookup 
allowed  Chancellor  Kohl  and  myself  to 
talk  with  each  other  and  with  the  astro- 
nauts in  space.  It  was  an  exciting  achieve- 
ment and  a  reflection  of  the  good  will 
upon  which  future  progress  can  be  built. 
This  morning  I  presented  Chancellor 
Kohl  with  a  plaque  commemorating  that 
mission,  which  bears  photographs  and  the 
U.S.  and  German  flags  that  were  flown  on 
that  mission  in  space.  As  the  inscrip- 
tion says  on  the  plaque,  we  look  toward 
future  German- American  cooperation  to 
strengthen  peace,  build  prosperity,  and 
expand  freedom  in  developing  space-our 
next  frontier. 

I  am  particularly  pleased  with  our 
success  in  expanding  the  human  side  of 
the  German-American  relationship.  The 
tricentennial  of  German  immigration  to 
America  heightened  our  awareness  of  the 
deep  personal  and  family  ties  between 
our  two  peoples.  The  German-American 
Friendship  Garden,  established  during 
the  tricentennial,  symbolizes  this  relation- 
ship. And  the  newly  launched  Congress- 
Bundestag  youth  exchange  program  will 
assure  that  these  important  contacts  con- 
tinue unabated. 


June  1984 


•^S 


""'""""■"'"'"»■""'""■" 


EUROPE 


After  only  17  months  in  office,  you  are 
in  the  forefront  of  leadership  in  the  West- 
ern World.  There's  rarely  an  issue  of  in- 
ternational significance  on  which  your 
views  are  not  sought  and  where  your  in- 
fluence is  not  felt.  I  count  on  youi"  friend- 
ship as  Americans  count  on  the  friendship 
of  the  German  people,  as  we  rise  together 
to  meet  challenges  of  the  coming  decade. 

Thank  you  for  visiting  us  in  Washing- 
ton here  today,  and  I  look  forwa^to  our 
next  get-together. 

Chancellor  KohP 

I  would  like  to  extend  to  you— dear  Mr. 
President  and  dear  friend— very  warmly 
for  the  extremely  friendly  welcome  you 
extended  to  me  and  for  the  intensive  and 
detailed  conversations  we  had  on  that 
occasion. 

In  the  last  few  months,  I  felt  with  par- 
ticular strength  how  important  it  was  for 
us  not  only  to  agree  on  political  issues  but 
also  on  fundamental  personal  values.  For 
us,  the  Germans,  in  order  to  preserve 
peace  and  the  liberty  of  our  countries,  we 
have  to  rely  on  two  fundamental  princi- 
ples. First  of  all,  they  are  the  close  ties 
with  our  friends  in  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  the  second  issue— the  sec- 
ond principle  of  equal  importance— is  our 
close  relations  within  the  allies  with  our 
friend,  the  United  States  of  America. 

You  in  particular  made  special  contri- 
butions toward  this  end,  particularly  as 
regards  to  friendship  between  our  two 
governments — when  I  think  back  on  the 
tricentennial  celebrations — also  the  con- 
tribution to  the  friendship  between  our 
two  nations.  We  discussed  thoroughly 
and  in  detail  the  perspective  and  pro- 
spects for  future  developments  between 
East  and  West,  and  there  is  a  far- 
reaching  agreement  concerning  future 
developments. 

Our  two  governments  stand  firmly  by 
the  proven  and  by  the  balanced  concepts 
of  the  alliance.  We  would  also  in  the 
future  assure  the  defense  capability  of  the 
West  by  seeking  military  balance  and 
equilibrium  at  as  low  a  level  as  possible. 

You  referred  to  the  statement  in  a 
declaration  issued  by  the  aDiance  on  the 
9th  of  December  1983,  and  you  reaffirmed 
that  declaration  in  the  fundamental 
speech  you  made  on  the  16th  of  January 
1984.  And  we  in  Europe  have  considered 
that  speech  of  yours  as  a  great  message 
of  peace. 

Over  the  last  2  years,  I  have  met  in 
you  a  man  who  has  always  been  aware  of 
his  personal  responsibility  for  the  peace 


in  the  world  and  who  is  also  ready  to  bear 
and  to  shoulder  that  responsibility.  And 
for  that  very  reason,  I  again  recom- 
mended to  you,  and  in  this  very  spirit,  to 
seek,  not  as  a  propaganda  coup,  but  as  a 
political  step,  an  early  and  a  well-pre- 
pared meeting  with  the  new  Secretary 
General  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Mr. 
Chemenko.  And  this  meeting  should  not 
be  a  propaganda  exercise.  The  Federal 
Government  and  I,  as  Federal  Chancellor, 
do  not  consider  ourselves  to  be  mediators 
in  that  context.  But  nevertheless,  if  such 
a  meeting  is  well  prepared  and  if  this 
opportunity  is  wisely  used,  we  would 
consider  such  a  meeting  to  be  of  great  im- 
portance and  helpful  for  shaping  future 
East- West  relations. 

The  President  and  I  underlined  the 
importance  and  the  significance  attached 
to  the  current  arms  control  negotiations. 
And  we  were  in  agreement  that  the 
West  should  take  the  initiative  in  the 
negotiations  about  mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions  in  Vienna  and  in  the 
negotiations  about  a  worldwide  ban  on 
chemical  weapons  and  that  it  should 
make  new  proposals  along  these  lines. 
And  I  was  grateful  to  note  how  much 
support  you  are  giving  to  the  proposals 
made  by  Secretary  of  State  Shultz  con- 
cerning a  ban  on  chemical  weapons. 

We  have  also  discussed  questions  of 
our  national  economies,  questions  which 
aire  of  mutual  concern  and  interest.  We 


also  discussed,  in  connection  with  the  dis- 
cussion of  our  economies,  the  state  of  our 
national  economies,  the  fact  that  it  is  im- 
portant for  us  to  ensure  that  protection- 
ism will  not  prevail  and  will  not  spread  in 
our  countries  and  in  our  continents, 
because  protectionism  is  not  a  means  to 
foster  free  economy.  It's  only  free  trade 
and  free  commerce  which  will  ensure  the 
future,  which  will  ensure  prosperity,  and 
which  will  make  for  a  free  exchange  of 
goods  and  ideas. 

And  of  course,  among  friends  there 
are  also  subjects  on  which  one  is  not  fully 
in  agreement,  on  which  one  does  not  com- 
pletely see  eye  to  eye.  A  European  who  is 
here  in  the  White  House  has  got  to  speak 
about  the  high  level  of  interest  rates  and 
the  impact  that  has  on  the  European 
economies.  And  it  is  quite  clear  this  is  a 
European  problem. 

I  would  like  to  point  out  that  these 
conversations  once  again  showed  to  me 
the  very  strong  foundations  on  which 
Gemian-American  partnership  and  friend- 
ship rest.  This  was  a  conversation  among 
friends,  and  what  better  there  could  you 
say? 


'  Made  in  the  East  Room  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  12,  1984). 

2  Chancellor  Kohl  spoke  in  German  and  his 
remarks  were  translated  by  an  interpreter.  ■ 


Federal  Republic  of  Germany— A  Profile 


People 

Noun  and  adjective:  German(s).  Population 
(1980  est.)'  61.6  million,  expected  to  decline 
gradually  because  of  low  bii'th  rates.  Ethnic 
groups:  Primarily  Gernian;  Danish  minority. 
Religions:  Protestant  44%,  Roman  Catholic 
i5%.  Language:  German. 

Geography 

Area:  249,535  sq.  km.  (95,975  sq.  mi.)  including 
West  Berlin;  about  the  size  of  Wyoming. 
Cities:  Capital-Bonn  (pop.  300,000).  Other 
Cities— West.  Berlin  (about  2  million),  Ham- 
burg (about  2  million),  Munich  (1.3  million). 

Economy 

GNP  (1982):  $658.8  bUlion.  Annual  growth 
rate  (1982);   - 1.19%  (real).  Per  capita  income: 
$10,688.  Avg.  inHation  rate:  4.8%. 


Natural  resources:  Iron,  coal,  potash. 

Agriculture  (2%  of  GNP):  Grains,  potatoes, 
sugar  beets. 

Industry  (43%  of  GNP):  Iron,  steel,  coal, 
cement,  chemicals,  machineiy,  ships,  vehicles. 

Trade  (1982):  Export.s-W^5.5  billion: 
chemicals,  motor  vehicles,  iron  and  steel 
products.  Major  marketx—KC  and  European 
countries,  US,  Latin  America,  communist 
countries,  OPEC  countries.  Imports — $162 
billion:  raw  materials,  fuels,  machinery. 
Major  suppliers — EC  countries,  US.  Latin 
America,  communist  countries. 

Official  exchange  rate  (May  1983):  About 
2.47  Deutsche  marks  =  US$1. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  August 
1983,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af 
fairs.  Department  of  State,  Editor;  J.  Darnell 
Adams.  ■ 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Visit  of  Portuguese 
Prime  IVIinister  Soares 


EUROPE 


Prime  Minister  Mario  Soares  of  the 
Portuguese  Republic  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washingtoyi,  D.C.,  March 
13-16,  198i,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Mi)iister 
Soares  after  their  meeting  on  March  H.^ 

President  Reagan 

It  has  again  been  an  honor  and  a  pleasure 
to  welcome  Mario  Soares  to  the  White 
House.  He  came  here  a  year  ago  as  Vice 
President  of  the  Socialist  International 
and  now  returns  as  Prime  Minister  of 
Portugal. 

He's  truly  an  international  personal- 
ity, a  valiant  supporter  of  Western  values 
and  ideals,  and  a  man  of  great  personal 
courage.  As  Prime  Minister  of  Portugal, 
he  represents  a  close  and  valued  ally,  one 
of  the  founding  members  of  the  North 
Atlantic  alliance.  We  regularly  seek  his 
counsel,  and  again  today  we've  had 
valuable  and  extensive  discussions. 

Prime  Minister  Soares  and  I  ex- 
amined economic  matters  of  importance 
to  both  our  peoples.  I  assured  the  Prime 
Minister  that  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  do  all  that  is  feasible  to  assist 
Portugal  in  meeting  its  difficult  economic 
challenges. 

In  another  vital  area  of  cooperation, 
we  discussed  the  bilateral  mutual  security 
arrangements  renewed  last  December. 
Under  these  arrangements,  Portugal  is 
playing  a  significant  role  in  protecting  the 
freedom  of  the  Western  democracies  and 
maintaining  world  peace.  The  respon- 
sibilities he  demonstrates  reflects  well  on 
the  character  of  Portugal's  people  and 
leaders.  And  today  I  reaffirm  to  Prime 
Minister  Soares  that  the  United  States 
stands  ready  to  help  modernize  the  Por- 
tuguese Armed  Forces. 

We  applaud  Prime  Minister  Soares' 
and  Portugal's  commitment  to  a  strong 
and  effective  NATO  alliance,  and  we  wish 
them  well  as  they  move  to  join  the  Euro- 
pean Communities. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  exchanged 
views  on  the  present  situation  and 
outlook  in  the  Middle  East  and  Central 
America— regions  in  which  he  has  a  long 
and  deep  interest  and  concern.  And  cer- 
tainly we  benefited  from  his  insights.  We 
had  an  especially  useful  discussion  of  the 


outlook  for  peaceful  settlements  of1,he 
conflicts  in  southern  Africa.  Portugal's 
historic  interests  in  Africa  and  cultural, 
economic,  and  political  ties  of  today  add 
much  weight  to  Prime  Minister  Soares' 
judgments  in  this  area.  We  agreed  that 
regular  consultations  between  our  two 
governments  on  African  questions  are 
useful  for  us  both,  and  we  will  continue 
this  practice. 

I  want  to  thank  Mario  Soares  for  his 
visit  and  our  forthright  exchange  of  ideas. 
He  is  a  special  friend,  as  well  as  an  impor- 
tant leader,  and  I  wish  him  Godspeed  and 
look  forward  to  our  meeting  again. 


Bill  Fiu-Patriik) 


Prime  Minister  Soares* 

I  would  like,  at  the  outset,  to  express  my 
appreciation  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States  for  his  invitation  to  make 
this  official  visit  to  Washington  and  to  say 
how  pleased  I  am  to  have  been  afforded 
this  opportunity  to  renew  now,  as  head  of 
the  Portuguese  Government,  the  contacts 
and  friendly  relationships  which  I 
established  in  the  past  with  President 
Reagan  and  the  American  Administra- 
tion. 

During  this  period,  we  have  learned 
to  respect  your  leadership  qualities  and 
the  straightforward  way  in  which  you 
have  handled  delicate  situations,  while 
always  keeping  in  mind  the  fundamental 
values  of  democracy.  Contacts  between 
the  leaders  of  our  countries,  which  should 
be  considered  normal  between  two  NATO 
allies  which  have  maintained  close  rela- 
tions over  a  long  period,  now  assume 
special  importance  in  view  of  the  readi- 
ness of  both  parties  to  imbue  our  relation- 
ship with  a  new  dynamic  following  the  im- 
portant impetus  to  our  cooperation  in  the 
defense  area  provided  by  the  renewal  of 
the  Lajes  Base  agreement. 

The  sound  relations  existing  between 
the  United  States  and  Portugal  are  not 
the  result  of  occasional  identical  positions 
or  passing  convergence  of  interests.  They 
are,  rather,  the  result  of  a  sincere  and 
profound  sharing  of  values  and  ideals, 
such  as  freedom,  democracy,  and  respect 
for  human  rights,  principles  in  which  we 
believe  and  which  we  practice.  The  Luso- 
American  community  residing  in  this 
country,  which  here  bears  witness  to  the 
affection  in  which  the  Portuguese  hold 
the  American  people,  greatly  contributes 
to  the  friendship  which  unites  us. 

Among  the  issues  which  we  have  had 
the  opportunity  to  address,  I  wish  to  em- 
phasize those  related  to  southern  Africa, 
a  region  of  the  world  where  important 
steps  on  the  road  to  peace  are  now  being 
taken.  Portugal,  which  maintains 
centuries-old  ties  of  friendship  with  the 
people  in  this  region,  namely  with  those 
of  Mozambique  and  Angola,  has  devoted 
particular  attention  to  the  problems  of 
this  area,  following  the  process  of 
decolonization  carried  out  in  1974,  and  has 
spared  no  effort  to  contribute  to  the  crea- 
tion of  a  climate  of  dialogue  and  peaceful 
solutions  to  the  pi'oblems  of  the  region. 


June  1984 


55 


EUROPE 


We  also  considered  the  situation  in 
Central  and  South  America.  I  believe  the 
initiatives  of  the  Contadora  group,  as  well 
as  all  those  directed  toward  advancing 
the  democratic  process  and  establishing 
regimes  guaranteeing  true  freedom  in  the 
countries  of  the  region,  are  deserving  of 
our  support.  The  cultural  ties  existing  be- 
tween the  Iberian  countries  and  Latin 
America,  stemming  from  a  longstanding 
commonality  of  historj'  and  language,  lead 
Portugal  to  take  profound  interest  in  the 
evolution  of  the  situation  in  the  countries 
of  this  region  and  to  maintain  close  con- 
tacts with  those  forces  seeking  to  uphold 


the  principles  of  liberty  in  that  part  of  the 
world. 

It  was  very  gratifying  for  me  to  note 
that  the  United  States  and  Portugal  share 
verj'  similar  points  of  view  regarding 
East-West  relations  and  the  need  to 
strengthen  the  Atlantic  alliance  in  order 
to  resist  expansionist  threats  and  con- 
tribute to  peace. 


•Made  to  reporters  assembled  at  the  South 
Portico  of  the  White  House  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Mar.  19,  1984). 

*Prime  Minister  Soares  spoke  in  Por- 
tuguese and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an 
interpreter.B 


Visit  of  French  President  IVIitterrand 


President  Francois  Mitterrand  of  the 
French  Republic  made  a  state  visit  to  the 
United  States  March  21-28,  198i.  While 
in  Washington,  D.C.,  March  21-2i,  he 
met  with  President  Reagan  and  other 
government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  at  the 
welcoming  ceremony  by  Presidents 
Reagan  and  Mitterrand,  the  luncheon 
toast  by  Secretary  Shultz,  and  dinner 
toasts  by  the  two  Presidents. 


photo  by  Michael  Evans) 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY. 
MAR.  22.  1984' 

President  Reagan 

Nancy  and  I  are  pleased  and  honored  to 
greet  you  and  Madame  Mitterrand.  We 
welcome  you  as  a  head  of  state  who  has 
demonstrated  courage  and  decisiveness  in 
the  face  of  international  challenges  that 
test  the  character  of  Western  leadership. 
We  welcome  you,  also,  as  the  represent- 
ative of  the  French  people  for  whom  all 
Americans  share  a  special  affection. 


We  look  out  over  the  White  House 
grounds  and  we  see  evidence  that  the 
bond  between  us  is  deep  and  has  stood 
the  tests  of  time.  There  in  the  distance  is 
the  Jefferson  Memorial,  a  tribute  to 
America's  third  President,  a  founder  of 
our  republic,  an  intellectual  whose  ideas 
were  profoundly  influenced  by  his  ex- 
posure to  French  philosophy  and  culture. 
It  is  not  mere  coincidence  that  this  giant 
of  American  freedom  was  one  of  our  first 
representatives  to  France. 

Millions  of  people  throughout  the 
world  admire  and  respect  your  country's 
historic  legacy.  Today,  under  your  leader- 
ship, France  continues  to  be  a  major  con- 
tributor to  world  stability  and  peace.  In 
this  cause,  we  stand  together  as  two 
peoples  who  cherish  Uberty  and  two 
peoples  committed  to  humane  and  civi- 
lized values. 

Ours  is  not  an  easy  task.  As  you  have 
astutely  noted:  "Peace,  like  liberty,  is 
never  given,  and  the  pursuit  of  both  is  a 
continual  one." 

In  Lebanon,  we  Americans  are  proud 
that  we're  part  of  a  peacekeeping  force 
working  together  at  great  risk  to  restore 
peace  and  stability  to  that  troubled  land. 
We  will  always  remember  that  in  this 
gallant  and  humanitarian  effort  we  stood 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  your  brave 
countrymen. 

Our  nations— two  great  world 
powers— have  responsibilities  far  beyond 
our  own  borders.  Your  influence  is  a  force 
for  good  in  the  Middle  East.  You  have 
drawn  a  line  against  aggression  in  Chad, 
and  you've  extended  assistance  to  other 
African  nations  seeking  to  preserve  their 
security  and  better  the  lives  of  their 
peoples.  These  are  but  a  few  examples  of 
the  constructive  global  role  that  France  is 
playing. 

The  American  people  applaud  you  and 
the  people  of  France  for  your  diligence 
and  your  courage. 

You  come  here  fresh  from  a  European 
Community  summit  meeting  in  Brussels. 
At  this  meeting  and  elsewhere,  you  ex- 
erted your  leadership  as  an  advocate  of 
greater  European  unity.  I  am  most  eager 
to  discuss  with  you  our  bilateral  concerns 
and  also  those  economic,  social,  and 
political  issues  of  significance  to  Europe 
as  a  whole.  America  continues  to  support 
a  strong  and  united  Europe.  The  Euro- 
pean democracies  are,  through  the  North 
Atlantic  alliance,  anchoring  the  mutual 
defense  of  our  common  freedom.  Today, 
as  in  years  past,  our  own  liberty  reUes 
heavily  on  the  good  will  and  shared  sense 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


of  purpose  among  those  people  in  the 
world  who  enjoy  freedom.  Victor  Hugo's 
words  still  ring  true,  "It  is  through 
fraternity,"  he  said,  "that  liberty  is 
saved."  Clearly,  if  those  who  love  liberty 
stand  together  strong  in  resolve,  freedom 
will  not  only  survive,  it  will  prevail. 

Symbolic  of  our  friendship,  this  sum- 
mer America  will  greet  the  first  con- 
tingent of  French  experts  coming  to  New 
York  to  aid  in  the  restoration  of  the 
Statue  of  Liberty.  This  year  we  will  begin 
celebrating  the  centennial  of  that  lady  of 
light.  That  magnificent  gift,  a  beacon  of 
liberty  for  all  mankind,  is  a  lasting 
reminder  of  that  precious  heritage  that 
we,  the  French  and  American  people, 
share. 

I'm  pleased  that  your  visit  will  include 
travel  to  parts  of  America  that,  as  Presi- 
dent of  France,  you  have  not  yet  been 
able  to  visit.  You've  already  seen  a  good 
part  of  our  east  coast,  especially  the 
tidewater  section  of  Virginia  which  you 
visited  during  the  celebration  of  the 
French  and  American  alliance  at 
Yorktown  and  again  when  we  met  with 
summit  colleagues  at  Williamsburg. 

This  week  you  will  go  further  south  to 
the  dynamic  city  of  Atlanta;  later,  north 
to  Pittsburgh.  Then  you  will  journey  to 
America's  heartland,  the  Midwest,  the 
farm  country,  for  a  firsthand  look  at 
American  agriculture.  And  you  will  travel 
to  the  American  west  coast  and  visit  our 
home  State  of  California.  There,  innova- 
tions in  energy  and  electronics,  spurred 
by  ta.x  incentives  that  reward  personal 
initiative  and  risk  taking,  are  paving 
the  road  to  the  21st  century  and  a  new 
era  of  high  technology. 

It's  comforting  to  know  that  no  mat- 
ter what  changes  technology  brings  to 
our  way  of  living,  the  good  will  between 
our  peoples  will  remain  solid  and  lasting. 
America  is  delighted  that  you  have  set 
this  week  aside  to  be  with  us  as  a  friend. 

During  your  visit  to  Washington, 
Nancy  and  I  look  forward  to  deepening 
our  personal  relationship  with  you  and 
Madame  Mitterrand  and  with  your  col- 
leagues. We  offer  you  a  warm  welcome 
and  our  best  wishes  for  a  rewarding  and 
memorable  visit. 

President  Mitterrand* 

My  visit  today  is  taking  place  between 
two  anniversaries— that  of  the  Treaties  of 
Versailles  in  Paris  last  September  and  the 
anniversary  of  the  Allied  landings  in  Nor- 
mandy in  2  months'  time.  Now,  I  may  say 
that  this  is  perhaps  a  case  where  chance 


has  been  on  our  side,  but  I  think  that 
there  is  more  than  this.  There  is  some- 
thing symbolic.  And,  in  fact,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  chance  in  the  history  of 
peoples  of  the  world.  There  is,  however, 
something  that  is  called  destiny.  And  our 
destiny  is,  indeed,  a  common  destiny. 

And  so  I  think  it  is  natural  that  my 
first  thoughts  should  go  to  the  Americans 
and  the  French,  brothers  in  arms,  who 
from  Yorktown  all  the  way  through  the 
ages  to  Beirut  have,  in  fact,  shed  their 
blood  together.  And  history  shows  that 
these  sacrifices  have  never  been  made  in 
vain,  because  their  purpose  was  not  to 
conquer  nor  to  achieve  power,  but  to  de- 
fend freedom. 

Despite  all  this,  perhaps  our  two 
peoples  do  not  yet  know  each  other  well 
enough.  And  so  there  is  sometimes,  shall 
we  say,  room  for  certain  uncertainties. 
After  having  had  conversations  with 
yourself,  Mr.  President,  I  wOl  have  the 
opportunity  of  spending  5  days  traveling 
through  the  country  in  order  to  see  again 
places  that  I've  learned  to  know  in  the 
last  38  years  since  my  first  visit  to  this 
country,  but  also  to  get  a  better  under- 
standing of  the  dynamic  qualities  of  the 
country,  the  great  diversity  of  the  United 
States,  its  culture  and  its  modernness. 

But  my  ambition  is  also  to  show 
you— during  my  visit  and  during  our  con- 
versations on  world  affairs  and  the  affairs 
that  concern  our  two  countries— I  want 
you  to  see  the  true  picture  of  France: 
France,  which  is,  all  right,  a  country  of 
tradition,  but  is  also  a  country  of 
economic  and  technological  power  that  is 
looking  toward  the  future;  a  France  that 
is  preparing  itself  with  determination  for 
the  world  of  the  future  that  the  next  few 
years  are  going  to  bring  us;  France, 
which  is  a  constant  ally  that  can  be 
counted  upon  and  which  intends  to  bring 
its  own  original  contribution  to  the  quest 
for  peace  and  the  pursuit  or  the  resump- 
tion of  development,  because  relations 
between  our  two  countries  obviously  can- 
not only  be  a  matter  of  celebrating  our 
glorious  past. 

Our  main  concern  in  1984  must  surely 
be  the  question  of  security  in  Europe  and 
relations  between  the  East  and  the  West 
and  also  between  the  North  and  South, 
which  we'll  be  talking  about. 

And  here  the  firm  and  clear  orienta- 
tions that  I  have  given  to  French  diplo- 
macy are  known  to  yourself  and  to  your 
Administration  and  to  our  friends 
throughout  the  world  and  based  on  the 
basic  idea  of  unfailing  loyalty  to  our 


EUROPE 


friends  and  the  concept  of  the  balance  of 
forces  worldwide  and  in  Europe.  Firm- 
ness and  determination  are  indispensable 
qualities,  but  they  must  go  together  with 
keeping  the  dialogue  open,  particularly 
with  the  Eastern  bloc. 

France  is  strong,  independent,  and 
sure  of  itself  and,  therefore,  is  willing  and 
prepared  and  determined  to  dialogue  with 
everyone  on  all  subjects.  And  France, 
sure  of  its  own  citizens,  is,  as  I  say,  open 
within  its  means  to  a  discussion  on  all 
matters  while  being  always  loyal  to  its 
friends.  But  there  are  other  important 
tasks  that  we  have  to  tackle  jointly  and 
which  are  essential  for  the  balance  and 
the  equilibrium  of  the  world. 

It  is  true,  we  recognize  that  the  up- 
turn, the  economic  circumstances  in  the 
United  States  and  the  presence  of 
American  diplomacy  worldwide— all  this 
creates  favorable  conditions  for  a 
recovery  of  world  affairs  in  every  sense  of 
the  term.  And  it  is  true  that  the  serious 
dangers  that  were  threatening  the  inter- 
national financial  system  last  year  have 
been  able  to  be  met.  But  our  efforts  must 
never  be  relinquished  in  such  areas. 

And  yet,  despite  all  this  that  we  have 
achieved,  I  think  the  main  task  is  still 
ahead  of  us.  We  must  consolidate  what 
has  been  achieved,  which  is  still  fragile. 
We  must  push  back  the  frontiers  of 
poverty,  which  remain  in  so  many  regions 
of  the  world  the  true,  the  genuine  roots  of 
war.  And  we  must  guard  ourselves 
against  too  much  indifference— any  indif- 
ference toward  the  Third  World,  in  par- 
ticular. We  must  remember  that  the 
Third  World  is  in  the  same  universe, 
although  in  difficult  conditions,  as 
ourselves.  And  what  will  happen,  the 
future  of  the  Third  World  is  something 
that,  of  course,  depends  on  them  but  also 
on  us. 

So  you  appreciate  that  we  have  so 
many  tasks  to  perform  together.  I  don't 
think,  though,  it  is  likely  that  our  friend- 
ship will  have  much  opportunity  of  re- 
maining idle  for  very  long.  We  have 
numerous  tasks  to  perform. 

I  am  really  happy  to  be  here,  in  front 
of  the  White  House,  in  this  city  of 
Washington,  in  this  garden,  in  these 
places  which  mean  so  very  much  to  all  of 
us.  For  you  and  I  this  will  be  another  of 
our  meetings,  and  we  have  always  been 
able  to  communicate  among  each  other 
concerning  our  plans  and  projects.  And  it 
is  my  earnest  wish  that  this  visit  should 
establish  yet  closer  ties  of  friendship  and 
fraternity  between  us,  because  I  think 
that  that  would  be  the  best  way  of  ensur- 
ing even  speedier  progress  toward  that 


June  1984 


WWWIHHIWHHiiHIIIlitilfililll^^ 


57 


WWf»F»?»W»'i 


EUROPE 


region  of  the  heart,  perhaps,  where  lib- 
erty exists.  We're  moving  in  that  direc- 
tion, but  we  still  have  some  road  to 
follow. 

How  can  I  end  these  remarks,  these 
first  remarks  that  I'm  making  here  on 
American  soil?  I  wish  to  say  to  all  those 
who  are  here,  all  those  who  are  present 
all  over  the  United  States,  I  wish  to  ex- 
tend, and  in  English,  my  warmest 
greetings  to  the  great  American  people. 


LUNCHEON  TOAST, 
MAR.  22, 19843 

Secretary  Shultz 

You  are  most  welcome  here  at  the 
Department  of  State.  We  are  honored  by 
your  presence.  We  are  all  surrounded  to- 
day by  symbols  of  the  very  special  links 
that  join  the  United  States  and  France. 
This  room  is  named  for  Benjamin 
Franklin,  our  first  special  emissary,  who 
secured  French  agreement  to  the  first 
bilateral  treaty  of  alliance.  Indeed,  it  was 
205  years  ago  tomorrow  that  Benjamin 
Franklin  presented  his  credentials  to 
Louis  XVI.  The  red  wine  we  have  just 
had  was  a  taste  of  California,  but  the 
winemaker  was  bom  in  France  to  a  fam- 
ily of  distinguished  French  winemakers. 
With  few,  if  any,  exceptions,  our  guests 
today  have  some  special  link  to  France. 

As  a  proud  member  of  the  French 
Legion  of  Honor,  I,  too,  have  my  own  per- 
sonal connection.  This  connection  goes 
back  many  years.  It  has  recently  been 
enriched  through  my  acquaintance  with 
you,  Mr.  President.  We  first  met  in  the 
spring  of  1982,  when  I,  as  a  private 
citizen,  had  been  asked  by  President 
Reagan  to  assist  in  his  preparations  for 
the  Versailles  summit.  Since  then  I  have 
been  privileged  with  five  further  meet- 
ings. In  all  of  these  meetings,  I  have  ap- 
preciated your  keen  insight  and  your 
thoughtful  approach  to  problems.  I  have 
learned  much  from  you,  not  only  about 
the  role  of  France  but  about  the  whole 
complex  of  economic  and  political  issues 
that  Western  leaders  must  confront. 

I  recall  in  particular  a  searching  and 
wide-ranging  discussion  of  the  problems 
of  Africa,  and  I  must  say.  President 
Mitterrand  is  a  genuine  scholar  and  stu- 
dent of  African  problems.  And  that 
discussion  encouraged  me  to  recommend 
to  President  Reagan  the  initiative  our 
own  government  has  recently  taken  to  ex- 
pand its  economic  assistance  to  that  conti- 
nent. 


Our  relationship  with  France  is,  of 
course,  not  always  easy.  We  are  two 
proud  countries  with  strong  views  and  a 
lot  of  self-confidence.  France  is  not  afraid 
to  fight  for  its  interests  or  to  express  its 
opinion,  even  if,  impossible  as  it  may 
seem,  it's  not  identical  to  ours.  We  have 
learned  to  live  with  this  because,  when 
the  chips  are  down,  an  ally  with  self- 
respect  and  an  independent  spirit  is  the 
best  kind  of  ally  to  have. 

Under  your  leadership,  France  has 
maintained  a  concept  of  its  world  role 
commensurate  with  your  country's  great 
history,  its  vast  possibilities,  and  the 
demands  of  our  troubled  times.  As  a 
result,  there  is  no  country  with  which  the 
United  States  shares  a  wider  range  of  in- 
terests than  with  France.  Whatever  frus- 
tration our  occasional  differences  may  in- 
spire, we  are  compelled  to  respect  a  na- 
tion which  accepts  its  international 
responsibility,  which  carries  through  on 
its  commitments,  and  which  is  prepared 
to  display  the  courage  of  its  convictions. 
Your  staunch  support  for  Western 
strength  and  unity  was  a  key  to  the 
alliance's  successful  passage  through  its 
period  of  testing  last  year,  which  led  to 
the  beginning  of  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  deployment.  President 
Reagan  deeply  appreciates  your  support. 
Together  the  allies  have  begun  to  redress 
the  balance  of  forces  in  Europe.  We  are 
prepared  for  the  meaningful  dialogue 
with  the  Soviets  that  our  newly  refreshed 
strength  and  unity  can  make  more  pro- 
ductive and  durable. 

We  also  believe  there  is  a  vital  link 
between  the  expansion  of  trade  and 
economic  growth.  President  Reagan  has  a 
deep  commitment  to  the  concept  of  an 
open  trading  system,  believing  it  essential 
to  the  economic  development  of  both  in- 
dustrialized countries  and  the  Third 
World. 

You  have  also  provided  leadership  to 
the  European  Economic  Community,  a 
task  made  even  more  important  by  cur- 
rent difficulties.  The  United  States  sup- 
ports a  strong,  economically  viable 
Europe.  It  is  in  our  fundamental  interest 
that  we  do  so,  for  we  believe  that  a 
healthy  economy  contributes  directly  to  a 
strong  defense.  There  are  genuine 
economic  problems  between  the  United 
States  and  Europe  in  several  important 
areas,  such  as  agriculture.  We  are  com- 
petitors, but  we  can,  and  must,  approach 
these  problems  with  a  common  deter- 
mination to  resist  protectionism. 


WhUe  Europe  is  sometimes  accused  of 
being  inward-looking  and  insufficiently 
concerned  about  events  far  from  its 
shores,  these  accusations  cannot  be 
leveled  against  France.  For  France  has 
sustained  a  global  vision  and  continues  to 
play  a  global  role.  We  respect  the  in- 
dependent nature  of  this  role,  while  we 
recognize  the  broad  coincidence  of  our  in- 
terests around  the  world  and  the  con- 
tinued possibilities  for  Franco-American 
cooperation.  We  share  common  interests 
in  promoting  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  in 
the  gulf,  in  Africa,  and  in  Asia.  We  shared 
in  and  can  be  proud  of  our  effort  to  pro- 
mote the  reconciliation  of  a  divided 
Lebanon. 

Looking  toward  the  future,  we  both 
want  to  see  more  resources  devoted  to 
global  economic  development  and  less 
wasted  in  mOitar>'  strife.  We  both  want  to 
explore  space  and  to  put  research  and 
technology  to  use  for  economic  growth. 
But  the  ultimate  bedrock  strength  of 
Franco- American  friendship  lies  in  our 
mutual  commitment  to  democracy  and 
liberty.  These  are  our  fundamental  values 
inscribed  in  our  Constitutions  and  deeply 
ingrained  in  our  national  life.  They  are 
what  motivate  our  efforts  to  safeguard 
human  rights  in  a  world  too  much 
tormented  by  persecution,  gulags,  tor- 
ture, and  state-supported  terrorism. 

Given  your  personal  dedication  to 
human  rights  and  liberty,  it  is  fitting  that 
you  are  here  as  we  begin  to  celebrate  the 
centennial  of  the  Statue  of  Liberty.  The 
statue  was  a  gift  from  the  people  of 
France.  French  assistance  is  helping 
restore  it.  What  better  than  the  Statue  of 
Liberty  to  symbolize  the  shared  values 
that  underlie  the  strength  and  endurance 
of  Franco-American  friendship? 

I  am  very  pleased  that  you  will  have 
an  opportunity  to  tour  the  United  States. 
It  was  a  Frenchman,  Alexis  de 
Tocqueville,  who  wrote  the  most 
penetrating  observations  about  what 
binds  this  country  together.  A  more  re- 
cent French  visitor  made  these  com- 
ments: "I  liked  this  country  where 
everyone  goes  out  of  his  way  to  meet 
those  who  are  passing  through  and 
throws  the  doors  wide  open.  I  liked  this 
boundless  country.  It  is  a  voyage  of 
discovery." 

Those  were  the  impressions  of  Mr. 
Francois  Mitterrand  in  1975.  In  1984,  as 
President  of  the  Republic  of  France,  I 
wish  you  a  happy  rediscovery. 

Let  us  now  raise  a  glass  to  the 
historic  and  enduring  friendship  of 
France  and  the  United  States,  to  the 
people  of  our  two  great  countries,  and  to 
the  President  of  the  Republic  of  France. 


Depart  IT' 


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EUROPE 


DINNER  TOASTS, 
MAR.  22.  1984 

President  Reagan 

Our  evening  together  has  rekindled  some 
pleasant  memories  of  warm  June  nights 
in  the  beautiful  gardens  of  Versailles,  of 
observing  the  colorful  and  moving  com- 
memoration of  the  union  of  French  and 
American  forces  at  Yoi'ktown,  of  the 
many  distinguished  world  leaders  at 
Williamsburg  just  last  year.  Soon,  I  look 
forward  to  bringing  home  yet  another 
memory  in  which  President  Mitterrand 
will  be  a  major  part. 

We  will  meet  later  this  year  to  com- 
memorate the  anniversary  of  the  landing 
of  Allied  Forces  on  the  Normandy 
beaches  40  years  ago.  That  event  tied  the 
hearts  of  our  people  and  for  all  time  sent 
a  message  to  tyrants  that  free  men  are  all 
citizens  of  the  same  land. 

Your  visit  to  America  this  week  is  yet 
another  milestone  in  the  common  heritage 
and  close  association  of  our  two  freedom- 
loving  nations.  France  was  America's 
first  ally.  The  trust  and  confidence  which 
have  characterized  our  long  relationship 
is  undoubtedly  an  object  of  great  envy 
throughout  the  world.  France  and 
America  share  many  traditions.  We  have 
innumerable  ties,  cherished  by  our 
people,  nurtured  by  our  governments. 

Foremost  among  our  ties  is  a  pro- 
found commitment  to  democracy  and 
liberty,  a  heritage  inscribed  in  the  Con- 
stitution of  both  our  countries.  These 
values  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  Atlantic 
alliance.  And  this  commitment  between 
the  great  democracies  of  Europe  and 
North  America  has  preserved  peace  for  a 
longer  period  than  any  [other]  in  modem 
European  history. 

Tonight  I  would  like  to  reemphasize 
that  the  United  States  remains 
thoroughly  committed  to  the  Western 
alliance  and  to  the  defense  of  Europe.  We 
seek  peace  and  security,  and  to  that  end, 
America  also  strives  to  achieve  greater 
East-West  dialogue.  We  will  continue  to 
work  for  a  more  stable  relationship  with 
the  Soviet  Union— one  that  will  lead  to 
better  understanding  and  a  relaxing  of 
existing  tensions. 

This  evening,  while  savoring  the 
memories  of  Lafayette  and  Rochambeau, 
of  Jefferson  and  Franklin,  we  must  also 
salute  those  contemporary  figures  who 
personify  the  richness  of  the  bonds  be- 
tween us.  I'm  struck  by  how  many  of  our 
guests  here  tonight  share  close  ties  to 
France  and  to  French  culture.  Both  our 


June  1984 


Visit  of  Irish  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Garret  FitzGerald  of  the  Republic  of  Ireland  made  an  official  working  visit 
to  Washington,  D.C.,  March  14  16,  1984,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other  govern- 
ment officials.  On  March  16,  the  President  hosted  a  luncheon  in  honor  of  Prime  Minister 
FitzGerald  where  he  expressed  "our  admiration  for  the  efforts  that  you  are  making  to  bring 
peace  and  stability  to  Ireland.  We  support  your  personal  mission  in  America  to  end  the 
tragically  misguided  support  of  some  here  for  terrorist  elements  in  Northern  Ireland.  .  .  . 
You've  reminded  those  in  this  country  who  provide  assistance  to  Northern  Ireland's 
terrorists  that  they  are  assisting  in  violence  and  murder.  Let  me  assure  you  that  the  vast 
majority  of  Irish  Americans  join  you  today  in  condemning  support  for  those  who  preach 
hatred  and  practice  violence  in  Ireland." 


nations  can  be  proud  of  our  citizens  whose 
work  and  creativity  have  contributed  so 
much  to  the  quality  of  our  lives  and  who 
are  recognized  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlan- 
tic. 

