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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2085 



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April 1984 


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Dpparttneni of State 

bulletin 



Volume 84 / Number 2085 / April 1984 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 



The Secretary of State ha.s determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-Y( 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by the 
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage 
at Washington, D.C, and additional mailing off( ». 
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to 
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Governmen 
Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 20402. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of State Billetin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bm.i.ETiN is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, I 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C 
20402 



CONTENTS 



The President 

1 Relations With the U.S.S.R. 

2 News Conference of February 22 

{Excerpts) 

The Vice President 

5 Trip to Europe and the U.S.S.R. 

The Secretary 

9 The U.S. and Africa in the 1980s 
12 Question-and-Answer Session Fol- 
lowing World Affairs Council 
Address 
15 Human Rights and the Moral 
Dimension of U.S. Foreign 
Policy 
19 Visit to Latin America 
28 Interview on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" 
30 Interview on "The MacNeil/Lehrer 
News Hour" 

Interview 

34 Under Secretary Eagleburger's 
Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 

Africa 

36 U.S., Angola, South Africa Discuss 
Peace (Joint Communique) 



East Asia 



37 



Recent Situation in the Philippines 
{John C. Monjo) 



Europe 

39 The Transatlantic Relationship: 
A Long-Term Perspective 
{Lawrence S. Eagleburger) 

43 Death of Soviet President 

Andropov {Secretary Shultz, 
Wiite House Statement) 

44 Assistant Secretary Burt's Inter- 

view for "Worldnet" 
51 Visit of Yugoslav President (Presi- 
dent Reagan, Mika Spiljak) 

Human Rights 

53 Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1983 

International Law 

58 Board of Appellate Review To 

Publish Decisions 

Middle East 

59 Defense Secretary Weinberger's 

Interview on "Meet the Press" 
{Excerpts) 

60 U.S. Forces in Lebanon {Letter to 

the Congress) 

61 Lebanon Cancels Agreement With 

Israel (Department Statement) 

62 Visit of King Hussein of Jordan 

(King Hussein I, President 
Reagan) 

63 President Meets With Two Arab 

Leaders (King Hussein I, 
Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, 
President Reagan) 

64 Chemical Weapons and the Iran- 

Iraq War (Department State- 
ment) 

65 U.S. Opposes Moving Embassy to 

Jerusalem (Lawrence S. 
Eagleburger) 



Nuclear Policy 

66 Nuclear Cooperation With 

EUR ATOM (Letter to the 
Congress) 

Science & Technology 

67 U.S. International Activities in 

Science and Technology (Message 
to the Congress) 

United Nations 

68 U.S. Participation in the United 

Nations (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick) 

Western Hemisphere 

71 Central America Initiative Pro- 

posed (President Reagan) 

72 Central America Democracy, 

Peace, and Development Initia- 
tive (Langhome A. Motley) 

75 Central America Initiative Legis- 
lation (Message to the Congress) 

77 Elections in El Salvador 
(Thomas R. Pickering) 

Treaties 

79 Current Actions 

Chronology 

81 February 1984 

Press Releases 

84 Department of State 

Publications 

84 Department of State 

85 GPO Subscriptions 

Index 



THE PRESIDENT 



Relations With the U.S.S.R. 



by President Reagan 



Radio address to the 7iatio7i 
on February 11, 198J^.^ 



I'd like to speak to you about a subject 
always on the minds of Americans, but 
of particular interest today in view of the 
death of Soviet leader Yuriy 
Andropov— our relations with the Soviet 
Union. 

Changes of leadership have not hap- 
pened often in the Soviet Union. Yuriy 
Andropov was only the sixth Communist 
Party leader in the 66 years since the 
Russian Revolution. In recent months, 
he'd been totally absent from public view 
so his death did not come as a shock to 
the world. Nevertheless, the importance 
of the U.S.-Soviet relationship makes his 
passing away a time for reflection on 
where that relationship is heading. 

The changes in Moscow are an ojjpor- 
tunity for both nations to examine 
closely the current state of our relations 
and to think about the future. We know 
that our relationship is not what we 
would hke it to be. We've made no 
secret of our views as to the reasons 
why. What is needed now is for both 
sides to sit down and find ways of solv- 
ing some of the problems that divide us. 

In expressing my condolences to Mr. 
Andropov's family and to the Soviet 
Government, I emphasized once again 
America's desire for genuine cooperation 
between our two countries. Together we 
can help make the world a better, more 
peaceful place. This was also the 
message for the Soviet people in my ad- 
dress on Soviet-American relations last 
month. In that speech, as in my private 
communications with the late Chairman 
Andropov, I stressed our commitment to 
a serious and intensive dialogue with the 
Soviet Union, one aimed at building a 
more constructive U.S.-Soviet Union 
relationship. 

This commitment remains firm, and 
Vice President Bu.sh will lead our delega- 
tion to Moscow for Mr. Andropov's 
funeral. He will be accompanied by 
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker 
and our Ambassador in Moscow, Arthur 



Hartman. I hope there will be an oppor- 
tunity for the Vice President to meet 
with the new General Secretary. 

As we engage in discussions with 
Soviet leaders, we recognize the fun- 
damental differences in our values and in 
our perspectives on many international 
issues. We must be realistic and not ex- 
pect that these differences can be wished 
away. But reahsm should also remind us 
that our two peoples share common 
bonds and interests. We are both 
relatively young nations with rich ethnic 
traditions and a pioneer philosophy. We 
have both experienced the terrible 
trauma of war. We have fought side-by- 
side in the victory over Nazi Germany. 
And, while our governments have very 
different views, our sons and daughters 
have never fought each other. We must 
make sure they never do. 

Avoiding war and reducing arms is a 
starting point in our relationship with 
the Soviet Union. 

But we seek to accomplish more. 
With a good-faith effort on both sides, I 
believe the United States and the Soviet 
Union could begin rising above the 
mistrust and ill-will that cloud our rela- 
tions. We could establish a basis for 
greater mutual understanding and con- 
structive cooperation, and there's no bet- 
ter time to make that good-faith effort 
than now. 

At this time of transition in the 
Soviet Union, our two nations should 
look to the future. We should find ways 
to work together to meet the challenge 
of preserving peace. Living in this 
nuclear age makes it imperative that we 
talk to each other, discuss our dif- 
ferences, and seek solutions to the many 
problems that divide us. 

America is ready. We would welcome 
negotiations. And I repeat today what I 
have said before. We're prepared to 
meet the Soviets halfway in the search 
foi- mutually acceptable agreements. I 
hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will 



5ril 1984 



THE PRESIDENT 



work with us in that same spirit. I invite 
them to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunities at hand to establish a more 
stable and constructive relationship. If 
the Soviet Government wants peace, 
then there v^ll be peace. 

In recent days, millions of citizens in- 
side the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and countries throughout the world have 
been brought together by one great 
event— the Winter Olympics. The com- 
petition is fierce, and we cheer for the 
men and women on our respective teams. 
But we can, and should, celebrate the 
triumphs of all athletes who compete in 
the true spirit of sportsmanship and give 
the very best of themselves. 



And when each race or event is done 
and our teams come together in friend- 
ship, we will remember that we are 
meant to be one family of nations. 

We who are leaders in government 
have an obligation to strive for coopera- 
tion every bit as hard as our athletes 
who reach within for the greatest efforts 
of their lives. If the Soviet Government 
would join us in this spirit, then together 
we could build a safer and far better 
world for the human family, not just for 
today but for generations to come. 



•Broadcast from Rancho del Cielo near 
Santa Barbara, Calif, (text from White House 
press release). ■ 



News Conference of February 22 (Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan 's 
news conference of February 22, 198Jt.^ 



Q. The Marines you sent to 
Lebanon 17 months ago are now being 
withdrawn on your orders. Considering 
their inability to achieve their peace- 
keeping mission and the casualties 
they suffered, has the United States 
lost credibility in the region? Has 
Syria won? And where do we go from 
here? 

A. In the first place, no, I don't 
think, first of all, that you can say we 
have lost as yet. I know that things don't 
look bright, as bright as they have at 
some times in this last year and a half 
since they've been there, but I think it's 
time to review a little history here and 
what this mission was and is. 

A year and a half or so ago, we and 
some of our allies— the United Kingdom, 
France, and Italy— decided on this idea 
of a multinational force, all of us to con- 
tribute troops to go there on a stabilizing 
mission, not a combat mission at all. And 
I would like to recall what the situation 
was. There've been five wars in the last 
36 years between Syria and Israel. Israel 
had crossed the Lebanese border be- 
cause of ten-orist attacks across its 
northern border, attacks on its civilians, 
and Israel had advanced all the way to 
Beirut. 

There were somewhere between 
10,000 and 15,000 PLO [Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization] terrorists in Beirut, 
and a pitched war was being fought right 



there in the streets with thousands of 
casualties among civilians. Syria was also 
on Lebanese soil. Since 1975 Lebanon 
had been fighting a kind of civil war 
among its own people. There was very 
little in the way of a government in 
Lebanon by this time. The PLO— finally 
there was an indication that they would 
be willing to depart from Lebanon, but 
they were fearful of stopping fighting for 
fear that they would then, if tried in an 
orderly way to get out, the\- would be 
massacred. This, again, was one of the 
reasons for our stabilizing force going in 
from the four countries. 

We went in with the idea that as 
they left, then the other two coun- 
tries—Syria and Isi-ael— could withdraw. 
Then, as a government was put in place 
in Lebanon— and we helped and intended 
from the beginning to help them restore 
their military capability not only with 
weapons but with training and all— that 
then, as Lebanon with a government was 
able to move out into the areas that had 
been occupied by Syria and Israel and 
where were the factions that had been 
part of the internecine warfare, the force 
put in by ourselves and the allies would 
have constituted behind their advance a 
stabilizing force there. 

That was the mission. We w^anted to 
prevent a war between Syria and Israel. 
It was a part and brought about by our 
proposal for an overall peace settlement 
in the Middle East, where we were go- 
ing to try and bring, once and for all, the 
Arab nations and Israel together, to do 
what Egypt before them had done. 



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Great progress was made in the first ,] 

year. First of all, the PLO did leave. Thr^ 
Israelis did start a phased withdrawal 
and evidenced their intention to move 
back toward theu- owii borders. Syria 
then reneged— having said that it would 
leave— and refused to leave, even thougl^eb «'f* 
they were asked by the present Govern- 
ment of Lebanon. The first President 
was the brother of this present Presi- 
dent. He was assassinated shortly after 
he took office, and a number of his 
Cabinet officials were murdered. He wai4t 
elected, this President, as was his 
brother, under the laws of that country. 

A few months ago, late summer or 
early fall, because of the progress— re- 
member the talks that had started in 
Geneva about broadening the base of tb 
government, to take in those factions 
that had been fighting against Lebanon 
and bring them in to be a part of the 
government, so that it was broad-based 
and gave every element in the country 
representation. Those meetings went on 
I think there was progress in that. 

The Government of Lebanon then ai 
rived at an agreement with Israel for 
peace between them and a withdrawal c 
Israel and protection of the northern 
border so that the terrorist attacks that 
had prompted theii- invasion would no 
longer exist. As this much success came 
to be, terrorist attacks began against th 
members of the multinational force on 
the part of those who don't want a 
peaceful settlement and who don't want 
a solution to the problem. And I think 
this is an indication of the success that 
this stabilizing force was having, that th 
efforts were made and the great traged; 
took place with our Marines with the 
suicide attack there. 

We still have an Ambassador at 
Large there who is commuting among 
Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv, trying 
to help wherever we can in bringing 
about a peaceful settlement. I have no 
hesitation in saying that I have no regre 
of the fact that we went in there with 
the idea of trying to bring peace to that 
troubled country. 

We are redeploying, because once th 
terrorist attacks started, there was no 
way that we could really contiibute to 
the original mission by staying there as 
target just hunkering down and waiting 
for further attacks. So, the forces have 
been moved, redeployed— ours as w^ell as 
others, and ours are going to be on the 
vessels offshore. 

But as long as there's a chance for a 
peaceful solution, we're going to try andlossi 
see if there's anv contribution we can fliej, 



Department of State Bulletin 



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THE PRESIDENT 



ake to achieving that. And as long as 
at chance exists, I'm not going to give 

and say, "Well, it's all over." And 
e're not bugging out; we're just going 

a little more defensible position. 

Q. You said that the terrorist at- 
icks were a factor in the withdrawal. 
968 that mean that terrorist attacks 
46 that can succeed in the Middle 
ast and elsewhere? 

A. No, I said that about those who 
■ged us to simply bug out and come all 
e way home, and I said that that would 

an admission. But I don't think that 
uply redeploying to a more defensible 
sition, because terrorist attacks— no 
e has still found a truly foolproof 
fense against these surprise attacks, 
rticularly when the attackers are will- 
g to give their own lives. 

So, no, we're on hand. We still will 
ive Marines there defending, as is 
istomary of the Marines, our Embassy 
id our Embassy personnel there. And 
e have been discussing with the 
emayel forces sending some training 
ams in that have been specializing in 
ings like terrorism for further training 
ivalo their forces. 

Q. On February 2, you told the 
^all Street Journal that if we pulled 
ut of Lebanon, it would be disastrous 
!sults worldwide for us. And you also 
iid you weren't going to cut and run 
k'en though there is a widespread 
erception that that's what we're do- 
ig. Do you think we will have now 
isastrous results worldwide because of 
lis pullout? 

A. I don't think so, because I think 
lat those people who make decisions 
nd so forth, and who have to make 
nem based on what is going on, they're 
ot going to see this as cutting and run- 
ing, because, as I say, they are on the 
hips, and that naval task force is going 
3 stay where it is. And so, I don't think 
hat they're going to view this in the 
isastrous way that I had— because when 
was speaking then, I was talking in 
eply to those who were urging us to 
ust pick up and go home without any 
egard to whether our allies were going 
do the same thing or not. We've 
tayed in consultation with them. We're 
cting together and in sync with them. 

Q. Under what circumstance would 
'ou send the Marines back in? 

A. That's a hypothetical that I don't 
mow whether I could answer. Let me 
ay this. If they could improve the 
)Ossibility of carrying out their mission, 
hen, yes, that would be a reason for 
ending them in. 



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Q. When our Marine compound 
was bombed, a lot of the parents of 
those young men said that they 
wondered what was the reason for the 
mission, and you've tried to explain 
the mission tonight. But can you say 
to those parents, now that you've with- 
drawn the marines to the ships, why 
more than 260 young men died there? 

A. I have talked to a great many of 
the families— the widows, and the 
parents— of the men who died there in 
that one terrible holocaust, and I have 
been amazed at their attitude, which was 
one of complete confidence that it was a 
worthwhile mission. And most of them 
based that on the letters that they were 
receiving from their sons and husbands, 
who said they behoved in thy mission, 
that they were there, that it was a 
worthwhile mission. And many of them 
expressed a pride in being there. 

I'm sure that now some of the 
younger men who are not really aware 
that this is a redeployment more than a 
coming home thing and have been 
quoted as saying that they're sorry that 
they were not able to complete their mis- 
sion. I don't see their mission as being 
over yet. And I don't think people 
knowledgeable over there with what's 
going on see it as over yet. 

Q. The Secretary of State has been 
one of those who is said to be very dis- 
couraged and has said that in Lebanon 
the light at the end of the tunnel can 
be the train coming at you. Can you 
tell us whether you share that dis- 
couragement? And would you accept a 
resignation from George Shultz, who, 
some people feel, has failed in this 
policy? 

A. No, I wouldn't. And he has not 
failed. And I have seen that talk, and I 
think it's disgraceful, frankly. I think he 
has done a splendid job. And I have 
every confidence in the world in him. 
And I hope he doesn't have any thoughts 
about leaving us at this point. 

The idea for the mission happened to 
be mine— sitting in the Situation Room in 
a meeting with all of the people who are 
concerned in these affairs. And he and 
our Ambassadors, beginning with Phil 
Habib and then Bud McFarlane and now 
Don Rumsfeld— all of these have been do- 
ing a splendid job there. And we're go- 
ing to continue, as I say, as long as there 
is a chance. 

Q. Our policy on naval shelling has 
been that it's in response to attacks 
against our Marines on the ground. 



Now that the Marines are being with- 
drawn to the safety of ships, does this 
mean that there will be an end to U.S. 
shelling of Lebanon? 

A. There hasn't been some shelling 
for quite a while. But remember, the 
most recent shelling was not because of 
attacks on the Marines at the ab-port; it 
was because of shelling of our Embassy. 
That's U.S. territory. And our Embassy 
personnel for a number of days were liv- 
ing in the basement. And for whatever 
protection that could be— there was one 
direct hit on, I think it was the 
residence; I'm not sure whether it was 
that or the Embassy headquarters— and 
that's what we were responding to. 
But we are behaving with restraint 
now. We are flying reconnaissance 
flights, and there have been some in- 
stances of firing on them— without result, 
I'm pleased to say. And we have not 
responded, because we think this is a 
time for restraint and for hoping to cool 
things down. 

Q. Did you say earlier— or suggest 
earlier— that there may now be some 
question about whether U.S. troops 
will be sent in to train the Gemayel 
government forces? 

A. This has been one of the things 
that we're planning. And we're watching 
developments here as to when that 
might be— they might be too busy right 
now to be trained. We're waiting until 
we can coordinate with Oiem. 

Q. This week the Senate will con- 
sider amendments to the Export Ad- 
ministration Act. One will be to lift 
the ban on the export of Alaskan oil, 
allowing it to be sold to markets in the 
Far East. If a change in the law were 
to take place, it would reduce our 
trade deficit with Japan; it would 
reduce the Federal deficit by 
generating some new revenues from in- 
creased domestic exploration and pro- 
duction; provide safer and cheaper 
transportation instead of going 
through the Panama Canal— and there 
are many other things. Your Ad- 
ministration has privately supported 
this. Will you campaign aggressively 
when it's being considered by Con- 
gress? 

A. We're still looking at and studying 
this. There are still some problems about 
it. And, I share the view that it would be 
an asset to the United States to do this. 



April 1984 



Wi 



THE PRESIDENT 



Q. Why did you not initiate some 
action sooner on withdrawing the 
Marines from Beirut? And what's your 
response to the people who have sug- 
gested—a number of critics— that it 
takes too long for you to hear the 
debate between your advisers and ar- 
rive at a consensus, and who ask, 
therefore, whether you are, in fact, 
really running things and whether you 
are a full-time President? What do you 
say? 

A. I've read a little of the fiction 
that's been going around about that, 
also. I can tell you, no, there was certain 
ly thorough discussion, and for a long 
time, ever since the suicide bombing, as 
to whether there was a way in which we 
could keep our forces there, not only our 
selves but, again, as I say, in sync with 
the other nations' forces and that might 
reduce the possibilities of and the 
vulnerability from terrorist attacks. 

And we were looking at eveiything. 
And from the very first, one of the alter- 
natives was putting them on the ships. 
We held out for a while, because we 
were concerned that people over there 
might see that as leaving, as abandoning 
the mission, and we didn't want that. 

We finally did arrive in the belief 
that we could do this. We talked to the 
Gemayel government; we talked to our 
allies; and we had made a decision that 
this looked like the most logical thing to 
do, a phased withdrawal to the ships, 
keeping our training detachment there 
that has been working with the 
Lebanese Army and all. And so, it 
wasn't a case of delay; it was a case of 
looking at the situation and wanting to 
make the right decision. 

As to that other fiction about 
whether I sit back and then somebody 
tells me what to do: That's a lack of 
understanding of how our system has 
been working here. And I will admit I 
don't think any Administration, to my 
knowledge, has ever exactly worked 
with the Cabinet and the staff the way 
we have. 

First of all, I think we've got one of 
the finest staffs and one of the finest 
Cabinets that has been in this city in 
many, many years. And I want people 
around me who are independent-minded. 
I want to hear all sides of everything. 
We have regular Cabinet meetings and 
things we call the Cabinet Council 
meetings, where it's a portion of the 
Cabinet based on the particular issue 
where it wouldn't particularly be of in- 
terest to the others. 



In those meetings, I hear all sides. It 
could best be compared to a board of 
directors or a board of regents or gover- 
nors of an institution other than 
business. And the debate rages, and it 
isn't just limited to one Cabinet officer 
who thinks that the problem is in his 
particular area. I hear and get the input, 
and the debate sometimes rages. It's 
nice if you can get a consensus, that's 
easy, but many times, I have to make a 
decision in which I come down, obvi- 
ously, against some of the advocates in 
the Cabinet and on the side of others. 
But it goes back and forth. The loser this 
week may be the winner next week. But 
this is the way the decisions are made. 

The only difference between a board 
of directors then and our Cabinet meet- 
ings is, when it comes time for decision, 
we don't take a vote. The decision is 
mine, and I make it on the basis of the 
information that I have heard. And if 
they haven't given me enough infoi-ma- 
tion, I make them come back again, and 
we talk some more. 

Q. Last week you said the Arab- 
Israeli conflict must be resolved 
through negotiations involving an ex- 
change of territory for peace. Were 
you telling Israel to reverse its settle- 
ment activity in the West Bank? 

A. No, from the very beginning— and 
the Israelis know this— I have told them 
that I thought with an effort that must 
be made out there for an overall peace in 
the area, that it was not helpful to go 
forward with what they were doing. I 
think that the peace process that we en- 
vision is based on the Camp David proc- 
ess, the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. 
And I had never referred to them as il- 
legal, as some did. But I did say that I 
thought they were not helpful, because 
obviously the peace process, when the 
negotiations come between the Arab 
States and Israel, it is going to have to 
involve territorial changes in return for 
secure, peaceful borders. And so, no, I 
just think that we would've had a better 
chance. 

Q. The war between Iraq and Iran 
is heating up in a rather perilous way, 
and I'd like to ask what the depth of 
your concerns are about the possibility 
that this war would lead to the closing 
of the Strait of Hormuz and cut off the 
supply of oil to Japan, Western 
Europe, and-ourselves, and to what 
lengths you're prepared to go to keep 
the strait open. 



A. What you have just suggested— 
Iran, itself, had voiced that threat some 
time ago, that if Iraq did certain things, 
they would close the Strait of Hormuz. 
And I took a stand then and made a 
statement that there was no way that 
we— and I'm sure this is true of our 
allies— could stand by and see that 
sealane denied to shipping, and par- 
ticularly, the tankers that are essential 
to Japan, to our Western allies in 
Europe, and, to a lesser e.xtent, our- 
selves. We're not importing as much as 
they require. But there's no way that w 
could allow that channel to be closed. 

And we've had a naval force for a 
long time, virtually permanently sta- 
tioned in the Arabian Sea, and so have 
some of our allies. But we'll keep that 
open to shipping. 

Q. Do you have anything different ^ 
to say to Mr. Chernenko in Moscow f 
than you had to say to his predecessor 
Mr. Andropov? Anything new to en- 
courage them to talk with the United 
States? 

A. Yes, and on the reports that the 
Vice President brought back after a ver; 
fruitful meeting there. We're very 
hopeful in this latest announcement that 
he had made that he was willing to agre^ 
to onsite inspection with regard to 
chemical waifare. We think this is a gooi 
sign, and we have let him know we want 
better relations. We want to sit dowTi 
and try to resolve some of the pi'oblems 
that we have. 



10 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 27, 1984. 



Department of State Bulletin k\\ 



ilitlilai'•i~il::liil^lll^:^i^lilir.:^l^llil:^:mr.l^^ i'^T;..,.iiUHllll^ 



HE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President's Trip 
to Europe and the U.S.S.R. 



Vice President Bush departed 

Washington, D.C., February 10, 1984; 

to visit the United Kingdom (February 11-12), 

Luxembourg (February 12-13), the 

Soviet Union (February 13-14), Italy 

and Vatican City (February 14-15), 

and France (February 15). 




"Britain and America share 
a common commitment to 
seeking peace with the 
Soviets from a position of 
strength . . . to the peaceful 
fostering of democratic insti- 
tutions around the world . . . 
to an open and stable inter- 
national economic 
system. ..." 

London 
February 12, 1984 



With Prime Minister Thatcher. 



photos by David Valdez) 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




^ 



"Luxembourg is a full and proud partner in the defense of 
the Western allies . . . and participates in our common deter- 
mination to preserve peace through strength. ..." 



Luxembourg 
February 13, 1984 



Standing before a portrait of Prince 
Walram Von Nassau Usingen (1635-1702 
in the Grand Ducal Palace are 
Hereditary Grand Duke Henri, Grand 
Duchess Josephine-Charlotte, Vice 
President Bush, Grand Duke Jean, 
Mrs. Bush, and Hereditary Grand 
Duchess Maria Teresa. 



r 



Department of State Bulletin 



■-M 



»Plan 
iaker, 
Wer. 



I4 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



'7 wish to express our condolences on the death of Chairman 
Andropov . . . I have led this American delegation to Moscow 
on this solemn occasion to symbolize my nation's regard for 
the people of the Soviet Union and to signify the desire of the 
United States to continue to work for positive relations 
between our two countries." 



Moscow 
February 13, 1984 




fitting at the left side of the table (from the 
op) are U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet 
Jnion Arthur A. Hartman, Senator Howard 
Saker, Vice President Bush, and Dimitri 
^rensburger, the Vice President's inter- 
jreter. 



'\pril 1984 



Sitting at the right side of the table (from the top) are Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, a 
member of the group of advisers to the General Secretary; Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko; General Secretary Konstantin U. Chemenko; Viktor Sukhodrev, the Russian in- 
terpreter; and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy F. Dobrynin. 



f 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



HE! 




"Italy's soldiers have performed their assignments in 
Lebanon with restraint and with bravery, as have all 
members of the multinational force. . . . After the bombing i 
the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, the soldiers of Italy 
and the United States worked side by side, digging feverishL 
to find their comrades." 

Rome 
February 15, 198 



[he 



Sw 



toyAi 
2tare 
tm 
dstof' 
im 
Krest 
irsista 

Bt25j 

ulintr 
age. It 
B[i 
jttie 
lriia,i 



With Francesco C'ossiga, President of the 
Italian Senate (top) and His Holiness Pope 
John Paul H. 



itliidiiii 
nergj'i 
eaial 
i)viets, 
indA 

M,t( 

ipen 

Seci 

toiionii 

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torici 



"... all Americans admire 
the valor of the French 
troops in Beirut. French and 
American soldiers have both 
been the subjects of terrorist 
attacks. . . . America honors 
the courage of French 
military men." 



Paris 

February 15, 1984 



Left to riRht are Alec Toumayan, the Vice 
President's interpreter; Vice President 
Bush; Christopher Thiery, President 
Mitterrand's interpreter; and President 
Mitterrand. 




HE SECRETARY 



The U.S. and Africa in tlie 1980s 



"P 



iih 



Secretary Shultz 's address before the 
iostmi World Affairs Council on 
'ehruary 1,5, 198i.^ 

[any Americans have images of Africa 
lat are anachronistic, partial, and often 
laccurate. The perception of Africa that 
iost of us grew up with— unknown 
nds somehow exotic and divorced from 
le rest of the world— has unfortunately 
srsisted in some quarters despite the 
.st 25 years of Africa's independence 
ad increasing presence on the world 
:age. It is a misperception that ignores 
impelling realities. One out of every 
;ght people in the world now lives in 
frica, and this proportion is growing, 
frica south of the Sahara— which is my 
rincipal concern this evening— is taking 
n increasing importance in several 
aspects. 

First, we have a significant 
eopolitical stake in the security of the 
Dntinent and the seas surrounding it. 
iff its shores lie important trade routes, 
icluding those carrying most of the 
nergy resources needed by our Euro- 
ean allies. We are affected when 
oviets, Cubans, and Libyans seek to ex- 
and their influence on the continent by 
orce, to the detriment of both African 
ndependence and Western interests. 

Second, Africa is part of the global 
conomic system. If Africa's economies 
re in trouble, the reverberations are 
elt here. Our exports to Africa have 
Iropped by 50% in the last 3 years; 
\.merican financial institutions have felt 
he pinch of African inability to repay 
loans. And Africa is a major source of 
aw materials crucial to the world 
'conomy. 

Third, Africa is important to us 
lolitically because the nations of Africa 
ire now major players in world 
li|il(imacy. They comprise nearly one- 
bird of the membership of the United 
^lations, where they form the most 
ohesive voting bloc in the General 
Assembly. 

Finally, Africa is important to us, 
Tiost of all, in human terms. Eleven per- 
|;ent of America's population traces its 
oots to Africa; all of us live in a society 
profoundly influenced by this human and 
ultural heritage. The revolution of 
Africa's independence coincided with the 
;ivil rights revolution in this country. 
Perhaps it was not a coincidence. Both 
livere among the great moral events of 



etii 'April 1984 



this century: a rebirth of freedom, sum- 
moning all of us to a recognition of our 
common humanity. Just as the continued 
progress of civil rights is important to 
the moral well-being of this country, so 
too the human drama of Africa— its 
political and economic future— is impor- 
tant to the kind of world we want our 
children and grandchildren to inherit. 

Africa's Economic Crisis 

Sub-Saharan Africa includes 45 coun- 
tries with an estimated population of 
nearly 400 million occupying over 9 
million square miles. It is a continent of 
enormous diversity. Yet today, virtually 
all sub-Saharan nations are in an 
economic crisis of stark proportions. 
This is Africa's most urgent problem. 

Per capita food production has fallen 
by 20% in the last 20 years. Rapid infla- 
tion has had a devastating effect. Each 
African over the past 3 years has seen 
his real income decrease by 2%-3% a 
year. Prolonged drought has wreaked 
ecological havoc across the continent, 
from the western Sahel to Mozambique 
in the east. Famine threatens tens of 
thousands, and malnutrition debilitates 
millions. Refugees number about 2 
million, or one-quarter of the world's 
total, with an equal number of people 
displaced in their own countries by 
drought, civil strife, or other hardship. 
It is a vast human tragedy. 

World recession has touched every 
nation, but to African countries it has 
dealt a body blow. Six pounds of Zam- 
bian copper, for example, would buy a 
barrel of oil in 1970; today it takes 43 
pounds of copper per barrel. Chronic 
balance-of-payments deficits— the result 
of low prices for African exports coupled 
with high prices for imports— have 
caused mounting debt and the virtual 
bankruptcy of several national treas- 
uries. The skyrocketing price of oil in 
the last decade distorted the economies 
of the continent's few oil producers and 
devastated its many petroleum im- 
porters. Meanwhile, the continent's 
population continues to grow at a rate of 
2%-3% a year and can expect almost to 
double by the year 2000. 

Recovery in the United States and 
other major economies will help Africa, 
but it will not be enough to change the 
situation fundamentally or to make 
Africa less vulnerable to future buffeting 
by world economic forces. This is 



because some of the most important 
causes of Africa's economic stagnation 
are home grown. A World Bank report 
states bluntly that: 

The immediate and continuing economic 
crisis in Africa is overwhelmingly a produc- 
tion crisis. It is a crisis which has risen from 
the widespead adoption of . . . inappropriate 
production incentives. 

Aiming at rapid development, 
African countries tried to mobilize 
scarce resources by relying on govern- 
ment controls and state-supported indus- 
trialization. But subsidies, price controls, 
and other regulations have burdened na- 
tional budgets and skewed the allocation 
of resources. Agriculture, the backbone 
of most African economies, suffered 
from neglect and disincentives to expand 
or to raise production. The private sec- 
tor was often subjected to state inter- 
ventions and, moreover, bore the brunt 
of taxation to support burgeoning 
bureaucracies. 

In several African states, the 
government payroll eats up more than 
half the national budget. The cumulative 
effect of an excess of government has 
been stagnation instead of development. 
Higher deficit spending, higher external 
debt, increased urban migration, infla- 
tion, and declining investment are the 
results, conducive only to social and 
political tensions and a deteriorating 
climate for material progress. 

Africa is now the weakest compon- 
ent of our interdependent global 
economy. Declining African markets and 
growing regional insolvency are a 
significant drag on global recovery, with 
a particular impact on Europe. In short, 
the West cannot afford— and we will not 
sit idly by and watch— the accelerating 
decline of Africa's economy. 

The Search for Solutions 

How can these awesome problems be 
solved? We have to start with three 
basic truths. 

The first basic truth is that our 
common humanity compels us to re- 
spond to the specter of famine across 
sub-Saharan Africa. At President 
Reagan's direction, we have already pro- 
vided record levels of food assistance. 
We now are asking the Congress for a 
supplemental $90 million in emergency 
food supplies. We committed over 
200,000 tons of food during the first 4 
months of this fiscal year. Requests for 



THE SECRETARY 



an additional 150,000 tons are in hand 
from African governments and requests 
are expected for an equal amount this 
year. 

But looking to the future, there is 
need to stem the long-term decline in 
food production that is undermining 
African economies. There is need to 
boost productivity across the board. 

The second basic truth, in other 
words, is that nothing the United States 
and other aid donors can do for Africans 
will have half the impact of what 
Africans can do for themselves. We will 
do our part in providing assistance 
where it can be effective, but without 
disciplined efforts by Africans, very 
little of it will be effective. 

The third basic truth is just as 
there are limits to what foreign govern- 
ments can do, there are limits to what 
national governments can do. Although 
development is a complex process, the 
requisites for growth are not a mystery: 
Africa is likely to break out of its 
stagnation only if reforms are under- 
taken to restore incentives to produce. 
This means allowing Africa's farmers to 
receive the prices their crops command 
in the market. It means letting the 
private sector do what it can and con- 
serving government resources for what 
only it can do. It means better fiscal and 
monetary management. 

Fortunately, many African govern- 
ments now realize both the depth of the 
crisis and the sources of the problem. 
Some have begun to introduce more 
realistic economic policies. The Reagan 
Administration intends to respond to 
those who are doing so. 

We have requested $1 billion for 
food aid and economic assistance for 
Africa in fiscal year (FY) 1985. This is a 
25% increase above FY 1983. Our devel- 
opment assistance programs are cast for 
the long term. They are tailored to pro- 
mote self-sufficiency and local initiative. 
They are not designed to perpetuate on 
an international scale the dependency on 
government that has so added to the 
problem. 

New U.S. Economic Policy Initiative 

Beyond this basic assistance, the Presi- 
dent is proposing a new special effort: 
an Economic Policy Initiative for Africa. 
As we announced on January 30, we ex- 
pect to ask the Congress for a 5-year, 
$500-million program, beginning with 
$75 milHon for FY 1985. The program 
will offer tangible support for those 
countries prepared to undertake the 
policy reforms needed to improve pro- 
ductivity. We will not allocate these 



10 



funds in advance, but rather we will re- 
spond to constructive reforms where 
and when they are undertaken. 

We are asking the international com- 
munity to join us. The aid-giving coun- 
tries, indeed, must do a better job. 
There are multiple projects and multiple 
donors operating, as often as not, with 
little coordination and, on occasion, ill 
advisedly. More than one white elephant 
plods the African landscape. We are 
urging the World Bank to expand its 
coordinating role among donors and to 
take the lead with African governments 
in evolving policy reforms. 

In addition to emergency food aid, 
ongoing economic assistance, and the 
Economic Policy Initiative, the Adminis- 
tration is planning other measures to 
help Africa become a more dynamic part 
of the global economic system. 

• We will continue to stress private- 
sector development in Africa. Where 
desired, we will provide concessional 
loans for African entrepreneurs; we will 
offer technical assistance in adapting 
laws and institutions to attract invest- 
ment, preparing prefeasibility studies 
for projects, and promoting awareness 
of investment opportunities in Africa. 

• One of Africa's greatest re- 
sources—the bounty of the seas which 
ring the continent— has up to now been 
inadequately exploited. We plan to help 
some West African countries create and 
improve their fisheries management pro- 
grams, including, for example, measures 
to reduce the spoilage that destroys half 
the fish brought ashore. 

• The President has already recom- 
mended to Congress that it extend the 
generalized system of preferences and 
exempt least developed countries from 
some of the more onerous international 
trade regulations. African countries 
need to diversify their exports, and we 
will help them do so. Trade, we hope, 
will be a powerful factor for growth. 
Already, the $6-billion U.S. trade deficit 
with sub-Saharan Africa is acting as an 
enormous contribution to African 
economic expansion, far more substan- 
tial than official or multilateral aid. 

• We shall increase our support for 
African regional economic organizations 
such as the African Development Bank 
and Fund. 

• We will continue and expand our 
multiyear food assistance programs. 
These programs encourage African 
governments to use the proceeds from 
sales of foodstuffs to finance long-term 
agricultural development, and they are 
linked to policy reforms that encourage 
greater local food production. 



• We will participate fully in the 
ICARA II conference [the second Inter- 
national Conference for Assistance to 
Refugees in Africa] in July of this year, 
an international effort to find enduring 
solutions to Africa's refugee problems. 

Regional Security 

Tonight, I have focused on the role we 
have to play in confronting Africa's 
economic crisis. But I cannot ignore the 
other concerns. Africa needs stability 
and an end to conflict to get on wdth the 
important tasks of national develop- 
ment. Many African nations face real 
security' threats. New and fragile 
political institutions are particularly 
vulnerable. Where economies falter and 
fail to provide the basics of existence 
and hopes for a better future, political 
instability can result. It is difficult for 
democracy to flourish; authoritarian 
solutions may appear more attractive 
but often only serve to make problems 
worse while circumscribing human and 
political rights. 

In this environment, outside powers 
are tempted to exploit instability. There 
is no excuse for some 35,000 Cuban 
troops in Africa— trained, equipped, 
financed, and transported by the Soviet 
Union— inserting themselves into local 
conflicts, and thereby internationalizing 
local problems. This Soviet/Cuban med- 
dling has no precedent; it distorts 
Africa's nonalignment; it injects an East 
West dimension where none should be, 
making fair solutions harder to achieve. 

We do not view Africa through the 
prism of East- West rivalry'. On the othei 
hand, Africa does not exist on some 
other planet. It is very much a part of 
today's world. Africa helps to shape the 
global structure— through its economic 
expansion or decline, by its weight in in- 
ternational forums, through its expand- 
ing web of bilateral and multilateral 
links with the major powers, and 
through its conflicts. At the same time, 
it is shaped by the global structure— by 
the shifts in the global balance of power, 
by the broader marketplace of ideas and 
technologies, and by the readiness of 
predators and partners to contribute to 
or detract from its development. We, 
and Africa, ignore these facts at our 
peril. 

We are not the gendarmes of Africa 
But to stand by and do nothing when 
friendly states are threatened by our 
own adversaries would only erode our 
credibility as a bulwark against aggres- 
sion not only in Africa but elsewhere. 
Therefore, we have been ready, togetheif 



Department of State Bulletir 



THE SECRETARY 



with others, to provide training and 
arms to help our friends defend 
themselves. 

And we act rapidly when the situa- 
tion demands. Last summer, when Chad 
was again invaded by Libyan troops, we 
rushed military supplies to the legiti- 
mate government there and helped halt 
the Libyan advance. Libya's destabiliza- 
tion efforts have come to be an unfor- 
tunate fact of African existence. It is an 
unacceptable fact. We will continue to 
work with others to help African states 
resist Qadhafi's overt aggression and 
covert subversion. 

In West and Central Africa as well 
as in the Horn— that critically important 
area which sits on Africa's right 
shoulder along the Red Sea— we help 
our friends, and we protect our own 
strategic interests. We encourage the 
regional parties to seek their own 
peaceful solutions to local conflicts. 

We continue to emphasize, as we 
should, economic and humanitarian 
assistance over military aid. This year 
the ratio will continue at five to one. 
The Soviets, of course, provide minimal 
economic assistance to sub-Saharan 
Africa and rarely participate in 
humanitarian relief. They seek to buy 
their influence in Africa through the 
provision of arms. In the past decade, 
Moscow has contributed less than 1% of 
Africa's foreign economic assistance but 
has sold or provided 75% of its weapons. 

Southern Africa 

Our policy of promoting peaceful solu- 
tions to regional conflicts applies, as a 
priority, to southern Africa. Our 
strategy in southern Africa is to work 
with the parties concerned to promote 
fundamental and far-reaching change in 
three areas: 

• To build an overall framework for 
regional security; 

• To bring about an independent 
Namibia; and 

• To encourage positive change in 
the apartheid policy of South Africa 
itself. 

Regional security is essential 
because our goals in the region are best 
served by a climate of coexistence in 
which the sovereignty and security of all 
states are respected. Economic reform 
and development, political pluralism, 
removal of outside forces, peaceful 
change in South Africa, and Namibian 
independence are more likely to be 
achieved in conditions of strengthened 
security and reduced violence. 



iliei 



The United States has no military 
bases or troops in southern Africa— and 
never has. In stark contrast, Moscow 
and Havana have sent nearly 25,000 
Cuban troops to Angola alone, com- 
pounding the problem of insecurity in 
southern Africa. 

Our diplomacy has not groped for 
quick fixes or instant remedies to com- 
plex and deeply rooted problems. Our 
role is that of a catalyst, an honest 
broker. We have made clear we will ex- 
ert ourselves where we are welcome. 
And welcome we are. Today, none of 
the region's leaders— whether in Lusaka 
or Pretoria, in Dar es Salaam or 
Maputo— is asking that we disengage. 
They all seek more, not less, American 
participation in helping negotiate solu- 
tions. 

It is too soon to predict break- 
throughs. Southern Africa today is at an 
early, pioneering stage on the road of 
peaceful change. The countries of the 
area must build that road; no one can do 
it for them. There are many bridges to 
be built and deep gulfs of suspicion, 
fear, and hatred to be overcome. But 
there are encouraging signs. We see a 
growing realism on all sides about the 
risks of open-ended conflict. Military 
solutions offer no hope. We detect a 
welcome glimmer of recognition that 
there are, indeed, common interests that 
bind the states of southern Africa 
together. After several years of tension 
and threats, openings for peace are 
being explored and developed with the 
active and energetic encouragement of 
the United States. 

We have helped foster a dialogue, 
for example, between South Africa and 
Mozambique. Ours is a balanced role 
whose only tilt is toward the principles 
of peaceful settlement and respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty- 
principles enshrined in the Charters of 
the United Nations and the Organization 
of African Unity. We have made clear to 
both sides that our goal is to nurture 
mutual security. In such a climate we 
are prepared to do our part to assist in 
Mozambique's development and to 
bolster its chances for genuine nonalign- 
ment. And we have moved swiftly to 
respond to the cyclones and drought 
that have repeatedly brought Mozam- 
bique to the edge of disaster. 

Our strengthened relationship with 
Mozambique has developed against a 
backdrop of concrete progress in its 
dialogue with South Africa. Today, 
leaders of the two countries are ham- 
mering out a basis of understanding and 
cooperation in the fields of security, 
transport, trade, energy, and tourism. 



April 1984 



Let me emphasize that these are 
fragile beginnings. But they symbolize 
what could become a broader pattern. 
We are helping to keep open existing 
channels of communication or to build 
new ones among other neighbors as 
well— South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, and 
Swaziland. We are uniquely placed to 
play this facilitating role: unique among 
outside powers, we are able to talk to all 
the diverse elements of the region. The 
broader pattern can take hold if it is 
based on the perception of enhanced 
security and mutual respect. 

South Africa recently announced its 
intent to reopen talks with the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency on safe- 
guard arrangements for its commercial 
nuclear enrichment facilities and to 
adhere to the London Supplier Group 
guidelines for export of sensitive 
materials. These moves flow from and 
can contribute to an environment of 
strengthened security. They did not hap- 
pen by accident. They are the direct 
result of our open and active policy of 
constructive engagement. 

I have mentioned our efforts to 
bring about Namibian independence, 
respect for borders, and the removal of 
Cuban forces from Angola. These re- 
main key objectives. We and our four 
Western partners— Britain, France, 
Canada, and Germany— working closely 
with the UN Secretary General and the 
parties in southern Africa have painstak- 
ingly resolved, one by one, the last 
issues remaining in UN Security Council 
Resolution 435. That plan, when im- 
plemented, will lead Namibia to in- 
dependence. In parallel, we are seeking 
to create conditions of greater con- 
fidence and security that could trigger 
the necessary decisions by Angola and 
South Africa that would set the process 
in motion. 

Recent events suggest a clearly 
positive evolution. A disengagement of 
forces in southern Angola is underway. 
Directly and indirectly, the key parties 
are communicating ideas and proposals 
to move the negotiations forward. 
Having defined the agenda and served 
as a catalyst, we are facilitating a step- 
by-step process that could— and I em- 
phasize could— \ead to further progress. 
We have not yet reached a settlement. 
Progress is fragile, and the situation 
remains complex. Our task is to con- 
solidate what has started and build 
upon it in the weeks and months ahead. 
This is the work of persistent, quiet 
diplomacy. 



11 



THE SECRETARY 



Our efforts for peaceful change have 
not neglected South Africa's internal 
policies. President Reagan has called 
apartheid "repugnant." It is also a 
source of tension and instability in the 
whole region. Thus, we have a moral 
and a practical interest in seeing the 
peaceful emergence of a more equitable 
system. To that end, this Administration 
has sought to work with peaceful ele- 
ments across the political spectrum in 
South Africa in support of constructive 
change. 

We have not pursued this goal in a 
vacuum. We have tailored our programs, 
our diplomatic exchanges, and our 
rhetoric to the facts. Let us be candid 
with each other. Changes are oc- 
curring—in black education and housing, 
in labor law and trade unionism, in black 
urban residency rights, in the extension 
of certain political rights to the colored 
and Asian communities. South Africa's 
white electorate has given solid backing 
to a government that defines itself as 
committed to evolutionary change. 

These steps are not by themselves 
solutions; they reflect a series of 
unilateral moves, not a process of 
negotiation among South Africans. The 
majority of South Africans remains 
without the fundamental human right of 
citizenship in their own country. Blacks 
are denied national political rights and 
cannot yet compete on an equal footing 
in South Africa's dynamic economy. Ar- 
bitrary forced removals have uprooted 
long-settled communities. I could go on 
with the positive and negative sides of 
the balance sheet. But the fact of change 
is clear. 

We have no blueprint of our own for 
what should replace apartheid; that is 
for South Africans to work out for 
themselves. But we are right to 
underscore that change is imperative. 
We are right to insist that all South 
Africans— black, white, and colored— 
participate in this process, and it is our 
obligation to lend whatever support we 
can to those who seek peaceful change. 
And we are right to recognize that a 
process of change has indeed begun, 
however imperfect it may be and 
however arduous it sometimes appears. 

The United States has sought to 
assist the process of change by en- 
couraging American labor unions to 
assist in the development of black labor 
unions, by programs to assist black 
managers and entrepreneurs, and by 
promoting over $26 million in scholar- 
ship assistance for young black South 
Africans. We have substantially ex- 
panded our support to civil and human 



rights organizations. With the en- 
couragement of the Congress, we are 
designing new programs to strengthen 
legal institutions and legal skills. And 
we have backed the impressive efforts of 
American businesses to provide equal 
treatment and expanded opportunities 
for all their workers, regardless of race. 

Economic development itself is a 
powerful engine for social and political 
evolution. Those who advocate disinvest- 
ment and economic sanctions would pull 
the rug out from under those South 
Africans who have taken the first con- 
crete steps toward a more equal and 
more equitable society. 

In the West we value life, freedom, 
progress, and peace; the only course 
consistent with these values is to engage 
ourselves as a force for constructive, 
peaceful change. It is not to egg on the 
forces of polarization, heightening the 
tensions that could destabilize the entire 
region. It is not our business to cheer 



on, from the sidelines, a race war in 
southern Africa— or to accelerate trends 
that will inexorably bring such a conflict 
about. We should recognize our limits: 
we can support and encourage change, 
but we cannot replace local initiative, in- 
stitutions, and vision. 

Tomorrow's Agenda 

If I may leave you with one message, it 
would be that America takes Africa and 
its problems seriously. We see a direct 
relationship between Africa's political 
and economic stability and the health of 
the Western world. We are committed 
to working with our African friends, ano 
with the international community, to 
help Africa overcome its problems. 

It is in our self-interest that we do 
so. And it is morally right. It is in the 
best tradition of America. 



'Press release 47 of Feb. 16. 1984. 



Question-and-Answer Session Following 
World Affairs Council Address 



Secretary Shiiltz held a question-and- 
answer session with the audience at the 
conclusion of his address before the 
Boston World Affairs Council on 
February 15, 198i.^ 

Q. Please share with us your personal 
assessment of Mr. Chernenko and 
what his incumbency will mean to 
U.S. -Soviet relations, particularly with 
respect to arms talks. 

A. Of course, we have many write- 
ups of Mr. Chernenko, but our knowl- 
edge of him is limited as it is of other 
Soviet leaders. He has been a part of the 
Soviet leadership for a long time, has 
been a part of the policies that have 
evolved there, particularly in the 
Brezhnev era, so the presumption is that 
he is more or less in agreement with 
them. 

We, of course, take every oppor- 
tunity—particularly one where a new 
leader emerges on the scene— to express 
our readiness to engage in a constructive 
dialogue with the Soviet Union and to do 
everything we can to solve, or at least 
put into better condition, the many prob- 
lems that we have between us. 

The most constructive thing we can 
do, I think, is to do that and be ready to 
follow through on it. Our behavior, we 
can have some control over. It's hard for 



12 



us to control theirs, but if we are there 
in good faith and at the same time mind- 
ful of our own interests, perhaps some- 
thing worthwhile can be started. 

That is the message that President 
Reagan delivered himself last January, 
and recognizing that there might be 
some changes in the Soviet Union, he 
chose to e.xpress it in a public speech so 
everybody there could read it. 'That is 
the message Vice President Bush took 
with him to Moscow and which he 
delivered in oral form and in a letter 
from the President 1,0 Mr. Chernenko in 
his meeting day before yesterday, I 
guess it was. 

Q. Why did not President Reagan 
or you go to Moscow? But, beyond 
that, wouldn't it be useful to have a 
meeting between our President and the 
Soviet leader? 

A. Speaking of summitry, there was 
scheduled to come to the United States 
on Monday and Tuesday two of our 
leading friends in the Arab world— King 
Hussein of Jordan and President 
Mubarak of Egypt. So the President had 
to consider, among other things, whether 
to engage in the rather intensive and ex- 
tensive discussions we had with those 
two leaders or to go to Moscow, pay his 
respects, and have a 30-minute meeting, 



Department of State Bulletin 



i JlB 



THE SECRETARY 



IS it turned out, with Mr. Cheriienko. I 
,hinlv the President made the right 
Set :hoice. 

That doesn't in any way suggest that 
he isn't ready for a dialogue with the 
Soviet leadership. He has expressed 
himself many times as being very much 
in favor of such a meeting if the work 
that precedes it gives a reasonable in- 
dication that something significant can be 
achieved. 

It is inevitable that if there is a 
meeting between the President of the 
United States and the Secretary General 
af the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, that people's e.xpectations will be 
aiK built to a very high level. I think that we 
should have some idea before under- 
taking such a meeting that they can be, 
at least in some manner, fulfilled. 

It may be very well that those condi- 
tions can be created, and, if so, I'm sure 
the President will have such a meeting. 
He's very good at personal interaction, 
and I have yet to see— I've sat in on 
countless meetings with the President 
and visiting heads of state— and there's a 
great chaitn about President Reagan, 
and also force and conviction, and he 
comes across. 

So if the time comes for a meeting, I 
think it will be a good thing just because 
of the way the President handles himself. 

I might say, just in case I don't get a 
question about Africa Daughter] that the 
President has met with 20 heads of state 
from Africa during his term of office so 
far. 

Q. Do you see a light at the end of 
the tunnel in Lebanon? Can the pres- 
ent regime of President Gemayel be 
saved? And what are the expectations 
of a UN force being deployed in Beirut 
instead of the multinational force? 

A. I hesitate, but I can't resist using 
that old image that the light you see at 
the end of the tunnel may be the train 
coming toward you. [Laughter] 

The situation in Lebanon is marked 
by violence and is in no way satisfactory 
and not at all what we have been trying 
to help bring about. Lebanon is a coun- 
try that has been beset by problems for 
many, many years, magnified in the last 
10 years by the presence of the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] and 
its terror groups and armaments, 
creating a state wdthin a state. So 
Lebanon is and has been a troubled land. 

We hoped that there was some 
chance, beginning about a year or so ago, 
that something more constructive and 
stable could develop, and if that were so, 
then it would contribute another building 



April 1984 



block in the structure of stability and 
peace in the Middle East. And so it was 
a situation that called out for help, 
literally, from them and to which we 
responded. 

It would be rash to say anything par- 
ticularly optimistic at this point in time, 
but the twists and turns in Lebanon are 
such that it's very difficult to predict. 
And I suppose just as you work on 
things and they seem just about to jell 
and then your hopes are dashed, so it is 
conceivable, at least that in this unpleas- 
ant juncture where we are, something 
positive may develop if people just get 
fed up enough with the conditions under 
which they exist. 

As for President Gemayel, I would 
first like to pay tribute to a very 
courageous individual who has under- 
taken the task of presidency of a war- 
torn and occupied country, where threats 
to life are common and all too commonly 
are effected. He's a courageous person 
who is fighting hard for his country. 

It is clearly important, if there is to 
be a sovereign and united Lebanon, that 
there be a broadened base for President 
Gemayel's government, and he has been 
trying to bring that about, but so far 
hasn't been successful in arranging the 
deals among the various leaders that 
would bring this into being. 

There is no question about the fact 
that the violence and the strife and the 
negativism, insofar as President 
Gemayel's efforts, are instigated and 
supported by Syria. In this sense, Syria 
is the problem. 

I think there are opportunities for 
President Gemayel, and just in what 
direction he goes and how that evolves 
very much remains to be seen. It's a 
tough situation. Now, your third ques- 
tion? 

Q. Was the replacement of the 
multinational force by a UN force. 

A. Our beUef is that the UN force— 
and there is a force of some 6,000 or 
7,000 UN troops in southern Lebanon, 
basically with an inoperative mandate, a 
tribute to the countries that have put up 
that force that they stay with it— we 
think there is an important role that the 
UN force could play throughout 
Lebanon. I think particularly around the 
Palestinian refugee camps, because the 
people in those camps are not well liked 
by the surrounding population as we saw 
in Sabra and Shatila. And so I think that 
there's a definite role for the UN there, 
and there are other things the UN force 
can do in taking up positions in key posts 
and so on. 



Whether in that role or especially if 
there is any role in Beirut, it depends 
upon whether or not a situation of 
stability can be created into which they 
can come. It's conceivable that the 
possibility that they might come can help 
create that stability; nevertheless, the 
UN force is not a way of eliminating it- 
self but rather it's a precondition for the 
UN force being able to come there. 

The multinational force will un- 
doubtedly be of lesser numbers on the 
ground in Lebanon, in any case, as the 
British have removed their forces, and 
we will move our Marines onto ships, 
although we have a very considerable 
number of Americans who are there in 
training roles and other ways of trying 
to be helpful, and, of course, in maintain- 
ing the security of our regular personnel 
there. So there is a U.S. presence, and 
that is there at this time. 

Q. Does this Administration have 
the courage to engage the Syrians 
militarily and defeat them on the 
ground in Lebanon, or will we retreat 
and suffer another military defeat 
[laughter]. 

A. Wow! The U.S. forces did not go 
there to undertake a military mission. 
They were not designed for that, and we 
have no intention of trying to mount the 
kind of military effort that it would take 
to have the United States dominate 
Lebanon militarily. 

I don't suppose there's any doubt 
that if we decided we really wanted to 
do that, we could do it. But we don't 
have any idea at all that that's the right 
thing to do. Our forces have been there 
at the urgent request of the Government 
of Lebanon, originally after the 
massacres at Sabra and Shatila, to 
separate Beirut from the Israeli forces 
and to provide some measure of security 
in Beirut and around the camps in Beirut 
and around the airport, and performed 
that mission very well. 

In recent months, it has been increas- 
ingly difficult because of the factional 
strife and the Syrian instigation of 
violence surrounding it in which we 
have, to some degree, been caught up. 
But if the question is a dare, we don't 
bite. It's not our intention to try to 
dominate events in Lebanon or in the 
Middle East by military means. 

I think the history of the Middle 
East is that violence— particularly the 
tactics of terror that we see— have led to 
nothing, only bitterness and bloodshed. 
Our emphasis, on the contrary, is that it 
is way past time for people to concen- 
trate on political solutions and trying to 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



work out in a peaceful way a better pat- 
tern of existence for themselves. And 
that is what we're trying to help out 
with. 

Q. President Mubarak said yester- 
day we should talk to Yasir Arafat. I 
think it makes sense. Don't you? 

A. The conditions under which the 
United States will talk to Mr. Arafat and 
members of the PLO have been stated 
by the President, and for that matter by 
his predecessors and probably by Joe 
Sisco [former Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs], many times; 
namely, that if he recognizes UN Resolu- 
tion 242 as the basis for a peaceful 
resolution of the Palestinian issues and if 
he acknowledges the right of the State of 
Israel to exist, we'll be glad to talk to 
him. 

We share the view of Israel that it 
makes no sense to talk to somebody who 
states that his intention is to eliminate 
the State of Israel and who has a history 
of trying to employ violent means to that 
end. 

The United States helped bring 
about the evacuation of the PLO and 
Mr. Arafat from Beii-ut a little over a 
year ago, and in an indirect way from 
Tripoli here recently. We hear many 
comments that Mr. Arafat is ready to 
forego the violent solution and seek a 
political action. If so, he knows what to 
say in order to talk with us, and we 
would welcome that kind of dialogue. 

Q. What is the hope for peace in El 
Salvador? 

A. The fu-st hope for peace is in the 
emergence of democracy and the rule (5f 
law. I think those are fundamental 
tenets. There is a democratically elected 
Constituent Assembly, and before the 
spring is over we believe there will be a 
democratically elected president. At the 
same time, the processes that we 
associate with the rule of law have been 
badly deficient in El Salvador, and in a 
great many ways we have been ti-ying to 
help the great majority of the people 
there who want to do so construct the 
basis of a judicial system that suits their 
w'ays and which provides a better 
measure of justice. 

There have been some encouraging 
signs even in recent days in this regard, 
but yet there is much to be done. So I 
think the first point is democracy and 
the rule of law. 

The second point is that there need 
to be conditions under which economic 
development can take place, and the bi- 
partisan commission to which Henry 
Kissinger gave brilliant leadership made 



some vei-y potent recommendations in 
that regard. That's the second thing. 

I think the third thing that we must 
recognize— and I know many people 
don't like to recognize but it's there— you 
can't have economic development, and 
it's very difficult to have political reform, 
when you have a guerrilla movement 
supported very heavily by outside forces 
trying to shoot their way in to your 
government. And so I think it's essential 
if we are going to place value on 
democratic development and we're going 
to place value and prospect on economic 
development, that we also help them pro- 
vide a shield of security so that these 
things can flourish. And this is some- 
thing that we have had great difficulty in 
persuading the American people to do. 
It's done not strongly enough, not with 
enough certainty for those in the 
Salvadoran military, but it is absolutely 
essential if the main objectives that we 
seek are going to be achieved. It is a 
very doable proposition if we have the 
clarity of view and the willpower and 
strength to carry it through. 

It is not in the interests of the 
United States, and very much against 
our vital interests, to have emerge in 
Central America a system of government 
akin to and allied with the Soviet Union 
and Cuba. The importance of these in- 
terests was stressed by the bipartisan 
commission, and I think it is something 
that we must take very seriously. 

I know this is a very controversial 
area, and I would beg of you, all of you 
who are worried and interested in this, 
that you take the time and the trouble to 
read the report of the bipartisan commis- 
sion. It's a very unusual report. 

The people who made up that com- 
mission started in with widely varying 
views. The President didn't pick a bunch 
of people who all sought the same thing; 
quite the contrary. They also are people 
of varying political persuasions, impor- 
tant people in both the Democratic and 
Republican Parties. They worked hard 
on that report. Henry Kissinger really 
engaged them in the process, and they 
spent countless days and days on it per- 
sonally. It was not a report put together 
by a staff and then argued over by the 
members. It was produced by the 
members themselves, and they sat in the 
space we allocated them in the State 
Department. Many weekends I'd go 
down there on a Saturday afternoon or a 
Sunday morning, they'd be down there 
arguing with each other. So they really 
put an effort into it. 



So I think given the effort they put 
in and the importance of the subject, you 
owe it to them to get their report and 
read it. 

Q. We're sponsoring a guerrilla 
war against Nicaragua. The San- 
dinistas have offered negotiations. 
Why do we refuse to negotiate? 

A. First of all, the Sandinistas have 
betrayed their own revolution and have 
put into place in Nicaragua a regime that 
should be repugnant to us. I've had good 
friends who experienced Germany in the 
1930s go there and come back and say, 
"I've visited many communist countries, 
but Nicaragua doesn't feel like that. It 
feels like Nazi Germany." 

So I don't think it's any— shouldn't 
be any surprise that there are a lot of 
dropouts from the Sandinista revolution 
who are objecting, and the Nicaraguans 
are feeling the effect of their own 
behavior. 

Insofar as negotiations are con- 
cerned, there is a negotiating process in 
place. It goes under the name of the 
Contadora process since it got started by 
the ideas of four countries— Mexico, 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama— 
which met on Contadora Island, and it 
engages the five Central American coun- 
tries—they're all taking part— and we 
think that's a good process. We think the 
problem is essentially regional in nature, 
and we support that process and en- 
courage it, try to help it along as best we 
can. 

That process has produced a 21-point 
set of principles, and if those principles 
were adopted and made operational, 
you'd have a pretty good situation. In 
"the last meeting of the group, they set 
out three working groups, the tasks of 
which were to try to make these prin- 
ciples into something operational. 

Whether this process is going to 
come of anything, of course, remains to 
be seen, but we think that is the right 
foi-um right now for these discussions to 
take place among the countries con- 
cerned, and we encour;jge it. Nicaragua 
is part of it. and we think they ought to 
engage with the others and agree to 
such things as democratic pluralism, 
agree to such things as having a level of 
armaments that is at least half way in 
keeping with defensive requii-ements and 
not the huge level of armaments they 
have which can only be justified if you 
have offensive intentions, agi-ee to the 
idea of not shipping munitions and other 
supplies across borders, and so on and so 
on through the 21 points. I think there's 
an answer there. 



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14 



Department of State Bulletin 



iiuummmiMaua 



"''■"■""""■"""^""^ 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Why do we always end up on the 
wrong side in Central America, in 
Lebanon, in the Philippines, and else- 
where in the world? 

A. I think we're on the right side. 
We're on the side of democracy, we're on 
the side of freedom, we're on the side of 
economic development. There is a fever 
of democracy running through our hemi- 
sphere. It's exciting. I just spent about 8 
days in Central America, in South 
America, in the Caribbean, and people- 
particularly peopte living in countries 
that have existed under dictatorship, 
when you talk to them, they're so ex- 
cited. Or not only in the area that I men- 
tioned; take Portugal and Spain. I don't 
know whether any of you have visited 
and talked to people there. They're so 
excited. They say, "We have freedom. 
It's wonderful!" 

I don't think we Americans have any 
appreciation of what it means to have 
freedom. It's like the air we breathe to 
us, but to people who haven't had it, it's 
wonderful. And by this time we can say 
that in our hemisphere, there are living 
under conditions of democracy or states 
which are moving inexorably to democ- 
racy over 90% of the population. Sticking 
out like a sore thumb— Cuba, Nicaragua, 
Suriname, Chile. Very different coun- 
tries, but leave that to the side, it's a 
pretty good picture, and we're on the 
right side of these issues in sticking with 
these principles. 



Human Rights and the Moral 
Dimension of U.S. Foreign Policy 



'Press release 47 of Feb. 16, 1984. 



Secretary Shultz's address at the 
86th annual Washington Day banquet of 
the Creve Couer Club of Illinois in 
Peoria on February 22, 198AJ 

I would like to speak to you today about 
human rights and the moral dimension 
of U.S. foreign policy. 

Americans have always been an in- 
trospective people. Most other nations 
do not go through the endless exercise 
of trying to analyze themselves as we 
do. We are always asking what kind of 
people we are. This is probably a result 
of our history. Unlike most other na- 
tions, we are not defined by an ancient 
common tradition or heritage or by 
ethnic homogeneity. Unlike most other 
countries, America is a nation conscious- 
ly created and made up of men and 
women from many different cultures 
and origins. What unifies us is not a 
common origin but a common set of 
ideals: freedom, constitutional 
democracy, racial and religious 
tolerance. We Americans thus define 
ourselves not by where we come from 
but by where we are headed: our goals, 
our values, our principles, which mark 
the kind of society we strive to create. 

This accounts in good part, I believe, 
for the extraordinary vitality of this 
country. Democracy is a great liberator 
of the human spirit, giving free rein to 
the talents and aspirations of in- 
dividuals, offering every man and 
woman the opportunity to realize his or 
her fullest potential. This ideal of 
freedom has been a beacon to im- 
migrants from many lands. 

We are a people that never felt 
bound by the past but always had con- 
fidence that we could shape our future. 
We also set high standards for 
ourselves. In our own society, from Jef- 
ferson to Lincoln to the modern day, 
there have always been keepers of our 
conscience who measured our perfor- 
mance against our ideals and insisted 
that we do better. The revolution in civil 
rights is perhaps the most dramatic re- 
cent example, and it has given impetus 
to other revolutions, such as in women's 
rights. We are blessed with a society 
that is constantly renewing and improv- 
ing itself by virtue of the standards it 
has set. 

In foreign affairs, we do the same. 
In the 19th century, when we had the 
luxury of not being actively involved in 



world politics, we, nevertheless, saw 
ourselves as a moral example to others. 
We were proud when liberators like 
Simon Bolivar in Latin America or 
Polish patriots in Europe invoked the 
ideals of the American Revolution. In 
the 20th century, since Woodrow 
Wilson, we have defined our role in the 
world in terms of moral principles that 
we were determined to uphold and ad- 
vance. We have never been comfortable 
with the bare concept of maintaining the 
balance of power, even though this is 
clearly part of our responsibility. 

Americans can be proud of the good 
we have accomplished in foreign affairs. 

• We have fought and sacrificed for 
the freedom of others. 

• We helped Europe and Japan 
rebuild after World War II. 

• We have given generously to pro- 
mote economic development. 

• We have been a haven for 
refugees. 

Thus, moral values and a commitment to 
human dignity have been not an appen- 
dage to our foreign policy but an essen- 
tial part of it, and a powerful impulse 
driving it. These values are the very 
bonds that unite us with our closest 
allies, and they are the very issues that 
divide us from our adversaries. The fun- 
damental difference between East and 
West is not in economic or social policy, 
though those policies differ radically, but 
in the moral principles on which they are 
based. It is the difference between 
tyranny and freedom— an age-old strug- 
gle in which the United States never 
could, and cannot today, remain neutral. 

But there has always been tension 
between our ideals and the messy 
realities of the world. Any foreign policy 
must weave together diverse strands of 
national interest: pohtical objectives, 
military security, economic management. 
All these other goals are important to 
people's lives and well-being. They all 
have moral validity, and they often con- 
front us with real choices to make. As 
the strongest free nation, the United 
States has a complex responsibility to 
help maintain international peace and 
security and the global economic system. 

At the same time, as one nation 
among many, we do not have the power 
to remake the planet. An awareness of 
our limits is said to be one of the lessons 
we learned from Vietnam. In any case, 



THE SECRETARY 



Americans are also a practical people 
and are interested in producing results. 
Foreign policy thus often presents us 
with moral issues that are not easy to 
resolve. Moral questions are more dif- 
ficult to answer than other kinds of 
questions, not easier. How we respond 
to these dilemmas is a real test of our 
maturity and also of our commitment. 

Approaches to Human Rights Policy 

There are several different ways of ap- 
proaching human rights issues, and 
some are better than others. One thing 
should be clear. Human rights policy 
should not be a formula for escapism or 
a set of excuses for evading problems. 
Human rights policy cannot mean simply 
dissociating or distancing ourselves from 
regimes whose practices we find defi- 
cient. Too much of what passes for 



friendly to us is subjected to more exact- 
ing scrutiny than others; our security 
ties with it are attacked; once such a 
government faces an internal or external 
threat, its moral defects are spotlighted 
as an excuse to desert it. This is not my 
view of human rights policy either. 

At issue here is not so much a tac- 
tical disagreement over human rights 
policy but fundamentally different con- 
ceptions of America and its impact on 
the world. What gives passion to this 
human rights debate is that it is a sur- 
rogate for a more significant underlying 
contest over the future of American 
foreign policy. 

There should be no doubt of Presi- 
dent Reagan's approach— not isola- 
tionism or guilt or paralysis but, on the 
contrary, a commitment to active 
engagement, confidently working for 



There should he no doubt of President Reagan's 
approach— not isolationism or guilt or paralysis but 
... a commitment to active engagement, confidently 
working for our values as well as our interests in the 
real world, acting proudly as the champion of 
freedom. 



human rights policy has taken the form 
of shunning those we find do not live up 
to internationally accepted standards. 
But this to me is a "cop-out"; it seems 
more concerned with making us feel bet- 
ter than with having an impact on the 
situation we deplore. It is really a form 
of isolationism. If some liberals advocate 
cutting off relationships with right-wing 
regimes— and some conservatives seek 
to cut off dealings with left-wing 
regimes— we could be left with practical- 
ly no foreign policy at all. This is not my 
idea of how to advance the cause of 
human rights. 

One unattractive example of this ap- 
proach derives from theories of 
American guilt, originating in our 
domestic debate over Vietnam. There 
are those eager to limit or restrain 
American power because they concluded 
from Vietnam that any exercise of 
American power overseas was bound to 
end in disaster or that America was 
itself a supporter or purveyor of evil in 
the world. Human rights policy was seen 
by some as a way of restricting 
American engagement abroad. Perverse- 
ly, in this way of thinking, a government 



our values as well as our interests in the 
real world, acting proudly as the cham- 
pion of freedom. The President has said 
that "human rights means working at 
problems, not walking away from them." 
If we truly care about our values, we 
must be engaged in their defense— 
whether in Afghanistan and Poland, the 
Philippines and El Salvador, or Grenada. 
This is the President's philosophy: We 
are proud of our country and of what it 
stands for. We have confidence in our 
ability to do good. We draw our inspira- 
tion from the fundamental decency of 
the American people. We find in our 
ideals a star to steer by, as we try to 
move our ship of state through the 
troubled waters of a complex world. 

So we consider ourselves activists in 
the struggle for human rights. As the 
President declared to the British Parlia- 
ment on June 8, 1982: "We must be 
staunch in our conviction that freedom is 
not the sole prerogative of a lucky few 
but the inalienable and universal right of 
all human beings." 



16 



Goals and Techniques of 
Human Rights Policy 

That was philosophy. But on a daily 
basis, we face practical issues and prob- 
lems of human rights policy. On one 
level, human rights policy aims at 
specific goals. We try, for example, to 
use our influence to improve judicial or 
police practices in many countries— to 
stop murders, to eliminate torture or 
brutality, to obtain the release of 
dissidents or political prisoners, to end 
persecution on racial or other grounds, 
to permit free emigration, and so forth. 
Many American officials, including Vice 
President Bush and myself, have gone to 
El Salvador and denounced the death 
squads not only privately but publicly- 
all of which is having a positive effect. 
We have sought to promote an honest 
and thorough investigation of the 
murder of Philippine opposition leader 
Benigno Aquino. 

President Reagan, during his visit to 
the Republic of Korea last November, 
publicly stated his belief in the impor- 
tance of political liberalization. But we 
have also made our thoughts on specific 
cases known privately, and several of 
these approaches have been successful. 
In our contacts with the Soviets, we 
have pressed for the release of human 
rights activists and for freedom of 
emigration. There are literally hundreds 
of such examples of American action. 
Sometimes we make progress; some- 
times we do not— proving only that we 
still have much to do. In this context, I 
must pay tribute to your distinguished 
Senator, Chuck Percy [Sen. Charles H. 
Percy, R.-Ill.]. No one in the Senate has 
played a more important role than 
Chuck Percy in the struggle for the 
right of emigration for Soviet Jewry and 
other oppressed peoples, for religious 
freedoms, and for the release of 
prisoners of conscience. 

The techniques of exerting our in- 
fluence are well known. We try, without 
letup, to sensitize other governments to 
human rights concerns. Every year we 
put on the public record a large volume 
of country reports examining the prac- 
tices of other countries in thorough and 
candid detail— the rights of citizens to be 
free from violations of the integrity of 
the person and the rights of citizens to 
enjoy basic civil and political liberties. 
The 1984 report has just been pub- 
lished—nearly 1,500 pages of facts about 
human rights around the world, some- 
thing no other country undertakes. 
Twice each year, we also send the con- 
gressional Helsinki commission a public 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



report thoroughly reviewing the record 
of Soviet and East European compliance 
with the human rights provisions of the 
Helsinki Final Act. 

Wherever feasible, we try to 
ameliorate abuses through the kind of 
frank diplomatic exchanges often re- 
ferred to as "quiet diplomacy." But 
where our positive influence is minimal, 
or where other approaches are unavail- 
ing, we may have no choice but to use 
other, more concrete kinds of leverage 
with regimes whose practices we cannot 
accept. 

We may deny economic and military 
assistance, withhold diplomatic support, 
vote against multilateral loans, refuse 
licenses for crime control equipment, or 
take other punitive steps. Where ap- 
propriate, we resort to public pressures 
and public statements denouncing such 
actions as we have done in the case of 
the Salvadoran death squads, Iranian 
persecution of the Bahais, South African 
apartheid, and Soviet repression in 
Afghanistan. 

Multilateral organizations are 
another instrument of our human rights 
policy. In the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, we supported a resolu- 
tion criticizing martial law in 
Poland— the first resolution there 
against a Communist country. The 
United States has been active and 
vigorous in regional conferences and 
organizations, such as the Helsinki proc- 
ess and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. We regret that some 
multilateral organizations have distorted 
the purposes they were designed to 
serve-such as UNESCO [UN Educa- 
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza- 
tion], which has not been living up to its 
responsibility to defend freedom of 
speech, intellectual freedom, and human 
rights in general. 

Friendly governments are often 
more amenable to traditional diplomacy 
than to open challenge, and we therefore 
prefer persuasion over public denuncia- 
tions. But if we were never seriously 
concerned about human rights abuses in 
friendly countries, our policy would be 
one-sided and cynical. 

Thus, while the Soviet Union and its 
proxies present the most profound and 
farreaching danger to human rights, we 
cannot let it appear— falsely— that this is 
our only human rights concern. It is not. 

Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy 

Clearly, there are limits to our ability to 
remake the world. In the end, sovereign 
governments will make their own deci- 



sions, despite external pressure. Where 
a system of government is built on 
repression, human rights will inevitably 
be subordinated to the perceived re- 
quirements of political survival. The 
sheer diversity and complexity of other 
nations' internal situations, and the 
problem of coping with them in a 
dangerous world, are additional limits. 
How we use our influence and how we 
reconcile political and moral interests 
are questions that call not for dogmatic 
conclusions but for painstaking, sober 
analysis— and no little humility. 

The dilemmas we face are many. 
What, for instance, is the relationship 
between human rights concerns and the 
considerations of regional or interna- 
tional security on which the independ- 
ence and freedom of so many nations 
directly depend? This issue recurs in a 
variety of forms. 

There are countries whose internal 
practices we sometimes question but 
which face genuine security threats from 
outside— like South Korea— or whose 
cooperation with us helps protect the 
security of scores of other nations— like 
the Philippines. But it is also true that in 
many cases a concern for human rights 
on our part may be the best guarantee 
of a long-term friendly relationship with 



Terrorism itself is a 
threat to human rights 
and to the basic right to 
civil peace and security 
which a society owes its 
citizens. We deplore all 
governmental abuses of 
rights, whatever the 
excuse. 



that country. There are countries whose 
long-term security will probably be 
enhanced if they have a more solid base 
of popular support and domestic unity. 
Yet there are also cases where regional 
insecurity weakens the chances for 
liberalization and where American 
assurance of security support provides a 
better climate for an evolution to 
democracy. Human rights issues occur 
in a context, and there is no simple 
answer. 



In the Middle East, to take a very 
different example, we have no doubt of 
Israel's commitment to human rights 
and democratic values. It is those very 
values we appeal to when we express 
our concern for the human rights and 
quality of life of the Palestinian people 
in the West Bank and Gaza— a concern 
that exists side by side with our 
understanding of Israel's security needs 
and our conviction that the basic prob- 
lem can only be resolved through 
negotiation. 

Another question that arises is: Do 
we know enough about the culture and 
internal dynamics of other societies to 
be sure of the consequence of pressures 
we might bring? If we distance ourselves 
from a friendly but repressive govern- 
ment, in a fluid situation, will this help 
strengthen forces of moderation, or 
might it make things worse? Pressures 
on human rights grounds against the 
Shah, Somoza, or South Vietnam had 
justification but may also have ac- 
celerated a powerful trend of events 
over which we had little influence, end- 
ing up with regimes that pose a far 
greater menace not only to human 
rights in their own country but also to 
the safety and freedom of all their 
neighbors. 

In some countries, harsh measures 
of repression have been caused— indeed, 
deliberately provoked— by terrorists, 
who waged deliberate warfare not only 
against the institutions of society- 
political leaders, judges, administrators, 
newspaper editors, as well as against 
police and military officials— but against 
ordinary citizens. Terrorism itself is a 
threat to human rights and to the basic 
right to civil peace and security which a 
society owes its citizens. We deplore all 
governmental abuses of rights, whatever 
the excuse. But we cannot be blind to 
the extremist forces that pose such a 
monumental and increasing threat to 
free government precisely because 
democracies are not well equipped to 
meet this threat. We must find lawful 
and legitimate means to protect civilized 
life itself from the growing problem of 
terrorism. 

The role of Congress is another 
question. There is no doubt that con- 
gressional concerns and pressures have 
played a very positive role in giving im- 
petus and backing to our efforts to in- 
fluence other governments' behavior. 
This congressional pressure can 
strengthen the hand of the executive 
branch in its efforts of diplomacy. At 
the same time, there can be complica- 
tions if the legislative instrument is too 



THE SECRETARY 



inflexible or heavy-handed, or, even 
more, if Congress attempts to take on 
the administrative responsibility for ex- 
ecuting policy. Legislation requires that 
we withhold aid in extreme circum- 
stances. If narrowly interpreted, this 
can lead us rapidly to a "stop-go" policy 
of fits and starts, all or nothing— making 
it very difficult to structure incentives in 



thorough repression but also because of 
their permanence and their global ambi- 
tions. In the last decade we have seen 
several military regimes and dictator- 
ships of the right evolve into 
democracies— from Portugal, Spain, and 
Greece to Turkey and Argentina. No 
Communist state has evolved in such a 
manner— though Poland attempted to. 



The cause of human rights is at the core of 
American foreign policy because it is central to 
America's conception of itself. These values are 
hardly an American invention, but America has 
perhaps been unique in its commitment to base its 
foreign policy on the pursuit of such ideals. 



a way that will really fulfill the law's 
own wider mandate: to "promote and en- 
courage increased respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. ..." 

In the case of El Salvador, the 
positive impact the Administration has 
had in its recent pressures against death 
squads should be a reminder that cer- 
tification in its previous form is not the 
only, or even the most effective, pro- 
cedure for giving expression to our ob- 
jectives. Sometimes a change in ap- 
proach is the most worthwhile course. 
We are ready to work cooperatively 
with the Congress on this issue, but it 
should be clear that the answers are not 
simple. 

Finally, the phenomenon of 
totalitarianism poses special problems. 
Sociologists and political theorists have 
recognized for decades that there is a 
difference between traditional, in- 
digenous dictatorships and the more per- 
vasively repressive totalitarian states, 
fortified by modern technology, mass 
parties, and messianic ideology. Certain- 
ly, both are alien to our democratic 
ideals. But in this year of George 
Orwell, 1984, we cannot be oblivious to 
the new 20th centrury phenomenon. 
Suppression of religion because it 
represents an autonomous force in a 
society; abuse of psychiatric institutions 
as intruments of repression; the use of 
prison labor on a mass scale for industrial 
construction— these and other practices 
are typical of the modem Marixst- 
Leninist state. Totalitarian regimes pose 
special problems not only because of their 
more systematic and 



And the Soviet Union, most impor- 
tantly and uniquely, is driven not only 
by Russian history and Soviet state in- 
terest but also by what remains of its 
revolutionary ideology to spread its 
system by force, backed up by the 
greatest military power of any tyranny 
in history. 

I raise these issues not to assert 
answers but to pose questions. These 
are complexities that a truly moral na- 
tion must face up to if its goal is to help 
make the world a better place. 

Human Rights and Democracy 

The Reagan Administration approaches 
the human rights question on a deeper 
level. Responding to specific juridical 
abuses and individual cases, as they hap- 
pen, is important, but they are really the 
surface of the problem we are dealing 
with. The essence of the problem is the 
kind of political structure that makes 
human rights abuses possible. We have a 
duty not only to react to specific cases 
but also to understand, and seek to 
shape, the basic structural conditions in 
which human rights are more likely to 
flourish. 

This is why President Reagan has 
placed so much emphasis on democracy: 
on encouraging the building of pluralistic 
institutions that will lead a society to 
evolve toward free and democratic 
forms of government. This is long-term, 
positive, active strategy for human 
rights policy. 

It is not a Utopian idea at all. For 
decades, the American labor movement 



has worked hard in many countries 
assisting the growth and strengthening 
of free labor unions— giving support and 
advice, teaching the skills of organizing 
and operating. In Western Europe after 
World War II, it was the free labor 
unions, helped in many cases by free 
unions here, that prevented Communist 
parties from taking over in several coun- 
tries. Today, free political parties in 
Western Europe give similar fraternal 
assistance to budding parties and 
political groups in developing countries, 
helping these institutions survive or 
grow in societies where democratic pro- 
cedures are not as firmly entrenched as 
in our own. 

The new National Endowment for 
Democracy, proposed by President 
Reagan and now funded with the bipar- 
tisan support of the Congress, 
represents an imaginative and practical 
American effort to help develop the 
tools of democracy. Just as our tradi- 
tional aid programs try to teach 
economic and agricultural skills, so our 
new programs will try to transfer skills 
in organizing elections, in campaigning, 
in legal reform, and other skills which 
we take for granted but which are basic 
to free, pluralistic societies. 

Through the endowment, our two 
major political parties, along with labor, 
business, and other private groups, will 
assist countries and groups that seek to 
develop democratic institutions and 
practices in their own societies. The 
President is also directing AID [Agency 
for International Development], USIA 
[U.S. Information Agency], and other 
agencies to strengthen their programs 
for democracy, such as support for free 
labor movements, training of journalists, 
and strengthening judicial institutions 
and procedures. Sen. Percy also 
deserves particular credit here for his 
cosponsorship of the Kassebaum-Percy 
Human Rights Fund for South Africa, 
which will channel $1.5 million to private 
and community organizations in South 
Africa working for human rights. 

It may not seem romantic or heroic 
to train African magistrates in Zim- 
babwe, provide technical help to the 
Liberian Constitution Commission, help 
publish a revised penal code in Zaire, 
help finance the education and research 
program of the Inter-American Institute 
of Human Rights in Costa Rica, or help 
provide international observers for free 
elections in El Salvador— but these pro- 
grams help create the institutional 
preconditions for democracy. Democracy 
and the rule of law are the only endur- 
ing guarantee of human rights. 



Department of State Bulletin 



""■— -TB 



THE SECRETARY 



We should never lose faith in the 
power of the democratic idea. 
Democracies may be a minority in the 
world at large, but it is not true that 
they must always be so. Freedom is not 
a culture-bound Western invention but 
an aspiration of peoples every- 
where—from Barbados to Botswana, 
from India to Japan. 

In Latin America, for example, 
where the news is so much dominated 
by conflict, there is, in fact, an extraor- 
dinary trend toward democracy. 
Twenty-seven nations of Latin America 
and thf Caribbean are either democratic 
or are formally embarked on a transition 
to democracy— representing almost 90% 
of the region's population, as compared 
with some 50% less than 10 years ago. 
And the trend has been accelerating. 

Between 1976 and 1980, two Latin 
American nations, Ecuador and Peru, 
elected civilian presidents who suc- 
cessfully replaced military presidents. 
Since 1981, however. El Salvador, Hon- 
duras, Bolivia, and most recently Argen- 
tina have moved from military rule to 
popularly elected civilian governments. 

Brazil is far along the same path. 
The people of Grenada have had 
restored to them the right to be the ar- 
biters of their own political future. 
Uruguay has a timetable for a transition 
to democracy, and its parties have 
returned to independent activity. 
Pressure for return to civilian rule is be- 
ing felt in Chile and Guatemala. This 
leaves only Cuba, a Marxist-Leninist 
state; Nicaragua, which has been steadi- 
ly moving in that direction; and a hand- 
ful of dictatorships outside this pattern. 

This trend toward democracy, which 
reflects the most profound aspirations of 
the people of Latin America, has re- 
ceived wholehearted and effective en- 
couragement from the Reagan Ad- 
ministration. Dictatorship in any form, 
leftist or rightist, is anathema in this 
hemisphere, and all states within the 
region have a responsibility to see that 
dictatorship gives way to genuine 
pluralist democracy. 

Nor is the trend toward democracy 
confined to Latin America. In the Philip- 
pines, for example, the democratic tradi- 
tion of that republic is evident in the 
strong popular pressure for free elec- 
tions and a revitalized Congress. The 
government has begun to respond to 
these aspirations, and we are encourag- 
ing it to continue this hopeful process so 
important to the long-term stability of 
the Philippines. Likewise in the Republic 
of Korea, we are encouraged by Presi- 
dent Chun's [Doo Hwan] commitment to 



April 1984 



undertake in the next few years the first 
peaceful, constitutional transfer of 
power in Korea's modern history. 

The Moral Commitment 
of the United States 

A policy dedicated to human rights will 
always face hard choices. In El 
Salvador, we are supporting the 
moderates of the center, who are under 
pressure from extremists of both right 
and left; if we withdrew our support, the 
moderates would be the victims, as 
would be the cause of human rights in 
that beleaguered country. The road will 
be long and hard, but we cannot walk 
away from our principles. 

The cause of human rights is at the 
core of American foreign policy because 
it is central to America's conception of 
itself. These values are hardly an 
American invention, but America has 
perhaps been unique in its commitment 
to base its foreign policy on the pursuit 
of such ideals. It should be an ever- 
lasting source of pride to Americans 
that we have used our vast power to 



such noble ends. If we have sometimes 
fallen short, that is not a reason to 
flagellate ourselves but to remind 
ourselves of how much there remains to 
do. 

This is what America has always 
represented to other nations and other 
peoples. But if we abandoned the effort, 
we would not only be letting others 
down, we would be letting ourselves 
down. 

Our human rights policy is a 
pragmatic policy which aims not at strik- 
ing poses but as having a practical effect 
on the well-being of real people. It is a 
tough-minded policy, which faces the 
world as it is, not as we might wish or 
imagine it to be. At the same time, it is 
an idealistic policy, which expresses the 
continuing commitment of the United 
States to the cause of liberty and the 
alleviation of suffering. It is precisely 
this combination of practicality and 
idealism that has marked American 
statesmanship at its best. It is the par- 
ticular genius of the American people. 



'Press release 51 of Feb. 24, 1984. 



Secretary Shultz Visits 
Latin America 



Secretary Shultz departed 
Washington, D.C., January 31, 198Jt, to 
visit El Salvador (January 31), 
Venezuela (February 1-3), Brazil 
(Febnmry 3-7), Grenada (Febniary 7). 
and Barbados (February 7-8). He re- 
turned to Washington on February 8. 

Following are the Secretary's 
remarks he made on various occasions 
djirin.g the trip. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
SAN SALVADOR, 
JAN. 31, 1984' 

I wish to express my appreciation to 
President Magana and his colleagues for 
receiving me and for all of the informa- 
tion they provided, and also for organiz- 
ing the luncheon that I have just taken 
part in with all six candidates for Presi- 
dent. I had a chance to hear from each of 
them at lunch, and I heard six eloquent 
statements in support of the democratic 
process, in support of the government of 
El Salvador, and in support of the people 
of El Salvador. 



Q. Someone had asked what results 
the Salvadorans [inaudible]? 

A. I had a session with the Presi- 
dent, the Defense Minister, and the 
Foreign Minister, and we discussed the 
elections, we discussed the problems of 
the system of justice, the death squads. 
We discussed the military situation, and 
I heard about the strong efforts being 
made and the improvements in the situa- 
tion that seem to be taking place. We 
discussed the Contadora pi'ocess, and in 
the luncheon I had social conversations 
with each of the candidates and then we 
had a general discussion. I mentioned the 
things that each candidate said— each one 
spoke, and I spoke on behalf of the 
United States, saying we truly believe in 
the democratic process. We are not 
neutral about the process; we are neutral 
about the outcome. We think that the im- 
portant thing is the country and that 
everybody will accept whatever the ver- 
dict of the people is in a fair election. We 
also expressed our grief and our concern 
about the recent killing of an American, 
apparently by terror from the left. 



19 



THE SECRETARY 




While in San Salvador, Secretary Shultz met with Minister of Defense Gen. Carlos Vides 
Casanova (far left), President Alvaro Magana, and U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador 
Thomas R. Pickering (far right). 



Q. Did you tell President Magana 
how much money President Reagan 
has [inaudible] for supplemental 
military aid this year? What did the 
Salvadorans say they could do with 
this additional money to break the 
military statement that seems to be 
going on? 

A. We discussed the bipartisan com- 
mission and its report and the 
President's support for that report, 
which does project large, additional 
elements of assistance to El Salvador 
and other countries of Central America. 

How can this be used? It is certainly 
the case that a reasonable security situa- 
tion is a necessary condition for economic 
development, social progress, and the 
emergence of the kind of political institu- 
tions that everyone wants. It's a 
necessary condition; those things can't 
happen without security, but it isn't a 
sufficient condition. And so, we support, 
in our program and in our effort here, all 
of those additional things that are the 
essential ingredients to economic 
development, and those cost money. All 
elements of the program were discussed. 

Q. Yesterday in Colombia, Am- 
bassador Stone [Ambassador at Large 
and special representative of the Presi- 
dent to Central America] said that 
there were problems and disagreements 



with the Contadora group. What are 
these disagreements, and what do they 
consist of ? 

A. Senator Stone is here and I looked 
over at him and he shook his head, so I 
think the question is on the wrong track. 
Let me say, as far as the Contadora 
process is concerned, we support it, we 
work with it, the President supports it. 
The President has appointed an out- 
standing American, Senator Stone, to 
help with those negotiations. We think 
there is progress being made, and we 
hope that that will continue and perhaps 
help bring stability to this region. 

Q. Did you raise the subject of the 
investigation of the slayings of the 
four American churehwomen and [in- 
audible]? 

A. We discussed those cases, and we 
discussed the processes in which they 
are in. Progress is being made— it is 
painfully slow, but it's there. But we did 
discuss each one of those cases. 

Q. Are you satisfied with that 
progress? 

A. Of course, I would wish that 
things moved faster; it's been a long 
time. However, the cases are in process 
and action is underway. 

Q. Would it pose a problem to 
American policy if Major D'Aubuisson 
were elected? 



20 
bHHIfllililHi 



A. We believe in a democratic proc- 
ess, and we believe in fair and open elec- 
tions. We believe that under those cir- 
cumstances you accept the verdict, 
whatever it may be, of the people who 
do the voting. 

Q. [Inaudible] of U.S. aid ending 
upon the open marketplace here? 

A. Are you speaking of this in- 
vestigation of the 112 cases that's been 
reported? I guess there are two cases in- 
volved. Some AID [Agency for Interna- 
tional Development] food appeared on 
the marketplace yesterday and our 
people went and corrected that situation 
and removed it in incredibly fast action 
on the part of the Ambassador. 

Q. Could you describe the conversa- 
tion you had with Major D'Aubuisson 
today? 

A. Yes, I had a perfectly straightfor- 
ward discussion with him, as I did with 
the other candidates, about such things 
as the nature of the campaign, theii' ex- 
pectations about voter turnout, and the 
kind of sense of people's attitude toward 
the election that they're having. In the 
general session at lunch where each 
Presidential candidate spoke, he as did 
the others spoke in defense of the 
democratic process and on behalf of the 
importance of the country and its in- 
terests and the interests of the people. 

The United States is neutral with 
respect to who wins the elections, but we 
are not neutral— we are very much in 
favor of the democratic process, con- 
ducted in a fair and free manner, free 
from coercion, open to those who choose 
to run, with access by everybody to the 
people, to the media, and able to express 
their views and opinions and put the 
issues to the voters as they choose. We 
are passionately in favor of the process, 
but we have no candidate in the election 
as such. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

CARACAS, 

FEB. 2, 1984* 

Today v\e celebrate democracy in 
Venezuela, mature democracy. But also, 
as the President said in his stirring ad- 
dress, democracy in Latin America, 
democracy in our hemisphere, democracy 
as a force in the world of supreme impor- 
tance. The winners, of course, ai'e the 
people, and I congratulate the people of 
Venezuela on this great day. 

Q. Do you see any role for the 
United Nations in the Falklands/ 



Department of State Bulletin 



masiiisiiiiiiaaa 



THE SECRETARY 



Malvinas Islands as far as the security 
or replacement of the British troops in 
the islands? 

A. We have supported resolutions in 
the United Nations and in the OAS 
[Organization of American States] which 
call for peaceful, negotiated solutions to 
problems, including that one, and that is 
our position. We hope that the parties 
can work at that issue themselves. 

Q. Can you tell us about the ses- 
sion this morning with the four Cen- 
tral American countries, what was said 
in this encounter? 

A. The meeting emerged sort of 
spontaneously during the reception last 
night as various people suggested it, and 
we got it organized. Of course, that's one 
of the benefits of occasions like this. 
People gather together, and you have a 
chance to meet and talk. 

As far as the content of the discus- 
sions is concerned, of course, it's up to 
each country to state its own viewpoint. 
I can state what I had to contribute in 
the meeting, which was, first of all, the 
great impression that was made on me 
by the visit to El Salvador, in particular 
the luncheon where I heard all six can- 
didates for president give eloquent sup- 
port to the democratic process. I must 
say, it plays into the situation here, and 
the progress of democracy in this region. 
I summarized for them the way in which 
the Administration is approaching the 
report of the bipai-tisan commission and 
our effort to encompass it together as a 
package, and the plans of the President 
to put this back into the process of put- 
ting that package over and getting con- 
gressional support for it. Of course, it is 
bipartisan in its composition, the commis- 
sion is, so we have good hope that it will 
materialize. Of course, in the process 
itself— the Contadora process— we are 
now in the stage of working groups that 
in a sense are seeking to transform the 
general principles of the 21 points into 
more operational matters, and all of the 
countries which took part in the 
breakfast meeting are involved in that. 
We discussed that subject and its impor- 
tance. 

Q. Does it disturb you, does it 
bother you the harder line adopted by 
Saudi Arabia? Do you think that this 
could erode the support that they have 
for the presence of Marine troops in 
Lebanon? 

A. I don't know what you're talking 
about. I've been busy all day and you 
have been scratching around. 



April 1984 



Q. What happened is that the 
Crown Prince spoke with a group 
yesterday and said that the United 
States and Israel ought to get out of 
Lebanon. He said that he didn't even 
know why they were there. It seems to 
me that this would erode the position, 
the posture of your government saying 
that they need to be there to pursue 
the credibility that they need to have 
with the moderate Arab governments. 

A. The United States is there at the 
expressed urgent invitation of the 
Government of Lebanon, and it stays 
there at the urgent request of the 
Government of Lebanon. I think it's im- 
portant to remind ourselves that thei-e is 
a legitimate Government of Lebanon pro- 
duced out of the parliament of Lebanon 
and it is that government that has asked 
for our support, and we have given it. 

As far as the attitudes of other coun- 
tries are concerned, in the region, of 
course, we've had many conversations 
with the heads of government in Saudi 
Arabia, .Jordan, Egypt, and so forth, and 
the uniform advice we get is that we 
should stay there. But we have no inten- 
tion of staying there forever. We're 
there to help achieve a purpose. We are 
there along with the forces of many 
other countries. And that purpose is to 
see emerge a Lebanon that has no 
foreign forces in it; no Israeli forces, not 
Syrian forces, not PLO [Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization] forces, not Iranian 
forces, not Libyan forces, and not forces 
from the MNF [multinational force]. 

Our objective is to create something 
in Lebanon that can be peaceful and 
stable, and I think that is what, from all 
the indications that I've heard, the Saudi 
Arabian Government wants too. 

So far as the Israeli forces are con- 
cerned, Israel is the one major country 
with forces in the region that has ex- 
plicitly agreed to withdraw totally. Now 
what is needed in Lebanon is an agree- 
ment for Syi'ia to withdraw as the 
Government of Lebanon has asked them 
to do. 

Q. The Contadora group has 
adopted principles that are against any 
military .solution. The bipartisan com- 
mission, however, has suggested that 
an increase in military aid be given to 
El Salvador and other countries. How 
can the United States say that it con- 
tinues to support Contadora? 



A. The Contadora 21 principles are 
comprehensive in scope just as the 
recommendations of the bipartisan 
Kissinger commission are comprehensive 
in scope. The big point in all of this is 
that there are a number of factors that 
have to operate together, and if one falls 
they all fall. There must be secui-ity; 
there must be economic development; 
there must be democi-acy and political 
conditions that are humane in the way 
people are treated, and access to a 
legitimate judicial sy.stem. Those are the 
things that are needed. If you take away 
the security shield in the face of the 
Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan aggression, an 
effort to upset the region, then you can't 
have economic development; you don't 
have the kind of political system that we 
are honoring here in Venzuela today; you 
substitute for it a totalitarian and 
repressive system. All of these things 
have to go together. 

Security is a necessary condition for 
the objectives we seek, but it is not a 
sufficient condition. We need the political 
conditions, we need the economic condi- 
tions that will lead to the kind of life that 
people want. We must have all of these 
together or else we do not achieve our 
objectives. 

Q. Returning to the question of the 
Falklands, what is your assessment of 
the suggestion made yesterday by 
President Alfonsin that a UN peace 
force may be sent to the islands as a 
guarantee for Argentina? 

A. Our position is as I stated it. We 
support a peaceful resolution of disputes 
of this kind, and we support a pi'ocess of 
negotiations involving the British and 
the Ai'gentines. As far as responses to 
the suggestions that one or the other 
makes, it is up to the other party to re- 
spond, we will be interested observers. 

Q. It is well known that the United 
States supports the efforts of 
Contadora in searching for peace and 
stability in Central America. Would 
your country agree with the idea of 
having the Contadora group monitor- 
ing the coming election in Nicaragua? 

A. First of all, of course, there are a 
lot of questions that need to be asked 
about the announced elections in 
Nicaragua. Under what conditions will 
they be held? Will there be the kind of 
structure that allows opposition political 
parties to operate? Will there be freedom 
of the press and access to the press by 
candidates so that their positions can be 
put before people? Will there be freedom 
to assemble and wall political parties be 
allowed to be formed and to assemble 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



people and talk to them and urge their 
support and so on? There are a whole set 
of questions about the structure of any 
election which are being struggled with 
in other countries. 

And, of course, then there is the con- 
duct of the election itself, an assurance 
that the election is fair, that the people 
who ought to vote have the ability to do 
so and that the votes are counted prop- 
erly and accounted for in the proper 
manner. 

Whether the Contadora group as 
such is a reasonable sponsoring agency 
for all of these activities would be a 
question mark; there are others that 
have done it. But the important thing is 
that if there has to be an electoral proc- 
ess that it be observed not only at the 
moment when people vote but also all 
the preliminary aspects of it which make 
an election really mean something. An 
election just as an election doesn't 
necessarily mean anything. There are 
elections held in the Soviet Union, and 
all they mean is that the idea of an elec- 
tion is so powerful that even though they 
don't respect it as a process, they feel 
they have to use it. I think that is the 
nature of the whole process that needs 
observation, not just the moment of 
voting. 

Q. Don't you think that the deci- 
sion of the United Kingdom to fortify 
the Falklands/Malvinas might cause a 
danger to all of Latin America, all of 
South America, because the Soviet 
Union might decide to respond by 
building a base in Africa, on the 
African coast, for example? 

A. There is a dispute between the 
United Kingdom and Argentina about 
the Falklands. Our position is that this is 
the sort of dispute that should be settled 
as others, by peaceful means, and we 
supported the UN and OAS resolutions 
to encourage that. You can ask me that 
question in any way you want, and I will 
give you the same answer. 

Q. There are reports in Washington 
today, both from the Defense Depart- 
ment and the Hill, saying that you are 
the principal stumbling block in get- 
ting the Marines out of Lebanon. 
Would you like to comment on this? 

A. The principal stumbling block in 
getting the Marines out of Lebanon are 
those people who seek to make it diffi- 
cult to create stability in Lebanon, to im- 
plement the broader governmental ar- 
rangements that President Gemayel 
seeks, who do not agree to withdraw 
their forces and thereby thwart the idea 
of a sovereign Lebanon free of foreign 



forces. It is that fact that those things 
haven't emerged that keeps the Marines 
in Lebanon, that keeps the multinational 
force in Lebanon, and we want to see 
progress toward those ends. We are 
there at the invitation of the Govern- 
ment of Lebanon to help bring that kind 
of stability, and it's the opponents of the 
stability that are the reason why the 
MNF continues to be there and con- 
tinues to seek that mission. 

Q. Commander Daniel Ortega got 
some big headlines yesterday saying 
that besides the formal recommenda- 
tions in the report, that privately the 
Kissinger commission had recom- 
mended an invasion of Nicaragrua and 
of El Salvador by the United States in 
order to protect its interests in Central 
America. 

A. I have been at all the meetings 
that the commisioners have had with the 
President; they must have been well 
publicized. The allegation must be a fig- 
ment of his imagination. At the same 
time, there is a very important message 
there. In order to keep conjuring up that 
image, Mr. Ortega and his colleagues 
must be worried, and if I were them, I 
would be worried too. After all they are 
the people who betrayed their revolu- 
tion. They are the people who have 
harassed the church and the Pope. They 
are the people who declared an amnesty 
and then found that they had to see Mis- 
quito Indians leave, being harassed as 
they left. They are the people who have 
suppressed the press. They are the 
people who have built up an armed force 
that goes far beyond anything that 
anyone could conceivably think is needed 
for their own defense and internal secu 
rity. So they have a lot to apologize for 
and, as I say, as they look at what they 
have done and compare it, let's say, 
with what is being celebrated here in 
Venezuela, it's no wonder they're wor- 
ried. Thev should be. 



REMARKS, 
BRASILIA, 
FEB. 6. 19843 

We complete today the task assigned to 
us just over 1 year ago by our 
Presidents to explore ways of expanding 
our cooperation. We have done so by 
working on five areas of great impor- 
tance to both countries— economic issues, 
nuclear energy, science and technology, 
space, and industrial/militarj' activities. 



These areas are of great interest in 
part because they contain issues that 
have troubled our relations for some 
time. Seeking an understanding on issues 
that were, in some instances, a source of 
persistent misunderstanding was not an 
easy task. The mission we were assigned 
was an ambitious one. It could have been 
conceived only by leaders of vision who 
would not allow themselves to be 
discouraged by pessimists recalling 
divergent interests and old grievances. 

You and I, as cochairmen, accepted 
this responsibility and launched the proc- 
ess after careful preparation. We both 
put able people to work. We encouraged 
their efforts. In some cases, we made 
hard decisions in order to ensure their 
progress. Now that we have concluded 
our work, I believe we can be proud of 
our accomplishments. 

First, the economic group: Here our 
delegations approached their subject 
with differing perspectives; one with the 
perspective of a developing country, the 
other with the perspective of an in- 
dustrialized country. But both sides 
recognized the seriousness of the world 
economic situation. In vei-y frank and 
direct discussions, they succeeded in nar- 
rowing the differences and expanding 
the areas of agreement. They agreed 
that: 

• Protectionism is harmful to both 
countries and to the entii-e trading 
world; 

• We should seek to expand trade in 
both dii'ections; and 

• We must strive to reduce inflation 
and interest rates and to strengthen in- 
ternational financial institutions. 

Our positions on a number of 
economic issues still do not coincide. We 
have learned, however, that our views 
are less far apart than at first they 
seemed. Having set a framework and 
having acknowledged the importance of 
harmonizing our views, we should con- 
tinue to work together in a determined 
effort to resolve our differences. 

Second, the nuclear working group 
found new possibilities for cooperation in 
nuclear energy. Our experts found a 
means to eliminate the longstanding fric- 
tion surrounding the resupply of fuel for 
ANGRA 1 and agreed on a procedure to 
rework defective fuel elements that had 
been stored for some years in Brazil. 
They also enumerated several projects of 
mutual interest on which Brazilian and 
American experts could work together. 
Most importantly, the discussion im- 
proved our understanding of each other's 



22 



jT^BUHmjumimmnimni 



THE SECRETARY 



nuclear objectives. The personal relations 
established in the process and the joint 
efforts to be undertaken will lead to a 
major increase in contacts during the 
coming months. 

Third, the industrial/military group 
reached an understanding that creates a 
basis for greater cooperation between 
our industrial sectors. This understand- 
ing will facilitate the inter-governmental 
consideration of technology transfers 
and, thereby, facilitate the binational 
programs. 

Fourth, the working group on science 
and technology negotiated a new agree- 
ment that will: 

• E.xpand private sector industrial 
cooperation in research and development; 

• Strengthen cooperation between 
government agencies in agriculture, 
health, oceanography, natural resources, 
basic sciences, environment, engineering, 
and industrial technology; and 

• Lead to the creation of a bilateral 
commission to oversee a general expan- 
sion of science and technology coopera- 
tion between the United States and 
Brazil. 

Fifth, and finally, the space group 
outlined a program for practical activities 
vital to modern life— weather forecasting, 
remote sensing, and atmospheric science. 
A Brazilian payload specialist is expected 
to perform experiments with Brazilian 
equipment aboard our space shuttle 
before the end of the decade. The hope 
President Reagan expressed during his 
visit 14 months ago will be realized. 

With the work accomplished so far, 
we believe the way has been opened to 
move rapidly from a broad policy of 
cooperation to specific projects of benefit 
to both countries. We could foresee, for 
example, technical cooperation in 
oceanographic exploration, including 
deep ocean drilling. Brazil last fall 
became a consultative party to the 
Antarctic Treaty, and we are looking for- 
ward to cooperative research in the 
Antarctic. The United States and Brazil 
are currently defining the terms of 
reference for cooperation in mapping, 
charting, and geodesy. We are also in- 
terested in joint energy technology 
research, particularly in coal gasification. 

The industrial/military understanding 
opens new fields for joint endeavor. 
Where it will lead depends on the in- 
genuity of those in our two governments 
and in our private sectors who have long 
wanted to explore possibilities of 
cooperation. 



April 1984 



In trade and finance, we are working 
closely to harmonize and expand our 
relations. Because the United States is 
already the largest market for Brazilian 
exports, I am convinced that Brazil will 
expand its sales to the United States, 
particularly now that our economy is 
again steadily expanding. Similarly, we 
e.xpect that tj.S. exports to Brazil will 
also begin to expand once more. Trade 
must flow in both directions if it is to 
have a firm basis. 

