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The  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  85  /  Number  2097 


April  1985 


Mfepartmvni  of  Siaip 

bulletin 


Volume  85  /  Number  2097  /  April  1985 


Cover: 

His  Majesty  King  Fahd  of  Saudi  Arabia 
and  Secretary  Shultz. 

(Llepartnient  of  Slatt-  photu) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  T.  MCCARTHY 

Acting  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


I 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
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1987. 


Department  of  State  BULLETIN  (ISSN  0041-7610) 
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NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
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CONTENTS 


^  1  Visitof  SAvibi  Km  5 


The  President 

9       State  of  the  Union  Address 

(ExceTjit) 
0  Nicaragua 
0       News  Conference  of  February  21 

(Excerpts) 

The  Secretary 

13       Economic  Cooperation  in  the 
Pacific  Basin 

6       America  and  the  Struggle  for 
Freedom 

!1        Question-and-Answer  Session 

Following  Commonwealth  Club 
Address 

!3       The  Importance  of  the  MX  Peace- 
keeper Missile 

\frica 

!5       Namihia  (Chester  A.  Crockei') 

Arms  Control 

!7       On  the  Road  to  a  More  Stable 

Peace  (Paul  H.  Nitze) 
:8       MBFR  Talks  Resume  in  Vienna 

(President  Reagan) 
!9       Report  on  Soviet  Noncompliance 

With  Arms  Control  Agreements 

(Message  to  the  Congress.  Text  of 

Unclassified  Report) 


Europe 


iast  Asia 


,  J4 
i 


The  Asia-Pacific  Region:  A 
Forward  Look  (Michael  H. 
Armacost) 
n       The  Pacific:  Region  of  Promise 

I  and  Challenge  (Paul  D. 

Wolfowitz) 

Economics 

11        Protectionism:  A  Threat  to  Our 
Prosperity  (W.  Allen  Wallis) 


44       The  United  States  and  Greece 
(Richard  N.  Haas) 

46  40th  Anniversary  of  the  Yalta 

Conference  (President  Reagan) 

47  Soviet  Crackdown  on  Jewish 

Cultural  Activists  (Department 
of  State  Report) 

General 

48  Strength  and  Diplomacy:  Toward 

A  New  Consensus?  (Michael  H. 
Armacost) 

Human  Rights 

52       1984  Human  Rights  Report 

(Excerpts) 

55  Child  Pornography:  A  Worldwide 

Problem  (Elliott  Abrams) 

Middle  East 

56  Recent  Developments  in  the 

Middle  East  (Richard  W. 
Murphy) 

Military  Affairs 

57  Continuing  the  Acquisition  of 

the  Peacekeeper  Missile 
(Message  to  the  Congress, 
Executive  Summary) 

Narcotics 

59  Summary  of  the  International 

Narcotics  Control  Strategy 
Report  for  1985 

Pacific 

60  Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister 

Hawke  (Robert.  J.L.  Hawke, 
President  Reagan) 
62       Australia  Reaffirms  Support  for 
ANZUS  Alliance  (Secretary 
Shultz) 


Science  &  Technology 

63       Protecting  the  Ozone  Layer 

(Richard  Elliot  Benedick) 

Terrorism 

65       Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S. 

Official  Personnel  Abroad, 
1982-84  (Evan  Duncan) 

Western  Hemisphere 

67       The  Need  for  Continuity  in  U.S. 
Latin  American  Policy 
(Langhorne  A.  Motley) 

End  Notes 

74  February  1985 

Treaties 

75  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

77       Department  of  State 
77       USUN 


Publications 

78       Department  of  State 
78       Background  Notes 


Index 


(I)i'partmfiil  cif  Slate  photo) 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


F€ATVRt' 
SauM  Aiv\b)A 


VisH  of  SMii>i  Kins 

bm  Abb  Al-Arir  Al  S^ut> 

of  the 
Km5t)om  of  S^viM  Ar^bi^ 

fmit>c  A  stAtc  visit 
to  the  \JnHct>  States 


Arrival  Ccrcyy\oy\\i, 
Prcsi^c>1t  RcAgAM 

It's  a  great  privilege  to  welcome  a  world 
statesman,  a  leader  of  Arab  and  Muslim 
people,  and  a  good  friend  of  the  United 
States,  His  Majesty  King  Fahd  bin  Abd 
al-Aziz  Al-Saud.  Although  he  is  no 
stranger  to  our  shores,  it's  been  almost 
8  years  since  he  has  paid  an  official  visit 
to  the  United  States.  And  I'm  honored 
to  welcome  him  back  again  today. 

King  Fahd's  visit  is  in  keeping  with 
the  warm  personal  relations  enjoyed  be- 
tween the  leaders  of  our  two  countries, 
a  tradition  which  began  40  years  ago 
this  week  when  King  Fahd's  father  and 
President  Franklin  Roosevelt  met  to  ex- 
change views.  The  good  will  that 
emerged  from  that  meeting  of  two  great 
men  has  enormously  benefited  both  our 
peoples  in  the  last  four  decades. 

The  friendship  and  cooperation  be- 
tween our  governments  and  people  are 
precious  jewels  whose  value  we  should 
never  underestimate.  The  positive 
nature  of  our  relations  demonstrates 
that  cultural  differences,  as  distinct  as 
our  own,  need  not  separate  or  alienate 
peoples  from  one  another. 

As  the  guardians  of  Mecca  and  the 
protectors  of  your  faith,  you  rightfully 
exert  a  strong  moral  influence  in  the 
world  of  Islam.  And  the  people  of  the 
United  States  are  proud  of  their  leader- 
ship role  among  the  democratic  nations. 

King  Fahd,  I  hope  that  we  can  work 
together  to  seek  a  new  rapprochement 
between  .the  Islamic  world  and  the 
Western  democracies.  Destiny  has  given 
us  different  political  and  social  systems, 
yet  with  respect  and  good  will,  as  our 
two  countries  have  demonstrated,  so 
much  can  be  accomplished. 

I  firmly  believe  that  in  the  years 
ahead,  there  should  be  and  will  be  a 
more  powerful  recognition  of  the  com- 
mon interests  shared  by  these  two 
significant  world  forces.  Already,  the 
bonds  of  commerce  are  strong,  especial- 
ly between  our  two  countries.  Petroleum 


from  Saudi  wells  helps  drive  the  engines 
of  progress  in  the  United  States,  while 
at  the  same  moment,  American 
technology  and  know-how  help  in  the 
construction  of  Saudi  roads,  hospitals, 
and  communications  systems. 

Saudi  Arabia  has  grown  into  one  of 
America's  largest  trading  partners.  The 
commercial  and  economic  power  that  we 
exert  in  the  world  spurs  enterprise  and 
bolsters  stability. 

I'd  like  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
express  admiration  for  the  responsible 
manner  in  which  Saudi  Arabia  has  con- 
ducted its  economic  affairs.  King  Fahd 
and  other  Saudi  leaders,  conscious  of  the 
global  impact  of  their  financial  and 
economic  decisions,  have  earned  our 
respect  and  gratitude. 

Their  many  humanitarian  contribu- 
tions touch  us  deeply,  as  well.  Saudi  aid 
to  refugees  uprooted  from  their  homes 
in  Afghanistan  has  not  gone  unnoticed 
here,  Your  Majesty.  The  people  of  the 
United  States  share  with  the  people  of 
Saudi  Arabia  a  deep  moral  outrage  over 
the  continuing  aggression  and  butchery 
taking  place  in  Afghanistan.  The  citizens 
of  the  Western  democracies  and  the 
Muslim  world,  by  all  that  they  believe  to 
be  true  and  just,  should  stand  together 
in  opposition  to  those  who  would  impose 
dictatorship  on  all  of  mankind. 

Marxist  tyranny  already  has  its  grip 
on  the  religious  freedom  of  the  world's 
fifth  largest  Muslim  population.  This 
same  grip  strangles  the  prayers  of 
Christians,  Jews,  and  Muslims  alike.  We 
all  worship  the  same  God.  Standing  up 
to  this  onslaught,  the  people  of 
Afghanistan,  with  their  blood,  courage, 
and  faith,  are  an  inspiration  to  the  cause 
of  freedom  everywhere. 

Afghanistan,  of  course,  is  not  the 
only  conflict  in  the  region.  We're  also 
concerned  about  the  tragic  war  between 
two  of  Saudi  Arabia's  neighbors — Iran 
and  Iraq — a  conflict  that  is  raging  only 
a  few  minutes  by  air  from  Saudi  ter- 
ritory. This  bloodshed  has  dragged  on 
far  too  long  and  threatens  peace 
throughout  the  region. 

The  United  States  will  do  what  we 
can,  diplomatically,  to  end  the  fighting. 
And  we  will  cooperate  with  Saudi 
Arabia  to  ensure  the  integrity  of  your 
borders. 


Your  Majesty,  I  look  forward  to  our 
discussions  about  these  and  other 
serious  problems  which  continue  to 
plague  the  Middle  East.  Together,  our 
considerable  influence  and  our  moral 
suasion  can,  at  the  very  least,  decrease 
the  threat  of  war. 

If  the  Saudi  and  American  Govern- 
ments focus  their  energies,  progress  cai 
be  made,  especially  in  the  lingering 
dispute  between  Israel  and  its 
neighbors. 

I  continue  to  believe  that  a  just  and 
lasting  settlement,  based  on  UN  Securi- 
ty Council  Resolution  242,  is  within 
reach.  The  security  of  Israel  and  other 
nations  of  the  region  and  the  legitimate 
rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  can  and 
should  be  addressed  in  direct  negotia- 
tions. It  is  time  to  put  this  tragedy  to 
rest  and  turn  the  pages  to  a  new  and 
happier  chapter. 

Bringing  about  a  better  and  more 
peaceful  world  will  require  courage,  in- 
tegrity, and  wisdom.  King  Faud,  and 
others  in  his  family  before  him,  have 
been  admired  for  just  these  traits.  I  loo 
forward  to  our  discussions.  King  Fahd, 
and  welcome  to  the  United  States. 


Km5  f^ht> 


I  should  like  to  express  my  happiness  o 
the  occasion  of  my  first  meeting  with 
you  on  the  soil  of  the  United  States  anc 
express  my  satisfaction  with  the  steady 
growth  of  relations  between  our  two 
countries.  I  look  forward  to  a  fruitful  e 
change  of  views  for  the  benefit  of  our 
two  countries  and  peoples  in  the  interest 
of  peace  in  our  region. 

Mr.  President,  since  the  historic 
meeting  between  His  Majesty  the  late 
King  Abd  al-Aziz  Al-Saud  and  the  late 
President  Franklin  Roosevelt  40  years 
ago  this  month,  the  leaders  of  our  two 
countries  have  continued  to  meet  from 
time  to  time  to  discuss  ways  of  pro- 
moting friendship  and  cooperation  be- 
tween our  two  countries  and  to  consult 
and  exchange  views  on  international 
matters  of  mutual  interest.  This  visit  to: 
your  friendly  country  takes  place  in  this 
same  context. 


F€ATVR€ 
SamM  ArAbLx 


Permit  me  to  turn  back  the  pages  of 
istory  to  the  period  following  the  First 
v^orld  War,  to  the  time  when  the  ma- 
)rity  of  the  Arab  countries  were  suffer- 
ig  under  the  yoke  of  colonialism;  when 
our  country  affirmed  the  principles  that 
dvocated  the  right  of  peoples  to 
•eedom,  independence,  and  self- 
etermination. 

At  that  time,  when  the  name  of  the 
nited  States  stood  for  freedom,  justice, 
nd  independence,  the  aspirations  of  the 
rab  peoples  were  directed  toward  your 
luntry  as  the  defender  of  truth  and 
istice.  Now  we  are  in  a  new  era,  in 
hich  the  United  States  reaffirms  those 
rinciples,  this  time  under  your  leader- 
aip,  Mr.  President. 

The  majority  of  the  Arab  countries 
ained  their  freedom  and  independence, 
ith  the  exception  of  one  people — the 
alestinian  people,  who  committed  no 
rong  that  could  justify  what  has 
rfallen  them.  The  Palestinians,  who 
«re  never  aggressors  or  invaders, 
und  themselves,  through  no  fault  of 
<eir  own,  the  victims  of  unjust  aggres- 
Dn. 

The  Palestinian  question  is  the 
ngle  problem  that  is  of  paramount  con- 
rn  to  the  whole  Arab  nation  and  af- 
cts  the  relations  of  its  peoples  and 
iuntries  with  the  outside  world.  It  is 
•e  one  problem  that  is  the  root  cause  of 
stability  and  turmoil  in  the  region.  I 
ipe  that  your  Administration  will  sup- 
)rt  the  just  cause  of  the  Palestinian 
1;  ?ople. 

li     We  only  ask  for  a  just  position  that 
■nforms  with  the  history  and  ideals  of 
lur  great  country — a  position  that  is 
■nsonant  with  its  role  of  leadership  in 
•e  international  community.  Such  a 
isition  will  earn  the  United  States  the 
spect  and  appreciation  not  only  of  the 
rab  and  Muslim  worlds  but  also  of 
eedom-loving  peoples  everywhere. 

Similarly,  the  probierr.  of  Lebanon 
•eds  to  be  addressed  i:i  such  a  way 
at  would  guarantee  the  withdrawal  of 
rael  from  Lebanese  territory  and  the 
hievement  of  Lebanon's  sovereignty, 
rritorial  integi-ity,  and  full  in- 
pendence. 


f** 


1^  ;;::^NA?s}-^r» 


I  share  your  view  that  Saudi  Arabia, 
with  its  Islamic  beliefs  and  principles, 
and  the  United  States,  with  its  ideals 
and  values,  can  together  find  a  common 
ground  against  aggression,  injustice,  and 
oppression. 

As  far  as  the  people  of  Afghanistan 
are  concerned,  these  people — who  want 
nothing  but  freedom  against  oppression, 
freedom  from  killing  women  and 
children — deserve  our  help. 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  long,  but  I  would 
like  to  say  in  conclusion  that  it  is,  in- 
deed, a  pleasure  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  congratulate  you  on  the  full  con- 
fidence that  your  people  have  placed  in 
you  by  supporting  your  presidency  for  a 
second  term.  This  clearly  demonstrates 
the  extent  of  the  confidence  your  people 
have  in  your  wise  leadership  and  your 
farsightedness. 

And,  in  conclusion,  I  would  like  to 
thank  you  very  much  and  to  thank  the 
American  people  and  all  the  officials  of 
the  U.S.  Govenment.  And  I  wish  you 
progress  and  good  health.  And  I  would 
like  to  thank  God  for  giving  us  a 
beautiful  sunny  day  today. 


Sccrct^rvf  ShuUz's 

Luncheon  Remarks, 
fchru3ir\\  ll,  19JJ5 

Your  Majesty,  we  are  honored  to  greet 
you.  You  have  come  as  a  friend,  and  we 
have  talked  today  as  only  friends  can  do. 
We  have  benefited  from  your  views.  Our 
countries  have  traveled  far  together  dur- 
ing the  past  half  century.  Our  coopera- 
tion has  taken  many  forms  but  has 
always  had  the  same  goals — the  mutual 
benefit  of  our  two  nations,  in  the  con- 
text of  peace  and  economic  progress 
throughout  the  region. 

You  have  spoken  of  your  concern 
about  the  ever-present  potential  for 
violence  and  trouble  in  the  Middle  East 
if  there  is  not  movement  toward  peace. 
We  agree.  The  security  and  well-being 
not  only  of  your  Kingdom  but  of  all  the 
states  of  the  region  require  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  between  Israel  and  all  its 
Arab  neighbors. 


)ril1985 


.v.u 


'  1 .-  > 


f. 


\:<rT^v%«^  '- 


Madain  Saleh,  an  ancient  city  of  rock 
tombs  and  dwellings  in  northwestern  Sam 
Arabia,  was  built  bv  the  Nabataean  Arabs 
2.000  years  ago  to  prevent  the  Romans 
from  capturing  their  frankincense  and 
mjTrh  trade  routes.  This  site  and  many 
others  of  archaeological  significance  in  thi 
Kingdom  are  protected  and  preserved  by 
the  Department  of  Museums  and  Antiq- 
uities. The  government  plans  to  build  a 
museum  at  Madain  Saleh,  not  only  to 
display  artifacts  from  the  past  but  to  assis 
researchers  interested  in  the  Kingdom  and 
the  .\rabian  Peninsula. 


ii 


s^^'   % 


;*';''^*1 


This  fertile  plain  in  the  Asir  region  is  one 
of  several  agricultural  areas  that  has  made 
the  Kingdom  virtually  self-sufficient  in 
food.  Its  farms  produce  eggs,  milk, 
poultry,  meat,  fruits,  and  vegetables; 


wheat  production  rose  from  3.000  tons  in 
1976  to  more  than  1.2  million  tons  in  1981. 
To  expand  the  arable  farm  land  and  pro- 
vide for  urban  needs,  the  Saudis  have 
developed  sophisticated  and  efficient  water 


storage  and  irrigation  systems.  Innovative 
management  of  the  Kingdom's  water 
resources  is  probably  its  single  most  impor 
tant  task. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


F€ATVR€ 


iddah.  on  the  western  coast  of  the  penin- 
tla,  is  the  most  important  commercial 
inter  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  a  major  port 
tty.  A  special  terminal  at  the  ultramodern 


King  Abd  al-Aziz  International  Airport 
serves  as  the  primary  reception  center  for 
the  Muslim  pilgrims  en  route  to  Makkah 
during  the  kajj.  A  modern  city  by  any 


standard,  with  a  population  of  more  than 
1  million,  Jeddah  also  boasts  fine  examples 
of  traditional  Arab  architecture. 


iilconry  is  an  ancient  and  honored  sport  in 
iiudi  Arabia  requiring  precise  coordina- 
)n  between  man  and  animal  and  demand- 
^  skill  and  concentration.  Hunting 
ason  usually  lasts  from  November  to 
arch,  after  which  the  falconer  releases 
e  bird  to  breed  for  the  next  season. 
?cause  much  of  the  falcon's  traditional 
■ey  is  now  endangered,  falconry  is  limited 
id  carefully  regelated. 


hotos  courtesy  Information  Office,  Royal  Embassy  of 
ludi  Arabia) 


prill  985 


,4c. 


History  shows  there  is  only  one  road 
to  such  a  peace:  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors 
based  on  the  territory-for-peace  formula 
of  Security  Council  Resolution  242. 
Negotiations  work.  Permanent  ar- 
rangements for  peace  have  been 
established  in  one  treaty  of  peace.  And 
we  will  not  rest  until  the  same  can  be 
said  for  all  the  other  areas  affected  by 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict. 

President  Reagan,  on  September  1, 
1982,  proposed  a  set  of  positions  that 
could  point  the  way  to  an  equitable  set- 
tlement. He  made  clear  that  we  seek  a 
peace  that  will  both  satisfy  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  peo- 
ple and  assure  the  security  of  the  State 
of  Israel. 

Our  positions  need  not  be  accepted 
by  any  other  party  in  advance  of 
negotiations.  Indeed,  we  would  expect 
each  party  to  bring  its  own  preferred 
positions  to  the  table  at  the  outset  and 
to  press  them  vigorously.  It  is  in  this 
respect  that  there  could  be  a  most  useful 
role  for  the  principles  endorsed  by  the 
Arab  summit  at  Fez  1982.  I  know  you 
labored  long  and  hard  for  those  prin- 
ciples. While  they  differ  from  our  own 
ideas  in  a  number  of  important  respects, 
they  could  contribute  importantly  to  the 
development  of  the  position  that  an 
Arab  negotiator  brings  to  the  table. 

Both  President  Reagan's  initiative 
and  the  Fez  declaration  refer  to  the  con- 
cept of  a  transitional  period  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza.  The  President  described 
the  purpose  of  such  a  period  as  the 
peaceful  and  orderly  transfer  of  authori- 
ty from  Israel  to  the'  Palestinian  in- 
habitants, without  interference  with 
Israel's  security  requirements.  Suc- 
cessful negotiations  for  a  transitional 
period  would  be  a  major  tangible  step  on 
the  road  to  peace  in  the  region. 

I  sense  the  region  is  moving  steadily 
toward  a  resumption  of  active  negotia- 
tions. We  have  been  trying  to  build 
toward  that  goal,  block  by  block,  by 
helping  arrange  Israeli  withdrawal  from 
Lebanon  with  security  for  Israel's  north- 
ern border,  by  urging  continued  im- 
provement in  Egyptian-Israeli  relations, 
and  by  seeking  to  improve  the  quality  of 
life  for  the  Palestinians. 


SAMt>iA  ArAbJA-A  Profile 


People 

Nationality:  iVo?/ «—Sau(ii(s).  Adjec- 
tive—Saudi Arabian  or  Saudi.  Population 
(1984):  10.7  million.  Annual  growth  rate: 
3.3%.  Ethnic  groups:  Arab  (90%),  Afro- 
Asian  (10%).  Religion:  Islam.  Language: 
Arabic.  Education:  Atfi'ndan-ce—&l%. 
Literacy— b2%.  Health:  Infant  inortaiity 
rate— 118/1,000.  Life  expectancy— 5&A 
years.  Work  force  (56%  Saudi,  44%  foreign): 
A<iri.ndture—2i<%.  Industry— 4%.  Services 
and  government— ii%.  Construction— 21%. 
Oil  and  mining — 3%. 

Geography 

Area:  2,331,000  sq.  km.  (830,000  sq.  mi.); 
about  one-third  the  size  of  the  continental 
U.S.  Cities:  Capita/  — Riyadh  (population 
1,800,000).  Other  ci/ies— Jeddah  (1,000,000), 
Makkah  (463,000),  Medina  (322,000),  Tail 
(256,000),  Damman  (159,000).  Terrain:  Main- 
ly desert.  Climate:  Arid  with  great  extremes 
of  temperature. 

Government 

Type:  Monarchy  with  Council  of  Ministers. 
Unification:  September  23,  1931.  Constitu- 
tion: None;  governed  according  to  Islamic 
law  (Sharia). 

Branches:  Executive— k\ng  (chief  of  state 
and  head  of  government).  Legislative— none. 
Judicial— Isls^mK  courts  of  first  instance  and 
appeals. 

Administrative  subdivisions:  14  prov- 
inces. 


Political  parties:  None.  Suffrage:  N 
Central  government  budget  (1982-^ 

$75.4  billion.  Defense  (1982-83):  29%  of 

budget. 

Economy 

GDP  (FY1983  estimate):  $120  billion.  Annua 
growth  in  non-oil  GDP:  approximately  '. 
Per  capita  GDP:  $14,117. 

Natural  resources:  Hydrocarbons,  Iron 
ore,  gold,  copper. 

Agriculture:  ProdMc/.s— dates,  grains, 
livestock. 

Industry  (oil,  46.7%  of  GDP;  non-oil, 
53.3%):  Petroleum  production,  petro- 
chemicals, cement,  fertilizer,  light  indusi 

Trade  (1983):  Exports— $40  billion: 
petroleum  and  petroleum  products.  Maj^ 
markets— Japan.  US,  Western  Europe.  / 
por/.s— $43  billion:  manufactured  goods, 
transportation  equipment,  construction 
materials,  and  processed  food  products.  .1;'  ■ 
jor  sources— VS,  Japan,  FRG. 

Official  exchange  rate:  3.52  Saudi 
riyals=US$l. 

Fiscal  year:  Follows  Islamic  year. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN  and  its  specialized  agencies,  Arab 
League,  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC),  In- 
ternational Wheat  Council  (IWC),  Nonalignec 
Movement,  Organization  of  Arab  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries  (OAPEC),  Organization 
of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPE(  t. 
INTELSAT,  Organization  of  the  Islamic  Con 
ference.  ■ 


The  Saudi  flag  bears  the  Muslim  creed  in 
Arabic  script:  "There  is  no  God  but  God: 
Muhammad  is  the  Messenger  of  God." 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


F€ATVR€ 
SamM  Ai'AbiA 


SAUDI  ARABIA 


International  boundary 
National  capital 


200  kilometers 


|)24  4-85  STATE{1NR/GE) 


Ihe  Saudi  symbol  means  that  prosperity 
Bn  only  be  had  through  justice. 


The  problems  that  must  be  over- 
come when  negotiations  are  joined  are 
monumental  in  their  complexity — but 
they  are  not  insurmountable.  And  it  is 
clear  that  nothing  will  be  achieved  until 
negotiations  get  started. 

The  positions  the  President  put  forth 
on  September  1  remain  as  important — 
and  urgent — today  as  they  were  then. 
We  are  ready  to  pursue  them  with  great 
energy  and  determination,  whenever  the 
parties  in  the  region  are  prepared  to 
negotiate.  The  risks  and  dangers  that 
we  face  in  the  absence  of  progress — on 
which  we  and  Saudi  Arabia  agree — lead 
us  to  one  crucial  conclusion:  the  sooner 
negotiations  begin,  the  better  for  all  con- 
cerned. 

As  we  work  toward  peace  in  the 
region,  the  security  and  well-being  of 
Saudi  Arabia  remain  of  vital  interest  to 
the  United  States,  as  they  have  been 
since  our  security  relationship  began  in 
the  days  of  World  War  II.  The  continu- 
ing, fruitless  war  pursued  by  Iran  is  a 
threat  to  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  other 
states  of  the  gulf.  The  shield  held  up  by 
Saudi  Arabia  has  been  forged  through 
the  years  of  our  effective  military 
cooperation.  The  Kingdom's  capacity  to 
defend  itself  when  challenged  is  proof  of 
the  wisdom  of  that  cooperation. 

But  our  cooperation  is  broader  than 
security — as  basic  as  that  is.  The 
U.S. -Saudi  Joint  Economic  Commission, 
now  10  years  old,  has  grown  into  a 
substantial  component  of  the  Saudi 
development  effort.  Over  20  major  proj- 
ects have  been  set  up,  ranging  from 
manpower  and  vocational  training,  to  a 
magnificent  national  park  in  southwest 
Saudi  Arabia,  to  the  solar  energy  project 
in  the  practical  use  of  photovoltaics  for 
agriculture  and  industry.  From  the  first 
days  when  American  oilmen  stepped 
ashore  in  Jubayl — then  a  small 
village — to  search  for  oil,  until  now 
when  American  and  Saudi  businessmen 
cooperate  in  many  ventures,  large  and 
small,  the  free-enterprise  philosophies  of 
our  two  countries  have  produced  a 
dimension  of  U.S. -Saudi  relations  that 
goes  much  farther  and  deeper  than  for- 
mal diplomatic  contacts. 


Beyond  these  bilateral  ties,  there  are 
broader  areas  of  cooperation.  The  Saudi 
Government  was  instrumental,  for  ex- 
ample, in  establishing  the  Gulf  Coopera- 
tion Council  (GCC)  to  enhance  the 
political,  social,  and  economic  interests 
of  its  six  member  nations.  The  GCC  is 
an  example  of  regional  cooperation  at  its 
best  and  is  an  experiment  of  which 
Saudi  Arabia  and  its  neighbors  are 
deservedly  proud.  The  United  States  re- 
mains ready  to  lend  its  support  to  the 
organization's  goals  of  regional  coordina- 
tion and  security. 

Saudi-American  friendship  and 
cooperation  thus  have  many  dimensions, 
many  achievements,  and  enormous 
potential.  Today  we  celebrate  the  many 
goals  we  share— above  all  peace  in  the 
Middle  East— and  we  dedicate  ourselves 
to  new  joint  efforts  to  turn  these  goals 
into  realities. 


¥chru3ir\\  ^3J9»^ 

The  State  visit  of  His  Majesty  King  Fahd  bin 
Abd  al-Aziz  Al-Saud  has  reaffirmed  the  long- 
standing bonds  of  friendship  and  mutually 
beneficial  cooperation  that  have  existed  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Saudi  Arabia 
for  over  fifty  years.  In  their  meetings  on 
February  11  and  12,  President  Reagan  and 
King  Faud  concentrated  on  the  search  for  a 
just,  stable  and  lasting  solution  to  the  Arab- 
Israel  conflict,  which  the  two  leaders  agreed 
was  their  primary  concern. 

The  King  expressed  his  belief  that  the 
Arab  consensus  defined  in  the  communique 
issued  at  Fez  in  September  1982  provided  a 
just  basis  for  negotiations  leading  to  a  com- 
prehensive peace.  The  President  expressed 
his  appreciation  for  the  Fez  consensus, 
positive  elements  of  which  have  been 
recognized  by  the  United  States.  He  reaf- 
firmed his  continuing  commitment  to  the 
positions  for  peace  which  he  announced  on 
September  1,  1982,  and  renewed  his  pledge 
that  the  United  States  will  support  those 
positions  in  direct  negotiations  involving  the 
parties  most  concerned 

In  their  discussions,  the  President  and 
the  King  stressed  that  a  stable  peace  must 
provide  security  for  all  states  in  the  area  and 
for  the  exercise  of  the  legitimate  rights  of 
the  Palestinian  people.  Both  agreed  to  main- 
tain their  dialogue  on  this  urgent  issue. 


The  two  leaders  discussed  the  situation  in 
Lebanon  and  agreed  on  the  need  for  rapid 
restoration  of  its  sovereignty,  independence 
and  territorial  integrity. 

The  President  and  the  King  discussed  the 
continuing  war  between  Iran  and  Iraq.  They 
deplored  the  tragic  loss  of  life  and  destruc- 
tion it  has  brought  and  the  threat  to  regional 
stability  and  peace  which  it  poses.  They 
pledged  to  continue  to  support  efforts  to 
bring  the  fighting  to  a  speedy  end. 

The  discussions  between  the  President 
and  the  King,  to  which  cabinet  members  and 
ministers  contributed,  charted  the  course  for 
continued  development  of  U.S. -Saudi  rela- 
tions. In  this  regard,  Saudi  Arabia's 
emergence  as  an  exporter  of  industrial  goods, 
as  well  as  of  crude  oil,  was  examined  in  the 
light  of  the  United  States'  traditional  commit- 
ment to  open  markets  for  goods  and  invest- 
ment. The  delegations  of  the  two  countries 
foresaw  growth  and  rising  mutual  benefit 
from  a  sustained  partnership  in  trade, 
development  and  regional  cooperation  that 
joins  Saudi  resources  and  aspirations  with 
American  technological  leadership. 


The  arrival  ceremony  was  held  on  the  South 
Lawn  of  the  White  House,  where  His  Majesty 
was  accorded  a  formal  welcome  with  full 
military  honors.  He  spoke  in  Arabic,  and  his 
remarks  were  translated  by  an  interpreter 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Feb.  18,  1985). 

Secretary  Shultz  hosted  the  luncheon  in 
honor  of  His'  Majesty  at  the  Department  of 
State  (text  from  press  release  19  of  Feb.  12). 

Text  of  joint  communiaue  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Feb.  25.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


State  of  the  Union  Address 


Excerpt  from  President  Reagan's  ad- 
dress before  a  joint  session  of  the  Con- 
gress on  February  6.  1985.^ 


Just  as  we're  positioned  as  never  before 
to  secure  justice  in  our  economy,  we're 
poised  as  never  before  to  create  a  safer, 
freer,  more  peaceful  world.  Our  alliances 
are  stronger  than  ever.  Our  economy  is 
stronger  than  ever.  We  have  resumed 
our  historic  role  as  a  leader  of  the  free 
world.  And  all  of  these  together  are  a 
great  force  for  peace. 

Since  1981  we've  been  committed  to 
seeking  fair  and  verifiable  arms  agree- 
ments that  would  lower  the  risk  of  war 
and  reduce  the  size  of  nuclear  arsenals. 
[Now  our  determination  to  maintain  a 
strong  defense  has  influenced  the  Soviet 
Union  to  return  to  the  bargaining  table. 
lOur  negotiators  must  be  able  to  go  to 
that  table  with  the  united  support  of  the 
American  people.  All  of  us  have  no 
greater  dream  than  to  see  the  day  when 
nuclear  weapons  are  banned  from  this 
Earth  forever. 

Each  Member  of  the  Congress  has  a 
role  to  play  in  modernizing  our  defenses, 
thus  supporting  our  chances  for  a  mean- 
ingful arms  agreement.  Your  vote  this 
spring  on  the  Peacekeeper  missile  will 
be  a  critical  test  of  our  resolve  to  main- 
tain the  strength  we  need  and  move 
toward  mutual  and  verifiable  arms 
reductions. 

For  the  past  20  years,  we've  be- 
lieved that  no  war  will  be  launched  as 
long  as  each  side  knows  it  can  retaliate 
with  a  deadly  counterstrike.  I  believe 
there's  a  better  way  of  eliminating  the 
threat  of  nuclear  war.  It  is  a  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  aimed  ultimately  at 
finding  a  non-nuclear  defense  against 
ballistic  missiles.  It's  the  most  hopeful 
possibility  of  the  nuclear  age.  But  it's 
not  very  well  understood. 

Some  say  it  will  bring  war  to  the 
heavens,  but  its  purpose  is  to  deter  war 
in  the  heavens  and  on  Earth.  Some  say 
the  research  would  be  expensive. 
Perhaps,  but  it  could  save  millions  of 
lives,  indeed  humanity  itself.  And  some 
say  if  we  build  such  a  system,  the 
Soviets  will  build  a  defense  system  of 
their  own.  They  already  have  strategic 
defenses  that  surpass  ours,  a  civil 
defense  system,  where  we  have  almost 
none;  and  a  research  program  covering 
roughly  the  same  areas  of  technology 
that  we're  now  exploring.  And  finally 


some  say  the  research  will  take  a  long 
time.  The  answer  to  that  is:  "Let's  get 
started." 

Harry  Truman  once  said  that, 
ultimately,  our  security  and  the  world's 
hopes  for  peace  and  human  progress  "lie 
not  in  measures  of  defense  or  in  the  con- 
trol of  weapons  but  in  the  growth  and 
expansion  of  freedom  and  self-govern- 
ment." 

And  tonight,  we  declare  anew  to  our 
fellow  citizens  of  the  world:  Freedom  is 
not  the  sole  prerogative  of  a  chosen  few; 
it  is  the  universal  right  of  all  God's 
children.  Look  to  where  peace  and  pros- 
perity flourish  today.  It  is  in  homes  that 
freedom  built.  Victories  against  poverty 
are  greatest  and  peace  most  secure 
where  people  live  by  laws  that  ensure 
free  press,  free  speech,  and  freedom  to 
worship,  vote,  and  create  wealth. 

Our  mission  is  to  nourish  and  defend 
freedom  and  democracy  and  to  com- 
municate these  ideals  everywhere  we 
can.  America's  economic  success  is 
freedom's  success;  it  can  be  repeated  a 
hundred  times  in  a  hundred  different  na- 
tions. Many  countries  in  East  Asia  and 
the  Pacific  have  few  resources  other 
than  the  enterprise  of  their  own  people. 
But  through  low  tax  rates  and  free 
markets,  they've  soared  ahead  of  cen- 
tralized economies.  And  now  China  is 
opening  up  its  economy  to  meet  its 
needs. 

We  need  a  stronger  and  simpler  ap- 
proach to  the  process  of  making  and  im- 
plementing trade  policy,  and  we'll  be 
studying  potential  changes  in  that  proc- 
ess in  the  next  few  weeks.  We've  seen 
the  benefits  of  free  trade  and  lived 
through  the  disasters  of  protectionism. 
Tonight  I  ask  all  our  trading  part- 
ners— developed  and  developing 
alike — to  join  us  in  a  new  round  of  trade 
negotiations  to  expand  trade  and  com- 
petition and  strengthen  the  global 
economy— and  to  begin  it  in  this  next 
year. 

There  are  more  than  3  billion  human 
beings  living  in  Third  World  countries 
with  an  average  per  capita  income  of 
$650  a  year.  Many  are  victims  of  dic- 
tatorships that  impoverished  them  with 
taxation  and  corruption.  Let  us  ask  our 
allies  to  join  us  in  a  practical  program  of 
trade  and  assistance  that  fosters 
economic  development  through  personal 
incentives  to  help  those  people  climb 
from  poverty  on  their  own. 


We  cannot  play  innocents  abroad  in 
a  world  that's  not  innocent,  nor  can  we 
be  passive  when  freedom  is  under  seige. 
Without  resources,  diplomacy  cannot 
succeed.  Our  security  assistance  pro- 
grams help  friendly  governments  defend 
themselves  and  give  them  confidence  to 
work  for  peace.  And  I  hope  that  you  in 
the  Congress  will  understand  that, 
dollar  for  dollar,  security  assistance  con- 
tributes as  much  to  global  security  as 
our  own  defense  budget. 

We  must  stand  by  all  our  democratic 
allies.  And  we  must  not  break  faith  with 
those  who  are  risking  their  lives — on 
every  continent,  from  Afghanistan  to 
Nicaragua— to  defy  Soviet-supported  ag- 
gression and  secure  rights  which  have 
been  ours  from  birth. 

The  Sandinista  dictatorship  of 
Nicaragua,  with  full  Cuban-soviet  bloc 
support,  not  only  persecutes  its  people, 
the  church,  and  denies  a  free  press  but 
arms  and  provides  bases  for  communist 
terrorists  attacking  neighboring  states. 
Support  for  freedom  fighters  is  self- 
defense  and  totally  consistent  with  the 
OAS  and  UN  Charters.  It  is  essential 
that  the  Congress  continue  all  facets  of 
our  assistance  to  Central  America.  I 
want  to  work  with  you  to  support  the 
democratic  forces  whose  struggle  is  tied 
to  our  own  security. 

And  tonight,  I've  spoken  of  great 
plans  and  great  dreams.  They're  dreams 
we  can  make  come  true.  Two  hundred 
years  of  American  history  should  have 
taught  us  that  nothing  is  impossible. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  11,  1985. 


April  1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Nicaragua 


President  Reagan's  radio  address  to 
the  nation  on  Febraary  16,  1985.^ 

One  of  the  most  inspiring  developments 
of  recent  years  is  the  move  against  com- 
munism and  toward  freedom  that  is 
sweeping  the  world.  In  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Eastern  Europe,  we  see  the 
dissidents;  in  Poland,  the  Solidarity 
movement.  We  see  freedom  fighters  in 
Afghanistan,  Ethiopia,  Cambodia,  and 
Angola.  These  brave  men  and  women 
are  fighting  to  undo  the  infamous 
Brezhnev  doctrine,  which  says  that  once 
a  nation  falls  into  the  darkness  of  com- 
munist tyranny,  it  can  never  again  see 
the  light  of  freedom. 

Nowhere  do  we  see  this  more  than 
in  Nicaragua  whose  Sandinista  govern- 
ment is  a  Marxist-Leninist  clique  that 
broke  the  hearts  of  the  freedom-loving 
people  of  their  country  by  imposing  a 
brutal  dictiitorship  soon  after  taking 
control  in  1979.  Functioning  as  a 
satellite  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba, 
they  moved  quickly  to  suppress  internal 
dissent,  clamp  down  on  a  free  press, 
persecute  the  church  and  labor  union, 
and  betray  their  pledge  to  hold  free  elec- 
tions. Now  they're  exporting  drugs  to 
poison  our  youth  and  linking  up  with  the 
terrorists  of  Iran,  Libya,  the  Red 
Brigades,  and  the  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization].  The  San- 
dinistas aren't  democrats  but  com- 
munists, not  lovers  of  freedom  but  of 
power,  not  builders  of  a  peaceful  nation 
but  creators  of  a  fortress  Nicaragua  that 
intends  to  export  communism  beyond  its 
borders. 

The  true  heroes  of  the  Nicaraguan 
struggle — noncommunist,  democracy- 
loving  revolutionaries — saw  their  revolu- 
tion betrayed  and  took  up  arms  against 
the  betrayer.  These  men  and  women  are 
today  the  democratic  resistance  fighters 
some  call  the  Contras.  We  should  call 
them  "freedom  fighters." 

Sandinista  propaganda  denounces 
them  as  "mercenaries"  and  former  Na- 
tional Guardsmen  of  the  Somoza  dic- 
tatorship. But  this  is  a  lie.  The  freedom 
fighters  are  led  by  those  who  opposed 
Somoza,  and  their  soldiers  are  peasants, 
farmers,  shopkeepers,  and  students — 
the  people  of  Nicaragua.  These  brave 
men  and  women  de.serve  our  help.  They 
do  not  ask  for  troops  but  only  for  our 
technical  and  financial  support  and  sup- 
plies. We  caniiDl  turn  from  Ihem  in  their 
moment  of  need.  To  do  so  would  be  to 
betray  our  centuries-old  dedication  to 
supporting  those  who  struggle  for 


freedom.  This  is  not  only  legal,  it's  total- 
ly consistent  with  our  history. 

Time  and  again  in  the  course  of  our 
history,  we've  aided  those  around  the 
world  struggling  for  freedom,  democ- 
racy, independence,  and  liberation  from 
tyranny.  In  the  19th  century,  we  sup- 
ported Simon  Bolivar,  the  Great 
Liberator.  We  supported  the  Polish 
patriots,  the  French  resistance,  and 
others  seeking  freedom.  We  well 
remembered  how  other  nations,  like 
France,  had  come  to  our  aid  during  our 
own  Revolution.  It's  not  an  American 
tradition  to  turn  away.  And  lucky  for  us 
that  those  who  loved  democracy  200 
years  ago  didn't  turn  away  from  us. 

Most  of  us  know  of  the  heroism  of 
Lafayette,  who  chose  to  be  a  brother  to 
those  who  fought  for  American  in- 
dependence. But  he  did  more  than  fight 
in  the  field  for  the  Continental  Army. 
He  went  to  France  during  the  war  and 
pleaded  with  his  government  for  finan- 
cial aid  for  the  American  rebels.  And  he 
returned  to  General  Washington  with  a 
promise  that  France  would  send  sup- 
port, including  a  large  contingent  of 
ti'oops  to  help  in  the  crucial  last  cam- 
paign. It  was  those  French  troops  and 
Lafayette  himself  who  helped  defeat 
General  Cornwallis  and  assure  the 
British  surrender  at  Yorktown. 

America  may  never  have  been  born 
without  the  help  and  support  of  the 
freedom-loving  people  of  Europe,  of 
Lafayette  and  Von  Steuben  and 
Kosciusko.  And  America  did  not  forget. 
More  than  a  century  after  our  Revolu- 


tion, American  soldiers  went  to  France 
to  help  them  resist  tyranny  in  World 
War  I.  And  they  said,  in  words  that  will 
live  forever  in  the  history  of  gratitude, 
"Lafayette,  we  are  here." 

This  is  not  a  story  from  some 
romantic  past.  This  is  how  democracy 
was  built,  with  one  country,  one  people 
helping  another  in  their  hour  of  greatest 
peril. 

And  now  the  free  people  of  El 
Salvador,  Honduras,  and.  yes,  of 
Nicaragua  ask  for  our  help.  There  are 
over  1.5,000  freedom  fighters  struggling 
for  liberty  and  democracy  in  Nicaragua 
and  helping  to  stem  subversion  in  El 
Salvador.  They're  fighting  for  an  end  to 
tyranny  and  its  only  reliable  product: 
cruelty.  They  are  our  brothers.  How  can 
we  ignore  them?  How  can  we  refuse 
them  assistance  when  we  know  that 
ultimately  their  fight  is  our  fight'?  We 
must  remember  that  if  the  Sandinistas 
are  not  stopped  now,  they  will,  as  they 
have  sworn,  attempt  to  spread  com- 
munism to  El  Salvador,  Costa  Rica, 
Honduras,  and  elsewhere. 

The  freedom  fighters  are  putting 
pressure  on  the  Sandinistas  to  change 
their  ways  and  live  not  as  communist 
puppets  but  as  peaceful  democrats.  We 
must  help.  Congress  must  understand 
that  the  American  people  support  the 
struggle  for  democracy  in  Central 
America.  We  can  save  them  as  we  were 
once  saved,  but  only  if  we  act,  and  now. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Feb.  25,  1985.  ■ 


News  Conference  of  February  21 
(Excerpts) 


Excerpts  from  President  Reagan  '.s 
news  conference  of  February  21,  198.5.'' 

Q.  Jack  Anderson  said  in  his  column 
today  that  in  1981,  you  passed  the 
word  to  Moscow  that  even  if  the 
Senate  ratified  SALT  II,  you  would 
not  sign  it;  that  in  1982,  Moscow  told 
you  that  they  are  no  longer  bound  by 
"the  SALT  II"  Treaty  and  they  began  "to 
build  up  their  arsenal  over  the  limit,  is 
that  true? 

A.  I  read  that  myself  this  morning, 
and  I  went  into  the  office  and  I  said, 
"Where  is  all  this  coming  from?"  I  do  not 
remember  any  statement  from  the 
Soviet  Union  of  that  kind. 


Both  countries  had  been  involved 
with  mutual — obeying  the  restraints  or 
staying  within  the  restraints  mainly 
because  of  our  efforts  toward  what 
we're  now  approaching,  arms  reduction 
talks;  that  we  felt  that  if  we  were  going 
to  engage  in  those  talks,  it  would  be 
even  better  if  we  did  abide  by  an  agree- 
ment that — one  that  had  been  signed,  it 
had  never  been  ratified  by  our  govern- 
ment. 

And  1  (i<in't  recall  that  at  all.  And  1 
have  to  say  that  we  know  that  the 
Soviet  Union,  we're  sure,  has  violated 
some  of  the  restraints  now.  And  we 
know  that  we're  coming  to  a  point  which 
we  have  up  until  now  been  hiding  l)y. 


10 


Denartment  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


And  as  we  replace  older  weapons  with 
new,  we  have  destroyed  the  old  ones. 

The  Soviet  Union — one  of  the  viola- 
tions of  theirs  has  been  that  they  were 
taking  nuclear  missile  submarines  out  of 
action,  but  they  were  cutting  them  down 
and  rebuilding  them  as  cruise  missiles 
carrying  submarines — 

Q.  Is  it  your  mood  now  to  stay 
with  the  treaties  that  we  have 
negotiated,  like  even  ABM  [Anti- 
ballistic  Missiles  Treaty],  while  the 
new  negotiations  go  on? 

A.  We're  going  to  stay  with  the 
treaties  that  are  in  effect,  that  have 
been  ratified  and  are  in  power.  We'll 
have  a — 

Q.  And  SALT  II? 

A.  We'll  have  a  decision  several 
months  from  now  to  make  with  regard 
to  whether  we  join  them  in  violating  the 
restraints. 


Q.  This  week  in  Vienna,  American 
^and  Soviet  officials  held  2  days  of 
talks  on  the  Middle  East,  apparently 
their  most  intensive  on  this  issue  for  7 
years.  Can  you  tell  us  anything  about 
them?  And,  also,  do  these  talks  fit 
into  any  other  recent  development 
such  as  King  Hussein's  recent  move 
ind  your  talks  with  King  Fahd  last 
kveek? 

A.  No.  These  talks  had  nothing  to 
lo  with  negotiations  or  anything  of  that 
■;ind.  We  simply  felt  that  it  was  time  to 
exchange  views  with  each  other  and 
Tiake  sure  that  there  couldn't  be  any 
iiiscalculations  that  could  lead  to  some 
<;ind  of  confrontation  or  problem.  We 
jrought  them  up-to-date  on  our  own 
.'lews  and  what  we  thought  and  they 
A'ere  talking  on  their  own,  and  that's  all. 

Q.  Is  the  Soviet  Government  still 
pushing  for  a  direct  negotiating  role 
;n  Middle  East  diplomacy? 

A.  I  haven't  had  a  full  report  enough 
:o  say  whether  they  mentioned  some 
specific  things.  They  have  tended  to  sup- 
Hirt  the  idea  of  a  great  international 
iiffting.  We  don't  favor  that.  We  don't 
)elieve  that  there  should  be  that  many 
lands  in  the  pot,  just  as  we're  not  envi- 
^iiining  any  participation  in  negotiations. 
\\'e  have  said  we'll  stand  by  and  we'll 
lelp  in  any  way  we  can,  but  these 
aegotiations  must  be  between  the  Arabs 
ind  the  Palestinians  and  the  Israelis. 

Q.  On  Capitol  Hill  the  other  day. 
Secretary  Shultz  suggested  that  a  goal 
of  your  policy  now  is  to  remove  the 
Sandinista  government  in  Nicaragua. 
Is  that  your  goal? 


A.  Removed  in  the  sense  of  its  pres- 
ent structure,  in  which  it  is  a  communist 
totalitarian  state,  and  it  is  not  a  govern- 
ment chosen  by  the  people.  So,  you 
wonder  sometimes  about  those  who 
make  such  claims  as  to  its  legitimacy. 
We  believe,  just  as  I  said  Saturday 
nu)rnitig,  that  we  have  an  obligation  to 
be  of  help  where  we  can  to  freedom 
fighters  and  lovers  of  freedom  and 
democracy,  from  Afghanistan  to 
Nicaragua  and  wherever  there  are  peo- 
ple of  that  kind  who  are  striving  for  that 
freedom. 

And  we're  going  to  try  to  persuade 
the  Congress  that  we  can  legitimately  go 
forward  and  hopefully,  go  forward  on  a 
multiyear  basis  with  the  Scoop  Jackson 
plan  for  t'-ying  to  bring  development  and 
help  to  all  of  Central  America. 

Q.  When  you  say  remove  it  in  the 
sense  of  its  present  structure,  aren't 
you  then  saying  that  you  advocate  the 
overthrow  of  the  present  Government 
of  Nicaragua? 

A.  What  I'm  saying  is  that  this  pres- 
ent Government  was  one  element  of  the 
revolution  against  Somoza.  The  freedom 
fighters  are  other  elements  of  that 
revolution.  And  once  victory  was  at- 
tained, the  Sandinistas  did  what  Castro 
had  done,  prior  to  their  time,  in  Cuba. 
They  ousted  and  managed  to  rid 
themselves  of  the  other  elements  of  the 
revolution  and  violated  their  own  prom- 
ise to  the  Organization  of  American 
States,  and  as  a  result  of  which  they  had 
received  support  from  the  organization, 
that  they  were — their  revolutionary  goal 
was  for  democracy,  free  press,  free 
speech,  free  labor  unions,  and  elections, 
and  so  forth,  and  they  have  violated 
that. 

And  the  people  who  are  fighting 
them,  the  freedom  fighters  opposing 
them,  are  Nicaraguan  people  who  want 
the  goals  of  the  revolution  restored.  And 
we're  going  to  try  to  help. 

Q.  Is  the  answer  yes?  Is  the 
answer  yes,  then? 

A.  To  what? 

Q.  To  the  question,  aren't  you  ad- 
vocating the  overthrow  of  the  present 
government?  If — 

A.  Not  if  the  present — 

Q.  — you  substitute  another  form 
of  what  you  say  was  the  revolution? 

A.  Not  if  the  present  government 
would  turn  around  and  say,  all  right,  if 
they'd  say,  "uncle."  All  right,  come  on 
back  into  the  revolutionary  government 
and  let's  straighten  this  out  and  institute 
the  goals. 


Q.  I  wonder  if  we  might  return  to 
Nicaragua.  In  answer  to  Sam's  ques- 
tion when  he  pressed  you,  you  said 
that  you — or  you  seemed  to  be  saying 
that  you  wouldn't  advocate  the  over- 
throw of  the  government,  not  if  the 
present  government  would  turn 
around  and  say,  "uncle."  Aren't  you 
really  saying  that  you  want  the  pres- 
ent government  out,  and  secondly, 
should  the  United  States  be  trying  to 
influence  a  government  of  another  na- 
tion in  this  hemisphere? 

A.  I  think  that  what  we're  doing  and 
what  we  have  proposed  doing  is  within 
the  UN  Charter  and  within  the  OAS 
Charter  and  the  right  of  people  to  do 
what  the  freedom  fighters  are  doing.  It's 
like  saying,  "Is  the  glass  half  full  or  half 
empty?"  You  can  say  we're  trying  to 
oust  the  Sandinistas  by  what  we're  say- 
ing. 

We're  saying  we're  trying  to  give 
those  who  fought  a  revolution  to  escape 
a  dictatorship,  to  have  democracy,  and 
then  had  it  taken  away  from  them  by 
some  of  their  fellow  revolutionaries — 
we're  saying  we  want  them  to  have  a 
chance  to  have  that  democracy  that  they 
fought  for.  And  I  don't  think  the  San- 
dinistas have  a  decent  leg  to  stand  on. 
What  they  have  done  is  totalitarian.  It  is 
brutal,  cruel.  And  they  have  no  argu- 
ment against  what  the  rest  of  the  people 
in  Nicaragua  want. 

Q.  What  about  the  specific  prohibi- 
tions by  the  U.S.  Congress  against  the 
kind  of  conduct  which  would  over- 
throw their  government  or  provide 
money  to  do  so? 

A.  The— what? 

Q.  I'm  referring  to  the  Boland 
amendment.  The  specific  prohibitions 
of  the  Congress. 

A.  I  think  that  some  of  the  pro- 
posals that  have  been  made  in  Congress 
have  lacked  a  complete  understanding  of 
what  is  at  stake  there  and  what  we're 
trying  to  do. 

Q.  You  will  soon  be  making  a 
decision  on  how  to  handle  the 
March  31st  expiration  of  Japanese 
auto  import  quotas.  If  Japanese  auto 
sales  do  increase  in  this  country,  will 
you  demand  that  the  Japanese  allow 
more  American-made  goods  to  be  sold 
in  their  country? 

A.  Let  me  just  say  that — comment- 
ing on  anything  of  that  kind,  we  have 
been  in  communication  with  the 
Japanese,  we  have  discussions  going  for- 
ward now  on  open  markets  both  ways, 
in  improving  the  situation  between  our 
two  countries. 


April1985 


11 


THE  PRESIDENT 


A  great  deal  of  progress  has  been 
made.  We've  got  a  long  way  to  go  yet. 
But  everything  that  we're  going  to 
decide  is  going  to  be  in  the  context  of 
the  two  of  us  as  trading  partners  having 
fair  trade  and  free  trade  between  us. 

Q.  With  no  restraints,  your  special 
trade  representative  has  predicted  a 
sales  increase  of  750.000  vehicles  in 
this  country.  Will  the  benefits  of  that 
for  consumers  outweigh  the  adverse, 
or  the  presumed  adverse,  effects  on 
the  U.S.  auto  industry? 

A.  The  agreement  that  is  being 
discussed  is  a  voluntary  agreement  that 
the  Japanese  themselves  instituted.  And 
we've  had  a  Cabinet  council  that  has— I 
know  some  of  you've  gotten  information 
before  I  did  on  this— that  is  going  to  be 
coming  to  me  with  a  recommendation. 
They  have  not  done  so  as  yet.  But  I  will 
hear  all  their  argimients,  and  I  will  con- 
sider them  in  the  context  of  the  negotia- 
tions and  the  discussion  that  is  going  on 
between  us  and  the  Japanese. 


Q.  A  number  of  the  questions  have 
been  on  our  economic  problems 
abroad.  The  farmers'  problem,  part  of 
it  is  that  they're  priced  out  of  the 
market  in  the  international  trade 
because  of  the  over-valued  dollar.  I 
think  that's  part  of  our  problem  in  the 
auto  sales  abroad,  and  in  this  country, 
where  they're  disadvantaged  because 
our  dollar  is  so  valuable  compared  to 
other  currencies.  I  wonder  if  you  have 
discussed  this  with  Mr.  Baker 
(Secretary  of  the  Treasury  James  A. 
Baker  III)  and  some  of  your  other 
economic  advisers,  and  if  you  have 
studied  the  possibility  of  taking  any 
action  by  this  country  to  try  to  reduce 
the  value  of  the  dollar  against  other 
currencies,  both  in  Europe  and  in 
Asia? 


A.  I  can  remember  when  our  dollar 
was  devalued,  and  there  weren't  very 
many  people  happy  about  that.  I  think 
the  problem  of  the  dollar  today  is  that 
our  trading  partners  in  the  world  have 
not  caught  up  with  us  in  economic 
recovery.  I  think  they  have  a  ways  to  go 
in  changing  some  rigidities  in  their 
customs  and  their  methods  of  doing 
business  and  in  industry.  And  what  we 
really  need  is  their  recovery  to  bring 
their  money  up  in  value  comparable  to 
ours. 

There  are  two  sides  to  tliis  problem, 
as  we  find  with  the  trade  deficit,  for  ex- 
ample, because  of  our  inability,  with  the 
price  of  our  dollar,  to  sell  some  of  our 
goods  abroad— they  are  too  high  priced. 

But  at  the  same  time,  you  turn  to 
the  other  hand  and  see  the  people  in  this 
country  who  are  benefitting  by  the  pur- 
chase of  products  which  are  cheap  by 
our  standards— cheap  in  price,  not 
quality— in  our  imports,  and  how  that 
has  managed  to  hold  down  inflation. 

I  think  if  you  start  toying  around 
with  trying  to  reduce  the  value  of  the 
dollar  without  curing  this  other  side  of 
the  issue,  we  put  ourselves  back  into  the 
inflation  spiral,  and  that  we  don't  want. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  weakening  signs 
in  the  region  of  the  southeastern  flank 
of  NATO  in  the  light  of  the  last  Greek 
attitude?  And  according  to  The 
Washington  Post,  there  was  a  story 
saying  that  the  U.S.  bases  will  be 
moved  out  of  Athens.  Do  you  intend  to 
do  so? 

A.    We  have  no  plans  about  any 
moves  of  any  kind,  but  all  I  can  say 
alxiut  the  other— and  I  don't  think  I 
should  go  farther  than  this— is  to  say 
that,  yes,  we're  very  concerned  about 
some  of  the  bilateral  problems  between 
countries  there  at  our  southern  flank  of 
NATO  and  the  effect  that  they  can  have 
on  the  whole  security  of  the  alliance. 


Q.  If  you  and  Mrs.  Thatcher  are 
correct  that  the  Soviets  plan  to  hold 
hostage  any  progress  on  intermediate 
range  and  strategic  weapons  in  the 
talks  in  Geneva  in  return  for  conces- 
sions on  your  part  on  your  space 
defense  program,  how  far  are  you 
willing  to  go  in  giving  concessions  to 
get  an  arms  agreement? 

A.  We  believe  if  the  Soviets  are 
sincere  in  the  statements  they've  made 
about  actually  wanting  a  reduction  and 
even  the  elimination  of  nuclear  weapons, 
they'll  stay  at  the  table  and  negotiate 
with  us.  AH  that  we  have  proposed  and 
all  that  we're  doing  is  engaging  in 
research  which  is  legal  within  the  AMB 
Treaty;  and  we're  not  violating  that 
treaty. 

And  I  have  said  repeatedly,  and 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher  is  aware  of 
this,  that  if  our  research  does  produce 
the  possibility  of  such  a  weapon — a 
defensive  weapon — that  could  alter  the 
balance,  then  I  would  be  willing  to  come 
forth  before  any  deployment  and 
negotiate  and  discuss  the  deployment 
and  the  use  of  that  weapon  in  such  a 
way  that  it  would  be  used  to  rid  the 
world  of  the  nuclear  threat,  not  to  give 
us  any  particular  advantage  over  anyone 
else. 

We  just  think  that  the  ABM  Treaty 
itself— this  is  one  part  that  has  been 
violated— the  ABM  Treaty  in  being 
passed,  being  a  defensive  weapon  treaty, 
expressed  the  belief  that  this  should 
then  be  accompanied  by  realistic  reduc- 
tions of  nuclear  weapons.  And  all  there 
has  been  since  the  treaty  was  passed 
was  a  tremendous  increase  in  those 
weapons. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  25,  198.3. 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Economic  Cooperation  in  the  Pacific  Basin 


by  Secretary  Sfiultz 

Address  at  the  Asia  Foundation  din- 
ner in  honor  of  the  U.S.  National  Com- 
mittee for  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation 
ill  San  Franci.'sco  on  Fehruanj  21.  1985.'' 

In  the  Pacific  today  there  is  a  new  reali- 
ty, though  the  world  may  not  yet  fully 
comprehend  it.  In  economic  develop- 
ment, in  the  growth  of  free  institutions, 
and  in  growing  global  influence,  the 
Pacific  region  has  rapidly  emerged  as  a 
leading  force  on  the  world  stage.  Its 
economic  dynamism  has  become  a  model 
for  the  developing  world  and  offers  a 
unique  and  attractive  vision  of  the 
future. 

Perhaps  even  more  important,  there 
is  a  new  trend  toward  wider  cooperation 
among  many  East  Asian  nations.  A 
sense  of  Pacific  community  is  emerging. 
We  see  an  expanding  practice  of 
regional  consultations,  a  developing 
sense  of  common  interests,  and  a  desire 
to  cooperate  on  a  widening  range  of 
■economic  issues. 

And  we  in  America  share  this  new 
cooperative  spirit.  The  United  States  has 
ihad  a  Pacific  coast  since  1819,  and  one 
■of  the  strongest  stimulants  to  our 
igrowth  and  prosperity  has  been  a  vision 
of  the  West  as  an  area  of  rich  opportuni- 
tty,  where  individual  enterprise  and  a 
commitment  to  freedom  can  accomplish 
ereat  things  for  all  mankind.  Our  vision 
today  is  no  less  bright  and  beckoning 
(than  when  our  forefathers  embarked 
uipon  their  manifest  destiny.  Pacific  con- 
Bciousness  is  rising  in  the  United 
"States— not  just  on  the  west  coast  but  in 
Boston,  New  York,  and  in  our  nation's 
apital. 

Last  spring,  a  major  French 
newspaper  noted  that  the  American 
President  had  observed  that  "Western 
history  began  with  a  Mediterranean  era, 
passed  through  an  Atlantic  era,  and  is 
now  moving  into  a  Pacific  era."  You 
might  be  surprised  to  learn  that  Le 
Monde  was  referring  not  to  Ronald 
Reagan  but  to  Theodore  Roosevelt.  But 
I  can  assure  you  that  President  Reagan, 
himself  a  Californian  with  a  western 
perspective,  fully  shares  Teddy 
Riiosevelt's  enthusiasm  about  the  oppor- 
tunities that  abound  in  the  Pacific.  Just 
this  past  September  at  the  White  House, 
the  President,  Vice  President  Bush,  and 
I  demonstrated  this  Administration's 
(•(immitment  to  the  future  of  Pacific 
cdojieration  by  joining  many  in  this  room 
t(i  inaugurate  this,  the  United  States 


National  Committee  for  Pacific 
Economic  Cooperation.  More  and  more 
Americans  are  becoming  aware  that  the 
economic  and  social  progress  of  this 
region  presents  an  exciting  opportunity 
for  the  United  States  and  for  interna- 
tional peace,  security,  and  prosperity. 

A  Region  of  Challenge  and  Diversity 

While  the  prospects  for  the  nations  and 
people  of  the  Pacific  Basin  are  bright, 
politically  and  economically,  we  must 
bear  in  mind  that  this  is  one  of  the  most 
heavily  armed  regions  in  the  world,  and 
Asian  peace  is  still  marred  by  continuing 
and  tragic  conflicts.  In  Vietnam,  Cam- 
bodia, and  Laos,  some  1.1  million  men 
are  now  under  arms,  while  on  the 
Korean  Peninsula  there  is  a  combined 
total  of  1.5  million  troops.  In  addition  to 
4.4  million  men  in  uniform  in  China,  ap- 
proximately one-third  to  one-half  of  the 
U.S.S.R.'s  ground  forces— some  52  divi- 
sions—are garrisoned  in  the  Soviet  Far 
East.  Soviet  air  power,  both  tactical  and 
strategic,  continues  to  grow;  the  Soviet 
Pacific  Fleet  is  now  their  largest;  and 
about  one-third  of  the  Soviet  SS-20 
intermediate-range  ballistic  missile  bat- 
talions overshadow  much  of  the  popula- 
tion of  the  region.  This  concentration  of 
military  forces  is  of  considerable  concern 
given  the  demonstrated  willingness  of 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  proxies — in 
Afghanistan,  Cambodia,  and  Korea— to 


stability— a  stability  that  derives  from  a 
number  of  factors  independent  of  a  sim- 
ple calculation  of  the  balance  of  forces. 
Economic  vitality,  in  particular,  is  an  im- 
portant factor  in  the  regional  equation. 
To  maintain  stability,  cooperation  among 
like-minded  states— particularly  those 
that  share  the  common  goals  of  peace 
and  regional  development— is  indispen- 
sable. 

The  Pacific  Basin  is  a  region 
characterized  by  great  diversity,  for  ex- 
ample; 

•  Populations  range  from  the 
world's  smallest  independent  state, 
Nauru,  in  the  South  Pacific,  with  8 
square  miles  and  a  population  of  8,000, 
to  the  world's  largest,  China,  with 
almost  4  million  square  miles  and  over  1 
billion  people; 

•  Economic  size  and  influence  range 
from  oil-rich  Brunei  with  a  per  capita 
GNP  [gross  national  product]  of  nearly 
$18,000  to  some  of  the  island  nations 
with  per  capita  GNPs  of  less  than  $350; 
and 

•  Cultural,  religious,  and  philo- 
sophical traditions  cover  the  spectrum  of 
the  world's  heritage,  ranging  from  Con- 
fucianism and  Buddhism  to  Islam  and 
Christianity. 

But  the  Pacific  nations  also  have 
much  in  common. 

•  With  a  few  exceptions,  countries 
in  the  region  tend  to  share  our  interest 


There  are  no  examples  of  a  communist  system, 
once  consolidated,  evolving  into  a  democracy. 


use  their  military  power  for  their 
political  ends. 

Other  challenges  confront  the 
region;  the  problems  of  the  Philippines 
are  serious,  with  potential  effects  on 
security  throughout  the  region;  the 
human  suffering  in  Indochina  drains  the 
resources  and  energies  of  many  Asian 
and  Pacific  nations;  ethnic  tensions, 
regional  rivalries,  and  potential  ter- 
ritorial disputes  impede  the  search  for 
lasting  security.  The  slow  growth  of 
political  liberalization  could  also  set  back 
Asia's  hard-won  successes. 

Despite  these  challenges,  the  Pacific 
Basin  enjoys  a  remarkable  degree  of 


in  peace  and  a  stable  environment  for 
growth  and  development. 

•  Most  of  the  vibrant  countries  of 
the  Pacific  are  market-oriented  systems 
that  recognize  the  vital  role  of  individual 
entrepreneurship. 

•  Human  resources  are  abundant  in 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  Education 
levels  are  relatively  high,  and  literacy 
(estimated  at  75%  in  the  developing 
Asian  countries)  is  well  ahead  of  other 
regions. 

•  Sound  financial  management  has 
led  to  rapid  economic  development.  East 
Asian  countries  owe  less  than  20%  of 
the  world's  developing  country  debt 


April1985 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


compared  with  over  50%  in  Latin 
America.  The  East  Asian  developing 
country  debt-to-service  ratio  is  the 
lowest  of  any  region— under  16%  in 
1982.  Their  debt-to-export  ratio,  nearly 
80%,  is  the  best  in  the  world. 

•  A  strong  technological  base  has 
been  built  with  an  extraordinary  em- 
phasis on  scientific  and  technical  educa- 
tion. The  transfer  and  practical  applica- 
tion of  technical  know-how,  coupled  with 
a  disciplined  and  skilled  work  force, 
have  launched  many  of  the  countries  of 
the  region  on  the  road  to  rapid  and  sus- 
tained development. 

•  In  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
too,  there  has  been  movement  toward 
greater  openness.  Pragmatism  is  now 
the  watchword  in  China,  where  the 
hopes  for  economic  modernization  have 
been  invested— wisely— in  a  bold  pro- 
gram of  reform.  We  watch  with  interest 
the  effect  of  a  great  nation  beginning 

to  throw  off  some  of  its  outmoded 
economic  doctrines  and  redirecting  the 
energies  of  a  billion  talented  people. 

Prior  to  the  Second  World  War, 
American  foreign  policy  focused  on  the 
defense  and  economic  well-being  of  our 
Asian  possessions  and  our  neighbors  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  Following  the 
war,  our  help  in  the  reconstruction  of 
Japan  and  our  efforts  to  defend  freedom 
in  Korea  and  Vietnam  monopolized  our 
attention  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific;  our 
primary  interest  was  in  supporting 
the  security  and  political  stability  of 
Asian  nations  and  the  trend  toward 
democracy.  Since  then,  our  interest  in 
Asia  has  continued  to  broaden,  with  the 
emergence  in  the  region  of  powerful  and 
diverse  economic  forces  that  are  having 
a  major  impact  not  only  in  the  United 
States  but  elsewhere  in  the  world. 

The  Role  of  Japan 

One  cannot  properly  contemplate  the 
story  of  the  Pacific  without  reflecting  on 
the  role  of  Japan  as  a  catalyst  in  the 
remarkable  developments  of  the  last  half 
of  the  20th  century.  Japan  has  em- 
barked upon  a  course  of  technological 
and  economic  advance  that  is  destined  to 
leave  an  indelible  mark  on  the  civiliza- 
tion of  this  era. 

Japan's  economy— literally  shattered 
after  the  war— has,  in  less  than  40 
years,  grown  to  become  the  free  world's 
second  largest.  In  the  1970s,  the 
Japanese  economy  grew  at  an  average 
annual  real  rate  of  4.9%— almost  two- 
thirds  greater  than  that  of  the  United 
States  and  about  twice  as  fast  as  Ger- 


many and  France.  Since  1951,  Japan's 
GNP  and  its  exports  have  both  grown 
by  100%. 

Our  permanent  partnership  with 
Japan  is  the  keystone  of  American 
foreign  policy  in  East  Asia  and  the  linch- 
pin of  our  relationships  in  the  region. 
But  beyond  that,  the  strong  ties  that 
have  developed  in  the  past  40  years  be- 
tween our  two  countries— in  the 
political,  economic,  and  security 
arenas— have  provided  the  foundation 
upon  which  the  Pacific  cooperation  and 
dynamism  of  which  I  speak  today  have 
been  built.  The  stimulus  and  the  role 
model  that  the  world's  two  largest  free 
market  economies  and  technological 
leaders  provide  to  the  region  cannot  be 
denied.  Official  economic  assistance  and 
private  capital  flows  from  Japan  and  the 
United  States  have  contributed  to 
economic  and  social  development  in 
many  Asian  nations.  And  the  close 
diplomatic  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  and  our  Treaty 
of  Mutual  Cooperation  and  Security,  and 
the  bases  that  it  makes  possible,  have 
bolstered  peace  and  stability  in  the 
region. 

If  Japan's  economic  performance 
and  the  close  U.S. -Japan  partnership 
have  been  nothing  short  of  miraculous, 
however,  much  remains  to  be  done. 
There  remain  serious  impediments  in 
Japan  to  competitive  foreign  exports. 
Japan  has  a  responsibility  to  take  con- 
crete actions  to  fulfill  its  commitment  to 
an  open  trade  and  investment  system. 
The  United  States  attaches  great  impor- 
tance to  the  understanding  reached  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone  in  Los  Angeles  on  January  2. 
With  the  full  support  of  both  leaders,  we 
have  begun  intensive  negotiations  to 
identify  and  remove  trade  barriers  in 
four  key  Japanese  markets;  telecom- 
munications, electronics,  forest  products, 
and  medical  equipment  and  pharma- 
ceuticals. Foreign  Minister  Abe  and  I 
have  been  directed  to  oversee  these 
negotiations  and  to  provide  a  progress 
report  to  Prime  Minister  Nakasone  and 
President  Reagan  at  the  time  of  the 
Bonn  economic  summit  meeting  in  early 
May.  In  the  security  area,  the  gap  be- 
tween Japan's  publicly  stated  defense 
responsibilities  and  its  ability  to  fulfill 
these  responsibilities  must  be  narrowed. 
In  short,  Japan,  like  all  Pacific  Basin  na- 
tions, must  be  responsive  to  the  global 
economic  and  security  system  in  which 
our  well-being  is  collectively  imbedded. 


Asia  and  the  U.S.  Economy 

Nevertheless,  the  growth  of  Japan's 
economy  has  been  a  miracle,  and  it  has 
stimulated  changes  elsewhere  in  the 
world.  Other  states  in  the  region  have 
emulated  the  Japanese  experience  and 
are  aggressively  applying  the  lessons 
learned.  In  addition  to  the  newly  in- 
dustrialized countries,  such  as  the 
Republic  of  Korea,  other  Pacific 
economies  are  growing  rapidly,  and 
their  trade,  both  within  the  region  and 
with  the  rest  of  the  world,  is  thriving.  In 
1982  well  over  half  of  the  trade  of  the 
14  principal  countries  of  the  region  (54% 
of  exports  and  59%  of  imports)  was 
transacted  within  the  Pacific  Basin.  And 
a  remarkable  70%  of  all  developing 
country  exports  are  from  the  newly  in- 
dustrialized countries  of  Asia. 

The  six  countries  that  constitute  the 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)— Brunei,  Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
the  Philippines,  Singapore,  and 
Thailand— are  of  growing  importance  to 
the  United  States.  Taken  together,  the 
ASEAN  countries  are  now  our  fifth 
largest  trading  partner  behind  only  the 
European  Community,  Canada,  Japan, 
and  Mexico.  American  trade  with 
ASEAN  grew  11.5%  in  1984  over  1983; 
and  ASEAN  bought  almost  $10  billion 
of  American  goods— more  than  4%  of 
our  total  exports.  ASEAN's  economic 
links  to  the  Pacific  are  reflected  in  the 
fact  that  almost  three-fourths  of  its  im- 
ports and  more  than  two-thirds  of  its 
total  trade  are  with  countries  of  the 
Pacific  Basin. 

The  economic  impact  of  all  these 
developments  on  the  United  States  is 
enormous.  For  the  first  half  of  this  cen- 
tury, our  total  world  trade  (imports  and 
exports)  averaged  less  than  4%  of  our 
gross  national  product.  By  1959,  it  had 
grown  to  somewhat  less  than  6%;  but,  in 
the  past  25  years,  it  has  almost  tripled 
to  17%  of  our  GNP.  If  present  rates  of 
growth  continue,  our  foreign  trade  will, 
by  the  year  2000,  amount  to  some  25% 
of  the  U.S.  GNP— or  approximately 
Japan's  current  percentage.  By  any 
measure,  those  are  significant  figures; 
and  it  goes  without  saying  that  as  trade 
continues  to  grow  as  a  component  of  our 
national  economy,  both  our  trade  policy 
and  our  domestic  economic  policies  will 
play  an  increasingly  important  role  in 
LI.S.  foreign  policy. 

For  the  past  5  years,  total  U.S. 
trade  with  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  has 
surpassed  U.S.  trade  with  any  other 
region  of  the  world.  Moreover,  East 
Asia's  and  the  Pacific's  share  of  total 
U.S.  trade  continues  to  rise— and  rapid- 
ly. In  1982,  our  trade  with  this  region 


14 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


vas  $126.5  billion  or  27.7%  of  total  U.S. 
rade.  In  1984,  U.S.  trade  with  the 
egion  was  $169  billion— almost  31%  of 
otal  U.S.  trade.  During  the  recent 
ecession,  our  overall  world  trade  de- 
fined more  than  5%,  while  that  with 
Cast  Asia  and  the  Pacific  was  off  by  less 
;han  1%.  In  1983,  total  U.S.  world  trade 
•ose  0.5%— but  trade  with  the  Pacific 
■egion  grew  by  8%. 

Pacific  trade  is  having  a  subtle  and, 
believe,  positive  influence  on  the  way 
\.mericans  do  business  both  at  home  and 
ibroad,  and  it  is  affecting  the  attitudes 
ind  broadening  the  perspectives  of 
Americans  generally,  many  of  whom  are 
ust  beginning  to  appreciate  the 
ignificance  of  this  trade.  Economically 
is  well  as  politically  and  strategically, 
he  Pacific  is  crucial  to  America's  future. 

The  Framework  for  Pacific 
ooperation 

olitical  maturation  and  economic  ex- 
)ansion  have  set  in  motion  a  dynamic 
)rocess  that  is  already  transforming  the 

'acific  Basin  into  one  of  the  most  pro- 
luctive  regions  of  the  world.  America 
tands  ready  to  contribute  to  this  proc- 
iss.  In  his  State  of  the  Union  message, 
■"resident  Reagan  said: 

America's  economic  success  is  freedom's 
uccess;  it  can  be  repeated  a  hundred  times 
n  a  hundred  different  nations.  Many  coun- 
rries  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  have  few 
lesources  other  than  the  enterprise  of  their 
•wn  people.  But  through  low  ta.x  rates  and 
ree  markets,  they  have  soared  ahead  of  een- 
Iralized  economies.  And  now  China  is  opening 
ip  its  economy  to  meet  its  needs. 

When  one  looks  ahead  to  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  Pacific  region  over  the  next 
.0  to  15  years,  the  stakes  are  high  and 
Ihe  prospects  exciting.  Multilateral 
tooperation,  built  upon  a  sound  network 
i)f  bilateral  relationships,  is  one  promis- 
ing means  for  Asian  and  Pacific  nations 
to  promote  regional  peace  and  an  endur- 
ing prosperity  for  their  peoples.  It  is  the 
;oal  of  the  United  States  to  cooperate 
with  others  to  develop  our  common 
jconomic  potential  and  to  build  mutually 
ijeneficial  relations  that  strengthen  all 
ountries  of  the  region. 

The  origins  of  the  Pacific  coop- 
erative movement  are  diffuse  and  spring 
:rom  varying  perceptions.  There  has 
emerged,  however,  a  clear  desire  to  ex- 
alore  the  prospects  for  regionwide 
cooperation.  The  American  people  view 
these  prospects  with  an  open  mind  and  a 
ivilling  spirit. 

In  recognition  of  the  growing  impor- 
tance of  the  Pacific  to  American  foreign 


policy,  some  14  months  ago  I  asked  Am- 
bassador [at  Large]  Richard  Fairbanks 
to  begin  consultations  with  leaders  of 
the  region,  to  get  their  views  on  how  the 
United  States  can  contrib\ate  to  the 
cooperative  movement  in  the  Pacific 
Basin,  and  to  advise  me  on  new  policy 
initiatives  for  the  United  States.  His  " 
preliminary  findings  are  most  encourag- 
ing, and  we  look  forward  to  working  in 
partnership  with  other  countries  of  the 
region. 

At  the  outset,  I  should  point  out 
that  the  United  States  has  no  pre- 
conceived notion  as  to  how  this  process 
should  continue  or  where  it  may 


spiration  and  progress.  Governments 
respond,  and  then  not  always  very  well, 
to  the  aspirations  of  individuals. 

In  various  areas  of  human  en- 
deavor— scientific,  educational,  and 
cultural— people  of  the  Pacific  are 
exchanging  ideas  and  joining  in  coopera- 
tive enterprises.  As  economies  begin  to 
grow  and  continue  to  expand  beyond 
their  borders,  and  as  entrepreneurs 
reach  out  for  improved  techniques  and 
new  opportunities,  businessmen  are 
forging  new  links  with  one  another, 
based  on  human  ingenuity  and  a  deter- 
mination to  succeed. 


The  forces  of  democracy  around  the  world  merit 
our  standing  with  them,  to  abandon  them  would  be 
a  shameful  betrayal .  .  . 


ultimately  lead.  Indeed,  it  is  critical  that 
we  join  others  in  an  open  and  frank 
dialogue  on  the  multitude  of  economic 
issues  before  us.  We  do  not  wish  to 
force  the  pace  or  inflate  expectations  in 
the  region.  But  at  the  same  time,  we  are 
eager  and  willing  to  continue  the 
dialogue  that  Ambassador  Fairbanks  has 
begun  and  to  contribute  whatever  we 
can  to  a  peaceful  and  progressive  part- 
nership in  the  Pacific. 

Let  me  also  affirm  that  the  United 
States  is  anxious  to  contribute  as  a  col- 
legial  participant.  It  is  neither  our  inten- 
tion nor  our  desire  to  dominate  that 
process  or  force  it  in  particular  direc- 
tions. Our  objective  is  to  move  forward 
in  a  cooperative  partnership  with  others. 
Our  goal  can  be  simply  stated:  peaceful 
progress  for  all  countries  in  the  region, 
based  on  a  shared  belief  in  the  value  of 
economic  cooperation  and  mutual 
respect  for  the  rights  of  all  participants 
to  freely  pursue  their  own  interests.  The 
President's  January  2  meeting  with 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  reaffirmed 
that  both  the  United  States  and  Japan 
believe  that  this  process  can  proceed 
only  with  the  participation  and  consen- 
sus of  the  countries  in  the  region. 

There  already  have  been  some  en- 
couraging developments.  Foremost 
among  these  has  been  the  remarkable 
dynamism  of  the  private  sector,  where 
individuals  have  taken  the  initiative  to 
improve  economic  and  commercial  rela- 
tionships among  peoples  of  the  region. 
For  it  is  people  who  are  the  source  of  in- 


These  private  trade  and  invest- 
ment relationships  are  the  key  to  the 
remarkable  economic  success  of  the 
region.  Such  organizations  as  the  Asia 
Foundation,  Pacific  Science  Association, 
the  Pacific  Forum,  the  ASEAN-U.S. 
Center  for  Technology  Exchange,  the 
Circum-Pacific  Energy  Resources  Coun- 
cil, and  the  Pacific  Basin  Economic 
Council  provide  important  momentum  to 
this  process;  they  reflect  the  growing 
sense  of  common  identity  and  shared  in- 
terest. 

Another  relatively  recent  and  en- 
couraging development  has  been  the  for- 
mation of  the  private  sector  Pacific 
Economic  Cooperation  Conference 
(PECC),  in  which  this  United  States 
Committee  for  Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation  participates.  From  modest 
beginnings  less  than  5  years  ago,  the 
PECC  movement  has  captured  the  spirit 
and  has  quickened  the  pace  of  Pacific 
cooperation.  With  each  successive 
meeting,  the  PECC  shows  greater  prom- 
ise of  helping  to  bring  into  focus  the  ma- 
jor economic  issues  of  the  region.  I  trust 
that  the  upcoming  meeting  in  Seoul  in 
April  will  build  upon  the  progress  made 
thus  far. 

With  respect  to  the  U.S.  National 
Committee  on  the  Pacific,  let  me  say 
that  your  dedication  and  interest  con- 
tribute vitally  to  a  strong  U.S.  role  not 
only  in  the  PECC  but  in  promoting 
regional  cooperation  more  generally.  In 
his  remarks  to  this  committee  at  the 
Wliite  House  last  September,  President 
Reagan  said: 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


I  congratulate  all  of  you  on  your  foresight 
and  commitment  to  recognizing  the  impor- 
tance of  the  Pacific  to  our  nation's  future  and 
acting  upon  it.  Your  advice  and  counsel  will 
be  important  to  our  continued  effort.  Your 
group  includes  four  Senators,  four  Members 
of  the  House,  seven  members  of  the  ex- 
ecutive, in  their  unofficial  capacity,  and  I 
think  this  demonstrates  a  bipartisan  commit- 
ment of  both  branches.  All  of  us  are  in  your 
debt  for  what  you're  doing  and  wish  you  well. 

I  would  like  not  only  to  reiterate  the 
President's  sentiments  but  also  to  assure 
you  of  this  Administration's  encourage- 
ment and  support.  While  the  committee 
must  remain  a  private  group,  we  in  the 
executive  branch  look  forward  to  work- 
ing with  its  distinguished  members.  As 
you  proceed  with  your  work,  I  would 
urge  you  to  explore  the  entire  range  of 
possibilities  for  Pacific  cooperation.  I 
have  been  encouraged  by  the  commit- 
tee's efforts  on  a  number  of  critical 
issues,  and  I  hope  that  the  progress  you 
have  made  so  far  is  a  harbinger  of  fu- 
ture achievements. 

The  spirit  of  Pacific  cooperation  is 
also  beginning  to  attract  the  attention  of 
other  governments  in  the  region.  Last 
July,  in  Jakarta,  ASEAN  foreign 
ministers  initiated  a  multilateral 
dialogue  with  their  Pacific  part- 
ners—Australia, New  Zealand,  Japan, 
Canada,  and,  of  course,  the  United 
States.  In  that  "6-i-5"  meeting,  we 
discussed  the  prospects  for  Pacific 
cooperation  and  agreed  to  make  a 
review  of  Pacific-wide  developments  a 
continuing  feature  of  these  annual 
ministerial  deliberations.  The  eleven  of 
us  also  agreed  that  the  governments 
would  work  together  on  the  first 
cooperative  project— Human  Resources 
Development,  chosen  as  a  focus  because 
it  encompasses  all  nations  in  the  region, 
big  and  small.  This  theme  was  suggested 
by  Foreign  Minister  Mochtar  of  In- 
donesia, who  has  spurred  us  and  his 
ASEAN  colleagues  to  think  creatively 
about  the  shape  of  Asia  yet  to  come  and 
the  human  resources  of  the  region. 

At  the  time,  I  expressed  the  view 
that  Pacific  cooperation  should  not  be  an 
exclusive  process,  but  that  all  who  are 
prepared  to  contribute  to  wider 
economic  cooperation  in  the  region 
should  be  encouraged  to  do  so.  The 
response  of  the  foreign  ministers  was 
encouraging,  and  the  progress  made  to 
date  augurs  well  for  future  cooperation 
in  other  areas. 

In  the  7  months  since  the  Jakarta 
meeting,  we  have  worked  to  draw 
together  the  resources  of  the  U.S. 
Government  to  participate  in  an  interna- 
tional inventory  of  existing  human 


development  and  training  programs  in 
the  Pacific.  Three  weeks  ago,  senior  of- 
ficials of  all  the  governments  met  in  In- 
donesia to  review  the  results  of  that  in- 
ventory. Participating  governments  have 
now  moved  closer  to  agreeing  on  the 
principles  that  wall  guide  the  Human 
Resources  Development  effort  and  have 
identified  areas  for  both  immediate  and 
long-term  cooperative  projects.  Over  the 
next  4  months,  our  representatives  will 
meet  to  work  out  specific  steps  for  con- 
sideration at  next  July's  postministerial 
Conference  on  Pacific  Cooperation.  For 
our  part,  we  will  make  every  effort  to 
contribute  to  the  success  of  this  promis- 
ing undertaking. 

I  am  encouraged  by  the  progress 
made  to  date  in  this  field,  and  I  look  for- 
ward to  meeting  with  the  foreign 
ministers  again  in  Kuala  Lumpur  this 
July  to  decide  on  further  actions  that  all 
of  the  countries  can  take  together. 

The  Hopeful  Prospects 

The  Pacific  cooperative  process  is  still  in 
its  infancy,  and  it  is  too  early  to  predict 


America  and  the  Struggle 
for  Freedom 


its  ultimate  form  or  direction.  Whatever 
arrangement  ultimately  evolves  is  likely 
to  be  unique  to  the  Pacific,  for  the  diver- 
sity, culture,  heritage,  and  traditions  of 
the  Pacific  states  constitute  a  unique  set 
of  challenges. 

As  we  prepare  to  mark  the  40th  an- 
niversary of  the  end  of  the  Pacific  war, 
it  is  appropriate  to  reflect  on  what  we 
have  accomplished  and  to  ponder  the 
future.  For  if  there  have  been  moments 
of  darkness  in  the  history  of  Asia,  there 
is  also  light  in  Asia's  philosophical, 
esthetic,  and  cultural  traditions.  The 
tragedy  that  befell  Angkor  Wat  sym- 
bolizes the  ironic  juxtaposition  of  Asia's 
turbulent  history  of  conflict  and  its  rich 
heritage  of  civilization.  When  we  look 
back  40  years  from  now,  I  hope  we  will 
see  this  incipient  process  of  Pacific 
cooperation  as  the  beginning  of  a  new 
era— an  era  of  reconciliation,  progress, 
and  peace. 


'Press  release  27. 


by  Secretary  Shultz 

Address  before  the  Commonwealth 
Club  of  California  in  San  Francisco  on 
February  22,  1985.'^ 

A  revolution  is  sweeping  the  world 
today— a  democratic  revolution.  This 
should  not  be  a  surprise.  Yet  it  is 
noteworthy  because  many  people  in  the 
West  lost  faith,  for  a  time,  in  the 
relevance  of  the  idea  of  democracy.  It 
was  fashionable  in  some  quarters  to 
argue  that  democracy  was  culture 
bound;  that  it  was  a  luxury  only  in- 
dustrial societies  could  afford;  that  other 
institutional  structures  were  needed  to 
meet  the  challenges  of  development; 
that  to  try  to  encourage  others  to  adopt 
our  system  was  ethnocentric  and  ar- 
rogant. 

In  fact,  what  began  in  the  United 
States  of  America  over  two  centuries 
ago  as  a  bold  new  experiment  in 
representative  government  has  today 
captured  the  imagination  and  the  pas- 
sions of  peoples  on  every  continent.  The 
Solidarity  movement  in  Poland; 
resistance  forces  in  Afghanistan,  in 
Cambodia,  in  Nicaragua,  in  Ethiopia  and 


Angola;  dissidents  in  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Eastern  Europe;  advocates  of 
peaceful  democratic  change  in  South 
Africa,  Chile,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  and 
the  Philippines— all  these  brave  men  and 
women  have  something  in  common:  they 
seek  independence,  freedom,  and  human 
rights— ideals  which  are  at  the  core  of 
democracy  and  which  the  United  States 
has  always  championed. 

The  American  Tradition 

All  Americans  can  be  proud  that  the  ex- 
ample of  our  Founding  Fathers  has 
helped  to  inspire  millions  around  the 
globe.  Throughout  our  own  history,  we 
have  always  believed  that  freedom  is  the 
birthright  of  all  peoples  and  that  we 
could  not  be  true  to  ourselves  or  our 
principles  unless  we  stood  for  freedom 
and  democracy  not  only  for  ourselves 
but  for  others. 

And  so,  time  and  again  in  the  last 
200  years,  we  have  lent  our  sup- 
port—moral and  otherwise— to  those 
around  the  world  struggling  for  freedom 
and  independence.  In  the  19th  century 
Americans  smuggled  guns  and  powder 
to  Simon  Bolivar,  the  Great  Liberator; 


16 


DeDartment  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


^e  supported  the  Polish  patriots  and 
thers  seeking  freedom.  We  well 
emembered  how  other  nations,  like 
ranee,  had  come  to  our  aid  during  our 
wn  revolution. 

In  the  20th  century,  as  our  power  as 
nation  increased,  we  accepted  a 
reater  role  in  protecting  and  promoting 
•eedom  and  democracy  around  the 
orld.  Our  commitment  to  these  ideals 
as  been  strong  and  bipartisan  in  both 
ord  and  deed.  During  World  War  I, 
le  Polish  pianist  Paderewski  and  the 
zech  statesman  Masaryk  raised  funds 
I  the  United  States;  then  Woodrow 
/ilson  led  the  way  at  war's  end  in 
chieving  the  independence  of  Poland, 
zechoslovakia,  and  other  states. 

At  the  height  of  World  War  II, 
ranklin  Roosevelt  set  forth  a  vision  of 
emocracy  for  the  postwar  world  in  the 
tlantic  Charter  and  Four  Freedoms, 
he  United  States  actively  promoted 
scolonization.  Harry  Truman  worked 
ard  and  successfully  at  protecting 
emocratic  institutions  in  postwar 
'estern  Europe  and  at  helping 
jmocracy  take  root  in  West  Germany 
id  Japan.  At  the  United  Nations  in 
948  we  supported  the  Universal 
leclaration  of  Human  Rights— which 
eclares  the  right  of  every  nation  to  a 
lee  press,  free  assembly  and  associa- 
on,  periodic  and  genuine  elections,  and 
lee  trade  unions.  John  F.  Kennedy 
-ew  upon  the  very  essence  of  America 
lith  his  call  to  "pay  any  price  ...  to 
Bsure  the  survival  and  success  of 
»erty." 

he  March  of  Democracy 

|he  struggle  for  liberty  is  not  always 

liccessful.  But  those  who  once 
?spaired,  who  saw  democracy  on  the 
!cline,  and  who  argued  that  we  must 
wer  our  expectations  were,  at  best, 
•emature.  Civilizations  decline  when 
ey  stop  believing  in  themselves;  ours 
IS  thrived  because  we  have  never  lost 
ir  conviction  that  our  values  are  worth 
'fending. 

When  Indira  Gandhi,  the  Prime 
inister  of  the  world's  largest 
>mocracy,  was  assassinated,  we  were 
locked  and  saddened.  But  our  con- 
lence  in  the  resilience  of  democracy 
as  renewed  as  millions  of  India's  peo- 
e  went  to  the  polls  freely  to  elect  her 
iccessor.  As  Rajiv  Gandhi  leads  his  na- 
jn  to  new  greatness,  he  demonstrates 
ore  clearly  than  any  words  or  abstract 
■ientific  models  that  democracy  is 
either  outmoded  nor  is  it  the  exclusive 
jssession  of  a  few,  rich.  Western  na- 
ons.  It  has  worked  for  decades  in  coun- 
ies  as  diverse  as  Costa  Rica  and 
ipan. 

In  the  Western  Hemisphere,  over 
)%  of  the  population  of  Latin  America 


and  the  Caribbean  today  live  under 
governments  that  are  either  democratic 
or  clearly  on  the  road  to  democracy— in 
contrast  to  only  one-third  in  1979.  In 
less  than  6  years,  popularly  elected 
democrats  have  replaced  dictators  in 
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  El 
Salvador,  Honduras,  Panama,  Peru,  and 
Grenada.  Brazil  and  Uruguay  will  in- 
augurate civilian  presidents  in  March. 
After  a  long  twilight  of  dictatorship,  this 
hemispheric  trend  toward  free  elections 
and  representative  government  is 
something  to  be  applauded  and  sup- 
ported. 

The  Challenge  to  the 
Brezhnev  Doctrine 

Democracy  is  an  old  idea,  but  today  we 
witness  a  new  phenomenon.  For  many 
years  we  saw  our  adversaries  act 
without  restraint  to  back  insurgencies 
around  the  world  to  spread  communist 
dictatorships.  The  Soviet  Union  and  its 
proxies,  like  Cuba  and  Vietnam,  have 
consistently  supplied  money,  arms,  and 
training  in  efforts  to  destabilize  or  over- 
throw noncommunist  governments. 
"Wars  of  national  liberation"  became  the 
pretext  for  subverting  any  noncom- 
munist country  in  the  name  of  so-called 
"socialist  internationalism." 

At  the  same  time,  any  victory  of 
communism  was  held  to  be  irreversible. 
This  was  the  infamous  Brezhnev  doc- 
trine, first  proclaimed  at  the  time  of  the 
invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  in  1968.  Its 
meaning  is  simple  and  chilling;  once 
you're  in  the  so-called  "socialist  camp," 
you're  not  allowed  to  leave.  Thus  the 
Soviets  say  to  the  rest  of  the  world: 
"What's  mine  is  mine.  What's  yours  is  up 
for  grabs." 

In  recent  years,  Soviet  activities  and 
pretensions  have  run  head  on  into  the 
democratic  revolution.  People  are  in- 
sisting on  their  right  to  independence, 
on  their  right  to  choose  their  govern- 
ment free  of  outside  control.  Where 
once  the  Soviets  may  have  thought  that 
all  discontent  was  ripe  for  turning  into 
communist  insurgencies,  today  we  see  a 
new  and  different  kind  of  struggle:  peo- 
ple around  the  world  risking  their  lives 
against  communist  despotism.  We  see 
brave  men  and  women  fighting  to 
challenge  the  Brezhnev  doctrine. 

In  December  1979,  the  Soviets  in- 
vaded Afghanistan  to  preserve  a  com- 
munist system  installed  by  force  a  year 
and  a  half  earlier.  But  their  invasion  met 
stiff  resistance,  and  the  puppet  govern- 
ment they  installed  has  proved  incapable 
of  commanding  popular  support.  Today, 
the  Soviets  have  expanded  their  occupa- 
tion army  and  are  trying  to  devastate 
the  population  and  the  nation  they  can- 
not subdue.  They  are  demolishing  entire 
Afghan  villages  and  have  driven  one  out 


of  every  four  Afghans  to  flee  the  coun- 
try. They  have  threatened  neighboring 
countries  like  Pakistan  and  have  been 
unwilling  to  negotiate  seriously  for  a 
political  solution. 

In  the  face  of  this  Soviet  invasion, 
the  Afghans  who  are  fighting  and  dying 
for  the  liberation  of  their  country  have 
made  a  remarkable  stand.  Their  will  has 
not  flagged;  indeed,  their  capacity  to 
resist  has  grown.  The  countryside  is 
now  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  popular 
resistance,  and  not  even  in  the  major 
cities  can  the  Soviets  claim  complete 
control.  Clearly,  the  Afghans  do  not 
share  the  belief  of  some  in  the  West  that 
fighting  back  is  pointless,  that  the  only 
option  is  to  let  one's  country  be  "quietly 
erased,"  to  use  the  memorable  phrase  of 
the  Czech  writer,  Milan  Kundera. 

In  Cambodia,  the  forces  open  to 
democracy,  once  all  but  annihilated  by 
the  Khmer  Rouge,  are  now  waging  a 
similar  battle  against  occupation  and  a 
puppet  regime  imposed  by  a  Soviet  ally, 
communist  Vietnam.  Although  Vietnam 
is  too  poor  to  feed,  house,  or  care  for 
the  health  of  its  own  population  ade- 
quately, the  Stalinist  dictators  of  Hanoi 
are  bent  on  imperial  domination  of  In- 
dochina— much  as  many  had  predicted 
before,  during,  and  after  the  Vietnam 
war.  But  6  years  after  its  invasion,  Viet- 
nam does  not  control  Cambodia. 
Resistance  forces  total  over  50,000;  of 
these,  noncommunist  forces  have  grown 
from  zero  to  over  20,000.  The  Viet- 
namese still  need  an  occupation  army  of 
170,000  to  keep  order  in  the  country; 
they  even  had  to  bring  in  two  new  divi- 
sions to  mount  the  recent  offensive. 
That  offensive,  while  more  brutal  than 
previous  attacks,  will  prove  no  more 
conclusive  than  those  before. 

In  Africa,  as  well,  the  Brezhnev  doc- 
trine is  being  challenged  by  the  drive  for 
independence  and  freedom.  In  Ethiopia, 
a  Soviet-backed  Marxist-Leninist  dic- 
tatorship has  shown  indifference  to  the 
desperate  poverty  and  suffering  of  its 
people.  The  effects  of  a  natural  disaster 
have  been  compounded  by  the  regime's 
obsession  with  ideology  and  power.  In 
classical  Stalinist  fashion,  it  has  ruined 
agricultural  production  through  forced 
collectivization;  denied  food  to  starving 
people  for  political  reasons;  subjected 
many  thousands  to  forced  resettlement; 
and  spent  vast  sums  of  money  on  arms 
and  "revolutionary"  spectacles.  But  the 
rulers  cannot  hide  the  dimensions  of  the 
tragedy  from  their  people.  Armed  in- 
surgencies continue,  while  the  regime 
persists  in  relying  on  military  solutions 
and  on  expanding  the  power  and  scope 
of  the  police  and  security  apparatus. 

In  Angola,  a  Marxist  regime  came 
into  power  in  1975  backed  and  sustained 
by  30,000  Cuban  troops  and  substantial 


prill  985 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


numbers  of  Soviet  and  East  European 
"advisers."  The  continuation  of  this 
Soviet/Cuban  intervention  has  been  a 
major  impediment  to  the  achievement  of 
independence  for  Namibia  under  the 
terms  of  UN  Security  Council  Resolution 
435;  it  is  also  a  continuing  challenge  to 
African  independence  and  regional  peace 
and  security— thus  our  sustained 
diplomatic  effort  to  achieve  a  regional 
settlement  addressing  the  issues  of  both 
Angola  and  Namibia.  In  Angola,  UNITA 
[National  Union  for  the  Total  In- 
dependence of  Angola]  has  waged  an 
armed  struggle  against  the  regime's 
monopoly  of  power  and  in  recent  years 
has  steadily  expanded  the  territory 
under  its  control.  Foreign  forces, 
whether  Cuban  or  South  African,  must 
leave.  At  some  point  there  will  be  an  in- 
ternal political  settlement  in  Angola  that 
reflects  Angolan  political  reality,  not  ex- 
ternal inter\'ention. 

Finally,  an  important  struggle  is  be- 
ing waged  today  closer  to  home  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Its  countries  are  in  transi- 
tion, trying  to  resolve  the  inequities  and 
tensions  of  the  past  through  workable 
reforms  and  democratic  institutions.  But 
violent  antidemocratic  minorities,  tied 
ideologically  and  militarily  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Cuba,  are  trying  to  prevent 
democratic  reform  and  to  seize  or  hold 
power  by  force.  The  outcome  of  this 
struggle  will  affect  not  only  the  future 
of  peace  and  democracy  in  this 
hemisphere  but  our  own  vital  interests. 

In  Nicaragua,  in  1979  the  Sandinista 
leaders  pledged  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS)  and  to  their  own 
people  to  bring  freedom  to  their  country 
after  decades  of  tyranny  under  Somoza. 
The  Sandinistas  have  betrayed  these 
pledges  and  the  hopes  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people;  instead,  they  have  imposed  a 
new  and  brutal  tyranny  that  respects  no 
frontiers.  Basing  themselves  on  strong 
military  ties  to  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  Sandinistas  are  attempting, 
as  rapidly  as  they  can,  to  force 
Nicaragua  into  a  totalitarian  mold  whose 
pattern  is  all  too  familiar.  They  are  sup- 
pressing internal  dissent;  clamping  down 
on  the  press;  persecuting  the  church; 
linking  up  with  the  terrorists  of  Iran, 
Libya,  and  the  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization];  and  seeking  to  under- 
mine the  legitimate  and  increasingly 
democratic  governments  of  their 
neighbors. 

This  betrayal  has  forced  many 
Nicaraguans  who  supported  the  anti- 
Somoza  revolution  back  into  opposition. 
And  while  many  resist  peacefully, 
thousands  now  see  no  choice  but  to  take 
up  arms  again,  to  risk  everything  so 
that  their  hopes  for  freedom  and 
democracy  will  not  once  again  be  denied. 

The  Sandinistas  denounce  their  op- 
ponents as  mercenaries  or  former  Na- 


tional Guardsmen  loyal  to  the  memory 
of  Somoza.  Some  in  this  country  seem 
all  too  willing  to  take  these  charges  at 
face  value,  even  though  they  come  from 
the  same  Sandinista  leaders  whose  word 
has  meant  so  little  up  to  now.  But  all 
you  have  to  do  is  count  the  numbers: 
more  people  have  taken  up  arms  against 
the  Sandinistas  than  ever  belonged  to 
Somoza's  National  Guard.  In  fact,  most 
of  the  leaders  of  the  armed  resistance 
fought  in  the  revolution  against  Somoza; 
and  some  even  served  in  the  new 
government  until  it  became  clear  that 
the  comandantes  were  bent  on  com- 
munism, not  freedom;  terror,  not 
reform;  and  aggression,  not  peace.  The 
new  fighters  for  freedom  include 
peasants  and  farmers,  shopkeepers  and 
vendors,  teachers  and  professionals. 
What  unites  them  to  each  other  and  to 
the  other  thousands  of  Nicaraguans  who 
resist  without  arms  is  disillusionment 
with  Sandinista  militarism,  corruption, 
and  fanaticism. 

Despite  uncertain  and  sporadic  sup- 
port from  outside,  the  resistance  in 
Nicaragua  is  growing.  The  Sandinistas 
have  strengthened  their  Soviet  and 
Cuban  military  ties,  but  their  popularity 
at  home  has  declined  sharply.  The  sti-ug- 
gle  in  Nicaragua  for  democracy  and 
freedom,  and  against  dictatorship,  is  far 
from  over,  and  right  now  may  well  be  a   , 
pivotal  moment  that  decides  the  future. 

America's  Moral  Duty 

This  new  phenomenon  we  are  witnessing 
around  the  world— popular  insurgencies 
against  communist  domination— is  not 
an  American  creation.  In  every  region, 
the  people  have  made  their  own  decision 
to  stand  and  fight  rather  than  see  their 
cultures  and  freedoms  "quietly  erased." 
They  have  made  clear  their  readiness  to 
fight  with  or  without  outside  support, 
using  every  available  means  and  endur- 
ing severe  hardships,  alone  if  need  be. 

But  America  also  has  a  moral 
responsibility.  The  lesson  of  the  postwar 
era  is  that  America  must  be  the  leader 
of  the  free  world;  there  is  no  one  else  to 
take  our  place.  The  nature  and  extent  of 
our  support— whether  moral  support  or 
something  more— necessarily  varies 
from  case  to  case.  But  there  should  be 
no  doubt  about  where  our  sympathies 
lie. 

It  is  more  than  mere  coincidence 
that  the  last  4  years  have  been  a  time  of 
both  renewed  American  strength  and 
leadership  and  a  resurgence  of 
democracy  and  freedom.  As  we  are  the 
strongest  democratic  nation  on  earth, 
the  actions  we  take— or  do  not 
take— have  both  a  direct  and  an  indirect 
impact  on  those  who  share  our  ideals 
and  hopes  all  around  the  globe.  If  we 
shrink  from  leadership,  we  create  a 
vacuum  into  which  our  adversaries  can 


move.  Our  national  security  suffers,  our 
global  interests  suffer,  and,  yes,  the 
worldwide  struggle  for  democracy  suf- 
fers. 

The  Soviets  are  fond  of  talking 
about  the  "correlation  of  forces,"  and  fo: 
a  few  years  it  may  have  seemed  that  the 
correlation  of  forces  favored  communist 
minorities  backed  by  Soviet  military 
power.  Today,  however,  the  Soviet  em- 
pire is  weakening  under  the  strain  of  its 
own  internal  problems  and  external  en- 
tanglements. And  the  United  States  has 
shown  the  will  and  the  strength  to  de- 
fend its  interests,  to  resist  the  spread  ol 
Soviet  influence,  and  to  protect  freedon 
Our  actions,  such  as  the  rescue  of 
Grenada,  have  again  begun  to  offer  in- 
spiration and  hope  to  others. 

The  importance  of  American  power 
and  leadership  to  the  strength  of 
democracy  has  not  been  the  only  lesson 
of  recent  history.  In  many  ways,  the 
reverse  has  also  proven  true:  the  spreac 
of  democracy  serves  American  interests 

Historically,  there  have  been  times 
when  the  failure  of  democracy  in  certah 
parts  of  the  world  did  not  affect  our  na- 
tional security.  In  the  18th  and  19th  cer 
turies,  the  failure  of  democracy  to  take 
root  elsewhere  was  unfortunate  and 
even  troubling  to  us,  but  it  did  not 
necessarily  pose  a  threat  to  our  own 
democracy.  In  the  second  half  of  the 
20th  century,  that  is  less  and  less  true. 
In  almost  every  case  in  the  postwar 
period,  the  imposition  of  communist 
tyrannies  has  led  to  an  increase  in 
Soviet  global  power  and  influence.  Pro- 
moting insurgencies  against  noncom- 
munist  governments  in  important 
strategic  areas  has  become  a  low-cost 
way  for  the  Soviets  to  extend  the  reach 
of  their  power  and  to  weaken  their 
adversaries,  whether  they  be  China  or 
the  democracies  of  the  West  and  Japan 
This  is  true  in  Southeast  Asia, 
Southwest  Asia,  Africa,  and  Central 
America. 

When  the  United  States  supports 
those  resisting  totalitarianism, 
therefore,  we  do  so  not  only  out  of  our 
historical  sympathy  for  democracy  and 
freedom  but  also,  in  many  cases,  in  the 
interests  of  national  security.  As  Presi- 
dent Reagan  said  in  his  second  inaugur; 
address:  "America  must  remain 
freedom's  staunchest  friend,  for  freedor 
is  our  best  ally  and  it  is  the  world's  only 
hope  to  conquer  poverty  and  preserve 
peace." 

In  many  parts  of  the  world  we  have 
no  choice  but  to  act,  on  both  moral  and 
strategic  grounds.  ■ 

How  To  Respond? 

The  question  is:  How  should  we  act? 
What  should  America  do  t<;)  further  both 
its  security  interests  and  the  cause  of 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


THE  SECRETARY 


reedom  and  democracy?  A  prudent 
trategy  must  combine  different 
lements,  suited  to  different  cir- 
umstances. 

First,  as  a  matter  of  fundamental 
irinciple,  the  United  States  supports 
luman  rights  and  peaceful  democratic 
hange  throughout  the  world,  in- 
luding  in  noncommunist,  pro-Western 
ountries.  Democratic  institutions  are 
he  best  guarantor  of  stability  and 
eace,  as  well  as  of  human  rights, 
herefore,  we  have  an  interest  in  seeing 
'eaceful  progress  toward  democracy  in 
riendly  countries. 

Such  a  transition  is  often  complex 
nd  delicate,  and  it  can  only  come  about 
1  a  way  consistent  with  a  country's 
istory,  culture,  and  political  realities, 
^e  will  not  succeed  if  we  fail  to 
ecognize  positive  change  when  it  does 
ccur— whether  in  South  Africa,  or  the 
Republic  of  Korea,  or  the  Philippines, 
or  will  we  achieve  our  goal  if  we  ig- 
ore  the  even  greater  threat  to  the 
•eedom  of  such  countries  as  South 
.orea  and  the  Philippines  from  external 
r  internal  forces  of  totalitarianism.  We 
lust  heed  the  cautionary  lessons  of  both 
"an  and  Nicaragua,  in  which  pressures 
gainst  rightwing  authoritarian  regimes 
ere  not  well  thought  out  and  helped 
tad  to  even  more  repressive  dictator- 
nip. 

Our  influence  with  friendly  govern- 
nents  is  a  precious  resource;  we  use  it 
ir  constructive  ends.  The  President  has 
■  lid  that  "human  rights  means  working 
;  problems,  not  walking  away  from 
lem."  Therefore,  we  stay  engaged.  We 
ay  in  contact  with  all  democratic 
jlitical  forces,  in  opposition  as  well  as 
government.  The  historic  number  of 
ansitions  from  authoritarian  regimes 
1  democracy  in  the  last  decade,  from 
)uthern  Europe  to  Latin  America, 
emonstrates  the  effectiveness  of  this 
jproach— as  well  as  the  essential  dif- 
■rence  between  authoritarian  and 
'talitarian  regimes.  There  are  no  ex- 
Tiples  of  a  communist  system,  once 
)nsolidated,  evolving  into  a  democracy. 
In  June  1982,  addressing  the  British 
arliament,  President  Reagan  endorsed 
new  effort— including  leaders  of 
isiness,  labor,  and  both  the  Democratic 
id  Republican  Parties— to  enlist  the 
lergies  of  American  private  citizens  in 
wiping  to  develop  the  skills,  institutions, 
id  practices  of  democracy  around  the 
orld.  Today,  the  National  Endowment 
ir  Democracy,  the  concrete  result  of 
lat  initiative,  is  assisting  democratic 
-oups  in  a  wide  variety  of  countries, 
he  endowment  represents  practical 
merican  support  for  people  abroad 
orking  for  our  common  ideals. 

Second,  we  have  a  moral  obliga- 
on  to  support  friendly  democratic 


governments  by  providing  economic 
and  security  assistance  against  a 
variety  of  threats.  When  democratic 
friends  are  threatened  by  externally  sup- 
ported insurgencies,  when  hostile 
neighbors  try  to  intimidate  them  by  ac- 
quiring offensive  arms  or  sponsor  ter- 
rorism in  an  effort  to  topple  their 
governments,  international  security  is 
jeopardized.  The  more  we  can  lend  ap- 
propriate help  to  others  to  protect 


to  broadcast  the  truth  to  people  in 
closed  societies. 

Fourth,  and  finally,  our  moral 
principles  compel  us  to  support  those 
struggling  against  the  imposition  of 
communist  tyranny.  F'rom  the  founding 
of  this  nation,  Americans  have  believed 
that  a  people  have  the  right  to  seek 
freedom  and  mdependence— and  that  we 
have  both  a  legal  right  and  a  moral 
obligation  to  help  them. 


.  .  .  today  we  see  a  new  and  different  kind  of  strug- 
gle: people  around  the  world  risking  their  lives 
against  communist  despotism. 


themselves,  the  less  need  will  there  be 
for  more  direct  American  involvement 
to  keep  the  peace. 

Americans  have  always  responded 
with  courage  when  overwhelming 
danger  called  for  an  immediate,  all-out 
national  effort.  But  the  harder  task  is  to 
recognize  and  meet  challenges  before 
they  erupt  into  major  crises,  before  they 
represent  an  immediate  threat,  and 
before  they  require  an  all-out  effort.  We 
have  many  possible  responses  that  fall 
between  the  extremes  of  inaction  and 
the  direct  use  of  military  force— but  we 
must  be  willing  to  use  them,  or  else  we 
will  inevitably  face  the  agonizing  choice 
between  those  two  extremes. 

Economic  and  security  assistance  is 
one  of  those  crucial  means  of  avoiding 
and  deterring  bigger  threats.  It  is  also 
vital  support  to  those  friendly  nations  on 
the  front  line— like  Pakistan,  Thailand, 
or  Honduras  and  Costa  Rica— whose 
security  is  threatened  by  Soviet  and 
proxy  efforts  to  export  their  system. 

Third,  we  should  support  the 
forces  of  freedom  in  communist 
totalitarian  states.  We  must  not  suc- 
cumb to  the  fashionable  thinking  that 
democracy  has  enemies  only  on  the 
right,  that  pressures  and  sanctions  are 
fine  against  rightwing  dictators  but  not 
against  leftwing  totalitarians.  We  should 
support  the  aspirations  for  freedom  of 
peoples  in  communist  states  just  as  we 
want  freedom  for  people  anywhere  else. 
For  example,  without  raising  false 
hopes,  we  have  a  duty  to  make  it 
clear— especially  on  the  anniversary  of 
the  Yalta  conference— that  the  United 
States  will  never  accept  the  artificial 
division  of  Europe  into  free  and  not 
free.  This  has  nothing  to  do  with  boun- 
daries and  everything  to  do  with  ideas 
and  governance.  Our  radios  will  continue 


In  contrast  to  the  Soviets  and  their 
allies,  the  United  States  is  committed  to 
the  principles  of  international  law.  The 
UN  and  OAS  Charters  reaffirm  the  in- 
herent right  of  individual  and  collective 
self-defense  against  aggression— aggres- 
sion of  the  kind  committed  by  the 
Soviets  in  Afghanistan,  by  Nicaragua  in 
Central  America,  and  by  Vietnam  in 
Cambodia.  Material  assistance  to  those 
opposing  such  aggression  can  be  a 
lawful  form  of  collective  self-defense. 
Moral  and  political  support,  of  course,  is 
a  longstanding  and  honorable  American 
tradition— as  is  our  humanitarian 
assistance  for  civilians  and  refugees  in 
war-torn  areas. 

Most  of  what  we  do  to  promote 
freedom  is,  and  should  continue  to  be, 
entirely  open.  Equally,  there  are  efforts 
that  are  most  effective  when  handled 
quietly.  Our  Founding  Fathers  were 
sophisticated  men  who  understood  the 
necessity  for  discreet  actions;  after  the 
controversies  of  the  1970s,  we  now  have 
a  set  of  procedures  agreed  between  the 
President  and  Congress  for  overseeing 
such  special  programs.  In  a  democracy, 
clearly,  the  people  have  a  right  to  know 
and  to  shape  the  overall  framework  and 
objectives  that  guide  all  areas  of  policy. 
In  those  few  cases  where  national 
security  requires  that  the  details  are  bet- 
ter kept  confidential,  Congi-ess  and  the 
President  can  work  together  to  ensure 
that  what  is  done  remains  consistent 
with  basic  American  principles. 

Do  we  really  have  a  choice?  In  the 
1970s,  a  European  leader  proposed  to 
Brezhnev  that  peaceful  coexistence 
should  extend  to  the  ideological  sphere. 
Brezhnev  responded  firmly  that  this  was 
impossible,  that  the  ideological  struggle 
continued  even  in  an  era  of  detente,  and 


prll1985 


19 


THE  SECRETARY 


that  the  Soviet  Union  would  forever  sup- 
port "national  liberation"  movements. 
The  practical  meaning  of  that  is  clear. 
When  Soviet  Politburo  member  Gor- 
bachev was  in  London  recently,  he  af- 
firmed that  Nicaragua  had  gained  in- 
dependence only  with  the  Sandinista 
takeover.  The  Soviets  and  their  proxies 
thus  proceed  on  the  theory  that  any 
country  not  Marxist-Leninist  is  not  truly 
independent,  and,  therefore,  the  supply 
of  money,  arms,  and  training  to  over- 
throw its  government  is  legitimate. 

Again:  "What's  mine  is  mine.  What's 
yours  is  up  for  grabs."  This  is  the 
Brezhnev  doctrine. 

So  long  as  communist  dictatorships 
feel  free  to  aid  and  abet  insurgencies  in 
the  name  of  "socialist  internationalism," 
why  must  the  democracies,  the  target  of 
this  threat,  be  inhibited  from  defending 
their  own  interests  and  the  cause  of 
democracy  itself? 

How  can  we  as  a  country  say  to  a 
young  Afghan,  Nicaraguan,  or  Cambo- 
dian: "Learn  to  live  with  oppression; 
only  those  of  us  who  already  have  free- 
dom deserve  to  pass  it  on  to  our 
children."  How  can  we  say  to  those 
Salvadorans  who  stood  so  bravely  in  line 
to  vote:  "We  may  give  you  some 
economic  and  military  aid  for  self- 
defense,  but  we  will  also  give  a  free 
hand  to  the  Sandinistas  who  seek  to 
undermine  your  new  democratic  institu- 
tions." 

Some  try  to  evade  this  moral  issue 
by  the  relativistic  notion  that  "one  man's 
freedom  fighter  is  another  man's  ter- 
rorist." This  is  nonsense.  There  is  a  self- 
evident  difference  between  those 
fighting  to  impose  tyranny  and  those 
fighting  to  resist  it.  In  El  Salvador,  pro- 
communist  guerrillas  backed  by  the 
Soviet  bloc  are  waging  war  against  a 
democratically  elected  government;  in 
Nicaragua  and  elsewhere,  groups  seek- 
ing democracy  are  resisting  the  tighten- 
ing grip  of  totalitarians  seeking  to  sup- 
press democracy.  The  essence  of 
democracy  is  to  offer  means  for  peaceful 
change,  legitimate  political  competition, 
and  redress  of  grievances.  Violence 
directed  against  democracy  is,  therefore, 
fundamentally  lacking  in  legitimacy. 

What  we  should  do  in  each  situation 
must,  of  necessity,  vary.  But  it  must 
always  be  clear  whose  side  we  are 
on — the  side  of  those  who  want  to  see  a 
world  based  on  respect  for  national  in- 
dependence, for  freedom  and  the  rule  of 
law,  and  for  human  rights.  Wherever 
possible,  the  path  to  that  world  should 
be  through  peaceful  and  political  means; 
but  where  dictatorships  use  brute  power 
to  oppress  their  own  people  and 
threaten  their  neighbors,  the  forces  of 
freedom  cannot  place  their  trust  in 
declarations  alone. 


Central  America 

Nowhere  are  both  the  strategic  and  the 
moral  stakes  clearer  than  in  Central 
America. 

The  Sandinista  leaders  in  Nicaragua 
are  moving  quickly,  with  Soviet-bloc  and 
Cuban  help,  to  consolidate  their 
totalitarian  power.  Should  they  achieve 
this  primary  goal,  we  could  confront  a 
second  Cuba  in  this  hemisphere,  this 
time  on  the  Central  American  main- 
land—with all  the  strategic  dangers  that 
this  implies.  If  history  is  any  guide,  the 
Sandinistas  would  then  intensify  their 
efforts  to  undermine  neighboring 
governments  in  the  name  of  their 
revolutionary  principles — principles 
which  Fidel  Castro  himself  flatly  reaf- 
firmed on  American  television  a  few 
weeks  ago.  Needless  to  say,  the  first 
casualty  of  the  consolidation  of  San- 
dinista power  would  be  the  freedom  and 
hopes  for  democracy  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  The  second  casualty  would  be 
the  security  of  Nicaragua's  neighbors 
and  the  security  of  the  entire  region. 

I  do  not  believe  anyone  in  the 
United  States  wants  to  see  this 
dangerous  scenario  unfold.  Yet  there  are 
those  who  would  look  the  other  way,  im- 
agining that  the  problem  will  disappear 
by  itself.  There  are  those  who  would 
grant  the  Sandinistas  a  peculiar  kind  of 
immunity  in  our  legislation— in  effect, 
enacting  the  Brezhnev  doctrine  into 
American  law. 

The  logic  of  the  situation  in  Central 
America  is  inescapable. 

•  The  Sandinistas  are  committed 
Marxist-Leninists;  it  would  be  foolish  of 
us  and  insulting  to  them  to  imagine  that 
they  do  not  believe  in  their  proclaimed 
goals.  They  will  not  modify  or  bargain 
away  their  position  unless  there  is  com- 
pelling incentive  for  them  to  do  so. 

•  The  only  incentive  that  has  proved 
effective  thus  far  comes  from  the 
vigorous  armed  opposition  of  the  many 
Nicaraguans  who  seek  freedom  and 
democratic  government. 

•  The  pressures  of  the  armed 
resistance  have  diverted  Sandinista 
energies  and  resources  away  from  ag- 
gression against  its  neighbor  El 
Salvador,  thus  helping  to  disrupt  guer- 
rilla plans  for  a  major  offensive  there 
last  fall. 

•  If  the  pressure  of  the  armed 
resistance  is  removed,  the  Sandinistas 
will  have  no  reason  to  compromise;  all 
U.S.  diplomatic  efforts— and  those  of  the 
Contadora  group— will  be  undermined. 

Central  America's  hopes  for  peace, 
security,  democracy,  and  economic  prog- 
ress will  not  be  realized  unless  there  is  a 
fundamental  change  in  Nicaraguan 
behavior  in  four  areas. 


First,  Nicaragua  must  stop  playing 
the  role  of  surrogate  for  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Cuba.  As  long  as  there  are 
large  numbers  of  Soviet  and  Cuban 
security  and  military  personnel  in 
Nicaragua,  Central  America  will  be  em- 
broiled in  the  East- West  conflict. 

Second,  Nicaragua  must  reduce  its 
armed  forces,  now  in  excess  of  100,000, 
to  a  level  commensurate  with  its 
legitimate  security  needs— a  level  com- 
parable to  those  of  its  neighbors.  The 
current  imbalance  is  incompatible  with 
regional  stability. 

Third,  Nicaragua  must  absolutely 
and  definitively  stop  its  support  for  in- 
surgents and  terrorists  in  the  region.  Al 
of  Nicaragua's  neighbors,  and  particular 
ly  El  Salvador,  have  felt  the  brunt  of 
Sandinista  efforts  to  destabilize  their 
governments.  No  country  in  Central 
America  will  be  secure  as  long  as  this 
continues. 

And  fourth,  the  Sandinistas  must 
live  up  to  their  commitments  to 
democratic  pluralism  made  to  the  OAS 
in  1979.  The  internal  Nicaraguan  opposi 
tion  groups,  armed  and  unarmed,  repre- 
sent a  genuine  political  force  that  is  en- 
titled to  participate  in  the  political  proc- 
esses of  the  country.  It  is  up  to  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  to  provide  the 
political  opening  that  will  allow  their 
participation. 

We  will  note  and  welcome  such  a 
change  in  Nicaraguan  behavior  no  mat- 
ter how  it  is  obtained.  Whether  it  is 
achieved  through  the  multilateral  Con- 
tadora negotiations,  through  unilateral    I 
actions  taken  by  the  Sandinistas  alone     j 
or  in  concert  with  their  domestic  op- 
ponents, or  through  the  collapse  of  the 
Sandinista  regime  is  immaterial  to  us.      i 
But  without  such  a  change  of  behavior,    | 
lasting  peace  in  Central  America  will  be 
impossible. 

The  democratic  forces  in  Nicaragua 
are  on  the  front  line  in  the  struggle  for 
progress,  security,  and  freedom  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Our  active  help  for  them  i; 
the  best  insurance  that  their  efforts  will 
be  directed  consistently  and  effectively 
toward  these  objectives. 

But  the  bottom  line  is  this:  those 
who  would  cut  off  these  freedom 
fighters  from  the  rest  of  the  democratic 
world  are,  in  effect,  consigning 
Nicaragua  to  the  endless  darkness  of 
communist  tyranny.  And  they  are 
leading  the  United"  States  down  a  path 
of  greater  danger.  For  if  we  do  not  takei 
the  appropriate  steps  now  to  pressure 
the  Sandinistas  to  live  up  to  their  past 
promises — to  cease  their  arms  buildup, 
to  stop  exporting  tyranny  across  their 
borders,  to  open  Nicaragua  to  the  com- 
petition of  freedom  and  democracy- 
then  we  may  find  later,  when  we  can  no 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


onger  avoid  acting,  that  the  stakes  will 
je  higher  and  the  costs  greater. 

Whatever  options  we  choose,  we 
nust  be  true  to  our  principles  and  our 
listory.  As  President  Reagan  said 
•ecently: 

It  behooves  all  of  us  who  believe  in 
lemocratic  government,  in  free  elections,  in 
he  respect  for  human  rights  to  stand  side  by 
,ide  with  those  who  share  our  ideals, 
ispecially  in  Central  America.  We  must  not 
)ermit  those  heavily  armed  by  a  far  away 
lictatorship  to  undermine  their  neighbors  and 
.0  stamp  out  democratic  alternatives  at 
lome.  We  must  have  the  same  solidarity  with 


those  who  struggle  for  democracy,  as  our 
adversaries  do  with  those  who  would  impose 
communist  dictatorship. 

We  must,  in  short,  stand  firmly  in 
the  defense  of  our  interests  and  prin- 
ciples and  the  rights  of  peoples  to  live  in 
freedom.  The  forces  of  democracy 
around  the  world  merit  our  standing 
with  them,  to  abandon  them  would  be  a 
shameful  betrayal— a  betrayal  not  only 
of  brave  men  and  women  but  of  our 
highest  ideals. 


'Press  release  29. 


3uestion-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Commonwealth  Club  Address 


Secretary  Shultz  held  a  question-and- 
mswer  session  with  the  audience  at  the 
oncliLsion  of  his  address  before  the  Com- 
nonwealth  Club  of  California  in  San 
^randsco  on  February  22,  1985.^ 

b.  In  connection  with  support  for  the 
■ontras  in  Nicaragua,  in  an  effort  to 
lestabilize  the  Sandinista  government 
inless  it  changes  its  present  direction, 
low  will  this  plan  square  with  the 
Soland  amendment  prohibiting  fund- 
ng? 

A.  Of  course,  at  the  present  time, 
here  is  no  U.S.  funding  to  support  the 
>eople  fighting  for  freedom  in 
Nicaragua.  It  has  been  cut  off  by  the 
'ongress.  The  Boland  amendment  ap- 
ilied  to  a  continuing  resolution  in  1983, 
•nd  the  restrictions  that  presently  apply 
re  of  a  different  sort. 

Q.  Could  you  elaborate  on  the  dif- 
•erence  between  a  freedom  fighter  and 
terrorist,  in  the  State  Department's 
lew?  [Laughter] 

A.  I  tried  to  do  that,  and  I've  tried 
0  do  that  on  many  occasions;  and  I 
ecognize  that  the  question  tantalizes 
leople  and  titillates  them  as  well,  I  see. 
Laughter] 

If  you  have  a  country  that  has  a 
lemocratic  form  of  government,  then 
hose  who  want  to  have  change,  of 
ifhatever  sort,  have  a  legitimatized  and 
iroper  method  of  trying  to  bring  it 
.bout.  So,  an  effort  through  violence  to 
iring  about  change  in  another  way  is  il- 
Bgitimate:  it  is  terrorism. 

Terrorism  is  a  method  of  seeking  to 
iring  about  change  that  employs  an  ef- 
ort  to  frighten  people,  to  cause  them  to 
eel  that  the  situation  is  out  of  control. 


It  attacks  civilian  targets.  It  hits  people 
who  have  no  connection,  necessarily, 
with  whatever  it  is  that  the  terrorists 
may  think  is  their  true  objective. 

People  who  are  fighting  for  freedom 
are,  by  definition,  in  a  situation  where 
freedom  doesn't  exist,  where  there  is  a 
dictatorship — a  dictatorship  in  being,  or 
as  in  the  case  of  Nicaragua,  a  dictator- 
ship seeking  to  impose  itself  more  and 
more  completely.  And  people  are  resist- 
ing that. 

Those  are  freedom  fighters — 
whether  they  are  in  Afghanistan, 
resisting  Soviet  direct  invasion;  in  Cam- 
bodia, where  their  country  has  been 
decimated  by  the  Vietnamese. 
Remember  in  this  counry  those  people 
who  exalted  Ho  Chi  Minh?  And  they  can 
see  what  the  Vietnamese  are  doing.  The 
same  in  Nicaragua;  the  same  in  many 
parts  of  the  world. 

So  I  think  that  the  notion  of  free- 
dom fighter  should  be  an  exalted  one, 
and  it's  a  perversion  of  our  language  and 
a  perversion  of  morality  to  equate  them 
in  any  manner  with  the  sort  of  terrorism 
that  we  see  operating  in  many  parts  of 
the  world.  [Applause] 

Q.  What  are  the  freedom  fighters 
in  racist  South  Africa?  Will  this  Ad- 
ministration ever  recognize  and  aid  in 
any  way  the  victims  of  apartheid?  [Ap- 
plause] 

A.  This  Administration  and  the 
President  find  apartheid  abhorrent.  We 
say  so  publicly  here;  we  say  so  publicly 
in  South  Africa.  We  say  so  privately. 
We  make  no  ifs,  ands,  and  buts  about  it. 

We  also  engage  with  the  South 
African  Government  on  that  basis  to  try 
to  persuade  them  that  there  must  be  a 


better  way,  there  must  be  change  to  a 
different  system — one  which  recognizes 
people  as  people,  regardless  of  their  col- 
or. We  support  people  in  South 
Africa — the  blacks  in  South  Africa — in 
all  sorts  of  ways.  Through  educational 
help,  our  U.S.  firms,  businesses,  that 
operate  in  South  Africa  have  provided  a 
model  in  employment  through  the 
Sullivan  principles,  among  other  ways. 
And  I  might  say  the  blacks  in  South 
Africa  want  American  investment  to 
stay  there.  They  see  the  positive  results 
and  the  jobs  that  it  brings. 

I  met  with  the  Chief  of  the  Zulu 
tribe,  Mr.  Buthelezi,  the  other  day. 
Referring  to  a  Senator  who  had  been 
traveling  in  South  Africa,  he  said,  "Who 
is  this  white  man  who  wants  to  tell  us 
that  we  shouldn't  have  these  jobs?" 
[Laughter  and  applause] 

So  we  are  trying  to  help  people.  We 
recognize  their  plight;  we  recognize  the 
justice  of  their  cause.  And  we  feel  that 
the  way  to  help  them  is  to  hang  in  there 
and  be  engaged  and  work  at  it — not  to 
just  throw  up  our  hands  and  say,  "We 
don't  like  the  situation"  and  walk  away. 
That's  not  going  to  do  any  good. 

And,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  over  the 
past  4  or  5  years,  there  has  been  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  change.  I  don't 
mean  to  imply  at  all  that  the  situation  is 
remotely  satisfactory,  but  there  has 
been  movement.  We  welcome  it,  and  we 
encourage  it.  [Applause] 

Q.  When  there  is  a  changing  of  the 
guard  at  the  Kremlin,  do  you  believe  it 
will  remain  with  the  older  generation 
or  be  passed  on  to  the  next  genera- 
tion? If  the  younger,  would  it  be  to 
our  benefit? 

A.  I  don't  know.  [Laughter  and  ap- 
plause] 

Q.  Please  comment  on  your  rela- 
tions with  Mr.  Gromyko.  [Laughter] 

A.  I've  had  a  great  number  of 
meetings  with  Mr.  Gromyko.  He's  an 
able,  experienced  person.  We've  had 
some  very  stormy  meetings,  particularly 
a  meeting  in  Madrid  shortly  after  the 
Soviet  Union  shot  down  a  Korean 
airliner— not  only  shot  it  down,  but  Mr. 
Gromyko  in  Madrid  said,  "We'd  do  it 
again."  They  showed  no  remorse.  And 
we  had,  I  can  assure  you,  one  stormy 
meeting. 

We've  also  had  many  meetings  that 
have  been  basically  nonpolemical, 
straightforward,  and  worthwhile.  In 
terms  of  our  personal  relationship,  I 
consider  it  to  be  perfectly  fine. 

I  can  remember  the  first  meeting  we 
had  when  I  was  Secretary  of  State.  I 
had  known  him  from  the  last  time  I  was 


Vpril1985 


21 


THE  SECRETARY 


in  governmeni.  It  was  in  September 
1982,  and  we  had  two  separate  meetings 
on  two  separate  days.  And  at  the  end  of 
the  first  meeting,  we  agreed  that  we 
ought  to  set  ourselves  a  little  agenda  for 
the  second  one,  try  to  find  a  few  areas 
where  we  thought  it  might  be  possible  to 
find  a  common  interest  and  work  con- 
structively together.  And  we  did  that. 

One  of  the  areas  we  picked  out  was 
nonproliferation  of  nuclear  weapon 
capability.  Both  of  us  felt  strongly  about 
that.  And,  as  it  turned  out,  as  a  result  of 
the  push  that  we  each  gave  this  subject, 
there  has  been  a  series  of  very  fruitful 
meetings  on  that  subject  between  the 
two  governments.  I  must  say  that  I 
noticed  this  morning  that  the  Soviet 
Union  agreed  to  on-site  inspection  of  at 
least  some  of  their  nonmilitary  nuclear 
facilities,  and  I  think  that's  progress. 

We  have  had  a  lot  to  argue  about, 
and  we  have  argued  vigorously,  and  we 
have  found  some  points  of  agreement. 

We  managed  to  agree  in  Geneva  on 
the  resumption  of  negotiations  that  will 
start  on  March  12th.  I  believe  that  as  we 
conduct  this  very  important,  very  dif- 
ficult relationship  with  the  U.S.S.R.  that 
it's  important  for  us  to  have  decency  in 
our  behavior  toward  our  opposite 
numbers.  But  it's  also  important  for  us 
always  to  remember  this  country  as  our 
adversary — always  to  remember  our  in- 
terests very  clearly.  When  we  talk  about 
arms  control,  we'd  like  to  have  an  agree- 
ment, but  a  bad  agreement  is  not  in  our 
interests.  We  don't  want  a  bad  agree- 
ment, we  want  a  good  agreement.  And 
also  to  remember  always  that  our  rela- 
tionship with  them  is  not  simply  one  in- 
volving arms  control. 

We  need  to  remind  them  continuous- 
ly, as  we  all  do  and  I  do,  that  their 
treatment  of  many  human  beings— par- 
ticularly, Jews  in  the  Soviet  Union— is 
entirely  unacceptable  to  us  and  to  keep 
probing  and  asking  about  that. 

We  need  to  keep  pointing  out  to 
them  how  detrimental  their  behavior  in 
many  parts  of  the  world— and  I've 
talked  about  them  here  today— how 
disruptive  it  is  to  world  peace  and 
stability. 

And  we  also  need  to  be  working 
with  them  on  areas  of  bilateral  in- 
terest—in terms  of  trade  and  space  and 
one  thing  and  another  that  we  historical- 
ly have  been  able  to  work  with  them 
on— and  try  to  develop,  to  the  extent  we 
can,  a  constructive  relation  with  them. 

But  I  think  underneath  it  all,  we 
must  remember  that  the  keys  are,  first, 
let's  always  be  realistic— never  wish- 
ful—and be  willing  to  say,  squarely  and 
frankly,  what  we  believe  the  truth  to  be. 


And,  second,  we  better  be  strong.  Don't 
kid  yourself;  weakness  will  not  get  us 
anywhere  with  the  Soviet  Union — not 
with  Mr.  Gromyko,  not  with  Mr. 
Gorbachev,  not  with  Mr  Romanov,  not 
with  Mr.  Chernenko;  nor  did  it  with  Mr. 
Brezhnev  nor  any  of  the  predecessors. 
[Applause] 

Q.  To  what  extent  are  Russia  and 
its  satellites  supporting  Sandinista 
covert  action  in  El  Salvador  and  Hon- 
duras? 

A.  The  supplies  that  flow  into 
Nicaragua — some  of  which  find  their 
way  into  El  Salvador  and  perhaps  other 
countries— come  from  the  Soviet  Union 
or  the  Soviet  bloc.  We  know  that,  could 
take  pictures  of  the  ships;  we  trace  them 
as  they  go  along.  It's  public  information; 
there  isn't  any  question  about  it  what- 
ever. 

For  some  time  the  Soviets  seemed 
to  have  the  idea  that  sending  these  sup- 
plies in  ships  of  other  countries,  such  as 
Bulgaria,  was  the  way  to  do  it;  but  late- 
ly they've  been  sending  their  supplies  in 
Soviet  ships  directly.  So  there  isn't  any 
ambiguity  about  the  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion. 

Q.  Why  doesn't  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment withdraw  all  support  from  the 
Government  of  Chile  until  they  have 
democratic  elections? 

A.  I  don't  know  exactly  what  sup- 
port there  is  to  withdraw.  I  would  say 
that  Chile  is  being  run  by  a  dictatorship. 
It  has  had  periods  in  which  it  seemed 
that  constructive  change  was  underway. 
It  ran  for  a  while  one  of  the  most  in- 
teresting free  market  economies  around 
that  was  quite  successful  for  a  time. 

Rigiit  now  the  regime  seems  to  have 
slipped  back  into  a  disappointingly 
repressive  phase,  with  a  state  of  siege 
being  maintained.  But  we  will  stay 
engaged  with  Chile.  The  Chilean  people 
are  a  wonderful  people  with  a  demo- 
cratic tradition.  We  can  hope  that,  even 
as  the  present  Constitution  calls  for,  at 
least  eventually  they  may  return  to  a 
democratic  form  of  government.  In  any 
case,  we  will  keep  working  at  that  and 
trying  to  help  bring  it  about. 

Q.  Why  are  private  citizens,  who 
are  not  elected  officials  or  appointed 
officials  and  do  not  represent  the 
United  States,  permitted  to  go  to 
Beirut,  Cuba,  et  cetera,  and  bargain 
with  those  respective  leaders  to  let 
out  hostages,  et  cetera?  And  what  is 
the  State  Department  doing  to  get 
American  hostages  released  in 
Lebanon? 


A.  As  far  as  the  problem  of 
hostages,  Americans  held 
anywhere — and  there  are  now  still  four 
that  were  seized  in  Lebanon — we  work 
tirelessly  in  an  effort  to  get  them  re- 
leased. And  we  make  it  very  clear  to 
those  we  believe  are  responsible  for 
holding  them  that  if  harm  comes  to 
them,  we  will  hold  those  parties  respon- 
sible, and  we  will  do  something  about  it. 

But  our  efforts,  I  can  assure  you, 
are  tireless— some  public,  mostly 
private,  diplomatic  efforts — and  we 
never  forget  those  who  have  been  seizec 
and  want  to  help  them  in  every  way  tha 
we  can. 

As  far  as  private  citizens  and  their 
efforts  are  concerned,  of  course  private 
citizens  have  a  right  to  go.  And  I  think 
Mrs.  Levin,  for  example,  did  quite  a  lot, 
in  collaboration  with  us,  in  trying  to 
work  for  the  release  of  her  husband. 

I  do  think,  when  it  comes  to  broadei 
efforts  to  represent  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment, that  it  is  a  bad  idea  for  people  nol 
operating  under  the  authority  of  the 
President  to  try  to  represent  the  United 
States,  because  the  President  is  elected 
to  do  that  and  you  can  only  have  one 
President  at  a  time. 

It  is  a  problem  for  us  in  this  coun- 
try, because  I  think  all  100  Senators, 
and  most  of  the  Congressmen,  consider 
themselves  to  be  candidates  for  Presi- 
dent. [Laughter]  And  sometimes  they 
think  they  already  are  there.  [Laughter] 

But,  on  the  whole,  I  think  people  do 
understand  this  point.  And  I  notice,  par 
ticularly,  when  it  comes,  for  example,  tc 
our  dealings  with  the  Soviet  Union  that 
on  both  sides  of  the  aisle  there  is  a  grea 
care  taken,  and  when  someone  is  going 
to  go  to  Moscow,  they  generally  let  us    i 
know.  We  tell  them  what  we  know  of     ' 
the  situation,  what  we  would  like  to  see 
represented.  They  without  fail  debrief 
and  tell  us  what  took  place  in  their  con- 
versations. And  I  think,  on  the  whole, 
Americans  are  very  responsible  about 
these  things. 

Q.  Do  we  have  a  policy  that 
reflects  how  we  want  the  Israeli- 
Lebanon  conflict  to  be  resolved?  And, 
if  so,  what  is  it? 

A.  We  have  had  clear  objectives  in 
Lebanon.  We  want  to  see  a  sovereign, 
independent  Lebanon.  We'd  like  to  see  ii 
free  of  all  foreign  forces.  And  we  would 
like  to  see  a  Lebanon  constituted  in  sucl' 
a  way  that  activities  in  southern 
Lebanon  are  not  a  threat  to  the  peace 
and  security  of  people  living  in  northern 
Israel. 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Those  have  been  our  objectives. 
They've  been  consistent.  And,  of  course, 
;he  condition  in  Lebanon  and  the  way  its 
•elationships  develop  are  part  and  parcel 
)f  the  whole  Middle  East  puzzle. 

We  worked  very  hard,  as  we  all 
enow  here;  and  we  suffered  some  very 
leavy  losses  that  leave  us  very  dis- 
;ressed.  But  those  have  been  our  objec- 
;ives  all  along. 

As  far  as  the  current  situation,  we 
ire  glad  to  see  the  Israelis  withdrawing. 
\\'e  would  like  to  see  that  withdrawal 
:ake  place  through  some  form  of 
legotiation,  so  that  a  possible  role  for 
JNIFIL  [UN  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon] 
s  defined  and  the  stability  that  a 
iesignated  role  could  add  would  be  put 
;here — and  that  there  would  be  an 
orderly  process,  an  understood  process, 
)f  turning  over  strong  points  as  the 
sraeli  Army  leaves  and  other  forces 
;ake  up  key  posts. 

Despite  a  great  deal  of  flexibility  on 
;he  part  of  Israel  in  trying  to  work  these 
■natters  out,  there  has  been,  I  think  it's 
'air  to  say,  great  intransigence  on  the 
)ther  side  in  recent  weeks  and  months. 
i\.nd  so  there  isn't  in  prospect  right 
now — although  this  may  change — any 
negotiated  outcome.  The  Israelis  are 
imply  pulling  back  unilaterally. 

And,  of  course,  in  the  end,  as  they. 
firaw  their  forces  completely  out  of  the 
lountry,  if  there  are  no  negotiated  ar- 
rangements to  provide  security  for  their 
northern  border,  they  will  have  to  figure 
>ut  unilaterally  what  they  will  do  about 
he  attacks  that  have  historically  come 
rem  southern  Lebanon  into  northern 
I'srael.  That's  the  reason  why  we  think  a 
legotiated  withdrawal  program  is  better 
han  a  unilateral  one,  in  that  arrange- 
nents  having  to  do  with  security  would 
)e  put  in  place.  Otherwise  I'm  afraid 
here  will  be  security  obtained,  accom- 
)anied  by  a  very  great  amount  of  ten- 
;ion  and  potential  for  continual  out- 
)reaks  on  the  border. 

Q.  In  light  of  the  growing  opposi- 
ion  to  the  Marcos  regime  in  the 
Philippines,  will  the  United  States 
.continue  to  support  Marcos? 

A.  Yes.  Ferdinand  Marcos  is  the 
legitimate  head  of  the  Philippine  Gov- 
jrnment,  and  we  will  deal  with  him. 

We  will  also  be  working  in  every 
way  that  we  can  to  build  up  and 
legitimatize — help  the  Philippines 
iegitimatize — all  manner  of  processes 
;hat  are  the  means  of  selecting  leader- 
ship in  a  country. 

So  we  supported  very  strongly,  the 
second  board  that  investigated  the 
Aquino  murder,  feeling  that  the  first 


was  not  really  an  expression  of  a  proper 
rule  of  law,  and  the  second  was. 

We  supported  the  use  of  arrange- 
ments for  the  elections  held  some 
months  ago,  so  that  they  would  be  as 
democratic  and  t)pen  and  free  as  possi- 
ble. And  they  turned  out  to  be  pretty 
good  elections. 

We  support  having  the  army  be  pro- 
fessionalized, not  politicized,  so  that,  on 
the  one  hand,  it  can  be  an  effective  force 
in  countering  the  communist  insurgency 
that  is  gathering  in  the  Philippines,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  respectful  of  the 
democratic  process  and  the  importance 
of  civilian  rule. 

We're  working  constantly  to  try  to 
keep  these  processes  alive  and  help  them 


flourish  so  that  whenever  a  transition 
comes,  it  comes  through  processes  of 
this  kind,  and  people  retiiin  their  con- 
fidence that  there  are  democratically 
based  |)rocedures  through  which  leader- 
ship should  be  cho.sen. 

Q.  How  does  a  hard-working  Sec- 
retary of  State,  such  as  yourself,  get 
such  a  great  tan  |  laughter  and  ap- 
plause], and  why  don't  you  have  an 
ulcer?  [Laughter] 

A.  I  don't  know  about  the  answer  to 
the  second,  but  the  answer  to  the  first 
is,  that  you  got, to  goof  off  once  in  a 
while.  [Laughter  and  standing  applause] 


'Press  release  29A  of  Feb.  2.5,  198.5, 


The  Importance  of 

the  MX  Peacekeeper  Missile 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee  on 
February  26.  1985.  ' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  you  to  speak  in  support  of  the 
President's  program  of  strategic  mod- 
ernization. 'This  subject  is  of  enormous 
importance  to  our  diplomacy  because  of 
the  direct  impact  of  strategic  moderniza- 
tion on  our  national  security,  our  arms 
control  objectives,  and  our  most  fun- 
damental foreign  policy  goals. 

Strategic  Modernization 
and  Foreign  Policy 

As  Secretary  of  State,  I  am  acutely  con- 
scious of  the  strength  or  weakness  of 
American  power  because  it  directly  af- 
fects our  ability  to  achieve  our  most  fun- 
damental goals:  the  defense  of  our 
values  and  our  interests  and  the  con- 
struction of  a  safer,  freer,  and  more 
prosperous  world.  Power  and  diplomacy 
are  not  separate  dimensions  of  policy; 
they  are  inextricably  linked  together. 

That  is  why  I  am  here  today  to  urge 
support  for  strategic  modernization  and, 
in  particular,  for  the  MX  Peacekeeper 
missile  program  which  is  a  central  pillar 
of  that  modernization. 

As  leader  of  the  democratic  nations, 
we  have  an  inescapable  responsibility  to 
maintain  the  strategic  balance— and  only 
we  can  maintain  it.  If  our  determination 
flags,  we  shake  the  confidence  of  our 
friends  and  allies  around  the  world;  we 
weaken  the  cohesion  of  our  alliances.  If 


we  in  America  are  strong  and  united  in 
our  commitment  to  peace  and  interna- 
tional security,  then  those  who  rely  on 
us,  and  upon  whom  we  rely,  have  the 
confidence  to  move  together  with  us 
toward  our  shared  goals. 

Modernization  of  our  strategic  forces 
is  essential.  The  Soviet  strategic  buildup 
has  continued  relentlessly.  Since  we 
deployed  our  most  modern  type  of 
ICBM  [intercontinental  ballistic  missile], 
the  Minuteman  III,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
deployed  f/iree  new  types  of  ICBMs— the 
SS-17,  -18,  and  -19— including  360 
SS-19s  roughly  comparable  in  size  to 
the  MX,  each  with  6  warheads,  and  308 
of  the  much  larger  SS-18,  each  with  10 
warheads.  Moreover,  within  the  next  2 
years,  the  Soviets  will  begin  deploying 
two  additional  new  types— the  SS-X-24 
and  -25.  This  means  five  new  Soviet 
ICBMs  compared  to  one— the  MX— for 
the  United  States. 

A  credible,  flexible  American 
strategic  posture  is  vital  to  the  stable 
balance  of  power  on  which  peace  and 
security  rest.  And  the  MX  is  a  vital  ele- 
ment of  that  stable  balance.  It  repre- 
.sents  the  response  that  four  successive 
administrations— both  Democratic  and 
Republican— have  believed  necessary  to 
offset,  at  least  partially,  the  formidable 
Soviet  ICBM  arsenal.  It  was  permitted 
by  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  and,  indeed,  its 
contribution  to  the  strategic  balance  was 
one  of  the  premises  on  which  that  treaty 
was  based.  The  bipartisan  Scowcroft 
commission  concluded,  and  I  am  con- 
vinced, that  the  MX  remains  an  essential 


April  1985 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


component  of  a  modernized  strategic 
triad. 

If  the  Soviets  could  strike  effectively 
at  our  land-based  ICBMs,  while  our  own 
land-based  deterrent  lacked  any  com- 
parable capability,  they  might  believe 
that  they  had  a  significant  advantage  in 
a  crucial  dimension  of  the  strategic 
balance;  they  could  seek  to  gain  political 
leverage  by  a  threat  of  nuclear  black- 
mail. Such  a  crucial  imbalance  in 
strategic  capabilities  could  well  make 
them  bolder  in  a  regional  conflict  or  in  a 
major  crisis.  As  the  Scowcroft  commis- 
sion put  it: 

A  one-sided  strategic  condition  in  which 
the  Soviet  Union  could  effectively  destroy  the 
whole  range  of  strategic  targets  in  the 
United  States,  but  we  could  not  effectively 
destroy  a  similar  range  of  targets  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  would  be  extremely  unstable 
over  the  long  run  [and]  would  clearly  not 
serve  the  cause  of  peace. 

We  must  move  ahead  with  deploy- 
ment of  the  MX  now  because  it  repre- 
sents a  credible  deterrent  today.  After 
years  of  planning  and  billions  of  dollars 
in  effort,  only  the  MX  offers  a  way 
toward  redressing  the  serious  strategic 
imbalance  now. 

Many  critics  of  the  MX  have  focused 
on  the  issue  of  MX  basing  in  relationship 
to  survivability.  There  are  three  points  I 
wish  to  make. 

First,  Soviet  planners,  in  the  uncer- 
tainty of  war,  would  have  to  take  into 
account  that  some  of  our  MX  missiles 
would  survive  attack  and  would  be  used 
to  retaliate  against  those  targets  the 
Soviets  value  most  highly,  including 
Soviet  missiles  held  in  reserve  for  fur- 
ther attacks  against  our  country. 

Second,  the  survivability  of  the  MX 
must  be  viewed  in  conjunction  with  the 
other  elements  of  our  strategic  triad. 
The  three  legs  of  the  triad— bombers, 
submarines,  and  land-based  ballistic  mis- 
siles—strengthen deterrence  by  greatly 
complicating  Soviet  planning.  If  the 
Soviets  were  to  contemplate  an  all-out 
attack,  they  would  be  forced  to  make 
choices  that  would  significantly  reduce 
their  effectiveness  against  one  leg  of  the 
triad  in  order  to  attack  another.  For  ex- 
ample, it  is  not  possible  to  attack  our 
bomber  bases  and  our  ICBM  silos 
simult<'ineously,  without  allowing  certain 
retaliation.  Indeed,  deterrence  rests 
upon  the  Soviet  planners  knowing  they 
cannot  contemplate  a  successful,  dis- 
arming first  strike. 

Third,  silo  hardening  can  be  im- 
proved significantly  in  the  future  and 
thereby  increase  the  survivability  for  the 
MX  force.  The  Scowcroft  commission 


reported  on  this  capability,  and  the  Con- 
gress has  funded  its  research.  The  pros- 
pects are  firm  and  promising  and  will 
ensure  the  MX  will  remain  a  key  ele- 
ment of  the  triad  far  into  the  future. 

Additionally,  it  is  important  to 
understand  that  the  whole  of  our 
strategic  triad  is  greater  than  the  sum 
of  the  individual  parts.  Viewed  in  the 
full  context,  the  MX  will  strengthen  the 
whole  of  our  triad,  on  which  our  security 
has  rested  for  many  years,  and,  in  so 
doing,  it  will  strengthen  the  fabric  of 
deterrence  and  peace. 

Strategic  Modernization 
and  Arms  Control 

At  this  moment,  the  MX  program  plays 
a  pivotal  role  in  advancing  our  arms  con- 
trol goals  as  well.  One  thing  we  have 
learned  over  the  years  is  that  the 
Soviets  respect  strength  and  firmness.  I 
am  convinced  that  our  firmness  and  th  t 
of  our  allies  in  the  last  few  years— in 
proceeding  with  INF  [intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces]  deployments  and 
resisting  Soviet  efforts  to  drive  a  wedge 
between  the  allies— persuaded  the 
Soviets  that  they  could  not  achieve  their 
objectives  by  political  pressure,  that  they 
could  not  sit  back  and  wait  for  unilateral 
concessions,  but  they  must  bargain  at 
the  table  instead. 

Thanks  to  the  West's  cohesion  and 
determination  over  this  period— and 
thanks  to  Congress'  bipartisan  support 
for  the  strategic  modernization  program 
over  the  past  3  years— our  negotiating 
position  today  is  strong.  The  Soviets 
must  realize  that  we  have  the  will  to 
protect  our  security  in  the  absence  of 
arms  control  agreements  and  that  it  is 
in  their  interest,  as  much  as  ours,  to 
seek  ways  to  reduce  nuclear  arsenals 
and  the  dangers  of  war.  This  basis  of 
strength  improves  the  prospects  for  suc- 
cessful negotiations. 

These  new  weapons  are  not 
"bargaining  chips";  they  are  part  of  the 
very  strength  on  which  real  bargaining 
rests.  They  represent  much-needed 
modernization,  consistent  with  existing 
arms  control  agreements;  they  are  an 
essential  element  of  our  deterrent 
posture;  and  they  are  the  foundation  on 
which  an  effective  and  balanced  arms 
control  regime  can  be  built. 


Jegotiating  With  Strength  and  Unity 

As  you  know,  a  new  round  of  arms  con- 
trol ne^'otiations  is  about  to  begin  in 
Geneva.  The  American  people  and  their 
government— the  Congress  and  the 
President— all  share  the  hope  that  these 
negotiations  will  bear  fruit.  We  must  be 
prepared  to  defend  our  ideals  and  in- 
terests whether  negotiations  are  suc- 
cessful or  not.  The  United  States  has, 
however,  long  sought  a  more  construc- 
tive and  productive  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  We  emphasized  through- 
out 1984  the  importance  of  resuming  a 
U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  aimed  at  reductions 
in  nuclear  arsenals. 

The  year  1985  has  begun  on  a 
positive  note.  The  outcome  of  the 
January  meetings  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  marked  a  potentially  important 
beginning.  The  agreement  to  start  new 
negotiations  in  Geneva  on  March  12 
brings  the  resumption  of  the  dialogue  on 
the  most  important  strategic  issues  now 
facing  our  two  nations.  We  will  use 
these  negotiations  to  discuss  fully  our 
views  on  the  evolution  of  strategic  deter- 
rence, including  our  hope  that  the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  research  will 
allow  us  to  move  to  a  new  strategic  en- 
vironment, based  on  defense  and  not 
simply  the  prospect  of  mutually  assured 
destruction.  We  are  now  engaged  in  a 
process  that  can  produce  beneficial 
results  for  the  United  States,  for  our 
allies,  and  for  world  peace  and  security. 

Success,  however,  will  require  firm- 
ness and  determination,  a  degree  of 
flexibility,  and  a  degree  of  caution.  It 
will  also  require  something  even  more 
basic:  unity  at  home  on  the  importance 
of  these  requirements  and  of  our  fun- 
damental strength. 

As  we  move  toward  these  negotia- 
tions, we  must  proceed  as  a  united  peo- 
ple. When  we  sit  down  at  the  table  to 
discuss  these  questions  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  it  is  essential  that  we  speak  with 
one  voice,  that  we  not  present  the  pic- 
ture of  a  nation  in  conflict  with  itself, 
giving  the  Soviet  Union  either  openings 
to  exploit  or  false  hopes  that  we  will 
make  unilateral,  unreciprocated  conces- 
sions. The  negotiations  we  are  about  to 
embark  upon  are  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  We  cannot 
and  must  not  allow  them  to  deteriorate 
into  negotiations  among  ourselves. 

The  negotiators  the  President  has 
chosen  to  represent  us  at  Geneva,  in- 
cluding your  former  colleague  John 
Tower,  are  among  the  most  intelligent, 
able  men  in  the  land.  They  are  tough 
negotiators.  They  will  represent  our 


24 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA 


country,  defend  our  interests,  and  pur- 
sue our  goals  with  skill  and  dedication. 
In  a  sense,  however,  these  men  are  only 
the  tip  of  the  pyramid:  their  work  in 
Geneva  will  be  supported  by  their 
respective  delegations  and  by  the  exper- 
tise and  commitment  of  hundreds  of 
people  in  the  U.S.  Government.  But  the 
real  foundation  of  the  whole  edifice— on 
which  its  strength  really  depends— is  the 
(letrree  to  which  they  are  supported  also 
by  our  Congress  and  public.  Our  arms 
control  efforts  cannot  succeed  without 
this  support. 

This  is  no  time  to  cast  doubt  on  our 
national  resolve.  When  we  send  our 
negotiators  to  the  table  in  Geneva,  we 
owe  it  to  them  and  to  our  country  to 
send  thei     in  with  the  strongest  possible 
negotiate    '  position  and  with  the  full 
backing  .     the  nation.  And  that  means 
not  suggesting  unilateral  concessions 
that  might  diminish  the  incentives  the 
Soviets  have  to  talk.  That  means  not 
cutting  programs  vital  to  our  strategic 
posture.  It  means  coming  together 
behind  a  solid  negotiating  position  that 
offers  the  best  hope  for  achieving  the 
goals  I  know  we  all  seek. 


Namibia 


'Press  release  30.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  Chester  A.  Crocker 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  February  21,  1985.  Mr. 
Crocker  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs.'- 

I  appi  eciate  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  the  subcommittee  to  discuss  U.S. 
policy  toward  Namibia.  Ever  since  the 
United  Nations  took  up  the  matter  after 
the  Second  World  War,  the  United 
States  has  been  deeply  involved  in  the 
problem  of  Namibia,  the  last  major  item 
on  the  agenda  of  African  decolonization. 
In  1966  the  United  Nations  revoked 
South  Africa's  mandate  over  Namibia, 
originally  granted  by  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. In  1971  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  upheld  the  UN's  authority,  deter- 
mined that  South  Africa's  presence  in 
Namibia  was  illegal,  and  stated  that 
South  Africa  was  obligated  to  withdraw 
immediately. 

We  continue  to  recognize  that  deci- 
sion, but,  of  course,  the  problem  is  not 
simply  one  of  determining  the  legalities 
of  the  situation  and  issuing  condemna- 
tions. Despite  earlier  attempts  by  then 
Secretary  Kissinger,  it  was  not  until  the 
development  of  a  consensus  on  UN 
[Security  Council]  Resolution  43.5  in 
1978  that  the  international  community 
began  a  sustained  and  intensive  effort  to 
resolve  the  problem  through  negotiation 
and  diplomacy.  The  implementation  of 
that  resolution  remains  the  goal  of  our 
policy.  The  resolution  provides  for  free 
elections  under  UN  supervision  and 
withdrawal  of  South  African  forces  from 
the  territory. 

The  Goal  of  Namibian  Independence 

This  Administration  strongly  supports 
the  goal  of  independence  for  Namibia 
and  has  invested  a  major  effort  toward 
achieving  it.  Success  would  strengthen 
U.S.  interest  throughout  Africa.  We 
believe  that  such  a  settlement  is  the 
surest  way  to  end  the  prolonged  suffer- 
ing in  Namibia,  to  reduce  the  oppor- 
tunities for  outside  interference,  and, 
finally,  to  build  sufficient  regional 
stability  to  encourage  South  Africa  to 
undertake  with  confidence  the  difficult 
political  decisions  it  faces  on  the  path  of 
continued  reform  at  home. 


We  have  made  substantial  progress 
toward  the  goal  of  Namibian  independ- 
ence. Our  efforts  to  resolve  the  remain- 
ing problems  preventing  a  settlement 
have  moved  beyond  a  debate  over  princi- 
ple and  into  a  new  phase  of  practical 
bargaining  about  a  potential  settlement 
package. 

Picking  up  from  the  failed  Geneva 
conference  of  January  1981,  we  and  our 
contact  group  partners  (the  United 


Atlantic     I  *"'®'''*  i    «M9iAj 
Ocean 


Kingdom,  France,  West  Germany,  and 
Canada)  obtained  South  Africa's  recom- 
mitment to  arrangements  for  bringing 
about  Namibian  independence  under  UN 
Resolution  435.  We  then  achieved  a  sig- 
nificant further  strengthening  of  Resolu- 
tion 435  through  a  series  of  understand- 
ings negotiated  in  1981-82  concerning: 

•  Constitutional  principles  to  guide 
the  transitional  constituent      ?embly; 
and 

•  Other  arrangements  i    ating  to 
the  UN  role  and  presence  during  the 
transition. 

The  only  remaining  barrier  to  ob- 
taining South  African  agreement  to  im- 
plement Resolution  435  is  an  acceptable 
agreement  on  Cuban  troop  withdrawal 
from  Angola.  Last  year  we  achieved 
substantial  progress  toward  a  resolution 
of  that  remaining  issue. 

The  Lusaka  Agreement 

A  first  step  was  the  Lusaka  agreement 
signed  a  year  ago,  in  which  the  United 
States  played  a  central  role.  We  ex- 
pected that  this  agreement  would  give 
new  impetus  to  the  negotiations,  stop 
the  violence  between  Angolan  and  South 
African  forces,  and  end  the  presence  of 


April  1985 


25 


AFRICA 


outside  forces  in  southern  Angola.  Those 
objectives  have  been  essentially 
achieved,  and  the  violence  that  preceded 
the  agreement  wras  followed  by  12 
months  of  peace  and  practical  coopera- 
tion between  Angola  and  South  Africa. 
Last  week,  the  South  African  Govern- 
ment indicated  publicly  that  the  long- 
awaited  completion  of  the  disengage- 
ment is  near. 

Because  the  United  States  was  m- 
timately  involved  in  the  Lusaka  agree- 
ment, both  sides  agreed  that  a  U.S. 
observer  role  would  be  useful.  To  sup- 
port that  U.S.  role,  a  liaison  office  was 
established  on  a  temporary  basis  in 
Windhoek,  the  Namibian  administrative 
capital.  This  office  was  established  with 
the  understanding  of  both  the  Angolan 
and  South  African  Governments  in  order 
to  support  U.S.  monitoring  of  the  South 
African-Angolan  Joint  Military  Commis- 
sion which  oversees  the  disengagement 
and  to  facilitate  and  complement  com- 
munication between  the  two  parties.  The 
office  has  been  symbolic  of  our  commit- 
ment to  the  disengagement  and  to  peace 
in  the  region.  It  has  played  an  indis- 
pensable role  in  furthering  our  under- 
standing of  the  security  issues  under 
consideration  in  the  joint  military  com- 
mission. Last  April,  Foreign  Service  of- 
ficer Dennis  Keogh  and  U.S.  Army  Lt. 
Col.  Kenneth  Crabtree  gave  their  lives 
to  support  our  commitment.  With  the 
disengagement  effort  now  near  comple- 
tion, there  is  a  diminished  need  for  U.S. 
monitoring  from  Windhoek,  and  the 
operation  there  has  now  been  sus- 
pended. We  are,  nevertheless,  maintain- 
ing the  office  facilities,  and  we  are  keep- 
ing open  the  possibility  of  sending  U.S. 
personnel  back  to  the  office,  should 
events  again  require  us  to  do  so.  Mean- 
while, we  will  continue  to  monitor  the 
disengagement  closely  and  will,  if 
necessary,  travel  to  the  area. 

The  Lusaka  agreement  of  last  Feb- 
ruary built  sufficient  mutual  confidence 
to  permit  the  negotiations  to  enter  into 
a  new  phase.  Late  last  summer,  it 
became  clear  that  we  had  moved  beyond 
the  stage  of  rhetorical  debate  on  the 
issue  of  "linkage"— whether  Cuban  troop 
withdrawal  and  Namibian  independence 
should  be  related.  Cuban  troop  with- 
drawal is— as  a  practical  matter,  and 
with  the  support  of  all  concerned— being 
discussed  in  the  context  of  the  imple- 
mentation of  Resolution  435.  In  October, 
the  Angolan  Government,  for  the  first 
time,  put  a  detailed  and  concrete 
negotiating  proposal  on  the  table.  This 
major  step  forward  was  followed  by  a 
South  African  proposal  a  month  later. 


There  is  agreement  between  South 
Africa  and  Angola  on  a  number  of  broad 
principles.  The  main  issue  now  is  re- 
solving the  practical  question  of  the  tim- 
ing of  Cuban  troop  withdrawal  in  rela- 
tion to  Resolution  435  so  that  the  essen- 
tial requirements  of  both  parties  can  be 
addressed.  The  United  States,  as 
mediator,  has  been  conducting  a  quiet 
but  continuous  shuttle  diplomacy  be- 
tween the  two  sides,  encouraging  them 
to  consider  ways  to  expand  the  common 
ground  between  them.  This  is,  by  defini- 
tion, the  kind  of  negotiation  that  is  best 
conducted  privately,  but  we  can  certain- 
ly say  that  we  have  made  considerable 
headway  and  that  both  sides  seem  com- 
mitted to  serious  negotiations.  We  are 
determined  to  do  our  part  to  actively  ex- 
plore ways  to  bring  the  two  sides  to- 
gether. 

The  only  acceptable  basis  for  such  a 
settlement  is  UN  Resolution  435.  We 
hear  reports  from  time  to  time  that 
thought  is  being  given  in  South  Africa 
and  Namibia  to  exploring  alternatives  to 
Resolution  435  in  order  to  accelerate  the 
independence  process  by  shelving  the 
Cuban  issue  and  changing  the  basic  pro- 
visions of  the  UN  plan.  The  U.S. 
Government  does  not  believe  there  is 
substance  to  such  reports,  since  it  is 
most  unlikely  that  a  settlement  diverg- 
ing from  that  plan  would  gain  interna- 
tional acceptance.  As  an  originator  and 
sponsor  of  Resolution  435,  the  United 
States  has  no  intention  of  backing  away 
from  it.  Moreover,  it  is  our  clear  impres- 
sion from  our  contacts  with  South 
Africa  and  the  front-line  states  that 
their  commitments  to  the  plan  remain 
valid.  We  maintain  an  active  exchange 
with  the  UN  Secretary  General  and  his 
staff  on  these  and  other  issues  in  the 
negotiations  in  order  to  assure  that  we 
are  fully  updated  on  the  positions  of  the 
many  parties  involved  and  to  encourage 
necessary  planning  so  that  implementa- 
tion can  proceed  when  agreement  is 
reached. 

Internal  Problems  in  Namibia 

These  negotiations  are  directly  related 
to  our  perception  of  the  internal  prob- 
lems in  Namibia.  A  negotiated  settle- 
ment is  the  only  way  to  end  the  continu- 
ing political  frustration  of  the  Namibian 
people,  expressed  openly  by  political  par- 
ties and  leaders  inside  Namibia  as  well 
as  outside.  It  will,  we  hope,  also  end  the 
frequent  serious  violations  of  human 
rights  in  Namibia  stemming  from  official 
policies  and  from  the  armed  contlict  be- 
tween South  African  and  SWAPO 
[South  West  Africa  People's  Organiza- 


tion] forces.  We  are  striving  for  an  in- 
ternationally acceptable  settlement  that 
will  end  the  fighting  and  result  in  the 
termination  of  South  Africa's  occupation 
of  the  territory.  This  is  not,  however,  to 
say  that  ending  the  violations  of  human 
rights  in  Namibia  should  await  a 
negotiated  settlement.  These  violations 
can  and  should  be  dealt  with  now. 
Namibia  differs  from  South  Africa  in 
that  the  formal  system  of  apartheid  was 
ended  in  1978,  although  de  facto  segre- 
gation persists  in  many  areas.  Charges 
that  police  and  security  forces  torture 
prisoners  continue  to  be  voiced  by  Nami- 
bian leaders.  Both  government  security 
units  and  SWAPO  are  reported  to  have 
murdered  opponents.  SWAPO  increas- 
ingly uses  bombs  or  mines  in  situations 
that  result  in  civilian  casualties. 
Curfews,  humiliating  searches,  and 
harassment  by  security  forces  greatly  af- 
fect the  daily  lives  of  individuals  living  in 
the  north. 

The  1984  human  rights  report  for 
Namibia  shows  a  pattern  of  violations  by 
the  government  in  many  categories.  Ar- 
bitrary detentions  without  charge  are  a 
common  problem.  Numerous  individuals 
have  been  detained,  often  with  no  of- 
ficial acknowledgment  of  the  fact.  Some 
detainees  have  been  released— notably 
the  freeing  in  May  of  1974  of  the  re- 
maining 75  prisoners  from  the  Mariental 
camp,  where  they  had  been  held  since 
their  capture  in  Angola  in  1978.  In  an 
encouraging  move,  the  South  African 
Government  released  Herman  Toivo  ja 
Toivo— a  long-imprisoned  founder 
member  of  SWAPO— last  year.  How- 
ever, we  have  been  concerned  by  new- 
reports  of  a  series  of  detentions  last 
month  in  the  north  of  Namibia. 

A  recent  development  that  received 
widespread  attention  was  the  announce-' 
ment  of  a  requirement  that  all  Namibian 
men  register  for  military  service.  This 
announcement  caused  concern  that  all 
elements  of  the  Namibian  population 
would  be  obliged  to  join  local  military 
units  fighting  alongside  South  African 
forces  to  maintain  South  African  rule. 
The  registration  appears  to  have  slowed 
or  stopped,  but  there  has  still  been  no 
official  announcement  that  it  has  ended. 
Last  year  saw  the  banning  of  a  critical 
local  newspaper  and  the  arrest  of  an 
outspoken  former  member  of  its  staff. 
The  banning  was,  however,  subsequently 
rescinded  and  the  charges  against  the 
editor  dropped.  We  have  made  frequent 
representations  to  the  South  African 
Government  about  human  rights  abuses, 
and  we  believe  this  has  been  a  factor  in 
some  mitigating  actions  that  the  govern- 
ment has  Uiken. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Conclusion 

The  negotiations  for  Namibia's  independ- 
ence have— like  many  multilateral 
negotiations,  including  the  effort  to  end 
minority  rule  in  Zimbabwe— been  pro- 
tracted, and  this  caused  some  to  con- 
clude that  the  effort  is  hopeless.  Now,  in 
recent  months,  talks  on  the  remaining 
issues  have  moved  forward.  There  is  still 
difficult  bargaining  ahead,  but  the 
negotiations  have  entered  a  new  and 
more  hopeful  phase  as  we  seek  a 
mutually  acceptable  compromise.  We 
would  regard  a  settlement  as  a  major 
victory  for  peace  and  security  in  the 
region,  for  our  diplomatic  efforts,  and, 
above  all,  for  the  Namibians  themselves, 
who  have  paid  a  very  high  price  in  their 
struggle  for  self-determination  and  inde- 
pendence. We  are  sparing  no  effort  to 
succeed. 


On  the  Road  to 

a  More  Stable  Peace 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearinjrs 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  avaifeble  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
Ifice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  Paul  H.  Nitze 

Address  before  the  World  Affairs 
Council  in  Philadelphia  on  February  20. 
1985.  Ambassador  Nitze  is  special  ad- 
viser to  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
of  State  on  arms  control  matters. 

Since  the  dawn  of  the  nuclear  age  40 
years  ago,  there  have  been  countless 
proposals  to  eliminate  nuclear  weapons 
from  the  face  of  the  Earth.  That  has 
been  the  professed  objective  of  both  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States,  but, 
until  recently,  it  has  not  been  a  practical 
goal. 

The  President  is  determined  to  do 
more,  to  look  even  now  toward  a  world 
in  which  nuclear  weapons  have,  in  fact, 
been  eliminated.  The  present  situa- 
tion—  in  which  the  threat  of  massive 
nuclear  retaliation  is  the  ultimate  sanc- 
tion, the  key  element  of  deterrence,  and, 
thus,  the  basis  for  security  and 
peace — is  unsatisfactory.  It  has  kept  the 
peace  for  40  years,  but  the  potential 
costs  of  a  breakdown  are  immense  and, 
because  of  continuing  massive  Soviet 
deployments  of  both  offensive  and 
defensive  weaponry,  are  not  becoming 
less.  If  we  can,  we  must  find  a  more 
reliable  basis  for  security  and  for  peace. 

This  concern  prompted  the  Presi- 
dent's decision  to  proceed  with  the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI).  He 
has  directed  the  scientific  community  to 
determine  if  new  cost-effective  defensive 
technologies  are  feasible  which  could  be 
introduced  into  force  structures  so  as  to 
produce  a  more  stable  strategic  relation- 
ship. We  envisage,  if  that  search  is  suc- 
cessful, a  cooperative  effort  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  hopefully  leading  to  an 
agreed  transition  toward  effective  non- 
nuclear  defenses  that  might  make  possi- 
ble the  eventual  elimination  of  nuclear 
weapons. 

The  Strategic  Concept 

In  preparing  for  Secretary  Shultz's 
January  meeting  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko,  we  developed  a  strategic  con- 
cept encompassing  our  view  of  how  we 
would  like  to  see  the  U.S. -Soviet 
strategic  relationship  evolve  in  the 
future.  That  concept  provides  the  basis 
for  our  approach  to  next  month's  talks 
in  Geneva.  It  can  be  summarized  in  four 
sentences. 


During  the  next  10  years,  the  U.S.  objec- 
tive is  a  radical  reduction  in  the  power  of  ex- 
isting and  planned  offensive  nuclear  arms,  as 
well  as  the  stabilization  of  the  relationship 
between  offensive  and  defensive  nuclear 
arms,  whether  on  earth  or  in  space.  We  are 
even  now  looking  forward  to  a  period  of  tran- 
sition to  a  more  stable  world,  with  greatly 
reduced  Ifvels  of  nuclear  arms  and  an 
enhanced  ability  to  deter  war  based  upon  an 
iticreasing  contribution  of  non-nuclear 
defenses  against  (jffensive  nuclear  arms.  This 
period  of  transition  could  lead  to  the  eventual 
elimination  of  all  nuclear  arms,  both  offensive 
and  defensive.  A  world  free  of  nuclear  arms 
is  an  ultimate  objective  to  which  we,  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  all  other  nations  can  agree. 

It  would  be  worthwhile  to  dwell  on 
this  concept  in  some  detail.  To  begin 
with,  it  entails  three  time  phases:  the 
near  term,  a  transition  phase,  and  an 
ultimate  phase. 

The  Near  Term 

For  the  immediate  future— at  least  the 
next  10  years — we  will  continue  to  base 
deterrence  on  the  ultimate  threat  of 
nuclear  retaliation.  We  have  little  choice; 
today's  technology  provides  no  alter- 
native. 

That  being  said,  we  will  press  for 
radical  reductions  in  the  number  and 
power  of  strategic  and  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  arms.  Offensive  nuclear 
arsenals  on  both  sides  are  entirely  too 
high  and  potentially  destructive,  par- 
ticularly in  the  more  destabilizing 
categories  such  as  the  large  MIRVed 
[multiple  independently-targetable  reen- 
try vehicles]  Soviet  ICBM  [intercontinen- 
tal ballistic  missile]  and  SS-20  forces. 

At  the  same  time,  we  will  seek  to 
reverse  the  erosion  that  has  occurred  in 
the  Antiballistic  Missile  (ABM)  Treaty 
regime — erosion  that  has  resulted  from 
Soviet  actions  over  the  last  10  years. 
These  include  the  construction  of  a  large 
phased-array  radar  near  Krasnoyarsk  in 
central  Siberia  in  violation  of  the  ABM 
Treaty's  provisions  regarding  the  loca- 
tion and  orientation  of  ballistic  missile 
early  warning  radars. 

For  the  near  term,  we  will  be  pur- 
suing the  SDI  research  program— in  full 
compliance  with  the  ABM  Treaty,  which 
permits  such  research.  Likewise,  we  ex- 
pect the  Soviets  will  continue  their  in- 
vestigation of  the  possibilities  of  new 
defensive  technologies,  as  they  have  for 
many  years. 


iApril1985 


27 


ARMS  CONTROL 


We  have  offered  to  begin  discussions 
in  the  upcoming  Geneva  talks  with  the 
Soviets  as  to  how  we  might  together 
make  a  transition  to  a  more  stable  and 
reliable  relationship  based  on  an  increas- 
ing mix  of  defensive  systems. 

The  Transition  Period 

Should  new  defensive  technologies  prove 
feasible,  we  would  want  at  some  future 
date  to  begin  such  a  transition,  during 
which  we  would  place  greater  reliance 
on  defensive  systems  for  our  protection 
and  that  of  our  allies. 

The  criteria  by  which  we  will  judge 
the  feasibility  of  such  technologies  will 
be  demanding.  The  technologies  must 
produce  defensive  systems  that  are  sur- 
vivable;  if  not,  the  defenses  would 
themselves  be  tempting  targets  for  a 
first  strike.  This  would  decrease  rather 
than  enhance  stability. 

New  defensive  systems  must  also  be 
cost  effective  at  the  margin— that  is, 
they  must  be  cheap  enough  to  add  addi- 
tional defensive  capability  so  that  the 
other  side  has  no  incentive  to  add  addi- 
tional offensive  capability  to  overcome 
the  defense.  If  this  criterion  is  not  met, 
the  defensive  systems  could  encourage  a 
proliferation  of  countermeasures  and  ad- 
ditional offensive  weapons  to  overcome 
deployed  defenses  instead  of  a  redirec- 
tion of  effort  from  offense  to  defense. 

As  I  said,  these  criteria  are  demand- 
ing. If  the  new  technologies  cannot  meet 
these  standards,  we  are  not  about  to 
deploy  them.  In  the  event,  we  would 
have  to  continue  to  base  deterrence  on 
the  ultimate  threat  of  nuclear  retalia- 
tion. However,  we  hope  and  have  expec- 


tfitions  that  the  scientific  community  can 
respond  to  the  challenge. 

We  would  see  the  transition  period 
as  a  cooperative  endeavor  with  the 
Soviets.  Arms  control  would  play  a 
critical  role.  We  would,  for  example,  en- 
visage continued  reductions  in  offensive 
nuclear  arms. 

Concurrently,  we  would  envisage  the 
sides  beginning  to  test,  develop,  and 
deploy  survivable  and  cost-effective 
defenses  at  a  measured  pace,  with  par- 
ticular emphasis  on  non-nuclear 
defenses.  Deterrence  would  thus  begin 
to  rely  more  on  a  mix  of  offensive 
nuclear  and  defensive  systems  instead  of 
on  offensive  nuclear  arms  alone. 

The  transition  would  continue  for 
some  time— perhaps  for  decades.  As  the 
U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  and  inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  arsenals  declined 
significantly,  we  would  need  to  negotiate 
reductions  in  other  types  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  involve,  in  some  manner, 
the  other  nuclear  powers. 

The  Ultimate  Period 

Given  the  right  technical  and  political 
conditions,  we  would  hope  to  be  able  to 
continue  the  reduction  of  nuclear 
weapons  down  to  zero. 

The  global  elimination  of  nuclear 
weapons  would  be  accompanied  by 
widespread  deployments  of  effective 
non-nuclear  defenses.  These  defenses 
would  provide  assurance  that,  were  one 
country  to  cheat— for  example,  by 
clandestinely  building  ICBMs  or  shorter 
range  systems,  such  as  SS-20s— it 
would  not  be  able  to  achieve  any  ex- 
ploitable military  advantage.  To  over- 


MBFR  Talks  Resume  in  Vienna 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JAN.  31.  198.5' 

Today  in  Vienna,  members  of  NATO 
and  the  Warsaw  Pact  will  resume  their 
efforts  to  negotiate  reductions  of  con- 
ventional forces  in  central  Europe. 
These  talks  on  mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions  (MBFR)  are  an  integral 
and  important  part  of  our  commitment 
to  achieve  genuine  progress  in  arms 
reductions — conventional,  chemical,  and 
nuclear. 

It  is  clear  that  a  militarily  signifi- 
cant, verifiable  MBFR  agreement  is 
possible.  Last  April  the  NATO  par- 
ticipants tabled  a  major  initiative  de- 
signed to  break  the  East- West  deadlock. 


We  remain  hopeful  of  a  constructive 
reply  from  the  Warsaw  Pact  partici- 
pants. 

Last  month  the  NATO  alliance,  in  its 
ministerial  communique,  expressed  the 
continuing  Western  commitment  to  do 
everything  possible  to  achieve  a 
verifiable  agreement  reducing  conven- 
tional forces  to  parity  at  lower  levels. 
Such  an  agreement  would  enhance  con- 
fidence, improve  military  stability,  and 
reduce  the  risk  of  war  in  Europe. 

On  its  return  to  Vienna,  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation will  continue  to  do  its  part  to 
achieve  such  an  agreement. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feh.  4,  198.^i 


come  the  deployed  defenses,  cheating 
would  have  to  be  on  such  a  large  scale 
that  there  would  be  sufficient  notice  so 
that  countermeasures  could  be  taken. 

Were  we  to  reach  the  ultimate 
phase,  deterrence  would  be  based  on  the 
ability  of  the  defense  to  deny  success  to 
a  potential  aggressor's  attack.  The 
strategic  relationship  could  then  be 
characterized  as  one  of  mutual  assured 
security. 

Comments 

Having  thus  outlined  our  strategic  con- 
cept, let  me  offer  some  comments  and 
perhaps  anticipate  some  of  your  ques- 
tions. 

First,  the  concept  is  wholly  consist- 
ent with  deterrence.  In  both  the  transi- 
tion and  ultimate  phases,  deterrence 
would  continue  to  provide  the  basis  for 
the  U.S. -Soviet  strategic  relationship. 

Deterrence  requires  that  a  potential 
opponent  be  convinced  that  the  risks 
and  costs  of  aggression  far  outweigh  the 
gains  he  might  hope  to  achieve.  The 
popular  discussion  of  deterrence  has 
focused  almost  entirely  on  one 
element— that  is.  posing  to  an  aggressor 
high  potential  costs  through  the  ultimate 
threat  of  nuclear  retaliation. 

But  deterrence  can  also  function  if 
one  has  the  ability,  through  defense  and 
other  military  means,  to  deny  the  at- 
tacker the  gains  he  might  otherwise 
have  hoped  to  realize.  Our  intent  is  to 
shift  the  deterrent  balance  from  one 
which  is  based  primarily  on  the  ultimate 
threat  of  devastating  nuclear  retaliation 
to  one  in  which  non-nuclear  defenses 
play  a  greater  and  greater  role.  We 
believe  the  latter  provides  a  far  sounder 
basis  for  a  stable  and  reliable  strategic 
relationship. 

My  second  comment  is  that  we 
recognize  that  the  transition  period— if 
defensive  technologies  prove  feasible 
and  we  decide  to  move  in  that  direc- 
tion— could  be  tricky.  We  would  have  to 
avoid  a  mix  of  offensive  and  defensive 
systems  that,  in  a  crisis,  would  give  one 
side  or  the  other  incentives  to  strike 
first.  That  is  precisely  why  we  would 
seek  to  make  the  transition  a  coopera- 
tive endeavor  with  the  Soviets  and  have 
offered,  even  now,  to  begin  talking  with 
them  about  the  issues  that  would  have 
to  be  dealt  with  in  such  a  transition. 

My  third  comment  is  that  we  realize 
that  a  world  from  which  nuclear 
weapons  have  been  eliminated  would 
still  present  major  risks.  The  technique 
of  making  nuclear  weapons  is  well 
known;  that  knowledge  cannot  be  ex- 
cised. The  danger  of  breakout  or 
cheating  would  continue.  Moreover, 
there  would  also  be  the  potential  prob- 
lem of  suitcase  nuclear  bombs  and  the 
like. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


But  even  if  all  risks  cannot  be 
jliminated,  they  can  be  greatly  reduced. 
Nothing  is  wholly  risk  free;  one  must 
compare  the  alternatives.  It  seems  to  me 
:hat  the  risks  posed  by  cheating  or  suit- 
case bombs  in  a  world  from  which 
luclear  arms  had  been  eliminated  from 
military  arsenals  would  be  orders  of 
magnitude  less  than  the  risks  and  poten- 
;ial  costs  posed  by  a  possible  breakdown 
n  the  present  deterrence  regime  based 
ipon  the  ultimate  threat  of  massive 
luclear  retaliation. 

The  Geneva  Talks 

J.S.  and  Soviet  delegations  will  meet  in 
jeneva  in  roughly  3  weeks'  time  to 
Degin  negotiations  on  nuclear  and  space 
irms.  In  those  talks,  we  will  advance 
positions  consistent  with  and  designed  to 
hirther  the  concept  I  have  outlined. 

At  the  end  of  January,  I  was  asked 
)y  the  press  whether  I  was  confident 
ibout  the  outcome  of  the  upcoming 
^Iks.  I  replied  that  I  was  more  confi- 
tient  than  previously— that  is,  before  the 
Geneva  meeting  between  Mr.  Shultz  and 
Air.  Gromyko — but  I  still  wasn't  very 
•onfident.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that 
.here  are  profound  differences  of  ap- 
proach between  the  two  sides. 

In  Geneva,  Mr.  Gromyko  stated  the 
soviet  position  clearly  and  unambiguous- 
ly. It  has,  since  then,  been  repeated  by 
nany  Soviet  commentators.  The  Soviets 
nsist  on  the  "nonmilitarization"  of  space; 
ly  that,  they  mean  a  ban  on  all  arms  in 
■pace  that  are  designed  to  attack  objects 
n  space  or  on  Earth  and  all  systems  on 
Carth  that  are  designed  to  attack  ob- 
ecls  in  space.  They  have  expressed  op- 
josition  to  research  efforts  into  such 
ystems,  in  spite  of  their  own  sizable  ef- 
orts  in  this  field,  which  include  the  only 
■urrently  operational  ABM  and  anti- 
.atellite  systems. 

As  to  offensive  arms  reductions,  the 
Soviets  have  yet  to  acknowledge  the 
egitimacy  of  our  concern  about  the 
hreat  we  see  in  their  large,  highly 
vIIRVed  ICBM  force.  They  continue  to 
lemand  compensation  for  British  and 
''rench  nuclear  forces  and  assert  that 
J.S.  Pershing  II  and  ground-launched 
■ruise  missiles  somehow  represent  a 
nore  odious  threat  than  that  posed  to 
\IATO  Europe  by  the  hundreds  of 
^S-20  missiles  now  deployed. 

In  addition,  the  Soviets  maintain 
hat  the  three  subject  areas— strategic 
mclear,  intermediate-range  nuclear,  and 
iefense  and  space  arms — must  not  only 
)e  discussed  in  their  interrelationship, 
iut  that  it  is  not  possible  to  implement 
m  agreement  in  one  area  without  agree- 
nent  in  the  others.  We  believe  other- 
A'lso;  if  the  sides  come  to  agreement  in 


one  area,  we  see  no  sense  in  a  self- 
denying  rule  that  would  prevent  the 
sides  from  implementing  an  agreement 
that  would  serve  the  interests  of  both. 
There  are  obvious  differences.  We 
will  present  our  views  and  listen  care- 
fully to  Soviet  proposals.  We  do  not  ex- 
pect the  Soviets  to  accept  immediately 
our  viewpoint  or  our  concept  as  to  how 
the  future  strategic  relationship  should 
evolve.  The  negotiators  have  their  work 
cut  out  for  them;  the  process  will  be 
complex  and  could  well  be  lengthy.  But 
with  persistence,  patience,  and  construc- 
tive ideas,  we  hope  the  Soviets  will  come 
to  see  the  merits  of  our  position— that  it 
will  serve  their  national  interests  as  well 


Conclusion 

At  the  beginning  of  my  remarks,  I  noted 
that  the  elimination  of  nuclear  weapons 


has  often  seemed  an  impractical  goal, 
one  which  has  received  little  more  than 
lip  service.  As  you  can  see,  the  United 
States  is  going  beyond  that;  the  Presi- 
dent has  initiated  a  serious  effort  to  see 
how  it  can  be  accomplished. 

We  do  not  underestimate  the  dif- 
ficulties in  reaching  that  objective.  Quite 
frankly,  it  may  prove  impossible  to  ob- 
tain; and,  even  if  we  do  eventually  reach 
it,  it  will  not  be  for  many,  many 
years— perhaps  well  into  the  next  cen- 
tury. 

But  we  cannot  be  anything  but 
uneasy  about  the  current  situation,  in 
which  the  nuclear  arsenals  of  the  world 
total  tens  of  thousands  of  nuclear 
weapons.  We  owe  it  to  our  children,  our 
grandchildren,  and— in  my  case— to  my 
great-grandchild  to  hold  out  for  and  to 
work  toward  some  brighter  vision  for 
the  future.  ■ 


Report  on  Soviet  Noncompliance 
With  Arms  Control  Agreements 


The  following  is  the  text  of  President 
Reagan's  message  to  the  Congress  trans- 
mitting his  unclassified  report  on  Soviet 
noncomplianee  with  arms  control  agree- 
ments a^  required  by  the  FY  1985 
Defense  Authorization  Act^ 

MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  1,  1985 

During  1984,  at  the  request  of  the  Congress, 
I  forwarded  two  reports  to  the  Congress  on 
arms  control  compliance.  The  first,  forwarded 
last  January,  was  an  in-depth  analysis  of 
seven  specific  issues  of  violations  or  probable 
violations  by  the  Soviet  Union  of  arms  con- 
trol obligations  and  commitments.  The  second 
report,  forwarded  in  October,  was  an  ad- 
visory study  prepared  independently  by  the 
General  Advisory  Committee  on  Arms  Con- 
trol and  Disarmament.  These  reports  indicate 
that  there  is  cause  for  serious  concern 
regarding  the  Soviet  Union's  conduct  with 
respect  to  observance  of  arms  control 
agreements. 

In  the  FY-1985  Defense  Authorization 
Act  and  the  Conference  Report  on  that  Act, 
the  Congress  called  for  additional  classified 
and  unclassified  reports  regarding  a  wide 
range  of  questions  concerning  the  Soviet 
Union's  compliance  with  arms  control  com- 
mitments. The  Administration  is  responding 
to  these  requests  by  providing  both  classified 
and  unclassified  reports  which  update  the 
seven  issues  initially  analyzed  in  the  January 
1984  report,  and  analyze  a  number  of  addi- 
tional issues. 


L„ 


In  this  unclassified  report  the  United 
States  Government  reaffirms  the  conclusions 
of  its  January  1984  report  that  the  USSR  has 
violated  the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  the  Geneva 
Protocol  on  Chemical  Weapons,  the  Biological 
and  Toxin  Weapons  Convention,  and  two  pro- 
visions of  SALT  II  [strategic  arms  limitation 
talks]:  telemetry  encryption  and  ICBM  [inter- 
continental ballistic  missile]  modernization. 
The  United  States  Government  also  reaffirms 
its  previous  conclusions  that  the  USSR  has 
probably  violated  the  SS-16  deployment  pro- 
hibition of  SALT  II  and  is  likely  to  have 
violated  the  nuclear  testing  yield  limit  of  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty.  In  addition,  the 
Uniti  1  States  Government  has  determined 
that  the  USSR  has  violated  the  ABM  [Anti- 
Ballistic  Missile]  Treaty  (through  the  siting, 
orientation,  and  capability  of  the  Krasnoyarsk 
Radar),  violated  the  Limited  Test  Ban  Trea- 
ty, and  violated  the  SALT  II  provision  pro- 
hibiting more  than  one  new  type  of  ICBM, 
and  probably  violated  the  ABM  Treaty 
restriction  on  concurrent  testing  of  SAM 
[surface-to-air  missiles]  and  ABM  com- 
ponents. Evidence  regarding  the  USSR's 
compliance  with  the  ABM  Treaty  provision 
on  component  mobility  was  determined  to  be 
ambiguous.  In  addition,  the  United  States 
Government  is  concerned  about  Soviet 
preparations  for  a  prohibited  territorial  ABM 
defense.  Further,  the  USSR  was  determined 
to  be  currently  in  compliance  with  those  pro- 
visions of  the  SALT  I  Interim  Agreement 
and  its  implementing  procedures  that  deal 
with  reuse  of  dismantled  ICBM  sites  and 
with  the  reconfiguration  of  dismantled 
ballistic  missile  launching  submarines. 


29 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Beyond  the  issues  that  are  treated  in  the 
unclassified  report  released  today,  there  are 
other  compliance  issues  that  will  not  be 
publicly  disclosed  at  this  time  but  which  re- 
main under  review.  As  we  continue  to  work 
on  these  issues,  we  will  brief  and  consult  with 
the  Congress  in  detail  and  will,  to  the  max- 
imum extent  possible,  keep  the  public  in- 
formed on  our  findings. 

In  order  for  arms  control  to  have  mean- 
ing and  credibly  contribute  to  national  securi- 
ty and  to  global  or  regional  stability,  it  is 
essential  that  all  parties  to  agreements  fully 
comply  with  them.  Strict  compliance  with  all 
provisions  of  arms  control  agreements  is  fun- 
damental, and  this  Administration  will  not  ac- 
cept anything  less.  To  do  so  would  undermine 
the  arms  control  process  and  damage  the 
chances  for  establishing  a  more  constructive 
U.S.-Soviet  relationship. 

As  I  stated  last  January,  Soviet  n(jn- 
compliance  is  a  serious  matter.  It  calls  into 
question  important  security  benefits  from 
arms  control,  and  could  create  new  security 
risks.  It  undermines  the  confidence  essential 
to  an  effective  arms  control  process  in  the 
future.  With  regard  to  the  issues  analyzed  in 
the  January  1984  report,  the  Soviet  Union 
has  thus  far  not  provided  satisfactory  ex- 
planations nor  undertaken  corrective  actions 
sufficient  to  alleviate  our  concerns.  The 
United  States  Government  has  vigorously 
pressed,  and  will  continue  to  press,  these 
compliance  issues  with  the  Soviet  Union 
through  diplomatic  channels. 

Our  approach  in  pursuing  these  issues 
with  the  Soviet  Union  is  to  ensure  that  both 
the  letter  and  intent  of  treaty  obligations  and 
commitments  will  be  fulfilled.  To  this  end  the 
Administration  is:  analyzing  further  issues  of 
possible  non-compliance;  as  noted  above, 
seeking  from  the  Soviet  Union  through  diplo- 
matic channels  explanations,  clarifications, 
and,  where  necessary,  corrective  actions: 
reporting  on  such  issues  to  the  Congress;  and 
taking  into  account  in  our  defense  moderniza- 
tion plans  the  security  implications  of  arms 
control  violations.  At  the  same  time,  the 
United  States  is  continuing  to  carry  out  its 
own  obligations  and  commitments  under  rele- 
vant agreements.  Our  objectives  in  the  new 
negotiations  which  begin  in  March  are  to  re- 
verse the  erosion  of  the  ABM  Treaty  and  to 
seek  equitable,  effectively  verifiable  arms 
control  agreements  which  will  result  in  real 
reductions  and  enhanced  stability.  While  all 
of  these  steps  can  help,  however,  it  is  funda- 
mentally important  that  the  Soviet  Union 
take  a  constructive  attitude  toward  full  com- 
pliance with  all  arms  control  obligations  and 
commitments. 

The  Administration  and  the  Congress 
have  a  shared  interest  in  supporting  the  arms 
control  process.  For  this  reason,  increased 
understanding  of  Soviet  violations  or  prob- 
able violations,  and  a  strong  Congressional 
consensus  on  the  importance  of  compliance  to 
achieving  effective  arms  control,  will 
strengthen  our  efforts  both  in  the  new 
negotiations  and  in  seeking  corrective  actions 
from  the  Soviet  Union. 


I  look  forward  to  continued  close  con- 
sultation with  the  Congress  as  we  seek  to 
make  progress  in  resolving  compliance  issues 
and  in  negotiating  sound  arms  control  agree- 
ments. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reag.^n 


UNCLASSIFIED  REPORT, 
FEB.  1,  1985 

Soviet  Noncompliance  With 
Arms  Control  Agreements 

INTRODUCTION 

In  January  1984,  the  President,  in  re- 
sponse to  Congressional  requests,  re- 
ported to  the  Congress  on  several  issues 
involving  violations  or  probable  viola- 
tions by  the  Soviet  Union  of  existing 
arms  control  agreements,  including:  the 
Geneva  Protocol  on  Chemical  Weapons, 
the  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons  Con- 
vention, the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  the 
ABM  Treaty,  SALT  II,  and  the  Thresh- 
old Test  Ban  Treaty. 

In  that  report  the  President  stated: 

If  the  concept  of  arms  control  is  to  have 
meaning  and  credibility  as  a  contribution  to 
global  or  regional  stability,  it  is  essential  that 
all  parties  to  agreements  comply  with  them. 
Because  1  seek  genuine  arms  control,  I  am 
committed  to  ensuring  that  existing  agree- 
ments are  observed. 

The  President  further  noted  that: 

Soviet  noncompliance  is  a  serious  matter. 
It  calls  into  question  important  security  bene- 
fits from  arms  control,  and  could  create  new 
security  risks.  It  undermines  the  confidence 
e.ssential  to  an  effective  arms  control  process 
in  the  future.  It  increases  doubts  about  the 
reliability  of  the  USSR  as  a  negotiating  part- 
ner, and  thus  damages  the  chances  ffir  estab- 
lishing a  more  constructive  U.S.-Soviet  rela- 
tionship. 

The  current  unclassified  report  pro- 
vides updated  information  on  the  seven 
issues  previously  reported  and  addi- 
tionally reviews  six  other  compliance 
issues  that  have  been  intensively  studied 
since  the  January  1984  report  was  com- 
pleted, for  a  total  of  thirteen  issues.  The 
six  new  cases  involve  questions  of  Soviet 
compliance  with  provisions  of  the 
SALT  I  Interim  Agreement,  the  Limited 
Test  Ban  Treaty  (LTBT),  and  the  Anti- 
Ballistic  Missile  (ABM)  Treaty. 

•  With  regard  to  the  SALT  I  In- 
terim Agreement,  this  report  examines 
the  evidence  on  two  issues:  (1)  whether 
the  USSR  has  made  prohibited  use  of 
remaining  facilities  at  dismantled  former 
ICBM  sites;  (2)  whether  the  USSR  has 


reconfigured  dismantled  ballistic  missile 
submarines  in  a  manner  prohibited  by 
Treaty  or  Protocol  provisions. 

•  With  regard  to  the  Limited  Test 
Ban  Treaty  (LTBT),  this  report  ex- 
amines whether  the  USSR  vented 
nuclear  debris  from  underground 
nuclear  tests  beyond  its  territorial  limits 
in  contravention  of  the  LTBT. 

•  With  regard  to  the  ABM  Treaty, 
this  report  examines  whether  the  USSR 
has:  concurrently  tested  SAM  and  ABM 
components;  developed,  tested,  or  de- 
ployed mobile  ABM  components;  and/or 
has  provided  a  base  for  territorial 
defense. 

In  this  report  the  United  States 
Government  reaffirms  the  conclusions  of 
its  January  1984  report  that  the  USSR 
has  violated  the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  the 
Geneva  Protocol  on  Chemical  Weapons, 
the  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons  Con- 
vention, and  two  provisions  of  SALT  II: 
telemetry  encryption  and  ICBM  modern- 
ization. The  United  States  Government 
also  reaffirms  its  previous  conclusions 
that  the  USSR  has  probably  violated  the 
SS-16  deployment  prohibition  of 
SALT  II  and  is  likely  to  have  violated 
the  nuclear  testing  yield  limit  of  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty.  In  addition, 
the  United  States  Government  has  de- 
termined that  the  USSR  has  violated  the 
ABM  Treaty  through  the  siting,  orienta- 
tion, and  capability  of  the  Krasnoyarsk 
Radar  and  the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty; 
by  testing  the  SS-X-25  ICBM  in  addi- 
tion to  the  SS-X-24  ICBM,  violated  the 
SALT  II  "new  types"  provision  limiting 
each  party  to  one  new  type  ICBM;  and 
probably  violated  the  prohibition  against 
concurrent  testing  of  SAM  and  ABM 
components.  Moreover,  the  Soviet 
Union's  ABM  and  ABM-related  actions 
suggest  that  the  USSR  may  be  prepar- 
ing an  ABM  defense  of  its  national  ter- 
ritory. Evidence  regarding  the  USSR's 
compliance  with  the  ABM  Treaty  provi- 
sion on  component  mobility  was  deter- 
mined to  be  ambiguous,  and  the  USSR 
was  determined  to  be  currently  in  com- 
pliance with  provisions  of  the  SALT  I 
Interim  Agreement  and  its  implement- 
ing procedures  that  deal  with  re-use  of 
dismantled  ICBM  sites  and  the  recon- 
figuration of  dismantled  ballistic  missile 
launching  submarines. 

In  addition  to  the  issues  regarding 
Soviet  compliance  with  arms  control 
agreements  which  are  addressed  in  this 
unclassified  report,  there  are  other  com- 
pliance matters  currently  under  review  _ 
which  cannot  be  publicly  disclosed  at  this ' 
time  and  which  we  intend  to  brief  to  the 
Congress  on  a  classified  basis  in  the 
near  future. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


In  examining  the  issues  in  this  un- 
classified report,  as  well  as  in  the 
classified  report  to  follow,  we  have 
focused  on  questions  of  Soviet  noncom- 
pliance. Questions  of  Soviet  noncom- 
pliance have  not  arisen  with  regard  to 
several  other  provisions  of  these  agree- 
ments, nor  with  certain  other  treaties, 
such  as  the  Antarctic  Treaty,  the  Outer 
Space  Treaty,  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty,  the  Seabed  Arms  Control  Trea- 
ty, the  Environmental  Modification  Con- 
vention, and  others. 

The  issues  we  have  analyzed  raise 
very  serious  concerns.  The  United 
States  Government  firmly  believes  that 
in  order  for  arms  control  to  have  mean- 
ing and  credibly  contribute  to  national 
security  and  to  global  and  regional 
stability,  it  is  essential  that  all  parties  to 
agreements  fully  comply  with  them. 
Strict  compliance  with  all  provisions  of 
arms  control  agreements  is  fundamen- 
tal, and  the  United  States  Government 
will  not  accept  anything  less:  to  do  so 
would  undermine  the  arms  control  proc- 
ess and  damage  the  chances  for  estab- 
lishing a  more  constructive  U.S. -Soviet 
relationship. 

THE  FINDINGS 

Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons 
Convention  and  1925  Geneva  Protocol 

1.  Chemical,  Biological, 
and  Toxin  Weapons 

•  Treaty  Status:  The  1972  Biologi- 
cal and  Toxin  Weapons  Convention  (the 
BWC)  and  the  1925  Geneva  Protocol  are 
multilateral  treaties  to  which  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  are 
parties.  Soviet  actions  not  in  accord  with 
these  treaties  and  customary  interna- 
tional law  relating  to  the  1925  Geneva 
Protocol  are  violations  of  legal  obliga- 
tions. 

•  Obligations:  The  BWC  bans  the 
development,  production,  stockpiling,  or 
possession,  and  transfer  of:  microbial  or 
other  biological  agents  or  toxins  except 
for  a  small  quantity  for  prophylactic, 
protective,  or  other  peaceful  purposes.  It 
also  bans  weapons,  equipment,  and 
means  of  delivery  of  agents  or  toxins. 
The  1925  Geneva  Protocol  and  related 
rules  of  customary  international  law  pro- 
hibit the  first  use  in  war  of  asphyxiat- 
ing, poisonous,  or  other  gases  and  of  all 
analogous  liquids,  materials,  or  devices; 
and  prohibits  use  of  bacteriological 
methods  of  warfare. 

•  Issues:  The  January  1984  compli- 
ance report  addressed  whether  the 
Soviets  are  in  violation  of  provisions 


that  ban  the  development,  production, 
transfer,  possession,  and  use  of  biologi- 
cal and  toxin  weapons.  Soviet  compli- 
ance was  reexamined  for  this  report. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that  evidence  during  1984  con- 
firm and  strengthen  the  conclusion  of 
the  January  1984  report  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  maintained  an  offensive  bio- 
logical warfare  program  and  capability 
in  violation  of  its  legal  obligation  under 
the  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons  Con- 
vention of  1972. 

Although  there  have  been  no  con- 
firmed chemical  and  toxin  attacks  in 
Kampuchea,  Laos,  or  Afghanistan  in 
1984,  there  is  no  basis  for  amending  the 
January  1984  conclusion  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  been  involved  in  the  produc- 
tion, transfer,  and  use  of  trichothecene 
mycotoxins  for  hostile  purposes  in  Laos, 
Kampuchea,  and  Afghanistan  in  viola- 
tion of  its  legal  obligation  under  interna- 
tional law  as  codified  in  the  Geneva  Pro- 
tocol of  1925  and  the  Biological  and  Tox- 
in Weapons  Convention  of  1972. 

Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty 

2.  Underground  Nuclear  Test  Venting 

•  Treaty  Status:  The  Treaty  Ban- 
ning Nuclear  Weapon  Tests  in  the  At- 
mosphere, in  Outer  Space  and  Under 
Water  (Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty 
(LTBT))  is  a  multilateral  treaty  that 
entered  into  force  for  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  in  1963.  Soviet  ac- 
tions not  in  accord  with  this  treaty  are 
violations  of  a  legal  obligation. 

•  Obligations:  The  LTBT  specifical- 
ly prohibits  nuclear  explosions  in  the  at- 
mosphere, in  outer  space,  and  under 
water.  It  also  prohibits  nuclear  explo- 
sions in  any  other  environment  "if  such 
explosion  causes  radioactive  debris  to  be 
present  outside  the  territorial  limits  of 
the  State  under  whose  jurisdiction  or 
control  such  explosion  is  conducted." 

•  Issue:  The  U.S.  examined 
whether  the  USSR's  underground 
nuclear  tests  have  caused  radioactive 
debris  to  be  present  outside  of  its  ter- 
ritorial limits. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that  the  Soviet  Union's  under- 
ground nuclear  test  practices  have  re- 
sulted in  the  venting  of  radioactive  mat- 
ter and  caused  radioactive  matter  to  be 
present  outside  the  Soviet  Union's  terri- 
torial limits  in  violations  of  its  legal 
obligation  to  the  Limited  Test  Ban  Trea- 
ty. The  Soviet  Union  has  failed  to  take 
the  precautions  necessary  to  minimize 
the  contamination  of  man's  environment 
by  radioactive  substances  despite  U.S. 
request  for  corrective  action. 


Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty 

3.  Nuclear  Testing  and  the 
150  Kiloton  Limit 

•  Treaty  Status:  The  Threshold 
Test  Ban  Treaty  (TTBT)  was  signed  in 
1974.  The  Treaty  has  not  been  ratified 
but  neither  party  has  indicated  an  inten- 
tion not  to  ratify.  Therefore,  both  par- 
ties are  subject  to  the  obligation  under 
customary  international  law  to  refrain 
from  acts  which  would  defeat  the  object 
and  purpose  of  the  TTBT.  Soviet  actions 
that  would  defeat  the  object  and  purpose 
of  the  TTBT  are  therefore  violations  of 
their  legal  obligation.  The  United  States 
is  seeking  to  negotiate  improved 
verification  measures  for  the  Treaty. 
Both  Parties  have  separately  stated  they 
would  observe  the  150  kiloton  threshold 
of  the  TTBT. 

•  Obligation:  The  Treaty  prohibits 
any  underground  nuclear  weapon  test 
having  a  yield  exceeding  150  kilotons  at 
any  place  under  the  jurisdiction  or  con- 
trol of  the  Parties,  beginning  March  31, 
1976.  In  view  of  the  technical  uncertain- 
ties associated  with  estimating  the 
precise  yield  of  nuclear  weapons  tests, 
the  sides  agreed  that  one  or  two  slight 
unintended  breaches  per  year  would  not 
be  considered  a  violation. 

•  Issue:  The  January  1984  report 
examined  whether  the  Soviets  have  con- 
ducted nuclear  tests  in  excess  of  150 
kilotons.  This  issue  was  reexamined  for 
this  report. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that,  while  ambig^uities  in  the  pat- 
tern of  Soviet  testing  and  verification 
uncertainties  continued  in  1984,  evi- 
dence available  through  the  year  con- 
firms the  January  1984  finding  that 
Soviet  nuclear  testing  activities  for  a 
number  of  tests  constitute  a  likely  viola- 
tion of  legal  obligations  under  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  of  1974, 
which  banned  underground  nuclear  tests 
with  yields  exceeding  150  kilotons. 
These  Soviet  actions  continue  despite 
U.S.  requests  for  corrective  measures. 

Helsinki  Final  Act 

4.  Helsinki  Final  Act  Notification  of 
Military  Exercises 

•  Legal  Status:  The  Final  Act  of 
the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  was  signed  in 
Helsinki  in  1975.  This  document 
represents  a  political  commitment  and 
was  signed  by  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  along  with  many  other 
States.  Soviet  actions  not  in  accord  with 


April  1985 


31 


ARMS  CONTROL 


that  document  are  violations  of  their 
political  commitment. 

•  Obligation:  All  signatory  States 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  are  committed 
to  give  prior  notification  of,  and  other 
details  concerning,  major  military 
maneuvers,  defined  as  those  involving 
more  than  25,000  ground  troops. 

•  Issues:  The  January  1984  com- 
pliance report  examined  whether 
notification  of  the  Soviet  military  exer- 
cise Zapad-81  was  inadequate  and 
therefore  a  violation  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  political  commitment  under  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act.  The  USSR's  com- 
pliance with  its  notification  commitment 
was  reexamined  for  this  report. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
previously  judged  that  the  Soviet  Union 
violated  its  political  commitment  to 
observe  the  prior-notification  provisions 
of  Basket  I  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act, 
which  requires  notification  and  other  in- 
formation concerning  exercises  ex- 
ceeding 25,000  ground  troops.  A  major 
Warsaw  Pact  maneuver  (Zapad-81),  ex- 
ceeding the  25,000  troop  limit,  was  con- 
ducted in  1981  at  a  time  great  pressure 
was  being  put  on  Poland,  and  the  Soviet 
Union  did  not  provide  the  pre-notifi- 
cation  or  other  information  required. 
The  judgment  that  the  Soviet  tfnion  did 
not  observe  the  prior  notification  provi- 
sions of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  is  con- 
firmed. 

While  the  USSR  and  Warsaw  Pact 
states  have  generally  taken  an  approach 
to  the  confidence-building  measures  of 
the  Final  Act  which  minimizes  the  infor- 
mation they  provide,  Soviet  compliance 
with  the  exercise-notification  provisions 
was  much  improved  in  1983.  However, 
during  1984,  the  USSR  returned  to  a 
minimalist  stance,  providing  only  the 
bare  minimum  required  under  the  Final 
Act. 

SALT  I  Interim  Agreement 

•  Treaty  Status:  The  SALT  I  In- 
terim Agreement  entered  into  force  for 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
in  1972.  Dismantling  procedures  im- 
plementing the  Interim  Agreement  were 
concluded  in  1974.  The  Interim  Agree- 
ment, by  its  own  terms,  was  of  limited 
duration  and  expired  as  a  legally  binding 
document  in  19'77.  The  applicability  of 
the  Interim  Agreement  to  the  actions  of 
both  parties  has,  however,  been  ex- 
tended by  the  parties  by  a  series  of 
mutual  political  commitments,  including 
the  President's  May  31,  1982  stjitement 
that  the  United  States  would  refrain 
from  actions  which  would  undercut 
existing  strategic  arms  agreements  so 


long  as  the  Soviet  Union  shows  equal 
restraint.  The  Soviets  have  told  us  they 
would  abide  by  the  SALT  I  Interim 
Agreement  and  SALT  II.  Any  actions 
by  the  USSR  inconsistent  with  this  com- 
mitment are  violations  of  its  political 
commitment  with  respect  to  the  Interim 
Agreement  and  its  implementing  pro- 
cedures. 

Two  issues  were  analyzed  for  this 
report:  Soviet  activities  at  dismantled 
ICBM  sites,  and  reconfiguration  of  a 
Yankee-Class  ballistic  missile  submarine. 

5.  Mobile  Missile  Base  Construction 
at  Dismantled  SS-7  ICBM  Sites 

•  Obligation:  The  SALT  I  Interim 
Agreement  and  its  procedures  prohibit 
the  parties  from  using  facilities  remain- 
ing at  dismantled  or  destroyed  ICBM 
sites  for  storage,  support,  or  launch  of 
ICBMs.  Any  Soviet  actions  inconsistent 
with  this  commitment  are  violations  of  a 
political  commitment  with  respect  to  the 
Interim  Agreement  and  its  implement- 
ing procedures. 

•  Issue:  The  U.S.  examined 
whether  the  USSR  has  used  former 
ICBM  sites  in  a  manner  inconsistent 
with  its  political  commitment  under  the 
Interim  Agreement  and  its  implemen- 
ting procedures. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that  Soviet  activity  apparently 
related  to  SS-X-25  ICBM  deployments 
at  two  former  SS-7  bases  does  not  at 
present  violate  the  agreed  implementing 
procedures  of  the  SALT  I  Interim 
Agreement.  However,  ongoing  activities 
raise  concerns  about  compliance  for  the 
future,  since  use  of  "remaining  facilities" 
to  support  ICBMs  at  deactivated  SS-7 
sites  would  be  in  violation  of  Soviet  com- 
mitments. The  U.S.  will  continue  to 
monitor  developments  closely. 

6.  Reconfiguration  of  Yankee-Class 
Ballistic  Missile  Submarines 

•  Obligations:  The  SALT  I  Interim 
Agreement  and  its  procedures  require 
that  submarines  limited  by  the  Agree- 
ment be  dismantled  or  be  reconfigured 
into  submarines  without  ballistic  missile 
capabilities.  Any  Soviet  actions  incon- 
sistent with  this  obligation  are  violations 
of  a  political  commitment. 

•  Issue:  The  U.S.  examined 
whether  the  USSR's  reconfiguration  of  a 
submarine  to  increase  its  length,  and  for 
use  as  a  platform  for  modern  long-range 
cruise  missiles,  is  consistent  with  its 
political  commitments  under  the  Interim 
Agreement  and  its  implementing  pro- 
cedures. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that  the  Soviet  Union's  conver- 


sion of  a  dismantled  SSBN  into  a  sub- 
marine longer  than  the  original,  and 
carrying  modern,  long-range  cruise 
missiles  is  not  a  violation  of  its  political 
commitment  under  the  SALT  I  Interim 
Agreement,  but  constitutes  a  threat  to 
U.S.  and  Allied  security  similar  to  the 
original  Yankee-Class  submarine. 

SALT  II  Treaty 

•  Treaty  Status:  SALT  II  was 
signed  in  June  1979  and  has  not  been 
ratified.  In  1981  the  United  States  made 
clear  to  the  Soviet  Union  its  intention 
not  to  ratify  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  Prior 
to  this  clarification  of  our  position  in 
1981,  both  nations  were  obligated  under 
customary  international  law  not  to  take 
actions  which  would  defeat  the  object 
and  purpose  of  the  signed,  but  unrati- 
fied. Treaty.  Such  Soviet  actions  prior  to 
1981  are  violations  of  legal  obligations. 
Since  1981,  the  United  States  has 
observed  a  political  commitment  to 
refrain  from  actions  that  undercut  the 
SALT  II  Treaty  so  long  as  the  Soviet 
Union  does  likewise.  The  Soviets  have 
told  us  they  also  would  abide  by  these 
provisions.  Soviet  actions  inconsistent 
with  this  commitment  are  violations  of 
their  political  commitment  with  respect 
to  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 

Three  SALT  II  issues  are  included 
in  this  unclassified  report:  encryption  of 
telemetry,  SS-X-25  ICBM,  and  SS-16 
ICBM  deployment. 

7.  Encryption  of  Ballistic  Missile 
Telemetry 

•  Obligation:  The  provisions  of 
SALT  II  ban  deliberate  concealment 
measures  that  impede  verification  by  na- 
tional technical  means.  The  Treaty  per- 
mits each  party  to  use  various  methods 
of  transmitting  telemetric  information 
during  testing,  including  encryption,  but 
bans  deliberate  denial  of  telemetry,  such 
as  through  encryption,  whenever  such 
denial  impedes  verification. 

•  Issue:  The  January  1984  com- 
pliance report  examined  whether  the 
Soviet  Union  has  engaged  in  encryption 
of  missile  test  telemetry  (radio  signals) 
so  as  to  impede  verification.  This  issue 
was  reexamined  for  this  report. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
reaffirms  the  conclusion  in  the  January 
1984  report  that  Soviet  encryption  prac- 
tices constitute  a  violation  of  a  legal 
obligation  under  SALT  II  prior  to  1981 
and  a  violation  of  their  political  commit- 
ment since  1982.  The  nature  and  extent 
of  such  encryption  of  telemetry  on  new 
ballistic  missiles,  despite  U.S.  request 
for  corrective  action,  continues  to  be  an 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


example  of  deliberately  impeding  verifi- 
cation of  compliance  in  violation  of  this 
Soviet  political  commitment. 

8.  The  SS-X-25  ICBM 

•  Obligation:  In  an  attempt  to  con- 
strain the  modernization  and  the  pro- 
liferation of  new,  more  capable  types  of 
ICBMs,  the  provisions  of  SALT  II  per- 
mit each  side  to  "flight  test  and  deploy" 
just  one  new  type  of  "light"  ICBM.  A 
new  type  is  defined  as  one  that  differs 
from  an  existing  type  by  more  than 

5  percent  in  length,  largest  diameter, 
launch-weight,  and  throw-weight  or  dif- 
fers in  number  of  stages  or  propellant 
type.  In  addition,  it  was  agreed  that  no 
single  re-entry  vehicle  ICBM  of  an  exist- 
ing type  with  a  post-boost  vehicle  would 
be  flight-tested  or  deployed  whose  reen- 
try vehicle  weight  is  less  than  50  percent 
of  the  throw-weight  of  that  ICBM.  This 
latter  provision  was  intended  to  prohibit 
the  possibility  that  single  warhead 
ICBMs  could  quickly  be  converted  to 
MIRVed  [multiple  independently- 
targetable  reentry  vehicles]  systems. 

•  Issues:  The  Soviets  declared  the 
SS-X-24  to  be  their  allowed  one  new 
type  ICBM.  The  January  1984  report  ex- 
amined the  issues:  whether  the  Soviets 
have  tested  a  second  new  type  of  ICBM 
(the  SS-X-25)  which  is  prohibited; 
whether  the  reentry  vehicle  (RV)  on  that 
missile,  if  it  is  not  a  new  type,  is  in  com- 
pliance with  the  provision  that  for  ex- 
isting types  of  single  RV  missiles,  the 
weight  of  the  RV  be  equal  to  at  least 

50  percent  of  total  throw-weight;  and 
whether  encryption  of  SS-X-25  flight 
test  telemetry  impedes  verification.  The 
U.S.  reexamined  these  issues  for  this 
report. 

•  Finding: 

a.  Second  New  Type:  The  U.S. 
Government  judges  that  the  SS-X-25  is 
a  prohibited  second  "new"  type  of  ICBM 
and  that  its  testing,  in  addition  to  the 
SS-X-24  ICBM,  thereby  is  a  violation  of 
the  Soviet  Union's  political  commitment 
to  observe  the  "new"  type  provision  of 
the  SALT  II  Treaty.  Despite  U.S.  re- 
quests, no  corrective  action  has  been 
taken. 

b.  RV-to-Throw-Weight  Ratio: 
The  U.S.  Government  reaffirms  the  con- 
clusion of  the  January  1984  report 
regarding  the  SS-X-25  RV-to-throw- 
weight  ratio.  That  is,  if  we  were  to  ac- 
cept the  Soviet  argument  that  the 
SS-X-25  is  not  a  prohibited  new  type  of 
ICBM,  it  would  be  a  violation  of  their 
political  commitment  to  observe  the 
SALT  II  provision  which  prohibits  the 
testing  of  such  an  existing  ICBM  with  a 


single  reentry  vehicle  whose  weight  is 
less  than  50  percent  of  the  throw-weight 
of  the  ICBM. 

c.  Encryption:  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment reaffirms  its  judgment  made  in  the 
January  1984  report  regarding  telem- 
etry encryption  during  tests  of  the 
SS-X-25.  Encryption  during  tests  of 
this  missile  is  illustrative  of  the  delib- 
erate impeding  of  verification  of  com- 
pliance in  violation  of  a  legal  obligation 
prior  to  1981,  and  of  the  USSR's 
political  commitment  subsequent  to 
1981. 

9.  SS-16  Deployment 

•  Obligation:  The  Soviet  Union 
agreed  in  SALT  II  not  to  produce,  test, 
or  deploy  ICBMs  of  the  SS-16  type  and, 
in  particular,  not  to  produce  the  SS-16 
third  stage  or  the  reentry  vehicle  of  that 
missile. 

•  Issue:  The  January  1984  report 
examined  the  evidence  regarding 
whether  the  Soviets  have  deployed  the 
SS-16  ICBM  in  spite  of  the  ban  on  its 
deployment.  The  U.S.  reexamined  this 
issue  for  this  report. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
reaffirms  the  judgment  made  in  the 
January  1984  report.  While  the  evidence 
is  somewhat  ambiguous  and  we  cannot 
reach  a  definitive  conclusion,  the  avail- 
able evidence  indicates  that  the  activities 
at  Plesetsk  are  a  probable  violation  of 
the  USSR's  legal  obligation  not  to  defeat 
the  object  and  purpose  of  SALT  II  prior 
to  1981  when  the  Treaty  was  pending 
ratification,  and  a  probable  violation  of  a 
political  commitment  subsequent  to 
1981. 

ABM  Treaty 

•  Treaty  Status:  The  1972  ABM 
Treaty  and  its  Protocol  ban  deployment 
of  ABM  systems  except  that  each  party 
is  permitted  to  deploy  one  ABM  system 
around  the  national  capital  area  or, 
alternatively,  at  a  single  ICBM  deploy- 
ment area.  The  ABM  Treaty  is  in  force 
and  is  of  indefinite  duration.  Soviet  ac- 
tions not  in  accord  with  the  ABM  Treaty 
are,  therefore,  violations  of  a  legal 
obligation. 

Four  ABM  issues  are  included  in 
this  unclassified  report:  the  Krasnoyarsk 
Radar,  mobile  land-based  ABM  systems 
or  components,  concurrent  testing  of 
ABM  and  SAM  components,  and  ABM 
territorial  defense. 

10.  The  Krasnoyarsk  Radar 

•  Obligation:  In  an  effort  to  pre- 
clude creation  of  a  base  for  territorial 
ABM  defense,  the  ABM  Treaty  limits 


the  deployment  of  ballistic  missile  early 
warning  radars,  including  large  phased- 
array  radars  used  for  that  purpose,  to 
locations  along  the  periphery  of  the  na- 
tional territory  of  each  party  and  re- 
quires that  they  be  oriented  outward. 
The  Treaty  permits  deployment  (without 
regard  to  location  or  orientation)  of 
large  phased-array  radars  for  purposes 
of  tracking  objects  in  outer  space  or  for 
use  as  national  technical  means  of 
verification  of  compliance  with  arms 
control  agreements. 

•  Issue:  The  January  1984  report 
examined  the  evidence  regarding  the 
construction  of  a  large  phased-array 
radar  near  Krasnoyarsk  in  central 
Siberia.  It  was  concluded  that  this  radar 
was  almost  certainly  a  violation  of  the 
ABM  Treaty.  The  U.S.  reexamined  this 
issue  for  this  report. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges,  on  the  basis  of  evidence  which 
continued  to  be  available  through  1984, 
that  the  new  large  phased-array  radar 
under  construction  at  Krasnoyarsk  con- 
stitutes a  violation  of  legal  obligations 
under  the  Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Treaty  of 
1972  in  that  in  its  associated  siting, 
orientation,  and  capability,  it  is  pro- 
hibited by  this  Treaty.  Continuing  con- 
struction, and  the  absence  of  credible 
alternative  explanations,  have  reinforced 
our  assessment  of  its  purpose.  Despite 
U.S.  requests,  no  corrective  action  has 
been  taken. 

11.  Mobility  of  New  ABM  System 

•  Obligation:  The  ABM  Treaty  pro- 
hibits the  development,  testing,  or 
deployment  of  mobile  land-based  ABM 
systems  or  components. 

•  Issue:  The  U.S.  examined 
whether  the  Soviet  Union  has  developed 
a  mobile  land-based  ABM  system,  or 
components  for  such  a  system,  in  viola- 
tion of  its  legal  obligation  under  the 
ABM  Treaty. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that  Soviet  actions  with  respect 
to  ABM  component  mobility  are  am- 
biguous, but  the  USSR's  development  of 
components  of  a  new  ABM  system, 
which  apparently  are  designed  to  be 
deployable  at  sites  requiring  relatively 
little  or  no  preparation,  represent  a 
potential  violation  of  its  legal  obligation 
under  the  ABM  Treaty.  This  and  other 
ABM-related  Soviet  actions  suggest  that 
the  USSR  may  be  preparing  an  ABM 
defense  of  its  national  territory. 

12.  Concurrent  Testing  of  ABM  and 
SAM  Components 

•  Obligation:  The  ABM  Treaty  and 
its  Protocol  limit  the  parties  to  one 


April  1985 


33 


EAST  ASIA 


ABM  deployment  area.  In  addition  to 
the  ABM  systems  and  components  at 
that  one  deployment  area,  the  parties 
may  have  ABM  systems  and  components 
for  development  and  testing  purposes  so 
long  as  they  are  located  at  agreed  test 
ranges.  The  Treaty  also  prohibits  giving 
components,  other  than  ABM  system 
components,  the  capability  "to  counter 
strategic  ballistic  missiles  or  their 
elements  in  flight  trajectory"  and  pro- 
hibits the  parties  from  testing  them  in 
"an  ABM  mode."  The  parties  agreed 
that  the  concurrent  testing  of  SAM  and 
ABM  system  components  is  prohibited. 

•  Issue:  The  U.S.  examined 
w^hether  the  Soviet  Union  has  concur- 
rently tested  SAM  and  ABM  system 
components  in  contravention  of  this 
legal  obligation. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that  evidence  of  Soviet  actions 
with  respect  to  concurrent  operations  is 
insufficient  to  assess  fully  compliance 
with  Soviet  obligations  under  the  ABM 
Treaty,  although  the  Soviet  Union  has 
conducted  tests  that  have  involved  air 
defense  radars  in  ABM-related  ac- 
tivities. The  number  of  incidents  of  con- 
current operation  of  SAM  and  ABM 
components  indicate  the  USSR  probably 
has  violated  the  prohibition  on  testing 
SAM  components  in  an  ABM  mode.  In 
several  cases  this  may  be  highly  prob- 
able. This  and  other  such  Soviet  ac- 
tivities suggest  that  the  USSR  may  be 
preparing  an  ABM  defense  of  its  na- 
tional territory. 

13.  ABM  Territorial  Defense 

•  Obligation:  The  Treaty  allows 
each  party  a  single  operational  site,  ex- 
plicitly permits  modernization  and 
replacement  of  ABM  systems  or  their 
components,  and  explicitly  recognizes 
the  existence  of  ABM  test  ranges  for 
the  development  and  testing  of  ABM 
components.  The  ABM  Treaty  prohibits, 
however,  the  deployment  of  an  ABM 
system  for  defense  of  the  national  ter- 
ritory of  the  parties  and  prohibits  the 
parties  from  providing  a  base  for  such  a 
defense. 

•  Issue:  The  U.S.  examined 
whether  Soviet  ABM  and  related  ac- 
tivities provide  a  base  for  a  territorial 
defense. 

•  Finding:  The  U.S.  Government 
judges  that  the  aggregates  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  ABM  and  ABM-related  actions 
suggest  that  the  USSR  may  be  prepar- 
ing an  ABM  defense  of  its  national  ter- 
ritory. 


The  Asia-Pacific  Region: 
A  Forward  Look 


'Texts  from  White  House  press 
release.  ■ 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  Far  East-America 
Council/Asia  Society  in  New  York  City 
on  January  29,  1985.  Ambassador 
Armacost  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs. 

As  the  Reagan  Administration  begins  its 
second  term,  it  is  a  timely  moment  to 
take  stock,  to  identify  salient  trends  and 
notable  developments  in  the  Pacific,  and 
to  examine  their  implications  for 
American  interests.  Let  me  begin  with 
three  general  observations. 

First,  the  growing  interest  of  the 
United  States  in  East  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  is  widely  acknowledged.  The 
reasons  are  clear.  Our  trade  with  the 
Pacific  Basin  exceeds  our  trade  with 
Europe  and  is  growing  more  rapidly. 
Political  cooperation  with  Asian  friends 
is  growing  apace.  We  have  learned 
through  bitter  experience  that  a  balance 
of  forces  in  the  region  is  indispensable 
to  our  own  security  and  that  no 
equilibrium  can  be  achieved  without  our 
active  participation.  A  growing  apprecia- 
tion of  the  importance  of  Asia  has  been 
buttressed  in  recent  years  by  the  influx 
of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Asian  im- 
migrants, who  are  making  an  extraor- 
dinary contribution  to  our  national  life  in 
every  field  of  human  endeavor. 

Second,  there  is  a  growing  national 
consensus  regarding  the  importance  of 
our  ties  to  the  Pacific  and,  I  might  add, 
the  efficacy  and  advisability  of  the 
policies  we  are  pursuing  there.  This  con- 
sensus was  evident  in  last  year's  election 
campaign  which,  for  the  first  time  in  a 
generation,  provoked  no  partisan  debate 
or  controversy  over  Asia  policy. 

Third,  the  growing  American  in- 
terest in  Asia  need  not  come  at  the  ex- 
pense of  our  interests  in  other  regions. 
My  predecessor,  Larry  Eagleburger, 
suggested  about  a  year  ago  that  the 
center  of  gravity  in  American  politics 
was  shifting  westward  and  that  our  in- 
terests would  shift  increasingly  toward 
the  Pacific  as  a  result  of  the  economic 
and  technological  dynamism  of  that  part 
of  the  world.  His  remarks  greatly 
alarmed  many  Europeans,  whose  worst 
fears,  I  suspect,  were  confirmed  by  my 
appointment  to  succeed  Larry. 

These  fears  are  groundless.  As  we 
have  consistently  reminded  our  Euro- 
pean friends,  a  strong  American 
strategic  presence  in  East  Asia  con- 


tributes directly  to  European  security  by 
confronting  the  Soviets  with  the  pros- 
pect of  a  two-front  war  if  they  under- 
take aggressive  moves  on  the  Continent. 
By  the  same  token,  our  efforts  to 
liberalize  access  to  the  Asian  market  af- 
ford European  as  well  as  American  en- 
trepreneurs expanded  trading  oppor- 
tunities. 

But  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  speak 
about  European  fears  concerning  a 
"Pacific  era."  I  wish,  rather,  to  speak  of 
the  policy  opportunities  and  problems 
which  face  the  United  States  in  that 
region— so  let  me  turn  to  recent 
developments  in  Asia. 

Regional  Developments 

I  would  single  out  these  items  of  major 
consequence,  beginning  with  the  good 
news. 

First,  I'd  mention  the  extraordinary 
economic  dynamism  of  the  region. 
Although  America's  recovery  has  been 
the  engine  of  growth  for  the  world 
economy  during  the  last  2  years,  the 
East  Asia-Pacific  economies  have,  year- 
in  and  year-out,  displayed  the  greatest 
resilience  and  the  world's  highest  rates 
of  growth.  Our  trade  with  the  region  is 
immense.  Preliminary  data  indicate  that, 
in  calendar  year  1984,  U.S.  exports  to 
the  East  Asia-Pacific  region  were  valued 
at  $54.6  billion;  our  imports  from  that 
region,  $114  billion.  U.S.  investments  in 
the  Pacific  are  conservatively  valued  at 
over  $30  billion.  Since  East  Asian 
economies  generally  pursue  export-led 
growth,  periods  of  U.S.  expansion  in- 
evitably lead  to  large  increases  in  our 
imports  from  the  Pacific,  and  we  pile  up 
huge  trade  deficits.  Asia  now  accounts 
for  more  than  50%  of  our  global  deficit. 
This  pattern  will  presumably  continue, 
though  hopefully  at  a  lower  level  in 
1985. 

Second,  Japan  continues  to  assume 
a  political  role  more  commensurate  with 
its  economic  pov/er.  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone  has  continued  his  prede- 
cessor's search  for  a  policy  of  "com- 
prehensive security";  he  is  associating 
Japan  more  closely  with  the  West 
through  his  determination  that  Japan 
shall  be  seen  and  accepted  as  a  "full 
partner  with  the  West";  he  is  promoting 
Tokyo's  accomplishment  of  defensive 
military  roles  and  missions;  and  he  is 
further  expanding  the  scope  and 
strategic  importance  of  Japan's 
economic  aid  contributions. 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


Third,  China  is  redoubling  its 
modernization  efforts  and  has  embarked 
on  a  stunning  program  of  economic 
reform.  While  China  remains  a  planned, 
socialist  economy,  market  forces  are 
playing  an  expanding  role,  and  the 
Chinese— while  praising  Marx— are 
openly  questioning  his  relevance.  The 
most  dramatic  results  of  reform  are  ap- 
parent in  the  countryside  in  increased 
productivity  and  higher  peasant  in- 
comes. Reform  of  the  industrial  sector 
will  be  more  difficult,  but  [Chairman  of 
the  Central  Military  Commission]  Deng 
[Xiaoping]  appears  determined  to  press 
ahead.  To  spur  technological  change, 
China's  policy  of  opening  to  the  outside 
encourages  imports  of  foreign  products, 
capital,  and  management  skills,  and  pro- 
motes investment  in  joint  ventures.  The 
Chinese  are  permitting  localities  and 
provinces  broader  autonomy  in  dealing 
with  the  outside  world. 

We  have  a  strong  interest  in  a 
modernized  China  which  is  open  to 
foreign  trade  and  investment  and  which, 
consequently,  creates  economic  oppor- 
tunities for  the  United  States  and  other 
developed  countries.  This  process 
strengthens  China's  resolve  to  broaden 
and  deepen  cooperative  arrangements 
with  the  West,  even  as  it  gives  it 
parallel  incentives  for  reducing  the  risks 
of  conflict  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  the  recent  negotiations  on  the 
future  of  Hong  Kong,  both  Beijing  and 
London  displayed  an  admirable  combina- 
tion of  pragmatism  and  patience  in 
working  toward  a  satisfactory  agree- 
ment. The  detail  of  the  transitional  ar- 
rangements plus  the  lengthy  period  of 
the  post- 1997  transition  should  provide 
investors  with  ample  reason  for  sus- 
tained confidence  in  the  future  of  Hong 
Kong  as  an  attractive  and  thriving  com- 
mercial center. 

Fourth,  there  have  been  some  hints 
of  change  in  the  relations  between  North 
and  South  Korea.  One  round  of  direct 
economic  talks  were  held  in  mid- 
November,  as  was  a  preparatory  round 
of  North-South  Red  Cross  talks  on 
family  reunification  and  other 
humanitarian  issues.  Regrettably,  North 
Korea  postponed  scheduled  talks  in 
December  and  seized  on  the  annual  U.S. 
"Team  Spirit"  military  exercise  with  the 
R.O.K.  [Republic  of  Korea]  to  postpone 
economic  talks  that  had  been  scheduled 
in  January.  We  hope  these  discussions 
will  resume  in  the  spring. 

Other  developments  have  a  less 
sanguine  appearance. 

First,  the  Soviet  Union  continues  its 
military  buildup  in  East  Asia  and  the 
Pacific.  Its  Pacific  fleet  is  now  its 
largest.  Its  facilities  in  Vietnam  continue 
to  expand,  thus  extending  the  "reach"  of 


Soviet  naval  forces  in  the  west  Pacific 
and  Indian  Oceans.  It  is  deploying  its 
most  advanced  equipment  to  forces 
along  China's  frontier. 

Fortunately,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
not  yet  been  able  to  translate  this  grow- 
ing military  power  into  effective  political 
influence.  Its  ideological  appeal  in  Asia 
remains  negligible,  its  economic  leverage 
limited.  Territorial  disputes  with  Japan 
and  China  limit  prospects  of  accom- 
modation with  its  most  important  Asian 
neighbors,  and  its  support  for  Vietnam 
fuels  the  suspicion  with  which  all 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  states  regard  Moscow. 

Second,  the  Vietnamese  show  no 
signs  of  reducing  their  military  pressure 
on  Cambodia.  Nor,  despite  more  mod- 
erate rhetoric  recently,  do  they  seem 
willing  to  negotiate  a  political  solution  to 
the  problem.  The  coalition  embracing 
Prince  Sihanouk  and  Son  Sann  as  well 


Fourth,  antinuclear  sentiment  is  ris- 
ing in  the  South  Pacific.  An  allergy  to 
nuclear  weapons  has  existed  there  for 
some  time,  sustained  by  regional  con- 
cerns about  current  nuclear  testing  by 
France,  along  with  the  more  general 
problem  of  disposing  of  radioactive 
wastes.  The  election  of  a  Labor  govern- 
ment in  New  Zealand  committed  to  ban- 
ning from  its  ports  and  territorial 
waters  all  nuclear-powered  and  nuclear- 
armed  ships  has  brought  this  issue  to 
the  fore  and  is  imposing  strains  on 
ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States  security  treaty]— one  of 
our  oldest  alliances. 

These  then  are  the  most  salient 
developments— favorable  and  otherwise. 
They  bring  opportunities  for  the  United 
States  to: 

•  Expand  commercial  and  invest- 
ment opportunities; 


Our  growing  trade  deficit  with  Asia  highlights 
the  need  for  a  new  trade  round  .  .  .[which]  not  only 
would  help  in  checking  protectionist  pressures  but 
could  extend  liberalization  into  the  important 
fields  of  agricultural  trade,  the  service  sector,  and 
high  technology. 


as  the  Khmer  Rouge  has  earned  Cam- 
bodia's resistance  greater  international 
support.  However,  the  sustainability  of 
the  coalition  and  its  acceptability  to  the 
Cambodian  people  require  that  the  non- 
communist  factions  increase  their 
strength  relative  to  the  Khmer  Rouge. 
Third,  East  Asia's  relative  stability 
is  tempered  by  the  reality  of  human 
mortality  and  the  prospect  of  political 
transitions  in  several  important  coun- 
tries. Chiang  Ching-kuo,  Lee  Kuan  Yew, 
Suharto,  and  Marcos  [leaders  of  Taiwan, 
Singapore,  Indonesia,  and  the  Philip- 
pines, respectively]  have  all  exercised 
power  for  many  years.  Much  attention 
has  already  been  directed  to  Deng 
Xiaoping's  efforts  to  ensure  the  con- 
tinuation of  his  policies  in  China.  Kim 
Il-sung  has  groomed  his  son  to  succeed 
him  in  North  Korea.  Vietnam's  collective 
leadership  has  seen  little  new  blood  for 
decades.  As  these  leaders  age,  succes- 
sion politics  becomes  a  source  of  uncer- 
tainty and  potential  instability  in  those 
countries  whose  political  institutions  are 
weak.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  hope  in 
some  countries  that  changes  could  bring 
about  increased  popular  participation  in 
the  political  and  economic  process. 


•  Associate  Japan  even  more  closely 
with  the  West; 

•  Propel  China  toward  patterns  of 
closer  cooperation  with  us; 

•  Work  constructively  with  regional 
groupings  in  the  area,  particularly 
ASEAN;  and 

•  Foster  a  North-South  dialogue  on 
the  Korean  Peninsula. 