We  share  strong  links  of  culture  and 
commerce.  We  engage  in  extensive  scien- 
tific cooperation.  And  every  day,  we  reap 
the  harvest  of  social,  cultural,  and  educa- 
tional interchanges. 

I'm  particularly  pleased  that  France 
and  the  United  States  are  engaging  in 
two  new  endeavors— an  artists  exchange 


program  and  a  cooperation  in  en- 
vironmental affairs.  These  agreements 
will  greatly  contribute  to  the  cultural  and 
scientific  enrichment  of  our  societies. 

Today  we  had  a  frank  discussion  of 
bilateral  issues  and  also  of  those  concerns 
of  the  European  Community  as  a  whole. 
And  such  dialogue  between  us  can  only 
serve  the  interests  of  both  our  countries. 
In  the  years  ahead,  Americans  and 
Frenchmen  will  be  as  they  always  have 
been— proud  and  independent  but  united 


mm^""^ 


59 


MIDDLE  EAST 


together  in  the  cause  of  freedom,  secu- 
rity, and  economic  progress.  All  Ameri- 
cans are  grateful  for  your  friendship  and 
appreciate  the  courageous  stands  France 
has  taken  throughout  the  world  in  the 
cause  of  liberty. 

When  you  return  to  your  country, 
please  take  that  message  of  our  gratitude 
and  admiration  with  you.  In  the  mean- 
time, we  wish  you  a  pleasant  and  worth- 
while visit  to  the  United  States. 

So  let  us  raise  now  a  glass  to  the  com- 
mon purpose  and  the  special  friendship  of 
France  and  the  United  States  and  of 
President  Francois  Mitten-and  and  his 
lovely  wife,  Danielle,  our  guests  and  our 
friends. 


President  Mitterrand* 

The  President  of  the  United  States  has 
just  used  two  words.  He  said  that  our 
meetings  were  pleasant  and  fruitful,  and  I 
think  that  no  better  words  could  be 
chosen. 

Pleasant,  our  meetings  have  been, 
since  this  morning  when  we  first  got 
together  from  the  very  first  moment. 
Thanks  to  yourself,  Mr.  President,  and 
your  wife,  and  all  those  who  have  con- 
tributed to  make  our  visit  so  pleasant,  we 
have  enjoyed  the  warmest  possible 
hospitality.  And  I'm  speaking  on  behalf  of 
myself  and  Mrs.  Mitterrand  and  those  ac- 
companying me.  At  the  same  time,  we 
have  been  able  to  engage  in  serious  con- 
versation but  in  a  climate  of  friendship. 
And  you  have  been,  I  think,  particularly, 
if  I  may  say  so,  nice  to  France,  and  this  is 
particularly  due  to  you,  Mr.  President, 
and  to  you,  Madame.  You're  responsible 
for  this— for  the  warmth  of  our  recep- 
tion—and I  want  to  thank  you. 

I  hope  also  that  our  meetings  will 
prove  to  be  fruitful.  We  have,  in  fact, 
already  started  discussing  a  number  of 
aspects  of  the  life  of  this  world  we  hve  in, 
and  sometimes  those  aspects  are  some- 
what tragic  and,  at  any  rate,  dramatic. 
We  have  talked  about  war.  We  have  tried 
to  find  ways  of  overcoming  and  prevent- 
ing war  and  how  it  can  be  possible, 
perhaps,  to  develop  the  machinery  to  en- 
sure that  thing  that  is  so  difficult  to 
achieve  and  is  so  mysterious, 
perhaps— peace. 

We  have,  perhaps,  not  yet  found  the 
secret  of  the  key  to  peace,  but  we  are 
craftsmen  working  on  the  job,  and  we  are 
looking  and  we  are  seeking  for  the  secret 
and  for  the  key.  And  I  think  our  work  will 
prove  to  be  fruitful  because,  in  any  case, 
it  is  always  fruitful  and  useful  to  compare 
the  assessments  of  the  world  situation  of 


Visit  of  Moroccan  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Mohamed  Karim-Lamrani  of  the  Kingdom  of  Morocco  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  February  28-March  2.  1984.  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials.  In  a  ceremony  at  the  White  House  on  March  1,  the 
President  and  Prime  Minister  witnessed  the  signing  of  a  I  .S.-Morocco  agreement  on  mod- 
ernizing the  Voice  of  America  relay  station  in  Tangier. 


b.vra 


two  countries  which  are  united  by  friend- 
ship, and  such  friendship  that  has  existed 
for  so  long,  for  so  many  years,  that  it 
becomes  just  a  natural  way  of  life,  and  I 
think  that  that  is  the  right  way  to  talk 
together  and,  indeed,  to  do  good  work 
together. 

We  have  reached  the  end  of  the  day 
and  not  the  least  pleasant  moment  of  this 
very  pleasant  day.  We  have  reached  a 
moment  of  rest  and  a  pleasant  moment  of 
relaxation;  at  the  same  time,  a  rich  and 
useful  conversation  which,  at  the  same 
time,  carries  with  it  the  great  pleasure, 
the  warmth  of  just  being  together  and, 
for  a  moment,  forgetting  perhaps  the  re- 
quirements of  our  official  ties  and  ex- 
istence. 


And  yet,  the  paradox  is  that  this  is 
still  a  state  visit,  as  the  diplomats  call  it, 
because  President  Reagan  has  invited  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic.  But  all 
the  same,  tonight  for  a  few  hours  we  have 
perhaps  been  able  to  shed  the  mantle— 
the  somewhat  heavy  mantle— of  protocol 
and  official  ties  and  relations  which  we 
will,  of  course,  resume  veiy  seriously 
tomoiTow.  But  for  the  moment,  we  have  a 
few  hours  just  to  live  our  lives,  and  to  live 
our  lives  in  a  pleasant  environment  and, 
also,  in  a  few  moments,  in  an  artistic  en- 
vii-onment. 

I  will  not  recall  here  all  the  moments 
of  our  common  history  that,  of  course, 
come  to  mind— the  people,  the  events  that 
have  led  our  two  nations  throughout  the 
years  and  centuries  of  history  to  the 


m 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


'Pr 

ami  his 

PWer. 

'Hf 

release 

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MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


situation  tiiat  we  are  in  today  in  this 
world  of  turmoil,  where  the  United  States 
and  France  have  managed  to  stay  linked 
together,  closely  tied  and  united,  and  for 
the  important  things  have  always  been 
able  to  work  together  for  peace  and  for 
the  defense  of  a  few  simple  principles  that 
do  not  need  complex  explanations,  but 
which  are  merely  the  very  essence  of  our 
civilization. 

And  so  I  wish  to  thank  you,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, and  you,  Madame,  for  the  excep- 
tional warmth  and  quahty  of  the  way  you 
have  received  us  here  today  and  par- 
ticularly tonight,  and  I  want  to  thank  you 
I  on  behalf  of  my  country,  on  behalf  of 
i  France.  Life— everyday  life  is  not  always 
particularly  easy.  Washington  and 
Paris— well,  there  is  some  distance  be- 
tween them,  naturally.  And  we  do  not 
always— our  eyes  are  not  always  turned 
in  exactly  the  same  direction.  And  that,  in 
a  way,  is  perfectly  natural,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  we  aren't  sitting  in  the  same 
place.  But  when  it  is  necessary,  you  are 
present  and  we  are  present.  And  we 
know  that.  You  know  it,  and  we  know  it. 
And  that,  I  think,  is  the  best  assurance 
that  when  we  are  gone,  our  successors 
will  be  able  to  say  that  that  friendship 
which  was  struck  up  at  the  end  of  the 
18th  century  stood  well  the  test  of  time 
until  the  end  of  the  20th  century,  and 
then,  as  far  as  the  future  is  concerned, 
that  will  be  their  problem. 

But  I  think  that  I  would  like  to  close 
by  raising  my  glass.  And  I  would  like  to 
drink  to  your  health,  Mr.  President.  You 
are  responsible  for  a  great  country  whose 
tremendous  diversity  reflects  so  much 
charm  and  strength.  And  to  you, 
Madame,  to  your  own  health,  to  the 
health  of  your  family.  And  to  you,  ladies 
and  gentlemen,  I  want  to  drink  to  your 
health  and  to  your  life,  your  work,  and 
your  hopes.  In  other  words,  your  life,  to 
coin  a  phrase.  And  I  hope  that  your  life 
will  be  a  long  and  prosperous  one.  In 
other  words,  what  I'm  saying  is  that  I'm 
raising  my  glass  to  the  American  people 
so  admirably  represented  here  tonight. 


•Made  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House  where  President  Mitterrand  was  ac- 
corded a  formal  welcome  with  full  military 
honors  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  26,  1984). 

^President  Mitterrand  spoke  in  French, 
and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an  inter- 
preter. 

^Held  at  the  Department  of  State  (press 
release  87). 

••Held  in  the  State  Dining  Room  at  the 
White  House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  26).B 


June  1984 


Report  of  the  Commission 
on  Strategic  Forces 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
APR.  9,  1984' 

On  January  3,  1983, 1  established  a  bi- 
partisan commission  to  examine  issues 
raised  by  the  Congress  concerning  the 
strategic  modernization  program,  espe- 
cially the  Peacekeeper  (MX)  missile.  On 
April  19,  1983,  I  was  very  pleased  to 
report  to  the  Congress  and  the  American 
people  that  the  commission  unanimously 
agreed  on  strategic  force  modernization 
recommendations,  which  I  strongly  en- 
dorsed. Secretary  Shultz,  Secretary 
Weinberger,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the 
Director  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disar- 
mament Agency,  and  the  National  Secu- 
rity Council  also  endorsed  the  recommen- 
dations of  the  commission.  At  that  time,  I 
affirmed  my  commitment  to  pursue  am- 
bitious arms  reduction  negotiations  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  package. 

Despite  the  range  of  views  which  ex- 
isted in  the  past,  the  Congress  joined  us 
in  supporting  this  bipartisan  effort  to 
modernize  our  strategic  deterrent.  This 
consensus  was  a  major  accomplishment  in 
our  common  effort  to  enhance  national 
security.  The  willingness  of  all  parties  to 
reexamine  their  previous  positions  al- 
lowed us  to  end  a  decade  of  political 
paralysis  over  arms  control  and  modern- 
ization. 

Last  week  the  commission  issued  its 
final  report.  The  report  focuses  on  the 
arms  control  portion  of  its  earlier  recom- 
mendations. Once  again,  the  commission 
members  and  their  counselors  have  per- 
formed a  tough  job  extraordinarily  well. 
Again,  we  all  owe  this  distinguished 
group  of  Americans  special  thanks. 

This  final  report  reiterates  the 
original  recommendations;  that  is,  an  in- 
tegrated strategic  program  consisting  of 
an  arms  control  structure  with  incentives 
to  enhance  stability  at  reduced  levels  of 
strategic  arsenals;  deployment  of  100  MX 
missiles;  and  development  of  a  small, 
single  warhead  ICBM  [intercontinental 
ballistic  missUe];  as  well  as  other 
elements.  The  commission  again  empha- 
sizes that  each  element  is  essential  to  the 
overall  program  it  outlined. 

After  noting  the  disappointing  history 
of  U.S. -Soviet  arms  control  negotiations. 


the  commission  emphasizes  the  impor- 
tance of  keeping  expectations  within 
bounds.  In  particular,  arms  control  can 
make  a  substantial  contribution  to  U.S. 
security  by  increasing  strategic  stability, 
allowing  some  types  of  defense  expendi- 
tures to  be  avoided,  and  offering  a  useful 
forum  for  dialogue  on  strategic  concepts 
and  priorities.  The  commission  stresses, 
however,  that  arms  control  alone  cannot 
end  the  threat  of  nuclear  war,  reduce  the 
casualties  and  damage  in  the  event  of 
such  a  war,  or  automatically  permit  deep 
or  early  defense  budget  cuts. 

On  related  issues,  the  commission  con- 
firms the  need  for  effective  verification 
and  satisfactory  compliance  to  sustain  the 
arms  control  process.  The  commission 
recognizes  the  significance  of  the  1972 
Antiballistic  Missile  Treaty  and  notes  that 
research  permitted  under  the  treaty  is 
important  to  ascertain  realistic, 
technological  possibilities  as  well  as  to 
guard  against  Soviet  ABM  breakout.  The 
commission  also  recommends  extreme 
caution  in  proceeding  to  engineering 
development  of  an  active  strategic 
defense  system. 

Our  proposed  strategic  defense  initia- 
tive is  limited  to  technology  research.  The 
initiative  also  includes  continued  study  of 
strategic  policy  and  arms  control  implica- 
tions of  strategic  defense  concepts.  'The 
program  is  consistent  with  all  treaty 
obligations  and  there  is  no  conflict  be- 
tween our  initiative  and  the  recommenda- 
tions made  by  the  commission. 

Finally,  the  commission  notes  the  im- 
portance of  measures  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
nuclear  war  and  makes  clear  the  serious 
flaws  of  a  nuclear  freeze. 

I  am  pleased  to  announce  that  I,  along 
with  Secretary  Shultz,  Secretary 
Weinberger,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the 
Director  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disar- 
mament Agency,  and  the  National  Secu- 
rity Council,  strongly  endorse  the  com- 
mission's final  report. 

I  urge  continuing  support  by  the  Con- 
gress and  the  American  people  for  this 
bipartisan  consensus  which  unites  us  in 
our  common  objective  of  strengthening 
our  national  security  and  moving  toward 
significant  reductions  in  nuclear  arms. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  16,  1984.  ■ 


61 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


Chemical  Weapons  Use  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  Afghanistan 


Following  is  the  U.S.  submission  of 
February  21,  198Jf.  to  the  UN  Secretary 
General  on  the  me  of  chemical  and  toxin 
■weapons  in  Southeast  Asia  and 
Afghanistan. 

The  Permanent  Representative  of  the 
United  States  of  America  presents  her 
compliments  to  the  Secretary  General  of 
the  United  Nations  and  has  the  honor  to 
provide  further  information  pertaining  to 
the  use  of  chemical  and  toxin  weapons  in 
the  continuing  conflicts  in  Afghanistan, 
Kampuchea,  and  Laos.  The  United 
States  is  sharing  its  new  preliminary 
findings  for  1983  in  accordance  with  its 
policy  of  keeping  the  international  com- 
munity and  the  public  routinely  informed 
in  a  timely  manner  about  chemical  and 
toxin  weapons  use  in  these  areas.  In 
view  of  the  concerns  of  members  of  the 
United  Nations,  as  expressed  in  General 
Assembly  Resolutions  35/144  C  of 
12  December  1980,  36/96  C  of  9  Decem- 
ber 1981,  37/98  D  and  E  of  13  December 
1982,  and  38/187  C  of  20  December  1983, 
I  request  that  this  submission  be  cir- 
culated at  an  early  date  as  an  official 
document  of  the  General  Assembly 
under  the  agenda  item  entitled 
"Chemical  and  Bacteriological  (Biological) 
Weapons." 

The  United  States  of  America  has 
long  been  concerned  about  the  use  of 
chemical  and  toxin  weapons  in  Afghan- 
istan and  Southeast  Asia  in  violation  of 
the  Geneva  Protocol  of  1925,  related 
rules  of  customary  international  law,  and 
the  1972  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons 
Convention.  The  United  States  has  thus 
carefully  monitored  the  situation  in  these 
regions  to  obtain  information  about 
chemical  and  toxin  weapon  attacks  and 
has  shared  the  information  and  evidence 
with  the  United  Nations  and  its  member 
states.  The  United  States  has  also  co- 
operated fully  with  the  Secretary 
General  and  his  Group  of  Experts  in  the 
UN  investigation  of  this  problem  and  in 
other  international  efforts  to  bring  a  halt 
to  the  use  of  these  terrifying  weapons. 

The  United  States  of  America,  over 
the  past  3  years,  has  submitted  a  series 
of  reports  presenting  the  evidence  of 
toxic  weapons  use  and  relevant  technical 
information  in  detail.  In  this  context,  two 
major  reports  were  submitted,  entitled 


"Chemical  Warfare  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  Afghanistan,"  dated  22  March  1982 
(A/37/157),  and  "Chemical  Warfare  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  Afghanistan:  An 
Update,"  dated  29  Novembei-  1982 
(A/C.1/37/10).  Most  recently,  on  Au- 
gust 4,  1983,  the  United  States  submit- 
ted a  report  (A/38/326)  on  evidence  ob- 
tained from  victims  of  toxic  warfare  at- 
tacks which  had  occurred  earlier  in  Laos 
and  Kampuchea. 

Since  the  submission  of  the  last 
report,  the  United  States  has  continued 
to  analyze  and  review  the  information 
and  evidence  available  to  it  on  the  use  of 
chemical  and  toxin  weapons  in 
Afghanistan  and  Southeast  Asia.  As  with 
the  previous  submissions,  the  United 
States  has  considered  reports  of  toxic  at- 
tacks as  valid  only  if  they  were  con- 
firmed from  two  or  more  types  of 
sources.  These  kinds  of  sources  include 
national  technical  means,  intelligence 
means,  medical  and  sample  data,  and 
direct  evidence  from  a  person,  other  than 
a  victim  or  refugee,  known  to  have  ac- 
cess to  a  particular  attack  site.  There- 
fore, while  we  never  discount  per  se  any 
report  or  secondhand  information,  our 
evidence  must  satisfy  those  tests  of  con- 
sistency and  multiple  sources  to  be  con- 
sidered valid  before  it  is  included  in  our 
final  body  of  data. 

Toxic  weapons  attacks,  deaths,  and 
incapacitation  continue  to  be  reported. 
At  this  point  in  our  analysis,  however, 
the  1983  information  shows  some  dif- 
ferences from  that  of  previous  years. 
Specifically,  there  appears  to  have  been 
a  diminution  of  attacks  in  Afghanistan, 
and  a  decrease  in  the  lethality  of  attacks 
in  Laos  and  Kampuchea.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  there  is  evidence  of  con- 
tinuing use  in  Laos  and  Kampuchea  of  an 
as  yet  unidentified,  nonlethal  agent  or 
agents. 

Since  December  1980,  the  interna- 
tional community,  the  United  Nations, 
and  private  individuals  and  organizations 
have  been  calling  attention  to  chemical 
and  toxin  weapons  use  and  bringing 
substantial  international  pressure  to  bear 
on  the  users  to  cease  such  activities. 
Although  current  evidence  indicates  a 
decrease  in  the  use  of  toxic  weapons,  the 
international  community  must  persevere 


in  its  efforts  to  bring  about  a  full  and 
permanent  cessation.  Permanently  end- 
ing the  use  of  these  weapons  in 
Afghanistan  and  Southeast  Asia,  how- 
ever, is  only  one  of  our  goals.  In  addi- 
tion, the  Government  of  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  press  for 
strengthening  relevant  international  con- 
ventions and  for  achieving  a  complete 
and  verifiable  ban  on  all  chemical 
weapons  through  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Geneva. 

Secretary  of  State  Shultz  expressed 
the  concerns  of  the  United  States  in  his 
letter  of  submission  for  our  November 
1982  report: 

The  use  of  chemical  and  toxin  weapons 
must  be  stopped.  Respect  for  existing  agree- 
ments must  be  restored  and  the  agreements 
themselves  strengthened.  Failure  to  achieve 
these  goals  can  only  have  serious  implications 
for  the  security  of  the  world  community,  par- 
ticularly for  the  security  of  smaller  nations, 
like  those  whose  people  are  being  attacked. 

Accordingly,  the  United  States  will 
continue  to  monitor  the  situation  and 
share  with  the  United  Nations  what  fur- 
ther relevant  information  it  may  acquire 
on  prohibited  use  of  toxic  weapons.  In 
this  connection,  the  LTnited  States  will 
not  neglect  to  monitor  other  areas  in  the 
world  where  prohibited  use  of  chemical 
weapons  has  been  alleged.  The  United 
States  notes  with  deep  concern  reports 
that  chemical  weapons  have  been  used  in 
the  unfortunate  ongoing  conflict  between 
Iraq  and  Iran— both  parties  to  the  1925 
Geneva  Protocol.  Such  use  of  chemical 
weapons  would  constitute  yet  another 
serious  breach  of  the  protocol,  and 
related  rales  of  customary  international 
law,  requiring  the  urgent  attention  of  the 
world  communitv. 


ANNEX 

Afghanistan.  The  United  States  has 
received  several  reports  of  Soviet 
chemical  attacks  occurring  in  1983,  but, 
contrary  to  previous  years,  we  have  not 
yet  been  able  to  confirm  these  reports  as 
valid,  in  accordance  with  our  above-men- 
tioned standards.  For  1982,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  United  States  had  strong 
evidence  of  several  dozen  chemical  at- 
tacks in  Afghanistan,  resulting  in  over 
300  agent-related  deaths. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Laos.  The  number  of  reported  toxic 
attacks  in  1983  on  which  the  United 
States  has  data  is  roughly  the  same  as  in 
previous  years.  While  our  analysis  of 
these  reports  has  not  been  completed, 
our  preliminaiy  judgment  is  that  use  of 
toxic  agents  has  actually  declined  in 
1983.  Additionally,  the  number  of  agent- 
related  deaths  and  cases  of  illness 
resulting  from  these  1983  attacks  ap- 
peal's to  be  appi'oximately  one-third  that 
for  1982.  Some  deaths  associated  with 
toxic  attacks  occurring  in  1983  resulted 
from  secondary  effects,  such  as  from 
eating  contaminated  animal  products 
after  an  attack.  In  some  cases,  deaths  oc- 
curred only  among  the  infu-m,  perhaps 
caused  by  exposure  to  normally  nonlethal 
agents  or  lethal  agents  in  low  concentra- 
tions. Additionally,  descriptions  of  the 
1983  incidents  and  medical  effects  by  vic- 
tims, doctors,  and  eyewitnesses  differ 
from  those  of  previous  years.  Fewer 
describe  the  rapid  onset  of  nausea  and 
vomiting,  small  blisters;  severe  irritation 
of  the  skin,  severe  bleeding  syndromes, 
including  pi-otracted  diarrhea;  or 
vomiting  of  blood  which  were  common  in 
reports  from  earlier  years.  These  symp- 
toms, in  the  past,  were  associated  with 
e.xposure  to  trichothecene  toxins,  as  con- 
firmed by  sample  analysis  and  examina- 
tion of  victims  by  doctors.  Methods  of 
delivery  of  the  agents,  however,  were  as 
reported  in  previous  submissions,  with 
aerial  spray  occurring  most  often. 

Kampuchea.  The  number  of  reports 
of  toxic  attacks  in  1983  is  close  to  50% 
greater  than  the  number  in  1982.  Based 
on  analysis  of  these  reports  to  date,  how- 
ever, it  appears  that  the  level  of  use  of 
toxic  weapons  has  not  increased  but  re- 
mained essentially  the  same  as  in  1982. 
We  believe  that  the  increase  in  reports  is 
due  in  part  to  better  monitoring  of  the 
Kampuchea-Thailand  border  area  where 
most  of  these  attacks  occurred.  The 
number  of  agent-related  deaths  resulting 
from  attacks  in  1983  also  appears  to  have 
decreased  significantly  from  1982  levels. 
On  the  other  hand,  victims  did  experi- 
ence more  short-term,  incapacitating  ef- 
fects from  which  they  recovered  in  houi's 
or  days.  This  may  be  indicative  of  the 
use  of  nonlethal  incapacitating  or  riot 
control  agents.  As  with  Laos,  1983 
reports  for  Kampuchea  contain  far  fewer 
descriptions  of  trichothecene  toxin-type 
effects  than  reports  fi-om  1982  and 
earlier  years.  Methods  of  delivery  of  the 
agents  were  as  previously  reported. 


PACIFIC 


General  Note:  With  regard  to  environ- 
mental and  physical  samples  from 
.Afghanistan,  Laos,  and  Kampuchea,  the 
United  States  has  received  and  analyzed 
in  1983  one  biological  sample  which  was 
confirmed  positive  for  trichothecene  tox- 
ins. This  was  a  sample  from  a  March 
1983  attack  in  Kampuchea,  reported  in 
the  August  4,  1983,  U.S.  submission. 
Confirmatoiy  analysis  foi-  trichothecene 
toxins  is  pending  on  several  other  biolog- 
ical samples  from  early  1983  reported 
toxic  attacks.  The  United  States  also  has 
a  number  of  1983  samples  undei-  analysis 


which  contain  manmade  toxic  chemicals 
and  assorted  substances  other  than 
trichothecene  toxins  and  known  conven- 
tional chemical  agents.  The  precise  com- 
position of  these  substances  has  not  yet 
been  fully  characterized.  In  keeping  with 
our  past  practice,  the  United  States  will 
I'epoi't  its  results  and  conclusions  when 
these  analyses  are  completed.  Similarly, 
the  United  States  will  report  any 
changes  in  our  overall  judgments  and 
findings  for  1983  as  analysis  of  the  data 
further  progresses.  ■ 


Visit  of  New  Zealand  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Robert  C.  Muldoon 
of  New  Zealand  made  an  official  work- 
ing visit  to  Washington,  P.C.,  February 
22-25,  198Jt,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  govemm,ent  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by  the 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister  after 
their  meeting  on  February  2It.^ 

President  Reagan 

I  am  delighted  that  Prime  Minister  Sir 
Robert  Muldoon  has  once  again  come  to 
Washington.  I  value  the  wise  counsel  of 
such  a  good  friend,  and  it  was  a  real 
pleasure  to  confer  with  Sir  Robert  on 
issues  of  importance  to  both  our  coun- 
tries. 

The  Prime  Minister's  thoughts  on  the 
international  economic  situation  have 
been  most  helpful.  His  breadth  of  ex- 
perience in  international  finance  as 
Finance  Minister  and  as  Prime  Minister 
is  matched  by  very  few  people.  And  I 
sincerely  appreciate  his  insights  on  these 
important  international  issues. 

I  also  want  to  thank  Sir  Robert  and 
all  New  Zealanders  for  the  key  role  they 
play  in  the  South  Pacific,  a  region  which 
should  serve  as  a  model  for  the  rest  of 
the  world.  The  South  Pacific  is  tranquil, 
respects  human  rights,  and  has  peaceful- 
ly developed  democratic  institutions  and 
self-government.  These  accomplishments 
would  not  have  been  possible  without 
New  Zealand's  development  assistance 
programs. 

New  Zealand's  contributions  to 
stability  and  security  extend  far  beyond 
the  South  Pacific.  We  see  them  as  far 
away  as  the  Sinai  Desert  and  in 
Singapore.  And  we  have  special  apprecia- 
tion for  your  commitment  to  ANZUS 


[Australia,  New  Zealand,  United  States 
security  treaty],  an  alliance  which  has 
assured  our  mutual  security  in  the 
Pacific  for  more  than  30  years. 

I  might  mention  that  our  ANZUS 
partners— New  Zealand  and 
Australia— are  our  only  allies  who  have 
been  at  our  side  in  all  four  major  con- 
flicts of  this  century.  The  strong  bonds 
between  our  two  nations  reflect  our  com- 
mon values,  shared  history,  and  mutual 
interests. 


June  1984 


ilWMIHHiMlilWIilWWflllHIIIBtiiHill^^ 


mmmnimmmrmfmmnmmmm'im"y 


SOUTH  ASIA 


We  are  more  than  good  friends.  And 
I  am  especially  grateful  to  Sir  Robert  for 
his  untiring  efforts  to  further  strengthen 
our  close  ties.  We  will  stay  in  close  touch 
in  the  future.  And,  Sir  Robert,  I  thank 
you  for  coming  to  Washington,  and  on 
behalf  of  our  countrj'men,  wish  you  God- 
speed during  your  visit  to  America  and  a 
safe  journey  home. 

Prime  Minister  Muldoon 

I  last  stood  here  at  the  White  House 
with  you  30  months  ago.  The  friendship 
between  our  countries,  as  you've  said, 
goes  back  a  long  way  and,  through  dif- 
ficult times  for  the  West,  was  attested  to 
then  by  the  warmth  of  your  welcome  and 
your  hospitality  as  it  has  been  again 
today. 

July  1981  was  the  midpoint  of  the 
first  year  of  your  Administration.  The 
economic  and  political  tasks  that  you  had 
set  yourself  were  of  global  significance. 
Among  these  was  a  detennination  to 
place  gi'eater  emphasis  on  consultation 
with  America's  allies  by  being  good 
listeners  wherever  possible.  New 
Zealand  is  one  ally  which  welcomed  that 
undertaking  as  a  renewal  of  the  concept 
which  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  ANZUS 
treaty. 

You've  been  as  good  as  your  word. 
The  period  of  your  first  term  has  been 
marked  by  a  frequency  and  closeness  of 
contact  which  has  made  New  Zealand, 
geographically  your  most  distant  security 
partner,  feel  that  its  voice  is  Hstened  to 
in  your  administration,  whether  on  issues 
of  bilateral  concern  or  wider  issues  af- 
fecting regional  and  global  security. 
We've  not  had  to  shout  to  be  heard. 

Much  of  that  is  due  to  the  regularity 
of  contact  at  the  Cabinet  level  between 
our  governments,  highlighted,  of  course, 
by  the  visit  of  Vice  President  Bush  to 
New  Zealand  in  May  1982.  We  look  for- 
ward in  July  to  seeing  our  good  and 
valued  friend,  George  Shultz,  back  in  the 
South  Pacific  region  once  again. 

PoUtical  visits  are  not  the  sole  meas- 
ure of  the  relationship  and  its  durability. 
Rather,  it's  a  matter  of  the  way  our 
citizens  relate  to  each  other  as  people. 
You've  often  spoken  about  the  desires  of 
ordinary'  Americans  to  live  free,  in  peace 
and  well-being.  New  Zealanders  share 
that  view  of  the  world.  It  is  why,  when 
we've  had  to,  we've  acted  together  with 
you  to  preserve  such  values  for 
ourselves  and  other  peoples.  That  hasn't 
changed. 


New  Zealanders  are  not  isolationists, 
in  spite  of  our  relative  geographic  isola- 
tion. Nor  are  New  Zealanders  among 
those  fairweather  friends  who  are  only 
too  ready  to  attack  American  motives 
and  policies.  In  an  uncertain  world,  you 
need  have  no  doubt  about  where  the 
New  Zealand  Government  and  people 
stand. 

Your  citizens— private,  official,  and 
military— remain  more  than  welcome  in 
our  country. 

Our  discussions  today  have  touched 
upon  New  Zealand's  own  trade  concerns, 
your  government's  aspirations  at  home 
and  abroad,  and  the  concern  of  many  na- 
tions for  a  new  stability  in  international 


economic  affairs.  Our  exchanges  have 
been  characterized  by  the  easy  give  and 
take  of  ideas  which  is  the  hallmark  of 
close  friends  and  allies. 

I  thank  you  warmly  for  your 
hospitality  and  that  of  Mrs.  Reagan  for 
my  wife.  The  coming  year  brings  new 
challenges  of  government  and  political 
life  for  both  of  us  and  our  families.  I 
wish  you  and  the  First  Lady  well  in  all 
that  lies  ahead. 


•Made  to  reporters  assembled  on  the 
South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  27,  1984).  ■ 


Soviet  Occupation  of  Afghanistan 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAY  1,  1984' 

We  strongly  condemn  the  current  Soviet 
escalation  of  warfare  in  the  Panjshir 
Valley  of  Afghanistan.  These  new  Soviet 
military  actions  are  unprecedented  in 
several  respects,  including  the  large  force 
levels  being  employed  in  the  Panjshir 
Valley  against  the  Afghan  resistance  and 
the  use,  for  the  first  time  in  Afghanistan, 
of  high  altitude  bombing,  which  will  bring 
untold  new  suffering  to  the  civilian 
population. 

This  new  Soviet  offensive,  the  most 
massive  in  the  4-year  history  of  the  Soviet 
occupation  of  Afghanistan,  further  high- 
lights the  brutal  anticivilian  tactics  being 
used  by  the  Soviet  Union  in  its  efforts  to 
subjugate  an  independent  country.  It 
worsens  the  instability  of  the  region  and 
raises  serious  questions  concerning  the 
sincerity  of  Soviet  statements  that  na- 
tions should  undertake  not  to  use  force 
against  each  other. 


These  new  Soviet  actions  seriously 
undermine  the  search  for  a  negotiated 
political  settlement,  based  on  the  four 
elements  of  the  repeated  UN  General 
Assembly  resolutions  of  Afghanistan: 

•  Withdrawal  of  Soviet  forces; 

•  Restoration  of  the  independent  and 
nonaligned  status  of  Afghanistan; 

•  Self-determination  for  the  Afghan 
people;  and 

•  Permitting  the  Afghan  refugees 
who  have  been  forced  to  flee  their  ovyn 
country  to  return  with  safety  and  honor. 

The  United  States  remains  committed 
to  achieving  these  internationally  agreed 
objectives.  It  is  past  time  that  the  Soviet 
Union  respect  the  wishes  of  the  world 
community  and  bring  to  an  end  the  terri- 
ble ordeal  which  they  have  imposed  on 
the  Afghan  people. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mav  7,  1984.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TERRORISM 


International  Terrorism 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
APR.  17, 1984» 

Acts  of  terrorism  continue  to  plague  us 
and  our  friends  and  allies.  The  toll  of 
bombings,  assassinations,  and  kidnap- 
pings bears  terrible  witness  to  the  indis- 
criminate attacks  and  lawlessness  that 
rules  the  behavior  of  terrorist  groups.  It 
is  also  apparent  that  several  states  have 
adopted  these  lawless  acts  as  instruments 
of  state  policy.  While  we  diligently  seek 
the  means  to  control  this  scourge,  we 
must  also  take  the  steps  that  are 
necessary  to  protect  our  citizens,  our  in- 
stitutions, and  our  friends  and  allies. 

We  have,  in  the  course  of  a  detailed 
review,  reached  some  conclusions  on  what 
we  must  do  to  protect  ourselves  and  to 
assist  others  in  protecting  themselves 
from  this  growing  threat.  Our  actions  will 
be  guided  by  the  following  principles. 

First,  no  nation  can  condone  interna- 
tional terrorism. 

Second,  it  is  the  right  of  every 
legitimate  government  to  resist  the  use  of 
terrorism  against  its  people,  institutions, 
or  property  by  all  legal  means  available. 

Third,  terrorism  is  a  problem  for  all 
nations,  and  this  government  will  work  as 
closely  as  possible  with  other  govern- 
ments—particularly other  similarly 
threatened  democracies— to  deal  with  it. 

While  we  have  cause  for  deep  concern 
about  the  states  that  now  practice  or  sup- 
port terrorism,  our  policies  are  directed 
against  all  forms  of  international  ter- 
rorism. The  states  that  practice  terrorism 
or  actively  support  it  cannot  be  allowed  to 
do  so  without  consequence.  As  a  first  step 
in  dealing  with  these  states,  every  chan- 
nel of  communication  that  is  available  to 
us  will  be  used  to  dissuade  them  from  the 
practice  or  support  of  terrorism.  We  will 
increase  our  efforts  with  other  govern- 
ments to  obtain  and  exchange  the  infor- 
mation needed  about  states  and  groups 
involved  in  terrorist  activities  in  order  to 
prevent  attacks;  warn  our  people,  our 
friends,  and  allies;  and  reduce  the  risk. 
We  will  also  do  everything  we  can  to  see 
that  acts  of  state-supported  terrorism  are 


publicized  and  condemned  in  every  ap- 
propriate forum.  When  these  efforts  fail, 
however,  it  must  be  understood  that 
when  we  are  victimized  by  acts  of  ter- 
rorism we  have  the  right  to  defend  our- 
selves—and the  right  to  help  others  do 
the  same. 

Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  our 
paramount  interest  is  in  improving  our 
ability  to  prevent  terrorist  attacks  on  our 
citizens,  installations,  and  those  foreign 
persons  and  facilities  in  the  United  States 


we  are  obligated  to  protect.  We  believe 
we  can  best  achieve  these  results  through 
a  combination  of  improved  information 
and  better  security  and  protection.  This 
does  not  present  any  change  in  U.S. 
policy— rather,  a  refocused  emphasis. 


'Made  by  the  principal  deputy  press 
secretary  to  the  President  Larry  Speakes  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiciential 
Documents  of  Apr.  23,  1984).  ■ 


President  Proposes  Legislation 
to  Counter  Terrorism 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
APR.  26,  1984' 

I  am  sending  to  the  Congress  today  four 
separate  bills  to  attack  the  pressing  and 
urgent  problem  of  international  terrorism. 

In  1983  more  than  250  American  citizens 
were  killed  in  terrorist  attacks,  the  largest 
number  in  any  year  of  record.  In  the  wake  of 
the  tragic  deaths  of  our  diplomats  and 
Marines,  as  well  as  French  and  Israeli  soldiers 
in  Lebanon,  in  light  of  the  cynical  murder  of 
four  South  Korean  cabinet  officers  and  many 
others  by  North  Korean  terrorists  in  Burma, 
and  as  a  result  of  the  attack  on  our  embassy  in 
Kuwait,  it  is  essential  that  we  act  immediately 
to  cope  with  this  menace  and  to  increase 
cooperation  with  other  governments  in  dealing 
with  this  growing  threat  to  our  way  of  life. 

In  the  past  fifteen  years,  terrorism  has 
become  a  frightening  challenge  to  the  tran- 
([uillity  and  political  stability  of  our  friends 
and  allies.  During  the  past  decade  alone, 
there  have  been  almost  6.500  terrorist  in- 
cidents. Over  3,500  people  have  been  killed  in 
these  incidents,  and  more  than  7,600  people 
have  been  wounded.  American  citizens  have 
been  the  victims  of  more  than  2,500  terrorist 
incidents.  Of  special  concern  to  me  has  been 
the  toll  inflicted  on  our  diplomats  and 
members  of  the  Armed  Forces.  I  am  also 
deeply  concerned,  however,  about  attacks 
against  other  American  citizens,  who  have 
been  the  victims  of  forty  percent  of  the  ter- 
rorist incidents  over  the  past  decade. 

In  recent  years,  a  very  worrisome  and 
alarming  new  kind  of  terrorism  has  developed; 
the  direct  use  of  instruments  of  terror  by 
foreign  states.  This  "state  terrorism,"  starkly 
manifest  in  the  recent  dreadful  spectacles  of 
violence  in  Beirut,  Rangoon,  and  Kuwait,  ac- 
counts for  the  great  majority  of  terrorist 
murders  and  assassinations.  Also  disturbing  is 
state-provided  training,  financing,  and 
logistical  support  to  terrorists  and  terrorist 
groups.  These  activities  are  an  extremely 
serious  and  growing  source  of  danger  to  us, 


our  friends  and  our  allies,  and  are  a  severe 
challenge  to  America's  foreign  policy. 

The  protection  of  our  citizens,  our  official 
personnel,  and  our  facilities  abroad  requires 
the  close  cooperation  and  support  of  other 
governments.  We  depend  on  other  govern- 
ments to  provide  security  protection  to  more 
than  250  United  States  diplomatic  and  con- 
sular posts  abroad.  We  look  to  other  govern- 
ments to  maintain  the  normal  protections  of 
law  in  their  countries  for  our  citizens  living 
and  traveling  abroad  and  for  our  business  rep- 
resentatives and  business  properties. 