In finance, we and many others are 
cooperating to support Brazil's efforts to 
overcome its short-term liquidity crisis. 
Considering the good judgment and 
responsible attitudes I have seen from 
everyone concerned, I am confident that 
Brazil will find a satisfactory solution to 
its financial difficulty. 

We all can take satisfaction in the 
completion of our task. The ac- 
complishments of the working groups 
will serve both countries. More impor- 
tant, for the longer term, we have 
proved that President Figueiredo was 
right when he said in 1982 that our coun- 
tries, though at different positions in the 
international order, can engage in con- 
structive dialogue. The United States 
and Brazil, he correctly judged, know 
how to take into account each other's 
situation, realistically harmonizing their 
respective interests and objectives. 

I congratulate everyone who par- 
ticipated in the working groups and hope 
their spirit and skill will help us all to 
build on the ground they have broken. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
ST. GEORGE'S, 
FEB. 7, 1984^ 

I'd like to express my appreciation to the 
Governor General and the chairman of 
the Advisory Council and members for 
what they are doing and the quick effort 
they are making to rearrange the situa- 
tion here in Grenada and to move this 
country forward in a democratic manner 
and give it a chance for economic vitality 
and the kind of progress that this lovely 
setting certainly deserves. I felt it a 
privilege to meet with them and hear 
their comments, not only about what 
they plan to do but about their ex- 
periences, particularly the Governor 
General went through in his own ordeal 
in bringing the situation to its present 
spot. He expresses, as others did, great 
appreciation to the United States, to the 
President, and they did so with elo- 
quence and great sincerity and meaning. 
But I had to say for my part that I ap- 
preciated very much all that they have 
done and are doing. 

Q. Can you tell us what discussion 
you've had regarding the feasibility of 
making the airport here of a greater 
degree of implement role of the United 
States? 

A. The question of completion of the 
airport is very much on everyone's mind 
and it was discussed everywhere I went. 
The situation is that a study team has 



In Brasilia, the Secretary held discussions 
with President Joao Figueiredo. 




23 



THE SECRETARY 



been here and has evaluated what needs 
to be done and its costs and the potential 
of it. That report is now cii-culating in 
the Office of Management and Budget 
and the White House. It was done under 
AID direction, and we expect we would 
come to a conclusion about it. I must say, 
from my own standpoint having landed 
there and looked around a little, it's cer- 
tainly a facility that is needed here in 
one way or another and I'm sure it will 
be completed. 

Q. Thirty-six Americans have been 
evacuated from Beirut. Do you expect 
to evacuate any more Americans? 

A. Dependents have left— almost all 
left. I think the problem is not so much 
their— certainly isn't at all —concern 
about risk to them but I think in the at- 
mosphere in Lebanon right now, wath 
the tactics of terror against individuals 
that the presence of dependents just of- 
fered the opportunity for hostages, and 
we felt it was an opportunity we just 
didn't want to [inaudible]. 

Q. Will there be any more evacua- 
tions? 

A. No. That has taken place for the 
reason that I described. 

Q. What would your thinking be 
about a Caribbean and East Caribbean 
security force, a collective security 
force? Would Grenada be a member or 
should it? 

A. Grenada, of course, has been a 
member of the East Caribbean group 
that formed their own treaty organiza- 
tion into which we responded, so I 
presume that Grenada would be a part of 
whatever emerges. It is, I think, clear 
that it's difficult for a small island, 
smaller than Grenada, to form their own 
security force, and so it makes sense that 
what you can't do alone perhaps you can 
do on a collective basis. But precisely 
what the details of that should be and 
how it should work is primarily up to the 
people of this region. Certainly the 
United States will be a very interested 
part of the discussion, and we want to be 
helpful. 

Q. How much money has the 
United States [inaudible] in Grenada? 

A. I don't have a number off the top 
of my head on that. If you spoke of it 
comprehensively, you would have to in- 
clude the cost of the rescue operation 
and then the funds that have gone into 
immediate aid, and then there are some 
substantial funds that are uncommitted 
at this point. But it will be [inaudible] I 




In Grenada Secretary Shultz is .shown the Point Salines airport by U.S. Ambassador 
Charles A. Gillespie, Jr. 



guess. I don't have a number in my head 
but it certainly is in the many millions of 
dollars. 

Q. Will the United States maintain 
a military presence here after the elec- 
tions are held? 

A. All the combat forces of the 
United States have long since left and 
the number of U.S. personnel is down to 
280 on the ground. "Then thei-e is a Coast 
Guard contingent adding another 100—75 
to 100— and they are on the ground but 
they are in the vicinity, if you can catch 
them or not. But that's the number that 
are here. Their primary mission is to 
help maintain security conditions on the 
island. Our desire is not to stay here in 
that posture. The sooner we can be 
replaced by people from other islands 
nearby or from other countries or as 
time goes on by Grenadians trained in 
police-type work, the better. And we 
want to see that take place as promptly 
as possible. I don't have an estimate on 
when that would be. 

Q. The same Marine unit that 
landed in north Grenada and came 
south is the same that's in Beirut. Do 
you see our projection of an American 
force, for instance this Marine unit, as 
foreign policy tools that can be used in 
the future such as President Reagan 
[inaudible]? 

A. The Marines, any particular unit 
of Marines, have a special experience like 
this one did, but I don't think that 
should single out this unit as something 



special. All Marines are special, including 
the unit you mentioned. 

Certainly the question of the use of 
force is something that must be con- 
sidered always very carefully. The 
armed forces mission, primarily, is a mis- 
sion of deterrence, and that is the 
primai-y effort we make. I do think that 
there are a great many situations likely 
around the world where the situation is 
rather ambiguous as to who the good 
guys are and who the bad guys are, 
where we have considerable interests 
and where military capability as well as 
diplomacy both have potential roles and 
where the interests of our country can 
be served if we are able to sustain a 
coordinated effort. And I think it's one of 
the questions we have to ask ourselves— 
whether or not it's possible, not in large- 
scale situations but in very particular 
rather ambiguous situations, if we know 
how to play a role. And the Marines, of 
course, are among the units that would 
be useful in that regard, but they would 
not be the only ones by any means in the 
armed forces. 

Q. Did the Grenadian leadership of- 
fer you any assurance concerning an 
election timetable? 

A. They want to have elections as 
soon as it's possible to have them on a 
sensible basis. The process is going for- 
ward in a very impressive way. A com- 
missioner has been named. There will 
shortly be a process identified for regis- 
tration. The registration activity itself 
will be getting going probably in March, 



*of' 



24 



i.l.».U..».HH,.«..».«....— 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



as I understand it. Of course, the process 
of registration then tends to bring for- 
ward political activity and, as the Gover- 
nor General said, he hopes that an elec- 
tion—or he stated flatly that an election 
would be held before the end of the yeai-. 
Precisely when that would be, I think he 
feels and I would share that view, he 
doesn't want to set an exact date until 
he sees how the processes that are in 
motion are going. But it's very clear that 
he is dedicated to putting a democratic 
government in place as soon as possible. 

Q. Did you get an exact date as to 
when the American troops will be pull- 
ing out? And during the meeting which 
you had today, was there any request 
from Grenada to you for additional 
security and how that security be car- 
ried out? 

A. There are no American troops 
here in a combat sense. They have all 
been withdrawn long since. I think in the 
middle of December, they were all 
withdrawn. What remains are a rela- 
tively small number which are here 
on request to help maintain security con- 
ditions, and I said in response to the 
previous question 1 don't have a date to 
state as to when they will leave. It 
depends on when adequate replacements 
can be put in place. 

Q. Many Grenadians are concerned 
about the status of Bernard Coard and 
other alleged people implicated. Have 
you had any discussion with officials 
here about what happens to them? 

A. The Governor Genei-al brought up 
the subject of detainees and wishes to 
see that as soon as possible there are 
none who are detained without charges. 
There is a process under way to see that 
information is developed properly that 
bears upon the potential charges against 
those who are being detained. And the 
Governor General's desire, as he ex- 
pressed it to me, is to have this process 
be completed as soon as possible and at 
the time to conduct it in an orderly and 
careful way and that's what's going for- 
ward. 

Q. [Inaudible] week ago last Mon- 
day the decision to keep the troops un- 
til elections [inaudible]. 

A. The discussion we had about 
security— obviously it's necessary in any 
organized community to have a way of 
keeping law and order. That's the first 
role of government and the sooner it can 
be taken over by the Grenadians 
themselves the better. 



As far as the United States is con- 
cerned, as soon as somebody else can 
assume this burden the closer to 
Grenada the better— we'll be pleased 
with that. We didn't discuss a date, or I 
wasn't asked to make a commitment that 
our current forces would stay until the 
elections. It was more in terms of a com- 
mon agi'eement that security is impor- 
tant, and in one way or the other it will 
be maintained. 

Q. Grenada is a subject that a lot 
of Americans read about and saw it on 
television, yourself included. How does 
it differ in reality from what you 
imagined? 

A. It's nicer; it's really a lovely place. 
I suppose physically, the terrain is more 
rugged than I imagined. But, of course, I 
have only seen a portion of it. But it cer- 
tainly is a lovely piece of real estate. 

Q. The full study says [inaudible] 
certainly is needed here. This seems to 
conflict with the President in his "star 
wars" speech accusing the airport of 
having no needs other than as a 
military base. 

A. I think what you referred to as 
the "star wars" speech dealt with a dif- 
ferent subject. But he did make a speech 
in which the airport was shown. The 
question is not about an airport of this 
sort; it's a que.stion of what it is to be 
used for. And the President's statement 
in the speech was that this airport was 
being built for purposes of a military 
base and a militai-y operation. 
I think that we must all agree that when 
you look at what was captured here and 
the tremendous volume of armaments 
and uniforms and so forth, it was clear 
that wasn't designed for protecting the 
security of Grenada. It was designed to 
carry on aggressive action— that which 
seems to me vindicates what the Presi- 
dent said. Now the regime here is dif- 
ferent. And there is no aggressive intent 
involved. The airport is needed for the 
purpose of having the kind of airplanes 
that could carry tourists and others to 
places like this and land— they can't land 
at the other airport. So it's needed for 
that pui-po.se. As I understand it, the 
idea of the airport goes way back foi- this 
purpose. 

Q. What's the security threat at the 
moment you were talking about? 

A. The security problem is the same 
kind of problem we have in Washington 
or New York or anywhere else. An 
orderly society has to have means of 
maintaining law and order. So you have 
to have a police force and an ability to 



see that orderly conrlitions are main- 
tained. I think it's just as simple as that. 
I don't know of any concern that there 
are people in the hills or what not that 
ai'e going to attack the island or any no- 
tion of an invasion or something of that 
kind, although to the e.xtent that 
anybody might worry about that, I sup- 
pose that's one of the functions of our 
Coast Guard. 

Q. What are the plans of the 
United States for security in the whole 
Caribbean area? 

A. Our plans are to discuss this issue 
with the people who live here, and since 
we're neighbors and we have been in- 
volved, obviou.sly, in this particular 
operation, we'll be very interested par- 
ticipants in that discussion. I believe that 
secui'ity, obviously, has a military dimen- 
sion to it. But deep down security has to 
do with the political condition under 
which people live— whether they're free, 
whether they're able to express 
themselves and live a life that they want 
to, and whether or not they're able to 
realize the opportunities and abilities 
that they have. Political conditions and 
economic conditions are essential 
elements in security as well as what im- 
mediately comes to mind— namely the 
military side of it. 



LUNCHEON TOAST, 
BRH)GETOWN, 
FEB. 8, 19845 

The spirit and the content of our 
meeting this morning should ring 
throughout the hemisphere. Democracy 
and the rule of law, economic develop- 
ment and well-being for our countries 
and peoples, security and a shield 
against aggression— these objectives 
were our agenda. They are very much 
the agenda throughout the Americas. 

I came here to address these issues 
in a spirit of partnership. I found 
strength, leadership, and hope. I found 
you to be genuine partners, as you were 
in our joint rescue mission for Grenada. 

Good partners make good neighbors. 
President Reagan is determined that the 
United States will be a good partner 
here in the Caribbean and in every part 
of this hemisphere. 

Each of our countries is unique, but 
there is a powerful sense in which our 
problems are common and their solu- 
tions related. We all must coordinate 
our actions and help each other if we are 
to make progress. 



THE SECRETARY 



Today is the culmination of a trip 
that took me to Central and South 
America and now to the Caribbean. Dur- 
ing the last 8 days, I have met with 
political leaders and businessmen, with 
journalists and military men, and with 
all of our ambassadors to Central and 
South America. 

I would like to share with you some 
reflections on where the hemisphere 
stands today and what lies ahead. 

Democracy 

My first thought goes to the importance 
of democracy. Two years ago, address- 
ing the Organization of American States 
to announce the Caribbean Basin Ini- 
tiative, President Reagan said that if 
they work together: 

. . . our many nations can live in peace, 
each with its own customs and language and 
culture but sharing a love for freedom and a 
determination to resist outside ideologies that 
would take us back to colonialism. 

I want to emphasize the President's 
last phrase: "sharing a love for freedom 
and a determination to resist outside 
ideologies that would take us back to 
colonialism." If there is one thing that 
all the nations of the hemisphere have in 
common, it is that every single country 
in this hemisphere was at one time a 
colony. When Latin Americans fought 
for independence in the 19th century, 
the United States, remembering its own 
revolution, felt a sense of solidarity with 
them. And as the island nations of the 
Caribbean have earned their independ- 
ence over this past generation, that 
solidarity has been renewed. 

We have learned that independence 
does not automatically bring democracy 
and freedom in its wake. Our own na- 
tion, like many others in the Americas, 
tolerated slavery for almost a century. 
But we also know that a society that 
guarantees all its citizens equality under 
the law, civil rights, social justice, and 
human dignity can fulfill the promise of 
national independence. 

We can take pride in the fact that 
today more than 90% of all the people of 
this New World live under democracies 
or under regimes in transition to 
democracy. The recent elections in 
Argentina were a dramatic reconfirma- 
tion of this general trend. 

Yet the job of building democracy is 
not finished. We must strengthen 
freedom, expand economic well-being, 
and defend ourselves against the new 
colonialism of communism. I tell you 
now that the success of the democratic 
enterprise in this hemisphere is not a 



26 
BHIiilililiiiiiiliieiBiiiiayill 



matter of indifference to the United 
States. Democracy is at once the founda- 
tion and the objective of our coopera- 
tion. 

All of us in this room share the bond 
of democratic solidarity. We all live it. 
And we all know that without democ- 
racy, our cooperation in Grenada, and all 
that it means for regional security, 
would have lacked the popular support it 
receives in each of our countries. 

Nor is democracy's appeal limited to 
those who already have it. It remains 
the standard even when the struggle for 
it is most arduous. In El Salvador last 
week, I found that the yearning of de- 
cent people for democracy is strong and 
their spirit unbroken. I found a country 
and a government that want democracy 
and are committed to achieving it. The 
candidates for the presidency of El 
Salvador all told me how they have been 
campaigning throughout the country and 
working to achieve the fullest and 
widest participation possible. 

The United States supports open 
elections without reservation. We want 
in Central America what we want 
here— peace guaranteed by democracy. 
We want to see every citizen free to par- 
ticipate in the political life of his or her 
country, without fear, threat, or in- 
timidation. 

In support of this principle, the 
Government of El Salvador, before the 
1982 Constituent Assembly elections, of- 
fered automatic legal registration to the 
political parties associated with the 
guerrillas. Before scheduling next 
month's presidential elections, the 
Government of El Salvador renewed the 
offer to discuss with the political front 
of the different guerrilla groups the 
terms and conditions of their participa- 
tion. 

Will the Salvadoran guerrillas and 
Nicaragua's comandantes finally stop 
their violence and submit to the verdict 
of the people? Will the comandantes 
abandon the menacing military buildup 
that threatens both Nicaraguans and 
their neighbors? Will they be as bold as 
El Salvador and place the decision of 
who is to govern genuinely in the hands 
of the people? Will they cast off the 
cynical alliances that have injected the 
East-West conflict into the region? 

To ensure peace and economic prog- 
ress. Central America needs democracy. 
What happened last fall here in the 
eastern Caribbean is telling. In Grenada, 
a system comparable to Nicaragua's 
ultimately proved so unstable and so 
divisive that it led to the murder of the 
Prime Minister by a military faction 
loyal to the Deputy Prime Minister. 



Both factions were antidemocratic; both 
sought power without legal limit or 
popular consent. Enamored of power 
and blinded by the illusions of a false 
revolution and false alliances, the New 
JEWEL Movement imposed an alien dic- 
tatorship. 

It is in everyone's interest that this 
not happen in Nicaragua. It is in 
Nicaragua's own interest to keep the 
pledges made to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in 1979 and to 
give practical force to the 21 substantive 
objectives they agreed to negotiate in 
the Contadora process. 

The history of Venezuela, a founder 
of Contadora, confirms that Central 
America can build democracy. Venezuela 
forged its democracy in a long and 
courageous struggle against extremists 
of both right and left. Throughout the 
1960s, Venezuela held elections while 
under assault by armed guerrillas sup- 
ported by Cuba. But Venezuelans were 
not intimidated. Just as they had thrown 
off dictatorship, they resisted Cuban 
subversion. They elected a succession of 
democratic leaders and made Venezuela 
a leader of democracy throughout the 
Americas. 

We in the United States support 
every nation in the hemisphere that 
struggles for freedom. And we are confi- 
dent that, as in Venezuela yesterday and 
Argentina today, those who work for 
democracy will prevail— in Grenada, in 
El Salvador, in Nicaragua, and 
throughout the hemisphere. 

Economic Development 

My second set of observations concerns 
economic development. The enemies of 
democracy often point to underdevelop- 
ment and economic hardship as argu- 
ments to justify violence and dictator- 
ship. But they've got it backward. 
Violence destroys development. And ex- 
perience around the world teaches that 
totalitarian solutions are bankrupt- 
economically as well as morally. It is the 
democratic and open societies that are 
the success stories of the developing 
world. 

The challenges of development are 
formidable. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
hemisphere's developing countries grew 
faster than either the United States or 
Europe. Important gains were regis- 
tered despite rapid population growth. 
Today, however, the recession has hit 
most countries in the hemisphere very 
hard. It has made debt service an 
onerous burden. And in just a few years 
it has begun to eat away many of the 
social gains of decades of growth. 



Department of State Bulletin' 



THE SECRETARY 



In my discussions of economic 
issues, I found both concern and 
realism— concern that economic ad- 
justments will have serious social conse- 
quences and that no country can sustain 
austerity indefinitely; realism that ad- 
justments are, nevertheless, unavoidable 
and that policies must be economically 
sound. 

Increased investment in productivity 
is a need that everyone— from govern- 
ments to bankers— must keep in mind. 
Equity investment is a good counter- 
balance to debt in meeting the overall 
capital aeeds of growth. 

The United States is committed to 
helping to manage the debt crisis effec- 
tively and equitably. And we are confi- 
dent that the global economic recovery, 
now clearly underway, will help carry 
many countries out of their current dif- 
ficulties. The continued openness of 
the U.S. market— in spite of trade 
deficits— is contributing importantly to 
stability abroad. The strong recovery 
now apparent in the United States will 
provide additional strength to our 
neighbors. 

The Caribbean Basin Initiative gives 
us all fresh tools and opportunities to at- 
tack the problems of development. The 
Central America Democracy, Peace, and 
Development Initiative should signifi- 
cantly increase the resources available in 
defense of development in Central 
America, where it is now most acutely 
threatened. And together we must show 
similar imagination and realism in pur- 
suit of development here in the eastern 
Caribbean. Democratic solidarity means 
we cannot be indifferent to the economic 
problems of our neighbors. The United 
States will be a good partner. 

Collective Security 

Economic progress depends on an en- 
vironment of security and confidence. 
This brings me to a third set of reflec- 
tions—on the need for collective 
security. 

The enemies of democracy and 
development are the same throughout 
the hemisphere. They are the violent ex- 
tremes—the violent left, subservient to 
Cuba and international totalitarianism, 
and the violent right, with its futile 
resistance to modern progress. The far 
left depends on outside arms, training, 
and propaganda; the far right depends 
on secrecy, intimidation, and abuse of 
power. 

The National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America underscored its con- 
viction that indigenous revolution is no 
threat to the United States. The threat 



from Cuba and the Soviet Union is the 
perversion of revolution, a betrayal of 
democracy that is rooted in intimidation 
and force. We have nothing to fear from 
honest political or economic competition, 
least of all from Cuba or the Soviet 
Union. But, as Grenada demonstrated, 
we must defend ourselves against the 
organized violence of communism, which 
preaches pluralism for others while im- 
posing a single party state and censor- 
ship at home. 

In building our defenses, we must all 
take care to strengthen democracy and 
to minimize any diversion of resources 
from development. We must all nego- 
tiate differences and show mutual 
restraint. But we must also maintain 
professional security forces that are 
capable of protecting our peoples and 
the rule of law from the enemies of 
democracy. And we must all see to it 
that our cooperation in behalf of collec- 
tive security is adjusted to fit our 
respective needs and capabilities. 

Our Commitment 

Yesterday, I had the pleasure of joining 
in the celebration of the 10th anniver- 
sary of Grenada's independence. My 
talks with the Governor General and 
members of the interim government, 
and the memorable and moving welcome 
we received from ordinary citizens, 
made clear that the changes that have 
come about since our joint action are 
widely and enthusiastically supported. 
We owe it to the people of Grenada to 
follow through: to help them to turn 
their hopes for democracy and freedom 
into a lasting reality. 

In Grenada and throughout the 
hemisphere, the United States wants to 
be a good partner. We want our 
assistance to foster self-reliance, not a 
new dependence. We will help, not im- 
pose solutions. 

Once again, the key is democracy. 
Foreign Minister Guerreiro of Brazil 
rightly pointed out this week that 
"Democratic principles do not require 
the imposition of a standard uniformity 
or unanimity." As he said, what they do 
require is mutual respect and solidarity. 

On the political front, we must con- 
tinue to nurture the habits and pro- 
cedures of democracy. Democracy in- 
creasingly describes the present. We 
must perfect and protect it so that it 
will endure. The National Endowment 
for Democracy, recently established in 
the United States, provides a new 
means for strengthening solidarity 
among democratic forces in the 
hemisphere. 



In economic matters, we must all 
keep our markets open. Freedom of 
economic choice and enterprise are 
natural regulators and natural liberators 
of talent, ability, and progress. And we 
must persevere in our cooperation for 
development. We in the United States 
must ensure that our assistance matches 
real needs and that once we undertake 
policies for the long term, we carry 
through without interruptions or neglect. 

Above all, we must together main- 
tain our resolve in the defense of 
democracy. The vocation of this 
hemisphere is to prove that the New 
World can produce a unique civilization 
based on peace, freedom, and justice. It 
is this vision that unites us. Our solidari- 
ty can make it a reality for all the 
peoples of the Americas. 



'Press release 32 of Feb. 6, 1984, 

^Press release 33 of Feb. 6. 

^Pre-ss release 37 of Feb. 15. 

■•Press release 40 of Feb. 8. 

^Made at a luncheon attended by the 
leaders of Barbados, Jamaica, and the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(press release 49 of Feb. 17). ■ 



April 1984 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary's Interview on 

"This Week With David Brinkley" 



Secretary Schidtz was interviewed on 
ABC-TVs "This Week With David 
Brinkley" on Jarmary 22, 198J,, by 
David Brinkley and Sam Dofialdson, 
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC 
Neivs Analyst.^ 

Q. You heard Mr. Brzezinski 
[Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national 
security adviser to President Carter], a 
minute ago, say in his opinion the 
Russians didn't really want any 
substantial arms agreement. Do you 
agree with that? 

A. It all depends on what area of 
discussion you're talking about. We have 
pretty good discussions going on now on 
the "hotline;" that's a form of arms 
agreement. Mr. Gromyko, when I met 
with him in Stockholm, suggested that 
we resume the discussions of the MBFR 
[mutual and balanced force reductions], 
that is, the troop level discussions in 
Vienna— conventional forces. We resume 
on March 16th, and we have examined 
that from our standpoint. We've let them 
know that we think that date for 
resumption is agreeable. 

The conference we both attended in 
Stockholm is a kind of arms control con- 
ference and that's going on. The con- 
ference in Geneva on chemical weapons 
is taking place. They made a proposal 
which we don't think is a very good pro- 
posal, but nevertheless we responded to 
it. We have some further things to say. 

In the field of nuclear arms, they 
have declined to set a date for resump- 
tion of the strategic arms talks and have 
said they have left the intermediate- 
range talks. It depends on what kind of 
arms control you're talking about. 

Q. The answer then is yes and no, I 
gather? 

A. I think that's the answer kind of 
across the board. There are some 
positive things; there are some negative 
things. It's kind of a mixed picture. 

Q. There's a rumor going around 
that the Reagan .Administration is so 
eager to get some kind of arms control 
agreement that it's going to retreat 
from a position held by other Ad- 
ministrations with regard to the 
MBFR talks, that is, an insistence on 
data on manpower deployments from 
the Soviet Union before manpower 
agreements, new levels, are agreed 
upon. 



.\nd people say it is particularly 
necessary, because we now have all 
this evidence of Soviet cheating. Man- 
power agreements are very hard to 
verify. And right now, we say the 
Soviet Union has 220,000 more forces 
than the Soviet Union admits. Are you 
going to insist on data prior to a man- 
power agreement? 

A. How we will conduct those 
negotiations, of course, will emerge in 
Vienna. But I would say that the key in 
that negotiation, as in the othei'S, is ade- 
quate measures to verify that what is 
undertaken actually does take place. I 
think that the most important thing in all 
of these agreements is reasonably ac- 
curate verification, and that vvoukl be a 
key. Obviously, linked to that is the 
question of an ability to determine how 
many forces there actually are; that is, 
data. 

Q. You seemed to surprise a lot of 
people, including those in the Ad- 
ministration, with your proposal in 
Stockholm about a worldwide ban on 
chemical weapons. .\nd a number of 
people in this .Administration seem to 
feel that's about as hard to verify as 
anything. How would you begin to 
verify that? 

A. There are certain things that you 
can verify and certain things that are dif- 
ficult. You can verify whether or not 
known stockpiles of chemical weapons 
are abolished. You can do a certain 
amount of verification of theii- movement 
around and so on. 

There are verification measures that 
can be taken. Insofar as chemical 
weapons are concerned, I think, number 
one, the regional approach that the 
Soviet Union proposed— a Europe-free 
chemical weapons zone— in effect, doesn't 
meet the test because chemical weapons 
are easily moved. 

Second, verification is hard and is a 
key, as I said before, and there's a cer- 
tain amount that can be done. 

Q. The Administration's theory 
about the INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] and perhaps the START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] talks 
all along has been that this country 
needed to build up its strength and 
needed to deploy along the two-track 
system that N.\TO agreed on, the 
Pershing and the cruise missiles. .And 



when we did that, the Soviets would 
understand that they needed to deal 
with us seriously. They would reach 
agreements with us that were 
equitable. 

Is that still your theory, and, if so, 
when will the Soviets come back to the 
table? 

A. No, the theory of the alliance was 
different. 

Q. I mean the Reagan .Administra- 
tion's theory about building up our 
defenses. 

A. There was a decision made in 1979 
by the North Atlantic alliance, and the 
Reagan Administration has basically pur- 
sued that decision. The observation, first 
of all, was that the Soviets were deploy- 
ing inteiTnediate-range missiles aimed at 
Europe in great numbers and then 
subsequently intermediate-range missiles 
aimed at China and Japan and elsewhere. 

So the alliance said, "We can't just 
sit here and have that happen. We have 
to provide ourselves with an adequate 
deterrent capability." We set out to do 
that, but while we're doing that, we 
should do everjlhing we can to negotiate 
an acceptable equal level in these. A 
negotiation was started, having that in 
mind. As it turned out, it wasn't 
possible— at least hasn't been so far— to 
arrive at any conclusion. 

But the theory wasn't to do 
something in order to get an agreement. 
The theory always has to be that you 
have to equip yourself with a deterrent 
capability to look after your interests, 
and no doubt it's true that if you do that, 
you're more likely to get a reasonable 
agreement than if you don't. 

Q. I muddied the water by bringing 
in the two-track system. Let me ask 
my question directly in terms of Presi- 
dent Reagan's theory about rearming 
America. He said in a speech just the 
other day— 

A. It's not a theory, it's an objective. 

Q. All right, he said the other day 
that we've done it. Now we are 
prepared— I paraphrase but I think ac- 
curately—now we are in the position 
and prepared to deal with the Soviet 
Union from the standpoint of arms 
reductions. Do you feel you are and 
will the Soviets come back to the 
table? -And if so, when? 

A. We feel we're in a much better 
position now than we were a few years 
ago. We have confirmed and have on 
track all the major weapons systems that 
have been set out, and there's a much 
better feel in the whole defense 



28 



■HHHHBH 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



establishment and bipartisan support for 
it, even though there ai'e lots of 
arguments about the level of the budget. 
That's a much stronger position from 
which to talk than one in which there is 
a great deal of uncertainty about our 
defense capabilities and world power. 

Q. Will the Soviets come back to 
the table and, if so, when? 

A. I pointed out that they are at the 
table along a number of fronts, and they 
are not at the table on the nuclear arms 
talk. 

Q. May I just press for an answer 
and if you care not to answer, I will 
accept that; will they come back to the 
INF and START negotiations and. if 
so, when? 

A. I don't know whether they'll come 
back or not. That's something that they 
have to determine. We can take care of 
our position, and our position is to be 
realistic about what they're doing, to be 
strong in our own capabilities, and to be 
ready to engage in a reasonable negotia- 
tion. And that's what we can control. 

Q. But why do we care? The SALT 
process— the strategic arms proc- 
ess—began about 15 years ago at a 
time when the strategic balance was in 
the U.S. favor. In the intervening 15 
years, the Soviet Union has deployed 
7,000 more modern warheads, and 
there's a general agreement, particu- 
larly in your Administration, that the 
strategic balance has shifted against 
us. After 15 years of this, punctuated 
by the documentation of the cheating, 
why do we care so much about arms 
control talks? 

A. It's a subject that we should pur- 
sue, and it's something from which we 
can attain some constructive results. But 
I think the lesson that is brought out by 
the comments you made— both the addi- 
tions to their arsenal and the problems of 
adhering to agreements— is that you do 
have to have clear and, I think, rela- 
tively simple agreements. You have to 
have strong measures for verification, 
and you can't put your ultimate depend- 
ence on arms control. You have to put 
your ultimate dependence on your own 
ability to take care of yourself. 

Q. I would like to ask you a ques- 
tion that weighs heavily on the minds 
of the American people and, 
understandably so, the fear of nuclear 
war. During the political campaign, 
which we are already in, there will be 
a great deal of discussion about the 
cold war, the colder relations with the 



Soviet Union, which will be frighten- 
ing to people. What would be your 
response to that? You're not running 
for office, I understand, but if you 
were, what would you say about it? 

A. Just what President Reagan .said 
the other day in his address; that 
because we are strong we are safer. And 
because we are strong, we're bettei- able 
to try to work out reasonable agree- 
ments with the other side. And because 
we're strong, we're able to be 
reasonable. All of these things add uj) to 
a situation from which, I think, the 
American people should take some heart. 

Q. In your view, the threat of 
nuclear war is diminished? 

A. Yes, I think so. I think that deter- 
i-ent strength diminishes the temptation 
of somebody to use their strength 
against you. 

Q. Another way that foreign policy 
is entering the campaign with regard 
to Lebanon, do you think it was a 
mistake in the summer of 1982 for us 
to encourage, to put it politely, the 
Israelis to stop before, as some people 
say, the Israelis finished the job, chas- 
ing the Syrians out of Lebanon? 

A. The situation was that you had 
the city of Beirut being shelled. You had 
a tremendous number of civilians- 
Lebanese— being killed. And I think that 
situation in Lebanon, in Beirut, cried out 
for help and the United States was able 
to provide some heljD in that situation. 
For that matter, Israel did stop its offen- 
sive in Lebanon. 

You remember that the original an- 
nouncement of the Israelis was that they 
were going in, which they did, against 
our advice, as I understand it. I was not 
around at the time. But they would only 
go in so far. However, they just kept 
right on going and nobody knew quite 
where they were going to wind up. 

Q. This weekend, Walid Jumblatt, 
the Druze leader, said that he will not 
accept Amin Gemayel as the President 
of Lebanon, that he must go. What 
does that do to the possibility of a suc- 
cessful peace settlement there? 

A. He traveled to Moscow, he came 
back to Syria, and he made a statement 
calling for the resignation of President 
Gemayel. I think you put those things 
together and you see where he's coming 
from. President Gemayel was put there 
by the legitimate process in Lebanon of 
election through a Parliament, and he 
represents the legitimate government 
there. I think that the efforts that he's 
making and that we would like to see 



others participate in to broaden the base 
of that government are an important ele- 
ment in this picture. 

Q. Are we going to support 
Gemayel all the way down the line? Is 
our allegiance to Gemayel, or is our 
allegiance to a process which may turn 
up someone else? 

A. Our allegiance is to the legitimate 
Government of Lebanon, produced by a 
process that's been there. We have 
counselled with him about the broaden- 
ing of the ba.se of his government, which 
he would like to do. That process would 
make Lebanon a more governable place. 

Q. Is Jumblatt speaking with 
Syrian acquiescence? Does this tell us 
something about the Syrian interven- 
tion here? 

A. He spoke from Damascus after 
returning from Moscow, so it looks as 
though those well-known influences on 
him are having an impact. This is their 
progi-am and no doubt his as well. 

Q. As you know, there is a rising, 
not to say, feverish course of demand 
in Congress, elsewhere, from both par- 
ties, in fact, that it's time to take the 
Marines out of Lebanon. What is your 
view on that? 

A. There is a chorus to some extent, 
and certainly you can read about it in the 
papers every day. It was interesting to 
me to see Senators Tower and Warner, 
who went to the Middle East, as they 
said, skeptical. And they came back con- 
vinced that it was very important for the 
United States to continue to resolve and 
to maintain its presence in Lebanon and 
in the Middle East. There may be some 
swing in the pendulum coming in the 
other direction. It remains to be seen. 

Q. The Syrians have every reason 
to believe that the United States, 
however, won't be hard to outwait in 
this regard. What incentive— 

A. They've said that quite a lot. In 
fact, [Syrian Foreign Minister] Khaddam 
has said to our negotiators, "The United 
States is short of breath. You can always 
wait them out." And he remembers some 
of our earlier times. 

Q. Is it part of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's plan to show that we're 
not short of breath, and does that 
mean leaving them in for a long time 
just to show that? 

A. It's important to show the world 
that we have resolve. But we also have 
to pay attention primarily to our objec- 
tives there. And our objectives are to 
make what contribution we can mainly 



April 1984 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



through our diplomacy but also through 
the presence of our forces along with the 
forces of other countries for the emer- 
gence of a more stable and sovereign 
Lebanon. That's what we're there for. 

Q. On Friday, several Administra- 
tion officials pointed to the danger of a 
kamikaze-type attack on our forces- 
planes run by, maybe, Iranian-trained 
pilots. Islamic fundamentalists, the 
terrorist groups. And at least one 
senior official suggested we might be 
considering— if we see that attack just 
about to take place— making a preemp- 
tive strike to safeguard our forces. Is 
that something we might do? 

A. Yes. I think we have to be very 
conscious of the rise of terrorism, not 
only in Lebanon but around the world. 
And the fact that it is increasingly evi- 
dent, that it has a base in a state, it isn't 
some random crazy group, it's something 
that's organized, systematic; people 
getting trained for it. And in the case of 
Lebanon, we see increasingly these 
things originating in Iran. We see them 
taking place, necessarily with the ac- 
quiescence of Syria. We see who this 
group is. There's Syria, there's Iran, 
there's Libya, and there's the Soviet 
Union. 

And I think the emergence of terror 
as a kind of weapon of war by states is 



something that we have to be very con- 
cerned about. An example in another 
part of the world was the North Korean 
assault on the South Koi-ean Government 
in a third country— in Rangoon— where 
they murdered a large portion of the 
South Korean Government. 

Q. Yes, but in that case, we asked 
South Korea to show some restraint 
from the standpoint of any precipitous 
strike military action. If we use our 
forces to make a preemptive strike on 
these terrorist bases to safeguard our 
forces, what will you say to people 
who say that we are involving our- 
selves to a deeper extent in the Middle 
Eastern war? 

A. It's not involving ourselves deeper 
in a Middle Eastern war to defend 
ourselves and our citizens against these 
tactics of terrorism. These tactics ai'e 
aimed at America generally. We had the 
tragic murder of the President of 
American University of Beijrut the other 
day, a person who literally has given his 
life to the betterment of the Middle 
East. It is going to individuals and it's 
going to organized governments. It in- 
volves not just us but others, and it's an 
attack on civilization. 



'Press release .31 of Feb. 4, 1984. 



Secretary's Interview on 

"The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
the Public Broadcasting System's "The 
MacNeil/Lehrer Neivs Hour" 
on Febrttary 23, 198i. by Charlene 
Hunter-Gait and Robert MacNeil.^ 

Q. Last night President Reagan 
said in his news conference that the 
Marines would still have a role to play 
in Lebanon, even though they were be- 
ing redeployed to the ships offshore. 
What exactly is that role? 

A. They are there— offshore— and 
they represent a continuing U.S. 
presence. They support our policy of try- 
ing to bring about, as best we can, the 
removal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon and the emergence of a 
sovereign Lebanon in charge of its own 
territory and with arrangements that en- 
sure the security of Israel's northern 
border. 



Q. How can they do that kind of 
support if they are confined to the 
ships and presumably not firing? 

A. They're not there to undertake a 
military mission, but they're there in the 
event that something happens that will 
make it desirable for them to be used in 
a manner such as they were used in the 
fii'st place. 

You remember that they came back 
in the second time— they went in the 
first time to provide the conditions under 
which the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] could be gotten out of 
Beirut. They accomplished that mission 
successfully, along with the other 
members of the multinational force. 

They came in the second time to pro- 
vide a division of the forces present and 
to set up conditions around Beirut for 
stability and protection around the Sabra 
and Shatila camps. What may happen in 
Lebanon, we don't know, but it may be 



that there will be a good purpose of that 
kind which the Marines will be called 
upon to serve. 

Q. The President did say specifi- 
cally that the Marines might go back 
into Beirut if the possibility of improv- 
ing their chances of fulfilling their 
mission were to reoccur. What specif- 
ically was he talking about in terms of 
the mission? 

A. He was basically just saying, as 
I've said here that there are a lot of dif- 
ferent possible things that may happen, 
and in order to be helpful you have to be 
Johnny-on-the-spot, and that's the Ma- 
rines' I'ole, I might say typically, I don't 
think people are aware of this, that we 
do have a deplojonent in the Mediterra- 
nean and the Marine amphibious unit 
that's there is deployed and has been for 
a long time around in the Mediterranean. 
It's now lying offshore Lebanon. 

Q. There tended to be, over a time, 
a lot of confusion about just what the 
mission there was. I mean, do you 
understand the reason for that confu- 
sion, and can you shed any light on 
that? 

A. The problem, I suppose, is that 
you have to start with a large pictui'e of 
our interests in the Middle East which 
are very great. These have tended to get 
focused, to a certain extent, on Lebanon 
in recent times, and the Marines are 
there to support our objectives in 
Lebanon. 

The anomaly occurs because we think 
of Marines as "gung-ho, bring in the 
Marines," and they have an offensive 
military mission, but that has not been 
their mission in this case. It's been a 
mission to help ensui'e stability and 
peace in that area, and it succeeded in 
very considerable part, although in re- 
cent months, with the rise of violence, 
they've been caught up in it, and we 
have found that a better place for them 
to be deployed is on ships. 

Q. You said yesterday, in testifying 
before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, that the situation in 
Lebanon was deteriorating. What do 
you think it would take at this point to 
rescue the country? 

A. The parties to the firing— and 
much of it is instigated by Syria— need to 
decide they've had enough, and let's 
have a cease-fire. We brought that about 
at one time, and there was a cease-fire 
for awhile, but it has erupted again. So 
first there needs to be a cease-fire. 

Second, there needs to be a broader 
Government of Lebanon. President 
Gemayel has been trying to bring that 



30 



Department of State Bulletin *pri 



THE SECRETARY 



about, and the various factions have been 
jockeying around and as yet have not 
been willing to join in that broader 
government. 

But, obviously, you want to broaden 
the base of that government and enable 
the government to take control and 
maintain law and order in the areas that 
aren't occupied. And then we want to 
get all of the foreign forces out and let 
Lebanon emerge as a sovereign state. 

Q. What's your assessment of the 
plan that the Saudis have proffered 
and that the Syrians reportedly have 
gone along with? I mean, do you think 
that this is something that can bring 
what you've just said about? 

A. That plan has a lot of change in it 
all the time. Every time we see it, it's a 
little different plan, and the Saudis are 
trying very hard to play a constructive 
role, and it may or may not emerge as 
something that is worthwhile. 

Q. One of the points of it, as I 
understand, involves abrogating the 
May 17 security treaty between 
Lebanon and Israel which the United 
States has supported. Would you be in 
favor of President Gemayel giving up 
that agreement in exchange for peace? 

A. That agreement is between Israel 
and Lebanon. We witnessed it. I helped 
to bring it about. I think it's a good 
agreement, and it provides for security 
arrangements on Israel's northern 
border. It provides for total Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon, and it opens 
the door to the possibility of some 
reasonable relationship between Israel 
and Lebanon. So I think it's a good 
agi-eement. But. of course, it belongs to 
Israel and Lebanon, and it's up to them 
to decide what they want to do with it. 

I would say only this: Those who a^:!- 
vocate the abrogation of that agreement 
must bear some responsibility for finding 
an alternative formula for bringing about 
Israeli withdrawal. 

Q. What sense of personal regret do 
you have about the turn of events in 
Lebanon? You've invested a lot time 
and energy in this situation. 

A. Everyone regrets the loss of life, 
the loss of American lives there— our 
Marines and others— and the loss of life 
of the Lebanese. So wherever you look 
in the world and you see that, you're 
sorry about it— I am, certainly. One of 
the great things, I think, about America 
is that when we see problems of that 
kind, we respond. And even if we find 
ourselves in a situation where the odds 
are not too good, we'll still try. And I 



April 1984 



think we can be proud as Americans that 
we've tried to bring about something 
better in Lebanon. 

Q. Your number two at the State 
Department. Kenneth Dam. speaking 
in the Far East today, said. "We've 
made a courageous effort, and simply 
because we've failed doesn't mean it 
wasn't worth the effort." Would you 
agree with that formulation of it? 

A. I wouldn't say that we've failed; 
we haven't succeeded, but the wheel is 
still turning, and we're there. Our 
diplomatic effort is represented by a 
very strong Ambassador, Reg 
Bartholomew, and we'll stay engaged in 
the process and do what we can to help 
bring about the sort of resnlt that we've 
sought all along. 

Q. Time magazine this week quotes 
a White House official, unnamed, as 
saying that George, meaning you, is 
ticked off at us, meaning the White 
House, because, for reasons of political 
expediency, they were more willing to 
see Gemayel abrogate or scuttle this 
agreement with Israel than you were. 
Do you have any comment on that? 

A. I'm always worried about anony- 
mous "theys" and the "White House." I 
used to work in the White House some 
years ago. I don't know how many hun- 
dreds of people work there. 

Q. But are you "ticked off? 

A. I work for the President, and if 
somebody tells me something the Presi- 
dent says, I respond to that. I've had 
many discussions about this with the 
President, and he and I see this matter 
exactly the same way. So that's the 
White House, as far as I'm concerned. 

Q. So you're not "ticked off? 

A. I think that that agreement is a 
good agreement, but it is up to the par- 
ties to decide what they want to do 
about it. There have been people who 
have a different point of view than I 
have, and we've had some arguments 
about it. but that's normal. In fact, I 
think it would be alarming if you had a 
government where people didn't have 
some diffei-ences of opinion. 

Q. It just seemed that there was a 
different emphasis last week. Early in 
the day President Reagan came out 
and said something like you're saying 
now, that there was agreement be- 
tween the two parties, and he seemed 
rather casually to accept the in- 
evitability of its being abrogated. And 
then a few hours later you made a 
statement at the State Department, 
making a very forceful U.S. defense 



and backing of the agreement. I just 
wonder why that difference of em- 
phasis within a few hours of each 
other? 

A. You have to look at the full ques- 
tion that the President was asked to .see 
the consistency of what we each said. 
And I might say that what I said was 
carefully written out and was reviewed 
by the President and cleared by the 
President. So I just didn't sound off on 
my own; I had the President's complete 
blessing on the words that I spoke. 

Q. He said last night in answer to a 
question at his news conference that 
he hoped you weren't considering leav- 
ing. Are you? 

A. No. 

Q. Why would he have to express a 
hope like that in public? Wouldn't he 
just know for sure that you weren't? 

A. He does know for sure, and I 
don't know where all of these rumors 
about my leaving came from. They had 
absolutely nothing to do with me and 
nothing to do with the President. Just 
the sort of thing that people tend to cook 
up around Washington, but there's ab- 
solutely nothing to it. 

Q. Are you going to stay on if 
there's a second term? 

A. I have to be invited by the Presi- 
dent before I can make any statement of 
that kind, but I came here to serve the 
President, I'm one of the President's 
guys, and I will be sticking with him. 
But I don't want to say anything now 
that in any way precludes or prejudices 
his ability to decide whatever he wants 
about who should be in this great post 
for a second term. 

Q. But if he asked you. would you 
be willing to stay on. or would you 
prefer to go and do something else? 

A. If I answered that question, I'd 
be putting him in a spot, so I think I'd 
just leave it that I'm here to serve the 
President and do what he wants me to 
do, and I'll just leave it at that. 

Q. Some commentators have sug- 
gested that because you invested so 
much time and your own prestige in 
helping Israel and Lebanon to negoti- 
ate the May 17 agreement, that it's a 
matter of personal pride to you not to 
see it abrogated. 

A. I did invest a lot of time in it, and 
so did others in our government. But we 
have to look upon it as a document of 
state, and it's something between Israel 
and Lebanon. I think it's a good agree- 



THE SECRETARY 



ment, independent of whether I had 
anything to do with it or not. and I hope 
that I'm grown up enough not to get 
myself all entangled in some sort of ego 
trip in something like that. 

Q. Back in October, on the 24th. 
you said, "If we are driven out of 
Lebanon, radical and rejectionist 
elements will have scored a major vic- 
tory." Do you see that now as a 
danger, to the extent that the United 
States has been driven back, if not out? 
Have those elements scored a major 
victory, and is that the direction of 
your anxiety about what may happen 
this evening? 

A. One of the major problems that 
we see in Lebanon is the emergence of 
state-sponsored terrorism, and I believe 
this is something that we must take very 
seriously in this country, and we really 
haven't faced up to it. 

We've had a number of deaths of our 
Marines and other personnel in Lebanon, 
but these have been dramatically punc- 
tuated by two tragic acts of massive ter- 
rorism. These are state- supported acts in 
which large numbers of Americans lost 
their lives, one in our Embassy and one 
in the Marine compound. 

This is a kind of warfare, really, that 
is something different for us. It's not 
enough, I don't believe, to defend 
yourself against this form of terrorism. 
We have to improve our intelligence 
capability, and we have to think through 
how, within the concept of the rule of 
law which we hold so deai", we can take 
a more aggressive posture toward what 
is a worldwide and very undesirable 
trend. 

It, of course, is not only the two big 
acts of terrorism that took place but the 
murder of the President of the American 
University of Beirut and many other 
acts. Fore.xample, much has been made 
about the fact that the Lebanese Armed 
Force has been having difficulty holding 
itself together, and I think under the cir- 
cumstances it's held together remarkably 
well. But here's the kind of thing that 
happens: An officer 2 days ago received 
a call from a terrorist saying. "If you 
don't leave the Lebanese armed force ^ 
within an hour, your son will be shot." 
The phone is hung up. An hour later he 
gets a call from a hospital. His son has 
been shot. That's terror, and people pay 
attention to it. 

This is one of the lessons that 
emerges out of Lebanon, and I think it's 
something we must think about very 
much harder than we ever have before. 



32 



Q. Can we turn for a few moments 
to events in Central America? I'd like 
to get your reaction to the Nicaraguan 
Government's announcement that they 
were going to hold elections a year 
earlier than planned— November 1984, 
in fact. 

A. They keep changing their minds 
about when they're going to hold an elec- 
tion, but I think elections are basically 
good if conducted in a proper way. There 
are lots of elections held in this world, 
such as those in the Soviet Union, that 
don't mean much, but elections in many 
countries do mean a great deal, and we 
favor that kind of a process. 

Q. How far does this announce- 
ment-at least that they're going to 
hold elections, and the announcement 
that they will be freeing up the press 
and liberalizing other things for the 
opposition— how far does that go in 
satisfying U.S. concerns about the 
direction of the Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment? 

A. The direction is fine, but the ex- 
tent to which they're going is certainly 
an open question whether there will be a 
genuine open press situation, whether 
competing candidates will have the time 
and opportunity to oi-ganize political par- 
ties and have the right of assembly, and 
have the right of open criticism of the 
government, and all of these things that 
are part of life as we know it in an open 
and democratic system. If those things 
happen, they'll be quite a long distance 
from this current situation in Nicaragua, 
and I think we'll be watching very 
carefully to see what does happen. 

Q. To the extent that these are 
among the things that the United 
States has said it wants to see in 
Nicaragua, I mean, would you ac- 
knowledge that there is some progress 
being made because of U.S. pressure? 

A. Whether it's because of U.S. 
pressure or not, I don't know. I think 
thei-e is. particularly in South America 
and in our hemisphere, a very strong 
trend toward democracy, and the 
Nicaraguans are feeling it. They're one 
of the few isolated places now that 
doesn't express a belief in democracy, 
Cuba being an outstanding other 
example. 

So they may be feeling that trend, 
but the actual conduct of a genuine elec- 
tion where opposition has a chance to 
organize and alternative candidates are 
put forward and the process is conducted 
in an orderly way and a fair way, they're 
a long way from that. 



Q. Are you encouraged at all about 
what they have said they're going to 
do? 

A. If they follow through on it. If the 
reality will follow the rhetoric, that's all 
a plus. 

Q. What would it take for the 
United States to stop aiding the anti- 
Sandinista insurgents, the Contras, 
waging a guerrilla campaign against 
the country from Honduras? 

A. Of course, the problem the 
Nicaraguan Government has is that 
there are a lot of Nicaraguans who don't 
like at all what they're doing. There are 
a lot of people who participated in the 
original Sandinista revolution back in 
1979 who have become very disen- 
chanted, and it's easy to see why that 
should be so. 

And so the problem of the 
Nicaraguan Government is not the 
United States; it's themselves and the 
conditions that they're creating that are 
leading people who have been 
Nicaraguans and are Nicaraguans to 
have the attitude that the Contras have. 

Q. So the United States will con- 
tinue to support the Contras until that 
point? 

A. I'm trying not to answer your 
question in a gentle way but to point out 
what the real thrust behind the Contras 
is. namely, theii- dissatisfaction with the 
way in which they're being treated by 
the Nicaraguan Govenmient. 

Q. Turning briefly to El Salvador, 
just a little while ago, all of the eight 
members of the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee voted to tie aid to E! 
Salvador to the country's progress on 
human rights which you have been op- 
posed to. What's your reaction to that 
move, and what do you think is wrong 
with that? 

A. I've never been opposed to that. I 
think that it's essential that we in our 
foreign policy generally, as well as in El 
Salvador, conduct our foreign policy in a 
manner as consistent as we can with the 
values that we hold as the tenets of our 
own society. That must include not only 
democracy" but the rule of law. proper 
judicial procedures, and in El Salvador 
doing something about the death squads. 

Actually, over the past 3 to 4 years, 
the number of killings has declined very, 
very sharply, but it's still not satisfac- 
tory because there are too many still go- 
ing on. And we have spoken about that 
very sharply, we have worked on that, 
and, as a matter of fact, even in recent 
months there's been some real progress. 



Department of State Bulletir 
wmmmmmrmm 



point II 

got to 

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THE SECRETARY 



The question isn't whether we are 
for or against that— we're all against that 
in this country; the question is, at a 
given moment of time, what's the most 
effective way to deal with it, and that's 
the only argument. 

Q. So are you saying that at this 
point in time the most effective way is 
not to tie aid to human rights prog- 
ress? 

A. I think it's a question of whether 
you want to tie it in the sense of putting 
down a certain set of dates periodically 
where a decision— a yes/no type deci- 
sion—is going to be made, or whether 
you want to certainly tie those two 
things together but provide for greater 
administrative flexibility in administering 
that concept. And I think that there are 
times when probably set dates work, and 
I think we've gotten some mileage out of 
that. 

But I do have a question on my mind 
about whether or not a different way of 
going about it wouldn't be more effec- 
tive. But in the end I think we are going 
to want to somehow work this around 
and come to agreement and decide what 
is the most effective way to implement 
what we all agree on. There's no dis- 
agreement about the importance of deal- 
ing with human rights problems. 

Q. How would you describe your 
optimism about the possibilities raised 
by having a new leadership in Moscow, 
the possibilities of improved relations? 

A. There's always some new 
possibilities posed by new leadership. I 
think basically we have to remember 
that the new leader has been part and 
parcel of the leadership of the Soviet 
Union for a considerable period, and so I 
think basically we can assume a certain 
measure of continuity. 

I think it's important for us to ex- 
amine our own posture which is that we 
need to be realistic all the time, don't kid 
yourself— that we have to keep saying 
that to ourselves, don't let the wish be 
the father to the thought here. We have 
to look to our strength— our military 
strength, our economic strength— our 
sense of purpose, reference to these 
human rights concerns that we talked 
about with respect to El Salvador, and 
we have to be ready to talk and 
negotiate. And if we can find reasonable 
agreements to make, to be ready to 
make them and work hard to do that. 

That is the posture of the President, 
and in the meetings the Vice President 
and Senator Baker and our Ambassador 
Hartman had with the new Soviet 
leadership, it seemed that they are ex- 



pressing a similar viewpoint. So now we 
have to roll up our sleeves and test out 
these intentions, and perhaps they feel 
the same way. If both sides are able to 
approach this in good faith, maybe we'll 
be able to accomplish something. It re- 
mains to be seen, however. 

Q. When you saw Foreign Minister 
Gromyko for 5 hours in Stockholm, it 
was reported that you were going to 
propose to him that some of the more 
difficult negotiations like arms control 
might be pursued in private and away 
from the glare of publicity and pur- 
sued, perhaps, across a broader range 
of issues including human rights. Did 
you, in fact, suggest that, and would 
that be the forum for testing out the 
new leadership? 

A. First of all, we always try to keep 
before the Soviet Union, in our discus- 
sions with them, our full agenda of 
things, which include arms control and 
which, of course, there are many aspects 
of that subject; which include regional 
issues such as Afghanistan, Central 
America, and other such places; which 
include bilateral problems; and which in- 
clude something that they don't like to 
discuss with us at all, namely, our con- 
cerns about human rights and human 
treatment in the Soviet Union. 

So all those things we have before 
us. We think that there is a role for very 
private discussions as well as the public 
negotiations that we see going on in 
Geneva and Vienna and Stockholm and 
other places. And they go on, and in the 
course of discussions between me and 
Mr. Gromyko, between our Ambassadors 
and respective Foreign Ministers, and in 
other ways. 

It certainly is true that the glare of 
publicity makes it difficult to work on 
some of these delicate issues, so we seek 
a way to remove that. 

Q. So are such talks going on now? 

A. You mentioned my talk with Mr. 
Gromyko. I see the Soviet Ambassador 
from time to time, our Ambassador sees 
Mr. Gromyko in Moscow, and we try to 
have a dialogue going. 

Q. How do you favor getting the 
Soviets back to the nuclear arms talks, 
in particular the ones on medium- or 
intermediate-range missiles in Europe? 

A. Those are talks in which we have 
put forward strong and good negotiating 
positions, both in the intermediate-range 
talks and in the strategic talks. And we 
are in a posture of readiness for give and 
take— 



Q. But is your posture just to wait? 

A. And I think that for you to say 
that because the Soviet Union walks 
away, we should change our position and 
offer them something to come back 
would be— that's poor negotiating 
posture. 

Q. So the United States is just go- 
ing to wait? 

A. We will continue to be in a posi- 
tion of ready for give and take and with 
reasonable positions on the table- 
remember, in the intermediate-range 
talks, the positions we've taken are not 
simply something that the United States 
thought up. We're negotiating on behalf 
of our allies, and the positions have been 
closely coordinated with them and have 
met the test of reasonableness of a lot of 
other countries. 

Q. I see. But you don't contemplate 
new initiatives at present to get them 
back to the talks? 

A. We think it's a very bad idea if 
somebody walks out of talks to say, "All 
right, we'll change our position in order 
to get you back." 



'Press release 52 of Feb. 24, 1984. 



INTERVIEW 



Under Secretary Eagleburger's 
Interview on "This Week 
With David Brinkley" 



Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Laivretice S. Eagleburger was inter- 
viewed on ABC-TV's "This Week With 
David Brinkley" on February 12, 198U, 
by David Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, 
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC 
News analyst. 

Q. Do you expect any real difference in 
Soviet- American relations as a result 
of the change in the Kremlin, whatever 
it turns out to be? 

A. Basically, I think no, particularly 
on the assumption that Chemenko is the 
chosen— 

Q. That's the story. 

A. —and I think we have to assume, 
on the basis of what we have now, that 
that's likely, although not certain. I don't 
think there's likely to be much change in 
U.S. -Soviet relationships. I think, 
frankly, and it's one point that I don't 
think was made adequately earlier in the 
program. We've seen evidence over the 
course of the last year that by and large 
the Soviet decisionmaking process has 
been in neutral, at best. We've had 
mi.xed signals from the Soviets for more 
than a year now, partly I think because 
Andropov was coming into power and 
then became sick. I don't think, for a 
while at least, that's Ukely to change. We 
are in another transition. 

Chernenko, if he is the man, is going 
to have to take some months to solidify 
his power. He comes, I think, from that 
part of the governing mechanism that is 
pretty cautious and conservative in 
terms of change. By and large we're go- 
ing to see a Soviet policy that is not 
much different from what we've seen 
over the last several years. And not very 
well articulated. 

Q. When you say "mixed signals," 
do you mean conflicting signals that 
suggested there was some confusion 
and di.sordcr there? 

A. I couldn't say it better. I think 
they have been confused and disorderly 
for most of 1983. I think at one point, we 
would get one set of signals that in- 
dicated perhaps some things could be 
done, and then very shortly thereafter 
there would be a hard move to the right, 
to the tougher answer. 

I think they have been confu.sed, and 
I think their leadership has been at sixes 



34 



and sevens with each other, and I sup- 
pose that's not unusual, given a new 
leader and then given the illness. 

Q. On the one hand, we're told a 
leader is not all that important 
because he is a part of a collective 
leadership group. If that is the case, 
why couldn't they get together and 
agree on what their policies are? 

A. I don't agree with the point that a 
leader doesn't make any difference. I 
think he makes some difference. I think 
in the Brezhnev era— when Brezhnev 
particularly was at his height of his 
powers— it was clear that Brezhnev made 
a difference. I think what we've seen 
thereafter is a much more collective 
leadership, but a collective leadership 
that does not always agree with itself 
And as a consequence, the signals have 
been mixed. 

Q. There's an obvious political in- 
centive for an American President in 
an election year to have a summit 
meeting, but this Administration has 
set a fairly exacting standard, the 
meaning of which I would like you to 
clarify. It is that the summit, in order 
to be held, must have a chance for 
serious, substantive success. Does that 
mean agreements, pieces of paper, 
arms control? What does that mean, 
substantively? 

A. I don't think it necessarily means 
that, although obviously that would be 
one way to define it. I should say that 
the position hasn't changed, and I don't 
think that there will be any change in 
the signals when the Vice President is in 
Moscow for the funeral. We are clear on 
where we are on a summit, and it hasn't 
changed. 

It doesn't necessarily mean 
agreements, although obviously that's 
one possible definition. What it does 
mean is that if they meet, we must e.v 
pect that when they finish with that 
meeting that some way or another there 
will have been some substantive result, 
the point being, it is not in our view sen- 
sible to have a summit if all you do is sit 
there and talk to each other. 

Q. What does the adjective 
"substantive" imply? Is a change in 
atmosphere substance enough? 



zamm 



A. No. Let me try to give you an ex- 
ample, and it's just pulled out of the air. 
For example, it might well be that the 
two could meet and talk about southern 
Africa, and if in the process they were 
able to come to some conclusions on how 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
ought to conduct themselves in the con- 
text of what's going on in southern 
Afi-ica, I suppose I would call that a 
substantive result, though nothing might 
be written down on a piece of paper. But 
talk for the sake of talk just does not 
seem to us to be sensible. 

Q. Is it correct that Vice President 
Bush has a mandate to feel out the 
Soviet leadership, or leader, if there is 
one by Tuesday, on this question of a 
summit? 

A. The basic answer to that question 
has to be no. He is going there to repre- 
sent the United States, to tell the Soviet 
Union that the policies that this Ad- 
ministration has espoused for .3 years 
continue in effect. Now I am not saying 
that the Vice President may not, in the 
course of conversations, talk about the 
possibilities of the leaders getting 
together, if it is possible to arrive at 
some substantive outcome. 

Q. You describe a situation in 
which you expect a period of pause as 
far as the Soviet ability to move for- 
ward. 

A. I would say a continuation of an 
inability to move forward. 

Q. .\11 right, but you said that if we 
have a new leader, he'll have to con- 
solidate his power. If it is a collective 
leadership that goes on for a period of 
months, you don't think there's going 
to be a way for the Soviets to move 
forward. So my question is this. Does 
it make sense for the United States to 
offer something at this point, say, in 
the deployment of missiles in Europe? 
We'll stop for a while until you can get 
your act together and then we'll go 
back to the conference table. 

A. Speaking for myself I think it 
makes no sense whatsoever. We have 
been, for more than a yeai', really coming 
to a culmination with the President's 
speech several weeks ago, we have laid 
out to the Soviet Union for some time a 
pi'ogram for trying to deal with the ma- 
jor issues that exist between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. That is still 
our program. We're ready to go back to 
the negotiating table on INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] and 
START [strategic arms reduction talks] 
tomorrow moming, if that's what they 
want, we're ready to move with those 
steps. To offer something now to the 

Department of State Bulletin 



INTERVIEW 



Soviet Union in addition to what we 
already have on the table I think simply 
gives Moscow the wTong signal. They 
know what we want. They know what 
we are prepared to do. I don't know 
why— 

Q. They are not in charge, ap- 
parently, to the extent that they can 
make a decision to move back from 
their position. 

A. It is an interesting fact that 
people can argue that since they are not 
in charge, we need to make more conces- 
sions. I don't understand that argument 
at all. 

Q. There is a rumor in this town 
that there is an open and active back 
channel in which we are proposing and 
receiving arms control proposals— 

A. It's not true. 

Q. Okay, flatly denied. 

A. Not true. 

Q. In view of the fact that the 
Soviet Union's foreign policy, for 
several years, has been a total failure, 
from their own standpoint— expansion 
into Afghanistan, Africa, trying to 
separate us from our European allies, 
all failed— do you see that they will 
persist in this, or might they not see, 
with a new leader, it's time to try 
something else? 

A. One has to hope that they will see 
that they need to try something else. 
Part of the problem I think is that 
bureaucracy is so ponderous, and in the 
absence of somebody who is clearly, 
forcefully in charge, it is so difficult to 
move it off paths that are sort of worn in 
the road, if you will, I think it is unlikely 
for some period of time that we will see 
major changes in one direction or the 
other. 

Therefore, I think it is also terribly 
important that the United States make 
clear where we stand, make clear that 
we are prepared to continue with 
negotiations and that we are trying to 
find solutions, but also don't get into this 
panic rushing toward offering new solu- 
tions to problems, because they won't 
work. 

Q. In a century of change and flux, 
one of the few constants is the purpose 
of the Soviet state and its foreign 
policy. You say at one point that the 
leaders have been at sixes and sevens. 
What are they disagreeing about? You 
say it takes a while for them to move 
out of a rut. What evidence do we have 
that they want to change? 

A. Again, I think there's a difference 
between the strategy, although even 
there I think the Soviets don't have 



April 1984 



much of a strategy, and the tactics. I 
think a lot of the debate has been, one, 
whether continuing to carry out foreign 
policy programs which have patently not 
worked, whether that doesn't mean that 
there needs to be some shifts and some 
changes, with some I suppose arguing 
that you need to be a little bit easier in 
your dealings with the United States. I 
think consistently when that argument 
has taken place in 1983, the hardliners 
have won the argument, but I think 
thei'e ai-e probably some who say, but 
we've got to shift, we've got to deal with 
the United States in a different way. I 
think those are where the arguments 
have been, not on the long-term objec- 
tive, no. 

Q. There was some discussion in 
Washington in the last day or two 
about whether the President. Mr. 
Reagan, should go to the funeral. It 
was decided he would not go. What 
was the thinking that went into that 
decision? 

A. Here again, I think, one, the rela- 
tionship with the Soviets and with Mr. 
Andropov over the course of the last 
year have not been particularly close. 
Two, the Vice President represented us 
at the last funeral. It was appropriate 
this time. For the President to go now 
would have implied all sorts of things in 
terms of the relationship with the Soviet 
Union that simply aren't true, and, 
therefore, it was thought by the Presi- 
dent best that he stay here. 

Q. It might also have seemed to 
have been politically motivated. 

A. Obviously that's going to be an 
issue any time this year at all. 

Q. Clear up a little bit of confusion 
on Lebanon. Is it correct that the 
Marines are coming out of Lebanon, 
going to be put on those ships within a 
month, except for a couple of hundred 
who will have garrison duty for the 
Embassy and Ambassador's residence? 

A. I wish I could clear up your confu- 
sion. The best I can say at this point is 
that we are consulting with our MNF 
[multinational force] partners. We are 
consulting with the Lebanese Govern- 
ment. We will try to move those Marines 
from the shore to the ships with all due 
and deliberate speed, but as quickly as 
we can. But I cannot at this point give 
you a specific timeframe. 

Q. There is no timetable? 

A. I'm not saying there isn't a 
timetable. I'm saying we're discussing 
this whole question with our allies and 
with the Lebanese, and until we finish 
those consultations I wouldn't want to go 
any further. 



Q. Is part of that discussion a 
discussion over whether we can put 
together a UN force? The Syrians have 
suggested, I believe, that perhaps they 
would now go for that. 

A. Part of the discussion is not about 
the question of a UN force, part of this 
consultation. That isn't to say that the 
question of a UN force isn't under con- 
sideration and I— 

Q. Is it under consideration? 

A. It is under consideration, has been 
for months, and I notice now that the 
Syrians are talking about perhaps a UN 
force would be possible. I have, myself, a 
problem with that, which is that basically 
I think you are going to find it difficult 
to get people, countries, to contribute to 
a UN force until there is a situation in 
Lebanon that is stabilized. These coun- 
tries are not going to want to put people 
into that maelstrom, to be shot at. When 
things have stabilized, I think that then 
you will find that it's possible to get con- 
tributors to a UN force, which doesn't go 
to the question about whether or not a 
UN force now might make sense. It's 
simply, I'm not sure you can put one 
together. 

Q. You mean the Scandinavians 
would not be eager to succeed us at the 
Beirut Airport? 

A. I think that's probably right. 

Q. Last Thursday, I believe, a week 
before, the President told the editors of 
The Wall Street Journal that the 
presence of our Marines in Lebanon 
was important for the survival of 
Lebanon, U.S. credibility, and the 
hope for peace in the Middle East. Six 
days later, the announcement is made 
that they are going to come out and be 
redeployed. When was that decision 
made? Was it made on Sunday, on 
Saturday? I mean, how close to the in- 
terview? 

A. First of all, I said the same thing 
to a House Foreign Affairs Committee 
hearing at about the same time. Without 
trying to get into the exact dates— when 
the President said what he said, and 
when I said what I said, decisions had 
not been made. 

But there's a more fundamental point 
here, I think, which is that we would 
argue strenuously that, as [Secretary of 
Defense] Cap Weinberger did earlier on 
your program, that we are redeploying 
those Marines from the land to the ships. 
They are not leaving Lebanon. So that 
our argument is that, under any cir- 
cumstances, we are putting them in a dif- 
ferent location, but they are still in 



35 



AFRICA 



Lebanon and the fleet is still there; 
therefore, we have not redeployed out of 
Lebanon. 

Q. On Saturday, the President said, 
in his radio address, he was not going 
to cut and run in Lebanon. 

A. So did I. 

Q. That's right, and your credibil- 
ity has been attacked by people on 
Capitol Hill, and I think one reason 
was that we were told— reports at the 
White House— that the decision was 
made in principle to remove the 
Marines, on February 1st. Was that an 
untrue— 

A. Don't hold me to the dates. I 
think the February 1st date is, in fact, 
quite wrong. But that, again, is not the 
point. 

Q. Then why were we told that? 
Simply to be misled into thinking that 
this was an orderly process that had 
been gone through? 

A. Why were you told what? 

Q. That the decision in principle 
had been made by the President on 
February 1st? 

A. The issue and the question of how 
we might redeploy was looked at for a 
fairly long period of time. There is no 
argument about that at all. Decisions 
were made after the President had made 
his statements. But I come back to say- 
ing again, you can't redefine for us what 
we consider to be presence in Lebanon, 
and on those ships is still presence in 
Lebanon. It is not cutting and running. 

Q. How far do the ships have to go 
from Lebanon to be not in Lebanon? 

A. I can't answer that question. They 
are off the shore in Lebanon. They are 
where the Marines could be put back in 
a short period of time and where the 
New Jersey and a lot of other ships can 
fire as they have been doing. 

Q. Why continue to fire at Syria 
and Syria-occupied positions when, in 
fact, Syria is one of the major players 
necessary to put together a government 
in Lebanon? 

A. Until the Syrians change the en- 
tire way in which they have approached 
the issue of Lebanon, they are going to 
have to be dealt with when they fire at 
us or threaten our people in Beirut. 
We're going to fire back. We've made 
that clear, and I don't know why 
everybody is so surprised about that. 

Q. We got a statement— just came 
in a minute ago from Dama.scus— from 
the Syrian Foreign Minister that 
Syria's patience is not unlimited. Does 



U.S., Angola, South 
Africa Discuss Peace 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
FEB. 16. 1984' 

On February 16, 1984, delegations of the 
People's Republic of Angola, the 
Republic of South Africa, and the United 
States of America met in Lusaka to 
discuss steps to further the process of 
peace in southern Africa. The Angolan 
delegation was headed by Minister of In- 
terior Alexandre Rodriguez, the South 
Afi-ican delegation was headed by 
Minister of Foreign Affairs R.F. Botha, 
and the American delegation was led by 
Assistant Secretary of State [for African 
Affaii-s] Chester A. Crocker. Responding 
to President Kaunda's assessment that a 
historic opportunity now exists to make 
progress, the conference achieved the 
following results: 

• Creation of a joint South 
African/ Angolan commission to monitor 
the disengagement process in southern 
Angola and to detect, investigate, and 
report any alleged violations of the com- 
mitments of the parties; 

• The first meeting of the joint com- 
mission took place in Lusaka on 
February 16. Further meetings will be 
held in other mutually agreed locations 



at the convenience of the parties; 

• It was agreed that a small number 
of American representatives would par- 
ticipate in the activities of the joint com- 
mission at the i-equest of the parties. The 
delegations agreed that the task of the 
joint commission in the weeks ahead is to 
facilitate the successful completion of the 
disengagement process and to establish 
an effective cessation of hostilities. The 
delegations are aware of the many com- 
plex and unresolved issues which must 
still be addressed in the search for solu- 
tions to the problems of the region. They 
agi-ee, however, that the Lusaka meeting 
constitutes an important and construc- 
tive step toward the peaceful resolution 
of the problems of the region, including 
the question of the implementation of 
UN Secui'ity Council Resolution 435. 

The participants express their deep 
appreciation to President Kaunda and 
the Government and people of Zambia 
and for the generous hospitality and ex- 
cellent arrangements provided in connec- 
tion with the conference. 



'Released in Lusaka and made available 
to news con-espondents by acting Department 
spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 



that frighten, startle, or upset you in 
any way? 

A. Mr. Khaddam is noted for his 
statements, I guess, but the basic point, 
I think, is that the Syrians have been, 
are now, and I suspect will continue to 
be for some period of time the basic 
problem with finding a solution to the 
tragedy of Lebanon. I don't much care 
whether his patience is close to ex- 
hausted or not; it is largely irrelevant. 
They have been acting like a bull in a 
china closet for some weeks now, and I 
don't think this changes anything. 

Q. One solution to the tragedy of 
Lebanon is to get rid of Lebanon. That 
is, granted that the President— 

A. The Lebanese might not like that. 

Q. They might not. but the Presi- 
dent says the Syrians are bent on ter- 
ritorial conquest. A principle of 
American policy, not just in the Middle 
East but everywhere, has been the in- 
tegrity of exi.sting states. 

Given the fact that Syria has an 
awful lot of Lebanon, that possession 
of nine-tenths of ownership, that they 



claim all of Lebanon to begin with for 
greater Syria, are you ruling out flatly 
American acceptance of the partition 
of Lebanon? 

A. I am not in a position to rule it in 
or out. I, myself, believe that if you look 
at U.S. policy with regard to Lebanon 
over the course of the last months, we 
have made it clear that our objective and 
certainly our desire is a Lebanon that is 
free. I can't say that we're going to ac- 
cept a partition of Lebanon. Clearly, our 
statements and our policy has been in 
another direction. 

I also have to say that, you know, 
there is a certain degi-ee to which we can 
control events and obviously there is a 
limit beyond which we cannot. I don't 
know what's going to happen. I can 
simply say we're not for a partitioned 
Lebanon. 

Q. What do we have to control 
events besides the guns of the fleet? 

A. Basically we have the guns of the 
fleet. We have, hopefully, the ability 
still-although I agree with you that 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



chances are slimmer— the ability of 
Gemayel to put together a broader based 
government, and we have obviously the 
Israelis sitting there. They are not irrele- 
vant to this question. And one has to 
hope that as Mr. Assad and his rather 
mouthy Foreign Minister look to the 
future, they may recognize that Syria's 
longer term interests require some sort 
of accommodation. 

Q. What is the Israeli relevance? 
They've been irrelevant so far— 20 
kilometers away from our Marines, 
and of no particular relevance. 

A. I don't think it's true that they 
have been iri-elevant. I think the Syrians 
do not consider them irrelevant. The way 
in which the Israelis act and now will 
react to events in Lebanon I think is 
something the Syrians clearly have to 
take account of. 

Q. Do you anticipate that President 
Gemayel will not abrogate the May 
17th agreement with Israel, the 
withdrawal agreement, and would we 
support an abrogation of it? 

A. The U.S. ixisition with regard to 
the May 17th agi'eement is clear: We 
helped arrive at that agreement; we sup- 
port that agreement. I suppose that if 
the Lebanese and the Israelis themselves 
indicate a desire to change that agree- 
ment or in some way to deal with it, we 
are not going to stand in the way of it. 
But on the other hand, as far as we are 
concerned, we have said it time and 
again, that May 17th agreement is 
something we are associated with and 
we're not going to walk away from it. 

Q. The Israelis say they don't want 
it abrogated. But that leaves President 
Gemayel twisting in the wind, doesn't 
it? 

A. I don't know that it leaves Presi- 
dent Gemayel twisting in the wind for 
several reasons. The first of which is the 
May 17th agi'eement as far as the 
Syrians are concerned is in my judgment 
a phony. And if there were no May 17th 
agreement, Mr. Assad and Mr. Khaddam 
would be looking for some other excuse. 
Right now they're using the May 17th 
agreement. What we need to remember 
is that that May 17th agi'eement was an 
attempt between Israel and Lebanon to 
arrive at a settlement. And the Syrian 
objection to May 17 is clearly that no 
Arab state ought to sign an agreement 
with Israel. Now one has to ask oneself 
whether that is sensible from an 
American point of view, and I happen to 
think not. ■ 



Recent Situation in the Philippines 



by John C. Monjo 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on East Asia and the Pacific of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee 07i 
February 7, 198Jt. Mr. Monjo is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to address today the situa- 
tion in the Philippines and the state of 
U.S. -Philippine relations. I intend to 
cover today developments since my last 
appearance before the committee in 
September not long after the tragic 
assassination of former Senator Benigno 
S. Aquino. I shall speak of political, 
financial, and economic developments, in- 
cluding the assassination investigation 
and preparations for the May 1984 
parliamentary election. I shall touch on 
U.S. policies in the wake of these 
developments. My presentation will also 
address the major areas of interest the 
committee indicated in its letter of invita- 
tion. 

Political Developments Since 
the Aquino Assassination 

Since my earlier appearance before you, 
there has been a series of important 
developments which have invigorated the 
Philippine political scene. Appreciable 
progress has been made. However, there 
is still some way to go, and it is still far 
from certain that the opposition will par- 
ticipate in the May parliamentary elec- 
tion. 

Perhaps the most striking political 
development in the Philippines following 
the Aquino assassination is the entrance 
into active politics of organized groups of 
businessmen and professionals. They 
have engaged in dialogue with Pi-esident 
Marcos personally and with New Society 
Movement (KBL) party leaders, they 
deal with the opposition, and they speak 
out on the issues. They organize peaceful 
demonstrations. Some have helped to 
oi'ganize and launch a new new^spaper, 
Veritas, with ties to the Catholic Church. 

These newly politicized groups have 
spearheaded attempts to resolve political 
problems through the give and take of 
negotiations involving the government, 
the opposition, and representatives of 
the private sector. The negotiations seem 
to be going on at several different levels 
simultaneously and are aimed primarily 
at clarifying the ground rules for the 



May 1984 parliamentary election. In- 
evitably, this involves the parametei's 
governing participation in the election by 
the moderate political opposition, as well 
as the political strategies of both the 
government and the opposition. 

The negotiations began last year with 
a backdrop of peaceful, frequent, well- 
organized, and well-attended demonstra- 
tions in urban areas, primarily in Manila, 
which called for orderly political change 
in the wake of the Aquino assassination. 
The government has also shown 
restraint and generally refrained from 
using force to deal with the demonstra- 
tions. To their great credit, all parties to 
the political debate have avoided 
violence, which they rightly recognize 
would further disrupt the prospects for 
restoring political and economic stability. 
The Catholic Church, in paiticular, has 
stressed the need for national reconcilia- 
tion among the various conflicting 
groups. The steady drumbeat of street 
politics Philippine-style, with its 
manifestations of political humor and 
yellow confetti, subsided during the holi- 
day season but picked up again just last 
week with a very large and peaceful 
demonstration in Manila led by Senator 
Aquino's brother, Agapito. 

Another indication of change in the 
aftermath of the assassination is in the 
sphere of press freedom. A significant 
expansion in the limits of press freedom 
has occurred since September with the 
proliferation of press organs carrying 
sharp criticism of government policy and 
generally more balanced treatment of 
issues in the major dailies. Some e.x- 
am])les: Malaya, an opposition sister 
publication of the closed down We 
Forum, now has a larger circulation na- 
tionwide than We Forum ever did. 
Business Day provides independent 
coverage and critical commentary to a 
nationwide readership, as does the 
newest newspaper, Veritas. 

Meanwhile, although the communist 
New People's Army (NPA) insurgency 
continues its steady growth in various 
pai'ts of the country, as it has for several 
years, we do not view the NPA as a 
serious, near-term political threat, nor do 
the events ensuing from the Aquino 
assassination appear in themselves to 
have bolstered support for the com- 
munist movement in the Philippines. 

The Marcos government has re- 
sponded positively to several of the im- 
portant demands of the opposition and 
the middle class business community. 



April 1984 



37 



EAST ASIA 



Some of these decisions were made after 
vigorous intense debate within the KBL 
party and after initial opposition on the 
pai-t of President Marcos. These include: 

• A new presidential succession 
mechanism which in any future election 
will restore the vice presidency; 

• Province-based elections for parlia- 
ment; 

• Agi-eement to conduct a new voter 
registration nationwide; and 

• Suspension until June 1 of the issu- 
ance of preventive detention orders, 
which permit an-est without warrant and 
allow persons to be held without bail un- 
til the President orders release. 

The government has agi-eed in prin- 
ciple to several other measures, including 
appointments of additional members to 
the Election Commission upon the 
recommendation of various gi-oups, 
electoral code amendments, abolition of 
bloc voting, allowing individuals to 
change party affiliation, and accreditation 
of political parties. 

These conciliatory moves, which 
responded to public pressure, have 
helped to defuse the tense political at- 
mosphere in Manila in recent months. In 
particular, the new presidential succes- 
sion mechanism, while it did not please 
everyone, served to remove the issue 
from" active contention, at least for the 
time being, with apparent benefits for 
the political stability of the country as 
well. 

The opposition's demands for political 
reform are more far-reaching, however. 
As a condition for their agi-eement to 
participate in the parliamentary election, 
leaders of key moderate opposition 
groups, including some who earlier were 
advocating participation, as well as those 
advocating boycott, have asked President 
Marcos to repeal all the presidential 
decrees which bestow on the Philippine 
President martial law-type powers. They 
demand the outright repeal of the Presi- 
dent's authority to legislate by decree, 
restoration of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus, repeal of all other decrees 
dealing with national security, and agree- 
ment to several other measures. The op- 
position leaders have stated that, if these 
demands are not met by February 14, 
the opposition will actively boycott the 
election. 

In sum. we are, therefore, in a 
delicate period of negotiation involving 
the government, the opposition, and the 
newly politicized business leaders. 



Aquino Assassination 
Investigation 

The Agrava board of inquiry into the 
Aquino assassination appears from all in- 
dications to be proceeding conscien- 
tiously and expeditiously with its inquiry 
and seems committed to pursuing the 
evidence wherever it leads. As a result, 
its reputation among Filipinos has stead- 
ily improved since its composition was 
announced in October 1983, and it now 
appears to enjoy considerable public 
credibility. The ultimate test will come, 
of course, when the board completes its 
hearing and reports its findings simul- 
taneously to the Philippine Government 
and the "public. This is not likely to hap- 
pen for some time. 

The United States is on record as ex- 
pecting the Philippine Government to act 
swiftly and vigorously to track down 
Senator Aquino's murderers. We are, 
therefore, following the progi-ess of the 
inquiry with gi-eat interest. 

Economic Developments 

While there have been positive 
developments in the political arena since 
last I appeared before you. the economic 
situation has seriously deteriorated. 

As a result of the political unrest 
following the Aquino assassination, 
plus the growing signs that the Philip- 
pine balance-of-payments deficit would 
greatly exceed government estimates, 
trade "financing by foreign banks began 
to evaporate in the third quarter of 1983. 
Fiscal and balance-of-payments problems 
had been aggi-avated during all of 1982 
and 1983 by low commodity prices for 
Philippine "exports, high interest rates on 
external borrowing, slowed export 
growth, depressed domestic demand, and 
reduced private investment activity. 
The situation grew more acute in 
October, when the Philippines was 
forced further to devalue the peso, de- 
clared a moratorium on payments of 
private debt principal, and later sought 
rescheduling of all foreign debt. Devalua- 
tion placed upward pressure on prices at 
home, and inflation climbed to double 
digit levels at the end of 1983. Inputs are 
down sharply, factories are closing or 
laying off workers. Total outstanding 
foreign debt as of mid-October 1983 was 
$24.6 billion. 

The Philippine Government clearly 
faces foi-midable problems, but other 
countries are facing and dealing suc- 
cessfully with problems of a similar 
nature. The first order of business will 
be to conclude the lengthy discussions 



between the Intei-national Monetary 
Fund and the Government of the Philip- 
pines for a standby agi'eement. This 
agreement and the foreign debt resched- 
uling it should make possible will likely 
entail certain painful, but necessai-y, 
austerity measures that are not politi- 
cally welcome anywhere. However, once 
the standby is in place, debt reschedul- 
ing can proceed, and that will open up 
the possibility for access to new foreign 
commercial and government financing 
that will be needed to reinvigorate the 
economy. In the short terni, however, 
present" economic hardships and rismg 
unemplojTnent figui'es are hkely to 
become major issues during the election 
campaign. 

Close Bilateral Relationship 

Because the ties between the United 
States and the Philippines are long and 
deep, it is vital that we underline at the 
outset the need for a policy that looks to 
the longer term in our relationship. Our 
bilateral ties today rest on the founda- 
tion of shared history, common suffering 
during wai", close people-to-people ties, a 
solid record of cooperation in economic 
development, and healthy trade and in- 
vestment. Our close security partnership, 
manifested in the existence of U.S. 
military facilities at Clark and Subic and 
our Mutual Defense Treaty, is another 
ingredient in the relationship. Our in- 
terests, shared over the years by suc- 
cessive Administrations in Washington 
and Manila, have taken on a new impor- 
tance in the 1980's, particularly in view 
of the Soviet buildup in the South China 
Sea and Vietnam. 

Over the past years, our security ties 
with the Philippines have been excellent. 
This is the principal reason we concluded 
the review of our Military Bases Agree- 
ment so rapidly and amicably last spring. 
It behooves us to preserve the quality of 
these ties with an old ally. By doing so, 
we avoid having our military facilities 
become a major focus of political debate 
within the Philippines, always a possibil- 
ity during unsettled political times but 
one that we have successfully avoided 
during the past months. Except among a 
small minority of opposition-oriented 
Filipino nationalists, anti-Americanism 
has not figm-ed prominently in the 
political debate of recent months. 



38 



'etin 



^SKi 



EUROPE 



U.S. Policy 

Throughout the difficult, even traumatic, 
past 6 months of Philippine history, our 
policy toward this important ally has re- 
mained steadfast. With an eye toward all 
of our long-term interests, we have 
spoken out consistently, both publicly 
and through active private diplomacy, 
along the following lines. 

• The United States believes firmly 
that a free and fair electoral process in 
which Filipinos can place their confidence 
is the key to I'esolution of the political 
problems left in the wake of the Aquino 
assassination. A fail- election will do 
much to bind the political wounds that 
are still open. We trust that responsible 
Philippine leaders from the govei-nment, 
the opposition, and the private sector 
will make those extra efforts needed to 
make this electoral process a genuine 
milestone in the political normalization 
process. If this election is successful, it 
could be the vehicle for bringing into 
democratic political life a whole new 
generation of office holders. 

• The United States looks forward 
with keen interest to the outcome of the 
work of the Agrava board, as it con- 
tinues resolutely in its investigation of 
the Aquino assassination. The board has 
already established a sound record of ac- 
complishment. We believe its work has 
contributed significantly to lowering the 
political temperature of the country over 
the past months. We e.xpect it to pursue 
its investigation vigorously to its logical 
conclusion. 

• We are keenly aware that no 
amount of political reform can prosper in 
an atmosphere of severe economic dislo- 
cation—and the reverse is also true. 
Economic distress can only assist radical 
elements inimical to our fundamental in- 
terest in a stable Philippines. For that 
reason, we have attempted to respond to 
the Philippines' economic needs by seek- 
ing, within the limits of U.S. law and 
resources, to make available to the 
Philippine economy the liquidity needed 
to resolve the immediate crisis. We have 
done this through accelerated economic 
support fund disbursements, provision of 
U.S. E.xport-Import Bank lines of in- 
surance guarantees to facilitate sales of 
industrial pi-oducts and agricultural com- 
modities, and provision of Commodity 
Credit Corp. credits to finance agricul- 
tural trade. We intend to do more, par- 
ticularly after the IMF concludes its ne- 
gotiations with the Philippine Govern- 
ment. 



• Finally, we continue to engage in 
active diplomacy in human rights. Our 
annual human rights report indicates 
that the human rights situation in the 
Philippines remains mixed, with con- 
tinued problems, particularly with tor- 
ture and summary executions which take 
place largely in areas where the in- 
surgency is active, and marked improve- 
ment in the areas of press freedom and 
political activity. 

We remain convinced that the 
Philippines has a depth of talent in all 
sectors capable of dealing with its 
political and economic difficulties. The 
country is blessed with abundant natural 
resources, a favorable geographic loca- 



tion in a part of the world that has 
registered enormous progress in recent 
years, and an industrious and hardwork- 
ing labor foi-ce. Filipinos must continue 
to make hard decisions to restore con- 
fidence, to resolve the current problems, 
and to enable economic growth to 
resume. U.S. policy will be to assist the 
Philippines in this effort to the extent 
that we can, as Filipinos determine for 
themselves the political and economic 
future of their countrv. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402.H 



The Transatlantic Relationship: 
A Long-Term Perspective 



by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Address as prepared for delivery 
before the National Newspaper Associa- 
tion on March 7, 198i. Ambassador 
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. 

A few weeks ago I made what some 
would describe as the mistake of think- 
ing aloud before an audience about some 
of the challenges the transatlantic rela- 
tionship will face through the rest of the 
20th century. Press reports then charac- 
terized my extemporaneous remarks as 
critical of our West European allies, 
which in turn led to a host of adverse 
comment on my intelligence, judgment, 
and paternity by any number of high- 
ranking European officials and even an 
opposition leader or two. In one of the 
kinder comments, Le Monde remarked 
that I didn't "even have the excuse of 
being one of the Califomians. ..." 

So I am here today to try again. My 
purpose is to examine the challenges— 
and I believe there are some— to the con- 
tinuance of a strong transatlantic rela- 
tionship over the course of the remainder 
of the 20th century-. It is not my thesis 
that the North Atlantic alliance is now 
in crisis. It is my contention that the 
final 15 years of the 20th century will be 
years of substantial— perhaps profound- 
change, and that it is time, now, for 
those who believe as I do that a strong 
transatlantic partnership will remain 



essential to the maintenance of peace and 
stability, to begin to examine together 
what is likely to change and how best to 
adjust to those changes. 

The problem as I see it is this: the 
Atlantic alliance is and will remain our 
most important political and security in- 
terest. Yet in the course of the next 
decades, our global foreign policy im- 
peratives will increasingly demand our 
attention, our time, and our imagination. 
We can, I believe, assume the continu- 
ance of an unwavering American commit- 
ment to the defense of Europe. We can, 
as well, assume a continuation of a Euro- 
pean commitment to our alliance partner- 
ship. But what we cannot— or at least 
should not— assume is that governments 
on either side of the Atlantic will always 
readily adjust to changing circumstances. 
An adjustment will be made, but its ade- 
quacy and the ease of the transition will 
depend heavily on how soon the West 
imderstands— collectively— that we face 
new times. 

M^or Changes 

Let me start by describing a few of the 
major changes I see taking place in the 
coming years. Some are simply and 
readily apparent, others neither so 
simple nor so clearly perceived. Demo- 
graphic changes in the United States, for 
example, are easily understood. We have 



April 1984 



EUROPE 



had a Pacific coast since 1819, and since 
our first census our demographic center 
has been shifting westward— a process 
that will continue and carry with it a 
continuing shift in our political center of 
gravity as well. Yet even this fact does 
not fully illustrate the importance of our 
west coast. California, for example, 
would have one of the world's largest 
gross national products were it an in- 
dependent nation. Growing, dynamic 
cities such as Los Angeles and San 
Diego, the San Francisco Bay area, 
Seattle, and Portland challenge or sur- 
pass the east coast cities of New York, 
Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore as 
commercial centers. 

Equally clearly, it is logical that our 
west coast's economic and commercial 
growth would increase the importance to 
us of a part of the world that, with to- 
day's communications, lies virtually at 
our doorstep. Yet the recent history of 
Pacific economic dynamism is by no 
means simply an American phenomenon. 
Asia's economies are today among the 
world's most prosperous. Japan's auto- 
mobiles, steel, and electronic goods are 
sold throughout the world. Dynamic 
market economies in the ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] countries, in South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong produce quality products 
at prices that assure their ability to com- 
pete in world markets. China offers a 
vast potential as it opens its economy to 
the world. 

It is little remarked, but nonetheless 
a remarkable fact, that since 1978 we 
have traded more with the Pacific Basin 
than vdth Europe; in 1982 the difference 
amounted to about $13 billion. The 
American and Japanese economies ac- 
count for about one-third of the world's 
total gross national product. Last year, 
Japan was the second largest buyer of 
American products (after Canada)— and 
yet only one of several increasingly im- 
portant Asian trading partners. 

Moreover, the United States and 
Japan are emerging— for the immediate 
future, at least— as the two most sig^iifi- 
cant players in the field of high-technol- 
ogy development— a field that is Ukely to 
define fast-paced economic development 
and prosperity in the years ahead. As we 
enter the 21st century, the United States 
and Japan are likely to be either the 
world's major economic competitors or 
important economic partners. 

We will face in the coming years the 
challenge of creating and maintaining in- 
stitutional links with Asian friends ap- 
propriate to their needs and to ours. 



Those links will not be identical to those 
we forged with our European friends, as 
they will reflect the differences in the 
relationships. Closer ties with Asia, for 
example, cannot duphcate our broad, 
historical relationship with Europe. But 
our increasingly shared economic, 
poUtical, and security concerns in Asia 
vdll almost certainly bring with them the 
creation of new institutional arrange- 
ments for dealing more effectively with 
those concerns. 

I remarked earlier that some 
changes, such as the demography of the 
United States, are easily seen and their 
consequences readily understood. Others 
are not so readily apparent. The nature 
of the transatlantic relationship over the 
next 15 years, for example, can, at this 
point, be only dimly perceived. 

The NATO alliance, which next 
month celebrates its 35th birthday, has 
assured more than a generation of peace 
in Europe— itself a rare occurrence in 
Europe's 20th century history— by re- 
minding friends and adversaries alike 
that we will consider an attack on them 
as an attack on ourselves. President 
Reagan has recently reaffirmed our com- 
mitment by deploying— in concert with 
our allies— a new generation of inter- 
mediate nuclear missiles that will com- 
plete the chain of deterrence and ensure 
that Western Europe's security will re- 
main coupled to our own. 

I need, here, to underline that 
American recognition that defending 
Western Europe is also the defense of 
our own country marked a revolutionary 
change in our foreign policy. It was not, 
at first, a premise with which Americans 
were entirely comfortable. For many, 
like myself, growing up in the Middle 
West, it irrevocably extended our 
destinies and our sense of personal and 
national security far beyond our natural 
frontiers. This premise has proved to be 
the fundamental link between the United 
States and Europe. 

There have been periodic crises in 
the history of the alliance over how to 
enhance our mutual security; there will 
assuredly be more in the future. We may 
disagree with some of our European 
allies on precisely how to couple or rein- 
force this bond— but the essential 
premise that peace in the Western world 
is indivisible has never come into ques- 
tion. And no installation of any weapons 
system can be a substitute for that fun- 
damental assumption. 

Yet Europe's importance to us goes 
beyond our security needs alone. We also 
share a culture, a history, and several of 
their languages. Ideas cross the Atlantic 



so quickly in both directions that it is dif- 
ficult to fathom from which side they 
originated. 

Finally, there is the political aspect 
of our transatlantic culture. Our systems 
of government may vary, but we join the 
nations of Western Europe in dedication 
to liberal democratic principles that en- 
sure the freedom and dignity of the in- 
dividual, and government on the basis of 
popular consent. We inherited these 
values from Western Europe, and we 
have contributed heavily to their sur- 
vival and viability in an often hostile 
world. 

Europe and Europeans have had, and 
still have, a major impact on our political 
thinking. Here were return to the impor- 
tance of the transatlantic dialogue. 
Although our diplomacy will never com- 
pletely satisfy our European friends any 
more than it will ever satisfy ourselves, 
European influence on our foreign policy 
has been far more important than is com- 
monly perceived. It has, on the whole, 
led over the years to a far more nuanced, 
far more sophisticated approach on our 
part than would have been the case were 
we left strictly to our own devices. It is 
an influence that has been most effec- 
tively exercised behind closed doors— in 
the NATO CouncO, at the annual seven- 
nation summits, in the constant meetings 
between American presidents and Euro- 
pean leaders, and in the host of meetings 
between American and European of- 
ficials that take place on almost a daily 
basis. It is a process that has worked 
because we have operated from a basis 
of shared values and objectives, common 
interests and hopes, and mutual danger 
and sacrifice. 

This is precious capital— an unpre- 
cedented resource of the transatlantic 
partnership which Americans and Euro- 
peans alike must seek to preserve for the 
generations yet to come. And since I 
believe we may run the risk, in the 
decades of the 1980s and 1990s, of losing 
some of that intimacy, now is the time to 
look to preserving it. I say "now," since 
the alliance, as I indicated earlier, is not 
today in a state of crisis. Indeed, the con- 
trary is true; we have survived, over- 
come, and resolved most of the difficult 
issues between us during the past year, 
and the climate of relations today is 
warm and workmanlike. 

Need To Address Problems 

So let me take this time of relative calm 
in the alliance to tell you of the problems 
I see ahead: problems which if left to 
evolve, unperceived and untended, may 
grow in complexity and consequence. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



Thirty years ago Atlanticists foresaw 
a united Europe overcoming its age-old 
divisions to play a global role near if not 
equal to that of the superpowers. 
Western Europe's combined population 
exceeded ours and that of the Soviet 
Union. Its rebuilt industrial base would 
underwrite its prosperity; its politicians 
and intellectuals approached their prob- 
lems with confidence and in a spirit of 
building a new and different Europe. 
Americans, although a bit wary perhaps 
of this emerging giant, welcomed re- 
newed West European prosperity and 
the prospect of its larger involvement in 
world affairs, because we knew we held 
no monopoly on wisdom and because we 
shared with West Europeans common 
values and objectives. Much more joined 
than divided us. 

Today, however, we see a Europe 
that has become less certain of its future, 
more uncertain about the wisdom of 
postwar policies, more focused on its own 
problems and, therefore, less prepared to 
look at the world whole. In addition, a 
goodly portion of Europe's younger 
generation apparently increasingly ques- 
tions the utility of many of the institu- 
tions and instrumentalities that have 
been so fundamental to the Atlantic 
alliance. 

The United States has been, for more 
than a generation of Europeans, the land 
of dreams, of achieving the impossible. It 
remains so today, for many. But it is 
probably also true that there is a level of 
disillusionment and bitterness— most 
clearly evident amongst the young— 
because neither America, in particular, 
nor Western institutions in general, have 
been able to fulfill all those hopes and 
dreams. And perhaps most unfortunate, 
this disillusionment sometimes goes 
beyond the young— to not so young 
leaders with enough experience to know 
better. 

This bitterness and disillusion is, to 
some degree, true on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Too often political parties out of 
office tend to take political stances on 
foreign policy that throw into the peren- 
nial debate the question of consistency 
on one side of the Atlantic or the other. 
It is, however, some consolation to 
realize that when political "outs" become 
the political "ins," they have tended to 
come to grips vrith reahty and reaffirm 
the overriding imperatives of the 
Atlantic alliance. 

While it can, therefore, be argued 
that my concerns about the attitudes of 
European youth and the vagaries of op- 
position political leaders can be over- 



April 1984 



done— since the process of aging and the 
responsibilities of power tend to change 
perspectives— it is less easy to put aside 
concerns about what I see as changing 
transatlantic perceptions of the world 
scene. 

I have often discussed with Euro- 
pean friends the different requirements 
for a nation with global responsibilities 
to those with more regional concerns. 
And the use of the word global is not 
meant in any arrogant fashion. Nor is it 
to deny the interests that several Euro- 
pean nations retain in areas of the world 
beyond their continent. But the sheer 
scope of American interests engages us 
in a different set of perspectives and im- 
peratives. I am persuaded that despite 
periodic inconsistencies (mainly on our 
part) and even more frequent crises of 
policy disagreement (emanating fre- 
quently from the European side), 
members of the alliance can still forge a 
strong consensus on most issues of im- 
portance. As the Warsaw Pact so clearly 
demonstrates, partnership without visi- 
ble differences is not a partnership of 
equals; nor is it a partnership that 
possesses the dynamic qualities so 
necessary to making the required ad- 
justments to changing circumstances. 
But an alliance in which there is an ero- 
sion of understanding of the reasons for 
those differences— including most par- 
ticularly a tolerance of the necessities of 
geography and responsibility— cannot be 
counted upon to retain today's vigor in 
the face of tomorrow's challenges. 

U.S. Policy Framework 

Europeans often argue— and their point 
is well taken— that detente has been 
largely successful in its European con- 
text. And it is certainly clear to 
Americans that tensions in the heart of 
Europe— with Berlin as but one ex- 
ample—have lessened significantly. Nor 
can we lightly ignore European efforts to 
bridge the economic, political, and 
cultural division of Europe— and how 
crucial they believe these efforts to be to 
their long-term vision of the security of 
Western Europe. 

But these considerations are, and 
must be, only some of the elements in 
the American policy framework. We see 
East- West rivalry in a broader context. 
Even a cursory study of recent events in 
Afghanistan, the Middle East, southern 
Afi-ica, or Latin America persuades us 
that detente has not been a success in 
areas outside of Europe. From our 
perspective, the Soviet role in these 
areas has not, to put it mildly, con- 
tributed to stability. 



EUROPE 



From the many conversations I have 
had with Europeans discussing our 
respective views of, and relations viath, 
the Soviet Union, I have not found them 
to be ignorant of, or prepared to ignore, 
the nature of the Soviet system. There is 
often, however, a broad gap in our 
evaluation of the Soviet threat. There is 
basic agreement within the alliance on 
the avoidance of war; there are different 
and differing voices in and vrithin the 
European members of the alliance, on 
precisely how to reduce the level of ten- 
sions. These disagreements can serve 
either to polarize our positions or as an 
example of how alliance differences can 
be contained within a unified policy. If 
they are to serve the latter purpose it 
will be necessary for both Europeans 
and Americans to recognize that there 
are legitimate reasons of geography and 
responsibility that will often require 
nuanced differences of approach toward 
the same general goals. 

Other kinds of transatlantic dif- 
ference, unfortunately, leave more 
bruised feelings— and perhaps demon- 
strate the degree to which we and our 
European allies have begun to diverge 
on basic issues. Two years ago the 
British effort to regain the Falkland 
Islands posed for the United States a 
more difficult choice than most Euro- 
peans yet recognize. Yet we made our 
choice. A few months ago I had reason 
to remember that decision when we 
learned, with profound regret, that as 
our Marines landed in Grenada, our 
European friends moved swiftly and 
publicly to condemn the action. That 
Europeans view the liberation of 
Grenada with less enthusiasm than 
Americans or Grenadians do, is, I admit, 
fully within the normal and acceptable 
range of alliance differences. But where, 
at that moment, was the alliance solidar- 
ity that had meant so much to us a year 
earlier? Where was the recognition that 
the United States might be justified in 
moving to protect what it believed to be 
its national interests? At the very least, 
could not our fi-iends have suspended 
judgment until the emerging situation 
became clearer? 

In the case of Grenada we moved in 
concert with Caribbean nations who 
recognized the threat to their own 
security that the regime in Grenada 
posed. The United States has, since the 
close of World War II, grown increas- 
ingly conscious of that curse of all great 
powers— unilateralism— and has sought to 
resist its temptations. We long ago 
discovered that there is a very fine line 
between unilateralism on the one hand 



41 



'i';n'iiji 



EUROPE 



I 



and leadership on the other and have 
tried very hard to avoid the one and em- 
brace the other. But the distinction 
becomes increasingly hard to maintain 
when our principal friends and allies do 
not recognize that the breadth of our m- 
terests sometimes leads us to a different 
evaluation of threats to those interests 
than is held by others. 

The Prime Minister of the youngest 
democracy in Europe, Felipe Gonzalez of 
Spain, recently touched upon another, 
related, problem that has come to con- 
cern some Americans of late. "Some- 
times," he said, "we, the Sparash, have 
the feeling that we trust more m the 
destiny of Europe than other countries 
ab-eady integrated into the group ot __ 
European institutions." "The fact is, he 
added, "that to a large extent Europe to 
day remains obsessed with its own prob- 
lems. This is something that needs to be 
overcome." 

The danger with this growmg ten- 
dency to look inward is that it may rem- 
force the potential negative consequences 
that can result from the changing trans- 
atlantic perceptions of the world that 1 
have earlier described. Either tendency, 
by itself, can be difficult enough to 
counter; both, moving together, each ex- 
acerbating the other, could prove to be a 
wicked brew indeed. 

This absorption with its mtemal con- 
cerns is in great measure a consequence 
of current economic conditions m Europe 
and therefore hopefully will dimmish as 
prosperity returns. But the tendency to 
lav the blame for recession largely at the 
door of the United States and our high 
interest rates presents another kind of 
problem. What must be avoided m this 
transatlantic dialogue over economic 
issues is a too facile resort to the blame 
America first" syndrome. For to do so is 
to obscure more fundamental failmgs 
that stand in the way of economic 
recovery. In the end, Europeans, 
possessing collectively a gross national 
product larger than that of the United 
States, need to ask themselves whether 
it can really be true that their economic 
recovery depends, in the main, on the 
prime rate in the United States. 

I have cited these problems because 
I deeply believe they need to be dis- 
cussed between friends while they are 
still manageable issues. I do not believe 
they demonstrate a fundamental rift be- 
tween the two sides of the Atlantic. Nor 
do I believe they are insurmountable. In 
fact, the manner in which we were able, 
together, to put our disagreement over 
pipeline sanctions behind us demon- 



strates the contrary. Rather, I cite them 
because I fear that left unchecked, these 
trends plus our own increasing concern 
with our affairs in other parts of the 
world-Central America, the Pacific, the 
Middle East, to name but a few-can 
over time, diminish the character of the 
transatlantic relationship. And that 
would be a tragedy, for a strong alliance 
is now, and will continue to be for 
decades to come, the keystone of our 
own-and the West's-security and 

stsbilitv 

Thus, now may well be the appropri- 
ate moment for all of us, Europeans and 
Americans, to take a new look at where 
we should be going together and how we 
should get there. Perhaps, as was re- 
cently indicated in the Wall Street 
Journal, we might forego the traditional 
choices between less and more involve- 
ment and direct ourselves instead to a 
"smarter" involvement. The two pillars 
of a "smarter" relationship, in my opm- 
ion, are: increasing respect for the dif- 
ferences in our alliance, and a more coor- 
dinated approach-across the board-to 
all political, economic, and security issues 
with our European allies. 



Third. How can the developed worid 
cope more effectively with the large, 
urgent, and as yet unmanageable ques- 
tions of development in the less devel- 
oped countries? 

Fourth. How can we overcome the 
increasing pressures toward protec- 
tionism on both sides of the Atlantic and 
in Japan? More constructively, how can 
the world's major trading nations reduce 
the barriers to a ft-eer trade between us.' 

These are but a few of the many 
questions that we should be workmg on 
iointly. But whatever our agenda, its 
purpose ought to be to bring the two 
sides of the partnership together to 
resolve problems, reverse trends that 
left unchecked will pull us apart, and-m 
the last analysis-move both sides of the 
Atlantic toward greater equality of ef- 
fort, outlook, and strength. To quote 
again from the Wall Street Journal: A 
genuine superpower doesn't need 
hegemonic influence with a weak set of 
client states, but a true aUiance with 
other great nations." 