There  are  also  risks: 

•  That  burgeoning  trade  deficits  will 
stimulate  increased  protectionist  senti- 
ment and  protectionist  trade  measures 
in  the  Congress; 

•  That  succession  crises  could  lead 
to  political  instability  adversely  affecting 
our  financial  flows,  economic  develop- 
ment, and  strategic  interests; 

•  That  antinuclear  sentiment  could 
check  our  naval  access  to  New  Zealand 
and  vitiate  a  key  alliance; 

•  That  failure  to  address  the  im- 
balance within  the  Cambodian  resistance 
could  undermine  future  possibilities  for  a 
political  solution;  and 

•  That  the  Soviet  Union  will  con- 
tinue to  build  its  military  strength  in 


April1985 


35 


EAST  ASIA 


Asia  while  playing  for  any  diplomatic 
and  political  breaks  that  may  come 
along. 

The  Major  Policy  Challenges 

Let  me  comment  briefly  on  our  major 
policy  challenges  in  the  period  ahead. 

Our  growing  trade  deficit  with  Asia 
highlights  the  need  for  a  new  trade 
round  which  the  Administration— along 
with  the  Japanese— endorsed  at  the  last 
London  summit.  A  new  round  not  only 
would  help  in  checking  protectionist 


urged  Philippine  authorities  to  open  up 
the  political  process  and  rely  more  heavi- 
ly upon  market  forces  to  stimulate  a 
revival  of  economic  growth. 

During  the  last  year,  there  has  been 
some  progress.  A  forthright  report  was 
produced  by  the  Agrava  Board;  indict- 
ments have  been  brought  against  key 
military  leaders  for  participation  in  a 
conspiracy  to  murder  Aquino  and  cover 
up  their  involvement.  Restrictions  on 
press  freedoms  have  been  relaxed; 
political  activity  has  been  resumed  by 
opposition  groups;  the  procedures  for 


We  shall  continue  to  urge  Japan  to  assume  a 
larger  responsibility  for  its  own  conventional 
defense  while  extending  the  range  of  its 
surveillance  and  patrolling  capabilities  along  its 
sealanes  to  the  south. 


pressures  but  could  extend  liberalization 
into  the  important  fields  of  agricultural 
trade,  the  service  sector,  and  high 
technology.  Pending  the  initiation  of  a 
general  round  of  trade  negotiations,  we 
will  be  focusing  particular  attention  on 
opening  Japan's  market  further.  Talks 
are  now  being  held  in  Tokyo  to  kick  off 
sectoral  negotiations  in  the  fields  of  elec- 
tronics, telecommunications,  forest  prod- 
ucts, medical  equipment,  and  pharma- 
ceuticals. Progress  in  these  negotiations 
will  be  the  subject  of  our  subcabinet  con- 
sultations in  March. 

In  addition,  we  have  an  intensive 
round  of  consultations  coming  up  with 
ASEAN.  U.S.  Special  Trade  Represen- 
tative Bill  Brock  will  meet  with  the 
ASEAN  trade  ministers  in  Malaysia  in 
early  February.  One  focus  of  his  talks 
will  be  proposals  for  a  U.S. -ASEAN 
reciprocal  trading  arrangement,  as  well 
as  a  new  multilateral  trade  negotiating 
round.  We  will  meet  in  Washington  in 
late  March  or  early  April  with  ASEAN 
economic  and  trade  ministers  for  our 
periodic  high-level  dialogue  covering 
both  policy  and  practical  trade  and  in- 
vestment matters.  And  Secretary  Shultz 
will  again  lead  our  delegation  to  the 
ASEAN  postministerial  consultations  to 
be  held  this  year  in  mid-July  in  Kuala 
Lumpur. 

1  have  mentioned  the  Philippines, 
where  we  face  significant  problems. 
Since  the  assassination  of  Ninoy  Aquino, 
the  United  States  has  consistently 
pressed  for  a  thorough,  impartial,  and 
complete  investigation  of  the  killing  and 


succession  have  been  altered;  relatively 
free  elections  held;  opposition  represen- 
tation in  the  legislature  increased;  con- 
straints on  the  arbitrary  power  of  the 
government  multiplied;  an  IMF  [Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund]  agreement  ini- 
tialed; and  a  restructuring  of  Philippine 
debt  negotiated. 

We  shall  continue  to  encourage  the 
further  democratization  of  Philippine 
politics,  the  opening  up  of  the  Philippine 
economy  to  the  freer  interplay  of 
market  forces,  and  reform  of  the 
military— which  requires,  above  all,  un- 
sullied leadership— to  enable  the  Philip- 
pine Armed  Forces  to  counter  a  growing 
insurgency  in  rural  areas. 

Much  remains  to  be  done,  but  we 
should  neither  exaggerate  our  capacity 
to  shape  internal  developments  in  the 
Philippines  nor  offer  gratuitous  public 
criticism  and  counsel.  Nonetheless,  we 
do  have  significant  influence  and  should 
continue  to  exercise  it  to  promote  the 
strengthening  of  democratic  institutions. 
We  shall  try  to  be  helpful  both  through 
the  advice  we  extend  quietly  to  the 
regime  and  through  the  contacts  we 
maintain  with  the  opposition. 

Vis-a-vis  Japan,  our  policies  are  well 
defined.  The  President's  meeting  with 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  earlier  this 
month  resulted  in  a  renewed  commit- 
ment by  both  sides  to  work  closely 
together  on  a  variety  of  global  issues. 
There  was  also  agreement  to  address 
promptly  the  problems  in  our  economic 
relationship— the  urgent  need  for  more 
balanced  trade  and  extension  of  the  role 
of  the  yen  as  an  international  currency. 


We  shall  continue  to  urge  Japan  to 
assume  a  larger  responsibility  for  its 
own  conventional  defense  while  extend- 
ing the  range  of  its  surveillance  and 
patrolling  capabilities  along  its  sealanes 
to  the  south.  We  will  not,  however,  en- 
courage Japan's  assumption  of  regional 
military  security  responsibilities. 

We  will  consult  with  the  Japanese 
on  how  best  to  coordinate  our  growing 
foreign  assistance  efforts,  not  only  in 
Asia  but  throughout  the  world.  Japan  is 
already  a  leading  donor  not  only  to  East 
Asia  but  also  countries  like  Pakistan, 
Turkey,  Egypt,  and  Sudan— countries 
which  the  Japanese  consider  important 
to  the  security  of  the  West.  In  close 
coordination  with  us,  Japan  has  also  pro- 
vided significant  support  for  Afghan  and 
Cambodian  refugees  and  has  responded 
generously  to  the  emergency  situation  in 
Africa. 

With  China,  we  shall  continue  to 
nurture  an  expanding  economic  relation- 
ship. China's  economic  modernization 
will  contribute  to  regional  stability  and 
progress,  even  as  it  will  generate  new 
issues  in  our  bilateral  relationship  and 
place  China  in  competition  with  several 
of  its  Asian  neighbors  for  access  to  our 
market.  Care  will  be  necessary  to  ensure 
that  our  own  trade  policies  encourage 
the  Chinese  to  continue  to  look  to  us  for 
the  technology,  products,  and  capital 
they  need. 

On  the  military  side,  our  help— in 
the  form  of  technology  transfer  and 
sales  of  equipment— can  help  Beijing 
bolster  its  defenses  along  the  northern 
border.  As  we  expand  cooperative  ar- 
rangements in  the  military  field  as  in 
others,  we  must  remain  sensitive  to  the 
views  of  our  other  friends  and  allies  in 
the  region,  and  that  will  counsel  close 
consultations  and  caution  in  helping 
China  strengthen  its  defensive 
capabilities. 

As  we  continue  to  expand  and  im- 
prove our  ties  with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China,  we  will  maintain  our  unofficial 
links  with  Taiwan.  We  have  a  continued 
interest  in  the  well-being  and  prosperity 
of  the  people  of  Taiwan  and  note  that 
our  economic  ties,  though  troubled  by  a 
large  deficit,  have  grown  dramatically  in 
the  past  decade. 

In  Korea,  we  should  sustain  close 
cooperation  with  the  R.O.K.  as  it  ex- 
plores the  potential  for  direct  North- 
South  talks.  In  the  past  the  North  has 
sought  to  ignore  the  South  in  order  to 
resolve  basic  issues  with  us.  We  shall 
resist  being  drawn  into  talks  with 
Pyongyang  at  the  South's  expense. 
There  can  be  no  durable  reduction  of 
tension  on  the  peninsula  until  North  and 
South  Korea  resolve  through  direct 
negotiations  the  basic  issues  which 
divide  them.  South  Korea  consistently 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


has  proposed  that  Pyongyang  join  in 
agreeing  to  various  confidence-building 
measures.  That  is  a  sensible  strategy 
and  deserves  our  support.  Indeed,  ail 
regional  powers  share  a  responsibility  to 
do  whatever  they  can  to  promote  stabili- 
ty and  ensure  peace  on  the  peninsula. 

With  regard  to  the  other  friendly  na- 
tions of  Southeast  Asia  and  ASEAN  col- 
lectively, we  will  continue  our  unam- 
biguous support  of  efforts  to  achieve  a 
political  settlement  in  Cambodia  as  part 
of  our  fundamental  policy  of  upholding 
the  national  integrity  of  these  peaceful 
and  free  countries.  Thailand,  as  the 
"front-line"  state,  plays  a  crucial  role  in 
those  efforts,  and  its  security  will  re- 
main a  paramount  concern  to  us.  We 
want  to  further  our  close  economic 
cooperation  with  ASEAN— as  typified 
by  the  extensive  range  of  consultations  I 
mentioned  earlier— and  we  will  do 
everything  possible  to  combat  protec- 
tionism in  the  interest  of  long-term 
mutual  benefit,  investment,  and  trade 
expansion.  We  will  also  continue  to  con- 
sult closely  with  ASEAN  on  other  mat- 
ters of  common  interest. 

We  must  sustain  our  support  for  the 
noncommunist  resistance  elements  in 
Cambodia.  Our  support  is  essentially 
humanitarian  and  political,  and  that 
should  be  increased.  They  need  our  help, 
and  without  it  the  growing  Khmer 
Rouge  dominance  within  the  resistance 
will  harden  Vietnamese  intransigence, 
undercut  Sihanouk's  role,  and  reduce 
prospects  for  a  future  political  accom- 
modation. 

In  addition  to  our  objective  of  seek- 
ing a  Cambodia  free  from  Vietnamese 
domination,  we  will  continue  to  work 
with  the  nations  of  Southeast  Asia  in 
our  efforts  to  manage  the  human  prob- 
lems created  by  the  continuing  flow  of 
refugees  from  Indochina.  On  the  ques- 
tion of  refugees— and  in  the  important 
effort  to  seek  additional  information  on 
U.S.  personnel  still  missing  in  action 
from  the  Vietnamese  war— we  will  con- 
tinue to  engage  Hanoi,  both  directly  and 
through  appropriate  international 
organizations. 

In  the  South  Pacific,  if  the  Lange 
government  in  New  Zealand  continues 
to  challenge  nuclear-powered  warship 
visits  or  insists  upon  no  visits  by 
nuclear-armed  ships,  the  future  of  our 
alliance  relationship  with  New  Zealand  is 
in  jeopardy.  It  is  scarcely  possible  to 
maintain  a  defensive  alliance  without  the 
regular  interaction  between  military 
establishments  which  gives  practical 
meaning  to  such  an  alliance.  Thus,  we 
have  worked  for  the  removal  of  barriers 
and  efforts  to  discriminate  among  our 
forces  according  to  their  weaponry  or 
propulsion.  We  have  sought  to  give  the 
Lange  government  time  to  alter  the  con- 


sensus within  the  governing  party.  But 
we  have  also  insisted  that  we  need  con- 
crete indications  that  progress  is  being 
made  and  that  a  restoration  of  normal 
access  is  possible  within  a  reasonable 
timeframe. 

The  problem  with  New  Zealand 
underlines  the  importance  of  our  ties 
with  Australia.  Prime  Minister  Hawke 
will  be  visiting  Washington,  Febru- 
ary 5-7.  The  security  situation  in  Asia 
and  the  Pacific,  along  with  East-West 
issues,  will  be  high  on  the  agenda.  We 
will  be  discussing  with  the  Prime 
Minister  the  key  contribution  that 
Western  strength  and  unity  have  made 
to  the  resumption  of  U.S. -Soviet  arms 
control  discussions.  I  am  sui-e  that  we 
will  also  be  discussing  ways  in  which  we 
can  both  seek  to  convince  the  Govern- 
ment of  New  Zealand  to  restore  its  full 
cooperation  in  the  ANZUS  alliance. 

During  the  months  ahead,  we  will  be 
following  through  in  completing  the 
transition  to  free  association  with  the 
Federated  States  of  Micronesia  and  the 
[Republic  of  the]  Marshall  Islands,  and 
we  will  continue  to  work  with  the 
elected  leadership  on  Palau  as  it  likewise 
seeks  to  work  out  a  future  relationship 
with  us  under  the  Compact  of  Free 
Association.  The  Northern  Mariana 


Islands  have  already  opted  to  enter  into 
a  commonwealth  status  with  us  upon 
termination  of  the  trust. 

As  for  Soviet  ambitions  in  Asia  and 
the  Pacific,  we  need  not  be  obsessed 
with  their  prospects  in  the  region.  They 
are  playing  with  a  weak  hand  politically 
and  have  regularly  displayed  the  kind  of 
cultural  insensitivity  which  undercuts 
their  prospects  for  gains.  But  we  cannot 
ignore  their  growing  military  strength 
and  must  work  to  counteract  it  by  main- 
taining a  strong  presence  of  our  own 
and  by  bolstering  mutual  defense  ar- 
rangements with  our  friends. 

Conclusion 

You  will  note  that  I  have  avoided  any 
grand  design  for  American  policy  in  the 
next  4  years.  The  hallmark  of  our  ap- 
proach is  the  patient  tending  of  policy 
lines  that  have  already  been  well  laid. 
This  is  an  approach  more  akin  to 
gardening  than  to  architecture.  The 
roots  of  our  policy,  I  believe,  are  strong. 
Our  prospects  are  good.  The  current  re- 
quirement is  patience,  attentiveness,  and 
perseverance  rather  than  dramatic  new 
initiatives.  ■ 


The  Pacific:  Region  of  Promise 
and  Challenge 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Address  before  the  National  Defense 
University  Pacific  Symposium  in 
Honolulu  on  February  22,  1985.  Mr. 
Wolfowitz  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs. 

We  hear  a  lot  these  days  about  the 
promise  of  the  Pacific.  What  people 
speak  of  most  often  is  the  remarkable 
economic  dynamism  of  the  region.  But 
equally  remarkable,  especially  in  light  of 
recent  history,  is  that  the  region — with 
the  notable  exception  of  Cambodia — is 
basically  at  peace.  Without  peace,  the 
region  would  not  have  won  this  eco- 
nomic prosperity. 

There  are  many  reasons  for  this 
stability,  and  it  would  be  wrong  to  say 
that  we  brought  it  about  by  ourselves, 
but  America's  renewed  commitment  to 
the  peace  of  the  region  has  been  impor- 
tant. That  the  Soviets  have  been  unable 
to  translate  their  increased  military 


presence  in  the  region  into  political  or 
economic  gains  is  in  large  measure 
because  our  military  has  been  there,  and 
they  have  been  ready.  This  is  a  salute 
we  diplomats  owe  to  our  military. 

But  we  can't  afford  to  be  compla- 
cent. As  important  as  it  is  to  maintain  a 
military  presence,  there  are  challenges 
to  stability  that  require  more  than  just 
our  strength  alone  to  meet. 

Today,  I'd  like  to  talk  briefly  about 
two  of  these  challenges  and  at  more 
length  about  a  third. 

Maintaining  An  Open  Trading  System: 
The  Fight  Against  Protectionism 

A  vigorous  American  economic  recovery 
has  pulled  the  free  world  out  of  a  drain- 
ing recession,  but  protectionism  could 
bring  back  recession  again.  America  con- 
tinues to  lead  the  fight  against  protec- 
tionism. Despite  a  few  exceptions,  our 
markets  are  among  the  freest  in  the 
world — but  we  cannot  do  it  alone. 

Other  nations,  particularly  Japan, 
must  lower  barriers  to  goods  and  serv- 


Aprll1985 


37 


EAST  ASIA 


ices  in  which  other  nations  can  be  com- 
petitive. During  the  President's  trip  to 
Japan  in  November  1983,  we  made  prog- 
ress in  one  such  area  by  getting  initial 
agreement  on  opening  Japanese  finan- 
cial markets.  During  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone's  visit  to  Los  Angeles,  we  set 
the  stage  for  progress  in  others. 

The  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  agreed  in  Los  Angeles  to  ini- 
tiate intensive  discussions  to  identify 
and  remove  barriers  to  Japan's  markets 
in  four  key  sectors:  telecommunications, 
other  electronic  products,  forest  prod- 
ucts, and  medical  equipment  and  phar- 
maceuticals. Late  last  month  Under 
Secretary  [for  Economic  Affairs]  Allen 
Wallis  led  a  high-level  team  to  Tokyo  to 
launch  this  effort,  and  we  agreed  with 
the  Japanese  on  the  program  for  this 
joint  effort  in  the  months  ahead.  We  will 
have  held  at  least  one  round  of  discus- 
sion on  each  of  the  four  sectors  by  the 
week  of  March  11  when  we  will  hold  ma- 
jor economic  consultations  with  the 
Japanese  in  Tokyo.  We  are  placing  a 
special  priority  on  telecommunications 
because  Japan  will  implement  sweeping 
changes  in  its  phone  system  on  April  1, 
opening  up  major  opportunities  for  the 
private  sector.  Secretary  of  State  Shultz 
and  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  Abe  are 
overseeing  this  process,  and  they  are  to 
give  a  progress  report  to  the  President 
and  Prime  Minister  Nakasone  at  the 
Bonn  summit  in  May. 

America  cannot  be  expected  to  fight 
protectionism  alone.  The  U.S.  public  has 
a  great  deal  of  patience,  but  it  will  not 
be  willing  to  keep  our  markets  open  for- 
ever while  others  keep  theirs  closed. 

Maintaining  Strong  Alliances: 
The  Threat  to  ANZUS 

Similarly,  the  U.S.  public  has  a  strong 
commitment  to  maintaining  forces  for 
peace  in  the  Pacific,  as  elsewhere.  But 
the  American  public  will  not  long  sup- 
port commitments  and  alliances  that 
protect  others  if  those  others  will  not 
uphold  their  own  responsibilities.  New 
Zealand's  refusal  to  allow  access  to  their 
ports  for  our  ships  confronts  us  with 
such  a  situation  today. 

ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States  security  treaty]  is  part  of 
a  system  of  postwar  alliances  in  which 
the  United  States  participates  that  has 
helped  to  keep  the  nuclear  peace  for 
four  postwar  decades.  Our  regional 
alliances  are  important  in  preventing 
small  conflicts  from  even  starting;  and 
since  it  is  from  small  wars  that  the 
greatest  danger  of  big  ones  arises,  these 
alliances  are  important  for  preserving 
the  nuclear  peace.  The  mutual  commit- 
ments that  these  alliances  entiiil  help  to 
avoid  the  kind  of  isolationism  that 


brought  on  the  last  world  war.  Ironical- 
ly, the  effect  of  New  Zealand's  action, 
small  though  it  may  be,  is  exactly  op- 
posite to  its  announced  purpose  of 
reducing  the  risk  of  nuclear  war. 

Some  would  say  that  New  Zealand 
should  not  have  to  bear  the  risks  or  face 
the  moral  responsibilities  imposed  by 
modern  weapons;  but  it  is  not  New 
Zealanders  who  bear  the  brunt  of  deter- 
rence in  the  nuclear  age.  Americans  are 
certainly  no  less  concerned  about  the 
danger  of  nuclear  war  or  the  moral 
issues  of  defending  freedom.  We  did  not 
seek  to  be  hostage  to  world  peace,  but 
we  have  accepted  the  role.  But  it  is  we 
who  bear  the  major  risks  and  burdens  of 
maintaining  a  nuclear  balance  upon 
which  all  the  free  countries  of  the  world 
depend. 

We  do  not  ask  New  Zealanders  to 
shoulder  the  burden  of  maintaining  a 
nuclear  balance.  We  are  not  pronuclear; 
we  are  pro-ANZUS.  But  without  access 
to  ports  and  the  surface  ship  deploy- 
ments that  access  supports,  we  cannot 
maintain  the  naval  presence  in  the 
Pacific  that  helps  to  deter  war  and 
preserve  the  peace.  And  we  can't  go 
around  advertising  which  of  those  ships 
has  nuclear  weapons  on  board,  or  when 
they  do  and  when  they  don't.  For  an  ally 
to  insist  on  that  kind  of  disclosure  as  a 
condition  for  port  access  is  just  not 
responsible. 

With  words  New  Zealand  assures  us 
that  it  remains  committed  to  ANZUS; 
but  by  its  deeds  New  Zealand  has  effec- 
tively curtailed  its  operational  role  in 
ANZUS.  A  military  alliance  has  little 
meaning  without  military  cooperation. 
New  Zealand  can't  have  it  both  ways. 

New  Zealand,  in  the  past,  has  been 
one  of  our  staunchest  allies.  We  hope 
that  in  the  future  New  Zealand  will 
shoulder  again  the  reciprocal  obligations 
of  a  full  treaty  partner,  in  its  own  na- 
tional interest  and  as  a  responsibility  to 
the  peace  of  the  region  and  the  world. 

Building  Strong  Political  Institutions: 
Democracy  in  the  Philippines 

The  final  challenge  I  would  like  to 
discuss  today  is  the  challenge  of  building 
strong  and  effective  political  institutions. 
We  as  Americans  obviously  favor  de- 
mocracy because  we  believe  it  is  the 
system  that  best  protects  the  rights  and 
supports  the  aspirations  of  individual 
citizens.  But  we  also  believe  that  history 
has  shown  that,  over  the  long  term, 
democracy  is  the  most  stable  form  of 
government  and,  thus,  the  strongest. 

The  challenge  of  strengthening 
democratic  institutions  is  one  faced  most 
acutely  today  by  our  oldest  ally  in  the 
Pacific,  the  Philippines.  The  Philippines 
today  suffers  from  serious  economic  dif- 
ficulties and  considerable  political  uncer- 


tainty. The  current  crisis  was  precipi- 
tated by  the  August  1983  assassination 
of  opposition  leader  and  former  Senator 
Benigno  Aquino.  That  event  on  its  own 
would  have  been  a  major  political  shock 
and  a  moral  outrage,  but  it  also  cata- 
lyzed problems  already  present.  It  re- 
duced the  credibility  of  the  Marcos 
government  among  broad  sectors  of  the 
Philippine  public  and  unleashed  political 
forces  that  had  previously  been  largely 
quiescent.  It  also  led  to  capital  flight  and 
disinvestment,  aggravating  already 
serious  economic  problems  of  declining 
productivity,  a  growing  public  sector 
deficit,  heavy  borrowing  from  abroad, 
excessive  government  interference  in 
the  market,  and  worldwide  recession. 
The  combined  effect  of  these  political 
and  economic  problems  has,  in  turn,  con- 
tributed to  the  growth  of  an  armed 
communist-led  insurgency  which  increas- 
ingly threatens  the  nation's  future. 

These  problems  are  profound  and 
will  not  be  resolved  quickly.  They  are, 
moveover,  interrelated.  Progress  in  each 
area  will  be  needed  for  further  progress 
in  the  others. 

These  problems  did  not  begin  just  in 
the  past  few  years,  although  recent 
events  have  made  them  more  acute. 
Many  of  the  political  problems  reflect 
decisions  made  years  ago  in  times  of 
domestic  turmoil.  Misallocations  of 
economic  resources  reflect  a  period 
when  the  Philippines,  like  many  Third 
World  countries,  was  seduced  by  the 
idea  that  excessive  government  interven- 
tion and  centralized  decisionmaking 
would  bring  a  shortcut  to  growth.  There 
was  too  much  reliance  on  debt  rather 
than  equity  investment.  At  the  same 
time,  entrenched  political  factors  have 
hampered  the  Philippine  military's  abili- 
ty to  press  reforms  needed  to  deal  with 
the  insurgency. 

In  hindsight,  it  is  easy  to  criticize 
the  erosion  that  brought  the  Philippines 
to  its  current  problems,  though  at  the 
time  they  were  taken,  many  of  these 
steps  were  not  unpopular.  For  the  mo- 
ment, it  is  enough  to  focus  on  how  to 
rekindle  the  vitality  of  its  institutions 
and  restore  the  Philippines  to  a  road  of 
progress. 

U.S.  Policy.  The  U.S.  policy  for 
progress  is  clear.  It  is  no  different  from 
the  policy  we  urge  at  home  and  in  other 
countries  abroad.  Democratic  processes 
and  market  mechanisms  are  often  tur- 
bulent and  lack  the  superficial  ap- 
pearance of  efficiency  of  highly  cen- 
tralized systems.  We  are,  nonetheless, 
convinced  that  countries  are  strongest 
and  prosper  best  when: 

•  Government  is  chosen  by  the  peo- 
ple, responsive  to  the  people,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  rule  of  law; 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


•  The  economy  is  open  to  the  forces 
)f  the  marketplace;  and 

•  The  mihtary  is  a  professional  in- 
stitution subject  to  the  civilian  govern- 
nent  and  respectful  of  citizens'  rights. 

The  appropriate  U.S.  role  is  to  en- 
;ourage  the  revitalization  of  Philippine 
nstitutions.  For  any  solution  to  work,  it 
nust  be  a  truly  Filipino  one.  Nonethe- 
ess,  it  is  appropriate  for  Americans  to 
xpress — both  publicly  and  privately — 
)ur  support  for  human  rights  and  our 
leep  belief  in  free  markets,  in  a  profes- 
sional military,  and,  above  all,  in 
lemocratic  institutions — particularly 
ree  and  fair  elections.  We  must  always 
emember  that  this  is  not  our  country, 
ind  we  are  qot  the  ones  who  should 
letermine  how  to  strike  the  delicate 
)alance  between  the  need  for  change 
md  the  need  for  stability.  Above  all,  it  is 
lot  our  place  as  Americans  to  choose  or 
moint  individual  leaders,  be  they  of  the 
government,  the  opposition,  the  private 
lector,  or  the  military.  It  is  up  to  the 
■"ilipinos,  who  know  their  country  and 
lave  to  live  in  it,  to  choose  their  par- 
icular  path  and  make  the  reforms  they 
udge  necessary.  But  it  is  appropriate 
or  Americans  to  express  our  support 
or  free  and  democratic  institutions. 

In  support  of  this  approach,  we  as  a 
:overnment  have  been  making  clear  that 
he  context  in  which  our  assistance  is 
irovided  is  affected  by  the  progress  we 
.re  able  to  see  in  Philippine  effort  to 
rapple  with  their  basic  problems.  We 
ave  also  worked  closely  with  other  con- 
erned  nations  and  with  multilateral  in- 
titutions  to  support  their  efforts  to  pro- 
lote  institutional  reform. 

In  the  final  analysis,  however,  it  is 
ur  ability  and  willingness  to  speak 
rankly  as  friend  and  ally  to  virtually  all 
lements  of  Philippine  society,  more 
han  any  other  single  factor,  that 
nables  us  to  encourage  constructive 
hange  in  the  Philippines.  We  find  our 
oice  is  most  effective  when  added 
esponsibly  to  a  debate  already  under- 
.'ay  in  the  Philippines.  We  are,  thus, 
dirking  with  President  Marcos  and 
inny  other  Philippine  leaders — 
epresenting  government,  opposition, 
iusiness,  military,  church,  and  other 
,'alks  of  life— who  are  themselves  aware 
'f  the  need  for  reforms.  As  President 
ieagan  said  only  10  days  ago: 

.  .  .  we've  got  a  good  relationship  with 
'rrsident  Marcos.  Now,  we  realize  there  is 
II  opposition  party  that ...  is  also  pledged  to 
eniocracy.  We  also  are  aware  that  there  is 
niither  element  in  the  Philippines  that  has 
onimunist  support  and  backing.  What  we  are 
opeful  of  is  that  the  democratic  processes 
,ill  take  place,  and  even  if  there  is  a  change 
f  ijarty  there  it  would  be  that  opposition  fac- 
iiiii  which  is  still  democratic  in  its  principles. 


L„ 


I  think  it  would  be  a  disaster  for  all  of  us  if, 
out  of  the  friction  between  those  two  parties, 
the  third  element,  the  communist  element, 
should  get  in,  because  we  know  that  their 
result  is  always  totalitarian. 

The  United  States  has  pursued  these 
policies  actively  since  the  current  crisis 
came  to  a  head  in  August  1983.  We 
have  sent  to  Manila  to  represent  us  dur- 
ing this  period  two  of  our  most  able  Am- 
bassadors, Michael  Armacost  and 
Stephen  Bosworth.  Our  approach,  based 
on  their  recommendations,  has  included 
enhanced  aid  and  other  measures 
tailored  to  respond  to  the  crisis  in  ways 
that  have  underlined  U.S.  resolve  to  be 
of  assistance.  We  have  kept  in  touch 
with  the  leadership  of  all  democractic 
elements  in  the  Philippines.  And, 
through  clear,  timely  political  state- 
ments by  our  ambassadors  in  Manila  and 
by  officials  in  Washington,  we  have 
demonstrated  to  the  Philippine  public 
and  national  leadership  that  we  stand 
with  them  in  their  time  of  trouble  and 
that  we  encourage  the  basic  reforms 
necessary  to  the  survival  of  their 
democratic  institutions. 

The  Record  So  Far.  One  step 
toward  progress  is  to  recognize  that 
some  progress  has  already  been  made. 
In  crafting  a  policy,  it  is  unwise  to 
minimize  what  remains  to  be  done;  but  it 
is  also  unwise  to  ignore  progress  that 
has  been  made. 

The  Philippine  people  and  their 
leaders,  with  much  help  from  their 
friends  and  allies  in  the  international 
community,  have  made  considerable 
progress  since  that  tragic  day  in  August. 
Perhaps  most  significantly,  an  independ- 
ent investigation  of  Senator  Aquino's 
murder  has  progressed  methodically. 
The  Agrava  board  appointed  by  Presi- 
dent Marcos  refuted  the  government's 
contention  that  Aquino's  death  was  the 
work  of  a  lone  communist  gunman  and 
charged  16  military  personnel  with  con- 
spiracy to  commit  murder  and  8  others 
with  participating  in  a  coverup.  All  of 
these  officials,  including  the  Armed 
Forces  Chief  of  Staff,  General  "Ver,  have 
rehnquished  their  duties  pending  the 
outcome  of  a  trial  in  a  civilian  court. 

Those  who  believe  in  the  rule  of  law 
can  only  praise  the  courage  and  states- 
manship of  those  who  have  brought  the 
case  to  this  point.  There  are,  sadly,  few 
countries  in  the  world  where  such 
thorough  scrutiny  of  government  actions 
would  have  taken  place. 

There  have  been  other  significant 
political  developments  over  the  past  18 
months. 

•  A  constitutional  mechanism  for 
succession  has  been  established  that  re- 
quires a  prompt  election  in  the  event  of 
presidential  death  or  incapacity.  This 


replaced  an  earlier  procedure  that  would 
have  permitted  indefinite  rule  by  an  ap- 
pointed executive  committee. 

•  There  is  now  a  degree  of  press 
freedom  seen  in  few  other  developing 
nations.  It  is  hard  to  conceive  of  any 
criticism  of  the  government  or  political 
rumor  that  does  not  find  its  way,  in 
some  fashion,  into  popular  print. 

•  Vigorously  contested  parliamen- 
tary elections  in  May,  considered  more 
open  and  fair  than  other  recent  polls, 
ushered  in  a  strong  and  active  assembly 
with  an  outspoken  opposition.  The  suc- 
cess of  the  election  was  due,  in  large 
part,  to  a  massive  voter  turnout  and  the 
remarkable  watchdog  role  played  by  the 
200,000  citizen  volunteers  of  the  Na- 
tional Movement  for  Free  Elections. 

On  the  economic  front,  we  have  seen 
acceptance  of  an  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund]  arrangement  involving 
stringent  austerity  constraints — the 
essential  first  step  toward  resolving  the 
financial  crisis.  In  accordance  with  this 
program,  the  Marcos  government  has 
adopted  such  tough  measures  as  budget 
cuts  of  roughly  30%  overall,  sharp  limits 
on  the  domestic  money  supply,  a  floating 
peso,  and  broad  new  taxes. 

Initial  steps  have  also  begun  toward 
the  structural  reforms  that  will  be 
needed  to  get  the  economy  back  on  a 
path  of  sustained  growth.  Unless  market 
forces  are  free  to  operate,  particularly  in 
key  sectors  of  the  economy  such  as  agri- 
cultural production  and  marketing,  the 
Philippine  economy  will  never  recover 
its  full  health.  For  long-term  growth,  it 
is  the  view  of  virtually  all  economists,  in- 
cluding those  at  the  World  Bank  and  the 
IMF,  that  the  Filipinos  must  ehminate 
the  barriers  that  currently  block  the  full 
realization  of  their  economy's  inherent 
potential. 

Finally,  the  past  few  months  have 
seen  encouraging  signs  that  the  Philip- 
pine Government  leadership  and  military 
establishment  recognize  the  seriousness 
of  the  insurgency  and  are  adopting  a 
more  effective,  comprehensive  approach 
to  the  challenge.  Positive  signs  of  mili- 
tary reform  include: 

•  A  new  system  to  police  military 
abuses; 

•  Some  reorganization  of  military 
command  and  deployment  to  deal  with 
the  insurgency;  and 

•  A  more  realistic  set  of  military 
procurement  priorities  focusing  on  basic 
mobility  and  communications  items 
needed  against  the  insurgency. 

The  Tasks  Ahead.  If  these  remarks 
suggest  that  Filipinos  have  put  some 
water  back  in  the  glass,  it  should  be 
equally  clear  that  the  glass  remains  half 
empty.  Much  more  has  to  be  done.  The 
challenges  remain  serious. 


39 


EAST  ASIA 


Our  current  efforts  to  help  the  Fili- 
pinos meet  these  challenges  concentrate 
on  the  following  three  general  areas. 

•  First,  support  for  the  growth  of 
democratic  institutions— the  United 
States  will  continue  to  support  the  effort 
to  guarantee  free  and  fair  local  elections 
in  1986  and  presidential  elections  in 
1987,  although  we  must  recognize  that 
on  such  critical  questions  as  electoral 
codes  and  election  monitoring  it  is  the 
Filipinos  themselves  who  must  decide 
what  is  necessary. 

•  Second,  support  for  efforts  to 
move  the  Philippine  economy  back  to  a 
free  market  orientation— here,  we  will 
continue  to  support  strongly  the  IMF 
reforms.  Beyond  that,  our  assistance 
will  continue  to  aim  at  encouraging  re- 
forms needed  to  establish  a  free  market 
environment  as  the  base  for  long-term 
growth.  We  are  requesting  $35  million 
from  the  Congress  for  a  new  PL  480 
food  aid  program  designed  specifically  to 
support  key  reforms  in  the  agricultural 
marketing  area.  We  will  also  support 
World  Bank  and  ADB  [Asian  Develop- 
ment Bank]  efforts  to  disburse  loans 
that  support  specific  reform  targets. 

•  Third,  we  will  provide  enhanced 
military  assistance  with  the  full  expecta- 
tion that  reform  programs  already  be- 
gun will  continue  and  expand.  The 
United  States  will  provide  badly  needed 
material  military  assistance.  Foreign  ex- 
change shortages  and  budgetary  re- 
straints have  sharply  reduced  the  re- 
sources available  to  the  Philippine 
Armed  Forces  to  play  their  role  in  a 
comprehensive  approach  to  the  in- 
surgency. As  a  percentage  of  GNP 
[gross  national  product],  Philippine  de- 
fense expenditures  have  dropped  by 
almost  half  in  the  last  2  years  and,  at 
1.1%  of  GNP,  are  the  lowest  in  South- 
east Asia— despite  the  growing  threat  of 
a  communist  insurgency.  Basic  short- 
comings in  maintenance,  logistics,  trans- 
portation, communications,  and  training 
can  only  be  overcome  through  adequate 
levels  of  foreign  assistance. 

We  are,  therefore,  asking  Congress 
for  an  additional  $15  million  in  military 
assistance  in  FY  [fiscal  year]  1986  over 
and  above  the  annual  level  projected  by 
understandings  related  to  our  bases 
agreement  as  well  as  for  improvement 
in  the  terms  of  that  assistance.  At  the 
same  time,  we  have  made  clear  to  the 
Filipinos  our  conviction  that  without 
basic  changes  the  Philippine  military  will 
not  be  able  to  stem  the  insurgency  tide. 
This  proposal  is  premised  on  the  full  ex- 
pectation that  the  incipient  reforms  we 
have  seen  will  continue  and  expand. 
First  and  foremost,  this  requires  an  end 
to  military  abuse  against  civilians— itself 
one  of  the  most  commonly  cited  factors 


in  explaining  the  alarming  growth  of  the 
communist  insurgency  throughout  the 
islands. 

While  military  reform  is  essential, 
the  communist  insurgency  cannot  be 
combated  effectively  without  also  ad- 
dressing the  political  and  economic  prob 
lems  that  the  communists  exploit.  The 
best  antidote  to  communism  is  democ- 
racy. This  is  not  something  we  need  to 
tell  the  Filipinos;  indeed,  it  might  be 
that  they  wrote  the  book  on  fighting 
communist  insurgencies  during  their  bat- 
tle against  the  Huks.  [Then  Secretary  of 
National  Defense  and  former  Philippine 
President]  Ramon  Magsaysay  put  it  elo- 
quently in  a  speech  in  1951: 

We  must  deliver  the  substance  of  democ- 
racy to  the  people.  Our  military  offensive  is 
indispensable,  since  force  must  be  met  by 
force.  But  our  social  offensive  is  the  extra 
weapon  which  the  enemy  cannot  produce. 
Here  the  enemy  meets  democracy's  strongest 
element  in  the  ability  to  realize  and  satisfy 
the  needs  of  its  people  without  taking  from 
them  their  freedom  and  dignity  as  human  be- 
ings. 

The  Stakes.  In  the  coming  years,  it 
is  the  freedom  and  dignity  of  human  be- 
ings that  will  be  the  true  test  of  our 
policy.  Philippine  success  in  meeting  its 
crisis  has  enormous  implications  for  the 
United  States  and  for  all  of  East  Asia. 
But  the  implications  are  most  profound 
for  the  Filipinos  themselves. 

True,  it  is  in  the  U.S.  interest  for 
the  Philippines  to  be  a  stable,  demo- 
cratically oriented  ally.  A  healthy  Philip- 
pines within  a  strong  ASEAN  [Associa- 
tion of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  is  a 
bulwark  for  freedom  in  Southeast  Asia. 
Through  support  for  common  interests 
and  concern  for  democratic  goals,  the 
Philippines  enhances  U.S.  interests  and 
the  chances  for  peace  in  the  region. 

There  is  a  tendency,  both  in  the 
Philippines  and  in  the  United  States,  to 
focus  upon  our  use  of  military  facilities 
as  the  bottom-line  U.S.  interest  in  the 
Philippines.  These  facilities  are,  indeed, 
enormously  important.  They  have  a  de- 
terrent effect,  preserve  the  balance  of 
power,  and  check  the  expanded  Soviet 
and  Vietnamese  presence  in  the  region. 
They  are  important  not  only  to  the 
United  States  and  the  Philippines,  which 
by  treaty  enjoys  protection  under  the 
U.S.  defense  umbrella,  but  also  to  the 
countries  of  North  and  Southeast  Asia. 

However,  the  role  of  the  military 
bases  in  shaping  U.S.  policy  is  far  too 
often  misunderstood  and  exaggerated. 
The  bases  give  us  one  more  important 
reason  to  be  concerned  for  the  long-term 
political  and  economic  health  of  the 
Philippines;  but  our  interest  in  the 
Philippines  is  far  larger  than  just  the 
bases,  and  our  interest  in  the  bases  is 


long  term,  not  short  term.  It  is  incum- 
bent upon  us  and  upon  Filipinos  of  all 
moderate  persuasions  to  ensure  that  the 
long-term  interests  of  both  our  countries 
are  not  threatened  by  short-term  tactica 
considerations. 

The  growth  of  the  communist-led  in 
surgency  in  the  Philippines  represents  a 
threat  to  our  interests  and  to  the  in- 
terests of  other  nations  of  the  region. 
But  the  most  serious  threat  is  to  the 
Filipinos  themselves.  The  United  States 
could  find  an  alternative  to  our  use  of 
facilities  in  the  Philippines.  They  would 
be  more  expensive  and  less  effective,  bui 
alternatives  could  be  found.  However, 
should  the  communists  succeed  in  taking 
over  the  government  in  the  Philippines, 
there  would  be  no  alternative  for  50 
million  Filipinos.  The  problems  we  see 
today  in  the  Philippines,  serious  though 
they  are,  pale  by  comparison  to  those 
that  every  communist  regime  in  history 
has  inflicted  on  its  people.  And  those 
regimes  are  not  open  to  peaceful 
change.  Not  a  single  one  has  returned 
on  its  own  to  democracy. 

It  has  become  almost  fashionable  re- 
cently to  make  comparisons  between  the 
Philippines  and  Iran.  Most  of  these  com- 
parisons ignore  the  enormous  differ- 
ences between  the  Philippines  and  Iran 
in  history,  culture,  traditions,  religion, 
and  political  institutions.  The  one  thing 
that  is  clear  is  that  the  Iranian  people 
would  be  far  better  off  under  the  former 
regime,  with  all  its  defects,  than  in  the 
darkness  they  find  themselves  in  today. 

Every  country  is  unique,  and 
analogies  are,  therefore,  always  dubious. 
But  if  we  are  looking  for  analogies,  let 
us  at  least  think  for  a  moment  about 
more  hopeful  ones,  about  the  many 
countries  that  have,  in  the  last  10  or  15 
years,  restored,  revitalized,  or,  in  some 
cases,  created  effective  democracies. 
There  is  no  reason  why  Filipinos,  with 
their  long  practical  experience  with 
democratic  institutions,  cannot  move  in- 
to the  future  with  equal  confidence. 

Conclusion.  Change  in  the  Philip- 
pines' economic,  political,  and  military 
institutions  is  clearly  underway.  We  are 
of  the  view  that  this  process  of  change 
is  both  necessary  and  constructive.  It  is 
bringing  with  it  a  greater  degree  of 
pluralism  in  the  political  system;  increas- 
ing transparency  in  public  administra- 
tion; new  accountability  in  the  country's 
economic,  political,  and  judicial  institu- 
tions; and  a  healthy  new  sense  of  profes- 
sionalism in  the  military.  All  of  these 
trends  add  to  national  strength,  interna- 
tional credibility,  and  the  reconciliation 
of  national  differences. 

Only  the  Filipinos  can  resolve  their 
myriad  problems.  However,  because  of 
the  legacy  of  history,  the  strong  ties  of 
our  people,  and  the  congruence  of 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ECONOMICS 


security  interests  in  the  western  Pacific 
and  Southeast  Asia,  we  have  and  will 
continue  to  have  a  natural  concern  for 
the  health  of  the  Philippines  and  its  in- 
stitutions. 

As  befits  an  old  and  strong  ally,  the 
United  States  is  able  to  help  influence 
developments  in  the  Philippines.  In  at- 
tempting to  do  so,  we  must  and  do  re- 
spect national  sensitivities  as  well  as 
recognize  restraints.  Our  ability  to  affect 
what  happens  in  the  Philippines  is  not 
what  it  is  thought  to  be  in  the  coffee 
shops  of  Manila  or,  for  that  matter,  by 
many  U.S.  observers.  But  we  will  not" 
underestimate  our  influence,  and  we  will 
exercise  it  constructively. 


The  problems,  by  any  measure,  are 
acute.  But  with  political  will,  a  spirit  of 
compromise,  and  vigorous  leadership, 
the  Filipinos  will  win  this  struggle.  The 
Filipinos'  love  for  democracy  has  been 
manifested  again  and  again"in  their 
country's  history.  They  are  a  resilient 
people.  They  are  fighters.  They  know,  as 
do  their  leaders  of  every  democratic 
political  persuasion,  that  they  have  our 
support  to  get  the  job  done.  They  can  be 
confident  that  we  will  be,  to  use  Presi- 
dent Reagan's  own  words,  ".  .  .  staunch 
in  our  conviction  that  freedom  is  not  the 
sole  prerogative  of  a  lucky  few,  but  the 
inalienable  and  universal  right  of  all 
human  beings."  ■ 


Protectionism:  A  Threat 
to  Our  Prosperity 


%  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  National  Associ- 
ation of  Business  Econornists  on 
'February  26,  1985.  Mr.  Wallis  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs. 

The  subject  I  have  been  asked  to  ad- 
dress is  international  economic  policy. 
At  the  outset,  I  want  to  point  out  that 
the  term  can  be  misleading.  Interna- 
'  tional  economics  is  governed  by  the 
same  fundamental  laws  as  domestic 
economics.  The  modifier  "international" 
does  not  mean  we  are  dealing  with 
something  exotic  or  arcane  that  must  be 
handled  with  a  different  set  of 
rules— not  at  all.  Economic  cause  and 
effect  on  the  international  scene  are  no 
different  than  on  the  domestic  scene. 
What  is  different  is  the  politics,  and 
even  the  politics  are  more  domestic  than 
foreign. 

Trade  policy,  for  example,  seems  to 
be  a  quintessential  example  of  interna- 
tional economic  policy.  But  the  essence 
of  trade  policy  was  illuminated  by  the 
19th-century  humorist,  Ambrose  Bierce. 
Bierce  defined  tariffs  as  devices  "to  pro- 
tect the  domestic  producer  against  the 
greed  of  his  consumers."  Trade  policy  in- 
volves diverting  the  income  of  some 
groups  in  a  country  (for  example,  con- 
sumers of  automobiles)  for  the  benefit  of 
other  groups  m  the  same  country  (for 
example,  producers  of  automobiles).  The 
policy  may  be  carried  out  at  the  border 
by  limiting  access  to  the  U.S.  market, 
but  both  its  beneficiaries  and  its  victims 
are  primarily  domestic  and  only  secon- 


darily foreign.  My  comments  on  protec- 
tionism today  may,  therefore,  be  taken 
as  equally  applicable  to  the  domestic  and 
international  economies. 


The  Dangers  of  Protectionism 

The  most  serious  threat  to  the  world 
economy— and  to  our  domestic 
economy— is  the  swelling  tide  of  protec- 
tionism. People  who  would  never  con- 
done protectionism  at  home  somehow 
accept  that  it  should  be  practiced  inter- 
nationally. To  illustrate  this  point  with  a 
hypothetical  example,  suppose  that  the 
State  of  Virginia  decided  that  North 
Carolina  tobacco  was  making  excessive 
inroads  in  the  Virginia  market,  and  sup- 
pose that  Virginia  (defying  the  constitu- 
tional prohibition  against  internal  tariffs) 
managed  to  impose  a  special  levy  on  all 
tobacco  entering  the  state.  Of  course, 
North  Carolina  would  retaliate  against 
products  from  Virginia.  Clearly,  total 
economic  activity — and  our  pros- 
perity— would  be  reduced.  No  one  in 
this  room  would  consider  that  trade  bar- 
riers among  the  50  States  would  be 
anything  but  a  disaster;  but  many  people 
(economists  included)  appear  to  assume 
that  a  different  set  of  economic  rules 
operates  on  the  international  scene.  By 
this  same  logic — or  lack  of  logic — they 
assume  that  with  impunity  we  can  in- 
troduce protectionist  measures  at  our  in- 
ternational borders  without  hurting  all 
parties  concerned — ourselves  more  than 
others. 

Protectionist  measures  invite  a 
spiral  of  retaliation,  and,  even  in  the 
absence  of  retaliation.  They  foster  ineffi- 
cient uses  of  scarce  resources  and  raise 


the  cost  of  living  in  the  country  in- 
troducing the  protection.  A  favored 
group  or  industry  may  initially  benefit 
from  a  quota,  for  example,  but  even 
greater  additional  costs  are  borne  by  the 
majority  of  the  population. 

It  may  seem  strange  that  in  the 
United  States,  historically  the  champion 
of  the  free  market,  I  should  feel  the 
need  to  make  a  plea  for  a  free  and  open 
trading  system.  But,  while  most  persons 
would  readily  agree  that  such  a  system 
is  demonstrably  superior  in  principle,  I 
often  find  them  advocating  policies  that 
would  produce  the  opposite  result.  When 
individuals,  industries,  or  even  whole 
sectors  perceive  their  economic  interests 
to  be  threatened,  they  often  rationalize  a 
course  of  action  that  has,  over  and  over 
again,  proven  to  be  a  failure:  protec- 
tionism. "We  believe  in  free  trade,"  they 
say,  "but  it  must  be  fair  trade."  "Fair 
trade"  is  not  defined,  but  implicitly  it 
means  trade  in  which  we  win. 

Protectionist  measures,  and  trade- 
distorting  measures  in  general,  are  not 
really  actions  taken  by  one  country 
against  another  country.  Instead,  they 
are  actions  that  benefit  one  domestic 
group  at  the  expense  of  other  groups  in 
the  same  country.  Producers  oppose 
consumers,  and  industries  that  compete 
with  imports  oppose  industries  that  ex- 
port. It  is  disheartening  but  not  surpris- 
ing that  protectionism's  advocates  are 
found  in  all  nations,  and  always  have 
been,  but  that  does  not  validate  their 
cause.  Their  arguments,  in  whatever 
language  they  may  be  phrased,  are 
founded  on  the  same  fallacies,  and 
neither  eloquence  nor  vehemence  will 
alter  the  fundamental  fact  that  protec- 
tionism is  inevitably  self-defeating.  Pro- 
tectionism is  like  a  disease— not  only 
pernicious  but  contagious.  When  it  ap- 
pears, it  spreads  and  leaves  a  trail  of 
economic  disability. 

By  "protectionism,"  I  mean  any 
measure  that  gives  a  domestic  producer 
an  artificial  advantage  over  foreign  pro- 
ducers. I  include  tariffs,  quotas,  volun- 
tary export  restraints,  subsidies,  un- 
necessary licensing,  health  and  safety 
standards,  and  all  other  measures  that 
distort  trade. 

On  the  surface  and  in  specific  cases, 
protectionism  may,  at  first  glance,  seem 
advantageous— at  least  to  the  naive.  It 
is  often  claimed,  for  example,  that  im- 
port restrictions  save  jobs.  It  may  be 
true  that  employment  in  one  industry  is 
higher  with  protection  than  without,  but 
jobs  lost  in  other  sectors  are  often 
greater. 


April  1985 


41 


ECONOMICS 


Why  are  jobs  lost  in  other  sectors? 
In  many  cases,  one  industry's  output  is 
another  industry's  input.  As  a  case  in 
point,  you  will  recall  that  last  summer 
President  Reagan  refused  to  yield  to 
demands  for  restrictions  on  copper  im- 
ports. He  recognized  that  the  domestic 
copper  industry  suffered  serious  prob- 
lems, but  he  also  recognized  that  any 
benefit  that  might  accrue  to  the  copper 
producers  would  be  more  than  offset  by 
increased  costs  to  those  industries  using 
copper  as  a  raw  material.  To  maintain 
international  competitiveness,  U.S.  firms 
need  to  have  access  to  the  highest  quali- 
ty and  lowest  cost  products  available  in 
the  world  market. 

More  generally,  to  the  extent  that 
protectionism  restrains  imports,  it  will 
cause  the  dollar  to  appreciate.  This,  in 
turn,  will  encourage  imports  and 
discourage  exports,  with  an  adverse  ef- 
fect on  employment.  Economists  have 
long  understood  that,  when  all  the  inter- 
relationships within  our  economy  are 
taken  into  account,  an  across-the-board 
import  duty  has  the  same  effect  as  an 
across-the-board  tax  on  exports.  Unfor- 
tunately, this  is  not  understood  by  those 
who  argue  for  an  import  surcharge  or 
other  protectionist  policies.  Protection 
alters  the  distribution  of  employment 
among  industries,  but  it  does  not  affect 
the  total  level  of  employment. 

It  is  sometimes  argued  that  protec- 
tion is  "fairer"  to  low-  and  middle-income 
families.  The  opposite  is  more  likely  to 
be  true,  since  protection  raises  prices  in 
the  protected  industry — and  who  pays 
for  that?  Higher  prices  always  impose  a 
higher  proportionate  burden  on  low- 
income  consumers  than  on  high-income 
consumers. 

Finally,  we  cannot  ignore  the  risk  of 
retaliation.  If  we  limit  a  country's  ex- 
ports of  a  given  product  to  us,  that 
country's  ability  to  buy  from  us  is  re- 
duced, and  it  may  also  retaliate  directly 
against  some  of  our  exports.  The  result 
will  be  that  a  different  U.S.  industry  will 
lose  an  export  market  and,  thus, 
employment.  In  such  a  situation,  our 
overall  employment  level  could  possibly 
remain  the  same,  but,  through  govern- 
ment intervention  in  the  marketplace, 
employment  will  have  been  redis- 
tributed. Furthermore,  the  redistribution 
will  be  from  more  efficient  to  less  effi- 
cient industries,  for  which  all  of  us  will 
pay,  both  as  consumers  and  as  pro- 
ducers. It  is  far  better  to  allow  the 
market  to  work  and  to  transfer  employ- 
ment from  an  uncompetitive  industry  to 
one  that  is  more  efficient. 

This  leads  me  to  the  often-heard 
argument  that  we  must  protect  our 


"basic"  industries.  This  argument  ig- 
nores the  fact  that,  in  a  dynamic 
economy  such  as  ours,  what  may  be  a 
basic  industry  in  one  period  of  time  may 
not  be  at  all  "basic"  in  another.  This 
argument  mistakes  the  prospects  for 
continued  vitality  in  our  economy  as  a 
whole  with  the  prospects  of  particular 
industries.  New  industries  develop,  and 
old  ones  decline.  For  example,  would 
any  of  you  hesitate  to  call  computers  a 
basic  industry?  But  was  it  a  basic  in- 
dustry in,  say,  1950?  Obviously,  the  mix 
is  constantly  changing  and  will  continue 
to  do  so.  Then  why  should  government 
intervene  to  decide  what  industry  is 
"basic"  and  merits  special  protection?  I 
submit  that  the  marketplace  will 
demonstrate  what  is  "basic"  and  what 
isn't  and  that  if  a  particular  industry  is 
declining,  the  marketplace  is  telling  us 
something. 

Protection  is  often  invoked  to  pro- 
vide an  industry  an  "adjustment  period" 
to  modernize  and  become  more  com- 
petitive. The  theory  is  that  it  will 
become  healthy  and  that  the  protection 
can  then  be  eliminated.  Unfortunately, 
the  opposite  is  usually  the  case.  Not  only 
does  protection  obviate  the  need  for  the 
protected  industry  to  become  more  effi- 
cient, but  the  protection  entices  more 
resources  into  a  sector  that  probably 
already  has  excess  capacity.  For  exam- 
ple, for  several  decades  textiles  has  been 
one  of  our  most  protected  industries,  yet 
a  study  in  1982  showed  that  fully  one- 
third  of  all  the  clothing  and  textile 
establishments  in  the  country  had  not 
been  in  the  industry  6  years  earlier.  In 
France,  one-fifth  of  all  new  manufactur- 
ing firms  in  recent  years  have  been  in 
the  clothing  and  textile  industry. 

Let  us  remember  that  in  the  1960s 
the  protection  sought  by  industrial  coun- 
tries for  their  textile  industries  was 
described  as  "temporary."  Would  we  not 
all  be  better  off  if  scarce  resources,  in- 
stead of  being  attracted  to  textiles,  had 
been  invested  in  new  industries  where 
we  enjoy  a  comparative  advantage?  Fur- 
thermore, we  would  now  have  a  serious 
problem  on  our  hands  if  we  were  to 
remove  protection  for  textiles  except 
over  a  prolonged  period;  and  the  in- 
dustry has  accumulated  huge  vested  in- 
terests that  lead  to  increasing  rather 
than  decreasing  its  protection. 

We  should  also  note  that  some 
forms  of  protection  not  only  reduce  our 
welfare  but  actually  help  foreign  pro- 
ducers by  enabling  them  to  charge 
higher  prices  for  the  restricted  exports. 
This  is  generally  true  of  quotas  or  so- 
called  voluntary  export  restraints.  U.S. 
protection  of  steel  in  the  1 970s,  for  ex- 


ample, is  estimated  to  have  increased 
the  annual  profits  of  Japanese  steel  pro- 
ducers by  about  $200  million,  or  about 
half  of  the  Japanese  expenditures  on 
research  and  development  in  steel.  The 
current  restraints  on  Japanese  auto- 
mobile exports  to  the  United  States  are 
adding  considerably  to  the  profits  of 
those  Japanese  automobile  manufac- 
turers who  are  allowed  to  export  to  the 
United  States,  thereby  generating  an  in- 
fluential voice  in  Japan  for  continuing 
the  restraints. 

Protectionist  measures  can  cause 
distortions  without  achieving  their 
original  intent.  In  1977  we  signed  an 
orderly  marketing  agreement  with 
Japan  covering  color  television 
receivers.  At  that  time,  Japan  accounted 
for  90%  of  our  imports.  Two  years  later, 
Japan  accounted  for  only  50%  of  our  im- 
ports— but  the  share  of  other  Asian 
countries  increased  from  15%  to  50%. 
Thus,  we  merely  succeeded  in  changing 
the  source  of  Imports. 

Protection  at  international  frontiers 
is  often  the  outgrowth  of  government  in- 
tervention in  the  market.  A  good  exam- 
ple is  provided  by  agriculture,  which  is 
subsidized  in  most  industrial  countries, 
including  our  own.  Subsidies  are  de- 
signed to  improve  the  income  of  a  privil- 
edged  group  at  the  expense  of  other 
citizens — in  this  case,  consumers.  Sub- 
sidies artificially  stimulate  the  produc- 
tion of  goods  that  are  neither  wanted 
nor  needed.  More  of  the  subsidized 
goods  are  produced  than  would  have 
been  without  subsidization — witness 
farm  surpluses  in  the  European  Com- 
munity. As  is  true  of  all  subsidies,  they 
shift  resources  away  from  other  sectors 
of  the  economy  to  the  subsidized  sector. 
The  result  is  that  resources  are  used  less 
efficiently,  total  output  is  reduced,  and 
investment  in  other  sectors  lags.  Part  of 
the  blame  for  the  European  Economic 
Community's  poor  economic  perform- 
ance in  the  past  decade  or  two  can  be 
attributed  to  the  rising  burden  of 
agricultural  subsidies,  which  attract 
capital  and  labor  into  farming  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  rest  of  the  economy. 

Having  pushed  commodity  prices 
above  market-clearing  levels  and  having 
enticed  new  jiroducers  into  the  market, 
subsidizing  nations  then  resort  to  protec- 
tionism. They  impose  import  barriers  to 
keep  out  the  cheaper  products  that 
would  undercut  the  artificial  price  struc- 
ture that  has  been  built  up.  Then,  with 
excessive  production  and  saturated 
markets,  producing  nations  move  to  the 
next  stage:  subsidizing  exports  to  move 
their  stockpiles. 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ECONOMICS 


That  protectionism  is  economically 
larmful,  particularly  to  the  nation  that 
mposes  the  restrictions,  is  not  just  an 
ibstract  theory.  It  is  an  observable  fact 
'or  which  I  have  given  a  few  examples 
lere  and  for  which  many  more  examples 
ould  be  readily  produced.  It  follows 
ogically  that  our  policies  should  be 
iirected  toward  tlie  reduction  of  protec- 
:ionism.  We  need  greater  public 
iwareness  that  protection  that,  in  the 
short  run,  appears  to  be  a  benefit  is,  in 
he  long  run,  detrimental.  Spreading 
his  awareness  is  a  task  for  which  I 
ount  on  your  support. 

3pening  Foreigfn  Markets 

3ther  countries,  of  course,  have  an  even 
)igger  stake  than  we  do  in  preserving 
md  extending  the  open  trading  system, 
'or  they  lack  our  huge  internal  free 
narket.  Japan,  for  example,  has 
)enefited  greatly  from  the  access  it  has 
■njoyed  to  our  market,  as  have  we.  But 
)arriers  that  Japan  maintains  to  its 
iomestic  market  limit  the  ability  of  U.S. 
'irms  to  sell  there  on  terms  comparable 
0  those  enjoyed  by  Japanese  firms  in 
he  United  States.  Both  countries  would 
oe  better  off  if  Japan  were  to  remove  as 
nany  of  these  obstacles  as  possible. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  President 
lleagan  and  Prime  Minister  Nakasone 
igreed  earlier  this  year  to  launch  an  in- 
lensive  series  of  sectoral  trade  negotia- 
lions.  Late  in  January,  I  led  a  mission  to 
!'okyo  to  initiate  the  discussions,  which 
will  initially  include  telecommunications, 
lectronics,  forest  products,  and  medical 
■quipment  and  pharmaceuticals.  High  of- 
icials  from  the  Office  of  the  U.S.  Trade 
lejjresentative,  the  Department  of  Com- 
iierce,  the  Department  of  Agriculture, 
lul  the  Treasury  are  very  active  in  the 
legotiations,  which  are  unique  in  that 
he  negotiators  on  both  sides  have  been 
^ven  the  same  instructions— to  identify 
larriers  to  Japan's  markets  that  are 
■usceptible  to  corrective  action  by 
government.  Secretary  Shultz  and 
'^oreign  Minister  Abe  have  been  in- 
tructed  to  provide  a  progress  report  to 
^resident  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone  at  the  time  of  the  Bonn 
'conomic  summit  in  May. 

We  have  no  illusions  that  success 
vill  be  instantaneous.  The  political 
orces  of  protectionism  are  stronger  in 
(apan  than  in  most  countries.  Never- 
heless,  we  seek  early  progress  in  the 
elecommunications  sector  and  will 
persevere  with  our  efforts. 

If  we  are  to  be  successful  in  break- 
ng  down  foreign  protectionist  barriers 
md  in  opening  foreign  markets,  we 


must  ourselves  avoid  resorting  to  pro- 
tection. Just  as  we  object  to  protec- 
tionism in  others,  we  should  not  expect 
them  to  welcome  it  in  us.  Nor  should  we 
be  surprised  if  they  retaliate  or  use  our 
actions  as  excuses  to  justify  their  own 
protectionism.  The  question  of  retalia- 
tion reminds  me  of  one  of  President 
Reagan's  favorite  analogies.  He  said,  if 
two  people  are  in  a  boat  and  one  of 
them  shoots  a  hole  in  the  bottom,  it  will 
not  help  the  other  person  to  shoot 
another  hole  in  the  bottom.  Some  call 
that  getting  tough,  the  President  said, 
but  he  calls  it  getting  wet.  Our  markets 
are  more  open  than  most,  but  we  have 
our  share  of  highly  protected,  inefficient 
sectors.  But  to  halt  and  reverse  the  tide 
of  protectionism,  it  is  obviously  not  suffi- 
cient to  practice  self-discipline  just  at 
home.  We  need  the  cooperation  of  the 
international  trading  community. 

Forming  a  Coalition  for  Free  Trade 

I  have  spoken  a  great  deal  of  the  danger 
of  protectionism  in  terms  of  reaction 
and  retaliation,  but  I  do  not  want  to 
leave  you  with  the  wrong  impression. 
The  main  reason  we  should  work  toward 
free  trade  is  not  fear  of  retaliation,  but 
that  we  gain  by  it,  whatever  other  coun- 
tries do.  I  am  advocating  a  hard-headed 
policy  to  maximize  our  own  welfare.  Of 
course,  open  markets  here  help  our 
trading  partners,  and  it  helps  them  and 
us  still  further  if  their  markets  are  open, 
too.  The  debt-ridden  less  developed 
countries,  for  example,  can  hardly  even 
service  that  debt  unless  they,  we,  and 
the  other  developed  countries  keep  our 
markets  open  to  them. 

In  considering  policies  for  opening 
trade,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
political  process  on  which  such  policies 
must  be  based.  Phrases  like  "political 
will"  are  empty  rhetoric.  The  important 
consideration  is  political  capacity. 

If  those  interested  in  an  industry 
have  an  influence  over  the  government, 
they  have  a  chance  of  gaining  protec- 
tion. This  is  strikingly  true  in  the  case  of 
nationalized  industries— for  example,  in- 
ternational airlines  in  most  countries. 
Modern  democracies  increasingly  have 
become  fragmented.  Some  of  this  is  due 
to  methods  of  electing  legislatures— for 
example,  by  proportional  representation 
or  by  electing  several  representatives 
from  a  single  constituency— and  other 
devices  which  effectively  prevent  any 
one  party  from  gaining  a  majority,  so 
that  coalitions  have  to  be  formed.  Even 
in  countries  where  the  two-party  system 
prevails,  such  as  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  States,  party  discipline  is 


weakening,  and  it  is  necessary  to  form 
coalitions  among  many  special  interest 
groups  in  order  to  achieve  any  legisla- 
tion. 

Comprehensive  negotiations,  such  as 
would  be  involved  in  a  new  round  of 
comprehensive  trade  arrangements,  of- 
fer the  best  chance  for  putting  together 
a  coalition  for  free  trade.  Each  party  to 
the  coalition  may  lose  some  special 
benefit.  But  if  it  can  be  assured  that  the 
special  benefits  lost  by  all  of  the  other 
members  will  gain  it  enough  to  offset  its 
loss,  it  is  possible  to  get  a  working  coali- 
tion for  free  trade.  This  is  a  case  in 
which  it  may  be  easier  to  clean  the 
whole  Augean  stable  at  once  than  to 
clean  it  one  stall  at  a  time. 

We  must,  therefore,  push  ag- 
gressively forward  on  a  comprehensive 
multilateral  trade  negotiation  under  the 
auspices  of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).  The  object  of 
such  negotiations  is  twofold; 

First,  to  hold  the  line  and  eventual- 
ly reverse  the  global  trend  toward  pro- 
tectionism that  has  already  cost  us  dear- 
ly and,  if  permitted  to  spread,  would 
eventually  cause  a  contraction  in  world 
trade  and  a  reduction  in  our  standard  of 
living; 

Second,  to  create  new  market  op- 
portunities for  our  own  (and  others') 
most  efficient  and  dynamic  industries  so 
that  they  may  realize  their  full  potential 
as  engines  of  future  growth. 

We  have  much  to  gain  from  a  new 
round  of  trade  negotiations,  and  so  do 
our  partners. 

But  the  problems  are  immense.  The 
less  developed  countries  have  shown  lit- 
tle interest  in  a  new  round  of  negotia- 
tions, and,  in  many  of  the  industrialized 
countries,  high  unemployment  has  en- 
couraged governments  to  shield  in- 
dustries from  competition.  Highly  pro- 
tected industries  in  this  country,  for  that 
matter,  do  not  want  import  competition. 
Many  people,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
have  to  be  shown  where  their  best  in- 
terests lie.  We  have  to  persuade  govern- 
ments that  the  best  reason  for  them  to 
reduce  trade  barriers  is  that  it  is  in  their 
best  interest  to  do  so.  Despite  the  dif- 
ficulties, this  Administration  is  deter- 
mined to  continue  its  efforts  to  produce 
a  freer  and  more  productive  trading 
system. 

In  closing,  I  ask  all  of  you,  as  pro- 
fessional economists,  to  contribute  your 
skills  and  your  prestige  to  this  common 
effort  to  increase  our  prosperity— not 
only  the  prosperity  of  the  United  States, 
but  that  of  the  whole  world.  ■ 


\pril1985 


43 


EUROPE 


The  United  States  and  Greece 


by  Richard  N.  Haas 

Address  before  the  American 
Hellenic  Educational  Progressive 
Association  (AHEPA)  on  February  8, 
1985.  Mr.  Haas  is  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  European  and  Canadian 
Affairs. 

The  theme  of  this  conference  is  "Irrecon- 
cilable Differences?  American  Foreign 
Policy  and  Greek  National  Interests." 
AHEPA  deserves  our  congratulations 
for  sponsoring  a  conference  on  so  impor- 
tant a  topic,  and  I  will  direct  most  of  my 
remarks  to  this  question.  But  I  want  to 
begin  with  a  few  words  about  the  larger 
context  in  which  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Greece  occur. 

President  Reagan  took  office  at  a 
time  of  crisis  and  demoralization  in  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Twin  setbacks  in  Iran  and 
Afghanistan,  a  relentless  Soviet 
weapons  buildup,  major  economic  prob- 
lems at  home  and  abroad— all  left  the 
West  relatively  weaker  and  America's 
leadership  role  more  in  doubt  than  at 
any  time  since  World  War  II. 

The  President  was  highly  successful 
in  meeting  these  challenges.  The  election 
results  of  November  attest  to  the 
widespread  support  for  his  policies  and 
leadership.  I  understand,  too,  that  near- 
ly two-thirds  of  the  Greek-Americans 
voting  favored  President  Reagan. 

What  Greek-Americans  and  others 
endorsed  was  a  self-confident  America, 
an  America  of  renewed  economic  oppor- 
tunity and  growth,  and  an  America  of 
restored  military  might.  Election  results 
also  revealed  support  for  a  foreign 
policy  dictated  by  a  sincere  commitment 
to  negotiations  and  arms  reduction 
tempered  by  a  realistic  assessment  of 
the  Soviet  Union. 

A  key  aspect  of  our  success  abroad 
was  that  it  was  shared.  The  United 
States  has  long  recognized  that  it  cannot 
go  it  alone  if  peace  and  freedom  are  to 
be  preserved.  Our  experience  in  the 
alliance  of  democracies,  NATO,  has  been 
a  great  success.  Sixteen  countries  with 
widely  different  backgrounds,  some 
formerly  bitter  enemies,  belong.  As 
allies  they  have  worked  together  to 
preserve  the  peace  in  Europe  for  over 
35  years.  And  they  have  done  so  in  the 
face  of  a  growing  threat  from  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact. 


Greece  and  the  Alliance 

Greece  is  one  of  the  members  of  this 
successful  alliance.  It  has  enjoyed  the 
peace  NATO  has  provided.  It  has  added 
to  the  strength  that  preserved  the 
peace.  Greece  and  the  United  States 
share  the  common  benefits  and  respon- 
sibilities that  go  with  membership  in  this 
unique  association. 

Yet  despite  this  proud  and  suc- 
cessful past,  our  differences  seem  to 
have  increased  in  number  and  gravity. 
Are  these  differences  irreconcilable?  I 
won't  keep  you  in  suspense.  My  answer 
is  no.  Let  me  justify  this  answer  with  a 
few  propositions. 

My  first  proposition  is  that  Greece 
has  long  been  a  valued  and  important 
friend  and  ally.  Just  as  Greek-Americans 
cannot  separate  themselves  entirely 
from  their  former  homeland,  America 
cannot  separate  itself  from  a  heritage 
which  dates 'back  to  ancient  Greece.  The 
very  word  for  our  form  of  govern- 
ment—democracy—comes from  Greek. 
Our  art  and  architecture  abound  with 
the  influences  of  Hellenic  culture. 
Thousands  of  our  citizens  each  year 
travel  to  Greece.  We  are  bound  by  a  net- 
work of  important  economic,  social,  and 
political  ties.  We  fought  with  Greece 
against  fascism  and  forged  close  bonds 
under  the  Truman  doctrine.  As  two  of 
that  small  and  select  group  of  nations 
which  embrace  democracy,  we  joined 
NATO  and  helped  halt  the  spread  of 
Soviet  communism. 

As  a  second  proposition,  Greece  is 
of  major  strategic  importance  to  the 
West,  the  United  States,  and  NATO  as 
well.  Located  at  the  crossroads  of 
Europe,  the  Middle  East,  and  Africa, 
Greece  is  in  a  position  to  help  control 
the  sea-  and  airlanes  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. Bordering  on  the  Warsaw  Pact, 
Greece  would  block  any  attack  toward 
the  Mediterranean  through  Thrace  and 
would  join  Turkey  and  other  members  of 
NATO  in  resisting  a  Soviet  effort  to 
seize  the  Dardanelles.  The  United  States 
has  valuable  military  facilities  in  Greece 
which  serve  key  alliance  and  mutual 
defense  objectives.  Without  Greece, 
NATO's  southern  frontier  would  be  split. 
A  dangerous  gap  would  emerge  in  the 
defense  chain  stretching  from  the 
Norwegian  Sea  to  the  eastern  Mediter- 
ranean. 


A  third  proposition  stems  from  the 
other  side  of  the  coin.  I  would  argue 
that  the  United  States  and  NATO  are 
vital  to  Greek  security.  Greece  enjoys 
the  benefits  of  a  world  in  which  warfare 
has  been  contained  due  to  the  strong  ef- 
forts of  the  Western  alliance.  While 
some  in  Greece  see  no  imminent  threat 
of  attack  from  the  north  today,  it  is  onlj 
the  deterrence  provided  by  a  united  and 
strong  alliance  that  makes  that  so.  As 
Prime  Minister  Papandreou  recently 
acknowledged  in  an  interview,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  approach  taken  by  the 
United  States  after  World  War  II, 
Greece  would  likely  be  in  the  Soviet  bloc 
today. 

Beginning  with  the  massive  effort  tc 
assist  Greece  under  the  Truman  doc- 
trine, as  it  resisted  Soviet  and  Soviet- 
supported  pressures,  the  United  States 
has  provided  over  $6.8  billion  in 
economic  and  military  assistance  to 
Greece.  Our  commitment  continues:  in 
the  current  fiscal  year,  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration has  proposed  that  Greece 
receive  $500  million  in  FMS  [foreign 
military  sales]  loans,  making  Greece  the 
fifth  largest  recipient  of  U.S.  security 
assistance.  Indeed,  of  the  five  major 
recipients,  only  Israel  receives  more  on 
a  per  capita  basis. 

Security  against  external  threat, 
combined  with  foreign  assistance,  has 
greatly  contributed  to  Greek  economic 
development.  Ties  to  the  West  provided 
a  framework  in  which  Greece  could 
make  impressive  political  and  economic 
strides.  With  the  tragic  exception  of  the 
period  from  1967-74,  Greece  since  1949 
has  experienced  one  of  its  longest 
periods  of  political  stability  as  a 
democracy  since  antiquity.  Economic  ac- 
complishments have  been  just  as  great. 
Greece's  annual  per  capita  income  has 
increased  from  below  $200  in  1950  to 
around  $4,000  today. 

Turkey  and  U.S.-Greek  Relations 

I  suspect  that  many  of  you  can  agree 
with  the  points  I  have  made  thus  far. 
What,  then,  underlies  our  topic  of  the 
day?  If  the  United  States  and  Greece 
share  a  mutual  heritage  and  traditions 
and  have  compelling  mutual  security  in- 
terests, then  why  has  AHEPA  through 
this  conference  emphasized  our  dif- 
ferences? Does  the  answer  lie  with  those 
who  believe  our  interests  are  irrecon- 
cilable because  of  our  relations  with 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Turkey  and  because  of  Cyprus?  This 
leads  to  my  next  proposition,  funda- 
mental to  our  policy  toward  the  eastern 
Mediterranean— namely,  that  good  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and 
Turkey  are  consistent  with  Greek  in- 
terests. So,  too,  is  the  approach  we  are 
taking  to  the  Cyprus  problem. 

There  is  no  denying  that  differing 
Derspectives,  mistrust,  and  suspicion  in 
3oth  Ankara  and  Athens  complicate  our 
:ies  with  both  allies.  Frankly,  we  some- 
;imes  are  tempted  to  conclude  that  if 
3oth  Greece  and  Turkey  are  dissatisfied 
Afith  us— as  is  sometimes  the  case— we 
Tiust  be  doing  something  right.  None- 
;heless,  there  are  a  number  of  good 
easons  why  our  relationship  with 
Turkey  serves  the  common  interests  of 
he  United  States  and  Greece. 

First,  just  as  Greece  is  vital  to 
MATO,  so  is  Turkey.  No  military  plan- 
ler  would  want  to  defend  Turkey 
A'ithout  Greece  or  Greece  without 
Turkey.  Turkey  does  not  only  share  a 
ong  border  with  the  Warsaw  Pact;  it 
Drojects  eastward  into  Southwest  Asia 
ind  stands  squarely  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  Middle  East.  In  wartime, 
Turkey  would  be  vital  to  us  and  to 
jlreece,  whether  the  attack  came  in 
Thrace,  Southwest  Asia,  or  the  Persian 
julf.  Nor  would  an  isolated  Turkey  out- 
ride NATO  be  in  Greek  interests.  I 
A'ould  add  that  U.S.  security  assistance 
M  Turkey,  although  larger  than  for 
areece,  is  not  excessive.  Turkey's  needs, 
pven  the  threat  I  have  outlined,  are 
lubstantial.  Much  of  Turkey's  arms  are 
obsolete.  Per  capita  GNP  [gross  national 
Droduct]  in  Turkey  is  only  a  third  that  of 
jreece. 

But  American  aid  for  Turkey  does 
not  merely  help  Ankara  meet  a  common 
fhreat  shared  by  Greece  and  the  United 
tates.  It  also  supports  continued 
political  and  economic  development  in 
DMrkey.  Turkey's  steady  return  to 
democracy  and  progress  toward 
iconomic  and  internal  stability  can  only 
ontribute  to  long-term  prospects  for 
iresolving  Greek-Turkish  differences.  We 
(do  not  minimize  these  problems,  but  we 
lio  not  consider  them  insoluble.  They  in- 
clude complex  and  important  issues  of 
sovereign  rights  relating  to  airspace  and 
the  sea  and  many  other  issues,  large  and 
small,  which  create  frictions  between 
these  two  neighbors.  Such  problems 
have  been  addressed  by  Greeks  and 
Turks  before.  One  need  only  think  back 
to  the  period  in  which  the  Greek  and 
Turkish  statesmen,  [Eleutherios] 
Venizelos  and  [Kemal]  Ataturk,  were 
able  to  establish  a  foundation  of  con- 


structive ties  in  difficult  circumstances. 
Those  of  the  present  ought  not  to  settle 
for  less. 

Quite  simply,  the  United  States  does 
not  have  the  luxury  of  favoring  one 
country  over  the  other,  and  neither 
country  would  benefit  if  we  did.  We  will 
continue  to  make  clear  our  opposition  to 
the  use  of  force  in  the  Aegean.  Both 
allies  face  too  many  threats  which  are 
real  and  too  many  demands  on  their 
limited  resources  to  squander  them  on 
needless  confrontation.  We  will  continue 
to  urge  both  countries  to  make  renewed 
efforts  to  ease  tensions  and  to  resume  a 
dialogue. 

The  Cyprus  Problem 

Let  me  turn  now  to  Cyprus.  Here,  too, 
we  believe  differences  in  perspective  be- 
tween Greece  and  the  United  States  do 
not  pose  intractable  problems  for  our 
relationship.  We  recognize  the  impor- 
tance of  this  issue  to  Greek  people 
everywhere  and  to  all  Greek  govern- 
ments. Cyprus  is  a  top  priority  for 
American  foreign  policy  as  well.  We 
have  made  clear  our  willingness  to  assist 
the  parties  in  the  search  for  a  settle- 
ment. We  have  also  made  clear  our  op- 
position to  actions  which  forestall  or 
prejudice  progress.  In  this,  we  should 
find  ourselves  not  at  odds  but  at  one 
with  all  Greeks. 

No  one  should  doubt  America's 
resolve  to  see  progress  toward  a  fair, 
negotiated  settlement  in  Cyprus.  The 
United  States  alone,  however,  cannot 
solve  the  Cyprus  problem.  Efforts  to  im- 
pose a  settlement  by  outside  parties 
have  failed  in  the  past.  Nor  can  the 
United  States  be  held  responsible  for  the 
current  situation,  which  developed  over 
many  years.  Attempts  to  make  the 
United  States  the  scapegoat  for  internal 
political  events  in  Greece  or  for  creating 
the  Cyprus  problem  are  wrong.  They  ig- 
nore the  long  history  of  differences  be- 
tween the  two  communities.  They  also 
detract  from  realistic  attempts  to  solve 
the  problem.  Ultimately,  the  Cypriots 
themselves  must  decide  how  they  will 
live  together.  Compromise  will  be 
necessary  from  both  sides. 

Our  policy  has  been  and  remains  one 
of  strong  support  for  the  efforts  of  the 
UN  Secretary  General  and  his  "good 
offices"  i;ole  of  bringing  the  two  com- 
munities together.  I  am  sure  many  of 
you  followed  closely  UN  Secretary 
General  Perez  de  Cuellar's  latest  in- 
itiative on  Cyprus,  which  culminated  in 
January's  meetings  between  President 
Kyprianou  and  [Turkish  Cypriot  leader] 
Mr.  Denktash.  'This  was  the  first  summit 


EUROPE 


meeting  between  the  Cypriot  parties  in 
nearly  6  years.  Extensive  discussion  of 
the  key  elements  of  a  settlement  took 
place.  While  we  were  disappointed  that 
the  parties  were  unable  to  reach  agree- 
ment, we  believe  that  much  has  been  ac- 
complished in  the  last  several  months. 
We  should  not  squander  the  progress 
that  has  been  made.  F^ursuit  of  a 
negotiated  solution  must  continue.  We 
are  urging  all  parties  to  renew  the 
search  for  progress.  As  before,  we  will 
do  what  we  can  to  assist  this  endeavor. 

In  doing  so,  we  do  not  believe  that 
one-sided  punitive  approaches,  such  as 
cuts  in  military  assistance  to  Turkey  or 
conditioning  Turkish  assistance  to 
specific  actions  on  Cyprus,  are  helpful. 
In  fact,  they  are  counterproductive.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  an  effort  to  provide 
positive  incentives  for  progress,  the 
President  proposed  last  year  a  $250 
million  Cyprus  Peace  and  Reconstruc- 
tion Fund  for  use  by  the  Cypriots  when 
a  settlement  is  reached  or  significant 
steps  toward  one  are  taken.  That  pro- 
posal is  still  valid  and  will  be  im- 
plemented should  circumstances  permit, 
as  we  all  hope  they  will.  We  welcome 
AHEPA's  thoughtful  and  constructive 
proposal  on  how  this  fund  might  be  used 
to  encourage  Greek  and  Turkish 
Cypriots  to  begin  practical  efforts  at 
cooperation. 

No  issue  requires  the  attention  of  all 
parties  in  the  region  now  more  than 
Cyprus.  The  prospects  for  progress  are 
greater  than  they  have  been  for  many 
years.  And  while  we  know  movement 
toward  a  resolution  of  the  Cyprus  prob- 
lem will  not  automatically  lead  to  im- 
provements in  relations  between  Greece 
and  Turkey,  it  is  clear  that  the  improved 
atmosphere  that  would  result  could 
make  it  easier  for  the  two  sides  to  ad- 
dress other  areas  of  tension. 

Other  Issues 

In  our  view,  then,  Turkey  and  Cyprus 
need  not  and  should  not  prevent  good 
U.S. -Greek  relations.  Our  differing 
views  do,  of  course,  complicate  our  rela- 
tions, and  it  would  be  disingenuous  to 
say  otherwise.  This  is  in  itself  nothing 
new.  What  is  new,  though,  is  the  scope 
and  intensity  of  problems  that  have 
characterized  our  relations  since  1981. 

Perhaps  most  difficult  for  many 
Americans  to  deal  with  are  the  harsh 
and  even  gratuitous  criticisms  directed 
at  the  United  States  in  recent  years  by 
the  Government  of  Greece.  We  have  our 
faults,  plenty  of  them.  Certainly,  we  are 
not  above  criticism.  Furthermore,  dif- 
ferences—even sharp  differences— are  to 


April  1985 


45 


EUROPE 


be  expected  between  democratic  allies 
with  independent  views. 

But  there  ought  to  be  limits.  As  we 
see  it,  these  differences  are  similar  to 
those  in  a  family.  They  should  be  kept  in 
the  family  context.  In  this  case,  the 
family  is  the  Western  community  of  na- 
tions with  its  core  of  shared  interests. 
We  do  not  believe  that  statements  by  an 
ally  calling  the  United  States  "the 
metropolis  of  imperialism"  and  virtually 
white-washing  the  Soviet  Union  are  con- 
sistent with  the  spirit  of  the  alliance. 
Nor  can  we  understand  why  a  friend 
would  accuse  the  United  States  of  put- 
ting into  jeopardy  the  lives  of  hundreds 
of  innocent  women  and  children  aboard 
Korean  Air  Lines  Flight  007,  shot  down 
by  the  Soviet  Union.  It  was  and  remains 
a  preposterous  charge  that  this  plane 
was  on  a  spy  mission  for  the  United 
States.  Provocative  Greek  Government 
statements  questioning  U.S.  and  NATO 
motivation  in  supporting  Solidarity  in 
Poland  only  detract  from  goals  we  all 
share.  So,  too,  does  Greek  refusal  to 
support  the  alliance  consensus  on 
resisting  the  deployment  of  Soviet 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles 


targeted  on  Europe.  These  accusations 
go  beyond  routine  disagreement  be- 
tween allies.  They  draw  down  the  large 
fund  of  good  will  for  Greece  here  in 
America  and  erode  support  for  the 
United  States  in  Greece. 

We  have  other  problem  areas.  Our 
military  bases  in  Greece  serve  mutual  in- 
terests, we  believe,  and,  in  fact,  we  con- 
cluded a  new  base  agreement  15  months 
ago.  We  assume  this  serves  Greek  in- 
terests or  the  government  would  not 
have  signed.  Yet  we  continue  to  hear 
statements  about  the  agreement  being 
no  more  than  a  5-year  termination  pact. 
Again,  these  are  statements,  not  specific 
actions,  but  they  hurt  the  atmosphere 
and  make  important  military  planning 
and  cooperation  much  more  difficult. 
Both  parties  to  an  alliance  must  be  con- 
fident they  can  rely  on  each  other  in  the 
future.  We  lack  this  when  the  Greek 
Government  asserts  that  the  Americans 
will  be  asked  to  leave  at  the  end  of  5 
years. 

We  here  in  the  United  States  were 
pleased  when  Greece  resumed  full  par- 
ticipation in  NATO  in  1980.  This  re- 
mains the  case.  As  you  know,  NATO  is 


40th  Anniversary 
of  the  Yalta  Conference 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  5,  1985' 

Forty  years  ago  this  week,  the  leaders 
of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and 
the  Soviet  Union  met  at  Yalta,  to  confer 
on  the  approaching  end  of  World  War  II 
and  on  the  outlines  of  the  postwar 
world.  The  agreements  they  reached  in- 
cluding the  Declaration  on  Liberated 
Europe,  committed  all  three  govern- 
ments to  the  reconstruction  of  a 
democratic  continent. 

Since  that  time,  Yalta  has  had  a 
double  meaning.  It  recalls  an  episode  of 
cooperation  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  free  nations,  in  a  great  common 
cause.  But  it  also  recalls  the  reasons 
that  this  cooperation  could  not  con- 
tinue— the  Soviet  promises  that  were 
not  kept,  the  elections  that  were  not 
held,  the  two  halves  of  Europe  that  have 
remained  apart. 

Why  is  Yalta  important  today?  Not 
because  we  in  the  West  want  to  reopen 
old  disputes  over  boundaries;  far  from 
it.  The  reason  Yalta  remains  important 
is  that  the  freedom  of  Europe  is  un- 


finished business.  Those  who  claim  the 
issue  is  boundaries  or  territory  are  hop- 
ing that  the  real  issues— democracy  and 
independence — will  somehow  go  away. 
They  will  not. 

There  is  one  boundary  which  Yalta 
symbolizes  that  can  never  be  made 
legitimate,  and  that  is  the  dividing  line 
between  freedom  and  repression.  I  do 
not  hesitate  to  say  that  we  wish  to  undo 
this  boundary.  In  so  doing,  we  seek  no 
military  advantage  for  ourselves  or  for 
the  Western  alliance.  We  do  not  deny 
any  nation's  legitimate  interest  in  securi- 
ty. But  protecting  the  security  of  one 
nation  by  robbing  another  of  its  national 
independence  and  national  traditions  is 
not  legitimate.  In  the  long  run,  it  is  not 
even  secure. 

Long  after  Yalta,  this  much  remains 
clear:  The  most  significant  way  of  mak- 
ing all  Europe  more  secure  is  to  make  it 
more  free.  Our  40-year  pledge  is  to  the 
goal  of  a  restored  community  of  free 
European  nations.  To  this  work  we 
recommit  ourselves  today. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  11,  1985. 


a  union  of  democratic  states,  so  diversi- 
ty, not  imposed  unanimity,  is  one  of  its 
great  strengths.  Nonetheless,  I  think  m^ 
concept  of  the  family  again  comes  into 
play.  An  overall  harmony  of  approach 
and  willingness  to  compromise  are 
essential.  We  do  not  see  such  an  ap- 
proach being  taken  by  the  Greek 
Government.  We  and  other  allies  are 
distressed,  for  example,  about  Greek  un 
willingness  to  participate  in  alliance 
military  exercises.  Such  exercises  are 
very  important  in  strengthening  and 
testing  NATO  defenses  and  benefit  all  o 
us.  We  hope  that  the  Greek  Governmen 
will  agree  to  participate  again  in  the 
future. 

We  also  have  had  our  differences  on 
specific  terrorist  incidents  in  the  recent 
past  and,  more  generally,  on  how  best  ti 
react  to  the  growing  threat  that  interna 
tional  terrorism  poses  to  all  civilized  na- 
tions. You  have  seen  media  accounts  of 
the  tragic  bombing  in  Glyfada.  Whateve 
the  source  of  the  outrage— and  we  do 
not  yet  have  enough  information  to 
judge— the  incident  starkly  reveals  our 
joint  vulnerability  to  acts  of  violence  anc 
terrorism.  We  appreciate  the  sympathy 
and  outrage  expressed  by  the  Greek 
Government  and  its  efforts  to  seize  the 
perpetrators.  We  sincerely  hope  that 
from  this  tragic  incident  will  come  an 
improved  dialogue  between  our  govern- 
ments on  terrorism.  Certainly,  progress 
in  the  key  area  of  antiterrorism  would 
go  a  long  way  to  improve  relations  be- 
tween us. 

I  should  point  out  that  despite  all 
these  obstacles,  there  are  accomplish- 
ments on  the  other  side  of  the  ledger  as 
well— the  conclusion  of  a  base  agree- 
ment which  had  not  been  possible  under 
previous  Greek  governments  was  a 
notable  achievement.  Implementation  of 
that  agreement,  despite  some  strong 
points  of  friction,  continues  to  go  well  in 
many  areas.  Sixth  Fleet  vessels  regular- 
ly visit  Athens  and  other  Greek  ports. 
We  are  currently  negotiating  for  new 
agreements  regarding  our  VOA  [Voice 
of  America]  transmitters  in  Greece  and 
status  of  forces  arrangements.  Discus- 
sions to  expand  economic  and  commer- 
cial ties  are  also  underway.  It  is,  indeed, 
a  shame  that  the  many  positive  aspects 
of  U.S. -Greek  relations  become  obscured 
in  the  face  of  our  differences. 

If  I  may  conclude  this  last  of  my 
propositions,  let  me  reiterate  that  I  do 
not  believe  the  differences  I  have  out- 
lined are  irreconcilable.  We  derive  no 
satisfaction  from  our  current  difficulties. 
To  the  contrary,  we  seek  to  have  the 
best  possible  relationship  with  Greece. 


46 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


We  believe  our  relationship  can  improve. 
And  we  are  doing  our  part  to  bring  this 
about.  We  do  not  ask  Greece  to  give  up 
its  independence  or  sovereignty.  We  ask 
only  for  a  reciprocal  approach  on  the 
part  of  the  Greek  Government.  Good 
relations  are  a  two-way  street.  We  ask 
that  our  differences  be  handled  construc- 
tively and  privately,  not  openly  and  con- 
tentiously.  We  do  not  and  cannot  ask 
that  all  our  differences  be  magically 
resolved,  only  that  they  be  dealt  with  in 
a  fashion  befitting  long-time  friends  and 
allies. 

AHEPA  has  a  key  role  to  play.  Your 
close  contact  with  the  Greek  people  and 
understanding  of  both  countries  provides 
an  important  bond  of  friendship  and 
trust.  No  gi-oup  is  more  qualified  to  ex- 
plain our  perspective  in  Greece  or  the 
Greek  perspective  here  than  you.  None 
can  doubt  your  sincere  concern  for  good 
It. S. -Greek  relations.  You  have 
represented  a  large  segment  of  the 
American  public's  views  on  these  issues 
responsibly  and  thoughtfully. 

We  all'  admire  what  your  organiza- 
tion has  done  and  continues  to  do  to 
foster  greater  understanding  and  better 
relations.  This  conference  is  a  fine  exam- 
ple of  your  timely  and  perceptive  ef- 
forts. I  personally  have  appreciated 
AHEPA's  dialogu.e  with  the  Administra- 
tion. I  ask  for  your  continued  help 
toward  the  goals  we  share— better  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and 
Greece,  better  relations  among  the  coun- 
tries of  the  region,  peaceful  resolution  of 
differences,  and  a  uniting  of  effort  to 
meet  our  common  challenges  and  aspira- 
tions. ■ 


Soviet  Crackdown  on 
Jewish  Cultural  Activists 


Tlie  follo^ving  Department  uf  State 
report  was  presented  to  Morris  Abram, 
chair-man  of  the  National  Conference  on 
Soviet  Jewry,  by  Assistant  Secretary  for 
European  and  Canadian  Affairs 
Richard  R.  Burt  on  January  SO,  1985.  It 
was  made  available  to  news  correspond- 
ents by  acting  Department  sp<>kesm.an 
Edward  Djerejian  on  February  1. 

[n  late  July  1984,  Soviet  authorities 
began  a  major,  sustained  crackdown  on 
Hebrew  teachers  and  other  Jewish 
cultural  activists.  By  the  end  of  January 
1985,  eleven  activists,  including  four 
Hebrew  teachers,  had  been  arrested  and 
four  sentenced  to  terms  in  Soviet  labor 
camps.  The  arrests  were  accompanied 
by  a  series  of  searches,  beatings,  and 
threats  which  have  sent  shock  waves 
through  the  Soviet  Jewish  community. 

The  crackdown  began  with  the 
July  26  arrest  of  Moscow  Hebrew 
teacher  Aleksandr  Kholmianskiy  in 
Estonia  on  hooUganism  charges.  Police 
reportedly  located  a  pistol  and  ammuni- 
tion in  a  subsequent  search  of  his 
parents'  Moscow  apartment.  In  early 
September,  his  fellow  Moscow  Hebrew 
teacher,  Yuliy  Edelshtein,  was  arrested 
after  a  police  search  of  his  apartment 
turned  up  narcotics.  There  is  no  reason 
to  doubt  the  assertions  of  close  relatives 
that  in  both  cases  the  items  were 
planted  by  the  police.  On  December  19, 
Edelshtein  was  convicted  and  sentenced 
to  3  years  in  a  labor  camp.  Kholmian- 
skiy," who  is  reportedly  very  weak  after 
a  prolonged  hunger  strike,  is  scheduled 
to  come  to  trial  on  January  31  on  the 
hooliganism  and  weapons  possession 
charges. 

In  addition  to  Moscow,  the  crack- 
down has  focused  on  Jewish  com- 
munities in  the  Ukraine.  Yakov  Levin,  a 
Jewish  cultural  activist  from  Odessa  ar- 
rested in  early  August,  was  sentenced 
on  November'  19  to  3  years  in  prison  on 
charges  of  anti-Soviet  slander.  His 
alleged  crime  was  circulating  religious 
materials.  His  father-in-law  to  be,  Mark 
Nepomnyashchiy,  was  arrested  in  Oc- 
tober on' anti-Soviet  slander  charges  and 
is  scheduled  for  trial  on  January  29. 
Their  friend,  refusenik  Yakov  Mesh,  was 
also  arrested  in  October  on  trumped-up 
charges  of  resisting  arrest.  The 
authorities  released  him  and  dropped 


charges  against  him  in  December  after 
he  sustained  life- threatening  injuries 
from  a  beating  administered  at  the  time 
of  his  arrest. 

losif  Berenshtein,  a  Kiev  Hebrew 
teacher,  was  arrested  in  November  and 
sentenced  to  3  years  in  a  labor  camp  on 
December  10,  also  for  allegedly  resisting 
the  police.  Soon  after  his  conviction,  he 
was  savagely  beaten  and  stabbed.  He 
suffered  deep  facial  wounds,  lost  the 
sight  of  one  eye,  and  is  in  danger  of  los- 
ing sight  in  his  second  eye.  Two  other 
Ukrainian  Jewish  activists,  Leonid 
Schreier  and  Yakov  Rosenberg,  both 
from  Chernovtsiy,  were  charged  in  late 
October  with  anti-Soviet  slander. 
Schreier  was  sentenced  to  3  years  in  a 
labor  camp  on  January  3,  while 
Rosenberg  remains  imprisoned  awaiting 
trial. 

Leningrad,  home  of  one  of  the 
largest  and  most  active  Jewish  com- 
munities in  the  Soviet  Union,  has  so  far 
been  spared  major  arrests.  With  the  ex- 
ception of  Yakov  Gorodetskiy,  a  leading 
activist  who  served  a  minor  2-month 
work  release  sentence  in  late  summer, 
no  one  in  the  activist  community  has 
been  arrested.  The  Leningrad  communi- 
ty has  not  escaped  major  harassment, 
however.  The  phones  of  Gorodetskiy  and 
several  other  activists  have  been  dis- 
connected, and  more  than  20  non- 
activists  refusenik  families  have  been 
called  in  by  the  poUce  and  threatened 
with  the  loss  of  their  jobs  if  they  do  not 
give  up  their  plans  to  emigi-ate.  There 
was  also  a  local  television  program  in 
November  which  identified  several  ac- 
tivists by  name  and  accused  them  of 
engaging  in  "Zionist"  subversion.  Many 
local  activists  fear  major  arrests  in  the 
near  future.  One,  Evgeniy  Lein,  has  al- 
ready been  threatened  with  arrest  on 
charges  of  "parasitism." 

The  crackdown  on  Hebrew  teachers 
and  Jewish  cultural  activists  has  been 
accompanied  by  a  stepped-up  anti- 
Semitic  campaign  in  the  Soviet  media. 
In  addition  to  the  Leningrad  program 
cited  above,  a  program  aired  in  Moscow 
in  November  equated  Zionism  with 
Nazism  and  accused  World  War  II 
Jewish  leaders  of  helping  the  Nazis 
round  up  Jews  for  the  death  camps.  The 
diversionary  activities  of  the  officially 
sponsored  "Anti-Zionist  Committee  of 
Soviet  Society"  have  also  been  given  ex- 
tensive coverage  recently  in  the  Soviet 
press. 


ADril1985 


47 


GENERAL 


Following  a  December  free  from  ma- 
jor arrests,  the  crackdown  regained 
momentum  in  January.  The  arrest  of 
Latvian  Jewish  cultural  activist  Vladimir 
Frankel  in  Riga  January  15  had  the  ef- 
fect of  spreading  the  crackdown  beyond 
Moscow  and  the  Ukraine.  Frankel  was 
charged  with  anti-Soviet  slander. 

In  Moscow,  meanwhile,  prominent 
activist  Dan  Shapiro  was  arrested  on 
January  22  and  also  charged  with  anti- 
Soviet  slander.  Police  conducted 
numerous  searches  in  conjunction  with 
the  two  arrests  and  Moscow  authorities 
are  reportedly  planning  to  arrest  two 
more  activists,  Dmitriy  Khazankin  and 
Igor  Kharach,  who  are  colleagues  of 
Shapiro's. 

The  Department  of  State  has  been 
monitoring  these  disturbing 
developments  with  concern  since  the 
crackdown  began  in  July.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  campaign  has  been 
consciously  directed  by  Soviet 
authorities  to  discredit  and  destroy  the 
revival  of  Jewish  culture  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  methods  used — arrests, 
beatings,  the  planting  of  evidence,  and 
the  use  of  the  media  to  slander  refusenik 
activists — have  created  a  renewed  at- 
mosphere of  crisis  in  the  Soviet  Jewish 
community  and  heightened  international 
concern  about  what  may  next  lie  in  store 
for  Soviet  Jewry. 

The  U.S.  Government  deplores  this 
accelerating  campaign  in  the  strongest 
possible  terms,  calls  on  the  Soviet 
authorities  to  end  it  immediately,  and 
urges  them  to  live  up  to  the  com- 
mitments to  respect  individual  human 
rights  that  they  have  solemnly  under- 
taken in  a  whole  series  of  international 
accords,  from  the  Universal  Declaration 
on  Human  Rights  through  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act  and  the  concluding  document 
agreed  to  in  1983  at  Madrid.  We  will  be 
watching  with  particular  interest  the 
results  of  the  upcoming  trials  of 
Aleksandr  Kholmianskiy  and  Mark 
Nepomnyashchiy.  ■ 


Strength  and  Diplomacy: 
Toward  A  New  Consensus? 


by  Michael  H.  Armacoat 

Address  before  the  World  Affairs 
Council  in  Boston  on  January  25,  1985. 
Ambassador  Armacost  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Political  Affairs. 

The  United  States  is  a  very  different 
country  from  what  it  was  5  or  10  years 
ago— and  our  allies  and  adversaries 
know  it.  Our  position  in  the  world  and 
our  ability  to  act  as  a  force  for  progress 
and  stability  have  improved  signifi- 
cantly. 

We  have  restored  the  credibility  of 
our  deterrent  forces  in  the  face  of 
Moscow's  ongoing  arms  buildup.  The 
vitality  of  the  American  economy  has 
begun  to  lift  the  global  economy  out  of 
recession.  Fueled  by  our  recovery,  most 
industrialized  countries  have  returned  to 
noninflationary  expansion,  and  there  has 
been  some  amelioration  of  the  Third 
World's  debt  crisis. 

But  something  more  is  happen- 
ing—less tangible,  perhaps,  than 
rebuilding  our  defenses  or  restoring 
health  to  our  economy  but  which  never- 
theless improves  our  foreign  policy  pros- 
pects. In  the  mid-1980s  Americans  once 
again  seem  comfortable  with  an  active 
role  of  world  leadership.  For  the  first 
time  since  Vietnam  and  Watergate,  at 
home  and  abroad  we  see  renewed  con- 
fidence in  the  United  States  as  an  in- 
strument of  peace  and  progress. 

A  New  Consensus 

The  recent  election  campaign  furnished 
evidence  of  a  growing  domestic  consen- 
sus on  key  foreign  policy  issues.  Both 
major  candidates  declared  their  commit- 
ment to  a  strong  defense,  to  the  quest 
for  reliable  arms  control  agreements 
with  the  Soviets,  to  active  diplomacy  to 
help  resolve  regional  conflicts,  and  to 
the  vigorous  promotion  of  democracy 
and  human  rights.  To  be  sure,  partisan 
differences  persist  on  many  policy 
issues.  That  is  natural.  But  I  firmly 
believe  there  is  more  evident  agreement 
on  shared  purposes  than  this  country 
has  witnessed  in  more  than  a  decade. 
This  is  a  fact  of  some  importance. 
To  be  effective,  foreign  policy  must  be 
sustainable.  In  a  democracy,  that,  in 
turn,  requires  broad  national  agreement 
on  basic  principles  and  close  collabora- 


tion between  the  executive  and 
legislative  branches,  reinforced  by  a 
healthy  dose  of  bipartisanship.  The  alter- 
native is  paralysis  and  confusion,  the 
erosion  of  our  position  in  the  world,  and 
a  retreat  from  the  ideals  to  which  we 
have  traditionally  adhered. 

The  20  years  following  World 
War  II  are  now  commonly  looked  upon 
as  the  halcyon  days  of  consensus  and 
bipartisanship  in  American  foreign 
policy.  The  psychological  and  political 
underpiimings  of  that  consensus  were 
supplied  by  the  shared  experience  of 
Munich,  victory  in  the  war  against 
fascism,  and  the  appearance  of  a  new 
geopolitical  menace  from  Stalin's  Russia. 
To  be  sure,  there  were  major  controver- 
sies triggered  by  the  "loss"  of  China  and 
the  Korean  war.  Nevertheless,  a 
substantial  unity  of  basic  purpose 
energized  a  period  of  great  creativity 
and  produced  some  of  our  most  endur- 
ing achievements:  the  United  Nations; 
new  international  financial  institutions 
and  a  more  open  global  trading  regime; 
the  Marshall  Plan;  and  alliances  with  the 
democracies  in  the  Atlantic  community, 
Japan,  and  ANZUS  [Australia,  New 
Zealand,  and  United  States  security 
treaty]. 

But  we  divided  bitterly  over  In- 
dochina. Critics — among  them  promi- 
nent members  of  the  foreign  policy 
establishment— concluded  not  just  that 
America  had  overreached  itself  in  the 
pursuit  of  its  goals  but  that  the  goals 
themselves  were  unworthy  or  misguided; 
not  just  that  America  no  longer  offered 
solutions  to  the  world's  problems  but 
that  America  itself  was  part  of  the  prob- 
lem. Shaken  by  Vietnam  and  by  trau- 
matic domestic  events  in  the  1960s  and 
1970s,  the  postwar  consensus  was 
severely  shaken. 

While  we  were  examining  our  con- 
sciences, the  Soviet  Union  relentlessly 
increased  its  military  strength.  It  took 
advantage  of  our  retrenchment  to 
establish  new  beachheads  in  areas  of 
conflict  and  instability — Angola, 
Ethiopia,  Vietnam,  Nicaragua — and  to 
invade  Afghanistan.  Our  ability  and  our 
determination  to  react  was  sapped  by 
public  diffidence,  by  congressional 
restrictions,  and  by  policy  initiatives  to 
reduce  unilaterally  U.S.  troop  levels  in 
Europe  and  in  the  Far  East.  Our 
humiliation  in  Iran  sprang  from  in- 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ligenous  sources  but  became  a  symbol 
)f  our  apparent  unwillingness,  if  not  in- 
ibility,  to  act  decisively  in  the  interna- 
ional  arena  to  protect  our  interests.  By 
L980  many  Americans  had  obviously 
;ome  to  the  conclusion  that  the  post- 
/ietnam  pendulum  had  swung  too  far. 

Polling  data  and  the  actions  of  Con- 
gress— a  reflection  of  constituency 
jressures — suggest  that  the  majority  of 
Americans  support  a  balanced  foreign 
)olicy,  that  they  neither  seek  the  respon- 
sibilities of  a  global  policeman  i  ir  favor 
•etreat  from  an  active  internal  >nal  role; 
;hat  they  believe  our  ideals— c    nocracy, 
iberty,  the  rule  of  law — are  n.    e  than 
;ver  relevant  to  the  rest  of  the  \vorld 
md  that  the  U.S.  Government  has  a 
listoric  responsibility  to  stand  up  for 
hem;  that  augmented  military  strength 
s  required  to  deter  aggression,  defend 
'reedom,  and  provide  the  necessary 
inderpinnings  for  an  active  diplomacy. 
The  American  people  are  realistic  about 
;he  power  and  aims  of  our  Soviet  adver- 
;ary,  yet  anxious  to  promote  a  dialogue 
vith  their  leaders;  they  support  an  open 
rading  system,  assistance  to  developing 
lations,  and  magnanimous  help  to 
•efugees  and  victims  of  natural 
iisasters. 

In  short,  a  consensus  supporting  the 
)road  line  of  our  postwar  policy  has 
)een  substantially  restored.  And  that  is 
I  good  thing. 

This  public  support  is  essential  to  ef- 
'ective  policy.  But  favorable  opinion 
)olls  are  not  the  ultimate  test  of  a  na- 
ion's  diplomacy.  As  Winston  Churchill 
;ommented  during  the  darkest  days  of 
A^orld  War  II:  "Nothing  is  more 
iangerous  .  .  .  than  to  live  in  the 
emperamental  atmosphere  of  a  Gallup 
^oU,  always  feeling  one's  pulse  and  tak- 
ng  one's  temperature."  The  test  of 
political  leadership  is  the  capacity  to 
nobilize  support  for  reasonable  courses 
)f  action,  not  the  ability  to  trim  one's 
;ails  to  the  prevailing  public  mood. 

It  is  a  characteristic  of  the  leader- 
ship of  President  Reagan,  I  believe,  that 
le  has  recognized  that  ideas  count,  that 
le  is  unafraid  of  unconventional  ideas, 
ind  that  he  has  attempted  through  the 
Dolitical  process  to  change  our  way  of 
:hinking.  Domestically,  the  President 
las  tested  the  proposition  that  reduc- 
tions in  tax  rates  could  be  associated 
with  accelerated  growth  and  reduced  in- 
flation— a  bold  idea,  which  on  the  basis 
Df  experience  to  date  has  been 
remarkably  successful.  And  in  foreign 
affairs  he  has  reminded  us  of  some 
timeless  truths  while  at  the  same  time 
provoking  serious  thought  about  new 
ideas. 


I  should  like  to  speak  about  several 
of  these  in  the  time  remaining  this  after- 
noon. They  relate  to  the  balance  be- 
tween defense  and  offense  in  the  deter- 
rent equation,  to  the  means  by  which  we 
cope  with  the  scourge  of  terrorism,  and 
the  role  of  power  in  our  diplomacy  in 
Central  America.  In  each  of  these  cases, 
we  are  discussing  ideas  that  cut  to  the 
core  of  our  national  experience— the 
relationship  between  power  and 
diplomacy,  the  role  of  force  in  protecting 
and  advancing  our  interests  in  the 
world. 

The  Deterrent  Balance 

Let  me  begin  with  the  deterrence  equa- 
tion. In  the  talks  concluded  in  Geneva  a 
few  weeks  ago,  the  Soviets  and  our- 
selves concluded  that  the  relationship 
between  offensive  and  defensive  systems 
will  be  a  core  subject  when  the  negotia- 
tions resume. 

When  we  negotiated  the  ABM  [an- 
tiballistic  missile]  Treaty  in  1972,  our 
view  was  that  missile  defenses  should  be 
limited  to  the  lowest  possible  level,  since 
deployment  of  defenses  would  simply 
stimulate  offsetting  expansion  of  offen- 
sive systems  to  no  one's  benefit.  With 
defense  severely  limited,  it  was  assumed 
that  comparably  low  levels  of  strategic 
offensive  forces  would  be  possible  and 
that  this  would  permit  the  establishment 
of  a  reliable  deterrent  balance  at  much 
lower  levels  of  defense  expenditure  and 
of  strategic  deployments. 

Since  1972,  we  have  had  to  rethink 
the  relationship  between  offensive  and 
defensive  arms.  Although  missile 
defenses  had  been  sharply  constrained, 
meaningful  limits  on  the  growth  of  of- 
fensive forces  proved  elusive.  Indeed, 
existing  agreements  permitted  the 
number  of  Soviet  ballistic  missile 
warheads  to  grow  by  a  factor  of  four 
since  the  SALT  I  [strategic  arms  limita- 
tion talks]  negotiations  began  in  1969. 
The  Soviet  Union  has  taken  full  advan- 
tage of  the  deployments  permitted  by 
the  ABM  Treaty.  It  has  exploited 
technical  ambiguities  in  the  agreement. 
It  has  almost  certainly  violated  the  1972 
treaty  with  the  construction  of  a  large 
phased-array  radar  system  at 
Krasnoyarsk. 

At  Geneva  a  few  weeks  ago,  both 
we  and  the  Soviets  acknowledged  the  in- 
terrelationships between  potential  limita- 
tion on  offensive  and  defensive  arms. 
And  we  are  prepared  to  explore  the  im- 
plications of  those  relationships  in 
negotiations  which  we  hope  will  com- 
mence within  the  next  2  months. 


GENERAL 


The  Administration  has  advanced  a 
related  idea,  relatively  simple,  yet  pro- 
found in  its  implications.  The  proposition 
is  this:  if  technology  should  permit,  we 
ought  to  alter  our  concept  of  deterrence, 
relying  more  upon  the  capacity  to  de- 
fend our  society  and  those  of  our  allies 
and  less  upon  cataclysmic  threats  of 
mutual  annihilation.  It  is  upon  this  pro- 
position that  the  Strategic  Defense 
Initiative  (SDI)  is  based.  To  explore  the 
feasibility  of  this  concept,  the  Ad- 
ministration has  launched  a  long-term 
program  of  intensive  research  into  new 
defensive  technologies. 

This  research  effort  is  completely 
consistent  with  our  obligations  under  the 
ABM  Treaty.  It  is  a  long-term  program; 
no  decisions  on  deployment  of  new 
defenses  are  expected  for  a  number  of 
years.  And  even  assuming  that  the 
technologies  check  out,  a  decision  to 
deploy  would  rest  upon  other  considera- 
tions, above  all: 

•  Whether  such  defensive  systems 
were  survivable  and  consequently  would 
contribute  to  strategic  stability;  and 

•  Whether  the  deployment  of  such 
defenses  would  be  cost  effective. 

We  should  remember  that  SDI  em- 
phasizes technology  that  does  not  re- 
quire nuclear  weapons. 

We  cannot  answer  at  present  the 
questions  I  have  posed  and  are  unlikely 
to  be  able  to  for  some  years.  Nor  can  we 
negotiate  effective  reciprocal  limits  on 
such  research  efforts,  since  no  one  has 
discovered  a  plausible  means  of  effec- 
tively and  verifiably  constraining 
research.  However,  we  have  indicated 
we  are  prepared  at  this  early  stage  to 
discuss  with  our  allies  and  with  the 
Soviet  Union  the  consequences  of 
deploying  such  defenses. 

We  will  have  to  live  for  some  years 
with  uncertainty  about  the  potential  ef- 
fectiveness and  costs  of  strategic 
defenses.  In  the  meantime,  we  are 
determined  to  pursue  the  negotiation  of 
meaningful  reductions  on  offensive 
nuclear  arms  and  in  a  way  which 
enhances  strategic  stability  and  thus 
reduces  the  risk  of  war.  The  U.S.S.R. 
professes  to  share  our  interest  in  reduc- 
ing nuclear  weapons.  If  this  is  true,  the 
Soviet  motive  is  probably  to  slow  our 
strategic  and  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  programs  and  our  ad- 
vanced technology  efforts.  We,  too,  have 
a  strong  incentive  to  slow  the  expansion 
of  Soviet  nuclear  capabilities— for  exam- 
ple, in  the  absence  of  arms  control 
restraints,  the  U.S.S.R.  may  sharply  ex- 
pand its  strategic  arsenal  over  the  next 
decade. 


April  1985 


49 


GENERAL 


If  we  are  to  achieve  real  arms  con- 
trol, we  must  continue  the  modern- 
ization of  our  own  strategic  forces,  the 
preservation  of  unity  among  our  NATO 
allies,  and  our  reputation  for  superior 
technological  innovation— all  of  which 
are  essential  to  our  effectiveness  in 
negotiating  arms  control  arrangements 
with  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  that  connection,  we  shall  be  seek- 
ing continued  public  and  congressional 
support  for  the  modernization  of  our 
strategic  deterrent,  including  the  MX 
missile,  SDl  research,  and  the  increased 
readiness  and  sustainability  of  our  con- 
ventional forces.  Those  who  applaud  the 
initiative  for  new  negotiations  with  the 
Soviets  should  recognize  that  support 
for  those  defense  programs  gives  the 
Soviets  a  continuing  incentive  to 
negotiate  seriously.  A  courageous  con- 
gressional decision  over  a  decacie  ago 
gave  the  United  States  the  effective 
leverage  to  negotiate  the  ABM  Treaty. 
We  should  hope  that  Congress  will  pro- 
vide comparable  support  for  our 
negotiating  effort  in  the  months  ahead. 

Combating  Terrorism 

Let  me  return  to  another  issue  on  which 
there  is  general  public  agreement  in 
principle,  yet  a  lack  of  consensus  on  con- 
crete policy  actions:  I  am  referring  to 
our  response  to  international  terrorism. 
While  not  an  entirely  novel  international 
phenomenon,  terrorism  has  become  a 
major  focus  of  government  concern  only 
in  the  last  decade.  Indeed,  the  scope, 
variety,  and  inherent  dangers  of  contem- 
porary state-supported  terrorism  are 
without  parallel.  Terrorist  assaults  on 
our  citizens  and  our  official  installations 
pose  moral  challenges  and  impose  on  us 
novel  and  demanding  policy  dilemmas. 
We  do  not  have  all  the  answers  to  this 
challenge,  but  we  have  urged  the  civi- 
lized world  to  face  up  to  this  extraor- 
dinary problem,  recognizing  that  coping 
with  it  requires  a  new  way  of  thinking. 

Five  Americans  and  one  Saudi 
citizen,  kidnaped  in  Beirut,  are  at 
present  held  hostage  by  terrorists  who 
also  have  claimed  responsibility  for  as- 
sassinating two  French  truce  observers 
in  Beirut.  In  November,  two  American 
diplomats  were  murdered  aboard  a 
Kuwaiti  airliner  at  Tehran  airport  by 
terrorists  who  appeared  to  enjoy  the 
tacit  support  of  Khomeini's  government. 
Libyan  assassination  squads  operate  out 
of  so-called  "People's  Bureaus"— as  the 
wanton  murder  of  a  Briti.sh  policewoman 
last  spring  in  London  and  the  attempted 
assassination  in  Egypt  of  a  former 


Libyan  Prime  Minister  have  demon- 
strated. Other  state-supported  terrorists 
are  waging  a  campaign  of  assassination 
against  Jordanian  officials  and  Pales- 
tinians who  are  seen  as  being  too  in- 
terested in  a  peaceful  solution  to  Middle 
Eastern  problems.  Nor  is  terrorism  con- 
fined only  to  the  Middle  East;  Western 
Europe  and  South  America  have  ex- 
perienced frequent  terrorist  incidents  in 
recent  months. 

There  is  no  denying  the  operational 
difficulties  of  combating  these  attacks. 
Intelligence  is  often  fragmentary  and  in- 
conclusive. Governments  supporting  ter- 
rorists go  to  considerable  lengths  to 
obscure  or  conceal  their  support. 
Cooperation  among  targeted  countries 
has  proven  to  be  surprisingly  elusive.  All 
too  often,  allies — with  strong  economic 
links  to  countries  like  Libya  and 
Iran — are  hesitant  to  acknowledge,  let 
alone  confront,  the  problem  of  state- 
supported  terrorism.  Even  our  own 
citizens — and  corporations — continue  to 
live  and  operate  in  Libya,  where  they 
could  become  Qadhafi's  hostages  at 
moments  of  his  choosing.  We  have 
urged  Americans  to  leave  Libya,  but  we 
cannot  legally  compel  them  to  do  so. 

The  bombings  of  the  Marine  bar- 
racks and  Embassy  complex  in  Beirut 
have  lent  urgency  to  one  aspect  of  the 
problem,  and  we  are  altering  the  m.odus 
operandi  of  many  of  our  foreign  mis- 
sions. We  are  taking  a  variety  of  prac- 
tical steps  to  enhance  the  security  of  our 
official  personnel  abroad.  Congress  has 
been  supportive.  We  are  also  seeking  to 
strengthen  international  cooperation 
against  terrorism  with  like-minded 
governments,  particularly  those  such  as 
Britain,  Italy,  and  West  Germany,  which 
have  themselves  been  exposed  to  serious 
terrorist  threats  with  the  objective  of 
expanding  the  network  of  cooperation 
and  making  it  more  effective.  Progress 
has  been  slow.  Yet  we  shall  persevere. 

It  is  our  hope  that  this  broad  pro- 
gram of  actions  will  reduce  the  incidence 
of  international  terrorism  and  convince 
those  who  have  sponsored  it  to  withhold 
further  support.  But  we  must  not  harbor 
illusory  hopes;  nor  are  we  unwilling  or 
unable  to  act  forcefully— unilaterally,  if 
necessary — to  preempt  international  ter- 
rorist acts.  We  will  use  force  only  if  ab- 
solutely necessary,  and  any  operation 
would  be  carefully  considered  and  im- 
plemented in  order  to  avoid  innocent 
casualties.  But  if  those  who  perpetrate 
acts  of  terror  pay  no  price  for  their 
mendacity,  what  incentive  have  they  to 
honor  civilized  codes  of  conduct?  Let 
there  be  no  mistake:  we  are  prepared  to 
act  forcefully.  Should  innocent  blood  be 


shed,  it  will  be  on  the  heads  of  those  ter- 
rorists who  have  used  innocents  as  cover 
for  their  barbaric  acts. 

Central  America 

Too  often,  Americans  regard  power  and 
diplomacy  as  alternatives.  Contemporary 
threats  to  international  peace  and 
security  are  not  limited  to  direct  conflict 
between  major  powers  or  to  state- 
sponsored  terrorists.  Regional  conflicts 
also  threaten  our  interests  directly  and 
provide  opportunities  for  politically  in- 
spired exploitation  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
Such  conflicts  can  escalate  into 
dangerous  superpower  confrontation.  In 
Central  America,  aggression  supported 
by  Nicaragua,  Cuba,  and  the  Soviet 
Union  threatens  the  peace  and  blocks 
the  yearning  of  the  people  for  freedom 
and  development.  Real  hopes  for  peace 
in  Central  America  require  a  steady  ap- 
plication of  both  power  and  diplomacy. 
Our  objectives  in  that  region  have 
been  clear  and,  I  believe,  consistent: 

•  To  stop  Nicaraguan  material  sup- 
port for  insurgency  in  El  Salvador; 

•  To  remove  the  Soviet  and  Cuban 
military  presence  in  Central  America; 

•  "To  reduce  the  size  of  Nicaragua's 
military  forces  in  order  to  achieve  a 
stable,  local  balance  of  forces  and  pro- 
tect the  independence  of  its  neighbors; 
and 

•  To  encourage  democratic  forces  in 
all  Central  American  countries. 

We  acknowledged  that  many  of  the 
problems  in  the  region  have  deeper 
economic,  political,  and  social  roots.  We 
have  expressed  repeatedly  our 
preference  for  diplomatic  solutions.  In- 
deed, we  initiated  last  June  the  Man- 
zanillo  talks  to  breathe  new  life  into  the 
Contadora  process  to  which  we  have 
given  our  full  support. 

We  are  doing  a  great  deal  to 
facilitate  a  regional  settlement. 

•  Over  the  past  several  years,  we 
have  vastly  increased  our  assistance  for 
Central  American  economic  develop- 
ment. 

•  We  have  encouraged  the  transi- 
tion toward  democracy  in  the  region.  In 
1981,  Central  American  politics  were 
dominated  by  generals.  Today,  civilians 
are  elected  heads  of  state  in  Honduras 
and  El  Salvador,  as  well  as  in  Costa 
Rica.  Guatemala  held  elections  for  a  con- 
stituent assembly  last  July  and  will  elect 
a  president  later  this  year. 

•  We  have  worked  actively  for  the 
improvement  of  human  rights  condi- 
tions. Death  squad  activity  in  El 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


GENERAL 


Salvador  has  declined.  The  killers  of  the 
American  nuns  have  been  tried,  con- 
victed, and  jailed.  For  the  first  time,  we 
have  begun  to  cooperate  with  the  states 
of  the  region  to  improve  the  administra- 
tion of  justice,  the  key  to  continued  im- 
provements in  the  protection  of  human 
rights. 

•  To  help  our  friends  shield 
themselves  from  internal  and  external 

ubversion,  and  thereby  promote  a 
negotiated  regional  settlement,  we  have 
increased  our  security  assistance.  While 
we  hope  the  peace  process  will  succeed, 
we  are  determined  to  do  what  is 
necessary  to  protect  our  friends. 

•  We  have  actively  supported  Con- 
tadora,  which  our  own  efforts  comple- 
ment. 

This  approach  is  having  a  major  im- 
oact  in  the  region  and  at  home.  In  the 
iftermath  of  the  election  of  President 
Duarte,  the  human  rights  situation  in  El 
Salvador  has  improved.  While  Nicaragua 
steadily  drifts  toward  totalitarianism,  a 
zlear  majority  of  the  American  people 
low  back  both  our  support  for  El 
tSalvador  in  its  fight  against  Nicaraguan- 
«upported  guerrillas  and  our  encourage- 
ment of  the  Contadora  peace  process. 
The  Kissinger  commission  report  and 
.he  Jackson  plan  together  represent  a 
bipartisan  approach  to  promoting 
lemocracy  and  peace  in  Central 
\merica. 

Unfortunately,  without  continued 
)ressure  from  those  Nicaraguans  who 
vant  to  return  to  the  ideals  and 
lemocratic  spirit  that  led  to  the  1979 
•evolution  against  Somoza,  the  San- 
linistas  would  still  be  unobstructed  in 
.heir  consolidation  of  an  undemocratic 
•egime  with  little  inclination  to  consider 
I  negotiated  settlement.  The  fact  that 
,he  Nicaraguan  armed  resistance  has 
)een  able  to  sustain  and,  in  some 
■espects,  even  increase  their  operations 
n  recent  months  reflects  substantial  in- 
digenous and  regional  support. 
^Jicaragua's  freedom  fighters  deserve 
support.  Effective  pressure  on  the  San- 
iinistas — economic,  political,  and 
nilitary  elements— is  an  essential  com- 
ponent of  a  successful  strategy  for  a 
legotiated  resolution  of  the  conflicts  in 
;he  region. 

In  pursuing  our  interests  in  Central 
\merica,  the  Administration  has  had  to 
nake  some  tough  decisions — including 
hat  of  withdrawing  from  the  Interna- 
innal  Court  of  Justice  case  filed  by 
^licaragua.  We  believe  firmly  in  the  rule 
3f  law  in  international  affairs,  but  armed 
.  conflicts  can  be  resolved  only  by  political 
md  diplomatic,  not  judicial  means.  We 


are  addressing  the  broader  issue  of 
jurisdiction  raised  in  this  case  by  taking 
steps  to  clarify  our  acceptance  of  the 
court's  compulsory  jurisdiction  to  make 
explicit  what  we  have  understood  from 
the  beginning— namely  that  cases  of  this 
nature  are  not  projjer  for  adjudication 
by  the  court.  At  the  same  time,  our 
withdrawal  from  this  case  in  no  way 
reduces  our  commitment  to  a  negotiated 
regional  solution.  In  fact,  it  underscores 
our  conviction  that  any  arrangement 
that  takes  into  account  only  Nicaragua's 
concerns — and  not  those  of  its  neigh- 
bors— will  not  bring  peace. 

The  Congress 

With  respect  to  Central  America  and 
virtually  every  other  major  area  of 
foreign  policy  concern,  it  is  axiomatic 
that  a  successful  American  foreign 
policy  requires  active  congressional  sup- 
port. In  reaction  to  the  popular  mistrust 
and  recrimination  over  Vietnam,  Con- 
gi'ess  asserted  itself  primarily  as  a  critic 
of  and  brake  on  the  executive  in  for- 
mulating and  executing  foreign  policy 
during  the  Watergate  era.  This  was  the 
background  to  the  still-controversial 
War  Powers  Resolution  and  a  pervasive 
structure  of  legislative  restrictions  on 
executive  authority. 

Many  of  these  restrictions,  we 
believe,  are  now  anachronistic  and  un- 
constructive;  they  inhibit  the  close  col- 
laboration between  the  executive  and 
legislative  branches  on  foreign  policy 
which  the  emerging  consensus  man- 
dates. Congress  has  an  indispensable 
role  to  play  in  foreign  affairs,  but  the 
tenor  of  the  times  calls  for  more  bipar- 
tisan teamwork.  It  also  requires  greater 
resistance  to  the  blandishments  of 
special  interests  and  single-issue  ad- 
vocates who  may  work  their  will 
through  such  procedures  as  the  attach- 
ment of  unrelated,  special-interest  riders 
to  appropriations  bills.  The  American 
people,  in  my  view,  want  and  expect  an 
effective  foreign  policy  which  such  ac- 
tivities inhibit.  The  leaders  of  both  par- 
ties should  recognize,  as  our  experience 
so  graphically  demonstrated,  that 
gridlock  between  the  two  branches  of 
government  only  weakens  our  foreign 
policy  and  cannot  help  but  raise  doubts 
among  both  our  friends  and  our  adver- 
saries about  the  reliability  of  American 
commitments. 


President  Reagan,  in  a  speech  last 
year,  put  it  this  way: 

The  most  far-reaching  consequence  of  the 
past  decade's  congressional  activism  is  this: 
Bipartisan  consensus-building  has  become  a 
central  responsibility  of  the  congressional 
leadership  as  well  as  of  the  executive  leader- 
ship. If  we  are  to  have  a  sustainable  foreign 
policy,  the  Congress  must  support  the  prac- 
tical details  of  policy,  not  just  the  general 
goals. 

A  final  thought.  The  United  States 
has  been  through  much  in  the  last  20 
years.  Vietnam  tested  the  strength  and 
the  coherence  of  our  society  and  forced 
us  to  examine  what  we  really  stood  for. 
The  rise  of  the  Third  World,  the  com- 
plexities of  the  international  economic 
system,  and  the  tendency  to  move  away 
from  the  bipolar  world  of  eariier  years 
will  challenge  us  in  the  years  ahead. 
But  we,  with  our  enduring  blend  of 
Wilsonian  optimism,  Vietnam  skep- 
ticism, and  American  common  sense, 
can  discover  that  the  foreign  policy 
agenda  before  us  can  build  on  and  con- 
tribute to  a  new  American  consensus  by 
inviting  us  once  again  to  accomplish 
great  things  in  the  service  of  our  highest 
ideals.  ■ 


Aprll1985 


51 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


1984  Human  Rights  Report 


The  following  introduction  is  excerpted 
from  the  Country  Reports  on  Human 
Rights  Practices  for  1984.' 

INTRODUCTION 

This  report  is  submitted  to  the  Congress 
by  the  Department  of  State  in  com- 
pliance with  Sections  116(dXl)  and 
j02B(b)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of 
1961,  as  amended.  The  legislation  re- 
quires reports  on  all  countries  which 
receive  aid  from  the  United  States  and 
all  countries  which  are  members  of  the 
United  Nations.  In  the  belief  that  the  in- 
formation would  be  useful  to  the  Con- 
gress and  other  readers,  we  have  in- 
cluded, as  well,  reports  on  countries 
such  as  Switzerland  which  are  not 
technically  covered  in  the  congressional 
requirement.  .  .  . 

Each  report  begins  with  an  introduc- 
tion which  provides  the  political  and 
economic  background  of  the  country, 
describes  how  the  country  is  governed, 
and  discusses  the  general  trend  of 
human  rights  in  1984.  The  report  then 
discusses  three  broad  categories  of 
human  rights,  in  three  sections  cor- 
responding to  the  categories: 

First,  the  right  to  be  free  from 
governmental  violations  of  the  integrity 
of  the  person— violations  such  as  kill- 
ings; torture;  cruel,  inhuman,  or 
degrading  treatment  or  punishment;  ar- 
bitrary arrest  or  imprisonment;  denial  of 
fair  public  trial;  and  invasion  of  privacy; 

Second,  the  right  to  enjoy  civil 
rights  without  discrimination  based  on 
race  or  sex,  including  freedom  of  speech, 
press,  assembly,  and  religion,  and  the 
right  to  travel  freely  within  and  outside 
one's  own  country; 

Third,  political  rights  or  the  right  of 
citizens  to  change  their  government. 

A  fourth  section  in  the  discussion  of 
human  rights  in  each  country  describes 
the  government's  attitude  toward  out- 
side investigation  of  internal  human 
rights  conditions.  A  final  section  in  each 
report  discusses  general  economic  and 
social  conditions  in  the  country.  Each 
report  is  then  followed  by  statistical 
tables,  where  relevant,  listing  the 
amounts  of  United  States  bilateral 
assistance  and  multilateral  development 
assistance  for  fiscal  years  1982,  1983 
and  1984 


Preparat'on  of  the  Report 

The  repo  :  must  be  submitted  to  Con- 
gress by  January  31.  To  comply.  United 
States  diplomatic  missions  are  given 
guidance  in  September  concerning  the 
timing  of  submission  of  draft  reports, 
format,  and  areas  of  interest  to  be  dis- 
cussed. Reports  on  countries  in  which 
there  is  no  United  States  representation 
are  prepared  in  the  Department  of 
State.  After  contributions  are  received 
from  embassies  and  appropriate  offices 
in  the  Department,  a  final  draft  is 
prepared  under  the  coordination  of  the 
Bureau  of  Human  Rights  and  Human- 
itarian Affairs  and  submitted  to  the 
Congress.  Because  of  the  preparatio»i 
time  required,  it  is  possible  that  de\    op- 
ments  in  the  latter  part  of  the  year 
under  review  may  not  be  fully  reflec^d; 
every  effort  is  made,  however,  to  in- 
clude reference  to  major  events  or  sig- 
nificant changes  in  trends. 

The  reports  are  based  upon  all  infor- 
mation available  to  the  United  States 
Government.  Sources  include  American 
officials,  officials  of  foreign  govern- 
ments, private  citizens,  victims  of 
human  rights  abuse,  congressional 
studies,  intelligence  information,  press 
reports,  international  organizations,  and 
non-governmental  organizations  con- 
cerned with  human  rights.  Much  of  this 
information  is  already  public.  For  obvi- 
ous reasons  much  of  our  information 
cannot  be  attributed  to  specific  sources. 
We  are  particularly  appreciative  of, 
and  make  reference  in  most  reports  to, 
the  role  of  non-governmental  human 
rights  organizations,  ranging  from 
gioups  in  a  single  country  to  major 
organizations  which  concern  themselves 
with  human  rights  matters  in  larger 
geographic  regions  or  over  the  entire 
world.  Only  two  major  non- 
governmental organizations,  Amnesty 
International  and  Freedom  House,  at- 
tempt reports  with  world-wide  coverage. 
References  to  their  views  and  findings 
are  included  in  most  of  our  reports. 
Reports  from  some  of  these  organiza- 
tions are  for  periods  ending  well  before 
the  end  of  1984.  In  many  cases  the 
observations  will  have  remained  valid 
through  1984,  but  in  others  the  situation 
may  have  changed  significantly.  We 
have  attempted  in  each  report  to  con- 
sider and  reflect  this.  .  .  . 

Extreme  care  has  been  taken  to 
make  these  country  reports  objective 
and  as  comprehensive  as  space  will 


52 


allow .  Given  the  reports'  diverse  reader- 
ship, it  is  also  important  that  they  be  as 
consistent  as  possible  in  both  scope  and 
quality  of  coverage.  Therefore,  par- 
ticular attention  has  been  paid  to  attain- 
ing a  high  standard  of  consistency 
despite  the  multiplicity  of  sources  and 
the  obvious  problems  related  to  varying 
degrees  of  access  to  information,  struc- 
tural differences  in  political  and  social 
systems,  and  trends  in  world  opinion 
regarding  human  rights  practices  in 
specific  countries. 

Access  presents  the  greatest 
obstacle  to  a  consistent  approach, 
especially  since  closed  societies  tend  to 
have  some  of  the  worst  human  rights 
abuses.  Our  most  detailed  reporting 
comes  from  open  societies,  where  access 
and  evaluation  are  welcomed  and 
facilitated  by  governments  whose  con- 
cern for  human  rights  equals  our  own. 
Since  information  available  from  closed 
societies  is  more  limited,  the  reports 
may  differ  markedly  in  terms  of  the 
evidence  presented  in  discussing  specific 
human  rights  violations. 

There  is  also  a  conceptual  difficulty 
in  applying  a  single  standard  of  evalua- 
tion to  societies  with'differing  cultural 
and  legal  traditions.  Human  rights 
observers  tend  to  focus  on  the  effec- 
tiveness of  such  modern,  Western  in- 
stitutions as  trial  by  jury,  habeas  corpus, 
a  free  press,  parliaments,  and  elections, 
and  to  ignore  non- Western,  traditional 
institutions.  It  is  not  easy  at  times  to 
decide  whether  adherence  to  certain  in- 
digenous traditions  is  a  violation  of 
human  rights  or  an  affirmation  of  them. 
This  problem  of  perspective  also  ap- 
plies in  discussing  countries  which  face 
differing  political  and  economic  realities. 
A  nation's  stage  of  development  or  its 
geographic  situation,  for  example, 
should  never  be  regarded  as  an  excuse 
for  violations  of  human  rights  but  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  describing  the 
human  rights  environment.  Similarly,  a 
particular  country's  human  rights 
reputation,  or  the  public  scrutiny  it  may 
previously  have  received,  cannot  be  ig- 
nored by  anyone  discussing  its  current 
human  rights  performance. 

Rather  than  viewing  a  country  in 
isolation,  then,  these  reports  take  as 
their  point  of  departure  the  world  as  it 
is  and  apply  a  consistent  approach  in 
assessing  each  country's  human  rights 
situation.  While  we  have  tried  to  make 
each  report  self-contained  by  including 
enough  background  information  to  place 
the  human  rights  situation  in  context, 
readers  who  need  to  delve  more  deeply 
may  wish  to  consult  other  sources,  in- 
cluding previous  country  reports. 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


United  States  Human  Rights  Policy 

This  Administration's  human  rights 
policy  also  faces  the  world  as  it  is,  not 
as  we  might  wish  or  imagine  it  to  be, 
with  a  commitment  to  active  engage- 
ment as  a  consistent  approach  to  a 
variety  of  challenging  situations.  As 
President  Reagan  has  said,  "human 
rights  means  working  at  problems,  not 
walking  away  from  them."  This  is  a 
pragmatic  policy  which  aims  not  at  strik- 
ing poses  but  at  having  a  practical  effect 
on  the  well-being  of  real  people.  At  the 
same  time,  it  is  an  idealistic  policy, 
which  expresses  the  continuing  commit- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  the  cause 
of  liberty  and  the  alleviation  of  suffer- 
ing. 

Since  America  was  created  in  order 
to  make  real  a  specific  political  vision,  it 
follows  that  "human  rights"  is  not 
something  added  onto  our  foreign  policy 
but  is  its  ultimate  purpose:  the  preserva- 
tion and  promotion  of  liberty  in  the 
world.  In  his  address  to  the  U.N. 
■  General  Assembly  in  September  1984, 
President  Reagan  stated  that  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  view  concern  for 
human  rights  as  the  moral  center  of  our 
foreign  policy. 

Our  human  rights  policy  has  two 
joals.  First,  we  seek  to  improve  human 
-ights  practices  in  numerous  countries— 
;o  eliminate  torture  or  brutality,  to 
secure  religious  freedom,  to  promote 
'ree  elections,  and  the  like.  A  foreign 
policy  indifferent  to  these  issues  would 
lot  appeal  to  the  idealism  of  Americans, 
would  be  amoral,  and  would  lack  public 
jupport.  Moreover,  these  are  pragmatic, 
lot  Utopian,  actions  for  the  United 
States.  Our  most  stable,  reliable  allies 
ire  democracies. 

As  the  second  goal  of  our  human 
-ights  policy,  we  seek  a  public  associa- 
non  of  the  United  States  with  the  cause 
)f  liberty.  This  is  an  eminently  practical 
joal:  our  ability  to  win  international 
:ooperation  and  defeat  anti-American 
propaganda  will  be  harmed  if  we  seem 
ndifferent  to  the  fate  of  liberty.  Friend- 
y  governments  are  often  susceptible  to 
zonfidential  diplomacy,  and  we,  there- 
fore, use  it  rather  than  public  denuncia- 
rfons.  But  if  we  never  appear  seriously 
:oncerned  about  human  rights  violations 
in  friendly  countries,  our  policy  will 
seem  one-sided  and  cynical.  Thus,  while 
the  Soviet  bloc  presents  the  most  serious 
long-term  human  rights  problem,  we 
2annot  let  it  falsely  appear  that  this  is 
Dur  only  human  rights  concern. 

Our  human  rights  policy  also  has 
two  tracks  or  sides— the  negative  and 
the  positive.  The  negative  side  is  em- 


bodied in  the  way  we  oppose  (through 
act  or  word)  specific  human  rights  viola- 
tions in  the  short  term.  On  the  positive 
side— strongly  emphasized  by  the 
Reagan  Administration— we  seek,  over 
the  long  term,  to  help  democracy,  the 
surest  safeguard  of  human  righte.  It  is  a 
fact  that  most  democracies  have  ex- 
cellent human  rights  records;  nothing  is 
as  likely  as  democracy  to  produce  this 
result. 

Obviously,  the  positive  track  of 
human  rights  policy  is  not  a  substitute 
for  an  immediate  and  active  response, 
including  sanctions,  for  human  rights 
violations  when  they  occur.  But  the  Ad- 
ministration believes  that  we  should 
treat  not  only  the  symptoms  but  the 
disease— that  we  should  not  only  re- 
spond to  human  rights  violations  but 
also  should  work  to  establish  democratic 
systems  in  which  human  rights  viola- 
tions are  less  likely  to  occur. 

It  is,  therefore,  encouraging  to  see 
real  progress  coming  about  in  the 
strengthening  of  democratic  institu- 
tions—particularly in  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean,  to  which  President 
Reagan  referred  in  his  remarks  com- 
memorating Human  Rights  Day  on 
December  10,  1984.  Noting  that  today 
more  than  90  percent  of  the  people  in 
that  region  live  in  nations  either 
democratically  governed  or  moving  in 
that  direction,  the  President  pledged  "to 


Section  116(d)(1)  provides  as  follows: 

The  Secretary  of  State  shall  transmit  to 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of 
the  Senate,  by  January  31  of  each  year,  a  full 
and  complete  report  regarding — 

(1)  the  status  of  internationally  recog- 
nized human  rights,  within  the  meaning  of 
subsection  (a) — 

(A)  in  countries  that  received  assistance 
under  this  part,  and 

(B)  in  all  other  foreign  countries  which 
are  members  of  the  United  Nations  and 
which  are  not  otherwise  the  subject  of  a 
human  rights  report  under  this  Act. 

Section  503(B)(b)  provides  as  follows: 

The  Secretary  of  State  shall  transmit  to 
Congress,  as  part  of  the  presentation 
materials  for  security  assistance  programs 
proposed  for  each  fiscal  year,  a  full  and  com- 
plete report,  prepared  with  the  assistance  of 
the  Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights 
and  Humanitarian  Affairs,  with  respect  to 
practices  regarding  the  observance  of  and 
respect  for  internationally  recognized  human 
rights  in  each  country  proposed  as  a  recipient 
of  security  assistance. 


our  neighbors  the  continued  support  and 
assistance  of  the  United  States  as  they 
transform  our  entire  hemisphere  into  a 
haven  for  democracy,  peace,  and  human 
rights." 

Our  efforts,  and  those  of  others,  to 
keep  human  rights  concerns  a  central 
focus  of  international  relations  face  the 
continuing  problem  that  activist  human 
rights  policies  such  as  ours  traditionally 
aim  at  affecting  the  domestic  behavior 
of  other  countries,  while  governments 
are  reluctant  to  alter  their  nation's 
political  system  for  foreign  policy 
reasons.  Since  the  leverage  that  the 
United  States  does  have  is  strongest  in 
friendly  countries,  there  is  a  danger  that 
human  rights  policy  might  highlight  and 
punish  human  rights  violations  in  those 
countries  while,  in  effect,  giving  un- 
friendly countries  immunity.  Moreover, 
a  nation  that  came  to  display  a  general 
pattern  of  undermining  or  estranging 
friendly  governments  would  obviously 
limit  its  future  influence  over  them,  in- 
cluding its  influence  over  their  human 
rights  behavior.  On  the  other  hand, 
countries  where  we  have  little  access 
and  leverage  include  many  countries 
which  both  restrict  the  human  rights  of 
their  citizens  and  resist  strongly  any 
foreign  effort  to  influence  the  situation. 
As  an  extreme  example,  a  represen- 
tative of  Iran  at  the  United  Nations  took 
the  unprecedented  step  in  1984  of 
declaring  that  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights  does  not  apply  to  Iran. 

However,  there  appears  to  be  grow- 
ing acceptance,  even  among  countries 
where  human  rights  are  not  fully 
respected,  of  the  validity  of  an  interna- 
tional human  rights  agenda.  Sensitivity 
to  these  annual  country  reports,  for  ex- 
ample, increasingly  takes  the  form  of 
constructive  response,  or  at  least  a  will- 
ingness on  the  part  of  the  country  con- 
cerned to  engage  in  a  discussion  of  its 
human  rights  image.  Many  countries 
which  are  strong  supporters  of  human 
rights  have,  like  us,  established  offices 
specifically  responsible  for  international 
human  rights  policy.  It  is  also  note- 
worthy that  in  1985  the  thirty-five  na- 
tions. East  and  West,  who  signed  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  will 
gather  in  Ottawa  for  a  Human  Rights 
Experts  Meeting  in  May  and  again  in 
Budapest  in  October  for  a  Cultural 
Forum  which  will  also  be  devoted 
significantly  to  discussing  human  rights. 


'April  1985 


53 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


International  Institutions  for  the 
Protection  of  Human  Rights 

In  line  with  the  theme  set  early   n  the 
Reagan  Administration,  the  United 
States  has  continued  to  insist  in  interna- 
tional forums  on  a  policy  of  evenhanded- 
ness  in  dealing  with  human  rights  viola- 
tions throughout  the  world. 

The  40th  session  of  the  U.N.  Human 
Rights  Commission  (UNHRC)  met  in 
Geneva  to  consider,  among  other  items 
on  its  agenda,  the  problem  of  human 
rights  violations  in  Poland.  However, 
unlike  the  two  previous  years,  the  Com- 
mission failed  to  extend  the  mandate  of 
the  Secretary  General's  special  represen- 
tative on  Poland.  It  voted,  instead,  to 
postpone  consideration  of  the  resolution 
to  continue  the  inquiry  into  the  human 
rights  situation  in  Poland  until  the  Com- 
mission's 1985  session. 

Nevertheless,  on  other  issues — par- 
ticularly Iran,  Grenada,  Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan  and  Cambodia— the  Com- 
mission voted  in  ways  which  recognized 
the  need  for  greater  evenhandedness 
and  fairness  in  dealing  with  human 
rights  situations  throughout  the  world. 
Two  resolutions  dealing  with  Grenada 
and  Nicaragua  which  unfairly  criticized 
the  United  States  Government  were 
moderated  during  the  Commission  ses- 
sion. In  each  case,  the  Commission 
members  approved  moderate  substitute 
resolutions  by  consensus. 

In  addition,  the  Commission 
adopted,  over  strong  Soviet  opposition, 
two  resolutions  on  Afghanistan  (one  call- 
ing for  appointment  of  a  Rapporteur) 
and  one  on  Cambodia.  On  the  question 
of  Iran,  the  Commision  voted  to  appoint 
a  Special  Rapporteur  to  "make  a 
thorough  study"  of  allegations  of  human 
rights  abuses  in  Iran,  following  reports 
of  summary  and  arbitrary  executions, 
torture,  detention  without  trial,  religious 
intolerance  and  persecution,  and  the  lack 
of  an  adequate  judiciary. 

The  agenda  for  the  40th  session  of 
the  Commission  included  the  customary 
large  number  of  items,  most  of  them 
carryovers  from  previous  sessions. 
Several  of  these  items  have  been  the 
subject  of  repetitive  resolutions  by  the 
Commission.  These  included  items 
relating  to  human  rights  in  Israeli- 
occupied  territories;  human  rights  in 
Chile,  El  Salvador,  Bolivia,  and 
Guatemala;  human  rights  in  South 
Africa;  and  a  general  item  relating  to 
the  realization  of  "economic  human 
rights"  and  a  "right  to  development." 
The  United  States  Government  con- 
tinues to  be  troubled  by  the  Commis- 
sion's emphasis  on  the  "right  to  devel- 


opment," which  the  United  States  is  not 
prepared  to  recognize  as  a  basic  human 
right,  as  well  as  its  treatment  of  ques- 
tions dealing  with  apartheid  and  the 
Middle  East.  In  general,  the  Commission 
remained  critical  of  human  rights  condi- 
tions in  Latin  America,  criticizing  Chile 
and  Guatemala  in  the  public  session,  in 
addition  to  the  resolution  on  El 
Salvador.  As  had  occurred  during  the 
39th  session  of  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly  (UNGA),  a  double 
standard,  which  focuses  solely  on  certain 
countries,  and  a  partisan  treatment  of 
human  rights  questions  often  charac- 
terized the  Commission's  deliberations. 

The  General  Assembly's  Third  Com- 
mittee (Social  and  Humanitarian  Affairs) 
voted  on  issues  regarding,  among 
others,  racial  discrimination;  human 
rights  in  El  Salvador,  Chile,  and 
Guatemala;  Middle  East  issues;  and  self- 
determination.  United  States  efforts 
served  primarily  to  moderate  excesses 
and  to  provide  a  forum  for  articulating 
the  beliefs  of  the  Administration,  in- 
cluding emphasis  on  the  hypocrisy  of 
current  double  standards,  discrimination 
against  Latin  American  countries,  and 
general  indifference  to  violations  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its  Communist  allies. 

On  the  question  of  El  Salvador,  the 
United  States  was  heartened  by  a 
resolution  adopted  December  7  after 
lengthy  negotiations.  Although  it  was 
not  a  draft  we  could  support,  because  it 
interfered  with  the  rights  of  sovereign 
nations  regarding  military  assistance, 
among  the  positive  results  of  this  effort 
were  the  strong  initiative  in  support  of  a 
draft  resolution  favorable  to  President 
Duarte's  reform  program;  a  considerably 
improved  final  text  compared  with  past 
years;  and  a  more  balanced  UNGA 
debate  and  outcome  which  should  con- 
tribute toward  further  progress  during 
the  session  of  the  UNHRC  in  1985. 

Adoption  of  a  convention  against 
torture  provided  the  highlight  of  the 
39th  UNGA.  On  December  10,  1984 
(Human  Rights  Day),  the  UNGA  decided 
by  consensus  to  adopt  and  open  for 
signature  a  Convention  Against  Torture 
and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading 
Treatment  or  Punishment.  The  final  text 


of  the  convention  is  identical  to  the  draft 
convention  submitted  by  the  UNHRC 
following  seven  years  of  negotiations, 
except  for  revisions  to  Articles  19  and 
20  (concerning  implementation)  and  a 
new  Article  28  which  expressly  provides 
that  States  can  make  reservations  about 
Article  20  at  the  time  of  ratification. 
Proponents  of  the  convention  achieved  a 
key  objective  by  avoiding  the  creation  of 
a  formal  UNGA  working  group,  sought 
by  convention  opponents  such  as  the 
U.S.S.R.,  which  had  the  potential  of 
burying  the  draft  convention  for  several 
years  and  resulting  in  a  significantly  in- 
ferior text.  Ambassador  Richard 
Schifter,  Alternate  United  States 
Representative  to  the  39th  session  of  the 
UNGA,  in  remarks  made  on  December 
10,  1984,  expressed  the  pleasure  of  the 
United  States  Government  in  joining 
consensus.  Ambassador  Schifter  added 
that,  although  the  compromise  text 
limits  the  implementation  mechanism  of 
the  Convention: 

In  the  final  analysis,  however,  it  is  the 
states  members  of  the  international  communi- 
ty which  are  morally  responsible  for  im- 
plementing the  existing  prohibition  against 
torture  and  other  forms  of  ill-treatment.  We 
hope  that  the  convention  just  adopted  will 
help  mobilize  the  political  will  of  states  to  end 
the  resort  to  torture  as  an  accepted  practice 
of  law  enforcement  agencies. 

On  that  same  day,  December  10, 

1984,  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  celebrated  the  36th  anniver- 
sary of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  and  President  Reagan, 
in  signing  his  annual  Human  Rights  Day 
Proclamation,  took  the  opportunity  to 
reaffirm  American  commitment  to  the 
international  standard  set  by  the  Univer- 
sal Declaration. 


A 


ij 


I 


'The  complete  report  documents  human 
rights  practices  in  more  than  160  countries  of 
the  world.  It  may  be  purchased  for  $19.00 
(GPO  stock  no.  052-070-05999-1)  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402  (tel:  202-783-3238).  Remittance  must 
accompany  order.  ■ 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Dhild  Pornography: 
\  Worldwide  Problem 


ly  Elliot  Abrams 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
•n  InvestigatioTis  of  the  Senate  Commit- 
ee  on  Government  Affairs  on  Febmiary 
'1,  1985.  Mr.  Abrams  is  Assistant 
ecretary  for  Human  Rights  and 
Jumanitarian  Affairs. ' 

'he  Department  of  State  is  pleased  to 
^ave  the  occasion  again  to  testify  before 
his  committee  on  the  activities  and  ef- 
orts  which  have  been  taken  since  the 
irevious  hearing,  held  on  November  29, 
984,  at  which  Deputy  Assistant 
lecretary  John  Kelly,  Bureau  of  Euro- 
■ean  and  Canadian  Affairs,  appeared. 
LS  I  informed  Senator  (William]  Roth  in 
ly  letter  to  him  of  January  8,  1985,  we 
ollowed  up  the  November  29  hearing  by 
stablishing,  on  December  4,  an  In- 
eragency  Group  to  Combat  Child  Por- 
■ography.  As  noted  by  Mr.  Kelly  in  his 
;arlier  testimony,  we  consider  child  por- 
ography  a  worldwide  problem  in  its 
reader  aspect.  For  that  reason,  in  my 
■lobal  responsibilities  as  Assistant 
•ecretary  for  Human  Rights  and 
lumanitarian  Affairs,  I  was  chosen  to 
hair  the  interagency  group  and  we  held 
ur  first  meeting  on  December  17,  1984. 
lembers  of  the  group,  in  addition  to  the 
)epartment  of  State,  are  the  Depart- 
lent  of  Justice,  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
nvestigation,  the  Customs  Service,  and 
fie  Postal  Service. 

Ihared  Concern 

iuilding  on  the  committee's  Novem- 
er  29  hearing  and  other  expressions  of 
oncern  over  the  offensive  and  insidious 
roblem  of  child  pornography,  we  con- 
idered  it  very  important  to  move  quick- 
/  to  hold  intensive  discussions  with  of- 
icials  in  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark, 
ountries  which  have  figured  in  the  ex- 
portation and  reexportation  of  child  por- 
lography  to  the  United  States.  Accord- 
ngly,  an  interagency  team  visited  those 
ountries,  plus  Sweden,  during  the 
leriod  January  15-18;  the  team  was  led 
>y  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Gary 
.latthews,  my  senior  deputy  in  the 
bureau  of  Human  Rights  and  Humani- 
arian  Affairs. 

I  would  like  to  underscore  the  extent 
o  which  Dutch,  Danish,  and  Swedish  of- 
icials  share  our  view  of  the  seriousness 


of  the  problem  posed  by  child  por- 
nography and  the  role  which  it  plays  in 
the  sexual  abuse  and  exploitation  of 
children.  We  made  it  clear  throughout 
our  discussions  with  these  officials  that 
we  in  the  United  States  faced  a  terrible 
problem  in  this  regard  and  that  we  first 
and  foremost  wanted  greater  and  closer 
cooperation  to  address  our  problem.  We 
equally  indicated  that  the  dimensions  of 
this  ugly  problem  clearly  were  broader 
than  any  one  country,  hence  our  em- 
phasis on  increased  measures  to  address 
it  on  a  comprehensive,  international 
front. 

Before  providing  some  insights  into 
the  team's  activities  in  The  Hague, 
Copenhagen,  and  Stockholm,  I  would 
also  like  to  emphasize  that  our  American 
Ambassadors  to  all  three  countries  take 
a  strong  personal  interest  in  our  shared 
efforts  to  address  the  problem  of  child 
pornography;  further,  each  Embassy 
now  has  a  designated  officer  as  the 
primary  point  of  contact  both  for  those 
U.S.  agencies,  e.g..  Customs  Service, 
working  on  aspects  of  the  problem,  as 
well  as  for  the  necessary  liaison  and 
followup  with  the  respective  host  coun- 
try officials. 

Netherlands 

In  the  Netherlands,  the  team  began  its 
day  of  discussions  by  meeting  with 
Justice  Minister  Korthals-Altes.  He 
assured  the  U.S.  side  of  his 
government's  willingness  to  cooperate 
with  the  United  States  in  combating 
child  pornography.  Minister  Korthals- 
Altes  stressed  the  importance  of  a  bill, 
currently  before  the  Dutch  Parliament, 
whose  expected  passage  in  April  or  May 
of  this  year  will  considerably  facilitate 
the  prosecution  of  child  pornography 
distributors.  The  team  also  discussed 
and  agreed  to  the  Dutch  suggestion  that 
we  explore  ways  to  utilize  the  1983 
U.S.-Dutch  Mutual  Judicial  Assistance 
Treaty  in  our  exchanges  on  child  por- 
nography. Finally,  the  United  States  and 
the  Netherlands  will  set  up  a  formal  pro- 
gram of  bilateral  cooperation  to  combat 
child  pornography  with  the  designation 
of  policy-level  officials  on  both  sides  to 
act  as  central  coordinators.  Specifically, 
we  envision  prompt  exchanges  of  infor- 
mation, including  that  of  evidentiary 
nature  with  "chain  of  custody"  materials 
and  the  sharing  of  investigative  reports 


in  which  U.S.  consumers  of  child  por- 
nography confirm  their  receipt  of  such 
materials  from  a  given  address  and 
purveyor. 

In  sum,  it  is  our  belief  that  the 
Dutch  Government  has  been  forthright 
and  responsive  in  regard  to  the  concerns 
raised  by  this  committee  and  by  the  in- 
teragency team  about  child  pornog- 
raphy, and  that  it  will  be  cooperating  ac- 
tively in  our  continuing  efforts  to  com- 
bat this  most  terrible  problem. 

Denmark 

In  Denmark,  the  team  also  had  very 
thorough  discussions  with  all  relevant 
Danish  authorities,  again  stressing  the 
importance  of  interrupting  the  flow  of 
child  pornography  at  the  distribution  as 
well  as  the  production  stage.  Our  Danish 
interlocutors  assured  us  of  their  desire 
to  work  closely  with  the  United  States 
and  others  in  addressing  the  problem. 
Indeed,  I  am  pleased  to  report  that  just 
recently,  on  February  9,  it  was  reported 
that  the  Danish  authorities,  using  the 
list  of  addresses  to  suspected  distribu- 
tors of  child  pornography  which  the  U.S. 
group  delivered  during  its  mission,  have 
moved  to  prosecute  three  persons 
described  as  managers  of  a  publishing 
firm  called  COQ  International,  charging 
them  with  producing  and  selling  child 
pornography. 

Sweden 

At  the  team's  final  round  of  discussions, 
in  Stockholm,  the  U.S.  side  again  en- 
joyed a  well-prepared,  thorough  ex- 
change of  views  with  all  relevant 
Swedish  authorities.  The  Swedish  side 
noted  that  it  had  investigated  suspected 
child  pornography  dealers,  utilizing  in- 
formation provided  earlier  by  the  United 
States,  but  had  as  yet  found  nothing 
prosecutable  as  child  pornography. 
Sweden  wishes  to  receive  further  infor- 
mation from  the  United  States  on  a 
timely  and  regular  basis.  The  U.S.  side 
acknowledged  the  considerable  progress 
which  Sweden  has  made  in  recent  years 
in  diminishing  the  flow  of  child  por- 
nography within  and  out  of  Sweden. 

Conclusion 

Let  me  conclude  by  stating  our  belief 
that  the  formation  of  the  interagency 
group  and  the  mission  of  the  interagen- 
cy team  can  be  regarded  as  concrete 
measures  which  will  produce  concrete 
results.  In  addition  to  greater  mutual 
coordination  and  a  strengthened  struc- 
ture of  cooperation  with  the  govern- 


\pril  1985 


55 


MIDDLE  EAST 


ments  concerned,  the  U.S.  side  has  in- 
vited appropriate  representatives  of 
those  governments'  judicial  and  law  en- 
forcement agencies  to  come  to  the 
United  States  to  study  investigative 
methods  in  dealing  with  child  por- 
nography. We  will  also  be  increasing  our 
information  exchanges  both  through  the 
timely  pro'/ision  of  relevant  information 
and  materials  (e.g.,  via  our  Customs  of- 
ficials in  Bonn)  as  well  as  in  directed  ex- 
changes between  policy-level  officials  of 
our  respective  governments. 

We  cannot  afford  the  slightest  pause 
in  our  combined  efforts  to  get  at  the 
producers,  purveyors,  and  users  of  child 
pornography.  We  must  frankly 
acknowledge  that  success  in  combating 


the  flow  from  one  place  may  only  divert 
it  to  another.  Nonetheless,  it  is  en- 
couraging to  note  that  the  enhanced 
cooperation  and  coordination  on  the  part 
of  all  concerned  U.S.  agencies  can  now 
be  considered  as  matched,  in  turn,  by 
exactly  this  kind  of  shai-ed  effort  on  the 
part  of  the  Dutch,  Danish,  and  Swedish 
Governments.  We  look  forward  to  work- 
ing with  this  committee  in  addressing 
the  child  pornography  problem  on  tiiis 
wide,  systematic,  and  international 
basis. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  liearirigs 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Recent  Developments 
in  the  Middle  East 


hy  Richard  W.  Murphy 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
January  30,  1985.  Ambassador  Murphy 
is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs.  * 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  meet  with 
you  today  to  discuss  recent  develop- 
ments in  the  Middle  East.  Much  has 
happened  in  the  region  since  we  met  in 
September  of  last  year,  including  some 
small  but  significant  steps  in  the  pursuit 
of  peace  between  Israel  and  its  Arab 
neighbors.  While  it  would  be  premature 
to  judge  that  1985  will  be  a  year  of 
dramatic  advance  in  this  process,  we 
believe  there  have  been  positive 
developments. 

The  Peace  Piocess 

The  first  was  in  September,  when  Prime 
Minister  Peres,  in  his  inaugural  address 
to  the  Israeli  Knesset,  offered  to 
negotiate  with  Jordan  without  precondi- 
tions. Further,  the  Government  of  Israel 
has  taken  steps  which  reflect  its 
understanding  of  the  need  to  create  a 
climate  in  the  region  more  conducive  to 
successful  negotiations. 

The  second  was  the  meeting  of  the 
Palestine  National  Council  (PNC)  in  Am- 
man in  November.  King  Hussein's  agree- 
ment to  host  the  PNC  was  a  bold 


demonstration  of  his  active  interest  in 
seeking  the  conditions  for  a  peaceful  set- 
tlement which  would  address  Palestinian 
grievances  while  enhancing  the  security 
of  both  Jordan  and  Israel. 

At  that  meeting.  King  Hussein  pro- 
posed a  coordinated  Palestinian- 
Jordanian  approach  to  negotiations 
based  upon  [UN  Security  Council] 
Resolution  242  and  the  convening  of  an 
international  conference.  We  support 
Jordanian  entry  into  negotiations  with 
Israel  as  the  essential  next  step  in  the 
peace  process,  and  we  support  the 
King's  desire  to  find  a  way  toward 
negotiations.  At  the  same  time,  we  con- 
tinue to  believe  that  a  proposal  for  an  in- 
ternational conference  is  neither  realistic 
nor  productive. 

"Third,  the  Arab  states  which  sup- 
port a  peaceful  settlement  are  more 
cohesive  than  they  have  been  for  some 
time,  as  most  clearly  evidenced  by  the 
resumption  of  formal  relations  between 
Jordan  and  Egypt. 

The  United  States  is  ready  to 
resume  its  role  as  full  partner  in  the 
search  for  peace  whenever  the  parties 
are  prepared  to  negotiate.  Those 
negotiations,  in  our  view,  will  be  based 
on  Security  Council  Resolution  242, 
whose  territory-for-peace  formula  con- 
tinues to  enjoy  broad  acceptance  by  the 
international  community.  We  ourselves 
remain  committed  to  the  positions  in  the 
President's  September  1,  1982,  ini- 
tiative, which  is  based  on  both  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338  and  the  Camp  David 


framework  and  which  remains  a  clear 
statement  of  the  positions  we  will  sup- 
port in  the  course  of  negotiations.  It  is 
not  a  prerequisite  that  the  parties  accep 
our  positions  in  advance  of  negotiations. 
Indeed,  we  anticipate  that  the  parties 
will  bring  their  own  positions  to  the 
bargaining  table. 

Other  Regional  Developments 

Israel.  Our  relationship  with  Israel  has 
never  been  stronger.  In  recent  months 
we  have  intensified  our  already  close 
and  productive  cooperation.  A  hallmark 
of  this  Administration's  policy  toward 
the  region  is  our  unwavering  commit- 
ment to  Israel's  security  and  well-being. 
Israel,  during  this  time,  has  been  fo- 
cused on  its  two  immediate  problems  of 
the  economy  and  withdrawal  from 
Lebanon.  In  September,  Prime  Minister 
Peres  launched  an  economic  stabilization 
program  to  restore  a  healthy  Israeli 
economy,  and  further  steps  in  this  proc- 
ess continue. 

We  have  established  with  Israel  a 
Joint  Economic  Development  Group  to 
review  recent  Israeli  economic  policy 
and  development  plans  and  the  role  of 
U.S.  assistance.  The  group  has  met 
twice  thus  far — in  November  and 
December — and  there  were  useful  ex- 
changes. The  United  States  and  Israel 
accept  the  principle  that  additional  ex- 
traordinary U.S.  economic  assistance 
would  only  serve  a  useful  purpose  in  the 
context  of  a  comprehensive  Israeli 
economic  reform  program.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Israel  is  working  toward  that 
goal. 

Lebanon.  We  have  welcomed 
Israel's  decision  to  withdraw  its  forces 
from  Lebanon,  with  the  first  phase 
scheduled  for  completion  February  18. 
This  is  consistent  with  our  continued 
support  for  efforts  to  bring  about  the 
total  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces 
from  Lebanon.  We  continue  to  support 
UN-sponsored  efforts,  such  as  the 
Naqura  talks  [discussions  between 
Israeli  and  Lebanese  military  officers  on 
the  modalities  of  an  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  southern  Lebanon],  to  achieve  the 
arrangements  necessary  to  enhance 
security  in  southern  Lebanon. 

During  the  last  months,  our  own  ef- 
forts with  regard  to  Lebanon  have  been 
exploratory'.  At  the  Secretary's  request, 
I  made  three  trips  to  the  region  in  the 
September-December  period  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  we  could  play  a 
useful  role  in  aiding  negotiations.  We 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


joncluded  that  the  next  steps  would 
fiave  to  be  taken  by  the  parties 
themselves  and  that  we  should  support 
the  efforts  of  the  United  Nations  to 
facilitate  an  orderly  withdrawal. 

Iran  and  Iraq.  In  the  gulf  war,  Iraq 
has  prevented  Iran  from  launching  its 
planned  southern  offensive,  and  Iran  has 
returned  to  a  strategy  of  attrition,  shift- 
ing military  preparations  northward 
while  still  maintaining  a  significant  force 
opposite  the  Iraqi  city  of  Basra.  Iraq  has 
recently  increased  its  attacks  on  all 
kinds  of  gulf  shipping,  and  both  sides 
continue  to  exchange  fire  across  the 
front  hnes.  Thus,  while  stalemated,  the 
war  continues  to  pose  a  broader  danger 
to  regional  security.  We  continue  to  sup- 
port all  efforts  to  achieve  a  cease-fire, 
and  we  remain  neutral  in  the  conflict, 
supplying  arms  to  neither  side,  either 
directly  or  indirectly.  We  believe  that 
our  policy  of  supporting  the  efforts  of 
Saudi  Arabia  and  the  gulf  states  to  im- 
prove their  ability  to  defend  their  ter- 
ritory has  helped  to  contain  this  war. 

One  of  the  more  positive 
developments  for  U.S.  policy  in  the 
region  was  Iraq's  resumption  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  United 
States  last  November.  However,  it 
iportends  no  change  in  our  policy  toward 
ithe  war  or  toward  other  states.  We  hope 
ithis  step  will  lead  to  increased  coopera- 
tion in  promoting  regional  stability.  Iraq 
has  stated  that  it  normalized  relations 
with  the  United  States  to  "balance"  its 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Our 
friends  in  the  region,  including  Israel, 
have  also  interpreted  this  as  a  positive 
move. 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations  and  the 
Middle  East.  Finally,  we  have  agreed  in 
principle  to  discuss  the  Middle  East  with 
the  Soviet  Union  as  one  of  the  regional 
issues  in  Soviet-American  relations.  The 
purpose  of  the  talks,  as  the  President 
said  during  his  speech  at  the  UN 
General  Assembly  last  fall,  would  be  to 
help  avoid  miscalculation  and  reduce  the 
risk  of  U.S. -Soviet  confrontation.  These 
talks  would  simply  be  an  exchange  of 
views  at  the  expert  level.  A  number  of 
Middle  East  regional  issues  could  be 
raised  in  the  course  of  these  talks— such 
as  Afghanistan,  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  and 
Arab-Israeli  issues.  They  would  not  be 
negotiations,  nor  would  they  presage  a 
joint  U.S. -Soviet  effort  in  the  Middle 
East. 


Continuing  the  Acquisition 
of  the  Peacekeeper  IVIissile 


"The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  avaikble  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Following  is  the  text  of  President 
Reagan's  message  to  the  Congress  and  the 
executive  summary  of  his  report  on  the 
Peacekeeper  (MX)  missile. 

MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  4,  1985 

The  attached  report  on  the  Peacekeeper 
missile  contains  my  assessment  of  the  re- 
quirement for  Peacekeeper  and  my  an- 
ticipated impact  of  the  continued  procure- 
ment of  Peacekeeper  missiles,  pursuant  to 
the  provisions  of  Public  Law  98-52.5,  Section 
no  of  October  19,  1984. 

My  report  concludes  that  the  continued 
procurement  and  deployment  of  the 
Peacekeeper  are  essential  to  national  securi- 
ty. The  recommendations  of  the  Scowcroft 
Commission  are  still  valid.  One  hundred 
Peacekeeper  missiles  should  be  deployed  in 
existing  Minuteman  silos  as  soon  as  possible. 

My  report  also  concludes  that 
Peacekeeper  is  an  essential  element  of  our 
arms  control  strategy.  Without  the 
Peacekeeper  our  chances  of  reaching  an 
equitable  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  to 
reduce  significantly  the  size  of  our  nuclear 
arsenals  are  substantially  lowered.  Indeed, 
should  Congress  delay  or  eliminate  the 
Peacekeeper  program,  it  would  send  an  un- 
mistakable signal  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  we 
do  not  possess  the  resolve  required,  nor  the 
continuity  of  purpose,  to  maintain  a  viable 
strategic  triad  and  the  policy  of  deterrence 
the  triad  represents. 

The  time  has  come  to  place  this  issue 
behind  us.  While  we  have  debated  the  merits 
of  the  Peacekeeper  program,  the  Soviets 
have  deployed  over  600  Peacekeeper  type 
missiles.  If  we  are  to  move  towards  an 
equitable  treaty  in  Geneva,  procurement  of 
100  Peacekeeper  missiles  must  continue. 

I  urge  each  member  of  Congress  to  ap- 
prove the  Peacekeeper  and  join  me  in  a  bipar- 
tisan and  united  effort  in  Geneva.  With  your 
support,  and  the  support  of  the  American 
people,  our  efforts  at  the  negotiation  table 
could  lead  to  the  more  stable  world  we  all 
seek,  and  lead  to  that  day  when  mankind  is 
free  of  the  terrible  threat  of  nuclear 
weapons. 

Ronald  Reagan 


EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 

The  President's  report  was  prepared  in 
accordance  with  the  fiscal  1985  Depart- 
ment of  Defense  Authorization  and  Ap- 
propriation Acts,  Committee  of  Con- 
ference, Section  llOe,  and  delivered  in 
compliance  with  Section  110g(2). 


After  thorough  analysis,  the  Presi- 
dent has  concluded  that  the  continued 
production  and  deployment  of 
Peacekeeper  (MX)  missiles  in  existing 
Minuteman  silos  is  required  in  order  to 
maintain  U.S.  national  security  in- 
terests, is  consistent  with  U.S.  arms 
control  policy,  and  enhances  the  pros- 
pects for  global  stability.  As  a  result,  the 
President  seeks  to  remove  Congressional 
restrictions  on  the  Fiscal  Year  1985 
funds  that  were  authorized  and  ap- 
propriated by  the  Congress  for  the 
Peacekeeper  missile  program.  This 
report  provides  the  President's  reasons 
and  furnishes  additional  information  as 
required  by  the  Congress. 

Strategic  Balance  and 
International  Stability 

In  February  1984,  the  President 
reported  to  Congress  on  the  anticipated 
political-military  impact  of  Peacekeeper 
procurement  and  concluded  that  such 
procurement  was  a  necessary  part  of 
our  efforts  to  strengthen  deterrence  and 
strategic  stability  as  well  as  to  enhance 
our  efforts  to  achieve  meaningful  arms 
reductions.  These  conclusions  coincided 
with  those  of  the  President's  Commis- 
sion on  Strategic  Forces  (Scowcroft 
Commission),  which  recognized  the  de- 
mand for  a  coherent  ICBM  moderniza- 
tion program  to  bring  U.S.  strategic 
forces  into  line  with  U.S.  strategic 
policy  and  arms  control  initiatives.  The 
President  has  concluded  that  the  Com- 
mission's recommendations  remain  as 
valid  today  as  when  the  initial  report 
was  issued  in  April,  1983. 

The  military  requirement  for  the 
Peacekeeper  is  now  even  more  valid,  as 
the  Soviet  threat  has  continued  to  in- 
crease, qualitatively  and  quantitatively, 
offensively  and  defensively.  The  Soviets 
have  increased  deployments  of  the  latest 
variant  fourth-generation  ICBMs,  fur- 
ther extending  their  prompt  hard-target 
destructive  advantage,  and  are  nearing 
deployment  of  two  new  fifth-generation 
ICBMs.  Two  new  classes  of  ballistic 
missile  submarines  are  being  deployed, 
with  a  new  SLBM  [submarine-launched 
ballistic  missile]  in  flight  testing.  Three 
intercontinental  bombers  and  a  family  of 
strategic  cruise  missiles  are  being 
developed  or  produced.  Soviet  strategic 
defensive  programs  include  ABM  [anti- 
ballistic  missile]  improvements  and 


April1985 


57 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


research  and  development  initiatives  for 
advanced  strategic  defense  systems.  The 
key  to  deterring  the  Soviets  from  using 
these  increasing  capabilities  is  our  ability 
to  effectively  hold  at  risk  the  hardened 
targets,  such  as  command,  control  and 
communication  facilities  and  other  high- 
value  assets,  which  are  essential  to 
Soviet  execution  of  a  nuclear  war. 

This  accumulation  of  vast  conven- 
tional military  power,  coupled  with  cur- 
rent Soviet  advantages  in  strategic 
forces,  could— if  unchecked— result  in 
the  Soviet  leadership  becoming  far  more 
confident  about  using  its  political  and 
military  leverage  to  exert  influence 
against  other  nations  around  the  globe. 
A  perception  that  the  United  States  is 
unable  or  unwilling  to  take  the  steps 
necessary  to  offset  this  growing  Soviet 
power  could  further  increase  the  Soviets' 
inclination  to  become  involved  in 
regional  conflicts,  even  if  such  involve- 
ment would  risk  engaging  U.S.  in- 
terests. 

To  reverse  these  dangerous  and 
destabilizing  trends,  this  Administration 
initiated  the  Strategic  Modernization 
program  in  October  1981.  This  five-part 
modernization  program  of  command, 
control,  communication  and  intelligence 
improvements,  bomber  and  cruise 
missile  modernization,  SLBM  im- 
provements, ICBM  modernization,  and 
defensive  improvements  is  well  under- 
way and  is  restoring  effective  deter- 
rence. 

As  the  Administration  continues  to 
implement  the  Scowcroft  strategic 
modernization  recommendations,  the 
President  firmly  believes  that  a  credible 
Peacekeeper  program  remains  a  central 
element  of  a  combined  modernization- 
arms  control  strategy. 

With  regard  to  arms  control,  we  are 
encouraged  that  the  prospects  for 
negotiations  have  been  improved  since 
our  last  report.  Important  developments 
have  occurred  after  the  one-year  hiatus 
that  followed  the  Soviet  walk-out  from 
the  Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces 
(WF)  talks  and  concomitant  refusal  to 
set  a  date  to  begin  new  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  negotia- 
tions. Contrasted  with  the  prospects  last 
year,  we  now  have  reason  for  cautious 
optimism.  We  and  the  Soviet  Union  are 
about  to  begin  new  negotiations  in 
Geneva,  in  which  a  central  objective  will 
be  to  seek  agreements  on  significant 
reductions  of  strategic  arsenals.  As  we 
enter  these  talks  we  recognize  that  our 
ability  to  negotiate  effectively— and  to 
achieve  our  goals  of  deep  and  effectively 


58 


verifiable  reductions— is  heavily  depen- 
dent on  the  Soviet  leadership's  view  of 
our  purpose,  will  and  strength. 

Recent  experience  has  confirmed, 

despite  Soviet  propaganda  attempts  to 
the  contrary,  that  they  have  responded 
to  the  steady,  responsible  actions  of  the 
NATO  Alliance  in  fulfilling  missile 
deployment  commitments  taken  under 
the  December  1979  decision.  They 
agreed  to  negotiate  initially,  only  when 
it  became  clear  NATO  would  make  a 
coordinated  decision  to  deploy.  They 
agreed  to  resume  negotiations  only 
when  it  became  clear  they  could  not 
destroy  NATO's  resolve  through  threats 
and  bluster.  Likewise,  if  we  are  to  suc- 
ceed similarly  in  our  new  strategic 
negotiations,  we  must  demonstrate  the 
same  constancy  of  purpose  and  deter- 
mination as  shown  by  the  Alliance  in 
INF.  Conversely,  if  we  fail  on  the  eve  of 
these  new  negotiations  in  Geneva  to  pro- 
ceed with  Peacekeeper  production  and 
deployment,  the  impact  could  be  far- 
reaching,  extending  not  only  to  failure 
of  the  strategic  negotiations,  but  may  af- 
fect the  broader  East- West  relationship 
as  well. 

We  hope  these  new  negotiations  will 
lead  eventually  toward  agreement  on 
deep  reductions,  but  they  are  at  a 
critical  stage— the  first  step.  That  step 
must  be  on  firm  ground  because  it  will 
set  the  direction  for  a  lengthy  but 
ultimately  rewarding  journey.  Most  of 
all,  it  is  essential  at  this  time  that  we 
not  appear  hestitant  or  otherwise  lack- 
ing in  resolve.  Cancellation  of,  or  slow- 
ing, the  Peacekeeper  deployment  would 
unavoidably  give  such  an  appearance  to 
the  Soviet  leadership.  In  fact,  should  the 
Congress  decide  to  terminate  the 
Peacekeeper  production  and  deployment 
program  during  these  early  stages  of 
negotiations,  the  Soviets  would  have 
every  incentive  not  to  negotiate  serious- 
ly, but  to  anticipate  that  the  United 
States  would  take  additional  unilateral 
actions  which  would  further  reduce  U.S. 
strength  without  them  having  to  make 
equitable  concessions  of  their  own. 
There  would  be  comparatively  little 
reason  for  the  Soviets  to  continue 
negotiating  seriously  in  the  START 
area,  because  they  would  have  achieved 
much  of  what  they  want  and  could  be 
expected  to  stall  to  see  how  much  addi- 
tional they  could  obtain  without  conces- 
sions. 


Effect  of  Peacekeeper  on  ICBM 
Vulnerability 

From  the  technical  viewpoint  the 
vulnerability  of  Peacekeeper  missiles 
based  in  existing  Minuteman  silos  will  be 
roughly  similar  to  the  currently  deployec 
Minuteman  ICBMs.  However,  the  ques- 
tion of  force  survivability  is  not  the 
same  as  that  of  silo  vulnerability. 
Together,  the  diversity  of  the  three  legs 
of  the  Strategic  Triad  provide  inherent 
survivability  not  found  in  the  individual 
components.  Because  the  three  legs  of 
the  Triad  exhibit  different  characteris- 
tics, a  Soviet  planner  faces  significant 
obstacles  which  would  greatly  reduce  tht 
effectiveness  of  an  attack  against  any 
component. 

In  addition,  the  Peacekeeper's  in- 
creased military  capability  against  even 
the  hardest  Soviet  targets  will 
significantly  strengthen  our  ability  to 
deter  a  wide  range  of  possible  aggres- 
sions. The  deterrent  value  of 
Peacekeeper  therefore  must  be  viewed 
from  the  Soviet  perspective  and  their 
estimate  of  risk  to  their  key  assets. 
Thus,  Peacekeeper's,  and  the  Triad's 
ultimate  survivability  resides  in 
Peacekeeper's  ability  to  deter  a  Soviet 
attack  in  the  first  instance  with  credible 
military  capabilities. 

ICBM  Basing 

For  over  13  years,  alternative  basing 
modes  for  the  Peacekeeper  (MX)  missile 
have  been  proposed  and  reviewed  by  the 
Department  of  Defense,  four  administra- 
tions and  the  Congress.  The  original  ob- 
jective of  these  investigations  had  been 
to  seek  a  single  solution  to  the  problem 
of  deploying  a  modernized,  capable 
ICBM  in  an  independently  survivable 
basing  mode. 

The  Scowcroft  Commission  took  a 
different  approach  to  ICBM  moderniza- 
tion, separating  the  problem  into  its 
near-term  and  longer-term  elements. 
The  President  supports  the  Scowcroft 
Commission  finding  that  Peacekeeper 
deployment  in  Minuteman  silos  remains 
the  best  near-term  ICBM  deployment 
options.  Current  review  of  basing  op- 
tions within  this  report  indicates  that  no 
other  alternative  is  available  or  cost- 
effective  for  a  near-term  Peacekeeper 
deployment.  However,  in  the  future, 
superhard  silo  technology  for 
Peacekeeper  could  enhance  ICBM  sur- 
vivability. In  the  long  term,  deployment 
of  the  small,  single-warhead  ICBM  in 
one  or  more  promising  modes,  could 
enhance  ICBM  survivability. 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin 


NARCOTICS 


^Conclusions 

'he  President's  report  documents  his 
eview  of  the  Peacekeeper  program  re- 
[uested  in  the  1985  Department  of 
)efense  Authorization  Act,  The  Presi- 
lent  has  concluded  that  further  acquisi- 
ion  of  operational  Peacekeeper  missiles 
s  in  the  national  security  interests  of 
he  United  States  and  is  consistent  with 
Jnited  States  arms  control  policy.  The 
^resident  has  reviewed  the  effect  of  the 
icquisition  and  deployment  of  Peace- 
keeper missiles  on  the  vulnerability  of 
he  U.S.  land-based  intercontinental 
)allistic  missile  force  and  found  that  the 
ecommendations  of  the  Scowcroft  Com- 
nission  remain  valid. 

The  President's  review  also  con- 
ludes  that  the  continued  efforts  of  the 
Soviets  to  expand  their  strategic  forces 
las  heightened  the  military  need  for  the 
-"eacekeeper  missile.  The  Report  also 
lotes  that  Peacekeeper  production  and 
leployment  is  closely  related  to  our 
:hances  of  achieving  significant  reduc- 
ions  in  nuclear  arsenals  in  Geneva.  It 
lotes  that  should  the  Congress  decide  to 
.erminate  the  Peacekeeper  production 
md  deployment  program  during  the 
legotiations,  the  Soviets'  long-term  ef- 
brts  to  reduce  U.S.  strength  without 
meaningful  negotiating  and  without  hav- 
ing to  make  equitable  concessions  of 
IJieir  own  would  be  realized  in  con- 
isiderable  measure.  Finally,  the  Report 
loncludes  that  Peacekeeper  deployment 
jn  existing  silos  is  essential  to  enhance 
deterrence  and  to  maintaining  crucial 
Dptions  for  restoring  the  survivability  of 
land-based  ICBMs  in  a  cost-effective 
manner  in  the  years  ahead. 

In  re-endorsing  the  Scowcroft 
"ecommendations  the  President  strongly 
-ecommends  that  production  and  deploy- 
Tient  of  the  Peacekeeper  missile  con- 
;inue  as  planned  in  parallel  with  develop- 
Tient  of  a  new  small  ICBM.  ■ 


Helicopters  are  used  to  spray  illegal  poppy 
crops,  such  as  here  in  Mexico.  This  is  one 
example  of  a  worldwide  eradication 
program  supported  by  the  Department  of 
State. 

{Photo  by  Steve  Raymer 
^National  Geographical  Society) 


Summary  of  the  International  Narcotics 
Control  Strategy  Report  for  1985 


The  Department  of  State  on  Kebru 
ary  14,  1985,  submitted  the  Interna- 
tional Narcotics  Control  Strategy  Report 
for  1985  to  Congress  as  required  by 
PL  98-164.  The  report  is  prepared  each 
year  under  the  direction  of  the  Depart- 
ment's Bureau  of  International  Narcotics 
Matters  and  provides  a  country-by- 
country  analysis  of  the  narcotics  situa- 
tion in  producing  and  transit  countries. 

Jon  R.  Thomas,  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Narcotics  Matters,  said 
the  1985  report  shows  that  "1984  was  a 
year  of  building  bases  for  enhanced  con- 
trol programs  and  creating  opportunities 
for  large-scale  actions  in  1985.  Genuine 
progress  is  reflected  in  the  production 
reports  on  several  countries,  but  there 
were  some  disappointments.  On  balance, 
the  events  of  1984  put  us  on  the  thresh- 
hold  of  what  should  be  oui-  most  produc- 
tive year  ever  in  narcotics  control." 

The  report  emphasizes  that,  more 
than  perhaps  at  any  time  in  recent 
memory,  there  are  strong  incentives  for 
source  nations  to  act  in  their  own  in- 
terests to  control  narcotics  trafficking. 
The  international  community  is  affected 
by  narcotics  trafficking  and  abuse  and 
the  attendant  violence,  corruption,  and 
social  costs  which  undermine  legitimate 
businesses  and  threaten  national  securi- 
ty in  many  parts  of  the  world.  In  some 
countries,  insurgents  and  terrorist 
organizations  have  established  links  to 


narcotics  traffickers,  and  these  groups 
are  now  sharing  in  the  narcotics  profits. 
Producing  nations  are  experiencing 
abuse  and  addiction  among  their  own 
youth,  and  the  demand  for  treatment 
and  prevention  has  int'reased  in  these 
source  countries. 

"These  concerns  are  prompting  new 
opportunities,"  Thomas  said.  "Source 
and  victim  nations  alike  have  a  common 
interest  in  the  success  of  control  pro- 
grams, and  source  countries  are  realiz- 
ing that  they  are  first  beneficiaries  of 
programs  to  curb  trafficking  and  all  of 
its  related  excesses.  This  realization  is 
reflected  in  the  program  expansion  of 
1984.  We  are  seeing  an  emerging 
alliance  in  Latin  America,  where  na- 
tional leaders  are  now  beginning  to 
work  together,  bilaterally  and 
multilaterally,  on  regional  approaches  to 
control  problems." 

The  report  provides  the  following 
observations. 

Opium  production  declined  in  Paki- 
stan and  Afghanistan  l)ut  marginally  in- 
creased in  other  countries.  Adverse 
weather  and  a  new  eradication  program 
in  Thailand  and  continuation  of  the  more 
effective  sweep  strategy  in  Mexico  por- 
tend well  for  reductions  in  prospective 
opium  poppy  production  in  most  sectors 
in  1985. 

Coca  production  increased  in  Peru 
and  Bolivia  as  anticipated,  while  holding 


April  1985 


59 


PACIFIC 


about  even  in  Colombia.  But  Peru  began 
to  eradicate  coca  on  an  appreciable  scale 
in  1984,  despite  terrorists  attacks 
against  eradication  workers.  Colombia  is 
testing  aerially  sprayed  herbicides  which 
could  offer  the  first  real  means  of 
eradicating  coca  on  a  major  scale.  While 
Bolivia's  economic  and  political  problems 
are  understood,  its  failure  to  begin  coca 
eradication  remains  a  major  disappoint- 
ment. 

The  most  important  marijuana 
development  in  1984  was  the  Colombian 
eradication  program  which  destroyed 
4,000  hectares,  including  3,000  hectares 
destroyed  by  an  aerially  applied  her- 
bicidal  spray.  Cannabis  cultivation  in- 
creased in  Mexico,  and  the  increase  in 
Belize  confirms  traffickers'  efforts  to 
establish  new  sources  of  supply.  Produc- 
tion probably  held  at  about  the  1983 
level  in  Jamaica. 

Assistant  Secretary  Thomas  noted 
the  goals  set  forth  in  the  strategy 
report,  including  continued  support  for 
the  Upper  Huallaga  Valley  coca  control 
project  in  Peru;  seeking  agreements  to 
begin  coca  eradication  in  other  parts  of 
Peru;  the  restoration  of  law  and  order  in 
Bolivia  and  an  initiation  of  coca  eradica- 
tion; a  vigorous  Jamaica  campaign  to 
eradicate  marijuana;  resumption  of 
aerial  herbicidal  eradication  in  Belize; 
continued  efforts  to  increase  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  Mexican  control  pro- 
grams; suppression  of  opium  cultivation 
in  Pakistan  and  halting  the  flow  of 
opiates  across  the  Afghan  border,  and  a 
more  effective  interdiction  effort  in 
Southwest  Asia  including  elimination  of 
heroin  labs. 

"International  strategies  must  give 
top  priority  to  crop  control,"  Thomas 
said.  He  called  for  bans  on  cultivation 
and  production,  enforced  when 
necessary  by  eradication.  An  effective 
international  strategy  should  offer  finan- 
cial and  technical  assistance  where  need- 
ed for  narcotic  control  projects.  The 
United  States  will  continue  to  provide 
assistance,  which  should  be  linked  to 
crop  control  agreements  to  ensure  suc- 
cess in  reducing  production.  Govern- 
ments of  producing  nations  must 
demonstrate  the  political  will  to  under- 
take effective  crop  control  and  interdic- 
tion programs.  The  corruption  that  has 
undermined  control  efforts  in  many 
source  countries  must  be  stiimped  out  by 
strong  and  determined  governments. 
The  international  community  must  make 
common  cause  in  a  more  vigorous,  more 
widespread,  and  more  united  effort  to 
control  international  narcotics  produc- 
tion and  trafficking. 


Visit  of  Australian 
Prime  Minister  Hawke 


Press  release  20. 


Prime  Minister  Robert  J.L.  Hawke 
of  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  made 
an  official  working  visit  to  Washington, 
D.C.,  February  5-7,  1985,  to  meet  with 
President  Reagan  and  other  gox'eryiment 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Hawke  after  their  meeting  on  Febru- 
ary 7.' 

President  Reagan 

Prime  Minister  Bob  Hawke,  it  was  a 
pleasure  to  meet  with  you  today,  the 
first  head  of  state  to  visit  us  since  the 
inauguration.  And  this,  I  understand,  is 
also  your  first  trip  abroad  since  your 
own  reelection.  We're  each  getting  our 
new  terms  started  by  sitting  down  and 
talking  with  a  good  friend. 

I  cannot  overstate  the  value 
America  places  on  our  friendship  with 
Australia.  We  share  a  commitment  to 
democratic  ideals.  In  fact,  at  the  heart 
of  our  election  process  is  the  secret 
ballot,  which,  by  no  coincidence,  was 
referred  to  as  the  Australian  ballot 
when  it  was  first  introduced  into  our 
country. 


Australia  is  a  reliable  ally,  an  impor- 
tant trading  partner,  a  trusted  friend, 
and  a  fellow  democracy.  We've  stood 
together  through  trials  and  tribulations. 
We've  rejoiced  together  in  triumph,  and 
now,  as  Australia  approaches  its 
bicentennial  in  1988,  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  private  sector  will  play  an  ac- 
tive part  in  that  historic  event. 

As  a  key  ally  and  a  vital  voice  in 
world  affairs,  Australia  makes  a  signifi- 
cant contributon  to  the  way  that  we  ap- 
proach international  challenges.  My  con- 
versations with  Prime  Minister  Hawke 
today  reflected  the  serious  consideration 
with  which  we  take  Australia's  views  in 
national  interest. 

Much  of  our  consultation  was  fo- 
cused on  arms  control.  Prime  Minister 
Hawke  made  clear  the  importance  of 
this  issue  to  the  Australian  people,  and 
it  is  no  less  so  for  us.  I  reiterated  my 
sincere  desire  to  achieve  deep  reductions 
in  nuclear  arms,  as  a  giant  first  step 
toward  eliminating  them  altogether. 

As  allies,  we've  always  consulted 
closely  on  foreign  policy  issues.  And  now 
that  .Australia  has  been  named  a 
member  of  the  UN  Security  Council, 
new  weight  will  be  added  to  our  con- 
sultations. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


PACIFIC 


Oh  regional  issues,  we  i-eaffirmed 
ir  stiong  belief  in  cooperation  among 
acific  states  to  maintain  secure,  pros- 
?rous,  and  democratic  societies.  Prime 
Minister  Hawke  and  I  agreed  that 
rength  and  unity  of  purpose  will  give 
le  West  the  leverage  it  needs  to 
hieve  effective  and  verifiable  arms 
'ductions  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  consider  that  close  and  com- 
rehensive  interaction  among  ANZUS 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  United  States 
;curity  treaty]  members  on  political, 
onomic,  and  defense  matters  is  central 
)  the  continued  effectiveness  of  the 
NZUS  alliance.  In  particular,  con- 
nued  military  cooperation  is  essential 
)  maintenance  of  the  alliance's  integrity 
nd  strength. 

We  deeply  regret  the  decision  by  the 
ew  Zealand  Government  to  deny  port 
:cess  to  our  ships.  We  consider  New 
ealand  a  friend.  It's  our  deepest  hope 
lat  New  Zealand  will  restore  the  tradi- 
onal  cooperation  that  has  existed  be- 
veen  our  two  countries.  Allies  must 
ork  together  as  partners  to  meet  their 
lared  responsibilities.  The  security 
hich  we  derive  from  these  ar- 
ingements  is  at  the  foundation  of  the 
rowing  prosperity  we  share. 

Prime  Minister  Hawke  and  I  were 
ary  pleased  to  discuss  the  economic 
Dod  news  coming  from  both  our  coun- 
ies  and  many  others  around  the  world. 
Ihe  global  economy  is  picking  uj)  steam, 
nd  we're  happy  to  have  played  a  part  in 
nat  recovery. 

This  is  our  second  meeting.  Bob.  It's 
;ill  a  long  way  from  Australia  to  the 
nited  States,  but  modern  technology 
nd  good  old-fashioned  friendship  are 
ringing  us  closer  than  ever  before. 

I'm  grateful  for  your  visit,  and  I'm 
loking  forward  to  working  together 
■ith  you  in  the  coming  years  to  make 
le  world  a  safer  and  a  better  place, 
.nd  Godspeed  now  on  your  way  home. 

■'rime  Minister  Hawke 

greatly  appreciate  the  warmth  and  the 
fiendliness  of  your  statement  and  of  the 
onsultations  we  have  just  concluded 
/ith  you  and  with  the  members  of  your 
idministration. 

But  this  is  my  first  overseas  visit 
ince  our  elections,  and  that  we  have  the 
lonor  to  be  the  first  official  visitors  here 
ince  your  second  inauguration  point  up 
he  prime  importance  of  our  personal 
elationship  and  those  between  our 
governments  and  between  our  coimtries. 

The  timing  of  our  talks  has  not  just 
)een  of  symbolic  significance  but  has 


Australia— A  Profile 


PROFILE 

People 

Nationality:  Noun  ayid  adjective — Aus- 
tralian(s).  Population  (1983):  15.3  million. 
Annual  gjowth  rate:  1.3%.  Ethnic  groups: 

European  (97%),  aboriginal  (1%),  Asian  (.6%). 
Religions:  Anglican  36%.  Roman  Catholic 
33%  (1976  census).  Languages:  English, 
aboriginal  languages.  Education:  Wars  com- 
puhory — to  age  15  in  all  states  except 
Tasmania,  where  it  is  16.  Attendance — 94%. 
Literacy — 100%.  Health:  Infant  mortality 
rate — 9.9/1,000  live  births.  Life  expect 
ancy — 74  yrs.  Work  force  (6.9  million  in 
1983):  Agriculture — 7%.  Industry  and  com.- 
merce — 30%.  Services — 32.6%.  Govern- 
ment—'iOA%. 


Tesmtt! 


Indian  Ocean 


NEW  ZEALAND  CA 


Geography 

Area:  7.7  million  sq.  km.  (2.9  million  sq.  mi.); 
about  the  size  of  the  continental  US.  Cities: 
CapttoV—Canberra  (pop.  222,000).  Other 
cities— 'SiyAncy  (3.2  million),  Melbourne  (2.8 
million),  Brisbane  (1  million).  Terrain: 
Varied,  but  generally  low  lying.  Climate: 
Relatively  dry,  ranging  from  temperate  in 
the  south  to  semitropical  in  the  north. 

Government 

Type:  Democratic,  federal-state  system 
recognizing  British  monarch  as  sovereign. 
Constitution:  July  9,  1900.  Independence 
(federation):  January  1,  1901. 

Branches:  Executive — prime  minister 
and  Cabinet  responsible  to  Parliament.  Leg- 
islative— bicameral  Parliament  (64-member 
Senate,  125-member  House  of  Represent- 
atives) Judicial — independent  judiciary. 


Administrative  subdivisions:  6  states 
and  2  territories. 

Political  parties:  Liberal,  National, 
Australian  Labor,  Australian  Democrats. 
Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 

Central  government  budget  (FY 
1982-83):  $40.9  billion. 

Defense  (FY  1982-83):  2.9%  of  GNP  or 
9.0%  of  government  budget. 

Flag:  On  a  blue  field,  UK  Union  Jack  in 
the  top  left  corner,  a  large  white  star  directly 
beneath  symbolizing  federation,  and  five 
smaller  white  stars  on  the  right  half 
representing  the  Southern  Cross  constella- 
tion. 

Economy 

GDP  (1983):  $150.2  billion.  Per  capita  in- 
come: $9,960.  Avg.  inflation  rate  (mid-1983): 

9.8%. 

Natural  resources:  Bauxite,  coal,  iron 
ore,  copper,  tin,  silver,  uranium,  nickel, 
tungsten,  mineral  sands,  lead,  zinc,  diamonds, 
natural  gas,  oil. 

Agriculture  (6.8%  of  1980  GDP):  Prod- 
ucts — livestock,  wheat,  wool,  sugar.  Arable 
land— 9%. 

Industry  (36%  of  1980  GDP):  Mining, 
manufacturing,  and  transportation. 

Trade  (1980):  Exports— $22.5  billion: 
livestock,  meat,  wool,  wheat,  energy  and 
mineral  resources,  manufactures.  Major 
markets— i3.])&n,  US  ($2.6  billion),  European 
Community.  /mpor(,«i— $20.7  billion:  con- 
sumer goods,  transportation  equipment, 
capital  goods,  industrial  supplies,  petroleum 
products.  Major  suppliers — US  ($4.6  billion), 
European  Community,  Japan. 

Official  exchange  rate:  The  Australian 
dollar  floats  freely.  The  rate  in  January  1984 
was  approximately  US$.90  =  Australian  $1. 

Fiscal  year:  July  1-June  30. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN,  OECD,  Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB), 
Economic  and  Social  Council  for  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  (ESCAP),  Australia-New  Zealand-US 
Pact  (ANZUS),  Commonwealth  of  Nations, 
Colombo  Plan,  International  Energy  Agency. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  May 
1984,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Editor:  Juanita 
Adams.  ■ 


t^pril1985 


61 


PACIFIC 


added  greatly  to  their  substantive  value. 
We  have  again  found  an  extensive  coin- 
cidence of  preoccupations  and  of  priori- 
ties in  managing  our  respective  foreign 
and  domestic  affairs. 

You  have  just  launched  a  budgetary 
process  which  will  have  great  signif- 
icance for  the  international  community. 
Both  our  governments  face  the  task  of 
maintaining  the  strong  growth  that  both 
the  United  States  and  Australia  have 
recently  enjoyed.  And  we  shall  both  be 
tackling  this  on  a  number  of  fronts  dur- 
ing 1985. 

We're  looking  also  to  increasing 
trade  flows  to  sustain  economic  recovery 
fully  and  widely.  We  seek  to  resist  pro- 
tectionism and  to  preserve  and  to 
strengthen  the  multilateral  trading 
system.  And,  Mr.  President,  we  look  to 
and  we  know  we  will  receive  from  you 
strong  leadership  in  that  direction. 

One  aspect — an  important  one — of 
the  ANZUS  relationship  has  become  a 
matter  of  close  concern  to  us  both  and 
will  require  continuing  consultation.  Let 
me  say,  first,  that  the  relationship  be- 
tween Australia  and  the  United  States 
under  the  ANZUS  treaty  and  the  rights 
and  obligations  assumed  by  us  under  the 
treaty  are  undiminished  by  recent 
events.  Your  statement  accurately 
reflects  the  position.  The  ANZUS  treaty 
remains;  the  fundamental  importance  of 
cooperation  within  it  has  been  reaf- 
firmed here  today. 

Similarly,  we  have  reaffirmed  the 
need  for  solidarity  and  common  purpose 
in  pursuit  of  arms  reductions.  I  con- 
gratulate you  again  on  reaching  agree- 
ment with  the  Soviet  Union  to  enter  into 
the  forthcoming  round  of  negotiations 
and  on  the  approach  you  have  taken  to 
that  agreement.  You  will  have  our  con- 
tinuing support  in  what  is  bound  to  be  a 
difficult  and  protracted  process. 

We  will  remain  closely  in  touch  as 
that  process  moves  forward.  And  we 
will  continue  to  offer  counsel,  while 
maintaining  our  own  direct  participation 
with  you  in  multilateral  disarmament 
work. 

We  will  continue  both  nationally  and 
in  the  established  pattern  of  partnership 
with  you  to  make  our  contribution  to 
Western  security  in  every  way  open  and 
acceptable  to  us.  We  will  do  so  against 
the  basic  criteria  that  a  stable  deter- 
rence, despite  its  defects,  is  necessary  in 
order  to  produce  progress  on  disarma- 
ment. 

We  have  a  fundamental  interest  in 
that  starting  point  of  stable  deterrence, 
in  the  final  goal  of  disarmament,  and  in 
an  intermediate  and,  hopefully,  early 
stage  of  substantial  arms  reductions. 


I  said  at  the  outset  that  the  timing 
of  our  talks  was  important.  I  believe  we 
have  been  successful  in  bringing  steady 
consideration  to  the  issues  before  us.  In 
the  process,  we  have  once  more  tested 
and  proved  our  ability  to  work  closely 
together. 

One  of  the  continuing  strengths  of  a 
mature  relationship  is  that  neither  seeks 
from  the  other  a  complete  conformity  of 
views  and  actions.  But  we  have  shown, 
once  again,  the  capacity  to  respond  to 
each  other's  needs  in  the  pursuit  of  ma- 
jor objectives  on  which  we  have  the 
widest  measure  of  agreement. 


I  thank  you  for  your  hospitality  and 
for  your  warm  references  to  our 
bicentennial  celebrations,  in  which  we 
look  forward  to  active  U.S.  participa- 
tion. 

I  thank  you,  also  for  the  kind  recep- 
tion which  you  and  Mrs.  Reagan  have 
given  to  me  and  to  my  wife.  I  look  for- 
ward to  continued  meetings  with  you 
and  members  of  your  Administration, 
whether  up  here  or  Down  Under. 


'Made  to  reporters  assembled  at  the 
South  Portico  oi  the  White  House  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  11,  1984).  ■ 


Australia  Reaffirms  Support 
for  ANZUS  Alliance 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  20,  1985  ' 

I  am  pleased  by  the  news  that  Prime 
Minister  Hawke  of  Australia  announced 
February  19,  that  his  cabinet  unanimous- 
ly reaffirmed  Australia's  support  for  the 
ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States  security  treaty]  alliance 
and  for  the  obligations  and  respon- 
sibilities that  the  alliance  entails.  We 
note  that  the  Prime  Minister  described 
ship  visits  and  the  U.S. -Australian  joint 
facilities  as  "continuing  fundamentals  of 
the  Australian-United  States  alliance 
relationship."  We  welcome  this  reaffir- 
mation of  Australia's  commitment  to  its 
ties  with  the  United  States.  Both  the 
United  States  and  Australia  have  em- 


phasized the  continuing  importance  we 
attach  to  the  conclusion  of  the  1984 
ANZUS  Council  communique  that:  "Ac- 
cess by  allied  aircraft  and  ships  to  the 
airfields  and  ports  of  the  ANZUS 
members  was  reaffirmed  as  essential  to 
the  continuing  effectiveness  of  the 
Alliance."  Both  President  Reagan  and 
Prime  Minister  Hawke  recognized,  dur- 
ing the  Prime  Mini-ster's  recent  visit, 
that  solidarity  among  the  Western 
states  is  critical  to  maintenance  of  globa 
and  regional  stability  and  to  progress 
toward  substantial  nuclear  arms  reduc- 
tion. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents,  on  behalf 
of  the  Secretary,  by  Department  spokesman 
Bernard  Kalb  (  press  release  26).  ■ 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


i:iENCE&  TECHNOLOGY 


rotecting  the  Ozone  Layer 


Richard  Elliot  Benedick 

Statement  before  the  UN  Environ- 
11 1  Program  working  group  of  experts 
protection  of  the  ozone  layer  in 
nera  on  January  21.  1985.  Am- 
sador  Benedick  is  Deputy  Assistant 
retary  for  Oceans  and  International 
vironmeyital  and  Scientific  Affairs. 

e  issue  of  ozone  layer  depletion  has 
m  with  us  for  over  a  decade.  Not  too 
g  ago,  it  almost  seemed  as  if  this 
)blem  was  going  away.  As  scientists 
oroved  their  models  by  adding  in  the 
ects  of  other  ozone-modifying  pertur- 
its,  the  net  depletion  estimates  were 
/ered. 

Unfortunately,  however,  more  re- 
it  analysis  indicates  that  substantial 
ks  do  exist,  particularly  when  realistic 
imates  of  future  growth  in  atmos- 
eric  pollutants  are  considered. 

Our  concern  is  based  on  a  number  of 
tors,  two  of  which  I  would  like  par- 
alarly  to  call  to  your  attention. 

One,  even  those  models  which 
jdict  only  a  small  depletion  in  total 
me  nevertheless  also  show  a  substan- 

change  in  the  vertical  distribution  of 
)ne,  which  could  significantly  affect 
Tiate  patterns. 

Two,  the  most  recent  models  in- 
ate  a  most  disturbing  phenomenon— 
mely,  that  the  atmospheric  response 
increasing  concentrations  of  chlorine 
iiy  not  be  linear.  In  other  words,  when 

chlorine  concentration  in  the  at- 

I  isphere  exceeds  a  threshold  level,  the 

1  :e  at  which  ozone  is  depleted  may  in- 

i?ase  dramatically. 
This  nonlinear  effect  is  discussed  in 
;  -ecent  article  in  Nature  magazine  [Vol. 
12,  November  15,  1984,  pp.  227-231] 
1  scientists  from  Harvard  University. 
'  le  Harvard  results  estimate  ozone 
i  pletion  of  15%  or  more  if  CFC  [chloro- 
!  lorocarbons]  use  grows  by  as  little  as 
Jb  annually— an  estimated  future 
j  owth  rate  which  is  not  unreasonable  in 
!  :ht  of  recent  experience  and  prospec- 
•  'e  worldwide  demand.  Moreover,  the 
(  mposition  of  the  ozone  layer  appears 
i'  be  highly  sensitive  to  even  relatively 
vinute  changes  in  emissions  of  CFCs 
^'id  other  gases  over  time— as  little  as 
j!  le  or  two  percentage  points  in  annual 
\'  -owth  rates  can  make  an  enormous  dif- 
:  rence  in  ozone  depletion.  This  means 


that  the  margin  of  error  between  com- 
placency and  catastrophe  is  too  small  for 
comfort. 

Despite  the  complexity  of  the  forces 
determining  future  changes  in  the  ozone 
layer,  one  thing  appears  clear  to  a  pru- 
dent and  impartial  observer:  if  CFC  use 
continues  to  grow  over  time,  some 
depletion  of  the  ozone  layer  is  likely  to 
occur. 

Unlike  some  other  more  localized  en- 
vironmental issues,  ozone  layer  depletion 
is  a  phenomenon  which  affects  the  well- 
being  of  every  country  represented 
here — indeed,  of  the  entire  planet.  If 
even  one  country,  or  a  few  countries, 
pursue  policies  which  damage  the  ozone 
layer,  we  are  all  affected. 

We  acknowledge  that  the  scientific 
evidence  concerning  CFCs  is  not  entirely 
unequivocal.  But,  due  to  the  nature  of 
the  science  and  our  capability  for 
stratospheric  measurement,  the  uncer- 
tainties are  likely  to  remain  for  many 
years.  We  must  soberly  ask  ourselves: 
what  are  the  consequences  of  delay  if  we 
insist  on  100%  certainty  and  fail  to  take 
actions  now? 

We  do  know  that  CFCs  have  a  long 
lifetime  in  the  atmosphere— unlike  many 
other  gases,  they  are  not  readily  broken 
down  and  removed  from  the  atmos- 
phere. Rather,  they  build  up;  they  ac- 
cumulate. And  the  models  indicate  that, 
unlike  other  forms  of  pollution,  there 
may  be  no  early  warning  of  serious 
damage  to  the  ozone  layer;  when  the 
chlorine  buildup  reaches  a  critical  point, 
the  ozone  decline  may  be  rapid  and 
precipitous  and  not  reversible  through 
short-term  human  actions. 

In  a  real  world  of  imperfect  knowl- 
edge and  uncertainty,  we,  as  policy- 
makers, nevertheless  have  the  respon- 
sibility to  take  prudent  actions  for  the 
benefit  of  generations  yet  to  come.  The 
U.S.  Government  thus  believes  that, 
while  cooperation  on  research— as  pro- 
vided for  in  the  convention^- is  neces- 
sary, it  is  not  sufficient  in  light  of  the 
potential  risks  we  all  face  from  ozone 
layer  depletion.  For  this  reason,  the 
United  States  joins  a  number  of  other 
countries  in  urging  this  group  to  adopt  a 
protocol^  to  the  convention  which  would 
effect  meaningful  near-term  reductions 
in  CFC  emissions. 

We  believe  it  is  entirely  feasible  to 
eliminate  the  least  essential  CFC  uses. 
While,  admittedly,  it  is  not  always  easy 
to  distinguish  essential  from  nonessen- 


tial, there  is  one  application  of  CFCs 
that  stands  out  as  an  obvious  choice. 
The  use  of  CFCs  as  propellants  in 
aerosols  still  constitutes  30%-35%  of  the 
tottil  CFC-11  and  -12  consumed  in  the 
world. 

The  United  States  and  several  other 
nations  have  already  successfully  limited 
the  use  of  CFCs  in  such  aerosols,  thus 
demonstrating  that  it  is  practicable.  In 
fact,  by  substituting  hydrocarbons  as  the 
propellant,  significant  cost  savings  have 
been  achieved  without  reducing  con- 
sumer satisfaction.  Nor  have  concerns 
about  flammability  hazards  proved  war- 
ranted. We  recognize  that  some  situa- 
tions will  exist  where  CFCs  are  needed 
as  propellants,  and  the  text  allows  for 
these  special  situations. 

An  important  aspect  of  the  protocol 
text  that  we  support  is  the  "multiop- 
tions"  format,  which  should  permit  ac- 
ceptance of  a  protocol  by  countries  with 
a  wide  range  of  differing  individual  cir- 
cumstances. This  approach  also  recog- 
nizes past  actions  by  governments  to 
reduce  CFC  use,  since  these  actions 
should  be  rewarded  and  not  ignored.  We 
are  not  wedded  to  any  particular  for- 
mulation of  a  multioptions  approach  and 
would  be  prepared  to  consider  variations 
of  the  proposal  now  on  the  table,  pro- 
vided that  they  would  offer  meaningful 
near-term  CFC  reduction. 

The  United  States  acknowledges 
that  the  proposal  offered  by  the  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community  (EC)  at  the 
last  working  group  meeting  is  a  sincere 
attempt  to  confront  the  ozone  depletion 
issue.  The  EC  proposal,  as  I  understand 
it,  corresponds  essentially  to  what  the 
EC  has  already  accomplished.  However, 
with  due  respect  to  my  EC  colleagues,  I 
believe  that  their  "single  option"  ap- 
proach would  be  less  practical  in  a  global 
context,  for  the  following  reasons. 

•  The  production  capacity  cap  is  set 
so  high  relative  to  current  production 
that  it  would  not  bind  for  at  least  20 
years,  during  which  time  irreparable 
damages  to  the  ozone  layer  may  well  be 
occurring. 

•  When  the  cap  is  reached,  coun- 
tries will  have  to  curtail  greater  quan- 
tities of  CFCs,  including  more  essential 
and  less  easily  substitutable  CFC  uses. 

•  By  allowing  CFC  emissions  to 
continue  to  grow  in  the  short  run,  the 
EC  proposal  does  not  take  account  of 
potential  changes  in  the  vertical  ozone 
profile  which  can  affect  climate. 


prll1985 


63 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


•  The  EC  proposal  does  not  restrict 
exports  or  imports— unless  all  countries 
become  party,  the  protocol  would  be  in- 
effective in  limiting  global  emissions. 

•  By  capping  present  capacity  and 
locking  in  current  production  and 
market  shares,  the  proposal  is  preju- 
dicial against  developing  countries,  as 
well  as  certain  others,  which  currently 
have  little  or  no  surplus  production 
capacity. 

In  sum,  I  find  it  difficult  to  envision 
how  the  EC  proposal  could  effectively 
function  or  be  enforced.  In  contrast,  the 
multioptions  approach  can  accommodate 
a  diversity  of  national  regulatory  ap- 
proaches, thus  allowing  more  countries 
to  join  in  international  controls.  We 
believe  it  is  a  pragmatic  and  responsible 
proposition  which  in  no  way  precludes 


future  additional  actions.  Indeed,  it  buys 
time  for  scientific  research  to  provide  us 
better  guidelines,  while  prudently 
safeguarding  the  environment  for  the 
near  term. 

If  the  world  can  at  least  reduce  less 
essential  uses  in  the  short  run,  we  may 
be  able  to  avoid  much  more  costly  meas- 
ures in  the  future.  All  that  we  ask  is 
that  interested  nations  be  allowed  to 
have  this  measure  available  in  March  for 
adoption  at  the  diplomatic  conference  ^ 
if  they  desire.  This  would  be  a  clear 
signal  to  our  constituencies  that,  even  in 
the  real  world  of  scientific  uncertainties, 
we  are  still  able  to  take  some  modest 
precautionary  steps  to  safeguard  future 
human  welfare  against  important  risks. 

In  conclusion,  by  continuing  to  load 
the  atmosphere  with  CFCs  and  other 
pollutants,  mankind  is,  in  effect,  per- 


forming a  gigantic  experiment  on  the  i 
mosphere — one  that  is  reversible  only 
over  decades  or  centuries.  Prudence  di 
tates  that  we  reduce  the  size  of  that  e> 
periment  until  we  better  understand  it 
results.  The  costs  of  the  precautionary 
measures  that  we  support  are  not  high 
compared  to  many  other  environmenta 
controls.  But  the  benefits  to  the  fragile 
chemical  balance  of  our  atmosphere — 
and,  ultimately,  to  human  and  economi 
well-being — may  be  great. 


'Draft  Global  Convention  for  the  Prote(| 
tion  of  the  Ozone  Layer. 

-Draft  Protocol  To  Protect  the  Ozone 
Layer  by  Controlling  Certain  Uses  of 
Chlorofluorocarbons. 

^Conference  of  Plenipotentiaries  on  ProJ 
tection  of  the  Ozone  Layer,  Vienna,  March 
18-22,  1985.  ■ 


Annua 

1  World  Emissions:  CFC- 

-11 

300 

i 

i 

1^ 

Kilograms 

ro 
o 
o 

A 

1 

1 

~o 

,^^^H 

llions 

o 
o 

^^H 

1 

■ 

5 

^^^H 

1 

■ 

0 
19 

p^^^^l^H 

1 

w 

50                    I960                   1970 

1980 

Because  CFCs  are  almost  indestructible  in  the  lower  atmosptiere, 
concentrations  will  build  up  even  if  ennissions  do  not  increase 
yearly.  Thus,  although  several  countries  reduced  CFC  use  m 
aerosols  sufficiently  to  level  off  world  emissions  growth  temporarily, 
concentrations  have  continued  to  climb. 


Source  Chemical  Manutacturers  Association,  198 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


■RRORISM 


Brrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official 
ersonnel  Abroad,  1982-84 


This  compilation  identifies  incidents 
olving  premeditated  political  ter- 
ism  directed  against  official  repre- 
tatives  ofthf  United  States.  Episodes 
t  occurred  during  irartime  situations 
that  resulted  from  random  disorder 
mob  action  are  excluded.  Attacks  on 
vate  citizeyis  are  not  listed.  Attacks  on 
iperty  have  been  included  only  when 
y  resulted  in  deaths  or  injunes  of 
lerican  personnel. 

This  article  is  a  supplement  to  Ter- 
ist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 
road,  which  appeared  i.n  the  April 
■1  issue  of  the  Bulletin,  and  to  Ter- 
ist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 
road,  1981,  which  appeared  in  the 
y  198-2  Bulletin. 

Evan  Duncan,  the  author  of  this 
dy.  is  a  Research  and  Reference 
Horian  in  the  Office  of  the  Historian, 
reau  of  Public  Affairs. 


. SALVADOR 

iiy  25,  1983 

idr.  Albert  A.  Schaufelberger,  deputy 
ef  of  the  U.S.  military  group  in  El 
Ivador,  was  shot  and  killed  by  two 
pmen  outside  the  University  of  Gen- 
ii America  in  San  Salvador.  Two  days 
er,  a  broadcast  by  Radio  Farabundo 
irt'i  called  Schaufelberger's  assassina- 
n  an  act  of  "national  defense"  carried 
t  by  members  of  the  Popular  Libera- 
n  Front.  On  June  1,  the  Popular 
Deration  Forces  claimed  responsibility 
d  threatened  further  attacks  on  U.S. 
litary  advisers  until  they  were 
j  thdrawn  from  El  Salvador. 


RANGE 

inuary  18,  1982 

,.  Col.  Charles  R.  Ray,  assistant  U.S. 
ilitary  attache  in  Paris,  was  shot  and 
led  by  a  gunman  outside  his  apart- 
(ent.  A  group  calling  itself  the 
ebanese  Armed  Revolutionary  Faction 
aimed  responsibility. 


August  21,  1982 

A  bomb  was  discovered  in  a  parking 
space  used  by  Roderick  Grant,  Commer- 
cial Counselor  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Paris.  The  bomb  was  believed  to  have 
been  attached  to  Grant's  car.  A  French 
policeman  was  killed  and  two  others 
were  wounded,  one  fatally,  when  the 
bomb  exploded  while  being  removed.  On 
August  22,  a  group  calling  itself  the 
Lebanese  Armed  Revolutionary  Faction 
claimed  responsibility. 

March  26,  1984 

A  gunman  on  a  motorcycle  shot  and 
slightly  wounded  Consul  General 
Robert  0.  Homme  outside  his  apartment 
in  Strasbourg.  The  Lebanese  Armed 
Revolutionary  Faction  claimed  respon- 
sibility and  accused  Homme  of  being 
employed  by  the  CIA. 


GREECE 

November  15,  1983 

Capt.  George  Tsantes,  head  of  the  naval 
section  of  the  joint  U.S.  military 
assistance  group  in  Greece,  was  shot 
and  killed  by  two  unidentified  gunmen  in 
Athens.  His"  Greek  chauffeur  was  also 
killed.  An  anonymous  caller  claimed 
responsibility  for  the  "November  17" 
group,  which  had  also  claimed  to  have 
killed  CIA  station  chief  Richard  Welch 
in  1975. 


April  3,  1984 

Two  unidentified  gunmen  shot  and 
wounded  U.S.  Air  Force  MSgt.  Robert 
H.  Judd  near  the  Athens  airport.  On 
April  5,  the  "November  17"  revolu- 
tionary organization  claimed  responsibili- 
ty, describing  the  attack  as  a  protest 
against  the  Greek  Government's  failure 
to  remove  American  military  bases  from 
the  country.  The  Greek  police  later 
reported  that  the  same  gun  had  also 
been  used  in  the  assassinations  of 
Richard  Welch  and  Capt.  George 
Tsantes. 


IRAN 

December  4-9,  1984 

Four  gunmen  hijacked  a  Kuwait  Air- 
ways jet  during  a  flight  from  Kuwait  to 
Karachi,  Pakistan.  Six  Americans,  in- 
cluding three  auditors  employed  by  AID, 
were  among  the  162  persons  aboard. 
Shortly  after  the  plane  landed  at 
Tehran,  the  hijackers  shot  and  killed 
AID  auditor  Charles  F.  Hegna  and 
released  44  women  and  children,  two  of 
whom  were  Americans.  The  hijackers 
threatened  to  blow  up  the  plane  unless 
the  Government  of  Kuwait  released  17 
persons  who  had  lieen  imprisoned  for  a 
series  of  bombings  that  had  taken  place 
on  December  12,  1983. 

The  Kuwaiti  Government  refused  to 
meet  the  hijackers'  demands.  Although 
the  hijackers  gradually  released  most  of 
their  hostages,  they  killed  a  second 
American  AID  official,  William  L. 
Stanford,  on  December  6  and  severely 
beat  and  tortured  the  remaining  U.S. 
and  Kuwaiti  passengers.  On  December 
9,  Iranian  security  forces  stormed  the 
plane,  captured  the  hijackers,  and  freed 
the  remaining  seven  hostages,  including 
AID  auditor  Charles  Kapar  and 
American  businessman  John  Costa. 
Kapar  and  Costa  were  flown  to  an 
American  hospital  in  West  Germany  for 
medical  treatment  before  returning  to 
the  United  States. 

The  hijackers,  who  did  not  identify 
themselves,  were  believed  to  have  been 
affiliated  with  either  Hizballah,  (the 
"Party  of  God")  a  Lebanese  Shiite  fac- 
tion linked  to  attacks  on  U.S.  facilities  in 
Lebanon,  or  to  a  militant  Iraqi  Shiite 
group  known  as  "Al  Dawa."  The  Iranian 
Government  refused  to  extradite  the  hi- 
jackers to  Kuwait  but  announced  on 
December  18  that  they  would  be  tried 
according  to  Islamic  law. 


ITALY 

February  15,  1984 

Retired  Foreign  Service  officer  Leamon 
R.  Hunt,  Director  General  of  the 
Multinational  Force  and  Observers 
(MFO)  in  the  Sinai  Peninsula,  was  shot 
and  killed  by  two  gunmen  outside  his 
home  in  Rome.  Persons  claiming  to 
represent  both  Italian  and  Lebanese 
radical  groups  claimed  responsibility. 


65 


TERRORISM 


4  <^ 


December  12,  1983 

A  suicide  truck  bomb  exploded  outside  a 
U.S.  Embassy  annex  in  Kuwait  (photo 
above)  wrecking  an  administrative  annex 
and  seriously  damaging  the  chancery. 
The  terrorist  and  three  local  employees 
of  the  Embassy  were  killed,  and  a 
Kuwaiti  visa  applicant  was  fatally  in- 
jured. The  blast  also  wounded  20 
Foreign  Service  nationals  and  17  visitors 
to  the  Embassy.  Other  bombs  exploded 
within  minutes  of  each  other  at  the 
French  Embassy,  the  airport,  an 
American  housing  complex,  a  power  sta- 
tion, and  an  oil  refinery, 
responsibility  for  these  attacks  in  the 
name  of  the  "Islamic  Jihad."  The 
Kuwaiti  Government  subsequently  tried 
25  persons  (mostly  Iraqis)  before  a 
special  state  security  court.  Six  were 
sentenced  to  death  (three  in  absentia), 
while  14  others  received  prison 
sentences  ranging  from  5  years  to  life. 
To  date,  the  death  sentences  have  not 
been  carried  out. 


LEBANON 


March  15,  1983 

Five  U.S.  Marines  serving  with  the 
multinational  force  in  Beirut  were 
wounded  in  a  grenade  attack.  A  second 
attack  wounded  five  Italian  soldiers,  one 
of  whom  later  died.  A  group  calling 
itself  the  "Islamic  Jihad"  claimed  respon- 
sibility for  the  attacks. 

April  18,  1983 

A  truck  bomb  wrecked  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  Beirut,  killing  more  than  50 
persons  and  wounding  more  than  100. 
The  dead  included  17  Americans  and  21 
Lebanese  employees  of  the  Embassy, 
while  4  Americans  and  16  local 
employees  were  hospitalized.  Individuals 
purporting  to  represent  the  "Islamic 
Jihad"  and  other  extremist  groups 
claimed  responsibility  for  the  attack. 

October  23.  1983 

A  truck  bomb  demolished  the  head- 
quarters of  the  U.S.  Marines  serving 
with  the  multinational  force  in  Beirut, 
killing  241.  A  second  attack  on  a  bar- 
racks occupied  by  French  paratroops 
killed  58.  The  "Free  Islamic  Revolu- 
tionary Movement"  and  the  "Islamic 
Jihad"  both  claimed  responsibility  for  the 
attacks. 


1 


March  16,  1984 


Political  officer  William  Buckley  was 
kidnapped  by  three  unidentified  gunme 
outside  his  apartment  in  Beirut.  On 
May  9,  the  "Islamic  Jihad"  claimed  to  I 
holding  him.  On  January  28,  1985,  the 
NBC  television  network  showed  a 
videotape  that  it  had  obtained  in  which 
Buckley,  holding  a  Beirut  newspaper 
dated  January  22,  said  that  he  and  tw( 
other  Americans  who  had  been  kid 
napped  in  Beirut  were  well. 


September  20,  1984 

A  truck  bomb  exploded  outside  the  U.! 
Embassy  annex  in  the  east  Beirut 
suburb  of  Aukar,  killing  14  persons  an^ 
injuring  57.  Army  Chief  Warrant  Offic 
Kenneth  V.  Welch  and  Navy  Petty  Of- 
ficer First  Class  Michael  R.  Wagner, 
both  with  the  Defense  Attache's  office 
died  in  the  attack.  Some  20  Americans 
were  injured,  4  of  them  seriously.  U.S. 
Ambassador  Reginald  Bartholomew  ar 
British  Ambassador  David  Miers  were 
slightly  injured. 

The  "Islamic  Jihad"  claimed  respon 
sibility,  urging  Lebanese  to  stay  away 
from  "American  centers"  and  stating 
that  they  were  keeping  their  "previous 
promise  not  to  allow  a  single  Americar 
to  remain  on  Lebanese  soil." 


NAMIBIA 

April  15,  1984 

A  bomb  explosion  at  a  gas  station  in 
Oshakati  killed  Dennis  W.  Keogh,  heac 
of  the  U.S.  Liaison  Office,  and  Lt.  Col. 
Kenneth  Crabtree,  the  Department  of 
Defense  representative  at  the  office.  A 
Namibian  civilian  was  also  killed. 
SWAPO  denied  responsibility,  and  Sou 
African  officials  stated  that  the  bomb 
had  probably  not  been  directed  at  the 
two  Americans.  ■ 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


'ESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Ihe  Need  for  Continuity 

1  U-S.  Latin  American  Policy 


Langhorne  A.  Motley 

Based  on  a  statement  before  the  Sub- 
vmittee  on  Western  HeTnisphere  Af- 
rs  of  the  HoiLse  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 

tee  on  January  29.1985.  Ambassador 
tley  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
lerican  Affairs.  ^ 

s  renewal  of  cooperation  between  the 
lected  Administration  and  the  new 
igress  is  an  appropriate  time  to  look 
listically  at  what  has  been  happening 
^atin  America  and  the  Caribbean 
■r  the  past  few  years.  It  is  a  moment 
ook  beyond  the  stereotypes  of  the 
t:  we  now  have  the  evidence  of  re- 
t  history  as  a  guide  into  the  future. 

must  study  it  carefully. 

Successful  policies  must  be  con- 
.ant  both  with  our  own  interests  and 
nciples  and  with  the  realities  "on  the 
•und."  In  Latin  America  and  the 
-ibbean,  I  believe  that  the  Ad- 
listration  and  the  Congress  have 
son  to  conclude  that  the  policies  we 
'6  been  following  the  last  4  years  are 
ceeding  and  that  the  best  option  for 

next  4  years  is  firm,  bipartisan  con- 
aity. 


}  INCIPLES 

'  lericans  expect  their  government  to 
i  nd  firmly  on  principle.  And  our  first 
1  nciple  must  be  the  defense  of  U.S.  na- 
;  lal  interests. 

The  United  States  has  many  impor- 
j  t  interests  in  Latin  America.  They  in- 
!  de  some  of  the  geopolitical,  security, 
1  i  economic  bases  of  our  nation's 
'  edom  and  prosperity.  They  also  in- 
:  de  moral  concerns  rooted  in  our  own 
;  ditions  of  political  freedom,  equality 
;  opportunity,  and  the  physical  security 
I  i  integrity  of  the  individual.  The 
;  nan  relationships  and  cultural  and 
:  torical  experiences  we  have  shared 
i  ;h  others  in  this  New  World  have 
•  ped  to  shape  our  national  ideals  and 
r  ues. 

Since  the  earliest  days  of  the 
!  public,  it  has  been  agreed  that  the 
^lited  States  cannot  be  indifferent  to 
.  neighbors.  The  independence  of  Latin 
inerican  governments  from  forces  out- 
■  e  the  hemisphere— first  the  European 
:  )narchies,  then  the  Axis  powers,  and 
pre  recently  Soviet  communism — has 
\\g  been,  and  remains,  a  primary  U.S. 
oerest. 


Conditions  in  Latin  America  have 
changed  dramatically  over  the  last 
quarter  century.  Let's  look  at  the 
positive  side. 

First,  social  modernization  and 
cultural  progress  have  begun  to 
transform  Latin  American  life  and 
politics.  Together  with  the  independence 
of  the  former  British  colonies  in  the 
Caribbean,  these  changes  are  propelling 
a  far-reaching  trend  toward  democracy 
that  is  capturing  the  imagination  and  ad- 
miration of  observers  throughout  the 
Western  world. 

Second,  Latin  American  and  Carib- 
bean economies  grew  very  rapidly 
throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s.  In  real 
terms,  this  expansion  averaged  more 
than  6%  a  year— more  than  double  the 
rate  of  population  growth — for  two 
decades. 

These  fundamental  developments 
have  strengthened  the  region's  prosperi- 
ty, freedom,  and  world  role.  They  have 
also  made  our  neighbors  better  trading 
partners  and  even  more  natural  allies. 

But  the  past  quarter  century  has 
seen  some  major  negative  aspects  as 
well. 

First,  since  the  early  1960s,  Cuba's 

military  forces  have  quadrupled,  becom- 
ing a  surrogate  for  Soviet  conventional 
military  power.  The  Soviets  and  Cubans 
are  now  joined  in  a  major  effort  to  sup- 
port armed  Marxist  minorities  seeking 
to  seize  power  by  force  elsewhere  in  the 
hemisphere.  The  people  of  Central 
America,  in  particular,  are  suffering  the 
resulting  instability  and  violence. 

Second,  though  economic  growth 
was  impressive,  it  was  very  uneven  and 
did  not  reach  large  segments  of  the 
population.  More  recently,  our 
neighbors'  economies  have  also  proved 
vulnerable  to  worsening  terms  of 
trade — increased  costs  of  oil  and  bor- 
rowed capital  and  depressed  prices  for 
locally  produced  commodities— ag- 
gravated by  a  world  recession  and 
debilitating  national  economic  policies. 

Third,  new  threats  to  stability  and 
the  rule  of  law  have  emerged  in  the 
form  of  narcotics  trafficking  and 
political  terrorism. 

The  defense  and  advancement  of 
U.S.  interests  must  reckon  with  all  these 
changes.  They  have  created  an  increas- 
ingly complex  environment  in  which 
there  are  no  simple  or  quick  solutions. 


As  the  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
on  Central  America  recognized,  for  ex- 
ample. Central  America's  problems  can- 
not be  resolved  separately  but  will  re- 
quire concerted  and  steady  action  on  all 
fronts  for  many  years.  The  same  is  true 
for  the  hemisphere  as  a  whole. 

But  if  our  tactics  must  keep  pace 
with  changing  situations,  our  principles 
cannot  change.  We  must: 

•  Support  democracy  and  the  com- 
mon security — the  achievement  of 
democracy  is  now  both  more  necessary 
and  more  possible  than  in  the  past.  We 
must  back  efforts  by  Latin  Americans  to 
implement  political  and  judicial  reforms, 
to  strengthen  respect  for  human  rights, 
and  to  provide  honest  and  efficient  con- 
stitutional government.  We  must  help 
our  friends  to  resist  extrahemispheric 
forces,  whether  from  the  Soviet  bloc  or 
Libya  or  the  Palestine  Liberation 
Organization.  We  must  support  peaceful 
evolution  against  violence,  guerrilla  war- 
fare, or  "power-sharing"  at  the  point  of 
a  gun. 

•  Facilitate  equitable  economic 
development — this  is  important  to  the 
health  of  our  own  economy  as  well  as  to 
the  well-being  and  political  stability  of 
our  neighbors  and  the  common  security. 
We  must  support  increased  social  and 
economic  opportunity  and  encourage 
free  trade,  private  initiative,  and 
economic  restructuring  to  help  renew 
our  neighbors'  demonstrated  potential 
for  growth. 

•  Finally,  we  must  help  fight  nar- 
cotics traffickers  and  terrorists. 

The  shifting  Latin  American  scene 

also  has  implications  for  the  nature  of 
the  leadership  required  to  turn  prin- 
ciples into  realities. 

First,  the  United  States  must  pro- 
vide leadership.  Latin  America  has 
grown  too  much  for  the  United  States  to 
attempt  to   act  unilaterally  or  without 
consultation.  There  are  limits  on  U.S. 
power.  But  these  limits  must  not  be 
taken  as  an  excuse  for  abdication.  The 
defense  of  U.S.  interests  cannot  be  left 
to  others;  it  requires  an  active  U.S. 
diplomacy  backed  by  power,  resources, 
and  imagination.  If  we  are  truly  commit- 
ted to  democracy,  we  must  help  to  nur- 
ture and  strengthen  its  continued 
growth  not  just  this  year  and  next,  but 
as  an  integral  part  of  our  relationship. 


»ril  1985 


67 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Second,  leadership  must  be  exer- 
cised wisely.  There  are  trwo  things  that 
the  vast  majority  of  the  American  peo- 
ple do  not  want  in  this  region  so  close  to 
home;  they  do  not  want  a  second  Cuba, 
and  they  do  not  want  a  second  Vietnam. 
By  a  second  Cuba,  I  mean  the  institu- 
tionalization of  another  well-armed  com- 
munist state,  this  time  on  the  mainland, 
supported  by  the  Soviet  Union  and 
working  actively  against  U.S.  interests 
and  friends  in  the  region. 

And  by  a  second  Vietnam,  I  mean  a 
prolonged  conflict  involving  U.S.  combat 
troops  with  no  clear  goal  and  no  end  in 
sight  consistent  with  the  protection  of 
strategic  American  interests. 

It  is  true  that  some  Americans  are 
concerned  with  one  and  not  the  other: 
some  would  risk  another  Vietnam  to 
prevent  another  Cuba,  while  others  are 
so  concerned  with  any  sign  of  a  second 
Vietnam  that  they  ignore  the  threat  of  a 
second  Cuba.  But  the  majority  of  our 
fellow  citizens  seek  and  will  support  a 
policy  which  serves  our  interests  while 
preventing  both  a  new  Cuba  and  a  new 
Vietnam. 

Third,  leadership  must  be  consist- 
ent. The  many  swings  in  the  pendulums 
of  the  partisanship  and  attention  that 
have  taken  place  in  the  past  generation 
have  generated  both  confusion  and 
cynicism.  The  national  interest  is  not  the 
property  of  any  particular  group  or 
issue. 


STANDING  BY  OUR  FRIENDS 

In  applying  these  principles,  Americans 
expect  something  fundamental  of  their 
government:  that  we  stand  firmly  with 
our  friends. 

It  is  in  our  own  interest  to  do  so, 
because  our  friends  are  people  and  na- 
tions who  share  our  principles  and  our 
concerns.  By  that  fundamental  measure, 
the  United  States  has  many  friends  in 
this  hemisphere. 

In  recent  years  the  sheer  number  of 
our  friends  has  multiplied  throughout 
the  hemisphere.  The  people  and  the 
elected  Government  of  Grenada  have 
joined  the  family  of  democracies.  So, 
too,  have  Brazil  and  Argentina  as  well 
as  the  economically  beleaguered  govern- 
ments and  peoples  of  countries  like 
Peru,  Ecuador,  Jamaica,  Bolivia,  and 
Uruguay.  All  these  nations  are  friends 
with  whom  we  can  and  should  stand 
proudly. 

The  people  of  Central  America  are 
also  our  friends.  They  feel  acutely  the 
tension  between  their  democratic  aspira- 
tions and  the  discredited  but  powerful 
extremisms  of  left  and  right.  And  they 
share  an  abiding  concern  with  what  they 


68 


perceive  as  the  ultimate  extremism:  the 
interference  in  their  internal  affairs  by 
the  Sandinistas  and  their  Soviet  and 
Cuban  sponsors. 

Political  polling  in  Costa  Rica,  El 
Salvador,  and  Honduras  has  consistently 
revealed  a  consensus:  that  Nicaragua  is 
a  direct  threat,  that  measures  against 
Nicaragua  must  be  sustained  in  the 
defense  of  the  rest  of  Central  America, 
and  that  the  United  States  is  the  only 
country  capable  of  carrying  off  such  a 
policy. 


THE  LAST  5  YEARS 

How  has  the  United  States  applied  our 
principles?  How  well  have  we  stood  by 
our  friends?  The  recent  past  provides 
mostly  positive  answers. 

The  Struggle  for  Democracy 

When  I  met  with  you  almost  exactly  6 
months  ago  to  discuss  democracy  in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  we 
were  all  struck  by  the  hemisphere-wide 
character  of  progress  toward 
democracy.  That  progress  continues. 
Belize  and  Grenada  have  held 
democratic  elections  and  installed  new 
governments  under  their  parliamentary 
systems.  An  elected  civilian  president 
has  taken  office  in  Panama.  In  Ecuador 
there  has  been  a  peaceful  transition 
from  one  party  to  another.  The  March 
inaugurations  in  Brazil  and  Uruguay  will 
be  milestones  for  those  nations  and  for 
the  hemisphere. 

The  democratic  trend  is  so  wide- 
spread that  the  list  of  countries  that  are 
democratic  or  clearly  moving  toward 
democracy  is  nearly  four  times  as  long 
as  that  of  countries  where  its  impact  has 
been  relatively  limited— in  Chile,  Cuba, 
Guyana,  Haiti,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay, 
and  Suriname.  When  we  look  south 
after  the  Brazilian  inauguration  of 
March  15,  more  of  our  neighbors  will  be 
living  in  countries  with  elected,  civilian 
governments  than  ever  before. 

What  is  happening  is  not  superficial, 
transitory,  or  externally  imposed.  The 
democratic  surge  reflects  a  palpable 
hemispheric  determination  to  establish 
and  protect  governments  responsive  to 
their  own  peoples.  The  depth  of  par- 
ticipation in  increasingly  open  political 
systems  reflects  long-term  develop- 
ment—including the  revolutions  in  com- 
munications and  expectations— and  a 
desire  to  repudiate  violence  and  create  a 
bulwark  against  dictatorships  of  both 
the  left  and  the  right. 

In  Central  America,  our  policy  of 
providing  political,  economic,  and 
military  assistance  to  prodemocratic 
forces  has  proven  effective.  Countries 
torn  by  deep  and  longstanding  political, 


social,  and  ethnic  divisions  have  made 
great  strides.  Our  assistance  has  helpe 
them.  But  the  problems  they  face,  froi 
within  and  without,  are  long  term  and 
systemic.  No  single  treaty,  no  single 
year's  economic  assistance,  no  single 
election  will  bring  peace  and  prosperit 
to  Central  America.  We  must  remain  " 
firm  in  our  support  until  the  transition 
from  virtual  feudalism  and  its 
vulnerabilities  is  complete. 