In  1983,  this  Administration  sent  to  the 
Congress  legislation  to  enable  us  to  provide 
adequate  protection  for  foreign  officials  in  the 
United  States.  Not  only  is  their  protection 
essential  to  meet  the  obligations  of  the  United 
States  under  international  treaties,  it  is  equal- 
ly important  to  demonstrate  to  officials  of 
other  governments  that  they  can  count  on  full 
protection  while  they  are  in  the  United  States. 

I  also  asked  the  Congress  to  provide 
legislative  authority  for  anti-terrorism  train- 
ing, and  in  some  cases  equipment,  to  foreign 
governments  in  order  to  enhance  cooperation 
with  governments  on  whom  we  must  depend 
for  protection  abroad.  In  my  view,  the  more  ef 
fective  and  knowledgeable  local  law  enforce- 
ment officials  and  officers  are,  the  greater  will 
be  their  ability  to  provide  the  kind  of  security 
both  they  and  we  need.  I  commend  the  Con- 
gress for  providing  a  two-year  authorization 
for  this  program  and  an  appropriation  of  $2.5 
million  for  1984. 

I  am  determined  that  my  Administration 
will  do  whatever  is  necessary  to  reduce  the  in- 
cidence of  terrorism  against  us  anj'where  in 
the  world  and  to  see  that  the  perpetrators  of 
terrorist  acts  are  brought  to  justice.  I  believe 
it  is  essential,  however,  that  the  Executive 
branch,  the  Congress,  and  the  public  clearly 
understand  that  combatting  terrorism  effec- 
tively requires  concerted  action  on  many  dif- 
ferent fronts.  With  trained  personnel,  effective 


June  1984 


TERRORISM 


laws,  close  international  cooperation,  and 
diligence,  we  can  reduce  the  risks  of  terrorism 
to  our  people  and  increase  the  deterrent  to 
future  acts  of  terrorism. 

Dealing  with  the  immediate  effect  of  ter- 
rorist violence  is  only  part  of  the  challenge, 
however.  We  must  also  assure  that  the  states 
now  practicing  or  supporting  terrorism  do  not 
prosper  in  the  designs  they  pursue.  We  must 
assure  that  international  forums,  such  as  the 
United  Nations,  take  a  balanced  and  practical 
view  of  who  is  practicing  terrorism  and  what 
must  be  done  about  it.  We  must  assure  that 
governments  that  are  currently  passive— or  in- 
active—respecting this  scourge  understand  the 
threat  that  terrorism  poses  for  all  mankind 
and  that  they  cooperate  in  stopping  it.  We 
must  work  to  assure  that  there  is  no  role  in 
civilized  society  for  indiscriminate  threatening, 
intimidation,  detention,  or  murder  of  innocent 
people.  We  must  make  it  clear  to  any  country 
that  is  tempted  to  use  violence  to  undermine 
democratic  governments,  destabilize  our 
friends,  thwart  efforts  to  promote  democratic 
governments,  or  disrupt  our  lives  that  it  has 
nothing  to  gain,  and  much  to  lose. 

The  legislation  I  am  sending  to  the  Con- 
gress is  an  important  step  in  our  war  against 
terrorism.  It  will  send  a  strong  and  vigorous 
message  to  friend  and  foe  alike  that  the  United 
States  will  not  tolerate  terrorist  activity 
against  its  citizens  or  within  its  borders.  Our 
legislative  package  consists  of  four  separate 
bills,  each  of  which  is  outlined  below. 


Act  for  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of 
the  Crime  of  Hostage-Taking 

In  September  1981,  I  signed  the  instrument 
ratifying  the  International  Convention  Against 
the  Taking  of  Hostages,  which  was  adopted  by 
the  United  Nations  on  December  17,  1979.  The 
convention  has  not  been  implemented  domes- 
tically through  enabling  legislation,  however. 
This  legislation  would  implement  the  1979  con- 
vention. It  would  amend  the  Federal  kidnap- 
ping statute  to  provide  for  Federal  jurisdiction 
over  any  kidnapping  in  which  a  threat  is  made 
to  kill,  injure,  or  continue  to  detain  a  victim  in 
order  to  compel  a  third  party  to  do  or  to  ab- 
stain from  doing  something.  This  is  a  common 
ploy  of  terrorists.  At  the  time  I  signed  the  in- 
strument of  ratification,  the  Congress  was  in- 
formed that  the  instrument  of  ratification 
would  not  be  deposited  with  the  United  Na- 
tions until  enabling  legislation  had  been 
enacted.  To  demonstrate  to  other  governments 
and  international  forums  that  the  United 
States  is  serious  about  its  efforts  to  deal  with 
international  terrorism,  it  is  essential  that  the 
Congress  provide  the  necessary  enabling 
legislation,  so  that  we  may  fully  implement  the 
Hostage-Taking  Convention. 


Aircraft  Sabotage  Act 

The  United  States  became  a  party  to  the 
Tokyo  Convention,  which  covers  certain  of- 
fenses or  acts  committed  aboard  aircraft,  in 
1969  and  the  Hague  Convention,  concerning 
the  suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of  aircraft, 
in  1971.  The  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of 
Unlawful  Acts  Against  the  Safety  of  Civil 
Aviation  was  adopted  at  Montreal  in  1971  and 
ratified  by  the  United  States  in  November 
1972.  The  Montreal  Convention  requires  all 
states  party  to  it  to  establish  jurisdiction  over 
certain  offenses  affecting  the  safety  of  civil 
aviation. 

The  Congress  has  approved  enabling  legis- 
lation for  the  first  two  of  these  conventions  but 
not  for  the  Montreal  Convention.  This  means 
that  certain  criminal  acts  related  to  aircraft 
sabotage  or  hijacking  are  not  adequately 
covered  by  United  States  law.  This  gap  in  the 
law  sends  a  false  signal  to  terrorists,  and  it 
also  indicates  to  other  governments  that  we 
may  not  be  as  serious  as  we  should  be,  and  as 
in  fact  we  are,  in  our  efforts  to  combat  interna- 
tional terrorism.  Action  by  the  Congress  now 
would  provide  the  basis  for  long-overdue  im- 
plementation of  this  convention. 

Act  for  Rewards  for  Information 
Concerning  Terrorist  Acts 

Current  law  authorizes  the  payment  of 
rewards  for  information  concerning  domestic 
crimes  but  is  outdated.  Maximum  rewards  are 
inadequate,  and  terrorism  is  not  specifically  in- 
cluded as  a  basis  for  paying  a  reward.  More- 
over, there  is  no  authority  for  the  payment  of 
rewards  for  information  on  acts  of  terrorism 
abroad. 

The  proposed  legislation,  which  is  modelled 
on  an  e.xisting  statute  that  allows  payment  of 
rewards  for  information  concerning  the 
unauthorized  manufacture  of  atomic  weapons, 
recognizes  that  payment  of  a  reward  in  connec- 
tion with  acts  of  domestic  terrorism  raises  a 
matter  of  law  enforcement  that  is  properly 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Attorney 
General,  but  that  the  payment  of  a  reward  in 
connection  with  an  act  of  terrorism  abroad 
poses  a  political  and  foreign  relations  problem 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Secretary  of 
State.  By  increasing  the  amounts  of  fines  that 
may  be  paid,  and  by  authorizing  rewards  for 
information  concerning  terrorist  acts  commit- 
ted abroad,  this  Act  would  markedly  improve 
the  ability  of  the  Departments  of  Justice  and 


State  to  obtain  information  leading  to  the  free- 
ing of  hostages  or  the  capture  of  the  perpe- 
trators of  acts  of  terrorism.  In  passing  this 
legislation,  the  Congress  can  further  under- 
score the  intent  of  the  United  States  to  take 
every'  appropriate  and  necessarv'  step  to  pro- 
tect its  citizens  and  property  from  terrorist 
acts. 


Prohibition  Against  the  Training  or 
Support  of  Terrorist  Organizations  Act 
of  1984 

The  training  and  support  of  terrorist  groups 
and  activities  by  a  number  of  countries  has 
reached  alarming  proportions.  In  addition,  the 
number  of  states  now  using  terrorism  as  an  in- 
strument of  foreign  policy  is  both  increasing 
and  highly  disturbing.  The  provision  of  assist- 
ance to  countries  that  support  terrorism  and 
use  terrorism  as  a  foreign  policy  tool  has  thus 
become  a  matter  of  grave  concern  to  national 
security.  This  Act,  together  with  revised  and 
strengthened  regulations  that  the  Department 
of  State  intends  to  issue  shortly,  would 
enhance  the  ability  of  the  Department  of 
Justice  to  prosecute  persons  involved  in  the 
support  of  terrorist  activities  and  of  states 
using  terrorism.  Enactment  of  this  legislation 
would  be  a  strong  contribution  to  the  effort  to 
combat  terrorism. 

We  must  recognize  that  terrorism  is  symp- 
tomatic of  larger  problems.  We  must  dedicate 
ourselves  to  fostering  modernization,  develop- 
ment, and  beneficial  change  in  the  depressed 
areas  of  the  world.  We  must  renew  our  com- 
mitment to  promoting  and  assisting  represen- 
tative and  participatory  governments.  We 
must  attack  the  problem  of  terrorism  as  a 
crime  against  the  international  community 
whenever  and  wherever  possible,  but  we  must 
strive  to  eradicate  the  sources  of  frustration 
and  despair  that  are  the  spawning  places  and 
nutrients  of  terrorism. 

The  legislative  proposals  that  I  am  sending 
to  the  Congress  today  will,  when  approved, 
materially  benefit  our  Nation  and  help  us  to 
assist  friendly  countries.  I  believe  that  they 
are  extraordinarily  important,  and  I  strongly 
urge  that  the  Congress  undertake  their  timely 
consideration  and  speedy  passage. 

RONALD  REAGAN* 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  30,  1984.  ■ 


Depart  r~ 


'e  Bulletii 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


U.S.  Efforts  to  Achieve 
Peace  in  Central  America 


Following  are  texts  of  the  transmit- 
tal letter  and  report  submitted  to  Con- 
gress by  Secretary  Shultz  on  March  15, 
198J,,  pursuant  to  Section  109  (f)  of  the 

Intelligence  Authorization  Act  of  198A. 


TRANSMITTAL  LETTER' 

On  behalf  of  the  President  I  am  pleased  to 
forward  herewith  a  report  on  U.S.  efforts  to 
achieve  peace  in  Central  America,  as  required 
by  Section  109(0  of  the  Intelligence  Authori- 
zation Act  of  1984. 

That  legfislation  makes  clear,  as  the  Ad- 
ministration has  long  maintained,  that  a  major 
share  of  blame  for  the  conflict  in  Central 
America  rests  with  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua. 

Noting  that  Nicaragua  should  be  held  ac- 
countable for  its  actions  before  the  OAS 
[Organization  of  American  States],  the  Intelli- 
gence Authorization  Act  recommended  that 
the  President  seek  the  reconvening  of  the 
Seventeenth  Meeting  of  Consultation  of  the 
OAS  Foreign  Ministers  to  evaluate  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  Government  of  Nicaragua.  The 
Act  further  recommended  that  the  President: 

•  seek  OAS  actions  which  would  ensure 
Nicaragua's  compliance  with  its  obligations; 

•  encourage  the  OAS  to  seek  resolution  of 
the  conflicts  in  Central  America;  and 

•  support  measures  of  the  OAS  and  of  the 
Contadora  group  to  end  support  for  subver- 

«'en«ii!|  sion  in  Central  America. 
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BEAGA 


The  report  which  I  now  submit  describes 
the  efforts  the  United  States  has  made,  con- 
sistent with  the  intent  and  spirit  of  the  Act, 
to  achieve  peace  through  dialogue  and 
negotiations  in  Central  America.  The  report 
points  out  that,  despite  the  valuable  contribu- 
tions made  by  the  OAS  over  the  years  in  the 
cause  of  peace,  efforts  to  engage  the  OAS 
constructively  in  the  current  conflict  generally 
have  not  met  with  the  support  of  the  member 
states,  especially  the  countries  most  directly 
involved.  The  Nicaraguan  Government,  in 
particular,  has  strongly  opposed  direct  OAS 
involvement  in  Central  American  negotia- 
tions. 

The  efforts  of  the  Contadora  group  have 
provided  an  effective  alternate  forum  for 
regional  dialogue.  This  report  describes  the 
major  developments  of  the  past  year  within 
the  Contadora  framework  and  actions  taken  by 
the  United  States  to  support  the  Contadora 
objectives.  We  are  mindful  that  much  of 
Contadora's  success  stems  from  its  regional 
nature  and  accordingly  we  have  limited 
ourselves  to  a  facilitating  role. 


The  regional  states,  recognizing  the 
legitimate  U.S.  interests  and  ties  to  Central 
America,  have  welcomed  our  assistance  in  pro- 
moting dialogue  both  among  the  governments 
(if  the  region — through  the  Contadora  proc- 
ess— and  within  the  war-torn  countries  of 
Central  America,  through  contacts  between 
the  Salvadoran  Peace  Commission  and  the 
FDR/FMLN  [Revolutionary  Democratic 
Front/Farabundo  Marti  Liberation  Front] 
guerrilla  front  and  promotion  of  dialogue  be- 
tween the  Nicaraguan  Government  and  its 
armed  opposition. 

The  enclosed  report  describes  these  steps 
in  detail.  They  include  high-level  public  state- 
ments of  United  States  backing  for  the 
Contadora  process;  meetings  between  U.S.  of 
ficials  and  Latin  American  counterparts  on 
this  issue;  and  a  continuous  process  of  con- 
sultations in  the  region,  both  by  our  resident 
ambassadors  and  by  Richard  B.  Stone,  the 
President's  former  Ambassador-at- Large  for 
Central  American  negotiations. 

These  efforts  w-ill  continue.  Ambassador 
Harry  Shlaudeman,  whom  the  President  has 
nominated  to  replace  Ambassador  Stone  as 
Ambassador-at-Large,  will  begin  his  consulta- 
tions with  regional  leaders  soon  after  his  con- 
firmation to  emphasize  the  President's  deep, 
personal  commitment  to  diplomatic  solutions  in 
Central  America. 

Regional  dialogue  is  essential  to  peace  and 
stability  in  Central  America.  But  it  is  only  one 
aspect  of  our  policy  toward  the  area.  We  also 
support  political  reform,  economic  devel- 
opment, and  the  security  of  the  region's 
democratic  nations.  By  proposing  significant 
increases  in  future  U.S.  assistance  to  the 
region,  as  recommended  by  the  National 
Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central  America, 
the  President  has  stressed  that  the  U.S.  has 
both  vital  interests  in  this  region  and  the  will 
and  capability  to  work  with  the  Central 
Americans  for  peaceful  development  and  the 
resolution  of  disputes. 

As  noted  above,  a  key  to  peace  is 
Nicaragua's  attitude  toward  its  neighbors. 
We  have  attempted  to  bring  economic  and 
diplomatic  pressure  to  bear  on  Nicaragua 
precisely  to  encourage  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment to  join  with  its  neighbors  in  regional 
dialogue.  At  the  same  time,  we  have  made 
clear  through  public  statements,  diplomatic 
channels  to  the  Nicaraguan  Government,  and 
conversations  with  other  governments,  that 
we  will  overlook  no  genuine  opportunity  for 
peace  and  will  respond  in  kind  to  positive,  con- 
crete steps  from  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua. 

Thus  far,  that  government  has  not  taken 
actions  that  would  reflect  the  commitments 
made  to  the  OAS  in  1979.  In  this  regard,  it  is 
worth  noting  the  majority  finding  of  the  Bipar- 


tisan Commission  that  "...  we  do  not  believe 
it  would  be  wise  to  dismantle  existing  incen- 
tives and  pressures  on  the  Managua  regime 
except  in  conjunction  with  demonstrable 
progress  on  the  negotiating  front." 

Bipartisan  congressional  support  for  U.S. 
policy  in  Central  America  remains  an  impor- 
tant goal  of  this  Administration.  I  urge 
prompt  congressional  approval  of  the  Central 
America  Democracy,  Peace,  and  Development 
Initiative  as  an  important  first  step  toward 
meeting  our  objectives  in  the  region.  Along 
with  early  Senate  confirmation  of  Ambassador 
Shlaudeman  as  Ambassador-at-Large,  ade- 
quate, timely  funding  for  the  programs  to  ad- 
vance our  goals  in  the  region,  including  those 
authorized  by  the  Intelligence  Authorization 
Act,  is  clearly  in  the  national  interest.  Such 
actions  would  signal  continued  U.S.  willing- 
ness to  support  our  major  national  objectives 
in  Central  America,  including  the  critical 
search  for  a  comprehensive,  verifiable  basis  for 
ending  the  conflict  in  that  region. 


REPORT" 

The  achievement  of  genuine,  lasting 
peace  in  Central  America  is  the  para- 
mount goal  of  U.S.  policy  toward  the 
region.  It  constitutes  a  central  compo- 
nent of  a  series  of  closely  interrelated 
U.S.  national  objectives.  These  include: 
the  strengthening  of  democratic  institu- 
tions, economic  development,  and  im- 
proved living  standards  for  the  peoples 
of  the  region  and  security  for  the  coun- 
tries of  Central  America  from  external 
threats  and  foreign-sponsored  subver- 
sion. Our  interests  in  the  area  are  critical, 
as  spelled  out  clearly  in  the  report  of 
the  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America,  and  the  Administration 
has  pursued  an  active  search  for  means  to 
end  conflict  and  bring  about  a  reconcilia- 
tion within  and  among  the  Central 
American  nations. 

Section  109  of  the  Intelligence  Autho- 
rization Act  of  1984  requested  that  the 
President  report  to  the  Congress  on  U.S. 
efforts  to  achieve  peace  in  Central 
America.  Under  section  109,  the  Presi- 
dent was  encouraged  to  take  several 
steps  in  pursuit  of  this  goal,  specifically: 

•  To  seek  a  prompt  reconvening  of 
the  Seventeenth  Meeting  of  Consultation 
of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States  for  the 
purpose  of  reevaluation  of  the  compliance 
by  the  Government  of  National  Recon- 
struction of  Nicaragua: 

(1)  with  the  commitments  made 
by  the  leaders  of  that  government  in 
July  1979  to  the  Organization  of  American 
States;  and 


Bylleti! 


June  1984 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


(2)  with  the  Charter  of  the  Organi- 
zation of  American  States. 

•  To  vigorously  seek  actions  by  the 
Organization  of  American  States  that 
would  provide  for  a  full  range  of  effective 
measures  by  the  member  states  to 
bring  about  compliance  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  National  Reconstruction  of 
Nicaragua  with  those  obligations,  in- 
cluding verifiable  agreements  to  halt  the 
transfer  of  military  equipment  and  to 
cease  furnishing  of  military  support 
facilities  to  groups  seeking  the  violent 
overthrow  of  governments  of  countries 
in  Central  America. 

•  To  use  all  diplomatic  means  at  his 
disposal  to  encourage  the  Organization  of 
American  States  to  seek  resolution  of  the 
conflicts  in  Central  America  based  on  the 
provisions  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  San 
Jose  Conference  of  October  1982, 
especially  principles  (d),  (e),  and  (g), 
relating  to  nonintervention  in  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  other  countries,  denying 
support  for  terrorist  and  subversive 
elements  in  other  states,  and  interna- 
tional supervision  of  fully  verifiable  ar- 
rangements. 

•  To  support  measures  at  the 
Organization  of  American  States,  as  well 
as  efforts  of  the  Contadora  Group,  which 
seek  to  end  support  for  terrorist,  sub- 
versive, or  other  activities  aimed  at  the 
violent  overthrow  of  the  governments  of 
countries  in  Central  America. 

This  report,  submitted  in  response  to 
section  109(0  of  the  act,  is  intended  to  in- 
form the  Congress  of  the  efforts  taken 
by  the  countries  of  the  area  and  by  the 
United  States  to  promote  peace  in 
Central  America  and  to  put  these  in  the 
perspective  of  other  major  developments 
in  the  area. 

Background  on  Regional  Peace  Efforts 

A  prominent  conclusion  of  the  House 
Permanent  Select  Committee  on  In- 
telligence in  the  report  and  legislation 
cited  above  was  that  there  must  occur 
marked  changes  in  behavior  by  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  in  order  for 
peace  to  be  possible  in  Central  America. 
We  concur  with  that  report  and  with  the 
report  of  May  13,  1983,  and  the  staff 
report  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Oversight 
and  Evaluation  of  the  same  committee  of 
September  22,  1982,  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  bears  a  heavy  burden 
of  responsibility  for  the  tragic  situation 
that  confronts  us  in  Central  America  to- 


day. Specifically,  the  May  1983  report 
said:  "the  Sandinistas  have  stepped  up 
their  support  for  insurgents  in 
Honduras"  and  that  Cuban  and 
Nicaraguan  aid  for  insurgents  constitutes 
"a  clear  picture  of  active  promotion  'for 
revolution  without  frontiers'  throughout 
Central  America  by  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua."  The  committee  also  reiter- 
ated its  earUer  finding  that  the  guerrillas 
in  El  Salvador  "are  well-trained,  well- 
equipped  with  modem  weapons  and  sup- 
plies, and  rely  on  the  use  of  sites  in 
Nicaragua  for  command  and  control  and 
for  logistical  support.  The  intelligence 
supporting  these  judgments  provided  to 
the  Committee  is  convincing." 

This  conclusion,  which  remains  valid 
today,  is  also  shared  by  Nicaragua's 
immediate  neighbors,  all  of  which  per- 
ceive themselves  directly  threatened  by 
the  Sandinista  regime  and  its  Cuban 
sponsors. 

Since  Cuba  began  its  most  recent  e.x- 
pansionist  efforts  in  1978,  peace  has  been 
a  much  sought  after,  but  elusive,  goal  in 
Central  America.  To  achieve  this  goal, 
the  United  States  has  worked  diligently 
in  recent  years  to  implement  a  four-part 
policy  toward  the  region: 

(1)  Support  for  democracy  and  hu- 
man freedom; 

(2)  Support  for  improved  living  condi- 
tions and  economic  development  in  the 
region; 

(3)  Support  for  legitimate  self- 
defense  capabilities  against  subversion 
and  the  threat  of  aggression;  and 

(4)  Support  for  dialogue  and  recon- 
ciliation between  and  within  the  coun- 
tries of  the  region. 

The  United  States  has  given  vigorous 
and  sustained  support  to  regional  efforts 
to  resolve  disputes  in  Central  America. 
The  complex,  multilateral  nature  of  the 
region's  political  and  security  problems- 
cross-border  support  for  guerrilla 
groups,  competition  in  arms  and  military 
force  levels,  the  presence  of  foreign 
military  advisers,  and  the  contagious  ap- 
peal of  political  and  economic  justice- 
rules  out  piecemeal  or  bilateral  solutions. 
What  is  clearly  required  is  a  comprehen- 
sive, verifiable  regional  settlement. 

Based  upon  its  charter,  the  OAS  nor- 
mally would  be,  as  the  House  Intelli- 
gence Committee  described  it,  "the 
proper  and  most  effective  means  of  deal- 
ing with  threats  to  the  peace  of  Central 
America,  of  providing  for  common  action 
in  the  event  of  aggression,  and  of  pro- 
viding the  mechanisms  for  peaceful 
resolution  of  disputes  among  the  coun-     , 


tries  of  Central  America."  In  practice, 
however,  efforts  to  engage  the  OAS  con- 
structively in  the  current  conflicts  have 
not  been  effective.  Nicaragua,  a  principal 
protagonist  in  the  area,  is  strongly  op- 
posed to  OAS  treatment  of  these  issues, 
alleging  that  the  institution  is  too  sup- 
portive of  U.S.  interests  (although  the 
OAS  was  instrumental  in  helping  the 
Sandinistas  to  power  in  1979).  Accord- 
ingly, many  other  member  states  are 
reluctant  to  become  involved  in  Central 
America,  preferring  to  rely  on  the 
Contadora  mechanism.  Recognizing  this 
fact,  the  OAS,  at  its  13th  General  As- 
sembly in  November  1983,  applauded  the 
Contadora  peacemaking  initiative  and 
"urge[d]  it  to  persevere  in  its  efforts." 

A  number  of  states  believe  it  would 
be  helpful  at  some  point  to  pressure  the 
Sandinistas  for  changes  by  formally 
holding  them  to  account  in  the  OAS  for 
their  broken  promises.  However,  suffi- 
cient backing  does  not  exist  today  for  ef- 
fective OAS  action. 

Nicaragua  was  also  uninterested  in 
pursuing  the  potential  for  regional  nego- 
tiation offered  by  the  October  1982  San 
Jose  Final  Act.  This  was  an  effort  of 
concerned  hemisphere  democracies- 
Honduras,  El  Salvador,  Costa  Rica, 
Belize,  Jamaica,  Colombia,  the  Dominican 
Republic,  and  the  United  States— to  set 
forth  for  the  first  time  the  essential  con- 
ditions for  peace  in  Central  America. 
Nicaragua  refused  to  receive  the  Costa 
Rican  Foreign  Minister,  whom  the  re- 
gional states  had  appointed  as  their 
representative  for  discussing  the  San 
Jose  Final  Act  with  Nicaragua. 

In  recognition  of  the  failure  of  initial 
efforts  to  find  a  satisfactory  vehicle  in 
which  to  pursue  a  settlement,  the  key 
regional  nations  active  in  the  search 
began  in  early  1983  to  seek  different 
forums  and  formulas  that  would  address 
the  obstacles  to  peace  in  the  region, 
notably  Nicaraguan  intransigence.  The 
result  was  Contadora. 

The  Contadora  Process 

By  April  1983— responding  to  external 
and  internal  pressures— Nicaragua 
agreed  to  join  El  Salvador,  Honduras, 
Guatemala,  and  Costa  Rica  in  regional 
negotiations  under  the  auspices  of  what 
became  known  as  the  "Contadora  Four" 
(Mexico,  Panama,  Colombia,  and 
Venezuela).  Initially,  much  of  the 
region's  leadership  was  guarded  in  its 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


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Costa 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


opinion  of  the  Contadora  Group's  pros- 
pects—recalling that  Nicaragua  had 
already  backed  away  from  the  OAS  and 
the  San  Jose  Final  Act.  But  pressures  on 
Nicaragua  to  end  the  growing  conflict 
and  the  skillful  diplomatic  efforts  of  the 
other  regional  countries  allowed  the  new 
process  to  develop  momentum. 

The  first  operational  issues  treated 
by  the  Contadora  Group  occurred  in 
spring  1983  resulting  from  Nicaraguan 
interference  with  Costa  Rican  use  of 
navigation  rights  on  the  San  Juan  River, 
the  capture  by  Nicaragua  of  five  Costa 
Rican  guardsmen,  an  incursion  into 
Costa  Rican  territory  by  a  Nicaraguan 
military  unit,  and  the  capture  of  a  Costa 
Rican  sport  fishing  vessel  by  Nicaraguan 
patrol  boats  in  Costa  Rican  waters.  On 
May  6,  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  re- 
quested that  an  OAS  peacekeeping  force 
be  sent  to  patrol  the  border.  The 
Contadora  Group,  however,  asked  that 
the  OAS  defer  action  on  the  request  un- 
til it  had  had  an  opportunity  to  consider 
how  to  deal  with  the  border  incidents. 
Costa  Rica  agreed  to  the  deferral,  and  on 
May  13,  the  Contadora  Four  Foreign 
Ministers  met  in  Panama  and  agreed  to 
create  a  Border  Observer  Commission, 
composed  of  civil  and  military  represen- 
tatives from  each  of  the  Contadora  Four 
countries,  with  responsibility  for  moni- 
toring the  border  and  making  recommen- 
dations for  preventing  incursions  and 
keeping  peace.  The  border  observer 
force  began  its  work  May  22,  1983,  and, 
after  consultations  in  both  capitals  and 
on-the-ground  inspections,  reported  to 
the  May  28-30  meeting  of  the  Contadora 
Group. 

By  April  1982  Nicaragua  had  begun 
to  participate  in  the  Contadora  process. 
However,  it  still  sought  to  avoid  the  con- 
cept of  regional  negotiations,  preferring 
to  deal  individually  and  bilaterally  with 
its  neighbors  from  what  it  saw  as  a  posi- 
tion of  strength.  Only  on  July  19,  1983, 
did  Nicaragua  accept  Contadora's  multi- 
lateral framework  for  discussions.  On 
that  date,  Nicaraguan  head  of  state 
Daniel  Ortega  announced  a  six-point 
Sandinista  Front  diplomatic  proposal. 
Although  it  recognized  the  need  for  an 
end  to  arms  supphes  to  the  Salvadoran 
guerrillas,  it  also  called  for  an  end  to 
security  assistance  to  the  Salvadoran 
Government;  while  it  called  for  an  end  to 
foreign  military  bases  in  the  region,  it 
studiously  ignored  the  issues  of  foreign 
military  advisers  and  Nicaragua's  mili- 
tarization. It  said  nothing  about  democra- 
tization, and  had  no  provisions  for  effec- 


tive verification.  The  United  States 
urged  Nicaragua  to  follow  up  its  proposal 
in  the  Contadora  Group. 

On  July  17,  chiefs  of  state  of  the 
Contadora  Four  met  for  the  first  time 
and  signed  the  Cancun  Declaration  on 
Peace  in  Central  America,  which  pro- 
posed that  the  Central  American  states 
undertake  a  series  of  commitments  for 
peace.  The  chiefs  of  state  transmitted 
the  te.xt  of  their  declaration  to  their 
counterparts  in  the  United  States  and 
other  countries  "with  interests  in  and 
ties  to  the  region,"  including  Cuba. 

The  President  responded  by  letter  to 
the  four  chiefs  of  state  on  July  21, 
reiterating  U.S.  adherence  to  the  four 
fundamental  principles  for  peace  in 
Central  America.  As  the  official  Con- 
tadora chronology  described  it,  his  letter 
". . . .  signalled  that  [the  U.S.]  govern- 
ment has  consistently  expressed  strong 
support  for  the  Contadora  group  and 
that  the  Declaration  of  Cancun,  by  ar- 
ticulating the  critical  issues  which  must 
be  treated  to  reach  an  effective  and  en- 
during resolution  of  the  Central  America 
conflict,  is  an  important  contribution  to 
advancing  that  process." 

The  Contadora  process  continued  in- 
termittently through  the  summer  of 
1983,  achieving  an  important  milestone 
on  September  10,  1983,  when  all  par- 
ticipants, including  Nicaragua,  agreed  on 
a  21-point  Document  of  Objectives  which 
addressed  all  of  the  major  concerns  of 
the  countries  of  the  region  and  of  the 
United  States.  This  document  repre- 
sented a  major  breakthrough  in  the 
Central  American  peace  process  in  the 
form  of  a  written  commitment  to  an 
agreed  set  of  objectives,  which  included 
political,  economic,  and  security 
concerns. 

In  the  security  field,  the  Document  of 
Objectives  called,  inter  alia,  for  steps  to 
end  support  for  external  subversion, 
reductions  in  the  numbers  of  foreign 
military  and  security  advisers,  a  halt  to 
illegal  arms  trafficking,  and  controls  on 
armaments  and  troop  levels.  The  socio- 
economic objectives  emphasized  the  need 
for  greater  regional  cooperation  and 
called  for  assistance  to,  and  the  volun- 
tary repatriation  of.  Central  American 
refugees.  Democratization,  national 
reconciliation,  and  respect  for  human 
rights  are  prime  elements  of  the  political 
objectives,  which  call  for  establishment 
throughout  the  region  of  democratic, 
representative,  and  pluralistic  systems 
that  ensure  fair  and  regular  elections. 
While  there  is  need  for  specific  and 
verifiable  undertakings  on  a  range  of 
sensitive  issues  beyond  an  agreement  of 


principles,  this  was  a  key  first  step  for 
Contadora. 

Although  Nicaragua  billed  itself  as 
the  first  state  to  sign  the  Document  of 
Objectives,  the  Sandinistas  were  clearly 
uncomfortable  with  many  of  them,  par- 
ticularly those  calling  for  respect  for 
basic  human  rights  and  national  recon- 
ciliation through  democratic  pluralism. 
Consequently,  the  Sandinistas,  while  un- 
willing to  accept  the  opprobrium  for 
scuttling  Contadora,  have  repeatedly 
sought  to  undercut  the  process  by 
pushing  their  own  agenda  elsewhere. 

In  particular,  they  have  sought  to  in- 
volve the  United  Nations  in  Central 
American  issues,  anticipating  a  friendlier 
hearing  in  this  forum  than  in  Contadora 
or  the  OAS  where  the  Sandinistas' 
record  works  against  them.  In  Octo- 
ber 1983,  for  example,  Nicaragua  in- 
troduced the  Central  American  issue 
before  the  UN  Security  Council— where 
it  was  discussed  inconclusively— breaking 
an  explicit  commitment  to  the  Contadora 
Group  that  it  would  not  do  so.  The  other 
Central  American  nations,  the  Contadora 
Four,  and  the  United  States  all  prefer 
that  the  issues  be  treated  in  a  local 
forum  of  those  most  directly  concerned 
rather  than  entering  the  highly  politi- 
cized arena  of  UN  debate. 

In  late  October,  Nicaragua  tried 
another  tack,  presenting,  first  to  the 
Contadora  Group  (through  Mexico)  and 
then  to  the  United  States,  four  draft 
peace  treaties.  The  treaties  covered  four 
areas:  Honduran-Nicaraguan  relations; 
U.S.-Nicaraguan  relations;  relations  be- 
tween the  five  Central  American  coun- 
tries; and  the  conflict  in  El  Salvador. 
Although  the  treaties  acknowledged  the 
need  for  an  end  to  support  for  all  guer- 
rilla groups  and  said  that  each  state 
should  not  take  steps  to  threaten  or  to 
attack  the  others,  the  treaties  stepped 
back  from  the  position  adopted  by  the 
signatories  to  the  Contadora  Document 
of  Objectives.  For  example,  they  ignored 
the  Contadora  objective  of  establishing 
democratic  institutions,  reflecting  instead 
the  Nicaraguan  position  that  democrati- 
zation is  not  susceptible  to  treatment  in 
international  agreements.  They  also 
sought  to  diminish  legitimacy  of  the 
elected  Government  of  El  Salvador  by 
treating  it  as  simply  one  of  two  belli- 
gerent parties  to  an  internal  conflict;  dis- 
regarded the  objective  of  restoring  mili- 
tary balance  among  the  Central 
American  states;  and  made  no  serious 
proposals  for  verification  and  control. 


June  1984 


69 


wmmmaaBSBB^xamaiamfmm 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


(Although  Nicaraguan  Foreign  Minister 
Miquel  D'Escoto  affirmed  that  the 
treaties  provided  for  "on-site  verifica- 
tion," the  treaties  contained  no  such  lan- 
guage.) The  Nicaraguan  draft  treaties 
deferred  treatment  of  foreign  advisers 
and  arms  buildup  and  failed  to  address 
the  Contadora  objectives  dealing  with 
refugees.  In  short,  they  disregarded 
many  of  the  21  points  and  renewed  the 
Sandinista  push  for  bilateral  and  piece- 
meal agreements.  Thus,  while  paying  lip- 
service  to  the  aims  of  Contadora,  the 
Sandinistas  were  still  far  from  eager  par- 
ticipants and  actively  sought  to  change 
the  direction  of  the  process. 

Direct  U.S.  Efforts 

In  his  April  27,  1983,  address  to  a  joint 
session  of  Congress,  the  President  an- 
nounced his  intention  to  nominate  a  per- 
sonal representative  to  facilitate  Central 
American  negotiations— both  talks  be- 
tween the  states  and  dialogue  within 
countries  to  heal  fragmented  societies. 
Although  the  United  States  and  the 
regional  governments  agreed  that  direct 
U.S.  participation  in  Contadora  would 
not  be  helpful,  all  parties  recognize  the 
strong  and  legitimate  U.S.  interest  in  the 
process  and  the  need  for  our  support  and 
involvement.  On  May  26,  1983,  Senator 
Richard  B.  Stone  was  appointed  by  the 
President  as  Ambassador  at  Large  for 
Central  American  negotiations  to  fill 
this  role. 

Beginning  with  his  trip  to  the  nine 
participating  Contadora  countries  in 
early  June  1983,  Ambassador  Stone's  ini- 
tial consultations  focused  on  ways  to  pro- 
mote multilateral  negotiations  within  the 
Contadora  process  and  on  initiating  con- 
tact between  the  Salvadoran  Peace  Com- 
mission, established  in  February  1983, 
and  the  FDR/FMLN  guerrilla  front.  The 
succeeding  months  were  characterized 
by  a  series  of  consultations  among  the 
Central  Americans  and  the  Contadora 
Four.  Ambassador  Stone  soon  became  a 
principal  supporting  actor  in  these  ongo- 
ing discussions,  albeit  not  a  direct  par- 
ticipant in  the  Contadora  process.  During 
this  period,  he  also  began  to  set  the 
stage  for  possible  talks  between  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  and  its  armed 
opposition. 

Progress  came  first  on  bringing  the 
Salvadoran  guerrillas  to  the  table  with 
the  Peace  Commission.  On  July  30,  1983, 
Ambassador  Stone  made  preliminary 
contact  with  representatives  of  the 


FDR/FMLN  guerrilla  groups.  In 
August,  they  met  for  the  second  time. 
These  efforts  were  instrumental  in  ar- 
ranging direct  contacts  between  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador  and  these 
guerrilla  groups.  On  August  29,  1983,  the 
Peace  Commission  of  the  Government  of 
El  Salvador  and  representatives  of  the 
FDR/FMLN  guerrillas  held  their  first 
direct  meetmg.  That  meeting  repre- 
sented an  important  step  by  the 
Salvadoran  Government  toward  imple- 
menting the  September  1983  Contadora 
Document  of  Objectives  which  called  for 
"pluralism  and  its  various  manifesta- 
tions, . . .  fuU  play  for  democratic  institu- 
tions, .  .  .  and  the  need  for  political  ac- 
commodation in  order  to  bring  about 
dialogue  and  understanding."  At  the  sec- 
ond meeting  with  the  FDR/FMLN  in 
Bogota,  September  21,  the  Peace  Com- 
mission offered  the  opportunity  to 
discuss  electoral  guarantees.  The 
FDR/FMLN  rejected  the  offer  and  in- 
sisted instead,  as  in  the  past,  on  forma- 
tion of  a  new  provisional  government  in 
which  they  would  be  included  prior  to  a 
"national  debate"  and  elections. 

In  their  latest  proposal,  dated 
January  31,  1984,  and  publicized  in  a 
Mexico  City  news  conference  on 
February  9',  1984,  the  FDR/FMLN 
leaders  again  proposed  the  formation  of  a 
provisional  government.  The  measures 
proposed  by  the  guerrillas  include  abol- 
ishing the  1983  Constitution,  legitimizing 
the  power  of  the  insurgents,  purging  the 
army,  dissolving  the  security  forces,  ban- 
ning the  ARENA  [National  Republican 
Alliance]  party,  and  judging  and  pun- 
ishing civil  and  military  personnel  in- 
volved in  alleged  political  crimes.  The 
formation  of  the  provisional  government 
would  be  brought  about  through  a 
negotiation  which  would  include  me- 
diators nominated  by  the  various  parties 
to  the  talks  and  international  witnesses. 
The  process  would  culminate  with  the 
organization  of  a  single  national  army 
made  up  of  the  insurgents  and  the 
purged  Government  of  El  Salvador 
forces,  both  of  which  would  retain  their 
weapons. 