The greatness is there, on both sides 
of the Atlantic. It is our job to find the 
means, together, to let it flourish. ■ 



Alliance Agenda 

I will be the first to admit that I have no 
magic formula for resolving the strams 
that will surely bear down on all of us in 
the coming decades. But I do believe 
that beginning the dialogue is the key to 
the eventual discovery of answers. 1 he 
agenda must be broad: the fora m which 
that agenda could be discussed are 
many And if I were asked to suggest 
some of the subjects that might be con- 
sidered I would propose: 

First. How can we enhance trans- 
atlantic cooperation in the development 
of high technology? Painful and costly as 
it may be, we must recognize that if any 
pari, of our alliance lags seriously behmd 
another in this field for any period of 
time, it will seriously diminish our over- 
all effectiveness. 

Second. The importance of moving 
now to the broadening of alliance defense 
procurement policies. The United 
States-pari^icularly the Congress-has, 
for too long, asked its allies to share 
more of the burden of the common 
defense without, at the same time, 
recognizing that European mdustry 
must, if this is to be the case, pari;icipate 
fully in the manufacture of defense 
items. 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



■WBimUHk 



EUROPE 



Death of Soviet President Andropov 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 10, 1984' 

The President has sent a message ex- 
pressing his condolences to Mr. 
Kuznetsov, the Acting Soviet Chief of 
State, on the death of Chairman 
Andropov. In his message the President 
emphasized to the people and Govern- 
ment of the U.S.S.R. his desire for 
cooperation between the two countries in 
the search for a more peaceful world. 
As the President reaffirmed in his 
addi-ess of January 16, the United States 
has sought and will continue to seek a 
constructive and realistic dialogue with 
the Soviet Union aimed at building a 
more productive and stable relationship. 
Our objective is not dialogue for its own 
sake, but a dialogue that produces real 
solutions to the many concrete problems 
that divide us. 

There are, to be sure, fundamental 
differences between the American and 
Soviet systems and our respective 
political beliefs. But the American and 
Soviet peoples have a common interest in 
the avoidance of war and the reduction 
of arms. It is this need to preserve and 
strengthen the peace that is at the heart 
of U.S. policy. 

The President's policy towai-d the 
Soviet Union seeks to achieve progress 
in three broad areas: developing ways to 
eliminate the use and the threat of force 
in international relations; significantly 
reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the 
world, particularly nuclear weapons; and 
establishing a better working relation- 
ship with Moscow, characterized by 
greater cooperation and understanding 
and based on mutual restraint and 
respect. 

At this time of transition in the 
Soviet Union, our two nations should 
look to the future in order to find ways 
to realize these goals. In the nuclear age, 
there is no alternative to dialogue. 

The United States hopes that the 
Soviet leader will work with us in this 
si)irit and take advantage of the oppor- 
tunities at hand to find common ground 
and establish a mutually beneficial rela- 
tionship. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. 
FEB. 10, 19842 

The President has expressed his per- 
sonal condolences to the Soviet leader- 
ship on the death of Chairman An- 
dropov, and I have sent a similar 
message to Foreign Minister Gromyko. 

At this time of transition in Moscow, 
let me reaffirm the basic principles of 
our policy toward the Soviet Union. We 
remain ready for a constructive and 
realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union. 
In this nuclear age, the United States 
will work to build a more stable and 
more positive relationship. As the Presi- 
dent has stressed, we seek to tlnd solu- 
tions to real problems, not just to im- 
prove the atmosphere of our relations. 
This applies, in particular, to the task of 
reaching equitable and verifiable 
agreements for arms reduction and 
reducing the risk of war. 

The President has made clear to the 
people and Government of the Soviet 
Union his desire for constructive 
cooperation in the search for peace. We 
invite the Soviet leadership to work with 
us to that end. There are opportunities 
at hand. Let us find common ground, and 
let us make the world a safer place. 



Q. Will President Reagan lead the 
U.S. delegation to Moscow? 

A. We have received no word from 
the Soviet Union as yet as to the time or 
arrangements for the funeral, and the 
President will make his decision after we 
receive that information. 

Q. What effect, do you think the 
death of Mr. Andropov could have in 
altering the relations— the current 
chilly relations— between the two coun- 
tries? 

A. We can reaffirm, with the great- 
est seriousness of purpose, our own 
readiness to engage with the Soviet lead- 
ership in solving problems and develop- 
ing those things that are needed to make 
the world a safer place. We invite their 
response and we hope very much that 
whoever emerges as the new leader, or 
leadership group, will want to respond in 
kind. 

Q. Do you think the President 
should invite a meeting with the new 
leader at the right time? 

A. The President will decide about 
whether he will attend the funeral, 
depending upon the arrangements that 
they suggest; and he has had the posi- 
tion all along that he's prepared to meet 
with the Soviet leadership if there is a 
reasonable opportunity for some substan- 
tive accomplishment. No doubt that re- 
mains his position now. 




President Reagan went to the Soviet Em- 
bassy after the death of President Andropov 
to sign the condolence book. 



April 1984 



EUROPE 



Q. Are you concerned that a pos- 
sible power struKKle in the Kremlin 
will further slow down progress on 
arms negotiations, other major issues, 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union? 

A. We have no information about the 
process of selecting a new leader. That is 
something the Soviet Union will do. 
From our standpoint, we have our 
strength, we have our detei-mination to 
defend our interests and our values, and 
we are prepared to deal constructively 
with the leadership that is put forward 
by the Soviet Union. Their own proc- 
esses will determine who they will put 
forward. 

Q. Do you think that President 
Reagan should, in fact, go, as some 
have suggested, as a signal of 
readiness to reopen a dialogue with the 
Kremlin leadership? 

A. The President has been and is 
prepared to continue and expand the 
dialogue with the Soviet leadership. 
There is a very extensive dialogue right 
now, but it needs to be expanded, if 
possible, and made more productive, and 
the President is prepared to do that. 

Q. Do you anticipate that with the 
change of leadership in the Soviet 
Union it would be even possible to 
resume serious arms negotiations dur- 
ing 1984? 

A. First of all, there are serious arms 
negotiations going on right now. 

Q. INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] talks? 

A. Insofar as the intermediate-range 
and sti-ategic nuclear weapons are con- 
cerned, there is nothing going on, and I 
see no reason why those talks couldn't 
be resumed. Certainly, we are prepared 
to do so if the Soviet leadership comes 
forw-ard with an equal willingness. 

Q. You've said that the President's 
decision may hinge on whether some 
substantive accomplishment could be 
achieved by his going to Moscow. Does 
that mean, in fact, that the Soviets 
will have to have chosen a new^ leader 
in order for the President to go, that 
he would go only if he could have a 
substantive discussion with that 
leader? 

A. There are two separate things 
floating around here, and let's distin- 
guish them. One is the question of 
whether or not the President would go 
to the funeral, and, of cour.se, on such an 
occasion, there would undoubtedly be a 
meeting but not an opportunity for an 
extended and full discussion of anything. 



44 



As I said, we have had no infoi-ma- 
tion as yet on the funeral ari'angements 
and what the Soviet Union intends to do 
about it, and .so the President will not 
make any statement about that until he 
has those arrangements. 

The other question was, at some time 
in the future would the President be 
willing to meet with the Soviet leader- 
ship, and I think I'll just restate my 
answer, and it is that, yes, certainly, 
gladly. But it's important that the 
ground be prepared in such a way that 
there would be chance for a significant 
result from the meeting. 

Q. Did the Soviet Union inform this 
government ahead of the formal an- 
nouncement of the death of Mr. 
.Andropov? 

A. No. 

Q. Because the Soviets have not 
chosen a leader, is the world a more 
tense place right now because of that 
uncertainty? 

A. We don't know whether they've 
chosen a leader or not. They may have 



and as yet not announced the leader, so 
we'll see about that. But as far as we are 
concerned, we deal with the Foreign 
Ministry and the Soviet Union is a func- 
tioning government. 

Q. Are you planning on going to 
the Soviet Embassy? 

A. Yes, indeed, when they have a 
book of condolences, and I will go when 
they are prepared. Insofar as I know 
they're not ready for that. 

Q. So you have no plans to see Mr. 
Dobrynin [Soviet .\mbassador to the 
United States] immediately? 

A. I have called Ambassador 
Dobrynin and expressed my condolences 
to him personally, and when they are 
prejiared to receive visitors, I will go 
there. 



'Read to reporters assembled at the 
Sheraton Hotel in Santa Bai-bara by principal 
deputy press secretary to the President 
Lan-y" Speakes (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Feb. 13, 1984). 

^Press release 4.3. ■ 



Assistant Secretary Burt's 
Interview for "Worldnet" 



Assistant Secretary for European 
and Canadian Affairs Richard R. Bu-rt 
was interviewed in Paris on January 31. 
198i, by news correspondents in Bonn, 
Brussels, Genem, The Hague, London, 
Paris, Rome, and Stockholm. The inter- 
view was later broadcast on "Worldnet," 
a satellite TV program of the U.S. Infor- 
mation Service. 

Q. We have been having some 
interesting, though mixed, signals be- 
tween Washington and Moscow. It 
began with statements by President 
Reagan and Mr. Andropov that seemed 
to be groping toward a resumption of 
dialogue, and then came a harsh Soviet 
allegation against the United States 
for violations of arms control treaties, 
following, of course, earlier U.S. 
charges of Soviet violations. 

And then yesterday, .Ambassador 
Rowny, the chief U.S. delegate to the 
strategic arms reduction talks (START) 
in Geneva, said that there was the 
possibility of a breakthrough if the 
talks resume because of trade-offs that 
would be of interest to both powers. 



My question to you is what sense 
are we to make of this? How do you 
sum it up? 

A. I think the situation in the 
U.S.-Soviet relationships now is genu- 
inely complicated. It cannot be summed 
up with a few words, whether we call it 
"confrontation" or "detente." It is clear 
that we have some important differences. 
You mentioned the issue of arms control 
compliance. As you know, the President 
has sent a report to the Congress detail- 
ing some violations, or probable viola- 
tions, that the Soviets have committed. 

At the same time, we have dif- 
ferences with the Soviets on regional 
issues. For example, there are Soviet 
military advisers in the Middle East— in 
Syria. We disagree with Soviet human 
rights policies. And we very much think 
the Soviet Union should come back to 
the negotiating table. 

While we have these differences, we 
also believe that it's important to talk. 
The Secretary of State, when he was in 
Stockholm recently, both in the speech 
he gave publicly and in the private 
meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, 
made it very clear that we are prepared 
to talk, that we're prepared to meet the 
Soviets halfway. Whether or not the 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



Soviets are prepared, it is difficult to say 
at this stage. We will have to see. 

Q. Do you foresee any fixed date 
between now and the presidential elec- 
tions in November for talks with the 
Soviet Union? 

A. If you are asking me whether I 
think the Soviet Union will return to the 
START or INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] negotiations between now 
and the presidential elections, of course I 
have to say I do not know. We are 
prepared to begin those negotiations 
right away. What the Soviets are 
prepared to do is not clear. We have 
seen some recent statements that sug- 
gest the Soviet Union is toning dowTi its 
rhetoric somewhat, that they, like the 
President, are supporting the notion of 
dialogue. 

There are some people who suggest 
that the Russians would not want to 
come back to the table because this 
might aid the President's reelection ef- 
fort. Thei-e are other suggestions that 
say that the Soviet Union will recognize 
that it is in Its interest to return to the 
negotiating table. 

What is important for us right 
now— speaking as a U.S. official but also 
as an alliance official— is not to try to 
speculate about future Soviet behavior; 
rather just make very clear our position. 
That is, we are prepared to begin those 
negotiations as soon as possible, and if 
we can sit down behind the negotiating 
table, we are prepared to engage in the 
neceessary trade-offs that could open up 
new opportunities for an agreement. 

Q. In 1976, when the SS-20s started 
to be deployed, you wrote in a paper 
about new weapons technology, 
"Debate and Direction," that improved 
conventional defense by new weapons 
technology might lead to reduced 
pressure on the United States for ex- 
tended deterrence. But new weapons 
technology and conventional ar- 
maments have only had a small impact 
compared with the nuclear debate. 

Since nuclear weapons still deter- 
mine the strategic thinking, what kind 
of impact would the vision of the 
future, the development of ballistic 
missile defense have? Will it be incre- 
mental, as in the conventional new 
weapons technology field? Or revolu- 
tionary? What kind of NATO involve- 
ment could you foresee, and what 
likely Soviet reaction at the 
negotiating table? 

A. First of all, let me say that I am 
pleased that at least one person read 



that paper that I wrote many years ago. 
And let me say a word, though, about 
conventional defense. Your question is 
correct in talking about the importance 
of nuclear weapons and the continuing 
importance of a sti'ategy of detei-rence. 

It's true that nuclear weapons alone 
are not sufficient for adequate deter- 
rence, and the alliance must look at new 
technologies in the conventional area to 
bolster deterrence. Conventional defense 
is as important as nuclear deterrence in 
protecting the security of the alliance. 

Your question went on, then,- to ad- 
dress the issue of ballistic missile 
defense. The President of the United 
States has stated that the United States 
needs to launch a research and develop- 
ment effort in the area of advanced 
ballistic missile defense concepts, in part 
because the Soviet Union is spending a 
great deal of money on this subject. And 
we must protect against any break- 
through that the Soviet Union might 
make. 

But also, looking toward the future 
into the 21st century, we have to in- 
vestigate the possibilities that all of our 
countries could be less vulnerable to 
nuclear attack. But I want to emphasize 
that this is a research and development 
effort. There has been no change in U.S. 
deterrence strategy, no planned changes 
in alliance strategy, and all of the ac- 
tivities that the United States is now 
undertaking are consistent with the 1972 
ABM Treaty [Antiballistic Missile 
Treaty]. 

Q. Do you think the Soviet Union 
should be more involved in the search 
for a settlement in the Middle East 
—and more specifically in Lebanon 
—in view of its connection with Syria? 
Do you think it would be wiser to con- 
tinue the past American policy of keep- 
ing the Soviets at arm's length in the 
Middle East? 

A. That's a very interesting question, 
and I think the answer has to focus 
always on the issue of whether or not 
the Soviet Union has a constructive, 
responsible role to play in the Middle 
East. Unfortunately, that has not been 
the case in recent months. 

You mentioned the Soviet involve- 
ment in Syria. We've seen the shipment 
of advanced weapons to Syria, and we've 
seen the presence in Syria of substantial 
numbers of Soviet military advisers. 
That has been a destabilizing develop- 
ment. It has not made the process of the 
withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Lebanon any easier. And it has not made 



the process of the reconciliation of the 
various factions within Lebanon any 
easier. 

We would hope that the Soviet Union 
would use whatever influence it has with 
Syria to play a constructive role, to pro- 
vide for the withdrawal of its forces as 
the Israelis have agreed with the 
Lebanese Government to do. 

We are prepared to discuss questions 
like the Middle East with the Soviet 
Union. But we are yet to see the Soviet 
Union willing to play the responsible role 
that is necessary for it to be brought into 
the process itself 

Q. Knowing that the Soviets would 
rather see somebody else in the White 
House than Mr. Reagan, do you 
foresee any worsening of the relations 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union now that Mr. Reagan has 
announced that he will be a candidate 
for the next presidential election? 

A. Fh-st of all, you say that we know 
that the Soviets would rather see some- 
one else in the White House. I am not 
sure that is entirely correct. Certainly no 
Soviet official has made that statement 
to me. 

It is difficult to say too much about 
what is Soviet thinking about American 
domestic politics. I would just point out 
that the Soviet Union, in the past, has 
not been terribly sophisticated in making 
political predictions about American 
politics or West European politics. For 
example, the Soviet Union made several 
comments about the German election in 
the spring of 1983, which tended to 
backfire for Soviet interests. And for all 
we know, the Soviet Union may have 
already decided that Ronald Reagan will 
be reelected, and if that is the case, then 
they would certainly make judgments on 
policy in a very different light than if 
they hope someone else is elected. 

So it's dangerous. We don't try to 
base our policy on the internal machina- 
tions of developments in the Soviet 
Union. For one thing, we don't know too 
much about them. And I tend to doubt 
that the Soviet Union itself does. What 
we have to do in our policy toward the 
Soviets is recognize that they have a 
government, that they are making deci- 
sions. We have to think about what their 
options are and try to engage them on 
issues that appear to us to meet their in- 
terests. 

Q. When do you think the Soviets 
will propose the merging of the Geneva 
talks-START and INF-and if nothing 
takes place, could it mean the taking 



April 1984 



45 



EUROPE 



into account of French and British 
nuclear forces, as asked by the 
Soviets? 

A. I am glad that you raised the sub- 
ject of merger, because there has been a 
great deal written about that subject. I 
think it is time that we clarified at least 
the U.S. position on the subject. 

To begin with, nobody has pro- 
posed—either the United States or the 
Soviet Union— the merger of the START 
and INF negotiations. And again looking 
toward the future, of course, we don't 
know what the Soviets might propose. 
They have told us they are reviewing 
their positions on the two negotiations, 
and we are ready and waiting to hear 
what theu" views are. But so far, we 
have not received any formal proposal 
along those lines. 

The U.S. position is that we think 
the current framework for negotiating 
nuclear arms control— that is a separate 
INF negotiating and a separate START 
negotiation— is perfectly adequate for dis- 
cussing these issues. We do not believe 
that a merger would necessarily be a 
panacea to the arms control problem. 

The fundamental obstacles that have 
blocked agreement in those two negotia- 
tions would remain; in the INF negotia- 
tion, the fact the Soviet Union has not 
accepted the right of U.S. missile deploy- 
ment, and in the START negotiation, tlie 
fact that the Soviet Union has been un- 
willing to cut back its ballistic missile 
forces to the extent we think would be 
stabilizing. A merger would not neces- 
sarily address those problems. 

If the Soviet Union has new ideas, 
new ideas about the relationship of 
START and INF, we will, of course, be 
prepared to discuss them with it. But a 
merger right now is not on the 
U.S.-Soviet agenda. It is not a topic for 
discussion. 

Certainly the whole question of 
British and French forces is one that we 
have been clear on all along. British and 
French forces are not substitutes for 
U.S. forces in Europe, and in any 
bilateral negotiation, we will not discuss 
limitation on those forces. 

Q. The last ministerial session in 
December, the Foreign Ministers, in- 
cluding of course Mr. Shultz, agreed 
on releasing, apart from the final com- 
munique, the Brussels declaration. [In- 
audible] was to explore systematically 
or to announce that the NATO 
ministers were ready to explore all 
channels that could lead to an im- 
provement of East- West relations, thus 
to a revival of detente. 



A. I am not too sure what the ques- 
tion was. But what I will say is I think 
you have had a systematic effort by the 
governments of the alliance to improve 
the character and the quality of the 
East-West dialogue. You mentioned the 
Brussels declaration at the NATO 
ministerial in December. That was 
followed up, of course, by a speech by 
President Reagan where he stated his 
desire to have a more genuine dialogue 
with the Soviet Union. 

Secretary of State George Shultz, in 
Stockholm, struck the same theme in his 
address at the CDE conference [Con- 
ference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disannament in 
Europe]. And then, of course. Secretary 
Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko 
had a 5-hour meeting. 

I think that the alliance is postured 
where it should be. That i§, we are 
continuing with the policies that are 
necessary to protect our safety. But at 
the same time, we are on the offensive 
with the Soviets. We are telling the 
Soviet Union that we are ready to 
negotiate, we are ready to talk, and we 
are urging the Soviet Union to return to 
the negotiating table. I think this is 
precisely the policy that the majority of 
the Western public wants and is getting. 

Q. The Soviets have stated again 
recently that the French and British 
nuclear forces have to be counted 
against the SS-20s. We know it is a 
negotiating device. But we also know 
from official sources that the French 
and British nuclear programs foresee a 
total of about 2,000 nuclear weapons 
when they are completed in a number 
of years. This will be a real deterrent. 

The news is making the rounds in 
European circles that the French and 
British deterrent might become the 
future European nuclear umbrella, 
replacing the American umbrella. I 
feel some perplexity. How do you see it 
from Paris now? 

A. Of course, if we were to move to a 
new system of European security and, as 
your question suggested, French and 
British nuclear forces would take over 
from the U.S. strategic deterrent, the 
job of deterring an attack against 
Europe, then the arms control equation 
would radically be changed. 

But that is certainly not the policies 
of either the Governments of France or 
Britain right now, and into the 
foreseeable future those forces are 
designed to be a deterrent against a 
direct strike against Britain or France. 
They do not play an extended deterrent 



role. They do not provide the nuclear 
umbrella that U.S. forces do. 

Thus, trying to see British and 
French forces as a substitute or as the 
same in a negotiation between U.S. 
Pershings and cruise missiles and the 
British and French forces is a major er- 
ror. Those U.S. forces provide the 
necessary link between the secwity of 
Europe and the American strategic 
deterrent. British and French forces do 
not play that role. 

For the foreseeable future we cannot, 
then, negotiate over these forces, 
because they do not provide the same 
function. As your question itself 
i-ecognized, it is not so much that the 
Soviet Union seems concerned about the 
growth of British and French nuclear 
capabilities. All along in the negotiations, 
the Soviet Union has never insisted— in 
INF— that Britain or France reduce the 
size of their nuclear arsenals. In fact, it 
is said that those arsenals could grow. 
Really what the Soviet Union has done 
has pointed at or signaled out the British 
and French forces as an excuse to argue 
that the United States should not deploy 
a single missile in Europe. And this is, of 
course, what we have objected to in the 
negotiations. What has emerged in the 
negotiations as the single most important 
obstacle— what President Reagan has 
called the half-zero option— is the fact 
that the Soviet Union wants to retain a 
substantial force of SS-20 missiles 
du-ected against Europe, while the 
United States would not be permitted to 
deploy a single system. 

Q. President Reagan has recently 
announced that he will seek a second 
term. In the past presidential election 
campaigns, they have had an impact 
on American foreign policy. Do you 
think we Europeans have a reason to 
expect any kind of flip-flopping this 
year in U.S. foreign policy? 

A. Absolutely not. I think that is a 
President who has learned, who believes 
very strongly, that the best way to get 
reelected, the best politics, is being a 
good President. And I do not believe 
that you ai'e to see any fundamental 
modifications of U.S. policy, any flip- 
flops, or inconsistencies designed for 
reelection purposes. I think that the ma- 
jority of the American people support 
the President, support his policies, sup- 
port the arms control policies and his 
security policies, and I think he will see 
those policies through to the November 
election. 



46 



■rniHMiwMiiiM 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. You have already mentioned the 
meeting in Stockholm between Mr. 
Shultz and Mr. Gromyko. and you, of 
course, were in that meeting. Could 
you mention any specific steps that 
might stem from it? 

A. We have already seen one step 
which, as you know, was the agi-eement 
by the NATO countries to resume 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on 
March 16th in Vienna on conventional 
force reductions. 

That was an issue that came up in 
that session, and we were encouraged 
that in the non-nuclear arms control 
area, the Soviet Union now has agreed 
to negotiate actively, not only in Vienna 
but in the Stockholm negotiations. The 
Soviet Union has also said that it is 
prepared to discuss chemical weapons 
arms control, although we have dif- 
ferences there. Those are negotiations 
that are going ahead. 

As the Secretary of State has said, 
the Soviets did not come forward with 
any new ideas or proposals on the 
nuclear negotiations. We are, thus, in a 
position of waiting for the Soviets to 
make up their minds on how they want 
to pursue these talks, and we will be 
ready to sit down and talk about that. 

But I think the most important out- 
come of the meeting between the 
Secretary of State and the Soviet 
Foreign Minister was the fact that they 
had an opportunity to listen to one 
another talk about important issues and 
to exchange views. Very often in these 
kinds of U.S. -Soviet discussions, one gets 
a sterile repetition of arguments that you 
can read in the newspapers. It is fair to 
say that on subjects like arms control 
and on regional issues like the Middle 
East or Afghanistan and on the bilateral 
relationship that the two Foreign 
Ministers were able to talk and exchange 
views. 

That is not to say that they agreed. 
Oftentimes they did not. But we think 
that at the moment in the East- West 
relationship, it is very useful, even when 
they do not agree, to at least have the 
opportunity to explain their perspectives. 

Q. There was some suggestion after 
Ambassador Rowny's remarks yester- 
day that he might be proposing trade- 
offs between some of the subject mat- 
ter of the INF talks-that is, the 
deployment of cruise missiles in 
Europe— for some elements of the stra- 
tegic talks. Is this the correct interpre- 
tation? And if not, could you tell us 
something of the trade-offs you had in 
mind? 



A. No, I am afraid that his remarks 
have been somewhat misintei-preted. As 
I pointed out before, we think that the 
two negotiations should be pursued 
separately. We think that we should get 
back to the INF negotiations and talk 
about the issues within the INF spec- 
trum of systems. And we should get 
back to the START negotiations and talk 
about those systems. 

We are not at the present time en- 
visaging any trade-offs, any deals, that 
would lead to reductions in one area in 
return for reductions in the other. We 
have said that if the Soviet Union has 
some ideas along these lines, we would 
be prepared to listen to them. As I said 
before, the Soviet Union has not given 
us any ideas. It is far too premature to 
talk about trade-offs between the two 
negotiations or, as an earlier questioner 
pointed out, a merger between the two 
negotiations. 

What Ambassador Rowny was dis- 
cussing was trade-offs within the context 
of the strategic arms negotiations them- 
selves. As many of the journalists in this 
group that we have assembled today 
recognize, the U.S. and Soviet strategic 
forces are not mere images of one 
another. They are different. The Soviet 
Union has certain sti-engths and advan- 
tages, particularly in its large land-based 
missile force, the heavy missiles, the 
SS-18 missiles, SS-19 missiles, that have 
a substantial number of multiple 
warheads. 

And the United States, for its part, 
has certain advantages, in particular in 
the bomber area with new bombers like 
the B-1 coming into the force, and with 
systems like air-launched cruise missiles. 

What we are suggesting, and what 
Ambassador Rowiiy was saying, is that 
we are willing, in our negotiating posi- 
tion, to recognize those trade-offs. That 
is, if the Soviet Union is walling to accept 
limitations in the area of its strength, we 
will be prepared to accept limitations in 
the areas of our strength. That is an im- 
portant step forward, because, as you 
know, we were criticized earlier on as 
singling out Soviet areas of advantage. 

As the President has said, most 
recently in his speech on U.S.-Soviet 
relations, we do think we should meet 
the Soviet Union halfway. If the Soviet 
Union comes back to the negotiating 
table in Geneva, we think there will be 
opportunities in those negotiations. 

Q. Is there a prospect in the MBFR 
[mutual and balanced force reductions] 
talks, which, after all, have been going 
on for more than a decade with little 
progress? Or are both Washington and 



EUROPE 



Moscow regarding this as a kind of in- 
sulated channel for exploring wider 
dialogues? 

A. No, we are certainly not looking 
at the Vienna talks as an opportunity to 
discuss other issues. We have other 
negotiations underway. In addition to the 
Vienna negotiations, which will get 
underway in March, we have a new- 
Stockholm negotiation, which offers a 
new interesting venue for talking about 
confidence-building measures, and we 
have the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva, where we are. among other 
things, talking about chemical weapons. 

The real point is that the Vienna 
talks have gone on for 10 years. They 
have not made much progress. And what 
we would like to do is see if, after all 
that time, it would not be possible to 
give them some new impetus. The Soviet 
Union has made some suggestions in the 
area of verification. They do not go as 
far as NATO would like those sugges- 
tions to go, but we are prepared to talk 
about them. 

We would like to see if, after all this 
time, we could not do something to bring 
about a balanced situation in conven- 
tional forces in Europe. 

Q. Would you think it feasible that 
if the Soviet Union could be persuaded 
to dismantle a certain number of 
SS-20s for a time period, say, for 3 
months or for half a year, that NATO 
would then interrupt its deployment 
schedule correspondingly? And would 
that be a possible way to reach lower 
levels that have earlier been aimed at 
an interim proposal? Or would you 
rather think that the threat of an 
uninterrupted deployment schedule is 
the best way to get Moscow back to 
the negotiating table? 

A. Let me make a general comment. 
It is useful and very important that we 
think through possible negotiating steps 
that could be taken to i-esult in progress 
in the negotiations. But we, at the same 
time, have to recognize the dangers in 
the West of negotiating with ourselves. 
We are constantly throwing up negotia- 
tions ideas and talking about them in an 
effort to see if we can't make progi-ess. 
And as I say, that is a very healthy ex- 
ercise. But in the final analysis, we have 
to sit down and talk with the Soviets and 
negotiate with the Soviets. 

We believe very strongly that the 
single most important incentive for the 
Soviet Union to do anything about 
limiting its deployment of the SS-20 
missile is its clear understanding that in 
the absence of any talks in Geneva, and 



April 1984 



47 



EUROPE 



in the absence of any agi-eement in 
Geneva, the alliance will go ahead and 
deploy all 572 of the ground-launched 
cruise missUes and the Pershing lis. 

The second that we indicated to the 
Soviet Union that we were not going to 
go forward with the progi-amed deploy- 
ment on schedule, the Soviet Union 
would simply have no incentive to come 
back to Geneva. After all, we should all 
ask ourselves, why did they leave those 
negotiations? They tried, while the 
negotiations were underway, to derail 
the deplojTnent program. And they 
failed. By leaving the negotiations, they 
are clearly attempting to raise the 
anxiety level in Western Europe and 
elsewhere in an effort to stop that 
development. 

The best thing the alliance can do is 
demonstrate very clearly to the Soviet 
Union that there is only one way to stop 
that deployment, and that is by achieving 
an effective, verifiable arms control in 
Geneva. 

Q. What is your opinion on these 
confidence-building measures Romania 
has proposed in Stockholm? And in 
general, Romania's position in the 
Warsaw Pact? 

A. The first thing I would like to say 
is that the confidence-building measures 
that I would like to talk about are the 
confidence-building measures that NATO 
has presented in Stockholm, because 
they are feasible, they are concrete, and 
they would do something to lessen the 
risk of surprise attack in Europe. We 
have focused for so long on levels of 
weaponry, and that of course, is a very 
appropriate subject for arms control. But 
we also have to recognize [inaudible] sub- 
ject for arms control. We also have to 
recognize that weaponry casts a political 
shadow. And how countries use those 
weapons, how they move their troops in 
a crisis situation, can have a decisive im- 
pact on whether a war will take place or 
whether it does not. 

NATO has come up with some sim- 
ple, verifiable, practical measures that 
would go a long way to build confidence 
in Europe. Those measures, focusing on 
the conventional forces and the use by 
countries of those forces, are the best 
way to launch the CDE process. 

On Romania's general foreign policy 
orientation, Romania is a sovereign coun- 
try. Like any other sovereign country, it 
has the right to make its own foreign 
policy. We respect that right, and we 
woufd not interfere with its efforts to 
launch initiatives in the areas of arms 
control or any other area for that matter 



48 



Q. The Canadian Prime Minister, 
Pierre Trudeau, said during a seminar 
last weekend in Switzerland that the 
United States might not risk using 
nuclear weapons to save Western 
Europe from a conventional Soviet in- 
vasion. What is your comment on that? 

A. I have not read a transcript of 
precisely what the Prime Minister said. I 
read a few Canadian press articles 
earlier today. But without referring 
specifically "to the Prime Minister's 
remarks, I would just make the simple 
statement that every U.S. President, in- 
cluding the current one, has made it 
very clear that the United States is 
prepared to go to war to prevent a major 
attack in Europe. And that remains the 
U.S. policy. 

The policy is one of deterrence. We 
are not trying to fight a conflict in 
Europe. There would never be an effort 
to fight a limited conflict in Europe. But 
to deter a conflict by making it very 
clear, both through the presence of U.S. 
forces in Europe and, if necessary, 
through the presence of U.S. INF 
missiles in Europe, that the United 
States will be fully engaged in any con- 
flict in Europe, if such a conflict were to 
take place. 

Q. There is one place where you ac- 
tually do negotiate with the Soviet 
Union and that is right here in 
Stockholm. I would like to go back to 
the Stockholm conference. At the con- 
ference, the West and some of the 
neutral countries insist that the goal 
must be concrete and verifiable agree- 
ments concerning confidence-building 
measures. Could you foresee a situa- 
tion in which such measures are traded 
with more declaratory agreements that 
the East wants to get an agreement? 

A. It is always difficult to predict 
what might happen in the future. I just 
would make this simple point. 

What we should try to achieve in 
Stockholm, as well as in the other 
negotiations and in the Geneva negotia- 
tions if the Soviets come back and in the 
Vienna negotiations, are agreements that 
genuinely reduce the risks of conflict. 
Soviet proposals calling for the non-use 
of force, other proposals calling for 
nuclear free zones, do nothing to actually 
reduce the risk of conflict. 

What we need to do is negotiate 
agreements in the nuclear and the con- 
ventional areas that actually have an im- 
pact on the size of military forces or the 
ability of countries to use those forces, or 
at least the responsibilities that govern- 
ments have to provide information about 
their military capabilities. Those are 



SBBBB 



feasible, concrete, measures. Rhetorical, 
declaratory measures do not reduce the 
risks of conflict, but even worse, they 
can suggest that somehow the risk of 
war and the conflict is no longer there. 
That is a very dangerous outcome. It is 
an outcome which we want to avoid. 

Q. Did the United States prepare 
new proposals to the Soviet Union to 
get the arms control talks going again? 
What could those new proposals be? 

A. The answer is very simple; it is 
no. And that is why we, of course, are 
prepared to return to the negotiating 
table. We are prepared, if we get back to 
the negotiating table and the Soviets are 
there, to talk about ways to move the 
negotiations ahead. I mentioned Am- 
bassador Rowny's discussion of trade- 
offs in START negotiations, looking at 
their areas of advantage and ours. But 
we do not believe we should make con- 
cessions merely to get the Soviets back 
to the negotiating table. 

Why? Because it will not work. If the 
Soviet Union knows that the longer they 
stay away from the table, the more con- 
cessions will be made by the United 
States and other Western powers, they 
will not come back. It is just that simple. 
I think what we have to do is make it 
clear to the Soviet Union that we are 
ready to talk to them; we are ready to 
work with them to make progress; but 
we are not ready to make concessions 
merely for the honor of sitting down 
with them across a table. 

Q. I was not speaking of conces- 
sions but of proposals, which is not 
quite the same. 

A. We have good proposals on the 
table. We think the proposals in the INF 
negotiations that were made last 
fall-proposals that talked about regional 
limitations on INF missiles, that raised 
the possibility of limiting aircraft, that 
talked about reductions of the Pershing 
II— all of these created good oppor- 
tunities for progi-ess. 

We think that the proposals we have 
on the table are adequate. What we need 
is to get the Soviets back to the table so 
we can talk about them. 

Q. The United States considers that 
Europe is its ally. But can a strong 
alliance be realized with economically 
vulnerable partners? My question is 
what then are the measures which 
President Reagan intends to take to 
reduce the deficit of the American 
budget and to bring the dollar down to 
a reasonable rate for Europe and 
especially for France? 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



A. I certainly agree with the assump- 
tion which is you cannot have a strong 
alliance without a strong economic pro- 
gram on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Where we might disagree is on what are 
the implications of U.S. economic policy 
for Western Eurojie. 

I think that a strong dollar, in some 
respects, has been an advantage for the 
European economies. For one thing, it 
has certainly made it easier for West 
European economies to compete with the 
United States in third areas for e.xports. 

The United States is going to run, 
this year, somewhere in the area of 
$70,000 million in our trade deficit. And 
that money is going to be made by other 
countries. To some extent, you could 
argue that some of the early signs of a 
recovery that we see in Gei-many and 
Britain are a result of the strength of the 
U.S. dollar. 

Another policy area that is terribly 
important is the area of protectionism. 
So far both the United States and the 
Europeans have avoided a debilitating, 
dangerous trade war in the area of 
agriculture and in other areas. It is very 
important that we work to avoid such a 
trade war in the future. This is the 
responsibility of both sides. I understand 
your concerns about the deficit. The 
President of the United States shares 
those concerns about the deficit, and he 
wants to work with the Congress to do 
something about the deficit. 

Q. I have a question regarding the 
CDE Stockholm conference. Does this 
conference provide a new channel, a 
new desk also, for negotiations be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union? What is your assessment of the 
Stockholm conference and its impact 
on the negotiating process? Does this 
conference give more weight to Euro- 
pean security interests in American 
politics? 

A. The first thing I would say is yes, 
it does. The very fact that you have a 
conference focusing on European secu- 
rity, from the Atlantic to the Urals, will 
have an impact on American policy, and 
I think a good impact. It will focus our 
attention on the security problems in 
that special region. 

I think that already, while in its very 
early days of the conference itself, we in 
the United States have been struck by 
the very constructive atmosphere that 
exists in Stockholm. When I was in 
Stockholm with the Secretary of State, 
we felt a very constructive atmosphere 
in the discussions among the NATO 
ministers and also with the neutrals, as 



well as the Eastern countries. There 
seems to be a good spirit there, a 
recognition that when other aspects of 
the East- West relationship are somewhat 
strained, that it is important that people 
take a constructive attitude toward the 
Stockholm conference. That is certainly 
our perspective there. 

That said, I just would like to make 
very clear that we do not view the 
Stockholm conference as a surrogate 
negotiation for the Geneva talks or the 
Vienna talks. We think the focus in the 
Stockholm conference should be on the 
confidence-building measures, and we 
have asked our Ambassador there- 
James Goodby— to work closely not only 
with the allies but to work with his 
Soviet counterpart to see if it isn't pos- 
sible to make some progress in this par- 
ticular negotiation. 

Q. Will the United States relax its 
sanctions against the Polish Govern- 
ment in the near future? What are the 
present requirements for that? 

A. On the question of Poland, I 
would say our policy has evolved 
somewhat over last year. Our general 
policy toward Poland has been that we 
are prepared to seek an improved rela- 
tionship with the authorities in Warsaw, 
in response to tangible steps that they 
take in dealing both with union 
movements and the church and activists 
who have been imprisoned. There have 
been some developments, such as the 
successful visit by the Pope and the 
release of political prisoners, which has 
enabled the President of the United 
States to take a decision in principle to 
begin discussions with other Western 
countries on the question of debt 
rescheduling. 

More recently we have stated a will- 
ingness to begin discussions with Poland 
on the question of a fishing allocation in 
U.S. waters, and we have also discussed 
in princijDle the possibility of taking other 
steps such as providing the Polish 
charter airline access to the United 
States. This is a measured policy. It is 
designed on the one hand to recognize 
improvements in the Polish situation but 
on the other hand to make it very clear 
to the Polish authorities that we do not 
approve of the systematic suppression of 
the Solidarity movement and the Polish 
people who have sought more freedom in 
their system. 

Q. The double-track decision of 
1979 said it expects that the INF 
negotiations should be carried out in 
the framework of SALT II. Why are 
vou now so reluctant to merge START 
and INF? 



A. The INF negotiations, as dis- 
cussed by the allies in 1981 and 1982, 
were also addressed in the framework of 
START. That language, agreed to in 
1979, talked about INF in a framework. 
It does not suggest a merger of the 
negotiations. What it does suggest is a 
recognition that in a larger sense, the 
two negotiations need to be seen in the 
same context, and in Geneva, they have 
been seen in the same context. 

For example, in Washington we ad- 
dress both START and INF issues in a 
way that we understand the interrela- 
tionships. In Geneva, when the negotia- 
tions were underway, Paul Nitze [head of 
the U.S. delegation to the INF negotia- 
tions] and Ed Rowny consulted closely 
together. I think it is fair to say that the 
INF negotiations did take place in a 
START framework. That is a very dif- 
ferent thing than saying that they should 
be merged. 

The problem is that we have two 
separate negotiations. We have devel- 
oped negotiating proposals for those two 
separate negotiations; we think they are 
good proposals. If the Soviet Union has a 
different idea, a different approach, we 
will be prepared to discuss it with them. 

We have done a lot of work in these 
two negotiations. We have made some 
progi'ess. We think the current 
framework is perfectly adequate to reach 
agreements if the Soviet Union would 
come back to the negotiating table. 

Q. You have dismissed the idea 
that the Franco-British nuclear um- 
brella might replace the American 
umbrella. What about the chemical 
umbrella? The Soviets have proposed a 
European zone free of chemical 
weapons, and I am thinking of nerve 
gases, these terrible mass destruction 
weapons. The Europeans, except 
perhaps the French, have no ner\'e 
gases. Many think a European free 
zone would be good. What do you 
think of this Soviet proposal? 

A. We have made our view on this 
abundantly clear. We would like a global 
free zone on chemical weapons. The 
problem with a European free zone on 
chemical weapons is really the same as 
the problem with the nuclear free zone, 
and that is a European free zone pro- 
hibits the deplojTTient of different 
weapons in that zone. It does not stop or 
prohibit the ability of the Soviet Union 
to launch weapons from outside that 
area, in the Soviet territory, into 
Europe. 



mm 



EUROPE 



What we have said to the Soviets is 
that yes, we agree on the need to ban 
the protection and stockpiling of these 
weapons, but let's not just limit it to 
Europe. Let's do it worldwide. For one 
thing, it would be easier to verify if we 
could include the entire territory of the 
Soviet Union, as well as the United 
States. 

But it is also important to recognize 
that in the chemical weapons area verifi- 
cation will be a very, very difficult prob- 
lem We are working on that problem at 
the Conference on Disarmament m 
Geneva, and we are hoping, as Secretary 
of State Shultz made clear in Sweden, 
that in the near future, we will table a 
draft treaty which will lay out the details 
for how we would go about banning 
chemical weapons on a worldwide basis. 
Q. A NATO report yesterday said 
that the rate of growth of Soviet 
militarv spending declined over the 
last half of the 1970s to around 2%. 
from hetween 4% and m over the first 
half of that decade. Do you have any 
indications that that slowdown in 
Soviet military spending has continued 
into the 1980s, and, if so, how does this 
change, and how do you expect this to 
change U.S. perceptions of Soviet 
militarv might and intention? 

A. Let me say first of all that I have 
not had the opportunity to look at this 
specific NATO report. I suspect that it is 
based on reports that were done by the 
American intelligence community about a 
year ago and received some publicity at 

that time. , .^ *v. 

Basically the feelings were that the 
Soviet Union was beginning to spend 
slightly less on the procurement of 
weapons systems, mainly as it spent 
more on research and development. Ihat 
is the basic pattern we see in the Soviet 
defense effort; that they are ending, at 
this phase, a phase of procurement of a 
whole family of weapons systems in dil- 
ferent areas, and they are beginning to 
look toward the future and investing 
more in the research and development 

area. , 

We do not see any fundamental 
change in the overall thrust of the Soviet 
defense effort. Even if Soviet growth in 
spending declines to 2% per year, in real 
terms, I would want to point out that 
during the 1970s, for example, the U.S. 
defense effort declined 1% in real ternis. 

What we see is a steady pattern of 
Soviet growth. It is difficult to 
predict-to look too far into the 
future-but I think that the American in- 
telligence community has concluded that 



there will certainly be real constraints on 
Soviet defense spending, given the prob- 
lems of the Soviet economy, that the 
Soviet military will still be able to count 
on an increased level of spending year 
after year during the decade of the 
1980s! 

Q. How imperative-if we go back 
to INF-is Geneva as the negotiating 
place, and how imperative is any 
specific negotiating place? In other 
words, that the whole field of 
geographical, technical problems, and 
definition matters must have been 
covered there in the last 2 years. But if 
we think about that in the course of 
1984, a sort of direct diplomatic and 
political negotiations between 
Washington and Moscow would start, 
especiallv since that would not compel 
the Soviet Union to return physically 
to Geneva and accept a loss in 
prestige. 

A. I don't know precisely what you 
have in mind, but I think it is important 
to recognize that we do discuss these 
issues in other channels. The Secretary 
of State, for example, sees Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. 
Our Ambassador in Moscow, Am- 
bassador Hartman, regularly sees Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko. Earlier this 
afternoon we discussed the recent 5-hour 
meeting between Secretary Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko. There could 
conceivably be future meetings between 
these two "later in the year. We do have 
venues for talking about these issues. 
High-level political discussion is impor- 
tant to encourage progress in the 
negotiations. . 

But they certainly do not substitute 
for the negotiations themselves. It is im- 
portant, after all, to discuss these _ 
technical issues. In arms control, as m a 
lot of other very complex areas, the devil 
is in the details. And it is important if 
we are going to make progress in the 
negotiations not only that senior political 
officials discuss these issues and talk 
about them but it is also important that 
the negotiators themselves get back to 
the table. 



Q. At a recent experts' meeting 
within NATO in Brussels, there was a 
discussion about a neutralization 
of West European countries. The term 
"Swedenization" was used. Could you 
comment on this? 

A I don't comment on "Swedeniza- 
tion," "Finlandization," or "Americaniza- 
tion." 



Q. You have talked about the im- 
portance of conventional defense, or 
the improvement of it, in Europe. One 
of the problems that arises, particu- 
larly for Europeans and particularly in 
the "light of the strong dollar, is that 
they have to produce so many of their 
new weapons from the United States. 
Can you talk to us about what plans 
the Administration has to enable Euro- 
peans to have access to U.S. advanced 
technology in new weapons and to 
share the costs of procuring these 
weapons for the alliance? 

A. It is a problem that a lot of time 
and effort have been spent talking 
about-the so-called two-way street, the 
desii-e of our European allies to have 
greater access to the American arms 
market. It is absolutely correct that not 
enough progi-ess has been made in the 
recent past in this area. 

We are looking at this problem now. 
As you may know, our new Ambassador 
to NATO, David Abshire, is very in- 
terested in the whole NATO resource 
problem, and he is talking not only to 
NATO officials but to Members of Con- 
gress about this issue. 

We are making some progress. For 
example, in many major weapons system 
purchases now-the European purchases 
from the United States-there are offsets 
where a good portion, if not all, of the 
money that government spends to ac- 
quirea new conventional weapons 
system is spent in the country that is 
making the purchase. 

An example of this was a recent deal 
for the conventional Patriot air defense 
system in Germany. These kinds of 
developments offset payments- seekmg 
ways to encourage a greater two-way 
street in the defense market-these are 
developments that should be encouraged. 
They will have to be encouraged if our 
European allies are going to continue to 
spend more and do what is necessary to 
maintain a strong conventional defense. 

Q. We know there is a rather inten- 
sive and critical discussion of NATO 
strategy here in this country, which 
centers, to a large extent, on the first- 
use threat of nuclear weapons by 
NATO. If we could establish a stable 
conventional balance in Europe, do 
you think that NATO could renounce 
the first-use threat? 

A. NATO strategy is that we will not 
use nuclear weapons first. NATO 
strategy is that the Soviet Union cannot 
rule out the possibility that in the event 
of a large-scale conventional attack that 
nuclear weapons would be used. 



50 



noDUi 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



With that clai-ification, what you 
have to ask yourself is, would announc- 
ing a no first-use policy strengthen or 
weaken deterrence? You are correct that 
if we could do more to enhance our con- 
ventional capabilities and create a con- 



ventional balance in Europe, and this is a 
worthy objective— the cost of that might 
surprise some people— there is still, of 
course, the real possibility of Soviet 
nuclear blackmail. 



1 think that what we need to do now 
is recognize that we have a strategy of 
deterrence, based now on the need to 
maintain a strong conventional capability 
and a credible nuclear capability. That 
strategy has worked for 30 years.B 



Visit of Yugoslav President 



President Mika Spiljak of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
made an official working visit to 
Washingtoti, D.C., January 31- 
February 2, 198U, to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and President Spiljak 
after their meeting on February 1.^ 

President Reagan 

It's been a great pleasure for me and for 
all of us to be able to welcome President 
Spiljak of Yugoslavia and to confer with 
him on issues of importance to both our 
countries. 

Relations between Yugoslavia and 
the United States are good. President 
Spiljak' s visit follows a long and well- 
established tradition of consultation and 
cooperation. The United States strongly 
supports Yugoslavia's independence, 
unity, and territorial integrity. Further, 
we respect its policy of nonalignment. 
Further, we respect this man who has 
done so much in these recent years for 
his country. 

Despite understandable differences, 
consultations between us provide a 
unique and valuable perspective, and to- 
day's meeting was no exception. I ex- 
pressed to the President our continued 
support for his government's efforts to 
meet its serious economic challenges. 
We'll do our part to help in cooperation 
with other Western governments, inter- 
national financial institutions, and com- 
mercial banks. Vigorous economic 
recovery in the United States will itself 
help Yugoslavia by creating new oppor- 
tunities for mutually beneficial commer- 
cial activity and the strengthening of 
bilateral trade. 

Yugoslavia, like other nations of 
Europe, hopes for progress in arms con- 
trol negotiations between the United 




States and the Soviet Union. I conveyed 
to President Spiljak our deeper commit- 
ment to reach equitable, verifiable 
agreements with the Soviet Union. Such 
agreements would be in our interest, the 
Soviet Union's interest, and in the in- 
terest of all mankind. We're flexible and 
realistic in pursuit of this goal and share 
the President's hope that the negotia- 
tions will resume in the near future. 

Today, we also discussed the serious 
menace of international terrorism and 
underscored our intention to cooperate in 
opposing it wherever it occurs and for 
whatevei- reasons. The United States 
deplores all ten-orist attacks against 
Yugoslav diplomatic counsellor and other 
representatives, and we will not tolerate 
such attacks on our territory. 

The American people join me in con- 
veying our best wishes to the people of 
Yugoslavia for the success of this year's 
Winter Olympic Games, which will begin 
next week in Sarajevo. Like our Los 
Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, 
the Yugoslav Olympic Committee has in- 
vested tremendous human and material 



resources in putting the games together. 
As the two host countries for the 1984 
games, we have reason to be proud of 
these endeavors. 

It's especially fitting that in this 
Olympic year, we're signing a 
U.S.-Yugoslav tourism agreement. We 
hope that the agreement to be signed 
tomorrow will lead to an increase in 
tourism and good will between our two 
countries. 

President Spiljak has been an espec- 
ially welcome guest, and I look forward to 
frequent consultations with him. And I'm 
confident that our bilateral relations will 
continue to grow and flourish. It's been 
good to have you here. 

President Spiljak^ 

First of all, I would like to express my 
pleasure with the opportunity to visit the 
United States of America and exchange 
views with President Reagan on the 
possibilities for promoting further our 
bilateral cooperation and on some impor- 
tant international issues. 



April 1984 



EUROPE 



I would like to point out that the 
talks with President Reagan were held 
in a friendly and candid atmosphere of 
full, mutual respect which characterizes 
the relations between our two countries 
and peoples. President Reagan and I 
share the view that a practice of dialogue 
in meetings between the highest repre- 
sentatives of our two countries, regard- 
less of the well-known diffei-ences in our 
positions and views in some international 
issues, continues to greatly contribute to 
a bettei" mutual understanding and stable 
cooperation in all fields of mutual in- 
terest. The principles of equality, in- 
dependence, and noninterference as a 
mutually accepted basis for bilateral rela- 
tions and cooperation were reaffirmed in 
our talks today. 

I'm glad to note that our talks con- 
firmed once again that the overall 
Yugoslav-American relations have been 
developing successfully and that there 
exist ample possibilities for their even 
more comprehensive promotion in the 
long run. 

As President Reagan displayed the 
interest, I briefed him on the essence of 
the Yugoslav long-term program for 
economic stabilization. The achievement 
of our targets will offer a broader basis 
for an overall economic cooperation with 
all countries and in which the United 
States of America is one of the most 
significant partners. In this context, I 
would like to emphasize that we attach 
great importance to the results achieved, 
as well as to the prospects to develop 
further mutual, economic cooperation in 
all areas. In this respect, special atten- 
tion should be devoted to industrial, 
technological, financial cooperation, as 
well as joint ventures. 

President Reagan reiterated the 
resolve of the U.S. administration to pre- 
vent the terrorists and other hostile ac- 
tivities against Yugoslavia which are, at 
the same time, directed against the good 
Yugoslav-American relations and 
cooperation. 

I had a very useful exchange of 
views with President Reagan on press- 
ing international issues. Thus we 
acquired a greater knowledge of, and 
gained a better insight in, the positions 
and activities of our two countries on the 
international scene. We share the con- 
cern over the present dangerous 
developments and further deterioration 
of the situation in the world. 

We agreed that the policy of the 
release of intemational tensions in 
negotiation has no alteraative. We, for 
our part, pointed in particular to the 
need for strengthening international con- 
fidence and creating an atmosphere 



Yugoslavia— A Profile 



People 

Noun and adjective: VuK<islav(s|. Population 
(IHiSl est.): TZA million. Annual growth 
rate: \"/i<. Clearly defined ethnic groups: 

Serli.s .Sti'!';,, Croats Lid'!:!. Bosnian MusHnis 
y'Ki. Macedonians fi%, Slovenes 8%. Alba- 
nians H%. Montenegrin Serbs 3'Ki. 
Hunjjarians 2%. Turks d..")"^.. Religions: 
Kastern Orthodox (Serbian ami Macedonian). 
Koniaii t'atholie, Muslim. Languages: Serbo- 
Croatian. Slovenian. Macedonian. Albanian, 
Hungarian. Education: .4 //f-y/i/'nirr — !l!l'S, m 
primary scIkioI (1979). Lilcniri/—H:^"/.,. 
Health: hijiinl morhilili/ /vj/i — li^.S/l .(KHI 
(19S1). Lij'i- I'Xjit'cldiirfi — men <W yrs.. women 
73 yrs. Work force (.5,786.000): Aijnnil- 
liiri — 3(»'R.. hi(liistry—lU%. 

Geography 

Area: 2.56.409 s(). km. (99,001) sq. mi.); aliout 
two-thirds the size of California. Cities: 
r„/„/„/ — Belgrade (pop. 1,300.000). Other 
.■/7/r.v— Zagreb (700.000), Sk(>|)je (44().()00). 
Sarajevo (400,000), Ljubljana (3()(),000). Ter- 
rain: One-third lowland hills and plains, with 
remainder mostly mountainous. Climate: 
Ciiiisl — hot m summer, rainy and mild in 
winter. Inhnid — warm in summer, cold in 
w inter. 

Government 

Type: Federal republu Independence: 
Dec-ember 1. 191,s, Constitution: February 
197-4, 

Branches: Ej-cculiti- — president of the 
Presideniv (chief of stati'. rotated annually 
from among the collective l)ody). (ireniier 
(lieail of government and president of the 
Federal Kxecutive Council. 4-vr Icnnl. 



/,i7rs7.//(/r —bicameral /Xssemlily (30,s 
delegates). Federal Kxecutive Council 
(cabinet; As.semlily's executive arm). 
.Iiiiliciiil — Constitutional Court. Federal 
Supreme Court. 

•Administrative subdivisions: (i re|iublics. 
- autononiou.-. pro\iiices. 

Political party: Lea^iie of Communists of 
Yujioshuia. Suffrage: Cniversal overage 18. 

Defense expenditures (1983 est.): 'k'>"/« 
ulCNl' 

Economy 

GNP (1981): .$.■>!. .5 billion. Annual tiNF 
growth rate (1981-82): 2.2'^. Per capita 
GNP (1981): .$2,300. .\vg. inflation rate 

(1982): 40'^.. 

Natural resources: Coal, copper, bauxite, 
timber, iron, antimony, chromium, lead, zinc, 
asbestos, mercury. 

Agriculture (13'!^, of (d)!'): L<n,il—{WV„ 
arable. .33'K, of which is plowlaml. Prml- 
iirls — corn, wheat, tobacco, sugar beets, 
livestock. 

Industries (37% of CD!'): VVoo.l. proc- 
es.sed food, nonferrous metals, machinery, 
textiles. 

Trade (1982): AV/,„w.s— $10.2 billion: 
agricultural products (including proi-essed 
meats), wooden furniture, leather goods and 
shoes, textiles. shi|)S. mineral ores, metal 
jiroducts. and tobacco. A/</./o/- wnrkcls— 
I SSK. ItaK. FKC. Czechoslovakia. //»- 
pitrls — .Si:i.3 billion: machinery and metal 
proiUicts, chemicals, iron, [letroleum. coking 
coal, steel, and agricultural products. . \//;yoc 
,,.„„, -/..s—l SSK. FKC. ItaK. IS. 



Taken from the Background Notes of June 
1983, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
.J. Darnell Adams. ■ 



favorable for the renewal of dialogue as a 
precondition for the settlement of the 
acute international political and economic 
problems. 

I also informed President Reagan of 
our assessments of the East-West rela- 
tions, the situation in Europe, and of our 
deep concern over the continuation of the 
arms race, in particular. We presented 
our views on the problems of the rela- 
tions between the developed and the 
developing countries, as well as our 
assessments of some acute hotbeds of 
crisis such as the Middle East and Near 
East, southern Africa, and others. We 
find it to the need of i-esolving them by 
peaceful means in compliance with the 
principles and purposes of the Charter of 



the United Nations. In this context, we 
pointed to the activities and initiatives of 
the nonaligned countries at solving the 
outstanding international problems. 

I'm confident that my visit and the 
fruitful and meaningful talks I had with 
President Reagan will give a fresh boost 
to an even more comprehensive develop- 
ment of cooperation between our two 
countries, thus contributing to interna- 
tional understanding in general. 



'Made to repoiters assembled at the 
South Portico of the White House (text from 
Weeklv Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Feb. 6, 1984). 

^Pi'esident Spiljak read the opening and 
closing portions of his statement in Serbo- 
Croatian; his inteipreter read the complete 
statement in English. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices for 1983 



FoUoiving is the introduction from 
Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1983, which was prepared by the 
Department of State and submitted to the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee and 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in February 198\. 



DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

For the last two years the introduction 
has contained an exposition of United 
States human rights policy as for- 
mulated in the Reagan Administration. 
The relationship between democracy and 
human rights is at the core of that 
human rights policy. The purpose of the 
present introduction is to examine that 
relationship in greater depth. 

The Experience of 
Human Rights Work 

Over the past three years, the United 
States Government has employed a 
broad range of instruments and tech- 
niques in responding to specific cases of 
human rights violations. In dealing with 
friendly governments, we have engaged 
in the kind of frank diplomatic ex- 
changes often referred to as "quiet 
diplomacy." Where diplomatic ap- 
proaches have not availed, or where our 
influence with a foreign government is 
minimal, we have dissociated ourselves 
from odious human rights practices by 
denying economic and military assist- 
ance, voting against multilateral loans, 
and denying diplomatic support. Where 
appropriate, we have distanced 
ourselves from human rights violators 
by public pressures and statements de- 
nouncing their actions. In most cases, 
we have employed a mixture of tradi- 
tional diplomacy and public affirmation 
of American interest in the issue. 

The success of these efforts has 
varied with the degree of leverage we 
have in a given country, the political en- 
vironment, and the energy and skill of 
our diplomatic representatives. 

Diplomatic exchanges on behalf of 
dissidents, and other victims of human 
rights abuse, are by their very nature 
confidential. Although we cannot public- 
ly claim credit, American representa- 
tions have often been instrumental in 



halting human rights violations against 
dissidents by governments with whom 
we enjoy some common interests. 
Perhaps the phrase "quiet diplomacy" 
does not fully convey either the intensity 
of American efforts, or the depth of our 
concern, on behalf of human rights vic- 
tims, yet in many cases, this kind of in- 
tercession has proven an effective 
response to human rights violations. Let 
us be clear that "quiet diplomacy" refers 
only to confidentiality of the diplomatic 
channels we use, rwt to the intensity of 
our representations. 

Compassion requires us to intervene 
in specific cases. When we have done so, 
we have often had successes. Such suc- 
cesses are important because they 
relieve suffering; in a few cases they can 
also have a major symbolic impact on a 
country and serve as a precedent for 
future improvements. But it is impor- 
tant to acknowledge the frustrations of 
this kind of work. All too often, the best 
efforts of any government can secure 
the release of a political prisoner only to 
see another political prisoner arrested; 
they can persuade a government to sus- 
pend the practice of torture only to see 
it renewed later on; they can secure per- 
mission for someone to leave his country 
only to see the next citizen who seeks to 
leave denied this right. We intervene, 
knowing very well that our interventions 
may fail to prevent new violations of the 
same type. 

In this regard, the human rights 
work traditionally done by the State 
Department differs from most other 
kinds of work undertaken in foreign 
policy. In other areas, diplomatic effort 
frequently culminates in major trans- 
formations: an arms control treaty, a 
treaty resolving a major conflict, an 
alliance between ourselves and another 
country, a diplomatic opening to a 
heretofore hostile country, a successful 



Copies of the Report 

The complete volume documents human 
rights practices in more than 160 countries of 
the world. It may be purchased for $23.00 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. Remittance must accompany 
order. ■ 



military action in defense of our friends, 
a new aid program. These are actions 
that may change the international 
system. Our case-by-case human rights 
work, in its very specific nature, cannot 
effect such changes. Of all the areas of 
traditional human rights work, it is 
perhaps only in the international 
organizations, where we can sometimes 
obtain a vote publicly identifying a ma- 
jor human rights violation, that our 
work is most marked by spectacular 
events similar to those that can take 
place in other areas of foreign policy. 
Thus, the criteria of success in human 
rights work are inherently less clear, 
and human rights work is inherently 
more frustrating for those doing it than 
other branches of diplomacy. 

Democracy and Human Rights 

For this reason, the Reagan Administra- 
tion has developed a two-track human 
rights policy. The first track is embodied 
in the way we oppose specific human 
rights violations over the short term. 
Thus, to take only public activities, we 
have spoken out against such gross af- 
fronts to human rights as the incarcera- 
tion of Soviet dissidents in psychiatric 
wards and the resurgence of officially 
sponsored anti-Semitism in the Soviet 
Union; the barbaric persecution of 
adherents of the Baha'i faith in Iran; the 
institutionalization of racial injustice by 
the apartheid system in South Africa; 
the destruction of the free trade union 
movement, Solidarity, in Poland; the ac- 
tivities of the "death squads" in El 
Salvador; the persecution of the Miskito 
Indians in Nicaragua; and the use of 
outlawed toxic weapons by Soviet forces 
in Afghanistan and by Vietnamese 
forces in Kampuchea. In these and other 
cases of human rights abuse, we have 
made use of such influence as we 
possess to help individual victims. 

At the same time, we have ad- 
dressed the long range need to create a 
system of government which institu- 
tionalizes the protection of human 
rights. For just as the creation of an 
economic system which promotes 
growth and prosperity is a better long 
term solution to the problem of poverty 
than repeated acts of charity, so, too, 
the creation of a system of government 
which safeguards human rights is a bet- 
ter long range response to the problem 
of human rights abuse than repeated, 
case-by-case diplomatic representations. 

This, then, is the second track of 
United States human rights policy: the 
long term development of democratic 
governments, which are the surest 



April 1984 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



safeguard of human rights. President 
Reagan has made the encouragement of 
democracy throughout the world a cen- 
tral goal. Too often our human rights 
policy has been simply reactive, respond- 
ing to violations after they have oc- 
curred rather than working to prevent 
them. The President has sought to go 
beyond this to an active, positive human 
rights policy. 

He outlined his conception in a 
speech to Parliament in London in June, 



The impetus behind the second track 
of our human rights policy is the 
recognition that a close connection exists 
between a democratic form of govern- 
ment and respect for human rights. As 
both the State Department's Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, and 
the reports of independent human rights 
groups, such as Freedom House, have 
repeatedly demonstrated, most democ- 
racies have excellent human rights 
records. Nor is this merely a coin- 



. . /'quiet diplomacy" refers only to confidentiality 
of the diplomatic channels we use, not to the inten- 
sity of our representations. 



1982, when he announced that the 
chairmen of the national Republican and 
Democratic parties were initiating a 
study to determine how the United 
States could best contribute to the 
global campaign for democracy. That 
study has now been completed, and its 
recommendations have been supported 
by Congress. The result has been the 
establishment of a National Endowment 
for Democracy, which will greatly ex- 
pand the involvement of our two major 
political parties, as well as labor, 
business and other private institutions, 
in programs designed to promote demo- 
cratic institutions and practices abroad. 
Such programs will be insulated from 
United States Government control, and 
will respond to the needs of men and 
women working for democracy in their 
own societies. 

Even before funding the National 
Endowment for Democracy, Congress 
had established one human rights pro- 
gram on the positive side. Section 116(e) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act provides 
Agency for International Development 
(AID) funding for programs and ac- 
tivities which encourage or promote in- 
creased adherence to civil and political 
rights in countries eligible for United 
States bilateral assistance. In Fiscal 
Year 1983 AID funded 51 activities 
totalling $1,853,466. Activities included 
support for the development of guide- 
lines for election observers, support for 
human rights education and training 
programs, and support for programs 
aimed at assisting government and 
private legal institutions abroad. 



cidence. Democracy, after all, is a form 
of government which is based on the 
freely given consent of the governed. 
But consent can only be freely given if 
the means for the free expression of 
consent, or of dissent, exist; such means 
include freedom of speech, freedom of 
press, freedom of assembly and associa- 
tion, an independent judiciary, and free 
elections. Thus, respect for human 
rights is built into the very foundations 
of the democratic form of government. 

All this is not to say that serious 
human rights violations can never take 
place in a democracy. But because free, 
competitive and periodic elections make 
the government accountable for its ac- 
tions to the electorate, such violations as 
do occur tend to be self-correcting over 
time. As Thomas Jefferson pointed out 
in his First Inaugural Address, free elec- 
tions are "a mild and safe corrective of 
abuses which are lopped off by the 
sword of the revolution where peaceable 
remedies are unprovided." In its ca- 
pacity to initiate a thorough-going proc- 
ess of peaceful reform, democracy dif- 
fers fundamentally from all other forms 
of government. Democracy is therefore 
the nearest thing we have to a guar- 
antee of human rights. 

Moreover, democratic government is 
also a precondition to the achievement 
of social justice. Recent events in Poland 
vividly confirm this. A basic grievance 
voiced by Solidarity was that members 
of the Polish Communist Party had 
ready access to the best food stores, the 
best medical care, and the best shops, 
while the ordinary Polish worker had ac- 
cess to none of these things. The Com- 



munist ruling class in Poland, aided and 
abetted by the Communist ruling class in 
the Soviet Union, responded to this 
grievance by imposing martial law, 
outlawing Solidarity, and holding its 
leader, Lech Walesa, incommunicado for 
many months. Today, Poland remains 
bitterly divided between the rulers and 
the ruled. That this has occurred in a 
self-proclaimed "Workers' State" only 
serves to underscore the absolute 
necessity of making the government ac- 
countable to the governed. For, to quote 
Jefferson once more, "Every govern- 
ment degenerates when trusted to the 
rulers of the people alone." 

Democracy and Minority Rights 

It is so true that democracy guarantees 
human rights that it requires an effort 
to bring to mind the apparent excep- 
tions. Minority rights are the greatest of 
these. For long periods in the United 
States, as in other democracies, the 
rights of minorities were systematically 
violated by the majority. It is no acci- 
dent that this is the greatest exception 
to the effectiveness of democracy as a 
guarantee of human rights. If democ- 
racy makes the government responsible 
to the will of the majority, it can, in 
theory, also become the vehicle whereby 
the majority disenfranchises the minori- 
ty. To prevent this from happening, a 
means must be devised to reconcile ma- 
jority rule with minority rights. As 
James Madison warned in Federalist 
Paper No. 10, the democratic form of 
government might enable a majority "to 
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest 
both the public good and the rights of 
other citizens. To secure the public good 
and private rights against the danger of 
such a faction, and at the same time to 
preserve the spirit and the form of 
popular government, is then the great 
object" of the authors of the Con- 
stitution. 

In the understanding of American 
statesmen who wrestled with this prob- 
lem, two elements of democratic political 
life can be brought into play against the 
deprivation of minority rights. The first 
is equality. Democratic political life im- 
plies natural equality, and this is 
ultimately incompatible with the subor- 
dination of minorities. Abraham Lincoln 
thus regarded equality as the central 
principle of American democracy: 

Public opinion, on any subject, always has 
a "central idea," from which all its minor 
thoughts radiate. That "central idea" in our 
political public opinion at the beginning was, 
and until recently has continued to be, "the 



ai 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



equality of men." And although it has alv> ays 
submitted patiently to whatever of inequality 
there seemed to be as a matter of actual 
necessity, its constant working has been a 
steady progress toward the practical equality 
of all men. 

The second democratic guard 
against the loss of minority rights is 
more practical. In order to secure 
minority rights against an overbearing 
majority, the makers of the American 
Revolution set out to encourage what 
James Madison called "a multiplicity of 
interests" throughout the United States. 
When society consists of a "great variety 
of interests, parties, and sects," wrote 
Madison in Federalist Paper No. 51, "a 
coalition of the majority of the whole 
society could seldom take place on any 
other principles than those of justice and 
the general good." With society "broken 
into so many parts, interests and classes 
of citizens," Madision concluded, "the 
rights of individuals, or of the minority, 
will be in little danger from interested 
combinations of the majority." In short, 
the security of minority rights depends 
on the diversity of interests in society: 
the greater the diversity, the more 
secure the rights. 

This diversity tends to guarantee 
human rights in another and even more 
practical way. Democracy works by 
making respect for human rights not 
only a matter of principles but of in- 
terests. A free press has a natural in- 
terest in securing freedom of opinion, as 
free churches have in securing freedom 
of religion. Lawyers who are accus- 
tomed to independence are naturally in- 
sistent on the right to a fair trial. 
Teachers who are accustomed to pro- 
fessing their own opinions are likely to 
insist on academic freedom. 

This, then, is the formula devised by 
the framers of the American democratic 
constitution to reconcile majority rule 
with minority rights: democratic govern- 
ment in the political sphere, diversity 
and pluralism in the social sphere, both 
operating under the principle of equality. 

With this situation we should com- 
pare minority rights under communism. 
The principles of the Bolshevik Revolu- 
tion were thoroughly internationalist 
and egalitarian, but the greatest real 
equality between the nationalities of the 
Soviet Union existed in the 1920's. Since 
then minority rights have been sys- 
tematically, even brutally, eroded. 

In the early years of Soviet history 
the party organizations in many of the 
national republics were dominated by 
local people, and were able in certain 
cases to work out indigenous versions of 



April 1984 



communism. At the national level, there 
were strict restraints on "Great Russian 
chauvinism," and many of the Soviet 
leaders in Moscow were neither Rus- 
sians nor Slavs. Subsequently, there 
were massive purges of the local Com- 
munist parties, together with the purg- 
ing of many indigenous elements from 
the national literatures and from the 
languages themselves. Today the Rus- 
sian people are given a special status 
above the others, and any expression of 
national distinctiveness is potentially 
open to criticism as "bourgeois na- 
tionalism." The national republics have 
Russian Second Secretaries to assure 
their fidelity to central policy, and it is 
taken for granted that the General 
Secretary must be a Russian or at least 
a Slav. 

This fact presents a vivid contrast to 
the position of minority rights in 
democratic countries, where the original 
principles of equality have again and 
again been restored. Abraham Lincoln 
did not discover his opposition to slavery 
as something new, but rediscovered the 
implication of the Declaration of In- 
dependence when it declared that all 
men are created equal. 

Indeed, the principles of equal rights 
were not only restored again and again, 
but restored in a more exact form. At 
the time of the American Revolution, 
women and most blacks did not share in 
voting. But their right to do so was 
somehow latent in the principle that all 
men are created equal. It took about a 
hundred and fifty years for women to be 
admitted to democratic self-governance 



Perhaps the answer lies in the fact 
that in the Soviet Union the realization 
of political principles is entrusted entire- 
ly to a central government. And that 
central government organizes and 
directs all activity within the country. 
Thus there can be no writers who freely 
point out the oppression of minorities, 
no civil rights groups to point out the 
forgetting of the founding principles of 
the regime, no new party founded— as 
the Republican Party was founded dur- 
ing the 1850's— to challenge injustice to 
minorities. There are, in the Soviet 
order, no groups, factions, and organiza- 
tions which themselves interpret, resort 
to, and reassert the political ideals of the 
regime. In the absence of such diversity 
the interpretation of the regime's found- 
ing principles is the interpretation given 
by the central government. Of course, as 
time passes that government will be 
pressed by various tactical necessities to 
compromise its original principles. Hav- 
ing compromised its principles for tac- 
tical reasons, a government which is the 
authoritative interpreter of national 
tradition will be compelled to reinterpret 
and corrupt that tradition to conform to 
its tactical needs. 

It is different when the society, and 
not the government, is the guardian of 
the country's principles. Independent 
organizations, groups, and factions are 
free to reassert the founding principles, 
such as equality or religious freedom, in 
a pure form. It is then for the demo- 
cratic political process to compromise 
among these statements of principles 
when they conflict, and not for the 



. . . today democracy has seized the imagination of 
the world to such an extent that even the most 
despotic regime feels obliged to refer to the people 
as the source of its legitimacy, and to hold periodic 
elections, however bogus. 



in the United States. It took a century 
to resolve the question of black suffrage 
constitutionally, and nearly two cen- 
turies for full voting rights to be 
guaranteed. But these changes were 
made, and they were made by returning 
to the principles of natural equality 
enunciated at the founding. What is the 
reason for this evident contrast between 
two systems, one in which the founding 
principles were progressively eroded and 
compromised, the other in which they 
unfolded and developed? 



government to do so. Thus the historical 
fact— the vitality and growth of the 
founding principles in democracies and 
their erosion in totalitarian regimes- 
should not be so surprising. It follows 
from the diversity of the society, which 
Madison recommended and which 
modern democracies embody in practice. 
The measure of its success may be 
gauged by the fact that whereas before 
the American Revolution, democratic 
government was held in such disrepute 
that Madison felt obliged to rescue it 



55 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



"from the opprobrium under which it has 
so long labored," today democracy has 
seized the imagination of the world to 
such an extent that even the most 
despotic regime feels obliged to refer to 
the people as the source of its 
legitimacy, and to hold periodic elec- 
tions, however bogus. 

Diversity and Human Rights 

In framing its current human rights 
policy, the United States Government 
has tried to draw on the tradition of 
democratic thinking. Thus, one of the 
goals of our democracy initiative is to 
encourage diversity and pluralism in 
non-democratic societies. We believe 
that once a "multiplicity of interests" 
begins to flourish in the economic 
sphere, the educational sphere, the 
religious sphere, the cultural sphere, and 
the social sphere, it becomes increasing- 
ly difficult for non-democratic govern- 
ments to exclude a similar degree of 
diversity in the political sphere. 
Democratic legitimacy— the notion that 
"the people" must somehow rule— is a 
powerful force in the modern world, but 
it will never be effectively embodied in 
institutions until there is a "great va- 
riety of interests, parties and sects." 
Looking around the world, there are 
some grounds for the generalization that 
democracy has been more successful in 



abandonment of diversity in the political 
sphere never led to the abrogation of 
diversity in the social sphere— would 
seem to confirm the accuracy of this 
view. By encouraging social diversity, 
the United States is now helping to pro- 
mote the transformation of non-demo- 
cratic regimes into democratic ones. 

Unfortunately, not all dictatorships 
are prepared to tolerate a measure of 
diversity in the non-political sphere. The 
twentieth century has witnessed a new 
phenomenon, the emergence of totali- 
tarian dictatorship, in its Communist 
and Fascist varieties. Totalitarian 
regimes, besides maintaining a monopoly 
on political activity, also claim the 
authority to direct all economic, social 
and cultural developments towards the 
attainment of a Utopian image of man's 
future. In Communist or Fascist states, 
society is not permitted to exist in its 
diversity as an autonomous entity, 
capable of exerting pressure on the 
regime. After the Second World War ex- 
tinguished the Fascist totalitarian 
regimes. Communist regimes remain the 
most hostile to internal diversity. It is 
no coincidence, then, that while a 
number of non-Communist dictatorships 
have evolved into democratic regimes, 
the world has yet to witness the 
peaceful transformation of a single Com- 
munist dictatorship into a democracy. 
Poland— an apparent exception to this 
generalization— is the only Soviet bloc 



. . . there are some grounds for the generalization 
that democracy has been more successful in estab- 
lishing itself in countries where there were multiple 
centers of power than in countries where social ac- 
tivity was organized from a center that dominated 
the whole life of the nation. 



establishing itself in countries where 
there were multiple centers of power 
than in countries where social activity 
was organized from a center that 
dominated the whole life of the nation. 
For example, democracy has tended to 
be more successful in countries that had 
a tradition of feudalism than in those 
where absolute monarchy was impor- 
tant: more successful in Japan than in 
China, in Nigeria than in Uganda. The 
return to democratic government in re- 
cent years in Spain, Portugal, Greece 
and Argentina— countries where the 



56 



state without a system of collectivized 
agriculture, as well as the one with the 
strongest independent church. 

This distinction between Communist 
and non-Communist dictatorships has 
obvious implications for human rights 
policy. All dictatorships— both on the left 
and the right— engage in serious human 
rights violations. All human rights viola- 
tions, in turn, deserve to be condemned. 
But while non-Communist dictatorships 
are capable, to varying degrees, of 
evolving into democracies, Communist 
dictatorships are singularly resistant to 



democratization. Because Communist 
and non-Communist dictatorships differ 
so radically in their potentialities for the 
future, it follows that preventing Com- 
munist dictatorships from establishing 
themselves ought to be an especially 
high priority of any realistic and serious 
human rights policy. 

This is not to say that similar human 
rights violations by Communist and non- 
Communist governments ought to be 
treated differently. But in a situation of 
instability, where a government such as 
Somoza's or the Shah's may shatter and 
be succeeded by another very different 
form of government, these distinctions 
become relevant. When we take our 
bearings not only by the human rights 
symptoms but by their causes, the dif- 
ference between types of political 
systems can become crucial. 

Why It Is Not Futile 
To Support Democracy 

Thus the experience of practical human 
rights work strengthens the analysis 
that leads us from human rights case 
work by itself, toward addressing 
underlying systemic problems. It shows 
that if we are going to produce major 
changes in human rights conditions, we 
can only do so by changing political 
systems— by encouraging democracy. 
The preceding analysis does not in itself 
show that the encouragement of democ- 
racy is a feasible undertaking. To see 
why it is, we need to look beyond our 
own times. When we seek, on top of 
eliminating human rights violations in 
specific cases, to change entire systems, 
it might seem that we go beyond the dif- 
ficult to the truly Utopian. Such a conclu- 
sion would be absolutely correct if we 
ignored the difference between the long 
term and the short term. At any par- 
ticular time in the past it was indeed 
Utopian to believe that absolute mon- 
archy, slavery, or serfdom could be 
abolished. But all these things were 
abolished. If we see only our particular 
moment in history, things will seem im- 
pregnable that are already being eroded 
by unseen but vast tides of history. In 
fact, any efforts we make on behalf of 
democracy, small as they may be, are 
sustained by democracy's gradual expan- 
sion since the days of the American 
Revolution. In 1790, there existed only 
two democratic republics: the United 
States and part of Switzerland. By 1909, 
there were a number of constitutional 
monarchies, but the tenacity of the old 
order was shown by the fact that there 
were still only three republics outside 
the Western Hemisphere: France, Swit- 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



itse'J 



zerland and Liberia. Today, there are 
fifty genuine democracies, comprising 
about a third of the world's population, 
and enjoying both the full panoply of 
political and civil liberties and— taken as 
a group— the world's highest standard of 
economic well-being. 

Whenever a non-democratic country 
embarks upon a process of political 
reform, democracy is always on the 
agenda. Today, with the exception of a 
handful of remote monarchies, all 
governments claim to base their 
legitimacy on the consent of the gov- 
erned. Democracy confers the most 
powerful form of legitimacy in the 
modern world. Our times display a 
remarkable paradox: the victory of 
democracy is virtually complete in prin- 
ciple, but still limited in practice. This 
paradox should teach us something both 
about the weakness of democracy and 
about its strength. 

The only alternative to democracy as 
a contemporary system of legitimacy is 
Marxism-Leninism. Developing coun- 
tries, when they choose their institutions 
and officers, choose either the forms of 
democracy or those of Marxism- 
Leninism. They have either a President 
or a General Secretary, either a Parlia- 
ment or a Central Committee, or some 
combination. While democracy em- 
powers the people through the operation 
of free institutions, Marxism-Leninism 
empowers a tiny elite; while democracy 
welcomes and encourages social diversi- 
ty, Marxism-Leninism seeks to eradicate 
it; while democracy stresses the in- 
alienable rights of its citizens, Marxism- 
Leninsim emphasizes their duties— par- 
ticularly their duty not to engage in 
■ whatever activity the Party deems 
'counter-revolutionary." Yet even while 
Marxism-Leninism departs so fundamen- 
:ally from democratic theory and prac- 
tice, it, too, has been compelled by the 
strength of the democratic idea to adopt 
;he rhetoric of democracy and pretend 
;hat it responds to the popular will. 

It follows that the task of believers 
n democracy is not to impose democ- 
racy on a world bitterly opposed to it, 
3ut rather to help fulfill the expectations 
;hat every people acknowledges for 
tself. These expectations are contained 
n such documents as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, pro- 
laimed by the General Assembly of the 
Jnited Nations in 1948, "as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples 
ind all nations." No people knowingly 
•esigns the right to choose its own 
iestiny. No one would voluntarily choose 
JO be deprived of his or her human 



S«* 



rights. Yet despite these self-evident 
truths, there are a number of wide- 
spread fallacies about democracy which 
often make us misunderstand its appeal, 
and misjudge its possibilities. 

Three Fallacies About Democracy 

Perhaps the most widely held fallacy 
about the democratic form of govern- 
ment is that it is an exclusively North 
Atlantic phenomenon. The facts, of 
course, are otherwise. Neither India nor 
Japan, Costa Rica nor Botswana, 
Senegal nor Fiji belong to the North 
Atlantic constellation of states; all are 
thriving democracies. 



cuse for reluctance to affirm their own 
democratic principles. 

A related fallacy about the demo- 
cratic form of government is that it can 
only take hold in wealthy societies. Yet 
when Switzerland and the United States 
established democratic governments, 
both were poor agrarian countries. To- 
day, while many democracies are ad- 
vanced industrial states, some are not. 
That democracy issues from great 
wealth would surprise Indians or Bar- 
badians or Botswanans! By freeing un- 
tapped social energies and providing op- 
portunities for their exercise, democracy 
often facilitates the creation of wealth. 



Perhaps the most widely held fallacfiesj about 
the democratic form of government is that it is an 
exclusively North Atlantic phenomenon. . . . that it 
can only take hold in wealthy societies . . . that its 
promotion is incompatible with peace, because ad- 
vocacy of democracy means interference in the in- 
ternal affairs of other countries. 



Nor is democracy in such countries 
necessarily an import from the North 
Atlantic area. Many peoples have some 
form of democracy as part of their 
heritage. In 1700 there were more ex- 
tensive areas of democracy in Africa 
than in Europe, because the societies 
called "primitive" by colonialism carried 
on their decision making by democratic 
means. Conversely, there was probably 
never as great a loss of human freedom 
in a short period of time as in the years 
1884 to 1900, when these societies came 
under colonial administration from out- 
side. Yet the tenacity with which the 
thesis about the North Atlantic nature 
of democracy is held suggests that it is 
based on an underlying presupposition: 
the relativist assumption that freedom's 
appeal does not derive from something 
inherent in human nature, but is merely 
the result of a particular form of 
cultural conditioning. The fact, however, 
that so many people from different 
cultures have taken enormous risks to 
escape from closed societies to free 
societies makes this notion difficult to 
sustain. Perhaps this idea has as its 
ultimate source, not the observation of 
the world but the self-doubt of the North 
Atlantic democracies, which seek an ex- 



Nothing indicates, however, that a 
wealthy society is an absolute precondi- 
tion for the establishment of democracy. 

A third fallacy about democracy is 
that its promotion is incompatible with 
peace, because advocacy of democracy 
means interference in the internal af- 
fairs of other countries. In fact, it is not 
the advocacy of human rights, but the 
denial of human rights that is the 
greater source of tension in world 
politics. As Secretary of State George 
Shultz recently stated. 

In Europe, as elsewhere, governments 
that are not at peace with their own people 
are unlikely to be on good terms with their 
neighbors. The only significant use of 
military force on the continent of Europe 
since 1945 has been by the Soviet Union 
against its East European "allies." As long as 
this unnatural relationship continues between 
the USSR and its East European neighbors, 
it is bound to be a source of instability in 
Europe. 

How many wars have begun at the 
hands of armies of occupation, how 
many have begun due to the denial of 
self-determination to peoples, to failures 
to accord citizens the right to govern 
themselves? In our time, at least, 
democracies have been less aggressive, 



April 1984 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



less oriented toward military power than 
other systems. The most stable zones of 
the world— Western Europe and North 
America— are zones of democracy. 
History has also shown that alliances 
with democracies tend to be more stable, 
because a single man does not have the 
power to reverse long-standing relation- 
ships embedded in a wider social reality. 
Thus, a democratic international en- 
vironment is more stable and predict- 
able, and produces fewer tensions and 
crises. Like all the other aims of foreign 
policy, the encouragement of democracy 
can, of course, become a source of ten- 
sion and danger if it is sought too quick- 
ly or by the wrong means. Precisely 
because it is a whole system, any at- 
tempt to impose democracy all at once 
on a society where its foundations do 
not exist would be a profound mistake. 
Likewise, the creation of democracy 
must be a gradual process; the very 
reason for turning human rights efforts 
in this direction is the inadequacy of 
what we can achieve in the short term. 

A Time of Choice for 
Democratic Nations 

These widespread fallacies may be large- 
ly responsible for the fact that one of 
the most hopeful developments in recent 
years— the march of democracy in Latin 
America— has gone largely unnoticed. 
The recent inauguration of President 
Alfonsin of Argentina is only the latest 
in a series of victories for democracy in 
Latin America. Apart from Cuba, 
Suriname, Haiti, Guyana and Paraguay, 
the other twenty-seven nations of Latin 
America and the Caribbean are either 
basically democratic, or at least nominal- 
ly embarked on the transition to full 
democracy. This process has accelerated 
over the last three years. Between 1976 
and 1980, only one Latin American na- 
tion, Ecuador, elected a civilian presi- 
dent to replace the military. Since 1980, 
however, nine Latin American nations 
have either held free elections, or 
declared their intention of doing so soon: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru 
and Uruguay. Even the Government of 
Nicaragua, having reneged on earlier 
promises to hold free elections, now 
claims to be planning them for 1985. 
While the honor for this achieve- 
ment belongs entirely to the people of 
Latin America, the United States has 
played a constructive role in this proc- 
ess. Given the influence which the 
United States has in its hemisphere, it is 
less likely that many military govern- 
ments would have embarked on a transi- 



58 



tion to democracy if the United States 
had been urging caution in this course. 
In fact. United States policy over the 
last three years has been the precise op- 
posite. In countries which had set 
timetables for transition to democracy, 
the United States has consistently urged 
adhering to these timetables or ac- 
celerating them. In countries where 
fragile democratic governments have 
been established and there have been 
rumors or initiatives of coups against 
democracy, the United States has 
mobilized its diplomatic influence to sup- 
port democratic continuity. The 
heightened concern of the United States 
for hemispheric security in the last three 
years has not hindered, but rather 
helped, movement toward democracy in 
Latin America. Transition to democracy 
invariably involves uncertainty and risk, 
as seen from the standpoint of those 
who are relinquishing power. Such fears 
are likely to be aggravated by a United 
States that seems inconsistent, unpredic- 
table, inclined to abandon its friends to 
Soviet or Cuban pressure. On the other 
hand, the risks and uncertainties are 
diminished by an American foreign 
policy that makes it clear that the 
United States can be counted on to pro- 
tect its interests and its friends. 

The United States is not alone, of 
course, in its efforts to foster democ- 



racy. As President Reagan stated in his 
address to the Members of Parliament in 
London, "Over the past several decades, 
Western European and other Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats, and 
leaders have offered open assistance to 
fraternal, political, and social institutions 
to bring about peaceful and democratic 
progress. Appropriately, for a vigorous 
new democracy, the Federal Republic of 
Germany's political foundations have 
become a major force in this effort." 

The United States has now joined 
many of its allies in an effort to realize 
our common goal. We recognize that 
such an effort necessarily contains many 
unresolved dilemmas, but one point is 
unarguable: if the United States and its 
allies can encourage the growth of 
democracy, we will strengthen our- 
selves. Conversely, American strength 
and self-confidence are crucial precondi- 
tions to an effective human rights policy. 
The democratic world is presented, not 
by its own will, but by events in the 
areas that are not yet democratic, with 
a choice about what its attitude toward 
democracy is going to be. We can either 
stand aside, and allow the conflicts rag- 
ing in that part of the world to take 
their course, or we can choose to act in 
defense of our deepest values and com- 
mitments. The decision is ours to 
make. ■ 



Board of Appellate Review 
To Publish Decisions 



The Department of State on January 30, 
1984, announced that selected decisions 
of the Board of Appellate Review on ap- 
peals from administrative determinations 
of the Department of State of loss of na- 
tionality and denials of passport facilities 
will henceforth be published as a matter 
of public record. 

Publication will commence with the 
board's decision of January 11, 1984, in 
the matter of R. J. Mc C, wherein the 
board affirmed the Department's detei'- 
mination of loss of appellant's nationality. 

The Board of Appellate Review, a 
quasijudicial, autonomous body, hears 
and decides appeals taken by individuals 
from administrative determinations made 
by the Department of State in cases in- 
volving loss of U.S. nationality; the 
denial, restriction, or refusal of passport 
facilities on grounds other than nonciti- 
zenship; certain contract cases; and such 
other cases as may be refeiTed to the 
board by the Secretary of State. It was 



created essentially to provide a final ad- 
ministrative review procedure consistent 
with the requu'ements of due process. 

The board's decisions are final within 
the Department and ai'e not subject to 
further administrative review by any of 
its officials. 

The board considers and deteiTnines 
each appeal on its pai'ticular facts and 
circumstances. The board's decisions, 
therefoi'e, are not, as a rule, considered 
precedential. 

A person who has been the subject of 
an adverse decision of the board in an 
appeal from an administrative determina- 
tion of loss of nationality or denial of a 
passport on grounds other than nonciti- 
zenship may institute proceedings in a 
U.S. District Court where the matter is 
heard de novo. 

The board e.xists by virtue of Part 7 
of Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations. 
For administrative purposes it is located 
in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State. 



Departnnent of State Bulletir 



MIDDLE EAST 



Since its establishment, the board 
has heard almost exclusively appeals 
taken from determinations of loss of na- 
tionality. Under law, the Secretary of 
State is responsible for the determina- 
tion of U.S. nationality of a person out- 
side the United States and for the is- 
suance of passports. An essential re- 
quirement in the perfonnance of these 
responsibilities is due process. The board 
thus provides an administj-ative remedy 
in the form of a quasijudicial heai-ing or 
review to one who was the subject of an 
adverse determination on nationality or 
restrictive action with respect to a 
passport. 

The board consists of two regular 
members, one of whom, Alan G. James, 
is chaii-man, and eight ad hoc members 
who are senior officials of the Depart- 
ment of State and who serve on the 
board in addition to their regularly as- 
signed duties. All members are required 
to be attorneys in good standing, ad- 
mitted to practice in any state, the 
District of Columbia, or any territory or 
possession of the United States. By 
regulation, all members of the board are 
designated by the Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State. In considering and 
deciding an appeal, a three-member 
panel constitutes the board. 

In conformity with the Privacy Act, 
5 U.S.C. 552a, and Section 51.33 of 
Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, in- 
formation identifying the appellant or 
other private persons associated with an 
appeal will be excised prior to publica- 
tion of the decisions. In all material 
respects, the published decisions will be 
as rendered by the board. The decisions 
will be issued in loose-leaf form. 

All decisions, appropriately excised in 
the intei-ests of privacy, that have been 
rendered by the board are available for 
inspection by appellants and interested 
counsel in the board's offices. 

Copies of the board's decision of 
January 11, 1984, and decisions published 
subsequently, may be obtained by calling 
or writing to the Public Information 
Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 
4827A, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. Telephone (202) 
632-6575. 

Inquiries about the role of the board 
and its procedures may be directed to 
the Chairman, Alan G. James, State 
Annex-1, Room W-115, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Defense Secretary Weinberger's 
Interview on "IVIeet the Press" 



Press release 24 of Jan. .30, 1984. 



April 1984 



Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on 
Februanj 12. 1984, by Bill Monroe, Jack 
Reynolds, and John Dancy, NBC News; 
Bruce W. Nelan, Time; and Carl T. 
Rowan, the Chicago Sun-Times. Follow- 
ing are excerpts from that interview. 

Q. When will the Marines begin com- 
ing out of their positions near Beirut? 

A. The first few have already been 
moved over to the ships, the ones who 
had no direct operational duties in con- 
nection with the perimeter positions. 
And, again, depending on the final deci- 
sions, and these can only come after con- 
sultation with the other members of the 
multinational force (MNF), substantial 
numbers .should be out by the end of this 
month, and probably it's perfectly feasi- 
ble that the entire operation can be com- 
pleted within less than 30 days. But the 
actual date depends on consultations 
with the other members of the multi- 
national force. 

Q. It's possible that they will all be 
out within 30 days? 

A. It can be done, oh, yes. There's no 
logistical or operational problem that 
would prevent that. 

Q. Would you like to see them all 
out in 30 days? 

A. I think there's no question about 
that, yes. I think they would be a much 
more effective and in a much safer posi- 
tion for them on the ships— a place from 
which they could be a lot more effective 
in trying to carry out the basic mission 
for which they entered about 16 months 
ago. 

Q. What will happen about protec- 
tion of that airport? 

A. That's one of the things we're 
discussing with the other members of 
the multinational force and the Lebanese 
armed force. The Lebanese armed force 
is an effective force. They have had some 
defections in the last few days, but it is 
still an effective army, and they could 
substitute for the Marines around the 
ail-port. 

The principal mission of the Marines 
is not to safeguard the airport. The 
Lebanese Armed Forces themselves 
have been participating in that in the 
last few months. 



Q. Would you comment on what 
[House] Speaker Tip O'Neill said about 
the new policy of U.S. Navy guns shell- 
ing positions in Syrian-controlled terri- 
tory? He said that it was absolutely 
not compatible with the congressional 
resolution passed a few months ago. 

A. I have to say we just think he's 
plain wrong, because we think that the 
congressional mandate is that we should 
protect the multinational force and cer- 
tainly protect the Marines and that we 
should protect American lives and 
American interests in that whole area. 
The shelling was coming dh-ectly in on 
the Ambassador's residence, on the Em- 
bassy area, and on the multinational 
force position. And these are not new 
rules with respect to the shelling. This is 
shelling that we do in retaliation or to 
try to silence the shelling that is coming 
from Syrian-controlled positions that falls 
on the Marines or falls on the Embassy, 
falls on American positions, endangers 
American or multinational force lives. 
And that's not only not a new position; 
it's a position that I would hope and 
assume all of us would want to have 
followed. 

Q. How badly has our failure in 
Beirut hurt us in the eyes of the Arabs 
in the area, the moderate Arabs that 
we'd like to influence? 

A. I don't think you can classify the 
activities that we've undertaken in 
Beirut as a failure at all, nor is the mat- 
ter over. We still have basically the same 
objectives. Our first objective was to get 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion] out of Beirut and avoid that kind of 
house-to-house fighting within the city. 
That was accomplished about almost a 
year-and-a-half ago, and it was accom- 
pUshed in less than 30 days. After that, 
there were assassinations of the suc- 
ceeding president in Lebanon, and there 
were a tremendous number of riots and 
all kinds of massacres that took place in 
the refugee camps. There have been a 
great many changes in the ground situa- 
tion. I wouldn't classify our activities 
there as a failure at all. 

I think that we still have the hopes 
of getting some kind of a relatively 
unified and strong Lebanese govern- 
ment, which, in turn, could be a major 
factor at trying to maintain peace in the 
entire Mideast. It takes steadfastness 
and it takes a great deal of patience. 



1 



MIDDLE EAST 



But you have to look at the alter- 
natives. And the alternatives would be to 
have the Soviet-controlled enclave 
throughout the whole of Lebanon, and I 
don't think anyone believes that would 
be a good thing for any of us. 

Q. But isn't it true that you and 
the informed chiefs advised against 
putting the Marines back in on the 
second go-round? 

A. There are various ways of accom- 
plishing many of these policies, and I 
don't discuss" the advice that I've given 
to the President. 

But what we have now is a situation 
in which the ground situation has 
changed, the basic ideas for which the 
multinational force went in have 
changed, but the objectives remain the 
same. And the objectives can best be 
served by having a Marine force onboard 
ship where the power of the American 
fleet can lend a great deal of credence to 
the importance of seeking a unified, un- 
occupied Lebanon. And it is, again, much 
better to try to do it now than to sit by 
passively and let the alternative occur, 
which would be a completely Soviet- 
dominated enclave right in Lebanon at a 
critically important part of the world. 

Q. The Syrians dominated that 
country for about 7 years before the 
Israelis invaded, and we didn't find 
that the Syrian presence was in- 
tolerable. Now we do. Why is that? 

A. I think very simply, because the 
Syrian presence is now enormously com- 
plicated by, or worsened by, the Soviet 
domination of Syria. You have to bear in 
mind that there is a large number of 
Soviet troops in Syria. They have resup- 
plied them for all of the weapons that 
were destroyed in Syria's war with 
Israel. And they are now in a situation 
that is, I think, perhaps more Soviet- 
dominated than even Egypt was a few 
years ago before President Sadat turned 
the Soviets out of Egypt. 

Q. You say you are redeploying the 
Marines back to the ships where they 
can be more effective. More effective 
doing what? 

A. You have to bear in mind the 
basic, original reason for the multina- 
tional force to go in. The multinational 
force did not go in to fight a war for 
Lebanon or anything of the kind. It went 
in for a very limited purjioso of pro- 
viding a stabilizing interi)osition force 
between the troops that we hoped and 
expected would be withdrawing; that is, 
the Syrian forces, the Israeli forces, and 
the PLO. 



60 



Now the PLO is out and pretty well 
broken as a military force. What it is is 
just an adjunct of the Syrian Army now. 
The Israelis signed an agreement to 
leave. The Syrians did not. The multi- 
national force was never designed mili- 
tarily to defeat the Syrians or to fight 
the Israelis or anything else. It was de- 
signed to try to give confidence that 
withdrawing forces could withdraw and 
the agi-eement would be kept. 

Q. But my question has not been 
answered. What is it the Marines will 
do more effectively once they're back 
on those ships? 

A. The normal position for the 
Marine amphibious units is onboard ship. 
And when the conditions are available 
again, when the condition should arise 
that if we can get an agreement by 
Syria— and many people are working on 
that now— to withdraw and the Israelis 
continue to adhere to their agi-eement to 
withdraw, then, at that time, there will 
again be a necessity for an interposition 
of a neutral peacekeeping force. And if 
the conclusion is that the multinational 
force should be used again for that pur- 
pose, the Marines will be available for 
that. 



U.S. Forces in Lebanon 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
FEB. 14, 1984' 

I am providing herewith a further report with 
respect to the .situation of Lebanon and the 
participation of the United States Armed 
Forces in the Multinational Force. This 
report, prepared by the Secretaries of State 
and Defense and covering the period from 
December 12, 1983 to February 13, 1984, is 
consistent with Section 4 of the Multinational 
Force in Lebanon Resolution. This report also 
includes the infomiation called for by the 
House version of the Resolution and is sub- 
mitted consistent with its more restrictive 
time limits. 

Congressional support for our continued 
participation in the Multinational Force re- 
mains critical to peace, national reconciliation, 
and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon. We will continue to keep you in- 
formed as to further developments with 
respect to this situation. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Re.^can 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, .Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Reijresentatives, and Strom Thuniiond. Presi- 
dent pro tempore of the Senate (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Feb. 20, 1984). ■ 



Q. When Deputy Secretary of State 
Dam went up to the Senate the other 
day, he was asked can you conceive of 
circumstances where you'll send those 
Marines back into Beirut. He didn't 
have an answer. Now you're telling me 
that you do conceive of sending them 
back. 

A. I told you under the very limited 
circumstances that I described, which 
were the exact circumstances under 
which they went in in the fir.'^t place 
about 16 months ago. But the ground 
conditions and all of the other assump- 
tions that everybody hoped would occur 
have not. And those assumptions were 
that the Syrians would do what they 
said, that "they wanted to withdraw, that 
they would agree, that the Israelis would 
agree, and that the PLO would be out. 
The PLO is out, practically speaking; the 
Syrians have not agreed. But this isn't to 
say that they can't. If and when they do, 
there will be a need for a force to give 
confidence to the withdrawing of troops 
that these agreements would be kept. At 
that time, why then you would need 
some neutral force, and it could well be 
the Marines as part of it. It could well be 
fourth or fifth or sixth countries; we 
don't know yet. But they will be there 
and they will be available should they be 
needed, and the Sixth Fleet will be 
there. The United States is not leaving 
the area in any sense. When you have 
one battleship, two carriers, and 2.3 com- 
batant vessels, you haven't left the area. 

Q. However long it takes, they're 
going to stay there, is that it? 

A. You're asking me to make predic- 
tions about the most unpredictable part 
of the world that there is. All I'm saying 
is that the policy and the necessities re- 
main the same. How we achieve them 
may, indeed, differ from time to time, 
and different policies may have to be 
adopted. But the basic thing that we've 
got to keep our mind on is that we don't 
want to have a spot as volatile, as 
troubled, and as likely to break out into 
a major conflict as Lebanon without try- 
ing our best to do something to ease that 
whole problem, and that's what we are 
going to continue to do. 

Q. Could you clear-up some confu- 
sion about the strategy behind the use 
of that naval gunfire, which has been 
enormous. We were told first it was to 
protect the Marines, then it was to in- 
clude the multinational force, then 
there was shelling on the Embassy and 
the Ambassador's residence, and it was 
in retaliation for that. Is there a 
broader context in which that's being 
used? 



BBliiiiiiiiiiiUiiiliiiiiiBBiiBIillieiiiiilil 



■BBBBBBDOBDm 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



A. No. The way you phrase it, it 
sounds as if this was a whole series of 
different decisions. Actually, it's the 
same basic decision. What happened was 
that thei-e was increasing use of Syrian- 
based gunfire— gunfire from Syrian- 
controlled areas that attacked, first, the 
Marine position, then other multinational 
force positions, the Ambassador's 
residence, and then portions of Beirut 
where there were American citizens and 
American interests. 

As these changing conditions were 
met, the same rules were applied, but 
they did require that we use gunfire that 
we hoped would silence the Syrian ar- 
tillery positions in Syrian-controlled 
areas of Lebanon. And thus far, they do 
seem to be considerably more silent than 
they were before the New Jersey and 
the others fired. 

Q. But is the concept also to sup- 
port the Gemayel government, in terms 
of that? 

A. The concept is to support a 
regularly, legitimately elected govern- 
ment of Lebanon. We have constantly 
and consistently urged President 
Gemayel to broaden the base of his 
government, to include several of these 
different factions that are involved. The 
army, for example, doe-sn't do that. The 
army is the only truly multiconfessional 
[sic] unit in Lebanon. And we've con- 
stantly urged that President Gemayel 
broaden his own government so that he 
can have a broader base of support. 

What we seek is the support of a 
legitimate government that can, indeed, 
produce peace and an unoccupied, 
sovereign condition for Lebanon. 

The firing, however, is not in support 
of any particular governmental unit or 
faction. The firing is just as I said, to try 
to silence fire that is endangering 
Marines, multinational forces, American 
interests in Beirut. 



Q. When the Marines first went in 
to Beirut, you were roundly criticized 
for giving them such a broad mandate 
that they could not possibly carry it 
out; that is, to support the Gemayel 
government there. Do you think, in 
retrospect, that that was a mistake? 

A. That, I don't believe, was their 
mandate. Their mandate, as I remember 
it, was that they were to go in and serve 
with the other three nations as an inter- 
position force, to give some confidence to 
the withdrawing forces of Syria and 
Israel, as we hoped; that the agreements 
would be kept; and that they could, in- 
deed, withdraw. When you're locked 



together in military combat, as those 
countries were, you're very vulnerable if 
you start to withdraw and if one side 
doesn't keep the agreement. 

The force was designed to do that, 
and it was designated to give some tem- 
porary breathing space to a government 
—a new government— that had come in 
following the assassination of the present 
President's brother. They didn't have 
any mandate that they were to go in and 
defend that government. They didn't 
have any mandate that they were to go 
in and clear Lebanon of foreign forces. If 
they had a mandate like that, they would 
have had to be at least 15 to 20 times as 
large as they are now. There was never 
any suggestion that they should do that. 
And moving them from shore back to 
ships will enable them, as I've mentioned 
earlier, sometime if the withdrawal 
agreements are ever secured, to resume 
that original mission. 

Now it's very difficult for them to do 
that because the ground conditions have 
changed so and all of these tremendous 
number of factions have come up and 



turned practically every street corner in- 
to an armed battle. 



Q. Now that we're withdrawing our 
forces from Beirut, what military role 
do we want the Israelis to play in that 
part of the world? 

A. I don't have any agenda for the 
Israelis, and I don't know of anybody 
else who has. I think what we want most 
is to have the foreign forces out of 
Lebanon, all completely, and the Israelis 
did agree to go when the Syrians left. 
And that, I think, is the thing that we 
desii-e most. Again, we've all sort of 
overlooked in the rush of events the pur- 
pose of all of this. The pui'pose was to 
get Lebanon cleared and sovereign and 
free of conflict so that we could go on to 
the broader a.spects of the President's 
Mideast peace initiative, which was to 
deal with the very difficult problems of 
the West Bank, and recognition and 
security for Israel's borders, and the im- 
portance of trying to get a peaceful at- 
mosphere after some 2,000 years of con- 
tinual strife that has been, in effect, 
almost the seed of wars for too long. 



Lebanon Cancels Agreement With Israel 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 5, 1984' 

The Government of Lebanon has said it 
has cancelled the Cabinet decision which 
approved the unratified May 17 agree- 
ment [with Israel] and, thereby, removed 
the authority of President Gemayel to 
exchange the instruments for the 
ratification of the agreement. 

The United States regrets this deci- 
sion. The United States played a facilitat- 
ing role in the negotiations that produced 
that accord and was a witness to its 
signature. That proposed agreement still 
represents the only agreed formula for 
ensuring both Israel's withdrawal from 
Lebanon and Israel's legitimate security 
interests in a manner consistent with 
Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanon needs 
peaceful, coojierative relations with all 
its neighbors. Those who were responsi- 
ble for the rejection of the agreement 
must now bear the responsibility to find 
an alternative negotiated formula to bring 
about Israeli withdrawal. 

At the same time, the LInited States 
does not intend to abandon the people or 
the legitimate Government of Lebanon. 
Diplomacy continues, with the aim of 



ending the fighting and reaching a 
political solution to Lebanon's conflicts. 
We will contribute to this process. 

Similarly, we stand ready to continue 
appropriate economic and military assist- 
ance, but decisions on these issues will 
be taken as the situation unfolds. In any 
event, we will continue to take all ap- 
propriate measures to ensure that U.S. 
personnel and property are fully pro- 
tected. 