In  1979,  four  of  the  five  Central 
American  countries  could  crudely  be 
described  as  largely  owned  and  operat 
by  an  economic  oligarchy  employing  a 
military  caste  to  protect  its  interests 
against  the  majority.  Six  years  have  p: 
duced  dramatic  change.  Today,  in  brog 
language,  the  rising  democratic  tide  hi 
swept  away  the  anachronistic  generals 
and  stopped  in  their  tracks  their  wouk 
be  radical  successors  of  the  extreme  le 
Only  Nicaragua  remains  under  a  dic- 
tatorship—having traded  a  tyrant  of  tl 
right  for  a  tyranny  of  the  left.  Only 
Costa  Rica  has  not  changed  politically: 
remains  thoroughly  democratic— thoug 
increasingly  and  justifiably  concerned 
about  the  threat  from  the  new  and  bet 
ter  armed  tyranny  next  door. 

The  evolution  of  Central  America 
can  usefully  be  measured  against  bene 
marks  offered  1  year  ago.  Events  havi 
demonstrated  that  the  report  of  the  N 
tional  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Centi 
America  was  right  in  its  analysis  and 
sound  in  its  recommendations.  In  so 
complex  and  divisive  a  situation,  this 
record  commands  attention. 

El  Salvador  illustrates  the  point,  i 
recently  as  a  year  ago,  many  in  the 
United  States,  in  Western  Europe,  am 
even  in  Latin  America  believed  El 
Salvador  was  caught  in  an  endless  wai 
between  guerrillas  of  the  left  and  deat 
squads  of  the  right.  But  Dr.  Kissinger 
[chairman  of  the  commission]  and  his 
colleagues  insisted  that  electoral 
democracy  and  political  dialogue— not 
externally  imposed  "power-sharing"— 
would  provide  a  workable  foundation  f 
attacking  the  seamless  web  of  political 
economic,  social,  and  security  problem; 
And  what  would  give  democracy,  re- 
form, and  economic  revitalization  a 
fighting  chance,  the  commission  held, 
would  be  the  increased  economic  and 
security  assistance. 

The  year  1984  demonstrated  that 
President  Duarte's  course  was  the  rout 
most  likely  to  lead  to  greater  respect  f( 
human  rights  and  a  better  life.  The 
Salvadorans  themselves  made  the  poini 
writ  large  in  two  rounds  of  national  ele 
tions  last  year.  And  they  did  it  again 
writ  small  when  a  civilian  jury  found 
five  former  National  Guardsmen  guilty 
of  the  murders  of  the  four  American 
churchwomen.  Support  for  this 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


nocratic  renewal  was  backed 
inimously  by  the  bipartisan  commis- 

,  by  President  Reagan,  and  by  a 
irti'san  majority  in  the  Congress,  and 
iiurope  by  Social  Democrats  as  well 
IJhristian  Democrats. 
It  would  be  naive  to  claim  that  all  is 
\!  reformed,  centrist,  and  peaceful  in 
Salvador.  But  the  progress  is 
matic  and  undeniable.  And  U.S.  firm- 
s  on  principles  and  in  behalf  of  our 
vadoran  friends  had  a  lot  to  do 
h  it. 

The  past  year  demonstrated  the  ac- 
acy  of  another  key  commission 
umption:  that  democratic  processes  in 
itral  America  can  be  nurtured  and 
ported  successfully  by  like-minded 
nds  from  other  countries.  Examples, 
ond  change  in  El  Salvador  and  con- 
lity  in  Costa  Rica,  include  the  specific 
•erience  of  growing  democracy  in 
iduras  and  the  first  steps  in 
itemala. 

The  recent  history  of  Guatemala,  as 
;h  as  that  of  El  Salvador,  exemplifies 

dangers  of  basing  policy  judgments 
stereotypes.  The  country  which  tradi- 
iial  wisdom  usually  ranked  as  "the 
5t  polarized"  or  with  the  "least  chance 
lemocratic  development"  has  con- 
nded  the  traditionalists.  The  Consti- 
nt  Assembly  elections  7  months  ago 
■e  not  only  widely  accepted  as  honest 

open,  but— to  the  surprise  of 
iiy— revealed  that  centrist  forces  con- 
late  the  political  majority.  This 
i  larkable  transition  in  Guatemala  is  il- 
3  rated  by  the  positive  November  1984 
( jrt  of  the  special  rapporteur  ap- 
« ited  by  the  UN  Commission  on 
]  nan  Rights,  the  resumption  last  year 
:  lipl(jmatic  relations  with  Spain,  and 
\  new,  deliberately  warmer  personal 
<  tacts  between  chief  of  state  Mejia 
;i   Presidents  Monge  of  Costa  Rica  and 
J  ancur  of  Colombia. 

It  is  encouraging  that  the  Guate- 
r  ans  have  moved  in  these  directions 
I.  ost  exclusively  on  their  own.  A  de- 
» t  respect  for  principle  should  lead  to 
L  ;ronger  link  between  Guatemala  and 
j  United  States  in  the  future. 

Honduras  remains  the  poorest  Cen- 
;i   American  country,  but  its  1982  tran- 
ii  on  to  democratic  government  holds 
;i  e.  There  is  a  free  press.  Trade  unions 
1  e  long  been  and  still  are  an  effective 
:'( je.  Land  distribution  is  relatively 
i  dtable.  Although  still  the  single 
J  ingest  institution,  the  military  has 
y  'er  been  a  praetorian  guard  for  the 
[jvileged,  nor  is  it  repressive.  Presiden- 
ti  elections  will  be  held  later  this  year. 
C  spite  all  this,  Honduras  is  uncertain 
Dut  the  continuity  of  the  U.S.  commit- 
Q  nt  to  help  Hor/duras  defend  itself. 


This  uncertainty  partly  reflects  debates 
in  the  United  States,  but  it  is  tied  direct- 
ly to  what  has  been  happening  in 
Nicaragua. 

In  Nicaragua,  1984  confirmed  dif- 
ferent but  equally  important  Jessons 
from  the  bipartisan  commission's  report. 
The  key  lesson:  that  dictatorship,  no 
matter  the  rhetoric,  leads  to  repression, 
civil  war,  and  foreign  entanglements. 
(That  Ortega  had  himself  "elected"  in 
1984  just  as  Somoza  had  himself 
"elected"  in  1974  only  underscores  the 
point.) 

But  1984  also  confirmed  another 
critical  lesson:  that  the  Sandinistas  can 
change  their  ways  if  the  pressure  to  do 
so  is  clear.  Throughout  1983  and  into 
1984,  a  variety  of  pressures— military 
exercises,  naval  maneuvers,  internal  op- 
position (both  armed  and  unarmed),  fall- 
ing international  prestige— did  produce 


Public  reaction  to  our  participation 
in  the  mission  of  rescue  and  liberation  of 
Grenada  showed  that  the  American  peo- 
ple understand  and  accept  the  judicious 
use  of  force  in  protecting  ourselves  and 
our  friends.  The  mission  itself  revealed 
the  "smoking  gun"  of  Cuban  and  Soviet 
encroachment  in  the  Caribbean  Basin; 
the  15  months  since  then  have  shown 
that  the  United  States  and  its  allies  are 
capable  of  cooperating  in  the  construc- 
tion of  democracy. 

Soviet  military  support  for  dictator- 
ship in  this  hemisphere  is  neither 
hypothetical  nor  limited  to  Cuba. 
Grenada's  New  JEWEL  dictatorship  had 
three  secret  military  agreements  with 
the  U.S.S.R.— and  Soviet-supplied  ar- 
tillery, antiaircraft  weapons,  armored 
personnel  carriers,  and  rocket  launchers 
far  beyond  any  possible  defense  needs. 


In  1979,  four  of  the  five  Central  American 
countries  could  crudely  he  described  as  largely 
owned  and  operated  by  an  economic  oligarchy 
employing  a  military  caste  to  protect  its  interests 
against  the  majority.  Six  years  have  produced 
dramatic  change. 


some  change,  at  least  rhetorically,  in 
Sandinista  behavior.  There  were  re- 
newed promises  of  free  elections  and 
continued  negotiations  within  the  Con- 
tadora  process.  But  then  something  hap- 
pened. 

By  the  end  of  1984,  the  Sandinistas 
were  again  acting  as  if  they  had  no  per- 
suasive reason  to  compromise  with  their 
neighbors,  with  their  own  dissident 
political  forces,  or  with  the  United 
States.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that 
the  Sandinistas  concluded  both  that 
their  opponents'  internal  support  would 
not  be  matched  externally  and  that  they 
themselves  could  propagandize  their  way 
to  "legitimacy"  through  a  sham  election. 
If  those  judgments  hold,  it  would  imply 
a  U.S.  failure  in  terms  of  both  friends 
and  principles. 

In  the  Contadora  process,  the  na- 
tions of  Central  America  have  agreed 
that  for  any  regional  peace  agreement 
to  last,  open  political  systems  must  be 
not  just  an  ideal  or  a  legal  commitment 
but  a  practical  reality.  They  know  that 
their  future  depends  on  working 
together  and  not  allowing  the  pendulum 
to  swing  back— and  on  their  not  allowing 
outside  powers  to  impose  a  new  dic- 
tatorship in  their  midst. 


Between  1981  and  1984,  Soviet 
military  aid  to  Cuba  alone  came  to  more 
than  $2.5  billion.  After  Cuba,  Nicaragua 
is  the  principal  arena  of  Soviet  military 
expansion.  That  country  now  has  over 
300  tanks  and  other  Soviet-bloc  armored 
vehicles.  The  latest  acquisition  was  the 
MI-24  ground  attack  helicopters,  the 
same  weapon  the  Soviets  have  used  so 
successfully  in  Afghanistan. 

Soviet  military  presence  in  the 
Caribbean  Basin  has  escalated 
significantly  in  terms  of  actual  military 
personnel.  In  Cuba  the  Soviets  now  sta- 
tion a  ground  forces  brigade  of  approx- 
imately 2,800  men,  almost  as  many 
military  advisers,  and  additional  forces 
at  the  intelligence  collection  facility  at 
Lourdes  in  a  Havana  suburb.  That  facili- 
ty, targeted  at  monitoring  electronic 
communications  in  the  United  States,  is 
the  most  sophisticated  Soviet  in- 
telligence complex  outside  the  Soviet 
Union  itself. 

Economic  Growth  and  Debt 

Democracy  is  a  problem-solving 
mechanism  whose  fairness  cannot  be 
matched  by  dictatorships  of  the  right  or 


ril1985 


69 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


the  left.  But  a  democracy  incapable  of 
addressing  major  economic  issues  will  be 
no  more  permanent  than  the  dictators  of 
the  right  and  left  that  it  has  replaced. 

Our  neighbors  have  in  large  part 
taken  the  often  painful  steps  necessary 
to  help  end  the  severe  contractions  of 
the  early  1980s.  Real  per  capita  income 
grew  about  0.2%  in  1984— not  much, 
but  better  than  the  decline  of  5.8%  in 
1983  and  3.3%  in  1982.  Vigorous  U.S. 
economic  gi'owth  in  1984  created  new 
export  opportunities.  U.S.  nonpetroleum 
imports  from  the  region  for  the  first  11 
months  of  1984  were  up  19%  over  1983. 
The  trade  balance  for  Latin  America 
with  the  rest  of  the  world  has  improved 
significantly  as  well,  from  a  negative  $2 
billion  in  1981  to  an  estimated  positive 
$37.6  billion  in  1984. 

Structural  adjustments  by  debtor 
countries  have  lowered  government  ex- 
penditures, bringing  them  in  line  with 
government  income;  they  have  restricted 
imports  of  nonessential  goods  to  save 
foreign  exchange;  they  have  adjusted 
their  exchange  rates  to  reflect  economic 
reality  and  breathe  new  life  into  their 
export  sectors;  and  they  have  worked 
with  the  international  financial  com- 
munity to  restructure  their  debts  and 
ensure  continued  orderly  debt  servicing. 
They  have  reallocated  scarce  resources 
even  as  those  resources  fell. 

The  international  financial  communi- 
ty also  made  important  contributions. 
U.S.  bilateral  assistance,  especially  to 
the  Caribbean  Basin  and  including  con- 
cessional food  aid,  expanded  significant- 
ly from  roughly  $1  billion  in  1983  to 
about  $1.4  billion  in  1984,  and  $1.5 
billion  in  1985.  We  remain  ready  to  pro- 
vide official  guarantees  and  insurance 
programs  in  support  of  commercial  bank 


rescheduling;  working  with  the  Congress 
to  prevent  protectionist  measures  from 
inhibiting  Latin  American  access  to  our 
markets;  and  encouraging  Europe  and 
Japan  to  open  markets  to  Latin 
American  goods  and  to  provide  addi- 
tional financial  resources. 

The  Mexican  and  Venezuelan 
multiyear  reschedulings  were  a  positive 
development.  The  second-tier,  or  smaller 
debtor,  countries  must  now  also  deal 
with  their  debt  burdens  in  ways  that 
allow  for  both  orderly  servicing  and 
economic  growth.  The  recent  distur- 
bances in  Jamaica  over  price  increases 
designed  to  limit  the  fiscal  deficit  are  a 
case  in  point.  Riots  in  the  Dominican 
Republic  in  April  1984  led  to  60  deaths 
after  President  Jorge  Blanco  moved  to 
place  the  country's  economy  on  sounder 
footing.  The  problems  of  Bolivia, 
Ecuador,  and  Peru  in  dealing  with  the 
shifting  El  Nino  current  are  additional 
examples. 

The  Central  American  initiative,^ 
building  on  the  recommendations  of  the 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Cen- 
tral America,  links  economic  aid  to 
policy  reform  to  eliminate  root  causes  of 
poverty  and  political  unrest.  Coupled 
with  improved  world  economic  condi- 
tions and  military  and  political  progress, 
this  expanded  assistance  is  having  a  real 
impact.  Discussions  are  underway  with 
recipient  countries  concerning 
macroeconomic  adjustment;  regional 
technical  training  programs  are  due  to 
begin  in  April;  the  revival  and  strength- 
ening of  the  Central  American  Bank  for 
Economic  Integration  is  being  studied; 
and  we  are  working  to  assist  in  the 
revival  of  the  Central  American  Com- 
mon Market.  The  Caribbean  Basin  In- 
itiative is  also  showing  some  positive 
signs. 


There  is  a  natural  marriage  of  convenience  between 
narcotics  traffickers  and  political  terrorists. 


financing  of  U.S.  exports.  Eximbank 
special  facilities  for  Brazil  and  Mexico 
are  in  operation.  And  the  Congress  ap- 
proved the  trade  credit  insurance  pro- 
gram to  promote  trade  finance  lines  in 
Central  America. 

We  have  also  been  instrumental  in 
helping  to  manage  the  immediate  debt 
crisis  by  encouraging  private  lenders  to 
maintain  prudent  involvement  in  lending 
and  rescheduling;  working  with  multi- 
lateral lending  institutions  to  assist  with 
immediate  resource  needs,  necessary 
economic  reforms  and  longer  term 


Narco-Terrorism 

There  is  a  new  awareness  among  the 
countries  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  that  illegal  drug  production 
and  trafficking  are  dangers  to  their  own 
societies. 

Historically,  some  of  these  countries 
have  been  lukewarm  to  joint  efforts  to 
fight  drug  production  and  trafficking. 
They  had  taken  a  position  that  illegal 
drug  activities  were  essentially  a  U.S. 
problem — that  once  our  own  consump- 
tion came  under  control,  the  problem 
would  disappear  in  their  countries.  Some 


even  saw  benefits  to  drug  trafficking  ; 
a  source  of  foreign  exchange. 

This  kind  of  thinking  is  changing. 
Illegal  drug  consumption  has  become  ; 
serious  problem  in  many  Latin  Ameri; 
societies.  As  in  our  country,  the  problf 
is  not  limited  by  social  class  or 
geography;  it  is  pervasive  and  tragic. 

Although  illegal  drugs  have  been 
around  for  a  long  time,  a  new  problen 
the  mutual  reinforcement  between  ille 
drugs  and  politically  motivated  insurgi 
cies  and  terrorists.  There  is  a  natural 
marriage  of  convenience  between  nar- 
cotics traffickers  and  political  terrorist 
Both  operate  in  a  shadowy  underwork 
of  clandestine  and  criminal  activities 
that  leads  readily  to  a  symbiotic  relatii 
ship.  Terrorist  groups  have  been  knos\ 
to  finance  their  operations  through  ac- 
tivities associated  with  drug  traffickin 
as  well  as  bank  robberies  and  kidnap- 
ings. 

In  1982  we  found  that  the  Cubans 
had  been  using  a  Colombian  narcotics 
ring  to  smuggle  both  arms  and  funds  1 
Colombian  M-19  guerrillas.  When  the 
Colombian  Armed  Forces  and  Nationa 
Police  entered  the  town  of  Calamar  in 
February  1984,  they  discovered  that  tl 
guerrilla  Revolutionary  Armed  Forces 
Colombia  had  campesinos  cultivating 
hundreds  of  hectares  of  coca  plants. 
Nicaraguan  officials  have  been  arreste 
in  both  the  United  States  and  Canada 
for  involvement  with  illegal  drugs. 

On  November  1,  1984,  Director 
William  Webster  announced  that  the 
FBI  had  thwarted  a  drug-financed  ploi 
to  assassinate  the  President  of  Hon- 
duras and  overthrow  his  administratio 
The  FBI  confiscated  345  kilos  of  co- 
caine, with  a  wholesale  value  of  $10.3 
million,  that  was  to  be  used  to  finance 
this  plot. 

Even  when  no  direct  links  exist,  n: 
cotics  trafficking  and  political  terrorist 
feed  on  each  other  and  threaten  U.S. 
interests  and  the  basic  fabric  of  demo- 
cratic societies.  They  promote  corrupti 
through  bribes  and  intimidation  and  ca 
undermine  confidence  in  public  institu- 
tions. Drug  runners  and  terrorists  stra 
the  capabilities  of  public  security  agen- 
cies. They  control  territory  and  impose 
their  will  on  an  unconsenting  public. 
And  they  are  backed  up  by  sophisticate 
international  networks. 

The  narcotics  traffickers  have 
become  a  terrorist  threat  in  themselves 
They've  murdered  civilian  drug  eradica 
tion  workers  in  Peru  and  public  official 
from  small-town  judges  to  the  Justice 
Minister  in  Colombia.  They  have 
threatened  to  murder  five  American 
diplomats  for  every  one  of  their  numbe 
extradited  to  the  United  States  from 
Colombia. 


I 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulletl 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


E  YEARS 
MEDIATELY  AHEAD 

linst  this  record,  what  should  we  ex- 
v:t  from  the  future? 

I  Future  of  Democracy 

intend  to  act  coiifidently  and  pur- 
efully  in  this  hemisphere  to  protect 
locracy  where  it  already  exists,  to 
)  consolidate  it  where  it  has  emerged, 

to  foster  it  where  it  is  wanting, 
darity  with  and  support  for 
locracy  throughout  the  hemisphere  is 
damental  to  our  leadership  role.  It  is 
a  glib  slogan.  It  is  sound,  practical 
cy  grounded  in  self-interest.  It  is 
ed  on  a  simple  premise:  democracies 
't  make  war  on  each  other.  They  are 
;er  neighbors,  better  trading  part- 


An  example  of  the  kind  of  support 
democracy  the  United  States  can 
vide  is  in  strengthening  systems  for 
administration  of  justice.  We  are  not 
(T Idling  or  trying  to  impose  the 
Ifiestic  system  we  have  taken  200 
c  rs  to  develop  but  are  providing  con- 
r  e  support  to  the  efforts  for  Latin 
L  ericans  themselves  to  strengthen 
Y  r  own  systems  of  administration  of 
J  ice.  For  instance,  we  are  supporting 
;  "iial  legal  reform  commissions 
■:  lut^-h  which  each  nation  can  assess  its 
'  1  needs  and  priorities,  and  we  are 
U  porting  training  of  Latin  Americans 
1  jatin  America  so  as  to  help  our 
.<  ^hbors  lay  the  foundation  for  long- 
5  n,  stable  democratic  government. 

The  strengthening  of  democracy  is  a 
i  tral  element  of  the  Central  American 
)  iative,  endorsed  and  funded  by  the 
!  igress.  We  are  working  to  help 
( elop  and  implement  programs  to 
I  'ngthen  skills,  infrastructure,  and 
•  ;ual  support  among  democratic  par- 
i ,  groups,  and  leaders  in  the  region. 
i  would  propose,  with  congressional 
I  port,  to  help  stimulate  practical  and 
!  cific  democratic  activiuies  as  a  con- 
I  ent  part  of  our  relations  throughout 
hemisphere. 

To  help  democrats  be  competitive  in 
political  marketplace.  President 
igan  announced  to  the  British  Parlia- 
Qt  on  June  8,  1982,  that  the  United 
tes  would  make  a  major  effort  to 
0  "foster  the  infrastructure  of 
nocracy"  around  the  world.  Since  that 
e,  both  governmental  and  nongovern- 
ntal  efforts  to  strengthen  democratic 
nds  abroad  have  increased  steadily. 
The  National  Endowment  for 
mocracy  and  the  four  democracy  in- 
utes  of  the  U.S.  Chamber  of  Com- 
rce,  the  AFL-CIO,  and  the 
publican  and  Democratic  parties  have 


undertaken  many  new  Latin  American 
initiatives.  For  example,  the  AFL-CIO's 
Free  Trade  Union  Institute  has  assisted 
a  democratic  union  in  Chile  whose 
development  has  been  severely  curbed 
by  government  restrictions  and  threat- 
ened by  communist-subsidized  rivals. 
The  American  Chamber  of  Commerce's 
Center  for  International  Private  Enter- 
prise has  funded  a  project  of  the  In- 
stituto  Lihertad  y  Democracia  in  Peru  to 
develop  a  new  legal  framework  for  the 
economic  activity  of  those  who  have  had 
to  resort  to  the  informal  economy  due  to 
archaic  and  burdensome  bureaucratic 
redtape.  Such  activities,  like  those  of  the 
Republican  and  Democratic  institutes, 
dovetail  with  U.S.  Government  pro- 
grams funded  through  the  Agency  for 
International  Development  and  the  U.S. 
Information  Agency. 

In  Chile  our  objective  is  to  work  to 
promote  the  restoration  of  democracy  by 
encouraging  dialogue  between  the  pro- 
transition  forces  within  the  government 
and  the  pronegotiation  forces  in  the  op- 
position. The  question  for  us  is  how  we 
can  best  encourage  a  process  which 
Chileans  themselves  must  bring  to  frui- 
tion. In  this  context  we  have  to  ask 
whether  our  actions  retard  or  promote 
this  process. 

The  political  transition  in  Chile  faces 
several  obstacles.  The  government  has 
so  far  failed  to  follow  through  on  its 
own  transition  commitments;  the 
political  opposition  has  not  yet  reached 
agreement  between  its  various  members 
on  a  clear  basis  for  talks  with  the 
military;  and  the  communists  are  not  in- 
terested in  compromise. 

The  difficulties  inherent  in  any  tran- 
sition effort  magnify  what  may  sound 
like  a  truism— there  are  no  single-issue 
solutions.  We  cannot  guarantee  to  the 
Congress  that  we  can  ensure  a  neat 
transition  process  in  Chile.  We  can  only 
guarantee  that  our  policy  is  committed 
to  doing  whatever  is  necessary  to  help 
the  Chileans  themselves  take  the  steps 
to  resolve  the  issues  that  will  foster 
dialogue  leading  to  the  reestablishment 
of  democracy. 

Although  the  changes  from  military 
to  democratic  governments  get  the 
headlines,  the  cases  of  renewal  and  con- 
solidation of  democratic  governments 
are  just  as  significant.  The  August  1984 
inauguration  of  Leon  Febres  Cordero  as 
President  marked  the  first  electoral 
transition  in  24  years  in  Ecuador  from 
one  democratic  government  to  another. 
Peru  and  Bolivia  are  preparing  for  elec- 
tions, in  April  and  June,  respectively,  to 
continue  elected  democratic  government, 
to  face  the  challenges  of  economic 
strains,  political  extremism,  and  nar- 
cotics trafficking.  We  and  the  other 
democracies  of  the  hemisphere  will 
stand  by  them. 


Economic  Policy 

For  Central  America,  the  remaining 
recommendations  of  the  bipartisan  com- 
mission must  be  heeded.  Peace  and 
economic  development  in  Central 
America  require  both  the  reliability  of 
multiyear  funding  and  the  confidence 
that  this  long-term  commitment  will  con- 
tinue to  be  tied  to  equity,  reform,  and 
freedom.  Bipartisan  support  is  essential 
if  the  Central  America  initiative  is  to  ad- 
dress the  commission's  call  for  a  commit- 
ment through  1989  to  provide- 
predictably— a  balanced  and  mutually 
reinforcing  mix  of  economic,  political, 
diplomatic,  and  security  activities. 

In  the  1960s,  the  impetus  for  high 
rates  of  growth  came  from  a  liberaliza- 
tion and  expansion  of  world  trade  and 
financial  systems.  Domestic  savings  and 
investment  provided  the  major  portion 
of  total  investment,  but  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  also  provided  significant  exter- 
nal resources.  Official  assistance  from  all 
sources  and  foreign  direct  investment  in 
the  region  provided  about  80%  of  net 
capital  inflows.  Commercial  loans  were 
not  a  major  factor. 

In  the  mid-1970s,  in  contrast, 
private  bank  financing  was  the  major 
source  of  external  capital  for  develop- 
ment. Banks  had  cash  to  lend,  and  bor- 
rowing grew  from  about  $75  billion  in 
1974  to  $336  billion  in  1983-an  increase 
of  about  20%  a  year. 

The  1980s  require  a  new  formula. 
There  simply  are  not  enough  funds  in 
the  financial  system  to  support  borrow- 
ing at  these  levels— even  if  lenders  re- 
mained willing  to  lend  and  borrowers 
willing  to  borrow.  For  debt  equity  to 
support  even  5%  growth  per  year, 
capital  inflows  of  some  $47  billion  a  year 
would  be  required.  And  although  we 
have  increased  our  bilateral  aid  in  recent 
years,  it  is  clear  that  foreign  assistance 
cannot  be  an  effective  basis  for  sus- 
tained growth. 

Investment  and  exports— the 
engines  of  growth  of  the  modern 
economy— must  drive  the  renewal  of 
growth.  Investment  brings  with  it 
technology,  training,  managerial  skill, 
and  access  to  markets.  As  stated  above, 
Latin  American  and  Caribbean  govern- 
ments are  beginning  to  make  the  struc- 
tural changes  needed  to  encourage  in- 
vestment and  move  away  from  inef- 
ficient statist  development  models.  They 
are  coming  to  realize  that  inward- 
looking  development  strategies  provide 
only  limited  potential  for  economic 
growth  and  that  a  good  climate  for 
domestic  entrepreneurs  will  also  attract 
foreign  investment.  The  global 
marketplace  holds  the  key  to  economic 
success,  national  development,  and  the 
basis  for  a  better  standard  of  living  for 
all.  Both  domestic  and  foreign  investors 


ril1985 


71 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


must  know  the  rules  of  the  game— which 
should  be  equitable,  clear,  and  applied 
consistently. 

Ecuador  is  one  country  taking  a 
free-market  approach  to  encourage 
domestic  entrepreneurs  and  foreign  in- 
vestors. As  a  major  step  to  attract  in- 
vestment, the  Febres-Cordero  govern- 
ment has  become  the  first  Andean  Pact 
state  to  reach  an  agreement  with  the 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tion which  will  serve  to  attract  the  new 
capital  so  essential  to  future  develop- 
ment. 

It  is  clearly  in  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  that  these  trends  con- 
tinue. We  will  continue  to  work  with  the 
international  financial  institutions  in 
lending  and  rescheduling  and  with  the 
multilateral  lending  institutions  to  assist 
with  immediate  resource  needs.  And  we 
are  growing  ourselves,  providing 
markets  for  foreign  products  and 
building  the  base  for  world  economic 
recovery.  The  U.S.  market  remains  the 
most  open  in  the  world  and  continues  to 
offer  substantial  opportunities  for  the 
region's  exports.  We  must  remain  firm 
in  our  commitment  to  keep  our  markets 
open,  our  tariff  barriers  modest,  and  our 
economic  assistance  flexible  and 
available  to  those  who  need  it  most. 

We  must,  for  example,  do  all  we  can 
to  foster  the  entry  of  the  small  pro- 
ducers into  the  international  market- 
place. The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  is 
a  major  step  in  this  direction.  What  is 
often  a  marginal  or  incremental  increase 
in  import  market  share  to  us  is  a  major 
part  of  their  gross  domestic  product. 

The  War  Against  Narco-Terrorism 

International  cooperation  led  to  the  con- 
trol of  air  piracy;  international  coopera- 
tion will  ultimately  conquer  illegal  nar- 
cotics. We  view  the  anarchy  fostered  by 
the  narco-terrorists  with  the  same 
seriousness  as  we  view  other  interna- 
tional threats  to  our  society  and  will 
react  with  equal  vigor.  Our  friends  are 
becoming  equally  resolute.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  work  with  them  until  the 
menace  of  illicit  drug  trafficking  is  over- 
come. 

The  recent  extradition  by  Colombia 
of  suspected  drug  traffickers  demon- 
strates courage  of  the  kind  required  to 
cooperate  effectively.  Mexico  has  been 
having  success  in  aerial  spraying  pro- 
grams against  poppy  and  marijuana 
crops.  Bolivia  and  Peru  have  initiated 
eradication  programs  in  areas  which 
were  previously  virtually  controlled  by 
narcotics  producers,  for  example,  the^ 
coca-producing  Chapare  region  and  the 
Upper  Huailaga  Valley.  We  expect  that 
active  testing  in  cooperation  with  the 
Colombian  Government  will  lead  to  the 


72 


discovery  of  an  effective  and  ecologically 
safe  herbicide  for  aerial  eradication  of 
coca  fields. 


WILL  NICARAGUA  CHANGE? 

The  lessons  from  the  recent  past  and  the 
guidelines  for  the  near  future  can  be 
condensed  into  an  assertion  and  a  warn- 
ing: the  skeptics  were  wrong  about  El 
Salvador,  they  were  wrong  about 
Grenada,  and  they  are  wrong  about 
Nicaragua — and  all  for  the  same 
reasons. 

There  is  one  issue,  however,  on 
which  considerable  controversy  still 
reigns:  Nicaragua.  On  that  issue,  as  on 
others,  we  must  be  realistic.  Realism 
means  standing  firmly  on  principles  and 
with  our  friends.  And  it  also  means 
understanding  how  to  go  about  it  in  the 
real  world — where  clear  alternatives  and 
easy  choices  are  as  rare  as  practicing 
democrats  among  the  comandarttes. 

Both  our  committee  and  our  in- 
terests can  best  be  served  by  the  conclu- 
sion of  a  workable,  comprehensive,  and 
fully  verifiable  regional  agreement  based 
solidly  on  the  21  objectives  the  Con- 
tadora  process  has  set  for  itself.  Our 
diplomacy  must  continue  to  support  that 
outcome. 

On  behalf  of  the  Contadora  coun- 
tries, Mexico  suggested  that  we  initiate 
direct  talks  with  the  Sandinistas. 
Secretary  Shultz  traveled  to  Managua 
last  June  to  propose  such  talks,  making 
clear  publicly  and  privately  to  Daniel 
Ortega  that  our  purpose  was  to  support 
and  facilitate  the  Contadora  process.  As 
a  result  of  the  Secretary's  initiative,  nine 
meetings  have  now  been  held  between 
special  envoy  Shlaudeman  and 
Nicaraguan  Vice  Minister  Tinoco.  These 
have  been  useful  in  permitting  each  side 
to  present  its  concerns,  hut  they  have 
made  no  substantive  progress.  In 
February,  a  new  and  most  important 
round  of  negotiations  is  to  begin  in  the 
Contadora  process.  With  that  in  view, 
and  in  order  to  avoid  any  impression 
that  the  Manzanillo  talks  could  in  any 
way  replace  or  interfere  with  those 
critical  multilateral  negotiations,  we 
decided  to  hold  off  on  any  further 
bilateral  meetings  with  the  Sandinistas 
pending  the  results  of  the  next  Con- 
tadora session. 

There  is  nothing  mysterious  about 
diplomatic  negotiations.  Commonsense 
rules  apply  as  much  to  the  multilateral 
Contadora  talks  on  Central  America  as, 
for  example,  to  a  labor-management 
dispute  in  the  United  States.  But  many 
have  not  applied  common  sense.  When  it 
comes  to  Central  America,  some  take  at 
face  value  things  they  would  never  ac- 
cept at  home. 


First,  in  any  negotiation,  the  agem 
has  to  have  something  in  it  for  each 
side.  Otherwise,  why  negotiate?  Fidel 
Castro,  for  example,  often  says  "let's 
negotiate,"  but  it  always  turns  out  thai 
the  only  important  item  he  wants  on  tl 
agenda  is  the  U.S.  economic  boycott 
anything  we  might  want— as  eliminatic 
of  Cuban  support  for  guerrillas— he  re- 
jects. In  the  first  years  of  their  rule,  tl 
Sandinistas  obviously  saw  no  advantag 
in  "negotiating  away"  their  support  for 
Salvadoran  and  other  guerrillas  or  thei 
military  buildup  and  ties  to  the  U. S.S.I 
and  Cuba.  They  took  our  money  but 
ignored  attempts  to  discuss  our  con- 
cerns. But  by  1983  they  had  an  incen- 
tive. The  strength  of  their  internal 
democratic  resistance,  armed  and 
unarmed,  their  neighbors'  military  exei 
cises  with  the  United  States,  and  their 
own  plummetting  international  prestig 
gave  the  Sandinistas  something  to 
bargain  for.  That's  when  Contadora 
started  rolling. 

Second,  nobody  bargains  for 
something  he  expects  to  get  free.  If  th 
Nicaraguans  in  the  armed  resistance  a 
abandoned,  why  should  the  Sandinistas 
negotiate  with  "them?  If  the  World  Cou 
makes  decisions  without  considering  t^ 
concerns  of  other  Central  Americans, 
why  should  Nicaragua  compromise  wit 
its  neighbors? 

Third,  pressure  outside  the  formal 
negotiation  is  a  normal  part  of  the  pro. 
ess.  What  some  call  "coercive  diplomac 
has  been  part  of  history  since  the  first 
diplomats  and  the  first  soldiers.  Peopk 
and  nations  do  not  move  to  the 
negotiating  table  simply  because  it's  a 
nice  piece  of  furniture.  If  anyone  know 
of  a  more  effective  way  to  create  a 
bargaining  situation  with  the  San- 
dinistas, let  us  know. 

Fourth,  it  takes  at  least  two  to 
negotiate.  If  one  side  practices  the 
theory  that  "what's  mine  is  mine,  what 
yours  is  negotiable,"  then  the  parties 
might  as  well  be  1,000  miles  apart 
rather  than  sitting  around  a  green  felt 
table— whether  in  Geneva,  or  Contador 
or  Manzanillo.  An  announcement  by  or 
party  that  one  of  several  contending 
texts  "must"  be  signed  immediately 
without  further  conversation  is  a 
declaration  of  unwillingness  to  negotiat 
further. 

Fifth,  balance  must  be  maintained. 
If  one  side  gets  what  it  wants  first,  it 
will  lose  its  incentive  to  compromise. 
That's  like  a  labor  union  agreeing  to 
postpone  consideration  of  pay  raises 
without  first  trying  to  get  them.  Or  the 
September  7  draft  for  a  Contadora  ack 
which  would  have  satisfied  Nicaragua's 
basic  demands  but  left  issues  fundamen 
tal  to  others  for  "future"  discussion. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Sixth,  what  negotiators  say  publicly 
irt  of  the  negotiating  process, 
iiragua's  statement  that  it  was  ready 
1  ign  the  September  7  draft  acta  "as 
vas  a  transparent  ploy  aimed  at 
-:tmg  the  balancing  changes  sure  to 
isisted  upon  by  the  other  par- 
laiits.  To  see  why,  just  carefully  read 
iitiinetable  and  ground  rules  under 
li'h  the  draft  acta  was  tabled. 
Seventh,  an  unenforceable, 
■nfiable  agreement  is  worse  than  no 
"•einent  at  all.  A  mere  announcement 
'  uiherence"  or  a  signature  mean 
iiii<4  without  a  means  to  ensure  com- 
I  ii\'.  And  if  an  agreement  fails,  a 
utum  will  become  even  more  difficult. 
Eighth,  what  is  important  is  the 

•  tiral  end  result.  Not  the  fact  of  a 

•  iiionial  meeting  or  a  framable  docu- 
it,  not  self-satisfying  statements  to 
press,  but  whether  or  not  the  "deal" 
ly  does  bring  results— whether 

ler  wages  for  workers  in  the  local 

t  or  peace  to  Central  America. 

And,  finally,  if  pressure  and 
i  jtiations  fail  and  the  problem  con- 
nes— as  is  possible,  if  not  necessarily 
cy,  in  the  case  of  Nicaragua's  San- 
1  ^t;is— then  the  alternatives  will  sure- 

'  less  desirable  and  far  more  expen- 
V.  Let  us  be  specific: 

•  The  Sandinistas  have  global  ties 

I  plans  for  Nicaragua  and  the  rest  of 
F  tral  America  that  are  contrary  to 

.    interests; 

•  They  will  not  modify  or  bargain 

r,  their  position  unless  there  is  some 
( ntive  for  them  to  do  so; 

•  The  only  incentive  that  has  proved 
:  :tive  thus  far  has  been  opposition 

I I  other  Nicaraguans  (remember 

1 1  happened  after  the  1980  emergen- 
r  applemental  for  Nicaraguan 
I  nstruction?); 

•  If  pressure  is  taken  away,  the 

E  Jinistas  will  have  no  reason  to  com- 
"  nise; 

•  If  the  Sandinistas  have  no  reason 
I  Dmpromise,  Contadora  will  surely 

t  and 

•  If  Contadora  fails,  the  long-run 
)  s  to  the  United  States  in  terms  of 
1  ley  and  lives  will  be  much  greater. 

The  perceived  U.S.  relationship  to 
I  Nicaraguans  who  have  taken  up 
r  s  against  those  who  cheated  them  of 
I  goals  of  their  revolution  against 
( loza  has  been  controversial. 
;  vever,  the  fact  that  the  Nicaraguan 
r  ed  resistance  has  been  able  to  sus- 
i ,  and  in  some  respects  even  increase, 
1  )perations  in  recent  months  reflects 
I  mbstantial  indigenous  as  well  as 
liispheric  support.  Realistically,  part 
(he  debate  over  the  future  should 
Us  on  what  Nicaragua  would  be  like 
nout  pressure  from  the  armed  opposi- 


tion, which,  short  of  changes  in  San- 
dinista  behavior,  is  the  only  internal 
obstacle  to  consolidation  of  an 
undemocratic  regime  at  home  providing 
military  support  to  Marxist  revolutions 
throughout  Central  America. 

U.S.  policies  also  must  consider  the 
consequences  of  any  failure  to  induce 
the  Sandinista  government  to  allow 
political  pluralism.  Contrary  to  their 
own  pronouncements,  the  Sandinistas 
may  be  content  to  be  left  alone  to  build 
Marxism  in  one  country.  But  the  burden 
of  proof  should  lie  on  those  who  pro- 
claim that  the  Sandinistas  are  interested 
in  doing  their  thing  totally  within 
Nicaragua.  Neither  the  Cuban  precedent 
nor  the  Sandinistas'  behavior  to  date  fit 
that  proposition.  And  if  a  long-term 
policy  of  containment  were  to  become 
necessary,  both  the  United  States  and 
its  friends  in  Central  America  would  pay 
the  price— in  resources  dearly  needed 
for  other  purposes. 

Nicaragua's  democratic  resistance 
deserves  the  solidarity  of  the  West  no 
less— some  would  say  more,  because  of 
the  imperative  of  proximity— than  the 
Afghan  rebels  or  the  Polish  Solidarity 
movement.  Shall  we  always  wring  our 
hands  when  a  country  suffers  from 
Soviet  or  Marxist  dictatorship  but  fail  to 
help  those  who  resist  it? 

The  identity  of  the  resistance 
fighters  has  been  clouded  by  Sandinista 
propaganda  denunciations  of  them  as 
mercenaries  and  mostly  former  National 
Guardsmen  who  remain  loyal  to  Somoza. 
In  fact,  all  you  have  to  do  is  count  the 
numbers;  there  are  far  more  resistance 
fighters  than  there  ever  were  members 
of  the  National  Guard,  even  at  its  peak 
in  Somoza's  last  days.  The  freedom 
fighters  are  peasants,  farmers, 
shopkeepers,  and  vendors.  Their  leaders 
are  without  exception  men  who  opposed 
Somoza.  And  what  unites  them  to  each 
other  and  to  the  thousands  of  Nica- 
raguans who  resist  without  arms  is 
disillusionment  with  Sandinista  abuse, 
corruption,  and  fanaticism.  The  myth 
that  if  Somoza  was  bad  the  Sandinistas 
have  to  be  good  was  exploded  long  ago 
for  most  Nicaraguans. 

Let  us  be  clear:  it  is  partly  because 
our  adversaries  are  intervening  on 
behalf  of  totalitarianism  in  Central 
America  that  so  many  of  our  friends  are 
involved  in  active  opposition  to  dictator- 
ship. The  Nicaraguan  resistance  was 
labeled  "contras"  by  the  people  who 
wanted  to  deny  them  legitimacy.  But  the 
historical  fact  is  that  they  are  more  "for" 
than  "against":  they  are  for  democracy, 
for  national  independence,  and  for  the 
original  promises  of  the  anti-Somoza 
revolution.  What  they  are  against  is  the 
subverters  of  those  ideals.  The 


Nicaraguan  democratic  resistance  clearly 
has  a  principled  claim  on  our  support. 
These  are  friends  who  merit  our  stand- 
ing with  them— and,  indeed,  can  be 
frustrated  if  they  are  denied  our  help. 


THE  BOTTOM  LINE 

Throughout  the  hemisphere,  the  bottom 
line  is  real  improvements  over  time 
in  economic  well-being  and  human 
freedom,  not  short-cut  (and  invariably 
short-lasting)  solutions,  headlines, 
dramatic  pronouncements,  and  "single- 
issue"  politics.  The  bottom  line  is  effec- 
tive action  against  the  real  dangers  of 
Cuban/Soviet  encroachments,  Nicara- 
guan regional  aggression,  economic  col- 
lapse, and  narco-terrorism,  not  postur- 
ing to  make  ourselves  feel  good. 

What  the  Administration  and  the 
Congress  have  learned  together  in  the 
past  provides  a  mandate  for  the  future. 
The  Administration  cannot  fulfill  that 
mandate  without  the  active  support  of 
the  Congress.  If  you  and  we  do  not 
stand  firmly  on  principle  and  with  our 
friends,  we  will  both  lose.  A  lack  of 
policy  consistency  would  be  a  significant 
obstacle  to  achieving  our  national  objec- 
tives in  this  region  over  the  next  months 
and  years. 

But  that  is  one  obstacle  we  here 
have  the  power  to  overcome.  We  have  a 
responsibility  to  stick  with  the  poUcies 
that  have  worked  or  begun  to  work. 
None  of  the  alternatives  would  ultimate- 
ly serve  U.S.  interests.  Quick  fixes,  pull- 
ing back  from  the  fray,  or  hoping  for 
diplomatic  miracles  are  not  responsible 
options.  And  direct  military  action  would 
be  a  sign  of  failure.  But  if  we  stand 
together,  firmly,  predictably,  and 
realistically  defending  our  principles  and 
our  friends,  and  do  so  in  the  steadfast 
manner  the  problems  require,  then  we 
can  prevail. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

'Central  American  Democracy,  Peace, 
and  Development  Initiative,  also  known  as 
the  Jackson  plan.  ■ 


» I1 1985 


73 


END  NOTES 


February  1985 


The  following  are  some  of  the  signifi- 
cant official  U.S.  foreign  policy  actions  and 
statements  during  the  month  that  are  not 
reported  elsewhere  in  this  periodical. 

February  1 

President  Reagan  meets  with  Brazil's  presi- 
dent-elect, Tancredo  Neves. 

February  2 

A  bomb  explodes  in  an  Athens  bar  near  the 
U.S.  air  base  at  Hellenikon  wounding  57 
Americans,  mostly  U.S.  service  personnel. 
Thirteen  injured  Americans  are  evacuated  to 
U.S.  military  hospitals  in  West  Germany. 

February  4-5 

New  Zealand  denies  port  access  to  the 
U.S.S.  Buckanan  because  the  U.S.  will  not 
say  whether  it  carries  nuclear  armaments. 
The  destroyer  was  scheduled  to  participate  in 
the  ANZUS  alliance  exercise  Sea  Eagle.  On 
Feb.  5,  the  U.S.  announces  its  withdrawal 
from  the  exercises;  Australia,  the  host  coun- 
try, cancels  the  exercise. 

February  4 

President  Reagan  meets  with  Chief 
Buthelezi,  Chief-Minister  of  Kwazulu,  to 
discuss  the  situation  in  South  Africa. 

February  5 

U.S.  and  Soviet  environmental  scientists 
meet  in  Washington  to  sign  a  protocol  calling 
for  scientific  cooperation  in  climate  research. 

February  7 

Enrique  Camarena,  a  U.S.  Drug  Enforce- 
ment Administration  official,  is  kidnapped  in 
Guadalajara. 

U.S.  and  Laos  agree  to  a  joint  excavation 
of  the  crash  site  of  a  C-130  aircraft  shot 
down  in  Dec.  1972  over  southern  Laos. 

Vietnam  offers  to  return  to  the  U.S. 
what  they  believe  to  be  the  remains  of  five 
missing  Americans. 

The  U.S.  abstains  in  a  vote  on  a  proposed 
$130  million  industrial  loan  to  Chile  by  the 
Inter-American  Development  Bank. 

February  8 

South  Korean  opposition  figure  Kim  Dae 
Jung  returns  to  Seoul  accompanied  by  a  U.S. 
delegation.  Upon  arrival,  members  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  are  roughed  up  by  Korean 
security  personnel  and  Mr.  Kim  is  placed 
under  house  arrest.  The  U.S.  makes  a  formal 
protest  deploring  the  incident  concerning  the 
improper  treatment  of  U.S.  delegation 
members. 


February  10-22 

U.S.  and  Laos  officials  working  on  a  joint  ex- 
cavation of  the  C-130  aircraft  crash  site 
recover  partial  remains  of  bodies.  The  U.S. 
team  returns  with  the  remains  for  further 
identification  on  Feb.  22. 

February  11 

State  Department  announces  the  appoint- 
ment by  Secretary  Shultz  of  a  reform  obser- 
vation panel  to  assess  and  report  on  the 
UNESCO  reform  process  and  to  encourage 
reform  efforts  that  advance  continuing  U.S. 
interests.  The  10-member  panel  will  be  head- 
ed by  Leonard  Marks,  former  director  of 
USIA. 

February  13 

Soviet  Ambassador  Dobrynin  meets  with 
Secretary  Shultz  at  the  State  Department. 

The  State  Department  issues  its  1984 
Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices, 

LI.S.  withdraws  from  the  International 
Dairy  Arrangement  due  to  some  members 
undercutting  the  arrangement's  minimum 
prices  for  dairy  exports. 

February  14-15 

Jeremy  Levin,  Beirut  bureau  chief  for  Cable 
News  Network,  escapes  from  his  captors  and 
is  taken  into  custody  by  Syrian  troops  at  a 
military  checkpoint  in  Baalbek.  Mr.  Levin 
was  kidnapped  on  Mar.  7,  1984,  by  a  group 
calling  itself  the  Islamic  Jihad. 

On  Feb.  15,  Mr.  Levin  is  taken  to  the 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Damascus.  He  then  flies  to 
Frankfurt,  West  Germany,  for  a  medical  ex- 
amination and  a  reunion  with  his  wife  and 
family. 

February  15 

Spain  expels  two  U.S.  diplomats  on  charges 
of  spying. 

February  16-20 

A.ssistant  Secretary  Motley  travels  to  Chile 
to  review  the  current  state  of  L'.S. -Chilean 
relations  and  to  convey  U.S.  views  on  a  range 
of  issues  of  mutual  concern.  On  Feb.  18,  he 
meets  with  President  Pinochet  to  discuss  the 
Reagan  Administration's  desire  for  a  return 
to  democracy  in  Chile. 

February  16 

U.S.  cancels  a  second  set  of  military  exer- 
cises with  New  Zealand  scheduled  for  Feb.  28 
near  Hawaii. 

February  19-20 

U.S.  and  Soviet  Union  delegations  meet  in 
Vienna  to  discuss  Middle  East  issues  in- 
cluding Afghanistan,  the  Iran-Iraq  war, 
southern  Lebanon,  and  Arab-Israeli  relations. 
Assistant  Secretary  Murphy  heads  the  U.S. 
delegation. 


February  20-22 

Moroccan  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Filal 
meets  with  Secretary  Shultz  on  Feb.  21  an 
President  Reagan  on  Feb.  22  at  the  requesl] 
of  King  Hassan. 

February  20 

British  Prime  Minister  Thatcher  endorses 
President  Reagan's  Strategic  Defense  Ini- 
tiative while  addressing  a  joint  meeting  of 
Congress. 

February  21 

The  South  Korean  Government,  respondini 
to  a  U.S.  diplomatic  note  of  Feb.  8,  expres 
regret  over  the  airport  incident  in  which 
Korean  police  used  force  against  two  U.S. 
Congressmen  and  other  U.S.  delegates. 

February  24-March  7 

Assistant  Secretary  Wolfowitz  visits  China 
(Feb.  24-28)  to  discuss  bilateral  relations 
with  officials.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  later  visits  In 
donesia  (Feb.  28-Mar.  4)  and  Malaysia 
(Mar.  4-6)  for  similar  talks  with  officials  ol 
those  countries. 

February  25 

Poland  expels  Colonel  Frederick  Myer  (a 
military  attache)  and  his  wife  for  taking 
photographs  in  a  restricted  military  zone.  1 
protest  of  reported  mistreatment  to  the 
American  couple  while  in  custody,  the  I  '.S 
expels  Polish  military  attache  Colonel 
Zygmunt  Szymanski  and  postpones  talks  o 
science  and  technology  agreement  with 
Poland  scheduled  for  Feb.  26-28. 

February  26 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Brown  meets 
with  New  Zealand  Prime  Minister  Lange  ii 
Los  Angeles. 

February  27 

State  Department  releases  its  Report  on  tl 
Situation  in  El  Salvador  for  the  period  Det 
1,  1984-Jan.  31,  1985. 

February  28  March  3 

En  route  to  Montevideo,  Secretary  Shultz 
stops  in  Guayaquil  to  meet  with  Ecuadorai 
President  Febres-Cordero  (Feb.  28).  On  M; 
1-2,  Secretary  Shultz  heads  the  U.S.  deleg 
tion  to  the  inauguration  of  Julio  Maria 
Sanguinette  as  President  of  Uruguay.  The 
Secretary  returns  to  Washington  on 
Mar.  3.  ■ 


74 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


lEATIES 


rrent  Actions 


.TILATERAL 

tion 

ention  on  international  civil  aviation. 
:  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
Apr.  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591.  Protocol  on 
uthentic  trilinj^al  text  of  the  convention 
ternational  civil  aviation  (TIAS  1591), 
annex.  Done  at  Buenos  Aires  Sept.  24, 
.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  24,  1968.  TIAS 

■rences  deposited:  Comoros,  Jan.  14, 

ention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts 
nitted  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo 

14,  1963.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  4, 

TIAS  6768. 
ssions  deposited:  Haiti,  Apr.  26,  1984; 
■u.  May  17,  1984. 


national  coffee  agreement,  1983,  with 
xes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
red  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1,  1983. 
ssion  deposited:  Cuba,  Feb.  19,  1985. 

eries 

national  convention  for  the  conservation 
.lantic  tunas.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 
14,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  21, 
.  TIAS  6767. 
ication  deposited:  Venezuela,  Nov.  17, 

rences  deposited:  Sao  Tome  and 

:ipe,  Sept.  15,  1983;  Uruguay,  Mar.  16, 


Lines 

national  convention  on  load  lines,  1966. 
at  London  Apr.  5,  1966.  Entered  into 
July  21,  1968.  TIAS  6331,  6629. 

■ssions  deposited;  Cameroon,  May  14, 
Djibouti,  Mar.  1,  1984. 

itorial  application;  Extended  by  the 

•'.d  Kingdom  to  the  Isle  of  Man,  Oct.  19, 


1  iiiments  to  the  international  convention 
:i(l  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331).  Adopted  at 

1  nn  Oct.  12,  1971.' 
iii.Mices  deposited;  Bulgaria,  Nov.  2, 

; ,  Peru,  June  7,  1984;  United  Arab 
1  ates,  Mar.  15,  1984. 

1  idments  to  the  international  convention 
ad  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331).  Adopted  at 

Nov.  12,  1975.1 

I 'lances  deposited:  Bulgaria,  Nov.  2, 

; ;  Peru,  June  7,  1984;  United  Arab 

rates.  Mar.  15,  1984. 

1  ndments  to  the  international  convention 
ail  Imes,  1966  (TIAS  6331).  Adopted  at 

>l<iii  Nov.  15,  1979.1 
ptances  deposited:  Brazil,  Aug.  15, 
;  Cyprus,  Sept.  3,  1984;  Peru,  June  7, 
;  United  Arab  Emirates,  Mar.  15,  1984. 


Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  on  the  establishment 
of  an  international  fund  for  compensation  for 
oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 
Dec.  18,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  16, 
1978.2 

Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  May  14, 
1984;  United  Arab  Emirates,  Dec.  15,  1983. 
Territorial  application;  Extended  by  the 
United  Kingdom  to  Anguilla,  Sept.  1,  1984. 

International  convention  on  civil  liability  for 
oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 
Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 
1975." 

Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  May  14, 
1984;  United  Arab  Emirates,  Dec.  15,  1983. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
United  Kingdom  to  Anguilla  Sept.  1,  1984. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  2,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited;  Spain,  July  6, 
1984.3 

Accessions  deposited:  Belgium,  Mar.  6, 
1984;^-'  Bulgaria,  Dec.  12.  1984;-'-'' 
Czechoslovakia,  July  2,  1984;  German  Dem. 
Rep.,  Apr.  25,  1984;  Hungary,  Jan.  14,  1985; 
Korea,  Rep.  of,  July  23,  1984;3  Oman,  Mar. 
13,  1984;=  South  Africa,  Nov.  28,  1984.^ 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  international  Maritime 

Organization.  Signed  at  Geneva  Mar.  6.  1948. 

Entered  into  force  Mar.  17,  1958.  TIAS 

4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Brunei,  Dec.  31,  1984. 

International  convention  on  standards  of 
training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping  for 
seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984.-' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Australia,  Nov.  7, 
1983;  Finland,  Jan.  27,  1984;  Ireland,  Sept. 
11,  1984. 
Approval  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  Nov.  5, 

1984. 

Accessions  deposited:  Bahamas,  June  7,  1983; 
Brazil,  Jan.  17,  1984;  India,  Nov.  16,  1984; 
Libya,  Aug.  10,  1983;  Nigeria,  Nov.  13,  1984; 
Philippines,  Feb.  22,  1984;  South  Africa. 
July  27,  1983;  United  Arab  Emirates, 
Dec.  15,  1983. 

Red  Cross 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  the  wounded  and  sick  in  armed 
forces  in  the  field.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12, 
1949.  Entered  into  force  Oct  21,  1950;  for 
the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3362. 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  the  wounded,  sick,  and  ship- 
wrecked members  of  armed  forces  at  sea. 
Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  2, 
1956.  TIAS  3363. 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  treatment 
of  prisoners  of  war.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12, 
1949.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for 
the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3364. 


Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  protection 

of  civilian  persons  in  time  of  war.  Done  at 

Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 

Oct.  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956. 

TIAS  3365. 

Accessions  deposited:  Seychelles,  Nov.  8, 

1984. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  international  armed  conflicts  (Pro- 
tocol 1),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  June 
8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.^ 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  noninternational  armed  conflicts  (Pro- 
tocol II).  Done  at  Geneva  June  8,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.= 
Accessions  deposited:  Kuwait,  Jan.  17,  1985; 
Rwanda,  Nov.  19,  1984;  Seychelles,  Nov.  8, 
1984. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force  May  25, 
1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Ratification  deposited:  Poland,  Mar.  15,  1984. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  May  15, 
1984;  Djibouti,  Mar.  1,  1984;  Thailand,  Dec. 
18,  1984. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1974 
(TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  May  1,  1981.  TIAS  10009. 
Ratification  deposited;  Poland,  Mar.  15, 
1984. 

Accessions  deposited;  Barbados,  May  29, 
1984;  Nigeria,  Nov.  13,  1984;  Singapore, 
June  1,  1984. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention  on  the  international  maritime 
satellite  organization  (INMARSAT),  with  an- 
nex. Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 

Operating  agreement  on  the  international 
maritime  satellite  organization  (INMARSAT), 
with  annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 
Accessions  deposited;  Gabon,  Dec.  28, 
1984;  Iran,  Oct.  12,  1984. 

Seals 

1984  protocol  amending  the  interim  conven- 
tion of  Feb.  9,  1957,  as  amended  and  extend- 
ed, on  conservation  of  North  Pacific  fur  seals 
(TIAS  3948,  5558,  8368,  10020),  with  state- 
ment.' 

Acceptance  deposited;  U.S.S.R.,  Jan  15, 
1985. 

Slavery 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of 
slavery,  the  slave  trade,  and  institutions  and 
practices  similar  to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva 
Sept.  7,  1956.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  10, 
1957;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  6,  1967.  TIAS  6418. 
Accession  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Feb.  5, 
1985. 


11985 


75 


TREATIES 


Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  with  annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  July  5,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1985. 
Notification  of  provisional  application:  Ivory 

Coast,  Jan.  22,  1985. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Korea,  Rep.  of. 

Feb.  14,  1985;  South  Africa,  Feb.  13,  1985. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
ment of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
July  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10,  1983. 
TIAS  10490. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Greece,  Aug.  19,  1983. 

Accessions  deposited:  Malaysia,  Apr.  24, 
1984;  Nigeria,  Nov.  13,  1984;  Saint  Vincent 
and  the  Grenadines,  Oct.  28,  1983;  United 
Arab  Emirates,  Dee.  15,  1983. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
United  Kingdom  to  the  Isle  of  Man,  Oct.  19, 
1984. 

Trade— Textiles 

Arrangement  regarding  international  trade  in 
textiles,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 
Dec.  20,  1973.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 
1974.  TIAS  7840. 

Protocol  extending  arrangement  regarding 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec.  20, 
1973.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  22,  1981.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1982.  TIAS  10323. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Panama,  Jan.  15, 
1985. 

Wheat 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 

wheat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 

Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 

into  force  July  1,  1983. 

Accession  deposited:  Saudi  Arabia,  Feb.  6, 

1985. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 

discrimination  against  women.  Adopted  at 

New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

Sept.  3,  1981.' 

Signature:  MaH,  Feb.  5,  1985. 

Ratification  deposited:  Senegal,  Feb.  5, 

1985 

BILATERALS 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  8,  1982  (TIAS  10483)  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Dhaka  Dec.  20,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  20,  1984. 

Bolivia 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing. Signed  at  La  Paz  Feb.  4,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  4,  1985. 


Brazil 

Master  data  exchange  arrangement  for  the 
mutual  development  of  military  equipment. 
Signed  at  Washington  Nov.  14,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  14,  1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  regarding  the 
exchange  of  scientists  and  engineers.  Signed 
at  Washington  Nov.  14,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Nov.  14,  1984, 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  .July  19,  1983  (TIAS  10756),  on 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  control  of  illicit 
traffic  of  drugs.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Brasilia  Oct.  4  and  Dec.  3,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1984. 

Agreements  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  31,  1982,  as  amended  (TIAS  10369), 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton  and  man-made 
fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  Dec. 
21.  1984,  and  .Jan.  8,  1985,  and  .Jan.  31  and 
Feb.  5,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  8  and 
Feb.  5,  1985. 

Canada 

Agreement  regarding  mutual  assistance  and 
cooperation  between  customs  administrations. 
Signed  at  Quebec  June  20,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  8,  1985. 

Treaty  concerning  Pacific  salmon,  with  an- 
nexes and  memorandum  of  understanding. 
Signed  at  Ottawa  Jan.  28,  1985.  Enters  into 
force  upon  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification. 

Denmark 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates.  Signed  at 
Washington  Apr.  27,  1983. 
Entered  into  force:  Nov.  7,  1984. 

Agreement  concerning  Faroese  fishing  in 
fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  the  United  States, 
with  annex  and  agreed  minute.  Signed  at 
Washington  June  11,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Nov.  20,  1984. 

Egypt 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
June  7,  1974  (TIAS  7855),  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities,  with  agreed 
minutes.  Signed  at  Cairo  Dec.  16,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Dec.  16,  1984. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  22,  1981,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at  San 
Salvador  Nov.  1,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Dee.  13,  1984. 

European  Economic  Community 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts 
of  the  United  States,  with  annex  and  agreed 
minute.  Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  1,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Nov.  14,  1984. 


Finland  ^t 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Washington 
Nov.  19.  1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  7,     ^i 
1985. 

German,  Federal  Republic  of 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
cooperative  project  of  research  in  the  field 
powder  metallurgy'  of  titanium  alloys.  Signe 
at  Washington  Jan.  8,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  8,  1985. 

Hungary 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Feb.  15 
and  25,  1983,  as  amended,  (TIAS  10666) 
relating  to  trade  in  wool  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Budapest 
Jan.  18  and  Feb.  6,  1985.  Entered  into  fore 
Feb.  6,  1985. 

Iceland 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coa; 

of  the  United  States,  with  annex  and  agree 

minute.  Signed  at  Washington  Sept.  21, 

1984. 

Entered  into  force:  Nov.  16,  1984. 

Israel 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  18  and  22,  1962,  as  amended  (TIAS 
5097,  6240),  relating  to  financing  certain 
educational  exchange  programs.  Effected  b 
exchange  of  notes  at  Jerusalem  Jan.  10  and 
30,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  30,  1985. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  30,  1982  (TIAS  10495),  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at  Kingstc 
Dec.  17,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  17, 
1984. 

Japan 

Agreement  relating  to  space  shuttle  con- 
tingency landing  sites.  Effected  by  exchang 
of  notes  at  Tokyo  Jan.  24,  1985.  Entered  ir 
force  Jan.  24,  1985. 

Mozambique 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Maputo  Jan.  11,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  11,  1985. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  11,  1985,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  lette- 
at  Maputo  Jan.  17  and  18,  1985.  Entered  ii 
force  Jan.  18,  1985. 

Panama 

Grant  agreement  for  the  financial  stabiliza- 
tion and  economic  recovery  program.  Signei 
at  Panama  City  Dec.  24,  1984.  Entered  inti 
force  Dec.  24,"l984. 

Romania 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  4,  1973,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  7901,  9431,  10703),  relating  to  civil : 
transport.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  al 
Bucharest  Jan.  25  anii  30,  1985.  Entered  inl: 
force  Jan.  30,  1985.  I 


76 


Department  of  State  Bullelii 


PRESS  RELEASES 


adi  Arabia 

l.iiiiMniium  lit'  understanding  for  the  ex- 
iji   I'f  international  express  mail,  with 
.'f  implementation.  Signed  at 
iL;ton  Nov.  2.  1984.  Entered  into  force 
,  1985. 


flmgement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
flrmation  and  cooperation  in  nuclear  safety 

Sters,  with  patent  addendum.  Signed  at 
rid  Sept.  28,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
i.  28,  1984. 


■ment  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
Iheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
■anteed  by.  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
ernment  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes, 
led  at  Khartoum  Dec.  22,  1984.  Entered 
force  Jan.  25.  1985. 

iden 

Imgement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
lij'-mation  and  cooperation  in  nuclear  safety 
rcers,  with  patent  addendum.  Signed  at 
b  kholm  Jan.  24,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
24,  1985. 

;ed  Kingdom 

eement  extending  memorandum  of 
;rstanding  of  Sept.  24,  1975  (TIAS  9033), 
;ing  to  the  principles  governing  coopera- 
in  research  and  development,  production, 
iprocurement  of  defense  equipment. 
led  at  Washington  Dec.  21,  1984.  Entered 
force  Dec.  21,  1984. 

eement  amending  the  agreement  of 
23,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  8641,  8965, 
;,  10059),  concerning  air  services,  with 
osures.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
[hington  Feb.  20,  1985.  Entered  into 
fe  Feb.  20.  1985;  effective  Nov.  9,  1982. 

ioslavia 

I  eement  amending  agreement  of  Oct.  26 
!  27,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9447),  con- 
!  ing  trade  in  men's  and  boys'  wool  and 
I  made  fiber  suits.  Effected  by  exchange 
i  3tes  at  Belgrade  Jan.  8  and  Feb.  7,  1985. 
lered  into  force  Feb.  7,  1985. 


'Not  in  force. 

'Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

'Not  a  party  to  Optional  Annexes  III,  IV, 

'With  declaration. 
'With  reservation.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

"13         2/4  Program  for  the  official 

working  visit  of  Australian 
Prime  Minister  Robert  J.L. 
Hawke,  Feb.  5-7. 
14         2/4  Shultz:  address  before  the 

American  Society  for  In- 
dustrial Security.  Arling- 
ton, Va. 

*14A      2/5  Shultz:  question-and-answer 

session  following  address 
before  the  American  Socie- 
ty for  Industrial  Security. 

*15        2/11        Program  for  the  state 

visit  of  His  Majesty  King 
Fahd  bin  Abd  al-Aziz  Al- 
Saud,  Feb.  10-15. 

•16        2/16       Shultz:  remarks  on  NBC- 
TV's  "Today  Show,"  Feb. 
11. 

*17         2/11        State  Department  Advisory 
Group  on  Food,  Hunger, 
and  Agriculture  meets, 
Feb.  b. 

*18  2/11  Appointment  of  reform 
observation  panel  for 
UNESCO. 

19  2/12        Shultz:  remarks  at  a 

luncheon  in  honor  of  Saudi 
King  Fahd,  Feb.  11. 

20  2/14        Summary  of  the  interna- 

tional narcotics  control 
strategy  report  for  1985. 

"21         2/14        Shultz:  interview  on  Voice  of 
America's  "Press  Con- 
ference, USA,"  Feb.  13. 

"22         2/15        Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  British 
Prime  Minister  Margaret 
Thatcher.  Feb.  19-21. 
23         2/19        Shultz:  statement  before  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee. 

"24         2/19        Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Budget  Committee. 

"25         2/19        Dam:  remarks  welcoming 
Jeremy  Levin.  Feb.  18. 

26  2/20       Shultz:  Australia  reaffirms 

support  for  ANZUS 
alliance. 

27  2/21        Shultz:  address  before  the 

the  U.S.  National  Commit- 
tee for  Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation,  San  Fran- 
cisco. 

28  2/22        American  Foreign  Policy: 

Current  DoeumenU.  1981. 
supplement  released. 

29  2/22        Shultz:  address  before  the 

Commonwealth  Club  of 
California,  San  Francisco. 
29A      2/25        Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  following  address 
before  Commonwealth 
Club.  Feb.  22. 


30 


•31 


32 


2/26 


2/26 


2/27 


Shultz:  statement  before 
the  Senate  Armed  Services 
Committee. 

President  submits  Compact 
of  Free  Association  to  the 
Congress  for  approval. 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Interna- 
tional Operations  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committi'e. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bullhtin. 


USUN 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

.Subject 

Kirkpatrick:     Kampuchea. 
General  Assembly. 

Emery:    chemical    weapons. 
Committee  I. 

Fleming:  Population 

Conference.  Committee  II. 

Di    Martino:    African    relief, 
special  meeting  on  Africa. 

Sorzano:     death     of    Prime 
Minister  Gandhi,  General 
Assembly. 

Clark:    reply    to    the    Soviet 
Union,  General  Assembly. 

Reynolds:     women.     Com- 
mittee III. 

Nygard:  personnel  questions. 
Committee  V. 

Schifter:     UNRWA,     Special 
Political  Committee. 

Kirkpatrick:   Africa,   General 
Assembly. 

Fleming:    economic   and   dis- 
aster relief  assistance  in 
Africa,  Committee  II. 

Keyes:  development, 

pledging  conference  for 
development. 

Jones:     Nicaragua,     Com- 
mittee III. 

Keyes:      request      for     a 
separate  vote  on  a 
paragraph  of  a  draft 
resolution.  General 
Assembly. 

Blocker:  information.  Special 
Political  Committee. 

Feldman:     U.S.     terrorises. 
Committee  IV. 

Keyes:    cooperation   between 
the  UN  and  Arab  League, 
General  Assembly. 

Emery:  prevention  of  war  in 
nuclear  age.  Committee  I. 

Schifter:    Grenada,    Security 
Council. 

Feldman:   role  of  specialized 
agencies  in  self-determin- 
ation. Committee  IV. 


No. 

Dale 

106 

10/30 

107 

10/31 

108 

10/31 

109 

10/31 

110 

10/31 

111 

10/31 

112 

1  1/2 

113 

1  1/6 

114 

11/6 

115 

1  1/6 

116 

11/6 

'117       11/7 


•118 
'119 


1  1/7 
11/8 


•120 

11/8 

"121 

11/8 

♦122 

1  1/8 

•123 

1  1/8 

•124 

1  1/9 

•125 

11/12 

111985 


77 


PUBLICATIONS 


•126 

11/12 

•127 

11/12 

•128 

11/12 

•129 

11/13 

•130 

11/13 

131 

11/14 

132 

11/15 

•133 

11/15 

•134 

11/16 

•135 

11/16 

•136 

11/16 

♦137 

11/19 

♦138 

11/19 

•139      11/20 


Clark:     UNRWA,     Special 

Political  Committee. 
Emery:    chemical    weapons, 

Committee  1. 
Blocker:    Nicaragua,    Special 

Political  Committee. 
Ray:    UNHCR   report.   Com- 
mittee III. 
Goodman:  living  conditions  of 
the  Palestinian  people. 
Committee  II. 
Kirkpatrick:    Afghanistan, 

General  Assembly. 
Thomas:    narcotics,     Com- 
mittee III. 
Keyes:     personnel.     Com- 
mittee V. 
Quintanilla:    Israeli    aggres- 
sion against  the  Iraqi 
nuclear  installations, 
General  Assembly. 
Herzberg:    refugees,    Com- 
mittee III. 
Herzberg:   refugees.  Ad  Hoc 
Committee  for  Voluntary 
Contributions  to  UNHCR. 
Kuttner:  UN  pension  system, 

Committee  V. 
Clark:     U.S.     pledge     to 
UNRWA,  Ad  Hoc  Commit- 
tee on  Voluntary  Contribu- 
tions to  UNRWA. 
Ray:  development  and  inter- 
national economic  coopera- 
tion. Committee  II. 
Schifter:  torture,  Com- 
mittee III. 
Keyes:  apartheid.  General 

Assembly. 
Fleming:  operational  ac- 
tivities for  development. 
Committee  II. 
Lowitz:  comprehensive 
nuclear  test  ban  treaty. 
Committee  I. 
Schifter:  religious  intoler- 
ance. Committee  III. 
Feldman:  Khmer  relief, 

donors'  meeting. 
President  Reagan's  state- 
ment on  the  25th  anniver- 
sary of  the  Antarctic  Trea- 
ty, Nov.  26. 
Sorzano:  outer  space,  Special 

Political  Committee. 
Jones:  women  and  refugees. 

Committee  III. 
Flesher:  Joint  Inspection 

Unit,  Committee  V. 
Jones:  narcotics,  Com- 
mittee III. 
Lowell:  outer  space.  Special 
Political  Committee, 
Nov.  27. 
Schifter:  investigation  of 
Israeli  practices.  Special 
Political  Committee. 
Sorzano:  Antarctica,  Com- 
mittee I. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  I 


140 

11/21 

141 

11/21 

142 

11/26 

'143       11/26 


•144 

11/27 

♦145 

11/28 

♦146 

11/28 

•147 

11/28 

•148 

11/28 

•149 

11/29 

•150 

11/29 

♦151 

11/29 

♦152 

11/29 

•153 

11/29 

Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

America  and  the  Struggle  for  Freedom, 
Commonwealth  Club  of  California,  San 
Francisco,  Feb.  22,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#659). 

Economic  Cooperation  in  the  Pacific  Basin, 
Asia  Foundation,  San  Francisco,  Feb.  21, 
1985  (Current  Policy  #658). 

Foreign  Assistance  Request  for  FY  1986, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Feb.  19, 
1985  (Current  Policy  #656). 

U.S.  Government  and  Business:  Our  Common 
Defense  Against  Terrorism,  American 
Society  for  Industrial  Security,  Arlington, 
Va.,  Feb.  4,  1985  (Current  Policy  #654). 

The  Future  of  American  Foreign  Policy: 
New  Realities  and  New  Ways  of  Thinking, 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee, 
Jan.  31,  1985  (Current  Policy  #650). 

Africa 

U.S.  Response  to  Africa's  Food  Needs  (GIST, 

Feb.  1985). 
Southern  Africa:  Constructive  Engagement 

(GIST,  Feb.  1985). 

Arms  Control 

Soviet  Noncompliance  With  Arms  Control 
Agreements,  President's  message  to  the 
Congress  and  unclassified  report,  Feb.  1, 
1985  (Special  Report  #122). 

On  the  Road  to  a  More  Stable  Peace, 
Ambassador  Nitze,  World  Affairs  Council, 
Philadelphia,  Feb.  20,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#657). 

Strength  and  Diplomacy:  Toward  a  New 
Consensus?,"  Under  Secretary  Armacost, 
World  Affairs  Council,  Boston,  Jan.  25, 
1985  (Current  Policy  #652). 

Geneva  Arms  Control  Meeting  (GIST,  Feb. 
1985). 

East  Asia 

The  Asia-Pacific  Region:  A  Forward  Look, 
Under  Secretary  Armacost,  Far  East- 
America  Council/Asia  Society,  New  York 
City,  Jan.  29,  1985  (Current  Policy  #653). 

Economics 

U.S.  Shipping  Policy  (GIST,  Feb.  1985). 
Generalized  System  of  Preferences 

(GIST,  Feb.  1985). 
International  Investment  Policy  (GIST,  Feb. 

1985). 

Human  Rights 

1984  Human  Rights  Report,  introduction 
excerpted  from  "Country  Reports  on 
Human  Rights  Practices  for  1984,"  Feb. 
1985  (Special  Report  #121). 


Middle  East 

Recent  Developments  in  the  Middle  East, 
Assistant  Secretary  Murphy,  Subcommit 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Jan.  30,  19? 
(Current  Policy  #651). 

United  Nations 

U.S.  Withdrawal  from  UNESCO  (GIST, 
1985). 

Western  Hemisphere 

The  Need  for  Continuity  in  U.S. -Latin 
American  Policy,  Assistant  Secretary 
Motley,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committi 
Jan.  29,  1985  (Current  Policy  #655). 

El  Salvador's  Land  Reform  (GIST,  Feb. 
1985).  ■ 

Background  Notes 


iiii 


II 


f 


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international  organizations.  Recent  revisio 
are: 

Bahamas  (Dec.  1984) 

Benin  (Nov.  1984) 

Economic  Communities  (Nov.  1984) 

German  Democratic  Republic  (Nov.  1984) 

Guatemala  (Sept.  1984) 

Guyana  (Jan.  1985) 

Iraq  (Dec.  1984) 

Jamaica  (Oct.  1984) 

Netherlands  (Nov.  1984) 

Niger  (Dec.  1984) 

Qatar  (Jan.  1985) 

Switzerland  (Jan.  1985) 

Turkey  (Dec.  1984) 

A  free  single  copy  of  one  of  the  above 
(and  an  inde,x  of  the  entire  series)  may  be 
tained  from  the  Correspondence  Managem^ 
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ment  of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  about  60  Background  Notes  a  year 
subscription  is  available  from  the  Super- 
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or  money  order,  made  payable  to  the 
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78 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


)EX 


:il  1985 
:ume  85,  No. 


2097 


inistan.  America  and  the  Struggle  for 
•eedom  (Shultz) 1(5 


1 

iea 


.,„    and    the    Struggle    for    Freedom 

liultz)    1^ 

ri'it  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 

broad,  1982-84  (Duncan) 65 

ican  Principles  ,      ,       -r,       , 

iea    aii.i    the    Struggle    for    Freedom 

hultz)    Ih 

of  the  Union  Address  (excerpt) 9 

gth  and  Diplomacy;  Toward  A  New 
onsensus?  (Armacost) 48 

Control  ^     ^      ^ 

nuing    the    Acquisition    of    the    Peace- 

eper  Missile  (message  to  the  Congress, 
<ecutive  summary) 57 

Importance    of    the    MX    Peacekeeper 

issile  (Shultz) 23 

R  Talks  Resume  in  Vienna  (Reagan)  .  .28 
e  Road  to  a  More  Stable  Peace  (Nitze)  .  27 
dent's  News  Conference  of  February  21 

■xcerpts)    ••••■■  :-"^ 

tion-and-Answer  Session  Following 
ommonwealth  Club  Address  (Shultz)  .21 
rt  on  Soviet  Noncompliance  With  Arms 
ontrol  Agreements  (message  to  the  Con- 

ress,  text  of  unclassified  report) 29 

of  tiie  Union  Address  (excerpt) 9 

gth  and  Diplomacy.  Toward  A  New 
onsensus?  (Armacost) 48 

ralia  .  .XT-yTTC 

-alia    Reaffirms    Support    for    ANZUb 

lliance  (Shultz) \-,:;- ;,■ '^ 

acific:    Region  of  Promise  and  Challenge 

vVolfowitz)   ;,  ■  ■  P 

of  Australian   Prime   Minister   Hawk 

iawke.  Reagan)  ■ • 

oodia.    America    and    the    Struggle 

reedoni  (Shultz) 

e.    Question-and-Answer 
ollowing  Commonwealth   Club 

5hultz)    ■ 

la.  The  Asia-Pacific  Region;  A 


60 

for 

.16 

Session 

Address 

21 

Forward 


jook  (Armacost) 34 

ess 
_.  Pornography;    A   Worldwide   Problem 

A.brams) ;•,■  ■  ri '  '    i ' ' '^'^ 

inuing  the  Acquisition  of  the  Peacekeeper 
dissile  (message  to  the  Congress,  ex_ 
cutive  summary) 57 

Importance    of    the    MX    Peacekeeper 

iVlissile  (Shultz) 23 

.ibia  (Crocker) .•••;,•  ^-  '  t'  ".'^ 

Need    for    Continuity    in    U.S.    Latin 

American  Policy  (Motley) 6 ' 

„  Human  Rights  Report  (excerpts)  .  .  .  _.  52 
snt    Developments    in    the    Middle    East 

Murphy)  \W- u   k 

jrt  on  Soviet  Noncompliance  With  Arms 
::ontrol  Agreements  (message  to  the  Con- 

,^ess,  text  of  unclassified  reports) 29 

leof  the  Union  Address  (excerpt) .9 

pmary  of  the  International  Narcotics 
Control  Strategy  Report  for  1985 59 

Asia-Pacific   Region;   A   Forward   Look 

(Armacost)    ■  ■  ■.•■  ■  ■  ■  •  . 

nomic   Cooperation   in  the   Pacific   Basin 

(Shultz)    1'^ 

inomics  ,      „    .j-     o    • 

>nomic   Cooperation   in  the  Pacific   Basin 

(Shultz)    .■    -^-o"  t'^ 

■  Need  for  Continuity  in  U.S.  Latin 
American  Policy  (Motley) 67 


Protectionism:   A  Threat  to  Our   Prosperity 

(Wallis)    41 

State  of  the  Union  Address  (excerpt) 9 

Europe 

Child   Pornography:    A    Worldwide    Problem 

(Abrams)  55 

4()th   Anniversary   of  the   Yalta   Conference 

(Reagan)    46 

MBFR  Talks  Resume  in  Vienna  (Reagan)  .  .28 
Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 

Abroad.  1982-84  (Duncan) 65 

Greece.     The     United     States     and     Greece 

(Ha;is)    44 

Human  Rights 

Child   Pornography:    A   Worldwide   Problem 

(Abrams)   "^■^ 

1984  Human  Rights  Report  (excerpts) 52 

Soviet     Crackdown     on     Jewish     Cultural 
Activists  (Department  of  State  report)  .47 

Japan 

The    Asia-Pacific   Region;    A   Forward   Look 

(Armacost)    34 

Economic  Cooperation   in  the  Pacific  Basin 

(Shultz)    13 

President's  News  Conference  of  February  21 

(excerpts)    16 

Middle  East 

President's  News  Conference  of  February  21 

(excerpts)    ■■■■■■  :^^ 

Question-and-Answer    Session    Following 

Commonwealth  Club  Address  (Shultz)  .21 

Recent    Developments    in    the    Middle    East 

(Murphy)  ^"^ 

Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 

Abroad,  1982-84  (Duncan) 65 

Military  Affairs 

Continuing    the    Acquisition    of    the    Peace- 
keeper Missile  (message  to  the  Congress, 

executive  summary) 57 

The    Importance    of    the    MX    Peacekeeper 

Missile  (Shultz) •  ■  23 

Monetary    Affairs.    President's    News    Con- 
ference of  February  21  (excerpts) 10 

Namibia.  Namibia  (Crocker) 25      On 

Narcotics 

The    Need    for    Continuity    in    U.S.    Latin 

American  Policy  (Motley) 67 

Summary    of    the    International    Narcotics 

Control  Strategy  Report  for  1985 59 

New  Zealand.  The  Pacific;    Region  of  Prom- 
ise and  Challenge  (Wolfowitz) 37 

Nicaragua 

America    and    the    Struggle    lor 

(Shultz)    

Nicaragua  (Reagan) •  •  • 

President's  News  Conference  of  February  21 

(excerpts)    •  ■  ■  ■. ■•■■•:  ^"^ 

Question-and-Answer    Session    Following 
Commonwealth  Club  Address  (Shultz)  .21 

The   Asia-Pacific   Region;    A   Forward   Look 

(Armacost)    ; '  '  v; '  -r'  '  'n  '  ■ 

Economic  Cooperation  in  the   Pacific 

(Shultz)    

Philippines 

The   Asia-Pacific   Region; 

(Armacost) ,  ^,    „ 

The  Pacific;    Region  of  Promise  and  Challenge 

(Wolfowitz)   .■•■  -•■••■;3'^ 

Question-and-Answer    Session    Following 

Commonwealth  Club  Address  (Shultz)  .21 

Presidential  Documents      ^  ,     „        , 

Continuing  the  Acquisition  of  the  Peacekeeper 

Missile    (message    to   the   Congress,    ex_ 

ecutive  summary) ;•••••, .i 

40th  Anniversary  oi  the  Yalta  Conference  .  46 

MBFR  Talks  Resume  in  Vienna 28 

Nicaragua •  ■  ■ V ^\f\ 

News  Conference  of  February  21  (excerpts)  10 
Report  on  Soviet  Noncompliance  With  Arms 
Control  Agreements  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress, text  of  unclassified  report) 


Freedom 

16 

10 


A   Forward 


Basin 
.  ..13 

Look 
...34 


State  of  the  Union  Address  (excerpt) 9 

Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister  Hawke 
(Hawke,  Reagan)  60 

Visit  of  Saudi  King  (King  Fahd,  Reagan. 
Shultz.  joint  communiciu) • 

Publications 

Background  Notes 78 

Department  of  State ■, '° 

Saudi  Arabia.  Visit  of  Saudi  King  (King 
Fahd,  Reagan.  Shultz.  joint  commu- 
nique)   •.•••;••  A'  ■  ■ 

Science  &  Technology.  Protecting  the  Ozone 
Layer  (Benedick) .63 

South  "Africa.  Question-and-Answer  Session 
Following  Commonwealth  Club  Address 
(Shultz)    21 

Terrorism 

The  Need  for  Continuity  in  U.S.  Latin 
American  Policy  (Motley) \-  ■■  ■„;^'' 

Strength  and  Diplomacy:  Toward  A  New 
Consensus?  (Armacost) 48 

Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 
Abroad.  1982-84  (Duncan) 65 

Trade  ^  ,    t      i 

The   Asia-Pacific   Region:    A    Forward    Look 

(Armacost)    ■■■,;•  '.  ;.■  '  'd  '  '^^ 

Economic  Cooperation   in  the   Pacific   Basin 

(Shultz)    •  ■ .13 

Protectionism;   A  Threat  to  Our  Prosperity 

(WalHs)    41 

Treaties 

Current  Actions ■  •  ■  •  •  ■  ■  ■  '•' 

Report  on  Soviet  Noncompliance  With  Arms 
Control  Agreements  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress, text  of  unclassified  report) 29 

United  Nations.  Protecting  the  Ozone  Layer 
(Benedick)  °3 

TT    c    C    R 

America'   and    the     Struggle    for     Freedom 

(Shultz)  -^  ■••;•••  ■''' 

The    Importance    of    the    MX    Peacekeeper 

Missile  (Shultz) • •••23 

MBFR  Talks  Resume  in  Vienna  (Reagan)  .  .2» 
the    Road    to    a    More    Stable    Peace 

(Nitze)   ^"^ 

President's  News  Conference  of  February  21 

(excerpts)    „■■.•■    'W  \;  '  "■ 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Commonwealth  Club  Address  (Shultz)  .21 

Recent  Developments  in  the  Middle  East 
(Murphy)   ■  ■  •  ■  •  \- 

Report  on  Soviet  Noncompliance  With  Arms 
Control  Agreements  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress, text  of  unclassified  report) 29 

Soviet  Crackdown  on  Jewish  Cultural  Activists 
(Department  of  State  report) 47 

Western  Hemisphere 

The  Need  for  Continuity  in  U.S.  Latin 
American  Policy  (Motley) \-   :  ■  ^i^'^ 

Strength  and  Diplomacy:  Toward  A  New 
Consensus?  (Armacost) •  ■  ■ 48 

Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 
Abroad.  1982-84  (Duncan) 65 


Name  Index 

Abrams.  Elliott •■•5^ 

Armacost.  Michael  H '  co 

Benedick.  Richard  Elliot "^ 

Crocker,  Chester  A j2 

Duncan,  Evan ;;„■•,■ V 

King  Fahd  bin  Abd  al-Aziz  Al  Saud .1 

Haas,  Richard  N 44 

Hawke,  Robert  J.  L 60 

Motley,  Langhome  A 6  / 

Murphy,  Richard  W g" 

Nitze  Paul  H ^ ' 

Reagan,  President..  1,9,  10,  28  29,46,57,60 

Shultz,  Secretary 1,  13,  16.  21. 16.  b^ 

Wallis,  W.  Allen 41 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D "^ ' 


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!:> 


Depnrttnvnt 


buUetBn 


'he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  85  /  Number  2098 


May  1985 


Df*partmf*ni  of  Si  ate 

bulletin 


Volume  85  /  Number  2098  /  May  1985 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

ROBERT  M.  SMALLEY 

Acting  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
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periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


Department  of  State  BULLETIN  (ISSN  0041-76: 
is  published  monthly  (plus  annual  index)  by  the 
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NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
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For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.' 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402 


CONTENTS 


The  President 

1        Visit  to  Canada  (Brian 

Mulroney,  President  Reagan, 
Dedarations.  Joint  Statement) 

9       News  Conference  of  March  21 
(Excerpts) 

12  MX  Missile 

The  Vice  President 

13  Visit  to  Africa 
18       Visit  to  Moscow 

20       Visit  to  Grenada,  Brazil,  and 

Honduras 
22       Nicaragua:  A  Threat  to 

Democracy 


The  Secretary 

24       Arms  Control:  Objectives  and 

Prospects 
28       Science  and  American  Foreign 

Policy:  The  Spirit  of  Progress 
32       News  Conference  of  March  15 
36       Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley" 
38       News  Briefing  for  Regional 

Media 
41       Assistance  Request  for  FY  1986 

Africa 

49       FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 
Sub-Sahara  Africa 
(Frank  Wisner) 


Arms  Control 


55 


57 


U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations  on 
Nuclear  and  Space  Arms 
(Robert  C.  McFarla.ne. 
President  Reagan) 

The  Objectives  of  Arms  Control 
(Paul  H.  Nitze) 


East  Asia 

63        FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
(Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 

Europe 


71 


74 


FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 
Europe  (Richard  R.  Burt) 

Death  of  Soviet  President 
Chernenko  (President  Reagan, 
"White  Hoiise  Statement) 


Middle  East 

75  FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 
the  Middle  East  and  South  Asia 
(Richard  W.  Murphy) 

Western  Hemisphere 

81        FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 
Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Langhome  A.  Motley) 

End  Notes 

90       March  1985 

Treaties 

90       Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

93       Department  of  State 

93  USUN 

Publications 

94  Department  of  State 

Index 


''*''=''^i^OFOOCUt«tNTS^ 


^UN  111985 


f 


I 


President  Reagan  reviews  the  troops  in  Quebec  City. 


(White  House  photd  by  Bill  Fitz-Patrick) 


HE  PRESIDENT 


President's  Visit  to  Canada 


President  Reagan  ynet  with  Prime  Minister  Brian 
Mulroney  in  Quebec  City  March  17-18,  1985.  Following  are 
•emarks  the  President  made  before  and  during  his  visit  and  the 
texts  of  two  declarations  and  one  joint  statement.  ^ 


RESIDENT'S  RESPONSES  TO 
(UESTIONS  SUBMITTED  BY 
lAcLEANS  MAGAZINE, 
lAR.  6.  19852 

Q.  Canadians  long  have  suffered 
^  rom  a  national  inferiority  complex  in 
egard  to  our  great  neighbor  to  the 
outh.  How  do  you  think  of  Canada, 
nd  what  do  you  see  as  Canada's  im- 
ortance  to  the  United  States? 

A.  No  other  country  in  the  world  is 
lore  important  to  the  United  States 
han  Canada,  and  we  are  blessed  to  have 
uch  a  nation  on  our  northern  border. 
Canada  is  a  friend,  a  neighbor,  and  a 
rusted  ally.  We  may  have  a  larger 
opulation  and  a  larger  GNP,  but  we're 
Iso  dependent  on  you.  Canada  con- 
umes  a  fifth  of  our  exports,  and  that's 
lore  than  any  other  nation.  You  use 
lore  of  our  capital  than  other  nations, 
nd,  of  course,  our  mutual  security  in- 
?rests  are  closely  intertwined.  It's  up  to 
oth  of  us  to  make  this  partnership  con- 
inue  to  work  in  both  our  interests. 

Q.  How  do  you  see  Canada's 
■ole — as  a  smaller  power — in  interna- 
ional  affairs?  For  instance,  External 
iffairs  Minister  Joe  Clark  will  be  in 
loscow  next  month  as  arms  control 
egotiations  resume  in  Geneva.  Is 
here  a  part  we  can  play  in  conjunc- 
ion  with  that  or  with  the  Contadora 
Tocess  in  Central  America? 

A.  Canada  has  played  a  significant 
(lie  in  international  affairs  ever  since 
V<irld  War  II,  a  role  which  has  reflected 
he  talents  of  Canadian  statesmen  and 
he  democratic  values  of  its  peoples.  It 
as  been  an  activist  in  the  United  Na- 
iniis— indeed,  Canadians  were  amongst 
he  founders  in  San  Francisco  40  years 
ii'i — and  has  shown  time  and  time 
-fi-.nn  that  it  is  prepared  to  back  up  its 
iiiivictions  on  peaceful  settlement  of 
lisputes  with  courageous  participation  in 
leacekeeping  operations  in  such 


hotspots  as  Cyprus  and  the  Middle  East. 
But  I  also  note  that  your  Prime  Minister 
recently  quoted  Dante  to  the  effect  that 
the  "hottest  place  in  hell  is  reserved  for 
those  who  in  times  of  moral  crisis  strive 
to  maintain  their  neutrality."  Canadians 
are  not  neutral — they  believe  in 
democracy  and  work  hard  to  protect  it. 
To  get  down  to  specifics,  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  unity  and  solid  support 
of  Western  leaders  on  arms  control  were 
the  principal  factors  that  brought  the 
Soviets  back  to  the  negotiating  table. 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney  has  been  very 
helpful,  and  we  feel  certain  that  Mr. 
Clark  will  convey  to  the  Soviet  leaders 
our  continuing  resolve  to  achieve  signifi- 
cant, verifiable,  and  equitable  arms 
reductions.  With  regard  to  the  Con- 
tadora process,  we  value  Canadian 
assistance,  and  I  would  note  that  Cana- 
dian suggestions  on  the  verification 
process  have  been  most  helpful. 

Q.  What  do  you  see  as  Canada's 
role  in  defense?  How  did  you  feel 
when  the  new  government  had  to  cut 
$154  million  from  military  spending, 
for  example,  contrary  to  what  they 
had  promised  during  the  election  cam- 
paign? Is  Canada  doing  its  fair  share 
in  NATO,  and  will  you  be  pressuring 
us  to  do  more? 

A.  When  Prime  Minister  Mulroney 
was  here  last  September,  he  expressed 
his  personal  commitment  to  enhancing 
Canada's  role  in  the  Atlantic  alliance  and 
to  carry  its  full  share  of  the  allied 
defense  burden.  But  he  and  I  recognized 
then  and  now  that  domestic  political 
pressures  affect  outcomes.  I  believe 
Brian  Mulroney  shares  my  conviction 
that  there  is  no  reasonable  alternative 
but  to  work  to  protect  freedom  and 
democracy. 

I  understand  Canada  is  now 
conducting  a  major  review  of  its  defense 
policy,  and  I  believe  that  the  review  will 
conclude  that  the  only  meaningful 


defense  question  facing  both  our  nations 
is  how  to  meet  the  challenge  now  liefore 
us.  And  that  challenge  has  nothing  to  do 
with  pressure  from  Canada's  allies  but 
rather  how  best  to  defend  freedom  and 
democracy. 

Q.  In  recent  weeks,  there  has  been 
an  uproar  over  the  news  that  con- 
tingency plans  exist  to  deploy  nuclear 
weapons — specifically  B  57  nuclear 
depth  charges — in  Canada  in  case  of 
an  emergency.  In  your  view,  is  Canada 
bound  to  accept  these  weapons, 
especially  when  the  government  never 
was  notified  of  such  plans?  And  what 
sort  of  emergency  would  prompt  such 
a  deployment? 

A.  I  know  that  stories  have  recently 
appeared  concerning  wartime  contingen- 
cy plans.  There  have  also  been  allega- 
tions that  America  is  pressuring  its 
allies  to  accept  nuclear  weapons.  I  have 
two  comments  to  make  on  these  reports. 
First,  over  the  years  NATO  has  worked 
out  various  defense  plans  designed  to 
strengthen  deterrence,  but  under  these 
plans  any  deployments  would  be  carried 
out  only — let  me  repeat  only — with  the 
prior  agreement  of  the  states  involved. 

Second,  it  is  contrary  to  the  interest 
of  the  alliance  and  to  the  individual 
member  states  to  talk  publicly  about 
confidential  contigency  planning.  Such 
discussion  would  not  serve  our  shared 
security  interests. 

Q.  If  Canada  suddenly  balked  at 
going  along  with  such  contingency 
plans — or  refused  to  allow  the  further 
testing  of  cruise  missiles  or  barred  an 
American  battleship  from  our  ports  as 
New  Zealand  recently  did — would  the 
United  States  respond  in  the  same 
way  that  it  did  to  New  Zealand,  that 
is,  threatening  a  broad  range  of 
countermeasures  including  economic 
sanctions? 

A.  Let  me  start  by  stressing  the 
U.S.  defense  cooperation  with  our  allies 
begins  with  a  common  understanding  of 
our  shared  security  interests  and  a 
determination  to  protect  those  interests 
against  any  threat.  Each  of  us  entered 
into  our  alliances — whether  ANZUS 
[Australia,  New  Zealand,  United  States 
security  treaty]  or  NATO  or  NORAD 
[North  American  Aerospace  Defense 
Command] — as  fully  sovereign  nations, 
not  because  we  were  pressured  to  do  so. 

Let  me  point  out  that  we  are  not 
taking  economic  sanctions  against  New 
Zealand.  Rather,  we  are  reviewing  our 
cooperation  in  security  matters  in  light 
of  New  Zealand's  decision  to  reduce 
cooperation  with  us  in  the  ANZUS 
alliance. 


May  1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Our  longstanding  and  excellent 
defense  cooperation  with  Canada  is 
grounded  in  our  partnership  in  NORAD 
and  our  joint  membership  in  NATO. 
Clearly,  we  share  common  objectives: 
for  example,  Canada's  cooperation  in  the 
testing  of  cruise  missiles,  which  we 
greatly  value  and  appreciate,  was,  I  am 
sure,  a  recognition  by  the  Canadian 
Government  that  this  missile  plays  an 
important  role  in  NATO's  deterrent 
posture  and  is  directly  related  to 
Canada's  own  security. 

Q.  The  Canadian  Government  has 
said  it  supports  the  Strategic  Defense 
Initiative  [SDI],  but  there  has  been  an 
uproar  each  time  it  has  been  sug- 
gested that  defense  cooperation  could 
lead  to  our  actual  involvement  in  the 
program.  In  your  view,  should  Canada 
have  a  role  in  SDI  research  and  why? 

A.  We  have  absolutely  no  intention 
of  pressing  any  of  our  allies  to  par- 
ticipate in  this  program.  It  will  be  en- 
tirely up  to  Canada  to  decide  the  extent 
to  which,  if  at  all,  it  wishes  to  share  in 
the  research  efforts.  Should  Canada 
decide  such  participation  is  in  its  in- 
terests, we  would  be  delighted  to  work 
with  you  in  this  important  undertaking. 

But  let's  get  this  straight  about  the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative:  For  more 
than  a  generation,  we  have  believed  that 
no  war  will  begin  as  long  as  each  side 
knows  the  other  can  retaliate  with 
devastating  results.  I  believe  there  could 
be  a  better  way  to  keep  the  peace.  The 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  is  a  research 
effort  aimed  at  finding  a  non-nuclear 
defense  against  ballistic  missiles.  It  is 
the  most  helpful  possibility  of  the 
nuclear  age.  Nuclear  weapons  threaten 
entire  populations;  the  SDI  seeks  to  end 
that  possibility  forever.  I  was  extremely 
heartened  by  the  understanding  and  sup- 
port for  this  research  effort  by  Prime 
Minister  Mulroney  and  External  Affairs 
Minister  Clark.  It  may  take  a  long  time, 
but  now  we  have  started. 

Q.  The  Federal  and  Provincial 
Governments  have  just  taken  substan- 
tial measures  to  control  the  contribu- 
tions to  acid  rain  on  our  side  of  the 
border.  What  is  the  United  States 
prepared  to  do  for  its  part? 

A.  The  United  States  is  a  world 
leader  for  a  cleaner  environment.  We 
take  pride  that  our  Clean  Air  and  Clean 
Water  Acts,  and  our  other  comprehen- 
sive environmental  legislation  have 
helped  to  set  international  standards. 
We  have  invested  $1.50  billion — yes, 
that's  billions — under  our  Clean  Air  Act, 
and  as  a  result  the  air  today  is  cleaner 
than  in  many  years.  Emissions  of 
sulphur  dioxide,  a  major  concern,  are 


down  nearly  30%  in  the  last  decade. 
This  trend  is  continuing:  down  10% 
since  I  became  President,  including 
2V2%  in  1983.  We  strictly  control 
nitrogen  oxides,  which  come  mainly 
from  auto  emissions,  and  their  level  has 
also  been  dropping  in  recent  years.  For 
the  future,  I  believe  it  is  a  question  of 
doing  what  is  reasonable  and  responsible 
after  getting  all  the  facts. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  the  pros- 
pects are  for  negotiating  a  free  trade 
agreement  with  Canada  during  your 
second  term?  Will  the  obstacles  come 
from  Congress  or  from  Canadian  na- 
tionalists? 

A.  As  I  understand  it,  the  Canadian 
Government  is  reviewing  its  trade  policy 
right  now  and  hasn't  yet  decided 
whether  to  propose  any  negotiations.  In 
our  Congress,  I  believe  there  is  a  deep- 
seated  appreciation  that  trade  between 
the  United  States  and  Canada — the 
largest  trade  volume  between  any  two 
countries  on  Earth — is  beneficial  to  both 
countries  and  should  be  fostered.  Of 
course,  there  are  sensitive  trade  areas, 
and  the  Congress  would  want  to  be  sure 
that  any  new  bilateral  understanding  is 
in  the  interest  of  the  United  States — so 
would  I,  and  I'm  sure  Canada  would  do 
the  same. 

What  is  important  is  that  we  con- 
tinue to  work  together  to  reduce  trade 
barriers.  Perhaps  we  can  set  an  example 
for  others  to  follow.  We  are  not  in- 
terested in  building  a  North  American 
island;  rather,  we  would  like  to  establish 
a  trend  toward  trade  liberalization  that 
others  can  emulate. 

Q.  Much  has  been  made  of  the 
warmer  relations  that  now  exist  be- 
tween Canada  and  the  United  States. 
What  particularly  irked  you  about  the 
previous  government's  actions?  Now, 
having  made  concessions  to  Canada  to 
signal  the  warmer  relationship,  what 
do  you  expect  of  Canada  in  return? 
And  what  would  you  tell  Canadian  na- 
tionalists who  fear  that  a  warmer 
relationship  means  that  we  sell  out 
our  independence? 

A.  You're  right  to  suggest  that  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries  are  in 
good  shape.  But  rather  than  talk  about 
concessions,  I  believe  that  what  has  hap- 
pened is  that  we've  come  to  recognize 
that  warm  close  relations  serve  both  our 
interests.  As  a  result,  we  both  have 
become  a  lot  more  attentive  to  each 
other's  concerns;  we  talk  with  each 
other  more  often.  And  I  don't  believe 
that  means  either  nation  becomes  less 
independent. 


Q.  How  important  is  a  warm  per 
sonal  relationship  among  leaders?  An( 
what  aspects  of  Mr.  Mulroney's  per- 
sonality contribute  to  the  chemistry 
reported  between  the  two  of  you? 

A.  People  respond  more  warmly  to 
some  than  to  others.  We're  all  human. 
And  I  confess  that  I  like  Brian  Mulrone; 
a  lot.  He  is  a  true  Canadian  patriot.  He 
is  honest,  hardworking,  intelligent,  and 
articulate — in  two  languages  at  that!  So 
let's  just  say  that  the  chemistry  is  good 


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RADIO  ADDRESS 
TO  THE  NATION, 
MAR.  16,  1985'  M 

Tomorrow,  in  our  first  trip  outside  the    lei 
States  in  this  second  term,  Nancy  and  I 
will  be  heading  north  to  visit  our  good 
neighbors  in  Canada.  We're  going  at  the 
invitation  of  Canada's  Prime  Minister 
Brian  Mulroney,  who  is  an  articulate 
and  effective  defender  of  Canadian  in- 
terests, a  strong  friend  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  best  vote-getter  in  his 
nation's  history. 

We're  delighted  that  Brian  Mulronej^s 
has  chosen  Quebec  City,  capital  of  his 
home  Province,  as  the  site  of  our 
meeting.  With  its  old  streets  and  charm- 
ing ways,  Quebec  is  one  of  the  most  in- 
triguing corners  of  North  America,  righi 
on  our  northeastern  doorstep.  Quebec  is 
modern,  too,  supplying  the  United 
States  with  everything  from  electric 
power  to  aerospace  parts  for  our 
defense  industries. 

We're  going  to  Canada  now  for  one, 
simple  reason — no  country  is  more  im- 
portant to  the  United  States.  Sometime; 
we  overlook  that  fact.  Sometimes  our 
friendship  and  cooperation  may  not 
seem  to  warrant  as  much  attention  as 
the  serious  problems  we're  dealing  with 
in  other  areas. 

But  certain  facts  about  our  Canadiar 
neighbors  with  whom  we  share  the 
world's  longest  undefended  boundary 
must  never  be  overlooked.  Canada  and 
the  United  States  are  each  other's  most 
important  trading  partner.  There  is 
greater  volume  of  trade  between  our 
two  countries  than  between  any  other 
two  countries  in  the  world. 

We  sold  $45  billion  in  goods  to 
Canada  in  1984,  which  supported  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  jobs  in  the  United 
States.  Canada  is  our  principal  foreign 
supplier  of  natural  gas  and  electricity, 
and  Canada  is  the  most  important  locale 
for  our  foreign  investment.  Walk  around 
our  cities  and  towns  today  and  you  can 
see  increased  Canadian  investment  in 
real  estate  and  many  other  parts  of  our 
economy. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Most  important  the  national  security 
the  United  States  and  of  Canada  are 
sry  closely  interrelated.  The  Com- 
ander  in  Chief  of  the  North  American 
erospace  Defense  Command  in  Col- 
•ado  Springs  is  from  the  States;  his 
iputy  is  Canadian,  and  their  staff  is 
vided  among  U.S.  and  Canadian  of- 
;ers. 

Four  years  ago,  some  problems  had 
veloped  in  relations  between  the 
Inited  States  and  Canada.  But  we've 
een  working  hard  on  both  sides  of  the 
)rder  to  set  things  right.  Today 
anadian-American  relations  are  good, 
;  good  as  they've  ever  been.  And  dur- 
g  this  trip,  the  Prime  Minister  and  I 
e  determined  to  do  all  we  can  to  make 
■em  even  better. 

We  will  seek  to  strengthen  our 
onomic  relations — market-oriented 
olicies  without  government  interference 
)ld  out  the  best  opportunities  for  our 
/o  countries  to  prosper  as  economic 
irtners. 

So  we  welcome  Canadian  investment 
the  United  States  and  the  Mulroney 
Dvernment's  legislation  to  loosen 
(strictions  on  foreign  investment  in 
anada,  which  is  an  important  first  step 
ward  liberalizing  Canada's  own  invest- 
lent  policies.  It's  the  firm  policy  of  this 
(dministration  to  resist  protectionist 
essures.  So  we  would  like  Canada  and 
her  countries  to  join  us  in  a  new  round 
multilateral  trade  talks  in  1986.  We 
ill  encourage  the  sharing  of  our  mutual 
'fense  responsibilities.  Canada  is  a 
unding  member  of  NATO  with  a  proud 
ilitary  history  stretching  from  Vimy 
idge  in  France  during  the  First  World 
'ar  to  the  skies  over  Germany  in  the 
=cond,  to  the  seas  off  Korea  during 
at  conflict. 

We're  pleased  with  the  commitment 
■  Brian  Mulroney's  government  to  in- 
ease  significantly  Canada's  overall  con- 
ibution  to  our  shared  defense  respon- 
bilities.  On  the  quest  for  arms  reduc- 
3ns  and  on  other  global  problems, 
anada's  council  will  be  a  source  of 
-eat  wisdom  and  strength.  The  Prime 
inister  and  I  will  exchange  views  on 
?velopments  throughout  the  world  in- 
uding  the  Geneva  arms  reduction  talks 
id  our  own  efforts  to  protect  freedom, 
?mocracy,  and  peace  in  this  hemi- 
ihere. 

The  United  States  is  a  pioneer  in  en- 
;ronmental  protection,  and  we  share 
ith  Canada  a  special  responsibility  for 
rotecting  our  shared  North  American 
nvironment.  The  problem  of  acid  rain 
mcerns  both  our  countries,  and  I'm 
nxious  to  hear  the  Prime  Minister's 
lews  on  that  subject. 


In  1939  Winston  Churchill,  describ- 
ing the  5,000-mile  peaceful  border 
dividing  Canada  and  the  United  States 
said,  "That  long  frontier  from  the  Atlan- 
tic to  the  Pacific  Oceans,  guarded  only 
by  neighborly  respect  and  honorable 
obligations  is  an  example  to  every  coun- 
try and  a  pattern  for  the  future  of  the 
world. 

Today  more  than  ever,  our  progress, 
our  partnership,  and  our  friendship  can 
be  a  model  for  others  and  a  pattern  for 
the  future.  Working  together,  Canada 
and  the  United  States  can  accomplish 
great  things  for  the  cause  of  a  safer, 
freer,  and  more  prosperous  world.  And 
that's  what  our  trip  is  all  about. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 
MAR.  17,  1985^ 

Prime  Minister,  Mrs.  Mulroney,  thank 
you  very  much.  Premier  and  Mrs. 
Levesque,  distinguished  ladies  and 
gentlemen,  and  my  friends,  the  people  of 
Canada,  it's  a  great  pleasure  to  be  here, 
for  to  be  on  Canadian  soil  is  to  be 
among  friends,  and  Nancy  and  I  are 
happy  to  return  here. 

Et  nous  sommes  heureux  que  notre 
voyage  nous  permette  de  venir  daws  cette 
belle  ville  de  Quebec.  [Applause]  Quebec 
is  one  of  the  most  intriguing  spots  on 
the  continent.  Here,  New  France  was 
founded.  Here,  French  is  the  language 
of  commerce,  the  arts,  and  everyday 
life.  Here,  English  Canadians  and 
French  Canadians  came  together  over  a 
century  ago  to  set  the  foundations  for  a 
country  in  whose  Parliament  both 
French  and  English  would  be  spoken. 
And  here,  the  Citadel  and  the  walls  of 
the  old  city  remind  us  that  Canadians 
and  Americans  long  ago  put  aside  their 
differences  to  become  friends.  In  fact, 
we're  more  than  friends  and  neighbors 
and  allies;  we  are  kin,  who  together 
have  built  the  most  productive  relation- 
ship between  any  two  countries  in  the 
world  today. 

This  is  my  first  trip  outside  the 
United  States  since  I  was  sworn  in  to  a 
second  term.  Four  years  ago,  I  took  my 
first  trip  as  President — and  then,  too,  I 
came  to  Canada.  And  this  is  not  a  coin- 
cidence. For  the  United  States,  there  is 
no  more  important  relationship  than  our 
tie  with  Canada.  We  are  each  other's 
most  important  economic  partner.  We 
each  play  an  important  role  in  world  af- 
fairs. We  share  a  responsibility  for  the 
protection  of  the  continent  that  we 
peacefully  share.  We  have  a  joint  stake 
in  its  environment.  And  we  are  partners 
in  space  and  in  the  technologies  of  the 
future. 


Between  two  such  independent  and 
sovereign  countries,  there  will  always  be 
some  differences,  as  there  will  always  be 
opportunities  for  agreement.  We  can 
still  use  what  Franklin  I).  Roosevelt,  our 
last  American  President  to  visit  Quebec 
City  while  serving  at  the  White  House, 
called  for  between  us.  He  asked  for 
"frank  dealing,  cooperation,  and  a  spirit 
of  give  and  take." 

That's  precisely  whal  your  Prime 
Minister  and  I  will  be  engaged  in  here  in 
Quebec.  We  will  discuss  many  matters 
pertaining  to  the  environment,  economic 
growth,  and  our  mutual  security.  We 
will  discuss  global  affairs,  including 
arms  control. 

We  will  also  be  celebrating  St. 
Patrick's  Day.  For  two  fellows  named 
Reagan  and  Mulroney,  this  would  seem 
to  be  appropriate.  I  know  a  number  of 
people  today,  including  myself,  are 
wearing  green  ties.  But  I  will  really 
make  my  contribution  this  evening  at 
dinner.  I'm  going  to  think  of  the  Prime 
Minister's  majority  in  Parliament  and 
turn  green  with  envy.  [Laughter  and  ap- 
plause] 


ANNOUNCEMENT  ON  ACID  RAIN, 
MAR.  17.  1985^ 

Prime  Minister  Mulroney 

The  President  and  I  have  had  what  I 
believe  to  be  a  very  important  discussion 
on  the  problem  of  acid  rain.  We  have 
made  a  significant  step  forward,  in  that 
a  matter  that  has  been  on  the  back 
burner  for  the  last  3  years  has  now  been 
brought  forward,  and  I  think  on  both 
sides  have  acknowledged  that  our  prob- 
lem is  common  in  nature  and  requires  a 
joint  solution.  The  President  and  I  will 
be  talking  about  this  again  tomorrow 
and  in  the  future.  But  I  think  that  we 
have  managed  to  break  a  deadlock 
which  has  prevented  some  common  ac- 
tion on  this. 

From  the  Canadian  point  of  view,  as 
you  know,  I've  taken  the  position  that 
it's  important  that  we  clean  up  our  own 
act.  And  Canada  has  begun  that  process 
with  a  comprehensive  national  program. 
And  so  there  will  be  a  document  re- 
leased—  I  suppose  within  the  next  half- 
hour  or  so. 

But  to  ensure  that  this  matter — this 
matter  that  the  President  and  I  both 
agree  is  of  such  great  importance  to  our 
respective  countries — never  finds  its 
way  again  onto  the  back  burner,  we 
have  agreed  today  to  the  appointment  of 
two  special  envoys  of  great  excellence 
and  influence  and  uncommon  access  to 
us  as  leaders. 


lay  1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


They  will  carry  the  matters  forward 
and  I  think  help  us  achieve  real  results. 
They'll  report  to  us  on  a  regular  basis, 
and  I  appreciate  the  President's  commit- 
ment as  demonstrated  by  the  calibre  of 
his  appointment  which  he  will  announce 
momentarily. 

For  our  part,  the  government  of 
Canada  is  particularly  pleased  to  an- 
nounce the  appointment  of  the 
Honorable  William  G.  Davis,  former 
Prime  Minister  of  Ontario,  as  our  special 
ambassador  in  this  vital  area. 

[The  Prime  Minister  repeated  this 
announcement  in  French.] 

President  Reagan 

I'll  only  take  a  second  here  simply  to  en- 
dorse what  the  Prime  Minister  had  told 
you.  We're  very  pleased  with  the  out- 
come of  the  discussion.  We  touched 
upon  a  number  of  things  of  interest,  and 
we'll  be  dealing  with  those  in  the  meet- 
ings to  come  tomorrow. 

But  of  particular  concern  to  us  was 
this  issue  of  acid  rain.  And  I'm  very 
pleased  with  the  envoys  who  have  been 
chosen.  The  Prime  Minister  has  named  a 
man  that — I'm  sure  you  all  know  his  ac- 
cess to  him  and  has  a  standing  that  will 
make  him  capable  of  carrying  what  has 
to  be  a  joint  undertaking  as  the  Prime 
Minister  has  said. 

And  for  our  own  part,  my  nom- 
inee— and  he  has  accepted — is  Drew 
Lewis,  the  former  Secretary  of 
Transportation,  who  has  agreed  to  take 
on  this  task. 

And  so  together,  we  will  find  an 
answer  to  this  problem.  I  couldn't  be 
happier  about  getting  this  underway  and 
off  dead-center. 


LUNCHEON  REMARKS, 
MAR.  18,  1985^ 

Nancy  et  moi  desirous  vour  remercier 
dufond  du  coeur  de  voire  chaleureuse 
hospitalite.  [Applause]  Just  as  4  years 
ago,  it  is  an  honor  and  a  privilege  to 
make  our  first  visit  of  the  term  a  visit  to 
Canada,  our  close  neighbor,  our  strong 
ally,  and,  yes,  our  dear  friend. 

To  have  come  to  the  heart  of  old 
Quebec,  to  this  chateau  that,  for  us,  will 
forever  be  a  memory  of  beauty  looking 
down  on  beauty  all  around,  and  still 
more,  to  have  been  joined  by  one  who 
shares  my  roots  on  St.  Patrick's  Day 
[laughter],  well,  it's  almost  too  much  for 
this  son  of  an  Irishman  to  bear. 
[Laugh  ter| 

As  you  might  say  in  your  native 
tongue,  se  formidable.  [Laughter]  And 
this  might  be  enough  to  convince  you 


that  French  is  not  my  native  tongue. 
[Laughter]  Actually,  I  was  told  a  long 
time  ago,  "Don't  worry  about  your  ac- 
cent. It's  not  how  well  you  speak 
French,"  the  gentleman  said,  "but  how 
well  you  appreciate  our  people  and 
culture."  And  ever  since  Jacques  Cartier 
told  me  that  [laughter],  I've  been  a  great 
admirer  of  all  things  French-Canadian. 
[Laughter] 

As  we  begin  anew,  we  come  again  to 
be  with  friends.  We  come  to  share  great 
dreams  in  a  land  where  big  is  a  word  too 
small  to  describe  the  sweep  of  Lauren- 
tian  peaks  and  prairie  plains  or  the 
strength  of  Canadian  spirit  that  tamed  a 
giant  continent  and  now  looks  to  a 
future  rich  with  promise. 

Flying  over  Canada  yesterday  after- 
noon, I  thought  of  your  Commander 
Marc  Garneau.  He's  the  first  of  what  we 
hope  will  be  many  Canadian  astronauts 
on  joint  space  shuttle  missions.  And 
aboard  the  space  shuttle  Challenger,  at 
a  moment  high  above  Quebec,  Com- 
mander Garneau  said,  "My  country  is 
very  fantastic.  We  are  lucky  to  be  Cana- 
dian, to  have  such  a  big  and  wonderful 
country."  To  which  I  would  only  add: 
And  are  we  not  lucky  to  be  neighbors  in 
these  good,  free  lands  that  God  has 
blessed  as  none  others  have  ever  been 
blessed? 

When  we  look  around  the  world  to- 
day, when  we  see  a  scar  of  shame 
dividing  families  in  Europe,  East  from 
West,  and  in  Korea,  North  from  South, 
see  the  anguish  that  aggression  has 
wrought  upon  so  many  innocent  lives 
across  our  planet,  then,  yes,  we  would 
do  well  to  give  thanks  for  the  principles 
of  democracy  and  human  dignity  that 
have  cradled  us  with  peace  and 
showered  us  with  abundance  since  the 
birth  of  our  two  nations. 

Victor  Hugo  once  observed,  no  army 
can  stop  an  idea  whose  time  has  come. 
Today,  the  tide  of  freedom  is  up,  lifting 
our  economies  ever  higher  on  new  cur- 
rents of  imagination,  discovery,  and 
hope  for  our  future. 

There  is  a  leader  who  personifies 
this  new  spirit  who  has  said,  "Canadians 
in  the  mid-'80's  have  a  renewed  sense  of 
confidence  in  themselves  as  a  nation." 
There  is  "a  role  for  government  that  is 
less  interventionist,"  he  said,  "a  role  that 
creates  a  climate  in  which  the  entrepre- 
neurial genius  of  the  private  sector  can 
do  what  it  does  best — namely,  create 
new  wealth,  new  possibilities  of  employ- 
ment." 

We  take  a  friendly  neighbor's  quiet 
pride  in  your  Canadian  revival;  and  we 
share  your  great  respect  for  the  man  do- 
ing so  much  to  carry  it  forward,  your 
Prime  Minister,  and  my  friend,  Brian 
Mulroney.  [Applause] 


k 


? 


Canadians  live  at  the  top  of  North 
America,  and  sometimes  we  think  of  yoi 
as  fellow  home-dwellers  inhabiting  the 
upper  floors  of  the  house.  And  we  who 
live  downstairs  have  heard  some  rum- 
bling up  here,  in  that  portion  that  we 
know  to  be  Quebec.  The  changes  in 
French  Canada  during  the  past  25 
years,  your  revolution  tranquille,  pro- 
pelled the  transformation  of  Quebec  into 
a  modern  community  while  emphasizing 
all  along  its  French-speaking  character. 

In  a  unique  referendum,  the  people 
of  Quebec  declared  themselves  Canadian 
and  Quebecois.  Now  your  long  history  as 
a  French-speaking  North  American  com 
munity  is  entering  an  exciting  pha.se — 
Quebec  enterpreneurs  competing  across 
the  continent,  spreading  business  know- 
how  with  a  French  face. 

We  see  and  feel  your  progress.  And 
we  value  highly  the  friendship  of  a  peo- 
ple unafraid  to  embrace  the  challenge  of 
change,  yet  unwilling  to  forsake  your 
oldest,  most-trusted  companions — 
Canadian  traditions,  values,  and  roots. 

There's  a  saying  I've  always  liked — 
one  should  keep  old  roads  and  old 
friends.  You  have  not  strayed  from  the 
road  of  Canadian  culture,  from  those 
good  and  graceful  virtues  that  enrich 
your  lives  and  keep  you  free  to  be  kind 
and  true,  free  to  strive  for  progress  and 
greatness,  without  surrendering  your 
souls  to  a  mad  and  mindless  pursuit  of 
the  material. 

Mes  amis,  the  eyes  of  all  America 
are  on  Canada.  In  our  universities,  new 
programs  for  Canadian  studies  have 
been  created;  in  our  government,  new 
importance  given  to  the  Canadian-Amer 
ican  relationship;  and  in  our  economy, 
we  feel  Canada's  heightened  presence  in 
our  daily  lives:  from  Quebec  electrical 
power  to  Alberta's  oil  and  natural  gas; 
and  from  your  help  in  liuilding  our  tele- 
communications industry  to  what  many 
believe  is  the  best  beer  in  the  world 
[laughter].  We're  with  you,  Mr.  Prime 
Minister,  we  feel  mighty  grateful  for 
Canada,  and  we  always  will. 

At  the  heart  of  my  nation's  policies 
is  one  conviction,  and  please  hear  it  well: 
No  relationship  is  more  important  to  the 
United  States  than  our  ties  with 
Canada.  We  are  by  far  each  other's  most 
important  trading  partner.  Our  two-way 
trade,  the  largest  in  the  world,  is  valued 
at  over  $1()()  billion.  We're  allies.  In 
North  America  and  across  the  North 
Atlantic,  we're  proud  to  stand  watch 
with  you,  and,  together,  we  shall  keep 
our  people  free,  secure,  and  at  peace. 
Above  all,  we're  friends,  and  friends  we 
shall  always  be.  [Applause| 

The  question  is,  having  righted 
ourselves  and  regained  our  optimism. 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


lere  do  we  go  from  here?  But  I  believe 
ur  F'rime  Minister  and  I  agree: 
.nada  and  America  can  invest 
j;ether.  grow  together  and  lead 
j-ether — and  leaders  we  shall  be  in  a 
w  partnership  pointing  toward  the 
st  century.  That  new  partnership 
gins  with  our  being  more  mindful  of 
r  need  for  close  cooperation  and  con- 
int  communication,  each  of  us  careful- 
respecting  the  other's  interests  and 
vereignty. 

For  our  part,  the  United  States  has 
gim  a  great  change  in  direction — 
ay  from  years  of  creeping  socialism 
i  ever-greater  dependency  that  slow- 
our  progress,  toward  a  new 
nerican  revolution;  a  peaceful  revolu- 
n  to  be  sure,  rising  from  our  convic- 
n  that  successful  action  must  begin 
th  a  vision  of  hope  and  opportunity 

all. 

The  evidence  is  clear:  Freedom 
rks,  incentives  are  key,  and  nations 
loring  these  principles  will  lose  out  in 
?  economic  competition  in  the  1980s 

beyond.  Japan,  a  devastated  country 
;er  World  War  II,  cut  tax  rates  almost 
ery  year  for  two  decades,  producing 
explosive,  noninflationary  expansion, 
iking  them  a  world  economic  power, 
d  leaving  Europe  and  North  America 
ling  behind.  Other  Pacific  nations 
ve  also  become  champions  for  growth. 

Let  us  then  set  our  sights  on  a  new 
ion — a  renaissance  of  growth  in  a 
'jrld  come  alive  with  entrepreneurial 
:or;  each  nation  trading  freely  with  its 
ghbors;  all  of  us  together  a  mighty 
•edom  tide  carrying  hope  and  oppor- 
lity  to  the  farthest  corners  of  the 
)be. 

We  in  the  States  have  tried  to  learn 
)m  our  mistakes  and  show,  once 
ain,  that  nothing  succeeds  like 
■edom.  Since  our  tax  rate  reductions 
)k  effect,  we  have  enjoyed  27  straight 
onths  of  economic  growth  and  a  record 
million  jobs  producing  a  dramatic  in- 
pase  in  our  purchases  from  other  na- 
ifns,  starting  with  Canada. 

We  know  we  must  do  much  more  to 
■strain  the  growth  of  government, 
eak  down  barriers  of  trade,  and 
come  more  competitive.  And,  since 
K  rates — functioning  as  prices  for  pro- 
cing,  saving,  and  investing — are  the 
ys  to  economic  growth  or  decline, 
'Ye  committed  to  a  historic  reform  of 
■r  tax  code,  making  America's  after- 
X  rewards  the  brightest  light  for 
owth  and  stability  in  the  industrialized 
)rld. 

Protecting  the  environment  is  one  of 
ramount  concern  to  us  both.  The 
lited  States  has  the  strictest  auto 
lissions  standards  in  the  world,  and 


President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  at  tiie  Citadel,  the  largest  fortification  in 
North  America  still  garrisoned  by  regular  troops.  Constructed  between  1820  and  1832,  it 
has  25  buildings,  including  the  Governor  General's  residence  (under  restoration).  In 
August  1943,  Winston  Churchill,  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  and  MacKenzie  King  met  at  the 
Citadel  for  their  historic  Quebec  conference. 


during  the  last  decade,  we  spent  over 
$150  billion  to  comply  with  our  Clean 
Air  Act.  Emissions  of  sulpher  dioxide 
are  down  nearly  30%  and  nitrogen  ox- 
ides are  declining  as  well.  But  we  must 
make  further  progress  and,  by  acting 
reasonably  and  responsibly,  we  can  and 
will.  Yesterday,  the  Prime  Minister  and 
I  issued  a  statement  on  our  agreement 
to  address  together  the  problem  of  acid 
rain. 

In  all  that  we  do,  we  seek  to  go  for- 
ward with  Canada  as  our  partner,  two 
leaders  for  progress  through  shared  vi- 
sion and  enlightened  cooperation.  This 
afternoon  at  the  Citadel,  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  and  I  will  take  further  steps 
together  to  put  our  new  partnership  to 
work. 


We  will  issue  a  declaration  on  inter- 
national security  and  sign  a  memoran- 
dum on  the  modernization  of  our  North 
American  air  defense  system.  We  will 
exchange  the  instruments  of  ratification 
that  will  bring  the  Pacific  salmon  treaty 
into  effect,  as  he  told  you.  We  will  sign 
a  mutual  legal  assistance  treaty  which 
will  aid  law-enforcement  authorities  in 
both  our  countries.  And,  we  will  issue  a 
declaration  on  trade. 

The  prosperity  of  Canada  and  the 
United  States  depends  upon  freer  flow- 
ing trade  within  this  continent  and 
across  the  seas.  We  stand  ready  to  im- 
prove further  the  Canada-U.S.  trading 
relationship  and  to  work  with  you  to  ini- 
tiate a  new  multilateral  trade  round  in 
early  1986. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


I'm  confident  there  isn't  an  area 
where  you  and  I  cannot  reach  an  agree- 
ment for  the  good  of  our  two  countries. 
Come  to  think  of  it,  maybe  there  is  one. 
I  know  it's  a  great  concern  to  you,  but  I 
don't  think  I  have  the  authority  to  send 
Gary  Carter  back  to  the  Expos. 
[Laughter] 

But  more  powerful  in  our  economies, 
more  powerful  in  our  friendship,  the 
United  States  and  Canada  can  meet 
together  the  challenge  of  defending 
freedom  and  leaving  a  safer  world  for 
those  who  will  follow.  For  more  than  35 
years,  we  and  our  European  friends 
have  joined  together  in  history's  most 
successful  alliance,  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization.  The  world  will  not 
forget  that  Canada  was  in  the  forefront 
of  the  nations  that  formed  and  armed 
NATO. 

Upgrading  NATO's  conventional 
forces  is  essential  to  deterrence.  The 
greater  our  ability  to  resist  Soviet  ag- 
gression with  conventional  forces;  the 
less  likely  such  aggression  will  ever  oc- 
cur. NA'TO  is  engaged  in  a  rebuilding 
program,  and  today,  I  want  to  thank 
publicly  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  and 
the  Canadian  people  for  your  commit- 
ment to  enhance  your  contribution  to 
NATO's  conventional  forces  and  our 
overall  defenses. 

Your  deficit  as  a  percentage  of  gross 
national  product  is  bigger  than  ours,  but 
you  understand  that  protecting  freedom 
is  government's  primary  responsibility. 
And  we  salute  Canadian  wisdom  and 
Canadian  courage.  [Applause] 

The  United  States  will  continue  to 
pur.sue  the  arms  control  talks  in  Geneva 
with  determination,  flexibility,  and  pa- 
tience. It  is  our  deepest  conviction  that  a 
nuclear  war  cannot  be  won  and  must 
never  be  fought.  We  must  not  rest  in 
our  search  for  a  safer  world  dedicated  to 
eliminating  nuclear  weapons,  with 
technology  providing  ever  greater  safe- 
ty, not  ever  greater  fear. 

We're  enthusiastic  about  the 
research  done  so  far  on  our  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative.  The  possibility  of 
developing  and  sharing  with  you 
technology  that  could  provide  a  security 
shield  and  someday  eliminate  the  threat 
of  nuclear  attack.  It  is,  for  us,  the  most 
hopeful  possibility  of  the  nuclear  age, 
and  we  very  much  appreciate  Canada's 
support  on  SDI  research. 

It  puzzles  me  to  hear  the  Soviets 
describe  research  to  protect  humanity  as 
a  threat  to  peace.  Their  protests  ring  a 
little  hollow.  I  did  some  research  of  my 
own  and  found  that  in  1967,  former 
Soviet  Premier  Aleksei  Kosygin  said, 
"The  antimissile  system  is  not  a  weapon 
of  aggression  or  attack,  it  is  a  defensive 


system."  And  the  Soviets  took  his  words 
to  heart  and  began  investing  heavily  in 
strategic  defense. 

Let  us  all  acknowledge  that  humani- 
ty will  be  far  better  served  by  moving 
away  from  offensive  nuclear  systems 
that  kill  people  to  non-nuclear  defensive 
systems  that  protect  people.  We  will  be 
consulting  closely  with  your  government 
during  these  negotiations.  And  I  have 
told  the  Prime  Minister  that  I'm  never 
more  than  a  phone  call  away.  As  allies, 
we  must  maintain  our  unity  and  insist 
on  agreements  that  are  equitable  and 
verifiable. 

As  much  as  we  may  hope  for 
greater  stability  through  arms  control, 
we  must  remember  that  the  Soviet 
record  of  compliance  with  past 
agreements  has  been  poor.  The  Soviet 
Union  signed  the  Yalta  accord,  pledging 
free  elections,  then  proceeded  to 
dominate  Eastern  Europe.  They  signed 
the  Geneva  convention  banning  use  of 
chemical  weapons;  SALT  II,  limiting 
development  of  new  weapons;  and  the 
Antiballistic  Missile  Treaty  but  are  now 
violating  all  three.  And  they  signed  the 
Helsinki  accords,  solemnly  pledging 
respect  for  human  rights  but  then  jailed 
the  individuals  trying  to  monitor  it  in 
the  U.S.S.R. 

Arms  control  is  not  the  only  issue  on 
the  East- West  agenda,  and  the  opening 
of  the  Geneva  talks  is  not  the  only 
development  in  East-West  relations.  In 
most  of  our  Western  countries,  our 
peoples  can  look  forward  to  continued 
strong,  stable  governments,  and  our 
alliances  are  in  good  shape.  We  have 
demonstrated  unity  and  firmness  in  our 
dealings  with  the  East.  We're  ready  to 
work  with  the  Soviet  Union  for  more 
constructive  relations.  We  all  want  to 
hope  that  last  week's  change  of  leader- 
ship in  Moscow  will  open  up  new 
possibilities  for  doing  this. 

There's  plenty  to  talk  about — in 
arms  control,  on  regional  issues,  on 
human  rights,  and  in  our  bilateral  rela- 
tions. My  representatives  in  Moscow  had 
good  talks  with  Mr.  Gorbachev,  and 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney  has  given  me 
his  own  assessment  of  the  new  Soviet 
leadership.  If  the  Soviets  are  as  ready  as 
we  are  to  take  the  other  side's  concerns 
into  account,  it  should  be  possible  to 
resolve  problems  and  reduce  interna- 
tional tensions. 

Let  us  always  remain  idealists  but 
never  blind  to  history.  I  suspect  that  our 
lives  grow  richer  and  fuller  as  we  help 
make  our  lives  more  secure  and  more 
free.  We  must  never  doubt  the  great 
good  that  Canada  and  the  United  States 
can  accomplish  together,  never  doubt  for 


a  moment  our  journey  toward  a  world 
where  someday  all  may  live  under 
freedom's  star — free  to  worship  as  the; 
please,  to  speak  their  thoughts,  to  com' 
and  go  as  they  will,  to  achieve  the 
fullness  of  their  potential,  and,  yes, 
reach  out  to  comfort  those  who  have 
fallen  with  the  Godly  gift  of  human  lov^ 

This  is  the  idealist  within  us  whose 
heart  is  pure  and  can  power  our  journe 
with  faith  and  courage.  But  the  realist 
must  be  there,  too — our  navigator  at  tl 
helm  whose  eagle-eyes  discern  each 
movement  of  the  sky  above  and  waves 
below.  We  must  never  stop  trying  to 
reach  a  better  world,  but  we'll  never 
make  it  if  we  don't  see  our  world  as  it 
truly  is. 

We  cannot  look  the  other  way  whei 
treaties  are  violated,  human  beings 
persecuted,  religions  banned,  and  entin 
democracies  crushed.  We  cannot  ignore 
that  while  Canadians  and  Americans 
have  donated  nearly  $100  million  from 
their  own  pockets  to  help  feed  starving 
Ethiopians,  the  Soviets  and  all  their 
satellites  have  given  almost  no  aid.  But 
they  continue  to  provide  more  than  a 
half  a  billion  dollars  a  year  in  military 
supplies  that  the  Ethiopian  Governmen 
is  using  against  its  own  people. 

These  are  painful  realities,  but 
history  may  well  remember  them  as  th( 
birth  pangs  of  a  new,  much  brighter  er 
Brave  men  and  women  are  challenging 
the  Brezhnev  doctrine  that  insists  once 
country  has  been  taken  from  the  familj 
of  free  nations,  it  may  never  return. 

Freedom  movements  are  rising 
up — from  Afghanistan  to  Cambodia. 
Angola,  Ethiopia,  and  Nicaragua.  More 
than  twice  as  many  people  are  fighting 
in  the  field  right  now  against  the 
Nicaraguan  communist  regime  as  fougl 
against  Somoza.  The  weight  of  the 
world  is  struggling  to  shift  away  from 
the  dreary  failures  of  communist  oppre 
sion  into  the  warm  sunlight  of  genuine 
democracy  and  human  rights. 

Will  history  speak  of  freedom  vic- 
torious? May  we  someday  salute  new 
heroes  from  nations  reborn — sons  and 
daughters  who  might  grow  up  to  be  lik< 
a  Marc  Garneau  or  Roberta  Bondar, 
bringing  honor  to  science  and  their  na- 
tions; or,  perhaps,  like  Andre  Viger, 
who  lost  the  use  of  his  legs,  but  with  hi: 
will  of  steel  in  a  land  of  the  free,  could 
keep  on  going  to  open  six  stores  emploj 
ing  more  than  40  people,  many  of  them 
handicapped,  and  even  win  our  Boston 
Marathon  as  well? 

History's  verdict  will  depend  on 
us — on  our  courage  and  our  faith,  on 
our  wisdom  and  our  love.  It'll  depend  on 
what  we  do,  or  fail  to  do,  for  the  cause 
of  millions  who  carry  just  one  dream  in 


Department  of  State  Bulletif 


heir  hearts — to  live  lives  like  ours,  in 
his  special  land  between  the  seas, 
/here  each  day  a  new  adventure  begins 
1  a  revolution  of  hope  that  never  ends. 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney  once  sug- 
ested  that  Americans  and  their  Presi- 
ent  should  be  grateful  for  Canada.  How 
lan  we  not  be  grateful  for  the  greatness 
f  Banting  and  Best,  of  Mike  Pearson, 
f  young  Steve  Fonyo,  and  of  so  many 
we  never  knew.  For  the  inspiration  you 
ive,  for  the  success  that  you  enjoy,  and 
ar  the  friend  of  America  and  friend  of 
freedom  that  you  will  always  be,  yes,  we 
(ay,  thank  God  for  Canada. 


ilGNING  CEREMONY, 

riAR.  18,  less-! 

.^he  Citadel  of  Quebec  says  so  much 
.bout  Canada  and  about  the  relations 
letween  our  two  countries.  On  this  rock 
ince  flew  the  flag  of  France  and  then 
he  flag  of  Britain.  And  today,  the 
*Iaple  Leaf  flag  symbolizes  a  united 
Canada. 

Over  two  centuries  ago,  Canadians 
md  Americans  battled  one  another  in 
his  city.  But  the  walls  surrounding  us 
oday  were  erected  later  for  a  war 
vhich  never  came.  Canada  and  the 
Jnited  States  put  aside  suspicion  to 
luild  not  only  a  lasting  and  permanent 
'riendship  but  a  great  and  productive 
-elationship.  Today,  the  Citadel,  and 
ither  places  like  it  in  both  our  countries, 
^tand  as  monuments  to  a  history  of 
Deace,  goodwill,  and  cooperation. 


Earlier  today,  I  suggested  that 
Canada  and  the  United  States  are  forg- 
ing a  new  partnership.  This  afternoon 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney  and  I  have  put 
that  new  partnership  to  work.  The  rela- 
tionship between  our  two  countries  is 
complex  and  varied.  The  agreements  we 
announced  this  afternoon  reflect  that 
variety. 

We  share  the  world's  longest 
undefended  border  and  the  world's 
largest  water  boundary.  Yet,  more  fun- 
damentally, we  share  Earth's  most  boun- 
tiful continent.  We're  responsible  for 
managing  and  preserving  that  common 
environment.  We  have  a  long  history  of 
cooperating  in  doing  so.  I'm  personally 
committed  to  continuing  this  proud 
tradition.  I  know  that  our  two  govern- 
ments share  this  commitment. 

And  I  know  that  the  issue  of  acid 
rain  has  received  a  great  deal  of  atten- 
tion in  Canada.  Let  me  simply  say, 
cooperation  on  this  issue  is  possible  and 
the  appointment  by  the  Prime  Minister 
and  by  me  of  special  envoys  is  another 
step  forward.  So  difficult  a  problem 
deserves  the  best  talent  that  our  two 
governments  can  enlist. 

For  almost  three  decades,  the  dis- 
tant early  warning  line — known  as  the 
DEW  line — has  been  the  northern-most 
edge  of  our  early  warning  capability.  It's 
been  a  vital  part  of  the  deterrent  system 
which  protects  both  countries  from  at- 
tack, serving  as  a  watchtower  for 
NORAD.  The  technology  of  the  DEW 
line  is  now  almost  obsolete.  But  the  need 
for  an  early  warning  line  remains.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  Prime  Minister  and  I 


THE  PRESIDENT 


issued  an  agreement  to  modernize  the 
North  American  air  defense  system. 

The  mutual  legal  assistance  treaty 
which  we  signed  will  facilitiile  coopera- 
tion between  Canadian  and  American 
law  enforcement  officials. 

Protecting  the  environment,  defend- 
ing our  people,  and  ensuring  that  justice 
is  done— these  are  all  special  roles  for 
government.  Economic  prosperity, 
however,  requires  the  enterprise,  work, 
and  investment  of  the  private  sector.  As 
each  other's  largest  trading  partner, 
Canada  and  the  United  States  have  long 
enjoyed  profitable  economic  and  com- 
mercial ties.  And  today.  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  and  I  are  issuing  an  important 
declaration  which  we  expect  will 
facilitate  expanded  trade. 

We  also  exchanged  the  instruments 
of  ratification  for  a  U.S. -Canada  Pacific 
salmon  treaty.  This  brings  a  15-year-old 
undertaking  to  a  successful  and  mutually 
beneficial  conclusion,  as  you've  been 
told.  The  treaty  will  be  a  boon  to  our 
citizens  along  the  Pacific  Coast.  It  sym- 
bolizes how  we're  able,  with  a  combina- 
tion of  hard  work  and  high-level  atten- 
tion, to  turn  an  irritant  in  our  relations 
into  a  form  of  cooperation. 

The  poet  Rupert  Brooke  wrote: 
"And  high  and  grey  and  serene  above 
the  morning  lay  the  citadel  of  Quebec.  Is 
there  any  city  in  the  world  that  stands 
so  nobly  as  Quebec?"  Nancy  and  I  have 
deeply  appreciated  your  hospitality. 
We'll  always  remember  the  beauty  of 
your  city.  Nous  garderons  toujours  un 
excellent  souvenir  de  notre  sejour  a 
Quebec,  et  de  vous.  We  will  always 
remember  Quebec,  we  will  always 
remember  you. 


SUMMARY 

President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  met  at  Quebec  City  on  March  17 
and  18  for  three  sessions  of  talks.  The  prin- 
cipal achievements  of  the  visit  were: 

•  A  trade  declaration  reflecting  the 
strong  political  commitment  of  the  two 
leaders  to  create  a  more  secure,  predictable 
environment  for  trade.  They  specifically  com- 
mitted themselves  to  halt  protectionism  on 
cross-border  trade  in  goods  and  services, 
adopted  measures  to  enhance  access  to  each 
other's  markets  and  launched  a  program  to 
explore  further  means  to  facilitate  and  in- 
crease trade  and  investment,  and  reaffirmed 
their  commitment  to  a  strong  multilateral 
trading  system; 

•  An  agreement  to  appoint  special  en- 
voys on  acid  rain,  with  an  agreed  mandate, 
and  to  report  to  the  President  and  Prime 
Minister  by  their  next  meeting; 


May  1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


•  A  declaration  on  international  security 
reinvigorating  the  defense  partnership  be- 
tween the  two  countries  including  the 
defense  development  and  production  sharing 
arrangements  and  committing  both  sides  to 
consult  closely  on  security  and  arms  control 
issues; 

•  An  agreement  on  modernization  of 
North  American  air  defense  and  the  north 
warning  system; 

•  An  exchange  of  instruments  ratifying 
the  new  treaty  to  restore  the  west  coast 
salmon  fishery; 

•  Signing  of  a  legal  assistance  treaty  to 
help  fight  international  criminal  activity  while 
respecting  each  other's  sovereignty. 

The  Prime  Minister  informed  the  Presi- 
dent that  Canada  has  accepted  the  U.S.  in- 
vitation to  participate  in  the  space  station 
project. 

Other  bilateral  subjects  discussed  during 
the  talks  included  the  Canada-U.S.  relation- 
ship, economic  issues,  and  improved  Canadian 
access  to  the  U.S.  defense  and  space  market. 

Their  discussion  also  covered  the  crisis  in 
Africa,  human  rights.  East- West  relations  in- 
cluding the  Prime  Minister's  trip  to  Moscow 
for  President  Chernenko's  funeral,  the 
Geneva  talks,  the  world  economic  situation, 
and  preparations  for  the  Bonn  summit. 


DECLARATION  ON  TRADE  IN 
GOODS  AND  SERVICES 

We  embark  today  on  a  joint  effort  to 
establish  a  climate  of  greater  predictability 
and  confidence  for  Canadians  and  Americans 
alike  to  plan,  invest,  grow,  and  compete  more 
effectively  with  one  another  and  in  the  global 
market. 

We  are  convinced  that  an  improved  and 
more  secure  climate  for  bilateral  trade  rela- 
tions will  encourage  market  forces  to  achieve 
a  more  rational  and  competitive  production 
and  distribution  of  goods  and  services. 

We  remain  committed  to  the  principles  of 
the  multilateral  trading  system  embodied  in 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT)  as  the  cornerstone  of  our  respective 
trade  policies.  We  are  determined  to  exercise 
the  political  will  to  make  the  open,  multi- 
lateral trading  system  work  better  and  to 
strengthen  and  extend  the  disciplines  govern- 
ing international  commerce. 

We  will  work  jointly  to  strengthen  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  GATT  rules  and  establish  new 
disciplines.  We  call  on  all  nations  to  join  with 
us  in  establishing  a  preparatory  committee 
this  summer  for  a  new  round  of  multilateral 
trade  negotiations  to  ensure  that  negotiations 
commence  in  early  1986. 

We  believe  that  the  challenge  to  our  two 
countries  is  to  invigorate  our  unique  eco- 
nomic relationship.  We  intend  to  build  on  our 
.success  in  resolving  a  number  of  disputes  and 
achieve  .something  of  lasting  significance  to 
provide  a  model  to  other  nations  of  the  way 
in  which  two  modern  societies  can  work  in 
harmony. 


We  have  today  agreed  to  give  the  highest 
priority  to  finding  mutually  acceptable  means 
to  reduce  and  eliminate  existing  barriers  to 
trade  in  order  to  secure  and  facilitate  trade 
and  investment  flows. 

As  a  first  step,  we  commit  ourselves  to 
halt  protectionism  in  crossborder  trade  in 
goods  and  services. 

We  have  charged  Ambassador  Brock,  the 
U.S.  Trade  Representative,  and  the 
Honorable  James  Kelleher,  Minister  for  In- 
ternational Trade,  to  establish  immediately  a 
bilateral  mechanism  to  chart  all  possible  ways 
to  reduce  and  eliminate  existing  barriers  to 
trade  and  to  report  to  us  within  6  months. 

We  have  also  directed  that  action  be 
undertaken  over  the  next  12  months  to 
resolve  specific  impediments  to  trade  in  a 
manner  consistent  with  our  international 
obligations  and  our  legislative  requirements. 
Such  action  will  proceed  on  the  basis  of  full 
consultation  with  the  private  sector  and  other 
levels  of  government  and  will  concentrate  ini- 
tially on: 

•  National  treatment,  on  a  contractual, 
equitable,  and  mutually  advantageous  basis, 
with  respect  to  government  procurement  and 
funding  programs; 

•  Standardization,  reduction,  or  simpli- 
fication of  regulatory  requirements  which 
would  facilitate  trade  in  goods  and  services; 

•  Improvement  in  the  Canada-U.S.  Air 
Transport  Agreement  aimed  at  facilitating 
transborder  travel  and  commerce  by  expand- 
ing the  number  of  available  services  and 
reducing  obstacles  to  the  introduction  of  in- 
novative and  competitive  new  services; 

•  Strengthening  our  market  approach  to 
Canada-U.S.  energy  trade  by  reducing 
restrictions,  particularly  those  on  petroleum 
imports  and  ex-ports,  and  by  maintaining  and 
extending  open  access  to  each  other's  energy 
markets,  including  oil,  natural  gas,  electrici- 
ty, and  coal; 

•  Improving  access  for  traders  on  both 
sides  of  the  border  through  reduction  in  tariff 
barriers; 

•  Facilitation  of  travel  for  business  and 
commercial  purposes; 

•  Elimination  or  reduction  of  tariff  and 
nontariff  barriers  to  trade  in  high-technology 
goods  and  related  services,  such  as  com- 
puters, data  flow,  and  computer-assisted 
design  and  manufacturing  technology;  and 

•  Cooperation  to  protect  intellectual 
property  rights  from  trade  in  counterfeit 
goods  and  other  abuses  of  copyright  and  pat- 
ent law. 

We  urge  our  respective  private  sectors  to 
expand  their  contacts  and  continue  to  provide 
advice  on  the  future  of  our  trading  relation- 
ship. 

We  are  confident  that  these  undertakings 
will  facilitate  trade  and  investment  flows  be- 
tween our  two  countries  and  act  as  catalysts 
for  broader  international  cooperation. 


JOINT  STATEMENT  ON  THE 
ENVIRONMENT 


To 


»tti 


Bill 

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sou 
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itdi 


During  their  tete-a-tete,  the  President  and 
the  Prime  Minister  discussed  environmental 
matters  at  some  length.  They  took  note  of 
the  7.5-year  history  of  environmental  cooper: 
tion  between  the  two  countries  as  exemplifit 
by  the  Boundary  Waters  Treaty,  the  Great 
Lakes  Water  Quality  Agreement,  and  the  re 
cent  Skagit  River-Ross  Dam  Treaty.  The 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister  expressed 
their  determination  to  continue  to  deal  with 
U.S. -Canadian  environmental  issues  in  a 
responsible  and  cooperative  spirit. 

In  the  spirit  of  cooperation,  and  in 
recognition  that  the  actions  of  one  country 
are  of  concern  to  the  other,  there  was  agree- 
ment that  a  high-level  special  envoy  would  b 
appointed  by  each  government  to  examine 
the  acid  rain  issue  and  report  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  Prime  Minister  by  their  next 
meeting.  The  envoys  will: 

(a)  Pursue  consultation  on  laws  and 
regulations  that  bear  on  pollutants  thought  t 
be  linked  to  acid  rain; 

(b)  Enhance  cooperation  in  research  ef- 
forts, including  that  for  clean  fuel  technologj 
and  smelter  controls; 

(c)  Pursue  means  to  increase  exchange  oj 
relevant  scientific  information,  and 

(d)  Identify  efforts  to  improve  the  U.S. 
and  Canadian  environment. 

The  President  announced  that  the  U.S. 
special  envoy  will  be  Andrew  L.  Lewis, 
former  Secretary  of  Transportation. 

The  Prime  Minister  announced  that  his 
special  envoy  will  be  William  G.  Davis, 
former  Premier  of  Ontario. 


DECLARATION  ON 
INTERNATIONAL  SECURITY 

We  are  neighbors  and  allies  dedicated  to  the 
defense  and  nourishment  of  peace  and 
freedom.  The  security  of  Canada  and  the 
United  States  are  inextricably  linked. 

We  have  committed  ourselves  at  Quebec 
to  reinvigorate  the  defense  and  security  part 
nership  between  the  two  countries.  To  rein- 
force deterrence  and  to  reduce  the  risk  posec 
by  threat  of  nuclear  attack,  we  agreed  to 
strengthen  continental  defense,  with  par- 
ticular reference  to  our  joint  participation  in 
the  North  American  Aerospace  Defense  Com 
mand  (NORAD).  Accordingly,  we  concluded 
an  agreement  to  modernize  the  North 
American  air  defense  surveillance  and  warn- 
ing system.  We  agreed  that  in  implementing 
this  program,  as  in  all  of  our  defense  rela- 
tions, we  shall  be  guided  by  the  principle  of 
mutual  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  our  two 
countries. 

In  the  spirit  of  mutual  trust  and  con- 
fidence between  our  countries,  we  have  com 
mitted  ourselves  to  consult  fully,  frankly,  and 
regularly  on  defense  and  arms  control  mat- 
ters. 


In 


an 
ret 


;otl 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


To  permit  systematic  consultation  and 
erall  review,  at  the  most  senior  levels,  of 
rangements  bearing  on  the  security  of 
;   mada  and  the  United  States,  we  resolved 
at  the  responsible  ministers  of  our  govern- 
ents  will  meet  together  on  a  regular  basis, 
e  have  also  agreed  to  make  greater  use  of 
e  Permanent  Joint  Board  on  Defense, 
tablished  at  the  historic  meeting  of  Prime 
inister  Mackenzie  King  and  President 
ranklin  Delano  Roosevelt  at  Ogdensburg  45 
;ars  ago. 

To  provide  for  an  effective  use  of 
isources  and  to  aid  both  of  our  countries  in 
aring  our  share  of  the  allied  defense 
irden,  we  reaffirm  the  Canada-United 
ates  defense  development  and  production 
aring  arrangements  and  agree  to 
rengthen  our  North  American  defense  in- 
istrial  base.  Recognizing  the  importance  of 
cess  to,  and  participation  of,  Canadian 
rms  in  the  U.S.  defense  market,  we  will 
ork  to  reduce  barriers  and  to  stimulate  the 
Dw  in  defense  goods.  We  will  seek  to  im- 
•ove  our  joint  access  to  information  relating 
'  defense  procurement;  we  will  explore  ways 
■  establish  a  separate  designation  for 
obilization  base  suppliers  for  U.S.  and 
anadian  firms;  and  we  will  seek  to  take 
-eater  advantage  of  flexibility  inherent  in 
^cond  source  suppliers.  We  will  also  under- 
ike  to  establish  a  freer  exchange  between 
)th  countries  of  technical  knowledge  and 
alls  involved  in  defense  production,  in  order 
facilitate  defense  economic  and  trade 
^operation  and  joint  participation  in  major 
ifense  programs.  In  this  connection,  we 
^ee  to  strengthen  our  cooperation  to  en- 
ure that  transfers  of  strategic  technology  to 
ar  potential  adversaries  are  effectively  con- 
'olled.  We  have  directed  the  responsible 
linisters  to  give  priority  attention  to  all 
iiese  issues  and  to  provide  a  progress  report 
lithin  4  months. 

The  security  of  Canada  and  the  United 
Itates  is  inseparable  from  that  of  the  Euro- 
ean  members  of  the  North  Atlantic  alliance, 
(^e  remain  fully  dedicated  to  preserving  the 
Bcurity  of  the  alliance  as  a  whole  through 
ne  maintenance  of  adequate  military 
irength,  an  effective  deterrent  posture,  and 
stable  balance  of  forces.  We  attach  great 
mportance  to  our  continuing  commitment  to 
;ation  Canadian  and  U.S.  forces  in  Europe. 
Ve  think  it  is  essential  to  strengthen  NATO's 
Dnventional  capabilities  and  accordingly 
literate  our  determination  to  continue 
ubstantial  real  growth  in  expenditures  for 
lefense. 

We  share  a  commitment  to  deepening  the 
lialogue  among  the  allies.  Our  alliance  draws 
Itrength  from  the  unique  and  individual  con- 
ibutions  of  its  sovereign  members  in  the 
tursuit  of  our  common  goal  of  peace  with 
reedom.  The  cohesion  and  political  solidarity 
f  the  alliance,  maintained  through  frequent 
i.nd  timely  consultations,  remain  the  founda- 
lion  for  the  protection  of  our  common  in- 
«rests  and  values. 

Significant,  equitable,  durable,  and 
erifiable  arms  control  measures  can  play  a 
ole  in  strengthening  strategic  stability. 


maintaining  our  security  at  a  lower  level  of 
force  and  armament,  building  trust  and  con- 
fidence between  East  and  West,  and  reducing 
the  risk  of  war.  We  have  agreed  to  consider 
joint  research  efforts  to  strengthen  our 
capacity  to  verify  agreements  on  the  control 
of  armaments.  We  will  work  to  gain  agree- 
ment on  effective  measures  in  the  interna- 
tional negotiations  in  Vienna,  Geneva,  and 
Stockholm,  and  we  will  strive,  with  the  coun- 
tries of  Europe,  to  progress  toward  the  aims 
enshrined  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

We  further  agreed  that  we  can  have  no 
higher  goal  than  the  reduction  and  eventual 
elimination  of  the  threat  of  peace,  whether  by 
nuclear  or  conventional  means.  Our  aim  is 
not  to  achieve  superiority  but  to  enhance 
deterrence  of  armed  aggression  and  bring 
about  significant  arms  reductions  between 
East  and  West.  We  seek  a  more  stable  world, 
with  gi-eatly  reduced  levels  of  nuclear  arms. 
The  prospect  of  an  enhanced  ability  to  deter 
war  based  upon  an  increasing  contribution  of 
non-nuclear  defenses  against  offensive 
nuclear  arms  has  prompted  the  U.S.  research 
effort  embodied  in  the  President's  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative.  We  are  agreed  that  this 
effort  is  prudent  and  is  in  conformity  with 
the  ABM  Treaty.  In  this  regard,  we  agreed 
that  steps  beyond  research  would,  in  view  of 
the  ABM  Treaty,  be  matters  for  discussion 
and  negotiation. 

Dialogue  and  negotiation  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  at 
Geneva  provide  a  historic  opportunity  to  set 
East-West  relations  on  a  more  secure  founda- 
tion. We  hope  that  these  negotiations  will 
lead  to  major  steps  toward  the  prevention  of 
an  arms  race  in  space  and  to  terminating  it 
on  Earth,  limiting  and  reducing  nuclear  arms, 
and,  ultimately,  eliminating  them  every- 
where. 

The  security  of  Canada  and  the  United 
States  is  linked  increasingly  with  that  of 
other  regions  in  the  world.  We  will,  there- 
fore, encourage  and  support  the  strengthen- 
ing of  multilateral  and  international 
mechanisms  for  the  control  and  peaceful 
resolution  of  disputes.  We  will  vigorously  op- 
pose the  exploitation  of  regional  instability 
and  promote,  at  the  same  time,  each  by  our 
distinctive  contributions,  the  social,  economic, 
and  political  development  essential  to  the 
achievement  of  a  stable  and  enduring  peace. 

Our  one  truly  strategic  aim  is  human 
freedom  in  a  world  at  peace. 

'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  25,  1985. 

-Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  18. 

^Broadcast  from  the  Oval  Office. 

■■Made  at  L'Ancienne  Lorette  Airport. 

^Made  at  the  Chateau  Frontenac  Hotel. 

«Held  at  the  Citadel.  ■ 


News  Conference 
of  March  21 
(Excerpts) 


Excerpts  from  President  Rewjan's 
news  conference  of  March  21,  1985  J 

Let  me  commend  again  the  Senate  of 
the  United  Sttites  for  having  approved 
production  of  21  more  MX  Peacekeeper 
missiles. 

The  Senate  has  endorsed  the  deci- 
sion of  four  Presidents  that  the 
Peacekeeper  is  a  vital  component  of  the 
American  deterrent.  Now  is  the 
time — testing  time  for  the  House  of 
Representatives.  The  votes  there  will 
answer  the  question  of  whether  we 
stand  united  at  Geneva  or  whether 
America  will  face  the  Soviet  Union  as  a 
nation  divided  over  the  most  fundamen- 
tal questions  of  her  national  security. 

For  more  than  a  decade,  we've 
debated  the  MX.  And  while  we  were 
debating,  the  Soviets  were  deploying 
more  than  600  such  missiles  and 
targeting  them  upon  the  United  States. 
Now  they're  on  the  verge  of  deploying 
two  new  strategic  land-based  systems 
and  we're  still  debating. 

Not  long  ago,  the  Parliaments  of 
four  NATO  countries  courageously  voted 
to  accept  deployment  of  Pershing  lis 
and  cruise  missiles.  And  these  NATO 
countries  are  now  looking  to  see  if  the 
American  Congress  is  possessed  of  equal 
courage — or  resolve,  I  should  say. 

No  request  by  an  American  Presi- 
dent for  a  major  strategic  system  de- 
mand vital  to  the  national  security  has 
ever  been  denied  by  an  American  Con- 
gress. It  is  the  tradition  of  bipartisan 
unity  on  national  defense  that  brought 
the  Soviets  back  to  Geneva.  And  unless 
that  tradition  is  maintained  next  week  in 
the  House,  there's  little  prospect  of  suc- 
cess at  Geneva. 


Q.  Can  you  give  us  your  think- 
ing on  the  summit — why  you  think 
it  would  be  good  to  meet  with 
Gorbachev,  what  you  think  can  be  ac- 
complished, and  why  you've  been 
rebuffed  so  far? 

A.  I  don't  really  consider  it  being 
rebuffed,  because  the  man  has  only  been 
in  office  for  a  few  days  and  I  have  some 
idea  of  what  is  confronting  him  now. 
But  I've  been — I've  felt  the  same  way 
about  each  of  the  three  previous  leaders 
there  and  then  things  intervened  that 
made  it  impossible — that  there  are  a 


THE  PRESIDENT 


number  of  things,  bilateral  situations 
between  our  two  countries,  other  things 
to  talk  about  that  we're  negotiating  or 
talking  to  each  other  on  a  ministerial 
level,  and  that  some  of  those  could  prob- 
ably be  further  advanced  if  we  met  at  a 
summit. 

And  so,  what  I  always  meant  by  an 
agenda  of  things  they  want  to  talk 
about,  mutual  problems  that  confront 
us,  and  I  think  it's  high  time  that  we  did 
this. 

Q.  What  are  the  prospects  for  hav- 
ing it  soon? 

A.  I  have  to  think  the— that  they 
should  be  good.  I  think  in  some  of  our 
people,  we've  had  about  an  hour  and  a 
half  conversation— the  Vice  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  did  with  him 
when  they  were  there.  And  so  I  think 
there  is  a  good  chance  of  that. 

The  reason  that  I  issued  the  invita- 
tion was  because,  under  the  kind  of  pro- 
tocol that  exists,  and  you  look  back  over 
the  history  of  such  meetings,  why,  it's 
our  turn  to  be  the  host.  So  that's  why  I 
proposed  it,  that  if  he  would,  the  invita- 
tion was  extended  for  whenever  he 
found  it  convenient. 

Q.  In  your  first  term,  you  proposed 
your  own  Middle  East  peace  plan.  You 
dispatched  special  envoys  to  the 
region  to  seek  solutions,  you  even  sent 
in  Marines  to  try  to  stabilize  Lebanon. 
These  days  we  hardly  ever  even  hear 
you  mention  the  Middle  East,  and  last 
week.  President  Mubarak  went  home 
disappointed  when  he  asked  for  your 
help  in  getting  peace  talks  started 
again. 

I  wonder  if  you  could  tell  us 
tonight,  what  you  expect  to  gain  from 
the  new  policy  of  disengagement,  and 
what  do  you  expect  to  be  achieved 
over  there? 

A.  It  isn't  disengagement,  and  let 
me  point  out,  I  believe  it's  a  misap- 
prehension that  President  Mubarak  left 
disappointed.  He  made  no  requests.  He 
told  us  what  he  was  doing;  and  certainly 
we  complimented  him  highly  upon  what 
he's  doing — I  think  it's  great. 

But  our  proposal,  in  the  very  begin- 
ning, was  that  we  did  not  want  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  negotiations.  It  wouldn't 
be  any  of  our  business  to  do  so,  but  that 
we'd  do  whatever  we  could  to  help  bring 
the  warring  parties  together,  and,  in  ef- 
fect you  might  say,  continue  the  Camp 
David  process,  and  continue  trying  to 
find  more  countries  that  would  do  as 
Egypt  did  and  make  peace. 


And  we  haven't  been  idle.  We  not 
only  have  had  President  Mubarak  here, 
but — and  a  short  time  before  that  we 
had  King  Fahd  of  Saudi  Arabia.  Masri, 
the  Foreign  Minister  [of  Jordan]  is  now 
here.  And  we  still  feel  the  same  way. 
We  have  been  trying  to  build  up  a  rela- 
tionship with  the  Arab  nations,  as  well 
as  the  relationship  that  we've  always 
had  with  Israel.  And  we  discussed  with 
President  Mubarak  the  things  that  he 
has  proposed,  and  the  idea  of  the 
Palestinians — we  did  have  to  make  it 
clear  that  we  couldn't  meet  if  it  was  the 
PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organization]. 
They  still  refuse  to  recognize  the  UN 
Resolutions  242  and  338,  and  they 
refuse  to  agree  or  admit  that  Israel  has 
a  right  to  exist  as  a  nation.  But  we  have 
said  Palestinian  representatives,  yes. 
There's  a  large  Palestinian  community 
and  I'm  sure  that  there  are  people  that 
do  not  consider  themselves  represented 
by  the  PLO. 

Q.  Do  you  see  a  direct  role  for  the 
United  States  in  any  talks  over  here? 

A.  Not  the  direct  role  in  sitting  at 
the  table  and  negotiating.  That  must  be 
done  in  direct  negotiations  between  the 
Arab  states  and  Israel.  And  I  think  that 
King  Hussein  [of  Jordan],  the  position 
he's  taken,  that  was  the  one  that  we  had 
hoped,  and  he  did  take  2  years  ago  when 
we  suggested  all  of  this,  and  then  things 
broke  down  with  the  Lebanese  conflict. 
And  now,  thanks  to  Mubarak  pushing 
ahead,  and  Hussein,  I  think  that  there  is 
a  reasonable  chance — and  we  have 
another  traveling  ambassador  on  his 
way  back  there  in  a  few  weeks. 

Q.  You  now  need  a  new  U.S. 
Representative  for  Trade  to  replace 
Ambassador  Brock.  Are  you  looking 
for  someone  who  will  more  sharply 
convey  to  other  nations,  especially 
Japan,  the  need  for  fairer  trading  con- 
ditions between  the  two  countries? 
And  are  voluntary  quotas  ever  going 
to  work  on  automobile  sales? 

A.  We're  just  going  to  have  to  see 
what  restraint  might  be  used  by  the 
Japanese  in  this.  But  I  have  to  say  I 
couldn't  fault  Bill  Brock  and  what  he  has 
done.  He's  been  as  forceful  as  anyone 
could  be.  And  we  are  still  leaning  on  our 
friends  and  trading  partners,  including 
Japan,  for  continued  lifting  of  restraints 
that  they  have,  particularly  with  regard 
to  their  own  markets.  Ami  in  the  talks 
in  Europe  that  will  liegin  in  May,  I  am 
going  to  [propose  again  another  round  of 
trade  negotiations  to  further  gel  us  back 
to  completely  free  trade. 


)1 


« 


And  we've  made  some  progress.  I 
have  to  say  that  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone  of  Japan  has  been  very  forth- |ia 
coming  on  this.  He  has  some  political 
problems  that— just  like  me,  he  can't 
just  give  an  order  and  have  it  happen 
But  he's  working  very  hard  on  this.  Ancjit 
Bill  did  a  great  job  and  I'm  quite  sure 
that  who  we'll  finally  get  to  replace  him 
will  be  equally  forceful  in  those  negotia- 
tions. 

Q.  As  you  know,  three  Leba- 
nese— working  for  CBS  News,  taking 
pictures  during  some  hostilities,  were 
shot  at  by  the  Israeli  Army  today.  Twi 
were  killed  and  one  was  critically 
wounded.  I  was  wondering  if  you  hav 
a  reaction  to  the  incident  and  if  you 
plan  to  lodge  any  protests  with  the 
Israeli  Government? 

A.  First  of  all,  I'd  like  to  know  all 
the  details  of  this.  I'm  quite  sure  in  com 
bat  of  that  kind  this  was  not  a  deliberat 
killing.  They  were  engaged  in  gunfire 
with  armed  persons  who  were  also — 
were  in  civilian,  not  uniformed  as  they 
would  be  in  a  war.  So,  these  things  can 
happen. 

And  it  is  a  tragedy.  And  all  I  can 
say  is  that  I  think  all  of  us  have  a  great 
feeling  of  sorrow  about  the  tragedy  that 
is  going  on  there  in  Lebanon,  and  par- 
ticularly in  South  Lebanon  now  as  the 
Israelis  try  to  withdraw.  And  whichever 
the  side,  the  acts  of  terror,  the  retalia 
tion — both  of  them  are  leading  to  trage- 
dies that  just  seem  to  be  so  needless. 

Q.  You're  saying  that  the  Israelis 
were  engaged  in  gunfire  with  other 
people  at  the  time  because  one  report 
said  that  they  just  opened  fire  on  the 
newsmen  who  were  obviously  taking 
pictures  and  covering  the  story? 

A.  My  goodness,  your  own  news 
program  tonight  showed  an  awful  lot  of 
gunfire  with  very  sophisticated  weapons 
including  grenade  launchers,  and  they 
were  obviously  being  used  by  civilians, 
at  least  people  in  civilian  uniform.  They 
weren't  Israelis.  So,  yes,  this  is  one  of 
the  things  that  happens  in  this  kind  of 
warfare  where  you're  not  fighting 
another  country's  army. 


Q.  Sir,  17  blacks  were  shot  to 
death  in  South  Africa  today  by  govern 
ment  authorities  in  what  appears  to  be 
a  continuing  wave  of  violence  by  the 
white  minority  government  against 
the  black  majority  population.  Are  you 
considering  changing  your  policy  to 
put  more  pressure  on  the  South 
African  Government  to  mend  its  ways? 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


A.  I  know  the  pressure  that  we  are 
itting  on  them  and  I  know  the  gains 
at  we've  made.  But,  we  know  there's 
ill  a  long  way  to  go.  But  I  think  to  put 
that  way— that  they  were  simply 
lied  and  that  the  violence  was  coming 
tally  from  the  law  and  order  side  ig- 
)res  the  fact  that  there  was  rioting  go- 
g  on  in  behalf  of  others  there.  And  it 
tragic  and  again,  we  hope  that  this 
in  be  corrected.  But  I  think  also  it  is 
gnificant  that  on  the  officer's  side — or 
le  police  side — whichever — whether 
ey  were  military  police,  I  think  they 
ere  police — it  is  significant  that  some 
■  those  enforcing  the  law  and  using  the 
ms  were  also  black — black  policemen. 

Q.  Sir.  is  it  your  estimate  of  the 
tuation  that  the  blacks  posed  a 
ireat  to  the  whites  who  had  the  guns 
hen  the  blacks  didn't? 

A.  No.  I  say  that  there  has  been  in- 
casing violence  and  there  is  an  ele- 
eiit  in  South  Africa  that  does  not  want 
peaceful  settlement  of  this — who  want 
violent  settlement,  who  want  trouble 

the  streets  and  this  is  what's  going 
1.  1  (lon't  hold  with  what  has  happened 
111.  as  I  say,  I  think  all  of  us  find  the 
stem  there  repugnant,  but  we're  going 

keep  on  trying  to  contribute  to  a 
■aceful  solution  if  we  can. 

Q.  Britain's  Foreign  Secretary,  Sir 
eoffrey  Howe,  has  raised  a  long  list 
concerns  and  questions  about  your 
rategic  Defense  Initiative  which 
injured  a  public  rebuke  from  Assist- 
it  Secretary  of  Defense  Richard 
jrle.  Was  Mr.  Perle  speaking  for  the 
dministration.  and  if  not,  how  do 
lu  feel  about  an  allied  official  public- 
questioning  SDI  just  as  arms  talks 
e  starting  in  Geneva? 

A.  I  haven't  seen  either  the  speech 
at  Perle  was  answering  or  his 
marks.  I  have  simply  heard  that  this 
ippened.  I'm  interested  in  finding  out 
hat  the  exact  words  were  about  it.  I  do 
low  that  we  have  the  support  of  Prime 
inister  Thatcher  and,  therefore,  the 
nglish  Government  in  our  research  for 
le  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  and  so 
Ti  satisfied  with  that.  I  don't  know 
hat  the  other  critic — 

Q.  Were  you  surprised  by  it? 

A.  What? 


Q.  Were  you  surprised  by  Sir 
Geoffrey's  words? 

A.  Just  surprised  when  1  heard 
about  it,  yes.  But  I'm  going  to  try  and 
find  out  exactly  what  was  said. 

Q.  At  your  last  news  conference 
you  aroused  the  Soviet  Union  of 
violating  SALT  II  limitations  on 
building  new  missiles  and  you  said 
you'd  have  to  decide  in  the  next  few 
months  whether  to  join  them  in 
violating  the  ag^reement.  Since  the 
Soviets  are  insisting  that  they're — all 
they're  doing  are  making  allowable 
upgn'ades  of  older  missiles,  won't  an 
open  violation  by  the  United  States 
run  the  risk  of  just  dashing  hopes  for 
arms  control  and  leading  us  into  a  real 
upward  spiraling  arms  race? 

A.  I  can  assure  you,  we're  not  going 
to  do  anything  that's  going  to  undercut 
the  negotiations  that  are  going  on. 
We're  hopeful  that  for  the  first  time,  we 
really  have  an  opportunity  to  get  a 
reduction  of  missiles.  I  have  said 
repeatedly,  and  continue  it,  and  I  really 
mean  it,  we're  going  to  wait  and  deal 
with  that  problem  when  we  come  to  that 
point— and  it  has  to  do  with  some  of  our 
submarine  missiles — as  to  what  our  con- 
duct's going  to  be. 

Q.  But,  sir,  if  I  may  follow  up— 
that's  this  fall,  and  it's  unlikely  you're 
going  to  have  any  major  arms  control 
agreement  before  this  fall. 

A.  No,  we— that's  right,  we  don't 
know.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  our  rec- 
ord as  compared  to  theirs  with  regard  to 
observing  all  the  niceties  of  all  the 
treaties  is  so  much  superior  that  I  don't 
think  we're  in  a  position  to  cause  any 
great  trouble. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  why  your  deci- 
sion not  to  visit  a  Nazi  concentration 
camp  site  when  you  make  your  trip  to 
Germany  in  May  commemorating 
VE-Day? 

A.  Yes,  I'll  tell  you.  I  feel  very 
strongly  that  this  time  in  commem- 
orating the  end  of  that  great  war,  that 
instead  of  reawakening  the  memories 
and  so  forth,  and  the  passions  of  the 
time,  that  maybe  we  should  observe  this 
day  as  the  day  when,  40  years  ago, 
peace  began  and  friendship;  because  we 
now  find  ourselves  allied  and  friends  of 
the  countries  that  we  once  fought 
against.  And  that  we— it  being  almost  a 
celebration  of  the  end  of  an  era  and  the 
coming  into  what  has  now  been  some  40 
years  of  peace  for  us. 


And  1  felt  that  since  the  German 
people,  and  very  few  alive  that  remem- 
ber even  the  war,  and  certainly  none  of 
them  who  were  adults  and  participating 
in  any  way,  and  the — they  do,  they  have 
a  feeling,  and  a  guilt  feeling  that's  been 
imposed  upon  them,  and  I  just  think  it's 
unnecessary.  I  think  they  should  be 
recognized  for  the  democracy  that 
they've  created  and  the  democratic  prin- 
ciples they  now  espouse. 

Q.  If  I  can  just  follow  that  up — 
has  the  West  Germany  Government 
asked  you  to  take  one  position  or 
another  on  it? 

A.  No,  but  in  talking  just  informally 
some  time  ago,  with  Chancellor  Kohl 
and  others,  they  all  felt  the  same  way, 
that  if  we  could  observe  this  as  the 
beginning  of  peace  and  friendship  be- 
tween us. 


Q.  Back  talking  about  the  Middle 
East.  You've  been  told  by  King 
Hussein,  I  believe,  or  at  least  King 
Hussein  has  said  it  publicly  that  his 
agreement  with  Yasir  Arafat  does  in- 
clude recognition  of  Israel's  right  to 
exist  and  renunciation  of  the  use  of 
force.  Under  those  conditions,  would 
you,  then,  at  least  consider  the 
possibility  of  inviting  a  joint 
Palestinian-Jordanian  delegation  for 
meetings  if  you  thought  they  would 
lead  to  direct  talks  and  if  they  did  not 
include  any  members  of  the  PLO? 

A.  As  I  say,  we're  willing  to  meet 
with  a  joint  group — Palestinian  and  Jor- 
danian. But  at  the  moment,  not  the  PLO 
because  of — we  have  not  had  any  state- 
ment from  them  that  they  do  recognize 
Israel  and  that  they  will  recognize  242 
and  so  forth.  But  there  are  many 
Palestinians  who  don't  feel  that  they're 
represented  by  the  PLO.  And  any 
delegation  of  them— for  example,  many 
of  those  who  are  living  and  holding  local 
offices  on  the  West  Bank. 

Q.  Do  you  think,  then,  that  it 
would  be  possible?  Would  you  con- 
sider the  Mubarak  approach  which  is 
for  the  United  States  to  invite  a  joint 
delegation  if  you  had  an  understand- 
ing about  the  composition  of  the 
Palestinians? 

A.  This  is  what  President  Mubarak 
was  talking  about  and— they're  putting 
together,  it's  a  case  of  their  inviting  us, 
not  the  other  way  around.  And  we've 
said  that  we'd  be  happy  to  discuss  with 
them.  But  they've  got  to  understand  we 


lay  1985 


11 


THE  PRESIDENT 


are  not  getting  into  the  direct  negotia- 
tions. That  is  none  of  our  business. 
We're  only  to  do  what  we  can  to  help. 

Q.  Question  about  Central 
America.  Are  you  giving  any  thought, 
sir.  to  recognizing  the  Contras  who 


are  fighting  the  Sandinistas  in 
Nicaragua  as  a  government  in  exile? 

A.  No,  we  haven't  thought  about 
that  at  all  and  yet  I  must  say  that  this 
matter  that's  before  the  Congress  of 
whether  it's  .$14  million  or  whatever, 
that  isn't  the  issue. 

The  issue  is  the  United  States  is  try- 
ing to  help  people  who  had  a  communist 


MX  Missile 


President  Reagan's  radio  address 
to  the  nation  on  March  9,  1985.'^ 


I'd  like  to  talk  to  you  today  about  the 
deep  desire  we  all  share  to  keep 
America  free,  secure,  and  at  peace.  In  3 
days'  time,  American  and  Soviet 
negotiators  will  meet  in  Geneva  to  ex- 
plore ways  to  reduce  nuclear  arsenals 
and  lower  the  risks  of  war. 

No  issue  concerns  me  more  and 
none  has  taken  up  more  of  my  time  than 
our  quest  for  a  breakthrough  on  arms 
reduction.  I  do  so  willingly  because  as 
your  President  and  as  a  husband,  a 
father,  and  a  grandfather,  I  know  what's 
at  stake  for  everyone.  And  I'm  pleased 
that  the  Soviets,  after  staying  away  for 
more  than  a  year,  have  agreed  to  return 
to  the  bargaining  table.  The  renewal  of 
these  negotiations  is  an  important  step 
in  the  right  direction,  and  America  will 
be  ready  to  move  forward  on  all  promis- 
ing avenues  for  progress. 

As  I  speak  to  you,  our  team  is  in 
Geneva.  I  cannot  think  of  a  more 
welcome  message  to  give  them  than  a 
strong  vote  of  confidence  from  you  the 
people  and  the  Congress.  I  know  that  all 
Americans  stand  four-square  behind  our 
negotiating  team  and  wish  them  every 
success.  In  fact,  you're  the  reason  that 
the  Soviet  Union  returned  to  the 
negotiating  table.  The  Soviet  leadership 
has  seen  your  patience  and  your  deter- 
mination to  keep  America  strong. 
They've  seen  the  renewal  of  your  spirit 
and  the  rebuilding  of  a  robust  and  ex- 
panding American  economy.  They  know 
we're  going  to  continue  moving  forward 
to  protect  our  freedom  and  our  way  of 
life. 


I  want  to  believe  that  Congress  will 
follow  your  lead,  but  that's  not  yet  cer- 
tain, and  I  need  your  help.  Each  House 
of  Congress  will  soon  vote  on  an  issue 
that  will  directly  and,  perhaps,  dramat- 
ically affect  the  outcome  at 
Geneva — that  vote  concerns  the  modern- 
ization of  our  strategic  forces  with  the 
MX  Peacekeeper  missile. 

Let  me  take  a  moment  to  explain 
what  that  vote  is  all  about.  Nearly  2 
years  ago  after  a  decade  of  indecision, 
confusion,  and  endless  debate  over  the 
merits  of  modernizing  our  aging  land- 
based  strategic  missiles,  our  political 
process  forged  a  bipartisan  consensus 
that  united  us  in  our  common  search  for 
ways  to  protect  our  country,  reduce  the 
risks  of  war,  and  work  for  dramatically 
reduced  levels  of  nuclear  arms. 

The  MX  Peacekeeper  missile  has 
been  part  of  the  consensus  and  with 
good  reason:  Time  and  again,  America 
exercised  unilateral  restraint,  good  will, 
and  a  sincere  commitment  to  arms 
reductions.  As  a  result,  many  of  the 
missiles  protecting  our  security  at  this 
very  moment  are  older  than  the  Air 
Force  men  and  women  taking  care  of 
them.  They're  missiles  of  the  sixties, 
originally  equipped  with  19.50s  aero- 
technology.  It's  sort  of  like  a  1963  jalopy 
with  some  new  parts.  You  know  as  well 
as  I  do  that  in  many  States  automobiles 
that  old  will  soon  qualify  as  antiques, 
hut  the  Soviets  don't  deal  in  antiques. 
Their  response  was  the  same  as  it's 
always  been:  no  restraint,  just  build, 
build,  and  build.  While  we  debated  and 
delayed,  they  developed  three  new  types 
of  land-based  intercontinental  missiles, 
and  they've  added  to  their  arsenal  800 


tyranny  imposed  on  them  by  force, 
deception,  and  fraud  and  either  we  con 
tinue  with  that  tradition  which  has 
always  been  ours,  or  we  give  that  up  en 
tirely,  and  I  don't  think  we  should  give 
that  up.  I  think  our  position  is  clear. 


(i 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  25,  198.5. 


new  missiles  with  more  than  5,000 
nuclear  warheads. 

It  took  us  too  long  to  realize  there  i; 
no  easy,  cheap  way  to  buy  security.  In 
1983,  based  on  the  recommendations  of 
a  distinguished  blue  ribbon  panel,  the 
Scowcroft  commission,  the  Congress 
joined  with  us  to  approve  the  MX 
Peacekeeper  program  — 100  up-to-date 
missiles  that  will  replace  aging  Minute- 
men  missiles.  Since  that  time,  the  MX 
Peacekeeper  has  finished  seven  suc- 
cessful flight  tests,  and  the  Soviets  are 
back  at  the  bargaining  table. 

Well,  once  again,  the  moment  of 
truth  is  at  hand.  As  I  mentioned  a  few 
minutes  ago,  each  House  of  Congress 
will  soon  vote  on  whether  to  reduce  the 
MX  funds  they  approved  last  year  and 
continue  production  of  the  missile.  The 
Soviet  leadership  views  the  current 
debate  on  the  MX  as  a  key  test  of 
American  resolve.  If  the  Congress  acts 
responsibly,  our  negotiators  will  have  a 
chance  to  succeed,  but  if  we  don't  have 
the  courage  to  modernize  our  land-basec 
strategic  missile  systems,  the  Soviets 
will  have  little  reason  to  negotiate  mean 
ingful  reductions.  And  why  should  they? 
We  would  he  signaling  to  them  that  the; 
can  gain  more  through  propaganda  and 
stonewalling  than  through  serious 
negotiations.  The  time  is  now  to  send  a 
signal  loud  and  clear  that  a  united  and 
resolute  America  backs  our  negotiators 
at  Geneva,  and  that  could  be  the  real 
key  to  a  successful  outcome. 

My  fellow  Americans,  the  stakes  are 
so  very  high.  The  vote  on  the  MX 
Peacekeeper  isn't  a  budget  issue;  it's 
about  our  nation's  security.  And  when  it 
comes  to  protecting  America's  security, 
we  can't  afford  to  divide  ourselves  as 
Democrats  or  Republicans— we  must 
stand  together  as  Americans.  It's  up  to 
you  to  let  your  feelings  be  known.  Your 
voice  matters;  let  it  be  heard. 


it 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  18,  1985. 


12 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin' 


HE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


^ice  President's  Visit  to  Africa 


Vice  President  Bush  departed 
Washington.  D.C..  March  3.  1985, 
visit  Sudan  (March  1,-7).  Niger 
(arch  7-9).  and  Mali  (March  9-10).  He 
•£n  went  to  Geneva  (March  10-12)  to  ad- 
ress  the  UN  Conference  on  the  Emergen- 
I  Situation  in  Africa. 

Following  are  remarks  he  made  dur- 
ig  the  trip. ' 


RRIVAL  STATEMENT, 

HARTOUM, 

[AR.  4,  1985 

come  to  Africa  as  a  pilgrim,  on  a 
airtiey  of  mercy  and  friendship.  I  will 
sit  three  countries — Sudan,  Niger,  and 
iali.  Each  is  suffering  a  catastrophic 
rought.  Each  in  its  own  way  is  re- 
5onding  with  courage  to  a  great  trial, 
ach  has  received  the  assistance  and  ad- 
liration  of  the  United  States  and  the 
merican  people. 

It  is  important  to  me  to  start  this 
urney  in  Sudan.  The  people  of 
udan— even  in  the  midst  of  their  own 
-eat  suffering — have  given  the  world  a 
sson  in  compassion.  They  have  opened 
leir  borders  to  victims  of  famine  and 
ar.  It  is  said  that  a  friend  in  need  is  a 
lend  indeed.  The  Sudanese  people  are, 
deed,  friends  to  those  who  have  come 
1  them  in  desperation.  And  I  am  here 
p  show  that  the  United  States  is  a 
lend  of  the  great-hearted  people  of 
udan. 

And,  I  should  add,  Sudan  is  an  im- 
Drtant  friend  of  the  United  States.  We 
ive  many  common  interests.  Sudan  is  a 
iy  country  in  a  volatile  region.  Its 
jalth,  its  development,  its  stability  are 
■iportant  to  the  region  and  thus  to  us.  I 
ok  forward  to  my  visit  here,  to  learn- 
Lg  first-hand  of  Sudan's  efforts  and  its 
roblems,  and  to  fruitful  discussions 
ith  President  Nimeiri — an  old 
•lend — and  his  colleagues. 

We  are  aware  that  Sudan  faces 
roblems  on  several  fronts.  As  a  friend 
)  the  government  and  the  people  of 
.frica's  largest  nation,  we  hope  to  help 
'here  we  can.  It  is  appropriate  that  this 
isit  to  Africa,  at  its  time  of  emergency, 
egins  here,  in  a  nation  born  barely  30 
ears  ago  but  in  which  Africa's  rich 
iversity  of  cultures  and  languages,  its 
)ng  and  proud  history,  is  so  well 
epresented. 


Sudan  is  also  an  appropriate 
jumping-off  point  because,  like  the  vast 
majority  of  African  nations,  it  is  proud 
of  its  independence  and  its  nonalignment 
and  is  determined  to  build  a  better 
future  for  its  people. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to 
helping.  Sudan  is  the  largest  recipient  of 
economic  assistance  from  the  United 
States  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  and, 
moreover,  is  receiving  a  large  amount  of 
food  and  disaster  assistance.  In  the  past 
4  years,  there  has  been  a  50%  increase 
in  economic  assistance  to  Africa.  This 
reflects  the  importance  the  United 
States  attaches  to  all  of  Africa.  In  addi- 
tion, food  aid  reached  a  record  level  last 
year  and  will  be  over  $1  billion  this  year. 

Throughout  my  visit,  I  will  want  to 
learn  more  about  the  long-range  ques- 
tion— how  to  keep  a  disaster  like  this 
from  happening  again. 

Two  areas  in  particular  give  reason 
for  hope.  The  first  is  the  advance  of 
agricultural  research;  for  example,  the 


development  of  high-yield,  drought- 
resistant  sorghum  hybrids.  The  sec- 
ond— and  also  of  great  importance — is 
that  all  across  Africa  a  consensus  is 
growing  that  the  key  to  long-term  pros- 
perity is  in  free  and  open  markets,  par- 
ticularly free  and  open  agricultural 
markets. 

So  I'm  here  on  a  kind  of  pilgrim- 
age— to  see  what  more  can  be  done  to 
help  those  who  suffer  now,  to  see  what 
can  be  done  to  ensure  that  no  calamity 
like  this  happens  again,  and,  on  behalf  of 
President  Reagan  and  the  American 
people,  to  show  America's  admiration 
and  respect  for  the  compassion  and 
courage  of  the  people  of  Sudan. 


STATEMENT, 
KHARTOUM. 
MAR.  7,  1985 

The  last  3  days  have  been  very  moving 
for  me.  I've  been  to  the  Wad  Sheriffe 


At  the  Wad  Sheriffi  refugee  camp  in  Sudan,  Mrs.  Bush  holds  a  7-month-old  infant:  the 
day  after  this  photograph  was  taken,  the  baby  died  of  severe  dehydration  brought  on  by 
malnutrition. 


•■lay  1985 


13 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


camp  for  Ethiopian  refugees  and  to  El- 
Obeid  cannp  for  displaced  Sudanese. 

How  can  I  express  what  I've  seen— 
the  suffering,  the  dignity,  and  the 
courage  among  those  who  have  lost 
everything  to  the  drought.  And  the 
courage  and  compassion,  as  well,  of 
those  who  tend  to  the  sick  and  the  dying 
and  who  save  lives. 

People  ail  over  the  world  have  one 
thing  in  common.  When  they  hear  of  a 
friend  in  need,  they  open  up  their 
hearts.  With  people  all  over  the  free 
world,  we  Americans  think  of  the 
Sudanese  people  as  friends.  And  our 
hearts  are  open. 

Before  the  year  is  done,  the  United 
States  will  have  provided  unprecedented 
amounts  of  relief  aid  to  Sudan,  which  is 
the  largest  recipient  of  U.S.  develop- 
ment aid  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  I  was 
especially  encouraged  to  learn  of  the 
American  role  in  development  of  new 
grain  hybrids — for  example,  the 
drought-resistant  strain  of  sorghum.  I've 
been  told  that  if  just  one-quarter  of 
Sudan's  farmers  were  to  plant  with  that 
hybrid,  Sudan  could  fully  feed  itself, 
even  in  dry  years  like  this  one.  So  sure- 
ly, with  developments  like  that,  there's 
reason  to  have  hope  for  the  future. 

But  let  me  state  again  my  firm 
belief  that  developments  like  the  grain 
hybrid  are  only  the  first  step.  In  the 
long  run,  the  key  to  prosperity  in  Sudan 
is — just  as  it  is  throughout  the  world — 
in  free  and  open  markets  and  trust  in 
the  dreams  and  energy  and  productive 
capacity  of  the  Sudanese  people. 

As  I  said  on  my  arrival,  Sudan  is  an 
important  friend  and  partner  in  a 
volatile  region  of  strategic  significance. 
During  my  3  days  here,  I  have  concen- 
trated on  drought,  famine,  and  refugee 
problems  and  the  response  of  Sudan's 
government  and  people  and  the  interna- 
tional community.  I  have  also  had  most 
useful  discussions  with  Sudan's  leaders 
on  other  issues. 

We,  like  they,  attach  high  impor- 
tance to  seeing  Sudan  get  back  on  its 
feet  economically.  These  are  tough  times 
in  many  African  countries,  including 
Sudan.  Leaders  all  over  this  continent 
are  grappling  with  difficult  decisions.  I 
am  hopeful  that  Sudan  can  soon  turn  the 
corner  toward  the  path  of  economic  ad- 
justment and  growth. 

We  also  care  deeply  about  the  sta- 
bility of  Sudan,  Africa's  largest  country. 
I  was  impressed  with  President 
Nimeiri's  speech  last  week  calling  for 
renewed  dialogue  between  north  and 
south.  I  was  also  impressed  in  my 
discussions  with  Second  Vice  President 


• 


Vice  President  Bush  with  Niger  President  Kountche. 


Lagu  and  other  southern  leaders  yester- 
day by  the  importance  of  the  issues  of 
national  reconciliation. 

We  in  America  are,  as  a  nation, 
reluctant  to  intervene  in  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  another  country.  But  we  are  also 
a  nation  that  suffered  a  great  conflict  of 
our  own  between  our  north  and  south. 
We  were  not  able  to  realize  our  full 
potential  until  that  conflict  was  truly 
resolved. 

So,  as  an  American  who  was  born  in 
our  north  but  who  first  went  to  work  in 
the  oil  fields  of  our  south,  I  urge  you  to 
take  up  the  openings  for  dialogue  that 
are  on  the  table,  to  reconcile  your  dif- 
ferences, to  develop  your  oil  as  we  did 
ours,  and  to  allow  all  the  people  of  this 
country  full  participation  in  building  the 
greatness  of  Sudan. 

Finally,  I  want  to  thank  President 
Nimeiri,  First  Vice  President  El  Tayeb 
and  their  wives,  and  the  people  of  Sudan 
for  their  extraordinary  hospittility  dur- 
ing my  visit  and  to  once  more  express 


the  enormous  admiration  that  the 
American  people  have  for  the  compas- 
sion and  courage  of  the  people  of  Sudan, 

Faced  with  an  overwhelming  crisis 
of  their  own,  the  Sudanese  people  have, 
nevertheless,  sheltered  and  given 
sustenance  to  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
refugees  from  many  countries.  For  this, 
America  salutes  Sudan. 


STATEMENT. 
NIAMEY. 
MAR.  9.  1985 

An  American  who  knew  much  about 
pain  and  denial,  Helen  Keller,  once  said, 
"Although  the  world  is  full  of  suffering, 
it  is  also  full  of  the  overcoming  of  it." 

In  the  last  2  days,  I  have  seen  a 
country  that  is  suffering  a  terrible 
famine  and  that  is  showing  the  world 
how  to  overcome  it.  Niger  understood 
before  many  other  countries  how  impor- 
tant it  is  to  trust  the  farmer  and  the 


14 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


irdsman — trust  their  aspirations,  trust 
eir  resourcefulness,  trust  them  in  the 
)en  and  free  market.  And  that  trust 
•educed  the  reserves  that  cushioned 

Ie  initial  impact  of  the  drought. 
I  was  involved  in  a  very  successful 
ogram  of  deregulation  in  my  own 
untry.  I'm  proud  to  say  it  had 
mething  to  do  with  the  revival  of  the 
merican  economy  these  past  4  years. 
n  pleased  to  see  that  deregulation — in 
is  case,  of  agriculture — is  becoming  in- 
rnational.  I  am  confident  it  will  have 
e  same  beneficial  effects  here  as  it  did 
America. 

The  U.S.  Government  is  proud  to  be 
)le  to  help  the  people  of  Niger  with  the 
ought,  and  we  have  committed 
)0,000  tons  of  food  for  that  effort.  This 
ill  be  a  total  of  $46.1  million  of  food 
id  other  disaster  assistance.  This 
^re  includes  a  total  of  approximately 
1  million  promised  during  this  visit  to 
)ur  country. 

I  want  to  emphasize  that  private  aid 
om  the  United  States  is  very  impor- 
nt.  With  me  on  this  trip  is  C.  Payne 
jcas,  an  old  friend  I  much  admire, 
ayne  worked  here  in  Niger  in  the 
eace  Corps  in  the  1960s.  After  he  left 
6  Peace  Corps,  he  formed  Africare, 
lie  of  the  finest  American  private  sec- 
ir  development  organizations. 

I  have  heard  more  than  once  from 
Ifrican  leaders  on  this  trip  that  to  give 
man  a  fish  will  feed  him  for  a  day,  but 
teach  him  how  to  fish  will  make  him 
If-sufficient  for  life.  Just  one  example 
Africare's  many  projects  here  in 
iger  is  an  IBM-financed  program  that 
ains  fishermen  in  Madarounfa  in 
odern  fishing  techniques  and  provides 
em  with  credit. 

As  I  said  the  other  night,  Niger  and 
merica  have  a  longstanding  friendship, 
'esident  Reagan  and  I  respect  Presi- 
mt  Kountche.  We  recognize  Niger's 
■oblems,  and  we  are  determined  to  do 
hat  we  can  to  help  Niger  in  its  time  of 
;ed.  I  want  to  thank  President 
ountche  for  his  warmth  and  candor 
id  hospitality.  My  stay  here  one  might 
rm  a  pilgrimage  of  friendship  and  con- 
■rn. 

As  I  said  at  the  outset,  Niger  has 
iffered  much  but  is  moving  to  over- 
)me  its  suffering.  President  Kountche 
ade  clear  in  our  discussions  how  im- 
:)rtant  it  is  to  Niger  that  food  commit- 
■d  by  donor  nations  be  delivered  on 
•hedule.  I  will  take  his  message  and  my 
imiration  of  the  Nigerien  people  with 
le  to  Geneva. 


DINNER  TOAST, 
BAMAKO, 
MAR.  9.  1985 

I  come  from  a  very  young  nation. 
Americans  trace  their  history  back  only 
a  few  hundred  years.  Here  in  Mali,  there 
were  great  empires  before  the  United 
States  even  existed.  I  know  Malians  are 
proud  of  their  history  and  with  good 
reason.  It  is  truly  correct  to  say  that 
"your  wealth  is  your  civilization."  The 
empire  of  Ghana  reached  its  peak  while 
Europe  was  still  in  the  midst  of  the 
Dark  Ages. 

The  Mali  Empire  under  the  reign  of 
Soundiata  Keita  was  even  more  power- 
ful. The  Songhai  of  Gao  were  one  of  the 
most  powerful  military  forces  ever 
known  in  West  Africa.  During  the  reign 
of  the  Askias,  their  empire  spread  from 
the  Atlantic  to  Lake  Tchad. 

Today  Mali  is  creating  a  new  his- 
tory. Significant  events  in  recent  years 
include  the  creation  of  the  second 
republic,  the  formation  of  the  Demo- 
cratic Union  of  Malian  People;  and  local 
elections  allowing  average  citizens' 
voices  to  be  heard.  The  United  States 
respects  and  honors  Mali's  history — old 
and  new. 

I  come  to  Mali  as  part  of  a  pilgrim- 
age of  friendship  and  concern  that  has 
taken  me  across  the  entire  Sahel — from 
Sudan  to  Niger  and  now  here.  In  this 


time  of  enormous  trial  for  much  of 
Africa,  the  United  States  and  the 
American  people  have  one  message  for 
the  people  of  Mali — we  are  with  you. 

We  have  heard  the  voices  of  the 
starving,  of  those  who  a  cruel  drought 
has  driven  from  their  lands.  We  have 
heard  the  voices  of  the  farmers  and  the 
herdsman.  We  will  help. 

Beyond  the  immediate  crisis,  the 
United  States  has  heard  another  voice 
from  Mali  as  well.  We  have  heard  you 
say  that  you  are  going  to  take  a  historic 
turn  in  agricultural  policy — a  historic 
turn  that  we  trust,  once  the  drought 
subsides  and  the  rains  return,  will  help 
ensure  that  famine  of  this  magnitude 
never  again  comes  to  Mali. 

It  is  a  simple  but  courageous  turn 
that  you  have  made,  and  it  is  summed 
up  in  a  single  word — trust.  Trust  the 
farmer,  trust  the  herdsman,  trust  their 
aspirations  and  their  resourcefulness, 
trust  their  private  initiative,  trust  them 
with  free  and  open  markets. 

The  United  States  fully  understands 
the  difficulties  implicit  in  a  turn  toward 
open  agricultural  markets,  and  so  here, 
too,  the  United  States  has  the  same 
message  for  the  people  of  Mali — we  are 
with  you. 

Members  of  my  party  have  signed 
today  agreements  that  will  assist  Mali  in 
making  this  transition.  We  applaud  the 


Felipe  Tejeda,  the  A.ssociate  Peace  Corps  Director  for  agriculture  and  rural  development, 
gives  Vice  President  and  Mrs.  Bush  a  briefing  on  the  Peace  Corps  activities  in  Mali. 


flay  1985 


15 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


courage  of  the  Malian  Government  in 
starting  on  this  difficult  road. 

I  am  told  that  Bambara  is  a 
language  of  proverbs.  One  in  particular 
caught  my  attention:  "Dooni  dooni 
kononin  b'a  nyaga  da."  ["The  small  bird 
builds  its  nest  twig  by  twig."]  I  under- 
stand that  this  saying  often  describes 
Malian  development  efforts.  I  completely 
endorse  the  philosophy  that  economic 
success  only  comes  with  sustained  ef- 
fort. I  propose  that  we  expand  the  scope 
of  the  proverb  to  include  the  relations 
between  our  two  great  nations. 

And  so,  Mr.  President,  I  propose  a 
toast  to  the  energy  and  resourcefulness 
of  the  people  of  Mali  and  to  lasting 
friendship  between  Mali  and  the  United 
States. 


STATEMENT, 
BAMAKO, 
MAR.  10,  1985 

Today  marks  the  end  of  a  journey,  a 
kind  of  pilgrimage  of  friendship  and  con- 
cern through  Africa.  My  trip  has  taken 
me  to  three  drought-stricken  coun- 
tries—Sudan, Niger,  and  Mali.  These 
countries  face  an  enormous  short-term 
problem — how  to  feed  millions  of  starv- 
ing people.  Each  faces  a  deeper  long- 
term  problem — how  to  keep  a  catas- 
trophe like  this  from  happening  again, 
that  is,  how  to  increase  overall 
agricultural  production. 

Sudan,  Niger,  and  Mali  are  not 
alone.  The  drought  spans  all  across  sub- 
Saharan  Africa  and  affects  more  than  a 
score  of  countries.  The  longer  term 
crisis  is  that  the  per  capita  agricultural 
production  in  Africa  has  been  dropping 
for  20  years.  According  to  the  World 
Bank,  even  without  the  drought,  African 
per  capita  production  would  have  fallen 
to  its  current,  disastrous  level  by  1988. 

Time  and  again  on  my  trip  I've 
heard  that  there  are  three  keys  to  re- 
versing this  startling  trend. 

The  first  is  to  move  toward  policies 
that  trust  the  farmer,  that  give  him  ac- 
cess to  free  and  open  markets.  The 
United  States  will  help  countries  bring 
about  these  and  other  kinds  of  policy 
changes. 

I  am  happy  to  announce  today  that 
the  U.S.  Government  will  provide  ap- 
proximately $18  million  over  3  years  in 
additional  resources  for  Mali.  This  is 
part  of  our  African  economic  policy 
reform  program.  This  is  a  multiyear  ef- 
fort which  has  the  specific  purposes  of 
encouraging  and  supporting  economic 
policy  changes  so  needed  for  growth. 
Our  commitment  today  is  subject  to  dis- 
cussions now  underway  with  the  U.S. 


Congress  and,  of  course,  to  discussions 
with  the  Government  of  Mali  on  how 
this  money  can  support  policy  changes 
that  the  Malian  Government  lacks  the 
resources  to  undertake. 

A  second  key  is  training — giving  the 
African  farmer  access  to  more 
sophisticated  and  efficient  techniques. 
Yesterday  I  visited  some  of  the  most 
splendid  men  and  women  I  have  met — 
our  80  Peace  Corps  volunteers  here  in 
Mali.  They  and  volunteers  like  them 
across  Africa  are  involved  in  this  impor- 
tant work. 

A  final  key  is  research — for  exam- 
ple, the  development  of  more  high-yield, 
drought-resistant  grain  hybrids. 

I  am  taking  this  message — Africa's 
message — with  me  to  Geneva  where  I 
will  address  a  UN  conference  dealing 
with  famine  in  Africa. 

Barbara  and  I  thank  President 
Traore,  Madame  Traore,  and  the  people 
of  Mali  for  their  marvelous  hospitality. 
We  hope  we  will  have  the  opportunity  to 
come  back  another  time  and  stay  longer 
in  this  warm  and  hospitable  country. 


ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE 
UN  CONFERENCE  ON  THE 
EMERGENCY  SITUATION 
IN  AFRICA, 
GENEVA, 
MAR.  11,  1985 

There  are  times  in  history  when  events 
in  one  land  serve  as  a  signal  to  others 
far  away — a  reminder  of  our  humanity 


and  of  the  costs  if  we  fail  to  mobilize  to 
meet  the  crisis  at  hand.  History  is  full  c 
sad  examples  when  the  signal  was  not 
heard  or  was  ignored.  Nearly  50  years 
ago — in  this  city,  in  this  hall — an 
African  nation,  Ethiopia,  called  upon  th 
world  to  resist  acts  of  aggression  that 
soon  engulfed  it  in  a  cycle  of  death  that 
struck  millions  of  people  in  Africa  and 
Asia,  Europe  and  America.  The  toll 
need  not  have  been  nearly  so  high. 

When  our  predecessors  met  here 
nearly  50  years  ago,  they  did  not  heed 
the  signal.  And,  today,  we  can — and  w( 
must — do  better.  Once  again,  the  signa 
comes  from  Africa,  but  this  time  it  is 
the  voice  not  of  one  nation  but  of  a 
score.  It  is  the  voice  of  millions  of  dyin; 
children,  starving  parents. 

Today,  a  great  tragedy  can  be 
avoided  if  we  listen  to  that  voice — if  wf 
put  aside  ideology,  open  our  hearts, 
strengthen  our  vital  institutions  of 
cooperation,  get  to  the  root  of  Africa's 
crisis,  and  have  the  courage  and 
perseverance  to  see  the  problem 
through. 

We  just  heard  [Tanzanian]  Presider 
Nyerere's  eloquent  plea,  and  to  use  his 
words:  yes,  it  would  be  a  miraculous 
relief,  he  called  it,  if  cooperation  and 
food  led  the  world  closer  to  peace.  Let's 
go  forward  in  that  spirit. 

I  come  before  you  today  as  one  wh( 
for  the  past  week,  has  stood  on  the 
parched  earth  of  Africa  and  seen  some 
of  the  results  of  ecological  disaster  and 
human  failure.  And  across  thousands  ol 
miles  in  Sudan,  Niger,  and  Mali,  I  have 
seen  and  heard  a  small  sample  of  the 
millions  of  Africans  who  are  at  risk  in  ; 
continentwide  emergency. 

What  Must  Be  Done 

I'd  like  now  to  share  my  thoughts  abou 
what  must  be  done  to  translate  today's 
challenge  into  a  better  tom.orrow  for 
millions  of  Africans. 

First,  in  terms  of  the  drought  and 
famine,  I  will  not  repeat  the  deadening 
barrage  of  statistics  and  differing 
estimates  of  what's  needed.  We  must 
simply  recognize  that  up  to  30  million 
people  are  affected  in  countries  across 
Africa.  It  is  not  possible  to  reach  a 
precise  definition  of  the  food  deficit.  At 
best,  we  have  a  snapshot  of  a  moving 
target  whose  exact  shape  changes  daily 

What  counts  in  the  short  term  is 
getting  food  to  people  before  they  die. 
Families  cannot  eat  ideology,  and  they 
cannot  wait  for  solutions  to  age-old  con- 
flicts. 

We  cannot  ignore  the  grim  news  of 
starvation  and  disaster  in  Ethiopia. 
Nearly  8  million  people  are  affected,  am 


16 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


ti) 


ny  of  them  are  beyond  the  reach  of 
y  existing  feeding  programs.  That 
nply  cannot  continue.  We  respect  the 
vereignty  and  the  territorial  integrity 
Ethiopia.  That  is  not  the  issue.  The 
;ue  is  that  we  cannot  accept  silence 
'  lile  perhaps  2.5  million  people  go 
thout  relief  in  northern  Ethiopia.  All 
ncerned— all — must  put  aside  politics 
bring  relief  to  all  in  need. 

We  must,  in  the  complicated  and 
manding  task  of  feeding  millions 
oughout  the  continent,  rely  on  the  ex- 
ing  organizations  which  have  served 
concerned  so  well.  On  behalf  of  Presi- 
nt  Reagan  and  all  Americans,  I  salute 
r  Secretary  General,  Javier  Perez  de 
lellar,  for  calling  this  meeting  of 
srcy.  I  commend  Brad  Morse  for  all 
at  he  is  doing  here  at  the  United  Na- 
ms,  as  well  as  Jim  Ingram  for  the 
orld  Food  Program's  important  food 
1  logistics  coordination. 2  And  I  salute 
the  volunteer  organizations,  many  of 
lich  are  represented  here  today. 

Just  as  threatened  populations  can- 
t  eat  ideology,  they  also  cannot  eat 
gue  pledges.  We  need  coordinated 
mmitments  which  encompass  the  task 
delivering  food  from  where  it  is 
own  to  where  it  is  eaten  at  a  time  cer- 
n.  Because  many  of  the  hardest  hit 
eas  are  in  land-locked  countries  and 

ports  that  serve  them  are  small, 
IS,  in  turn,  requires  priority  treatment 
food  ships. 

Much  more  needs  to  be  done  with 
spect  to  this  key  question  of  coordina- 
itn  and  timing,  and  the  UN  Office  of 
mergency  Operations  in  Africa  is  ideal- 
suited  to  play  a  central  role. 
f    We  cannot  fail  to  heed  the  eloquent 
I  ?a,  just  made  by  President  Kountche 
I '  Niger],  and  here's  the  quote:  "to  pay 
1  rticular  attention  to  logistics  and  com- 
i  jnication." 

As  an  American,  I  am  proud  of  the 
I  sponse  which  hunger  in  Africa  has 
I  oked  from  the  American  people.  Since 
'  e  first  television  pictures  appeared  in 
i;tober,  Americans — from  their  own 
ickets — have  given  more  than  $70 
:  illion  for  African  relief.  I  saw 
Tierican  mercy  planes  filled  with 
ivately  donated  relief  supplies  at  every 
op  I  made  in  Africa. 

As  we  did  last  year,  the  United 
i.ates  is  again  prepared  to  meet  50%  of 
e  emergency  food  need,  which  we 
timate  to  be  about  3  million  tons.  Let 
e  be  clear  on  the  central  point.  We  are 
eking  the  needed  funds  from  our  Con- 
•ess,  and  we  are  committed  to  obtain 
em.  I  am  pleased  today  that  the  ma- 
rity  and  minority  leaders  of  the  U.S. 


Senate  are  seated  with  the  American 
delegation,  that  they  have  been  joined 
by  Senator  Lugar,  who  is  the  Chairman 
of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  and 
also  by  Senator  Pell  and  Senator 
Kennedy. 

In  all,  this  year,  we  plan  to  provide 
3  million  tons  of  food  for  emergency  and 
other  requirements.  Our  total  food  and 
drought  assistance  will  come  to  more 
than  $1  billion,  in  addition  to  the  $788 
million  of  other  previously  planned 
economic  assistance. 

The  Search  for  Long-Term  Solutions 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  long-term 
future,  because  we  realize  that  the  prob- 
lem of  recurring  famine  in  Africa  may 
take  decades  to  solve. 

Along  with  the  sadness  and  the 
tragedy  in  the  relief  camps,  I  also  saw 
hope  in  the  faces  of  children  who  had 
responded  to  adequate  food  and  water 
as  a  withered  plant  responds  to  rain. 
And  for  the  long  term,  there  is 
hope— hope  in  the  growing  recognition 
by  more  and  more  governments  that  it 
is  time  to  open  Africa's  agricultural 
markets  and  let  its  farm  economies 
breathe. 

President  Nimeiri  in  Sudan,  Presi- 
dent Kountche— here  with  us  today— in 
Niger,  and  President  Traore  in  Mali  all 
discussed  with  me  enacted  or  planned 
reforms.  Today,  I  was  pleased  to  meet 
with  Dr.  Nyerere  to  further  discuss  the 
concerns  in  the  overall  OAU  [Organiza- 
tion of  African  Unity]  context. 

Almost  half  of  the  countries  on  the 
continent  have  started  the  journey  to 
open  and  free  agricultural  markets.  The 
removal  of  price  controls  in  Somalia,  I 
am  told,  has  led  to  a  striking  40%  in- 
crease in  sorghum  and  banana  produc- 
tion. After  Malawi's  maize  prices  were 
allowed  to  rise,  their  crop  doubled,  and 
Malawi  is  now  a  maize  exporter  despite 
the  drought.  In  Zimbabwe,  price  incen- 
tives to  farmers  have  been  a  central 
factor  in  that  country's  impressive 
agricultural  output. 

The  United  States  is  encouraging 
such  progress  with  a  5-year,  $500 
million  African  economic  policy  reform 
program  and  a  "Food  for  Progress"  pro- 
gram under  which  nondisaster  food  will 
be  provided  to  countries  undertaking 
reform. 

There  is  a  second  reason  for  grow- 
ing hope  in  Africa's  future— that  is  the 
dawning  of  a  new  day  in  African 
agricultural  practices. 


I  was  briefed  in  Kliarloum  about 
a  new  strain  of  drought-resistant 
sorghum,  one  of  the  first  products  of 
agricultural  research  focused  on  Africa 
itself.  It  promises  to  increase  yields  by 
150%.  If  Sudanese  farmers  come  to  use 
it  for  just  a  quarter  of  the  sorghum  they 
grow,  Sudan  will  feed  itself. 

Africa  needs  its  own  green  revolu- 
tion. It  needs  research— it  needs  it 
badly— to  develop  new  seed  varieties  ap- 
propriate to  Africa's  fragile  soils  and  its 
fickle  climate.  Moreover,  people  need  to 
be  trained  to  use  the  new  seeds,  to  use 
the  new  techniques. 

We  donors  have  a  responsibility  to 
our  own  citizens  and  to  Africa  alike  to 
give  both  relief  and  forms  of  aid  that  do 
not  perpetuate  dependency.  Today, 
Africans  seek  our  help  not  because  they 
want  to  depend  on  someone  else,  not 
because  they  wanted  to  depend  on  us, 
but  because  other  models  have  failed 
and  they  want  to  get  on  their  own  feet. 
They  also  want  changes  in  other  areas 
that  I  have  not  touched  on,  such  as  im- 
proved training  and  education  and  sensi- 
ble family  planning,  which  the  United 
States  also  supports. 

Desertification 

Finally,  I  must  speak  of  a  daunting  fac- 
tor in  the  African  equation— that  is,  of 
the  growing  aridity  in  Africa  called 
desertification.  I  felt  this  ecological 
disaster  firsthand  when  swirling  dust 
storms  prohibited  our  landing  at  Maradi, 
in  Niger,  to  see  firsthand  the  ravage  of 
desertification. 

In  many  parts  of  Africa  today,  I  am 
told,  farmers  rise  before  dawn,  and  they 
never  see  the  full  light  of  day— they  live 
in  a  half-lit  world  beneath  the  dust 
clouds  of  the  expanding  desert. 

Why  is  the  desert  growing?  We 
don't  know  completely.  But  if  we  do  not 
have  all  the  answers  right  now,  I 
believe,  nevertheless,  that  here,  as  in  so 
many  other  areas,  we  have  a  reason  for 
hope. 

In  the  1930s,  in  the  central  plains  of 
the  United  States,  my  country, 
Americans  experienced  something  we 
call  the  "dust  bowl."  It  encompassed 
many,  many  of  our  states,  and  our  ma- 
jority leader  of  the  Senate,  Senator 
Dole,  comes  from  Kansas— a  state  that 
was  devastated  by  the  so-called  dust 
bowl.  The  land  became  parched  from  an 
extended  drought,  and  the  wind  kicked 
up  dust  as  dense  as  it  is  in  areas  of  the 
Sahel.  People  said  that  land  would  never 
produce  crops  again. 


ay  1985 


17 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


That  was  just  in  the  1930s,  and,  to- 
day, an  important  part  of  the  food 
America  ships  to  Africa  comes  from 
what  once  was  known  as  the  dust  bowl. 
With  more  research,  Africa,  too,  will 
reclaim  its  once-productive  land. 

I  have  finished  my  brief— all  too 
brief— journey  to  Africa,  but  obviously 
Africa's  journey  is  really  just  beginning. 
If  the  land  of  the  Sahel  is  to  follow  the 
example  of  America's  dust  bowl,  Africa 
must  travel  a  long  distance— a  long 
distance  in  agricultural  policy;  a  long 
distance  in  developing  the  skills  of  its 
farmers;  and  a  long  distance  in  applying 
new  techniques. 

And  we,  the  humanitarian  nations  of 
the  world,  have  a  responsibility  to  Africa 
itself,  a  responsibility  to  those  little 
children  to  join  Africa  in  that  journey.  I 
can't  think  of  any  better  place  to  make 
that  commitment  than  right  here,  today, 
in  this  room. 


Vice  President's  Visit  to  iVIoscow 


'Texts  from  the  Office  of  the  Vice  Presi- 
dent's Press  Secretary. 

^Brad  Morse,  Director  of  the  Office  for 
Emergency  Operations  in  Africa  and  Ad- 
ministrator of  the  UN  Development  Program; 
James  C.  Ingram.  Executive  Director  of  the 
World  Food  Program.  ■ 


Vice  President  Bush  was  named  by 
President  Reagan  to  head  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  funeral  of  Soviet  Presi- 
dent Konstantin  U.  Chemenko.  He  was 
in  Moscow  March  12-13,  1985. 

Following  are  his  departure  remarks 
in  Geneva  and  a  news  conference  held  in 
Moscow. ' 


DEPARTURE  STATEMENT, 

GENEVA, 

MAR.  12,  1985 

I'm  leaving  this  morning  for  Moscow  to 
attend  the  funeral  of  President 
Chernenko.  Yesterday,  as  you  know,  I 
addressed  the  UN  International  Con- 
ference on  the  Emergency  Situation  in 
Africa.  This  has  become  a  trip  of  con- 
trasts that  will  have  taken  me,  before  I 
am  done,  from  the  heat  and  dust  of 
Africa  to  the  cold  and  snow  of  the 
Soviet  Union;  and  from  focusing  on  the 
issue  of  famine  to  focusing  on  the  broad- 
est issues  of  world  peace.  But  diverse  as 
these  issues  are,  they  have  one  thing  in 
common — each  deals  with  the  broad 
aspiration  of  our  common  humanity. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  suffered  an 
extraordinary  loss.  For  the  third  time  in 
less  than  2V2  years,  it  has  lost  its  leader. 
Once  again  I  am  carrying  the  condo- 
lences of  President  Reagan  and  the 
American  people  to  the  people  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  I  look  forward  once  again 
to  meeting  with  the  new  Soviet  leader- 
ship and  to  conveying  the  desire  of 
President  Reagan  and  the  American 
people  for  a  peaceful  world  free  from 
the  threat  of  great  power  conflict  and 
free  from  the  threat  of  nuclear  weapons. 

All  mankind  desires  peace.  Today,  at 
this  hour,  those  hopes  focus  on  the  com- 
mencement of  arms  control  talks  here  in 
Geneva. 

America  hopes  that  within  the 
Soviet  Union,  we  will  see  another  begin- 
ning— the  begfinning  of  a  new  era  of 
stable  Soviet  leadership  in  which  we 
may  progress  in  sustained  movement 
toward  arms  reduction;  the  beginning  of 
a  new  era  leading  toward  lasting  world 
peace.  Lasting  world  peace — that  is  the 
hope  and  prayer  of  all  mankind.  And 
that,  together  with  my  message  of  con- 
dolence, is  the  purpose  of  this  trip  to 
Moscow. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 

MOSCOW, 

MAR.  13,  1985 

Let  me  just  say  that  we  have  come  froi 
a  rather  extensive  meeting  [with 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev].  It  lasted 
for  about  1  hour  and  25  minutes,  I 
think.  I  will  not  go  into  details,  specific: 
I  never  have,  some  of  you  may  recall, 
and  I  won't  do  it  here. 

I  will  say — and  I  try  to  be  respon 
sive  to  questions,  but  we  are  not  going 
to  discuss  the  details  of  v/hat  I  dis- 
cussed, what  the  Secretary  discussed — 
that  the  meeting  was  useful,  and  there 
was  a  lot  of  important  content  dis- 
cussed, a  wide  array  of  issues. 

Q.  Did  you  bring  a  letter  from 
President  Reagan  inviting  Mr. 
Gorbachev  to  a  summit  meeting  in 
Washington,  and  if  so,  what  was  his 
reaction? 

A.  I  brought  a  letter;  I  will  not 
discuss  the  contents  of  it.  But  I  believe 
that  the  President  does  feel  a  meeting 
would  be  useful. 

Q.  There  has  been  a  spate  of 
stories  and  suggestions  that  we  are 
now  heading  for  a  new  era  of  detente 
or  for  at  least  better  relationships  be- 
tween Washington  and  Moscow.  Can 
you  give  us  your  assessment  of  any 
possible  shift  in  atmosphere? 

A.  I  think  we  both  felt  that  it  was 
constructive  and  nonpolemical.  If  there 
ever  was  a  time  when  we  can  move  for- 
ward with  progress  in  the  last  few 
years,  I  would  say  that  this  is  a  good 
time  for  that,  and  our  aspirations  for 
that  are  high.  But  we  are  not  euphoric; 
we're  realistic  in  our  assessment  of 
things  now,  and  we  were  before  this 
meeting  and  we  are  after  this  meeting. 
We  encountered  nothing  there  to 
discourage  us  in  any  way  from  these 
feelings  that  I  think  you  appropriately 
say  are  high — high  on  hope,  high  that 
we  can  make  progress  in  Geneva,  high 
for  an  overall  reduction  of  tensions. 
Nothing  happened  tonight  that  would 
discourage  us  from  that.  The  frankness 
and  the  usefulness  and  the  content  of 
the  meeting  was  such  that  I  think  that 
we  have  reason  to  be  encouraged. 

Q.  Did  you  talk  about  the  Stra- 
tegic Defense  Initiative?  Was  it  your 
feeling  that  the  new  Soviet  leader 
feels  that  this  is  an  insuperable  bar- 
rier to  good  relations? 


18 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin' 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


ftpr  the  funeral  of  President  Chernenko 
Moscow,  Vice  President  Bush  and 
etretary  Shultz  met  with  the  new  Soviet 


leader  Mikhail  Gorbachev  (second  from 
left)  and  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko. 


A.  You  must  have  missed  my  earlier 
imment  about  not  discussing  the 
r-tails  of  what  we  did  talk  about.  I'm 
'iTv,  it  makes  it  much  less  interesting, 
know,  but  I  will  stay  with  that  and  just 
■IVr  on  the  specifics  of  what  we  talked 
tout.  We  don't  feel  from  the  overall 
mversation  that  anything  is  in- 
ijierable,  no. 

Q.  How  much  of  the  meeting  was 
inducted  by  Mr.  Gorbachev  and  how 
luch  by  Mr.  Gromyko? 

A.  Mr.  Gorbachev  conducted  the 
leeting  and  did  it  with  great  confidence 
id  assurance.  When  the  Secretary  had 
)nu'thing  to  say,  the  atmosphere  was 
u  li  that  all  four  of  us  felt  inclined  to 
uticipate.  But  clearly  Mr.  Gorbachev 
as  the  main  interlocutor  and  self- 
infident  in  the  statements.  He  made  a 
ery  strong  impression. 

Q.  You  say  if  there  ever  was  a 
ime  for  progress  that  this  is  the  time, 
t'^hy  does  the  change  in  leadership 
lake  this  such  a  good  time  at  the 
resent  time?  Is  there  something 
bout  the  new  leader,  or  what  is — 

A.  I  would  simply  say  that  my  view 
n  that  would  have  been  enhanced  by 
he  meeting  we  have  just  had.  I'm  not 
uphoric,  suggesting  there  are  no  major 
roblems.  There  are  big  problems,  major 
ifferences  that  we've  had  over  the 


years  and  probably  will  continue  to  have 
in  the  future.  But  the  climate  is  such 
that  we  feel  this  is  a  good  time  to  move 
forward,  and  I  hope  that  we  adequately 
conveyed  our  President's  view  on  that. 
Secretary  Shultz  saw  him  more  recently 
than  I,  in  fact  I  haven't  seen  the 
President — I  talked  to  him  once — but 
the  Secretary  had  had  long  talks  with 
him  after  the  change  here.  I  think  that 
George  agrees  that  the  President  is 
very,  very  serious  and,  indeed,  hopeful, 
and  the  Secretary  will  report  back. 

Q.  Without  going  into  details,  can 
you  say  that  President  Reagan  wants 
an  early  meeting  with  Mr.  Gorbachev 
in  the  next  few  months  or  is  this 
something  that  has  to  be  put  off  down 
the  road  to  the  end  of  the  year? 

A.  No  I  think  he'd  be  ready  as  soon 
as  the  Soviet  leadership  will  be,  but 
that's  just  my  speculation  on  that. 

Q.  You  met  with  Mr.  Rajiv  Gandhi 
this  morning.  Would  you  like  to  com- 
ment on  your  discussions  with  him — 
the  Prime  Minister  of  India? 

A.  He  accorded  us  a  good  deal  of 
time.  I  had  a  chance  to  tell  him  how 
much  the  President  was  looking  forward 
to  receiving  him  in  June.  We  discussed 
our  relations  with  India,  and  we  are  en- 
couraged as  to  how  they  are  going. 
Nothing  we  do  with  any  other  country  is 
to  be  done  to  the  detriment  of  India,  and 
I  think  the  Prime  Minister  understands 
that. 


All  in  all  both  the  Secretary  and  I 
feel  that  it  was  a  very,  very  useful 
meeting,  and  it  was  very  frank  with  the 
Prime  Minister,  who  really  has  won  the 
respect  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  coming  in  under  extraordinarily 
difficult  circumstances  and  conducting 
himself  with  real  leadership  and 
foresight.  So  we  are  looking  forward  to 
his  visit  this  June. 

Q.  What  impression  did  you  have 
of  Mr.  Gorbachev's  readiness  for  a 
meeting  with  Mr.  Reagan? 

A.  I  really  honestly  can't  answer; 
not  to  try  to  avoid  your  question,  but  I 
just  couldn't  tell  you  from  anything 
about  that.  But  I  have  the  very  comfort- 
able feeling  knowing  the  President  as 
well  as  I  do— and  I  haven't  compared 
notes  with  the  Secretary  on  this — that  it 
would  be  fruitful  and  be  good  and  that 
there  would  be — we  come  away  saying 
useful  and  we  really  mean  it,  and  in  im- 
portant content,  we  really  mean  that. 
We  felt  that  we  had  perhaps  made  some 
progress  and  I  know  that  the  President 
would  feel  exactly  the  same  way. 


'Texts  from  the  Office  of  the  Vice  Presi- 
dent's Press  Secretary.  ■ 


lay  1985 


19 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


Vice  President's  Visit  to  Grenada, 
Brazil,  and  {Honduras 


Vice  President  Bush  went  from 
Moscow  to  visit  Grenada  (March  H, 
1985),  Brazil  (March  14-16)  to  head  the 
U.S.  delegation  at  the  inauguration  of 
President-elect  Tancredo  de  Almeida 
Neves,  ^  and  Honduras  (March  16). 

Following  are  remarks  he  made  dur- 
ing the  trip.^ 


STATEMENT, 
ST.  GEORGE'S, 
MAR.  14,  1985 

Let  me  begin  by  saying  how  very 
pleased  I  am  to  have  this  chance  to  visit 
Grenada.  Our  reception  has  been  as 
warm  as  the  Caribbean  sun. 

I  have  just  met  with  Governor 
General  Sir  Paul  Scoon  and  Prime 
Minister  Blaize.  Among  the  many  issues 
we  discussed  was  the  withdrawal  of  U.S. 
and  Caribbean  peace  force  troops  and 
the  worries  of  many  on  this  island  that 
their  departure  will  leave  Grenada 
vulnerable  to  the  antidemocratic  forces 
that  have  recently  caused  so  much 
misery. 

We  are  confident  that  Grenada's 
own  security  forces  can  now  take  on  the 
primary  responsibility  for  Grenada's  pro- 
tection. But  let  me  just  state  for  the 
record:  Should  extraordinary  develop- 
ments threaten  this  island  during  the 
withdrawal  period,  we  stand  ready  to 
halt  and  reverse,  if  necessary,  the  with- 
drawal of  troops. 

Grenada  is  now  part  of  the  brother- 
hood of  democratic  nations.  With  able 
leaders  such  as  Prime  Minister  Blaize, 
Grenada  can,  indeed,  look  forward  to  a 
bright  future. 


REMARKS. 

TANTEEN  FIELD,  GRENADA, 

MAR.  14,  1985 

In  the  short  time  I  have  spent  on  your 
beautiful  island,  my  heart  has  been 
warmed  by  the  spontaneous  expressions 
of  friendship  from  the  Grenadian  people. 
What  I  have  seen  makes  me  both  happy 
and  proud. 

I  have  met  with  Governor  General 
Scoon  and  your  newly  elected  Prime 
Minister  Blaize — able  men  dedicated  to 
strengthening  the  democratic  institu- 
tions and  building  the  vital  economy  on 
which  this  island's  future  depends.  And  I 
have  seen  many  of  the  places  of  battle, 


Grenada  welcomes  Vice  President  Bush. 


scenes  of  valor  and  sacrifice,  where 
American  servicemen  distinguished 
themselves  in  service  to  their  country 
and  to  your  people — True  Blue  Campus, 
Grande  Anse  and  Calivigny. 

President  Reagan  asked  me  to  per- 
sonally convey  to  you  his  best  wishes 
and  to  thank  you  for  your  hundreds  of 
letters  of  support — especially  those  let- 
ters of  appreciation  for  the  soldiers  who 
served  here.  He  was  deeply  moved  by 
your  descriptions  of  brutality  under  the 
communist  rule,  and  he — along  with  all 
Americans — share  your  joy  in  your  new- 
ly won  freedom.  One  man  wrote  that 
where  there  was  darkness,  now  there  is 
light. 

Our  hopes  and  emotions  were  with 
you  last  December  when  such  an  over- 
whelming number  of  the  people  of  this 
island  turned  out  to  vote  and  affirm,  fur 
all  the  world  to  see,  that  Grenada  would 
once  again  proudly  take  its  stand  among 
the  ranks  of  free,  democratic  nations. 
Grenada  has  taken  hold  of  its  destiny, 
and  together  with  the  vast  majority  of 
countries  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean,  you  have  confidently  set  off 
on  a  journey  down  freedom's  road. 


I  want  to  emphasize  as  strongly  as  I 
can  that  President  Reagan  and  I  and  th( 
people  of  the  United  States  will  never 
waver  in  our  support  for  democracy, 
and  we  will  always  have  a  special  in- 
terest in  Grenada.  We  support  the  freelj 
elected  government  of  Prime  Minister 
Blaize,  and  we  will  continue  to  do  all  we 
can  to  help  as  you  work  to  secure  a 
l)right  and  prosperous  future. 

I  know  that  many  on  these  islands 
are  worried  about  the  safety  of  their 
new  democracies  now  that  the  United 
Sttites  and  the  members  of  the  Carib- 
bean peace  force  are  withdrawing  their 
troops.  Many  have  expressed  the  fear 
that  without  our  troops,  the  unprin- 
cipled, antidemocratic  forces  and  their 
foreign  allies  in  the  communist  bloc  will 
once  again  work  to  subvert  the  freedoms 
(Grenada  now  enjoys. 

Let  me  assure  you,  we  will  not  leave 
you  unprotected.  We  will  continue  to 
support  Grenada's  own  police  and 
paramilitary.  They  are  well  trained  and 
equipped,  and  we  are  confident  that  they 
are  now  prepared  to  take  on  the 
primary  responsibility  for  Grenada's 
security.  But  let  me  state  clearly:  We 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


ill  not  sit  idly  by  and  watch  Grenada's 
>curity  threatened.  Should  a  security 
ireat  materialize  during  the  withdrawal 
?riod,  we  stand  ready  to  halt  and,  if 
ecessary,  reverse  the  withdrawal  of  our 
?curity  forces. 

There  is  a  bond  of  friendship  be- 
veen  our  two  nations  that  cannot  now 
?  broken.  We  will  continue  to  provide 
•aining  and  equipment  and  to  par- 
cipate  with  Grenada  and  other  demo- 
:"itic  Caribbean  nations  in  regularly 
?heduled  joint  military  exercises.  We 

support  each  other,  and  we  will 
ever  relax  our  vigilance  against  the 
jrces  of  oppression.  Despots  of 
'hatever  stripe  can  forget  their  designs 
n  this  nation.  Grenada  has  found  its 
iture  in  freedom. 

But  we  know  that  the  truly  difficult 
■ork  of  building  prosperity  has  only  just 
egiui.  Prime  Minister  Blaize  has  wisely 
iken  a  reform  of  this  nation's  tax 
/stem  as  one  of  his  first  priorities.  As 
'e  have  found  these  last  few  years  in 
le  United  States,  and  as  we  have  seen 
I  me  and  again  around  the  world,  only 
I'hen  there  are  incentives  and  people 
Ire  left  free  to  hope,  work,  and  produce, 
nly  then  is  true,  lasting  economic 
evelopment  possible. 

At  the  same  time,  I  promise  you 
lat  President  Reagan  and  I  are  doing, 
nd  will  continue  to  do,  all  we  can  to  aid 
1  Grenada's  development.  Already  $57 
lillion  have  gone  into  completion  of  this 
lirport,  building  roads,  and  improving 
le  water  supply.  We  have  made  con- 
-ibutions  in  education,  agriculture, 
ealth,  and  in  meeting  the  shortfall  of 
iovernment  income.  Our  Agency  for  In- 
prnational  Development  projects  have 
Bready  provided  employment  for  more 
lan  1,000  people. 

But  ultimately,  jobs  and  opportunity 
lepend  on  self-sustaining  economic 
evelopment— the  kind  Prime  Minister 
lllaize  is  skillfully  working  toward. 

Under  the  example  and  the  guidance 
■f  Governor  General  Sir  Paul  Scoon,  the 
tewardship  of  the  interim  government 
nder  Mr.  Nicholas  Brathwaite,  and  now 
he  leadership  of  your  distinguished 
'rime  Minister,  Grenada  has  come  a 
3ng  way.  You  have  earned  the  respect 
if  your  fellow  democracies.  I  join  Presi- 
lent  Reagan  and  the  American  people  in 
aluting  you. 

I  know  I  speak  for  all  of  us  in  the 
Jnited  States  when  I  say,  God  bless  the 
ree  people  of  Grenada,  and  God  bless 
he  firm  and  lasting  friendship  that  con- 
inues  to  grow  between  our  two  nations. 


Vice  President  Bush  with  Jose  Sarney, 
interim  President  of  Brazil  (above)  and 
President  Suazo  of  Honduras  (right). 


REMARKS, 

COMAYAGUA,  HONDURAS. 

MAR.  16.  1985 

Mr.  President,  it  is  a  great  personal 
pleasure  to  be  here  and  be  able  to  renew 
our  friendship.  You  have  visited  the 
United  States  three  times,  and  I  have 
been  privileged  to  have  you  as  a  guest  in 
our  home.  I  am  honored  tobe  in  your 
country  to  visit  you — particularly  on 
this,  the  eve  of  your  birthday.  I  bring 
you  greetings  from  President  Reagan 
and  the  American  people  and  best 
wishes  for  a  healthy,  happy  birthday 
with  many  more  to  come. 

Today  you  and  I  will  discuss  matters 
of  mutual  concern  to  our  two  countries. 
We  will  speak  as  representatives  of  two 
nations  that  desire  peace,  respect  in- 
dividual rights,  and  work  to  increase 
economic  prosperity  for  our  own  people 
and  for  all  our  neighbors  throughout  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  Our  talks  will  fur- 
ther strengthen  the  bonds  of  friendship 
and  shared  values  between  Honduras 
and  the  United  States. 


Mr.  President,  thank  you  for  the  op- 
portunity to  visit  your  beautiful  country 
and  to  meet  with  you  once  more. 


STATEMENT. 

COMAYAGUA.  HONDURAS, 
MAR.  16,  1985 

It  has  been  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to 
meet  with  President  Suazo  in  his  home 
town  of  La  Paz  and  to  visit  U.S.  forces 


i/lay  1985 


21 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


here.  I  have  the  utmost  admiration  and 
friendship  for  President  Suazo.  When  he 
is  succeeded  next  January,  I  know  that 
he  will  have  earned  his  place  in  the 
history  of  the  Americas. 

My  visit  here  today  underlines,  for 
all  the  world  to  see,  our  lasting  commit- 
ment to  a  free  and  democratic  Hon- 
duras. Against  the  communist/terrorist 
forces  which  seek  to  destabilize  the 
region,  the  United  States  and  Honduras 
stand  firmly  united  in  a  close  bond  for 
friendship  and  mutual  support.  In  the 
last  4  years,  the  United  States  has 
dramatically  increased  its  annual 
economic  assistance  to  Honduras. 

Freedom  loving  people  everywhere 
appreciate  the  hardships  and  trials  Hon- 
duras has  had  to  endure  as  a  nation  on 
the  front  lines  of  freedom.  Both  of  our 
governments  recognize  the  need  for 
vigilance  against  the  threat  of  com- 
munist aggression.  Any  communist 
power  with  designs  against  Honduras 
should  know  that  the  United  States 
stands  foursquare  behind  its  democratic 
partner.  We  will  not  allow  the  security 
of  Honduras  to  be  compromised. 

As  long  as  the  Sandinistas  impose 
totalitarian  rule  and  ally  themselves  with 
the  communist/terrorist  nations,  as  long 
as  the  Nicaraguan  military  buildup  far 
exceeds  that  country's  defensive  needs, 
there  will  be  instability  in  the  region. 
Let  the  Sandinistas  look  to  the  example 
of  their  democratic  neighbors,  countries 
that  now  enjoy  the  hope  and  freedom 
that  the  rulers  in  Managua  have  stolen 
from  their  own  people. 

We  urge  Nicaragua  to  cut  its  ties  to 
hostile  foreign  military  forces  and  join 
the  great  majority  of  countries  in  Latin 
America  on  their  march  to  freedom. 

As  I  leave,  I  want  to  emphasize  once 
again  our  deep  commitment  to  Hon- 
duras' security  and  to  its  right  to  the 
peaceful  enjoyment  of  the  democratic 
liberties  it  has  so  proudly  earned. 


Nicaragua:  A  Threat  to  Democracy 


Ik 


'Due  to  illness,  President-elect  Neves  was 
unable  to  take  the  oath  office;  Jose  Sarney 
was  sworn  in  as  Vice  President  and  became 
Acting  President. 

^Text  from  the  Office  of  the  Vice  Presi- 
dent's Press  Secretary.  ■ 


by  Vice  President  Bush 

Address  before  the  Austin  Council  on 
Foreign  Affairs  on  February  28.  1985."^ 

It's  been  more  than  6  months  since  Con- 
gress voted  to  hold  up  further  aid  to  the 
freedom  fighters,  battling  to  bring  de- 
mocracy to  Nicaragua.  And  apparently 
the  communist  rulers  in  that  country 
have  seen  their  opportunity  and  are  now 
engaged  in  a  major  military  effort  to 
wipe  out  the  armed  democratic 
resistance  to  their  regime  once  and  for 
all. 

They're  being  helped  by  massive  sup- 
plies of  weapons  from  their  friends  and 
allies  in  the  Soviet  Union,  East  Ger- 
many, Bulgaria,  North  Korea,  Vietnam, 
Cuba,  the  Palestinian  Liberation 
Organization  (PLO),  Libya,  and  other 
radical  states.  These  weapons  included 
the  ultra-sophisticated  HIND  heli- 
copter— the  one  being  used  by  the 
Soviets  with  devastating  effect  against 
the  freedom  fighters  in 
Afghanistan — over  L50  tanks,  and  200 
other  armored  vehicles,  many  of  these 
mobile  rocket  launchers. 

Even  so,  the  freedom  fighters  con- 
tinue to  gain  support  and  recruits  from 
the  disillusioned  Nicaraguan  populace. 
The  democratic  aspirations  which  fueled 
that  first  revolution  in  1979  against 
Somoza  still  burn  unsatisfied  in  the 
breasts  of  the  Nicaraguan  people. 

But  the  urgent  question  which  we 
must  address  and  address  quickly  is  how 
long  that  democratic  resistance  can  sur- 
vive the  Sandinista  assault  if  the  United 
States  refuses  to  give  any  aid.  The  long- 
suffering  Nicaraguan  people  need  our 
help. 

No  one's  asking  for  U.S.  troops,  only 
for  technical  material  financial  support. 
And  we're  only  asking  Congress  to 
release  a  few  dollars  to  a  brave  people 
who  are  striving  for  the  same  demo- 
cratic ideals  and  freedoms  that  our  own 
forefathers  fought  for  in  the  American 
Revolution. 

Sandinista  Intentions 

When  I  watch  the  debate  over  Nicara- 
gua I  sometimes  wonder  if  the  op- 
ponents of  aid  to  the  freedom  fighters 
have  been  listening  to  what  the 
rulers — the  Marxist-Leninist  rulers  in 
Nicaragua — themselves  have  been  say- 
ing, because  the  Sandinistas  are  often 
quite  open — not  when  they  send  their 
people  up  here — but  they're  often  quite 
open  about  the  intentions  and  purposes. 


And  they  often  directly  contradict  the 
excuses  made  for  them  by  some  of  theii 
misguided  sympathizers  in  this  and  in 
other  countries. 

For  instance,  some  still  insist  that 
the  Marxist-Leninists  in  Nicaragua  pose 
no  threat  to  their  democratic  neighbors 
Yes,  the  Nicaraguan  Army  is  stronger 
and  better  equipped  than  all  the  other 
armies  of  Central  America  combined. 
But,  say  Nicaragua's  defenders,  these 
Marxists  have  no  extraterritorial  ambi- 
tion. 

Tomas  Borge,  Nicaraguan  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  has  stated  from  the 
beginning,  "This  revolution  goes  beyond 
our  borders.  Our  revolution  was  always 
internationalist."  This  is  a  Borge  quote. 

I  brought  with  me  some  commemor 
ative  postage  stamps  from  Nicaragua. 
Karl  Marx,  the  Communist  Manifesto. 
These  are  stamps — commemorative 
stamps — of  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua. 

Or  listen  to  Humberto  Ortega,  the 
Sandinista  Defense  Minister,  who  openl; 
said.  "Of  course,  we're  not  ashamed  to 
be  helping  the  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador. 
We  would  like  to  help  all  revolutions." 
His  own  quote. 

Or  Nicaragua's  Foreign  Minister, 
[Miguel]  D'Escoto,  who  described  how 
the  Sandinistas  view  Central  America. 
Here's  the  quote:  "You  may  look  at  us  a 
five  countries,  six  now  with  Panama,  bu 
we  regard  ourselves  as  six  different 
states  of  a  single  nation,  in  the  process 
of  reunification." 