While  refusing  to  participate  in  elec- 
tions, the  guerrillas  had  said  that  the 
voting  scheduled  in  El  Salvador  for 
March  25,  1984,  "would  not  be  the  object 
of  direct  military  attacks."  Their  recent 
actions  and  comments  in  their  propa- 
ganda radio  broadcasts  make  it  clear, 
however,  that  they  have  not  wavered  in 
their  violent  opposition  to  the  elections 
and  that  their  destructive  activities  will 
continue  before,  during,  and  after  the 


balloting.  On  January  27,  a  guerrilla 
group  assassinated  Legislative  Assembly 
Deputy  Amoldo  Pohl  of  the  ARENA 
party,  calling  the  murder  a  "response" 
to  the  elections.  On  February  24,  PAISA 
[Authentic  Institutional  Salvadoran 
Party]  Deputy  Roberto  Ayala  was  mur- 
dered, bringing  to  four  the  number  of 
assembly  members  killed  by  leftist 
violence.  Although  no  group  has  yet 
claimed  the  Ayala  murder,  it  is  almost 
certain  the  work  of  the  Clara  Elizabeth 
Ramirez  Front  (CERF),  a  leftist  urban 
terrorist  group  which  took  responsibility 
for  the  assassination  of  Pohl  and  another 
ARENA  deputy. 

In  addition  to  these  attacks  on  politi- 
cians, the  guerrillas  persist  in  other  at- 
tacks against  the  population  and  the 
economic  infrastructure  aimed  at  cre- 
ating conditions  that  would  make  it  im- 
possible to  carry  out  elections.  These 
have  included  the  murder  of  an  Amer- 
ican woman,  the  destruction  of  an  impor- 
tant bridge,  the  bombing  of  a  civilian 
train,  the  burning  of  a  coffee-processing 
plant  that  employed  400  people  in  a  area 
that  has  suffered  significant  economic 
hardship  at  the  hands  of  the  FMLN,  and 
two  attacks  on  an  agrarian  reform  co-op 
in  which  9  innocent  co-op  members,  in- 
cluding 3  children,  were  killed.  Neverthe- 
less, the  Government  of  El  Salvador  has 
publicly  reiterated,  as  recently  as 
February'  2,  1984,  that  the  door  remains 
open  to  dialogue.  The  United  States, 
through  Ambassador  Stone,  also  con- 
firmed that  it  remains  ready  to  further 
sincere  talks.  This  effort  will  be  resumed 
after  the  March  1984  presidential  elec- 
tions, looking  toward  legislative  and 
municipal  voting  in  1985. 

Both  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic 
Force  (FDN)  and  the  Revolutionary' 
Democratic  Alliance  (ARDE)  have  made 
known  their  interest  in  returning  to  a 
Nicaragua  in  which  the  original  promises 
of  the  Sandinista  revolution  were  ob- 
served. ARDE  had  issued  a  declaration 
of  necessary  conditions  for  its  return  on 
December  is,  1982;  its  leader,  Eden 
Pastora,  stated  that  ARDE  would  begin 
military  operations  against  the  govern- 
ment on  April  15,  1983,  if  the  conditions 
were  not  met.  The  government  brushed 
aside  the  declaration,  and  ARDE  com- 
menced guerrilla  operations  in  April 
1983.  The  FDN,  which  had  been  conduct- 
ing military  operations  against  the 
government  since  early  1982,  issued  its 
conditions  for  an  end  to  fighting  on 
January  16,  1983.  The  Nicaraguan 
Government  similarly  ignored  this 
declaration. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


In  late  1983,  Ambassador  Stone 
began  consultations  with  the  various 
Nicaraguan  armed  opposition  groups  to 
promote  a  process  of  national  reconcil- 
iation that  would  complement  his  eiTorts 
to  support  the  parallel  efforts  toward 
reconciliation  in  El  Salvador.  Although 
the  various  groups  were  initially  divided 
on  what  terms  were  acceptable  for  an 
end  to  the  fighting,  they  agreed  to  dis- 
cuss a  common  platform  and  to  meet 
with  Ambassador  Stone  in  Panama  from 
November  30  to  December  1,  1983.  Fol- 
lowing that  meeting,  the  FDN,  and 
MISURA  (the  Miskito,  Sumo,  and  Rama 
Indian  opposition  group),  supported  by 
ARDE,  offered  to  hold  a  direct  or  in- 
direct dialogue  with  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  on  ending  the  fighting  in 
return  for  full  democratization. 

ARDE  and  the  FDN  issued  further 
detailed  statements  on  this  subject  on 
February  18,  1984,  and  February  21, 
1984,  respectively.  A  comparison  of  their 
positions  with  that  of  the  leftist  Sal- 
vadoran  rebels  clearly  indicates  that  the 
Nicaraguan  opposition  is  prepared  to  ac- 
cept a  democratic  outcome,  while  the 
Salvadoran  FMLN  is  insisting  even  more 
rigidly  on  a  power-sharing  formula, 
without  early  elections.  Nevertheless, 
the  Nicaraguan  Government  has  spumed 
negotiations  with  its  armed  opponents, 
and  the  Nicaraguan  Minister  of  Justice 
affirmed  on  March  9,  1984,  that  the 
government  would  try  some  of  the 
armed  opposition  leaders  in  absentia. 

These  efforts  to  stimulate  the  overall 
process  of  dialogue  within  the  region 
have  offered  both  the  FDR/FMLN  and 
the  Nicaraguan  Government  a  peace- 
ful and  democratic  way  to  end  the  fight- 
ing. Unfortunately,  neither  side  has 
seized  the  opportunity.  As  noted,  the 
FDR/FMLN  rejects  elections  in  favor  of 
immediate  power  sharing.  The 
Nicaraguan  Government  appears  to  have 
ruled  out  negotiations  with  the  armed 
opposition  and  shows  no  signs  of  chang- 
ing its  political  system  in  a  way  that 
would  allow  the  opposition  the  right  to 
compete  for  power.  Since  December  4, 
1983,  Nicaragua  has  offered  safe  conduct, 
under  some  conditions,  to  certain  mem- 
bers of  the  armed  opposition,  but  it  has 
excluded  participation  in  this  program  by 
the  armed  opposition  leadership,  thus  de- 
nying them  the  ability  to  contest  the 
election  scheduled  for  November  4,  1984. 
Although  the  unarmed,  legal  opposition 


will  be  allowed  to  participate  in  those 
elections,  there  are  numerous  obstacles 
to  a  true  contest  for  power  as  will  be 
seen  below. 

While  Ambassador  Stone  was  pro- 
moting internal  dialogue,  the  United 
States  also  actively  pursued  a  program 
of  clarifying  and  building  support  for  the 
multilateral  Contadora  process  and  its 
21-point  Document  of  Objectives.  On  Oc- 
tober 7,  Secretary  of  State  Shultz  met 
with  Central  American  foreign  ministers 
and  UN  ambassadors  at  the  UN  General 
Assembly.  They  discussed  the  need  to 
move  forward  simultaneously  on  all 
points  elaborated  in  the  Document  of 
Objectives  and  emphasized  internal 
democracy  in  all  Central  American  coun- 
tries as  an  essential  method  to  ensure 
enforcement  of  all  commitments.  The 
Secretary  and  the  Foreign  Ministers  of 
Costa  Rica,  Honduras,  El  Salvador,  and 
Guatemala  followed  up  this  discussion 
with  a  November  16  meeting  on  the 
margins  of  the  OAS  General  Assembly 
and  again  in  Caracas  in  January  1984 
during  the  Venezuelan  presidential  in- 
auguration. 

During  this  same  period.  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs 
Langhome  Motley  made  two  trips  to 
Central  America  to  discuss  all  aspects  of 
the  conflict.  On  his  first  trip  in  Sep- 
tember, Ambassador  Motley  hoped  to  in- 
clude Nicaragua,  and  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  initially  welcomed  his  visit. 
However,  shortly  before  his  scheduled 
arrival  in  Managua,  the  Sandinistas 
canceled  his  appointments  with  senior  of- 
ficials. Assistant  Secretary  Motley  post- 
poned his  visit,  and  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  later  invited  him  for  talks 
on  October  13.  In  his  discussions  in 
Managua,  Motley  encouraged  the 
Nicaraguans  to  implement  the  original 
principles  of  their  revolution  through 
sincere  negotiations  based  on  the  21 
points. 

In  the  meantime,  we  were  active  in 
pursuing  these  issues  both  in  this  hemi- 
sphere and  with  our  European  allies, 
most  of  whom  backed  the  concept  of  a 
regional  peace  effort,  but  lacked  first- 
hand information  on  the  dynamics  of 
relations  in  the  region  and  of  Contadora. 
In  a  series  of  visits  and  consultations. 
Ambassador  Stone  and  other  senior  of- 
ficers explained  to  European  and  other 
hemispheric  governments  how  the 
groundwork  had  been  prepared  for 
agreement  in  the  Document  of  Objec- 
tives and  the  reasons  for  strong  U.S. 
support.  We  confumed  the  belief  of 


many  Europeans  that  only  a  comprehen- 
sive and  completely  verifiable  treaty 
could  bring  about  peace  in  Central 
America. 

During  November  and  December 
1983,  the  Contadora  Group  considered 
several  proposals  for  converting  the 
Document  of  Objectives  into  such  a 
viable  and  verifiable  final  treaty.  The 
Contadora  Four,  Nicaragua,  and  the 
other  Central  American  states  all  pre- 
sented suggestions  for  the  content  of  a 
final  agreement.  A  Vice  Ministerial 
Technical  Commission  attempted  to 
reconcile  the  proposals,  but  it  became 
clear  that  only  the  nine  foreign  ministers 
could  decide  on  the  next  steps  to  take. 

On  December  22,  after  consulting 
with  Ambassador  Stone,  the  President 
once  again  publicly  reaffirmed  our  strong 
support  for  the  peace  process  under- 
taken by  the  Contadora  Group.  The 
President  said,  "I  want  to  reiterate  my 
support  and  commitment  to  [Ambassador 
Stone's]  delicate  but  crucial  mission." 

Ambassador  Stone  traveled  again  to 
the  region  prior  to  the  January  7-8 
foreign  ministers  meeting,  to  suggest 
means  of  facOitating  discussion  of  the 
various  peace  proposals  and  to  reiterate 
our  strong  conviction  that  Contadora's 
momentum  should  be  maintained.  In 
his  January  meetings  in  Managua, 
Ambassador  Stone  emphasized  to  the 
Sandinistas  that  Nicaragua  could  respond 
to  all  U.S.  concerns  by  sincere  negotia- 
tions to  turn  the  Document  of  Objectives 
into  a  comprehensive,  operational,  and 
verifiable  agreement.  He  also  urged  the 
Sandinistas  to  open  a  dialogue  with  the 
armed  opposition  groups,  noting  those 
groups'  offer  to  lay  down  their  weapons 
in  exchange  for  democratization. 

In  these  and  other  meetings  we  have 
made  clear  to  the  Sandinistas  our  four 
policy  objectives  vis-a-vis  Nicaragua: 

(1)  Implementation  of  the  Sandin- 
istas' democratic  commitments  to  the 
OAS; 

(2)  Termination  of  Nicaragua's  sup- 
port for  subversion  in  neighboring 
states; 

(3)  Removal  of  Soviet/Cuban  military 
personnel  and  termination  of  their 
military  and  security  involvement  in 
Nicaragua;  and 

(4)  The  reduction  of  Nicaragua's 
recently  expanded  military  apparatus  to 
restore  military  equilibrium  among  the 
Central  American  states. 


June  1984 


71 


mimmmmmmfmmmmmmmimrfwwffffffrmnft'\i\  1 1 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


At  the  January  1984  foreign  min- 
isters' meeting,  the  Contadora  Group 
reached  a  second  important  milestone  in 
the  peace  negotiations,  an  agreement  on 
procedures  and  guidelines  for  translating 
the  21  objectives  into  verifiable  commit- 
ments. The  Contadora  Four  and  the 
Central  Americans  charged  three  work- 
ing commissions  to  refme  proposals  on 
political,  security,  and  socioeconomic 
issues.  They  agreed  that  the  commissions 
would  formally  constitute  themselves  by 
January  31,  would  prepare  work  plans 
by  February  29,  and  would  present 
recommendations  to  the  foreign  min- 
isters by  April  30.  By  establishing  work- 
ing groups  and  a  series  of  benchmark 
dates,  the  Contadora  Group  made  clear 
that  progress  in  all  three  areas  is  essen- 
tial if  a  formal  peace  agreement  is  to  be 
attained.  The  group  since  has  met  the 
first  two  benchmark  dates. 

For  its  part,  the  United  States  sent  a 
team  of  security  specialists  to  Central 
America  in  February-March  to  provide 
expertise  to  friendly  governments  in  this 
phase  of  the  process  and  to  underline  our 
own  strong  commitment  to  its  success. 
At  the  most  recent  meeting  of  the 
Contadora  Group,  held  in  Panama  on 
Februarj'  29,  the  working  commissions 
agreed  on  agendas  to  guide  their  work 
until  April  30.  They  agreed  to  caucus 
again  with  the  Vice  Ministerial  Technical 
Commission  on  April  2-4  and  24-28, 
before  meeting  with  the  foreign 
ministers. 

In  moving  from  the  conceptual  stage 
to  actual  drafting  of  language  which 
could  form  the  basis  of  a  Central 
American  peace  treaty,  the  Contadora 
process  has  entered  a  labor-intensive 
phase.  A  verifiable  agreement  to  imple- 
ment the  21  points  would  address  our 
concerns  with  Nicaraguan  behavior, 
would  meet  the  interests  of  the  other 
Central  American  states,  and  would  give 
Nicaragua  a  concrete  framework  for 
peaceful  political  and  economic  coopera- 
tion with  its  neighbors. 

Contadora  and  the  OAS 

The  United  States  and  other  members  of 
the  OAS  have  respected  the  efforts  of 
the  Contadora  Group  by  supporting  the 
peace  process  it  has  fostered.  In  an  ef- 
fort to  move  the  process  forward,  we 
have  not  invited  more  direct  OAS  in- 
volvement at  this  time,  although  we  have 
been  careful  to  leave  open  that  possibil- 
ity. The  OAS  role  in  other  regional 
disputes  has  been  very  constructive. 


72 


Future  OAS  involvement  could  be  appro- 
priate and  highly  desirable,  depending  on 
the  circumstances  that  arise.  We  could 
foresee  circumstances  where  the 
organization  could  play  a  useful  role  in 
helping  to  further  develop  or  implement 
the  teiTns  of  an  agreement  in  Central 
America.  At  this  stage,  however,  coun- 
tries mside  and  outside  the  region,  as 
well  as  those  involved  in  the  Contadora 
process,  would  interpret  a  U.S.  effort  to 
shift  the  negotiating  process  into  the 
OAS  as  a  vote  of  no  confidence  in  Con- 
tadora that  would  greatly  reduce  its  ef- 
fectiveness. Others  would  see  it  more 
simply  as  a  U.S.  effort  to  sabotage  the 
peace  process.  Therefore,  the  United 
States  so  far  has  attempted  to  achieve 
its  goals,  including  those  mentioned  in 
section  109  of  the  act,  through  support 
for  the  Contadora  process  rather  than  by 
more  direct  and  immediate  involvement 
of  the  OAS  or  attempting  to  revive  the 
San  Jose  concept. 

Summary  of  Diplomatic  Efforts 

As  stated  above,  U.S.  support  for  the 
peace  process  has  been  manifested 
by  various  actions:  high-level  public 
statements  of  U.S.  backing  for  the 
Contadora  process;  meetings  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  with  Latin  American 
leaders  on  this  issue;  a  continuous  proc- 
ess of  consultations  in  the  region;  private 
demarches  to  governments  in  Latin 
America  and  Western  Europe  asking 
them  to  lend  diplomatic  assistance  to 
these  regional  negotiations;  dispatch  of  a 
security  experts  team;  and  the  efforts  of 
the  President's  special  envoy  who  over 
the  past  8  months  has  made  12  trips  to 
Central  and  South  America  to  carry  out 
his  mission  of  furthering  regional 
dialogue. 

Through  all  of  these  efforts,  the 
Administration  has  acted  in  full  accord 
with  the  spirit  of  section  109  of  the  act. 
The  President  has  reiterated  the  con- 
tinued, dedicated  support  of  the  United 
States  for  the  negotiating  process  and 
the  cause  of  peace  in  Central  America. 
His  prompt  nomination  of  Ambassador 
Harry  Shlaudeman  to  succeed  Ambas- 
sador Stone  is  a  sign  of  the  Administra- 
tion's intention  to  remain  fully  engaged 
in  this  process. 

Other  Dimensions  of  the  U.S 
Search  for  Peace 

As  implied  in  our  four-point  policy 
toward  Central  America,  the  United 
States  has  contributed  to  the  search  for 
peace  by  providing  needed  economic  and 


security  assistance  to  democratic  coun- 
tries in  the  area  in  order  to  reduce 
vulnerability  to  externally  supported  in- 
surgencies and  to  provide  needed  con- 
fidence to  facilitate  participation  in 
regional  peace  discussions.  By  proposing 
significant  increases  in  future  U.S. 
assistance  to  the  region,  as  recommended 
by  the  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
on  Central  America,  the  President  has 
demonstrated  our  vital  interest  in  this 
area  and  strong  commitment  to  peaceful 
development  and  the  prompt  resolution 
of  regional  disputes. 

As  outhned  above,  an  essential  factor 
behind  the  progress  to  date  in  Contadora 
has  been  Nicaragua's  willingness— albeit 
grudging— to  participate  in  the  process. 
While  the  shift  in  Nicaragua's  posture 
appears  due  in  part  to  tactics  and  to  a 
desire  not  to  be  blamed  for  failure,  it  is 
clear  that  on  a  more  basic  level,  the 
Sandinistas  have  moved  from  a  prior 
position  of  unyielding  obstructionism  to 
their  present  stance  as  a  direct  result  of 
pressure  from  its  neighbors,  the  United 
States,  other  governments  and  interna- 
tional bodies,  and  the  armed  Nicaraguan 
opposition.  The  United  States  has  at- 
tempted to  bring  economic  and  diplo- 
matic pressure  to  bear  on  Nicaragua  pre- 
cisely because  it  had  become  clear  that 
without  it  Nicaragua  would  be  unwilling 
to  modify  its  aggressive  policies  and 
nondemocratic  system  of  internal  con- 
trols. The  United  States  has  not  been 
alone  in  taking  such  steps:  West  Euro- 
pean and  Latin  American  countries  have 
informed  Nicaragua  that  additional  eco- 
nomic assistance  will  depend  upon  im- 
proving its  attitude  toward  political 
pluralism. 

At  the  same  time,  the  armed  opposi- 
tion in  Nicaragua  has  stepped  up  its  ac- 
tivities, demonstrating  clearly  to  the 
world  the  extent  to  which  the  Nicaraguan 
Revolutionary  Government's  failure  to 
respect  its  internal  and  external  com- 
mitments has  led  to  popular  discontent. 
These  actions  have  imposed  a  stiff  price 
on  the  Sandinistas  and  offer  an  incentive 
to  explore  mutual  accommodation. 

Although  our  relations  with  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  are  strained, 
the  United  States  has  kept  open  its 
direct  channels  of  communication  to  the 
Sandinistas.  Initial  attempts  to  engage 
Nicaragua  bilaterally  were  unsuccessful. 
Nicaragua  did  not  respond  in  a  positive, 
substantive  manner  to  two  U.S.  pro- 
posals made  in  August  1981  and  in  April 
1982  to  resolve  tensions  in  the  region. 


Department  of 


'etin 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Through  these  proposals,  the  United 
States  addressed  Nicaragua's  stated  con- 
cerns about  alleged  U.S.  intervention 
and  the  activities  of  Nicaraguan  exile 
^oups  in  the  United  States,  as  well  as 
Nicaragua's  support  for  guemlla  groups, 
militarization,  the  presence  of  foreign 
military  advisers,  the  need  for  democrati- 
zation, the  possible  resumption  of  U.S. 
leconomic  assistance  to  Nicaragua,  and  in- 
ternational verification.  More  recently,  in 
addition  to  Ambassador  Stone's  conver- 
sations with  Nicaraguan  leaders,  in- 
cluding four  meetings  with  junta  coor- 
dinator Ortega,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  for  Inter-American  Affairs 
Ambassador  Langhorne  A.  Motley 
visited  Nicaragua  in  October  1983.  Later 
that  month.  Ambassador  Motley  received 
Nicaraguan  Foreign  Minister  Miguel 
D'Escoto. 

In  late  November  and  early  Decem- 
ber of  1983,  as  the  Nicaraguan  armed 
opposition  intensified  its  attacks,  the 
Sandinistas  took  several  actions  that  sug- 
gested they  might  be  willing  to  address 
in  a  more  serious  manner  the  concerns  of 
Nicaragua's  neighbors  and  of  the  United 
States.  These  actions  included  announc- 
ing preparations  for  elections,  now  sched- 
uled for  November  1984,  an  amnesty 
program  for  certain  Miskito  Indians,  a 
safe-conduct  program  for  some  members 
of  the  armed  opposition,  relaxation  of 
press  censorship,  hints  that  certain 
Cuban  civilian  advisers  were  leaving 
Nicaragua  (which  conformed  to  previous 
rotation  schedules),  and  assertions  that 
some  Salvadoran  guerrilla  leaders  had 
been  asked  by  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment to  leave  the  country.  The 
Nicaraguan  Government  also  reiterated 
its  support  for  an  end  to  all  foreign  sup- 
port for  guerrilla  groups  in  the  region,  a 
regional  arms  freeze  followed  by  arms 
negotiations,  and  reciprocal  bans  on 
foreign  military  bases  and  foreign 
military  advisers. 

In  December  1983,  the  Secretary  of 
State  noted  the  positive  nature  of  these 
gestures,  but  stressed  that  it  was  impor- 
tant for  the  United  States  to  see  what 
reality  lay  behind  the  rhetoric.  The 
United  States  made  clear,  through  public 
statements,  diplomatic  channels  to  the 
Nicaraguan  Government,  and  in  conver- 
sations with  other  governments,  that 
it  was  willing  to  respond  in  kind  to 
concrete  and  genuine  steps  from  the 
Nicaraguan  Government. 

Thus  far,  however,  that  government 
has  not  taken  actions  that  would  affect 
its  basic  policies  of  military  expansion. 


dependence  on  a  substantial  number  of 
foreign  military  and  security  personnel, 
and  continued  material  support  for  guer- 
rilla groups  in  the  region.  In  fact,  a  de- 
tailed look  at  the  hints  of  moderation 
proved  discouraging.  Although  2,000 
Cuban  teachers  left  Nicaragua  on  normal 
rotation,  about  1,000  may  return  this 
month,  leaving  the  Cuban  civilian  pres- 
ence at  4,500  to  6,500  and  the  Cuban 
military  and  security  presence  at  about 
3,000  persons.  In  addition,  the  Soviet 
Union  and  other  Soviet-bloc  countries 
maintain  about  100  military  advisers. 
While  some  civilian  leaders  of  the 
Salvadoran  guerrillas  left  Nicaragua,  the 
Salvadoran  guerrilla  military  personnel 
remain.  Nicaraguan  support  for  the 
Salvadoran  guerrilla  command-and- 
control  centers,  training  facilities,  and 
arms  shipments  has  continued.  Likewise, 
Nicaragua  continues  to  receive  heavy 
arms  from  the  Soviet  bloc,  building  an 
arsenal  that  dismays  and  alarms  its 
neighbors. 

The  Nicaraguan  military  and  security 
forces  number  at  least  75,000  (including 
regular  troops,  reserves,  and  organized 
militia),  compared  with  about  43,000  in 
Guatemala,  22,000  in  Honduras,  40,000  in 
El  Salvador,  and  about  8,000  civil  and 
rural  guards  and  police  in  Costa  Rica.  In 
September  1983,  Nicaragua  instituted 
universal  draft  registration,  placing  it  in 
a  position  to  maintain  and  to  expand  its 
military  force. 

The  Nicaraguan  Government's  tenta- 
tive moves  on  the  domestic  front  have 
similarly  lacked  substance.  The  amnesty 
program  for  Miskitos  was  Ul-received  by 
the  Miskito  people,  1,200  of  whom  fled  to 
Honduras  in  December  1983,  claiming 
mistreatment  and  torture  by  Nicaraguan 
authorities.  Likewise,  the  safe-conduct 
program  for  the  armed  opposition  ap- 
pears to  have  few  if  any  takers  among 
the  insurgents,  who  remain  highly  skep- 
tical of  Sandinista  intentions. 

Although  the  Sandinistas  finally  an- 
nounced a  date  for  elections,  a  first  step 
to  potentially  fulfilling  its  1979  pledge  to 
the  OAS,  the  Nicaraguan  opposition  re- 
mains convinced  that  the  Nicaraguan 
electoral  system  now  being  devised  will 
not  permit  a  true  contest  for  power  to 
occur.  For  example,  there  has  been  no 
resolution  of  the  issues  of  meaningful  ac- 
cess to  government-controlled  media,  or 
political  parties'  ability  to  organize  and 
conduct  a  political  campaign  free  from 
intimidation  and  harassment,  or 
Sandinista  access  to  state  resources. 
Sandinista  leaders  have  said  that  armed 


opposition  leaders  will  not  be  allowed  to 
run  for  office,  and  it  now  appears  possi- 
ble that  the  state  of  emergency  (in  effect 
since  March  1982)  will  not  be  lifted  for  a 
long  enough  period  to  allow  the  opposi- 
tion a  fair  chance  to  compete.  A  possible 
clue  as  to  the  type  of  election  planned  by 
the  Sandinistas  came  from  a  comment  of 
Minister  of  Planning  Henry  Ruiz  on 
February  3,  1984,  when  he  said  the 
Nicai-aguan  people  had  a  right  to  "plural- 
ism, but  with  a  Sandinista  hegemony." 
Meanwhile,  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment periodically  offers  vivid  reminders 
that  despite  occasional  relaxation,  press 
censorship  remains  very  much  in  effect. 
New  crackdowns  led  the  independent 
newspaper  La  Prensa  not  to  publish  on 
three  occasions  in  January  and  February 
of  1984.  Nor  has  the  government  relaxed 
its  control  over  news  programing  by  the 
remaining  independent  radio  stations. 

Conclusions  and  Recommendations 

In  the  foregoing  history,  two  themes 
emerge— the  persistent  efforts  to  achieve 
peace  by  the  United  States  and  most 
regional  governments,  and  the  obstruc- 
tionist response  to  these  efforts  by  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua.  As  noted, 
there  recently  has  been  some  movement 
by  the  Sandinistas  away  from  their  basic 
intransigence,  but  we  have  not  yet 
seen  any  real  change  in  their  goals  of 
spreading  revolution  or  consolidating 
their  rule.  Rather,  it  appears  that  as  the 
Sandinistas  have  become  increasingly 
isolated  and  pressured  at  home  and 
abroad,  they  have  responded  by  giving 
out  public  hints  and  signals,  accompanied 
by  some  grudging  tactical  shifts.  On  the 
basis  of  performance  to  date,  their  aim 
seems  to  be  to  adopt  de  minimis 
changes  sufficient  only  to  reduce  internal 
and  external  pressure  to  modify  their 
basic  system.  In  the  meantime,  they 
have  taken  no  steps  that  are  not  in- 
stantly reversible,  as  they  proved  when 
they  cracked  down  with  new  intensity  on 
La  Prensa  in  January  and  February 
1984. 

Consequently,  while  the  United 
States  and  Nicaragua's  neighbors  believe 
strongly  that  pressure  is  working— and, 
indeed,  has  proven  to  be  the  only  effec- 
tive inducement  to  the  Sandinistas— we 
believe  that  it  should  only  be  reduced  or 
removed  when  Nicaragua  undertakes  the 
real  changes  in  its  external  and  internal 
policies  that  will  contribute  to  regional 
peace.  It  is  worth  noting  that  10  of  the 
12  members  of  the  National  Bipartisan 
Commission  on  Central  America,  chaired 


June  1984 


73 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


by  former  Secretarj'  of  State  Kissinger, 
concluded  "...  we  do  not  believe  it 
would  be  wise  to  dismantle  existing  in- 
centives and  pressures  on  the  Managua 
regime  except  in  conjunction  with  de- 
monstrable progress  on  the  negotiating 

front." 

Bipartisan  congressional  support  for 
U.S.  policy  toward  Central  America  re- 
mains an  important  goal  of  this  Adminis- 
tration. There  are  several  areas  in  which 
future  congressional  support  is  essential 
to  meeting  our  objectives  in  this  area. 

First,  prompt  congressional  approval 
of  the  Central  America  Democracy, 
Peace,  and  Development  Initiative  is  an 
important  first  step.  This  proposal  is 
proof  of  U.S.  recognition  of  its  vital  in- 
terests in  the  area  and  the  need  to  adopt 
innovative  measures  to  deal  with  the 
complex  situation.  Prompt  approval 
would  signal  continued  bipartisan  in- 
terest and  support  in  the  United  States 
for  peaceful,  democratic  change  in  the 
area.  To  not  approve  it  or  to  dilute  it 
significantly  would  be  read  throughout 
the  area  as  a  sign  of  U.S.  unwillingness 
to  shoulder  its  responsibilities  in  Central 
America.  That  would  only  weaken  our 
friends'  confidence  in  theii-  ability  to  help 
maintain  security  and  democracy  and 
promote  economic  growth  under  terms  of 
any  negotiated  settlement— or  even  to 
negotiate  successfully. 

Second,  early  Senate  confirmation  of 
Ambassador  Hany  Shlaudeman  as 
Special  Presidential  Envoy  for  Central 
American  Negotiations  is  also  highly 
desirable. 

The  third  area  is  adequate  and 
timely  funding  for  programs  authorized 
by  the  Intelligence  Authorization  Act. 
Representatives  of  the  executive  branch 
have  discussed  this  with  appropriate 
committees  of  the  Senate  and  the  House. 
We  have  found  conclusively  that  the 
broad  array  of  incentives,  both  positive 
and  negative,  that  currently  exists  in  the 
area  plays  a  very  important  role  in  reas- 
suring our  allies  and  in  convincing  those 
who  oppose  them  that  the  United  States 
will  stand  by  its  friends  and  its  commit- 
ments. To  hamper  U.S.  ability  to  main- 
tain these  incentives  would  delay  rather 
than  advance  our  efforts  and  those  of 
other  countries  to  achieve  peace  in 
Central  America. 


A  National  Response  to  the 
Crisis  in  Central  America 


by  Langhome  A.  Motley 

Prepared  statement  submitted  to  the 
Subcmmnittee  on  Foreign  Operatimis  of 
the  House  Appropriations  Committee  on 
March  27, 1981f  Ambassador  Motley  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American 
Affairs.^ 

The  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America  reported  in  January 
that  the  Central  American  "crisis  will 
not  wait.  There  is  no  time  to  lose."  It 
recommended  a  long-tenn  national 
strategy  formulated  "in  a  nonpartisan 
spii-it  and  in  a  bipartisan  way." 

This  prepared  statement  addresses 
two  topics: 

•  The  need  for  emergency  assistance 
to  help  El  Salvador  defend  its  chosen 
path  toward  democracy;  and 

•  The  vital  importance  of  implement- 
ing the  bipartisan  commission's  long- 
term  recommendations  so  as  to  achieve 
an  enduring  and  peaceful  solution  to  the 
troubles  that  threaten  to  engulf  our 
neighbors. 


'Text  of  identical  letters  from  Secretary 
Shultz  to  Thomas  P.  O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  and  George 
Bush,  President  of  the  Senate,  March  15,  1984. 

^Appendixes  are  not  included.  ■ 


74 


I.  EL  SALVADOR'S  STRUGGLE 

The  bipartisan  eonmiission  concluded 
that  "the  future  of  Central  America 
depends  in  large  part  on  what  happens 
in  El  Salvador."  The  next  3  months  are 
critical  if  El  Salvador  is  to  continue  to 
evolve  toward  democracy. 

Sunday,  more  than  a  million  Salva- 
dorans  cast  their  vote  for  president  and 
vice  president.  While  guerrilla  sabotage 
and  procedural  confusion  hampered  some 
voters,  the  armed  forces  successfully 
protected  the  balloting  as  a  whole. 
Voters  were  able  to  go  to  the  polls  in  a 
more  relaxed  environment  than  in  1982. 

Final  results  are  not  in,  but  it  ap- 
pears that  the  voting  was  so  hotly  con- 
tested that  no  candidate  will  receive  the 
absolute  majority  required  for  election 
under  the  Constitution. 

Thirty  days  after  Sunday's  results 
are  certified,  "therefore,  a  runoff  election 
will  be  held  between  the  two  front- 
runners.  That  vote  will  probably  take 
place  in  May.  If  guerrilla  opposition  can 
continue  to  "be  blunted,  this  second  roimd 


jrtions 


should  encounter  fewer  administrative 
difficulties  than  those  produced  by  the 
new  antifraud  measures  adopted  Sunday. 

The  new  government  is  to  be  in- 
stalled in  .June. 

To  protect  the  Salvadoran  people  and 
the  leaders  they  choose,  the  Salvadoran 
Armed  Forces  must  have  the  supplies 
and  training  they  need  to  fend  off  guer- 
rilla forces  supported  by  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua. 

We  have  no  time  to  lose.  El  Salvador 
needs  supplies  now,  not  just  next 
summer. 

If  I  were  asking  you  to  provide  funds  i 
to  shore  up  a  collapsing  political  system 
or  to  rescue  an  army  reeling  in  retreat,  I 
could  understand  that  this  committee 
and  the  Congress  might  be  extremely 
reluctant  to  do  so.  But  I  am  asking  for 
continued  support  for  a  policy  that  is 
working. 

Progress  on  the  Ground 

In  1979,  reform-minded  officers  threw 
out  the  military-oligarchic  system  under 
which  El  Salvador  had  been  ruled  for 
decades.  Progress  since  then  has  been 
slow  but  remarkably  steady  in  light  of  in- 
herited difficulties,  violent  opposition 
from  extremist  groups  on  both  left  and 
right,  and  a  determined  Soviet-Cuban- 
Sandinista  effort  to  help  the  guerrillas  to 
seize  power. 

El  Salvador's  leaders  have  begun  one 
of  the  most  revolutionary  land  reforms  in 
all  Latin  America.  They  have  im- 
plemented an  amnesty  for  guerrillas  and 
their  sympathizers.  In  March  1982,  1.3 
million"  Salvadorans  elected  a  Constituent! 
Assembly  which  wrote,  debated,  and  ap- 
proved a"  modern  constitution.  That  con- 
stitution institutionalizes  refoi-m,  in- 
cluding land  reform,  and  provides  for  a    \ 
democratic  political  system  accountable 
to  the  people. 

The  direct  popular  election  of  a  con- 
stitutional president  and  vice  president 
this  year  will  be  followed  by  elections  fori 
a  new  National  Assembly  and  local  and 
department  officials  next  year. 

Salvadoran  civil,  military,  political, 
and  business  leaders  have  condemned 


tlatiJi 
Civilia 
forllK 


FE 


Department  of  State  Bulleti. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


aivaiii' 


if  km 


death  squad  activity  and  taken  specific 
actions  to  end  it.  It  would  be  premature 
to  write  /??n'.s  to  this  sordid  and  tragic 
phenomenon,  but  all  observers  agree 
that  indiscriminate  violence  is  down. 
Civilian  deaths  from  all  political  causes 
for  the  month  of  February  were  the 
lowest  since  the  guerrilla  war  began  in 
1980:  one-tenth  the  number  only  3  or  4 
years  ago.  This  decline  has  occurred 
despite  a  i-ecent  upsurge  of  killings  from 
the  left,  such  as  the  assassination  of  con- 
servative deputies  and  the  deaths  of 
civilian  train  passengers. 

The  Armed  Forces  of  El  Salvador 
are  not  in  retreat.  The  myth  that  they 
are  on  the  verge  of  collapse  is  a  Cuban- 
FMLN  [Farabundo  Marti  National  Liber- 
ation Front]  propaganda  offensive  aimed 
at  undermining  the  March  25  presidential 
election.  This  disinformation  campaign 
was  launched  in  mid-January  by  Fidel 
Castro.  Castro  claimed  that  the  army 
knew  the  guerrillas  were  winning  and 
was  preparing  a  coup  against  the 
elections. 

The  corollary  assertion  that 
Salvadoran  troops  regularly  sell  their 
weapons  to  the  guerrillas  and  that  there 
are  wholesale  defections  is  another 
canard.  In  fact,  we  have  recently  identi- 
fied additional  U.S.  weapons  captured 
from  the  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador  as  one 
which  the  manufacturer  shipped  to  Viet- 
nam in  the  1960s  and  1970s.  Moreover,  it 
is  the  guei-rillas  who  are  press-ganging 
rural  youths  into  their  I'anks  to  offset 
combat  losses  and  the  defections  that  are 
yielding  excellent  intelligence  about 
guerrilla  plans. 

The  Salvadoran  military  is  gradually 
improving  its  capabilities.  It  takes  time 
to  see  the  results  from  training  junior  of- 
ficers and  noncommissioned  officers,  but 
the  number  of  Salvadoran  troops  who 
have  received  U.S.  training  is  slowly  in- 
creasing. Some  15%  of  the  active 
Salvadoran  military  has  received  exten- 
sive U.S.  training;  more  have  received 
short  training  courses.  The  guerrillas 
avoid  contact  with  the  U.S. -trained, 
immediate- reaction  battalions— an  indica- 
tion that  they,  at  least,  do  not  believe 
their  own  propaganda. 

The  restructuring  of  the  military 
command  last  November  increased  army 
effectiveness  and  improved  coordination 
betw^een  civilian  and  military  authorities. 
The  Salvadoran  military  has  been  on  the 
offensive  since  mid-January,  extending 
the  National  Plan  into  Usulutan  Depart- 
ment and  elsewhere  in  the  country.  This 
season's  harvest  was  defended  so  suc- 
cessfully that  only  one  coffee  mill  was 


June  1984 


burned  by  the  guerrillas.  And  in  recent 
military  actions,  like  the  one  at  San 
Gerardo  in  mid-February,  government 
forces  have  been  inventive  and 
aggressive. 

The  fact  is  that,  despite  a  handful  of 
guerrilla  spectaculars  like  the  flestruction 
of  the  Cuscatlan  bridge  and  the  assault 
on  the  El  Paraiso  gai-ri.son,  the 
Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  have  been 
holding  their  own  and  giving  signs  that, 
with  pi'oper  supplies,  they  could  do  even 
better.  Government  forces  are  operating 
effectively  in  Morazan,  maintaining 
pressure  on  the  guerrillas  by  dismantling 
their  camps  and  disrupting  their  supply 
networks.  Guerrilla  attempts  to  divert 
government  forces  from  these  operations 
in  Moi'azan  and  San  Miguel  Departments 
with  the  March  16  attack  on  Suchitoto 
and  the  mortar  attack  on  San  Miguel  city 
on  March  17  failed. 

It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  the  guer- 
rillas' claim  that  elections  are  "meaning- 
less" and  a  "farce"  with  their  effort  to 
disrupt  them.  Violating  their  pledges  not 
to  disrupt  the  elections,  the  guerrillas 
have  assassinated  Legislative  Assembly 
deputies,  confiscated  identity  cards 
needed  to  vote,  threatened  retaliation 
against  voters,  and  conducted  extensive 
sabotage  against  the  power  grid  on  elec- 
tion eve.  The  principal  guerrilla  com- 
mander, Joaquin  Villalobos,  made  it 
explicit  on  March  17  that  he  has  no  in- 
tention of  accepting  elections. 

In  sum,  the  Armed  Forces  of  El 
Salvador  are  doing  what  the  civilian 
authorities  have  been  asking  them  to 
do— defending  the  people  and  their  coun- 
try's increasingly  democratic  political 
processes.  And  they  have  been  doing  so 
in  the  face  of  continuing  guerrilla  tei'- 
rorism  and  disruption. 