Our long-term goals remain— the 
restoration of a sovereign, independent, 
unified Lebanon; the removal of all 
foreign forces; and the security of 
Israel's northern border. We oppose the 
partition of Lebanon, which could only 
lead to even greater instability. 

The Middle East is a region of vital 
importance to the United States and our 
friends and allies. The United States will 
continue to be deeply concerned and in- 
volved in efforts to resolve the Arab- 
Israeli problem and other critical issues 
in the Middle East, including the crisis in 
the gulf. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



April 1984 



61 



•I :!'i'lt;'!!";'|(;'"HJII 



MIDDLE EAST 



Q. You're not seeking some form of 
strategic cooperation, to coin a phrase, 
in which the Israelis might deal mili- 
tarily with the Syrians and any PLO 
who might be headed south? 

A. I think what we are seeking is 
just what I said. It is a peaceful, unoc- 
cupied, sovereign Lebanon that will 
enable us to go and deal with the 
broader, even thornier issues of the 
Mideast. We don't ask anybody to fight 
anybody else, or anything of the kind. 
Quite the contrary. We would like to see 
the forces that are in Lebanon do exactly 
what theii- governments have said. 

All of the Syrian statements have 
always been that they wanted to with- 
draw. The Israeli statements have been 
that they wanted to withdraw. PLO, 
when it was still a force, said that, and ^ 
they're no longer a military force, I don't 
think, of any consequence. But the im- 
portant thing is to pursue those objec- 
tives, and I don't think you're going to 
solve those by asking one side to fight 
another side. 

Q. When you and others went up 
on the Hill last week, there was so 
much frustration that Representative 
Trent Lott, the Republican Whip, said, 
"You people are out of touch with 
reality." Isn't it a reality that there is 
no way those Marines can go back into 
Lebanon as peacemakers, that the only 
way they can go back is as combat 
fighters? 

A. No, they would not go back as 
combat fighters, because they never 
went in as combat fighters. They went in 
as part of a multinational force, and the 
confusion that Mr. Lott was speaking 
about-and I have high respect for 
him— was simply the problem that we 
are not able, as a member of a multina- 
tional force, to go up and announce on a 
particular day that we're going to do 
something within a given time period 
without having had the consultations 
that take time and effort with three 
other nations-Britain, Italy, and France. 
They are our partners in this. They have 
suffered grievous losses, too, and they 
deserve and have a need to be consulted, 
and that's required if we want to have 
continuing future relationships with 
those countries, which we clearly have to 
do. So there wasn't any confusion. As 
I've said earlier, there's no mechanical or 
logistical problem. The Marines can be 
out in a few days, but it is essential that 
we work out arrangements for others to 
hold the airport and work out arrange- 
ments that our partners would find 
satisfactory in the multinational foi-ce. 



Visit of King Hussein 
of Jordan 



His Majesty King Hussein I of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an 
official working visit to Washington, 
D.C., February 12-U, 198J,, to meet mth 
President Reagan and other government 
officials. 

FoUomng are remarks made by 
President Reagan and His Majesty after 
their meeting on February 13.^ 

President Reagan 

King Hussein and I met today in the 
spirit of good will and cooperation that 
characterizes the relationship between 
the United States and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. Cooperation between 
us is increasingly vital in the face of the 
tragic violence in Lebanon, a growing 
terrorist threat, and the ominous cloud of 
war that hovers over much of the Middle 
East. 

Today we witness bloodshed and con- 
flict between Iran and Iraq, in Chad, in 
the Western Sahara, and Lebanon. And 
now, as never before, it behooves people 
of good will to work together for peace 
and stability. 

King Hussein has led Jordan with 
strength and wisdom these last three 
decades. He's an experienced statesman, 
and his insights are valuable to us as 
well as to the people of Jordan. His 
Majesty was an important force behind 
the UN Resolution 242, which continues 
to be the starting point for tangible 
Middle East peace efforts, including my 
own peace initiative of September 1, 
1982. 

King Hussein has proven himself a 
responsible leader and a reliable friend 
on many occasions. His support for 
friends "in the gulf region has demon- 
strated his capacity for deeds as well as 
words. The economic progress of his 
people, the political equality, and the 
religious tolerance found in Jordan are a 
tribute to the benevolence of his reign, 
and I am grateful for his counsel. 

His Majesty's visit strengthens the 
bonds of friendship that link Jordan and 
the United States. America's commit- 
ment to help Jordan meet its security 
needs remains firm and unwavering. 
Today we spoke of a number of 
bilateral "concerns, but the focus of our 
meeting was on the issues affecting 
regional peace. We both believe that 
while the challenges remain formidable, 
the opportunities for a broader peace are 
still present. We also agree that ter- 



rorism cannot be tolerated and that the 

leaders of all states must stand together 

against this new barbarism that 

threatens civilization. 

States that condone terrorism under- 
mine their own legitimacy. In these 
times of trial, disillusionment would be 
easy. But my meeting today with King 
Hussein has" reaffirmed to me that the 
good and decent people of this world can 
and will work together and that progi-ess 
can be made toward the perplexing prob- 
lem of peace in the Middle East. 

King Hussein 

Once again it's a privilege and a pleasure 
for me to have the opportunity to meet 
with vou as the leader of the United 
State's of America, as a man I respect 
and admire, as a friend. And I would like 
to say that these feelings are shared by 
my government and my people-the feel- 
ings'of pride in the fact that our goals 
and aims are one and the same; our 
ideas, our principles, our belonging to 
the family of free people throughout the 
world. 

The challenges before us are, indeed, 
tremendous, but the determination is 
there to strive for a better tomorrow. 
This is a cause to which we are 
dedicated in Jordan-the cause of a 
stable area, the cause of establishing, 
eventually, a just and lasting peace in 
the area, "the cause of a better future for 
generations to come. 

On all subjects that you were kind 
enough to address, I could not in all 
honesty sav that I could have presented 
my vie"ws any differently. I thank you 
for the opportunity and the chance to 
discuss problems of the moment and to 
share with you the vision of the future 
and to reaffirm our commitment to our 
common goals of a better future within 
our area and within the world and for 
the establishment of a just and durable 
peace. 

We are proud of our friendship, and 
we will do all we can to see it grow and 
flourish in every way and in every area. 
Thank you once again for the wonderful 
opportiinity of meeting with you. God 
bless you, "and thanks again for all your 
kindnesses to me. 



•Made to reporters assembled on the 
South Portico of the White House (text fi-om 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Feb. 20, 1984). ■ 



62 



IBHE 



of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



►resident Meets With Two Arab Leaders 



His Majesty King Hussein I of 
Jordan and President Mohamed Hosni 
Mubarak met with President Reagan at 
the Wiiite House on February U. 1981,. 
Following are remarks made by the 
three leaders at the conclusion of that 
meeting.^ 

President Reagan 

I have been honored today to welcome 
and confer with King Hussein and Presi- 
dent Mubarak. Theii" visit highlights the 2 
friendship between the United States £ 
and the two important countries they |, 
lead. Our countries share common in- £ 
terests in developing practical solutions g 
to the problems of the Middle East. The s 
good will and trust between us promise a | 
solid foundation for overcomng the for- J 
midable obstacles to peace and progress | 
in the region. ^ 

Our discussions today have reaf- I 

firmed that Egyjjt and Jordan will re- 
main leaders in efforts to bring peace 
and security to the Middle East. King 
Hussein and President Mubarak have 
demonstrated foresight, realism, and 
resolve, which are essential if the peace 
process is to succeed. 

We discussed in detail the oppor- 
tunities for progress in the Middle East. 
Recent events in the area make it even 
more urgent to keep the broader peace 
process moving. The tragic events in 
Lebanon show that the occupation of ter- 
ritory by outside forces does not lead to 
peace but rather to continued conflict 
and turmoil. I wish today, therefore, to 
reaffirm my commitment and that of our 
government to the principles I set forth 
in September of 1982, and in particular 
to the principle that the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict must be resolved through negotia- 
tions involving an exchange of territory 
for peace. 

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty proves 
what can be accomplished when states 
have the will to take risks for peace. And 
I'm confident that further steps toward 
peace in the Middle East are possible. 
For our part, the United States is ready 
to do all it can to keep the process mov- 
ing forward. 

King Hussein, President Mubarak 
are men I greatly admire, and I'm grate- 
ful to them for having come here to 
speak as friends and to reconfirm our 
common purposes in the enduring 
struggle for peace. 



April 1984 




King Hussein 

I'd like to thank you for your great kind- 
ness in enabling me and my brother, 
President Mubarak, to meet with you to- 
day and to discuss all aspects of the 
problems which we face in our area of 
the world; and our common goals and ob- 
jectives for a better future for all in that 
area— of establishment of a just and com- 
prehensive peace for greater stability 
and for a better life for generations to 
come. 

I'm very grateful for the opportunity 
to have had this chance to hear your 
views and the views of President 
Mubarak on all matters and to contribute 
what I could for the purpose of achieving 
better understanding of oui" respective 
positions as we move ahead with hope 
and determination and with a commit- 
ment to do our utmost for a better 
future in the area from which we come 
and for a just and comprehensive peace. 
I will carry back with me, the impres- 
sions I gained of your determination and 
that of the United States to contribute 
its full share to help all concerned 
achieve their objectives. 

We are pi-oud of our friendship. It is 
of long standing. We are hopeful that 
this friendship will develop and evolve 
and that, based on trust and confidence 
and with determination, we shall over- 
come what appear and have appeared to 
be for a long period of time insurmount- 



able obstacles. After all, the cause we 
are striving to serve is the cause of 
people, their future, their rights, human 
dignity, and, at the same time, their 
freedom and a better life, which is theu- 
right. 

I thank you once again for many 
kindnesses, and I thank you, my brother. 
President Mubarak, and wish you every 
continued success. And I would like to 
say that this has been a visit I shall 
always remember. I'll treasure the 
memories of this visit and the wonderful 
opportunity it has given me to meet with 
you both. Thank you very, very much in- 
deed for your many courtesies and kind- 
nesses and the warmth of youi- welcome. 

President Mubarak 

I was very pleased to meet once again 
with our good friend. President Reagan 
and discuss with him issues of great con- 
cern to our nations. We did so in the 
spu-it of friendship and cooperation that 
dominates the relationship between 
Egypt and the United States. 

I find it most rewarding to consult 
regularly with President Reagan and ex- 
change views with him on matters of 
mutual interest. He is a statesman of 
great courage and wisdom. He has a pro- 
found sense of mission and responsibility. 
Our bilateral relations constitute a shin- 
ing model for understanding and the 
cooperation among nations. We are 



63 



MIDDLE EAST 



determined to strengthen the bonds of 
friendship that link our peoples. The 
talks we held today will ceilainly add to 
this evergrowing friendship and mutual 
understanding. 

I would like to seize this opportunity 
to thank the American people for 
cooperating with us in the vigorous ef- 
forts we are e.xerting to improve the 
quality of life for our masses. We are 
striving to refonn our economic system 
and increase production and productiv- 
ity. We are struggling to restore security 
and stability to the Middle East and 
Africa, Egypt has a pivotal role to play 
and a mission to fulfill. It is determined 
to do so with vigor and dedication. We 
are devoted to strengthening the struc- 
ture of peace in our region and through- 
out the world. 

The situation in Lebanon today is in- 
tolerable. The escalation of violence and 
the bloodshed is a threat to us all. Every 
nation is called upon to help. The peace- 
keeping role of the United Nations must 
be expanded and reinforced. The parti- 
tion of this war-torn country should be 
prevented at any cost. The Lebanese 
people have a right to live and prospei- 
like all other nations. 

The key to a viable solution is the 
prompt and unconditional withdrawal of 
Israeli forces. The Israeli invasion is the 
root and the cause of the present sad 
situation in the area. No problem can be 
solved through foreign intervention and 
the use of force. 

The Lebanese crisis is a stark 
reminder of the centrality of the Pales- 
tinian problem. That question must be 
addressed frontally and without delay. 
Our purpose is to create the necessary 
conditions for coexistence and the mutual 
recognition between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis. This coexistence must be 
based on justice and the recognition of 
rights. Fu'st and foremost, the right of 
the Palestinian people's self- 
determination should be honored and ex- 
ercised. This is the clue to peace and 
security for all nations, including Israel. 

The Palestinian people are entitled to 
your support and understanding. There 
is no substitute for a direct dialogue with 
them through their chosen represen- 
tative, the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization]. Such dialogue will im- 
mensely serve the cause of peace to 
which we are both committed. Mr. 
Arafat is a responsible leader who has 
demonstrated tremendous courage under 
the most difficult circumstances. A 
dialogue with him would reassure the 
Palestinian people and rekindle their 
hope for a better future. 



64 



No other nation can speak for the 
Palestinians. No other entity has a man- 
date to lay out theii- requirements for 
peace, and no other nation is more quali- 
fied than the American people, lending 
their support and backing. 

The war between Iran and Iraq is 
another sad chapter in the history of the 
Middle East. We should spare no effort 
to bring it to an end immediately. No 
one can possibly benefit from the 
continuation of bloodshed between 
peoples who are linked together through 
the strongest cultural and spiritual 
bonds. To restore peace between these 
neighbors, certain concrete steps should 
be taken by those who are genuinely 
concerned. The mere expression of good 
will is no help in the face of continued 
fighting and escalated tension. 

I came here also to plead the case for 
Africa. The African people need your at- 
tention and understanding. They are 
struggling against formidable odds. 
Economic crises and natural disasters 
are strangling their efforts for develop- 
ment and social transformation. Helping 
them is not only a moral obligation; it is 
a practical necessity for building a better 
world in which all nations live in peace 
and cooperate for their common good. 

We are seeking your help in order to 
secure the unconditional independence of 



Namibia. The continuation of the present 
situation is unacceptable to all African 
nations. The minority regime of South 
Africa must know that the United States 
cannot support its policy of aggression 
and violation of human rights. 

It was a happy coincidence that I 
met here with His Majesty King Hussein 
and pursued with him our ongoing con- 
sultation. We believe that Jordan has an 
impoitant role to play in solidifying the 
stiaieture of peace. It is an element of 
stability and security in the Middle East. 
Therefore, we support the dialogue be- 
tween Jordan and the PLO. This is a 
positive step toward peace. In the 
months ahead, we will be intensifying 
our contents with our partners in the 
peace process with a view of accelerating 
progress. 

I have extended an invitation to 
President Reagan to visit Egypt at the 
earliest possible date. This will give our 
people an opportunity to demonstrate 
the depth of their sentiments toward the 
President and evei'v Ameiican. 



'Made to reporters assembled in the East 
Room of the White House (te.xt from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Feb. 20. 1984). ■ 



Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 5, 1984' 

The United States has concluded that 
the available evidence indicates that Iraq 
has used lethal chemical weapons. The 
United States strongly condemns the 
prohibited use of chemical weapons 
wherever it occurs. There can be no 
justification for their use by any country. 

The United States has been working 
for many years with other nations to 
establish a treaty banning production 
and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitat- 
ing chemical weapons in order to 
strengthen the present international pro- 
hibitions against their use. The use of 
chemical weapons in recent conflicts, in- 
cluding the Iran-Iraq war, only adds to 
the urgency of this undertaking. 

While condemning Iraq's resort to 
chemical weapons, the United States also 
calls on the Government of Iran to ac- 
cept the good offices offered by a num- 



ber of countries and international 
oi-ganizations to put an end to the blood- 
shed. The United States finds the pres- 
ent Iranian regime's intransigent refusal 
to deviate from its avowed objective of 
eliminating the legitimate government of 
neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with 
the accepted norms of behavior among 
nations. 

The United States deplores the 
tragic and needless loss of both Iranian 
and Iraqi lives, especially through at- 
tacks on civilian populations. We urge 
both states to respect their obligations 
under international conventions designed] 
to mitigate the human suffering of war- 
fai-e, particularly those banning the use 
of chemical weapons and requiring the 
humane treatment of prisoners of war 
and protection of civilians. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



Department of State Bulletir 



■^mBBBaaaaa 



Viitj 



MIDDLE EAST 



U.S. Opposes Moving 
Embassy to Jerusalem 

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Statement before the Setmte Foreign 
Relations Committee on February 23, 
IQSJf. Ambassador Eagleburger is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs.^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 
with the committee the Administration's 
position on S. 2031. As you know, this 
bill provides for the U.S Embassy and 
Ambassador's residence in Israel to be 
moved to the city of Jerusalem. 

This committee has already received 
Secretary Shultz's letter expressing the 
strong opposition of the Administration 
to this bill. Before I outline the reasons 
for our opposition, let me take a few 
moments to provide the context in which 
this proposal arises. 

The United States has been and re- 
mains Israel's staunchest supporter. In 
1948 when Israel proclaimed its indepen- 
dence, the United States was the first 
country to extend it recognition. We 
quickly established diplomatic relations 
and e.stablished our embassy at Israel's 
seat of government, Tel Aviv. There our 
embassy has remained, during the Ad- 
ministrations of eight Presidents. Dating 
from well before the establishment of the 
State of Israel, we have maintained a 
consulate general in Jerusalem which 
reports directly to the Department. This 
is in accord with arrangements in special 
circumstances elsewhere, such as Hong 
Kong. 

Why has it been consistent with U.S 
policy, during Democratic and 
Republican Administrations, to retain 
our embassy in Tel Aviv? In short, 
because the location of our embassy is in- 
timately related to the efforts of the 
United States to secure a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. In this 
regard, U.S. efforts have stressed peace 
through negotiations. Our willingness to 
resist attempts to settle the Arab-Israeli 
conflict through force or through uni- 
lateral actions has preserved our ability 
to play a coiisti'uctive role in settling the 
conflict. Moving our embassy to 
Jerusalem would inevitably convey a 
message that the United States accepted 
the position of one party to the issue, 
when, in fact, a resolution of that issue- 
that is, a resolution of the issue that can 
stand the test of time— can only be found 
in the framework of a final settlement 
reached through negotiations. 



The status of Jerusalem is an integi-al 
part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While 
we fully understand the depth of attach- 
ment of Israelis to the city of Jerusalem, 
we have a responsibility to bear in mind 
the special significance which the city 
holds as well for Jews, Moslems, and 
Christians throughout the world. That is 
a compelling fact that cannot be lightly 
put aside. We would not have achieved 
the Camp David accords if the United 
States had adopted the position of either 
party on the question of Jerusalem. This 
explains President Carter's separate let- 
ter attached to the Camp David accords 
which reaffirmed the U.S. position that 
the status of Jerusalem be resolved 
through negotiations. That position con- 
tinues to be U.S. policy today. 

Our policy on this issue has been 
resolute for more than three decades. In 
1949, when the IsraeHs began moving 
their government to Jerusalem, we in- 
formed them that we could not accept a 
unilateral claim to the city. Again, in 
1960, we informed Jordan of our opposi- 
tion to its intention to make the eastern 
part of the city Jordan's second capital. 
And in 1967, when Israel occupied the 
eastern sector, we opposed Israeli ac- 
tions to place all of Jerusalem under 
Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administra- 
tion. Most recently, President Reagan 
stated in his September 1, 1982, Middle 
East peace initiative that ". . . we remain 
convinced that Jerusalem must remain 
undivided, but its final status should be 
decided through negotiations." 

A change in the U.S. position on the 
status of Jerusalem would seriously 
undermine our ability to play an effective 
role in the Middle East peace process. 
Indeed, moving our embassy to 
Jerusalem would widely be perceived as 
an effort by the United States to pre- 
empt negotiations altogether by pre- 
judging a crucial issue. In short, to move 
our embassy to Jerusalem now would 
almost certainly gravely damage the 
prospects for a negotiated settlement; at 
a minimum, it would seriously com- 
promise the ability of the United States 
to continue to play a constructive role in 
bringing the parties to the negotiating 
table. 



In addition, the proposed legislation 
would be a direct interference in the 
President's constitutional authority to 
conduct foreign affairs. As stated in 
Secretary Shultz's letter, we are con- 
cerned that, regardless of its merits, the 
bill raises serious constitutional questions 
of a sejjaration of powers nature. The 
President historically has been respon- 
sible for conducting diplomatic relations 
on behalf of the United States, including 
the determination of where and through 
what means to conduct such relations. 
Legislation directing him to relocate an 
embassy would be in direct conflict with 
this principle. By further seeking to com- 
pel him to recognize all of Jerusalem as 
part of Israel, it would impair his ability 
to determine the recognition policy of the 
United States. In seeking to force the 
President's hand, the proposed legisla- 
tion, in our view, would exceed the 
proper scope of legislative action. 

I am told, although I find it hard to 
credit, that some have argued that in re- 
taining our embassy in Tel Aviv, we 
raise doubts concerning American 
recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. 
That argues in the face of too many 
years of history to be taken seriously. 
The United States and Israel have, since 
1948, shared a special friendship, special 
closeness— a special relationship, if you 
will— that is known as such throughout 
the world. There cannot be any doubt 
about our commitment to Israel. 

Some proponents of this legislation 
appai'ently also argue that U.S. policy is 
not in accord with reality, that Jerusalem 
is Israel's capital, and that by failing to 
locate our embassy there we are denying 
Israel a sovereign prerogative. But this 
begs the fundamenal question, at least 
from the perspective of the United 
States. It is the essence of the Jerusalem 
issue— or at least America's decades-old 
position thereon— that it should not be 
resolved by the unilateral actions of any 
party. 

It has also been suggested that con- 
ducting diplomatic relations through our 
embassy in Tel Aviv imposes practical 
impediments, since many Israeli Govern- 
ment offices are now located in 
Jerusalem. That is, no doubt, true. But 
we have been able to manage and will 
continue to be able to do so. In any 
event, I doubt that even the strongest of 
S.203rs proponents would argue that 
their principal purpose for putting the 
legislation forward is to improve the effi- 
ciency of our diplomatic establishment in 
Israel. 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



I have spoken here on behalf of the 
Administration of which I am a part. But 
were I speaking simply on my own 
behalf, I would take no different a line. 
It is because I care about my country's 
relationship with Israel and my country's 
ability to continue to play a crucial role 
in the search for that which the people of 
Israel so richly deserve— peace— that I 
oppose this legislation. 

I cannot deny the frustration many 
Americans and most Israelis must feel 
because of our position. Nor do I, or this 
Administration, take this frustration 
lightly. We regi-et it. 



But in the last analysis, it is a just 
and lasting peace for Israel that will 
bring with it a solution to this vexing 
problem of the status of Jerusalem. It is 
the calling, and the commitment, of the 
United States to help bring about that 
just and lasting peace. Indeed, I believe 
we are indispensable to the achievement 
of such a result. And, therefore, I must 
oppose passage of S.2031. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOM 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
FEB. 23, 1984' 



The United States has been engaged in 
nuclear cooperation with the European Com- 
munity for many years. This cooperation was 
initiated under agreements concluded over 
two decades ago between the United States 
and the Eui'opean Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) which extend until'December 
31, 1995. Since the inception of this coopera- 
tion, the Community has adhered to all its 
obligations under those agi-eements. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
amended the Atomic Energy Act to establish 
a new nuclear e.xport criteria, including a re- 
quirement that the United States have a right 
to consent to the reprocessing of fuel ex- 
ported from the United States. Our present 
agreements for cooperation with EURATOM 
do not contain such a right. To avoid disrupt- 
ing cooperation with EURATOM, a proviso 
was included in the law to enable continued 
cooperation until March 10, 1980, and negotia- 
tions concerning our cooperation agreements. 

The law also provides that nuclear coopera- 
tion with EURATOM can be extended on an 
annual basis after March 10, 1980, upon deter- 
mination by the President that failure to 
cooperate would seriously prejudice the 
achievement of United States nonproliferation 
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common 
defense and security and after notification to 
the Congress. President Carter made such a 
determination four years ago and signed Ex- 
ecutive 12193, permitting continued nuclear 
cooperation with EURATOM until March 10, 
1981. I made such determinations in 1981, 1982 
and 1983 and signed Executive Orders 122905, 
12351 and 12409 permitting continued nuclear 
cooperation through March 10, 1984. 



The United States has engaged in five 
rounds of talks with EURATOM regarding 
the renegotiation of the US-EURATOM 
agi-eements for cooperation. These were con- 
ducted in November 1978, September 1979, 
April 1980, .January 1982 and November 1983. 
The European Community is now considering 
U.S. proposals relating to our cooperation 
agreements, and progress in the talks appears 
to be possible. 

I believe that it is essential that coopera- 
tion between the United States and the Com- 
munity continue and likewise that we work 
closely with oui- Allies to counter the threat 
of nuclear explosives proliferation. A disi-up- 
tion of nuclear cooperation would not only 
eliminate any chance of progi-ess in oiu- talks 
with EURATOM related to our agreements, 
it would also cause serious problems in our 
overall relationships. Accordingly, I have 
detei-mined that failure to continue peaceful 
nuclear cooperation with EURATOM would 
be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
United States nonproliferation objectives and 
would jeopardize the common defense and 
security of the United States. I intend to sign 
an Executive Order to extend the waiver of 
the application of the relevant export 
criterion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
for an additional twelve months from March 
10, 1984. 

Sincerely, 

Rox.ALD Reag.^n 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and George Bush, President 
of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Feb. 27, 
1984). ■ 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



■■.^^■»M,»..T' 1 [.I I 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 

U.S. International Activities 
In Science and Technology 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
FEB. 17, 1984' 

In accordance with the requirements of Title 
V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1979 (Public Law 95-426), I 
am transmitting the 1983 annual report on the 
United States Government's international ac- 
tivities in the fields of science and technology. 
As in the past, this report has been prepared 
by the Department of State in collaboration 
with other concerned agencies of the Federal 
government. 

I would like to take this opportunity, first 
of all, to express again my personal regret on 
the passing of Congi-essman Clement J. 
Zablocki. As Chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee and of the Subcommittee 
on International Security and Scientific Af- 
fairs, Congi-essman Zablocki made many 
significant contributions to this Nation's pur- 
suit of foreign relations spanning several ad- 
ministrations. None of these, however, was 
more important than his tireless efforts to see 
that scientific progress toward economic 
growth both for our Nation and others across 
the globe and incoiporated that understand- 
ing into the Title V legislation of which he 
was the prime architect. On behalf of the 
people of the United States, I want to ex- 
press the gratitude of the Nation for his many 
years of distinguished service. 

Science and technology have been key to 
the economic and social development of the 
United States. Political liberty and free enter- 
prise provide a fertile environment to 
American scientists and engineers who have 
given us a standard of living unequaled in the 
history of the world. We are certain that 
science and technology offer similar hope to 
all nations committed to the pursuit of 
realistic and sustained economic development. 
The United States has increasingly made 
cooperative scientific and technological ar- 
rangements important to our developmental 
assistance efforts to Third World countries 
and of strengthened bilateral relations with 
other industrialized nations. 



During 1983 we were successful in our ef- 
forts to encourage inteniational science and 
technology cooperation. There were many 
positive developments which are set out in 
detail in this report. Of particular importance, 
though, are several of our bilateral relations. 
It is important to develop a strong bilateral 
relationship with the People's Republic of 
China while maintaining our friendship with 
the democratic nations of Asia. Broad-based 
science and technology agreements are a vital 
part of our efforts to build this relationship. 
The role of science and technology plays a 
similar role in Latin America This is particu- 
larly true in our bilateral relations with Brazil 
and Mexico. I am certain that these nations 
attach as much importance to scientific and 
technology cooperation as we do. We will con- 
tinue to pursue the opportunities for in- 
creased cooperation. 

Perhaps the most disturbing development 
of 1983 in the field of science and technology 
has been our reluctant, but necessary, deci- 
sion to give notice of our intent to withdraw 
from participation in UNESCO. Our persis- 
tent efforts over the past three years to con- 
vince the UNESCO bureaucracy in Paris to 
address the Agency's serious problems of ad- 
ministrative and fiscal mismanagement and to 
reorient its direction to pursue once again 
only the mission envisioned in its charter 
have failed. We see no viable option but to 
sever our ties with this Agency if its overt 
hostility to American values and its increasing 
substantive impotence and procedural abuse 
are not satisfactorily corrected. We will strive 
to minimize any significant adverse effect on 
beneficial science and technology activities at 
UNESCO by making alternative arrange- 
ments for U.S. participation in such pro- 
grams. 

Our scientific and technological relations 
with the Soviet Union and Poland have been 
adversely affected by disappointing Soviet at- 
titudes and actions. In our Title V Report for 
1982, I made it clear that cooperation depends 
upon the steps the Soviet Govenmient takes 
to comply with recognized nonns of interna- 
tional behavior. Soviet behavior still falls far 



short of this standard, and our position re- 
mains unchanged. We will continue to care- 
fully observe Soviet behavior and adjust our 
science and technology cooperation ac- 
cordingly. 

In the overall international arena, we can 
be proud of our scientific leadership. It can go 
a long way in helping the cause of freedom and 
economic growth around the world. The inter- 
national programs described in this report 
benefit our Nation and our cooperative part- 
ners, and are a source of good will around the 
world. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 20, 1984. 



April 1984 



67 



UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Participation in the United Nations 



by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreiffn Operations of the Senate Ap- 
propriations Committee on March 2, 
198Jf Ambassador Kirkpatrick is U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations.^ 



As always, it is a great pleasure and a 
pi-ivilege for me to testify before this 
committee with regard to U.S. participa- 
tion in the United Nations. Today is a 
particularly auspicious occasion since it 
marks the first congi-essional inquii-y 
relative to implementation of Section 
101(b) of the continuing resolution of 
November 14, 1983, as well as Section 117 
of the State Department Authorization 
Act for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The 
continuing resolution requires that the 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations furnish to Congress 
country-by-country reports on voting pat- 
terns and practices at the United Nations 
during the previous year; the State 
Department Authorization Act calls upon 
the Secretary of State to furnish annual 
reports regarding the policies which each 
member country of the United Nations 
pursues in international oi'ganizations of 
which the United States is a member. 

I want to make clear that I welcome 
and endorse fully these reporting re- 
quirements. Indeed, I firmly believe 
that, as regularly applicable provisions of 
law governing the functions of the State 
Department and the U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, 
these legislative enactments will provide 
an important tool for Congress in the 
fulfillment of its oversight respon- 
sibilities concerning the conduct of U.S. 
foreign relations. 

It would be difficult to overstate the 
importance of close and continuing atten- 
tion by Congress to events at the United 
Nations. After all, through their repre- 
sentatives in Congress, the American 
people contribute over 1.5 billion ta.x 
dollars annually toward the UN budget, 
and they contribute additional billions an- 
nually in various forms to many of the 
nations who play important roles in the 
activities of the United Nations. Our 
financial support of the United Nations 
and the assistance we provide to other 
nations symbolize not only our continuing 
commitment to the principles of the UN 



Charter but our dedication to world 
peace and the improvement of the qual- 
ity of life in nations less fortunate than 
ours. Congress' role in the decisions 
governing this formulation of the policies 
and allocation of these monies is of 
necessity very large. 

It goes without saying that it is of 
paramount importance that congressional 
decisions regarding UN funding and 
financial support to other countries be 
well-informed judgments and that they 
reflect the wishes of an informed elec- 
torate. These principles are not peculiar 
to matters of foreign relations; they are 
fundamental to our democratic form of 
government. 

To an extent greater than often 
realized, what occurs at the United Na- 
tions involves central issues of world 
politics and frequently touches upon vital 
U.S. national goals and interests. It 
therefore is obvious that the conduct of 
other UN members with regard to these 
goals and interests is very important to 
us. It constitutes a significant dimension 
of our relations with other countries to 
be considered with the utmost 
seriousness and gravity. 

Annual reviews of UN voting pat- 
terns and practices provide this commit- 
tee, as well as the electorate in general, 
with a reliable, systematic basis for 
assessing the attitudes, the policies, and 
the decisions of UN members on the 
salient questions of our time that come 
before the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council for consideration and 
action. Here we have the hard evidence 
of what has happened on issues of impor- 
tance to us. From it, we can make 
judgments concerning those whose 
values and views are harmonious with 
our own, and whose policies are opposed 
to ours, and those who fall in between. 
Beyond views, of course, come interests 
—often vital interests. So it is important 
that we take due note of actions which 
comport with, or are opposed to, what 
we regard as vital interests. 

The United Nations is a complex 
arena whose dynamics differ significantly 
fi-om relations in other arenas. Distinc- 
tive patterns of international politics 
have developed in UN arenas which 
often seem to have little relation to our 
bilateral relations. Often, far too often, 
only casual, intermittent, and inadequate 
efforts have been made to integrate U.S. 



policies and relations with other nations 
inside the United Nations to U.S. 
policies and relations with those same na- 
tions outside the United Nations. Yet, 
UN interactions and decisions have im- 
portant effects on our ability to achieve 
our goals outside the United Nations. 
Often, relations in the UN fora shape the 
context and limit the options available to 
the United States in the world. 

In examining the voting record of 
member states in the United Nations it 
should be borne in mind that relations in 
the United Nations are only one dimen- 
sion of our relations with other countries 
and often are not the most important 
aspect of these relations. Economic, 
strategic, and moral factors may be and 
often are more important to U.S. in- 
terests, policy, and pohcymakers than a 
country's behavior inside the United Na- 
tions. However, at the same time, if a 
given country's relations inside the 
United Nations are not all important, or 
even the most important factor in our 
relations with it, neither can relations in- 
side the United Nations be considered 
trivial. 

If the decisions and policies of the 
key bodies of the United Nations matter, 
then the votes of member nations mat- 
ter. If UN decisions make little or no dif- 
ference to our interests, then the United 
States should surely devote less money 
and enei-gy to our UN participation. 

Votes in the General Assembly and 
the Security Council provide mandates 
and guidance to the Secretary General 
and the Secretariat, and the diverse 
worldwide operations of its subgroups. 
UN decisions allocate funds, call con- 
ferences, and authorize programs. 

Since the UN system has a combined 
budget of over $4 billion and it employs 
over 50,000 individuals, decisions 
concerning the use of these worldwide 
resources are significant indeed. 

UN voting practice data require 
analysis to be useful. Merely because a 
country votes with us on some issues 
does not necessarily signify friendship or 
shared objectives. Countries with a low 
incidence of compatible votes are not 
necessarily foes. Indeed, on some issues 
of importance to us, our treaty allies and 
those with whom we hold strategic and 
other objectives in common may vote 
against us. We must not ignore the full 



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Department of State Bullet! 



'I 



UNITED NATIONS 



weight of the contextual circumstances in 
which any vote is cast. Nevertheless, 
with all these caveats in mind, significant 
patterns of political conduct and at- 
titudes do emei'ge from these data. 

Votes Focus World Attention 

The agendas of the principal UN bodies 
have a unique influence on the percep- 
tion of global problems because, to an e.x- 
tent not appreciated in the United 
States, discussions, debates, and votes in 
the United Nations are followed in the 
world press. Subjects discussed in majoi- 
UN fora come to be widely i-egarded as 
important. Because of this capacity to 
focus attention on some subjects and ig- 
nore others, the agendas of major UN 
Drganizations influence the definition of 
what is and what is not important in the 
world; what is a problem, what is a prob- 
lem worthy of "world" attention. For ex- 
ample, Cuba has worked hard to have 
Puerto Rico on the agenda of past 
General Assemblies as a problem of 
decolonization" to embarrass the 
United States and to create a problem 
where none exists. For the reverse 
reasons, the Soviet Union and its 
associated states try to keep off the 
agenda subjects such as the repression in 
Poland, the Libyan invasion of Chad, the 
lowning of the Korean airliner, the 
Rangoon bombing. 

When, year after year. Security 
Council resolutions focus on Israeli 
'practices" as violations of the fourth 
Geneva convention and ignore greater 
violations of other countries, there is a 
powerful tendency for many to come to 
believe that Israel is especially guilty of 
gross human rights abuses. Progres- 
sively, Israel comes to be perceived as a 
pariah. Continuing focus of UN bodies on 
the Palestinian question has kept Pales- 
tinian problems higher on the agenda of 
world politics than the plight of more 
numerous refugee populations and has 
won more generous financial support than 
for other refugee populations. 



Votes Define "World Opinion" 
on Major Issues 

The decisions of the United Nations are 
widely interpreted as reflecting "world 
opinion" and are endowed with substan- 
tial moral and intellectual force. The 
cumulative impact of decisions of UN 
bodies influence opinions all over the 
world about what is legitimate, what is 
acceptable, who is lawless and who is 
repressive, what countries are and are 



not capable of pi'otecting themselves anri 
their friends in the world body. 

Each year large majorities of the 
General Assembly put on record their 
disapproval of the occupation of 
Afghanistan and Kampuchea and their 
request for withdrawal of all foreign 
forces. Even though these resolutions do 
not name the occupying power, their 
meaning is clear and it is understood by 
everyone. It makes clear that the major- 
ity of member states understand what 
has happened and is happening in those 
two countries, that they disapprove, and 
that Soviet influence in the United Na- 
tions, though indubitably great, is not 
always large enough to prevent the ex- 
(jression of general disapproval. 

UN bodies can damage a country's 
reputation. The determined effort to 
make Israel a pariah state reflects the 
conviction of her adversaries that such 
delegitimization would be damaging. 
When resolutions are passed by the 
Security Council that make demands in- 
compatible with a nation's basic in- 
terests, they will almost surely be 
ignored. But refusal to respect a Secur- 
ity Council resolution leaves a country 
open to the charge that it is an "interna- 
tional outlaw," "not a peaceloving 
nation," and, therefore, eligible for fur- 
ther sanctions. Thus, Isi-ael, having been 
requested by Security Council action to 
withdraw all its troops from Lebanon, is 
"guilty" of noncompliance, while Syria is 
"not guilty" because thei'e were never 
enough votes in the Security Council to 
demand Syria's withdrawal. The fact of 
noncompliance becomes yet another 
ground for censuring Israel in the 
United Nations regardless of the fact 
that Israel agreed to a timetable foi' joint 
withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon 
and actually began a withdrawal which 
Syria refused even to discuss. 

When the Soviet Union is able to 
protect itself against being criticized by 
name— no matter how flagrant its viola- 
tions of the UN Charter— it establishes 
itself as skillful, effective, and influential, 
a power to be reckoned with in what is 
regularly called the international com- 
munity. When its client states and allies 
ai-e able to escape criticism— no matter 
how flagrantly they violate the UN 
Charter— the Soviets are judged to be in- 
fluential, useful friends. Soviet success 
and influence in the United Nations then 
becomes an additional incentive for sen- 
.sitivity to Soviet views and for associa- 
tion with the Soviet bloc. Conversely, 
when the United States and its friends 
are subjected to harsh and often unfaii- 



attack, the Lfnited States appears to be 
devoid of influence and association with 
it becomes undesirable if not dangerous. 
LIN votes affect both the image and the 
reality of power in the UN system and 
beyond it. 

What UN Votes Tell Us About 
the Countries Who Cast Them 

Thei-e is much votes cannot tell us. The 
votes of a congressman do not necessar- 
ily tell us where and how he stands 
within his party or within the Congress, 
nor what he cares most deeply about, 
nor about his relation with his peers, nor 
about the views of his constituency or 
his legislative assistant. A vote does not 
even tell us to which party a con- 
gressman belongs. A congressman may 
argue even that his votes do not ac- 
curately reflect his true values and 
preferences but, instead, the pressures 
in an election year of his constituency, 
his party, the financial pressures on him, 
and the issues he was forced to vote on. 
But cumulatively a congressman's votes 
tell us in a general way about where he 
stands on various kinds of issues, what 
he stands for, and whom he stands with. 

Similarly in the United Nations, a 
country's votes do not tell us many 
things. Votes may not depend just on 
the country's objective position and 
needs, nor its subjective values and 
identifications, but on what some 
authoritative person decided was in his 
own best interest or his country's best 
interest in a particular place, at a par- 
ticular time. The cumulative record, 
however, tells us what a government 
judges to be in its best interest. When 
an African government votes with the 
majority of Africans, or with the majoi-- 
ity of the nonaligned government group, 
for a resolution that is unfairly critical of 
the United States for violating the South 
African arms embargo, for example, that 
African state is not necessarily express- 
ing its hostility to the United States; it 
may simply believe there will be more 
unpleasant (personal or official) conse- 
quences for voting no than voting yes. 

Over time, however, a country's 
votes reflect its choices about values and 
priorities. 

There are certain interesting paral- 
lels between the country-by-country 
reports on human rights practices under 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and 
the UN voting practice reports, as re- 
quired by last year's legislative enact- 
ment. Both reflect an effort by Congress 
to take account in its consideration of 
foreign assistance decisions the policies 



April 1984 



UNITED NATIONS 



and practices of other countries with 
regard to the moral and poUtical goals 
which guide U.S. policy. Both provide 
data which must be evaluated with sen- 
sitivity and understanding. Like the 
human rights reports, the data on UN 
voting practices the reports provide can 
be quite valuable in contributing to bet- 
ter informed, more intelligent decisions. 

Congress, as always, will be free to 
decide to grant or withhold. But in 
reaching its decisions. Congress will 
have, by virtue of the UN voting 
reports, the assistance of information 
which may be highly relevant in any 
given case. The public will similarly have 
an understandable basis for judgments 
that are more reliable than generalized 
impressions. 

As I have indicated, these reports 
are not very different in their purpose 
than data supplied to Congress in a host 
of domestic contexts, as part of the 
legislative process. There is nothing 
unique in Congress' quest for the en- 
lightenment provided by relevant infor- 
mation. If any country feels that the 
reports do not faithfully reflect its 
policies, attitudes, and decisions, it is, of 
course, free to speak out as it sees fit. 

Our nation has never been mean or 
vindictive in its conduct of foreign rela- 
tions. It has, on the contrary, been 
generous to a fault and understanding in 
the extreme. That has been the 
American style. I believe it will continue 
to be so— though perhaps with greater 
sensitivity and closer attention to the 
hard realities of the world in which we 
live. These reports should be a helpful 
adjunct in that process. 

Some Generalizations and Conclusions 

First, the U.S. weakness in UN arenas 
is of longstanding duration. It dates back 
to the 1960s and apparently is rooted in 
the transformation of UN membership 
by the influx of many new nations, many 
of which are not democratic, and the 
failure of the United States to take part 
in the developing "party system" inside 
the United Nations. It also reflects a 
U.S. habit of acting as though another 
country's behavior toward our values 
and interests inside the United Nations 
were not relevant to their relationship 
with us. 

Second, the position of the United 
States in the United Nations is not 
nearly as strong as our economic and 
military strength might suggest. That is 
another way of saying U.S. strength and 
resources in the world have not been 
translated into influence inside the 
United Nations. 



70 



Third, rising Soviet influence has ac- 
companied declining U.S. influence inside 
UN fora. This has been achieved by in- 
tegration of Soviet influence with the 
major blocs (through their client states) 
and in the UN permanent bureaucracy 
and weak coordination among the person- 
nel and policies of the democracies and 
prodemocratic forces. 

Fourth, the strength of the Soviet 
Union inside the United Nations is based 
on the transfer into the United Nations 
of power relations outside the United 
Nations. Soviet dominance of Eastern 
Europe is translated into a solid bloc of 
votes in the United Nations. Soviet 
client states always support Soviet posi- 
tions and strategies inside the United 
Nations. 

Conclusions from the experience of 
the past 3 years suggest that it should 
be possible to enhance U.S. abUity to 
maximize democratic values and the prin- 
ciples of the UN Charter and to protect 
our interests and reputation in UN 
arenas providing: 

• The United States and its represen- 
tatives are clear and make clear to 
others that we take a serious interest in 
decisions in these arenas and no longer 
are willing to shrug off UN interactions 
as without importance; 

• That we integrate regular com- 
munication on UN affairs into our normal 
bilateral relations with other countries; 

• That we take special measures to 
infoiTTi other countries about issues of 
special concern to us; and 

• That we make clear inside the 
United Nations that we are prepared to 
respect our friends' and associates' basic 
values and interests but expect that such 
respect should be mutual. 

The foreign policy of the United 
States, in the United Nations as out of 
it, should affirm our commitment to 
sti-engthening international peace, to pro- 
moting democratic values including 
respect for human rights, to encouraging 
development, and to strengthening in- 
stitutions that provide for the peaceful 
resolution of conflict. 

When the United States is weak and 
without influence in international arenas, 
the possibilities of promoting these 
values in those arenas are diminished. 
When the United States and the other 
democracies are influential, democratic 
values and institutions are strengthened 
as well. It is not enlightened or generous 
or responsible for the United States to 
be or seem to be indifferent to what 



transpires in gi'eat international fora. It 
is not genei-ous or responsible to act as 
though we did not cai-e about decisions 
in international bodies. It is our duty to 
try in all appropriate ways to strengthen 
freedom and human rights and to pro- 
mote the values of the UN Charter— the 
reason for our initial sponsorship of, and 
present membership in the United Na- 
tions. 



•The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Department of State Bullet 

"3 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Central America Initiative Proposed 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
FEB. 3, 1984' 

In the coming days, we'll send legislation 
to the Congi-ess based on a remai'kable 
bipartisan consensus of the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America. And I urge prompt congi-es- 
sional action and support. 

Last April, in an address to a joint 
session of the Congress, I spoke to the 
American people about what is at stake 
in Central America and asked for bipar- 
tisan cooi)eration in our efforts to help 
make a better life for the people of that 
region. Shortly after that speech, the 
late Senator Henry Jackson called for 
the appointment of a bipartisan commis- 
sion to chart a long-term course for 
democracy, economic improvement, and 
peace in Central Amei'ica. And as Scoop 
Jackson so rightly observed, "Whatever 
policy options might be available to us, 
ignoring threats to the stability of 
Central America and refusing to engage 
ourselves in the problems of the region 
are not among them." 

It was against this background that I 
did establish the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America. Its mis- 
sion was to recommend a long-teiTn pol- 
icy appropriate to the economic, social, 
political, and military challenges to the 
region. 

The distinguished Americans who 
served on that commission have per- 
formed a great service to all Americans. 
All of us— when I say all Americans— «// 
of us from Point Barrow to Tierra del 
Fuego. Henry Kissinger and the commis- 
sion members and senior counselors: My 
appreciation for a tough job well done. 

Our proposed legislation, the Central 
America Democracy, Peace, and Devel- 
opment Initiative Act, is based on the 
commission's analysis and embodies its 
recommendations, and it's in the spirit of 
Senator Jackson who first proposed the 
idea of a bipartisan commission and 
sei'ved until his death as one of its senior 
counselors. He represented something 
very special in American politics. Scoop 
Jackson stood for national security and 
human rights because he knew that one 
without the other is meaningless. He 
said what he believed and stuck to it 
with vision, integrity, and grace. 

The legislation does not offer a quick 
fix to the crisis in Central America; 
there is none. Our plan offers a com- 
prehensive program to support demo- 



April 1984 




President Reagan with (left to right) Richard McP^arland, national security adviser; Robert 
Strauss, a member of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America; and Dr. 
Henry A. Kissinger, chairman of the national commission. 



cratic development, improve human 
rights, and bring peace to this troubled 
region that's so close to home. 

The approach is right. It includes a 
mix of developmental, political, diplo- 
matic, and security initiatives, equitably 
and humanely pursued. We either do 
them all, or we jeopardize the chance for 
real progress in the region. The plan 
i-esponds to decades of inequity and in- 
difference through its support of 
democracy, reform, and human freedom. 
It responds to the economic challenges of 
the region. 

The legislation calls for $400 million 
in supplementary economic assistance for 
fiscal year 1984. And during the next 5 
years, economic assistance will amount to 
$5.9 billion in appropi-iated funds and $2 
billion in insurance and guarantees. 

To support the security of the 
region's threatened nations, the legisla- 
tion will provide $515 million over the 
next 2 years. At the same time, it will 
require semiannual reports to the Con- 
gress assessing El Salvadoran policies 
for achieving political and economic 
development and conditions of security. 

To support dialogue and negotiations 
both among the countries of the region 
and within each country, the legislation 



provides guidance for cooperation with 
the Central American countries in 
establishing, then working with, the Cen- 
tral American Development Organiza- 
tion. 

Our plan is for the long haul. It won't 
be easy, and it won't be cheap. But it 
can be done. And for strategic and moral 
reasons, it must be done. I ask the Con- 
gress to study the commission report 
and to give our legislative proposal its 
urgent attention and bipartisan support. 
It is not an impossible drearii. We have 
the resources to do it. This initiative 
serves the interest of the Western 
Hemisphere. The beleaguered people in 
Central America want our help. Our 
enemies, extremists of the left and the 
right, would be delighted if we refused 
to give it. And if we don't help now, 
we'll surely pay dearly in the future. 

With the support of the Congress, we 
will not let down all those in Central 
America who yearn for democracy and 
peace. And in so doing, we'll not let 
ourselves down. 



'Made in the East Room of the White 
House to Members of Congress, members of 
the diplomatic community, and Administration 
officials (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 6, 1Q84). ■ 



71 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Central America Democracy, Peace, 
and Development Initiative 



by Langhome A. Motley 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
February 21, 198i. Ambassador Motley 
is Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs.' 

I am pleased to appear before you to 
testify on the vitally important Central 
America Democracy, Peace, and 
Development Initiative Act of 1984. 

The exhaustive study made by the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Cen- 
tral America has enabled us to prepare a 
comprehensive response to the many- 
sided crisis in Central America. The Ad- 
ministration and the Congress are now 
in a position to forge a complete pro- 
gram of action that meets both im- 
mediate operational needs and the re- 
quirements of a long-term strategy. 

The bill the President has just 
transmitted to the Congress embodies 
those recommendations made by the 
bipartisan commission which cannot be 
implemented without legislation. As you 
know, the President will implement by 
executive action those commission 
recommendations that do not require 
new legislation. He urges prompt con- 
gressional action and support for this 
bill. 

This legislative package will help to 
stabilize economies and societies plagued 
by injustice and violence. At the same 
time, it will enable us to take the offen- 
sive against poverty and to foster 
democratic development, to increase 
respect for human rights, and to help 
bring lasting peace to this troubled 
region so close to the United States. 

This prepared statement addresses: 

• The report of the bipartisan com- 
mission; 

• The major elements of the legisla- 
tion; and 

• Some questions of policy and im- 
plementation. 

The Report of the Bipartisan 
Commission 

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the 
commission's report is its honesty— its 
candor in facing up to the complexities 
of Central America. The commission 
could have focused superficially on one 



72 



or two "critical issues" which, if ad- 
dressed in isolation, might have created 
the illusion of a broader solution. 

To its credit, the commission refused 
to oversimplify. It acknowledged that 
Central America's problems are com- 
plex, severe, and deeply rooted, con- 
cluding flatly that they add up to a 
"seamless web" from which no quick 
fixes or shortcuts will free us. The U.S. 
interests involved, it pointed out, are 
both moral and strategic. And they are 
threatened by human rights abuse and 
by economic misery as well as by Cuban 
and Soviet intervention. 

The commission's recommendations 
are as comprehensive and direct as its 
analysis. It could have insisted on its 
mandate to deal with long-term issues 
and avoided the difficult questions we 
face now. It could have summarized the 
policies already being pursued by the 
Administration and given us credit for 
being on the right track. And it could 
have simply praised the peace efforts of 
the Central American countries and the 
central importance of negotiations 
like those underway in the Contadora 
process. 

But the commission was both 
unanimous and unambiguous in con- 
cluding that the long term will be far 
less manageable if we fail to deal with 
existing challenges. It called for U.S. 
support for regional efforts like Con- 
tadora but said that the United States 
also has a special responsibility to con- 
tribute actively to the creation of 
economic, security, and political condi- 
tions required for peace. It concluded 
that we are not doing enough and 
recommended that the Administration 
and the Congress cooperate to ensure 
that we provide the resources we and 
our Central American friends need to 
work successfully together to attain a 
lasting peace built solidly on democracy 
and development. 

The commission refused to accept 
precooked judgments and conventional 
platitudes. Bipartisan in composition and 
nonpartisan in mandate, the commission 
approached its task with total in- 
dependence. Mr. Chairman [Michael D. 
Barnes], you and I can both testify to 
the commission's thoroughness and in- 
dependence. We were both asked many 
questions. We were asked to identify the 
problems and to explain what we 



thought was needed to deal with them. 
But we were never asked whether this 
or that recommendation would "sell." 
We were never asked to compromise our 
views for reasons of political or ad- 
ministrative expediency. 

The commission's discussions with 
Central and Latin American leaders 
eliminated the screens created by 
distance, paperwork, and partisan 
preconceptions and exposed its members 
to the region's realities. They saw for 
themselves what is happening in El 
Salvador and in Nicaragua and 
throughout the isthmus. 

From these experiences the commis- 
sion developed a perspective on Central 
America that combines: 

• An enlightened understanding of 
the capacity of social and economic 
frustration to undermine stability and 
feed on itself to create yet more un- 
happiness and more instability; 

• A technical knowledge of how 
world economic developments can in- 
fluence, and at times devastate, strug- 
gling economies and an equally informed 
insight into how those economies can 
renew their growth; 

• A sophisticated understanding of 
the tactics and tools of the Soviet Union 
and Cuba, who would exploit these 
vulnerabilities and ultimately threaten 
us; and lastly, 

• A truly American insight for 
responding to the economic and political 
realities of Central America in a way 
that conforms to our neighbors' aspira- 
tions for peace, democracy, and pros- 
perity. 

As a result, what emerges from the 
commission's report is the Central 
American dynamic itself. It is a dynamic 
in which communism, violence, and dic- 
tatorship feed on misery, injustice, and 
an unfortunate past. It is a destructive 
dynamic that oppresses the people of 
Central America and will, unless altered, 
increasingly endanger the rest of the 
hemisphere. 

The Central America Democracy, 
Peace, and Development Initiative 
Act of 1984 

To break this destructive dynamic will 
require action in support of democratic 
self-determination, economic and social 
development that fairly benefits all, and 
cooperation in meeting threats to the 
security of the region. That is the con- 
sensus of the bipartisan commission. It 
is the basis of the legislative package 
now before you. 



Department of State Bulletin 
■ tim ii H i i— WW 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Specifically, this is what the Presi- 
dent proposes to implement the recom- 
^ mendations of the bipartisan commis- 
sion. 

Economic Assistance. Recognizing 
that economic deterioration aggravates 
social and political unrest, the commis- 
sion recommended an additional $400 
million this year for emergency stabiliza- 
tion to set the stage for long-term 
development. 

Our supplemental request for FY 
1984 is for $400 million in emergency 
funds to halt sharp declines in gross 
•■! domestic product (GDP), per capita in- 
come, and employment. During the last 
several years, per capita GDP has fallen 
Dy 35% "in El Salvador, 23% in Costa 
Rica, 14% in Guatemala, and 12% in 
Honduras. In 4 years. El Salvador has 
ost 15 years of economic development. 

The commission recommended 
ilmost doubling our projected economic 
lid to roughly $8 billion over the next 5 
years. This amount, which looks large 
antil compared to the region's needs, 
»vould support a comprehensive strategy 
to promote democratization, economic 
growth, human development, and 
security. 

Our implementation plan for fiscal 
year (FY) 1985-89 calls for a total of 
$5.9 billion in appropriated funds and 
off-budget guarantee authorities to allow 
for $2 billion in insurance and guar- 
antees, the latter including housing in- 
vestment guarantees and a trade credit 
insurance program to be administered by 
the Export-Import Bank. 

For FY 1985, we propose a program 
involving $1.1 billion in appropriated 
funds and $600 million in insurance and 
guarantees. Depending on country per- 
formance, we estimate that the major 
beneficiaries of direct, bilateral aid in 
FY 1985 would be El Salvador ($341 
million), Costa Rica ($208 million), Hon- 
duras ($139 million), and Guatemala ($96 
million). El Salvador, which has suffered 
over $800 million in guerrilla destruc- 
tion, would be the largest single re- 
cipient. Two other countries, however, 
would receive more on a per capita 
basis. 

From a functional standpoint, this 
FY 1985 proposal includes: 

• About $550 million in balance-of- 
payments support to finance the import 
of critical goods by the private sector; 

• $120 million in Public Law 480 
food assistance, with local currency pro- 
ceeds used to reinforce programs in, for 
example, education and health; 



April 1984 



• Major labor-intensive construction 
of infrastructure and housing; 

• Significantly increased support for 
education, including literacy and teacher 
corps training and scholarships; 

• Major funding to develop commer- 
cial agriculture, the backbone of the 
Central American economies, including 
assistance to broaden ownership pat- 
terns and to increase the availability of 
credit; 

• Increase funding for activities in 
Central America by the private National 
Endowment for Democracy; 

• Funds to strengthen the adminis- 
tration of justice in the region as the 
surest way to safeguard individual liber- 
ties and human rights; and 

• Support for the Central American 
Common Market and its companion Cen- 
tral American Bank for Economic In- 
tegration to revitalize intraregional 
trade and restore economic production 
and employment. 

Military Assistance. Peace is essen- 
tial to economic and humanitarian prog- 
ress in Central America. Without securi- 
ty, the best economic programs and the 
wisest diplomacy will be unable to stop 
the opponents of democracy. 

The commission recommended sig- 
nificantly increased levels of military aid 
to El Salvador, warning specifically 
against providing "too little to wage the 
war successfully." 

The President's proposal is as 
follows: 

• For El Salvador: $178.7 million in 
FY 1984 supplemental assistance and 
$132.5 million for 1985. Added to the 
$64.8 million available under this year's 
continuing resolution, the FY 1984-85 
program for El Salvador would total 
$376 million. This program would be 
concentrated in FY 1984 in order to 
break the military stalemate and provide 
as soon as possible a firmer basis for 
economic recovery and democratic na- 
tional reconciliation in El Salvador. 

• For the rest of Central America: 
$80.35 million in FY 1984 supplemental 
military assistance and $123.4 million 
for FY 1985. The lion's share would be 
allocated to Honduras, a democracy that 
still faces frequent violations of its na- 
tional territory by Salvadoran guerrillas 
seeking refuge and using Honduras as a 
supply route, as well as by Honduran 
guerrillas infiltrated from Nicaragua. 
Honduras also faces a direct military 
threat from Nicaragua, which has built 
up armed forces at least five times 
larger than Somoza's National Guard 



and has received some $250 million in 
military assistance from the Soviet bloc 
since 1979. 

The commission recommends that 
military aid to El Salvador should, 
through legislation requiring periodic 
reports, be made contingent upon 
demonstrated progress toward human 
rights objectives, including free elections 
and reduction in death-squad activities. 
There is agreement among the ex- 
ecutive, the Congress, and the commis- 
sion that human rights progress is 
essential in El Salvador to ensure a suc- 
cessful outcome of war and to protect 
U.S. security and moral interests. There 
is also a consensus that U.S. assistance 
should actively be used to achieve these 
objectives. 

As this committee knows, the ex- 
ecutive branch and the Congress have 
not always seen eye to eye on how best 
to achieve this shared goal. My ex- 
ecutive branch colleagues and I are firm- 
ly convinced that a statutory formula re- 
quiring determinations at arbitrary pre- 
set intervals on an "all-or-nothing" basis 
is not an effective approach. Experience 
shows that such a formula may actually 
trigger hostile action by guerrilla forces 
and focus attention on the certification 
process rather than on the underlying 
problems and their remedies. 

We must find a means to condition 
our assistance in ways that work. This 
requires the flexibility to respond to 
specific circumstances as they exist at a 
given moment. Recent advances, which 
have taken place in the absence of a 
legislated certification requirement, 
demonstrate that alternatives do exist. 
We are ready to work closely with 
the Congress to ensure continuing 
human rights progress while preserving 
the President's ability to pursue an ef- 
fective foreign policy. 

Central American Development 
Organization (CADO). The commission 
recommended creation of a Central 
American Development Organization to 
give multilateral form and substance to 
economic development efforts. 

In line with the commission's recom- 
mendation, the proposed legislation sets 
forth principles to guide the negotiations 
for establishing this new institution in 
conjunction with the Central American 
countries and other donors. 

The President has indicated that he 
intends to respect the principles set 
forth in the legislation, both in his 
negotiations and in subsequent U.S. par- 
ticipation in CADO. In line with these 
principles: 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



• CADO would provide an effective 
forum for an open dialogue on Central 
American political, economic, and social 
development, and a continuous review of 
local policies and of the uses to which 
foreign assistance is put. 

• Participation would be open to the 
United States, other donors, and those 
Central American countries that commit 
themselves to, among other things, 
peace and mutual security, maintaining 
or making progress toward human 
rights development, building democracy, 
and encouraging economic growth 
through policy reforms. CADO would in- 
clude representatives from both the 
public and private sectors, from labor 
and business, and be supported by a 
small professional staff. 

• CADO would make recommenda- 
tions on political, economic, and social 
development objectives; mobilization of 
resources and external resource needs; 
and economic policies and structures. 
CADO would evaluate country perform- 
ance and progress in meeting objectives. 

• In this regard, disbursement of 
25% of economic assistance funds 
authorized under this act and allocated 
for each Central American country 
would be deferred until both the United 
States and CADO have approved. Con- 
sistent with the Constitution, ultimate 
control of U.S. aid funds would remain 
with Congress and the President. 

Multiyear Funding. To ensure ef- 
fective planning and predictability, the 
proposed economic assistance departs 
from the conventional practice of seek- 
ing authorizations for 1 or 2 years. We 
are seeking an authorization that will go 
beyond FY 1985 and extend through FY 
1989. In addition, we are requesting that 
appropriations under this authorization 
be made available beyond a single fiscal 
year. 

The reason for this innovation is 
that the bill represents a 5-year pro- 
gram. This is what was developed by the 
commission, and it is supported by our 
own analysis. This approach has the fun- 
damental virtue of enabling everyone 
concerned— both in the United States 
and in Central America— to know what 
could become available if performance 
standards are met. 



Policy and Implementation 

Many questions have arisen about this 
program. 

• Are we asking for too much? 

• Will our assistance be used effec- 
tively? 



• Are we seeking a military solution 
in El Salvador? 

• Shouldn't increased assistance 
follow a regional settlement? 

• Will these additional resources 
solve the problem? 

Let me take each in turn. 

Are we asking for too much? No. 

In fact, the sums are modest in relation 
to need. As the bipartisan commission 
underlined, the need for external 
assistance is enormous. Physical in- 
frastructure has been damaged, health 
and education systems need expansion, 
and investment in productive capacity is 
essential to employ the region's growing 
labor force. 

There are those who counsel that we 
should provide less economic assistance. 
But is less than 15% of our proposed 
global economic aid budget for FY 1985 
too large a price to pay to alleviate suf- 
fering and serve our interests in Central 
America? 

Others advocate a reduction in 
military assistance. Yet there is no 
reduction in the arms, training, and 
other support flowing to the other side, 
a side that has rejected democracy and 
pluralism and utilizes violence as its 
chosen means to power. 

Still others recommend that we 
withdraw altogether, because the situa- 
tion is supposedly too tough for us, 
because regional forces of moderation 
and democracy are allegedly too weak, 
or because they discount the manifest in- 
tentions of the antidemocratic forces at 
work. The United States cannot, how- 
ever, afford to withdraw and abandon 
Central America to poverty and com- 
munism. 

Lastly, there are those who are will- 
ing to do something to help, but not 
enough. They don't want to shoulder the 
political consequences if those we sup- 
port lose, but they are not willing to 
concede the assistance needed for them 
to win. They refused to make a genuine 
commitment and continue to seek "quick 
fixes" that fail to address the fundamen- 
tal issues of peace, democracy, security, 
and honest reform. The commission 
rightly singles out this approach as the 
most pernicious. 

Assistance of $8 billion over 5 years 
would be equivalent to about 5% of the 
gross domestic product of the region. 
This is less than the aid previously made 
available to some other parts of the 
world. 

Another useful measure of the abili- 
ty of Central America to absorb these 
proposed levels of assistance is the 



shortfall in export earnings from coffee 
and sugar due to lower prices, plus 
higher costs for imported oil. This net 
hard currency loss amounts to about 
$1.5 billion per year— the same general 
magnitude as the proposed assistance. 

Moreover, considerable excess 
capacity could quickly and easily be 
brought back into play, generating in- 
creased employment and output. Private 
firms need only working capital and im- 
ported inputs; in the public sector, high- 
priority investment programs that have 
been suspended or cut back because of 
austerity programs lack only financial 
support to be reactivated. 

Will the assistance be used effec- 
tively? In the near term, the bulk of our 
resources will go to private-sector ac- 
tivities, not expansion of government 
bureaucracies. In the longer term, we 
will also be providing the institution- 
building help, training, and technical 
assistance that will allow our neighbors 
to carry out larger scale programs more 
efficiently. 

Local policy reform will be required 
to receive and ensure effective use of 
our funds. We will not subsidize ineffi- 
ciency and will strive to create oppor- 
tunities and incentives for private-sector 
investment. We hope that CADO will be 
an effective mechanism to this end. A 
key objective of CADO will be to consult 
the private sector to identify activities 
that will most increase productivity: 
neither government bureaucracy nor 
handouts but the cutting edge of local 
production. 

Capital flight was a serious problem 
for 3-4 years beginning about 1979. | 

More recently, however, the central 
banks of the region have recognized the 
seriousness of the problem and are suc- 
cessfully working to prevent capital 
flight. 

Our AID [Agency for International 
Development] missions also are pro- 
viding useful advice and technical 
assistance to help Central American 
monetary authorities meet the challenge 
As a result, outflows have been greatly 
reduced. 

Are we seeking a military solution 
in El Salvador? No. As President 
Reagan said last March, "the real solu- 
tion can only be a political one," with th 
Salvadoran people deciding their own 
destiny through free and fair elections. 
That is not a "military solution." The 
military assistance we are requesting 
would provide the wherewithal for the 
Salvadoran Armed Forces to break the 
current stalemate and take and sustain 



Department of State Bulletin 



uaaaam 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Central America Initiative Legislation 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
FEB. 17, 1984' 

I herewith transmit proposed legislation that 
embodies the consensus arrived at by the Na- 
tional Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America. Its unifying thread is the spirit of 
the late Senator Henry M. Jackson— to ad- 
vance the twin purposes of national security 
and human development. 

Peace and individual betterment are 
universal purposes. They are at the heart of 
the American dream. Yet, today in Central 
America these goals are not realized. Poverty 
and violence are widespread. As a conse- 
quence, democratic forces are not able to 
flourish, and those who seek to disrupt 
freedom and opportunity threaten the heai-t 
of those nations. 

Throughout our history, our leaders have 
put country before party on issues in foreign 
affairs important to the national interest. The 
Commission identifies the situation in Central 
America as this kind of issue. The 12 Commis- 
sioners—Democrats and Republicans 
alike— conclude "that Central America is both 
vital and vulnerable, and that whatever other 
ci-ises may arise to claim the nation's atten- 
tion, the United States cannot afford to turn 
away from that threatened region." 

We face an inescapable reality: we must 
come to the support of our neighbors. The 
democratic elements in Central America need 
our help. For them to overcome the problems 
of accumulated historical inequities and im- 
mediate armed threats will take time, effort, 
and resources. We must support those efforts. 

As the Commission recommends, our 
policy must be based on the principles of 
democratic self-determination, economic and 
social improvement that fairly benefits all, 
and cooperation in meeting threats to the 
security of the region. 

Accordingly, I propose the "Central 
America Democracy, Peace and Development 
Initiative Act of 1984." This act calls for an 
increased commitment of resources beginning 
immediately and extending regularly over the 
ne.xt five years. This assistance is necessary 
to support the balance of economic, political, 
diplomatic, and security measures that will be 
pursued simultaneously. 



I propose authorization for an $8 billion, 
five-year reconstruction and development pro- 
gram for Central America, composed of $6 
billion in direct appropriations and $2 billion 
in insurance and guarantee authority. For 
fiscal year 1985 the figures are SLlbillion 
and $600 million, respectively. In addition, the 
plan calls for $400 million in supplemental ap- 
propriations for an emergency economic 
stabilization program for fiscal year 1984. 

These resources will support agricultural 
development, education, health services, ex- 
port promotion, land reform, housing, 
humanitarian relief, trade credit insurance, 
aid for small businesses, and other activities. 
Because democracy is essential to effective 
development, special attention will be given 
to increasing scholarships, leadership training, 
educational exchanges, and support for the 
growth of democratic institutions. 

Regional institutions such as the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) and the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integra- 
tion (CABEI) made a major contribution to 
the region's economic growth in the 1960's 
and early 70's. I am proposing a substantial 
assistance program to revitalize these institu- 
tions and thereby stimulate intra-regional 
trade and economic activity. 

To enable the countries of Central 
America to paitidpate directly in the plan- 
ning of these efforts, I shall explore the crea- 
tion of a Central American Development 
Organization (CADO). This would enable 
political and private leaders from both the 
United States and Central America to review 
objectives and progress, and make recommen- 
dations on the nature and levels of our 
assistance efforts. The organization would, in 
effect, help to oversee and coordinate the ma- 
jor efforts that must be made. The legislation 
I am proposing sets out a series of principles 
to guide the negotiations for the establish- 
ment of this new regional institution. I intend 
to respect those principles in these negotia- 
tions and in our subsequent participation in 
CADO. As the Commission recognized, the 
ultimate control of aid funds will always rest 
with the donors. Consistent with the Con- 
stitution and this precept, final disposition of 
funds appropriated under this legislation will 
be subject to the ultimate control of the Con- 
gress and the President. 



The National Bipartisan Commission 
specifically recommends significantly in- 
creased levels of military aid to the region, 
especially El Salvador. In the words of the 
report, "the worst possible policy for El 
Salvador is to provide just enough aid to keep 
the war going, but too little to wage it suc- 
cessfully." I propose authorization for the 
region for fiscal year 1984 and a $256 million 
program for fiscal year 1985. 

U.S. military assistance is vital to shield 
progress on human rights and democratization 
against violence from extremes of both left 
and right. I shall ensure that this assistance is 
provided under conditions necessary to foster 
human rights and political and economic 
development, and our Administration will con- 
sult with the Members of the Congress to 
make certain that our assistance is used fairly 
and effectively. 

No new laws are needed to carry out 
many of the Commission's recommendations. 
There is, for example, a consensus on an in- 
tegral part of our strategy in Central 
America: support for actions implementing 
the 21 Contadora objectives to help bring 
about peace. The Contadora objectives are in 
Central America's interest and in ours. 
Similarly, we are urging other nations to in- 
crease their assistance to the area. 

I believe it is no accident that the Com- 
mission reached many of the same conclusions 
about comprehensive solutions to Central 
America's problems as have the participants 
in the Contadora process. As Dr. Kissinger 
noted in his January 10 letter to me, "the 
best route to consensus on U.S. policy toward 
Central America is by exposure to the 
realities of Central America." 

The National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America has done its work. Now it is 
our turn. Unless we act— quickly, humanely, 
and firmly— we shall face a crisis that is much 
worse for everyone concerned. We owe it to 
our children to make sure that our neighbors 
have a chance to live decent lives in freedom. 
I, therefore, ask that the enclosed legisla- 
tion be given your urgent attention and early 
and favorable action. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 20, 1984. 



'.pril 1984 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



the initiative to provide a stronger shield 
for protecting political and economic 
development. This would increase the in- 
centives for the FDR/FMLN [Revolu- 
tionary Democratic Front/Farabundo 
Marti Liberation Front] to enter into 
serious discussions with the Salvadoran 
Peace Commission about participation m 
elections. We doubt this will happen un- 
til the FDR/FMLN becomes convinced it 
cannot prevail militarily. Passage of our 
proposed assistance package, however, 
could be a deciding factor in ensuring 
participation of important elements ot 
the far left in the 1385 municipal and 
legislative elections. 

Though the amount of proposed mili- 
tary assistance is larger than that pro- 
vided previously, we should bear m mind 
that the current military stalemate may 
be partly due to the inadequacy and 
uncertainty of past assistance. To con- 
tinue an inadequate level of assistance 
may be tantamount to prolonging the 

war. 

The amount of military assistance 
for El Salvador should also be kept in 
perspective: total FY 1984 military 
assistance for El Salvador (that provided 
in the continuing resolution plus the 
supplemental request) is 3.6% of our 
worldwide military assistance, and the 
FY 1985 request for El Salvador is 2.1% 
of the global figure. The bipartisan com- 
mission stated that "there is ... no 
logical argument for giving some 
[military] aid but not enough." We can 
afford the amount we are requesting, 
whether in terms of our important in- 
terests in Central America or of our 
worldwide responsibilities. 

Shouldn't increased economic aid 
accompany or follow an overall 
regional settlement? The economic 
assistance which we are requesting is 
essential support for any negotiated 
settlement. If we want to give peace a 
chance, we must begin now to rebuild 
the economies of Central America to 
create the climate for peace. 

At some point in the future, if all 
the parties are ready for settlement, the 
peace process could proceed very rapid- 
ly With our full support, Contadora has 
already prepared the groundwork for an 
agreement in its excellent 21-point Docu- 
ment of Objectives. But successful 
negotiations must reflect operational 
realities. The economies of Central 
America, fragile from the beginning, 
have been subjected to the stress of 
economic crisis and violence. If a 
regional peace agreement is signed, even 
with the best intentions of all the par- 



& 



ties, it will not succeed if the nations of 
the region are suffering from economic 
collapse. 



Will these additional resources 
solve the problem? Resources alone will 
not solve the Central American crisis. 
But resource predictability can enable 
our diplomacy to take more effective ad- 
vantage of the interplay between dif- 
ferent policy instruments to channel 
events toward peaceful solutions, in- 
cluding negotiated solutions wherever 
possible. , 

What is needed, in addition to the 
provision of adequate levels of economic 
and military assistance, is demonstration 
by the U.S. of a long-term commitment; 
the adoption by Central American 
governments of appropriate economic, 
political, and social policies/reforms; and 
an active and long-term diplomacy tor 
peace. 

Conclusion 

This comprehensive policy will require 
considerable effort and sacrifice. There 
are those who are inclined to support 
only economic assistance. There are 
others who are inclined to support only 
military assistance. There is. however 
no realistic alternative to the balanced 
approach in the proposals before you. 

The crisis is acute. Our neighbors m 
Central America urgently need the help 
of the only country capable of making 
the difference. We have a responsibility. 
U S. moral and strategic interests are 
both engaged in an area in which we 
have historically been involved. Doing 
nothing or doing too little are not 
responsible alternatives. 

Our initiative is based on sound 
analysis. It is rooted in the consensus 
judgment that the area's problems have 
both indigenous and extraregional 
causes. „, . , 

Our goals are realistic. The region s 
most progressive, democratic forces 
strongly believe that we can work 
together successfully to strengthen the 
moderate center in Central America. 
These same people are convinced that 
our active participation will serve both 
to defeat communism and to bolster 
respect for human freedom in this 
critical part of our hemisphere. 

The approach is right. There is 
broad agreement that effective action 
must include a mix of developmental, 
political, diplomatic, and security 
elements and that these elements must 
be pursued simultaneously, equitably. 



and humanely. There is no such thing as 
a wholly "economic," a wholly "political," 
or a wholly "military" solution to Central 
America's problems. Economies must be 
protected as well as developed. Govern- 
ments must be worth defending. Home- 
grown poverty and Cuban-directed guer- 
rilla warfare are allies of each other; our 
policies must take aim at both. 

The approach proposed by the bipar- 
tisan commission and adopted by the 
President does call for greater U.S. in- 
volvement in the region, but it is a con- 
structive involvement that will eventual- 
ly enable Central Americans to stand on 
their own and live at peace with one 
another. This kind of involvement now 
will eliminate the need for greater in- 
volvement later. 

What the bipartisan commission and 
the President propose is not impossible. 
It is a realistic and humane response to 
a real crisis in a particularly troubled 
setting. We have the resources to do it. 
The people in Central America want us 
to do it. Our enemies— extremists of the 
left and the right-will be delighted if 
we hesitate. 

I hope that your consideration of the 
bill will be infused by the bipartisan 
commission's unanimous conclusion, a 
conclusion that guided its preparation 
and which is worth quoting in full: 

The Commission has concluded that the 
security interests of the United States are 
importantly engaged in Central America; thai 
these interests require a significantly larger 
program of military assistance, as well as 
greatly expanded support for economic 
growth and social reform; that there must be 
an end to the massive violation of human 
rights if security is to be achieved in Central 
America; and that external support of the m- 
surgency must be neutralized for the same 
purpose. 



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'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent ot 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington. D.C. 20402. ■ 




WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Elections in El Salvador 



by Thomas R. Pickering 

Address before the Corporate Round 
Table of the World Affairs Council on 
March 1, 1981,- Mr. Pickering is U.S. 
Embassador to El Salvador. 

:n 25 days El Salvador will hold direct 
lections for a president and a vice presi- 
ient. Under pressures of a civil war, 
frave economic difficulties, major efforts 
,0 deal with a crisis in human rights, and 
in economy which has suffered a 25% 
iecline in 4 years, this will be no easy 
ask. 

These elections will tax El Salvador's 
;apacity to evolve as a democracy. Many 
lave seen the problems; few have looked 
it the potential and the possibilities. To- 
lay I want to talk with you about the 
lections, why El Salvador is holding 
hem, the timing of those elections, the 
ireparations for the process, and how 
he Salvadorans themselves will conduct 
his effort. 

These elections will be not only im- 
ortant for the future of El Salvador— 
hey will determine its next president 
nd its course for the next 5 years. They 
/ill also set a standard by which other 
Central American elections will be 
udged. 

Nicaragua has announced elections 
'or November; Guatemala is considering 
ilections in mid-summer. 

In El Salvador, all parties are 
j^uaranteed free access to the media. In 
El Salvador, all those who wish to par- 
ticipate, including the guerrillas, have 
Deen invited to join the democratic proc- 
ss. In El Salvador, the government has 
;aken major steps to open the door to all 
:iualified voters in an internationally 
observed process with clear and careful 
steps to prevent fraud. 

Nicaragua, in contrast, has come only 
Dart way in the process. Salvadorans are 
;ertain that the standards that they have 
jstablished can meet the careful scrutiny 
jf the entire outside world. Let us hope, 
too, that the Nicaraguans will develop a 
process that will be equally free, fair, 
3pen, and democratic. 

The United States has made clear 
that it supports— indeed, applauds— the 
holding of elections in El Salvador. At 
the same time, it has declared its full 
neutrality with regard to the parties and 
the candidates. Finally, the United 
States has stated that it will accept the 



April 1984 



results of a free and fair democratic elec- 
tion in El Salvador. The United States 
will gauge and develop its policies with 
respect to the winner of the Salvadoran 
elections— whomever he may be— accord- 
ing to the policies he puts into action. 
The United States will not support a 
president or govei'nment or party in this 
process which is not willing to be held 
accountable through succeeding- free and 
fair elections. In our judgment all parties 
currently competing in the Salvadoran 
elections meet this test. 

Why Elections? 

The leader of the jjolitical wing of the 
guerrillas, Guillei-mo Ungo, has said that 
"elections will not be a solution, but will 
instead worsen the situation, because 
they respond to the interests of the U.S. 
Administration and not to the interests 
of the Salvadoran people." 

Elections have been a difficult point 
for the guerrillas to accept. If the voters 
freely express their will, how can the 
voters lose? The guerrillas have been 
free and are still free to participate in 
Salvadoran elections. The fact is and has 
been that the guerrillas have been em- 
barrassed by theii' opposition to the 1982 
elections and have openly admitted that 
embarrassment in recent statements— a 
backhanded admission of the importance 
which the El Salvador electoral process 
has achieved in the eyes of the world. 

Already some guerrilla factions and 
military groups are expressing doubts 
and disagreements with Guillermo Ungo. 
One group has issued a declaration foi-- 
bidding four villages in El Salvador to 
participate in the polling. 

The clear fact is that the guerrillas 
know that they are unlikely to win any 
significant percentage of the vote. 
Among the guerrillas and their key 
leaders are many militants who would 
prefer to continue to fight and to kill 
rather than to accept this popular 
verdict. 

The basis for guerrilla opposition to 
the elections is clear. But what are the 
reasons for believing that elections in El 
Salvador can make for constructive 
change? 

The first point is that, while elections 
of and by themselves will not solve all 
problems, they are another important 
step forward on the difficult path toward 
democracy. Just as the United States 
strongly supports and advocates elec- 



tions in Chile, in Nicaragua, and in 
Guatemala, so too we support the exer- 
cise of popular democracy in El Salvador. 
We know of no better way to achieve 
that objective than having the people 
choose their next president and vice 
president. 

This process in El Salvador has been 
a long and difficult road. For over 50 
years the winner of El Salvador's 
presidential elections was knovra in ad- 
vance. When the reforming group of 
military officers took over the govern- 
ment in 1979, the old process collapsed. 
In its place the new military leaders, in 
accord with the Christian Democratic 
Party, carried out elections in 1982. The 
purpose of those elections was to choose 
a body to write a new constitution, ap- 
point a government, and enact necessary 
laws. At the time of those elections, 
Salvadoran leaders pledged themselves 
to democratic elections within 2 years. 
The new elections carry out that pledge. 

The elections will mark another step 
in separating the military from the 
political process in El Salvador. A new, 
popularly elected president will become 
commander in chief. The military are 
pledged not to interfere in the electoral 
process, to protect and defend that proc- 
ess, and to accept its results. Thus far 
they have given every indication that 
they are doing so, and we expect that 
they will carry out their pledge. 

Finally, elections now will select a 
man who can provide a platform and a 
program for El Salvador for the future. 
This approach will mark a distinct 
change from the present transitional 
government in which the president was 
appointed by the Legislative Assembly. 
The new Constitution of El Salvador re- 
quires that the president be selected by 
clear majority. 'This requirement means 
that he can justifiably claim to have a 
popular mandate for his programs and 
policies, something that has not been 
known in El Salvador for quite a few 
years. 

Some have suggested that they 
should "postpone" elections in El 
Salvador. Others have indicated an in- 
terest in "power sharing" with the guer- 
rillas. In my experience in El Salvador, I 
have found very few who support these 
suggestions. The elections of 1982 were 
extremely popular, enjoying an 80% turn- 
out; it is too early to predict what the 
results might be this year. However, all 
of the political parties tell us that their 
members indicate that there will be a 
large turnout again in the 1984 elections. 
Those who want to postpone, delay or 
engage in power sharing take 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



heavy responsibility on their shoulders in 
trying to deny to a very large percent- 
age of the Salvadoran people their right 
to vote and to choose their future. 

El Salvador aspires to and clearly is 
entitled to the kind of government to 
which we also believe we are entitled. It 
is an expression of some intolerance, and 
perhaps even worse, to claim that we can 
ignore the will of the Salvadoran people 
because we know what is best for El 
Salvador. 

Elections in El Salvador wall not be 
risk free. Neither I nor the U.S. Govern- 
ment favors a party or a candidate. We 
don't know how they are going to come 
out; indeed, at this date it is a very close 
race. The candidates are each very dif- 
ferent. Their programs provide for a 
wide range of choices. The present 
government is not running for reelection. 
Elections themselves could give a can- 
didate the authority to pursue a more 
vigorous dialogue with the left, seeking 
their participation in the elections to be 
held next year for a new national 
assembly and for mayors. 

Why Now? 

I've already indicated the commitment of 
past and present governments to hold 
elections on a regular basis. One of the 
hallmarks of democracy is knowing that 
after a time the people will once again 
have an opportunity to select a new 
government. El Salvador is now ready to 
take this important step. 

The elections themselves will add 
another base for establishing the rule of 
law in El Salvador. They will adhere to 
standards established in the nation's new 
Constitution and to the recently passed 
electoral law. We believe they can and 
will be conducted in a free, fair, and im- 
partial manner. 

Observers from many countries have 
been invited, as in 1982, to view and 
verify the conduct of these elections. El 
Salvador is ready for it and welcomes 
careful international scrutiny of its elec- 
toral process. El Salvador also welcomes 
the fact that many hundreds of reporters 
and other journalists will be present in 
their country to see the electoral process 
unfold; in 1982 even some of the most 
skeptical journalists admitted the 
fairness of the process. 

No one makes the claim that this will 
be an easy process nor that it will be 
trouble free. The fact that the army will 
actively have to engage itself to protect 
the elections is a clear indication that the 
guerrillas, whatever they say, are ex- 



pected to conduct an increasingly 
punishing level of military activity at 
election time. 

The time is right for El Salvador and 
its people to demonstrate that they are 
not prepared to allow a small group of 
armed guerrillas, supported by less than 
the 5% of the people— according to the 
guerrillas' claim— to veto their 
democratic development. 

How Are the Elections 
Going To Be Conducted? 

The presidential election campaign is in 
full swing. Americans would be at home 
with the rhetoric, the enthusiasm, the 
fanfare, and even the invective 
characteristic of a tough political battle. 
Press, radio, and television coverage is 
extensive. Advertising is widespread. 
Posters and painted party emblems ap- 
pear on the walls, on the streets, and on 
the electric light poles. The candidates 
are in the countryside and in the cities 
with rallies of up to 15,000 supporters. 

The independent Central Elections 
Council is putting together El Salvador's 
first valid electoral registry. The United 
States has provided $3 million in 
assistance for the computer equipment 
and software to do this. The Salvadorans 
themselves have launched a massive ef- 
fort to get the registry in shape by elec- 
tion day. 

The registry is based on the national 
identity card system. Over 2.4 million 
identification card entries have been put 
into the system. Over the last several 
months, over 600 people have been work- 
ing 24 hours a day photocopying, 
microfilming, and entering municipal 
birth and death records into the com- 
puter to check the identity card informa- 
tion and remove invalid entries. Simi- 
larly, an effective program has been used 
to weed out duplicate identification 
cards. It is expected that somewhere 
between 1.5-2 million Salvadorans will 
be eligible to go to the polls on March 25. 
The registry will be used to check their 
eligibOity. By assigning voters to voting 
places, the register should help to reduce 
the waiting time and long lines of 1982. 
It will also be available should a second, 
run-off election be required and for the 
elections scheduled for 1985. 

On voting day each voter will be told 
in advance where he is to vote. The Elec- 
tion Council, the parties, and local of- 
ficials will see to that. Special arrange- 
ments will be made for those large 
numbers of Salvadorans who wish to 
vote away from their home districts. 



M 



At the polls the voter's name will be 
checked against the register. His finger 
and identity card will be marked with a 
special visible and indelible ink to pre- 
vent double voting. The voter will be 
given a ballot displaying the various par 
ty symbols. He will mark an "X" across 
the party symbol of the party of his 
choice. He will then fold the ballot and 
put it in a box made of hard, transparent a^ 
plastic. Although he will mark the ballot nfic 
in secret before it is folded, the rest of 
the process will take place in full view of Jievelo 
the poll watchers of the various parties. 
Their duty is to verify on behalf of their 
party that the registered voter receives 
only one ballot, casts only one vote, and 
that the vote is placed in the ballot box. 

Except for the use of the registry 
and the visible ink, this is the same proc- 
ess that worked so well in 1982. 

Similarly, the counting and transmis- 
sion of official results will follow a strict 
procedure. After the polls close, at 
sunset where there is no electricity and 
at 6 p.m. where there is, the sealed 
ballot boxes will be broken open by the 
poll watchers. The box cannot be opened 
without physically damaging its sides. 
The poll watchers will count the ballots 
in each other's presence, draw up an of- 
ficial report, and agree to and sign the 
report. Each party poll watcher wall hav' 
his own copy. 

The reports from each ballot box will 
be sent up the line to the Central Elec- 
tions CouncO for computation and final 
tallying. Each of the steps will be carriei 
out under the eyes of the party poll 
watchers. In case of a challenge, the poll jjelau 
watchers' copies of the official report wil 
be consulted. If copies conflict, the ma- 
jority rules. 

It is a system designed to be simple Ijctdfj 
and at the same time to prevent fraud; 
to inspire confidence and to avoid being 
unwieldy. 

I have already mentioned the invita- 
tions to international observers and the 
fact that El Salvador will welcome the 
press. We expect that they and the 
observers will carefully probe for 
vulnerabilities in the process as they did 
in 1982. I am told that there were more 
than 1,500 journalists from all over the 
world covering the 1982 elections. 
Although I was not there at the time, 
many people who were there have 
assured me that the massive turnout am |ir 
the high standard of honesty of those 
elections were impressive to all. So, too, 
has been the absence of any substan- 
tiated charges of electoral malfeasance o 
fraud. 



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Vhat About Other Problems? 

•roviding security for the elections will 
le as important and as difficult as ensur- 
ig that they are honest and free of 
raud. 

On January 25, Mario Aguinada, a 
lierrilla spokesman, said in Bogota that, 
vhi[e the guerrillas would not militarily 
arget the elections, the war would con- 
inue— "some bridges may fall, or some 
raffic may be stopped." As they did in 
982, the Salvadoran Armed Forces have 
leveloped an effective plan to deal with 
his threat. In 1982 election returns were 
ecorded from 90% of the 261 municipali- 
ies of El Salvador, and those for which 
etums were not recorded constituted 
nly a tiny percentage of the registered 
oters. These security precautions will 
equire intense activity by the 
alvadoran military at a time when all of 
ur military assistance has been obli- 
ated. Especially if a second round of 
oting is required, the Salvadoran 
lilitary will have to carefully husband 
heir munitions and equipment in order 
ensure that the voting takes place in 
s free an environment as possible. 

The guerrillas, despite their 
tatements, have intensified their attacks 
n civilians, including the recent murder 
f two deputies to the Legislative 
tof Lssembly. A guerrilla communique called 
he first murder "a response" to the 
oming elections. Military commanders 
ave been ordered to guarantee the 
ecurity of the elections, to be responsive 
the legitimate concerns of the political 
arties, and to offer full support within 
he law to keep the process "free, legiti- 
liiate, and pure." 

The military themselves, as a sign of 
heir own effort to avoid influencing the 
lectoral process, have decided not to ex- 
rcise their constitutional right to vote. 

Conclusion 

n closing, I would like to leave with you 
few key thoughts. No country is ever 
eally "ready" for an election in the 
lind of all of its citizens. One attribute 
f fair elections is that they take place 
espite the idea of "readiness" which 
ould be used to distort the process. 

El Salvador is bravely entering this 
rocess in the midst of a heated civil 
far. One hundred and twenty years ago 
ti ur own country faced a similar chal- 
;nge. There was hot debate over 
ostponing the elections. After the elec- 
ions were held, the winner stated: 



TREATIES 



...Lf the rebellion could force us to forego 
or postpone a national election, it might fairly 
claim to have already conquered and ruined 
us. . . . But the election, along with its in- 
cidental and undesirable strife, has done good 
too. It has demonstrated that a people's 
government can sustain a national election in 
the midst of a great civil war. Until now, it 
has not been knowTi to the world that this 
was a possibility. 

The speaker of course was Abraham 
Lincoln, reelected president during our 
nation's greatest crisis. A man who 
emerged as one of our greatest healers. 
A man generous in victory with a vision 
of a reunited nation. 

We often forget that democracy re- 
quires heros— the silent heros who 
believe that ballot boxes, not bullets, 
resolve issues and stand the test of time. 
El Salvador will face a serious and im- 
portant test on March 25. Our own faith 
in democracy should lead us to believe 
that, in spite of all the challenges El 
Salvador will emerge stronger, surer, 
and reconfirmed in its determination to 
advance the course of peace and 
democracy. ■ 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington Dec. 

1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. 

TIAS 4780. 

Accession deposited: Hungary, 

.Jan. 27, 1984. 

Recommendations relating to the futherance 
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc- 
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June 
20, 1975. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1978 for 
VIII 6-8 and 10-4; Sept. 1, 1980 for VIII 3-4. 
TIAS 10486. 

Acceptance deposited : F.R.G., 
Jan. 26, 1984 for VIII-9. 

Atomic Energy 

Agreement between the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and the Governments of 
Canada, Jamaica, and the United States of 
America concerning the transfer of enriched 
uranium for a low power research reactor, 
with annexes and exchange of notes. Signed 
at Vienna Jan. 25, 1984. Entered into force 
Jan. 25, 1984. 

Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Montreal 
Sept. 30, 1977." Acceptance deposited: 
Turkey, Feb. 23, 1984. 



Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1983, with an- 
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entei-ed into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
Ratification deposited: Honduras, Dec. 28, 
1983; Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, Dec. 30, 1983. 

Commodities— Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 

for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 

Geneva June 27, 1980.' 

Ratification deposited: Comoros, Jan. 27, 

1984. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR 
caniets, with annexes, as amended. Done at 
Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force 
Mar. 20, 1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982. 
Accession deposited: Israel, Feb. 14, 1984. 

Finance— African Development Bank 

Agreement establishing the African Develop- 
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Khartoum 
Aug. 4, 1963, as amended at Abidjan May 17, 
1979. Entered into force May 7, 1982; for the 
U.S. Jan. 31, 1983. 

Acceptance deposited: Spain, Feb. 13, 1984. 
Accession deposited: Portugal, Dec. 15, 1983. 

Nuclear Weapons— Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow Julv 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 
5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 

Accession deposited: Sao Tome & Principe, 
July 20, 1983. 

Patents— Microorganisms 

Budapest treaty on the international recogni- 
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the 
puipose of patent procedure, with regulations. 
Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977. Entered into 
force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, Jan. 26, 1984. 

Prisoner Transfer 

Convention on the transfer of sentenced per- 
sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.' 
Signature : U.K. Aug. 25, 1983. 

Property— Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. 
Done at Stockholm Julv 14, 1967. Entered in- 
to force Apr 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 
1970, except for Arts. 1-12 entered into force 
May 19, 1970, for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. 
TIAS 6923, 7727. 

Notification of accession: Rwanda, Dec. 1, 
1983. 

Trade 

Protocol of provisional application of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Concluded at Geneva Oct. 20, 1947. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. 
De facto application: Brunei, Dec. 31, 1983. 



TREATIES 



Arrangement regarding international trade in 
textiles. Done at Geneva Dec. 20, 1973. 
Entered into force Jan. 1. 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Accession deposited : China, Jan. 18, 1984. 

Protocol extending the arrangement regard- 
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done at 
Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 
1, 1982. TIAS 10323. 

Accession deposited: China, Jan. 18, 1984. 
Approval deposited: Yugoslavia, Sept. 26, 
1983. 

United Nations 

Convention on the privileges and immunities 
of the United Nations. Adopted at New York 
Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 
1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. 
Accession deposited: Uruguay, Feb. 16, 1984. 

Wheat 

1983 protocol for the further extension of the 
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered in- 
to force July 1, 1983. 

Ratifications deposited : Algeria, Spain, Feb. 
14, 1984; U.K., Feb. 22, 1984.^ 
Accessions deposited : Ecuador, Dec. 29, 1983; 
Syrian Arab Rep., Jan. 30, 1984. 

1983 protocol for the further extension of the 
food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). Done 
at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered into 
force July 1, 1983. 

Ratifications deposited : Spain, Feb. 14, 1984; 
U.K., Feb. 22, 1984.3 

Wine 

Agreement for the creation, in Paris, of an In- 
ternational Wine Office. Done at Paris Nov. 
29, 1924. Entered into force Oct. 29, 1927. 
Notification of accession deposited : U.S., Jan. 
25, 1984; effective July 25, 1984. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981.'' 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Feb. 1, 1984. 

World Health Organization 

Amendments to Arts. 24 and 25 of the Con- 
stitution of the World Health Organization 
(TIAS 1808). Adopted at Geneva May 17, 
1976, by the 29th World Health Assembly. 
Acceptances deposited : Canada, Jan. 20, 1984; 
Malaysia, Jan. 25, 1984. 
Entered into force: Jan. 20, 1984. 



World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Acceptance deposited: Antigua & Barbuda, 
Nov. 1, 1983. 



BILATERAL 

Algeria 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperation and trade in the field of 
agriculture, with annex. Signed at Algiers 
Feb. 2, 1984. Entered into force Feb. 2, 1984. 

Belgium 

Agreement concerning the status of forces of 
the U.S. ground-launched cruise missile unit. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels 
Feb. 13, 1984. Entered into force Feb. 13, 
1984. 
Brazil 

Agreement relating to industrial and military 
cooperation, with memorandum of under- 
standing. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Brasilia Feb. 6, 1984'. Entered into force Feb. 
6, 1984. 
Canada 

Agi-eement relating to the AM broadcasting 
service in the medium frequency band, with 
annexes. Signed at Ottawa Jan. 17, 1984. 
Entered into force Jan. 17, 1984. 
Supersedes: Agreement of Mar. 31 and June 

12, 1967, as amended (TIAS 62(58, 6626). 
China 

Arrangement relating to a visa system for ex- 
ports to the United States of cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Feb. 16, 1984. Entered into force 
Feb. 16, 1984. 
Dominican Republic 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Sept. 
28, 1977 (TIAS 8944). with memorandum of 
understanding. Signed at Santo Domingo Jan. 

13, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1984. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperation in geological sciences. Signed at 
Santo Domingo Jan. 23, 1984. Entered into 
force .Jan. 23, 1984. 
Egypt 

First amendment to the grant agreement of 
Aug. 19, 1981 (TIAS 10242), for basic educa- 
tion. Signed at Cairo Nov. 10, 1983. Entered 
into force Nov. 10, 1983. 

Third amendment to the grant agreement of 
Aug. 29, 1979 (TIAS 9699) as amended, for 
Alexandria w-astewater system expansion. 
Signed at Cairo Nov. 10, 1983. Entered into 
force Nov. 10, 1983. 

International express mail agreement with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Cairo and 
Washington Dec. 3 and 22, 1983. Entered into 
force Feb. 1, 1984. 
Honduras 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Tegucigalpa Dec. 16, 1983. 
Entered into force Dec. 16, 1983. 



80 



Hungary 

Program of cooperation and exchanges in 
culture, education, science, and technology for 
1984 and 1985, with annex. Signed at 
Budapest Dec. 12, 1983. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1984. 

Memorandum of understanding for scientific 
and technical cooperation in earth sciences. 
Signed at Reston and Budapest Jan. 6 and 20, 
1984. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1984. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 
13 and Nov. 9, 1982 (TIAS 10580), relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber tex- 
tiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Jakarta Jan. 24 and 27, 
1984. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1984. 

Israel 

Grant agreement to support the economic and 
political stability of Israel. Signed at 
Washington Dec. 29, 1983. Entered into force 
Dec. 29, 1983. 

Memorandum of understanding for coopera- 
tion in the fields of social sciences and human 
development. Signed at Washington and 
Jerusalem Jan. 12 and 16, 1984. Entered into 
force Jan. 16, 1984. 

Italy 

Memorandum of understanding on cooperatior 
in earth sciences. Signed at Reston and Rome 
Nov. 7 and Dec. 1, 1983. Entered into force 
Dec. 1, 1983. 

Liberia 

Agreement relating to the agreement of Aug. 
13, 1980, for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities (TIAS 9841). Signed at Monrovia 
Dec. 15, 1983. Entered into force Dec. 15, 
1983. 

Macao 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Hong Kong and Macao Dec. 28, 
1983, and Jan. 9, 1984. Entered into force 
Jan. 9, 1984; effective Jan. 1, 1984. 

Mexico 

Agreement on the development and facilita- 
tion of tourism. Signed at Mexico Apr. 18, 
1983. 

Entered into force: Jan 17, 1984. 
Supersedes: Agreement of May 4, 1978 (TIAS 
9468). 

Agreement for cooperation on environmental 
programs and transboundary problems. 
Signed at La Paz (Mexico) Aug. 14, 1983. 
Entered into force : Feb. 16, 1984. 
Supersedes: Agreement of June 14 and 19, 
1978 (TIAS 9264). 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the 
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by e.\- 
change of letters at Mexico Jan. 4, 1984. 
Entered into force Jan. 4, 1984. 



Department of State Bulletin 



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Morocco 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaran- 
teed by, or insured by the U.S Government 
and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at 
Rabat Dec. 30, 1983. Entered into force 
Feb. 10, 1984. 

Agreement relating to agreement of May 17, 
1976, for sale of agricultural commodities 
(TIAS 8309), with memorandum of under- 
standing. Signed at Rabat Feb. 2, 1984. 
Entered into force Feb. 2, 1984. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the project loan agree- 
ment of May 23, 1983 (TIAS 10724), for rural 
electrification. Signed at Islamabad Dec. 19, 
1983. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1983. 

Philippines 

Agreement amending the memorandum of 
consultation of the agreement concerning air 
transport services of Sept. 16, 1982 (TIAS 
10443). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Manila Nov. 23, 1983 and Jan. 23, 1984. 
Entered into force Jan. 23, 1984. 

Portugal 

Agreement relating to economic and militai-y 
assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Lisbon Dec. 13, 1983. Entered into force Feb. 
4, 1984. 

Agreement relating to the continued use of 
facilities in the Azores by U.S. forces under 
the agreement of Sept. 6, 1951, as amended 
TIAS 3087, 7254, 10050). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Lisbon Dec. 13, 1983. 
Entered into force Feb. 4, 1984. 

Singapore 

Agreement concerning general security of 
military information. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Singapore June 25, 1982, and Mai-. 9, 

1983. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1983. 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Singapore Sept.'l, 1983, and Jan. 16, 1984. 
Entered into force Jan. 17, 1984. 

Switzerland 

Memorandum of consultation concerning in- 
terim measures on air transport services, 
with annex. Signed at Washington Feb. 1, 

1984. Enters into force when confirmed by 
diplomatic note. 

Togo 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or 
^aranteed by the U.S. Government through 
the Export-Import Bank. Signed at Lome 
Nov. 29, 1983, 
Entered into force: Jan. 31, 1984. 



rb* 



Yugoslavia 

Agreement on cooperation in the field of 
tourism. Signed at Washington Feb. 2, 1984. 
Enters into force on the date of last note by 
which the contracting parties inform one 
another that their internal procedures have 
been satisfied. 

Zambia 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of ceitain debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its 
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Lusaka 
Dec. 19, 1983. Entered into force Feb. 10, 
1984. 



'Not in force. 

^Applicable to Bailiwicks of Guemsey and 
Jersey, Isle of Man, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat, 
St. Helena, and dependencies. 

'Applicable to Bailiwick of Guernsey. 

"Not in force for the U.S. ■ 



February 1984 



February 1 

President Reagan offers no comment on a 
House Democrats draft resolution pressing 
him to begin "prompt and orderly 
withdrawal" of U.S. Marines from Beirut. 
Deputy White House spokesman Larry 
Speakes says the resolution "could encourage 
intransigence on the part of the Syrians and 
clearly undermine the peace process." Any 
statement indicating a "lack of solidarity" in 
the United States, he asserts, "can encourage 
the Syrians to dig in and hold on." 



February 2 

In response to a congressional call for the 
"prompt and orderly" withdrawal of troops 
from Beirut, State Department officials say 
that such action would embolden "the forces 
of radicalism and extremism" in the Middle 
East. The resolution could also lead to the 
commitment of more American troops in the 
region "in even more dangerous cir- 
cumstances," asserts Under Secretary 
Eagleburger. 

In Beirut, heavy fighting erupts between 
Lebanese army troops and Druze and Shia 
Muslim militiamen. The fighting occurs during 
a deadlock in efforts to get the Lebanese 
Government, the Druze and Shia opposition, 
and the Syrians to agree on a security plan to 
separate the warring factions and begin mov- 
ing toward reconciliation. State Department 
officials report that there were no incidents 
that day involving U.S. Marines and call on 
"all parties to respect the cease-fire" and to 
"spare innocent civilian lives." 



February 2-3 

U.S. -Netherlands representatives meet in The 
Hague to discuss recent developments in in- 
ternational communications. Topics include 
international and regional organizations in- 
volved in telecommunications and information 
issues; international satellite issues; and 
developments in telecommunications policy. 
U.S. delegation is headed by Ambassador 
Diana Lady Dougan, Coordinator for Interna- 
tional Communication and Information Policy. 



February 3 

President Reagan says his proposed legisla- 
tion on Central America, implementing the 
bipartisan commission's recommendations, 
will offer "a comprehensive program to sup- 
port democratic development, improve human 
rights, and bring peace to this troubled region 
so close to home." In remarks to Members of 
Congress, the diplomatic community, and Ad- 
ministration officials at the White House, the 
President, urging prompt congressional action 
and support for the initiative, says it "serves 
the interest of the United States and of the 
Western Hemisphere." The legislation calls 
for $400 milUon in supplementary economic 
assistance for FY 1984. Dui-ing the next 5 
years, economic assistance will amount to $5.9 
billion in appropriated funds and $2 billion in 
insurance and guarantees. 



February 5 

Lebanon's Muslim Prime Minister, Shafig al- 
Wazzan, and his cabinet resign. President 
Gemayel accepts the resignation and an- 
nounces an eight-point program for national 
reconciliation. 



February 6 

U.S.-Brazil sign a new bilateral science and 
technology agreement. In scientific coopera- 
tion, the agreement covers oil and gas 
surveys, evaluation of coal resources and 
water-data exchange; in space cooperation, 
ongoing projects such as geodynamics, at- 
mospheric, and space science research, remote 
sensing, environmental observations, 
technology utilization research and rescue 
satellites, and advance communications and 
planned Brazilian use of the space shuttle, are 
covered. 

The 40th session of the UN Human 
Rights Commission opens in Geneva. The ses- 
sion focuses on allegations of human rights 
violations worldwide and addresses such con- 
cerns as the human rights situation in Central 
America, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and 
Poland as well as Soviet abuse of psychiatry. 
Richard Schifter, U.S. representative to the 
Human Rights Commission, heads the U.S. 
delegation. 

Political and military situation worsens in 
Beirut as intense fighting erupts following a 
curfew imposed at 1 p.m. Beirut time. Deputy 
White House spokesman Larry Speakes con- 
finns reports that the U.S. Marine contingent 
comes under hostile fire from small arms and 
mortar. Marines return fire and are supported 



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by naval gunfire from ships offshore. 

Acting State Department spol<esman Alan 
Romberg says the Syrians are responsible for 
the current deterioration in Lebanon but 
declines to assign "specific weight" to that 
responsibility. The U.S. ".shares the goals" 
announced in President Gemayel's eight-point 
plan which includes: 

• Political and administrative reforms; 

• Reconvening the political reconciliation 
talks in Geneva on Feb. 28; 

• Acceptance of Prime Minister Wazzan's 
resignation; 

• Formation of a government of national 
unity; 

• Preparation for Lebanese Armed Forces 
deployment to the south and the north; 

• Comprehensive and total cease-fire with 
an obser\'er committee; 

• Intensified Lebanese-Syrian consulta- 
tions; and 

• Complete withdrawal of all foreign 
forces. 

"Deploring the continued shelling of inno- 
cent civilians," President Reagan calls on the 
Syrian Government to "cease this activity." 
The President also welcomes Gemayel's ef- 
forts to "stop the fighting and to resume the 
talks in Geneva" and reiterates the U.S. com- 
mitment to the "unity, independence, and 
sovereignty of Lebanon" and continued sup- 
port to its government and people. 

State Depaitment officials say the U.S. 
was informed "early last week" that four 
American officers serving with the U.S. Em- 
bassy in Ethiopia were asked to leave that 
country. The four Americans are Eniest 
Brant, First Secretary; Paul Bradley, Second 
Secretary; Timothy Wells, Commercial Of- 
ficer; and Robert Kragie, Vice Consul. 
Department Deputy Spokesman Romberg 
says, "We told the Ethiopians they would 
have to withdraw two of their diplomats in 
Washington. One [Belay Tsadik] has left. The 
other [Gelagay Zawde] has severed his con- 
nections with the Ethiopian Government and 
has asked to remain in the LTnited States." 