Tomas  Borge  once  described  the 
final  process  of  that  reunification  when 
he  called  Costa  Rica  "the  dessert."  WTia 
he  meant  was  that  tiny  Costa  Rica,  a 
long-standing,  stable  democracy  with  n< 
army,  would  be  completely  vulnerable  ti 
armed  aggression — a  piece  of  cake,  as  i 
were.  Nicaragua's  Ambassador  to  Costa 
Rica  spelled  it  out  more  openly,  more 
clearly.  He  said  that  the  Costa  Ricans, 
should  they  call  on  the  OAS  [Organiza- 
tion of  American  States)  to  help  them  in 
the  event  of  an  invasion,  would  not  have 
time  to  convoke  an  OAS  meeting 
because  "by  that  time  they  would  have 
been  occupied." 

This  is  the  voice  of  bullying  and  in- 
timidation and  blatant  contempt  for  in- 
ternational law.  And  it  is  the  voice, 
often  heard  before  in  history,  of  tyrants 
bent  on  conquest.  And  it's  a  very  clear 
voice  for  all  who  choose  to  listen  of  the 
Nicaraguan  Sandinista  rulers. 

They  came  to  power — the  San- 
dinistas— promising  to  establish  a 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


?mocratic  government  chosen  by  free 
ections,  and  we  believed  their  prom- 
es.  And  so,  the  United  States  gave  the 
icaraguan  revolutionaries  un- 
•ecedented  aid.  We  were  the  largest, 
I  far,  supporters  of  the  Sandinistas 
"ter  the  overthrow  of  the  Somoza  dic- 
.torship— $120  million  from  1979  to 
)81  plus  support  for  $240  million  more 
funds  from  the  Inter-American 
evelopment  Bank.  And  we  gave  more 
d  than  any  other  nation.  But  even 
hile  we  were  giving  aid,  the  hard-line 
)mmunists  there  were  already  breaking 
leir  promises. 

[oral  and  Strategic 
iterests  at  Stake 

0,  in  Nicaragua  we  see  that  the  San- 
nistas  have  nearly  extinguished 
eedom  of  the  press — la  prensa.  In- 
jpendent  labor  unions  have  been 
arassed,  their  leaders  beaten  and  ar- 
!sted.  Leaders  of  the  business  com- 
unity  were  arrested  simply  because 
ley  issued  statements  criticizing  official 
jlicy.  And  following  the  Cuban  model, 
18  Sandinistas  set  up  a  network  of  in- 
rmers  and  "thought"  police  spying  on 
.milies  and  communities.  And  already 
leir  jails  are  filled  with  political 
-isoners,  some  3,600  by  the  latest 
;timate. 

But  of  course  the  biggest  obstacle  to 
le  Sandinistas'  complete  domination  is 
le  church,  which  has  been  harassed 
ercilessly.  In  a  country  of  deeply 
iligious  people,  the  government  doesn't 
jsitate  to  have  priests  beaten,  arrested, 
id  you  saw  not  so  many  months  ago, 
eked  out — exiled  from  Nicaragua, 
oly  Week  services  and  the  bishop's 
eekly  homily  have  been  censored.  At 
le  time  they  wouldn't  even  permit — 2 
jars  ago,  I  believe  it  was — Holy  Week 
-oadcasts  at  all.  Government-inspired 
lobs  even  insulted  and  mocked  the  Holy 
ather  when  he  visited  that  country, 
rotestant  sects,  including  Evangelicals, 
ave  been  attacked.  There  have  been  an- 
semitic  attacks,  and  the  Sandinista 
lilitary  has  burned  over  50  churches. 

Amazingly,  we  still  hear  the  libel 
?peated  that  the  Nicaraguan  freedom 
ghters  are  made  up  largely  of  followers 
f  Somoza — ex-followers  of  Somoza.  In 
ict,  ex-members  of  Somoza's  national 
uard  account  for  only  a  tiny  handful  of 
le  1.5,000  armed  resistance  fighters, 
'he  entire  political  leadership  of  the 
"eedom  fighters— Alfonso  Robelo  and 
ildolfo  Colero  of  the  FDN  [Nicaraguan 
)emocratic  Force]  and  Eden  Pastora — 
/ere  prominent  political  opponents  of 
lOmoza. 


Both  Robelo  and  Pastora,  the 
famous — you  know,  he's  the  com- 
mander, Commandante  Zero— par- 
ticipated in  the  revolution  and  were 
members  of  the  original  revolutionary 
government.  They  only  took  up  arms 
again  when  it  became  clear  to  them  that 
the  hard-line  Marxist  communists  had 
seized  all  power  and  were,  as  Eden 
Pastora  says,  selling  their  country  out  to 
the  Soviet  bloc. 

But  apart  from  the  compelling  moral 
reasons  for  supporting  fellow  Americans 
struggling  for  their  liberty,  the  United 
States  has  paramount  strategic  interests 
at  stake.  How  long,  I  wonder,  can  we  ig- 
nore the  threat  to  our  national  security 
posed  by  a  Soviet  client  stage  on  the 
American  mainland?  I  don't  have  to  tell 
you  how  strategically  vital  the  Caribbean 
and  gulf  are,  with  nearly  two-thirds  of 
our  oil  and  half  of  all  foreign  trade  pass- 
ing through  the  region.  Some  of  the 
largest  oil  refineries  and  tanker  facilities 
in  the  world  are  located  here,  and  the 
Caribbean  Basin  is  the  fourth  largest 
market  for  U.S.  products. 

In  time  of  conflict,  half  of  NATO's 
resupply  and  reinforcement  would 
depart  from  gulf  ports.  And  they  would 
be  highly  vulnerable  to  attack — sub- 
marines or  other — as  we  found  in  World 
War  II,  we  saw  what  the  submarines  did 
when  they  were  a  mere  handful  of 
U-boats  operating  from  distant  bases  in 
Europe,  sinking  114  allied  ships  in  6 
months. 

Most  dangerous  is  the  momentum  of 
the  communist  armed  subversion,  in 
which  each  new  conquest  becomes  a 
base  area  to  launch  an  attack  against 
neighboring  countries. 

Recently,  the  Soviet  Ambassador  to 
Brazil  said  of  Nicaragua  that  the  way 
things — and  here's  the  quote — "The  way 
things  are  going,  we  will  have  another 
Cuba  there."  But  that  might  not  be  the 
worst  of  it  because  along  with  the 
Soviets  came  the  Libyans — you  heard 
[Muammer]  Qadhafi  the  other  day  speak- 
ing to  Farrakhan's  democratic  group— 
the  PLO,  and  now  we  see  the  fanatical 
Iranian  followers  there  of  AyatoUah 
Khomeini.  Worse  than  another  Cuba,  we 
run  the  risk  of  seeing  another  Libya— 
that  kind  of  a  real  radicalism,  developing 
a  warehouse  of  subversion  and  terrorism 
only  2  hours  by  air  from  the  Texas 
border. 

We  should  think  hard  and  seriously 
about  this.  Do  we  really  want  to  allow 
the  virus  of  international  terrorism  to 
effect  the  American  mainland?  The 
tyrants  aren't  shy  about  supporting  com- 
munism and  subversion.  Why  should  the 
democratic  countries  hesitate  in  their 
support  of  freedom? 


As  we  celebrate  what  our  President 
has  called  a  second  American  revolution 
of  hope  and  opportunity  abroad — at 
home,  we  shouldn't  forget  that  our  first 
American  revolution  might  not  have 
been  successful  without  the  aid  and  sup- 
port of  freedom-loving  people  from 
around  the  world:  Lafayette  from 
France,  Von  Steuben  from  Germany, 
Kosciusko  from  Poland.  Let's  not  forget 
that  others  must  still  fight  for  their 
freedom. 

Signs  of  Democracy 

Next  month,  I'll  be  flying  down  to  Brazil 
to — after  we  get  back  from  Africa,  2 
days,  and  then  down  there  to  celebrate 
the  inauguration  of  Mr.  [Tancredo] 
Neves  as  the  first  civilian  President  in 
that  country  in  21  years.  On  the  same 
trip,  I'll  be  visiting  Grenada  and  Hon- 
duras, two  other  countries  that  are  now 
going  down  the  democratic  path.  In  the 
last  5  years,  elected — this  is  an  in- 
teresting statistic — I  don't  think  many 
Americans  focus  on  it — in  the  last  5 
years,  elected  civilian  presidents  have 
also  replaced  military  leaders  in  Argen- 
tina, Bolivia,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador, 
Panama,  Peru,  and  on  March  1st, 
Uruguay  will  join  the  democratic  club. 

Guatemala's  had  already  constituent 
assembly  elections,  and  later  this  year, 
will  have  general  elections  for  a  presi- 
dent. And  it's  clear  then  that  when  free 
to  choose,  the  people  of  Latin  America 
choose  democracy. 

It's  not  over.  You  have  Chile  with  a 
dictatorship,  totalitarian  dictatorship  on 
the  right,  and  you  have  countries  like 
Nicaragua,  from  who  avowedly  are 
Marxist-Leninist,  on  the  left. 

In  Central  America,  we  are  engaged 
in  an  effort  to  assist  the  people  in 
establishing  democracy  and  free  enter- 
prise, and  it  is  working.  The  signs  of 
success  are  expressed  in  the  growing 
strength  of  the  democracy  in  El 
Salvador,  in  the  cohesion  of  the  people, 
and  the  army  and  their  successful  cam- 
paign against  the  rebels.  It's  expressed 
in  the  elections  of  the  past  4  years  in 
Costa  Rica,  Honduras,  and  Guatemala. 
And  perhaps  it's  expressed  in  the  peace 
initiative  announced  yesterday  by  Daniel 
Ortega  in  Nicaragua.  Something  must  be 
working  when  changes  like  this,  if  in- 
deed they  are  changes,  occur.  How  are 
we  to  interpret  this  current  series  of 
statements? 

On  the  face  of  it,  offering  to  remove 
about  1%  of  the  Cuban  presence,  or  to 
pause  in  their  imports  of  arms  which 
they  acknowledge  could  not  be  absorbed 
at  this  time,  do  not  appear  to  represent 


^au  1PRIS 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


significant  moves.  But  it  is  relevant  to 
ask  wiiy  the  bother?  Is  it  because 
Nicaraguan  young  men  are  refusing  to 
serve  in  the  army  out  of  revulsion  at 
their  government's  policies,  and  are  join- 
ing the  resistance?  Is  it  because  of 
outrage  being  expressed  by  the  church 
in  Nicaragua?  Is  it  because  of  the  col- 
lapse of  their  economy  under  the  weight 
of  Sandinista  militarism  and  corruption? 
Is  it  because  their  people  see  what's  go- 
ing on  in  neighboring  countries  and 
want  it  for  themselves? 

Perhaps  it  is  because  of  these 
reasons.  Perhaps  it  is  because  the  Scoop 
Jackson  plan,  our  plan  to  support 
economic  change  and  reform,  is  work- 
ing. Perhaps  it's  because  the  struggling 
freedom  fighters  appeal  to  the  people  of 
Nicaragua.  Whatever  the  cause,  we 
would  surely  welcome  genuine  Nica- 
raguan  interest  in  peace. 

And  all  we're  asking  is  that  the  San- 
dinistas commit  themselves  to  specific, 
concrete  actions  that  would  show  their 
good  faith  interest  in  peace— actions  in- 
volving no  more  than  they  committed 
themselves  in  their  own  revolution  5 
years  ago. 

We  have  consistently  pursued 
negotiations  with  the  Sandinistas.  We 
supported  the  Contadora  process  from 
its  conception  and  still  do.  And  even 
undertook,  with  the  Sandinistas — with 
Ambassador  [Harry]  Shlaudeman's 
talks— separate  bilateral  negotiation. 
And  our  Assistant  Secretary  of  State, 
Tony  Motley,  has  been  down  there 
several  times — bilateral. 

We've  done  that  with  Nicaragua  to 
help  facilitate  agreement.  And,  unfor- 
tunately, negotiations  have  stalled  out 
on  their  intransigence.  All  we  are  asking 
is  that  the  Sandinistas  stop  exporting 
subversion  of  their  neighbors;  that  they 
reduce  their  bloated  military  to  restore 
regional  balance.  And  it's  not  just  the 
United  States  that  is  asking  this — it's 
many  of  the  democratic  countries  in  the 
hemisphere  as  well.  Stop  subversion; 
reduce  the  military  to  restore  a  regional 
balance;  sever  military  ties  with  Cuba 
and  the  Soviet  bloc;  and  begin  to  honor 
their  promises  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  to  create  a  democratic, 
pluralistic,  political  system. 

That  last  point,  establishing 
pluralism  and  democracy,  is  really  the 
most  fundamental.  And  what  signs 
should  we  look  for  for  the  progress 
toward  genuine  democracy?  That  the 
Sandinistas  bring  the  democratic  leaders 
back  into  the  political  process;  that  they 
hold  honest,  free  and  fair  elections;  that 
they  stop  beating  up  on  the  church,  the 
unions,  and  business  community;  stop 


censoring  the  press;  stop  going  after  the 
Jews  in  an  antisemitism  perhaps  un- 
matched in  this  hemisphere;  that  they 
sever  control  of  the  army  from  the  par- 
ty, from  the  Sandinista  Party;  and  that 
they  remove  the  most  insidious  form  of 
totalitarian  control,  that  neighborhood 
spy  system  known  as  the  "Sandinista 
Defense  Committees." 

Freedom  can  flourish  in  Nicaragua, 
just  as  it's  flourishing  throughout  the 
rest  of  the  continent;  but  it  really  does 
need  our  help.  We  must  act  now,  before 
it's  too  late.  We  need  your  support,  the 


support  of  the  American  people,  to  mak 
Congress  understand  that  the  struggle    ? 
of  the  Nicaraguan  people  for  freedom 
and  democracy  is  not  an  issue  that  can 
be  ignored.  So  let  us  extend  a  helping 
hand  to  the  Nicaraguan  people,  just  as 
others  helped  our  forefathers  in  their 
time  of  need.  Let  us  resolve  to  give 
freedom  a  chance  in  Nicaragua. 


'Text  from  the  Vice  President's  Office  oi 
the  Press  Secretary  (opening  remarks  omit 
ted  here).  The  question-and-answer  session 
following  the  address  is  not  printed  here.  I 


) 


1 


Arms  Control: 
Objectives  and  Prospects 


by  Secretary  Shultz 

Address  before  the  Council  on 
Foreign  AJfai7-s  in  A ustin,  Texas,  on 
March  28."l985.^ 

One  of  the  most  profound  moral  and 
political  challenges  facing  our  nation  to- 
day is  the  effort  to  control  and  reduce 
nuclear  weapons. 

In  recent  years,  concern  about  the 
danger  of  nuclear  holocaust  has  made 
nuclear  arms  control  more  than  ever  the 
focus  of  national  debate.  This  is  all  to 
the  good.  In  our  free  society,  vigorous 
debate  makes  us  stronger,  not  weaker, 
as  we  work  to  safeguard  our  security 
and  protect  the  peace. 

But  moral  concern  about  nuclear 
weapons  must  be  matched  by  an 
understanding  of  the  underlying  political 
and  military  complexities.  If  it  is  not, 
this  moral  concern  can  only  raise  false 
hopes— with  consequences  of  the 
greatest  immorality,  endangering  the 
prospect  for  peace. 

As  we  embark  on  a  new  round  of 
arms  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union— the  most  comprehensive  and 
complex  of  any  in  history— such 
understanding  is  more  important  than 
ever.  Today,  I  would  like  to  discuss 
these  underlying  issues  with  you  and  to 
explain  how  your  government  is  meeting 
this  challenge. 

The  Basis  of  Peace  and  Stability 

Our  fundamental  goal  is  to  defend  our 
freedom  and  that  of  our  allies  and  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  war,  especially 
nuclear  war. 


The  prerequisite  of  successful  arms 
control— and  world  peace— is  the  deter- 
rent strength  of  the  United  States.  This 
strength  has  been  the  basis  of  interna- 
tional stability  and  security  for  the  past 
40  years.  The  defense  policy  of  the 
United  States  and  the  North  Atlantic 
alliance  has  been  to  have  that  strength 
necessary  to  convince  any  potential 
adversary  that  aggression  will  not  pay. 
The  democracies  cherish  peace;  we 
would  prefer  to  go  about  our  lives  with- 
out devoting  huge  effort  and  treasure  t( 
arming  ourselves.  But  as  long  as  there 
are  others  in  this  world  hostile  to 
freedom  and  willing  to  use  force  to  im- 
pose their  own  system,  we  must  be  will- 
ing to  defend  what  we  hold  dear.  As 
President  Truman  expressed  it  in  1946: 
"Peace  has  to  be  built  on  power  for 
good.  Justice  and  good  will  and  good 
deeds  are  not  enough." 

For  a  time  in  the  1970s,  in  the  wakt 
of  Vietnam,  we  tended  to  turn  away 
from  this  reality,  and  we  neglected  our 
defenses.  But  the  Soviet  buildup  con- 
tinued without  breaking  stride.  The 
Soviets  passed  the  United  States  in  the 
number,  size,  and  destructive  power  of 
offensive  missiles;  they  proceeded  to 
develop  more  and  more  modern  systems 
We  essentially  froze  the  number  of  our 
missiles;  our  modernization  programs 
slowed  down.  As  this  process  continued, 
the  improvements  in  the  Soviet  ballistic 
missile  force— including  the  prompt 
hard-target-kill  capability  of  its  giant 
ICBMs  [intercontinental  ballistic 
missiles]— increasingly  threatened  the 
survivability  of  our  own  land-based 
retaliatory  forces  and  our  national  com- 
mand structure.  The  Soviets  spent 
significant  resources  on  passive  defen- 


24 


Dpnartmpnt  nf  .9tatp  Rnllfitin 


THE  SECRETARY 


ive  measures  to  improve  the  survivabili- 
y  of  their  own  forces,  and  they  con- 
inued  to  develop  active  defenses  that 
night  eventually  be  able  to  counter  the 
urviving  U.S.  retaliatory  forces.  These 
Soviet  moves  were  slowly,  but  very 
urely,  eroding  our  capability  for  swift 
ind  effective  retaliation — on  which 
lepends  our  ability  to  deter  any  attack. 
)ur  concern  was  heightened  by  mount- 
ng  evidence  of  Soviet  violations  of 
irevious  arms  control  agreements. 

The  arms  control  process  has  always 
lad  as  a  main  goal  to  ensure  deterrence 
ly  enhancing  stability  and  balance  in  the 
trategic  relationship.  These  Soviet  ac- 
ions  were  undermining  that  very  goal. 
:'he  United  States  had  an  inescapable 
esponsibility  to  work  to  maintain  the 
)asic  conditions  for  stability  and 
lalance. 

To  strengthen  our  deterrent  and 
restore  the  military  balance.  President 
leagan  has  moved  to  modernize  our 
itrategic  and  conventional  forces  across 
he  board.  The  MX  Peacekeeper  missile 
3  a  vital  element  of  this  policy.  I  cannot 
itress  too  much  the  importance  of  con- 
inuing  on  course  with  this  program. 

But  the  American  eagle  holds  ar- 
'ows  in  one  hand  and  the  olive  branch  in 
!he  other — and  his  eyes  look  toward  the 
live  branch.  Our  goal  is  peace,  and, 
herefore,  we  are  always  ready  for 
erious  dialogue  with  our  adversaries  on 
/ays  to  control  and  reduce  weapons, 
'he  Soviets  have  now  returned  to  the 
argaining  table  for  new  negotiations, 
fter  their  failed  attempts  to  divide  us  at 
ome  and  from  our  allies.  Earlier  this 
lonth,  the  President  dispatched  three 
istinguished  Americans — Max 
Lampelman,^  Mike  Glitman,^  and  Texas' 
wn  John  Tower^ — to  lead  our  side  in 
hese  crucial  negotiations.  With  a 
trengthened  deterrent,  an  alliance  that 
as  withstood  Soviet  pressures,  and  the 
-npressive  vote  of  confidence  given  by 
he  American  people  last  November,  we 
re  now  in  a  good  position  for  successful 
rms  control.  Our  steadfastness  and  our 
ontinuing  commitment  to  serious 
legotiations  have  brought  us  to  this 
iromising  moment.  This  is  a  lesson  we 
nust  not  forget  in  the  arduous  months 
.nd  years  ahead. 

)ur  Objectives  at  Geneva 

Vhat  are  our  objectives  in  these  new 
legotiations?  Our  four  basic  aims  are 
.tability,  reductions,  equality,  and 
'erif lability. 

•  First,  we  seek  arms  control 
neasures  that  enhance  strategic  stabili- 
y.  An  agreement,  if  it  is  truly  to  pro- 
note  security,  must  decrease  and 


minimize  the  incentives  one  side  might 
have  to  preempt  or  strike  first  in  a 
crisis.  By  this  means,  arms  control  can 
help  reduce  the  danger  of  war. 

•  Our  second  objective  is  reduc- 
tions. Our  arms  control  proposals  repre- 
sent a  historic  and  systematic  effort  to 
reduce  the  levels  of  nuclear  weapons 
substantially— rather  than,  as  in  the 
past,  only  legitimize  their  increase. 
When  the  SALT  I  [strategic  arms  limita- 
tion talks]  negotiations  began  in  1969, 
the  Soviet  Union  had  about  1,500 
strategic  nuclear  weapons.  Today,  the 
Soviet  arsenal  has  grown  to  more  than 
8,000  strategic  nuclear  weapons,  yet  it 
still  remains  within  most  of  the  limits  of 
the  SALT  I  and  SALT  II  Treaties.  The 
radical  reductions  that  we  seek  today 
would  reverse  the  arms  buildup  and 
result  in  a  more  stable  balance  at  lower 
levels  of  forces  on  both  sides. 

•  Our  third  objective  is  equality. 
Reductions  must  leave  both  sides  with 
equal  or  equivalent  levels  of  forces.  An 
agreement  that  leaves  one  side  with  a 
unilateral  advantage  could  only  create 
instability.  Soviet  strategic  power  is 
centered  in  its  land-based  missile  force; 
American  strategic  power  is  spread 
more  evenly  over  each  element  of  our 
triad  of  land-based  missiles,  submarines, 
and  bombers.  We  recognize  these  dif- 
ferences and  are  prepared  to  be  flexible 
and  reasonable  in  taking  them  into  ac- 
count. 

•  Our  fourth  objective  is  verifiabili- 
ty.  No  American  would  favor  an  accord 
which  lacked  provision  for  effective 
verification  of  compliance  by  the  parties. 
Questions  about  our  ability  to  verify  the 
SALT  II  Treaty  were  one  reason  it  en- 
countered such  opposition.  All  our  ef- 
forts to  resolve  the  many  complicated 
issues  of  stability,  reductions,  and 
equality  will  come  to  naught  in  the 
absence  of  effective  terms  of  verifica- 
tion. The  evidence  of  Soviet  violations  or 
probable  violations  of  existing  arms  con- 
trol obligations— including  verification 
provisions  of  SALT  11— makes  this  an 
inescapable  necessity. 

In  the  new  Geneva  talks,  our 
negotiators  will  discuss  offensive  and 
defensive  weaponry  with  the  Soviets  in 
three  broad  areas:  strategic  offensive 
nuclear  systems,  intermediate-range  of- 
fensive nuclear  forces,  and  defense  and 
space  arms.  The  President  has  in- 
structed our  negotiators  to  bargain 
seriously  and  vigorously.  We  will  judge 
the  results  by  the  strictest  of  stand- 
ards—whether they  would  maintain  the 
security  of  the  United  States  and  our 
allies,  ensure  deterrence,  enhance 
strategic  stability,  and  reduce  the  risk  of 


war.  We  are  prepared  to  be  flexible, 
however,  about  ways  to  achieve  our  ob- 
jectives. We  will  meet  the  Soviet  Union 
halfway  in  finding  a  mutually  acceptable 
approach. 

In  the  field  of  strateg^ic  arms,  our 
negotiators  are  authorized  to  explore 
ways  of  bridging  differences  that 
separated  the  two  sides'  positions  in  the 
earlier  strategic  arms  reduction  talks 
(START).  In  those  talks,  we  offered  to 
explore  alternate  ways  to  reduce  ballistic 
missile  throw-weight,  in  response  to 
Soviet  criticism  that  our  proposals  would 
require  restructuring  of  Soviet  forces. 
We  were  willing  to  consider  indirect 
limits  such  as  those  we  originally  pro- 
posed, direct  limits  if  the  Soviets  pre- 
ferred, or  any  other  serious  Soviet  pro- 
posals. In  response  to  the  Soviet 
criticism  that  the  original  U.S.  proposal 
was  not  comprehensive,  we  dropped  our 
two-phased  approach  and  proposed  a 
draft  treaty.  This  treaty  included  equal 
limits  on  heavy  bombers  and  held  the 
number  of  air-launched  cruise  missiles 
allowed  on  each  bomber  to  a  level  below 
that  of  SALT  II. 

We  remain  ready  to  explore  trade- 
offs between  areas  of  U.S.  and  Soviet 
advantage  in  order  to  begin  the  process 
of  reducing  overall  numbers,  particularly 
the  numbers  of  the  most  destabilizing 
systems— highly  MIRVed  [multiple 
independently-targetable  reentry 
vehicles]  ICBMs.  For  our  part,  we  are 
ready  to  limit  the  potential  capabilities 
of  our  heavy  bombers. 

With  regard  to  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces  (INF),  we  believe  the 
position  that  we  outlined  in  the  fall  of 
1983  in  the  earlier  INF  talks  provides  a 
framework  for  a  fair  agreement.  Our 
ultimate  objective  has  been  and  remains 
a  zero-zero  outcome— the  complete, 
global  elimination  of  this  entire  class  of 
longer  range  INF  missiles.  The  continu- 
ing Soviet  deployment  of  SS-20  missiles, 
now  with  over  1,200  warheads,  makes 
this  goal  all  the  more  important.  We  are 
also  ready  to  consider  interim  steps, 
such  as  a  balance  at  equal  levels  of 
warheads  in  a  global  context.  The 
United  States  is  prepared  to  consider 
foregoing  deployment  of  its  full  global 
allowance  in  Europe.  We  are  ready  to 
talk  about  possible  aircraft  limitations 
and  to  be  flexible  on  other  points  as 
well.  We  look  to  the  Soviets  to  be  equal- 
ly flexible. 

There  remains  a  third  area  under 
discussion  at  the  new  Geneva  talks, 
namely  defense  and  space  arms.  Here 
we  seek  a  dialogue  on  how  both  sides 
together  may  begin  to  move  from  the 
current  strategic  situation  toward  a 
more  stable  framework  for  deterrence. 


vlav  1985 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


one  relying  more  and  more  on  non- 
nuclear  defensive  systems.  In  these 
discussions,  we  will  present  our  concerns 
about  the  erosion  of  the  Anti-Ballistic 
Missile  (ABM)  Treaty  regime,  including 
Soviet  actions  that  have  called  that 
agreement's  premises  into  question.  In 
turn,  we  will  provide  the  Soviets  with  a 
comprehensive  rationale  for  our 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative— or  SDI— 
and  be  prepared  to  address  the  entire 
question  of  defense  and  space  weapons. 

The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 

For  at  least  the  past  30  years,  deter- 
rence has  rested  on  the  ultimate  threat 
of  offensive  nuclear  retaliation;  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
each  been  hostage  to  the  nuclear  forces 
of  the  other.  Our  retaliatory  deterrent 
has  enabled  us  to  live  in  peace  with 
freedom.  We  strive  to  deter  war  with 
the  minimum  level  of  military  power 
consistent  with  that  purpose.  If  there  is 
no  alternative  to  the  threat  of  offensive 
nuclear  retaliation,  then  this  is  the 
necessary  and  moral  course.  But  if,  with 
adequate  defenses,  we  could  deny  the 
potential  aggressor  any  hope  of  achiev- 
ing his  objectives  through  military 
power,  so  that  neither  side's  population 
was  at  risk  to  the  other,  then  that  would 
become  the  preferable  and  moral  course. 

Effective  defenses  against  ballistic 
missiles  would  enhance  deterrence  by 
reducing  or  eliminating  the  efficacy  of 
the  attacking  weapons.  Such  defenses, 
with  the  ability  to  intercept  first-strike 
missiles,  would  take  away  incentives  for 
an  aggressor  to  attack  first  in  a  crisis. 
They  would  also  provide  an  insurance 
policy,  in  the  remote  possibility  that 
deterrence  failed,  by  shielding  us  and 
our  allies  against  attack. 

In  his  seminal  speech  of  March  23, 
1983,  President  Reagan  proposed  that 
we  explore  the  possibility  of  countering 
the  awesome  Soviet  missile  threat  with 
defensive  measures.  He  offered  a  vision 
of  a  world  in  which  the  mutual  hostage 
relationship  might  eventually  be  re- 
placed by  something  more  secure— by 
systems  that  could  intercept  and  destroy 
missiles  before  they  strike  their  targets. 
Such  a  strategic  world  would  be  not  to 
any  single  nation's  advantage,  but  to  the 
benefit  of  all.  As  the  President  asked, 
"Wouldn't  it  be  better  to  save  lives  than 
to  avenge  them?" 

We  recognize  that  deterrence  will 
have  to  rely  on  the  threat  of  offensive 
nuclear  retaliation  for  many  years  to 
come— though  at  sharply  reduced  levels. 


if  the  Geneva  talks  succeed.  With  this 
understanding,  we  now  begin  a  major 
research  effort:  the  SDI.  We  believe 
that  it  will  provide  the  basis  for  a  con- 
sidered judgment,  sometime  in  the  next 
decade,  on  the  feasibility  and  practicality 
of  providing  a  shield  for  the  United 
States  and  our  allies  against  ballistic 
missiles. 

Defenses,  if  feasible,  will  also  aid 
our  objective  of  deep  reductions  in  offen- 
sive missiles.  A  strategic  balance  at 
sharply  lower  levels  is  more  vulnerable 
to  the  risk  of  cheating.  The  lower  the 
agreed  level  of  arms,  the  greater  the 
danger  that  concealed  deployments 
could  be  of  a  magnitude  to  threaten  the 
other  side's  forces.  But  with  feasible 
defenses  in  place,  so  many  illegal 
missiles  would  be  required  to  upset  the 
balance  that  significant  cheating  could 
not  be  concealed. 

Indeed,  this  very  point  was  made  by 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko,  who  told  the 
UN  General  Assembly  in  1962  that  anti- 
missile defenses  could  be  the  key  to  a 
successful  agreement  reducing  offensive 
missiles.  They  would,  he  said,  "guard 
against  the  eventuality  ...  of  someone 
deciding  to  violate  the  treaty  and  con- 
ceal missiles  or  combat  aircraft."  Mr. 
Gromyko  and  other  Soviet  leaders  in  the 
past  have  often  discussed  the  value  of 
defenses.  I  would  hope  that  he  and  his 
colleagues  would  review  those  state- 
ments and  come  to  acknowledge  again 
the  merit  of  our  position  today  on  the 
potential  value  of  strategic  defense. 

I  have  emphasized  that  the  defenses 
would  have  to  be  feasible.  Feasibility 
means,  first,  that  any  new  defensive 
systems  must  be  reasonably  survivable; 
if  not,  they  might  themselves  be  tempt- 
ing targets  for  a  first  strike.  Second,  it 
means  not  just  that  the  systems  must 
work  but  that  they  must  be  cheaper  to 
produce  than  would  the  new  offensive 
systems  needed  to  overcome  them.  In 
short,  they  must  be  cost  effective;  other- 
wise, it  would  make  sense  to  produce  of- 
fensive weapons  in  numbers  sufficient  to 
overwhelm  the  defenses. 

A  change  in  the  cost  relationship  of 
offensive  to  defensive  forces  would  have 
revolutionary  and  potentially  quite 
beneficial  effects.  Cost-effective  defenses 
would  change  the  marginal  incentive  for 
investment  away  from  offensive  to 
defensive  systems.  In  turn,  even  an  im 
perfect  but  cost-effective  defense  system 
would  vastly  complicate  any  aggressor's 
first-strike  planning  and  further  reduce 
his  temptation  to  consider  a  preemptive 
nuclear  attack. 


The  Transition  to  a  New 
Strategic  Environment 

The  road  to  this  safer  world  would  have 
to  be  traveled  with  care.  In  making  the 
transition  from  today's  near  total 
reliance  on  offense,  our  objective  would 
be  to  deploy  defensive  systems  which,  at 
each  step  of  the  process,  make  a  first 
strike  even  more  difficult.  By  doing  so, 
we  would  not  only  enhance  stability  but 
also  provide  further  incentives  for  re- 
ducing offensive  forces. 

The  feasibility  criteria  we  have 
adopted — survivability  and  cost  effec- 
tiveness— are  designed  precisely  to  en- 
sure that  any  transition  period  is  a 
stable  one.  Thus,  survivability  means 
less  temptation  and  incentive  for  either 
side  to  attack  these  new  defensive 
systems  at  a  moment  of  political  crisis 
during  the  transition  period.  Phasing  in 
of  truly  cost-effective  defensive  systems 
will  mean  that  offensive  counter- 
measures — such  as  piling  up  more 
missiles  to  swamp  the  defenses — are  a 
losing  game. 

SDI  is  not  a  bid  for  strategic 
superiority;  on  the  contrary,  it  would 
maintain  the  balance,  in  light  of  the 
rapid  Soviet  progress  in  both  offensive 
and  defensive  systems.  Nor  is  SDI  an 
abrogation  of  the  ABM  Treaty.  Presi- 
dent Reagan  has  directed  that  the 
research  program  be  carried  out  in  full 
compliance  with  the  treaty.  He  has  also 
made  clear  that  any  future  decision  to 
deploy  defenses  that  were  not  permitted 
by  treaty  would  have  to  be  a  matter  of 
negotiation. 

This  does  not  mean  giving  the 
Soviets  a  veto  over  our  defensive  pro- 
grams, any  more  than  the  Soviets  have 
a  veto  over  our  current  strategic  and 
intermediate-range  programs.  But  our 
commitment  to  negotiations  does  reflect 
a  recognition  that  we  should  seek  to 
move  forward  in  a  cooperative  manner 
with  the  Soviets.  Given  the  early  stage 
of  our  research,  many  of  the  details  of 
such  a  transition  are,  by  necessity,  still 
unclear.  Nonetheless,  we  look  forward 
to  discussions  in  Geneva  with  the 
Soviets  on  the  implications  of  new 
defensive  technologies  for  arms  control 
and  strategic  stability  and  on  how  best 
we  can  both  manage  any  transition  to 
such  defenses. 

Thus  far,  the  Soviets  have  not  ac- 
cepted the  idea  of  such  a  cooperative 
transition.  This  should  neither  surprise 
nor  particularly  dismay  us.  At  this  point, 
the  Soviets  still  are  seeking  to  under- 
mine our  domestic  and  allied  support  for 
SDI  research  while  they  proceed  with 
their  own  efforts.  They  are  tough- 
minded  realists,  however.  As  our 


26 


THE  SECRETARY 


ssearch  proceeds  and  both  nations  thus 
ain  a  better  sense  of  the  future  pros- 
ects,  the  Soviets  should  see  the  advan- 
iges  of  agreed  ground  rules  to  ensure 
:at  any  phasing  in  of  defensive  systems 
all  be  orderly,  predictable,  and  stabiliz- 
ig.  The  alternative— an  unconstrained 
nvironment— would  be  neither  in  their 
iterest  nor  in  ours. 

Our  SDI  program  is  designed  to  en- 
ance  allied  as  well  as  U.S.  security.  A 
ecision  to  move  from  research  to 
evelopment  and  deployment  would,  of 
ourse,  be  taken  in  close  consultation 
ith  our  allies.  As  the  U.S.  and  Soviet 
trategic  and  intermediate-range  nuclear 
rsenals  declined  significantly,  we  would 
eek  to  negotiate  reductions  in  other 
/pes  of  nuclear  weapons.  If  we  could 
evelop  the  technologies  to  defend 
gainst  ballistic  missiles,  we  could  then 
irn  our  energies  to  the  perfection  of 
efensive  measures  against  these  other 
uclear  weapons.  Our  ultimate  objective 
ould  be  the  elimination  of  them  all. 

By  necessity,  this  is  a  very  long- 
3rm  goal.  For  years  to  come,  we  will 
ave  to  continue  to  base  deterrence  on 
(16  ultimate  threat  of  nuclear  retalia- 
on.  And  that  means  we  will  continue 
ur  modernization  programs  to  keep  the 
eace. 

This  long-term  goal  also  poses 
oecial  challenges.  Were  we  to  move 
Dward  the  sharp  reduction  or  elimina- 
(on  of  nuclear  weapons,  the  need  for  a 
table  conventional  balance  would  come 
nee  again  to  the  fore.  To  maintain 
ATO's  security,  continued  moderniza- 
*on  of  conventional  forces  will  be  essen- 
lal— just  as  it  is  in  the  present  condi- 
<ons  of  the  strategic  balance.  At  the 
ame  time,  we  must  continue  to  press 
or  reductions  in  conventional  forces— in 
articular,  for  mutual  and  balanced 
eductions  in  troop  levels  in  Europe.  The 
'orld  community  should  also  devote 
^•gent  attention  to  the  need  to  limit 
hd,  indeed,  eliminate  the  menace  of 
bemical  weapons.  We  have  made  such  a 
reposal  with  a  draft  treaty  presented 
f  Vice  President  Bush  last  spring  in 
■eneva  to  the  Committee  on  Disarma- 
iient. 

We  must  remember  as  well  that 
leterrence  would  continue  to  be  the 
lasis  of  our  security,  even  were  we  to 
nake  this  transition  to  a  defense- 
lominated  world.  The  difference  would 
te  that,  rather  than  resting  on  the 
tireat  of  mutual  assured  destruction, 
leterrence  would  be  based  on  the  ability 
If  the  defense  to  deny  success  to  a 
otential  aggressor's  attack— whether 
iuclear  or  conventional.  The  President 
las  called  this  strategic  relationship 
nutual  assured  security. 


The  Debate  over  SDI 

Some  urge  against  SDI.  They  say  the 
balance  of  terror  has  worked,  so  why 
tamper  with  it?  They  also  say  SDI  will 
lead  to  an  offensive  arms  race  as  the 
Soviets  move  to  counter  our  defenses— 
as  if  the  Soviets  have  not  been  engaged 
for  the  past  20  years  in  the  greatest  of- 
fensive buildup  in  history,  one  far 
beyond  legitimate  security  needs. 

These  critics  overlook  two  other  cen- 
tral points. 

•  The  first  is  that  the  pace  of 
technological  advance  in  offensive 
weapons— such  as  increasing  missile  ac- 
curacy and  mobility— could,  over  time, 
undermine  the  principles  on  which  the 
mutual  hostage  relationship  has  rested. 
SDI  is  a  prudent  and  wise  investment  in 
our  future  safety.  It  would  enhance,  not 
undercut,  deterrence. 

•  The  second  point  the  critics 
overlook  is  that  the  Soviets  have  their 
own  version  of  an  SDI  program  and 
have  had  it  for  years,  long  before  ours. 
Behind  the  propaganda  about  the  al- 
leged "militarization  of  space,"  you  will 
find  the  expenditures,  the  military  and 
research  personnel,  the  laboratories, 
testing  grounds,  and  weapons  of  an  am- 
bitious Soviet  strategic  defense  pro- 
gram. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  always  placed 
great  reliance  on  strategic  defense.  Over 
the  past  20  years,  the  Soviets  have 
spent  approximately  as  much  on  defense 
as  on  their  massive  offensive  program. 
They  have  long  made  major  investments 
in  civil  and  air  defense;  they  have  the 
world's  only  operational  antisatellite 
weapon  system  and  the  only  operational 
ABM  system  around  Moscow.  The  1972 
ABM  Treaty  permits  one  such  system; 
we  abandoned  ours,  but  they  have  main- 
tained and  modernized  theirs.  The 
Soviet  Defense  Forces— one  of  their  five 
military  services— number  500,000 
strong,  more  than  the  Soviet  Navy  or 
Strategic  Rocket  Forces. 

We  have  persuasive  evidence  that 
the  Soviets  have  long  been  investigating 
the  defensive  technologies  on  which  our 
SDI  research  will  focus.  Their  high- 
energy  laser  program  is  considerably 
bigger  than  ours  and  continues  to  grow. 
There  is  also  much  evidence  of  a  major 
Soviet  research  effort  in  the  develop- 
ment of  particle-beam  weapons. 

The  ABM  Treaty  limits  the  deploy- 
ment of  ballistic-missile  early-warning 
radars  to  locations  along  the  periphery 
of  the  national  territory  of  each  party 
and  requires  that  they  be  oriented  out- 
ward. At  Krasnoyarsk,  almost  400  miles 
inside  the  frontiers  of  the  Soviet  Union, 


a  new  radar,  oriented  across  Soviet  ter- 
ritory, is  under  construction  in  violation 
of  the  treaty.  Other  Soviet  activities 
suggest  that  the  Soviet  Union  may  be 
preparing  a  nationwide  ABM  de- 
fense—an action  which,  of  course,  would 
entirely  negate  the  ABM  Treaty. 
Twenty-three  Democratic  members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  just  sent  a 
letter  to  General  Secretary  Gorbachev, 
pointing  out  that  if  the  Krasnoyarsk 
matter  "is  not  resolved  in  a  satisfactory 
manner,  it  will  have  serious  conse- 
quences for  the  future  of  the  arms  con- 
trol process."  Halting  and  reversing  this 
erosion  of  the  ABM  Treaty  is  another 
objective  we  have  set  for  the  Geneva 
talks. 

My  point  here  is  clear:  the  United 
States  is  not  alone.  We  are  not  starting 
another  arms  race.  We  are  starting  a 
research  program  that  complies  with  the 
ABM  Treaty.  Rather  than  asking  what 
will  be  the  Soviet  response  to  SDI, 
critics  ought  to  be  asking:  given  the 
Soviet  Union's  major  strategic  defense 
effort  and  its  huge  offensive  forces, 
what  are  the  consequences  for  deter- 
rence, stability,  and  Western  security  if 
we  do  not  pursue  an  adequate  research 
effort? 

Prerequisites  for  Successful 
Arms  Control 

These  are  the  issues  we  intend  to  pursue 
in  Geneva.  They  represent  a  full  agenda. 
The  United  States  is  committed  to  seek 
progress;  we  hope  the  Soviets  have  the 
same  commitment.  We  in  the  West  can 
facilitate  progress  if  we  bear  in  mind 
what  progress  depends  upon.  History 
suggests  there  are  three  prerequisites. 

The  first,  which  I  explained  earlier, 
is  the  need  to  keep  up  our  guard  and 
our  strength.  In  the  past,  we  have  had  a 
tendency  to  focus  either  on  our  military 
strength  or  on  negotiations.  To  succeed, 
we  must  treat  them  both  in  tandem  as 
two  essential  components  of  a  sensible 
national  security  strategy.  That  is  the 
plain  reality  of  international  politics. 
Talk  without  the  strength  to  back  it  up 
is  just  that:  talk.  The  Soviets  must 
understand  that  in  the  absence  of  an 
equitable,  verifiable  agreement,  we  will 
be  as  strong  as  necessary  to  maintain 
our  freedom  and  deter  war. 

The  other  two  prerequisites  are  pa- 
tience in  seeking  the  agreement  we 
desire  and  unity  both  at  home  and  with 
our  allies. 

We  are  embarked  on  the  most  com- 
plex and  comprehensive  negotiations  to 
limit  arms  in  the  history  of  man.  In 
these  talks,  we  face  Soviet  diplomats 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


who  are  practiced,  patient,  and  deter- 
mined. They  will  try  to  wear  us  down. 
They  will  also  try  to  undermine  our  posi- 
tions by  deceptive  propaganda,  by 
specious  appeals  to  public  opinion  here 
and  in  Europe,  by  subtle  and  not  so  sub- 
tle threats,  just  as  they  did  for  2  years 
during  the  START  and  INF  talks. 

The  opening  of  the  Geneva  talks  a 
few  weeks  ago,  like  my  meeting  with 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  in  January, 
received  much  publicity  and  attention. 
This  is  understandable.  It  reflects  the 
hopes  of  all  people,  hopes  we  share.  But 
if  we  are  ever  to  attain  those  hopes,  we 
must  be  patient.  We  must  recognize 
from  experience  that  the  talks  may  be 
long  and  arduous.  Every  negotiation  has 
been  protracted.  The  talks  that  led  to 
the  1963  Limited  Nuclear  Test  Ban 
Treaty  took  8  years;  the  1968  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty  took  4  years;  SALT 
I,  almost  3  years;  SALT  II,  nearly  7 
years.  Ever  since  bilateral  nuclear  arms 
control  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  began  some  30  years  ago,  the 
Soviets'  rigid  perception  of  their  military 
requirements  and  their  hostility  to  prop- 
er measures  of  verification  have  been 
significant  obstacles.  But  we,  for  our 
part,  are  ready  to  move  ahead  as  fast  as 
possible.  We  will  not  be  the  obstacle. 

The  third  and,  perhaps,  most  impor- 
tant prerequisite  is  unity,  both  at  home 
and  with  our  allies. 

Many  of  our  problems  in  the  past  15 
years  have  resulted  from  divisions  here 
at  home.  Probably  the  greatest  cost  of 
the  Vietnam  war,  after  its  terrible  toll  in 
lives,  was  the  shattering  of  the  national 
consensus  on  defense  that  was  forged  in 
World  War  II  and  that  carried  us 
through  the  most  difficult  days  of  the 
cold  war.  Today,  I  believe  a  new  consen- 
sus is  emerging— a  growing  majority 
behind  the  need  for  a  strong  defense 
coupled  with  serious  and  realistic  efforts 
for  reliable  arms  control  agreements 
with  the  Soviets.  And  we  see  a  new 
patriotism,  a  new  pride  in  America. 

Last  November,  the  American  peo- 
ple overwhelmingly  expressed  their  con- 
fidence in  President  Reagan  and  his 
policies.  The  Administration  has  the 
responsibility  to  consult  with  the  Con- 
gress, and  we  are  doing  all  we  can,  in  a 
spirit  of  cooperation.  Congress  has  the 
duty  to  debate  and  criticize,  to  approve 
expenditures,  and  to  consult  in  the  for- 
mulation of  general  policy.  We  in  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  have  the  constitutional 
responsibility  to  conduct  the  negotia- 
tions. To  aid  Congress  in  its  role,  we 
had  with  our  delegation  at  the  opening 
of  the  Geneva  talks  a  distinguished  bi- 
partisan group  from  both  Houses. 


Should  a  treaty  be  negotiated,  it  will  re- 
quire the  Senate's  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification.  But  if  the  Congress  does  not 
back  us  in  many  other  ways,  we  may  not 
have  a  good  treaty  to  bring  home  for  ad- 
vice and  consent. 

The  same  principle  applies  to  our 
relations  with  our  allies.  The  Soviet  at- 
tempt to  prevent  the  deployment  of 
Pershing  and  cruise  missiles  in  Europe 
failed  utterly  because  we  allies  stood 
together,  as  we  have  for  decades.  The 
Soviets  may  make  this  attempt  again,  in 
the  context  of  the  new  talks.  We  must 
continue  to  stand  together  if  we  want 
these  talks  to  succeed.  The  Soviets  will 
be  watching  closely  for  signs  of  dif- 
ferences and  disarray  in  the  West.  If 
they  see  such  signs,  they  will  only  be  en- 
couraged to  step  up  their  political  war- 
fare while  prolonging  negotiations  and 
waiting  for  unilateral  concessions.  But  if 
they  see  us  united,  we  will  have  hast- 
ened the  day  of  serious  negotiation  and 
furthered  the  prospects  of  success. 

The  Geneva  talks  will  be  of  un- 
precedented complexity.  We  must  be 


Science  and  American  Foreign  Policy: 
The  Spirit  of  Progress 


careful  not  to  permit  our  revulsion 
against  war  to  lower  our  guard.  We 
must  not  let  our  hopes,  noble  as  they 
are,  blind  us  to  the  daunting  realities  of 
the  arms  control  process.  But  there  are 
favorable  factors  at  work.  America  is 
recovering  its  economic  vitality,  its 
military  strength,  and  its  self- 
confidence.  We  stand  firm  with  our 
staunch  allies.  If  we  in  the  West  are  pa- 
tient and  united,  combining  resolution 
with  flexibility,  then  we  have  good  pros- 
pects of  success.  We  can  attain  the  goal 
we  all  share:  reducing  the  danger  of  wai 
and  building  a  constructive  and  secure 
relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  tlu 
nuclear  age. 


'Press  release  59. 

-Head  of  the  U.S.  Delegation  and  U.S. 
Negotiator  on  Space  and  Defensive  Arms. 

'U.S.  Negotiator  on  Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear  Arms. 

^U.S.  Negotiator  on  Strategic  Nuclear 
Arms.  ■ 


by  Secretary  Shultz 

Address  before  a  symposium  on 
science  and  foreign  -policy  sponsored  by 
the  National  Academy  of  Sciences  on 
March  6.  1985.'' 

Soon  after  the  dawn  of  the  nuclear 
age,  Albert  Einstein  observed  that 
everything  had  changed  except  our 
modes  of  thinking.  Even  so  dramatic  a 
development  as  the  nuclear  revolution 
took  a  long  time  to  be  fully  understood. 
In  recent  decades,  the  world  has  seen 
other  extraordinary  advances  in  science 
and  technology — advances  that  may  be 
of  even  more  pervasive  importance  and 
that  touch  every  aspect  of  our  lives.  In 
so  many  of  these  areas,  the  pace  of 
change  has  been  faster  than  our  ability 
to  grasp  its  ramifications.  There  have 
even  been  moments  when  our  mood  was 
more  one  of  fear  than  of  hope. 

In  the  1970s,  many  were  preoc- 
cupied with  the  idea  that  ours  was  a 
small  planet  and  getting  smaller,  that 
natural  resources  were  limited  and  were 
being  depleted,  that  there  were  in- 
escapable limits  to  growth.  Food  would 
run  out;  forests  would  disappear;  clean 
water  would  be  scarce;  energy  sources 
would  vanish.  There  was,  in  short,  a 


deep  pessimism  about  the  future  of  our 
planet  and  of  mankind  itself. 

Fortunately,  that  spirit  of  pessimisn 
has  been  replaced  in  recent  years  by  a 
new  spirit  of  progress.  More  and  more, 
we  are  returning  to  the  belief  tradi- 
tionally held  by  post-Enlightenment 
societies:  that  the  advance  of  science  is 
something  to  be  welcomed  and  en- 
couraged, because  it  multiplies  our 
possibilities  faster  than  it  adds  to  our 
problems.  More  and  more,  we  see  that 
unleashing  the  vast  potential  of  human 
ingenuity,  creativity,  and  industrious- 
ness  is  itself  the  key  to  a  better  future. 
Science  and  technology  cannot  solve  all 
our  problems,  but  the  experience  of  re- 
cent years  reminds  us  that  they  can 
alleviate  wide  areas  of  human  suffering 
and  make  a  better  life  possible  for 
millions  around  the  world.  We  can  only 
imagine  what  they  might  achieve  in  the 
decades  to  come. 

When  I  was  at  MIT,  I  knew  an 
economist  at  Harvard  who  had  an  un- 
canny knack  for  making  accurate  predic- 
tions. I  always  wondered  about  the 
secret  of  his  forecasting  ability,  and 
when  he  died,  someone  going  through 
his  papers  found  part  of  the  explanation 
He  had  written  that  he  was  more  suc- 
cessful at  economic  predictions  than 


28 


THE  SECRETARY 


hers  because  he  was  "an  optimist 
30ut  America,"  a  trait  he  attributed  to 
TO  things:  his  origins  in  the  Midwest, 
vhere  the  future  is  more  important 
lan  the  past,"  and  the  fact  that  he 
'ew  up  in  a  family  of  scientists  and 
igineers,  forever  "discovering"  and 
loing"  new  things. 

Optimism  alone  will  not  be  enough 
carry  us  through  the  difficult  times 
lat  lie  ahead,  and  mindless  optimism 
ould  be  as  foolish  as  the  mindless 
jssimism  of  years  past.  The  scientific 
id  technological  revolutions  taking 
ace  all  around  us  offer  many  great  op- 
artunities,  but  they  also  present  many 
lallenges— challenges  that  come  from 
le  need  to  make  choices,  challenges 
lat  lie  at  the  intersection  of  science  and 
Dlitics,  and,  perhaps  most  important, 
lallenges  to  our  ways  of  thinking  about 
irselves  and  our  world. 

lilemmas  and  Choices 

he  revolutions  in  science  and 
^chnology  have  opened  up  seemingly 
"nitless  possibilities  for  transforming 
ir  world.  With  each  new  breakthrough, 
nvever,  come  new  and  difficult  dilem- 
as.  For  while  we  may  seek  ways  to 
lange  the  world  around  us,  there  is 
s<i  much  we  would  like  to  preserve, 
ur  civilization  is  not  based  on  material 
ings.  Our  culture,  our  moral  values, 
id  our  political  ideals  are  treasures 
at  we  would  not  sacrifice  even  for  the 
ost  amazing  scientific  miracle. 
Breakthroughs  in  biological 
igineering,  for  instance,  raise  funda- 
ental  moral  questions  about  man's 
•oper  role  in  the  creation  and  altera- 
in  of  life,  even  as  they  offer  new  hope 
■  cure  diseases,  produce  food,  and 
•oaden  our  understanding  of  the 
•igins  of  life.  We  need  to  be  concerned 
)out  the  dangers  to  our  environment 
lat  may  accompany  some  new  tech- 
)logies,  even  while  recognizing  that 
her  new  technologies  may  be  the 
mrce  of  solutions  to  these  problems, 
'e  need  to  ensure  that  the  revolution  in 
immunications  does  not  infringe  on  our 
ght  to  privacy,  even  while  recognizing 
le  enormous  benefits  of  improved  com- 
lUnication  for  education  and  for  bring- 
:g  the  world  closer  together.  This  is  the 
iman  condition:  the  creativity  that  is 
le  part  of  our  nature  poses  constant 
lallenges  to  the  morality  that  is 
lother  part  of  our  nature.  There  is  no 
nal  resting  place,  no  permanent  solu- 
on— only  a  continuing  responsibility  to 
ice  up  to  these  hard  dilemmas. 

We  also  face  some  difficult  practical 
loices,  and,  as  societies,  we  address 
lem  through  our  political  process. 


Scientific  research  and  development,  for 
example,  require  financial  support. 
Where  should  that  support  come  from? 
And  what  should  be  supported?  The 
United  States  will  invest  some  $110 
billion  in  scientific  research  and  develop- 
ment next  year— more  than  Japan, 
France,  West  Germany,  and  the  United 
Kingdom  combined.  Of  that  amount, 
nearly  half  comes  from  the  Federal 
Government.  That  is  a  large  investment, 
taken  by  democratic  process  from  the 
American  taxpayer.  But  it  reflects  a 
choice  we  have  all  made  to  support 
scientific  progress.  It  reflects  our 
understanding  that  scientific  advance 
serves  everyone  in  our  society— by  im- 
proving health  and  the  quality  of  life,  by 
expanding  our  economy,  by  enhancing 
the  competitiveness  of  our  industries  in 
the  world  market,  by  improving  our 
defenses,  and,  perhaps  most  important, 
simply  by  pushing  back  the  frontiers  of 
knowledge. 

Yet  we  have  also  learned  that 
government  can  become  too  involved, 
that  government  bureaucracies  are  not 
always  the  best  judges  of  where  such 
money  can  most  usefully  be  spent.  To- 
day, private  industry,  not  government, 
is  pushing  hardest  at  the  technological 
frontiers  in  many  fields— in  electronics 
and  biotechnology,  to  name  just  two. 

The  problem,  then,  is  to  discover 
how  government  support  for  science  and 
technology  can  best  serve  the  broad 
goals  of  society.  In  the  field  of  basic 
research,  for  example,  we  cannot  always 
count  on  the  profit  motive  to  foster 
progress  in  those  areas  where  research 
may  not  lead  to  the  development  of 
marketable  products  for  many  years. 
Government  support  for  basic  research 
gives  learning  and  the  pursuit  of 
knowledge  a  chance  to  proceed  without 
undergoing  the  rigorous  test  of  the 
marketplace. 

One  particularly  worthy  recipient  of 
government  support,  therefore,  is  the 
university.  The  unfettered  process  of 
learning  and  discovery  that  takes  place 
mainly  in  academia  is  vital.  From  the 
university  comes  the  fundamental 
knowledge  that  ultimately  drives  innova- 
tion. And  from  the  university  comes  the 
pool  of  creative  and  technically  profi- 
cient young  men  and  women  who  can 
use  that  knowledge  and  apply  it  to  prac- 
tical problems.  The  Reagan  Administra- 
tion recognizes  the  importance  of  this; 
since  1981,  support  for  basic  research  at 
universities  has  grown  by  nearly  30%. 

Even  so,  the  government  has  limited 
funds,  and  further  choices  have  to  be 
made  about  which  projects  to  support 
and  which  to  cut  back.  Government, 
universities,  and  the  private  sector  have 


to  work  together  to  make  these  difficult 
but  inescapable  decisions.  We  as  a  socie- 
ty cannot  afford  to  turn  away  from  the 
challenge  of  choosing. 

Science  and  Politics 

These  are  not  the  only  hard  choices  that 
have  to  be  confronted  at  the  intersection 
of  science  and  politics.  Scientific  ad- 
vances have  increasingly  become  the 
focus  of  political  debate.  Today,  scien- 
tific questions,  and  scientists  themselves, 
play  a  prominent  role  in  the  political 
arena.  On  a  wide  variety  of  complex 
issues,  the  American  people  look  to 
scientists  as  an  important  source  of  in- 
formation and  guidance.  In  a  nation  like 
ours,  where  knowledge  is  valued  and  the 
search  for  truth  is  considered  among  the 
noblest  of  human  endeavors,  the  scien- 
tist naturally  and  properly  commands 
great  respect.  With  that  respect, 
however,  comes  responsibility. 

Too  often  in  recent  years,  we  have 
seen  scientists  with  well-deserved 
reputations  for  creative  achievement  and 
intellectual  brilliance  speaking  out  on 
behalf  of  political  ideas  that  unfortunate- 
ly are  neither  responsible  nor  particular- 
ly brilliant. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  scientists 
will  have  strong  views  on  such  technical- 
ly complex  matters  as  nuclear  weapons, 
arms  control,  and  national  defense.  But 
the  core  issues  in  dispute  here  are  really 
not  technical  but  political  and  moral. 
Scientists  should  not  expect  their  words 
to  have  special  authority  in  nonscientific 
areas  where  they  are,  in  fact,  laymen. 
Scientists  are  not  specialists  in  the  field 
of  world  politics,  or  history,  or  social 
policy,  or  military  doctrine.  As  citizens 
of  a  free  society,  they  have  every  right 
to  take  part  in  the  public  debate.  But 
they  have  no  special  claim  to  infallibility. 

Challenges  to  Our  Ways  of  Thinking 

The  great  intellectual  adventure  of  the 
scientific  revolution  beckons  all  of  us— 
scientists,  government  leaders,  and  all 
Americans— to  march  ahead  together.  In 
collaboration  we  can  achieve  a  better 
and  deeper  understanding  of  these  new 
developments  and  what  they  portend. 
The  changes  occurring  all  around  us 
have  far-reaching  implications  not  only 
for  our  personal  lives  but  also  for  the 
conduct  of  our  foreign  policy,  for  na- 
tional security,  and,  indeed,  for  the  very 
structure  of  the  international  order.  And 
as  we  confront  these  changes,  we  must 
heed  Einstein's  observation:  perhaps  the 
greatest  challenges  we  face  are  to  our 
ways  of  thinking. 


law  IQR'^ 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  Age  of  Information 
Technology.  One  of  the  most  revolu- 
tionary recent  developments  is  what 
Walter  Wriston  has  called  "the  on- 
rushing  age  of  information  technology." 
The  combination  of  microchip  com- 
puters, advanced  telecommunications, 
and  a  continuing  process  of  innovation  is 
not  only  transforming  communication 
and  other  aspects  of  daily  life  but  is  also 
challenging  the  very  concepts  of  national 
sovereignty  and  the  role  of  government 
in  society. 

The  implications  of  this  revolution 
are  not  only  economic.  First  of  all,  the 
very  existence  of  these  new  technologies 
is  yet  another  testimony  to  the  crucial 
importance  of  entrepreneurship— and 
government  policies  that  give  free  rein 
to  entrepreneurship— as  the  wellspring 
of  technological  creativity  and  economic 
growth.  The  closed  societies  of  the  East 
are  likely  to  fall  far  behind  in  these 
areas— and  Western  societies  that  main- 
tain too  many  restrictions  on  economic 
activity  run  the  same  risk. 

Second,  any  government  that 
resorts  to  heavyhanded  measures  to  con- 
trol or  regulate  or  tax  the  flow  of  elec- 
tronic information  will  find  itself  stifling 
the  growth  of  the  world  economy  as  well 
as  its  own  progress.  This  is  one  of  the 
reasons  why  the  United  States  is  press- 
ing for  a  new  round  of  trade  negotia- 
tions in  these  service  fields,  to  break 
down  barriers  to  the  free  flow  of 
knowledge  across  borders. 

For  2  years  the  Organization  of 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD)  has  been  considering  an 
American  initiative  for  a  common  ap- 
proach to  this  problem.  Today,  we  are 
very  close  to  obtaining  a  joint  statement 
by  OECD  governments  pledging 
themselves  to: 

•  Maintain  and  promote  unhindered 
circulation  of  data  and  information; 

•  Avoid  creating  barriers  to  infor- 
mation flows;  and 

•  Cooperate  and  consult  to  further 
these  goals. 

There  are  other  dilemmas  that  must 
be  confronted  if  we  are  to  increase  the 
flow  of  ideas  and  technologies  across 
borders.  One  issue  of  particular  concern 
to  the  United  States,  for  instance,  is  the 
infringement  of  intellectual  property 
rights.  American  businesses  lose  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  dollars  annually  due 
to  the  counterfeiting  and  piracy  of 
records,  tapes,  and  other  intellectual 
property.  But  the  even  bigger  losers  are 
those  nations  who  fail  to  offer  protection 
to  intellectual  property.  America's  high- 
technology  companies— for  example,  in 
computers  and  computer  software— are 


not  going  to  want  to  invest  in  countries 
where  their  intellectual  property  can  be 
stolen  with  impunity.  This  will  result  in 
a  loss  to  those  countries  of  the  types  of 
skills  needed  to  develop  a  modern  in- 
dustrial sector  with  well-educated,  high- 
paid,  skilled  workers.  The  entire  free 
world  has  a  stake  in  building  a  more 
open  system  that  encourages  the  free 
exchange  of  new  scientific  advances, 
because  together  we  can  progress  faster 
and  farther  than  any  of  us  can  alone. 

This  points  to  another  advantage  the 
West  enjoys.  The  free  flow  of  informa- 
tion is  inherently  compatible  with  our 
political  system  and  values.  The  com- 
munist states,  in  contrast,  fear  this  in- 
formation explosion  perhaps  even  more 
than  they  fear  Western  military 
strength.  If  knowledge  is  power,  then 
the  communications  revolution  threatens 
to  undermine  their  most  important 
monopoly— their  effort  to  stitle  their 
people's  information,  thought,  and  in- 
dependence of  judgment.  We  all 
remember  the  power  of  the  Ayatollah's 
message  disseminated  on  tape  cassettes 
in  Iran;  what  could  have  a  more  pro- 
found impact  in  the  Soviet  bloc  than 
similar  cassettes,  outside  radio  broad- 
casting, direct  broadcast  satellites,  per- 
sonal computers,  or  Xerox  machines? 

Totalitarian  societies  face  a  dilem- 
ma: either  they  try  to  stifle  these 
technologies  and  thereby  fall  further 
behind  in  the  new  industrial  revolution, 
or  else  they  permit  these  technologies 
and  see  their  totalitarian  control  in- 
evitably eroded.  In  fact,  they  do  not 
have  a  choice,  because  they  will  never  be 
able  entirely  to  block  the  tide  of 
technological  advance. 

The  revolution  in  global  communica- 
tion thus  forces  all  nations  to  reconsider 
traditional  ways  of  thinking  about  na- 
tional sovereignty.  We  are  reminded 
anew  of  the  world's  interdependence, 
and  we  are  reminded  as  well  that  only  a 
world  of  spreading  freedom  is  compati- 
ble with  human  and  technological  prog- 
ress. 

The  Evolution  of  Strategic 
Defense.  Another  striking  example  of 
the  impact  of  scientific  and  technological 
change  is  the  issue  of  strategic  defense. 
Here  the  great  challenge  to  us  is  not 
simply  to  achieve  scientific  and  engineer- 
ing breakthroughs.  As  real  a  difficulty  is 
to  come  to  grips  with  "our  ways  of 
thinking"  about  strategic  matters  in  the 
face  of  technical  change. 

For  decades,  sUindard  strategic  doc- 
trine in  the  West  has  ultimately  relied 
on  the  balance  of  terror— the  confronta- 
tion of  offensive  arsenals  by  which  the 
two  sides  threaten  each  other  with  mass 
extermination.  Deterrence  has  worked 


under  these  conditions,  and  we  should 
not  abandon  what  works  until  we  know 
that  something  better  is  genuinely 
available.  Nevertheless,  for  political, 
strategic,  and  even  moral  reasons,  we 
owe  it  to  ourselves  and  to  future  gener: 
tions  to  explore  the  new  possibilities 
that  offer  hope  for  strategic  defense, 
that  could  minimize  the  dangers  and 
destructiveness  of  nuclear  war.  If  such 
technologies  can  be  discovered,  and  the 
promise  is  certainly  there,  then  we  will 
be  in  a  position  to  do  better  than  the 
conventional  wisdom  which  holds  that 
our  defense  strategy  must  rely  on  solely 
offensive  threats  and  must  leave  our 
people  and  our  military  capability  un- 
protected against  attack. 

Adapting  our  ways  of  thinking  is 
never  an  easy  process.  The  vehemence 
of  some  of  the  criticism  of  the 
President's  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
(SDI)  seems  to  come  less  from  the 
debate  over  technical  feasibility— which 
future  research  will  settle  one  way  or 
another  in  an  objective  manner— than 
from  the  passionate  defense  of  orthodo> 
doctrine  in  the  face  of  changing 
strategic  realities.  We  are  proceeding 
with  SDI  research  because  we  see  a 
positive,  and,  indeed,  revolutionary 
potential:  defensive  measures  may 
become  available  that  could  render  ob- 
solete the  threat  of  an  offensive  first 
strike.  A  new  strategic  equilibrium 
based  on  defensive  technologies  and 
sharply  reduced  offensive  deployments  i 
likely  to  be  the  most  stable  and  secure 
arrangement  of  all. 

Science  and  Foreign  Policy 

These  are  but  two  examples  of  how 
technological  advances  affect  our  foreig 
policy.  There  are  many  others.  It  is  in 
our  national  interest,  for  example,  to 
help  other  countries  achieve  the  kinds  o 
technological  progress  that  hold  such 
promise  for  improving  the  quality  of  life 
for  all  the  world's  people.  The  expansior 
of  the  global  economy  and  new  possibili- 
ties of  international  cooperation  are 
among  the  benefits  that  lie  ahead  of  us 
as  technical  skills  grow  around  the 
world. 

Therefore,  cooperation  in  the  fields 
of  science  and  technology  plays  an  in- 
creasing role  in  our  relations  with  a 
range  of  countries.  We  have  important 
cooperative  links  with  China  and  India, 
for  example,  as  well  as  with  many  other 
nations  in  the  developing  world.  We  are 
working  with  nations  in  Asia,  Latin 
America,  and  Africa  to  achieve 
breakthroughs  in  dryland  agriculture 
and  livestock  production  to  help  ease 
food  shortages  or  in  medicine  and  public 


30 


THE  SECRETARY 


health  to  combat  the  scourge  of  disease. 
Our  scientific  relations  with  the  in- 
dustrialized nations  of  Western  Europe 
and  Japan  aim  at  breaking  down  bar- 
riers to  the  transfer  of  technological 
knowhow. 

Clearly,  our  science  and  technology 
relationships  with  other  industrialized 
nations  are  not  without  problems.  There 
s,  in  fact,  a  permanent  tension  between 
3ur  desire  to  share  technological  ad- 
i^ances  and  our  equally  strong  desire  to 
see  American  products  compete  effec- 
tively in  the  international  market.  We 
:annot  resolve  this  dilemma,  nor  should 
ive.  The  interplay  between  the  advance- 
Tient  of  knowledge  and  competition  is 
jroductive.  Some  nations  may  focus 
;heir  efforts  too  heavily  on  competition 
it  the  expense  of  the  spread  of 
knowledge  that  can  benefit  everyone, 
ind  certainly  we  in  the  United  States 
;hould  not  be  alone  in  supporting  basic 
icientific  research.  The  industrialized  na- 
;ions  should  work  together  to  strike  a 
oalance  that  can  promote  the  essential 
baring  of  scientific  advances  and  at  the 
same  time  stimulate  the  competitive 
;pirit  which  itself  makes  such  an  impor- 
tant contribution  to  technological 
i)rogress. 

ITechnology  Transfer 

1  further  dilemma  arises  where  new 
echnologies  may  have  military  applica- 
ions.  We  maintain  a  science  and 
echnology  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Jnion,  for  instance,  even  though  we 
nust  work  to  ensure  that  the 
echnologies  we  share  with  the  Soviets 
annot  be  used  to  threaten  Western 
ecurity. 

The  innovations  of  high  technology 
re  obviously  a  boon  to  all  nations  that 
■ut  them  to  productive  use  for  the 
■enefit  of  their  peoples.  But  in  some 
ocieties,  it  often  seems  that  the  people 
re  the  last  to  get  these  benefits.  The 
loviet  Union  has,  for  decades,  sought  to 
:ain  access,  through  one  means  or 
nother,  to  the  technological  miracles 
aking  place  throughout  the  free  world, 
ind  one  of  their  goals  has  been  to  use 
hese  new  technologies  to  advance  their 
'olitical  aims— to  build  better  weapons, 
lOt  better  health  care;  better  means  of 
urveillance,  not  better  telephone 
ystems. 

This,  of  course,  poses  another  dilem- 
;ia.  We  seek  an  open  world,  where 
echnological  advances  and  knowhow 
an  cross  borders  freely.  We  welcome 
ooperation  with  the  Soviet  Union  in 
cience  and  technology.  And  yet  in  the 
^'orld  as  it  exists  today,  the  West  has  no 
hoice  but  to  take  precautions  with 


,1  ay  1985 


technologies  that  have  military  applica- 
tions. Cooperation  with  our  allies  is 
essential.  Countries  that  receive  sen- 
sitive technologies  from  the  United 
States  must  maintain  the  proper  con- 
trols to  prevent  them  from  falling  into 
the  hands  of  our  adversaries. 

Scientists  can  help  us  think  through 
this  difficult  problem.  What  technologies 
can  be  safely  transferred?  How  do  we 
safeguard  against  the  transfer  of 
technologies  that  have  dual  uses?  Where 
do  we  strike  the  balance? 

The  Proliferation  of  Nuclear 
and  Chemical  Weapons 

And  scientists  can  also  be  helpful  in 
other  areas  where  the  free  flow  of 
technical  knowledge  poses  dangers.  One 
priority  goal  of  our  foreign  policy,  for  in- 
stance, is  to  strengthen  international 
controls  over  two  of  the  grimmer  prod- 
ucts of  modern  technology:  weapons  of 
mass  destruction,  both  nuclear  and 
chemical. 

The  world  community's  success  or 
failure  in  preventing  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons  will  have  a  direct  im- 
pact on  the  prospects  for  arms  control 
and  disarmament,  on  the  development  of 
nuclear  energy  for  peaceful  purposes, 
and,  indeed,  on  the  prospects  for  peace 
on  this  planet.  The  United  States  pur- 
sues the  goal  of  nonproliferation  through 
many  avenues. 

•  We  have  long  been  the  leader  of 
an  international  effort  to  establish  a 
regime  of  institutional  arrangements, 
legal  commitments,  and  technological 
safeguards  against  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  capabilities.  We  take  an  active 
part  in  such  multilateral  agencies  as  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency,  and  the  In- 
ternational Energy  Agency. 

•  Although  we  have  major  dif- 
ferences with  the  Soviet  Union  on  many 
arms  control  issues,  we  have  a  broad 
common  interest  in  nuclear  nonprolifera- 
tion. In  the  fall  of  1982,  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  and  I  agreed  to  ini- 
tiate bilateral  consultations  on  this  prob- 
lem; since  then,  several  rounds  of  useful 
discussions  have  taken  place,  with  both 
sides  finding  more  areas  of  agreement 
than  of  disagreement. 

•  This  year,  the  United  States  will 
sit  down  with  the  126  other  parties  to 
the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  for  the 
third  time  in  a  major  review  conference. 
We  will  stress  the  overarching  signifi- 
cance of  the  treaty,  its  contribution  to 
world  peace  and  security,  and  the 
reasons  why  it  is  in  every  nation's  fun- 
damental interest  to  work  for  universal 
adherence  to  it. 


The  progress  in  nuclear  non- 
proliferation  lias,  unfortunately,  not 
been  matched  in  the  area  of  chemical 
weapons.  The  sad  fact  is  that  a  half  cen- 
tury of  widely  accepted  international 
restraint  on  the  use  or  development  of 
chemical  weapons  is  in  danger  of  break- 
ing down.  In  1963,  we  estimated  that 
only  five  countries  possessed  these 
weapons.  Now,  we  estimate  that  at  least 
13  countries  have  them,  and  more  are 
trying  to  get  them.  As  we  have  seen, 
the  problem  has  become  particularly 
acute  in  the  war  in  the  Persian  Gulf. 

We  have  had  some  marked  success 
in  limiting  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  in  part  because  the  world  com- 
munity has  worked  together  to  raise 
awareness  and  to  devise  concrete 
measures  for  dealing  with  the  problem. 
We  must  do  the  same  in  the  field  of 
chemical  weapons.  It  will  not  be  an  easy 
task.  Chemical  industries  and  dual-use 
chemicals  are  more  numerous  than  their 
counterparts  in  the  nuclear  field,  and 
chemical  weapons  involve  lower  levels  of 
technology  and  cost  less  than  nuclear 
weapons.  But  the  effort  must  be  made. 

First,  we  need  to  raise  international 
awareness  that  there  is  a  growing  prob- 
lem and  that  developed  nations,  in  par- 
ticular, have  a  special  obligation  to  help 
control  the  spread  of  chemical  weapons. 

Second,  we  need  to  expand  and  im- 
prove our  intelligence  capabilities  and 
provide  for  greater  coordination  be- 
tween intelligence  services  and 
policymakers  in  all  countries. 

'Third,  we  must  take  both  bilateral 
and  multilateral  actions  to  deal  with 
problem  countries  and  to  curb  exports  of 
materials  that  can  be  used  in  the 
manufacture  of  chemical  weapons. 

The  scientific  community  can  help  in 
a  variety  of  ways.  Chemical  engineers 
can  help  us  identify  those  items  that  are 
essential  to  the  manufacture  of  chemical 
weapons  and  then  determine  which 
countries  possess  them,  so  that  we  can 
promote  more  effective  international 
cooperation.  Scientists  can  help  us  find 
better  ways  to  check  the  flow  of  the 
most  critical  items  without  overly  in- 
hibiting the  transfer  of  information  and 
products  that  serve  so  many  beneficial 
purposes  around  the  world. 

These  are  difficult  problems,  but  if 
we  work  together  we  can  begin  to  find 
better  answers. 

The  Vision  of  a  Hopeful  Future 

I  want  to  end,  as  I  began,  on  a  note  of 
hope.  If  we  confront  these  tough  issues 
with  wisdom  and  responsibility,  the 
future  holds  great  promise.  President 


31 


THE  SECRETARY 


Reagan,  in  his  State  of  the  Union 
message  last  month,  reminded  us  all  <if 
the  important  lesson  we  should  have 
learned  by  now:  "There  are  no  con- 
straints on  the  human  mind,  no  walls 
around  the  human  spirit,  no  barriers  to 
our  progress  except  those  we  ourselves 
erect."  Today,  we  see  this  fundamental 
truth  being  borne  out  again  in  China, 
where  a  bold  new  experiment  in  open- 
ness and  individual  incentives  is  begin- 
ning to  liberate  the  energies  of  a  billion 
talented  people.  The  Chinese  have  real- 
ized that  farm  productivity  is  not  merely 
a  matter  of  scientific  breakthroughs;  it 
is  also  a  matter  of  organization  and 
human  motivation. 

The  technological  revolution  is 
pushing  back  all  the  frontiers  on  earth, 
in  the  oceans,  and  in  space.  While  we 
cannot  expect  these  advances  to  solve  all 
the  world's  problems,  neither  can  we 
any  longer  speak  in  Malthusian  terms  of 
inevitable  shortages  of  food,  energy, 
forests,  or  clean  air  and  water.  In  the 
decades  ahead,  science  may  find  new 
ways  to  feed  the  world's  poor— already 
we  can  only  look  in  wonder  at  how  in- 
creased farm  productivity  has  made  it 
possible  for  a  small  percentage  of 
Americans  to  produce  enough  food  for  a 
significant  portion  of  the  world's  people. 
We  may  discover  new  sources  of  energy 
and  learn  how  to  use  existing  sources 
more  effectively— already  we  see  that 
past  predictions  of  energy  scarcity  were 
greatly  exaggerated.  We  may  see  new 
breakthroughs  in  transportation  and 
communication  technologies,  which  will 
inevitably  bring  the  world  closer 
together— think  back  on  the  state  of 
these  technologies  40  years  ago,  and 
imagine  what  will  be  possible  40  years 
hence. 

Change— and  progress— will  be  con- 
stant so  long  as  we  maintain  an  open 
society  where  men  and  women  are  free 
to  think,  to  explore,  to  dream,  and  to 
transform  their  dreams  into  reality.  We 
would  have  it  no  other  way.  And  in  a 
society  devoted  to  the  good  of  all,  a 
society  based  on  the  fundamental 
understanding  that  the  free  pursuit  of 
individual  happiness  can  benefit 
everyone,  we  can  have  confidence  that 
the  products  of  science  will  be  put  to 
beneficial  uses,  if  we  remain  true  to  our 
heritage  and  our  ideals. 

Therefore,  we  retain  our  faith  in  the 
promise  of  progress.  Americans  have 
always  relished  innovation;  we  have 
always  embraced  the  future.  As  Presi- 
dent Reagan  put  it,  we  must  have  a  "vi- 
sion that  sees  tomorrow's  dreams  in  the 
learning  and  hard  work  we  do  today." 


News  Conference  of  March  15 


Secretary  Shultz  held  a  news  con- 
ference at  the.  Department  of  State  on 
March  15.  1985.'' 

I've  just  met  with  the  President  and 
reported  to  him  on  the  Vice  President's 
and  my  trip  to  Moscow  and  meeting 
with  General  Secretary  Gorbachev. 

The  President  sent  us  with  a  clear, 
constructive  message.  He  believes  that 
this  is  a  potentially  important  moment 
for  U.S. -Soviet  relations.  He  has  begun 
a  new  term,  and  his  policies  are  firmly 
in  place;  we  and  the  Soviets  are  back  to 
the  negotiating  table  in  Geneva;  and 
now  there  is  a  new  leader  in  place  in 
Moscow.  So  our  two  governments  have 
an  opportunity  for  a  high-level  dialogue 
to  deal  with  specific  problems  and  to 
achieve  concrete  results.  The  President 
remains  ready  to  pursue  this  process 
with  energy  and  realism.  Toward  that 
end,  he  directed  that  we  provide  the 
General  Secretary  a  candid  assessment 
of  both  the  obstacles  and  opportunities 
before  us. 

The  substance  of  our  agenda  is  well 
known.  It  involves  arms  reduction, 
regional  disagreements,  bilateral  issues, 
and  human  rights.  In  each  of  these  areas 
there  are  differences — objective  dif- 
ferences of  values  and  national  interest 
that  will  be  difficult  to  resolve.  The 
President  firmly  intends  to  work  toward 
a  more  constructive  relationship  across 
the  board. 

In  Geneva  the  main  objective  is  to 
achieve  agreement  at  the  earliest  possi- 
ble time  on  deep  reductions  in  offensive 
nuclear  arms.  We  also  want  to  launch  a 
longer  term  dialogue  with  the  Soviets  on 
the  contribution  that  strategic  defenses 
may  be  able  to  make  to  a  more  stable 
military  relationship.  We  see  no 
obstacles  from  either  side  to  getting 
down  to  specifics  in  these  talks. 

President  Reagan  also  believes  that 
we  need  better  understanding  with  the 
Soviet  Union  on  the  necessity  for  each 
to  contribute  to  peaceful  solutions  to  the 
world's  problems,  particularly  in  regions 
of  crisis  and  potential  confrontation. 

Reflecting  his  own  strongly  held 
views  and  those  of  the  American  people 
and  the  Congress,  the  President  would 
like  to  see  progress  on  human  rights 
issues.  He  hopes  that  a  process  of 
dialogue  and  confidential  diplomacy  and 
better  Soviet  undersUmding  of  the 
positive  impact  that  progress  in  this 
field  could  have  in  other  areas  of  the 
relationship  will  yield  results. 


Finally,  the  President  is  prepared  to 
seek  an  expansion  of  bilateral  coopera- 
tion across  a  broad  range:  people-to- 
people  contacts,  cultural  exchanges, 
airline  safety,  nonstrategic  trade,  and 
other  areas  of  mutual  interest.  We  are 
now  in  the  midst  of  discussions  with  the 
Soviets  in  a  number  of  these  fields. 

There  is  a  natural  tendency  in  the 
United  States  to  view  change  with  op- 
timism—we are  a  nation  of  optimists 
and  that  is  good.  We  also  tend  to  give 
others  the  benefit  of  the  doubt,  and  that 
too,  is  good.  Indeed,  it  is  in  that  spirit 
that  we  carry  on  in  the  several  diverse 
areas  of  discussion  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  we  do,  we  carry  along  with 
our  good  faith  and  hope  a  healthy 
measure  of  realism— a  realism  based 
upon  a  history  which  has  not  always 
fulfilled  our  expectations. 

We  and  the  Soviet  Union  carry  an 
enormous  responsibility  for  preserving 
peace  and  fostering  better  understand- 
ing. In  the  coming  months,  the  Presi- 
dent intends  to  devote  his  fullest  efforts 
to  both  objectives. 

Q.  The  Vice  President  came  away 
from  the  meeting  the  two  of  you  had 
saying  that  he  had  high  hopes  for  im- 
proved Soviet-American  relations. 
Could  you  tell  us  on  what  these  high 
hopes  were  based? 

A.  I  think  basically  on  the  things 
that  I've  identified  here,  and  I  think  this 
statement  is  sort  of  an  elaboration  of 
what  the  Vice  President  said.  But  it  is 
true  that  we  have  a  President  starting 
his  second  term,  his  policies  are  in  place 
and  he  has  the  perspective  of  the  4 
years  ahead  of  him.  We  have  a  new 
leader  in  Moscow.  We  have  arms  talks 
going  on;  and  for  that  matter  we  have 
had  an  array  of  talks  on  other  issues, 
with  some  agreements  here  and  there. 

So  it  is  an  important  moment,  and 
the  President  feels  that  it  is  important 
for  us  to  be  prepared  to  move  forward  il 
it  turns  out  that  that  is  also  the  Soviet 
Union's  wish.  And  of  course,  Mr. 
Gorbachev,  in  his  various  public 
statements,  has  indicated  that  that  is  his 
wish. 

Q.  You  haven't  mentioned  a  sum- 
mit meeting  between  President 
Reagan  and  Mr.  Gorbachev.  Where 
does  that  stand'.' 

A.  I  think  that  the  President  would 
be  glad  to  see  Mr.  Gorbachev  here  in  the 
United  States  at  his  convenience;  but 
where  beyond  that  that  stands,  I  don't 
have  anything  further  to  add.  But  I 


'Press  release  41. 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


think  it  would  be  a  constructive  thing 
for  them  to  meet. 

Q.  Prime  Minister  Thatcher  said 
she  believes  that  she  can  do  business 
with  Mr.  Gorbachev.  Yet  he  is  very 
much  a  product  of  the  Soviet  system 
over  some  years.  Is  there  any  reason 
to  feel  that  there  is  any  sound  basis 
for  a  change  in  Soviet  policy  because 
of  the  new  leadership? 

A.  I  think  you  have  to  expect  con- 
tinuity. Mr.  Gorbachev  gives  the  feeling 
of  a  very  capable,  energetic  person  who 
is  businesslike — that  is,  when  you  go  to 
a  meeting,  he  seems  to  be  well  informed 
and  well  prepared  and  gets  right  at  the 
issues  and  in  a  conversational  kind  of 
form. 

Whether  it  turns  out  that  you  can  do 
business  is  another  matter.  It's  one 
thing  to  be  businesslike,  but  then  we 
have  to  find  the  substance  of  the  issues 
and  see  where  we  can  go  on  them.  And 
what  I  have  said,  with  the  President's 
blessing  here — I  went  over  this  state- 
ment carefully  with  the  President  before 
coming  here — is  that  he  is  prepared  to 
work  at  it  in  a  constructive  vein. 

So  we  have  two  businesslike  people. 
The  President's  prepared  to  work  at  it. 
Whether  anything  can  come  of  it  re- 
mains to  be  seen.  But  I  think  there  is  an 
(important  responsibility  on  both  sides  to 
make  every  effort  to  take  advantage  of 
ithis  moment  of  opportunity. 

Q.  You've  mentioned  an  array  of 
other  talks  with  the  Soviets  with  some 
agreements.  Can  you  be  more  specific 
in  whether  you  mean  the  Middle  East 
or  transportation?  Can  you  be  more 
specific? 

A.  The  things  that  we  have  man- 
aged to  agree  on  in  the  last  year  or 
so — the  "hot  line"  upgrade  is  an  exam- 
ple; the  long-term  grain  agreement,  the 
additional  sales;  the  beginning  of  things 
in  the  nonstrategic  trade  area;  some 
LXintacts  in  other  fields.  So  there's  been 
ill  array  like  that  of  things  where  we 
iKive  talked. 

Of  course,  I  suppose  the  most 
momentous  agreement — it's  not  an 
igreement  in  substance  but  an  agree- 
ment in  procedure — is  to  undertake  new 
LU-ms  reduction  talks  in  Geneva. 

So  there  have  been  a  number  of 
things  of  that  kind  that  do  show  that  it's 
possible  for  these  two  countries  to  come 
t(i  an  agreement  on  certain  things.  And 
that  I  think  is  something  to  note  along 
the  way.  But  I  don't  put  a  tremendous 
amount  of  emphasis  on  it,  but  it's  a  plus. 


Q.  Is  there  any  reason  now,  given 
the  draw-down  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Beirut,  to  keep  it  open  at  all,  given 
the  difficult  circumstances  in  working 
there? 

A.  Yes.  We  have  an  important 
representational  job  to  do  in  Lebanon, 
even  under  the  current  circumstances, 
and  we  intend  to  do  it.  Of  course  we 
have  to  size  the  number  of  people  in  our 
E  mbassy  to  the  task  that  needs  to  be 
performed.  And,  given  the  difficulties 
now  in  Lebanon,  there  is,  in  a  sense, 
less  to  do  so  you  don't  need  as  many 
people.  But  we  will  continue  to  do  what 
we  feel  is  in  our  interest  to  do  in 
Lebanon. 

Q.  Has  the  abrogation  of  the 
May  17,  1983,  agreement  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel  affected  in  any 
way  the  U.S.  Government  resolve  to 
help  Lebanon  rid  itself  of  occupation 
and  the  achievement  of  a  free  and  in- 
dependent Lebanon? 

A.  We  continue  to  advocate  a  free 
and  independent  Lebanon  with  all 
foreign  forces  removed  and  with  ar- 
rangements that  will  look  to  the  security 
along  Israel's  northern  borders,  so  that 
the  tendency  to  use  southern  Lebanon 
as  a  base  from  which  to  attack  northern 
Israel  isn't  repeated.  That,  of  course, 
was  the  basis  on  which  the  Israelis  pro- 
ceeded into  Lebanon  in  the  first  place. 
So  we  continue  to  advocate  those  goals. 

The  May  17  agreement  was  an 
agreement  for  Israeli  complete 
withdrawal,  and  we  believe  that  the 
Israelis  are  correct  to  withdraw  now. 

Personally,  I  think  it  would  be  better 
all  around  for  all  parties  in  the  area  if 
the  Lebanese  and  the  Syrians  were 
prepared  to  negotiate  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  so  that  arrangements  were 
made  that  would  provide  for  the  kind  of 
stability  that  will  prevent  just  a  recur- 
rent pattern  of  violence.  That  would  be 
constructive,  but  it  isn't  happening. 

Q.  Your  response  a  moment  ago  to 
the  question  on  the  draw-down  of 
staff  at  the  Embassy  suggested  that 
that  was  being  done  merely  because 
there  was  less  to  do.  We  have  been  led 
to  believe  in  Washington  that  there 
are  many  other  considerations,  not  the 
least  of  which  is  the  security  of 
Americans  in  Lebanon.  Would  you 
comment  on  the  sense  of  deja  vu  that 
certainly  some  of  us  have  about  the 
security  situation  in  Lebanon  and 
about  the  continuing  reasons  for  U.S. 
presence  in  Beirut? 


A.  Obviously  the  security  situation  is 
a  tense  one  for  everybody,  not  just 
Americans.  However,  we  don't  intend  to 
be  pushed  out  of  a  region  by  terrorist 
threats.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  no 
point  in  having  people  in  a  situation 
where  there  is  danger  more  than  you 
need.  So  the  two  considerations  combine 
to  lead  you  to  reduce  the  presence  for 
now,  And  if  things  should  stabilize — I 
hope  they  will,  but  they  are  far  from 
that  right  now — but  if  they  do,  then  we 
would  reintroduce  people  who  would 
have  a  role  to  play  in  helping  Lebanon 
reconstruct  itself  and  be  the  prosperous 
place  that  it  once  was  but  is  far  from 
right  at  this  moment. 

Q.  Will  the  Ambassador  remain 
there? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Was  there  anything  that  you 
heard  in  Moscow  from  Mr.  Gorbachev 
which  suggested  that  there  are  par- 
ticular areas  where  the  Soviets  are 
ready  to  move  or  where  you  sense  a 
particularly  promising  opening? 

A.  Between  his  statements  and  the 
Vice  President's  statements  and  the 
ones  that  I  made,  we  covered  the 
ground  broadly.  But,  of  course,  in  even 
that  brief  time — I  guess  we  were  there 
for  almost  an  hour  and  half,  but  still 
that's  a  brief  time  considering  2-way 
translation  and  the  fact  that,  of  course, 
they  had  the  funeral  and  all  the  events 
surrounding,  and  so  on — it  wasn't  possi- 
ble to  get  into  any  real  detail.  But  I 
think  it's  a  fair  statement  that  the 
general  tone  of  the  discussion  was  a 
businesslike  and  constructive  tone. 

Q.  Did  either  you  suggest  or 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  suggest 
adding  a  special  impetus  or  urgency  to 
on-going  negotiations?  In  other 
words,  did  either  of  you  suggest  that 
both  sides  send  new  instructions  to 
their  teams  or  add  a  special  impor- 
tance to  on-going  negotiations? 

A.  Of  course,  the  arms  control  and 
reduction  negotiations  in  (}eneva  carried 
on,  and  our  side  has  very  strong  instruc- 
tions, constructive  proposals  to  make. 
Mr.  Karpov  [head  of  the  Soviet  delega- 
tion to  the  arms  control  negotiations] 
said  that  in  the  meeting  in  which  he  was 
given  his  instructions,  that  meeting  was 
chaired  by  Mr.  Gorbachev,  so  I  assume 
that  Mr.  Gorbachev  agreed  with  those 
instructions.  I'm  sure  he  did.  So  there's 
no  reason  to  shift  things  around. 

I  think  we  have  to  remember  that 
this  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  a  com- 
plicated, vitally  important  relationship; 


■May  1985 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


and  while  personalities  matter— and  we 
do  have  two  strong  personalities  at  the 
heads  of  the  two  governments— never- 
theless, you  have  to  look  always  at  the 
interests  and  the  values  and  the  dif- 
ferences as  well  as  the  opportunities  to 
resolve  them,  and  bear  that  in  mind. 

Q.  Mr.  Gorbachev  has  accepted  in- 
vitations to  visit  France  and  West 
Germany.  Why  do  you  think  we  have 
had  no  public  response  yet  to  the  U.S. 
overture? 

A.  You  have  to  ask  him.  I  can't 
speculate  about  that. 

Q.  On  the  ANZUS  situation,  will 
there  be  any  bilateral  defense  rela- 
tions now  with  New  Zealand?  And 
when  you  meet  with  the  Australian  of- 
ficials, will  you  ask  them  for  a  deeper 
military  commitment  to  the  United 
States? 

A.  Insofar  as  the  ANZUS  situation 
is  concerned,  the  Government  of  New 
Zealand,  as  is  its  sovereign  right  to  do, 
has  decided  to  prohibit  port  calls  by  U.S. 
naval  ships.  Given  that  decision  on  their 
part,  that  basically  breaks  the  military 
relationship  on  which  the  ANZUS  trea- 
ty, and  the  relationship  under  the 
ANZUS  treaty,  is  based.  And  so  we 
have  proceeded  in  that  manner  to 
reduce  quite  sharply  the  military-to- 
military  relationships,  although  they 
don't  get  eliminated  entirely. 

New  Zealand  is  a  friendly  country 
which  shares  Western  values.  I  know 
many  New  Zealanders,  been  there 
several  times;  it's  a  wonderful  country. 
So  they  have  basically  broken  the 
military  relationship. 

As  far  as  Australia  is  concerned,  we 
basically  retain  the  structure  of  the 
ANZUS  treaty;  and  we  will  continue  to 
have  a  strong  and  constructive,  worth- 
while relationship  with  the  Australians 
for  our  mutual  defense  needs  in  the 
region. 

Q.  As  you  know.  President 
Mubarak  has  been  here  asking  the 
United  States  to  take  a  step  toward 
reviving  the  peace  process  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  by  being  willing  to  have  a 
dialogue,  as  he  calls  it,  with  a  joint 
delegation  of  Jordan  and  Palestinians. 
Under  what  circumstances  would  the 
United  States  agree  to  do  that? 

A.  We  have  done  quite  a  few  things 
to  advance  the  peace  process  in  the  Mid- 
dle East.  President  Mubarak's  sugges- 
tion is  one  suggestion.  There  are  a 
number  of  others. 

We  have,  of  course,  had  the  Prime 
Minister  of  Israel  visiting  here  last  fall. 


The  King  of  Saudi  Arabia  has  been  here 
recently.  President  Mubarak  was  here. 
The  Foreign  Minister  of  Jordan  will  be 
here  next  week.  So  we  have  a  very  ac- 
tive diplomacy  in  the  field. 

I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  there  has 
been  movement  among  the  parties  in  the 
region  which  we  have  encouraged.  And 
so  it's  important— and  it  seemed  to  me 
this  was  President  Mubarak's  main 
point — to  try  to  keep  this  momentum 
going.  He  deserves  credit  for  helping  get 
it  going. 

To  that  end,  after  the  Jordanian 
Foreign  Minister  has  been  here.  Am- 
bassador Richard  Murphy  [Assistant 
Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs]  will  be  sent  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  myself  to  the  region.  He'll  go 
to  Israel,  he'll  go  to  Saudi  Arabia,  he'll 
visit  other  countries,  and  he  will  con- 
tinually assess  developments.  He  will 
report  back  promptly,  and  we  will  be  do- 
ing everything  that  we  can  to  keep  the 
momentum  toward  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  going.  It  is  of  vital  significance  not 
only  to  the  parties  in  the  region  but  to 
ourselves  and  other  countries  as  well. 

Q.  If  there  is  an  improvement  in 
the  Chinese-Soviet  relationship,  would 
you  expect  this  to  affect  American  in- 
terests? 

A.  Probably  in  a  positive  way.  That 
is,  the  Chinese  have  put  certain  condi- 
tions down  for  any  really  fundamental 
change.  They  have  talked  about  the 
masses  of  troops— Soviet  troops— along 
their  borders  and  the  deployment  of  the 
SS-20  missiles.  They  have  talked  about 
the  Soviet  sponsorship  of  the  Viet- 
namese occupation  and  advance  into 
Cambodia.  They  have  talked  about  the 
Soviet  Union's  invasion  and  continued 
military  activities  now,  over  5  years  or 
so,  in  Afghanistan  and  have  said  that 
these  conditions  should  be  changed.  We 
think  if  those  conditions  were  changed, 
it  would  be  positive;  it  would  be  good  for 
the  world. 

Q.  What  was  Mr.  Gorbachev's 
reaction  when  you  issued  the  invita- 
tion to  a  summit,  and  did  he  give  you 
any  indication  of  how  soon  we  might 
be  able  to  expect  one? 

A.  I  think  I  can  only  say  that  the 
President  feels  that  this  is  an  important 
moment,  for  all  the  reasons  that  I  have 
specified,  and  believes  that  it  would  be 
good  in  due  course  to  meet  with  Mr. 
Gorbachev,  and  no  doubt  the  Soviet 
Union  has  this,  Mr.  Gorbachev  has  that 
possibility  under  consideration,  but  I 
can't  in  any  way  try  to  speak  for  him. 


Q.  Did  he  give  you  any  reaction  at 
all,  though,  when  you  were  there? 

A.  1  just  can't  try  to  speak  for  him 
in  any  way.  I  don't  think  that's  appro- 
priate for  me.  I  can  only  say  what  our 
views  are. 

Q.  Can  you  say  whether  you  attach 
any  particular  military  or  political 
significance  to  the  continuing  buildup 
of  SS-20s  by  the  Soviets  and  whether 
you  regard  that  as  "business  as 
usual"?  And  second,  did  the  issue 
come  up  in  your  meeting  with  Mr. 
Gorbachev? 

A.  Unfortunately,   it  is  "business  as 
usual"  that  we  see  continued  deploy- 
ments and  continued  development  of  the 
Soviet  strategic  and  intermediate-range 
missilery.  Of  course,  getting  control  of 
this  process  mutually  is  what  the  Geneva 
talks  are  primarily  about.  So  we  will 
proceed  on  that  basis. 

Q.  Is  it  the  Administration's  view 
that  the  ascension  of  Gorbachev 
represents  more  than  a  change  in 
style? 

A.  It  remains  to  be  seen.  I  think  Mr. 
Gorbachev  has,  understandably,  made  a 
point  that  the  keynote  is  continuity,  and 
he  has  been  part  of  the  group  of  people 
and  the  leadership  of  the  Soviet  Union 
who  have  produced  the  present  set  of 
policies,  and  I  wouldn't  expect  to  see  it 
change  sharply.  But  in  any  case,  what 
we  can  have  some  control  over  is  our 
own  posture.  And  we  don't  know  what 
may  be  on  the  minds  and  intentions  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  but  we  hope  construc- 
tive. They  have  said  so. 

From  our  standpoint,  we  want  to 
proceed— as  I  said  in  the  statement  that 
I  discussed  with  the  President — with  a 
sense  of  realism.  Of  course,  we  have  to 
maintain  our  capability  to  defend  our 
values  and  our  interests,  and  at  the 
same  time  we  have  to  be  ready — and 
make  it  clear  to  the  Soviet  Union  that 
we're  ready — to  undertake  a  genuinely 
constructive  dialogue  with  them  and  to 
try  to  work  out  concrete  solutions  to 
problems.  We  will  hope  that  they  will 
respond.  In  any  case,  for  our  part,  we 
can  continue  to  be  in  that  stance  and  en- 
courage a  response  on  their  part. 

Q.  In  recent  times,  you've  spoken 
about  the  need  to  support  freedom 
fighters  around  the  world.  I've  got 
two  questions  on  that.  Has  the  Ad- 
ministration decided  what  it's  going  to 
do  in  Congress  on  supporting  the  in- 
surgents or  rebels  or  contras  in 
Nicaragua?  And  secondly  given  the 
situation  in  Indochina  where  the  anti- 
Vietnamese  Cambodians  were  given  a 


34 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


pretty  big  beating,  why  doesn't  the 
United  States  do  something  to  help 
them  out  militarily?  They've  been  ask- 
ing for  it. 

A.  First  of  all,  on  the  latter  ques- 
tion, we  continue  to  be  in  close  consulta- 
tion with  our  friends  in  the  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] countries,  and  we  are  basically 
supporting  what  they  are  trying  to  do. 
We  are  continually  reviewing  the  nature 
of  that  support  with  them. 

On  the  former  part  of  your  question, 
we  believe  that  the  people  fighting  for 
freedom  and  independence  in  Nicaragua 
should  be  supported.  If  your  question  is 
sort  of  tactical— "What  is  our,  sort  of, 
legislative  strategy?" — that  I'm  not  in  a 
position  to  go  into.  But  as  far  as  the  im- 
portance of  standing  with  people  who 
are  trying  to  attain  freedom  and  a  more 
open,  a  more  pluralistic  society  in 
Nicaragua  is  concerned,  we  are  with 
them. 

Q.  As  a  result  of  your  visit  to 
Moscow,  have  you  come  any  closer  to 
making  decisions  on  what  youll  do 
with  regard  to  the  SALT  II  Treaty 
'toward  the  end  of  this  year,  when  you 
Ihave  to  make  certain  basic  decisions 
las  to  whether  to  adhere  to  it  or  ex- 
iceed  the  limitations  on  strategic 
launchers? 

A.  No  there's  no  change  in  our  view 
lof  that  between  this  week  and  last  week. 

Q.  The  Vice  President  was  greeted 
■with  boos  and  shouts  of  "Go  home" 
this  morning  in  Brasilia.  Apparently, 
the  reason  was  the  foreign  debt.  It 
seems  to  be  the  first  time  that  an 
American  official  was  blamed  for  that 
or  was  booed  for  that.  Do  you  see  that 
issue — the  foreign  debt — becoming  a 
problem  between  the  new  Brazilian 
Government  and  the  United  States? 

A.  The  question  of  how  to  handle 
the  foreign  debt  is  a  difficult  one.  It's 
been  worked  with  very  hard,  particular- 
ly over  the  last  2  years.  I  think  it  came 
first  to  the  fore  with  respect  to  the  Mex- 
ican debt. 

The  IMF  [International  Monetary 
Fund]  is  the  international  agency 
primarily  dealing  with  it.  We  have 
played,  I  think,  a  very  constructive 
role— Secretary  Regan,  when  he  was  in 
the  Treasury,  and  Paul  Volker  in  the 
Federal  Reserve,  and  now  Secretary  [of 
the  Treasury]  Baker.  We've  tried  to 
assist  from  the  standpoint  of  the  State 
Department. 


But  I  think  the  United  States  has 
been  a  very  helpful  partner  in  trying  to 
help  countries  work  their  way  through 
the  debt  problem.  It  involves,  on  the  one 
hand,  rescheduling;  on  the  other  hand, 
undertakings  by  countries  that  have  the 
debt  to  create  more  healthy  conditions  in 
their  country  economically  so  there  is 
some  chance  of  repaying. 

And  I  think,  number  three — and 
most  important  really— is  the  develop- 
ment of  an  atmosphere  of  expansion  in 
the  world  economy  and  in  the  individual 
economies,  because  you  can't  work  out 
of  debt  through  austerity  alone.  You've 
got  to  have  expansion.  And  of  course, 
the  contribution  of  the  United  States  to 
world  expansion  has  been  critical  and 
immense.  So  I  think  the  U.S.  contribu- 
tion to  the  solution  to  this  problem  has 
been  a  very  strong  and  positive  one  and 
well-appreciated  by  financial  people  all 
over  the  world. 

Q.  Can  you  please  say  what  further 
reforms  you  would  like  to  see  in  the 
Israeli  economy  before  naming  an 
economic  aid  figure? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  get  into  the  posi- 
tion of  trying  to  prescribe  for  somebody 
else's  economy,  but  I  do  think  that, 
clearly,  the  things  that  they  say  and  are 
trying  to  do  are  key  things.  The  underly- 
ing things  are,  number  one,  get  control 
of  the  budget,  which  means  getting  con- 
trol of  spending,  because  tax  rates  in 
Israel  are  already  so  high  that  they  are 
on  the  downward  part  of  the  Laffer 
curve — that  is,  if  you  raise  taxes,  you'll 
collect  less  money.  So  it's  got  to  be  done 
through  controlling  spending. 

Associated  with  that,  there  needs  to 
be,  and  the  Israelis  are  proposing,  a 
budget  control  law  which  I  hope  will  be 
passed — they  have  proposed  it — to 
enable  the  Finance  Ministry  to  have  a 
better  hand  on  the  spending  by  the 
various  ministries  so  that  when  they 
say,  "We  are  going  to  spend  X  amount," 
they  will  come  somewhere  near  control- 
ling it  to  that  amount. 

Second  is  the  control  of  the  money 
supply.  There  is  legislation  to  make  the 
Bank  of  Israel  a  more  independent 
organization  so  it  isn't  simply  an  agency 
that  has  the  role  of  funding  the  deficit 
but  has  a  more  independent  stance  to 
get  control  of  the  money  supply  which  is 
fueling  the  inflation. 

Third,  to  deal  with  the  problem  of 
the  cross-rate  of  the  shekel  and  other 


currencies.  Here  they  have  an  especially 
difficult  problem  because  they  more  or 
less  relate  themselves  to  the  dollar,  and 
even  as  they  have  gentle  devaluations 
with  respect  to  the  dollar,  given  the 
dollar's  strength,  those  devaluations 
don't  quite  take  hold  with  respect  to  the 
European  currencies,  and  most  of  their 
trade  is  with  Europe.  So  they  have 
those  dilemmas  to  work  with.  They 
understand  the  problem  well,  and  have 
made  some  headway,  but  it's  difficult 
sledding. 

Q.  We've  just  sent  two  senior  of- 
ficials to  Chile — two  senior  U.S.  of- 
ficials have  now  been  to  Chile  in  the 
past  month  or  so,  and  meanwhile,  we 
have  deviated  from  the  common  prac- 
tice of  supporting  loans  to  Chile  in  the 
multilateral  banks.  How  do  you  view 
the  situation  in  Chile  now,  and  par- 
ticularly the  impact  of  these  recent 
steps  by  the  United  States? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  impact  the  ac- 
tions in  the  bank  votes  will  have,  but 
they  suggest  the  reservations  we  have 
about  the  current  situation  in  Chile. 
There  was  a  time  when  it  seemed  that 
there  was  movement  toward  what  is 
called  "liberalization,"  and  I  think  that 
was  promising;  but  there  has  been  move- 
ment away  from  that. 

We  continue  to  work  with  the  people 
and  Government  of  Chile,  but  we  would 
like  to  see  political  reform  and  also  to 
see  Chile's  economy  come  back.  That,  of 
course,  is  something  that  will  derive 
from  a  variety  of  factors,  not  simply  the 
stance  of  the  government. 


'Press  release  52. 


tiAcM  -fQPK 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary's  Interview  on 

"This  Weel^  With  David  Brinl^ley" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
ABC-TV's  'This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley"  on  March  17,  1985.  by  David 
Brinkley  and  Sam  Donaldson,  ABC 
News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC  Neu>s 
analyst. ' 

Q.  Have  you  had  any  response,  directly 
or  indirectly,  from  Mr.  Reagan's  pro- 
posal for  a  summit  meeting  with  Mr. 
Gorbachev? 

A.  Not  really. 

Q.  Why  not?  Why  can  they  respond 
to  the  French  and  the  Germans  in 
principle  but  not  to  us? 

A.  You  have  to  ask  them  that  ques- 
tion. 

Q.  I  just  did,  and  I  didn't  under- 
stand the  answer  [given  by  previous 
guest,  Stanislav  M.  Menshikov,  ad- 
viser to  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union]. 

A.  The  United  States  is  different. 
It's  much  more  powerful,  and  we  are 
engaged  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  many 
ways  very  directly,  so  more  has  to  be 
thought  about,  no  doubt,  as  is  true  in 
our  own  case. 

Q.  You  don't  read  into  this  any  at- 
tempt to  rebuff  or  to  hold  us  up  to 
sort  of  public  laughter  for  making  a 
request  which  they  don't  deign  to  re- 
spond to  immediately? 

A.  We  didn't  make  a  request.  We 
made  a  suggestion,  put  forward  in  good 
faith  by  the  President  suggesting  that 
this  is  an  important  moment,  and 
perhaps  something  more  constructive 
could  be  worked  out.  However,  he  has 
also  noted,  and  we  have  emphasized, 
that  the  key  thing  here  is  for  us  to  main- 
tain our  strength  and  our  sense  of  pur- 
pose, and  if  in  that  environment  some- 
thing more  constructive  can  emerge, 
then  that  would  be  good. 

Q.  The  Administration  continues 
to  call  this  a  moment  of  opportunity. 
Yet  Mr.  Gorbachev  says  that  the 
theme  of  his  leadership  will  be  con- 
tinuity, which  means  the  continuation 
of  policies  that  this  Administration 
finds  highly  and  comprehensively  un- 
satisfactory. He  has  begun  his  tenure 
by  making  threats  against  Pakistan 
and  linking  it  in  some  way  with 
Nicaragua.  What  is  your  conclusion  to 
be  drawn  from  that? 

A.  I  tend  to  take  people  at  their 
word,  and  the  statement  that  there  will 
be  continuity,  I  think  you  have  to  look  at 


that.  They  did  threaten  the  Belgians,  but 
the  Belgians  have  gone  ahead  and 
deployed.  They  have  threatened  the 
Pakistanis,  and  I  think  the  Pakistanis 
will  hold  firm  in  their  concern  about 
what's  going  on  in  Afghanistan. 

Q.  They  did  link  in  some  way  in 
the  Soviet  press,  they're  saying  that 
somehow  their  attitude  toward  Paki- 
stan's involvement  with  the  Afghan 
resistance  is  linked  to  their — Soviet 
behavior — toward  Nicaragua.  How  do 
you  see  it  linked? 

A.  I  don't  see  it  linked.  I  think  that 
the  situation  in  Nicaragua  is  one  in 
which  our  interests  are  threatened,  but 
more  than  that,  in  which  freedom  of  the 
people  in  Nicaragua  and  in  Central 
America  is  threatened.  We  have  to 
stand  with  those  who  are  fighting  for 
freedom  there,  just  as  we  have  to  sup- 
port those  who  are  resisting  the  blatant 
Soviet  aggression  in  Afghanistan. 

Q.  Pve  heard  a  report  that  Mr. 
Karpov  [head  of  the  Soviet  delegation 
to  the  arms  control  negotiations]  has 
been  very  menacing  in  his  perform- 
ance in  Geneva  so  far,  saying  that  he 
would  blow  up  the  talks  unless  we 
were  prepared  to  abandon  SDI 
[Strategic  Defense  Initiative).  Is  that 


a  fair  characterization,  menacing,  of 
this  behavior  so  far? 

A.  Oh,  I  don't  know  about  that,  Imt 
he  did  give  a  public  interview  that,  I 
guess,  played  yesterday.  I  don't  know 
just  when  it  was  recorded,  but  if  that 
kind  of  performance  is  to  mean  that  the 
Soviets  approach  those  negotiations  as 
propaganda  opportunities,  then  that 
doesn't  bode  very  well  for  the  negotia- 
tions. The  negotiations  should  take  place 
as  a  private  diplomatic  effort  in  which 
the  rules  of  confidentiality  that  they 
have  set  up  are  observed. 

Q.  Are  we  prepared  to  say  at  this 
point  that  we're  not  interested  in  a 
cosmetic  arms  control  agreement,  that 
the  only  agreement  we're  interested  in 
would  have  substantial  force  reduc- 
tions, and  if  not,  if  we  can't  get  that 
we  don't  want  an  agreement? 

A.  Sulistantial  force  reductions 
leading  to  zero  is  what  the  President 
wants,  and  there's  just  not  too  much 
point  in  ratifying  what  people's  plans  for 
the  future  are. 

(J.  But  we  did  that  in  SALT  I  and 
II.  We  essentially  did  ratify,  it  was  a 
snapshot  of  the  arms  race  at  the  mo- 
ment. Are  you  saying  that  is  un- 
satisfactory? 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


A.  That  is  the  basis  on  which  Presi- 
dent Reagan  consistently  criticized  both 
of  those  agreements,  and  so  we  seel\ 
something  different.  I  felt  myself  that 
one  of  the  notable  aspects  of  the  Geneva 
agreement  that  we  reached  in  January 
was  that  both  sides  said  that  they  were 
interested  in  radical  reductions  leading 
to  zero. 

Q.  The  Soviets  are  deploying  these 
SS-24  and  25  heavy  missiles.  What's 
your  view?  Is  the  24  in  violation  of 
SALT  II  or  not? 

A.  We  think  it  raises  very  con- 
siderable questions  about  that,  but 
beyond  that  point  what  it  shows  is  the 
continuing  modernization  of  the  Soviet 
land-based  weapons.  In  this  case  you 
have  a  heavy  MIRVed  [multiple 
independently-targetable  reentry  vehicle] 
missile  that  is  probably  mobile.  I  think 
the  emergence  of  weapons  of  that  kind 
only  emphasize  the  importance  of 
defense  against  them,  because  they  are 
not  in  a  fixed  place  where  you  know 
where  they  are. 

Q.  There's  a  story  this  morning 
that  there  are  two  schools  of  thought 
within  our  government.  One  is  that 
although  they  are  destroying  some  of 
their  old  missiles  to  make  room  for 
the  24s,  that  that  is  within  the  treaty, 
we  ought  to  encourage  them  to  do  it. 
And  the  other  is,  which  you  seem  to 
have  suggested,  that  they  may  be  in 
violation  of  that  treaty,  and  we  ought 
to  come  out  against  those  new 
weapons.  Which  is  your  view? 

A.  There  are  many  aspects.  One 
aspect  is  in  terms  of  new  missiles  as 
distinct  from  numbers  of  missiles,  and 
it's  the  new  systems  that  are  brought 
into  question. 

Q.  What's  your  view  on  this  one? 

j        A.  To  me  it  is  a  clear  new  missile. 

Q.  That's  a  violation. 

A.    Exactly.  There  are  questions 
about  whether,  in  a  purely  technical 
sense,  it  fits  within  certain  treaty 
language  as  might  be  interpreted  by  a 
lawyer. 

Q.  You  just  mentioned  the  fact 
that  candidate  Reagan  opposed 
SALT  II.  Now,  sometime  this  fall 
probably,  when  the  Trident  Alaska 
goes  into  service,  the  Administration, 
in  order  to  continue  what,  by  the  Ad- 
ministration's own  position,  is 
unilateral  compliance  with  SALT  II— 
unratified  but  we're  still  complying 
with  it.  In  order  to  comply  with  the 
sublimits  on  MIRV  missiles,  we  will 
have  to  dismantle  some  land-based 
R  BMs  [intercontinental  ballistic 


missile]  or  chop  up  a  Polaris  sub- 
marine. How  can  this  Administration, 
staffed  almost  entirely  by  people  who 
hated  SALT  II,  continue  to  comply 
with  it  and  dismantle  systems  while 
asking  Congress  for  billions  more  for 
an  MX? 

A.  We  have  to  make  that  decision  as 
we  come  to  it.  In  the  meantime,  the 
President's  policy  is  a  no  undercut  policy 
in  the  interests  of  seeing  if  we  can't 
bring  forward  from  the  present  Geneva 
negotiations  the  promise  of  the  radical 
reductions  in  the  agreement  that  led  to 
these  negotiations. 

Q.  The  SALT  II  stipulates  2,250 
launchers  for  each  side.  We've  never 
been  over  that;  the  Soviet  Union's 
never  been  under  that,  have  they? 

A.  When  you  say  "never,"  I  think 
that  you're  wrong  on  that. 

Q.  Not  since  SALT  II. 

A.  But  it  is  a  problem,  and  the 
mobility  of  missiles  increasingly  raises 
problems  about  verification,  whether  you 
can  really  count  them  and  know  how 
many  there  are  and  where  they  are. 

Q.  We  have  all  g^rown  up  since 
World  War  II  being  told,  and  I  think 
believing,  that  a  summit  meeting  be- 
tween the  leaders  of  two  huge  nations 
raise  substantial  public  expectations 
and  so,  therefore,  should  be  carefully 
prepared  so  as  to  be  sure  that  when 
they  were  over  something  worthwhile 
came  out  of  them.  We  have  been  told 
that,  haven't  we? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  And  that's  been  our  way  of 
thinking. 

A.  And  I  think  it's  correct. 

Q.  Now  we're  talking  about  a  sum- 
mit meeting  with,  as  far  as  I  can  tell, 
no  preparation  at  all,  just  a  rather 
casual  meeting  in  which  to  chit-chat 
or  whatever.  What  do  we  have  in  mind 
for  this  meeting? 

A.  We  don't  have  in  mind  casual 
chit-chat.  There  has  been  implicitly  quite 
a  lot  of  preparation  in  the  sense  that  the 
two  sides  have  made  their  positions 
quite  clear  on  a  very  wide  range  of 
issues.  There's  been  a  lot  of  discussion, 
and  there's  been  a  few  agreements  in 
the  past  year;  there  are  a  wide  variety 
of  things  under  discussion  now.  At  a  mo- 
ment when  the  President  is  starting  a 
new  term  with  his  basic  policies  in  place, 
when  we  do  have  arms  talks  starting  in 
Geneva,  when  we  have  a  new  leader  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  it  seems  to  be  a  mo- 
ment when  it  would  be  useful  to  review 
the  bidding,  not  with  no  preparation  and 


not  on  the  basis  of  chit-chat  or  just  get- 
ting to  know  you  but  on  the  basis  of 
reviewing  all  of  the  various  substantive 
issues  which  are  deep  and  difficult. 

Q.  We  are  hearing  in  Washington 
now,  and  I  think  we've  heard  it  from 
you,  that  in  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
we  now  have  a  window  of  opportunity 
which  implies  that  something  exists 
now  which  did  not  exist  before  and 
may  not  exist  in  the  future.  What  is 
this? 

A.  Just  to  go  over  it,  there  has  been 
a  considerable  amount  of  discussion  of 
the  deep  and  difficult  issues  between  the 
two  countries.  There  is  a  President 
starting  a  second  4-year  term  with 
policies  in  place,  so  he  has  examined  the 
range  of  these  issues.  There  is  a  new 
leader  of  the  Soviet  Union  who  is  going 
to  have  the  opportunity  to  fill  vacancies 
in  the  Politburo  and  thereby,  no  doubt, 
strengthen  whatever  his  point  of  view  is 
as  he  looks  ahead  in  their  evolution  as  a 
country.  We  do  have  important  discus- 
sions going  on  now  pointed  toward  arms 
reduction — not  just  control,  reduction. 
At  least  that's  the  stated  subject  of 
these  negotiations.  So  all  of  these  things 
together  create  a  moment  when,  at  least 
the  President  believes,  it  would  be 
worthwhile  to  review  the  bidding  and 
see  where  we  may  go  from  here. 

Q.  All  the  arguments  about  the 
details  of  Soviet-U.S.  relations  are 
really  at  bottom  arguments  about  one 
question:  What  does  the  Soviet  Union 
want?  What's  the  goal  of  the  regime? 
Is  it,  as  some  people  say,  an  inherently 
militarist  and  expansionist  regime, 
deriving  its  legitimacy  from  its  role  as 
the  keeper  of  a  revolutionary  flame 
against  the  rest  of  the  world,  or  is  it 
just  another  great  power  that  wants 
to  get  along  with  us?  What's  the 
Reagan  Administration  view? 

A.  I  think  you  have  to  assume  the 
former,  because  that's  basically  the  way 
they've  always  described  themselves, 
and  they've  always  behaved. 

Q.  In  other  words,  that  they  are  an 
expansionist,  militarist,  ideological 
power. 

A.  No,  from  our  standpoint,  we  have 
to  recognize  that  as  a  reality,  or  certain- 
ly potential  reality,  and  generate  the 
strength  of  purpose  and  ability,  along 
with  our  allies,  to  protect  and  defend 
and  enlarge  the  scope  of  freedom  in  the 
world.  Knowing  that,  and  knowing  that 
these  two  ideologies  are  not  truly  com- 
patible, we  have  to  expect  competition. 
But  that  doesn't  mean  in  this  world  that 
we  have  to  resign  ourselves  to  a  nuclear 


Mav  1985 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


holocaust  or  anything  of  that  kind;  we 
need  to  work  to  prevent  it. 

Q.  But  isn't  the  premise  of  an  arms 
control  process  that  we,  by  negotia- 
tion, can  change  the  fundamental 
character  and  aspirations  of  the  Soviet 
regime?  I  mean,  after  all,  they've  been 
saying  since  1959  that  they're  for 
reducing  weapons. 

A.  I  don't  think  that  that  is  the 
premise.  I  think  we  have  to  accept  that 
the  kind  of  system  they  have  described 
to  us  they  have  is  probably  the  way  they 
think  about  it.  We  have  to  position 
ourselves  so  that  we're  able  to  deal  with 
that  and  under  those  circumstances  see 
if  there  are  some  agreements  that  will 
reduce  the  level  of  potential  outbreaks 
of  nuclear  or  other  forms  of  warfare. 

Q.  King  Hussein  of  Jordan  has 
now  said  that  he's  gone  as  far  as  he 
can  go  in  trying  to  inch  back  into  the 
Middle  East  peace  process,  that  if  the 
United  States  will  not  reverse  its  posi- 
tion and  see  a  joint  Palestinian- 
Jordanian  group,  that  he's  going  to,  in 
effect,  wash  his  hands  of  it.  Are  you 
going  to  reconsider? 

A.  I  think  that  first  of  all,  it's  impor- 
tant to  notice  that  over  the  past  6  to  8 
months  there  have  been  a  number  of 
favorable  developments  in  the  direction 
of  Middle  East  peace.  There  have  also 
been  some  steps  in  the  other  direction, 
but  King  Hussein's  recognition  of  Egypt, 
despite  the  fact  that  Egypt,  as  the  con- 
dition always  was,  has  continued  its 
peaceful  relationships  with  Israel;  the 
Iraqi  desire  to  resume  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  us,  despite  the  fact  that  we 
have  as  strong  or  stronger  relationship 
with  Israel  than  ever;  the  efforts  on  the 
part  of  King  Hussein  to  engage  with 
some  sort  of  Palestinian  delegation  on 
the  idea  of  direct  negotiations  with 
Israel,  these  are  all  positive  things. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  far  as  dealing 
with  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  is  concerned,  we  have  set 
down  certain  conditions,  very  simple 
ones  basically — that  they  recognize  [UN 
Security  Council]  Resolution  242,  which 
is  essentially  the  territory  for  peace  for- 
mula, and  recognize  that  Israel  is  a  state 
and  exists  and  has  a  right  to  exist — so 
that  when  the  negotiations  take  place 
they  don't  take  place  on  the  idea  that 
somehow  one  party  is  seeking  to 
eliminate  the  other. 

Q.  Is  the  answer  to  my  question 
then  no?  My  question  being,  will  we 
reconsider  our  policy  and  meet  with  a 
joint  Jordanian-Palestinian  group? 


A.  Your  question  doesn't  lend  itself 
to  yes  or  no.  There's  motion.  There's 
motion  there.  The  President  is  dispatch- 
ing Ambassador  Murphy  [Richard  W. 
Murphy,  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs]  to  the 
area,  and  we'll  explore  these  possibili- 
ties, and  we  will  see  if  it  isn't  possible  to 
construct  a  Palestinian  delegation,  for 
example.  There's  not  a  PLO  delegation. 

Q.  King  Hussein,  last  week  and 
again  today  abroad,  and  President 
Mubarak  of  Egypt  are  complaining  of 
the  U.S.  policy  of  not  getting  in  as  a 
mediator  as  an  on-the-table-bargainer 
until  both  the  Arabs  and  the  Jewish 
nation  sit  down  together  is  wrong: 
just  absolutely  wrong,  and  defeatist. 
How  do  you  answer  that? 

A.  I  think  the  message  that  we  have 
tried  to  give  over  there,  namely,  that  if 
peace  is  going  to  come  about,  the  parties 
out  there  are  going  to  have  to  think  it 
over  and  decide  some  things  for  them- 
selves. That  message  has  gotten 
through,  and  I  think  it's  a  fine  thing. 

Q.  So  you're  saying,  boys,  you're 
on  your  own. 

A.  No,  we're  not. 

Q.  If  you  ever  get  together — 
A.  No,  we're  not. 

Q. — come  see  us. 

A.  We're  saying  that  the  United 
States  is  ready  and  has  been  very  heavi- 
ly involved  in  all  of  this,  and  we're  pre- 


pared to  undertake  further  things.  But 
we  want  to  see  the  ante — some  ante — 
put  on  the  table  by  everybody,  and  that's 
beginning  to  happen.  So  I  think  it's  a 
healthy  process. 

Q.  If  the  Sandinista  regime  is  as 
wicked  as  the  Administration  says  it 
is,  and  Nicaragua  is  as  important  as 
the  Administration  says  it  is,  and  our 
duty  to  help  freedom  fighters  is  as 
clear  as  you  said  it  was  in  your  San 
Francisco  speech,  isn't  the  Admin- 
istration program  awfully  small  com- 
pared to  the  gravity  it's  described?  I 
mean,  $14  million  —  we  have  the  Navy 
and  the  Marines  and  all  the  rest — 
shouldn't  the  Administration  say  that 
we're  not  going  to  rely  just  on  —  I 
mean,  by  its  own  terms — just  on  $14 
million  here  and  there,  but  are  going 
to  take  more  decisive  actions? 

A.  We  are  not  relying  on  $14 
million.  We're  relying  first  of  all  on  the 
strength  of  the  ideas  involved,  on  the 
proven  workability  of  a  free  and  open 
society  to  produce  a  better  life  for  peo- 
ple. We  are  helping  the  surrounding 
countries  to  find  democracy,  the  rule  of 
law  and  economic  development  to  stand 
in  contrast  with  what's  going  on  in 
Nicaragua.  We  intend  to  give  every  sup- 
port we  are  able  to  to  those  within 
Nicaragua  who  fight  for  what  the  San- 
dinista revolution's  goals  were  in  the 
first  place. 


iPress  release  5.5  of  Mar.  18,  1985. 


Secretary's  News  Briefing 
for  Regional  IVIedia 


Secretary  Shultz's  news  briefing  to 
regional  TV,  radio,  and  newspaper 
organizations,  held  in  the  Old  Executive 
Office  Building  on  March  11.  1985.^ 

[Inaudible]  early  this  morning  of  the 
passing  of  General  Secretary 
Chernenko.  The  President  has  sent  to 
the  Soviet  leadership  a  message  of  con- 
dolence, and  I  have  similarly  expressed 
my  condolence  to  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko.  I  think  it  is  an  occasion,  par- 
ticularly since  I've  just  been  told  of  an 
announcement  from  TASS  that  Mr. 
Gorbachev  has  been  elected  as  the 
General  Secretary,  or  named  General 
Secretary. 

It  is  a  moment  of  transition  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  It  is  a  moment  when 
negotiations  for  arms  reductions  are 
about  to  begin  in  Geneva.  And  so  it  is  a 
moment  when  we  need  to  pause  and 


reflect  and  position  ourselves  to  do  as 
much  as  we  can  to  develop  and  sustain  a 
constructive  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union — certainly  in  the  fields  of  arms 
reduction,  but  also  in  the  many  other 
aspects  of  life  in  which  these  two  coun- 
tries interact.  I'm  sure  that  is  the  Presi- 
dent's intent  and  certainly  mine  and,  I 
believe,  the  general  wish  of  the  Ameri- 
can people. 

Part  of  that  effort,  of  course,  is  to 
be  prepared  to  discuss  outstanding  prob- 
lems and  to  try  to  resolve  them  in  a  sen- 
sible way  from  our  standpoint;  recogniz- 
ing that  agreements  between  two  par- 
ties are  not  agreements  unless  they 
reflect  some  give-and-take,  that  is,  they 
have  to  be  in  the  mutual  interests  of 
both  parties. 

We  also  know  that  it  is  important 
always,  and  particularly  at  a  moment  of 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


possible  transition,  to  remind  ourselves 
that  there  is  a  reality  in  which  we  have 
two  countries  with  different  systems 
that  don't  see  things  the  same  way. 
There  is  a  reality  that  we  must  keep 
before  us.  That  reality  means  that  the 
United  States  must  be  careful  that  we 
develop  and  maintain  the  strength  to  de- 
fend our  values,  to  defend  our  interests, 
and  to  work  successfully  with  our  allies 
to  that  end. 

We  will  all  be  looking  to  this  period 
ahead  as  one  in  which  it  is  possible  that 
a  continuation  of  the  constructive  trend 
that  has  been  in  place  now— perhaps 
hesitatingly,  but  nevertheless  definitely 
in  place — symbolized  and  made  concrete 
by  the  agreement  for  the  resumption  of 
arms  control  talks.  We  will  be  working 
to  pursue  that  possibility.  Perhaps  that 
effort,  if  matched  by  a  similar  effort 
from  the  Soviet  side,  can  produce 
something  that  will  make  us  all  feel 
more  comfortable.  I  hope  so.  Again,  let 
me  take  this  occasion  to  express  my  con- 
dolences to  the  people  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  particularly  in  my  case,  to  my 
counterpart.  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko, 
on  the  death  of  General  Secretary 
Chernenko. 

Q.  Last  week  Cuba  published  a 
statement— 14  points— saying  that 
they  would  comply  with  Ortega's  deci- 
sion to  withdraw  100  Cubans.  But  if 
after  May  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  harass  and  fight  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Sandinista  government, 
he  will  reserve  the  right  to  send  any 
quantity  or  number  of  technicians  or 
military  people  that  Nicaragua 
chooses.  Do  you  have  any  reaction  to 
that?  Is  that  a  blackmail  to  the  United 
States? 

A.  I  guess  you  can  pull  that  into  this 
prt'ss  conference  by  the  ears,  as  every- 
body does,  and  let  me  try  to  make  it 
I  relevant  for  you.  I  think  the  relevance  is 
that  Cuba  is  supported  by  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Nicaragua,  in  its  present 
regime,  is  supported  by  the  Soviet 
L'nion  and  Cuba. 

The  direction  of  their  activity  is  a 
direction,  we  believe,  of  wanting  to  have 
a  Soviet-style  totalitarian  state  placed  in 
Central  America.  The  President  and  I, 
and  I  think  an  increasing  number  of 
Americans,  don't  think  that's  a  good 
idea.  So  we  resist.  Now  whether  the 
Cubans  take  out  a  hundred  people  or 
Hdt;  if  they  take  them  out,  that's  good. 
We  estimate  that  there  are  thousands 
there,  and  so  it's  not  that  big  a  deal. 

The  agreement  of  the  Nicaraguans 
and  then  the  delivery  of  the  hostage  that 
they  took— against  all  diplomatic  tradi- 
[  tion— from  the  Costa  Rican  Embassy  in 


Managua  has  at  least  opened  the  way 
for  the  Contadora  talks  to  resume. 
That's  positive  development,  although 
it's  one  of  those  activities  where 
somebody  does  something  bad,  and  tiien 
they  say  it's  wonderful  that  I've  stopped 
doing  something  bad  and  you  can  cheer 
about  it,  liut  it's  a  restrained  cheer. 

We  are  prepared  to  work  for  peace 
in  Central  America  but  a  peace  that  we 
think  has  some  stability  potentially  in  it. 
There  is  no  stability  if  we  have  a  regime 
that  is  bent  on  upsetting  its  neighbor- 
hood, and  that's  what  we  object  to. 

Q.  Will  the  President  be  going  to 
Mr.  Chernenko's  funeral? 

A.  No.  It's  been  announced  that  the 
Vice  President  will  lead  the  American 
delegation  to  the  funeral.  All  details 
haven't  been  worked  out,  and  we  have 
no  information  from  the  Soviet 
authorities  yet  as  to  exactly  the  struc- 
ture. They  have  announced  that  the 
funeral  will  be  at  1  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon in  Moscow.  Moscow  time. 

Q.  Do  you  see  easier  days  ahead 
under  Gorbachev  than  we  saw  under 
Chernenko  or  his  predecessors?  Do 
you  see  easier  days  ahead  in  U.S.  rela- 
tions with  the  U.S.S.R.? 

A.  What  we  can  have  an  impact  on 
is  what  we  do  and  the  attitudes  that  we 
bring  to  the  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  What  change  there  may  be  re- 
mains to  be  seen.  But  from  our  stand- 
point, it's  important  for  us  to  continue  to 
be  realistic.  It's  important  for  us  to  con- 
tinue to  be  strong,  and  it's  important  for 
us  to  continue  to  be  ready  for  a  con- 
structive dialogue.  The  more  ready  the 
Soviet  Union  is,  the  more  things  can 
progress.  Mr.  Gorbachev  seems  to  be  a 
dynamic  and  a  strong  person.  If  he  is 
designated  the  leader,  as  he  apparently 
has  been,  we  hope  that  we  will  have  a 
chance  to  engage  with  him  and  work 
constructively  with  him. 

Q.  With  a  much  younger  leader 
like  Mr.  Gorbachev,  who  obviously  has 
been  consolidating  his  power  for 
awhile  as  was  read  in  the  announce- 
ment today,  does  that  mean  we  might 
finally  have  a  sense  of  continuity  in 
dealing  with  the  Soviets— somebody 
who  may  be  there  awhile? 

A.  From  our  standpoint,  we  regard 
the  Soviet  Government  as  having  been  a 
functioning  government  and  a  govern- 
ment capable  of  deciding  things.  We  will 
deal  with  whoever  the  Soviet  system 
produces  as  the  leadership.  I  do  have  the 
feeling— and  it  certainly  was  said  by  Mr. 
Shcherbitskiy,  for  instance,  most  recent- 
ly when  he  was  here— that  decisions 
that  have  been  made  in  recent  times 


have  been  collective  decisions;  that  is, 
the  Politburo  group  has  all  weighed  in 
on  them.  At  least  that's  what  he  has  told 
us,  and  so  presumably  Mr.  Gorbachev 
was  very  much  a  part  of  that  process. 
He  has  been  designated  as  the  second-in- 
command  and  agrees  with  the  flow  of 
decisions  leading  to  the  resumption  of 
arms  control  talks  that  arc  starting  up 
in  Geneva.  He,  so  far  as  we  know,  is  not 
sick.  He's  a  vigorous,  young  man  and  so 
we  except  to  be  dealing  with  him  as  the 
future  unfolds. 

Q.  In  light  of  what  you've  just 
described  about  collective  decision- 
making, should  we  assume  from  that 
that  there  really  won't  be  any  signifi- 
cant changes  early  on  in  terms  of  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  I  said  that  I  assume  that  there 
has  been  collective  decisionmaking.  That 
is  what  we  have  been  told  and  so  that 
would  presume  some  continuity  here. 
But,  as  I  say  again,  I  think  it  is  much 
more  important  for  us  to  be  clear  in  our 
analysis,  in  our  objectives,  and  in  our 
commitment  to  have  a  constructive 
stance  and  to  be  ready  to  meet  and  try 
to  influence  what  comes  because  of  that 
than  it  is  to  speculate  about  what  may 
be  happening  in  the  Soviet  Union  and,  in 
any  way,  to  adjust  our  stance  to  what 
we  think  may  be  theirs,  because  we  can 
be  wrong  because  our  knowledge  is  not 
as  large  as  we  might  like  it  to  be. 

I  hear,  for  example,  occasionally,  an 
argument  made  by  somebody  or  I  read 
an  article  that  somebody  writes  saying 
that  the  Soviet  Union  is  obviously  not 
serious  about  arms  control  negotiations. 
It  is  a  potential  propaganda  battle  in 
Geneva,  and,  therefore,  we  shouldn't  be 
serious  about  it.  I  say  that's  cockeyed 
thinking. 

In  the  first  place  those  who  say  they 
aren't  serious,  don't  know  what  they're 
talking  about.  They  may  be,  they  may 
not  be.  From  our  standpoint,  we're 
serious,  and  we  should  go  there  in  that 
spirit.  If  it  turns  out  that  they're 
serious,  we'll  get  somewhere.  If  it  turns 
out  that  they're  not,  we  won't.  But  we 
shouldn't  make  any  such  presumption  as 
is  often  made  in  the  discussions.  And 
believe  me,  we  will  go  at  this  in  a  con- 
structive spirit. 

Q.  In  the  last  few  weeks  a  U.S. 
narcotics  officer  was  abducted  in  a 
foreign  country  and  killed,  and 
America  seemed  to  have  little  coopera- 
tion initially  in  getting  back.  What 
can  the  United  States  do  in  the  future 
to  ensure  the  protection  of  U.S.  nar- 
cotics agents  overseas  and  stem  the 


May  1985 


39 


THE  SECRETARY 


tide  of  drugs,  especially  from  Central 
America? 

A.  There  are  lots  of  things  we  can 
do,  although  our  power  is  not  infinite. 
We,  first  of  all,  can  make  our  view  clear. 
We  can  do  everything  we  can  to  en- 
courage, assist  the  law  enforcement  ac- 
tivities of  host  countries.  We  can  get 
people  to  see  the  interlocking  of  drug 
trafficking,  terrorism,  and  what  goes  on 
in  certain  countries.  The  fact  that  Cuba 
and  Nicaragua,  to  name  two,  have  been 
involved,  and  there  is  undoubted 
evidence  of  that  in  drug  trafficking.  Peo- 
ple must  see  that. 

We  need  an  international  effort 
here,  and  I  think  gradually  that  is  taking 
shape.  It  is  a  major  problem  and,  as  we 
all  know,  it  is  highlighted  by  this  most 
recent  tragedy  in  Mexico.  At  any  rate, 
there  are  many  things  that  we  can  do, 
and  we  are  doing  them.  The  one  reason 
I'm  a  little  preoccupied  here,  and  I  didn't 
mean  to  cut  off  your  follow-up  question; 
it  was  just  that  I  was  told  when  I  came 
in  that  you  were  all  grumbling  because 
you  didn't  get  enough  people  asking 
questions,  and  so  I  wanted  to  spread  it 
around.  But  I'm  a  little  preoccupied 
because  I'm  trying  to  think  about  where 
we  go  from  here  in  Soviet  context  and 
as  soon  as  I  leave  here  will  be  meeting 
with  Foreign  Minister  Sepulveda  of 
Mexico. 

Q.  President  Mubarak  has  asked 
that  the  United  States  meet  with  a 
joint  Palestinian-Jordanian  delegation. 
If  such  a  delegation  were  put 
together,  in  which  the  Palestinians 
might  possibly  be  tacitly  approved  by 
the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO)  but  were  non-PLO  members, 
would  the  United  States  be  willing  to 
meet  with  such  a  group? 

A.  We  have  always  had  the  position 
and  still  have  the  position  that  we  are 
prepared  to  talk  with  the  PLO,  which 
would  include  representatives  of  the 
PLO,  when  they  recognize  Israel's  right 
to  exist  and  when  they  recognize  UN 
Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338  as  a  basis  upon  which  to  proceed. 

President  Mubarak  is  here.  I  had  a 
brief  exchange  with  him  on  Saturday 
evening  when  he  came  in  and  I  look  for- 
ward to  meeting  with  him  later  today. 
He  will  be  meeting  with  the  President, 
of  course,  tomorrow  and  with  others. 
There  has  been  a  lot  of  activity  in  the 
Middle  East  lately  on  the  peace  process 
and  a  lot  of  attention  to  it.  President 
Mubarak  has  been  in  the  center  of  this, 
and  we  want  to  explore  carefully  with 
him  how  he  sees  things.  He  is  a  con- 
structive force,  and  we  will  want  to  be 
working  with  him.  I  don't  want  to  make 


a  lot  of  unequivocal  statements  here,  but 
I  do  believe  that  our  position  as  far  as 
discussions  with  the  PLO  is  concerned— 
I  just  restated  it — and  there's  been  no 
change  in  that  position. 

Q.  For  some  weeks  now,  we've 
been  hearing  that  the  President 
refuses  to  negotiate  on  the  strategic 
defense  and  you  yourself  just  a  few 
minutes  ago  said  that  there  has  to  be 
give  and  take.  Can  you  resolve  that  ap- 
parent contradiction? 

A.  The  President's  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  is  a  research  program. 
The  Soviet  Union  is  also  engaged  in  a 
research  program  in  this  area.  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  and  I  agreed  that, 
even  if  you  wish  to  make  an  agreement 
about  research — which  we  don't  think 
would  be  wise — but  even  if  you  wish  to 
make  one,  there  is  no  way  you  could 
verify  it. 

I  suppose  in  the  asymmetry  of  the 
situation,  there  would  be  a  greater  abili- 
ty of  the  Soviet  Union  to  know  what  we 
are  doing  because  our  activities  all  need 
to  be  authorized  and  appropriated  and 
so  on.  We  don't  have  any  way  of  verify- 
ing what  they're  doing.  And  so  an  agree- 
ment about  research  just  seems  to  be 
out  of  the  question  for  that,  among 
other  reasons.  That's  what  the  program 
is. 

Beyond  that,  of  course,  there  are 
many  other  issues  involved  in  testing 
and  development  and  so  forth,  let  alone 
possible  deployment  and  much  of  that  is 
covered  by  existing  treaties.  At  any 
rate,  the  subject  will  all  be  given  very 
careful  discussion  in  Geneva.  Also,  there 
will  be  very  careful  discussion,  I'm  sure, 
of  our  view  of  the  very  active  measures 
the  Soviet  Union  has  taken  in  the  field 
of  antiballistic  missile  defense. 

Q.  Would  the  Chernenko  funeral 
have  provided  an  opportunity  for  the 
President  to  make  that  positive  stance 
you  talked  about  a  moment  ago?  Why 
did  he  decide  not  to  go? 

A.  I  think  you  will  probably  be 
meeting  with  him.  You  might  want  to 
ask  him  if  you  wish  to.  I  think  that 
basically  there  will  certainly  be  a  point,  I 
hope,  where  the  President  and  a  Soviet 
leader  will  have  a  chance  to  get  together 
and  talk  in  some  detail  about  these 
many  problems. 

'The  fact  is  that  since  President 
Reagan  has  been  in  office,  it  is  probably 
the  case  that  there  hasn't  been  a  time 
when  there  was  a  Soviet  leader  who  was 
in  a  state  of  health  such  that  he  could 
travel  and  so  on.  Perhaps  that  condition 
will  be  changed.  The  arrangements  at  a 
funeral  are  not  conducive  to  the  kind  of 
exchange  that  I  described.  I  don't  know 


whether  you're  familiar  with  what  at 
least  has  happened  in  the  past,  and 
which  I  assume  will  happen  in  the 
future,  but  there  are  many  delegations 
there  and  the  Soviet  leadership  naturally 
has  to  meet  with  many  people.  It  has 
symbolic  significance  and  perhaps  a  little 
content,  but  it  simply  isn't  the  setting  in 
which  you  can  have  a  good,  thorough, 
and  searching  examination  of  problems. 

Q.  Would  you  say  in  respect  of  the 
Soviets'  having  worked  on  strategic 
defense  for  a  number  of  years,  that 
the  U.S.  position  is  now  that  we 
welcome  an  intensified  Soviet  effort 
in  this  area? 

A.  We're  not  asking  them  to  do  the 
research.  They  have  been  doing  it.  You 
don't  have  to  ask  the  Soviet  Union  to 
get  preoccupied  with  defense.  They  are 
preoccupied  with  defense.  They  have 
spent  as  much  money  on  defense,  we 
estimate,  as  they  have  on  offense,  while 
we  basically  checked  out  of  the  area  un- 
til very  recent  years.  We  intend  to  pur- 
sue the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  and 
what  happens  on  research  is  something 
that  one  can't  verify.  If  they  said  they 
were  going  to  do  less  of  it,  we  wouldn't 
know  whether  they  did  or  not.  If  they 
said  they  were  going  to  do  more,  we 
would  have  a  hard  time  knowing 
whether  they  did  or  not. 

Q.  What  is  your  assessment  going 
into  the  arms  control  talks  of 
U.S. -Soviet  relations,  and  what  is  your 
assessment  of  the  chances  of  getting  a 
concrete  agreement  this  time  around? 

A.  U.S. -Soviet  relations  are  not  as 
good  as  we  would  like  to  see  them.  On 
the  other  hand,  over  the  last  4  years, 
from  the  standpoint  of  our  ability  to  sup- 
port and  defend  U.S.  interests,  I  think 
that  things  have  gone  relatively  well 
from  our  standpoint.  But  in  any  case, 
we  would  like  to  have  a  better  relation- 
ship with  the  Soviet  LInion.  It's  possible 
if  they  have  the  same  wish,  as  they  say 
they  do.  If  that  is  the  case,  certainly 
discussions  of  arms  control  are  an  im- 
portant ingredient  in  this  process.  Not 
the  whole  thing  by  any  means,  but  they 
are  an  important  ingredient  in  the  whole 
process.  So,  partly  the  outcome  of  arms 
control  talks  will  be  sort  of  settled  in  its 
own  terms,  in  terms  of  what  they  are 
ready  to  agree  to  and  what  we  are 
ready  to  agree  to  and  so  on.  But  partly 
also  it's  a  reflection  of  the  more  general 
picture  and  how  it  emerges. 

Q.  I  want  to  ask  you  about  the  in- 
tensified border  searches  along  the 
U.S. -Mexican  border  that  ended  a  few 
weeks  ago.  Do  you  think  they  were 
necessary,  first  of  all,  and  second  of 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


all,  do  you  think  they  were  a  good 
idea  [inaudible],  and  what  do  you  want 
Mexico  to  do? 

A.  thirst,  they  took  place  because  we 
were  so  concerned  about  the  kidnapped 
drug  enforcement  agent.  It  was  an  ef- 
fort to  search  intensively,  and  also  to 
react  to  some  of  the  threats  that  come 
from  the  drug  trafficking  people  who  try 
to  constitute  themselves  as,  in  a  sense,  a 
government-within-a-government.  I 
think  they  were  a  good  idea.  Among 
other  things  they  gave  people  the 
message  that  this  subject  is  very  impor- 
tant, and  it  just  has  got  to  get  address- 
ed. 

A  vigorous  effort  to  find  out  who 
was  responsible  for  this  horrible  death 
and  more  generally  to  build  on  that  to 
have  the  ability  to  prevent  is  the  sort  of 
thing  that  we  want  to  see  happen. 

Q.  Ambassador  Motley  [Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs] 
was  talking  to  us  earlier  this  morning 
and  described  what  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment wants  from  the  Nicaraguan 
Government.  The  impression  I  got 
from  that  is  that  we  simply  are  not 
prepared  to  live  with  a  belligerent  or 
semibelligerent  government  of  that 
sort.  Yet  we  do  elsewhere  in  the 
5  world  live  with  belligerent  or 
semibelligerent  governments,  in- 
cluding Cuba  on  our  doorstep,  without 
applying  the  kinds  of  pressures  we 
seem  to  be  applying  to  Nicaragua. 
What  is  it  that  is  so  different  about 
Nicaragua  that  makes  it — what  seems 
to  me  to  be  a  special  case? 

A.  We  don't  want  much  from 
Nicaragua.  All  we  want  them  to  do  is  to 
live  up  to  the  undertakings  they've  con- 
tinuously made.  That  shouldn't  be  too 
much  to  ask. 

As  far  as  Cuba  is  concerned,  our 
point  has  been  perfectly  clear.  We've 
had  an  economic  boycott  sustained  over 
more  than  a  decade  with  Cuba.  Cuba  is 
a  problem,  and  we  don't  like  Cuban 
behavior.  We  would  like  to  see  Cuban 
behavior  change. 

Nicaragua  is  a  problem.  It  is  incon- 
trovertibly  trying  to  subvert  its 
neighbors.  No  question  about  that.  And 
as  it  develops  greater  capacity,  if  it 
does,  to  do  so,  the  problem  will  increase. 
And  as  it  has  the  kind  of  government 
that  it  seems  to  be  moving  toward  rap- 
idly, as  distinct  from  the  kind  of  govern- 
ment that  it  told  the  OAS  it  would 
aspire  to,  the  problem  increases.  And  so 
that's  what  we  have  on  our  minds,  and 
here  it  is  close  to  home. 

People  sometimes  say  to  me,  "Aren't 
>cu  afraid  that  Nicaragua  will  turn  out 
to  be  another  Vietnam?"  And  I  don't 
know  exactly  what  they  have  in  mind 


there;  we  don't  have  any  plan  for 
American  forces  in  Nicaragua.  On  the 
other  hand,  tho.se  who  say  that  ought  to 
think  a  little  bit  about  what's  happened 
in  Vietnam.  The  fact  that  Vietnam  is 
now  occupying  Cambodia;  the  fact  that 
there  is  an  absolute  flood  of  refugees 
from  Vietnam,  Cambodia,  Laos — from 
that  part  of  Asia — a  very  large  number 
of  whom  now  are  in  the  United  States.  I 
think  it's  better  if  conditions  can  be  so  at 
home,  including  at  home  in  Central 
America,  that  people  want  to  stay  there. 
Those  are  all  things  that  concern  us 
about  Nicaragua. 

Q.  How  much  longer  can  we  wait 
for  change  to  come  about  in  Nicara- 
gua, and  what  kind  of  pressures  do 
you  put  on  them  to  bring  about  more 
change? 

A.  We  would  like  to  see  change  im- 
mediately. And  we  have  been  speaking 
out  on  the  subject  for  quite  some  long 
time.  The  President  set  out  a  program 
that  is — and  the  Kissinger  commission 
came  in  with  a  set  of  recommendations 
that  are  very  parallel  and  which  we  are 
trying  to  follow.  That  program  is  to  sup- 
port, throughout  Central  America, 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law;  to  sup- 
port economic  development;  and  to 
recognize  that  if  these  things  are  going 
to  take  place  in  an  area  where  active 
subversion  is  taking  place,  then  we  must 
help  the  countries  such  as  El  Salvador 


and  Honduras  erect  a  security  shield. 
Otherwise,  the  Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan 
axis  will  destroy  the  ability  of 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law  and 
economic  development  to  take  place. 
Those  are  all  things  that  we  have  been 
working  toward  and  trying  to  persuade 
the  American  public  and  the  American 
Congress  to  support  and,  I  think,  with 
increasing  success. 

Let  me  just  say  one  further  thing  as 
I  close.  We  have  some  very  important 
votes  coming  up  in  our  Congress,  and 
one  of  them — very  much  related  to  the 
subject  that  I  have  been  talking  about — 
has  to  do  with  the  Peacekeeper  MX 
missile.  We  think  this  is  an  important 
modernization  of  the  strategic  triad  of 
forces  that  maintain  the  strategic 
balance  and  the  deterrence  that  has  kept 
the  peace  for  many  years.  It's  important 
in  and  of  itself.  Of  course,  it's  also  im- 
portant as  the  arms  control  negotiations 
start  in  Geneva  not  to  have  actions  take 
place  here  that  tend  to  pull  the  rug  out 
from  under  our  negotiators.  So  both  on 
the  count  that  the  Peacekeeper  missile  is 
important  in  its  own  right  and  on  the 
count  that  it's  important  to  our  stance  in 
the  negotiations.  I  think  it  is  extremely 
important  that  the  Congress  vote  to 
unfence  the  fence  that  has  been  erected 
before  these  missiles. 


'Press  release  49  of  Mar.  14,  1985. 


Assistance  Request  for  FY  1986 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
February  19.  1985.'^ 

I  know  that  we  agree  on  the  need  for 
prudent  investments  abroad  to  enhance 
our  national  security,  promote  economic 
and  political  freedom,  and  reflect  the 
humanitarian  concerns  of  the  American 
people.  Foreign  assistance  is  such  an  in- 
vestment. Yet  our  foreign  assistance  re- 
quest for  fiscal  year  (FY)  1986  comes 
before  this  committee  at  a  time  when 
this  Administration  and  the  Congress 
are  committed  to  bringing  our  budget 
deficits  down.  As  a  former  budget  direc- 
tor, perhaps  I  am  more  sympathetic 
than  most  to  the  immense  challenge  this 
poses  and  the  painful  choices  that  will 
have  to  be  made. 

Recognizing  the  overriding  impor- 
tance of  reducing  the  budget  deficit,  we 
have  carefully  constructed  our  economic 
and  military  assistance  programs  to  a 
level  and  mix  that  represent  the 
minimum  requirements  to  support  our 
foreign  policy  objectives. 


At  the  same  time,  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  our  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams are  vital  to  the  achievement  of 
our  foreign  policy  goals.  A  world  of 
peace,  freedom,  international  stability, 
and  human  progress  cannot  be  built  by 
the  United  States  alone.  We  need  the 
support  and  cooperation  of  the  many 
friends  and  allies  around  the  world  who 
share  our  hopes  and  dreams  of  a  better 
world  and  who  rely  on  us.  And  if  we  are 
to  count  on  their  support  in  facing  the 
difficult  and  sometimes  dangerous 
challenges  of  the  modern  world,  we 
must  ourselves  be  a  reliable  partner.  We 
must  be  consistent  in  our  devotion  to  the 
principles  we  cherish  and  proclaim:  to 
promote  prosperity,  to  defend  freedom, 
to  help  build  democracy  and  respect  for 
human  rights,  to  help  alleviate  suffering, 
and  to  protect  our  friends  and  allies 
against  aggression. 

In  his  State  of  the  Union  address, 
President  Reagan  noted  that  "dollar  for 
dollar,  our  security  assistance  con- 
tributes as  much  to  global  security  as 
our  own  defense  budget."  Strengthening 


May  1985 


41 


THE  SECRETARY 


our  friends  is  one  of  the  most  effective 
ways  of  protecting  our  interests  and  fur- 
thering our  goals.  It  gives  them  the 
ability  and  the  confidence  to  defend 
themselves  and  to  work  for  peace.  If  we 
are  willing  to  pay  the  relatively  modest 
cost  and  make  the  necessary  sacrifices 
today,  we  can  avoid  far  greater  costs 
and  sacrifices  in  the  future.  Foreign 
assistance  is  a  prudent  investment  in 
our  future  and  the  world's  future. 

I  first  appeared  before  this 
distinguished  committee  to  justify  our 
foreign  assistance  programs  over  2 
years  ago.  I  sought  then,  as  I  did  last 
year,  to  show  how  closely  linked  our 
foreign  assistance  programs  are  to  our 
most  fundamental  foreign  policy  goals. 

The  events  over  the  past  2  years 
have  convinced  me  more  than  ever 
before  that  we  are  on  the  right  track. 
We  have  strengthened  our  relationships 
with  our  friends  in  the  developing  world 
against  Soviet  expansionism.  We  have 
seen  a  number  of  developing  countries 
move  toward  free  and  more  open 
economies.  Increasingly,  the  world 
recognizes  that  statist  economic  systems 
do  not  work.  Free  market  economies  do. 
And  we  have  witnessed  extraordinary 
progress  in  the  growth  of  democratic  in- 
stitutions and  in  the  decline  of  dic- 
tatorships, particularly  in  our  own 
hemisphere. 


and  preserve  peace.  Every  blow  we  inflict 
against  poverty  will  be  a  blow  against  its 
dark  allies  of  oppression  and  war.  Every  vic- 
tory for  human  freedom  will  be  a  victory  for 
world  peace. 

Today,  we  are  seeing  developments 
in  the  Third  World  which,  if  we  continue 
to  nurture  them,  will  lead  to  a  more 
secure  and  prosperous  world.  There  will 
inevitably  be  occasional  setbacks,  but  if 
we  stay  the  course,  I  believe  the  emerg- 
ing pattern  of  stable  and  democratic 
governments  will  slowly  but  inexorably 
grow  and  be  strengthened. 

Much  remains  to  be  done.  The  most 
effective  contribution  we  can  make  to 
the  developing  world  is  to  maintain  a 
healthy  American  economy.  Our 
economic  growth  rate  in  1983  was  a 
prime  reason  for  the  sharp  increase  in 
U.S.  imports  from  the  non-OPEC 
developing  countries  to  $92.3  billion, 
some  24%  over  the  previous  year.  The 
developing  nations  will  reap  even  more 
substantial  benefits  from  the  vigorous 
growth  of  our  economy  in  1984.  They 
also  gain,  as  we  do,  from  our  commit- 
ment to  restrain  protectionist  forces. 

More  than  any  other  factor,  how- 
ever, the  domestic  policies  of  these  coun- 
tries will  determine  the  strength  and 
sustainability  of  their  economies  and 
their  political  institutions.  Our  foreign 
assistance  can  provide  those  critical  in- 


.  .  .  the  skeptics  were  wrong  about  El  Salvador, 
they  were  wrong  about  Grenada,  and  they  are 
wrong  about  Nicaragua — and  all  for  the  same 
reason. 


It  is  no  coincidence  that  along  with 
the  emergence  of  freer  societies,  we  see 
more  open  economies.  One  supports  and 
reinforces  the  other.  People,  if  they  have 
a  choice,  want  economic  growth.  They 
want  prosperity.  They  need  only  the  per- 
sonal security  and  the  political  and 
economic  environment  that  allows  them 
to  exercise  their  will  and  use  their 
talents.  Our  support  for  the  security  and 
territorial  integrity  of  our  friends, 
therefore,  advances  the  most  basic 
human  goals  of  prosperity  and  freedom. 
But  it  also  advances  another  goal,  peace. 
We  have  seen  over  the  years  that 
economic  progress,  individual  liberty, 
and  world  peace  are  closely  related.  As 
President  Reagan  said  in  his  second  in- 
augural address: 

America  must  remain  freedom's  staunch- 
est  friend,  for  freedom  is  our  best  ally  and  it 
is  the  world's  only  hope  to  conquer  poverty 


cremental  resources  to  help  them 
achieve  these  objectives. 

With  this  framework  in  mind,  we 
have  engaged  in  an  exhaustive  budget 
review  process  to  assure  that  the  sum  of 
our  resources  and  each  individual  com- 
ponent are  the  absolute  minimum  essen- 
tial to  implement  and  support  our 
foreign  policy. 


OVERVIEW  OF  1986  FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE  BUDGET  AND  1985 
SUPPLEMENTAL  REQUEST 

The  FY  1986  foreign  assistance  request 
totals  $14.8  billion,  a  $300  million  reduc- 
tion from  the  VY  198,5  continuing 
resolution  level.  As  1  will  explain  later, 
we  have  yet  to  determine  the  economic 
assistance  level  for  Israel.  When  that 
assistance  figure  is  eventually  included, 


our  request  will  be  higher  than  the 
previous  year.  Economic  assistance — 
which  includes  development  assistance, 
PL  480,  the  economic  support  fund 
(ESF),  and  contributions  to  multilateral 
development  institutions — accounts  for 
$8.2  billion.  Military  assistance — which 
includes  military  grants,  loans,  and 
training — totals  $6.6  billion. 

Our  FY  1986  request  contains  only 
one  modest  new  initiative — an  enhanced 
economic  aid  package  for  the  Andean 
democracies  of  Ecuador,  Peru,  and 
Bolivia.  With  that  one  exception,  our 
1986  budget  request  by  and  large 
represents  a  continuity  program,  reflect- 
ing both  the  overall  fiscal  constraints 
under  which  we  are  operating  and  the 
fact  that  many  of  our  earlier  initia- 
tives— especially  in  Central  America — 
are  now  well  underway  and  beginning  to 
show  progress. 

As  in  the  past,  the  largest  single 
component  of  our  foreign  assistance  re- 
quest is  for  Israel  and  Egypt — 28%  of 
the  total.  (This  percentage,  of  course, 
will  be  higher  when  we  include  economic 
assistance  funds  for  Israel.)  Assistance 
to  base  rights  countries — Spain,  Por- 
tugal, Greece,  Turkey,  and  the  Philip- 
pines— accounts  for  an  additional  16%, 
while  military  access  and  front-line 
states  such  as  Korea  and  Thailand  take 
up  another  13%.  Central  America  and 
the  Caribbean  represent  another  11%  of 
the  request.  All  other  country  programs 
account  for  only  12'Fo  of  the  total 
resources  requested.  This  12%,  however, 
is  spread  among  more  than  80  separate 
countries  and  regional  programs.  Final- 
ly, contributions  to  multilateral  develop- 
ment institutions  and  voluntary  con- 
tributions to  international  organizations 
and  programs  make  up  10%  of  the  re- 
quest, with  the  remainder  of  the 
amounts  requested  going  to  the  Peace 
Corps,  migration  and  refugee  assistance, 
international  narcotics  control  activities, 
and  a  number  of  smaller  programs. 

Turning  to  the  specifics  of  our  re- 
quest, I  would  like  to  make  the  following 
brief  observations. 

•  In  development  assistance,  we  are 
requesting  $2.1  billion  to  attack  serious 
conditions  of  poverty  in  Africa,  Asia, 
Latin  America,  and  the  Near  East  and 
to  help  establish  the  basic  conditions  for 
economic  progress.  We  place  heavy  em- 
phasis on  policy  reform,  greater  use  of 
the  private  sector,  and  on  technology 
transfer  to  foster  development  break- 
throughs. These  economic  programs  are 
a  critical  aspect  of  our  overall  foreign 
policy  objectives. 

•  Closely  related  to  the  development 
assistance  request  is  a  request  for  $1.3 
billion  in  PL  480  for  food  assistance  and 
balance-of-paymenls  support  to  friendly 
governments.  Food  aid  remains  the 
centerpiece  of  the  American  people's 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


humanitarian  response  to  the  tragic 
famine  conditions  in  Africa. 

•  The  $2.8  billion  requested  for  the 
economic  support  fund  is  $1  billion 
below  the  amount  appropriated  in  the 
FY  1985  continuing  resolution.  This  is 
due,  in  part,  to  the  fact  that  we  have 
deferred  making  any  ESF  request  for 
Israel  at  this  time.  I  will  elaborate  on 
the  question  of  economic  assistance  to 
Israel  later  in  my  remarks. 

•  Our  request  for  military 
assistance — that  is,  direct  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  credits  and  grant 
MAP  [military  assistance  program] — is 
$860  million  more  than  was  appro- 
priated in  1985.  Most  of  this  increase, 
$525  million,  is  accounted  for  by  higher 
levels  for  Israel  ($1.8  billion  as  opposed 
to  $1.4  billion  in  1985)  and  Egypt  ($1.3 
billion  as  opposed  to  $1,175  billion).  In 
addition,  our  military  assistance  request 
for  Turkey  has  been  increased  from  the 
1985  level  of  $700  million  to  $785 
million.  For  the  Philippines,  we  are  re- 
questing a  $75  million  increase  over  the 
FY  1985  level. 

In  conjunction  with  our  FY  1986  re- 
quest, we  are  submitting  two  requests 
for  supplemental  appropriations  in  FY 
1985.  These  include  $235  million  in  new 
budget  authority  to  complete  our  $1 
billion  package  of  relief  for  the  victims 
of  the  famine  that  continues  to 
devastate  much  of  sub-Saharan  Africa. 
We  are  also  requesting  a  $237  million 
supplemental  to  meet  our  arrearage 
payments  to  several  multilateral 
development  institutions. 


THE  REGIONS 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Nowhere  has  the  dynamic  linkage  be- 
tween foreign  assistance  and  U.S.  na- 
tional interests — and  between 
■democracy  and  economic  opportunity — 
'been  more  dramatically  illustrated  than 
in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 
The  past  year  has  provided  strong 
evidence  that  democratic  development 
and  the  rejection  of  the  communist  left 
and  the  far  right  are  the  keys  to  ensur- 
ing peace  and  improving  standards  of 
living  for  all. 

Our  policy  of  lending  political, 
economic,  and  military  assistance  to  pro- 
democratic  forces  is  working.  In  so  com- 
plex a  situation,  we  should  look  at  the 
record. 

In  1979,  four  of  the  five  Central 
American  countries  were  undemocratic, 
but  6  years  have  produced  dramatic 
change.  Today,  only  Nicaragua  remains 
under  a  dictatorship— having  traded  a 
tyrant  of  the  right  for  the  tyranny  of  the 
left.  Only  Costa  Rica  has  not  changed 
politically:  it  remained  thoroughly 


democratic— though  increasingly  and 
justifiably  concerned  about  the  threat 
from  the  new  and  heavily  armed  com- 
munist tyranny  next  dt)or. 

El  Salvador  is  the  most  dramatic  case 
of  progress.  As  recently  as  a  year  ago, 
many  in  the  United  States,  in"  Western 
Europe,  and  even  in  Latin  America 
believed  El  Salvador  was  caught  in  an 
endless  war  between  guerrillas  of  the 
left  and  death  squads  of  the  right.  But 
the  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America  insisted  that  electoral 
democracy  and  political  dialogue— not 
externally  imposed  "power-sharing"— 
would  prove  a  workable  foundation  for 
attacking  the  seamless  web  of  political, 
economic,  social,  and  security  problems. 
Increased  economic  and  security  assist- 
ance was  necessary  to  give  democracy, 
reform,  and  economic  revitalization  a 
fighting  chance. 


accepted  as  honest  and  open  but— to  the 
surprise  of  many— revealed  that  centrist 
forces  constitute  the  political  majority. 
It  is  encouraging  that  the  Guatemalans 
have  moved  in  this  direction  almost  ex- 
clusively on  their  own. 

There  is  one  issue,  however,  on 
which  considerable  controversy  still 
reigns:  Nicaragua.  While  we  are  pro- 
moting democratic  reform  throughout 
Central  America,  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Cuba  are  abetting  the  establishment  of  a 
communist  dictatorship  in  Nicaragua. 

If  the  forces  of  dictatorship  continue 
to  feel  free  to  aid  and  abet  insurgencies 
in  the  name  of  "proletarian  interna- 
tionalism," it  would  be  absurd  if  the 
democracies  felt  inhibited  about  pro- 
moting the  cause  of  democracy. 

Peace  and  economic  development  in 
Central  America  require  both  the 


Security  assistance  remains  essential  for  many 
African  countries.  States  threatened  by  Libyan 
adventurism  or  Soviet-armed  hostile  neighbors 
cannot  devote  the  energy  or  resources  necessary  to 
economic  development. 


Last  year  demonstrated  that  Presi- 
dent Duarte's  course  was  the  route  most 
likely  to  lead  to  greater  respect  for 
human  rights  and  a  better  life.  The 
Salvadorans  themselves  made  the  point 
in  two  rounds  of  national  elections  in 
1984.  And  they  did  it  again  in  a  dif- 
ferent dimension  when  a  civilian  jury 
found  five  former  National  Guardsmen 
guilty  of  the  murders  of  the  four 
American  churchwomen.  Support  for 
this  democratic  renewal  was  backed 
unanimously  by  the  national  bipartisan 
commission,  by  President  Reagan,  by  a 
bipartisan  majority  in  the  Congress,  and 
in  Europe  by  Social  Democrats  as  well 
as  Christian  Democrats. 

It  would  be  naive  to  claim  that  all  is 
now  reformed,  centrist,  and  peaceful  in 
El  Salvador.  But  the  progress  is 
dramatic  and  undeniable.  And  U.S.  firm- 
ness on  principles  and  on  behalf  of  our 
Salvadoran  friends  has  had  a  lot  to  do 
with  it. 

The  recent  history  of  Guatemala,  as 
much  as  that  of  El  Salvador,  exemplifies 
the  dangers  of  basing  judgments  on 
stereotypes.  The  country  often  ranked 
as  "the  most  polarized"  or  with  the 
"least  chance  of  democratic  develop- 
ment" has  confounded  the  conventional 
wisdom.  The  Constituent  Assembly  elec- 
tions 7  months  ago  were  not  only  widely 


reliability  of  multiyear  funding  and  the 
confidence  that  this  long-term  commit- 
ment will  continue  to  be  tied  to  equity, 
reform,  and  freedom.  Bipartisan  support 
is  essential  if  the  Central  America  ini- 
tiative [Central  America  Democracy, 
Peace,  and  Development  Initiative]  is  to 
address  the  bipartisan  commission's  call 
for  a  commitment  through  1989  to  pro- 
vide— in  a  consistent,  predictable  way — 
a  balanced  and  mutually  reinforcing  mix 
of  economic,  political,  diplomatic,  and 
security  activities. 

This  initiative  is  designed  to  use 
large  amounts  of  economic  aid,  coupled 
with  policy  reform,  to  eliminate  root 
causes  of  poverty  and  political  unrest. 
Much  work  is  already  underway.  Discus- 
sions are  taking  place  with  recipient 
countries  concerning  macroeconomic  ad- 
justment. Progress  has  been  made 
toward  economic  stabilization.  Regional 
technical  training  programs  will  begin  in 
April.  We  have  begun  to  work  with 
governments  and  nongovernment  organ- 
izations seeking  to  improve  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  A  trade  credit  in- 
surance program  has  been  set  up 
through  AID  [Agency  for  International 
Development]  and  the  Export-Import 
Bank.  The  revival  and  strengthening  of 


May  1985 


43 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  Central  American  Bank  for  Eco- 
nomic Integration  is  being  studied.  And 
we  are  working  to  assist  in  the  revival 
of  the  Central  American  Common 
Market. 

The  democratic  trend  in  the  Andean 
region  has  been  equally  impressive.  All 
five  countries  have  democratically 
elected  governments.  But  like  their 
Latin  neighbors  to  the  north,  many  of 
their  economies  are  being  seriously 
challenged. 


created  new  export  opportunities.  There 
also  has  been  growth  in  real  per  capita 
income  of  about  0.2%  in  1984— not 
much,  but  better  than  the  decline  of 
5.8%  in  1983  and  3.3%  in  1982. 

The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  is 
showing  some  positive  signs.  U.S. 
nonpetroleum  imports  from  the  region 
for  the  first  11  months  of  1984  were  up 
19%  over  1983.  The  open  U.S.  market 
continues  to  offer  substantial  oppor- 
tunities for  the  region's  exports. 


The  United  States  has  mounted  an  un- 
precedented campaign  to  provide  both  economic 
and  emergency  food  assistance  to  Africa  .  .  .  we 
have  not  allowed  political  or  ideological  differences 
with  any  government  to  weaken  our  determination 
to  direct  assistance  to  those  in  need. 


Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Bolivia  have  been 
particularly  hard  hit  by  the  recent  global 
recession.  Their  difficulties  have  been 
exacerbated  by  catastrophic  weather 
conditions,  sagging  prices  for  their  main 
exports,  and,  in  Peru,  a  vicious  Maoist 
guerrilla  movement.  These  countries 
deserve  our  help,  and  it  is  in  our  interest 
to  help  them.  We  are  proposing  a  special 
Andean  program  principally  supported 
by  $70  million  in  economic  support  funds 
to  assist  these  countries  in  their 
recovery  efforts. 

A  democracy  incapable  of  addressing 
major  economic  problems  will  be  no 
more  permanent  than  the  dictators  of 
the  right  or  left  that  it  has  replaced. 

We  are  encouraged  that  our  neigh- 
bors in  Latin  America,  for  the  most 
part,  are  taking  the  necessary  and  often 
painful  steps  to  ensure  economic 
revitalization.  They  have  lowered 
government  expenditures,  bringing  them 
in  line  with  government  income.  They 
have  restricted  imports  of  nonessential 
goods  to  save  foreign  exchange.  They 
have  adjusted  their  exchange  rates  to 
reflect  economic  reality  and  breathe  new 
life  into  their  export  sectors.  They  have 
worked  with  the  international  financial 
community  to  restructure  their  debts 
and  ensure  continued  orderly  debt  serv- 
icing. They  have  reallocated  scarce 
resources  even  as  those  resouces  fell. 

The  efforts  are  beginning  to  show 
results.  The  trade  balance  for  Latin 
America  with  the  rest  of  the  world  has 
improved  significantly,  recovering  from 
a  negative  $2  billion  in  1981  to  an 
estimated  positive  $37.6  billion  in  1984. 
Vigorous  U.S.  economic  growth  in  1984 


44 


In  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean, 
I  believe  that  the  Administration  and  the 
Congress  have  reason  to  conclude  that 
the  policies  we  have  been  following  the 
last  4  years  are  succeeding.  The  best 
option  for  the  next  4  years  is  to  continue 
these  efforts  based  on  firm,  bipartisan 
support. 

The  lessons  from  the  recent  past 
and  the  guidelines  for  the  near  future 
can  be  condensed  into  an  assertion:  the 
skeptics  were  wrong  about  El  Salvador, 
they  were  wrong  about  Grenada,  and 
they  are  wrong  about  Nicaragua— and 
all  for  the  same  reasons. 

What  the  Administration  and  the 
Congress  have  learned  together  in  the 
past  provides  a  mandate  for  the  future. 
The  Administration  cannot  fulfill  that 
mandate  without  the  active  support  of 
the  Congress.  If  you  and  we  do  not 
stand  firmly  on  principle  and  with  our 
friends,  we  will  both  lose.  A  lack  of 
policy  consistency  would  be  a  significant 
obstacle  to  achieving  our  national  objec- 
tives in  this  region  over  the  next  months 
and  years. 

Africa 

I  turn  now  from  the  promising 
developments  in  Latin  America  to  a 
region  where  problems  continue  to  be 
grave.  Africa's  desperate  economic  state 
is  more  in  the  public  eye  than  it  has  ever 
been.  I  would  like  to  devote  the  major 
portion  of  my  discussion  of  Africa  today 
to  the  economic  crisis.  In  doing  so,  I  do 
not  mean  to  minimize  the  relationship 
between  economic  development  and  the 
national  security  of  African  states. 


Security  assistance  remains  essential  for 
many  African  countries.  States  threat- 
ened by  Libyan  adventurism  or  Soviet- 
armed  hostile  neighbors  cannot  devote 
the  energy  or  resources  necessary  to 
economic  development.  And  economical- 
ly fragile  societies  are  most  vulnerable 
to  subversion  and  attack. 

Our  total  FY  1986  request  for  Africa 
is  just  over  $1.2  billion.  Of  that  amount, 
17%  is  for  military-related  assistance, 
roughly  the  same  amount  as  in  FY  1985. 
The  overwhelming  majority — over  $1 
billion — is  for  economic  assistance. 
While  the  military  component  is  small,  it 
is  nevertheless  extremely  important  if 
we  are  to  continue  the  programs  of 
logistics  support  and  training  that  we 
have  started  and  if  we  are  to  provide 
the  bare  minimum  in  the  way  of  defense 
equipment  for  our  friends  facing  threats. 
The  proximity  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  to 
the  Middle  East  and  vital  oil  shipping 
routes  in  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Indian 
Ocean  adds  a  critical  strategic  dimension 
to  our  interests  in  creating  a  politically 
stable  and  economically  viable  environ- 
ment in  the  region.  Consequently,  we 
are  seeking  the  resources  necessary  to 
assist  Sudan,  Kenya,  Somalia,  and 
Djibouti  to  cope  with  their  flat 
economies  and  to  help  Sudan  and 
Somalia  counter  the  very  real  threats  to 
their  security. 

In  southern  Africa  we  continue  to 
work  diligently  toward  a  just  and  lasting 
settlement  for  Namibia  based  on  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  435,  for  con- 
tinued change  in  the  repugnant  system 
of  apartheid  in  South  Africa,  and  for  the 
economic  and  political  stability  of  the 
region  in  general.  The  funds  that  we  are 
requesting  for  programs  in  southern 
African  countries  will  enable  us  to  strike 
directly  at  the  causes  of  the  economic 
difficulties  of  the  region.  In  southern 
Africa,  as  in  East  Africa,  we  intend  to 
thwart  the  destabilizing  influence  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  bloc  by  pro- 
viding economic  assistance  and  by  offer- 
ing an  alternative  to  Soviet  and  Eastern- 
bloc  military  assistance  and  training. 
Mozaml)ique  has  demonstrated  a  real  in- 
tent to  move  away  fr()m  heavy  depend- 
ence upon  the  Soviet  Union  and  toward 
a  position  of  true  nonalignment.  The 
small  MAP  and  IMET  [international 
military  education  and  training]  pro- 
grams for  Mozambique  are  of  particular 
importance  in  encouraging  this  process. 

In  West  Africa,  we  have  recently 
seen  the  spread  of  both  the  effects  of 
the  drought  and  long-term  economic 
stagnation  and  Libyan  adventurism.  Our 
assistance  is  targeted  against  both  the 
near-term  crisis  and  the  long-range  ef- 
fects of  the  economic  crisis. 

I  would  like  to  focus  specifically  on 
the  two  most  urgent  crises  facing  Africa 
today:  famine  and  economic  stagnation. 
During  recent  months,  untold  thousands 
of  Africans  have  perished.  We  estimate 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


that  some  14  million  Africans  remain  at 
risk.  If  they  are  to  survive,  they  need 
urgent  assistance  in  terms  of  food, 
medical  care,  and  shelter. 

There  is  also  the  broader  problem  of 
malnutrition.  An  estimated  20%  of 
Africa's  population  eats  less  than  the 
minimum  needed  to  sustain  good  health. 
Africa  is  the  only  region  in  the  world 
where  per  capita  food  production  has 
declined  over  the  past  two  decades — a 
combination  of  a  drop  in  productivity 
and  rapidly  growing  population.  Africa's 
food  dependency  on  outside  sources  has 
been  growing  at  an  alarming  pace,  with 
African  commercial  imports  of  grain  in- 
creasing at  a  rate  of  9%  per  year  during 
the  past  20  years. 

In  addition  to  the  current  severe 
food  crisis,  Africa's  disappointing 
economic  performance  has  made  it  dif- 
ficult for  most  African  countries  to  serv- 
ice their  debt,  propeling  many  countries 
from  one  financial  crisis  to  another.  The 
economic  crisis  has  required  that 
African  nations  regularly  seek  debt 
rescheduling.  Ten  of  the  fourteen  Paris 
Club  reschedulings  in  1984  were  for 
African  countries. 

The  United  States  has  mounted  an 
unprecedented  campaign  to  provide  both 
gconomic  and  emergency  food  assistance 
to  Africa.  In  this  effort,  we  have  not 
allowed  political  or  ideological  dif- 
ferences with  any  government  to 
nveaken  our  determination  to  direct 
assistance  to  those  in  need.  Since 
Dctober  of  last  year,  we  have  committed 
more  than  $400  million  to  send  over  1 
Tiillion  tons  of  emergency  food  and 
Dther  types  of  humanitarian  assistance 
to  Africa.  If  we  add  our  regular  AID 
Ifood  programs,  then  our  total  food 
assistance  for  Africa  is  even  larger— 
almost  $600  million  thus  far  this  fiscal 
year.  Our  cuirent  request  for  $235 
million  in  supplemental  emergency  fund- 
mg  for  Africa  will  bring  total  food  and 
emergency  assistance  this  year  to  over 
$1  billion."  I  think  we  can  be  justifiably 
proud  of  what  we  have  been  able  to  ac- 
3omplish  in  such  a  short  period  of  time. 
I  assure  you  that  our  response  will  con- 
tinue to  be  a  generous  one. 

Equally  impressive  has  been  the 
direct  response  of  the  American  people 
and  the  private  sector.  Through 
generous  contributions  to  private  volun- 
tary agencies,  many  thousands  of  addi- 
tional lives  have  been,  and  continue  to 
be,  saved.  Volunteers  for  these  agencies 
are  directly  involved  in  distributing  food, 
medicines,  clothing,  and  shelter  and  car- 
ing for  drought  victims  in  the  most 
remote  parts  of  Africa,  enduring  ex- 
treme hardships  and  even  risking  their 
own  lives.  Such  humanitarian  assistance 
is  in  the  best  tradition  of  America  and 
the  values  for  which  America  stands. 


May  1985 


Public  attention  has  focused  on  the 
immediate  drought  crisis,  but  it  is  ap- 
parent that  Africa's  economic  difficulties 
have  a  profound  origin  that  goes  back 
many  years.  Drought  has  aggravated 
the  problem,  but  is  not  the  principal 
cause  of  Africa's  economic  crisis.  Many 
of  the  African  governments  recognize 
that  past  policy  failures  have  contributed 
to  the  current  economic  crisis.  While  wo 
seek  to  address  the  immediate  crisis, 
therefore,  we  must  also  seek  more  sus- 
tainable solutions  to  Africa's  economic 
problems.  The  United  States  has  been  in 
the  forefront  of  those  seeking  to  help 
African  countries  move  from  a  statist 
economic  orientation  to  one  which  allows 
market  forces  to  operate  freely  and 
which  provides  appropriate  price  incen- 
tives, particularly  to  the  small  farmers. 
Structural  issues  which  are  being  ad- 
dressed include  inefficient  parastatals, 
overvalued  exchange  rates,  negative  in- 
terest rates  on  bank  deposits,  uneco- 
nomic subsidies  to  consumers,  and 
artificially  low  prices  to  producers.  In 
addition  to  the  emergency  assistance  to 
meet  the  drought  and  famine  needs. 
U.S.  economic  assistance  levels  for 
Africa  have  increased  from  $787  million 
in  FY  1981  to  over  $1  billion  in  FY 
1985;  for  FY  1986  we  are  again  asking 
for  a  total  of  $1  billion  in  economic  aid. 
To  assist  reform-minded  governments  to 
undertake  desirable  reforms,  the  Ad- 
ministration has  established  two  new 
programs. 


in  a  fundamental  way  their  national 
economic  policies.  Above  all,  the 
relevance  of  free  market  economies  as 
opposed  to  statist  solutions  has  become 
clear  to  African  leaders  as  never  before. 
We  are  in  the  process  of  identifying  the 
first  African  countries  to  participate  in 
this  special  program.  In  addition,  we  are 
asking  other  donors  and  international 
financial  institutions  to  work  with  us 
and  to  provide  cofinancing  for  these  ven- 
tures. 

I  might  just  add  that  our  perception 
of  the  roots  of  Africa's  current  economic 
crisis  is  widely  shared  by  the  interna- 
tional community.  We  are  particularly 
pleased  with  the  World  Bank's  latest 
report  on  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  its 
stress  on  the  need  for  economic  reform 
to  reverse  Africa's  economic  decline.  The 
World  Bank  recently  launched  its  own 
special  facility  which  will  provide  finan- 
cial support  to  reform-minded  coun- 
tries— a  facility  which  complements  and 
reinforces  our  efforts. 

The  "Food  for  Progress"  initiative 

recently  announced  by  the  President  is 
also  targeted  at  achieving  policy  reform 
but  exclusively  in  the  agricultural  sector. 
This  initiative  would  use  food  aid  in 
strategically  important  African  countries 
to  promote  reform  in  the  key  agricul- 
tural sector,  stressing  market  ap- 
proaches in  agricultural  pricing,  market- 
ing, and  the  supply  and  distribution  of 
fertilizers,  seeds,  and  other  agricultural 


There  are  no  quick  and  easy  solutions  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East,  but  our  assistance  plays 
a  crucial  role  in  furthering  the  peace  process. 


The  African  Fund  for  Economic 
Policy  Reform,  a  program  funded  with 
$75  million  in  economic  support  funds  in 
FY  1985  has  the  following  main  objec- 
tives: 

•  First,  to  provide  additional  sup- 
port for  those  African  countries  which 
are  in  the  process  of  implementing 
policy  changes  or  have  indicated  a  will- 
ingness and  ability  to  establish  growth- 
oriented  policies;  and 

•  Second,  to  strengthen  the  interna- 
tional assistance  framework  for  Africa 
by  improved  multilateral  and  bilateral 
donor  coordination  at  the  country  level. 

Although  this  policy  reform  program 
is  still  in  its  initial  stages,  preliminary 
reaction  to  this  new  initiative  has  been 
encouraging.  An  increasing  number  of 
African  countries  are  beginning  to  alter 


inputs.  One  of  the  goals  of  the  initiative 
is  to  supply  American  food  to  reform- 
minded  countries  on  a  multiyear  basis. 
The  sale  of  the  commodities  in  the  local 
economies  would  provide  resources  for 
the  governments  to  use  in  supplying 
needed  incentives  and  inputs  to  the 
farmers  while  easing  the  effects  on  ur- 
ban consumers  of  moving  toward  a 
market  economy.  The  details  of  this  pro- 
posal, including  funding  levels  and 
sources,  will  be  transmitted  to  the  Con- 
gress shortly. 

Near  East  and  South  Asia 

One  of  the  most  important  foreign  policy 
goals  of  this  Administration  is  to  help 
achieve  a  lasting  peace  between  Israel 
and  its  Arab  neighbors.  There  are  no 


45 


THE  SECRETARY 


quick  and  easy  solutions  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East,  but  our  assistance  plays  a 
crucial  role  in  furthering  the  peace  proc- 
ess. Israel  and  Egypt  remain  our  prin- 
cipal partners  in  the  quest  for  peace, 
and  these  two  nations  would  be  the 
largest  recipients  of  our  proposed 
foreign  assistance  for  FY  1986.  Our 
economic  and  military  assistance  pro- 
grams are  needed  to  strengthen 
Jordan's  security  and  economy,  both  of 
which  are  vital  to  enable  Jordan  to  con- 
front the  risks  involved  in  playing  a 
significant  role  in  the  peace  process.  Our 
relationships  with  Saudi  Araba  and  the 
Arab  gulf  states  are  important  elements 
in  our  efforts  to  advance  the  peace  proc- 
ess and.  as  I  will  mention  later,  to  pro- 
tect our  interests  in  the  Persian  Gulf. 

The  United  States  has  a  commit- 
ment to  Israel's  security  extending  over 
three  decades.  Our  security  assistance 
proposal  aims  to  ease  the  onerous 
burden  Israel  shoulders  in  meeting  its 
defense  needs.  The  FY  1986  foreign 
military  sales  program  will  enable  Israel 
to  maintain  a  qualitative  military  edge 
over  potential  adversaries  in  the  region. 
Further  progress  toward  peace  depends, 
in  part,  on  Israel  having  sufficient  con- 
fidence in  its  ability  to  withstand  exter- 
nal threats  but  also  confidence  in  U.S. 
support  and  assistance.  For  these 
reasons,  we  are  recommending  a  signifi- 
cant increase  in  foreign  military  sales  on 
a  grant  basis  for  Israel. 

The  U.S.  and  Israeli  Governments 
agreed  last  October  to  establish  a  Joint 
Economic  Development  Group  to  review 
economic  developments  in  Israel,  the 
role  of  U.S.  assistance  in  support  of  the 
Israeli  adjustment  program,  and  Israeli 
longer  term  development  objectives.  At 
a  meeting  in  December,  Israeli  Govern- 
ment officials  presented  the  annual 
white  paper  outlining  Israeli  economic 
objectives  and  assistance  requirements 
for  the  remainder  of  this  fiscal  year  and 
for  FY  1986. 


Israeli  economy.  Without  such  a  reform 
program,  however,  additional  U.S. 
assistance  would  not  resolve  Israel's 
economic  problems  but  merely  help  to 
perpetuate  them.  Moreover,  without 
economic  adjustment,  Israel  will  become 
even  more  dependent  on  U.S.  assistance 
in  the  future.  Our  objective  is  to  seize 
the  window  of  opportunity  provided  by 
greater  Israeli  understanding  of  the 
problems  of  their  economy. 

The  Israeli  Government  has  made 
some  considerable  progress  to  date  in 
developing  an  adjustment  program.  But 
further  progress  is  necessary  if  their 
program  is  to  put  Israel  back  on  the 
path  of  economic  health  and  additional 
U.S.  assistance  is  to  serve  a  useful  pur- 
pose. Accordingly,  the  Administration 
intends  to  hold  open  for  the  time  being 
the  amount  and  form  of  ESF  which  we 
will  be  requesting  from  the  Congress 
pending  further  discussions  with  Israel 
and  further  evolution  of  its  stabilization 
program. 

Our  discussions  will  continue  to 
focus  not  only  on  short-term  stabilization 
measures  but  also  on  Israel's  longer 
range  development  objectives  so  that 
Israeli  citizens  can  have  confidence  in  a 
brighter,  more  prosperous  future.  We 
agreed  during  Prime  Minister  Peres' 
visit  last  October  to  work  together  to 
promote  foreign  investment  in  Israel, 
particularly  in  the  high-technology  area 
where  Israel  has  a  comparative  advan- 
tage. Both  governments  are  examining 
existing  programs  and  frameworks 
which  might  help  to  improve  Israel's  in- 
vestment climate  and  attract  venture 
capital  from  abroad.  It  is  clear  that  in 
Israel's  case — as  in  other  countries — 
mobilizing  both  domestic  and  foreign 
venture  capital  depends  on  an  atmos- 
phere that  encourages  private  enter- 
prise, appropriate  tax  structures,  and 
market-pricing  policies.  Private  sector 
initiatives  hold  the  greatest  promise  for 
helping  Israel  to  achieve  its  development 


We  seek  to  prevent  conflict  among  the  major  states 
[in  South  Asia],  to  help  the  region  develop 
economically,  and  to  foster  the  success  of 
democratic  institutions. 


Our  security  assistance  is  a  reflec- 
tion of  the  U.S.  commitment  to  Israel's 
security  and  economic  well-being.  In  ad- 
dition, we  have  indicated  our  willingness 
to  provide  extraordinary  assistance  in 
support  of  a  comprehensive  Israeli 
economic  program  that  deals  effectively 
with  the  fundamental  imbalances  in  the 


goals,  and  we  are  encouraged  by  the  in- 
terest that  has  been  generated  in  both 
countries.  Our  real  objective  is  to  sup- 
port Israel's  own  efforts  to  seize  the  op- 
portunity to  establish  the  fundamental 
conditions  for  economic  growth  in  an 
age  of  new  technology. 


The  Camp  David  accords  and  the 
Egy]5tian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  remain 
the  cornerstone  of  our  Middle  East 
peace  policy.  Egypt  has  demonstrated 
its  firm  commitment  to  those  accom- 
plishments by  repeatedly  refusing  to 
disavow  them  as  a  price  for  resuming  its 
historic  leadership  role  in  the  Arab 
world.  Our  assistance  helps  ensure  that 
EgjTJt  will  remain  strong  enough  to  con- 
tinue to  resist  the  pressures  of  radical 
forces  which  seek  to  undo  what  has  been 
achieved.  Egypt  remains  an  important 
force  for  moderation  and  stability  not 
only  in  the  Middle  East  but  also  in 
Africa,  where  it  plays  an  important  role 
in  helping  African  states  deter  Libyan 
adventurism.  Egypt's  ability  to  continue 
this  deterrent  role  depends  heavily  on 
our  assistance.  The  FY  1986  foreign 
military  sales  program  has  been  in- 
creased to  enable  Egypt  to  continue 
replacing  obsolete  Soviet  equipment  and 
remain  a  credible  deterrent  force  in  the 
region. 

Another  major  U.S.  interest  in  the 
Middle  East  is  to  maintain  free  world 
access  to  the  vital  oil  supplies  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  now  and  in  the  future.  The 
Persian  Gulf  countries  produce  over  25% 
of  the  free  world's  oil  supply.  Through 
our  assistance,  we  help  to  improve  the 
security  of  our  friends  in  this  area. 
Oman  is  cooperating  closely  with  the 
United  States  toward  our  common  goal 
of  maintaining  security  and  stability  in 
that  vital  area  and  freedom  of  naviga- 
tion through  the  Strait  of  Hormuz; 
Oman's  agreement  to  permit  access  to 
its  facilities  represents  a  key  asset  for 
the  U.S.  Central  Command.  Although 
not  recipients  of  U.S.  financial  assist- 
ance, the  other  gulf  states  and  Saudi 
Arabia,  as  members  with  Oman  in  the 
Gulf  Cooperation  Council,  have  shown 
the  will  and  the  ability  to  defend 
themselves  against  encroachment  of  the 
Iran-Iraq  war.  The  Administration  is 
embarking  on  a  comprehensive  review  of 
our  security  interests  and  strategy'  in 
the  area,  focusing  on  how  our  various 
programs  in  the  security  field  comple- 
ment our  efforts  in  the  peace  process 
and  contribute  to  the  general  stability  of 
the  region. 

In  North  Africa  we  have  longstand- 
ing and  close  relationships  with  Morocco 
and  Tunisia  as  firm  friends  and 
strategically  located  geopolitical  part- 
ners. Morocco,  with  which  we  have  tran- 
sit and  exercise  agreements,  and  Tunisia 
are  both  in  difficult  economic  circum- 
stances. Our  assistance  program  in 
Morocco,  in  concert  with  other  donors, 
is  designed  to  help  the  Moroccan 
Government  as  it  implements  necessary 
economic  reforms.  We  have  expressed  to 
the  Government  of  Morocco  our  disap- 
pointment over  the  unwelcome  develop- 
ment of  the  Libya-Morocco  treaty  of 
August  1984.  Qadhafi's  aggression 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


gainst  neighboring  states  and  his  un- 
liminished  support  of  terrorism  and 
uliversion  worldwide  are  continuing 
auses  of  concern.  We  have  registered 
hese  concerns  with  the  Moroccans  and 
old  them  that  we  discount  the  possihili- 
y  that  association  with  King  Hassan 
ould  influence  Qadhafi  constructively. 
)espite  differing  views  on  how  to  deal 
vith  Qadhafi,  however,  the  economic 
md  political  rationale  for  this  assistance 
,0  Morocco  remains;  indeed,  it  is 
tronger. 

south  Asia 

\  major  foreign  policy  objective  in 
south  Asia  is  to  obtain  a  negotiated  set- 

lement  to  get  the  Soviet  Union  out  of 
Afghanistan  so  that  the  refugees  can 

eturn  and  Afghans  can  exercise  their 
3wn  sovereignty  and  independence.  In 
3ur  efforts  to  achieve  this  goal,  it  is  vital 
:hat  we  help  ensure  the  security  of 
Pakistan  in  the  face  of  Soviet  intimida- 
tion. Our  6-year  assistance  program  for 
Pakistan  serves  this  goal.  It  is  designed 
to  support  Pakistan's  economy  and  its 
development  and  to  help  strengthen  its 
defenses  through  provision  of  military 
equipment  and  training. 

The  United  States  has  several  im- 
portant goals  in  South  Asia.  We  seek  to 
prevent  conflict  among  the  major  states 
of  the  region,  to  help  the  region  develop 
economically,  and  to  foster  the  success 
of  democratic  institutions.  India,  the 
largest  democracy  in  the  world,  plays  a 
pivotal  role  in  the  peace  and  stability  of 
(the  region.  Our  development  assistance 
program  for  India  will  concentrate  on 
•more  sophisticated  research  and  higher 
technical  training,  building  on  India's 
strong  scientific  and  technological  base. 
Our  assistance  programs  in  Bangladesh, 
Sri  Lanka,  and  Nepal  demonstrate  U.S. 
support  for  the  moderate  nonaligned 
policies  and  economic  development  of 
these  countries. 


Europe 

Security  assistance  proposals  for  the 
European  region  are  designed  to  redress 
the  military  imbalance  in  Europe  and 
counter  the  increased  Soviet  military 
threat  in  central  Europe  and  in  South- 
west Asia.  The  assistance  supports  key 
NATO  allies  and  has  the  dual  result  of 
providing  the  United  States  with  con- 
tinued access  to  important  military 
bases  and  helping  these  countries 
modernize  their  own  military  capa- 
bilities. By  so  doing,  our  security  assist- 
ance sustains  confidence  in  our  best 
efforts — commitments  which  are  the 
foundation  of  base  agreements. 

U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives  in 
Spain  are  to  support  Spanish  democ- 
racy, to  encourage  Spanish  movement 


toward  a  more  open  economy,  and  to 
contribute  to  Western  defense  by  assur- 
ing continued  U.S.  access  to  vital  air 
and  naval  facilities  in  Spain.  The  securi- 
ty assistance  program  plays  a  key  role 
in  achieving  these  objectives. 

The  Spanish  military  has  assumed  a 
role  appropriate  for  armed  forces  in  a 
democracy.  Our  assistance  is  necessary 
to  help  Spain  meet  its  goal  of  modern- 
ization to  NATO  standards  and  to  pro- 
vide tangible  evidence  of  the  benefits 
Spain  receives  as  a  partner  in  the 
Western  alliance,  as  demonstrated  by  its 
bilateral  relationship  with  the  United 
States  as  well  as  its  participation  in 
NATO.  Our  security  assistance  program 
thus  plays  an  important  role  in  helping 
Spain  to  consolidate  and  strengthen  its 
new  democratic  institutions. 


U.S.  security  assistance  to  Portugal, 
therefore,  provides  both  real  and  sym- 
bolic support  for  I'ortugal's  attempt  to 
strengthen  its  democracy  and  free 
market  economy.  It  provides  a  cor- 
nerstone for  Portugal's  attempts  to  play 
a  more  effective  role  in  NATO.  It  also 
serves  to  meet  the  assistance  goals  to 
which  the  United  States  is  committed 
under  the  1983  agreement. 

Our  security  assistance  to  Greece 
and  Turkey  contributes  to  important 
strategic  policy  objectives  on  the 
southern  flank  of  NATO.  Turkey's  posi- 
tion between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
Middle  East  and  proximity  to  Southwest 
Asia  make  it  a  natural  barrier  to  Soviet 
expansion  into  the  Middle  East  and  the 
Persian  Gulf.  The  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan,  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  and  the 


Security  assistance  proposals  for  the  European 
region  are  designed  to  redress  the  military 
imbalance  in  Europe  and  counter  the  increased 
Soviet  military  threat  in  central  Europe  and  in 
Southwest  Asia. 


Prime  Minister  Gonzalez's  govern- 
ment has  taken  politically  difficult  steps 
to  open  Spain's  traditionally  protec- 
tionist economy  to  market  forces.  This 
decision  was  particularly  courageous 
since  Spain's  economic  austerity  pro- 
gram has  been  accompanied  by  high 
unemployment.  But  as  a  result,  the 
Spanish  economy  has  shown  impressive 
improvement  in  1984.  Its  economic  pro- 
gram would  have  placed  a  much  more 
onerous  burden  on  the  Spanish  people 
without  our  support.  The  security 
assistance  program  helps  in  modernizing 
the  economy  through  scientific  and 
technical  exchanges  and  permits  Spain 
to  continue  its  economic  recovery 
without  jeopardizing  its  military  modern- 
ization. 

Our  objectives  in  Portugal  are 
similar  to  those  in  Spain.  Portugal  is 
striving  to  consolidate  its  10-year-old 
democratic  institutions  while  it  assumes 
an  expanded  role  in  Western  political 
and  military  structures.  It  is  also  pur- 
suing a  demanding  economic  austerity 
program  in  an  attempt  to  reform  its 
troubled  economy,  which  is  the  second 
poorest  in  Western  Europe.  The  U.S. 
security  assistance  program  assists  Por- 
tuguese economic  development  efforts 
and  permits  Portugal  to  continue  its  pro- 
gram of  military  modernization  aimed  at 
assuming  expanded  NATO  defense 
responsibilities. 


disintegration  of  Lebanon  highlight  the 
importance  of  a  politically  stable  and 
militarily  credible  Turkish  ally  in  this 
disturbed  region.  We  also  benefit  from 
our  military  relationship  with  Turkey  by 
our  use  of  extremely  valuable  military 
and  intelligence  facilities.  The  United 
States  accordingly  has  a  compelling  in- 
terest in  enhancing  Turkey's  ability  to 
meet  its  NATO  commitments  and  deter 
potential  aggression  in  Southwest  Asia 
through  provision  of  security  assistance. 

Our  interests  are  not  confined  to 
NATO  security  objectives.  We  have 
sought  the  cooperation  of  the  Turkish 
Government  in  promoting  a  settlement 
on  Cyprus.  The  Turkish  Government  ac- 
cepted and  supported  the  UN  Secretary 
General's  initiative.  We  are  now  working 
with  all  the  parties  to  ensure  that  ef- 
forts in  the  wake  of  the  recent  summit 
in  New  York  to  reach  a  settlement  be- 
tween the  Government  of  Cyprus  and 
the  Turkish  Cypriot  community  can 
move  forward.  Accordingly,  we  believe 
that  any  attempt  at  one-sided  efforts  to 
impose  conditions  regarding  Cyprus  on 
security  assistance  to  Turkey  would  not 
only  be  unwarranted  but  would  set  back 
the  prospects  of  a  settlement  on  Cyprus. 

On  the  economic  side,  Turkey  has 
taken  far-reaching  and  courageous  steps 
to  stabilize  and  liberalize  its  economy. 


May  1985 


47 


THE  SECRETARY 


U.S.  concessional  aid  to  Turkey  is  direct- 
ly and  constructively  related  to  Turkey's 
efforts  to  create  a  freer  and  more  sound 
economy. 

We  are  also  seeking  a  substantial 
level  of  security  assistance  for  Greece. 
While  we  have  our  differences  with  the 
Greek  Government,  we  see  those  dif- 
ferences in  the  context  of  a  relationship 
between  two  democratic  allies  who  share 
important  interests.  We  recognize 
Greece's  strategic  importance  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean.  We  derive  im- 
portant benefits  fromi  our  military 
facilities.  Our  security  assistance  pro- 
gram is  an  important  element  in  our 
relationship  with  Greece.  It  is  exceeded 
only  by  our  request  for  Israel,  Egypt, 
Turkey,  and  Pakistan. 


the  Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions (ASEAN)— the  Philippines,  In- 
donesia, and  Thailand.  The  bulk  of  the 
$483  million  requested  for  military 
assistance  will  go  to  deter  direct  military 
threats  to  Korea  and  Thailand  and  to 
enhance  our  close  military  relationship 
with  the  Philippines,  a  treaty  ally.  We 
also  propose  modest  assistance  pro- 
grams in  other  ASEAN  countries;  in 
Burma,  a  country  that  has  ijecome  in- 
creasingly important  to  our  antinarcotics 
efforts;  and  in  the  islands  of  the  South 
Pacific.  I  would  like  to  highlight  some  of 
our  specific  concerns. 

The  Philippines  has  passed  through 
difficult  times  that  have  adversely  af- 
fected the  economy.  The  government 
has  begun  to  take  corrective  measures 


Foreign  assistance  is  an  investment  in  the  future 
that  can  benefit  both  recipient  and  donor.  This  is 
particularly  evident  in  the  East  Asia  and  Pacific 
region.  .  .  . 


East  Asia  and  Pacific 

Foreign  assistance  is  an  investment  in 
the  future  that  can  benefit  both  recipient 
and  donor.  This  is  particularly  evident  in 
the  East  Asia  and  Pacific  region  where 
the  returns  paid  on  our  foreign 
assistance  investment  have  been  enor- 
mous. For  some  20  years.  East  Asian 
countries  have  achieved  higher  economic 
growth  rates  than  any  other  region  of 
the  world.  They  have  achieved  these 
remarkable  results  principally  by  relying 
on  the  dynamism  of  free  market 
systems.  As  a  result  of  this  rapid 
economic  growth,  the  region  now  ac- 
counts for  more  of  our  foreign  trade 
than  any  other  region  of  the  world. 
Since  former  aid  recipients  in  the  region 
have  reached  the  stage  of  development 
where  they  no  longer  need  bilateral  aid, 
and  in  some  cases  have  become  aid 
donors  themselves,  East  Asia  and 
Pacific  countries  now  account  for  only  a 
small  portion  of  our  worldwide 
assistance  programs  despite  the  vital  im- 
portance of  the  region  to  the  United 
States. 

In  spite  of  this  generally  bright  pic- 
ture, the  region  still  has  pressing 
economic  and  security  problems  that  we 
must  confront.  The  Administration's  FY 
1986  foreign  assistance  request  for  East 
Asia  and  the  Pacific  that  addresses 
these  problems  totals  approximately 
$818  million.  The  requested  economic 
assistance  of  $.33.5  million  will  be  concen- 
trated in  the  three  largest  members  of 


and  has  concluded  an  economic  stabiliza- 
tion agreement  with  the  International 
Monetary  Fund.  These  actions  are  show- 
ing signs  of  progress.  The  Philippine 
situation  is  further  clouded  by  a  growing 
armed  insurgency  by  the  New  People's 
Army,  the  military  arm  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  of  the  Philippines  which 
has  been  able  to  exploit  the  country's 
political,  economic,  and  social  diffi- 
culties. The  revitalization  of  democratic 
institutions,  the  establishment  of  long- 
term  growth  through  structural  eco- 
nomic reform,  the  maintenance  of  our 
vital  security  relationship,  and  the  suc- 
cessful resistance  to  a  communist 
takeover  of  the  Philippines  are  inter- 
twined. Our  integrated  economic  and 
military  assistance  program  is  designed 
to  support  all  of  these  objectives. 

Like  the  Philippines,  Thailand  is  a 
treaty  ally  of  the  United  States.  It  is 
also  a  front-line  state  that  faces  serious 
security  challenges  caused  by  Soviet- 
supported  Vietnamese  aggression  in 
neighboring  Cambodia.  Our  security  as- 
sistance to  Thailand  supports  the 
government's  efforts  to  improve  social 
and  economic  conditions  in  the  war- 
affected  Thai-Cambodian  border  areas 
that  have  experienced  a  large  influx  of 
refugees  because  of  continued  brutal  at- 
tacks by  Vietnam.  Our  militiiry 
assistance  supports  the  modernization  of 
Thailand's  defense  forces  to  provide  a 
deterrent  to  further  Vietnamese  aggres- 
sion. 


The  specific  efforts  of  the  Philip- 
pines and  Thailand  are  reinforced  by 
their  membership  in  ASEAN,  which 
represents  the  best  hope  for  peace  and 
stability  in  Southeast  Asia.  Consistent 
with  our  strong  support  for  ASEAN  anc 
in  recognition  of  the  importance  of  our 
relationship  with  Indonesia,  we  have 
also  proposed  economic  and  military 
assistance  for  that  nation.  Indonesia  has 
continued  to  make  good  progress  in  its 
development  program  and  maintaining 
sound  economic  policies  in  the  face  of  an 
international  recession.  Our  military 
sales  to  Indonesia  have  enhanced  our 
common  strategic  interests  in  Southeast 
Asia.  We  also  plan  to  continue  the 
ASEAN  regional  technical  assistance 
program.  In  another  ASEAN  member, 
Malaysia,  where  U.S.  private  investment 
continues  to  be  a  major  catalyst  of 
economic  growth  and  development,  the 
government  has  expressed  interest  in 
continued  defense  cooperation  with  the 
United  States  within  the  context  of  that 
nation's  nonaligned  status.  Malaysia  has 
played  a  constructive  role  in  interna- 
tional affairs  and  has  forcefully  ad- 
vanced ASEAN's  strategy  to  bring 
about  a  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  forces 
from  Cambodia.  We  propose  to  continue 
our  modest  military  assistance  program 
in  support  of  these  efforts. 

Another  important  U.S.  treaty  ally 
is  the  Republic  of  Korea  (R.O.K.).  The 
prevention  of  North  Korean  aggression 
against  South  Korea  is  indispensable  for 
peace  and  stability  in  the  region  and  im- 
portant to  our  own  security.  So  far,  we 
have  been  successful  in  deterring  ag- 
gression and  preventing  a  recurrence 
of  hostilities  on  the  Korean  Peninsula. 
To  maintain  our  support  for  the 
U.S.-R.O.K.  alliance,  we  propose  to  con- 
tinue an  FMS  credit  program  that  will 
permit  the  R.O.K.  to  improve  the 
capabilities  of  its  combat  forces,  many  of 
which  are  stationed  with  our  own  forces 
along  the  DMZ  [demilitarized  zone]  and 
would  operate  with  us  under  a  joint 
command  in  time  of  war. 

I  now  want  to  emphasize  the  impor- 
tance the  Administration  places  on  pro- 
posed legislative  action  that  will  require 
no  additional  appropriation  under  the 
bill  you  are  considering.  Our  expanding 
economic,  scientific,  and  cultural  ties 
with  China  have  been  mutually  beneficial 
and  have  become  a  very  important  ele- 
ment in  our  overall  relationship.  Con- 
sistent with  this  growing  friendly  rela- 
tionship, the  President  has  sought 
changes  to  laws  that  link  China  with  the 
Soviet  bloc.  I  am  pleased  to  note  that, 
with  your  support,  important  progress 
was  made  in  this  effort.  Last  year  we 
proposed  the  elimination  of  the  prohibi- 
tion on  assistance  to  China  to  permit  us 
the  flexibility  to  provide  some  assist- 
ance—such as  training— if  we  so  chose. 


[! 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA 


his  proposal  was  approved  in  both  the 
iouse  Foreign  Affairs  and  Senate 
'oreign  Relations  Committees.  The 

I  verall  bill  was  not  passed,  however,  for 
Basons  unrelated  to  China.  To  remove 

Bf.  lis  anachronism  in  our  laws  affecting 
Ihina,  I  ask  you  to  pass  this  proposal 
lis  year. 

■  lultilateral  Development  Banks 

'hus  far,  I  have  stressed  the  vital  role 
'» American  bilateral  assistance  plays  in 
iromoting  the  security  and  stability  of 
he  developing  world.  As  I  am  sure  each 
!  if  you  appreciates,  this  task  is  far  too 
jeat  for  one  country  to  attempt  to  do 
lone.  Fortunately,  we  do  not  have  to. 
)ur  friends  and  allies  in  the  industrial- 
zed  world  devote  a  considerable  amount 
f  their  resources  to  the  task  of  pro- 
noting  the  development  process,  which, 
n  turn,  yields  dividends  in  the  expansion 
)f  economic  trade  and  strengthening  of 
iemocratic  institutions.  These  resources 
ire  becoming  too  scarce  to  allow  for  in- 
efficient use  of  any  kind.  A  coordinated 
ipproach  among  donors  has  always  been 
iesirable.  It  is  now  critical. 

A  principal  tool  available  for  such 
;oordination  is,  and  will  continue  to  be, 
he  pooling  of  a  portion  of  our  economic 
assistance  through  the  multilateral 
development  banks  (MDBs).  MDB  lend- 
ng  remains  a  significant  and  growing 
source  of  investment  capital  for  develop- 
ing countries.  In  FY  1984,  MDBs 
together  committed  $22  billion  in  new 
loans.  That  a  lending  program  of  this 
size  was  sustained  with  a  U.S.  paid-in 
ontribution  of  $1.3  billion  testifies  to 
the  advantages  of  using  the  MDBs  to 
share  the  burden  of  providing  aid.  The 
United  States  benefits  directly  from  the 
MDBs'  efforts  to  promote  strong  and 
sustained  progress  in  the  developing 
countries  through  increased  sales  of 
'U.S.  goods  and  services.  Indeed,  a 
significant  portion  of  the  U.S.  trade 
deficit  can  be  attributed  to  the  decline  in 
purchases  by  debt-troubled  developing 
countries,  a  decline  which  appropriate 
development  assistance  can  help  reverse. 

While  valuable  as  a  source  of 
development  finance,  the  MDBs  play  an 
equally  critical  role  by  providing  sound 
market-oriented  economic  policy  advice 
to  their  borrowers.  They  also  impose 
financial  discipline  on  the  development 
objectives  of  their  clients.  These  institu- 
tions are  devoting  increasing  resources 
to  projects  and  programs  designed  to 
support  private  enterprise  in  the 
developing  world.  For  many  years,  the 
World  Bank's  special  affiliate,  the  Inter- 
national Finance  Corporation,  has  fo- 
cused on  the  specific  needs  of  the  pri- 
vate sector.  The  regional  development 
banks  are  beginning  to  follow  the  World 
Bank's  lead.  The  strengthened  commit- 
ment on  the  part  of  these  institutions  to 


private  enterprise  may  prove  to  be  one 
of  the  most  important  factors  in  sup- 
porting a  successful  development 
process. 

We  are  convinced  that  the  MDBs 
have  a  crucial  role  to  play  in  advancing 
worldwide  growth  and  development  and 
increasing  the  private  sector  contribu- 
tion to  that  process.  We  thus  consider 
our  participation  in  them  a  necessary 
complement  to  our  bilateral  assistance 
policy.  In  recent  years  this  Administra- 
tion, acting  in  close  consultation  with 
the  Congress,  has  sought  to  reduce  the 
cost  to  us  of  providing  an  effective  level 
of  support  to  these  institutions  while 
maintaining  U.S.  leadership.  We  have 
been  successful  in  negotiating  overall 
replenishment  levels  which  we  believe 
are  adequate  to  the  needs  of  borrowing 
members  but  also  take  into  considera- 
tion our  budgetary  constraints.  Main- 
taining U.S.  leadership,  however, 
depends  on  our  meeting  these  obliga- 
tions in  a  timely  manner.  I,  therefore, 
urge  Congress  to  support  fully  both  our 
FY  1986  request  for  $1.3  billion  and  our 


VY  1985  supplemental  request  for  $237 
million. 


SUMMARY 

In  closing,  I  would  like  to  emphasize  the 
basic  theme  of  this  year's  budget  presen- 
tation. We  have  a  responsibility  to  stick 
with  the  policies  that  have  worked  or 
begun  to  work.  Quick  fixes,  pulling  back 
from  the  fray,  or  hoping  for  diplomatic 
miracles  are  not  responsible  options.  But 
if  we  stand  together— firmly,  predict- 
ably, and  realistically  defending  our 
principles  and  our  friends— and  do  so  in 
the  steadfast  manner  the  problems  re- 
quire, then  we  can  prevail.  Our  FY  1986 
budget  request  is  designed  to  do  just 
that. 


'Press  release  23.  The  complete  tran- 
script of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the 
committee  and  will  lie  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402.  ■ 


FY  1986  Assistance  Requests 
for  Sub-Sahara  Africa 


by  Frank  Wisner 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Foreign  Ajfairs 
Coynmittee  on  March  5,  1985.  Ambas- 
sador Wisner  is  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  African  Affairs. ' 

1  am  happy  to  discuss  the  Administra- 
tion's fiscal  year  (FY)  1986  foreign 
assistance  proposals.  I  would  like  to  con- 
centrate my  remarks  on  the  overall 
policy  setting— our  goals  and  objectives 
in  Africa  and  how  the  foreign  assistance 
program  fits  into  them.  I  will  also  in- 
clude brief  statements  on  the  situation 
as  we  see  it  in  major  subregions  of 
Africa. 

Some  observers  of  U.S.  policy  still 
seem  surprised  when  a  State  Depart- 
ment official,  particularly  one  from  a 
regional  bureau,  discusses  economics.  I 
want  to  assure  you  that  I  feel  complete- 
ly at  home  in  this  role.  A  major  part  of 
my  time,  and  that  of  my  colleagues,  is 
spent  on  economic  issues.  These  are 
paramount  in  our  relationship  with 
many  African  countries,  important  in  all 
countries. 

Anyone  who  has  followed  the  devel- 
opments of  the  past  several  years  will 
understand  why  I  say  this.  First,  there 


has  been  the  drought  which  has  had 
such  an  immense  tragic  impact  on  many 
parts  of  Africa.  We  are  proud  that  in 
the  first  5  months  of  this  fiscal  year,  we 
have  committed  $0.5  billion  to  supply  a 
million  tons  of  emergency  food  and 
other  emergency  supplies  for  21  coun- 
tries in  Africa. 

We  should  also  acknowledge  the  re- 
sponse of  other  countries.  Our  prelimi- 
nary estimates  are  that  the  combined 
contributions  from  other  countries  such 
as  Canada,  European  countries,  Japan, 
and  countries  in  the  Middle  East  have 
nearly  matched  our  level.  The  impor- 
tance of  this  multilateral  effort  will  be 
underscored  at  the  UN  conference  which 
will  be  held  in  Geneva  beginning 
March  11.  The  Vice  President  will  head 
the  U.S.  delegation,  following  the  com- 
pletion of  his  current  visit  to  three  of 
the  most  seriously  affected  countries, 
Sudan,  Niger,  and  Mali.  The  conference 
will  concentrate  both  on  assuring  that 
sufficient  amounts  of  assistance  are 
available  and  that  there  is  adequate 
coordination  on  logistics  such  as  trans- 
portation and  timing  of  arrivals. 

However,  it  is  not  the  drought  which 
I  wish  to  discuss  with  you  today  but 
rather  the  relationship  of  U.S.  foreign 
assistance  to  Africa's  long-term  eco- 
nomic difficulties,  what  is  often  called 


49 


AFRICA 


"the  African  economic  crisis."  Much  time 
is  often  wasted  on  polemics  as  to  whose 
"fault"  this  is.  I  am  not  very  interested 
in  debating  the  percentage  of  blame  to 
be  ascribed  to  drought,  oil  prices,  terms 
of  trade,  faulty  exchange  rates,  poor 
domestic  pricing  policies,  excessive  bor- 
rowing, overly  centralized  government 
planning,  donor  policies,  etc.,  so  well  set 
out  in  the  World  Bank's  report,  Towards 
Sustained  Development  in  Sub-Saharan 
Africa:  A  Joint  Program  of  Action,  as 
well  as  two  predecessor  reports  on  the 
same  subject.  Whatever  the  causes,  the 
results  are  clear.  Africa  is  the  only 
region  in  the  world  where  per  capita 
food  production  has  declined  over  the 
past  two  decades  and  where  dependency 
on  imports  continues  to  rise  alarmingly 
(10  million  tons  of  cereals  per  year  at 
present).  African  GDPs  [gross  domestic 
products]  continue  to  decline  while  debt 
soars.  Debt  service  ratios  tend  to  aver- 
age from  30%  to  80%,  and  the  bulk  of 
Paris  Club  debt  reschedulings  are  now 
for  African  countries. 

There  is  no  American  panacea  for 
this  situation.  There  is,  however,  an 
American  plan  for  action.  It  is  based  on 
the  recognition  that  Africa  needs  a 
variety  of  forms  of  assistance.  In  some 
cases — and  there  are  various  forms  of 
this — food  assistance  may  be  appropri- 
ate while  in  other  cases  it  would  be 
harmful.  In  some  cases  balance-of- 
payments  or  budgetary  support  is 
crucial  in  order  to  maintain  a  multi- 
lateral pattern  of  assistance.  In  some 
cases  such  assistance  would  be  useless 
since  the  recipient  country  is  not  pre- 
pared to  undertake  policies  which  will 
provide  economic  viability  over  the 
longer  run.  In  virtually  all  cases  we  need 
to  undertake  longer  term  assistance  pro- 
grams— bilaterally,  regionally,  and 
multilaterally — to  assist  Africans  to 
develop  the  human  and  physical  infra- 
structure which  will  permit  development 
over  the  coming  decades. 

We  are  sometimes  accused  of  not 
taking  others'  views  into  account  in 
making  aid  decisions.  Nothing  could  be 
further  from  the  truth  with  respect  to 
assistance  programs  in  Africa.  We  are 
the  second  largest  bilateral  donor  of  aid 
to  Africa  but  are  acutely  aware  that  this 
accounts  for  only  roughly  one-eighth  of 
total  assistance  flows  which  reach 
Africa,  though  our  role  belies  this  small 
fraction.  I  shall  come  back  to  this  later. 
More  importantly,  we  are  aware  that  we 
can  only  respond  to  and  work  with 
African  decisions  as  to  the  types  of 
assistance  Africans  believe  are  suitable 
to  their  needs.  We  must,  on  our  part, 
decide  whether  our  resources  should  be 
employed  in  a  particular  program  or  as 


part  of  an  overall  economic  strategy. 
The  dialogue  on  this  subject  is  not 
always  easy,  but  it  is  necessary  and  in- 
volves considerable  diplomatic  skill. 

On  the  multilateral  side,  we  see  a 
crucial  role  for  the  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund]  and  World  Bank.  Their 
capability  to  discuss  difficult  decisions 
with  other  countries  often  exceeds  any 
possible  bilateral  role.  We  work  closely 
with  the  Bank  in  sector  and  project 
assistance.  We  were  pleased  that  the 
Bank  has  focused  its  attention  on  sup- 
porting policy  reform.  We  do  not  intend 
to  contribute  to  the  Bank's  new  African 
facility,  not  because  we  disagree  with  its 
goals  but  because  we  had  developed  our 
own  initiative.  Our  initiative  last  year  in 
seeking  and  securing  funds  to  support 
policy  reform  was  in  many  ways  a  pre- 
cursor of  the  Bank's  new  African  facili- 
ty, and  we  intend  to  work  closely  with 
the  Bank  when  its  facility  becomes 
operational  later  this  year.  In  estab- 
lishing the  facility,  the  World  Bank 
looked  both  for  direct  contributions  and 
cooperative  bilateral  financing.  We  and 
several  other  donors  are  in  the  latter 
position. 

Looking  back  over  the  past  year  at 
economic  developments  in  Africa,  one 
cannot  help  but  be  struck  by  the  major 
rethinking  of  economic  policy  which  has 
taken  place.  Country  after  country  has 
changed  economic  course  to  devote  more 
attention  and  resources  to  agriculture. 
This  has  sometimes  involved  major  de- 
valuations, reduced  budget  deficits,  the 
reduction  of  dysfunctional  bureaucracies 
and  unnecessary  controls,  etc.  While  the 
degree  and  effectiveness  of  these  actions 
have  varied  widely,  most  countries  are 
moving  in  that  direction.  These  are 
African  decisions  made  by  governments 
which  have  come  to  recognize  that  major 
shifts  in  resources  must  take  place  to 
favor  productive  elements,  largely  the 
farming  sector,  in  the  domestic 
economy.  In  the  longer  nm  this  will  not 
only  have  a  major  economic  effect  but 
also  offer  enhanced  political  stability 
since  it  is  these  elements  which  consti- 
tute the  overwhelming  majority  in  all 
African  countries. 

Lest  there  be  any  misunderstanding, 
let  me  hasten  to  add  that  this  does  not 
reduce  the  need  for  foreign  assistance. 
On  the  contrary,  these  changes  necessi- 
tate and  warrant  our  support  which  can 
be  used  to  good  effect.  It  takes  political 
courage  to  close  parastatals  and  de- 
crease or  eliminate  price  subsidies  for 
urban  dwellers.  As  we  know  at  home, 
austerity  is  not  a  popular  diet.  In  Africa 
it  is  an  exceedingly  dangerous  one.  We 
need  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  to 


iro 


J 


[ 


Africans  that  economic  reforms  lead  to 
growth. 

A  good  example  is  Zaire.  In  Septem 
ber  1983  Zaire  devalued  its  currency  by 
80%.  Zaire  has  eliminated  price  controls 
on  agricultural  production,  reduced  its 
budget  deficit,  and  initiated  reform  of 
parastatals.  It  has  signed  a  bilateral  in- 
vestment treaty  with  us  and  welcomes 
foreign  investment.  I  am  happy  to  be 
able  to  report  that  Zaire's  foreign  ex- 
change regime  seems  to  be  working  and 
economic  growth  has  resumed.  The 
rigorous  enforcement  of  the  IMF's  pro-    t 
grams  and  the  World  Bank's  work  with    n 
Zaire's  mining  industry  has  had  an  im- 
portant effect  in  reducing  the  misuse  of 
Zaire's  scarce  resources.  Foreign  invest- 
ment has  begun  to  flow  in  small  quan- 
tities, but  this  will  take  time  to  have  an 
impact.  On  the  negative  side,  despite 
generous  Paris  and  London  Club  debt 
reschedulings,  Zaire  must  spend  more 
than  half  its  budget  on  debt  repayments. 
Little  is  left  over  for  economic  develop- 
ment. And  the  situation  is  not  very  dif- 
ferent in  other  countries. 

I  know  this  committee  is  particularly 
interested  in  our  programs  relating  to 
the  economic  policy  reform  program  in- 
itiated in  FY  1985.  I  would  like  to  take  s 
moment  to  bring  you  up  to  date  on  what 
we  have  undertaken  so  far,  as  well  as 
the  implications  for  FY  1986.  As  we 
have  already  informally  notified  you,  we 
have  initiated  discussions  with  four 
countries,  Zambia,  Malawi,  Rwanda,  and 
Mali.  We  hope  to  have  congressional 
notifications  with  specifics  on  programs 
to  you  shortly.  As  you  will  see,  each  of 
these  programs  has  been  tailored  to  the 
needs  of  the  recipients,  i.e.,  how  we  can 
best  support  their  efforts  to  restructure 
their  economies  toward  growth.  In  all 
cases  we  consulted  with  other  major 
donors,  including  the  World  Bank.  In 
several  cases  our  programs  were  closely 
linked  to  others'  activities  for  maximum 
impact  and  minimum  bureaucratic 
burden  on  the  recipient.  WHiile  the 
results  are  not  yet  in,  we  believe  that 
our  efforts  will  produce  a  significant  in- 
crease in  effective  assistance  from  other 
donors  as  well. 

We  have  accepted  the  will  of  the 
Congress  as  reflected  in  the  FY  1985 
continuing  resolution  and  chosen  to  ask 
for  ESF  [economic  support  funds]  rather 
than  development  assistance  funds  for 
this  program  in  FY  1986.  We  plan  to  ap- 
ply the  same  criteria  for  country  choice 
that  were  used  this  year,  as  previously 
furnished  to  this  committee.  We  have 
made  no  decisions  on  countries  for  next 
year  but  expect  that,  as  a  practical  mat- 
ter, there  will  be  few  repeats  from  FY 
1985.  We  shall  consult  with  this  and 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ther  appropriate  committees  as  our 
rograms  continue. 
^"^      Overall,  we  are  proud  of  our  record 
'■'  n  assistance  to  Africa.  Economic  assist- 
nce  has  grown  from  $787  million  in 
981  to  over  $1  billion  in  1985,  not 
ounting  emergency  assistance.  In  a 
ear  of  extreme  budget  stringency  we 
re  proposing  a  modest  increase  for 
T  1986. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  just  like  to 
lote  that  Africans  have  long  recognized 
he  basic  interconnection  between  eco- 
lomics  and  politics,  between  economic 
;Towth  and  political  stability,  and  the 
everse.  African  governments  presently 
ace  an  unusually  large  number  of 
erious  economic  problems.  Most  are 
acing  up  to  these  problems,  if  not 
ilways  at  the  speed  that  outsiders,  in- 
cluding the  United  States,  would  wish. 
This  situation  underscores  the  political 
Tilnerability  of  many  countries,  which 
)thers  are  willing  to  exploit.  It  is  essen- 
;ial  that  our  response  be  as  varied  as  the 
)roblems  are  diverse.  I  have  already 
overed  the  economic  and  would  now 
ike  to  turn  to  the  security  side. 

Security  Assistance 

Dur  security  assistance  program  for 
Africa  recognizes  that  political  security 
and  economic  security  are  inextricably 
ntertwined.  It  is  concentrated  in  areas 
where  we  have  security  interests  and 
where  the  threat  is  tangible  and  clear. 
We  are  painfully  aware  from  the  Soviet 
practice  that  massive  arms  aid  tied  to 
ineager  economic  assistance  results  ulti- 
mately in  structural  disarmament— that 
is,  the  phenomena  of  "rusting-iron" 
monuments  to  military  friendship  found 
j  in  areas  where  the  local  economy  simply 
I  cannot  support  the  maintenance  of  the 
military  hardware  provided.  Almost  83% 
,  of  our  total  foreign  assistance  request 
for  Africa  is  in  the  form  of  economic 
and  food  aid.  The  relatively  small  mili- 
tary assistance  request  is  almost  all 
grant  in  recognition  of  Africa's  massive 
economic  problems.  By  encouraging  the 
development  of  an  educated  and  profes- 
sionalized military,  our  security  assist- 
ance program  reinforces  the  structure 
on  which  the  stability  necessary  for 
economic  growth  and  stability  depend. 
We  must  recognize,  however,  that 
Africa  faces  genuine  security  threats. 
Our  security  assistance  is  intended  to 
promote  stability  in  the  face  of  Libyan, 
Soviet,  and  Cuban  adventurism.  States 
threatened  by  this  adventurism  or 
hostile  neighbors  cannot  devote  the 
energy  or  resources  necessary  for  eco- 
nomic development.  U.S.  assistance  per- 
mits friendly  countries  to  acquire 


modest  quantities  of  military  equipment 
in  order  to  improve  the  border  patrol 
and  self-defense  capabilities  of  their 
armed  forces,  thereby  decreasing  terri- 
torial threats  and  enhancing  regional 
stability.  Transfers  of  sophisticated 
weapons  are  discouraged. 

Our  request  for  FY  1986  is  roughly 
the  same  as  in  FY  1985.  Of  our  total 
1986  request  for  Africa,  just  over  $1.2 
billion,  only  17%  is  for  military-related 
assistance.  While  the  military  component 
is  small,  it  is,  nevertheless,  extremely 
important  if  we  are  to  continue  the  pro- 
grams of  logistics  and  training  that  we 
have  started  and  if  we  are  to  provide 
the  bare  minimum  in  the  way  of  defense 
equipment  for  our  friends  facing  threats. 

In  the  Horn  of  Africa,  our  security 
assistance  is  directed  toward: 

•  Helping  Somalia  defend  itself 
against  attacks  by  Ethiopian  forces  and 
Ethiopian-supported  rebels; 

•  Assisting  Sudan  in  protecting 
itself  from  Libyan  incursions;  and 

•  Helping  Kenya  and  Djibouti  to 
modernize  their  forces. 

These  efforts  are  clearly — in 
magnitude  and  choice  of  equipment — de- 
fensive, not  offensive.  Our  assistance  is 
coupled  with  diplomatic  efforts,  by  our- 
selves and  our  allies,  to  reduce  tensions 
in  the  area  and  to  find  ways  to  diffuse 
tense  border  situations  that  could  flare 
up  into  major  military  confrontations. 

Southern  Africa  remains  an  area  of 
continued  effort.  Aid  to  nations  in  south- 
ern Africa  (Botswana,  Mozambique,  and 
Zimbabwe)  is  geared  toward  reducing 
tensions  and  encouraging  the  evolution 
of  an  internationally  acceptable  agree- 
ment for  the  independence  of  Namibia. 

Oiu-  initiative  to  provide  security 
assistance  to  Mozambique  warrants 
special  mention.  By  providing  nonlethal 
items — such  as  uniforms,  communica- 
tions equipment,  trucks,  and  training — 
we  are  working  in  parallel  with  our 
allies  to  reinforce  Mozambique's  support 
of  regional  stability  by  offering  an  alter- 
native to  total  dependence  on  the 
Eastern  bloc  for  military  supply.  At  the 
same  time  this  assistance  will  bring  the 
Mozambican  Armed  Forces  into  contact 
with  the  U.S.  military. 

A  more  detailed  analysis  of  our  re- 
quest will  put  it  in  context.  The  1986 
MAP  [military  assistance  program]  re- 
quest is  for  $189.4  million;  the  1985  re- 
quest was  for  $190.5  million;  and  the  ac- 
tual allocation  as  a  result  of  the  continu- 
ing resolution  process  was  $149.0 
million.  You  can  see  that  our  1986  re- 
quest is  virtually  the  same  as  the  1985 
request.  The  1986  FMS  [foreign  military 


AFRICA 


sales]  credit  request  is  $18.0  million,  up 
$8  million  over  1985  as  a  result  of  an  in- 
crease in  Cameroon  and  the  addition  of 
$5.0  million  for  Gabon.  Only  three  coun- 
tries in  sub-Saharan  Africa  receive  FMS 
credits:  Gabon,  Cameroon,  and 
Botswana.  Our  FY  1986  IMET  [interna- 
tional military  education  and  training] 
request  is  for  $11.5  million.  The  FY 
1985  request  was  for  $11.1  million,  and 
the  actual  allocation  was  $10.9  million. 
Our  IMET  program  (request  and  actual) 
has  remained  remarkably  con.stant  and 
continues  to  be  one  of  our  most  effective 
tools  in  Africa. 

Three  new  programs  are  contained 
in  the  1986  request.  We  propose  a  small 
MAP  program  for  Equatorial  Guinea. 
This  $1.0  million  program  would  begin 
to  refurbish  Equatorial  Guinea's  patrol 
boats  and  hopefully  provide  the  navy 
with  at  least  a  minimal  capability.  The 
Soviets  provided  the  original  equipment 
and  did  not  support  it.  The  patrol  craft 
are  currently  not  in  seaworthy  condition. 
Equatorial  Guinea  is  another  of  the 
growing  list  of  countries  that  are  turn- 
ing to  the  West  and  the  LInited  States 
for  assistance  in  the  wake  of  Soviet  mis- 
treatment. 

We  also  propose  to  begin  small 
IMET  programs  in  Sao  Tome  and  in  the 
Comoros.  Both  countries  are  well  aware 
of  the  IMET  program  and  are  anxious 
to  send  a  few  officers  to  the  United 
States  for  training.  Relations  have  im- 
proved with  both  countries,  and  we 
would  like  to  offer  these  programs  as  a 
demonstration  of  intention  to  continue 
the  warming  trend  in  our  relationships 
as  well  as  begin  to  have  more  contact 
with  the  military  leadership  which 
formerly  had  contacts  only  with  the 
Soviet  bloc. 

Refugees 

Another  important  element  of  U.S. 
policy  in  Africa,  closely  related  to  the 
question  of  the  drought  and  the  mass 
movements  of  people  across  borders 
which  it  has  caused,  is  that  of  U.S. 
refugee  assistance.  Though  many  of 
those  crossing  borders  in  the  past  6-8 
months  are  not  refugees  in  the  strict 
sense  that  they  are  fleeing  for  political 
reasons,  their  needs  are  equally  impossi- 
ble to  ignore.  Thus,  in  places  where 
there  are  already  refugee  assistance  pro- 
grams, refugee  assistance  organizations 
such  as  the  UNHCR  [UN  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees],  ICRC  [Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross],  and 
numerous  other  private  voluntary 
organizations  have  taken  on  at  least 
temporary  responsibility  for  relief  of 
these  persons,  and  U.S.  contributions  in 


May  1985 


51 


AFRICA 


traditional  refugee  assistance  channels 
have  had  to  keep  pace  accordingly. 

The  number  of  refugees  in  Africa,  or 
people  being  dealt  with  as  refugees,  has 
increased  by  20%  since  mid-1984  to  2.5 
million.  About  40%  of  those  are  in 
Sudan,  particularly  in  eastern  Sudan. 
Commitments  to  UNHCR  and  ICRC  to 
date  in  FY  1985,  including  drawdowns 
of  the  emergency  refugee  and  migration 
assistance  fund,  now  total  $66.5  million. 
Total  U.S.  Government  assistance  to 
African  refugees  from  all  sources,  in- 
cluding food  and  in-kind  contributions,  is 
expected  to  reach  $150  million  in 
FY  1985  (compared  with  $105  million  in 
FY  1984). 

The  State  Department  budget  re- 
quest for  FY  1986  includes  a  total  of 
$48.5  million  for  UNHCR  and  ICRC 
refugee  operations  in  Africa.  Last  year 
at  this  time,  we  noted  that  refugee 
numbers  in  Africa  had  somewhat 
stabilized  and  expressed  our  hope  that 
we  could,  during  FY  1985,  turn  our 
focus  to  longer  term  efforts,  including 
enhanced  prospects  for  voluntary 
repatriation  and  programs  aimed  at  in- 
tegrating refugee  assistance  into  the 
overall  development  schemes  of  the  host 
countries.  This  is  still  our  hope,  and 
planning  for  U.S.  support  of  these 
longer  term  projects  continues  in 
tandem  with  our  emergency  efforts; 
some  have  already  been  funded.  The 
dire  situation  of  even  those  refugees 
who  have  been  settled  in  camps  for 
some  time  serves  to  point  up  the  need 
for  efforts  to  make  refugees  more  self- 
sufficient.  We  must  be  certain  that  these 
longer  term  efforts  are  not  lost  or 
neglected  in  the  aftermath  of  the  crash 
effort  we  are  now  making. 

Nevertheless,  we  will  also  have  to 
keep  our  eye  on  the  continuing  potential 
for  further  emergency  needs  and  be 
prepared  to  meet  them.  As  there  is  no 
way  of  predicting  such  variables  as  rain- 
fall, we  would  expect  to  continue  to 
meet  these  unanticipated,  and  "unan- 
ticipatable,"  needs  from  emergency 
funds  as  needs  arise.  We  also  will  be 
keeping  in  close  touch  with  the  major 
refugee  relief  and  assistance  organiza- 
tions as  they  develop  their  appeals  for 
the  coming  year. 

West  Africa 

Turning  to  the  regional  picture.  I  would 
like  to  begin  with  West  Africa. 

West  Africa  is  an  area  of  endemic 
poverty  and  political  instability  whose 
continued  deterioration  could  have 
serious  consequences  for  our  interests. 
Major  U.S.  objectives  in  the  area  are  to: 


•  Assist  in  long-term  development 
and  the  immediate  crisis  of  hunger  when 
it  occurs; 

•  Promote  regional  political  stability 
by  helping  governments  to  resist  exter- 
nal—  mainly  Libyan — adventurism  and 
destabilization; 

•  Foster  our  continued  access  to  im- 
portant raw  materials  and  markets  (e.g., 
Nigeria,  which  is  both  an  important  and 
relatively  secure  major  source  of  oil  and 
an  important  locus  of  U.S.  investments, 
and  (luinea  with  its  important  bauxite 
reserves);  and 

•  Continue  our  access  to  important 
ports  and  airfields  and  other  facilities. 

While  the  American  presence  and 
aid  levels  in  the  16  countries  of  West 
Africa  generally  are  not  large,  they  are 
significant.  In  drought-affected  coun- 
tries, such  as  Niger  and  Mali,  our 
emergency  assistance  is  crucial.  Dealing 
with  this  is  both  a  short-term  human- 
itarian problem  and  a  longer  term 
developmental  objective.  In  Senegal  our 
programs  are  designed  to  bolster  a 
friendly  democratic  government.  In  ad- 
dition to  providing  Senegal  the  largest 
amount  of  U.S.  development  assistance 
in  F'rancophone  Africa,  we  are  using 
HISF  to  enable  the  Senegalese  to  under- 
take significant  economic  policy  reforms 
under  the  auspices  of  the  World  Bank. 
Our  assistance  |)rograms  have  been 
coordinated  with  P>ance,  Senegal's 
largest  donor,  and  the  international 
financial  institutions.  We  also  seek  to 
continue  a  modest  but  highly  valued  $4 
million  MAP  program  in  FY  1986  to 
augment  Senegal's  capability  to  resist 
Libyan  subversion;  our  highly  successful 
IMET  program  trains  about  30  officers 
of  Senegal's  apolitical,  professional 
armed  forces  in  the  United  States.  We 
believe  that  this  mix  of  programs  in  FY 
1986  will  assist  this  friend  of  the  United 
States  to  initiate  policy  reforms  and  to 
])reserve  stability  in  this  key  area  in 
Africa. 

In  Liberia — where  the  United  States 
is  by  far  the  largest  aid  donor — our 
ESF,  development  assistance,  and  MAP 
programs  have  enabled  the  government 
to  withstand  serious  deflationary 
pressure  caused  by  a  precipitous  fall  in 
demand  for  its  major  exports  and  capital 
night  in  the  wake  of  the  1980  military 
coup.  Our  assistance  programs  to 
Liberia  are  part  of  a  carefully  balanced 
approach  aimed  at  promoting  economic 
recovery,  return  to  civilian  rule,  and 
political  stability  in  a  nation  which  is  our 
closest  ally  in  Africa.  Our  assistance 
levels  are  the  minimum  necessary  to 
prevent  an  economic  collapse  which 
could  destabilize  the  country  and  jeop- 
ardize subsUmtial  U.S.  interests,  in- 


cluding three  large  communications         jf 
facilities. 

U.S.  assistance  on  the  economic 
front  has  also  allowed  the  Liberian 
Government  to  make  progress  toward 
national  reconciliation  and  returning  the 
country  to  civilian,  constitutional 
government  by  January  1986.  In  the 
past  year,  Liberia  held  a  constitutional 
referendum,  lifted  the  ban  on  political 
activities,  and  began  registering  politica 
parties.  Although  there  have  been  prob- 
lems, including  a  bloody  student 
demonstration,  overall  progress  toward 
civilian  rule  has  been  excellent.  The 
United  States  and  other  Western  na- 
tions are  assisting  this  effort  through 
technical  and  financial  assistance.  The 
MAP  program  funds  housing,  nation- 
building  civic  action  programs,  and  a 
program  which  seeks  to  develop  profes- 
sionalism in  the  Liberian  military.  These 
programs  are  consistent  with  our  effort; 
to  encourage  the  return  to  civilian  rule. 