These  developments  give  hope  that 
the  orderly,  just,  and  legally  based 
democratic  society  we  all  desire  for  El 
Salvador  actually  stands  a  chance  of 
becoming  a  reality. 

But  this  progress— including  the  on- 
going reforms— will  be  stopped  in  its 
tracks  and  could  be  reversed  if  U.S.  sup- 
port is  cut  off  or  interi'upted. 

Delay  in  Washington 

Part  of  the  problem  we  face  is  that  the 
Washington  political  and  legislative 
calendars  are  out  of  phase  with  what  is 
happening  in  El  Salvador.  In  fact,  they 
have  rarely  been  more  out  of  phase  with 
the  U.S.  national  interest. 


Last  fall,  we  knew,  and  the  Congress 
knew,  that  the  assistance  levels  ap- 
proved for  El  Salvador  in  last  fall's  con- 
tinuing resolution  would  run  out  this 
spring.  But  our  deliberations  then  were 
conducted  in  anticipation  of  the  bipar- 
tisan commission's  report.  The  common 
understanding  was  that,  once  the  bipar- 
tisan commission  had  made  its  findings, 
we  VNould  be  in  a  better  position  to 
determine  the  extent  of  our  support. 

The  bipartisan  commission  issued  its 
report  on  schedule.  It  called  for  a  com- 
bination of  emergency  stabilization  and 
long-term  development  measures. 

The  commission  also  unanimously 
recommended  that  the  United  States 
provide  El  Salvador  "significantly  in- 
creased levels  of  military  aid  as  quickly 
as  possible"  [emphasis  in  the  report].  It 
also  pointed  out  that  "The  worst  possible 
policy  for  El  Salvador  is  to  provide  just 
enough  aid  to  keep  the  war  going  but  too 
little  to  wage  it  successfully." 

In  the  comprehensive  legislation  he 
sent  Congress  to  implement  the  commis- 
sion's recommendations  (and  which  I 
review  in  section  II),  the  President  re- 
quested $178.7  million  in  supplemental 
military  aid  to  El  Salvador  this  fiscal 
year. 

It  is  now  obvious,  however,  that  Con- 
gress will  not  act  on  this  legislation 
before  June  at  the  earliest.  Funding  is 
not  likely  to  be  available  before  July,  and 
more  time  is  needed  after  that  to  begin 
actual  deliveries. 

Immediate  Needs 

Events  on  the  ground  in  El  Salvador 
simply  will  not  wait  that  long.  There  is  a 
wai-  going  on.  Military  operations  have 
been  continuous  since  early  last  fall. 
Government  forces  have  taken  successful 
offensive  or  defensive  actions  every 
week  since  the  first  of  the  year. 

The  growing  gap  between  what  is 
needed  to  sustain  progress  on  the  gound 
and  the  pace  of  our  legislative  calendar 
led  us  to  identify  $93  million  in  partic- 
ularly urgent  requirements. 

This  emergency  request  was  de- 
signed to  enable  the  Salvadoran  military 
to  maintain  effective  operations  through 
the  elections,  the  inauguration  of  a  new 
president  and  adrhinistration,  and  the 
first  weeks  of  that  administration— that 
is,  until  appropriations  provided  from 
congressional  action  on  the  overall  legis- 
lative package  would  become  available. 

The  major  portion  of  the  $93-million 
package  is  $49.5  million  for  training,  am- 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


munition,  spare  parts,  and  other  material 
to  sustain  current  operations. 

A  second  element  is  $12.5  million  for 
medical  evacuation.  In  El  Salvador  one- 
third  of  the  soldiers  wounded  in  combat 
die  of  their  wounds.  This  compares  to  1 
in  9  or  1  in  10  in  recent  U.S.  military 
combat  actions.  This  lo.s.s  of  life  is  all  the 
more  tragic  because  so  much  of  it  is 
avoidable. 

Last  year,  with  congressional  ap- 
proval, we  instituted  a  medical  training 
program.  We  ti-ained  380  Salvadoran 
soldiers  as  field  medical  corpsmen  to 
treat  the  wounded  in  and  near  the 
battlefield.  We  also  trained  medical  .ser- 
vice corps  officers  and  provided  addi- 
tional assistance  to  ensui-e  that  field 
medical  care  would  be  available  to 
troops. 

Salvadoran  hospitals  have  an  ex- 
cellent survival  record— over  90%.  But 
some  40  or  more  small  jeep  ambulances 
and  4  aero-medical  evacuation  helicopters 
are  needed  to  evacuate  the  wounded  to 
hospitals.  With  these  tools,  we  believe 
the  Salvadoran  Army  can  save  many 
lives— civilian  and  guerrilla  lives  as  well 
as  those  of  Salvadoran  soldiers.  We 
believe  it  will  also  improve  the  effective- 
ness and  morale  of  then-  own  forces.  I  do 
not  think  we  can  in  good  conscience 
delay  this  medical  evacuation  capability. 

A  third  element  is  $29  million  to 
enhance  tactical  mobility  by  providing  9 
or  10  helicopters  and  200  ti-ucks.  Govern- 
ment forces  must  defend  all  points,  all 
the  time,  all  over  the  country.  But  gov- 
ernment-to-guerrilla force  ratios  are  cur- 
rently as  low  as  three  and  one-half  to 
one.  Since  its  forces  are  necessarily 
spread  thin,  the  government  needs 
transport  to  deploy  in  force.  Yet  the 
Salvadoran  Air  Force  currently  has  less 
than  20  helicoi)ters.  To  move  any  of  its 
major  units,  the  army  actually  has  to 
rent  civilian  trucks. 

The  final  component  is  $2  million  for 
communications  equipment.  The 
Salvadoran  militai-y  has  never  been  able 
to  equip  its  forces  below  the  platoon 
level  with  radios  without  borrowing  from 
larger  units.  This  has  meant  that  small 
units  have  been  unable  to  call  in  rein- 
forcements when  under  attack  or  to  com- 
municate immediately  the  position  of 
guerrilla  units  they  locate.  This  lack  of 
communications  below  the  platoon  level 
has  prevented  the  Salvadoran  Army 
from  taking  full  advantage  of  the  tactical 
gains  from  its  recent  shift  to  smaller 
patrols. 


Last  week,  in  the  course  of  intensive 
consultations  within  the  Senate,  it 
became  clear  that  there  was  bipartisan 
support  in  the  Senate  for  providing  im- 
mediately $61.75  million  of  the  original 
supplemental  request.  Because  this 
meets  the  most  urgent  needs,  the  Ad- 
ministration agreed  to  support  this  bipar- 
tisan proposal  in  order  to  ensure  ex- 
peditious action.  This  compromise  on 
House  Joint  Resolution  492  will  permit 
us  to  continue  our  current  programs  for 
the  immediate  future,  but  it  will  leave 
unfulfilled  other  important  requirements 
for  both  economic  and  military  assistance 
which  must  be  met  this  year  if  we  are  to 
sustain  the  progr-ess  El  Salvador  is  mak- 
ing to  establish  a  secure  democracy  and 
lay  the  basis  for  equitable  economic 
growth. 

The  Stakes 

Who  will  lose  if  the  flow  of  U.S.  military 
supplies  to  El  Salvador  were  to  be 
interrupted? 

Certainly  not  the  death  squads, 
because  the  continuation  of  U.S.  military 
assistance  has  been  a  powerful  and  suc- 
cessful tool  against  those  who  would  use 
medieval  methods. 

Certainly  not  those  on  the  far  right 
who  hope  to  block  centiist,  democratic 
evolution  and  end  refomi  in  El  Salvador. 

And,  of  course,  not  the  guenillas, 
who  would  be  delighted  to  have  the 
pressure  against  them  lifted  without  the 
need  for  any  retreat  on  their  part. 

The  losers  would  be  the  democratic 
reformers  and  those  in  the  military  who 
have  supported  a  more  humane  and  con- 
stitutional course  for  El  Salvador. 

The  losers  would  be  the  friends  of 
democracy  and  moderation  in  the  rest  of 
Central  America  and  the  surrounding 
region  who  understand  that  it  is 
necessary  to  defend  democracy  and 
human  rights  against  theb'  immediate 
armed  enemies  as  well  as  the  ravages  of 
traditional  inequities  and  repression. 

But  the  biggest  losers  would  be  the 
people  of  El  Salvador  and  the  people  of 
the  United  States.  If  we  fail  to  act  now, 
w^e  would— as  Secretary  Shultz  said  on 
March  20 — prolong  sui'fering,  hinder 
prospects  for  peace  and  negotiations, 
and  strengthen  the  hand  of  our  adver- 
saries. And,  by  our  default,  we  would 
also  increase  the  risk  of  the  spread  of 
communism  in  Central  America. 


II.  THE  CENTRAL  AMERICA 
DEMOCRACY,  PEACE,  AND 
DEVELOPMENT  INITIATIVE 
ACT  OF  1984 

I  hope  I  have  conveyed  the  urgency  of 
El  Salvador's  emergency  needs.  At  the 
same  time,  I  want  to  underscore  that  our 
overall  approach  to  the  problems  of 
Central  America  is  considered  and 
comprehensive. 

The  exhaustive  report  of  the  Na- 
tional Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America  and  the  President's  endorse- 
ment of  its  recommendations  amount  to  a 
national  program  of  action  that  meets 
immediate  operational  needs  within  the 
compass  of  a  long-term  strategy. 

"The  actions  proposed  by  the  bipar- 
tisan commission  and  ajjproved  by  the 
President  will  help  to  stabilize,  moder- 
nize, and  humanize  situations  plagued  by 
injustice  and  violence.  And  they  will 
enable  us  to  take  the  offensive  against 
poverty,  to  foster  democratic  develop- 
ment and  respect  for  human  rights,  and 
to  help  bring  lasting  peace  to  this 
troubled  region  so  close  to  the  United 
States. 

As  you  know,  the  President  is  imple- 
menting by  executive  action  those  com- 
mission recommendations  not  requiring 
congressional  action.  The  bill  he  trans- 
mitted to  the  Congress  on  February  17 
embodies  the  recommendations  made  by 
the  bipartisan  commission  that  do  re- 
quire legislation.  The  President  urges 
prompt  congressional  action  in  support  of 
this  program. 

The  Bipartisan  Consensus 

The  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America  was  chaired  by  Henry 
A.  Kissinger.  The  other  commissioners 
were  Nicholas  F.  Brady,  Henry  G. 
Cisneros,  William  P.  Clements,  Jr., 
Caiios  F.  Diaz-Alejandro,  Wilson  S. 
Johnson,  Lane  Kirkland,  Richard  M. 
Scammon,  John  Silber,  Potter  Stewart, 
Robei't  S.  Strauss,  and  William  B. 
Walsh. 

In  the  United  States,  the  commissions 
met  with  the  President,  the  Secretary  of 
State,  three  former  Presidents,  four 
former  Secretaires  of  State,  Membei's  of 
Congress,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  and 
an  exceptionally  wide  range  of  organiza- 
tional representatives  and  private 
individuals. 

The  commission's  discussions  with 
Central  and  other  Latin  American 
leaders  eliminated  the  screens  created  b) 
distance,  paperwork,  and  partisan  pre- 


Department  of  State  Bulleth 


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WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


inceptions  and  exposed  its  members  to 
;he  region's  realities.  They  saw  for  them- 
selves what  is  happening  in  El  Salvadoi- 
ind  in  Nicaragua  and  throughout  the 
sthmus. 

In  Central  America,  communism, 
k'iolence,  and  dictatorship  feed  on  misei-y 
ind  a  dismal  history  of  injustice.  During 
:he  last  several  years,  per  capita  gross 
domestic  product  has  fallen  by  35%  in  El 
Salvador,  23%  in  Costa  Rica,  "l4%  in 
Guatemala,  and  12%  in  Honduras.  In  4 
vears.  El  Salvador  has  lost  15  years  of 
•oonomic  development.  And  the  San- 
linistas,  Cuba,  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  been  actively  e.xploiting  these 
roubles  through  propaganda,  covert  ac- 
ion,  and  support  for  armed  struggle. 

The  result  is  a  destructive  dynamic 
hat  oppresses  the  people  of  Central 
America  and  will,  unless  altered,  increas- 
ingly endanger  the  rest  of  the  hemi- 
sphere. 

This  destructive  dynamic  must  end. 
lop-  iBut  it  cannot  be  broken  without  im- 
mediate and  jjersistent  action  in  support 
of  democratic  self-determination,  eco- 
nomic and  social  development  that  fairly 
benefits  all,  and  cooperation  in  meeting 
threats  to  the  security  of  the  region. 

That  was  the  consensus  reached  by 
uiriii?   the  bipartisan  commission.  It  is  also  the 
basis  of  the  President's  legislative 
proposals. 

The  commission  found  that  Central 
America's  problems  are  complex,  severe, 
and  deeply  rooted.  It  concluded  that 
there  are  no  quick  fixes  or  shortcuts  to 
solving  them.  The  U.S.  interests  in- 
volved, it  pointed  out,  are  both  moral 
and  strategic.  They  are  threatened  by 
human  rights  abuse  and  economic  misery 
and  by  Cuban  and  Soviet  intervention. 

The  commission  concluded  unani- 
mously that  the  long  tei-m  will  be  far  less 
manageable  if  we  fail  to  deal  with  cur- 
rent challenges.  It  concluded  that  we  are 
not  doing  enough  to  protect  our  in- 
terests. It  called  for  U.S.  support  for 
regional  diplomacy  like  Contadora,  add- 
ing that  the  United  States  has  a  special 
responsibility  to  contribute  actively  to 
the  economic,  security,  and  political  con- 
ditions required  for  Contadora  to  suc- 
ceed. It  recommended  that  the  Adminis- 
tration and  the  Congress  cooperate  to 
provide  the  resources  we  and  our  Cen- 
tral American  friends  need  to  attain  a 
lasting  peace  built  solidly  on  democracy 
and  equitable  develojiment. 


npi'*' 


pwir! 


The  Bipartisan  Program 

To  implement  the  recommendations  of 
the  bipartisan  commission,  the  President 
proposes: 

Economic  Assistance.  To  halt  eco- 
nomic deterioration  and  the  social  and 
political  unrest  it  engenders,  the  bipar- 
tisan commission  recommended  an  im- 
mediate additional  $400  million  for 
emergency  stabilization  to  set  the  stage 
foi"  long-term  development.  The  Pi'esi- 
dent  has  requested  these  funds  in  the 
foi-m  of  a  supjilemental  for  fiscal  year 
(FY)  1984. 

To  make  possible  a  comprehensive 
strategy  to  promote  democratization, 
economic  growth,  human  development, 
and  security,  the  commission  recom- 
mended almost  doubling  our  projected 
economic  aid  to  roughly  $8  billion  over 
the  next  5  years. 

The  President's  implementation  plan 
for  FY  1985-89  calls  for  a  total  of  $5.9 
billion  in  appi'opriated  funds  and  off- 
budget  authorities  to  allow  for  $2  billion 
in  insurance  and  guarantees,  the  latter 
including  housing  investment  guarantees 


and  a  trade  credit  insurance  program  to 
be  administered  by  the  Export-Import 
Bank. 

Foi-  FY  1985,  his  program  calls  for 
$1.1  billion  in  appropriated  funds  and 
$600  million  in  insurance  and  guarantees. 

Depending  on  country  performance, 
we  estimate  that  the  major  beneficiaries 
of  direct,  bilateral  aid  in  FY  1985  would 
be  El  Salvador  ($341  million),  Costa  Rica 
($208  million),  Honduras  ($139  million), 
and  Guatemala  ($96  million).  Although 
other  countries  would  receive  more  on  a 
per  capita  basis.  El  Salvador,  which  has 
suffered  over  $800  million  in  guerrilla 
fiestruetion,  would  be  the  largest  single 
recipient.  This  FY  1985  proposal  in- 
cludes: 

•  About  $550  million  in  balance-of- 
payments  suppoit  to  finance  the  import 
of  critical  goods  by  the  private  sector; 

•  Major  funding  to  develop  commer- 
cial agriculture,  the  backbone  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  economies,  including 
assistance  to  broaden  ownership  patterns 
and  to  increase  the  availability  of  credit; 

•  $120  million  in  Pubhc  Law  480  food 
assistance,  with  local  currency  proceeds 


U.S.  Aid  to  El  Salvador 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
APR.  13,  1984» 

On  February  17  of  this  year,  the  Presi- 
dent submitted  a  plan  to  the  Congress 
based  on  the  work  of  the  National  Bipar- 
tisan Commission  on  Central  America— 
the  "Scoop  Jackson  plan"— to  advance 
democracy,  peace,  and  development  in 
Central  America.  It  included  a  request 
for  $178  million  in  supplemental  military 
aid  for  El  Salvador  in  FY  1984. 

Early  last  month,  the  President  asked 
that  about  half  of  that  money  ($93  million) 
be  appropriated  immediately  to  meet 
urgent  security  requirements  until  the 
Congress  could  act  on  the  whole  plan  in 
the  summer. 

Two  weeks  ago,  to  help  get  things 
moving,  the  President  authorized  reduc- 
ing our  request  to  $62  million.  This  lower 
sum  would  have  met  only  minimal 
medical,  supply,  and  ammunition  require- 
ments. Our  proposal  passed  the  Senate 
with  broad  bipartisan  support.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  two  Houses  were  unable  to 
meet  and  complete  action  before  leaving 
for  the  2-week  Easter  recess. 


Meanwhile,  in  El  Salvador  a  tragic 
irony  is  at  hand.  At  the  very  moment 
when  the  people  have  turned  out  in 
massive  numbers  to  register  dramatically 
their  hopes  and  beliefs  in  democracy, 
their  armed  forces  are  running  out  of 
means  to  defend  against  Marxist  violence. 
We  must  not  let  that  happen. 

For  the  past  10  days,  officials  from 
State,  Defense,  and  the  White  House 
have  worked  with  bipartisan  leaders  of 
both  Houses  to  secure  the  necessary 
funding.  We  would  have  preferred  that 
the  Congress  complete  its  processes 
before  the  congressional  recess.  Congress 
will,  of  course,  have  that  opportunity 
upon  its  return.  In  the  interim,  in  order  to 
prevent  unnecessary  loss  of  life  and  to 
assure  security  requii-ed  for  the  runoff 
election,  the  President  is  today  exercising 
authorities  provided  in  law  to  deUver  the 
essential  materials  to  El  Salvador. 

We  look  forward  to  continuing  discus- 
sions with  the  Congress  on  this  matter 
when  the  Congress  returns. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  16,  1984.  ■ 


June  1984 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


! 


used  to  reinforce  progi-ams  in  education, 
health,  and  other  vital  social  services; 

•  Funds  to  strengthen  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  in  the  region  as  the 
surest  way  to  safeguard  individual  liber- 
ties and  human  rights: 

•  Labor-intensive  construction  of  in- 
frastructure and  housing; 

•  Significantly  increased  support  for 
practical  education,  including  literacy  and 
teacher  corps;  scholarships;  and  ex- 
change programs  for  democratic  leaders 
and  institutions;  and 

•  Support  for  the  Central  American 
Common  Market  and  its  companion  Cen- 
tral American  Bank  for  Economic  Inte- 
gration to  revitalize  intraregional  trade 
and  restore  economic  production  and 
employment. 

Military  Assistance.  Without  secu- 
rity, neither  the  best  economic  programs 
nor  the  wisest  diplomacy  will  stop  the 


opponents  of  democracy  in  Central 
America. 

The  bipartisan  commission  noted  that 
there  is  "no  logical  argument  for  giving 
some  aid  but  not  enough.  The  worst  pos- 
sible policy  for  El  Salvador  is  to  provide 
just  enough  aid  to  keep  the  war  going 
but  too  little  to  wage  it  successfully."  It. 
therefore,  unanimously  recommended 
that  the  United  States  provide  to  El 
Salvador  "significantly  increased  levels 
of  military  aid  as  quickly  as  possible,  so 
that  the  Salvadoran  authorities  can  act 
on  the  assurance  that  needed  aid  will  be 
forthcoming"  [emphasis  in  the  report]. 

The  President's  proposal  is  as 
follows: 

For  El  Salvador:  To  break  the  mili- 
tary stalemate  as  soon  as  possible  and 
provide  a  firmer  basis  for  economic 
recovery  and  democratic  national  recon- 
ciliation in  El  Salvador,  we  seek  $178.7 


Preliminary  ICJ  Ruling  on  Nicaraguan  Request 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAY  10, 1984» 

As  the  Department's  Legal  Adviser 
Davis  Robinson's  statement  in  The 
Hague  indicated  earlier  today,  we  will 
have  to  withhold  full  comment  on  the 
decision  until  we  have  had  an  opportunity 
to  review  the  lengthy  opinion  and  its  im- 
plications. As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  have 
not  even  received  the  full  text  of  the 
statement  in  Washington  yet. 

However,  at  this  point,  we  would  like 
to  make  some  preliminary  observations. 

The  first  is  that  the  United  States 
respects  the  Court  and  the  rule  of  law 
and  intends  to  act  accordingly. 

The  Court  has  not  made  a  decision 
regarding  jurisdiction,  and  we  regret  that 
the  Court  has  denied  the  U.S.  request 
that  the  case  be  dismissed  at  this  time. 
However,  we  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  Court  noted  that  a  number  of 
issues  which  merited  examination  had 
been  raised  with  respect  to  jurisdiction 
and  that  the  Court  intends  to  pursue  that 
issue.  And,  of  course,  there  was  no  deci- 
sion on  the  merits  or  judgment  on 
Nicaragua's  allegation  that  the  United 
States  had  done  anything  illegal. 

With  respect  to  the  provisional 
measures  enumerated  in  the  decision,  we 
wOl  need  to  examine  them  carefully,  but 
we  note  that  the  decision  refers  to  the 


rights  of  all  states  to  be  free  from  the 
threat  or  use  of  unlawful  force  and  that 
the  Court  called  on  both  the  United 
States  and  Nicaragua  to  refrain  from  ac- 
tions which  could  extend  or  aggravate  the 
dispute  before  the  Court. 

The  principles  articulated  are  based 
on  the  UN  Charter,  to  which  we  sub- 
scribe. Our  initial  reaction  is  that  nothing 
contained  in  the  measures  indicated  by 
the  Court  is  inconsistent  with  current 
U.S.  policy  or  activities  with  respect  to 
Nicaragua. 

We  will  be  asking  the  Court  quickly 
to  decide  the  fundamental  issue  of  its 
jurisdiction.  We  will  be  meeting  with  the 
Court  tomorrow  to  develop  a  schedule  for 
further  proceedings  in  this  case  on  that 
issue  of  jurisdiction. 

The  United  States  continues  to 
believe  that  the  best  prospect  for  resolv- 
ing the  political,  social,  and  economic 
problems  that  plague  the  nations  of  Cen- 
tral America,  including  Nicaragua,  is 
through  serious  negotiations  in  the  Con- 
tadora  process.  We  hope  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  will  respond  to  the 
Court's  decision  by  making  a  serious  ef- 
fort to  advance  the  regional  negotiating 
process  in  cooperation  with  the  Con- 
tadora  process. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


million  in  FY  1984  supplemental  assis- 
tance and  $132.5  million  for  1985.  Added 
to  the  $64.8  million  available  under  this 
year's  continuing  resolution,  the 
FY  1984-85  program  for  El  Salvador 
would  total  $376  million.  (Our  emergency 
request  for  $92.75  million  to  protect  the 
elections  and  sustain  other  progi-ess  is 
part  of  the  FY  1984  supplemental.) 

For  the  rest  of  Central  America: 
$80.35  million  in  FY  1984  supplemental 
military  assistance  and  $123.4  million  for 
FY  1985.  The  lion's  share  would  be 
allocated  to  Honduras,  a  democracy  that 
still  faces  frequent  violations  of  its  na- 
tional territory  by  Salvadoran  guerrillas 
seeking  refuge  or  using  Honduras  as  a 
supply  route,  as  well  as  by  Honduran 
guen-illas  infiltrated  from  Nicaragua. 
Honduras  also  faces  a  direct  military 
threat  from  Nicaragua,  which  has  built 
up  armed  forces  at  least  five  times  larger 
than  Somoza's  National  Guard  and  has 
received  more  than  $250  million  in  mili- 
tary assistance  from  the  Soviet  bloc  since< 
1979. 

Conditionality.  There  is  agreement 
among  the  executive,  the  Congress,  and 
the  commission  that  in  El  Salvador 
human  rights  progress  is  essential  to  en- 
sure a  successful  outcome  of  the  war  and 
to  pi-otect  U.S.  security  and  moral  inter- 
ests. There  is  also  a  consensus  that  U.S. 
assistance  should  actively  be  used  to 
achieve  these  objectives. 

The  commission  recommends  that 
military  aid  to  El  Salvador  "should, 
through  legislation  requiring  periodic 
repoiis.  be  made  contingent  upon 
demonstrated  progress  toward  free  elec- 
fidiis:  frrcitom  of  association;  the  estab- 
lish ment  nf  the  ride  of  law  and  an  effec- 
tive judicial  system;  and  the  termiyiatiori 
of  the  activities  of  the  so-called  death 
squads,  as  well  as  vigorous  action 
against  those  guilty  of  crimes  and  the 
prosecution  to  the  extent  possible  of  past 
offenders.  These  conditions  should  be 
seriously  eyiforced"  [emphasis  in 
original]. 

The  executive  branch  and  the  Con- 
gress agree  with  this  objective  but  have 
not  always  seen  eye  to  eye  on  how  best 
to  achieve  this  shared  goal.  We  must 
now  find  a  means  to  condition  our 
assistance  in  ways  that  work. 

Progi-ess  during  the  last  3  months 
demonstrates  that  there  are  effective 
alternatives  to  the  previous  statutory 
formula  that  required  determinations  on 
an  "all-or-nothing"  basis  at  pre-set  inter- 
vals. This  formula  is  not  required  to  spu)^ 


Department  of  State  Bullet! 


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WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


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xecutive  action,  may  actually  trigger  in- 
Teased  hostile  action  by  guerrilla  forces, 
ind  can  focus  attention  on  the  certifica- 
ion  process  rather  than  on  the  under- 
ying  pi'oblems  and  their-  remedies. 

The  Administration  is  engaged  in  in- 
,ense  discussions  in  both  the  House  and 
senate  to  define  conditions  requiring,  as 
he  commission  recommended,  that  the 
overnment  of  El  Salvador  demonstrate 
)rogress  on  specified  issues  of  common 
;oncern. 

In  our  view,  an  effective  formula 
nust  allow  the  flexibility  to  respond  to 
;oncrete  circumstances.  Our  policies 
nust  be  able  to  take  into  account  such 
actors  as  sovereignty,  local  nationalism, 
md  the  interplay  among  contending 
brces  at  any  given  moment.  The  only 
)rovisions  unacceptable  to  the  Adminis- 
ration  are  ones  that  prejudge  the  situa- 
ion  on  the  ground  or  that  create  a 
)resumption  that  aid  should  be  cut  off 
irbitrarily. 

We  are,  in  sum,  working  closely  with 
.he  Congress  to  ensure  continuing 
luman  rights  progress— including  a  pro- 
Uam  to  achieve  mutually  agreed 
•esults— while  avoiding  confrontations 
ind  preserving  the  President's  ability  to 
)ursue  an  effective  foreign  policy. 

Central  American  Development 
Organization  (CADO).  The  bipartisan 
;ommission  recommended  creation  of  a 
Central  American  Development  Organi- 
ation  (CADO)  to  "do  what  no  existing 
lational  or  international  body  now  does: 
)rovide  a  continuous  and  coherent  ap- 
)roach  to  the  development  of  the  region, 
I  process  of  review  of  that  development, 
md  access  to  the  process  by  those 
vho  have  not  before  been  an  integral 
jart  of  it." 

The  President's  proposal  sets  forth 
jrinciples  to  guide  the  negotiations  for 
establishing  this  cooperative  mechanism 
n  conjunction  with  the  Central  American 
jountries  and  other  donors. 

The  President  intends  to  respect  the 
principles  set  forth  in  the  legislation, 
3oth  in  his  negotiations  and  in  subse- 
:juent  U.S.  participation  in  CADO.  In 
ine  with  these  principles: 

CADO  would  serve  as  a  broadly 
Dased  forum  for  an  open  dialogue  on 
Central  American  economic,  social,  and 
political  development  and  a  continuous 
review  of  local  policies  and  of  the  uses  to 
vhich  foreign  assistance  is  put; 

Participation  would  be  open  to  the 
United  States,  other  donors,  and  those 


mlif 


II'  f  • 
'inmtii 


Central  American  countries  that  commit 
themselves  to,  among  other  things,  peace 
and  mutual  security,  maintaining  or  mak- 
ing [progress  toward  human  rights  devel- 
opment, building  democracy,  and  en- 
couraging economic  growth  through 
policy  reforms.  CADO  would  include  the 
public  and  private  sectors,  the  latter  in- 
cluding representatives  from  both  labor 
and  business.  It  would  be  supported  by  a 
small  professional  staff; 

•  CADO  would  evaluate  country  per- 
formance and  progi-ess  in  meeting  objec- 
tives. It  would  then  make  recommenda- 
tions on  political,  economic,  and  social 
development  objectives;  mobilization  of 
resources  and  external  resource  needs; 
and  economic  policies  and  structures; 
and 

•  Disbursement  of  25%  of  economic 
assistance  funds  authorized  under  this 
act  and  allocated  for  each  Central 
American  country  would  be  deferred  un- 
til both  the  United  States  and  CADO 
have  approved.  Consistent  with  the  Con- 
stitution, ultimate  control  of  U.S.  aid 
funds  would  remain  with  Congress  and 
the  President. 

Multiyear  Funding.  To  ensure  effec- 
tive planning  and  predictability,  the 
President's  proposal  departs  fi-om  the 
conventional  practice  of  seeking  economic 
assistance  authorizations  for  only  1  or  2 
years.  We  are  seeking  an  authorization 
that  will  e.xtend  through  FY  1989.  We 
are  also  requesting  that  appropriations 
under  this  authorization  be  made 
available  beyond  a  single  fiscal  year. 

This  innovation— the  development  of 
a  properly  funded  5-year  program— was 
recommended  by  the  bipartisan  commis- 
sion. It  is  supported  by  our  own  analysis. 
It  would  enable  everyone  concerned— 
both  in  the  United  States  and  in  Central 
America— to  know  what  could  become 
available  if  perfonnance  standards  are 
met.  It  would  improve  efficiency.  And  it 
would  remove  much  of  the  uncertainty 
over  U.S.  reliability  and  commitment 
that  has  plagued  U.S.  relations  with  our 
neighbors  in  recent  years. 


III.  POLICY,  IMPLEMENTATION, 
AND  TIMING 

The  scope  and  importance  of  the  Presi- 
dent's proposals  to  implement  the  bipai-- 
tisan  commission's  recommendations 
have  understandably  led  to  many  ques- 
tions. Let  me  address  a  few  of  the  major 
ones. 


Are  we  asking  more  than  Central 
America  can  usefully  absorb? 

No.  The  sums  requested  are  modest  in 
relation  to  need. 

The  proposed  appropriation  of  $1.12 
billion  for  FY  1985  is  less  than  15%  of 
our  proposed  global  economic  aid  budget 
for  FY  1985  and  less  than  5%  of  the 
gross  domestic  product  of  the  region. 
Relative  to  gross  national  product,  this  is 
less  than  aid  previously  made  available 
to  some  other  parts  of  the  world,  in- 
cluding South  Korea  and  Taiwan.  The 
total  pi'oposed  program  of  $8  billion  over 
5  years  is  much  smaller  than  the 
Marshall  Plan,  which  in  less  than  4  years 
provided  $42  billion  at  today's  prices. 

One  useful  measure  of  the  ability  of 
Central  America  to  absorb  aid  in  these 
amounts  is  the  recent  shortfall  in  export 
earnings.  Lower  world  prices  for  coffee 
and  sugar  and  higher  costs  for  imported 
oil  have  led  to  net  hard  currency  losses 
of  $1.5  billion  per  year— the  same  general 
magnitude  as  the  proposed  assistance. 

Considerable  excess  capacity  already 
exists  to  generate  increased  employment 
and  output.  Private  firms  need  working 
capital  and  imported  inputs.  In  the  public 
sector,  high-priority  investment  pro- 
gi-ams  that  have  been  suspended  or  cut 
back  because  of  austerity  programs  could 
be  reactivated. 

Finally,  as  the  bipartisan  commission 
underlined,  physical  infrastructure  needs 
to  be  rebuilt,  health  and  education 
systems  need  expansion,  and  investment 
in  productive  capacity  is  essential  to 
employ  the  region's  growing  labor  force. 

Will  the  assistance  be  used  effectively? 

Yes.  We  will  not  subsidize  inefficiency. 

First,  the  largest  part  of  the  assis- 
tance will  be  balance-of-payments  assis- 
tance channeled  to  the  private  sector, 
rather  than  to  government  programs. 

Second,  we  will  provide  substantial 
technical  assistance  and  training  for  gov- 
ernment officials  to  streamline  operations 
and  increase  efficiency. 

Third,  local  policy  reform  will  be  re- 
quired to  receive  and  ensure  effective 
use  of  our  funds.  We  will  seek  improved 
opportunities  and  incentives  for  private 
economic  activity.  In  ag^riculture,  ade- 
quate prices  and  access  to  land  with 
secure  titles  will  stimulate  investment 
and  production  by  the  people  who  under- 
stand best  how  to  do  this— the  individual 
farmers.  In  industry,  good  policies 
mobilize  individual  entrepreneurs  to 
make  the  right  decisions  concerning  in- 
creased employment  and  production.  A 


June  1984 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


\ 


key  objective  of  CADO  will  be  to  engage 
the  private  sector  to  identify  activities 
that  will  most  increase  productivity  at 
the  cutting  edge  of  local  production. 

In  addition,  we  are  encouraged  by 
progress  on  two  important  sources  of  in- 
efficiency. 

•  Capital  flight  was  a  serious  prob- 
lem for  3-4  years  beginning  about  1979. 
Recently,  however,  the  central  banks  of 
the  region  have  greatly  reduced  such 
outflows.  Our  AID  [Agency  for  Intei-na- 
tional  Development]  missions  also  are 
providing  useful  advice  and  technical 
assistance  to  help  Central  American 
monetary  authorities  meet  the  challenge. 

•  Corruption  has  long  been  a  prob- 
lem in  the  region.  But  recent  media 
reports  of  abuse  of  U.S.  assistance  funds 
have  been  exaggerated.  And  most  were 
stimulated  by  our  own  internal  audit  pro- 
cedures. It  is  ironic  indeed  that  our  very 
ability  to  detect  corruption  and  identify 
administrative  deficiencies  should 
become  an  argument  against  continuing 
assistance  measures  that  are  over- 
whelmingly in  the  national  interest. 

Are  we  seeking  a  military 
solution  in  El  Salvador? 

No.  As  President  Reagan  said  a  year 
ago,  "the  real  solution  can  only  be  a 
political  one,"  with  the  Salvadoran 
people  deciding  their  own  destiny 
through  free  and  fair  elections.  That  is 
not  a  military  solution. 

We  are  requesting  military  assistance 
to  enable  the  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces 
to  break  the  current  stalemate.  To  pro- 
vide less  would  prolong  the  war  and 
decrease  incentives  for  the  FDR/FMLN 
[Revolutionary  Democratic  Front/ 
Farabundo  Marti  National  Liberation 
Front]  to  enter  into  serious  discussions 
with  the  Salvadoran  Peace  Commission 
about  a  political  settlement  through  elec- 
tions. Passage  of  our  proposed  economic 
and  military  assistance  package  could  be 
a  deciding  factor  in  ensuring  participa- 
tion of  important  elements  of  the  far  left 
in  the  198.5  municipal  and  legislative 
elections. 

So  long  as  the  guerrillas  receive  ex- 
ternal assistance,  however,  U.S.  military 
aid  must  provide  a  defensive  bulwark 
behind  which  elections,  reform,  and 
recovery  can  proceed.  Our  emergency  re- 
quest for  $92.75  million  of  the  proposed 
,$178.7  FY  1984  supplemental  military 
assistance  for  El  Salvador  must  be  seen 


in  this  context  and  against  the  [jrobabil- 
ity  that  funding  from  the  supplemental 
will  not  be  available  before  July.  As  the 
bipartisan  commission  emphasized, 
assurance  of  adequate  supplies  is  in- 
dispensable to  maintan  confidence  as  well 
as  the  tempo  of  operations. 

Finally,  the  amount  of  military 
assistance  requested  for  El  Salvador 
should  also  be  kept  in  perspective:  total 
FY  1984  military  assistance  for  El 
Salvador  (that  provided  in  the  continu- 
ing resolution  plus  the  supplemental  re- 
quest) is  3.6%  of  oui-  worldwide  military 
assistance,  and  the  FY  1985  request  is 
2.1%  of  the  global  figure.  These  are  not 
large  amounts,  either  in  terms  of  our  in- 
terests in  Central  America  or  of  our 
worldwide  responsibilities. 

Shouldn't  increased  economic  aid 
accompany  or  follow  an  overall 
regional  settlement? 

There  is  no  question  that  economic  aid 
would  be  more  effective  in  a  peaceful 
setting.  But  the  relevant  question  is 
whether  withholding  economic  aid  would 
produce  peace.  The  answer,  obviously,  is 
no.  Withholding  aid  until  the  war  is  over 
would  simply  provide  an  additional  ele- 
ment of  leverage  to  the  guerrillas  and 
give  them  a  veto  over  prospects  for 
peace. 

With  our  support,  the  five  Central 
American  governments  agreed  last 
September  to  negotiate  a  peace  agi-ee- 
ment  based  on  a  21-point  Document  of 
Objectives.  We  support  this  Document  of 
Objectives.  In  accepting  it,  Nicaragua 
has  agi'eed  to  negotiate  an  agreement 
that  could,  if  implemented  on  a  verifiable 
and  reciprocal  basis,  meet  our  concerns 
in  both  Central  America  as  a  whole  and 
in  Nicaragua.  If  a  regional  peace  agi-ee- 
ment  is  signed,  even  with  the  best  inten- 
tions of  all  the  parties,  it  will  not  succeed 
if  the  nations  of  the  region  are  suffering 
from  economic  collapse.  In  short,  the 
economic  assistance  which  we  are  re- 
questing is  essential  to  any  negotiated 
settlement. 

Will  these  additional  resources 
solve  the  problem? 

Resoui'ces  alone  will  not  solve  the  Cen- 
tral American  crisis.  But  the  bipartisan 
commission  was  correct  in  faulting  oui- 
policy  for  not  providing  the  resources 
needed  to  sustain  progress.  Resource 
predictability  would  provide  the  basis  of 


confidence  that  regional  diplomacy  needs 
to  channel  events  toward  peaceful  solu- 
tions, including  negotiated  solutions 
wherever  possible. 

Demonstration  by  the  United  States 
of  a  long-term  commitment  through  the 
provision  of  adequate  levels  of  economic 
and  military  assistance  and  the  adoption 
by  Central  American  governments  of  ap- 
propriate economic,  political,  and  social 
policie.s/reforms  are  all  essential  to  an  ac- 
tive diplomacy  for  peace. 


IV.  CONCLUSION 

The  crisis  is  acute.  Our  neighbors  in 
Central  America  urgently  need  our  help. 
The  United  States  can  make  a  decisive 
difference. 

We  have  a  responsibility  rooted  in 
the  history  of  our  own  involvement  in 
the  area.  U.S.  moral  and  strategic  in- 
terests are  both  engaged.  Doing  nothing 
or  doing  too  little  are  not  responsible 
alternatives. 