February 7 

President Reagan announces the following 

decisions on U.S. policy in Lebanon. 

• Under the e.xisting MNF mandate, he 
authorizes [announced Feb. 6] U.S. naval 
forces to provide gunfire and air support 
"against any units firing into greater Beirut 
from parts of Lebanon controlled by SjTia, as 
well as against any units directly attacking 
American or MNF personnel and facilities." 

• When the Lebanese Government 
becomes a "broadly based representative 
government," the U.S. will "vigorously ac- 
celerate the training, equipping, and support 
of the Lebanese Armed Forces" by "speeding 
up delivery of equipment, improving the flow 
of information to help counter ho.stile bom- 
bardments, and intensifying training in 
counterterrorism." 



• A plan for redeployment of the Marines 
from Beirut airport to their ships offshore will 
begin "shortly" and "proceed in stages." U.S. 
military personnel will remain on the ground 
to train and equip the Lebanese Army and to 
protect remaining personnel. Naval and 
Marine forces offshore will continue to "pro- 
vide support for the protection of American 
and other MNF personnel. ..." 



February 8 

State Department issues a travel advisory 
warning that "the situation in Lebanon re- 
mains hazardous" and advises that "all 
Americans should avoid travel to Lebanon at 
this time." It continues that "in view of the 
worsened security situation, dependents of 
U.S. Government employees have left the 
country, but the embassy in Beirut remains in 
operation." 

Department Deputy Spokesman Alan 
Romberg says a drawdown of U.S. personnel 
in Beirut is continuing, and 191 U.S. Govern- 
ment employees, including 106 temporary 
duty military trainers, remain in the city. He 
says that on Feb. 7, 41 Americans departed 
Beirut for Cyprus. Of those, 24 were U.S. 
Government employees, and 17 were 
dependents. Forty-nine Americans left on 
Feb. 8. Romberg estimates that approxi- 
mately 1,350 U.S. citizens are in Beirut. 

He also confirms that the battleship 
U.S.S. New Jersey fires 16-inch guns at 
SjTian-controUed targets. 



February 9 

State Department releases fourth set of 
Grenada documents relating to the following 
subjects: 

• "Minutes of key organizational units of 
the National Jewel Movement;" 

• "Economic, technical and military 
assistance and educational and cultural ex- 
change involving Grenada and such nations as 
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., 
Libya, and the Soviet Union;" 

• "Several churches on Grenada;" and 

• "SociaUst International." 



February 10 

Soviet leadership officially announces the 
death of Yuriy V. Andropov. President 
Reagan, in his message of condolence to Mr. 
Kuznetsov, the acting Soviet chief of state, 
emphasizes to the people and Government of 
the U.S.S. R. his desire that the two countries 
cooperate in the search for a more peaceful 
world. Secretarj' Shultz sends a similar 
message of condolence to Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko reaffirming the basic prin- 
ciples of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. 
President Reagan designates Vice President 
Bush to lead the U.S. delegation to the 
funeral. 

State Department releases 1983 annual 
report on human rights. The report em- 
phasizes two goals of the Reagan Administra- 
tion policy: 



• Improving "human rights practices in 
numerous countries— to eliminate torture or 
brutaUty, to secure religious freedom, to pro- 
mote free elections. . . ." and 

• Seeking a "pubUc association of the 
United States with the cause of liberty." 



February 10-11 

Some 350 U.S. citizens and almost 600 citizens) 
of other nations are evacuated from Beirut. 
The U.S. Embassy announces that "because 
of the unsettled conditions in Lebanon" it 
would evacuate any Americans or Lebanese 
who are in the process of taking up American 
citizenship. 



February 10-15 

Vice President Bush makes an official work- 
ing visit to Europe which includes visits to 
the United Kingdom (Feb. 11-12), Luxem- 
bourg (Feb. 12-13), the Soviet Union (Feb. 
13-14) where he heads U.S. delegation attend- 
ing Andropov's funeral, Italy and the 
Vatican (Feb. 14-15), and France (Feb. 15). 



February 11-14 

Eg\iJtian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak 
makes an official working visit to Washington 
D.C., to meet with President Reagan and 
other government officials. 



February 12-14 

His Majesty King Hussein I of Jordan makes 
an official w-orking visit to Washington, D.C., 
to meet \\ith President Reagan and other 
government officials. 



February 13 

Communist Party's Central Committee 
chooses Konstantin U. Chemenko to succeed 
Yuriy V. Andi-opov as its General Secretary. 

President Ricardo de la Espriella of 
Panama resigns. He is replaced by Vice Presi 
dent Jorge lUueca. 



February 14 

Responding to the Panamanian President's 
resignation. State Department spokesman 
John Hughes says the U.S. is pleased that thi 
Panamanian elections will be held as planned 
on May 6, President lUueca, Hughes says, 
"reaffirmed the Panamanian Government's 
commitment to hold the elections as sched- 
uled. We have no reason to doubt that it will 
be done. We are gratified that the electoral 
process, to which we place great importance 
in all countries in the region, will proceed." 



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February 15 

In a letter to the Congress (Feb. 14), Presi- 
dent Reagan forwards a further report on th<( 
situation in Lebanon. The report, prepared b;j 
the Secretaries of State and Defense and 
made public Feb. 15, covers the period 
Dec. 12, 1983, to Feb. 13, 1984. 



Department of State Bulleti 



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cilBi permit; 

• "To respond to those who attack or 
threaten the safety of our personnel; and 

• "To redeploy our Marine detachment 
onto ships." 

The Secretary reiterates continued U.S. 
support for "withdrawal of all foreign forces" 
as well as for the May 17 agreement between 
Lebanon and Israel. 

Leamon Hunt, retired Foreign Service of- 
ficer and Director General of the multina- 
tional force and observers in the Sinai, is 
assassinated in Rome. Secretai-y Shultz con- 
demns the terrorist attack in the strongest 
terms saying "his sacrifice must inspire us to 
rededicate ourselves to the cause of peace and 
to defiance of forces of terror." 



■tenca 



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CHRONOLOGY 



Secretary Shultz says that "Syrian- 
sponsored violence against the Government 
[of Lebanon] has presented us with difficult 
choices in view of the legislative and other 
constraints under which our forces are 
operating. We are nonetheless proceeding: 

• "To provide materiel support to the 
Lebanese Armed Forces as circumstances 



February 16 

Lebanese President Gemayel reportedly . 
agrees to an eight-point plan said to be spon- 
sored by Saudi Arabia which includes abroga- 
tion of the May 17 peace agreement with 
Israel. Acting State Department spokesman 
Alan Romberg reiterates U.S. support for the 
May 17 agreement. 

Speaking during an urgent meeting of the 
UN Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Jeane 
Kirkpatrick says the U.S. supports "authen- 
tic, international peacekeeping efforts in 
Lebanon" and will support a "reasonable pro- 
posal" for a UN role in easing the situation. 
The U.S. is ready to enter into serious discus- 
sion, without preconditions, concerning "the 
composition and deployment of UN forces, 
preferably throughout Lebanon," she asserts. 



February 17 

Lebanese opposition leaders and Syria 
reportedly reject the Saudi eight-point plan 
presented by Lebanese President Gemayel 
and insist on the prior, unconditional abroga- 
tion of the May 17 agi-eement between 
Lebanon and Israel. President Reagan, 
asserting it is "unfair" to say his Lebanon 
policies had failed, accuses Syria of being the 
"stumbling block" to a settlement in 
Lebanon. 

White House announces the resignation of 
Richard Stone, the President's special envoy 
and Ambassador at Large for Central 
America. Harry Schlaudeman, former Am- 
bassador to Venezuela, is named his suc- 
cessor. 

President Reagan transmits the Central 
America Democracy, Peace and Development 
Initiative Act of 1984 to the Congress. The 
legislation would implement the recommenda- 
tions of the National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America. The legislation proposes 
$400 million in FY 1984 supplemental 
economic assistance and $1.12 billion in FY 



1985 assistance. Military assistance is $259 
million in additional assistance in FY 1984 and 
$256 million in FY 1985. 

President Reagan gives final approval to 
the redeployment of U.S. Marines from 
Beirut to U.S. ships offshore. White House of- 
ficials say (Feb. 16) that the first Marines 
would begin redeploying within 2-3 days, and 
all of the Marines in the U.S. contingent 
would be back on the ships within 30 days. 



February 21 

U.S. Marine contingent in Beirut begins for- 
mally moving to U.S. Sixth Fleet vessels off- 
shore. 

U.S. submits new evidence of the use of 
chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and 
Afghanistan to the United Nations. Since sub- 
mitting its last report in August 1983, the 
U.S. has continued to analyze and review the 
reports of attacks and to analyze samples as 
well. The 4-page report says that while there 
appears to have been a sharp decrease of at- 
tacks in Afghanistan and a decrease in the 
lethality of attacks in Laos and Kampuchea, 
evidence shows continued use of an uniden- 
tified, nonlethal agent or agents in Laos and 
Kampuchea. 



February 22-25 

New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Robert C. 
Muldoon makes an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C., to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 



February 23 

State Department denounces the Feb. 22 
bomb attack against a housing complex of the 
Soviet Union's mission to the United Nations. 
"This disgraceful, cowardly attack brings 
disrepute upon the United States" says 
Department spokesman John Hughes. Hughes 
continues that "if it was, in fact, committed 
by a group which purports to support Jewish 
emigration from the Soviet Union, the group 
is doing a disservice to that cause." The U.S. 
Government has "long supported and con- 
tinues to support the right of Soviet Jews to 
emigrate to the country of their choice" and 
"condemns this act of terrorism against the 
Soviet UN mission complex," he asserts. 

Hughes also says that administrative sup- 
port staff has arrived in Windhoek, the 
capital of Namibia, to open a Ll.S. liaison of- 
fice. The office will be headed by William 
Twaddell, formerly Charge d'Affaires 
(1980-83) at the U.S. Embassy in Maputo, 
Mozambique. "Our role," he says, "will be 
limited to assisting with the disengagement of 
forces now under way in southern Angola." A 
Department of State operation, the office's 
sole purpose is "to be a presence between the 
Angolans and the South Africans as need be 
for the passing of messages. . . ." 

President Reagan announces the follovring 
individuals as members of the U.S. delegation 
who will attend the independence celebrations 
of Brunei: 



• Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam to 
head the delegation; 

• Dr. Alfred Balitzer, Claremont, Cal.; 

• Mary Davis, Los Angeles, Cal.; 

• John C. Fitch, Houston, Tex.; 

• John H. Schoettler, Parker, Colo.; 

• William R. Sutton, Fair Oaks, Cal. 



February 27 

State Department spokesman John Hughes 
confirms that U.S. Marines turned over con- 
trol of Beirut's International Airport Feb. 26 
to units of the Lebanese Army. While the 
Marines have been redeployed, he notes, 
"there are still U.S. military and diplomatic 
personnel and facilities in Lebanon that we 
still must protect." Some 150 Marines remain 
to protect the U.S. Embassy and the Am- 
bassador's residence along with about 25 
State Department employees and about 80 
U.S. Army military trainers. 



February 27-March 5 

Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschlaeger 
makes a state visit to the United States, and 
to Washington, D.C., Feb. 27-29, to meet 
with President Reagan and other government 
officials. 



February 28-March 2 

Moroccan Prime Minister Mohamed Karim- 
Lamrani, accompanied by five members of the 
Moroccan Cabinet, including the Ministers of 
Information, Economic Planning, Finance, 
Commerce, and Agriculture, makes an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., to meet 
with President Reagan and other government 
officials. 



February 29 

Soviet Union vetoes a French proposal in the 
LTN Security Council which would have 
authorized an international contingent to 
replace the American and European troops of 
the multinational force in Beirut. The vote 
was 13 to 2 (the Ukraine also voted against). 

Syrian President Assad and Lebanese 
President Gemayel meet in Damascus to 
discuss Lebanon. Department of State 
spokesman John Hughes, responding to ques- 
tions concerning possible cancellation of the 
May 17 agreement, says, "I think the fact of 
the matter is that President Gemayel is in 
Damascus and we, like you, will have to wait 
to see what developments ensue. We have 
consistently thought this was a good agi'ee- 
ment and are aware of discussions and sug- 
gestions and reports that one side might 
abrogate that treaty. That would be a reality. 
It doesn't alter our analysis, our feeling that 
it was and is a good agreement." 

State Department announces appointment 
of Ambassador Loren E. Lawrence as the 
new U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Grenada. He 
replaces Charles A. Gillespie, Jr. 

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
announces a decision to resign. ■ 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



*28 2/2 



*m 


2/2 


31 


2/4 


32 


2/6 


33 


2/6 


*-M 


2/6 


*35 


2/7 


*36 


2/9 


37 


2/15 


*38 


2/8 


*39 


2/8 


40 


2/8 


*41 


2/10 



*44 
*45 



2/14 
2/15 



49 


2/17 


*50 


2/22 


51 


2/24 



Subject 

U.S. Organization for the 

International Telegraph 

and Telephone Consultative 

Committee (CCITT), 

study group B, Feb. 23. 
Shipping Coordinating Committee 

(SCO, Subcommittee on 

Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 

working group on radio com- 

mimications, Feb. 28. 
1984 foreign fishing allocations. 
Shultz: interview on "This Week 

with David Brinkley," Jan. 22. 
Shultz: news conference, San 

Salvador, Jan. 31. 
Shultz: news conference, 

Caracas, Feb. 2. 
Shultz: arrival statement, 

Brasilia, Feb. 5. 
Shultz: remai-ks. Brasilia, Feb. 6. 
Shultz: toast, Brasilia. Feb. 6. 
Shultz: remai'ks, Brasilia, Feb. 6. 
Shultz: news conference, 

Brasilia, Feb. 6. 
Shultz: anival statement, 

Bridgetown, Feb. 7. 
Shultz: news conference, St. 

George's, Feb. 7. 
Program for the official working 

visit to Washington of Egyptian 

President Mohamed Hosni 

Mubarak, Feb. 11-14. 
Program for the official working 

visit to Washington of 

Jordanian King Hussein L 

Feb. 12-14. 
Shultz: statement and news 

briefing on the death of 

Soviet President Andropov. 
West Coast Pacific salmon 

negotiations, 
sec. National Committee for 

the Prevention of Marine 

Pollution, Mar. 6. 
Shultz: statement and question- 

and-answer session on 

Lebanon. 
Shultz: address and question- 

and-answer session on Africa, 

World Affairs Council, 

Boston, Feb. 15. 
Program for the official working 

visit to Washington of 

New Zealand Prime Minister 

Muldoon, Feb. 22-25. 
Shultz: toast, Bridgetown, 

Feb. 8. 
Shultz: news conference, 

Bridgetown, Feb. 8. 
Shultz: address before the 

Creve Coeur Club of Illinois 

on human rights, Peoria, 

Feb. 22. 



^■flHHHHHHU 



*54 2/24 

*55 2/24 

*56 2/27 

*57 2/27 

*58 2/27 

*59 2/27 

*60 2/27 



*62 2/27 
*63 2/28 



Shultz: interview on "The 
MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour," 
Feb. 23. 

Thomas W.M. Smith sworn in 
as Ambassador to Nigeria, 
Feb. 17 (biographic data). 

CCITT, modem working party 
of study group D, Mar. 8. 

U.S. Organization for the 
International Radio Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCIR), study 
group 1, Mar. 14. 

Progi-am for the state visit 
to the U.S. of Austrian 
President Kirchschlaeger, 
Feb. 27-Mar. 5. 
Program for the official work- 
ing visit to Washington of 
Moroccan Prime Minister 
Mohamed Karim-Lamrani, 
Feb. 28-Mar. 2. 
sec, SOLAS, working gi-oup 
on standards of training and 
watchkeeping. Mar. 28. 
CCITT, study group A, 
Mar. 27. 

Advisory Committee on 
International Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, Mar. 22 
Fine Arts Committee, Mar. 

17. 
sec, SOLAS, Mar. 26. 
Progi-am for the official 
working visit to Washington 
of West German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, Mar. 3-6. 
Regional foreign policy 
conference, Birmingham, 
Mar. 22. 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 

Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State Publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Free multiple copies may be obtained by 
writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and 
Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Secretary Shultz 

Democratic Solidarity in the Americas, lunch- 
eon remarks to leaders of Barbados, 
Jamaica, and the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States, Bridgetown, Feb. 8, 
1984 (Current Policy #550). 

The U.S. and Africa in the 1980s, Boston 
World Affairs Council, Feb. 15, 1984 
(Current Policy #549). 

Foreign Aid and U.S. Policy Objectives, 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 9 
1984 (Cun-ent Policy #548). 

Canada 

U.S.-Canada Relations (GIST, Feb. 1984). 

East Asia 

U.S. -Japan Relations in Perspective, 

Deputv Secretary Dam, Japan Society, 
New York, Feb. 6, 1984 (Cun-ent Policy 
#.547). 

The U.S. and Korea: Auspicious Prospects, 
Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, Asia 
Society, New York, Jan. 31, 1984 
(Current Policy #543). 

Economics 

International Economic Issues, Under 
Secretary Wallis, Joint Economic 
Committee of Congress, Feb. 7, 1984 
(Current Policv #545). 

U.S. Trade Policy (GIST, Feb. 1984). 

Controlling Transfer of Technologv (GIST, 
Feb. 1984). 

Europe 

The Atlantic Relationship, Assistant 

Secretary Burt, Subcommittee on Europe 
and the Middle East, House Foreign 
Affau-s Committee, Feb. 7, 1984 
(Current Policy #.544). 

Food 

World Food Security (GIST, Feb. 1984). 

Middle East 

U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon, L'nder 

Secretary Eagleburger, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee. Feb. 2, 1984 
(Current Policy #542). 

U.S. Interests in Lebanon, Assistant 
Secretary Muiphy, Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Jan. 26, 1984 
(Current Policy #540). ■ 



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Department of State Bulletir 



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NDEX 

Vpril 1984 

Volume 84, No. 2085 



frica. The U.S. and Africa in the 

1980s(Shultz) 9 

merican Principles 

ountrv Reports on Human Rights 

Practices for 1983 53 

uman Rights and the Moral Dimension 

of U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15 

ngola. U.S., Angola, South Africa Discuss 

Peace {joint communique) 36 

rms Control 

ssistant Secretary Burt's Interview 

for "Worldnet"" 44 

ecretary's Interview on "This Week 

With David Brinkley" 28 

razil. Secretary Shultz Visits Latin 

America 19 

ongress 

entral America Democracy, Peace, and 

Development Initiative (Motley) 72 

entral America Initiative Legislation 

(message to the Congress) 75 

entral America Initiative Proposed 

(Reagan) 71 

auntry Reports on Human Rights Practices 

for 1983 ,53 

uman Rights and the Moral Dimension of 

U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15 

iclear Cooperation With EURATOM 

(letter to the Congress) 66 

ecent Situation in the Philippines 

(Monjo) 37 

.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the 

Congress) 60 

S. International Activities in Science 

and Technology (message to the 

Congress) 67 

.S. Opposes Moving Embassy to Jerusalem 

(Eagleburger) ' 65 

S. Participation in the United Nations 

(Kirkpatrick) 68 

epartment and Foreign Service. U.S. 

C)j:)poses Moving Embassy to Jerusalem 

(Eagleburger) 



65 



conomics 

sistant .Seoi-etarv Burt's Intei-\'iew for 

"Wuiidnet" 44 

le U.S. and Africa in the 1980s(Shultz) 9 

gypt. President Meets With Two Arab 

(Hussein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63 

I Salvador 

lections in El Salvador (Pickering) 77 

jestion-and- Answer Session Following 
World Affairs Council Address (Shultz) . . 12 

cretary Shultz Visits Latin America 19 

cretarv's Interview on "The MacNeiVLehrer 

News Hour" .30 

urope 

- ssistant Secretary Burt's Interview for 
"Worldnet" 44 

le Transatlantic Relationship: A Long-Term 
Perspective (Eagleburger) 39 

ice President's Trip to Europe and 
theU.S.S.R 5 

areign Assistance 

- antral America Democracy, Peace, and 
Development Initiative (Motley) 72 

antral America Initiative Legislation 
(message to the Congi'ess) 75 

antral America Initiative Proposed 
(Reagan) 71 

cretary Shultz Visits Latin America 19 

renada. Secretary Shultz Visits 
Latin America 19 



Human Rights 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 

for 1983 53 

Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of 

U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15 

International Law. Board of Appellate- 
Review To Publish Decisions 58 

Iran. Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq 

War (Department statement) 64 

Iraq. Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq 

War (Department statement) 64 

Israel 

Lebanon Cancels Agreement With Israel 

(Department statement) 61 

U.S. Opposes Moving Embassy to Jerusalem 

(Eagleburger) " 65 

Jordan 

President Meets With Two Arab Leaders 

(Hussein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63 

Visit of King Hussein of Jordan (Hussein, 

Reagan) 62 

Lebanon 

Defense Secretary Weinberger's Interview 

on "Meet the Press" (e.xcerpts) ,59 

Lebanon Cancels Agreement With Israel 

(Department statement) 61 

President's News Conference of February 22 

(e.xcerpts) ! . . . 2 

Question-and-Answer Session Following World 

Affairs Council Address (Shultz) 12 

Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeil/ 

Lehrer News Hour" 30 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week 

With David Brinkley" 28 

Under Secretary Eaglehurger's Interview on 

"This Week With David Brinkley" 34 

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the 

Congress) 60 

Middle East 

Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of 

U.S. Foreign Policv (Shultz) 15 

President Meets With Tw^o Arab Leaders 

(Hussein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63 

President's News Conference of 

February 22 (excerpts) 2 

Military Affairs 

Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War 

(Department statement) 64 

Defense Secretary Weinberger's Interview on 

"Meet the Press" (excerpts) .59 

President's News Conference of February 

22 (excerpts) 2 

Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeil/Lehrer 

News Hour" 30 

Nicaragua 

Question-and-Answer Session Following World 

Affairs Council Address (Shultz) 12 

Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeiL/Lehrer 

News Hour" ,30 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 
Transatlantic Relationship: A Long-Tei-m 

Per.spective (Flagleburger) 39 

Nuclear Policv. Nuclear Cooperation With 

EURATOM (letter to the Congress) ... .66 
Passports. Board of Appellate Review To 

Publish'Decisions 58 

Philippines. Recent Situation in the 

Philippines (Monjo) 37 

Presidential Documents 

Central America Initiative Legislation 

(message to the Congress) 75 

Central America Initiative Proposed 71 

Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOM (letter 

to the Congress) 66 

President Meets With Two Arab Leaders 

(Hus.sein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63 

President's News Conference of February 22 

(e.xceriDts) '. . . .2 

Relations With the U.S.S.R. (Reagan) 1 

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the 

Congress) 60 



U.S. International Activities in Science and 

Technology (message to the Congress). . .67 
Visit of King Hussein of Jordan (Hussein, 

Reagan) 62 

Visit of Yugoslav President (Reagan, 

Spiljak) 51 

Publications 

Department of State 84 

GPO Subscriptions 85 

Science and Technology. I'.S. International 

Activities in Science and Technology 

(message to the Congress) 67 

Security Assistance 

Central America Democracy, Peace, and 

Development Initiative (Motley) 72 

Central America Initiative Legislation 

(message to the Congress) 75 

Central America Initiative Proposed 

(Reagan) 71 

South Africa. U.S., Angola, South Africa 

Discuss Peace (joint communique) 36 

Terrorism 

Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of 

U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" 28 

Trade. President's News Conference of 

February 22 (excerjjts) 2 

Treaties. Current Actions '79 

U.S.S.R. 

Assistant Secretary Burt's Interview for 

"Woridnet" 44 

Death of Soviet President Andropov (Shultz, 

White House statement) 43 

President's News Conference of February 22 

(excerpts) 2 

Question-and-Answer Session Following 

World Affairs Council Address 

(Shultz) 12 

Relations With the U.S.S.R. (Reaean) 1 

Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeil/ 

Lehrer News Hour" 30 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week 

With David Brinkley" 28 

Under Secretary Eagleburger's Interview on 

"This Week\Vith David Brinkley" 34 

Vice President's Trip to Europe and the 

U.S.S.R 5 

United Nations. U.S. Participation in the 

United Nations (Kirkpatrick) * 68 

Venezuela. Secretary Shultz Visits Latin 

America 19 

Western Hemisphere 

Central America Democracy, Peace, and 

Development Initiative (Motley) 72 

Central America Initiative Legislation 

(message to the Congress) 75 

Central America Initiative Proposed 

(Reagan) 71 

Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of 

U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15 

Yugoslavia. Visit of Yugoslav President 

(Reagan, Spiljak) 51 



Name Index 

Burt, Richard R 44 

Bush, Vice President 5 

Eagleburger, Lawrence-S^ 34,39,65 

King Hussein 1 62,63 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 68 

Monjo, John C 37 

Motley, Langhorne A 72 

Mubarak, Mohamed Ho.sni 63 

Pickering, Thomas R 77 

Reagan, President 1,2,51,60,62,63 

66,67,71,75 

Shultz, Secretary 9,12,15,19,28,30,43 

Spiljak, Mika 51 

Weinberger, Caspar W 59 



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The Official Montinly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2086 



May 1984 




■ ■m i i])i n L i ini i , i ii i i i i i ii iii i iiii i ii J i ] i i PPPii H Pl>^^^MWI ^^ ^W WH > PIPHilliitimn illlM p Mtl>l l1 



Cover: 



President Reagan 
Secretar>- Shultz 



Dppartntpnt of Sin it* 

bulletin 



Volume 84/ Number 2086/May 1984 



The Department OF State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

A.ssistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public t'omniunication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 



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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
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mi 



CONTENTS 



The President 



1 



11 



American Foreign Policy 
Challenges in the 1980s 

Democratic Ideals and 
U.S. -Israel Relations 

News Conference of April 4 
(Excerpts) 

Central America 



The Secretary 



12 



15 



17 



22 



37 
40 



Power and Diplomacy in the 
1980s 

FY 1984 Supplemental and FY 
1985 Authorization Requests 

Foreign Aid and U.S. Policy 
Objectives 

International Security and 
Cooperation Development Pro- 
gram (Report to the Congress) 

News Conference of March 20 

Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Africa 

43 FY 1985 Assistance Requests 
for Sub-Sahara Africa 
(Princeton Lyman) 

Arms Control 

49 Security Policy and Arms Con- 

trol (Lawrence S. Eagleburger) 

50 MBFR Talks Resume 

(President Reagan) 

East Asia 

52 FY Assistance Requests for 
East Asia and the Pacific 
(Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

Europe 

59 FY 1985 Assistance Requests 
for Europe (Richard R. Burt) 

Foreign Assistance 

62 FY 1985 Request for Economic 
Assistance Programs (M. Peter 
McPkerson) 

Middle East 

66 FY 1985 Assistance Requests 
for the Middle East 
(Richard W. Murphy) 

68 U.S. Forces in Lebanon (Letter 
to the Congress) 



Military Affairs 

71 Strategic Defense Initiative 

(Department of Defense Fact 
Sheet) 

Narcotics 



FY 1985 Assistance Requests 
for Narcotics (Clyde D. Taylor) 



72 



Pacific 

74 Administration Urges Approval 

of Compact of Free Association 
(Message to the Congress) 

Security Assistance 

75 FY 1985 Security Assistance 

Requests (William 
Schneider, Jr.) 

South Asia 

77 FY 1985 Assistance Requests 
for South Asia (Howard B. 
Schaffer) 

82 Afghanistan Day, 1974 

(Secretary Shultz, 
Proclamation) 

United Nations 

83 FY 1985 Assistance Requests 

for Organizations and Programs 
(Gregory J. Newell) 

Treaties 

87 Current Actions 

Chronology 

89 March 1984 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 

Publications 

93 Department of State 

94 Background Notes 

Index 



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^ 1984 



THE PRESIDENT 



American Foreign Policy 
Challenges in the 1980s 



by President Reagan 



Address before the 

Center for Strategic 

and International Studies 

on April 6, 1981^.'^ 



I'd like to address your theme of bipar- 
tisanship with a view toward America's 
foreign policy challenges for the 1980s. 



IDEALISM AND REALISM 

Two Great Goals 

All Americans share two great goals for 
foreign policy: a safer world and a world 
in which individual rights can be re- 
spected and precious values may flourish. 

These goals are at the heart of 
America's traditional ideahsm and our 
aspirations for world peace. Yet, while 
cherished by us, they do not belong ex- 
clusively to us. They're not "made in 
America." They're shared by people 
everywhere. 

A Troubled World 

Tragically, the world in which these fun- 
damental goals are so widely shared is a 
very troubled world. While we and our 
allies may enjoy peace and prosperity, 
many citizens of the industrial world con- 
tinue to live in fear of conflict and the 
threat of nuclear war. And all around the 
globe, terrorists threaten innocent people 
and civilized values. And in developing 
countries, the dreams of human progress 
have, too often, been lost to violent rev- 
olution and dictatorship. 

Quite obviously, the widespread 
desire for a safer and more humane 
world is— by itself— not enough to create 
such a world. In pursuing our worthy 
goals, we must go beyond honorable in- 
tentions and good will to practical means. 



Key Principles 

We must be guided by these key prin- 
ciples. 

Realism. The world is not as we 
wish it would be. Reality is often harsh. 
We will not make it less so if we do not 
first see it for what it is. 

Streng:th. We know that strength 
alone is not enough, but without it there 
can be no effective diplomacy and ne- 
gotiations; no secure democracy and 
peace. Conversely, weakness or hopeful 
passivity are only self-defeating. They in- 
vite the very aggression and instability 
that they would seek to avoid. 

New Economic Growth. This is 
the underlying base that ensures our 
strength and permits human potential to 
flourish. Neither strength nor creativity 
can be achieved or sustained without 
economic growth— both at home and 
abroad. 

Intelligence. Our policies cannot be 
effective unless the information on which 
they're based is accurate, timely, and 
complete. 

Shared Responsibility With Allies. 
Our friends and allies share the heavy 
responsibility for the protection of 
freedom. We seek and need their part- 
nership, sharing burdens in pursuit of 
our common goals. 

Nonaggression. We have no terri- 
torial ambitions. We occupy no foreign 
lands. We build our strength only to 
assure deterrence and to secure our in- 
terests if deterrence fails. 

Dialogue With Adversaries. Though 
we must be honest in recognizing fun- 
damental differences with our adver- 
saries, we must always be willing to 
resolve these differences by peaceful 



Bipartisanship at Home. In our 

two-party democracy, an effective 
foreign policy must begin with bipar- 
tisanship, and the sharing of responsibili- 
ty for a safer and more humane world 
must begin at home. 



AMERICAN RENEWAL 

Restored Deterrence: "American 
Leadership Is Back" 

During the past 3 years, we've been 
steadily rebuilding America's capacity to 
advance our foreign policy goals through 
renewed attention to these vital prin- 
ciples. Many threats remain, and peace 
may still seem precarious. But America 
is safer and more secure today because 
the people of this great nation have re-, 
stored the foundation of its strength. 

We began with renewed realism— a 
clear-eyed understanding of the world 
we live in and of our inescapable global 
responsibilities. Our industries depend on 
the importation of energy and minerals 
from distant lands. Our prosperity re- 
quires a sound international financial 
system and free and open trading mar- 
kets. And our security is inseparable 
from the security of our friends and 
neighbors. 

I believe Americans today see the 
world with realism and maturity. The 
great majority of our people do not 
believe the stark differences between 
democracy and totalitarianism can be 
wished away. They understand that 
keeping America secure begins with 
keeping America strong and free. 

When we took office in 1981, the 
Soviet Union had been engaged for 20 
years in the most massive military build- 
up in history. Clearly, their goal was not 
to catch us but to surpass us. Yet, the 
United States remained a virtual specta- 
tor in the 1970s, a decade of neglect that 
took a severe toll on our defense capabil- 
ities. 

With bipartisan support, we em- 
barked immediately on a major defense 
rebuilding program. We've made good 
progress in restoring the morale of our 
men and women in uniform, restocking 
spare parts and ammunition, replacing 
obsolescent equipment and facilities, im- 
proving basic training and readiness, 



THE PRESIDENT 



and pushing forward with long-overdue 
weapons' programs. 

The simple fact is that in the last half 
of the 1970s we were not deterring, as 
events from Angola to Afghanistan made 
clear. Today we are, and that fact has fun- 
damentally altered the future for millions 
of human beings. Gone are the days when 
the United States was perceived as a rud- 
derless superpower, a helpless hostage to 
world events. American leadership is 
back. Peace through strength is not a 
slogan, it's a fact of life. And we will not 
return to the days of handwringing, 
defeatism, decline, and despair. 

We have also upgraded significantly 
our intelligence capabilities— restoring 
morale in the intelligence agencies and in- 



A Stark Contrast 

Our principles don't involve just rebuild- 
ing our strength; they also tell us how to 
use it. We remain true to the principle of 
nonaggression. On an occasion when 
the United States, at the request of its 
neighbors, did use force— in Grenada— 
we acted decisively but only after it was 
clear a bloodthirsty regime had put 
American and Grenadian lives in danger 
and the security of neighboring islands in 
danger. As soon as stability and freedom 
were restored on the island, 
we left. The Soviet Union had no such 
legitimate justification for its massive in- 
vasion of Afghanistan 4 years ago. And 
today, over 100,000 occupation troops re- 
main there. The United States, by stark 



Challenge number one is to reduce the risk of 
nuclear war and to reduce the levels of nuclear ar- 
maments in a way that also reduces the risk they 
will ever be used. 



creasing our capability to detect, analyze, 
and counter hostile intelligence threats. 

Economic Recovery 

Economic strength, the underlying base 
of support for our defense buildup, has 
received a dramatic new boost. We've 
transformed a no-growth economy, crip- 
pled by disincentives, double-digit infla- 
tion, 21.5% interest rates, plunging pro- 
ductivity, and a weak dollar, into a 
dynamic growth economy, bolstered by 
new incentives, stable prices, lower in- 
terest rates, a rebirth of productivity, and 
restored our confidence in our currency. 
Renewed strength at home has been 
accompanied by closer partnerships with 
America's friends and allies. Far from 
buckling under Soviet intimidation, the 
unity of the NATO alliance has held fiiTn, 
and we are moving foi-ward to modernize 
our strategic deterrent. The leader of 
America's oldest ally, French President 
Francois Mitterrand, recently reminded 
us that: "Peace— like liberty— is never 
given ... the pursuit of both is a continual 
one. ... In the turbulent times we live in, 
solidarity among friends is essential." 



contrast, occupies no foreign nation, nor 
do we seek to. 

Though we and the Soviet Union dif- 
fer markedly, living in this nuclear age 
makes it imperative that we talk with 
each other. If the new Soviet leadership 
truly is devoted to building a safer and 
more humane world, rather than e.xpand- 
ing armed conquests, it will find a sympa- 
thetic partner in the West. 

In pursuing these practical principles, 
we have throughout sought to revive the 
spirit that was once the hallmark of our 
postwar foreign policy— bipartisan 
cooperation between the executive and 
the legislative branches of our govern- 
ment. 

Much has been accomplished, but 
much remains to be done. If Republicans 
and Democrats wUl join together to con- 
front four great challenges to American 
foreign policy in the 1980s, then we can 
and will make great strides toward a 
safer and more humane world. 



FOUR GREAT CHALLENGES 

Challenge Number One 

Challenge number one is to reduce the 
risk of nuclear war and to reduce the 
levels of nuclear armaments in a way that 
also reduces the risk they will ever be 



used. We have no higher challenge, for a 
nuclear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought. But merely to be against 
nuclear war is not enough to prevent it. 

For 35 years, the defense policy of the 
United Stales and its NATO allies has 
been based on one simple premise: we do 
not start wars. We maintain our conven- 
tional and strategic strength to deter ag- 
gression by convincing any potential ag- 
gressor that war could bring no benefit, 
only disaster. Deterrence has been and 
will remain in the cornerstone of our na- 
tional security policy to defend freedom 
and preserve peace. 

But, as I mentioned, the 1970s were 
marked by neglect of our defenses, and 
nuclear safety was no exception. Too 
many forgot John Kennedy's warning 
that only when our arms are certain 
beyond doubt can we be certain beyond 
doubt they will never be used. By the 
beginning of this decade, we faced three 
growing problems: the Soviet SS-20 
monopoly in Europe and Asia; the vul- 
nerability of our land-based ICBM [inter- 
continental ballistic missile] force; and the 
failure of arms control agreements to slow 
the overall growth in strategic weapons. 
The Carter Administration acknowledged 
these problems. In fact, almost everj'one 
did. 

There is a widespread, but mistaken, 
impression that aiTns agreements auto- 
matically produce arms control. In 1969, 
when SALT I [strategic arms limitation 
talks] negotiations began, the Soviet 
Union had about 1,500 strategic nuclear 
weapons. Today, the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal can grow to over 15,000 nuclear 
weapons and still stay within all past 
arms control agreements, including the 
SALT I and SALT II guidelines. 

The practical means for reducing the 
risks of nuclear war must, therefore, 
follow two parallel paths— credible deter- 
rence and real arms reductions with ef- 
fective verification. It is on this basis that 
we've responded to the problems I just 
described. This is why we've moved for- 
ward to implement NATO's dual-track 
decision of 1979, while actually reducing 
the number of nuclear weapons in 
Europe. It is also why we have sought 
bipartisan support for the recommenda- 
tions of the Scowcroft commission and the 
"build-down" concept, and why we've 
proposed deep reductions in strategic 
forces as the strategic arms reduction 
talks (START). 

Without exception, every arms con- 
trol proposal that we have offered would 
reverse the aiTns buildup and help bring a 
more stable balance at lower force levels. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



At the START talks, we seek 
to reduce substantially the number of 
ballistic missile warheads, reduce the 
destructive capacity of nuclear missiles, 
and establish limits on bombers and 
cruise missiles below the levels of 
SALT II: at the talks on intermediate- 
range nuclear forces (INF), our 
negotiators have tabled four initiatives to 
address Soviet concerns and improve pros- 
pects for a fair and equitable agreement 
that would reduce or eliminate an entire 
class of such nuclear amis. Our flexibility 
in the START and INF negotiations has 
been demonstrated by numerous 
modifications to our positions. But they 
have been met only by the silence of 
Soviet walkouts. 

At the mutual and balanced force 
reduction talks in Vienna, we and our 
NATO partners presented a treaty that 
would reduce conventional forces to par- 
ity at lower levels. To reduce the risks of 
war in time of crisis, we have proposed 
to the Soviet Union important measures 
to improve direct communications and in- 
crease mutual confidence. And just re- 
cently, I directed Vice President Bush to 
go to the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva to present a new American in- 
itiative: a worldwide ban on the produc- 
tion, possession, and use of chemical 
weapons. 

Our strategic policy represents a 
careful response to a nuclear agenda 
upon which even our critics agreed. 
Many who would break the bonds of bi- 
partisanship, claiming they know how to 
bring greater security, seem to ignore 
the likely consequences of their own pro- 
posals. 

Those who wanted a last-minute 
moratorium on INF deployment would 
have betrayed our allies and reduced the 
chances for a safer Europe; those who 
would try to implement a unilateral 
freeze would find it unverifiable and de- 
stabilizing, because it would prevent 
restoration of a stable balance that keeps 
the peace; and those who would advocate 
unilateral cancellation of the Peacekeeper 
missile would ignore a central recommen- 
dation of the bipartisan Scowcroft report 
and leave the Soviets with little incen- 
tive to negotiate meaningful reductions. 
Indeed, the Soviets would be rewarded 
for leaving the bargaining table. 

These simplistic solutions, and others 
put forward by our critics, would take 
meaningful agreements and increased 
security much further from our grasp. 
Our critics can best help us move closer 
to the goals we share by accepting prac- 
tical means to achieve them. Granted, it 
is easy to support a strong defense; it's 
much harder to support a strong defense 



May 1984 
I^HQBBBBBBBBaBB 



budget. And granted, it is easy to call for 
arms agreements; it's more difficult to 
support patient, firm, fair negotiations 
with those who want to see how much 
we will compromise with ourselves first. 
Bipartisanship can only work if both 
sides face up to real-world problems and 
meet them with real-world solutions. 

Challenge Number Two 

Our safety and security depend on more 
than credible deterrence and nuclear 
arms reductions. Constructive regional 
development is also essential. Therefore, 
our second great challenge is strengthen- 
ing the basis for stability in troubled and 
strategically sensitive regions. 

Regional tensions often begin in long- 
standing social, political, and economic 
inequities and in ethnic and religious dis- 
putes. But throughout the 1970s, in- 
creased Soviet support for terrorism, in- 
surgency, and aggression, coupled with a 
perception of weakening U.S. power and 
resolve, greatly exacerbated these ten- 
sions. 

The results were not surprising: the 
massacres of Kampuchea followed by the 
Vietnamese invasion; the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan; the rise of Iranian ex- 
tremism and the holding of Americans 
hostage; Libyan coercion in Africa; So- 
viet and Cuban military involvement in 
Angola and Ethiopia; their subversion in 
Central America; and the rise of state- 
supported terrorism. 



aid, security assistance, and diplomatic 
mediation tailored to the needs of each 
region. 

It is also obvious we alone cannot 
save embattled governments or control 
terrorism. But doing nothing only en- 
sures far greater problems down the 
road. So we strive to expand cooperation 
with states who support our common in- 
terests, to help friendly nations in dan- 
ger, and to seize major opportunities for 
peacekeeping. 

Perhaps the best example of this 
comprehensive approach is the report 
and recommendations of the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America. It is from this report that we 
drew our proposals for bringing peaceful 
development to Central America. They 
are now before the Congress and will be 
debated at length. 

I welcome a debate. But, if it's to be 
productive, we must put aside mythology 
and uninformed rhetoric. Some, for ex- 
ample, insist that the root of regional 
violence is poverty but npt communism. 
Well, three-fourths of our request and of 
our current program is for economic and 
humanitarian assistance. America is a 
good and generous nation. But, eco- 
nomic aid alone cannot stop Cuban and 
Soviet-sponsored guerrillas determined 
to terrorize, bum, bomb, and destroy 
everything from bridges and industries 
to electric power and transportation. 
And neither individual rights nor eco- 



. . .our second great challenge is strengthening the 
basis for stability in troubled and strategically sen- 
sitive regions. 



Taken together, these events defined 
a pattern of mounting instability and 
violence that the United States could not 
ignore. And we have not. As with de- 
fense, by the beginning of the 1980s, 
there was an emerging consensus in this 
country that we had to do better in deal- 
ing with problems that affect our vital in- 
terests. 

Obviously no single abstract policy 
could deal successfully with all problems 
or all regions. But as a general matter, 
effective regional stabilization requires a 
balanced approach— a mix of economic 



nomic health can be advanced if stability 
is not secured. 

Other critics say we shouldn't see the 
problems of this or any other region as 
an East- West struggle. Our policies in 
Central America and elsewhere are, in 
fact, designed precisely to keep East- 
West tensions from spreading, from in- 
truding into the lives of nations that are 
struggling with great problems of their 
own. Events in southern Africa are 
showing what persistent mediation and 
an ability to talk to all sides can ac- 
complish. The states of this region have 
been poised for war for decades, but 



BiiuHuuiiuHiiiiuiiiiuiiiiimiimi 



mumimmmuum 



THE PRESIDENT 



there is new hope for peace. South Af- 
rica, Angola, and Mozambique are im- 
plementing agreements to break the cy- 
cle of violence. Our Administration has 
been active in this process, and we will 
stay involved, trying to bring an inde- 
pendent Namibia into being, end foreign 
military interference, and keep the 
region free from East-West conflict. I 
have hope that peace and democratic 
reform can be enjoyed by all the peoples 
of southern Africa. 

In Central America we've also seen 
progress. El Salvador's presidential 
elections express that nation's desire to 
govern itself in peace. Yet the future of 
the region remains open. We have a 
choice: either we help America's friends 
defend themselves and give democracy a 
chance or we abandon our responsibil- 
ities and let the Soviet Union and Cuba 
shape the destiny of our hemisphere. If 
this happens, the East-West conflict will 
only become broader and much more 
dangerous. 

In dealing with regional instability, 
we have to understand how it is related 
to other problems. Insecurity and re- 
gional violence are among the driving 
forces of nuclear proliferation. Peace- 
keeping in troubled regions and strength- 
ening barriers to nuclear proliferation are 
two sides of the same coin. Stability and 
safeguards go together. 



our friends, can help stop the spread of 
violence. I have said, for example, that 
we will keep open the Strait of Hormuz, 
the vital lifeline through which so much 
oil flows to the United States and other 
industrial democracies. Making this clear 
beforehand— and making it credible- 
makes such a crisis much less likely. 

We must work with quiet persistence 
and without illusions. We may suffer set- 
backs, but we must not jump to the con- 
clusion that we can defend our interests 
without ever committing ourselves. Nor 
should other nations believe that mere 
setbacks will turn America inward again. 
We know our responsibilities, and we 
must live up to them. 

Because effective regional problem 
solving requires a balanced and sus- 
tained approach, it is essential that the 
Congress give full, not piecemeal, sup- 
port. Indeed, where we have foundered 
in regional stabilization, it has been 
because the Congress has failed to pro- 
vide such support. Halfway measures- 
refusing to take responsibility for means- 
produce the worst possible results. I'll 
return to this point when I discuss the 
fourth challenge in just a few minutes. 

Challenge Number Three 

Expanding opportunities for economic 
development and personal freedom is our 



Expanding opportunities for economic develop- 
ment and personal freedom is our third great 
challenge. 



No one says this approach is cheap, 
quick, or easy. But the cost of this com- 
mitment is bargain basement compared 
to the tremendous sacrifices we will have 
to make if we do nothing or do too little. 
The Kissinger commission warned that 
an outbreak of Cuban-type regimes in 
Central America will bring subversion 
closer to our ovra borders and the 
specter of millions of uprooted refugees 
fleeing in desperation to the north. 

In the Middle East, which has so 
rarely known peace, we seek a similar 
mix of economic aid, diplomatic media- 
tion, and military assistance and coopera- 
tion. These will, we believe, make the 
use of U.S. forces unnecessary and make 
the risk of East- West conflict less. But 
given the importance of the region, we 
must also be ready to act when the 
presence of American power, and that of 



third great challenge. The American con- 
cept of peace is more than absence of 
war. We favor the flowering of economic 
growth and individual liberty in a world 
of peace. And this, too, is a goal to which 
most Americans subscribe. Our political 
leaders must be judged by whether the 
means they offer will help us to reach it. 
Our belief in individual freedom and 
opportunity is rooted in practical experi- 
ence: free people build free markets that 
ignite dynamic development for every- 
one. And in America, incentives, risk 
taking, and entrepreneurship are re- 
awakening the spirit of capitalism and 
strengthening economic expansion and 
human progress throughout the world. 
Our goal has always been to restore 
and sustain noninflationary worldwide 
growth, thereby ending for good the 
stagflation of the 1970s, which saw a 



drastic weakening of the fabric of the 
world economy. 

We take our leadership responsibil- 
ities seriously, but we alone cannot put 
the world's economic house in order. At 
Williamsburg, the industrial countries 
consolidated their views on economic 
policy. The proof is not in the communi- 
que; it's in the results. France is reduc- 
ing inflation and seeking greater flexibil- 
ity in its economy; Japan is slowly, to be 
sure, but steadily— we will insist— liber- 
alizing its trade and capital markets; 
Germany and the United Kingdom are 
moving forward on a steady course of 
low inflation and moderate, sustained 
growth. 

Just as we believe that incentives are 
key to greater grovrth in America and 
throughout the world, so, too, must we 
resist the sugar-coated poison of protec- 
tionism everywhere it exists. Here at 
home, we're opposing inflationary, self- 
defeating bills like domestic content. At 
the London economic summit in June, I 
hope that we can lay the groundwork for 
a new round of negotiations that will 
open markets for our exports of goods 
and services and stimulate greater 
growth, efficiency, and jobs for all. 

And we're advancing other key initia- 
tives to promote more powerful world- 
wade growth by expanding trade and 
investment relationships. The dynamic 
growth of Pacific Basin nations has made 
them the fastest growing markets for 
our goods, services, and capital. Last 
year, I visited Japan and Korea, two of 
America's most important allies, to forge 
closer partnerships. And this month I 
will visit the People's Republic of China, 
another of the increasingly significant 
relationships that we hold in the Pacific. 
I see America and our Pacific neighbors 
as nations of the future, going forward 
together in a mighty enterprise to build 
dynamic growth economies and a safer 
world. 

We're helping developing countries 
grow by presenting a fresh view of de- 
velopment—the magic of the market- 
place—to spark greater growth and par- 
ticipation in the international economy. 
Developing nations earn twice as much 
from exports to the United States as 
they received in aid from all the other 
nations combined. 

And practical proposals Uke the Car- 
ibbean Basin Initiative wall strengthen 
the private sectors of some 20 Caribbean 
neighbors, while guaranteeing fairer 
treatment for U.S. companies and na- 
tionals and increasing demand for 
American exports. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



We've recently sent to the Congress 
i new economic policy initiative for Af- 
rica. It, too, is designed to support the 
jrowth of private enterprise in African 
ountries by encouraging structural eco- 
nomic change and international trade. 
We've also asked the Congress to in- 
srease humanitarian assistance to Africa 
to combat the devastating effects of ex- 
treme drought. 

In building a strong global recovery, 
jf course, nothing is more important 
han to keep the wheels of world com- 
Tierce turning and create jobs without 
enewing the spiral of inflation. The In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) is a 
inchpin in our efforts to restore a sound 
vvorld economy and resolve the debt 
Droblems of many developing countries. 
With bipartisan support, we imple- 
■nented a major increase in IMF re- 
sources. In cooperation with the IMF, 
ive're working to prevent the problems 
Df individual debtor nations from dis- 
rupting the stability and strength of the 
ntire international financial system. It 
ivas this goal that brought nations of 
aorth and south together to help resolve 
:he debt difficulties of the new demo- 
ratic Government of Argentina. 

Because we know that democratic 
governments are the best guarantors of 
human rights, and that economic growth 
will always flourish when men and 
women are free, we seek to promote not 
just material products but the values of 
faith and human dignity for which Amer- 
ica and all democratic nations stand- 
values which embody the culmination of 
5,000 years of Western civilization. 

When I addressed the British Parlia- 
ment in June of 1982, I called for a bold 
and lasting effort to assist people strug- 
gling for human rights. We've estab- 
lished the National Endowment for De- 
mocracy, a partnership of people from all 
walks of life dedicated to spreading the 
positive message of democracy. To suc- 
ceed, we must oppose the doublespeak of 
totalitarian propaganda. And so we're 
modernizing the Voice of America and 
our other broadcasting facilities, and we 
are working to start up Radio Marti, a 
voice of truth to the imprisoned people of 
Cuba. 

Americans have always wanted to 
see the spread of democratic institutions, 
and that goal is coming closer. In our 
own hemisphere, 26 countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean are either 
democracies or formally embarked on a 
democratic transition. This represents 
90% of the region's population, up from 
under 50% a decade ago. 



Trust the people, this is the crucial 
lesson of history and America's message 
to the world. We must be staunch in our 
conviction that freedom is not the sole 
possession of a chosen few, but the uni- 
versal right of men and women every- 
where. President Truman said, "If we 
should pay merely lip service to inspiring 
ideals, and later do violence to simple 
justice, we would draw down upon us 
the bitter wrath of generations yet un- 



sequent second guessing about whether 
to keep our men there severely under- 
mined our policy. It hindered the ability 
of our diplomats to negotiate, encouraged 
more intransigence from the Syrians, and 
prolonged the violence. Similarly, con- 
gressional wavering on support for the 
Jackson plan, which reflects the recom- 
mendations of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America, can 
only encourage the enemies of democracy 
who are determined to wear us down. 



. . .our fourth great challenge [is to] restore bipar- 
tisan consensus in support of U.S. foreign policy. 



bom." Let us go forward together, faith- 
ful friends of democracy and democratic 
values, confident in our conviction that 
the tide of the future is a freedom tide. 
But let us go forward with practical 
means. 

Challenge Number Four 

This brings me to our fourth great chal- 
lenge: we must restore bipartisan con- 
sensus in support of U.S. foreign policy. 
We must restore America's honorable 
tradition of partisan politics stopping at 
the water's edge. Republicans and 
Democrats standing united in patriotism 
and speaking with one voice as responsi- 
ble trustees for peace, democracy, in- 
dividual liberty, and the rule of law. 

In the 1970s we saw a rash of con- 
gressional initiatives to limit the presi- 
dent's authority in the areas of trade, 
human rights, arms sales, foreign assist- 
ance, intelligence operations, and the dis- 
patch of troops in time of crisis. Over 100 
separate prohibitions and restrictions on 
executive branch authority to formulate 
and implement foreign policy were 
enacted. 

The most far-reaching consequence of 
the past decade's congressional activism 
is this: bipartisan consensus building has 
become a central responsibility of con- 
gressional leadership as well as of execu- 
tive leadership. If we're to have a sus- 
tainable foreign policy, the Congress 
must support the practical details of pol- 
icy, not just the general goals. 

We have demonstrated the capacity 
for such jointly responsible leadership in 
certain areas. But we have seen setbacks 
for bipartisanship, too. I believe that 
once we established bipartisan agree- 
ment on our course in Lebanon, the sub- 



To understand and solve this prob- 
lem of joint responsibility, we have to go 
beyond the familiar questions as to who 
should be stronger, the president or the 
Congress. The more basic problem is: in 
this "post-Vietnam era," Congress has 
not yet developed capacities for coher- 
ent, responsible action needed to carry 
out the new foreign policy powers it has 
taken for itself. To meet the challenges 
of this decade, we need a strong Presi- 
dent and a strong Congress. 

Unfortunately, many in the Congress 
seem to believe they're stUl in the 
troubled Vietnam era, with their only 
task to be vocal critics and not respon- 
sible partners in developing positive, 
practical programs to solve real prob- 
lems. 

Much was learned from Vietnam— les- 
sons ranging from increased appreciation 
of the need for careful discrimination in 
the use of U.S. force or military assist- 
ance to increased appreciation of the 
need for domestic support for any such 
military element of policy. MUitary force, 
either direct or indirect, must remain an 
available part of America's foreign pol- 
icy. But, clearly, the Congress is less 
than wholly comfortable with both the 
need for a military element in foreign 
policy and its own responsibility to deal 
with that element. 

Presidents must recognize Congress 
as a more significant partner in foreign 
policymaking, and, as we have tried to 
do, seek new means to reach bipartisan 
executive-legislative consensus. But leg- 
islators must realize that they, too, are 
partners. They have a responsibility to 
go beyond mere criticism to consensus 
building that will produce positive, prac- 
tical, and effective action. 



May 1984 



■WilHIIimilllHIIilllllJUIIIII 



THE PRESIDENT 



Bipartisan consensus is not an end in 
itself. Sound and experienced U.S. for- 
eign policy leadership must always 
reflect a deep understanding of funda- 
mental American interests, values, and 
principles. 

Consensus on the broad goals of a 
safer and more humane world is easy to 
achieve. The harder part is making pro- 
gress in developing concrete, realistic 
means to reach these goals. We've made 
some progress. But there is still a con- 
gressional reluctance to assume responsi- 
bility for positive, bipartisan action to go 
with their newly claimed powers. 

We've set excellent examples with 
the bipartisan Scowcroft commission, bi- 
partisan support for IMF funding, and 
the bipartisan work of the Kissinger 
commission. But it's time to lift our ef- 
forts to a higher level of cooperation; 
time to meet together, with realism and 
idealism, America's great challenges for 
the 1980s. 

We have the right to dream great 
dreams, the opportunity to strive for a 
world at peace enriched by human dig- 
nity, and the responsibility to work as 
partners, so that we might leave these 
blessed gifts to our children and to our 
children's children. 

We might remember the example of 
a legislator who lived in a particularly 
turbulent era, Henry Clay. Abraham 
Lincoln called him "my beau ideal of a 
statesman." He knew Clay's loftiness of 
spirit and vision never lost sight of his 
country's interest, and that, election year 
or not. Clay would set love of country 
above all political considerations. 

The stakes for America for peace and 
for freedom demand every bit as much 
from us in 1984 and beyond— this is our 
challenge. 



iText from White House press release. I 



Democratic Ideals and 
U.S.-lsrael Relations 



Excerpts from President Reagan 's 
remarks before the Young Leadership 
Conference of the United Jevrish Appeal 
on March 13, 198i.^ 



In your lives, you must overcome great 
challenges. I know you draw strength and 
inspiration from the well of a rich 
spiritual heritage, from the fundamental 
values of faith and family, work, 
neighborhood, and peace. 

Two centuries ago those values led 
Americans to build democratic institu- 
tions and begin their Constitution with 
those courageous and historic words, 
"We, the people . . . ." And today our 
democratic institutions and ideals unite all 
Americans, regardless of color or creed. 
Yet as we enjoy the freedom that 
America offers, we must remember that 
millions on Earth are denied a voice in 
government and must struggle for their 
rights. They live under brutal dictator- 
ships or communist regimes that 
systematically suppress human rights. 

Under communism, Jews, in par- 
ticular, suffer cruel persecution. Here in 
our own hemisphere, the communist San- 
dinista regime in Nicaragua has used 
threats and harassment to force vh-tually 
every Nicaraguan Jew to flee his country. 

In the Soviet Union Jews are virtually 
forbidden to teach Hebrew to their chil- 
dren, are limited to a small number of 
synagogues, and cannot publish books of 
Hebrew liturgy. Emigration of Jews from 
the Soviet Union has been brought to a 
near standstill. Prominent Jews like losif 
Begun have been arraigned in mock trials 
and given harsh sentences. Hebrew 
scholars like Lev Furman have seen their 
teaching materials robbed and their 
homes ransacked. And Jewish dissidents 
like Anatoli Shcharanskiy have been put 
in mental wards or thrown in jail. We 
must support Soviet Jews in their strug- 
gle for basic rights, and I urge all 
Americans to observe the International 
Day of Concern for Soviet Jews this 
Thursday, day aftei- tomorrow, March 
15th. 



To promote our democratic ideals 
abroad, we must also meet great 
challenges, and I see three that are para- 
mount. 



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First, we must keep America strong. 
During the 1970s the United States made 
a conscious choice to restrict its military 
development, fervently hoping the 
Soviets would respond in kind. During 
those 10 years, our spending on defense 
dropped over 20% in real terms. We 
canceled major weapons programs, re- 
duced our nuclear stockpile to its lowest 
level in 20 years, and slackened in the 
training of our armed forces. Between 
1968 and 1978, we cut our navy— the 
fleet— by more than half. 

But" far from responding to om- good 
intentions with restraint, the Soviets 
launched the most massive military 
buildup in world history. From 1974 to 
1980, they outproduced us in practically 
every category of weapons: 3 times more 
tanks, twice as many tactical combat aii-- 
craft, 5 times more ICBM's [intercon- 
tinental ballistic missiles], and 15 times 
more ballistic missile submarines. By 198(i 
total Soviet military investment was more 
than IV2 times ours. 

President Carter's Secretary of 
Defense, Harold Brown, put it very well. 
He acknowledged a bitter lesson about 
Soviet practice in saying, "When we 
build, they build. When we don't build, 
they buUd." 

Since taking office, our Administra- 
tion has made significant headway in 
rebuilding our defenses and making 
America more secure. Perhaps you 
remember the 29th Psalm in which King 
David said, "The Lord will give strength 
to His people; the Lord will bless His peo- 
ple with peace." Today America once 
again recognizes that peace and strength 
are inseparable. 

But we've only begun to repaii- past 
damage. Make no mistake: If we heed 
those who would cripple America's 
rebuilding program, we will undermine 
our own security and the security of our 
closest friends, like Israel, and I am not 
prepared to let that happen. After two 
decades of military expansion by the 
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THE PRESIDENT 



regain the superiority we once enjoyed 
but simply to restore the military 
equivalence we need to keep the peace. 

A second great challenge is to defend 
and pi-omote human rights throughout 
the world. Aleksandi- Herzen, the great 
Russian writer, warned, "To shrink from 
saying a word in defense of the oppressed 
is as bad as any crime. . . ." We who are 
blessed by the fruits of liberty have a per- 
sonal responsibility and a moral obligation 
to speak out in defense of our brothers 
and sisters. We must not and we will not 
remain silent. 

Our Administration has repeatedly 
and vigorously protested the persecution 
of Jews and others in the Soviet Union 
and other communist nations. We're also 
using our influence with countries that 
receive American assistance to give 
human rights firm support. In El Sal- 
vador, we're insisting that the leaders 
take steps to end human rights abuse. 
And although El Salvador is far from 
perfect, we've seen marked progress. 

In the United Nations, Iran's 
representative once called Israel, "a 
cancerous growth," and Libya's 
representative has referred to the people 
of Israel as "the most vile people upon 
Earth." This so-called anti-Zionism is just 
another mask for vicious anti-Semitism, 
and that's something the United States 
will not tolerate. 

As I wi-ote last month to Stanley 
Blend, the president of the Jewish 
Federation of San Antonio, ". . . the 
lesson of history is overwhelmingly clear. 
Silence is never an acceptable response to 
anti-Semitism." 

UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick is 
our leader on this. And let me assure you 
of one thing about Jeane: She is a very 
tenacious woman. She has defended 
Israel and stood up for human rights with 
persistence and courage. But just so no 
one gets any ideas, I will be bhmt: If 
Israel is ever forced to walk out of the 
UN, the United States and Israel will 
walk out together. 

Standing steadfast with our allies in 
support of greater economic growth and 
of peace with freedom is our third great 
challenge. Our Administi-ation is working 
hard to do just that. In Europe we and 
our NATO allies have shown the Soviets 
our willingness to negotiate and our un- 
shakable resolve to defend Western 
Europe. In the Far East, we are 
strengthening our ties to the Asian 
democracies and developing our relations 
with China. In Central America we have 
supported democracy and fostered 



economic development. And in the Middle 
East we have strengthened our relations 
with a nation close to your heart and 
mine— the State of Israel. 

Let me take a moment to describe our 
relations with Israel and our efforts in the 
Middle East. Israel and the United Stales 
are bound together by the ties of friend- 
ship, shared ideals, and mutual interests. 
We're allies in the defense of freedom in 
the Middle East. The United States was 
the first nation to recognize the State of 
Israel, and ever since, om- support for 
Israel has remained unflinching. Today, 
when even our NATO allies vote with us 
in the United Nations only some six out of 
ten votes, the alliance between the 
United States and Israel is so strong that 
we vote together more than nine times 
out of ten. 

Since I took office, the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship has grown closer than ever 
before in three crucial ways. 

First, the U.S.-Israeli strategic rela- 
tionship has been elevated and formal- 
ized. This is the first time in Israel's 
history that a formal strategic relation- 
ship has existed. The new American- 
Israeh Joint Political-Military Group is 
working to decide how the United States 
and Israel can counter the threat that 
growing Soviet involvement in the Middle 
East poses to our mutual interests. Our 
cooperation adds to deterrence and im- 
proves and protects the prospects for 
peace and security. The negotiations have 
been positive, and they're moving for- 
ward. 

Second, we're negotiating to establish 
a free trade area between the United 
States and Israel, and this will launch a 
new era of closer economic relations be- 
tween our countries. By substantially 
eliminating duties and nontariff barriers 
between our nations, we will enable 
American producers to sell and compete 
in Israel while providing Israeli manufac- 
turers unimpeded access to the free 
world's largest market. 

Third, the United States will soon be 
giving Israel military aid on a grant, not a 
loan, basis. We have re.structured our 
1985 foreign aid package, and Israel v\ill 
now receive economic aid totaling $850 
million and a military grant of some $1.4 
billion. This will ensure that Israel main- 
tains its qualitative military edge. 

All in all, the friendship between 
Israel and the United States is closer and 
stronger today than ever before. And I 
intend to keep it that way. 

In the Middle East, as a whole, the 
United States has three aims. 

First, we must deter the Soviet 
threat. As the crossroads among three 



continents and the source of oil for much 
of the industrialized world, the Middle 
East is of enormous strategic importance. 
Were the Soviets to control the region— 
and they have expanded their influence 
there in a number of ways, notably, by 
stationing 7,000 troops and advisers in 
Syria— the entire world would be 
vulnerable to economic blackmail. Their 
brutal war against the Afghan people con- 
tinues with increasing ferocity. We must 
not allow them to dominate the region. 

Second, we must prevent a widening 
of the conflict in the Persian Gulf which 
could threaten the sealanes carrying 
much of the free world's oil. It could also 
damage the infrastructure that pumps the 
oil out of the ground, and we must not 
permit this to happen. 

Third, we seek to go on promoting 
peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. In response to the growth of 
Syrian power and the rise of the Iranian 
threat, we must help to protect moderate 
Arabs who seek peace from the radical 
pressures that have done such harm in 
Lebanon. 

Syria is trying to lead a radical effort 
to dominate the region through terroi'ism 
and intimidation aimed, in paiticular, at 
America's friends. One such friend we 
continue to urge to negotiate with Israel 
is King Hussein of Jordan. Today Jordan 
is crucial to the peace process, and for 
that very reason, Jordan, like Israel, is 
confronted by Syria and faces military 
threats and terrorist attacks. 

Since the security of Jordan is crucial 
to the security of the entire region, it is in 
America's strategic interest, and I believe 
it is in Israel's strategic interest, foi- us to 
help meet Jordan's legitimate needs for 
defense against the growing power of 
Syria and Iran. Such assistance to Jordan 
does not threaten Israel, but enhances 
the prospects for Mideast peace by reduc- 
ing the dangers of the radical threat. 

This is an historic moment in the Mid- 
dle East. Syria must decide whether to 
allow Lebanon to retain control over its 
own destiny or condemn it to occupation. 
Syria forced the Lebanese Government to 
renounce the May 17th agreement with 
Israel precisely because it was a good 
agreement. Those who hsve chosen this 
course will have to find other ways to 
secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces. 
Arab governments and the Palestinian 
Arabs must decide whether to reach 
peace with Israel through direct negotia- 
tions. And if Arab negotiators step for- 
ward, Israel must decide if it will take the 
risks necessary to attain the real security 



May 1984 



THE PRESIDENT 



thai comes only with genuine peace. I 
have no doubt thai given thai choice, the 
Israelis will once again have the courage 
to choose peace. 

I'm convinced that the initiative that I 
presented on September Isl, 1982, re- 
mains the best option for all the parties. 
It is squarely based on the Camp David 
framework and UN Security Council 
Re.<olution 242. It is lime for the Arab 
world to negotiate directly with Israel 
and to recognize Israel's righl to exist. 

We hope that the Government of 
Israel will understand that continued set- 
tlement activity in the West Bank and 
Gaza will make the peace process more 
difficult. Peace can only come about 
through the give-and-take of direct 
negotiations. These negotiations will deal 
with many issues, including the status of 
Jerusalem, voting rights, land use, and 
security. If there's to be any hope for 
these negotiations, however, we must 
preserve our credibility as a fairminded 
broker seeking a comprehensive solution. 
Only the United States can advance this 
process. And we must not undermine our 
role. 

And permit me to reaffirm a 
longstanding American commitment: So 
long as the PLO [Palestine Libei-ation 
Organization] refuses to recognize Israel's 
right to exist and to accept Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the 
United States will neither recognize nor 
negotiate with the PLO. 

Only 2 weeks ago, terrorists planted 
hand grenades outside a store on a 
crowded street in Jerusalem. When they 
exploded, 21 shoppers and passersby 
were injured, some seriously. Yasir 
Arafat, on behalf of the PLO praised the 
attack on innocent civilians. He had the 
gall to call it a "military operation." Ter- 
rorism, whether by government or in- 
dividuals, is repulsive, and peaceful coex- 
istence can never come from in- 
discriminate violence. 

If I could leave you with one thought 
today it would be this: Even though in 
the Middle East and elsewhere the world 
seems hostile to democratic ideals, it's the 
free men and women on this Earth who 
are making history. 

Here in the United Stales we've only 
seen the beginning of what a free and a 
brave people can do. Today America is 
leading a revolution even more sweeping 
than the Industrial Revolution of a cen- 
tury ago. It's a revolution ranging from 
tiny microchips to voyages into the vast, 
dark spaces of space; fi-om home com- 
puters that can put the great music, film, 
and literature at a family's fingertips to 
new medical breakthroughs that can add 



years to our lives, even helping the lame 
to walk and the blind to see. 

In Israel free men and women are 
every day demonstrating the power of 
courage and faith. Back in 1948 when 
Israel was founded, pimdits claimed the 
new country could never survive. Today, 
no one questions that Israel is a land of 
stability and democracy in a region of 
tyranny and unrest. 



This Sunday, as Jews the world over 
observe Purim, they'll celebrate not only 
the ancient deliverance of Jews from the 
wicked but a modem joy as well— the 
miracle of the State of Israel. 



• Made at the Washington Hilton Hotel 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Mar. 19, 1984).H 



News Conference of April 4 (Excerpts) 



Excerpts from Presidejiis Reagan's 
news conference of April k. 198Jt} 

In 2 weeks, I will send Vice President 
Bush to Geneva to present to the 40-na- 
tion Conference on Disarmament a bold, 
American initiative for a comprehensive 
worldwide ban on chemical weapons. Our 
proposal would prohibit the production, 
possession, and use of chemical weapons. 

The short cdHiings of early chemical 
weapons treaties have been made 
tragically clear in recent years. Chemical 
weapons have been used against 
defenseless peoples in Afghanistan, in 
Southeast Asia, and in the conflict be- 
tween Iran and Iraq. The use of the terri- 
ble weapons also has serious implications 
for our own security. 

The Soviet Union's e.xtensive arsenal 
of chemical weapons threatens U.S. 
forces. It requires the LInited States to 
maintain a limited retaliatory capability of 
its own until we achieve an effective ban. 
We must be able to deter a chemical at- 
tack against us or our allies. And without 
a modern and credible deterrent, the 
prospects for achieving a comprehensive 
ban would be nil. 

Our comprehensive treaty proposal 
can bring the day closer when the world 
will prohibit all chemical weapons. But 
verification of a chemical weapons ban 
won't be easy. Only an effective monitor- 
ing and enforcement package can ensure 
international confidence in such an agi-ee- 
ment. The United States is, therefore, 
developing bold and sound verification 
procedures. 

This latest initiative reflects my 
continuing strong commitment to arms 
control. Our Administration seeks to 
move forward in several areas. I'm 
pleased, for example, that the United 
Stales is also participating in a promising 
new multilateral negotiation dealing with 



confidence-building measures in Europe 
and, in the recently resumed East-West 
talks, in reducing conventional forces in 
Europe. 

We're working closely with our 
NATO allies to try to make progress in all 
these areas. I can't report these promis- 
ing developments, however, without ex- 
pi'essing my deep, personal regret that 
the Soviet Union still has not returned to 
the two negotiations on nuclear arms 
reductions— the START [strategic reduc- 
tion talks] and the INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] talks which it 
walked away from late last year. 

The United States and many othei- 
countries have urged repeatedly that the 
Soviets return to these talks. So far they 
have ignored the will of the world. I hope 
that the Soviet leadership will respond to 
our new initiatives, not only by 
negotiating seriously on chemical 
weapons but also by joining us in the 
urgent task of achieving real reductions 
in nuclear arms. The Vice President's 
mission is a vital one, and we wish him 
Godspeed. 

Q. The Secretary of State, George 
Shultz, is advocating a wider, greater 
use of military force, a show of force, 
around the world and, also, preemptive 
strikes against potential terrorists. If 
you slam the door on negotiations for 
killer satellites, which could lead to a 
arms race in space, my question is, how 
do these moves ser\e the cause of peace 
and do you think that the country is 
really ready for wider involvement, 
military involvement, around the 
world? 

A. I don't think that George meant to 
imply anything of that kind or that we're 
going to get more militant or anything. I 
think he was trying to express to those 
people who have been so concerned about 
arms and whether there's an arms race, 
and that is that your military strength is 



Department of State Bulletin 



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THE PRESIDENT 



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a definite part of diplomacy and I think 
this is what he was ti-ying to explain. 

With regard to the space weapons, 
this is a situation in which the Soviet 
Union is ahead of us and already has and 
has in place such a weapon. We'are still in 
the stage of studying such a thing. The 
great problem that we have— and we're 
very willing to enter into a treaty with 
regard to outlawing such weapons, except 
that it so far seems almost impossible to 
verify such a weapon, if not actually im- 
possible. And if that's true, then we, 
again, must have a deterrent. 

Q. You're one who always says 
nothing is impossible, and you're going 
to try on chemical weapons. Why don't 
you on the killer satellites? 

A. In both of them, we are trying, but 
as we say, we have to face the reality that 
before you can place any confidence "in 
such a treaty, you must be confident that 
you have the one thing that the Soviets 
have been the most reluctant to give in 
any treaties that we've ever had, or that 
we have with them, and that is verifica- 
tion procedures. 

Q. With regard to your proposal to 
ban chemical weapons, isn't this pro- 
posal another way to get Con- 
gress-what they've failed to do for the 
last 3 years which is appropriate money 
for chemical weapons? And what do we 
say if our adversaries accuse us of talk- 
ing peace but preparing for war? 

A. I don't think the accusation would 
stand up if they said that. The situation is 
that we haven't produced any such 
weapons for 15 years. The Soviet Union 
has a massive arsenal and is ahead of us 
in many areas having to do with chemical 
warfare. 

If there is ever one example or one 
place where there is an example of the 
power of a deterrent force, it is in the 
field of chemical weapons. And I hand you 
World War II when all the nations had 
them and no one used them, even in the 
most desperate moments when defeat 
was staring at them because they knew 
that the others had them and could use 
them in return. 

The second thing is if we're going to 
have a chemical warfare ban or a treaty 
banning them, you've got to have 
something to bargain with. And, there- 
fore, it's just the same as it is with the 
other weapons. They must know that the 
alternative to banning them is to then 
face the fact that we're going to build a 
deterrent. 



^^gv/ 1QQ/! 



Q. Last October you said the 
presence of U.S. Marines in Lebanon 
was central to our credibility on a 
global scale. And now you've with- 
drawn them and terminated our 
presence in the MNF [multinational 
forces], to what extent have we lost 
credibility— 

A. We may have lost some with some 
people. The situation's changed. It was 
true when I said that, but I can, I think, 
explain. I'll try to make it as brief as I can 
what the situation, or what the change 
was. 

We and three of our allies— our four 
governments-decided that in an effort to 
straighten out the situation that was so 
out of control in Lebanon, that we would 
send in a combination force, a multiple 
force not to participate in a war but to be 
on hand to help provide stability while the 
Lebanese were allowed then to create a 
government. 

You will remember, a civil war had 
been going on there for about 10 years. 
And at the time this was decided, the 
Israelis were at the border of Beirut; 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion]- 10,000- 15,000 of them were fighting 
from within the heart of Beirut; the 
Syrians were also involved. 

The idea was that if a government 
could be created in Lebanon and then we 
could help them recreate their military 
and the foreign forces withdraw, then as 
their military moved out into the areas 
previously occupied by the foreign 
powers to hopefully pacify the internecine 
fighting groups, the militias that were 
fighting each other as well as the official 
forces of Lebanon— that the multinational 
force would be a kind of stable peacekeep- 
ing force behind keeping order while they 
went out to do that job because they 
wouldn't have the manpower to do both. 

This was the task. The first success 
was the leaving of Lebanon of some 
10,000-15,000 PLO who up until then 
were unwilling to surrender, even though 
they faced defeat, because they feared a 
massacre at the hands of those who were 
fighting them. So with the multinational 
force there to guarantee against that, 
they were ushered out. 

The government was formed, of 
Lebanon. The same government that to- 
day is negotiating and has been holding 
meetings in Geneva and elsewhere to 
bring about a peaceful settlement. 

We did train— and there was no atten- 
tion paid to this. Our army had a unit in 
there training the Lebanese military and 
equijjping them and made a vei-y capable 



military. What did happen-the deterioi-a- 
tion when Syria insisted on staying in and 
backing some of the rebel radical forces 
there, was that with religious and ethnic 
differences, some units of the army re- 
fused to take up arms against some of 
their same ethnic background or religious 
background. The Government of Lebanon 
went forward then in trying to bring 
together the kind of a consensus govem- 
ment-the radical elements and all-and 
take them into a broadened based govern- 
ment. In the meantime, because the 
multinational force had been successful, 
to that extent, it was determined by those 
who don't want that kind of a solution in 
Lebanon that they had to put the 
pressure on to get our forces and the 
others out. 

And with the terrorist attacks that 
brought such tragedy, our forces dug in, 
but once dug in, while this was offering 
security to them from the kind of attacks 
they'd been subjected to, they were no 
longer visible as the kind of force they 
were supposed to be. And so, with agree- 
ment with our allies, we redeployed; some 
of them redeployed to other areas. But 
then, as these efforts went forward on 
their own for peace, it was agreed that 
there was no longer any point in the four 
governments keeping their forces there. 
And we withdrew. 

We are still engaged diplomatically 
with anything we can do to help. And' 
there are those in the area who say that 
they doubt that there can be any solution 
or peace without our help. And "so we'll do 
that. 

Q. You began your answer by say- 
ing we lost some credibility. Are you to 
blame for that? Or, like Secretary 
Shultz. do you blame Congress? 

A. I have to say this, and then I'll 
move on to another subject. I have to say 
that this was one of the things— and they 
must take a responsibility. When you're" 
engaged in this kind of a "diplomatic at- 
tempt, and you have forces there, and 
there is an effort made to oust them, a 
debate as public as was conducted here 
raging with the Congress demanding— 
"Oh, take our, bring our men home, take 
them away." All this can do is stimulate 
the terrorists and urge them on to further 
attacks because they see a pos.sibility of 
success in getting the force out which is 
keeping them from having their way. It 
should be understood by everyone in 
government that once this is committed, 
you have rendered them ineffective when 
you conduct that kind of a debate in 
public. 



...,.„„,»^x„.JBHHIIWIIIIUWIIIM 



THE PRESIDENT 



Q. The Senate today unanimously 
adopted a proposal to withdraw U.S. 
military aid from El Salvador if the 
(Tovernment there is overthrown by a 
military coup. Some people have sug- 
gested that that might happen if Mr. 
Duarte is elected. Do you support the 
proposal that passed the Senate today? 
And would you veto it if it came to your 
desk? 

A. I'm not going to talk about 
whether to veto or not. but I think here 
again, this is not helpful in what we're 
trying to accomplish, and I think it's 
something that— I just don't think they 
should be doing it at this time. 

Q. Does that mean you don't sup- 
port it? 

A. No. 

Q. Secretary of State Shultz says 
one of the problems in Lebanon is the 
War Powers Act and Congress is always 
meddling in foreign policy, that neither 
our foes nor our friends know who's in 
charge. How much of a problem do you 
have with the War Powers Act and 
would you like to see a Supreme Court 
test whether or not it's constitutional? 

A. There's been no talk of such a test 
or doing anything of that kind, but I do 
have to say this. In the last 10 years, the 
Congress has imposed about 1.50 restric- 
tions on the President's power in interna- 
tional diplomacy, I think that the Con- 
stitution made it pretty plain way back in 
the beginning as to how diplomacy was to 
be conducted, and I just don't think that a 
committee of 535 individuals, no matter 
how well-intentioned, can offer what is 
needed in actions of this kind or where 
there is a necessity. 

Do you know that prior to the Viet- 
namese war, while this country had only 
had four declared wars. Presidents of this 
country had found it necessary to use 
military forces 125 times in our history? 

Q. People do cite Vietnam where a 
President waged an undeclared war for 
years, and they say without the War 
Powers Act that's going to continue. 

A. I'll tell you, this is the time for me 
to say " I told you so." For a long time, 
and even before I became governor, I was 
saying that the war in Vietnam had 
reached a position or a state in which we 
should have asked for a declaration of war 
and called it a war. 



Q. Recently the U.S.-backed op- 
ponents of the Sandinista regime have 
gone beyond their warfare on land to 
mining ports off the Nicaraguan coast. 



Are you concerned that these mines 
there, which neutral freighters or 
others could hit, run a risk of widening 
the war in Central America? And do 
you think there's any point in which we 
ought to try to call a halt to the ac- 
tivities of the Contras? 

A. No, our interest in Nicaragua, I'm 
not going to comment on that one way or 
the other or the tactics that are used in a 
war of that kind. Our interest in Nica- 
ragua is one and one only. The present 
Government of Nicaragua is exporting 
revolution to El Salvador, its neighbor. 
and is helping, supporting, arming, and 
training the guei-rillas who are trying to 
overthrow a duly elected government. 
And as long as they do that, w-e're going 
to try and inconvenience that Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua until they quit that 
kind of action. 

Q. We are training troops down 
there in Honduras. Do you see, from 
your perspective, a danger of a wider 
war in Central America at this point? 

A. No, I think these maneuvers are 
something we've done before. They're not 
something unusual or aimed at anyone 
down there. They are combined exercises 
that we hold with our owni units and we 
have— one unit goes through some of 
these and gets the training, we send 
another one down to do the same thing. 
And that's all they are is war games. 

Q. Until recently your Administra- 
tion had handled trade disputes with 
Japan with relatively little public fan- 
fare. But over the last few days, three 
of your Cabinet members and several 
other Administration officials have 
spoken out publicly and firmly in 
criticizing Japan. Why the change in 
strategy? 

A. It's not a change in strategy. It's 
just talking frankly about what's going 
on. It's like any government with its 
various interests and its bureaucracies 
and so forth. We're not making as much 
progress as we would like to make with 
regard to the things that I had discussed 
in Japan with Prime Minister Nakasone 
and here at the Williamsburg summit. I 
know where he stands. And I know that 
he sincerely and honestly wants better 
trade relations and some of the obstacles 
removed that are impairing free and fan- 
trade between us. But then there are 
other elements, and they're subject to 
political pressure and public opinion 
pressure the same as we are in our own 
country. And I think what you've been 
hearing are some complaints about those 
who are trying to negotiate these things. 



10 



Q. You've been saying recently that 
you're trying to encourage moderate 
Arab leaders to join the Middle East 
peace process. Yet King Hussein, the 
key moderate Arab, seems to have shut 
the door rather firmly. In view of that, 
what is your future course for guiding 
your 1982 peace plan, and how do you 
intend to try to remove the obstacles on 
that course? 

A. That continues to be our plan, and 
I believe that King Hussein still feels and 
believes that he w-ould have to be an im- 
portant part, being the next-door 
neighbor to Israel, in bringing about such 
negotiations. And I continue to believe in 
this. This is the answer. It's what started 
us from the very beginning in the Middle 
East to continue the Camp David process 
to persuade other nations to do w'hat 
Egypt did in making that peace. 

At the present moment, you have a 
group of Arab nations that have never 
retreated from that Israel does not have a 
right to exist as a nation, and we're try- 
ing to persuade them that we can be 
even-handed and that we're not tr\ing to 
dictate any peace of any kind. We simply 
want to be of help if we can; an in- 
termediary in bringing about a negotia- 
tion that will erase the issues and the 
problems that have kept them apart so 
that they can settle back and live in peace 
together. And we're going to continue to 
try to do that. 

Q. The Soviet Union is currently 
engaged in perhaps its largest military 
exercise ever in the Atlantic Ocean. An 
exercise that involves some 40 vessels, 
including submarines, destroyers, and a 
nuclear powered battle cruiser. I 
wonder if you could tell us what you 
think the Soviet Union is up to in all of 
this? 

A. I think it's spring in Russia as well 
as the United States, and that's when you 
have war games and maneuvers. We've 
been having some of our owti. We always 
tell when we're going to have them. We 
wish they'd tell us. 

But I think this is nothing more than 
that. Your war games are actually— 
whoever's conducting them— based on 
your ovni thoughts as to what contingen- 
cies could arise that would find you in an 
emergency situation, and so you set out to 
train or practice for that. 

Some 40 ships, I know, sounds like an 
awful lot, but when you stop to think 
we're talking about a navy of almost 1,000 
ships, it kind of comes down in size a little 
bit. No, I think these are regular and 
routine maneuvers that usually begin in 
the spring of the year for most of us. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Q. So you don't think that the 
Soviet Union is trying to send us any 
particular signal? 

A. No, I really don't. Nor are we try- 
ing to send them a signal with our own 
war games. 

Q. Getting back to your earlier 
statement that you felt for some time 
that we should have declared war dur- 
ing the Vietnam period, against whom 
would we have declared war, and if we 
had done so, wouldn't that have wid- 
ened the war and gotten us stuck into 
an even greater quagmire? 

A. I can only say with regard to 
that— I said that at a time when it was go- 
ing on because of what was going on here 
in our country, in which none of the rules 
of warfare could apply with regard to 
lending comfort and aid to the enemy. 
Who we would have declared war against 
would have been a country— North Viet- 



Central America 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation on March 2i, 198U^ 

Tomorrow is an historic day for the 
beleaguered nation of El Salvador. Scores 
of international obsei-vers will watch as 
the people of El Salvador risk their lives 
to exercise a right we take for 
granted— the right to vote for their Presi- 
dent. 

This right of choice is not something 
that is common in all of Central America. 
It contrasts shaiply, for example, with 
Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas staged 
a revolution in 1979 promising free elec- 
tions, freedom of the press, freedom of 
religion. Despite these promises, the San- 
dinistas have consistently broken their 
word, and the elections that they've an- 
nounced for November seemed designed 
only to consolidate their control. 

Unlike El Salvador, the Nicaraguans 
don't want international oversight of their 
campaign and elections. When the mem- 
bers of the National Bipartisan Commis- 
sion on Central America visited 
Nicaragua, the Sandinista dictators 
briefed them with Soviet intelligence and 
said the United States is the source of all 
evil. 

In El Salvador the members heard ap- 
preciation for our country's efforts to pro- 
mote peace, democracy, and development. 
El Salvador is an emerging democracy 
plagued by a communist insurgency and 



nam. The settlement of French Indochina 
created two nations— South Vietnam and 
North Vietnam. They were two separate 
nations. In fact back through history, 
they had pretty much been separate coun 
tries before. You say that because of the 
situation of the time. Whether I would 
still feel the same way or not— I know 
that there was great concern about the 
possibility of a war widening, just as 
there was in Korea that prevented us 
from allowing General MacArthur to lead 
us to a victory in Korea. Evei\vone 
thought that if you— you have to fight a 
war without winning it, or you might find 
yourself in a bigger war. Maybe General 
MacArthur was right. There is no 
substitute for victory. 



'Text from White House press release. 



human rights abuses which must stop, 
but a nation which is sti'ongly pro- 
American and struggling to make self- 
government succeed. 

Nicaragua is a communist dictatorship 
armed to the teeth, tied to Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, which oppi'esses its people 
and threatens its neighbors. 

The stability of our Latin friends— 
indeed, the security of our own 
borders— depends upon which tyjje of 
society prevails— the imperfect 
democracy seeking to improve or the 
communist dictatorship seeking to ex- 
pand. 

The bipartisan commission warned 
that new communist regimes could be ex- 
pected to fall into the same pattern as 
Nicaragua; namely, expand their armed 
forces, bring in large numbers of Cuban 
and Soviet bloc advisers, and increase the 
repression of their own people and the 
subversion of their neighbors. And the 
commission warned that a rising tide of 
communism would likely produce 
refugees, perhaps millions of them, many 
of whom would flee to the United States. 

These tragic events are not written in 
stone, but they will happen if we do 
nothing or even too little. Based on the 
recommendations of the commission, I 
sent the Congress in February a proposal 
to encourage democratic institutions, im- 



prove living conditions, and help our 
friends in Central America resist com- 
munist threats Three-fouiths of our re- 
quest is for economic and humanitarian 
assistance. 

And that brings me to an important 
point: The people who argue that the root 
of violence and instability is poverty, not 
communism, are ignoring the obvious. 
But all the economic aid in the world 
won't be worth a dime if communist guer- 
rillas are determined and have the 
freedom to terrorize and to burn, bomb, 
and destroy everything from bridges and 
industries to power and transportation 
systems. So in addition to economic and 
humanitarian assistance, we must also 
provide adequate levels of security 
assistance to permit our friends to protect 
themselves from Cuban and Soviet sup- 
ported subversion. 

Military assistance is crucial right 
now to El Salvador. The Salvadoran peo- 
ple repudiated the guerrillas when they 
last voted in 1982, but continued Soviet- 
Cuban-Nicaraguan support for the guer- 
rillas, combined with the failure of our 
Congress to provide the level of military 
aid I've requested, have put El Salvador 
in an extremely vulnerable position. The 
guerrillas have been seizing the identifica- 
tion cards that allow citizens to vote. One 
of El Salvador's principal guerrilla com- 
manders has pledged an all-out effort to 
disrupt the elections. And, should there 
be a need for an election run-off in late 
April or May, these same guerrillas, who 
have already assassinated elected con- 
gressmen in El Salvador, will do every- 
thing they can to disrupt that election as 
well. 

We're looking at an emergency situa- 
tion. So I've asked Congress to provide 
immediate security assistance for El 
Salvador while the comprehensive bipar- 
tisan legislation makes its way through 
the Congress over the next several 
months. 

This is the moment of truth. There is 
no time to lose. If the Congress acts 
responsibly, while the cost is still not 
great, then democracy in Central 
America will have a chance. If the Con- 
gress refuses to act, the cost will be far 
greater. The enemies of democracy will 
intensify their violence,' more lives will be 
lost, and real danger will come closer and 
closer to our shores. This is no time for 
partisan politics. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 2, 1984.1 



May 1984 



,i.«»imimiuuiniiwuiiu«......uu»»iiwiiiuiiiii— — IP 



JIHI 



THE SECRETARY 



Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s 



Secretary Shultz's address before the 
Trilateral Commission on April 3, 198^.^ 

Over 20 years ago, President John 

Kennedy pledged that the United States 
would "pay any price, bear any burden, 
meet any hardship, support any friend, 
oppose any foe, in order to assure the 
survival and the success of liberty." We 
know now that the scope of that commit- 
ment is too broad— though the self-confi- 
dence and courage in those words were 
typically American and most admirable. 
More i-ecently, another Administration 
took the view that our fear of commu- 
nism was "inordinate" and that there 
were very compUcated social, economic, 
religious, and other factors at work in 
the world that we had little ability to af- 
fect. This, in my view, is a counsel of 
helplessness that substantially underesti- 
mates the United States and its ability 
to influence events. 

Somewhere between these two poles 
lies the natural and sensible scope of 
American foreign policy. We know that 
we are not omnipotent and that we must 
set priorities. We cannot pay any price 
or bear any burden. We must discrimi- 
nate; we must be prudent and careful; 
we must respond in ways appropriate to 
the challenge and engage our power only 
when very important strategic stakes are 
involved. Not every situation can be 



advance them. Thus we as a nation are 
perpetually asking ourselves how to 
reconcile our morality and our practical 
sense, how to pursue noble goals in a 
complex and imperfect world, how to 
relate our strength to our purposes— in 
sum, how to relate power and diplomacy. 

We meet this evening amid the ex- 
citement of America's quadrennial exer- 
cise of self-renewal, in which we as a 
country reexamine ourselves and our in- 
ternational objectives. It is an unending 
process— almost as unending as the presi- 
dential campaign season. But there are 
some constants in our policy, such as our 
alliance with the industrial democracies, 
as embodied in the distinguished gather- 
ing. This partnership— the cornerstone of 
our foreign policy for 35 years— itself 
reflects our ability to combine our moral 
commitment to democracy and our prac- 
tical awareness of the crucial importance 
of maintaining the global balance of 
power. So I consider this an appropriate 
forum at which to shai-e some thoughts 
on the relationship between power and 
diplomacy in the last two decades of the 
20th century. 

The World We Face 

By the accident of history, the role of 
world leadership fell to the United 
States just at the moment when the old 



Americans, being a moral people, want their 
foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a 
nation. But Americans, being a practical people, also 
want their foreign policy to be effective. 



salvaged by American exertion even 
when important values or interests are 
at stake. 

At the same time, we know from his- 
tory that courage and vision and deter- 
mination can change reality. We can af- 
fect events, and we all know it. The 
American people expect this of their 
leaders. And the future of the free world 
depends on it. 

Americans, being a moral people, 
want their foreign policy to reflect the 
values we espouse as a nation. But 
Americans, being a practical people, also 
want their foreign policy to be effective. 
If we truly care about our values, we 
must be prepared to defend them and 



12 



international order had been destroyed 
by two world wars but no new stable 
system had developed to replace it. A 
century ago, the international system 
was centered on Europe and consisted of 
only a few major players. Today, in 
terms of military strength, the dominant 
countries are two major powers that had 
been, in one sense or another, on the 
edge or outside European diplomacy. But 
economic power is now widely dispersed. 
Asia is taking on increasing significance. 
The former colonial empires have been 
dismantled, and there are now more than 
160 independent nations on the world 
scene. Much of the developing world it- 
self is torn by a continuing struggle be- 
tween the forces of moderation and 



forces of radicalism. Most of the ma- 
jor international conflicts since 1945 
have taken place there— from Korea to 
Vietnam to the Middle East to Central 
America. Moreover, the Soviet Union 
continues to exploit nuclear fear as a 
political weapon and to exploit instabil- 
ities wherever they have the opportunity 
to do so. 

On a planet grown smaller because of 
global communications, grown more 
turbulent because of the diffusion of 
power— all the while overshadowed by 
nuclear weapons— the task of achieving 
stability, security, and progress is a pro- 
found challenge for mankind. In an age 
menaced by nuclear proliferation and 
state-sponsored terrorism, tendencies 
toward anarchy are bound to be a source 
of real dangers. 

It is absurd to think that America 
can walk away from these problems. 
This is a world of great potential danger. 
There is no safety in isolationism. We 
have a major, direct stake in the health 
of the world economy; our prosperity, 
our security, and our alliances can be af- 
fected by threats to security in many 
parts of the world; and the fate of our 
fellow human beings will always impinge 
on our moral consciousness. Certainly 
the United States is not the world's 
policeman. But we are the world's 
strongest free nation, and, therefore, the 
preservation of our values, our prin- 
ciples, and our hopes for a better world 
rests in great measure, inevitably, on our 
shoulders. 

Power and Diplomacy 

In this environment, our principal goal is 
what President Reagan has called "the 
most basic duty that any President and 
any people share— the duty to protect 
and strengthen the peace." History 
teaches, however, that peace is not 
achieved merely by wishing for it. Noble 
aspirations are not self-fulfilling. Our aim 
must always be to shape events and not 
be the victim of events. In this fast- 
moving and turbulent world, to sit in a 
reactive posture is to risk being over- 
whelmed or to allow others, who may 
not wish us well, to decide the world's 
future. 

The Great Seal of the United States, 
as you know, shows the American eagle 
clutching arrows in one claw and olive 
branches in the other. Some of you may 
have seen the Great Seal on some of the 
china and other antique objects in the 
White House or in the ceremonial rooms 
on the eighth fioor of the State Depart- 
ment. On some of the older items, the 



Department of State Bulletin 



iBV other wi 



THE SECRETARY 



eagle looks toward the arrows; on others, 
toward the olive branches. It was Presi- 
dent Truman who set it straight: he saw 
to it that the eagle always looked toward 
the olive branches— showing that America 
sought peace. But the eagle still holds 
onto those aiTOWS. 

This is a way of saying that our fore- 
fathers understood quite well that power 
and diplomacy always go together. It is 
even clearer today that a world of peace 
md security will not come about without 
nuiiiiy exertion or without facing up to some 
tough choices. Certainly power must 
it ilways be guided by pui-pose, but the 
lard reality is that diplomacy not backed 
Dy strength is ineffectual. That is why, 
for example, the United States has suc- 
ceeded many times in its mediation when 
■nany other well-intentional mediators 
lave failed. Leverage, as well as good 
ivill, is required. 

Americans have sometimes tended to 
;hink that power and diplomacy are two 
iistinct alternatives. To take a very re- 
cent example, the Long commission 
"eport on the bombing of our Marine 
Darracks in Beirut urged that we work 
larder to pursue what it spoke of as 
'diplomatic alternatives," as opposed to 
'military options." This reflects a fun- 
damental misunderstanding— not only of 
3ur intensive diplomatic efforts through- 
out the period but of the relationship be- 
tween power and diplomacy. Sometimes, 
regrettable as it may be, political con- 
lict degenerates into a test of strength. 
It was precisely our military role in 
Lebanon that was problematical, not our 
diplomatic exertion. Our military role 
ivas hamstrung by legislative and other 
nhibitions; the Syrians were not in- 
;erested in diplomatic compromise so 
ong as the prospect of hegemony was 
lot foreclosed. They could judge from 
Dur domestic debate that our staying 
power was limited. 

In arms control, also, successful 
[legotiation depends on the perception of 

military balance. Only if the Soviet 
leaders see the West as determined to 
modernize its own forces will they see an 
incentive to negotiate agreements estab- 
lishing equal, verifiable, and lower levels 
of armaments. 

The lesson is that power and diplo- 
macy are not alternatives. They must go 
together, or we will accomplish very lit- 
tle in this world. 

The relationship between them is a 
complex one, and it presents us with 
both practical and moral issues. Let me 
address a few of those issues. One is the 
variety of the challenges we face. A sec- 
ond is the moral complexity of our 
response. A third is the problem of man- 
aging the process in a democracy. 



The Range of Challenges 

Perhaps because of our long isolation 
from the turmoil of world politics, Ameri- 
cans have tended to believe that war and 
peace, too, were two totally distinct 
phenomena: we were either in a blissful 
state of peace, or else (as in World 
Wars I and II) we embarked on an all- 
out quest for total victory, after which 



not engage in military conflict without a 
clear and precise military mission, solid 
public backing, and enough resources to 
finish the job. This is undeniably true. 
But does it mean there are no situations 
where a discrete assertion of power is 
needed or appropriate for limited pur- 
poses? Unlikely. Whether it is crisis 
management or power projection or a 



... in the 1980s and beyond^ most likely we will 
never see a state of total war or a state of total peace. 



we wanted to retreat back into inward- 
looking innocence, avoiding "power 
poUtics" and all it represented. During 
World War II, while single-mindedly 
seeking the unconditional surrender of 
our enemies, we paid too little heed to 
the emerging postwar balance of power. 

Similarly, since 1945 we have experi- 
enced what we saw as a period of clear- 
cut cold war, relieved by a period of 
seeming detente which raised exagger- 
ated expectations in some quarters. 
Today we must see the East-West rela- 
tionship as more complex, with the two 
sides engaging in trade and pursuing 
arms control even as they pursue incom- 
patible aims. It is not as crisis prone or 
starkly confrontational as the old cold 
war; but neither is it a normal relation- 
ship of peace or comfortable coexistence. 

Thus, in the 1980s and beyond, most 
likely we will never see a state of total 
war or a state of total peace. We face in- 
stead a spectrum of often ambiguous 
challenges to our interests. 

We are relatively well prepared to 
deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on 
our West European and Japanese allies; 
that's why these are the least hkely con- 
tingencies. But, day in and day out, we 
will continue to see a wide range of con- 
flicts that fall in a gray area between ma- 
jor war and millennial peace. The coming 
years can be counted upon to generate 
their share of crises and local outbreaks 
of violence. Some of them— not all of 
them— will affect our interests. Terror- 
ism—particularly state-sponsored terror- 
ism—is already a contemporary weapon 
directed at America's interests, 
America's values, and America's allies. 
We must be sure we are as well pre- 
pared and organized for this interme- 
diate range of challenges. 

If we are to protect our interests, 
values, and allies, we must be engaged. 
And our power must be engaged. 

It is often said that the lesson of 
Vietnam is that the United States should 



show of force or peacekeeping or a 
localized military action, there will 
always be instances that fall short of an 
all-out national commitment on the scale 
of World War II. The need to avoid no- 
win situations cannot mean that we turn 
automatically away from hard-to-win 
situations that call for prudent involve- 
ment. These will always involve risks; 
we will not always have the luxury of be- 
ing able to choose the most advantageous 
circumstances. And our adversaries can 
be expected to play rough. 

The Soviets are students of 
Clausewitz, who taught that war is a 
continuation of politics by other means. 
It is highly unlikely that we can respond 
to gray-area challenges without adapting 
power to poUtical circumstances or on a 
psychologically satisfying, all-or-nothing 
basis. This is just not the kind of reality 
we are likely to be facing in the 1980s, or 
1990s, or beyond. Few cases will be as 
clear or as quick as Grenada. On the con- 
trary, most other cases will be a lot 
tougher. 

We have no choice, moreover, but to 
address ourselves boldly to the challenge 
of terrorism. State-sponsored teiTonsm 
is really a form of warfare. Motivated by 
ideology and political hostility, it is a 
weapon of unconventional war against 
democratic societies, taking advantage of 
the openness of these societies. How do 
we combat this challenge? Certainly we 
must take security precautions to protect 
our people and our facilities; certainly we 
must strengthen our intelligence 
capabilities to alert ourselves to the 
threats. But it is increasingly doubtful 
that a purely passive strategy can even 
begin to cope with the problem. This 
raises a host of questions for a free soci- 
ety: in what circumstances— and how- 
should we respond? When— and how- 
should we take preventive or preemptive 
action against known terrorist groups? 



May 1984 



■llllllllWIWimilHWHHiiyilillllJWHIHWIIIII.»HIHIIIMIIHHHII^ 



||»Hlf~|I| 



13 

mmmmmmm 



'ith'ii'ii'ii'.i-tii'M'in'a 



THE SECRETARY 



What evidence do we insist upon before 
taking such steps? 

As the threat mounts— and as the in- 
volvement of such countries as Iran, 
Syria, Libya, and North Korea has 
become more and more evident— then it 



pend on us be subjugated by brute force 
if we have the capacity to prevent it. 
There is, in addition, another ugly 
residue of our Vietnam debate: the no- 
tion, in some quarters, that America is 
the guilty party, that the use of our 



. . . any use of force involves moral issues. 
American military power should be resorted to only 
if the stakes justify it, if other means are not 
available, and then only in a manner appropriate to 
the objective. But we cannot opt out of every contest. 



is more and more appropriate that the 
nations of the West face up to the need 
for active defense against terrorism. 
Once it becomes established that ter- 
rorism works— that it achieves its 
political objectives— its practitioners will 
be bolder, and the threat to us will be all 
the greater. 

The Moral Issues 

Of course, any use of force involves 
moral issues. American military power 
should be resorted to only if the stakes 
justify it, if other means are not 
available, and then only in a manner ap- 
propriate to the objective. But we cannot 
opt out of every contest. If we do, the 
world's future will be determined by 
others-most likely by those who are the 
most brutal, the most unscrupulous, and 
the most hostile to our deeply held prin- 
ciples. The New Republic stated it well a 
few weeks ago: 

[T]he American people know that force 
and the threat of force are central to the 
foreign policy of our adversaries, and they ex- 
pect their President to be able to deter and 
defeat such tactics. 

As we hear now in the debate over 
military aid to Central America, those 
who shrink from engagement can always 
find an alibi for inaction. Often it takes 
the form of close scrutiny of any moral 
defects in the friend or ally whom we are 
proposing to assist. Or it is argued that 
the conflict has deep social and economic 
origins which we really have to address 
first before we have a right to do 
anything else. 

But rather than remain engaged in 
order to tackle these problems— as we 
are trying to do— some people turn these 
concerns into formulas for abdication, 
formulas that would allow the enemies of 
freedom to decide the outcome. To me, it 
is highly immoral to let friends who de- 



power is a source of evil and, therefore, 
the main task in foreign policy is to 
restrain America's freedom to act. It is 
inconceivable to me that the American 
people believe any of this. It is certainly 
not President Reagan's philosophy. 

Without being boastful or arrogant, 
the American people know that their 
country has been a powerful force for 
good in the world. We helped Europe 
and Asia-including defeated enemies- 
rebuild after the war, and we helped pro- 
vide a security shield behind which they 
could build democracy and freedom as 
well as prosperity. Americans have often 
died and sacrificed for the freedom of 
others. We have provided around $165 
billion in economic assistance for the 
developing worid. We have played a vital 
facilitating role in the Middle East peace 
process, in the unfolding diplomacy of 
southern Africa, as well as in many other 
diplomatic efforts around the globe. 

We have used our power for good 
and worthy ends. In Grenada, we helped 
restore self-determination to the people 
of Grenada, so that they could choose 
their own future. Some have tried to 
compare what we did in Grenada to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We 
welcome such comparison. Contrast, for 
example, the propsects for free elections 
in the two countries. In Grenada, they 
will be held this year; in Afghanistan, 
when? Contrast the number of American 
combat troops now in Grenada 5 months 
after the operation with the number of 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan 55 months 
after their invasion. The number in 
Grenada is 0; the number in Afghan- 
istan is over 100,000. 

More often, the issue is not the direct 
use of American military power but 
military assistance to friends to help 
them defend themselves. Around the 
world, security support for friends is a 
way to prevent crises; it bolsters our 
friends so they can deter challenges. And 



14 



it is a way of avoiding the involvement of 
American forces, because it is only when 
our friends' efforts in their own defense 
are being overwhelmed that we are faced 
with the agonizing decision whether to 
involve ourselves more directly. Security 
assistance is thus an essential tool of 
foreign policy. It is an instrument for _ 
deterring those who would impose their 
will by force and for making political 
solutions possible. It gets far less sup- 
port in this country than it deserves. 

Central America is a good example. 
The real moral question in Central 
America is not do we believe in military 
solutions, but do we believe in ourselves? 
Do we believe that our security and the 
security of our neighbors has moral 
validity? Do we have faith in our own 
democratic values? Do we believe that 
Marxist-Leninist solutions are an- 
tidemocratic and that we have a moral 
right to try to stop those who are trying 
to impose them by force? Sure, economic 
and social problems underlie many of 
these conflicts. But in El Salvador, the 
communist guerrillas are waging war 
directly agamst the economy, blowing up 
bridges and power stations, deliberately 
trying to wreck the country's economy. 

The conflict in Central America is not 
a debate between social theorists; it is 
one of those situations I mentioned 
where the outcome of political competi- 
tion will depend in large measure on the 
balance of military strength. In El 
Salvador, the United SUtes is support- 
ing moderates who believe in democracy 
and who are resisting the enemies of 
democracy on both the extreme right 
and the extreme left. If we withdrew our 
support, the moderates, caught in the 
crossfire, would be the first victims-as 
would be the cause of human rights and 
the prospects for economic development. 
And anyone who believes that military 
support for our friends isn't crucial to a 
just outcome is living in a dream world. 
And anyone who believes that military 
support can be effective when it's given 
on an uncertain installment plan is not 
facing reality. 

Accountability Without Paralysis 

The third issue I want to mention is the 
question of how this country, as a 
democracy, conducts itself in the face of 
such challenges. 

Over the last 35 years, the evolution 
of the international system was bound to 
erode the predominant position the 
United States enjoyed immediately after 
Worid War II. But it seems to me that 
in this disorderiy and dangerous new 
world, the loss of American predomi- 
nance puts an even greater premium on 
consistency, determination, and 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



coherence in the conduct of our foreign 
policy. We have less margin for error 
than we used to have. 