Our  other  development  assistance 
programs  are  concentrated  in  food  pro- 
duction programs  designed  to  induce 
needed  policy  reforms  and  reduce  the 
need  for  food  imports.  Evidence  of  im- 
portant policy  reform  can  be  seen  in 
countries  such  as  Senegal,  Mali,  and 
Niger  and  the  beginnings  of  policy 
reform  in  such  countries  as  Guinea, 
Sierra  Leone,  and  Guinea-Bissau. 

In  Ghana,  where  strained  political 
relations  necessitated  a  suspension  of 
aid  programs  in  1983,  the  government 
has  now  implemented  difficult  economic 
reforms  in  cooperation  with  the  IMF. 
Our  reinstated  aid  program  is  providing 
important  assistance  in  food  production, 
and  U.S.  emergency  food  aid  in  1984 
played  a  major  role  in  averting 
widespread,  drought-induced  famine. 

In  all  of  the  examples  cited,  there  is 
a  common  thread — of  helping  poor  peo- 
ple and  vulnerable  governments  to  bet- 
ter help  themselves  by  undertaking 
needed  policy  reform,  concentrating 
development  efforts  on  increased  food 
production,  and  providing,  where 
needed,  military  assistance  to  help  resist; 
outside  efforts  at  destabilization. 

East  Africa 

Our  economic  and  security  assistance  is 
programmed  to  strengthen  the  economic 
growth  and  domestic  stability  of  East 
African  countries  and  improve  their 
ability  to  defend  themselves  against  ex- 
ternal aggression.  A  number  of  coun- 
tries— including  Kenya,  Sudan,  Somalia, 
Mauritius,  and  Madagascar — have 
undertaken  tight,  much-needed  economic 
adjustment  programs  to  establish  a 
stronger  basis  for  self-sustaining 


52 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA 


rowth.  Two  countries,  Somalia  and 
Madagascar,  are  in  the  process  of  cor- 
seting earlier  severe  economic  distor- 
ons.  Last  month,  for  example,  the  IMF 
Dproved  a  standby  agreement  and  addi- 
^  onal  funding  to  compensate  for  lost  ex- 
ort  earnings — critical  financial  assist- 
nce  in  support  of  major  economic 
jforms  undertaken  by  the  Somali 
overnment.  Our  aid  programs  focus  in 
''jveral  cases  on  quick-disbursing  ESF 
■  rants  which  enable  importation  of 
eeded  inputs  to  agriculture  and  com- 
lerce  and  provide  the  catalysts  for 
nancial  assistance  from  other  donors  as 
ell  as  assistance  complementary  to  that 
■om  international  organizations  such  as 
le  IMF  and  World  Bank. 

In  Sudan  the  United  States  has 
laved  a  leading  role  in  an  extraordinary 
iternational  effort  which  has  mobilized 
esources  to  enable  Sudan  to  meet 
ecurring  payments  for  imports  essential 
0  development  and  other  obligations, 
'hrough  quick-disbursing  commodity  im- 
port program  funds  and,  when 
lecessary,  cash  grants,  we  have  played 
,  central  role  in  helping  Sudan  manage 
ts  economic  resources  within  the 
:uidelines  of  IMF  and  consultative 
:roup  programs.  Sudan  is  a  case  study 
if  the  difficulty  of  a  sustained  reform  ef- 
ort,  of  the  need  for  consistent  but 
riendly  encouragement  and  support, 
.nd,  at  the  same  time,  firmness  in  seek- 
ng  the  changes  that  are  absolutely 
ssential  for  long-term  growth. 

Our  ESF  and  PL  480  assistance  has 
')een  conditioned  on  the  Sudanese  under- 
aking  basic  economic  reforms  to  expand 
)pportunities  and  competitiveness  in  the 
orivate  sector,  liberalize  commodity  pric- 
ing, and  provide  incentives  for  export 
Droduction.  Our  development  assistance 
)rojects,  meanwhile,  have  addressed  the 
problem  of  expanding  productivity, 
especially  in  the  agricultural  sector,  and 
improving  public  sector  management  to 
strengthen  leadership  skills  for  longer 
;erm  growth. 

In  response,  the  Sudanese  Govern- 
•nent  has,  over  3  years,  done  much  to 
stimulate  agricultural  production 
through  higher  prices  to  farmers  and  to 
overcome  distortions  in  exchange  rate 
management.  However,  the  process 
stalled  seriously  during  1984,  and 
Sudan's  standing  with  the  international 
donors  and  financial  community  was 
damaged.  In  recent  weeks,  the  Sudanese 
Government  has  reinvigorated  its 
economic  policy  management  and  begun 
to  move  forward  again.  It  has  removed 
budget  subsidies  on  consumer  com-^ 
modifies  that  were  deepening  deficits; 
made  further  devaluations  in  the  official 
exchange  rate;  agreed  to  liberalize  the 


commercial  rate,  which  will  once  again 
give  producers  a  fairer  return  on  their 
products;  and,  within  the  last  week,  pro- 
posed other  measures  to  close  the 
budget  deficit. 

These  are  major  short-  and  long- 
term  structural  reform  accomplishments 
for  the  country  which,  in  terms  of  pro- 
portional magnitude  of  debt,  is  the 
African  equivalent  to  Brazil  or  Mexico  in 
Latin  America.  We  have  been  engaged 
in  an  intensive  dialogue  with  the  govern- 
ment over  the  delays  in  the  implementa- 
tion of  additional  much-needed  struc- 
tural reforms  and  are  encouraged  by  re- 
cent measures  announced  by  Sudan's 
economic  leadership.  Our  ESF  and 
PL  480  Title  I  food  aid  are  linked  to 
progress  in  Sudan's  reform  policies, 
leveraging  Sudanese  cooperation  in  this 
difficult  recovery  process,  and  providing 
the  cushion  of  painful  domestic  ad- 
justments. 

Continual  instability  and  external 
threats  in  the  region  increase  the 
pressure  on  East  African  countries  to 
develop  effective  defensive  forces. 
Sudan  continues  to  be  threatened  by 
subversion  from  within  and  without  by 
forces  and  elements  supported  by  Libya 
and  Ethiopia.  Last  year  the  Libyans 
mounted  an  air  attack  close  to  the 
capital,  underlining  the  need  for  more 
effective  air  defense  systems.  The  grow- 
ing security  problem  on  two  borders  ex- 
acerbates the  internal  political  tasks  of 
the  Government  of  Sudan.  We  have 
made  clear  to  Sudan  that  our  military 
assistance  is  not  for  pursuit  of  a  military 
solution  to  problems  in  the  south.  Presi- 
dent Nimeiri,  on  Sunday,  March  3,  took 
this  position  clearly,  announcing  an  im- 
mediate unilateral  cease-fire  against  the 
rebels  and  his  intention  to  pursue  a 
political  solution. 

Our  security  assistance  in  1986  is 
vital  for  Somalia  to  control  its  borders 
and  manage  its  own  destiny.  Somalia  is 
still  engaged  in  an  active  border  conflict 
with  Ethiopia.  Ethiopian  troops  still  oc- 
cupy two  Somali  villages.  Ethiopians 
bombed  a  Somali  town  in  the  north  and 
have  repeatedly  engaged  in  border 
harassments.  Insurgent  activity  has  in- 
creased over  the  last  year  in  the  north. 
Our  assistance  to  Somalia  is  no  threat  to 
other  countries,  being  only  a  fraction  of 
what  is  being  supplied  to  Ethiopia,  but  is 
essential  to  the  improvement  of 
Somalia's  limited  defensive  capability. 
We  and  our  allies  continue,  meanwhile, 
to  encourage— through  every  diplomatic 
way  possible— a  lessening  of  tensions  in 
the  region  and  a  process  for  overcoming 
border  and  other  divisive  issues.  We  are 
pleased  with  the  progress  in  better  rela- 
tions between  Kenya  and  Somalia,  in 


which  old  enmities  are  being  overcome 
through  statesmanship  and  cooperation. 
Unfortunately,  no  such  progress  has 
been  possible  between  Ethiopia  and 
Somalia,  but  our  position,  we  believe, 
has  helped  to  dissuade  a  resort  to  large- 
scale  military  attacks  across  the  borders, 
despite  the  continuation  of  lower  level 
violence. 

Kenya  occupies  an  important  posi- 
tion on  the  Indian  Ocean  in  proximity  to 
Southwest  Asia.  Our  national  security 
objective  is  to  ensure  our  continued  ac- 
cess to  the  region  in  time  of  crisis. 
Kenya  permits  our  Navy  ships  access  to 
its  port  facilities,  the  only  modern  work- 
ing port  between  Durban  and  Port  Said. 
This  access  provides  our  vessels  with 
fuel,  provisions,  repair  facilities,  and 
crew  liberty  and  has  made  a  major  con- 
tribution toward  the  continued  deploy- 
ment of  our  naval  forces  in  the  western 
Indian  Ocean. 

Kenya  is  struggling  through  a 
severe  economic  crisis,  brought  on  by 
the  worldwide  recession  coupled  with  its 
own  serious  economic  structural 
weaknesses.  Kenya  has  taken  tough 
measures  to  limit  its  critical  balance-of- 
payments  and  foreign  exchange  deficits 
through  devaluation,  import  reductions, 
and  budget  cuts.  Fortunately,  assistance 
from  the  Worid  Bank,  the  IMF,  and  the 
world  donor  community  in  support  of 
Kenya's  short-  and  long-term  reform  ef- 
forts is  proving  successful. 

Central  Africa 

Our  security  and  political  objectives  in 
the  central  African  region  are  to: 

•  Help  maintain  political  stability 
and  foster  friendly  relations; 

•  Assist  governments  to  resist 
Soviet  and  Libyan  destabilization,  par- 
ticularly Libyan  subversion  and  aggres- 
sion in  Chad;  and 

•  Provide  key  countries  with  securi- 
ty assistance  needed  for  legitimate  self- 
defense. 

Our  economic  objectives  are  to: 

•  Assist  governments  in  pursuing 
effective  economic  and  development 
policies; 

•  Encourage  food  production;  and 

•  Provide  emergency  food  aid  where 
needed. 

The  United  States  has  a  major 
policy  stake  in  ensuring  an  independent 
Chad  in  the  face  of  direct  Libyan  ag- 
gression. Libyan  occupation  of  Chad  in 
1980-81  created  serious  fears  through- 
out the  region  and  led  to  strong  African 
reaction.  Unfortunately,  Libya  entered 
Chad  again  in  force  in  1983,  threatening 


53 


AFRICA 


the  recognized  government,  and  its 
forces  continue  to  occupy  the  country's 
north.  Our  security  assistance  support 
for  Chad  is  designed  to  complement  the 
efforts  of  France,  which  has  the  primary 
role  in  assisting  Chad's  security. 
Because  of  its  shattered  economic  base, 
Chad  needs  fast-disbursing  ESF  to 
restore  basic  civilian  services  and 
development  activity  as  well  as  MAP  to 
strengthen  its  capabilities  to  face  possi- 
ble attacks  and  continued  subversion 
directed  by  Libya.  Emergency  aid  is  be- 
ing provided  to  prevent  what  could  be 
major  famine  and  malnutrition. 

Zaire  has  been  a  firm  friend  and  has 
supported  U.S.  policies;  it  contributes 
substantially  to  stability  in  central 
Africa  through  its  pro- Western  foreign 
policy.  For  example,  it  supports  the 
Chadian  Government  and  provides  train- 
ing in  Zaire  to  Chadian  troops.  In  addi- 
tion, Zaire  has  close  ties  with  Israel, 
with  which  it  reestablished  diplomatic 
relations  in  1982.  A  neighbor  of  conflict- 
ridden  Angola,  Zaire  is  equally  a  critical 
country  in  the  search  for  peaceful 
resolution  of  southern  African  conflicts. 
Zaire's  military  has  long  been  under- 
funded, and  our  MAP  program  is 
designed  to  get  Zaire  programs  back  on 
their  feet,  particularly  in  the  key  airlift 
area.  The  importance  of  this  program 
was  demonstrated  last  November  when 
Zairian  forces  were  airlifted  in  a 
U.S. -provided  C-130  to  recapture  a 
town  in  eastern  Zaire  that  had  been 
seized  by  antigovernment  rebels. 

Zaire  has  taken  major  steps  to 
reform  its  economy.  The  marketing  of 
copper  and  cobalt  has  been  reorganized 
to  ensure  that  the  state  mining  enter- 
prise, Gecamines,  receives  the  revenues 
from  its  exports  so  that  it  can  rebuild  its 
capital  base  and  undertake  new  in- 
vestments. The  Government  of  Zaire  has 
continued,  for  the  second  full  year,  to 
adhere  closely  to  an  IMF-sponsored  pro- 
gram of  austerity  and  reform.  The 
results  have  been  impressive.  The  an- 
nual inflation  rate  has  been  reduced 
from  over  100%  to  under  20%.  A 
market-based  foreign  exchange  system 
has  been  successfully  introduced,  and 
the  black  market  for  foreign  exchange 
has  virtually  disappeared.  The  govern- 
ment payroll  has  been  cut,  IMF- 
mandated  budget  ceilings  have  been 
respected,  and  internal  price  controls 
lifted.  After  years  of  decline,  the 
economy  is  now  growing,  and  there  are 
increasing  signs  of  a  revival  in  business 
confidence. 

Our  FY  1986  request  is  designed  to 
help  support  Zaire's  efforts  to  continue 
along  this  path.  By  doing  so,  we  help 


prevent  the  reform  effort  from  stalling 
and  lay  the  groundwork  for  longer  term 
and  equitable  economic  development. 

Cameroon  provides  the  example  of 
building  on  success.  It  is  one  of  the  few 
countries  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  which 
is  normally  self-sufficient  in  food  pro- 
duction, though  the  current  drought 
has  affected  the  country's  far  north. 
Cameroon's  policies,  including  emphasis 
on  the  private  sector  and  active  en- 
couragement of  foreign  investment, 
have  been  conducive  to  sound  develop- 
ment programs.  Cameroon's  petroleum 
resources  have  contributed  in  large 
measure  to  the  country's  relative  pros- 
perity; but,  since  its  petroleum  reserves 
are  limited,  Cameroon's  long-term 
economic  viability  rests  on  agriculture. 

Thus,  we  have  targeted  our  develop- 
ment assistance  in  Cameroon  to  ensur- 
ing continued  self-sufficiency  in  food 
production.  Projects  are  focused  on  two 
related  sectors— agriculture  and  rural 
education.  With  a  proposed  budget  of 
$20..5  million  in  FY  198.5  and  $21.5 
million  in  FY  1986,  our  economic  aid 
emphasis  is  on  the  construction  of  an 
agricultural  university  and  the  design  of 
its  programs,  as  well  as  work  in  primary 
education  with  children  who  will  be  stay- 
ing in  the  rural  areas  rather  than 
migrating  to  the  cities  and  seeking 
higher  education  there.  Our  FY  1986 
security  assistance  program  is  modest 
($7  milHon  FMS  loans;  $225,000  IMET), 
aimed  at  technical  training  and  ground 
transport  vehicles.  Cameroon  borders  on 
Chad  and  seeks  to  improve  the  mobility 
and  efficiency  of  its  modest  defense 
forces. 

Southern  Africa 

We  are  engaged  in  a  major  diplomatic 
effort  in  southern  Africa  to  decrease  the 
level  of  violence  and  establish  more 
stable  bases  for  regional  security  and  to 
achieve  movement  of  South  Africa  away 
from  apartheid  and  toward  a  more  just 
system  based  on  the  consent  of  all  the 
governed.  These  objectives  are  inter- 
related. As  long  as  the  level  of  cross- 
border  violence  and  the  perception  of 
threat  remain  high,  it  will  be  difficult  to 
generate  among  white  South  Africans 
the  political  will  necessary  to  move 
toward  real  reform.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  question  that,  for  as  long  as 
it  exists,  apartheid  will  be  a  source  of 
conflict  and  instability  in  the  region, 
creating  opportunities  for  outside  in- 
tervention. 

We  have  seen  progress  toward  these 
objectives.  Our  agenda  of  diplomatic 
resolution  of  conflicts  and  of  economic 
development  has  replaced  an  orientation 


toward  armed  conflict  which  favored 
only  our  adversaries.  The  Nkomati  and 
Lusaka  accords  between,  respectively. 
South  Africa  and  Mozambique  and 
South  Africa  and  Angola  have  greatly 
decreased  the  level  of  cross-border 
violence  and  halted  fighting  between  the 
armies  of  the  countries  concerned.  Our 
effort  to  achieve  Namibian  independence 
on  the  basis  of  UN  Resolution  435  has 
made  important  progress.  We  now  have 
concrete  proposals  on  the  table  from 
both  Angola  and  South  Africa  and  are 
exploring  how  to  bring  them  closer 
together. 

These  achievements  are  fragile  and 
incomplete.  Much  remains  to  be  done. 
The  area  has  vast  development  poten- 
tial, but  this  potential  can  never  be 
achieved  as  long  as  the  problems  of  war 
economic  disruption,  racism,  and  foreigr 
intervention  persist.  Our  assistance  pro- 
grams are  designed  to  achieve  greater 
regional  security,  economic  develop- 
ment, peaceful  change,  and  reform  in 
South  Africa.  They  are  a  tangible 
demonstration  that  we,  and  not  our 
adversaries,  have  the  capacity  and  will- 
ingness to  help  the  countries  in  the 
region  achieve  peace  and  better  the  lives 
of  their  people. 

We  strongly  endorse  and  support 
the  objectives  of  the  Southern  African 
Development  Coordination  Conference 
(SADCC),  which  seeks  to  coordinate 
development  projects  of  the  nine 
majority-ruled  governments  in  southern 
Africa.  AID  [Agency  for  International 
Development]  provides  direct  technical 
and  financial  support  to  the  SADCC 
Secretariat  and  works  with  SADCC  in 
various  areas,  including  agricultural 
research,  manpower  development,  food 
security,  and  transportation. 

In  Zambia  the  Kaunda  government 
remains  committed  to  a  difficult  pro- 
gram of  economic  reform  necessitated 
by  depressed  world  mineral  prices  and 
decline  in  other  sectors  such  as  agri- 
culture. Because  of  the  government's  ef- 
forts, Zambia  has  been  selected  as  one 
of  four  nations  to  benefit  from  the  addi- 
tional funding  the  Congress  has  made 
available  in  support  of  African  economic 
reform  initiatives.  In  addition  to  this 
special  funding,  our  proposed  aid  pro- 
gram for  FY  1986  would  continue  to 
assist  Zambia's  economic  recovery 
through  the  commodity  import  program 
and  development  of  the  agricultural 
sector. 

Malawi  has  also  been  selected  for 
special  funding  under  the  economic 
reform  program.  This  country  has  been 
fortunate,  due  to  climate  and  sensible 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


igricultural  policies,  not  to  be  so  severe- 
y  affected  by  the  drought.  It  remains, 
lowever,  extremely  poor  and  warrants 
)ur  support  as  it  undertakes  new  ini- 
iatives  to  diversify  and  strengthen  its 
iconomy. 

Our  aid  is  helping  Zimbabwe  to  stay 
)n  a  sound  economic  footing.  Our  efforts 
ire  focused  on  the  private  sector,  where 
in  invaluable  commodity  import  pro- 
p-am has  alleviated  foreign  exchange 
imitations  that  otherwise  would  have 
stalled  industrial  and  commercial 
•ecovery.  The  private  agricultural  sector 
laturally  suffered  under  the  region's 
evere  drought,  but  all  things  con- 
sidered, coped  fairly  well  and,  with  im- 
proved weather  this  year,  now  seems 
Doised  for  major  increases  in  production. 

Mozambique  has  made  major 
lesirable  changes  in  orientation  over  the 
oast  18  months,  and  we  have  responded 
3y  developing  diplomatic  relationships 
and  economic  assistance  programs  in- 
tended to  show  our  support  for  the 
zhange.  I  have  already  mentioned  the 
Nkomati  accord,  a  key  move  away  from 
armed  confrontation.  Mozambique  has, 
since  then,  moved  toward  greater  par- 
ticipation in  the  Western  economic 
system.  It  has  joined  the  IMF  and  World 
Bank,  adhered  to  the  Lome  Convention, 
and  signed  an  OPIC  [Overseas  Private 
Investment  Corporation]  agreement  and 
a  Paris  Club  rescheduling.  It  v/as  one  of 
the  worst  drought-affected  countries  in 
the  region,  and  we  have  responded  with 
'i large-scale  emergency  food  assistance. 
Our  assistance  programs— including  a 
proposed  military  assistance  pro- 
gram—demonstrate tangibly  our  support 
for  the  Machel  regime  and  the  reforms 
it  has  undertaken.  This  support  is  par- 
ticularly timely,  since  the  Mozambican 
Government's  turn  away  from  heavy 
reliance  on  the  Soviet  Union  is  being 
called  into  question  by  continued  anti- 
government  violence  committed  by 
;  Renamo,  a  movement  initially  created  by 
I  Ian  Smith's  Rhodesia,  nurtured  prior  to 
[  the  Nkomati  accord  by  the  South 
African  Government,  and  still  supported 
by  neocolonialist  Portuguese. 

Our  assistance  program  within 
South  Africa  is  one  of  the  pillars  of  our 
policy  toward  that  country.  It  demon- 
strates clearly  that  our  policy  is  not 
limited  to  a  narrow  range  of  issues  nor 
to  dialogue  with  the  South  African 
Government  alone.  It  also  encourages  in- 
dividuals and  groups  striving  for  change 
in  South  Africa. 

Working  directly  with  regional 
organizations,  private  voluntary 
organizations,  local  community  groups, 
and  individuals,  our  assistance  program 


is  aimed  at  improving  educational  and 
training  opportunities  for  disadvantaged 
South  Africans.  Such  training  is  essen- 
tial to  assure  that  strong  and  responsi- 
ble leadership  is  available  to  assume  in- 
creasingly greater  positions  of  respon- 
sibility and  authority  in  both  the  public 
and  private  sectors. 

Assistance  projects  address  educa- 
tional and  skills  training  through  tutorial 


programs,  scholarship  programs,  pro- 
grams for  black  entrepreneurs,  and 
labor  union  leaders  as  well  as  significant 
human  rights  and  self-help  projects. 


'The  complete  trunscrifil  of  the  heuriMjjs 
will  he  puhii.shed  hy  the  committee  and  will 
he  availahle  from  tlie  Superinlendi'iit  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washint^ton,  D.C.  20401^.  ■ 


U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations 
on  Nuclear  and  Space  Arms 


President  Reagan  with  the  U.S.  arms  control  negotiating  team 
and  John  Tower  and  Maynard  Glitman. 


(Whitf  House  photo  by  Mary  Anne  Fackelman) 

Max  Kampelman  (left) 


PRESIDENTS  REMARKS. 
MAR.  8,  1985' 

The  challenge  of  statesmanship  is  to 
have  the  vision  to  dream  of  a  Ijetter, 
safer  world  and  the  courage,  per- 
sistence, and  patience  to  turn  that 
dream  into  reality.  Since  the  dawn  of 
the  nuclear  era,  all  God's  children  have 
lived  with  the  fear  of  nuclear  war  and 
the  danger  of  nuclear  devastation.  Our 
moral  imperative  is  to  work  with  all  our 
power  for  that  day  when  the  children  of 
the  world  can  grow  up  without  the  fear 
of  nuclear  war. 

So,  today,  we  reaffirm  that  vision:  a 
world  dedicated  to  the  elimination  of 
nuclear  weapons,  a  world  in  which  tech- 
nology provides  ever  greater  safety 
rather  than  greater  fear.  Today,  we  set 
out  on  a  new  path  toward  agreements 
which  radically  reduce  the  size  and 
destructive  power  of  existing  nuclear 
missiles. 

Soviet  leader  Konstantin  Chernenko 
said  last  month:  "Our  ultimate  objective 
here  is  the  complete  elimination  of 
nuclear  weapons  everywhere  on  this 
planet,  the  complete  removal  of  the 
threat  of  nuclear  war."  Well,  I  welcome 
that  statement  and  assure  Mr. 
Chernenko  that  the  elimination  of 


nuclear  weapons  is  also  the  ultimate  ob- 
jective of  the  American  Government  and 
the  American  people. 

It's  now  our  task  and  responsibility 
to  take  practical  steps  to  turn  this  vision 
into  reality.  We  should  have  no  illusions 
that  this  will  be  easy,  since  any  venture 
of  this  magnitude  will  take  time.  And 
since  the  most  vital  security  interests  of 
both  sides  are  at  stake,  this  will  clearly 
be  long  and  difficult.  We're  realistic 
because  we  know  that  our  differences 
with  the  Soviet  Union  are  great.  Pa- 
tience, strength,  and  unity — Western 
unity — will,  therefore,  be  required  if 
we're  to  have  a  successful  outcome. 

Next  week,  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  meet  in  Geneva  to 
begin  a  new  dialogue  on  these  issues. 
And  above  all,  we  seek  agreement  as 
soon  as  possible  on  real  and  verifiable 
reductions  in  American  and  Soviet  offen- 
sive nuclear  arms.  For  our  part,  the 
United  States  is  ready  with  firmness, 
patience,  and  understanding  to  negotiate 
fair  and  equitable  agreements  reducing 
the  dangers  of  nuclear  war  and  enhanc- 
ing strategic  stability. 

I've  just  concluded  a  very  good 
meeting  with  our  three  negotiators.  Am- 
bassadors Max  Kampelman,  John 
Tower,  and  Mike  Glitman,  which 


May  1985 


55 


ARMS  CONTROL 


culminates  an  extensive  round  of 
preparations.  In  the  meeting  I  gave  my 
instructions  for  the  first  round  of  talks. 
These  instructions  enabled  our  nego- 
tiators to  explore  every  promising 
avenue  for  progress.  And  they  have  my 
personal  support. 

Like  Americans  everywhere,  I  want 
these  negotiations  to  succeed  and  will  do 
everything  I  can  to  ensure  that  this  hap- 
pens. And  I  pray  that  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship is  prepared  to  make  the  same  com- 
mitment. 

I  want  to  thank  our  team  for  the 
fine  work  that  they've  already  done  in 
getting  ready  for  this  endeavor.  As  all 
of  you  prepare  to  leave  for  Geneva,  I 
can't  think  of  a  more  welcome  message 
than  an  unmistakable  vote  of  confidence 
from  the  American  people  and  the  Con- 
gress. 

Ambassadors  Kampelman,  Tower, 
and  Glitman  and  all  the  members  of  our 
negotiating  team,  I  know  that  all  of  our 
fellow  Americans  wish  you  every  suc- 
cess. And  I  know  from  my  conversations 
with  the  bipartisan  leadership  of  the 
Congress  that  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  joins  in  supporting  you. 

So,  to  all  of  you — those  who  will  be 
at  Geneva  and  those  who  will  be  sup- 
porting this  crucial  effort  from 
Washington — best  wishes,  and  God  bless 
you. 


NATIONAL  SECURITY 
ADVISER  McFARLANE'S 
STATEMENT, 
MAR.  8.  19852 

The  President  met  this  morning  with  the 
three  negotiators  leading  the  groups  on 
strategic  offensive  arms,  intermediate- 
range  arms,  and  defense  and  space 
systems  as  they  prepared  to  depart  for 
Geneva  this  afternoon.  In  that  meeting, 
the  President  expressed  the  hope  that 
he  places  on  these  negotiations,  prem- 
ised foremostly  upon  the  declared  objec- 
tive of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  to  agree  upon  reductions  in  offen- 
sive systems,  leading  ultimately  to  their 
total  elimination. 

At  the  same  time,  the  President 
stressed  his  concern  over  trends  in  the 
strategic  balance  which  are  worrisome 
and  must  be  arrested,  and  he  focused  in 
particular  upon  the  fact  that  the  balance 
is  out  of  kilter  in  offensive  systems,  par- 
ticularly in  those  which  have  a  prompt, 
hard-target,  kill  capability. 

He  referred,  as  well,  to  new  systems 
which  are  in  the  wings  which  promise  to 
contribute  a  further  desUibilizing  ele- 
ment, and  he,  mentioned  in  particular 
the  possibility  of  MIRVed  [multiple  inde- 


Ambassador  Kampelman.  head  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  with  Ambassador  Viktor  P.  Karpo' 
(left),  head  of  the  Soviet  delegation,  at  the  Soviet  mission  in  Geneva. 


pendently-targetable  reentry  vehicle], 
mobile,  land-based  systems.  He  also  re- 
ferred to  the  poor  record  of  Soviet  com- 
pliance with  past  arms  control 
agreements  and  the  importance  that  we 
deal  forthrightly  with  it  if  we  are  to 
achieve  agreements  in  which  both  sides 
can  have  some  confidence  in  the  future. 

He  believed  that  in  some,  these 
several  activities — the  trends  and  the 
balance,  the  character  of  new  systems, 
the  history  of  noncompliance — 
has  called  into  question  the  fundamental 
framework  on  which  deterrence  has 
rested  for  the  past  10  years  or  so.  At 
the  same  time,  he  said  that  there  are 
promising  elements  in  the  mix,  and,  in 
particular,  he  said  he  believes  that  if  we 
and  the  Soviets  can  come  to  terms, 
there  is  on  the  horizon  the  possibility 
that  we  can  move  away  from  offensive 
nuclear  systems  and  toward  defensive 
systems  and  that  we  should  open 
promptly  a  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  this  regard. 

Turning  to  the  specific  agenda  of 
these  negotiations,  the  President 
stressed  that  his  objective  remains 
significant  reductions  in  offensive  forces; 
in  addition,  under  terms  that  would  be 
verifiable,  that  would  lead  to  equality, 
and  which  would  improve  stability.  Sec- 
ondly, he  stressed  that  we  must  try  to 
arrest  the  erosion  of  the  ABM  Treaty, 
which  was  treated  in  last  month's  com- 
pliance report  sent  to  the  Congress. 

Further,  however,  the  President  said 
that  in  our  approach  to  how  we  get 
reductions  in  offensive  forces,  the 
United  States  need  not  try  to  dictate  the 
character  of  the  Soviet  force  structure 
and  that  we  should  approach  that  issue 
flexibly.  The  ultimate  goal  remains  to 


achieve  significant  reductions  in  START 
but  we  are  willing  to  meet  the  Soviet 
Union  halfway  in  the  approach  we  take 
to  this. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  approached 
these  talks  in  the  past,  focusing  upon 
launchers  as  a  unit  of  account;  the 
United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  focus- 
ing upon  ballistic  missile  warheads  and 
throwweight. 

The  President  has  provided  guidanc 
that  makes  possible  the  bridging  of 
these  differences  for  this  round.  We 
have  no  desire  to  dictate  the  structure  c 
U.S.  and  Soviet  missile  forces.  We  sim- 
ply want  to  set  overall  limits  on  them. 

In  addition,  because  bombers  and 
their  weapons  pose  less  of  a  threat  to 
stability,  they  are  fundamentally 
retaliatory  systems  that  are  poorly 
suited  for  use  in  a  surprise  attack.  We 
believe  that  they  ought  to  be  limited 
separately  from  ballistic  missiles  and 
their  warheads.  Nevertheless,  we  are 
also  proposing  limits  on  heavy  bombers 
and  on  the  number  of  ALCMs  [air- 
launched  cruise  missiles]  that  they  carry 
below  the  limits  that  were  set  in  SALT 
II. 

We're,  therefore,  ready  to  explore 
trade-offs  between  areas  of  U.S.  and 
Soviet  advantage  and  interest  to  con- 
sider provisions  that  would  allow  a 
Soviet  advantage  in  ballistic  missile 
capability  in  return  for  a  U.S.  advantage 
in  bomber  capability.  We  are  prepared 
to  recognize  in  our  outcome  and  in  our 
negotiating  strategy  that  there  are,  ob- 
viously, significant  differences  between 
U.S.  and  Soviet  force  structures  and 
asymmetries  in  them. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


An  importiint  part  of  our  proposal  is 
allistio  missiles  and  heavy  bombers 
ould  be  limited  under  a  common  ceiling 
nd,  similarly,  that  ballistic  missile 
t'arheads  and  ALCMs  could  also  be 
,  imited  under  a  common  ceiling. 

With  regard  to  INF  [intermediate- 
ange  nuclear  forces],  the  U.S.  position 
n  the  past  provides,  we  think,  a 
atisfactory  framework  in  which  a  good 
.greement  can  be  reached.  You  recall 
lur  objective  has  been  a  zero-zero  out- 
ome. 

But  we've  made  clear  that  as  an  in- 
erim  measure,  we  could  accept  a 
)alance  at  equal  levels  of  warheads  in  a 
rlobal  context  and,  further,  in  1983  as 
he  Soviets  left,  we  made  clear  that  we 
vere  in  a  position  to  not  necessarily — 
leploy  our  full  entitlement  in  Europe, 
hat  the  number  of  Pershing  lis  would 
)e  decreased  accordingly  in  any  reduc- 
ion  from  our  intended  deployment  and 
;hat  we  were,  as  well,  prepared  to  talk 
ibout  aircraft  limitations. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  at 
,his  time  as  well  to  consider  various  ap- 
proaches that  will  give  us  at  the  end  of 
;he  day  a  zero  global  ceiling.  And  the 
lexibility  is  at  hand  in  this  round  for  ex- 
Dloring  any  number  of  different  ap- 
jroaches. 

The  third  basket  of  negotiations 
deals  with  defense  and  space  arms.  The 
President  has  stressed  in  his  instructions 
of  more  than  a  dozen  pages  that  we 
Bhould  begin  in  this  session  to  establish 
bhe  U.S.  view  on  the  relationship  be- 
tween offense  and  defense,  to  present 
ithe  U.S.  concerns  on  the  erosion  of  the 
(ABM  Treaty,  to  provide  the  Soviet 
Union  with  a  comprehensive  rationale 
Tor  the  U.S.  strategic  defense  program, 
and  to  take  up  some  dozen  different 
issues  with  the  Soviet  Union — including 
lur  view  of  the  current  strategic  situa- 
tion imbalance;  our  strategic  concept 
which  was  laid  out  at  Geneva  as  to  how 
we  view  the  evolution  in  strategic  forces 
in  the  next  10  years  and  the  transition 
over  time  away  from  offense  and  toward 
defensive  forces;  a  treatment  of  why 
we're  concerned  about  the  erosion  of  the 
ABM  Treaty;  a  treatment,  in  the  exten- 
sion, of  our  concerns  over  compliance 
with  it;  a  discussion  in  depth  of  our  con- 
cern about  air  defenses  and  the  potential 
for  upgrade  and  their  use  as  antiballistic 
missile  systems;  a  discussion  of  emerg- 
ing technologies,  and  how  and  why  we 
believe  that  they  can  lead  to  a  more 
stable  framework  for  deterrence. 

As  a  final  personal  comment,  I  have 
to  say  that  I  know  many  of  you  have 
heard  that  there  was  a  family  of  options 
presented  to  the  President,  particularly 
for  the  strategic  aspect  of  these  talks. 


and  that  is  true,  which  featured  a  half 
dozen  different  options. 

The  President  reviewed  all  of  these 
and,  at  the  end  of  the  day,  believed  that 
our  tradition  of  moving  incrementally  by 
the  adoption  of  a  single  option,  sending 
a  team  to  negotiate  it,  getting  a  reac- 
tion, then  coming  back — all  for  the  pur- 
pose of  changing  one  number  or  two  or 
three — prevents  dynamism  and  inhibits 
the  pace  of  negotiation.  And,  conse- 
quently, the  President  established  the 
outcomes  which  he  believed  would  serve 
U.S.  interests  and  serve  as  a  more 
stable  framework  of  deterrence;  out- 
comes built  around  warheads,  destruc- 
tive capacity,  and  delivery  vehicles  but 


stressed  that  there  are  many,  many 
ways  that  you  can  get  there.  And  in  a 
sense,  the  President  chose  all  six  and 
provided  the  flexibility  for  our 
negotiators  to  proceed  to  explore  a 
number  of  different  avenues  that  could 
lead  to  this  outcome. 

I  have  to  say  I  have  never  seen  in- 
structions that  have  provided  any 
negotiators  with  greater  latitude  for 
serious  give-and-take. 


'Made  in  the  Roosevelt  Room  at  the 
White  House  (text  from  the  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  1 1 , 
lilH.S). 

-Text  from  White  House  press  release, 
which  includes  question-and-answer  session 
with  news  correspondents.  ■ 


The  Objectives  of  Arms  Control 


by  Paul  H.  Nitze 

Addresa  before  the  International  In- 
stitute for  Strategic  Studies  in  London 
on  March  28,  1985.  A7nbassador  Nitze  is 
special  adviser  to  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  arms  control  mat- 
ters. 

It  is  a  privilege  for  me  to  deliver  the 
1985  Alastair  Buchan  Memorial  Lecture. 

In  the  1950s,  during  the  transition 
from  the  Truman  Administration  to  the 
Eisenhower  Administration,  Alastair 
was  the  Washington  correspondent  for 
the  Observer.  He  had  a  clear,  wide- 
ranging  mind.  He  was  both  a  skeptic 
and  an  idealist.  He  had  high  aims  for  the 
West;  he  was  troubled  by  the  manifest 
shortcomings  of  Western  policy. 

At  one  point,  it  became  evident  that 
he  was  under  deep  intellectual  strain. 
For  a  time  he  came  to  live  with  my  wife 
Phyllis  and  me  in  Washington.  Over 
many  discussions,  the  nature  of  his 
strain  became  evident. 

During  his  youth,  his  father  had 
been  Governor  General  of  Canada,  and 
Alastair  had  developed  a  deep  affection 
for  Canada.  However,  he  was  English 
by  ancestry  and  had  been  educated  at 
Oxford.  Later,  he  had  come  to  the 
United  States  during  the  Truman  years 
and  had  been  deeply  impressed  by  the 
generosity  and  wisdom  of  American 
policy  of  those  days. 

As  a  result,  he  had  difficulty  making 
up  his  mind  which  was  his  primary  loyal- 
ty and  which  were  his  secondary 
loyalties.  He  finally  s.ettled  the  matter 
with  a  clear  decision;  his  primary  loyalty 
was  to  England. 


It  was  then  that  his  great  days  as 
the  first  director  of  the  International  In- 
stitute for  Strategic  Studies  began.  He 
has  made  an  immense  contribution  to 
the  wisdom  and  the  coherence  of 
Western  thought  and  policy,  both  then 
and  as  Montague  Burton  Professor  of 
International  Relations  at  Oxford. 

One  of  the  subjects  which  Alastair 
and  I  used  to  discuss  was  the  question  of 
the  proper  aims  and  objectives  of  arms 
control.  It  is  that  subject  which  I  pro- 
pose to  address  this  evening.  I  will  begin 
with  a  summary  of  my  views,  then  at- 
tempt to  illuminate  the  principal  issues 
by  reviewing  my  recollections  of  how 
they  arose  in  the  past,  and  conclude 
with  a  look  toward  the  future. 

Arms  Control  Objectives 

The  primary  security  objective  of  the 
United  States  and,  I  believe,  of  the 
Western  alliance  in  general  is  to  reduce 
the  risk  of  war  while  maintaining  our 
right  to  live  in  freedom.  Consistent  with 
this  objective,  we  have  long  based  our 
security  policy  on  deterrence— that  is, 
prevention  of  conflict  by  convincing  a 
potential  opponent  that  the  problems, 
risks,  and  costs  of  aggression  would  far 
outweigh  any  possible  gains  he  might 
hope  to  achieve. 

In  this  context,  arms  control  should 
be  viewed  as  one  element  of  our  security 
policy.  It  complements  the  measures 
that  we  must  take  unilaterally,  such  as 
maintaining  weapons  and  forces 
necessary  for  an  adequate  deterrent. 

Arms  control  is  not  a  substitute  or 
replacement  for  adequate  defenses.  In- 
deed, experience  indicates  that,  while 


May  1985 


57 


ARMS  CONTROL 


arms  control  hopefully  can  play  an  im- 
portant role  in  enhancing  our  security 
and  bringing  about  a  more  stable 
strategic  relationship,  what  we  are  able 
and  willing  to  do  for  ourselves  is  more 
important.  It  provides  the  necessary 
foundation  on  which  effective  deterrence 
and  arms  control  must  rest.  I  remember 
one  Soviet  negotiator  during  SALT  I 
[strategic  arms  limitation  talks]  saying, 
"We  will  do  whatever  is  necessary  to 
deter  you;  whether  you  are  able  to  deter 
us  is  up  to  you." 

The  objective  of  reducing  the  risk  of 
war  is  intrinsically  linked  to  deterrence. 
Whether  or  not  we  have  arms  control 
agreements,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
United  States  and  its  allies  have  suffi- 
cient military  forces,  both  conventional 
and  nuclear,  to  deter  an  armed  attack 
by  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  associates. 

Likewise,  the  Soviet  Union  un- 
doubtedly is  determined  to  have  what 
they  assess  to  be  fully  adequate  military 
capabilities,  whether  or  not  there  are 
arms  control  agreements  between  us.  It 
has  been  and  is  our  belief,  however,  that 
a  relationship  of  offsetting  deterrent 
capabilities  can  be  made  more  secure, 
stable,  and  reliable— and  perhaps  less 
costly— if  we  and  the  Soviets  can  agree 
on  effective,  equal,  and  verifiable  arms 
control  constraints. 

There  are  two  important  corollaries 
to  the  objective  of  reducing  the  risk  of 
war  through  effective  deterrence.  These 
are  the  objectives  of  assuring  parity,  or 
at  least  rough  equivalence  between  the 
capabilities  of  the  two  sides,  and  of 
assuring  crisis  stability— that  is,  reduc- 
ing the  incentives  that  a  side  might  have 
in  a  crisis  to  strike  first  or  in  peacetime 
to  provoke  a  crisis  that  might  lead  to  a 
military  confrontation. 

Some  commentators  tend  to  em- 
phasize one  of  these  goals  or  the  other. 
To  my  mind  they  are  interrelated;  we 
cannot  tolerate  either  significant  in- 
equality or  substantial  crisis  instability. 

The  greatest  strain  on  deterrence 
could  arise  in  a  crisis  or  a  series  of 
crises  stemming  from  a  complex  of  fac- 
tors difficult  to  control.  In  such  a  period, 
our  military  forces  as  a  whole  must  have 
the  necessary  characteristics  of  effec- 
tiveness, flexibility,  survivability,  and 
diversity  to  dissuade  the  Soviet  Union 
from  contemplating  reckless  action. 

We  cannot  be  confident  that  an  ar- 
ray of  U.S.  and  allied  forces  manifestly 
inferior  to  those  of  the  Soviet  Union 
would  provide  an  adequate  deterrent  to 
reckless  action  in  such  a  period.  Similar- 
ly, forces  of  roughly  equal  capability 
could  be  inadequate  if  a  significant  por- 
tion of  them  were  vulnerable  to  destruc- 
tion in  a  surprise  or  preemptive  attack. 


Consistent  with  the  objectives  of 
promoting  stability  and  rough  equality, 
arms  control  should  aim  to  achieve 
sharp  reductions  in  the  levels  of  ar- 
maments. Reductions  per  se  may  not 
always  be  good;  for  example,  reductions 
in  the  number  of  launchers  can  be 
destabilizing  if  they  increase  the  ratio  of 
warheads  to  vulnerable  launchers.  But 
well-conceived  proposals  embodying 
reductions  which  bring  about  improve- 
ments in  the  proper  indices  can  do  much 
to  enhance  stability. 

Finally,  the  panoply  of  arms  control 
agreements  should  deal  with  the  rela- 
tionship between  offensive  and  defensive 
systems.  I  will  return  later  to  this  sub- 
ject in  some  detail. 

For  arms  control  agreements  to  be 
effective,  there  are  a  number  of  addi- 
tional requirements.  The  agreements 
should  be  reasonably  precise  and  unam- 
biguous in  their  terms.  While  no  agree- 
ment can  be  made  completely  unam- 
biguous, the  less  ambiguity,  the  better. 

Moreover,  we  should  have  con- 
fidence in  our  ability  to  verify  adherence 
to  an  agreement's  provisions,  and  the 
panoply  of  arms  control  agreements 
should  be  sufficiently  comprehensive  so 
that  their  constraints  cannot  be  readily 
circumvented.  And  finally,  we  must  have 
confidence  that  the  parties  will  abide  by 
the  agreements  into  which  they  have 
entered,  a  requirement  that  has  become 
increasingly  important  in  view  of  find- 
ings of  Soviet  noncompliance  with  ex- 
isting arms  control  arrangements. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  objec- 
tives and  requirements,  our  arms  control 
policy  must  merit  the  sustained  support 
of  Western  publics  and  of  Western  con- 
gressional and  parliamentary  bodies.  In 
the  absence  of  such  support,  the  Soviets 
will  seek  to  drive  wedges  and  exploit 
divisions;  indeed,  tough  Soviet  bargain- 
ing stances  have  always  been  com- 
plemented by  hard-nosed  propaganda 
and  active  measures  campaigns  designed 
to  bring  about  unilateral  Western  con- 
cessions. Such  public  and  legislative  sup- 
port will  also  be  essential  to  carrying  out 
the  unilateral  defense  programs  that 
must  necessarily  proceed  in  parallel  with 
arms  control. 

These,  then— in  my  view — comprise 
the  basic  objectives  and  requirements  of 
arms  control  policy. 

History  as  It  Illuminates  the  Issues 
Concerning  Objectives 

Let  me  review  the  issues  and  conflicting 
views  as  to  the  objectives  of  arms  con- 
trol as  they  have  evolved  over  the  years 
following  the  dawn  of  the  nuclear  age  in 
1945. 


fw 
jat 
It, 
lea 
iiitl 
liai 

M 

p 

«1 

ac 


li( 


Immediately  after  the  Japanese  sur- 
render. President  Truman  asked  some  c 
us  who  had  been  engaged  in  the 
Strategic  Bombing  Survey  in  Europe  to 
undertake  a  comparable  mission  with 
respect  to  the  war  in  the  Pacific.  He 
asked  us  not  only  to  report  on  the  ef- 
fects of  air  power  in  the  Pacific  war  but 
in  particular,  to  survey  in  detail  the  ef- 
fects of  the  atomic  weapons  used  at 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki.  We  were  also 
asked  to  offer  recommendations  for  U.S 
national  security  in  light  of  modern 
weapons,  especially  nuclear  weapons. 

We  recruited  a  distinguished  team  o 
physicists,  engineers,  and  other  scien 
tists  who  measured  in  minute  detail  the  \:> 
effects  of  blast,  radiation,  heat,  and 
fallout  on  people,  buildings,  and  on  the 
Japanese  will  and  ability  to  continue  the 
war.  The  general  public  reaction  after 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  had  been  that 
the  destructiveness  of  atomic  weapons 
was  absolute  and  immeasurable.  We 
were,  nevertheless,  directed  to  measure 
precisely  what  those  weapons  had  done 
and  what  they  had  not  done. 

We  were  all  shocked  by  the 
devastation  of  the  two  cities.  The 
casualties  and  damage  were  immense. 
The  destruction  at  Hiroshima  was 
tremendous;  part  of  Nagasaki  survived, 
as  it  was  shielded  by  a  hill.  Even  at 
Hiroshima,  however,  the  destruction 
was  not  absolute;  trains  were  running 
through  Hiroshima  within  48  hours  after 
the  attack.  Our  computations,  based  on 
the  effects  of  those  relatively  primitive 
bombs,  indicated  that  the  advent  of 
atomic  weapons  had  increased  the  poten 
tial  power  of  air  attack  against  un- 
defended cities  by  100-  to  200-fold. 

The  policy  implications  we  drew 
were  several.  Nuclear  weapons  provided 
an  increase  in  the  power  of  offensive 
weapons  by  more  than  a  hundredfold, 
and  future  technology  could  be  expected 
to  increase  it  by  another  order  of 
magnitude.  In  war,  the  temptation  for 
an  aggressor  possessing  nuclear 
weapons  to  employ  a  preemptive 
strategy  could  be  immense.  The  impor- 
tance of  being  able  to  control  the  rele- 
vant air  space,  which  had  been  of  high 
importance  in  a  war  fought  with  conven- 
tional weapons,  would  be  far  greater  in 
a  world  with  nuclear  arms. 

We  were  faced  with  a  grim  realiza- 
tion: even  if  we  had  very  good  offensive 
and  defensive  capabilities  and  a  nuclear 
war  were,  nevertheless,  to  occur,  we 
could  not  be  sure  that  some  weapons 
would  not  get  through,  and  even  a  few 
could  cause  immense  damage. 


58 


DeDartment  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Therefore,  our  policy  should  be  one 
'*(  '  maintaining  a  deterrent  posture  ade- 
iiate  to  assure  that  no  war  would  oc- 
ir.  Since  we  could  not  guarantee  the 
leans  fully  to  protect  our  society  from 
uclear  attack,  we  should  develop  forces 
lat  would  make  clear  to  a  potential  op- 
onent  that  he  could  not  achieve  military 
ains  through  launching  an  attack 
gainst  us  or  our  allies  and  that  the  con- 
equences  for  him  of  launching  his  at- 
ick  would  be  so  horrible  that  the  poten- 
al  gains  of  such  aggression  would  not 
e  worthwhile. 

One  important  issue  remained.  Some 
[lought  the  terror  of  nuclear  weapons 
^as  such  that  their  very  existence  would 
1  itself  prevent  war.  This  view  was  held 
y  those  who  considered  the  destruc- 
ne  iveness  of  nuclear  weapons  to  be  ab- 
olute.  Bernard  Brodie  was  the  first  and 
nost  eloquent  proponent  of  this  position. 
ie  also  argued  that  there  was  an  ab- 
olute  dichotomy  between  the  view  that 
he  purpose  of  military  forces  was  to 
leter  and  the  view  that  their  purpose 
vas  to  deny  an  aggressor  the  possibility 
f  military  success. 

The  alternative  position  was  that 
ieterrence  would  be  greatly  strength- 
ned  by  the  ability  to  face  an  enemy 
vith  military  capabilities  and  a  strategy 
hat  would  deny  him  the  ability  or 
perception  that  he  might  successfully 
prosecute  a  war-winning  strategy  and 
emerge  from  a  war  in  a  predominant 
nilitary  position. 

This  issue  of  what  is  required  to 
assure  deterrence— the  mere  existence 
jf  nuclear  weapons  or  a  manifest 
■nilitary  capability  sufficient  to  deny  the 
inemy  any  realistic  prospect  of  achiev- 
ng  his  objectives— remains  with  us  to 
this  day.  I  believed  then,  and  I  believe 
now,  that  the  latter  position  is  the  sensi- 
ble one. 

The  question  remains,  now  as  then, 
how  to  maintain  a  sure  ability  to 
retaliate  with  devastating  nuclear 
destruction  but  concurrently  to  increase 
our  ability  to  deny  an  aggressor  the 
possibility  of  military  success  and,  thus, 
reduce  our  dependence  on  the  threat  of 
mutually  devastating  nuclear  destruc- 
tion. 

The  Interest  in  Nuclear  Disarmament 

Shortly  after  nuclear  weapons  appeared, 
strong  interest  arose  in  negotiating  the 
elimination  of  all  such  arms.  Immediate- 
ly after  the  war's  end,  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report  proposed  a  world 
government  restricted  in  its  authority  to 
nuclear  matters  but  including  everything 
to  do  with  those  matters.  The  idea  was 
roughly  translated  into  the  Baruch  plan 


for  the  international  control  of  atomic 
weapons  and  technology  and  offered  to 
the  Soviets.  Thev  wouki  have  no  part 
of  it. 

Interest  in  nuclear  disarmament  con- 
tinued, however.  Some  years  later, 
before  the  UN  Committee  on  Disarma- 
ment, the  Soviets  presented  a  program 
for  what  they  called  "general  and  com- 
plete disarmament."  But  it  soon  became 
clear  that  their  position  was  purely  for 
progaganda  purposes;  they  offered  no 
practical  way  to  get  to  their  stated  end. 

While  "general  and  complete  disar- 
mament" did  not  then  appear  to  be  a 
realistic  or  achievable  goal,  the  Soviets, 
nevertheless,  were  reaping  significant 
benefits  in  the  propaganda  field.  The 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom, 
France,  and  Canada  in  response 
changed  their  position  to  advocate 
"phased  total  disarmament,"  which 
meant  approximately  the  same  thing  as 
"general  and  complete  disarmament"  but 
offered  a  somewhat  more  practical  ap- 
proach. 

From  that  point  on,  the  propaganda 
battle  was  a  standoff.  But  the  talks  on 
the  subject  had  little  to  do  with  actual 
steps  toward  the  goal  of  eliminating 
nuclear  weapons  or  toward  reducing  the 
risk  of  war. 

The  Shift  Toward  Arms  Control 
and  Limited  Measures 

When  the  Kennedy  Administration  took 
office,  the  debate  between  the  West  and 
the  Soviet  Union  concerning  "general 
and  complete  disarmament"  versus 
"phased  total  disarmament"  was 
continuing. 

Thought  in  the  Administration 
began  to  turn  to  the  possibility  of 
negotiating  agreements  more  limited  in 
their  scope,  with  the  hope  that  success 
in  these  agreements  would  open  the 
possibility  of  more  comprehensive 
agreements  later.  In  other  words,  our 
interest  turned  toward  arms  control 
rather  than  disarmament. 

Instead  of  total  disarmament— in 
which  security  would  have  been  en- 
trusted to  something  akin  to  a  world 
government— we  set  our  sights  on  a 
more  realistic  plane.  We  accepted  the 
prospect  of  deterrence  based  on  the 
threat  of  nuclear  retaliation  and  sought 
to  make  the  strategic  balance  safer, 
more  stable,  and  perhaps  less  costly. 

As  a  result,  the  Limited  Test  Ban 
Treaty,  the  Outer  Space  Treaty,  the 
Non-Proliferation  Treaty,  and  the 
Seabed  Arms  Control  Treaty  came  into 
being.  These  agreements  were  impor- 
tant in  their  own  right,  but  they  were 


peripheral  to  the  central  issue  of  achiev- 
ing an  agreement  which  would  serve 
materially  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war. 

Up  until  1963,  thought  on  arms  con- 
trol had  concentrated  on  multilateral  ar- 
rangements; it  was  thought  that  a 
bilateral  agreement  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  would  not 
be  sufficiently  comprehensive  and  could 
lead  to  possible  circumvention  and 
undercutting  by  other  nations.  But  in 
the  spring  of  1963,  some  of  us  in  the 
Administration  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  we  weren't  apt  to  get  an  interna- 
tional agreement  on  the  central  issues 
unless  and  until  we  could  work  out  the 
main  issues  bilaterally  with  the  Soviets. 

We  prepared  a  paper  on  the  issues 
involved  in  a  bilateral  agreement 
limiting  strategic  nuclear  delivery 
vehicles  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  The  analysis  sug- 
gested that  the  total  elimination  of 
nuclear  weapons  was  not  the  optimum 
solution.  This  was  because  nuclear 
technology  had  become  too  widely 
known;  the  risk  of  clandestine  or  third- 
country  production  of  nuclear  weapons 
was  too  great.  It  seemed  that  a  level  of 
perhaps  500  strategic  nuclear  weapons 
on  each  side  would  provide  a  more 
stable  and  predictable  future  than  none 
at  all. 

Then  Secretary  of  Defense  [Robert] 
McNamara  agreed  with  these  conclu- 
sions and  took  them  seriously.  This 
helped  set  the  stage  for  his  proposal  to 
[Soviet  Premier]  Kosygin  at  Glassboro  in 
June  1967  that  we  begin  bilateral 
nuclear  arms  control  negotiations.  By 
1967,  the  Soviets  had  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  such  negotiations  "might  not 
be  impossible."  The  invasion  of 
Czechoslovakia  in  1968  temporarily 
made  them  impossible;  the  SALT  I 
negotiations,  as  such,  did  not  begin  until 
the  fall  of  1969. 

SALT  I  and  SALT  II 

SALT  represented  what  we  hoped 
would  be  a  mutual  effort  to  achieve  ef- 
fective arms  control  constraints  pro- 
viding for  a  stable  strategic  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  at  lower  levels  of  arms. 

In  the  late  1960s,  we  were  com- 
pleting our  intercontinental  ballistic 
missile  (ICBM)  and  submarine-launched 
ballistic  missile  (SLBM)  deployment  pro- 
grams and  were  pursuing  an  active  anti- 
ballistic  missile  (ABM)  program.  The 
Soviets  also  had  vigorous— and  grow- 
ing—programs in  both  the  offensive  and 
defensive  fields.  With  respect  to  ABM, 
however,  we  in  the  United  States  were 
coming  to  the  conclusion  that  the  state 


May  1985 


59 


ARMS  CONTROL 


1 


of  the  technology  at  the  time  was  such 
that  ABM  systems  were  not  very 
reliable  and  could  be  overcome  by 
deploying  additional  offensive  systems  at 
substantially  lesser  cost. 

Deployment  of  such  ABM  systems 
might  thus,  it  was  feared,  encourage  a 
proliferation  of  offensive  arms.  Were 
defenses  limited,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
might  be  possible  to  work  out  reductions 
and  tight  limitations  on  offensive 
nuclear  weapons.  We,  therefore,  were 
prepared  stringently  to  limit  ABM 
systems. 

SALT  I  produced  the  ABM  Treaty 
and  the  Interim  Agreement  on  offensive 
arms.  We  believed  that  those  measures 
would  be  helpful  to  the  security  of  both 
sides.  That  belief  was  based  on  three 
principal  assumptions: 

First,  that  the  constraints  on 
ballistic  missile  defenses,  particularly 
those  on  large  phased-array  radars, 
would  prevent  breakout  or  circumven- 
tion; 

Second,  that  both  sides  would 
adhere  to  the  letter  and  intent  of  the 
agreements;  and 

Third,  that  with  defensive  systems 
severely  limited,  it  would  be  possible  in 
the  following  few  years  to  negotiate 
comprehensive  limits  on  strategic  offen- 
sive forces  and  to  establish  a  reliable 
deterrent  balance  at  reduced  levels. 

We  believed  that  those  assumptions 
were  shared  by  both  sides. 

The  ABM  Treaty  seemed  to  me  to 
be  a  useful  and  equitable  agreement.  It 
constrained  not  only  the  interceptor 
launchers,  which  were  relatively  simple 
and  cheap  and  could  be  easily  stored  and 
rapidly  deployed.  More  significantly,  the 
treaty  limited  large  phased-array 
radars— which  were  expensive  and  took 
years  to  build;  were  one  side  to  build 
such  a  radar  in  a  manner  not  permitted 
by  the  treaty,  the  other  side  would  have 
considerable  warning  time  to  challenge 
the  action  and,  if  necessary,  take 
countermeasures.  The  ABM  Treaty  of- 
fered promise  for  enhancing  stability  by 
setting  the  stage  for  comprehensive 
limitations  on  offensive  arms. 

Unfortunately,  a  number  of  Soviet 
actions  since  1972— such  as  the  construe 
tion  of  an  early  warning  radar  at 
Krasnoyarsk  in  violation  of  constraints 
on  such  radars  provided  by  the  ABM 
Treaty— have  undermined  the  first  two 
assumptions.  They  call  into  serious  ques- 
tion Soviet  intentions  with  regard  to 
possible  breakout  as  well  as  Soviet  will- 
ingness to  comply  with  arms  control  ar- 
rangements when  Soviet  military 
priorities  are  not  consonant  with  them. 


60 


We  were  also  disappointed  with 
regard  to  the  third  assumption;  we  could 
not  get  the  Soviets  to  agree  to  tight 
limitations  on  offensive  arms  comparable 
to  those  applied  to  ABM  systems  or 
reductions  in  such  arms.  Indeed,  limiting 
defenses  did  not  appear  to  have  any  ef- 
fect on  the  Soviet  offensive  buildup. 

Part  of  the  problem  was  that  the 
Soviets  were  doing  well  with  respect  to 
offensive  systems.  We  had  ceased 
building  new  ICBMs,  ballistic  missile 
submarines,  and  heavy  bombers  some 
years  earlier;  we  were  improving  them 
through  qualitative  changes.  The  Soviet 
Union  was  actively  deploying  large 
numbers  and  new  types  of  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs.  Momentum  thus  tended  to 
favor  the  Soviets;  they  saw  no  reason  to 
sign  a  piece  of  paper  which  would  cause 
them  to  forgo  that  advantage. 

The  1972  SALT  Interim  Agreement 
purported  to  freeze  the  offensive  balance 
at  the  then-existing  level.  In  fact,  it  did 
no  such  thing.  It  froze  the  number  of 
operational  ballistic  missile  launchers 
and  those  the  Soviets  claimed  were 
under  construction;  the  levels  were 
grossly  unequal.  Those  inequalities  con- 
tinue to  the  present  day  and  have 
become  more  significant  as  the  Soviets, 
as  some  then  anticipated,  have  caught 
up  to  us  in  accuracy,  MIRVing  [multiple 
independently-targetable  reentry 
vehicle],  and  other  pertinent  aspects  of 
technology. 

Our  inability  to  negotiate  tight  limits 
on  offensive  arms  was  also  in  part 
linked  to  the  relationship  between  the 
verifiability  of  an  agreement  and  its 
comprehensiveness.  It  was  our  view  that 
it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  each  side 
to  provide  sufficient  information  to  the 
other  so  that  each  could  verify  and  have 
confidence  in  the  other's  adherence  to 
the  terms  of  an  agreement. 

Because  the  Soviets  refused  to  agree 
to  such  a  cooperative  approach  to 
verification,  the  limitations  of  an  agree- 
ment had  to  be  restricted  to  large  visible 
items  such  as  missile  silos  and  sub- 
marine missile  tubes.  They  could  not 
apply  to  smaller  systems  or  components. 
Nor  could  they  apply  to  the  more 
significant— but  more  difficult  to 
monitor— qualitative  characteristics  of 
weapons  systems. 

The  rationale  for  concluding  such  a 
modest  and  unequal  accord  as  the  1972 
Interim  Agreement  was  based  upon  two 
expectations,  both  of  which  subsequently 
proved  to  be  ill-founded. 

First,  we  thought  the  two  sides 
could  negotiate  a  more  comprehensive 
agreement  within  the  next  2  or  3  years, 
surely  within  the  .S-year  duration  of  that 
agreement. 


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Second,  we  underestimated  the  ex- 
tent to  which,  and  how  quickly,  actual  . 
Soviet  force  developments— particularly  leqt 
MIRVing— would  take  advantage  of  the  0. 
loose  offensive  constraints  of  SALT  I. 

Compounding  these  weaknesses 
SALT  II  incorporated  many  of  the 
drawbacks  of  its  predecessor. 

It  is  hard  to  make  a  case  that  the  Ii 

terim  Agreement  or  SALT  II  met  any  ( 

the  principal  objectives  for  arms  contro. 

One  would  truly  be  hard  pressed  to 

demonstrate  how  they  embodied  rough 

equivalence,  lowered  armaments, 

enhanced  crisis  stability,  or  reduced  the 

risk  of  war. 

SALT  II,  as  its  predecessor,  focusei 

on  the  wrong  indices  of  power- 
launchers— giving  both  sides  incentives 
to  increase  the  number  of  weapons  on 
their  missiles,  with  negative  implication 
for  stability.  Likewise,  it  did  not  providn  '■» 
for  rough  equivalence,  allowing  the 
Soviet  Union  unilateral  rights,  such  as 
the  right  to  heavy  ballistic  missiles. 

And  by  no  means  has  SALT  reduce 
armaments— the  number  of  warheads  oi 
U.S.  and  Soviet  ballistic  missiles  has  in- 
creased since  1972;  the  number  of 
warheads  on  Soviet  ballistic  missiles  hai 
increased  by  more  than  50%  since  1979 
And  taking  advantage  of  their  much 
superior  throwweight,  the  Soviet 
capability  to  destroy  hard  targets  has  ir 
creased  by  an  even  greater  amount.  All 
of  this  has  taken  place  within  the  limita 
tions  of  SALT. 

The  shortcomings  of  SALT  II,  in 
particular  the  fact  that  it  would  not  pro 
vide  for  significant  warhead  limitations, 
came  to  be  widely  recognized.  In  fact, 
its  proponents  largely  fell  back  on  the 
rationale  that  SALT  II  was  "better  thai 
no  agreement."  For  some  of  us  who 
have  worked  to  clarify  thinking  on  the 
objectives  of  arms  control  agreements, 
this  was  a  defeatist  criterion;  it  sug- 
gested loss  of  confidence  in  our  ability  to 
maintain  an  adequate  deterrent  posture 
without  arms  control  and  implied  that 
we  must,  therefore,  accept  more  or  less 
what  the  Soviets  would  agree  to. 

In  the  START  [strategic  arms  reduc 
tion  talks]  and  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  negotiations  earlier  in 
this  decade,  the  United  States  sought  to 
rectify  some  of  the  inadequacies  of  the 
SALT  experience.  For  example,  we 
made  warheads  rather  than  launchers 
the  principal  units  of  account  and  tabled 
positions  embodying  significant  reduc- 
tions rather  than  merely  legitimizing  ex 
isting  launcher  levels  and  permitting  in- 
creased warhead  levels.  Unfortunately, 
our  efforts  were  largely  overshadowed 
by  the  Soviet  campaign  to  split  NATO 
over  the  issue  of  INF. 

Department  of  State  Bulleti 


ARMS  CONTROL 


n  he  Debate  Since  the  Mid-1970s 

■''  rom  the  mid-1970s  on,  the  debate  on 
•  le  question  of  arms  control  objectives 
ems  to  me  to  have  been  confused  and 
nfusing. 

An  issue  raised  in  the  1970s  has 
en  the  idea  that  the  principal  objective 
arms  control  should  be  to  "stop  the 
ifirms  race."  Yet  from  1972,  when  the 
oviets  passed  the  United  States  in  the 
umber,  size,  and  throwweight  of  offen- 
ive  missile  systems,  they  proceeded  to 
evelop  and  deploy  one  generation  after 
'nother  of  more  modern  systems.  Mean- 
hile,  we  had  frozen  the  number  of  our 
eapon  systems  and  restrained  our 
lodernization  programs. 

It  was  in  the  Soviet  interest  to  keep 
hings  that  way.  Their  propaganda  ap- 
roach  was  and  is  keyed  to  the  phrase 
stop  the  arms  race."  To  the  extent  the 
oviets  can  use  such  phrases  to  en- 
ourage  unilateral  Western  restraint, 
hey  can  avoid  serious  negotiations  in 
/hich  they  might  have  to  concede  some 
f  their  advantages. 

To  many  in  the  United  States, 
lowever,  it  seemed  that  the  Soviets  had 
>een  merely  reacting  to  what  we  had 
lone  first,  that  they  were  merely  catch- 
ng  up;  if  we  were  to  stop,  they  would 
itop,  too.  For  some  10  years,  this  and 
Ihe  trauma  and  aftereffects  of  the  Viet- 
nam war  combined  to  restrain  the 
Jnited  States  from  responding  to  con- 
linuing  Soviet  force  developments. 

Over  the  years,  however,  it  became 
'^  ncreasingly  clear  that  the  Soviets  were 
lot  merely  reacting;  they  were  execut- 
ng  a  deliberate  long-term  program  to 
mprove  their  capabilities,  regardless  of 
vhat  we  did.  As  former  Secretary  of 
Defense  [Harold]  Brown  put  it,  "When 
ve  build,  they  build;  when  we  don't 
:)uild,  they  build." 

Today,  both  sides  express  agreement 
)n  "radical  reductions"  as  being  an  im- 
Dortant  objective.  But,  as  I  noted 
jarlier,  those  reductions  should  be  such 
;hat  they  improve  stability  and  result  in 
■•ough  equality  and  not  the  reverse. 
Reductions  to  low  and  equal  levels  of 
aallistic  missile  warheads  and  redressing 
the  imbalance  in  destructive  capability 
can  undoubtedly  enhance  the  strategic 
situation,  particularly  if  such  reductions 
are  structured  so  as  to  encourage  sur- 
vivable  basing  for  strategic  systems  and 
"de-MIRVing"  of  forces  with  a  danger- 
ous capability  against  hard  targets.  Such 
reductions  would  greatly  reduce  the 
value— and,  therefore,  the  likelihood— of 
a  first  or  preemptive  strike. 

Reduction  in  the  number  of  launch- 
ers alone,  however— without  regard  to 


the  number  and  power  of  warheads- 
could  be  grossly  destabilizing.  It  would 
increase,  not  decrease,  the  existing  in- 
equality between  the  capabilities  of  the 
two  sides  and  could  increase  the  incen- 
tive to  go  first  or  preempt  in  a  crisis. 

Others  began  talking  in  the  late 
1970s  and  early  1980s  of  a  verifiable  and 
comprehensive  nuclear  freeze.  If  a 
freeze  is  not  comprehensive,  it  makes 
the  situation  worse,  not  better,  and 
today's  situation  is  not  good.  If  a  freeze 
is  comprehensive,  it  will  both  freeze  the 
present  unequal  situation  into  the  future 
and  not  be  verifiable. 

What  has  been  the  basic  difficulty 
with  the  arms  control  situation?  I  believe 
it  goes  back  to  the  days  before  SALT  I. 
We  were  then  ahead  in  most  of  the 
measures  of  strategic  capability.  But  we 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  enough  was 
enough.  It  was  our  hope  that,  when  the 
Soviets  pulled  even,  they  also  would  con- 
clude that  enough  is  enough.  The  evi- 
dence indicates  that  we  were  wrong. 

Since  1972,  the  nuclear  arms  control 
problem  has  been  one  of  attempting  to 
square  the  circle.  The  Soviet  side  has 
been  quite  frank  in  saying  it  would  not 
enter  into  an  agreement  which  would 
change  the  correlation  of  strategic 
forces  in  a  manner  they  deemed  adverse 
to  their  interests.  Once  the  Soviets 
judged  the  military  correlation  of  forces 
had  become  favorable,  they  were  ada- 
mant in  refusing  to  consider  any  agree- 
ment which  would  result  in  rough  equali- 
ty or  which  would  improve  crisis  stabili- 
ty. But  any  agreement  which  would  not 
lead  to  these  results  was  flawed  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  West. 

My  view  is  that  we  should  get  back 
to  fundamentals.  The  issues  are  com- 
plex, but  not  too  complex.  Four  really  is 
greater  than  two.  The  Soviet  leaders  are 
not  mad;  they  look  to  their  interests 
through  eyes  trained  in  the  Marxist- 
Leninist  approach.  Many  of  them  are  ex- 
cellent logicians,  strategists,  mathemati- 
cians, and  physicists.  Their  approach  is 
usually  relatively  understandable  and 
predictable— more  so,  perhaps,  than  the 
approach  of  Western  governments. 

What  we  must  do  is  give  the  Soviets 
grounds  for  concluding  that  we  in  the 
West  are  prepared  to  maintain  sufficient 
political  will  and  military  capability  to 
ensure  deterrence  of  any  possible  ag- 
gression, conventional  or  nuclear.  We 
must  bring  them  to  realize  that  their 
buildup  cannot  and  will  not  be  translated 
into  an  exploitable  military  or  political 
advantage.  If  it  turns  out  that  we  have 
to  go  for  a  few  more  years  without  a 
formal  agreement  limiting  offensive 
nuclear  weapons,  that  is  undesirable,  but 


let  us  not  panic;  we  have  been  living 
with  that  situation  for  some  years. 

At  the  same  time,  we  should  hold 
out  a  better  alternative,  one  that  would 
produce  a  more  stable  and  reliable  rela- 
tionship from  the  perspective  of  both 
sides.  To  this  end,  let  me  outline  the 
strategic  concept  that  underlies  the  U.S. 
approach  to  the  negotiations  that  began 
earlier  this  month  in  Geneva. 

The  U.S.  Strategic  Concept 

As  I  have  explained  elsewhere,  that  con- 
cept can  be  summarized  in  four 
sentences: 

During  the  next  10  years,  the  U.S.  objec- 
tive is  a  radical  reduction  in  the  power  of  ex- 
isting and  planned  offensive  nuclear  arms,  as 
well  as  the  stabilization  of  the  relationship 
between  offensive  and  defensive  nuclear 
arms,  whether  on  earth  or  in  space.  We  are 
even  now  looking  forward  to  a  period  of  tran- 
sition to  a  more  stable  world,  with  greatly 
reduced  levels  of  nuclear  arms  and  an 
enhanced  ability  to  deter  war  based  upon  an 
increasing  contribution  of  non-nuclear  de- 
fenses against  offensive  nuclear  arms.  This 
period  of  transition  could  lead  to  the  eventual 
elimination  of  all  nuclear  arms,  both  offensive 
and  defensive.  A  world  free  of  nuclear  arms 
is  an  ultimate  objective  to  which  we,  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  all  other  nations  can  agree. 

For  the  immediate  future,  we  will 
continue  to  base  deterrence  on  the 
ultimate  threat  of  devastating  nuclear 
retaliation.  We  have  little  choice;  today's 
technology  provides  no  alternative.  For 
now  and  the  foreseeable  future,  we  and 
our  allies  must,  therefore,  continue  to 
maintain  a  modern  and  effective  nuclear 
deterrent. 

We  will  continue  to  press  for  radical 
reductions  in  strategic  and  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  arms,  with  attention,  of 
course,  to  the  proper  indices  of  limita- 
tion. Reductions  can  be  structured  so  as 
to  produce  a  more  stable  balance  and 
reduce  the  risk  of  war.  In  the  Geneva 
talks,  we  are  prepared  to  consider 
various  means  of  bridging  differences 
between  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  positions  in 
an  effort  to  achieve  equitable  accords 
that  entail  real  reductions. 

We  also  remain  committed  to  the 
ABM  Treaty  and  will  seek  to  reverse  the 
erosion  that  has  occurred  in  that  regime 
as  a  result  of  Soviet  actions  such  as  the 
construction  of  the  Krasnoyarsk  radar. 
In  the  longer  run,  however,  we  want  to 
consider  the  possibilities  of  a  more 
defense-reliant  balance. 

Fifteen  years  ago,  we  concluded  that 
defenses  could  be  overwhelmed— at 
relatively  less  cost— by  additional  offen- 
sive arms.  Technology,  however,  has  ad- 
vanced considerably  since  then.  We  now 


VI  ay  1985 


61 


ARMS  CONTROL 


see  the  possibility  that  new  defensive 
systems  might  lead  to  a  more  stable  and 
reliable  strategic  balance  and,  ultimate- 
ly, might  provide  the  means  by  which 
we  could  move  with  confidence  toward 
the  complete  elimination  of  nuclear 
arms. 

In  March  1983,  President  Reagan 
questioned  whether  we  should  confine 
ourselves  to  a  future  in  which  deter- 
rence rests  solely  on  the  threat  of  offen- 
sive nuclear  retaliation.  His  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  (SDI)  research  pro- 
gram was,  therefore,  given  the  task  of 
determining  the  feasibility  of  effective 
defenses  against  nuclear  ballistic 
missiles.  This  includes  possible  defenses 
based  both  on  earth  and  in  space.  The 
President  has  directed  that  the  program 
be  carried  out  in  full  compliance  with 
the  ABM  Treaty.  Its  object  is  to  provide 
the  basis  for  an  informed  decision, 
sometime  in  the  next  decade,  as  to  the 
feasibility  of  providing  for  a  defense  of 
the  United  States  and  our  allies  against 
ballistic  missile  attack. 

We  expect  the  Soviets  will  continue 
their  investigation  of  new  defensive 
technologies.  Indeed,  the  debate  over 
SDI  has  often  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that 
the  Soviets,  besides  having  the  only 
operational  ABM  system,  have  long  had 
a  major  research  effort  devoted  to  ad- 
vanced ballistic  missile  defense  tech- 
nologies, including  high-energy  lasers 
and  particle-beam  weapons. 

Should  new  defensive  technologies 
prove  feasible  and  meet  our  criteria,  we 
would  want,  at  a  future  date,  to  begin  a 
transition  to  a  balance  in  which  we 
would  place  greater  reliance  on  defen- 
sive systems  for  our  protection  and  that 
of  our  allies.  Such  defenses  could 
enhance  deterrence  by  creating  ex- 
cessive complications  for  an  aggressor's 
planning  for  a  possible  first  strike, 
thereby  lessening  the  chance  that  he 
might  seriously  contemplate  it. 

Let  me  note  that  the  criteria  by 
which  we  will  judge  the  feasibility  of 
new  technologies  will  be  demanding. 
They  must  produce  defensive  systems 
that  are  reasonably  survivable;  if  not, 
the  defenses  could  themselves  be  tempt- 
ing targets  for  a  first  strike.  This  would 
decrease  rather  than  enhance  stability. 

New  defensive  systems  must  also  be 
cost-effective  at  the  margin — that  is,  it 
must  be  cheaper  to  add  additional  defen- 
sive capability  than  it  is  for  the  other 
side  to  add  the  offensive  capability 
necessary  to  overcome  the  defense.  If 
this  criterion  is  not  met,  the  defensive 
systems  could  encourage  a  proliferation 


of  countermeasures  and  additional  offen- 
sive weapons  to  overcome  deployed 
defenses,  instead  of  a  redirection  of  ef- 
fort from  offense  to  defense. 

As  I  have  said,  these  criteria  are 
demanding.  But  they  are  necessary  if  we 
are  to  move  toward  a  more  stable 
balance  at  lower  levels  of  arms.  While 
our  SDI  research  program  will  seek 
technical  answers  to  technical  questions, 
we  are  simultaneously  examining  the 
broader  strategic  implications  of  moving 
toward  a  more  defense-reliant  balance. 

If  the  new  technologies  cannot  meet 
the  standards  we  have  set  and,  thus,  not 
contribute  to  enhancing  stability,  we 
would  not  deploy  them.  In  that  event, 
we  would  have  to  continue  to  base  deter- 
rence largely  on  the  ultimate  threat  of 
nuclear  retaliation,  though  hopefully  at 
lower  levels  of  arms.  However,  we  have 
high  expectations  that  the  scientific  and 
technical  communities  can  respond  to 
the  challenge. 

Let  me  be  clear  that  SDI  in  not  an 
attempt  to  achieve  superiority.  Through 
any  transition  our  goal  would  be  to 
maintain  balance.  President  Reagan  has 
made  clear  that  any  future  decision  to 
deploy  new  defenses  against  ballistic 
missiles  would  be  a  matter  for  negotia- 
tion. 

This  does  not  mean  a  Soviet  veto 
over  our  defense  programs;  rather,  our 
commitment  to  negotiation  reflects  a 
recognition  that  we  should  seek  to  move 
forward  in  a  cooperative  manner  with 
the  Soviets.  We  have,  thus,  offered  to 
begin  discussions  even  now  in  Geneva 
with  the  Soviets  as  to  the  implications  of 
new  defensive  technologies,  whether 
developed  by  them  or  by  us,  and  how  we 
might  together  manage  a  transition  to  a 
more  stable  and  reliable  strategic  rela- 
tionship based  on  an  increasing  contribu- 
tion of  defensive  systems  in  the  mix  of 
offense  and  defense. 

Of  course,  arms  control  would  play 
an  important  role  in  such  a  transition. 
Properly  structured  cuts  in  offensive 
arms  are  not  only  worthwhile  in  their 
own  right,  they  could  also  facilitate  the 
shift  to  a  more  defense-reliant  posture. 

Before  negotiating  such  a  coop- 
erative transition  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  throughout  the  transition  period,  we 
would  consult  fully  with  our  allies.  Such 
a  transition  would  continue  for  some 
time,  perhaps  for  decades.  As  the  U.S. 
and  Soviet  strategic  and  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  arsenals  declined 
significantly,  we  would  seek  to  negotiate 
reductions  in  other  types  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  involve,  in  some  manner, 
the  other  nuclear  powers. 


Given  the  right  technical  and 
political  conditions,  we  would  hope  to  bi 
able  to  continue  the  reduction  of  all 
nuclear  weapons  down  to  zero.  By 
necessity,  this  is  a  very  long-term  goal. 
Its  realization  would,  of  course,  have 
far-reaching  implications  for  the  global 
military  balance  at  all  levels.  For  exam- 
ple, the  deterrent  effect  of  nuclear 
weapons  has  helped  to  prevent  conven- 
tional as  well  as  nuclear  conflict.  Were 
we  to  move  to  a  situation  in  which 
nuclear  weapons  had  been  eliminated, 
the  need  for  a  stable  conventional 
balance  would  become  even  more  impor 
tant  than  today. 

We  would  have  to  devote  particular 
attention  and  effort  to  how,  together 
with  our  allies,  we  might  counter  and 
diminish  the  threat  posed  by  conven- 
tional arms  imbalances  through  both 
conventional  arms  improvements  and 
arms  control  efforts.  Clearly,  were  we 
able  to  move  cooperatively  with  the 
Soviet  Union  toward  a  nuclear-free 
world,  that  would  presuppose  a  more 
cooperative  overall  relationship  than  ex- 
ists at  present — one  in  which  efforts  to 
establish  a  conventional  balance  at  lowe 
levels  should  also  be  fruitful. 

The  global  elimination  of  nuclear 
weapons,  if  this  were  ever  to  become 
possible,  would  need  to  be  accompanied 
by  widespread  deployments  of  effective 
non-nuclear  defenses.  These  defenses 
would  provide  assurance  that,  were 
some  country  to  cheat— for  example,  by 
clandestinely  building  ICBMs  or  shorter 
range  systems,  such  as  SS-20s— it 
would  not  be  able  to  achieve  an  ex- 
ploitable military  advantage.  To  over- 
come the  deployed  defenses,  cheating 
would  have  to  be  conducted  on  a  large 
scale— of  too  great  a  magnitude  to  pass 
unnoticed  before  appropriate  counter- 
measures  could  be  taken. 

Were  we  to  reach  the  ultimate 
phase,  deterrence  would  be  based  on  tht 
ability  of  the  defense  to  deny  success  to 
a  potential  aggressor's  attack— whether 
nuclear  or  conventional.  The  strategic 
relationship  could  then  be  characterized 
as  one  of  mutual  assured  security. 

Conclusion 

Having  thus  outlined  our  strategic  con- 
cept for  the  future,  let  me  offer  some 
comments. 

In  the  1950s,  total  nuclear  disarma- 
ment was  the  declared  objective  of  both 
;ides,  but  it  was  wholly  impractical. 
Among  other  reasons,  in  an  uncertain 
world,  neither  side  could  have  the  con- 
fidence necessary  seriously  to  consider 
abandoning  its  nuclear  weapons;  de- 
fenses against  them  seemed  impossible. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


merging  defensive  technologies  may 
TOvide  the  hedge  that  we  need  to  move 
A-ay  from  primary  reUance  on  nuclear 
eapons.  I  frankly  do  not  see  any  way 
1  which  we  could  consider  eventually 
lOving  toward  extremely  deep  cuts  in 
ffensive  nuclear  arms— and  their 
Itimate  elimination— without  some 
leans  to  protect  against  cheating  and 
ther  contingencies. 

Let  me  caution,  however,  that  for 
he  foreseeable  future— that  is,  in  the 
ear  term  and  even  in  the  early  and  in- 
prmediate  stages  of  any  possible  transi 
ion— offensive  nuclear  arms  and  the 
hreat  of  massive  destructive  retaliation 
hey  embody  will  be  the  key  element  of 
eterrence.  This  situation  unavoidably 
/ill  obtain  for  many,  many  years. 

Let  me  also  emphasize  that  the  con- 
ept  I  have  outlined  is  wholly  consistent 
/ith  deterrence.  Not  only  in  the  near 
erm  but  in  both  the  transition  and 
itimate  phases  as  well,  deterrence 
/ould  continue  to  provide  the  basis  for 
he  U.S. -Soviet  strategic  relationship. 
As  I  said  at  the  beginning  of  my 
lemarks,  deterrence  requires  that  a 
lotential  opponent  be  convinced  that  the 
iroblems,  risks,  and  costs  of  aggression 
ar  outweigh  the  gains  he  might  hope  to 
chieve.  A  popular  view  of  deterrence  is 
hat  it  is  almost  solely  a  matter  of 
rosing  to  an  aggressor  high  potential 
osts  through  the  ultimate  threat  of 
levastating  nuclear  retaliation. 

But  deterrence  can  also  function  ef- 
ectively  if  one  has  the  ability,  through 
lefense  and  other  military  means,  to 
leny  the  attacker  the  gains  he  might 
)therwise  have  hoped  to  realize.  Our 
lope  and  intent  are  to  shift  the  defer- 
ent balance  from  one  which  is  based 
)rimarily  on  the  punitive  threat  of 
levastating  nuclear  retaliation  to  one  in 
vhich  nuclear  arms  are  greatly  reduced 
)n  both  sides  and  non-nuclear  defenses 
)lay  a  greater  and  greater  role.  We 
relieve  this  would  provide  a  far  sounder 
lasis  for  a  stable  and  reliable  strategic 
•elationship  and  for  a  real  reduction  in 
lie  risk  of  war. 

The  concept  I  have  outlined  em- 
.odies  much  that  is  old  and  some  things 
:hat  are  new.  It  requires  that  we  rethmk 
^(ime  of  our  strategic  policy,  and  we 
4i(iuld  not  shy  away  from  doing  so. 
Reducing  the"  risk  of  war  is  a  goal  of 
vital  importance  to  both  the  West  and 
East.  We  should  examine  all  ways  by 
which  we  can  advance  that  goal  with 
clear,  objective,  and  open  minds.  This  in- 
cludes frank  discussion  between  allies. 
This  is  the  manner  in  which  our  coalition 
(if  democracies  must  work;  1  am  confi- 
dent that  together  we  will  make  the 
right  choices.  ■ 


FY  1986  Assistance  Requests 
for  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statements  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
February  20,  1985.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs.'^ 

The  year  that  has  passed  since  I  last  ap- 
peared before  the  committee  on  this  sub- 
ject has  been  a  generally  good  one  for 
the  region.  Prosperity,  political  stability, 
and  regional  security  have  been 
strengthened  and  along  with  this  has 
come  an  even  stronger  awareness  of  the 
importance  of  East  Asia  to  the  United 
States.  There  have  been  important  ad- 
vances also  in  cooperation  among  many 
of  the  nations  of  the  region.  Increasing- 
ly, they  are  concentrating  on  the  in- 
terests and  objectives  they  have  in  com- 
mon despite  their  great  diversity  and  a 
history  replete  with  animosities  and  con- 
flict. 

Our  policies  in  the  region  have 
sought  to  encourage  these  trends.  We 
have  been  working  with  the  nations  of 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  to  ensure  con- 
tinuing economic,  political,  security,  and 
technological  advances  that  serve  global 
as  well  as  regional  and  national  in- 
terests. 

These  policies  and  programs  are  ob- 
viously working,  and  they  are  paying 
substantial  annual  dividends  in  terms  of 
securing  our  foreign  policy  goals.  We 
are  witnessing  some  progress  toward 
political  and  social  systems  that  share 
our  democratic  values  and  commitment 
to  human  rights.  We  are  seeing 
dramatic  success  of  economic  systems 
that  are  open  and  market  oriented  and 
benefit  from  trade  with  them.  Finally, 
with  the  tragic  exception  of  Cambodia, 
we  are  sharing  in  the  benefits  of  peace 
that  have  been  secured  through  strength 
and  deterrence,  in  a  region  that  histori- 
cally has  been  plagued  by  war  and 
violence. 

We  can  be  proud  of  the  role  we  have 
played  and  of  our  contributions  to  the 
remarkable  achievements  that  this 
region  has  continued  to  record,  and  this 
is  particularly  true  of  our  crucial 
economic  and  military  assistance  pro- 
grams. 

It  remains  true,  however,  that  not 
all  countries  of  the  region  have  shared 
equally  in  the  region's  dynamism  and 


economic  growth.  Several  still  have  very 
low  per  capita  incomes.  Others  are  still 
reeling  under  the  effects  of  international 
recession,  experiencing  declining  terms 
of  trade  for  their  exports,  or  suffering 
from  liquidity  problems,  inflation,  or 
structural  imbalances  in  their  economy. 
These  nations  need  and  deserve  our 
continued  help  and  encouragement. 
Among  them  are  countries  that  are 
menaced  also  by  communist  military 
forces  either  on  or  within  their  borders. 
Their  critical  need  to  divert  resources  to 
meet  this  security  threat  has  worsened 
their  economic  difficulties.  They 
recognize,  however,  that  no  course  of 
economic  restructuring  or  development 
can  succeed  where  there  is  a  climate  of 
fear  and  weakness  in  the  face  of  a 
military  menace. 

An  added  important  reason  for  pro- 
viding these  nations  with  sorely  needed 
economic  assistance  is  the  fact  that  they 
are  not  depending  solely  on  outside  help 
to  solve  their  economic  difficulties  for 
them.  Rather,  they  themselves  have 
adopted  tough  austerity  measures,  such 
as  currency  devaluation,  and  are  ad- 
dressing structural  reforms  designed  to 
improve  their  economic  performance  and 
prospects.  Such  measures  have  been 
painful  and  costly  politically.  They  are  a 
sign,  however,  of  the  determination  and 
realism  of  these  governments. 

Our  economic  assistance  proposals 
are  concentrated  most  heavily  on  three 
countries— the  Philippines  and  Thailand, 
both  of  which  are  treaty  allies,  and  In- 
donesia. Due  to  budgetary  constraints, 
the  funds  proposed  for  these  and  other 
nations  of  the  region  are  unfortunately 
below  the  levels  of  last  year.  The  largest 
amount  is  proposed  for  the  Philippines, 
which  is  experiencing  its  most  critical 
economic  crisis  since  World  War  II.  We 
are  taking  steps  to  ensure  that  our  aid 
contributes  to  the  structural  economic 
reforms  needed  to  put  the  Philippines' 
economy  back  on  the  path  of  growth. 

The  second  largest  amount  of 
economic  assistance  is  proposed  for  In- 
donesia. Low  per  capita  income,  a  cur- 
rent account  deficit,  a  decrease  in  ex- 
ports, and  the  effects  of  the  recession 
have  left  Indonesia  in  a  difficult 
economic  situation  and  hard  pressed  to 
meet  the  challenge  of  having  to  absorb 
the  1.8  million  people  who  join  its  labor 
force  each  year.  The  Government  of  In- 
donesia has  undertaken  an  austerity 


1 


63 


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EAST  ASIA 


reform  program  and  a  serious  develop- 
ment progam  that  emphasizes  equity, 
growth,  and  stability  along  with  private 
investment  and  human  resources 
development. 

A  smaller  proportion  of  the  eco- 
nomic assistance  funds  are  targetted  for 
Thailand,  which  is  afflicted  by  declining 
terms  of  trade  for  its  exports,  an  in- 
creasing debt  burden,  and  other  prob- 
lems associated  with  the  international 
recession,  the  government,  however,  has 
taken  prudent  steps  to  adjust  its 
economy  which  remains  free  and  open 
and  which  has  sustained  impressive 
growth. 

A  relatively  small  amount  of  eco- 
nomic assistance  is  proposed  for  Burma, 
one  of  the  world's  poorest  nations.  It 
has  been  hurt  by  the  world  recession 
and  the  depressed  market  for  its  major 
foreign  exchange  earner,  rice. 

Modest  amounts  of  economic 
assistance  are  also  proposed  for  Fiji  and 
other  Pacific  Island  states.  We  are  sup- 
porting a  regionwide  program  with  em- 
phasis on  improving  agriculture,  rural 
development,  and  fishing  techniques, 
and  promoting  regional  cooperation  in 
this  area  of  smaller  populations  and 
smaller  markets. 

I  believe  that  by  supplementing  the 
efforts  these  nations  are  making  to  cope 
with  their  economic  problems  we  will 
also  be  enhancing  the  conditions  under 
which  democratic  traditions,  including 
respect  for  human  rights,  take  root  and 
thrive. 

Threats  in  the  Area 

However,  as  I  mentioned  previously, 
economic,  social,  and  political  develop- 
ment can  be  thwarted  by  foreign 
military  attack  and  internal  subversion. 
And  unfortunately,  the  Asia  and  Pacific 
region  continues  to  be  menaced  by  an 
enormous  concentration  of  military 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  Soviets,  Viet- 
namese, and  North  Koreans.  These  are 
governments  which  have  demonstrated  a 
willingness  to  use  such  forces  directly  or 
as  a  means  of  intimidation  to  secure  ob- 
jectives that  they  have  been  unable  to 
obtain  in  other  ways  due  to  the  im- 
poverishment of  their  economic  and 
political  systems. 

The  U.S.S.R.  continues  to  strength- 
en its  military  forces  in  the  region  and 
has  recently  added  MiG-23  fighter  air- 
craft to  its  already  formidable  military 
presence  in  Vietnam.  Vietnam  itself  and 
North  Korea  continue  to  maintain  enor- 
mous military  forces  that  are  far  greater 
than  any  defensive  need.  North  Korea 
forces  remain  poised  in  an  offensive 
posture  along  the  border  of  the  Republic 


of  Korea,  and  Vietnamese  forces  are  at 
this  moment  bringing  more  tragedy  and 
terror  to  Cambodia  and  to  the  Thai 
border  area.  The  Philippines  also  faces  a 
serious  internal  challenge — an  armed, 
communist-led  guerrilla  movement  that 
poses  a  growing  threat  to  stability  and 
progress  toward  the  revitalization  of 
democratic  institutions. 

The  nations  which  these  communist 
forces  menace  are  facing  the  threat 
realistically  and  staunchly.  They  are 
building  up  their  own  military  strength 
while  at  the  same  time  pursuing  political 
and  diplomatic  efforts  aimed  at  pro- 
moting peace,  stability,  and  freedom 
across  and  within  their  borders.  The 
United  States  obviously  continues  to 
have  a  very  important  stake  in  the  ef- 
forts that  these  nations  are  making  to 
promote  peace  and  security  in  a  region 
which  has  had  a  long  and  tragic  history 
of  war  and  violence  and  of  conflicts  in 
which  the  United  States  has  become 
directly  engaged.  Korea,  Thailand,  and 
the  Philippines  are  treaty  allies  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  Philippines  is 
also  the  site  of  military  facilities  that  are 
vital  for  the  protection  of  U.S.  security 
interests  and  the  preservation  of  peace 
in  the  region. 

Consequently,  our  security  assist- 
ance proposals  for  FY  1986  are  again 
concentrated  on  the  Philippines  and  the 
two  front-line  states  of  Korea  and 
Thailand. 

The  largest  share  of  military  assist- 
ance is  again  proposed  for  Korea  which 
continues  to  face  the  greatest  threat 
from  its  communist  neighbor.  North 
Korea.  The  Government  of  the  Republic 
of  Korea  already  is  spending  a  signifi- 
cant portion  of  its  GNP  on  defense,  but 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credits  are 
highly  important  for  the  implementation 
of  Korea's  force  improvement  plan. 

In  the  case  of  the  Philippines,  our 
request  for  security  assistance,  which  in- 
cludes a  substantial  economic  support 
fund  (ESF)  component,  is  closely  linked 
to  the  Presidential  "best-efforts"  commit- 
ment made  in  the  context  of  the  last 
5-year  review  of  our  Military  Bases 
Agreement.  Proposed  enhancements  of 
the  military  component  of  our  aid  pack- 
age are  aimed  at  helping  the  armed 
forces  of  the  Philippines  overcome 
serious  shortcomings  in  maintenance, 
logistics,  transportation,  communica- 
tions, and  training  during  a  period  of 
severe  economic  difficulties.  This  pro- 
posal is  premised  on  the  expectation 
that  recent  trends  toward  military 
reform  and  greater  professionalism  with 
the  leadership  and  throughout  the  in- 
stitution will  continue  and  strengthen. 


Thailand  continues  to  face  a  large 
Vietnamese  force  that  is  trying  to  sub- 
jugate Cambodia  and  which  poses  a 
significant  threat  to  Thailand's  security 
The  Thai  Government  is  allocating 
substantial  resources  to  military  mod- 
ernization in  order  to  create  a  credible 
deterrent  to  Vietnamese  adventurism. 
Our  support  for  this  effort  is  crucial  not 
only  because  of  the  importance  of 
Thailand  itself  but  because  of  the  stake 
we  have  in  the  independence,  integrity, 
and  prosperity  of  the  members  of  the 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nation; 
(ASEAN),  of  which  Thailand  is  a  part. 
The  ASEAN  states  are  astride  the  im- 
portant sealanes  connecting  Asia  and 
the  Middle  East  and  Europe;  the  free 
nations  of  the  Pacific  and,  indeed,  of  the 
world  have  a  common  stake  in  keeping 
them  peaceful  and  open.  Indonesia  is  in 
a  key  position  in  this  respect,  and  our 
common  strategic  interests  are  among 
the  important  reasons  why  we  are  pro- 
posing continued  security  assistance  for 
that  country. 

The  security  assistance  levels  that 
we  are  proposing  for  these  and  other  na 
tions  of  the  region  entail  only  minor  in- 
creases from  1985  levels  and  in  several 
cases  these  amounts  are  still  below  thosi 
allocated  in  FY  1984.  Moreover  they 
make  up  only  a  modest  proportion  of  th( 
total  worldwide  foreign  assistance  funds 
requested  for  FY  1986. 

Korea 

The  prevention  of  conflict  on  the  Korear 
Peninsula  is  a  key  component  of  regiona 
peace,  for  which  the  deterrence  of  Nortl 
Korean  aggression  against  South  Korea 
is  fundamental.  For  over  30  years,  the 
U.S.-R.O.K.  alliance  has  been  successfu 
in  its  central  aim — preventing  North 
Korean  aggression  leading  to  a  recur- 
rence of  hostilities  on  the  Korean  Penin- 
sula. The  peace  on  the  peninsula  is  at 
times  an  uneasy  one.  It  has  been  markec 
by  such  incidents  as  the  1968  raid  on  the 
Blue  House  by  North  Korean  comman- 
does, the  seizure  2  days  later  of  the 
U.S.S.  Pueblo,  tunneling  under  the 
demilitarized  zone  (DMZ)  by  the  North, 
and,  more  recently,  the  1983  bombing  in 
Rangoon,  which  a  Burmese  court  deter- 
mined was  planned  and  executed  by 
Pyongyang.  Yet  peace  has  been  pre- 
served, and  this  peace  has  allowed  great 
economic  and  social  progress  in  South 
Korea. 

In  spite  of  this  impressive  develop- 
ment, however,  the  need  for  continued 
U.S.  security  assistance  to  Korea  is 
strong.  In  the  past  decade.  North  Korea, 
which  we  estimate  spends  20-25%  of  its 
GNP  on  armaments,  has  carried  out  a 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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lajor  force  buildup,  and  the  compara- 
ive  military  balance  continues  to  favor 
he  North.  North  Korea  has  about 
50,000  men  under  arms,  compared  with 
bout  620,000  in  the  South,  but  these 
umbers  substantially  understate  North 
Korea's  combat  superiority,  because 
Jorth  Korean  ground  forces  are  better 
quipped  and  combat-ready  and  rely  ex- 
ensively  on  nonmilitary  units  that  are 
lOt  counted  in  this  manpower  total  for 
upport  functions.  North  Korean  forces 
.re  well  equipped  and  have  a  substantial 
advantage  (at  least  2-1)  in  several  key 
ategories  of  offensive  weapons— tanks, 
3ng-range  artillery,  and  armored  per- 
onnel  carriers.  The  North  has  perhaps 
he  world's  largest  commando  force, 
ome  80,000-100,000  troops,  designed 
or  insertion  behind  the  lines  in  time  of 
var. 

North  Korea  also  has  more  than 
wice  as  many  combat  aircraft  as  the 
louth,  although  R.O.K.-U.S.  forces 
lave  the  qualitative  edge.  North  Korean 
'xercises  have  revealed  impressive 
ophistication  in  terms  of  joint  and  com- 
lined  forces  operations.  In  addition  to 
their  size  and  their  capabilities,  the 
hallenge  posed  by  North  Korean  forces 
3  compounded  by  factors  of  time  and 
listance.  The  bulk  of  North  Korean 
lorces  are  deployed  well  forward,  along 
ihe  DMZ,  some  25  miles  from  Seoul; 
4orth  Korea  has  recently  begun  to  con- 
struct additional  underground  fortifica- 
tions near  the  DMZ.  Warning  time  for 
I.O.K.  and  U.S.  forces  is,  therefore, 
"ery  limited,  and  a  high  state  of 
readiness  is  required  at  ali  times. 

To  counter  this  threat,  the  R.O.K., 
ivhich  is  committed  to  spending  6%  of 
Its  GNP  on  defense,  is  engaged  in  a  ma- 
tor  force  improvement  program  de- 
dgned  to  increase  warning  time,  aug- 
.  nent  its  effective  fire  power,  and 
>nhance  its  air  defense  capability.  The 
irogram,  which  includes  coproduction  of 
he  F-5  and  M109  A2  howitzer,  acquisi- 
ion  of  the  F-16,  TOW  missiles  [tube 
aunched,  optically  tracked,  wire-guided 
uititank  missiles],  and  upgrade  of  the 
lawk  air  defense  system,  is  projected  to 
■ost  over  $9  billion  during  the  1982-86 
ici-iod,  with  half  that  amount  slated  for 
.mcurement  in  the  United  States. 

To  assist  the  defense  efforts  of  this 
IVont-line  ally,  with  which  American 
troops  would  fight  side  by  side  in  the 
.■\  ent  of  North  Korean  aggression,  we 
pi-ovided  a  total  of  $220  million  in  FMS 
iifdits  in  FY  1985  and  are  requesting 
^•^128  million  in  FY  1986.  Last  year,  the 
Congress  approved  10  years'  grace  on 
iH'iiayment  of  principle,  and  20  years' 
reiiayment  for  Korea.  This  very 


welcome  provision  will  allow  Korea  to 
devote  a  larger  proportion  of  each  year's 
allocation  to  actual  purchases,  thereby 
permitting  the  force  improvement  pro- 
gram to  proceed  on  schedule.  We  are 
also  requesting  a  slight  increase  in 
IMET  funds,  to  $2.2  million,  for  profes- 
sional and  technical  military  training. 

Our  Korean  ally  is  doing  its  utmost 
for  its  own  security.  It  purchases  an- 
nually from  the  United  States  about 
$500  million  in  military  equipment  over 
and  above  the  FMS  credit  allocation.  It 
is  clearly  in  our  interest  to  help  Korea 
meet  its  force  improvement  goals  and 
mutual  security  objectives.  (Jiven 
Korea's  impressive  economic  and  social 
progress,  I  believe  time  is  on  Seoul's 
side.  I  believe  that  helping  Korea  main- 
tain a  strong  defense  with  adequate 
FMS  credits  is  very  much  in  our  own  in- 
terest. 

The  Philippines 

Our  security  assistance  request  for  the 
Philippines  is  designed  to  address  the 
critical  needs  of  a  key  allied  nation  fac- 
ing a  combination  of  political,  economic, 
and  security  problems,  as  well  as  to  sup- 
port a  vital  defense  relationship  in- 
cluding key  support  facilities  for  U.S. 
forces.  The  basic  framework  for  our  re- 
quest is  a  Presidential  "best-efforts" 
commitment  made  in  connection  with 
the  5-year  review  of  our  Military  Bases 
Agreement  in  1983.  By  letter  to  Presi- 
dent Marcos,  the  President  indicated  his 
intention  to  seek  a  total  of  $900  million 
in  security  assistance  during  the  5-year 
period  beginning  in  FY  1985.  Our  securi- 
ty assistance  thus  relates  closely  to  our 
ability  to  maintain  unhampered  use  of 
Clark  Air  Force  Base,  Subic  Naval  Base, 
and  related  installations,  facilities  that 
are  crucial  to  our  capability  to  protect 
the  sea  and  airlanes  of  the  region  and  to 
provide  logistical  support  for  U.S.  forces 
in  the  Indian  Ocean  and  Persian  Gulf. 

Developments  since  the  Presidential 
commitment  was  made  have  rendered 
the  need  for  assistance  all  the  more 
acute.  In  the  wake  of  the  Aquino 
assassination  in  August  1983,  the  Philip- 
pines plunged  into  its  most  critical  eco- 
nomic crisis  since  World  War  II.  Conclu- 
sion of  a  $615  million  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  standby  arrange- 
ment involving  stringent  austerity 
measures  and  successful  restructurmg  of 
public  and  private  foreign  debt  represent 
crucial  first  steps  toward  economic 
stabilization.  However,  the  economic 
outlook  remains  bleak  in  the  short-to- 
medium  term.  The  Philippines  registered 
negative  real  GNP  growth  of  around 
5.5%  in  1984,  with  inflation  of  over 


.50%.  Positive  real  GNP  growth  is 
unlikely  to  resume  until  1986,  and  then 
only  at  a  modest  rate.  The  need  to 
restrict  government  expenditures,  cur- 
tail imports,  and  service  a  large  external 
debt  will  weigh  heavily  on  the  Philip- 
pines for  the  remainder  of  this  decade. 

As  it  seeks  to  cope  with  economic 
crisis,  the  Government  of  the  Philippines 
also  faces  the  challenge  of  a  growing 
communist  insurgency.  The  communist 
New  People's  Army  (NPA)  now  numbers 
some  10,000-12,000  armed  guerrillas 
and  operates  in  rural  areas  throughout 
the  country.  The  root  causes  of  the  in- 
surgency are  political  and  socioeconomic 
and  must  be  addressed  as  such.  At  the 
same  time,  the  insurgency  poses  a 
military  challenge  requiring  an  effective 
military  response.  Exchange  shortages 
and  budgetary  restraints— Philippine 
defense  expenditures  have  declined  by 
more  than  20%  in  real  terms  since 
1978— have  severely  restricted  re- 
sources available  to  the  armed  forces  of 
the  Philippines  to  play  its  role  in  a  com- 
prehensive approach  to  the  insurgency. 

The  past  year  has  seen  important 
progress  toward  the  revitalization  of 
political  institutions  in  the  Philippines. 

•  The  independent  Agrava  board 
carried  out  an  independent  investigation 
of  the  tragic  Aquino  assassination,  and 
25  military  personnel,  including  the 
Armed  Forces  Chief  of  Staff,  are  now 
on  trial  for  the  crime. 

•  Presidential  succession  rules  have 
been  redefined. 

•  There  is  a  broad  press  freedom. 

•  A  vigorously  contested  parliamen- 
tary election  last  May  produced  a  strong 
and  active  assembly  and  renewed  op- 
position political  activity. 

On  the  economic  front,  we  have  seen 
acceptance  of  an  IMF  arrangement  in- 
volving stringent  austerity  constraints, 
and  beginnings  have  been  made  toward 
a  program  of  structural  reform. 

Finally,  we  are  encouraged  by  signs 
over  the  past  few  months  that  the 
Philippine  military  establishment  and 
government  leadership  accept  the 
seriousness  of  the  insurgency  and  are 
taking  steps  to  deal  with  it  more  effec- 
tively. Encouraging  signs  of  military 
reform  include: 

•  A  new  system  to  deal  with  mili- 
tary abuse  cases; 

•  Some  reorganization  to  deal  with 
the  insurgency;  and 

•  A  more  realistic  set  of  military 
procurement  priorities. 

Our  military  assistance  proposal  is 
made  in  the  expectation  that  these  posi- 
tive trends  will  continue  and  strengthen. 


Mau  1C)8?i 


65 


EAST  ASIA 


Our  proposed  assistance  package  for 
FY  1986  is  designed  both  to  ensure 
fulfillment  of  the  Presidential  "best- 
efforts"  commitment  and  to  address  the 
seriousness  of  the  problems  now  facing 
the  Philippines.  Including  development 
assistance  and  PL  480,  we  have  re- 
quested a  total  of  $275  million  in  aid  to 
the  Philippines,  $173  million  of  which  is 
economic.  We  believe  this  balance  well 
reflects  current  needs. 

Our  request  for  a  total  of  $100 
million  in  military  assistance  ($50  million 
in  the  military  assistance  program 
(MAP)  and  $50  million  FMS)  aims  at 
making  up  some  of  the  shortfall  in  mili- 
tary assistance  resulting  from  last  year's 
congressional  action  when  $45  million  in 
proposed  FMS  for  FY  1985  was  shifted 
to  ESF.  The  Presidential  letter  specifies 
that  a  total  of  $425  million  in  military 
assistance  ($125  million  MAP/$300 
million  FMS)  will  be  sought  during  the 
5-year  period.  With  military  assistance 
reduced  to  $40  million  in  FY  1985,  we 
need  to  begin  to  increase  military  assist- 
ance over  the  base-line  level  of  $85 
million  if  we  are  to  fulfill  the  President's 
commitment  during  the  5-year  period. 

Equally  important  in  determining 
the  level  of  military  aid  for  FY  1986  is 
the  Philippine  Armed  Forces'  concrete 
need  for  such  assistance  if  it  is  to  mount 
an  effective  military  response  to  the  in- 
surgency challenge.  The  reduced  level  of 
FY  1985  military  assistance  will  be 
almost  totally  absorbed  by  operations 
and  maintenance  costs  in  support  of  ex- 
isting inventory.  Serious  shortcomings  in 
maintenance,  logistics,  transportation, 
communications,  and  training  can  only 
be  overcome  through  adequate  levels  of 
foreign  assistance.  Over  the  next  few 
years,  military  assistance  levels  at  least 
equal  to  those  embodied  in  the  5-year 
Presidential  commitment  are  essential. 
Our  international  military  education  and 
training  (IMET)  program  request  of 
$2.25  million,  aimed  at  improving  the 
leadership  and  technical  skills  required 
for  professional  military  performance, 
also  addresses  important  Philippine 
needs. 

Our  proposal  that  military  assistance 
consist  of  equal  portions  of  MAP  and 
concessional  FMS  credits  flows  from 
current  and  projected  international 
payments  calculations.  In  FY  1984 
repayments  of  $50.5  million  on  previous 
market  rate  FMS  credits  exceeded  new 
credits  of  $50  million.  In  the  absence  of 
Paris  Club  debt  rescheduling,  repayment 
obligations  resulting  from  FMS  credits 
would  have  again  exceeded  new  inflows 
of  military  grants  and  credits  in  FY 
1985,  and  projected  repayments  are  ex- 
pected to  reach  $48  million  in  FY  1986. 


This  increased  debt  burden  comes  at  an 
extremely  difficult  time  for  the  Philip- 
pine economy,  with  its  overall  ratio  of 
debt  service  to  exports  at  around  50% 
prior  to  debt  rescheduling.  In  this  situa- 
tion, the  breakdown  between  grants  and 
credits  envisaged  in  the  Presidential 
commitment  simply  is  not  responsive  to 
current  economic  needs. 

The  severity  of  the  economic  situa- 
tion also  makes  it  imperative  that  ESF 
be  maintained  at  the  base-line  level  of 
$95  million.  Given  the  Philippines'  eco- 
nomic prospects  for  the  next  few  years, 
it  is  difficult  to  square  anything  less 
with  our  interest  in  that  nation's  eco- 
nomic recovery.  Our  ESF  will  be  pro- 
grammed in  accordance  with  the  basic 
premise  that  providing  government  serv- 
ices to  address  the  economic  and  social 
conditions  in  rural  areas  which  allow  in- 
surgencies to  prosper  is  at  least  as  im- 
portant as  military  operations.  ESF  pro- 
gramming will  continue  to  be  linked 
with  the  overall  development  assistance 
strategy  in  the  Philippines,  resulting  in  a 
focus  on  agriculture  and  small-  and 
medium-scale  industrial  development 
and  continued  support  for  the  creation 
of  rural  infrastructure.  Decisions  will  be 
made  in  the  context  of  a  continuing 
policy  dialogue  with  the  Philippine 
Government  on  economic  structural 
reform  in  coordination  with  other  donor 
efforts. 

In  addition  to  security  assistance 
related  to  our  bases  arrangements,  we 
propose  that  development  assistance  be 
maintained  at  $36  million,  roughly  the 
same  level  as  in  previous  years.  We  have 
also  requested  $7  million  in  PL  480  Title 
II  to  continue  feeding  programs  that 
have  been  rendered  even  more  impor- 
tant by  the  ravages  of  two  typhoons 
that  inflicted  severe  damage  to  the 
Philippines  late  last  year. 

Last,  but  by  no  means  least,  we  are 
proposing  the  institution  of  a  new  PL 
480  Title  I  program  of  $35  million  which 
will  be  directly  linked  to  structural 
reform  in  the  agricultural  sector.  Lltiliz- 
ing  funds  that  may  be  made  available 
from  the  Title  I  reserve  in  FY  1985  and 
FY  1986,  this  new  program  will  be  used 
along  with  our  development  assistance 
to  encourage  the  structural  economic  re- 
forms that  will  be  needed  if  the  Philip- 
pines is  to  resume  a  path  of  sustained 
economic  growth. 

Our  policy  toward  the  Philippines 
rests  on  the  premise  that  fundamental 
political,  economic,  and  military  reforms 
are  needed  if  stability  is  to  be  preserved 
and  economic  health  restored.  A  central 
objective  of  our  assistance  is  to  con- 
tribute to  the  needed  reform. 


A  lot  has  happened  in  the  Philip-      p 
pines  in  recent  years.  A  key  allied  natio  Ssb 
is  deeply  troubled  on  a  variety  of  fronts 
It  is  incumbent  upon  us  to  do  what  we  |«* 
can  to  help  the  Filipinos  get  through  th 
difficult  period  while  taking  the  difficult 
measures  needed  to  lay  the  basis  for 
future  stability  and  prosperity. 


f 


Thailand 


* 


i 


Thailand  is  a  close  friend  and  treaty  alh 
of  the  United  States.  The  important 
relationship  we  have  developed  over  the 
years  is  based  on  a  shared  commitment 
to  the  values  of  freedom  and  independ- 
ence. In  the  spirit  of  mutual  respect  anc  B 
shared  obligations  which  exists  between  lai 
our  countries,  we  propose  to  continue 
our  assistance  to  'Thailand's  programs 
for  economic  development  and  armed 
forces  modernization.  In  a  broader  con- 
text, our  assistance  is  also  viewed  as  a 
gauge  of  the  reliability  of  our  commit- 
ment to  Thailand  and  our  support  for 
ASEAN  generally.  To  maintain  our  in- 
terests in  the  region,  we  should  help  to   |ii 
sustain  our  friends. 

On  its  eastern  border,  Thailand  face- 
a  strong  military  threat  from  a  combat- 
hardened  Vietnamese  Army  which  con- 
tinues to  battle  Cambodian  resistance 
groups  as  it  seeks  to  consolidate  its  grip 
on  Cambodia.  Vietnamese  incursions 
into  Thai  territory  occur  regularly.  This 
threat  has  prompted  an  overdue  mod- 
ernization of  Thailand's  military  forces. 
We  support  this  modernization  program 
which,  in  conjunction  with  other  efforts, 
aims  to  provide  a  deterrent  to  further 
Vietnamese  aggression.  In  order  to  en- 
joy a  credible  deterrent  which  will 
enable  Thailand  to  become  more  self- 
reliant  in  an  emergency,  the  Thai  must 
be  accorded  continued  high  priority  in 
the  allocation  of  assistance. 

Our  overall  assistance  package  is 
also  important  for  Thai  economic 
management.  In  recent  years,  the  Thai 
economy  has  demonstrated  impressive 
resiliency  and  has  continued  to  expand, 
although  at  a  somewhat  slower  rate.  In 
the  last  couple  of  years,  however,  it  has 
seen  a  worrisome  increase  in  its  trade 
deficit  and  level  of  debt.  These  problems 
have  been  due  in  part  to  international 
factors.  The  government  of  Prime 
Minister  Prem  has  taken  courageous 
steps  to  address  these  problems,  but 
Thailand  now  faces  a  period  of  painful 
adjustments.  The  Thai  Government 
traditionally  has  managed  to  balance  its 
allocation  of  resources,  giving  social  and 
economic  development  a  high  priority 
while  also  providing  for  necessary 
military  expenditures.  Security  assist- 
ance from  the  LInited  States  has  helped 


66 


Denartment  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


le  Royal  Thai  Government  maintain 
lis  balance  in  the  face  of  growing 
jmands  on  limited  resources.  Our  eco- 
3mic  assistance,  while  not  large  in 
rms  of  total  resources,  has  been 
rected  into  sensitive  priority  areas 
ich  as  the  eradication  of  rural  poverty. 

For  FY  1986,  we  are  requesting  a 
ight  increase  in  FMS  funding  for 
hailand  to  $97.5  million  from  $95 
lillion  in  1985.  In  the  face  of  the  very 
^al  strains  on  the  Thai  economy,  how- 
i^er,  we  have  also  recommended  in- 
•eased  concessionality  in  our  assistance 
ackage.  We  have  requested  that  $40 
lillion  in  FMS  be  provided  at  conces- 
■(  onal  rates  while  the  terms  on  the  re- 
laining  $57.5  million  would  be  extended 
n  terms  providing  10  years'  grace  and 
0  years'  repayment  of  principle.  These 
mds  will  help  finance  a  long  overdue 
pgrading  of  equipment  by  all  the  serv- 
:es  as  well  as  purchases  of  necessary 
xpendable  items  which  will  enhance 
iistainability. 

Our  MAP  request  is  again  for  $5 
lillion  and  is  intended  to  ease  the  cost 
3  the  Thai  of  necessary  equipment  pur- 
hases. 

Our  request  for  $5  million  in  ESF, 
gain  straight-lined  from  last  fiscal  year, 
5  directed  to  the  continuing  need  for  the 
'hai  to  supplement  their  own  efforts  to 
ssist  war-torn  rural  communities  along 
ae  Cambodian  border.  The  spill-over  of 
ghting  into  their  homes,  with  the  at- 
endant  disruption  to  their  lives,  make 
he  people  in  these  communities  deserv- 
ig  of  special  help  and  compassion.  The 
^SF  funds  also  directly  contribute  to 
pholding  Thailand's  humane  policy  of 
ffering  asylum  to  refugees  and  other 
lisplaced  persons  by  assisting  the  Thai 
order  villages  affected  by  the  refugee 
nflux. 

In  1986  we  are  requesting  $2.5 
nillion  in  IMET  funds.  These  training 
lunds  have  become  all  the  more  impor- 
lant  as  the  Thai  military  absorbs  more 
sophisticated  systems  with  attendant 
'hallenges  to  technical  competence  and 
ogistics  support.  The  Thai  consistently 
)ut  this  training  to  effective  use  to 
ipgrade  their  capabilities  in  technical 
ind  command  subjects. 

Our  development  assistance  request 
)f  $22  million  shows  a  small  decrease 
:'rom  last  year.  However,  it  represents 
in  important  contribution  toward 
ichieving  Thailand's  development  goals 
and  the  maintenance  of  a  healthy, 
oalanced  economy  in  the  face  of  increas- 
ng  security  requirements.  Working 
closely  with  the  Thai  Government,  the 
emphasis  of  our  program  has  shifted  as 


the  Thai  economy  has  changed.  Our  pro- 
gram will  now  emphasize  two  new 
areas — the  creation  of  jobs  in  rural 
areas  through  the  promotion  of  small  in- 
dustrial enterprises  and  assistance  in  the 
field  of  science  and  technology. 

Indonesia 

The  requested  FY  1986  security  assist- 
ance program  for  Indonesia  consists  of 
$2.8  million  in  IMET  funding,  plus  $34.5 
million  FMS  direct  loans  at  concessional 
interest  rates.  Concessional  rates  are 
considered  necessary  to  assist  Indonesia 
in  recovering  from  the  effects  of  the 
global  recession  in  the  early  1980s  and 
to  overcome  serious  budgetary  shortfalls 
due  to  declining  oil  and  non-oil  export 
revenues  in  recent  years.  Uncertainties 
regarding  oil  and  natural  gas  revenues, 
which  account  for  more  than  60%  of  the 
Indonesian  budget,  are  expected  to  con- 
tinue for  several  years,  and  the  Indo- 
nesian Government  is  expected  to  be 
hard-pressed.  At  the  same  time,  the  In- 
donesian Government  has  responded  to 
the  recession  and  declining  oil  revenues 
in  a  most  responsible  way  by  under- 
taking self-imposed  austerity  and  reform 
programs.  The  rupiah  has  been  de- 
valued by  30%,  foreign  exchange  ex- 
penditures for  development  programs 
were  cut  in  half,  and  the  overall  budget 
deficit  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  was  also 
reduced  by  50%.  In  addition,  the  govern- 
ment undertook  a  sweeping  reform  of 
the  financial  sector  by  removing  interest 
rate  and  lending  controls,  increasing  tax 
revenues  and  broadening  the  tax  base, 
and  reviewing  regulations  inhibiting  the 
growth  of  the  private  sector. 

Development  assistance  of  $60 
million  is  being  requested  for  FY  1986,  a 
decrease  of  $5  million  from  the  FY  1985 
level.  Our  budgetary  constraints  also 
have  dictated  a  $10  million  reduction  in 
PL  480  Title  I  assistance  to  $30  million. 
PL  480  assistance  to  Indonesia  con- 
tinues to  be  a  high  priority  because  food 
stocks  need  to  be  maintained  at  accept- 
able levels  in  order  to  forestall  hardship 
and  public  unrest,  as  well  as  provide  for 
adequate  emergency  shipments  of  food 
to  impoverished  or  disaster-struck  areas. 
A  PL  480  Title  II  request  of  $6  million 
supports  voluntary  agency  programs 
and  World  Food  Program  operations. 

Indonesia,  the  world's  fifth  largest 
country,  plays  a  key  leadership  role  in 
both  Southeast  Asia  and  in  the  broader 
Pacific  Basin.  Its  geostrategic  impor- 
tance and  hence  its  importance  to  the 
United  States  cannot  be  underrated.  In- 
donesia is  also  an  important  leader  in 
the  Nonaligned  Movement,  and  its  role 


as  a  moderate  in  that  forum  is  a  valued 
one.  Indonesia  also  ranks  among  the 
moderates  in  the  Islamic  movement  and 
has  played  constructive  roles  in  many  in- 
ternational organizations.  Development 
and  security  assistance  to  Indonesia  are 
part  of  our  strong  support  for  ASEAN, 
which  in  our  view  represents  the  best 
hope  for  peace,  stability,  and  economic 
and  social  development  in  Southeast 
Asia.  A  consistent  development  assist- 
ance program  for  Indonesia  is  necessary 
to  increase  manpower  and  management 
skills,  to  advance  agricultural  research, 
to  expand  appropriate  .science  and  tech- 
nology programs,  to  continue  to  upgrade 
Indonesia's  educational  system,  and  to 
promote  the  private  sector's  role  in 
economic  development. 

Although  Indonesia  has  wisely 
slowed  the  pace  of  its  military  force 
modernization  in  the  face  of  recent  and 
continuing  economic  problems,  U.S. 
security  assistance  has  helped  to  sustain 
a  number  of  important  programs,  in- 
cluding aircraft  maintenance  and  spare 
parts,  ship  overhaul  and  spare  parts,  im- 
provements in  air  and  sea  defense 
systems,  the  purchase  of  war  reserve 
munitions,  and,  most  importantly,  ad- 
vanced and  specialized  training  for  com- 
manders and  management  personnel  in 
the  Indonesian  Army,  Navy  and  Air 
Force.  Added  emphasis  this  year  is  ex- 
pected to  be  given  to  "train-the-trainers" 
programs  which  would  measurably  im- 
prove indigenous  training  capabilities. 

Indonesia's  military  forces  remain 
critically  short  of  qualified  technicians 
and  program  managers.  U.S.  training 
primarily  will  be  in  technical  fields,  and 
the  level  of  IMET  funding  requested 
should  permit  approximately  250 
military  officers  to  attend  our  armed 
forces  schools  in  FY  1986.  IMET 
deserves  the  highest  priority  support 
because  of  the  important  role  played  by 
the  professional  military  in  the  Indone- 
sian society,  the  utility  of  the  program 
in  furthering  our  foreign  relations  objec- 
tives, and  the  desirability  of  improving 
mutually  beneficial  service-to-service 
contacts. 

Malaysia 

Strategically  located  on  the  Malacca 
Strait,  Malaysia's  continued  political 
stability  and  economic  development  are 
essential  to  U.S.  interests  in  the 
ASEAN  region.  Confronted  with  the 
Vietnamese  occupation  of  Cambodia  and 
the  consequent  threat  to  regional  peace 
and  stability,  Malaysia  has  been  in  the 
forefront  of  ASEAN's  strategy  to  bring 
about  a  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  forces 


67 


EAST  ASIA 


from  Cambodia  and  a  negotiated  settle- 
ment ensuring  the  rights  of  the  Khmer 
people.  Beyond  Southeast  Asia,  Malaysia 
is  a  responsible  member  of  the  Islamic 
Conference  and  Nonaligned  Movement 
and  has  played  a  constructive  role  in  in- 
ternational affairs  generally. 

U.S. -Malaysian  relations,  founded  on 
mutual  respect  and  common  interests, 
are  very  good  and  were  enhanced  fur- 
ther by  the  visit  to  Washington  in  early 
1983  by  Prime  Minister  Mahathir  bin 
Mohamad.  There  have  been  subsequent 
exchanges  of  high  level  visitors,  in- 
cluding Secretary  of  State  Shultz  in  July 
and  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Musa  Hitam 
in  November  of  1984.  The  Malaysians 
are  interested  in  continued  defense 
cooperation  with  the  United  States,  tak- 
ing into  account  Malaysia's  nonaligned 
status,  and  U.S.  security  assistance  is 
designed  to  augment  their  legitimate 
self-defense  capabilities,  thus  con- 
tributing to  the  security  of  all  of  the 
ASEAN  countries. 

The  $5  million  FMS  request  level  for 
Malaysia  in  FY  1986  is  designed  to  pro- 
vide continuity  in  the  program  as  Malay- 
sian military  planners  consider  force 
restructuring  away  from  counter- 
insurgency  to  a  more  conventional  force 
posture  which  will  create  new  equipment 
needs.  Although  Malaysia  has  not  in  the 
past  made  extensive  use  of  FMS  credits, 
additional  purchases  are  likely  as  its 
economy  improves.  Possible  purchases 
include  surveillance  equipment,  antiship 
weapons,  and  Sidewinder  and  Maverick 
missiles. 

The  IMET  request  of  $1.1  million  is 
a  slight  increase  from  last  year  and  is  to 
some  extent  based  on  the  increased  cost 
of  training.  The  IMET  program  provides 
an  important  means  for  the  Malaysian 
Armed  Forces  to  meet  their  training 
needs  as  they  adjust  to  a  more  conven- 
tional force  structure  and  acquire  more 
sophisticated  weapon  systems.  The 
Malaysian  Government  considers  ex- 
posure to  U.S.  defense  management, 
operational  doctrine,  and  support  con- 
cepts critically  important  to  the  modern- 
ization of  its  armed  forces.  Whereas 
Malaysia  in  the  past  has  not  made  exten- 
sive use  of  FMS  credits,  the  Malaysian 
Armed  Forces  are  increasingly  utilizing 
U.S.  training  in  all  areas— equipment- 
related  technological  training,  advanced 
combat  training,  management,  and 
leadership  development.  Malaysia  is  ex- 
pected to  look  to  the  United  States  to 
fulfill  its  external  training  needs  for  the 
foreseeable  future. 


Singapore 

Singapore  plays  an  important  role 
within  ASEAN  and  occupies  a  pivotal 
strategic  position  in  Southeast  Asia  by 
virtue  of  its  location  at  the  juncture  of 
the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans. 
Singapore  is  a  valuable  port  of  call  for 
U.S.  ships  transiting  the  Malacca  Strait 
and  offers  important  ship  and  aircraft 
support  facilities.  A  nonaligned  nation, 
Singapore  plays  a  significant  moderating 
role  with  the  Nonaligned  Movement  and 
in  UN  fora.  Singapore  has  stood  up 
forthrightly  in  opposition  to  Soviet  ac- 
tions in  South  and  Southeast  Asia,  and 
Singaporean  leaders  have  publicly  called 
for  the  United  States  to  maintain  a  con- 
tinuing regional  security  role  as  a  deter- 
rent to  Soviet  expansionism.  Additional- 
ly Singapore  has  strongly  supported 
ASEAN's  strategy  for  achieving  a 
political  settlement  of  the  Cambodian 
problem  and  an  end  to  Vietnamese  oc- 
cupation of  that  country. 

The  purpose  of  the  IMET  program 
for  Singapore  is  to  provide  this  friendly 
country  with  access  to  our  military 
schools  system.  For  FY  1986,  we  are  re- 
questing $75,000,  which  is  an  increase  of 
$25,000  over  FY  1985,  largely  because 
of  increased  training  costs  in  the  United 
States  and  because  more  highly  tech- 
nical training  may  be  sought,  for  exam- 
ple, in  connection  with  Singapore's  ac- 
quisition of  the  E2C  surveillance  air- 
craft. This  modest  amount  of  assistance 
serves  to  demonstrate  our  continuing  in- 
terest in  Singapore's  security  and  in  con- 
tinued development  of  Singapore's  small 
but  highly  proficient  armed  forces.  The 
United  States  is  an  important  source  of 
military  training  doctrine  and  expertise, 
as  well  as  a  supplier  of  military  equip- 
ment. Singapore's  participation  in  U.S. 
military  training  programs  is  highly 
significant  in  creating  and  sustaining 
military-to-military  relationships. 

Burma 

We  are  pleased  with  the  continuing  up- 
ward trend  in  our  relations  with  Burma. 
The  Burmese  Government,  while  firmly 
committed  to  nonalignment,  pursues  a 
foreign  policy  that  is  not  incompatible 
with  our  own  strategic  interests  in 
South  and  Southeast  Asia.  Moreover  the 
Burmese  leadership's  gradual  movement 
away  from  strict  isolationism  has  led  to 
increased  contacts  between  our  govern- 
ments and  to  expanded  bilateral  coop- 
eration in  areas  of  mutual  concern,  such 
as  narcotics  control. 


Our  principal  objectives  in  Burma 
are  to  encourage  the  country's  economi 
development  and  evolution  into  a 
politically  stable  society  friendly  to  the 
West  and  to  assist  the  Burmese  Goven 
ment  to  suppress  the  flow  of  illicit 
opium  and  opium  derivatives  such  as 
heroin  from  Burma  to  international 
markets. 

Despite  substantial  natural  re- 
sources, Burma  ranks  among  the  work 
poorest  countries.  It  has  a  per  capita  ir 
come  of  less  than  $190,  estimated 
foreign  currency  reserves  of  less  than 
$30  million,  and  a  debt-service  ratio  of 
well  over  30%. 

The  $13  million  in  development 
assistance  proposed  for  FY  1986  will 
enable  the  U.S.  Agency  for  Internation 
Development  (AID)  to  continue  its  sup 
port  of  Burmese  efforts  to  improve  rur 
primary  health  care,  to  increase  agri- 
cultural research,  and  to  improve  oilsee 
production  and  processing  to  reduce 
Burma's  dependence  on  rice  exports  to 
earn  badly  needed  foreign  exchange. 
The  AID  projects,  tightly  focused  on 
specific  and  achievable  goals,  have  beer 
well-received  by  the  leadership  and  peo 
pie  of  Burma  and  have  contributed 
measurably  to  a  strengthening  of  our 
bilateral  relations  that  has  included 
much  closer  cooperation  in  antinarcotic 
activity  in  recent  years. 

Internally  the  Burmese  Governmen 
faces  an  array  of  insurgent  and  warlorc 
groups,  including  the  Burma  Communis 
Party,  that  control  large  areas  of  the 
hinterland  and  finance  themselves 
through  narcotics  trafficking  and  other 
forms  of  smuggling.  The  effectiveness  ( 
the  Burmese  military  is  the  key  to 
Burma's  efforts  to  control  these  groups 
and  their  narcotics  activities  and,  over 
time,  to  achieve  stability  and  economic 
progress  in  the  country. 

The  $1  million  MAP  grant  proposec 
for  FY  1986  will  enable  the  meagerly 
equipped  military  to  strengthen  its  posi 
tion  against  the  insurgents  and  con- 
tribute to  the  effectiveness  of 
U.S. -Burmese  narcotics  control  efforts. 
The  proposed  $300,000  for  IMET  will 
assist  the  government  to  develop  its  ow 
training  capability  while  providing 
Burmese  military  officers  direct  ex- 
posure to  American  society  and  values. 
Because  of  the  military's  dominant  role 
in  Burma,  this  could  have  a  favorable 
long-term  effect  on  our  bilateral  rela- 
tions. 


68 


EAST  ASIA 


acific  Islands 

ur  major  concerns  in  the  South  Pacific 
lands  are  to  support  their  remarkable 
hievements  to  date  in  building  demo- 
atic  institutions  and  to  prevent  their 
;e  for  strategic  purposes  by  outside 
jstile  powers.  World  War  II  demon- 
rated  the  necessity  for  the  latter 
)licy.  These  islands  lie  across  our  lines 
'  sea  and  air  communication  to 
ustralia,  New  Zealand,  and  Southeast 
sia. 

Since  the  war,  these  island  states 
ive  undergone  great  changes,  and  in 
le  past  20  years  most  have  become  in- 
pendent  states.  Our  relations  with 
lem  are  friendly;  we  share  to  a  re- 
arkable  degree  a  belief  in  democratic 
Dvernment  and  devotion  to  individual 
Derties.  It  is  in  the  U.S.  interest  to 
5sist  island  governments  in  their  ef- 
rts  to  promote  economic  growth. 

For  FY  1986,  we  have  requested  $5 
illion  in  development  assistance  to  sup- 
Drt  a  region-wide  program  with  em- 
lasis  on  improving  agricultural  rural 
evelopment  and  fishing  techniques  and 
promote  regional  cooperation  in  this 
-ea  of  small  populations  and  small 
arkets.  In  addition,  we  are  requesting 
oproval  for  a  modest  bilateral  assist- 
ice  program  ($1  million)  for  Fiji  using 
SF.  Our  military  assistance  would  con- 
st of  small  IMET  programs  with  a 
)tal  dollar  value  of  $275,000  for  all  of 
lie  Pacific  Islands,  plus  a  small  MAP 
location  to  Fiji  of  $300,000. 

liji 

Ihe  $100,000  IMET  program  requested 
•)r  FY  1986  represents  a  straight-lining 
cm  FY  1985's  funding  level.  The 
'  loney  would  assist  the  Royal  Fiji 
,  [ilitary  Forces  in  acquiring  needed  pro- 
■.'^sional  and  technical  skills  to  better 
lerate  a  small,  but  modern  defense 
ir<'o.  We  are  requesting  $300,000  in 
!AF  to  assist  the  Fiji  military  mod- 
rnize  its  small  arms. 

A  functioning  democracy  and  a 
•ader  in  regional  organizations,  Fiji  also 
lakes  important  contributions  to  inter- 
ational  peacekeeping  efforts.  Fiji  main- 
lins  two  battalions  of  troops  with  the 
inai  Multilateral  Force  and  Observers 
VIFO)  and  the  UN  Interim  Force  in 
,ebanon  (UNIFIL),  more  than  are  on 
uty  in  Fiji  itself.  Our  bilateral  relations 
re  excellent.  In  1983,  Fiji  reopened  its 
'orts  to  all  our  U.S.  Navy  ships.  Fiji  has 
iven  the  U.S.  Government  particularly 
trong  support  on  a  number  of  impor- 
ant  international  issues,  including 
Jrenada,  the  Korean  airline  incident, 
.nd  Afghanistan. 


Papua  New  Guinea 

The  United  States  has  enjoyed  friendly 
relations  with  Papua  New  Guinea  before 
and  since  its  independence  from  Aus- 
tralia in  1975.  The  country's  size, 
strategic  location,  and  resources  make  it 
a  major  actor  in  the  South  Pacific. 

Papua  New  Guinea  maintains  the 
largest  defense  force  in  the  Pacific 
Island  region.  The  proposed  FY  1986 
IMET  program  of  $75,000  represents  an 
increase  of  $25,000  over  last  year's 
allocation.  Papua  New  Guinea  is  ex- 
pected to  use  its  IMET  grant  to  provide 
training  in  improving  logistics,  manage- 
ment, and  administrative  capabilities 
and  search  and  rescue  techniques. 

Tonga 

Tonga  continues  to  be  a  reliable  friend 
for  the  United  States  in  the  South 
Pacific.  The  Tongan  Government  has 
welcomed  port  calls  by  the  U.S.  Navy 
and  has  stated  its  willingness  to  host 
nuclear-powered  vessels  even  when 
other  island  governments,  concerned 
over  an  upsurge  in  public  sensitivity  to 
nuclear  matters,  have  been  reluctant  to 
do  so.  The  proposed  FY  1986  IMET  pro- 
gram of  $50,000  is  the  same  as  FY 
1985.  The  funds  are  expected  to  be  used 
for  training  in  management  and  mainte- 
nance and  repair  skills. 

Solomon  Islands 

The  Solomon  Islands,  independent  since 
1978,  is  the  second  largest  of  the  Pacific 
Island  states  in  the  area  and  the  third 
largest  in  population.  Its  foreign  policy 
has  been  markedly  pro-Western.  The 
newly  elected  government  has  been 
working  with  us  to  resolve  the  fisheries 
problems  that  developed  in  1984.  The 
Solomon  Islands  continues  to  try  to 
upgrade  its  rudimentary  defense  forces. 
The  requested  FY  1986  IMET  level  is 
$50,000  and  represents  a  $20,000  in- 
crease over  the  FY  1985  allocation.  Ob- 
jectives of  the  program  remain  to  assist 
in  creating  skills  necessary  for  effective 
control  and  maintenance  of  security  and 
management  of  forces. 

Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands 

The  United  States  has  administered  the 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands 
(TTPI)  since  World  War  II  and  since 
1947  under  a  trusteeship  agreement 
with  the  United  Nations.  Since  1969  we 
have  been  negotiating  with  the  leader- 
ship of  the  TTPI  for  new  political  rela- 
tionships. In  1983  two  of  the  island 


governments — the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia  (P'SM)  and  the  Republic  of 
the  Marshall  Islands— completed  all  the 
necessary  procedures  to  enter  into  a 
new  and  uni(iue  relationship  with  the 
United  States,  that  of  freely  associated 
states.  The  Administration  is  resubmit- 
ting the  Compact  of  Free  Association  to 
this  Congress  in  order  to  complete  the 
process  on  our  side  and  initiate  the  new 
relationship  with  FSM  and  the  Mar- 
shalls.  The  Administration's  target  date 
for  implementation  of  the  free  associa- 
tion relationship  is  October  1,  1985. 

For  FY  1986,  we  have  requested 
$299.3  million  for  the  compact  upon  the 
enactment  of  the  necessary  authorizing 
legislation. 

The  compact  will  regulate  the  rela- 
tionships between  the  United  States  and 
the  Marshall  Islands  and  the  FSM. 
Under  the  compact,  the  United  States  is 
granted  full  powers  and  authority  for 
defense  and  security  matters,  including 
the  right  to  establish  military  bases  and 
support  activities,  throughout  the  freely 
associated  states.  The  compact  specifies 
the  amounts  and  attendant  objectives 
and  purposes  of  U.S.  grant  and  service 
assistance  to  each  of  the  freely 
associated  states. 

The  overall  policy  goals  of  the 
United  States  with  regard  to  the  com- 
pact are  based  on  a  review  of  U.S. 
policy  by  the  senior  interagency  group 
on  foreign  policy  and  were  approved  by 
the  President  on  September  21,  1981. 
The  compact  implements  long-term  U.S. 
national  security  requirements  and  pro- 
vides the  basis  for  the  accomplishment 
of  shorter  term  contingency  basing  and 
logistic  needs.  Another  important  policy 
goal  of  the  United  States  is  to  see 
political  stability  in  the  freely  associated 
states.  The  compact  accomplishes  the 
equally  important  goal  of  political  stabili- 
ty through  provision  of  annual  grant 
assistance. 

The  first  year  estimate  exceeds  by 
$153.1  million  the  second  year  estimate 
and  exceeds  by  $143.5  million  the 
average  annual  budget  estimate.  This  is 
due  to  the  inclusion  of  several  one-time 
payments,  the  most  significant  of  which 
is  a  one-time  $150  million  payment  to 
establish  a  trust  fund  for  the  settlement 
of  all  claims  resulting  from  the  U.S. 
nuclear  weapons  testing  program  in  the 
Marshall  Islands. 

Regional  Economic  Assistance 

The  Administration's  budget  proposal 
has  $19.5  million  for  the  Asian  regional 
program.  This  program  includes  funds 
for  South  Asia  and  East  Asia  activities 
of  the  American  Free  Labor  Institute 


ii/lay1985 


69 


EAST  ASIA 


and  a  number  of  American  private 
voluntary  organizations  and  provides 
some  support  to  Peace  Corps  projects.  It 
will  also  provide  $5.62  million  in  tech- 
nical assistance  during  FY  1986  to  the 
small  but  significant  regional  assistance 
program  we  have  established  with  the 
six  governments  of  ASEAN.  As  a  result 
of  the  regular  high-level  economic  dia- 
logues we  hold  with  the  ASEAN  govern- 
ments, AID  has  developed  several  high 
quality  technical  assistance  projects  that 
respond  to  specific  regional  needs.  Proj- 
ects supported  by  past  funding  have 
focused  on  health,  education,  agricul- 
ture, energy,  and  industry.  This  year  we 
are  seeking  funding  for  a  watershed 
management  project  that  will  assist  in 
checking  the  serious  soil  erosion  and 
water  control  problems  facing  these  na- 
tions, an  energy  conservation  and 
management  project,  and  a  human 
resources  development  program  that 
will  provide  scholarships  in  a  number  of 
technical  disciplines,  including  agri- 
culture, health  and  nutrition,  engineer- 
ing, and  management. 

The  regional  program  for  ASEAN 
countries  is  part  of  a  larger  effort  by 
several  U.S.  Government  agencies  and 
the  U.S.  business  community  to  expand 
the  areas  of  cooperation  in  culture, 
science,  and  technology  between  the 
United  States  and  ASEAN.  For  exam- 
ple, the  Food  and  Drug  Administration 
has  organized  seminars  on  improving 
food  quality  controls  for  canning  in- 
dustries, and  the  U.S.  Geolog^ical  Survey 
provides  advice  and  training  in  the  quest 
for  phosphate  minerals.  The  U.S. 
business  community,  with  some  support 
from  AID  last  year,  has  sponsored  a 
new  U.S.-ASEAN  Center  for  Tech- 
nology Exchange  that  recently  began 
operations.  With  offices  in  each  of  the 
ASEAN  countries,  the  Technology  Ex- 
change Center  will  be  working  closely 
with  ASEAN  and  U.S.  Chambers  of" 
Commerce  in  planning  industry-specific 
seminars  and  field  visits  to  the  United 
States  to  meet  the  special  requirements 
of  small  businesses  in  identifying  the 
technology,  the  organizational  skills,  and 
the  investment  capital  to  create  more 
product  employment. 


I  noted  last  year  before  this  commit- 
tee that  economic,  scientific,  and 
cultural  ties  have  become  an  important 
and  mutually  beneficial  aspect  of  the 
U.S.  relationship  with  China.  Those  ties 
continue  to  expand,  and  our  commercial 
relationships  offer  particular  promise. 
Since  the  establishment  of  diplomatic 
relations  in  1979,  trade  with  China  has 
grown  dramatically — last  year,  it 
recovered  from  a  2-year  slump  and  set  a 
new  record  of  $6  billion,  approximately 
balanced  between  the  two  sides.  High 
technology  exports  to  China  has  been  a 
particularly  dynamic  area — we  issued 
4,600  license  approvals  for  such  exports 
last  year,  representing  a  128%  increase 
in  just  2  years.  U.S.  equity  investment 
in  China  may  now  reach  $100  million, 
with  several  hundred  million  more  in- 
vested by  U.S.  firms  in  petroleum  ex- 
ploration. Exchanges  cover  a  broad 
range  of  activities — over  1.50  Chinese 
delegations  visit  the  United  States  each 
month,  over  10,000  Chinese  students 
study  in  the  United  States,  and  21  pro- 
tocols under  the  science  and  technology 
agreement  promote  valuable  exchanges. 

Our  rapprochement  with  China  over 
the  past  decade  has  also  made  important 
contributions  to  global  and  regional 
peace  and  stability.  China  shares  our 
deep  concern  about  Soviet  aggression  in 
Afghanistan  and  the  Soviet-backed  oc- 
cupation of  Cambodia.  U.S. -China  rela- 
tions have  meshed  well  with  our  existing 
alliances  and  security  relationships  in 
Asia  and  Europe.  The  exchange  of  visits 
last  year  between  Premier  Zhao  Ziyang 
and  President  Reagan  reinforced  the 
stability  and  durability  of  the  relation- 
ship. 

In  1981  the  President  decided  to 
seek  legislative  change  to  laws  that  link 
China  with  the  Soviet  bloc.  The  proposal 
to  eliminate  the  prohibition  against 
foreign  assistance  to  China  received 
favorable  consideration  by  this  commit- 
tee in  the  authorization  bills  for  FY 
1983,  FY  1984,  and  FY  1985,  but  the 
overall  bill  was  not  passed  for  reasons 
unrelated  to  China.  This  year  we  are 
again  proposing  legislation  which  would 
permit  elimination  of  this  prohibition. 


We  have  adopted  the  committee's 
language;  even  though  it  does  not  ex- 
plicitly remove  China  from  the  list  of 
proscribed  countries,  the  amendment 
now  proposed  would  nevertheless  meet 
our  objectives. 

In  seeking  this  amendment,  our  pur 
pose  has  been  to  remove  the  negative 
symbolism  of  legislative  langage  which 
continues  to  depict  China  as  an  unfrienc 
ly  nation.  We  are  not  proposing  a 
bilateral  development  assistance  pro- 
gram for  China.  Should  we  decide  to 
propose  a  program  for  China  at  any 
point  in  the  future,  it  would  only  be 
after  careful  scrutiny  within  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  and  would,  of  course,  be 
subject  to  the  authorization  and  ap- 
propriations process  of  the  Congress. 

In  addition  to  removing  an 
anachronism  in  our  laws,  amendment  ol 
the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  would  allow 
China  to  participate  in  ongoing  AID 
technical  assistance  programs,  under 
current  funding  levels,  in  the  same  man 
ner  as  do  most  other  countries.  Chinese 
participation  in  these  programs  will  not 
threaten  AID  programs  with  other  cour 
tries  but  will  contribute  to  China's 
development  through  existing  AID 
research  and  training  projects. 

Last  month  Secretary  Shultz,  in  his 
testimony  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee,  reviewed  this 
region's  excellent  progress  and  pros- 
pects while  also  noting  the  challenges 
and  problems  it  must  face.  He  concludec 
by  observing  that  "we  can  be  proud  of 
the  vitality  of  our  alliances,  friendships, 
and  productive  ties  in  this  promising 
region.  If  nations  act  with  wisdom  and 
statesmanship,  we  may  well  be  at  the 
threshold  of  a  new  era  in  international 
relations  in  the  Pacific  Basin." 

The  economic  and  security  assist- 
ance program  that  we  are  proposing, 
and  for  which  we  urge  your  support,  is 
essential  for  the  realization  of  that  goal. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tine  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


China 

Since  1982  the  Administration  has  urged 
a  change  in  foreign  assistance  legislation 
as  it  applies  to  China.  I  want  to  em- 
phasize the  importance  that  we  continue 
to  attach  to  this  change,  and  I  sincerely 
hope  that  action  can  be  completed  this 
year. 


70 


Dpnartmpnt  nf  ?;tatp  REilJptin 


EUROPE 


lY  1986  Assistance  Requests 
|Dr  Europe 


Richard  R.  Burt 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee  on 
ropean  and  Middle  East  Affaiis  of  the 
na<e  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
bruary  21,  1985.  Mr.  Burt  is  Assistant 
vetary  for  European  and  Canadian 
fei'r,s.' 

is  a  pleasure  tx)  have  this  opportunity  txi 
jak  to  you  today  on  tehalf  of  security 
iistance  requirements  for  the  Eurojjean 
;^on  in  FY  1986.  Although  the  countries 
the  Atlantic  alliance  weathered  in  1984  a 
ijor  challenge  to  their  unity,  we  must  ac- 
3t  the  fact  that  1985  and  ftitiire  years 
11  bring  additional  challenges.  Fortunate- 
the  vast  majority  of  our  European 
3nds  and  allies  possess  the  capacity  to 
fiU  their  responsibilities  and  help  us  meet 
ise  challenges  without  any  dii^ect  U.S. 
distance;  a  few,  however,  cannot,  and 
3d  our  help  if  they  are  to  be  able  to  do 
ir  share  in  safeguarding  U.S.  and 
sstem  interests. 
The  four  aUies  which  do  require  special 
istance  are  to  be  found  along  the  nortli- 

I  edge  of  the  Mediterranean.  These  four 
les — Spain,  Portugal,  Greece,  and 

irkey — constitute  much  of  NATO's  soutli- 

II  flank.  This  region  is  critical  for  the 
fcense  of  the  central  front  and  Europe 
lire  generally.  At  the  same  time,  the 
ithem  flank  is  uniquely  important  for 

i  3ther  reason — as  a  bridge  across  Europe 
I  king  the  Atlantic  to  the  Middle  East  and 
I  uthwest  Asia.  As  NATO  Foreign  and 
1  'fense  Ministers  regularly  note,  Westeni 
i  erests  outside  the  fomial  treaty  area  can 
I  d  do  affect  the  well-being  of  every 
i  ance  member.  The  countries  of  the 
i  ithem  flank,  by  virtue  of  their  location 
s  mg  major  East-West  air  and  sea  routes, 
I  ve  the  potential  to  make  a  special  con- 
I  bution  to  this  increasingly  important 
I  nension  of  Western  security.  It  is  U.S. 
;  ^i.'^ lance  programs  which  can  turn  tliis 
1  teiilial  into  reality. 

Rut  in  speaking  of  what  these  countries 
I  ght  do  in  the  future,  we  ought  not  over- 
1  )k  the  accomplishments  of  the  recent 
jst.  Each  of  these  four  countries  has 
ide  a  difficult  but  crucial  transition 
\vard  democracy.  Much  as  I  noted  last 
ar  before  this  subcommittee,  over  the 
st  decade  several  have  made  important 
onomic  strides.  Each  has  negotiated  a 
ajor  base  agreement  with  the  United 
ates.  And  in  each  and  every  case,  I 
ilieve  that  U.S.  security  assistance  pro- 


grams have  constituted  an  integral  part  of 
this  evolution.  Our  economic  and  military 
assistance  progi-ams  have  proven  to  l)e  an 
essential  foreign  policy  instrument. 

Let  me  address  each  of  the  proposed 
security  assistance  programs  in  turn,  I 
would  then  like  to  say  a  few  words  about 
our  policy  toward  Cyprus. 

Portugal 

A  charter  member  of  NATO,  Portugal  is 
a  long-time,  steadfast,  and  reliable  ally 
of  the  United  States.  The  Portuguese 
Government  actively  supports  Western 
policies  in  international  fora  and  has 
been  in  the  forefront  of  Western  reac- 
tion to  major  events  such  as  the  invasion 
of  Afghanistan,  the  proclamation  of 
martial  law  in  Poland,  and  the  taking  of 
the  U.S.  hostages  in  Iran.  Portugal 
holds  a  strategic  position  of  great  im- 
portance for  NATO  reinforcement/re- 
supply  and  other,  including  non-NATO, 
contingencies.  The  Lajes  air  base  is 
critical  to  these  missions. 

Although  concerned  that  expanded 
U.S.  use  of  their  facilities  for  non-NATO 
purposes  could  expose  Portugal  to  in- 
creased military  and  economic  risks, 
Portugal  has  been  highly  cooperative  in 
allowing  use  of  its  bases,  provided  that 
its  relatively  modest  military  and  eco- 
nomic needs  can  be  taken  into  account. 
A  new  mutual  defense  agreement  signed 
in  December  1983  provides  the  United 
States  with  continued  access  to  the 
strategic  Lajes  facilities  and  reaffirms 
the  strength  and  vitality  of  our  security 
relationship.  The  expanding  nature  of 
that  relationship  is  reflected,  as  well,  by 
Portugal's  agreement  in  March  1984  to 
installation  on  the  mainland  of  a  U.S. 
satellite  tracking  station  (GEODSS 
facility).  The  facility  will  be  a  key  part  of 
a  global  network  designed  to  improve 
U.S.  ability  to  monitor  friendly,  as  well 
as  potentially  hostile,  objects  in  space. 

Portugal  has  come  a  long  way  in 
establishing  a  working  democracy  since 
the  1974  revolution.  Portuguese  political 
parties,  both  in  government  and  in  op- 
position (with  the  exception  of  the  com- 
munists) are  pro- Western  and  agree  that 
Portugal  should  make  a  more  substan- 
tial, active  military  contribution  to 
NATO.  We  support  Portugal's  increased 
participation  in  NATO  along  with  other 
alliance  partners  and  want  to  help  in  the 
long-range  Portuguese  military  moderni- 
zation effort. 


Military  modernization  has  a  long 
way  to  go,  however,  since  until  the  1974 
revolution,  the  Portuguese  Armed 
Forces  were  largely  a  colonial  force, 
heavy  on  foot-soldiers  and  light  on  arms. 
The  armed  forces  have  been  restruc- 
tured to  more  modern  proportions,  and 
the  process  of  acquiring  modern  equip- 
ment has  begun,  in  accordance  with 
NATO  force  goals.  It  is,  nevertheless, 
clear  that  Portugal  will  not  be  able  to 
bear  the  burden  alone.  In  recognition  of 
this,  we  and  other  NATO  partners  are 
cooperating  in  an  ad  hoc  committee  of 
NATO  to  coordinate  assistance  efforts. 

Portugal  is  the  least  affluent  NATO 
member,  after  Turkey,  and  has  been  ex- 
periencing serious  economic  difficulties. 
The  government  has  undertaken  a  pain- 
ful economic  austerity  program  and  in 
1984  met  or  exceeded  most  of  its  targets 
under  an  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF)  standby  program.  This,  however, 
has  come  at  the  cost  of  a  severe  reces- 
sion. In  addition,  the  country  is  facing  a 
major  adjustment  as  it  prepares  to  enter 
the  European  Community  (EC).  It  is  in 
our  best  interest  to  provide  substantial 
levels  of  economic  support  fund  (ESF) 
grants  to  assist  the  Azores  and  the 
mainland  economies,  and  sufficient 
amounts  of  military  assistance  program 
(MAP)  grant  assistance  and  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  to  help  Portugal 
achieve  NATO  readiness  and  fulfill  its 
obligations  in  Europe  and  the  Atlantic. 

For  FY  1986,  we  have  requested  an 
ESF  grant  of  $80  million,  a  MAP  grant 
of  $70  million,  and  FMS  credits  of  $65 
million  along  with  $3  million  interna- 
tional military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  funds.  In  light  of  Portugal's 
serious  economic  problems  and  its 
substantial  debt  service  burden,  we  are 
requesting  that  $35  million  of  our  FMS 
credits  come  under  the  concessional 
FMS  category,  and  we  are  seeking 
legislative  authority  to  offer  Portugal 
extended  repayment  terms  for  the  non- 
concessional  portion  of  FMS  credits.  The 
requested  levels  of  MAP  and  FMS 
would  help  Portugal  to  acquire  equip- 
ment to  complete  the  NATO-dedicated 
brigade  and  its  airlift,  start  up  a  second 
air  transportable  light  infantry  brigade, 
complete  a  second  squadron  of  A- IP's, 
commence  a  three-ship  antisubmarine 
frigate  program,  and  acquire  six  used 
P-3B  aircraft  for  Atlantic  antisubmarine 
patrols.  IMET  will  provide  professional 
training  for  the  Portuguese  Armed 
Forces.  ESF  is  intended  to  provide  vital 
budget  support  for  the  economically 
pressed  Azores  as  well  as  economic 
assistance  to  the  mainland. 


ay  1985 


71 


EUROPE 


Spain 

Since  the  death  of  Franco  in  1975,  Spain 
has  successfully  established  a  fully  func- 
tioning democracy,  while  working  to 
integrate  more  fully  with  the  West,  in- 
cluding joining  NATO  and  soon  the  EC. 
In  conjunction  with  a  democratic  Por- 
tugal, Spain's  remarkable  progress  in 
establishing  a  free  society  and  in  reduc- 
ing the  communists  to  only  a  marginal 
political  force  has  helped  to  secure 
NATO's  southern  flank  and  enhanced 
alliance  strength. 

The  U.S. -Spanish  bilateral  security 
relationship  dates  back  to  1953  and  has 
been  confirmed  through  a  series  of 
agreements  regarding  U.S.  use  of 
Spanish  military  facilities  and  U.S. 
assistance  for  Spanish  military  moderni- 
zation. Since  Spain's  entry  into  NATO 
and  its  peaceful  transition  to  democracy, 
it  has  also  become  an  important  alliance 
partner.  The  basis  for  our  security 
cooperation  has  thus  been  broadened. 
Modernization  of  the  Spanish  military 
forces,  which  strengthens  the  common 
defense  as  well  as  encourages  an  institu- 
tional role  for  the  military  similar  to 
that  played  by  the  military  in  other 
Western  democracies,  has  gained  new 
importance.  Our  security  assistance  rela- 
tionship has  thus  become  even  more 
significant. 

Following  national  elections  in  Spain 
in  1982,  the  newly  elected  socialist 
government,  in  the  face  of  considerable 
popular  sentiment  against  NATO, 
"froze"  the  process  of  military  integra- 
tion into  the  alliance  pending  a  popular 
referendum,  for  which  no  firm  date  has 
been  set.  The  Spanish  public  clearly 
evaluates  membership  and  military  inte- 
gration partly  in  terms  of  what  benefits 
they  offer  the  Spanish  military's  mod- 
ernization effort.  While  we  consider  the 
ultimate  decision  to  be  a  matter  for 
Spain  alone  to  decide,  it  is  important 
that  our  assistance  effort  make  clear  the 
value  of  NATO  participation. 

Under  the  1983  Agreement  on 
Friendship,  Defense,  and  Cooperation, 
Spain  provides  the  United  States  with 
continued  access  to  vital  air  and  naval 
facilities  which  are  important  to  the 
maintenance  of  our  forces  in  Europe  and 
would  be  crucial  in  the  event  of  a  Euro- 
pean contlicl.  The  agreement  also  estab- 
lishes an  institutional  framework — the 
U.S. -Spanish  Council  and  the  various 
committees  which  operate  under  its 
aegis — for  the  development  and  imple- 
mentation of  our  broad  political,  eco- 
nomic, cultural,  and  scientific  coopera- 
tion with  Spain.  We,  in  turn,  are 
pledged  to  "best  efforts"  in  assisting 
Spain  to  upgrade  its  military  equipment, 


modernize  its  forces,  and  bring  them  up 
to  NATO  standards. 

At  a  minimum,  it  is  vital  that  we 
maintain  our  current  "best-efforts"  com- 
mitments for  FY  1986,  which  would  be 
to  continue  FY  1985  assistance  levels  of 
$400  million  in  FMS  credits,  and  $12 
million  in  ESF  grants,  and  to  seek  $3 
million  in  IMET.  The  ESF  grant  would 
fund  scientific/cultural  exchanges  and 
programs  designed  to  counterbalance 
the  large  military  component  of  our  rela- 
tions. The  IMET  program  is  aimed  at 
the  professional  development  of  the 
Spanish  military.  FMS  guaranteed 
credits  are  scheduled  to  fund  the  pur- 
chase of  F-18  aircraft,  a  frigate  con- 
struction/purchase program,  helicopters 
to  upgrade  military  airlift  and  capability, 
a  software  test  facility,  torpedo  improve- 
ment kits,  and  ground  support  weapons. 

Greece 

Greece  is  strategically  important  to  the 
United  States  and  NATO.  It  borders  on 
three  communist  countries  and  would 
block  any  Warsaw  Pact  thrust  south- 
ward toward  the  Mediterranean  through 
Thrace  as  well  as  joining  with  Turkey  to 
resist  any  Soviet  effort  to  seize  control 
of  the  Dardanelles.  At  the  same  time, 
Greece  is  positioned  to  help  control  the 
sea-  and  airlanes  of  the  eastern  Mediter- 
ranean and  is  one  of  the  countries  con- 
trolling access  to  the  Middle  East.  With- 
out this  key  ally,  NATO's  southern  flank 
would  be  split. 

We  also  consider  our  defense  rela- 
tionship with  Greece  to  be  in  the 
broader  context  of  our  traditional  friend- 
ship. Greece  is  a  friend  as  well  as  an 
ally.  We  are  bound  by  a  web  of  eco- 
nomic, social,  and  political  ties.  As  two 
of  a  small,  select  group  of  nations  em- 
bracing democracy,  we  share  the 
defense  of  our  common  values  through 
NATO. 

Our  defense  relationship  continues 
to  operate  within  the  framework  of  the 
defense  and  economic  cooperation  agree- 
ment which  formally  came  into  force  in 
December  1983.  This  accord  provides  for 
the  continuation  of  the  activities  pre- 
viously conducted  in  Greece  on  a  mutual- 
ly agreeable  basis.  The  agreement  is 
valid  until  terminated  by  written  notice 
by  either  side,  which  can  be  given  at  the 
end  of  5  years  or  thereafter.  This  ar- 
rangement is  comparable  to  agreements 
we  have  with  other  allies. 

Under  the  new  agreement,  the 
operation  of  our  bases  and  associated 
facilities  during  the  past  year  has  been 
relatively  smooth.  The  agreement  has 
eased  the  handling  of  previously  difficult 
issues  such  as  U.S.  requests  for  waivers 


Gi 


« 


f 


\ 


of  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  U.S.  service- 
men charged  with  offenses  against 
Greek  civil  law.  Sixth  Fleet  ships  con- 
tinue to  make  regular  visits  to  Greek 
ports.  We  have  experienced  problems, 
however,  when  the  Greek  Government 
in  our  view,  has  not  provided  adequate 
security  during  strikes  of  Greek  base 
personnel.  Moreover  the  Greek  Govern- 
ment has  cast  doubt  over  our  future 
ability  to  use  their  facilities  by  its  fre- 
quent statements  to  the  effect  that 
American  access  to  the  facilities  will  tei 
minate  after  the  agreement  has  been  in 
force  for  5  years. 

Unfortunately  the  problems  we  hav  ^ 
experienced  regarding  our  facilities  in 
Greece  are  far  from  unique.  Greece  is 
not  participating  in  NATO  exercises. 
The  Greek  Government  regularly  dis- 
associates itself  from  the  NATO  consen 
sus  on  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces.  And  the  Greek  Government  not 
only  echoed  the  preposterous  charge 
that  Korean  Air  Lines  #007  was  on  an 
espionage  mission  for  the  United  States 
but  questioned  the  legitimacy  of  suppor 
for  solidarity  in  Poland. 

These  and  other  differences  with  th 
policy  of  the  Government  of  Greece  are 
serious  and  highly  bothersome.  We  will 
do  our  best  to  improve  relations  with 
Greece,  but  the  Greek  Government  mus 
do  its  part  as  well  if  there  is  to  be  prog 
ress.  In  the  meantime,  I  can  well  under 
stand  the  frustrations  in  Congress  and 
elsewhere  and  the  temptation  to  take 
punitive  measures  in  return  against  the 
current  Greek  Government.  But  commc 
interests  between  the  United  States  an( 
the  American  people  with  the  people  of 
Greece  are  too  important  for  us  to  adoj 
such  a  short-term  prospective.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  our  security  assistance 
request  for  FY  1986  deserves  congres- 
sional support. 

The  security  assistance  we  are  re- 
questing for  Greece  is  an  integral  part 
of  our  close  bilateral  defense  relation- 
ship which  includes  common  membershi 
in  NATO  as  well  as  U.S.  use  of  military 
facilities  in  Greece.  U.S.  assistance  is 
necessary  to  improve  Greece's  capability 
to  carry  out  its  assigned  tasks  under 
NATO.  Recently,  for  example,  Greece 
committed  itself  to  purchase  40  U.S. 
F-16s  to  help  upgrade  its  air  defense 
system.  The  Greek  percentage  of  GNP 
devoted  to  military  expenditures  re- 
mains among  the  highest  in  NATO. 
Greece,  in  recent  years,  has  used  its  ow! 
foreign  exchange  resources  as  well  as 
U.S.  loan  guarantees  to  improve  its 
defense  posture.  However,  U.S.  assist- 
ance continues  to  be  needed.  Like  other- 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


ropean  allies,  Greece  suffers  from  in- 
ion,  unemployment,  and  a  balance-of- 
ments  problem.  The  repayment 
ms  for  our  military  assistance  loans 
reece  are  the  best  available  to  any 
ion  under  our  nonconcessional  FMS 
gram. 

This  year  we  propose  to  maintain 
level  of  FMS  funds  at  $500  million 
was  allocated  for  FY  1985  to  permit 
tinued  purchase  of  military  equip- 
nt,  including  aircraft,  ammunition 
i  spare  parts,  communications  and 
ar  equipment,  and  missiles.  We  also 
pose  $1.75  million  for  IMET,  which 
)articularly  important  to  the  Greek 
Tied  Forces  at  both  the  professional 
1  technical  levels. 

rkey 

assistance  program  for  Turkey  re- 
ins the  third  largest  in  the  world, 
lecting  the  country's  strategic  impor- 
ce  and  its  contribution  to  the  defense 
SJATO  and  to  deterrence  of  potential 
p"ession  in  Southwest  Asia.  Owing  to 
npeting  demand  on  our  assistance  re- 
rees,  we  are  proposing  a  program  for 
-key  which  is  only  slightly  larger  than 
;  year's  proposal  and  which  thus  falls 
Tt  of  Turkish  needs.  Nonetheless  it  is 
TOgram  that  would  permit  us  to  con- 
ae  to  assist  Turkey  with  its  military 
dernization  programs  while  it  con- 
dates  its  democratic  institutions  and 
9  nomic  reforms. 

Let  me  describe  for  you  briefly  the 
J  iety  of  foreign  policy  and  strategic  in- 
)( ests  the  United  States  shares  with 
II  -key.  Turkey  plays  a  critical  role  as 
I  anchor  of  the  southern  flank  of 
[  TO.  It  defends  one-third  of  the 
\  der  between  NATO  countries  and  the 
\  .rsaw  Pact.  It  controls  egress  from 
i  Black  Sea  into  the  Mediterranean 
I  \  stands  between  the  Soviet  Union 
\  1  the  Middle  East  and  astride  the 
•  .te  of  a  possible  Soviet  thrust  into 

■  jthwest  Asia. 

The  United  States  has  access  to  a 
/  -iety  of  military  facilities,  including  air 
]  ;es  and  other  installations  that  con- 
;  )ute  directly  to  our  national  security, 
I  well  as  to  the  defense  of  NATO.  We 
] .  e  signed  important  military  agree- 
-  nts  in  the  past  year,  including  a  Co- 
:  lated  Operating  Base  Agreement  in- 

■  viiig  improvement  of  bases  in  eastern 
rkey,  where  both  NATO  and  Turkey 
ire  an  interest  in  maintaining  an  ef- 
tive  deterrence. 

Turkey's  close  relations  with  key 
ctes  in  the  Middle  East  enable  it  to 
ity  a  unique  role  in  that  troubled 
^on.  We  have  an  active  and  produc- 
e  dialogue  with  Turkey  on  Middle 


East  issues,  based  on  our  close  bilateral 
relatonship  and  shared  interest  in 
regional  stability. 

Over  the  past  year,  Turkey  has 
made  major  strides  in  the  consolidation 
of  democratic  institutions  and  in  the  pro- 
tection of  human  rights.  Municipal  elec- 
tions were  held  in  March  1984,  in  which 
all  legal  political  parties  participated. 
Martial  law  has  been  progressively  lifted 
from  a  majority  of  Turkish  provinces. 
The  government  of  Prime  Minister  Ozal 
has  taken  steps  to  eliminate  abuses  in 
Turkish  prisons.  Having  assisted  Turkey 
during  the  past,  very  difficult  years,  as 
it  struggled  to  overcome  political  chaos 
and  economic  bankruptcy,  it  is  impor- 
tant we  continue  to  support  the  newly 
elected  government  as  it  makes  notable 
progress.  Security  assistance  is  a  funda- 
mental part  of  that  support. 

Equally  impressive  has  been 
Turkey's  progress  in  the  economic 
sphere.  With  the  support  of  interna- 
tional institutions  and  Turkey's  friends, 
including  the  United  States,  the  Turkish 
Government  has  embarked  on  an  un- 
precedented program  of  economic 
reform  designed  to  increase  the 
economy's  productivity  and  competitive- 
ness. While  results  to  date  have  been 
substantial,  the  Turkish  economy  re- 
mains fragile  and,  in  the  short  term,  the 
success  of  the  government's  economic 
policy  will  require  continued  external 
support.  This  year,  repayment  of  the 
rescheduled  external  debt  will  add  to  the 
debt  service  burden.  We  are  requesting 
less  in  ESF  assistance  to  Turkey  than  in 
FY  1985,  but  Turkey's  economic  dif- 
ficulties and  our  interests  in  Turkey  and 
in  the  success  of  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment's economic  program  argue  strongly 
for  maintenance  of  ESF  funding  at  this 
level. 

Turkey  maintains  the  second  largest 
standing  military  force  in  the  alliance 
and  devotes  a  higher  proportion  of  its 
budget  and  GNP  to  defense  than  most 
other  NATO  members.  However,  to 
enable  Turkey  to  meet  its  NATO  mis- 
sions, sustained,  adequate  levels  of 
security  assistance  will  be  needed.  The 
Turkish-American  defense  and  economic 
cooperation  agreement  commits  the  U.S. 
Government  to  "best  efforts"  to  obtain 
adequate  levels  of  security  assistance  for 
Turkey,  a  pledge  that  we  and  the 
Turkish  Government  take  very  seriously. 

Our  security  assistance  request  is 
for  $230  million  in  MAP,  $345  million  in 
concessional  FMS  loans,  $210  million  in 
FMS  guarantees,  $150  million  in  ESF, 
and  $4  million  in  IMET  funds.  The 
greater  portion  of  these  funds  will  be 
used  for  the  modernization  of  the 


. 


y1985 


EUROPE 


Turkish  Armed  Forces.  Major  programs 
include  the  F-^16  coproduction  program, 
the  M-48  tank  upgrade,  and  naval  force 
modernization.  These  are  key  programs 
which  will  be  critical  in  helping  Turkey 
modernize  its  armed  forces  and  make  its 
contribution  to  the  security  of  the 
alliance.  They  fall  short,  however,  of 
enabling  Turkey  to  meet  fully  its 
military  requirements,  derived  from  its 
extensive  NATO  missions. 

Security  assistance,  as  Secretary 
Shultz  has  stated,  is  closely  linked  to  our 
most  fundamental  foreign  policy  goals. 
In  this  regard,  Turkey  is  a  notable  suc- 
cess story.  Security  assistance  for 
Turkey  not  only  furthers  U.S.  strategic 
defense  and  NATO  objectives  but  also 
provides  aid  to  a  country  striving  for 
democracy,  economic  liberalization,  and 
against  terrorism.  Few  countries  meet 
the  criteria  of  our  assistance  program  as 
fully  as  Turkey  does.  I  urge  congres- 
sional approval  of  the  entire  Administra- 
tion request  and  without  conditioning 
our  assistance  on  Turkish  actions  on 
Cyprus.  I  firmly  believe  that  the  prog- 
ress we  have  made  in  recent  months  on 
Cyprus  would  be  jeopardized  by  one- 
sided, punitive  measures  directed 
against  Turkey.  Turkey  played  a  con- 
structive role  leading  to  the  January  17 
Cyprus  summit  and  it  is  important  that 
it  continue  to  do  so. 

Cyprus 

The  United  States  places  high  value  on 
its  excellent  relationship  with  the  people 
and  Government  of  Cj^prus.  This  rela- 
tionship endures  despite  periodic  dif- 
ferences between  us  regarding  a  solution 
to  the  continuing  partition  of  the  island 
between  Greek  and  Turkish  commu- 
nities. This  Administration  places  top 
priority  on  achieving  progress  toward  a 
just  and  lasting  Cyprus  settlement.  We 
remain  totally  committed  to  that  goal.  A 
divided  Cyprus  for  us  involves  a  press- 
ing humanitarian  issue,  weakens  allied 
defenses  in  a  strategically  important 
region,  and  is  one  of  the  principal  causes 
of  the  tension  between  two  NATO 
allies — Greece  and  Turkey. 

Thus  we  have  compelling  reasons  to 
do  all  we  can  to  promote  a  fair  and  final 
settlement  for  the  two  Cypriot  com- 
munities. We  also  oppose  measures 
which  obstruct  such  a  settlement.  Ac- 
cordingly, we  support  UN  Security 
Council  Resolution  541,  passed 
November  18,  1983,  which  calls  for 
reversal  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot  declara- 
tion of  statehood.  We  also  strongly  op- 
posed the  exchange  of  ambassadors  be- 
tween Ankara  and  the  self-proclaimed 


73 


EUROPE 


Turkish  Cypriot  state,  which  we  do  not 
recognize.  Currently,  we  are  intensively 
involved  in  supporting  the  UN  Secretary 
General's  ongoing  efforts  to  find  a  solu- 
tion. Those  efforts  resulted  last  fall  in  a 
series  of  "proximity"  meetings  under  the 
good  offices  of  the  UN  Secretary 
General  which  in  turn  led  to  the  first 
summit  meeting  between  the  leaders  of 
the  two  communities  in  nearly  6  years. 
Unfortunately  the  meeting  failed  to 
achieve  a  signed  agreement.  It  did, 
however,  as  the  Secretary  General  said, 
greatly  narrow  the  gap  between  the 
sides.  We  are  doing  what  we  can  in 
coordinating  with  Secretary  General 
Perez  de  Cuellar  and  his  staff  to  ensure 
that  the  process  does  move  forward  and 
the  momentum  generated  since  last 
August  when  the  "proximity"  talks 
began  is  not  lost. 

The  $3  million  in  ESF  we  have  re- 
quested for  Cyprus  as  in  the  past  will  be 
applied  to  the  existing  Cyprus  American 
scholarship  program  which  provides 
American  university  educations  to  young 
Cypriots  of  both  communities.  Cyprus  is 
without  universities  of  its  own  and  this 
program  provides  a  necessary  alter- 
native to  Soviet  bloc  study.  We  believe 
this  to  be  an  appropriate  demonstration 
of  American  interest  in  the  welfare  of 
the  people  of  Cyprus. 

Finally,  in  an  effort  to  provide 
positive  incentives  for  progress  toward  a 
Cyprus  settlement,  the  President  pro- 
posed last  year  a  $250  million  Cyprus 
peace  and  reconstruction  fund  for  use  by 
the  Cypriots  when  a  settlement  is 
reached  or  significant  steps  toward  one 
are  taken.  I  want  to  stress  that  this  pro- 
posal is  still  valid,  and  a  specific  request 
for  the  authorization  and  appropriation 
of  funds  will  be  forwarded  to  the  Con- 
gress should  circumstances  permit,  as 
we  all  hope  they  will. 


Death  of  Soviet  President  Chernenko 


) 


PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE, 
MAR.  11.  1985' 

Please  accept  my  condolences  on  the 
death  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Presidium 
of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  Konstantin 
Ustinovich  Chernenko. 

At  this  solemn  time,  I  wish  to 
reiterate  the  strong  desire  of  the 
American  people  for  world  peace. 
Although  the  problems  which  divide  our 
countries  are  many  and  complex,  we  can 
and  must  resolve  our  differences 
through  dialogue  and  negotiation.  Our 
two  delegations  are  sitting  down  in 
Geneva  to  begin  negotiation  on  how  to 
reduce  and  eliminate  nuclear  weapons. 
We  must  seize  the  opportunities  for 
peace.  We  need  to  find  ways  to  reduce 
the  threat  and  use  of  force  in  solving  in- 
ternational disputes.  We  must  also 
establish  a  working  relationship  that 
builds  greater  trust  and  cooperation  be- 
tween us.  I  hope  that  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship will  join  with  me  with  renewed 
dedication  to  create  a  firm  and  durable 
basis  for  better  relations  between  our 
two  countries. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  11.  19852 

The  President  has  sent  a  message  of 
condolence  to  Acting  Head  of  State, 
Vasiliy  Vasil'yevich  Kuznetsov,  on  the 
death  of  Chairman  and  General 
Secretary  Konstantin  Ustinovich 
Chernenko.  In  his  message  the  Presi- 


dent reaffirmed  his  commitment  to 
peace  and  to  working  for  a  cooperative 
relationship  with  the  peoples  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment. The  President  called  upon  the 
Soviet  leadership  to  seize  the  opportu- 
nity offered  by  the  negotiations  about  t 
begin  in  Geneva  to  make  progress 
toward  our  shared  goal  of  eliminating 
nuclear  weapons  from  the  face  of  the 
Earth. 

In  our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  United  States  has  three  bas 
goals:  to  reduce  significantly  the  unac- 
ceptably  high  numbers  of  weapons  whic 
now  exist;  to  eliminate  the  use  and  the 
threat  of  force  in  international  relation: 
and  to  develop  greater  trust  and  con- 
fidence in  our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  overall.  Our  nations  share  an  in- 
terest in  the  development  of  stable  and 
constructive  relations  for  the  long  tern- 

We  believe  that  the  problems  whicl 
exist  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations  can  be 
resolved  and  that  progress  is  possible  ii 
the  near  term.  We  cannot  achieve  prog 
ress  singlehandedly,  but  we  will  do  our 
part  to  bring  it  about.  The  United  Stati 
hopes  to  work  with  the  Soviet  leadersh 
on  common  interests  in  order  to  help 
create  a  better  and  safer  world. 


'Sent  to  Vaisily  V.  Kuznetsov,  First 
Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the 
Supreme  Soviet  of  the  U.S.S.R.  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Mar.  18,  1985). 

-Read  to  news  correspondents  by  prin- 
cipal deputy  press  secretary  to  the  Presider 
Larry  Speakes  (text  from  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  18). 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


74 


/iDDLE  EAST 


•Y  1986  Assistance  Requests 
r  the  Middle  East  and  South  Asia 


Richard  W.  Murphy 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Af- 
'•s  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
nmittee  on  March  21,  1985.  Am- 
sador  Murphy  is  Assistant  Secretary 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Af- 


elcome  the  opportunity  to  testify  to- 
in  support  of  the  Administration's 
posals  for  FY  1986  economic  and 
urity  assistance  for  the  Near  East 
South  Asia. 

The  Administration's  proposal  re- 
ts our  foreign  policy  and  national 
urity  objectives  in  this  vital  region.  In 
h  country,  our  assistance  programs 
intended  to  nurture  relationships  of 
tual  interest  and  trust  and  to  assist 
se  governments  in  strengthening 
ir  security  and  furthering  their 
nomic  progress. 

Our  foreign  assistance  programs  in 
region  are  vital  to  the  achievement 
)ur  foreign  policy  goals: 

To  promote  stability  in  this 
ategically  important  region; 

•  To  ensure  the  security  and  well- 
ig  of  Israel  and  to  assist  other 
ndly  states  in  the  region  with  their 
urity  needs; 

■Po  foster  the  peaceful  resolution 
'•egional  conflicts; 

•  To  maintain  free  world  access  to 
vital  oil  resources  of  the  Persian 

f;  and 

•  To  search  for  peace  in  Afghani- 
n,  including  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
itary  forces  and  the  restoration  of 

\t  ^han  independence. 

Iti  our  efforts  to  advance  regional 

I  lility  and  to  promote  the  resolution 

I  oiiflicts  throughout  the  region,  we 

<  luiiize  that  the  spirit  of  accommoda- 

i  1  1  an  grow  more  readily  if  friendly 

tes  feel  confident  of  their  ability  to 

vide  for  their  own  security  and  for 

economic  and  social  needs  of  their 

'ple. 

The  levels  and  terms  of  our  pro- 
;ed  assistance  have  been  carefully 
'eloped  within  the  constraints  of  our 
Iget  stringencies  and  the  President's 
nomic  program  and  are  the  minimum 
ounts  needed  to  meet  essential  re- 
rements  of  the  countries  in  this 
,ion. 

Our  FY  1986  foreign  assistance  re- 
?st  for  the  Near  East  and  South  Asia 
1  fund  six  major  programs: 

ay  1985 


•  $3,646.3  million  in  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  credit,  including  $3,100 
million  in  forgiven  credits  for  Israel  and 
Egypt; 

•  $67  million  in  grant  military 
assistance  programs  (MAP); 

•  $12.32  million  in  international 
military  education  and  training  (IMET); 

•  $1,182  million  in  economic  support 
funds  (ESF)  which  does  not  include  ESF 
for  Israel; 

•  $287.2  million  in  development 
assistance;  and 

•  $538.7  million  in  PL  480  food 
assistance. 

Middle  East 

As  part  of  the  general  effort  to  promote 
regional  stability,  the  resolution  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  continues  to  be  one 
of  our  foremost  objectives.  There  are  no 
quick  and  easy  solutions  for  peace  in  the 
region.  However,  we  will  persevere  with 
our  efforts,  which  are  based  on  the 
President's  Middle  East  peace  initiative 
of  September  1,  1982.  Our  assistance 
plays  an  important  role  in  furthering  the 
peace  process. 

Six  years  ago,  a  peace  treaty  ended 
30  years  of  war  between  Egypt  and 
Israel.  Israel  and  Egypt  remain  our 
principal  partners  in  the  quest  for  peace, 
and  these  two  nations  are  the  largest 
recipients  of  our  proposed  foreign 
assistance  for  FY  1986.  This  assistance 
is  aimed  at  ensuring  their  security  and 
strengthening  their  economies,  both 
essential  to  their  continuing  on  the  path 
to  a  broader  peace  settlement. 

Smaller  programs  planned  for  Jor- 
dan and  Lebanon  can  also  promote 
regional  stability  and  progress  toward 
peace.  Jordan  requires  our  continued 
support  to  maintain  its  security,  its  role 
in  facilitating  the  stability  of  the  area, 
and  to  build  the  necessary  confidence  to 
join  the  peace  process.  Lebanon  needs 
our  support  to  help  deal  with  the  contin- 
uing problems  besetting  it  and  to  pro- 
mote stability  in  the  areas  between 
Syria  and  Israel.  Our  program  also 
seeks  to  improve  the  quality  of  Palestin- 
ian life  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and 
to  encourage  economic  and  social 
cooperation  in  the  region. 

IsraeL  The  United  States  has  a 
historic  commitment  to  Israel's  security 
and  viability  extending  over  the  past 
three  decades.  Our  assistance  provides  a 


tangible  demonstration  of  the  strength 
and  durability  of  that  commitment  and 
seeks  to  give  Israel  the  confidence  to 
take  the  risks  necessary  to  pursue  the 
peace  process. 

To  assist  Israel  in  maintaining  its 
qualiUitive  edge  in  military  capability 
over  potential  aggressors,  a  $1.8  billion 
in  forgiven  FMS  credits  is  required,  an 
increase  of  $400  million  over  FY  1985. 
Israel's  military  needs  have  been  ana- 
lyzed by  both  governments  during  ses- 
sions of  the  Joint  Security  Assistance 
Planning  Group.  We  each  agree  that  the 
terms  and  level  of  the  FY  1986  FMS  re- 
quest for  Israel  will  achieve  our  mutual 
goals. 

Israel  has  requested  $2.64  billion  in 
ESF  assistance  in  the  form  of  an  FY 
1985  supplemental  appropriation  and 
$1.85  billion  in  ESF  for  FY  1986,  a  net 
addition  in  ESF  of  $1.44  billion  over  last 
year's  $1.2  billion  level.  The  United 
States  has  indicated  its  willingness  to 
provide  additional  assistance  in  support 
of  a  comprehensive  Israeli  economic  pro- 
gram that  deals  effectively  with  the  fun- 
damental imbalances  in  the  Israel 
economy.  Without  such  a  reform  pro- 
gram, additional  U.S.  assistance  would 
not  resolve  Israel's  economic  problems 
and  would  provide  only  temporary  relief. 
Moreover,  without  economic  adjustment, 
Israel  will  become  even  more  dependent 
on  U.S.  assistance  in  the  future. 

The  Israeli  Government  has  taken  a 
number  of  difficult  steps  toward 
economic  stability  and  recovery.  We  are 
impressed  with  the  leadership  and  com- 
mitment of  Prime  Minister  Peres  in  this 
effort  to  develop  a  comprehensive  pro- 
gram. But  further  efforts  are  necessary 
if  the  program  of  the  Government  of 
Israel  is  to  achieve  its  goal  of  putting 
Israel  back  on  the  path  of  self-sustaining 
economic  growth  and  if  additional  U.S. 
assistance  is  to  have  a  durable  effect. 
During  the  recent  visit  of  Israeli 
Minister  of  Finance  Modai,  we  held  very 
useful  talks;  we  hope  this  will  lead  to 
agreement  on  an  approach  in  which  ad- 
ditional U.S.  assistance  can  be 
associated  with  an  effective  Israeli  pro- 
gram. Accordingly  the  Administration 
intends  to  defer  a  request  for  a  sup- 
plemental for  extraordinary  assistance 
for  Israel.  In  the  meantime,  the  Ad- 
ministration now  supports  an  ESF 
authorization  for  Israel  for  FY  1986  in 
the  amount  of  $1.2  billion. 

Egypt.  The  Camp  David  accords  and 
the  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  re- 
main the  cornerstone  of  our  Middle  East 
peace  policy.  Egypt  has  demonstrated 
its  firm  commitment  to  those  ac- 
complishments by  repeatedly  refusing  to 


75 


MIDDLE  EAST 


disavow  them  as  a  price  for  resuming  its 
historic  leadership  role  in  the  Arab 
world.  The  Mubarak  government  public- 
ly and  actively  supports  the  Camp  David 
accords  and  the  President's  September 
1,  1982,  peace  initiative.  In  this  context, 
President  Mubarak  has  recently  em- 
phasized the  importance  of  achieving 
peace  through  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors. 
Egypt  and  Israel  have  intensified  con- 
tacts since  the  beginning  of  1985  to 
resolve  outstanding  differences  and  im- 
prove the  atmosphere  of  relations  be- 
tween them. 

Egypt  remains  an  important  force 
for  peace  and  stability  in  the  region  not 
only  in  the  Middle  East  but  also  in 
Africa,  where  it  plays  a  vital  role  in 
helping  African  states  deter  Libyan 
adventurism.  Egypt's  ability  to  continue 
this  deterrent  role  depends  heavily  on 
our  assistance.  Cooperating  directly  with 
the  United  States  in  military  exercises 
has  served  to  enhance  both  countries' 
ability  to  preserve  stability  in  the  region. 
The  recent  trend  toward  improved  rela- 
tions between  Egypt  and  moderate  Arab 
states,  and  in  particular  the  restoration 
of  relations  between  Egypt  and  Jordan, 
is  evidence  of  the  growing  strength  of 
those  forces  which  seek  a  more  stable 
and  secure  Middle  East  and  peaceful, 
negotiated  solutions  to  its  problems. 

The  request  for  $1.3  billion  in  for- 
given FMS  credits  for  FY  1986  reflects 
our  commitment  to  a  long-term  military 
supply  relationship  with  Egypt  to  help  it 
modernize  its  forces  and  replace  obsoles- 
cent Soviet-supplied  equipment.  Our 
military  assistance  relationship  with 
Egypt  is  a  key  part  of  our  efforts  to 
maintain  the  regional  balance  of  forces 
which  has  been  in  danger  of  shifting  in 
favor  of  Soviet-supplied  radicals  like 
Libya  and  Syria.  FMS  for  FY  1986  will 
be  devoted  mainly  to  progress  payments 
on  F-16  and  E-2C  aircraft,  air  defense 
system  integration,  and  air  defense 
radars  as  well  as  to  follow-on  support 
for  U.S.  equipment  supplied  over  the 
past  few  years.  Less  than  $20  million 
will  be  spent  on  new  equipment  (counter/ 
artillery  radar)  this  year. 

A  $2  million  I  MET  program  is  pro- 
posed for  FY  1986  which  will  finance 
training  for  Egyptian  personnel  in  the 
United  States.  The  objectives  of  this 
program  are  to  assist  P^gypt  in  develop- 
ing expertise  needed  to  manage  effec- 
tively its  defense  esttiblishment  and  to 
acquaint  Egyptian  offlcers  with  the  U.S. 
military  and  U.S.  society  and  values. 

Our  economic  assistance  helps  main- 
tain the  continued  economic  growth 
which  is  essential  to  Egypt's  stability. 
Our  program  is  designed  to  support 


economic  policies  which  address  the  ex- 
isting constraints  on  development.  Over 
the  past  year,  the  Egyptian  Government 
has  moved  deliberately  on  economic 
reform,  raising  prices  of  food  and  elec- 
tricity and  liberalizing  foreign  exchange 
regulations.  Our  proposed  economic  aid 
program  includes  $222  million  in  PL  480 
food  assistance  and  a  grant  ESF  pro- 
gram of  $185  million.  The  ESF  program 
consists  of  a  $200-million  commodity  im- 
port program,  which  will  enable  Egypt 
to  import  U.S.  manufactured  goods  and 
commodities,  $515  million  in  project  and 
sector  assistance,  and  $100  million  as  a 
cash  transfer.  The  cash  transfer  will 
help  Egypt  adjust  to  balance-of- 
payments  problems  caused  in  part  by 
declining  oil  prices. 

PL  480  food  assistance  remains  an 
important  part  of  our  balance-of- 
payments  support  and  is  a  tangible 
demonstration  of  the  benefits  of  peace. 
A  modest  reduction  in  both  PL  480  Title 
I  and  Title  II  programs  for  Egypt  from 
$237  million  in  FY  1985  to  $222  million 
requested  for  FY  1986  is  being  proposed 
to  help  meet  the  growing  demand  for 
food  assistance  in  drought  stricken 
regions  of  Africa.  The  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment has  made  good  progress  in  im- 
plementing measures  such  as  increasing 
procurement  prices  paid  to  farmers, 
which  should  help  stimulate  production 
in  the  agricultural  sector. 

Lebanon.  We  have  welcomed 
Israel's  decision  to  withdraw  its  forces 
from  Lebanon,  with  the  first  stage  com- 
pleted successfully  on  February  18.  This 
is  consistent  with  our  continued  support 
for  efforts  to  bring  about  the  withdrawal 
of  all  foreign  forces  from  Lebanon.  We 
remain  committed  to  the  achievement  of 
long-term  stability  and  believe  that  U.S. 
economic  and  military  support,  properly 
channeled,  can  assist  in  the  attainment 
of  this  goal. 

Our  military  assistance  consists  of 
FMS  credits  and  IMET.  The  FY  1986 
request  is  for  $10  million  in  FMS 
credits.  This  is  a  minimum  level  to  sus- 
tain U.S. -origin  equipment  presently  in 
the  Lebanese  inventory.  The  Lebanese 
Armed  Forces,  while  weakened  by  com- 
munal dissension  in  1983  and  1984, 
maintained  their  essential  integrity  as  an 
institution  of  the  central  government.  It 
is  important  that  the  military  arm  of  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  be  sufficiently 
strong  to  discourage  the  use  of  Lebanon 
as  a  base  for  terrorist  operations  and  to 
permit  the  central  government  to 
reestablish  control  over  additional  por- 
tions of  the  national  territory  as  foreign 
forces  withdraw.  To  provide  training  to 
bolster  the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces, 
$800,000  in  IMET  monies  is  required. 


The  ESF  request  of  $10  million  for 
FY  1986  is  also  a  minimum  request 
which  takes  into  consideration  the  ex- 
istence of  about  $70  million  which  re- 
mains unobligated  from  the  FY  1983 
supplemental  appropriation  for  Lebanor 
During  the  current  fiscal  year,  activity 
will  continue  in  telecommunications 
rehabilitation  and  in  relief  assistance 
working  through  private  voluntary 
organizations.  In  addition  we  plan  to  im 
plement  projects  in  health,  vocational 
training,  and  in  the  repair  of  water 
systems  as  soon  as  security  conditions 
permit  resumption  of  economic 
reconstruction  activities. 


Jordan.  A  stable  and  secure  Jordan 
is  essential  to  advance  the  President's 
Middle  East  peace  initiative.  Jordan  is 
surrounded  by  larger  and  more  powerfu 
states.  It  is  vastly  weaker  militarily  thai 
Israel,  and  its  defensive  capability  vis-a- 
vis Syria  has  declined  dramatically  in 
relative  terms  over  the  past  decade. 
Despite  this  difficult  position,  Jordan 
has  recently  taken  some  bold  steps 
which  demonstrate  its  commitment  to 
modernization  and  progress  toward 
peace.  Last  fall,  it  reestablished 
diplomatic  relations  with  Egypt,  therebj 
reducing  Egypt's  isolation,  underscoring 
once  again  Jordan's  moderate  role  and 
reinforcing  the  principle  that  no  state 
should  be  ostracized  or  penalized  for 
making  peace.  Jordan  also  hosted  the 
Palestine  National  Council  (PNC) 
meeting  in  Amman,  where  King  Husseii 
openly  challenged  the  Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization  (PLO)  to  accept  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  242  and  to 
give  up  the  call  for  an  independent 
Palestine  state. 

Radical  elements  of  the  PLO  and  th 
Syrian  Government,  as  well  as  the 
Soviet  Union,  opposed  this  meeting  and 
disapproved  of  the  outcome.  The 
dangers  of  supporting  the  PNC  meeting 
were  demonstrated  by  the  tragic 
assassination  in  Amman  of  a  former 
West  Bank  Mayor,  Fahd  Qawasmeh, 
who  was  a  moderate  spokesman  favor- 
ing a  Jordanian-Palestinian  agreement 
on  an  approach  to  peace  with  Israel,  as 
well  as  violence  directly  against  Jorda- 
nian Government  installations  and  of- 
ficials. Jordan's  security  situation  is 
threatened  by  the  massive  Soviet  arms 
transfers  to  Syria.  Yet  this  has  not 
deterred  the  Jordanian  Government, 
which  continues  to  seek  a  formula  for 
bringing  Palestinian  representatives  into 
the  peace  process  as  part  of  a  Jordanian 
delegation. 

The  Jordanians  play  a  responsible 
role  in  the  region  in  other  ways  as  well. 
Jordan's  preparedness  to  respond  to  re- 
quests for  assistance  and  support  to 


76 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


lb  states  in  the  gulf  continues  to  be  a 
element  of  King  Hussein's  policy,  as 
s  Jordanian  efforts  to  maintain  a 
ure  border  between  Jordan  and 
lel.  Jordan's  influence  as  a  force  for 
urity,  stability  and  moderation  in  the 
idle  East  has  been  and  continues  to 
a  positive  one,  deserving  of  U.S. 
iport. 

The  proposed  FY  1986  assistance 
gram  for  Jordan  consists  of  $95 
lion  in  FMS  credits,  $20  million  in 
F,  and  $2  million  in  IMET.  The  FY 
!6  request  will  not  be  used  for  the 
•chase  of  new  weapons  systems  but 
her  for  spare  parts,  ammunition, 
ow-on  support,  as  well  as  further 
port  for  the  I-Hawk  system.  In  view 
Jordan's  economic  problems,  $65 
lion  of  the  proposed  FMS  credits  will 
provided  at  concessional  rates.  The 
ining  funds  under  IMET  will  enhance 

I  professional  capability  of  Jordan's 
S  ned  Forces,  provide  Jordanian  of- 
Its  with  a  U.S.  orientation,  and  influ- 
'  e  the  training  the  Jordanian  Armed 

<"  ces  provide  to  other  moderate  Arab 
i  ntries. 

Jtirdan's  economy  has  slowed  con- 
jjrably  since  1981.  Jordan  is  poor  in 
Bural  resources  with  limited  arable 
ad  and  limited  water.  The  Iran-Iraq 
»-  has  halted  the  growth  of  Iraq  as  an 
n  )ortant  market  for  Jordanian  prod- 
i)S  and  skills.  At  the  same  time,  falling 

II  income  in  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  gulf 
.■  tes  has  had  a  three-fold  influence  on 
[  dan— significant  reductions  in  Arab 

u ,  increasing  competition  in  traditional 
r  danian  markets  coupled  with  decreas- 
I  demand,  and  leveling  off  of  remit- 
■;  ces  from  Jordanians  working  over- 
i  s.  To  its  credit,  the  Jordanian 
:  i/ernment  has  pursued  responsible 
;  inomic  policies  in  adjusting  to  these 
I  ^erse  economic  developments,  but  it  is 
1  V  strapped  with  a  very  tight  budget. 

The  FY  1986  ESF  program  will  con- 
;  lie  efforts  in  highland  agricultural 
i  /elopment  to  expand  and  modernize 
:  iduction  in  extensive  highland  areas. 
i  )rk  in  groundwater  assessment  will 
:  Id  on  an  ongoing  project  covering 
rrthern  Jordan.  Another  continuing 
p  )ject  will  provide  short-  and  long-term 
b  lining  in  economic  and  technical 

•  jjects. 

Regional  Program.  The  Middle 
list  regional  program  request  for  FY 
186  consists  of  $22  miUion  in  ESF, 
S.17  in  development  assistance,  and  $2 
t  llion  in  PL  480  Title  II.  The  ESF  pro- 
|sal  furthers  U.S.  objectives  of  peace 
!  d  economic  and  social  development  for 
ie  peoples  of  this  region.  This  grant 

•  11  finance  three  major  activities. 


For  development  projects  in  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza,  $10  million  will  be 
used.  Through  these  products,  which  are 
implemented  by  U.S.  and  local  private 
voluntary  organizations,  the  Ihiited 
States  has  been  and  continues  to  be  ac- 
tively involved  in  efforts  to  improve  the 
quality  of  Palestinian  life  in  these  ter- 
ritories. This  involvement  reflects  the 
legitimate  concern  which  we  have  for 
the  welfare  of  the  Palestinians  living  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  We  intend  to 
implement  this  program  in  a  manner 
that  will  directly  contribute  to  achieving 
the  economic  and  social  objectives  of  the 
people  it  is  designed  to  serve.  Re- 
quirements for  the  program  have 
become  greater  because  of  the  Israeli 
economic  crisis  which  has  had  its  impact 
on  the  economy  of  the  occupied  ter- 
ritories. The  private  voluntary  organiza- 
tions projects  are  concentrated  in  the 
following  areas:  health  and  sanitation, 
agricultural  development,  water  storage 
and  supply,  community  development, 
and  vocational  and  higher  education.  In 
addition,  during  the  past  year,  we  have 
inaugurated  programs  designed  to  pro- 
vide assistance  directly  to  deserving 
Palestinian  institutions  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza. 

We  are  encouraged  by  the  stated 
commitment  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister 
Peres  to  support  and  encourage  an  im- 
proved quality  of  Palestinian  life  in  the 
territories  and  the  steps  taken  to  date  in 
that  regard,  particularly  in  the  health 
field.  We  will  continue  to  encourage  this 
approach  directly  and  through  this 
assistance  program. 

We  are  fully  aware  that  these  pro- 
grams are  no  substitute  for  a  negotiated 
settlement  that  can  give  expression  to 
the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinians 
in  these  territories — nor  are  they  in- 
tended to  do  so.  We  are  prepared  to  ad- 
dress the  political  dimension  of  the 
Palestinian  problem  whenever  the  par- 
ties themselves  are  ready.  In  the  mean- 
time, we  are  actively  addressing  the 
human  dimension  both  financially  and 
diplomatically.  These  programs  have  the 
full  support  of  the  highest  levels  of  the 
U.S.  Government  and,  as  circumstances 
allow,  we  are  prepared  to  do  even  more. 

To  support  the  regional  cooperation 
program,  which  consists  of  a  variety  of 
joint  projects  involving  Israeli  and  Egyp- 
tian participation,  we  request  $5.8 
million.  We  seek  to  use  these  funds  in  a 
manner  that  promotes  contacts  among 
Israeli  universities,  government 
ministries,  and  private  organizations  and 
their  counterparts  in  Egypt.  Cooperative 
projects  help  promote  relationships  be- 
tween Israelis  and  their  Arab  neighbors. 


thus  helping  to  break  down  barriers  be- 
tween people  and  to  promote  mutual 
understanding.  Ongoing  projects  include 
arid  lands  agriculture,  technology  ex- 
change in  agriculture,  marine  sciences, 
and  research  on  infectious  diseases. 

For  the  first  time,  $5  million  in  ESF 
from  the  Middle  East  regional  program 
is  proposed  for  the  American  University 
of  Beirut.  This  regional  program  is 
recommended  as  a  source  of  funding  to 
avoid  conflict  between  the  needs  of  the 
university  and  the  needs  of  Lebanon.  It 
is  also  logical  because  the  American 
University  of  Beirut  is  an  invaluable 
regional  institution  serving  the  educa- 
tional needs  of  the  area.  These  funds 
will  defray  operating  costs  of  the  univer- 
sity and  the  university  hospital.  Lower 
student  enrollments,  the  added  burden 
to  the  hospital  resulting  from  caring  for 
casualties  from  the  fighting,  and  the 
weakness  of  the  Lebanese  currency  have 
contributed  to  the  university's  budget 
deficits.  In  addition  to  the  $5  million 
from  this  regional  program,  it  is  an- 
ticipated that  American  Schools  and 
Hospitals  Abroad  will  also  assist  the 
American  University  of  Beirut  with 
funding. 

To  finance  eight  regional  projects  in 
such  areas  as  population,  private  enter- 
prise, environment,  and  agriculture,  as 
well  as  project  design  and  evaluation, 
$4.17  million  is  requested. 

Persian  Gulf 

The  Southwest  Asia/Persian  Gulf  region, 
a  critical  source  of  energy  to  the  free 
world,  is  threatened  by  Soviet  encroach- 
ment through  Afghanistan  and  by 
radical  forces  from  within  the  region. 
Over  25%  of  the  free  world's  oil  produc- 
tion originates  in  the  Persian  Gulf. 
Through  our  assistance,  we  help  to  im- 
prove the  security  of  these  countries  and 
to  maintain  the  availability  of  these  vital 
oil  supplies.  Our  programs  are  directed 
at  supporting  those  countries  in  the 
region  which  provide  important  access 
to  military  facilities  as  well  as  other  na- 
tions which  provide  transit  rights  into 
the  region  should  they  be  required  by 
U.S.  forces  in  time  of  crisis. 

Oman.  Strategically  located  at  the 
entrance  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  Oman 
cooperates  closely  with  the  United 
States  in  our  common  objectives  of 
maintaining  security  and  stability  in  that 
vital  area  and  assuring  freedom  of 
navigation  through  the  Strait  of  Hormuz 
and  its  approaches.  Oman's  agreement 
to  permit  access  to  its  facilities 
represents  a  major  contribution  to 
American  force  projection  capability  in 
Southwest  Asia.  The  military  supply  and 


ay  1985 


77 


MIDDLE  EAST 


training  relationship  between  our  two 
countries  contributes  to  Oman's  con- 
tinued willingness  to  cooperate  with  the 
United  States  in  security  matters. 

In  an  effort  to  broaden  our  relation- 
ship with  Oman  beyond  its  security 
aspects,  the  Omani-American  Joint  Com- 
mission was  established  in  1980.  ESF 
assistance  funds  the  U.S.  contribution  to 
this  joint  commission  which  provides 
technical  assistance  for  the  development 
of  the  non-oil  sectors  of  Oman's 
economy.  Omani  proven  oil  reserves  are 
modest,  accounting  for  about  0.6%  of 
the  free  world's  proven  reserves.  Pres- 
ent reserves  will  be  depleted  in  about  20 
years  at  current  production  levels.  Non- 
oil  resources  are  very  limited. 

Our  FY  1986  request  for  Oman  in- 
cludes $58.3  million  in  FMS  credits,  $20 
million  in  ESF,  and  $150,000  in  IMET. 
A  significant  increase  in  FMS  credits  is 
requested  to  help  Oman  bear  the  cost  of 
upgrading  and  modernizing  its  air 
defense  capability  as  part  of  a  collective 
effort  by  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council 
(GCC)  states.  The  continued  threat  of 
military  attack  by  Iran  has  required 
Oman  to  increase  defense  expenditures 
in  recent  years  to  approximately  48%  of 
budgeted  expenditures,  one  of  the 
highest  levels  in  the  world.  The  small 
IMET  program  will  provide  advanced 
training  for  officers  in  the  Sultan's 
armed  forces;  this  will  help  to  support 
the  Omani  Government's  goal  of 
"Omanization." 

Of  the  $20  million  in  ESF,  $15 
million  will  be  used  to  improve  and  ex- 
pand the  water  supply  system  for  the 
capital  region;  the  remainder  will  fund 
scholarships  and  training  as  well  as 
feasibility  and  design  studies  and 
technical  assistance. 

Yemen.  The  proposed  FY  1986 
assistance  program  for  the  Yemen  Arab 
Republic  is  necessary  to  maintain  a 
bilateral  assistance  program  which  of- 
fers a  visible  alternative  to  Yemen's 
present  heavy  dependence  on  Soviet 
assistance.  The  strategic  location  of  the 
Yemen  Arab  Republic,  its  porous  border 
with  Saudi  Arabia,  and  the  large 
numbers  of  Yemenis  working  in  the  oil 
states  of  the  peninsula  underscore  the 
importance  of  Yemen  to  regional  stabili- 
ty and,  hence,  to  U.S.  interests  in  the 
area.  Furthermore,  the  Yemen  Arab 
Republic  is  a  "buffer"  between  the  Marx- 
ist People's  Democratic  Republic  of 
Yemen  and  Saudi  Arabia.  One  of  the 
goals  of  U.S.  security  assistance  to 
Yemen  is  to  increase  the  effectiveness  of 
the  Yemeni  Armed  Forces  as  a  deter- 
rent to  potential  military  adventurism  by 
the  Marxist  regime  in  South  Yemen. 


For  Yemen  our  FY  1986  request 
consists  of  $29  million  in  development 
assistance,  $6  million  in  MAP,  $1.55 
million  in  IMET,  and  $5  million  in  PL 
480  Title  I. 

Yemen  is  one  of  the  poorest  and 
least  developed  nations  in  the  Middle 
East.  In  the  last  2  years,  Yemen  has 
been  seriously  affected  by  a  sharp 
decline  in  Arab  donor  aid  and  a  leveling 
off  of  worker  remittances.  The  govern- 
ment also  had  to  cope  with  a  devasting 
earthquake  in  December  1982  which  left 
up  to  400,000  people  homeless.  In  view 
of  the  severe  constraints  in  the  develop- 
ment assistance  account,  we  are  propos- 
ing a  $29  million  level,  which  is  basically 
the  same  as  the  current  level.  However, 
this  assistance  request  will  be  sup- 
plemented by  $5  million  in  PL  480  Title 
I  food  aid  which  will  help  in  filling  a  gap 
which  has  been  created  by  an  ongoing 
drought. 

A  $1  million  increase  in  MAP  is  pro- 
posed over  the  current  FY  1985  level  of 
$5  million.  Our  MAP  assistance  will  be 
used  to  fund  supplemental  training, 
munitions,  maintenance,  and  support 
equipment.  The  IMET  program  seeks  to 
expose  as  many  Yemeni  military  person- 
nel as  possible  to  training  in  the  United 
States,  although  some  training,  in  par- 
ticular English-language  instruction, 
takes  place  in  country.  Areas  of  focus  in- 
clude operations,  communications, 
maintenance,  and  logistics. 

North  Atlantic 

Morocco.  U.S.  relations  with  Morocco 
are  based  on  a  long  record  of  coopera- 
tion, shared  foreign  policy  interests,  and 
mutual  respect.  Despite  differing  views 
on  how  to  deal  with  Libya's  Qadhafi, 
bilateral  relations  remain  strong, 
grounded  in  a  firm  foundation  of  mutual 
benefit.  As  chairman  of  the  Islamic  Con- 
ference and  the  Arab  League  Summit, 
King  Hassan  plays  a  leading,  moderate 
role  in  the  Arab  world. 

The  Treaty  of  Union  between  Moroc- 
co and  Libya  has  been  a  cause  of  great 
concern.  King  Hassan  affirmed  that  it 
would  have  no  effect  on  the 
U.S. -Moroccan  relationship  and  that 
both  Morocco  and  Libya  would  remain 
totally  independent  and  each  would  pur- 
sue its  own  foreign  policy  objectives. 
Our  opposition  to  the  agreement  was 
made  clear  to  Morocco.  To  date  it  ap- 
pears the  agreement  has  been  sufficient- 
ly circumscribed.  We  will,  however,  con- 
tinue to  monitor  its  application. 

Currently,  the  Moroccan  economy  is 
beset  by  a  combination  of  factors  beyond 
the  immediate  control  of  the  Moroccan 
Government.  The  country's  major  source 


for  foreign  exchange — export  of 
phosphates  and  derivatives — suffers 
from  low  world  prices  and  a  flat  marke 
Totally  dependent  on  imported  energy, 
Morocco  has  had  to  bear  the  burden  of 
high  cost  imports  denominated  in  U.S. 
dollars.  Thus  Morocco's  economic  plight 
has  been  exacerbated  by  the  strength  o 
the  dollar,  a  factor  which  also  has  af- 
fected other  imports  including  critical 
foodstuffs  and  commodities.  Chronic 
unemployment  and  underemployment, 
along  with  rapid  population  expansion, 
further  burden  the  Moroccan  economy. 

The  Moroccan  1985  debt  service 
ratio,  prior  to  rescheduling,  is  estimatec 
to  be  greater  than  50%.  This  com- 
plicates the  Moroccan  Government's 
prospects  for  arranging  necessary  fi- 
nancing for  government  projects  and 
necessary  imports. 

Despite  the  serious  problems  which 
confront  it,  the  Moroccan  Government 
has  demonstrated  its  determination  to 
rationalize  the  economic  and  financial 
situation.  Participants  in  a  World  Bank 
consultative  group,  which  met  in  Paris 
this  January,  were  uniformly  impressed 
by  the  seriousness  of  purpose 
demonstrated  by  Morocco  in  pursuing 
economic  reform  and  austerity.  These 
proposed  policies  will  set  the  backgrouiv 
for  a  Moroccan  request  for  a  new  debt 
rescheduling  by  the  Paris  Club  later  this 
spring. 

Our  FY  1986  requests  for  economic 
assistance,  which  includes  $19  million  in 
development  assistance,  $22.5  million  in 
ESF,  and  $44.9  million  in  PL  480  food 
aid,  will  address  the  deeper  Moroccan 
economic  problems  through  longer  term 
expansion  of  productive  capacity  and  by 
encouraging  the  sorts  of  economic 
policies  which,  if  pursued  consistently 
and  vigorously,  ultimately  should  help 
right  the  situation.  A  shift  in  military 
assistance  from  loans  to  grants  and  an 
increase  in  ESF  reflects  our  determina- 
tion to  ameliorate  the  out-year  debt  im- 
plications stemming  from  our  military 
assistance  programs. 

Our  military  assistance  to  Morocco  i: 
intended  to  enable  the  Moroccan 
Government  to  maintain  and  operate 
LI. S. -origin  equipment  provided  under 
earlier  programs.  Proposed  FY  1986 
levels  of  $45  million  in  MAP,  $5  million 
in  FMS  credits  at  concessional  interest 
rates,  and  $1.85  million  in  IMET  will  go 
a  long  ways  toward  meeting  Morocco's 
legitimate  but  increasingly  costly  needs 
in  this  respect. 

Algeria.  On  April  17,  President 
Bendjedid  will  pay  a  state  visit  to  Wash- 
ington. This  clearly  points  toward  con- 
tinuing improvement  in  bilateral  rela- 
tions, an  improvement  marked  earlier  by 


78 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


notable  achievements  as  the 
rian  role  in  obtaining  release  of  our 
an  hostages.  We  welcome  the  ex- 
ied  relationship. 

[n  FY  1986,  we  propose  a  modest  in- 
se  in  the  IMET  program  for 
3ria,  up  from  the  FY  1985  initial  pro- 
n  of  $50,000  to  $100,000.  We  seek 
ugh  this  program  to  encourage  the 
essional  development  of  selected 
irian  military  personnel  as  well  as  to 
note  further  contact  between  U.S. 
Algerian  Armed  Forces. 
Fortunately  the  economic  cir- 
stances  for  the  Algerian  Govern- 
t  are  reasonably  bright.  Although 
soft  market  for  hydrocarbons  has  af- 
ed  revenues  negatively,  per  capita 
me  in  Algeria  is  about  $2,400 — ap- 
dmately  twice  that  in  Tunisia  and 
3st  three  times  that  in  Morocco.  This 
)les  the  Algerian  Government  to  pur- 
;e  items  on  a  cash  basis. 
We  do  not  have  longstanding  securi- 
sistance  relationships  with  Algeria, 
late  military  sales  have  consisted  of 
-130s  and  miscellaneous  training, 
future  sales  will  be  considered  in 
;ion  to  Algeria's  legitimate  internal 
irity  needs  and  the  overall  military 
ition  in  the  region. 

Tunisia.  Our  historic,  friendly  rela- 
^  with  Tunisia  continue.  We  take 
?  in  having  contributed  to  steady 
omic  development  and  in  helping  to 
t  the  country's  security  needs. 
A^lthough  much  has  been  accom- 
led  under  the  leadership  of  Presi- 
Rourguiba,  Tunisia  has  experienced 
li  stress  which  erupted  into  violence 
/  in  1984  following  a  sharp  increase 
le  price  of  bread.  After  several  years 
ifficulty,  Tunisia's  economy  is  show- 
signs  of  modest  recovery.  However, 
ide  deficit  combined  with  lower 
ipts  from  tourism  and  worker's 
ittances  are  adding  to  Tunisia's  debt, 
ther  serious  and  continuing  problem 
lemployment.  As  is  the  case  in 
(nco,  we  seek  through  our  ESF  pro- 
n  to  foster  greater  productivity  in 
Tunisian  economy. 
Like  Morocco  and  Algeria,  the  Tuni- 
Government  is  placing  great  em- 
^is  on  rural  and  agricultural  develop- 
it.  Our  ESF  program  is  designed  to 
plement  these  objectives,  e.g. 
lugh  the  allocation  of  resources  to 
r.iitral  Tunisia  project,  which  is  an 
ji:rated  rural  development  scheme 
to  a  credit  project  for  small 
ners.  In  addition  the  FY  1986  ESF 
support  population  planning,  private 
or  development,  and  scholarships  for 
ly  in  the  United  States. 


Tunisia,  because  of  its  geographical 
proximity,  is  even  more  vulnerable  to 
Libyan  adventurism  than  are  Algeria 
and  Morocco.  Over  the  past  year  we 
have  delivered  12  F-5  fighter  aircraft 
(one  squadron)  and  54  M-60A3  tanks  to 
the  Tunisians.  Our  FY  1986  request  for 
$53  million  in  FMS  credits  and  $16 
million  in  MAP  will  be  used  to  continue 
the  modernization  program  outlined  by  a 
joint  State/Defense  survey  team  in  1980 
and  will  include  the  purchase  of  two 
C-130  aircraft,  howitzers  and  TOW 
missiles  [tube-launched,  optically 
tracked,  wire-guided  antitank]  missiles 
as  well  as  follow-on  support  for 
previously  acquired  U.S.  equipment.  We 
consider  that  this  is  a  contribution  to 
Tunisia's  defense  capability  and  visible 
evidence  of  U.S.  support  which  will 
make  the  Government  of  Tunisia  more 
confident  in  dealing  with  Libyan  threats 
and  pressures. 

South  Asia 

U.S.  primary  objective  in  South  Asia  is 
to  encourage  the  growth  of  stable, 
strong,  independent  nations  which  live 
in  peace  with  one  another  free  of  outside 
interference.  We  seek  to  deter  Soviet 
expansionism,  to  prevent  nuclear  pro- 
liferation to  expand  human  freedom  and 
democracy,  and  to  reduce  drug  traffick- 
ing. We  seek  to  contribute  to  the  efforts 
that  the  South  Asian  countries  are  mak- 
ing to  develop  themselves  economically 
and  to  achieve  higher  living  standards 
for  their  people.  The  fundamental  prin- 
cipal underlying  our  assistance  programs 
in  South  Asia  is  to  respond  to  the  needs 
and  priorities  of  these  nations 
themselves.  Our  proposed  FY  1986 
levels  for  South  Asia  have  been  set  with 
the  need  for  budget  austerity  in  mind. 

Pakistan.  Our  goal  of  a  secure, 
stable,  and  prosperous  Pakistan  serves 
our  own  interests  at  this  junction  point 
of  South,  Southwest,  and  Central  Asia 
with  the  Indian  Ocean.  We  are  re- 
questing $325  million  in  a  mix  of 
economic  assistance  programs.  These 
totals,  which  reflect  a  3.2%  increase 
over  the  FY  1985  estimates,  are  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  multiyear  assistance 
program  agreed  to  with  the  Pakistan 
Government  in  late  1981  and  involving 
close  consultation  with  Congress. 

The  pressures  facing  Pakistan  in 
1981  which  warranted  the  initiation  of  a 
major  U.S.  aid  program  have  not 
abated;  in  fact,  during  1984,  these 
pressures  increased  perceptibly.  Soviet 
intimidation  was  stepped  up  as 
crossborder  attacks  from  Afghanistan 
into  Pakistan  left  several  hundred 
civilians  inside  Pakistan  dead  or 


wounded.  Harsh  Soviet  threats  aimed  at 
undermining  Pakistan's  sense  of  security 
continued  throughout  the  year.  Pakistan 
stood  steadfast  despite  the.se  threats, 
refusing  to  recognize  the  Soviet- 
controlled  regime  in  Kabul  or  to  ac- 
quiesce in  the  continued  Soviet  efforts  to 
subjugate  the  Afghan  people. 

Soviet  pressure  on  Pakistan  has  in- 
creased as  a  consequence  of  Soviet 
frustration  at  its  continuing  inability  to 
make  good  its  conquest  of  Afghanistan. 
The  Soviets  in  1984  found  themselves  no 
closer  to  defeating  the  Afghan 
resistance  than  they  were  in  1979.  The 
resistance,  facing  the  modern  war 
machine  of  a  superpower,  held  its  own 
throughout  1984  and  remains  capable  of 
striking  almost  at  will  anywhere  in  the 
country. 

While  Soviet  troops  continue  their 
aggression  in  Afghanistan  and  Soviet 
pressure  on  Pakistan  increases,  UN-led 
efforts  to  reach  a  political  settlement  for 
Afghanistan  have  failed  to  elicit  a  mean- 
ingful Soviet  response.  The  United 
States  and  Pakistan  remain  committed 
to  seeking  a  peaceful  settlement  which 
would  include  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
troops,  respect  for  the  independent  and 
nonaligned  status  of  Afghanistan,  deter- 
mination by  the  Afghan  people  of  their 
own  form  of  government,  and  the  secure 
return  of  the  refugees. 

In  the  absence  of  a  political  settle- 
ment in  Afghanistan,  we  must  continue 
urgently  to  address  Pakistan's  security 
needs.  Our  proposed  FY  1986  package 
of  FMS  credits  and  IMET  will  help  meet 
critical  Pakistani  needs  for  moderniza- 
tion of  their  armed  forces.  Our  overall 
program  will  enable  Pakistan  to  con- 
tinue its  steady  opposition  to  Soviet  ag- 
gression in  Afghanistan  and  continue  to 
host  the  Afghan  refugees,  while  pursu- 
ing essential  economic  development  pro- 
grams. Our  proposed  FY  1986  economic 
assistance  package  of  $325  million  will 
work  directly  toward  assisting 
Pakistan's  long-term  development  ef- 
forts in  the  fields  of  health,  population, 
energy,  and  agriculture  while  providing 
short-term  balance-of-payments  support. 

The  extraordinary  generosity  and 
sense  of  humanitarian  responsibility 
with  which  the  Pakistani  Government 
and  people  have  shouldered  the  burden 
of  over  2  million  Afghan  refugees 
deserves  special  note.  U.S.  support 
through  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  (UNHCR)  and  World  Food 
Program  helps  alleviate  the  serious 
strain  on  Pakistani  resources. 

The  Pakistani  economy  suffered 
recently  from  a  sharp  downturn  in 
workers  remittances  and  crop  shortfalls. 
Economic  growth  has  bounced  back,  but 


1985 


79 


MIDDLE  EAST 


balance-of-payments  pressures  have  in- 
creased. Our  projected  FY  1986  net  aid 
flow  to  Pakistan  of  nearly  $500  million 
will  play  a  special  role  in  helping 
Pakistan  to  adjust  to  these  new  and 
adverse  balance-of-payments  realities.  In 
addition,  our  sizable  ESF  and  develop- 
ment assistance  is  two-thirds  grant,  thus 
helping  to  counterbalance  the  additional 
long-term  debt  burden  resulting  from 
substantial  FMS-financed  military  pur- 
chases at  near  commercial  rates. 

Our  assistance  to  Pakistan  helps 
create  economic  conditions  necessary  for 
growth  with  political  stability.  At  the 
same  time,  we  have  encouraged  the 
martial  law  administration  of  President 
Zia  to  move  Pakistan  toward  constitu- 
tional government  based  on  represen- 
tative political  institutions.  The  recent 
elections  held  in  Pakistan  demonstrate 
the  commitment  of  the  government  to 
moving  in  this  direction. 

An  important  U.S.  concern  also 
served  by  our  economic  assistance  is 
narcotics  control.  Roughly  one-half  of  all 
heroin  on  the  U.S.  market  is  South  and 
Southwest  Asian  in  origin.  While 
Pakistani  production  has  been  substan- 
tially reduced,  significant  amounts  still 
transit  Pakistan.  We  have  a  well- 
established  program  in  Pakistan  to  help 
eradicate  opium  production  and  shut 
down  heroin  labs,  but  the  task  is  far 
from  complete.  Our  FY  1986  program 
combines  economic  assistance  funding 
for  integrated  rural  development,  along 
with  U.S. -Pakistan  law  enforcement 
cooperation  and  funding  for  outreach 
programs  to  the  Pakistani  public. 

Another  critical  U.S.  regional  and 
global  interest  served  by  our  assistance 
program  is  nonproliferation.  We  have 
conveyed  to  the  Pakistan  Government 
the  serious  concern  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment on  this  matter  at  every  opportuni- 
ty. We  welcome  President  Zia's  public 
assurances  regarding  the  peaceful 
nature  of  Pakistan's  nuclear  program. 
We  believe  our  assistance  provides 
Pakistan  with  the  confidence  in  its 
security  necessary  for  Pakistan's  leader- 
ship to  eschew  the  acquisition  of  a 
nuclear  explosives  capability. 

India.  India  hold.s  a  place  of  central 
importance  for  the  United  States  in  our 
approach  to  South  Asia.  As  one  of  the 
world's  great  democracies,  as  an  impor- 
tant spokesman  for  the  needs  and  con- 
cerns of  developing  countries,  and  as  the 
pivotal  element  in  determining  the  pros- 
pects for  peace  and  stability  in  South 
Asia,  India  is  an  essential  partner  if  we 
are  to  successfully  pursue  our  goals 
regionally  and  globally.  We  look  forward 
to  a  continuation  of  the  steady  improve- 
ment in  U.S. -Indian  relations  of  recent 


years.  Differences  remain,  as  they  in- 
evitably must  between  two  strong  and 
independent  nations,  on  a  number  of  im- 
portant world  and  regional  issues,  but 
we  are  able  to  address  these  issues 
through  frank  and  open  dialogue. 

In  the  past  year,  India  has  ex- 
perienced more  than  its  fair  share  of 
tragedies  and  challenges — growing  Sikh 
unrest  in  the  Punjab,  culminating  in  the 
June  6  assault  on  the  Golden  Temple; 
the  assassination  of  Prime  Minister  In- 
dira Gandhi  on  October  31  and  subse- 
quent violence  resulting  in  the  deaths  of 
several  thousands;  and  the  un- 
precedented industrial  accident  at  the 
Union  Carbide  plant  at  Bhopal  on 
December  3,  killing  some  2,000  residents 
and  injuring  many  thousand  others.  In- 
dia emerged  from  this  difficult  period 
with  its  fundamental  strength  and 
stability  very  much  intact,  illustrating 
once  again  the  strength  of  its 
democratic  traditions  and  institutions. 

The  new  Prime  Minister  has 
declared  that  one  of  his  top  priorities 
will  be  to  inject  new  vigor  into  an 
economy  plagued  by  inefficiency,  over- 
regulation,  and  a  shortage  of  resources. 
He  has  already  taken  steps  to  loosen 
controls  over  investments  and  imports  in 
certain  indu.stries,  and  further  move- 
ment in  this  direction  appears  likely. 

The  trend  toward  further  economic 
liberalization  in  India  could  open  up 
broad  new  vistas  for  scientific,  technical, 
and  industrial  collaboration  with  the 
United  States.  We  are  already  India's 
most  important  trading  partner,  as  well 
as  its  largest  source  of  new  investments 
and  technical  licensing  agreements  from 
abroad.  In  addition,  we  have  an  active 
program  of  scientific  exchanges  as 
evidenced  by  the  large  numbers  of  In- 
dians in  American  universities,  research 
institutions,  and  corporations.  A  steady 
flow  of  American  scientists  travel  to  In- 
dia each  year.  We  regard  this  as  a  very 
healthy  process.  Indeed,  through  our 
trade  and  investment  promotion  efforts, 
through  the  Reagan-Indira  Gandhi 
science  and  technology  initiative,  and 
through  our  discussions  aimed  at 
establishing  a  binational  rupee  fund  for 
joint  studies  and  exchanges,  our  two 
governments  are  making  an  important 
contribution. 

India  is  by  far  the  most  advanced  in- 
dustrial country  in  South  Asia,  but  the 
tragedy  at  Bhopal  serves  as  a  timely 
reminder  of  the  need  to  devote  consist- 
ent attention  to  health,  safety,  and  en- 
vironmental concerns  as  well  as  man- 
power training.  The  Indian  Government 
is  moving  swiftly  to  strengthen  regula- 
tions and  procedures  governing  in- 
dustrial facilities,  an  area  in  which  the 


k 


United  States  can  make  a  contributioi 
We  have  begun  to  exchange  views  wii 
Indian  health  and  environmental  expe 
and  expect  such  collaboration  to  con- 
tinue as  an  important  new  area  of  em 
phasis  in  our  science  and  technology  f 
change  program. 

We  look  forward  to  a  continuatior 
the  steady  improvement  in  U.S. -India 
relations.  Our  aid  program  to  India  hf 
been  an  important  positive  element  in 
Indo-U.S.  relations  since  Indian  in- 
dependence. For  FY  1986,  we  are  pro 
posing  a  program  of  $8.5  million  in 
development  assistance,  $93.5  million 
PL  480  Title  II  food  aid,  and  an  IME1 
program  of  $3.50,000.  Our  assistance  ( 
fort  focuses  on  irrigation,  agricultural 
research,  forestry,  family  planning, 
health,  and  nutrition.  In  addition,  ther 
is  increasing  emphasis  on  the  relevant 
application  of  science  and  technology  1 
key  development  problems.  It  is  well- 
targeted  at  India's  own  development 
priorities  and  will  serve  U.S.  interests 
the  region. 

Sri  Lanka.  Sri  Lanka  is  a  nation 
with  a  strong  democratic  tradition  anc 
bright  hope  for  the  future.  But  first  it 
must  deal  with  severe  communal  prob- 
lems which  have  worsened  over  the  pa 
year,  as  Tamil  dissidents  seeking  a 
separate  nation  have  stepped  up  attacl 
on  government  security  forces.  Effort: 
to  reach  a  political  accord  came  to  an 
end  last  December  with  the  rejection  c 
the  government's  proposal  by  both  the 
Tamil  leadership  and  by  hardliners 
within  the  Sinhalese  community.  We 
believe  that  the  best  hope  for  the 
restoration  of  communal  harmony  lies 
an  early  resumption  of  political  dialogi 
aimed  at  addressing  the  problems  of 
Tamil  alienation. 

The  economy  grew  by  a  respectabl 
5%  in  1984,  somewhat  less  than  an- 
ticipated because  of  floods  in  the  begin 
ning  of  the  year.  The  separatist  violenc 
has  been  primarily  confined  to  the  norl 
although  other  areas  have  also  ex- 
perienced some  economic  disruption  du 
to  the  conflict.  Economic  strains  are  e\ 
dent  in  stagnation  of  nontraditional  ex- 
ports, the  rising  external  debt  burden, 
an  apparent  erosion  of  investor  con- 
fidence, and  continued  budgetary  im- 
balance exacerbated,  no  doubt,  by  the 
growing  cost  of  maintaining  security. 
Violence  in  the  north  is  taking  a  toll  on 
the  economy,  and  the  pressures  seem 
likely  to  increase  with  time  if  a  solution 
is  not  found. 

Our  economic  assistance  program  ii 
Sri  Lanka  serves  as  an  important 
demonstration  of  support  for  its 
economic  policies  and  for  its  efforts  to 


80 


nonartmont  r\f  Qtato  Riill<=>ti 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


'!'  ore  the  communal  harmony  so  essen- 
to  future  growth  and  stabihty.  For 
1986,  we  are  proposing  $32  million 
development  assistance,  $29.7  million 
PL  480  food  assistance,  and 
),000  for  IMET.  These  funds  are 
zed  in  support  of  irrigation, 
cultural  research,  entrepreneurial 
'lopment,  and  institutional  develop- 
t  in  the  health  and  agricultural 
ors. 

Nepal.  The  aim  of  U.S.  assistance  to 
al  is  to  promote  economic  and 
;ical  development,  with  a  view  to 
ributing  to  stability  in-that  country 
thereby  in  the  region  as  a  whole, 
al's  geographical  position  between 
la  and  India  makes  the  maintenance 
s  domestic  stability  particularly  im- 
ant  in  a  regional  context. 
Relations  between  Nepal  and  the 
;ed  States  are  excellent.  We  value 
al's  support  for  UN  peacekeeping  ef- 
3  in  the  Middle  East,  where  the 
alese  Government  recently  provided 
ttalion  of  crack  Ghurka  troops  for 
UN  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon 
IFIL).  LI.S.  military  training  under 
;T  has  encouraged  Nepal  to  con- 
ate  forces  to  UN  peacekeeping 
tations  while  trying  to  maintain  the 
quality  and  effectiveness  of 
Uese  forces. 
"With  a  per  capita  income  of  approx- 
rs  ely  $167  per  year,  Nepal  remains 
1  <  if  the  poorest  and  least  developed 
1  ins  in  the  world,  relying  heavily  on 
K  igricultural  sector  which  employs 
~>   of  the  work  force.  Thanks  in  large 
(si;re  to  a  favorable  monsoon,  the 
'lomy  grew  by  over  7%  in  1983-84. 
I  Nepal  continues  to  face  severe  dif- 
E  ties  related  to  poverty,  overpopula- 
c ,  degradation  of  the  environment, 
1  rising  prices.  Foreig^n  assistance  is 
•1  cal  in  financing  economic  develop- 
,it. 
I^ur  economic  assistance  program  in 
tal  focuses  on  resource  conservation, 
i  th  and  family  planning,  rural 
>'liipment,  water  management,  and 
I'  rehabilitation  of  irrigation  resources. 
c  VY  1986,  we  are  proposing  $15 
i  (in  in  development  assistance  and 
D.OOO  in  IMET. 

Bangladesh.  Our  assistance  is  chan- 
;  h\  to  help  meet  the  basic  human 
sis  of  this  very  poor  nation,  while 
ering  sustained  economic  growth 
:h  will  help  move  Bangladesh  off  the 
srty  treadmill.  At  the  same  time,  we 
;  through  our  assistance  to  en- 
gage movement  toward  long-term 
tical  stability  under  representative 
itutions,  a  goal  we  pursue 
lughout  South  Asia. 


Bangladesh,  a  resource  poor  nation 
of  100  million,  bears  an  enormous 
burden  in  providing  for  the  needs  of  its 
rapidly  growing  populace.  Recognizing 
this  burden,  our  proposed  aid  is  entirely 
grant,  supporting  Bangladesh's  develop- 
ment strategy  focused  on  such  areas  as 
family  planning,  agriculture,  and  rural 
development.  For  FY  1986,  we  are  re- 
questing $78  million  in  development 
assistance,  PL  480  totaling  $89  million, 
and  $300,000  for  our  IMET  program. 

We  have  also  welcomed 
Bangladesh's  efforts  to  move  toward 
civilian  rule  through  elections.  President 
Ershad  has  announced  a  referendum  for 
March  21  to  garner  support  for  national 
elections,  after  which  he  hopes  to 
resume  negotiations  with  the  opposition 
political  parties  to  establish  an  ap- 
propriate framework  for  the  elections. 
We  see  transition  to  representative 
government  as  an  important  step  in  the 


development  of  enduring  political  institu- 
tions in  Bangladesh. 

Another  trend  favorable  to  our  in- 
terests is  Bangladesh's  moderate  foreign 
policy  and  constructive  work  in  interna- 
tional organizations.  These  positive 
trends  reinforce  our  basic  humanitarian 
interest  in  remaining  involved  in 
Bangladesh's  development  efforts. 

In  summary,  we  consider  our  FY 
1986  submission  to  be  consistent  with 
programs  which  the  Congress  supported 
in  previous  years.  Justifiable  in  terms  of 
the  multifaceted  political,  economic,  and 
security  requirements  of  the  Middle 
East  and  realistic  in  the  context  of  our 
budgetary  constraints. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1986  Assistance  Requests 

for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 


by  Langhorne  A.  Motley 

Based  on  a  statement  before  the  Sub- 
committee on  Western  Hemisphere  Af- 
fairs of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee on  March  5,  1985.  Ambassador 
Motley  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
Am.erican  Affairs.^ 

Five  weeks  ago,  on  January  29,  I 
stressed  to  this  subcommittee  the  vital 
importance  of  defending  U.S.  interests 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere  by  standing 
by  our  friends,  adhering  to  our  prin- 
ciples, and  supporting  democracy  and 
the  common  defense.  I  stressed  my  con- 
viction that  the  Administration  and  the 
Congress  have  good  reason  to  conclude 
that  the  policies  we  have  been  pursuing 
the  last  several  years  are  beginning  to 
succeed  and  that  the  best  option  for  the 
future  is  firm,  bipartisan  continuity. 

Today,  I  come  before  you  to  support 
the  Administration's  request  of  $1,551 
million  for  economic  assistance  and  $357 
million  for  military  aid  for  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  in  fiscal  year 
(FY)  1986.  This  request  balances  impor- 
tant needs  of  the  LInited  States.  We 
need  budgetary  stringency  to  advance 
the  U.S.  economic  recovery.  And  we 
also  need  to  protect  U.S.  interests 
abroad. 


In  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean, 
this  rec}uires  that  we  invest  now  in  the 
future  of  democracy,  that  we  support 
the  recovery  and  security  of  our 
neighbors,  and  that  we  assist  them  to 
achieve  a  more  secure  environment  in 
which  political  freedom  and  economic 
opportunity  may  flourish. 

In  requesting  this  assistance,  our 
focus  is  on  the  U.S.  national  interest. 
We  have  neither  the  resources  nor  the 
responsibility  to  solve  our  neighbors' 
problems.  But  the  fragility  of  democratic 
institutions  and  their  vulnerability  to 
violence — bred  by  poverty,  injustice,  and 
in  many  cases  abetted  by  hostile  ex- 
ternal forces — create  an  obligation, 
rooted  in  our  national  interest,  to  help 
our  neighbors.  We  do  have  the  means 
and  the  will  to  serve  as  a  friend  and 
catalyst  to  help  our  neighbors  to  the 
path  of  growth  with  freedom.  As 
Secretary  Shultz  said  to  you  2  weeks 
ago: 

.  .  .  the  domestic  policies  of  these  coun- 
tries will  determine  the  strength  and  sus- 
tainability  of  their  economies  and  their 
political  institutions.  Our  foreign  assistance 
can  provide  those  critical  incremental 
resources  to  help  them  achieve  those  objec- 
tives. 

This  prepared  statement  addresses 
the  assistance  we  have  requested  for  FY 
1986  in  two  ways: 


/1985 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


First,  by  the  three  main  regions  for 
which  we  are  proposing  programs— Cen- 
tral America,  the  Andes,  and  the  Carib- 
bean; and 

Second,  certain  specific  innovations 
based  on  lessons  learned  and  which  will 
require  legislation  to  be  implemented. 

Central  America 

In  Central  America,  except  for 
Nicaragua,  economic  decline  has  been 
stemmed,  and  a  basis  for  gradual  long- 
term  revitaiization  is  being  laid.  While 
per  capita  income  continued  to  decline, 
gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  grew  by 
1.2%  last  year  after  a  decline  of  4%  over 
the  previous  2  years.  Unemployment, 
underutilized  productive  resources,  lack 
of  foreign  exchange,  and  inflation  all, 
nonetheless,  remain  serious.  Were  the 
Central  American  crisis  economic  alone, 
it  might  be  on  its  way  to  resolution;  but 
ic  would  still  be  a  crisis. 

Significant  advances  are  taking 
place  with  regard  to  another  primary  ob- 
jective of  U.S.  policy — democracy  and 
its  attendant  institutions.  Underscoring 
the  changes  is  the  percedent-setting  in- 
sistence in  the  regional  Contadora  peace 


process  that  democracy  based  on  open 
elections  is  essential  for  peace  in  Central 
America.  And  five  of  the  six  countries 
have  now  held  free  elections.  The  excep- 
tion, again,  is  Nicaragua,  whose  elec- 
tions were  carefully  staged  to  prevent 
an  electoral  challenge  to  the  Sandinista 
monopoly  of  power. 

We  are  in  the  first  year  of  im- 
plementation of  the  recommendations  of 
the  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America.  Although  it  is  less 
than  a  year  since  Congress  approved  the 
new  funding  levels,  the  longer  term 
focus  recommended  by  the  bipartisan 
commission  is  beginning  to  take  shape. 
We  are  working  with  governments  and 
legal  organizations  to  improve  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  Technical  train- 
ing and  scholarship  programs  are  under- 
way. We  are  developing  programs  for 
leadership  training,  political  networking, 
and  support  for  democratic  institutions. 
Nutrition  and  health  programs  have 
been  designed  and  implementation  has 
begun.  The  trade  credit  insurance  pro- 
gram has  been  established.  We  are  look- 
ing for  the  most  effective  way  to 
strengthen  the  role  of  the  Central 
American  Bank  for  Economic  Integra- 
tion. 


Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean:  FY  1986  Foreign  Assistance  Request 

$  millions 

Economic 


l.DUU 

1,400 

- 

1,200 

- 

1,000 

- 

800 

- 

600 

- 

400 

— 

200 
n 

- 

Military 


Economic 


Military 


IMET 


As  all  of  us  from  Secretary  Shultz 
on  down  have  stressed,  policy  consists 
cy  is  necessary  in  order  to  pursue  our 
terests  in  the  economic  and  political 
development  of  Central  America.  Cur 
rent  policy  is  working,  and  we  must 
stick  with  it.  Without  consistency  and 
perseverence  we  will  still  fail — 
despite  our  good  start.  We  need  the 
reliability  of  a  multiyear  commitment 
and  the  confidence  that  this  commitmi 
will  continue  to  be  tied  to  equity, 
reform,  and  freedom.  We — and  each  ( 
our  friends  in  this  region — need  your 
support  for  this. 

We  propose  to  continue  our  suppo 
for  economic  stabilization  and  adjust 
ment  in  FY  1986  with  $601  million  in  |a 
economic  support  funds  (ESF).  This 
assistance  helps  governments  address  |8 
balance-of-payments  problems,  provid(  ' 
resources  needed  for  imports  of  basic 
commodities,  and  generates  counterpa 
funds  that  governments  can  use  to  ad- 
dress destabilizing  sociopolitical  prob- 
lems. In  addition  to  ESF,  we  propose 
$269  million  for  development  assist- 
ance— for  programs  such  as  agricultui 
development,  education,  family  plannii 
and  health  and  nutrition. 

We  have  requested  $236  million  in 
military  assistance  program  (MAP) 
funds,  $14  million  for  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  credits,  and  $4  million  in  i 
ternational  military  education  and  trai 
ing  (IMET)  funds  for  FY  1986. 