There  are  some  who  are  inclined  to 
support  only  economic  assistance.  Others 
are  inclined  to  support  only  military 
assistance.  There  is,  however,  no  real- 
istic alternative  to  the  balanced  approach 
in  the  act. 

Our  initiative  is  based  on  sound 
analysis.  It  is  based  on  the  consensus 
judgment  that  the  area's  problems  have 
both  indigenous  and  extraregional 
causes. 

Our  goals  are  realistic.  The  region's 
most  progressive,  democratic  forces 
strongly  believe  that  we  can  work 
together  successfully  to  strengthen  the 
moderate  center  in  Central  America. 
These  same  people  are  convinced  that 
our  active  participation  will  serve  both  t( 
defeat  communism  aiid  to  bolster  respect 
for  human  freedom  in  this  critical  part  ol 
our  hemisphere. 

The  approach  is  right.  Effective  ac- 
tion must  include  a  mix  of  developmen- 
tal, political,  diplomatic,  and  security 
elements.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a 
wholly  "economic,"  a  wholly  "political," 
or  a  wholly  "military"  solution  to  Centrau 
America's  problems.  These  elements 
must  be  pui-sued  simultaneously,  equita- 
bly, and  humanely.  Economies  must  be 
protected  as  well  as  developed.  Govern- 
ments must  be  worth  defending.  Home- 
grown poverty  and  Cuban-directed  guer- 
rilla warfare  work  in  tandem;  our  policie; 
must  address  both. 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


Ho 


U.S, 


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l«ti\ 


dits 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


»■      The  approach  advocated  by  the 
"*'"  bipartisan  commission  and  adopted  by 
he  President  calls  for  a  constructive  in- 
olvement  in  Central  America  that  ad- 
dresses underlying  causes  of  conflict  in 
the  long  term  while  preventing  a  guer- 
illa victory  in  the  short  term.  This  kind 
■lifcf  involvement  now  will  eliminate  the 
^  leed  for  greater  involvement  later. 

Finally,  I  hope  that  your  considera- 
'9»s  jon  of  the  bill  will  be  infused  by  the 
Dipartisan  commission's  unanimous  con- 
;lusion,  a  conclusion  that  guided  its 
preparation  and  which  is  worth  quoting 
n  full: 

The  Commission  has  concluded  that  the 
rliel|ftecurity  interests  of  the  United  Stales  are  im- 


»  J.S.  Relations  With 

^  Honduras  and  Nicaragua 


IS  havi 


portantly  engaged  in  Central  America;  that 
these  interests  require  a  significantly  larger 
program  of  military  assistance,  as  well  as 
greatly  expanded  support  for  economic 
growth  and  social  reform;  that  there  must  be 
an  end  to  the  massive  violation  of  human 
i-ights  if  security  is  to  be  achieved  in  Central 
America;  and  that  external  support  of  the  in- 
surgency must  be  neutralized  for  the  same 
purpose. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


)y  James  H.  Michel 

Statement  prepared  for  the  Subcom- 
nittee  on  Military  Installatimis  and 
'acilities  of  the  House  Armed  Sen- 
ces  Committee  ow  March  28, 198U- 
\dr.  Michel  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
or  Inter-American  Affairs.'^ 

J.S.  relations  with  Honduras  have  his- 
orically  been  stable  and  constructive. 
This  traditional  bOateral  cooperation  is 
ihaped  today  by  two  region- wide  objec- 
,       ;ives  shared  by  both  countries: 

ientlit        •  To  broaden  popular  participation  in 
1  broad,  cooperative  effort  to  overcome 
ngrained  patterns  of  social  inequity,  eco- 
lomic  stagnation,  and  political  authori- 

rfs|w  arianism;  and 

parti        •  To  meet  the  security  threat  created 
)y  Soviet  and  Cuban  support  for  regional 

jveat-   subversion  and  the  military  buildup  in 
Sandinista  Nicaragua. 

Honduras  and  the  United  States 
'  make  good  partners  in  seeking  these  ob- 
ijectives. 

Honduras  is  a  new  democracy  buf- 
feted by  the  instability  of  its  immediate 
neighbors,  Nicaragua  and  El  Salvador.  It 
has,  nonetheless,  maintained  the  integrity 
of  its  institutions  and  played  a  consistent- 
'ly  creative— and  too  little  appreciated— 
role  in  seeking  diplomatic  resolutions  of 
Ithe  tensions  afflicting  Central  America. 
1       The  United  States,  for  its  part,  has 
helped  Honduras  to  strengthen  its  demo- 
cratic institutions  and  to  counter  the  im- 


June  1984 


pact  of  the  global  economic  recession  and 
the  military  pressures  directed  against  it 
by  Nicaragua. 

The  U.S.-Honduran  partnership  is  a 
force  for  both  stability  and  hope  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Its  continued  development 
is  essential  to  prevent  a  wider  regional 
conflict  and  to  improve  prospects  for  a  po- 
litical solution  to  Central  America's  prob- 
lems. 

A  full  explanation  of  the  relationship 
between  our  country  and  Honduras— the 
why  and  how  of  U.S.  policy— must,  there- 
fore, begin  with  a  look  at  the  Central 
American  crisis  as  a  whole. 

U.S.  Policy  in  Central  America 

There  are  short-term  needs  but  no  short- 
cuts to  resolution  of  the  Central  American 
crisis.  Building  a  durable  peace  in  Central 
America  will  require  U.S.  efforts  across  a 
broad  range  of  activities  identified  by  the 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Cen- 
tral America,  and  the  comprehensive 
long-term  program  the  President  submit- 
ted to  the  Congress  on  February  17. 
These  efforts  must  be  sustained  to  suc- 
ceed. 

This  policy  is  designed  to  work  over 
the  long  term  by  addressing  each  of  the 
interrelated  factors  that  have  produced 
widespread  suffering  and  uncertainty  in 
Central  America. 

First,  inherited  inequities  between 
the  landed  rich  and  the  landless  poor  con- 
tinue and  the  benefits  of  economic  growth 
have  not  been  widely  spread. 


That  is  why  we  emphasize  social  and 
economic  reform,  including  land  reform. 

Second,  political  systems  have  too 
often  been  closed  to  some  social  groups, 
including  the  awakening  poor. 

That  is  why  we  stand  so  firmly  by  the 
democracies— the  recent  burgeoning  in 
Honduras  as  well  as  the  continuing  tradi- 
tion in  Costa  Rica. 

And  that  is  why  we  favor  free,  fair, 
open  elections  and  democratic  processes 
in  El  Salvador,  in  Guatemala,  and  in 
Nicaragua. 

Third,  reliance  on  violence  to  resolve 
conflict  has  proved  unworkable,  and  it  is 
morally  offensive. 

That  is  why  we  are  promoting  securi- 
ty against  violence.  That  is  why  we  are 
working  to  help  strengthen  judicial  proc- 
esses. That  is  why  we  are  insisting  on  an 
end  to  death  squads  wherever  they  exist. 
And  that  is  why  we  applaud  the  Con- 
tadora  recognition  of  internal  democracy, 
and  not  "power  sharing,"  as  the  only 
legitimate  mechanism  toward  the  resolu- 
tion of  internal  conflict. 

Fourth,  the  downturn  in  the  global 
economy  compounded  by  the  spread  of 
guerrilla  warfare,  particularly  in  El 
Salvador,  has  devastated  the  Central 
American  economies. 

That  is  why  the  substantial  financial 
and  economic  assistance  called  for  by  the 
bipartisan  commission  is  vital:  first  to 
help  stabilize  the  situation,  then  to  help 
restore  growth  and  regional  cooperation. 

Fifth,  the  guerrilla  movements  of  the 
left  do  not  have  broad  indigenous  sup- 
port—government reforms  and  the  guer- 
rillas' economic  warfare  undermined  the 
popular  support  they  had  before  mid- 
1980,  but  they  do  have  the  outside  back- 
ing they  need  to  function. 

That  is  why  this  Administration,  like 
its  predecessor,  has  sought  and  continues 
to  seek  security  assistance  for  El 
Salvador.  And  that  is  why  the  bipartisan 
commission  warned  that:  "The  worst 
possible  policy  for  El  Salvador  is  to  pro- 
vide just  enough  aid  to  keep  the  war  go- 
ing, but  too  little  to  wage  it  successfully." 

Sixth,  Nicaragua's  massive  military 
buildup  and  communist  military  ties  are 
already  a  source  of  instability  in  the  en- 
tire region. 

•  Cuban  "advisers"  entered  Managua 
on  the  heels  of  the  Sandinista  takeover, 
the  Cuban  presence  reaching  hundreds  in 
a  matter  of  months.  Today,  excluding 
several  thousand  Cuban  civilians,  who  in- 
creasingly are  young  males  who  have 
served  in  the  Cuban  militia,  we  estimate 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


that  between  2,500  and  3,500  Cuban  mili- 
tary and  secret  police  personnel  are  in 
Nicaragua. 

•  Soviet-bloc  military-  aid  of  more 
than  a  quarter  of  a  billion  dollars  since 
1979  has  made  the  Sandinista  Armed 
Forces  the  largest  and  most  heavily 
equipped  in  Central  America— a  military 
establishment  five  times  larger  than 
Somoza's  National  Guard  and  four  times 
that  of  the  Honduran  Armed  Forces. 

This  military  buildup  in  Nicaragua  not 
only  underpins  the  Sandinista  regime's  in- 
ternal power  but  is  also  an  instrument  of 
direct  harassment  and  intimidation 
against  its  neighbors,  Costa  Rica  and 
Honduras. 

That  is  why  we  are  providing  security 
assistance  to  those  neighbors.  And  that  is 
why  it  is  important  to  help  maintain 
regional  balance  through  joint  training 
exercises  which  give  palpable  reality  to 
U.S.  commitments  under  the  1948  Rio 
Treaty. 

Honduras  and  U.S.  Policy 

The  internal  conditions  that  facilitated  the 
Sandinisa  takeover  in  Nicaragua  and  nur- 
tured the  development  of  the  guerrilla 
movement  in  El  Salvador  do  not  e.\ist  in 
Honduras. 

•  Honduras  does  not  have  a  landed 
oligarchy.  Land  reform  is  a  success. 

•  An  independent  and  free  press  is 
open  to  everyone,  including  the  political 
opposition. 

•  Trade  unions  are  an  effective  force 
and  have  been  for  more  than  30  years. 

•  Although  still  the  strongest  single 
institution,  the  military  has  never  been  a 
praetorian  guard  for  the  privileged,  nor  is 
it  repressive. 

But  Honduras  does  face  the  serious 
problems  associated  with  building  demo- 
cratic institutions  on  a  partially  feudal 
(albeit  nonviolent)  past,  in  the  face  of  ex- 
treme economic  hardship,  and  threatened 
by  political  instability  on  every  border. 

Economic  Difficulties.  Consolidation 
of  Honduran  democracy  will  depend  less 
on  the  balance  of  civilian-military  rela- 
tions than  on  managing  a  difficult 
economic  situation.  Honduras  is  the 
poorest  Central  American  nation  and  the 
Suazo  government  inherited  an  economy 
that  was  nearly  bankrupt.  Fueled  by 
world  recession,  depressed  global 
markets  for  the  tropical  and  subtropical 
agricultural  products  that  are  Honduras' 
major  exports,  and  continued  regional  in- 


82 


stability,  the  economic  crisis  can  be  ex- 
pected to  last  well  into  the  1980s. 
Burgeoning  population  growth,  declining 
productivity,  a  sharp  drop  in  international 
reserves,  limited  sources  of  domestic 
revenue,  and  a  growing  export-import 
gap  are  aU  reasons  why  Honduras  will 
continue  to  require  substantial  bilateral 
and  international  assistance. 

The  inflow  of  over  44,000  refugees 
fleeing  internal  crises  in  neighboring 
countries  has  made  major  demands  on 
Honduras'  fragile  economy.  About  18,000 
are  Salvadoran;  700  are  from  Guatemala; 
and  the  rest— more  than  20,000— are 
Nicaraguan,  the  majority  Miskito  and 
Sumo  Indians. 

Yet,  despite  economic  pressure,  high 
unemployment,  and  strong  austerity 
measures,  the  government  enjoys 
substantial  popular  backing. 

Security.  In  terms  of  national  securi- 
ty, Honduras  is  preparing  principally 
against  terrorism  and  guerrilla  warfare 
designed  to  destabilize  its  popular  civilian 
government. 

Beginning  in  1981-82,  Honduras  was 
struck  by  a  wave  of  terrorist  and  subver- 
sive attacks.  The  timing,  targets,  and  ac- 
companying propaganda  made  it  obvious 
that  they  were  orchestrated  by 
Nicaragua  to  intimidate  the  Honduran 
Government  and  in  retaliation  for  depriv- 
ing the  Salvadoran  guerrillas  of  sanctuary 
in  Honduran  territory. 

The  government's  reaction  to  the  ter- 
rorist violence  has  been  firm  but 
measured.  Fears  of  2  years  ago  that  a  ris- 
ing level  of  terrorism  would  provoke 
police  repression  have  not  been  borne 
out.  Public  security  forces  have  demon- 
strated a  growing  antiterrorist  capability 
without  providing  the  radical  left  the  mar- 
tyrs they  seek. 

Honduras'  external  security  situation 
continues  to  be  precarious,  however.  The 
Sandinistas  have  not  relented.  Their 
strategy  is  to  increase  the  political  and 
psychological  pressure,  backed  by  a  con- 
siderable Nicaraguan  military  buildup 
and  heightened  destabilization  efforts. 
Last  July  Nicaragua  infiltrated  Cuban- 
trained  guerrillas  into  Honduras. 

Soviet  and  Cuban  efforts,  including 
the  training  of  pilots,  call  into  question 
the  deterrent  capacity  of  the  Honduran 
Air  Force,  the  nation's  traditional  defen- 
sive mainstay.  Honduran  Army  units  are 
undertrained;  the  country's  total  militarj' 
force  is  one-fourth  that  of  Nicaragua;  and 
its  inventory  of  transportation,  com- 
munications, and  air  defense  materiel  is 
skimpy  and  aged. 


It  should  be  noted  that  the  perception 
of  threat  is  not  one  exclusively  of  ' 

Honduran  leaders,  whether  civOian  or 
military.  In  September  1983  a  Costa 
Rican  affiliate  of  the  Gallup  organization 
asked  700  Honduran  adults  with  a  least  1 
year  of  secondary'  school  what  country,  if 
any,  was  either  a  threat  or  a  help  to 
Honduras.  The  interviewers  volunteered 
no  names  of  countries.  Eighty  percent 
named  Nicaragua  as  a  militaiT  threat  to 
Honduras.  One  percent  so  identified  the 
United  States.  (This  contrast  was  further 
emphasized  when  93%  identified  the 
United  States  as  helping  Honduras  to 
solve  its  problems.) 

Honduras  is  not  trying  to  match 
Nicaragua's  buildup  of  ground  forces. 
Honduras  wants  to  avoid  war  with 
Nicaragua.  The  country  has,  therefore, 
embarked  upon  a  selective  militarj' 
modernization  program  to  establish  a 
minimal  deterrent  for  self-defense.  The 
Honduran  military  is  concentrating  on 
developing  a  force  with  sufficient 
firepower  and  mobility  to  meet  an  attack 
wherever  it  might  occur  and  to  perform 
an  effective  counterinsurgency  role. 

U.S.  Assistance.  Our  policy  toward 
Honduras  is  to  support  a  democratic 
regime  under  pressure  from  external 
forces.  Honduran  authorities,  including 
the  militarj',  agree  that  economic  prob- 
lems are  the  most  serious  questions  that 
the  country  faces,  and  U.S.  assistance  has 
been  concentrated  in  this  sector.  While 
Hondurans  express  gratitude,  they  are 
frustrated  that  the  levels  of  aid  have  not 
been  sufficient  to  bridge  the  current 
export-import  gap. 

U.S.  economic  assistance  ($84.4 
million  in  the  continuing  resolution  for  F'i 
1984;  $84.5  million  in  the  FY  1984  sup- 
plemental request;  $139.0  million  re- 
quested for  FY  1985)  is  designed  to  assist 
Honduras  through  the  difficult  period  of 
adjustment.  It  would  provide  critically 
needed  foreign  exchange  to  increase  the 
availability  of  domestic  credit  as  well  as 
to  foster  private  sector  participation  in 
the  development  process. 

The  U.S.  military  assistance  program 
has  concentrated  on  training  and  basic 
equipment.  No  sophisticated  weapons  or 
systems  have  been  transferred  to 
Honduras.  Moreover,  that  assistance  re- 
mains modest  when  compared  with  the 
threat  facing  Honduras  and  the  state  of 
its  defensive  forces. 

The  bipartisan  commission  recom- 
mended increased  assistance  to  build  a 
credible  deterrent.  Our  aid  ($41.5  million 
in  the  continuing  resolution  for  FY  1984; 
$37.5  million  in  FY  1984  supplemental  re- 
quest; $62.5  million  for  FY  1985)  would 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


to  provide  training,  helicopters,  fixed-wing 
transport  and  communications  aircraft, 
naval  equipment  and  patrol  boats, 
vehicles,  medical  equipment,  radar,  com- 
munications equipment,  ammunition  and 
spare  parts.  Some  of  these  items  would  be 
used  m  equipping  two  new  infantry  bat- 
■^ -".lions. 

The  Regional  Military  Training 
'enter  (RMTC)  was  estabUshed  in  June 
11983  to  offer  training  to  friendly  coun- 
tries in  the  region  through  their  militarj- 
-~™u,a  assistance  programs.  The  RMTC  is  a 
1*      Honduran  facility.  Over  100  U.S.  Special 
«ii)     Forces  comprise  the  majority  of  the  train- 

mg staff.  We  are  requesting$45  mUlion 
M      over  the  next  2  fiscal  years  to  make  the 
m.     current  austere  premises  a  more  effective 
™       facility  for  wider  regional  training. 
*e,  To  enhance  Honduran  and  U.S.  cap- 

in       abilities  and  to  demonstrate  resolve,  we 
Ma     have  also  conducted  a  series  of  major 
it  The    joint  military  exercises  with  Honduras. 
iifon  iThese  exercises  have  also  reduced  the 
t       level  of  armed  incidents  instigated  by 
natiatkpjicaragua  along  its  common  border  with 
erfom  ponduras. 

*.  To  support  the  exercises,  three  air- 

oivarJ    ^^^^^^  "^^^^  upgraded  to  receive  C-130 
^^      transport  aircraft.  These  improvements 
n,j]     are  largely  temporary.  Engineering  units 
Ufa    ^'^°  ^"^'-  ^^  seahuts  to  house  exercise 
„„,k    troops.  They  were  more  cost  effective 
; ;    and,  in  Honduras'  climate,  healthier  than 
tents.  As  contemplated,  they  are  being 
dismantled. 
'2  During  the  Ahuas  Tarn  exercises, 

venot  "^^^  ''^^^^  faculties  capable  of  detecting 
I  aerial  infiltration  were  set  up  in 
Honduras.  The  Honduran  Government 
hopes  to  purchase  a  replacement  for  the 
long-range  early  warning  surveillance 
system  when  it  is  redeployed.  The  short- 
range  surveillance  radar  will  soon  be 
returned  to  the  United  States. 

In  May  1982  the  United  States  agreed 
to  improve  two  other  airfields  in  return 
for  access  for  various  contingency  uses. 
The  $13-million  construction  project  to  im- 
prove runways,  ramp  space,  and  fuel  facil- 
ities at  Palmerola  airbase  is  scheduled  for 
completion  in  June.  An  $8-million  project 
at  La  Ceiba  has  been  delayed  by  Con- 
gress pending  submission  of  an  overall 
military  construction  plan  for  the  region. 

The  Defense  Department  has  re- 
quested funds  as  part  of  its  FY  1985 
budget  to  construct  a  prestock  ammuni- 
tion depot,  an  airplane  hangar,  and  a 
150-man  living  facOity  at  Palmerola  as 
well  as  a  prestock  ammunition  depot  at 
San  Lorenzo. 

We  are  analyzing  possible  participa- 
tion in  the  construction  of  other 


Honduran  facilities  if  access  to  such 
faculties  might  complement  our  regional 
defensive  needs. 

But  even  with  the  expansion  of  U.S. 
military  assistance,  including  training  at 
the  Regional  MUitai-y  Training  Center 
and  the  conduct  of  the  Ahuas  Tara  series 
of  joint  exercises,  some  doubts  among  the 
Honduran  leadership  over  the  reliability 
of  U.S.  sustained  support  persist. 


Military  Aid  and  Democratization 

A  frequent  criticism  of  U.S.  policy  toward 
Honduras  is  the  assertion  that  aU  this 
military  activity,  in  fact,  weakens  democ- 
racy by  mUitarizing  the  country. 

A  careful  look  at  what  has  happened 
politicaUy-and  mUitarily-in  Honduras 
over  the  past  few  years  suggests  the  con- 
trary conclusion:  that  the  whole  direction 
of  events  has  been  from  military  control 
toward  a  civUian,  democratic  polity. 

Honduras  returned  to  civilian  and 
constitutional  rule  in  January  1982  after 
nearly  18  years  of  military  governments. 
At  the  time  of  President  Suazo's  inaugu- 
ration on  January  23,  there  was  a  clear 
transfer  of  power  from  mUitary  to  civUian 
hands.  This  process  had  already  begun 
during  the  transition  period  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  when  the  key 
Communications  Ministry  shifted  from 
military  to  civilian  direction,  as  did  the 
Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Agrarian 
Reform  Institute.  The  Foreign  Ministry 
and  the  Forestry  Agency  were  returned 
to  civUian  control,  leaving  the  Defense 
Ministry  and  the  telephone  and  telegraph 
agency  as  the  only  major  government 
bodies  still  headed  by  mUitary  men. 

The  Liberal  Party  government  has 
established  a  solid  reputation  for  honesty 
and  technical  competence.  It  has  exer- 
cised clear  and  unquestioned  authority  in 
economic  and  internal  political  matters, 
including  appointments.  President  Suazo 
makes  the  decisions. 

The  Honduran  budget  gives  higher 
priority  to  health,  education,  and  public 
works  than  to  mUitary  expenditures.  The 
government  has  now  initiated  a  voter 
registration  program  to  prepare  for  the 
November  1985  presidential,  congres- 
sional, and  municipal  elections.  And  in 
Honduras  there  are  no  rumors  of  coup 
plotting. 

The  U.S.  role  is  just  as  clear.  In  the 
first  place,  the  civUian-mUitary  relation- 
ship is  the  product  of  Honduras'  own  his- 
tory and  political  dynamics;  the  level  of 
U.S.  military  assistance  is  not  a  signifi- 
cant factor.  At  each  stage  in  the  return  to 


democratic  rule,  the  U.S.  Government  en- 
couraged the  restoration  and  specifically 
discouraged  those  elements  which  sought 
to  maintain  de  facto  mUitary  rule.  U.S. 
military  assistance  has  permitted  the 
Honduran  Government  to  husband  scarce 
resources,  not  divert  them  from  economic 
to  mUitary  use. 

Honduran  democracy  is  stronger  not 
weaker,  than  it  was  2  years  ago;  and ' 
Honduras  today  is  clearly  more  pro- 
gressive and  more  democratic  than  it  was 
before  the  1980s. 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Nicaragua 

The  mUitary  components  of  U.S.  policy 
toward  Honduras  are  closely  related  to 
our  objectives  with  regard  to  Nicaragua. 
Those  objectives,  in  turn,  reinforce  the 
overaU  policy  of  support  for  democracy 
development,  and  security  in  Central 
America. 

We  seek  an  end  to  Nicaraguan  sup- 
port for  guerrilla  groups,  severance  of 
Nicaraguan  mUitary  and  security  ties  to 
Cuba  and  the  Soviet  bloc,  restoration  of 
military  equUibrium  by  reduction  of 
Nicaragua's  mUitary  strength  rather  than 
a  corresponding  buildup  by  its  neighbors 
and  furUlment  of  the  original  Sandinista  ' 
promises  to  support  democratic  pluralism. 

These  objectives  are  consistent  with 
the  goals  the  Sandinistas  themselves  set 
as  the  Somoza  dictatorship  was  coUaps- 
ing.  They  match  the  objectives  of 
Nicaragua's  neighbors,  from  small,  con- 
cerned, democratic  Costa  Rica  to  the 
regional  powers-Mexico,  Colombia, 
Venezuela-all  deeply  affected  with 'the 
threat  to  peace  in  Central  America.  And 
they  are  consistent  with  a  series  of 
bUateral  and  then  multinational  ap- 
proaches to  Nicaragua  over  the  last  3 
years. 

This  record  of  consistency,  of  increas- 
ingly convergent  views,  is  itself  a  remark- 
able piece  of  history  which  deserves 
greater  attention  and  study.  The  chronol- 
ogy of  demarches  for  peace-and  of  the 
Nicaraguan  reaction  to  them-best  pro- 
vides the  background  to  what  is  happen- 
ing now. 

The  Search  for  Serious  Negotia- 
tions. When  the  Sandinistas  came  to 
power  in  July  of  1979,  they  assumed  that 
they  would  succeed  in  monopolizing 
power  in  Nicaragua  and  help  to  over- 
throw neighboring  governments,  begin- 
ning with  El  Salvador.  They  were  confi- 
dent that  Cuban  and  Soviet  support 
would  enable  them  to  overcome  resis- 
tance. They  made  promises  about 
nonalignment  and  democratic  pluralism, 


June  1984 


83 


---'''-^iff''f«*'^^ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


and  they  called  just  as  openly  for  "negoti- 
ations"—using  them,  however,  as  a  tactic 
to  divide  their  neighbors  and  neutralize 
the  United  States. 

Prior  to  mid-1983,  the  Sandinistas' 
record  on  these  key  regional  issues  was 
one  of  total  intransigence.  They  drove 
non-Marxists  from  the  government, 
repressed  independent  groups,  estab- 
lished intimate  ties  with  Cuba  and  the 
Soviet  bloc,  and  gave  full  support  to  the 
guerrillas  in  El  Salvador  and  to  terrorists 
in  Honduras  and  Costa  Rica.  They  even 
spumed  U.S.  bilateral  aid  when  congres- 
sional conditionality  insisted  that 
Nicaragua  end  support  for  subversion. 
And  they  rejected  or  ignored  U.S.  and 
other  bilateral  peace  proposals  as  well  as 
the  multilateral  San  Jose  peace  frame- 
work. 

In  short,  for  4  years  the  Sandinistas 
consistently  rebuffed  economic  and 
diplomatic  incentives  to  change  their 
behavior  and  enter  into  serious  negotia- 
tions. 

Over  the  past  year,  however,  various 
pressures  on  Nicaragua  have  increased 
enough  to  start  giving  the  Sandinistas 
some  second  thoughts.  These  pressures 
include  West  European  criticism  of  San- 
dinista  repression  and  subversion;  stead- 
fast resistance  to  Sandinista  pressures  by 
all  of  Nicaragua's  neighbors;  the  embar- 
rassing collapse  of  the  Sandinista  attempt 
to  undermine  Contadora  at  the  United 
Nations  last  fall;  the  failure  of  guerrilla 
forces  to  break  the  stalemate  in  El 
Salvador  or  to  advance  elsewhere  in  the 
region;  the  setback  to  Soviet  and  Cuban 
influence  in  Grenada;  the  continuation 
and  expansion  of  resistance  to  the  San- 
dinistas inside  Nicaragua;  and,  frankly, 
the  evidence  of  the  U.S.  military  presence 
in  the  immediate  area— in  Honduras,  in  El 
Salvador,  and  at  various  times  offshore. 
To  these  must  be  added  the  consensus, 
expressed  by  the  bipartisan  commission 
and  shared  by  the  sponsors  of  the  Con- 
tadora negotiations,  that  Nicaragua's 
military  ties  to  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  an  obstacle  to  peace  and  devel- 
opment in  the  entire  region. 

The  first  indications  of  possible 
Sandinista  flexibility  occurred  in  July 
1983  when  Junta  Coordinator  Daniel 
Ortega  announced  willingness  to  take 
part  in  regional  peace  negotiations.  Then, 
in  September  1983,  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  formally  agreed  to  the 
21-point  Contadora  Document  of  Objec- 
tives—which  includes  all  demands  by 
their  neighbors— as  a  basis  for  peace.  In 
November  the  Sandinistas  embarked  on  a 


84 


flurry  of  high-visibility  diplomatic  activity 
to  advertise  their  claimed  desire  for 
peace.  This  was  coupled  with  hints  of 
loosened  ties  with  Cuba,  plus  hints  of 
eased  internal  controls,  e.g.,  dialogue  with 
Catholic  Church  officials  and  initial 
discussion  of  the  elections  now  announced 
for  November  4. 

These  moves  could  still  prove  wholly 
tactical.  The  Sandinistas  have  yet  to  give 
up  anything  significant,  either  domestical- 
ly or  in  their  links  to  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  have  seen  no  evidence  of  fun- 
damental change  in  Nicaragua's  relations 
with  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas.  What  has 
taken  place  so  far  may  well  represent 
only  a  surface  shift  aimed  at  lulling  us, 
the  rest  of  the  world,  and  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  Our  conclusion— shared  by  most 
observers  in  the  area  and  in  Europe  as 
well— is  that  continued  pressure  is 
necessary. 

The  Contadora  Negotiations 

For  pressure  to  work,  it  must  have  de- 
fined political  goals— a  reasonable  alter- 
native that  satisfies  common  concerns. 
That  is  the  essence  of  diplomacy  in  the 
real  world.  And  the  key  point  is  that  such 
a  set  of  clearly  delineated  goals  does  ex- 
ist: they  are  contained  in  the  21  points 
agreed  to  by  all  nine  Contadora  countries 
last  faD. 

The  Document  of  Objectives  agreed 
to  on  September  7, 1983,  by  the  five  Cen- 
tral American  states,  including  Nica- 
ragua, is  not  a  fuzzy  series  of  admirable 
but  unreachable  goals.  It  is  a  specific  set 
of  standards  written  in  tenns  fully  under- 
standable to  all  the  participants.  And  it  is 
a  formula  that  would  achieve  our  objec- 
tives in  Nicaragua— if  actually  im- 
plemented on  a  verifiable  and  enforceable 
basis. 

Compare  our  owm  four  basic  objec- 
tives in  Nicaragua  with  the  substance  of 
the  Contadora  Document  of  Objectives. 

•  We  seek  an  end  to  Nicaraguan  sup- 
port for  guerrilla  groups;  the  Document 
of  Objectives  calls  for  an  end  to  support 
for  subversion. 

•  We  want  Nicaragua  to  sever  its 
military  and  security  ties  to  Cuba  and  the 
Soviet  bloc;  the  Document  of  Objectives 
calls  for  the  proscription  of  foreign 
militan'  bases  and  the  reduction  and 
eventual  elimination  of  foreign  military 
advisers  and  troops. 

•  We  seek  reduction  of  Nicaragua's 
military  strength  to  levels  that  would 
restore  military  equilibrium  in  the  area; 
the  Document  of  Objectives  calls  for  the 
reduction  of  current  inventories  of  arms , 
and  military  personnel. 


•  We  seek  fulfillment  of  the  original 
Sandinista  promises  to  support  democrat- 
ic pluralism;  the  Document  of  Objectives 
calls  for  the  establishment  of  democratic 
systems  of  government  based  on  genuine- . 
ly  open  elections. 

•  Finally,  we  seek  a  diplomatic  solu- 
tion that  is  verifiable  and  enforceable;  the 
Document  of  Objectives  calls  for  adequate 
means  of  verification  and  control. 

The  substance  of  the  21  objectives  is 
virtually  identical  with  our  own  reading 
of  what  is  necessary  to  satisfy  legitimate 
U.S.  interests  in  the  area.  Those  who 
doubt  that  should  compare  the  Contadora 
substance  to  the  October  1982  San  Jose 
statement,  of  which  we  were  a  signatory 
together  with  eight  other  democratic 
countries. 

The  joint  exercises,  the  infrastructure, 
developed  in  Honduras  to  support  those 
exercises,  the  fleet  maneuvers,  the  fears 
of  Nicaragua's  neighbors,  the  warnings  t( 
the  Sandinistas  from  Europe  and  from 
around  this  hemisphere— all  are  part  of 
this  carefully  nurtured  framework  of 
pressure-with-a-purpose.  What  the  San- 
dinistas are  being  asked  to  do  is  clear  to 
them,  to  their  neighbors,  and  to  us.  The 
path  to  a  political  "solution,"  to  regional 
democracy  and  disarmament  is  encom- 
passed in  the  21  objectives. 

The  Honduran  record  with  regard  to 
these  negotiations  is  also  clear.  The 
record  shows  that  Honduras  has  been 
firmly  supportive  of  a  comprehensive 
regional  approach  to  the  resolution  of 
political  tension  in  Central  America. 

Many  Hondurans,  including  senior 
government  officials,  consider  the 
achievements  of  the  Contadora  process- 
especially  the  Document  of  Objectives 
drafted  in  September  1983— as  an  essen- 
tially Honduran  achievement.  This  inter- 
pretation can  be  supported  by  a  reading 
of  the  Honduran  peace  plan  presented  tc: 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
by  Foreign  Minister  Paz  Bamica  on 
March  23,  1982.  Honduras  has  been  con 
sistently  willing  to  discuss  all  issues  witl 
any  of  its  neighbors,  including  Nicaragu; 
but  insists— along  with  Costa  Rica,  El 
Salvador,  and  Guatemala— that  the  princ 
pie  of  reciprocity  and  procedures  for 
verification  are  intrinsic  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  a  meaningful  peace. 

The  basic  fact  is  this:  if  the  San- 
dinistas adhere  to  those  principles  in  a 
way  in  which  we  can  have  confidence— 
whether  on  the  basis  of  a  formal  treaty  ( 
not— its  neighbors  will  do  the  same,  and 
so  will  we.  The  pressure  will  have 


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Iter 


kiui.itiiiiiUiiijHWiMiyyiuUtiiiuuttiaiiUiW!itiiiUiliitiHiuiiUi,ihiul^ 


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WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


'orked,  our  concerns  will  have  been 
"alleviated,  and  a  political  solution  will 
have  been  achieved  in  Central  America. 
But  for  that  to  happen,  no  one  can  afford 
■*  ;o  let  up  on  the  pressures  without  a  corre- 
sponding change  on  the  other  side. 


ml 


flte 


rospects  for  the  Future 

The  months  ahead  are  critical.  They  will 
ietermine  whether  the  progress  to  date 
Droves  ephemeral  or  begins  to  establish  a 
Dattem  for  regional  stability. 

We  know  what  the  standards  are. 
There  are  benchmarks  along  the  way;  and 
/fe  must  all  keep  careful  track,  in  effect 
'conditioning"  our  attitudes  and  actions 
jn  what  is  actually  happening  in  Central 
America:  we  are  looking  for  tangible  evi- 
dence—that  El  Salvador  and  Honduras 
ire  continuing  to  develop  a  democratic 


J.S.  Policy  in  Central  America 


iiie!«il 


polity;  that  Nicaragua  and  Guatemala  are 
taking  credible  steps  toward  fair  elec- 
tions, including  openness  to  all  political 
factions;  and  that  democratic  govern- 
ments are  able  to  protect  themselves 
againsi  the  antidemocratic  terror  of  the 
far  left  and  the  far  right. 

We  can,  with  some  precision,  envision 
a  better  future  for  the  people  of  Central 
America.  Costa  Rica,  Honduras,  and  in- 
creasingly El  Salvador  demonstrate  that 
the  vision  is  attainable.  And  we  will  have 
erred  consciously  if  we  do  not  use  our 
resources  now  to  help  them  move  toward 
that  future. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
\PR.  10,  1984' 

The  following  statement  is  concurred  in 
jy  Secretary  of  State  George  Shultz, 
Secretary  of  Defense  Caspar  Weinberger, 
Director  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agen- 
;y  William  Casey,  and  Assistant  to  the 
President  for  National  Security  Affairs 
Robert  McFarlane: 


In  recent  days  a  shrill  and  often  con- 
fusing debate  has  developed  over  our 
joals,  plans,  and  activities  in  Central 
America.  Because  this  debate,  much  of  it 
5f,  ininformed  and  unattributed,  is  obscur- 
ng  the  real  situation,  we  believe  it  in  the 
,jjfe  jublic  interest  to  set  the  record  straight 
)n  our  objectives,  our  policy,  and  our  ac- 
ions— ow  the  record. 

First,  allegations  have  been  made 
hat  we  are  planning  for  U.S.  combat 
,roops  to  conduct  an  invasion  in  Central 
i*5f^nierica.  We  state  emphatically  that  we 
lave  not  considered  nor  have  we  devel- 
)ped  plans  to  use  U.S.  military  forces  to 
nvade  Nicaragua  or  any  other  Central 
American  country.  Secretary  Weinberger 
nade  this  point  in  his  television  appear- 
ince  on  Sunday.  Some  have  chosen  to 
iisbelieve  him— consciously  or  un- 
lonsciously  confusing  what  they  call  "in- 
vasion" plans  with  our  longstanding 
)bligations  under  the  1947  Rio  treaty,  our 
.reaty  obligations  to  defend  the  Panama 


Canal,  or  military  contingency  plans  for 
disaster  relief,  humanitarian  assistance, 
or  emergency  evacuations.  For  over  a 
generation,  as  prudence  would  dictate,  we 
have  maintained  and  updated  plans  for 
these  contingencies.  We  have  not, 
however,  planned  to  use  our  forces  to  in- 
vade any  country  in  the  region. 

Second,  some  have  indicated  that  we 
are  planning  to  conduct  a  postelection 
military  enterprise  in  Central  America. 
This  quite  simply  is  not  ihe  case.  As 
stated  before,  we  are  not  planning  for 
such  action  now  nor  are  we  planning  for  it 
after  our  election. 

Third,  it  has  been  alleged  by  critics  of 
the  Administration  that  certain  activities 
in  the  Central  American  region  have  not 
been  adequately  briefed  to  appropriate 
committees  of  the  Congress.  To  the  con- 
trary, all  U.S.  activities  in  the  Central 
America  region  have  been  fuUy  briefed  in 
detail  to  the  committees  of  the  Congress 
which  exercise  jurisdiction  in  full  com- 
pliance with  the  law.  Further,  last  week 
(April  4)  the  President  sent  a  letter  to 
the  majority  leader  of  the  Senate, 
Howard  Baker,  assuring  him  that  our  ob- 
jectives and  goals  in  the  region  had  not 
changed— specifically,  "the  United  States 
does  not  seek  to  destabilize  or  overthrow 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua." 

Fourth,  and  perhaps  most  signifi- 
cantly, the  current  debate  has  tended  to 
confuse  the  improvements  that  we  have 


helped  make  in  El  Salvador  with  what  is 
really  going  on  in  Nicaragua: 

•  Our  policy  toward  Nicaragua  has 
been  consistent  in  that  we  have  sup- 
ported the  multilateral  dialogue  in  what  is 
known  as  the  Contadora  process.  We 
have  endorsed  the  21  Contadora  objec- 
tives which  would  require  that  Nicaragua 
terminate  the  export  of  subversion, 
reduce  the  size  of  its  military  apparatus, 
implement  its  democratic  commitments  to 
the  OAS  [Organization  of  American 
States],  and  remove  Soviet  bloc  and 
Cuban  military  personnel. 