This change in our external cir- 
cumstances, however, coincided histori- 
cally with a kind of cultural revolution at 
home that has made it harder for us to 
achieve the consistency, determination, 
and coherence that we need. The last 15 
years left a legacy of contention between 
the executive and legislative branches 
and a web of restrictions on executive ac- 
tion embedded permanently in our laws. 
At the same time, the diffusion of power 
within the Congress means that a presi- 
dent has a hard time when he wants to 
negotiate with the Congress, because 
congressional leaders have lost their 
dominance of the process and often can- 
not produce a consensus or sometimes 
even a decision. 

The net result, as you well know, is 
an enormous problem for American for- 
eign policy— a loss of coherence and re- 
curring uncertainty in the minds of 
friend and foe about the aims and con- 
stancy of the United States. 

Particularly in the war powers field, 
where direct use of our power is at 
issue, the stakes are high. Yet the war 
powers resolution sets arbitrary 60-day 
deadlines that practically invite an adver- 
sary to wait us out. Our Commander in 
Chief is locked in battle at home at the 
same time he is trying to act effectively 
abroad. Under the resolution, even inac- 
tion by the Congress can force the Presi- 
dent to remove American forces from an 
area of chaUenge, which, as former Presi- 
dent Ford has put it, undermines the 
President even when the Congress can't 
get up the courage to take a position. 
Such constraints on timely action may 
only invite greater challenges down the 
road. In Lebanon our adversaries' 
perception that we lacked staying power 
undercut the prospects for successful 
negotiation. As the distinguished Major- 
ity Leader, Senator Howard Baker, said 
on the floor of the Senate 4 weeks ago: 

[W]e cannot continue to begin each 
military involvement abroad with a prolonged, 
tedious and divisive negotiation between the 
executive and the legislative branches of 
government. The world and its many 
challenges to our interests simply do not 
allow us that luxury. 

I do not propose changes in our con- 
stitutional system. But some legislative 
changes may be called for. And I pro- 
pose, at a minimum, that all of us, in 
both Congress and the executive branch, 
exercise our prerogatives with a due 
regard to the national need for an effec- 
tive foreign policy. Congress has the 
right, indeed the duty, to debate and 
criticize, to authorize and appropriate 
funds and share in setting the broad 



lines of policy. But micromanagement by 
a committee of 535 independent-minded 
individuals is a grossly inefficient and in- 
effective way to run any important 
enterjjrise. The fact is that depriving the 
President of fiexibility weakens our coun- 
try. Yet a host of restrictions on the 
President's ability to act are now built 
into our laws and our procedures. Surely 
there is a better way for the President 
and the Congress to exercise their 
prerogatives without hobbling this coun- 
try in the face of assaults on free-world 
interests abroad. Surely there can be ac- 
countability without paralysis. The sad 
truth is that many of our difficulties over 
the last 15 years have been self-imposed. 

The issue is fundamental. If the pur- 
pose of our power is to prevent war, or 
injustice, then ideally we want to 
discourage such occurrences rather than 
have to use our power in a physical 
sense. But this can happen only if there 
is assurance that our power would be 
used if necessary. 

A reputation for reUabUity becomes, 
then, a major asset— giving friends a 
sense of security and adversaries a sense 
of caution. A reputation for living up to 
our commitments can, in fact, make it 
less likely that pledges of support will 
have to be carried out. Crisis manage- 
ment is most successful when a favorable 
outcome is attained without firing a shot. 
Credibility is an intangible, but it is no 
less real. The same is true of a loss of 
credibility. A failure to support a friend 
always involves a price. Credibility, once 
lost, has to be reeamed. 



Facing the Future 

The dilemmas and hard choices will not 
go away, no matter who is president. 
They are not partisan problems. Anyone 
who claims to have simple answers is 
talking nonsense. 

The United States faces a time of 
chaUenge ahead as great as any in recent 
memory. We have a diplomacy that has 
moved toward peace through negotiation. 
We have rebuilt our strength so that we 
can defend our interests and dissuade 
others from violence. We have allies 
whom we value and respect. Our need is 
to recognize both our challenge and our 
potential. 

Americans are not a timid people. A 
foreign policy worthy of America must 
not be a policy of isolationism or guilt 
but a commitment to active engagement. 
We can be proud of this country, of what 
it stands for, and what it has accom- 
phshed. Our morality should be a source 
of courage when we make hard decisions, 
not a set of excuses for self-paralysis. 

President Reagan declared to the 
British Parliament nearly 2 years ago: 
"We must be staunch in our conviction 
that freedom is not the sole prerogative 
of a lucky few but the inalienable and 
universal right of all human beings." As 
long as Americans hold to this beUef, we 
will be actively engaged in the world. 
We will use our power and our 
diplomatic skill in the service of peace 
and of our ideals. We have our work cut 
out for us. But we will not shrink from 
our responsibility. 



' Press release 97.1 



FY 1984 Supplemental and FY 1985 
Authorization Requests 



Secretary Shultz 's statement before 
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
State, and Judiciary of the Senate Ap- 
propriations Committee on March 28, 

It is a pleasure to appeal" before you to 
present the Department of State's re- 
quest for 1984 supplemental appropria- 
tions and the budget for 1985. 

During the past year, the worldwide 
environment for the Department has 
become dangerous, costly, and difficult to 
support. In this complex and all too often 
hostile setting, the Depai-tment must seek 
increases in the resources required to 
carry out the di])l()matic and consular 
responsibilities of the United States. The 
President's I'ecjuest foi- much needed in- 



creases for the Department recognizes 
the vital role foreign policy plays in con- 
tributing to our national security. 

This request will continue operations 
of the Department of State at existing 
levels and jarovifle limited growth in vital 
substantive and support areas. It was 
developed in conjunction with other 
foreign affairs agencies, is based on an in- 
tensive resource review, and represents a 
cost = effective approach to meeting this 
country's foreign policy and national 
security goals. 

Total Budget Request 

For 1985 the Department is requesting 
appropriations totaling $2,338,951,000. 
This represents an increase of 



May 1984 



■BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 



THE SECRETARY 



$235,057,000 and 497 positions above the 
1984 appropriations, after adding pro- 
posed supplementals totaling 238 posi- 
tions and $49,587,000. Most of our re- 
quested increases are required to con- 
tinue programs supported by this commit- 
tee in previous years. 

About 52'?^' of the total increase for 
the Department's 1985 operating budget 
is needed to continue operations at 1984 
levels. This increase is first needed to 
keep pace with higher overseas operating 
costs where inflation often exceeds that in 
the United States. Other increases are 
workload related such as for passport and 
consular activities, overseas adminis- 
trative support to other foreign affairs 
agencies, cost increases required to sup- 
port our domestic-based employees, and 
continuation of previously approved 
foreign buildings projects. 

The remaining 48% of the Depart- 
ment's requested increase is for programs 
which will continue to renew our opera- 
tional capabilities and strengthen several 
areas of crucial importance to our global 
capability. Failure to make these in- 
vestments not only jeopardizes the effec- 
tive conduct of foreign affairs but also in- 
creases the size of such necessary in- 
vestments in the future. 

Two of the most important issues fac- 
ing the Department are the reporting and 
analysis of foreign affairs information and 
the security of our people and properties 
abroad. Our request contains major ini- 
tiatives in both of these areas. 

First, the budget will strengthen our 
reporting and analysis of foreign political 
and economic events. This is our most 
essential function. For this purpose, we 
are requesting 146 positions and $9 
mill'on in a 1984 supplemental appropria- 
tion and an additional eight posi^'ons and 
$800,000 as part of the 1985 request. We 
must improve our ability to report and 
analyze the significanc; of foreign political 
and economic events and how they relate 
tu American national security interests. 
Indeed, the crucial relationship of the 
Department's information collection and 
analysis program to this country's foreign 
policy decision process was a central ele- 
ment in our budget review process with 
the President. To this end, the Depart- 
ment's request is needed to meet im- 
mediate specific needs for additional 
reporting and analysis. These needs were 
identified through exhaustive internal 
and interagency executive branch review 
of available information and the national 
security requirements for additional infor- 
mation. 

Our conclusion is that we must im- 
prove the foreign affairs information and 



16 



analysis available to the Department, the 
National Security Council, and the Presi- 
dent. 

Second, in conjunction with the other 
security-related projects contained in this 
request, we plan two major security im- 
provement initiatives, one immediate and 
one longer range. First we are reassess- 
ing our priorities to accelerate the im- 
plementation of improved security 
measures in the Persian Gulf. Second, I 
will convene a high-level advisory panel to 
conduct a comprehensive examination of 
our worldwide security strategy. 

We must continue to improve, with 
your assistance, the security of our people 
and property overseas. The recent series 
of vehicle bombings in the Middle East 
represents a serious escalation in the 
security threat— in addition to the wide 
spectrum of existing concerns— to U.S. 
personnel and facilities overseas. In 1983 
alone, three such suicide bombings 
against U.S. installations— the U.S. Em- 
bassies in Beirut (April) and Kuwait 
(December) and the Marine Corps head- 
quarters at the Beirut airport (October)— 
accounted for over 300 deaths and scores 
of injuries. The most recent intelligence 
estimates offer no reason to believe that 
this threat will diminish. On the contrary, 
we can only assume that the overall 
threat level against our overseas ac- 
tivities, particularly in the Middle East 
region, wUl grow even further, fueled by 
such events as the continuing civil conflict 
in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war. An ad- 
ditional and extremely disturbing de 
velopment is the recent assassination of 
MFO [multinational force and observers] 
Director General Hunt in Rome and the 
evidence that suggests a connection be- 
tween a revived Red Brigade in Italy and 
the role of the United States in Middle 
Eastern affau's. 

Other important initiatives are 
needed to: 

• Improve the security, reliability, 
and cost-effectiveness of the Depart- 
ment's communications systems; 

• Provide new office and housing 
facilities where needed and continue to 
upgrade and restore our inventory of 
overseas property valued at an estimated 
$5 billion; and 

• Expand the Department's 
worldwide information processing capa- 
bility. 

1984 Supplemental Appropriations 

The proposed 1984 supplemental ap- 
propriations total 238 positions and $50.1 
million and are requu-ed for the following 
urgent unbudgeted needs: 



• 146 positions and $9 million to fund 
135 reporting and analysis and 11 interna- 
tional communications policy positions. 
These resources form the basis of our ma- 
jor initiative to strengthen political and 
economic reporting and analysis efforts; 

• 49 positions and $4.2 million to han- 
dle unanticipated increases in passport 
workload levels. In 1982 and 1983, the ex- 
traordinary strength of the dollar pro- 
duced significant increases in the demand 
for passports, well beyond budgeted 
rates, the cumulative impact of these 
unanticipated passport workload in- 
creases is a severe shortfall in the 
resources needed to process the projected 
passport workload during 1984; 

• $10.5 million for urgent security re- 
quirements; 

• 36 positions (including 20 local na- 
tionals) and $5.1 million to open a mission 
in Grenada. The mission will be headed 
by a charge and will include a small staff 
to assist as appropriate the economic 
development of Grenada; 

• $10.4 million to fund the January 
1984 Federal pay raise; 

• $1.8 million to modernize the Coor- 
dinating Committee for Multilateral 
Security Export Controls (COCOM) 
facilities in Paris so that COCOM can im- 
prove its capabilities in line with the in- 
creased emphasis on strategic trade con- 
trols; 

• 7 positions and $1.5 million to sup- 
port the U.S. delegation to the Con- 
ference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) in Stockholm and fulfill the 
President's commitment to support fully 
the Helsinki nuclear disarmament proc- 
ess; 

• $2.5 million to handle unanticipated 
increases in protective security and com- 
munications support for the 1984 Summer 
Olympics in Los Angeles; and 

• $4.6 million to finance the unfunded 
liability of the Foreign Service retirement 
fund created by the January 1984 Federal 
salary increase. 

Major Components of 
the 1985 Funding Request 

After including these proposed sup- 
plementals, our 1985 request, as I in- 
dicated above, reflects a net increase of 
$235,057,000 and 497 positions over 1984. 

The 1985 request reflects changes in 
four major operating areas. 

First, in the salaries and expenses ap- 
propriation, there is a net increase of 
$162.6 million. This increase is requested 
primarily to cover overseas wage and 
price inflation, workload increases, built- 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



in security cost increases, and critical im- 
provements for the Department's opera- 
tions in the areas of security, reporting 
and analysis, consular activities, profes- 
sional development, post openings, infor- 
mation systems, communications, and ad- 
ministrative support. 

Second, the regular and special cur- 
rency foreign buildings appropriations in- 
clude a total net increase of $50.2 million. 
In addition to new development and con- 
struction projects, the 1985 foreign 
buildings budget includes the .second in- 
stallment in a multiyear renewal program 
to maintain the Department's worldwide 
inventory of property. Included in the 
basic program level of these appropria- 
tions are resources to fund initial develop- 
ment and or construction of office and 
housing facilities in nine countries. 

Third, we are proposing two new ap- 
propriations requiring budget authority 
of $14.5 million as follows: 

• $9.5 million to provide reim- 
bursements, in case of extraordinary 
need, to state and local governments and 
to secure services of private firms for in- 
creased protection of foreign missions and 
officials in the United States; and 

• $5 million to provide research opjjor- 
tunities, through gi'ant support, in 
specialties of high interest to the profes- 
sional Soviet-East European studies com- 
munity and to U.S. policymakers. 

Fourth, there is a total net increase 
of $7.8 million among all other appropria- 
tions. This growth results from increases 
for contributions to international orga- 
nizations ($6.8 million), international con- 
ferences and contingencies ($2.3 million), 
international commissions ($3.7 million), 
and other appropriations ($1.3 million) off- 
set by adjustments to buying power 
maintenance ( -$4.6 million) and the pay- 
ment to the Foreign Service retirement 
and disability fund (-$1.7 million). 

In addition, this request includes a 
one-time off-budget appropriation of $110 
million of U.S. -owned Indian rupees. This 
appropriation will establish a binational 
U.S.-India fund for cooperative scientific, 
educational, and cultural activities. The 
fund will provide an effective means of 
furthering long-term cooperation and 
friendly relations between the United 
States and India. 

Major Components of 
the Position Request 

The Department's 1985 request totals 
17,324 positions, a net increase of 497 
positions over the 1984 level. 



Of the 497 positions inci'ea.se, 301 posi- 
tions are for built-in changes, largely for 
consular and passport workload as well as 
administrative support requirements. 

The remaining 196 positions are 
needed for new initiatives including: 

• 48 positions for opening six 
po.sts— Wuhan, People's Republic of 
China; Windhoek, Nambia; Luanda, 
Angola; Moroni, Comoros; and resident 
representative offices in Ponape and Ma- 
juro, Micronesia, along with an associated 
office of Micronesian Affairs in 
Washington, D.C. 

• 8 positions to strengthen the 
substantive reporting and analysis 
capability of the Department; 

• 11 positions to improve consular and 
passport activities; 

• 17 ])ositions for expanded profes- 
sional development; 



port; 



' 28 positions for communications sup- 



• 27 po.sitions for information systems; 
and 

• 57 positions for security, legal sup- 
port, the development of a new property 
management system for our facilities 
abroad, and for support of air pollution 
studies on the Canadian border. 

Last fall I ui-ged the President to 
make a commitment, in a difficult budget 
situation, to a stronger Department of 
State and Foreign Service. He agreed, 
and the result is the budget before you. I 
ask you and your subcommittee to give it 
your strongest support. 



> Press release 91 of Mar. 29, 1984. The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



Foreign Aid and 
U.S. Policy Objectives 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Hmise Fwreiffti Affairs Committee on 
February 9, 198Jt.^ 

Last year when I met with you, I sought 
to demonstrate how U.S. assistance to 
developing countries serves our national 
interests. In the intervening months, 
two commissions of citizens and 
Members of Congress have examined 
our overseas programs. The Commission 
on Security and Economic Assistance, 
headed by Frank C. Carlucci, reviewed 
our total foreign assistance program. 
The National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America, headed by Henry A. 
Kissinger, reviewed our national goals 
and needs for assistance in Central 
America. More than two dozen Members 
of Congress served with these two com- 
missions as members, ex officio 
members, or senior counselors. 

We are indebted to these members 
and all commission participants for their 
excellent work. We are particularly 
gratified that these citizens— Republi- 
cans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives, 
businessmen, labor leaders, and aca- 
demics—reached a clear consensus on 
the importance of foreign assistance. 

The Carlucci commission concluded: 
"The instrumentalities of foreign assist- 
ance are potent and essential tools that 
advance our interests. ... On balance, it 



May 1984 



is the judgment of the Commission that 
U.S. assistance programs make an indis- 
pensable contribution to achieving 
foreign policy objectives." 

Both commissions concluded that 
economic and military assistance are 
equally servants of our national in- 
terests. The Carlucci commission notes 
that rising standards of living in the 
Third World are vital to internal stabili- 
ty and external defense. Conversely, 
threats to stability impede development. 

In a similar vein, the bipartisan com- 
mission characterizes the problems of 
Central America as a "seamless web" 
which can't be defined solely in 
economic, political, social, or security 
terms. 

Both commissions believe that cur- 
rent levels of foreign aid are inadequate. 
According to the Carlucci commission, 
"in real terms . . . U.S. assistance ex- 
penditures over the last five years have 
averaged some 21 percent below those 
of a comparable period ten years ago." 
The commission states: "To meet U.S. 
foreign policy objectives, significant in- 
creases in real levels of assistance will 
be required." The bipartisan commission, 
having focused on the problems of one 
region, also concludes that significantly 
more resources are needed to meet our 
national interests there. 



17 



maBaaam 



THE SECRETARY 



In my testimony today, I want to 
build on the foundations laid by these 
two commissions. Our foreign assistance 
program serves four U.S. interests: 

• Our interest in a growing world 
economy which enhances the well-being 
of citizens in both the developing and 
the industrialized world; 

• Our interest in security— protect- 
ing our vital interests abroad, strength- 
ening our friends, contributing to 
regional stability, and backstopping our 
diplomatic efforts for peaceful solutions 
to regional problems; 

• Our interest in building democracy 
and promoting adherence to human 
rights and the rule of law; and 

• Our humanitarian interest in 
alleviating suffering and easing the im- 
mediate consequences of catastrophe on 
the very poor. 

A world of stability and progress 
cannot be built by the United States 
alone. Therefore, strengthening our 
friends must be a central component of 
our foreign policy in both the economic 
and security dimensions. There is always 
the temptation to cut corners here and 
there in the aid budget. It is unwise to 
give in to this temptation; it is penny- 
wise and pound foolish. Strengthening 
our friends is generally an effective way 
to avoid major problems down the 
road— problems that could end up 
costing us much more in resources and 
sacrifice. 



assistance will be distributed geographic- 
ally in FY 1985. 

In military assistance, we have made 
a significant change so that we can 
lower interest rates on military assist- 
ance loans to poor or debt-burdened 
countries. Over the past decade military 
assistance has increasingly been provid- 
ed as "off-budget" loans with interest 
rates at cost of money to the [Depart- 
ment of the U.S.] Treasury. As a result, 
the Carlucci commission reports that the 
21 countries receiving substantial 
military and economic assistance in 1982 
received an effective interest rate— in- 
cluding both grants and loans— of 
approximately 9% for military assistance 
and 1% for economic assistance. This 
discrepancy has meant that in some 
countries military assistance repayments 
have become or threaten to become a 
large fraction of total debt service. For 
others, repayment of military assistance 
loans takes up foreign exchange needed 
for economic growth. 

In response, we have moved all mili- 
tary assistance "on budget"— a step 
which Congress has long urged. By so 
doing, we are able to provide military 
assistance loans either at a concessional 
rate or at the cost of money to the 
Treasury depending on the economic 
situation of individual countries. You 
will note on Chart C how we have in- 
creased the concessionality of military 
assistance in FY 1985 compared to 



previous years. This decision is a key 
step toward one of our critical goals— 
the more effective integration of our 
military and economic assistance. 



Central America, the Caribbean, 
and South America 

The National Bipartisan Commission [on 
Central America] concluded its study 
"persuaded that Central America is both 
vital and vulnerable and that whatever 
other crises may arise to claim the na- 
tion's attention, the United States can- 
not afford to turn away from that 
threatened region. Central America's 
crisis is our crisis." 

The commission emphasized that the 
countries of Central America— our 
neighbors— are in mid-passage from the 
predominantly authoritarian societies of 
the past to what— with determination 
and help— can become predominantly 
pluralistic, democratic societies in the 
future. That passage is marked today by 
warfare, poverty, and political turmoil, 
which breed extremism and violence 
from the left and the right. It creates 
conditions which Cuba and the Soviet 
Union seek to exploit for their own 
strategic and political purposes. 

The United States has a profound in- 
terest in helping the people of Central 
America move from these travails to a 
future of greater economic and social 
justice. Our interests will be served by 



Overview of 1985 Budget 
and 1984 Supplemental 

The foreign assistance program for 
FY 1985 totals $15.8 billion, of which 
$1.5 billion is multilateral aid and $14.3 
billion is bilateral aid. This includes $9.4 
billion in economic assistance and $6.4 
billion in military assistance. Chart A [see 
p. 31] shows the relative proportions of 
economic and mOitary assistance in the 
foreign aid program since 1974. 

For FY 1984, we are seeking supple- 
mental funds of $1.1 billion, including 
$400 million for emergency economic 
assistance to Central America and $259 
million for military aid to the region. 

Our economic aid in FY 1985 will 
focus on increasing food production and 
reducing hunger; improving health, 
especially reducing infant and child mor- 
tality; slowing population growth rates; 
spreading education and literacy; and 
improving host-country financial struc- 
tures. Chart B shows how our economic 



Chart B 



A.I.D. Economic Assistance 

By Region 
FY 1985 



I Development Assistance 
WM Economic Support Fund 
\ Z\ PL 480 Title I 
I I PL 480 Title II 




Asia Latin AiTiencan Nea 

& Caribbean & Eui 



East Central 

rope Programs 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Chart C 



other 

Concessional 

2.6% 



Military Assistance Concessionality 



1981 Actual 



1983 Actual 




Non-Concessionnl 
81.4% 



Noil Concessional 
71.5% 



Non-Concessionai 
33.5% 



helping alleviate economic grievance in 
the region. We have a vital interest in 
helping our friends block the Soviet 
Union from consolidating a foothold in 
Central America. And most basically, 
progress in this hemisphere means the 
advancement of our most basic values: 
democracy and the rule of law. This is 
the kind of world we want our children 
to inherit. 

President Reagan last week quoted 
Sen. Henry Jackson when he recom- 
mended establishment of the bipartisan 
commission: "Whatever policy options 
might be available to us, ignoring 
threats to the stability of Central 
America and refusing to engage 
ourselves in the problems of the region 
are not among them." 

The bipartisan commission recom- 
mended, and we concur, that our 
engagement in the region should be 
comprehensive: a mix of developmental, 
political, diplomatic, and security 
measures. Because many of Central 
America's problems are rooted in pover- 
ty, our largest commitment of resources 
will be for economic reconstruction and 
revitalization. 

Of the supplemental funds we are 
requesting for Central America in FY 
1984, $400 million-or 61%-is for 
emergency economic assistance. In addi- 
tion, we are proposing a 5-year $8 billion 
program for economic stabilization, 
reconstruction, and long-term develop- 
ment. This includes $6 billion in direct 



appropriations and $2 billion in in- 
surance and guarantee authority. These 
funds will support agricultural develop- 
ment, education, health services, export 
promotion, land reform, housing, and 
humanitarian relief, as well as trade 
credit insurance and aid for small 
businesses. 

We endorse the commission's pro- 
posal to establish a Central American 
development organization composed of 
representatives from the Central 
American countries themselves. Its in- 
dependent recommendations will affect 
our determinations on the level and 
structure of our economic assistance. 

We will also follow through vigor- 
ously on the commission's conclusion 
that the United States must support th( 
strengthening of democracy in the 
region. We are proposing aid to 
democratic, educational, and cross- 
cultural institutions, as well as increased 
funding for scholarships, leadership 
training, and educational exchange. 

The commission also recognizes that 
in the case of El Salvador, economic aid 
and support for democracy are not by 
themselves sufficient. It recommends 
significantly increased military aid for 
El Salvador. To see only indigenous 
social upheaval in that country, for ex- 
ample, is as shortsighted as to recognize 
only the role of Cuba and the Soviet 
Union. Our aid supports the moderate 
center against extremists of both the 
left and right. If we give inadequate 



help, it is the moderates who will be the 
victims. In the words of the commission 
report; "the worst possible policy for El 
Salvador is to provide just enough aid to 
keep the war going, but too little to 
wage it successfully." 

At the same time, the commission 
concludes, and we agree, that without 
continued progress on human rights and 
democratic reform in El Salvador, as 
well as elsewhere in Central America, 
our policies will not succeed. We agree 
that U.S. military assistance should be 
conditioned on this progress. Salvadoran 
leaders have been made aware of this 
fact repeatedly; we are submitting 
periodic reports to the Congress on the 
human rights situation in that country. 
We also believe, however, that any 
legislation which imposes absolute and 
inflexible restrictions on the President's 
ability to protect national security in- 
terests would jeopardize our efforts to 
bring about lasting improvement in the 
observance of human rights. 

Finally, there is a consensus be- 
tween the commission and the Adminis- 
tration on another integral part of our 
strategy in Central America: support for 
the efforts of the Contadora countries to 
bring peace to the region. The Con- 
tadora objectives are in Central 
America's interest and in ours. The 
President's program for Central 
America is ambitious and comprehen- 
sive—consistent with the challenges we 
face. We urge your support. 

I have talked at length today about 
Central America. But it would be truly 
wrong to ignore the same kinds of in- 
terplay between economic growth, 
security, and democracy elsewhere in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 

WTiat we found in Grenada, for ex- 
ample, demonstrates how indigenous 
grievances can be misappropriated for 
strategic ends and turned against the 
people. Earlier this week, I had the 
pleasure of joining the celebration of the 
10th anniversay of Grenada's independ- 
ence. It was joyful— a rebirth of freedom 
and economic hope. It underscored that 
freedom and economic progress depend 
on an environment of security. The 
enemies of democracy and development 
are the violent extremes of the left and 
right. The task of blunting these ex- 
tremes takes not only efforts to 
strengthen democracy and promote eco- 
nomic growth but also requires profes- 
sional security forces and a system of 
collective security which can protect peo- 
ple and the rule of law. Our security 
assistance— as our economic assist- 
ance—is vital to building a hemisphere 



May 1984 



19 



BBBBBBBBBmBDE 



SBBDCBBBBBnBBDmBB 



THE SECRETARY 



which is self-reliant and able to fulfill the 
aspirations of its people. Your support 
for these programs serves the fun- 
damental interests of all the citizens of 
this hemisphere— our neighbors' and our 
own. 

Africa 

I turn now to Africa, which faces a 
much different, although perhaps equally 
serious, crisis. Drought is widespread. 
As some Members of Congress— most 
recently Sen. Danforth [John C. 
Danforth, R.-Mo.]-have eloquently 
reported, starvation stalks the continent. 
In response, the United States has com- 
mitted nearly 200,000 tons of food from 
our emergency Title II reserve. 

But we now have requests from 
African governments for an additional 
150,000 tons, and expect further re- 
quests for 130,000 more tons this year. 
We are, therefore, requesting Congress 
to approve an additional $90 million in 
PL 480, Title II for Africa for FY 1984. 
WTien people are dying, common decen- 
cy compels us to respond. 

Drought may be the immediate 
cause of the food crisis, but Africa's dif- 
ficulties have deeper origins. Food pro- 
duction per capita has fallen by over 
20% since the 1960s. During the past 
decade, 15 countries had negative 
growth rates. Export earnings are 
down, and import prices are up; ex- 
cessive debt burdens many African coun- 
tries. 

There are many reasons for Africa's 
economic problems, but a primary cause 
lies in Africa itself. Briefly put, many 
African countries have followed policies 
which don't produce growth. Pervasive 
state controls, bloated state enterprises 
and bureaucracies, overvalued curren- 
cies, and disincentives for agriculture 
have all had the effect of stifling the 
private sector and individual initiative. 
The requisites for economic growth 
in Africa are many. But Africa needs to 
replace policies that won't work with 
those that will. There is increasing 
recognition of this fact in Africa, and a 
number of countries are undertaking 
policy reforms. 

To encourage this process, the Presi- 
dent is proposing beginning in FY 1985, 
an economic policy initiative for Africa. 
This effort has three components. 

First, we are proposing a 5-year, 
$500 million program, beginning with 
$75 million for 1985, as a new fund 
specifically to assist African countries 
establish and implement growth-oriented 
economic policies. We will give par- 



ticular attention to reforms which in- 
crease food production. 

Second, we are working with other 
donors— particularly the Worid Bank- 
to coordinate our aid efforts better and 
provide more unified support for policy 
reform in Africa. 

Third, we will continue to direct our 
ongoing development assistance to help- 
ing build the skills and institutions need- 
ed to carry out better policies effective- 
ly- 
Continued economic crisis in Africa 
can generate or amplify security prob- 
lems. Libya continues its efforts to 
subvert governments and install puppet 
regimes in Chad and elsewhere. There 
are the continuing conflicts in southern 
Africa which we and our allies are seek- 
ing to resolve through negotiations. 

However, unlike Central America, 
the security problems in Africa to date 
require only modest military assistance 
from the United States. The prime need 
there is to reinvigorate economic 
growth. There is no reason to despair 
about the future. Several African coun- 
tries have made progress. With more ef- 
fective policies and continued investment 
by Africans, the United States, and 
other donors, Africa can resume the 
progress which marked its first years of 
independence. 

The Middle East and Surrounding 
Regions and Southern Europe 

We now turn our attention toward an 
area where security has become the 
predominant concern. A line on the map 
from Spain and Portugal in the west to 
Pakistan in the east passes through or 
near the Straits of Gibraltar, the 
Mediterranean, Libya, the Suez Canal 
and Egypt, the State of Israel, the Per- 
sian Gulf oil fields, and the southwestern 
border of the Soviet Union. 

This is an unparalleled braid of in- 
terests vital to the United States, 
Western Europe, Japan, and the free 
worid. Yet, there is no area so pregnant 
with threats to peace— not just regional 
peace but world peace. Peace is not yet 
achieved between Israel and all its 
neighbors; Iran and Iraq remain at war; 
the Soviet Union is occupying Afghan- 
istan. About half of our total FY 1985 
foreign assistance request is slated for 
this broad area. 

Our highest priority continues to be 
a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East. Israel and Egypt, at peace now 
for almost 5 years, have thus far been 
our principal partners. Our programs 
with these two states have three aims: 
nourishing the economic growth which 



underpins their security; sustaining the 
military forces they need for defense; 
and in the process, providing the con- 
fidence and security they need to con- 
tinue their support for the peace 
process. 

We have made significant changes in 
the military assistance programs for 
Israel and Egypt this year. To reduce 
the debt service burden associated with 
heavy defense requirements, we are 
recommending that all military 
assistance to these two countries be 
grants, not loans. Because grants are 
more valuable than loans and because of 
the cash flow requirements of these pro- 
grams, we have reduced our military 
assistance requests for both countries 
below the levels made available in recent 
years. We have discussed these pro- 
posals thoroughly with Israel and Egypt, 
and there is general agreement that 
these levels and terms support our 
mutual goals. 

In Lebanon, as the President said on 
Tuesday [Feb. 7], the bloodshed we have 
witnessed over the last several days has 
demonstrated the length to which the 
forces of violence and intimidation are 
prepared to go to prevent a peaceful 
reconciliation process from taking place. 

The measures the President has 
outlined reorient U.S. political and 
military resources in Lebanon in a way 
that will strengthen our ability to do our 
job we set out to do and to sustain our 
efforts over the long term. The United 
States will remain fully engaged. We 
will continue our efforts to bring all 
sides to the bargaining table. We will 
continue to press the Lebanese Govern- 
ment and the opposition alike to move 
toward political accommodation. 

Consistent with our policy, we will 
focus on ways to strengthen the govern- 
ment's armed forces as a key element in 
a stable Lebanon. The funds we have re- 
quested in the current budget are part 
of that continuing program. Depending 
on the progress we make and the 
capabilities of the armed forces, we may 
have to request additional funds later in 
the year. 

Our program for the Middle East 
focuses also on Jordan, whose role will 
be crucial in taking the next major step 
toward peace. Most of the funds we pro- 
pose for Jordan in FY 1985 will go for 
military assistance to help that country 
meet its defense needs. The Kingdom of 
Jordan is a moderate Arab government 
that has long been a friend of the United 
States. It now faces a severe challenge 
from Syria and other radical forces, 
precisely because of its constructive 
policies. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



The oil-producing states in 
Southwest Asia are xoiJnerable to out- 
side threats and internal subversion by 
externally supported elements. Nearby 
in Africa, Sudan and Somalia face also 
the threats of instability which arise 
from poverty. Our programs in these 
areas seek to counter these pressures 
and instabilities. At the same time, we 
are supporting countries that provide 
access to the facilities which our forces 
would need in order to operate in the 
area should that ever be necessary. 

There is no disputing the importance 
of Persian Gulf oil to Western economic 
and strategic interests. The best way to 
protect these interests is to work with 
countries in the region to help them 
build their economies and to support 
their efforts to provide for their own 
security. 

Europe 

Our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] allies Turkey, Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal provide a shield 
both for the Mediterranean and the 
southern flank of Europe, as well as a 
bridge to the Middle East and South- 
west Asia. U.S. security assistance is 
essential if these countries are to meet 
their alliance responsibilities. Turkey's 
strategic position is central. There has 
been encouraging progress in that coun- 
try. The infusions of aid from the United 
States and Europe in the past few years 
have helped Turkey recover from its 
near bankruptcy in the late 1970s. The 
Ozal government has announced reforms 
to encourage market forces and competi- 
tion to increase exports. These should 
further enhance Turkey's prospects. Our 
interest lies in continuing to support 
Turkey's growth, and we propose $175 
million in ESF [economic support funds] 
for FY 1985. 

In addition, we propose in 1985 
about $1.8 billion to support ongoing 
military modernization programs in 
Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. 
Greece and Turkey lag behind other 
NATO countries in military strength and 
urgently need modernization. U.S. rights 
to use critical Portuguese facilities in 
the Azores were extended in Decem- 
ber 1983. The Azores base is pivotal if 
the United States is to react effectively 
to military challenges in Europe or to 
threats to Western security from outside 
NATO. 

Our principal objectives in the 
security assistance program for Portugal 
are to support the continuing consolida- 
tion of its democratic institutions, to 
help Portugal modernize its military. 



and to assist Portugal as it confronts 
continuing economic problems. Spain, a 
NATO ally since 1982, also provides the 
United States access to air and naval 
facilities. By contributing to Spanish 
military modernization, U.S. assistance 
encourages the depoliticization of the 
Spanish armed forces as well as their 
modernization. 

Asia 

The pictures I have been painting in this 
rapid tour around the globe brighten 
when we turn to Asia. Despite oil 
shocks, inflation, and recession, growth 
in Southeast Asia continued in the 
1970s. Thailand, the Philippines, and In- 
donesia all grew in the 6%-7% range 
during the decade. For some 20 years, 
the East Asian countries have sustained 
higher growth rates than any other part 
of the world, although all countries have 
been affected by the recession. 

South Asia, where the majority of 
the world's poor live, has also seen 
reasonable improvements, particularly in 
agricultural production. There are some 
dark spots. In recent years, the Philip- 
pines has increased its external debt and 
growth has lagged. Sri Lanka suffered a 
setback in 1983 following communal 
violence. But, assuming continued in- 
flows of capital, sound policies, and a 
good "pull" from restored economic 
health in the West, economic growth will 
continue in Asia. 

And what do we learn from this 
record of progress? We learn that 
growth improves well-being for those at 
the low end of the income distribution 
spectrum. For instance, according to a 
World Bank estimate, absolute poverty 
in Thailand has dropped from 57% in 
the early 1960s to 30% in the mid-1970s. 
Moreover, available evidence suggests 
that where economic growth is rapid, 
the lowest 40% of income earners have 
moderately increased their share of total 
income over time. 

The Asian experience provides 
lessons for countries in Africa and other 
parts of the world. We have found the 
benefits to lower-income groups from 
growth to be greatest where the follow- 
ing conditions obtain. 

• Growth is broadly based and 
agricultural prices favor producers 
rather than consumers. 

• Productive investment is labor- 
intensive. 

• Government interference in 
markets and prices is minimized. 

• Population growth rates are low, 
and educational attainment levels are 
better than average. 



And we have also learned how rapid 
growth in Third World countries 
benefits us both as producers and con- 
sumers. The East Asian countries now 
account for about one-sixth of world 
trade. U.S. investment in the region 
now exceeds $26 billion and is growing. 

The population of Asia— even ex- 
cluding China— exceeds that of Africa, 
the Near East, and Latin America com- 
bined. Continued growth there will be an 
enormous contribution to world pros- 
perity and stability. Our aid programs in 
Asia are concentrated in South Asia and 
Indonesia. They emphasize technical 
assistance in fields such as agriculture 
research. Whether we speak of this aid 
as simply an investment in the future or 
more pointedly as an investment in an 
immense future market, we will reap 
great returns from continuing to assist 
growth in the region. 

Precisely because the stakes are so 
high both in economic and strategic 
terms and because serious threats re- 
main, we continue to provide military 
assistance in the region. Our aid to 
Thailand and Korea deters direct 
military threats to these countries from, 
respectively, Vietnam, which now has 
the world's third largest standing army, 
and North Korea, which spends over 
20% of its GNP on its military. Our 
assistance to the Philippines helps main- 
tain the U.S. bases there which 
undergird our strategic position in the 
Pacific. Our relationship with ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] is an important pillar of stability 
in Southeast Asia. 

Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBS) 

In FY 1983, lending by the World Bank 
and its regional counterparts totaled 
$20.4 billion, up from $16.8 billion in 
FY 1982. That this lending program was 
sustained with a paid-in contribution 
from the United States of $1.5 billion 
testifies to the advantages of using the 
MDBs to share the burden of providing 
aid. The MDBs are also leaders in pro- 
viding advice on sound market-oriented 
economic policies. 

We consider our participation in the 
MDBs as a crucial part of our assistance 
policy. I want to stress in particular the 
important role played by the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA) in 
promoting development in the poorest 
countries. We have just completed 
negotiations for the seventh replenish- 
ment of IDA'S resources. In our judg- 
ment, this replenishment provides a 
basis for a strong IDA program in sub- 
Saharan Africa to work in conjunction 



May 1984 



21 



mnmnauaa 



THE SECRETARY 



with our Africa initiative. We are re- 
questing the final $150 nnillion for IDA 
VI in our FY 1984 supplemental pro- 
posal and $750 million for IDA VII in 
our P"Y 1985 budget proposal. Our 
pledge to IDA VII has been widely 
discussed in the Congress and should 
enjoy broad support here. 

Conclusion 

You and the other members of the 
Carlucci commission concluded that the 
foreign aid program is vital to our na- 
tional interests. I have tried to show 
why this is so region by region. 

You also recommended improve- 
ments in the program, particularly more 
effective integration of military and 
economic assistance and development of 
means to speak to the Congress about 
the program as a whole rather than its 
individual parts. I have reviewed all 
your recommendations and have asked 
for immediate followup on most. Many 
were already on this Administration's 
agenda of improvements. 

I did not agree with the commis- 
sion's recommendation for a new mutual 
development and security administration 
because I felt that the commission's 
main aims— better integration of our 
assistance programs and a more unified 
voice in representing these programs to 
the Congress— could be achieved within 
our existing structure and without the 
disruptions of a major reorganization. I 
have asked the appropriate offices to 
prepare a plan for doing this by early 
March. 

The Carlucci commission produced a 
bipartisan consensus as to the value of 
our foreign assistance program. We will 
do our part to improve the program as 
recommended. We hope Congress will 
respond in kind by supporting and pass- 
ing the budget requests which we have 
made. 



International Security and 
Development Cooperation Program 



' Press release 67 of Mar. 8. 1984. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Go\-ernment Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



Transmittal Letter 



TO THE CONGRESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 

The Program for International Security 
and Development Cooperation presented 
here constitutes the predominant portion 
of what is, in effect, the foreign policy 
budget of the United States. It is that 
portion of the total Federal budget which 
directly protects and furthers U.S. na- 
tional interests abroad. These interests 
run the gamut from situations in which 
we contribute to the military capabilities 
of a friendly or allied country against a 
common threat to circumstances in which 
we act to assure the maintenance of a 
strong, stable international economic 
system. 

America's stake in a stable interna- 
tional political and economic environ- 
ment, which has always been large, con- 
tinues to grow. For e.xample, our exports 
of goods and services as a percentage of 
our gross national product grew from 
6.5% in 1972 to 11.3% in 1982. The impor- 
tance of our trade with developing coun- 
tries has grown even more quickly, so 
that by 1980 developing countries were 
purchasing 40% of U.S. exports— more 
than those bought by Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and 
China combined. Today 1 of every 20 
workers and 1 of every 5 acres of our 
farmland produce for 'Third World mar- 
kets. More than 40% of our imports are 
supplied by developing countries. As 
part of this total, those countries supply 
more than half of our supplies of some 14 
strategic materials, including bauxite, 
tin, and cobalt. 

The means available to us to promote 
and maintain the kind of stable interna- 
tional environment we need are varied, 
ranging from keeping our market open 
to developing-country exports to projec- 
ting a strong U.S. defense posture to 
help deter acts of adventurism by our 
adversaries. Some of the most effective 
means we have to promote stability are 
the varied programs of foreign assistance 
we have developed, ranging from direct 
military aid to pay for training or 
weapons, to short-term economic 
stabilization support, to long-term 



development assistance. Each country's 
assistance package is carefully designed 
to meet the specific problems— in many 
cases, the threats— faced by our friends 
and allies. In most cases, the assistance 
we give today is designed to avoid the 
development of a more serious prob- 
lem—with a more expensive solu- 
tion—tomorrow. 

Effectively protecting and advancing 
American interests, particularly in the 
poorer countries, takes considerable 
resources— for technical assistance and 
training, for the modem technology of 
production, for the human investment 
which will pay off in a growing economic 
pie. It serves our own interests, further- 
more, to help ensure their military' com- 
petence, thus helping them to resist 
hostile encroachments without our hav- 
ing to send American forces. Our adver- 
saries will rarely choose to pose their 
challenges in places where we are 
strong. But they will challenge us where 
weak links in the chain exist. It is in our 
clear national interest to help strengthen 
those links, and to do so requires 
resources. 

It is these resources which the Presi- 
dent's International Security and Devel- 
opment Cooperation Program for FY 
1985 proposes to the Congress. The link 
between U.S. national interests and the 
proposed resources is established in the 
way in which the Administration 
assembles and reviews this program. 
There are three essential elements. 

• At the outset we develop and pro- 
mulgate a statement of our current 
foreign policy priorities— the major na- 
tional objectives around which our 
foreign policy is focused. 

• The appropriate bureaus and agen- 
cies then prepare country and program 
proposals which, in their view, are 
needed to support our foreign policy 
priorities. 

• Those programs are then assem- 
bled and undergo rigorous high-level 
State Department and interagency 
review prior to their presentation to the 
President for his approval. 

This process is designed to en- 
sure—insofar as is possible— that our 
scarce resources are allocated as effi- 
ciently as possible to our highest priority 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



foreign policy goals. Those priorities, 
with respect to this budget proposal, 
should by now be well known and well 
understood. 

In the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia, we seek to further the peace proc- 
ess and enhance the security of free- 
world access to the region's oil. Since 
both of these objectives concern the 
same part of the world and engage the 
interests of many of the same countries, 
they are, in large part, intertwined. 
Thus, our programs in many, if not most, 
countries in the Middle East— from 
North Africa to Southwest Asia— are to a 
significant degree important or even 
crucial to both of our objectives. 

In the Central American region, we 
seek to protect our political, security, 
and economic interests by furthering the 
development of democratic institutions 
and free-market economic institutions 
which will ensure the establishment and 
protection of civU liberties and human 
rights. We are convinced that this is in 
the demonstrable interest of the people 
in the region, as well as of the United 
States and the Western world. It is 
clear, however, that there are countries 
and political movements which seek to 
exploit legitimate domestic grievances 
for opposite goals— totaUtarianism in the 
political sphere and state monopoly in 
the economic sphere. This opposition is, 
of course, not limited to peaceful political 
methods, hence the need for a major ef- 
fort to bolster the military capacities of 
friendly countries in the region. Most of 
our assistance to this region, however, is 
economic aid designed to help overcome 
major obstacles to the resumption of sus- 
tainable equitable growth. 

Our Central American and Caribbean 
region program in FY 1984, including 
our supplemental requests, is 74% eco- 
nomic assistance, and our FY 1985 re- 
quest—which reflects not only the Ad- 
ministration's preferences but also the 
recommendations of the National Bipar- 
tisan Commission on Central America— is 
more than 84% economic. The smaller 
military assistance proportion does not 
imply, however, that it is any less impor- 
tant. Economic stabilization and recovery 
depend upon the existence of an effective 
military shield against military aggres- 
sion and subversion. 

Our principal foreign policy goal in 
Europe pertinent to this resource pro- 
posal is to continue to strengthen 
NATO's southern flank. Most of our 
NATO allies are fully industrialized coun- 
tries and do not require U.S. assistance 
of the kind provided for in this budget 
request. However, some of the southern 



flank countries— which provide critical 
bases and transit rights for U.S. forces 
and which requii-e our help so that they 
can better fulfill theu- alliance responsi- 
bilities—do need such support. Their pro- 
grams are among our highest priorities. 

It is also important that we continue 
to strengthen our alliances and friend- 
ships along the periphery of Asia, from 
the Republic of Korea in the north to our 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] friends in the south, some 
of whom face hostile military forces on 
their borders. 

As I made clear in presenting the FY 
1984 program, our resource needs for the 
conduct of foreign policy remain 
modest— less than 2% of the Federal 
budget— yet there should be no doubt as 
to their importance. In many areas these 
programs are very cost-effective substi- 
tutes for much larger direct U.S. defense 
expenditures. In other areas they effec- 
tively complement our direct military ef- 
forts, helping to sustain the economies of 
important friendly countries. In all cases, 
these programs contribute to the well- 
being of the American people, as our eco- 
nomic intercourse with many of these 
countries and the regions within which 
they are located continues to grow. 

The President's FY 1985 Interna- 
tional Security and Development Co- 
operation Program is prudent, closely tai- 
lored to our most urgent foreign and 
security policy priorities, and deserves 
the concurrence of the Congress and the 
full support of the American people. 

George P. Shultz 



Introduction 

This over/iew presents the President's 
proposed FY 1984 supplemental request, 
the FY 1985 International Security and 
Development Cooperation Program, and 
the foreign and national security strategy 
and priorities which shape these requests. 
More detailed congressional presentations 
for the security, development, and 
multilateral cooperation programs are 
submitted to the Congress separately. 

As in previous presentations, this Ad- 
ministration has sought to integrate the 
various programs— bilateral and 
multilateral, economic and military— into 
an effective and efficient instrument of 
U.S. national policy and interests. That 
process is now in its fourth year and has 
produced its third full International 
Security and Development Cooperation 
Program request. 



The essential elements of this budget 
preparation process include: 

• The foreign policy framework 
established by the Secretary of State, 
which sets forth the foreign poUcy priori- 
ties which are to guide the preparation 
of the budget; 

• The preparation of specific country 
programs to support our pursuit of the 
above priorities; 

• 'The integration of all proposed pro- 
grams within a review process involving 
full interagency participation and final 
approval by the Secretary of State; 

• The presentation of the Secretary's 
proposed program for review by the Of- 
fice of Management and Budget, by the 
Budget Review Board, and ultimately by 
the President; 

• The submission of the President's 
proposed program to the Congress. 

This process has again produced a 
prudent and carefully designed program 
tailored to support our highest foreign 
policy priorities and the continuing re- 
quirement for restraint in this period of 
continuing fiscal stringency. 



FY 1984 Supplemental 
Request 

As has been the case for the past several 
years, funds provided in last November's 
Continuing Resolution do not meet all of 
the requirements of our foreign policy. 
Therefore, the President requests some 
urgent additions to the FY 1984 pro- 
gram, which the Congress approved. 

The report of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America pro- 
poses, and the President concurs, that 
the United States provide significantly 
larger amounts of assistance to promote 
democratization, economic growth, hu- 
man rights, and security in the isthmus. 
Our largest commitment of resources will 
be devoted to the reconstruction and 
revitalization of Central America's 
economies. Our proposal for economic 
assistance requests a total amount for 
FY 1984 that would nearly double the 
level ah-eady authorized by the Continu- 
ing Resolution. It reflects the immediate, 
urgent needs identified in the commis- 
sion's analysis. This magnitude of as- 
sistance is needed in the near term to 
prevent further decline in living stand- 
ards in the region and over the medium 
term to enable the region to achieve per 
capita economic growth on the order of 
about 3% per year by the end of the 
decade. 



May 1984 



BBBflB&£!!r: 



23 

•nmmrmrm 



:':''i!™ 



THE SECRETARY 



On the military side, the commission 
recommended significant increased as- 
sistance for El Salvador and other Cen- 
tral American countries. It did not 
specify precise amounts, but it noted the 
estimate by the Department of Defense 
that approximately $400 million is 
needed for FY 1984-85. Our FY 1984 
supplemental request of $259 million is 
consistent with the commission's think- 
ing; recipients, in addition to El Salva- 
dor, will be Honduras, Costa Rica, Pan- 
ama, and the Regional Military Training 
Center. 



TABLE 1 




Supplemental Request for Central 




America, FY 1984 




(Appropriated Funds, $ millions) 




Functional Development 




Assistance 


73.0 


Economic Support Fund 


290.5 


PL 480 


25.0 


AID Operating Expenses 


2.5 


U.S. Information Agency 


7.0 


Peace Corps 


2.0 


Subtotal— Economic 


400.0 


MAP 


259.05 


Subtotal— Military 


259.05 


TOTAL 


659.05 



Africa faces a food-supply crisis 
which began in 1982-83 when drought 
and insects caused extensive crop dam- 
age. Disruption of farming activities and 
transport links due to internal strife has 
meant substantially reduced food produc- 
tion in the face of continuing population 
growth. Urgent assistance from the in- 
ternational donor community is required 
to avoid widespread human suffering. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) estimates that 700,000 metric tons 
are needed immediately to help alleviate 
this situation. The FAO estimates that 
the total food aid gap for the emergency 
is 1.7 mDlion metric tons. As a prudent 
but essential contribution to this urgent 
humanitarian effort, the President has 
requested a supplemental of $90 million 
for PL 480 Title II. 

The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) is the central instrument 
in the international effort to restrain the 
spread of nuclear weapons and is, there- 
fore, a critical element in support of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy. The Continuing 
Resolution cut $3.7 million from the U.S. 



contribution which supports the critical 
safeguards and technical assistance pro- 
grams of the agency. A reduction of this 
magnitude (about 20% of the U.S. contri- 
bution) raises real questions about the 
depth of the U.S. commitment to non- 
proliferation, particularly as we approach 
the 1985 review conference on the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. We request restora- 
tion of $3.7 million to the FY 1984 pro- 
gram and approval of the full request for 
FY 1985. 

The Continuing Resolution for FY 
1984 also reduced the operating expense 
account of the Agency for International 
Development (AID) by some $17 million. 
This account pays the necessary adminis- 
trative costs of the development assist- 
ance program, the economic support 
fund, and the PL 480 programs. Only 
limited cuts could be made here before 
the programs themselves would be af- 
fected. The congressional action resulted 
in a thorough executive branch review of 
this issue, which produced some $5.5 
million in management efficiencies, defer- 
rals, and cancellations of some planned 
activities which could be absorbed short 
of serious negative impact upon the 
authorized programs themselves. There- 
fore, the Administration requests the 
restoration of $11 million of the FY 1984 
congressional reduction. 

Our participation in the multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) continues to 
be a crucial part of our assistance policy. 
The MDBs are leaders in providing sohd 
advice on— and in tailoring their assist- 
ance for support of— sound market- 
oriented economic policies. The MDBs 
provide an efficient mechanism for shar- 
ing among the free world's donor nations 
a part of the burden of providing eco- 
nomic assistance to developing countries. 
For these reasons, our support for the 
MDBs must continue to be strong. The 
FY 1984 Continuing Resolution passed in 
November has left significant shortfalls 
in funding our current commitments to 
these important institutions. Our request 
for an additional $319.6 million in the FY 
1984 supplemental request will substan- 
tially close those gaps and reaffirm our 
commitment for continued strong, but 
prudent, lending programs by these 
institutions. 

For migration and refugee assistance, 
the Continuing Resolution level of $323 
million left the Department unable to 
respond to new requirements totaling 
$14.65 million. These requirements in- 
clude program cost increases for Thai- 
Kampuchean border relief, African as- 
sistance programs of the United Nations 



TABLE II 

Supplemental Request (Including 
Central America), FY 1984 

($ millions) 



Multilateral Banks 


319.6 


International Organizations 




and Programs 


3.7 


Development Assistance 


87.9 


PL 480 


115.0 


Economic Support Fund 


290.5 


Peace Corps 


2.0 


Refugees 


14.7 


Military Assistance Program 


259.1 


TOTAL 


1,092.4 



High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the emergency situation in 
Lebanon, and Central American pro- 
grams for refugees and displaced per- 
sons. These funds are necessary for the 
United States to continue to meet for- 
eign policy commitments and to address 
urgent human needs. 



FY 1985 Program 

The International Security and Develop- 
ment Cooperation Program consists of 
several different types of programs 
authorized under the law for particular 
purposes. 

Multilateral programs provide a vehi- 
cle through which the United States can: 

• Share equitably with other donors 
the burden of providing concessional 
assistance to developing countries; and 

• Influence the allocation of these 
resources toward recipients and in sup- 
port of policies consistent with U.S. pur- 
poses and interests. 

Bilateral programs— that is, those 
based upon direct relations between the 
United States and particular recipient 
countries— support U.S. objectives more 
directly. They can provide either military 
support (training, technical assistance, 
and construction or the financing of 
weapons and military equipment pur- 
chases) or economic support either by 
funding specific economic development 
programs (in areas such as health, edu- 
cation, training, and food production) or 
by providing essential budgetary support 
in critical circumstances, permitting the 
continuation of essential government pro- 
grams. 

This mix of programs provides, in ef- 
fect, a variety of instruments that can be 
used in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy 



24 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



objectives. Fcr any particular country, 
we try to shape a mix of programs most 
efficiently tailored to that country's most 
urgent needs. The overall program con- 
stitutes the principal concrete instrument 
of U.S. foreign policy. 

Table III (page 26) shows the pro- 
gram proposed to the Congress for FY 
1985, along with the President's requests 
for the first 3 years of his Administra- 
tion. 

Virtually aU of the funds which are 
allocated bilaterally to the procurement 
of goods and services are required by 
law or policy to be expended in the 
United States. They clearly contribute 
directly to American economic activity 
and provide jobs to American workers. 

Most of the funds that are allocated 
to the payment of salaries and other 
personnel-related costs in this program, 
are paid to American citizens, again 
directly contributing to American 
economic activity. 

A large proportion of the assistance 
under these programs is in the form of 
loans to be repaid, with interest, to the 
U.S. Treasury. 

The International Security and De- 
velopment Cooperation Program, there- 
fore, is not only the principal tangible in- 
strument of U.S. foreign policy but also a 
program with substantial favorable im- 
pact upon the U.S. economy. 



FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK 

Our major resource demands abroad 
are predominantly in regions of crisis 
and areas where we face crises which 
threaten U.S. and free-world interests. 

Middle East and Southwest Asia 

In the Middle East and Southwest Asia 
we continue to pursue the twin objec- 
tives of furthering the Middle East peace 
process and working to secure un- 
impeded access for all to the petroleum 
of the Persian Gulf. These goals are, of 
course, intertwined as the result of geog- 
raphy, since from North Africa to South 
Asia many of the same countries are 
critical to our pursuit of both objec- 
tives—whether by providing or helping 
us to provide a deterrent military pres- 
ence or by themselves playing active and 
important roles in the search for peace in 
the region. The importance of these twin 
goals is attested to by the' fact that our 
programs directed toward these goals ac- 
count for almost 40% of the proposed FY 
1985 program. 

Our highest priority continues to be 
to bring a just and lasting end to the 



May 1984 

l^BDBBBBBaBBSBBBSaBBraB 



conflict and turmoil which has disturbed 
the Middle East for so long. There are 
no quick and easy solutions for peace in 
the region. However, we will persevere 
with our efforts and with the President's 
Middle East peace initiative of Septem- 
ber 1, 1982. Our assistance plays an im- 
portant role in furthering the peace 
process. 

Ten years ago we helped negotiate 
the disengagement of Egyptian and 
Israeli Armed Forces. They have not 
clashed since. Five years ago a peace 
treaty ended 30 years of war between 
Egypt and Israel. Israel and Egypt re- 
main our principal partners in the quest 
for a wider peace, and these two nations 
are the largest recipients of our proposed 
foreign assistance for FY 1985. This 
assistance is aimed at ensuring their 
security and strengthening their 
economies, which are essential to their 
continuing on the path to a larger peace 
settlement. 

Similar, although smaller programs, 
are planned for Lebanon and Jordan, also 
important participants in our quest for a 
Middle East peace. Lack of progress 
toward a more peaceful, stable Lebanon 
vrill erode the chances for peace and 
stability elsewhere in the region. In its 
quest for reconciliation, Lebanon needs 
our support, both moral and material. 
Jordan requires our continued support to 
build the necessary confidence to join the 
peace process. Our program also seeks to 
improve the quality of Palestinian life in 
the West Bank and Gaza and to encour- 
age economic and social cooperation in 
the region. 

The Persian Gulf region, a critical 
source of energy to the free world, is 
simultaneously threatened by Soviet en- 
croachment through Afghanistan and by 
radical forces from within. About 25% of 
the free world's oil imports originate in 
the Persian Gulf. Through our assistance 
we help to improve the security of these 
countries and to maintain the availability 
of these vital oil supplies. Certain of our 
programs are directed at supporting 
those countries in the region which pro- 
vide important access to mOitary 
facilities and transit rights into the 
region for U.S. forces to be used in time 
of crisis. In addition to the security con- 
cerns which these countries face, some of 
them, e.g., Morocco and the Yemen Arab 
Republic, have very serious economic 
problems. 



Central America and the Caribbean 

In the Central American and Caribbean 
region, we find a growing challenge to 
emerging democratization from insur- 
gency and terrorism encouraged and sup- 
ported from outside the region and 
through regional proxies. Thus, our ef- 
forts, while remaining overwhelmingly 
economic, must nevertheless include mili- 
tary resources adequate to provide a 
shield behind which the processes of de- 
mocratization and the reestablishment of 
economic stability and ultimately growth 
can continue. 

National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America. The crisis in this re- 
gion and the controversy over the U.S. 
response led the President to appoint the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Cen- 
tral America under the chairmanship of 
the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger. 

That commission was charged by the 
President with developing recommenda- 
tions on a long-term U.S. policy that 
would best respond to the challenges of 
social, economic, and democratic develop- 
ment in the region and to internal and 
external threats to its stability. Earlier 
this year the commission presented its 
report to the President, who has ac- 
cepted, in principle, all of its recommen- 
dations. The Administration conducted a 
thorough analysis of the report and has 
developed proposals for a comprehensive 
program to meet the acute crisis of Cen- 
tral America, based upon the commis- 
sion's work. 

The bipartisan commission found, as 
it studied the region and its crisis, that 
the long-term challenge also requires 
short-term actions. In many respects the 
crisis is so acute, and the time for 
response so limited, that immediate ac- 
tions are a necessary element of any 
long-term policy. 

Although the roots of the crisis are 
indigenous— poverty, injustice, and closed 
political systems— worldwide economic 
recession and Cuban/Soviet/Nicaraguan 
intervention have brought Central 
America to a crisis level. The United 
States must address this crisis im- 
mediately and simultaneously in all its 
aspects. An ultimate solution will, of 
course, depend on economic progress and 
social and political reform. But insurgen- 
cies must be checked if lasting progress 
is to be made on these fronts. 

Indigenous reform, even indigenous 
revolution, is no threat to the United 
States. But the intrusion of outside 
powers exploiting local grievances for 
political and strategic advantage is a 
serious threat. The United States has 



25 



i't'MPWM'P'PWfWPPPP 



( :i"! !H 



THE SECRETARY 



fundamental interests at stake: Soviet/ 
Cuban success and the resulting collapse 
in Central America would substantially 
increase the military threat to us and 
others within this hemisphere. It would, 
thus, compel a substantial increase in our 
security concerns along our southern 
borders or the redeployment of forces to 
the detriment of vital interests else- 
where. We have a deep and historic in- 
terest in the promotion and presen'ation 
of democracy. Pluralistic societies are 
what Central Americans want and are 
essential to lasting solutions. In this case 
our ideals and our strategic interests 
coincide. Although there is an urgent 
need for action, quick solutions are 
unlikely. We must be prepared for a 
lengthy effort. 

Strengthening NATO's Southern Flank 

The southern flank of NATO is im- 
portant to its overall defense posture 
against the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat to 
continental Europe. However, as the 
facts of geography make clear, the na- 
tions from Portugal to Turkey along the 
northern shore of the Mediterranean are 
equally important to defense against 
Warsaw Pact/Soviet threats in the Medi- 
terranean region and the Middle East. 

The importance of these countries, 
however, is coupled with the fact that 
they are among the economically weaker 
and less developed of our NATO part- 
ners. Thus, there is an urgent need 
for support from their more economi 
cally developed partners if these key 
southern-tier countries are to meet their 
NATO responsibilities effectively. 

Moreover, helping finance military 
modernization in these countries is 
clearly in the common interest. Our ac- 
cess to bases in Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
and Greece constitutes an integral ele- 
ment of our capacity to deploy and sus- 
tain forces in Europe and Southwest 
Asia. Just as important are the military 
missions the forces of each country per- 
form in the NATO alliance. Our support 
for their effective contribution to 
NATO's military posture is thus among 
the most cost-effective national security 
investments which we can make, from 
the standpoint not only of our European 
interests but from the clear standpoint of 
our interests in North Africa, the Middle 
East, and the entire Mediterranean 
region. 



TABLE III 

International Security and Development Cooperation 
Program Requests, FY 1982-85' 

(Budget Aulhojity, $ millions) 



International Security Assistance 

Economic Support Fund 

Grant Military Assistance Program and 
Foreign Military Sales Financing 
Program^ 

Foreign Military Sales (off-budget 
guaranteed loans) 

International Military Education and Train- 
ing, Peacekeeping Operations, and 
Antiterrorism Assistance 

FMS Guarantee Reserve Fund 

Offsetting Receipts 

Subtotal 

Foreign Economic and Financial Assistance 

Development Assistance Program 

PL 480 Food Programs 

Multilateral Development Banks 

Other' 

Offsetting Receipts 

Subtotal 

Total Budget Authority 
Total Off-Budget Financing 
TOTAL PROGRAM 



927 


1,652 


2,084 


6,024 


(3.320) 


(4,163) 


(4,401) 


(0) 


189 



-194 


77 



-155 


108 



-126 


115 

274 

-117 


3,486 


4,590 


5,252 


9,734 


1,711 
1,000 
1,262 
823 
-327 
4,529 


1,840 
1,028 
1,537 
823 
-430 
4,798 


2,022 
1,167 
1,644 
830 
-460 
5,203 


2,267 
1,355 
1,236 
1,068 
-463 
5,463 


8,015 
(3,320) 
11,335 


9,388 
(4.163) 
13,551 


10,455 
(4,401) 
14,856 


15,197 

(0) 

15,197 



'The President's revised requests. Figures may not total due to rounding. 

^For FY 1985 all military financing is proposed to be on budget, approximately 80% 
to be at nearmarket rates. 

'Includes migration and refugee assistance, Peace Corps, international organiza- 
tions and programs, narcotics control program, miscellaneous minor programs, and, for 
FY 1985, the Micronesia Compact. 



Protecting Pacific Interests 

The Pacific region is of major political, 
strategic, and economic importance to 
the United States. We have important 
treaty relationships with Japan, South 
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and our 
ANZUS partners, Australia and New 
Zealand. We also have important and 
growing economic and commercial inter- 
ests in the area, with petroleum both 
originating in and passing through the 
region. U.S. trade with this region now 
surpasses that with Western Europe by 
an ever-increasing margin. 

In Northeast Asia a significantly 
strengthened North Korea must be mili- 
tarily balanced by the Republic of Korea 
in order to continue to deter war. To the 
south, a Soviet-supported, 180,000-man 
Vietnamese Army remains in Kam- 
puchea and threatens Thailand's secu- 
rity. Apart from our Manila Pact commit- 
ment, it is essential to maintain our sup- 
port for this front-line ASEAN state. 



Our assistance to Thailand is viewed as 
the litmus test of American support by 
all the ASEAN states. 

The Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia are located astride strategic 
sealanes vital to U.S. and Western in- 
terests. Indonesia is an important source 
of petroleum. The Philippines provides 
the United States with essential military 
facilities. All three play a major role in 
ASEAN. Our security and economic 
assistance contributes to their stability, 
economic progress, and political develop- 
ment. Furthermore, our refugee pro- 
gram, including support for the resettle- 
ment of large numbers of refugees who 
have fled to these countries, is also 
especially important in this area. 

Pursuing U.S. Interests in Africa 

Africa in 1984 is a continent troubled 
from within and threatened from with- 
out. It is beset by severe food shortages 
and malnutrition, by falling export reve- 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



nues and rising import bills, and by 
crushing burdens of debt service. Many 
African nations are targets of subversion 
by Soviet-, Cuban-, and Libyan- 
supported dissidents— as the current Lib- 
yan invasion of Chad so vividly demon- 
strates. Our policy approach to Africa 
must address each of these unpleasant 
realities, for each directly affects our 
policy interests in the continent. 

For this fiscal year $90 million in ad- 
ditional PL 480 Title II authority is re- 
quested for Africa. The President and 
Members of Congress have discussed 
why that assistance is desperately 
needed to confront the tragic effects of 
drought. People are dying now for want 
of adequate food. The United States can, 
and must, help. 

The immediate food crisis, however, 
is but one symptom of a much larger 
problem. Africa's economic crisis is of 
such dimensions that it now impinges on 
every aspect of our relations in the area. 
Underlying Africa's inability to cope 
with the many economic setbacks now 
confronting it is a generally poor system 
of economic policies not oriented toward 
producer incentives and growth. Produc- 
tion in Africa— including food produc- 
tion—is not keeping pace with population 
grow^th. Nearly 20 countries in Africa 
have resorted to assistance by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF) to avoid 
economic collapse, and many of these 
same countries have also required large 
debt rescheduling. 

Economic Policy Initiative. The 

key to restoration of economic stability 
and growth in Africa is increased reli- 
ance on the private sector. State control, 
state corporations, and state farms have 
proven to be millstones. To undertake 
such fundamental redirections of policy 
as divestiture of state corporations, de- 
control of prices, restoration of reason- 
able exchange rates, and incentives for 
private enterprise will be difficult. Over 
the long term, however, such reform is 
essential. Our regular economic assist- 
ance programs, including vital economic 
support fund (ESF) programs, have 
already been recast to promote this goal, 
and some African countries are now 
ready to take the necessary measures. 
However, they will require extra assist- 
ance if they are to do this successfully. 
The Economic Policy Initiative for 
Africa is a framework to provide that 
assistance. Through close cooperation 
with other donors, and with vigorous 
leadership from the World Bank, the ini- 
tiative envisages providing additional 
support for selected countries where 



significant reforms are a real possibility. 
We intend to provide $500 million over 5 
years as a catalyst to energize African 
governments, other donors, and the 
World Bank toward a joint effort using 
new resources to make possible new and 
major economic reforms. The first U.S. 
contribution we seek toward this plan is 
$75 million for FY 1985. 

Countries to be included in the initia- 
tive have not been preselected. The in- 
tention is to begin this new effort in a 
small number of countries which can 
establish a comprehensive policy frame- 
work for reform. Success in those coun- 
tries would demonstrate to others what 
can be accomplished through a coopera- 
tive effort. 

Other Assistance. The southern 
Africa region— stretching from Zaire to 
South Africa— is threatened by both in- 
ternal and external instability. Our 
security assistance for this region is de- 
signed to help friendly African nations 
cope with the economic and military 
threats to their security. Border conflict 
and internal subversion in these mineral- 
rich and key states threaten the stability 
of the entire region and give the Soviet 
bloc and others targets ripe for exploita- 
tion. The peaceful Namibian transition to 
independence is at the heart of our 
southern Africa policy. While we work 
with the nations directly involved in this 
process, we must also work with and 
support the nations on the periphery, 
primaiily Botswana and Zaire, in order 
to help them cope with their economic 
and military threats. A reawakening of 
dormant conflicts such as Shaba or an 
escalation of the border skirmishes be- 
tween southern African states would 
provide significant opportunities for the 
Soviets and Cubans in that region. 

Severe economic depression con- 
tinues to endanger every nation in West 
Africa. Even the once-prosperous nations 
of Nigeria and the Ivory Coast have 
been hard hit by the recent worldwide 
recession. These nations also are faced 
with external subversion, notably overt 
and covert Libyan attempts to destabi- 
lize or actually overthrow governments 
in the region. We continue to provide 
modest international military education 
and training (IMET) funds to virtually all 
of the countries in West Africa while 
concentrating our equipment programs 
in Liberia, Senegal, Niger, Cameroon, 
and Chad— countries where we have im- 
portant interests or which are directly 
threatened by Libya. 

Because of the fiscal plight of our 
African friends, we have undertaken a 
restructuring of our African military as- 



sistance from loan foreign military sales 
(FMS) to grant military assistance pro- 
gram (MAP), despite the tight fiscal con- 
straints on MAP. This includes our pro- 
grams in the Horn and East Africa, 
where substantial U.S. interests related 
to Persian Gulf access are at stake in 
Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. 

Assisting Economic Growth in 
Low-Income Developing Countries 

The low-income developing countries are 
characterized by widespread poverty and 
limited economic infrastructure. As a 
result, they have little ability to obtain 
or service financial flows from the inter- 
national private sector. They depend 
upon concessional assistance to support 
their development efforts. The United 
States and other donors, therefore, 
direct the bulk of their development and 
food aid to the world's poorer countries. 
At Cancun, President Reagan committed 
the United States to maintaining assist- 
ance levels to these nations. 

The promotion of economic develop- 
ment serves our economic, commercial, 
political, security, and humanitarian ob- 
jectives. Many less developed countries 
possess important agricultural and min- 
eral resources. By improving the skills of 
their people and the effectiveness of 
their institutions, our assistance im- 
proves the prospects for mutually advan- 
tageous trade and investment. The devel- 
oping world already constitutes a large 
and growing market for U.S. goods and 
services. From a political perspective, 
the poorer countries are often an impor- 
tant voice in world forums, and some are 
strategically located near important sea- 
lanes, lines of communication, or other 
important U.S. friends and allies. 

Other Considerations in U.S. 
Assistance Planning 

One of the most important challenges our 
nation faces is the need to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons. The success 
of our efforts depends in large part upon 
our abUity to enhance regional and global 
stability and thus reduce those security- 
related incentives that can lead countries 
to seek nuclear-weapons capabilities. 
U.S. assistance can contribute to pre- 
venting the spread of nuclear weapons 
by helping recipients address specific 
security concerns, as well as by enhanc- 
ing U.S. influence with recipients. A 
critical component in this effort involves 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
because of its ongoing effort to extend 
and facilitate international safeguards 



May 1984 

^MBBiBBBBBBBnmaawa 



THE SECRETARY 



against misuse of civilian nuclear power 
programs throughout the world. 

High-priced oil imports remain a ma- 
jor constraint on economic development 
for many countries. While oil prices have 
stabilized generally, the fact that they 
are denominated in dollars increases the 
burden for countries whose currency is 
decreasing in value vis-a-vis the dollar. 
The resulting threat to the economic 
stability of these nations makes it impor- 
tant that we continue our efforts to de- 
crease their reliance on oil imports 
through development and application of 
suitable alternative energy technologies. 

Protecting the global environment is 
another important concern for the 
United States and clearly requires the 
cooperation of other nations. U.S. bilat- 
eral assistance, to the extent feasible, 
helps developing countries to maintain 
the quality of the air, water, and land 
and to sustain the integrity of the 
natural resource base on which their 
long-term economic development 
depends. 

In general, U.S. programs of coopera- 
tion also consider the extent of democ- 
racy and freedom in each country, the 
effectiveness of each country's ovra 
development efforts, its policies toward 
the United States, its record of support 
for the United States in the United Na- 
tions and other international organiza- 
tions, its human rights record, its efforts 
to control illegal narcotics, and, of 
course, available U.S. resources. 



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 

International security assistance pro- 
grams are vital instruments of U.S. na- 
tional security and foreign policy, serving 
to strengthen alUed and friendly coun- 
tries where the United States has special 
security concerns. Through these pro- 
grams, the United States assists other 
countries in acquiring, training for, and 
using the modem military equipment 
necessary for their defense and promotes 
economic and political stability through 
balance-of-payments support and project 
assistance. 

For FY 1985 the President is re- 
questing $9.7 billion in security assist- 
ance-related budget authority. The shift 
of the FMS financing program from "off 
budget" to "on budget" is the principal 
reason for the $4.5-billion increase in 
budget authority over the FY 1984 re- 
quest. 



Moving the FMS Progrram On Budget 

In the wake of the American withdrawal 
from Southeast Asia in the early 1970s, 
it appeared that the growing economic 
capabilities of many countries receiving 
U.S. military financing coupled with a 
lessened U.S. security requirement for 
military assistance in the Third World 
would permit the gradual shift from 
grant military assistance to credit and 
ultimately cash arms sales where U.S. 
security interests dictated that they 
continue. 

That optimistic view of world stabil- 
ity and security proved to be off the 
mark. Third World economic growth suf- 
fered a sharp reversal as a result of the 
oil price spiral of the 1970s and the paral- 
lel worldwide recession of more recent 
years. A number of our key friends and 
allies in the Third World, as well as in 
more economically advanced regions, face 
very severe debt-burden problems that 
prevent adequate common security ef- 
forts without more concessional military 
financing, not to mention extraordinary 
financial and economic support. The 
challenge we face is to sustain the min- 
imal necessary military modernization ef- 
fort—and in virtually all the key cases it 
is just that, since many military estab- 
lishments are shrinking— without con- 
tributing further economic burdens. 
These circumstances clearly require an 
urgent response, as the Congress now 
well understands. Yet Administration 
requests for increased grant levels have 
met with relatively limited success. 

The bipartisan Commission on Secu- 
rity and Economic Assistance took note 
of this growing problem and strongly 
recommended a growth in concessional 
military assistance. 

For FY 1985, the Administration pro- 
poses two initiatives in this regard: 

• Placing the entire FMS financing 
program on budget, thus requiring 
authorization and appropriation of funds 
for the entire program; and 

• Providing, in addition to forgiven 
credits for Israel and Egypt, $538.5 
million of the total program at conces- 
sional interest rates to 16 countries. 

The proposed concessional credits 
will minimize further exacerbation of the 
debt problems in certain critical coun- 
tries whose security is important to U.S. 
interests. Economic need and the ability 
to repay are the primary criteria in 
determining the allocation of concessional 
assistance. These initiatives will provide 
the flexibility to tailor security assistance 
programs to the economic situation of 



recipient countries by providing an ap- 
propriate mix of grant, concessional, and 
market-rate financing. 

The total FMS credit request for FY 
1985 is $5.1 billion for 26 countries, in- 
cluding the $538.5 million in concessional 
interest rate credits, and $1.4 and $1,175 
billion in forgiven credits for Israel and 
Egypt respectively. The entire FMS pro- 
gram for Israel and Egypt would be in 
the form of forgiven credits. While the 
total program for both countries is lower 
than that in FY 1984, the "all-forgiven" 
FY 1985 programs will provide signifi- 
cantly better long-term economic benefits 
to both countries. 

Israel will receive 27% of the total 
request. Egypt, the second largest recipi- 
ent, will receive 23%. An additional 30% 
of the program is requested for the five 
countries with which the United States 
currently has formal defense cooperation 
agreements (i.e., Greece, Philippines, 
Portugal, Spain, and Turkey). The re- 
maining 20% (about $1 billion) is re- 
quested for 19 other countries, including 
those which provide access to important 
facilities (e.g., Oman, Kenya, and Morocco) 
and countries with hostile neighbors pos- 
ing a military threat (e.g., Thailand, Jor- 
dan, Tunisia, El Salvador, Yemen Arab 
Republic, Pakistan, and South Korea). 

Proposed recipients of concessional 
credits include Turkey, Jordan, Domin- 
ican Republic, Morocco, Tunisia, Indo- 
nesia, PhOippines, Botswana, Cameroon, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador. 

Summary of Programs 

The foreign military sales (FMS) fi- 
nancing program enables eligible foreign 
governments to purchase defense ar- 
ticles, services, and training. For FY 
1985 $5.1 billion is being requested, a net 
decrease of $616 million from the FY 
1984 level. More than half the total is 
allocated to Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. 

The military assistance program 

(MAP) provides grant financing for 
defense articles, services, and training to 
eligible foreign governments. The Presi- 
dent's request for FY 1985 includes $924 
million in budget authority for the mili- 
tary assistance programs of which $107 
million is for reimbursement for section 
506a drawdowns from Defense Depart- 
ment stocks and for general costs. More 
than 75% of the remainder goes to the 
following countries: Turkey, Portugal, El 
Salvador, Sudan, Honduras, Morocco, 
and Somalia. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 
mm 



THE SECRETARY 



The economic support fund (ESF) 
program provides flexible economic 
assistance including balance-of-payments 
support, infrastructure assistance, and 
development projects of direct benefit to 
the poor, on a grant or loan basis, to 
countries of special political and security 
interest to the United States. The ESF 
program is administered by the Agency 
for International Development. For FY 
1985 the Administration requests $3,438 
billion— $254 million more than the Presi- 
dent's revised FY 1984 request. Of this 
total, almost 50% is proposed for Israel 
and Egypt. Some 70% of this total goes 
to these two plus eight other countries 
primarily in Central America and the 
Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. 

The international military education 
and training (IMET) program provides 
professional military training and educa- 
tion in the United States and overseas to 
foreign military personnel. It also ac- 
quaints them with U.S. social, economic, 
and political institutions, including our 
human rights concerns. Proposed grants, 
totaling $61 million in budget authority, 
are requested in 1985. The President's 
request would allow the training of per- 
sonnel from 95 countries. The largest 10 
programs are in Turkey, Spain, Portugal, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Egypt, Jordan, 
South Korea, the Philippines, and Kenya, 
accounting for almost $25 million or 40% 
of the total. 

Peacekeeping operations enable the 
United States to participate in the multi- 
lateral operations necessary to help avoid 
international conflict. Currently, the 
United States provides voluntary contri- 
butions to the Multinational Force and 
Observers in the Sinai as part of the 
Camp David agreements, the UN Force 
in Cyprus, and the Caribbean peace 
force in Grenada. Total budget authority 
proposed for these peacekeeping pro- 
grams in 1985 is $49 million. The Ad- 
ministration also proposes legislation pro- 
viding for $25 million in emergency 
drawdovra authority for peacekeeping 
operations. 



FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 

Foreign economic and financial assistance 
supports the foreign policy interests of 
the United States by promoting eco- 
nomic development aimed at meeting 
basic human needs in many Third World 
countries. The United States provides 
such assistance both bilaterally and 
through multilateral institutions. 



Bilateral Assistance 

Bilateral development assistance is ad- 
ministered by the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development. This assistance 
seeks to promote U.S. interests in the 
developing world through the promotion 
of long-term equitable grovki;h in the 
developing countries. Within the frame- 
work of the existing legislative mandate 
on foreign assistance, the President has 
established the following policies to guide 
the formulation of country programs: 

• Implementation of effective and ef- 
ficient economic policies by the devel- 
oping countries; 

• Strengthening of the indigenous 
private sector in the development 
process; 

• Creating and strengthening the in- 
stitutional and technological capacities of 
the developing countries; and 

• Encouraging diffusion of technol- 
ogy and the expansion of research and 
development, particularly through 
cooperative efforts between U.S. and 
developing-country scientists. 

This approach stems from the recog- 
nition that the economic performance of 
the developing countries is critically 
dependent upon their own economic 
policies. The greatest strides toward self- 
sustaining growth have occurred in those 
countries that have relied to the greatest 
extent on market forces and have 
enough private initiative and sufficiently 
viable institutions to develop and apply 
technology to their development effort. 

Development assistance helps 
foreign nations to meet basic human 
needs through sustained, broadly based 
economic growth. Grant and loan funds 
are provided for goods and services, 
mostly American, in key development 
fields of food production, education and 
training, and population and health, 
where the United States has a compara- 
tive technical advantage and expertise. 
Those areas also have the greatest 
potential for long-term development to 
benefit the poor in recipient countries. 
The program reflects the Administra- 
tion's emphasis upon policy dialogue, 
private enterprise, technology transfer, 
and institutional development, and com- 
plements nonassistance measures such as 
trade, investment, private bank financ- 
ing, and other forms of nonconcessional 
support for development. The FY 1985 
proposal of $2,267 billion represents an 
increase of $245 million over the revised 
FY 1984 request. 



Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) 

Title I concessional food sales permit a 
flexible response to the pressing eco- 
nomic needs of recipient countries. 
Title II provides food on a grant basis. 
These programs also provide support in 
times of natural disasters, support 
market development for U.S. agricultural 
products, and provide leverage for 
agricultural self-help measures. Greater 
emphasis is being placed on integrating 
these humanitarian programs, aimed at 
the serious food-deficit countries, with 
our overall economic development, mar- 
ket development, and other foreign pol- 
icy objectives. Title III provides support 
for longer term programs in agricultural 
and rural development. The President's 
PL 480 request is for $1.36 billion. 

Migration and refugee assistance 

comprises both refugee assistance over- 
seas and resettlement to the United 
States. In FY 1985 the Administration 
seeks $341 million, an increase of about 
$4 million over the FY 1984 adjusted re- 
quest. The program continues to focus on 
both humanitarian and foreign policy con- 
siderations associated with refugee pop- 
ulations and movements. 

The Administration wall continue to 
support major assistance programs in 
such politically important areas as South- 
east Asia, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, 
Central America, and the Middle East. 
Most assistance is provided through 
multilateral channels such as the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, the In- 
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, 
and the Intergovernmental Committee 
for Migration. U.S. funding for these pro- 
grams helps meet basic human needs 
while seeking longer term solutions such 
as voluntary repatriation, resettlement in 
the country of asylum, or resettlement in 
third countries. 

The Administration seeks to resolve 
refugee problems without resort to large 
programs for resettlement to the United 
States but will continue to provide re- 
settlement opportunities to maintain first 
asylum for refugees and to aid refugees 
with links to the United States. The Ad- 
ministration also seeks to encourage 
other nations to assume a greater level 
of responsibility for resettlement of refu- 
gees. Refugee resettlement in this coun- 
try is expected to be 72,000 persons in 
FY 1984 and the same level in FY 1985. 

Narcotics control assistance aims to 
control the flow of illicit narcotic and 
other dangerous drugs through bilateral 
and multOateral assistance programs. 
The control strategy emphasizes eradica- 
tion of narcotic drugs at their source 



May 1984 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



with assistance also directed toward im- 
proving law enforcement. The Adminis- 
tration proposes $50.2 million for FY 
1985. While reinforcing important proj- 
ects to control heroin production and 
trafficking in Mexico, Pakistan, Burma, 
and Thailand, and trafficking in Turkey, 
this budget level also permits increased 
emphasis upon control of cocaine and 
marijuana from South America and in- 
cludes the U.S. contribution to the UN 
Fund for Drug Abuse Control. 

The Inter-American Foundation 

(lAF) was established by Congress in 
1969 as an autonomous government cor- 
poration. It extends grants to local 
private groups in the Caribbean and 
Latin America, particularly those tradi- 
tionally outside the mainstream of U.S. 
development assistance programs. The 
lAF promotes more equitable, respon- 
sive, and participatory approaches to 
development and foreign assistance in 
the region through grants supporting 
self-help projects. 

The Peace Corps embodies the 
American spirit of self-reliance, volun 
tarism, and personal initiative. By help- 
ing others to help themselves, by pro- 
viding targeted technical assistance with 
lasting impact, and by serving as a 
catalyst in the development process, 
Peace Corps volunteers personify this 
Administration's approach toward devel- 
oping nations. By utilizing the voluntary 
service of individual Americans, it is also 
one of the least costly and most visible 
ways to provide direct technical assist- 
ance to developing countries. The Ad- 
ministration proposes $124 million in 
1985, an increase of some 5% over the re- 
vised FY 1984 request. 

Multilateral Assistance 

Multilateral assistance enables us to 
multiply the impact of our bilateral pro- 
grams with contributions from other 
donors. Donor contributions are further 
leveraged in hard loan windows through 
multilateral development bank (MDB) 
borrowing on capital markets. Multi- 
lateral institutions also can encourage 
policy reforms and projects in areas that 
may be too sensitive for bilateral discus- 
sion and can encourage global or regional 
approaches to problems that do not lend 
themselves to bilateral solutions. 

Multilateral Development Banks 

Multilateral development bank programs 
are an important complement to U.S. 
bilateral assistance. For example: 



30 



• In 1983, the MDBs provided $584.3 
million to three important Caribbean 
Basin countries— Jamaica, Guatemala, 
and Honduras— more than double the 
U.S. economic and military assistance; 

• Five key countries near the Per- 
sian Gulf— Kenya, Pakistan, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, and Sudan— received over $1 
billion from the MDBs in 1981 and $835.7 
million from U.S. bilateral programs; and 

• MDBs provided assistance of more 
than $1.5 billion to five countries where 
the United States maintains basing ar- 
rangements—Kenya, Somalia, Oman, 
Thailand, and the Philippines— about 
three times our $516 million bilateral 
program. 

While the Administration decided to 
honor existing U.S. commitments to 
multilateral institutions in order to 
preserve credibility abroad, it has not 
adopted a "business-as-usual" approach 
to the MDBs. The President decided not 
to enter into new replenishment agree- 
ments until a comprehensive assessment 
of the extent and nature of U.S. partici- 
pation in the banks had been completed. 

The assessment was completed in 
1982 and concluded that the MDBs can 
make an important and cost-effective 
contribution to growth and stability by 
promoting a market-oriented interna- 
tional economic system. Therefore, a 
leading U.S. role in these banks is 
justified by our fundamental interest in 
a more stable and secure world. 

The assessment recommended that 
the United States should begin to reduce 
our participation in the soft loan win- 
dows in real terms and phase down the 
level of paid-in capital in hard loan 
windows. The Administration has been 
successfully pursuing this objective in 
replenishment negotiations. We also are 
implementing recommendations to en- 
courage more emphasis on private initia- 
tives, increased cofinancing with com- 
mercial banks and other private 
investors, more effective policy condi- 
tionality, a greater concentration of 
concessional resources on the poorest 
countries without access to alternative 
sources of funds, and a more consistent 
maturation/graduation policy aimed at 
gradually moving countries out of the 
ranks of those needing assistance. 

International Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development (IBRD) finances 
lending operations— $11.3 billion in FY 
1983— primarily from borrowing in the 
world capital markets and from retained 
earnings and loan repayments. Loans are 
repayable over 20 years or less, including 
a 5-year grace period. The IBRD interest 



rate is based on its own cost of borrow- 
ing. Loans are directed toward countries 
at the relatively more advanced stages of 
economic development, generally re- 
ferred to as middle-income developing 
countries. 

International Development Associa- 
tion (IDA) lends only to the poorest 
developing countries, those with an an- 
nual per capita income of $805 or less in 
1982 doUars; 93% of IDA funds went to 
countries with per capita incomes below 
$410 in 1983. IDA loans have 50-year 
maturities including a 10-year grace 
period. They carry no interest, but there 
is a minimal annual service charge. 

Inter- American Development Bank 
(IDE) provides development assistance 
to Latin American and Caribbean coun- 
tries. Like other multilateral develop- 
ment banks, the IDB provides resources 
on both market-related and concessional 
terms. The IDB's hard loan window 
utOizes capital-market borrowings to 
fund the majority of its lending program. 
The Fund for Special Operations pro- 
vides concessional financing. Each dollar 
of the U.S. contribution is matched by 
about $2 from other donors. 

Inter-American Investment Cor- 
poration (IIC). The Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) is proposing 
the creation of an investment corpora- 
tion, along the lines of the International 
Finance Corporation of the World Bank. 
The purpose of the IIC would be to pro- 
mote the economic development of the 
regional developing members by en- 
couraging the establishment, expansion, 
and modernization of private enterprises 
and of market-oriented mixed enterprises 
controlled by the private sector, giving 
priority to small- and medium-scale 
enterprises. IDB management seeks to 
fund the IIC at a minimum of $200 
million, of which the United States would 
provide $50-$60 million over 4 years 
beginning in FY 1985. 

The Asian Development Bank 
(ADD) supports development in the 
countries of Asia and the Pacific. The 
ADB, particularly through its conces- 
sional window, the Asian Development 
Fund (ADF), has placed increased em- 
phasis on lending for projects intended 
to meet the needs of the poorest people 
in these countries. Projects for agricul- 
ture and agroindustry have recently ac- 
counted for approximately one-third of 
all ADB and ADF lending, with energy 
comprising about one-quarter. The 
largest borrowers from the ADB and 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



ADF are Indonesia, Philippines, South 
Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh. 

African Development Bank and 
Fund (AFDB, AFDF) were founded in 
1963 and 1973, respectively. The United 
States joined the fund, the concessional 
lending affiliate of the African Develop- 
ment Bank, in 1976. The AFDF lends to 
the poorest African countries. During 
FY 1983, this amounted to $238 million 
distributed among 18 African nations. 
Late in 1982, membership in the bank 
was opened to non-African states, and 
the United States became a member on 
February 8, 1983. 

International Organizations 
find Programs 

International organizations and pro- 
grams support certain voluntarily funded 
development, humanitarian, and scientific 
assistance programs of the United Na- 
tions and the Organization of American 
States (OAS). U.S. contributions provide 
the basis for U.S. efforts to improve the 
effectiveness and influence the direction 
of these important multilateral programs. 
U.S. contributions to these programs are 
important for maintaining U.S. influence 
in the United Nations and the OAS 
regarding others matters as well. 

More than 80% of the requested 
funds are for three major UN pro- 
grams—the UN Development Program, 
UN Children's Fund, and the Interna- 
tional Fund for Agricultural Develop- 
ment. U.S. contributions to the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency, UN 
Environment Program, UN Capital 
Development Fund, smaller UN pro- 
grams, and OAS development assistance 
programs represent significant but more 
specialized assistance funded by this ac- 
count. Funding is requested for one new 
initiative in the account, the Investment 
Promotion Service Office of the UN In- 
dustrial Development Organization in 
New York, whose purpose is to train in- 
vestment promotion officers from devel- 
oping countries and to support their ef- 
forts to attract commercial investors. 

The International Fund for Agrri- 
cultural Development (IFAD) provides 
concessional agricultural loans and grants 
in member developing states to help ten- 
ant and small farmers expand food pro- 
duction, improve nutrition, and combat 
rural poverty. The loans are often 
cofinanced with multilateral banks, UN 
agencies, and bilateral donors including 
OPEC countries. Almost all IFAD loans 
have been allocated to countries with an- 
nual per capita incomes of under $500 (in 



1978 dollars). Countries pay interest 
charges reflecting their levels of per 
capita income. Negotiations on IFAD's 
first replenishment (IFAD I) were com- 
pleted in 1982 with members of OPEC 
and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development agreeing 
to share the same relative burden as 
they did in the institution's initial fund- 
ing. The U.S. pledge under IFAD I is 
$180 million. The United States has 
already paid $90 million of this pledge 
and $50 million more toward the pledge 
is requested for FY 1985. 

The UN Development Program 

(UNDP), which provides technical assist- 
ance to some 15() countries and terri- 
tories, exercises leadership within UN 
specialized agencies and programs to 
bring a mix of resources and technical 
help to bear upon economic development 
programs. The activities of the UNDP 
are financed entirely through voluntary 
contributions. 

The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) 

focuses on delivering basic services to 
mothers and children of the Thu-d World. 
UNICEF's current programs in 110 
countries are financed entirely through 
the voluntary contributions of member 
states and from private sources. 

The Organization of American 

States (OAS), which is not part of the 
UN system, conducts programs that sup- 



port technical cooperation contributing to 
the economic and social development of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. In re- 
cent years, several Latin American coun- 
tries have become net contributors to 
OAS development programs. 

The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) fulfills an important role 
for U.S. nonproliferation interests by 
operating the international safeguards 
system against nuclear-weapons prolifer- 
ation and by providing technical assist- 
ance in the peaceful development of 
nuclear energy. 



Report of the Commis- 
sion on Security and 
Economic Assistance 

On February 22, 1983, the Secretary of 
State announced the formation of the 
Commission on Security and Economic 
Assistance, under the chairmanship of 
the Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, to 
review the goals and activities of United 
States foreign assistance efforts. This 
commission was broadly bipartisan and 
included a wide representation from both 
Houses of Congress as well as from the 
private sector. It was cochaired by 
Joseph Lane Kirkland, Lawrence H. 
Silberman, and Dr. Clifton R. Wharton, 



U.S. Foreign Economic and 
Military Assistance, FY 1974-85 







1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1 '18 1 

Fiscal Year 



1983 1984 1981 



May 1984 



mWBBHmmilllllLIUllllLlllilUH 



THE SECRETARY 



Jr. The commission presented its report 
to the Secretary in November 1983. 
After reviewing it's recommendations, 
the Secretary of State presented the 
report to the President in February 
1984. 

The commission recognized at the 
outset that the United States, through 
its support of the economic and security 
capabilities of friendly countries, seeks to 
further free, humane, and open societies 
in a secure, prosperous world. American 
efforts abroad are directed toward assur- 
ing our national security, promoting the 
democratic rights and ideals upon which 
our society is based, and fostering our 
diplomatic, economic, and commercial 
interests. 

The commission recognized, however, 
that concerns about the lack of popular 
and legislative support, real resource 
levels which have stagnated if not de- 
clined over the years, and skepticism 
regarding program effectiveness— factors 
which led to the creation of the commis- 
sion—all imposed serious limits upon the 
effectiveness of our assistance programs 
as instruments of U.S. foreign and 
security policy. The commission's 
charter, therefore, was to examine all 
aspects of U.S. foreign assistance pro- 
grams and to propose ways in which 
these programs could make a greater 
contribution to meeting U.S. national 
objectives. 

The commission found that support 
for foreign assistance had broken dovra 
and polarized, as advocates for military 
or economic programs tend to oppose 
rather than support each other. Budget- 
ary limitations forcing difficult trade-offs 
among domestic and international pro- 
grams have further exacerbated the 
problem. Widespread misunderstanding 
regarding the nature and objectives of 
specific foreign assistance programs 
means that the general public no longer 
perceives these efforts as coherently 
serving valid U.S. national interests. 
Program management has become in- 
creasingly encumbered by legislative re- 
quirements, while recent efforts to inte- 
grate security and economic assistance 
policy and programs should be continued. 

The keystone to the Carlucci commis- 
sion's recommendations is the conclusion 
that economic and military assistance 
must be closely integrated since eco- 
nomic growth and rising standards of liv- 
ing are vital to internal stability and ef- 
fective external defense. Conversely, 
threats to stability impede economic 
development and prosperity. The future 
effectiveness of the foreig^i assistance 
program rests on the concept that secu- 



Economic Assistance as a Percentage of Total 
Foreign Assistance, FY 1946-85 




j—i—i Ill 



I I I I i—i I I I I 



1965 

iscal Year 



rity and growth are mutually reinforcing 
and that both are fundamental to the ad- 
vancement of U.S. interests. On balance, 
the commission determined that U.S. 
assistance programs make an indispen- 
sable contribution to achieving U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. 

U.S. foreign assistance as a whole 
has been declining. In real terms (when 
adjusted for inflation), U.S. assistance 
expenditures over the last 5 years have 
averaged some 21% below those of a 
comparable period 10 years ago. Mihtary 
assistance, especially in terms of its 
"grant element," has fallen dispro- 
portionately. Although the trend has 
changed in recent years, in 1975 the pro- 
portion of concessional economic and mili- 
tary assistance was roughly equal. By 
1983, five dollars of economic assistance 
was given on concessional terms for 
every dollar of grant military assistance. 
Excluding support to Israel and Egypt, 
most of our military assistance in recent 
years has been provided at the cost of 
money to the U.S. Treasury, yet there 
are friendly countries with legitimate 
security needs that simply cannot afford 
to borrow for necessary military equip- 
ment and services on these terms. 

The commission recognized that the 
balance between economic and security 
assistance continues to be one of the 
most divisive issues affecting the foreign 
assistance program. That debate has 
become sterile and unproductive at best 



and damaging to U.S. interests at worst. 
The commission returned repeatedly to 
the conclusion that the optimum mix of 
programs could only be reached on a 
country-by-country basis where local con- 
ditions and U.S. interests would deter- 
mine requirements. 

The countries of the world are highly 
interdependent and continue to become 
more so. In this setting, the commission 
concluded, the United States cannot 
escape the importance of international 
lending, trade relations, collective secu- 
rity, and foreign assistance. Because our 
foreign assistance efforts must respond 
to a changing environment that 
threatens American security and pros- 
perity in every part of the world, the 
commission offered, among others, the 
following recommendations: 

• The commission urged that the 
congressional leadership and the Presi- 
dent jointly endorse the conclusion that 
foreign security and economic coopera- 
tion programs are mutually supportive 
and constitute an essential instrument of 
the foreign policy of the United States 
and that they broaden efforts to inform 
the American public of the importance of 
our foreign assistance programs. 

• It also made clear that to meet 
U.S. foreign policy objectives, significant 
increases in real levels of assistance will 
be required, particularly in regions such 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



as sub-Saharan Africa and Central Amer- 
ica and the Caribbean where special 
challenges face the United States in the 
forseeable future. 

• The commission endorsed the posi- 
tion that programs should contribute to 
the evolution of policies that will result 
in open, self-sustaining, and democratic 
societies. While human resource develop- 
ment and institution-building are essen- 
tial to development and security, greater 
emphasis also should be given to science 
and technology-related development as- 
sistance that also could be available, on a 
mutually cooperative basis, to middle- 
income and newly industrialized 
countries. 

• The commission also endorsed the 
use of bilateral and multilateral coopera- 
tion programs to encourage the growth 
of indigenous private sectors and U.S. 
private-sector contributions to the devel- 
opment process. The commission called 
for maintenance of the flexibility of the 
ESF program and, in the administration 
of the development assistance account, to 
ensure that long-term development needs 
are met in ways consistent with the 
short-term economic and financial con- 
straints that are facing many developing 
countries. Whenever possible, PL 480 
resources should be used in connection 
with other forms of economic assistance 
to maximize development impact. 

• The commission concluded that 
greater concessionality was needed in 
military assistance in order to reduce the 
debt repayment burden of poorer countries 
facing serious security requirements. 

The Administration fully endorses 
the overall approach and general conclu- 
sions of the commission and has incor- 
porated most of the specific recommenda- 
tions into the President's Security and 
Development Cooperation Program for 
FY 1985. ■ 



May 1984 



APPENDIX A 



Foreign Economic and Military Assista 


nee, FY 1984 and 1985' 






($ millions) 












FY 19B4 


FY 1984 


FY 1984 






Continuing 


Supplemental 


Revised 


FY 1985 




Resolution 


Request 


Request 


Request 


ECONOMIC 










Multilateral 










Multilateral Banks 


1,324.4 


319.6 


1,644.0 


1,235.6 


International Organizations and Programs 


314.2 


3.7 


317.9 


241.8 


Subtotal 


1,638.5 


323.3 


1,961.8 


1,477.4 


Bilateral 










Development Assistance 


1,934.2 


87.9 


2,022.1 


2,267.5 


PL 480 


1,052.0 


115.0 


1,167.0 


1,355.0 


Economic Support Fund 


2,893.3 


290.5 


3,183.8 


3,438.1 


Peace Corps 


115.0 


2.0 


117.0 


124.0 


Refugees 


323.0 


14.7 


337.7 


341.5 


Narcotics 


41.2 




41.2 


50.2 


Micronesia Compact 










295.5 


Antiterrorism 


2.5 




2.5 


5.0 


Peacekeeping 


56.2 




56.2 


49.0 


Other (including African Development 










Foundation and Inter-A.nerican 










Foundation) 


16.0 
6,433.3 




16.0 
6,943.4 


15.0 


Subtotal 


510.0 


7,940.7 



TOTAL (ECONOMIC) 



MILITARY 



8,071.9 



833.3 



TOTAL (GROSS) 

Offsetting Receipts 

Agency for International Development 
Foreign Military Sales 

TOTAL (NET) 



586.5 
-460.5 
- 126.0 

13,763.2 



586.5 

- 460.5 

- 726.0 



'Figures may not total due to rounding. 