The  Andean  Region 

The  five  Andean  countries — Bolivia,  C 
lombia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Venezuela 
all  have  democratically  elected  govern- 
ments. They  merit  U.S.  support.  They 
must  deal  in  differing  degrees  with 
serious  economic  problems,  coupled  in 
some  cases  with  the  need  to  cope  with 
the  terrorism  of  guerrillas  and  narcotic 
traffickers. 

Except  for  Venezuela  and  Colombi 
where  we  are  not  proposing  economic 


Glossary 

DA — development  assistance. 

ESF — economic  support  fund  (economic 
stabilization  and  development  funds), 

FMS — foreign  military  sales  (program  to 
facilitate  sale  of  US,  military  equipment, 
spare  parts,  and  training), 

IMET — International  military  education  and 
training  program 

MAP — military  assistance  program  (grant 
military  aid), 

PL  480 — Food  for  Peace  program. 


82 


r^on  •!i  i-trr»^r*t  rsi  Q.^-^ici   PiilliDti 


'Hi 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


atin  America  and  the  Caribbean:  FY  1986  Foreign  Assistance  Request 

imillions) 


:entral  America 


,  ielize 
;osta  Rica 
:l  Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
'anama 
Regional  Programs 

Vndean 


Bolivia 
>olombia 

cuador 

•eru 
/enezuela 

l^aribbean 


"he  Bahamas 

Dominican  Republic 

iastern  Caribbean 

juyana 

Haiti 

lamaica 

Juriname 

'rinidad  and  Tobago 


TOTAL: 
Latin  America 
and  ttie  Caribbean 


Economic  Assistance 

ESF DA  PL  480  TOTAL 


Military  Assistance 

FMS  IMET 


600.5 


268.6 


110.8  979.9 


235.9 


14.0 


4.0 
150.0 
210.0 
25.0 
80.0 
40.0 
91.5 

70.00 


6.8 
14.4 
89.8 
33,0 
450 
22.6 
57.0 

57.4 


0.0 

10.8 

23.0 

187.4 

50.8 

350.6 

19.0 

77.0 

18.0 

143.0 

0.0 

62.6 

0.0 

148.5 

58.6 


186.0 


1.0 

2.5 

131.0 

0.0 

87.0 

14.4 

NA* 

24.35 


0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
10.0 
0.0 
4.0 
NA 

35.0 


10.0 

0.0 

15.0 

45.0 

0.0 

160.0 


7.8 

0.0 

25.0 

24.6 

0.0 

110.1 


28.6 
0.0 
0.6 

29.4 
0.0 

87.9 


46.4 

0.0 

40.6 

99.0 

0.0 

358.3 


6.0 

0.0 

0.0 

20  0 

0.0 

5.0 

8.35 

10.0 

0.0 

0.0 

24.5 


4.0 


0.0 

50.0 

35.0 

0.0 

5.3 

70.0 

0.0 

0.0 


0.0 
30.0 
31.1 

0.0 
25.0 
24.0 

0.0 

0.0 


0.0 

0.0 

31.8 

111.8 

0.0 

66.1 

0.0 

0.0 

25.7 

56.0 

30.4 

124.4 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 
6.0 
10,0 
0.0 
0.5 
8.0 
0.0 
0,0 


0.0 
4.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 


833.0 


460.9 


257.3 


1,551.2 


284.75 


55.5 


4.125 


3.00 


2.15 


16.575 


254.025 


.100 

1.100 

.225 

2.725 

.600 

132.600 

.300 

10.300 

.250 

88.250 

.650 

19.050 

NA 

NA 

62.350 


.300 

6.300 

.950 

20.950 

.800 

5.800 

.850 

29.200 

.100 

,100 

30.65 


,050 

.050 

.800 

10,800 

400 

10.400 

.050 

.050 

475 

.975 

.275 

8.275 

.050 

.050 

.050 

.050 

'  Dther 

2.2 

24.8 

0.0 

27.0 

0.0 

2.5 

7.300 

9.800 

\rgentina 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

100 

.100 

Brazil 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

,100 

.100 

:hile 

0.0 

0,0 

0.0 

0,0 

0,0 

0,0 

,100 

.100 

(/lexico 

0.0 

0,0 

00 

0.0 

0,0 

0,0 

,250 

.250 

Paraguay 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0,0 

0,0 

,125 

.125 

Jruguay 

0.0 

0,0 

0.0 

0,0 

0,0 

2,5 

,125 

2.625 

.atin  America  and 

Caribbean  Regional 

Programs 

2.2 

24,8 

0.0 

27,0 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

='anama  Canal 

vlilitary  Schools 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

0,0 

0,0 

2,500 

2.500 

J.S,  Army  School 

Df  the  Americas 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

0,0 

0,0 

4.000 

4.000 

356.825 


*NA  =  not  applicable. 


istance,  our  aid  is  primarily  economic 
limited  military  assistance  is  also  im- 
tant.  The  only  new  economic  assist- 
e  program  in  our  request  is  an  ESF 
gram  for  Ecuador.  Peru,  and  Bolivia. 
3  economies  of  Peru  and  Bolivia, 
ng  with  their  democratic  systems 
mselves,  face  very  serious  challenges, 

y1985 


and  both  are  scheduled  to  hold  presiden- 
tial elections  this  year.  Each  has  so  far 
had  great  difficulty  in  dealing  with  the 
impact  of  grave  natural  disasters,  low 
commodity  prices,  and  the  consequences 
of  past  policy  errors.  Ecuador,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  pursuing  sound  economic 
policies,  although  its  recovery,  too,  is 
tenuous. 


We  propose  an  ESF  program  of  $70 
million  and  development  assistance  of 
$57  million  for  these  three  countries.  To 
strengthen  peaceful  politics  and  defend 
against  antidemocratic  violence,  we  have 
requested  $24  million  in  military 
assistance  program  funds  and  $38 
million  for  foreign  military  sales  credits. 


83 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


This  small  program  is  not  by  itself 
the  answer  to  all  their  economic  and 
social  difficulties.  It  is,  however,  an  in- 
cremental resource,  and  thus  an  added 
incentive  for  these  democratic  govern- 
ments to  engage  the  international  finan- 
cial community  in  ongoing  dialogue.  It  is 
a  means  to  show  concrete  support  for 
their  undertaking  the  necessary  steps 
toward  stabilization.  It  is  a  small  price 
to  pay  for  the  chance  to  participate 
directly  in  the  resolution  of  problems  in 
countries  important  to  the  future  of  the 
region. 

The  Caribbean 

The  countries  of  the  Caribbean  do  not 
face  the  immediate  challenge  of  exter- 
nally supported  violence  but  must  deal 
with  high  debt  and  unemployment,  poor 
traditional  export  markets,  internal  dis- 
equilibria,  and  inadequate  infrastructure. 
The  island  states  of  the  eastern  Carib- 
bean also  must  establish  their  own 
economic  viability  in  the  world 
marketplace. 

The  problems  are  daunting,  and 
solutions  are  not  available  in  the  short 
run,  no  matter  how  great  the  will. 
Markets  for  sugar  and  bauxite,  two 
mainstays  of  the  region,  are  unlikely  to 
recover  in  the  short  term,  and  major  in- 
vestments in  these  industries  are  being 
abandoned.  The  entire  world  economy, 
from  the  perspective  of  these  island  na- 
tions, has  undergone  a  major  negative 
change  over  the  past  few  years. 
Although  the  need  for  adjustment  to 
these  new  realities  is  obvious,  it  is  by  far 
easier  said  than  accomplished. 

Economic  stabilization  and  restruc- 
turing are  necessary  to  build  a  founda- 
tion for  sustained  economic  growth  and 
development.  That  is  the  basic  challenge 
facing  the  governments  of  the  region. 
Our  task  is  to  facilitate  the  adjustments. 
Without  support  from  the  United  States 
and  others,  improved  policies  will  result 
in  stabilization  and  renewed  growth  at 
levels  of  economic  activity  well  below 
those  of  recent  history.  We  must  help 
develop  growth  paths  which  will  lead  to 
healthy  and  sustained  development. 

The  more  open  U.S.  market 
achieved  by  the  Caribbean  Basin  Ini- 
tiative can  help.  For  our  Caribbean 
neighbors  to  seize  that  advantage  re- 
quires, among  other  things,  foreign  ex- 
change markets  which  allow  exporters 
and  others  in  the  private  sector  to  in- 
crease export  production  and  sales.  It 
requires  fiscal  policies  that  stimulate  in- 
vestment and  allow  the  private  sector  to 
compete  equally  for  credit  and  resources 


Regional  Comparison:  FY  1986  Foreign  Assistance  Request 

$  millions 


>ni 


uuu 

900 

— 

800 

— 

700 

— 

600 

r— 

500 

— 

400 

—  , 

300 

— 

200 

— 

100 

n 

— 

Central  America 


Andean 


Caribbean 


with  the  public  sector.  It  requires  open 
economies  receptive  to  investment  from 
both  domestic  and  foreign  sources.  And 
it  requires  political  and  social  stability. 
To  support  the  adjustment  process, 
we  request  $160  million  in  ESF  for  the 
Caribbean  in  FY  1986.  To  deal  with  sec- 
toral problems  and  problems  in  human 
development,  we  propose  $110  million  in 
development  assistance.  We  have  re- 
quested $25  million  in  MAP  funds,  $4 
million  in  FMS  credits,  and  $2  million  in 
IMET  to  assist  the  Caribbean  nations  to 
modernize  and  professionalize  their 
security  forces. 

Lessons  Learned:  Some 
Legislative  Proposals 

Let  me  now  turn  to  several  legislative 
proposals  that  will  help  us  to  better  ad- 
vance U.S.  interests  in  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean.  These  are  based  on 
the  lessons  we  have  learned  in  develop- 
ing and  applying  assistance  programs. 
Some  are  recent  lessons.  Others  are 
rooted  on  dilemmas  and  confusions  that 
have  bedeviled  foreign  assistance  vir- 
tually from  its  inception. 


Administration  of  Justice.  Last 
year  we  proposed  to  help  strengthen 
judicial  systems  in  Central  America  an- 
the  Caribbean  by  assisting  the  entire 
process,  including  the  training  and  sup 
port  of  law  enforcement  agencies  unde 
carefully  defined  conditions.  We  have 
learned  that  this  is  a  significant,  low- 
cost  program  which  will  strengthen 
democracy  and  the  observance  of  basic 
human  rights.  And  we  have  discovered 
significant  number  of  allies — Latin 
American  and  Caribbean  lawyers, 
judges,  bar  associations,  justice 
ministers,  prosecutors,  and  professors 
law — who  are  actively  engaged  in  ef- 
forts to  reform  and  strengthen  a  sectoi 
central  to  the  functioning  of  any  civilizi 
society,  and  who  want  our  support.  Thi 
year  we  have  expanded  this  proposal  tc 
cover  all  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean. 

Economic  Assistance  Coordina- 
tion. We  are  again  requesting  your 
cooperation  in  authorizing  U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  an  effective  forum  for 
dialogue  on  the  problems  of  the  Central 
American  region.  The  bipartisan  com^  ' 


< 


84 


ir*rr^/-.n*    /-^*    Cirti^ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


LMoii  argued  for  the  Central 
Trican  Development  Organization  to 
'-itate  the  direct  participation  of  Cen- 
Americans,  from  the  private  sector 
I'll  as  from  the  government,  in  the 
lulation  of  strategies  to  achieve  our 
111' 111  objectives.  We  believe  that  the 
a; ion  of  such  a  regional  organization 
guarantee  that  congressionally 
,lii  purposes  will,  in  fact,  be  in- 
jiated  into  the  long-term  regional 
••'■liipment  policies.  Our  experience 
such  concepts  as  the  Caribbean 
1 1  !  nitiative  has  taught  us  that  when 
i-U'ii  to  our  neighbors,  they  do  a 
'IlT  job  of  listening  to  us. 

Multiyear  Authorization  of  Fund- 

j  The  National  Bipartisan  Commis- 
)  on  Central  America  concluded  that 
vrtaintly  about  future  U.S.  assistance 
1  Tiiiines  the  implementation  of  cur- 
■1  aid  programs.  We  fully  agree.  This 
1  lomenon  is  a  reflection  of  a  broader 
•MJem:  many  Latin  Americans  have 
I  the  experience  of  seeing  the  United 
;os  periodically  lose  interest  in  their 
1  IS.  The  ironic  result  is  that  many  of 
1  neighbors  to  the  south,  especially  in 
BLral  America,  are  more  concerned 
3  it  U.S.withdrawal  than  about 
r  Tican  involvement.  It  is  true  that 
Ml'nited  States — or  any  coun- 
1  -  focuses  attention  on  the  "crises" 

I  that  shifts  in  concern  from  one  area 
■"  le  world  to  another  are  to  be  ex- 

e  eil;  it  is  an  altogether  human  trait. 
1-  problem  is  that,  for  example,  the 
li  sters  of  planning  dealing  with 
).  y's  crisis  must  act  as  if  international 
C  ntion  will  shift  elsewhere  by 
):  orrow. 
In  Central  America  today,  the  result 
weaken  not  only  the  ability  of  the 
li  ners  to  plan,  and  the  private  sector 
)  ivest,  but  also  to  undercut  the 
1!  ile-  and  long-term  approach  which  is 
:  cessary  part  of  our  assistance 
h  isophy— and  one  in  which  the  Con- 
r  .s  has  always  had  a  special  interest. 
'I  in  one  sentence,  y  ear-by -year  fund- 

II  in  a  situation  as  complex  as  Central 

r;ca  diminishes  the  impact  of  our 
J  jort  in  such  key  areas  as  human 
ij  ts  and  economic  reform. 

The  bipartisan  commission  concluded 
h  Central  Amierica  today  presented 
r  ipportunity  for  us  to  initiate  a  more 
\  ure  and  more  effective  relationship 

1  that  majority  of  Central  Americans 

1  want  progressive  change  but  need  a 
eible  and  steady  U.S.  commitment  to 

)  them  make  it  happen. 


Training.  Over  the  years  a  number 
of  prohibitions  on  U.S.  assistance  have 
applied  to  training.  While  these 
legislative  provisions  have  laudable 
goals,  we  believe  their  application  to 
training  can  be  self-defeating.  The 
targets  of  the  legislation  are  usually 
specific  governments,  but  the  "victims" 
are  often  individuals  who  may  influence 
the  future,  often  with  a  different 
government.  The  result  is  a  kind  of 
foreign  policy  catch-22:  develop  a  course 
designed  to  inform  future  leaders  about 
democracy;  then  prohibit  attendance 
from  the  very  countries  we  would  like  to 
see  move  in  that  direction. 

There  is  no  more  worthwhile  and 
long-lasting  investment  we  can  make 
than  in  people.  And  training— which 
develops  professional  skills  while  deep- 
ening understanding  of  our  democratic 
and  humane  ideals — has  proven  to  be  an 
unusually  effective  channel  for  such  in- 
vestment. We  believe  that  opening  chan- 
nels of  influence  and  communications, 
rather  than  reinforcing  existing  isola- 
tion, would  serve  our  national  interests 
throughout  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean. 

The  Administration  is,  therefore, 
proposing  legislation  to  permit  training 
from  funds  made  available  in  this  act  to 
be  treated  the  same  as  the  Peace  Corps, 
U.S.  Information  Agency,  disaster  relief, 
and  narcotics  programs— that  is,  as 
being  exempt  from  general  prohibitions 
on  assistance.  Of  course.  Congress  could 
otherwise  specify  at  any  time  in  any  par- 
ticular case.  The  human  rights  provi- 
sions of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act,  as 
well  as  the  general  prohibition  against 
police  training,  would  continue  to  apply. 

Safety  Equipment.  Another  section 
of  the  proposed  legislation  would  permit 
the  sale  or  licensing  for  export  of  items 
which  are  necessary  for  the  safe  opera- 
tion of  previously  supplied  U.S.  defense 
equipment.  Because  of  certain  country- 
specific  provisions  in  U.S.  law,  some 
countries  have  not  been  able  to  obtain 
items  necessary  for  the  safe  operation  of 
previously  supplied  U.S.  defense  articles. 
We  believe  the  United  States  should  not 
be  in  the  position  of  denying  equipment 
needed  to  avoid  jeopardizing  the  lives  of 
pilots  or  other  foreign  military  person- 
nel. 

El  Salvador  Land  Reform.  We  are 

again  requesting  authorization  to  use 
U.S.  assistance  funds  to  accelerate  com- 
pensation to  former  landowners  in  El 
Salvador  affected  by  the  agrarian 
reform.  The  land  reform  has  proven  ef- 
fective in  rallying  peasant  support  and 
limiting  guerrilla  opportunities.  Valua- 
tion of  affected  properties,  many  of 
which  were  middle  sized,  appears  to 


have  been  fair  in  nijost  instances.  But 
compensation  has  often  been  delayed. 
We  must  help  this  key  reform  move  for- 
ward. Uncertainty,  evictions,  and  other 
enemies  of  effective  planning;  entre- 
preneurship;  and  production  are  all  ag- 
gravated by  the  absence  of  compensa- 
tion. 

El  Salvador  Conditionality.  Finally, 
our  proposed  legislation  this  year  does 
not  provide  for  a  continuation  of  de- 
tailed reporting  requirements  with 
regard  to  El  Salvador.  Singling  out  par- 
ticular countries  for  specific  monitoring 
has  limited  usefulness  and  can  be  quickly 
overtaken  by  psychological  and  other 
factors.  This  is  especially  true  when  a 
government  like  that  of  President 
Duarte  is  committed  to  the  same  objec- 
tives as  we  are,  and  the  conditions  serve 
mainly  to  denigrate  his  efforts.  We 
demonstrated  this  past  year,  I  believe, 
that  the  route  of  two-way  cooperation 
between  the  U.S.  and  Salvadoran 
Governments  is  effective  in  achieving 
our  mutual  human  rights  and  other 
priority  goals. 

Conclusion 

I  believe  that  our  understanding  of  the 
problems  and  the  proposals  for  their 
remedy  are  realistic.  We  have  not 
claimed  credit  for  all  the  progress  in  the 
past,  and  I  am  not  predicting  that  we 
will  mn  a  3-minute  mile  if  you  provide 
everything  we  have  requested.  But,  as  I 
suggested  to  you  and  your  colleagues 
when  you  launched  your  review  of  policy 
5  weeks  ago,  the  alternatives — a  harder 
line,  a  softer  line,  any  attempted  quick 
fix  or  plain  inaction— on  analysis  simply 
do  not  coalesce  into  policies  which  serve 
our  national  interests. 

The  democratic  transition  in  the 
hemisphere  over  the  past  half  dozen 
years  has  shown  that  the  people  of  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  have  an 
enhanced  ability  to  use  the  kinds  of 
economic,  military,  social,  and  political 
support  I  have  outlined  for  FY  1986.  At 
the  same  time,  their  own  goals  and  ob- 
jectives— whether  outlined  in  the  Con- 
tadora  objectives  or  the  latest  national 
economic  restructuring  program — coin- 
cide more  and  more  with  our  own.  It  is 
in  our  own  national  interest  to  provide 
that  support  to  them. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  avaifeble  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


/1985 


85 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


FY  1986  Foreign  Assistance  Requests 
for  Selected  Countries 


S  millions 


EconoiT 


V/////////A  MH.ar, 


Central  America 


El  Salvador 


U.S.  assistance  was  part  of  an  overall 
effort  that  enabled  the  Salvadoran 
ecomony  to  grow  by  1.5%  in  1984 — the 
first  year  of  growth  since  1979.  Living 
standards  remain  painfully  low,  but  the 
economic  decline  appears  to  be  bottom- 
ing out,  helped  along  by  the  cautious  op- 
timism engendered  by  political  and 
military  events.  The  government  has 
taken  policy  measures  to  increase  incen- 
tives to  exporters  of  nontraditional  prod- 
ucts, has  made  progress  in  allowing  ex- 
change rates  to  respond  to  market 
forces,  and  has  improved  its  overall 
foreign  exchange  management. 

Political  life  was  highlighted  over 
the  past  year  by  the  election  and  in- 
auguration of  President  Duarte — with 
congressional  and  municipal  elections 
scheduled  for  this  month.  Improvements 
in  the  judiciary  helped  complete  judicial 
action  against  the  murderers  of  four 
American  churchwomen.  Last  fall.  Presi- 
dent Duarte  took  the  initiative  to  open 
direct  dialogue  with  the  FMLN/FDR 
[Farabundo  Marti  National  Liberation 
Front/Revolutionary  Democratic  Front]. 
This  was  an  important  new  step  in  the 
process  of  national  reconciliation  in  El 
Salvador.  Guerrilla  intransigence  at  the 
second  meeting  dramatized  the  problems 
that  lie  ahead  but  could  not  obscure  the 
Duarte  Government's  historic  accom- 
plishment and  commitment  to  constitu- 
tionalism and  peace. 

The  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  have 
played  a  major  role  in  these  events, 
moving  a  considerable  distance  in  the 
past  few  years  in  terms  of  profes- 
sionalism, effectiveness  in  combat,  and 
observance  of  human  rights.  The  guer- 
rilla offensive  planned  for  last  fall  never 
took  place  in  large  part  because  the 
FMLN  was  thrown  off  balance  by  the 
constant  operations  of  the  Salvadoran 
Armed  Forces.  The  increased  mobility 
provided  by  U.S. -supplied  helicopters, 
and  the  controlled  fire  support  of  the 
C-47  aircraft  have  permitted  rapid  reac- 
tion to  surprise  attacks,  interfering  with 


the  guerrillas'  ability  to  mass,  strike, 
and  withdraw  before  reinforcements  ar- 
rive. The  improving  capabilities  of 
government  troops  have  forced  the 
guerrillas  to  break  up  into  smaller  units 
and  to  rely  increasingly  on  economic 
sabotage  and  subversion. 

It  remains  vital  for  the  constitu- 
tional government  of  President  Duarte 
to  have  the  economic  and  military  assist- 
ance it  needs  to  defend  democracy  and 
to  approach  its  dialogue  with  the  in- 
surgents with  confidence.  On  the  eco- 
nomic side,  we  are  requesting  $210 
million  in  ESF  and  $90  million  in  devel- 
opment assistance  to  bolster  economic 
stabilization,  support  the  land  reform, 
and  provide  humanitarian  assistance. 
We  are  also  proposing  $51  million  under 
the  PL  480  program. 

On  the  military  side,  the  proposed 
MAP  program  of  $131  million  will  be 
used  for  unit  and  individual  equipment 
and  training,  ammunition,  replacement 
parts,  aircraft,  and  naval  patrol  craft. 
The  $1.6  million  IMET  program  will  be 
used  to  teach  essential  technical  and 
managerial  skills,  including  officer 
development,  pilot  and  other  training, 
and  the  technical  skills  necessary  to 
operate  and  maintain  U.S.  equipment. 
All  training,  as  in  the  past,  will  em- 
phasize professionalism  and  human 
rights. 


^ 


$88 


Bordering  on  both  Nicaragua  and  El 
Salvador,  Honduras  has  a  key  role  in 
resisting  aggression  and  subversion  in 
Central  America.  On  the  economic  side, 
we  are  requesting  $80  million  in  ESF, 
$45  million  in  development  assistance, 
and  $18  million  in  PL  480  assistance  to 
help  Honduras  through  this  difficult 
period.  Development  strategy  focuses  on 
increasing  private  sector  participation  in 
the  economy,  developing  economic  in- 
frastructure, and  institution  building. 

Honduras  took  steps  over  the  past 
year  to  better  manage  its  finances  and  is 
contemplating  additional  measures  to 
improve  export  competitiveness  and  to 
address  remaining  structural  problems. 
The  substantial  assistance  necessary 
through  the  late  1980s  will  be  a  key  ele- 


ment in  the  consolidation  of  institution4ai 
democratic  rule.  Presidential  and  con- 
gressional elections  are  scheduled  for 
November  1985,  which  can  be  expecteo 
to  lead  to  the  second  successive  free 
election  and  the  first  democratic  succes 
sion  in  over  50  years. 

Nicaragua's  military  buildup  and  at 
tempts  with  Cuba  to  subvert  Honduras 
have  imposed  on  this  poor  but  demo- 
cratic nation  the  necessity  of  modern- 
izing its  armed  forces,  which  are  less 
than  one-fifth  the  size  of  Nicaragua's  e) 
panded  military  apparatus.  The  MAP 
program  at  the  proposed  $87  million 
level  will  allow  an  initial  step  to  mod- 
ernize the  Honduran  forces  through  ac- 
quisition of  vehicles,  radios,  transport 
helicopters,  light  fixed-wing  aircraft, 
naval  patrol  vessels,  and  artillery.  The 
IMET  program,  for  which  we  are  re- 
questing $1  million,  will  focus  on  the 
professional  and  technical  training 
needed  to  manage  and  utilize  effectively 
the  U.S.  equipment  entering  the  Hon- 
duran inventory. 

Because  of  our  close  cooperation  on 
regional  issues  and  Honduras'  increased 
exposure  to  Sandinista  pressures,  we 
are  together  revising  our  relationship, 
including  both  the  need  for  adequate 
security  understandings  and  the  press- 
ing need  for  economic  assistance  to  helfl 
the  very  serious  problems  Honduras 
faces.  We  responded  last  fall  to  Hon- 
duran concerns  by  establishing  a 
bilateral  commission,  which  I  head  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States,  to  enhance 
economic  and  security  cooperation.  Dur 
ing  several  ensuing  rounds  of  talks  we 
have  explored  ways  in  which  we  can 
cooperate  and  in  which  the  United 
States  can  assist  Honduras  within  the 
limits  of  available  resources. 

Costa  Rica 


Costa  Rica,  Central  America's  strong 
traditional  democracy,  continues  to  face 
serious  economic  problems  and,  like 
Honduras,  is  alarmed  at  the  actions  of 
the  Sandinistas  and  the  implications  for 
its  internal  security  and  well-being  of  an 


r\i-i  r\  f^  rt  f 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Economic 


insionist  Marxist-Leninist  state  on 
(Order.  Opinion  in  Costa  Rica  has 
led  sharply  against  the  Sandinistas. 
Costa  Rican  democratic  system  has 
^ed  strong  enough  to  withstand  the 
lomic  shocks  of  the  past  few  years 
remains  the  regional  model.  With 
from  the  United  States  and  the  in- 
ational  financial  system,  Costa  Rica 
undertaken  a  comprehensive  stabil- 
ion  program  which  has  recorded  im- 
sive  economic  gains.  The  fiscal 
cit  was  reduced  from  14%  to  2.4%  of 
:»  from  1981  to  1984,  and  inflation 
from  82%  to  17%  over  the  same 
od. 

Our  economic  aid  request  for  1986 
lis  $187  million.  The  ESF  component 
150  million  will  provide  critically 
ied  foreign  exchange  reserves.  In 
1984-85  we  gave  $9  million  in  MAP 

I  year  to  Costa  Rica  for  the  purchase 
quipment  designed  to  enhance  the 
;iency  and  mobility  of  the  public 
irity  forces.  In  FY  1986  the  reduced 

II  of  $2.5  million  will  primarily  pro- 
replacement  parts  and  training  in 

Dort  of  the  previously  supplied  equip- 
iit. 


iiitemala 


, -I-  encouraged  by  developments  in 
iiiiiala.  The  government  has  an- 
mrd  that  national  elections  will  be 
!  on  October  27,  and  that  the  elected 
-lature  will  take  office  in  mid- 
ember  and  the  new  president  on 
uary  14,  1986.  The  constituent 
■mbly  elections  held  in  July  1984 
e  free  and  fair,  and  it  is  generally  ac- 
f(l  in  all  sectors  in  Guatemala  that 
elections  this  year  will  follow  an 
n  more  competitive  pattern.  These 
tions  represent  a  development  of 
iamental  importance  to  all 
itemalans,  and  represent  clearly  the 
itive  trends  in  Central  America 
ch  effectively  serve  U.S.  interest, 
blems  still  exist  in  the  observance  of 
lan  rights,  but  Lord  Colville  of 
ross  reported  for  the  UN  Human 
hts  Commission  that  significant  im- 
vements  have  taken  place,  citing 
?ttlement  of  internally  displaced  per- 
s,  pardons,  and  release  of  individuals 


convicted  by  special  tribunals,  and  lower 
levels  of  politically  related  deaths.  In 
economic  policy  the  government  also  is 
addressing  its  problems.  Guatemala  has 
improved  its  exchange  rate  policy  and  is 
reducing  its  fiscal  deficit. 

We  are  proposing  balanced  economic 
and  security  assistance  for  Guatemala  to 
reinforce  the  very  encouraging  demo- 
cratic trends,  address  basic  social  and 
economic  inequalities  that  feed  the  in- 
surgency, and  provide  limited  materiel 
and  training  support  to  the  newly 
elected  government  in  combating  the 
Marxist-led  guerrillas.  Provision  of  $25 
million  in  ESF  recognizes  that  the 
foreign  exchange  crisis  can  be  an  im- 
mediate source  of  political  instability. 
The  $33  million  in  development  assist- 
ance would  focus  on  small  farmer 
agricultural  development  and  basic 
health,  education,  and  family  planning. 

In  addition  to  continuing  IMET  at 
the  same  level  as  FY  1985,  we  propose 
$10  million  in  FMS  on  concessional 
terms.  The  Guatemalan  Armed  Forces 
are  combating  an  active  insurgency,  and 
this  sum  would  enhance  mobility  by  per- 
mitting the  purchase  of  spare  parts  for 
motor  vehicles  and  helicopters  along 
with  new  craft  and  would  improve  the 
capability  of  the  Armed  Forces  to  assist 
in  civic  action  programs  by  making 
possible  the  acquisition  of  engineering 
and  medical  equipment.  Aside  from  its 
value  in  enhancing  the  professional  and 
technical  skills  of  the  Guatemalan 
Armed  Forces,  the  proposed  IMET 
training  will  have  the  benefit  of  expos- 
ing the  military  to  American  political  in- 
stitutions and  ideals. 


Belize 


$1 


Belize's  democracy  showed  again  its  firm 
roots  in  elections  held  last  year, 
although  it,  too,  remains  vulnerable  to 
the  conflictive,  destabilizing  forces  pres- 
ent elsewhere  in  Central  America.  Nar- 
cotics trafficking  threatens  internal 
stability,  while  the  falling  world  price 
and  shrinking  world  market  for  sugar 


have  made  more  urgent  the  need  for 
economic  revitalization  in  other  areas. 

Our  P]SF^  request  of  $4  million  will 
help  Belize  manage  its  balance-of- 
payments  deficit  and  is  conditioned  on 
review  of  and  improvements  in  the 
management  of  its  electric  and 
marketing  boards.  This  complements  an 
IMF  standby  agreement  signed  in  1984. 
Our  development  assistance  proposal  of 
$6.8  million  concentrates  on  developing 
badly  needed  infrastructure  and  on  im- 
proving education,  agriculture,  and 
health. 

Our  small  IMET  and  MAP  pro- 
grams, totaling  $1  million,  will  assist  the 
Belize  Defense  Force  to  protect  its 
borders  and  interdict  illegal  arms  and 
narcotics. 


Panama 


U.S.  assistance  to  Panama  is  aimed  at 
promoting  economic  and  political  stabili- 
ty, which  are  essential  to  the  protection 
of  highly  important  U.S.  treaty  rights, 
responsibilities  and  interests  in  that 
country.  We  have  requested  $40  million 
in  ESF  to  help  Panama  undertake  a 
major  shift  from  public  to  private  sector- 
led  growth.  The  request  for  $22  million 
for  development  assistance  is  aimed  at 
developing  self-sustaining  growth  in 
agriculture  and  encouraging  private  sec- 
tor investment  to  promote  employment 
and  export-led  growth. 

The  United  States  retains  important 
security  and  economic  interests  in 
Panama,  including  operating  and 
safeguarding  the  Panama  Canal  and  the 
trans-isthmian  pipeline,  base  rights,  and 
the  third-largest  concentration  of  U.S. 
investment  in  Latin  America.  Our  pro- 
posed MAP  program  of  $14.4  million 
will  help  to  lessen  the  burden  on  U.S. 
forces  and  develop  Panama's  capacity 
for  an  increased  role  in  defense  of  the 
canal  by  supporting  the  Panama  Defense 
Force's  long-term  force  development 
plan  to  create  several  light  infantry  bat- 
talions, enhance  military  engineering 
and  civic  action  capabilities,  and  increase 
naval  and  air  transportation  and 
surveillance. 


Jiv1985 


87 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Econoi 


Andean 


Colombia 


Peru  is  currently  suffering  from  an  un- 
precedented economic  and  financial 
crisis  that  is  making  it  one  of  Latin 
America's  poorest  countries.  Real  per 
capita  income  is  lower  today  than  it  was 
20  years  ago.  Our  $45  million  ESF  re- 
quest would  provide  critically  needed 
balance-of-payments  support  and 
generate  local  currency  to  support  in- 
frastructure development  to  promote 
alternative  occupations  in  coca-growing 
areas,  civic  action  in  terrorist-afflicted 
regions,  and  increased  access  to  credit 
to  help  struggling  enterprises.  The  $25 
million  in  development  assistance  would 
support  economic  recovery  and  disaster 
reconstruction,  market-oriented  growth, 
agricultural  development,  and  antinar- 
cotics  activities.  We  also  request  a  $29 
million  PL  480  program. 

The  largest  proposed  military 
assistance  program  in  the  Andes  is  for 
Peru,  where  we  are  proposing  $18 
million  in  MAP  and  $10  million  in  con- 
cessional FMS  financing  and  $850,000  in 
IMET.  Under  the  previous  military 
regime,  Peru  developed  an  unhealthy 
reliance  on  the  Soviet  Union  for  tanks 
and  aircraft  intended  to  address  exter- 
nal security  problems.  The  security 
threats  now  facing  Peru  are  the  Sendero 
Luminom  terrorists  and  narcotics  traf- 
fickers. The  equipment  needed  to  deal 
with  these  threats,  primarily  transport 
and  communications,  is  precisely  the 
type  of  equipment  the  United  States  is 
well  placed  to  provide.  By  modestly  in- 
creasing our  military  assistance  now,  we 
are  providing  vital  aid  to  maintain 
democracy  in  Peru  while  encouraging 
the  government's  oft-stated  desire  to 
diversify  its  sources  to  reduce 
dependence  on  the  Soviets. 


$21 


Like  Peru,  Colombia  faces  both  nar- 
cotics and  insurgent  threats.  Although 
cease-fire  agreements  were  reached  last 
year  with  three  of  the  four  major  in- 
surgent groups,  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment is  maintaining  its  military 
readiness  to  be  able  to  respond  in  the 
event  of  increased  violence  while  also 
mounting  a  major  drive  against  nar- 
cotics processing  and  commerce. 
Therefore,  although  we  are  not  seeking 
economic  assistance  for  Colombia  in  FY 
1986,  we  are  proposing  $20  million  in 
FMS  financing,  half  at  Treasury  rates 
and  half  at  concessional  rates.  These 
credits  would  be  used  for  helicopters, 
replacement  parts  for  vehicles  and  air- 
craft previously  acquired,  infantry 
weapons,  vehicles,  and  construction 
equipment.  We  also  request  $950,000  for 
IMET. 

Bolivia 


$6 


Bolivia  continues  to  be  South  America's 
poorest  and  most  fragile  democracy. 
Since  the  return  to  civilian  government 
in  October  1982,  the  country's  economy 
has  deteriorated  badly,  suffering 
hyperinflation  and  falling  real  output. 
The  proposed  total  of  $46  million  in 
ESF,  development  assistance,  and  PL 
480  is  needed  to  encourage  and  support 
Bolivian  efforts  to  halt  the  alarming 
economic  decline.  Elements  of  these  pro- 
grams also  will  contribute  to  the  fight 
against  illegal  narcotics  production  and 
trafficking.  The  small  $6  million  MAP 
program  would  be  aimed  largely  at  put- 
ting back  into  service  equipment  we  sup- 
plied in  previous  years,  such  as  heli- 
copters and  trucks,  but  may  permit 


some  purchases  of  new  trucks  and 
patrol  boats.  The  $300,000  IMET  pro 
gram  would  support  necessary  technic 
training. 

Ecuador 


On  August  10,  1984,  Ecuador  had  its 
first  transition  between  elected  govern 
ments  in  24  years.  The  United  States 
should  demonstrate  continued  support 
for  Ecuadoran  democracy  during  this 
period  of  economic  difficulty.  The  $15 
million  in  ESF  is  designed  to  help  over 
come  a  serious  payments  imbalance  an 
give  Ecuador  some  of  the  breathing 
room  needed  to  implement  its  free 
market-oriented  economic  program.  W' 
also  request  $26  million  in  development 
assistance  and  PL  480. 

The  proposed  $5  million  in  conces- 
sional FMS  financing  for  Ecuador  is  ex 
pected  to  be  used  for  the  purchase  of 
communications  and  medical  equipment 
The  planned  IMET  program  of  $800.00 
includes  courses  aimed  at  improving  th' 
capabilities  of  the  Ecuadoran  military, 
maintenance  and  management,  with 
greater  emphasis  on  civic  action. 


Caribbean 


Eastern  Caribbean 


We  request  $35  million  in  ESF  and  $31 
million  in  development  assistance  for  th( 
seven  independent  island  nations  of  the 
eastern  Caribbean:  Antigua  and  Bar- 
buda, Barbados,  Dominica,  Grenada,  St. 
Lucia,  St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines, 
and  St.  Christopher-Nevis.  The  ESF  will 
help  meet  a  severe  balance-of-payment 


88 


r\^^  r-i  o  i-t  n-ii-i  r»  t   ^^■f   C*otj-i    Diilli-itii 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Economic 


Military 


idget  crisis  and  allows  the  import 
aurces  necessary  for  sustained 
■nic  growth.  The  $31  million  in 
pment  assistance  helps  govern- 
deal  with  conditions  that  severely 
social  and  political  structures: 
jloyment,  low  agricultural  produc- 
dwindling  incentives  and 
ces  to  stimulate  private  invest- 
and  minimal  infrastructure, 
'e  also  are  proposing  $10  million  in 
Recent  history  has  demonstrated 
hese  countries  must  pay  some  at- 
n  to  their  security,  but  economic 
,ions  permit  only  a  minimum  in- 
ent.  Only  Barbados  and  Antigua 
arbuda  have  small  national  defense 
in  addition  to  the  police.  The 
islands  have  organized,  as  an  in- 
part  of  their  small  police  forces, 
-member  Special  Service  Units 
are  responsible  for  external 
3e.  Nobody  is  advocating  the 
rization  of  the  area.  The  proposed 
along  with  an  IMET  program  of 
100,  will  support  a  program  em- 
;ing  training  of  local  forces  and 
ase  of  coast  guard  craft,  com- 
ations  equipment,  vehicles,  and 
parts.  We  are  also  cooperating 
he  small  headquarters  staff  of  the 
nal  Security  System  that  the  na- 
if the  eastern  Caribbean  have 
ished  to  deal  with  larger  threats 
individual  security  forces  may  not 
le  to  handle.  Grenada  has  an- 
led  that  it  will  join  this  organiza- 

ne  situation  in  the  eastern  Carib- 
s  remarkable  for  the  request  that 
here.  We  are  making  no  new  re- 
for  peacekeeping  funds.  The 
tly  elected  Government  of  Grenada 
le  Government  of  the  United 
5  have  announced  the  withdrawal 
Grenada  during  the  course  of  the 
several  months  of  the  small  remain- 
merican  military  contingent,  which 
pen  supporting  the  multinational 
■bean  peace  force.  The  Caribbean 
will  also  depart  Grenada  in  a 
•d  withdrawal,  to  be  completed  in 
•mber  when  the  Grenadian  police 
will  have  reached  full  strength  and 
ave  been  fully  trained.  We  are  thus 
ing  to  a  successful  conclusion  the 
;  begun  in  October  1983  to  help  the 
idians  restore  peace  and  democracy 
it  nation. 


Jamaica 


Jamaica  continues  to  pursue  a  wrench- 
ing policy  of  belt  tightening  and 
economic  readjustment  to  reverse 
deterioration  that  occurred  during  the 
1970s.  The  $70  million  in  ESF  would 
play  an  important  role  in  helping  the 
Jamaican  Government  toward  economic 
stabilization;  $24  million  in  development 
assistance  and  $30  million  in  PL  480 
also  would  contribute  to  lessening  the 
potenial  for  social  unrest  and  political  in- 
stability. 

We  propose  an  increase  to  $8  million 
in  MAP  for  FY  1986  in  recognition  of 
the  important  role  played  by  Jamaica  in 
securing  democratic  interests  in  the  area 
and  in  combating  narcotics  production 
and  trafficking.  Jamaica  is  providing  the 
largest  contingent  to  the  peacekeeping 
force  in  Grenada.  MAP  funds  will  be 
used  for  the  purchase  of  a  new  patrol 
boat,  and  for  spare  parts  and  main- 
tenance of  aircraft  and  other  transport 
equipment. 


Dominican  Republic 


The  maintenance  of  democracy  and  the 
preservation  of  a  stable  political  and 
economic  environment  are  key  to  the 
protection  of  U.S.  interests  in  the 
Dominican  Republic.  The  country  con- 
fronts a  sharp  decline  in  traditional  pro- 
ductive sectors,  high  unemployment,  a 
massive  trade  deficit,  and  a  serious 
shortage  of  foreign  exchange.  The 
Dominican  Republic  is  in  the  midst  of  a 
comprehensive  economic  adjustment 
program  consisting  of  strict  austerity 
measures  including  currency  devaluation 
and  tight  limits  on  imports  and  govern- 
ment spending.  The  proposed  $50 
million  in  ESF  will  help  alleviate  the 
Dominican  Republic's  severe  foreign  ex- 
change shortage,  while  the  proposed  $30 


million  in  development  assistance  will 
emphasize  private  sector  development 
and  expansion,  export  and  investment 
promotion,  infrastructure  upgrading, 
and  training.  We  are  also  requesting  $32 
million  in  PL  480  funds. 

A  proposed  mix  of  $6  million  in 
MAP  and  $4  million  in  FMS  financing 
on  concessional  terms  for  F^Y  1986 
would  be  used  to  purchase  two  to  four 
A-37  aircraft  with  ground  support 
equipment  and  spare  parts,  trucks, 
helicopters,  a  patrol  boat,  communica- 
tions equipment,  M-16  rifles  and  am- 
munition. 

Haiti 


Haiti  is  the  poorest  country  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  with  an  annual 
GDP  per  capita  of  only  $300.  Our 
economic  assistance  program  is  designed 
to  address  the  most  fundamental  prob- 
lems of  the  Haitian  rural  poor  and 
revitalize  the  private  sector.  In  propos- 
ing modest  increases  in  our  ESF, 
development  assistance,  and  PL  480  pro- 
grams in  FY  1986  to  $56  million,  we 
have  taken  into  account  Haitian  efforts 
in  the  area  of  fiscal  reform,  human 
rights,  and  cooperation  with  the  United 
States  in  migrant  and  narcotics  interdic- 
tion programs. 

We  are  also  proposing  $500,000  in 
MAP  for  Haiti.  This  sum  would  finance 
limited  amounts  of  nonlethal  equipment 
and  repair  services  for  the  Haitian 
Navy,  thus  enabling  Haiti  to  play  a 
larger  role  in  narcotics  and  migrant  in- 
terdiction programs  of  direct  interest  to 
the  United  States.  On  January  28,  1985, 
in  accordance  with  Section  540  of  the 
Foreign  Assistance  and  Related  Pro- 
grams Act  of  1985,  the  Secretary  of 
State  submitted  to  the  Congress  a  deter- 
mination that  the  Haitian  Government  is 
cooperating  with  the  United  States  in 
emigration  and  economic  assistance  mat- 
ters and  is  making  gradual  progress 
toward  improving  human  rights  and 
toward  implementing  political  reforms 
essential  for  the  development  of 
democracy  in  that  country.  ■ 


89 


END  NOTES 


TREATIES 


March  1985 


The  following  are  some  of  the  signifi- 
cant official  U.  S.  foreign  policy  actions 
and  statements  during  the  month  that  are 
not  reported  elsewhere  in  this  periodical. 

March  2 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Nicaraguan 
President  Ortega  while  in  Montevideo  for  the 
inauguration  of  Uruguayan  President 
Sanguinetti. 

March  3-6 

A  U.S  delegation  travels  to  Hanoi 
(Mar.  3-5)  to  discuss  POW/MIA  issues  and 
exchange  views  on  re-education  camp  inmates 
with  Vietnam  officials.  The  delegation,  head- 
ed by  National  Security  Council  staff  member 
Richard  Childress,  visits  a  B-52  crash  site 
near  Hanoi  recently  located  but  not  yet  ex- 
cavated. 

On  Mar.  5-6,  the  delegation  travels  to 
Vientiane  to  express  U.S.  appreciation  to  the 
Lao  Government  for  its  excellent  cooperation 
in  the  February  joint  excavation  of  a  crash 
site  near  Pakse. 

March  3-11 

Vladimir  V.  Shcherbitskiy,  a  member  of  the 
Politburo  and  First  Secretary  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  of  the 
Ukraine,  heads  a  Soviet  delegation's  visit  to 
the  U.S.  reciprocating  a  congressional  delega- 
tion visit  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  1983  led  by 
Congressman  Foley. 

Mr.  Shcherbitskiy  meets  with  President 
Reagan  and  Secretary  Shultz  (Mar.  7)  follow- 
ing meetings  with  Members  of  Congress. 

March  5 

The  following  newly  appointed  ambassadors 
present  their  credentials  to  President 
Reagan:  Nizar  Hamdoon  (Iraq),  Joaquim 
Rafael  Branco  (Sao  Tome  and  Principe), 
Wallace  Rowling  (New  Zealand),  Eduardo 
Palomo  Escobar  (Guatemala),  and  Edmund 
Richard  Mashoko  Garwe  (Zimbabwe). 
DEA  agents  arrest  Chief  Minister 
Saunders  of  the  Turks  and  Caieos  Islands  for 
plotting  to  use  the  island  chain  as  a  base  to 
smuggle  narcotics  into  the  U.S.  The  arrest 
was  made  after  he  accepted  cash  payments 
from  undercover  agents  to  protect  a  cocaine 
and  marijuana  transshipment  base  to  agents 
proposed  to  establish  on  the  islands. 

March  6 

Under  Secretary  Wallis  meets  with  Israeli 
Finance  Minister  Modai  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment. 


Mexican  police  find  the  bodies  of  DEA 
agent  Camarena  and  a  Mexican  pilot  working 
with  anti-drug  authorities.  The  two  men  were 
kidnapped  on  Feb.  7. 

March  11 

Shultz  meet  with  Mexican  Foreign  Minister 
Sepulveda  at  the  State  Department. 

AID  provides  emergency  assistance  to 
victims  of  the  earthquake  that  struck  Chile 
on  Mar.  3. 

March  12-13 

U.S.  and  Egj'pt  sign  four  grant  agreements 
that  will  provide  more  than  half  a  billion 
dollars  in  economic  aid  to  Egypt. 

March  12 

U.S.  and  Soviet  negotiators  meet  in  Geneva 
for  the  first  session  of  talks  on  nuclear  and 
space  arms.  Ambassador  Kampelman  heads 
the  U.S.  delegation. 

U.S.  vetoes  a  Security  Council  resolution 
condemning  Israeli  actions  in  southern 
Lebanon.  The  vote  was  1 1  to  1  with  3  absten- 
tions. 

March  13 

Vice  President  Bush  heads  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion to  the  funeral  of  Soviet  leader  Konstan- 
tin  Chernenko  who  died  Mar.  10.  Secretary 
Shultz  and  Ambassador  Hartman  also  attend. 

U.S.  agrees  to  clean  up  the  radiation  on 
Bikini  Atoll,  a  Micronesian  island,  caused  by 
U.S.  nuclear  tests  conducted  between  1946 
and  1958. 

March  14 

On  his  return  from  the  funeral  of  Soviet 
leader  Chernenko,  Secretary  Shultz  stops  in 
Reykjavik  to  meet  with  Foreign  Minister 
Hallgrimsson. 

Some  U.S.  personnel  are  temporarily 
moved  out  of  Lebanon  because  of  the  general 
security  situation  there. 

March  16 

Terry  A.  Anderson,  chief  Middle  East  cor- 
respondent of  The  Associated  Press,  is  kid- 
napped by  armed  men  in  west  Beirut. 

March  20 

Vietnam  returns  to  the  U.S.  the  remains  of 
five  people  believed  to  be  Americans  listed  as 
missing  in  action. 

March  22 

The  White  House  and  the  Departments  of 
State  and  Defense  release  a  publication  en- 
titled "The  Soviet-Cuban  Connection  in  Cen- 
tral America  and  the  Caribbean." 

March  24 

A  U.S.  Army  officer,  Major  Arthur  D. 
Nicholson,  Jr.,  assigned  to  the  U.S.  Military 
Liaison  Mission  in  Potsdam,  East  Germany, 
was  shot  and  killed  by  a  Soviet  soldier  while 
on  a  reconnaissance  mission. 


March  25 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Iraqi  Foreig. 
Minister  Aziz. 

March  28 

In  the  second  of  two  required  votes,  the 
House  of  Representatives  approves  releai 
$1.5  billion  in  FY  1985  funds  for  the  pur 
chase  of  21  additional  MX  missiles.  The  v 
is  217  to  210. 

March  30 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Soviet  Am 
bassador  Dobrynin  to  discuss  U.S.- 
Soviet relations  and  the  shooting  of  Majoi 
Nicholson.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawfi 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  D 
at  Montreal,  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Afghanistan,  Sept.  2 
1984.1 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  deve 
ment,  production,  and  stockpiling  of  bacte 
riological  (biological)  and  toxin  weapons  ai 
on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washington 
London,  and  Moscow.  Apr.  10,  1972.  Enti 
into  force  Mar.  26,  1975. 
Accession  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Mar.  12 

1985. 

Conservation 

Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
1973,  on  international  trade  in  endangere 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  824 
Adopted  at  Bonn,  June  22,  1979.^ 
Acceptances  deposited:  Panama,  Oct.  28. 
1983;  Trinidad  &  Tobago,  May  17,  1984; 
Uruguay,  Dec.  21.  1984. 

Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
1973.  on  international  trade  in  endangere( 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  824! 
Adopted  at  Gaborone,  Apr.  30,  1983.^ 
Acceptances  deposited;  Austria,  Jan.  21, 
1985;  Monaco,  Aug.  24,  1983;  Netherlands 
Feb.  12,  1985;  Norway,  Feb.  15,  1984; 
Seychelles,  Sept.  15,  1983;  Togo,  Feb.  24, 
1984;  Trinidad  &  Tobago,  May  17,  1984; 
Uruguay,  Dec.  12,  1984. 


TREATIES 


llnatic  Relations 

(11  II invention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Kit  \'ienna  Apr.  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
tXlir,  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13, 
■  ri.\S  7502. 
■aiion  deposited:  Thailand,  Jan.  23, 

;ion  deposited:  Turkey,  Mar.  6,  1985. 

ies — Tuna  (Atlantic) 

;ol  to  amend  the  International  Conven- 

'  May  14,  1966,  for  the  Conservation  of 

,ic  Tunas  (TIAS  6767).  Done  at  Paris 

0,  1984.  Entered  into  force  upon 

t  with  the  Director-General  of  the  FAO 

uments  of  approval,  ratification,  or  ac- 

ice  by  all  contracting  parties. 

ure:  U.S.,  Sept.  10,  1984. 

tances  deposited:  Korea,  Rep.  of, 

;0,  1984;  Sao  Tome  &  Principe,  Oct.  17, 


ational  agreement  on  jute  and  jute 

3ts,  1982,  with  annexes.  Done  at 

la  Oct.  1,  1982.  Entered  into  force  pro- 

illy  Jan.  9,  1984. 

sion  deposited:  Spain,  Feb.  26,  1985. 

Pollution 

lational  convention  on  civil  liability  for 
lution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 
19,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 

■sion  deposited:  Oman,  Jan.  24,  1985. 

national  convention  relating  to  interven- 
1  the  high  seas  in  case  of  oil  pollution 

Sties,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels  Nov. 

"  69.  Entered  into  force  May  6,  1975. 

^  a'.iiin  deposited:  Cameroon,  May  14, 

•I  ill  Ills  deposited:  Oman,  Jan.  24,  1985; 
1 1  .\rab  Emirates,  Dec.  15,  1983. 

i<  'ol  relating  to  intervention  on  the  high 

6  1  cases  of  pollution  by  substances  other 

r  il.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973. 

ti  id  into  force  Mar.  30,  1983.  TIAS 

4. 

)i  ;ion  deposited:  Oman,  Jan.  24,  1985. 

C  ime  Matters 

E  ational  convention  for  the  unification  of 
1 1  rules  relating  to  bills  of  lading  and 
t  ol  of  signature.  Done  at  Brussels 
»;5,  1924.  Entered  into  force  June  2, 
r  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1937.  51  Stat. 
;:'S  931. 
1  iciatioji:  Italy,  Nov.  22,  1984;  effective 

v;2,  1985. 

intion  on  facilitation  of  international 
me  traffic,  with  annex.  Done  at  London 
i,  1965.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  5, 
for  the  U.S.  May  16,  1967.  TIAS  6251. 
'tance  deposited:  Algeria,  Nov.  28, 

sions  deposited:  Cuba,  Nov.  27,  1984; 


Convention  on  the  international  regulations 
for  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972,  with 
regulations,  as  amended.  Done  at  London 
Oct.  20,  1972.  Entered  into  force  July  15, 
1977.  TIAS  8587,  10672. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  May  14. 
1984;  Cuba,  Nov.  7,  1983;  Djibouti,  Mar.  1 , 
1984;  St.  Vincent  &  the  Grenadines,  Oct.  28, 
1983;  United  Arab  Emirates,  Dec.  15,  1983; 
Venezuela,  Aug.  3,  1983. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  to 

Netherlands  Antilles  by  Netherlands,  July  1, 
1984. 

Narcotics  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done 
at  Vienna  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  16,  1976;  for  the  U.S.  July  15,  1980. 
TIAS  9725. 
Accession  deposited:  Bolivia,  Mar.  20,  1985. 

Nuclear  Test  Ban 

Treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the 
atmosphere,  in  outer  space,  and  under  water. 
Done  at  Moscow  Aug.  5,  1963.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  10,  1963.  TIAS  5433. 
Accession  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Mar.  12, 
1985. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  July  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Accession  deposited:  Brunei,  Mar.  26,  1985. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June  19,  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24,  1978.  TIAS  8733.'' 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Dec.  28,  1984. 

Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  producers  of 
phonograms  against  unauthorized  duplication 
of  their  phonograms.  Done  at  Geneva 
Oct.  29,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Ap. .  18, 
1973;  for  the  U.S.  Mar.  10,  1974.  TIAS  7808. 
Notification  of  accession:  Czechoslovakia, 
Oct.  15,  1984. 

Postal 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 
Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1966.  TIAS  5881. 

Additional  protocol  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union.  Done  at  Tokyo 
Nov.  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 
1971,  except  for  Art.  V  which  entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1971.  TIAS  7150. 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  Universal  Postal  Union.  Done  at 
Lausanne  July  5.  1974.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1976.  TIAS  8231. 
Accessions  deposited:  Brunei,  Nov.  21,  1984; 

Panama,  Oct.  19,  1984. 


General  regulations  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the 
universal  postal  convention  with  final  pro- 
tocol and  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
.luly  1,  1981;  except  for  Art.  124  of  the 
general  regulations  which  became  effective 
Jan.  1,  1981.  TIAS  9972. 
Accession  deposited:  Brunei.  Nov.  21,  1984. 
Ratification  deposited:  Nicaragua,  June  15, 
1984. 

Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks 

agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  with 

final  protocol.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 

Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  1. 

1981.  TIAS  9973. 

Ratification  deposited:  Nicaragua,  June  15, 

1984. 

Prisoner  Transfer 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  per- 
sons. Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  France,  Feb.  11, 
1985;^^  Spain,  Mar.  11,  1985;^  U.S.,  Mar.  11, 
1985. 
Enters  into  force:  July  1,  1985. 

Property — Industrial — Classification 

Nice  agreement  concerning  the  international 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 
purpose  of  the  registration  of  marks  of 
June  15,  1957,  as  revised.  Done  at  Geneva 
May  13,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  6, 
1979;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  29,  1984. 
Notification  of  accession:  Barbados,  Dec.  12, 
1984. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellec- 
tual Property  Organization.  Done  at 
Stockholm  July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  26,  1970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1970. 
Accessions  deposited:  Angola,  Jan.  15, 
1985;  Bangladesh,  Feb.  11,  1985;  Nicaragua, 
Feb.  5,  1985. 

Satellite  Communications  Systems 

Convention  on  the  international  maritime 
satellite  organization  (INMARSAT),  with  an- 
nex. Done  at  London  Sept.  3.  1976.  Entered 
into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 

Operating  agreement  on  the  international 
maritime  satellite  organization  (INMARSAT), 
with  annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 
Accessions  deposited:  Pakistan,  Feb.  6,  1985. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  with  annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  July  5,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1985. 
Approval  deposited:  German  Dem.  Rep., 

Mar.  8,  1985. 

Ratification  deposited:  Guatemala,  Mar.  8, 

1985. 

Accession  deposited:  Canada,  Feb.  20,  1985. 


0,  May  31,  1983. 


1985 


91 


TREATIES 


Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 
tected persons,  including  diplomatic  agents. 
Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Accession  deposited:  Switzerland,  Mar.  5. 
1985. 

International  convention  against  the  taking  of 
hostages.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  17,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983;  for  the  U.S. 
Jan.  6,  1985. 
Ratification  deposited:  Switzerland,  Mar.  5, 

1985. 

UN  Industrial  Development  Organization 

Constitution  of  the  UN  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.^ 

Ratifications  deposited:  Poland,  Mar.  5,  1985; 
Sao  Tome  &  Principe,  Feb.  22,  1985. 


BILATERALS 

Bahamas 

Agreement  for  the  interdiction  of  narcotics 
trafficking.  Signed  at  Nassau  Mar.  6,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  6,  1985. 

Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  1,  1971  (TIAS  7221),  as  amended  and 
extended,  relating  to  a  program  of  scientific 
and  technological  cooperation.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Brasilia  Mar.  8,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  8,  1985;  effective 
Dec.  1,  1984. 

Canada 

Treaty  concerning  Pacific  salmon,  with  an- 
nexes and  memorandum  of  understanding. 
Signed  at  Ottawa  Jan.  28,  1985. 
Senate  advice  &  consent  to  ratification: 
Mar.  7,  1985. 

Ratification  signed  by  the  President:  Mar.  14, 
1985. 

Ratifications  exchanged:  Quebec  City, 
Mar.  18,  1985. 

Entered  into  force:  Mar.  18,  1985. 
Supersedes  convention  of  May  26,  1930  for 
the  protection,  preservation,  and  extension  of 
the  salmon  fishery  of  the  Eraser  River 
system  as  amended  by  protocols  of  Dec.  28, 
1956,  and  Feb.  24,  1977.  50  Stat.  1355,  TS 
918;  TIAS  3867,  9954. 

Treaty  on  mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal 
matters,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Quebec  Mar. 
18,  1985.  Enters  into  force  upon  the  ex- 
change of  instruments  of  ratiJfication. 

Agreement  regarding  modernization  of  the 
North  American  Air  Defense  System,  with 
memorandum  of  understanding.  Effected  liy 
exchange  of  notes  at  Quebec  Mar.  18,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  18,  1985. 


Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
access  of  airlines  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada  to  LaGuardia  Airport  for  transborder 
services.  Signed  at  Washington  Mar.  25, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  25,  1985. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  1,  1984,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
San  Salvador  Jan.  29,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  29,  1985. 

Finland 

Agreement  relating  to  scientific  and  technical 
cooperation,  with  patent  annex.  Signed  at 
Washington  Mar.  22,  1985.  Enters  into  force 
thirty  days  after  the  date  when  the  Parties, 
through  diplomatic  channels,  have  notified 
each  other  that  their  respective  requirements 
for  entry  into  force  of  the  agreement  have 
been  fulfilled. 

France 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
information  and  cooperation  in  the  regulation 
of  nuclear  safety.  Signed  at  Fontenay-aux- 
Roses  Sept.  17,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  17,  1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  regarding  the 
exchange  of  scientists  and  engineers.  Signed 
at  Paris  and  Washington  Jan.  24  and 
Feb.  14,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  14, 
1985. 

Honduras 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  16,  1983,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities,  with  memorandum  of 
understanding.  Signed  at  Tegucigalpa 
Mar.  11,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  11, 
1985. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  2,  1980,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities (TIAS  10063).  Signed  at  Jakarta 
Feb.  13,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  13, 
1985. 

Agreement  amending  agi-eement  of  Oct.  13 
and  Nov.  19,  1982  (TIAS  10580),  as  amended, 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man- 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Ef- 
fected tiy  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
Feb.  25  and  26,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  26,  1985. 

Japan 

Memorandum  of  understanding  regarding 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  geological  sciences. 
Signed  at  Reston  and  Tsukuba,  Ibaraki, 
Feb.  8  and  25,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  25,  1985. 

Agi'eement  amending  the  arrangement  of 
Aug.  17,  1979  (TIAS  9564),  concerning  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles, 
as  extended  and  amended  with  record  of 
discussion.  Signed  at  Washington  Mar.  13, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  13,  1985. 


Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  2,  1977  (TIAS  8952),  relating  to  ad< 
tional  cooperative  arrangements  to  curli  i 
illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  ex 
change  of  letters  at  Mexico  Feb.  4,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  4,  1985. 

Pakistan 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  sclent 
and  technical  cooperation.  Signed  at 
Islamabad  Jan.  23,  1985.  Entered  into  fo 
Jan.  23,  1985. 

Singapore 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Aug. 
1981,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade  in  co' 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  ; 
Washington,  Mar.  6  and  12,  1985.  Entere 
into  force  Mar.  12,  1985. 

AgTeement  amending  agreement  of  Aug. 
1981,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade  in  coi 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  i 
Washington,  Mar.  6  and  12,  1985.  Enters 
into  force  Mar.  12,  1985. 

Sudan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Khartoum  Dec.  27.  IS 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  3,  1985. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  27,  1984,  for  sales  of  agricultural  co) 
modities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  s 
Khartoum  Jan.  9,  1985.  Entered  into  fore 
Jan.  9,  1985. 

Tonga 

Investment  incentive  agreement.  Effecte( 
exchange  of  notes  at  Suva  and  Nuku'alofe 
Aug.  22,  1983  and  Nov.  26,  1984.  Entere. 
to  force  Nov.  26,  1984. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  amending  and  supplementing 
agreement  of  Mar.  27,  1941,  as  amended 
supplemented  (55  Stat.  1560,  EAS  235;  T 
2105,  9359),  regarding  leased  naval  and  a 
bases,  with  appendices.  Effected  by  exc-ha 
of  notes  at  Washington  Mar.  7,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  7,  1985. 


'With  reservation. 

^Not  in  force. 

^Not  in  force  for  U.S. 

"•U.S.  is  not  a  party  to  Chapter  II. 

^With  declaration  and  reservation.  I 


QO 


ESS  RELEASES 


partment  of  State 


releases  may  be  obtained  from  llie  Of- 
f  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
int!:ton,  D.C.  20520. 

Date  Subject 

3/1  Program  for  the  official 

working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C,  of 
Italian  Prime  JVlinister 
Craxi,  Mar.  4-7. 
3/1  Shultz:  news  conference, 

Guayaquil.  Ecuador, 
Feb.  28. 
3/4  Shultz:  interview  on  ABC's 

"Good  Morning.  America." 
3/4  Dam/Dodd;  interview  on 

NBC's  "Meet  the  Press," 
Mar.  3. 
3/4  Shultz:  statement,  Victoria 

Plaza  Hotel,  Montevideo, 
Mar.  2. 
3/5  Shultz:  news  conference, 

Montevideo,  Mar.  2. 
3/5  U.S.  delegation  to  the  World 

Conference  to  Review  and 
Appraise  the  Achievements 
of  the  UN  Decade  for 
Women  announced. 
3/6         The  Di-ug  Problem: 

Americans  Arrested 
Abroad. 
3/6  Shultz:  address  to  the 

National  Academy  of 
Sciences. 
3/7  Shultz:  question-and- 

answer  session  at  National 
Academy  of  Sciences, 
Mar.  6.  " 
3/7  Shultz:  statement  before  the 

Senate  .Appropriations  Sub- 
committee on  Foreign 
Operations. 
3/7  Max  M.  Kampelman  sworn 

in  as  head  of  U.S.  delega- 
tion and  U.S.  negotiator  on 
space  and  defensive  arms 
(l)iographic  data). 
3/7  Maynard  W.  Glitman  sworn 

in  as  U.S.  negotiator  on 
intermediate-range  nuclear 
arms  (biographic  data). 
3/7         John  G.  Tower  sworn  in  as 
U.S.  negotiator  on 
strategic  nuclear  arms 
(biographic  data). 
3/8         Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C,  of 
Egyptian  President 
Mubarak,  Mar.  9-13. 
3/8  Shultz:  statement  on  murder 

of  DEA  agent.  Mar.  7. 
3/12        Shultz:  interview  on  ABC 

"Evening  News,"  Mar.  11. 


49         3/ 1 4        Shultz:  press  briefing  to 

regional  television,  radio, 
and  newspaper  organiza- 
tions, Mar.  11. 
*50        3/15        Program  for  the  state  visit 
to  the  U.S.  of  Argentine 
President  Alfonsin. 
Mar.  17-25. 
♦51         3/15        Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee. 
52         3/15        Shultz:  news  conference. 
"53         3/15        U.S.  holds  bilateral  communi- 
cations talks  with  the  U.K., 
Italy,  and  the  Vatican, 
Apr.  16-25. 
'54         3/18        Shultz/Dobrynin:  remarks 
at  the  reception  for  the 
Diplomatic  Corps,  Mar.  16. 
55         3/18        Shultz:  interview  on  ABC's 
"This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley,"  Mar.  17. 
*  3/21        Shultz:  statement  before  the 

House  Appropriations 
Foreign  Operations  Sub- 
committee. 
*57        3/26       Regional  Foreign  Policy 

Conference,  Apr.  10. 
♦58        3/27        Shultz:  toast  in  honor  of 
Ambassador  Jeane  J. 
Kirkpatrick. 
59         3/28       Shultz:  address  before  the 
Austin  Council  on  Foreign 
Affairs,  Texas. 
*59A      4/1  Shultz;  qtiestion-and- 

answer  session  at  the 
Austin  Council  on  Foreign 
Affairs,  Mar.  28. 
*60         3/29       Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C,  of 
Turkish  Prime  Minister 
Ozal,  Apr.  1-5. 
»61         3/29        Shultz:  statement  on  the 
5th  anniversary  of  the 
USIA  Wireless  File. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


USUN 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Date  Subject 

•  1 54       12/6      Sorzano:  outer  space.  Special 

Political  Committee. 
•155       12/3      Feldman:  Western  Sahara, 

Committee  IV. 
•156       12/4      Keyes:  situation  in  Africa, 

General  Assembly. 
•157      12/4     Feldman:  colonial  countries 

and  peoples.  General 

Assembly. 

*  158       12/5      Nygard:  budget  coordination 

between  the  UN  and  its 
specialized  agencies.  Com- 
mittee V. 
*159      12/7     Schifter:  Israel's  decision  to 
build  a  canal  linking  the 
Mediterranean  and  the 
Dead  Sea,  Special  Political 
Committee. 
•160       12/7     Schifter:  human  rights  in 

Cuba,  Committee  III. 
•161       12/7     Jones:  El  Salvador  and 

Guatemala.  Committee  III. 
•162      12/7     Schifter:  Chile,  Committee 

III. 
•163      12/10     Grooms:  information.  Special 

Political  Committee. 
•164      12/10     Schifter:  torture,  General 

Assembly. 
*165       12/12      Goodman:  environment. 

Committee  II. 
•166       12/11      Kirkpatrick:  Palestine,  Gen- 
eral Assembly. 
•167       12/12     Kirkpatrick:  Namibia,  Gen- 
eral Assembly. 
•168      12/13     Ray:  law  of  the  sea.  General 

Assembly. 
*169       12/13      Keyes;  apartheid.  General 

Assembly. 
*170       12/13     Ray:  security  of  diplomats, 

General  Assembly. 
*171       12/14     Quintanilla:  women.  General 

Assembly. 
•172      12/14     Kirkpatrick;  Middle  East, 

General  Assembly. 
•173      12/14     Kirkpatrick.  Schifter:  Middle 

East.  General  Assembly. 
•174      12/17     Sorzano:  terrorism,  General 

Assembly. 
*175       12/17     Keyes:  African  food  emer- 
gency, ECOSOC 
*176      12/17     Sorzano:  40th  anniversary  of 
the  UN,  General  Assembly. 
•177       12/18     Nygard:  UN  conference 
(Rev.l)  facilities  in  Addis  Ababa. 

•178       12/18      Sorzano;  consumer  protec- 
tion. General  Assembly. 
•179       12/18     Kirkpatrick:  Ethiopia  food 
emergency,  donors' 
meeting. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  I 


93 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Ut'ijart- 
ment  of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

The  Importance  of  the  MX  Peacekeeper 
Missile,  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee, 
Feb.  26,  1985  (Current  Policy  #662). 

State  Department  Authorization  Request  for 
FY  1986-87,  Subcommittee  on  Interna- 
tional Operations,  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Feb.  27,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#668). 

Africa 

U.S.  Pledges  One-Half  of  Africa's  Food  Aid, 
Vice  President  Bush,  UN  Conference  on 
the  Emergency  Situation  in  Africa,  Geneva, 
Mar.  11,  1985  (Current  Policy  #673). 

FY  1986  Foreign  Assistance  Proposals  for 
Africa,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Wisner, 
Subcommittee  on  Africa,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Mar.  5,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #672). 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Namibia,  Assistant 
Secretary  Crocker,  Subcommittee  on 
Africa,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee, 
Feb.  21,  1985  (Current  Policy  #663). 

Ethiopian  Famine  (GIST,  Mar.  1985). 

East  Asia 

U.S.  Export  Controls  and  China  (GIST, 
Mar.  1985). 

Economics 

The  U.S.  Perspective  on  the  International 
Economy,  Under  Secretary  Wallis,  Cana- 
dian Institute  of  International  Affairs, 
Mar.  5,  1985  (Current  Policy  #671). 

Protectionism:  A  Threat  to  Our  Prosperity, 
Under  Secretary  Wallis,  National  Asso.  of 
Business  Economists,  Feb.  26,  1985  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #664). 

U.S.  Export  Controls  (GIST,  Mar.  1985). 

Europe 

The  United  States  and  Greece,  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  Haas,  American 
Hellenic  Educational  Progressive  Asso., 
Feb.  8,  1985  (Current  Policy  #661). 

Northern  Ireland  (GIST,  Mar.  1985). 

U.S.-Canada  Relations  (GIST,  Mar.  1985). 


Middle  East 

Background  Note  on  Egypt  (Fel).  1985). 

Military  Affairs 

Strategic  Defense  Initiative,  National 
Security  Adviser  McFarlane,  Overseas 
Writers  Asso.,  Mar.  7.  1985  (Current  Policy 
#670). 

Continuing  the  Acquisition  of  the  Peace- 
keeper Missile,  President's  message  to  the 
Congress  and  the  executive  summary  of  his 
report  on  the  Peacekeeper  (MX)  missile. 
Mar.  4,  1985  (Special  Report  #123). 

The  President's  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
(GIST,  Mar.  1985). 

Narcotics 

The  Drug  Problem;  Americans  Arrested 
Abroad  (GIST,  Mar.  1985). 

Pacific 

The  ANZUS  Alliance,  Assistant  Secretary 
Wolfowitz,  Subcommittee  on  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs,  House  Fijreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Mar.  18,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#674). 

The  Pacific:  Region  of  Promise  and 
Challenge,  Assistant  Secretary  Wolfowitz, 
National  Defense  University  Pacific  Sym- 
posium, Honolulu,  Feb.  22.  1985  (Current 
Policy  #660). 

U.S.  and  Oceania  (GIST,  Mar.  1985). 

Science  &  Technology 

Science  and  Foreign  Policy:  The  Spirit  of 
Progress,  Secretary  Shultz  and  Assistant 
Secretary  Malone,  National  Academy  of 
Sciences,  Mar.  6,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#665). 

Terrorism 

Combating  International  Terrorism,  Director 
Oakley,  Subcommittees  on  Arms  Control, 
International  Security,  and  Science  and  on 
International  Operations,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Mar.  5,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #667). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Aid  and  U.S.  Interests  in  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean,  Assistant  Secretary 
Motley,  Subcommittee  on  Western 
Hemisphere  Affairs,  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Mar.  5,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#666). 

Background  Note  on  El  Salvador  (Feb. 
1985).  ■ 


QA 


EX 


1985 

me  85,  No.  2098 


ice  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)  ...  41 
6  Assistance  Requests  for  Sub-Sahara 

ca(Wisner) -19 

ontrol 

Control:    Objectives    and    Prospects 

iltz)    24 

Isile  (Reagan) i^ 

ectives  of  Arms  Control  (Nitze)  ....  57 
nt's   News   Conference   of   March   21 

erpts)    

ry  s   Interview   on  "This  Week   With 

id  Brinkley"  ..^....36 

ry's    News    Briefing    for.    Regional 

lia 38 

ry's  News  Conference  of  March  15  .  32 
.S.S.R.   Negotiations  on  Nuclear  and 

ce  Arms  (McFarlane,  Reagan) 55 

Vice   President's   Visit  to   Grenada, 

zil,  and  Honduras 20 

iia.   Secretary's  News  Conference  of 

■ch  15 ;,--j^ 

a.  President's  Visit  to  Canada 
Ironey,  Reagan,  declarations,  joint 
ement) 1 

nee  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)  ...  41 
!6  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 

( the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 63 

186    Assistance    Requests   for   Europe 

jrt) T^ 

'  86    Assistance    Requests    for    Latin 
J  erica  and  the  Caribbean  (Motley)  ...  81 
i;6  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 
3,t  and  South  Asia  (Murphy)  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  •'75 

I  6  Assistance  Requests  for  Sub-bahara 
yica(Wisner) 49 

a  nee  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)  .  41 
n6  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 
1   the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 63 

5  nee  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)  .  .  .41 
86    Assistance    Requests    for   Europe 

J  rt)      '^ 

int's   News   Conference   of  March   21 

« :erpts)    ^ 

S  n  Assistance 

s  nee  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)  ...  41 

H6  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 

a  I  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) ■  ■  63 

)86  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin 
P  lerica  and  the  Caribbean  (Motley)^ ..  81 
]  i(,  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 
E  3t  and  South  Asia  (Murphy)  .  .  .  .  •  ■  • -75 
1  ^6  Assistance  Requests  for  Sub-Sahara 
/  -ica  (Wisner) 49 


Grenada.  Vice  President's  Visit  to  Grenada, 

Brazil,  and  Honduras 20 

Honduras.  Vice  President's  Visit  to  Grenada, 

Brazil,  and  Honduras 20 

Human    Rights.    Nicaragua:    A    Threat    to 

Demoeracv  (Bush) 22 

Information  "Policv.    Science   and   American 

Foreign    Policv"   The   Spirit   of   Progress 

(Shultz)    ....." '28 

Israel.     Secretary's    News    Conference    of 

March  15 32 

Lebanon.    Secretary's   News   Conference   of 

March  15 " 32 

Mali.  Vice  President's  Visit  to  Africa 13 

Middle  East 

Assistance  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)  ...  41 

FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 

East  and  South  Asia  (Murphy) 75 

President's   News   Conference   of  March   21 

fCXCETDtsl 

Secretary's   Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley" 36 

Secretary's    News    Briefing    for    Regional 

Media r  '  '  '  '^^ 

Narcotics.    Secretary's    News    Briefing    tor 

Regional  Media 38 

New  Zealand.  Secretary's  News  Conference  ot 

March  15 32 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua:  A  Threat  to  Democracy  (Bush)  .  22 

Secretary's   Interview   on  "This  Week   With 

David  Brinkley r; '  '  •'  '  ^'^ 

Secretary's    News    Briefing    for    Regional 

Media 38 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  March  15  .32 

Niger.  Vice  President's  Visit  to  Africa  ....  13 

Nuclear    Policy.     Science    and    American 

Foreign   Policy:   The   Spirit   of  Progress 

(Shultz)    ■ •■■28 

Pacific     FY    1986   Assistance   Requests  tor 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz)  .  .63 
Presidential  Documents 
Death    of    Soviet    President    Chernenko 

(White  House  statement) ^4 

MX  Missile ^ 

President's   News   Conference   of  March   21 

(excerpts)    ;■•;;■, 

Presidents    Visit    to    Canada    (Mulroney. 

Reagan,  declarations,  joint  statement)  .  A 

U  S  -U  S  S  R.    Negotiations    on    Nuclear 

'   and  Space  Arms  (McFarlane,  Reagan)  .  .  55 

Publications.  Department  of  State 94 

Security  Assistance  „,    ,    , 

Assistance  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)    .  .  41 
FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  tor  t^ast  Asia 
and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz)  .....^■■■M 
FY    1986    Assistance    Requests   tor    burope 

FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for  Latm 
America  and  the  Caribbean  (Motley)^ ..  81 

FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Middle 
East  and  South  Asia  (Murphy)  .  .  ._  ^.  , -JS 

FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  lor  buD-sanara 
Africa  (Wisner) ^^ 


Science  &  Technology.  Science  and  American 
Foreign    Policy:    The   Spirit   of   Progress 

(Shult^/.)    ^'  ■;  •  ■ 

South  Africa.  President's  News  Conference 

of  March  21  (excerpts) 9 

South  Asia  ,    ,    , 

Assistance  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)^  ..  41 
FY  1986  Assistance  Re<iuesls  tor  the  Middle 

East  and  South  Asia  (Murphy) '75 

Sudan.  Vice  President's  Visit  to  Africa 13 

Trade.     President's    News    Conference    ol 

March  21  (excerpts) -9 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 90 

I T    C    C    I> 

Arms'  Control:    Objectives    and    Prospects 

(Shultz)    ,•■•,„■"■ 

Death  of  Soviet  President  Chernenko  (Reagan 

White  House  statement) "Jl 

The  Objectives  of  Arms  Control  (Nitze)  .  .  .  .  57 
President's   News   Conference   of  March   21 

(cxcprDts)        ■ 

Secretary  s   Interview  on  "This  Week   With 

David  Brinkley"  ■ „  ■  ■  .•  '  "^ , 

Secretary's    News    Briefing    for    Regional 

Media    38 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  March  15  .32 
U  S  -U  S  S  R.  Negotiations  on  Nuclear  and 

Space  Arms  (McFarlane,  Reagan) 55 

Vice  President's  Visit  to  Moscow  ....  .  .  •.■  •  1» 

United    Nations.    Vice    Presidents   Visit   to 

Africa    " 

Western  Hemisphere  ^,    ,,  >        ,, 

Assistance  Request  for  FY  1986  (Shultz)    .  .41 
FY     1986    Assistance     Requests    for    Latin 

America  and  the  Caribbean  (Motley)  ...  81 
Nicaragua:  A  Threat  to  Democracy  (Bush)  .  22 
President's   News   Conference   of  March   21 

(excerpts)    9 


Name  Index 

Burt,  Richard R  ^. •„•  ,„■  i^Al 

Bush,  Vice  President 13,  18,  ZO,  ^z 

McFarlane,  Robert  C ^t" 

Motley,  Langhome  A *^ 

Mulroney,  Brian  ■  ^ 

Murphv.  Richard  W '» 

Nitze,  Paul  H ;-q'i9'rc74 

Reagan,  President -^y  ^^1.9.  12.  5o,  n 

Shultz,  Secretary 24,  28,  32,  36,  38,  41 

Wisner,  Frank l^ 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D ♦'•^ 


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The  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  85  /  Number  2099 


^ERWTENOeNT  OF  DOCUMENTS 
DEPOSITORY 


June  1985 


m  f^yiuo  ui^ARY 


»^.1i§S!SSalfrica/1,36 


I 

^fri( 


FY  1986  Assistance: 

Foreign  Assistance/49 

Narcotics/62 

Refugees/67 

Security  Assistance/68 

UN/78 


Dvparimvni  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  85  /  Number  2099  /  June  1985 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Biilletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

ROBERT  M.  SMALLEY 

Acting  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Puhlic  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  E(lit(ii-ial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


I 


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For  .sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402 


CONTENTS 


GOVERNMENT  DOCUMENTS 
DEPARTMENT 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 

Feature 

1        Africa:  The  Potential  for  Higher  Food  Production 
8       African  Hunger  Relief  (President  Reagan) 


8 


Economic  Assistance  for  Sudan  (White  House  Statement) 


ie  President 

Nicaragua  Peace  Proposal 
Meeting  With  Central  American 

Leaders 
Central  America 

he  Secretary 

The  Meaning  of  Vietnam 
U.S.  and  Central  America:  A 

Moment  of  Decision 
The  U.S.  and  Israel:  Partners  for 

Peace  and  Freedom 
Southern  Africa:  Toward  an 

American  Consensus 
National  Policies  and  Global 

Prosperity 
Foreign  Policy  and  the  Black 

Community 
State  Department  Authorization 

Request  for  FY  1986-87 

Africa 

6       South  Africa:  The  Case  Against 
Sanctions  (Kenneth  W.  Dam} 

8  U.S.  Response  to  Apartheid  in 
South  Africa  (Chester  A. 
Crocker) 

9  U.S.  Regrets  South  African 
Arrests  and  Trials  (Department 
Statement) 


East  Asia 


n 


ASEAN-U.S.  Dialogue  Held  in 

Washington  (Secretary  Shultz 
W.  Allen  Wallis,  Joint  State- 
ment) 


zurope 

16  Visit  of  British  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  (President  Reagan, 
Margaret  Thatcher) 

17  Visit  of  Italian  Prime  Minister 
(Bettino  Craxi,  President 
Reagan) 


Foreign  Assistance 

49       FY  1986  Request  for  Foreign 

Assistance  Programs  (M.  Peter 
McPherson) 

IVIiddle  East 

52        Developments  in  the  Middle  East: 
An  Update  (Richard  W. 
Murphy) 

54  U.S. -Israel  Free  Trade  Area 

Agreement  (Department  Fact 
Sheet) 

55  Visit  of  Egyptian  President 

(Mohayned  Hosni  Mubarak. 
President  Reagan) 

IVIilitary  Affairs 

57       Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
(Robert  C.  McFarlane) 

60       MX  Missile  and  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Negotiations  on  Nuclear  and 
Space  Arms  (Max  Kampelman. 
President  Reagan) 

Narcotics 

62       FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 

Narcotics  Control  (Jon  R. 
Thomas) 


Nuclear  Policy 

64  Nuclear  Cooperation  with 

EURATOM  (Letter  to  the 
Congress) 

Pacific 

65  ANZUS  Alliance  (Paul  D. 

Wolfowitz) 

Refugees 

67  FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 

Migration  and  Refugees 
(James  N.  Pur  cell.  Jr.) 

Security  Assistance 

68  FY  1986  Security  Assistance 

Requests 

(William  Schneider,  Jr.) 


Terrorism 

73        Combating  International  Terror- 
ism (Robert  B.  Oakley) 

United  Nations 

78       FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 
Organizations  and  Programs 
(Gregonj  J.  Neuvll) 

Western  Hemisphere 

80       The  New  Opportunity  for  Peace 

in  Nicaragua  (Langhome  A. 

Motley) 
83       Nicaragua:  The  Stolen  Revolution 

(J.  William  Middendorf  II) 
86       Secretary  Visits  Ecuador  and 

Uruguay 
89        Visit  of  Argentina's  President 

(Raul  Alfonsin,  President 

Reagan.  Joint  Statement) 

End  Notes 

92        April  1985 

Treaties 

92  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

93  Department  of  State 

Publications 

94  Department  of  State 

Index    ^tii;-:fENDgNn[OFgOCUMfeNib 
DEPOSITORY 


JUL  6  m 

,    BOSTON  PUeUC  LIBRARY 


SENEG 


Sel 

COl 

TrL 

Ue 

in 

Ser 
des 

0 

500 

sto 
1,0 

'  Desertification 


Analys, 


6017   3-85  STATE(INR/GE) 


FEATURE 


Africa  and  Food 


Africa:  The  Potential  for 
l-ligher  Food  Production 


rica  is  suffering  from  a  severe 
)ught  and  widespread  famine.  Untold 
lusands  of  Africans  have  perished, 
i  an  estimated  20  million  require 
rent  assistance— food,  medical  care, 
i  shelter— if  they  are  to  survive.  It  is 
;hout  question  the  most  serious 
ergency  Africa  has  faced  since  in- 
3endence.  This  paper  focuses  on  the 
jmising  developments  in  agricultural 
.earch  that  in  time  could  lead  to 
3stantially  increased  food  production 
Africa  and  alleviate  future  tragedies, 
also  considers  the  need  for  reform  in 

policy  sector  and  describes  U.S.  food 
istance  to  Africa. 

Although  little  can  be  done  to  elim- 
ite  drought,  which  occurs  periodically 
Africa,  much  can  be  done  to  avoid 
nine.  Drought  has  been  transformed 
.0  famine  by  resource  degradation, 
rh  population  growth  rates,  and  the 
sence  of  growth  in  farm  output, 
.mine,  in  turn,  has  been  aggravated  by 
staken  national  policies  and  armed 
nflict.  Nonetheless,  Africa  does  have 
e  potential  to  produce  sufficient  food 
r  its  increasing  population  and  thereby 
duce  its  vulnerability  to  future 
oughts.  This  potential  depends  greatly 
ion  the  ability  of  African  governments 

mplement  effective  national  policies 
at  support  small  farmers  and  en- 
urage  the  development  and  use  of 
levant  technology. 


he  Agricultural  Crisis 

frica  is  the  only  region  in  the  world 
here  per  capita  food  production  has 
lien  over  the  past  two  decades.  Even 
jfore  the  current  drought,  more  than 
)%  of  Africa's  population  consumed 
ss  than  the  minimum  number  of 
dories  needed  to  sustain  good  health, 
hild  mortality  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  is 
3uble  the  rate  of  all  developing  coun- 
ties. Some  36  countries  have  recently 
«n  affected  by  abnormal  food  short- 
jes. 


Africa's  dependence  on  outside  food 
sources  is  growing  at  an  alarming  pace, 
and  commercial  imports  of  grain  have 
risen  at  an  annual  rate  of  9%  during  the 
past  20  years.  Africa  normally  imports 
more  than  10  million  tons  of  cereals,  ex- 
cluding current  emergency  needs;  if 
trends  continue,  this  deficit  will  increase 
markedly.  Per  capita  gross  domestic 
product  declined  by  3%-4%  per  year 
from  1981  to  1983— attributable  largely 
to  the  decline  in  agriculture,  the  primary 
component  of  most  African  economies. 

Africa  has  serious  agricultural  con- 
straints—  insufficient  rainfall,  fragile 
soils,  a  variety  of  microclimates,  high 
soil  temperatures,  extreme  seasonability, 
and  unique  insect  pests.  Farmers  have 
been  shortening  the  fallow  periods  for 
their  fields,  which  has  led  to  decreased 
yields  and  increased  soil  erosion. 
Overuse  of  forests  for  firewood  and  in- 
tensive grazing  also  have  contributed  to 
erosion.  High  population  growth  rates 
have  stretched  most  African  nations  to 
the  production  limits  of  their  traditional 
agricultures. 

Nonetheless,  Africa's  agroclimatic 
resources  appear  adequate  to  feed  its 
growing  population.  The  African  climate 
probably  has  not  undergone  any  fun- 
damental change  for  the  worse.  Africa 
always  has  been  subjected  to  periodic 
droughts,  as  well  as  to  longer  term 
variations  in  rainfall.  The  best  time- 
series  data  on  the  Sahel  region  indicate 
that  the  19.50s  and  1960s  were  some- 
what wetter  than  normal,  and  thus  the 
desert  may  have  "receded"  during  those 
years.  Moreover,  advances  resulting 
from  agricultural  research— such  as 
more  drought-resistant  plant 
varieties— should  help  to  increase 
African  food  productivity.  African  plant 
life  already  has  demonstrated  extraor- 
dinary resilience,  and  when  the  current 
drought  ends,  the  African  nations  will 
have  major  opportunities  to  improve 
both  their  food  productivity  and  their 
conservation  policies. 


Political  constraints  also  have 
limited  agricultural  productivity.  Two 
decades  after  independence,  African 
leaders  are  confronted  with  difficult 
choices  and  overwhelming  economic 
obstacles  that  would  try  the  patience 
and  administrative  capacity  of  more  ex- 
perienced governments  elsewhere  in  the 
world.  These  leaders  often  have  adopted 
policies  that  have  discouraged  farm  pro- 
duction in  order  to  favor  politically  in- 
fluential urban  populations.  However, 
African  governments  are  increasingly 
aware  that  they  will  need  to  provide 
more  effective  support  for  the  small 
farmer  in  order  to  increase  domestic 
food  production  and  to  reduce 
vulnerability  to  droughts  and  reliance  on 
imported  food. 


The  Promise  of 
Agricultural  Research 

Agricultural  research  is  beginning  to 
offer  Africa  the  promise  of  improved 
food  productivity  in  many  areas. 

New  Plant  Varieties 

Sorghum.  Africa  may  be  experiencing  a 
cereal  crop  breakthrough  in  sorghum.  A 
new  hybrid  sorghum  has  been  developed 
in  Sudan  by  a  U.S.  university-trained 
Ethiopian  plant  breeder,  the  Interna- 
tional Center  for  Research  in  the  Semi- 
Arid  Tropics  (ICRISAT),  and  the  U.S. 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  through  the  INSTORMIL  (Title 
XII  Collaboration  Research  Support  Pro- 
gram for  sorghum  and  millet)  and  the 
AID  Mission  in  Khartoum.  This  new 
hybrid  could  double  or  triple  sorghum 
yields  in  Sudan,  which  possesses  large 
areas  of  underused  cropland.  Equally 
important,  it  has  shown  drought 
tolerance.  The  new  hybrid  sorghum  pro- 
duces about  4,000  kilograms  per  hectare 
(2.47  acres)— while  traditional  varieties 
produce  about  2,000  kilograms  under 
normal  growing  conditions. 


The  new  sorghum,  which  seems  to 
tolerate  a  broad  range  of  soils  and 
stresses,  may  further  increase  African 
food  supplies  by  supplanting  corn  grown 
on  land  where  low  rainfall  makes  corn  a 
marginal  crop.  Field  trials  are  being  in- 
itiated in  other  drought-prone  African 
nations — such  as  Kenya,  Tanzania, 
Zaire,  and  Zimbabwe — where  the 
sorghum  also  could  become  an  important 
cereal  crop. 

Enough  seed  has  been  produced  to 
plant  100,000  acres  in  Sudan  for  1985, 
and  a  U.S.  company  is  trying  to 
establish  a  joint  venture  with  Sudan  to 
produce  the  seed  locally.  However, 
significant  changes  in  farmers'  attitudes 
and  in  government  policies  will  be  re- 
quired to  make  full  use  of  the  new 
sorghum.  Like  the  wheat  and  rice 
varieties  that  created  the  Green  Revolu- 
tion, it  requires  fertilizer  and  pest  pro- 
tection to  achieve  its  full  yield  potential. 
Futhermore,  because  the  hybrid  seed 
will  not  breed  true,  farmers  will  have  to 
buy  new  seed  every  year. 

A  promising  new  sorghum  for  the 
Sahel  countries  also  was  tested  in  1984. 
Bred  from  all-African  parent  lines  under 
the  sponsorship  of  ICKISAT,  African 
research  institutions,  and  AID,  it  gives 
consistent  yields  of  1.5-1.7  metric  tons 
per  hectare  in  the  700  millimeter  rainfall 
zone  through  the  southern  parts  of  Mali, 
Burkina,  Niger,  and  (..'had.  .'\lihough  its 


yield  potential  is  lower  than  that  of  the 
Sudan  variety,  it  will  thrive  under  more 
adverse  conditions  and  should  far  out- 
produce the  area's  traditional  cereals. 

Potatoes.  Potatoes — which  yield 
more  human  nutrients  per  hectare  than 
any  other  crop  for  human  consump- 
tion— are  well  suited  to  much  of  the 
Ethiopian  highlands.  The  International 
Potato  Center,  headquartered  in  Peru, 
has  tested  improved  potato  varieties  in 
Ethiopia,  with  yields  as  high  as  50 
metric  tons  per  hectare.  Potatoes  tradi- 
tionally have  not  been  grown  or  con- 
sumed in  Ethiopia,  however,  and  a  ma- 
jor national  effort  will  be  needed  to  pro- 
mote potato  consumption  and  to  develop 
the  necessary  production,  storage,  and 
marketing  network  to  make  potatoes  an 
important  food  source. 

Forage  Crops.  Scarcity  of  dry 
season  feed  is  the  major  constraint  on 
Ethiopia's  livestock  production.  The  In- 
ternational Livestock  Center  for  Africa, 
located  in  Ethiopia,  has  discovered  that 
forage  crops  respond  dramatically  to 
added  phosphorus.  To  increase  dairy 
production  in  highland  areas,  the  center 
has  developed  a  program  that  employs 
forage  legumes  fertilized  with  phos- 
phorus, cross-bred  dairy  cattle,  conser- 
vation of  water  in  surface  ponds,  and 
better  land  cultivation  methods.  The 
resulting  additional  milk  could  be  proc- 
essed into  boiled  curd  cheese  for  the 


Drought  has  caused  many  Africans  to  leavi 
their  homes  and  seek  food  and  shelter  in 
refugee  camps. 

marketplace.  This  low-cost  technology 
could  be  applied  widely  in  Ethiopia,  but 
the  government  has  made  no  effort  to 
extend  its  use. 

Corn.  In  Nigeria,  where  yields  of 
white  corn  average  less  than  1  metric 
ton  per  hectare,  a  new  variety  has 
averaged  more  than  9  metric  tons,  even 
in  the  midst  of  the  recent  drought  and  a 
severe  outbreak  of  maize  streak  virus.  1 
yielded  well  in  both  savannah  and  forest 
locations,  indicating  wide  adaptability. 

Cassava.  Africa  plants  more  than  7 
million  hectares  in  cassava,  a  fleshy,  edi 
ble  rootstock  that  provides  about  half 
the  caloric  intake  for  some  200  million 
people.  Yields  average  about  6  metric 
tons  per  hectare,  compared  to  a  genetic 
potential  of  15-20  metric  tons.  The  In- 
ternational Institute  for  Tropical  Agri- 
culture in  Nigeria  has  bred  new  varietic 
of  cassava  resistant  to  both  the  endemii 
cassava  mosaic  disease  and  a  fast- 
spreading  bacterial  blight.  These  im- 
proved varieties  outyield  local  strains  b\ 
200%-l,800"Ki.  To  counter  the  spread  ofj 
cassava  mealybug  and  green  spidermite 
in  western  and  central  Africa,  scientist'; 
at  the  institute  are  using  imported  insec 
predators  and  breeding  impoved  cassavai 
lines  to  resist  the  pests.  i 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


i'' 

1 

1 

V 

V 

FEATURE 


Africa  and  Food 


!^ape  Verde 

67.3 


GRAIN  REQUIREMENTS 

FOR  SELECTED 

AFRICAN  COUNTRIES 

FOR  FY85 


Djibouti 

160 


Percent 


100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 


Needed 
Aid 

Pledged 


Self 
Met 


TOTAL  GRAIN 

REQUIREMENT 

FOR  FY85 


The  number  under  each  country  name 

is  the  total  grain  requirement  for  FY85; 

in  thousands  of  metric  tons. 


me  1985 


4a:. 


Top:  With  the  assistance  of  an  AID-funded 
atjricultural  extension  program  in  Kenya,  a 
women's  farming  cooperative  has  increased 
its  yield. 

Middle:  A  free  market  economy  and  AID 
projects  contribute  to  surplus  millet  pro- 
duction in  southern  Mali. 

Bottom:  An  AID  project  in  Niger  helps  to 
produce  drought-resistant  sorghum. 


(.•\1I)  photos) 


Peanuts.   New  peanut  varieties 
have  achieved  extraordinary  yields  at 
ICRISAT  in  India.  Three  varieties  pro- 
duced more  than  7,000  kilograms  per 
hectare,  compared  to  average  yields  in 
Africa  of  about  800  kilograms.  They  an 
being  introduced  in  peanut  breeding  pn 
grams  in  Mozambique,  Zambia,  and  Zirr 
babwe. 


re 


Leguminous  Trees.    Leucaena 
leucocephala,  a  leguminous  tree  native 
to  Central  America,  provides  its  own 
nitrogen  fertilizer  and  has  a  deep  tap- 
root that  resists  drought.  It  may  offer 
some  important  benefits  to  Africa — as  ; 
fast  growing  firewood  species,  forage 
for  livestock,  and  a  means  of  fertiliza- 
tion and  of  preventing  soil  erosion. 
Research  by  the  International  Institute 
for  Tropical  Agriculture  and  the  Inter- 
national Council  for  Research  in  Agro- 
forestry  already  has  proved  that  inter- 
planting  crops  with  rows  of  leguminous 
trees  can  stabilize  soils,  increase  food 
and  firewood  yields,  and  shorten  the 
fallow  periods  in  Africa.  Leucaena 
species  adapted  especially  for  Africa  an 
being  developed  and  could  boost  the 
trees'  wood  and  forage  yields 
severalfold. 

Improved  varieties  of  mesquite,  loiij 
considered  a  nuisance  by  U.S.  cattle 
ranchers,  also  could  contribute  to 
African  food  production  and  drought 
resistance.  Mesquite,  too,  is  leguminous 
and  its  pods  contain  13%  protein  and 
30%  sucrose.  Long  taproots  can  reach 
water  as  deep  as  20  meters.  In  shrub 
form  the  improved  varieties  can  yield 
4,000-10,000  kilograms  of  biomass  per 
hectare  or  3,000-4,000  kilograms  per 
hectare  of  nutrient-rich  pods. 

A  U.S.  tropical  soil  specialist  in 
Texas  has  developed  a  mulch-tillage 
technique  that  greatly  speeds  reforesta- 
tion and,  in  fact,  doubles  the  rate  of 
revegetation  on  degraded  arid  lands  in 
Africa.  The  tillage  disturbs  the  barren 
soil  surface,  while  mulching  with 
branches  or  brush  traps  windblown  sane 
and  seeds  and  attracts  termites,  whose 
burrowing  increases  water  retention.  A 
tillage  tool  called  the  Texas  Sandfighter 
is  being  adapted  to  animal  power  to 
keep  sand  from  covering  tree  seedlings. 

Fertilizer  and  Pesticide 

Experiments  in  East  Africa  by  the  Food 
and  Agriculture  Organization  have 
shown  that  fertilization  increases  crop 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletii 


Ids  by  50%  and  that  application 
•ectly  under  the  planted  seeds  adds 
other  10%-30%.  Such  placement  is 
itical  where  rainfall  is  sparse  because 
herwise  the  fertilizer  cannot  reach 
,nt  roots. 
U.S.  scientists  have  discovered  a 
le-celled  protozoan  parasite  that  could 
■eatly  reduce  the  grasshopper  hordes 
at  are  infesting  West  Africa.  Research 
Nigeria  shows  that  protozoans  can  be 
;ed  to  infect  and  kill  the  grasshoppers, 
owever,  Africa  has  no  facility  to  raise 
e  protozoans  and  no  readily  available 
lit. 

Electrostatic  handsprayers  could 
ake  pesticides  as  effective  for  Africa's 
nail  traditional  farms  as  for  mecha- 
zed  farms  in  developed  countries.  With 
le  new  sprayer,  the  farmer  carries  only 
small  container  of  low-volume,  pre- 
easured  spray  (about  12.5  kilograms 
;r  hectare)  instead  of  1,500  kilograms 
nth  many  refills)  required  for  conven- 
Dnal  backpack  sprayers.  The  new 
rayers  are  easy  to  carry,  use,  and 
aintain.  They  also  are  much  safer, 
oth  for  the  farmer  and  the  environ- 
ent,  and  more  cost  effective  because 
ore  of  the  electrically  charged  droplets 
low-volume  pesticide  adhere  to  plant 
laves  rather  than  disperse  in  the  air  or 
11  to  the  ground. 

Using  the  new  handsprayer  should 
Ip  to  increase  crop  yields  significantly. 
se  of  the  sprayers  in  Nigeria  already 
Bs  raised  yields  of  new  cowpea  va- 
leties  from  200  kilograms  per  hectare 

1,500  kilograms,  and  the  farmer's 
trofits  by  about  600%  per  hectare;  in 
lambia,  farmers  averaged  1,210  kilo- 
rams  of  cotton  per  hectare,  compared 

770  kilograms  for  their  neighbors 
ising  conventional  backpack  sprayers. 


V. 


FEATURE 


Africa  and  Food 


DROUGHT  AREAS  IN  ETHIOPIA:  1984 


Source     Food  and  Agricultural 

Organiiationof  the  United 
Nations,  1984 


SUDAN 


INDIAN 

OCEAN 


he  Need  for  Policy  Reform 


>\er  time,  agricultural  research  can 
ramatically  affect  food  production  and 
ase  political  dilemmas  faced  by  many 
African  governments.  New  technology 
an  lower  the  per  unit  cost  of  producing 
arm  products  and  thus  provide  an  in- 
entive  for  farmers  to  increase  produc- 
ion  without  raising  consumer  prices, 
jowered  costs  help  to  eliminate  the 
leed  for  governments  to  choose  between 
,he  risks  of  famine  in  the  long  term  and 


of  consumer  riots  over  food  price  in- 
creases in  the  short  term. 

Although  the  Third  World's  total  na- 
tional spending  for  agricultural  research 
tripled  in  real  terms  during  the  1970s 
and  now  exceeds  that  in  either  Western 
Europe  or  North  America,  Africa  has 
lagged  far  behind.  African  governments 
must  provide  more  effective  support  for 
agricultural  research. 

They  also  will  have  to  provide  their 
farmers  with  access  to  the  new 
technologies  and  other  inputs  that  can 
increase  productivity.  Yet  most  African 
states  have  discouraged  productivity  im- 


provements by  maintaining  government- 
established  food  prices  and  overvalued 
currency  exchange  rates  that  artificially 
lower  the  price  of  food  imports.  As  a 
result,  small  farmers  have  little  incen- 
tive to  produce  marketable  surpluses.  In- 
efficient government  agencies  have  in- 
hibited the  access  of  small  farmers  to 
financial  resources  as  well  as  to  im- 
proved plant  varieties,  chemicals,  and 
other  farm  technology.  Moreover,  the 
marketing  or  physical  infrastructure  re- 
quired to  distribute  farm  products  has 
not  been  developed. 


une 1985 


Most  African  countries  now  serious- 
ly affected  by  food  shortages  have 
followed  poor  agricultural  policies.  For 
example,  although  Ethiopia  suffers  from 
a  major  famine,  its  agricultural 
resources  are  substantial,  including 
sizable  tracts  of  undeveloped  cropland 
and  significant  irrigation  potential  in 
some  of  its  river  valleys.  It  possessed  a 
fledgling  agricultural  research  establish- 
ment when  the  Marxist  regime  of  Haile- 
Mariam  Mengistu  came  to  power  10 
years  ago.  Researchers  had  developed 
several  improved  plant  varieties  that, 
when  combined  with  modest  amounts  of 
fertilizer,  doubled  crop  yields  on  small 
highland  farms. 

Under  Mengistu  the  research  estab- 
lishment lost  key  staff  and  momentum. 
The  government  channeled  most  of  its 
agricultural  investment  into  large  state 
farms  that  have  produced  only  about  6% 
of  the  nation's  farm  output.  Ethiopia's 
food  situation  began  a  precipitous 
decline  in  1984  when  rains  failed  for  the 
mid-year  crop,  which  normally  produces 
5%-15%  of  the  nation's  grain.  Relatively 
dry  weather  during  the  primary  rainy 
season,  coupled  with  pest  infestations, 
led  to  a  very  poor  yield  from  the  main 
harvest  in  late  1984  and  worsened  the 
already  severe  famine. 

Tanzania  also  possesses  good  unde- 
veloped cropland  but  has  had  no  real 
growth  in  agricultural  output  for  the 
past  decade.  Per  capita  food  production 
has  declined  sharply,  and  major  reduc- 
tions in  the  volume  and  quality  of  its 
farm  exports  have  caused  a  foreign  ex- 
change crisis. 

The  Sahel,  one  of  the  world's  least 
favored  agricultural  areas,  could  possibly 
double  its  cereal  production  if  the  coun- 
tries affected — Mali,  Burkina,  Niger, 
and  Chad — offered  fair  prices  to 
farmers  and  managed  their  existing  ir- 
rigation projects  more  effectively.  If  the 
Sahel  countries  could  impose  seasonal 
grazing  rotation  on  their  uncontrolled 
rangeland  "commons,"  more  livestock 
could  be  supported  with  far  less  en- 
vironmental damage. 

In  contrast,  Kenya  has  had  one  of 
the  most  effective  agricultural  programs 
in  Africa.  After  gaining  independence  in 
1963,  some  2,000  large  European  land- 
holdings  were  sold  to  about  .50,000 
Kenyan  smallholder  families.  The  new 
government  continued  existing  agricul- 
tural research,  operated  an  extension 


Ethiopian  refugees  in  Somalia. 


program  focused  on  smallholders,  and 
tried  to  maintain  agricultural  price  in- 
centives. Since  1970,  farm  productivity 
has  increased  some  35%.  Although 
Kenya's  weather  has  been  bad,  relatively 
high  farm  productivity  has  saved  its 
population  from  famine.  The  country 
entered  the  drought  with  600,000  metric 
tons  of  grain  stocks,  and  farm  exports 
had  generated  sufficient  foreign  ex- 
change with  most  of  the  food  needed  to 
maintain  the  population.  Once  the 
drought  ends,  Kenya  should  be  self- 
sufficient  in  food,  but  serious 
agricultural  problems  remain.  In  par- 
ticular, Kenya  needs  to  revitalize  its 
agricultural  research  program  and  to 
reform  its  inefficient  national  marketing 
system. 

African  leaders  increasingly 
recognize  the  need  to  reform  govern- 
ment policies.  In  the  past  several  years, 
attitudes  have  shifted  dramatically  on 
such  issues  as  exchange  rates,  measures 


to  rehabilitate  infrastructure,  the  need 
to  reduce  government  regulation  and 
bureaucracy,  and  pricing  and  marketin 
reforms.  In  Zambia,  for  example,  con- 
siderable increases  in  agricultural  price 
have  stimulated  production.  In 
Madagascar,  production  has  been 
boosted  by  a  liberalization  of  the  rice 
marketing  system  and  by  price  in- 
creases. Similar  developments  have  oc- 
curred in  Somalia,  Sudan,  Zimbabwe, 
Malawi,  Ghana,  Mali,  Senegal,  and 
Rwanda.  The  Government  of  Mozam- 
bique is  emphasizing  farm  price  incen- 
tives and  permitting  private  traders  to 
transport  more  tools  and  consumer 
goods  into  rural  areas  in  exchange  for 
crop  surpluses. 

Donor  countries  and  international  i 
stitutions  are  beginning  to  realize  that 
their  practices  also  have  contributed  to 
Africa's  inefficient  use  of  resources. 
Donors  have  insisted  on  imposing  on 
recipients  their  own  requirements  whic 
however  well  intentioned,  have  caused 
administrative  problems  and  strained 
the  absorptive  capacity  of  African  na- 
tions—  for  example,  .50  donors  have  cor 
tributed  to  188  projects  in  Malawi  and 
61  donors  to  321  projects  in  Lesotho. 


U.S.  Assistance 

In  response  to  the  human  tragedy  in 
Africa,  the  United  States  is  providing 
unprecedented  levels  of  assistance.  We 
are  attempting  to  alleviate  the  im- 
mediate needs  of  millions  of  starving 
people  as  well  as  to  promote  long-term 
solutions  to  Africa's  food  production 
problems.  We  are  providing  assistance 
through  international  organizations  anc 
bilateral  programs  and  helping  private 
voluntary  groups  in  their  efforts  to 
deliver  food  and  other  necessities  of  lif( 
We  are  now  furnishing  more  than  half 
of  all  emergency  food  reaching  the 
famine  victims.  The  United  States  has 
not  allowed  political  differences  with  ar 
government  to  weaken  its  determinatio 
to  have  assistance  reach  those  in  need. 
We  are  the  largest  donor  to  Ethiopia,  a 
country  whose  government  has  been 
openly  hostile  to  us  for  several  years. 

On  July  10,  1984,  President  Reagan 
announced  a  major  initiative  to  respond 
more  quickly  and  effectively  to  the  food 
needs  of  the  people  of  Africa  and  others 
suffering  from  hunger  and  malnutrition 
This  five-point  program  includes: 


FEATURE 


Africa  and  Food 


Prepositioning  grain  in  selected 
ird  World  areas; 

Creating  a  special  $50  million 
Bsidential  fund  to  allow  a  more  flexible 
S.  response  to  food  emergencies; 

Financing  or  paying  ocean  and  in- 
id  transportation  costs  associated  with 
S.  food  aid  in  special  emergency 
ics; 

•  Creating  a  government  task  force 
provide  better  forecasts  of  food  short- 
es  and  needs;  and 

Establishing  an  advisory  group  of 
siness  leaders  to  share  information  on 
lird  World  hunger  and  food  produc- 

The  President  also  announced  a 
mprehensive  African  Hunger  Relief 
itiative  on  January  3  of  this  year,  in 
lich  he  directed  the  U.S.  Government 
provide  more  than  1.5  million  metric 
IS  of  emergency  food  during  fiscal 
ar  1985 — three  times  the  record 
lount  from  the  previous  year.  In  fiscal 
ar  1984,  the  U.S.  Government  pro- 
led  $200  million  of  emergency  assist- 
tce — including  more  than  500,000 
etric  tons  of  emergency  food  aid  as 
11  as  medicine  and  transport  assist- 
ice — to  more  than  25  African  coun- 
les.  Total  food  aid  to  Africa  amounted 
more  than  1.4  million  metric  tons  in 
If  1984. 

During  the  first  quarter  of  fiscal 
(85,  the  U.S.  Government  had  already 
dpped  660,000  metric  tons  of  emergen- 
food  aid.  Total  emergency  and 
Igular  food  aid  and  disaster  relief  pro- 
ams — including  resources  already 
*  mmitted  to  Africa,  the  channeling  of 
( her  AID  resources  to  meet  the  crisis, 
;  d  a  supplemental  appropriation  ap- 
]oved  by  Congress — will  exceed  $1 
1  lion  this  year.  The  United  States  will 
:  pply  half  of  Africa's  estimated 
1  KTgency  food  needs  this  fiscal 
;  ar— about  2  million  metric  tons. 
'  ader  all  food  assistance  programs  this 
j'ai-,  the  United  States  will  ship  about  3 
jillion  metric  tons  food  to  Africa. 

Because  the  roots  of  the  hunger 
■oblem  are  deep,  the  solutions  will  take 
-ne.  AID  is  concentrating  on  the  areas 
African  policy  reform,  agricultural 
search,  and  human  resource  develop- 
ent.  Through  international  organiza- 
Dns  and  U.S.  bilateral  and  regional  pro- 
-ams,  the  United  States  is  supporting 
ich  efforts  as  agi'icultural  development 
'ojects,  land  reclamation,  and  other 


programs  to  develop  agricultural  land 
and  to  train  farmers  in  soil  conservation 
techniques. 

To  assist  governments  wanting  to 
undertake  desirable  reforms,  the  Ad- 
ministration has  developed  several  pro- 
grams. The  African  economic  policy 
reform  program,  an  initiative  funded 
with  $75  million  in  economic  support 
funds,  has  two  main  objectives: 

•  To  provide  additional  support  for 
those  African  countries  that  are  in  the 
process  of  implementing  policy  changes 
or  have  indicated  a  willingness  and  abili- 
ty to  establish  a  growth-oriented  policy 
framework  which  will  provide  incentives 
to  production  sectors  of  the  economy, 
such  as  farmers;  and 

•  To  strengthen  the  international 
assistance  framework  for  Africa  by  im- 
proved multilateral  and  bilateral  donor 
coordination  at  the  country  level. 

The  United  States  is  working  to 
identify  African  countries  for  this  ini- 
tiative, as  well  as  international  financial 
institutions  or  other  donors  that  may 
wish  to  provide  cofinancing  for  policy 
reform  programs. 


The  President's  "Fot)d  for  Progress" 
initiative  is  designed  specifically  to  use 
food  aid  in  support  of  African  countries 
that  have  committed  themselves  to 
reform  of  the  agricultural  sector.  It  will 
stress  market  approaches  in  agricultural 
pricing,  marketing,  and  input  supply  and 
distribution.  The  necessary  legislative 
framework  and  funding  sources  for  this 
program  are  being  developed. 

Although  the  United  States  has  an 
influential  role  in  mobilizing  an  effective 
response  to  the  problem  of  drought  and 
famine,  the  task  is  not  solely  a  U.S. 
responsibility  and,  in  fact,  is  far  too 
great  for  the  United  States  to  attempt 
alone.  The  crisis  in  Africa  touches  upon 
the  welfare  of  the  entire  world  and  re- 
quires a  sustained  and  coordinated  inter- 
national effort  to  relieve  the  suffering. 
In  the  long  run,  however,  only  higher 
food  production  in  Africa  will  put  an  end 
to  hunger.  Primary  responsibility  must 
rest  with  the  African  nations  them- 
selves, whose  actions  and  policies  will 
largely  determine  how  much  progress 
toward  self-reliance  in  food  is  possible.  ■ 


Relief  workers  distributing  emergency  food. 


line  1985 


'I 


African  Hunger  Relief 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
APR.  5,  1985' 

Last  January  I  announced  the  African 
hunger  relief  initiative,  a  program  of  ac- 
tion to  provide  over  $1  billion  to  combat 
famine  and  malnutrition,  which  threaten 
the  lives  of  over  14  million  Africans.  All 
Americans  have  been  horrified  at  the 
unfolding  human  tragedy  in  Africa.  The 
overwhelming  response  has  been  heart- 
warming and  in  the  best  tradition  of 
American  values  and  ideals.  Through  a 
community  effort  at  all  levels  of 
American  society,  Americans  have 
selflessly  contributed  resources,  food, 
and  their  services  to  meet  the  needs  of 
African  famine  victims.  I  am  proud  to 
say  that  America's  massive  reponse  has 
been  successful  in  preventing  millions  of 
Africans  from  dying. 

Last  month  Vice  President  Bush 
visited  Sudan,  Niger,  and  Mali,  three  of 
the  most  seriously  drought-affected 
countries,  to  study  firsthand  the  dimen- 
sions of  the  famine  problem,  what  we 
and  other  donors  have  been  able  to  ac- 


complish, and  what  still  needs  to  be 
done.  Though  profoundly  shocked  by  the 
degree  of  human  suffering  witnessed 
during  the  trip,  the  Vice  President  did 
see  signs  of  hope.  He  saw  that  the 
tremendous  amounts  of  U.S.  food  are  in- 
deed reaching  famine  victims  with  the 
help  of  private  voluntary  agencies  and 
local  governments. 

The  U.S.  response  has  been  far 
larger  and  faster  than  that  of  any  other 
nation  or  institution.  Yet,  it  is  apparent 
to  all  that  more  needs  to  be  done.  This 
is  the  reason  for  the  legislation  that  I 
submitted  to  Congress  in  January  and 
have  now  signed.  H.R.  1239  makes 
available  an  additional  $1  billion  to  meet 
Africa's  emergency  needs — an  amount 
which  I  should  note  substantially  ex- 
ceeds the  Administration's  current 
estimate  of  need.  However,  this  bill,  as  I 
requested,  does  support  the  U.S.  objec- 
tive of  providing  up  to  50%  of  the 
emergency  food  aid  requirements  in 
Africa.  Moreover,  there  is  sufficient 
flexibility  for  the  Administration  to  en- 
sure that  all  food  aid  is  used  effectively. 


Thus,  I  intend  to  abide  by  the  intent  of 
Congress  in  ensuring  that  all  the  food 
and  funds  that  the  United  States  pro- 
vides are  directed  efficiently  at  meetinj 
real  needs  and  that  aid  will  not  exceed 
logistical  capacities.  Misuse  of  assistan( 
is  particularly  unacceptable  when  hums 
lives  are  at  stake.  Moreover,  as  we  con 
tinue  to  increase  our  shipments  of  food 
aid  to  those  at  risk  in  Africa,  we  also 
will  continue  to  ensure  that  our  aid  doe 
not  provide  a  disincentive  to  increased 
local  production  that  is  critical  to  solvit 
Africa's  food  problem  in  the  long  term. 
We  are  confident  that,  together  with 
contributions  from  other  donor  nations 
we  now  have  the  resources  to  combat 
the  immediate  crisis  and  that  as  a  resu 
further  millions  of  lives  will  be  saved. 

I  want  to  again  thank  the  Americai 
people  for  their  selfless  outpouring  of 
donations.  We  have  once  again  shown 
the  world  that  individual  caring  and  g\\ 
ing  is  an  American  way  of  life. 


(.1 


'Made  on  signing  H.R.  1239  into  law 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Apr.  8,  1985).  ■ 


Economic  Assistance  for  Sudan 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
APR.  1,  1985' 

The  President  and  members  of  his  Ad- 
ministration have  had  an  opportunity  to 
review  with  President  Nimeiri  recent 
economic  policy  actions  undertaken  by 
the  Government  of  Sudan  as  part  of  a 
comprehensive  economic  reform  pro- 
gram. The  President  believes  that  ex- 
change rate  adjustments,  elimination  of 
subsidies,  and  limitation  on  the  budget 
deficit  are  highly  commendable  actions, 
worthy  of  international  donor  support. 
He  recognizes  that  these  are  difficult 
steps  to  take,  requiring  sacrifice. 

In  support  of  these  recent  economic 
reforms,  the  President  has  directed  that 
the  U.S.  Government  proceed  with 
disbursement  of  the  balance  of  our  FY 
1984  economic  support  funds  program  in 
Sudan,  $67  million.  We  are  prepared  to 


proceed  immediately  to  work  with  the 
Government  of  Sudan  and  other  donors 
to  build  a  viable  1985  assistance  pro- 
gram. 

It  is  clear  that  the  Government  of 
Sudan  is  taking  the  steps  that  are  re- 
quired to  bring  its  economy  under  con- 
trol while  it  is  faced  with  the  added  dif- 
ficulties of  drought  and  refugee 
emergencies.  Prior  to  President 
Nimeiri's  visit,  the  United  States  had 
already  delivered  or  agreed  to  provide 
750,000  tons  of  grain  this  year.  We  have 
now  agreed  to  provide  an  additional 
225,000  tons  and  will  continue  working 
with  Sudan  and  other  donors  on  its  total 
needs.  This  will  mean  a  total  of  975,000 
tons  from  the  United  States  for  this 
year. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  8,  1985. 


npn;^rtmpnt  nf  l^tatp  Riillptir 


HE  PRESIDENT 


licaragua 
^^eace  Proposal 


RESIDENTS  REMARKS 
R.  4,  1985' 


/ant  to  aiiiiouin'e  today  a  proposal  for 
ice  in  Central  America  that  can 
able  liberty  and  democracy  to  prevail 
this  troubled  region  and  that  can  pro- 
t  the  security  of  our  own  borders, 
jnumy,  and  people. 
On  March  1  in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica, 
' '  i  leaders  of  the  Nicaraguan  demo- 
itic  resistance  met  with  a  broad  coali- 
n  of  other  exiled  Nicaragnan 
mocrats.  They  agreed  upon  and 
ned  a  historic  proposal  to  restore 
ace  and  democracy  in  their  country, 
le  members  of  the  democratic 
sistance  offered  a  cease-fire  in  return 
r  an  agreement  by  the  Nicaraguan 
gime  to  begin  a  dialogue  mediated  by 
e  Bishops'  Conference  of  the  Roman 
itholic  Church  with  the  goal  of  restor- 
y  democracy  through  honest  elections. 
)  date,  the  Nicaraguan  regime  has 
fused  this  offer. 
The  Central  American  countries,  in- 
ding  Nicaragua,  have  agreed  that  in- 
rnal  reconciliation  is  indispensable  to 
gional  peace.  But  we  know  that,  unlike 
'esident  Duarte  of  El  Salvador  who 
eks  a  dialogue  with  his  opponents,  the 
mmunists  in  Nicaragua  have  turned, 
least  up  until  now,  a  cold  shoulder  to 
!)peals  for  national  reconciliation  from 
e  Pope  and  the  Nicaraguan  bishops. 
nd  we  know  that  without  incentives, 
one  of  this  will  change. 

For  these  reasons,  great  numbers  of 
icaraguans  are  demanding  change  and 
Iking  up  arms  to  fight  for  the  stolen 
remise  of  freedom  and  democracy, 
iver  15,000  farmers,  small  merchants, 
Ihites,  blacks,  and  Miskito  Indians  have 
lited  to  struggle  for  a  true  democracy. 

We  supported  democracy  in  Nic- 
'agua  before,  and  we  support 
jmocracy  today.  We  supported  national 
conciliation  before,  and  we  support  it 
)day.  We  believe  that  democracy 
eserves  as  much  support  in  Nicaragua 
3  it  has  received  in  El  Salvador.  And 
e're  proud  of  the  help  that  we've  given 
El  Salvador. 

You  may  recall  that  in  1981,  we 
ere  told  that  the  communist  guerrillas 
7ere  mounting  a  final  offensive,  the 
overnment  had  no  chance,  and  our  ap- 
roach  would  lead  to  greater  American 


involvement.  Well,  our  critics  were 
wrong.  Democracy  and  freetiom  are  win- 
ning in  El  Salvador.  President  Duarte  is 
pulling  his  country  together  and  enjoys 
wide  support  from  the  people.  And  all  of 
this  with  America's  help  kept  strictly 
limited. 

The  formula  that  worked  in  El 
Salvador— support  for  democracy,  self- 
defense,  economic  development,  and 
dialogue — will  work  for  the  entire 
region.  And  we  couldn't  have  ac- 
complished this  without  bipartisan  sup- 
port in  Congress,  backed  up  by  the  Na- 
tional Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America,  headed  by  Henry  Kissinger. 
And  that's  why,  after  months  of  con- 
sulting with  congressional  leaders  and 
listening  carefully  to  their  concerns,  I 
am  making  the  following  proposal;  I'm 
calling  upon  both  sides  to  lay  down  their 
arms  and  accept  the  offer  of  church- 
mediated  talks  on  internationally  super- 
vised elections  and  an  end  to  the  repres- 
sion now  in  place  against  the  church,  the 
press,  and  individual  rights. 

To  the  members  of  the  democratic 
resistance,  I  ask  them  to  extend  their  of- 
fer of  a  cease-fire  until  June  1. 

To  the  Congress,  I  ask  for  im- 
mediate release  of  the  $14  million 
already  appropriated.  While  the  cease- 
fire offer  is  on  the  table,  I  pledge  these 
funds  will  not  be  used  for  arms  or  muni- 
tions. These  funds  will  be  used  for  food, 
clothing,  and  medicine  and  other  support 
for  survival.  The  democratic  opposition 
cannot  be  a  partner  in  negotiations 
without  these  basic  necessities. 

If  the  Sandinistas  accept  this  peace 
offer,  I  will  keep  my  funding  restrictions 
in  effect.  But  peace  negotiations  must 
not  become  a  cover  for  deception  and 
delay.  If  there  is  no  agreement  after  60 
days  of  negotiations,  I  will  lift  these 
restrictions,  unless  both  sides  ask  me 
not  to. 

I  want  to  emphasize  that  consistent 
with  the  21  goals  of  the  Contadora  proc- 
ess, the  United  States  continues  to  seek: 

1.  Nicaragua's  implementation  of  its 
commitment  to  democracy  made  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States; 

2.  An  end  to  Nicaragua's  aggression 
against  its  neighbors; 


3.  A  removal  of  the  thousands  of 
Soviet-bloc,  Cuban,  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization],  Libyan,  and 
other  military  and  security  personnel; 
and 

4.  A  return  of  the  Nicaraguan 
military  to  a  level  of  parity  with  their 
neighbors. 


Now,  later  today,  I  will  be  meeting 
with  Arturo  Cruz,  Adolpho  Calero,  and 
Alfonso  Robelo  [leaders  of  the 
Nicaraguan  opposition]  to  discuss  my 
proposal.  Democracy  is  the  road  to 
peace.  But  if  we  abandon  the  brave 
members  of  the  democratic  resistance, 
we  will  also  remove  all  constraints  on 
the  communists. 

Democracy  can  succeed  in  Central 
America,  but  Congress  must  release  the 
funds  that  can  create  incentives  for 
dialogue  and  peace.  If  we  provide  too  lit- 
tle help,  our  choice  will  be  a  communist 
Central  America  with  communist 
subversion  spreading  southward  and 
northward.  We  face  the  risk  that  100 
million  people  from  Panama  to  our  open 
southern  border  could  come  under  the 
control  of  pro-Soviet  regimes  and 
threaten  the  United  States  with 
violence,  economic  chaos,  and  a  human 
tidal  wave  of  refugees. 

Central  America  is  not  condemned 
to  that  dark  future  of  endless  violence. 
If  the  United  States  meets  its  obliga- 
tions to  help  those  now  striving  for 
democracy,  they  can  create  a  bright 
future  in  which  peace  for  all  Americans 
will  be  secure. 

So,  in  the  spirit  of  Easter,  let  us 
make  this  so.  I  look  forward  to  working 
with  the  Congress  on  this  important 
matter  in  the  coming  weeks. 


PRESIDENT'S  LETTER  TO 
CONTADORA  PRESIDENTS, 
APR.  4,  19852 


April  4,  1985 

Dear  Mr.  President: 

In  the  efforts  of  the  Contadora  group  to 
resolve  the  conflict  in  Central  America,  one 
key  objective  has  been  to  achieve  national 
reconciliation  in  those  countries  rent  by  inter- 
nal conflict.  In  El  Salvador,  President  Duarte 
has  taken  the  initiative  in  launching  a 
dialogue  with  the  guerrilla  forces  seeking  to 
overthrow  that  country's  democratic  govern- 
ment; in  Guatemala,  which  has  been  the 
scene  of  decades  of  strife,  hope  for  national 
reconciliation  has  been  kindled  by  the  interest 
of  a  broad  spectrum  of  parties  in  partici- 
pating in  elections  later  this  year. 

Only  in  Nicaragua  have  we  seen  efforts 
to  promote  national  reconciliation  frustrated 
by  the  government's  negative  response.  I 


une1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


believe  we  now  have  an  important  new  op- 
portunity to  promote  peace  and  reconciliation 
in  Nicaragua. 

As  you  are  aware,  the  principal  leaders  of 
Nicaragua's  democratic  opposition  groups 
signed  a  declaration  on  March  1,  1985,  in  San 
Jose,  Costa  Rica,  in  which  they  offered  a 
ceasefire  in  return  for  agreement  by  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  to  a  dialogue 
mediated  by  the  Bishops  Conference  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church.  This  offer 
represents  a  bold  and  important  initiative 
which  I  believe  the  United  States  and  the 
Contadora  countries  should  work  together  to 
promote. 

My  government  intends  to  take  action 
designed  to  strengthen  Nicaragua's 
democratic  resistance  forces  while  encourag- 
ing the  Sandinista  regime  to  agree  to  Church- 
mediated  dialogue.  I  have  asked  Congress  to 
make  available  $14  million  for  the  Nica- 
raguan democratic  resistance  forces.  On 
Thursday,  April  4,  I  plan  to  announce  to  the 
American  people  that  I  will  use  these  funds 
only  for  humanitarian  assistance  while  the 
democratic  opposition's  March  1  call  for 
dialogue  remains  in  effect.  I  will  ask  the 
democratic  opposition  to  extend  their  offer 
until  June  1.  If  the  Nicaraguan  government 
accepts  the  offer  of  dialogue  with  the  opposi- 
tion, then  my  government's  assistance  will  re- 
main limited  to  humanitarian  purposes  for  a 


sufficient  period  to  allow  a  serious  dialogue 
to  achieve  progress.  If  the  Sandinistas  do  not 
respond  positively  to  the  March  1  offer  or,  if 
60  days  after  the  offer  of  dialogue  is  accepted 
no  agreement  has  resulted,  I  will  lift  this 
restriction  on  U.S.  assistance  unless  both  par- 
ties ask  me  to  keep  it  in  effect. 

Mr.  President,  I  am  informing  you  of  my 
actions  before  I  announce  them  to  the 
American  people  because  I  know  the  impor- 
tance you  attach  to  obtaining  a  negotiated 
settlement  of  the  conflict  in  Central  America 
on  the  basis  of  verified  implementation  of  all 
of  the  twenty-one  Contadora  objectives.  I 
believe  this  proposal  for  peace  and  democracy 
in  Nicaragua  can  contribute  toward  achieving 
the  key  objective  of  national  reconciliation  in 
that  country. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reacan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  8,  198.5. 

'^Identical  letters  addressed  to  Presidents 
Belisario  Betancur  Cuartas  (Colombia), 
Miguel  de  la  Madrid  Hurtado  (Mexico),  Jorge 
Enrique  Illueca  Sibauste  (Panama),  and  Jaime 
Lusinchi  (Venezuela).  Text  released  Apr.  22, 
198.5,  and  printed  in  the  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  29.  ■ 


President  Meets  With 
Central  American  Leaders 


President  Reagan's  remarks  in  a 
meeting  with  Central  American  leaders 
in  the  Old  Executive  Office  Building  on 
March  25.  1985.^ 

Welcome  all  of  you  to  the  White  House. 
And  I  want  to  express  my  deepest  ap- 
preciation to  you,  the  Concerned 
Citizens  for  Democracy;  to  Carlos  Perez, 
who  helped  you  organize  your  Spirit  of 
Freedom  Flight;  and  to  the  Jefferson 
Educational  Foundation,  your  hosts  here 
in  Washington.  We  welcome  you  as 
neighbors,  and  we  welcome  you  as 
fellovt'  Americans.  You  represent  the 
countries  of  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  El 
Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras, 
Nicaragua,  Panama,  and  Venezuela.  And 
you've  come  to  Washington  at  your  own 
expense  to  share  with  us  and  our  Con- 
gress the  most  compelling  truth  of  our 
time:  the  dream  of  a  bright  future  for 
democracy,  economic  progress,  and 
stiibility  in  this  hemisphere.  And  it's  all 


within  our  grasp.  But  that  dream  can 
quickly  become  a  nightmare  if  we  don't 
stand  behind  the  brave  men  who  are 
putting  their  lives  on  the  line  for  the 
cause  of  freedom  in  Nicaragua. 

We,  the  people  of  the  Americas, 
share  a  common  language;  it's  the 
language  of  freedom.  Words  like 
"democracia,"  "justicia" — [laughter] — I 
didn't  do  that  right — and  "liberty"  were 
handed  down  to  us  by  the  heroes  that 
we  share  and  honor  together,  Simon 
Bolivar  and  George  Washington.  And 
they  gave  us  values  that  we  cherish  and 
strive  to  live  by  today:  faith  in  a  God  of 
truth,  love,  mercy;  belief  in  the  family  as 
the  center  of  our  society;  recognition  of 
the  inalienable  rights  of  man;  and  a  con- 
viction that  government  must  derive  its 
legitimacy  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed. 

And  so  it  is  that  the  United  SUites 
has  a  noble  commitment  to  Central 
America.  We're  committed  by 


geography,  by  treaty,  and  by  moral 
obligation  to  stand  with  you,  our 
American  neighbors,  in  defense  of  liber- 
ty.' 

But  the  Soviet  Union  has  its  own 
plan  for  Central  America,  a  region 
which  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromykc 
described  as  "boiling  like  a  cauldron."  Ir 
the  last  5  years,  the  Soviets  have  pro- 
vided more  military  assistance  to  Cuba 
and  Nicaragua  alone  than  the  United 
States  has  provided  to  all  of  Latin 
America.  The  Soviets'  plan  is  designed 
to  crush  self-determination  of  free  peo- 
ple, to  crush  democracy  in  Costa  Rica, 
Honduras,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  and 
Panama.  It's  a  plan  to  turn  Central 
America  into  a  Soviet  beachhead  of  ag- 
gression that  could  spread  terror  and  in 
stability  north  and  south,  disrupt  our 
vital  sealanes,  cripple  our  ability  to  carr; 
out  our  commitments  to  our  European 
allies,  and  send  tens  of  millions  of 
refugees  streaming  in  a  human  tidal 
wave  across  all  our  borders. 

Already,  the  Nicaraguan  people  are 
fleeing  the  Sandinista  tyranny,  escaping 
into  your  neighboring  countries.  In  just 
the  last  few  weeks,  thousands  of 
Nicaraguans  have  fled  to  Costa  Rica. 
They  tell  of  rising  resistance  to  the  San- 
dinista dictatorship,  a  dictatorship  that 
speaks  reassuring  words  of  peace  to  the 
outside  world,  even  as  it  has  moved  to 
crush  personal  freedoms,  attack  the 
church,  nearly  wipe  out  an  entire 
culture— the  Miskito  Indians— sum- 
marily execute  suspected  dissidents, 
drive  leading  democrats  into  exile,  and 
force  young  boys  to  defend  the  revolu- 
tion while  Soviet-bloc  advisers  sit  in 
Managua  living  off  the  people. 

Just  last  week  the  Sandinistas 
started  the  forced  movement  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  people  from  Jinotega  and 
Murra  in  order  to  create  "free  fire 
zones."  And  they're  using  Stalin's  tactic 
of  Gulag  relocation  for  those  who  do  not 
support  their  tyrannical  regime. 

How  many  times  have  we  seen  this 
pattern  of  forced  relocation  repeated — 
in  the  Ukraine,  in  Vietnam,  in  Cam- 
bodia, Afghanistan,  Angola,  Ethiopia, 
Cuba,  and  elsewhere'?  And  yet  because 
we're  such  a  trusting  people,  anxious  to 
believe  others  and  believe  that  they 
share  our  hopes  and  our  dreams,  some 
still  find  it  hard  to  look  reality  in  the  eye 
or  to  rouse  themselves  even  when  our 
most  vital  interests  are  threatened. 

The  United  States  was  on  the  side  of 
democracy  during  the  fight  against 
Somoza,  and  we're  on  the  side  of 
democracv  today.  When  the  Sandinistas 


■' 


10 


Dfinartmpnt  of  ."^tatp  Riillptin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


,me  to  power  promising  democracy,  we 
ive  them  more  aid  than  any  other 
(veloped  country — $119  million  from 
179  to  1981,  plus  support  for  $244 
illion  more  from  the  Inter-American 
evelopment  Bank.  How  did  they  re- 
lond  to  America's  outstretched  hand  of 
iendship,  trust,  and  generosity? 

Well,  the  Sandinistas  became,  as 
ey  had  always  planned,  eager  puppets 
r  the  Soviets  and  the  Culians.  They 
eated  their  own  Karl  Marx  postage 
amps.  They  sang  an  anthem  that 
lied  the  United  States  the  enemy  of  all 
ankind.  They  brought  in  East  Germans 
I  organize  their  state  security.  They 
>came  a  rubber  stamp  for  the  com- 
unist  bloc  in  the  United  Nations, 
)ting  against  the  democracies  on  vir- 
lally  every  crucial  issue,  from  refusing 
1  condemn  Vietnam's  invasion  of  Cam- 
)dia  to  not  accepting  Israel's  creden- 
als. 

While  the  United  States  was  offer- 
g  friendship  and  providing  un- 
"ecedented  sums  of  aid,  the  Sandinistas 
lere  building  up  an  army  that  dwarfed 
id  bullied  their  neighbors.  While 
mericans  were  debating  the  San- 
nistas  true  intentions,  Tomas  Borge, 
le  Sandinista  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
Iho  received  his  training  from  the 
Dviets,  Cubans,  and  PLO  [Palestine 
iberation  Organization],  was  saying, 
lou  cannot  be  a  true  revolutionary  in 
iatin  America  without  lieing  Marxist- 
eninist."  Well,  while  we  were  bending 
i/er  backward  to  be  friendly  and 
elpful,  the  Sandinistas  were  already 
imspiring  to  bring  communist  revolu- 
on  to  all  of  Central  America. 

As  far  back  as  1969,  they  pledged  to 
■■truggle  for  a  true  union  of  the  Central 
imerican  peoples  within  one  country, 
pginning  with  support  for  national 
Deration  movements  in  neighboring 
tates."  Once  in  power  in  Nicaragua, 
ney  began  working  for  their  revolution, 
ithout  frontiers,  in  which  small, 
pmocratic,  unarmed  Costa  Rica  would 
p — and  I  quote  their  words— "the 
2sert."  Well,  today  the  PLO  is  honored 
ith  an  embassy  in  Managua.  And,  in 
(ddition  to  their  close  ties  with  the 
loviets,  Cubans,  and  East  Germans,  the 
andinistas  receive  support  from 
luigaria,  Vietnam,  and  North  Korea. 
he  radical  states  of  Iran  and  Libya  also 
ave  established  military  ties  with  the 
.andinistas  in  a  "new"  Nicaragua,  which 
Use  harbors  members  of  the  Red 
trigades,  the  ETA  [a  Basque  group], 
nd  other  terrorist  organizations. 


And  all  this  is  taking  place  only  a 
few  hundred  miles  from  our  shores.  The 
Sandinistas  are  masking  these  deeds 
behind  well-rehearsed  rhetoric  of  disin- 
formation intended  to  lull  the  world  in 
the  weeks  ahead.  But  you  know  their 
true  intentions.  You  know  what  hap- 
pened when  a  broad  coalition  of  exiled 
Nicaraguan  democrats  recently  met  in 
San  Jose  and  offered  to  lay  down  their 
weapons,  if  only  the  Sandinistas  would 
accept  democracy  and  free  elections. 
The  Sandinistas  not  only  refused,  but 
their  state  security  rounded  up  the 
editor  of  La  Prern^a.  the  president  of  the 
Private  Enterprise  Council,  and  other 
leading  democrats  in  Managua  and 
threatened:  If  you  meet  with  the 
members  of  the  San  Jose  group,  then 
"you  will  suffer  the  consequences." 

Well,  hasn't  the  time  come  for  all 
freedom-loving  people  to  unite  in  de- 
manding an  end  to  the  Sandinista  in- 
timidation? 

And,  you  know — look,  Nicaraguan 
freedom  fighters  don't  ask  us  to  send 
troops;  indeed,  none  are  needed,  for  the 
Nicaraguan  people  are  coming  over  to 
their  side  in  ever-greater  numbers.  The 
freedom  fighters  have  grown  to  a  force 
more  than  two  times  bigger  than  the 
Sandinistas  were  before  they  seized 
power.  Their  freedom  fighters  are  peo- 
ple of  the  land;  they're  the  true  revolu- 
tionaries. They  are  the  hope  for  a  future 
of  democracy,  and  with  our  help, 
democracy  can  and  will  be  restored. 

There  are  two  among  you  here 
today — Senor  Alberto  Suhr  and  Senor 
Carlos  Garcia — who  have  personally  suf- 
fered the  full  range  of  Sandinista  in- 
sults, persecution,  and  imprisonment. 
Alberto  Suhr  was  jailed  for  helping  to 
identify  missing  persons  the  Sandinistas 
had  hidden  in  prisons.  Carlos  Garcia,  a 
leading  figure  in  the  international  world 
of  baseball,  was  imprisoned  for  1,640 
days  on  totally  trumped-up  charges. 

Their  story,  just  like  your  journey,  is 
a  profile  in  courage.  We  can  only  be 
thankful  for  all  of  you  who  care  enough 
to  speak  the  truth.  And  we  can  only 
pray  that  all  who  hold  the  fate  of 
freedom  in  their  hands  will  heed  your 
words  before  it  is  too  late.  Let  it  never 
be  said  that  we  were  not  told,  that  we 
were  not  warned,  that  we  did  not  know. 

Thank  you  all  for  being  here.  God 
bless  you  all. 

[At  this  point,  the  President  was  pre- 
sented with  a  statement  of  appreciation 
and  a  recording  of  "America  Immortal." 
Mr.  Suhr  and  Mr.  Garcia  made  the 
presentations  on  behalf  of  Concerned 
Citizens  for  Democracy.] 


Thank  you  all.  I'm  greatly  honored, 
and  I  appreciate  this  more  than  i  can 
say.  And  your  words  there — I'm  just  go- 
ing to  take  a  second  and  tell  you  a  little 
experience — a  few  years  ago  when  I 
made  my  trip  down  into  your  countries, 
in  Costa  Rica.  And  I  was  invited  to 
speak,  and  I  think  mainly  the  audience 
was  made  Uf)  of  the  legislature  there. 
And  before  I  could  start  to  speak,  a 
gentleman  rose  and  started  making  a 
speech  at  me.  And  I  wasn't  familiar 
enough  with  the  language  to  know  just 
what  was  going  on.  And  your  statement 
about  peasants  and  the  poor  and  the 
people  who  really  are  on  the  side  of 
freedom,  when  we  hear  so  much  from 
some  others — that  they  represent  those 
people. 

I  stepped  back  and  asked  the  Presi- 
dent, and  he  told  me  that  this  man  was 
a  member  of  the  legislature,  he  was  a 
communist  member  of  the  legislature, 
and  that  he  was  making  a  communist 
speech.  Well,  in  the  pride  and 
democracy  that  so  characterizes  Costa 
Ricans,  they  resisted  any  effort  to,  by 
force,  keep  him  from  speaking.  But  I 
also  thought  it  was  interesting  that  the 
President  told  me  he  was  the  only 
member  of  their  legislature  that  drove  a 
Mercedes.  [Laughter] 


'Text  frrim  the  Weekly  Compilation  nf 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  1,  1985 
(opening  remarks  omitted  here).  ■ 


Central  America 


President  Rengnna  radio  address  to 
the  nation  on  March  30.  1985.^ 

This  week  the  House  joined  the  Senate 
in  approving  production  of  the  MX 
Peacekeeper  missile  and  sent  an  impor- 
tant signal;  America  will  maintain  deter- 
rence by  modernizing  our  strategic 
forces,  and  we  will  stand  united  behind 
our  negotiating  team  at  the  arms  talks 
in  Geneva.  And  by  strengthening  deter- 
rence, we  can  ensure  those  weapons  are 
never  used  and  meet  a  crucial  challenge 
to  our  shared  bipartisan  responsibility 
for  preserving  people. 

But  another  crucial  challenge  must 
be  squarely  faced.  It's  a  challenge  that  I 
and  members  of  my  Administration  will 
be  presenting  to  you  with  the  utmost 
seriousness  in  the  days  ahead,  for  it 
goes  to  the  heart  of  American  security. 
I'm  talking  about  the  Soviet-Cuban- 


11 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Nicaraguan  plan  to  destroy  the  fragile 
flower  of  democracy  and  force  com- 
munism on  our  small  Central  American 
neighbors — a  plan  that  could,  for  the 
first  time,  bring  tyranny  to  our  own 
borders,  carrying  the  same  specter  of 
economic  chaos,  the  same  threat  of 
political  terrorism,  the  same  floodtides 
of  refugees  we've  seen  follow  every  com- 
munist takeover  from  Eastern  Europe 
to  Afghanistan,  Laos,  Vietnam,  Cam- 
bodia, Ethiopia,  and,  now.  Central 
America. 

A  key  Soviet  objective  has  long  been 
to  turn  Central  America  into  a  beach- 
head for  subversion.  By  tying  us  down 
in  this  hemisphere,  by  penetrating  our 
vital  sealanes  and  crippling  our  ability  to 
meet  our  commitments  worldwide,  the 
Soviets  will  find  it  much  easier  to  in- 
timidate other  nations  and  to  expand 
their  empire. 

I  know  many  well-intentioned  people 
would  rather  not  accept  these  facts.  But 
we  who  have  the  responsibility  for 
governing  cannot  afford  to  be  ostriches 
with  our  heads  in  the  sand. 

Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
described  the  region  on  our  doorstep  as 
"boiling  like  a  cauldron"  and  urged 
revolution.  We  know  that  the  Soviets 
turned  Grenada  into  a  warehouse  of 
violence.  They  did  this  in  the  last  5 


years,  and  they  provided  more  military 
assistance  to  Cuba  and  Nicaragua  than 
we  did  to  all  of  Latin  America.  And  we 
know  that  the  support  Nicaragua  gets 
from  Cuba,  Bulgaria,  East  Germany, 
North  Korea,  Libya,  the  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization],  and  Iran  is  a 
threat  to  our  society,  because  the  dic- 
tators of  Cuba  and  Nicaragua  have  not 
only  pledged  to  spread  communism, 
they've  been  caught — forgive  me — 
redhanded  trying  to  do  just  that. 

Right  now  Havana  and  Managua  are 
waging  a  campaign  of  disinformation  to 
cover  up  their  deeds  and  reassure  the 
American  people  with  soft  words  of 
peace.  A  secret  Nicaraguan  memo 
leaked  to  The  Wall  Street  Journal  and 
reported  yesterday  revealed  how  the 
communists  have  used  propaganda  to 
smear  their  opponents,  tighten  censor- 
ship, and  confuse  the  outside  world. 

There  are  other  examples  of  the 
regime's  true  intent.  On  March  1st, 
exiled  Nicaraguan  leaders,  representing 
a  broad  pro-democracy  movement,  met 
in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica,  and  made  this 
offer:  The  freedom  fighters  in  Nicaragua 
would  agree  to  a  cease-fire  if  the  com- 
munist regime  will  negotiate,  permit 
free  elections  and  genuine  democracy. 
The  answer  came  back  quick,  loud,  and 
clear;  Forget  it. 


U.S.  support  for  the  freedom 
fighters  is  morally  right  and  intimately 
linked  to  our  own  security.  If  we  refuse 
to  help  their  just  cause,  if  we  pull  the 
plug  and  allow  the  freedom  fighters  to 
be  wiped  out  by  the  same  helicopter 
giinships  the  Soviets  are  using  to 
murder  thousands  of  Afghans,  then  oui 
ultimate  price  to  protect  peace,  freedor 
and  our  way  of  life  will  be  dear  indeed. 

Nearly  24  years  ago.  President  Ker 
nedy,  warning  against  communist 
penetration  in  our  hemisphere,  said,  "1 
want  it  clearly  understood  that  this 
government  will  not  hesitate  in  meetini 
its  primary  obligations,  which  are  to  th 
security  of  our  nation." 

Well,  for  my  part,  I  want  it  clearly 
understood  today  that  if  we  fail  to  mee 
this  obligation,  then  history  will  hold  uj 
fully  accountable  to  the  consequences, 
for  we  will  send  an  unmistakable  signal 
that  the  greatest  power  in  the  world  is 
unwilling  and  incapable  of  stopping  con 
munist  aggression  in  our  own  backyan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  8,  1985 
(opening  remarks  omitted  here).  ■ 


12 


npnartmpnt  nf  .'^tatp  Riillpti 


HE  SECRETARY 


The  Meaning  of  Vietnam 


Srrretary  Shultz's  address  at  the 
jHirtment  of  Stale  of  April  25,  1985^ 

1st  a  few  hundred  yards  from  here 
jaiiiis  the  Vietnam  Veterans  Memorial. 
s  stark  beauty  is  a  reminder  of  the 
•aring  experience  our  country  went 
rough  in  its  longest  war.  From  a  win- 
'w  of  my  office  I  can  see  the  crowds  of 
■opie— veterans,  families,  old  and 
'img— coming  to  search  for  names  on 
o  lilack  granite  slabs,  or  to  search 
til-  souls  in  meditation.  It  is  more  than 
;  memorial;  it  is  a  living  human  tribute 
king  place  day  after  day.  This  is  not 
Mi'lirising.  That  war  left  its  mark  on  all 

0  .American  people. 

There  are  three  dozen  names  that  do 
)t  appear  on  that  memorial.  Instead, 
t'v  are  here  in  this  diplomatic  en- 
aiice,  on  our  own  roll  of  honor.  Many 
vilians  served  in  Southeast  Asia— from 
I'  State  Department,  AID  [Agency  for 
itt-rnational  Development],  USIA 
Inited  States  Information  Agency],  and 
her  agencies.  Many  of  you  here  today 
ere  among  them.  While  the  war  raged, 
)u  were  trying  to  build  peace— working 
r  land  reform,  for  public  health  and 
onomic  progress,  for  constitutional 
>velopment,  for  public  information,  for 
negotiated  end  to  the  war.  I  am  here 

pay  tribute  to  you. 

The  10th  anniversary  of  the  fall  of 
idochina  is  an  occasion  for  all  of  us,  as 
nation,  to  reflect  on  the  meaning  of 
lat  experience.  As  the  fierce  emotions 
■  that  time  subside,  perhaps  our  coun- 
y  has  a  better  chance  now  of  assessing 
le  war  and  its  impact.  This  is  not  mere- 

a  historical  exercise.  Our  understand- 
g  of  the  past  affects  our  conduct  in  the 
-esent,  and  thus,  in  part,  determines 
ir  future. 

Let  me  discuss  what  has  happened 

1  Southeast  Asia,  and  the  world,  since 
?75;  what  light  those  postwar  events 
led  on  the  war  itself;  and  what 
devance  all  this  has  to  our  foreign 
Dlicy  today. 

ndochina  Since  1975 

he  first  point— and  it  stands  out  for  all 
J  see— is  that  the  communist  subjection 
f  Indochina  has  fulfilled  the  worst 
redictions  of  the  time.  The  bloodshed 
nd  misery  that  communist  rule  wrought 


in  South  Vietnam,  and  in  Cambodia  and 
Laos,  add  yet  another  grim  chapter  to 
the  catalog  of  agony  of  the  20th  century. 

Since  197.5,  over  1  million  refugees 
have  fled  South  Vietnam  to  escape  the 
new  tyranny.  In  1978,  Hanoi  decided  to 
encourage  the  flight  of  refugees  by  boat. 
At  its  height  in  the  spring  of  1979,  the 
exodus  of  these  "boat  people"  reached 
over  40,000  a  month.  Tens,  perhaps  hun- 
dreds, of  thousands  never  made  it  to 
safety  and  today  lie  beneath  the  South 
China  Sea.  Others  managed  to  survive 
pirate  attacks  and  other  hardships  at  sea 
in  their  journey  to  freedom.  We  have 
welcomed  more  than  730,000  Indo- 
chinese  refugees  to  our  shores.  The 
work  of  people  in  this  Department  has 
saved  countless  lives.  Your  dedication  to 
the  refugees  of  Indochina  marks  one  of 
the  shining  moments  of  the  Foreign 
Service. 

In  addition  to  "boat  people,"  Hanoi 
has  given  the  world  its  own  version  of 
the  "reeducation  camp."  When  the  North 
Vietnamese  Army  conquered  the  south, 
it  rounded  up  officials  and  supporters  of 
the  South  Vietnamese  Government,  as 
well  as  other  suspected  opponents.  Many 
were  executed  or  disappeared  forever. 
Hundreds  of  thousands  were  sent  to 
these  camps,  suffering  hard  labor,  indoc- 
trination, and  violent  mistreatment.  To 
this  day,  upward  of  10,000  remain  im- 
prisoned. They  include  Buddhist  and 
Christian  clergy  and  intellectuals,  as 
well  as  former  political  figures.  Accord- 
ing to  refugee  reports,  they  face  indeter- 
minate sentences,  receive  food  rations 
below  subsistence  levels,  are  denied 
basic  medical  care,  and  are  punished 
severely  for  even  minor  infractions  of 
camp  rules— punishment  often  resulting 
in  permanent  injury  or  death. 

Hanoi  has  asserted  for  years  that  it 
will  let  these  prisoners  go  if  only  we 
would  take  them  all.  Last  fall.  President 
Reagan  offered  to  bring  all  genuine 
political  prisoners  to  freedom  in  the 
United  States.  Now,  Hanoi  no  longer 
adheres  to  its  original  proposal. 

Another  communist  practice  has 
been  to  relocate  people  in  so-called  new 
economic  zones.  In  the  years  after  the 
fall  of  Saigon,  hundreds  of  thousands 
were  uprooted  and  forced  into  these 
isolated  and  barren  rural  areas  to  ex- 
pand agricultural  production  and  reduce 
"unproductive"  urban  populations.  Many 
have  fled  the  zones,  returning  to  the 


cities  to  live  in  hiding,  without  the  ration 
or  neighborhood  registration  cards 
needed  to  get  food  or  jobs.  Indeed,  no 
one  in  Vietnam  may  change  residence  or 
place  of  work  without  permission,  and 
unauthorized  absences  open  whole 
families  to  arrest. 

The  24  million  people  of  South  Viet- 
nam are  now  victims  of  a  totalitarian 
state,  before  which  they  stand  naked 
without  the  protection  of  a  single  human 
right.  As  Winston  Churchill  said  of 
another  communist  state,  they  have 
been  "frozen  in  an  indefinite  winter  of 
subhuman  doctrine  and  superhuman 
tyranny." 

Compare  conditions  in  Vietnam 
under  10  years  of  communist  rule  with 
conditions  in  the  South  Vietnam  we 
fought  to  defend.  The  South  Vietnamese 
Government  accepted  the  principles  of 
free  elections,  freedom  of  speech,  of  the 
press,  and  of  association.  From  1967  to 
1971  the  South  Vietnamese  people  voted 
in  nine  elections;  opposition  parties 
played  a  major  role  in  the  assembly. 
Before  1975  there  were  27  daily  news- 
papers, some  200  journals  of  opinion  and 
scholarship,  3  television  and  2  dozen 
radio  stations,  all  operating  in  relative 
freedom. 

No,  South  Vietnam  was  not  a  Jeffer- 
sonian  democracy  with  full  civil  liberties 
by  American  standards.  But  there  was  a 
vigorous,  pluralist  political  process,  and 
the  government  intruded  little  into  the 
private  lives  of  the  people.  They  enjoyed 
religious  freedom  and  ethnic  tolerance, 
and  there  were  few  restrictions  on 
cultural  or  intellectual  life.  The  trans- 
gressions of  the  Thieu  government  pale 
into  insignificance  next  to  the  system- 
atic, ideologically  impelled  despotism  of 
the  regime  that  replaced  it. 

The  neutralist  government  in  neigh- 
boring Laos  was  swiftly  taken  over  in 
1975  by  local  communists  loyal  to  Hanoi. 
As  in  Vietnam,  thousands  of  former  of- 
ficials were  sent  to  "reeducation  camps." 
Fifty  thousand  Vietnamese  troops  re- 
main in  Laos  to  ensure  the  "irreversibili- 
ty" of  communist  control— in  Hanoi's 
version  of  the  Brezhnev  doctrine— and 
thousands  of  Vietnamese  advisers  are  in 
place  to  monitor  Laos'  own  "socialist 
transformation." 

Hmong  villagers  in  Laos  who 
resisted  communist  control  were  sup- 
pressed by  a  military  juggernaut  that 
relied  on  chemical  weapons  produced 
and  supplied  by  the  Soviet  Union  in 
violation  of  international  treaties.  Six 
decades  of  international  restraints  on 
chemical  warfare  have  been  dangerously 
eroding  in  recent  years,  and  "yellow 


une1985 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


rain"  in  Indochina  was  the  first  major 
breach— yellow  rain,  another  addition  to 
our  vocabulary  from  post-1975  In- 
dochina. 

Finally,  in  Cambodia,  the  worst  hor- 
ror of  all:  the  genocide  of  at  least  1 
million  Cambodians  by  the  Khmer 
Rouge,  who  also  took  power  10  years 
ago  this  month.  The  Khmer  Rouge 
emptied  the  cities  and  murdered  the 
educated;  they  set  out  to  destroy  tradi- 
tional Cambodian  society  and  to  con- 
struct a  wholly  new  and  "pure"  society 
on  the  ruins  of  the  old.  A  French  Jesuit 
who  witnessed  the  early  phases  of  com- 
munist rule  called  it  "a  perfect  example 
of  the  application  of  an  ideology  pushed 
to  the  furthest  limit  of  its  internal  logic." 
We  say  at  least  1  million  dead.  Maybe  it 
was  2  million.  The  suffering  and  misery 
represented  by  such  numbers  are  beyond 
our  ability  to  comprehend.  Our  imagina- 
tions are  confined  by  the  limits  of  the 
civilized  life  we  know. 

In  December  1978,  Vietnam  went  to 
war  with  its  erstwhile  partners  and 
overthrew  the  Khmer  Rouge  regime. 
Naturally,  some  Cambodians  at  first 
welcomed  the  Vietnamese  as  liberators. 
But  as  the  Vietnamese  invaders  came  to 
apply  in  Cambodia  the  techniques  of 
repression  known  all  too  well  to  the  peo- 
ple of  Vietnam,  resistance  in  Cambodia 
grew. 

In  1979,  Cambodia  was  ravaged  by 
widespread  famine  that  killed  tens,  if 
not  hundreds,  of  thousands.  Vietnam 
bears  much  responsibility  for  this 
famine.  Its  invasion  prevented  the  plant- 
ing of  the  1979  rice  crop;  its  army 
adopted  scorched-earth  tactics  in  pur- 
suing the  retreating  Khmer  Rouge. 
Many  will  recall  how  the  Vietnamese 
obstructed  international  relief  programs 
and  refused  to  cooperate  with  the  ef- 
forts of  the  Red  Cross  and  others  to 
establish  a  "land  bridge"  of  trucks  to 
bring  relief  into  the  country  from 
Thailand. 

Today,  Cambodia  is  ruled  by  a  pup- 
pet regime  stiffened  by  a  cadre  of  hun- 
dreds of  former  Khmer  Rouge;  it  is 
headed  by  Heng  Samrin,  a  former 
Khmer  Rouge  himself.  The  Vietnamese 
shell  refugee  camps  along  the  Thai 
border  in  their  attempt  to  smash  the 
resistance. 

Hanoi's  leaders  are  thus  extending 
their  rule  to  the  full  boundaries  of  the 
former  colonial  domain,  seeking  domin- 
ion over  all  of  Indochina.  Not  only  do 
the  Vietnamese  threaten  Thailand— the 
Soviets,  with  naval  and  air  bases  at  Cam 
Ranh  Bay,  are  now  better  able  to  pro- 
ject their  power  in  the  Pacific,  Southeast 
Asian,  and  Indian  Ocean  regions  and  to 


threaten  vital  Western  lines  of  com- 
munication in  all  these  regions.  Cam 
Ranh  is  now  the  center  of  the  largest 
concentration  of  Soviet  naval  units  out- 
side the  U.S.S.R. 

Retrospective:  The  Moral  Issue 

What  does  all  this  mean?  Events  since 
1975  shed  light  on  the  past:  this  horror 
was  precisely  what  we  were  trying  to 
prevent.  The  President  has  called  our  ef- 
fort a  noble  cause,  and  he  was  right. 
Whatever  mistakes  in  how  the  war  was 
fought,  whatever  one's  view  of  the 
strategic  rationale  for  our  intervention, 
the  morality  of  our  effort  must  now  be 
clear.  Those  Americans  who  served,  or 
who  grieve  for  their  loved  ones  lost  or 
missing,  can  hold  their  heads  high:  our 
sacrifice  was  in  the  service  of  noble 
ideals— to  save  innocent  people  from 
brutal  tyranny.  Ellsworth  Bunker  used 
to  say:  no  one  who  dies  for  freedom  ever 
dies  in  vain. 

We  owe  all  our  Vietnam  veterans  a 
special  debt.  They  fought  with  courage 
and  skill  under  more  difficult  conditions 
than  Americans  in  any  war  before  them. 
They  fought  with  a  vague  and  uncertain 
mission  against  a  tenacious  enemy.  They 
fought  knowing  that  part  of  the  nation 
opposed  their  efforts.  They  suffered 
abuse  when  they  came  home.  But  like 
their  fathers  before  them,  they  fought 
for  what  Americans  have  always  fought 
for:  freedom,  human  dignity,  and  justice. 
They  are  heroes.  They  honored  their 
country,  and  we  should  show  them  our 
gratitude. 

And  when  we  speak  of  honor  and 
gratitude,  we  speak  again  of  our 
prisoners  of  war— and  of  the  nearly 
2,500  men  who  remain  missing.  We  will 
not  rest  until  we  have  received  the 
fullest  possible  accounting  of  the  fate  of 
these  heroes. 

Retrospective:  The  Strategic  Price 

We  left  Indochina  in  1975,  but  the  cost 
of  failure  was  high.  The  price  was  paid, 
in  the  first  instance,  by  the  more  than 
30  million  people  we  left  behind  to  fall 
under  communist  rule.  But  America,  and 
the  world,  paid  a  price. 

Our  domestic  divisions  weakened  us. 
The  war  consumed  precious  defense 
resources,  and  the  assault  on  defense 
spending  at  home  compounded  the  cost; 
years  of  crucial  defense  investment  were 
lost,  while  the  Soviets  continued  the 
steady  military  buildup  they  launched 
after  the  Cuban  missile  crisis.  These 


wasted  years  are  what  necessitated  oui !« 
recent  defense  buildup  to  restore  the 
global  balance. 

For  a  time,  the  United  States 
retreated  into  introspection,  self-doubt, 
and  hesitancy.  Some  Americans  tended 
to  think  that  American  power  was  the 
source  of  the  world's  problems,  and  tha 
the  key  to  peace  was  to  limit  our  actio? 
in  the  world.  So  we  imposed  all  sorts  o 
restrictions  on  ourselves.  Vietnam — an( 
Watergate— left  a  legacy  of  congres- 
sional restrictions  on  presidential  flex- 
ibility, now  embedded  in  our  legislation 
Not  only  the  War  Powers  Resolution  bi 
a  host  of  constraints  on  foreign  aid, 
arms  exports,  intelligence  activities,  an 
other  aspects  of  policy— these  weakenei 
the  ability  of  the  President  to  act  and  t 
conduct  foreign  policy,  and  they 
weakened  our  country.  Thus  we  pulled 
back  from  global  leadership. 

Our  retreat  created  a  vacuum  that 
was  exploited  by  our  adversaries.  The 
Soviets  concluded  that  the  global  "cor- 
relation of  forces"  was  shifting  in  their 
favor.  They  took  advantage  of  our  in- 
hibitions and  projected  their  power  to 
unprecedented  lengths:  intervening  in 
Angola,  in  Ethiopia,  in  South  Yemen, 
and  in  Afghanistan.  The  Iranian  hostag 
crisis  deepened  our  humiliation. 

American  weakness  turned  out  to  t 
the  most  destabilizing  factor  on  the 
global  scene.  The  folly  of  isolationism 
was  again  revealed.  Once  again  it  was 
demonstrated— the  hard  way— that 
American  engagement,  American 
strength,  and  American  leadership  are 
indispensable  to  peace.  A  strong 
America  makes  the  world  a  safer  place 

Where  We  Are  Today 

Today,  there  are  some  more  positive 
trends.  In  Asia,  the  contrast  between 
communist  Indochina  and  the  rest  of  th 
region  is  striking.  Indochina  is  an 
economic  wreck;  the  countries  of 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  are  advancing 
economically.  In  1982,  their  per  capita 
income  averaged  $770;  Vietnam's  was 
$160.  ASEAN  is  a  model  of  regional 
cooperation.  It  is  now  our  fifth  largest 
trading  partner.  In  the  past  5  years, 
total  U.S.  trade  with  East  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  surpassed  our  trade  with  any 
other  region  of  the  world.  Our  relations 
with  Japan  remain  excellent  and  our  tie 
with  China  are  expanding.  The  regional 
picture  is  clouded  by  the  growing  Soviet 
military  presence  and  by  Vietnam's  con- 
tinuing aggression.  But  a  sense  of  com- 
munity among  the  Pacific  nations  is 


14 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletir 


THE  SECRETARY 


wing.  A  decade  after  the  war, 
erica  is  restoring  its  position  in  Asia. 
At  home,  the  United  States  is 
avering  its  economic  and  military 
mgth.  We  have  overcome  the 
nomic  crisis  of  the  1970s  and  once 
in  are  enjoying  economic  growth 
h  stable  prices.  We  are  rebuilding  our 
enses.  We  have  regained  the  con- 
!nce  and  optimism  about  the  future 
t  have  always  been  the  real  basis  for 
national  strength.  We  see  a  new 
riotism,  a  new  pride  in  our  country. 
A  lot  of  rethinking  is  going  on  about 
Vietnam  war— a  lot  of  healthy 
linking.  Many  who  bitterly  opposed  it 
e  a  more  sober  assessment  now  of 
price  that  was  paid  for  failure.  Many 
D  supported  it  have  a  more  sober 
lerstanding  now  of  the  responsibil- 
s  that  rest  on  our  nation's  leaders 
n  they  call  on  Americans  to  make 
h  a  sacrifice.  We  know  that  we  must 
prudent  in  our  commitments.  We 
)W  that  we  must  be  honest  with 
selves  about  the  costs  that  our  exer- 
is  will  exact.  And  we  should  have 
■•ned  that  we  must  maintain  the  abili- 
;o  engage  with,  and  support,  those 
ving  for  freedom,  so  that  options 
er  than  American  military  involve- 
nt  remain  open. 

e  Relevance  of  the 
)tnam  Experience 

it  experience  has  many  other  lessons. 
acted  under  many  illusions  during 
Vietnam  period,  which  events  since 
■5  should  have  dispelled.  We  have  no 
luse  for  falling  prey  to  the  same  illu- 
ns  again. 
During  the  Vietnam  war,  we  heard 
f  endless  and  shifting  sequence  of 
I  'h'^des  for  the  communists:  that  they 
\  •(■  "nationalists";  that  they  were  an 

I  im'nous  anticolonial  movement;  that 
J  >  were  engaged  in  a  civil  war  that 

;i  c  lutside  world  should  not  meddle  in. 
A  these  arguments  were  proved  hollow, 
;1  apologies  changed.  We  heard  that  a 
;•  iimunist  victory  would  not  have  harm- 
'1  cimsequences,  either  in  their  coun- 
ts (ir  the  surrounding  region.  We 
\  i-(  ■  told  that  the  communists'  ambi- 
1-  would  be  satisfied,  that  their 
i;i\  lor  would  become  moderate.  As 
-r  assertions  became  less  convincing, 
.ipulogies  turned  to  attack  those  who 
.milt  to  be  free  of  communism:  our 
Is  were  denounced  as  corrupt  and 
orial,  unworthy  of  our  support. 
l.'ir  smallest  misdeeds  were  magnified 

I I  iiindemned. 


Then  we  heard  the  theme  that  we 
should  not  seek  "military  solutions,"  that 
such  conflicts  were  the  product  of  deep- 
seated  economic  and  social  factors.  The 
answer,  they  said,  was  not  security 
assistance  but  aid  to  develop  the  econ- 
omy and  raise  living  standards.  But  how 
do  you  address  economic  and  social 
needs  when  communist  guerrillas— as  in 
Vietnam  then  and  in  Central  America 
now— are  waging  war  against  the 
economy  in  order  to  maximize  hardship? 
Our  economic  aid  then,  as  now,  is 
massive;  but  development  must  be  built 
on  the  base  of  security.  And  what  are 
the  chances  for  diplomatic  solutions 
if— as  we  saw  after  the  1973  Paris 
agreement— we  fail  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  strength  on  which  successful 
negotiation  depends?  Escapism  about 
the  realities  of  power  and  security — 
that  is  a  pretty  good  definition  of  isola- 
tionism. 

And  finally,  of  course,  the  critics 
turned  their  attack  on  America.  America 
can  do  no  right,  they  said.  Now,  criti- 
cism of  policy  is  natural  and  common- 
place in  a  democracy.  But  we  should 
bear  this  past  experience  in  mind  in  our 
contemporary  debates.  The  litany  of 
apology  for  communists,  and  condemna- 
tion for  America  and  our  friends,  is 
beginning  again.  Can  we  afford  to  be 
naive  again  about  the  consequences 
when  we  pull  back,  about  the  special 
ruthlessness  of  communist  rule?  Do  the 
American  people  really  accept  the  notion 
that  we,  and  our  friends,  are  the  repre- 
sentatives of  evil? 

The  American  people  believe  in  their 
country  and  in  its  role  as  a  force  for 
good.  'They  want  to  see  an  effective 
foreign  policy  that  blocks  aggression  and 
advances  the  cause  of  freedom  and 
democracy.  They  are  tired  of  setbacks, 
especially  those  that  result  from  re- 
straints we  impose  on  ourselves. 

Vietnam  and  Central  America 

Vietnam  and  Central  America— I  want 
to  tackle  this  analogy  head-on. 

Our  goals  in  Central  America  are 
like  those  we  had  in  Vietnam: 
democracy,  economic  progress,  and 
security  against  aggression.  In  Central 
America,  our  policy  of  nurturing  the 
forces  of  democracy  with  economic  and 
military  aid  and  social  reform  has  been 
working— without  American  combat 
troops.  And  by  virtue  of  simple 
geography,  there  can  be  no  conceivable 
doubt  that  Central  America  is  vital  to 
our  own  security. 


With  the  recent  legislative  and 
municipal  elections,  El  Salvador  has  now 
held  four  free  elections  in  the  past  3 
years.  When  the  new  assembly  takes  of- 
fice shortly,  El  Salvador  will  have  com- 
pleted an  extraordinary  exercise  in 
democracy— drafting  a  new  constitution 
and  electing  a  new  government,  all  in 
the  midst  of  a  guerrilla  war.  The  state 
of  human  rights  is  greatly  improved,  the 
rule  of  law  is  strengthened,  and  the  per- 
formance of  the  armed  forces  markedly 
better.  Americans  can  be  proud  of  the 
progress  of  democracy  in  El  Salvador 
and  in  Central  America  as  a  whole. 

The  key  exception  is  Nicaragua.  Just 
as  the  Vietnamese  communists  used  pro- 
gressive and  nationalist  slogans  to  con- 
ceal their  intentions,  the  Nicaraguan 
communists  employ  slogans  of  social 
reform,  nationalism,  and  democracy  to 
obscure  their  totalitarian  goals.  The 
1960  platform  of  the  communists  in 
South  Vietnam  promised: 

Freedom  of  expression,  press,  assembly, 
and  association,  travel,  religion,  and  other 
democratic  liberties  will  be  promulgated. 
Religious,  political,  and  patriotic  organiza- 
tions will  be  permitted  freedom  of  activity 
regardless  of  belief  and  tendencies.  There 
will  be  a  general  amnesty  for  all  political  de- 
tainees [and]  the  concentration  camps  dis- 
solved ....  [ipiegal  arrests,  illegal  imprison- 
ment, torture,  and  corporal  punishment  shall 
be  forbidden. 

These  promises  were  repeated  time 
after  time.  We  find  similar  promises  in 
the  letter  the  Nicaraguan  revolutionary 
junta  sent  to  the  Organization  of  Amer- 
ican States  in  July  1979.  The  junta, 
which  included  the  communist  leader 
Daniel  Ortega,  declared  its  "firm  inten- 
tion to  establish  full  observance  of 
human  rights"  and  to  "call  .  .  .  free  elec- 
tions." The  Nicaraguan  communists 
made  the  same  commitment  when  they 
agreed  to  the  Contadora  Document  of 
Objectives  in  September  1983,  and  when 
they  said  they  accepted  the  Contadora 
draft  treaty  of  September  1984. 

What  the  communists,  in  fact,  have 
tried  to  do  since  they  took  power  in 
Nicaragua  is  the  opposite:  to  suppress  or 
drive  out  noncommunist  democratic 
political  forces;  to  install  an  apparatus  of 
state  control  down  to  the  neighborhood 
level;  to  build  a  huge  war  machine;  to 
repress  the  Roman  Catholic  Church;  to 
persecute  Indians  and  other  ethnic 
groups,  including  forcible  relocations  of 
population;  and  to  welcome  thousands  of 
Cuban,  Soviet,  East  European,  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization],  and 
Libyan  military  and  civilian  personnel. 
They  have  formed  links  with  PLO,  Ira- 
nian, and  Libyan  terrorists,  and  are 


he  1985 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


testing  their  skills  as  drug  traffickers. 
Like  the  Vietnamese  communists,  they 
have  become  a  threat  to  their  neighbors. 

Broken  promises;  communist  dic- 
tatorship; refugees;  widened  Soviet  in- 
fluence, this  time  near  our  very 
borders— here  is  your  parallel  between 
Vietnam  and  Central  America. 

Brave  Nicaraguans— perhaps  up  to 
15,000— are  fighting  to  recover  the 
promise  of  the  1979  revolution  from  the 
communists  who  betrayed  it.  They 
deserve  our  support.  They  are  strug- 
gling to  prevent  the  consolidation  and 
expansion  of  communist  power  on  our 
doorstep  and  to  save  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  from  the  fate  of  the  people  of 
Cuba,  South  Vietnam,  Cambodia,  and 
Laos.  Those  who  assure  us  that  these 
dire  consequences  are  not  in  prospect 
are  some  of  those  who  assured  us  of  the 
same  in  Indochina  before  1975. 

Particularly  today,  what  can  we  as  a 
country  say  to  a  young  Nicaraguan: 
"Learn  to  live  with  oppression;  only 
those  of  us  who  already  have  freedom 
deserve  to  pass  it  on  to  our  children"? 
What  can  we  say  to  those  Salvadorans 
who  stood  so  bravely  in  line  to  vote: 
"We  may  give  you  some  aid  for  self- 
defense,  but  we  will  also  give  a  free 
hand  from  a  privileged  sanctuary  to  the 
communists  in  Nicaragua  to  undermine 
your  new  democratic  institutions"? 

The  critical  issue  today  is  whether 
the  Nicaraguan  communists  will  take  up 
in  good  faith  the  call  of  the  church  and 
of  the  democratic  opposition  for  a  cease- 
fire and  national  dialogue.  This  is  what 
President  Reagan  called  for  on  April  4. 
What  does  it  tell  us  about  the  Nicara- 
guan regime  that  it  refuses  dialogue 
combined  with  a  cease-fire?  What  does  it 
tell  us  about  who  is  prolonging  the  kill- 
ing? About  who  is  the  enemy  of 
democracy?  What  does  it  tell  us  about 
the  prospects  for  peace  in  Central 
America  if  the  democratic  forces  are 
abandoned? 

The  ordeal  of  Indochina  in  the  past 
decade— as  well  as  the  oppressions  en- 
dured by  the  people  of  Cuba  and  every 
other  country  where  communists  have 
seized  power— should  teach  us  some- 
thing. The  experience  of  Iran  since  the 
fall  of  the  Shah  is  also  instructive.  Do 
we  want  another  Cuba  in  this  hemis- 
phere? How  many  times  must  we  learn 
the  same  lesson,  and  what  is  America's 
responsibility? 


America's  Responsibility 

Today,  we  remember  a  setbaci?,  but  the 
noble  cause  of  defending  freedom  is  still 
our  cause.  Our  friends  and  allies  still 
rely  on  us.  Our  responsibility  remains. 

America's  Armed  Forces  are  still  the 
bulwark  of  peace  and  security  for  the 
free  world.  America's  diplomats  are  still 
on  the  front  line  of  efforts  to  reduce 
arsenals,  settle  conflicts,  and  push  back 
the  danger  of  war. 

The  larger  lesson  of  the  past  dec- 
ade is  that  when  America  lost  faith  in 
itself,  world  stability  suffered  and 


freedom  lost  ground.  This  must  never 
happen  again.  We  carry  the  banner  of 
liberty,  democracy,  the  dignity  of  the  in 
dividual,  tolerance,  the  rule  of  law. 
Throughout  our  history,  including  the 
period  of  Vietnam,  we  have  been  the 
champion  of  freedom,  a  haven  of  oppor 
tunity,  and  a  beacon  of  hope  to  op- 
pressed peoples  everywhere. 

Let  us  be  true  to  the  hopes  investec 
in  us.  Let  us  live  up  to  our  ideals  and  b 
their  strong  and  faithful  champion 
around  the  world. 


'Press  release  83. 


U.S.  and  Central  America: 
A  Moment  of  Decision 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
Indianapolis  Economic  Club  and  the 
Organizing  Committee  for  the  10th  Inter- 
national Pan-American  Games  in  In- 
diana on  April  22.  1985.^ 

In  2  years,  the  United  States  will  host 
the  10th  pan-American  games  here  in 
Indianapolis.  I  know  that,  when  the 
athletes  from  37  nations  come  to  com- 
pete, this  beautiful  city  will  display 
America  at  its  best. 

The  meaning  of  the  pan-American 
games  goes  beyond  sports.  They  offer  us 
a  chance  to  strengthen  friendship  among 
all  the  peoples  of  the  Americas.  They  re- 
mind us  of  our  common  heritage— as 
founders  and  creators  of  the  New 
World— and  of  our  common  destiny— as 
peoples  united  in  the  pursuit  of  peace 
and  freedom.  There  is  extraordinary 
diversity  in  our  hemisphere,  but  this 
diversity  is  overwhelmed  by  what  we 
share  in  common:  a  love  of  liberty,  a 
strong  commitment  to  religious  values,  a 
passion  for  democracy,  and  a  desire  for 
peace. 

The  United  States  has  an  important 
role  to  play  in  helping  achieve  these 
noble  goals.  If  we  act  with  wisdom  and 
determination,  in  a  spirit  of  bipartisan- 
ship, we  can  play  that  role  effectively. 

I  am  especially  pleased  to  be  here 
today  in  the  home  state  of  a  true  states- 
man and  an  outstanding  political  leader, 
Senator  Dick  Lugar.  He  has  taken 
charge  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  and  brought  it  new  energy 
and  dynamism,  and  he  is  working  hard 
to  forge  strong,  bipartisan  commitment 
in  Congress  to  our  nation's  security  and 


our  goals  around  the  world.  He  is  a 
champion  of  peace  and  freedom.  We  an 
grateful  for  his  counsel  and  his  strong 
leadership— particularly  on  the  issue  thi 
I  would  like  to  address  today:  our  polic\ 
in  Central  America. 

The  Challenge  to  Democracy 
and  Peace 

In  Central  America  today,  we  confront 
fundamental  challenge— a  challenge  to 
our  national  interests  and  to  the 
freedom  and  security  of  our  neighbors. 
Our  goals  in  Central  America  are  clear: 
we  seek  peace,  security,  economic  prog- 
ress, and  the  growth  of  freedom  and 
democracy  in  every  country. 

In  recent  years,  we  have  seen 
tremendous  progress.  Costa  Rica's 
democracy  remains  strong  and  vibrant, 
despite  threats  and  attempted  subver- 
sion from  Nicaragua  and  despite  the  fac 
that  Costa  Rica  maintains  no  standing 
army.  In  Honduras  and  Panama, 
military  rulers  have  been  replaced  by 
civilian  governments.  In  Guatemala,  the 
transition  to  democracy  is  moving 
steadily  ahead,  with  presidential  elec- 
tions scheduled  next  October.  The 
triumph  of  democracy  in  El  Salvador 
was  reaffirmed  last  month  as  more  thai 
a  million  voters  went  to  the  polls  to 
choose  their  legislative  and  municipal 
leaders.  President  Duarte  has  shown  his 
readiness  for  dialogue  with  the  armed 
opposition.  Peace  in  El  Salvador  is  more 
possible  under  Duarte's  democratic  ad- 
ministration than  ever  before. 

In  short,  the  transition  to  democracj 
is  succeeding  everywhere  in  Central 
America — everywhere,  that  is,  except 


Dpnartmfint  of  State  Bulletir 


THE  SECRETARY 


aragua,  where  a  small  group  of 
rxist-Leninists  who  call  themselves 
.ndinistas,"  backed  by  the  Soviet 
ion  and  Cuba,  are  in  the  process  of 
josing  a  brutal  tyranny.  In  Central 
lerica,  everyone  knows  that 
:aragua's  intransigence  is  the  single 
St  important  obstacle  to  peace  and 
urity  in  the  region.  And  the  threat 
:  Sandinistas  pose  is  growing,  not 
eding. 

With  Soviet  and  Cuban  help,  the 
ndinistas  are  still  working  to  con- 
idate  their  power  and  turn  Nicaragua 
0  a  full-fledged  communist  state, 
ould  they  achieve  this  goal,  we  would 
e  a  second  Cuba  in  this  hemisphere, 
s  time  on  the  mainland  of  the 
lericas — with  all  the  strategic 
ngers  that  this  implies.  If  the  history 
Cuba  is  any  guide,  Nicaragua  would 
;n  intensify  efforts  to  undermine  its 
ghbors  in  the  name  of  so-called 
^olutionary  principles — principles  that 
lei  Castro  himself  flatly  reaffirmed  on 
nerican  television  earlier  this  year. 

Needless  to  say,  the  first  casualty  of 
;ommunist  consolidation  in  Nicaragua 
iuld  be  the  freedom  and  hopes  for 
mocracy  of  the  Nicaraguan  people. 
16  second  casualty  would  be  the  securi- 
of  Nicaragua's  neighbors  and  the 
lurity  of  the  entire  region. 

And  the  results  of  our  failure  to  stop 
■;  spread  of  communism  in  this 
misphere  will  be  clear  for  all  to  see,  in 
3  millions  of  refugees  who  will  escape 
freedom  from  tyranny,  just  as  others 
tve  before  them— from  Eastern 
iirope  and  Afghanistan,  from  Cuba  and 
dochina.  In  the  past  10  years,  over  a 
lUion  and  one-half  people  have  fled 
dochina  alone.  Seven  hundred  and  fif- 
1  thousand  have  come  here  to  the 
1  lited  States;  thousands  more  died 
I  fore  they  could  reach  safe  haven.  Do 
\ '  want  to  see  this  tragedy  reenacted  in 
lis  hemisphere? 

Such  a  disaster  in  Central  America 
i  avoidable  if  the  United  States  has  the 
II  and  the  wisdom  to  take  prudent 
:_-lis  now.  There  is  an  alternative  to 
•ir  and  oppression — a  peaceful  alter- 
ti\o,  based  on  negotiations  toward 
i  iii.icracy  and  internal  dialogue  among 
icaraguans,  all  Nicaraguans,  armed 
:i(l  unarmed,  in  and  out  of  the  country, 
and  out  of  power. 

New  Opportunity 

n  March  1,  in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica, 
le  leaders  of  the  Nicaraguan 
;mocratic  resistance  asked  the  San- 
nista  regime  to  begin  a  dialogue  for 
eace  and  democracy  in  their  country. 


They  offered  a  cease-fire.  They  asked 
for  a  dialogue  to  let  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  decide,  finally,  after  years  of 
dictatorship— first  under  Somoza  and 
then  under  the  Sandinistas — who  they 
want  to  govern  their  country  and  how. 

On  March  22,  the  bishops  of 
Nicaragua's  Roman  Catholic  Church 
agreed  to  mediate. 

On  April  4,  President  Reagan  made 
an  urgent  appeal  in  the  name  of  peace 
and  on  behalf  of  the  American  people. 
He  called  upon  the  government  and  the 
armed  opposition  to  stop  fighting  and  to 
begin  talks  on  national  reconciliation, 
the  restoration  of  democracy,  and  an 
end  to  repression  and  tyranny. 

The  Sandinistas,  so  far,  turned  a 
deaf  ear  to  the  calls  for  dialogue,  for 
peace  and  democracy.  We  hope  they 
will  reconsider.  Without  further  incen- 
tives, however,  that  seems  unlikely. 
Throughout  their  6  years  in  power,  the 
Sandinistas  have  been  flexible  only  when 
they  were  convinced  they  had  no  choice. 
There  are  those  in  this  country  who 
would  look  the  other  way,  imagining  this 
problem  will  disappear  by  itself.  But 
hesitation  or  neglect  on  our  part  will 
only  allow  the  Sandinistas  the  time  they 
need  to  consolidate  their  totalitarian 
control.  The  time  for  us  to  act  is  now. 

The  Congress  will  vote  tomorrow  on 
funds  for  the  Nicaraguan  democratic 
resistance.  President  Reagan  has  asked 
the  Congress  to  release  the  $14  million 
already  appropriated.  If  Congress  ap- 
proves, those  funds  would  be  used  for 
humanitarian  purposes,  not  for  arms  or 
munitions.  We  want  to  give  the  San- 
dinistas a  chance  to  consider  and  accept 
the  offer  of  peace.  If  the  comandantes 
do  accept  the  offer  of  the  democratic  op- 
position, the  restrictions  the  President 
has  put  on  the  funds  will  remain  in  ef- 
fect. But  if  the  comandantes  continue  to 
reject  all  peaceful,  democratic  alter- 
natives, then  the  United  States  will  be 
obliged,  sooner  or  later,  on  both  moral 
and  strategic  grounds,  to  support  the 
democratic  resistance  in  Nicaragua  with 
the  resources  they  need  to  defend 
themselves. 

As  Senator  Dick  Lugar  stressed 
yesterday,  we  face  a  challenge  far  more 
important  than  the  sum  of  $14  million. 
It  is  the  challenge  "of  whether  the 
United  States  is  prepared  to  be  involved 
effectively  in  the  region  during  the 
coming  years."  And,  as  the  Senator 
said,  we  are  unlikely  to  see  a  change  in 
Nicaraguan  policy  if  we  turn  our  backs 
on  the  one  force  that  has  demonstrated 
it  can  command  the  attention  and  the 
concern  of  the  Nicaraguan  regime. 


The  choice  before  Congress  is  grave 
and  cannot  be  avoided.  We  are  at  a 
pivotal  moment  that  will  help  to  deter- 
mine the  future  of  Central  America  and 
directly  affect  the  national  security  of 
the  United  States. 

The  situation  today  in  Nicaragua  is 
dangerous  because  both  sides  are  poised 
to  settle  in  for  the  long  haul;  on  one  side 
are  the  nine  coiiiandantea,  entrenched 
along  exactly  the  same  repressive 
ideological  and  subversive  lines  staked 
out  by  Fidel  Castro  in  Cuba  25  years 
ago.  They  face  the  resistance  of  the 
armed  and  unarmed  democratic  opposi- 
tion, growing  in  popular  support,  and 
digging  in  on  the  classic  model  of  ex- 
tended civil  war.  If  the  regime  rejects 
dialogue,  if  it  continues  to  stifle  the 
democratic  aspirations  of  the  Nica- 
raguan people,  then  the  conflict  in  that 
war-torn  country  will  continue  and 
worsen. 

That  is  why  the  opportunity  of  inter- 
nal reconciliation  through  dialogue  is  so 
important— MOM).  And  that  is  why  we 
Americans  have  a  special  responsibility 
to  profit  by  the  experience  of  the  past  6 
years  in  Central  America  and  act,  now, 
to  seize  that  opportunity.  We  have 
learned  in  El  Salvador  that  dialogue 
within  the  framework  of  a  democratic 
and  constitutional  order  offers  the  best 
chance  to  break  through  the  frustrating 
stalemate  of  prolonged  conflict. 

The  positive  lesson  of  El  Salvador 
tends  to  be  ignored  in  the  so-called  alter- 
natives to  the  President's  initiative  being 
proposed  in  the  Congress.  Some  of  these 
alternatives  are  potentially  construc- 
tive—and I  believe  the  President  and  a 
group  of  Senators,  Democrats  and 
Republicans,  are  discussing  this  issue 
right  now  in  the  White  House— but  some 
are  not  alternatives  at  all. 

Consider,  for  example,  the  proposal 
to  provide  funds  for  refugees  outside 
Nicaragua  and  for  monitoring  an  even- 
tual Contadora  treaty.  These  are  fine 
goals,  but,  in  this  situation,  they  are 
worse  than  nothing.  The  President's  pro- 
posal of  April  4  promotes  peace  by  sup- 
porting Nicaragua's  democrats  and  pro- 
viding incentives  for  the  comandantes  to 
enter  into  a  dialogue  with  them.  This 
alternative  does  neither.  It  supports 
neither  dialogue  nor  enduring  peace.  If 
anything,  it  is  a  formula  for  turning 
freedom  fighters  into  refugees  without 
hope  of  a  democratic  outcome.  It  is  a 
green  light  for  the  regime  to  continue  its 
foreign  subversion  without  ever  accept- 
ing a  Contadora  treaty. 

The  fundamental  problem  with  this 
so-called  alternative  is  that  it  ducks  the 
central  issue  of  incentives.  The  San- 


une1985 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


dinistas  will  not  change  their  behavior 
without  powerful  reasons  to  do  so.  We 
wish  this  were  not  true.  But  6  years 
have  taught  us  that  the  comandantes 
listen  to  others  only  when  they  have  a 
reason.  That  is  why  the  President  has 
asked  Congress  to  provide  a  reason.  A 
"yes"  vote  will  maintain  the  pressure  on 
the  communists  and  provide  incentives 
for  change.  A  "no"  vote  or  a  phony  alter- 
native would  remove  the  incentive  and 
guarantee  a  prolonged  conflict.  Those  in 
Congress  who  vote  "no"  must  accept 
their  share  of  the  responsibility  if  this 
crucial  opportunity  is  lost. 

The  Democratic  Opposition 
in  Nicaragua 

The  democratic  forces  in  Nicaragua  are 
on  the  front  line  in  the  struggle  for 
security  and  freedom  in  Central  Ameri- 
ca. We  must  support  their  courageous 
efforts  for  peace  and  democracy  through 
dialogue. 

In  1979,  the  anti-Somoza  organiza- 
tions pledged  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS),  and  to  their 
own  people,  to  bring  freedom  to  their 
country  after  decades  of  tyranny. 
Somoza  fell,  but  the  comandantes  then 
betrayed  these  pledges  and  the  hopes  of 
the  Nicaraguan  people;  they  purged  the 
noncommunists  from  their  regime  and 
imposed  a  new  and  brutal  tyranny  that 
has  respected  no  frontiers.  They  are  at- 
tempting to  force  Nicaragua  into  a 
totalitarian  mold  whose  pattern  is  all  too 
familiar.  They  are  suppressing  internal 
dissent;  displacing  the  free  labor  move- 
ment with  their  own  government- 
controlled  unions;  censoring  the  press; 
persecuting  the  church;  cooperating  with 
the  terrorists  of  Iran,  Libya,  and  the 
PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organization]; 
and  seeking  to  undermine  the  govern- 
ments of  their  neighbors.  This  emerging 
totalitarianism  is  supported  by  political, 
military,  and  intelligence  links  to  Cuba 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  betrayal  has  forced  many 
Nicaraguans  who  opposed  Somoza  back 
into  opposition.  And,  while  many  resist 
peacefully,  thousands  have  seen  no 
choice  but  to  take  up  arms  again,  to  risk 
everything  so  their  hopes  for  freedom 
and  democracy  will  not  once  again  be 
denied.  Many  poor  peasants,  unwilling 
to  be  drafted  to  defend  communist  rule, 
have  fled  the  country. 

The  Sandinistas  denounce  all  op- 
ponents as  mercenaries  or  as  former  Na- 
tional Guardsmen  loyal  to  the  memory 
of  Somoza.  We  can  expect  them  to  make 
such  charges.  What  is  surprising  is  that 


18 


some  in  this  country  seem  all  too  willing 
to  accept  such  charges  at  face  value. 

The  truth  about  the  democratic 
resistance  is  that  it  is  a  popular  move- 
ment led  mostly  by  men  who  fought  in 
the  revolution  against  Somoza.  Its  key 
political  leaders  either  supported  or  ac- 
tually served  in  the  new  government  un- 
til it  became  clear  that  the  comandantes 
were  bent  on  communism,  not  freedom; 
repression,  not  reform;  and  aggression, 
not  peace.  Adolfo  Calero,  the  comman- 
der in  chief  of  the  democratic  armed 
resistance,  is  a  lifelong  opponent  of 
Somoza  who  tried  to  cooperate  with  the 
Sandinistas  in  rebuilding  Nicaragua 
after  Somoza's  fall.  Alfonso  Robelo 
founded  a  political  party  opposed  to 
Somoza  and  then  served  as  one  of  the 
original  five  members  of  the  post- 
Somoza  junta.  Arturo  Cruz  was  a 
member  of  that  junta  after  Robelo  left. 
These  men  and  the  thousands  who 
follow  them  are  democrats  committed  to 
a  struggle  against  tyranny — whether  of 
the  right  or  the  left. 

The  ranks  of  the  democratic  forces 
in  Nicaragua  are  swelling  day  by  day. 
Many  thousands  of  Nicaraguans  are 
risking  their  lives.  Would  these  men  and 
women  be  making  such  great  sacrifices 
if  they  believed  it  would  lead  to  a  return 
to  tyranny?  The  answer  is  no. 

The  resistance  fighters  include 
peasants  and  farmers,  shopkeepers  and 
vendors,  teachers  and  professionals. 
What  unites  them  to  each  other,  and  to 
the  other  thousands  of  Nicaraguans  who 
resist  without  arms,  is  disillusionment 
with  Sandinista  economic  failure,  repres- 
sion, militarism,  and  subservience  to 
foreign  communist  governments.  The 
young  people  of  Nicaragua  are  sending 
the  message:  draft  dodging  is  one  of  the 
biggest  problems  the  regime  faces  to- 
day. Yet,  at  the  same  time,  when  the 
resistance  fighters  go  out  on  patrol,  they 
come  back  with  more  people  than  they 
started  with— as  volunteers  are  choosing 
the  side  of  freedom. 

The  Challenge  to  the  Sandinistas 

As  we  have  said  many  times,  the  goals 
we  share  with  our  neighbors  in  Central 
America  cannot  be  achieved  unless 
Nicaraguan  behavior  changes  in  four 
fundamental  ways. 

First,  Nicaragua  must  stop  playing 
the  role  of  surrogate  for  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Cuba.  As  long  as  there  are 
large  numbers  of  Soviet  and  Cuban 
security  and  military  personnel  in 
Nicaragua,  Central  America  will  be  em- 
broiled in  the  East- West  conflict.  The 
Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan  power  play  in- 


jects that  East- West  conflict  into  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  Central  America 
is  West.  The  East  must  get  out. 

Second,  Nicaragua  must  reduce  its 
armed  forces — now  in  excess  of  100,000 
and  heavily  armed — to  a  level  com- 
parable to  those  of  its  neighbors.  The 
current  imbalance  in  both  men  and 
weapons  is  incompatible  with  regional 
stability. 

Third,  Nicaragua  must  absolutely 
and  definitively  stop  its  support  for  in- 
surgents and  terrorists  in  the  region.  All 
of  Nicaragua's  neighbors — particularly 
El  Salvador  but  also  democratic  Costa 
Rica — have  felt  the  brunt  of  Sandinista 
efforts  to  destabilize  their  governments. 
No  country  in  Central  America  will  be 
secure  as  long  as  this  continues. 

And  fourth,  the  Sandinistas  must 
live  up  to  their  commitments  to 
democratic  pluralism  made  to  the  OAS 
in  1979.  The  internal  Nicaraguan  opposi- 
tion, armed  and  unarmed,  represents  a 
genuine  political  force  that  is  entitled  to 
participate  in  the  political  processes  of 
the  country.  The  government  in 
Managua  must  provide  the  political 
opening  that  will  allow  their  participa- 
tion. 

In  essence,  all  that  we  and  the 
Nicaraguan  democrats  ask  is  that  the 
Sandinistas  live  up  to  the  promises  they 
have  already  made:  the  promises  they 
made  in  1979  to  the  OAS,  the  com- 
mitments they  made  when  they  signed 
the  21 -point  Contadora  Document  of  Ob- 
jectives in  September  1983,  the  prin- 
ciples they  purported  to  accept  when 
they  endorsed  the  Contadora  draft  of 
September  1984. 

The  fact  that  they  now  refuse  a 
dialogue  can  only  raise  new  doubts 
about  their  willingness  to  abide  by  any 
commitments.  Can  the  Sandinistas  be 
trusted  to  abide  by  what  they  agree  to? 
If  they  cannot  be  trusted — if  their  com- 
mitments to  peace  and  pluralism  are 
hollow — what  does  this  imply  about  the 
long-term  prospects  for  peace  and 
democracy  in  Central  America?  The 
present  peace  offer  of  the  democratic 
opposition  is  a  crucial  test  of  the  San- 
dinistas' willingness  to  live  in  peace  with 
their  neighbors  and  their  own  people.  It 
may  well  be  the  last  chance  for  a 
peaceful  solution. 

Any  treaty,  as  we  all  know,  requires 
adequate  verification  of  compliance.  This 
is  one  of  the  key  issues  now  in  the  Con- 
tadora negotiations.  But  the  most  impor- 
tant as.surance  of  compliance  is  the  in- 
ternal openness  of  Nicaragija's  political 
system.  Closed  societies,  and  particular- 
ly communist  societies,  have  a  long 
record  of  disregarding  agreements.  The 


I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


cord  of  the  Sandinistas  is  dismal,  and 
eryone  in  the  region  knows  it. 
President  Reagan's  peace  proposal 

15  won  support  throughout  Latin 
merica.  President  Duarte  of  El 
ilvador  said  he  believes  "it  is  the  right 
ep  at  the  right  time  in  our  quest  for 
ace  and  democracy  in  this  region." 
ntadora  leaders  have  emphasized  that 

leir  Document  of  Objectives  calls  for  in- 
rnal  dialogue  in  all  countries  of  Cen- 
al  America,  in  Nicaragua  as  well  as  El 
ilvador.  President  Monge  of  Costa 
ica  called  the  initiative  "a  proposal  for 
peaceful  solution  to  one  of  the  great 
-oblems  of  our  time."  Presidents  Suazo 
'  Honduras,  Lusinchi  of  Venezuela, 
etancur  of  Colombia,  Alfonsin  of 
rgentina,  Barletta  of  Panama,  and 
ebres  Cordero  of  Ecuador,  among 
;hers,  have  made  clear  their  support 
ir  the  proposed  dialogue.  From  a  wide 
inge  of  political  viewpoints,  all  urge 

16  Sandinista  leaders  to  accept  the 
'fer  of  peace  and  begin  the  dialogue. 

he  Moral  Responsibility 
f  the  United  States 

he  United  States  cannot  escape  its 
'sponsibility.  Peace  and  freedom  can  be 
;hieved  in  Central  America  only  if  we 
"e  willing  to  support  those  in  the 
!gion  who  share  these  goals. 

How  can  we  as  a  country  say  to  a 
3ung  Nicaraguan:  "Learn  to  live  with 
Dpression;  only  those  of  us  who  already 
^ve  freedom  deserve  to  pass  it  on  to 
jr  children"?  How  can  we  say  to  those 
alvadorans  who  stood  so  bravely  in  line 
)  vote:  "We  may  give  you  some 
;onomic  and  military  aid  for  self- 
efense,  but  we  will  also  give  a  free 
and  to  the  Sandinistas  to  undermine 
3ur  new  democratic  institutions"? 

We  must  make  every  effort  to  con- 
ince  the  Sandinistas  that  the  path  of 
eaceful  democratic  change  is  the  only 
ath  they  can  take.  To  cut  off  support 
ow  for  the  democratic  resistance  in 
licaragua  would  be  to  turn  our  backs  on 
crucial  opportunity  for  peace  in  that 
ountry.  If  we  do  not  take  the  ap- 
ropriate  steps  now  to  pressure  the  San- 
inistas  to  live  up  to  their  past  promises, 
len  we  may  find  later,  when  we  can  no 
)nger  avoid  acting,  that  the  stakes  will 
e  higher  and  the  costs  greater.  And 
nat  would  be  a  tragic  mistake.  Today, 
/e  have  a  chance  to  bring  about  real 
hange  in  Nicaragua  and  throughout 
"entral  America,  and  at  a  low  cost.  We 
annot  afford  to  miss  this  opportunity. 

I  agree  with  those  who  say  that  this 
ould  be  the  most  important  moment  in 
>'ongress  since  1947.  Then,  the  Con- 


gress supported  President  Truman's 
determination  to  stand  up  to  the  expan- 
sion of  Soviet  imperialism.  Tomorrow, 
Congress  will  choose  whether  to  support 
the  President  in  his  determination  to 
stop  Soviet  encroachment  right  here  in 
this  hemisphere.  If  Congress  fails  this 
test,  the  message  will  go  worldwide— to 
freedom  fighters  in  Afghanistan, 
Southeast  Asia,  Africa,  and  elsewhere 
where  the  spark  of  freedom  still  glows. 
But  it  is  a  message  that  will  have  its 
greatest  impact  right  here  in  the 
Americas. 


We  in  this  country  must  stand  firm- 
ly in  the  defense  of  our  interests  and 
principles  and  the  rights  of  peoples  to 
live  in  freedom.  Nicaragua's  democrats 
deserve  our  support.  Their  struggle  is 
vital  to  hemispheric  peace.  To  abandon 
them  would  be  a  shameful  betrayal— a 
betrayal  not  only  of  brave  men  and 
women  but  of  our  highest  ideals  and  the 
national  security  of  the  United  States. 


'Press  release  79. 


U.S.  and  Israel:  Partners 
for  Peace  and  Freedom 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
Annual  Policy  Conference  of  the 
American  Israel  Public  Affairs  Commit- 
tee in  Arlington,  Virginia,  on  April  21, 
1985  ^ 

We  Americans  are  united  by  values  and 
ideals  that  have  guided  us  since  the 
founding  of  this  nation.  We  seek  to 
preserve  and  promote  freedom — 
freedom  to  vote,  freedom  to  speak, 
write,  think,  and  worship  as  one 
chooses.  We  believe  in  tolerance — and 
religious  tolerance,  in  particular.  We 
believe  in  justice  and  equality  under  the 
law.  We  are  committed  to  democratic 
government  as  the  best,  if  not  the  only 
way,  to  protect  the  rights,  well-being, 
and  dignity  of  all  men  and  women. 

We  have  also  understood  that  to 
pursue  these  noble  goals,  we  have  to  be 
strong  enough  to  defend  our  country 
and  our  way  of  life  against  aggression. 
And  we  must  have  an  equally  strong 
commitment  to  international  peace  and 
security.  A  world  of  peace  offers  the 
best  hope  for  the  spread  of  freedom;  and 
a  world  of  freedom  offers  the  best  hope 
for  lasting  peace. 

In  the  latter  half  of  this  century, 
both  the  defense  of  freedom  and  the 
achievement  of  peace  have  come  to  de- 
pend on  American  strength.  There  can 
only  be  peace  when  potential  aggressors 
know  that  they  cannot  hope  to  achieve 
their  aims  through  war.  In  the  modern 
world,  that  means  that  America,  as  the 
strongest  democracy  on  earth,  has  a 
reponsibility  to  stand  with  those  who 
share  our  hopes  and  dreams. 

These  principles  inform  every  action 
we  take  in  our  foreign  policy.  Today,  I 


would  like  to  talk  about  how  our  ideals, 
our  morality,  and  our  responsibilities  in 
the  world  apply  to  our  relationship  with 
Israel  and  to  our  hopes  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East. 

The  United  States  supported  the 
creation  of  the  State  of  Israel,  almost 
four  decades  ago,  because  of  moral  con- 
victions deeply  rooted  in  the  American 
character.  We  knew  of  the  centuries  of 
persecution  suffered  by  the  Jews,  and 
we  had  witnessed  the  horror  of  the  Nazi 
Holocaust.  No  decent  American  could 
fail  to  see  the  justice  and  necessity  of  a 
Jewish  state  where  Jews  could  live 
without  fear. 

But  the  founding  of  the  State  of 
Israel  also  had  a  wider  significance.  Cer- 
tainly, America's  support  for  Israel  has 
been  a  moral  response  to  centuries  of 
persecution.  But  the  birth  of  Israel  also 
marked  the  entrance  onto  the  world 
stage  of  a  new  democracy,  a  new 
defender  of  liberty,  a  new  nation  com- 
mitted to  human  progess  and  peace.  In  a 
world  where  such  nations  have  always 
been  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule, 
the  creation  of  Israel  was  a  historic  and 
blessed  event. 

When  Lincoln  spoke  at  Gettysburg 
of  rededication  to  the  cause  of  freedom, 
he  was  saying  that  the  survival  of  liber- 
ty depended  on  people's  faith  in  liberty. 
Israel's  success  as  a  thriving  democracy 
helps  sustain  our  faith  in  the  democratic 
way  of  life  not  only  in  America  but 
throughout  the  world.  Today,  the  prin- 
ciples of  freedom  and  democracy  are 
more  alive  than  when  Israel  was 
founded.  The  number  of  countries 
around  the  world  that  are  democratic  or 
on  the  road  to  democracy  is  growing.  I 


lune1985 


19 


THE  SECRETARY 


believe  the  example  of  Israel  and  the 
United  States  has  something  to  do  with 
this  heartening  trend. 

No  wonder,  then,  that  the  friendship 
between  the  American  people  and  the 
people  of  Israel  has  grown  so  strong 
over  the  years.  Our  original  moral  com- 
mitment to  Israel  has  never  wavered. 
but  over  the  years  Americans  have  also 
come  to  recognize  the  enormous  impor- 
tance of  Israel— as  a  partner  in  the  pur- 
suit of  freedom  and  democracy,  as  a 
people  who  share  our  highest  ideals,  and 
as  a  vital  strategic  ally  in  an  important 
part  of  the  world.  The  moral  and  per- 
sonal bonds  that  tie  us  together  have 
strengthened  us  both. 

America's  Commitment  to 
Israel's  Security 

For  all  these  reasons,  the  United  States 
has  maintained  unwavering  support  for 
Israel's  security  for  nearly  four  decades. 
Until  peace  was  made  with  Egypt,  Israel 
was  completely  surrounded  by  hostile 
forces  since  its  birth,  and  it  has  had  to 
fight  four  wars  in  less  than  40  years  to 
defend  its  very  existence.  We  know  that 
the  goals  we  share  with  the  people  of 
Israel— freedom  and  peace— cannot  be 
achieved  unless  both  America  and  Israel 
are  strong.  That  is  why  we  are  com- 
mitted, and  always  will  be  committed,  to 
helping  Israel  protect  itself  against  any 
combination  of  potential  aggressors. 
And  that  is  why  we  must  always  make 
clear  to  the  world— through  our  material 
and  moral  support  for  Israel,  our  votes 
in  the  United  Nations,  and  our  efforts 
for  peace— that  we  are  a  permanent, 
steadfast,  and  unshakable  ally  of  the 
State  of  Israel. 

Every  year  we  provide  more  securi- 
ty assistance  to  Israel  than  to  any  other 
nation.  We  consider  that  aid  to  be  one  of 
the  best  investments  we  could  make- 
not  only  for  Israel's  security  but  for  ours 
as  well.  Even  as  we  developed  our  own 
budget  and  worked  with  Israel  on  its 
economic  program,  we,  nonetheless, 
went  ahead  with  a  major  increase  in  our 
security  assistance  for  Israel.  This  is  a 
statement  of  our  commitment;  it  reflects 
our  understanding  of  who  our  friends 
are  in  the  world  and  who  can  be  counted 
upon  in  times  of  crisis.  Americans  know 
that  we  have  no  more  reliable  friend  in 
the  world  than  Israel. 

Our  common  interests  afford  us  an 
opportunity— and  a  necessity— to  work 
together  on  many  issues. 

We  face,  for  example,  the  common 
threat  posed  by  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
American  people  and  the  people  of 
Israel  both  know  what  is  at  stake  in  the 


struggle  against  the  spread  of  Soviet 
power— not  just  territory  and  natural 
resources  but  the  very  way  of  life  for 
which  both  our  nations  have  shed  so 
much  blood  and  made  so  many 
sacrifices. 

The  continuing  persecution  of  Jews 
and  other  minorities  by  the  Soviet 
Government  is  an  abomination.  And  we 
in  America  know  that  a  threat  to  the 
rights  of  Jews  anywhere  is  a  threat  to 
the  rights  of  all  peoples  everywhere.  In 
the  Soviet  Union  today,  Jews  are  not 
free  to  practice  their  religion  or  to  teach 
Hebrew  or  Yiddish  to  their  children; 
they  are  actively  discriminated  against 
throughout  the  government  and  society. 

In  the  face  of  this  injustice,  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  Jews  seek  to  leave 
the  Soviet  Union.  Many  want  to  settle  in 
Israel.  But  Soviet  authorities  continue  to 
restrict  Jewish  emigration,  and  only  a 
tiny  number  are  allowed  to  leave.  Those 
who  have  sought  emigration  and  been 
denied  exit  visas  often  suffer  additional 
persecution;  those  who  stand  up  for 
their  rights  risk  prison  or  confinement 
in  so-called  psychiatric  hospitals.  The 
United  States  is  doing  all  it  can  to  urge 
the  Soviet  Union  to  set  the  Jews  free. 
Nothing  the  Soviets  could  do  would 
more  convince  us  of  their  desire  to  im- 
prove relations  than  to  release  Anatoli 
Shcharanskiy  and  others  and  grant 
Soviet  Jews  their  right  to  emigrate. 

In  addition  to  denying  human  rights 
at  home,  the  Soviet  Union  has  also  con- 
sistently sought  to  undermine  the 
strategic  interests  of  both  Israel  and  the 
United  States.  Today,  they  seek  to  in- 
crease their  influence  in  every  corner  of 
the  globe,  including  within  this 
hemisphere. 

Today,  we  are  trying  to  check 
Soviet-backed  aggression  in  Central 
America.  Everyone  in  this  audience  and 
supporters  of  Israel  across  the  country 
know  that,  in  the  Middle  East,  America 
is  committed  to  the  security  of  its 
democratic  ally.  We  all  understand  the 
need  to  negotiate  from  strength,  not 
from  weakness.  We  all  understand  the 
need  for  constant  vigilance  against  ag- 
gressors heavily  armed  by  the  Soviet 
Union.  Those  who  truly  uphold  these 
principles,  which  are  the  foundation  of 
Israel's  security,  will  see  the  vital  impor- 
tance of  supporting  these  same  prin- 
ciples elsewhere.  The  security  of  so  vital 
a  region  as  Central  America  is  crucial  to 
the  global  position  of  the  United  States. 
Let  there  be  no  illusions;  a  failure  to 
contain  communist  aggression  so  close 
to  home  will  only  erode  the  security  of 
all  our  allies  and  friends  around  the 
world. 


In  the  Middle  East  today,  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  radical  allies  continue  to 
block  peace  and  to  threaten  those  who 
seek  it.  They  exert  influence  by  their 
ability  to  intimidate  with  guns  and 
through  the  terrorists  they  sponsor  and 
direct.  The  United  States  and  Israel  can 
work  together  to  help  ensure  that  such 
attempts  fail. 

Strategic  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  Israel  has  become  a 
formal,  institutionalized  process.  We 
have  established  the  Joint  Political- 
Military  Group  to  improve  cooperation 
so  that  we  can  resist  threats  to  our  com- 
mon interests  in  the  Middle  East.  This 
kind  of  cooperation  has  been  long  over- 
due. Today,  it  is  an  important  part  of 
our  strategic  relationship. 

The  Challenge  of  Peace 

Americans  are  committed  to  the  security 
of  Israel  because  we  want  to  ensure  that 
the  Jewish  nation  and  the  Jewish  people 
never  again  face  a  threat  to  their  very 
existence.  But  our  permanent  commit- 
ment to  Israel's  security  serves  another 
and  related  goal,  as  well:  the  goal  of 
peace. 

Military  might  has  prevented  defeat 
on  the  battlefield,  but  true  security  and 
peace  can  come  only  when  Israel  has 
gained  the  acceptance  and  recognition  of 
its  neighbors.  That  is  why,  even  as  we 
assist  Israel's  capacity  to  defend  itself, 
the  top  priority  of  our  efforts  in  the 
Middle  East  is  to  promote  Arab-Israeli 
peace  through  negotiations. 

We  have  learned  many  important 
lessons  over  the  years.  One  of  them  is 
that  a  strong,  visible,  and  permanent 
American  commitment  to  Israel  offers 
the  best  hope  for  peace.  The  history  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  shows,  without 
question,  that  movement  in  the  peace 
process  can  only  come  when  there  is  no 
doubt  of  our  commitment  to  Israel.  It 
can  only  come  when  no  one  in  the  Arab 
world  or  elsewhere  has  any  delusions 
about  the  central  reality  that  America's 
support  for  Israel  can  never  be  weak- 
ened. Israel  has  demonstrated,  beyond 
doubt,  that  it  will  not  bend  or  change  its 
policies  in  the  face  of  military  or  ter- 
rorist threats.  Nor  will  the  policies  of 
the  United  States  ever  yield  to  terror  or 
intimidation.  On  this  principle,  the 
United  States  and  Israel  stand  together, 
solid  as  a  rock.  So  others  should  not 
miss  the  point:  the  point  is,  to  be  sure 
people  recognize  there  are  no  military 
options.  There  are  no  terrorist  options. 
The  only  path  to  progress,  justice,  and 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  is  that  of  direct 
negotiations. 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Negotiations  work.  We  have  tangible 
vidence  of  this  today  in  the  Peace 
reaty  Between  Israel  and  Egj-pt.  This 
felationship  is  the  cornerstone  of  the 
eace  process.  We  must  build  upon  it. 
'he  EgjT^tian-Israeli  relationship  itself 
lUst  grow  and  be  strengthened.  And 
thers  must  learn  from  the  example  that 
Igypt  and  Israel  have  set.  President 
lubarak  is  committed  to  peace.  Others 
lust  join  him.  We  are  glad  that  King 
lussein  has  reestablished  Jordan's 
iplomatic  relations  with  Egypt.  The 
recess  of  building  peace  must  continue, 
nd  the  United  States  is  committed  to 
.elping  the  parties  move  forward. 

In  recent  months,  there  has  been 
nuch  activity.  Many  people  on  both 
ides  are  working  to  further  the  peace 
irocess.  Today,  for  the  first  time  in 
ears,  there  are  signs  of  a  new  realism 
nd  a  new  commitment  on  the  part  of 
;ey  regional  actors. 

Prime  Minister  Peres  has  made  clear 
srael's  desire  to  negotiate  with  Jordan 
without  preconditions,  and  he  has  ex- 
)ressed  his  great  respect  for  King 
lussein.  The  King  has  also  called  for 
»eace;  he  has  undertaken  an  effort  to 
irganize  the  Arab  side  to  negotiate 
•eace  with  Israel  on  the  basis  of  Securi- 
ty Council  Resolution  242.  There  is  also 
novement  in  the  Palestinian  community 
oward  greater  realism,  and  President 
vlubarak  has  played  a  constructive  role 
n  promoting  negotiations. 

Both  Arabs  and  Israelis  trust  us, 
md  they  seek  our  help.  They  find  reas- 
.urance  in  our  participation  as  they  face 
he  risks  and  challenges  of  peace.  Such 
m  American  role  is  indispensable. 

We  also  know  that  those  Arab  na- 
ions  that  are  moving  toward  peace  are 
aking  risks.  Radical  forces  in  the  region 
ise  terrorism  and  threats  of  war  not 
inly  against  Americans  and  Israelis  but 
igainst  responsible  Arabs  who  have 
A-orked  to  bring  Egy]3t  back  into  the 
'^rab  fold  and  who  have  sought  to  pro- 
iiote  negotiations  with  Israel.  As  King 
Hussein  took  steps  to  move  with  the 
Palestinians  to  the  negotiating  table,  we 
saw  Jordanian  diplomats  killed;  we  saw 
Jordanian  airline  offices  bombed.  Those 
who  take  risks  for  peace  should  know 
that  the  United  States  will  help  them  de- 
fend themselves.  The  United  States 
must  continue  to  support  those  who  seek 
negotiations  and  peaceful  solutions 
against  those  who  promote  violence  and 
oppose  peace.  [Applause]  That  is  a  very 
important  point,  and  I'm  glad  there  was 
a  little  applause  for  that. 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State  [for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs] 
Richard  Murphy  is  now  in  the  region,  on 
the  President's  behalf,  exploring  prac- 


tical steps  that  might  be  taken  toward 
peace.  But  whatever  opportunities  may 
emerge,  no  one  in  the  region  or 
throughout  the  world  can  have  the 
slightest  doubt  about  America's  policy. 
Israel's  vital  interests  will  never  be  com- 
promised; Israel's  survival  and  security 
will  never  be  put  at  risk. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  also 
made  clear  our  concern  for  the  Pales- 
tinian people.  Lasting  peace  and  security 
for  Israel  will  require  a  just  settlement 
for  the  Palestinians  that  assures  their 
dignity  and  legitimate  rights.  How  ironic 
and  tragic  it  is,  therefore,  that  those 
who  claim  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  Pales- 
tinians have  continued  to  block  negotia- 
tions—the only  course  that  can  achieve  a 
just  settlement  for  the  Palestinians. 

Now  is  the  time  for  the  Arabs  to  let 
negotiations  proceed.  Now  is  the  time 
for  the  Arabs  to  let  King  Hussein  come 
forward.  There  is  no  alternative  to 
direct  negotiation;  the  longer  this  truth 
is  evaded,  the  longer  the  Palestinian 
people  are  the  victim.  Those  who  chased 
illusions  of  "armed  struggle,"  those  who 
engaged  in  terrorism,  those  who  thought 
that  Soviet  support  would  intimidate  the 
United  States  and  Israel,  have  only 
brought  death  to  innocents  and  pro- 
longed the  suffering  of  the  Palestinian 
people.  Such  methods  have  achieved 
nothing  constructive  and  never  will. 

But  the  way  is  open  for  progress- 
even  early  progress— and  we  know  what 
that  way  is.  President  Reagan's  ini- 
tiative of  September  1,  1982,  remains 
the  most  promising  route  to  a  solution. 
Our  policy  will  continue  to  be  guided  by 
six  fundamental  principles  in  the  years 
to  come. 

First,  we  will  continue  to  seek  a 
lasting  peace  that  respects  the 
legitimate  concerns  of  all  the  parties. 

Second,  the  United  States  will  op- 
pose violent  and  radical  challenges  to 
peace  and  security.  We  will  oppose 
governments  or  terrorist  organizations 
of  whatever  stripe  in  their  efforts  to 
undermine  the  State  of  Israel  and  our 
Arab  friends  in  the  region. 

Third,  U.S.  policy  toward  the  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization]  is 
unchanged:  we  will  never  recognize  or 
negotiate  with  any  group  that  espouses 
violent  solutions  or  refuses  to  accept 
Resolutions  242  and  338  or  recognize 
Israel's  right  to  exist. 

Fourth,  the  only  way  to  achieve  a 
genuine,  lasting  peace  is  through  direct 
negotiations  between  the  Arab  states 
and  Israel.  No  other  procedures  can 
substitute.  No  other  approach  will  get 
anywhere.  No  further  plans  or  pre- 


liminaries are  needed.  There  is  one  and 
only  one  place  to  negotiate— at  the  table, 
face  to  face. 

Fifth,  we  will  support  a  negotiated 
settlement  by  which  the  Palestinian  peo- 
ple can  achieve  their  legitimate  rights 
and  just  retjuirements.  We  will  not  sup- 
port the  establishment  of  an  independ- 
ent Palestinian  state  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza,  nor  will  we  support  annexa- 
tion or  permanent  control  by  Israel. 

Sixth,  and  finally,  we  will  always  in- 
sist on  Israel's  right  to  exist  in  peace 
behind  secure  and  recognized  borders. 
As  President  Reagan  said  on  Septem- 
ber 1,  1982 — part  of  his  initiative — "In 
the  pre- 1967  borders,  Israel  was  barely 
10  miles  wide  at  its  narrowest  point. 
The  bulk  of  Israel's  population  lived 
within  artillery  range  of  hostile  Arab  ar- 
mies. I  am  not  about  to  ask  Israel  to  live 
that  way  again."  The  United  States 
stands  firmly  behind  that  solemn  com- 
mitment. 

If  Israel  and  the  United  States  con- 
tinue to  work  together,  we  can  make 
progress  toward  peace. 

The  Economic  Challenge 

We  know  that  peace  is  essential  to 
Israel's  security.  But  there  is  another 
important  element  to  that  security.  The 
strength  of  Israel  also  depends  on  the 
strength  of  its  economy.  Israel  must 
work  to  overcome  its  economic  prob- 
lems. Because  of  our  own  deep  interest 
in  a  strong,  healthy,  and  secure  Israel, 
we  will  also  do  our  part  in  ways  we  can 
be  most  helpful. 

We  in  America  know  what  it  is  like 
to  live  through  difficult  economic  times. 
Only  in  the  past  3  years  have  we  begun 
to  pull  ourselves  out  of  the  spiraling 
stagflation  of  the  late  1970s.  We  also 
know  how  hard  it  is  to  make  the  tough 
political  decisions  and  the  sacrifices 
needed  to  put  an  economy  on  a  stable 
path  of  growth  without  inflation.  We 
know  firsthand  how  tough  it  is  to  cut 
the  budget.  Yet  these  tough  decisions 
must  be  made. 

But  remember,  the  Israeli  economy 
is  a  spectacular  success  story.  The 
Israeli  standard  of  living  has  risen 
steadily  and  remarkably.  Israeli  goods 
compete  successfully  in  the  major  inter- 
national markets.  In  fact,  in  1984  Israel 
increased  its  exports  by  about  12.5%, 
while  simultaneously  reducing  its  im- 
ports by  2.5%.  If  the  United  States  had 
done  the  same  in  percentage  terms,  our 
trade  deficit  would  be  more  than  $80 
billion  lower  than  it  is  today. 


June  1985 


21 


THE  SECRETARY 


Still,  the  Israeli  economy  faces  real 
problems.  Israel  is  consuming  more  than 
it  produces,  and  its  economy  is  beset  by 
a  large  national  debt,  untenable  budget 
deficits,  structural  rigidities,  and  power- 
ful inflationary  forces.  There  are  no 
quick  solutions  to  these  problems — yet 
Israelis  have  proved  during  the  state's 
early  decades  that  they  could  pull 
together  to  build  and  maintain  a 
dynamic,  growing  economy.  Israel  has 
all  the  qualities  needed  for  economic  suc- 
cess: an  educated,  dynamic  people;  im- 
pressive capacities  for  research  and 
development  of  new  technologies;  and 
outstanding  universities.  Israel's 
economic  achievements  in  previous  years 
were  a  testament  to  the  public  spirit, 
bravery,  creativity,  and  talents  of  its 
people.  I  have  no  doubt  that  those  same 
qualities  today  hold  out  the  promise  of 
future  prosperity. 

But  Israel  must  pull  itself  out  of  its 
present  economic  trauma.  And  the 
Israeli  people  must  do  it  themselves;  no 
one  can  do  it  for  them.  Israel  will  need 
support  as  it  makes  the  needed  ad- 
justments, and  here  the  United  States 
can  and  must  help.  But  our  help  will  be 
of  little  avail  if  Israel  does  not  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  cut  government 
spending,  improve  productivity,  open  up 
its  economy,  and  strengthen  the 
mechanisms  of  economic  policy.  Israel 
and  its  government  must  make  the  hard 
decisions.  Prime  Minister  Peres  and 
Finance  Minister  Modai  have  shown 
courageous  leadership;  they  deserve  sup- 
port, here  and  in  Israel,  for  this  effort. 

From  1981  to  1984,  the  United 
States  has  provided  almost  $9.5  billion 
in  aid  to  Israel.  In  1984,  aid  to  Israel 
made  up  more  than  a  quarter  of  our  en- 
tire foreign  aid  program.  Yet  we  must 
all  understand  that  this  aid  cannot  really 
help  unless  Israel  makes  hard  and  far- 
reaching  decisions  for  structural  adjust- 
ment. 

The  United  States  can  also  help 
Israel  in  other  ways,  over  the  long  term, 
to  achieve  the  economic  success  Israel  is 
capable  of  achieving.  Tomorrow,  for  in- 
stance, the  United  States  and  Israel  will 
formally  sign  the  Free  Trade  Area 
Agreement.  This  will  guarantee  Israel 
completely  open  access  to  the  world's 
largest  and  most  diverse  market.  So, 
when  you  say  to  an  investor,  "What  can 
be  the  market  for  what  you're  doing," 
the  Free  Trade  Area  Agreement  pro- 
vides guaranteed  access  to  the  biggest 
and  most  diverse  market  there  is.  It's  a 
very  important  development.  In  1983, 
the  United  States  imported  almost  $1.5 
billion  worth  of  Israeli  products.  The 


Free  Trade  Area  Agreement  will 
strengthen  our  trade  partnership  even 
further. 

And  we  have  created  a  Joint 
Economic  Development  Group  for  a  con- 
tinuing dialogue  on  the  problems  of  the 
Israeli  economy  and  on  ways  that  our 
cooperation  can  help. 

The  future  belongs  to  the  free,  the 
venturesome,  the  educated,  and  the 
creative.  The  Israeli  people  are  all  of 
these.  Their  future  is  bright. 

America's  Pledge 

In  the  years  to  come,  Israel  and  the 
United  States  will  stand  together  in 
defense  of  our  shared  values  and  in  sup- 
port of  our  common  goals.  Our  two 
peoples  have  the  same  vision  of  a  better 
world — a  world  of  peace  and  freedom, 
where  the  dignity  of  all  men  and  women 
is  respected  by  all  nations.  The  evils  we 
see  all  around  us  today — terrorism  and 
the  states  that  sponsor  it,  the  persecu- 
tion of  Jews  and  other  minorities  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  outrages  against 
Israel  in  the  United  Nations — these  only 
strengthen  our  determination. 


Every  year  thousands  of  Americans 
visit  Yad  Vashem — the  memorial  to  the 
victims  of  the  Holocaust.  I  will  go  there 
again  next  month.  The  images  of  Jewish 
suffering  at  Nazi  hands  still  burn  in  our 
memories.  Our  pledge  at  the  end  of 
World  War  II  was  simple:  never  again. 
And  our  support  for  Israel  is  the  lasting 
embodiment  of  that  pledge. 

Our  two  nations  know  that  eternal 
vigilance  is,  indeed,  the  price  of  liberty. 
The  world  will  be  safe  for  decency  only 
if  men  and  women  of  decency  have  the 
courage  to  defend  what  they  cherish. 
Security  and  strength  are  the  foundation 
of  survival — and  of  any  serious  foreign 
policy.  They  are  essential  not  only  for 
the  defense  of  liberty  but  for  any  hopes 
for  peace.  Those  who  would  threaten 
peace  and  freedom  must  know  that  the 
champions  of  peace  and  freedom  stand 
strong  and  united. 

America  and  Israel  have  learned  this 
lesson.  Together,  we  will  set  an  example 
for  all  free  people:  we  will  work  tireless- 
ly for  peace  and  for  a  better  world. 


'Press  release  78. 


Southern  Africa:  Toward 
an  American  Consensus 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
National  Press  Club  on  April  16,  1985.^ 

Much  has  been  said  in  recent  years 
about  the  need  to  rebuild  the  national 
consensus  in  foreign  policy— the  consen- 
sus that  assures  continuity  and  purpose 
in  our  diplomacy.  I  share  that  view. 

Consensus  does  not  just  happen 
spontaneously.  It  must  be  nurtured,  like 
a  garden;  it  grows  from  knowledge  and 
experience.  Consensus  should  be  a 
positive  force:  we  need  to  decide  what 
we  are  for  and  know  what  means  are 
available  to  achieve  our  goals;  consensus 
cannot  be  simply  a  negative  catalogue  of 
what  we  are  against.  And  we  will 
achieve  neither  consensus  nor  results  if 
our  public  discourse  is  simply  emotional 
or  divorced  from  facts  and  from  a 
realistic  understanding  of  the  problems 
at  hand. 

Today,  I  want  to  speak  about  an 
area  of  the  world  that  has  become  a 
focus  of  interest  and  debate  and  where 
both  our  policies  and  the  regional 


realities  are  too  often  misunderstood  or 
even  distorted.  I  am  talking  about 
southern  Africa. 

A  great  human  drama  is  unfolding 
in  southern  Africa  as  new  nations  strug- 
gle for  stability  and  progress  and  as 
South  Africa  itself  confronts  the  necessi- 
ty of  internal  change.  This  drama  has 
crucial  implications  for  the  United 
States.  The  region's  future  touches  on 
our  most  basic  moral  convictions  as  well 
as  our  interests  and  our  global  respon- 
sibilities for  security  and  peace. 

On  such  an  issue,  above  all,  a  na- 
tional consensus  is  imperative.  On  a 
question  of  such  overwhelming  moral, 
practical,  and  strategic  significance,  our 
national  policy  must  be  coherent,  con- 
sidered, and  effective.  We  simply  cannot 
afford  to  let  southern  Africa  become  a 
divisive  domestic  issue— tearing  our 
country  apart,  rendering  our  actions 
haphazard  and  impotent,  and  con- 
tributing to  the  ugliest  and  most  violent 
outcome. 

Equally  important— and  I  believe 
this  deeply— the  elements  of  such  a  con- 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


sensus  exist,  based  on  our  principles, 
our  goals,  and  our  capabilities.  Few 
Americans  today  would  contest  that  we 
want  to  help  the  people  of  South 
Africa— black  and  white— build  a  just 
society;  and  we  want  to  promote  peace, 
freedom,  and  progress  throughout 
southern  Africa.  Few  Americans  would 
contest  that  change  is  inevitable.  The 
question  now  being  debated  is:  how  best 
can  we  help  South  Africans  manage  that 
change?  Wiiat  is  the  most  effective  way 
to  promote  a  just  and  peaceful  outcome? 
Today,  I  will  outline  the  analysis  and 
the  facts  that  underlie  our  strategy.  I  do 
so  with  confidence  that  Americans  over- 
whelmingly support  the  goals  of  racial 
justice,  progress,  and  peaceful  change 
and  are  realistic  enough  to  judge  for 
themselves  what  policies  work  and  don't 
work. 

Southern  African  Realities 

In  1981,  the  new  Reagan  Administration 
found  in  southern  Africa  a  region 
marked: 

•  By  growing  racial  tension  in 
South  Africa; 

•  By  escalating  cross-border 
violence; 

•  By  Soviet  and  Cuban  intervention 
in  the  region; 

•  By  stalled  negotiations  for  the  in- 
dependence of  Namibia,  a  territory  il- 
legally ruled  by  South  Africa;  and 

•  By  governments  that  were  willing, 
indeed,  eager  to  see  the  United  States 
undertake  an  effective  and  forceful 
diplomatic  role. 

To  play  such  a  role,  we  had  to  take 
into  account  hard  realities. 

The  first  reality  is  that  South 
Africa's  denial  of  political  rights  to  the 
country's  majority— apartheid— is  not 
only  morally  indefensible;  it  is,  in  the 
long  run,  unsustainable.  South  Africa's 
blacks  are  making  their  voices  heard, 
saying  that  they  are  no  longer  willing  to 
live  under  a  system  that  denies  them 
fair  political  participation;  both 
demography  and  economics  are  on  the 
side  of  those  challenging  the  old  order. 
The  key  psychological  breakthrough  will 
come  when  everyone  in  South  Africa 
recognizes  that  change  is  coming;  then 
the  question  shifts  from  "whether"  to 
"how."  An  upheaval  of  bloodshed  and 
destruction  would  be  a  monstrous 
tragedy  for  all  South  Africans  of  all 
races. 

Second,  South  Africa  is  not  a  small 
island.  It  is  a  regional  powerhouse  en- 
dowed with  vast  mineral  resources  and 
real  economic  might.  It  is  the  hub  of  the 


entire  area's  economy  and  infrastruc- 
ture. The  bordering  states— Mozam- 
bique, Zimbabwe,  Botswana,  Lesotho, 
Swaziland,  Namibia— and  even  countries 
farther  away,  such  as  Zambia  and  Zaire, 
are  heavily  dependent  upon  South 
Africa's  ports,  industries,  railway  net- 
works, and  financial  institutions.  At  the 
same  time.  South  Africa  needs— but  to  a 
lesser  degree— the  markets,  the  labor, 
the  transport  systems  of  its  neighbors. 
Any  policy  which  ignores  this  symbiotic 
relationship  is  out  of  touch  with  reality. 
A  scenario  of  upheaval  in  South  Africa 
will  spell  disaster  for  its  neighbors. 

But  for  much  of  the  past  decade, 
this  interdependence  has  been  strained 
by  hostility  and  armed  conflict.  This  is 
the  third  reality:  southern  Africa  has 
been  a  region  of  conflict,  with  warfare 
or  armed  dissidence  of  one  form  or 
another  in  South  Africa,  Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique,  Namibia,  Lesotho,  and 
Angola.  A  senseless  cycle  of  cross- 
border  violence  increased  in  ferocity  as 
guerrillas  operating  from  the  black 
African  states  thrust  into  South  Africa, 
while  South  Africa  turned  on  its 
neighbors  with  its  military  might  and 
destabilizing  efforts. 

The  violence  has  provided  new  op- 
portunities for  our  global  adversaries. 
And  this  is  a  fourth  reality.  Today,  there 
are  about  30,000  Cuban  troops  in 
Angola,  along  with  Soviet  and  East 
European  advisers.  Soviet  aid  in  the 
region  has  been  almost  exclusively 
military.  Our  adversaries  have  no  con- 
structive stake  in  the  region,  seeing, 
rather,  in  instability  their  best  chance  to 
expand  their  influence.  When  the 
Soviets  and  Cubans  intervene  in  a  part 
of  the  world  far  from  their  borders,  we 
had  better  pay  attention.  Such  interven- 
tion threatens  African  independence  as 
well  as  the  global  balance.  'The  peoples 
of  Africa  deserve  better  than  the 
bankruptcy — economic,  political,  and 
moral — of  the  Soviet  model.  More  and 
more  Africans  have  come  to  look  to  the 
United  States  and  the  West  for  help  in 
addressing  the  twin  challenges  of 
regional  peace  and  economic  survival. 

This  leads  to  a  fifth  reality— the  im- 
portance of  the  American  role.  Of 
course,  there  are  limits  to  what  we  can 
do  directly.  Our  influence  over  issues 
and  players  is  not  the  determining  fac- 
tor in  their  actions.  Nevertheless,  we  are 
not  without  potential  to  affect  events. 
While  the  Soviets  can  fan  conflicts  and 
supply  the  implements  of  war  to  pursue 
them,  they  cannot  produce  solutions. 
That  peacemaking  role  can  only  be 
played  by  a  power  that  has  a  working 


relationship  and  influence  with  all  the 
parties,  including,  of  course.  South 
Africa. 

I  have  devoted  some  time  to  describ- 
ing the  broad  regional  realities  because 
the  regional  context  is  all  important.  Its 
many  dimensions  are  interrelated.  The 
external  environment  has  a  direct  bear- 
ing on  the  situation  within  South  Africa; 
a  white  government  that  no  longer  sees 
itself  as  besieged  from  outside  its 
borders  will  be  better  able  to  take  the 
steps  it  must  to  reform  its  own  society. 
Conversely,  internal  upheavals  in  South 
Africa  can  spill  over  and  complicate  the 
regional  diplomacy.  An  end  to  cross- 
border  violence  is  essential  if  the  sur- 
rounding black  states  are  to  be  able  to 
devote  their  energies  to  economic 
development  or  to  offer  less  tempting 
opportunities  for  Soviet  adventurism. 

From  the  outset,  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration undertook  to  help  influence 
the  process  of  change: 

•  To  accelerate  the  peaceful  evolu- 
tion in  South  Africa  away  from  apart- 
heid; and 

•  To  diminish  the  violence  and  in- 
stability that  threaten  lives  and 
livelihoods  throughout  the  region. 

The  complexities  are  daunting.  But 
the  United  States  has  confronted  an  un- 
satisfactory situation,  worked  at  the 
problem  with  care  and  determination, 
and  achieved  a  good  measure  of  prog- 
ress. There  have  been  ups  and  downs, 
obstacles  and  setbacks.  But  through 
painstaking  diplomacy,  we  have  reached 
the  point  where  the  agenda  we  proposed 
is  accepted  by  all  participants;  where 
we,  not  the  Soviet  Union,  have  a  major 
say  in  helping  shape  the  region's  political 
future.  There  is  now  less  cross-border 
violence  than  there  has  been  in  1 1  years. 
There  has  been  more  reform  in  South 
Africa  in  the  past  4  years  than  in  the 
previous  30. 

The  gains  are  fragile.  Nonetheless,  a 
process  of  change  is  clearly  under 
way— offering  hope  to  Africa's  peoples  if 
we  continue  to  show  responsibility  and 
dedication  in  helping  them  manage  that 
process. 

South  Africa 

Let  me  start  with  the  central  issue  of 
domestic  reform  in  South  Africa.  In  pur- 
suing that  goal,  we  have  been  guided  by 
two  important  facts. 

First,  South  Africa  is  not  a  closed, 
totalitarian  society  in  which  the  govern- 
ment controls  all  aspects  of  life,  all 
means  of  communication,  all  avenues  of 


June  1985 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


thought.  While  the  white  minority 
dominates  the  system,  there  is  in  that 
system  a  significant  degree  of  openness 
of  political  activity  and  expression— a 
generally  free  press,  an  independent 
judiciary,  vigorous  debate  within  the 
governing  party  and  in  parliament,  and 
vocal  critics  of  all  viewpoints.  There  is 
nothing  comparable  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
This  degree  of  openness  reflects  the  fact 
that  white  South  Africa  is  not  immune 
to  the  moral  influence  of  the  West;  in- 
deed, the  white  community's  desire  to  be 
viewed  as  part  of  the  Western  world 
and  its  growing  recognition  of  the  need 
for  change  are  among  the  grounds  for 
hope  for  peaceful  change.  How  many 
governments  in  the  world  would  permit 
ABC's  Nightline  program  to  set  up  shop 
for  a  week,  probe  and  dissect  the  coun- 
try's ills,  film  heated  debates  between 
government  leaders  and  their  most  ar- 
dent critics,  and  then  show  those  pro- 
grams to  its  people? 

Second,  we  chose  to  focus  on  get- 
ting results.  We  cannot  have  it  both 
ways:  we  cannot  have  influence  with 
people  if  we  treat  them  as  moral  lepers, 
especially  when  they  are  themselves 
beginning  to  address  the  agenda  of 
change.  South  Africa's  neighbors 
recognize  this.  We  must,  too. 

By  the  same  token,  this  has  not  kept 
us  from  speaking  out — to  South 
Africans  of  all  races  and  to  the 
American  people.  We  have  conveyed  the 
message  to  the  South  African  Govern- 
ment that  a  more  constructive  relation- 
ship with  the  United  States  is  possible, 
prorlded  that  it  demonstrates  a  sustain- 
ed commitment  to  significant  reform 
toward  a  more  just  society. 

•  We  have  consistently  called  for  an 
end  to  apartheid. 

•  We  have  spoken  out  forcefully  for 
press  freedom  and  against  repressive 
measures  such  as  forced  removals,  ar- 
bitrary detentions,  and  bannings. 

•  We  have  called  for  political 
dialogue  between  blacks  and  whites  and 
for  an  end  to  Nelson  Mandela's  long  im- 
prisonment. 

•  With  our  support,  U.S.  businesses 
have  become  a  positive  force  for  change 
in  South  Africa  by  adopting  the  Sullivan 
code  of  fair  labor  employment  practices 
and  by  providing  educational,  housing, 
and  other  benefits  worth  more  than 
$100  million  to  their  black  employees 
over  the  past  few  years. 

•  We  have  developed  nearly  $30 
million  in  assistance  programs  to  train 
leaders  in  the  black  community  to  help 
them  work  more  effectively  for  change 
in  their  own  society. 


The  truth  is  that  South  Africa  is 
changing.  For  the  most  part,  the 
transformation  is  being  brought  about 
by  reality — by  the  growing  realization 
that  a  modern  industrial  society  simply 
cannot  be  governed  by  a  preindustrial 
political  philosophy  of  racial  segregation. 

The  old  illusion  that  South  Africa's 
blacks  could  live  permanently  or  enjoy 
citizenship  rights  only  in  designated 
tribal  homelands — so  that  in  the  end 
there  would  no  longer  be  any  "South 
African  blacks" — is  being  abandoned. 
Blacks  are  no  longer  prohibited  from  ac- 
quiring property  rights  in  the  supposedly 
"white"  urban  areas.  The  right  of  blacks 
to  organize  trade  unions  has  been 
recognized,  and  black  unions  are  now  a 
powerful  factor  on  South  Africa's  in- 
dustrial relations  scene;  fully  50%  of 
trade  unionists  in  South  Africa  are 
black.  Central  business  districts  are 
being  opened  to  black  businessmen,  and 
cities  like  Durban  and  Cape  Town  are 
desegregating  their  public  facilities. 
Faced  with  the  obvious  injustice  of 
forced  removals  of  settled  black  com- 
munities and  with  the  obvious  inability 
to  stop  the  influx  of  blacks  into  the 
cities,  the  government  has  suspended 
such  removals  and  is  shifting  to  what  it 
calls  an  "orderly  urbanization"  policy. 