•  Nicaragua's  response  throughout 
has  been  fraudulent  and  cynical.  They 
have  tried  to  avoid  a  comprehensive  solu- 
tion for  the  region  by  seeking  to  reduce 
all  diplomacy  to  bilateral  questions.  They 
have  tried  to  bypass  reg^ional  and  hemi- 
spheric efforts  by  making  propaganda  at 
the  United  Nations.  Now  they  have 
cynically  attempted  to  sidetrack  negotia- 
tions by  going  to  the  International  Court 
of  Justice.  A  government  fanatically 
dedicated  to  intervention  beyond  its 
borders  thus  seeks  to  use  an  honorable  in- 
ternational institution  to  protect  it  from 
its  own  citizens  who  are  rising  up  against 
it.  This  Administration  wall  not  be  de- 
ceived nor  will  it  play  that  game.  Follow- 
ing the  example  of  other  nations,  the 
United  States  has  checked  this  maneuver 
by  a  temporary  and  limited  modification 
of  our  acceptance  of  the  court's  jurisdic- 
tion. 

•  Nicaragua  continues  to  be  the 
source  of  regional  subversion  and  insur- 
gency. In  May  1983,  the  House  Perma- 
nent Select  Committee  on  Intelligence, 
itself,  concluded  that  "the  Sandinista 
Government  of  Nicaragua  is  helping  train 
insurgents  and  is  transferring  arms  and 
financial  support  from  and  through 
Nicaragua  to  the  insurgents.  They  are 
also  providing  the  insurgents  bases  of 
operations  in  Nicaragua.  Cuban  involve- 
ment—especially in  providing  arms— is 
also  evident." 

•  In  El  Salvador,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  have  witnessed  an  inspiring  display  of 
courage  and  commitment  to  the  demo- 
cratic process  by  the  people  of  El 
Salvador.  At  the  end  of  last  month,  these 
courageous  people  again  braved  guer- 
rillas' violence  and  sabotage  to  vote  for 
their  next  President. 

The  courage  and  confidence  in  democ- 
racy that  the  Salvadoran  people  are 
demonstrating  deserve  our  admiration 
and  full  support.  Now  more  than  ever, 
our  backing  for  the  democratic  process 
must  go  beyond  mere  words.  Recent 
uninformed  comment  on  these  matters 
has  diverted  attention  from  the  central 


June  1984 


85 


TREATIES 


issue.  The  Administration  has  proposed  a 
long-term  program  based  on  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  National  Bipartisan 
Commission  on  Central  America.  We 
have  also  presented  our  case  for  urgent 
military  assistance  to  El  Salvador.  That 
ease  is  sound,  and  the  ongoing  Salvadoran 
election  process  about  to  enter  a  runoff 
requires  our  support  so  that  El  Salvador 
can  ensure  its  safe  conduct. 

It  is  critical  that  the  American  people 
understand  what  is  at  stake  in  the  Cen- 
tral American  region.  Central  America  is 
strategically  important  to  the  United 
States.  It  not  only  contains  the  Panama 
Canal  but  sits  astride  some  of  the  most 
important  sealanes  in  the  world.  Most  im- 
portantly, it  contains  millions  of  people 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Antarctic  treaty.  Signed  at  Washington  Dec.  1, 

1959.  Entered  into  force  June  23,  1961.  TIAS 

4780. 

Accession  deposited:  Sweden,  Apr.  24,  1984. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Buenos 
Aires  July  7,  1981.' 
Notification  of  approval:  Japan,  Apr.  10,  1984. 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at  New 
York  June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 
1959;  for  the  U.S.,  Dec.  29,  1970.  TIAS  6997. 

Accession  deposited:  Guatemala.  Mar.  21. 

1984. 

Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadnlingual  te.\t  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(TIAS  1591),  with  anne.x.  Done  at  Montreal 
Sept.  30,  1977.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  China,  Apr.  24,  1984. 

Bills  of  Lading 

International  convention  for  the  unification  of 
certain  rules  relating  to  bills  of  lading  and  pro- 
tocol of  signature.  Done  at  Brussels  Aug.  25, 
1924.  Entered  into  force  June  2,  1931;  for  the 
U.S.,  Dec.  29,  1937.  TS  931;  51  Stat.  233. 
Notice  of  termination:  Denmark,  Finland,  Nor- 
way, and  Sweden,  Mar.  1,  1984;  effective 
Mar.  1,  1985. 


who  want  to  be  free  and  who  crave 
democracy.  The  recent  elections  in  El 
Salvador  prove  that.  The  real  issues  are 
whether  we  in  the  United  States  want  to 
stand  by  and  let  a  communist  government 
in  Nicaragua  export  violence  and  ter- 
rorism in  this  hemisphere  and  whether 
we  will  allow  the  power  of  the  ballot  box 
to  be  overcome  by  the  power  of  the  gun. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Cuba  want  to  see  communism  spread 
further  in  Central  America.  The  question 
is:  Will  the  United  States  support  those 
countries  that  want  democracy  and  are 
willing  to  fight  for  their  own  freedom? 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  16,  1984.  ■ 


Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 

ne.xes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982.  Entered 

into  force  provisionally,  Oct.  1,  1983. 

Accession  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  Mar.  28, 

1984. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Philippines,  Feb.  6, 

1984;  Spain,  Feb.  7,  1984. 

Commodities— Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund  for 
Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at  Geneva 
June  27,  1980.' 

Ratifications  deposited:  Afghanistan,  Mar.  28, 
1984;  Nepal,  Apr.  3,  1984;  Togo,  Apr.  10,  1984. 

Finance— African  Development  Bank 

Agreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
ment Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Khartoum 
Aug.  4,  1963,  as  amended  at  Abidjan  May  17, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1982;  for  the 
U.S.,  Jan.  31,  1983. 

Signature  and  accession:  Saudi  Arabia, 
Dec.  15,  1983. 

Genocide 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment 
of  the  crime  of  genocide.  Adopted  at  Paris 
Dec.  9,  1948.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  12,  1951.^ 
Accession  deposited:  Tanzania,  Apr.  5,  1984. 

Marine  Pollution 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollu- 
tion by  dumping  of  wastes  and  other  matter, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  London,  Mexico  City, 
Moscow,  and  Washington  Dec.  29,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  30,  1975.  TIAS  8165. 
Accession  deposited:  Oman,  Mar.  13,  1984. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done 

at  Vienna,  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered  into  force 

Aug.  16,  1976;  for  the  U.S.,  July  15,  1980. 

TIAS  9725. 

Accession  deposited:  Ivory  Coast,  Apr.  11, 

1983: 


Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations.    ' 
Done  at  Washington  June  19,  1970.  Entered  in 
to  force  Jan.  24,  1978;  with  exception  of 
Chapter  II  for  the  U.S.  TIAS  8733. 
Accession  deposited:  Bulgaria,  Feb.  21,  1984.^ 

Postal 

General  regulations  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the 
universal  postal  convention  with  final  protoco 
and  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
July  1,1981.  TIAS  9972. 
Ratification  deposited:  Argentina,  Nov.  11, 
1983.* 

Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  with  fin. 
protocol.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  Oct.  26,  1979 
Entered  into  force  July  1,  1981.  TIAS  9973. 
Ratification  deposited:  Argentina,  Nov.  11, 
1983." 


Publications 

Agreement  for  the  repression  of  the  circula- 
tion of  obscene  publications.  Signed  at  Paris 
May  4,  1910.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  15,  191 
TS  559;  37  Stat.  1511. 

Protocol  amending  the  agreement  for  the  sup 
pression  of  the  circulation  of  obscene  publica- 
tions signed  at  Paris  May  4,  1910.  Done  at 
Lake  Success  May  4,  1949.  Entered  into  forct 
May  4,  1949;  for  the  U.S.,  Aug.  14,  1950.  TIA 
2164. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Cuba.  Dec.  2, 1983. 

Terrorism 

International  convention  against  the  taking  o 
hostages.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  17,  197 
Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983.^ 
Accession  deposited:  Spain,  Mar.  26,  1984. 

Trade 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  Article  VI] 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade,  with  protocol  (customs  valuation).  Do 
at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  and  Nov.  1,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1981.  TIAS  10402. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Czechoslovakia,  Apr. 
1984.5 

Second  certification  of  modifications  and  rec- 
tifications to  the  annex  to  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  12,  1973  (TIAS  9620,  10673)  on  trade  in 
civil  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  Jan.  27, 1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  27,  1984. 


Isli 


(ft 
kj 

jrte 


too: 


ki 


Wheat  Bttei 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the,^! 
wheat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered  irt 
to  force  July  1,  1983. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Austria,  Mar.  6,  1984    ^E 
Kenya,  Apr.  3,  1984. 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  thf^    "" 
food  aid  convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015).  Domi      ■ 


B6 


at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered  into  fori 

July  1,  1983. 

Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  Mar.  6,  1984 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


Vorld  Health  Organization 

^)nstitution  of  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
ion.  Done  at  New  York  July  22,  1946.  Entered 
nto  force  Apr.  7,  1948.  HAS  1808. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Antigua  and  Barbuda, 


N.'  lar.  12,  1984. 

Vorld  Heritage 

onvention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
I'orld  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
'aris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
)ec.  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Ratification  deposited:  Yemen  (Sanaa),  Jan.  25, 


TREATIES 


984. 


liski    IILATERAL 

,2yj7)  Lustria 

i%]l   lemorandum  of  understanding  on  scientific 

ovii    nd  technological  cooperation.  Signed  at 

i^ashington  Feb.  23,  1984.  Entered  into  force 

'eb.  23,  1984. 


niitVl 


tahamas 

Lgreement  concerning  U.S.  defense  facilities 

1  the  Bahamas,  with  annex,  agreed  minute, 

nd  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Washington 

Lpr.  5,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  5,  1984; 

»  ffective  Jan.  26,  1983. 

mplementing  arrangement  to  the  agreement 
[,^  onceming  U.S.  defense  facilities  concerning 
he  provision  of  sites  for  U.S.  defense  pur- 
oses,  with  attachments  (maps).  Signed  at 
I'ashington  Apr.  5,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
ipr.  5,  1984;  effective  Jan.  26,  1983. 

Lgreement  relating  to  the  continuation  of  a 
takii8«looperative  meteorological  program  in  the 
.  11,  Wiwahamas,  with  memoranda  of  arrangement. 

Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Nassau 
IN.  Bet.  14,  1982,  and  Aug.  25,  1983.  Entered  into 

ferce  Aug.  25,  1983;  effective  July  2,  1982. 

agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over 
lessels  utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore  Oil 
tort.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Nassau 
Sept.  23  and  Oct.  5,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
[)ct.  5,  1982. 


Belize 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Apr.  6, 
9a3  (TIAS  10686),  as  amended,  for  control  of 
llicit  production  and  traffic  of  drugs.  Signed  at 
jelmopan  Mar.  30,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
[lar.  30,  1984. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
fune  13,  1977  (TIAS  9020),  as  extended,  on  ex- 
changes and  cooperation  in  cultural,  scientific, 
•iducational,  teciinological,  and  other  fields.  Ef 
ected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Sofia,  Apr.  9, 
.984.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  9, 1984. 

Canada 

Preaty  relating  to  the  Slcagit  River  and  Ross 
jake,  and  the  Seven  Mile  Reservoir  on  the 
'  'end  d'Oreille  River,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Vashing^ton  Apr.  2,  1984.  Enters  into  force 
ipon  exchange  of  ratifications. 


\3 


Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Aug.  28 
and  Sept.  1,  1961  (TIAS  4841),  relating  to 
disposal  of  surplus  U.S.  property  in  Canada. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa 
Dec.  21,  1983,  and  Mar.  14,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  14,  1984;  effective  Oct.  1,  1983. 

Central  African  Republic 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to  or 
guaranteed  by  the  U.S.  Government  through 
the  Export-Import  Bank,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Bangui  Feb.  16,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  16,  1984. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts, with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Santo  Domingo  Dec.  30,  1983;  effec- 
tive June  1, 1983. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  22,  1981,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at  San 
Salvador  Dec.  1,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  20,  1984;  effective  Dec.  1,  1983. 

(Jermany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  par- 
ticipation of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
in  the  ocean  drilling  program,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Bonn  and  Washington  Mar.  2  and  5, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  5,  1984. 

Greece 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  technical  in- 
formation and  cooperation  in  nuclear  safety 
matters,  with  patent  addendum.  Signed  at 
Athens  Oct.  17,  1983,  and  Athens  and 
Washington  Feb.  24,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
February  24,  1984;  effective  Oct.  17,  1983. 

Grenada 

Agreement  concerning  the  status  of  U.S. 
forces  in  Grenada.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  St.  George's  Mar.  12  and  13,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  13,  1984. 

Hong  Kong 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  23,  1982  (TIAS  10420),  relating  to  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  Dec.  23  and  30,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  30, 1983. 

Hungary 

Arrangement  relating  to  a  visa  system  for  ex- 
ports to  the  U.S.  of  wool  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  Feb.  2  and  3,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  3,  1984. 

Indonesia 

Memorandum  of  understanding  relating  to  the 
agreement  of  Dec.  9,  1983,  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at  Jakarta 
Mar.  22,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  22, 
1984. 


let  June  1984 


Ireland 

International  express  mail  agreement  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Dublin  and 
Washington  Feb.  29  and  Mar.  20,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  May  19, 1984. 

Italy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  fur- 
nishing of  launch  and  associated  services  of 
INTELSAT  program.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Rome  Sept.  29  and  Oct.  10, 1983. 
Entered  into  force:  Mar.  5,  1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  develop- 
ment of  the  Tethered  Satellite  System  (TSS). 
Signed  at  Rome  Mar.  7,  1984.  Enters  into  force 
upon  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  confirming 
agreement  and  providing  for  implementation 
of  project. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  develop- 
ment and  launch  of  the  Laser  Geodynamies 
Satellite-2  (Lageos).  Signed  at  Rome  Mar.  7, 
1984.  Enters  into  force  upon  exchange  of 
diplomatic  notes  confirming  agreement  and 
providing  for  implementation  of  joint  project. 

Mali 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
international  military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Bamako  Nov.  4,  1983,  and  Mar.  23, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1984. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement  for  the  establishment  of  a  Loran 
transmitting  station.  Signed  at  Managua 
Sept.  5,  1958.  TIAS  4106. 
Terminated:  Feb.  28, 1983. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Mar.  25, 
1980  (TIAS  9782).  Signed  at  Islamabad 
Mar.  20, 1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20, 
1984. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  24,  1982,  as  amended  (TIAS  10612, 
10712),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
Apr.  1 1  and  12,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  12,  1983;  effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Poland 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over 
vessels  utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore  Oil 
Port.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Mar.  30  and  Apr.  10,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  10,  1984. 

Romania 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guaran- 
teed or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Government  and 
its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Bucharest  Feb.  16, 1984.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  16,  1984. 


87 


immimiiwmtwiiMBMnmill 


CHRONOLOGY 


\ 


St.  Christopher  and  Nevis  Apfll  1984 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
international  military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  St.  John's  and  Basseterre  Mar.  19  and 
20,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20,  1984. 

Senegal 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  30  and  Feb.  5, 1981,  as  amended  (TIAS 
10088,  10325),  regarding  the  establishment  and 
operation  of  a  space  vehicle  tracking  and  com- 
munication facility  in  connection  with  the 
space  shuttle.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Dakar  Oct.  27,  1983,  and  Feb.  14,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  14,  1984;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1984. 

Sweden 

Agreement  for  cooperation  concernmg  peace- 
ful uses  of  nuclear  energ>-.  with  annexes, 
agreed  minute,  and  related  notes.  Signed  at 
Stockholm  Dec.  19, 1983. 
Entered  into  force:  Apr.  11,  1984. 

Turkey 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over 
vessels  utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore  Oil 
Port.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Apr.  9  and  10,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  10,  1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  a 
cooperative  program  in  strong-motion  data  ac- 
quisition and  analysis.  Signed  at  Ankara  and 
Reston  Mar.  8  and  Apr.  16,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  16,  1984. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  regarding  arrangements  for  con- 
tinued U.K.  access  to  and  use  of  the  Atlantic 
Undersea  Test  and  Evaluation  Centre 
(AUTEC)  facility  in  the  Bahamas.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Apr.  5, 1984. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  5,  1984. 

Uruguay 

Treaty  on  extradition  and  cooperation  in  penal 

matters.  Signed  at  Washington  Apr.  6,  1973. 

Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged:  Apr.  11, 

1984. 

Entered  into  force:  Apr.  11,  1984. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Oct.  26  and  27,  1978,  as  amended 
and  extended  (TIAS  9447,  10041),  concerning 
trade  in  men's  and  boys'  wool  and  manmade 
fiber  suits.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Belgrade  Dec.  27  and  30, 1983.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  1,  1984. 


'Not  in  force. 
»Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
3With  declaration(s). 
♦With  reservation(s). 
"Subject  to  ratification.  ■ 


April  1 

El  Salvador's  Elections  Council  announces  the 
official  results  of  the  Mar.  25  presidential  elec- 
tion: 

•  Jose  Napoleon  Duarte  (Christian 
Democrat),  43.4%; 

•  Roberto  d'Aubuisson  (Nationalist 
Republican  Alliance),  29.8%; 

•  Francisco  Jose  Guerrero  (National  Con- 
ciliation Party),  19.3%; 

•  Candidates  representing  five  other 
political  parties  share  the  remaining  votes. 

As  no  candidate  receives  a  majority,  there 
will  be  a  run-off  election. 

Israeli  artillery  units  open  fire  on  positions 
in  Syrian-held  territory  of  Lebanon's  Bakaa 
Valley. 

Vietnam  denies  Thai  accusations  that 
its  troops  crossed  into  Thailand  from  Kam- 
puchea and  attacked  Thai  civilians. 

April  2  ^    ^ 

President  Reagan  sends  a  report  to  the  Con- 
gress on  antisat«llite  arms  control,  cautioning 
against  seeking  talks  on  the  control  of  weapons 
designed  to  destroy  orbiting  satellites.  He 
asserts  that  such  controls  are  unverifiable  and 
that  the  U.S.  needs  to  complete  an  antisatellite 
missile  system  to  deter  the  Soviet  Union. 

Nicaragua's  Supreme  Court  names  a  three- 
member  election  council  to  supervise  the 
Nov.  4  election  of  a  president,  vice  president, 
and  90-member  parliament. 

Senate  votes  for  an  Administration  pro- 
posal to  provide  $61.75  million  in  military  and 
medical  assistance  to  El  Salvador. 

Iran's  representative  to  the  UN  says  Iran 
has  the  capability  of  producing  chemical 
weapons  and  may  retaliate  in  kind  if  Iraq  con- 
tinues its  use  of  such  weapons. 

In  Washington,  D.C.,  Secretary  Shultz  and 
Canadian  Foreign  Secretan,'  MacEachen  sign  a 
treaty  to  prevent  flooding  of  the  Skagit  River 
Valley  in  British  Columbia.  It  resolves 
longstanding  concerns  over  raising  the  height 
of  Ross  Dam  in  Washington  State  in  order  to 
provide  more  electric  power.  Under  the  agree- 
ment, British  Columbia  wUl  supply  power  to 
Seattle  at  a  cost  equivalent  to  the  cost  of  rais- 
ing the  dam. 

April  3 

In  an  address  before  the  Trilateral  Commis- 
sion, Secretary  Shultz  urges  the  nations  in  the 
West  to  "faceup  to  the  need  for  active  defense 
against  terrorism State-sponsored  ter- 
rorism is  really  a  form  of  warfare.  Motivated 
by  ideology  and  political  hostility,  it  is  a 
weapon  of  unconventional  war  against 
democratic  societies,  taking  advanUge  of  the 
openness  of  these  societies." 

Soviet  Union  launches  naval  maneuvers  in 
the  North  Atlantic  and  by  all  appearances  are 
the  largest  ever  staged  in  the  Atlantic  by  any 
nation.  NATO  forces  begin  monitoring  the 
Soviet  fleet. 


Defense  Department  confirms  that  on 
Apr  2,  three  signal  flares  fired  from  a  Soviet* 
aircraft  carrier  hit  a  U.S.  frigate.  There  were* 
no  personnel  injuries  or  damage  to  the  fngat4t 
Both  vessels  were  in  international  waters  in 
the  South  China  Sea. 

U.S.  Air  Force  staff  sergeant  is  shot  and 
wounded  while  en  route  to  the  U.S.  air  base 
near  Athens  airport.  His  two  assailants 
escape. 

In  Guinea  the  army  seizes  control  of  the 
government.  Its  leaders  say  they  want  to 
create  a  democracy  and  avoid  a  personal  dic- 
tatorship and  that  all  political  prisoners 
are  being  released.  The  coup  is  led  by  Col. 
Lansana  Conte;  the  fate  of  acting  head  of  sta 
Lansana  Beavogui  is  unknown. 


Bfpartn 


Sen 


April  4 

In  his  opening  statement  at  a  news  conferem 
President  Reagan  announces  that  he  has  ask 
Vice  President  Bush  to  go  to  the  Conference 
on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  and  submit  a  dra 
treaty  banning  the  production,  possession,  ai 
use  of  chemical  weapons  woridwide.  At  the 
same  time,  the  President  says  the  U.S.  need  - 
to  have  a  limited  reUliatorj'  capability  of  its 
own  to  deter  a  "massive  arsenal"  of  such 
weapons  compUed  by  the  Soviet  Union  until 
treaty  is  agreed.  ■,  .u    it  c 

In  the  UN  Security  Council,  the  U.S. 
vetoes  a  draft  resolution  calling  for  an  end  t( 
the  mining  of  Nicaragua's  ports.  The  vote  is 
13-1  with  1  abstension  (U.K.).  Calling  the 
draft  resolution  one-sided,  the  U.S.  represe 
tative  states  that  it  "expresses  no  concern  l 
the  many  attacks  on  El  Salvador  .  .  .  orfor 
the  continued  violations  of  that  country  s 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  by 
Nicaragua's  continuing  shipment  of  arms  tc  ■ 
Salvadoran  guerrillas." 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  si  i 
the  U.S.  has  joined  the  U.K.  and  France  in 
protesting  to  the  Soviet  Union  the  latter's 
unilateral  reservations  of  airspace,  at  times 
used  by  allied  commercial  flights  to  and  fror 
BerUn,"  for  Soviet  militan,-  exercises. 

In  the  third  day  of  fighting,  Chinese  and 
Vietnamese  exchange  artillerj'  fire  across  tl 
border,  causing  heavy  casualties.  Each  accu 
the  other  of  the  escalation. 

Today  mtrks  the  35th  anniversary  of  thi 
signing  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty. 

In  a  TV  interview,  U.S.  SecreUry  of  thf 
Navy  Lehman  says  recent  incidents  betwee 
U.S." and  Soviet  ships  should  not  escalate  im 
a  problem  in  relations  between  the  two  cour: 
tries.  In  May  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  Union  wil  i 
hold  their  annual  discussions  on  such  incidei 
at  sea;  previous  meetings  have  resolved  sue 
matters. 

Israel's  Knesset  votes  to  hold  new  electio) 
on  July  23. 


April  5 

Soviet  news  agency  TASS  characterizes  Pre' 
dent  Reagan's  proposal  to  ban  chemical 
weapons  as  an  attempt  to  camouflage  a  U.S. 
buildup  of  chemicals  and  as  a  "propaganda 
trick."  It  accuses  the  President  of  attaching 
deliberately  unacceptable  monitoring  and 
verification  conditions  to  the  proposal.  State 


rtlitf 
mi 

Mil 


llil 


l'.S, 


Fre 


88 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


CHRONOLOGY 


•iofthi 


aS«\i  Department  acting  spokesman  Romberg  says 
»e»a  ,he  Soviet  charges  "are  obviously  intended  for 
)ropaganda  effect  to  divert  attention  from 
heir  own  actions  in  this  area."  He  also  notes  it 
s  regrettable  that  the  Soviet  Union  chose  to 
i-,  ittack  the  chemical  weapons  ban  initiative 
)efore  even  seeing  it. 

Senate  approves  an  Administration-backed 
ompromise  bill  of  $61.75  million  for  emergen- 
y  military  aid  to  El  Salvador  and  $21  million 
or  funds  for  Nicaragua. 

An  extreme  leftist  group,  calling  itself  the 
levolutionarj-  Organization  November  17, 
■laims  responsibility  for  wounding  a  U.S.  Air 
orce  sergeant  near  Athens  on  Apr.  3.  Local 
lolice  believe  the  same  group  was  responsible 
or  the  murders  of  three  other  U.S.  officials  in 
975  and  1983. 

Defense  Department  spokesman  Burch 
the  Soviet  Union  did  not  notify  the  U.S. 
advance  of  their  current  naval  exercises  in 
he  North  Atlantic.  While  noting  neither  party 
5  under  any  legal  obligation  to  inform  the 
ther  of  such  exercises,  the  U.S.  had  done  so 
n  advance  of  its  Apr.  2  naval  maneuvers. 

Col.  Lansana  Conte,  who  led  the  Apr.  3 
oup  in  Guinea,  is  named  President. 

U.S.  and  the  Bahamas  conclude  agreement 
n  U.S.  defense  facilities— undersea  test  and 
■valuation  center,  long-range  navigation  sta- 
ion,  and  an  air  force  tracking  station.  A 
elated  agreement  permits  British  use  of  the 
est  and  evaluation  center.  The  U.S.  will  pay 
he  Bahamas  $10  million  a  year  for  10  years, 
ith  an  option  to  renew  for  an  additional  5 
ears. 


Mnferei 


?' 


iir;»l'.il 


Lpriie 

n  an  address  before  the  Georgetovm  Center 
Dr  Strategic  and  International  Studies,  Presi- 
Dent  Reagan  says  the  numlier  one  foreign 
'')oLicy  challenge  for  America  is  to  reduce  the 
•isk  of  nuclear  war  and  that,  without  excep- 
ion,  every  arms  control  proposal  his  Admin- 
tration  has  made  would  reverse  the  arms 
uildup  and  help  bring  a  more  stable  balance 
it  lower  force  levels.  He  says  U.S.  flexibility 
n  the  START  and  INF  negotiations  has  been 
Remonstrated  by  numerous  modifications  in 

.S.  positions. 
.m     State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  says 
"    .he  U.S.  has  raised  its  concern  with  the 

rench  Government  that  France  has  offered  to 
elp  Nicaragua  clear  its  ports  of  mines  if  one 
ir  several  friendly  European  powers  are  wili- 
ng to  cooperate.  He  says  the  U.S.  has  been 
'concerned  with  the  large  Soviet  and  Cuban 
nilitary  relationship  with  Nicaragua  and  we 
vould  not  favor  any  nation  contributing  to 
-Nicaragua's  ability  to  export  revolution  with 
mpunity." 
■wdecui       Greek  police  say  ballistics  tests  confirm 
hat  the  gun  used  to  wound  a  U.S.  Army 
lergeant  on  Apr.  3  was  the  same  weapon  used 
o  kill  a  U.S.  Navy  officer  last  year  and  a  U.S. 
j,j(cPit  ntelligence  official  several  years  ago. 

"  ;?Vpril  7 

U.S.  and  Japan  reach  agreement  on  new  ex- 
.  Dort  quotas  that  will  allow  American  farmers 
sell  siginificantly  more  beef  and  citrus  prod- 
,ijl,Stil'|>ct8  to  Japan. 


Aprils 

State  Department  issues  a  statement  announc- 
ing that  the  U.S.  "has  notified  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  United  Nations  of  a  temporarj' 
and  limited  modification  of  the  scope  of  the 
U.S.  acceptance  of  the  compulsory  jurisdiction 
of  till'  Inlcrnational  Court  of  Ju.stice  .  .  .  The 
notification,  effective  April  6,  provides  that  the 
Court's  compulsorj' jurisdiction  shall  not  apply 
to  the  United  States  with  respect  to  disputes 
with  any  Central  American  state  or  any  dis- 
pute arising  out  of  or  related  to  events  in  Cen- 
tral America  for  a  period  of  2  years." 

April  9-14 

President  Salvador  Jorge  Blanco  of  the 
Dominican  Republic  makes  a  state  visit  to  the 
United  States. 

April  9 

In  a  statement.  President  Reagan  endorses 
the  report  of  the  National  Commission  on 
Strategic  Forces.  The  report  focused  on  arms 
control  issues  and  suggested  ways  to  find  com- 
mon approaches  and  common  definitions  in 
dealing  with  the  asymmetrical  strategic 
arsenals  fielded  by  the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Lebanese  Government  announces  that  an 
agreement  has  been  reached  among  the  war- 
ring factions  on  disengaging  their  forces  in 
Beirut.  Intermittent  fighting,  however,  con- 
tinues in  the  city  and  in  the  surrounding  hills. 

Nicaragua  files  an  application  with  the 
ICJ  asking  it  to  declare  illegal  U.S.  support 
for  guerrilla  raids  on  its  territory  and  the 
U.S.  role  in  the  mining  of  Nicaraguan  ports. 
State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  says 
that  as  the  U.S.  modified  its  consent  to  ICJ 
jurisdiction  over  Central  American  cases  for 
2  years,  the  Court  does  not  have  jurisdiction 
over  Nicaragua's  application.  Hughes  says 
this  modification  is  a  technical  option  that  has 
been  used  by  other  countries  and  that  other 
avenues  are  open  to  Nicaragua  to  settle 
regional  disputes,  in  particular  the  Contadora 
process. 

EC  ministers,  meeting  in  Luxembourg, 
again  fail  to  agree  on  how  to  resolve  the  EC's 
financial  difficulties.  The  U.K.  is  demanding  a 
rebate  of  about  $1.2  billion  on  its  contribution 
to  the  EC  and  an  assurance  that  its  future 
payments  will  be  reduced. 

April  10 

A  Nicaraguan  rebel  leader  says  his  Democratic 
Revolutionary  Alliance  is  ready  to  stop  mining 
Nicaragua's  harbors  if  the  Sandinista  govern- 
ment will  end  press  censorship. 

By  a  vote  of  84  to  12,  the  Senate  adopts  a 
nonbinding,  sense  of  the  Senate  resolution  op- 
posing the  use  of  U.S.  funds  to  mine 
Nicaraguan  waters. 

West  European  and  Latin  American 
diplomats  say  in  Managua  that  the  Sandinista 
government  is  continuing  to  send  military 
equipment  to  Salvadoran  insurgents  and  per- 
mitting training  camps  for  them  in  Nicaraguan 
territory.  The  U.S.  has  been  making  similar 
charges  for  3  years. 


El  Salvador's  Elections  Council  announces 
May  6  as  the  date  for  the  run-off  presidential 
election. 

White  House  releases  a  statement  by  the 
four  principal  U.S.  foreign  poUcy  officials 
emphatically  denying  that  the  U.S.  has  any 
plans  to  invade  Nicaragua  or  any  other  Cen- 
tral American  country. 

At  a  meeting  in  Luxembourg,  the  Foreign 
Ministers  of  West  Germany,  the  U.K.,  Den- 
mark, Belgium,  and  the  Netherlands  approve  a 
plan  to  restrict  the  export  of  chemicals  that 
can  be  used  to  make  chemical  weapons. 

Soviet  Union  rejects  an  ICAO  report  on 
the  downing  of  a  South  Korean  civilian  air- 
liner by  Soviet  fighters  last  Sept.,  saying  it 
is  inaccurate  and  without  legal  foundation. 

April  11 

Supreme  Soviet  names  Soviet  Communist  Par- 
ty leader  Konstantin  U.  Chemenko  as  Presi- 
dent (head  of  state). 

Third  Secretary  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Kabul,  Richard  S.  Vandiver,  is  expelled  from 
Afghanistan  for  "espionage,  collecting  of  in- 
formation, and  actions  against  the  Democratic 
Republic  of  Afghanistan." 

April  12-14 

Prime  Minister  Prem  Tinsulanonda  of  Thailand 
makes  an  official  working  visit  to  Washington. 
A  science  and  technologj*  exchange  agreement 
is  signed  during  his  visit.  On  Apr.  13,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  announces  that  the  U.S.  will  sell 
Thailand  40  M-48  tanks  because  of  the  threat 
posed  by  Vietnamese  troops  in  Kampuchea. 

April  12 

In  a  speech  to  the  Supreme  Soviet,  Premier 
Tikhonov  says  the  Soviet  Union  will  return  to 
the  INF  negotiations  when  U.S.  intermediate- 
range  missiles  are  withdrawn  from  Western 
Europe. 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  de- 
nies reports  that  U.S.  military  trainers  have 
participated  in  bombing  raids  while  flying  as 
instructors  with  Salvadoran  Air  Force  pilots. 

By  a  vote  of  281  to  111.  the  House  of 
Representatives  adopts  a  nonbinding,  sense 
of  the  Congress  resolution  condemning  the 
reported  U.S.  role  in  mining  Nicaraguan 
harbors. 

April  13 

In  a  TV  interview,  ACDA  Director  Adelman 
says  the  U.S.  is  hopeful  the  Soviet  Union  will 
comply  with  the  verification  provisions  of  the 
U.S.  draft  treaty  to  prohibit  chemical  weap- 
ons. He  underscores  the  importance  of  such 
provisions  which  call  for  on-site  inspections  at 
declared  and  nondeclared  chemical  weapons 
sites. 

White  House  announces  that  under  Section 
21D  of  the  Arms  Control  Export  Act,  the 
President  will  use  his  emergency  authority 
to  provide  essential  military  material  to  EI 
Salvador. 

A  private  delegation  of  U.S.  veterans  of 
the  Vietnam  war  return  from  Southeast  Asia 
after  having  talks  with  Vietnamese  and  Kam- 
puchean  officials  about  2,500  American  serv- 
icemen still  listed  as  missing. 


Bul*)une  1984 


89 


M— IIBilBUlWIIIIIIII 


CHRONOLOGY 


1 


Lebanon  enters  its  10th  year  of  civil  strife. 
The  following  newly  appointed  ambassadors 
present  their  credentials  to  President  Reagan; 
Renagi  Renagi  Lohia  (Papua  New  Guinea), 
Sonatane  Tu'a  Taumoepeau-Tupou  (Tonga), 
Archbishop  Pio  Laghi  (The  Holy  See),  and 
Serara  Tsholofelo  Ketlogetswe  (Botswana). 

April  14 

In  his  weekly  radio  address,  President  Reagan 
says  he  has  ordered  $32  million  in  emergency 
military  equipment  for  El  Salvador  after  Con- 
gress recessed  without  approving  the  funds. 

April  15 

Dennis  W.  Keogh,  head  of  the  U.S.  Liaison 
Office  in  Windhoek,  Namibia,  and  Lt.  Col. 
Kenneth  Crabtree,  the  Defense  Department 
representative  to  the  Liaison  Office,  are  killed 
by  an  explosion  at  a  gas  station  in  Oshakati, 
Namibia.  They  were  members  of  a  special 
team  set  up  to  monitor  the  disengagement  be- 
tween Angola  and  South  Africa  in  Namibia, 

A  missing  French  citizen  and  Frank 
Regier,  an  American  professor  at  American 
University  in  Beirut,  both  of  whom  were  kid- 
napped in"  Feb.,  are  rescued  by  members  of  the 
Shia  Amal  militia. 

Iran  holds  elections  for  its  270-member 
parliament. 

April  16 

Salvadoran  national  employed  by  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  San  Salvador  is  assassinated. 

U.S.  and  Japan  sign  an  agreement  on 
nuclear  research. 

April  17 

Secretary  Shultz  chairs  a  meetmg  of  the 
U.S.-Mexico  Binational  Commission  at  the 
State  Department. 

SUte  Department  spokesman  Hughes  con- 
demns recent  Vietnamese  attacks  along  the 
Thai-Kampuchean  border  as  a  threat  to 
Thailand's  security  and  restates  the  U.S.  com- 
mitment to  seU  40  M-48  tanks  to  ThaUand  to 
help  improve  border  defenses. 

April  18 

Vice  President  Bush  formally  presents  to  the 
Conference  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  the 
U.S.  draft  treaty  for  a  worldwide  ban  on 
possession,  development,  production,  acquisi- 
tion, retention,  transfer,  or  use  of  chemical 
weapons. 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  en- 
dorses an  assessment  by  a  Salvadoran  military 
commander  that  rebel  forces  in  El  Salvador 
continue  to  receive  military  supplies  from 
Nicaragua. 

Two  unarmed  U.S.  Army  helicopters,  one 
carrying  two  U.S.  Senators,  are  shot  at  over 
Honduras  near  the  border  with  El  Salvador. 
Both  helicopters  make  a  precautionary  forced 
landing;  there  are  no  injuries. 

U.S.  formally  notifies  Nicaragua  that  Nora 
Astorga,  a  Deputy  Foreign  Minister,  will  not 
be  accepted  as  the  next  Ambassador  to  the 
U.S. 


90 


Prime  Minister  Vere  Bird  is  reelected  to  a 
5-year  term  when  his  Labor  Party  wins  a  clear 
majority  of  seats  in  the  Antigua  and  Barbuda 
Parliament. 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  ex- 
presses U.S.  disappointment  over  the  Turkish 
Government's  decision  to  exchange  ambas- 
sadors with  the  self-proclaimed  Turkish 
Cypriot  state  on  Cyprus,  saying  it  could  "set 
back  the  UN  Secretary  General's  efforts  to 
bring  about  a  solution  based  on  negotiations 
between  the  two  parties  in  Cyprus." 

April  19 

NATO  allies  introduce  a  new  proposal  at  the 
MBFR  talks  in  Vienna  to  break  the  impasse 
caused  by  discrepancies  in  the  Eastern  and 
Western  data  on  the  size  of  Eastern  forces 
now  in  central  Europe.  Instead  of  requiring 
formal  data  agreement  on  all  forces  in  central 
Europe  before  reductions  begin,  the  West 
now  stands  ready  to  accept  an  exchange  of  _ 
data  that  falls  within  an  acceptable  range  of 
Western  estimates  on  the  combat  and  combat 
support  forces  of  both  sides. 

President  Gemayel  meets  with  the  Syrian 
President  in  Damascus  and  reaches  agree- 
ment on  forming  a  new  Lebanese  Govern- 
ment of  national  unity  and  undertaking  inter- 
nal reforms. 

U.S.  officials  in  Honduras  say  that  the 
helicopters  fired  on  yesterday  may  have 
strayed  over  rebel-controlled  territory  in  El 
Salvador,  but  they  deny  the  helicopters  were 
engaged  in  anything  other  than  transporting 
the  passengers  to  a  Salvadoran  refugee 
camp. 

UN  Security  council  votes  to  e.xtend  the 
UN  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL)  for  6 
months. 

April  20-May  6 

U.S.  holds  military  war  games  in  the  Carib- 
bean and  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  demonstrate  and 
improve  the  U.S.  capability  to  protect  and 
mainUin  the  free  use  of  the  sealanes. 

April  20  „     ^ 

In  a  Pravda  article,  the  Soviet  Union  calls  the 
U.S.  chemical  weapons  ban  draft  treaty  absurd 
and  unacceptable.  It  says  the  proposal  to 
verify  compliance  by  inspecting  only  govern- 
ment-owned factories  discriminates  against  the 
Soviet  Union. 

Warsaw  Pact  Foreign  Ministers,  meetmg 
in  Budapest,  issue  a  communique  demanding 
that  NATO  halt  deplojTnent  of  nuclear  mis- 
siles in  Western  Europe  as  a  precondition  for 
resuming  the  INF  talks. 

While  on  a  routine  obser\'ation  mission 
along  the  West  German-Czechoslovak  border, 
a  U.S.  Army  helicopter  is  fired  on  by  two 
Soviet-built" MiGs  of  unknown  nationality.  The 
helicopter  is  not  hit  and  returns  safely  to  its 
home  base.  The  Defense  Department  is  inves- 
tigating the  incident.  . 