8,905.2 9,418.1 



Foreign Military Sales Guarantees 










Off Budget 


(4,401.3) 




(4,401.3) 


(0) 


On Budget 
Concessional 
Forgiven 
Market 


1,315.0 
0.0 

1.315.0 
0.0 




1,315.0 
0.0 

1.315.0 
0.0 


5,100.0 

53S.5 

2,575.0 

1.986.5 


Military Assistance Program 
International Military Education 

and Training 
Guarantee Reserve Fund 


510.0 

51.5 



6,277.8 


259.1 


769.1 

51.5 



6,536.8 


924.5 

60.9 
274.0 


TOTAL (MILITARY) 


259.1 


6,359.4 



14,349.7 1,092.4 15,442.0 15,777.5 



580.1 
-463.1 
-117.0 



1,092.4 14,855.6 15,197.4 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



APPENDIX B 



FY 1985 Bilateral Assistance Program Requests 

(Budget Authority. $ millions) 





Develop- 












Conces- 


Market- 






ment 












sional 


Rate 






Assist- 
ance 


PL 480 




ESF 


IMET 


MAP 


FMS 
Loans 


FMS 
Loans 






Title 1 


Title II 


TOTAL 


Middle East and Southwest Asia 


















Egypt 


_ 


225.000 


18.349 


750.000 


2.000 





1,175.000 





2,170.349 


Israel 


— 


— 


— 


850.000 


— 


— 


1,400.000 


— 


2,250.000 


Jordan 


— 


— 


0.087 


20.000 


2.000 


— 


47.500 


47.500 


117.087 


Lebanon 


— 


— 


— 


20.000 


0.800 


— 


_ 


15.000 


35.800 


Regional Middle East 


3.000 


— 


2.288 


15.000 


— 


— 


— 


— 


20.288 


Algeria 


— 


— 


— 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


0.050 


Djibouti 


— 


— 


1.046 


3.500 


0.100 


2.500 


— 


— 


7.146 


Kenya 


30.000 


10.000 


5.139 


55.000 


1.800 


23.000 


— 


— 


124.939 


Madagascar 


2.000 


6.000 


2.312 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


10.362 


Mauritius 


— 


3.500 


0.233 


2.000 


— 


— 


— 


— 


5.733 


Morocco 


19.000 


40.000 


12.504 


15.000 


1.700 


40.000 


10.000 


— 


138.204 


Oman 


— 


— 


— 


20.000 


0.100 


— 


— 


45.000 


65.100 


Pakistan 


50.000 


50.000 


3.996 


200.000 


1.000 


— 


100.000 


225.000 


629.996 


Seychelles 


— 


— 


0.292 


2.000 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


2.342 


Somalia 


22.000 


20.000 


1.830 


35.000 


1.250 


40.000 


— 


— 


120.080 


Sudan 


28.000 


50.000 


2.451 


120.000 


1.700 


69.000 


— 


— 


271.151 


Tunisia 


— 


5.000 


0.854 


3.000 


1.700 


15.000 


25.000 


25.000 


75.554 


Yemen 


30.000 


5.000 


0.067 


— 


1.500 


10.000 


— 


— 


46.567 


Total 


184.000 


414.500 


51.448 


2,110.500 


15.800 


199.500 


2,757.500 


357.500 


6,090.748 



Central America and the Caribbean 



Belize 


6.000 


Costa Rica 


20.000 


El Salvador 


80.000 


Guatemala 


40.000 


Honduras 


45.000 


Panama 


19.800 


Regional Organization 




for Central American 




Programs 


62.000 


Regional Military 




Training Center 


— 


Bahamas 


_ 


Dominican Republic 


30.000 


Eastern Caribbean 


32.000 


Guyana 


— 


Haiti 


24.000 


Jamaica 


28.000 


Suriname 


— 


Trinidad & Tobago 


— 


Total 


386.800 



— 


— 


4.000 


0.100 


0.500 


_ 


28.000 


— 


160.000 


0.200 


9.800 


_ 


44.027 


7.073 


210.000 


1.500 


116.000 


15.000 


16.047 


5.353 


35.000 


0.300 


— 


10.000 


15.135 


3.865 


75.000 


1.200 


61.300 


_ 


— 


0.488 


20.000 


0.600 


14.400 


5.000 



— 


— 


— 


0.050 


22.000 


2.895 


45.000 


0.750 


— 


0.130 


20.000 


0.300 


— 


0.048 


— 


0.050 


15.000 


10.081 


5.000 


0.450 


30.000 


0.100 


70.000 


0.250 


— 


— 


— 


0.080 


— 


— 


— 


0.050 


70.209 


30.033 


780.600 


5.880 



20.000 



3.000 
5.000 



0.300 
5.000 



235.300 



5.000 



35.000 



10.600 
218.000 
473.600 
106.700 
201.500 

60.288 



198.600 

20.000 

0.050 

108.645 

57.430 

0.098 

54.831 

133.350 

0.080 

0.050 



— 1,643.822 



Europe and NATO's Southern Flanl< 



Austria 

Cyprus 

Finland 

Greece 

Iceland 

Portugal 

Spain 

Turkey 

Yugoslavia 

Total 



3.000 



0.060 



— 


0.060 


— 


— 


1.700 


— 


— 


0.025 


— 


80.000 


3.000 


70.000 


12.000 


3.000 


— 


75.000 


4.000 


230.000 


— 


0.150 


— 



250.000 



250.000 



— 


0.060 


— 


3.000 


— 


0.060 


500.000 


501.700 


— 


0.025 


55.000 


208.000 


400.000 


415.000 


275.000 


934.000 


— 


0.150 



1,230.000 2,061.995 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



■tHHHH 



"""■■'"■ 



THE SECRETARY 



APPENDIX B— Continued 





Develop- 




meni 




Assist- 




ance 


Pacific/Asia 




Asian Region 


19.500 


Brunei 


— 


Burma 


15.000 


Fiji 


— 


Indonesia 


65.000 


South Korea 


— 


Malaysia 


— 


Papua New Guinea 


— 


Philippines 


39.000 


Singapore 


— 


Solomon Islands 


— 


South Pacific 


6.000 


Thailand 


27.000 


Tonga 


— 



Conces- 
sional 
FMS 
Loans 



Market- 




Rate 




FMS 




Loans 


TOTAL 





19.500 


— 


0.030 


— 


15.300 


— 


0.080 


20.000 


155.441 


230.000 


232.000 


10.000 


11.000 


— 


0.050 


30.000 


230.959 


— 


0.050 


— 


0.030 


— 


7.000 


98.000 


137.400 


— 


0.030 


388.000 


808.870 



9.959 



Total 



171.500 



— 


0.030 


— 


— 


0.300 


— 


— 


0.080 


— 


_ 


2.700 


— 


_ 


2.000 


— 


— 


1.000 


— 


— 


0.050 


— 


5.000 


2.000 


25.000 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


0.030 


— 


1.000 


— 


— 


5.000 


2.400 


5.000 


— 


0.030 


— 


)1.000 


10.670 


30.000 



50.000 



South Asia 



Bangladesh 

Bhutan 

India 

Maldives 

Nepal 

Sri Lanka 

Total 



82.000 
87.000 


75.000 


22.873 

0.605 

125.034 


15.000 
41.500 


26.000 


1.106 
6.114 


225.500 


101.000 


155.732 



0.250 

0.300 
0.025 
0.100 
0.150 

0.825 



180.123 
0.6.05 
212.334 
0.025 
16.206 
73.764 

483.057 



South America 



Argentina 

Bolivia 

Brazil 

Chile 

Colombia 

Ecuador 

South American Region 

Mexico 

Pan American College 

of the Americas 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 

Total 



20.000 11.941 

— 0.071 



10.000 
21.500 



30.000 



73.500 



2.000 



20.000 13.887 



40.000 26.693 2.000 



0.050 
0.100 
0.050 
0.050 
0.900 
0.700 

0.250 

6.000 
0.050 
0.850 
0.060 
0.050 
9.110 



3.000 



_ 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


47.041 


_ 


_ 


0.121 


_ 


_ 


0.050 


4.000 


4.000 


8.900 


2.000 


2.000 


15.494 


_ 


— 


23.500 


- 


- 


0.250 








6.000 


— 


— 


0.050 


5.000 


5.000 


74.737 


— 


— 


0.060 


— 


— 


0.050 



3.000 11.000 11.000 



May 1984 



35 



THE SECRETARY 


APPENDIX B— Continued 




DwMlop- 












Conces- 


Market 






mem 












sional 


Rate 






Aulst- 
anc« 


PL 480 




ESF 


IMET 


MAP 


FMS 
Loans 


FMS 
Loans 


TOTAL 




Thlel 


Thie II 


Africa 




















Southern Africa 


















Angola 





_ 


0.194 


— 


— 


_ 


— 


_ 


0.194 


Botswana 


— 


— 


2.015 


10.000 


0.300 


4.000 


5.000 


— 


21.315 


Lesotho 


10.300 


— 


7.189 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


17.489 


Malawi 


10.000 


— 


0.348 


— 


0.200 


1.000 


— 


— 


11.548 


Southern African Region 


— 


— 


— 


37.000 


— 


— 


— 


— 


37.000 


Swaziland 


7.900 


— 


0.442 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


8.392 


Tanzania 


— 


— 


1.272 


— 


0.075 


— 


— 


— 


1.347 


Zaire 


12.000 


15.000 


1.079 


15.000 


1.400 


15.000 


— 


— 


59.479 


Zambia 


— 


10.000 


— 


20.000 


— 


— 


— 


— 


30.000 


Zimbabwe 


15.000 


— 


— 


15.000 


0.150 


— 


— 


— 


30.150 


West Africa 




















Cameroon 


20.400 


_ 


0.821 


_ 


0.200 


— 


5.000 


_ 


26.421 


Cape Verde 


2.000 


— 


3.680 


— 


0.060 


— 


— 


— 


5.740 


Chad 


5.000 


— 


0.909 


10.000 


0.150 


5.000 


— 


— 


21.059 


Congo 


1.000 


— 


— 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


1.050 


Equatorial Guinea 


1.000 


— 


0.676 


— 


0.060 


— 


— 


— 


1.736 


Gabon 


_ 


_ 


— 


— 


0.100 


— 


— 


— 


0.100 


Gambia 


4.000 


_ 


1.099 


— 


0.060 


— 


— 


— 


5.159 


Ghana 


1.000 


— 


7.142 


— 


0.325 


— 


— 


— 


8.467 


Guinea 


2.600 


6.000 


0.304 


— 


0.100 


3.000 


— 


— 


12.004 


Guinea-Bissau 


2.000 


_ 


0.804 


— 


0.075 


— 


— 


— 


2.879 


Ivory Coast 


_ 


— 


— 


— 


0.075 


— 


— 


— 


0.075 


Liberia 


14.500 


16.000 


0.109 


45.000 


1.200 


15.000 


— 


— 


91.809 


Niger 


18.000 


_ 


0.379 


7.000 


0.200 


5.000 


— 


— 


30.579 


Sao Tome 


_ 


— 


0.163 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


0.163 


Senegal 


17.000 


8.000 


5.618 


15.000 


0.500 


3.000 


— 


— 


49.118 


Togo 


3.000 


— 


2.803 


— 


0.075 


— 


— 


— 


5.878 


Upper Volta 


7.000 


— 


10.177 


— 


0.150 


— 


— 


— 


17.327 


Otf}er Programs 




















Africa Civic Action 


_ 


_ 


_ 


— 


— 


5.000 


— 


— 


5.000 


Africa Regional 


51.499 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


51.499 


Economic Policy Initiative 


75.000 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


75.000 


Benin 


— 


_ 


1.869 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


1.919 


Burundi 


4.300 


— 


2.067 


— 


0.090 


— 


— 


— 


6.457 


Central African Republic 


2.000 


— 


0.167 


— 


0.100 


— 


— 


— 


2.267 


Comoros 


0.400 


— 


0.413 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


0.813 


Ethiopia 


_ 


_ 


3.711 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


3.711 


Mall 


10.000 


_ 


2.481 


— 


0.125 


— 


— 


— 


12.606 


Mauritania 


3.500 


_ 


6.221 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


9.771 


Rwanda 


5.500 


_ 


4.088 


— 


0.060 


— 


— 


— 


9.648 


Sahel Region 


31.000 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


31.000 


Sierra Leone 


1.300 


4.000 


1.644 


— 


0.050 


— 


— 


— 


6.994 


Uganda 


10.000 


— 


— 


— 


0.100 


— 


— 


— 


10.100 


Total 


348.199 


59.000 


69.884 


174.000 


6.180 


56.000 


10.000 




723.263 


36 














Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



News Conference of March 20 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the Department of State on 
March 20, IQSJ,.'' 

In San Salvador a few weeks ago, I 
minced no words in saying that death 
squads and terror have no place in a 
democracy. The time has come to be 
equally blunt about what needs to be 
done here in Washington to prevent new 
Cubas in Central America. 

This Administration, the last Ad- 
ministration, and a 12-member bipartisan 
commission, which studied Centi-al 
America for 5 months, have all concluded 
that important U.S. interests are at 
stake. If regimes responsive to Moscow 
and Havana, and hostile to the United 
States, are installed in Central America, 
we will pay a high price for a long, long 
time. 

The irony is that the price to avoid 
new Cubas is still relatively small and 
that we can still pay it by supi)orting a 
pohcy that is fully consistent with our 
ideals and with a search for political solu- 
tions. 

The people of El Salvador vote Sun- 
day for president and vice president. The 
choices are real, and the balloting will be 
fair. The outcome is not a foregone conclu- 
sion. Whoever takes office in June will 
have the legitimacy of proven support 
from the people of El Salvador. We and 
everyone else will have to recognize that 
fact in evaluating our policies and in- 
terests. 

The election, however, is not being 
fought just among candidates who have 
agreed to support the voters' decision. It 
is being violently opposed by a guerrilla 
minority that refuses to put its program 
to the test of the ballot box. The guer- 
rillas have pulled some spectacular raids, 
but the army has been doing what 
counts— protecting the cities, the harvest, 
and the people's right to choose. Despite 
an upsurge of guerrilla terrorism against 
elected officials, civilian deaths from all 
political causes for the month of February 
were the lowest in several years— less 
than one-third those of February a year 
ago and one-tenth those of 3 to 4 years 
ago. 

There is nothing unexpected about 
the need for more aid to El Salvador. We 
knew, and the Congress knew, that the 
assistance authorized last fall would run 
out this spring. It was understood that 
we would reevaluate our needs after the 
bipartisan commission had made its find- 
ings. 



In January, the bipartisan commission 
recommended unanimously that we pro- 
vide El Salvador "significantly increased 
levels of military aid as quickly as possi- 
ble" [emphasis in original report]. In 
February the President sent Congress a 
supplemental request for El Salvador as 
part of his comprehensive progi-am to im- 
plement the bipartisan commission's 
recommendations. It is now obvious that 
Congress will not act on this legislation 
before June at the earliest, and deliveries 
will take time after that. 

Events in Central America simply 
will not wait that long. There is a gap 
between what is needed on the ground 
and the pace of the legi-slative calendar. 
So we identit"ied what is needed now to 
help El Salvador continue on its chosen 
path to democracy and to keep the 
pressure on Nicaragua to negotiate. 

The national interest is clear. I call 
upon the Congress to approve the $93 
million in emergency security assistance 
for El Salvador so that its armed forces 
can protect the people and the leaders 
they choose. And I also call upon the Con- 
gress to recognize the validity of the 
struggle of those Nicaraguans who are 
resisting totalitarianism. To delay these 
funds is to hinder prospects for peace and 
negotiations, to prolong suffering, and to 
strengthen the hand of our adversaries. 

Q. Do you intend to go through with 
the Jordan Stinger sale in light of King 
Hussein's recent remarks? 

A. First of all, on the question of Jor- 
danian security, we support the impor- 
tance of security for Jordan and our other 
friends in the Middle East. In making 
that effective, of course, the President 
takes his position, and we have to 
mobilize congressional support for any 
position on that subject. And we will con- 
tinue to work with the Congress to find, 
in every way we can, the means of help- 
ing Jordan make itself as secure as possi- 
ble in the region. Just how that will play 
itself out remains to be seen, but our ob- 
jective will be to help King Hussein and 
the Jordanians provide for their security. 

Q. Do you think his views are, in 
any way, symptomatic of other coun- 
tries' views about U.S. Middle East 
policy, other countries such as Saudi 
Arabia? 

A. I think that, obviously, as we have 
not achieved the results that we sought in 
Lebanon, there is a tendency to question 
us, no doubt about it. 



I would say, insofar as Lebanon is 
concerned, that the wheel continues to 
turn. We don't put a period after 
Lebanon. We're there; we intend to re- 
main engaged. I'd say we put a comma 
there or maybe a semicolon. The United 
States has been an important factor in the 
region for a long time because we have 
important interests there and because we 
have been a factor for peace and because 
we have been concerned about the secu- 
rity interests of all states in the region. 

So I would expect that while, of 
course, people are constantly looking 
around and questioning this, that, and the 
other factor, that in the end the essential- 
ity of the U.S. role will be apparent to all. 

Q. King Hussein says American 
policy in the Middle East has failed 
because the United States has allegedly 
taken Israel's side in conflicts with the 
Arabs. He says he won't participate in 
the Reagan peace initiative as a result. 
Is the Administration planning any new 
initiative to bring Hussein into the 
talks, including possibly putting more 
pressure on Israel to stop settlements 
activity? 

A. I think it has to be clear to every- 
body that from the U.S. point of view, we 
care about stability and peace and secu- 
rity in the region. And we are prepared 
to help, and we have expended a lot of 
energy to help. But primarily it is up to 
the parties in the region to find their way 
to security and peace and, for that mat- 
ter, better quality of life goals that 
everyone seeks. We're there to help 
them. 

Somehow or other we have to get 
over this notion that every time things 
don't go just to everybodys' satisfaction 
in the Middle East, il's the U.S. fault or 
it's up to the United States to do 
something about it. 

We are active. We will help. But 
others must come forward as well. In the 
end any solution that works will work 
primarily because the parties to it were 
out there, are involved in it, and are 
determined to make it work. 

Q. Do you share to any degree the 
view that Henry Kissinger expressed 
last Sunday, that perhaps this is the 
right time for the United States and the 
Middle East to do nothing? 

A. We don't do nothing. We will con- 
sult with our friends. We are, of course, 
active in providing security assistance 
and economic assistance to countries in 
the region. So we will be doing those 
things. 

King Hussein has obviously said that 
he doesn't intend to step forward and 



May 1984 



37 



mmmmuuummtnm 



THE SECRETARY 



start a process of negotiation with Israel 
in the near future, so he said that. We ac- 
cept that. On the other hand, we will con- 
tinue to be engaged, and we'll be pre- 
pared to be helpful as the situation 
evolves. 

Q. As you know. King Hussein was 
central to the President's Middle East 
peace plan. What, if anything, is left of 
the Reagan plan now, and what hopes, 
if any, do you have for building a wider 
peace in the region? 

A. Obviously, if security and stability 
and peace in the Middle East are to be at- 
tained, it is necessary that the countries 
there and their leaders somehow in the 
end sit down with each other and work 
out the conditions under which those ob- 
jectives will be achieved. 

As far as the President's proposals 
are concerned, they depend upon every- 
body, in a sense. They depend upon there 
being a process of negotiation. But the 
proposals themselves, in their own terms, 
are as valid today as they were when the 
President spelled them out. And so 
they're there, and when people start talk- 
ing about an agenda for a greater sense of 
stability and peace in the area, I suspect 
they're going to come back and talk about 
these same ideas. 

Q. What hopes, if any, do you have 
now for seeing the development of a 
wider peace in the region? 

A. There doesn't seem to be any im- 
mediate—like this month, this week— op- 
portunity for things to move forward in a 
genuinely strong way, and perhaps for a 
longer time than that. 

Nevertheless, as I already said, we'll 
continue to be there. We work through 
our Ambassadors. We have important 
security and economic assistance pro- 
grams. We'll be engaged in whatever 
develops in Lebanon. Our Ambassador 
there is contacted by everybody, and so 
on. So in that sense we will just have to 
see what happens, and we'll be prepared 
for it as it comes. 

Q. It's not clear to me just exactly 
what it is you're going to do or not go- 
ing to do in connection with the Jorda- 
nian military aid package. You say 
you'll have to continue to work with 
the Congress and see how it will play 
itself out. Are you or are you not plan- 
ning to proceed with the Stinger sale, 
for example? 

A. The President's proposals are 
before the Congress. There are a variety 
of other issues that have been raised in 
the Congress that have to do with sta- 
bility and developments in the Middle 



East, particularly the proposal that the 
U.S. Embassy should be moved to 
Jerusalem. All these things are there, and 
they're being discussed. 

My point is that the President has 
been, and remains, committed to be 
helpful to helping Jordan in its security 
interests. He's put forward a proposal. I 
think it's fail' to say, with respect to the 
Stinger that you asked about, that the 
President was ready to put on a major ef- 
fort to get that approved. There's no 
que.stion about the fact that King 
Hussein's statements constitute a very 
serious setback to the chances of congres- 
sional approval of that. 

Nevertheless, we'll continue to work 
on the security interests and all of these 
proposals and try to bring about a result 
that does as much as possible to achieve 
the result we seek. 

Q. You mentioned moving the em- 
bassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. If the 
Senate voted to do that do you think 
that would be damaging or threatening 
to U.S. interests in the Middle East? 

A. Yes, I think it would be very 
damaging. The question of Jerusalem, of 
course, involves the old city of Jerusalem 
and it involves the deep religious sites 
and connotations of that city. When you 
touch that, you touch a raw nerve run- 
ning across the Muslim world and, for 
that matter, something that is way 
beyond political matters and goes into 
deep religious roots. 

So I think that it's a question that we 
would do well to stay away from. And so 
the President opposes that. I oppose that 
strongly, as does the President, and we 
hope that in the end the Congress won't 
vote that way. 

I might take note of the fact that as a 
constitutional question, this is not the 
main point; but as a constitutional ques- 
tion, there certainly is an issue about 
whether or not it is the prerogative of 
Congress to say where an embassy will 
be located. 

Q. You have been urged by a 
number of European leaders to do 
something to resume the arms control 
dialogue with the Soviet Union. You 
have also had reports of meetings be- 
tween your Ambassador in Moscow and 
your meetings with Ambassador 
Dobrynin here. Are there any signs now 
that the arms control negotiations will 
resume? 

A. First of all, there are many arms 
control negotiations that are very much in 
process. The MBFR [mutual and balanced 
force reductions] talks started up again on 



March 16. The meeting in Stockholm, the 
CDE [Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarma- 
ment in Europe], is going forward and 
those discussions are very much under- 
way. There are meetings in Geneva, par- 
ticularly focusing on the use of chemical 
weapons. We think that's a very impor- 
tant subject, and we intend to put for- 
ward, the President intends to put for- 
ward, a treaty on the subject. It's a mat- 
ter of great significance. 

There ai-e things that are on the 
periphery of arms control, such as the 
Hot-Line discussion that are going for- 
ward and there are others. So my point is 
that when you talk about arms control 
discussions, there are many of them. 

I presume you're speaking of the 
discussions of intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. 
With respect to those, the United States 
has strong proposals on the table, forth- 
coming. Our negotiators have been there 
in a spirit of give-and-take, and we're 
prepared to resume those talks at any 
time. I have no indication that the Soviet 
Union is prepared to return to those 
talks. 

Q. Have you had a chance to study 
the communique that came out of 
Havana last night between the Angolan 
President and Fidel Castro, and 
whether that seems to move forward 
the chances for bringing about a solu- 
tion to the problems in southern Africa? 

A. That communique seems to in- 
dicate, fu-st of all, that the Cubans and 
the Angolans were discussing the right 
subject, namely, Cuban troop withdrawal. 
I think that's a positive development if 
that gets underway. 

Certainly, it's connected, as they said 
in their communique, with the issue of 
Namibian independence, which we seek. 
We have been very much in favor of the 
moves going on in the region in which 
South Africa has been pulling back in a 
general kind of disengagement. And I 
think also most significantly the agree- 
ment between South Africa and Mozam- 
bique last Friday was a historic event. 

So there are some very positive signs 
in Southern Afi'ica. And if the outcome of 
the Angolan/Cuban talks is that there is 
progi-ess being made toward Cuban troop 
withdrawal, I think that's positive. 

Q. There are some obser\'ers who 
think that the most imminent threat to 
stability lies in the Iran-Iraq war and 
the possibility now that Iran may 
simply overwhelm Iraq. Do you share 
that view? Secondly, as I recall, you 
once indicated that this was an area 
where the Soviet Union and the United 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



States might have a common interest. 
Are you pursuing the opportunity or, if 
there is any, to deal with the Soviet 
Union on trying to limit the effects of 
that war? 

A. First of all, on the Iran-Iraq wai-, it 
is a huge tragedy for both countries with 
tremendous losses, really just a slaugh- 
ter, and you can only weep for the people 
involved. 

Second, insofar as containing it, we 
and others have worked in the United 
Nations and in other diplomatic ways to 
keep the war from spreading itself, so to 
speak, into third countries and into the 
gulf itself, as has sometimes been 
threatened. 

The United States and our friends are 
determined that the international water- 
ways will remain open. Insofar as the 
Soviet Union is concerned, various 
statements have been made, coming out 
of TASS and other places, about what our 
intentions are, and, of course, we have let 
the Soviet Union know directly what our 
objectives are and the limits of them. 

Going beyond that, it is our opinion, in 
view of the basic difficulty of closing the 
strait, that in one way or another, even if 
an effort is made, it will be manageable. 
It will not be possible to cause a genu- 
inely long-term disruption in the flow of 
oil supplies. 

Second, that we now have on hand, 
and so do others in other countries, very 
large stocks deliberately put there as a 
matter of national policy, so that we're 
much better able to cope with any short- 
term interruption that may come about, 
and to see to it that that doesn't result in 
a major explosion in the oil markets and a 
major disruption of our own economy. 

The point is, from our standpoint and 
the standpoint of the West generally, 
we're working hard to keep this problem 
in manageable proportions. 

Q. I would like to ask about El 
Salvador. The armed forces are con- 
tinually on the defensive against guer- 
rilla troops. There continue to be 
charges that the officials are linked to 
the death squads there. In Nicaragua 
the continued resistance still has made 
only what the State Department calls 
"tactical changes" in the Sandinista's 
behavior. What evidence do you have 
that additional money will be spent 
more effectively or will achieve the 
goals you have in mind for that region? 

A. I think the Salvador Armed Forces 
are effective and have been basically do- 
ing a better and better job. One recent 
piece of evidence of a different sort than 
is usually cited is that of .some 260, I think 
it is, municipalities where ballot bo.xes 
will be placed for the election; for awhile 



it was thought that there were 70 places 
where you couldn't guarantee the secu- 
rity of those, due to guerrilla activity. 
That estimate is now scaled down to 
around 20, due to the efforts of the armed 
forces to secure security for this election. 
And I might say those 20 are in lightly 
populated areas and provisions ai"e being 
made so that people there can vote. 

But I think it is the case that the 
Salvador Armed Forces are giving a 
credible account of themselves and will do 
better and better if they get our support. 
We have to recognize that, granting all of 
the difficulties they have, it's still the case 
that we have a process here in our sup- 
port for them of creating a kind of max- 
imum of uncertainty in their minds about 
what the flow of resources is going to be, 
and that causes great difficulties in plan- 
ning. And take the situation right now— 
they have to make a choice. Do we take 
the resources we have and operate at a 
very meager, low level so as to stretch 
them out, or do we say we have to go all 
out to protect this election and spend 
what we've got to do it and take the 
chance on simply running out? And that's 
not a good position to place them in. 

I think they're giving a much better 
account of themselves than the nature of 
your question implied. 

Q. If the Congress refuses to act in 
a timely fashion on the Admini- 
stration's request, is the Administra- 
tion prepared to use its emergency 
powers— .506 determination. Section 
21(d)— in order to provide aid for the 
Salvadoran military? 

A. Our effort is to get the Congi'ess to 
vote for this money— it's needed— and 
that is our concern, and I think that it is 
something that the Congress ought to 
step up to and step up to promptly, and 
that's where we're going to place our em- 
phasis. And we will proceed in a fashion 
in which we expect to get favorable votes 
on that money. 

Q. Over the weekend the United 
States sent some AW ACS planes to the 
area of the Sudan, and it's reported 
that a warning has been sent to Libya 
regarding the activities in the Sudan. 
Could you tell us if there was such a 
warning, what were they warned about, 
and how do you see the situation? Is it 
in your view, the Sudan, part of some 
broader attack, perhaps by Ethiopia 
and Libya, as has been claimed? Is it 
evidence of some Libyan activism? 
What do you expect to happen there? 

A. We have sent AWACS to the 
region at the request of the countries 
there. It is a fact that Libya did attack in 



the Sudan, unprovoked aggressive behav- 
ior. It's also a fact that Libya apparently 
managed an act of terror in London, or at 
least the British authorities expelled 
some Libyans for that, and perhaps a 
related attack took place in Chad re- 
cently. 

We see a pattern of behavior on the 
part of Libya that is outside the pale of in- 
ternationally acceptable behavior. We 
have sent our AWACS to the region at 
request, and they are there in a support- 
ive role, and we have wanted the Libyans 
and others to know that fact and to know 
what their role is. 

Q. Did the United States send a 
warning to Libya? 

A. The Libyans should know that 
those planes are there, and they should 
not be interfered with. 

Q. Is the political campaign in the 
United States now affecting the im- 
plementation of foreign policy? .4re you 
fmding out, for example, that countries 
such as the Soviet Union, countries in 
the Middle East or Central America, 
wherever, are adopting a wait-and-see 
attitude to see the outcome in 
November before they commit them- 
selves and, in fact, you yourself are be- 
ing thrust into a holding pattern? 

A. At first when you started, I was 
going to say, "What political campaign?" 
I thought you were talking about the one 
in El Salvador, and there does seem to be 
a tendency in the Congress to want to 
know about the outcome of that election. 

I think the important thing is to focus 
on the electoral process itself— that's 
what we support— and I think all the can- 
didates ought to be in a position of sup- 
porting whoever does get elected. 

In terms of our own election, people 
ai-e debating foreign policy, and that's all 
right. But I hope that as it proceeds, the 
broad and fundamental thrust of Ameri- 
can foreign policy, which has great 
elements of continuity in it, will wind up 
having general support with some debate 
around the edges. 

The purpose of the bipartisan commis- 
sion was in part to find a bipartisan state- 
ment on the subject of Central America, 
just as one of the purposes of the Scow- 
croft commission was -to find bipartisan 
support for the modernization of the triad 
of forces and for the arms control ini- 
tiatives with the Congress and in con- 
sultation with our allies, as the case may 
be. 

We will continue to work at it that 
way and hope that partisan considera- 
tions don't wind up playing a part in our 
own elections. 



May 1984 



39 



BBBBnBBDSBBBBlin 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Are you finding that the 
Kremlin, in fact, is holding off on INF 
and strategic arms negotiations- 
holding off a resumption— because they 
do not, from their point of view, want 
to help the President achieve a break- 
through in arms control? 

A. Of course, I don't know what the 
considerations in the Kremlin are about 
these matters, although from statements 
that are made, it's pretty clear that 
Ronald Reagan is not their candidate for 



President. But what their considerations 
are in holding off and whether they will 
decide to come back to the negotiating 
tables remains to be seen. 

What we do know is that we will be 
there, that we will be reasonable, that we 
will continue to have an attitude of good 
faith and give-and-take in these negotia- 
tions as we have before. 



'Press release 82.1 



Secretary's Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on April 1, 
198Jt, by Marvin Kalb and Bill Monroe, 
NBC News; Leslie Gelb, The New York 
Times; Karen DeYoung, The Washington 
Post; a7id John Wallach, Hearst 
newspapers.^ 

Q. The Senate is expected to pass a 
$62 million emergency military aid bill 
for El Salvador, but there is talk that 
the House could delay consideration of 
it until mid-May, until after the runoff 
election in El Salvador. Would that 
seriously bother you, a 5- or 6-week 
delay? 

A. Yes, it would. 

Q. Why? 

A. Because the money is needed. The 
money supports the effort of the Salvador 
Government to attain a secure election 
and to protect the efforts they're making 
for political reform and economic develop- 
ment. So we should provide those funds, 
and additional funds, and do it promptly. 

Q. Delaying those funds would 
jeopardize the runoff election? 

A. Of course, because they are close 
to the end of the resources they have, and 
if you're in that situation as a military 
operation, you have a choice. Do you just 
spend everything and then faU off a cUff, 
or do you piece it out on a smaller scale 
and then you know you're not going to be 
as effective as you could be. 

We have a stake in those elections. 
We have a stake in political reform in El 
Salvador. We have a stake in economic 
development in that country, and we 
ought to be willing to step up to it. 

Q. Your critics say that the 
Salvadoran Government still refuses to 
prosecute any political murderers, that 
no matter who is elected, the army is 



going to stay in control, and that after 
3 years left-wing guerrillas are stronger 
than ever. They are saying, in effect, 
that U.S. policy is failing and that more 
aid would be wasted. What is your 
answer to that? 

A. Those statements are just false, 
across the board. The election itself is one 
fact that is hard to get around, and the 
fact that the election was held under 
relatively secure conditions. Certainly 
there is guerrilla warfare going on in El 
Salvador, but the situation is better than 
it has been. Certainly there are problems 
insofar as the system of justice is con- 
cerned, but it is better than it was, and 
things are happening. There are always 
some setbacks. There was one just here 
yesterday that we don't like. So there are 
setbacks, but there is also a lot of prog- 
res.s. 

Q. You have been very critical in re- 
cent weeks of the role of Congress in 
handling foreign policy, saying that it 
is making it virtually impossible for the 
Administration to pursue a consistent 
course. Congress has a constitutional 
responsibility and right to declare war 
and be involved in other ways. If you 
were a senator who strongly disagreed 
with Administration policy, how would 
you want to express your differences? 

A. I would say so, and I think that ob- 
viously there— the problem is what is the 
right interaction between the President 
and the Congress in the conduct of 
foreign policy? Both are naturally vitally 
concerned with a topic of this kind. So it 
is appropriate to have a way to debate, 
and certainly in our democracy people 
will criticize. But it is also important that 
we have a capacity to be decisive and 
then to carry through on the decisions 
that we make, so that we have a chance to 
be consistent and have a constancy to 



what we do. And the situation that we're 
in right now, I don't say that it is imposs- 
ible, but I think it makes it difficult 
because there is very little capacity to be 
decisive. And you have to be decisive if 
you're going to manage anything well. 

Q. When Congrress expresses its 
view by a majority you get one view, for 
example, on the importance of civil 
rights in Central .America. This Ad- 
ministration has been very inconsistent 
on many policies too, just like Congress 
has. Why is the Administration in- 
herently more right in what it wants to 
do in Lebanon or Central America than 
Congress' approach? 

A. I don't think the Administration 
has been inconsistent, but that is not 
really what I'm driving at. What I'm driv- 
ing at is to have a capacity to make a deci- 
sion, and then have that decision stick 
and have a chance for it to work and to be 
carried through. That's the problem. 

Q. Going back to Central America 
directly for just a moment, there ap- 
peared to be some confusion last week 
in Administration statements over the 
extent to which U.S. military aid was 
falling into the hands of leftist rebels 
there and also the extent to which U.S. 
military advisers were involved in com- 
bat situations. Could you perhaps 
clarify how much of our military aid is 
going to the rebels in El Salvador? 

A. Hardly any, in proportionate 
terms, of the aid that we provide falls into 
the hands of the guerrillas. On the other 
hand, in terms of the materiel that they 
have at hand, a portion of it is captured. 
The confusion came from a statement that 
was made about, I think, 50% of the arms 
that the guerrillas had coming from what 
was captured, or otherwise obtained. 
That statement reflected only a very 
small period of time in a segment of El 
Salvador. 

As the facts are as I understand 
them, and nobody can know precisely, but 
only a fraction of the arms that the guer- 
rillas have comes from what is captured, 
and a very small fraction, like probably 
less than 10%, of the supplies come from 
that. That is, the ammunition and the pro- 
visions, and so forth. 

Q. Mr. Ikle [Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle], in his 
testimony I think said more than 40% 
of the arms that the guerrillas had 
came from— 

A. Yes, that's what I said. That state- 
ment was a description of what was found 
out over a very small period of time in a 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



small part of El Salvador and is not 
characterization of the overall situation, 
which is as I've tried to describe it. 

Q. Could you make a percentage 
characterization of the overall situa- 
tion? 

A. It's hard to give a number. 1 said 
in terms of the essential flow right now, 
which is ammunition and supplies of one 
kind or another, as far as I know the 
number is less than 10%. The weapons 
and things of that kind, mostly they have 
those. So that is not as much of a problem 
for them. 

Q. Former President Nixon, who is 
hardly a left-wing critic of this Ad- 
ministration, yesterday said that 
without a new relationship with the 
Soviet Union, there is no chance for 
peace to survive in the world. The im- 
passe between the United States and the 
Soviets is as big as ever. If you could sit 
down with Foreign Minister Gromyko 
today what would you tell him? 

A. I've sat down with Foreign 
Minister Gromyko quite a few times, and 
we've had a sometimes tempestuous, 
sometimes straightforward, and here and 
there reasonably constructive discussions 
across a broad range of issues. I think it 
is very important for the United States to 
continue to do what it is doing, namely, to 
be careful that we keep our strength, not 
only our military strength but our 
economic strength, and our resolve and 
strength of purpose, but also to be in a 
posture of reasonableness and to be 
testing and probing all the time to find 
substantive areas of significance that the 
Soviet Union may want to work out prob- 
lems with us on. 

Q. Your critics charge that precisely 
in that order, you put the priority on 
building America's defense and you 
relegate to a lower priority improving 
relations with the Soviets. Substan- 
tively, is there anything that the United 
States could do or should do now to 
prove that it really wants a more mean- 
ingful dialogue with the Soviets? 

A. Let me comment first about the 
importance of paying close attention to 
our own national security interests. The 
day we decide that, that those interests 
have a low priority, is the day we go 
down the drain. We have to be ready to 
defend ourselves, and make no mistake 
about it. 

As far as the priorities are concerned, 
I think it is kind of an artificial thing in a 
sense, because the two things go to- 
gether, without a doubt. It is the fact that 
we're strong that gives us a chance to 



deal effectively with the Soviet Union. If 
we were weak, there would be very little 
going for us in any negotiations, so the 
two things go together. 

Q. But isn't the problem that this 
Administration hasn't dealt with the 
Soviet Union? As the Democrats in one 
of their ads point out, showing every 
President since General Eisenhower, 
this is the first Administration that 
hasn't reached an arms control agree- 
ment with the Russians. 

A. One of the greatest mistakes you 
can make in any negotiation is to get 
yourself in a position where the other side 
can see that you need an agreement and it 
doesn't, and as soon as they've got you 
there, they'll squeeze you to death. So I 
think the President has been absolutely 
right to keep his cool, be calm about it but 
also to be reasonable. The positions we 
have on the table aci-oss the board of a 
vei-y wide range of things we're discuss- 
ing with the Soviet Union are reasonable 
positions, and we're there in a spirit of 
give and take. But we're not there in a 
spirit of give away the store, and that's 
what you have to be careful about. 

Q. Two or 3 months ago, you, the 
President, and the entire Administra- 
tion were saying that the presence of 
Armed forces in Lebanon was the key 
to stability in Lebanon, as well as the 
key to peace in the Middle East. Now 
the United States has ended its involve- 
ment with the multinational force. 
Were you wrong 2 months ago and right 
now, right then, wrong now? It's hard 
to imagine both. 

A. I think it is correct to say that 
what has happened in Lebanon is a disap- 
pointment to us. We have important in- 
terests there and important interests in 
the Middle East. I think those interests 
would have been advanced had we been 
able to bring about, or help others bring 
about with our help, the sort of objectives 
that we sought. We'll continue to seek 
those objectives. They're just as impor- 
tant now as they have been, but we'll 
have to change our tactics. 

Q. Change tactics, but isn't it a 
radical step to put such a tremendous 
emphasis just a few short weeks ago on 
the presence of the Marines there, and 
the importance of that presence, and to- 
day to make the absence of the Marines 
seem almost a virtue? 

A. We're not making it a virtue. I 
think that the existence of U.S. staying 
power and forcefulness was an important 
ingredient, and if we could have main- 
tained it in a strong fashion, perhaps the 
results would be different than they are 
today. 



Q. So the pulling out of the forces 
indicated a lack of resolve? What is the 
other side of the coin then? 

A. I don't know what you mean by 
the other side of the coin. 

Q. If the presence would have 
demonstrated credibility and consist- 
ency in policy, what does it mean to 
pull the forces out? A lack of credibil- 
ity, a lack of consistency? 

A. There is a lack of credibility in pull- 
ing the forces out, or an apparent lack of 
credibility, and we have suffered a lot for 
that in the Middle East. Now, what we 
set out to do was to redeploy the Marines, 
and I think it was a very sensible move, 
to redeploy the Marines, putting them on 
ships, and at the same time to take even 
further measures to help the Lebanese 
Armed Force develop itself and also, 
given the way the situation in Beirut was 
shifting, in which terrorism was rising as 
a threat to everybody, including 
ourselves, to put much more emphasis on 
training and efforts to deal with the ter- 
rorist threat. 

As that process was unfolding, the 
situation in Lebanon sort of deteriorated. 
So the redeployment that we had in mind 
never really quite matei-ialized. But it is a 
problem to have a terrorist act pei'- 
petrated against the United States and 
then to have all of this second guessing 
and changing of mind on the part of the 
Congress, no doubt reflecting many 
people's views, and having the Marines 
then leave. We've got to be clear with 
ourselves about that. 

Q. Thirty-seven senators, 211 con- 
gressmen. Senator Gary Hart, former 
Vice President Mondale, all favor a 
shift in the U.S. Embassy in Israel from 
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The President 
has suggested, but he has not made it 
entirely clear, that he would veto any 
legislation requiring such a shift. 
Would he, in fact, veto it? 

A. I think the main point is that those 
who are advocating that shift I can't 
believe have really thought the matter 
over very cai-efully. It would not serve 
the intei-ests of the United States to move 
our embassy. It would be a gigantic ag- 
gravation to important religions, par- 
ticularly the Muslims, the Islamic 
religion, and it would thereby damage the 
interests of the United States. It would 
damage our ability to be effective in the 
peace process, and so I think in a general 
way would be a mistake; a bad move to 
make. That is the point, and I'm glad to 
say that the President has kept his head 
about him in all this and is staying with 
that position. 



May 1984 



mmmummuumnmmmfmnu. mm 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Would the President veto legisla- 
tion requiring such a shift? 

A. I can tell you that the President is 
very much opposed to it and will not 
move that embassy. What he will do in a 
particular piece of legislation, I don't 
think it is wise for me to predict, but I 
know that he'll oi)pose that move. He has 
said so publicly, and he also said it to me 
in our private conversations. 

Q. Even if such legislation passes, 
whether or not there is a veto, he would 
find a way not to move the embassy. 

A. I think first of all it would be very 
bad for the United States if such legisla- 
tion passes, even if it doesn't become law, 
even if the President vetoes it, even if he 
refuses to move the embassy. It's a very 
bad signal across the world if something 
like that takes place. And my impression 
is that people in the Congi-ess are more 
and more having second thoughts about 
this and looking around for some way in 
which they might defuse this issue. 

Q. You said a moment ago that it 
was Congress that changed its mind on 
Lebanon. But isn't it also true that 
there were changes of mind within the 
Administration itself, condemning 
people who wanted to call for 
withdrawal in Congress and then 
deciding on withdrawal of the Ad- 
ministration itself? And didn't you. 
yourself, oppose this precipitous kind of 
withdrawal? 

A. There are many views within the 
Administration on most topics, and I 
think that's healthy, that there's a good 
strong debate. By the time the President 
made the decision he made, the situation 
itself had changed a lot. One of the 
reasons why it changed was that it was 
perfectly apparent to the Syrians, by 
reading our newspapers and watching our 
television reporting accurately on what 
was taking place in the Congress, that all 
they had to do was keep pushing and 
pretty soon the United States would, as 
they said, be short of breath and would 
drop out. And that changed the situation, 
that perception. 

Q. This raises a broader and more 
fundamental question. Presidents for 
the last two decades have been com- 
plaining about Congress— Democratic 
Presidents and Republican Presidents. 
What's the problem here? Is it with the 
product, the policy itself? Or the proc- 
ess? Is the process fundamentally 
flawed ? 

A. I think there will be tension, and 
that was the objective of having a system 
of checks and balances that's built into 
our Constitution. And 1 think it's good. 



And we should debate these things. I do, 
however, beheve that there has to be in 
this process, in the end, a capacity for 
decisiveness. And once a decision is made, 
to allow that decision to be implemented 
and carried forward in a consistent way. 

We can't be always creating the 
image, "Well, we decided this today, but 
a week from now maybe we'll have 
another vote and have a different out- 
come. 

Q. Did the Administration show 
decisiveness in Lebanon just because 
there were newspaper articles in the 
press and some questioning in Con- 
gress? Why didn't you stick it out 
anyway? 

A. We did stick it out until it was ap- 
parent that the situation had changed to 
the point where the kind of redeployment 
I described a moment ago was the sensi- 
ble way to proceed. However, over the 
preceding months, as one could see by 
following the negotiations going on, it was 
the uncertainty created by the situation 
in the United States that helped. I don't 
say it was totally responsible, but helped 
to change the situation. 

Q. Under the general subject of 
chemical weapons, a prominent scien- 
tist last week claimed that he had 
gathered material in Southeast Asia 
proving, as far as he was concerned, 
that what the Administration had 
claimed was yellow rain used against 
people in Southeast Asia was, in fact, 
bee excrement. Is there any possibility 
that any of the samples originally col- 
lected by the Administration were, in 
fact, bee excrement? 

A. This keeps coming up from time to 
time from various scientists; these points 
have been investigated very thoroughly. 
This has been gone into in great detail. 
It's been examined by our NATO allies, 
by people all around the world, and I 
don't think there is any real question 
about the fact that chemical warfare was 
used in Southeast Asia, it has been used 
in Afghanistan, and that's a tragedy. We 
see that it is also being used in the Iran- 
Iraq war, and I don't think there's any 
question about that. So the problem of the 
use of chemical weapons is a very serious 
problem. And we shouldn't trivialize it 
with this kind of nickel and diming of 
what are validated, firm findings. And 
we'd better concentrate on doing every- 
thing we can to keep this problem under 
control. 

Q. I know you're deeply concerned 
about the issue of state-supported ter- 
rorism, particularly the kind that Iran 
and Syria exported to Lebanon. The 



United States has tried to cover up but, 
I guess, made not much of a secret of 
the provision of mines to the rebels 
fighting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. 
In fact, also providing maps of the 
depths and channels of the ports. Isn't 
that the same thing? Isn't that state- 
supported terrorism? 

A. As far as Nicaragua is concerned, 
Nicaragua has a problem, because it has 
stolen its own revolution. It has not been 
true to what it set out to do. So it has 
created, within its own country, people 
who are bitterly disappointed at what is 
happening in that country. They've also 
been persecuting people, like the Meskito 
Indians. There are refugees— there are 
100,000 of them in Costa Rica. vSo they've 
created a problem for themselves and a 
reaction. And they're having to live with 
it. 

Q. What do you think about Senator 
Hart's suggestion that the United 
States should pull out of Central 
America? 

A. It's ridiculous. My gosh, this is an 
area of vital significance to the United 
States. It's an area where we're on the 
right side of things, where we are 
supporting democracy, where we're sup- 
porting the rule of law, where there are 
lots of people whom we want to help in 
their economic development, and we'd 
better stick with it. 



' Press release 108 of Apr. 9, 1984.1 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 

■BHHI 



AFRICA 



FY 1985 Foreign Assistance Requests 
for Sub-Sahara Africa 



by Princeton Lyman 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on February 7, 198i. Mr. 
Lyman is Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
present to this committee the underlying 
philosophy and objectives of the Ad- 
ministration's proposals for assistance to 
Africa in FY 1985 and for the FY 1984 
supplemental request for additional food 
aid to Africa. 



Overview 

Our Africa policy is an activist one, based 
on an appreciation of the importance of 
the continent to the United States. We 
are involved in joint efforts with others— 
our allies, international financial institu- 
tions, and, most importantly, African 
states themselves— to promote Africa's 
development and progress. We do not 
delude ourselves into believing that we 
are the only actor on this stage. Rather 
we are aware that we must work with 
others in cooperative ventures. In fact, as 
you know, the United States is not the 
principal bilateral donor to Africa. We 
rank behind France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The World Bank 
contributes more than we do. All of this 
places a high priority on donor coordina- 
tion, a principal focus of the Economic 
Policy Initiative (EPI) which we are pro- 
posing in this budget and which I will ex- 
plain further in a few moments. 

Our activities are multifaceted. We 
are prepared to use our diplomatic skills, 
where possible, to lessen regional ten- 
sions in Africa, tensions which can be ex- 
ploited by our own adversaries for their 
own purposes and to the detriment of 
peace in Africa. Our efforts within the 
contact group to bring Namibia to in- 
dependence under the terms of UN 
Security Council Resolution 435, to pro- 
mote peace among the states of southern 
Africa, and to enhance the possibilities for 
peaceful change within South Africa are 
important examples of our diplomatic ap- 
proach. 

We also realize, as does this commit- 
tee, that tangible resources must be com- 
mitted by the United States to promote 



development and stability in Africa. Our 
assistance efforts cover a broad spectrum 
from short-term emergency food and 
disaster relief to longer range develop- 
mental programs, from economic assist- 
ance to security assistance. We see all of 
these efforts as part of a unified approach 
which recognizes the interrelatedness of 
Africa's developmental concerns. 

A principal focus of our concern and 
efforts is the economic situation which ex- 
ists today in Africa. While the word 
"crisis" is often overutilized, it is not an 
exaggeration to talk about an African 
economic crisis which has profound 
political and social impacts on all Africans. 
This is not solely the view of the United 
States Government. It is equally the view 
of the Organization of African unity 
(OAU), the statement of African leaders 
in the Lagos plan of action, the African 
Development Bank, the World Bank, 
other major donors, and, most important 
of all, virtually are, to be sure, shadings of 
emphasis and different stresses on what 
should be done but none question the 
seriousness of the situation and the need 
for major changes in policy. We do not 
claim to have the ultimate answers, but 
we are determined to play a constructive 
and activist role in searching for solu- 
tions. 

Numbers sometimes have a deaden- 
ing effect on real perceptions, and nothing 
has a greater impact than seeing 
something personally. I have spent the 
past 20 years working on development, 
the last 12 on African problems, have 
lived there and visited frequently. The 
contrast between what is taking place in 
Africa and elsewhere in the world is pro- 
foundly disturbing and the situation 
shows little sign of improving. During the 
decade of the 1970s, a time of boom for 
many, per capita income in almost all 
African countries declined. At the end of 
the decade, average per capita income 
was $411, and for the low income coun- 
tries it was much less. Food production 
per capita declined by 10% over the 
decade. The 1980s have begun no better. 
In 1981 and 1982, GDP in sub-Saharan 
Africa, excluding Nigeria, grew by 
less than 2%. If one includes Nigeria, the 
growth rate was about zero. This means 
that per capita income is still dropping in 
the 1980s and in some cases plummeting. 
Food production continues to stagnate 



and food imports to grow, but the latter is 
no solution in the absence of adequate 
foreign exchange to pay for imports. 

In a report issued last year, the 
Economic Commission for Africa stated 
that: "The picture that emerges from the 
analysis of the perspective of the African 
region by the year 2008 under the 
historical trend scenario is almost a 
nightmare." 

It is always appealing to search for a 
single "villain, " just as it is natural to 
look for a signal panacea, but both rarely 
exi.st, and they certainly don't apply to 
Africa. Drought, world recession, high in- 
terest rates, and deteriorating terms of 
trade have all contributed to the current 
crisis, and there is the temptation to 
blame calamities on outside forces. The 
truth is probably more blurred. Certainly 
external factors have had a major impact 
though world economic recovery will help 
in this regard. However, the key to 
change in Africa remains the domestic 
economic policy framework in each coun- 
try. 

I agree with the World Bank which 
characterized the African economic crisis 
overwhelmingly as a production crisis. To 
quote: "It is a crisis which has arisen 
from the widespread adoption of struc- 
tures of prices and incomes which have 
provided inappropriate production incen- 
tives. In particular they have provided in- 
adequate incentives to agricultural pro- 
ducers and this has been aggi-avated by 
the development of costly and inefficient 
marketing systems for both inputs and 
outputs." 

None of this is intended to minimize 
the extent of the inherent difficulties 
Africans face in the task of national 
development. Africa is diverse and vast. 
It is a region of Balkanized economics 
almost all with vei-y limited internal 
markets, with unbalanced resource bases 
which can often only be linked by very 
high-cost transport. 

Measured by the balance of payments, 
debts, production levels, and other 
economic indicators, 1983. probably pro- 
duced few positive signs. However, we do 
see significant though gradual changes in 
attitudes and policies which, we believe, 
hold great hope for the future. Whether 
one is talking about Somalia, Senegal, 
Sudan, Guinea, Zambia, Ghana, Zaii-e, or 
Mali; to name only a few, there is a search 



May 1984 






AFRICA 



for new and pragmatic policies which are 
less ideological and more effective. This is 
reflected in more realistic exchange rates, 
changes in pricing policies to allow 
greater income for farmers and other pro- 
ducers, cutbacks in government expen- 
ditures which do not advance develop- 
ment, and many other actions, all de- 
signed to change the economic situation. 
The process is slow and painful, and it 
takes great political courage for many 
governments to initiate these changes. 
This is particularly true because Africa's 
present economic problems are cumula- 
tive and complex. The process is, none- 
theless, underway in many African coun- 
tries, and it is one to which we should 
lend support 

Economic Assistance 

Our specific economic and security 
assistance proposals are carefully con- 
structed to complement each other to the 
degree possible and to respond to Africa's 
most pressing needs. Thus our food pro- 
grams address immediate, often emer- 
gency, requirements, but local currencies 
which some of these programs generate 
are used for economic development, and 
policy reform requirements are tied to 
certain of the non-emergency programs. 
We are requesting separately a $90 
million supplemental for this fiscal year 
for emergency food assistance for Africa. 
It is our judgment that this is sufficient to 
meet our share of pending requests. 

Development assistance in Africa is a 
major instrument for progress and for im- 
proved economic management. Economic 
support funds (ESF) are used both for 
long-term development and for shorter- 
term support to countries of particular 
importance to the United States. Military 
equipment and training programs foster 
stability and security in threatened 
friendly countries. Five of every six 
dollars of aid we give to Africa is 
economic rather than military. This is not 
to suggest that the security assistance is 
less relevant but rather that the conti- 
nent's needs are overwhelmingly 
economic. 

In PL 480 for FY 1985, we are re- 
questing $148.5 million for the Title I con- 
cessional sales program and $83.2 million 
for Title II humanitarian food aid (plus 
emergency food aid). These levels repre- 
sent an increase of 12% in Title I and a 
decrease in Title II from the much higher 
levels emerging for 1984 as the full scope 
of Africa's immediate food crisis emerges. 
We are hopeful that the drought will 
break by FY 1985. If it does not, we ex- 
pect to be back for additional Title II 
resources at that time. 



Our FY 1985 request for development 
assistance for sub-Saharan Africa totals 
$355.2 million, including the Sahel pro- 
gram. This is a 12.5% increase over the 
1983 level and a 2.5%. increase over the 
current year. This figure does not include 
the $75 million of development assistance 
requested as initial year funding for the 
Economic Policy Initiative for Africa. 

We are requesting $391.5 million in 
economic support funds for FY 1985, an 
increase of 47% over 1983 and of 16% over 
the current year level. As Africa's 
economic crisis grows deeper, the need 
for flexible assistance gi'ows greater. In 
Africa, ESF is generally used to deter 
critical economic deterioration in coun- 
tries of particular importance to the 
United States. Depending on the country 
context, ESF can be used for direct finan- 
cial support, for commodity imports, or 
for developmental activities. 

For instance, our ESP support in 
Djibouti, which is of strategic interest to 
us and to our Western allies, funds 
development activities in fisheries, skills 
training, health, nutrition, and housing. 
In Sudan our ESF purchases essential 
commodity imports to help Sudan over- 
come a foreign exchange crisis, provide 
inputs for local production, and support 
economic reforms within the context of an 
agreed international progi-am coordinated 
by the World Bank. In Senegal ESF 
finances commodity imports and a rural 
roads maintenance progi-am. In Liberia it 
provides support to the Liberian Govern- 
ment as it copes wdth severe financial 
problems and as it proceeds along the 
path to a restoration of constitutional rule 
ne.xt year. In Zambia our ESF supports 
development activities in agricultural 
training and institutional development 
and provides essential commodity im- 
ports. 

Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) 

A major new element of our proposal for 
this fiscal year is the Economic Policy Ini- 
tiative. What is it and how is it similar to 
and different from our other assistance 
programs? The essential structure of our 
request to Congress is that we expect to 
seek $500 million over a 5-year period, 
with a $75 million request in FY 1985. 
Unlike other assistance funding, these ap- 
propriations would not be allocated in 
advance to specific countries or specific 
activities. While we have reached no deci- 
sions on any specific prospective 
recipient, we plan to limit the total 
number of recipients to a few countries 
each year. There is no magic number, but 
a large number would tend to dissipate 
the purpose of the initiative. 



As I noted earlier, many African 
countries are in the process of attempting 
to introduce significant economic policy 
reforms. Each country's problems are dif- 
ferent, and we do not seek to impose rigid 
guidelines. Given the overwhelmingly 
agricultural nature of Africa, one could 
expect most EPI activities to be in this 
sector. We might wish to support a 
government's decision to turn existing 
centrally controlled and inefficient 
cooperatives into true cooperatives con- 
trolled by their members. In such a case, 
we might offer to finance technical 
assistance or provide inputs, spare parts, 
etc. Or, where a country decided to in- 
troduce more realistic pricing policies 
which should induce greater agricultural 
production but faiTn-to-market roads and 
transport had disintegrated, we might 
contribute to their rehabilitation. Our 
assistance, therefore, would usually be 
sector directed. 

I would stress that we are under no il- 
lusions that our $75 million will solve the 
problems of Africa or even of selected 
countries. They will, however, be syn- 
chronized with our aid efforts which are 
ten times the size of the EPI. Moreover, 
and key to the success of the initiative, is 
its multilateral dimension. The World 
Bank and many major donors share our 
view on the need for policy reform in con- 
nection with outside assistance. We 
already have multilateral groups in about 
20 African countries, but theii- effec- 
tiveness varies wadely. We only give 
10-15% of total assistance to Africa- 
somewhat more if multilateral contribu- 
tions are considered— and so we must 
work with others more effectively if prog- 
ress is to be made. We shall take their 
views into consideration and be prepared 
to adjust our activities, as we hope others 
will also be prepared to do. The EPI can 
only serve its intended catalytic purpose 
if the community of donors works closely 
together and with the African countries 
which become involved. We have not 
preselected those countries. Theii" selec- 
tion will be based on criteria such as the 
climate for effective reform, the commit- 
ment to such reforms of the political 
leadership, and the probability that coor- 
dinated donor support and some in- 
cremental donor resources could create 
an environment within which the reforms 
envisaged can be achieved. The World 
Bank has agreed to play a leading role in 
donor coordination; other donors with 
which we have discussed the initiative in 
general terms are supportive. 

To summarize the EPI is both similar 
to and different from other forms of 
assistance. Its uniqueness is its flexibility. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



AFRICA 



potential responsiveness to African 
needs, and multilateral character. Yet it 
is an extension of and ingredient of our 
overall effort. It would be the capstone to 
efforts already underway in some African 
countries to implement reforms to reduce 
the role of the state, increase incentives 
to production, and begin the difficult 
process of i-estructuring. I hope that you 
will find it as positive as and stimulating 
as have the Africans and other govern- 
ments with which we have consulted. 

Refugee Relief 

No discussion of Africa can ignore the 
question of refugees. As in past years, the 
tJ.S. Government will be a major con- 
tributor to the solution of refugee prob- 
lems in Africa in FY 1985. The State 
Department budget request includes a 
total of approximately $60 million for 
refugees in Africa; to that should be 
added the estimated $10 million which the 
Agency for International Development 
(AID) e.xpects to spend in refugee food 
assistance and money remaining from the 
previous special authorizations for 
refugee resettlement, which will depend 
on actual expenditures during the re- 
mainder of FY 1984. The funding now 
planned is sufficient, in combination with 
the efforts of other donors, to meet relief 
needs, absent any new, large, refugee 
movements. 

In most cases (the major exceptions 
being the recent movement of Banyar- 
wandan refugees from Uganda into 
Rwanda and Tanzania and the recently in- 
creased flows of Ethiopians into Sudan) 
the refugee situation in Africa has 
stabilized somewhat and has passed the 
stage of emergency relief. Our efforts 
must focus more on enhancing the pros- 
pects for voluntary repatriation and on in- 
tegrating refugee programs into the 
overall development needs of the coun- 
tries of first asylum, where prospects for 
repatriation are poor. 

The coordination of a multidonor 
response and a focus on infrastructure 
and development in countries of asylum 
are major elements of the upcoming sec- 
ond International Conference on 
Assistance to Refugees in Africa 
(ICARA II). 

Security Assistance 

Just as Africa's economy is an integral 
part of the global system, Africa's 
political stability is affected both by inter- 
nal problems and by non- African in- 
fluences. Dangerous security threats con- 



tinue to affect African nations already 
hard hit by the adverse climate and 
economic conditions. 

Our efforts and those of our allies and 
friends to help African nations to over- 
come their economic problems do not 
exist, in a political vacuum. Where serious 
security problems exist, they, too, must 
be addressed effectively or else there is 
little point in pursuing economic 
recovery. Our balanced approach to 
assisting our African friends recognizes 
this reality. We consult with them and 
our allies to detennine how best to meet 
threats of e.xtemal aggression, and in 
several cases externally instigated 
subversion, with the least disruption to 
the human and material resources being 
mobilized for economic recovery and 
development. 

Our FY 1985 security assistance re- 
quests reflect this carefully balanced ap- 
proach rather dramatically. 

Fii'st, our military assistance requests 
are heavily concentrated in the areas of 
greatest strategic concern, mainly 
eastern and southern Africa, for which we 
have made over 80% of our military 
assistance program (MAP) requests. 

Second, in a few countries— Sudan, 
Somalia, Kenya, and Liberia— we play a 
prominent security assistance role, but in 
most countries we supplement largei- 
security assistance programs provided by 
our allies, such as in Chad, Niger, 
Senegal, and Zaire. 

Third, in FY 1985 we completed the 
sharp switch from foreign military (FMS) 
loan to MAP grant assistance begun in 
FY 1983 in response to the deep financial 
crisis our African friends face. In FY 1983 
we sought $37.7 million in FMS loans for 
eight countries, in FY 1984 we have $29.5 
million in FMS loans for six countries, 
while for FY 1985 we seek only $10 
million total FMS loans for just two coun- 
tries. In effect, MAP has now replaced 
FMS loans. 

Fourth, our foreign assistance re- 
quests remain overwhelmingly economic 
($1,053 billion; 83.3%) over military 
($211.63 million; 16.7%), with a ratio of 
more than 5 to 1 in FY 1985. 

As with economic assistance, 
however, our Western allies cannot bear 
the African security assistance burden 
alone. The security assistance portion of 
our assistance is a basic part of the foun- 
dation of cooperation on which rests the 
larger, combined Western effort to help 
Africa survive economically. 

We are also careful as to the tj-pe of 
equipment provided and the need for 
basic defensive capabilities, not offensive 
weaponry. In Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, 
Zaire, Liberia, and elsewhere on the con- 
tinent, American assistance has helped 



African armies in the crucial areas of 
training and logistics. We are encouraged 
by progress in the longstanding problems 
with the F-5 squadron in Kenya and the 
C-130 program in Zaire. Significant im- 
provements in the logistical and main- 
tenance procedures of the Somali Army 
are another area of positive change 
brought about by our programs. 

Two 1985 initiatives waiTant mention. 
First, recognizing the important role that 
African armies can play in national 
development— by providing engineering, 
construction, disaster relief, and health 
services to the civilian population— we are 
proposing a modest program of civic ac- 
tion activities. 

Included within the civic action ini- 
tiative is a program to assist African na- 
tions to patrol and protect their fishing 
grounds. As we all know, many African 
coastal states do not have the necessary 
facilities to protect their ow^^ exclusive 
economic zones from poaching and over- 
fishing by others, notably Soviet bloc na- 
tions. A limited amount of funds will be 
directed toward assisting these nations to 
improve their patrolling and enforcement 
capabilities. This program will be coor- 
dinated with developmental assistance ef- 
forts designed to give the same nations 
greater ability to take advantage them- 
selves of their own ocean resources. 

The other 1985 initiative, as I men- 
tioned earlier, is placing the majority of 
our security assistance in the form of 
grant aid under the MAP and less under 
FMS credits. In conjunction with this 
switch to MAP is an Administration pro- 
posal to put a portion of FMS credits on 
budget, thereby allowing the Administra- 
tion to offer concessional credits to those 
countries which can afford to repay loans, 
but not high market interest rates. 

An analysis of the Administration's 
request for military assistance for Africa 
reveals that, with the exception of inter- 
national military education and training 
(IMET), our request has actually declined 
from FY 1983. In 1983 we requested $234 
million in military assistance; we received 
$117 million. In 1984 we requested $201.5 
million and received $149 million, an in- 
crease over 1983 but still short of the re- 
quested level. Nevertheless an important 
feature of the 1983 progi-am was that we 
began to make the switch to MAP grants 
from FMS credits. This trend continued 
in 1984, and in 1985 we are requesting 
almost all grant assistance. For 1985 we 
have proposed $109.5 million in MAP and 
$10 million in FMS concessional credits. 
This total is actually $1 million less than 
the 1984 requests; it is, however, an in- 
crease of approximately $51 million over 
the actual 1984 allocation. 



May 1984 



mmmmmmi 



AFRICA 



The exception to this trend is in the 
IMET account. In 1983 we requested $8.7 
million and received $7.3 million; in 1984 
we requested $9.8 million and received 
$8.8 milion. We are requesting $11.1 
million for 1985. We continue to feel very 
strongly that IMET is our most valuable 
tool in dealing with the African military 
establishments. Not only do we have a 
chance to interact with and train officers 
and noncommissioned officers in the 
United States, but we are able to field 
mobile training teams to go out to in- 
dividual countries to train a large number 
of military in the basic skills required to 
organize and maintain an ai-med force. 
This training reduces the costs of the 
military establishments and adds to then- 
sen.se of pride and professionalism. We 
have received nothing but praise in Africa 
for the IMET program. We hope that 
Congi-ess will continue to fund the pro- 
gram at the request level. 

Sub-Regional Perspective 

The congressional presentation docu- 
ments for development and security 
assistance provide you with overview 
summaries for Africa and descriptions of 
individual country programs. Since, 
however, sub-Saharan Africa is so large 
and involves so many countries, it might 
be useful now to look at some key fea- 
tures of these programs from the perspec- 
tive of the subregions of western, central, 
eastern, and southern Africa. My brief 
overview will highlight our security 
assistance goals and progi-ams in conjunc- 
tion with the underlying goals of our 
economic assistance. We should also bear 
in mind that in most African countries our 
assistance programs supplement larger 
ones provided by our allies, the World 
Bank and IMF, and several major Arab 
donors. 

West Africa. West Africa is an area 
of endemic poverty and political instabil- 
ity whose continued deterioration could 
have serious consequences for our in- 
terests. Major U.S. objectives in the area 
are to: 

• Assi.st in long-temi development 
and the immediate crisis of hunger when 
it occurs; 

• Promote regional political stability 
by helping governments to resist exter- 
nal—mainly Libyan— adventurism and de- 
stabilization; 

• Foster our continued access to im- 
portant raw materials and markets (e.g., 
Nigeria, which is both an important and 
relatively secure major source of oil and 



an important locus of U.S. investments; 
Guinea with its important bauxite 
reserves); and 

• Continue our access to important 
sea and air sites and facilities. 

While the American presence and aid 
levels in the 16 countries of West Africa 
generally are not large compared with 
other Western and Arab donors, they are 
significant. In Senegal, for example, our 
progi-ams are designed to bolster a 
friendly democratic government. In addi- 
tion to providing Senegal the largest 
amount of U.S. development assistance in 
francophone Africa, we are using ESF to 
assist Senegal to meet balance-of- 
payments and cuiTent account deficits 
consistent with Senegal's IMF standby 
perfoiTnance. Our assistance programs, 
which have also been coordinated with 
France, Senegal's largest donor, are 
designed to enable the Senegalese to 
undertake significant economic reforms, 
particularly in the agi-icultural sector. We 
also seek to continue a modest but highly 
valued $3 million MAP program in FY 
1985 to augment Senegal's capability to 
resist Libyan subversion. Our highly suc- 
cessful IMET progi'am trains about 30 of 
ficers of Senegal's apolitical, professional 
aiTned forces in the United States. We 
believe that this mix of programs in FY 
1985 will assist this friend of the United 
States to initiate policy reforms and to 
preserve stability in the key area in 
Africa. 

In Liberia, where the United States is 
by far the largest aid donor, our ESF, 
development assistance, and MAP pro- 
grams have enabled the government to 
withstand serious deflationary pressure 
caused by a precipitous fall in demand for 
its major exports. Our assistance pro- 
grams to Liberia are part of a carefully 
balanced approach aimed at promoting 
economic recovery and political stability 
in a nation that has close ties with the 
United States. Our ESF is disbursed in 
close cooperation with the IMF. 

U.S. and IMF assistance on the 
economic front has also allowed the 
Liberian Government to make progress in 
its goal of returning the country to 
civilian, constitutional government by 
April 1985. An elections timetable has 
been announced and a new constitution 
drafted. The United States and other 
Western nations are assisting this effort 
through technical and financial assistance. 
Through the MAP-funded military hous- 
ing construction program, we hope to 
eliminate a grievance that contributed to 
the 1980 coup and encourage the retuni 
to civilian rule. 



Our other development assistance 
programs are concentrated in food pro- 
duction programs designed to induce 
needed policy reforms and reduce the 
need for food imports. Evidence of impor- 
tant policy reform can be seen in coun- 
tries such as Senegal, Mali, and Niger and 
the beginnings of policy reform in such 
countries as Sierra Leone and Guinea 
Bissau. 

In Ghana, where strained political 
relations necessitated a suspension of aid 
programs, the government has now im- 
plemented difficult economic reforms in 
cooperation with the IMF. Our recently 
reinstated aid program is providing im- 
portant assistance in food production, and 
U.S. emergency food aid is playing a ma- 
jor role in averting widespread, drought- 
induced famine. Emergency food aid is 
also playing a major role in Mauritania, 
Senegal, and elsewhere in the Sahel. 

In all of the examples cited there is a 
common thread— of helping poor people 
and vulnerable governments to better 
help themselves by undertaking needed 
policy reform, concentrating development 
efforts on increased food production, and 
providing, where needed, military assist- 
ance to help resist outside efforts at 
destabilization. 

Central Africa. Our security and 
political objectives in the central African 
region are to: 

• Help maintain political stability and 
foster friendly relations; 

• Assist governments to resist Soviet 
and Libyan destabilization, particularly in 
Chad; and 

• Provide key countries vnth security 
assistance needed for legitimate self- 
defense. 

Our economic objectives are to assist 
governments in pursuing effective 
economic and development poUcies, en- 
courage food production, and provide 
emergency food aid where needed. 

The United States has a major policy 
stake in ensuring an independent Chad in 
the face of direct Libyan aggression. 
Libyan occupation of Chad in 1980-81 
created serious fears throughout the 
region and led to strong African reaction. 
Unfortunately, Libya entered Chad again 
in force in 1983 threatening the recog- 
nized government. Our security 
assistance support for Chad is designed to 
complement the efforts of France, which 
has the primary role in assisting Chad's 
security. Because of its shattered 
economic base, Chad needs fast disburs- 
ing ESF to restore civilian services and 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



development activity, as well as MAP to 
strengthen its capabilities to face con- 
tinued Libyan-sponsored attacks. 

On the security front, Zaire has been 
a firm friend and has supported United 
States policies; it contributes substan- 
tially to stability in central Africa. It cur- 
rently has troops in Chad to help that 
nation defend itself from the Libyan inva- 
sion. The visits to Zaire of Israeli Presi- 
dent Herzog last month and Egyptian 
President Mubarak this month attest to 
Zaire's valued support for the Camp 
David peace process. A neighbor of 
conflict-ridden Angola, Zaire is equally a 
critical country in the search for peaceful 
resolution of southern African conflicts. 
Zaire's military has long been under- 
funded, and our MAP program is de- 
signed to get Zaire programs back on 
their feet, particularly in the key airlift 
area. 

Zaire has taken major steps to reform 
its economy. The marketing of copper and 
cobalt has been reorganized to ensure 
that the state mining enterprise, 
Gecamines, receives the revenues from 
its exports so that it can rebuild its 
capital base and undertake new in- 
vestments. Early last year Zaii-e's an- 
ticorruption campaign resulted in the 
dismissal of a number of civil servants. In 
1983 Zaire also successfully implemented 
several key reforms sought by the IMF. 
These include an 80% devaluation of the 
Zaire and a floating e.xchange rate de- 
signed to prevent the Zaire from becom- 
ing overvalued again, controls on wage in- 
creases, and the liberalization of price 
controls. The budget deficit has been 
brought under control in spite of low ta.x 
revenues because of severely depressed 
copper and cobalt prices. The success of 
these reforms led the IMF to approve 
$350 million in new drawings for Zaire 
and official creditors to reschedule Zaire's 
debt in December. Later in December the 
World Bank sponsored a consultative 
group on Zaire during which it urged 
donors to lend more support to the prog- 
ress being made. 

Now that Zaire has taken these steps 
to help itself, our FY 1985 request is to 
help Zaire to continue to meet its reform 
goals. By doing so, we help prevent the 
refoiTn effort from stalling and lay the 
groundwork for longer term and more 
equitable economic development. 

Cameroon provides the example of 
building on success. It is one of the few 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa which is 
self-sufficient in food production. Its 
policies have been conducive to sound 
development programs, including em- 
phasis on the private sector and active en- 



couragement of foreign investment. 
Cameroon's petroleum resources have 
contributed in large measure to the coun- 
try's relative prosperity, but since its 
petroleum reserves are limited, 
Cameroon's long-term economic viability 
rests on agriculture. Thus, we have 
targeted our development assistance in 
Cameroon to ensuring continued self- 
sufficiency in food production. Projects 
are focused on two related sectors- 
agriculture and rural education. 

With a proposed budget of $20 million 
in FY 1984 and $21.42 million in FY 1985, 
our economic aid emphasis is on the con- 
struction of an agricultural university and 
the design of its programs, as well as 
work in primary education with children 
who will be staying in the rural areas 
rather than migi-ating to the cities and 
seeking higher education there. 

Our FY 1985 security assistance pro- 
gram is modest ($5 million FMS loans, 
$200,000 IMET) aimed at technical train- 
ing and ground transport vehicles. 
Cameroon borders on Chad, and seeks to 
impi'ove the mobility and efficiency of its 
modest defense forces. 

IMET progi-ams in most of the central 
African countries are designed to provide 
United States examples, training, and 
skills to key military leaders. 

East Africa. East Africa plays an in- 
tegral part in our security cooperation ar- 
rangements for the protection of U.S. in- 
terests in Southwest Asia. The continuing 
support of the countries of this region is 
critical for the success in meeting our 
strategic objectives. 

Our economic and security assistance 
is programmed to strengthen the growth 
and internal stability of East African 
countries and improve their ability to de- 
fend themselves against external aggres- 
sion. A number of countries— including 
Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Madagas- 
car—have undertaken tight, much needed 
economic adjustment progi-ams to 
establish a stronger basis for self- 
sustaining growth. Two coun- 
tries—Somalia and Madagascar— are in 
the process of correcting severe economic 
distortions under socialized regimes. This 
month, for example, Somalia announced 
plans to switch to free market production 
and pricing for agriculture. Our 
assistance is crucial to assuring the suc- 
cess of these reforms in promoting longer 
term economic recovery. It relies, in 
several cases, on quick-disbursing ESF 
grants which close balance-of-payments 
gaps and provide the catalysts for finan- 
cial assistance from other donors as well 



AFRICA 



as assistance complementary to that from 
international organizations such as the 
IMF and Worid Bank. 

Our progi-am in Sudan is an excellent 
example of how U.S. assistance, as part of 
a concerted international effort, is effec- 
tively meeting immediate needs while 
promoting longer term economic reform. 

For the last 2 years, the United 
States has played a leading role in an ex- 
traordinary international effort, both 
among official donors in the World Bank- 
chaired consultative group and among 
bilateral creditors in the Paris Club, 
which has mobilized resources to enable 
Sudan to meet recurring payments for im- 
ports essential to development and other 
obligations. Through quick-disbursing 
commodity import program funds and, 
when necessary, cash grants, we have 
played a central role in helping Sudan 
closely manage its economic resources 
within the guidelines of its IMF and con- 
sultative group programs. Our ESF and 
PL 480 assistance has been conditioned 
on the Sudanese undertaking basic 
economic reforms to expand opportunities 
and competitiveness in the private sector, 
liberalize commodity pricing, and provide 
incentives for export production. 

Our development assistance projects, 
meanwhile, have addressed the problem 
of expanding productivity, especially in 
the agricultural sector, and improving 
public sector management to strengthen 
leadership skills for longer term growth. 
In response the Sudanese Government 
has removed budget subsidies on con- 
sumer commodities and devalued the of- 
ficial exchange rate 45%. Farm gate 
prices on government-operated irrigation 
were increased substantially and cost 
distortions eliminated to stimulate cotton 
production, the major export crop. The 
government's strict adherence to a World 
Bank-approved investment program has 
focused public investment in essential 
areas. These are major short- and long- 
term structural reform accomplishments 
for the country which, in terms of propor- 
tional magnitude of debt, is the African 
equivalent to Brazil or Mexico in Latin 
America. Our FY 1985 requests build on 
these achievements. They enable us to 
continue to play a leading role in the in- 
ternational effort to assist Sudan to come 
back from the abyss of banki-uptcy and 
default to undertaking the long and dif- 
ficult road to recovery. 

Continual instability and external 
threats in the region increase the 
pressure on East African countries to 
develop effective defensive forces. Sudan 
continues to be threatened by subversion 
from within and without by forces and 



May 1984 
^mmmmmm 



47 



:i ':".U: ';'!(;', i't-^f'/:. 



'M 



AFRICA 



elements supported by Libya. The grow- 
ing security problem on two borders and 
in the south— by dissidents and ban- 
dits—exacerbates the internal political 
tasks of the government. Our security 
assistance in 1985 is vital for Sudan to 
control its borders and manage its own 
destiny. 

Somalia is still engaged in an active 
border conflict with Ethiopia. Ethiopian 
troops still occupy two Somali villages, 
Ethiopians recently bombed a Somah 
town, and tensions remain great. Our 
assistance to Somalia is no threat to other 
countries but essential to Somalia in 
covering its long borders and deterring 
insurgent and external attacks. 

Kenya occupies an important position 
on the Indian Ocean in proximity to world 
energy sources in Southwest Asia. Our 
national security objective is to ensure 
our continued access to the region in time 
of crisis. To do this, we must continue to 
contribute to Kenya's economic develop- 
ment, stability, and military prepared- 
ness. Kenya permits U.S. Navy ships ac- 
cess to its port facilities, the only modern 
working port between Durban and Port 
Said. This access provides our vessels 
with fuel, provisions, repair facilities, and 
crew liberty and has made a major con- 
tribution toward the continued deploy- 
ment of our naval forces in the western 
Indian Ocean. 

In contrast to many African nations, 
Kenya has a mixed economy, and its 
governmental traditions are patterned 
after the Western democratic model. 
Kenya, like most other African countries, 
however, is struggling through a severe 
economic crisis, brought on by the world- 
wide recession coupled with Kenya's own 
serious economic structural weaknesses. 
Kenya has taken tough measures to cure 
its critical balance-of-payments and 
foreign exchange deficits through devalu- 
ation, import reductions, and budget cuts. 



Fortunately, assistance from the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the world donor com- 
munity in support of Kenya's short- and 
long-term reform efforts is proving suc- 
cessful, as affirmed in the recent con- 
sultative group meeting. 

Southern Africa. Southern Africa is 
of substantial strategic and economic im- 
portance to the United States. We are 
engaged there in a major diplomatic effort 
to bring about the independence of 
Namibia under UN Secui-ity Council 
Resolution 435 and a situation of peace 
among countries suffering from a cycle of 
violence. We have seen progress in these 
objectives and in our relationships with 
all the countries of the region aimed at 
achieving this objective. But we have still 
major efforts ahead of us. The area has 
vast development potential. However, 
this potential can never be achieved as 
long as the problem of war, economic 
disruption, racism, and foreign interven- 
tion persist. Our objectives in the region 
are designed to address these problems 
through enhanced regional security, 
economic development, peaceful change, 
and a movement in South Africa away 
from apartheid and toward a system of 
governance based on the consent of all 
the governed. Our assistance programs 
are targeted at achieving these goals and 
allowing the area to resolve its difficulties 
and develop without outside interference, 
especially from Soviet bloc nations. 

In Zambia the government has under- 
taken a series of difficult economic re- 
forms necessitated by the depressed 
world mineral prices and the decline in 
other sectors such as agriculture. Om* 
proposed aid program for FY 1985 would 
continue to assist Zambia's economic 
recovery through the commodity import 
program and development of the 
agricultural sector. 

In Zimbabwe, our aid is helping this 
new country to recover from a lengthy 



war and to stay on a sound economic 
footing. Our efforts are focused on the 
private sector, where an invaluable com- 
modity import program has alleviated 
balance-of-pajTnents and foreign ex- 
change limitations that otherwise would 
have stalled industrial and commercial 
recovery. 

In Mozambique we are beginning an 
assistance program through our regional 
program and deepening our involvement 
in combatting the famine from drought 
and cyclone. Mozambique has become one 
of the largest recipients worldwide of 
U.S. emergency assistance. 

Our security assistance program in 
Botswana is helping to build a small, effi- 
cient, and mobile defense force capable of 
maintaining territorial integrity by con- 
trolling movement across its long 
borders. 

Throughout the region we are helping 
the majority-ruled nations of the area to 
improve regional economic integration by- 
developing better infrastructure. 

In South Africa we will continue to 
focus our efforts on human development 
and the provision of educational oppor- 
tunities for those who have been disad- 
vantaged by apartheid. These projects 
cuiTently include scholarships for aca- 
demic training in-country and in the 
United States, managerial and trade 
union training, and significant self-help 
and human rights projects. We also are 
considering other possible programs 
aimed at the same important goals. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published bv the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



Security Policy 
and Arms Control 

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Address before a regional foreign 
policy conference in Birmingham on 
March 22, 198U- Ambassador 
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. 

Security policy and arms control are 
complex, difficult, and often extremely 
boring subjects. You have undoubtedly 
read the numbers and seen the graphs 
and clever illustrations in newspapers, 
magazines, and on television that try to 
explain these numbers. But numbers and 
graphs inevitably fail to explain that in 
arms control negotiations we often com- 
pare apples and oranges, or more pre- 
cisely, planes, missiles, and submarines; 
that we are negotiating the well-being 
and perhaps even the survival of inde- 
pendent nations; and that in doing so we 
encompass very real human hopes and 
fears. 

Arms control negotiations— indeed, 
armaments levels as a whole— are basi- 
cally a reflection of the broader reality of 
relations between nations, rather than 
the determinant of those relations. They 
reflect the way in which we view our 
place in the world, as well as our percep- 
tion of how world events and trends af- 
fect us now or may affect us in the 
future. Although there is a tendency to 
compartmentalize arms control and al- 
though its newsworthiness has made it a 
premier object of our attentions, we 
should not make the mistake of confus- 
ing it with the totality of foreign policy. 
Rather, arms control is but one com- 
ponent—albeit an important one— of a 
broadly based policy that must encom- 
pass not only our bilateral relations vdth 
a competing superpower but our global 
interests as well. 

Today, I would like to leave the 
numbers and the graphs to the technical 
experts and speak about the principles 
which shape our approach to security 
policy, and how those principles are re- 
flected in some specific positions of this 
Administration. I will focus on nuclear 
issues, because these are understandably 
of greatest public concern. 

In doing so, I cannot stress too 
strongly that arms control is not an 
alternative to modernizing our nuclear 
forces. Rather, maintaining adequate 



nuclear forces on the one hand— and this 
includes replacing older, obsolete technol- 
ogies—and achieving sound arms control 
agreements on the other are mutually 
dependent and mutually reinforcing 
policies. Sound, verifiable arms control 
agreements can make force planning 
more predictable, and, therefore, help us 
make better decisions about what kinds 
of weapons we need. Yet a clear commit- 
ment on our part to match Soviet force 
improvements is a necessary incentive to 
Soviet seriousness in arms control nego- 
tiations. The experience of massive 
Soviet buildups during a period of U.S. 
restraint in the late 1960s and early 
1970s makes all too clear that Moscow 
will seize unilateral advantage if possible. 

Principles Shaping U.S. Policy 

Let me now come to the principles I 
promised. 

The first is that military power is 
an essential part of diplomacy. This is 
always a difficult principle for us as 
Americans to accept. One hears— for in- 
stance, from critics of our Middle East 
policy— that we must look for diplomatic 
rather than military solutions to interna- 
tional problems. But we must get it 
through our heads that history has long 
since taught that diplomacy does not and 
cannot exist in isolation from national 
power. Power, of course, takes several 
forms— economic, political, social, moral, 
and military— and diplomacy at its best 
entails the most effective use of aU of 
these factors in combination. But mili- 
tary power is an inescapable part of the 
equation. 

The actual use of military force must, 
of course, be a last resort for the United 
States. But it must be clear to all that 
we are prepared, under certain circum- 
stances, to use that force. Our own vul- 
nerability to nuclear blackmail, the sus- 
ceptibility of our friends to intimidation, 
the image of U.S. strength, and the per- 
ception of U.S. commitments, all rest in 
part on the credibility of U.S. military 
forces. 

This is especially so given the nature 
of the Soviet Union, whose economy is 
weak and faltering; whose society sets an 
example for virtually no one in our con- 
temporary world; and whose moral be- 



havior will win it no peace prizes except 
the ones it has invented for itself. 
Because of such limitations, military 
force— whether actually applied, as in 
Afghanistan and Eastern Europe by the 
Soviet Union and elsewhere by its prox- 
ies, or merely threatened— play an over- 
whelming role in Soviet diplomacy. Thus 
in a world in which the Soviet Union is 
one of the two most powerful actors, 
military force continues vitally to shape 
international politics. 

The second, and for Americans 
most fundamental, principle of secu- 
rity policy, is that our purpose is to 
prevent war, and especially nuclear 
war, from occurring. As President 
Reagan has said time and again, a nu- 
clear war cannot be won and must never 
be fought. 

Preventing war is every bit as much 
the goal of our force modernization pro- 
grams as of our arms control efforts. The 
policy of deterrence— of maintaining 
forces which make clear to any potential 
aggressor that the cost to him of starting 
a war would be far greater than any- 
thing he could hope to gain— has not 
changed throughout the postwar period. 

However uncomfortable the balance 
of terror may make us, we should never 
forget how well it has worked. As Henry 
Kissinger recently reminded a group of 
Western leaders, it has been no accident 
that all wars in the nuclear age have oc- 
curred where there were no American 
nuclear weapons. Since 1945 the 
American deterrent has helped prevent 
direct conflict between ourselves and the 
Soviet Union and brought Europe the 
longest period of peace in the 20th cen- 
tury. If the avoidance of nuclear war is a 
moral imperative, and if the maintenance 
of a nuclear deterrent is in large mea- 
sure responsible for the fact that we 
have not had to fight a nuclear war, then 
how is it possible for some to argue that 
nuclear deterrence is an immoral policy? 

This brings me to my third princi- 
ple and to one of the great ironies of 
security policy: that to preserve peace 
we must continually improve our war- 
fighting capability. One hears a good 
deal of talk these days about nuclear 
"overkill" and invidious' comparisons be- 
tween the most powerful strategic 
nuclear weapons which deter war and 
more limited nuclear weapons allegedly 
intended for actually fighting one. Such 
comments seem to reflect a conviction 
that aU we need to ensure deterrence is 
a few nuclear weapons— perhaps on 
bombers or submarines— which could sur- 
vive a Soviet attack and then reach 
Moscow. 



May 1984 



■UUUiHIIIUIIIIIIIIUJIIIIIM 



1 



ARMS CONTROL 



Clear U.S. nuclear superiority 
through the 1960s did lend credibility to 
our threat to use our strategic nuclear 
forces in response to any aggression 
against ourselves or our allies. But as 
the Soviet Union attained nuclear equal- 
ity across the board-and some impor- 
tant advanteges-it became less credible 
to threaten massive U.S. nuclear reta,lia- 
tion in response to a relatively limited 
Soviet conventional or even nuclear 
probe against U.S. forces or allies 
anywhere around the globe. Thus 
deterrence-preventing war-has come to 
require a range of nuclear and conven- 
tional forces-warfighting forces, if you 
wnll-whose possible use would seem 
credible in the variety of situations we 
might face. 

The fourth principle which guides 
U.S. security policy is that the present 
and projected levels of nuclear 
weapons are profoundly unsatisfac- 
tory. There is, I deeply believe, no 
sound alternative, in the nuclear age, to 
a poUcy of deterrence. We cannot dism- 
vent nuclear weapons or make them go 
away with slogans. But we can, with pa- 
tience and skill, negotiate mutual reduc- 
tions in their members while maintammg 
credible deterrence. 



Nuclear Deterrence 

When the Reagan Administration took 
office, the Soviet Union was engaged in a 
sustained and impressive mUitar>- buUd- 
up far surpassing any legitimate defen- 
sive needs. Moscow seemed bent on go- 
ing beyond overall parity with U.S. 
forces to acquire a measure of superior- 
ity. Substantial quantitative and qualita- 
tive increases in Soviet strategic 
weapons raised the possibility that a 
Soviet first strike might destroy the 
large majority of U.S. land-based inter- 
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 
This obviously posed a major challenge 
to the fundamental principle of deter- 
rence: that neither side should be able to 
deprive the other of the ability to retali- 
ate for a nuclear attack. Equally worry- 
ing to our European allies was Soviet 
deployment of the SS-20 missile-a 
highly accurate mobile weapon which can 
reach all of Western Europe from sanc- 
tuaries within the Soviet Union. 
Moscow's objective, through these SS-20 
deployments, clearly was to create trans- 
atlantic strains by posing a threat to 
Europe that could only be responded to 
by the use of the U.S.-based strategic 
deterrent. Europeans facing this Soviet 
threat would inevitably ask-and, indeed. 



MBFR Talks Resume 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 16, 1984> 

I am pleased to note the resumption in 
Vienna today of the negotiations on con- 
ventional force reductions in Europe, 
known as the MBFR talks. The U.S. 
representative, Ambassador Morton 
Abramowitz, and his NATO colleagues 
will be working closely together in seek- 
ing early progress toward an agreement 
to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces 
in central Europe to a substantially lower 
and equal level. 

The Western participants in MBFR 
are united in theu' pursuit of positive 
results. I call upon the Soviet Union and 
the other nations of the Warsaw Pact to 
join us in a good-faith effort to achieve 
real progress. 

The MBFR talks are an important 
part of the East- West security and arms 
control dialogue. The resumption of 
MBFR coincides with the conclusion to- 
day of the first round of the CDE [Con- 
ference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe] talks in Stockholm, which deal 



with military confidence-building 
measures in Europe. Here, too, the 
Western nations are working closely 
together. During the initial round, we 
have tabled a comprehensive package of 
proposed measures to reduce the risk of 
war. 

I welcome these developments and 
sincerely hope that General Secretary 
Chernenko and other members of the new 
Soviet leadership will approach these ne- 
gotiations in a similarly positive spirit. I 
also urge the Soviet Union to return to 
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] and START [strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks] negotiations, where very im- 
portant work in the cause of building a 
more secure and peaceful world has been 
suspended by them. These crucial 
negotiations can succeed if the Soviet 
Union wants them to succeed. We are 
certainly ready to do our part. It is in the 
interest of all mankind that these vital ef- 
forts be resumed now. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 19, 1984. 



did ask-if the United States would be 
willing to respond in such a massive way 
to a Soviet attack limited to Europe. 

Thus, in response to the Soviet 
SS-20 deployment, NATO collectively 
decided on a unique response: an offer to 
negotiate mutual restraint in this new 
category of weapons coupled with a firm 
decision to match the Soviet buildup, if 
negotiations failed, by modernizing its 
own intermediate-range nuclear weapons. 
The latter was not just a rhetorical 
threat. Work on the missiles and prepa- 
rations for their deployment in Europe 
began. But, because the NATO missiles 
would not be ready for 4 years, Moscow 
had ample time to prevent their deploy- 
ment through negotiation. 

This reaction to the SS-20 threat is 
representative of the Reagan Adminis- 
tration's general approach to the difficult 
issue of nuclear deterrence. It is a two- 
fold policy: 

First, a comprehensive effort to 
modernize our strategic nuclear weapons 
-land-based intercontinental baUistic 
missiles, submarine-launched missiles, 
and bombers-and to continue implemen- 
tation of NATO's 1979 decision to deploy 
U.S. weapons in Europe to balance 
Moscow's SS-20s; 

Second, offers of deep cuts m U.S. 
and Soviet nuclear systems across the 
board and especially in those systems 
which, by seeming to threaten a first 
strike are most destabilizing. 

Our force improvements are designed 
both to improve the survivability of our 
nuclear deteirent in the face of a grow- 
ing Soviet threat and to make clear to 
Moscow that we will not allow it a mili- 
tary advantage that could be used for 
purposes of blackmail. At the same time, 
we are offering Moscow relief from the 
economic and other burdens of the arms 
race through mutual and verifiable 
reductions in all categories of nuclear 
weapons, but especially those which 
seem most threatening to the retaliatory 
capability of each side. 

We are not trying to disarm the 
Soviet Union or to gain advantage over 
it. Our arms control proposals would not 
deprive it of any weapons that would be 
useful in its defense, even if its propa- 
ganda about an aggressive, war-monger- 
ing United States were true. Quite the 
contrary: our proposals for mutual re- 
straint in the most threatening weapons 
should, by enhancing the survivability of 
Soviet as well as U.S. deterrent forces, 
make both of us feel more secure. 

In the strategic arms reduction talks, 
or START, we have proposed substantial 



50 



.. Li^^.^^-^JMUMBi ' ! 



Department o* ^•-♦- 



ARMS CONTROL 



reductions in deployed missiles, with par- 
ticular emphasis on reductions in the 
most threatening or destabilizing 
systems, reductions in deployed ballistic 
missile warheads by one-third, and limits 
below SALT II [strategic amis limitation 
talks] levels on the air-launched cruise 
missiles which Moscow claims to find so 
threatening. 

After consultations with key congres- 
sional leaders, we incorporated into our 
START proposal the principle of a mu- 
tual, guaranteed build-down of strategic 
forces. The principle of build-down is 
simple. Some old weapons would have to 
be withdrawn for any new ones 
deployed. And the "penalty"— the num- 
ber to be withdrawn— would be greater 
for deployment of new weapons which 
might seem to threaten a first strike at- 
tack. Thus, as both the United States 
and Soviet Union modernize theii" 
nuclear forces, there would be a power- 
ful incentive to shift to less destabilizing 
new systems. 

In the negotiations on intermediate- 
range nuclear forces, or INF, we have 
proposed scrapping Moscow's new 
SS-20s and older SS-4s and 5s, in return 
for scrapping NATO's actual and 
planned deployments of new inter- 
mediate-range nuclear weapons. This 
bold proposal would have resulted in the 
first-ever elimination of an entire class of 
nuclear weapons from the face of the 
earth. When that proved too bold for 
Moscow, we offered an interim proposal 
to limit both sides' INF deployments to 
an equal, mutually agreed number below 
NATO's planned deployments of 572. 

The results to date in both INF and 
START negotiations have, as you know, 
been disappointing. 

With regard to INF, Moscow wasted 
the 4 years that elapsed between 
NATO's announced intention to modern- 
ize its forces if a negotiated settlement 
could not be reached and the arrival of 
the first new U.S. missiles in Europe. It 
used this time not to negotiate seriously 
but rather to play on West European 
public opinion in the hope that it could 
use the fear of nuclear weapons to split 
the alliance and thereby prevent us from 
proceeding with deployments. In the 
INF talks themselves, the unifying 
theme in various Soviet proposals was 
that no U.S. nuclear missiles belong in 
Europe, no matter what the Soviets 
might do. This is part of a long-term 
Soviet effort to exclude the United 
States, not only from the nuclear defense 
of Europe but also— since most of our air- 
craft which can carry nuclear weapons 



play vital conventional defense roles as 
well— to push us out of Europe 
altogether. 

The failure of Moscow's effort led, as 
we all know, to the Soviet breakoff of 
the negotiations. Whether time will lead 
the Soviets to a wiser course, with a 
return to the negotiating table, remains 
to be seen. But, in the meantime, it is 
important that Western publics keep 
clearly in mind that it is the Soviets who 
broke off the negotiations and are con- 
tinuing their wholly unnecessary INF 
buildup, while it is the United States 
that is prepared to return immediately to 
the negotiating table. 

The Soviet record in START was, for 
a time, a little better. Some real, if still 
limited, progress had been achieved 
before Moscow interrupted those negoti- 
ations, too, in protest against the be- 
ginning of NATO's INF deployments. 
The Soviets had acknowledged the need 
for some reductions below the SALT II 
levels for missiles and bombers. 
Moscow's START proposals would, how- 
ever, have perpetuated its advantage in 
throw-weight, or destructive power, and 
probably would not have required reduc- 
tions in its ballistic missile warheads, as 
opposed to launchers. In fact, it could 
allow a great increase in the number of 
warheads. But, in any event, this is, for 
now, academic. The Soviets, as you 
know, have not returned to the START 
negotiations since they left Geneva last 
year. It is, again, the United States that 
seeks to continue to negotiate. 

U.S.-Soviet Relations 

Let me take a moment here to say some- 
thing about the particular frustrations 
this Administration has had in dealing 
with the Soviets over the past 3 years. 
During the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan, we have had to contend with 
three Soviet leaders. This flux in the 
Kremlin has severely hampered the give- 
and-take of diplomacy in general and of 
our arms control negotiations in 
particular. 

When this Administration took office, 
it found an aging and ailing Brezhnev. A 
shrewd and calculating leader at his 
best— these qualities are not necessarily 
negative in a negotiating adversary- 
Brezhnev was far from the top of his 
powers in 1981 and 1982. Moreover, his 
colleagues on the Politburo were well 
aware of his mortality and positioning 
themselves for the succession. 

Andropov never took complete con- 
trol of the Soviet state and was seriously 
ill for much of his short tenure. Cher- 



nenko has yet to establish himself, and 
we may well face an interval of political 
consolidation before the Kremlin is ready 
to turn its full attentions to arms control 
talks. 

This sustained period of Soviet suc- 
cession politics, in my opinion, has had a 
major impact on the ability of the Soviet 
Union to make decisions. Productive 
negotiations require flexibility, and flex- 
ibility requires leadership that is willing 
to make difficult decisions and accept 
responsibility for them. The Soviet 
Union has not had such leadership dur- 
ing the Reagan Administration. Virtually 
without exception, each time the Soviets 
have been faced with difficult choices we 
have witnessed a period of apparent in- 
ternal debate, followed, inevitably, by 
hard-line decisions clearly dictated by the 
most conservative elements in the 
Politburo. 

At the very least the past 4 years 
have challenged the popular assumption 
that we can put our influence to effective 
use during periods of Soviet political 
fluidity. Soviet politics is not likely soon 
again to be as fluid as it has been during 
the past 3 years; and this Administration 
has worked very hard to put forward 
sensible arms control proposals. Yet, for 
now, at least, all we have to show for it 
is a Soviet walkout from the two most 
important arms control negotiations, 
START and INF. The last 3 years have 
indicated that, if anything, the Soviet 
decisionmaking apparatus— in the ab- 
sence of strong leadership that is pre- 
pared to exercise its authority— is likely 
to seek refuge in a bureaucratically safe 
but substantively sterile hard line. 

This Soviet paralysis is particularly 
frustrating when we are the ones ac- 
cused of not being forthcoming in arms 
negotiations. The record shows that we 
have responded constructively and imag- 
inatively to the challenges of arms con- 
trol. It is the Soviets who have shown 
neither flexibility nor commitment to the 
cause of reducing tensions. 

Flexibility and the 
U.S. Approach 

When arms control negotiations resume, 
and I am convinced that sooner or later 
the Soviets will come to realize that they 
must resume, we will give careful con- 
sideration to any serious Soviet propos- 
als. Indeed, one distinguishing feature of 
the Reagan Administration's approach to 
arms control has been its flexibility. Both 
our START and our INF proposals have 
evolved over time in carefully considered 
response to Soviet descriptions of their 
security perceptions and needs. When 



May 1984 

■DSmSBBOBBBBIBBBI 



Ikiliikiiii 



51 



EAST ASIA 



negotiations begin again, we will enter 
them in that same spirit. 

There are some things, however, 
about which we will not be flexible. Let 
me list them. 

• One is our commitment to begin- 
ning a process of substantial reductions. 
I understand the appeal of calls to freeze 
nuclear weapons first, then reduce them. 
But I am utterly convinced that it would 
not work that way. A freeze, by locking 
in existing Soviet military advantages 
and preventing us from modernizing our 
forces, would reduce— perhaps eliminate 
—Soviet incentives to negotiate. A freeze 
on all nuclear weapons would, moreover, 
prevent both the Soviets and the United 
States from shifting to less threatening, 
clearly retaliatory systems. Thus, a nu- 
clear freeze would work against the very 
objective its proponents espouse— a 
lessening of the threat of nuclear war. 

• The second point on which we will 
be inflexible is in focusing on approaches 
that will actually improve stability in our 
strategic relationship with the Soviet 
Union. We must begin to shift from more 
threatening nuclear weapons to those 
clearly intended only for retaliation. 

• Third, we will insist on balanced 
agreements which result in substantial 
equality between the superpowers. In 
START, where we are negotiating about 
a wide variety of very different weapons 
systems and where each side has its own 
historical strengths and preferences, we 
have repeatedly made clear our willing- 
ness to consider trade-offs between areas 
of U.S. and Soviet advantage. In INF, 
where the weapons on the table are 
more comparable to each other, we have, 
in effect, told Moscow to pick a number— 
the lower the better— so long as it is an 
equal number for both sides. But the 
principle of equal rights and limits is not 
negotiable. 

• Fourth, any agreements we sign 
must be verifiable. Verification becomes 
more difficult and complicated as nuclear 
weapons grow more complex, and espe- 
cially as we focus on qualitative aspects of 
the arms race. But arms control is far too 
important to be a matter of trust. 

Winston Churchill aptly expressed a 
realistic approach to arms control and 
deterrence when he wrote that: 

Moralists may find it a melancholy thought 
that peace can find no nobler foundations than 
mutual terror. But for my part I shall be con- 
tent if these foundations are solid, because 
they will give us the extra time and the new 
breathing space for the supreme effort which 
has to be made for a world settlement. 



The attempt to deal with the relation- 
ship between arms and human passions 
has been a consuming one for our cen- 
tury. We have no choice but to learn from 
rather than to repeat the mistakes of the 
past, for we no longer enjoy the luxury of 
a broad margin for error that earlier 
generations possessed. The existence of 
nuclear weapons has changed aU that. We 
must, today, be clear about what we seek; 
equally, we must be clear about the fun- 
damental differences between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union. Otherwise, we may 
end up by heightening tensions rather 
than consolidating the peace— imperfect 
as it is— that we now enjoy. 

No one has expressed this irony bet- 
ter than the American political philoso- 
pher Walter Lippmann. Writing in 
1943-as the tide of the Second Worid 
War began to turn in our favor, but while 
the outcome was by no means cer- 
tain— Lippmann was understandably bit- 
ter as he analyzed the costs of haphazard, 
shortsighted Western disarmament in the 
years following the First World War. 

Lippmann noted that: "The genera- 
tion which most sincerely and elaborately 
declared that peace is the extreme end of 
foreign policy got not peace, but a most 
devastating war." Advocates of disarma- 
ment, Lippmann wrote, were "tragically 
successful in disarming the nations that 
believed in disarmament." His implica- 
tions were clear: only one side disarmed, 



due to pressures exerted by its own 
people. The other side, free of those 
pressures, rearmed and thought itself 
free to pursue its aggressive intentions. 

Advocates of disarmament made two 
tactical errors and one strategic error 
during the period that Lippmann ana- 
lyzed. Tactically, they led the fascist 
states to believe that democracies were 
unwilling, in the end, to defend their 
values; and, when the democracies were 
forced to act, the policies of shortsighted 
disarmament forced them to act from 
positions of weakness. The larger, strate- 
gic mistake was ignoring the political dif- 
ferences between the democracies and 
their enemies, in naive belief that these 
political differences would disappear once 
they put down their arms. Thus, a bad 
arms agreement was infmitely worse 
than no agreement at aU. 

Agreements between the United 
States and the Soviet Union will be 
ultimately successful only if they take 
full account of the differences between 
us. Our conventional and nuclear 
arsenals do not divide us; rather, they 
exist because other issues divide us. 

The question is not closed. We are 
still committed to negotiating agree- 
ments to reduce both strategic and inter- 
mediate-range nuclear weapons. It is 
now up to the Soviets to embrace, 
sincerely, a simOar commitment. ■ 



FY 1985 Assistance Requests for 
East Asia and the Pacific 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
March 22, 198i. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assist- 
ant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs.^ 

I am delighted to have this opportunity to 
present our FY 1985 foreign assistance 
proposal for East Asia and the Pacific. 

U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES 

Our past investments in the economies 
and security of our East Asian and Pacific 
friends have paid enormous dividends. 
For 20 some years. East Asian countries 



have sustained higher economic growth 
rates than any other part of the world. 
They now account for one-sixth of world 
trade, and their share is growing. Our an- 
nual trade with East Asia and the Pacific 
exceeds that with any other region. U.S. 
investments in the region now exceed $26 
billion and continue to increase. And 
despite formidable challenges to their 
security which persist to this day, most of 
our friends have achieved a degree of in- 
ternal stability and national resolve rare 
in other parts of the world. 

However, just as important as the 
volume of trade is the extent to which 
East Asian economies have come to sym- 
bolize the dynamism of the free market 
system. Records for the largest and 
longest sustained growth rates are held 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



by nations from this region. Such coun- 
tries span the spectrum from lesser 
developed and industriaHzing to industrial 
economies. It is worth noting the extent 
to which they have accomplished eco- 
nomic development while maintaining 
political stability as well as cultural iden- 
tity. These countries have accepted the 
common features— positive and nega- 
tive—which accompany modernization. 
This is in sharj) conti-ast to the dreary, 
rigid mold the neighboring command 
economies have imposed on their people. 

There are also pressing economic 
problems to confront despite the gen- 
erally bright jjicture of the past several 
years. The world recession brought sharp 
declines in income for the many Asian and 
Pacific exporters of primary commodities, 
and we have only begun to see an up- 
swing in these markets. The Philippines 
economy is going through a particularly 
difficult period. Growth has been uneven 
in several countries, and pressing politico- 
economic problems remain. 

We have a great stake in the pros- 
perity and security of East Asian and 
Pacific nations. Our FY 1985 assistance 
programs are designed to protect this 
stake and to expand it to those areas 
which are less prosperous and less secure. 

Our foreign assistance proposals have 
also been developed in the context of a 
disturbing buildup of Soviet military 
strength over the past few years. Unable 
to match the vitality and progress of our 
friends in East Asia and the Pacific, the 
Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam 
are threatening the region with military 
buildups that far exceed their defensive 
needs. Huge numerical increases in land, 
sea, and air foi-ces have been buttressed 
with qualitative improvements which are 
becoming significant during this decade. 

Soviet ground forces east of the Urals 
increased from 20 to over 50 divisions 
since 1965, including deployments on the 
Sino-Soviet border. Soviet air forces in 
the four eastern-most military districts 
now have more than 3,000 combat air- 
craft. The Soviet Pacific fleet is now the 
largest fleet in the Soviet Navy and con- 
tains approximately one-thii-d of all Soviet 
submarines, one-fourth of all principal 
surface combatants, and one-third of all 
naval aircraft. 

Soviet ability to project power is fur- 
ther enhanced by forward deployment in 
Vietnam. Soviet surface combatants and 
attack submarines normally found at Cam 
Ranh, combined with aircraft deploy- 
ments, present a clear and current danger 
to free world sealanes. 

Recent evidence demonstrates that 
the Soviet buildup continued during this 



past year. The Soviet Union has for the 
first time deployed its Badger bombers to 
Cam Ranh Bay. And following its down- 
ing of the Korean airliner, it stationed 
MiG-23 fighters in the Japan Northern 
Territories occupied by the Soviets since 
World War II. Its SS-20 intermediate 
nuclear missile force in Asia has grow7i 
rapidly from 99 launchers in February 
last year to 135 today. 

Apart from the Soviet threat, the 
regional military threats have continued 
to increase at a disturbing rate. Vietnam 
has doubled the size of its standing army 
since 1979 and now, with more than a 
million men under arms, possesses the 
third largest standing army in the world. 
Improvements in firepower, command 
and control, and weaponry have con- 
tinued apace with the numerical in- 
creases. In addition the Vietnamese have 
assembled forces along the Thai- 
Kampuchean border which suggest they 
may again this year attack Kampuchean 
refugee settlements on the border. 

North Korea continues to spend at 
least 20% of its GNP on its military forces 
in an apparent effort to increase further 
its numerical superiority over the South 
in land and air forces. They have further- 
more in Rangoon descended to barbaric 
behavior against their southern coun- 
trymen, which casts grave doubts over 
theii- protestations of peaceful long-term 
intentions and which violated the 
sovereignty of a neutral country. 

In view of these economic and secu- 
rity challenges, we believe our resources 
should be allocated to accomplish the 
following objectives: 

• To strengthen human rights and the 
commitment to democracy and free 
markets in the region; 

• To reduce poverty and economic 
and social inequalities which foster 
violence and invite external interference; 

• To assure access to the markets and 
raw material of the region; 

• To maintain close, cooperative rela- 
tionships with countries in strategic prox- 
imity to key sealanes of communication; 
and 

• To protect the front-line states 
(Korea and Thailand), enhance our treaty 
relationships (with Korea, the Philippines, 
and Thailand), and maintain use of 
military facilities in the Philippines. 

Accompanying these major goals are 
a number of other important objectives 
such as effectively coping with refugee 
flows and reducing narcotics cultivation 
and trafficking. 



REGIONAL PROGRAM OVERVIEW 

As has been the case since FY 1983, the 
development and security assistance pro- 
grams are integrated components of a 
single program. All components are 
directly related to U.S. interests in East 
Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 

The FY 1985 bilateral foreign 
assistance request for East Asia and the 
Pacific totals approximately $793 million 
and would be an increase of some 13.1% 
over the FY 1984 allocations of just over 
$701 million. Our total request for 
economic assistance— development 
assistance, PL 480, and economic support 
funds (ESF)-is for $314.8 million and 
would represent an increase of about 22%i 
over the FY 1984 allocations of $258.1. 

Our request for military assist- 
ance—foreign military sales (FMS), 
military assistance progi'am (MAP), and 
international military education and train- 
ing (IMET)— on the other hand would 
total $478.6 million for FY 1985 and 
represents an increase of only 8% over 
the FY 1984 allocations of $443.1. 

Because of the strength of the East 
Asian countries themselves, the level of 
effort required of us in the region is pro- 
portionately a very small share of the 
U.S. worldwide effort, even though the 
region itself is as important to U.S. in- 
terests as any other region of the world. 
The East Asian share of the FY 1985 
worldwide bilateral foreign assistance re- 
quest is some 5.1%. 

East Asia's share of the worldwide 
economic and military assistance alloca- 
tions for FY 1985 would be approximately 
5% and 8%, respectively. Korea, facing 
the most formidable regional military 
threat, requires the largest allocation of 
military assistance. 

Perhaps more important than the 
arithmetic balance between economic and 
military assistance is the manner in which 
we target our scarce resources to meet 
those problems which are most closely 
linked to our national interests. 

The largest recipients of development 
assistance are Thailand, a treaty ally and 
front-line state; the Philippines, also a 
treaty ally and the host country for im- 
portant joint defense facilities; and In- 
donesia, which in area and population con- 
stitutes roughly half of Southeast Asia. 
All of these states have shown the 
capability of putting development 
assistance to good use. They also sit 
astride or near key sea lanes of com- 
munication. 