The  government  has  now  acknowl- 
edged that  it  must  consult  with  repre- 
sentative blacks  aliout  political  participa- 
tion outside  the  tril)al  homelands  and  at 
the  national  level;  mere  local  self- 
government  is  understood  to  be  inade- 
quate. Just  this  week,  the  government 
accepted  a  special  commission's  report 
that  calls  for  the  abolition  of  laws  ban- 
ning interracial  marriage  and  sexual 
relations — one  of  the  most  important 
symbols  of  apartheid. 

If  we  recognize  that  white  opinion 
holds  vital  keys  to  change,  then  we  must 
also  recognize  that  change  must 
originate  in  shifts  in  white  politics.  In 
this  regard,  in  the  past  3  years,  the 
white  government  has  crossed  a 
historical  divide:  it  has  been  willing  to 
accept  major  defections  from  its  own 
ranks  in  order  to  begin  to  offer  a  better 
political,  economic,  and  social  deal  to  the 
nation's  black  majority. 

These  changes  are  not  enough. 
South  Africa  is  not  now  a  just  society. 
Serious  inequities  continue:  repression, 
detentions  without  trial,  and  the  pros- 
pect of  treason  trials  for  some  black 
leaders.  The  issues  of  common  citizen- 
ship for  all  and  of  black  political  rights 
have  been  raised  but  not  yet  concretely 
addressed  by  the  government.  The  hated 
pass  laws  and  influx  control  continue, 
though  the  government  appears  to  be 


rethinking  its  actions  on  this  front. 
Much  more  needs  to  be  done.  Change 
has  just  begun,  but  it  has  begun.  Our  job 
is  to  continue  to  encourage  it. 

The  recent  domestic  violence  is 
clearly  a  setback.  All  Americans  are  sad- 
dened and  dismayed  at  the  almost  daily 
reports  of  violent  encounters  that  have 
caused  nearly  300  deaths  among  black 
South  Africans  over  the  past  9  months. 
The  United  States  has  consistently, 
repeatedly,  and  publicly  deplored  this 
bloodshed  and  the  police  tactics  that 
only  produce  killings  and  add  fuel  to  the 
unrest. 

There  is  no  excuse  for  official 
violence  against  peaceful  demonstrators. 
Any  government  has  a  duty  to  maintain 
law  and  order.  Nevertheless,  that  cannot 
be  done  simply  on  the  basis  of  force;  law 
and  order  also  means  due  process  and 
adequate  channels  for  airing  and  resolv- 
ing grievances. 

But  just  as  we  recognize  the  right  of 
peaceable  assembly,  so,  too,  if  we  are  to 
be  taken  seriously,  must  we  reject  the 
right  of  any  to  take  the  law  into  their 
own  hands.  That  is  a  formula  for  anar- 
chy. We  applaud  the  courage  of  those 
black  leaders  who  press  for  nonviolent 
change,  confronted  on  one  side  by  a 
surging  mass  of  black  bitterness  and  on 
the  other  side  by  a  long-unresponsive 
political  system.  We  welcome  the  words 
of  Bishop  Desmond  Tutu,  Nobel  Peace 
laureate,  who  urged  a  crowd  of  blacks  at 
a  funeral  the  other  day: 

Don't  undermine  our  wonderful  cause. 
Let  us  not  use  the  methods  that  are  used 
against  us  by  our  enemies.  Wlien  we  finally 
achieve  our  goal  of  freedom,  we  must  be  able 
to  look  back  with  pride  at  how  we  got  there. 

There  are  responsibilities  here  for  all 
South  Africans,  and  most  particularly 
for  those  in  authority.  We  hope  the 
government  will  move  quickly  and  con- 
cretely to  restore  confidence  in  its 
reform  commitments;  we  urge  it  to  take 
up  the  dialogue  with  black  leaders  about 
the  road  to  a  just  society.  We  urge  all 
South  Africans  to  take  advantage  of 
openings  for  peace. 

Regional  Security 

Peace  within  South  Africa,  as  I  said,  is 
directly  linked  to  the  question  of 
regional  peace.  A  society  that  feels  im- 
mensely threatened  by  outside  forces  is 
less  likely  to  loosen  the  controls  at 
home.  Nor  can  black  states  normalize 
their  relations  with  their  South  African 
neighbor  so  long  as  there  is  no  convinc- 
ing movement  away  from  apartheid. 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  United  States  has  worked  hard 
and  successfully  to  maintain  the  con- 
fidence of  the  parties  and  to  facilitate 
negotiated  solutions. 

•  We  helped  bring  South  Africa  and 
Mozambique  together  in  the  Nkomati  ac- 
cord of  March  1984,  ending  government- 
supported  cross-border  violence  and  pro- 
moting economic  cooperation.  This  ac- 
cord faces  serious  challenges,  but  both 
sides  are  committed  to  making  it  work. 

•  We  helped  Angola  and  South 
Africa  agree  on  a  plan  for  the 
withdrawal  of  South  African  forces  from 
Angola  and  control  of  SWAPO  [South 
West  Africa  People's  Organization]  and 
Cuban  troops  in  southern  Angola.  The 
war  between  South  Africa  and  Angola  is 
over;  there  has,  in  fact,  been  peace  for 
the  last  14  months.  The  few  South 
African  troops  left  in  Angola  as  part  of 
a  joint  monitoring  commission  will  be 
withdrawn  this  week  as  the  final  step  of 
disengagement.  The  problems  of  Angola 
and  Namibia  are  far  from  solved,  but 
this  marks  important  progress. 

•  Our  diplomacy,  in  concert  with 
key  Western  allies,  has  brought  Namibia 
closer  to  independence  than  ever  before. 
Agreement  on  a  timetable  for  Cuban 
troop  withdrawal  from  Angola  is  the  one 
issue  remaining  in  the  overall  settlement 
package.  Let  there  be  no  mistake  about 
it:  UN  Security  Council  Resolution  435 
remains  the  only  internationally  accept- 
able basis  for  a  solution. 

•  The  United  States  has  helped 
bring  about  understandings  between 
Lesotho  and  Botswana,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  South  Africa  on  the  other,  averting 
potential  conflicts. 

•  And  we  helped  move  Mozambique 
away  from  heavy  dependence  on  the 
Soviet  camp  and  closer  to  true  nonalign- 
ment.  We  demonstrated  to  Mozambique 
that  its  best  interests  are  served  by 
closer  cooperation  with  the  West  and  by 
rejection  of  confrontation  with  South 
Africa.  The  trend  of  our  relations  with 
Mozambique  is  positive  and  needs  fur- 
ther encouragement. 

All  of  these  steps  have  lessened  the 
danger  of  warfare.  But  the  situation  re- 
mains fragile;  it  requires  the  continued 
pragmatism,  realism,  and  dedication  of 
the  parties  involved.  New  opportunities 
have  been  created;  they  should  be 
seized. 


America's  Responsibility 

Southern  Africa  is  thus,  clearly  and  un- 
mistakably, in  a  process  of  transforma- 
tion. The  only  question  is  how  this 
change  will  come  about.  The  idea  that 
our  policy  is  simply  reinforcing  the 
status  quo  is  an  utter  misconception — a 
display  of  ignorance  of  what  is  going  on. 
We  are  engaged  as  a  force  for  peace  and 
for  constructive  change  throughout 
southern  Africa.  This  is  the  only  respon- 
sible course,  and  we  will  not  be  deflected 
from  it. 

Some  believe  that  the  United  States 
should  have  nothing  to  do  with  Marxist 
regimes  such  as  Angola  or  Mozambique, 
leaving  them  to  cope  with  their  predict- 
able economic  failures  or  throwing  in 
our  lot  with  their  armed  opponents. 
Such  a  notion  ignores  the  realities  on 
the  ground  in  southern  Africa  as  well  as 
significant  distinctions  between  those 
two  countries. 

In  Angola,  when  the  Portuguese 
granted  independence,  a  number  of 
black  liberation  movements  competed 
for  power.  A  Marxist  party  took  over 
the  country  in  1975,  backed  and  sus- 
tained by  the  massive  Soviet/Cuban  in- 
tervention. UNITA  [National  Union  for 
the  Total  Independence  of  Angola],  an 
important  indigenous  nationalist  move- 
ment, was  denied  a  share  of  power.  The 
U.S.  Congress  passed  the  Tunney  and 
Clark  amendments  barring  any  U.S. 
support  for  those  Angolans  opposing  the 
Soviet/Cuban  intervention— as  if  to 
grant  the  Marxist  regime  immunity 
against  its  own  people.  The  Brezhnev 
doctrine — which  declares  that  com- 
munist revolutions  are  irrever- 
sible— was,  in  effect,  enacted  into 
American  law.  Since  1975,  UNITA  has 
waged  a  determined  armed  struggle  in 
the  countryside  against  the  MPLA 
[Popular  Movement  for  the  Liberation  of 
Angola]  government's  monopoly  of 
power;  it  has  steadily  grown  in  strength 
and  territorial  control. 

We  do  not  believe  that  Angola's 
agony— still  continuing  10  years  after 
independence— can  be  resolved  militari- 
ly. In  our  contacts  with  both  the  MPLA 
government  and  UNITA,  we  sense  little 
optimism  about  military  solutions.  Our 
diplomacy,  therefore,  has  sought  con- 
structive alternatives  to  open-ended  war- 
fare and  suffering.  By  focusing  on  the 
related  international  questions  of  Nami- 
bian  independence  and  Cuban  troop 
withdrawal  from  Angola,  we  have  taken 
important  steps  forward.  The  principle 
of  a  regional  settlement  involving  these 
two  issues— Namibia  and  Angola— is 


June  1985 


now  accepted;  the  next  step  is  to  agree 
on  specifies.  If  we  succeed,  Africa's  last 
colony  will  achieve  statehood,  and 
foreign  intervention  and  foreign  forces 
will  be  removed  from  the  Angolan  equa- 
tion. This  can  set  the  stage  for  all 
Angolans  to  work  out  their  own  future 
and  achieve  reconciliation  at  home. 

In  Mozambique,  we  make  a  different 
calculation  based  on  different  facts. 
Mozambique  and  South  Africa  have 
moved  toward  coexistence  based  on 
their  own  national  interests.  This  pros- 
pect, which  we  encouraged,  offered  an 
opening  for  improved  relations  with 
Western  nations  and  Western  help  for 
Mozambique's  shattered  economy.  We 
have  seized  these  openings.  By  com- 
peting, we  have  strengthened  a  trend 
favorable  to  our  interests.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances, our  European  allies.  South 
Africa,  and  Mozambique's  other 
neighbors  have  thrown  their  weight 
behind  that  country's  turn  toward 
moderation.  We  have  done  the  same. 

There  are  also  those  who  believe  we 
should  cut  our  ties  with  the  Government 
of  South  Africa  because  of  its  racial 
policies.  This  is  just  as  mistaken  as  the 
idea  that  we  should  refuse  to  deal  with 
Angola  and  Mozambique  because  of  their 
Marxist  inclinations.  We  cannot  bury 
our  heads  in  the  sand.  We  do  not 
enhance  our  ability  to  influence  change 
in  the  region  by  eliminating  ourselves  as 
an  actor. 

Some  propose  that  we  try  to  cut 
South  Africa  off,  to  run  it  out  of  the 
Western  world  through  boycotts,  em- 
bargoes, and  sanctions.  They  argue  that 
even  if  such  actions  do  not  bring  about 
change,  our  position  will  "put  us  on  the 
side  of  right."  I  reject  that  view.  It  leads 
us  down  the  road  to  ineffectual  actions 
that  are  more  likely  to  strengthen 
resistance  to  change  than  strengthen  the 
forces  of  reform.  It  ignores  the  harm 
that  such  an  approach  will  inflict 
precisely  on  the  black  majority  whom 
the  advocates  of  boycotts,  embargoes, 
and  sanctions  purportedly  want  to  help. 

Opinion  polls  in  South  Africa  by 
reputable  organizations  reveal  that  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  black  factory 
workers  are  opposed  to  disinvestment  by 
American  firms.  An  economy  that  even 
now  needs  to  create  250,000  new  jobs 
for  young  blacks  each  year  and  that  will 
have  twice  as  many  of  them  entering  the 
job  market  by  the  turn  of  the  century 
needs  more  job  opportunities,  not  fewer. 

I  do  not  understand  why  it  is  good 
for  American  investors  to  create  jobs  for 
black  workers  in  Zimbabwe  or  Zaire  but 
not  in  South  Africa.  And  I  suspect  the 
tens  of  thousands  who  have  flocked  to 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  squatters'  camp  at  Crossroads  out- 
side Cape  Town  in  a  desperate  search 
for  work  would  not  understand  either. 
Nor  would  the  more  than  1  million 
Africans  from  the  surrounding  nations 
who  have  moved  into  South  Africa  in 
search  of  employment. 

I  do  not  accept  the  argument  that  it 
is  in  our  interests  to  help  a  black  middle 
class  develop  in  Guinea  or  Gabon  but  not 
in  South  Africa. 

I  do  not  agree  with  those  who  argue 
that  American  companies  should  pro- 
mote the  social  and  educational  advance- 
ment of  their  black  workers  in  Sierra 
Leone  or  Senegal  but  not  in  South 
Africa. 

Now,  I  am  quite  aware  that  some  of 
the  proposals  now  before  the  Congress 
are  not,  strictly  speaking,  disinvestment 
bills.  Instead,  they  are  couched  in  terms 
of  conditional  bans  on  "new  investment" 
or  new  loans  unless  certain  political 
changes  are  made  within  a  year  or  two. 
Other  proposals  would  make  the  volun- 
tary Sullivan  code  mandatory  and  se- 
verely penalize  firms  that  do  not  comply 
adequately.  Well-intentioned  as  these 
proposals  may  be,  let  us  not  kid 
ourselves  about  their  likely  effect.  Given 
the  additional  risks  and  uncertainties 
which  such  legislation  would  create, 
many  U.S.  firms  are  apt  to  conclude 
that  their  continued  presence  in  South 
Africa  is  simply  no  longer  worth  the 
candle.  The  result  will  be  reduced 
American  influence. 

U.S.  firms,  private  U.S.  groups  and 
foundations,  as  well  as  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment, have  played  an  important  role  in 
influencing  the  changes  we  have  seen. 
That  is  because  they  were  there. 

The  only  course  consistent  with 
American  values  is  to  engage  ourselves 
as  a  force  for  constructive,  peaceful 
change.  It  is  not  our  business  to  cheer 
on,  from  the  sidelines,  the  forces  of 
polarization  that  could  erupt  in  a  race 
war;  it  is  not  our  job  to  exacerbate  hard- 
ship, which  could  lead  to  the  same 
result. 

At  the  same  time,  a  clear  bipartisan 
American  voice  that  rejects  apartheid  as 
an  unjust,  anachronistic,  and  untenable 
system  is  another  essential  building 
block  of  a  successful  policy.  And  here  1 
return  to  my  opening  theme  of  consen- 
sus. As  long  as  Americans  speak  with 
contrary  and  confusing  voices,  our  in- 
fluence will  be  less  than  it  could  be. 

Wliat,  then,  can  we  as  Americans 
agree  on? 

First,  we  can  all  agree  that  southern 
Africa  is  an  important  part  of  the  world 
that  demands  our  attention. 


26 


Second,  we  can  all  agree  that  the 
pace  of  change,  of  reform  and  develop- 
ment in  each  of  the  countries  of  the 
region,  depends  on  regional  peace  and 
stability.  Continued  conflict  only  helps 
perpetuate  racism  and  poverty. 

Third,  we  can  agree  that  apartheid 
must  go.  It  is  a  system  contrary  to  all 
that  we  stand  for  as  a  nation. 

Fourth,  we  can  agree  that  we  are 
more  interested  in  promoting  real  prog- 
ress than  in  posturing,  debating  points, 
or  grandiose  schemes  that  are  likely  to 
prove  ineffectual. 

Fifth,  we  can  agree  that  in  southern 
Africa,  as  in  every  other  part  of  the 
world,  the  engine  of  economic  and  social 
advancement  is  the  productive  private 
sector  and  its  links  to  the  global 
economy. 

And,  finally,  we  should  agree  that 
America's  role  must  always  be  on  the 
side  of  those  seeking  peaceful  change. 
We  should  agree  that  we  do  not  support 
violence  but  that  we  do  support— and 
will  support  aggressively— those  who 
have  committed  themselves  to  promote 
change  and  justice. 

These  are  the  elements  for  a  broad 
consensus  that  will  allow  America  to 
speak  with  one  voice. 


National  Policies 
and  Global  Prosperity 


) 


We  must  recognize  the  importance 
of  what  has  been  taking  place  in  South 
Africa  in  recent  years,  and  we  must 
reinforce  that  process  creatively.  Only 
by  engaging  ourselves  can  we  hope  to  d 
so.  We  will  not  be  the  main  actors  in 
this  human  drama;  that  role  must  be 
played  by  the  region's  people— black  and^ 
white  Africans.  But  we  must  not  stand 
by  and  throw  American  matches  on  the 
emotional  tinder  of  the  region. 

Our  morality  and  our  interests  coin- 
cide. America's  values  and  America's 
global  responsibilities  both  compel  us  to 
stay  engaged,  to  work  actively  for 
justice  and  decency  and  reconciliation. 
We  should  be  indignant  at  injustice  and 
bloodshed— but  indignation  alone  is  not ; 
strategy.  The  morality  of  a  nation's 
policy  must  be  judged  not  only  by  the 
noble  goals  it  invokes  but  by  the  results 
and  consequences  of  its  actions. 

If  all  Americans  work  together,  this 
nation  can  be  a  major  force  for  good. 
Thus,  we  serve  our  highest  ideals. 


'Press  release  73. 


Secretary  Shidtz's  address  before  the 
Woodrow  Wilson  School  of  Public  and 
International  Affairs  at  Princeton 
University  in  New  Jersey  on  April  11, 
1985^ 

My  theme  today  is  simple:  the  American 
economy  is  a  success  story — a  dramatic 
success  story.  But  success  brings  with  it 
new  challenges,  which  we  must  address 
with  great  energy  in  order  to  preserve 
and  build  on  the  success  we  have 
achieved. 

We  face  a  paradox.  In  the  past  2 
years,  our  economy  has  made  the 
strongest  recovery  of  any  in  the  last 
three  decades,  and  the  expansion  re- 
mains robust.  Yet  we  also  see,  in  our 
domestic  and  international  economic 
relations,  some  unusually  large  and  im- 
portant imbalances: 

•  A  large  net  capital  inflow; 

•  An  exceptionally  strong  dollar; 

•  The  largest  trade  deficit  in  our 
history;  and 

•  Large  and  continuing  deficits  in 
the  U.S.  Federal  budget. 


What  relationship  is  there,  if  any, 
between  our  clear  economic  success  and 
these  equally  clear  imbalances?  How  do 
these  imbalances  relate  to  each  other? 
What  are  our  prospects  if  the  imbal- 
ances continue?  And  what  conclusions 
follow  for  economic  policy — in  this  coun- 
try and  in  other  countries?  These  are  th€ 
issues  I  would  like  to  discuss  with  you 
today. 

"The  economic  policies  of  this  Ad- 
ministration—  reducing  the  role  of 
government,  promoting  private  initia- 
tive, and  encouraging  free  trade — have 
led  the  United  States  out  of  recession 
and  toward  prosperity.  We  can  be  proud 
of  our  economic  performance.  Our  ex- 
pansion has  led  to  export-induced 
recoveries  abroad — underscoring  the  in- 
terdependence among  the  world's 
economies. 

In  large  part,  the  imbalances  I  men- 
tioned have  contributed  to  our  economic 
success;  some  are  partly  the  result  of  it. 
To  a  degree,  they  have  been  exacerbated 
by  the  economic  policies  of  other  na- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


ions.  Whatever  their  source,  my  main 
onclusion  can  be  stated  up  front:  these 
nbalances  are  interrelated,  and  they 
lust  be  corrected  if  we  are  to  maintain 
he  momentum  of  our  economic  success. 
Ve — and  other  countries — share  a 
esponsibility  to  make  some  hard 
olitical  decisions. 

Let  me  focus  on  these  imbalances, 
irst  as  they  impact  on  the  American 
conomy  and  then  as  they  are  mirrored 
1  other  countries.  Then  I  will  lay  out 
he  policy  responses  I  see  as  neces- 
ary— responses  by  all  nations— to  keep 
he  world  economy  on  the  path  of  sus- 
ained,  noninflationary  growth. 

apital  Flows 

irst,  the  large  net  capital  inflows  into 
he  United  States. 

An  impressive  investment  boom  has 
Iriven  American  economic  expansion  in 
he  past  3  years.  To  a  large  extent,  this 
loom  reflects  the  new  investment  incen- 
ives  the  Administration  provided  in  its 
irst  term — including  incentives  for  vital 
esearch  and  development,  which  is  the 
ource  of  future  investment.  Gross  sav- 
ng  by  individuals,  business,  and  state 
nd  local  governments  also  recovered 
rem  its  recession  low  of  18%  of  GNP 
gross  national  product]  in  1982  to  20% 
n  1984. 

But  with  the  Federal  deficit,  gross 
ational  saving  alone  could  not  finance 
nis  higher  level  of  investment.  In  1984, 
rross  saving  in  the  United  States  by  in- 
iividuals,  businesses,  and  state  and  local 
1  overnments  ran  about  $730  billion.  On 
net  basis  of  capital  consumption,  the 
igure  was  $325  billion.  These  are 
ealthy  amounts  by  recent  standards, 
ifter  taking  account  of  the  large 
''ederal  deficit,  however,  total  national 
aving  amounted  to  only  about  $150 
lillion  on  a  net  basis  or  $555  billion  on  a 
;ross  basis— considerably  less  than  the 
;635  billion  recorded  in  gross  private 
lomestic  investment  in  1984. 

As  measured  by  our  current  account 
leficit,  net  capital  inflows  into  the 
Jnited  States  were  about  $100  billion 
ast  year.  This  is  almost  one-fifth  the 
;ize  of  our  gross  national  saving— and 
wo-thirds  the  size  of  our  net  national 
saving— and  has  been  an  important  fac- 
tor in  financing  the  expansion  of  our  in- 
vfestment  and,  therefore,  of  our 
economy. 

These  inflows  have  come  about 
largely  because  of  the  health  and  vigor 
of  our  own  economy,  in  contrast  with 
the  less  attractive  conditions  for  lending 
and  investment  in  other  countries.  But 


they  come,  to  some  degree,  at  the  ex- 
pense of  building  up  foreign  claims  on 
the  United  States.  On  the  basis  of  cur- 
rent trends,  the  United  States  will  soon 
become  a  large  net  debtor  nation— our 
foreign  liabilities  could  exceed  our 
foreign  assets  by  $100  billion  by  the  end 
of  the  year. 

And  underlying  conditions  are  bound 
to  change  in  the  future.  As  opportunities 
to  invest  improve  in  other  countries, 
capital  inflows  into  the  United  States 
will  slow  down  and  outflows  will  in- 
crease. In  other  words,  even  if  we  are 
prepared  to  finance  investment  in  the 
United  States  through  a  continuing  net 
inflow  of  funds,  we  cannot  count  on  at- 
tracting adequate  funds  indefinitely. 
Without  a  compensating  increase  in 
domestic  saving  to  support  our  own  in- 
vestment—and if  our  Federal  deficit 
continues  to  preempt  a  large  portion  of 
domestic  saving— lower  capital  inflows 
could  force  a  decline  in  our  investment 
and  impair  the  long-term  growth  of  the 
American  economy. 

The  Strong  Dollar 

These  large  net  capital  inflows  into  the 
United  States  have  produced  an  extraor- 
dinarily strong  dollar.  Although  the 
dollar  has  receded  somewhat  in  the  last 
month,  it  is  still,  on  a  trade-weighted 
basis,  about  80%  above  its  1980  average 
in  nominal  terms. 

The  exchange  value  of  the  dollar 
today  is  determined  far  more  by  capital 
movements  than  by  trade  balances. 
Many  factors  have  contributed.  The 
restoration  of  America's  economic  vitali- 
ty and  leadership  on  the  world  scene  has 
had  an  important  effect  on  investment 
decisions.  Our  economic  success— and 
our  bright  prospects— cause  investments 
in  dollar  assets  to  be  judged  more  at- 
tractive and  less  risky  than  others 
despite  the  dollar's  high  value.  The 
dollar  market  also  offers  the  widest 
selection  and  greatest  liquidity.  And 
dollar  assets  are  serving  not  only  as  a 
store  of  value  but  as  a  political 
safehaven  as  well.  Exchange  markets 
reflect  all  these  considerations,  par- 
ticularly as  they  contrast  with  the  poor 
growth  performance  in  Europe,  the 
financial  problems  of  the  developing 
world,  and  the  large  excess  of  saving 
over  domestic  investment  in  Japan. 

The  net  inflows  of  foreign  capital, 
and  the  resulting  high  dollar,  have  cer- 
tain advantages.  By  reducing  the  cost  of 
imports  and  forcing  domestic  suppliers 
to  compete  more  effectively,  the  strong 
dollar  has  helped  restrain  inflation  in  the 
United  States.  The  net  capital  inflows 


have  helped  moderate  interest  rates  as 
well.  Abroad,  the  growth  of  American 
imports  and  slower  growth  of  American 
exports  have  stimulated  export-related 
jobs  and  generated  economies  of  scale 
for  foreign  producers.  The  high  value  of 
the  dollar  also  makes  offsliore  procure- 
ment, tourism,  and  American  foreign 
direct  investment  in  other  countries  all 
less  expensive. 

But  the  extraordinarily  high  dollar 
also  has  important  disadvantages. 

•  It  reduces  the  competitiveness  of 
our  exports  and  the  potential  for  their 
growth.  Even  though  our  exports  have 
increased  and  the  United  States  is  still 
the  world's  largest  exporter,  our  share 
of  the  world  market  for  exports  of 
manufactured  goods  in  volume  terms  is 
estimated  to  have  declined  by  25%  since 
1980. 

•  Because  of  increased  domestic  de- 
mand, economic  activity  in  the  United 
States  has  not  yet  been  appreciably 
restricted.  But  that  may  change. 

•  The  dollar's  strength  is  causing 
painful  structural  adjustments  in  many 
of  our  export-related  industries;  it  is 
altering  the  character  of  the  American 
economy  in  a  basic  and,  in  my  view, 
undesirable  way.  Lower  costs  in  other 
countries— due  to  exchange  rates— are 
leading  many  American  firms  to  locate 
abroad  production  facilities  that  would 
otherwise  be  competitive  in  the  United 
States.  Such  decisions  to  locate  or  ex- 
pand abroad  would  be  both  difficult  and 
costly  to  reverse  if  the  dollar's  exchange 
value  came  down. 

•  The  large  decline  in  the  value  of 
other  currencies  against  the  dollar  has 
also  eroded  the  value  of  existing  foreign 
investments,  sales,  and  earnings  denom- 
inated in  foreign  currencies. 

•  In  the  meantime,  the  growth  of 
our  imports  is  spurring  protectionist 
demands  for  tariffs,  nontariff  barriers, 
and  export  subsidies.  Whatever  short- 
term  relief  for  specific  industries  such 
measures  might  provide,  the  overall 
long-term  cost  to  the  mettle  of  the 
American  economy,  to  the  American 
consumer,  and  to  the  world  economy 
would  be  devastating.  Let  us  never 
forget  the  catastrophic  effects  of  protec- 
tion in  the  1930s  and  the  exhilarating 
impact  of  more  open  trade  in  the 
decades  following  World  War  II. 

The  Trade  Account 

This  leads  me  to  the  most  visible  inter- 
national consequence  of  the  strong 
dollar:  its  role  in  our  huge  and  growing 
trade  deficit,  which  reached  a  record 
$123  billion  in  1984. 


June  1985 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


Despite  the  strong  dollar,  our  ex- 
ports, in  fact,  grew  last  year  by  9%  to  a 
total  of  $218  billion— demonstrating  the 
underlying  strength  of  the  American 
economy  and  reflecting  adjustments  in 
efficiency  occurring  within  the  market 
place.  Nevertheless,  the  growth  of  im- 
ports overwhelmed  the  growth  of  ex- 
ports, increasing  24%  in  volume  terms 
and  26%  in  value  terms.  Over  half  of  the 
$85  billion  deterioration  in  the  U.S. 
trade  account  since  1980  has  been  at- 
tributed to  the  strong  dollar. 

I  have  already  mentioned  the  grow- 
ing demands  for  protectionism.  The  Ad- 
ministration is  resisting  these  pressures, 
and  I  will  have  more  to  say  about  our 
approach  to  trade  policy  in  a  moment. 
But  one  point  is  crucial  here:  we  should 
not  delude  ourselves  into  thinking  that  a 
lowering  of  foreign  barriers  will  have  a 
decisive  or  even  substantial  impact  on 
the  trade  deficit. 

We  can  break  the  back  of  the  trade 
deficit  only  through  a  combination  of, 
first,  a  stronger  worldwide  recovery 
and,  second,  a  strengthening  of  other 
currencies  in  relation  to  the  dollar  as  the 
performance  and  prospects  of  other 
economies  improve  and  as  these  pros- 
pects are  recognized  by  the  markets. 
Even  with  movement  on  these  fronts, 
the  effects  on  the  trade  deficit  will  be 
gradual. 

With  depreciation  of  the  dollar,  U.S. 
imports  would  become  more  expensive 
and  there  would  be  some  increase  in  in- 
flationary pressure,  at  least  initially.  The 
growth  of  imports  should  slow  down  but 
probably  with  a  lag.  Purchases  of  raw 
materials,  energy  products  and 
petroleum,  specialized  capital  goods,  and 
many  consumer  goods  do  not  respond 
quickly  when  their  prices  rise. 

The  growth  of  our  export  sales  will 
depend  on  several  factors:  on  our  ability 
to  remain  competitive;  on  a  faster  pace 
of  economic  recovery  in  other  nations, 
notably  Europe;  on  the  success  of  ad- 
justment efforts  in  developing  countries; 
and  on  long  overdue  action  by  Japan  to 
open  its  markets.  Exports  to  the 
developing  countries,  particularly  to 
those  in  Latin  America  burdened  by 
debt,  will  still  depend  upon  their  ability 
to  expand  their  exports  to  pay  for  our 
goods.  This  means  our  markets  and 
those  of  other  industrialized  countries 
must  remain  open  to  their  products. 
And  many  American  exporters  have 
already  lost  major  foreign  markets, 
recoverable  only  with  a  major  effort. 


The  U.S.  Federal  Deficit 

I  have  discussed  the  large  net  capital  in- 
flows, the  strong  dollar,  and  the  huge 
trade  deficit.  It  is  no  coincidence  that 
these  imbalances  are  accompanied  by 
huge  Federal  budget  deficits. 

As  long  as  there  are  ample  unused 
resources  in  our  economy,  the  Federal 
budget  deficit  does  not  cause  major  im- 
mediate problems  for  the  United  States. 
But  current  deficits  are  simply  not  sus- 
tainable indefinitely.  These  deficits  can 
become  a  habit  and  weaken  an  essential 
discipline  over  Federal  spending  and 
over  the  size  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment. They  drain  off  national  savings, 
leading  to  increased  reliance  on  foreign 
capital  or  curtailment  of  needed  invest- 
ment. And,  as  our  expansion  begins  to 
stretch  our  resources,  continued  large 
deficits  pose  an  increasing  danger  to 
that  very  expansion. 

We  can  all  continue  to  debate  what 
combination  of  policies  is  best  designed 
to  deal  with  all  the  imbalances  I  have 
discussed— budget  deficits,  large  capital 
inflows,  the  dollar  on  a  financial  high, 
and  trade  deficits.  But  a  consensus  has 
emerged  that  action  to  reduce  the 
Federal  budget  deficit  is  an  essential 
part  of  our  response.  The  President  has 
shown  the  way  with  his  proposals  and  in 
his  negotiations  with  the  Congress. 
Special  interests  must  give  way  to  the 
general  interest. 

Control  of  government  spending, 
coupled  with  vigorous  growth,  must  be 
the  key  to  our  effort.  We  must  cut 
spending  in  a  way  that  does  the  least 
harm  to  the  economy's  investment  and 
growth  potential  and  to  basic  national 
security.  But  significant  cuts  must  be 
made  now.  Tax  rate  increases  are  not 
the  answer.  To  the  contrary,  the  recent 
Reagan  tax  cuts,  like  the  Kennedy  cuts 
two  decades  earlier,  have  stimulated  in- 
vestment, fueling  the  recovery  and  con- 
tributing to  the  future  productive  poten- 
tial of  the  economy.  In  fact,  further  tax 
simplification  and  reform  could  be  very 
helpful  in  reducing  tax-induced  distor- 
tions in  economic  activity  and  in 
stimulating  additional  growth. 

Other  Industrialized  Countries 

So  far  I  have  focused  primarily  on  the 
American  economy.  But  in  our  in- 
terdependent world,  the  impact  of 
domestic  policies  and  performance  on 
the  economies  of  other  nations  is  a  two- 
way  street.  Other  countries  face 
challenges  in  their  own  domestic 
policies.  They,  too,  must  meet  their 
challenges  if  the  world  economy  is  to 


lo 


correct  the  imbalances  that  cloud  our 
common  future.  The  imbalances  can  do 
harm  also  to  important  political  relatior 
ships.  We  all  have  a  job  to  do. 

The  major  industrialized  countries 
are  recovering  from  the  1980-82  world 
recession  at  different  rates.  Whereas  th 
United  States  and.  to  a  lesser  degree, 
Japan  and  Canada  have  expanded 
vigorously.  Western  Europe  still  lags. 
Average  real  growth  in  the  four  major 
European  economies  (Germany,  France 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  Italy)  ac- 
celerated in  1984,  but  only  to  a  year- 
over-year  annual  rate  of  2.4%.  This  rise 
represented  less  than  half  the  average  c 
the  American,  Japanese,  and  Canadian 
rates.  The  Japanese  and  Canadian  ex- 
pansions, however,  have  depended  heav 
ly  on  the  stimulus  of  exports  to  the  U.S 
market.  The  increase  in  Canadian  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  amounted  to 
over  half  the  increase  in  Canadian  GNP 
in  current  prices  between  1982  and 
1984,  while  the  increase  in  Japanese  ex- 
ports to  the  U.S.  market  was  over  10% 
of  the  increase  in  current-price  GNP 
over  the  same  period. 

The  slowness  of  recovery  in  Europe 
results  from  conditions  that  stifle  invest 
ment,  particularly  structural  problems  ii 
labor  markets  and  government  disincen- 
tives to  adjustment  and  growth.  The 
rigidities  in  European  labor  rates  and 
conditions  also  tend  to  bias  investment 
toward  capital-intensive  technologies- 
further  inhibiting  the  growth  of  employ- 
ment. There  has  been  essentially  no  net 
job  creation  in  Europe  since  1970,  com- 
pared with  the  American  record  of  over 
26  million  new  jobs  during  the  same 
period.  Over  7.5  million  net  new  jobs 
have  been  created  in  this  country  since 
the  trough  of  the  recession  in  1982. 

Expressed  as  a  share  of  output, 
gross  investment  in  Europe  has  declinec 
steadily  since  the  first  oil  shock  in  1973 
and  is  now  well  below  its  share  in  the 
1960s.  Since  investment  opportunities  ir 
Europe  have  been  less  attractive  than 
elsewhere,  capital  has  flowed  elsewhere. 
Much  of  the  capital  has  come  to  the 
United  States,  either  as  investment  in 
U.S.  assets  by  foreigners,  disinvestment 
by  American  investors  abroad,  or  a 
reduction  in  the  previous  rate  of  foreign 
lending  by  U.S.  banks.  At  the  same 
time,  it  is  estimated  that  half  of 
Western  Europe's  growth  in  1984  came 
from  export  sales  to  the  United  States. 
These  exports  amounted  to  $75  billion  oi 
nearly  22%  of  total  U.S.  imports  last 
year. 

Capital  outflows  from  Europe  and  a 
dependence  on  exports  to  the  United 
States— like  the  other  imbalances  I  have 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


lentioned— cannot  be  expected  to  con- 
nue  indefinitely.  Other  OECD, 
)rganization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
nd  Development]  governments  must 
nd  ways  to  stimulate  growth-oriented 
ivestment,  thereby  making  their  invest- 
lent  opportunities  attractive  to 
omestic  and  international  capital.  At 
take  is  an  efficient  allocation  of  global 
^sources— a  system  which  responds  to 
conomic  potential.  This  will  require 
Dund  economic  policies  and  hard 
olitical  decisions— but  the  result  will  be 
ustained  growth,  job  creation,  and  a 
Tighter  economic  future. 

Japan  is  a  special  case.  The  $37 
illion  U.S.  trade  deficit  with  Japan,  as 
re  all  know,  is  a  source  of  intense  fric- 
lon  in  our  bilateral  relationship  and  the 
ause  of  much  of  the  growing  demand 
Dr  protectionism  in  this  country.  But 
tie  more  meaningful  measure  of  Japan's 
xternal  imbalance  is  not  our  bilateral 
nbalance  but  Japan's  overall  trade 
urplus,  estimated  at  $44  billion  in  1984. 

The  Japanese  could  reduce  their 
rade  surplus  with  the  world  by  pur- 
uing  policies  to  offset  the  impact  of 
!ieir  high  savings  rate.  Gross  private 
aving  in  Japan  is  over  30%  of  GNP, 
bout  50%  higher  than  the  average  of 
ne  other  OECD  countries.  This  high 
ate  of  saving  means  low  consumption. 
"he  excess  of  production  over  private 
(nd  public  consumption  is  not  being  used 
(1  domestic  investment.  It,therefore,  ap- 
lears  as  net  exports.  Or,  to  put  it 
mother  way,  under  current  conditions, 
lapan  relies  on  a  large  excess  of  exports 
iver  imports  to  maintain  full  employ- 
nent. 

Opening  up  investment  opportunities 
i/ithin  Japan  would  be  one  way  to  use 
luch  resources  and  reduce  the  pressure 
10  export.  The  needed  decisions  are 
lore  difficult  for  Japan  politically  than 
iconomically.  The  structural  rigidities  in 
Ihe  Japanese  economy  restrict  access  by 
(yen  Japanese  firms  and  investors.  If 
he  Japanese  Government  would  im- 
►rove  incentives  and  reduce  restrictions 
ihat  currently  restrain  domestic  and 
oreign  firms  from  investing  in  Japan, 
Jl  nations,  especially  Japan,  would 
lenefit.  Steps  are  already  underway  to 
iberalize  the  Japanese  capital  market  so 
IS  to  channel  Japanese  savings  more  ef- 
iciently  to  both  foreign  and  domestic 
ises  and  to  widen  the  financial  oppor- 
unities  facing  Japanese  firms.  As  this 
)roceeds,  and  as  the  international  role 
)f  the  yen  expands,  we  would  expect  the 
/alue  of  the  yen  more  fully  to  reflect  the 
strength  of  the  Japanese  economy. 


On  the  trade  side,  the  removal  of 
barriers  to  the  sale  of  foreign  goods  and 
services  in  Japan  would  expand  market 
opportunities  for  foreign  suppliers,  in- 
creasing Japan's  imports.  Prime 
Minister  Nakasone's  recent  speech  and 
the  Japanese  Government's  package  of 
measures  to  lower  trade  barriers  and  en- 
courage imports  are  a  laudable  and  en- 
couraging beginning.  More  specifics 
must  come. 

All  these  steps  would  help  defuse 
protectionist  pressures  in  other  coun- 
tries. But  Japan  must  deal  with  its 
savings-investment  imbalance  if  its 
chronic  imbalance  in  trade  is  to  be 
corrected. 

The  Developing  Countries 

The  external  accounts  of  the  developing 
countries,  like  those  of  the  European 
countries,  help  make  up  the  mirror 
image  of  ours.  The  United  States  takes 
nearly  60%  of  all  manufactured  exports 
of  developing  countries  to  the  industrial 
world.  At  the  same  time,  our  capital  in- 
flows from  the  developing  nations  are, 
in  part,  the  result  of  American  investors 
bringing  their  money  home  or  of 
American  banks  reducing  their  foreign 
lending  as  opportunities  in  those  coun- 
tries appear  less  attractive. 

Despite  the  progress  made  since  the 
1982-84  debt  crisis,  many  developing 
countries  still  face  the  need  for  fun- 
damental changes  in  their  economies 
and  economic  strategies. 

Several  high-debt  countries  have 
successfully  tackled  the  job  of  stabilizing 
their  economies.  They  have  cut  public 
sector  spending  to  more  nearly  match 
their  resources,  priced  currencies  to 
reflect  better  their  market  value,  and  set 
interest  rates  to  encourage  saving.  They 
now  face  the  need  to  get  away  from 
massive  price  subsidies  or  public  sector 
dominance  of  investment  resources  and 
economic  activity. 

The  emphasis  should  be  on  the 
positive.  Austerity  is  not  an  end  in  itself. 
For  difficult  adjustments  to  be  under- 
taken and  sustained,  a  country's  citizens 
must  be  able  to  see  real  prospects  for 
future  growth.  Economic  expansion, 
fueled  by  increased  investment  and  ex- 
ports, is  the  only  way  these  countries 
can  raise  living  standards  for  their  peo- 
ple. 

This  is  a  theme  that  applies  to  many 
of  the  issues  I  have  discussed  today.  Ad- 
justments such  as  these  are  more  dif- 
ficult politically  than  economically— re- 
quiring new  ways  of  thinking  even  more 
than  they  require  resources.  The  cuts  we 


must  make  in  our  own  Federal  spending 
are  painful,  but  they  are  justified 
because  they  safeguard  tfie  continued 
growth  of  the  productive  private  sector 
of  our  economy.  The  structural  reforms 
in  Europe  that  will  ensure  an  attractive 
investment  climate  for  domestic  savings 
and  international  capital  are  necessary 
to  restore  Europe's  own  growth  and 
technological  advance.  For  the  Third 
World,  structural  adjustment  is  the  key 
to  economic  development. 

The  developing  countries  will  clearly 
need  financing  as  they  go  through  this 
process.  But  where  will  this  financing 
come  from?  No  one  can  realistically  ex- 
pect that  official  development  assistance, 
bilateral  and  multilateral,  is  likely  to  ex- 
pand; the  net  flows  are  already  very 
large— around  $34  billion  from  official 
donors.  And  it  is  a  fact  of  life  that  com- 
mercial bank  lending  will  not  return  to 
the  high  levels  of  the  past  decade.  Even 
increases  from  current  levels  are  unlike- 
ly until  developing  countries  improve 
their  creditworthiness  and  offer  produc- 
tive investment  opportunities.  In  any 
case,  most  developing  countries  already 
have  more  debt  than  they  can  readily 
handle. 

There  is  no  escaping  this  hard  con- 
clusion: domestic  saving  and  private 
foreign  equity  investment  will  be  the 
main  sources  of  funds  available  to 
finance  development  and  stimulate 
growth.  Development  and  growth  will 
come  only  to  countries  with  sound 
domestic  policies  that  stimulate  domestic 
savings,  promote  trade,  and  attract  ex- 
ternal resources. 

•  India  is  a  striking  example  of  a 
country  that  finances  92%  of  its  invest- 
ment needs  from  domestic  savings.  In- 
dia's recent  growth  has  been  impressive 
and  its  prospects  are  bright. 

•  Protectionism  in  the  developing 
world  can  be  a  further  drag  on  growth. 
The  barriers  to  trade  among  developing 
countries  are  a  hindrance  to  Third 
World  expansion,  and  the  barriers  to 
outside  trade  and  investment  also  retard 
development. 

•  The  value  of  foreign  equity  invest- 
ment cannot  be  measured  by  the  volume 
of  funds  alone.  Foreign  investors  often 
bring  technological  and  management 
skills  that  cannot  be  easily  obtained  in 
other  ways.  The  enterprises  of  such  in- 
vestors tend  to  grow  more  rapidly  and 
export  more  of  their  output  than  the 
economy  as  a  whole.  Moreover,  there  is 
no  conflict  between  what  needs  to  be 
done  to  stimulate  foreign  and  domestic 
investment;  both  respond  to  a  stable  and 


June  1985 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


predictable  regulatory  environment  and 
to  an  expectation  that  they  will  be 
treated  fairly. 

Many  developing  countries  seem 
reluctant  to  encourage  foreign  invest- 
ment. It  is  their  decision  to  make.  But  a 
number  of  countries  have  shed  once 
fashionable  mythology  and  recognized 
the  opportunity.  Now,  after  consistent 
application  of  sound  policies,  they  are 
reaping  the  benefits. 

International  Trade 

For  developed  and  developing  countries 
alike,  economic  growth  clearly  depends 
also  on  the  continued  openness  of  the 
world  trading  system  and,  indeed,  on  a 
further  liberalization  of  world  trade. 
This  is  a  collective  international  respon- 
sibility. 

Protectionism  is  not  the  remedy  to 
an  illness.  It  is  itself  an  illness.  It  is  a 
hidden  tax  on  the  consumer,  often  an 
extremely  regressive  tax.  Hold  onto 
your  pocketbooks  when  politicians  start 
trying  to  "protect"  you  against  buying 
what  you  want  to  buy.  Even  in  the 
relatively  open  U.S.  market,  one 
estimate  is  that  U.S.  protectionist 
policies  cost  American  consimiers  direct- 
ly almost  $60  billion  in  1980.  That  was 
over  $250  for  every  man,  woman,  and 
child  in  the  country.  Protectionism  keeps 
prices  up,  reduces  living  standards,  and 
stifles  growth. 

Trade  promotes  the  flow  not  only  of 
goods  and  services  but  also  of  ideas.  All 
countries  benefit  from  the  further  divi- 
sion of  labor  that  permits  a  broadening 
of  the  international  marketplace.  Those 
developing  countries  will  grow  the 
fastest  that  reduce  impediments  to  trade 
and  exploit  their  comparative  advantage. 
Nor  can  developed  countries  repeal  the 
laws  of  economics  and  defy  the  principle 
of  comparative  advantage;  they  must  be 
prepared,  over  time,  to  phase  out  in- 
dustries in  which  they  are  no  longer 
competitive. 

The  ninefold  growth  in  the  volume 
of  international  trade  since  World 
War  II  reflects  the  success  of  the  world 
trading  system.  During  this  period, 
world  trade  increased  considerably  more 
than  world  production.  In  the  prewar 
period,  by  contrast,  protectionism  and  a 
decline  in  world  trade  thrust  the  world 
into  depression.  A  new  initiative  is 
needed  to  sustain  what  has  been 
achieved. 

The  United  States  has  proposed— 
and  strongly  urges— a  new  round  of 
multilateral  negotiations  early  next  year 
to  liberalize  trade,  particularly  to 


30 


eliminate  nontariff  barriers  such  as 
quotas,  voluntary  export  restraints,  and 
subsidies.  We  want  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  to  ex- 
tend its  coverage  to  trade  in  services, 
agriculture,  and  high  technology  and  to 
strengthen  its  system  of  safeguards  and 
dispute  settlement.  Progress  in  these 
areas  will  provide  new  opportunities  and 
new  markets,  bringing  tangible  benefits 
to  both  developed  and  developing  na- 
tions. It  will  also  contribute  to  the  fight 
against  protectionism.  In  the  absence  of 
progress  on  the  multilateral  front, 
pressures  for  protection  and  a  retreat  to 
reciprocal  bilateral  arrangements  will 
mount. 

From  a  global  perspective,  a 
splintering  of  the  multilateral  trading 
system  into  a  multitude  of  bilateral  ar- 
rangements would  be  a  backward  step. 
Bilateral  free  trade  agreements, 
however,  such  as  we  have  negotiated 
with  Israel  and  have  offered  to  discuss 
with  other  countries,  need  not  have  this 
result;  they  can  stimulate  trade  and 
strengthen  the  multilateral  system.  Free 
trade  agreements  are  sanctioned  by  the 
international  rules  and  involve  a  tighter 
trade  discipline;  they  can  promote  freer 
trade  than  the  multilateral  system  is 
currently  prepared  to  accommodate.  Our 
hope,  nonetheless,  is  that  the  example  of 
greater  liberalization— and  the  recogni- 
tion that  the  United  States  can  pursue 
another  course— will  help  motivate  a 
larger  group  of  nations  to  tackle  the  job 
of  expanding  trade  on  a  global  basis. 

But  we  cannot  forget  our  respon- 
sibility here  at  home.  We  in  the  United 
States  are  today  more  affected  by  the 
health  of  the  global  economic  system 
than  we  have  ever  been  before.  And  as 
the  world's  largest  economy,  we  cannot 
escape  the  reality  that  any  protectionist 
action  here  can  do  enormous  harm  to 
the  global  economic  system.  So  in  our 
own  long-term  self-interest,  we  must  re- 
main loyal  to  our  long-standing  tradi- 
tion—our proud  commitment  to  free  and 
open  trade. 

A  Program  for  Sustained 
Global  Growth 

Let  me  conclude  with  a  message  and  a 
program  that  emerge  from  my  analysis. 
The  message  is  twofold;  first,  the  main 
objective,  and  the  key  to  success,  is  to 
accelerate  growth  in  the  world  economy. 
That's  what  this  is  all  about.  And  sec- 
ond, growth  in  the  world  economy  is  the 
result  of  interaction  among  sound  na- 
tional policies.  That  is  the  most  impor- 
tant common  ingredient  in  the  policy 


Ti 


ean 
■fcer 


(1, 


steps  that  nations  must  take  to  correcti 
the  imbalances  I  have  discussed. 

Together,  these  steps  are  a  prograi , 
of  international  action  to  protect  the 
current  recovery  and  move  us  decisive; 
onto  the  path  of  sustained,  noninfla- 
tionary  growth. 

First,  for  our  own  part,  and  even 
for  purely  domestic  reasons,  the  Unite 
States  must— and  will— substantially 
reduce  its  Federal  spending  and  deficit 

Second,  the  West  Europeans  shou 
adopt  policies  that  reduce  the  obstacles 
to  change  and  innovation,  that  attract 
capital,  and  that  stimulate  domestic  in 
vestment. 

Third,  in  addition  to  opening  its 
markets  to  foreign  products,  Japan 
should  reduce  the  impact  of  its  high  ra 
of  domestic  saving  on  its  trade  surplus 
This  could  be  done  by  a  combination  of 
steps,  including  liberalized  capital 
markets  that  internationalize  the  yen 
and  measures  to  stimulate  investment 
Japan  by  Japanese  and  foreigners  alike 

Fourth,  the  developing  nations, 
especially  those  heavily  indebted,  shoul 
continue  to  make  the  structural  ad- 
justments needed  to  stabilize  their 
economies,  reduce  the  economic  burder 
of  government,  expand  their  trade,  anc. 
stimulate  growth.  They  should  en- 
courage domestic  savings  and  foreign 
equity  investment. 

Fifth,  all  nations  should  support 
freer  international  trade  and  prepare  ft 
early  commencement  of  a  new  interna- 
tional trade  round.  We  must  reject  a 
surtax  on  imports;  other  countries  musfi 
contain  political  pressures  that  threatei 
trade. 

Finally,  our  approach  to  the 
strength  of  the  dollar  should  concentra 
on  the  fundamental  market  forces  at 
work.  Intervention  in  exchange  market 
addresses  only  the  symptoms  of  the 
dollar's  strength — and  not  at  all  suc- 
cessfully. An  easy  monetary  policy, 
undertaken  in  an  illusory  effort  to 
reduce  interest  rates,  would  only 
reignite  fears  of  inflation,  raise  interest 
rates,  and  weaken  economic  prospects. 
Instead,  we  should  maintain  consistent, 
noninflationary  growth  in  monetary  ag- 
gregates to  accommodate  economic 
growth  while  continuing  the  trend  to 
lower  inflation. 

This  program  of  action  calls  for 
many  hard  decisions.  But  they  are  the 
right  decisions.  We  stand  at  the 
threshold  of  what  can  be,  if  all  govern- 
ments meet  their  responsibilities,  a  long 
period  of  global  economic  expansion  and 
a  new  era  of  unprecedented  prosperity. 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


Wf( 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  benefits  that  economic  growth 
,     n  bring  to  all  the  world's  people  trans- 
it nd  the  purely  material — though  for 
fie  world's  poor  and  hungry,  this  alone 
Duld  be  a  monumental  blessing.  A 
rong  and  growing  global  economy  will 
Ip  advance  all  of  America's  most  fun- 
veJtmental  goals:  a  world  of  cooperation, 
;ace,  stability,  and  progress,  a  world 
here  human  rights  are  respected  and 


freedom  tlourishes.  We  have  great  op- 
portunities to  help  build  such  a  world, 
but  we  will  succeed  only  if  we  have  the 
will  and  the  wisdom  to  recognize  the 
dangers  and  confront  them.  We  know 
what  must  be  done.  But  we  must  act  on 
that  knowledge  if  our  hopes  for  a  better 
world  are  to  become  a  reality. 


'Press  release  70. 


-oreign  Policy 

nd  the  Black  Community 


101 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
th  National  Conference  on  Blacks  in 
igher  Education  on  April  1.  1985^ 


le  longer  I  spend  at  the  Department  of 
:ate,  the  more  conscious  I  become  of 
5  unique  position  among  government 
fancies.  Unlike  the  other  Cabinet 
apartments,  our  focus  is  on  develop- 
lent  and  management  of  policy,  rather 
lan  administration  of  heavily  funded 
"Ograms.  The  only  resource  we  have  in 
i)ing  our  job  is  the  people  in  the 
epartment,  both  Foreign  Service,  Civil 
ervice,  and  that  tiny  sprinkling  of  in- 
nd-out  noncareerists,  of  which  I  am 
ne.  The  quality  of  our  foreign  policy 
nd  of  our  representation  around  the 
orld  depends  directly  on  our  ability  to 
lip  the  skills  and  talents  of  the  best  of 
II  segments  of  American  society.  Not 
aly  is  it  a  matter  of  simple  fairness  and 
quality;  but  the  national  interest  re- 
aires  that  we  have  a  Foreign  Service 
ffficer  corps  that  represents  the  rich 
::hnic  diversity  of  the  United  States. 


ncreasing  Involvement 
(f  the  Black  Community 

oday,  I  want  to  underscore  my  per- 
Dnal  commitment  to  increasing  the  in- 
dvement  of  the  black  community  in  in- 
rnational  affairs.  And  I  want  to  re- 
ffirm  the  Department  of  State's  com- 
litment  to  increasing  the  representation 
f  minorities  and  women  in  our  work 


The  historically  black  colleges  and 
:niversities  have  a  central  role  to  play  in 
his  effort  and  in  other  areas.  As  you 
:now,  this  was  recognized  by  the  Presi- 
lent's  Executive  Order  12320,  signed 
)ack  in  1981.  The  President  directed 
'^ederal  agencies  to  increase  the  par- 
ticipation of  black  colleges  in  Federally 
sponsored  programs. 


Further,  both  the  Civil  Service  Act 
of  1978  and  the  Foreign  Service  Act  of 
1980  mandate  continued  efforts  by  the 
Department  to  develop  a  work  force 
that  fairly  represents  the  American  peo- 
ple. We  must  do  so  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  of  merit,  equal  employ- 
ment opportunity,  and  fair  and  equitable 
treatment  for  all.  I  and  the  other  senior 
officials  of  the  Department  of  State  are 
strongly  committed  to  this  effort,  both 
from  personal  conviction  and  from  our 
knowledge  that  fair  representation 
means  a  more  effective  Foreign  Service. 

We  have  made  progress.  Let  me  cite 
the  Foreign  Service  officer  corps,  which 
staffs  our  diplomatic  missions  overseas 
and  in  Washington  assists  the  President 
and  myself  in  the  formulation  and  con- 
duct of  our  foreign  policy.  The  percent- 
age of  minority  Foreign  Service  officers 
has  almost  tripled  during  the  past  10 
years,  from  4.2%  in  1975  to  12.4%  to- 
day. The  number  of  women  officers  has 
doubled,  from  9%  to  over  18%.  Our  re- 
cent incoming  junior  officer  classes  have 
typically  been  over  20%  minority  and 
over  30%  female.  As  these  new  recruits 
rise  in  their  careers,  we  will  find  in- 
creasing numbers  of  them  in  senior 
Department  positions. 

More  progress  is  needed.  Our  en- 
trance process  is  competitive,  but  I  have 
no  doubt  that  there  are  many  among 
your  students  who  have  both  the  ability 
and  commitment  necessary  to  succeed. 

In  addition  to  our  general  entry  pro- 
cedures, we  have  affirmative  action  pro- 
grams for  entry  into  the  Foreign  Service 
and  for  summer  internships,  both  in 
Washington  and  in  Embassies  overseas. 
We  are  also  actively  recruiting  Foreign 
Service  specialists  in  a  wide  range  of 
areas  from  security  officers  to 
engineers.  We  welcome  applicants  from 
your  institutions  in  those  areas  as  well.  I 
will  be  asking  my  chief  adviser  on  per- 
sonnel matters,  the  Director  General  of 


Iune1985 


the  Foreign  Service  and  Director  of  Per- 
sonnel, George  Vest,  to  follow  up  with 
you  by  letter  and  give  full  details  of  all 
of  our  employment  possibilities. 

I  ask  that  you  remember  the  State 
Department  when  you  are  counseling 
your  students  about  their  futures.  Our 
careers  are  unique,  full  of  challenge  and 
diversity.  They  demand  the  best  our 
country  has  to  offer,  and  we  need  your 
help  in  making  your  students  aware  of 
these  opportunities.  We  believe  there  is 
an  underutilized  pool  of  talent  at  the 
historically  black  colleges  and  univer- 
sities whose  interest  in  the  Foreign 
Service  can  and  should  be  aroused.  Our 
Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Office  is 
here  to  help  find  that  talent.  I  am  deter- 
mined that  in  my  tenure  as  Secretary 
we  will  seek  the  best  people  everywhere. 
With  the  challenges  our  country  faces  in 
the  world  today,  we  can  afford  to  do  no 
less. 

I  understand  that  a  number  of  the 
schools  in  your  association  want  to  know 
how  the  black  academic  community  can 
become  more  involved  in  foreign  rela- 
tions. One  way  is  through  our  diplomat- 
in-residence  program.  For  a  number  of 
years  we  have  assigned  a  senior  Foreign 
Service  officer  to  a  black  college.  The  of- 
ficer gives  courses,  lectures,  holds 
seminars,  counsels  students,  and  aids  in 
the  administration  of  the  institution.  The 
Department  pays  the  officer's  salary  and 
gives  him  an  allowance.  During  the 
1984-85  academic  year,  an  officer  was 
assigned  to  Morgan  State  University. 
Assignments  of  officers  under  the  diplo- 
mat-in-residence  program  are  made  on 
the  basis  of  proposals  submitted  by  col- 
leges and  universities  throughout  the 
country.  We  have  several  historically 
black  colleges  and  universities  that  are 
strong  contenders  for  1986-87,  and  I 
want  to  urge  all  of  you  to  apply.  The 
Foreign  Service  Institute,  which  is  our 
permanent  link  with  academia,  can  pro- 
vide you  with  all  the  information. 

The  institute  is  home  to  the  Center 
for  the  Study  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Together,  they  invite  well  over  200 
scholars  each  year  to  lecture  and  to 
train  foreign  affairs  professionals.  The 
center,  which  was  founded  only  2  years 
ago,  sponsors  a  thriving  research  pro- 
gram in  which  symposia  play  a  key  role. 
Last  year  the  center  conducted  a 
seminar  on  the  American  relationship 
with  Nigeria  and  another,  part  of  its 
conflict  management  series,  on  the 
negotiations  that  led  up  to  the  independ- 
ence of  Zimbabwe.  Soon,  the  center  will 
host  a  symposium  on  "What  Science  and 
Technology  Can  Do  To  Help  Africa  Feed 
Itself."  Few  foreign  policy  subjects  have 


31 


THE  SECRETARY 


such  a  sense  of  urgency  and  priority  for 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Presi- 
dent. The  institute  and  the  center 
welcome  your  interest  and  involvement 
in  their  activities. 

Another  way  the  black  academic 
community  can  become  more  involved  in 
foreign  relations  is  through  our  external 
research  program.  This  is  administered 
by  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and 
Research  and  its  Office  of  Long-Range 
Assessments  and  Research.  Every  year, 
limited  funds  are  made  available  for 
research  and  conferences  related  to  the 
immediate  concerns  of  the  Department's 
policy  bureaus.  Additional  funding  is 
made  available  for  specialists  outside  the 
Department  to  conduct  long-range 
assessments. 

Finally,  you  should  know  about  our 
scholar-diplomat  seminars.  In  the  past 
10  years,  over  1,600  scholars  have  par- 
ticipated in  this  week-long  program. 
Each  participant  is  assigned  to  a 
Department  official,  typically  at  the 
desk-officer  level,  and  works  with  him  in 
his  daily  tasks.  The  scholar  thus  gains 
unique  insight  into  the  making  of  foreign 
policy  in  his  field  of  expertise.  The 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs  can  give  you 
complete  information. 

International  Issues  Before  Us 

As  Americans,  we  all  face  a  full  agenda 
of  international  challenges.  Let  me  say  a 
few  words  about  some  of  the  issues  we 
are  grappling  with,  that  I  am  sure  are  of 
interest  to  you. 

Africa.  The  American  people  have 
greater  interest  in  African  developments 
today  than  in  many  years.  This  is  all  to 
the  good.  Africa  has  enriched  our  coun- 
try with  its  culture  and  is  important  to 
us  both  economically  and  politically.  We 
take  an  active  interest  in  seeking  to  help 
Africa  resolve  its  problems. 

Africa  is  beset  with  a  longstanding 
economic  crisis  aggravated  by  drought 
and  famine.  We  estimate  that  at  least  20 
million  people  across  the  continent  are 
at  risk.  To  meet  this  crisis,  we  and  other 
Western  nations  have  provided  urgent 
assistance  with  food,  medical  care,  and 
shelter.  Since  last  October,  the  United 
States  has  committed  more  than  $600 
million  in  food  assistance.  Total  food  and 
emergency  assistance  from  the  United 
States  to  Africa  this  year  will  reach 
more  than  $1  billion— as  much  as  the 
rest  of  the  world  combined. 

While  adverse  climatic  conditions 
have  been  a  cause  of  much  of  the  cur- 
rent despair,  there  are  other  causes  as 
well.  African  nations  have  received  less 


income  in  recent  years  for  their  raw 
materials.  Insufficient  capital  investment 
has  been  available  to  promote  needed 
economic  development.  Difficult  terrain 
and  inadequate  transportation  systems 
further  retard  growth.  In  addition,  un- 
wise government  economic  policies,  rely- 
ing too  heavily  on  state  control,  have 
deadened  the  initiative  of  small-scale 
farmers,  the  backbone  of  Africa's 
economy.  In  recent  years,  many  African 
governments  have  come  to  recognize 
that  past  mistakes  have  contributed  to 
the  current  crisis.  The  United  States  is 
now  encouraging  structural  changes  that 
will  expand  private  incentives  and  pro- 
mote increased  food  production  and 
development. 

Vice  President  Bush  has  just  re- 
turned from  a  trip  to  Africa.  His  journey 
focused  attention  on  our  efforts  to  help 
meet  the  current  food  crisis.  He  also  ex- 
plained our  desire  to  work  with  African 
governments  to  provide  the  necessary 
development  assistance  and  other 
resources  that  will  promote  economic 
growth.  The  task  ahead  is  a  daunting 
one  and  progress  is  absolutely  vital  for 
the  millions  of  people  of  Africa.  We 
believe  there  is  some  hope  for  progress. 
Free  economies  have  brought  improve- 
ment in  widely  differing  societies  the 
world  over.  Efforts  at  liberalization  are 
bringing  encouraging  results  in  some 
African  countries;  we  believe  this  ap- 
proach holds  similar  promise  throughout 
the  continent  and  will  do  all  in  our 
power  to  help. 

Africa  also  faces  serious  political 
problems.  In  some  parts  of  the  conti- 
nent, hostile  states  confront  each  other; 
elsewhere,  internal  political  or  ethnic 
rivalries  threaten  civil  discord  or  war. 
Other  nations— such  as  the  Soviet 
Union,  Cuba,  and  Libya— attempt  to  ex- 
ploit these  conditions.  We  cannot  solve 
all  of  Africa's  problems.  But  we  can  use 
our  influence  to  help  promote  solutions. 

Of  course,  our  eyes  focus  on  South 
Africa.  President  Reagan  has  made  clear 
our  position  that  South  African  apart- 
heid is  an  affront  to  every  principle  and 
ideal  of  our  country.  The  President 
declared  on  December  10th: 

We  .  .  .  call  upon  the  Government  of 
South  Africa  to  reach  out  to  its  black  majori- 
ty by  ending  the  forced  removal  of  blacks 
from  their  communities  and  the  detention, 
without  trial,  and  lengthy  imprisonment  of 
lilack  leadei-s.  .  .  .  [W|e  ask  that  the  construc- 
tive changes  of  recent  years  be  broadened  to 
address  the  aspirations  of  all  South  Afri- 
cans. .  .  .  We  urge  both  the  Government  and 
the  people  of  South  Africa  to  move  toward  a 
more  just  society. 


Apartheid  must  end.  There  has  been 
some  change  in  South  Africa,  faster  to- 
day than  in  earlier  years  but  not  nearly 
enough.  We  believe  the  influence  of  our 
diplomacy,  the  influence  of  American 
companies  doing  business  there,  and  our 
assistance  programs  for  black  South 
Africans  do  make  some  contribution  to 
positive  change.  There  must  be  much 
more  change,  peaceful  change  that 
should  build  until  South  Africa  achieves 
freedom  and  justice  for  each  and  every 
one  of  its  citizens.  To  this  end  we  are 
constructively— and  actively— engaged. 

We  strongly  condemn  the  govern- 
ment actions  that,  in  recent  weeks,  have 
caused  many  deaths.  The  government 
must  answer  the  demands  of  the  black 
majority  with  negotiations.  South  Africa 
needs  peace,  not  violence;  dialogue,  not 
confrontation  and  repression. 

Our  policy  also  rests  on  the  view 
that  resolution  of  regional  problems 
would  contribute  to  peaceful  change 
within  South  Africa.  Thus,  our  diplo- 
macy has  helped  to  reduce  violence 
across  the  borders  between  South  Africa 
and  its  black-ruled  neighbors.  We  con- 
tinue—along with  four  of  our  allies— to 
seek  the  independence  of  Namibia  in 
accordance  with  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  435.  We  seek  a  regional  set- 
tlement addressing  also  the  issue  of 
Angola,  including  a  withdrawal  of  the 
Cuban  intervention  force. 

In  sum,  we  are  actively  working  to 
achieve  goals  in  southern  Africa  that  all 
Americans  can  support— peaceful  change 
away  from  a  racist  system;  greater 
stability  in  the  region  as  a  whole,  in- 
cluding the  removal  of  all  foreign  forces; 
and  Namibian  independence.  A  great 
deal  remains  to  be  done.  But  we  can  do 
our  job  only  if  we  are  engaged,  physi- 
cally present,  in  contact  with  all  parties, 
and  able  to  bring  our  limited  influence  to 
bear.  The  alternative— disengage- 
ment—will  only  reduce  our  ability  to 
achieve  these  goals  and  make  us  less 
relevant  to  this  important  region. 

Caribbean  Basin.  Let  me  now  turn 
to  the  Caribbean,  a  region  of  the  world 
that  has  a  special  importance  and  rela- 
tionship to  the  United  States.  With  few 
exceptions,  the  nations  of  the  Caribbean 
are  democratic,  governed  by  freely 
elected  leaders  responsible  to  their  peo- 
ple. These  societies  value  their  inde- 
pendence and  democratic  heritage. 

In  October  1983,  the  states  of  the 
eastern  Caribbean,  Jamaica,  and  the 
United  States  joined  together  in  the 
liberation  of  Grenada.  We  acted  to  turn 
Grenada  back  to  its  own  people,  after 
the  island  had  fallen  prey  to  a  bloody 
power  struggle  among  its  Marxist- 


32 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


,eninist  rulers.  Last  December,  with  the 
lauguration  of  Prime  Minister  Blaize,  a 
ree  Grenada  was  welcomed  back  to  the 

'■   ommunity  of  democratic  nations. 
The  leaders  and  peoples  of  the 
Caribbean  have  demonstrated  their  com- 
litment  to  democracy.  In  fact,  many 
tudied  the  principles  of  free  govern- 
lent  in  the  United  States  at  institutions 
uch  as  yours.  But  their  countries  con- 
ront  serious  economic  problems, 
although  they  may  not  face  the 
hallenge  of  externally  supported  in- 
urgencies,  all  must  deal  with  the  diffi- 
ulties  posed  by  high  debt  and 
inemployment,  poor  markets  for  their 
raditional  exports,  and  often  inadequate 
iconomic  institutions  and  infrastructure. 
President  Reagan's  Caribbean  Basin 
nitiative  provides  for  12  years  of  one- 
vay  free  trade  to  increase  imports  of 
nost  products  from  designated  countries 
nto  the  United  States.  Twenty-one 
ountries  have  been  designated  bene- 
iciaries  since  January  1984,  when  the 
)rogram  went  into  effect.  We  have  early 

ica  ndications  of  progress:  nonpetroleum 
mports  into  the  United  States  from 
hese  countries  were  up  17.9%  in  1984 
ind  American  investors  are  showing 
greater  interest  in  the  region,  although 
msiness  investment  decisions  take  time. 
iVe  think  the  program  will  produce 
'avorable  results  as  the  countries  of  the 
Caribbean  adjust  to  the  realities  of  the 
nternational  marketplace. 

Arms  Control.  Before  I  conclude, 
et  me  say  a  few  words  about  our  efforts 
,0  control,  limit,  and  reduce  nuclear 
weapons.  The  President's  policies,  in  his 
'irst  term,  strengthened  our  defenses, 
•einvigorated  our  economy,  and  helped 
-estore  the  country's  sense  of  engage- 
ment and  leadership  in  the  world.  In  so 
doing,  they  have  laid  the  basis  for  a 
stable,  mature  relationship  with  the 
3oviet  Union. 

At  the  Geneva  talks  that  opened 
March  12th,  our  goal  is  to  achieve 
radical  reductions  of  nuclear  weapons 
and  to  increase  strategic  stability.  At 
the  same  time  we  seek  to  move  to  a  dif- 
ferent kind  of  strategic  relationship,  one 
ess  reliant  on  the  threat  of  offensive 
nuclear  devastation  and  more  reliant  on 
non-nuclear  defensive  systems  that 
threaten  no  one.  We  have  embarked  on 
a  research  program  to  determine  the 
feasibility  of  such  defenses— the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  Strategic 
defenses,  if  workable,  would  give  our 
children  and  grandchildren  a  safer 
world. 


Our  negotiators  have  instructions  to 
be  flexible  and  determined  in  attempting 
to  reach  equitable  agreements.  Such 
agreements  would  have  to  maintain  the 
security  of  the  United  States  and  our 
allies,  ensure  deterrence,  enhance  stabili- 
ty, and  reduce  the  risk  of  war. 

To  succeed,  we  must  be  united  at 
home.  Domestic  divisions  will  only  en- 
courage the  Soviets  to  sit  back  and  wait 
for  us  to  make  unilateral  concessions,  as 
they  always  do.  So,  to  achieve  our  com- 
mon goal,  we  need  your  support. 

Conclusion 

We  strive  to  live  up  to  our  nation's 
ideals  in  the  formulation  and  execution 
of  our  foreign  policy.  This  is  the  only 


road  to  success.  And  thus  our  efforts 
and  your  efforts  have  much  in  common. 
America  is  probably  unique  among  na- 
tions in  the  depth  of  its  commitment  to 
moral  ideals  in  foreign  policy— freedom, 
democracy,  racial  justice,  human  rights. 
We  can  be  proud  of  the  good  that  our 
country  has  achieved  in  the  world,  just 
as  we  are  conscious  of  how  much  more 
needs  to  be  done.  Our  commitment  de- 
rives from  the  nature  of  our  society,  and 
our  ability  to  promote  freedom  and 
justice  abroad  depends  very  much  on 
our  success  in  achieving  freedom  and 
justice  at  home.  I,  for  one,  am  very  con- 
fident of  this  great  country's  ability  to 
do  both. 


'Press  release  64. 


State  Department  Authorization 
Request  for  FY  1986-87 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Operations  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  February  27.  1985} 

I  am  here  today  to  discuss  the  Presi- 
dent's authorization  request  for  the 
Department  of  State.  The  Department  is 
a  principal  national  security  arm  of  the 
U.S.  Government,  comparable  with  our 
military  and  intelligence  services.  War 
only  starts  when  diplomacy  fails.  Diplo- 
macy is  the  front  line,  worldwide,  24 
hours  a  day.  As  a  result,  this  budget 
should  be  seen  as  a  fundamental  part  of 
our  national  security  program. 

For  fiscal  year  (FY)  1986,  the  Presi- 
dent and  I  are  requesting  $2,898,693,000 
to  support  the  Department's  activities  at 
home  and  abroad.  This  figure  is 
$18,468,000  less  than  the  estimate  of 
$2,917,161,000  for  FY  1985.  For  FY 
1987,  we  are  requesting  authorization  of 
$2,885,137,000  which  is  $13,556,000  less 
than  the  amount  for  FY  1986,  primarily 
reflecting  the  nonrecurrence  of  building 
costs  in  FY  1986. 

Accomplishments 

Before  discussing  the  details  of  our 
authorization  request,  I  would  like  to  tell 
you  about  some  of  our  accomplishments 
since  I  talked  with  you  last. 

In  the  field  of  reporting  and 
analysis: 

•  We  have  established  the  new 
political  and  economic  officer  positions 


June  1985 


authorized  by  the  Congress  as  part  of 
the  Administration's  program  to  rebuild 
the  Department's  reporting  and  analysis 
capabilities.  Sixty  percent  of  these  were 
overseas  positions;  some  of  the  domestic 
positions  were  used  to  augment  our 
analysis  of  terrorist  organizations  and 
activities. 

•  We  have  opened  five  new  Foreign 
Service  posts,  including  Embassies  in 
Grenada  and  Brunei  and  Consulates  in 
Brisbane,  Australia;  Pusan,  Korea;  and 
Shenyang,  China.  (Shenyang  is  the  third 
Consulate  we  have  opened  in  China.) 

In  the  field  of  security: 

•  144  posts  worldwide  have  received 
funds  for  emergency  perimeter  security 
improvements. 

•  We  have  contracted  with  10  U.S. 
construction  firms  to  design  and  build 
major  physical  security  improvements  at 
37  high-threat  posts  abroad.  These  firms 
are  beginning  to  survey  construction  re- 
quirements this  month. 

•  60  fully  armored  vehicles  will  be 
delivered  to  posts  worldwide  by  early 
fall  of  this  year  to  augment  the  current 
fleet,  which  is  woefully  inadequate. 

•  Mobile  security  training  teams 
have  been  formed  and  after  special 
training  will  be  dispatched  to  overseas 
posts  in  June  to  train  foreign  national 
security  personnel  and  Americans  in 
antiterrorist  tactics,  such  as  defensive 
driving,  and  hostage  survival  techniques. 

I  will  come  back  to  reporting  and 
analysis  and  security  in  a  moment. 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


In  the  field  of  reciprocity: 

•  We  have  imposed  travel  and  real 
estate  controls  on  certain  foreign  mis- 
sions and  their  diplomats  (mostly 
Eastern  bloc). 

•  We  have  begun  issuing  red,  white, 
and  blue  Federal  diplomatic  license 
plates  for  vehicles  owned  by  foreign  mis- 
sions and  their  personnel  as  part  of  a 
program  to  require  that  all  diplomatic 
vehicles  carry  adequate  third-party 
liability  insurance. 

In  the  field  of  management: 

•  Partly  in  response  to  0MB  [Office 
of  Management  and  Budget]  and  the 
Grace  commission,  we  are  developing  a 
5-year  workforce  plan  to  determine  the 
appropriate  size  and  structure  for  the 
Foreign  Service.  Our  goals  are  to  reduce 
staffing  at  the  mid-  and  senior  levels  and 
add  junior  officer  positions.  In  the  last 
promotion  cycle,  we  took  the  difficult 
decision  to  curtail  promotions  into  the 
Senior  Foreign  Service. 

In  the  field  of  communications: 

•  We  have  formed  a  crisis  communi- 
cation team  equipped  with  tactical  satel- 
lite systems  that  can  provide  emergency 
comriiunications  for  three  simultaneous 
crises. 

•  We  have  installed  four  classified 
information  systems  that  provide 
"paperless"  handling  of  sensitive  infor- 
mation at  overseas  posts. 

Budget  Details 

I  am  proud  of  these  accomplishments, 
but  much  remains  to  be  done.  Therefore, 
we  are  requesting  authorization  of  ap- 
propriations for  FY  1986  in  four  major 
categories. 

First,  we  seek  $1,962,376,000  for 
the  administration  of  foreign  affairs— 
to  cover  the  Department's  basic  diplo- 
matic and  consular  functions,  salaries, 
operating  expenses,  allowances,  over- 
seas building  construction,  and 
maintenance. 

Second,  in  the  category  interna- 
tional organizations  and  conferences,  we 
request  $553,574,000  to  cover  assessed 
contributions  to  international  organiza- 
tions of  which  the  United  States  is  a 
member,  contributions  for  UN  peace- 
keeping activities,  and  American  par- 
ticipation in  multilateral  international 
conferences. 

Third,  under  the  heading  of  interna- 
tional commissions,  $26,278,000  is  re- 
quired to  meet  our  treaty  commitments 
under  boundary  agreements  with 
Canada  and  Mexico  and  to  cover  our 


share  of  expenses  as  a  member  of  1 1  in- 
ternational fisheries  commissions. 

Finally,  in  the  category  of  other  ap- 
propriations, we  propose  $356,465,000 
for  assistance  to  migrants  and  refugees, 
bilateral  science  and  technology 
agreements  with  Yugoslavia  and  Poland, 
support  for  the  Asia  Foundation,  and 
the  Soviet  East  European  Research 
Training  Fund. 

FY  1986  is  the  first  time  in  14  years 
the  Department  has  not  requested  an  in- 
crease in  funding.  Nonetheless,  within 
this  necessarily  harsh  fiscal  environ- 
ment, we  will  continue  to  meet  the 
challenges  which  are  central  to  the 
security  and  economic  vitality  of  the 
nation. 

We  will  pursue  the  President's 
policies  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war 
through  arms  control  and  nuclear  non- 
proliferation,  to  fight  terrorism,  and  to 
expand  opportunities  for  economic  devel- 
opment and  personal  freedom  through 
trade  promotion,  solutions  to  interna- 
tional debt  problems,  increased  food  pro- 
duction, and  other  humanitarian  efforts. 

The  Department's  budget  strategy 
has  been  to  hold  the  line  on  spending  in 
all  areas  except  those  which  are  abso- 
lutely essential  to  accomplish  our  mis- 
sion. While  we  cannot  fund  all  our  cur- 
rent activities  at  existing  levels,  we  will 
seek  to  increase  productivity  through 
automation  and  management  im- 
provements to  absorb  significant  work- 
load increases  in  areas  such  as  passport 
issuance  and  administrative  support. 

But  three  important  areas  must  be 
maintained  and  strengthened.  They  are: 

•  Expanding  and  improving  the 
Department's  ability  to  obtain  and  inter- 
pret foreign  policy  information  through 
improved  reporting  and  analysis; 

•  Improving  the  security  of  our  peo- 
ple overseas;  and 

•  Improving  our  personnel  manage- 
ment and  training. 

Reporting  and  Analysis.  I  would 
like  to  discuss  reporting  and  analysis 
first.  It  is  our  central  function.  When  I 
talk  about  reporting  and  analysis,  I 
mean  information  about  the  thoughts 
and  plans  of  key  foreign  leaders,  the  fac- 
tors which  influence  them,  how  they 
make  policy  decisions,  and  how  they  will 
react  to  our  own  decisions  and  those  of 
other  countries.  We  must  predict  trends, 
intentions,  and  objectives.  Ultimately,  I 
must  use  this  information  and  related 
judgments  as  a  basis  for  policy  recom- 
mendations to  the  President. 


These  recommendations  based  on 
reporting  and  analysis  are  critical  to  our 
national  security.  The  Department  is  the 
single  most  important  source  of  foreign 
affairs  information  for  the  entire  U.S. 
Government.  In  the  case  of  the  national 
security  intelligence  and  economic  intelli- 
gence categories,  the  Department  pro- 
vides more  than  half  of  all  foreign  af- 
fairs information  available  to  the 
government.  Concerning  the  internal 
politics  of  other  countries,  the  Depart- 
ment provides  about  two-thirds  of  this 
data. 

But,  as  I  have  stated  to  the  Con- 
gress before.  State's  ability  to  meet  na- 
tional reporting  and  analysis  re- 
quirements has  seriously  atrophied  in 
the  previous  decade  in  the  face  of 
budget  constraints.  With  the  support  of 
the  Congress,  we  have  begun  to  restore 
our  weakened  reporting  and  analysis 
capability.  Based  on  the  advice  of  our 
ambassadors,  assessments  by  our 
regional  bureaus,  evaluations  by  the 
Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research,  in- 
spection reports,  and  advice  from  other 
elements  of  the  intelligence  community, 
the  Department  has  identified  where  our 
reporting  analysis  capability  is  deficient 
and  produced  a  3-year  plan  to  remedy 
that  deficiency.  This  year  the  Ad- 
ministration is  seeking  176  new  posi- 
tions for  this  purpose. 

Security.  I  would  now  like  to  turn 
to  the  issue  of  security.  Last  year  I  told 
the  House  and  Senate  Appropriations 
Committees  I  was  taking  two  steps: 
first,  an  immediate  effort  to  improve 
worldwide  security,  primarily  in  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  area,  and,  second,  that  I 
planned  to  convene  a  high-level  advisory 
panel  to  study  how  the  worldwide 
security  problem  would  affect  us  in  the 
future  and  to  make  recommendations  to 
deal  with  it. 

As  you  know,  the  bombings  in 
Beirut  fed  to  a  greatly  expanded  effort 
to  strengthen  the  security  of  our 
facilities  and  people  overseas— an  effort 
which  received  strong  congressional  sup- 
port. 

All  our  posts  have  intensively  re- 
viewed their  security  needs,  and  these 
reviews  have  been  the  basis  for  quick  ac- 
tion. We  have  made  immediate  improve- 
ments at  23  high-threat  posts,  and  we 
are  planning  to  construct  13  new  office 
buildings  that  will  meet  new  security 
standards.  In  addition,  we  have  con- 
tracted with  private  firms  to  provide 
longer  term  improvements  at  38  of  our 
posts.  We  have  kept  congressional 
leadership  advised  of  our  progress  on  a 
regular  detailed  basis. 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


It  has  been  a  crucial  necessity  to 
spend  more  money  to  protect  our  people 
abroad,  and  the  Congress,  on  a  biparti- 
san basis,  has  been  enormously  helpful. 
Last  year  the  Congress  authorized  a 
$361  million  security  supplemental,  of 
which  $110  million  was  appropriated. 
That  money  is  currently  funding  the 
bulk  of  the  new  measures  we  are  now 
taking. 

We  are  now  seeking  the  balance  of 
this  emergency  authorization  in  a  1985 
supplemental  appropriation  to  allow  us 
to  start  the  construction  6f  these  new 
Embassy  buildings  and  other  essential 
actions.  It  is  a  major  undertaking. 
Delay  extends  the  period  of  danger  to 
our  people. 

The  high-level  advisory  panel  was 
formed  last  summer  under  the  chair- 
manship of  retired  Admiral  Bobby 
Inman.  Its  members  include  Senator 
Warren  Rudman  and  Representative 
Dan  Mica;  former  Under  Secretary  of 
State  Larry  Eagleburger;  Ambassador 
Anne  Armstrong;  Lt.  Gen.  DAVayne 
Gray,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Marines;  and 
Robert  McGuire,  former  Police  Commis- 
sioner of  New  York  City  and  now  presi- 
dent of  Pinkerton. 

This  distinguished  and  experienced 
group  plans  to  give  me  a  report  and 
recommendations  in  late  May.  But  it  has 
recently  given  me  some  preliminary  sug- 
gestions. The  most  important  pre- 
liminary finding  of  the  panel  is  that 
facilities  at  perhaps  139  of  our  262  posts 
abroad  do  not  meet  our  new  minimum 
security  standards  and  are  in  need  of 
replacement  or  significant  overhaul.  For 
example,  some  posts  are  located  on  the 
streets  in  downtown  areas  while  others 
are  NOilnerable  for  other  reasons. 

There  is  one  other  development  re- 
garding security  of  our  personnel  over- 
seas I  would  like  to  comment  on.  I 
recently  announced  the  formation  of  a 
new  joint  venture  between  the  State 
Department  and  the  private  sector:  the 
Overseas  Security  Advisory  Council. 

The  members  of  this  council  will 
come  from  a  wide  range  of  Amei-ican 
luisinesses  that  operate  abroad,  Ameri- 
can law  enforcement  agencies,  and  other 
foreign  affairs  agencies.  The  council's 
goals  are: 

•  To  establish  a  continuing  liaison 
between  officials  in  both  the  pubhc  and 
private  sector  in  charge  of  security  mat- 

j  ters;  and 

•  To  recommend  plans  for  greater 
operational  coordination  between  the 
government  and  the  private  sector  over- 
seas. 


June  1985 


By  working  together  to  enhance 
security,  I  know  we  can  be  more  effec- 
tive in  saving  lives  and  reducing  the 
dangers  of  doing  private  or  official 
business  abroad. 

Personnel  Management  and  Train- 
ing. I  would  like  to  conclude  my  re- 
marks with  some  thoughts  about  person- 
nel management  and  training  in  the 
Foreign  Service.  In  doing  so,  I  would 
like  to  point  to  the  strong  record  of  con- 
gressional support  for  our  personnel 
most  recently  expressed  in  the  Foreign 
Service  Act  of  1980.  Your  support  af- 
fects morale  strongly,  and  we  deeply  ap- 
preciate it. 

It  is  a  truism  to  say  that  our  people 
are  the  Department's  most  important  re- 
source. We  must  never  lose  sight  of  this 
fact.  It  is  why  we  attach  so  much  im- 
portance to  improved  security,  to  pay 
and  benefits,  and  to  training. 

For  the  last  60  years  the  Congress 
has  directed  the  Department  to  provide 
training  in  foreign  affairs  for  the 
Foreign  Service  and  other  government 
agencies  without  providing  a  location  for 
it.  The  Foreign  Service  Institute— which 
has  become  one  of  the  finest  training 
centers  in  language,  area,  and  profes- 
sional studies— has  been  housed  in  a 
series  of  temporary  buildings,  apart- 
ments, a  garage,  and  now  unsatisfactory 
office  building  space  in  Rosslyn.  We  will 
have  to  curtail  the  training  program 
mandated  by  Congress  in  the  Foreign 
Service  Act  of  1980  if  we  do  not  get 
new  space.  The  time  has  come  to  estab- 
lish a  permanent,  national  foreign  af- 
fairs training  center  to  serve  all  foreign 
affairs  agencies.  To  that  end,  we  seek 
authorization  for  the  establishment  of 
such  a  facility  for  the  Foreign  Service 
Institute. 

This  year  the  Congress  will  again  be 
looking  at  benefits,  principally  retire- 
ment. I  ask  you  to  keep  in  mind  the 
bravery,  devotion  to  duty,  and  sacrifice 
made  by  the  men  and  women  in  the 
Foreign  Service.  Our  people  are  con- 
stantly exposed  to  the  dangers  of  ter- 
rorism, kidnaping,  bombings,  and  mob 
action.  In  just  the  last  2  years,  21 
Americans  assigned  to  Foreign  Service 
posts  abroad  were  killed  by  hostile  ac- 
tion. 

In  a  world  in  which  the  threat  of 
terrorism  is  mounting  and  America  is 
called  upon  to  deal  with  a  difficult, 
dangerous,  and  debilitating  array  of 
problems,  it  is  the  Foreign  Service 
which  is  out  there  on  the  front  line. 


Allowances,  differentials,  and  bene- 
fits do  not  enrich  Foreign  Service  per- 
sonnel. They  partially  compensate  for 
unhealthful  or  dangerous  living  condi- 
tions or  the  absence  of  services  such  as 
public  education  to  which  all  Americans 
are  entitled.  Now,  many  of  them  are 
reduced  in  this  budget  as  a  function  of 
the  5%  pay  cut. 

The  Foreign  Service  retirement  plan 
is  a  benefit  which  is  central  to  the 
management  of  the  service.  It  offers  the 
possibility  of  and,  in  fact,  requires 
earlier  retirement  than  the  Civil  Service 
program  in  recognition  of  the  com- 
petitive nature  of  the  Foreign  Service 
and  the  accumulated  stress  and  diffi- 
culties of  a  Foreign  Service  career. 
After  age  50,  for  example,  more  than 
half  of  our  Foreign  Service  personnel 
are  unavailable  for  worldwide  duty  be- 
cause either  the  employee  or  a  member 
of  the  family  cannot  qualify  for  a  full 
medical  clearance.  They  no  longer  can 
meet  the  physical  requirements  of  the 
job. 

The  Foreign  Service  personnel 
system  is  highly  competitive  and  annual- 
ly separates  or  "selects  out"  a  number  of 
officers.  Last  year  39  officers  were  man- 
datorily retired  in  that  manner.  We  need 
to  be  sure  that  changes  to  the  retire- 
ment system  do  not  render  the  "up  or 
out"  system  or  the  management  of  the 
worldwide  availability  system  unwork- 
able. 


'Press  release  32.  The  complete  tran- 
script of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the 
comnfiittee  and  will  oe  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington.  D.C. 
20402.  ■ 


35 


AFRICA 


South  Africa: 

The  Case  Against  Sanctions 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee on  Banking.  Housing,  and  Urban  Af- 
fairs on  April  16,  1985.  Mr.  Dam  is 
Deputy  Secretary  of  Stale.'' 

Thank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  speak 
to  you  today  on  U.S.  policy  toward 
South  Africa. 

I  believe  that  all  Americans  find 
repugnant  the  system  of  racial 
discrimination  called  apartheid  that  is 
practiced  there.  We  are  united  in  our 
belief  that  apartheid  is  morally  abhor- 
rent, politically  unsustainable,  and 
economically  wasteful.  But  moral  in- 
dignation, no  matter  how  natural  and 
justifiable,  is  not  a  substitute  for  an  ef- 
fective foreign  policy— certainly  not  for 
an  activist  world  power  that  seeks 
change  in  a  manner  that  will  benefit  all 
South  Africans. 

The  issue,  then,  is  what  we  as  a  na- 
tion can  do  to  promote  positive  and  non- 
violent change  toward  a  more  just 
order— an  order  that  recognizes  fun- 
damental human  rights  and  political 
liberties  in  South  Africa. 

It  is  the  position  of  this  Administra- 
tion that  sanctions,  such  as  those  in  the 
legislation  before  you  today,  would  be 
counterproductive:  they  are  more  likely 
to  strengthen  resistance  to  change  than 
to  strengthen  the  forces  of  reform. 
Moreover,  they  do  not  even  put  us,  as 
some  say,  "on  the  side  of  right."  If  our 
moral  imperative  as  Americans  is  to  en- 
courage freedom  and  reform,  we  must 
reject  sanctions  for  we  do  not  enhance 
our  ability  to  influence  change  by 
eliminating  ourselves  as  an  actor. 

I  should  like  to  briefly  review  the 
situation  in  South  Africa,  the  extent  of 
U.S.  influence  there,  and  the  current 
U.S. -South  African  relationship,  which  is 
based  on  anything  but  business  as  usual. 
Then,  I  should  like  to  briefly  analyze 
some  of  the  principal  sanctions  that  have 
been  proposed  in  S.  635  and  other 
legislation  as  well. 

The  policy  of  this  Administration  has 
been  to  foment  change  away  from  apart- 
heid: 

•  By  unambiguous  public  statements 
condemning  apartheid's  evils; 

•  By  reinforcing  these  views  with 
quiet  diplomacy; 


•  By  working  with  elements  within 
South  Africa  that  share  a  vision  of  peace 
and  equity; 

•  By  encouraging  laudable  fair 
employment  practices  of  U.S.  com- 
panies; and 

•  By  involving  ourselves  as  a 
government  in  financing  programs- 
some  $30  million  in  3  years— to  give 
South  African  blacks  better  training  and 
educational  opportunities. 

In  part  because  of  U.S.  encourage- 
ment, change  in  South  Africa  has 
begun-  -barely,  but  it  has  begun.  More 
progress  toward  justice  in  that  society 
has  been  made  in  the  last  few  years 
than  in  the  preceding  three  decades.  The 
concept  that  South  Africa's  blacks  have 
no  citizenship  rights  outside  the  tribal 
homelands  has  been  abandoned,  and 
blacks  today  have  certain  urban  residen- 
cy rights  in  areas  that  were  unavailable 
a  few  years  ago.  Black  trade  unions 
have  become  a  powerful  force  in  in- 
dustry. The  government  has  suspended 
the  forced  removal  of  settled  black  com- 
munities. It  has  just  announced  that  it 
will  support  repeal  of  two  of  the  more 
odious  aspects  of  apartheid,  the  Mixed 
Marriages  Act  and  that  portion  of  the 
Immorality  Act  that  proscribes  sexual 
relations  between  the  races.  Central 
business  districts  are  being  opened  to 
black  businessmen.  Cities  throughout 
South  Africa  have  abolished  the  trap- 
pings of  petty  apartheid  such  as 
segregated  parks  and  swimming  pools. 
The  government  has  acknowledged  the 
need  to  consult  and  negotiate  with 
representative  blacks  outside  the  tribal 
homelands. 

Tragically,  of  course,  much  remains 
to  be  done.  South  Africa  still  cannot  be 
considered  a  just  society  whose  system 
derives  its  authority  from  the  consent  of 
the  governed.  Black  leaders  continue  to 
be  detained  without  trial  or  charged 
with  treason.  Violence  has  increased  in 
recent  months  with  tragic  results.  The 
government  has  yet  to  repeal  the  hated 
pass  laws  or  to  devise  mutually  accept- 
able mechanisms  for  negotiations  with 
black  leaders. 

We  must  use  our  influence  to  pro- 
mote further  peaceful  change  but  we 
must  not  overestimate  the  degree  of  our 
influence.  South  Africa  has  traditionally 
pursued  a  course  it  believes  to  be  in  its 
own  best  interest  and  has  been  open 


only  to  those  who  bear  what  it  believes 
is  a  constructive  message  based  on  an 
intelligent  appraisal  of  the  complex 
realities  it  faces.  In  addition,  South 
Africa  looks  to  us  as  perhaps  the  only 
non-African  nation  capable  of  playing  a 
constructive  role  with  all  the  nations  of 
southern  Africa  in  the  search  for 
regional  peace. 

We  must  not  overlook  this  regional 
aspect  in  assessing  the  South  African 
issue.  The  region  has  seen  almost  con- 
tinuous conflict  with  armed  clashes  tak- 
ing place  in  South  Africa,  Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique,  Namibia,  Lesotho,  and 
Angola.  Guerrilla  attacks  launched 
against  South  Africa  from  neighboring 
black  states  have  provoked  cross-border 
retaliation  by  South  Africa.  One  of  the 
primary  goals  of  our  policy  has  been  to 
reduce  this  violence  between  neighbors, 
and  in  this  we  believe  we  have  had  some 
success. 

It  is  important  to  recognize  that  our 
influence  with  South  Africa  does  not 
derive  from  a  client  relationship.  In  fact, 
our  military,  political,  and  economic  rela- 
tions with  South  Africa  are  by  design 
far  less  intimate  than  with  many  other 
states  of  similar  political  and  economic 
importance.  Indeed,  significant  restric- 
tions are  already  in  place  that  circum- 
scribe our  trade  and  cooperation  in  the 
military  and  nuclear  areas,  and  impose  a 
political  stance  that  results  in  our  clearly 
dissociating  ourselves  from  apartheid. 

For  example,  in  an  effort  to 
eliminate  apartheid,  U.S.  arms  sales  to 
South  Africa  have  been  embargoed  since 
1963,  and  in  1977  the  United  States 
joined  the  United  Nations  in  imposing  a 
further  mandatory  arms  embargo  on 
South  Africa.  Our  regulations  are,  in 
fact,  more  severe  than  the  UN  embargo 
and  restrict  U.S.  exports  to  the  South 
African  military  and  police  of  items  not 
covered  in  the  UN  embargo.  In 
December  of  last  year,  the  United  States 
joined  with  other  UN  Security  Council 
members  in  voting  for  an  embargo  on 
imports  of  arms  and  ammunition  pro- 
duced in  South  Africa. 

Our  commercial  relationship  is  now 
also  restricted.  Eximbank  is  essentially 
prohibited  from  financing  U.S.  sales  to 
South  Africa  except  under  very  restric- 
tive circumstances.  OPIC  [Overseas 
Private  Investment  Corporation]  does 
not  provide  guarantees  for  South  Africa. 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA 


Dur  representative  at  the  IMF  [Interna- 
.ional  Monetary  Fund)  must  "actively 
)ppose  any  facility  involving  use  of  fund 
iredit  by  any  country  which  practices 
ipartheid"  unless  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  makes  certain  certifications  to 
longress.  U.S.  trade  fairs  do  not  travel 
;o  South  Africa.  We  carefully  review  ex- 
Dort  license  applications  for  the  export 
)f,  among  other  things,  U.S.  crime  con- 
;rol  equipment  to  prevent  the  use  of 
such  items  in  the  enforcement  of  apart- 
leid. 

This,  then,  is  the  reality  of  our  rela- 
.ionship:  limitations  on  a  vast  portion  of 
)ur  military  and  commercial  transac- 
,ions.  To  argue,  as  some  do,  that  our 
•elationship  is  based  on  business  as 
jsual— or  that  our  government  has  a 
'normal"  relationship  with  South 
Africa— is  patent  nonsense. 

Some  argue  that  we  should  go  fur- 
;her  and  try  to  run  South  Africa  out  of 
;he  community  of  nations  through 
boycotts,  embargoes,  and  sanctions.  The 
egislation  before  you,  for  example, 
would  prohibit  bank  loans  to  the  South 
African  Government  or  its  parastatal 
corporations.  We  fail  to  see  how  this 
would  hasten  the  end  of  the  apartheid 
system.  Indeed,  it  would  hurt  U.S.  and 
allied  business  more  than  it  would  help 
reform  in  South  Africa. 

A  prohibition  on  bank  loans  would 
create  a  dangerous  precedent  undermin- 
ing the  U.S.  policy  that  international 
capital  markets  should  remain  free  of 
government  interference  and  that  lend- 
ing decisions  should  be  based  on  market 
rather  than  political  considerations.  If 
bank  loans  to  South  Africa  should  be 
prohibited,  then  South  Africa  would  be 
the  only  country  with  which  the  United 
States  has  diplomatic  relations  that 
would  be  subject  to  a  U.S.  bank  loan 
prohibition;  this  is  an  important  prece- 
dent for  the  banking  committee  to  bear 
in  mind. 

The  result  of  such  a  prohibition  on 
bank  loans  would  be  that  parastatal 
agencies  far  removed  from  the  develop- 
ment of  apartheid  policy,  such  as  the 
Electricity  Supply  Commission  or  South 
African  Airways,  would  be  unable  to  get 
U.S.  financing  for  the  purchase  of 
American  products.  This  would  penalize 
U.S.  banks  and  firms  doing  significant 
business  with  these  entities  without  any 
real  impact  on  South  Africa.  Almost  cer- 
tainly other  countries'  banks  would 
replace  U.S.  banks  as  a  lending  source 
and  their  factories  would  benefit  from 
the  orders  that  would  have  gone  to  U.S. 
firms. 


June  1985 


111  addition,  any  extension  of  an  ef- 
fective loan  prohibition  to  cover  foreign 
affiliates  or  branches  of  U.S.  banks 
would  raise  serious  questions  about  the 
extraterritorial  application  of  U.S.  law. 
The  result  would  be  strong  objections 
from  our  allies  who  would  consider  their 
sovereignty  violated. 

The  Administration  also  opposes  the 
adoption  of  a  prohibition  on  new  invest- 
ment in  South  Africa.  Our  opposition  is 
based  on  three  points. 

First,  such  a  prohibition  would  limit 
opportunities  for  expansion  by  precisely 
those  firms  that  have  done  the  most  to 
promote  social  change  in  South  Africa. 
It  would  thus  "freeze"  the  number  of 
black  employees  benefiting  from  the 
Sullivan  code  and  similar  codes  of  cor- 
porate conduct.  Such  a  "freeze"  would, 
in  turn,  slow  the  process  of  change  in- 
side South  Africa  in  which  the  more  pro- 
gressive U.S.  firms  have  been  in  the 
forefront. 

Second,  this  measure  would 
discriminate  against  U.S.  firms  that 
might  desire  to  invest  in  South  Africa  by 
offering,  in  effect,  an  oligopolistic  situa- 
tion for  firms  already  there.  To  the  ex- 
tent that  the  absence  of  U.S.  investment 
might  create  market  opportunities  in 
South  Africa,  there  is  little  doubt  that 
some  of  our  economic  competitors 
around  the  world  would  step  in  to  fill 
such  a  gap. 

Third,  and  most  important,  as  a 
direct  consequence  of  a  prohibition  on 
new  investment,  black  South  Africans 
would  lose  new  job  opportunities  or  be 
denied  opportunities  to  be  employed  by 
the  more  progressive  U.S.  firms.  An 
economy  that  must  create  250,000  new 
jobs  for  young  blacks  each  year,  and 
that  will  have  twice  as  many  of  them 
entering  the  job  market  by  the  turn  of 
the  century,  needs  more  jobs,  not  less. 

In  addition  to  a  prohibition  on  bank 
loans,  another  proposal  would  also  re- 
quire that  U.S.  firms  in  South  Africa  be 
made  to  comply  with  mandatory  labor 
standards.  This  proposal  would  mandate 
the  adoption  by  U.S.  firms  in  South 
Africa  of  employment  standards  such  as 
those  contained  in  the  Sullivan  prin- 
ciples, which  are  voluntary  in  nature.  In 
our  view,  it  has  been  precisely  the  volun- 
tary nature  of  these  principles  that  has 
resulted  in  their  successful  application  to 
date  by  U.S.  firms  operating  in  South 
Africa.  While  less  than  a  majority  of  the 
U.S.  firms  in  South  Africa  have  actually 
adopted  the  Sullivan  principles,  the 
largest  U.S.  firms  have  done  so,  with 
the  result  that  more  than  70%  of  the 
nonwhite  employees  of  U.S.  firms  in 


South  Africa  are  covered  by  these  prin- 
ciples. Through  continued  persuasion, 
we  believe  more  firms  will  join  this  ef- 
fort. 

Requiring  companies  to  adopt  labor 
standards  and  threatening  prosecution 
for  failure  to  do  so  is  likely  to  undercut 
the  positive  achievements  of  the  U.S. 
Sullivan  signatory  firms.  The  voluntary 
nature  of  the  Sullivan  code  has  served  to 
set  an  example  for  P^uropean  and  South 
African  firms  to  break  with  the  old, 
racist  ways  of  doing  business.  The  U.S. 
companies,  through  Sullivan,  proved 
that  individual  efforts  could  help  move 
the  system  in  a  positive  direction.  These 
firms  have  spent  over  $100  million  out- 
side the  workplace  to  aid  their  em- 
ployees and  others  in  the  black  com- 
munity. In  addition,  given  the  delicate 
business  climate  faced  by  firms  that  in- 
vest in  South  Africa,  making  labor 
standards  mandatory  could  prove  to  be 
the  final  straw  in  causing  some  U.S. 
firms  to  reconsider  their  presence  in 
South  Africa.  Their  withdrawal  would 
mean  that  fewer,  rather  than  greater, 
numbers  of  black  South  Africans  would 
come  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  working 
for  firms  that  adhere  to  enlightened 
labor  standards. 

These  fair  labor  standards  were 
originally  developed  to  be  a  voluntary 
guide  for  firms,  not  a  legal  code.  Some 
of  the  measures  under  consideration, 
however,  would  require  the  U.S. 
Government  to  make  highly  complex 
legal  judgments,  based  on  vague  and  im- 
precise standards,  on  each  U.S.  firm  and 
impose  severe  penalties  on  firms  that 
are  not  certified  as  being  in  compliance. 
This  would  not  only  be  unfair  to  the 
firms  involved  but  would  be  unworkable 
as  well. 

Finally,  other  bills  before  you  would 
impose  a  blanket  prohibition  on  the  ex- 
port of  nuclear  equipment  and  tech- 
nology. Such  a  prohibition  would  under- 
mine our  ability  and  leverage  to  broaden 
the  application  of  international  safe- 
guards in  countries  that  do  not  presently 
accept  full-scope  safeguards.  Such  a 
blanket  prohibition  on  the  export  of  all 
dual-use  goods  and  nuclear  equipment  or 
technology  to  South  Africa,  as  well  as 
all  other  nonfull-scope  safeguard  states, 
would  undercut  our  nonproliferation   ef- 
forts, and  would  reduce  our  influence  in 
such  countries'  nuclear  progi-ams. 
All  applications  for  exports  of 
nuclear-related  equipment  or  assistance 
are  already  thoroughly  reviewed  as  to 
their  proliferation  implications  and  their 
effect  on  foreign  policy.  In  the  case  of 
states  that  have  not  accepted  full-scope 
safeguards,  only  limited  nonsensitive 


37 


AFRICA 


assistance  is  permitted— and  then  only 
when  it  will  advance  our  nonprolifera- 
tion  objectives.  In  the  case  of  South 
Africa,  our  dialogue  with  that  govern- 
ment on  nonproliferation  matters, 
coupled  with  a  willingness  to  allow  ex- 
tremely limited,  nonsensitive  assistance 
to  facilities  in  South  Africa  that  are 
under  IAEA  [International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency]  safeguards,  contributed 
to  three  important  decisions  by  the 
South  African  Government  last  year: 

First,  to  require  IAEA  safeguards 
on  all  its  nuclear  exports; 

Second,  to  export  only  according  to 
the  Nuclear  Suppliers  Group  guidelines; 
and 

Third,  to  renew  talks  with  the 
IAEA  concerning  placement  of  its 
semicommercial  uranium  enrichment 
plant  under  IAEA  safeguards. 

In  sum,  this  Administration  does  not 
believe  that  any  of  the  punitive 
measures  in  the  bill  before  you,  or 
similar  ones  in  other  bills  that  have  been 
proposed,  will  hasten  the  demise  of 
apartheid.  We  do  not  believe  it  is  wise  to 
withdraw  the  limited  tools  of  influence 
we  do  have  and  simply  hope  the  problem 
goes  away.  To  impose  sanctions  might 
express  our  grief  and  anger  over  the 
violence  that  has  recently  taken  the  lives 
of  so  many  in  the  eastern  Cape  and 
elsewhere  in  South  Africa.  Such  action 
would  not,  however,  decrease  the 
burdens  of  the  victims  of  apartheid.  In- 
deed, the  likely  result  would  be  to  in- 
crease those  burdens  and  squander  our 
influence,  thus  making  the  United  States 
essentially  irrelevant  to  the  process  of 
change  in  South  Africa. 

In  short,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
South  Africa  will  be  a  better  place 
without  U.S.  influence  and  presence 
there,  limited  though  they  are.  If  what 
we  seek  is  to  influence  positive  change 
within  South  Africa  and  to  encourage 
regional  stability  (including  the  establish- 
ment of  an  independent  and  interna- 
tionally recognized  Namibia),  then  sanc- 
tions must  be  rejected. 


U.S.  Response  to  Apartheid 
in  Soutli  Africa 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  he  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  Chester  A.  Crocker 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  Hotaie  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  April  1 7,  1985.  Mr. 
Crocker  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs. ' 

Thank  you  for  this  opportunity  to  ap- 
pear before  you  today  on  the  important 
subject  of  U.S.  policy  toward  South 
Africa.  For  the  sake  of  brevity  and  with 
the  permission  of  the  committee,  I 
would  like  to  introduce  for  the  record 
yesterday's  important  speech  by  Secre- 
tary Shultz  on  southern  Africa  and  a 
copy  of  yesterday's  testimony  by  Deputy 
Secretary  Dam  made  before  the  Senate 
Banking  Committee  on  Senate  bill  635. 
The  former  is  a  comprehensive  and 
authoritative  statement  of  Administra- 
tion policy,  and  there  would  be  little  pur- 
pose in  my  simply  repeating  it  here  this 
morning.  The  latter  covers  in  detail  our 
opposition  to  that  legislation,  which  is 
paralleled  by  proposals  before  this  body. 
I  will  confine  my  remarks  this  morn- 
ing to  a  short  statement  of  some  basic 
facts  about  current  U.S.  policy  and  the 
important  developments  occurring  in 
South  Africa  and  will  make  some 
general  observations  about  why  we 
believe  it  is  wrong-headed  to  impose  any 
new  punitive  sanctions  against  South 
Africa  and  its  people  as  a  means  of  try- 
ing to  influence  its  government. 

U.S.  Policy  and  Public  Opinion 

Let  me  begin  by  stating  what  shoukl  be 
obvious  to  all  of  us  at  this  time  of 
heightened  American  interest  in  events 
in  South  Africa:  there  is  no  support  for 
apartheid  in  our  country.  No  respectable 
voice  is  being  raised  in  defense  of  that 
odious  system  or  in  defense  of  the  status 
quo.  No  one  is  suggesting  that  our  policy 
should  be  a  cozy  partnership — business 
as  usual — with  a  government  that 
denies  elementary  political  and  other 
rights  to  a  majority  of  the  people  on  the 
basis  of  race.  While  there  is  much 
debate  in  our  country  concerning  South 
Africa,  that  debate  is  not  about  apar- 
theid. Rather,  it  concerns  what  we  can 
do  to  support  change  toward  a  just 
society  whose  system  is  based  on  the 
consent  of  the  governed. 

This  leads  to  my  second  point.  At 
this  time  of  protests  and  other  expres- 


sions of  moral  indignation — about  apart- 
heid and  the  killings  of  blacks  in  South 
Africa — we  should  be  able  to  agree  on 
two  things.  We  are  fully  justified  in  ex- 
pressing our  moral  indignation.  At  the 
same  time,  moral  indignation  by  itself  is 
not  foreign  policy.  If  we  are  to  play  a 
positive,  constructive  role,  it  will  not  do 
to  proclaim  simply  that  we  must  "do 
something"  about  apartheid  and  then 
select  among  proposals  according  to  how 
good  they  make  us  feel.  Of  course,  there 
is  a  role  for  protest  politics  in  any  free 
society,  and  we  respect  it.  But  I  do  not 
believe  the  American  people  vote  for 
their  elected  leaders  in  Congress  and  the 
executive  branch  to  shape  our  foreign 
policies  without  regard  to  the  practical 
results  of  those  policies.  Hence,  the  onus 
is  on  all  of  us  to  consider  carefully  the 
consequences  of  current  and  alternative 
policies.  We  cannot  throw  our  hands  in 
the  air  and  say,  in  effect,  "We  are  not 
interested  in  the  results  in  South 
Africa." 

We  have  heard  arguments  to  the  ef- 
fect that,  if  nothing  else,  punitive  sanc- 
tions would  send  a  moral  signal  of  our 
concern — a  signal  to  black  South 
Africans  that  we  hear  their  voices  and  a 
signal  to  South  Africa's  white  leadeis 
that  the  time  for  basic  change  is  now.  In 
our  view,  there  are  better  ways  of  send- 
ing signals  than  those  proposed  by  the 
critics  of  President  Reagan's  policy. 
What  signal  is  sent  by  adjusting  U.S.  ex- 
port licensing  procedures  so  that  South 
Africa's  electric  utility  corporation  im- 
ports German  or  Japanese  computers  in- 
stead of  American  ones?  What  signal  is 
sent  when  we  tell  black  South  Africans 
that  we  are  going  to  support  their  cause 
by  stopping  new  or  existing  U.S.  invest- 
ment so  that  their  chances  of  employ- 
ment with  the  world's  most  enlightened 
and  advanced  corporations  will  be 
diminished?  We  submit  that  there  are 
far  more  effective  ways  of  sending 
signals,  many  of  which  are  part  and 
parcel  of  our  current  policy  toward 
South  Africa. 

Setting  the  Record  Straight 

This  brings  me  to  an  observation  and  an 
appeal.  If  our  current  discussions  about 
South  Africa  and  U.S.  jjolicy  are  to 
serve  any  useful  purpose,  they  must  be 
based  on  facts  and  on  a  reasonable 
understanding  of  the  issues  and  our 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA 


policies.  As  we  exchange  views  with  con- 
cerned Americans,  we  frequently  face  a 
litany  of  warped  statistics,  misrepre- 
sentations, or  outright  falsifications  of 
the  facts  with  the  clear  purpose  of  dis- 
crediting U.S.  policy  toward  that  coun- 
try and  creating  a  false  contrast  be- 
tween current  policies  and  those  of 
previous  administrations  going  back  to 
the  early  1960s.  The  record  needs  to  be 
set  straight. 

First  of  all,  it  should  be  clear  to  any 
objective  observer  that  our  relationship 
with  South  Africa  is  far  from  a  "normal" 
one.  The  significant  embargoes  and 
restrictions  already  in  place  on  our  trade 
and  cooperation  in  the  military  and 
nuclear  areas,  as  well  as  in  our  commer- 
cial relationships,  demonstrate,  in  a 
tangible  way,  that  we  find  apartheid 
repugnant  and  are  dissociating  ourselves 
from  it.  Many  of  these  policies  and  prac- 
tices have  existed  for  years.  We  have 
maintained  them.  U.S.  arms  sales  to 
South  Africa  have  been  embargoed  since 
1963,  and  in  1977  the  United  States 
joined  the  United  Nations  in  imposing  a 
further  mandatory  arms  embargo  on 
South  Africa.  Our  regulations  are,  in 
fact,  more  severe  than  the  UN  embargo 
and  restrict  U.S.  exports  to  the  South 
African  military  and  police  of  items  not 
covered  in  the  UN  embargo.  In 
December  of  last  year,  the  United  States 
joined  with  other  UN  Security  Council 
members  in  voting  for  an  embargo  on 
imports  of  arms  and  ammunition  pro- 
duced in  South  Africa. 

In  the  commercial  area,  Eximbank  is 
essentially  prohibited  from  financing 
U.S.  sales  to  South  Africa  except  under 
very  restrictive  circumstaiices.  OPIC 
[Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tion] does  not  provide  guarantees  for 
South  Africa.  Our  representative  at  the 
IMF  [International  Monetary  Fund] 
must  "actively  oppose  any  facility  involv- 
ing use  of  Fund  credit  by  any  country 
which  practices  apartheid"  unless  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  makes  certain 
certifications  to  Congress.  U.S.  trade 
fairs  do  not  travel  to  South  Africa.  We 
carefully  review  license  applications  for 
the  export  of,  among  other  things,  U.S. 
crime  control  equipment  to  prevent  the 
use  of  such  items  in  the  enforcement  of 
apartheid. 

This  information,  vital  to  an  under- 
standing of  current  American  policy,  is 
too  often  ignored  or  misrepresented  in 
our  discussions.  We  hear  claims  that  the 
United  States  supports  the  enforcement 
of  apartheid  by  permitting  the  South 
African  authorities  to  import  mainframe 
computers  to  implement  the  pass  laws 
which  control  the  lives  of  approximately 


U.S.  Regrets  South  African 
Arrests  and  Trials 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  1,  1985' 

As  we  have  stated  before,  we  deeply 
regret  the  arrests  of  these  opposition 
leaders  in  South  Africa,  which  appear 
inconsistent  with  the  new  emphasis  on 
dialogue  and  negotiation  which  the 
government  itself  has  declared. 

It  is  the  judgment  of  the  U.S. 
Government  that  a  genuine  process  of 
reform  is  underway  in  South  Africa  and 
that  the  government  there  is  determined 
to  move  down  the  road  of  constructive 
change  away  from  apartheid.  Important 
decisions  and  commitments  have  already 
been  made.  Notable  in  this  regard  are 
recent  undertakings  by  the  South 
African  Government  to  halt  forced 
removals  of  blacks  to  homelands  while 
the  removals  policy  is  reviewed,  the 
decision  to  talk  with  black  community 
leaders  at  the  Crossroads  settlement 
outside  Cape  Town  on  a  plan  for  urban 
renewal  for  that  area,  and  the  decision 
to  make  it  easier  for  blacks  to  obtain  ur- 
laan  residency  rights.  However,  it  is  also 
clear  that  the  atmosphere  for  a  broad 
reform  process  has  not  yet  fully 
developed  and  that  a  meaningful 
dialogue  between  all  South  Africans, 
which  state  President  Botha  called  for  in 
his  January  25  speech,  is  indeed  essen- 
tial to  this  process. 

It  is  in  the  light  of  this  politic;al 
situation  that  we  view  with  regret  the 
government's  decision  to  arrest  and  hold 


treason  trials  for  a  significant  number  of 
opposition  leaders.  It  is  not  for  us  to 
take  a  position  on  the  validity  of  the 
charges,  which  are  now  before  a 
judiciary  which  has  a  reputation  for  fair- 
ness. However,  the  very  decision  on  the 
part  of  the  government  to  seek  these 
trials  detracts  from  the  government's 
own  stated  commitment  to  seek  a 
dialogue  with  black  leaders.  They  do  not 
add  to  the  prospects  of  success  for  such 
a  dialogue. 

It  has  long  been  this 
Administration's  view  that  a  dialogue 
among  all  South  Africans  is  an  essential 
step  in  a  process  that  can  lead  to  a 
government  fully  representative  of  all 
South  Africa's  peoples  and  based  on  the 
consent  of  the  governed.  Our  role  in  this 
situation  is  to  encourage  the  process, 
not  to  intervene  in  it.  We  fully  recognize 
the  complexity  of  the  task  ahead,  as  well 
as  the  importance  of  steps  already 
taken.  We  also  recognize  that  it  requires 
more  than  one  willing  party  if  dialogue 
is  to  occur.  We,  therefore,  urge  both  the 
South  African  Government,  as  well  as 
those  in  opposition  to  it,  to  look  beyond 
shortsighted  actions  and  tactical 
postures  and  to  take  courageous  steps  to 
break  the  stalemate  that  has  for  too 
long  impeded  communication  and 
negotiation  in  South  Africa. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Edward  Djerejian.  ■ 


22  million  nonvoting  South  Africans. 
This,  too,  is  absolutely  false;  it  has  no 
basis  in  fact.  Administration  policy  is  to 
prohibit  the  sale  of  computers  to  the 
South  African  military,  police,  or  en- 
tities enforcing  apartheid.  We  conduct 
regular  prelicense  checks  on  the  end-use 
of  these  computers  by  such  agencies  as 
the  Post  Office,  the  Reserve  Bank,  or 
the  Electricity  Supply  Commission  and 
have  insisted  on  our  right  to  do  post- 
license  checks  as  well.  To  my  knowledge, 
there  have  been  no  violations  to  date.  As 
far  as  we  are  concerned,  this  is  a 
realistic  approach,  balancing  our  moral 
and  political  responsibilities  with  the 
realities  of  free  trade. 

We  hear  claims  from  critics  that, 
since  this  Administration  took  office,  the 
United  States  has  sold  $100  million 
worth  of  munitions  to  South  Africa,  in- 
cluding such  items  as  shock  batons. 


These  allegations  are  a  complete  distor- 
tion of  the  facts.  The  Department  of 
State  has  simply  not  licensed  any  export 
to  South  Africa  of  any  item  that  is  sub- 
ject to  the  UN  embargo.  It  is  important 
to  understand  that  our  export  controls 
go  beyond  the  requirements  of  the  UN 
embargo.  There  are  items  on  the  U.S. 
munitions  list  which  are  not  subject  to 
the  UN  embargo.  For  example,  "encryp- 
tion" devices,  such  as  those  used  in  bank 
teller  machines,  are  on  the  munitions 
list.  We  will  authorize  their  export  to 
South  Africa  only  for  use  by  private  en- 
tities like  banks,  financial  institutions, 
and  U.S.  corporate  subsidiaries,  after 
careful  checks  on  the  recipients  and 
their  intended  uses.  These  items  com- 
prise 90%  of  the  value  of  licenses  given 
for  munitions  list  exports  to  South 
Africa.  The  remaining  items,  while  on 
the  munitions  list,  had  similarly  valid 


June  1985 


39 


AFRICA 


end-use  by  other  entities,  such  as  image- 
intensifier  tubes  for  an  astronomical 
observatory.  There  are  no  items  ap- 
proved for  export  for  military  purposes. 

Yes,  the  system  of  controls  is  not 
perfect.  A  license  was  mistakenly  autho- 
rized by  the  Department  of  Commerce 
some  time  ago  for  a  shipment  of  shock 
batons  to  South  Africa.  This  item  was 
not  controlled  by  the  munitions  list.  It 
was  not  the  critics  who  first  brought 
this  to  our  attention,  but  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce,  which  discovered 
the  error  and  brought  it  to  light.  Such 
an  export  would  not  have  been  approved 
if  it  had  been  handled  in  the  normal 
manner.  It  is  blatantly  untrue  to  accuse 
the  Administration  of  approving  or  in- 
creasing arms  sales  to  South  Africa. 

Our  critics  accuse  us  of  supporting 
South  Africa's  acquisition  of  sensitive 
nuclear  technology,  claiming  that  South 
Africa  could  not  have  developed  its 
nuclear  potential  without  active  assist- 
ance from  the  United  States.  It  must  be 
pointed  out  that  South  Africa  has  pur- 
sued an  independent  nuclear  program 
for  three  decades.  It  stretches  the  imagi- 
nation to  envision  how  any  U.S.  Govern- 
ment could  have  prevented  a  technologi- 
cally advanced  nation  like  South  Africa 
from  developing  an  indigenous  nuclear 
program.  U.S.  law  and  policy  bar  all 
significant  nuclear  transfers  to  countries 
like  South  Africa  that  have  not  accepted 
full-scope  safeguards,  and  we  have  strict 
controls  over  transfers  of  nuclear  tech- 
nology. All  applications  for  exports  of 
nuclear-related  equipment  or  assistance 
are  thoroughly  and  carefully  reviewed  so 
that  only  limited,  nonsensitive  trans- 
actions are  permitted.  The  United  States 
has  approved  for  export  to  South  Africa 
only  unclassified,  nonsensitive  items  for 
use  in  fully  safeguarded  civil  nuclear 
facilities.  No  U.S.  help  was  given  to 
weapons-related  research. 

On  the  other  hand,  by  our  efforts, 
the  South  Africans  have  agreed  to 
follow  the  London  Nuclear  Supplier 
Group's  guidelines  on  nuclear  exports 
and  are  negotiating  with  the  IAEA  [In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency]  for 
the  application  of  safeguards  at  South 
Africa's  semicommercial  enrichment 
plant.  We  strenuously  reject  implications 
that  we  have  an  irresponsible  attitude 
toward  proliferation  of  nuclear  tech- 
nology in  South  Africa. 

I  could  cite  many  more  illustrations 
of  the  climate  of  spurious  allegation  and 
distorted  analysis  in  which  our  current 
discussions  are  taking  place.  The  point, 
however,  is  clear.  The  helicopters  flying 
South  African  soldiers  and  police  are  not 
American.  The  nuclear  power  plants  out- 
side Cape  Town  are  not  American.  Com- 


40 


puters  used  by  security  forces  and  apart- 
heid-enforcing agencies  are  not 
American.  We  have  in  place  strong  and 
effective  policies  that  distance  our  coun- 
try from  such  fields,  sending  both  a 
tangible  and  symbolic  signal  that  is 
clearly  understood  in  South  Africa.  Our 
policies  in  this  regard  are  the  most 
rigorous  of  any  of  its  major  industrial 
trading  partners. 

The  fact  that  we  are  one  of  South 
Africa's  largest  trading  partners  should 
surprise  no  one,  given  the  vast  size  and 
strength  of  our  economy.  But  it  makes 
no  sense  to  argue  that  overall  U.S.- 
South  African  economic  relations  "sup- 
port apartheid"— unless  one  is  also 
prepared  to  argue  that  our  policy  should 
aim  at  the  weakening  and  ultimate  de- 
struction of  that  country's  economy  as  a 
device  to  end  apartheid.  Let  me  be  very 
clear  on  that  point;  we  have  no  intention 
of  waging  economic  warfare  on  South 
Africa  and  its  people.  On  the  contrary, 
we  firmly  believe  that  economic  growth 
has  been— and  will  continue  to  be— a 
principal  engine  of  constructive  change 
in  all  fields  in  that  country. 

The  Debate  Over 
Constructive  Change 

I  stated  a  moment  ago  that  debate  in 
this  country  today  is  not  about  apartheid 
but  about  the  appropriate  policies  to 
hasten  its  demise.  Allow  me  to  qualify 
that  judgment  in  one  important  respect. 
There  is  a  debate  about  the  basic  trend 
of  events  in  South  Africa,  whether  con- 
structive change  is  occurring  there  or 
not.  We  believe  the  record,  though  no 
source  of  complacency  or  satisfaction  on 
our  part,  is  clear:  South  Africa  is  chang- 
ing for  the  better.  It  also  has  a  long  way 
to  go,  and  many  basic  issues  have  not 
yet  been  adequately  addressed. 

This  is  not  the  place  for  a  compre- 
hensive statement  of  the  case.  But  allow 
me  to  make  two  brief  observations  about 
change. 

First,  we  must  recognize  that  the 
essential  precondition  for  progress  is 
change  in  the  hearts  and  minds  of  white 
South  Africans  and  in  the  white  political 
alignments  they  give  rise  to.  Winnie 
Mandela,  the  banned  wife  of  the  im- 
prisoned ANC  [African  National  Con- 
gress] leader,  said  it  best  when  she  told 
ABC's  Ted  Koppel  that  the  Government 
of  South  Africa  holds  in  its  hands  the 
key  to  the  question  of  whether  it  is  too 
late  to  avoid  a  catastrophe,  too  late  for 
constructive  change.  In  our  judgment, 
she  is  correct.  Despite  the  obvious 
limitations  of  change  seen  so  far,  we 
have  witnessed,  over  the  past  3  years, 
the  crossing  of  a  historical  watershed  by 
the  National  Party  government,  which 


has  seen  major  defections  in  its  own 
ranks  as  it  undertakes  reforms.  We  can- 
not afford  in  this  country  to  underesti- 
mate the  significance  of  this  realignment 
in  white  politics,  a  process  which  is  pro- 
ducing an  electorate  and  a  leadership 
committed  to  reform.  Many  factors  have 
played  a  role  in  that  process— including 
our  policies— but  the  principal  pressures 
for  change  are,  and  will  remain, 
internal. 

Second,  it  should  surprise  no  one 
that  wildly  conflicting  claims  are  made 
about  what  is  really  going  on  in  that 
country.  We  are  dealing  with  a  highly 
politicized  and  polarized  situation.  It 
does  not  serve  the  political  interest  of 
white  leaders  to  speak  openly  about  the 
implications  of  specific  reform  steps  or 
to  define  clearly  in  advance  their  current 
vision  of  their  bottom  lines  in  the 
bargaining  that  surely  lies  ahead. 
Similarly,  it  does  not  serve  the  political 
interest  of  black  leaders  to  give  credi- 
bility to  a  reform  process  from  which 
they  have  been  largely  excluded  so  far 
or  to  speak  positively  about  reform 
measures  and  models  that  do  not  yet  of- 
fer them  access  to  the  corridors  of 
political  power.  We  are  witnessing,  in 
short,  an  effort  by  leaders  of  all  races  in 
South  Africa  to  keep  the  faith  with  their 
own  audiences  and  to  hang  onto  their 
constituencies.  Surely,  that  point  will  be 
understood  in  this  House. 

We  in  this  country  have  a  different 
role  and  responsibility.  We  are  only  in- 
directly participants  in  a  vital  political 
process  taking  place  8,000  miles  away. 
It  is  unseemly  for  us  to  add  to  the 
polarization  and  distortions  that  occur 
there.  It  is  also  unseemly  for  us  to  dis- 
miss as  trivial  changes— such  as  the 
repeal  of  laws  on  marriage  and  sex  be- 
tween races— that  were  made  in  this 
country  less  than  20  years  ago. 

In  conclusion,  we  believe  our  policies 
are  responsible  and  effective.  Our  posi- 
tion on  proposed  economic  sanctions 
against  South  Africa  is  but  one  small 
part  of  a  broader  policy  framework  to 
which  this  Administration  remains  com- 
mitted. We  also  remain  open  to  con- 
structive ideas  on  how  we  can  do  better. 
The  case  against  such  sanctions— which 
have  been  opposed  by  every  administra- 
tion for  the  past  20  years— is  stronger 
than  ever  precisely  because  of  what  is 
taking  place  in  South  Africa. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


ASEAN-U.S.  Dialogue 
Held  in  Washington 


The  sixth  annual  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)-U.S.  dialogue  was  held  in 
Washington,  D.C..  April  2-3,  1985. 
Following  are  remarks  made  on  that  oc- 
casion by  Secretary  Shultz  and  Under 
Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  W.  Allen. 
Wallis  and  the  text  of  the  joint  state- 
ment. 


SECRETARY  SHULTZ, 
APR.  2,  1985' 

My  role  is  to  welcome  you,  and  I 
welcome  you.  [Laughter]  But  it  goes  a 
little  further  than  that:  both  as 
Secretary  of  State  and  as  an  individual 
who  in  various  walks  of  life — private 
and  public — has  spent  quite  a  lot  of  time 
in  various  countries  of  ASEAN  and  I'm 
quite  familiar  with  that  part  of  the 
world.  I  think  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
United  States  it's  a  very  important  area. 
And  the  ASEAN  grouping,  as  a  group- 
ing, has  always  struck  me  as  an  in- 
genious and  very  worthwhile  kind  of 
luidertaking. 

So  we're  very  pleased  as  a  govern- 
ment to  have  this  kind  of  opportunity 
for  an  exchange  of  views  as  well  as,  of 
course,  the  annual  dialogue  partners 
meeting  out  in  one  of  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries—I  think  in  Kuala  Lumpur  this 
coming  year. 

There  are  many  aspects  to  the  in- 
terest of  the  United  States  with  the 
ASEAN  countries,  and  they,  of  course, 
range  from  security  concerns — which  we 
support  what  ASEAN  is  doing— and, 
obviously,  economic  relationships.  As  I 
understand  it,  this  meeting  probably  will 
concentrate  on  economic  relationships. 
That's  well  and  good,  because  they  are 
of  tremendous  importance  to  all  of  us. 

I  believe  that  two-way  trade  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  ASEAN 
countries,  taken  as  a  group,  is  on  the 
order  of  $26  billion  now.  It's  increased  in 
the  last  year  by  almost  12%  overall.  It's 
interesting  to  note  that  the  increase  of 
exports  from  the  ASEAN  countries  to 
the  United  States  has  increased  on  the 
order  of  20%.  In  other  words,  the  flow 
from  there  to  here  has  exceeded  in  its 
rate  of  growth  the  flow  in  the  other 
direction. 

I  think  keeping  these  trade  flows  go- 
ing and  promoting  and  maintaining  a 
good  investment  climate  are  very  impor- 
tant to  both  of  us.  On  the  trade  front. 


there's  great  concern  all  over  the  world 
with  the  problem  of  protection,  and  I 
know  whenever  I  go  to  the  ASEAN 
countries,  that  is  what  I  mostly  hear 
about — protection  in  the  United  States. 

I  have  managed  to  say,  in  the  light 
of  the  various  trade  figures,  that  if  we 
are  a  protectionist  country,  we're  doing 
a  lousy  job  of  it,  given  our  trade  im- 
balance and  the  increases  even  in  prod- 
ucts like  textiles  where  there  is  a 
worldwide  quota  system.  I  might  say 
that  that  system  is  not  my  idea  of  how 
to  run  economies,  but  there  it  is;  it's 
been  constructed  by  political  pressures 
over  the  years  in  all  countries. 

But,  at  any  rate,  we  fight  protection 
very  hard  here,  and  it  is  tough  when  you 
have  a  trade  picture  like  the  one  that  we 
have.  But  it  will  not  diminish  our  efforts 
to  keep  our  markets  open;  first  and 
foremost  because  we  think  that  serves 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  and, 
second,  because  it  serves  our  interests 
indirectly  by  contributing  to  an  open 
trading  system  in  the  world. 

I  believe  that  you,  from  the  ASEAN 
countries,  have  a  challenge  to  face  not 
only  in  examining  the  ways  in  which  our 
market  has  its  deficiencies  from  your 
point  of  view  in  letting  us  know  about 
that  but  examine  your  market  and  what 
sort  of  restrictions  you  place  on  the  im- 
port of  goods  and  ask  yourself  whether 
that  is  in  your  long-run  interests.  I 
think,  basically,  the  answer  is  no, 
although  it  is  certainly  the  case  in  coun- 
tries that  are  thought  of  as  developing 
countries.  Not  all  the  ASEAN  countries 
really  can  be  thought  of  that  way 
anymore. 

At  any  rate,  there  certainly  are 
reasons  why  you  want  to  provide  a  way 
in  which  an  industry  may  build  itself  up, 
but  you  don't  want  to  build  in  inefficien- 
cies. 

The  investment  climate  is  extremely 
important  to  all  of  us.  I  don't  mean  by 
that  to  focus  necessarily  on  foreign  in- 
vestment to  a  country  but  just  on  invest- 
ment as  such,  which  involves  an  attitude 
toward  ownership,  profitability,  enter- 
prise. It  seems  to  me  it  has  to  start  with 
what  your  attitudes  are  toward  invest- 
ment by  your  own  nationals  and  then,  by 
extension,  if  you  believe  in  the  principle 
of  no  differentiation  between  the  treat- 
ment of  investment  from  whatever 
source,  then  that  would  apply  to  others 
as  well. 


I  know  that  all  of  these  issues  are 
ones  that  you'll  be  exploring,  and  my 
main  object  here  is  to  welcome  you  and 
to  say  how  important  I  think  this  whole 
relationship  is.  It's  not  only  important 
now,  but  I  think  it  gives  every  reason  to 
expect  that  it  will  be  more  important  as 
the  years  unfold,  and  the  degree  to 
which  that's  so  will  be  a  reflection  of 
how  well  we  all  manage  it.  And  so  a 
di.scussion  of  all  these  issues  in  a  group 
like  this  is,  I  think,  something  to  be 
welcomed,  to  be  taken  very  seriously. 

I  expect  all  of  you  to  work  very  hard 
in  this  conference,  24-hours-a-day,  7 
days-a-week  approach  but  have  a  little 
fun  as  well.  Thanks  very  much  for  being 
here.  I  look  forward  to  seeing  you  not 
only  here  but  out  in  the  region. 


UNDER  SECRETARY  WALLIS, 
APR.  2,  1985 

At  the  outset,  let  me  extend  again  the 
warmest  of  welcomes  to  you,  my  col- 
leagues, and  your  delegations.  I  hope 
you  find  the  spring  weather  and  am- 
bience in  Washington  agreeable,  not  on- 
ly in  the  personal  sense  but  also  to  the 
fulfillment  of  the  aims  of  our  joint 
dialogue. 

I  warmly  recall  the  fine  hospitality 
extended  to  me  and  the  U.S.  delegation 
during  our  last  session  in  Manila  in 
December  1983.  I  only  hope  that  we  can, 
in  some  measure,  reciprocate  the  fine 
hospitality  and  friendliness  shown  us 
then  by  the  Government  of  the  Philip- 
pines. And  here  I  would  like  to  follow  a 
fine  Southeast  Asian  practice  by 
apologizing  in  advance  for  any  shortcom- 
ings relating  to  the  arrangements  for 
this  conference  and  for  perhaps  the  in- 
evitable slip-ups  which  may  occur.  I 
trust,  however,  that  we  can  exchange 
views  on  the  important  economic  mat- 
ters of  concern  to  our  nations  in  a 
suitable  and  congenial  atmosphere  here 
in  Washington. 

As  Secretary  Shultz  noted,  it  gives 
us  special  pleasure  to  welcome  Brunei 
Darussalam  and  its  chief  delegate.  His 
Excellency  Lim  Jock  Seng,  to  its  first 
dialogue  in  the  United  States. 

Before  I  give  you  my  views  on  our 
objectives  for  this  sixth  ASEAN-U.S. 
dialogue,  I  would  like  to  set  the  scene 
briefly  and  say  a  few  words  about  the 
dialogue  process.  To  paraphrase  a 
popular  American  cigarette  advertise- 
ment, "We've  come  a  long  way,  ladies 
and  gentlemen." 

Total  ASEAN-U.S.  trade  is  at  an  all- 
time  high.  Our  most  recent  data  show  a 
two-way  volume  of  $26.3  billion  for 


June  1985 


41 


EAST  ASIA 


1984,  an  increase  of  more  than  $2.7 
l)i!lion  over  1983  and  more  than  $4.8 
billion  over  1982.  I  note,  however,  that 
all  of  this  increase  has  come  in  one 
direction.  ASEAN  purchases  from  the 
United  States  were  smaller  in  1984  than 
they  were  in  1982,  while  ASEAN  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  grew  by  $5 
billion.  As  noted  by  Secretary  Shultz, 
such  export  growth  is  hardly  an  indica- 
tion of  a  well-protected  U.S.  market.  Ob- 
viously, however,  the  United  States  can 
do  more  in  the  ASEAN  marketplace. 

The  numbers  on  recent  U.S.  invest- 
ment flows  to  ASEAN  are  equally 
dramatic.  U.S.  investment  in  ASEAN  by 
the  end  of  1983  totaled  $8  billion,  almost 
doubling  in  4  years.  These  data 
underscore  that  our  economies  are  more 
interdependent  than  ever  and  that  skill 
and  dialogue  are  needed  to  manage  this 
burgeoning  economic  relationship.  In  the 
coming  days,  we  will  discuss  important 
aspects  of  this  relationship  in  greater 
detail. 

With  regard  to  the  dialogue  process, 
I  want  to  reaffirm  the  commitment  of 
my  government  to  it.  We  must, 
however,  endeavor  to  improve  the  proc- 
ess, and  we  are  committed  to  working 
closely  with  you  toward  this  end.  We 
will  have  some  time  later  this  morning 
to  discuss  what  changes  we  might  make. 
There  was  a  distinctly  different  tone  to 
our  proceedings  in  Manila  from  previous 
dialogues,  with  a  new  emphasis  on  the 
mutuality  of  our  objectives  of  economic 
progress  through  more  open  markets 
and  private  initiative.  We  welcome  this 
emphasis. 

At  the  ASEAN  postministerial  con- 
sultations last  July,  Secretary  Shultz 
cited  the  challenge  of  economic  develop- 
ment facing  all  members  of  the  interna- 
tional community.  He  commented  that 
ASEAN  has  made  economic  develop- 
ment a  major  goal,  and  this  has  become 
a  central  part  of  the  U.S. -ASEAN  rela- 
tionship. And,  according  to  Secretary 
Shultz,  there  must  be  a  clear  realization 
that  we  are  all  part  of  a  world  economy. 
Consequently,  our  efforts  must  extend 
beyond  the  confines  of  the  U.S. -ASEAN 
relationship. 

This  brings  me  to  my  government's 
objectives  for  this,  the  sixth  in  our  series 
of  economic  dialogues. 

We  want  to  reinforce  our  mutual 
recognition  of  the  centrality  of  the 
private  sector  in  our  economic  relation- 
ship and  the  appropriate  role  of  govern- 
ments. The  dynamism  in  ASEAN-U.S. 
trade  which  I  referred  to  is  a  purely 
[iragmatic,  capitalist  economic 
phenomenon.  We  ignore  at  our  peril  the 
power  of  the  marketplace,  and  I  would 


submit  that  it  is  the  function  of  govern- 
ment to  facilitate  trade  and  to  promote 
private  sector  trade,  capital  flows,  and 
investment  to  the  fullest  extent  possible. 

At  the  same  time,  governments 
must  eschew  distortionist  policies,  tariff 
and  nontariff  barriers,  and  other 
obstructions  to  private  sector  relation- 
ships. The  Reagan  Administration  has 
repeatedly  affirmed  its  adherence  to  an 
open  global  trading  system.  Protec- 
tionist forces  must  be  stemmed.  As 
Secretary  Shultz  told  your  ministers  last 
July,  "We  do  face  protectionist  pressure, 
and  occasionally  we  are  forced  to  limit 
the  growth  of  imports  of  some  products. 
I  note  with  pride,  however,  that  the 
U.S.  economy  is  a  genuinely  open  one, 
and  this  openness  is  of  great  benefit  to 
developing  countries."  I  reaffirm  the 
Secretary's  statement. 

The  U.S.  government  will  continue 
to  do  its  best  to  restrain  protectionism 
and  to  eliminate  distortions  which 
threaten  free  and  equitable  trade.  Yet, 
at  the  same  time,  we  look  to  other 
governments  also  to  calculate  the  cost  of 
statist  policies,  to  adopt  measures  which 
improve  the  climate  for  free  trade  in 
goods  and  services,  and  to  encourage 
the  free  flow  of  capital  and  mutually 
beneficial  private  investment. 

Our  second  objective  is  to  continue 
working  on  the  "micro"  problems  which 
affect  the  ASEAN-U.S.  economic  rela- 
tionship. We  are  all  aware  of  specific, 
often  small,  problems  in  discrete  sectors 
of  economic  life  and  trade  between  our 
countries.  During  this  dialogue,  I  hope 
we  can  make  progress  on  them,  or  at 
least  increase  our  common  understand- 
ing of  the  objective  factors  pertaining  to 
them.  We  will  finish  our  talks  with  some 
honest  disagreements,  and  I  would  not 
want  to  conceal  or  minimize  them. 
Nevertheless,  we  must  approach  real 
and  perceived  problems  with  pragma- 
tism, determination,  and  a  sense  of 
negotiation  and  accommodation,  as 
Secretary  Shultz  has  said. 

Another  major  objective  is  to  hear 
your  views  on  matters  that  will  be 
discussed  at  the  economic  summit  in 
Bonn  in  May.  You  will  recall  that  before 
last  year's  London  summit,  Foreign 
Minister  Mochtar — who  was  then  chair- 
man of  the  ASEAN  standing  commit- 
tee— wrote  Secretary  Shultz  about  the 
special  concerns  of  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries. You  may  know  that  I  am  one  of 
the  "sherpas"  charged  with  organizing 
these  annual  summit  meetings.  You, 
therefore,  have  a  good  opportunity  in 
our  present  deliberations  to  give  me 
your  dettiiled  views  which  I  can  then  fac- 
tor into  the  Bonn  summit  process. 


Finally,  we  hope  to  continue  to  im- 
prove both  the  form  and  content  of  our 
dialogue.  In  recent  weeks,  together  we 
have  made  a  determined  effort  to  refine 
our  conference  agenda  to  meet  this  ob- 
jective, and  I  believe  we  have  achieved  a 
sensible  accommodation  for  this  round 
of  talks.  We  will  concentrate  on  the 
overriding  economic  factors  and 
challenges  facing  our  nations — the  im- 
pact of  the  global  economic  situation  and 
the  need  to  move  toward  new  under- 
standings and  improved  trading  ar- 
rangements. Let's  talk  tomorrow  about 
ways  to  make  the  seventh  dialogue  even 
more  fruitful. 

Let  me  now  touch  for  a  moment  on 
a  number  of  developments  of  common 
interest  since  our  last  dialogue  in 
December  1983  and  the  ASEAN 
postministerial  consultations  in  July  of 
last  year.  We  will  be  hearing  more  about 
some  of  these  matters  in  coming  days, 
but  I  want  to  highlight  them  for  you. 

First,  the  U.S.  Congress  approved 
the  Trade  and  Tariff  Act  of  1984  in 
early  October  of  last  year.  We  believe 
the  renewal  of  the  U.S.  generalized 
system  of  preferences  (GSP)  under  the 
act  through  mid- 1993  is  of  tremendous 
benefit  and  importance  to  ASEAN.  We 
want  to  work  with  you  to  continue  to 
improve  GSP  utilization  and  on  im- 
plementation of  other  provisions  of  this 
law. 

Also,  pursuant  to  the  Trade  and 
Tariff  Act,  the  Administration  is  review- 
ing the  GSP  system  in  light  of  a  number 
of  factors  in  beneficiary  countries.  One 
is  market  access,  another  is  intellectual 
property  protection,  and  a  third  provi- 
sion is  respect  for  the  basic  rights  of 
workers. 

Another  significant  development  has 
been  the  negotiated  resolution  in  almost 
all  of  the  textile  countervailing  duty 
cases  instituted  last  August.  With 
regard  to  the  process,  I  wish  to  point 
out  that  my  government  has  no  choice 
but  to  follow  the  provisions  of  U.S.  law. 
While  some  of  the  negotiated  set- 
tlements may  not  have  pleased  your 
manufacturers  or  our  manufacturers, 
the  agreements  achieved  are  consistent 
with  our  mutual  objective  of  reducing 
distortions  to  trade  and  promoting  the 
structural  change  and  evolution  which 
are  necessary  to  maintain  vigorous  and 
competitive  business. 

A  fourth  development  has  been  the 
process  which  has  led  to  this  week's 
meetings  in  Kuala  Lumpur  which 
hopefully  will  point  toward  a  construc- 
tive renegotiation  of  the  International 
Natural  Rubber  Agreement.  I  want  you 
to  know  that  we  have  worked  hard  at 


42 


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EAST  ASIA 


creating  the  appropriate  climate  for 
renegotiation  of  this  oommodity  agree- 
ment which,  as  you  know,  is  predicated 
on  satisfactory  implementation  of  the 
provisions  of  the  existing  agreement. 
We  want  to  cooperate  with  ASEAN  rub- 
ber producers  in  this  joint  endeavor,  and 
my  government  sincerely  hopes  the 
INRO  Council  deliberations  in  Kuala 
Lumpur  will  be  successful. 

And  lastly,  the  new  U.S. -ASEAN 
Center  for  Technology  Exchange  for- 
mally came  into  being  in  November. 
Start-up  contributions  have  been  made 
by  two  U.S.  Government  agencies — the 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  and  the  Overseas  Private  Invest- 
ment Corporation  (OPIC).  Highly  suc- 
cessful initial  programs  have  thus  far 
been  held  in  Kuala  Lumpur  and  Manila. 
The  formation  of  national  steering 
groups  proceeds,  fully  involving  private 
sector  representatives  in  each  ASEAN 
country  as  well  as  U.S.  business  people. 
This  is  an  important  initiative.  We  not 
only  wish  it  well,  but  we  hope  our 
governments — individually  and  collec- 
tively— will  give  Technology  Exchange 
Center  programs  the  importance  and 
support  they  so  rightly  deserve. 

Before  we  proceed  to  the  next  item 
on  today's  agenda,  I  wish  to  respond  to 
some  of  the  things  we  have  been  hearing 
from  ASEAN  sources  about  unilaterally 
"rewriting  the  rules  of  the  game"  insofar 
as  international  trade  is  concerned. 
Secretary  Shultz,  at  last  year's 
postministerial  consultations,  responded 
at  length  to  statements — yes,  allega- 
tions—that the  United  States  is 
unilaterally  imposing  its  will  on  the  in- 
ternational trading  system.  Nothing 
could  be  further  from  the  truth.  I  have 
said  earlier  that  we  seek  pragmatic  and 
negotiated  solutions  to  the  problems  fac- 
ing us.  Ambassador  Brock  [U.S.  trade 
representative]  and  other  U.S.  decision- 
makers have  worked  very  hard  at  put- 
ting this  policy  into  practice.  And  it  is 
precisely  for  this  reason  that  the  Reagan 
Administration  has  consistently  ad- 
vocated a  new  round  of  multilateral 
trade  negotiations  in  which  all  countries 
could  join  to  define  and  refine  the  rules 
by  which  international  trade  is  con- 
ducted. It  is  becoming  urgent  to  move 
forward  with  this  process,  and  I  hope 
that  our  talks  this  week  will  be  able  to 
advance  this  important  objective. 

In  conclusion,  I  wish  once  again  to 
welcome  you  to  Washington.  I  eagerly 
look  forward  to  our  detailed  discussions 
and  to  what  you  have  to  say.  We  take 
consultations  seriously,  and  I  want  again 
to  assure  you  of  our  best  efforts  to  im- 
prove their  usefulness  to  both  ASEAN 
and  to  the  United  States. 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  3,  1985 

The  si.xth  meeting  of  the  ASEAN-U.S. 
dialogue  took  place  in  Washington,  D.C., 
April  2  and  3,  1985,  in  the  Department 
of  State. 

The  ASEAN  delegations  were  led  by 
Ambassador  Lim  Jock  Seng,  Director 
General,  ASEAN  National  Secretariat, 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Brunei 
Darussalam;  Ambassador  Adiwoso 
Abubakar,  Director  General,  ASEAN 
National  Secretariat,  Ministry  of 
P'oreign  Affairs,  Indonesia;  Ambassador 
Mohamad  Yusof  Bin  Hitam,  Director 
General,  ASEAN  National  Secretariat, 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Malaysia; 
Minister  Vicente  B.  Valdepenas,  Jr., 
Director  General.  Philippine  National 
Economic  and  Development  Authority 
and  Ambassador  Benjamin  T. 
Romualdez,  Ambassador  of  the  Philip- 
pines to  the  United  States,  as 
cochairmen;  Ambassador  Tan  Keng  Jin, 
Director,  ASEAN  National  Secretariat, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Singapore; 
and  Ambassador  Kasem  S.  Kasemsri, 
Ambassador  of  Thailand  to  the  United 
States.  Minister  Valdepenas  was  the 
ASEAN  spokesman.  Ambassador  Phan 
Wannamethee,  ASEAN  Secretary 
General,  and  a  member  of  his  staff 
represented  the  ASEAN  Secretariat. 
Dato  Wan  Sidek  Bin  Haji  Wan  Abdul 
Rahman,  Chairman,  ASEAN  Committee 
on  Culture  and  Information,  Mr.  Salmon 
Padmanegara,  Chairman,  ASEAN  Com- 
mittee on  Food,  Agriculture  and 
Forestry,  Datuk  Ishak  Bin  Tadin,  Chair- 
man of  the  ASEAN  Committee  on 
Transport  and  Communications, 
Edgardo  L.  Tordesillas,  Chairman, 
ASEAN  Committee  on  Industry, 
Minerals,  and  Energy,  and  Ridzwan 
Dzafir,  Chairman,  ASEAN  Committee 
on  Trade  and  Tourism,  and  Mr.  Kasem 
Snidvongs,  a  representative  of  the 
Chairman  of  the  ASEAN  Committee  on 
Science  and  Technology,  also  par- 
ticipated. Ambassador  Mohamad  Yusof 
Bin  Hitam  was  also  present  as  Chairman 
of  the  ASEAN  Committee  on  Social 
Development. 

The  U.S.  delegation  was  led  by  W. 
Allen  Wallis,  Under  Secretary  of  State 
for  Economic  Affairs.  Richard  Howarth, 
Acting  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs,  was 
deputy  head  of  the  U.S.  delegation. 

The  U.S.  delegation  was  made  up  of 
representatives  of  the  Departments  of 
State,  Commerce,  Treasury,  Labor,  and 
Agriculture;  the  Office  of  the  U.S.  Trade 
Representative;  AID;  the  Food  and 
Drug  Administration;  and  OPIC. 


The  dialogue  was  opened  by 
Secretary  of  State  George  Shultz  who, 
in  his  openitig  remarks,  stressed  the  im- 
portance the  United  States  attaches  to 
the  countries  of  ASEAN  and  the  value 
of  the  dialogue  process.  In  his  opening 
statement.  Under  Secretary  Wallis  reaf- 
firmed the  increasingly  close  and  friend- 
ly ties  between  the  United  Stales  and 
ASEAN.  In  his  remarks,  Mr.  Wallis 
noted  the  important  U.S.  objectives  for 
the  dialogue  are  (a)  to  reinforce  our 
mutual  recognition  of  the  central  role  of 
the  private  sector  in  our  economic  rela- 
tionship and  the  appropriate  role  of 
governments,  (b)  to  continue  working  on 
the  microeconomic  problems  which  af- 
fect the  ASEAN-U.S.  relationship,  and 
(c)  to  hear  ASEAN's  views  on  major  in- 
ternational economic  issues  and  on  mat- 
ters that  will  be  discussed  at  the 
economic  summit  in  Bonn  in  May. 

Minister  Valdepenas,  as  the  ASEAN 
spokesman,  welcomed  the  holding  of  the 
sixth  dialogue  as  an  opportunity  for  both 
the  United  States  and  ASEAN'to 
restate  their  common  objectives,  to 
review  issues  of  mutual  concern,  and  to 
evolve  workable  approaches  and  solu- 
tions to  questions  of  mutual  interest.  He 
conveyed  his  hope  that  the  dialogue 
would  further  strengthen  the  close  and 
special  partnership  between  ASEAN 
and  the  United  States  particularly  in  the 
areas  of  trade,  investment,  and  develop- 
ment cooperation.  He  expressed  the 
serious  concern  of  ASEAN  over  a 
resurgence  of  protectionism  in  the  in- 
dustrialized countries.  He  stressed  that 
in  launching  the  new  round  of  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations,  the 
highest  priority  should  be  given  to  the 
improvement  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries' access  to  the  markets  of  the 
developed  countries. 

Both  sides  noted  with  satisfaction 
the  progress  of  the  ASEAN-U.S. 
dialogue  as  evidenced  by  the  record 
levels  of  trade  and  investment  flows  be- 
tween the  two  regions  and  by  the 
meeting's  focus  on  these  most  important 
issues.  It  was  agreed  that  the  dialogue 
provides  an  appropriate  forum  for 
discussion  of  remaining  trade  related 
problems.  There  was  reference  to  the 
excellent  experience  with  cooperative 
projects  and  programs  in  many  fields  of 
public  and  private  endeavor  and  to  the 
mutual  intention  of  seeking  new  ap- 
proaches to  activities  of  mutual  benefit 
to  both  sides. 

During  the  opening  session,  the 
ASEAN  and  U.S.  delegations  reviewed 
the  progress  of  the  dialogues.  Both  sides 
agreed  that  this  has  been  a  productive 
process  and  that  future  dialogues  could 


June  1985 


43 


EAST  ASIA 


be  further  improved  by  more  frequent 
interim  consultations. 

International  Economic  Issues 

There  v/as  a  wide-ranging  discussion  of 
the  issues  facing  the  world  economy. 
Particular  reference  was  made  to  the 
importance  of  a  strong  and  open  U.S. 
economy  in  order  to  maintain  the  pros- 
perity and  the  growth  of  the  world 
trading  system,  including  the  ASEAN 
area.  The  United  States  welcomed  the 
continuing  vigorous  growth  of  the 
ASEAN  economies,  noting  that  the 
leading  role  of  their  private  sectors  was 
a  major  impetus  to  their  high  growth 
rate. 

The  ASEAN  side  reassured  the  U.S. 
side  that  the  ASEAN  states  have  always 
taken  a  positive  attitude  in  searching  for 
a  healthy  international  political  and 
economic  environment.  However,  the 
ASEAN  delegations  expressed  concern 
over  market  access  for  the  exports  of 
ASEAN,  declining  commodity  prices, 
and  the  persistent  problem  of  debt. 
There  was  a  consensus  that  ASEAN  and 
the  United  States  could  address  these  in 
the  spirit  of  mutual  cooperation. 

Under  Secretary  Wallis  outlined 
what  are  to  be  the  main  issues  of  the 
economic  summit  in  Bonn  in  May  and 
asked  about  ASEAN  concerns  on  these 
issues.  He  said  that  the  ASEAN 
memorandum  on  the  summit  would 
prove  useful  in  preparations;  since  it  has 
been  sent  to  all  summit  participants,  it 
would  undoubtedly  serve  to  focus  discus- 
sion in  Bonn  on  its  contents. 

International  Trade  Issues 

The  U.S.  delegation  was  chaired  by 
Doral  Cooper,  Assistant  U.S.  Trade 
Representative,  for  this  agenda  item. 
She  described  the  major  elements  of  the 
U.S.  Trade  and  Tariff  Act  of  1984, 
which  included  the  extension  of  the  U.S. 
generalized  system  of  preferences  until 
1993.  While  expressing  gratification  at 
the  new  U.S.  GSP  authority,  ASEAN's 
representatives  called  attention  to 
various  parts  of  the  new  act  which  could 
have  unsettling  effects  upon  their  coun- 
tries' trade  and  development  efforts.  In 
particular,  they  referred  to  antidumping 
and  countervailing  duty  laws,  possible 
U.S.  retaliation  against  foreign  trade 
barriers,  and  the  uncertainty  surround- 
ing new  conditions  attached  to  GSP 
eligibility. 

The  U.S.  delegation  noted  that  most 
of  the  provisions  that  ASEAN  would 
have  found  objectionable  were  removed 
from  the  act  before  its  passage  and  that 


the  United  States  would  administer  the 
act  in  an  equitable  and  transparent  man- 
ner. It  was  agreed  that  consultations 
between  the  U.S.  Government  and  the 
Economic  Coordination  Committee  of 
the  ASEAN  Washington  committee 
would  facilitate  understanding  of  the 
act's  technical  provisions  and  of  their 
repercussions  on  ASEAN-U.S.  trade. 

Both  sides  noted  their  continued 
strong  support  for  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  and  its 
important  role  in  expanding  the  world 
trading  system  through  tariff  reductions 
and  removal  of  other  trade  barriers. 
They  welcomed  a  new  round  of 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  at  an  ap- 
propriate, early  date  and  agreed  on  the 
need  to  fulfill  the  commitments  of  the 
Tokyo  Round  and  the  1983  GATT  work 
program.  ASEAN  emphasized  the  con- 
tinued need  for  special  and  differential 
treatment  for  developing  countries  in 
future  GATT  negotiations,  while  the 
United  States  stressed  the  need  to  move 
more  toward  reciprocal  negotiations  on 
both  goods  and  services.  Recent 
developments  with  respect  to  the  GATT 
subsidies  code  and  the  procurement  code 
were  reviewed. 

With  regard  to  textiles,  the  ASEAN 
side  asked  for  a  modification  of  U.S.  ac- 
tions which  tend  to  affect  small  and 
medium  suppliers.  The  U.S.  delegation 
pointed  to  the  growth  of  textile  and  ap- 
parel exports  from  ASEAN  to  the 
United  States  to  $1.4  billion  in  1984,  an 
increase  of  74%  over  1983,  as  the  best 
indication  of  the  openness  of  the  U.S. 
market.  With  respect  to  problems  with 
category  classification,  noted  by 
ASEAN,  the  U.S.  side  said  they  will 
tend  to  disappear  as  the  United  States 
implements  the  program  of  tariff  har- 
monization. The  ASEAN  governments 
singled  out  the  amount  of  time  and 
resources  they  expended  in  defending 
themselves  against  the  recent  counter- 
vailing duty  petitions,  but  noted  that  the 
cases  were  resolved  in  an  amicable  man- 
ner. The  U.S.  side  noted  the  accession  to 
the  GATT  subsidies  code  of  some  of  the 
ASEAN  countries.  While  acknowledging 
the  rapid  growth  of  textile  and  garment 
exports  from  ASEAN  to  the  United 
States,  the  ASEAN  representatives 
noted  their  still  small  share  of  the  total 
U.S.  textile  market,  the  strict  quotas 
now  being  enforced  against  many  of 
their  apparel  products,  and  pending  U.S. 
legislation  which  would  establish  global 
quotas. 

ASEAN  looked  to  the  renegotiation 
of  the  MFA  by  1986  to  achieve  improved 
access  by  developing  country  suppliers, 
particularly  by  small  or  medium  scale 


exporters  as  well  as  new  entrants,  to  all 
advanced  country  markets.  In  response, 
the  U.S.  delegation  expressed  its  ap- 
preciation for  the  ASEAN  views  and 
noted  that  other  suppliers  have  similar 
views. 

The  ASEAN  governments  expressed 
particular  interest  in  U.S.  policies  with 
respect  to  key  commodities,  such  as  tin, 
sugar,  and  rubber,  from  which  some 
ASEAN  countries  earn  an  important 
share  of  their  export  earnings. 

ASEAN  expressed  support  for  the 
Tropical  Timber  Agreement,  noting  two 
members  had  already  signed,  and  asked 
what  the  United  States  intended  to  do. 
The  U.S.  side  said  it  was  currently 
studying  the  agreement  and  hoped  to 
make  a  decision  on  U.S.  entry  within  a 
short  time  (i.e.,  a  few  more  weeks). 
ASEAN  indicated  interest  in  an  interna- 
tional natural  rubber  agreement  and 
noted  the  U.S.  concern  that  the  existing 
agreement  be  fully  implemented  in  order 
to  proceed  with  renegotiation  now 
scheduled  to  begin  in  Geneva  on 
April  22nd.  In  keeping  with  the 
U.S. -ASEAN  memorandum  of  under- 
standing concerning  disposals  of  surplus 
tin  from  the  U.S.  national  defense  stock- 
pile, anticipated  disposal  levels  for 
calendar  year  1985  and  world  market 
conditions  were  discussed.  Both  sides 
recognized  that  the  memorandum  of 
understanding  is  a  continuing  document 
and  remains  in  effect.  The  ASEAN  side 
expressed  the  strong  hope  that  tin  dis- 
posals could  be  kept  within  the  level 
described  in  the  memorandum  of  under- 
standing and  stressed  the  view  that 
there  be  no  market  disruption  from 
these  disposals.  The  U.S.  side  reaffirmed 
that  the  spirit  underlying  the  memo- 
randum of  understanding  and  the 
consultative  process  provided  therein 
continue  to  guide  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  ASEAN  countries 
on  this  important  matter.  ASEAN  ex- 
plained its  desire  to  serve  as  a  catalyst 
for  members'  interest  in  supporting  re- 
search and  development  on  tin.  The 
United  States  noted  that  its  private  sec- 
tor has  the  primary  role  in  research  and 
development,  but  the  U.S.  Government 
would  be  happy  to  act  as  a  catalyst  or 
channel  of  communication.  The  United 
States  mentioned  the  interest  of  the  Na- 
tional Science  Foundation  in  basic  re- 
search; applied  research  is  clearly  a 
private  sector  responsibility,  but  the 
U.S.  Government  will  facilitate  contacts 
where  appropriate. 

The  U.S.  delegation  pointed  to  the 
importance  of  intellectual  property  pro- 
tection to  increased  trade  and  invest- 
ment. It  noted  recent  and  proposed  U.S. 


44 


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EAST  ASIA 


legislation  in  the  area  of  copyrights, 
patents,  and  trademarks.  Noting  that  in- 
dustrial production  of  all  kinds  is  shift- 
ing to  the  developing  world,  the  U.S. 
delegation  emphasized  that  the  protec- 
tion of  intellectual  property  takes  on 
more  importance  to  such  economies.  The 
ASEAN  delegations  described  measures 
their  governments  were  taking  to  ensure 
effective  protection  of  intellectual  prop- 
erty rights. 

Briefings  were  also  provided  by  U.S. 
Government  experts  on  several  other 
trade  issues  raised  by  ASEAN.  These 
topics  included  U.S.  Food  and  Drug  Ad- 
ministration (FDA)  regulations  and  the 
Buy  America  Act.  ASEAN  expressed 
concern  at  the  potential  for  using  health 
measures  as  protectionist  devices. 

ASEAN  expressed  its  concern  on 
some  shipping  issues,  particularly  on 
freight  rate  negotiations  and  controlled 
carrier  legislation.  Both  issues  have  re- 
mained unresolved  for  a  long  time  and 
adversely  affect  the  harmonious  trade 
relations  between  ASEAN  countries  and 
the  United  States.  The  U.S.  side  replied 
that  the  U.S.  Administration  is  still  ex- 
ploring ways  in  which  ASEAN  shipping 
could  be  exempted  from  current  laws, 
but  there  appears  to  be  little  likelihood 
of  legislative  change.  In  the  meantime, 
there  are  unilateral  measures  which 
governments  can  take  to  change  the 
coverage  of  the  Controlled  Carrier  Act. 

It  was  noted  that  the  book  value 
U.S.  investment  in  ASEAN  had  doubled 
from  1979  to  1983,  reaching  $7.9  billion 
at  the  end  of  that  year.  The  U.S.  dele- 
gation stressed  the  basically  favorable 
and  cooperative  climate  for  foreign  in- 
vestment in  ASEAN  countries,  of  which 
the  growth  of  U.S.  investment  was  a 
major  indicator. 

There  was  discussion  of  some  of  the 
factors  that  may  discourage  the  in- 
vestors, and  ASEAN  stated  that  cog- 
nizant of  the  need  for  a  healthy  climate 
for  investment,  its  members  have  taken 
measures  to  improve  general  business 
conditions  by  exerting  continued  efforts 
at  simplifying  government  regulations  as 
well  as  improving  the  structure  of  in- 
vestment. ASEAN  welcomed  the  strides 
made  in  the  field  of  investment  coopera- 
tion between  ASEAN  and  the  United 
States  but,  realizing  the  vast  resources 
of  the  United  States,  stressed  the  need 
for  more  vigorous  cooperation  in  order 
to  realize  the  industrial  development 
goals  and  objectives  of  ASEAN.  In  this 
regard,  ASEAN  suggested  a  number  of 
promotional  activities  for  U.S.  con- 
sideration. 


The  United  States  expressed  in- 
terest in  the  various  ASEAN  industrial 
schemes  which  have  been  established 
and  suggested  further  discussion  on  how 
the  U.S.  private  sector  can  best  be  in- 
formed of  investment  opportunities.  The 
United  States  also  stressed  the  impor- 
tance of  investment  agreements  and  na- 
tional treatment  provisions  therein  in  at- 
tracting U.S.  investment. 

Development  Cooperation 

Detailed  discussion  of  ongoing  and  new 
cooperative  projects  took  place  in  a 
separate  working  group  on  April  2, 
under  the  joint  chairmanship  of  Mr. 
David  N.  Merrill,  Director,  Office  of 
East  Asian  Affairs  of  the  U.S.  Agency 
for  International  Development,  and  Mr. 
Romualdo  A.  Ong,  Director  General  of 
ASEAN-Philippines.  The  working  group 
provided  an  opportunity  for  detailed 
review  of  ongoing  ASEAN-U.S.  develop- 
ment projects  in  several  fields. 

ASEAN  introduced  a  number  of 
new  or  renewed  project  proposals.  The 
proposals  covered  a  broad  range  of 
topics,  including  a  study  of  folk  art  in 
ASEAN  countries,  studies  on  drug  prob- 
lems, additional  support  for  the  Agri- 
cultural Development  Planning  Center, 
the  extension  of  the  PLANTI  project, 
and  a  study  of  teacher  education  institu- 
tions. Over  the  next  several  months, 
U.S.  Government  agencies  will  work 
with  appropriate  ASEAN  committees  to 
review  each  of  the  proposals.  Special 
determinations  will  then  be  made  con- 
cerning project  details  and  funding 
possibilities. 

The  working  group  approved,  in 
principle,  projects  in  the  fields  of 
energy,  public  health,  agriculture, 
human  resource  development,  narcotics 
control,  research,  and  small  and  medium 
business  support.  The  United  States 
agreed  to  ASEAN  proposals  in  the  area 
of  culture  and  information,  specifically 
some  COCI  projects  to  undertake  com- 
parative studies  in  folk  arts  and  indige- 
nous architecture  in  ASEAN  countries, 
and  in  this  regard  to  establish  contact 
between  the  relevant  ASEAN  body  and 
the  Smithsonian  Institution.  The  U.S. 
delegation  further  agreed  to  examine 
areas  of  assistance  and  cooperation  in 
the  field  of  urban  redevelopment  and 
conservation  of  historic  sites.  U.S.  as- 
sistance commitments  by  AID  to 
ASEAN  under  the  regional  cooperative 
development  program  now  total  $23.8 
million,  in  addition  to  substantial 
amounts  of  bilateral  and  multilateral  aid 
and  many  cooperative  ventures  with 
ASEAN. 


ASEAN  welcomed  the  U.S.  an- 
nouncement that  AID  expects  to  ap- 
prove a  marine  sciences  project  and  a 
third  energy  project  within  the  next  2  to 
3  months  in  response  to  ASEAN  re- 
quests made  at  the  fifth  ASEAN-U.S. 
dialogue. 

ASEAN-U.S.  Business  Council 

Regular  participation  by  the  business 
communities  in  the  dialogues  receive  the 
blessing  of  the  fiftii  dialogue  in  Manila  in 
December  1983.  Thus  both  sides  wel- 
comed the  special  presentation  ma<le  by 
-Mr.  William  E.  Tucker,  chairman  of  the 
U.S.  section,  on  behalf  of  the  ASEAN- 
U.S.  Business  Council  (AUSBC). 
ASEAN  and  U.S.  Government  repre- 
sentatives were  also  briefed  on  the  new 
U.S.-ASEAN  Center  for  Technology  Ex- 
change, which  inter  alia  will  assist  in 
gaining  access  to  capital  markets.  The 
center  was  especially  welcomed  by  both 
delegations  as  being  responsive  to 
ASEAN's  request  for  assistance  to  the 
small  business  sector.  The  AUSBC  rep- 
resentatives also  briefed  the  delegates 
on  the  business  community's  concerns 
about  laws  which  distort  investment  and 
the  failure  of  many  governments  to  pro- 
vide national  treatment  to  foreign  in- 
vestors. Both  sides  agreed  to  study  care- 
fully the  proposals  and  suggestions  in 
the  various  fields  raised  during  this 
discussion  with  the  aim  of  strengthening 
ASEAN-U.S.  economic  cooperation. 

ASEAN  also  expressed  its  concern 
about  the  establishment  of  separate  in- 
ternational satellite  systems  for  trans- 
oceanic traffic  by  U.S.  companies.  While 
taking  note  of  the  ASEAN  concerns, 
the  U.S.  reiterated  its  support  for 
INTELSAT  [International  Telecom- 
munications Satellite  Organization]  and 
assured  the  ASEAN  side  that  any 
separate  system  approved  for  specialized 
traffic  would  be  consistent  with  U.S. 
obligations  to  INTELSAT;  in  this  proc- 
ess, it  will  consult  with  other  members 
of  INTELSAT. 

The  delegations  agreed  that  the  next 
dialogue  shall  take  place  in  the  ASEAN 
region  at  a  time  to  be  mutually  deter- 
mined. 


'Press  release  65. 


June  1985 


45 


EUROPE 


Visit  of  British 

Prime  Minister  Thatcher 


Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher 
of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Northern  Ireland  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  on 
February  19-21,  1985,  to  meet  with 
President  Reagan  and  other  govemm.en.t 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  after  their  nueeting  on 
February  20.'' 

President  Reagan 

It's  always  a  pleasure  to  exchange  views 
with  Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  a  dear 
friend  and  the  respected  leader  of  one  of 
America's  closest  allies.  We've  had  a  cor- 
dial discussion  on  a  wide  range  of  mat- 
ters. Our  conversations  reflected  the  ex- 
cellent relationship  which  exists  between 
our  two  countries,  as  well  as  the  warm 
friendship  between  Mrs.  Thatcher  and 
myself. 

We  discussed  East- West  relations, 
and  in  particular  the  preparations  for 
the  upcoming  Geneva  talks  with  the 
Soviets.  We  fully  agree  that  the  unity, 
patience,  and  determination  of  the 
North  Atlantic  alliance  are  essential  if 
arms  control  negotiations  are  to  suc- 
ceed. 

What  we're  seeking  are  significant 
reductions  in  the  numbers  of  nuclear 
weapons  through  fair  and  verifiable 
agreements.  Prime  Minister  Thatcher 
and  I  agree  that  it's  absolutely  necessary 
to  continue  NATO's  INF  deployments  on 


schedule,  in  accord  with  the  alliance's 
1979  decision. 

We're  both  hopeful  that  the  dialogue 
opening  in  Geneva  will  result  in  prog- 
ress. And  while  that  progress  continues, 
however,  we  will  be  steadfast  in  the 
modernization  of  our  forces  and  in  our 
determination  to  promote  full  adherence 
to  existing  arms  control  agreements. 
These  are  crucial  incentives  to  any  real 
progress. 

Prime  Minister  Thatcher  and  I  also 
discussed  the  current  situation  in  the 
Middle  East  and  agreed  on  the  need  for 
parties  in  that  region  to  take  concrete 
steps  toward  peace. 

We  reviewed  the  situation  in  Central 
America,  and  I  assured  the  Prime 
Minister  of  our  determination  to 
preserve  democracy  and  to  seek  peaceful 
solutions  to  the  problems  of  that  area. 

We  also  discussed  the  threat  of  in- 
ternational terrorism,  and  we  agreed 
that  increased  international  cooperation 
is  called  for  to  combat  this  evil.  We  ex- 
pressed our  willingness  to  work  together 
and  with  other  governments  to  fight  ter- 
rorism and  deter  those  who  give  support 
to  terrorists. 

We  discussed  the  situation  in  North- 
ern Ireland,  and  I  told  the  Prime 
Minister  that  the  United  States  applauds 
the  continuation  of  her  dialogue  with 
Irish  Prime  Minister  FitzGerald  and 
assured  her  of  our  support  of  all  those 
working  for  peaceful  solutions  and 
reconciliation. 


Prime  Minister  Thatcher  and  I 
reviewed  the  current  economic  situation 
and  the  prospects  for  our  economies  in 
the  future. 

And  in  closing,  I  wish  to  note  that 
1985  marks  the  200th  anniversary  of  the 
establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain. 

Over  the  years  these  relations  have 
taken  on  a  very  special  quality.  In  fact, 
they're  quite  extraordinary.  We,  as 
Americans,  are  proud  of  our  relations 
with  our  allies  the  British.  And  I  am 
personally  proud  of  my  close  collabora- 
tion with  my  friend  Margaret  Thatcher. 

Prime  Minister  Thatcher 

Mr.  President,  may  I  say  how  very 
grateful  I  am  to  you  for  inviting  me  for 
this  brief  visit,  the  first  official  one  in 
your  second  term,  although  I  paid  an 
unofficial  working  visit  to  Camp  David 
in  December.  Our  talks  are  always  par- 
ticularly valuable,  because  we  see  many 
things  in  the  same  way,  and  you  can 
speak  of  a  real  meeting  of  minds. 

As  the  President  pointed  out,  this 
meeting  is  a  special  one  because  1985 
marks  the  200th  anniversary  of 
diplomatic  relations  between  Britain  and 
the  United  States.  And  I  think  I  can 
safely  say  that  our  relations  now  are 
better  than  when  John  Adams  presented 
his  credentials  to  King  George  III.  In- 
deed, I  feel  no  inhibitions  about  describ- 
ing the  relations  as  very,  very  special. 

And  it  is  a  particular  honor  that 
President  Reagan  and  Mrs.  Reagan  have 
accepted  an  invitation  to  dinner  at  the 
British  Embassy  tonight  to  mark  this 
very  special  diplomatic  anniversary. 

The  President  has  given  you  an  ac- 
count of  the  discussions  we  had  today. 
We  had  some  very  thorough  ones, 
especially  about  the  prospects  for  arms 
control  negotiations.  Those  negotiations 
carry  our  hopes  with  them.  They  will,  as 
I  indicated,  this  morning,  be  complex, 
but  those  who  are  negotiating  on  the 
part  of  the  West  know  of  our  fundamen- 
tal, sincere  wish  to  get  down  the  number 
of  nuclear  weapons  in  the  world  in  a 
way  which  is  still  balanced  and  which 
still  keeps  our  security.  We  believe  our 
negotiators  will  strive  to  that  end,  and 
they  will  carry  our  good  wishes  with 
them. 

We  also  spent  some  time  discussing 
the  Middle  East,  and  both  agreed  that 
the  moment  is  propitious  for  a  fresh  ef- 
fort to  achieve  progress  toward  a  Middle 
Eastern  settlement.  And  I  told  the 
President  of  my  support  for  the  state- 
ment issued  following  King  Fahd's  re- 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


cent  visit  to  Washington.  And  we  both 
endorsed  King  Hussein's  efforts  to  ar- 
rive at  a  joint  Arab  position,  which 
would  allow  direct  negotiations  with 
Israel  to  take  place. 

We  also,  as  you'd  expect,  had  a 
thorough  discussion  on  economic  mat- 
ters. The  record  of  the  American 
economy  and  its  success  in  creating  new 
jobs  is  enviable.  And  such  is  the  scale  of 
your  economy  that  your  decisions  affect 
all  of  us. 

We  discussed  how  important  it  is  to 
keep  down  public  spending.  We  have  a 
different  problem  with  the  deficit,  but 
we  both  share  similar  problems  of  how 
to  keep  down  public  spending  so  that 
people  may  be  able  to  keep  a  bigger  pro- 
portion of  their  own  money  in  their  own 
pockets.  And  I  think  we're  at  one  in 
resisting  any  move  toward  protec- 
tionism. 

We  also  touched  on  a  number  of 
other  issues,  perhaps  the  most  impor- 
tant of  which  was  the  Northern  Irish 
and  Republic  of  Ireland  talks — always  to 
try  to  secure  an  agreement  which  will 
respect  both  communities  in  Northern 
Ireland  and  always  recognizing  that  any 
changes  must  come  about  by  consent  of 
the  people  concerned. 

It  was,  as  always,  Mr.  President,  a 
very  friendly  visit.  You  always  make 
them  friendly  and  warm  by  your  own 
very  welcome  reception  of  us.  But  we  do 
have  just  a  very  special  ease  in  talking 
about  these  things,  an  ease  which  comes 
because  we  share  common  goals  and 
common  political  philosophies.  A  very 
happy  and  successful  visit. 


Visit  of  Italian  Prime  Minister 


'Made  to  reporters  assembled  at  the 
South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  25,  1985).  ■ 


Prime  Minister  Bettino  Craxi  of  the 
Italian  Republic  made  an  official  work- 
ing visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  March 
Jt-7,  1985,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan 
and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Craxi  after  their  meeting  on  March  5.' 

President  Reagan 

I'm  honored  today  to  welcome  Prime 
Minister  Craxi  back  to  the  United 
States.  Since  your  visit  in  October  of 
1983,  you've  taken  on  a  new  respon- 
sibility— assuming  the  Presidency  of  the 
European  Community. 

We're  pleased  to  have  had  this  op- 
portunity to  meet  with  you  as  a  friend, 
as  a  leader  of  a  great  nation,  and  as  the 
representative  of  the  European  peoples. 
Cooperation  between  Italy  and  the 
United  States  is  at  a  level  unsurpassed 
in  our  history. 

Your  country  is  an  ally  second  to 
none.  Our  efforts  have  kept  the  peace  in 
Europe  for  almost  40  years.  Italy  has 
played  an  active  role  in  the  cause  of 
peace.  It  continues  to  do  so  today  in  the 
Middle  East,  an  area  which,  as  Prime 
Minister  Craxi  explained,  is  of  special 
importance  to  Italy. 

And  today  the  Prime  Minister  and  I 
also  discussed  East- West  relations  and 
arms  control.  We  reviewed  the  approach 
the  United  States  will  take  in  the  com- 
ing Geneva  talks.  And  the  Prime 
Minister  reconfirmed  Italy's  continued 
steadfastness  on  INF  deployment. 


We  also  discussed  the  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  (SDI).  The  Prime 
Minister  assured  me  of  Italy's  full 
understanding  of  the  program's  objec- 
tives, and  we  agreed  on  the  great  poten- 
tial benefits  this  research  effort  could 
provide.  We  firmly  agree  that  now  is  the 
time  for  alliance  solidarity.  And  our  goal 
remains  the  reduction  and  eventual 
elimination  of  the  means  of  aggression, 
nuclear  and  conventional. 

In  another  area  of  cooperation,  we 
look  forward  to  a  productive  Bonn  sum- 
mit. I  affirmed  to  the  Prime  Minister 
the  high  priority  we  place  on  undertak- 
ing a  new  round  of  trade  negotiations  by 
early  1986.  These  talks  are  necessary, 
not  just  to  forestall  a  possible  slide  back 
toward  protectionism,  but  to  take  new 
steps  for  freer  and  more  open  trade  and 
a  stronger  world  economy. 

The  United  States  and  Italy  are  two 
of  the  world's  great  democracies.  Our 
bilateral  relations,  reflecting  our  shared 
values,  are  on  a  high  plane.  When  the 
Prime  Minister  last  visited,  we  decided 
to  improve  our  coordination  and 
cooperation  against  narcotics.  And  I'm 
happy  to  report  that  our  initiative  has 
now  yielded  an  effective  new  instrument 
to  combat  this  scourge — our  binational 
working  group  on  narcotics  and  orga- 
nized crime. 

Our  common  fight  against  terrorism 
is  another  area  of  close  cooperation,  and 
Italy  deserves  accolades  for  its  coura- 
geous struggle  against  terrorism.  I  know 
I  speak  for  all  An.ericans  in  thanking 
you  publicly  for  Italy's  successful  thwart- 
ing last  November  of  a  potential  bomb 
attack  against  our  Embassy  in  Rome. 


June  1985 


47 


EUROPE 


As  the  head  of  a  vital,  vibrant 
democracy,  nurtured  by  statesmen  hke 
yourself  and  your  illustrious  predeces- 
sors, you  and  your  coalition  partners 
have  put  Italy  in  the  forefront  of  the 
world's  functioning  democracies.  You've 
demonstrated  your  unequivocal  and  com- 
pelling commitment  to  Western  values. 
We're  grateful  to  the  Italian  people  as 
our  friends  and  allies,  and  we're  also 
proud  to  welcome  your  historic  address 
to  the  Congress  tomorrow.  It  will,  I'm 
certain,  be  another  milestone  in  the 
numerous  and  long-lasting  ties  between 
our  two  countries. 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  America  wel- 
comes you  with  her  warmest  friendship, 
and  we  salute  you  and  your  partners, 
and  wish  you  continued  success. 

Prime  Minister  Craxi^ 

I  wish  to  thank  President  Reagan  for 
the  warm  welcome  he  has  extended  to 
me.  My  visit  to  this  great,  friendly  na- 
tion has  a  particular  importance  in  view 
of  the  responsibilities  which  fall  upon 
Italy  now  that  it  is  holding  the  Presiden- 
cy of  the  European  Community.  Our 
talks  have  been  extensive,  open,  and 
very  constructive. 

I  have  renewed  to  President  Reagan 
the  heartfelt  congratulations  of  the 
Italian  Government  and  my  own  per- 
sonal ones  for  the  great  consensus 
received  at  the  recent  Presidential  elec- 
tions. I  have  also  congratulated  him  for 
his  success  in  expanding  the  American 
economy  which  has  resulted  in  greater 
employment. 

The  United  States  has  succeeded  in 
the  hard  task  of  combining  moderniza- 
tion of  productivity  with  the  creation  of 
new  jobs.  Europe  and  the  United  States 
should  work  together  to  achieve  coor- 
dinated action  and  initiatives  which  are 
necessary  to  improve  transatlantic 
economic  cooperation  to  mutual  benefit. 

I  have  expressed  to  President 
Reagan  my  assessment  of  the  issues 
which  Italy  follows  with  the  utmost  at- 
tention: first  of  all,  those  of  peace, 
security,  development,  and  the  safe- 
guarding of  the  rights  of  peoples.  And 
while  also  illustrating  the  programs  and 
prospects  of  the  Ten  [European  Com- 
munity member  nations]  for  a  wider 
community  integration,  I  have  stressed 
that  our  willingness  to  proceed  toward 
European  unity  is  consonant  with  the 
framework  of  constant  strengthening  of 
the  European- American  partnership 
through  a  balanced  relationship  and 
more  effective  mutual  responsibility. 

Again,  on  this  occasion,  I  have 
realized  how  deep  and  strong  are  the 


bonds  of  friendship,  alliance,  and 
cooperation  between  Italy  and  the 
United  States.  It  is  our  firm  intention  to 
continue  to  strengthen  them.  I  have  par- 
ticularly appreciated  the  special  con- 
sideration shown  by  President  Reagan 
and  his  administration  for  Italy  and  for 
the  development  of  Italian-American 
relations.  I  consider  this  attention  as  a 
recognition  of  the  consistency  and  the 
commitment  shown  by  the  Italian 
Government  in  making  a  positive  con- 
tribution to  the  search  of  more  stable  in- 
ternational equilibria  in  the  field  of 
defense,  as  well  as  in  the  economic  and 
political  ones. 

Our  exchange  of  views  confirmed 
the  existence  of  broad  and  encouraging 
convergence,  since  I  am  convinced  that 
the  basic  goals  of  the  U.S.  policy  remain 
defense  and  peace  based  on  a  balance  of 
forces.  The  President  has  assured  me 
that  these  same  goals  will  be  pursued 
through  the  SDI,  from  whose  research 
program  we  will  draw  mutual  advan- 
tages in  the  scientific  and  technological 
field. 

We  attach  a  fundamental  importance 
to  the  success  of  the  forthcoming 
Geneva  negotiations.  We  are  firmly  con- 
vinced that  a  substantial,  balanced,  and 
verifiable  reduction  of  armaments  is  the 
essential  condition  for  a  stabler  and 
safer  peace.  We  will  work  hard  to 
strengthen  confidence  so  that  this 
negotiation  and  those  which  are  taking 
place  in  other  fora  may  develop  under 
the  best  possible  circumstances. 

There  are  no  substitutes  for  the 
negotiation  process.  An  agreement  on  a 
gradual  and  balanced  elimination  of  ar- 
maments and  on  the  organization  of 
peace  based  on  an  accepted  and 
recognized  balance  is  in  the  interest  of 
all. 

We  have  discussed  the  Middle  East 
situation  and  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
emergence  of  positive  signs  indicating 
that  there  is  a  possibility  of  reactivating 
the  negotiation  process  toward  a 
political  solution  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
crisis.  We  both  noted  with  interest  the 
recent  Jordanian-Palestinian  dialogue. 
We  hope  that  this  agreement  will  short- 
ly allow  for  a  joint  Arab  stand  on  the 
opening  of  realistic  negotiations  with 
Israel. 

We  agreed  to  keep  in  constant  con- 
tact in  order  to  effectively  support  all 
positive  steps  toward  a  just,  global,  and 
lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

In  my  talks  here  in  Washington,  we 
also  examined  the  international  eco- 
nomic situation  and  exchanged  views  on 
ways  and  means  to  consolidate  and 
strengthen  economic  recovery  within  the 


context  of  greater  stability.  We  must 
harmonize  our  national  efforts  so  that 
the  beneficial  results  of  recovery  will  be 
fully  reflected  on  the  occupational  levels, 

However,  we  cannot  pay  attention 
only  to  our  own  economic  prosperity. 
The  increasing  serious  problems  in  the 
Third  World  are  a  matter  of  great  con- 
cern. We  must  help  in  seeking  solutions 
to  them.  We  agreed  to  hold  effective 
consultations  between  our  governments 
on  these  issues  in  order  to  ensure  the 
success  of  the  summit  conference  of  the 
industrialized  nations,  which  will  take 
place  in  Bonn  on  May  2d  through  the 
4th. 

Having  just  visited  Latin  America,  I 
also  emphasized  in  my  talks  here,  the 
great  importance  of  the  return  of 
democracy  in  the  highly  civilized  nations 
of  that  continent  and  drew  attention  to 
the  expectations  for  the  democratic 
solidarity  of  the  peoples  living  there  who 
aspire  to  a  regime  based  on  freedom. 

Last  year  I  worked  out  with  Presi- 
dent Reagan  a  program  for  a  more  ef- 
fective bilateral  cooperation  in  the  fight 
against  drug  traffic  and  organized 
crime.  The  results  have  been  positive 
and  significant.  Our  cooperation  has 
been  carried  out  with  mutual  satisfac- 
tion. We  will  continue  these  efforts, 
while  trying  at  the  same  time  to  im- 
prove bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements  so  as  to  defend  our 
democratic  system  against  any  rise  of 
the  threat  of  international  terrorism. 

I  wish  to  thank  President  Reagan 
for  this  fruitful  exchange  of  views.  It 
was,  for  me,  a  confirmation  of  how 
much  the  sharing  of  values  and  aspira- 
tions, in  a  context  of  longstanding 
friendship,  makes  it  easier  to  reach 
mutual  understanding  and  agreement  on 
how  to  cope  with  and  solve  problems  for 
which  we  have  responsibilities  not  only 
as  governments  but  for  which  we  have 
responsibilities  to  our  own  peoples. 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  11,  1985). 

^Prime  Minister  Craxi  spoke  in  Italian, 
and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an  inter- 
preter. ■ 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


FY  1986  Request  for 
Foreign  Assistance  Programs 


I  by  M.  Peter  McPherson 

DH        Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  Senate  Ap- 
propriations  Committee  on  April  2, 
1985.  Mr.  McPherson  is  Administrator 
of  the  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment (AID)  and  Acting  Director  of  the 
International  Development  Cooperation 
Agency  (IDCA).^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you  to 
present  the  Administration's  FY  1986 
proposed  program  for  foreign  economic 
assistance. 

This  is  a  difficult  and  challenging 
year — from  a  budgetary  standpoint — for 
the  development  of  a  foreign  assistance 
program  which  meets  our  foreign  policy 
objectives  within  the  tight  fiscal  con- 
straints facing  us.  The  executive  branch 
and  Congress  are  together  confronted 
with  the  need  to  sharply  restrain  spend- 
ing in  order  to  gain  better  control  of  the 
Federal  deficit  and  to  keep  the  U.S. 
economic  recovery  on  a  sound  footing.  A 
healthy  American  economy  is  important 
for  reasons  of  foreign  policy  as  well  as 
domestic  considerations.  Our  success  in 
maintaining  the  strength  of  our  economy 
is  important  to  developing  countries — 
which  depend  on  the  United  States  as  an 
important  trading  partner. 

Notwithstanding  the  need  to 
restrain  the  growth  of  the  Federal 
budget,  requirements  for  resources  to 
pursue  foreign  policy  objectives  continue 
to  increase.  Our  challenge  is  to  find  a 
way  to  meet  these  grov/ing  demands, 
and  respond  to  new  opportunities,  with 
limited  foreign  assistance  resources.  We 
believe  the  FY  1986  foreign  assistance 
request  we  bring  before  you  does  that. 
We  have  carefully  focused  our  program 
on  the  highest  priority  foreign  policy  ob- 
jectives. 

In  the  face  of  proposed  cut-backs  in 
many  domestic  programs,  it  is  more  im- 
portant than  ever  that  we  justify  to  the 
American  people  the  reasons  why  a 
strong  foreign  assistance  program  is 
crucial  to  the  national  interest.  The  FY 
1986  request  reflects  our  view,  based  on 
experience,  that  foreign  assistance  has 
proven  to  be  an  important  tool  in  achiev- 
ing foreign  policy  objectives. 

As  the  Secretary  has  already 
testified,  the  foreign  assistance  program 
is  critical  to  the  achievement  of  some  of 
our  highest  foreign  policy  priorities— the 


promotion  of  peace  in  the  Middle  East, 
assuring  access  to  such  strategically  im- 
portant regions  as  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
Southeast  Asia,  and  support  for 
democracy  in  Latin  America.  Economic 
growth  in  the  Third  World  is  also  direct- 
ly linked  to  the  growth  of  our  foreign 
trade  and  export  capacity. 

The  foreign  assistance  program  has 
also  produced  notable  achievements  in 
accomplishing  our  humanitarian  objec- 
tives of  helping  developing  countries  to 
improve  their  own  development  pros- 
pects and  to  meet  the  basic  needs  of 
their  people.  I  would  like  to  cite  some 
examples. 

Notable  Achievements 

Especially  promising  are  initiatives  to 
transfer  new  health  technology  to  the 
Third  World.  From  the  very  gratifying 
results  we  have  seen  to  date — par- 
ticularly in  the  area  of  improved  child 
survival — and  research  which  holds 
promise  of  new  breakthroughs  in  the 
near  future,  I  believe  it  is  fair  to  say,  in 
fact,  that  we  are  on  the  verge  of  a 
"health  revolution." 

By  teaching  families  how  to  use  life- 
saving  oral  rehydration  salts,  we  have 
demonstrated — in  country  after  coun- 
try—that the  use  of  this  new  technology 
can  produce  a  dramatic  reduction  in  in- 
fant mortality  rates.  Similarly,  our  sup- 
port for  expanded  immunizations  has  the 
potential  for  overcoming  what  are  now 
major  causes  of  death  and  diminished 
quality  of  life  each  year  for  millions  of 
children  in  the  Third  World. 

In  addition,  our  support  for  key 
research  is  permitting  AID  to  stay  on 
the  cutting  edge  of  technology  for  child 
survival.  The  United  States  deserves, 
and  has  received,  a  great  deal  of  credit 
for  the  technological  breakthroughs  on 
which  our  child  survival  action  program 
depends.  AID  is  committed  to  maintain- 
ing this  leadership,  specifically  focusing 
on  the  rapid  development  and  improve- 
ment of  vaccines  against  the  major 
killers  of  infants  and  children— such  as 
measles  and  malaria. 

A  second  area,  where  I  think  there 
is  both  an  acute  need  and  the  possibillity 
of  solutions  through  our  technology 
transfer  efforts,  is  the  reversal  of  the 
long-term  trend  of  declining  per  capita 
food  production  in  Africa.  Through  the 
foreign  assistance  program,  we  have 
already  successfully  developed  and 


released  the  first  commercial  hybrid  of 
sorghum — a  major  staple  food  crop  in 
Africa.  This  new  sorghum  variety  pro- 
duces a  50%  increase  in  yields.  We  are 
now  funding  part  of  a  broad  multidonor 
research  effort  in  Africa  to  develop  new 
methods  of  dryland  farming.  We  expect 
this  effort  to  point  the  way  to  increased 
grain  production  under  the  semiarid  con- 
ditions widespread  in  the  sub-Saharan 
region.  And  we  are  funding  the  develop- 
ment of  new  types  of  maize,  tubers,  and 
other  crops,  as  well  as  new  methods  of 
pest  control,  all  of  which  hold  the 
possibility  of  dramatically  improving 
food  production. 

A  second  major  element  of  the  food 
production  problem  in  Africa  is  govern- 
mental policy.  It  is  clear  that  inap- 
propriate policies  on  the  part  of  African 
governments  have  held  down  food  pro- 
duction. As  a  result,  coupled  with  our 
agricultural  research,  we  have  initiated 
policy  dialogue  efforts  in  a  number  of 
African  countries,  as  well  as  elsewhere. 
These  efforts  have  helped  focus  atten- 
tion on  the  need  to  change  inappropriate 
policies  and  eliminate  controls  on  market 
incentives  to  increased  production. 
Through  AID's  successful  policy  dialogue 
efforts,  a  number  of  African  coun- 
tries— such  as  Zambia,  Somalia,  and 
Uganda— have  already  made  difficult 
but  important  policy  reforms.  And 
coupled  with  these  continuing  policy 
dialogue  efforts,  we  are  planning  to  use 
the  $75  million  that  was  included  in  the 
FY  1985  continuing  resolution  for  new 
programs  in  Africa  for  programs  that 
will  encourage  further  policy  changes. 
We  have  included  an  additional  $75 
million  in  our  FY  1986  economic  support 
fund  (ESF)  request  to  be  used  to  en- 
courage further  economic  policy  reforms 
in  Africa  aimed  at  increasing  food  pro- 
duction. 

Another  major  area  where  we  have 
had  some  particular  success  and  on 
which  we  need  to  continue  to  focus 
resources  is  that  of  family  planning. 
Successful  AID  programs  in  Asia  have 
demonstrated  our  ability  to  assist 
developing  countries  in  their  efforts  to 
implement  voluntary  family  planning 
programs  when  there  is  commitment  on 
the  part  of  the  government.  Our  recent 
experience  with  contraceptive  social 
marketing  shows  promise  of  becoming 
an  effective  new  way  to  increase  the 
distribution  of  population  commodities. 

Other  areas  of  success  in  our  foreign 
assistance  program  included  increased 
involvement  of  the  private  sector  in 
development.  We  have  had  particular 
success  in  stimulating  the  increased  role 
of  small  and  medium-sized  agro- 


June  1985 


49 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


businesses  in  the  development  process  in 
a  number  of  developing  countries.  And 
we  have  increased  the  involvement  of 
historically  black  colleges  and  univer- 
sities in  this  country  in  the  training  of 
developing  country  participants  from 
government  and  the  private  sector. 

In  the  area  of  institution  building, 
the  foreign  assistance  program  has 
helped  significantly  increase  the  level  of 
training  of  future  developing  country 
leaders  and  the  strengthening  of  their 
indigenous  institutions.  In  Swaziland, 
where  an  expanding  health  system  had 
outstripped  the  ability  of  its  admin- 
istrative systems  to  staff  and  support  it, 
the  establishment  of  an  AID- funded  In- 
stitute of  Health  Sciences  has  given  the 
country  a  high-quality  institution  for 
training  its  own  nurses  and  health  per- 
sonnel. The  Central  American  Business 
School,  founded  with  AID  assistance,  is 
now  a  key  technical  resource  in  improv- 
ing private  sector  export  management 
capacity. 

Our  foreign  assistance  program  has 
proven  effective,  too,  as  a  vehicle  for 
responding  to  the  international 
humanitarian  concerns  of  Ameri- 
cans—  providing  worldwide  disaster 
relief  and  assistance  with  crises  such  as 
that  now  facing  Africa. 

I  could  cite  many  more  such  ex- 
amples. Through  successes  such  as 
these,  our  foreign  assistance  program  is 
effectively  helping  to  meet  the  basic 
human  needs  of  the  poor  majority  of  the 
Third  World.  It  is  contributing,  thereby, 
to  our  foreign  policy  goal  of  fostering 
improved  stability  and  progress  toward 
economic  self-sufficiency  in  the  develop- 
ing nations. 

And  finally,  it  is  important  to 
remember  that  the  foreign  assistance 
program  is  important  from  a  domestic 
standpoint  as  well.  A  high  percentage  of 
the  funds  authorized  and  appropriated 
by  the  Congress  for  foreign  assistance 
are  spent  in  the  United  States,  creating 
jobs  and  stimulating  exports;  more  than 
one-third  of  all  U.S.  exports  now  go  to 
Third  World  nations.  Funding  for  crop 
substitution  projects  is  an  important  ele- 
ment in  our  international  efforts  to 
counter  the  production  and  trafficking  of 
narcotics.  In  short,  our  foreign 
assistance  progi-am  is  on  track,  produc- 
ing the  intended  results. 

Demands  for  Resources 

But  we  are  faced  with  growing  demands 
for  the  limited  foreign  assistance 
resources  at  our  disposal  in  FY  1986. 

•  The  drought  in  Africa,  besides 
creating  near-term  famine,  has  ac- 


celerated the  long-term  decline  in 
African  food  production,  necessitating  a 
significant  increase  in  aid  to  that 
troubled  region. 

•  Many  countries  are  continuing  to 
recover  only  slowly  from  the  worldwide 
recession  and  oil  price  shock  and  need 
continued  balance-of-payments  support 
to  help  them  overcome  pressing 
economic  problems. 

•  Continued  internal  unrest  and  ex- 
ternal aggression  threatens  the  eco- 
nomic and  political  stability  of  countries 
in  strategically  important  regions  such 
as  Central  America  and  Southeast  Asia. 

And  we  are  confronted  with  new  op- 
portunities and  challenges.  In  parts  of 
Africa,  governments  need  our  help  in 
finding  solutions — through  economic 
policy  reform  and  structural  changes — 
to  complex  economic  problems  that  have 
been  in  the  making  for  decades.  In  the 
Andes,  emerging  democracies  need  our 
assistance  in  overcoming  internal  unrest 
and  confronting  mounting  economic 
problems. 

In  short,  the  combination  of  in- 
creased fiscal  restraint  and  the  need  to 
apply  resources  to  new  demands  has 
forced  some  very  difficult  budgetary  and 
programmatic  choices  for  FY  1986. 

As  a  result,  the  FY  1986  request  is  a 
lean  budget,  closely  focused  on  prior- 
ities. In  developing  this  request,  we  have 
sought  to  carefully  integrate  the  various 
components  and  programs  which  make 
up  the  overall  request  in  order  to 
achieve  the  coordination  necessary  to 
get  the  most  from  our  aid. 

To  do  so,  we  have  made  very  active 
and,  I  think,  effective  use  of  the  in- 
tegrated budget  process  to  strike  the 
right  balance  in  the  level  and  kind  of 
resources  within  countries  and  in  the 
overall  mix  of  foreign  assistance.  The 
result  is  a  foreign  assistance  budget  re- 
quest which  essentially  retains  the  ex- 
isting balance  between  economic  and 
military  assistance. 

In  addition  to  holding  down  our  re- 
quest for  program  funds,  we  have  sharp- 
ly limited  our  request  for  operating  ex- 
penses— as  part  of  the  government- wide 
effort  to  achieve  greater  economies  in 
the  management  of  Federal  programs. 
To  fit  within  the  tight  budget  request 
level  for  operating  expenses,  we  have  in- 
creased attention  to  operating  efficiency. 
We  are  taking  advantage  of  the  fact 
that  our  major  policies  are  now  in  place, 
allowing  us  to  focus  our  attention,  and 
our  resources,  on  improving  program 
implementation.  We  have  already  taken 
steps  to  revise  the  agency's  program- 
ming system  to  achieve  a  more  efficient 
use  of  staff,  both  in  Washington  and  the 


field.  We  are  simplifying  and  stream- 
lining the  planning  process.  We  are 
eliminating  unnecessary  elements  of  the 
agency's  budgetary  process.  We  are  in- 
creasing the  delegation  to  our  field  mis- 
sions of  responsibility  for  project 
development  and  approval.  We  are  in- 
troducing new  procedures  to  improve 
our  oversight  of  management  perform- 
ance. We  have  initiated  a  new  manage- 
ment planning  process  and  regular  pro- 
gram implementation  reviews  to  assure 
that  our  program  objectives  are  being 
met  and  that  funds  are  being  obligated 
in  a  timely  manner.  And  we  are  under- 
taking new  arrangements  to  make  more 
efficient  use  of  resources,  such  as  the 
new  cooperative  arrangements  we  have 
established  with  the  Peace  Corps. 

As  as  result,  the  FY  1986  program  I 
bring  before  you  has  been  reduced  to  its 
essentials.  The  request  is  the  very 
minimum  we  think  we  can  operate  with, 
given  the  magnitude  of  the  resource 
needs  confronting  us. 

Details  of  FY  1986  Request 

Our  general  approach  in  developing  the 
FY  1986  request  has  been  to  hold  levels 
in  total  to  those  in  last  year's  request. 
Within  the  overall  program,  we  have 
made  some  marginal  adjustments  among 
programs  to  meet  priority  requirements. 
The  request  for  development  assist- 
ance is  essentially  the  same  as  our  FY 
1985  request.  For  the  functional  ac- 
counts, including  the  Sahel  program,  the 
request  totals  $1,675  billion.  Within  the 
functional  account  request,  there  has 
been  some  shift  in  the  levels  for  in- 
dividual programs. 

•  The  request  for  agriculture  is 
$792.5  million.  This  level  is  up  about  5% 
over  the  FY  1985  level,  mainly  due  to 
the  need  for  increased  assistance  to 
Africa. 

•  The  request  for  population  is  $250 
million.  Although  down  from  the  1985 
appropriation,  due  in  part  to  declining 
requirements  in  Asia,  the  level  was  held 
to  the  same  as  last  year's  request. 

•  The  health  request,  $146  million, 
also  is  down  as  a  result  of  forward  fund- 
ing in  FY  1985  made  possible  by  the  $75 
million  increase  for  new  health  and  child 
survival  activities.  To  maintain  the 
momentum  in  health,  we  have  acceler- 
ated the  development  of  new  health 
projects  to  come  on  line  in  the  coming 
years. 

•  The  other  functional  accounts — 
education  and  selected  development  ac- 
tivities— are  down  just  slightly  from  last 
year's  request  levels. 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


•  The  functional  account  request 
also  includes  $20  million  for  the  third 
year  of  capitalization  of  the  private  sec- 
tor revolving  fund  through  which  we  are 
helping  finance  increased  involvement  of 
private  enterprises  in  development. 

Also  within  the  development 
assistance  program,  we  have  requested 
$10  million  for  American  schools  and 
hospitals  and  $25  million  for  disaster 
assistance — the  same  levels  as  we  re- 
quested last  year. 

For  the  ESF,  we  are  requesting  a 
total  of  $2,824  billion.  This  represents  a 
slight  increase  from  last  year's  request, 
excluding  funding  for  Israel  on  which  a 
decision  has  yet  to  be  made.  The  in- 
crease is  principally  to  accommodate  the 
planned  increase  in  Pakistan  and  some 
new  requirements  in  Latin  America, 
which  I  will  detail  in  just  a  moment,  plus 
continuation  of  the  African  economic 
reform  program. 

From  a  geographic  standpoint,  the 
allocation  of  development  assistance  and 
ESF  represents  some  shifts  among 
countries  and  regions  compared  to 
amounts  we  currently  have  budgeted  for 
FY  1985. 

•  In  Africa,  the  request  for  develop- 
ment assistance  and  ESF  is  up  by  a 
total  of  $42  million  over  current  FY 
1985  levels — principally  in  ESF — 
distributed  among  several  countries  in- 
cluding Kenya,  Zambia,  Somalia,  and 
Liberia.  As  I  said,  the  request  also  in- 
cludes $75  million  for  African  economic 
reform.  And  of  course,  we  are  proposing 
a  large  food  aid  supplemental  for  FY 
1985  to  help  meet  immediate  food  needs. 

•  In  Asia,  total  development 
assistance  and  ESF  is  down  about  $45 
million  from  current  levels,  due  prin- 
cipally to  the  reduction  in  ESF — back  to 
our  original  1985  request  level— for  the 
Philippines,  which  had  been  increased 
this  year  as  a  result  of  the  limitation  on 
military  assistance.  Development 
assistance  reductions  would  also  occur  in 
Bangladesh,  Indonesia,  Sri  Lanka,  and 
Pakistan,  the  latter  offset  by  our 
planned  ESF  increase  in  Pakistan. 

•  In  Latin  America,  the  combined 
development  assistance  and  ESF  re- 
quest is  up  about  $100  million  from  the 
FY  1985  appropriated  level,  excluding 
amounts  carried  forward  from  last 
year's  supplemental.  This  is  due  mainly 
to  the  $70  million  total  ESF  program 
proposed  for  economic  stabilization  pur- 
poses for  the  Andean  region— Peru, 
Ecuador,  and  Bolivia.  In  addition,  levels 
for  El  Salvador  and  for  the  regional  pro- 
grams in  Central  America  and  the 
Caribbean  are  slated  to  rise  to  a  total  of 


June  1985 


$52  million  to  provide  sorely  needed  sup- 
port through  projects  resulting  from  the 
Kissinger  commission  recommendations 
as  well  as  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative. 

•  In  the  Near  East,  leaving  aside 
the  question  of  funding  for  Israel  and 
excluding  amounts  budgeted  in  Lebanon 
from  an  earlier  supplemental  develop- 
ment assistance  and  ESF  is  down  a  total 
of  $18  million  from  currently  budgeted 
FY  1985  levels.  The  net  decrease  is  due 
mainly  to  a  proposed  $25  million  reduc- 
tion in  ESF  for  Turkey,  where  economic 
progress  is  moderating  the  need  for  con- 
tinuing high  levels  of  assistance.  This 
cut  is  partly  offset  by  a  $7.5  million  in- 
crease in  ESF  for  Morocco,  which  is  tak- 
ing hard  measures  to  bring  about  a 
positive  economic  reversal  of  their 
troubled  economy. 

•  Centrally  funded  development 
assistance  programs  are  down  from  FY 
1985  levels  by  a  total  of  roughly  $65 
million.  The  decrease  is  due  mainly  to 
the  forward  funding  of  population  and 
health  activities  which  has  occurred  dur- 
ing the  current  year  as  a  result  of  the 
increase  in  those  programs. 

For  PL  480,  the  total  budget 
authority  request,  excluding  the  World 
Food  Program,  is  $1,307  billion.  The 
Title  I  request  of  $657  million  in  budget 
authority  will  support  a  program  level  of 
$1,030  billion,  sufficient  to  provide 
5  million  metric  tons  to  33  countries. 
The  request  includes  a  new  $35  million 
program  for  the  Philippines,  provided 
discussions  with  the  Philippine  policy 
reform  prove  successful. 

For  Title  II,  we  are  requesting  $650 
million,  which  we  project  will  enable  us 
to  provide  almost  2  million  metric  tons 
of  food.  Our  FY  1985  request  of  $650 
million  at  this  time  last  year  was  pro- 
jected to  enable  us  to  provide  1.7  million 
metric  tons.  So  while  our  request  is  the 
same  as  last  year  in  dollar  terms, 
because  of  lower  estimated  commodity 
prices  we  will  be  able  to  provide  more 
food.  The  Title  11  regular  voluntary 
agency  programs  for  Africa  have  been 
increased  from  the  FY  1985  level,  and 
we  have  designated  at  least  $25  million 
from  the  unallocated  reserve  for 
enhancement  of  these  programs  to  help 
rehabilitate  Africa  from  the  effects  of 
the  current  drought. 

We  believe  our  FY  1986  request, 
along  with  our  FY  1985  reprogramming 
efforts  and  supplemental  request,  will 
allow  us  to  meet  current  projected  food 
aid  needs  for  Africa.  Obviously,  should 
conditions  require  an  extraordinary  U.S. 
food  aid  response  to  Africa  in  FY  1986, 


and  available  resources  prove  inade- 
quate, we  will  consider  requesting  a  sup- 
plemental appropriation. 

For  the  trade  and  development  pro- 
gram, we  are  requesting  $20  million, 
nearly  the  same  level  as  last  year's  re- 
quest. 

Under  multilateral  assistance,  we 
are  requesting  a  total  $1,348  billion  for 
scheduled  replenishments  of  the  multi- 
lateral development  banks.  In  addition, 
we  have  requested  an  FY  1985  supple- 
mental appropriation  to  cover  unfunded 
prior  year  replenishment  payments.  For 
the  international  organizations  and  pro- 
grams account,  we  are  requesting  $196 
million,  up  slightly  from  last  year's  re- 
quest, excluding  International  Fund  for 
Agricultural  Development  (IFAD),  for 
which  funding  of  the  first  replenishment 
was  completed  in  FY  1985.  We  have  not 
yet  concluded  negotiations  on  a  second 
IFAD  replenishment. 

The  FY  1986  for  the  Peace  Corps  in- 
cludes $2.8  million  for  a  new  African 
food  initiative  aimed  at  improving  food 
availability  at  the  community  level.  AID 
and  the  Peace  Corps  are  jointly  planning 
the  initiative  which  will  offer  new  poten- 
tial for  enhanced  field  coordination  be- 
tween the  two  agencies.  The  first  year 
of  the  program  is  slated  for  two  coun- 
tries—  Mali  and  Zaire — and  eventually 
we  plan  to  expand  it  to  include  between 
six  and  twelve  African  countries. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


51 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Developments  in  the  Middle 
East:  An  Update 


by  Richard  W.  Murphy 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
April  k,  1985.  Ambassador  Murphy  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs. ' 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  meet  with  you  today 
to  review  developments  in  the  Middle 
East. 

Arab-Israeli  Peace  Efforts 

Let  me  begin  with  some  observations  on 
the  efforts  being  made  to  bring  peace 
between  Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors. 
Several  encouraging  developments  have 
occurred.  Israel  has  proposed  negotia- 
tions with  Jordan  without  preconditions; 
Jordan  and  the  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization]  have  reached  agree- 
ment on  a  joint  approach  that  we  have 
said  could  be  a  helpful  step  in  the  proc- 
ess leading  toward  direct  negotiations 
between  Jordan  and  Israel  with  the  par- 
ticipation of  representative  Palestinians; 
and  Egypt  has  been  highly  active  in 
seel<ing  practical  steps  toward  direct 
negotiations.  In  addition,  high-level  con- 
tact and  communication  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  have  intensified,  and  this  is 
an  invaluable  contribution  to  the  current 
efforts. 

In  sum,  the  parties  in  the  region 
have  imparted  a  new  momentum  to  the 
search  for  peace.  Thus  far,  however, 
this  momentum  is  tentative,  and  further 
efforts  are  necessary  to  maintain  and 
build  upon  it.  We  hope  that  the  key 
parties  in  the  region,  who  see  1985  as  a 
year  in  which  to  make  progress,  will 
make  such  efforts.  In  that  hope,  we  will 
be  working  with  our  friends  to  achieve 
the  near-term  goal  of  direct  negotiations 
between  Israel  and  Jordan  with  the  par- 
ticipation of  representative  Palestinians. 

A  key  development  has  been  King 
Hussein's  initiative  with  the  PLO  and 
the  conclusion  of  their  February  11 
agreement.  The  Jordan-PLO  framework 
agreement  demonstrates  that  thinking  in 
the  region  is  evolving  in  a  constructive 
manner,  and  it  can  serve  as  an  impor- 
tant step  forward  in  the  current  process. 
It  could  have  been  more  specific  on 
some  issues,  such  as  acceptance  of  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  242,  and  it 
contains  elements  that,  in  our  view,  are 


52 


not  realistic.  Nonetheless,  the  direction 
of  this  process  will  probably  prove  to  be 
more  important  than  the  document 
itself.  We  strongly  support  King  Hus- 
sein's efforts  to  move  toward  negotia- 
tions, but  only  time  will  tell  whether  the 
agreement  will  ultimately  enable  him  to 
do  so. 

The  visit  of  President  Mubarak  to 
Washington  was  a  positive  occasion  and 
gave  us  ample  opportunity  to  discuss  the 
importance  of  practical  steps  with  the 
Egyptians.  We  made  it  clear  that  we  are 
open  to  their  proposals,  including  the 
suggestion  that  the  United  States  meet 
with  a  Jordanian-Palestinian  delegation, 
provided  this  would  lead  to  direct 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  an  Arab 
partner.  We  intend  to  discuss  this  and 
other  suggestions  further  to  determine 
how  they  can  contribute  to  a  realistic 
scenario  leading  to  direct  negotiations. 

In  Israel,  the  National  Unity  govern- 
ment is  moving  to  withdraw  from 
Lebanon  and  striving  to  deal  with  its 
economic  problems.  At  the  same  time,  it 
clearly  seeks  progress  toward  peace 
negotiations.  Only  a  few  days  ago,  on 
March  31,  Prime  Minister  Peres  told  the 
Jerusalem  Arabic-language  daily  al-Quds 
that  "We  are  prepared  to  negotiate  un- 
conditionally with  a  joint  Jordanian- 
Palestinian  delegation,  a  Jordanian 
delegation,  or  a  Palestinian  delegation  in 
our  efforts  toward  an  immediate  peace- 
ful solution  or  a  solution  in  stages."  We 
will  remain  in  close  consultation  with 
Israel  on  the  search  for  peace. 

In  view  of  the  encouraging  develop- 
ments of  recent  months,  and  given  our 
abiding  interest  in  fostering  moves 
toward  peace,  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  have  asked  me  to  travel  to  the 
region  this  month  to  assess  the  situation 
there,  to  explore  how  the  various  ideas 
that  have  been  put  forward  might  serve 
to  move  the  process  forward,  and  to 
stimulate  further  thinking.  No  itinerary 
has  been  set  for  the  trip,  but  I  would  ex- 
pect to  travel  to  a  number  of  key  coun- 
tries. My  basic  objective  will  be  to  try  to 
get  a  real  sense  of  what  is  possible  and 
of  how  we  can  be  most  effective  in  help- 
ing the  parties  turn  the  possible  into 
reality. 

Our  thinking  is  flexible.  We  are 
prepared  to  respond  creatively  to  prac- 
tical suggestions  coming  from  the 
region,  but  it  is  important  to  set  forth 
on  a  clear  path  to  direct  negotiations. 


This  is  the  only  way  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment can  be  achieved. 

At  the  same  time,  our  policy  regard- 
ing the  PLO  remains  unchanged:  we  will 
not  recognize  or  negotiate  with  the  PLO 
until  it  accepts  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  242  and  338  and  Israel's 
right  to  exist. 

Lebanon 

With  regard  to  Lebanon,  we  have  con- 
sistently encouraged  the  withdrawal  of 
all  foreign  forces  and  welcome  the 
steady  implementation  of  Israeli 
withdrawal,  now  in  its  second  phase. 
The  timing  of  the  third  phase- 
withdrawal  to  the  international 
border— is  under  active  discussion  in 
Israel,  with  many  proposing  that  it  be 
accelerated  over  earlier  estimates.  We 
are  deeply  concerned  by  the  mounting 
cycle  of  violence  that  has  developed  in 
southern  Lebanon  and  have  urged  that 
all  parties  exercise  restraint  to  help 
bring  this  pattern  of  attacks  and 
counterattacks  to  an  end.  We  hope  that 
Israel  and  Lebanon  will  be  able  to 
resume  talks  under  L'N  auspices  to  work 
out  adequate  security  arrangements. 

Early  in  March,  when  the  Security 
Council  last  deliberated  on  southern 
Lebanon,  we  made  known  our  pref- 
erence for  consensus  action  aimed  at 
calming  the  situation.  Instead,  we  were 
confronted  with  an  unbalanced  resolu- 
tion and,  therefore,  voted  against  it, 
with  our  negative  vote  constituting  a 
veto.  We  have  consistently  advocated 
practical  steps  to  resolve  the  problems 
of  southern  Lebanon.  We  do  not  believe 
this  can  be  accomplished  by  one-sided 
resolution. 

The  situation  in  Christian  areas  of 
Lebanon,  recently  unsettled,  appears  to 
have  stabilized.  We  have  received 
reports  of  efforts  within  the  Christian 
community  to  achieve  a  peaceful  politica 
solution  to  its  disagreements.  We  wish 
these  efforts  every  success.  We  support 
the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity 
of  Lebanon,  and  we  support  the  efforts 
of  the  central  government  under  Presi- 
dent Gemayel  to  restore  sovereignty 
over  all  Lebanese  territory.  We  believe 
that  security  for  all  Lebanese  can  best 
be  achieved  by  restoration  of  central 
government  authority. 

We  are  determined  to  obtain  the 
safe  release  of  the  five  American 
citizens  missing  in  Lebanon.  The  captivi- 
ty of  these  innocent  men  is  in  flagrant 
contradiction  to  all  civilized  norms  of 
behavior  and  to  all  religious  tenets.  We 
believed  that  the  quiet,  unpublicized 
course  we  are  following  is  the  best  way 
to  achieve  this  result. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


The  United  States  will  not  allow 
itself  to  be  intimidated  by  terrorist 
threats  or  permit  those  threats  to  com- 
promise our  fundamental  policies  and 
values.  As  we  have  stated  before,  we 
are  prepared  to  consider  the  use  of  force 
to  deal  with  specific  terrorist  situations. 
However,  in  a  situation  as  serious  as 
this,  we  must  be  certain  that  our  actions 
are  based  on  sound  intelligence  and  will 
lead  to  the  results  we  seek. 

Economic  Assistance  to 
Israel  and  Egypt 

Turning  to  Israel,  the  Israeli  Govern- 
ment has  begun  to  make  progress  in 
developing  a  comprehensive  economic 
reform  program.  It  has  concluded  and 
put  into  effect  a  second  wage/price 
restraint  agreement,  and  the  Israeli 
Cabinet  has  approved  a  series  of  new 
taxes  that  it  hopes  will  ease  pressure  on 
foreign  exchange  reserves  and  increase 
revenues.  Knesset  approval  is  required. 
Government  expenditures  and  subsidies 
have  also  been  cut  in  the  FY  [fiscal  year] 
1986-87  budget.  While  this  is  a  signifi- 
cant improvement,  the  deficit  is  still  un- 
sustainable and  inconsistent  with 
domestic  and  balance-of-payment  equi- 
librium. Finally,  the  Israeli  Government 
is  taking  steps  to  introduce  institutional 
reform  through  legislation  to  improve 
budgetary  discipline  and  the  execution  of 
monetary  policy. 

We  have  repeatedly  indicated  our 
willingness  to  provide  additional  extraor- 
dinary assistance  in  support  of  a  com- 
prehensive Israeli  economic  program. 
Our  goal  is  to  help  Israel  achieve  a  sus- 
tainable program  of  solid  economic 
growth.  Supplementary  U.S.  assistance 
can  be  very  helpful  in  supporting  Israel's 
progress  toward  recovery,  but  it  needs 
to  relate  closely  to  a  reform  program. 
Israel  will  gain  nothing  by  postponing 
the  solution  of  basic  structural  problems 
in  its  economy.  Extraordinary  U.S. 
assistance,  if  provided  in  the  absence  of 
a  clear  and  realistic  reform  program, 
may  simply  be  consumed  without  con- 
tributing to  a  solution  to  Israel's 
economic  problems.  The  President 
pledged  last  October  that  we  would  be 
prepared  to  work  with  the  Government 
of  Israel  to  avert  balance-of-payments 
problems,  and  we  have  recently  re- 
affirmed that  policy. 

As  a  result  of  the  visit  of  Israeli 
Finance  Minister  Modal  last  month,  we 
have  now  intensified  our  dialogue  with 
the  Government  of  Israel.  Herb  Stein 
and  Stanley  Fischer,  who  are  con- 
sultants to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
recently  visited  Israel.  We  hope  our  in- 


June1985 


tensified  dialogue  will  lead  to  agreement 
on  an  approach  in  which  additional  U.S. 
assistance  could  be  associated  with  an 
effective  Israeli  program.  Pending  the 
outcome  of  these  discussions,  we  intend 
to  continue  to  defer  a  request  for  an  FY 
1985  supplemental.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Administration  supports  regular  ESP^ 
[economic  support  fund]  assistance  for 
Israel  in  the  amount  of  $1.2  billion  for 
FY  1986. 

The  Egyptian  Government  has  also 
requested  supplementary  assistance  for 
FY  1985.  Egypt's  economic  situation  has 
been  deteriorating  over  recent  months, 
not  only  as  a  result  of  a  decline  in  oil  ex- 
port revenues  but  also  because  Egypt's 
other  traditional  sources  of  foreign  ex- 
change—tourism, Suez  Canal  tolls,  and 
remittances  from  Egyptians  working 
abroad— are  not  performing  as  well  as 
expected.  We  estimate  that  each  $1 
decline  in  the  per-barrel  price  of  crude 
oil  will  reduce  Egypt's  oil  export  earn- 
ings by  about  $150  million.  The  an- 
ticipated decline  in  employment  oppor- 
tunities in  nearby  oil-producing  countries 
will  also  have  a  negative  effect  on  the 
Egyptian  economy. 

■The  Egyptians  have  begun  to 
broaden  the  scope  of  their  economic 
reform  efforts  in  response  to  these 
developments.  At  the  same  time, 
Egypt's  debt  service  is  growing.  One 
component  of  that  debt  is  the  growing 
burden  of  interest  payments  on  FMS 
[foreign  military  sales]  debt  to  the 
United  States— expected  to  be  about 
$450  million  this  fiscal  year  and  $540 
million  in  FY  1986.  Because  of  these 
worrisome  economic  trends,  the  Ad- 
ministration is  now  seriously  considering 
presenting  a  proposal  to  Congress  for 
supplementary  economic  assistance  to 
Egypt  in  FY  1985. 

Persian  Gulf  Conflict 

In  the  tragic  war  in  the  gulf,  the 
Iranians  undertook  a  major  offensive 
across  the  marshlands  of  the  south  in 
March  and  failed  disastrously.  We  may 
never  know  the  cost  of  this  latest  cam- 
paign in  human  lives,  but  it  can  be 
reckoned  in  the  thousands  and  perhaps 
tens  of  thousands.  The  Iraqi  counterat- 
tack seems  to  have  recovered,  with  a 
terrible  cost  in  Iranian  lives,  most  of  the 
territory  Iran  had  gained  only  a  few 
days  earlier.  Meanwhile,  the  frequency 
of  attacks  by  both  sides  against  shipping 
in  the  gulf  has  increased  over  the  last 
month. 

An  ominous  development  since  we 
last  met  has  been  the  breakdown  of  the 
cease-fire  arranged  by  the  United  Na- 


tions for  civilian  population  centers.  Iraq 
is  carrying  out  aerial  bombardment  of 
Iranian  cities  and  economic  targets,  and 
Iran  has  employed  surface-to-surface 
missiles  against  Iraqi  cities.  The  capitals 
of  Tehran  and  Baghdad  have  both 
become  targets  in  the  war. 

Further,  it  is  our  conclusion  that  the 
Iraqis  have  used  chemical  weapons 
against  the  recent  invasion  attempt.  On 
this,  there  can  be  no  doubt  about  our 
position.  We  condemn  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  violation  of  interna- 
tional law  and  conventions  whenever 
and  wherever  it  occurs,  including  in  this 
latest  instance.  We  initially  raised  our 
concern  about  the  possible  use  of 
chemical  weapons  with  the  Iraqi  Govern- 
ment in  late  1983  and  were  the  first  to 
condemn  their  use  publicly  when  our  in- 
formation became  conclusive  in  March 
1984.  We  have  continued  to  express  our 
strong  views  to  Iraq  on  this  issue  and 
did  so  again  when  Foreign  Minister 
Tariq  Aziz  was  here  last  week. 

We  have  also  tried  to  get  at  the 
heart  of  the  problem  by  supporting  in- 
ternational efforts  toward  a  comprehen- 
sive settlement  of  the  war.  We  have 
done  so  to  protect  our  interest  in  the 
stability  of  the  region  and  to  halt  viola- 
tions of  international  standards  and  con- 
ventions against  the  use  of  chemical 
weapons,  the  use  of  children  in  combat, 
attacks  on  civilian  centers,  and  the 
abuse  of  prisoners  of  war. 

We  firmly  believe  that  there  can  be 
no  military  resolution  of  this  conflict. 
We  again  urge  Iran  to  join  Iraq  in  ac- 
cepting the  many  international  calls  for 
an  immediate  cease-fire  and  negotiations 
to  reach  a  settlement.  While  recognizing 
the  need  for  a  comprehensive  cease-fire, 
we  continue  to  support  all  steps  directed 
toward  ending  the  fighting,  including  ef- 
forts within  the  UN  context.  Unfor- 
tunately, we  see  no  evidence  that  Iran  is 
willing  either  to  come  to  the  bargaining 
table  to  end  this  war  or  to  forego  its 
support  of  terrorism  to  pursue  its  wider 
aims. 

U.S.  Security  Policy 

In  conclusion,  let  me  note  that  the  Ad- 
ministration has  been  undertaking  a 
comprehensive  review  of  our  security 
policy  in  the  Middle  East.  We  are  mak- 
ing satisfactory  progress  on  the  study. 
When  it  is  completed,  we  will  consult 
with  the  Congress.  Its  basic  purpose  is 
to  assess  the  relationship  of  our  security 
assistance  partnership  with  countries  in 
the  area  to  our  policy  goal  of  maintain- 
ing stability  in  the  region  and  to  our 
other  broad  political  and  military  objec- 


53 


MIDDLE  EAST 


tives.  Among  these  are  the  resolution  of 
regional  disputes,  the  foremost  of  which 
is  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  As  we  have 
said  before,  we  are  not  initiating  the 
sale  of  major  new  weapons  systems 
while  the  review  is  under  way.  Follow- 
ing the  review,  and  based  on  its  conclu- 
sions, we  will  make  decisions  on  the  con- 
tent and  timing  of  further  major  arms 
sales  to  Middle  Eastern  states. 

I  wish  to  emphasize  that  this  is  an 
assessment  of  our  policies  within  the 
context  of  longstanding  and  important 


security  relationships  with  countries  in 
the  region— including  Israel  and 
moderate  Arab  states.  We  expect  no 
fundamental  changes  in  our  policy  or  in 
our  commitments  to  states  in  the 
region. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearines 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.-lsrael  Free  Trade  Area  Agreement 


DEPARTMENT  FACT  SHEET, 
MAR.  5,  1985' 

On  November  29,  1983,  President 
Reagan  and  Israeli  Prime  Minister 
Shamir  agreed  to  proceed  with  bilateral 
negotiations  on  a  U.S. -Israeli  free  trade 
area,  which  the  Israeli  Government  had 
originally  proposed  in  1981.  Negotiations 
began  in  mid- January  1984  and  conclud- 
ed in  February  1985.  This  agreement 
will  eliminate  restrictions  on  substantial- 
ly all  trade  between  the  United  States 
and  Israel,  which  in  1984  represented 
$1.9  billion  in  U.S.  exports  and  $1.7 
billion  in  U.S.  imports. 

The  United  States  has  never  con- 
cluded an  agreement  of  this  kind.  We 
have  had  experience  in  undertaking 
more  limited  free  trade  area  arrange- 
ments, such  as  the  one-way,  duty-free 
trade  established  by  the  Caribbean  Basin 
Economic  Recovery  Act  (CBI)  and  the 
sectoral  free  trade  agreement  with 
Canada  in  the  automotive  sector.  But  we 
have  never  before  attempted  an  agree- 
ment which  fully  meets  the  definition  of 
a  free  trade  area. 

The  FTA  and  the  GATT 

A  free  trade  area  is  a  bilateral  arrange- 
ment between  two  countries  in  which 
each  country  removes  trade  barriers 
with  respect  to  the  other.  Under  Article 
XXIV  of  the  GATT  [General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  two  signatories  to 
that  agreement  may  create  a  free  trade 
area  provided  that  there  is  an  elimina- 
tion of  duties  and  other  restrictive 
regulations  of  commerce  on  substantially 
all  the  trade  between  the  two  countries 
undertaking  the  arrangement  and  that 
this  is  accomplished  in  a  reasonable 
length  of  time.  We  believe  the 
U.S.-lsrael  Free  Trade  Area  Agreement 
(FTA)  meets  the  GATT  requirements. 


Tariff  Reductions 

The  U.S.-lsrael  FTA  comprises  a  pream- 
ble and  23  separate  articles,  as  well  as 
four  Annexes,  which  are  integral  parts 
of  the  agreement.  Annexes  1  and  2  pro- 
vide the  respective  schedules  of  tariff 
reductions.  There  will  be  no  permanent 
product  exclusions  from  the  agreement. 
However,  there  will  be  some  differentia- 
tion in  the  treatment  of  products 
depending  on  their  sensitivity  and  tariff 
level.  For  purposes  of  duty  elimination, 
there  will  be  four  categories  of  products, 
which  will  be  identical  for  both  parties. 

•  Products  on  which  duties  will  be 
eliminated  immediately  upon  entry  into 
force  of  the  agreement; 

•  Products  on  which  duties  will  be 
eliminated  in  several  stages  by  January 
1.  1989; 

•  Products  on  which  duties  will  be 
eliminated  in  eight  stages  over  a  10-year 
period;  and 

•  Products  on  which  duties  will 
receive  no  reduction  for  a  .5-year  period. 
On  the  U.S.  side,  after  .5  years  we  will 
request  additional  advice  from  the  U.S. 
International  Trade  Commission  on 
these  products  and  will  then  negotiate 
the  elimination  of  duties  on  these  prod- 
ucts based  upon  that  advice. 

Nontariff  Provisions 

The  FTA  creates  consultation  mechan- 
isms, sets  out  rules  of  origin  (modeled 
on  the  CBI  rules  of  origin  with  slight 
modifications),  encourages  cooperation 
in  trade  in  services,  and  reaffirms 
bilateral  and  multilateral  trade  com- 
mitments. The  FTA  contains  a  strong 
commitment  from  the  Government  of 
Israel  that  it  will  eliminate  export  sub- 
sidies. In  addition,  both  parties  will  limit 
the  use  of  trade-related  balance-of- 


payments  actions  and  restrictive  licens- 
ing. The  agreement  also  includes  provi- 
sions on  intellectual  property  rights, 
trade-related  performance  requirements, 
and  dispute  settlement.  Both  Israel  and 
the  United  States,  parties  to  the  GATT 
government  procurement  code,  have 
agreed  to  additional  restrictions  on  the 
application  of  "buy  national"  regulations. 
Both  nations  may  maintain  limited  im- 
port restrictions  based  on  agricultural 
policy  considerations,  and  Israel  retains 
a  right  to  impose,  on  the  principle  of  its 
religious  dietary  laws. 

The  agreement  ensures  the  U.S. 
trade  remedy  legislation  (i.e.,  counter- 
vailing duty,  antidumping,  etc.)  is  not 
contravened.  There  are  stricter  limits 
than  required  by  the  GATT  on  the  use 
of  protective  measures  to  benefit  infant 
industries.  More  precise  and  modern 
standards  are  included  which  modify  the 
right  of  both  parties  to  increase  their 
specific  duties  to  keep  pace  with  change; 
in  the  value  of  their  currency.  Both  par- 
ties have  agreed  that  no  new  tariff  or 
nontariff  measures  may  be  applied 
bilaterally  except  as  permitted  by  the 
terms  of 'the  FTA  or  by  the  GATT. 

Status  of  the  FTA 

The  text  of  the  agreement,  together 
with  implementing  legislation,  have  beer 
submitted  to  the  appropriate  congres- 
sional committees  for  their  informal 
review.  After  the  review  has  been  com- 
pleted, which  we  anticipate  will  be  early 
April,  the  agreement  will  be  signed  and 
officially  transmitted  to  the  Congress. 
Within  60  days  the  Congress  will  vote 
for  or  against  approval  (i.e.,  no  amend- 
ments). The  date  of  the  FTA's  entry  int. 
force  will  be  determined  by  the  length  o 
time  needed  by  both  governments  to 
complete  the  necessary  administrative 
procedures. 


'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  Department  spokesman  Bernard  Kalb.  ■ 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


MIDDLE  EAST 


\^isit  of  Egyptian  President 


President  Mohamed  Hosrd  Mubarak 
if  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  made  an 
ifficial  working  visit  to  Washington, 
I.e.,  March  9-13,  1985,  to  meet  with 
^resident  Reagan  and  other  government 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  after 
heir  meeting  and  dinner  toasts  made  by 
^residents  Reagan  and  Mubarak  on 
Warch  12.^ 


lEMARKS  FOLLOWING 
THE  MEETING, 
tfAR.  12,  1985=^ 

'resident  Reagan 

have  enjoyed  this  opportunity  to  host 
^resident  Mubarak  and  to  exchange 
news  with  him  on  issues  of  mutual  in- 
,erest  and  importance  to  Egypt  and  the 
Jnited  States. 

As  close  friends  and  partners  in 
jeace,  we've  had  a  good  discussion,  in- 
luding  a  thorough  review  of 
levelopments  in  the  Middle  East  area. 
The  substantial  economic  and  military 
issistance  that  we're  requesting  for 
Egypt  reflects  our  strong  commitment 
-0  Egypt's  security  and  economic  well- 
leing. 

Earlier  this  morning  our  represen- 
atives  signed  agreements  which  will 
•esult  in  $215  million  in  U.S.  assistance 
;o  support  rehabilitation  of  Egypt's  in- 
frastructure, $300  million  in  balance-of- 
Dayments  support  which  will  enable 


Let  us  hope  that  the  positive  trends 
that  have  recently  begun  in  the  region 
will  be  strengthened  and,  that  with 
Egypt's  valued  help,  they  will  open  the 
path  to  direct  negotiations.  In  the  full 
knowledge  that  the  parties  are  still  a 
long  way  from  the  negotiating  table,  the 
United  States  takes  an  active  interest  in 
these  developments,  and  we'll  support 
the  parties'  efforts  to  build  on  this  prom- 
ising beginning. 

The  road  to  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  has  been  long,  frustrating,  and 
marked  by  great  tragedy.  Fortunately 
there  have  also  been  great  achieve- 
ments, such  as  the  Egyptian-Israeli 
peace  treaty,  which  reminds  us  that  suc- 
cess is  possible — it's  not  only  possible, 
it's  imperative. 

I  reassured  President  Mubarak  of 
the  commitment  of  the  United  States 
and  my  personal  commitment  to  work 
with  Egypt  and  our  other  friends  in  the 
area  to  achieve  a  just  and  lasting  peace. 


-  President  Mubarak 


Egypt  to  buy  needed  goods  from  the 
United  States.  Egypt  faces  economic  dif- 
ficulties, and  as  your  friend  and  full 
partner  in  the  Middle  East  peace  proc- 
ess, we'll  be  giving  careful  and  sym- 
pathetic consideration  to  what  we  might 
do  to  help. 

A  major  focus  of  our  talks  today 
was  how  to  broaden  the  historic  Middle 
East  peace  process.  And  Egypt's  ex- 
perience as  peacemaker  and  your  leader- 
ship in  the  region  uniquely  suits  you  to 
help  build  new  bridges  of  understanding, 
confidence,  hope,  and  trust. 

Recently,  President  Mubarak,  you've 
made  suggestions  which  have  helped 
renew  interest  in  the  peace  process.  I 
regard  them  as  a  positive  contribution, 
and  I  appreciate  the  constructive  spirit 
in  which  you  offered  them.  We  note  par- 
ticularly your  realistic  assessment  that 
the  path  to  peace  between  Israel  and  its 
Arab  neighbors  is  through  direct 
negotiations. 

The  United  States  continues  to 
believe  that  such  negotiations  should 
take  place  on  the  basis  of  UN  Security 
Council  Resolution  242,  which  provides 
both  for  the  restoration  of  Arab  land 
and  the  right  of  Israel,  as  all  states  in 
the  region,  to  live  in  peace  within  secure 
and  recognized  borders.  As  reaffirmed 
in  my  initiative  of  September  1,  1982, 
the  United  States  also  believes  that  the 
outcome  of  this  process  must  recognize 
the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people. 


President  Reagan,  it  was  a  great 
pleasure  to  meet  with  you  once  again,  in 
the  spirit  of  friendship  and  the  fraterni- 
ty which  characterizes  our  relations. 

As  ever,  I  found  the  conversations 
were  most  constructive  and  rewarding. 
Our  friendly  meeting  today  reaffirmed 
my  belief  that  you  are  a  man  of  honor 
and  vision.  It's  a  good  omen  that  our 
meeting  today  coincides  with  the  150th 
anniverary  of  the  establishment  of  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries. 
Throughout  these  years  we  have 
endeavored  to  set  up  a  model  for 
cooperation  among  nations.  Our  bilateral 
relations  are  moving  from  good  to  ex- 
cellent. We  encounter  no  problems  in 
setting  the  stage  for  more  cooperation, 
which  is  equally  profitable. 

We  conduct  our  relations  on  the 
basis  of  mutual  respect  and  profound 
understanding.  Your  appreciation  of  the 
efforts  the  Egyptian  people  are  exerting 
on  the  road  of  economic  development 
and  reform  is  recognized  by  every  Egyp- 
tian. On  the  other  hand,  your  commit- 
ment to  peace  and  justice  in  our  part  of 
the  world  is  unwavering.  I  am  pleased  to 
note  that  we  agree,  together,  on  the 
centrality  of  the  Palestinian  question  to 
the  situation  in  the  Middle  East.  It  is 
the  key  to  progress  and  the  source  of 
despair  and  tension.  Hence,  we  should 
devote  ourselves  to  reaching  a  just  and 
honorable  solution,  therefore,  without 
delay. 

I  believe  that  no  nation  is  more 
qualified  than  America  to  support  the 
Palestinian  peoples'  right  to  self- 


55 


MIDDLE  EAST 


determination.  This  is  a  stand  that  is 
consistent  with  the  American  heritage 
and  values.  This  country  was  founded  on 
the  principle  that  all  men  are  equal  and 
were  created  by  God  Almighty  to  live  m 
freedom  and  dignity. 

I  also  believe  that  no  leader  is  more 
equipped  to  play  an  historic  role  and 
fulfill  a  sacred  mission  in  the  Middle 
East.  Destiny  has  chosen  you  to  lead 
this  great  nation  at  a  time  when  a 
golden  opportunity  for  peace  is  emerg- 
ing- .   . 