The  officers'  club  at  the  U.S.  Navy  Yard  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  is  bombed;  there  are  no  in- 
juries. A  Salvadoran  group,  with  ties  to  Puerto 
Rican  nationalists,  claims  responsibility  and 
says  the  act  was  a  protest  against  U.S.  policy 
in  Central  America. 


State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  says 
"the  United  States  has  no  intention  of  pro- 
viding funds  to  third  countries  for  the  purpose  j 
of  supporting  covert  activities  in  Central 
America." 


KithP 


April  21 

In  a  Pravda  article,  the  Soviet  Union  rejects 
the  Apr.  19  NATO  approach  to  troop  reduc- 
tions in  central  Europe. 

AssisUnt  Secretary  Murphy,  after  holdmg 
talks  with  Arab  leaders,  says  in  Cairo  that  the 
U.S.  supports  all  diplomatic  and  poUtical  solu- 
tions to  end  the  Iran-Iraq  war  but  that  Iranian 
officials  have  rejected  all  proposals. 


April; 


April  22 

U.K.  announces  it  has  broken  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Libya  and  orders  the  occupants  of 
the  Libyan  Embassy  to  leave  the  country  by 
Apr.  29.  This  action  is  the  result  of  the  refusal 
by  Libyan  leader  Qadhafi  to  cooperate  in  an  in- 
quiry into  the  killing  on  Apr.  17  of  a  British 
police  constable  and  the  wounding  of  10  other 
people  by  gunmen  fu-ing  from  the  embassy  in- 
to a  crowd  of  anti-Qadhafi  demonstrators. 
White  House  deputy  press  secretary  Speakes 
says  the  U.S.  supports  Britain's  decision. 

April  23  , 

Acting  State  Department  spokesman  Romber^ 
says  the  U.S.  supports  ASEAN's  efforts  to 
achieve  a  political  solution  to  the  Kampuchear 
problem  based  on  the  total  withdrawal  of  Viet 
namese  troops  and  the  restoration  of  self-de- 
termination for  the  Khmer  people  through  in- 
ternationally supervised  elections. 

April  24 

An  official  Afghan  Government  radio  broad- 
cast claims  that  a  major  Soviet-led  offensive 
has  resulted  in  the  overrun  of  the  Panjshir 
Valley  north  of  Kabul,  a  guerrilla  stronghold 
for  years.  Acting  State  Department  spokes- 
man Romberg  confirms  that  an  offensive  has 
begun  and  describes  it  as  "an  escalation  of  the 
destructive  and  brutal  anti-civilian  warfare  in 
Afghanistan." 

April  25 

ICJ  begins  hearing  Nicaragua's  complaint 
against  the  U.S.  Nicaragua  calls  on  the  Worl 
Court  to  indicate  immediate  provisional 
measures  to  stop  the  U.S.  from  offering 
direct  or  indirect  support  for  military  ac- 
tivities against  the  Sandinista  government. 

The  Foreign  Ministers  of  Costa  Rica,  Hon( 
duras,  and  El  Salvador  issue  a  strong  joint 
statement  in  support  of  the  Contadora  peace 
process.  The  statement  calls  for  specific 
measures  in  support  of  Contadora  from  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  and  asserts  that  to 
achieve  the  goals  of  Contadora,  any  agreemen 
concluded  in  that  forum  must  be  comprehen- 
sive, fully  verifiable,  binding,  and  enforceable. 

April  26-May  1 

President  Reagan  visits  the  People's  Republic 
of  China,  the  fu-st  by  an  American  President 
since  the  formal  reestablishment  of  diplomatic 
relations  in  1979.  His  visit  includes  the  cities  c 
Beijing,  Xi'an.  and  Shanghai  and  meetings 


Dgan 


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[■fiiij   ivith  President  Li  Xiannian,  Premier  Zhao 


Ziyang,  Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping,  and 
Communist  Party  Ceneral  Secretary  Hu 
Yaobang.  During  his  stay,  the  President 
signs  bilateral  agreements  on  taxes,  nuclear 
cooperation,  and  cultural  exchanges. 


iVpril  26-May  7 

U.S.,  El  Salvador,  and  Honduras  hold  com- 
)ined  naval  exercises  in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  on 
he  Pacific  coast  of  Central  America  to  im- 
Drove  surveillance  and  interdiction  techniques 
md  procedures  and  to  enhance  regional 
rstii  iefense  procedures. 

\pril  26 

President  Reagan  sends  four  proposed  legisla- 
;ive  acts  to  the  Congress  "to  attack  the  press- 
ng  and  urgent  problem  of  international  ter- 
•orism:" 

Act  for  the  prevention  and  punishment 
)f  the  crime  of  hostage-taking; 

Aircraft  sabotage  act; 

Act  for  rewards  for  information  concem- 
ng  terrorist  acts;  and 

Prohibition  against  the  training  or  sup- 
)ort  of  terrorist  organizations  act  of  1984. 

Sunni  Muslim  leader  Rashid  Karami  is 
lamed  Prime  Minister  of  Lebanon  by  Presi- 
ient  Gemayel  and  is  asked  to  form  a  new  gov- 
imment  of  national  unity. 

Defense  Department  spokesman  Burch 
lays  a  U.S.  Army  investigation  has  con- 
:luded  that  a  U.S.  Army  helicopter  in- 
idvertently  crossed  the  West  German  border 
nto  Czechoslovakia  on  Apr.  20. 


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PRESS  RELEASES 


Ipril  27 

J.S.  urges  the  ICJ  to  reject  Nicaragua's  re- 
|uest  for  provisional  measures  and  dismiss  its 
.pplication.  U.S.  asserts  that  the  World  Court 
loes  not  have  jurisdiction  over  this  matter  and 
itresses  that  Nicaragua  never  properly  ac- 
lepted  the  ICJ's  compulsory  jurisdiction. 

^pril  30 

■"oreign  Ministers  of  the  Contadora  Four  (Co- 
ombia,  Mexico,  Panama,  Venezuela)  and  the 
ive  Central  American  countries  (Costa  Rica, 
Honduras,  El  Salvador,  Nicaragua,  and 
lUatemala)  meet  in  Panama  to  receive  recom- 
nendations  from  the  three  working  commis- 
ions  (security,  socioeconomic,  and  political) 
ind  the  technical  commission  on  implementa- 
ion  of  the  21-point  document  of  objectives. 

Prime  Minister-designate  Karami  of 
jebanon  announces  the  formation  of  a  national 
inity  government  to  include  leaders  of  the 
varring  factions  in  a  10-member  cabinet;  there 
ire  five  Christians  and  five  Muslims.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20r)2(). 

No.  Date  Subject 

*93      4/2  Shultz:  remarks  at  luncheon 

for  chief  executive  officers 
of  U.S.  firms  in  South 
Africa,  Mar.  29. 
*94      4/2  Regional  foreign  policy  con- 

ference, Dallas,  Apr.  26. 
*95      4/3  President  Reagan  urges  Con- 

gress to  approve  Compact 
of  Free  Association  be- 
tween the  U.S.  and  the 
Marshall  Islands  and 
Micronesia. 
*96      43  Shultz,  MacEachen:  remarks 

at  U.S. -Canada  treaty  sign- 
ing ceremony,  Apr.  2, 

Shultz:  address  before  the 
Trilateral  Commission. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  tlie 
National  Foreign  Policy 
Conference  on  Centra! 
America. 

Agreements  on  U.S.  defense 
facilities  in  the  Bahamas 
concluded. 

Program  for  the  state  visit  of 
President  Salvador  Jorge 
Blanco  of  the  Dominican 
Republic,  Apr.  9-14. 

Secretary's  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Private  Interna- 
tional Law,  Apr.  27. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, Apr.  30. 

International  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative 
Committee  (CCITT),  study 
group  A,  May  1. 

International  Radio  Consulta- 
tive Committee,  study 
group  6,  May  4. 

Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCC),  Subcommit- 
tee on  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea 
(SOLAS),  working  group  on 
safety  of  navigation, 
May  31. 
•106      4/6  CCITT,  study  group  C, 

May  4. 
*107      4/6  Shultz:  interview  on  the 

"Today  Show." 
108      4/9  Shultz:  interview  on  "Meet 

the  Press,"  Apr.  1. 
*109      4/9  Program  for  the  official  work- 

ing visit  of  Thai  Prime  Min- 
ister Prem  Tinsulanonda, 
Apr.  12-14. 
110       4/12         Foreign  Relations  of  the  U.S.. 
1952-54,  Vol.  1:  General: 
Economic  and  Political  Mat- 
ters released  Apr.  19. 


97 

4/3 

*98 

4/4 

*99 

4/5 

100 

4/6 

101 

4/6 

102 

4/6 

103 

4/6 

104 

4/6 

105 

4/6 

*111      4/12        Press  credentials  for  North 
Atlantic  Council  ministerial 
meeting.  May  29-31. 

*112      4/13        Conference  on  U.S.  trade  and 
investment  in  Africa,  Los 
Angeles,  Apr.  19. 
1 13      4/16        Digest  of  United  States  Prac- 
tice in  International  Law, 
1979  released. 

*114  4/19  Shultz:  interview  on  USIA's 
"Worldnet,"  Apr.  18. 

*115      4/19        Barrington  King  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Brunei 
(biographic  data). 

♦116      4/23        David  C.  Miller,  Jr.,  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Zim- 
babwe (biographic  data). 

*117  4/23  Shultz:  news  briefing  on  the 
President's  trip  to  the  Far 
East,  Apr.  18. 

*118      4/24        Stephen  W.  Bosworth  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  the 
Philippines  (biographic 
data). 

*119      4/25        SCC,  May  31. 

*120      4/30        Shultz:  interview  on  "Good 

Morning  America,"  Apr.  27. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


USUN 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Pubhc  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Date  Subject 

♦87      10/13      Meyerhoff:  U.S.  actions  in  the 
Middle  East,  South  Asia, 
and  elsewhere,  General 
Assembly. 

*88      10/14       Pritchard:  militarj'  arms 

embargo  imposed  on  South 
Africa,  General  Assembly. 

•89      10/17      Keyes:  World  Food  Day, 
General  Assembly. 

*90      10/17      Pritchard:  proposed  program 
budget  for  the  biennium 
1984-85  and  program  plan- 
ning, Committee  V. 

•91  10/18  Keyes:  U.S.  policy  misrepre- 
sentations and  conditions, 
Committee  III. 

•92      10/19       Rosenstock:  peacekeeping 

operations.  Special  Political 
Committee,  Oct.  18. 

•93  10/19  Keyes:  economic  conditions  in 
developing  countries.  Com- 
mittee 11. 

♦94      10/19      Gershman:  right  of  self- 
determination,  Committee 
III. 


June  1984 


91 


HDIBMIBBHni 


PRESS  RELEASES 


*97  10/21 

*98  10/24 

•99  10/27 

*100  10/26 

•101  10/26 

•102  10/27 

•103  10/27 

•104  10/28 

•105  10/28 

•■106  10/28 

•107  10/28 

•108  10/31 


•110  11/2 

•111  10/31 

•112  10/31 

•113  10/1 

•114  11/2 

•115  11/1 

•116  11/1 

•117  li/2 

■118  11/2 

•119  11/3 

•120  11/2 

•121  11/10 


Adelman:  U.S.  commitment 
to  reduce  nuclear  arms, 
Committee  I. 

Gershman:  self-determination 
in  the  Ukraine,  Committee 
III,  Oct.  19. 

i'ritchard:  non-self-governing 
territories  and  foreign 
economic  interests.  Com- 
mittee IV. 

Kirkpatrick:  Namibia,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

Dombalis:  economic  develop- 
ment issues.  Committee  II. 

Kirkpatrick:  U.S.  role  in  the 
world,  Nicaragua,  Security 
Council. 

Kirkpatrick:  Grenada,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

Solarz:  Kampuchea,  General 
Assembly. 

Kirkpatrick:  U.S.  use  of  force 
in  Grenada. 

Lichenstein:  Grenada,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

Keyes:  global  negotiations. 
General  Assembly. 

Davis:  UN  and  League  of 
Arab  States  cooperation. 
General  Assembly. 

Lichenstein:  Namibia,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

Sherman:  petitioner's  request 
for  hearing.  Committee  IV, 
Oct.  26. 

Gershman:  racial  discrimina- 
tion, Committee  III,  Oct.  26 
and  27. 

Gershman:  self-determination. 
Committee  III,  Oct.  27. 

Feldman:  youth,  aging,  and 
the  disabled.  Committee 
III. 

Sorzano:  inscription  of  the 
situation  in  Grenada, 
General  Committee. 

Fields:  chemical  weapons. 
Committee  I. 

Lichenstein:  information. 
Special  Political  Committee, 
Nov.  1. 

Bader:  military  assistance  to 
South  Africa,  Committee  IV. 

Fields:  disarmament,  Com- 
mittee I. 

Housholder:  specialized  agen- 
cies. Committee  V. 

Kirkpatrick:  free  elections  in 
Grenada,  General 
Assembly,  Nov.  2. 

Keyes:  Grenada,  Cuba,  Com- 
mittee II,  Nov.  2. 

Kirkpatrick:  U.S.  actions  in 
Grenada,  General 
Assembly. 

Loeb:  Israeli  aggression 
against  Iraqi  nuclear  in- 
stallations. General 
Assembly. 


•122      11/4         Loeb:  prevention  of  nuclear 
war.  Committee  I,  Nov.  3. 
•123      11/7        Sorzano:  Grenada,  Cuban  mil- 
itary presence  in  other 
countries.  Committee  I, 
Nov.  3. 
•124      11/4         Reynolds:  women.  Committee 

III. 
•125      11/4        Sherman:  U.S.  support  for 
IAEA  programs.  General 
Assembly. 
•126      11/7        Solarz:  chemical  weapons. 

Committee  I,  Nov.  4. 
•127      11/7        Wake:  social  and  economic 
development  information 
e.xchanges.  Committee  III, 
Nov.  4. 
•128      11/7        Feldman:  International  Youth 
Year,  Grenada,  Committee 
III,  Nov.  4. 
•129      11/8         Lindahl:  arms  race  in  outer 

space,  Nov.  7. 
•130      11/9         Lindahl:  U.S.  space  program. 
Special  Political  Committee. 
•131       11/9        Kirkpatrick:  Central  America, 

General  Assembly,  Nov.  8. 
•132      11/9        Fields:  disarmament. 

Committee  I. 
•133      11/10       Dewey:  humanitarian  assist- 
ance, Kampuchea,  Khmer 
Relief  donors  meeting. 
•134      11/10       Loeb:  Central  America, 

General  Assembly. 
•135      11/10       Bader:  U.S.  trusteeship  of 

Micronesia,  Committee  IV, 
Nov.  9. 
•136      11/U       Sherman:  U.S.  territories. 

Committee  IV. 
•137      11/11       Kelly:  disaster  and  drought 

relief.  Committee  II. 
•138      11/14       Lichenstein:  U.S.  military 

presence  in  Lebanon,  Secu- 
rity Council,  Nov.  11. 
•139      11/15       Kuttner:  Joint  Staff  Pension 
Board,  Committee  \'. 
Nov.  14. 
•140      11/15      Kuttner:  International  Civil 
Service  Commission,  Com- 
mittee V. 
•141       11/15      Goodman:  assistance  to  the 

Palestinian  people.  Commit- 
tee II,  Nov.  14. 
•142      11/15       Keyes:  apartheid  in  South 

Africa,  General  Assembly. 
•143      11/16      Goodman:  shelter  for  the  " 
homeless.  Committee  II, 
Nov.  14. 
•144      11/16      Jones:  human  rights.  Commit- 
tee III,  Nov.  11. 
•145      11/16       Solarz:  U.S.  policies  on  refu- 
gees. Committee  III. 
•146      11/17       Sherman:  Namibia  independ- 
ence. South  Africa,  non- 
governmental organiza- 
tions, U.S.  public  opinion, 
Committee  IV. 
•147      11/17      Streeb:  trade  and  develop- 
ment. Committee  II. 
Nov.  16. 
•148       11/17       Sherman:  UN  influence  over 
U.S.  public  opinion.  Com- 
mittee IV. 


•149 

11/18 

•150 

11/18 

•151 

11/18 

•152 

11/22 

•153 

11/22 

•154 

11/22 

•155 

11/23 

•156 

11/23 

•157 

11/25 

•158 

11/30 

►159 

11/30 

160 

12/1 

161 

12/1 

162 

12/1 

163 

12/1 

164 

12/2 

165 

12/2 

166 

12/5 

167 

12/5 

168 

12/5 

169 

12/6 

170 

12/7 

171 

12/6 

•173 
•174 


12/8 
12/8 


DiCarlo:  international  drug 
trafficking.  Committee  III. 

Feldman:  U.S.  contributions 
to  humanitarian  programs, 
UNHCR  ad  hoc  Committee. 

Keyes:  apartheid  in  South 
Africa,  General  Assembly. 

Lichenstein:  Palestine  refu- 
gees. Special  Political 
Committee. 

Kirkpatrick:  Afghanistan, 
General  Assembly. 

Fleming:  UN  operational 
activities.  Committee  II. 

Kuttner:  UN  personnel  ques- 
tions. Committee  V. 

Dombalis:  religious  intoler- 
ance. Committee  III. 

Gershman:  human  rights, 
torture,  inhuman  treatment 
or  punishment.  Committee 
III. 

Sorzano:  Antarctic  Treaty, 
Committee  I. 

Jones:  Voluntary  Fund  for 
the  UN  Decade  for  Women, 
Committee  III. 

Fields:  disarmament.  Com- 
mittee I.  Nov.  30. 

Jones:  UN  Decade  for  Women 
world  conference.  Commit- 
tee III. 

Lichenstein:  information. 
Special  Political  Committee. 

Lichenstein:  outer  space. 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful 
Uses  of  Outer  Space. 

Miller:  hazardous  products. 
Committee  II,  Dec.  1. 

Sorzano:  U.S.  vote  on  Indian 
Ocean  issue.  Committee  I. 

Jones:  human  rights,  children, 
drugs,  migrant  workers, 
Committee  III,  Nov.  30. 

Keyes:  apartheid.  General 
Assembly. 

Lichenstein:  Israel,  Special 
Political  Committee. 

Sherman:  decolonization, 
Namibia,  non-self-governing 
territories.  General 
Assembly. 

Feldman:  human  rights. 
Committee  III,  Dec.  5. 

Davis:  Palestine  refugees. 
Middle  East,  Special 
Political  Committee,  Dec.  2. 

Merry:  Grenada,  Nicaragua, 
Lebanon,  South  Afi-ica, 
Committee  I. 

Fields:  international  security, , 
Committee  I,  Dec.  7. 

Kirkpatrick:  human  rights, 
totalitarianism,  Poland, 
Soviet  Union,  Chile, 
Guatemala,  El  Salvador, 
Committee  III. 
Keyes:  human  rights.  Bill  of 
Rights  Day,  General 
Assemblv. 


lep 


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ttpici 


iretap 


"52 


UBLICATIONS 


76  12/14      Pritchard:  Palestinian  issue, 
General  Assembly,  Dee.  13. 

77  [Not  issued.] 
.78      12/16      Sorzano:  nuclear  energy, 

Nonproliferation  Treaty. 
Dec.  14. 

79  12/15       Sorzano:  UN  Development 

Program,  General 
Assembly. 

80  12/19      Solarz:  Middle  East  situation. 

General  Assembly. 

81  12/20      Sorzano:  Indian  Ocean  as  a 

zone  of  peace.  General 
Assembly. 

82  12/20       Keller:  U.S.  delegation's 

views  on  program  budget 

1984-85,  Committee  V. 
,83       12/20       Keyes;  global  negotiations. 

General  Assembly. 
,84      12/21       Sorzano:  INF  negotiations. 

General  Assembly,  Dec.  20. 

85  12/20       Kirkpatrick:  South  Africa, 

Angola,  Namibia,  Security 
Council. 

86  12/22       Herzberg:  refugees  in  Africa, 

Committee  III,  Dec.  8. 
,87      12/22       Keyes:  International  Year  of 
Peace,  General  Assembly, 
Dec.  5. 
12/22       Dombalis:  International  Year 
of  Peace,  General 
Assembly,  Dec.  5. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Billeti.n. 


)epartment  of  State 


ree  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ent  of  State  publications  are  available  from 
le  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
ureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
ashington,  D.C.  20520. 

Free  multiple  copies  may  be  obtained  by 
riting  to  the  Office  of  Opinion  Analysis  and 
ans.  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

resident  Reagan 

merica's  Foreign  Policy  Challenges  for  the 
1980s,  Center  for  Strategic  and  Interna- 
tional Studies,  Apr.  6,  1984  (Current  Policy 
#562). 

ice  President  Bush 

.S.  Proposes  Banning  Chemical  Weapons, 
Conference  on  Disarmament,  Geneva, 
Apr.  18,  1984  (Current  Policy  #566). 


letuiiti 


t,ti     scretary  Shultz 

Dwer  and  Diplomacy  in  the  1980s,  Trilateral 
Commission,  Apr.  3,  1984  (Cun-ent  Policy 
#561). 


Arms  Control 

START  in  a  Historical  Perspective,  Ambassa- 
dor Rowny,  Kiwanis  Club,  Atlanta,  Apr.  10, 
1984  (Current  Policy  #563). 

START  Proposals  (GIST,  Apr.  1984). 

East  Asia 

POW/MlAs  in  Southeast  Asia  (GIST, 
Apr.  Ut84). 

Economics 

Review  of  East -West  Economic  Relations, 
Under  Secretary  Wallis,  Subcommittee  on 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Mar.  29,  1984  (Current 
Policy  #567). 

Steel:  Domestic  Industry  in  a  Global  Market, 
Under  Secretary  Wallis,  Convention  of  the 
Iron  and  Steel  Society,  American  Institute 
of  Metallurgical  Engineers,  Chicago,  Apr.  2, 
1984  (Current  Policy  #565). 

Examining  the  Unitary  Tax,  Under  Secretary 
Wallis,  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Coral 
Gables,  Mar.  8,  1984  (Current  Policy  #564). 

London  Economic  Summit  (GIST.  Apr.  1984). 

Europe 

The  Baltic  States'  Struggle  for  Freedom, 
Assistant  Secretary  Abrams,  3d  annual 
Human  Rights  Conference  of  the  Baltic 
American  Freedom  League,  Los  Angeles, 
Mar.  17,  1984  (Current  Policy  #560). 

Foreign  Assistance 

International  Security  and  Development 
Cooperation  Program,  Department  of  State 
report,  Apr.  1984  (Special  Report  #116). 

Western  Hemisphere 

U.S.  Efforts  to  Achieve  Peace  in  Central 
America,  transmittal  letter  and  report  sub- 
mitted to  the  Congress  by  Secretary  Shultz, 
Mar.  15,  1984  (Special  Report  #115).  ■ 


une  1984 


Foreign  Relations 
Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  Stale  on  April  19, 
1984,  released  Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States,  1952-1954,  Volume  I, 
General:  Economic  and  Political  Matters. 
The  volume  presents  previously  clas- 
sified documents  on  major  economic 
policies  and  on  domestic  political  and 
legislative  developments  that  had  impor- 
tant impact  upon  the  conduct  of  foreign 
affairs  in  the  last  year  of  the  Truman 
presidency  and  the  first  2  years  of  the 
Eisenhower  Administration.  Included  are 
sections  dealing  with  the  foreign  policy 
aspects  of  the  transition  in  Administra- 
tions; proposals  by  Senator  John  Bricker 
of  Ohio  and  others  in  the  Senate  to 
restrict  the  executive  treatymaking 
powers  of  the  President;  the  development 
of  policy  on  the  applicability  of  antitrust 
legislation  to  international  petroleum 
companies;  the  foreign  policy  aspects  of 
congressional  loyalty  and  security  in- 
vestigations during  the  period  1950-54; 
and  the  Department  of  State's  views  on 
the  McCarran-Walter  Immigration  Act  of 
1952  and  the  Refugee  Relief  Act  of  1953. 
The  major  portion  of  the  volume,  ap- 
proximately two-thirds,  deals  with  impor- 
tant international  economic  aspects  of 
American  foreign  policy  ranging  from 
general  foreign  economic  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  particular  policies  on  in- 
ternational trade  and  commerce,  invest- 
ment and  economic  development,  money 
and  finance,  as  well  as  transportation  and 
communications.  The  two  largest  sections 
in  the  volume,  totaling  8(X)  pages,  deal 
with  foreign  assistance  under  the  Mutual 
Security  Program  and  U.S.  economic 
defense  policy,  which  includes  attempts  to 
control  East-West  trade,  stockpiling  of 
strategic  goods,  and  efforts  to  protect 
strategic  industries  abroad  as  well  as  to 
assure  the  supply  of  key  commodities  re- 
quired for  the  defense  of  the  West. 

The  Foreign  Relations  series  has 
been  published  continuously  since  1861  as 
the  official  record  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 
The  volume  released  April  19  is  the 
seventh  to  be  published  in  a  series  of  16 
volumes  covering  the  years  1952-54. 

Foreign  Relations  1952-1954,  Volume 
I,  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of  the 
Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
Department  of  State.  Copies  of  Volume  I 
(Department  of  State  Pubhcation  Nos. 
9366  and  9367;  GPO  Stock  No. 


93 


■imnMiiiimiiiinB 


PUBLICATIONS 


044-000-02005-0)  may  be  purchased  for 
$27.00  (domestic  postpaid)  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington 
D.C.  20402.  Checks  or  money  orders 
should  be  made  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents. 


Press  release  110  of  .\pr.  2,  1984. 

International  Law 
Digest,  1979 


The  Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in 
International  Law,  1979,  is  available  at 
the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  It  is 
the  seventh  in  a  series  of  annual  volumes 
that  the  Office  of  the  Legal  Adviser  of  the 
Department  of  State  has  published, 
beginning  with  the  year  1973. 

Like  its  predecessors,  the  1979  Digest 
presents  a  variety  of  materials  that 
reflect  actions  of  the  U.S.  Government 
affecting,  or  affected  by,  international 
legal  developments. 

The  1979  Digest  describes  measures 
undertaken  by  the  United  States  to  at- 
tempt to  obtain  the  release  of  the 
American  hostages  captured  by  Iranian 
revolutionaries  at  the  American  Embassy 
in  Tehran  in  November  1979:  the  freeze  of 
Iranian  Government  assets  in  the  United 
States,  the  prohibition  of  various  transac- 
tions with  Iran  and  Iranian  nationals,  and 
the  initiation  of  proceedings  against  Iran 
before  the  International  Court  of  Justice. 

The  volume  also  includes  treaty- 
related  issues:  a  challenge— before  the 
courts  and  in  the  Congress— to  the  Presi- 
dent's authority  to  terminate  the  Mutual 
Defense  Treaty  with  Taiwan  (and  other 
defense  treaties),  and  the  connected  ques- 
tion of  U.S.  relations  with  Taiwan,  ad- 
dressed through  enactment  of  the  Taiwan 
Relations  Act.  The  deliberations  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
regarding  the  SALT  II  Treaty  are  set  out 
in  some  detail.  U.S.  practice  in  extradi- 
tion and  prisoner  transfer  matters  is 
reflected  through  discussion  of  new 
treaties  in  these  areas  and  through  ex- 
cerpts from  judicial  opinions  that  inter- 
pret existing  treaties.  Of  particular 


significance  is  the  Abu  Ayin  case, 
holding  that  a  terrorist  act  is  not  exempt 
as  a  political  offense  from  extraditability, 
even  though  the  act  was  politically 
motivated. 

The  volume  contains  copious  ex- 
tracts—intended to  be  useful  to  courts 
and  practitioners  alike— from  briefs 
amicus  curiae  filed  by  the  United  States 
on  sovereign  immunity  issues  and  the 
scope  of  the  act  of  state  doctrine,  especial- 
ly in  regard  to  actions  that  involve  U.S. 
antitrust  laws. 

The  1979  Digest  outlines  the  general 
U.S.  effort  and  describes  specific  U.S. 
undertakings  connected  with  signature  of 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  on  March  26,  1979,  including  subse- 
quent U.S.  participation  in  negotiations 
for  Palestinian  autonomy  on  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza.  American  backing  for  the 
international  legal  principles  of  territorial 
integrity  and  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
disputes  is  also  illustrated  in  regard  to 
other  areas  of  the  world— Democratic 
Kampuchea  (Cambodia),  the  Yemen  Arab 
Republic,  and  Morocco. 

Closer  home,  U.S.  support  for  resolv- 
ing boundary  disputes  through  creative 
legal  effort  is  evidenced  through  the 
U.S.-Canadian  agreement  to  submit  their 
maritime  boundary  dispute  in  the  Gulf  of 
Maine  to  international  adjudication.  The 
agreement  invoked  for  the  first  time  Arti- 
cle 26  of  the  Statute  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice,  which  provides  for  an  ad 
hoc  chamber  of  the  Court  to  decide  a  case. 
(Following  a  lengthy  preparation,  argu- 
ment in  the  Gulf  of  Maine  case  began 
before  this  ad  hoc  chamber  on  April  2, 
1984.) 

Prior  to  initiating  the  annual  series  of 
Digests  that  focus  upon  U.S.  practice,  the 
Department  of  State  issued  comprehen- 
sive, encyclopedic-type  Digests,  begin- 
ning with  Cadwalader's  one-volume 
Digest  (1877).  While  the  earlier  Digests 
surveyed  worldwide  developments  in  in- 
ternational law,  they  nevertheless  em- 
phasized U.S.  practice.  The  distinguished 
Digests  by  Marjorie  M.  Whiteman  (15  v., 
1963-73),  Green  Haywood  Hackworth  (8 
v.,  1940-44),  John  Bassett  Moore  (8  v., 
1906),  and  Francis  Wharton  (3  v.,  1887) 
are  considered  authoritative  for  their 
respective  periods  of  coverage  and  are 
heavily  relied  upon  by  practitioners, 
scholars,  government  officials,  and  jurists 
throughout  the  world. 


The  Legal  Adviser  of  the  Department^ 
of  State  is  Davis  Rowland  Robinson,  who 
assumed  office  on  July  30,  1981.  The 
Legal  Advisers  during  the  period  covereci 
by  the  1979  Digest  of  United  States  Prac- 
tice in  Intematioyial  Law  were  Herbert 
J.  Hansen,  who  assumed  office  on  April  8,' 
1977,  and  Roberts  B.  Owen,  who  assumec 
office  on  October  4,  1979,  and  served  unti 
January  20, 1981.  The  Editor  of  the  1979 
Digest  is  Marian  Lloyd  Nash  (Mrs.  Haroli 
Herbert  Leich),  an  attorney  in  the  Office 
of  the  Legal  Adviser. 

Orders  for  the  1979  Digest  and/or 
earlier  annual  Digests  should  be  sent  to 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington 
D.C.  20402,  and  should  be  accompanied 
by  check  or  money  order  made  payable  V 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  Remil 
tances  from  foreign  countries  may  be 
made  by  international  postal  money 
order,  by  draft  on  an  American  or  Cana- 
dian bank,  or  by  UNESCO  coupons;  an 
additional  25%  handling  charge  is  re- 
quired for  orders  to  foreign  countries. 

Ordering  data  is  as  follows: 

•  1979:  Digest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
International  Law,  $22.00  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01937-0)  (1,933  pp.). 

•  1978:  CHgest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
International  Law,  $26.00  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01762-8)  (1,802  pp.). 

•  1977:  Digest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
International  Law,  $19.00  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01720-2)  (1,158  pp.). 

•  1976:  Digest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
International  Law,  $16.00  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01645-1)  (850  pp.). 

•  1975:  Digest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
International  Law,  $17.00  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01605-2)  (947  pp.). 

•  1974:  Digest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
International  Law,  $15.00  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01566-8)  (2d  printing)  (796  pp.). 

•  1973:  Digest  of  U.S.  Practice  in 
Intematimial  Law,  $14.00  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01525-1)  (618  pp.). 


Chei 


CD! 


D.S, 


Press  release  113  of  Apr.  16,  1984. 


94 


■■  tJ  LTH 


INDEX 

June  1984 

Volume  84,  No.  2087 


Afghanistan 

Chemical  Weapons  Use  in  Southeast  Asia 

and  Afghanistan  (U.S.  report) 62 

Soviet  Occupation  of  Afghanistan 

(Reagan) 64 

Arms  Control 

Arms  Control  for  Antisatellite  Systems 

Getter  to  the  Congress) 48 

CDE  Negotiations  Resume  in  Stockholm 

(Reagan) 47 

Realism  and  Responsibility:  The  U.S.    o 

Approach  to  Arms  Control  (Shultz)  28 

Report  of  the  Commission  on  Strategic  Forces 

(Reagan) 61 

START  m  a  Historical  Perspective 

(Rowny) 44 

U.S.  Proposes  Banning  Chemical  Weapons 

(Bush.summary  of  U.S.  draft  treaty) . . .  .40 
U.S.  Proposes  Initiative  at  the  MBFR  Talks 

(Reagan) 46 

Asia.  Chemical  Weapons  Use  in  Southeast  Asia 

and  Afghanistan  (U.S.  report) 62 

Austria.  Visit  of  Austrian  President 

(Kirchschla^er,  Reagan) 50 

Botswana.  Visit  of  Botswana  President 

(Masire,  Reagan) 38 

Business.  Trade,  Interdependence,  and  Con- 
flicts of  Jurisdiction  (Shultz) 33 

China.  President  Reagan  Visits  China 

(addresses,  toasts,  inter\'iew,  remarks, 

text  of  treaty) 1 

Congress 

Arms  Control  for  Antisatellite  Systems 

Getter  to  the  Congress) 48 

A  National  Response  to  the  Crisis  in  Central 

America  (Motley) 74 

President  Proposes  Legislation  to  Counter 

Terrorism  (message  to  the  Congress) ....  65 
U.S.  Efforts  To  Achieve  Peace  in  Central 

America  (Secretary's  letter  to  the  Congress 

and  report) 67 

U.S.  Relations  With  Honduras  and  Nicaragua 

(Michel) 81 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Foreign 

Service  Day,  1984  (Reagan,  Shultz) 49 

Economics.  Trade,  Interdependence,  and  Con- 
flicts of  Jurisdiction  (Shultz) 33 

El  Salvador 

A  National  Response  to  the  Crisis  in  Central 

America  (Motley) 74 

U.S.  Aid  to  El  Salvador  (White  House  state- 
ment)   77 

U.S.  Interests  in  Central  America 

(Reagan) 22 

U.S.  Pohcy  in  Central  America  (White  House 

statement) 85 

France.  Visit  of  French  President  Mitterrand 

(Mitterrand,  Reagan,  Shultz) 56 


Germany.  Visit  of  West  German  Chancellor 

Kohl  (Kohl,  Reagan)  53 

Honduras.  U.S.  Relations  With  Honduras  and 

Nicaragua  (Michel) 81 

International  Law 

Preliminary  ICJ  Ruling  on  Nicaraguan 

Request  (Department  statement) 78 

Trade.  Interdependence,  and  Conflicts  of 

Jurisdiction  (Shultz) 33 

Ireland.  Visit  of  Irish  Prime  Minister 

Reagan  59 

Japan.  Secretary  Visits  Korea  and  Japan 

(Shultz)  ....■ 37 

Korea.  Secretary  Visits  Korea  and  Japan 

(Shultz)  ...." 37 

Military  Affairs 

Chemical  Weapons  Use  in  Southeast  Asia 

and  Afghanistan  (U.S.  report) 62 

Report  of  the  Commission  on  Strategic 

Force.s  (Reagan) 61 

Morocco.  Visit  of  Moroccan  Prime  Minister  .60 
New  Zealand.  Visit  of  Prime  Minister  of  New 

Zealand  (Muldoon,  Reagan) 63 

Nicaragua 

Preliminary  ICJ  Ruling  on  Nicaraguan 

Request  (Department  statement) 78 

U.S.  Interests  in  Central  America  (Reagan)  .22 
U.S.  Policy  in  Central  America  (White  House 

statement) 85 

U.S.  Relations  With  Honduras  and  Nicaragua 

(Michel) 81 

Portugal.  Visit  of  Portuguese  Prime  Minister 

Soares (Reagan,  Soares) 55 

Presidential  Documents 

Arms  Control  for  Antisatellite  Systems 

Getter  to  the  Congress) 48 

CDE  Negotiations  Resume  in  Stockholm 

(Reagan) 47 

Central  America  (Reagan)  27 

Foreign  Service  Day,  1984  (Reagan, 

Shultz) 49 

President  Proposes  Legislation  to  Counter 

Terrorism  (message  to  the  Congress) ....  65 
President  Reagan  Visits  China  (addresses, 

toasts,  interview,  remarks,  text  of  treaty)  1 
Report  of  the  Commission  on  Strategic  Forces 

(Reagan) 61 

Soviet  Occupation  of  Afghanistan  (Reagan) .  .64 
U.S.  Interests  in  Central  America 

(Reagan) 22 

U.S.  Proposes  Initiative  at  the  MBFR  Talks 

(Reagan) 46 

Visit  of  Austrian  President  (Kirchschlager, 

Reagan) 50 

Visit  of  Botswana  President  (Masire, 

Reagan  38 

Visit  of  French  President  Mitterrand 

(Mitterrand,  Reagan,  Shultz) 56 

Visit  of  Irish  Prime  Minister  (Reagan) 59 

Visit  of  Portuguese  Prime  Minister  Soares 

(Reagan,  Soares) 55 

Visit  of  Prime  Minister  of  New  Zealand 

(Muldoon,  Reagan) 63 

Visit  of  West  German  Chancellor  Kohl 

(Kohl,  Reagan) 53 


Publications 

Department  of  State 93 

F'oreign  Relations  Volume  Released 93 

International  Law  Digest,  1979 94 

Security  Assistance.  U.S.  Aid  to  El  Salvador 

(White  Hou.se  statement) 77 

Terrorism.  Foreign  Ser\'ice  Dav,  1984 

(Reagan,  Shultz) ." 49 

International  Terrorism  (White  House  state- 
ment)   65 

President  Proposes  Legislation  to  Counter 

Terrorism  (message  to  the  Congress) ...  .65 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 86 

U.S.S.R. 

Realism  ami  Re.-iijcmsibility:  The  U.S. 

Approach  to  Anns  Control  (Shultz) 28 

Soviet  Occupation  of  Afghanistan  (Reagan) .  .64 
START  in  a  Historical  Perspective  (Rowny)  .44 
U.S.  Proposes  Banning  Chemical  Weapons 

(Bu.sh.  summary  of  U.S.  draft  treaty) 40 

United  Nations.  Chemical  Weapons  Use  in 

Southeast  Asia  and  Afghanistan  (U.S. 

report) 62 

Vatican  City.  President  Meets  With  Pope  John 

Paul  II 26 

Western  Hemisphere 

Central  America  (Reagan)  27 

A  National  Response  to  the  Crisis  in  Central 

America  (Motley) 74 

U.S.  Efforts  To  Achieve.Peace  in  Central 

America  (Secretary's  letter  to  the  Congress 

and  report) 67 


Name  Index 

Bush,  Vice  President    40 

Kirchschlager,  Rudolf 50 

Kohl,  Helmut 53 

Masire,  Quett  K.  J 38 

Michel,  James  H 81 

Mitterrand,  Francois    56 

Motley,  Langhome  A   74 

Muldoon,  Robert  C   63 

KeaKiin,  President  ....  1,  22,  27,  38,  46,  47,  48 
49.  .50,  53,  55,  .56,  61,  63,  64,  65 

RowTiy,  Edward  L 44 

Shultz.  Secretary 28,  33,  37,  49,  56,  67 

Soares,  Mario 55 


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