Notwithstanding our great stake in 
the region, its vast size, and the for- 
midable threats to its prosperity and 



May 1984 



iliiilBii 



53 



EAST ASIA 



security, our FY 1985 request levels for 
most program recipients are essentially 
straight-lined from the FY 1984 allocation 
with little or no compensation for infla- 
tion. We are requesting a 6.2% increase in 
Indonesia's total request level, chiefly to 
augment its PL 480 program, a proposal 
to increase Burma's development 
assistance by $2.5 million, and modest 
IMET increases in several countries. 

The Philippines is the only country in 
the region for which we are seeking 
substantial increases. In the Philippines, 
we have I'equested a total increase in 
bilateral assistance programs of nearly 
$80 million to bring the total program 
level from $151 million in FY 1984 to 
nearly $231 million for FY 1985. 

This level is, as you know, in accord- 
ance with President Reagan's "best- 
effort" pledge to seek $900 million of 
assistance over a 5-year period following 
the review of our Military Bases Agi-ee- 
ment last spring. These bases have im- 
mense strategic value for the United 
States. Moreover, the U.S. presence and 
assistance can help the Philippines to 
cope more effectively with its difficult 
economic and security pi-oblems. 

Some 92% of our securitv assistance 
(FMS, MAP, IMET, ESF) request for the 
region is allocated to Korea, the Philip- 
pines, and Thailand. This assistance helps 
to deter direct military threats to Korea 
and Thailand and to enhance the U.S. 
strategic posture in Asia, the Pacific, and 
Indian Oceans by maintaining the use of 
military bases in the Philippines. 

Our FY 1985 military assistance re- 
cjuest recognizes that countries with low 
per capita incomes and severe debt serv- 
icing problems may require some form of 
concessional financing. The Philippines 
fits this category, and we have, therefore, 
requested that half of the FMS ci-edits 
proposed for the Philippines be offered at 
a concessional interest rate of 5%. Conces- 
sionality for the Philippines takes into ac- 
count the serious and mounting economic 
difficulties it is experiencing. 

In Indonesia a loss of export earnings 
and a current account deficit of about $6.5 
billion last year also indicates the need for 
concessional financing. In addition, in an 
effort to hold down our overall levels 
while providing necessary assistance to a 
nonaligned state with which we have a 
very important relationship, we have pro- 
posed reducing Indonesia's total FMS 
levels by $5 million from FY 1984. 

Considering the extremely heavy 
military purchasing requirements forced 
on South Korea by the continuing North 
Korean military buildup, we are re- 
questing 10/20 loan terms for South 



54 

LLXiMJ* 



Korea. This fomi of concessionality ex- 
tends the loan terms for a country to pro- 
vide a 10-year grace period in which only 
interest is paid followed by a 20-year 
repayment period. In this way we can 
demonstrate our interest in helping South 
Korea deter anothei- attack by North 
Korea w^hile still holding our FY 1985 
FMS request level down to last year's. 

Southeast Asia 

Philippines. The Philippines has recently 
experienced the shock of the Aquino 
assassination, followed by demonstra- 
tions, some political changes, and growing 
economic problems. We have spoken out 
clearly on these issues. The U.S. Govern- 
ment has expressed its outrage over 
Aquino's murder, and we have urged that 
it be investigated quickly and vigorously 
with a view to bringing the perpetrators 
to justice. An independent board, which 
has gained wide respect in the Philip- 
pines, is now investigating this crime. 

We have expressed our strong desire 
for rapid political normalization; in par- 
ticular, we have stressed the importance 
we attach to the Philippines' holding free 
and impartial elections in order to have a 
clear expression of the public will and to 
encourage the growth of a new genera- 
tion of political leaders. 

There has been progress in this area. 
A new presidential succession mechanism 
is in place. In response to opposition 
demands, provinces rather than regions 
will be the new geographic units for elec- 
tions, and a new voter registration will 
take place. A new election code, which is 
acceptable to key elements of the opposi- 
tion, has been approved. Many key op- 
position groups are presenting candi- 
dates. Additionally, President Marcos has 
agreed to appoint some new independent 
members on the election commission. 

For FY 1985, we are placing our em- 
phasis in the Philippines on ESF. We are 
requesting $180 million in economic and 
security assistance, of which $95 million is 
in ESF. We have substantially increased 
economic assistance. Our ESF request for 
the FY 1985-89 period is $475 million, up 
from $200 million in the previous 5-year 
period. We more than doubled ESF, an 
increase of 137%. 

We have significantly increased our 
ESF partly in recognition of the fact that 
providing government services to address 
the economic and social conditions in rural 
areas is vitally important. This is a reality 
which the Philippine Government also 
recognizes. ESF takes on added impor- 
tance because of the deteriorating 
economy during the past year. 



Discussions with the Philippine 
Government concerning the use of ESF 
have not yet been concluded, but we ex- 
pect that half of the funds will be devoted 
to a continuation of such development 
projects as school consti-uction, feeder 
roads, and municipal development in 
areas adjacent to Clark Air Force Base, 
infrastructure development in provinces 
near our bases, rural energy develop- 
ment, and construction of market 
facilities, roads, and schools throughout 
the Philippines. The other half of the FY 
1985 ESF program will be devoted to a 
new activity: local currency supporting 
the Philippine Government's contribution 
to ongoing Agency for International 
Development (AID), World Bank, and 
Asian Development Bank activities. 

We are requesting $39 million in 
development assistance and $9.75 million 
in PL 480 Title II (excluding World Food 
Progi-am donations of $209,000). The 
global recession, with low commodity 
prices and high interest rates for external 
borrowing, have slowed exjDort and eco- 
nomic growth. Depressed domestic 
demand and investment activity have fur- 
ther aggi-avated fiscal and balance-of- 
payments problems. Rural areas and 
poverty groups have been particularly 
hard hit by the economic slowdown. 

Some 4 million households in the 
Philippines are considered below the 
poverty line. The development assistance 
program focuses on the poorer regions of 
the country with emphasis on agricultural 
production, rural employment generation, 
and family plaiming. PL 480 assistance 
also has been centered in rural areas. 
These programs contribute to develop- 
ment and stability in the Philippines. 

The value of our military facilities in 
the Philippines remains unchanged. For- 
tunately throughout the recent difficul- 
ties, the attitude of the Philippine people 
toward the United States has i-emained 
constant, and support for our military 
presence continues without any signifi- 
cant change. 

The requested security assistance 
levels for the Philippines are closely 
linked to the 5-year review of the Military 
Bases Agreement conducted in April-May 
1983. On the day the review was suc- 
cessfully completed, President Reagan, in 
a letter to President Marcos, made a 
"best efforts" pledge to seek $900 million 
in security assistance for FY 1985-89. 

Military cooperation is an integi-al 
part of the U.S.-Philippine relationship 
and has been so since the independence of 
that nation. We use facilities which are 
located on Philippine bases, work closely 
with our military hosts, and enjoy 



Department of State Bulletin 



unhampered use of these facilities. The 
Philippines has always procured the bulk 
of its military equipment from the United 
States. 

For a number of years, the military's 
share of the national budget in the Philip- 
pines has been smaller than that of any 
other Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) member. Although the 
size of the military establishment has 
gi'own in the past decade, its arsenal re- 
mains very obsolete. Yet, it is the Philip- 
pines, alone among ASEAN countries, 
that faces serious, active insurgencies. 

The communist-sponsored insurgency, 
if unchecked, would inflict suffering on 
the Philippine people and ultimately 
threaten U.S. interests. In addition, while 
the Philippines does not face any immi- 
nent foreign threat, the Soviet military 
presence in the region has increased, and 
the Philippines does require a modest 
deterrent capability. 

We have significantly increased our 
request for IMET to $2 miUion. Philippine 
Government financial constraints have 
resulted in a les.sening of the Philippines' 
contribution to the program, whose value 
to both countries has, if anything, grown. 
In this period of change and upheaval in 
the Philippines, it is more important than 
ever that we strengthen the existing 
close personal ties with its younger 
military leaders, whose professionalism 
has been one of the country's strengths. 

We have included MAP in the Philip- 
pine program for the first time in 4 years, 
the recognition of the serious economic 
situation there. We expect the Philippine 
Government to request use of MAP and 
FMS financing for- helicopters, trucks, 
and armored vehicles; communications 
and engineering equipment; new patrol 
vessels; retrofitting of ships; and spare 
parts for major items of equipment. 

We are requesting $25 million in MAP 
and $60 million in FMS. The combined 
FMS/MAP total of $85 million compares 
with $50 million last year. Our FY 
1985-89 request is for FMS/MAP of $425 
million compared with $300 million the 
previous years, an increase of 42%. These 
increases are less than they appear 
because inflation has eroded the Philip- 
pine package which had maintained con- 
stant levels since 1979. Moreover, Philip- 
pine needs increased significantly in in- 
tervening years, and the Philippine 
Government suffered severe budgetary 
difficulties. 

Thailand. Thailand has been a close 
treaty ally for decades. Our support for 
Thailand's continued development and 
security is seen as a gauge of the Ameri- 
can commitment to Thailand and to 
ASEAN generally. 



On its eastern border, Thailand faces 
a strong, well-proven Vietnamese military 
threat, in position there since late 1978. 
This has prompted an overdue moderniza- 
tion of Thailand's military forces designed 
to provide a deterrent to further Viet- 
namese aggression. The Thai must be ac- 
corded a high priority in the allocation of 
assistance to enable them to enhance 
their self-reliance. 

Our MAP request is $5 million, the 
same as for last year. This is the only 
form of concessionality in our Thai 
assistance package which can go for 
equipment purchases. 

We are requesting $98 million in FMS 
funding, an increase of $4 million over last 
year's amount. These funds will go for a 
long overdue upgrading of Thai Air Force 
equipment; for the army's acquisition of 
additional armor, radar, armored person- 
nel carriers, and howitzers; and navy 
missiles for new patrol craft it has 
ordered. 

For IMET funds, we are asking $2.4 
million, an increase of $200,000 over FY 
1984. These funds will cover necessary 
training for newly acquired equipment. 
The Thai invariably make good use of 
IMET and are eager to acquire the 
technical skills needed to use and main- 
tain modern equipment. 

The Thai economy, even while sad- 
dled with heavy defense requirements, 
has performed reasonably well. Social and 
economic development needs are not be- 
ing ignored because of defense spending. 
Thailand's free market economy and open 
society have thus far been able to balance 
these interests skillfully. Security 
assistance from the United States has 
been pivotal. 

Our development assistance request 
of $27 million represents a modest 
decrease from last year's figure of $29.3 
million. It contributes, however, to 
Thailand's continued emphasis on balanc- 
ing necessary defense expenditures with 
domestic development expenditures. Part 
of this assistance will go to projects 
designed to deal with rural poverty in the 
northeast, where the communist in- 
surgency once flourished. A new AID 
strategy emphasizing science and 
technology is being developed for 
Thailand as well. 

Thailand, with our help, is determined 
not to abandon these villagers. ESF funds 
also directly contribute to the upholding 
of Thailand's policy of first asylum for 
refugees, by assisting refugee impact on 
Thai border villages. 

Despite some pushoff problems, the 
Thai have continued to support the 
refugee program. They have granted first 



EAST ASIA 



asylum to over 600,000 refugees since 
1975, including 80,000 boat people, and 
have 132,000 in refugee camps now 
awaiting resettlement, thereby con- 
tributing significantly to international ef- 
forts to cope with aggressive Vietnamese 
policies. 

The UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)-Thai antipiracy pro- 
gram, to which we contribute, has not 
produced the results we had hoped for. 
Although there is active patrolling— air 
and sea— by the Royal Thai Navy, no 
pirates have been apprehended since the 
inception of the program. Piracy attacks 
also still occur on many refugee boats but 
the incidence has decreased from about 
70-80% in 1982 to 50-60% in late 1983. A 
UNHCR assessment team has reviewed, 
the program and suggested a number of 
improvements that we support. The 
Royal Thai Government is considering 
these proposals. 

On its eastern border, Thailand faces 
a strong, well-proven Vietnamese military 
threat, in position there since late 1978. 
This has prompted an overdue moderniza- 
tion of Thailand's military forces. This 
modernization, which has had our sup- 
port, will not make Thailand a match for 
the Vietnamese. It will, however, in con- 
junction with other efforts, provide a 
deterrent to further Vietnamese aggres- 
sion. In order to provide a credible deter- 
rent which will enable Thailand to become 
more self-sufficient in an emergency, the 
Thai must be accorded a high priority in 
the allocation of assistance. 

Indonesia. The geostrategic 
significance of Indonesia's location and 
size and its standing as a moderate among 
nonaligned nations and in the Islamic 
world add to the importance of our rela- 
tionship. Development and security 
assistance to Indonesia is also consistent 
with our strong support for ASEAN, 
which represents the best hope for peace 
and stability in Southeast Asia. 

A strong and moderately growing 
development assistance program in In- 
donesia is necessary to increase man- 
power and management skills, to advance 
agi'icultural research, to continue to 
upgrade Indonesia's educational system, 
and to promote the private sector's role in 
economic development. 

Development assistance of $65 million 
is being requested for Indonesia for FY 
1985, an increase of $1 million over the 
FY 1984 allocation. An increase in PL 
480, Title I assistance to $40 million is re- 
quested in recognition that rice and grain 
supplies have been diminished by late 
rains and droughts in some areas. Food 



May 1984 



BBBBBBBBBBBBBni 



EAST ASIA 



stocks need to be maintained at accept- 
able levels in order to forestall hardship 
and social unrest, as well as to provide 
adecjuate emergency shipments to im- 
poverished areas. A PL 480, Title II re- 
quest of a little over $7.7 million supports 
voluntary agency pi'ograms and the 
World Food Program. 

The reciuested FY 1985 security 
assistance progi-am for Indonesia consists 
of $2.7 million in IMET funding, plus $40 
million in FMS du-ect loans, half of this 
amount at concessional interest rates and 
half at treasury rates. This mix of conces- 
sional and treasury rates is considered 
necessary to assist Indonesia in recover- 
ing from the effects of the worldwide 
recession and serious budgetary shortfalls 
due to declining oil and non-oil export 
revenue in 1981-82. In addition to the 
FMS credit program, Indonesia is ex- 
pected to purchase some equipment 
through FMS cash procedures. 

Indonesia's military forces remain 
critically short of ciualified technicians, 
program managers, and officers. Most 
U.S. training will be in technical fields 
related to these shortages. The level of 
funding requested should permit between 
250 and 300 military students to attend 
our armed forces schools in FY 1985. 

IMET deserves the highest priority 
support because of the important role 
played by the professional military in In- 
donesian society, the utility of the pro- 
gram in furthering our foreign relations 
objectives, and the desirability of mutual 
service-to-service contacts. 

Although Indonesia's recent economic 
problems have caused a slowdown in 
military force modernization, U.S. secu- 
rity assistance has helped to sustain a 
number of important programs, including 
aircraft maintenance and spare parts, 
ship overhaul and spare parts, im- 
provements in air and sea defense 
systems, the purchase of war reserve 
munitions, and, most importantly, ad- 
vanced professional training for the In- 
donesian Army, Navy, and Au- Force. 

Malaysia. U.S.-Malaysian relations 
are good and were enhanced by the 
January visit to Washington of Prime 
Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad. 
Malaysia's continued political stability 
and economic development are important 
to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. 
The Malaysians have also expressed in- 
terest in continued defense cooperation 
with the United States within the context 
of their nonaligned status. 

Strategically located on the Strait of 
Malacca and faced with Soviet-backed 
Vietnamese forces occupying nearby 



Kampuchea, Malaysia is a responsible 
member of the Islamic Conference and 
Nonaligned Movement. Malaysia has 
played a constructive role in international 
affairs and has forcefully advanced 
ASEAN's strategy to bring about a 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from 
Kampuchea. 

IMET plays a significant role in the 
U.S.-Malaysian military relationship by 
providing a framework in which mutually 
beneficial professional relationships are 
established. The IMET request of $1 
million is a slight increase from the 
$900,000 level of FY 1984. The IMET pro- 
gram also provides an important means 
for the Malaysian Armed Forces to meet 
their training needs as they attempt to 
adjust to a more conventional force struc- 
ture and sophisticated weaponry. 

The $10 million FMS request level for 
Malaysia in FY 1985 is an increase from 
the FY 1983 level of $4 million and would 
restore the program to its FY 1982 level. 
Although Malaysia has not in the past 
made extensive use of FMS credits, addi- 
tional purchases are now likely as its 
economy improves and the restrictions of 
the government austerity progi-am are 
eased. Possible purchases include trans- 
port aircraft, naval vessels capable of 
patrohng its exclusive economic zone, and 
weapon systems designed to enhance the 
modernization of Malaysia's Armed 
Forces. 

Singapore. The U.S. enjoys extensive 
commercial relations with Singapore, 
which is the site for many U.S. business 
regional headquarters. Although formally 
nonaligned, Singapore shares U.S. 
strategic perceptions and goals, and its 
positions in international fora support in- 
terests common to both our countries. 

Physically a tiny city-state, Singapore 
has come to play a role in Southeast Asia 
completely out of proportion to its size. 
Strategically located at the juncture of 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Singapore 
permits valuable access for our military 
forces to its modern ship and aircraft sup- 
port facilities. It opposes an increased 
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and 
supports a continuing regional security 
role for the United States as a barrier to 
Soviet expansion. 

For FY 1985 we are again requesting 
an IMET progi-am of $50,000. This 
modest amount of assistance serves to 
demonstrate our continuing interest in 
Singapore's security and helps ensure 
that its armed forces continue to look to 
the United States for training and equip- 
ment purchases. 



Brunei. Brunei became fully inde- 
pendent January 1, 1984, and has subse- 
quently become a member of ASEAN. As 
ASEAN is the focus of U.S. policy in 
Southeast Asia, close ties with all its in- 
dividual members are important. 

Oil-rich Brunei offers significant com- 
mercial opportunities for U.S. business 
and investment. In addition the Brunei 
defense force which consists of the Royal 
Brunei Malay Regiment, numbering ap- 
proximately 3,000 men, has expressed in- 
terest in close ties with the U.S. Armed 
Forces. 

Our security assistance request for 
FY 1985 consists solely of $30,000 in 
IMET. This is designed to furnish re- 
quired training as the Bruneian Armed 
Forces prepare to assume greater respon- 
sibility. Further assistance will not be re- 
quu'ed, but it is possible that Brunei may 
in time consider FMS cash purchases. 

ASEAN. The cornerstone of our 
policy in Southeast Asia is support for the 
Association of South East Asian Nations, 
which has been a highly effective force for 
stability and prosperity in the region. In 
addition to the bilateral assistance pro- 
grams to its six members, we have 
developed a limited but high quality 
cooperative regional assistance program 
as a further indication of our commitment 
to the organization. Focusing on areas of 
special concern to ASEAN, we have 
funded technical assistance activities in 
watershed management, energy and plant 
quarantine, as well as visits to the United 
States by media leaders. We are just ini- 
tiating a new program for small business 
requested by ASEAN, and we will also 
suppoit a U.S. private sector effort to 
enhance technology cooperation with the 
ASEAN business sector. We are re- 
questing $4.8 million for this progi-am, a 
slight inci'ease over our FY 1984 request 
of $4.5 million. 

Burma. Our principal objectives in 
Burma are to help prevent the cultivation 
and trafficking of illicit Bunnese narcotics 
to international markets and to encourage 
Bui-ma's evolution toward a stable, pros- 
perous, and more open society which will 
contribute to stability in Southeast Asia. 

Burma's leadership remains commit- 
ted to nonalignment, socialism, and self- 
reliance. However, within that context, it 
has moved toward closer cooperation with 
the West, including the United 
States, particularly in such areas as 
development, advanced technical training, 
and educational exchanges. Burma 
recently broke diplomatic relations with 
North Korea over the October 9, 1988, 
terrorist bombing in Rangoon which was 
carried out by North Korean commandos. 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



As part of its opening to the West, the 
Burmese Government has welcomed ex- 
panded bilateral cooperation with the 
United States in areas such as narcotics 
control, where we are assisting Burmese 
efforts to suppress opium cultivation and 
trafficking. Both our narcotics and our 
development assistance programs have 
responded to specific Burmese requests 
and have led to a gradual strengthening 
of our bilateral relations. 

The $15 million in development 
assistance proposed for FY 1985 will 
enable AID to continue its support of 
Burmese efforts to improve rural primary 
health care, to increase the production of 
food and oilseed crops, and to modernize 
oilseeds processing and distribution. It 
will also provide funds for a new 
agricultural research and development 
project. 

The modest budget increase proposed 
($2.5 million over the FY 1984 level) will 
maintain the momentum of our recently 
established AID program, assist BuiTnese 
development efforts in a promising new 
area, and demonstrate to the Burmese 
that we are serious about helping them to 
meet their development needs. 

The proposed increase in IMET fund- 
ing to $300,000 for FY 1985 will provide 
additional training opportunities in the 
United States for Burmese military of 
fleers. The Burmese Ministry of Defense 
attaches considerable importance to this 
program and has taken pains to select its 
most promising officers for training in the 
United States. Since 1981 approximately 
50 such officers have gained exposure to 
U.S. concepts and methods by attending 
courses in helicopter maintenance, field 
artillery, and other subjects. Since the 
military plays a central role in contem- 
porary Burma, IMET training should 
have a favorable long-term impact on 
Burmese attitudes toward the United 
States. 

Laos. Bilateral developmental 
assistance to Laos is at present prohibited 
by the Foreign Assistance Act. The Ad- 
ministration has told officials of the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic that action 
to lift the congressional ban on assistance 
would be possible only once a pattern of 
sustained cooperation had been estab- 
lished toward resolving the fate of 
Americans missing in Laos from the war 
in Indochina. 

Such a pattern of sustained coopera- 
tion has not yet been established, 
although we are encouraged by recent 
progress on this issue, including the 
December 1983 crash site survey by the 
Joint Casualty Resolution Center. If 



future progress develops into a pattern of 
sustained cooperation, the Administration 
would consult with members of Congress 
on the question of lifting the ban on 
assistance to Laos. 

Korea 

Continued peace and stability in North- 
east Asia is essential to our own security. 
The prevention of North Korean aggres- 
sion against South Korea is indispensable 
for peace and stability in the region and 
the world. For the past 30 years, the 
U.S.-R.O.K. alliance has been successful 
in its central aim— deterring aggression 
and preventing a recurrence of hostilities 
on the Korean Peninsula. This absence of 
hostilities— marked though it has been 
from time to time by examples of North 
Korean aggression such as the Pueblo in- 
cident, the raid on the Blue House, or, 
more recently, the North Korean attack 
in Rangoon— has allowed great economic 
and social progress in South Korea. 

In spite of South Korea's impressive 
development, the need for continued U.S. 
security assistance is as strong as ever. 
In the past decade. North Korea, which 
we estimate spends over 20% of its GNP 
on armaments, has carried out a major 
force buildup which has seriously affected 
the military balance on the peninsula. 

North Korea has about 25% more 
armed forces than the South and 2V2 
times as many armored personnel car- 
riers, artillery pieces, and tanks. North 
Korean tanks are larger and more 
modem than those of the R.O.K. The 
North also maintains a 100,000-man com- 
mando force, probably the largest such 
force in the world. With major elements 
of its forces only 35 miles from Seoul, the 
North could launch an attack with very 
little notice. 

To counter this threat, the R.O.K. , 
which spends 6% of its GNP on defense, 
is engaged in a major force improvement 
program designed to increase warning 
time, augment its effective firepower, and 
enhance its air defense capability. The 
progi'am, which includes coproduction of 
the F-5 and acquisition of the F-16, TOW 
missiles [tube launched, optically tracked, 
wire-guided antitank missiles], and Hawk 
modifications, will cost several billion 
dollars during the FY 1982-86 period, 
with almost half slated for procurement 
from the United States. 

To assist the vital efforts of this front- 
line ally, we provided a total of $185 
million in FMS credits in FY 1983 and 
plan to provide $230 million in FY 1984. It 
is worth noting in this regard that during 
FY 1982, the R.O.K. paid some $254 



million to the U.S. Government in prin- 
cipal and interest charges for previous 
loans, e.xceeding by about $88 million the 
amount of new credits provided in that 
year. 

To ease the burden Korea faces in 
maintaining a credible deterrent, we are 
proposing $230 million FMS credits for 
the R.O.K., the same amount it should 
receive in FY 1984. We also are seeking 
legislation to provide a 10-year grace and 
20-year repayment terms for Korea. This 
will enable Korea to devote a larger pro- 
portion of each year's allocation to actual 
weapons purchases, thereby permitting 
the force improvement program to pro- 
ceed on schedule. 

Our Korean ally is doing its utmost 
for its own security. It is clearly in the 
American interest to help Korea meet its 
force improvement goals and mutual 
security objectives. We should bear in 
mind that Korean combat forces, whose 
capabilities are enhanced by FMS credits, 
are stationed with our own forces along 
the DMZ and would operate with us 
under a joint command in time of war. 
Thus, we have a very direct stake in the 
force improvement efforts of this front- 
line ally. 

Pacific Islands 

Since World War II, the Pacific Islands 
have undergone great changes, and in the 
past 20 years most have become 
independent states. Our relations with 
them are friendly; we share to a 
remarkable degi'ee a belief in democratic 
government and devotion to individual 
liberties. It is in the U.S. interest to 
assist island governments in their efforts 
to promote economic growth. 

For FY 1985 we have requested $6 
million in development assistance to sup- 
port a region-wide program with em- 
phasis on improving agricultural rural 
development and fishing techniques and 
to promote regional cooperation in this 
area of small populations and small 
markets. 

World War II also demonstrated the 
importance of the Pacific Islands to our 
security. These islands lie across the Hnes 
of communication between the U.S. west 
coast and Australia, New Zealand, and 
Southeast Asia. Our military assistance 
would consist of small IMET programs 
with a total dollar value of $190,000. 

Fiji. Fiji is a functioning democracy 
and a leader in regional organizations. 
Our bilateral relations are excellent. Fiji 
also makes important contributions to in- 
ternational peacekeeping efforts. The 



May 1984 



Ki ' I ''' III* 



1 



EAST ASIA 



Royal Fiji Military Forces maintains 
more troops with the Sinai multilateral 
force and observers (MFO) and with the 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
than are on duty in Fiji itself. 

Our $80,000 IMET pi-ogram re- 
quested for FY 1985 represents no in- 
crease over FY 1984's funding level. The 
money would assist the Royal Fiji 
Military Forces in acquii-ing needed pro- 
fessional and technical skills to better 
operate a small but modern defense force. 

Papua New Guinea. The United 
States has enjoyed friendly relations with 
Papua New Guinea before and since its 
independence from Australia in 1975. The 
country's size, strategic location, and 
resources make it a major actor in the 
South Pacific. 

Papua New Guinea, which maintains 
the largest defense force in the Pacific 
Island region, is expected to use its 
IMET grant to provide training in im- 
proving logistics, management, and ad- 
ministrative capabilities and search and 
rescue techniques. The proposed FY 1985 
IMET program of $50,000 represents an 
increase of $20,000 over last year's alloca- 
tion. 

Tonga. Tonga continues to be a 
reliable friend for the United States in 
the South Pacific. The Tongan Govern- 
ment has welcomed port calls by the U.S. 
Navy and has stated its willingness to 
host'nuclear powered vessels even when 
other island governments, concerned over 
an upsurge in public sensitivity to nuclear 
matters, have been reluctant to do so. 
The proposed FY 1985 IMET funds are 
expected to be used for training in 
management and maintenance and repair 
skills. The IMET program of $30,000 
represents no increase over FY 1984. 

Solomon Islands. The Solomon 
Islands, independent since 1978, is the 
second largest of the Pacific Islands 
states in area and the third largest in 
population. Its foreign policy has been 
markedly pro-Western. The government 
is attempting to upgrade its rudimentary 
defense force with the objectives of 
assisting in creating skills necessary for 
effective control and maintenance of 
security and management of forces. The 
requested FY 1985 IMET level is $30,000 
and, as a new progi-am, represents a 
positive U.S. response to the expressed 
interest of the Solomon Islands in obtain- 
ing assistance in upgrading their military 
skills. 



Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands. The United States has ad- 
ministered the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands (TTPI) since World War II 
and, since 1947, under a trusteeship 
agreement with the United Nations. 
Since 1969 we have been negotiating with 
the leadership of the TTPI for new 
political relationships. 

Last year two of the island govern- 
ments— the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands-completed all the nec- 
essary procedures to enter into a new and 
unique relationship with the United 
States, that of freely associated states. 
The Administration is submitting the 
Compact of Free Association to this Con- 
gress in order to complete the process on 
our side and initiate the new relationship 
with the FSM and the Marshalls. 
For FY 1985 we will request 
$295,490,000 for the compact upon the 
enactment of the necessary authorizing 
legislation. 

The compact will regulate the rela- 
tionships between the United States and 
the Marshall Islands and the FSM. Under 
the compact, the United States is granted 
full powers and authority for defense and 
security matters, including the right to 
establish military bases and support ac- 
tivities, throughout the freely associated 
states. The compact specifies the amounts 
and attendant objectives and purposes of 
U.S. grant and service assistance to each 
of the freely associated states. 

The overall policy goals of the United 
States with regard to the compact are 
based on a review of U.S. policy by the 
senior interagency group on foreign 
policy and were approved by the Presi- 
dent'on September 21, 1981. An impor- 
tant policy goal of the United States is to 
see political stability in the freely 
associated states. The compact also im- 
plements long-term U.S. national security 
requirements and provides the basis for 
the accomplishment of shorter term con- 
tingency basing and logistic needs. The 
compact accomplishes the equally impor- 
tant goal of political stability through pro- 
vision of annual grant assistance. 

The first year estimate exceeds by 
$152.8 million the second year estimate 
and exceeds by $146.2 million the average 
annual budget estimate. This is due to the 
inclusion of several one-time payments, 
the most significant of which is a one-time 
$150 million payment for the settlement 
of all claims resulting from the U.S. 
nuclear weapons testing program in the 
Marshall Islands. 



China 

I now want to emphasize the importance 
the Administration places on completing 
action on proposed legislative changes for 
China. 

Our expanding economic, scientific, 
and cultural ties have been mutually 
beneficial and have become a very impor- 
tant element of our overall relationship. 
Our commercial relations are particularly 
healthy and hold great promise for both 
countries. Since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in January 1979, 
trade with China has grown dramatically 
resulting in a U.S. trade surplus of ap- 
proximately $6 billion in 5 years. While 
two-way trade declined in both 1982 and 

1983 from the record high of $5.5 billion in 
1981, we expect bilateral trade to bounce 
back' to between $5.5 and $7 billion in 

1984 with an anticipated increase of high 
technology exports to China. 

We share a broad range of official ex- 
changes-over 100 Chinese delegations 
visit the United States each month— and 
over 10,000 Chinese students now study 
in the United States. The 21 protocols 
under the U.S.-China science and 
technology agreement have promoted 
valuable exchanges in such widely vary- 
ing fields as earthquake studies, 
hydropower, and health. 

Our rapprochement with China over 
the past decade has also made important 
contributions to global and regional peace 
and stability. China shares our deep con- 
cern about Soviet aggression in Afghan- 
istan and the Soviet-backed occupation of 
Kampuchea. U.S.-China relations have 
meshed well with our existing alliances 
and security relationships in Asia and 
Europe. The recent visit of Chinese 
Premier Zhao Ziyang helped to 
underscore the importance of a stable and 
enduring U.S.-China relationship. 

Consistent with our growing relation- 
ship. The President, in June 1981, decided 
to seek legislative change to laws that 
link China with the Soviet bloc. I am 
pleased to note that, with your assistance, 
important progress was made in this ef- 
fort during the past 2 years in clarifying 
the provisions of the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act and by 
lifting the prohibition on importation of 
Chinese furskins. 

The proposal to eliminate the prohibi- 
tion of foreign assistance to China, which 
was submitted to the Congi-ess in FY 
1983 and again in our 1984 authorization 
bill, received favorable consideration in 
both the Senate Foreign Relations and 
House Foreign Affaii-s Committees. 



58 



rtmont nf St3tp Bulletin 



EUROPE 



However, in both years, the overall bill 
was not passed for reasons uiii-elated to 
China. We have resubmitted the proposal 
concerning China in this year's foreign 
assistance bill. 

Amendment of the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act would allow China to participate 
in ongoing AID technical assistance pro- 
grams, under current funding levels, in 
the same manner as do most other coun- 
tries. We previously provided the com- 
mittee staff a paper outlining the type of 
ongoing projects for which we would con- 
sider China's participation. I would stress 
that Chinese participation in these pro- 
grams will not threaten AID programs 
with other countries but will contribute to 
China's development through e.xisting 
AID research and training projects while 
familiarizing the P.R.C. with commercial- 
ly available U.S. technology. 

Our motive in seeking this change is 
the same as 2 years ago; the President 
wants to remove an anachronism in our 
laws that links China with the Soviet bloc 
countries. We have no plans for bilateral 
assistance programs, although some 
Chinese have e.xpressed interest in low 
interest loans. Any such programs would 
have to be authorized and appropriated 
by the Congress. 



CONCLUSION 

In conclusion our FY 1985 foreign 
assistance request is designed to protect 
and reinforce the great strides our friends 
have made in bringing prosperity and 
security to East Asia and the Pacific. 
Although the thi'eats to this progress 
have grown, we have limited our request 
to levels essential to our interests. 
Economic and military assistance pi'o- 
grams are, we believe, well balanced and 
both are targeted against economic prob- 
lem areas and critical military threats. 
We would most welcome this committee's 
support. 



FY 1985 Assistance Requests 
for Europe 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published bv the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Richard K. Burt 

StateitiCHt hcfhre the Si(bconniiittee 
on Eunijiciiii mid Middle FJdst Affairx of 
the Hoiisf Fiircigii Affairx Cnnntiittee on 
February 6, 19,%. Mr. Burt is Assistant 
Secretary for European and Canadian 
Affairs.^ 

It is a pleasure to have this opportunity 
to speak to you today on behalf of secu- 
rity assistance requirements for the Eu- 
ropean region in fiscal year 1985. Although 

the counti'ies of the Atlantic alliance 
weathered in 1983 a major challenge to 
their unity, we must accept the fact that 
1984 and futui-e years will bring addi- 
tional challenges. Fortunately, the vast 
majority of our European friends and 
allies possess the capacity to fulfill their 
responsibilities and help us meet these 
challenges without any direct U.S. 
assistance; a few, however, cannot and 
need our help if they are to be able to do 
their share in safeguarding U.S. and 
Western interests. 

The four allies which do require 
special assistance are to be found along 
the northern edge of the Mediterranean. 
These four allies— Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Turkey— constitute much of 
NATO's southern flank. This region is 
critical for the defense of the central front 
and Europe more generally. At the same 
time, the southern flank is uniquely im- 
portant for another reason— as a bridge 
across Europe linking the Atlantic to the 
Middle East and Southwest Asia. As 
NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers 
regularly note. Western interests outside 
the formal treaty area can and do affect 
the well-being of every alliance member. 
The countries of the southern flank, by 
vLi'tue of their location along major East- 
West air and sea routes, have the poten- 
tial to make a special contribution to this 
increasingly important dimension of 
Western security. It is U.S. assistance 
programs which can turn this potential 
into reality. 

But in speaking of the future, we 
ought not overlook the accomplishments 
of the recent past. Over the past decade, 
each of these four countries has made a 
difficult but crucial transition toward 
democracy. Each has strengthened its 
association with the values and institu- 
tions of the West. Each has negotiated a 
major base agreement with the United 



States. And in each and every case, I 
believe that U.S. .security assistance pro- 
grams have constituted an integral part 
of this evolution. Our economic and 
military assistance programs have proven 
to be an essential foreign policy instru- 
ment. 

Portugal 

A charter member of NATO, Portugal is 
a long-time, steadfast, and reliable ally of 
the United States. The Portuguese 
Government actively supports Western 
policies in international fora, most notably 
on Iran, Afghanistan, and Poland. Por- 
tugal holds a strategic position of great 
importance for NATO reinforcement and 
resupply and including non-NATO con- 
tingencies. The Lajes Air Base is critical 
to these missions. Although concei-ned 
that expanded U.S. use of their facilities 
for non-NATO purposes could expose 
Portugal to increased military and 
economic risks, Portugal has been highly 
cooperative in allowing use of its bases, 
provided that theii- relatively modest 
military and economic needs can be taken 
into account. A new mutual defense 
agreement signed in December 1983 pro- 
vides the United States continued access 
to the critical Lajes facilities and reaf- 
firms the strength and vitality of our 
security relationship. 

Portugal has come a long way in 
establishing a working democracy since 
the 1974 revolution. Portuguese political 
parties, both in government and in op- 
position (with the exception of the com- 
munists), are pro- Western and agree that 
Portugal should make a more substantial, 
active military contribution to NATO. 
The country's Stalinist Communist Party, 
meanwhile, has been thoroughly dis- 
credited and, while controlling almost 
20% of the electorate, has no chance of 
participating in the government. We sup- 
port Portugal's increased participation in 
NATO along with other alliance partners 
and want to help in the long-range Por- 
tuguese military modernization effort. 

Military modernization has a long way 
to go, however, since until the 1974 
revolution the Portuguese Armed Forces 
were largely a colonial force, heavy on 
foot-soldiers and light arms. The army 
has been restructured to more modern 
proportions, and the process of acquiring 
modern equipment has begun, in accord- 



May 1984 



59 



EUROPE 



ance with NATO force goals. It is, never- 
theless, clear that Portugal will not be 
able to bear the burden alone. In recogni- 
tion of this, we and other NATO partners 
are cooperating in an ad hoc committee of 
NATO to coordinate assistance efforts. 

Portugal is one of the poorest NATO 
members, experiencing serious economic 
difficulties in the midst of a stringent 
austerity program set up by agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). In addition, the country is facing a 
major adjustment as it prepares to enter 
the European Communities (EC). It is in 
our best interest to provide increased 
levels of economic support fund (ESF) 
grants to support the Azores and the 
mainland economies, and sufficient 
amounts of military assistance program 
(MAP) grant assistance to help Portugal 
achieve NATO readiness and fulfill its 
obligations in Europe and the Atlantic. 

For FY 1985, we have requested an 
ESF grant of $80 million, a MAP grant of 
$70 million, and foreign military sales 
(FMS) credits of $5.5 million along with $3 
million international military education 
and training (IMET) funds. This level 
would help Portugal to obtain U.S. equip- 
ment for three antisubmarine warfare 
frigates (partially fulfilling our commit- 
ment to help modernize the Portuguese 
Navy), provide funds to complete the ac- 
quisition of a second squadron of A-7P 
aircraft, vital electronic warfare equip- 
ment for the NATO-dedicated brigade, 
and military personnel training. The ESF 
is intended to provide vital budget sup- 
port for the economically pressed Azores 
as well as economic assistance to the 
mainland. In addition, it will help finance 
the establishment of a Luso- American 
Development Foundation, intended to be 
a clearinghouse for technical assistance to 
Portugal after the phase out of current 
Agency for International Development 
(AID) operations. 

Spain 

Since the death of Franco in 1975, Spain 
has successfully established a fully func- 
tioning democracy, while working to in- 
tegrate more fully with the West, in- 
cluding membership in NATO and the 
EC. In conjunction with a democratic 
Portugal, Spain's remarkable progress in 
establishing a free society and in reducing 
the communists to only a marginal 
political force has helped to secure 
NATO's southern flank and enhanced 
alliance strength. 

The U.S. -Spanish bilateral security 
relationship dates back to 1953 and has 



been confirmed through a series of 
agreements regarding U.S. use of 
Spanish military facilities and U.S. 
assistance for Spanish military modern- 
ization. Since Spain's entry into NATO 
and its peaceful transition to democracy, 
it has also become an important alliance 
partner. The basis for our security 
cooperation has thus been broadened. 
Modernization of the Spanish military 
farces, which strengthens the common 
defense as well as encourages an institu- 
tional role for the military similar to that 
played by the military in other Western 
democracies, has gained new importance. 
Our security assistance relationship has 
thus become even more significant. 

Following national elections in Spain 
in 1982, the newly elected socialist 
government, in the face of considerable 
popular sentiment against NATO, "froze" 
the process of military integration into 
the alliance pending a popular referen- 
dum. No date for a referendum has been 
set, but the authorities are now evalu- 
ating membership and military integra- 
tion partly in terms of what benefits they 
offer the Spanish military's modernization 
effort. While we consider the ultimate 
decision to be a matter for Spain alone to 
decide, it is important that our assistance 
effort make clear the value of NATO par- 
ticipation. 

Under the 1983 Agreement on 
Friendship, Defense, and Cooperation, 
Spain provides the United States con- 
tinued access to vital air and naval 
facilities which will be crucial in the event 
of a European conflict. The agreement 
also establishes an institutional 
framework— the U.S.-Spanish Council and 
the various committees which operate 
under its aegis— for the development and 
implementation of our broad political, 
economic, cultural, and scientific coopera- 
tion with Spain. We, in turn, are pledged 
to "best efforts" in assisting Spain to 
upgrade its military equipment, profes- 
sionalize its forces, and bring them up to 
NATO standards. 

At a minimum, it is vital that we 
maintain our current "best efforts" com- 
mitment for FY 1985, which would be to 
continue at FY 1984 assistance levels of 
$400 million in FMS credits and $12 
million in ESF grants, and to seek $3 
million in IMET. The ESF grant would 
fund scientific-cultural exchanges and pro- 
grams designed to counterbalance the 
large military component of our relations. 
The IMET program is aimed at the pro- 
fessional development of the Spanish 
military. FMS guaranteed credits are 
scheduled to fund air defense and missile 



systems, continued funding for the pur- 
chase of F-18 fighter aircraft, cargo/ 
transport helicopters. Harpoon missiles, 
ship construction, and other weapons 
systems. 

Greece 

The strategic importance of Greece is well 
recognized. Bordering on the Warsaw 
Pact, Greece would block any pact thrust 
southward toward the Mediterranean 
through Thrace and would join with 
Turkey in resisting any Soviet effort to 
seize control of the Dardanelles. At the 
same time, Greece is in a position to con- 
trol the sea and air lanes of the eastern 
Mediterranean and is one of the several 
countries controlling access to the Middle 
East. Greece is thus a key ally on the 
southern flank of NATO." 

In addition to these strategic in- 
terests, our defense relationship with 
Greece must be placed in the broader con- 
text of a traditional friendship which is 
very important to the United States. It is 
our intention to work to deepen the 
understanding between our two coun- 
tries. While at times we have significant 
differences with Greece, these must be 
considered in the larger context of rela- 
tions between two democratic allies 
whose perspectives can differ but also 
coincide. 

The most important development in 
our defense relationship last year was the 
conclusion of the new Defense and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement. The 
agreement was formally signed 
September 8 and entered into force 
December 20 following Greek parliamen- 
tary approval. The Congi'ess helped make 
this agreement possible by indicating its 
willingness to increase our secuiity 
assistance progi-am to Greece in the con- 
text of a defense relationship reaffirmed 
by conclusion of a satisfactory agreement. 
This accord provides for the continuation 
of the activities previously conducted in 
Greece on a mutually agreeable basis. The 
agreement will be valid until terminated 
by written notice by either side, which 
can be given at the end of 5 years or 
thei-eafter. This arrangement is com- 
parable to agreements we have with 
other allies. We believe this agreement 
strengthens NATO and benefits the 
United States and Greece. 

The security assistance we are re- 
questing for Greece is an integi-al part of 
a close defense relationship which in- 
cludes our common membership in NATO 
as well as U.S. use of military facilities in 
Greece. U.S. assistance is needed to im- 



60 



s^ammaa 



Department of State Bulletin 
IBBBBHBIBI 



prove capability to carry out its assigned 
tasks under NATO. Greece has made con- 
siderable pi'oiiress in recent years, utiliz- 
ing its own foreign exchange resources as 
well as U.S. loan guarantees. The Greek 
percent of GNP devoted to military e.\- 
penditures is among the highest in 
NATO. However, U.S. assistance con- 
tinues to be needed. Like other European 
allies, Greece is suffering from inflation, 
unemployment, and a balance-of- 
payments problem. The repayment terms 
for our military assistance loans to Greece 
are the best available to any nation under 
our nonconcessional FMS program. 

For Greece we propose to maintain 
the level of FMS funds at $500 million as 
was allocated for FY 1984 to permit the 
purchase of military equipment, ammuni- 
tion, and spare parts— including aircraft, 
communications, and radar equipment— 
and missiles. We also propose $1.7 million 
for IMET, which is important to the 
Greek Armed Forces at both the profes- 
sional and technical levels. 

Turkey 

Our assistance program for Turkey re- 
mains one of the largest in the world, 
reflecting both that country's importance 
and its potential. We are proposing a pro- 
gram for Turkey identical in size to last 
year's proposal, but doing so recognizes 
that it will leave significant shortcomings, 
both in terms of Turkish needs and what 
we would like to see occur there. 
Nonetheless, it is a program which will 
permit us to continue to assist the Turks 
with major military modernization pro- 
grams and provide an important element 
of assistance to their imaginative 
economic I'eforms. 

Although Turkey's strategic impor- 
tance has been reiterated many times to 
this committee, I would like to mention it 
once again briefly. Turkey, with both land 
and sea frontiers with the U.S.S.R. and 
Bulgaria and holding the key to Soviet ac- 
cess to the Mediterranean, is the anchor 
of the southeast flank of NATO. In addi- 
tion, Turkey shares borders with Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria and is exploring a new, 
more active role in Islamic affairs. Given 
the impact of all three countries on cur- 
rent unrest in the Middle East, Turkey's 
potential role takes on added significance. 
Our dialogue and cooperation with 
Turkey on Middle East issues has 
increased significantly, based on the good 
and productive bilateral relationship we 
have developed. Security assistance 
remains an important basis of that 
relationship. 

Turkey's political system is undergo- 
ing a positive transformation toward full 
parliamentary democracy. The govern- 



ment elected in November 1983 is active- 
ly developing and carrying out new and 
inn(ivati\(' i)()licies. Municipal elections 
scheduled for March 25 will include all 
legal political parties, a further indication 
that movement toward full democracy re- 
mains on schedule. Having supported 
Turkey during the past few difficult years 
as it struggled to overcome political chaos 
and economic bankruptcy, it is important 
that we continue to strongly support the 
new government and the return to full 
democracy. 

Turkey's economic recovery in recent 
years is justly lauded as an e.xample of 
how international cooperation and a com- 
mitted country can overcome staggering 
financial problems. At the same time, the 
economy remains fragile and requires out- 
side support for the next year to two. 
This year will be especially important. 
Repayment of previously rescheduled 
debt will add significantly to short-term 
debt service; and the important economic 
reforms announced by the new govern- 
ment, which ultimately *:hould increase 
the economy's productivity and com- 
petitiveness, will also put short-term 
pressure on the balance of payments. Our 
ESF assistance to Turkey has decreased 
dramatically in recent years, but it is very 
important that we not decrease it further 
at this critical juncture. 

For Turkey, our request is for $755 
million in military assistance— $230 in 
MAP, $250 in concessional FMS loans, 
and $275 in FMS guarantees-$175 million 
in ESF and $4 million in IMET funds. 
Some of our military assistance will con- 
tinue to provide maintenance and support 
of aging equipment which cannot yet be 
replaced. The greater portion will be used 
for modernization of Turkish Armed 
Forces' equipment. Major programs in- 
clude M-48 tank upgrade, helicopter ac- 
quisition, naval weapon procurement, and 
continuation of the important F-16 pro- 
gram begun in FY 1984. These are key 
l)riigrams which will make major strides 
in helping Turkey meet NATO com- 
mitments which, in turn, contribute 
directly to U.S. national defense. They 
fall far short, however, of enabling 
Turkey to overcome all of its equipment 
shortcomings in a reasonable timeframe. 



EUROPE 



Cyprus 

This Administration, from its very first 
days, has placed a high priority on the 
achievement of a just settlement. We are 
committed to that goal, for as long as 
Cyprus is divided and its status uncer- 
tain, it constitutes a humanitarian concern 
and remains a serious barrier to good 
relations between Greece and Turkey. 
The November 15 declaration of 
statehood by the Turkish Cy]jriots was 
unhelpful to the search for a fair and final 
negotiated settlement. We condemned the 
move and called for its reversal. We also 
supported UN Security Council Resolu- 
tion 541, passed November 18, which also 
called for reversal of the Turkish Cypriot 
action. In January we welcomed an- 
nouncements by the Turkish Cypriots of a 
group of goodwill measures and by the 
Government of Turkey of their removal of 
1 ,500 troops from Cyprus. We also 
responded favoi-ably to President 
Kyprianou's proposed framework for a 
comprehensive settlement— a proposal 
containing positive elements. We are now 
actively encouraging both sides to react 
to the other's proposals in a way which 
can lead to a comprehensive solution of 
the outstanding issues. 

The $3 million requested for Cyprus 
would be applied to the existing Cyprus- 
America scholarship program which pro- 
vides American university educations to 
young Cypriots of both communities. 
Cyprus is without universities of its own 
and this program provides a very popular 
alternative to Soviet bloc study. We 
believe this to be a modest but significant 
demonstration of continuing American in- 
terest in the welfare of the people of 
Cyprus; as such, it constitutes a worthy 
complement to our diplomatic endeavors. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



May 1984 



61 



IHWBiiiilWifHtBlHftlllBi^^ 



FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

FY 1985 Request for 
Economic Assistance Programs 

by M. Peter McPhenon 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
m Foreiffn/yperations of the Senate Ap- 
propria tions Committee on March 8 
198i Mr McPherson is Administrator of 
the Agency for International Develop, 
ment (AID) and Acting Director of the In- 
ternational Development Cooperation 
Agency GDCA).^ 



It is a pleasure to be here once again to 
present the Administration's annual pro- 
posal for foreign economic assistance 1 
want to express my appreciation to the 
committee for its past support of the 
foreign assistance program. I look tor- 
ward to our continued cooperation under 
vour leadership. 

Foreign assistance has been and con- 
tinues to be in the best interests of the 
United States. For that reason, it has 
been supported by your committee and 
continues to be an important part ot the 
Administration's foreign policy. 

The historical trend has been to 
broaden the statutory mandate for 
foreign assistance, since its inception with 
the Marshall Plan. Successive accretions 
include postwar reconstruction, food tor 
peace, and basic human needs. 

I have pursued an integrated ap- 
proach to foreign assistance, combining 
growth with equity as an operational goal. 
My philosophy is to help others to help 
themselves. Foreign assistance is a 
limited resource. There is no substitute m 
the long run for development that is 
broadly based and self-sustaming. Such 
development is not simply economic. 
Development requires inter aha 
spreading knowledge and the promotion 
of flourishing institutions as well as grow- 
ing economies. 

We have set forth four pillars or 
means to implement our programs. 

• Policy Dialogue and Reform. This 
brings to the fore the notion that long- 
term equitable growth depends clearly on 
the nature of policies followed by develop- 
ing countries. We seek to achieve agree- 
ment with host country governments on 
the nature of key poUcy constramts to 
basic development and on practical 
changes that can be addressed. 

• Institutional Development. We 
have come to recognize that faulty institu 
tional frameworks can impede develop- 
ment and that increased centralization 



62 



and bureaucratization can be major 
obstacles to progress. Our approach, thus, 
has been modified to include the idea that 
what is sometimes required is reducing 
the size of institutions, decentrabzmg and 
encouraging greater reliance o" Pn^'^te 
and voluntary, rather than pubhc, institu- 
tions. 

. Technology Transfer. In this area, 
we are seeking dramatic breakthroughs 
in such areas as biomedical research, 
agriculture, and family planning. Our em- 
phasis is on finding solutions to age-old 
problems through inexpensive methods 
that can be widely disseminated. AID m- 
tends to be a leader in supportmg new 
technologies. 

. Greater Use of the Private Sector. 
We are also stressing the contributions 
that the private sector can make to solv- 
ing key development problems, based on 
the conviction that there are many things 
government cannot do or cannot do wdl. 
For example, we are testing pilot efforts 
for indigenous private sector involvement 
in areas such as the distribution of 
agricultural inputs and the manufacture 
and marketing of inputs for health and 
population programs. 

The past 3 years have involved 
change as well as continuity in our foreign 
assistance. And there is progress to 

report. ec.^ ^„ 

AID and the Department of State 
have worked closely to integrate our 
foreign assistance and our foreign 
nolicy-to relate our assistance efforts 
more directly to foreign policy interests. 
This coordination is reflected not only in 
the details of our budgetary requests but 
also in the repori^s of the Commission on 
Security and Economic Assistance 
(Cariucci commission) and the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America. I shall say more about those 
reports in later pages of this statement. 
AID has followed through on the mi- 
tiatives of President Reagan at the Can- 
cun conference. Presidential task forces 
have been sent to several countries, and 
their repori^s have helped guide ensuing 
poUcy dialogues. The Caribbean Basm 
Initiative has been launched, and its im- 
portance for our relations with that 
strategic region is now widely recognized. 
PL 480 has been more fully integrated 
into our development programming 
without diminishing its humamtanan 
character. Title II commodities, for exam- 
ple are being used to develop cooper- 



atives in India, to promote agriculture in 
Jamaica, and to help reforestation m 

Congress has increased our flexibility 
in responding to crises and opportunities. 
Particularly noteworthy is the new 
revolving fund which will allow AID to 
develop new financing mechanisms and 
increase its support of private sector ac- 
tivities We have made a good start m 
this du-ection through the authority pro- 
vided to us this year. 

AID'S voluntarv family plannmg pro- 
grams are increasingly using private sec- 
tor marketing. The market reaches out to 
customers and localities which are not 
reached by governmental progi-ams. The 
private sector also competes successfully 
with governmental progi-ams that are 
free of charge, for example, m 
Bangladesh. The net effects are an in- 
crease in individual choice, a decrease in 
governmental subsidies, and an improve- 
ment in program effectiveness 

AID has taken the lead m the dis- 
semination of oral rehydration therapy. 
This simple therapy promises to reduce 
substantially the millions of deaths of in- 
fants and small children. We recen ly 
sponsored an international conference on 
this therapy, and we are introducing it in 
social marketing systems-private as well 
as public-in several developmg coun- 

^' "' AID continues to support research on 
an antimalarial vaccine. This pioneering 
effort is increasingly successful. Clinical 
testing with human subjects is expected 
to begin in 198.5. If all goes well, distribu- 
tion should begin m 1990. 

We have recognized the extraor- 
dinary needs of sub-Sahara Africa and 
Central America. New initiatives to meet 
those needs are outlined in later pages of 
this statement. Those initiatives reflect 
the input of members of this commit ee as 
well as the Commission on Secunty and 
Economic Assistance and the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 

'"aid has broadened and deepened its 
relations with corporations as well as 
universities in the United States. Cor- 
porate expertise has proven to be par- 
ticulariv helpful in recommending 
remedies for the environmental impact ot 
some industries in developing countries 
AID and universities are increasing their 
cooperation with the new memorandum o1 



Depart nnf 



Bulletir 



FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 



understanding and joint Career Corps. A 
major effort is now underway to expand 
the involvement of historically black col- 
leges and universities in our programs. 

AID has increased its ti-aining of 
students fi-om developing countries in the 
United States. We sponsored almost 8,000 
students in FY 1982, over 9,000 in FY 

1983, and over 10,000 (projected) in FY 

1984. This reverses a trend of the 1970s. 
A strategic planning process was ini- 
tiated 2 years ago to give a sense of direc- 
tion not only to our regional bureaus but 
also to the entire agency. The preliminary 
results of that planning process are 
reflected in later pages of this statement. 
The final results are to be shared in the 
coming weetts with your committee. 

We are establishing an early-warning 
system with the international develop- 
ment banks, and we are pressing in a 
variety of fora for more coordination with 
other donors. This effort recently bore 
fi-uit with the adoption of its first 
guidelines for donor coordination by the 
Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development (OECD). 

I am pleased to have been able to 
report progress in these areas. Let me 
now turn to a review of the current situa- 
tion. 

World Economy 

During the past year, there have been im- 
portant developments which affect our 
program for FY 1985. First, the interna- 
tional economic picture is changing, with 
both positive and less encouraging 
aspects. Second, two major commissions 
have issued reports making important 
recommendations on certain aspects of 
our foreign assistance effort. I would like 
to address each of these points briefly. 

At the time of my appearance before 
this committee last year, I testified that 
nations around the world, particularly 
those in the Third World, were confront- 
ing serious economic problems brought on 
by the global recession. They had ex- 
perienced a sharp decline in demand for 
their e.xports, compounded by high in- 
terest rates which increased the cost of 
borrowing to meet their rapidly growing 
balance-of-payments deficits. The result 
was rising levels of debt and debt- 
servicing burdens and a decline in the 
level of private lending. For many of 
these developing countries, problems 
were aggravated by their own inap- 
propriate economic policies. 



Today the situation has begun to 
stabilize, and some of these same coun- 
tries are showing hopeful signs of 
recovery. A number have undertaken ad- 
justment progi-ams, often in conjunction 
with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), aimed at achieving a sustainable 
balance-of-payments position. For some 
recovery is due in part to policy reforms 
which we and other donors have helped to 
put in place through policy dialogue ef- 
foits in the development arena. 

Several recent events offer hope of 
sustained improvement in less developed 
country (LDC) economic performance. 
First, the developing countries them- 
selves are increasingly recognizing the 
value of sound economic policies and the 
importance of adjustment programs to 
their long-term economic prospects. Sec- 
ond, economic recovery, led by the 
United States and other developed coun- 
tries, began to take hold during the latter 
part of 1983. We can expect it to continue 
and spread in 1984. Third, interest rates 
have fallen significantly, world market oil 
prices have declined, and LDC commod- 
ity prices have experienced some in- 
creases. As a result of these positive 
trends, aided by a significant cutback in 
LDC imports, the balance-of-payments 
situation of the developing countries as a 
whole improved last year. The LDCs' 
total balance-of-payments deficit, though 
still significant, was about one-third less 
than a couple of years ago. 

The worldwide economic recovery, as 
it strengthens and spreads, will be impor- 
tant to the economic prospects of the 
developing countries— particularly the 
middle and higher income developing 
countries with a greater capacity to ad- 
just and respond to the economic oppor- 
tunity provided by the recovery in the 
developed countries. 

Even with the improvement in 
economic conditions, though, many 
developing countries, particularly the 
poorest, will continue to face serious 
economic difficulties and will continue to 
require substantial foreign assistance. 
For many of them, recovei-y has yet to 
blossom. Even in those which have begun 
appropriate adjustments, the first step 
has often required substantial reductions 
in domestic credit, in government 
development expenditures, and in im- 
ports needed for investment. All of this 
constrains economic performance, par- 
ticularly over the short run. 

For the low-income countries facing 
severe economic problems, with limited 
capacity to attract or service private 
flows, and with extremely hmited human. 



physical, and institutional infrastructure 
needed to address their basic develop- 
ment problems, development a.ssistance 
will remain critically important. Economic 
assistance will also be critical in helping 
countries avoid serious economic and 
political disruption while needed .stabiliza- 
tion and adjustment programs are being 
undertaken. Indeed, the challenge we 
face is to assist the developing world to 
address its current economic problems 
while at the same time assisting in laying 
the foundation for long-term sustainable 
development. In short , there is cau.se for 
hope, but the job is far from over. 

Assisting developing countries to con- 
front these massive economic problems 
effectively, with the Hmited resources 
available, requires a carefully thought out 
foreign assistance program and greater 
suppoil from the public than has been the 
case in recent years. It was for that 
reason that Secretary Shultz last year 
called for creation of the Commission on 
Security and Economic Assistance. He 
charged it with the task of reviewing the 
foreign assistance program and making 
recommendations for improving its focus 
and administration, and for increasing its 
public support. 

The commission, on which you and 
members of your committee served, has 
served a very useful purpose in focusing 
greater attention on the necessity for a 
strong foreign assistance program. I need 
not take time here to review in detail the 
findings and recommendations of the com- 
mission, since members of this committee 
played a very active part in their formula- 
tion. I would hke to cite, however, a few 
of the ways in which we are moving to im- 
plement those recommendations. 

The commission called for increases in 
the foreign assistance budget to help 
meet our foreign policy objectives. It also 
pointed out the need for carefully in- 
tegrated programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Caribbean, and Central America. In 
response to these recommendations as 
well as those of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America, we are 
proposing new initiatives entailing signifi- 
cant increases in funding for both of these 
i-egions. I will go into that in more detail 
in just a moment. 

Consistent with the commission's af- 
firmation of the importance of a total 
country approach to program develop- 
ment, over the past 3 years we have 
developed and improved upon an in- 
tegrated budget process to allocate 
resources in each country so as to ensure 
the best mix of overall assistance to meet 
foreign policy interests. We are following 
the recommendations of the commission 



May 1984 



63 



■mwiim«iiiwHH»w...iumiiiu«».PiHiininiwpiiiiiiiuiiiin« 



FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 



to increase emphasis on policy refonn. in- 
stitutional development, technology 
ti-ansfer, and involvement of the private 
sector as means of fostering development. 
We also are taking steps to respond to 
the commission's call to increase the flex- 
ibility of the development assistance pro- 
gram and to maintain that of the economic 
support fund (ESF). We have also sought 
to increase the use of PL 480 to meet 
development objectives. And we are look- 
ing at other ways in which we can follow- 
up on the commission's recommendations. 

Sub-Sahara Africa 

Another major concern has been the 
tremendous challenge to stimulate strong 
growth in Africa. Measured by almost 
any indicator of development— income, in- 
fant mortality, literacy, malnutrition, or 
life span— the situation in Africa is more 
serious than elsewhere. During the past 
decade the economic performance of the 
region has been particularly poor— 15 
countries recorded negative gi'owth rates. 
Sub-Sahara Africa is the only region in 
the world where per capita food produc- 
tion has declined over the last 20 years. 
Moreover the poor economic performance 
has been exacerbated recently by severe 
drought, seriously affecting food produc- 
tion, causing growing food shortages con- 
tinent wide, and widespread hunger and 
malnutrition. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) has identified 24 
countries which are most seriously af- 
fected and in need of urgent emergency 
food aid. 

To help respond to the worsening 
situation in Africa, we are taking several 
steps. One, we are allocating a larger 
share of our cun-ent year program to 
African countries— to date we have pro- 
vided 218,000 metric tons of PL 480, Title 
II food aid valued at $85 million (including 
ocean freight costs) in response to 
emergency requests. Two, because of the 
magnitude of the problem, we are re- 
questing an FY 1984 PL 480 food aid sup- 
plemental of $90 million to augment cur- 
rent allocations. These steps will respond 
positively to today's emergency. 

We also wish to address long-term 
problems. Thus as part of our FY 1985 re- 
quest for the development assistance pro- 
gram, we are seeking congressional ap- 
proval of a new Economic Policy Ini- 
tiative (EPI) for Africa. The initiative is 
planned as a 5-year, $500 million fund. 
For FY 1985, we are requesting an 
authorization and appropriation of $75 
million. The purpose of this new initiative 
is to foster economic policy reforms which 
are essential to any reversal of the cur- 



64 



rent downward trend in many African 
countries. The resources of this special 
fund will be used to bolster those coun- 
tries which are prepared and able to 
establish a comprehensive economic 
policy framework conducive to growth 
and long-term development. Resources 
will be used to suppoi't implementation of 
the reform package once promulgated. 
Assistance from this fund will be tied to 
major policy reform measures and fo- 
cused predominantly on the agricultural 
sector. We expect that such a fund will 
help significantly to strengthen the policy 
dialogue between donors and recipients 
and to improve coordination among 
donors. 

Central America 

Another major development has been the 
recent release of the much-awaited report 
by the National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America, chaired by former 
Secretary of State Kissinger. By now, 
many of you are familiar, I am sure, with 
the essentials of the commission's find- 
ings, so I will touch on them only briefly 
at this time. 

Confirming the widely held percep- 
tion of a crisis of acute proportions in a 
region of fundamental importance to the 
United States, the commission calls for a 
program to meet basic human needs, help 
achieve peace, and promote democracy. It 
proposes a comprehensive approach to 
economic development in the region and 
reinvigoration of the Central American 
Common Market, all tied to major policy 
reforms. It has recommended mounting a 
large-scale, long-term assistance program 
to help stabilize the Central American 
economies, rebuild infrastructure, provide 
trade credits, and encourage rescheduling 
of multilateral debt. The commission has 
also proposed a new organizational struc- 
ture to administer a portion of the pro- 
posed program. 

In response to the commission's 
recommendations, we are requesting 
authorization of a major new program of 
assistance to Central America. The pro- 
gram's strategy concentrates on four fun- 
damental elements: economic stabiliza- 
tion, creation of a basis for long-term 
growth, promotion of equity, and 
strengthened democratic institutions and 
respect for human rights. 

Accordingly, the program's major 
goals are, first, to end the downward 
spiral of production in the region by next 
year. Second, over the course of the pro- 
gram, we want to help the countries of 
the region achieve an annual economic 
growth rate of at least 6%, creating more 



than 250,000 new jobs each year through 
export-led growth. Third, we seek to 
foster an increase in agricultural produc- 
tion of 4% per year by 1989, generating 
an additional 80,000 jobs and increasing 
food availability and agi-oindustrial e.\- 
ports. Fourth, we want to see substan- 
tially greater benefits of economic growth 
accrue to all sectors of the populace to 
better meet theii' basic human needs— in- 
creased primary school enrollment, re- 
duced infant mortality, greater availabil- 
ity of modem family planning services, in- 
creased low-income housing, and better 
access to clean water and sanitation 
facilities. We also want to foster the 
strengthening of democratic institutions 
and progress toward participatory 
democracy and legal systems which 
respect human rights. 

To achieve these goals, we request 
authorization of an $8.3 billion program of 
economic assistance and guarantees for 
Central America to be made available 
over the next 6 years. 

For the first phase of its implementa- 
tion, we are requesting a supplemental 
appropriation of $400 million in FY 1984, 
including $290 million in ESF, $73 million 
in development assistance, $25 million in 
PL 480 commodities, and $12 million for 
other agencies and for increased AID 
operating expenses. 

For FY 1985 we are requesting an ap- 
propriation of $1.12 billion, consisting of 
$(>41 million in ESF. $272.8 million in 
development assistance, $10 million for 
housing guaranty reserves, $120 million 
in PL 480 commodities, and $77 million 
for other programs and AID operating 
expenses, plus $600 million in guaranty 
authority to support private lending to 
the region. 

As the bipartisan commission recom- 
mended, the assistance would be provided 
on a collaborative basis. Our program 
would be closely tied to commitments for 
economic and social reforms by the recip- 
ient governments. 

I know that there is a major question 
in the minds of some with respect to the 
capacity of the Central American coun- 
tries to absorb productively the level of 
assistance which we are proposing. Let 
me assure the committee that this is a 
matter which we have considered care- 
fully in our planning, and I would like to 
share with you our thinking on it. 

While our program is ambitious, I am 
convinced that it is both essentia! and 
feasible. I believe, in fact, that a more 
modest program might be undercut by 
the political uncertainty, insurgency, low- 
commodity prices, and economic depres- 
sion that now characterize the region. 



Department of State Bulletin 



FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 



First, with respect to the overall size 
of the program, the assistance we are pro- 
posing for FY 1985 i-epresents less than 
5% of the region's GNP and is less than 
the $1.5 billion shortfall in export earn- 
ings which have resulted from lower cof- 
fee and sugar prices and higher costs for 
imported oil. We have provided higher 
levels of aid relative to GNP in other 
parts of the world, like South Korea and 
Taiwan, and much larger amounts during 
the Marshall Plan. 

On the issue of the management 
capacity of the Central American govern- 
ments, while we recognize that serious 
deficiencies do exist, we are taking 
several steps to prevent such problems 
from limiting our impact. For one thing, 
the largest part of the assistance will go 
to the private sector rather than to 
government programs. For another, as 
part of our effort, we will provide 
substantial technical assistance and train- 
ing for government officials to streamline 
opei'ations and increase efficiency. Third, 
significant capacity for expansion is 
already in place since government in- 
vestments and social programs have been 
dramatically cut back as a result of the 
region's financial problems. 

With regard to specific bottlenecks, 
we recognize that aid expansion has been 
hindered in some areas by such problems 
as clogged ports or shortages of trucks to 
move commodities. This is simply not the 
case in Central America, where produc- 
tion has artificially shrunk as a result of 
economic depression. For the next 
several years, considerable excess capac- 
ity will exist. Over the longer term, 
where we can make plans to address 
potential bottlenecks before they arise, 
the need for investment is enormous. 
Physical infrastructure is undeveloped, 
health and education systems need expan- 
sion, and investment in productive capaci- 
ty is essential to employ the region's 
growing labor force. These all require 
resources. 

Finally, I would note that our own 
past experience with assistance programs 
in the region suggests that we can build 
up a larger program, given the kind of 
commitment to economic, social, and 
political reform that we will seek as a 
precondition to such assistance. We have 
found that our programs have tended to 
be implemented fairly quickly in Central 
America compared with other regions of 
the woi-ld. Less than 20% of our pipeline 
of undi-sbursed funds was obligated more 
than 3 years ago, and some of this was for 
projects where long lead times were fore- 
seen in project design. 

I believe that the central determinant 
of absorptive capacity is government 



policies. Policy reforms are crucial to ef- 
fective use of our funds and those of host 
countries. The key is to avoid subsidizing 
inefficiency and to create opportunities 
and incentives for private sector invest- 
ment. In agriculture, adequate prices and 
access to land with secure titles will 
stimulate investment and production by 
the people who understand best hov\' to 
do this— the individual farmers. In in- 
dustry good policies will mobilize in- 
dividual entrepreneurs to make the right 
decisions concerning increased employ- 
ment and production. The Central 
American Development Organization 
(CADO), which we support, can be a vehi- 
cle for assuring that our assistance is, in- 
deed, tied to good performance on the 
whole range of policies— economic, social, 
and political— essential for the success of 
the Central America program. 

The stakes are high in Central 
America, and the success of this effort is 
vital to our foreign policy interests. For it 
to succeed, the proposed program will re- 
quire sti-ong bipartisan congressional sup- 
port. We will welcome the opportunity to 
discuss with the members of this commit- 
tee and others in Congress the details of 
the program as they are fleshed out and 
to seek your guidance as to how it can 
best be implemented. 

Let me now turn to the overall AID 
program. 

General Strategy 

Our programs should be aimed at over- 
coming the basic problems of hunger, il- 
literacy, lack of training, disease, and pre- 
mature death. We cannot, of course, 
assist developing nations to achieve such 
standards through our pi'ograms alone. 
Indeed the principal impetus for sur- 
mounting these problems must come from 
the developing countries themselves. The 
programs of other donors are a critical 
element in achieving progress. 

There are essentially six key develop- 
ment areas on which we are focusing AID 
resources: 

• Attacking hunger; 

• Addressing health problems, espe- 
cially the high levels of infant and child 
mortality in the Third World; 

• Addressing high rates of population 
growth; 

• Increasing literacy, education, and 
training opportunities; 

• Reducing unemployment and 
underemployment; and 

• Improving host country financial 
structures. 



Many of these are a continuation of 
past efforts, but we are striving to give 
better focus to our efforts and to establish 
a clearer vision of what this agency is, 
and should be, concerned with. Moreover, 
we are emphasizing as basic means of im- 
plementation the four pillars of agency 
policy: policy reform, technology transfer, 
institutional development, and greater 
use of the private sector. 

Through policy dialogue, we seek to 
achieve agreement with host country 
governments on the nature of key policy 
constraints to basic development and on 
practical changes that can be made. Right 
policies are essential to achieve develop- 
ment progress. 

Institutional development, thi-ough 
which we strive to help create and im- 
prove the institutional capacities of the 
peoples of the developing countries, has 
been part of AID's approach since its 
beginnings. Over time we have come to 
recognize that faulty institutional 
frameworks can impede development and 
that increased centralization and 
bureaucratization can be major obstacles 
to progress. As a result, our approach to 
institutional development has been modi- 
fied to include the idea that sometimes 
what is required is decentralizing institu- 
tions rather than centralizing them and 
encouraging greater reliance on private 
and voluntary— rather than public— insti- 
tutions. In this regard, we will continue to 
strengthen our partnership with U.S. 
private and voluntary organizations and 
draw on their unique capacities in such 
areas as small-scale enterprise, health 
delivery systems, and community 
development. 

We ai-e also stressing the contribution 
that the private sector and the use of 
market power can make to solving key 
development problems. We believe there 
are many things that government cannot 
do, or cannot do well. In particular we 
plan to test pilot efforts for private sector 
involvement in areas where government 
has often been unsuccessful— such as 
distribution of agricultural inputs. We 
will be testing the capabilities of in- 
digenous private sectors to manufacture 
and market inputs for health and popula- 
tion programs. 

In the area of technology transfer, we 
hojDe to achieve dramatic breakthroughs 
in such areas as biomedical research, 
agriculture, and family ])lanning. "New 
technologies" frequently connote com- 
plex, expensive applications to solve 
esoteric problems. But technology also 
may be used to find solutions to age-old 
problems through inexpensive methods 



May 1984 



^mmmwumutHmmimmmmmmm 



MIDDLE EAST 



that can be disseminated to people 
everywhere. An example is the 
breakthrough in oral rehydi-ation 
therapy, which I mentioned earlier. 

AID intends to be a leader in sup- 
porting the development and dissemina- 
tion of such new technologies. Sustained 
development requii'es an indigenous 
capacity to adopt, create, and apply a con- 
tinuing stream of appropriate tech- 
nologies to the problems of health, popu- 
lation growth, hunger, illiteracy, 
unemployment, and labor productivity. 
Moreover their dissemination and actual 
utilization requires that they be 
economically and financially sound, 
capable of withstanding the test of the 
market. 

Research thus takes on added impor- 
tance, and AID intends to give greater 
emphasis to it as a fulcrum of tech- 
nological transfer. We have identified 
four critical research areas that will 
receive major AID attention in the com- 
ing years: agriculture, health, family plan- 
ning, and fuelwood production and utiliza- 
tion. 

The developments I have just out- 
lined have had a major part in shaping 
our proposed program for FY 198.5 and 
will influence the way in which that pro- 
gram is caiTied out. Let me turn now to 
the details of the FY 1985 request. 

Request 

For FY 1985 we are proposing a program 
of $8.9 billion for foreign economic 
assistance, including amounts we are re- 
questing as part of our overall proposal 
for Central America. In addition, to re- 
spond to several pressing requirements 
this year, we are requesting several FY 
1984 supplemental appropriations. These 
include an urgent $90 million PL 480, 
Title II food aid supplemental for Africa 
to respond to the dire food shortage in 
that region, $.320 million in supplemental 
for the multilateral banks, and a $400 
million supplemental for Central America. 

The Central America supplemental 
consists of $290.5 million for ESF, most of 
which is for urgently needed balance-of- 
payments support; $73 million for func- 
tional development assistance; and a total 
of $11.5 million for AID operating ex- 
penses, the Peace Corps, and U.S. Infor- 
mation Agency. 

The FY 1985 request for bilateral 
assistance includes $2.2 billion for 
development assistance, $3.4 billion for 
the ESF, $21 million for the trade and 
development program, and $1.3 billion in 
budget authority for the PL 480 Food for 
Peace program. 



66 



Our development assistance request 
includes $1.6 billion for the functional 
development assistance accounts. Of this 
amount, $20 million would be allocated to 
the private enterprise revolving fund. 
The development assistance request also 
includes $97.5 million for the Sahel 
development program, $75 million for the 
new Economic Policy Initiative for Africa 
which I mentioned earlier, $10 million for 
support of American schools and hospitals 
abroad, $25 million for the international 
disaster assistance program, and $404 
million for AID operating expenses. And 
it includes $34 million for the Foreign 
Service retirement fund, for which fund- 
ing is already authorized. 

I would like to point out that, with 
respect to our development assistance re- 
quest, we are proposing a reduction in the 
minimum loan level required for allocation 
within our functional accounts. This will 
give us needed flexibility in the program- 
ming of our resources and avoid the 
possibility of having to provide loans to 
any of the least developed countries such 
as has been required this year in 
Bangladesh as a result of the current loan 
floor. 

The ESF, consistent with the pro- 
gram of the past several years, has over 
half of its resources allocated to Israel 
and Egyjjt to continue our support for the 
search for peace in the Middle East. The 



FY 1985 Assistance Requests 
for the Middle East 



request also includes expanded assistance 
to the Caribbean Basin countries to 
restore economic growth to this troubled 
region, support for continuing efforts to 
stem the spread of economic and political 
disruption in Africa, and to advance our 
security and development-oriented pro- 
grams in Pakistan and the Philippines. 

For multilateral assistance in FY 
1985, we are requesting a total of $1.5 
bilhon. This includes $1.2 billion for U.S. 
contributions to the multilateral develop- 
ment banks. The request also includes 
$242 million for international organiza- 
tions and programs, of which $50 million 
is for support of the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IF AD) and 
$192 million is for voluntary contributions 
to UN development programs, including 
$120 million for the UN Development 
Program (UNDP) and $27 million for the 
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). 

I look forward to working with the 
committee in carrying out our proposals. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the "Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402.H 



by Richard W. Murphy 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap- 
propriations Committee on March 15, 
198U- Ambassador Murphy is Assistant 
Secretary of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs. 

I welcome the opportunity to testify to- 
day in support of the Administration's 
proposals for FY 1985 economic and 
security assistance for the Near East. 

The Administration's proposal 
reflects the realities of our foreign policy 
and national security objectives in this 
vital region. In each country, our 
assistance programs are intended to nur- 
ture relationships of mutual interest and 
trust and to assist these governments in 
strengthening their security and further- 
ing their economic progress. 



Our programs support objectives in 
the region which are vital to our own 
peace, security, and well-being. 

• We are actively pursuing a just 
and lasting Middle East peace. 

• We are engaged in maintaining 
unimpeded access to the crucial oil 
resources of the Persian Gulf. 

• Our assistance to Lebanon aims to 
help the Lebanese Government restore 
peace and regain sovereignty over the 
country. 

• We are working with friendly 
countries to safeguard our vital interests 
in North Africa, Southwest Asia, and the 
Persian Gulf. 

• We are searching for peace in 
Afghanistan which would include the 
withdrawal of Soviet military forces and 
the restoration of Afghanistan in- 
dependence. 

In our efforts to advance the Middle 
East peace process and to promote the 



Department of State Bulletin 






MIDDLE EAST 



resolution of conflicts elsewhere in the 
region, we recognize that the spirit of ac- 
commodation can grow more readily if 
friendly states feel confident of their abili- 
ty to provide for their own security and 
for the economic and social needs of their 
people. 

An important change that the Ad- 
ministration is proposing for the FY 1985 
foreign assistance involves a shift of the 
foreign military sales (FMS) financing 
program to "on budget," thus requiring 
authorization and appropriation of funds 
for the entire program. We are seeking 
this change so that we will be able to offer 
FMS credits at a concessional rate as an 
alternative to market rates to avoid ex- 
acerbating the debt burden of many of 
our friends. Congress has repeatedly ex- 
pressed concern about the mounting debt 
problems of many developing countries, 
where there has been a significant rise in 
recent years of the debt-servicing 
burdens. An increasing number of coun- 
tries are seeking debt-service relief from 
both official and private creditors. In the 
Middle East, Morocco rescheduled its 
govemment-to-govemment debt last 
October. 

FMS debt service is significant in 
terms of overall debt, particularly in the 
case of Israel and Egypt. The increasing 
burden of debt service has a negative im- 
pact on both economies. For this reason, 
as part of this "on budget" proposal, the 
FY 1985 request would provide Israel 
and Egypt all their FMS credits on a 
forgiven or grant basis. 

In addition, on-budget lending will 
provide the Administration with greater 
flexibility in adjusting the amount of con- 
cessionality in individual programs of 
other countries. Economic need and the 
ability of a country to repay will be the 
primary criteria in determining who 
receives concessional FMS interest rates 
just as it is in determining who receives 
grant military assistance. We now plan to 
provide these loans at a 5% interest rate, 
to be reviewed at the time funds are 
allocated. Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco 
are among the 13 countries worldwide 
which would receive part or all (Morocco) 
of their FMS credits at concessional rates. 

The levels and terms of our proposed 
assistance have been carefully developed 
vdthin the constraints of our budget 
stringencies and the President's economic 
program and are the amounts needed to 
meet essential requirements of the coun- 
tries to this region. 

Our FY 1985 foreign assistance re- 
quest for the Near East vdll fund six ma- 
jor programs: 



May 1984 



• $2,790 mUlion in FMS credits, in- 
cluding $2,575 million in forgiven credits 
for Israel and Egypt; 

• $65 million in grant military 
assistance programs (MAP); 

• $9.85 million in international 
military education and training (IMET); 

• $1,693 million in economic support 
funds (ESF); 

• $52 million in development 
assistance; and 

• $620.2 million in PL 480 food 
assistance. 

Middle East Peace 

Our highest priority continues to be fur- 
thering the Middle East peace process to 
bring a just and lasting end to the conflict 
and turmoil which has disturbed this area 
for so long. There are no quick and easy 
solutions for peace in the region. 
However, we will persevere with our ef- 
forts and with the President's Middle 
East peace initiative of September 1, 
1982. Our assistance plays an important 
role in furthering the peace process. 

Ten years ago, we helped negotiate 
the disengagement of Egyptian and 
Israeli Armed Forces. They have not 
clashed since. Five years ago, a peace 
treaty ended 30 years of war between 
Egypt and Israel. Israel and Egypt re- 
main our principal partners in the quest 
for peace, and these two nations are the 
largest recipients of our proposed foreign 
assistance for FY 1985. This assistance is 
aimed at ensuring their security and 
strengthening their economies, both 
essential to their continuing on the path 
to a broader peace settlement. 

Similar programs, although smaller in 
amounts, are planned for Lebanon and 
Jordan, also important participants in our 
quest for a Middle East peace. Lack of 
progress toward a more peaceful, stable 
Lebanon will erode the chances for peace 
and stability elsewhere in the region. In 
its quests for reconciliation, Lebanon 
needs support, both moral and material. 
Jordan requires our continued support to 
buOd the necessary confidence to join the 
peace process. Our program also seeks to 
improve the quality of Palestinian life in 
the West Bank and Gaza and to encour- 
age economic and social cooperation in the 
region. 

Israel 

The United States has a historic commit- 
ment to Israel's security and economic 
well-being extending over the past three 
decades. Our assistance provides a tangi- 
ble demonstration of the strength and 
durability of that commitment and seeks 



kummttm 



to give Israel the confidence to take the 
risks necessary to pursue the peace 
process. 

To assist Israel in maintaining its 
qualitative edge in military capability 
over potential aggressors, a $1.4 billion 
FMS credit level is requested. For the 
first time, this FMS request would con- 
sist exclusively of forgiven credits, i.e., 
grant funds. This change is being pro- 
posed to respond to the negative impact 
of the increasing burden of debt service 
on the Israeli economy. The overall level 
of FMS credits proposed for Israel would 
decline from levels appropriated in previ- 
ous years because of the greater financial 
value of an all grant program. Israel's mil- 
itary needs have been analyzed by both 
governments, and we each agree that the 
terms and level of the FY 1985 FMS re- 
quest for Israel will achieve our mutual 
goals. 

The proposed $850 million ESF pro- 
gram also is to be all grant. The major 
portion will be provided on a cash trans- 
fer basis to support Israel's balance of 
payments; these funds permit Israel to 
import essential civilian goods and serv- 
ices without drawing down its foreign 
exchange reserves. In addition, $65 mil- 
lion of the request will be used to aug- 
ment endowments for four existing 
U.S.-Israeli binational foundations. These 
foundations (Binational Industrial Re- 
search and Development Foundation, Bi- 
national Science Foundation, Binational 
Agricultural Research and Development 
Fund, and the U.S.-Israeli Educational 
Foundation) undertake a variety of pro- 
grams in education and research which 
contribute to the technological base upon 
which Israel intends to build its future 
growth. 

It has, however, become increasingly 
clear that helping Israel to restore its 
basic economic strength and balance is 
not and cannot be solely a function of the 
level of U.S. assistance. In other words, 
a somewhat higher level of ESF, as the 
Congress legislated last year in the con- 
tinuing resolution, whDe welcomed by 
Israel because every dollar helps, will not 
address the basic problems that beset the 
Israeli economy. What is needed instead 
is our steadfast encouragement to the 
Israeli Government as it devises economic 
programs that can rid the country of the 
twin perils of high inflation and an in- 
creasingly difficult external accounts situ- 
ation. Our total assistance, when we take 
into account the interest savings associ- 
ated with a shift to an all-grant FMS pro- 
gram, is almost equivalent to what the 
Congress appropriated last year for 
Israel. In addition to its economic benefit, 
it serves as a political statement of our 



67 



MIDDLE EAST 



strong support for Israel and, particularly 
in the endowments proposed, directly ad- 
dresses our concern for Israel's future. 

Egypt 

Egypt is key to our regional political and 
strategic policies. Egypt is an active part- 
ner in the Middle East peace process, and 
continued Egyptian support is crucial to 
its ultimate success. The Mubarak gov- 
ernment publicly and actively supports 
the Camp David accords and the Presi- 
dent's September 1, 1982, peace initiative. 
It was also supportive of our efforts to 
foster stability in Lebanon. 

During the past year, Egypt has been 
helpful in deterring radical destabilization 
efforts directed at neighboring countries, 
such as Sudan and Chad. Egypt's impor- 
tance as a stabilizing force continues to in- 
crease as tensions remain high elsewhere 
in the region. U.S.-Egyptian military ex- 
ercises have served to enhance both coun- 
tries' ability to preserve stability in the 
region. The recent trend toward im- 
proved relations between Egypt and mod- 
erate Arab states is evidence of Egypt's 
importance as a bulwark against radical 
forces which reject the idea of a negoti- 
ated settlement with Israel. Our sus- 
tained assistance reinforces the accom- 
plishments made through the Camp 
David process and supports regional 
stability. 

The request for $1,175 billion in for- 
given FMS credits for FY 1985 reflects 
our commitment to a long-term military 
supply relationship with Egypt to help it 
modernize its forces and replace obsolete 
Soviet-supplied equipment. Our military 
assistance relationship with Egypt is a 
key part of our efforts to maintain the 
regional balance of forces which has been 
in danger of shifting in favor of Soviet- 
supplied radicals like Libya and Syria. 
The change to an all grant program has 
been made in recognition that military 
modernization will not benefit regional 
stability if it is accomplished by amassing 
debts which could undermine Egypt's 
ability to sustain economic growth. FMS 
for FY 1985 will be devoted mainly to 
progress payments on F-16 and E-2C air- 
craft, tanks, armored personnel carriers, 
and air defense radars as well as to 
follow-on support for U.S. equipment sup- 
plied over the past few years. 

Our economic assistance helps main- 
tain the continued economic growth which 
is essential to Egypt's stability. Our pro- 
gram is designed to support economic pol- 
icies which address the existing con- 
straints on development. Over the past 



U.S. Forces in Lebanon 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 30, 1984' 

Since the date of my last report to you on the 
participation of United States Armed Forces 
in the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon, 
I have decided that the U.S. will terminate its 
participation in the MNF. In accordance with 
my desire that Congress be kept informed on 
these matters, and consistent with Section 4 of 
the Multinational Force in Lebanon Res- 
olution, I am hereby providing a final report 
on our participation in the MNF. 

U.S. foreign policy interests in Lebanon 
have not changed, and remain as stated in my 
last report to Congress on February 13. The 
U.S. is committed to the goals of the restora- 
tion of a sovereign, independent and united 
Lebanon, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, 
and the security of Israel's northern border. 
However, the continuation of our participation 
in the MNF is no longer a necessary or appro- 
priate means of achieving these goals. We 
have discussed our decision with the Govern- 
ment of Lebanon and the other MNF par- 
ticipants, and the other MNF countries have 
made similar decisions. 

The U.S. military personnel who made up 
the U.S. MNF contingent were earlier 
redeployed to U.S. ships offshore. Likewise, 
the MNF personnel of other national con- 
tingents have either already departed 
Lebanon or are in the process of departing. 
As you know, prior to their earlier rede- 
ployment to ships offshore, U.S. MNF per- 
sonnel had come under intermittent hostile fu-e 
as a result of continued fighting in the Beirut 
area, including the round of serious fighting 
that occurred in late February. On February 
25-26, and again on February 29, U.S. war- 
ships returned fire against artillery and rocket 
positions in Syrian-controlled territory that 
had fu-ed on U.S. military and diplomatic loca- 
tions and on U.S. reconnaissance flights. 

During the overall course of our participa- 
tion in the MNF, U.S. forces suffered a total of 
264 killed (of which 4 non-MNF personnel were 
killed in the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy), and 137 wounded in action. (Three 
of these were wounded in the period since my 
last report to Congress on February 13.) The 
estimated cost of U.S. participation in the 
MNF for FY 1984 was a total of $14.6 million 
for the U.S. Marine Corps deployment, $44.9 
million for U.S. Navy support, and $243,000 
for U.S. Army support. 



These were heavy burdens and griev- 
ous losses for our country. We owe a 
great debt of gratitude to those military 
and diplomatic personnel of the United 
States and other MNF countries who 
served their countries so proudly to give 
the people of Lebanon a chance to achieve 
peace and national reconciliation. 

The United States has not abandoned 
Lebanon. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut re- 
mains in full and active operation and a 
Marine detachment of approximately 100 
personnel drawn from the Marine unit 
afloat remains to provide additional exter- 
nal security for our diplomatic mission. In 
addition, a limited number of U.S. mili- 
tary personnel (equipped with personal 
weapons for self-defense) will remain to 
provide military training and security 
assistance liaison to the Lebanese Armed 
Forces. These personnel will not be part 
of any multinational force; they will be 
deployed under the authority of the For- 
eign Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Acts, and my Constitutional authority 
with respect to the conduct of foreign 
relations and as Commander-in-Chief of 
U.S. Forces. I do not intend or expect, 
under present circumstances, that these 
personnel will become involved in hostil- 
ities; nonetheless, U.S. naval and air 
forces in the Mediterranean area, includ- 
ing the U.S. Marines redeployed from 
Lebanon, are available to protect our 
military and diplomatic personnel should 
that need ever arise. 

1 appreciate the support for this vital 
effort that Congress provided last October 
in adopting the Multinational Force in 
Lebanon Resolution. I hope that Con- 
gress will support the programs of eco- 
nomic and security assistance that are es- 
sential for the future of Lebanon and the 
Middle East. I will keep Congress in- 
formed on events in Lebanon, and on the 
U.S. role in encouraging peace and stabili- 
ty in the area. 
Sincerely, 

RONALD REAGAN 

•Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Strom Thurmond, President 
'pro tempore of the Senate (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 
2, 1984). ■ 



68 



Department of State Bulletii 



IXmn 



MIDDLE EAST 



year, the Egyptian Government has 
moved deliberately toward economic re- 
form, raising prices, and liberalizing for- 
eign exchange regulations. Our proposed 
economic aid program includes $243 mil- 
lion in PL 480 food assistance and grant 
ESF of $750 million. The ESF program 
consists of a $300 million commodity im- 
port program, which will enable Egypt to 
import U.S. manufactured goods and com- 
modities, and $450 million in project and 
sector assistance. Emphasis will be on re- 
habilitation and expansion of urban water 
and sewer systems, increasing agricul- 
tural and industrial production, and insti- 
tution building. 

Lebanon 

Although we are watching the situation in 
Lebanon closely, it is still difficult to 
predict how events will evolve. We re- 
main committed to the achievement of 
long-term stability and believe that U.S. 
economic and military support, properly 
channeled, can assist in the attainment of 
this goal. 

We do not intend to abandon either 
the people or the Government of 
Lebanon; security and economic assist- 
ance are an important element of our 
policy toward Lebanon. 

Our military assistance consists of 
FMS credits and IMET. The FY 1985 re- 
quest is for $15 million in FMS credits. 
This is a minimum level for follow-on sup- 
port for U.S.-origin equipment. When the 
situation in Lebanon stabilizes, more 
funds may be needed to assist the 
Lebanese Government in its efforts to 
continue the expansion and modernization 
of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Given the 
rapidly evolving situation in Lebanon, it 
is impossible to state at this time that ad- 
ditional assistance may be needed. To pro- 
vide training to bolster the Lebanese 
Armed Forces, $800,000 in IMET monies 
is required. 

The ESF request of $20 million for 
FY 1985 assumes that the $150 million ap- 
propriated as no-year funds in FY 1983 
will be fully obligated. The FY 1985 ESF 
program as presented in the congres- 
sional presentation document will be con- 
centrated on three sectors— housing, 
health, and government revenue genera- 
tion. However, some of these funds may 
also be needed to replace $5 million taken 
from the $150 million appropriation for 
reUef activities and $7.6 milhon for the 
American University in Beirut due to re- 
cent war damage. 



Jordan 

A stable and secure Jordan is essential to 
further the President's Middle East peace 
initiative. Our security and economic as- 
sistance encourages King Hussein's confi- 
dence in the U.S. commitment to the se- 
curity of Jordan as he seeks a formula to 
enable him to join peace negotiations. 

The proposed FY 1985 assistance pro- 
gram for Jordan consists of $95 million in 
FMS credits, $20 million in ESF, $87,000 
in PL 480, Title II through the World 
Food Program, and $2 million in IMET. 
Jordan has a growing need for more 
modem armament as the result of the 
massive Soviet arms transfers to Syria. 
FMS financing assists Jordan to acquire 
those weapons most critical to its legit- 
imate self-defense needs. In view of 
Jordan's economic problems, coupled with 
reduced levels of aid from Arab oil ex- 
porters, half of the proposed FMS credits 
would be provided at concessional rates. 

Given the threat from Syria, which 
has a significant advantage in armor and 
air power, the FMS credits will most 
likely be used to acquire releasable air 
defense and antiarmor weapons. Other 
items to be purchased include vehicles, 
communications equipment, ammunition, 
and follow-on support for the U.S.-origin 
equipment already in the Jordanian in- 
ventory. The training funds under IMET 
enhance the professional capability of 
Jordan's Armed Forces and assists 
Jordan in continuing its training and ad- 
visory role in the region. 

Jordan's economy is heavily depend- 
ent upon world prices of its major raw 
materials exports, earnings of its ex- 
patriate work force, and annual rainfall. 
Export prices of phosphates and potash 
remain close to Jordan's production costs. 
The general slowdown in economic devel- 
opment projects in the Persian Gulf has 
reduced worker remittances, which nor- 
mally make a major contribution to 
Jordan's balance of payments. A current 
drought is straining the irrigation 
systems of the Jordan Valley, with poten- 
tially disastrous results for Jordanian 
agricultural exports. By improving 
Jordanian technical and managerial capa- 
bilities through our ESF assistance, we 
help Jordan to deal with these and with 
future problems. 

Our ESF programs will stress tech- 
nology transfer and technical assistance 
in such areas as rainfed agriculture and 
renewable energy sources. Work will con- 
tinue on important water development 
projects. 



Regional Program 

The regional program request for FY 1985 
consists of $15 million in ESF, 13 million 
in development assistance, and $2.29 mil- 
lion in PL 480, Title II. 

The ESF proposal furthers the Mid- 
dle East peace process by addressing ob- 
jectives that cannot be met through con- 
ventional bilateral programs. This grant 
assistance will finance two major 
activities: 

• $9 million will be used for develop- 
ment projects in the West Bank and 
Gaza. By financing these projects, which 
are implemented by U.S. private volun- 
tary organizations, the United States 
seeks to improve the quality of Pales- 
tinian life in these territories; 

• $5 million will support the regional 
cooperation program, which consists of a 
variety of joint projects involving Israeli 
and Egyptian participation. We seek to 
use these funds in a manner that promotes 
contacts between Israeli universities, 
government ministries, and private 
organizations and their counterparts in 
Egypt. Cooperative projects help pro- 
mote relationships between Israelis and 
their Arab neighbors, thus helping to 
break down barriers between people. 

• $3 million in development assistance 
funds will finance six ongoing regional 
projects as well as project design and 
evaluation. 

Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf- 
North Africa 

The Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf-North 
Africa region, a critical source of energy 
to the free world, is simultaneously threat- 
ened by Soviet encroachment through 
Afghanistan by radical forces from within 
and by the increasing intensity of the 
Iran-Iraq war. About 40% of the free 
world's oil imports originate in the 
Persian Gulf. Through our assistance, we 
help to improve the security of these 
countries and to maintain the availability 
of these vital oil supplies. Our programs 
are directed at supporting those countries 
in the region which provide important 
access to military facilities as well as other 
nations which provide transit rights into 
the region for U.S. forces t'o be used in 
time of crisis. In addition to the security 
concerns which these countries face, some 
of them, i.e., Morocco and Yemen, have 
very serious economic problems. 

Oman. Oman, strategically located at 
the entrance to the Persian Gulf, is 
cooperating closely with the United 
States in our common objective of main- 



elir May 1984 



MIDDLE EAST 



taining security and stability in that vital 
area and freedom of navigation through 
the Strait of Hormuz and its approaches. 
Oman's agreement to permit access to its 
facilities represents a major contribution 
to American force projection capability in 
Southwest Asia and an important public 
expression of local support for our 
presence in the region. The military sup- 
ply and training relationship between the 
two countries contributes to Oman's con- 
tinued willingness to cooperate with the 
United States in security matters. 

In an effort to broaden our relation- 
ship with Oman beyond its security 
aspects, the U.S. -Oman Joint Commission 
was estabhshed in 1980 in conjunction 
with the facilities access agreement. ESF 
assistance funds the U.S. contribution to 
this joint commission which provides 
technical and capital assistance for the 
development of infrastructure and the 
non-oil sectors of Oman's economy. 

Our FY 1985 request for Oman in- 
cludes $45 million in FMS credits, $20 mil- 
Uon in ESF, and $100,000 in IMET. The 
military equipment purchased from the 
United States through the FMS program 
helps Oman strengthen its defense in the 
face of threats from Soviet-supplied South 
Yemen and from Iran. The small IMET 
program will provide advanced training 
for officers in the Sultan's armed forces. 

Of the $20 million in ESF, $15 million 
will be used for school construction. Ap- 
proximately $4 million will go toward 
funding the joint commission's scholar- 
ship and training project which brings 
Omani students to the United States for 
studies as well as providing in-country 
training programs. These projects are in- 
tended to meet Oman's acute trained 
manpower shortage. Remaining funds 
will be spent on joint commission opera- 
tions, technical assistance, and feasibility 
and design studies, primarily in the area 
of water resources. 

Yemen. The proposed FY 1985 assist- 
ance program for the Yemen Arab 
Republic is necessary to strengthen a 
bilateral assistance program which offers 
a visible alternative to Yeman's present 
heavy dependence on Soviet assistance. 
The strategic location of the Yemen Arab 
RepubHc, its porous border with Saudi 
Arabia, and the large numbers of Yemenis 
working in the oil states of the peninsula 
underscore the importance of Yemen in 
regional stability and, hence, to U.S. in- 
terests in the area. Furthermore, Yemen 
is a "buffer" between the Marxist 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
and Saudi Arabia. 



For Yemen our FY 1985 request con- 
sists of $30 million in development assist- 
ance, $10 million in MAP, $1.5 million in 
IMET, and $5 million in PL 480, Title I. 

This strategically located country is 
one of the poorest and least developed in 
the Middle East. We are proposing a 
small increase in development assistance 
in recognition of Yemen's increasingly 
severe economic situation due to a decline 
in Arab donor assistance as weU as a de- 
crease in worker remittances. The Yemen 
Government also had to cope with a dev- 
astating earthquake in December 1982 
which left up to 400,000 homeless. Our 
projects are concentrated in the agricul- 
ture, education, and health sectors. 

MAP funds will be used to fund follow- 
on support for U.S. -origin military equip- 
ment as well as to purchase ammunition. 
We are requesting grant assistance be- 
cause Yemen has been financially unable 
to draw on credits for the past 2 years. 
The IMET program seeks to expose as 
many Yemeni military personnel as possi- 
ble to training in the United States, 
although some training, in particular 
English-language instruction, takes place 
in country. 

Morocco. Morocco is of key strategic 
importance to the United States and has a 
longstanding record of cooperation and 
friendship. Morocco has consistently 
taken moderate, constructive positions on 
issues of mutual concern. Over the past 
3 years, the United States and Morocco 
have reaffirmed the closeness of relations 
with the establishment of Joint Economic 
and Military Commissions, the agreement 
of King Hassan to provide transit access, 
and numerous exchanges of high-level of- 
ficial visitors. 

Morocco is in severe financial straits 
and is again confronting a drought dis- 
aster. As part of an International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF) economic reform pack- 
age, the Moroccan Govei-nment has begun 
a program of austerity measui'es designed 
to bring its balance of pajinents into 
equilibrium by 1987. Reduction of food 
subsidies was initiated at the beginning of 
August without incident. In mid-January, 
however, six cities in Morocco were 
shaken by rioting. Although the incidents 
were not directly linked, they have a com- 
mon stimulus in economic considera- 
tions—rising prices, lack of employment 
prospects for the half of the population 
which is under 20, and the perception of 
austerity which lies ahead for the popula- 
tion. In response to the disturbances, 
King Hassan announced there would be 
no further price inci-eases. This decision 
opens the question of alternative methods 



of cutting government expenditures in 
order to meet the IMF austerity package. 

For Morocco the Administration is re- 
questing $19 million in development 
assistance, $15 million in ESF, and $52.5 
million in PL 480 food assistance. These 
different forms of economic assistance are 
intended to assist Morocco in this period 
of economic austerity and budgetary 
stringency. If the present drought con- 
tinues, more assistance may be needed. 
Development assistance will be focused 
on agriculture, population, and energy. 
The ESF will be used for projects de- 
signed to increase water supplies through 
continuation of a snow pack augmentation 
project, a complete funding of an energy- 
project, and for quick dispersing assist- 
ance to the agricultural sector, which is 
suffering from acute drought. The PL 480 
assistance will provide balance-of- 
payments support. 

As a key country in North Africa, it is 
in our interest to see Morocco maintain a 
suitable level of militai-y preparedness. 
An increase of MAP to $40 million and 
some concessional FMS credits are being 
proposed in recognition of Morocco's 
severe economic problems. MAP and 
FMS credits will aid the Moroccan 
Government in its maintenance and 
modernization programs, including air 
surveillance equipment and antiaiTnor 
weapons. Training for Moroccan military 
personnel in communications, logistics, 
and maintenance will be provided by $1.7 
million in IMET funding. 

Tunisia. A longtime friend of the 
United States and an Arab moderate, 
Tunisia looks to the United States both 
for security assistance in meeting Libyan 
threats to its security and for support for 
continued Tunisian economic develop- 
ment. As a sign of our support for Tunisian 
stability following the early January riots 
over higher bread prices, we have offered 
the Tunisian Government an additional $5 
million of PL 480 food assistance in 
FY 1984. These disturbances were a re- 
flection of the increasingly difficult eco- 
nomic situation that Tunisia now faces as 
it is squeezed by declining receipts from 
exports and tourism, mounting external 
debt, continued drought, and a per- 
sistently high unemployment rate. The 
proposed ESF of $3 million for FY 1985 is 
needed to fund an ongoing program for 
Tunisian graduate students in the United 
States, as Tunisia seeks to reorient its 
technical sector from French to U.S. 
products and technology. To assist 
Tunisia in coping with the impact of the 
drought, we are requesting $5.85 million 
in PL 480 food assistance. 



Department of State Bulletin 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



For military assistance, the FY 1985 
request includes $50 million in FMS 
credits, $15 million in MAP, and $1.7 mil- 
Uon in IMET. Of the FMS credits, $25 
million would be provided at concessional 
rates of financing. The FMS credits and 
MAP are needed to enable Tunisia to 
complete its purchases under a 3-year 
security assistance package, begun in 
FY 1982, which includes F-5 aircraft. 
Chaparral missiles, and M-60 tanks. 
FY 1985 security assistance wUl also be 
used for the purchase of necessary tank 
support equipment. Payments will begin 
on two C-130 transports. IMET funding 
will permit professional training for Tuni- 
sian officers as well as technical training 



required to support recently acquii'ed 
U.S. equipment. 

In summary, we consider our FY 1985 
submission to be consistent with pro- 
grams which the Congress supported in 
previous years, justifiable in teiTns of the 
multifaceted political, economic, and se- 
curity requirements of the Middle East 
and realistic in the conte.xt of our budg- 
etai-y constraints. 



'The complete tran.script of the hearings 
will be publisned by the committee and will be 
available from the "Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Strategic Defense Initiative 



FACT SHEET, 
MAR. 9, 1984» 

For the past 3 years, the Reagan Admin- 
istration has sought to restore the balance 
of forces necessary to maintain peace and 
stabOity by modernizing the strategic 
deterrent, while at the same time press- 
ing for significant, verifiable arms reduc- 
tions. 

This year President Reagan has in- 
cluded in the defense budget a research 
program that explores the possibility of 
strengthening deterrence further by tak- 
ing advantage of recent advances in tech- 
nology that could, in the long term, pro- 
vide an effective defense against ballistic 
missiles. This new program focuses on ex- 
isting research and development pro- 
grams, totaling nearly $1.8 billion (88% 
Department of Defense, 12% Department 
of Energy) in FY 1985, in five technology 
areas that offer the greatest promise for 
defense against missiles. It also includes 
an additional funding increment of about 
$250 million to augment these and exploit 
other new technological opportunities. 

In consolidating these efforts, the 
strategic defense initiative seeks to de- 
velop sound technical options that could 
allow future Presidents to decide whether 
to develop an effective defense against 
ballistic missiles. While such a research 
effort would not affect current arms con- 
trol treaties. President Reagan also di- 
rected a full and continuing assessment of 
the future implications of developing stra- 
tegic defenses for our defense posture, 
deterrence strategy, and arms reduction 
program. 



The strategic defense initiative is de- 
signed to work toward the long-term na- 
tional goal, set by President Reagan in a 
speech to the American people last 
March, of putting an end to the threat of 
ballistic missiles. To determine the techni- 
cal feasibility and strategic implications of 
pursuing that goal, the Defense Depart- 
ment formed two study groups of scien- 
tists and national security experts. The 
reports of those studies, submitted in 
October 1983, form the basis for the pro- 
posed strategic defense program. 

The defensive technologies study, 
headed by Dr. James Fletcher, the 
former Director of the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), concluded that promising new 
technologies are becoming available that 
justify a long-term research effort to iden- 
tify future technical options concerning 
the development of a defense against bal- 
listic missiles. Exploring the implications 
of strategic defense, two future security 
strategic studies— one interagency and 
one contractor— concluded that defensive 
systems could strengthen stability and 
deterrence and enhance prospects for 
arms reductions. 

The studies recognized that there are 
uncertainties that will not be resolved 
until more is known about the technical 
characteristics and capabilities of defen- 
sive systems and the response of the 
Soviet Union to U.S. initiatives. These 
uncertainties notwithstanding, the 
studies concluded that it was essential 
that options for the deployment of ad- 
vanced ballistic missile defenses be estab- 
lished and requirements permit us no al- 



ternative because the decision to begin 
ballistic missile defense deployment is not 
solely a U.S. decision. 

For a number of years, the Soviet 
Union has pursued advanced ballistic mis- 
sile defense technologies and is the only 
country maintaining an operational sys- 
tem of terminal balhstic missil