The  Jordanian-Palestinian  agree- 
ment to  pursue  a  peaceful  settlement  is 
a  major  development  that  should  not  be 
discounted  or  discarded.  We  cannot  af- 
ford another  missed  opportunity  for 
peace,  and  not  during  your  presidency. 
I'm  confident  that  the  United  States  will 
act  without  delay  in  order  to  keep  the 
momentum  going  and  to  pave  the  way 
for  further  progress.  We  have  discussed 
the  variety  of  available  options  for 
following  up  this  move. 

In  the  months  ahead  we  shall  work 
together  as  faithful  partners  on  the  road 
to  peace.  We  shall  persevere  in  our  drive 
which  aims  at  bridging  the  gap  existing 
between  the  positions  of  the  parts  and 
ushering  in  a  new  era  of  peace  and 
reconciliation. 

We  realize  that  the  task  is  difficult 
and  the  challenge  is  great,  but  the  cause 
is  greater.  During  the  past  few  years 
you  offered  your  help  to  African  coun- 
tries suffering  from  the  drought  and 
famine;  this  has  been  appreciated  by 
fellow  Africans.  May  I  suggest  that  the 
United  States  champions  a  worldwide  ef- 
fort to  cope  with  the  problem  on  a  long- 
term  basis.  May  I  also  express  our  con- 
fidence that  the  United  States  will  spare 
no  effort  in  order  to  help  end  the  plight 
of  our  brothers  in  southern  Africa  and 
secure  the  immediate  independence  of 
Namibia. 

Again,  Mr.  President,  thank  you, 
dear  friend,  and  I'm  looking  forward  to 
meeting  with  you  again  in  pursuit  of  our 
common  goals,  and  thank  you. 

DINNER  TOASTS, 
MAR.  12,  19853 

President  Reagan 


President  Mubarak's  visit  here 
underscores  the  special  bonds  of  friend- 
ship that  have  developed  over  many 
years  between  Egypt  and  the  United 
States.  Our  two  countries  are  partners 
in  a  broad  range  of  endeavors,  most 
notably  as  full  partners  in  the  search  for 
a  lasting  Middle  East  peace.  Today 


there's  a  renewal  of  hope  that  the  peace 
process  can  be  broadened  and  in- 
vigorated. 

Egypt's  indispensable  leadership 
position  in  the  area  is  reflected  in  its  im- 
portant dialogue  with  two  key  coun- 
tries—Israel and  Jordan.  And,  after  all, 
we're  engaged  in  a  process  that  can  only 
advance  with  the  support  of  those 
directly  concerned.  In  this  respect, 
Egypt  is  uniquely  equipped  to  help 
reconcile  differing  points  of  view  and 
build  the  solid  bridge  of  confidence 
necessary  for  progress. 

As  you  recently  emphasized,  the 
path  to  peace  that  recognizes  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  peo- 
ple is  through  direct  negotiations.  The 
inescapable  basis  for  such  negotiations  is 
UN  Security  Council  Resolution  242, 
which  provides  both  for  the  restoration 
of  Arab  land  and  for  the  right  of  Israel 
and  all  states  to  live  in  peace  within 
secure  and  recognized  borders.  The 
challenge  now  is  to  clear  the  way  so  that 
negotiations  can  begin.  We  shouldn't 
underestimate  the  obstacles— we  never 
have— but  we  shouldn't  be  daunted  by 
them  either. 

One  question  that  we  must  address 
forthrightly  is  how  the  Palestinians 
should  be  represented.  And,  you've  wise- 
ly stressed  the  need  for  practicality.  In 
our  quest  for  peace,  we  reaffirm  with 
you  that  in  all  stages  of  the  negotiating 
process  there  should  be  Palestinian  par- 
ticipation. As  we've  said  many  times 
before,  these  Palestinians  should  include 
representatives  from  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  and  other  Palestinians  as  mutually 
agreed  to  by  the  parties. 

Now,  these  are  wide  parameters; 
they  provide  ample  scope;  and  they 
should  be  put  to  use.  And  in  this  context 
we  especially  welcome  the  improvement 
in  the  EgjT>tian-Israeli  dialogue.  And  the 
integrity  of  this  relationship  is  the  cor- 
nerstone of  the  peace  process. 

With  realism  as  our  guide,  let  us 
seize  this  moment  to  rededicate 
ourselves  to  the  task  of  peace.  And  with 
your  continued  help  and  commitment,  I 
feel  sure  that  we  will  make  great 
progress. 

In  this  spirit,  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
please  join  me  in  a  toast  to  President 
Mubarak  and  Mrs.  Mubarak  and  to  a 
broadening  of  the  process  of  peace  to 
which  Egypt  has  so  courageously 
contributed. 


President  Mubarak 


»iit 


toi 


Today  we  had  a  working  session  and  a 
working  lunch.  I  pursued  the  work  by 
having  two  sessions  in  the  Congress, 
where  I  met  with  friends  in  both  the 
Senate  and  the  House.  It  was  a  full 
working  day,  and  I  take  it  that  you 
thought  that  we  deserve  to  have  this 
dinner  and  to  see  this  magnificent,  new- 
ly redecorated  quarters  in  the  State 
Department— another  good  piece  of 
work  of  my  friend,  George  Shultz. 

President  Reagan,  in  my  remarks  to 
day,  as  we  departed  after  lunch,  I  refer- 
red to  the  establishment  of  formal 
Egyptian-American  relations  150  years 
ago.  There  is,  however,  another  aspect 
to  this  event:  the  role  of  individual 
Americans  who  began  to  visit  Egypt 
since  the  early  years  of  last  century. 
Most  of  them  were  fascinated  by  the 
history  of  our  people  and  of  our  land. 
They  wanted  to  unravel  the  mystery  ol 
all  the  Egyptian  civilizations.  They  sailed 
down  the  Nile.  They  lived  by  the 
monuments.  They  recorded  their  obser- 
vations in  articles  and  in  letters.  Some 
of  them  returned  home  with  samples  of 
antiquities,  and  some  even  remained  and 
were  employed  by  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment. The  Washington  Monument, 
which  stands  marvelously  in  your 
capital,  was  inspired  by  those  eariy 
Americans  who  came  to  admire  Egyp- 
tian obelisks.  Thus,  many  achievements 
in  American-Egyptian  relations  took 
place  particulariy  on  the  human  and  the 
cultural  levels. 

The  movement  has  not  been  con- 
fined to  Americans  traveling  to  Egypt; 
but  Egyptians  also  traveled  and  even 
settled  in  America.  In  fact,  a  new 
phenomena  was  born:  the  immigrant 
Egyptian  settling  in  America.  I  am  hap- 
py and  proud  to  see  many  of  them,  all 
walks  of  American  life:  university  pro- 
fessors, doctors,  scientists,  engineers, 
workers,  et  cetera.  I  am  sure  that  you 
would  agree  with  me  that  it  was  the 
pure  individual  initiative  which  brought 
about  these  achievements. 

There  is  also  something  else  to  it 
that  brings  our  peoples  together.  It 
could  be  a  certain  sense  of  optimism 
about  life  whose  root  is  faith  in  God.  I 
was  touched  during  this  visit  by  a 
distinguished  Congressman  who  to  Id  me 
that  he  noticed  the  warmest  friendly 
relations  between  the  Americans  and  thi 
Egyptian  peoples  even  when  your 
former  relations  were  under  strain  for  a 
brief  period  in  the  past. 

Today  Egyptian-American  relations 
provide  in  their  intensity  an  ever-greate 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


jxample  of  solid  friendship,  based  on 
nutual  respect  and  whose  objective  is 
nothing  more  noble  than  strengthening 
he  cause  of  peace  in  our  part  of  the 
vorld.  We  both  share  an  irreversible 
■oiiimitment  to  bring  total  peace  to  an 
area  whose  peoples  have  long  suffered 
From  conflicts  and  violence.  Nothing  is 
more  worthwhile  than  an  investment  in 
peace.  In  the  interdependent  world  in 
vhich  we  live,  such  an  investment 
)ecomes  even  more  precious,  if  not  in- 
lispensable.  It  is  in  that  sense  that  the 
\merican-Egyptian  partnership  is  a 
partnership  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East 
md,  as  such,  offers  the  greatest  con- 
;ribution  to  the  world  peace. 

Let  me  once  again  congratulate  you 
)n  the  fact  that  you  have  been  reelected 
he  President  of  the  great  Nation  by 
such  an  impressive  majority  of  the 
American  people.  What  stands  behind 
;hat  are  great  American  values:  faith  in 
jod,  faith  in  human  ingenuity,  courage, 
ind  enlightened  patriotism. 

Let  me  also  express  our  admiration 
'or  Vice  President  George  Bush,  who  I 
inow  did  all  the  best  and  planned  his 
;ravels  in  such  a  way  that  he  would  have 
-nade  it  possible  for  us  to  meet  with  him 
lere  during  the  trip.  But,  as  the  saying 
joes  in  Arabic,  "Man  plans  and  God 
determines." 

Dear  President  and  dear  friends, 
may  I  wish  you  to  rise  in  a  tribute  of  ad- 
miration and  respect  for  the  President 
Df  the  United  States,  President  Ronald 
Reagan,  and  for  his  great  country,  the 
United  States,  and  the  great  American 
people. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  18,  1985. 

^Made  to  news  correspondents  assembled 
at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White  House. 

^Made  in  the  Thomas  Jefferson  Room  at 
the  Department  of  State  (opening  remarks 
omitted  here).  ■ 


Strategic  Defense  Initiative 


by  Robert  C.  McFarlane 

Address  before,  the  Overseas  Writers 
Association  on  March  7,  1985.  Mr. 
McFarlane  is  Assistant  to  the  President 
for  National  Security  Affairs. 

No  issue  is  of  greater  importance  to 
mankind  today  than  strategic  stability. 
A  world  awaits,  with  asperity,  the 
reconvening  of  nuclear  arms  control 
negotiations  on  March  12.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  returned  to  the  bargaining 
table,  and  we  welcome  them  back. 
Ahead  of  us  stretches  a  difficult  path. 
The  United  States  seeks  equitable  and 
verifiable  agreements  which  significantly 
reduce  the  size  of  both  U.S.  and  Soviet 
nuclear  arsenals.  We  hope  the  Soviet 
Union  will  join  us  in  a  constructive 
search  for  necessary  solutions  to  our  dif- 
ferences. 


A  Historical  Perspective 

These  differences  are  profound.  To  see 
this  best,  it  is  useful  to  take  a  historical 
perspective.  We  live  in  a  world  of 
change.  As  in  social  and  scientific  areas, 
the  strategic  picture  too  has  changed 
greatly  since  the  early  1970s  when  the 
ABM  [Anti-Ballistic  Missile]  Treaty  was 
signed.  Certain  hopes  and  assumptions 
underlying  that  treaty,  and  the  accom- 
panying SALT  I  [strategic  arms  limita- 
tion talks]  Interim  Agreement,  have 
been  altered  substantially. 

One  of  these  underlying  assumptions 
was  that  the  two  agreements  would  lead 
to  real  reductions  in  offensive  nuclear 
systems.  That  didn't  happen.  In  negotia- 
tions, the  Soviet  Union  has  consistently 
refused  to  accept  meaningful  and 
verifiable  reductions  in  offensive  nuclear 
arsenals.  SALT  II  did  no  more  than  set 
caps  on  already  high  levels  of  strategic 
arms.  It  is  clear  now  that  the  Soviet 
Union  never  intended  to  settle  for  the 
rough  equivalence  of  offensive  strategic 
forces  foreshadowed  in  the  SALT  I 
agreements. 

Since  SALT  I  was  signed,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  deployed  eight  new  strategic 
ballistic  missiles,  five  new  ballistic 
missile  submarine  classes,  and  a  new 
strategic  bomber.  In  comparison,  the 
United  States  has  fielded  only  one  new 
missile  system,  one  submarine  class,  and 
has  delayed  deployment  of  the  B-1 
bomber.  This  buildup  by  the  Soviet 
Union  has  altered  the  balance  between 


June  1985 


opposing  forces  so  necessary  to  main- 
taining stable  deterrence.  We  are  very 
concerned  about  the  qualities  of  new 
Soviet  ballistic  missile  systems.  In  time 
of  crisis,  these  weapons  are  the  most 
destiibilizing;  they  are  swift,  carry  a  big 
payload,  are  mobile,  and  are  accurate.  It 
is  becoming  increasingly  apparent  that 
the  Soviet  Union  is  acquiring  a  sur- 
vivable,  first-strike  capability  which  will 
be  far  less  easy  to  deter. 

The  second  assumption  was  that 
there  would  be  mutual  restraints  on 
strategic  defense.  This  was  based  on  the 
hope  that  the  Soviets  would  come  to  ac- 
cept, in  doctrine  and  in  practice,  that 
this  mutual  vulnerability  to  each  other's 
offensive  nuclear  forces  was  in  our  com- 
mon interest.  This  innocent  expectation 
did  not  materialize  either.  While  the 
United  States  stopped  deployment  of 
strategic  defenses,  the  Soviet  Union  con- 
tinued to  develop  and  deploy  successive 
generations  of  antiballistic  missiles, 
tracking  radars,  interceptor  aircraft, 
and  surface-to-air  missiles.  In  fact, 
spending  on  strategic  defense  has  been 
equal  to  or  greater  than  that  on 
strategic  offense.  They  have  deployed 
around  Moscow  the  world's  only  ballistic 
missile  defensive  system.  Soviet 
research  and  development  of  more  ad- 
vanced technologies,  including 
sophisticated  directed  energy  weapons, 
proceeded  throughout  the  1970s  into  the 
mid-1980s  at  a  pace  far  in  excess  of  our 
own  efforts.  Furthermore,  along  with 
already  deployed  phased-array  radars, 
construction  continues  on  one  in  central 
Siberia  apparently  capable  of  battle 
management,  in  clear  violation  of  the 
ABM  Treaty.  They  have  constructed 
numerous  hardened  leadership  bunkers 
and  continue  expansion  of  their  exten- 
sive network  of  civil  defense.  Alto- 
gether, these  efforts  increase  the 
possibility  of  sudden  Soviet  abandon- 
ment of  the  ABM  Treaty  and  rapid  na- 
tionwide expansion  of  their  antiballistic 
defenses. 

We  could  say  that  a  third  assump- 
tion, not  surprisingly,  was  an  expecta- 
tion in  the  West  that  these  and  other 
arms  control  agreements  would  be  fully 
observed.  Here,  too,  we  have  been  disap- 
pointed. The  Soviet  record  on  com- 
pliance overall  is,  at  best,  disappointing. 
And  it  is  particularly  disturbing  in  the 
strategic  area,  where  they  have  commit- 
ted serious  violations  of  both  offensive 
and  defensive  agreements.  Although  we 


57 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


have  pursued  resolution  of  these  viola- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  in  diplomatic 
channels,  we  have  received  little 
satisfaction  to  date. 

There  is  one  more  change  I  would 
like  to  mention.  The  assumptions  made 
by  the  American  negotiators  in  1972 
also  had  a  technological  premise.  It  was 
not  feasible  then  to  develop  an  effective 
defense  against  ballistic  missiles.  But 
technology  does  not  stand  still.  Just  as 
we  have  observed  the  qualitative  ad- 
vance in  strategic  offensive  arms,  new 
breakthroughs  in  the  past  few  years 
offer  the  promise  that  a  militarily  sound 
and  cost-effective  defense  may  be 
possible. 

The  Pattern  Since  1972 

The  pattern  since  1972  is  clear  and  dis- 
turbing. Soviet  actions  have  disproved 
our  assumptions  and  thwarted  real  arms 
reductions.  The  balances  between  offen- 
sive forces,  which  have  for  years  main- 
tained deterrence  between  the  nuclear 
powers,  are  being  upset  by  the  Soviet 
Union.  Restraint  on  our  part  since 
SALT  I  in  the  deployment  of  offensive 
strategic  weapons  has  gone  unmatched 
by  the  Soviets.  Instead,  they  have  con- 
tinued to  increase  the  size,  mobility,  and 
accuracy  of  their  offensive  nuclear 
arsenals. 

No  less  alarming,  in  both  size  and 
scope,  is  their  investment  in  strategic 
defense  over  the  last  20  years.  As  they 
develop  antiballistic  missiles  capable  of 
being  moved  and  widely  deployed  in 
relatively  little  time,  we  must  ask,  for 
what  purpose?  When  they  harden  an  ex- 
panding system  of  command  and  con- 
trol, we  must  ask  the  question,  why?  As 
they  shield  their  leadership,  harden  their 
missile  silos,  and  spend  vast  sums  on 
civil  defense,  we  must  ask,  to  what  end? 
The  West  simply  has  not  posed  a  grow- 
ing threat  that  would  warrant  such 
Soviet  actions.  But  faced  with  Soviet  un- 
willingness to  date  to  agree  to  mutual, 
verifiable  reductions  in  offensive 
arsenals,  the  West  has  no  choice.  We 
have  to  examine  restoring  the  balance 
and  alternative  means  for  preserving  a 
stable  deterrence.  We  face  three  inter- 
related options  in  our  efforts  to  restore 
and  maintain  the  balance. 

First,  we  can  attempt,  through 
negotiations,  to  get  the  Soviets  to 
reduce  offensive  systems  to  equal  levels. 
This  will  be  our  [)riority  task  in  Geneva. 
But,  if  the  past  is  any  guide,  our  job  will 
be  difficult.  We  are  prepared  to  be  open, 
flexible,  and  constructive  and  will  work 
diligently  with  the  Soviet  Union  to 


negotiate  effective,  verifiable  arms 
reductions.  Remember,  though,  it  will 
take  two  to  make  these  negotiations 
work. 

Second,  we  can  try  to  reverse  the 
trends  by  simply  attempting  to  match 
the  Soviet  activity  and  maintain  an  of- 
fensive nuclear  balance.  In  the  short 
run,  we  certainly  have  to  restore  and 
maintain  that  balance  until  other  options 
are  available.  Our  strategic  moderniza- 
tion program  and  NATO's  LRINF 
[longer  range  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  missile  modernization 
programs  do  this. 

Finally,  we  can  devote  our  energies 
to  see  if  there  is  a  better  way  to  provide 
for  the  security  of  both  the  United 
States  and  our  allies  by  strengthening 
deterrence  through  greater  reliance  on 
defensive  systems — systems  that 
threaten  no  one. 

We  will  pursue  all  three  options  in 
the  necessary  and  appropriate  ways. 

•  We  will  press  on  in  pursuit  of 
equitable  and  verifiable  arms  reductions. 
But  this  must  be  a  two-way  street,  and 
it  will  take  time. 

•  We  will  maintain  the  nuclear 
balance  until  other  alternatives  are 
available.  Peacekeeper  and  the  NATO 
LRINF  modernization  program  are 
essential  in  this  regard. 

•  Finally,  we  must  explore  the 
growing  potential  of  the  new  defensive 
technologies. 

The  Need  To  Explore 
Strategic  Defenses 

Let  me  concentrate  on  the  need  to  ex- 
plore strategic  defenses,  and  give  you 
three  concrete  argximents  why  we  have 
made  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
(SDI)  a  central  point  of  our  defense 
programs. 

The  first  argument  revolves  around 
deterrence.  We  have  ignored  one  basic 
fact  about  a  world  in  which  there  are  no 
defenses.  Without  defenses,  it  is  ex- 
tremely easy  for  an  attacker  to  plan  his 
first  strike.  Once  an  attacker  launches 
his  ICBM  [intercontinental  ballistic 
missile],  he  knows,  within  a  certain 
range,  just  what  damage  he  will  do 
because  there  is  nothing  to  interfere 
with  his  attack.  He  can  plan  anil 
calculate  just  what  forces  he  needs  to 
destroy  the  forces  on  the  other  side.  If 
he  has  the  money  and  the  inclination,  he 
can  then  buy  those  forces.  It  is  basically 
an  engineering  problem.  Well,  the 
Soviets  have  done  their  calculations,  and 
they  have  had  the  time  and  money  to 
buy  their  forces. 


But  when  you  introduce  defenses, 
even  defenses  that  are  less  than  perfect, 
the  problem  is  entirely  different.  An  at- 
tacker will  not  be  able  to  launch  a 
missile  and  destroy  a  target.  He  has  no  ' 
real  idea  of  whether  his  attack  plan  will 
work  or,  if  he  succeeds  partially,  which 
targets  he  will  miss  because  he  cannot 
know  how  good  our  defenses  will  be. 
The  defender  will  also  be  uncertain.  But 
he  is  not  deciding  whether  to  attack. 
With  defenses,  suddenly  what  was  an 
engineering  problem  becomes  a  much 
tougher,  more  expensive  military  prob- 
lem. Even  defenses  that  are  imperfect 
strengthen  deterrence  because  they 
create  enormous  headaches  and  uncer- 
tainties for  anyone  contemplating  an  at- 
tack. That  is  a  good  thing  to  do. 

The  second  point  involves  saving 
lives.  Very  bluntly,  we  can  deter  an  at- 
tack by  defeating  that  attack  or  by 
threatening  to  kill  enemy  civilians  in 
retaliation.  There  is  no  question  in  my 
mind  that  it  is  far  better  to  be  able  to 
defeat  the  attack  and  thus  deter  it  from 
occurring  in  the  first  place.  SDI,  for  the 
reasons  I  have  just  discussed,  can  help 
us  make  that  judgment,  without  de- 
fenses, we  must  continue  to  rely  on 
retaliation  in  order  to  deter  a  nuclear 
attack. 

Many  of  those  who  oppose  SDI  ad- 
vocate reliance  on  assured  destruction  ii 
order  to  keep  the  peace.  Let  me  point 
out  something  about  assured  destruc- 
tion. There  has  been  much  discussion 
about  nuclear  winter  recently.  While 
there  are  many  uncertainties,  one  thing 
is  clear.  Nuclear  winter  is  most  likely  to 
be  caused  by  the  smoke  and  dust  from 
burning  cities  that  have  been  attacked 
by  nuclear  weapons.  Everything  in  our 
Administration's  strategic  weapons 
policy,  including  SDI,  is  designed  to 
move  us  away  from  that  kind  of  attack. 
Those  who  disagree  with  us  and  who 
continue  to  support  the  discredited 
policy  of  assured  destruction  must  face 
the  following  fact:  the  kind  of  war  that 
could  occur  if  their  policies  were  adoptee 
is  precisely  the  kind  of  war  most  likely 
to  cause  nuclear  winter. 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  address  a 
problem  less  massive  but  perhaps  more 
urgent  than  deterring  a  Soviet  attack. 
Our  efforts  to  prevent  nuclear  prolifera- 
tion have  had  a  good  deal  of  success. 
Certainly  there  are  fewer  countries  to- 
day with  nuclear  weapons  than  anyone 
would  have  predicted  20  years  ago.  But 
many  countries  continue  to  seek  nuclear 
weapons.  We  know  that  many  of  them 
also  seek  ballistic  missile  technology.  Wt 
will  not  reduce  our  nonproliferation 
work.  But  I  believe  it  is  an  act  of  simple 


58 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletin 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


prudence  to  investigate  defenses  that 
could  defeat  limited  nuclear  attacks  or 
accidental  nuclear  attacks. 

The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 

For  these  reasons,  President  Reagan 
has  asked  this  nation  to  undertake  a 
program  of  vigorous  research,  the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  It  will  focus 
on  advanced  defensive  technologies  with 
the  aim  of  finding  ways  to  provide  a  bet- 
ter basis  for  deterring  aggression, 
strengthening  stability,  and  increasing 
the  security  of  the  United  States  and 
our  allies.  Our  efforts  will  be  in  full  com- 
pliance with  the  ABM  Treaty. 

In  practical  terms,  a  strategic  defen- 
sive option  must  be  cost  effective.  That 
is,  it  must  be  cheaper  and  easier  to  add 
defensive  capability  than  offensive 
capability.  Otherwise,  there  would  be  in- 
centive to  expand  the  offensive  arms  we 
seek  to  reduce.  In  addition,  any  defen- 
sive system  must  be  survivable  in  the 
face  of  attack  or  else  it  could  invite  an 
effort  to  overwhelm  it  regardless  of 
cost.  The  goal  of  strategic  stability 
demands  such  high  performance  stand- 
ards. 

In  our  relations  with  other  nations, 
strategic  defensive  options  must  satisfy 
not  only  our  own  security  concerns  but 
also  those  of  our  allies  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  United  States  is  actively  con- 
sulting our  allies  to  respond  to  their  con- 
cerns and  questions  regarding  SDI. 
Since  this  is  a  research  program,  their 
thoughts  are  essential  as  we  examine 
the  capabilities  and  set  performance 
criteria  for  the  defensive  technology. 
Further,  no  step  away  from  an  offensive 
deterrent  structure  which  has  so  effec- 
tively kept  the  peace  in  Europe  can  or 
will  ignore  the  voice  of  our  allies.  Our 
own  national  survival  depends  on  our 
allies'  security  from  attack  and  safety 
from  all  wars. 

In  the  new  negotiations  in  Geneva 
and  in  other  talks,  we  hope  to  develop 
with  the  Soviet  Union  mutual  under- 
standing of  each  other's  security  con- 
cerns. The  United  States  does  not  seek 
superiority.  This  is  difficult  for  the 
Soviet  Union  to  comprehend  since  they 
judge  us  by  their  own  ambitions.  But, 
the  facts  of  history  are  clear  in  this 
regard.  No  nation  in  history  has  acted  so 
responsibly  while  possessing  so  superior 
a  position  in  weaponry  as  the  United 
States  after  World  War  II,  when  we 
were  the  only  nation  with  nuclear  arms. 
We  are  ready,  if  the  technology  proves 
feasible  and  cost  effective,  to  consider 
integration  of  defensive  systems  into  the 
mix  of  forces  of  both  sides.  This  would 


be  in  the  context  of  a  cooperative, 
balanced,  and  verifiable  environment 
that  reflects  a  balance  of  offensive  and 
defensive  forces  in  ways  that  reduce 
existing  nuclear  arsenals  while  en- 
hancing security  and  stability.  If  our 
research  proves  the  feasibility  of  the 
concepts,  a  negotiated  transition  period 
of  many  years  with  assurance  of  stabili- 
ty and  security  throughout  will  be 
essential. 

Finally,  there  are  at  least  four 
myths  about  SDI  which  I  wish  to  dispel. 

•  The  first  myth  is  that  the  United 
States  is  attempting  to  "militarize 
space."  This  is  a  Soviet  propaganda  line, 
and  it  is  grievously  misleading.  Ac- 
tivities in  space  generally  fall  into  three 
categories:  commercial,  scientific,  and 
military.  Orbiting  overhead  are  over  800 
Soviet  satellites,  compared  to  some  400 
satellites  of  the  West.  That  is  a  ratio  of 
2  to  1,  and  unlike  in  the  West,  the  vast 
majority  of  Soviet  satellites  are  military. 
These  military  satellites  travel  overhead 
in  a  space  the  Soviets  threaten  with  the 
only  antisatellite  weapons  now  in  exist- 
ence. Further,  it  was  the  Soviet  Union 
which  first  developed,  in  1957,  the 
ICBMs  which  travel  through  space  and 
which  now  carry  far  more  warheads  in 
total  than  U.S.  systems.  What  space  is 
there  left  which  the  Soviet  Union  has 
not  already  militarized?  Space  has  long 
been  used  for  military  purposes.  When 
the  Soviet  Union  speaks  of  "preventing 
the  militarization  of  space"  and  of  an 
ASAT  [antisatellite  weapon]  mora- 
torium, they  are  being  extremely  dis- 
ingenuous by  ignoring  15  years  of  their 
determined  effort  in  this  domain. 

•  The  next  myth  is  that  the  United 
States  is  upsetting  an  agreed  philosophy 
of  "mutual  assured  destruction,"  upon 
which  strategic  stability  allegedly  rests. 

I  hope  I  have  exploded  that  myth 
already  today  by  describing  the 
destabilizing  march  of  the  Soviet 
strategic  buildup  and  the  ever-expanding 
shielding  of  their  forces  and  leadership 
from  "assured  destruction."  A 
U.S. -Soviet  comparison  of  the  invest- 
ment in  so-called  passive  defense  of  the 
shielding  of  populations  and  economic 
base  from  nuclear  attack  is  simply  not 
possible.  So  large  is  the  Soviet  effort 
and  so  minimal  is  our  own  that  the  ratio 
approaches  absurdity.  Their  civil  defense 
preparations  are  enormous.  Our  own 
small  efforts  show  we  in  the  West  have 
great  difficulty  even  conceiving  of  life 
after  a  nuclear  war. 


•  Third,  the  Soviet  Union  contends 
that  SDI  will  be  destabilizing.  Their 
stated  apprehension  over  the  demise  of 
a  stable  deterrent  is  ironic.  The  United 
States  is  heavily  involved  in  diplomatic 
and  private  consultations  as  it  ponders 
the  accelerating  developments  in 
strategic  defense  which  hold  promise  for 
strengthening  deterrence  in  the  future. 
As  I  stated  earlier,  strategic  defensive 
options  must  also  strengthen  stability, 
or  they  will  not  be  considered.  The 
Soviet  Union,  on  the  other  hand,  con- 
tinues to  develop  and  deploy  a  new 
generation  of  strategic  offensive  ballistic 
missiles  and  expand  their  already  con- 
siderable defensive  capabilities.  They 
have  consulted  with  no  one  and  feel  they 
should  answer  to  no  one,  as  they  further 
upset  a  stable  balance  in  pursuit  of  their 
own  internal  needs. 

•  The  last  myth  is  that  the  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  will  complicate  the 
arms  control  process.  The  truth  is  that  it 
was  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative, 
combined  with  the  demonstrated  resolve 
of  the  Western  allies  to  modernize  their 
strategic  deterrent,  which  brought  the 
Soviet  Union  back  to  the  negotiating 
table.  There  is  mounting  evidence  that 
defensive  technologies  offer  real  hope  of 
reducing  the  need  for  offensive  nuclear 
arsenals  in  the  future.  To  engage  in 
talks  aimed  at  controlling  arms  without 
discussing  what  may  prove  to  be  the 
best  tool  to  aid  the  effort  is  to  trivialize 
the  whole  process.  President  Reagan  is 
committed  to  serious  and  substantive 
progress  in  reducing  the  size  of  existing 
nuclear  arsenals  and  enhancing  security 
and  stability.  His  acceptance  of  the 
moral  challenge  to  explore  all  means 
available  to  achieve  this  end  is  essential. 

To  close,  let  me  say  once  again  that 
the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  is  a  pru- 
dent and  moral  response  to  continuing 
Soviet  actions  which  threaten  world 
stability  and  security.  SDI  is  a  research 
program  wholly  within  the  limits  of  the 
ABM  Treaty.  'This  research  is  designed 
to  explore  the  feasibility  of  strategic 
defense,  given  new  technologies  now 
available  to  the  defense  community.  SDI 
seeks  answers  to  those  questions  that 
peaceful  nations  must  ask.  If  we  are  to 
keep  the  balance  which  gfuarantees 
peace,  we  can  do  no  less.  ■ 


June  1985 


59 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


MX  Missile  and  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations 
on  Nuclear  and  Space  Arms 


President  Reagan's  and  Ambassador 
Max  Kampelman's  remarks  at  a  meeting 
with  Members  of  Congress  on  March  25, 
1985.'  Ambassador  Kampelman  heads 
the  U.S.  delegation  on  arms  control 
negotiations  and  is  U.S.  negotiator  on 
defense  and  space  arms. 

President  Reagan 

Let  me  just  take  a  moment  and  say  first 
why  I  want  you  to  know  why  I  feel  that 
support  for  the  Peacekeeper  is  so  very 
important,  not  only  for  our  national 
security  but  for  the  solidity  of  our 
NATO  alliance  and  for  our  successful 
arms  reductions  talks  in  Geneva  as  well. 
Afterward,  Ambassador  Max 
Kampelman,  who's  flown  in  from 
Geneva,  will  discuss  arms  control  with 
you  and  take  your  questions.  Max  has 
been  meeting  with  Mr.  [Viktor]  Karpov, 
his  Soviet  counterpart,  for  almost  2 
weeks  now — too  short  a  time,  of  course, 
to  expect  any  dramatic  breakthrough. 

But  I  think  we've  already  gotten  a 
flavor  of  what  those  talks  are  going  to 
be  like.  We  have  some  tough  negotiating 
ahead,  but  we  expected  that.  The 
Soviets  aren't  going  to  compromise  out 
of  the  goodness  of  their  hearts,  but  only 
if  they  calculate  that  an  agreement  is  in 
their  immediate  self-interest.  We'd  be 
doing  the  American  people  a  disservice 
if  we  imagined  otherwise. 

We  do,  of  course,  have  much  com- 
mon ground  on  which  to  negotiate.  But 
if  history  is  any  guide,  we  can  be  sure 
that  the  Soviets  are  not  going  to  simply 
give  up  their  tremendous  advantage  in 
the  MX-type  missiles  without  some  in- 
centive, and  without  the  MX  that  incen- 
tive is  lacking. 

For  years,  when  the  Soviets  were 
planning  an  ABM  [antiballistic  missile] 
system  and  we  weren't,  you'll  remember 
we  were  trying  to  get  negotiations  on 
that.  Only  when  you  in  the  Congress  ap- 
propriated funds  for  our  own  ABM 
system,  the  Soviets  suddenly  decided 
they  wanted  to  talk  seriously;  and  soon 
we  had  an  ABM  treaty.  After  staying 
away  for  more  than  a  year  now,  they 
have  returned  to  the  bargaining  table. 

But  let's  not  delude  ourselves.  The 
Soviets  returned  to  the  table  only 
because  they've  recognized  the  failure  of 
their  efforts  to  divide  us  from  our  allies 
and  weaken  our  determination  to  rebuild 
our  national  defense.  Now,  if  we  don't 


want  to  see  our  hopes  evaporate,  we 
must  continue  to  demonstrate  the 
resolve  to  carry  the  negotiations  to  a 
successful  conclusion  on  a  sound  basis. 

I  join  three  previous  Presidents, 
Republican  and  Democratic,  who  have 
urged  that  we  deploy  the  Peacekeeper. 
Each  is  convinced  that  the  missile  is  ab- 
solutely essential  to  our  national  security 
and  our  hopes  for  peace.  The  bipartisan 
Scowcroft  commission,  a  study  group 
made  up  of  our  country's  finest  strategic 
thinkers,  endorsed  the  Peacekeeper. 
Secretary  [of  Defense  Caspar] 
Weinberger  and  all  our  Chiefs  of  Staff, 
as  you  know,  are  unanimous  in  their 
support  of  this  weapons  system. 

Just  last  month,  former  Defense 
Secretary  Harold  Brown  said,  "We  have 
to  proceed  with  the  modernization  pro- 
gram of  offensive  forces,  including  the 
MX."  But  while  we've  been  debating,  the 
Soviets  have  been  deploying — over  600 
MX-class  missiles  in  the  last  decade.  As 
our  land-based  deterrence  slips  slowly 
but  surely  toward  obsolescence,  the 
Soviets  are  upgrading,  modernizing  their 
systems  every  day.  And  they're  busy 
developing  two  new  mobile  ICBM  [inter- 
continental ballistic  missile]  systems  in 
addition  to  the  600  MX-class  missiles. 
Our  own  mobile  system,  the  Midgetman, 
is  still  on  the  drawing  board  and  at  least 
7  years  from  deployment. 

The  Soviets  have  seen  our  restraint 
only  as  an  opportunity  to  gain  the  ad- 
vantage. The  modernization  of  our  land- 
based  deferment  must  no  longer  be 
delayed  in  the  vain  hope  that  they  will 
simply  follow  suit.  For  us  to  back  down 
now  on  Peacekeeper  deployment  will 
deliver  a  telling  blow  to  our  allies'  con- 
fidence in  us.  They  stood  firm  in  the 
deployment  of  Pershing  II  and  cruise 
missiles  in  Europe.  We  asked  them  to 
walk  through  fire  and  brave  a  storm  of 
Soviet  propaganda  and  not-so-veiled 
threats,  and  they  did. 

And  I  believe  that  not  only  the 
Soviets  but  our  European  allies  view  the 
current  debate  on  the  Peacekeeper  as  a 
key  test  of  our  resolve.  If  we  fail,  we'll 
be  signaling  to  the  world  that  on  this 
key  issue  we  are  irresolute  and  divided. 
And  the  Soviet  Union  will  see  that,  in 
dealing  with  the  United  States,  prop- 
aganda and  stonewalling  are  much  more 
profitable  than  good-faith  negotiations. 
And  our  allies  may  wonder  how  much 
confidence  they  can  place  in  an  alliance 


whose  largest  member  cannot  even  show 
the  determination  and  fortitude  of  its 
smallest. 

Tomorrow's  vote  in  the  House  could 
very  well  spell  the  difference  between 
success  or  defeat  in  our  arms  reduction 
efforts.  It's  important  that  together  we 
send  a  message — loud  and  clear — that  a 
united  and  resolute  America  backs  our 
negotiators  in  their  efforts  to  reverse 
the  arms  race  and  bring  us  closer  to  a 
stable,  secure,  and  lasting  peace, 
without  fear  for  us  and  our  children. 

And  now,  I've  talked  too  long.  I'm 
going  to  ask  Max  Kampelman,  Am- 
bassador Kampelman,  to  come  up  here 
and  speak  to  you.  And  I  have  to  tell  you, 
he  has,  as  you  know,  just  flown  in,  and 
he's  due  at  a  meeting  back  in  Geneva 
tomorrow  morning.  And  I  think  that's 
service  almost  above  and  beyond. 

Ambassador  Kampelman 

Thank  you,  Mr.  President.  Mr.  Vice 
President,  Mr.  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
[Robert]  McFarlane  [assistant  to  the 
President  for  national  security  affairs], 
Members  of  Congress,  it  is  true  that  I 
do  have  a  meeting  tomorrow  morning  at 
11  a.m.  Our  negotiating  in  Geneva  is 
now  moving  into  the  stage  where  our 
three  negotiating  groups  have  agreed  to 
meet  separately,  one  with  another,  so 
that  we  could  get  down  to  the  serious 
business  of  negotiating.  We've  been 
making  statements  at  each  other  and  by 
each  other,  but  now  I  hope  we'll  have  an 
opportunity  to  begin  talking  to  each 
other.  And  I  didn't  want  to  be  in  a  posi- 
tion of  missing  that  first  of  those  ses- 
sions tomorrow  morning  at  11  o'clock. 
The  whole  issue  of  arms  control  is, 
of  course,  intimately  related,  for  a 
democratic  society,  with  the  issue  of 
public  opinion.  We  don't  live  in  govern- 
ments where  policies  are  made  just  by 
dictate  and  by  fiat.  We  live  in  a  govern- 
ment where  policy  is  made  as  a  result  of 
healthy  democratic  discussion  and 
debate.  The  task  is  to  try  to  see  to  it 
that  following  that  healthy  debate  and 
discussion,  that  we  end  up  with  resolve; 
that  we  end  up  with  dedication,  with 
determination,  and  with  a  broad  unity  of 
purpose  which  reflects  American  values 
and  American  security  interests. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


Many  of  you  here  are  people  I've 
<nown  for  a  long  period  of  time,  and 
/ou  know  tiiat  I'm  a  Democrat.  But  I 
Dperate  out  of  the  assumption  that  we 
nave  only  one  President  at  a  time,  and 
ihat  when  he  is  President,  he  is  my 
President,  as  he  is  your  President,  and 
le's  the  President  of  the  American  peo- 
3le.  And  when  he  speaks  and  when  he 
^ves  instructions  to  his  negotiators  to 
5peak  in  behalf  of  the  United  States,  I 
;hink  it  is  essential  that  we  do  what  we 
;an  to  communicate  to  the  world,  and 
Darticularly  to  the  other  negotiating 
partner,  that  he  speaks  for  a  united 
ountry. 

I  am  not  speaking  about  a 
ananimous  country;  we're  much  too 
arge  to  think  in  terms  of  unanimity. 
But  I  do  believe  that  the  American 
governmental  system  is  facing  a 
challenge  today,  which  is  to  try  to  pro- 
Ade  a  kind  of  consensus — obviously, 
hort  of  unanimity— behind  these  issues 
jf  American  values  and  behind  these 
issues  of  American  national  interests. 
And  this  is  why  I  am  very  happy  to 
serve  as  our  President's  representative 
in  Geneva  and  pleased  to  return  here  in 
arder  to  highlight  one  important  aspect 
Df  the  negotiation  that  is  of  particular 
interest  to  those  of  us  who  are 
aegotiating  now  at  this  stage  of  the 
negotiation. 

Our  task  is  a  difficult  one  of  com- 
municating with  each  other.  We  don't 
trust  each  other.  We  don't  fully  under- 
stand one  another.  One  of  the  important 
first  tasks  that  our  delegation  undertook 
was  to  suggest  a  procedure  whereby  we 
don't  talk  to  the  press  about  the  sub- 
stance of  these  negotiations.  And  I  will 
not  talk  today  about  the  substance  of 
those  negotiations  in  the  few  moments 
that  I  stand  here. 

But  one  of  the  reasons  for  that,  as  I 
explained  to  our  Soviet  colleagues,  is  I 
want  to  be  talking  to  thern  about  issues, 
about  seeking  understanding,  and  not 
necessarily  engaging  in  a  propaganda 
mechanism  and  in  a  propaganda  device. 
And  I  hoped  that  they  would  respond. 

Similarly,  we  have  to  communicate 
to  them  that  we're  serious  about  our  ob- 
jectives. I've  learned,  in  many  years  of 
observing  the  Soviet  Union  and  par- 
ticipating myself  in  negotiations  with 
them,  that  they  respect  strength  and 
determination,  but  that  they  also  respect 
a  trading  position.  Acts  of  good  will, 
which  we  might  do,  for  example,  in 
negotiating  with  the  Canadians,  making 
a  gesture  of  good  will  and  then  expect- 
ing something  in  return  to  reciprocate 
and  foster  that  spirit,  in  my  view,  is  not 
effective.  It  is  looked  upon,  rather,  as  an 


June  1985 


absence  of  will,  rather  than  an  act  of 
good  will.  And  to  negotiate  successfully, 
we  must  have  will  and  determination. 

I,  therefore,  have  long  operated  on 
the  assumption,  and  I  think  the  United 
States  and  the  free  world  must  operate 
on  the  assumption,  that  if  the  Soviets 
want  something  from  us  and  if  we  feel 
it's  in  our  national  interest  to  weigh 
what  they  want,  we  must  insist  on  get- 
ting something  in  return  for  it.  The  ex- 
tent to  which  they  receive  something 
from  us,  without  the  necessity  for  them 
to  give  anything  in  return — we  are 
seriously  interfering  with  the  negotiat- 
ing process,  because  as  they  enjoy  the 
apple  that  falls  from  the  tree  that  they 
did  not  have  to  pay  for,  they  quite 
understandably  wonder  what  other  fruit 
will  fall  from  that  tree  that  they  do  not 
have  to  pay  for. 

And  the  extent  to  which  they  don't 
know  the  answer  to  that  question,  they 
will  wait  for  the  answer  to  that  ques- 
tion. And  they  are  prepared  to  wait. 
And  I  am  convinced — or  I  would  not 
have  returned  from  Geneva  here — I  am 
convinced  that  were  the  MX  decision 
made  in  a  manner  which  made  it  un- 
necessary for  them  to  be  concerned 
about  it  anymore,  that  this  would  in- 
evitably delay  the  negotiations  as  they 
would,  I  think  quite  correctly  and 
understandably,  ask  themselves:  What 
else  might  we  obtain  through  this 
understandable  debate  and  discussion 
that  we  will  not  have  to  pay  for? 

I  want  to  make  something  clear  as  a 
result  of  spending  some  time  today  on 
the  Hill.  People  who  differ  with  me  on 
this  MX  issue  include  some  very  dear 
friends  of  mine,  people  whom  I've 
worked  with  for  a  long  period  of  time.  I 
think  they  are  wrong.  But  at  no  stretch 
of  the  imagination  can  we  permit  this 
debate  to  get  to  the  point  of  saying  that 
those  who  are  wrong  are  necessarily  un- 
patriotic or  less  interested  in  the  success 
of  the  negotiations.  I  want  to  make  that 
clear. 

But  as  much  as  I  feel  that,  I  feel 
equally  the  obligation  to  say  to  my 
friends:  You  are  wrong.  And  that  I  do 
without  any  hesitation  here  as  I  speak  to 
you  this  afternoon. 

I  think  America's  resolve  at  the 
negotiating  table  and  elsewhere  outside 
of  the  table,  in  the  multifaceted  ap- 
proach we  have  in  dealing  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  must  be  one  of  strength, 
and  that  must  include  important  military 
strength;  a  willingness  to  talk  and  to 
negotiate,  but  to  have  strength  behind 
that  talking  and  that  negotiating;  a  will- 
ingness to  resolve  issues. 


And  I  want  to  say  one  thing  as  a 
pledge  to  you  here  today:  If  there  is  an 
agreement  to  come  out  of  Geneva — and 
I  can't  answer  that  question  in  all  hones- 
ty; I  can't  answer  it  because  I  can  only 
speak  for  our  resolve,  I  cannot  speak  for 
anybody  else's  resolve — but  if  there  is 
an  agreement  to  come  out  of  Geneva, 
your  negotiators  will  find  the  means  of 
coming  out  with  that  agreement  and 
recommending  it  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 

I  conclude  by  urging  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Vice 
President  and  others  who  represent  the 
executive  branch  of  our  government  to 
urge  the  urgency,  the  importance  of 
bipartisan  consultations  and  delibera- 
tions at  all  stages  of  policy  development. 
And  I  also  want  to  associate  that  by 
making  a  plea  to  my  Democratic  friends 
in  this  audience  that  you  must  respond 
to  such  an  initiative  constructively, 
because  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States  depend  on  it,  our  values  depend 
on  it,  and  the  strength  and  integrity  of 
the  United  States  of  America  depend 
on  it. 

And  I  know  that  all  of  you  will  give 
this  very  important  decision  the  careful 
attention  and  prayers  that  it  deserves. 
And  I  can  ask  no  more  from  any 
Member  of  Congress.  But  1  would  also 
have  been  derelict  in  my  responsibility  if 
I  did  not  return  here  to  tell  you  my 
judgment  as  to  the  effect  of  your  deci- 
sion on  the  vital,  indispensable  negotia- 
tions that  are  now  taking  place. 


•Made  in  the  East  Room  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  1,  1985).  I 


61 


NARCOTICS 


FY  1986  Assistance  Requests 
for  Narcotics  Control 


by  Jon  R.  Thomas 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  U, 
1985.  Mr.  Thomas  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Narcotics  Matters. ' 

On  February  14,  1985,  the  Department 
of  State  submitted  the  International 
Narcotics  Control  Strategy  Report  for 
1985  to  Congress  as  required  by  PL 
98-164.  The  report  is  prepared  each 
year  under  the  direction  of  our  Bureau 
of  International  Narcotics  Matters  and 
provides  a  country-by-country  analysis 
of  the  narcotics  situation. 

The  1985  report  shows  that  1984 
was  a  year  of  building  bases  for  en- 
hanced control  programs  and  creating 
opportunites  for  large-scale  actions  in 
1985.  Genuine  progress  is  reflected  in 
the  production  reports  on  several  coun- 
tries, but  there  were  some  disappoint- 
ments. I  believe  that,  on  balance,  the 
events  of  1984  put  us  on  the  threshold 
of  what  should  be  our  most  productive 
year  ever  in  narcotics  control. 

The  report  emphasizes  that,  more 
than  perhaps  at  any  time  in  recent 
memory,  there  are  strong  incentives  for 
source  nations  to  act  in  their  own  in- 
terests to  control  narcotics  trafficking. 
The  international  community  is  affected 
by  narcotics  trafficking  and  abuse  and 
the  attendant  violence,  corruption,  and 
social  costs  which  undermine  legitimate 
businesses  and  threaten  national  securi- 
ty in  many  parts  of  the  world.  In  some 
countries,  insurgents  and  terrorist 
organizations  have  established  links  to 
narcotics  traffickers,  and  these  groups 
are  now  sharing  in  the  narcotics  profits. 
Producing  nations  are  experiencing 
abuse  and  addiction  among  their  own 
youth,  and  the  demand  for  treatment 
and  prevention  has  increased  in  these 
source  countries. 

These  concerns  are  prompting  new 
opportunities.  Source  and  victim  nations 
alike  have  a  common  interest  in  the  suc- 
cess of  control  programs,  and  source 
countries  are  realizing  that  they  are  first 
beneficiaries  of  programs  to  curb  traf- 
ficking and  all  of  its  related  excesses. 
This  realization  is  reflected  in  the  pro- 
gram expansion  of  1984.  It  is  reflected 
in  the  emerging  alliance  in  Latin 
America,  where  national  leaders  are 
now  beginning  to  work  together, 
bilaterally  and  multilaterally,  on  regional 


approaches  to  control  problems.  The 
report  provides  the  following  observa- 
tions. 

Opium  production  declined  in 
Pakistan  and  Afghanistan  but  marginal- 
ly increased  in  other  countries.  Adverse 
weather  and  a  new  eradication  program 
in  Thailand,  and  a  possible  expanded 
crop  eradication  program  in  Burma,  and 
continuation  of  the  more  effective  sweep 
strategy  in  Mexico  portend  well  for 
reductions  in  prospective  opium  poppy 
production  in  most  sectors  in  1985. 

Coca  production  increased  in  Peru 
and  Bolivia  as  anticipated,  while  holding 
about  even  in  Colombia.  But  Peru  began 
to  eradicate  coca  on  an  appreciable  scale 
in  1984,  despite  terrorists  attacks 
against  eradication  workers.  Colombia  is 
testing  aerially  sprayed  herbicides  which 
could  offer  the  first  real  means  of 
eradicating  coca  on  a  major  scale.  While 
Bolivia's  economic  and  political  problems 
are  understood,  its  failure  to  begin  coca 
eradication  remains  a  major  disappoint- 
ment. We  are  hopeful  that  the  deploy- 
ment of  police  forces  on  February  3  into 
the  Chapare  and  Cochabamba  areas  is 
the  prelude  to  a  sustained  eradication 
campaign. 

The  most  important  marijuana 
development  in  1984  was  the  Colombian 
eradication  program  which  destroyed 
4,000  hectares,  including  3,000  hectares 
destroyed  by  an  aerially  applied  her- 
bicidal  spray.  Cannabis  cultivation  in- 
creased in  Mexico,  and  the  increase  in 
Belize  confirms  traffickers'  efforts  to 
establish  new  sources  of  supply.  Produc- 
tion probably  held  at  about  the  1983 
level  in  Jamaica. 

There  are  several  1985  goals  set 
forth  in  the  report,  including  continued 
support  for  the  Upper  Huallaga  Valley 
coca  control  project  in  Peru;  seeking 
agreements  to  begin  coca  eradication  in 
other  parts  of  Peru;  the  restoration  of 
law  and  order  in  Bolivia  and  an  initia- 
tion of  coca  eradication;  a  vigorous 
Jamaica  campaign  to  eradicate  mari- 
juana; resumption  of  aerial  herbicidal 
eradication  in  Belize;  expanded  eradica- 
tion programs  in  Burma  and  Thailand; 
continued  efforts  to  increase  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  Mexican  control  pro- 
grams; suppression  of  opium  cultivation 
and  heroin  trafficking  in  Pakistan;  and  a 
more  effective  interdiction  effort  in 
Southwest  Asia,  including  elimination  of 
heroin  labs. 


We  will  advance  our  cause  in  1985 
through  such  programs.  But  the  long- 
term  strategy  requires  that  there  be  a 
timely  international  effort,  not  just  a 
U.S.  program,  and  a  high  priority  for 
our  activity  in  1985  is  the  enhancement 
of  the  response  of  the  international  com- 
munity. 

More  than  ever,  international 
strategies  in  1985  and  beyond  must  give 
top  priority  to  crop  control— bans  on 
cultivation  and  production,  enforced 
when  necessary  by  eradication.  An  effec- 
tive international  strategy  should  offer 
financial  and  technical  assistance  where 
needed  for  narcotic  control  projects.  The 
United  States  will  continue  to  provide 
assistance,  which  should  be  linked  to 
crop  control  agreements  to  ensure  suc- 
cess in  reducing  production.  But  donor 
assistance  is  only  a  part  of  the  success 
equation.  Governments  of  producing  na- 
tions must  demonstrate  the  political  will 
to  undertake  effective  crop  control  and 
interdiction  programs.  The  corruption 
that  has  undermined  control  efforts  in 
many  source  countries  must  be  stamped 
out  by  strong  and  determined  govern- 
ments. The  international  community 
must  make  common  cause  in  a  more 
vigorous,  more  widespread,  and  more 
united  effort  to  control  international 
narcotics  production  and  trafficking. 


FY  1986  Budget 

With  that  background,  1  will  address  our 
proposed  1986  budget.  This  budget  and 
our  current  funding  are  illustrated  in  the 
budget  summary  sheets  with  this  testi- 
mony. The  proposed  FY  1986  budget  is 
for  $57.5  million,  a  15%  increase  (or 
$7.3  million)  over  the  FY  1985  request. 
The  proposed  budget  continues  the  ex- 
pansion of  crop  eradication  programs 
and  builds  upon  the  initiatives  of  1984 
and  1985. 

Latin  America.  The  proposed 
budget  would  increase  funds  for  Latin 
America  by  9%,  to  $32.1  million,  the 
largest  budget  element. 

Particular  attention  continues  to  be 
focused  upon  Colombia  which,  in  1984, 
remained  the  largest  supplier  of  mari- 
juana to  the  United  States  and  the  prin- 
cipal refining  source  for  cocaine  but  also 
was  emerging  as  one  of  the  most  in- 
creasingly effective  international  control 
programs.  Colombia  may  well  eradicate 
the  majority  of  its  marijuana  crop  in 
1985,  thus  giving  the  very  real  prospect 
of  reducing  availability  from  what  has 
been  the  major  marijuana  resource  to 
the  United  States.  Colombia  is  also 
testing  herbicides  to  be  used  against 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


NARCOTICS 


coca  in  an  aerial  spraying  program, 
which  would  permit  large-scale  eradica- 
tion. 

On  January  21,  Peru  redeployed  its 
special  narcotics  unit  into  the  Upper 
Huallaga  Valley,  thus  permitting 
resumption  of  the  coca  eradication  ef- 
fort. On  February  1,  the  rural  mobile 
patrol  unit  also  resumed  its  interdiction 
activities.  The  1986  budget  includes 
funds  for  creation  of  a  second  rural 
mobile  patrol  unit  to  be  deployed  in  a 
second  coca-producing  region,  while  in- 
creasing eradication  efforts  in  the  Upper 
Huallaga  Valley.  The  United  States  ex- 
pects to  see  Peru  proceed  actively  on 
two  enforcement  fronts — against  ter- 
rorists and  against  narcotics  traffickers. 

The  United  States  has  been  en- 
couraged by  the  strong  leadership  of 
President  De  la  Madrid,  who  has  faced 
the  needs  for  both  a  reinvigorated  crop 
control  program  and  a  campaign  to 
stamp  out  narcotics  corruption  in  Mex- 
ico. New  sweep  campaigns  are  increas- 
ingly effective  at  destroying  narcotics 
crops.  The  proposed  1986  budget  will 
continue  the  expansion  of  the  Mexican 
Attorney  General's  office  eradication 
fleet  and  provide  operational  and  ground 
support  for  fixed-wing  aerial  eradication 
aircraft  being  introduced  into  the  fleet. 

Due  to  continued  delays  in  imple- 
menting the  eradication  and  other  proj- 
ects anticipated  in  FY  1984,  the  1986 
budget  request  for  Bolivia  shows  a 
decrease  in  requirements  from  the  1985 
level;  there  will  be  sufficient  pipeline 
funds  to  carry  forward  the  expected  ef- 
forts in  Bolivia. 

There  is  need  to  counter  the  efforts 
of  South  American  traffickers  seeking 
new  safehavens  in  countries  like  Brazil, 
Ecuador,  and  Venezuela.  A  major  in- 
crease is  proposed  for  Brazil  to  support 
the  eradication  and  interdiction  efforts 
of  the  national  police  against  increasing 
coca  and  cannabis  production  and  co- 
caine trafficking. 

The  Latin  American  regional  fund 
will  be  increased  to  provide  augmented 
support  and  technical  assistance  to  coun- 
tries in  the  region;  there  are  several  ini- 
tiatives related  to  Vice  President  Bush's 
discussions  with  Latin  American  Presi- 
dents at  Quito  in  August,  and  subse- 
quent negotiations.  These  recognize  the 
welcome  development  of  regional  co- 
operation, especially  among  key  South 
American  countries. 

Southwest  Asia.  The  FY  1986 
budget  request  is  $5.5  million,  an  83% 
increase  over  1985. 


FY  1986  International  Narcotics  Control  Program 


Fiscal  Summary 
(thousands  U.S.$) 


FY  1984 

FY  1985 

FY  1986 

Actual 

Request 

Request 

COUNTRY  PROGRAM 

Latin  America 

Bolivia 

$  2,670 

$  5,500 

$  3,960 

Brazil 

0 

250 

750 

Colombia 

6,765 

10,300 

10,600 

Ecuador 

72 

0 

300 

Mexico 

8.318 

8,900 

10,100 

Peru 

2,805 

3,500 

4,350 

Regional 

1,755 

1,000 

2,000 

Subtotal 

22,385 

29,450 

32,060 

Southeast  Asia 

Burma 

2,447 

5,000 

6,000 

Thailand 

3,005 

2,800 

3,900 

Regional 

170 

300 

300 

Subtotal 

5,622 

8,100 

10,200 

Southwest  Asia 

Pakistan 

3,350 

2,000 

4,470 

Turkey 

1,000 

900 

920 

Regional 

85 

100 

100 

Subtotal 

4,435 

3,000 

5,490 

Total  Country  Programs 

32,442 

40,550 

47,750 

INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 

LIN  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse 

Control  $  2,500 

Colombo  Plan  75 


Subtotal 


2.575 


INTERREGIONAL  PROGRAMS 


2,742 
75 


2,817 


2,825 
75 


2,900 


Demand  Reduction 
DEA  Training 
Customs  Training 
INM  EOP  Training 

400 
1,990 
1,020 

190 

400 
2,200 
1,150 

300 

400 
2,320 
1,230 

300 

Subtotal 

3,600 

4,050 

4,250 

PROGRAM 
DEVELOPMENT 
AND  SUPPORT 

2,524 

2.800 

2,629 

TOTAL  PROGRAM 

$41, Ur 

$50,217 

$57,529 

'The  President's  Budget  and  Treasury  Reports  reflect  .$41,046,000  in  obligations. 
Amounts  reflected  in  this  budget  include  actual  obligations  made  but  not  reported  m  tmie  tor 
inclusion  in  those  various  reports. 


June  1985 


63 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


With  solid  pledges  from  the  U.S. 
Agency  for  International  Development, 
the  United  Kingdom,  Italy,  and  others 
for  a  special  development  and  enforce- 
ment program,  Pakistan  is  extending  its 
increasingly  effective  opium  ban  into  ad- 
ditional areas  of  the  Northwest  Frontier 
Province.  Pakistan  continues  to  be  a  ma- 
jor refiner  of  heroin,  drawing  on  opium 
production  in  Afghanistan  as  well  as  its 
own  stocks.  A  major  increase  is 
budgeted  for  1986  for  enforcement 
assistance  to  augment  the  number  of  in- 
teragency narcotics  units  deployed  to  in- 
terdict opium  and  heroin  production  and 
trafficking. 

The  budget  also  includes  funds  to 
continue  programs  in  Turkey  and  to  sup- 
port the  Southwest  Asian  regional  ini- 
tiative. 

Southeast  Asia.  The  FY  1986  re- 
quest for  Southeast  Asia  amounts  to  $10 
million,  a  26%  increase. 

Effective  for  many  years  at  sup- 
pressing laboratories  and  narcotics  war- 
lords on  its  border  with  Burma,  the 
Government  of  Thailand  initiated  a 
promising  opium  poppy  eradication  pro- 
gram in  late  1984  that  could  lead  to  the 
eradication  of  several  hundred  hectares 
of  opium  poppy  in  1985.  A  substantial 
budget  increase  is  proposed  for  1986  to 
support  a  significantly  expanded  poppy 
control  program  aimed  at  terminating  il- 
licit poppy  production  within  5  years  and 
to  provide  additional  enforcement 
assistance  to  consolidate  efforts  along 
the  Thai-Burma  border,  and  also  to  sup- 
port interdiction  efforts. 

Burma  has  been  the  largest  illicit 
opium  producer  in  recent  years,  and  the 
government  conducted  a  pilot  aerial 
eradication  project  in  late  1984,  covering 
more  than  160  acres.  This  test  will 
hopefully  lead  to  a  more  widespread 
aerial  eradication  effort  in  1985.  An  in- 
creased budget  for  1986  will  permit  a 
strengthening  of  the  opium  poppy 
eradication  effort,  by  providing  addi- 
tional aircraft,  and  provide  urgently 
needed  equipment  and  training  for  the 
narcotics  control  activities  of  police  and 
paramilitary  forces. 

Other  Activities.  The  Department 
of  State  funds  training  for  foreign  law 
enforcement  officials,  which  is  provided 
by  the  Drug  Enforcement  Administra- 
tion (DEA)  and/or  U.S.  Customs,  at 
Federal  training  sites  or  in  foreign 
countries. 

Technical  assistance  in  demand 
reduction  is  provided  through  a  variety 
of  channels,  including  direct  assistance 
with  a  priority  on  aiding  producer 
governments  in  controlling  domestic  de- 


Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOIVI 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  4,  19851 

The  United  States  has  been  engaged  in 
nuclear  cooperation  with  the  European  Com- 
munity for  many  years.  This  cooperation  was 
initiated  under  agreements  concluded  over 
two  decades  ago  between  the  United  States 
and  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Communi- 
ty (EURATOM)  which  extend  until  December 
31,  1995.  Since  the  inception  of  this  coopera- 
tion, the  Community  has  adhered  to  all  its 
obligations  under  those  agreements. 

The  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  of 
1978  amended  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  to 
establish  new  nuclear  export  criteria,  in- 
cluding a  requirement  that  the  United  States 
have  the  right  to  consent  to  the  reprocessing 
of  fuel  exported  from  the  United  States.  Our 
present  agreements  for  cooperation  with 
EURATOM  do  not  contain  such  a  right.  To 
avoid  disrupting  cooperation  with 
EURATOM,  a  proviso  was  included  in  the 
law  to  enable  continued  cooperation  until 
March  10,  1980,  if  EURATOM  agreed  to 
negotiations  concerning  our  cooperation 
agreement,  which  it  did. 

The  law  provides  that  nuclear  cooperation 
with  EURATOM  can  be  extended  on  an  an- 
nual basis  after  March  10.  1980,  upon  deter- 
mination by  the  President  that  failure  to 
cooperate  would  seriously  prejudice  the 
achievement  of  United  States  non- 
proliferation  objectives  or  otherwise  jeopard- 
ize the  common  defense  and  security  and 
after  notification  to  the  Congress.  President 
Carter  made  such  a  determination  five  years 
ago  and  signed  Executive  Order  1219.3,  per- 
mitting continued  nuclear  cooperation  with 
EURATOM  until  March  10,  1981.  I  made 
such  determinations  in  1981,  1982,  1983  and 
1984  and  signed  Executive  Orders  12295, 
12351,  12409  and  12463,  permitting  con- 


tinued nuclear  cooperation  through  March  10. 
1985. 

In  addition  to  numerous  informal  con- 
tacts, the  United  States  has  engaged  in  six 
rounds  of  talks  with  EURATOM  regarding 
the  renegotiation  of  the  U.S. -EURATOM 
agreements  for  cooperation.  These  were  con- 
ducted in  November  1978,  September  1978, 
April  1980,  January  1982,  November  1983 
and  March  1984.  The  European  Community 
is  now  considering  U.S.  proposals  relating  to 
our  cooperation  agreements,  and  further 
progress  in  the  talks  is  anticipated  this  year. 

I  believe  that  it  is  essential  that  coopera- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the  Com- 
munity continue  and,  likewise,  that  we  work 
closely  with  our  Allies  to  counter  the  threat 
of  nuclear  explosives  proliferation.  A  disrup- 
tion of  nuclear  cooperation  would  not  only 
eliminate  any  chance  of  progress  in  our  talks 
with  EURATOM  related  to  our  agreements, 
it  would  also  cause  serious  problems  in  our 
overall  relationships.  Accordingly.  I  have 
determined  that  failure  to  continue  peaceful 
nuclear  cooperation  with  EURATOM  would 
be  seriously  prejudicial  to  the  achievement  of 
United  States  non-proliferation  objectives  and 
would  jeopardize  the  common  defense  and 
security  of  the  United  States.  I  intend  to  sign 
an  Executive  Order  to  extend  the  waiver  of 
the  application  of  the  relevant  export 
criterion  of  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act 
for  an  additional  twelve  months  from 
March   10,  1985. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  George  Bush,  President 
of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  11, 
1985).  ■ 


mand  and  internal  drug  abuse  problems. 
Other  channels  include  support  for 
regional  and  international  demand 
reduction  projects,  participation  in  inter- 
national agency  programs  and  fora,  pro- 
vision of  materials,  conduct  of  special 
demand  reduction  training  programs, 
and  providing  linkage  between  U.S.  na- 
tional and  international  demand  reduc- 
tion efforts.  U.S.  Information  Service 
(USIS)  officers  in  the  field  have  been 
especially  effective  in  public  education 
efforts  in  source  countries,  and  the  U.S. 
Information  Agency/Service  are  support- 
ing the  new  public  awareness  seminars 
sponsored  by  the  State  Department's 
Bureau  of  International  Narcotics 
Matters. 

There  has  been  improved  support  of 
international  narcotics  control  by  the  in- 
telligence community.  As  part  of  an  ex- 
panded data  generation  effort,  the  State 


Department  will  support  aerial  photog- 
raphy programs  in  1985  in  Pakistan, 
Thailand,  Burma,  Peru,  Bolivia,  and 
Jamaica  and  anticipates  assisting  Mexico 
and  Colombia  in  aerial  surveys. 

International  Organizations.  Con- 
siderable diplomatic  ami  iirograni 
assistance  coordination  is  conducted 
through  international  organizations,  par- 
ticularly organs  of  the  I'nited  Nations. 
The  UN  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control 
(UNFDAC)  has  been  a  major  multi- 
lateral vehicle  for  enforcement,  supply 
reduction,  and  demand  reduction  pro- 
grams. Through  UNFDAC,  we  finally 
have  a  European  presence  in  our  effort 
to  curb  cocaine  production  in  Latin 
America.  And  through  I'NFDAC,  a 
number  of  nations  are  supporting  a  new 
program  to  eliminate  poppy  production 
in  the  major  remaining  growing  areas  of 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


PACIFIC 


Pakistan.  In  FY  1986,  funds  are  pro- 
vided for  UNFDAC  and  also  for  the  Co- 
lombo plan. 

Summary 

In  sum  we  believe  we  have  a  sound 
strategy,  and  it  is  not  only  working  but 
increasingly  effective.  We  are  strongly 
challenged  by  logistics,  economic  self- 
interest,  and,  not  least,  by  well-aimed 
criminal  organizations  increasingly  will- 
ing to  strike  back,  using  terrorist  tac- 
tics. There  are  congressional  reports 
which  offer  a  conflicting  view.  We  agree 
with  some  aspects  of  these  reports  but 
note  numerous  inaccuracies  as  well.  I 
think  the  salient  aspect  of  these  reports 
is  that  they  virtually  concede  that  there 
is  really  no  alternative  but  to  negotiate 
crop  control  programs  that  can  be 
simultaneously  effective  in  all  growing 
regions.  That,  in  fact,  is  the  objective  we 
have  pursued.  And  the  data  available 
show  that  this  strategy  is  beginning  to 
bring  down  production. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


ANZUS  Alliance 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  18.  1985.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs. ' 

The  ANZUS  [security  treaty  among 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  the  United 
States]  alliance  has  existed  since  1951. 
It  was  originally  sought  by  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  to  prevent  repetition 
of  the  circumstances  that  led  to  World 
War  II.  The  alliance  has  evolved  subse- 
quently into  a  component  part  of  the  in- 
terlocking system  of  alliances  linking  the 
Western  states.  Collectively,  these 
alliances  deter  aggression  and  prevent 
an  outbreak  of  global  conflict  by 
creating  mutually  reinforcing  links  be- 
tween the  respective  national  interests 
and  security  capabilities  of  the  Western 
states. 

Within  the  South  Pacific  and 
Southeast  Asian  region,  the  ANZUS 
alliance  has  served  well  to  maintain 
stability,  to  deter  conllicts  among 
regional  states  that  could  evolve  into 


June  1985 


major  wars,  and  to  fill  what  otherwise 
might  be  a  tempting  security  vacuum. 

Under  the  ANZUS  treaty,  an  effec- 
tive security  structure  has  been  main- 
tained. The  United  States  has  provided 
peacetime  assistance  for  Australia  and 
New  Zealand,  helping  them  to  develop 
credible  defense  capabilities  within  their 
region.  Australia  and  New  Zealand  have 
assisted  us  in  maintaining  our  own 
forces  in  the  western  and  southern 
Pacific,  thereby  further  strengthening 
regional  security. 

The  ANZUS  alliance  also  serves  as 
an  umbrella  under  which  bilateral 
cooperation  has  been  pursued  between 
the  member  states,  including  our  impor- 
tant work  with  Australia  on  the  joint 
facilities  critical  to  deterrence  and  arms 
control  interests. 

In  addition  to  the  direct  benefits 
which  ANZUS  provides  to  the  United 
States,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand,  the 
alliance  also  offers  substantial  indirect 
advantages.  For  example,  the  ANZUS 
link  with  the  United  States  has  added 
significant  weight  to  Australia's  and 
New  Zealand's  influence  and  ability  to 
preserve  stability  within  the  region — 
giving  those  countries  enhanced  security 
leverage  beyond  what  they  would  have 
in  isolation. 

The  ANZUS  treaty  covers  not  only 
the  territory  of  the  member  states  but 
also  their  armed  forces  in  the  Pacific. 
Consequently,  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  force  deployments — such  as 
those  in  Malaysia  and  Singapore  under 
the  Five  Power  Defense  Agreement  as 
well  as  other  potential  deployments  in 
the  Pacific — carry  with  them  greatly 
enhanced  stabilizing  and  deterrent  value 
by  virtue  of  the  ANZUS  link  with  the 
United  States. 

The  ANZUS  treaty  has,  of  course, 
entailed  risks  and  costs  for  its  members. 
For  our  part,  our  alliance  commitments 
have  subjected  us  to  risks  we  might  not 
have  had  to  run  had  we  chosen  to  follow 
a  different  course.  And  there  have  been 
enhanced  operating  and  opportunity 
costs  when  it  has  been  necessary  or 
desirable  to  divert  our  ships  to  the 
ANZUS  region  from  other  areas.  For 
our  alliance  partners,  there  also  have 
been  material  and  political  risks  and 
costs  as  a  result  of  being  our  partners 
and  engaging  in  alliance  activities. 

But  notwithstanding  the  burdens,  all 
the  ANZUS  partners  have  found  the 
treaty  to  be  useful.  It  is  perhaps  surpris- 
ing to  some  that,  at  this  time  of  tension 
within  the  alliance,  no  member  govern- 
ment—not even  New  Zealand— has 
opted  to  withdraw  from  the  treaty. 
Latest  polls  show  that  more  than  70%  of 
New  Zealand  and  Australian  public 
opinion  favor  continued  participation  in 
the  ANZUS  alliance.  With  this  kind  of 
support,  the  alliance  is  clearly  perceived 


by  most  citizens  "down  under"  as  serv- 
ing a  highly  useful  [mrpose. 

Only  a  decade  ago,  the  nations  of 
the  region  were  worried  about  a  poten- 
tial U.S.  withdrawal  from  the  western 
Pacific.  That  disengagement  never  oc- 
curred. The  continuity  demanded  by  our 
ANZUS  commitment  was  part  of  the 
reason.  Indeed,  the  prolonged  engage- 
ment of  democratic  public  opinion  in 
support  of  regional  and  global  security  is 
one  of  the  signal  achievements  of  our 
postwar  alliances,  of  which  ANZUS  is 
an  important  part. 

The  alliance  does,  of  course,  have  its 
critics.  In  Australia  and  New  Zealand, 
these  critics  assert  that  participation  in 
ANZUS  makes  those  countries  nuclear 
targets  and  involves  them  in  prepara- 
tions for  a  nuclear  war — preparation 
which  these  critics  consider  dangerous 
and  immoral.  In  Australia,  the  govern- 
ment has  responded;  it  has  accepted  that 
Australia's  risk  is  heightened  by  virtue 
of  its  cooperation  with  the  United  States 
but  has  stated  that  this  heightened  risk 
is  worthwhile  if  deterrence  can  be 
enhanced,  nuclear  war  made  less  likely, 
and  the  prospects  of  verifiable  arms  con- 
trol can  be  increased.  In  the  latter  con- 
nection, the  Australian  Government  also 
accepts  that  Western  maintenance  of 
adequate  defense,  including  nuclear 
weapons,  is  a  regrettable  necessity  until 
arms  control  reduces  and  eventually 
eliminates  those  weapons. 

The  current  New  Zealand  Govern- 
ment has  banned  nuclear-armed  and 
-propelled  ship  visits  in  order  to  get 
away  from,  and  protest,  "things 
nuclear."  According  to  the  New  Zealand 
Government,  the  country's  location — far 
removed  from  potential  adversaries — 
renders  a  "nuclear  defense"  unnecessary 
and  unwanted. 

The  U.S.  view  is  that  the  safest 
course  in  a  dangerous  world  is  to  make 
clear  our  commitment  to  defend 
freedom.  We  believe  the  best  way  to 
prevent  a  large  war  is  to  keep  small 
wars  from  starting.  The  commitments  of 
the  Western  allies  to  each  other  over 
four  decades  have  helped  to  prevent 
nuclear  war. 

Our  efforts  to  keep  New  Zealand 
within  the  framework  of  Western 
defense  have  been  persistent.  After  elec- 
tion of  the  Labor  Government  in  July 
1984,  Secretary  Shultz — in  New  Zealand 
for  the  ANZUS  Council — met  immedi- 
ately with  Prime  Minister-elect  Lange. 
Secretary  Shultz  reaffirmed  publicly 
that,  in  our  view,  an  alliance  by  defini- 
tion requires  an  interaction  of 
forces— an  ability  to  operate  together 
and  benefit  from  mutual  cooperation.  In 
the  words  of  the  1984  ANZUS  Council 
communique:  "Access  by  allied  aircraft 
and  ships  to  the  airfields  and  ports  of 
the  ANZUS  members  was  reaffirmed  as 
essential  to  the  continuing  effectiveness 
of  the  alliance." 

65 


PACIFIC 


In  the  interests  of  finding  a  har- 
monious solution,  however,  we  pro- 
ceeded with  restraint,  deferring  any  ship 
visit  request  for  6  months.  During  this 
period,  we  engaged  in  intensive  discus- 
sions with  the  New  Zealand  authorities 
to  try  to  find  a  way  to  permit  visits  of 
U.S.  warships  without  disclosure  of  in- 
formation important  to  potential  adver- 
saries. We  had  hoped  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  New  Zealand  could  accept  our 
"neither  confirm  nor  deny"  policy  re- 
garding the  presence  or  absence  of 
nuclear  weapons  aboard  ships  and  would 
remove  barriers  to  nuclear-powered  war- 
ship visits  based  on  their  impeccable 
safety  record.  As  a  first  step,  in  Janu- 
ary 1985,  we  nominated  the  U.S.S. 
Buchanan,  a  conventionally  powered 
destroyer,  the  only  ship  submitted  since 
the  port  ban  went  into  effect.  We  were 
disappointed  when  the  New  Zealand 
Government  refused  the  visit,  which  was 
to  take  place  after  an  ANZUS  exercise 
with  Australian  and  New  Zealand 
forces.  That  refusal  was  based  on  the 
Labor  Government's  insistence  on  a  vir- 
tually explicit  guarantee  that  the  ship 
was  not  nuclear  armed. 

During  the  period  of  negotiations 
and  since,  we  have  made  a  number  of 
facts  very  clear. 

First,  the  United  States  is  not  pro- 
nuclear;  it  is  proalliance.  U.S.  policy  in 
the  event  of  conflict  is  to  employ  the 
lowest  level  of  defense  necessary  to  turn 
back  an  aggression,  to  preserve  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  the  United  States 
and  its  allies,  and  to  restore  peace  on  an 
acceptable  basis.  Indeed,  the  foremost 
purpose  of  our  alliances  is  to  prevent 
war  from  ever  occurring.  By  weakening 
one  of  those  alliances.  New  Zealand,  in  a 
small  way,  is  detracting  from  that  pur- 
pose. 

Second,  we  are  fully  aware  of  the 
non-nuclear  policy  of  the  Labor  Govern- 
ment. We  applaud  New  Zealand's 
adherence  to  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty  and  resulting  commitment 
neither  to  receive  nor  acquire  nuclear 
weapons  or  explosive  devices.  While  we 
have  welcomed  New  Zealand's  opinion 
on  desirable  defense  strategy  and  tac- 
tics, we  have  not  asked  that  New 
Zealand  become  involved  in  planning  or 
other  consultative  arrangements  involv- 
ing potential  use  of  our  nuclear  forces, 
as  is  the  case  among  our  NATO  allies. 

Third,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is 
little  nuclear  threat  now  in  the  South 
Pacific  area.  It  is  in  the  common  interest 
to  keep  it  that  way.  The  presence  of 
strong  defense  capabilities,  necessarily 
naval  in  this  maritime  region,  is  the  best 
guarantee  against  eruption  of  conven- 
tional conflict.  And,  if  conventional  con- 
flict can  be  deterred,  the  threat  of 
nuclear  conflict  is  significantly  dimin- 
ished. 


Fourth,  we  have  only  one  navy — not 
one  conventionally-capable  navy  and  one 
nuclear-capable  navy;  not  one  navy  to 
accommodate  one  country's  policy  and 
another  navy  for  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Fifth,  for  ships,  it  would  be  irre- 
sponsible and  would  weaken  the  deter- 
rent value  of  our  forces  to  advertise  to 
potential  adversaries  when  they  are  or 
are  not  carrying  nuclear  weapons. 

Sixth,  in  our  view.  New  Zealand's 
"example"  does  not  stimulate  mutual 
control  of  arms.  It  only  encourages 
potential  adversaries  to  wait  out  other 
signs  of  unilateralism  and  antinuclear 
sentiments  in  the  West,  thereby 
avoiding  the  need  for  any  reciprocal 
concessions  to  contain  or  reduce 
Western  strength. 

In  sum,  we  believe  that  New 
Zealand's  policy,  whatever  its  intentions, 
is  not  good  for  the  alliance  or  for  the 
cause  of  peace.  While  we  do  not  exag- 
gerate the  effect  of  that  policy,  we  can- 
not ignore  it. 

The  U.S.  public  has  a  strong  com- 
mitment to  maintaining  forces  for  peace 
in  the  Pacific,  as  elsewhere.  But  the 
American  public  will  not  long  support 
commitments  and  alliances  that  protect 
others  if  those  others  will  not  uphold 
their  own  responsibilities.  New  Zealand's 
refusal  to  allow  access  to  its  ports  for 
our  ships  confronts  us  with  such  a  situa- 
tion today. 

With  words  New  Zealand  assures  us 
that  it  remains  committed  to  ANZUS; 
but  by  its  deeds  New  Zealand  has  effec- 
tively curtailed  its  operational  role  in 
ANZUS.  A  military  alliance  has  little 
meaning  without  military  cooperation— 
without  some  equity  in  sharing  both  the 
burdens  and  the  rewards.  New  Zealand 
can't  have  it  both  ways. 

In  light  of  New  Zealand's  diminution 
of  cooperation  with  us,  we  have  reduced 
our  own  military  and  security  coopera- 
tion with  New  Zealand.  We  have  made 
these  reductions  with  regret  given  New 
Zealand's  history  as  an  ally— one  that 
has  fought  with  us  in  four  wars  in  this 
century.  But  unless  our  alliance  partners 
bear  a  commensurate  share  of  military 
cooperation  essential  to  the  alliance,  our 
partnership  cannot  be  sustained  prac- 
tically or  politically. 

We  recognize  that  New  Zealand's 
decision  has  been  a  product  of  the 
democratic  process.  New  Zealand  is 
under  no  compulsion  to  cooperate  with 
us  militarily  if  it  feels  that  this  does  not 
serve  its  interest.  But  the  United  States 
is  also  a  democratic  nation  with  broad 
responsibilities.  We  must  husband  our 
defense  resources  for  use  in  areas  where 
our  help  is  wanted  and  appreciated.  Our 
people  would  tolerate  nothing  less. 

We  still,  however,  regard  New 
Zealand  as  a  friend  and  have  sought  to 
avoid  petulant  reactions.  We  have  not 
resorted  to  punitive  measures,  such  as 


economic  sanctions,  and  have  carefully 
limited  our  response  to  avoid  totally  cut- 
ting off  cooperation  even  in  the  military 
and  security  areas.  We  have  merely 
responded  in  a  prudent  and  measured 
way  to  the  changed  situation  in  which 
we  found  ourselves  as  a  result  of  the 
New  Zealand  decision.  We  have  not 
acted  precipitately  but  have  given  the 
New  Zealand  Government  abundant  op- 
portunity—over 7  months— to  sort  out 
its  position.  Once  its  decision  was  clear, 
we  have  tried  to  avoid  bullying  and  have 
maintained  cooperation  with  the  New 
Zealand  Government  as  we  would  with 
any  friendly,  democratic  Western  state. 

We  have  emphasized  that  the  ad- 
justments we  have  made  in  military  and 
security  cooperation  are  all  reversible 
when  our  ships  are  permitted  in  under 
acceptable  conditions.  As  President 
Reagan  said  on  February  7: 

We  deeply  regret  the  decision  by  the 
New  Zealand  Government  to  deny  port  ac- 
cess to  our  ships.  .  .  .  It's  our  deepest  hope 
that  New  Zealand  will  restore  the  traditional 
cooperation  that  has  existed  between  our  tw< 
countries. 

While  the  New  Zealand  Government 
has  not  yet  given  any  signs  of  moving 
back  from  its  present  stance,  the  door 
remains  open  to  restore  cooperation 
within  ANZUS  to  normal  levels. 

Some  in  Congress  are  understand- 
ably impatient  with  New  Zealand's  ac- 
tions against  American  ships  in  light  of 
the  great  exertions  we  have  made  on 
behalf  of  it  and  other  allies.  Some  ask 
whether  we  should  not  back  away  from 
our  commitments  to  New  Zealand  under 
the  ANZUS  treaty  or  reshape  the  treaty 
into  a  strictly  bilateral  U.S. -Australian 
instrument.  While  we  fully  agree  that 
our  cooperation  with  Australia  must  be 
protected — and  we  are  proceeding  to  do 
so  through  bilateral  military  and  political 
cooperation  which  will  substitute  for 
former  trilateral  activities — we  are 
reluctant  at  this  time  to  dismantle  the 
treaty  or  fall  back  from  our  commitmeni 
to  it. 

We  hope  that  the  Government  and 
people  of  New  Zealand  consider  careful- 
ly their  security  interests.  We  strongly 
desire  that  reason  will  prevail  and  New 
Zealand  will  return  to  full  defense  col- 
laboration with  us  and  the  other 
Western  democracies. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  t"ne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


={EFUGEES 


=Y  1986  Assistance  Requests 
or  Migration  and  Refugees 


ty  James  N.  Purcell,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
•n  Foreign  Operations  of  the  Senate  Ap- 
tropriations  Committee  on  March  II,. 
9S5.  Mr.  Purcell  is  Director  of  the 
bureau  for  Refugee  Programs. ' 

t  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you  to- 
lay  to  present  the  Department  of 
State's  migration  and  refugee  assistance 
ppropriation  request  for  FY  1986. 

Strife  and  persecution  continue  to 
reate  refugee  crises  of  substantial  pro- 
lortions  on  virtually  every  continent. 
Ve  estimate  that  over  8  million  refugees 
[1  the  world  today  are  outside  their 
ountry  because  of  these  unfortunate 
ircumstances.  Frequently,  the 
irecarious  situations  of  these  victims  of 
[nrest  are  exacerbated  by  other  factors, 
deluding  natural  disaster.  Every  person 
ere  is  aware  of  the  most  dramatic  ex- 
mple — the  current  tragic  famine  in 
Africa,  which  has  affected  not  only  those 
1  their  own  homelands  but  has  resulted 
1  the  flight  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
cross  national  boundaries  in  search  of 
elief. 

Most  refugees  find  asylum  in 
leighboring  developing  countries  that 
annot  adequately  provide  for  their 
leeds.  Many  of  these  host  countries  are 
if  interest  to  the  United  States  for 
trategic  and  other  foreign  policy 
easons  and  need  to  be  supported  in 
heir  efforts  to  assist  these  persons.  The 
Jnited  States  must  also  continue  to  re- 
pond  to  needs  to  resettle  refugees  in 
his  country  when  voluntary  repatriation 
r  settlement  in  the  region  of  first 
,sylum  on  a  long-term  or  permanent 
lasis  are  not  possible. 

To  address  these  humanitarian  and 
oreign  policy  concerns,  the  Department 
3  requesting  a  migration  and  refugee 
.ssistance  appropriation  of  $337.7 
nillion  in  FY  1986,  an  increase  of  $12 
nillion  over  the  FY  1985  funding  level. 

The  migration  and  refugee  assist- 
,nce  request  does  not  include  funds  for 
he  emergency  response  to  the  present 
amine  in  Africa.  These  emergency  pro- 
jams  funded  by  the  refugee  program 
lave  largely  been  funded  to  date  from 
he  Emergency  Refugee  and  Migration 
Assistance  Fund,  which  is  a  separate  ap- 
iropriation  to  fund  urgent  and  unex- 
lected  needs  which  are  not  anticipated 
n  a  regular  budget  request.  The  com- 


mittee may  recall  that  the  President  has 
authorized  a  drawdown  of  the  fund 
twice  in  the  past  year  for  Africa,  the 
most  recent  of  which  was  $25  million  in 
January  of  this  year. 

As  I  recently  testified  before  the 
House  Appropriations  Subcommittee  on 
Foreign  Operations,  it  is  essential  that 
this  emergency  fund  be  replenished  to 
the  level  of  $33  million  by  enactment  of 
our  1985  supplemental  request  of  $25 
million.  This  fund  is  a  critical  backstop 
to  our  programs  of  humanitarian  relief. 

The  amounts  requested  for  refugee 
programs  fall  in  four  categories  of  ex- 
penditure: refugee  admissions  to  the 
United  States,  refugee  assistance 
overseas,  other  assistance  activities,  and 
administrative  expenses. 

Refugee  Admissions  Program 

The  refugee  admissions  program,  with  a 
request  of  $130.1  million,  comprises 
almost  40%  of  our  request.  These  funds 
cover  activities  necessary  to  admit  a 
projected  68,000  refugees  to  the  United 
States  in  1986.  The  refugee  admissions 
level  is  consistent  with  major 
developments  during  the  past  year. 

First,  the  President  launched  an  ini- 
tiative last  fall  to  expand  the  orderly 
departure  program  from  Vietnam  to  in- 
crease the  number  of  Amerasian 
children  and  political  prisoners  and  their 
family  members  allowed  to  depart  Viet- 
nam. This  request  is  sufficient  to  cover 
the  projected  increased  number  of 
Amerasians.  At  such  time  that  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam  agrees  to 
a  program  for  political  prisoners,  more 
numbers  may  be  needed. 

Second,  the  admission  of  former 
Cuban  political  prisoners  and  their 
families  to  the  United  States  as  refugees 
is  now  beginning  as  a  consequence  of 
the  agreement  reached  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Cuba  in  December.  This  request 
allows  continuation  of  that  program  in 
FY  1986. 

Refugee  Assistance  Overseas 

The  activities  carried  out  under  the  ad- 
missions program  include  voluntary 
agency  processing  activities  overseas, 
processing  and  transportation  by  the 
Intergovernmental  Committee  for 
Migration  (ICM)  English-language  and 
cultural  orientation  training  overseas. 


and  initial  reception  and  placement  ac- 
tivities provided  by  the  resettlement 
voluntary  agencies.  Of  the  $26.9  million 
increase  over  the  1985  level,  $19.4 
million  is  attributable  to  the  expansion 
of  the  reception  and  placement  program 
to  cover  financial  responsibility  for  all 
basic  necessities  for  the  refugees'  first 
90  days  after  admission  to  the  United 
States  in  order  to  discourage  welfare 
dependency.  This  initiative  is  similar  to 
that  proposed  in  the  Refugee  Assistance 
Extension  Act  passed  by  the  House  last 
year. 

Refugee  assistance  programs  over- 
seas total  $180.2  million  and  account  for 
about  53%  of  our  request.  This  budget 
provides  approximately  the  current  level 
(if  support  to  meet  estimated  core  pro- 
gram costs  of  the  international  organiza- 
tions and  other  agencies  that  carry  out 
international  relief  and  resettlement  pro- 
grams overseas. 

Other  Assistance 

While  the  Department's  first  priority  re- 
mains the  preservation  of  life  through 
providing  for  refugees'  basic  needs, 
these  funds  also  will  support,  when 
possible  and  appropriate,  programs  that 
offer  more  lasting  resolutions  to  refugee 
situations  through  voluntary  repatriation 
and  settlement  in  the  region  of  asylum. 

The  requested  $26.5  million  for 
assistance  to  Indochinese  refugees  in 
Southeast  Asia  primarily  supports  the 
efforts  of  the  UN  High  Commissioner 
for  Refugees  (UNHCR),  the  UN  Border 
Relief  Organization  (UNBRO),  the  Inter- 
national Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
(ICRC),  and  other  agencies  to  address 
the  needs  of  refugees  in  first  asylum  and 
of  the  250,000  Cambodian  refugees  who 
remain  in  a  precarious  position  on  the 
Thai-Cambodian  border.  In  addition,  this 
program  covers  contributions  of 
$800,000  toward  the  UNHCR-admin- 
istered  orderly  departure  program  and 
$1  million  for  programs  combatting 
pirate  attacks  on  boat  refugees  in  the 
Gulf  of  Thailand. 

African  refugee  assistance  of  $51 
million  in  FY  1986  will  support  core  pro- 
grams of  the  UNHCR  and  the  ICRC  for 
refugee  relief  and  provide  funding  for 
refugee  scholarships  and  other  special 
relief  needs. 

The  Near  East  and  South  Asia 
assistance  programs  request  is  $87 
million.  The  request  includes  $67 
million — the  same  as  the  FY  1985 
estimate — for  the  support  of  Palestine 
refugees  through  the  vital  work  of  the 
UN  Relief  and  Works  Agency  (UNRWA) 
for  Palestine  Refugees.  We  also  intend 


June  1985 


67 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


to  continue  funding  the  UNHCR,  the 
ICRC,  and  voluntary  agencies  for  the 
approximately  2.5  million  Afghan 
refugees  in  Pakistan  at  $20  million. 

In  response  to  the  continued  high 
level  of  refugee  needs  in  Latin  America, 
we  proposed  to  fund  programs  assisting 
those  refugees  at  $15.7  million,  roughly 
the  FY  1985  level.  Most  of  this  amount 
will  support  UNHCR  programs,  while 
the  rest  will  be  contributed  to  the  ICRC 
and  voluntary  agencies. 

Our  request  includes  $19.5  million 
for  other  assistance  activities — non- 
regional  assistance  needs.  Of  this 
amount,  the  program  of  assistance  to 
refugees  settling  in  Israel  is  requested 
at  $12.5  million.  We  believe  this  amount 
will  cover  adequately  the  resettlement 
costs  of  refugees  from  the  Soviet  Union, 
Eastern  Europe,  and  other  areas  of  the 
world.  Also  included  is  a  request  for  $7 
million  for  international  organization 
contributions,  including  the  U.S.  con- 
tributions of  $2  million  to  the  ad- 
ministrative budget  of  the  ICRC.  The 
Intergovernmental  Committee  for 
Migration  is  funded  at  $3  million  for  its 
assessed  administrative  budget  and  $2 


million  for  the  voluntary  contribution  to 
ongoing  migration  programs. 

Administrative  Expenses 

Finally,  we  request  $7.9  million  for  ad- 
ministrative expenses,  a  decrease  of 
$270,000  from  1985.  Within  this 
amount,  we  plan  to  fund  three  new  posi- 
tions to  strengthen  bureau  administra- 
tion of  the  English-language  and  cultural 
orientation  program,  the  reception  and 
placement  program,  and  the  assistance 
program  in  Central  America.  The 
decrease  is  because  of  the  proposed  pay 
reductions  and  other  administrative  sav- 
ings. 

In  closing,  I  would  note  with  ap- 
preciation the  ongoing  concern  for  the 
dedication  to  the  problems  of  refugees 
by  the  members  of  this  committee.  I 
look  forward  to  our  working  together  to 
continue  to  insure  a  sound  U.S.  refugee 
policy. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1986  Security  Assistance  Requests 


by  William  Schneider,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Arms  Control,  International  Secu- 
rity, and  Science  of  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  on  February  28,  1985. 
Mr.  Schneider  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Security  Assistance.  Science,  and. 
Technology. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  you  today 
to  discuss  the  Administration's  proposed 
FY  1986  security  assistance  program. 
As  the  Secretary  indicated  to  you  last 
week  in  his  overview  of  the  entire  pro- 
gram, foreign  assistance  is  a  prudent  in- 
vestment abroad.  It  assists  us  in  the  ef- 
fective implementation  of  our  foreign 
policy  objectives,  promotes  global 
economic  and  political  freedom,  and 
reflects  the  humanitarian  concerns  of 
the  American  people.  Foreign  assistance 
is  also  one  of  the  most  cost-effective 
means  at  our  disposal  for  enhancing  our 
national  security. 

A  year  ago,  I  testified  before  you  on 
the  three  most  difficult  but  vitally  im- 
portant issues  facing  our  security 
assisUince  program  at  that  time — the 
Soviet-  and  Cuban-backed  insurgency  in 
Central  America,  the  acute  tensions  in 


the  Middle  East,  and  the  critical  and 
growing  debt  burdens  of  many  develop- 
ing countries.  There  have  been,  and  will 
be,  no  easy,  quick  solutions  to  these 
problems,  but  I  can  assure  you  today 
that  we  have  made  progress  in  each  of 
these  critical  areas. 

First,  looking  at  the  area  closest  to 
home,  there  is  definite  and  sustained 
progress  toward  democracy  and  stable 
political  processes  in  Central  America 
and,  indeed,  throughout  the  hemisphere, 
notwithstanding  the  continuing  efforts 
of  Soviet-  and  Cuban-backed  insurgents 
to  undermine  the  political  and  economic 
fabric  of  Central  American  govern- 
ments. El  Salvador  now  has  a 
democratically  elected  government 
whose  legitimacy  is  recognized  by  its 
own  populace  and  by  the  world's 
democratic  community.  There  has  been 
a  sharp  decline  in  political  violence  in 
that  country  and  a  growing  acceptance 
of  democratic  institutions.  Bolstering 
these  positive  political  developments,  the 
Salvadoran  military  has  demonstrated 
an  increasing  professionalism  and  ability 
to  work  within  the  guidelines  established 
by  President  Duarte;  there  has  also  been 
a  turnaround  in  their  ability  to  conduct 
counterinsurgency  operations. 


Elsewhere  in  Central  America  proj 
ress  has  been  equally  impressive.  In 
neighboring  Honduras,  new  presidentia 
elections  are  scheduled  for  later  this 
year.  Panama  and  Belize  both  recently 
have  held  democratic  elections.  Constit 
ent  Assembly  elections  in  Guatemala  8 
months  ago  were  widely  accepted  as 
honest  and  open.  Costa  Rica  maintains 
its  strong  democratic  traditions.  U.S. 
economic  and  security  assistance  has 
been,  and  will  continue  to  be,  vital  for 
the  continuation  of  this  progress  in  the 
region,  especially  in  the  face  of 
Nicaragua's  Soviet-  and  Cuban-backed 
destabilization  efforts. 

Second,  there  have  also  been 
modest  positive  developments  in  our 
quest  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  Thi 
Israeli  offer  last  September  to  negotiat 
with  Jordan  without  preconditions  and 
the  recently  initiated  phased  withdraw; 
of  Israel's  Armed  Forces  from  Lebanoi 
have  helped  create  an  atmosphere  mor 
conducive  to  progress  toward  negotia- 
tions. Likewise,  the  resumption  of 
diplomatic  relations  between  Jordan  ar 
Egypt — two  Arab  states  which  suppor* 
a  peaceful  settlement— is  a  promising 
development.  We  have  also  been  follow* 
ing  the  Jordan-Palestine  Liberation 
Organization  (PLO)  dialogue  and  believ 
that  if  an  agreement  promotes  negotia 
tions  between  Jordan  and  Israel,  it 
would  be  a  positive  step. 

U.S.  security  assistance  has  not  be 
the  only  contributing  factor  in  these  tv 
vital  areas  of  the  world.  It  has,  howevt 
played  an  important  role.  Because  the 
Administration  and  Congress,  working 
together,  have  been  able  to  increase  th 
levels  of  our  security  assistance  during 
the  past  few  years,  we  now  have  on- 
going effective  programs  that  are  begi 
ning  to  show  clear  signs  of  success.  W 
are  unquestionably  on  the  right  track; 
we  must  continue  to  press  the  advan- 
tages already  gained;  we  must  not  let 
now. 

Third,  last  year  I  also  described  to 
you  the  critical  debt  service  burden  fac 
ing  many  countries  around  the  world. 
Although  much  remains  to  be  done,  we 
believe  the  worst  of  the  debt  crisis  is 
behind  us.  For  example,  in  Latin 
America,  where  fully  half  of  the  less 
developed  country  (LDC)  debt  problem 
is  concentrated,  there  has  been  a  signil 
cant  improvement  in  the  region's  cur- 
rent account  deficit,  and  economic 
growth  has  returned  to  the  region  as  a 
whole.  Although  much  of  the  credit 
must  go  to  the  difficult  adjustment  ef- 
forts undertaken  by  many  of  these  cou 
tries,  the  U.S. -led  worldwide  economic 
recovery  clearly  has  been  a  major 
benefit  in  spurring  this  turn-around. 


68 


Department  of  State  Buileti 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


The  positive  congressional  response 
0  the  FY  1985  Administration  request 
0  place  foreign  military  sales  (FMS) 
inancing  on-budget  has  made  possible 
he  initiation  of  a  modest  but  much- 
eeded  concessional  FMS  financing  pro- 
ram.  Along  with  increases  in  military 
ssistance  program  (MAP)  grants,  con- 
essional  FMS  lending  is  an  important 
J.S.  effort  to  help  security  partners  who 
ften  face  either  more  debt  or  height- 
ned  military  vulnerability.  This  flexibili- 
y  has  permitted  us  to  tailor  comprehen- 
ive  security  assistance  programs  which 
ake  into  account  the  economic  cir- 
umstances  of  needy  friends  and  allies. 

Even  under  the  best  of  economic 
nd  budgetary  circumstances,  however, 
here  are  limits  to  the  amount  of  finan- 
ial  assistance  which  the  United  States 
an  or  should  provide  to  our  friends  and 
Hies.  This  year,  as  the  President  has 
lade  clear,  we  must  deal  with  the  struc- 
ural  deficit  in  the  Federal  budget  in 
rder  to  maintain  a  healthy  U.S.  finan- 
ial  system  and  continued  non- 
iflationary  economic  growth.  At  the 
ame  time,  we  must  not  abdicate  our 
lobal  responsibilities.  The  FY  1986  in- 
ernational  affairs  request  that  we  have 
roposed  balances  the  need  for 
udgetary  restraint  with  our  foreign 
olicy  and  national  defense  imperatives, 
lecurity  assistance  plays  a  key  role  in 
he  pursuit  of  these  objectives  and,  as  I 
/ill  demonstrate  later  in  my  testimony, 
I'e  have  prepared  a  proposal  that 
epresents  the  minimum  level  of 
esources  necessary  to  meet  our  foreign 
lolicy/national  security  needs. 

i^Y  1986  Programs  and  Their  Value 

Jecurity  assistance  contributes  directly 

0  the  security  of  the  United  States  and 
,t  the  same  time  lowers  defense  costs. 

•  It  enables  our  friends  and  allies  to 
btain  military  equipment  and  training 

D  defend  their  independence  and  ter- 
itorial  integrity,  permitting  them,  in 
ome  cases,  to  undertake  responsibilities 
^hich  otherwise  we  ourselves  might 
ave  to  assume. 

•  It  furnishes  tangible  evidence  of 
ur  support  for  the  independence  and 
erritorial  integrity  of  our  friends  and 
Hies,  thus  deterring  possible  aggression 
nd  promoting  regional  stability. 

•  It  contributes  to  the  broad 
ooperative  relationships  which  permit 
he  presence  of  U.S.  facilities  or  access 
ly  U.S.  forces  to  host  country  facilities 

1  time  of  threat  to  mutual  interests, 
hereby  reducing  the  cost  of  U.S. 
efense. 


•  It  provides  a  means  of  demon- 
strating U.S.  constancy  and  willingness 
to  stay  the  course  in  support  of  nations 
whose  survival  constitutes  a  basic  pur- 
pose of  our  foreign  policy. 

•  It  helps  alleviate  the  economic  and 
social  distress  that  breeds  domestic 
violence  and  invites  external  sub- 
version—particularly important  for 
countries  whose  necessary  military  ex- 
penditures would  otherwise  impose 
severe  strains  on  their  economies. 

•  It  provides  to  the  U.S.  and  foreign 
buyer  the  benefits  of  consolidated  plan- 
ning and  economies  of  scale. 

The  FY  1986  security  assistance 
program  was  carefully  developed 
through  an  extensive  interagency  proc- 
ess which  thoroughly  reviewed  each  pro- 
gram. We  first  identified  and  assigned 
relative  priorities  to  our  key  strategic 
objectives  and  coordinated  them  with 
foreign  policy  and  defense  planning. 
Then  we  designed  a  security  assistance 
program  and  integrated  it  with  develop- 
ment assistance  priorities.  The  FY  1986 
program  has  been  crafted  in  accordance 
with  the  Administration's  extraordinary 
effort  to  restrict  budget  growth.  At  the 
same  time,  each  recipient  country  has 
been  provided  with  the  specific  mix  of 
program  resources  which  we  believe  will 
best  meet  its  needs. 

As  a  result  of  this  process,  for  FY 
1986  we  are  requesting  $9.5  billion  in 
security  assistance — $6.7  billion  in 
military  assistance  programs  and  $2.8 
billion  in  economic  support  fund  (ESF) 
assistance.  This  ESF  request  level,  of 
course,  does  not  contain  an  amount  for 
Israel.  Once  this  amount  is  included,  the 
ESF  level  will  undoubtedly  exceed  the 
ESF  level  appropriated  in"  the  FY  1985 
continuing  resolution. 

Military  Assistance  Programs.  An 

$860  million  increase  in  FMS  credits  and 
grant  military  assistance  over  the  levels 
in  the  FY  1985  continuing  resolution  can 
largely  be  accounted  for  by  increased 
levels  for  only  four  countries — Egypt, 
Israel,  the  Philippines,  and  Turkey.  All 
four  are  friends  with  which  we  have 
close  security  cooperation.  The  latter 
two  countries  are  base  rights  countries 
whose  armed  forces  are  in  dire  need  of 
modernization  or  improvement. 

For  our  largest  security  assistance 
program— the  FMS  credit  program— we 
are  requesting  $5.7  billion  for  programs 
in  27  countries.  These  programs  enable 
eligible  countries  to  purchase  U.S.  equip- 
ment, spare  parts,  and  training.  With 
the  exception  of  a  few  country  programs 
which  were  raLsed  in  limited  amounts, 
virtually  all  of  the  increase  in  the  FMS 
financing  program  level  over  FY  1985  is 


for  Egypt  and  Israel — an  increase  of 

$125  million  (to  $1.3  billion)  for  Egypt, 
and  of  $400  million  (to  $1.8  billion)  for 
Israel.  The  $3.1  billion  request  for  these 
two  countries  is  almost  55%  of  the  total 
FMS  credit  package.  Twelve  percent 
($651  million)  of  the  FMS  program  is  to 
be  devoted  to  concessional  financing  for 
15  countries;  almost  34%  ($1.9  billion)  of 
the  total  FMS  program  will  be  in  the 
form  of  Treasury  rate  financing  for  16 
individual  country  programs. 

We  are  requesting  $949  million  in 
MAP  for  36  country  and  regional  pro- 
grams. This  is  a  15%  increase  over  the 
FY  1985  continuing  resolution  level  and 
represents  a  continuing  effort  to  provide 
more  grant  assistance  to  the  poorer 
countries.  Providing  grant  funding  for 
defense  articles  and  services,  MAP  is 
vital  to  financially  strapped  countries 
which  otherwise  either  would  have  to 
forego  providing  for  their  defense  or 
would  have  to  divert  scarce  resources 
from  economic  development  needs. 

We  consider  the  $65.7  million  re- 
quested for  the  international  military 
education  and  training  (IMET)  program 
to  be  one  of  the  most  important,  albeit 
one  of  the  smallest,  parts  of  our  security 
assistance  budget.  These  grants  not  only 
provide  needed  professional  military 
training  but  they  also  represent  a  low- 
cost  method  of  providing  a  valuable 
channel  of  communication  and  influence 
with  an  important  sector  of  a  country's 
leadership,  especially  in  the  Third 
World,  exposing  trainees  to  such  U.S. 
values  as  respect  for  democracy  and 
observance  of  human  rights. 

Economic  Support  Fund.  The  ESF 

program,  at  $2.8  billion,  reflects  the  con- 
tinuing U.S.  concern  for  the  economic 
problems  faced  by  our  friends  and  allies. 
This  form  of  economic,  rather  than 
military,  assistance  is  provided  on  a 
grant  or  loan  basis  to  countries  selected 
for  their  special  political  and  security  in- 
terest to  the  United  States.  It  comprises 
approximately  30%  of  the  total  FY  1986 
security  assistance  program.  As  I  noted 
earlier,  a  request  for  Israel  has  not  yet 
been  included  in  our  FY  1986  ESF  pro- 
gram. We  have  been  carrying  on  a 
dialogue  with  Israel  through  a  joint 
U.S. -Israeli  Economic  Development 
Group  which  is  reviewing  recent  Israeli 
economic  policy  and  development  plans 
and  the  role  of  U.S.  assistance  in  sup- 
port of  that  policy.  We  will  submit  an 
ESF  request  to  (Congress  once  we  have 
completed  our  analysis  of  the  Israeli 
economic  program  and  assistance  re- 
quirements for  FY  1985  and  FY  1986. 


unel985 


69 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


Finally,  our  FY  1986  proposal  in- 
cludes $37  million  for  peacekeeping 
operations  funding.  This  will  support 
multilateral  activities  in  the  Sinai  and 
Cyprus. 

Worldwide  Programs 

Within  the  overall  security  assistance 
program,  the  largest  single  component 
(41%)  is  devoted  to  Israel  and  Egyjjt  to 
support  Middle  East  stability  and  peace. 
When  an  ESF  request  is  made  for 
Israel,  this  percentage  of  the  total  will 
increase  and  the  percentage  for  other 
country  groupings  will  decrease  cor- 
respondingly. Base  rights  countries- 
Spain,  Portugal,  Greece,  Turkey,  and 
the  Philippines— account  for  24%.  These 
seven  countries  receive  almost  two- 
thirds  of  all  security  assistance.  Military 
access  and  front-line  states  are  provided 
16%,  while  the  strategically  and 
politically  important  countries  in  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean  account  for 
another  11%.  We  have  little  choice  but 
to  provide  those  countries  with  the  level 
of  resources  that  are  either  required  by 
treaty  or  are  necessary  to  help  insure 
their  (and  our)  security.  As  a  result,  only 
7%  of  the  total  FY  1986  security 
assistance  request  is  left  for  all  other 
country  and  regional  programs  (over 
75).  The  only  real  flexibility  we  have  is 
in  this  final  area  and  even  here  we  are 
limited  by  resources  (only  $654  million) 
and  the  damage  to  our  interests  that 
elimination  of  some  of  these  small  pro- 
grams might  bring  about. 

Egypt  and  Israel.  One  of  our 

highest  priorities  continues  to  be  to 
bring  a  just  and  enduring  end  to  the 
conflict  and  turmoil  which  has  disturbed 
the  Middle  East  for  so  long.  Our 
assistance  plays  a  crucial  role.  For  that 
reason,  the  principal  recipients  of  our 
worldwide  request  remain  Israel  and 
Egypt. 

We  believe  that  Israel  must  maintain 
confidence  in  its  security  if  it  is  to  take 
risks  for  peace.  As  a  result  of  a  bilateral 
review  of  Israeli  defense  requirements, 
we  must  have  increased  the  level  of 
forgiven  FMS  financing  substantially 
from  $1.4  billion  in  FY  1985  to  $1.8 
billion  in  FY  1986.  In  a  similar  fashion, 
the  FY  1986  forgiven  FMS  financing 
program  for  Egypt  has  been  increased 
to  $1.3  billion  to  give  it  credible  deter- 
rence against  Soviet  armed  radical 
states  opposed  to  the  Camp  David  ac- 
cords and  the  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace 
Treaty. 


In  FY  1986  we  plan  to  provide  the 
same  level  of  ESF  support  to  Egypt  as 
that  appropriated  by  Congress  for  FY 
1985.  As  I  indicated  earlier,  an  ESF  re- 
quest for  Israel  will  be  made  at  a  later 
date. 

Base  Rights  Countries.  Countries 
which  provide  the  United  States  with 
the  right  to  utilize  territory  to  maintain 
bases  are  critical  to  the  forward  projec- 
tion of  our  global  defense  posture. 
Security  assistance  for  those  countries 
at  the  requested  levels  is  essential  to 
sustain  confidence  in  the  best-efforts 
pledges  which  underpin  all  U.S.  base 
agreements.  Security  assistance  in  FY 
1986  totals  $2.3  billion  for  the  five  base 
rights  countries. 

Greece  and  Turkey  are  essential  to 
the  continued  viability  of  the  southern 
flank  of  NATO.  In  addition  to  control- 
ling Soviet  naval  access  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean, Turkey  is  strategically  position- 
ed along  the  flank  of  the  U.S.S.R.'s 
Transcaucasus  region,  where  the  Soviets 
have  substantially  increased  their  forces. 

At  $785  million,  the  FY  1986  MAP 
and  FMS  financing  request  for  Turkey  is 
$85  million  higher  than  the  amount 
allocated  under  the  FY  1985  continuing 
resolution.  Although  a  more  significant 
increase  could  be  justified  on  program- 
matic grounds,  the  amount  requested  is 
the  minimum  necessary  to  assist  Turkey 
to  meet  its  NATO  commitments  through 
force  modernization,  including  purchase 
of  F-16  aircraft.  Furthermore,  we  are 
proposing  that  a  larger  portion  of  the 
Turkey  program  be  on  a  concessional 
basis  to  avoid  undercutting  that 
country's  stringent  economic  stabiliza- 
tion program  that  has  helped  turn  the 
country's  economy  around.  While  we  are 
proposing  an  increase  in  military 
assistance,  improvements  in  Turkey's 
economic  performance  have  allowed  us 
to  lower  our  ESF  request  to  $150 
million. 

We  continue  to  pursue  vigorously 
progress  on  Cyprus.  The  Government  of 
Turkey  has  accepted  and  supported  the 
UN  Secretary  General's  initiative.  This 
initiative  offers  the  best  available  pros- 
pect for  success.  We  must  not  under- 
mine it  by  considering  punitive  condi- 
tions on  assistance  to  Turkey  which  can 
only  stiffen  the  resistance  of  those  who 
oppose  compromise. 

Our  request  for  Greece  is  identical 
to  last  year's.  Greece  is  a  traditional 
friend  and  democratic  ally  with  which 
we  have  strong  common  interests  even 
though  we  disagree  on  several  important 
issues.  U.S.  security  assistance  for 
Greece  assists  in  armed  forces'  modern- 
ization to  meet  both  Greek  and  NATO 


defense  needs  and  helps  to  ensure  con- 
tinued use  of  four  U.S.  military  faciliti) 
and  a  number  of  smaller  installations. 

Our  security  assistance  program 
plays  an  important  role  in  helping  Spai 
to  consolidate  its  new  democratic  instit 
tions  and  meet  NATO  modernization 
standards.  The  FY  1986  request  for  th 
country,  which  permits  U.S.  use  of 
Spanish  military  facilities,  is  the  same 
we  are  providing  in  FY  1985. 

Portugal  is  a  reliable  NATO  ally 
which  provides  the  United  States  with 
access  to  the  strategic  Lajes  Air  Base 
facilities.  The  modest  increase  in  the  F 
1986  request  over  the  FY  1985  prograi 
level  for  Portugal  results  primarily  fro' 
an  increase  in  FMS  financing  and  will 
enable  Portugal  to  begin  participation 
a  NATO  frigate  program. 

In  the  Philippines,  security  assist- 
ance supports  a  vital  defense  relation- 
ship. The  basic  framework  for  our  re- 
quest is  the  Presidential  "best-efforts" 
commitment  made  in  connection  with 
the  5-year  review  of  our  military  base 
agreement  in  1983.  Our  security  assist- 
ance program  of  $197  million  for  the 
Philippines  seeks  to  alleviate  the  Philip 
pines'  most  critical  economic  crisis  sine 
World  War  II  and  to  counter  the  grow 
ing  armed  insurgency  by  the  Communi 
Party's  military  arm.  It  will  also  suppo 
the  revitalization  of  democratic  institu- 
tions and  long-term  economic  growth. 
The  ESF  request  is  for  $95  million  whi 
the  military  assistance  request  has  beei 
increased  to  account  for  the  FY  1985 
shift  of  much  of  the  FMS  request  to 
ESF.  An  improvement  in  the  grant  am  i 
concessional  nature  of  our  request 
reflects  our  concern  for  the  deteriorat-  j 
ing  Philippine  economy. 

Military  Access/Front-Line  Statei^ 

A  number  of  U.S.  security  assistance 
recipients,  such  as  Korea  and  Thailand  , 
face  hostile  Soviet  or  Soviet-backed 
states  across  their  borders.  Others  per- 
mit the  United  States  to  use  storage 
facilities  or  provide  refueling  ar- 
rangements which  are  important  to  the 
execution  of  U.S.  military  exercises  an( 
enable  us  to  move  troops  to  trouble 
spots  at  critical  moments.  I  will  com- 
ment on  a  few  of  these  key  allies. 

Within  this  grouping  of  countries, 
we  have  valuable  treaty  allies  such  as 
Korea  where  almost  40.000  U.S.  troops 
are  located.  Our  military  assistance  to 
this  country  is  virtually  at  the  same  lev 
as  in  FY  1985. 

Thailand,  another  front-line  state, 
faces  Soviet-supported  Vietnamese  ag- 
gression in  Cambodia  from  military 
forces  larger  and  better  equipped  than 
its  own.  Our  program  is  designed  to  pn 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


e  the  Thais  with  a  credible  deterrent 
ce  to  deal  with  Vietnamese  incur- 
ns,  such  as  the  one  that  recently  oc- 
•red,  and  to  help  them  cope  with  the 
)nomic  costs  of  the  refugee  dis- 
,cements  that  have  resulted  from  the 
hting  in  Cambodia.  Other  key  friends 
;h  as  Sudan  face  serious  security 
eats  from  Libyan  adventurism. 
Pakistan,  also  in  this  grouping,  is  a 
al  participant  in  international  efforts 
resolve  the  crisis  created  by  the 
viet  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  Our 
istance  package  to  Pakistan  is  part  of 
i-year  program  to  help  that  country  to 
prove  its  defense  capabilities  and 
)nomic  performance.  The  small  overall 
rease  to  $576.2  million  in  our  security 
;istance  program  with  Pakistan  is 
lost  entirely  in  the  ESF  account  and 
rtially  reflects  a  decline  in  our  re- 
3sted  levels  of  development  assist- 
:e. 
On  the  Arabian  Peninsula,  Oman  is 
only  country  where  we  have  a  for- 
il  access  agreement  which  provides  ac- 
ss  to  U.S.  military  forces  in  peacetime 
d  contingency  and  allows  the  United 
ites  to  preposition  military  materiel  at 
:eral  locations.  Oman  is  a  strong  sup- 
rter  of  Camp  David  and  the 
esident's  September  1982  initiative.  It 
iey  to  preserving  our  access  to  the 
If. 

Central  America  and  the  Carib- 

an.  As  I  indicated  earlier,  progress  is 
ing  made  in  Central  America  on  both 
;  political  and  military  fronts.  The 
)mentum  is  clearly  with  our  friends  in 

region.  I  am  encouraged  and  confi- 
nt  that  our  security  assistance  funding 
s  been  a  key  factor  in  these  positive 
velopments.  The  appropriation  by 
ngress  of  adequate  FY  1985  security 
istance  and  an  increased  level  for  FY 
84  through  a  supplemental  for  Central 
nerica  has  gone  a  long  way  toward 
plementation  of  the  recommendation 
the  National  Bipartisan  Commission 

Central  America  for  "greater  con- 
lUity  and  predictability"  in  our  aid  to 
it  beleaguered  area.  Nevertheless,  the 
errillas  in  El  Salvador  remain  a 

ious  threat  and  must  be  dealt  with; 
caragua  still  threatens  to  destabilize 

entire  region  and  economic  problems 
main. 

Our  FY  1986  request  for  Central 
nerica  is  essentially  one  of  continuity 
sustain  and  further  the  progress 
ide  in  implementing  the  national 
lartisan  commission's  recommenda- 
ns.  For  FY  1986,  over  70%  ($601 
llion)  of  the  security  assistance  re- 
ested  for  Central  America  is  in  the 
m  of  ESF.  This  assistance  will  con- 


ne1985 


tinue  our  support  for  the  resolution  of 
the  economic  crisis  plaguing  the  area. 
(There  is  also  an  additional  $379  million 
in  development  and  food  aid  proposed 
for  the  area).  To  enable  our  economic 
assistance  to  be  effective,  we  plan  to 
devote  $254  million  in  military  assist- 
ance to  safeguard  the  further  develop- 
ment of  democracy  and  economic 
growth  against  antidemocratic  forces. 

As  in  FY  1985,  El  Salvador  is  to  be 
the  largest  recipient  of  security 
assistance  in  Central  America.  The  pro- 
posed $132.6  million  in  military 
assistance  represents  only  a  small  in- 
crease over  the  enacted  FY  1985  level 
and  will  help  provide  the  security 
necessary  to  sustain  critical  economic, 
social,  and  political  programs.  Our  ESF 
request  of  $210  million  is  crucial  to  the 
maintenance  of  economic  stability  in  the 
face  of  continued  destabilization  efforts 
by  the  insurgents.  It  will  enable  the 
Salvadoran  Government  to  procure  com- 
modities, including  equipment  to  restore 
and  maintain  internal  communication, 
marketing,  and  distribution  links,  and  to 
assist  displaced  families. 

Neighboring  Honduras  has  serious 
financial  difficulties  exacerbated  by  its 
proximity  to  the  area's  trouble  spots. 
The  use  of  $80  million  in  ESF  to  fulfill  a 
need  for  fast-disbursing  nonproject 
assistance  will  be  negotiated  within  the 
context  of  a  U.S.-Honduran  economic 
working  group.  Grant  MAP  totaling  $87 
million  is  to  be  applied  to  the  critically 
needed  Honduran  program  of  selective 
modernization  and  expansion  of  its 
armed  forces. 

Costa  Rica,  an  historically  secure 
democracy,  nevertheless  faces  security 
challenges  and  considerable  economic 
stress.  MAP  grants  of  $2.5  million  is  to 
be  largely  dedicated  to  the  maintenance 
of  previously  provided  equipment.  An 
ESF  program  of  $150  million  is  planned 
for  Costa  Rica  to  assist  in  stabilizing  the 
economy  and  establishing  an  export-led 
recovery. 

For  Guatemala  our  total  security 
assistance  request  of  $35.3  million— 
$10.3  million  in  military  assistance,  and 
$25  million  in  ESF— is  less  than  our  re- 
quest for  FY  1985  although  more  than 
the  amount  allocated  from  FY  1985  ap- 
propriations. Guatemala  is  preparing  for 
Presidential  elections  this  year.  Our  pro- 
gram is  designed  to  encourage  further 
movement  toward  democracy  and  to 
assist  the  Government  of  Guatemala  to 
redirect  resources  to  solve  socioeco- 
nomic problems  and  overcome  local  in- 
surgency. It  would  be  counterproductive 
if  this  assistance  was  to  be  again 
restricted  as  in  the  FY  1985  continuing 
resolution. 


Lesser  amounts  of  military  assist- 
ance are  requested  for  Belize,  Panama, 
the  Panama  Canal  area  military  schools, 
and  for  the  U.S.  Army  School  of  the 
Americas  at  its  Ft.  Benning,  Georgia, 
transitional  training  facility. 

The  Caribbean  area  still  faces  severe 
economic  problems  which  we  are  now  at- 
tempting to  address  with  ESF  levels 
that  are  substantially  higher  than  those 
for  military  assistance.  Nevertheless,  the 
island  nations  of  the  eastern  Caribbean 
have  small  or  no  regular  defense  forces 
and  require  modest  amounts  of  U.S. 
military  assistance  to  enhance  their 
capabilities  and  give  them  the  capacity 
to  protect  themselves.  An  adequate 
amount  of  economic  and  security 
assistance  to  this  area  is  essential  if  we 
are  to  maintain  stability  in  the  region 
and  avoid  future  Grenada's. 

All  Other  Country  and  Regional 
Programs.  After  security  assistance  has 
been  provided  to  Israel  and  Egypt,  base 
rights  countries,  Central  America  and 
the  Caribbean,  and  military  access/front- 
line states,  only  about  7%  ($654  million) 
is  left  for  more  than  75  country  and 
regional  programs  scattered  around  the 
globe.  While  many  of  the  nations  in  the 
"all  other"  category  are  provided  only 
small  IMET  programs,  others  have 
much  more  pressing  security  needs 
which  must  be  addressed  even  though 
they  do  not  fall  into  the  four  priority 
categories  that  I  have  just  discussed. 

Peru,  for  example,  is  struggling 
against  the  brutal  Maoist  Sendero 
Luminoso  insurgency  as  well  as  drug 
traffickers.  We  plan  to  assist  Peru  in 
dealing  more  effectively  with  its  threats 
to  internal  stability  while  encouraging 
efforts  at  arms  supply  diversification. 

We  have  also  requested  a  new  FY 
1986  ESF  initiative  for  three  Andean 
democracies — Ecuador,  Peru,  and 
Bolivia.  The  negative  effects  of  almost 
hemispheric-wide  economic  difficulties 
have  hit  these  smaller  democratic  coun- 
tries especially  hard.  Their  economic 
problems  have  been  compounded  by  ma- 
jor damage  from  the  El  Nino  climatic 
disaster  of  2  years  ago.  Political  stress, 
especially  in  Peru,  has  resulted  from  ter- 
rorism and  narcotics  trafficking.  We  are 
proposing  $70  million  in  ESF  for  these 
three  countries  to  help  alleviate  some  of 
their  more  pressing  problems. 

Africa  also  represents  critical  secu- 
rity interests  to  the  United  States,  and  a 
number  of  African  programs  fall  within 
this  "all  other"  grouping.  Africa  is  im- 
portant for  its  vital  mineral  resources, 
U.S.  investment,  and  its  proximity  to 
our  interests  in  Southwest  Asia.  In 
eastern  and  southern  Africa,  the 


71 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


destabilizing  influence  of  the  Soviets 
must  be  countered.  Our  strategic  objec- 
tives continue  to  include  the  pursuit  of 
peaceful  settlement  in  Namibia,  a 
change  in  South  Africa's  system  of 
apartheid,  and  the  withdrawal  of  Cuban 
troops  from  Angola. 

Africa  today  faces  the  most  critical 
test  in  its  history— the  continuing 
economic  crisis  compounded  by  drought. 
Our  ESF  programs  in  Africa,  in  con- 
junction with  other  forms  of  economic 
assistance,  are  desig-ned  to  help  spur 
economic  development  in  the  face  of 
famine  and  economic  stagnation.  An  im- 
portant element  of  our  African  ESF  re- 
quest is  the  $75  million  for  the  African 
economic  policy  reform  program.  We 
believe  this  program  can  continue  to 
stimulate  the  visible  trend  in  many 
African  countries  toward  free  market 
economies  and  away  from  statist 
economic  approaches. 

For  FY  1986  modest  MAP  and 
IMET  programs  are  proposed  for  Bur- 
ma. One  of  the  world's  poorest  nations, 
Burma  is  struggling  against  an  in- 
surgency which  is  heavily  supported  by 
illicit  narcotics  production  and  traffick- 
ing. We  believe  the  small  program  we 
are  proposing  can  contribute  to 
strengthening  U.S.  and  Burmese  rela- 
tions and  to  their  dealing  more  effec- 
tively with  this  internal  security  prob- 
lem. 

I  have  highlighted  only  a  few  of  the 
small  but  important  security  assistance 
programs  in  this  "all  other"  category. 
There  are,  of  course,  many  more  for 
which  time  will  not  permit  a  full  discus- 
sion. Suffice  it  to  say,  however,  that  any 
reductions  in  our  program  will  fall  heav- 
ily in  this  small  area  of  flexibility.  In 
some  cases,  entire  country  programs 
will  be  in  jeopardy. 

FY  1986  Legislative  Proposals 

For  several  years,  this  committee  has 
considered  favorably  a  number  of  pro- 
posed changes  to  the  Foreign  Assistance 
Act  (FAA)  of  1961,  as  amended,  and  to 
the  Arms  Export  Control  Act  (AECA), 
which  would  materially  increase  the  ef- 
fective management  of  the  security 
assistance  program.  (And,  thanks  to 
your  personal  leadership,  Mr.  Chairman, 
the  House  passed  an  authorization  bill 
last  year.)  'The  lack  of  an  enacted 
authorization  bill  during  this  period, 
however,  has  precluded  their  ultimate 
implementation.  For  FY  1986  we  plan  to 
resubmit  most  of  last  year's  initiatives  in 
addition  to  several  new  ones. 

We  had  hoped  to  transmit  the  Ad- 
ministration's proposed  FY  1986  foreign 


assistance  bill  before  today.  Last  minute 
problems,  however,  have  delayed  it.  We 
will  transmit  it  within  the  next  few 
days.  It  will  contain  the  following  pro- 
posals. 

New  Proposals.  First,  we  are  pro- 
posing that  the  procedures  governing 
the  special  defense  acquisition  fund 
(SDAF)  be  streamlined.  SDAF  has  now 
operated  with  success  for  3  years,  but 
we  need  some  refinements  in  the  law.  In 
the  foreign  assistance  appropriations 
legislation,  we  have  requested  authority 
to  obligate  SDAF  funds  over  a  3-year 
period.  We  are  also  proposing  certain 
modifications  to  the  existing  legislation 
governing  the  SDAF.  One  such  modifi- 
cation would  permit  the  fund  to  be  used 
to  acquire  defense  articles  and  services 
in  anticipation  of  their  transfer  to  the 
Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  to  replace 
items  transferred  from  DOD  inventory 
to  foreign  countries.  This  would  assist  in 
maintaining  the  readiness  of  the  U.S. 
services  while  facilitating  the  transfer  of 
less  advanced  systems  in  the  inventory 
of  DOD  to  foreign  countries. 

The  other  legislative  change  would 
allow  the  fund  to  be  used  to  keep  on 
continuous  order  such  defense  articles 
and  services  as  are  assigned  by  DOD  for 
integrated  management  by  the  Defense 
Logistics  Agency  in  anticipation  of  the 
transfer  of  similar  defense  articles  and 
services  for  foreign  countries. 

Another  proposal  would  amend  Sec- 
tion 24  of  the  AECA  to  authorize  and 
make  available  funds  to  pay  claims 
based  on  defaults  and  reschedulings  of 
outstanding  FMS  loans.  A  long-term 
mechanism  for  maintaining  the  integrity 
of  the  guarantee  reserve  fund  (GRF), 
this  proposal  for  a  guarantee  reserve 
will  treat  the  reserve  as  most  of  the 
Federal  Government's  guarantee  reserve 
programs  are  already  treated,  which  is 
to  put  it  on  a  permanent  authorization 
basis  and  fund  it  as  necessary.  It  will 
eliminate  the  need  for  yearly  authoriza- 
tion and  appropriation.  We  believe  that 
this  is  a  more  practical  and  efficient  way 
to  handle  this  fund. 

In  addition,  we  propose  to  amend 
the  AECA  to  waive  contract  administra- 
tion charges  on  a  reciprocal  basis  with 
NATO  allies  as  we  already  do  for  quality 
assurance,  inspection,  and  contract  audit 
defense  services. 

Also  in  the  NATO  context  and  at 
the  request  of  the  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee,  we  are  requesting 
authorization  to  continue  the  implemen- 
tation of  the  Patriot  agreement  (Coop- 
erative Agreements  on  Air  Defense  in 
Central  Europe)  which  was  authorized 
for  FY  198.5  in  the  DOD  Authorization 
Act. 


. 


We  are  also  seeking  to  conform  the 
calculation  of  the  costs  of  training  using 
MAP  funds  to  the  calculations  of  costs 
of  IMET  by  excluding  the  costs  of 
salaries  of  members  of  the  U.S.  services 
from  the  pricing. 

Because  the  provision  of  training  is 
so  important  for  increasing  professional 
skills  and  exposing  foreign  nationals  to 
U.S.  values,  including  human  rights,  we 
have  included  another  training  initiative 
this  year.  This  proposal  would  permit 
training  from  development,  ESF,  MAP, 
and  IMET  funds,  notwithstanding  cer- 
tain general  or  country-specific  prohibi- 
tions on  the  provision  of  assistance  that 
would  otherwise  be  applicable.  The 
training  programs  would  be  relatively 
modest  in  size  and  the  allocation  of 
funds  for  such  programs  will  remain 
subject  to  all  congressional  oversight  re 
quirements.  Further,  the  human  rights 
provisions  of  the  FAA  (Sections  116  am 
502B)  and  the  prohibition  against  police 
training  (Section  660)  would  continue  to 
apply. 

Because  of  certain  country-specific 
and  other  restrictions,  some  countries 
have  not  been  able  to  obtain  items 
necessary  for  the  safe  operation  of 
previously  supplied  U.S.  origin  equip- 
ment. For  example,  Chile  has  F-5  and 
A-37  aircraft  purchased  from  the 
United  States  a  decade  or  more  ago. 
Items  such  as  ejection  seat  cartridges 
for  these  aircraft  are  manufactured  onl; 
in  U.S.  arsenals.  If  they  are  not  replace 
when  worn  out,  the  operation  of  the  air 
craft  becomes  very  hazardous.  Should 
the  United  States  be  in  the  position  of 
denying  such  equipment  needed  to  aver 
life-threatening  situations?  We  think  no 
We  are,  therefore,  proposing  an  amend 
ment  which  would  permit  the  sale  and 
licensing  of  such  equipment  which  is 
essential  to  the  safe  operation  of 
previously  supplied  equipment. 

Another  proposal  would  permit  the 
transfer  of  defense  articles  and  defense 
services  on  the  U.S.  munitions  list  unde 
the  anti-terrorism  assistance  program 
when  appropriate  and  necessary  to  deal 
with  actual  or  potential  terrorist  in- 
cidents. In  addition  it  would  repeal  the 
sunset  provision  on  the  antiterrorism 
assistance  program  in  order  to  provide 
permanent  authorization  for  the  pro- 
gram. 

We  have  also  added  Thailand  to  the 
list  of  countries  which  would  be  eligible 
to  repay  FMS  Treasury  rate  loans  at  ex 
tended  repayment  terms  of  not  more 
than  30  years  (i.e.,  20  years  following  a 
grace  period  of  10  years  on  principal). 
Although  the  Thai  economy  remains 
relatively  strong  and  open,  Thailand's 


72 


Department  of  State  Bullet! 


TERRORISM 


ternal  debt  has  continued  to  grow 

£idly,  and  its  balance-of-payments 
ition  has  become  more  strained. 

Proposals  Resubmitted.  A  number 
proposals  are  resubmissions  from  FY 
85.  Modifications  have  been  made  in  a 
V  of  these. 

We  are  again  proposing  a  new  Sec- 
n  23  of  the  AECA  which  otherwise 
f(  thorizes  the  provision  of  FMS  credits, 
e  entire  FMS  financing  program  was 
iced  on-budget  for  FY  1985.  We  are 
le  to  implement  a  concessional  loan 
3gram  under  current  authorities.  As 
t  year,  the  proposed  amendments 
luld  reflect  more  clearly  and  accurate- 
the  changed  nature  of  the  FMS  fi- 
ncing  program  and  allow  the  program 
be  managed  more  efficiently. 

The  Administration's  FY  1985  pro- 
sal  to  help  strengthen  judicial  systems 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean 
authorizing  the  training  and  support 
law  enforcement  agencies  under  care- 
ly  defined  conditions  has  been  resub- 
tted  and  expanded  slightly  to  cover 
jgrams  throughout  Latin  America  and 
;  Caribbean.  Economic  assistance 
ids,  including  ESF,  could  be  used  for 
:h  projects. 

Other  proposals  that  we  are  again 
luesting  for  FY  1986  include: 

The  addition  of  El  Salvador,  Hon- 
ras,  Pakistan,  Sudan,  Tunisia,  and 
nezuela  to  the  list  of  countries 
thorized  to  have  more  than  six  U.S. 
litary  personnel  assigned  in-country  to 
:urity  assistance  programs; 

A  waiver  of  the  return  of  old 
hP  equipment  proceeds; 

Reciprocal  provision,  without 
uarge,  of  catalogue  data  and  services  to 
^\T0  countries; 

•  Authority  for  the  President,  with 
ar'residential  determination,  to  remove 
fohibitions  against  assistance  to  certain 
cuntries,  most  particularly  the  People's 
[■public  of  China,  contained  in  Section 

■  *Ht'}.  This  year's  proposal  is  identical  to 
L-  provision  passed  in  HR  5119  last 
yar; 

•  Streamlining  of  reprogramming 
cquirements; 

Permitting  no-cost  exchange  train- 
j  on  a  one-to-one  basis; 

•  $25  million  in  emergency  peace- 
eping  operations  drawdown  authority; 

•  An  increase  in  penalities  for  viola- 
ins  of  the  AECA;  and 

Authorization  of  maritime  law  en- 
rcement  assistance. 

Other  Provisions.  We  are  also  pro- 
sing to  amend  the  FAA  to  establish  a 
iling  of  $360  million  in  FY  1986  on  the 
jgregate  value  of  additions  made  to 


overseas  stockpiles  of  defense  articles  in 
FY  1986,  i.e.,  in  Korea's  stockpiles. 

Conclusions 

In  1981  this  Administration  pledged  to 
rebuild  the  leadership  role  of  the  United 
States  in  world  affairs.  We  moved  to 
formulate  a  coherent,  consistent  foreign 
policy  in  which  the  entire  range  of 
assistance  programs— bilateral  and 
multilateral,  economic  and  military— are 
used  effectively  to  further  U.S.  political, 
economic,  and  humanitarian  interests 
and  to  enhance  our  security  and  the 
security  of  our  friends  around  the  world. 
We  have  made  considerable  progress  in 
the  last  4  years,  and  I  am  convinced 
more  than  ever  that  the  programs  we 
have  implemented  are  effective.  We  are 
moving  in  the  right  direction. 


U.S.  strategic  interests  and  com- 
mitments have  dictated  a  set  of 
priorities  which  we  have  attempted  to 
implement— leaving  few  resources  and 
very  little  flexibility  to  fulfill  the  needs 
of  other  friends  and  allies.  The  FY  1986 
program  I  have  presented  to  you  today 
represents  the  minimum  funding  essen- 
tial to  meet  national  security  objectives 
and  conduct  a  coherent  and  responsible 
foreign  policy.  Let  us  continue  to  move 
forward  with  a  program  that  we  know 
works.  I  hope  that  Congress  will  give 
the  FY  1986  security  assistance  pro- 
gram its  full  support. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  t'he  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Combating  International  Terrorism 


by  Robert  B.  Oakley 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  Arms  Control,  International  Securi- 
ty, and  Science  and  on  International 
Operations  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  March  5,  198.5.  Ambas- 
sador Oakley  is  Director  of  the  Office  for 
Counter-Terrorism  and  Emergency 
Planning'^ 

Seeking  to  impose  one's  political  will 
over  others  through  the  threat  or  use  of 
violence  is  as  old  as  history.  Over  the 
last  few  centuries,  however,  the  civilized 
world  was  thought  to  have  made  prog- 
ress in  establishing  nonviolent  rules  of 
political  conduct.  International  rules  of 
war,  human  rights  resolutions,  and,  in- 
deed, the  fundamental  premises  under- 
lying the  establishment  of  the  United 
Nations  are  all  based  on  the  assumption 
that  political  violence  and  political 
freedom  do  not  and  cannot  mix.  Political 
intimidation,  the  object  of  the  use  of  ter- 
rorism, is  antithetical  to  freedom  of 
political  expression,  the  cornerstone  of 
democratic  society. 

Sadly,  there  has  been  a  growing 
trend  in  the  past  two  decades  by  in- 
dividuals, groups,  and,  in  some  in- 
stances, by  governments,  to  resort  to 
terrorism  on  an  international  scale  in 
the  pursuit  of  their  political  aims.  In  an 
age  of  high  technology  and  mass  com- 
munications such  tactics  are  relatively 
cheap,  effective,  and  produce  a  max- 
imum of  media  exposure.  They  also 
cynically  sacrifice  the  lives  and  well- 
being  of  innocent  people  and  eliminate 


peaceful  options  of  compromise  and 
diplomacy.  Left  unchallenged,  the  rise  of 
terrorism  will  undermine  the  system  of 
political,  economic,  and  military  relation- 
ships which  the  United  States  and  its 
allies  have  come  to  rely  upon  to  pre- 
serve, protect,  and  promote  their  na- 
tional and  mutual  interests  in  an  orderly 
and  peaceful  fashion.  During  the  years 
ahead,  we  must  be  prepared  for  con- 
tinued serious  threats  from  international 
terrorism— in  Western  Europe,  in  the 
Middle  East,  and  in  Latin  America,  in 
particular— much  of  it  supported  or  en- 
couraged by  a  handful  of  ruthless 
governments.  The  challenge  is  clearly 
before  us. 


Terrorist  Activity  in  1984 

During  1984,  the  total  number  of  inter- 
national terrorist  incidents,  at  least  as 
counted  by  the  U.S.  Government,  was 
up  some  30%— a  total  of  over  650  com- 
pared to  500,  the  figure  for  1983  and 
the  average  of  the  previous  5  years. 
Western  Europe  had  over  250  incidents, 
up  one-third;  the  Middle  East  had 
almost  200  incidents,  up  two-thirds; 
Latin  America  held  steady  between 
110-120.  While  total  casualties  were 
down  to  1,300  (450  dead)  from  1,900 
(650  dead)  in  1983,  this  was  due  primari- 
ly to  the  absence  in  1984  of  an  event 
similar  to  the  massive  1983  U.S. -French 
casualties  in  Beirut,  when  three  suicide 
bombings  caused  almost  600  dead  and 
wounded.  It  was  also  due,  in  part,  to  im- 
proving security,  so  that  even  the 


me  1985 


73 


TERRORISM 


September  20,  1984,  bombing  of  our 
Embassy  in  Beirut  caused  few 
casualties.  However,  in  1984  the  total 
number  of  incidents  which  were  lethal  or 
clearly  intended  to  be  lethal  increased  at 
least  proportionally  to  the  number  of 
total  incidents,  as  some  50%  were 
armed  attacks.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
number  and  percentage  of  less  deadly  in- 
cidents, such  as  kidnapings  and  hostage 
seizures,  were  way  down.  Both  Latin 
America  and  Western  Europe  showed 
trends  toward  more  lethal  attacks,  a 
pattern  already  established  in  the  Middle 
East. 

Who  were  the  principal  per- 
petrators, and  what  were  their  targets? 
The  most  deadly  terrorists  continue  to 
operate  in  and  from  the  Middle  East,  in- 
cluding Libya.  Middle  Eastern  terrorists 
were  involved  in  over  300  incidents— 
almost  50%  of  the  world  total— many  of 
which  occurred  in  Western  Europe. 
There  are  two  main  categories  of  Middle 
East  terrorists: 

•  Fanatical  Palestinians  who  have 
split  off  from  the  mainline  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization]  led 
by  Arafat  and  often  have  the  direct  sup- 
port of  Libya,  Syria,  and/or  Iran;  and 

•  Shia  zealots  from  various  Arab 
countries,  especially  Lebanon,  who  are 
inspired  and  trained,  often  armed  and 
financed,  and,  to  varying  degrees, 
guided  by  Iran. 

In  addition,  there  are  actual  agents 
of  governments  such  as  Libya  who  often 
act  directly  rather  than  through  sur- 
rogates. The  targets  of  Middle  East  ter- 
rorism fall  principally  into  three  groups: 
Israel;  Western  governments  and 
citizens,  particularly  France  and  the 
United  States;  and  moderate  Arab 
governments  and  officials,  including  the 
mainline  PLO  as  well  as  Jordan,  Egypt, 
Kuwait,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  Iraq.  Critics 
of  radical  regimes,  particularly  Libyans 
and  Iranians,  are  also  targets  of  their 
own  governments.  The  overall  objective 
is  clear:  deter  and  disrupt  policies  and 
actions  which  could  bring  moderation, 
stability,  and  peace  to  the  Middle  East 
and  damage  relations  between  the 
Middle  East  and  the  West. 

In  Europe,  there  have  been  many 
terrorists  operating  during  the  past 
decade:  lesser  known  ethnic  groups  such 
as  Corsicans,  Basques,  Croatians,  and 
Armenians,  as  well  as  leftist  organiza- 
tions such  as  the  Red  Brigades,  Direct 
Action,  Red  Army  Faction,  and  PIRA 
[Provisional  Irish  Republican  Army].  The 
PIRA  has  usually  been  the  most  deadly 
of  the  lot,  and  this  remained  true  in 
1984  when  it  killed  some  50  people. 


However,  in  recent  years  there  had  been 
an  overall  downward  trend  in  terrorist 
incidents,  a  trend  which  lasted  until  the 
last  half  of  1984.  At  that  time,  a  new 
phenomenon  suddenly  emerged  in  the 
form  of  several  different  terrorist 
groups  in  different  West  European 
countries  adopting  a  common  propagan- 
da line  and  attacking  a  common  set  of 
targets  related  to  NATO.  These  groups 
apparently  hope  to  capitalize  upon  last 
year's  failed  campaign  of  propaganda 
and  street  demonstrations  against 
NATO  and  deployment  of  NATO's  inter- 
mediate-range missiles,  a  campaign  sup- 
ported by  the  U.S.S.R.  This  parallel  and 
interrelated  resurgence  of  leftist  ter- 
rorist activity  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  France,  Belgium,  Spain,  and 
Portugal,  plus  continued  terrorism  in 
Greece,  accounted  for  most  of  the  in- 
crease in  the  total  number  of  incidents 
in  Europe,  with  Middle  East-origin  ter- 
rorism accounting  for  the  rest. 

In  Latin  America,  social,  economic, 
and  political  turmoil  has  served  to  pro- 
long existing  patterns  of  insurgency  and 
international  and  domestic  terrorism  in 
several  countries,  particularly  El 
Salvador,  Guatemala,  Chile,  and  Peru. 
These  patterns  have  been  strengthened 
by  outside  communist  support.  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  have  continued  to  encourage 
and  support  terrorism  elsewhere  in  the 
hemisphere  with  arms,  advice,  and  ex- 
pertise. Most  Latin  American  terrorism 
appears  to  be  aimed  at  governments 
associated  with  the  United  States  and  at 
U.S.  Government  installations,  officials, 
and  private  businesses. 

A  new  threat,  narco-terrorism,  has 
grown  during  the  past  year.  It  is  doubly 
dangerous  because  it  often  combines 
drug  criminals  with  political  terrorists 
and  guerrillas.  The  billionaire  narcotics 
bosses  of  Latin  America,  hurting  from 
the  pressure  applied  to  their  drug  smug- 
gling into  the  United  States,  have  begun 
to  strike  at  U.S.  officials  and  business- 
men and  officials  of  their  own  govern- 
ments by  hiring  criminal  elements  to 
conduct  assassinations,  bombings,  kid- 
napings, and  other  terroristic  activities. 
Cuba  and  Nicaragua  have  been  active  in 
narcotics  trafficking  as  well  as  terror- 
ism, since  both  activities  weaken  the 
social  and  political  structures  of  demo- 
cratic governments  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

U.S.  Efforts  To  Combat  Terrorism 

This  background  makes  it  clear  that  a 
tremendous  effort  is  required  merely  to 
hold  one's  own,  much  less  put  an  end  to 
international  terrorism,  and  that  an  in- 


ternational effort  is  required,  not  merel 
one  by  our  government.  No  matter  wha 
our  commitment  and  capability  may  be, 
we  cannot  succeed  alone  when  the 
threat  originates  abroad  and  strikes 
abroad  where  other  governments 
necessarily  have  the  major  responsibili- 
ty. In  this  country,  the  leadership  of 
President  Reagan  and  Secretary  of 
State  Shultz  and  the  strong  support  of 
Congress,  particularly  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  are  pro- 
viding both  the  means  and  the  political 
will  to  combat  terrorism.  But  unless  anc 
until  other  governments  are  willing  and 
able  to  make  the  same  commitment,  the 
unfavorable  trend  experienced  last  year 
cannot  be  reversed.  Without  this  inter- 
national cooperative  effort,  the  ter- 
rorists and  those  behind  them  will  con- 
tinue to  be  successful,  which  will  en- 
courage others  to  utilize  terrorism  to 
achieve  their  political  and  ideological 
goals. 

We  have  strong  leadership  at  the 
State  Department  in  the  struggle  to  op- 
pose terrorism  and  improve  security 
preparedness  abroad.  The  Secretary  of 
State  has  these  subjects  very  much  on 
his  mind  and  makes  clear  daily  to 
everyone  in  the  Department  of  State 
that  it  must  also  be  on  their  minds.  He 
does  the  same  for  our  ambassadors  and 
diplomatic  personnel  abroad.  He  is 
leading  a  government-wide  effort  to  pro  < 
mote  international  awareness  and 
cooperation  to  address  the  common 
threat  and  convince  them  to  work  close- 
ly with  us  to  counter,  deter,  and  even- 
tually end  terrorism. 

Under  Secretary  for  Management 
Ron  Spiers  oversees  and  coordinates  all 
this  activity  for  the  Secretary  of  State. 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Administration 
and  Security  Bob  Lamb;  his  principal 
deputy,  Dave  Fields;  and  I  all  report 
to  the  Under  Secretary.  While  we 
each  have  our  separate  roles,  we  make 
every  effort  to  coordinate  our  actions 
internally. 

Assistant  Secretary  Lamb  will  ad- 
dress for  you,  at  a  future  date,  the 
overall  organization  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment for  security  work.  However,  it 
may  be  useful  to  point  out  here  that  the 
Office  of  Security  (SY),  which  is  under 
his  supervision,  has  the  overall  respon- 
sibility for  the  security  of  all  official  U.S 
personnel,  facilities,  and,  of  course,  na- 
tional security  information  overseas— ex- 
cept, of  course,  for  LI.S.  military  fa- 
cilities and  personnel  assigned  to  U.S. 
military  commands.  In  addition,  the 
development  and  execution  of  overseas 
diplomatic  security  policies  are  the 
responsibility  of  the  Department's  Office 
of  Security.  As  Deputy  Assistant 


74 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TERRORISM 


ecretary  for  Security,  Dave  Fields 
lairs  the  Overseas  Security  Policy 
roup,  which  was  formed  in  1983.  This 
roup,  composed  of  the  directors  of 
curity  from  the  major  foreign  affairs 
^encies,  meets  monthly  to  formulate 
road  operational  security  policies  and 
)  serve  as  a  focal  point  for  interagency 
verseas  security  activities. 

The  Office  for  Counter-Terrorism 
nd  Emergency  Planning,  known  in  the 
ureaucracy  as  M/CTP,  has  a  traditional 
olicy  and  coordinating  role  within  the 
department  of  State  plus  several  more 
jcently  acquired  responsibilities  for  ad- 
linistering  State  Department  programs, 
hese  programs  include: 

•  The  antiterrorist  assistance  pro- 
ram; 

•  Emergency  action  planning;  and 

•  Exercising  Embassy  response 
ipabilities. 

As  Director  of  M/CTP,  I  am  also  the 
lairman  of  the  Interdepartmental 
roup  on  Terrorism  (IG/T)  established 
3  a  result  of  National  Security  Decision 
directive  30  in  which  the  President 
esignated  the  Department  of  State  as 
aving  the  lead  interagency  role  in  com- 
ating  terrorism.  In  this  role,  M/CTP  is 
ssponsible  for  ensuring  the  coordination 
f  activities  by  al!  U.S.  Government 
gencies  in  combating  international  ter- 
arism.  The  IG/T  provides  a  very  useful 
jrum  for  the  major  departments  and 
gencies  actively  involved  in  combating 
*  jrrorism  to  meet  regularly  and  share 
ieas,  draw  conclusions,  and  make 
Bcommendations  on  policy  and  pro- 
rams.  The  permanent  members  include 
he  Vice  President's  Office,  the  National 
ecurity  Council  (NSC),  the  Department 
f  Justice  (which  has  interagency 
esponsibility  for  domestic  terrorism), 
nd  the  FBI,  the  Department  of  the 
'reasury,  the  Department  of  Defense 
nd  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the 
)epartment  of  Energy,  the  Central  In- 
elligence  Agency  (CIA),  and  the  Federal 
Lviation  Administration  (FAA).  Other 
gencies  are  invited  when  there  is  an 
genda  item  of  direct  interest  to  them, 
'he  IG/T  provides  a  single  point  to 
/hich  the  various  departments  and 
gencies  can  address  questions  and 
lake  proposals.  The  conclusions  and 
ecommendations  of  the  IG/T  then  go  to 
he  NSC  and  the  various  agencies  in- 
olved. 


Goals  of  U.S.  Counterterrorism 
Activities 

Having  noted  the  general  nature  of  our 
activities,  I  think  it  might  be  useful  to 
outline  some  of  the  goals  which  guide  us 
in  our  daily  activities: 

First  is  attainment  of  effective  coor- 
dinated action,  both  within  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  for  L'nder  Secretary 
Spiers  and  Secretary  Shultz  and  among 
all  the  agencies  of  the  U.S.  Government 
involved  in  combating  terrorism. 

Second  is  the  effective  integration 
between  more  passive  measures  for 
security  and  protection  of  our  installa- 
tions and  people  abroad  and  more  active 
measures  to  deter  or  preempt  terrorist 
attack. 

Third  is  the  attainment  of  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  combating  ter- 
rorism. We  believe  that  only  through 
long-term,  cooperative  international  ac- 
tion can  terrorist  problems  be  reduced. 
Because  of  the  political  realities  facing 
us,  such  action  often  operates  more  ef- 
fectively on  a  bilateral  than  a  multi- 
lateral basis. 

Finally,  there  is  the  need  to  utilize 
to  the  fullest  our  government's  intelli- 
gence effort  against  terrorism.  We 
recognize  the  importance  of  good  in- 
telligence in  a  form  which  can  be  as- 
sessed and  put  to  use  rapidly  and,  when 
appropriate,  be  shared  with  selected 
allies. 

Effective  Coordinated  Action.  Let 

me  elaborate  on  some  of  our  activities  as 
they  relate  to  these  goals.  The  periodic 
crises  which  require  our  attention  pre- 
sent good  examples.  What  happens 
when  there  is  a  hijacking,  a  bombing,  or 
a  kidnaping  outside  of  the  United 
States?  How  does  the  State  Department 
respond  and  how  do  we  work  with  other 
agencies?  Raiher  than  set  forth 
generalities,  it  might  be  more  useful  to 
cite  examples. 

•  When  Kuwait  Airline  Flight  221 
was  hijacked  to  Tehran  on  December  4, 
1984,  the  State  Department  set  up  a 
working  group  chaired  jointly  by  my  of- 
fice and  the  Bureau  of  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs  (NEA).  Other 
participants  included  the  Office  of  Con- 
sular Affairs  and  the  Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development  (AID),  once  it  was 
known  that  several  AID  employees  were 
aboard  the  plane.  This  working  group 
followed  the  developments  of  the  hijack- 
ing in  Kuwait  and  Tehran  day  and  night 
until  the  last  hostage  was  released  near- 
ly a  week  later.  The  working  group 
coordinated  actions  within  the  U.S. 
Government,  kept  senior  officials  in- 
formed of  developments,  maintained 


contact  with  families  of  passengers,  pro- 
vided information  to  the  press  about  the 
latest  developments,  and  developed  ini- 
tiatives with  other  governments.  When 
the  hijacking  came  to  an  end,  the  work- 
ing group  organized  transport  back  to 
the  States  for  the  released  American 
hosttiges  and  initiated  prompt  debrief- 
ings  in  order  that  we  might  benefit  in 
future  incidents  from  the  lessons 
learned. 

•  At  the  time  of  the  September  20 
bombing  of  our  Embassy  in  Beirut,  the 
Department  organized  a  similar  working 
group  which  monitored  events  and  coor- 
dinated activities  around  the  clock.  In 
addition,  the  Department  of  State  sent 
two  delegations  to  conduct  two  levels  of 
inquiry.  One  delegation,  headed  by 
Assistant  Secretary  [for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs]  Murphy  and 
which  included  representatives  of 
M/CTP  and  SY  plus  other  agencies, 
visited  Beirut  for  2  days  immediately 
after  the  bombing  for  a  quick  survey  of 
what  had  happened.  Immediately  upon 
their  return,  this  team  reported  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  the  President  on 
its  findings.  The  second  delegation,  an 
Emergency  Reaction  Team  composed  of 
bomb  and  security  experts  led  by  the 
Department's  Office  of  Security,  spent 
several  weeks  studying  all  aspects  of  the 
bombing  so  that  precautions  might  be 
taken  at  Beirut  and  elsewhere  to 
minimize  similar  future  threats.  A  full 
report  was  prepared  covering  all  aspects 
of  the  situation.  The  activities  of  both 
groups  were  carefully  coordinated. 

•  The  kidnaping  of  five  Americans 
in  Lebanon  over  the  course  of  the  past 
year  presents  another  example  of  how 
we  coordinate  with  other  offices  in  the 
Department  and  other  agencies  in  the 
U.S.  Government.  For  most  of  the  year, 
M/CTP  worked  on  an  almost  daily  basis 
with  the  Bureau  of  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Affairs  to  follow  the  latest 
developments,  suggest  to  friendly 
governments  and  private  groups  in- 
itiatives aimed  at  the  freeing  of  the 
hostages,  and  maintain  contact  with  the 
families  and  employers.  When  news  was 
received  of  Jeremy  Levin's  escape  from 
his  captors,  the  Department  promptly 
organized  a  task  force  cochaired  by 
NEA  and  M/CTP  to  be  on  the  alert  for 
intelligence  and  actions  to  take  concern- 
ing the  other  hostages  and  coordinate 
Mr.  Levin's  release  and  travel  back  to 
the  United  States.  In  this  and  similar  in- 
stances, there  is  constant  communication 
between  the  State  Department  and 
other  agencies  and  coordination  with  the 
NSC  to  ensure  a  unified  position. 


75 


TERRORISM 


Protection  of  U.S.  Presence 
Abroad.  We  have  taken  a  number  of 
steps  in  recent  months  to  improve  coor- 
dination in  security  preparedness  with 
our  military  commands  and  with  private 
U.S.  business  and  to  see  that  what  is 
done  by  these  three  major  elements  of 
the  U.S.  presence  abroad  is  done 
cooperatively  with  the  governments  of 
the  countries  where  they  are  located, 
whose  responsibility  it  is  to  provide  pro- 
tection. 

To  give  you  an  example  of  the 
dialogue  between  the  State  Department 
and  Embassies  abroad  on  this  aspect  of 
our  antiterrorism  strategy,  a  telegram 
was  sent  by  Secretary  Shultz  in  mid- 
January  to  our  ambassadors  in  Western 
Europe  outlining  the  growing  terrorist 
threat  to  the  alliance  there  as  seen  by 
intelligence  analysts  in  Washington.  It 
instructed  them  to  review  the  security 
preparedness  of  their  own  staff  and 
facilities  and  also  to  continue  and  in- 
crease if  need  be  their  contact  with  U.S. 
military  commanders  and  American 
businessmen,  on  the  one  hand,  and  with 
host  government  officials,  on  the  other, 
in  order  to  ensure  maximum  prepared- 
ness and  maximum  cooperation.  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Securi- 
ty Dave  Fields  was  in  Western  Europe 
shortly  thereafter,  going  over  security 
preparedness  with  his  regional  security 
officers,  and  his  office  sent  out  two 
detailed  analyses  of  the  country-specific 
and  Europe-wide  threats  to  U.S.  in- 
stallations and  personnel.  There  was  a 
subsequent  preparedness  coordinating 
meeting  in  Europe  of  officers  from 
M/CTP  and  SY  with  the  State  Depart- 
ment Associate  Directors  of  Security  for 
Europe,  Africa,  and  the  Middle  East, 
and  with  relevant  U.S.  military  com- 
mands. 

International  Cooperation.  In  order 
to  improve  longer  term  cooperation  with 
friendly  governments,  over  the  past  6 
months,  senior  interagency  delegations 
of  our  governments,  including  myself, 
have  held  personal  in-depth  bilateral 
talks  with  top-level  officials  in  six  friend- 
ly foreign  capitals  on  the  many  aspects 
of  this  antiterrorist  struggle,  ranging 
from  better  intelligence  and  better 
physical  security  to  more  effective  anti- 
hijacking  measures  and  how  to  close 
legal  loopholes  which  often  allow  ter- 
rorists quickly  to  go  free  and/or  prevent 
them  from  being  extradited.  (This  is  also 
a  problem  for  us,  since  several  PIRA 
terrorists  have  been  able  to  avoid  ex- 
tradition from  the  United  States  to  the 
United  Kingdom.)  We  have  had  a  large 
number  of  discussions  on  terrorism  with 
high-level  representatives  of  other 


governments  during  the  course  of  or- 
dinary diplomatic  exchanges.  NATO 
foreign  ministers  at  their  December 
meeting  declared  their  determination  to 
suppress  terrorism.  Security  of  NATO 
facilities  and  personnel  is  kept  under 
regular  review  in  bilateral  and 
multilateral  channels.  The  heads  of  the 
seven  governments  who  attend  the  an- 
nual economic  summit  address  the 
threat  of  terrorism.  At  last  year's  Lon- 
don summit,  the  heads  of  state  issued  a 
strong  and  detailed  declaration.  Con- 
sultations, both  bilateral  and  multi- 
lateral, continue  in  this  framework. 
European  governments  are  also  address- 
ing the  terrorist  challenge  through  the 
framework  of  the  European  Economic 
Community. 

I  am  not  free  to  go  into  detail  public- 
ly on  these  diplomatic  exchanges.  It  is 
difficult  to  measure  the  near-term  effect 
of  such  discussions,  but  progress  has 
been  made.  It  may  be  hard  to  prove  this 
since  the  struggle  against  terrorism, 
even  more  than  conventional  warfare, 
requires  secrecy.  However,  I  can  say 
that  there  have  been  a  considerable 
number  of  actual  or  planned  terrorist  at- 
tacks against  U.S.  and  friendly  targets 
abroad  which  have  failed  over  the  past  6 
months  because  of  better  cooperation 
among  us  in  sharing  intelligence  and 
because  of  better  preparedness  and  im- 
proved protection.  I  can  also  say  that 
there  promises  to  be  still  more  improve- 
ment in  both  bilateral  and  multilateral 
cooperation— effective  and  purposeful 
cooperation— in  the  months  ahead. 

Effective  Intelligence  Efforts.  In- 
telligence is  clearly  one  of  the  keys  to  an 
effective  counterterrorism  strategy.  But 
terrorism  poses  a  special  kind  of 
challenge  to  the  intelligence  effort  in 
terms  of  both  collection  and  analysis. 
More  than  in  any  other  intelligence  field 
in  peacetime,  counterterrorism  in- 
telligence is  action  oriented.  To  be 
useful,  it  must  be  acted  upon.  Thus, 
there  is  often  a  hard  choice  to  make  be- 
tween concealing  our  knowledge  and 
taking  advantage  of  it.  In  the  past,  there 
has  been  a  tendency  to  protect  in- 
telligence, even  within  and  between 
agencies,  rather  than  promote  its  rapid 
use.  Where  lives  hang  in  the  balance, 
this  is  not  an  acceptable  procedure.  In 
addition,  the  bigger  threat  to  our  in- 
terests is  from  international  terrorism, 
not  domestic  terrorism;  therefore,  we 
must  rely  heavily  on  other  friendly 
governments,  and  we  must  be  prepared 
to  share  information  and  analyses  with 
them. 

Interagency  efforts  to  improve  in- 
telligence collection  and  coordination 
have  included  the  following  actions. 


•  Terrorism  has  been  made  a  collec- 
tion priority  for  the  entire  intelligence 
community. 

•  A  24-hour  terrorism  intelligence 
watch  has  been  established  at  the 
Department  of  State  and  is  in  constant 
contact  around  the  clock  with  other 
agencies. 

•  At  State,  a  special  category  of 
cables  relating  to  terrorism  with  a 
special  message  caption  now  facilitates 
rapid,  controlled  distribution  to  all  who 
need  to  know  in  the  State  Department 
and  other  agencies. 

•  A  coordinated  interagency  alert 
system  has  been  developed  to  inform 
Embassies  and  other  U.S.  Government 
installations  immediately  of  any  threat. 

New  Initiatives 

The  activities  I  have  just  enumerated 
constitute  the  traditional  functions  of 
M/CTP— coordinating,  planning,  incident 
management,  and  cooperation  with 
other  governments.  We  have  also 
assumed  three  new  tasks  in  the  past  3 
years  as  part  of  the  effort  to  combat  ter 
rorism  more  effectively:  emergency  ac- 
tion planning,  exercises,  and  antiter- 
rorist assistance. 

Emergency  Action  Planning.  Early 
last  year,  M/CTP  acquired  responsibility 
for  "emergency  action  planning"  for  U.S., 
overseas  posts.  Each  post  is  required  to   j 
prepare  an  "emergency  action  plan"  for 
any  threats  or  emergencies  it  might 
face.  When  we  took  over  responsibility 
for  this  program,  fewer  than  one-fourth 
of  our  posts  abroad  had  complied  with 
the  requirement.  Compliance  is  now  on 
the  order  of  96%,  and  the  delinquent 
posts  are  primarily  either  recently 
established  or  temporarily  seriously 
short  on  personnel  because  of  illness  or 
death  of  the  principal  (and  sometimes 
only)  officer.  The  96%  figure  includes  a 
substantial  number  of  posts  which  have 
fully  revised  their  plans — some  more 
than  once — as  circumstances  and  ex- 
perience dictated  (often  in  the  course  of 
the  overseas  crisis  management  exer- 
cises described  in  more  detail  below). 

The  Defense  Department  has  long 
had  a  major  role  in  overseas  emergency 
planning  protection  and  evacuation,  not 
only  for  military  personnel  but  other 
U.S.  citizens  and  certain  designated 
aliens.  Since  acquiring  its  emergency 
planning  responsibility,  M/CTP  has  ini- 
tiated steps  to  increase  emergency  plan- 
ning coordination  between  State  and 
Defense  both  in  Washington  and  in  the 
field.  Specifically,  we  have  sought  to 
revive  and  reinvigorate  mechanisms, 
such  as  State-Defense  regional  liaison 


76 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TERRORISM 


gi'oups  overseas,  so  that  senior  State 
and  military  officers  responsible  for  pro- 
tection and  evacuation  of  U.S.  citizens 
can  develop  a  sense  of  unified  effort.  We 
have  also  initiated  a  program  of  periodic 
meetings  by  interagency  delegations 
from  Washington  with  the  regional 
liaison  gi'oups. 

In  conjunction  with  the  Department 
of  Defense,  our  office  is  attempting  to 
provide  much  more  comprehensive  and 
frequent  interagency  emergency  plan- 
ning surveys  of  our  higher  risk 
posts — eventually  we  hope  to  do  this  for 
all  of  them — to  furnish  professional 
assessment  and  advice  on  the  workabili- 
ty of  certain  aspects  of  the  plans.  You 
will  appreciate,  naturally,  that  I  am 
unable  to  go  into  detail  in  open  session. 
However,  a  better  appreciation  and 
understanding  of  the  capability  and 
responsibility  of  each  element  by  the 
others  is  growing,  enhancing  our 

ni  preparedness  to  meet  contingencies 
abroad  as  they  arise. 

While  State  and  Defense  have  the 
lead  in  this  field,  it  goes  without  saying 

'!  that  other  civilian  agencies  with  person- 
nel assigned  abroad  have  major  roles  to 
play  in  a  post's  preparedness.  Converse- 
ly, it  is  the  Ambassador's  or  principal  of- 
ficer's responsibility  to  provide  all  U.S. 
Government  personnel  with  equal  and 
effective  security  and  protective  sup- 
port. Both  in  the  planning  and  in  the  im- 
plementation, we  work  with  all  agencies 
assigned  at  the  Embassy  through  the 
post's  Emergency  Action  Committee  and 
here  in  Washington  through  the  Inter- 
departmental Group  on  Terrorism,  the 
Washington  Liaison  Group,  the  Overseas 
Security  Policy  Group,  chaired  by  SY, 
and  other  ad  hoc  meetings  as  the  situa- 
tion may  require. 

Crisis  Training.  There  are  two 
separate  and  distinct  aspects  to  the  pro- 
grams of  exercises  which  the  State 
Department  either  develops  and 
manages  or  in  which  it  plays  a  support- 
ing role.  In  the  first  instance,  as  part  of 
M/CTP  responsibilities  for  emergency 
planning  as  well  as  counterterrorism,  we 
have  developed  and  are  implementing  a 
major  program  of  scheduled  overseas 
crisis  management  training  exercises. 
Fiscal  1985,  the  first  year  of  M/CTP 
program  management,  will  see  almost  a 
tripling  of  exercises  to  22  from  the 
average  of  8  per  year  during  the  pilot 
period  1983-84. 

We  approach  this  program  from  the 
point  of  view  that  contingency  planning 
to  meet  crises  is  not  only  desirable  but 
possible.  Using  the  Foreign  Service 
post's  specific  emergency  action  plan  as 
a  point  of  departure,  the  2-3  day  exer- 


June1985 


cise  simulates,  through  a  compressed 
time  scenario,  a  series  of  crises  designed 
to  test  both  the  plan  and  the  planners. 
Included  in  the  exercise  team  are 
representatives  of  State  (M/CTP,  SY, 
and  the  Foreign  Service  Institute)  and 
the  regional  military  command  which 
has  evacuation  responsibilities.  Illus- 
tratively, we  simulate  crises  created  by 
terrorism,  by  political  conflict,  and  by 
natural  causes.  For  example,  in  a  Cen- 
tral American  post,  it  would  be  credible 
to  simulate  an  aircraft  hijacking  on  the 
one  hand  and  an  earthquake  on  the 
other.  Simulated  crises  are  often 
developed  within  a  theoretical  back- 
ground of  strained  relations  with  the 
United  States.  Each  situation  will  re- 
quire crisis  management,  coordination  of 
resources,  interagency  cooperation, 
heightened  involvement  with  the  host 
government,  and  significantly  increased 
communications  with  Washington  agen- 
cies as  well  as  adjacent  posts.  Addi- 
tionally, in  the  case  of  a  potential 
evacuation  following  a  major  natural 
disaster,  there  is  intense  communication 
and  coordination  with  the  appropriate 
U.S.  military  command. 

This  fiscal  year,  we  have  already 
held  6  major  exercises  reaching  10  em- 
bassies and  consulates.  An  additional  16 
posts  with  participation  from  13 
observer  posts  are  scheduled  to  be  exer- 
cised before  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year.  It 
is  our  intention  to  increase  the  rate  of 
exercises  to  36  formal  post  programs 
with  observer  participation  from  an  ad- 
ditional 15  to  20  subordinate  and/or 
adjacent  posts  in  fiscal  1986  and  each 
successive  year— subject,  of  course,  to 
funding.  We  are  also  developing  a  new 
series  of  shorter  miniexercises  which 
place  fewer  demands  upon  posts  and  can 
be  used  both  for  smaller  posts  and  to 
supplement  full-scale,  longer  exercises 
for  large  posts,  thus  increasing  the  fre- 
quency of  exercises. 

The  Department  also  plays  a  major 
role  in  the  development  and  implementa- 
tion of  command  post  and  field  exercises 
on  crisis  management  involving  two  or 
more  Federal  agencies  at  the  national 
level  and  in  joint  exercises  with  friendly 
governments.  The  degree  to  which  we 
are  a  major  player  relates  directly  to  the 
type  and  site  of  the  simulation.  An  exer- 
cise Involving  domestic  terrorism  could 
have  the  State  Department  in  a  support 
role,  providing  an  information  base  on 
the  alleged  foreign  origin  of  the  ter- 
rorists. An  exercise  involving  overseas 
terrorism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  one  in 
which  we  take  a  lead  role  in  coor- 
dinating policy  response  to  the  nation 
where  the  incident  is  taking  place  as 
well  as  considering  requests  for 
assistance  from  other  governments. 


One  example  of  a  recent  multiagen- 
cy  set  of  exercises  involved  preparation 
for  the  1984  Olympic  games.  Participa- 
tion included  all  agencies  concerned  with 
the  Olympics.  The  State  role  was  to  sup- 
port the  Justice  Department  by  pro- 
viding data  on  the  background  of  foreign 
terrorists  and  appropriate  foreign  policy 
guidance  needed.  Another  hypothetical 
example  would  be  a  joint  antihijacking 
exercise  in  which  we  work  with  another 
country  to  develop  better  methods  of 
terrorist  detection  and  apprehension 
before  the  incident  or,  failing  that,  bet- 
ter means  of  negotiation  and  crisis 
resolution. 

The  compartmented  nature  of  for- 
eign policy  and  divisions  of  labor  be- 
tween different  agencies  abroad  often 
means  that  officers  at  overseas  posts 
work  without  much  interaction  between 
sections  and  without  a  high  premium  on 
group  action.  Crises,  however,  demand 
coordinated  responses — drawing  upon 
the  resources  of  the  full  range  of  in- 
dividuals and  disciplines.  The  overseas 
crisis  management  training  program  is 
designed  to  demonstrate  to  those  who 
manage  and  staff  overseas  posts,  and 
particularly  the  Emergency  Action  Com- 
mittee, how  best  to  use  available 
resources  under  simulated  crisis  condi- 
tions. It  is  the  opinion  of  the  Office  of 
the  Inspector  General  that  those  posts 
which  have  had  exercises  demonstrate 
better  preparedness,  more  effective  in- 
ternal working  relationships,  and  a 
streamlined  decisionmaking  structure 
which  reacts  more  rapidly  and  coolly 
under  pressure. 

Antiterrorist  Assistance.  The  anti- 
terrorism assistance  program  has  pro- 
vided the  U.S.  Government  with  a  vehi- 
cle to  train  and  exchange  experiences 
with  friendly  foreign  governments  on 
the  practical  aspects  of  counterter- 
rorism. The  legislation  establishing  the 
program  has  enabled  us  to  provide  this 
important  assistance  under  State 
Department  control  to  civilian  agencies 
of  foreign  governments,  thereby  relax- 
ing a  bit  the  longstanding  ban  on  aid  to 
foreign  law  enforcement  organizations. 
Through  this  program,  we  are  aiding  the 
same  civilian  forces  which  must  carry 
the  brunt  of  the  fight  against  terrorists 
and  the  protection  of  our  business, 
diplomatic,  and  military  installations  and 
personnel. 

The  objectives  of  the  antiterrorism 
assistance  program  are  to  enhance 
cooperation  with  and  improve  the 
organization  of  foreign  governments  in 
the  antiterrorism  field.  During  our  first 
year  of  operation  in  1984,  we  established 
active  exchange  and  training  programs 


77 


UNITED  NATIONS 


with  15  foreign  governments  in  all  areas 
of  the  world.  For  1985,  we  expect  at 
least  12  additional  governments  to  those 
already  participating.  There  will  be  a 
total  of  perhaps  500  foreign  officials 
from  countries  as  diverse  as  Italy, 
Egypt,  Turkey,  the  United  Kingdom, 
Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  Honduras,  and 
Colombia. 

In  administering  this  program,  we 
have  set  up  an  interagency  advisory  and 
coordinating  group  under  the  IG/T  in 
order  to  select  the  most  suitable  ac- 
tivities for  a  particular  country  and  to 
be  certain  that  these  activities  comple- 
ment and  do  not  conflict  with  programs 
being  run  by  other  U.S.  Government 
agencies. 

We  are  convinced  that  the  program 
will  produce  major  benefits  for  the 
United  States.  We  expect  not  only  im- 
proved organization  and  training  to  com- 
bat terrorism  but  also  greater  coopera- 
tion with  the  United  States  on  antiter- 
rorism by  participating  governments, 
thanks  to  better  mutual  understanding. 
In  addition,  as  was  the  case  with  Italy 
last  year,  our  people  are  learning  as 
much  as  they  teach. 

Within  the  United  States,  the  pro- 
gram has  also  been  useful  in  encourag- 
ing and  expanding  cooperation  between 
Federal  Government  agencies  and  with 
State  and  local  government  authorities, 
all  of  whom  have  responded  enthu- 
siastically to  invitations  to  participate. 
Recently,  we  expanded  our  activities  to 
include  the  private  sector.  A  joint 
government/industry  delegation,  com- 
posed of  State  Department  and  FAA  of- 
ficials together  with  airline  represen- 
tatives, traveled  to  Kuwait  and  Greece 
to  discuss  mutual  concerns  in  the  areas 
of  civil  aviation  security.  We  were  very 
pleased  by  the  cooperation  and  participa- 
tion of  the  two  American  air  carriers. 
As  a  result  of  this  three-way  mission, 
improvements  in  civil  aviation  security 
are  expected  in  both  countries.  We  hope 
to  use  that  experience  as  a  model  for 
future  joint  efforts. 

I  am  very  proud  of  what  we  have  ac- 
complished in  the  last  14  months  with 
the  antiterrorism  assistance  program 
and  am  pleased  to  present  to  the  com- 
mittee the  first  annual  report  on  our  ac- 
tivities. The  report  consists  of  two  por- 
tions. One  is  a  full  description  of  the 
way  the  program  is  structured  and  how 
it  operates  and  a  list  of  the  countries 
which  have  participated  up  to  now  and 
those  which  are  definitely  scheduled  in 
the  near  future.  There  is  also  a  classified 
annex  which  goes  into  greater  detail  on 
three  illustrative  examples. 


Looking  to  the  program  in  FY  1986, 
there  are  three  major  questions  to  be 
considered — lifting  the  sunset  legisla- 
tion, provision  of  additional  equipment, 
and  increased  funding. 

Section  577  of  the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act  provides  an  automatic 
sunset  provision  for  the  antiterrorist 
assistance  program  on  September  .30, 
1985,  which  is  why  we  are  now  submit- 
ting new  authorizing  legislation.  We 
believe  that  the  activities  conducted  to 
date  under  the  program  show  great 
promise,  and  the  Administration  now  re- 
quests that  the  program  be  placed  on  a 
permanent  footing,  subject  to  normal 
congressional  oversight. 

With  regard  to  equipment,  we  feel 
that,  with  the  initial  success  of  the  train- 
ing program,  the  time  has  now  come  to 
look  also  at  supplying  equipment,  with 
the  focus  on  limited  amounts  of  that 
simple,  low-cost  equipment  best  suited 
to  doing  the  job,  even  if  it  is  on  the 
munitions  control  list.  The  lack  of 
proper  equipment  reduces  overall  effec- 
tiveness, technical  ability,  and  the  will  to 
conduct  dangerous  operations.  By  sup- 
plying such  equipment,  the  United 
States  will  not  only  significantly  enhance 
the  effectiveness  of  antiterrorism  action 
by  foreign  civilian  agencies,  but  can  also 
obtain  the  benefit  of  an  increased  desire, 


willingness,  and  ability  by  these  forces 
to  work  closely  with  us  and,  if  need  be, 
protect  our  installations  and  personnel 
from  terrorist  attack.  We  are  thus  pro- 
posing the  repeal  of  Section  573  (d)  (4) 
of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961, 
as  amended,  which  prohibits  the  transfer 
of  defense  articles  and  services  as  part 
of  the  antiterrorism  assistance  program. 
This  will  make  it  possible  to  more  effec- 
tively carry  out  our  mandate,  which  is 
"to  enhance  the  anti-terrorism  skills  of 
friendly  governments  by  providing  train- 
ing and  equipment  to  deter  and  counter   ; 
terrorism." 

Concerning  funding,  you  will  note 
that  we  have  not  requested  any  addi- 
tional funding  for  FY  1986  over  the  $5 
million  provided  for  FY  1985.  This  is 
because  our  projections  for  1986  indicate 
we  can  continue  to  operate  effectively  at 
this  level  of  funding.  However,  we  wish 
you  to  be  mindful  that,  given  the  un- 
predictable nature  of  the  problem  of  the 
growth  and  spread  of  terrorist  activities, 
we  may  be  forced  in  the  future  to  seek 
additional  funding  if  circumstances  so 
require. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1986  Assistance  Requests 
for  Organizations  and  Programs 


by  Gregory  J.  Newell 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Operations  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  March  12, 
1985.  Mr.  Newell  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Organization  Affairs. ' 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you  to- 
day in  support  of  our  requests  for  fiscal 
years  1986  and  1987,  totaling  $502.6 
million  and  $527.1  million,  respectively, 
for  the  international  organizations  and 
conferences  chapter  of  the  Department's 
authorization  of  appropriations  bill.  As 
you  know,  this  authorization  covers  two 
separate  appropriations.  Our  requests 
under  this  chapter  for  FY  1986  include: 
contributions  to  international  organiza- 
tions, $495.2  million  and  international 
conferences  and  contingencies,  $7.3 
million.  In  addition  to  the  amount  re- 
quested to  be  authorized  under  this 
chapter,  the  Department  plans  to  use 
the  permanent  legislation  as  authoriza- 


tion for  our  request  for  $51  million  in 
1986  for  contributions  for  international 
peacekeeping  activities.  I  will  discuss 
each  of  these  requests  in  turn. 

U.S.  Priorities 

As  I  have  discussed  with  this  committee 
before,  the  work  of  the  Bureau  of  Inter- 
national Organization  Affairs  has  been 
guided  by  an  emphasis  on  selected  policy 
priorities.  To  continue  building  on  past 
accomplishments  of  the  United  States  in 
multilateral  forums,  we  reformulated  the 
bureau's  policy  priorities  last  summer.  I 
would  like  to  briefly  review  with  you  the 
six  priorities  that  currently  guide  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  bureau. 

Our  first  priority,  as  it  has  been 
earlier,  is  to  ensure  that  we  will  attain 
effective  American  leadership  and  par- 
ticipation in  international  organizations. 
In  order  to  achieve  this  end,  it  is  as 
essential  as  ever  to  formulate  policies 
early,  to  enunciate  them  clearly,  and  to 


78 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


UNITED  NATIONS 


obby  for  them  extensively.  Moving  from 
I  damage  limitation  mode  to  one  of  con- 
itructive  leadership,  as  we  have  sought 
,0  do  over  the  past  3  years  with  some 
luccess,  has  required  that  we  more  deft- 
y  orchestrate  our  participation  in  UN 
ystem  activities.  We  have  felt  that  we 
ihould — that  we  could — and  that  we  did 
)ut  more  of  our  own  ideas  and  resolu- 
ions  on  the  table:  that  we  could 
trengthen  allied  cooperation  in  pursuit 
)f  common  goals;  and  that  we  could 
lonorably  encourage  and  induce 
noderate  nonaligned  countries  to  speak 
orcefully  in  defense  of  their  own  true 
nterests,  rather  than  in  reflexive 
esponse  to  bloc  stimuli. 

Our  second  priority  is,  again,  to  seek 
esponsible  budget  and  management 
ractices.  We  helped  draft,  and  we  fully 
ubscribe  to,  a  policy  statement  on  inter- 
lational  organization  assessed  budgets 
hat  was  adopted  by  members  of  the 
leneva  group — Western-oriented 
nembers  contributing  1%  or  more  to  the 
ssessed  budgets  of  the  UN  specialized 
.gencies.  The  joint  policy  statement  of 
he  Geneva  group  at  the  consultative 
svel,  for  the  second  half  of  the  1980s, 
alls  for  a  general  commitment  to  zero 
eal  growth  and  maximum  absorption  of 
londiscretionary  cost  increases.  This 
»olicy  recognizes  the  need  for  new  pro- 
gram initiatives  but  requires  that  they 
le  financed  within  existing  resource 
evels.  During  the  first  half  of  the  1980s, 
ve  emphasized  zero  real  growth.  For 
he  second  half  of  the  1980s,  we  should 
)lace  greater  emphasis  on  improved 
nanagement  and  on  cost  effectiveness  in 
he  delivery  of  programs,  as  we  have 
)egun  to  do.  We  will  not  flag  in  our  ef- 
brts  to  eliminate  or  reduce  completed, 
ibsolete,  marginal,  and  ineffective  ac- 
.ivities,  but  the  time  has  come,  addi- 
.ionally,  to  call  for  renewed  scrutiny  of 
ixpenditures  made  for  administrative 
ind  common  services.  We  have  no  taste 
'or  idle  rhetoric  on  this  score.  There  are 
simple  and  real  steps  that  can  be  taken 
.0  produce  salutary  results.  In  our  view, 
•esponsible  budget  practices  must  begin 
vith  decidedly  more  restraint  respecting 
;he  largest  component  of  international 
)rganization  budgets,  viz.,  personnel 
;osts.  Personnel  costs  account  for  over 
10%  of  UN  system  expenditures.  We 
aote,  and  we  share,  the  increased  con- 
;ern  that  is  now  evident  in  the  Congress 
vith  respect  to  international  organiza- 
;ion  personnel  costs. 

The  third  item  we  have  placed  on 
)ur  list  of  priorities  is  new  to  the  lineup. 
[t  might  seem  technical,  bureaucratic, 
ind  deadly  dull,  but  it  cuts,  in  fact,  to 
the  heart  of  UN  system  performance.  It 


is  important  that  UN  system  agencies 
perform  well  at  headquarters.  It  may  be 
even  more  important  that  they  perform 
well  in  the  field.  Our  third  priority  then 
is  to  improve  evaluation  mechanisms 
and  conduct  assessments  of  field  pro- 
grams. We  actively  support  the  work  of 
the  UN  Joint  Inspection  Unit.  We  are, 
as  a  vital  first  step,  actively  seeking  to 
strengthen  its  influence  throughout  the 
UN  system.  The  Joint  Inspection  Unit 
has  a  crucial  importance  for  these 
reasons. 

•  It  is  the  only  intergovernmentally 
chosen  body  that  is  independent  of  the 
Secretariat. 

•  It  has  investigative  powers 
throughout  the  whole  UN  system. 

•  It  makes  its  findings  and  recom- 
mendations publicly  available  to  member 
states. 

The  Joint  Inspection  Unit's  reports 
and  recommendations  have  helped  us  to 
focus  on  areas  that  require  improve- 
ment. In  that  they  have,  for  example, 
encouraged  agencies  to  establish — and 
improve — evaluation  units  and  systems, 
tightened  travel  procedures,  and  called 
for  more  control  over  the  costs  of  con- 
sultants. 

We  have,  in  addition,  launched  a 
field  study  of  our  own  with  the  object  of 
reviewing  the  effectiveness  of  various 
UN  system  agencies  in  delivering 
assistance  in  recipient  countries.  A 
bureau-led  team  has  visited  several  West 
African  countries  to  assess  World  Food 
Program  field  activities.  We  plan  visits 
to  additional  food  program  projects  in 
East  Africa  and  in  Central  America.  We 
will  be  happy  to  share  with  interested 
members  of  Congress  the  results  of  our 
field  studies  as  they  are  completed. 

Our  revisited  fourth  priority,  one 
that  is  also  new — as  least  as  a  specific- 
ally stated  objective — is  to  keep  ex- 
traneous political  issues  out  of  the 
specialized  agencies.  We  insist,  candidly 
and  clearly,  that  conference  chairmen, 
secretariats,  and  key  member  states 
must  all  work  to  keep  the  meetings  of 
the  UN's  specialized  agencies  and  pro- 
grams focused  on  their  assigned 
technical  subjects.  Continued  abuse  of 
the  UN  system,  occasioned  by  inclusion 
of  extraneous  political  issues  in  agendas 
and  deliberations,  is  quite  clearly  con- 
trary to  the  charters  of  the  several  UN- 
system  organizations.  Repetition  of  such 
practices  will,  in  several  ways,  inevitably 
lead  to  adverse  consequences.  Both  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  the  Congress 
have  made  it  very  clear  that  the  United 
States  would  withdraw  its  participation 
and  support  from  any  UN  organization 
that  improperly  denied  to  Israel  its  un- 


doubted right  to  participate.  This  re- 
mains, at  every  level,  a  firm  U.S.  policy 
today. 

Our  fifth  priority  is  to  continue  to  in- 
crease the  role  of  the  private  sector.  We 
forthrightly  promote  multilateral  ini- 
tiatives that  can  complement  and  en- 
courage private  sector  approaches  to  the 
problems  of  development.  The  world  is 
rather  generally  coming  to  recognize 
that  -socialist  economic  .systems  just 
don't  work.  We  find  growing  signs  of  a 
steady  turning  away  from  Marxist  and 
stiitist  rhetoric — and  from  such  eco- 
nomic models — toward  freer,  more 
open,  and  more  efficient  economies.  If 
development  efforts  in  the  Third  World 
are  to  be  successful,  they  must  enlist  in- 
creased private  sector  participation. 

Our  sixth  priority  is  to  increase  the 
presence  of  U.S.  nationals  in  interna- 
tional organizations.  We  are  insisting,  at 
the  highest  levels,  that  the  number  of 
Americans  employed  by  any  given  inter- 
national organization  fall,  in  fact,  within 
the  agreed-upon  range.  We  are  identify- 
ing upcoming  policymaking  vacancies  at 
an  early  stage  and  are  seeking  to  ensure 
that  U.S.  nationals  will,  as  appropriate, 
be  recruited  and  promoted  to  fill  these 
positions. 

In  the  same  vein,  one  of  our  impor- 
tant related  goals  is  to  increase  the 
number  of  Americans  occupying  posi- 
tions in  international  organizations  at 
junior  levels.  It  is  very  important,  as  we 
well  understand,  to  see  to  it  that  junior- 
level  people  are  given  opportunities  to 
move  up  within  those  organizations.  We 
believe,  generally,  that  promotion  from 
within  helps  to  improve  the  effectiveness 
of  the  relevant  organizations.  To  support 
that  approach  and,  at  the  same  time, 
secure  appropriate  placement  of  U.S. 
nationals,  requires  that  we  give 
heightened  attention  to  the  retention 
and  promotion  of  junior-level  employees. 
We  wish  to  be  assured  that  we  will  find 
a  significant  American  presence  in  inter- 
national organizations  in  the  future. 

I  would  like  to  turn  to  the  specifics 
of  the  international  organizations  and 
conferences  chapter  of  the  Department's 
1986-87  Authorization  Bill. 

Contributions  for  International 
Organizations 

Our  FY  1985  request  for  contributions 
to  international  organizations  reflects 
only  a  1.5%  increase  over  FY  1985  re- 
quirements. This,  in  turn,  reflects  the 
success  of  our  determined  effort  in  the 
recent  past  to  contain  the  growth  of  in- 
ternational organization  assessed 
budgets.  This  has  all  taken  place  because 
we  have,  with  some  fair  success,  pur- 


June  1985 


79 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


sued  a  policy,  for  the  first  half  of  the 
1980s,  that  called  for  zero  net  program 
growth  and  significant  absorption  of 
nondiscretionary  cost  increases.  In 
March  1984,  the  Geneva  group,  with  our 
full  support,  agreed  to  continue  that 
policy,  on  an  even  more  restrictive  basis, 
during  the  second  half  of  the  decade. 
In  concert  with  our  Geneva  group 
colleagues,  the  United  States  has  made 
repeated  demarches  to  the  executive 
heads  of  UN  agencies.  They  have 
stressed  that  budgets  must  reflect  max- 
imum restraint,  priorities  must  be 
established  and  adhered  to,  ineffective 
programs  must  be  terminated,  and  in- 
tensified scrutiny  must  be  applied  to  ex- 
penditures for  administrative  and  com- 
mon services. 

In  November  1984,  instructions  for 
implementing  and  achieving  U.S.  policy 
objectives  in  this  regard  were  system- 
atically conveyed  to  all  diplomatic  and 
consular  posts. 

As  we  meet,  only  two  of  the  major 
UN  agencies  have  issued  their  draft 
1986-87  budgets.  The  World  Health 
Organization  (WHO)  has  done  so.  Its 
budget  reflects  zero  real  growth.  The  In- 
ternational Labor  Organization  (ILO) 
has  also  done  so.  At  the  recently  con- 
cluded ILO  governing  body  meeting,  the 
U.S.  delegation  negotiated  rigorously 
and  succeeded  in  reducing  the  proposed 
real  growth  from  2.2%  to  1.1%  on  a  net 
basis.  Our  delegation  was  also  suc- 
cessful, moreover,  in  urging  the  ILO  to 
revise  its  exchange  rate  upward.  The 
result  of  that  revision  is  that  the 
1986-87  draft  budget  represents  a 
nominal  increase  of  only  0.2%,  for  the 
biennium,  over  1984-85.  We  understand 
that  the  1986  draft  budget  for  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA) 
will  contain  zero  real  growth  (following 
a  real  growth  level  of  0.2%  in  198.'3). 
We  are  confident,  that  this  trend 
will  continue.  The  clear  and  basic  thrust 
of  our  budget  policy  has  achieved 
remarkable  success  in  changing  the  tone 
of  the  budget  reviews  in  UN  agencies 
and  other  groups.  Whereas  requests  for 
more  and  ever  more  funds  once  passed 
by  unchallenged,  amid  pervasive  and 
generalized  indifference,  budget  requests 
are  now  subjected  to  sharp,  sometimes 
painful,  examination.  Precisely  because 
we  do  remain  committed  to  the  purposes 
and  ideals  reflected  in  the  chapters  of 
the  various  UN  system  agencies,  we 
have  committed  ourselves  to  make  every 
effort  to  work  from  within  (where  we 
obtain  any  respectful  hearing  at  all)  to 
assure  that  the  agency's  responsibilities 
are  implemented  in  the  most  effective 
and  economical  manner  possible.  Our 
goal  is  to  ensure  that  U.S.  wishes  and 


concerns  are  taken  into  account.  We  do 
ask,  rightly,  that  they  be  carefully 
evaluated  and  meaningfully  weighed. 

Contributions  for  International 
Peacekeeping  Activities 

As  you  know,  the  appropriation  for  con- 
tributions for  international  peacekeeping 
activities  provides  funding  for  the  UN 
peacekeeping  forces  on  the  Golan 
Heights  and  in  southern  Lebanon.  These 
peacekeeping  forces,  at  least  for  the 
present,  are  thought  by  most  concerned 
parties — including  some  who  are  other- 
wise hostile — to  be  important  to  peace 
and  stability  in  the  Middle  East.  The 
UN  Disengagement  Observer  Force 
(UNDOF),  established  in  1974,  monitors 
the  disengagement  agreement  on  the 
Golan  Heights.  The  UN  Interim  Force  in 
Lebanon  (UNIFIL)  was  established  in 
1978.  Its  consistent  objective  has  been  to 
aid,  where  possible,  in  restoring  the 
authority  of  the  Lebanese  Government 
in  southern  Lebanon.  Its  objective, 
shared  with  others  and  with  U.S.  policy 
generally,  is  to  stabilize  conditions  in 
that  troubled  area.  In  recognition  of  the 
collective  financial  responsibility  of  all 
members  for  the  maintenance  of  peace 


and  security,  the  expenses  of  these 
forces  are  apportioned  by  the  UN 
General  Assembly  in  accordance  with 
Article  17(2)  of  the  Charter.  Our  FY 
1986  request  of  $51  million  will  enable 
us  to  meet  our  assessed  contributions 
going  to  support  these  forces. 

International  Conferences  and 
Contingencies 

Again  the  international  conferences  and ' 
contingencies  appropriation  provides 
funding  for  official  U.S.  participation  in 
multilateral  intergovernmental  con- 
ferences, contributions  for  the  U.S. 
share  of  expenses  of  new  or  provisional 
international  organizations,  and  par- 
ticipation of  U.S.  congressional  groups 
in  interparliamentary  unions. 

Our  FY  1986  request  is  for  $7.3 
million  in  new  budget  authority.  In- 
cluded in  our  request  for  conference  par 
ticipation  is  $1.8  million  for  continued 
participation  in  the  mutual  and  balancec 
force  reductions  (MBFR)  negotiations. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C,  20402.  ■ 


The  New  Opportunity 
for  Peace  in  Nicaragua 


by  Langhorne  A.  Motley 

Prepared  statement  before  the  Sub- 
committee on  Western  Hemisphere  Af- 
fairs of  the  House  Foreign.  Affairs  Com- 
mittee on  April  17.  1985.  Ambassador 
Motley  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
American  Affairs.' 

President  Reagan's  April  4  initiative  of- 
fers an  important  opportunity  for 
Nicaragua  to  move  toward  peace— with 
its  own  people,  with  its  neighbors,  and, 
therefore,  with  the  United  States. 

The  President's  proposal— to  link 
U.S.  policy  to  an  internal  dialogue 
mediated  by  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church— creates  a  new  opportunity  for 
reconciliation.  It  is  a  hopeful  and 
realistic  opportunity  for  peace  in  Central 
America  for  at  least  two  basic  reasons. 

First,  the  President  is  building  on 
the  impressively  broad  international  con- 
sensus that  some  form  of  democratiza- 
tion is  required  in  every  country  in  Cen- 


tral America,  and  that  this  holds  for 
Nicaragua  as  much  as  for  El  Salvador. 

Second,  the  President  has  identified 
an  alternative  to  the  two  extremes  the 
American  people  want  to  avoid:  a  secon- 
Cuba,  this  time  on  the  Central  Americai 
mainland;  and  a  second  Vietnam,  with 
American  troops  mired  in  combat. 

This  is  thus  an  opportunity  for 
North  Americans  as  well  as  Central 
Americans.  Only  Congress,  however, 
can  give  the  President  the  means  to 
make  peace  work.  The  experience  of  the 
past  6  years  has  shown  that  the  San- 
dinistas respect  others  only  when  left  nc 
alternative. 

The  Central  American  Crisis 

Nearly  everyone  now  agrees  on  the 
outlines  of  Central  America's  crisis. 

The  Central  American  countries  are 
beset  for  the  most  part  by  decades  of 
social,  economic,  and  political  inequities 
and  have  more  recently  been  driven  to 
the  edge  of  economic  disaster  by 


80 


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WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


/orsening  terms  of  trade,  world  reces- 
ion,  and  unproductive  national  eco- 
loniic  policies.  These  explosive  condi- 
ions  are  the  "root  causes"  of  rebellion 
,nd  violence. 

At  the  same  time,  as  the  National 
iipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America  detailed  so  well,  Cuba  and  the 
)0\iet  Union  are  exploiting  historical 
loverty  and  repression  to  advance  their 
wn  strategic  interests  in  the  hemi- 
phere.  Those  interests  are  inexorably 
lostile  to  the  United  States.  And  ex- 
lerience  over  6  long  years  of  crisis  has 
mply  demonstrated  that  the  goals  of 
he  Cubans,  the  Soviets,  and,  to  date, 
he  Sandinistas  are  also  contrary  to  the 
lational  interests  of  the  region's 
lemocratic  nations. 


J.S.  Policy 

?he  United  States  has,  through  two  ad- 
ninistrations,  evolved  a  response  that 
akes  into  account  all  aspects  of  this 
!omplicated  crisis.  The  four  continuing 
roals  of  U.S.  policy  in  Central  America 
vere  outlined  by  President  Reagan  to  a 
oint  session  of  the  Congress  in  April 
.983: 

First.  In  response  to  decades  of  inequity 
nd  indifference,  we  will  support  democracy, 
eform,  and  human  freedom.  .  .  . 

Second.  In  response  to  the  challenge  of 
/orld  recession  and,  in  the  case  of  El 
laivador,  to  the  unrelenting  campaign  of 
conomic  sabotage  by  the  guerrillas,  we  will 
upport  economic  development.  .  .  . 

Third.  In  response  to  the  military 
hallenge  from  Cuba  and  Nicaragua— to  their 
leliberate  use  of  force  to  spread  tyran- 
ly— we  will  support  the  security  of  the 
■egion's  threatened  nations.  .  .  . 

Fourth.  We  will  support  dialogue  and 
legotiations— both  among  the  countries  of 
he  region  and  within  each  country. 

What  this  involves  at  bottom  is  a 
change  in  political  attitudes  and 
systems.  Some  time  ago.  Secretary 
Shultz  said  that  the  United  States  seeks 
1  Central  America  more  like  Costa  Rica 
than  Cuba.  That  remains  a  good  sum- 
mary of  our  basic  attitude.  Costa  Rica 
has  never  repressed  its  own  people  or 
sought  to  subvert  its  neighbors;  the 
various  sectors  of  Costa  Rican  society 
rely  on  dialogue  rather  than  confronta- 
tion, whether  in  national  elections  or  in 
the  Legislative  Assembly  or  when  deal- 
ing with  foreign  problems. 

Costa  Rica  is  in  the  forefront  of  that 
large  and  growing  number  of  nations 
calling  upon  Nicaragua  to  support  and 
not  oppose  the  democratizing  trend  in 
the  hemisphere.  At  the  same  time,  Costa 
Rica's  concern  about  the  United  States 
is  not  that  we  are  "interfering"  in  Cen- 


tral America;  it  is  that  we  appear 
capable  of  abandoning  our  friends  and 
not  meeting  our  responsibilities.  Presi- 
dent Monge's  visit  this  week  reflects  the 
overwhelming  concern  of  Central 
America's  strongest  democracy. 

The  responsibilities  borne  by  the 
United  States  in  this  crisis  are,  indeed, 
great.  The  bipartisan  commission  and, 
since  then,  the  Administration  and  the 
Congress  have  recognized  that  specific 
reforms  alone  are  not  enough.  Only  a 
comprehensive  and  sustained  approach 
which  deals  simultaneously  with  all  of 
the  interlocking  problems  of  the  region 
can  succeed.  Economic  aid  is  necessary 
to  deal  with  the  ravages  of  depression 
and  civil  war  and  to  help  provide  the 
bases  for  longer  term  growth  with  equi- 
ty. Security  assistance  and  other 
demonstrations  of  U.S.  national  will, 
backed  by  military  power,  have  provided 
an  effective  shield  behind  which  the  rest 
of  our  policy  has  been  able  to  unfold. 

On  April  12,  Secretary  Shultz  for- 
warded to  the  President  a  report  assess- 
ing the  situation  in  Central  America  and 
our  programs  and  policies  there  since 
the  bipartisan  commission  submitted  its 
report  in  January  1984.  I  ask  that  the 
Secretary's  report  be  included  in  the 
record  and  considered  an  integral  part 
of  this  statement.-  The  basic  conclusion 
is  threefold: 

First,  events  have  shown  that  the 
commission  was  right  in  its  judgments 
and  recommendations; 

Second,  we  have  made  important 
progress  in  implementing  the  com- 
prehensive policy  advocated;  and 

Third,  we— the  Administration,  the 
Congress,  and  the  Central  Americans 
themselves — have  much  more  to  do 
before  the  task  is  completed. 

One  aspect  of  the  Secretary's  report 
is  worth  underscoring — the  dramatic 
progress  in  El  Salvador  since  early 
1984.  The  world  has  recognized  and  ap- 
plauded the  benchmarks:  last  year's 
presidential  elections  followed  by 
legislative  and  municipal  elections  less 
than  3  weeks  ago;  the  continued  decline 
in  politically  motivated  killings;  the 
triumphant  assertion  of  the  democratic, 
reformist  center  against  the  violent  ex- 
tremes of  left  and  right;  the  public  con- 
fidence in  President  Duarte  which  en- 
abled him  to  make  his  historic  offer  of 
dialogue  with  the  guerrillas;  and  grow- 
ing practical  recognition  from  Tokyo  to 
Paris  to  Mexico  City  that  democracy  is 
the  future  of  El  Salvador. 

Less  than  2  years  ago,  of  course, 
there  was  no  consensus.  As  recently  as 
the  beginning  of  1984,  many  observers 
saw  little  hope  for  what  was  then  called 


the  "elusive"  democratic  center.  They 
doubted  that  the  repressive  political 
culture  of  the  old  El  Salvador  really  was 
doomed.  They  believed  polarization  was 
so  complete  that  no  amount  of  U.S.  aid 
would  provide  relief  and  that  the  United 
States  was  being  drawn  into  direct 
military  involvement  on  the  side  of  dic- 
tators and  unpopular  governments. 

The  critics,  the  cynics,  and  the  skep- 
tics were  wrong.  Duarte  and  a  million 
and  a  half  voters  made  believers  of  most 
of  them.  Today,  few  who  hear  the 
phrase  "military  intervention"  think  of 
any  possible  application  in  El  Salvador. 
There  has  been  no  second  Vietnam  in  El 
Salvador.  And  El  Salvador  will  not 
become  a  second  Cuba. 

Nicaragua  in  the  Balance 

Sandinista  Nicaragua  today  is  the  "odd- 
man  out"  in  a  Central  America  moving 
toward  democracy.  It  is  also  the  major 
obstacle  within  the  Contadora  process. 
The  Sandinista  leaders  are  profoundly  at 
odds  with  the  Nicaraguan  people,  with 
the  Nicaraguan  Catholic  Church,  and 
with  democratic  leaders  throughout  the 
world. 

The  record  of  the  past  6  years  pro- 
vides the  critical  background.  The  San- 
dinistas have  repeatedly  and  system- 
atically rejected  normal  relations  with 
Nicaragua's  neighbors  in  favor  of  the 
Soviet  bloc,  despite  extraordinary  U.S. 
economic  assistance  during  the  first  18 
months  after  Somoza  fell.  Where  once 
the  Sandinistas  were  praised  as 
liberators,  today  there  is  little  disagree- 
ment about  their  internal  repression; 
about  the  transparent  falsity  of  an  "elec- 
tion" facade  set  against  "divine  mobs" 
and  a  censored  press;  about  the  un- 
precedented buildup  of  the  military 
forces;  the  presence  of  thousands  of 
Cuban,  Soviet,  and  other  bloc  military 
personnel;  or  about  the  continuing  sup- 
port for  guerrillas  and  terrorists  in 
neighboring  Central  American  countries. 

U.S.  policy  is  aimed  directly  at 
bringing  about  a  change  in  this  behavior. 
So  is  the  policy  of  all  of  Nicaragua's 
neighbors,  as  well  as  the  specific,  agreed 
objectives  of  the  Contadora  process 
itself. 

One  aspect  of  the  record,  however, 
may  not  be  adequately  understood,  and 
it  is  one  of  direct  relevance  to  this  hear- 
ing. That  is  the  history  surrounding  the 
attempts  at  internal  dialogue  on  the  part 
of  the  Nicaraguan  democratic  opposi- 
tion. As  another  integral  part  of  this 
statement,  I  would  offer  a  special 
documentary  report,^  which  places  the 
current  calls  for  dialogue— including 
President  Reagan's  peace  initiative — in- 


June1985 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


to  the  context  of  the  Contadora  process, 
the  appeals  of  the  Nicaraguan  bishops, 
and  the  calls  of  hemispheric  leaders  for 
dialogue  within  Nicaragua. 

The  documents  speak  for  them- 
selves. I  would  only  emphasize  how 
starkly  the  record  contrasts  the  recent 
histories  of  Nicaragua  and  El  Salvador 
and  how  uniformly  the  Latin  Americans 
themselves  support  internal  dialogue  in 
Nicaragua. 

The  Salvadoran  experience  speaks 
directly  to  where  we  stand  today  in 
Nicaragua.  Alternatives  to  civil  war  and 
foreign  entanglement  exist  in  Nicaragua 
as  well. 

The  President's  Proposal 

President  Reagan's  April  4  initiative 
grew  out  of  this  historical  context.  If  the 
United  States  is  somehow  "imposing" 
democracy,  dialogue,  and  reconciliation 
on  Sandinista  Nicaragua,  that  is  news 
indeed  to  the  Central  and  South 
Americans. 

The  immediate  precursor  of  the 
President's  proposal  was  the  Nicaraguan 
bishops'  acceptance  on  March  22  of  the 
mediation  role  proposed  in  the  Febru- 
ary 22  and  March  1  announcements  by 
the  internal  and  external  democratic  op- 
position. The  opposition's  call  for  church- 
sponsored  dialogue  and  a  cease-fire  in 
place  was  characterized  as  fair  and 
promising  by  a  wide  spectrum  of 
observers.  The  Sandinistas  rejected  the 
entire  idea,  just  as  they  had  excoriated 
the  bishops  for  their  Easter  pastoral  let- 
ter in  1984,  which  had  called  for 
dialogue  among  all  Nicaraguans  in  and 
out  of  the  country,  armed  and  unarmed. 

President  Reagan  has  asked  the 
Sandinistas  to  reconsider  and  has  asked 
you  to  help  provide  the  incentive. 

The  Salvadoran  Government  has 
crossed  the  psychological  threshold  to 
dialogue  with  armed  guerrillas.  Are  the 
Sandinistas  exempt  from  any  obligation 
to  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  their  op- 
position? President  Reagan's  offer  is  a 
pragmatic  incentive  to  the  Sandinistas— 
and  a  commitment  to  them— to  ease  the 
difficulties  the  nine  comandantes  are  ap- 
parently facing  as  they  consider  crossing 
that  threshold. 

With  the  help  of  Congress,  that  in- 
centive will  be  clear:  the  one  aspect  of 
our  behavior  which  the  Sandinistas  have 
sought  to  change  in  every  available 
forum— U.S.  funds  to  support  demo- 
cratic resistance  forces— can,  indeed, 
be  changed,  but  only  in  exchange 
for  a  genuine  reconciliation  among 
Nicaraguans. 

Some  wonder  whether  we  can 
realistically  expect  the  Sandinistas  to  ac- 


cept now  what  they  have  steadfastly  re- 
jected in  the  past.  Can  we  expect 
"realism"  or  "pragmatism"  from 
"ideologues"  or  "fanatics"?  The  record  of 
recent  years  suggests  we  can— if  the 
right  approach  is  developed.  In  1979-81, 
the  United  States  cooperated  with  the 
new  Sandinista  regime  and  furnished 
economic  aid;  the  Sandinistas  militarized 
and  subverted.  But  when  pressure  was 
applied  by  the  armed  resistance,  the 
comandantes  began  to  hedge.  To  use  a 
favorite  term  from  the  Marxist  lexicon, 
they  began  to  respond  to  changes  in  the 
"objective  conditions"  they  faced.  And 
there  is  no  "objective  condition"  so 
sobering  as  the  growing  resistance  of 
one's  own  people.  Even  ideologues 
recognize  that  kind  of  reality. 

■The  President  has  made  clear  that 
we  have  a  moral  obligation  and  a  na- 
tional interest  not  to  abandon 
Nicaragua's  democrats  in  exchange  for 
empty  promises  or  sham  elections.  But 
real  dialogue  and  genuine  democracy 
would  allow  the  opposition— which  took 
up  arms  because  the  democratic  route 
was  unavailable— to  lay  them  down  once 
again.  The  President's  offer  is  designed 
to  help  the  Sandinistas  recognize  that 
their  acceptance  would  not  be  a  zero- 
sum  outcome.  Nor  would  it  be  for  us. 
But  to  abandon  an  ally— whether  Costa 
Rica,  or  Honduras,  or  the  Nicaraguan 
people— would,  by  definition,  be  a  losing 
proposition  for  the  United  States,  and  a 
blow  to  U.S.  credibility. 

It  is  important  to  read  the 
President's  proposal  within  the 
framework  of  what  has  already  hap- 
pened in  and  out  of  Nicaragua.  For  ex- 
ample, the  President  has  not  provided  a 
"final  outcome"  for  the  dialogue.  That  is 
for  the  Nicaraguans  themselves  to  work 
out.  What  he  has  done  is  to  facilitate  the 
self-determination  of  Nicaragua's  future 
by  Nicaraguans,  something  the  San- 
dinistas have  heretofore  prevented. 

Finally,  President  Reagan  has 
neither  provided  the  basis  for  an  inva- 
sion of  Nicaragua  nor  has  he  unilaterally 
injected  the  United  States  into  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  a  sovereign  nation.  Again, 
the  historical  context  makes  this  clear. 
The  United  States  has  been  called  on  by 
Nicaragua's  Central  American  neighbors 
to  do  no  more— and  no  less— than  help 
defend  them  against  an  aggressive  gar- 
rison state  armed  and  supported  by 
Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Nicaragua  is 
being  asked  no  more  than  what  was 
demanded  of  El  Salvador  by  the  Con- 
gress and  many  others  around  the 
world,  including  the  Sandinistas 
themselves.  The  Sandinistas  are  called 
on  to  fulfill  promises  they  themselves 
freely  made  in  1979  to  their  own  people 


ke 


and  to  the  Organization  of  American 
States  (including  the  United  States).  In- 
deed, the  Nicaraguan  Government  in 
1983  signed  the  Contadora  Document  of 
Objectives— which  asserts  that  regional 
peace  is  impossible  unless  a  dialogue  is 
undertaken  between  the  government 
and  opposition  in  each  country  affected 
by  violence. 

The  documents  of  current  history 
support  the  wisdom  of  the  President's 
peace  plan.  The  immediate  reaction  has 
been  significantly  positive:  Duarte  of  El 
Salvador  saw  the  reflection  of  his  own 
experience;  Betancur  of  Colombia  em- 
phasized that  dialogue  fit  "within  the 
philosophy  and  within  the  reach  of  the 
Document  of  Objectives  which  the  coun- 
tries of  Central  America  freely  signed"; 
Mexico's  De  la  Madrid  underscored  the 
cease-fire  aspect;  Lusinchi  of  Venezuela 
noted  that  "the  Nicaraguan  Government 
would  not  lose  anything  by  entering  into 
conversation  with  the  opposition"; 
Ecuador's  Febres  Cordero  cited  El 
Salvador  and  Guatemala  as  favorable 
precedents;  Costa  Rica's  Monge  gave  his 
"enthusiastic  support";  and  more  en- 
couragement came  from  Suazo  of  Hon- 
duras, Barletta  of  Panama,  and  Alfonsin 
of  Argentina. 

The  democratic  resistance  has  ap- 
parently accepted  the  President's  re- 
quest to  extend  their  cease-fire  offer  un- 
til June  1.  We  hope  the  Sandinistas  will 
also  respond  to  the  many  voices— and,  I 
stress  again,  it  is  not  just  our  own- 
calling  on  them  to  make  peace  with  their 
own  citizens. 

The  Choice  Facing  the  Congress 

A  critical  element  of  the  President's  pro- 
posal to  the  Sandinistas  is  the  incentive 
that  can  only  be  provided  by  congres- 
sional approval  of  the  immediate 
release— under  the  formula  the  Presi- 
dent carefully  defined  on  April  4— of  the 
$14  million  already  appropriated. 

What  exactly  is  implied  in  Congress' 
choice?  A  great  deal,  and  the  conse- 
quences will  be  both  short  and  long 
term. 

To  begin  at  the  beginning,  a  vote  in 
favor  would  be  a  demonstration  of  con- 
tinued national  commitment  to  a  suc- 
cessful policy  in  Central  America.  Con- 
sistency and  continuity  are  two  charac- 
teristics that  have  been  lacking  in  U.S. 
policy  toward  Latin  America.  This  is  not 
the  time  to  abandon  a  policy  that  is 
working. 

In  the  second  place,  a  vote  in  favor 
would  provide  the  President  with  the 
authority  he  needs  to  deal  with  a  com- 
plex negotiating  situation— with  the 
capability  to  increase  pressure,  hut  in 


82 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


e  hope  that  congressional  support  will 
!lp  make  its  use  unnecessary.  To  vote 
es"  is  to  make  the  most  of  the  new  op- 
)rtunity  for  peace. 

Some  say  that  a  vote  against  would 
!  a  vote  for  peace,  because  the  demo- 
atic  resistance  would  then  give  up, 
id,  like  it  or  not,  we  could  then  learn 

I  live  with  the  Sandinistas.  This  is  folly. 
8  as  a  nation  have  often  not  learned 
>11  from  history,  but  there  are  certain 
3Sons  so  recent  and  so  painful  that  we 
ive  paid  attention.  One  of  these  is  the 
3Son  of  Cuba:  has  Castro's  enforced 
astery  over  Cuba  in  any  way  affected 
s  policy  of  acting  as  a  Soviet  proxy 
rainst  U.S.  interests  at  every  available 
portunity?  No.  And  "learning  to  live" 
ith  an  antidemocratic  Nicaragua  would 
;  a  contradiction  in  terms  for  any 
imocracy.  And  Nicaragua  is  not  an 
and. 

To  be  sure,  the  Nicaraguan 
sistance  has  demonstrated  a  will  to 
irry  on  even  without  our  full  support; 
le  resistance  forces  are  not  mer- 
■naries.  To  deny  them  support  would 
eaken  their  ability  to  resist;  it  would 
)t  end  the  fighting.  And  if  the  San- 
(iiistas  conclude  we  are  not  serious,  if 
tey  conclude  that  they  can  avoid 
lalogue  with  impunity,  then  even  more 
jcaraguans  would  die.  Peace  would  be 
lie  least  likely  outcome.  The  only  pros- 
M't  would  be  unabated  irregular  war- 
re  and  destruction— for  years  to  come. 

That  is  why  the  opportunity  for  in- 
■rnal  reconciliation  through  dialogue  is 
'  important— wow.  We  Americans  have 
special  responsibility  to  profit  by  the 
I'lTience  of  the  past  6  years  in  Central 
.merica  and  act,  now.  to  seize  that  op- 
j.irtunity.  We  have  learned  from  El 
lilvador  that  dialogue  within  the  frame- 
'ork  of  democratic  and  constitutional 
i-der  is  possible  when  a  government 
■  issesses  the  self-confidence  that  results 
urn  being  democratically  elected. 

We  have  also  learned  that  the  San- 
mistas  will  not  change  without  power- 
I  reasons  to  do  so.  That  is  why  the 
resident  has  asked  the  Congress  to 
•nvide  such  a  reason.  A  "yes"  vote  will 
aintain  the  pressure  and  provide  incen- 
■ves  for  change.  A  "no"  vote  would 
■move  the  incentive  and  guarantee  the 
■elongation  of  the  conflict.  A  "yes"  vote 
J  a  catalyst  for  a  peaceful  solution;  a 
lo"  condemns  Nicaragua  and  the  region 
)  continuing  bloodshed. 

We  are  not  saying  that  a  "no"  vote 
ould  result  in  instant  disaster.  The  fact 
,  we  would  probably  not  see  an  im- 
lediate  effect  of  that  "no,"  either  in  the 
eld  or  at  the  next  Contadora  meeting, 
ut  the  impact  would  come,  first 


Ljne1985 


privately  and  then  publicly,  and  it  would 
ultimately  add  up  to  a  disaster.  A  "no" 
vote  would  leave  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  its  democratic  allies 
open  to  steady  erosion. 

We  do  not  want  to  see  more  suffer- 
ing in  Central  America.  We  do  not  want 
to  see  relations  between  Nicaragua  and 
the  United  States  frozen  into  the  kind  of 
hostile  and  confrontational  stalemate 
that  has  characterized  U.S. -Cuban  rela- 
tions since  Castro  turned  his  island  into 
a  Soviet  proxy. 

We  have  before  us  an  opportunity  to 
prevent  a  tragic  repetition  of  history. 
We  must  grasp  it  by  demonstrating  to 
Nicaraguans— to  the  com.andantes  and  to 
the  democratic  resistance— and  to  the 
rest  of  the  world  that  we  are  united  in 
our  principles  and  our  goals.  The  Presi- 
dent's proposal  offers  the  opportunity 
for  the  American  people,  through  their 
elected  representatives,  to  demonstrate 
their  resolve  in  support  of  people  strug- 
gling for  democracy. 

Conclusion: 

The  Unanswered  Questions 

Ten  weeks  ago  I  appeared  before  this 
subcommittee  to  review  the  broad  prin- 
ciples which  have  guided  our  policy  in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  and, 
of  course,  we  discussed  Nicaragua.  At 
that  time,  I  asked  one  question:  "Will 
Nicaragua  change?"  I  asked  it  in  several 
ways— and  at  least  one  of  these  was 


repeated  by  a  member  of  this  committee 
to  other  witnesses: 

•  "Why  negotiate  unless  the  agenda 
has  something  in  it  for  each  side?" 

•  "If  the  Nicaraguans  in  the  armed 
resistance  are  abandoned,  why  should 
the  Sandinistas  negotiate  with  them?" 

And  a  rhetorical  question: 

•  "If  anyone  knows  of  a  more  effec- 
tive way  to  create  a  bargaining  situation 
with  the  Sandinistas,  let  us  know." 

To  my  knowledge,  no  one  has 
developed  a  more  workable  answer  to 
those  questions  than  what  has  formed 
the  basis  of  our  policy.  It  has  had  its 
clearest,  most  hopeful  articulation  in  the 
President's  offer  of  April  4.  I  believe  it 
is  the  responsibility  of  the  Congress  to 
give  the  President  what  he  needs  to  help 
Central  Americans— and  Nicaraguans  in 
particular— to  achieve  peace. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

^Special  Report  No.  124— "Sustaining  a 
Consistent  Policy  in  Central  America:  One 
Year  After  the  National  Bipartisan  Commis- 
sion Report,"  April  1985. 

^Special  Report  No.  126-"The  Nica- 
raguan Peace  Process:  A  Documentary 
Record,"  April  1985.  ■ 


Nicaragua:  The  Stolen  Revolution 


by  J.  William  Middendorf  II 

Statement  before  the  Organization  of 
Ameri.can  States  (OAS)  Permanent 
Council  meeting  on  March  27.  1985.  Am- 
bassador Middendorf  is  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  OAS. 

The  U.S.  delegation  wishes  to  note  that 
on  July  18,  1984,  we  last  raised  the  mat- 
ter of  Nicaragua's  failure  to  live  up  to  its 
solemn  promises  of  July  12,  1979,  to  the 
Secretary  General  of  this  body.  They 
promised  the  OAS  to  hold  early  free 
elections,  to  establish  an  independent 
judiciary,  and  to  uphold  human  rights. 
The  OAS,  in  turn,  for  the  first  and  only 
time  in  its  history,  withdrew  its  support 
for  a  sitting  member  government. 

It  is  my  delegation's  sad  duty  to 
report  that,  since  that  date,  no  progress 
has  been  made  in  the  fulfillment  of  any 
of  these  promises.  We,  therefore,  have  a 


continuing  responsibility  to  monitor  this 
situation  until  these  commitments  are 
fulfilled  to  this  body's  satisfaction. 

When  Sandinista  troops  entered 
Managua  on  July  19,  1979,  they  were 
met  by  joyous  throngs  of  Nicaraguan 
citizens  who  believed  that,  at  long  last, 
freedom  and  economic  well-being  were 
at  hand.  We  all  know  now  that  the  San- 
dinista revolution  was  stolen— stolen  by 
a  small,  hardcore  group  of  Marxist- 
Leninists  who  did  not  represent  majority 
opinion  within  the  Sandinista  movement 
but  who  had  long  conspired  to  take  the 
movement  over  and  who  were  armed  to 
make  it  possible  to  carry  out  their  plan. 

Impact  of  Sandinista  Rule 

Let  us  look  first  at  the  impact  almost  6 
years  of  Sandinismo  have  had  on  the  or- 
dinary Nicaraguan  people.  We  are  not 
talking  now  about  political  figures  or 


83 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


business  leaders  but  about  the  Nicara- 
guan  "man  in  the  street"— the  ordinary 
Nicaraguan  whose  only  ambition  is  to 
make  a  decent  enough  living  to  support 
his  family.  What  is  happening  to  this  or- 
dinary Nicaraguan  today? 

•  His  children  don't  have  enough  to 
eat.  Robert  Leiken,  who  initially  strong- 
ly supported  the  revolution,  wrote  in  the 
New  Republic  on  October  8,  1984,  that 
children  were  supposed  to  be  the 
"spoiled  ones"  of  the  revolution.  Instead, 
he  noticed  on  his  visit  last  year  far  more 
naked  children  with  signs  of  malnutri- 
tion than  he  had  ever  seen  before  in 
Nicaragua.  Most  foodstuffs  are  rationed, 
with  the  local  Committees  for  the 
Defense  oi  Sandinismo  handing  out  ra- 
tion cards— or  withholding  them  for 
citizens  who  show  "insufficient  revolu- 
tionary fervor." 

•  His  older  children,  from  age  11  on 
up,  face  the  possibility  of  being  drafted 
into  the  Sandinista  Armed  Forces. 
Strong-arm  recruiters  snatch  them  off 
the  streets  or  from  their  schoolrooms  to 
fill  the  ranks  of  the  Sandinista  military, 
which  now  outnumbers  all  of  the  other 
military  forces  of  Central  America  com- 
bined. 

•  His  freedom  of  speech  is  sorely 
limited.  The  Committees  for  the  Defense 
of  Sandinismo  keep  their  eye  on  him.  If 
he  complains  to  a  neighbor  about 
something  the  government  has  done,  he 
may  find  himself  hauled  before  a 
neighborhood  court,  with  no  appeal  of 
any  sentence  that  court  hands  down 
allowed. 

•  His  freedom  to  be  informed  about 
national  and  international  events  is  re- 
stricted. Radio  and  television  news  are 
under  government  control,  and  they 
broadcast  only  what  the  Sandinista 
party  wants  them  to.  There  is  only  one 
opposition  newspaper.  La  Preri^a,  and  it 
is  so  heavily  censored  by  government 
censors  that  it  frequently  suspends 
publication  because  after  the  censors  are 
through  there  is  not  enough  news  left  to 
print.  And  sometimes  the  government 
orders  it  to  suspend  publication  anyway. 

•  His  livelihood  is  threatened.  If  he 
works  in  the  private  sector,  the  gradual 
elimination  of  private  enterprise  by  the 
Sandinista  government  may  leave  him 
without  a  job.  If  he  is  a  farmer,  under 
the  laws  establishing  state  agen- 
cies—which are  the  only  entities  to 
which  he  is  allowed  to  sell  his  produce, 
at  a  non-negotiable  price  fixed  by  the 
government— he  may  not  even  hold  back 
seed  for  next  season's  planting.  He  may 
not  receive  enough  income  to  make  ends 
meet. 


•  The  average  Nicaraguan  has 
always  been  religious.  He  has  usually 
been  a  devout  Catholic  or,  in  the  case  of 
the  Miskito  Indians,  a  devout  Moravian. 
Now,  he  finds  his  church  leaders,  in- 
cluding the  Pope,  harassed  by  Sandinista 
youth  mobs,  the  "Turban  Dimnas."  He 
finds  his  priest  or  pastor  accused  of 
being  "a  counterrevolutionary"  when  he 
refuses  to  praise  the  Sandinista  govern- 
ment in  his  sermons.  He  can  no  longer 
hear  the  Archbishop's  homily  on  radio  or 
television  because  the  Sandinistas  do  not 
allow  it  to  be  broadcast  without  their 
prior  censorship,  something  to  which  the 
Archbishop  has  understandably  refused 
to  submit. 

Compare  his  situation  with  that  of 
ordinary  citizens  in  neighboring  Costa 
Rica  and  Honduras,  and  you  will  see  the 
contrast.  While  those  countries  have 
problems,  they  are  working  democracies 
where  people  can  say  what  they  please, 
don't  have  to  worry  about  their  children 
being  drafted,  and  where  farmers  can 
sell  their  produce  in  the  market 
themselves  or  choose  among  several 
competing  middlemen  who  will  buy  the 
produce  for  resale. 

Yet  the  Sandinista  leaders  say  that 
countries  such  as  Honduras  and  Costa 
Rica  must  undergo  their  own  revolu- 
tions. Interior  Minister  Tomas  Borge,  in 
his  interview  in  Playboy  magazine  of 
September  1983,  was  asked  to  respond 
to  the  Reagan  Administration  contention 
that,  following  its  triumph  in  Nicaragua, 
the  revolution  will  be  exported  to  El 
Salvador,  then  Cuatemala,  then  Hon- 
duras, then  Mexico.  Borge  replied:  "That 
is  one  historical  prophecy  of  Ronald 
Reagan's  that  is  absolutely  true." 

On  the  second  anniversary  of  the 
Sandinista  revolution,  Borge  gave  a 
speech  in  Managua  in  which  he  said: 
"This  revolution  goes  beyond  our 
borders.  Our  revolution  was  always  in- 
ternationalist. .  .  ." 

In  our  special  session  on  Febru- 
ary 29,  1984,  my  esteemed  colleague 
from  Nicaragua  told  this  body: 

If  we  had  wanted  to  attack  Costa  Rica 
with  a  specific  end  in  mind,  we  would  have 
done  so,  and  they  wouldn't  even  have  had 
enough  time  to  ask  that  a  special  session  be 
called,  because  by  then  they  would  have  Iseen 
occupied.  .  .  . 

While  supposedly  denying  an  inten- 
tion of  invading  Costa  Rica,  this  state- 
ment shows  how  confident  the  San- 
dinistas are  in  their  ability  to  invade 
their  southern  neighbor  successfully,  if 
they  ever  feel  the  desire  to  do  so. 


Broken  Promises 

I  think  it  is  worth  asking,  taking  into  ac- 
count these  statements  I  have  just  men- 
tioned as  well  as  many  others,  what 
makes  anyone  believe  that  the  San- 
dinista government  is  willing  to  live  in 
peace  with  its  neighbors?  Just  because 
they  have  stated  their  peaceful  inten- 
tions? 

You  will  recall  that  promises  made 
to  this  body  on  .luly  12,  1979,  have  not 
been  kept.  How,  then,  can  we  assume 
that  promises  not  to  attack  their 
neighbors  will  be  kept  by  the  San- 
dinistas? When  almost  daily  we  observe 
shots  fired  by  the  Sandinistas  across  the' 
Honduran  and  Costa  Rican  borders,  and 
guerrillas  trained  by  the  Sandinistas 
carry  on  their  activities  in  El  Salvador 
and  Guatemala,  and  Managua  has  been 
the  command  center  for  the  gTierrilla  ac- 
tivities throughout  Central  America- 
can  we  believe  their  avowal  of  peaceful 
intentions? 

Let  us  review  the  record  again.  In 
1979  the  Sandinista  junta  promised  the 
OAS  that  it  would  respect  human  rights- 
set  up  an  independent  judiciary,  and 
hold  "the  first  free  elections  in  this  coun 
try." 

Human  Rights.  As  I  have  already 
pointed  out,  human  rights  have  been 
violated  on  a  massive  scale.  The 
mistreatment  of  the  Miskito  and  other 
Indian  tribes  was  especially  noteworthy 
Shortly  after  the  revolution,  the  MiskiU 
Indians'  traditional  homelands  were 
flooded  with  Cuban  and  Nicaraguan  per 
sonnel  who  said  they  were  there  to 
"rescue"  them.  The  attempt  was  made  t 
force  them  to  give  up  their  traditional 
way  of  life  and  adopt  the  Marxism- 
Leninism  of  the  revolution.  As  Freedon 
House  said  at  the  time,  the  program  "is 
to  deprive  them  of  their  socio-cultural 
identity."  Their  traditional,  freely  electe' 
leaders  were  replaced  with  Sandinista- 
appointed  authorities— some  of  them 
Cubans. 

Massive  relocation  of  the  Miskitos. 
as  well  as  other  tribes  such  as  the  Suim 
and  the  Rama,  was  undertaken.  In  somn 
instances  where  they  resisted,  Miskitos 
were  killed.  Men,  women,  and  children 
were  forced  to  walk  long  distances  on 
foot.  Their  farm  animals  were  often  ap- 
propriated by  the  state.  Ominously,  we 
hear  reports  today  of  a  similar  involun- 
tary forced  relocation  of  people  from  a 
wide  area  in  nn-al  northern  Nicaragua 
and  of  Sandinistti  army  personnel  put- 
ting the  torch  to  the  fields  left  behind. 
So  much  for  the  promise  to  the  OAS  to 
respect  human  rights. 


84 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Independent  Judiciary.  In  1979  the 
andiiiista  JLint.a  promised  this  body  that 
n  independent  judiciary  would  be 
stabiished.  Yet  justice  has  become  the 
ervant  of  Sandinista  totalitarianism, 
he  neighborhood  courts,  where  people 
re  judged  for  such  "crimes"  as  failing  to 
ttend  Sandinista  party  rallies,  hand 
own  sentences  which  are  not  subject  to 
idicial  review.  The  nominally  independ- 
nt  Supreme  Court  of  Justice  has 
mited  power  to  review  decisions 
anded  down  by  lower  courts.  The  right 
f  huhean  corp^is  has  been  practically 
liminated. 

The  recent  Urbina  Lara  case  illus- 
-ates  the  lack  of  respect  Sandinista 
istice  has  for  the  traditional  Latin 
merican  doctrine  of  asylum.  Mr. 
Irbina  Lara,  who  had  taken  refuge  in 
le  Costa  Rican  Embassy,  was  forcibly 
?moved  from  the  Embassy  building, 
'ounded,  and  imprisoned  by  Sandinista 
uthorities  at  a  moment  when  the  Costa 
lean  diplomats  had  briefly  left  the  Em- 
assy  building  unoccupied  except  for  Mr. 
Irbina  Lara.  Mr.  Urbina  Lara  was 
Uowed  to  leave  Nicaragua  only  after 
le  incident  threatened  to  disrupt  the 
ontadora  peace  process.  We  under- 
tand  that  President  Ortega  has  told 
igh-level  visitors  to  Managua  that 
Irbina  Lara  left  the  Embassy  of  his 
wn  accord.  On  his  arrival  in  Colombia, 
owever,  Mr.  Urbina  Lara  confirmed 
le  details  of  this  breach  of  the  principle 
f  diplomatic  asylum.  Meanwhile,  his 
efense  lawyer  was  detained  for  several 
ays  in  a  Managua  jail  without  charges. 
0  much  for  the  Sandinista  promise  to 
16  OAS  of  justice. 

Free  Elections.  Finally,  in  1979  the 
andinista  junta  promised  early,  free 
lections.  Late  last  year,  "elections" 
/ere  held.  But  they  were  nothing  but  a 
ham,  as  the  Sandinista  government 
efused  to  create  the  conditions  whereby 
he  largest  opposition  coalition,  the 
'oordinadora  Democratica 
Hcaraguense,  could  have  any  chance  to 
ompete.  That  group's  candidate,  Arturo 
'tuz,  who  had,  at  one  time,  been  the 
.andinista  government's  own  am- 
assador  to  Washington,  had  his  rallies 
isrupted  by  Sandinista  youth 
lobs — the  so-called  Turhas 
Hvinas — on  repeated  occasions  during 
he  preelectoral  period.  His  pro- 
louncements  were  censored  from  the 
ipposition  newspaper,  La  Prensa,  and 
^ere  not  carried  by  the  government 
irint  and  broadcast  media.  Indeed,  San- 
linista  censors  have  assured  that 
riticism  of  the  government  is  all  but  ab- 
ent  from  the  media. 

Faced  with  the  situation  in  which 
he  Sandinista  government  would  not 

une1985 


allow  C'ruz  to  conduct  a  full  and  free 
campaign,  after  many  attempts  to 
negotiate  campaign  guarantees,  the 
coordinadora  refused  to  participate  in 
the  election  campaign. 

Two  other  parties  intended  to  pull 
out  also.  In  one  case,  mobs  broke  up  a 
meeting  of  the  Partido  Coruservador 
Democrata  at  which  a  vote  to  pull  out  of 
the  elections  was  about  to  be  taken,  with 
a  clear  majority  in  favor.  In  the  other 
case,  Partido  Liberal  htdeperidiente  can- 
didate Virigilio  Codoy  announced  on  Oc- 
tober 21  that  he  was  withdrawing  his 
candidacy,  but  the  government  press 
continued  to  run  his  campaign  adver- 
tisements, and  La  Prensa  was  censored 
when  it  attempted  to  report  the 
withdrawal. 

No  matter  how  honest  the  vote 
counting  itself,  an  election  is  nothing 
more  than  a  sham  if  parties  who  wish  to 
run  are  not  given  the  chance  to  mount  a 
full  and  fair  campaign. 

I  think  it  would  be  interesting  to  see 
what  Sandinista  leaders  themselves  have 
said  about  elections.  In  May  1984  Com- 
andante  Bayardo  Arce,  one  of  the  nine 
members  of  the  Sandinista  Directorate 
gave  a  speech  to  the  Nicaraguan 
Socialist  Party.  He  did  not  realize  that 
the  speech  was  being  tape-recorded.  A 
text  of  it  appeared  in  the  Barcelona 
newspaper.  La  Vanguardia.  on  July  31, 
1984,  and  I  note  that  the  Sandinista 
government  has  never  denied  the 
authenticity  of  the  text.  Comandante 
Arce  said,  ".  .  .  of  course,  if  we  did  not 
have  the  war  situation  imposed  on  us  by 
the  United  States,  the  electoral  problem 
would  be  totally  out  of  place  in  terms  of 
its  usefulness.  .  .  ." 

If  we  analyze  this  statement,  we  are 
led  to  believe  that  if  the  freedom 
fighters  had  not  waged  their  valiant 
fight  to  force  the  Sandinistas  to  live  up 
to  their  promises,  the  junta  never  would 
have  held  elections. 

Comandante  Arce  also  said: 

.  .  ,  We  think  the  electoral  process  .  .  . 
was  and  continues  being  an  offensive  tool 
from  the  standpoint  of  confronting  U.S. 
policy.  ...  It  is  well  to  be  able  to  call  elec- 
tions and  take  away  from  American  policy 
one  of  its  justifications  for  aggression  against 
Nicaragua  .  .  .  bourgeois  democracy  has  an 
element  which  we  can  manage  and  even 
derive  advantages  from  for  the  construction 
of  socialism  in  Nicaragua  ...  we  are  using  an 
instrument  claimed  by  the  bourgeoisie,  which 
disarms  the  international  bourgeoisie,  in 
order  to  move  ahead  to  matters  that  are  for 
us  strategic  ...  we  believe  that  the  elections 
should  be  used  in  order  to  vote  for  Sandin- 
ismo,  which  is  being  challenged  and  stigma- 
tized by  imperialism,  in  order  to  demonstrate 
that,  in  any  event,  the  Nicaraguan  people  are 


for  that  totalitarianism,  the  Nicaraguan  peo- 
ple are  for  Marxism-Leninism  ...  we  see  the 
elections  as  one  more  weapon  of  the  revolu- 
tion. .  .  . 

There  you  have  the  affirmation,  in 
Comandante  Arce's  own  words,  that  the 
elections  were  held  not  because  of  the 
Sandinistas'  love  for  democracy  but  for 
purely  tactical  reasons.  Is  it  any  wonder, 
then,  that  they  established  conditions 
under  which  only  the  Sandinista  party 
had  any  chance  of  victory?  Had  they 
given  the  coordinadora  democratica  a 
fair  chance  to  campaign  on  an  equal 
footing,  the  Sandinistas  would  have  been 
in  danger  of  being  swept  out  of  of- 
fice—something they  could  not  risk. 
Thus,  on  November  4,  1984,  the  election 
which  was  held  had  to  be  the  sham  that 
it  was.  So  much  for  the  Sandinista 
promises  to  the  OAS  Secretary  General 
in  1979. 


U.S.  Initiatives 

In  this  connection  I  would  like  to  note 
that  Congressman  Claude  Pepper,  who 
honors  us  with  his  presence  today,  has 
written  my  country's  President,  Ronald 
Reagan,  to  call  attention  to  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  U.S.  Congress,  em- 
bodied in  Public  Law  98-215  of 
December  9,  1983.  This  recommendation 
proposes  that  the  President  seek  the 
prompt  reconvening  of  the  17th  meeting 
of  consultation  of  the  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs  for  the  purpose  of 
evaluating  the  compliance  of  the  San- 
dinista government  with  respect  to  the 
promises  to  the  OAS  and  also  to  con- 
sider whether  that  government  is  living 
up  to  the  terms  of  the  OAS  Charter. 

I  would  also  note  that  I  have  re- 
ceived the  text  of  House  Resolution  81 
of  March  7,  1985,  sponsored  by  56 
members  of  the  U.S.  Congress,  which 
calls  on  the  President  to  grant  explicit 
recognition  to  the  democratic 
Nicaraguan  resistance  and  urges  the 
President  and  all  members  of  the  OAS 
to  support  the  Nicaraguan  resistance— 
the  so-called  contras—m  their  quest  for 
peace,  human  rights,  free  elections,  and 
national  reconciliation.  Yesterday, 
Senator  Durenberger  spoke  to  the  Na- 
tional Press  Club  about  the  Nicaraguan 
situation. 

My  government's  efforts  to  get  the 
Sandinistas  to  live  up  to  their  promises 
has  often  been  branded  by  them  as  a 
lonely  effort  by  President  Reagan  which 
does  not  have  the  support  of  the 
American  people  or  their  elected 
representatives  in  the  Congress.  I  would 
submit  that  the  existence  of  these  con- 
gressional initiatives  by  congressmen 


85 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


from  both  the  Democratic  and 
Republican  Parties  shows  the  deep  con- 
cern of  the  American  people  about  the 
danger  to  the  peace  and  security  of  the 
hemisphere  posed  by  the  actions  of  the 
Sandinista  dictatorship. 

The  Search  for  a  Solution 

I  would  also  like  to  take  note  of  the  re- 
cent document  on  national  dialogue  of 
the  Nicaraguan  resistance,  proclaimed  in 
San  Jose,  Costa  Rica,  on  March  2,  1985, 
by  the  coordinadora  democratica.  which 
has  named  as  its  representatives  Arturo 
Cruz,  Alfonso  Robelo,  and  Adolfo 
Calero. 

In  it,  they  request  that  the  San- 
dinista government  engage  in  a  national 
dialogue  leading  to  democratization  of 
Nicaragua— a  political  system  which 
guarantees  real  separation  of  power, 
development,  and  reconstruction; 
recognition  of  civilian  primacy  over  the 
state;  full  respect  for  human  rights; 
demilitarization  of  the  society;  a  foreign 
policy  which  emphasizes  good  relations 
with  neighboring  states;  an  economic 
system  which  gives  importance  to  the 
development  of  the  private  sector;  in- 
stitution of  a  multiparty  system  which 
guarantees  alternation  in  power  and 
respect  for  minorities;  freedom  to 
organize  labor  unions;  agrarian  reform; 
municipal  autonomy;  respect  for  the 
culture  and  traditions  of  the  Atlantic 
coast;  a  general  political  amnesty;  and 
expulsion  from  the  country  of  advisers 
from  Cuba  and  other  communist  coun- 
tries. 

In  this  connection,  the  coordinadora 
is  not  asking  that  Daniel  Ortega  be 
ousted  as  president,  but  only  that  he  live 
up  to  the  1979  promises  to  the  OAS.  It 
is  a  pity  that  the  Sandinista  government 
did  not  take  advantage  of  this  opportuni- 
ty to  resolve  Nicaragua's  problems  by 
peaceful  means. 

Up  to  now,  the  Sandinistas  have 
refused  calls  for  dialogue  with  the  op- 
position. Yet,  in  El  Salvador  and  Colom- 
bia we  have  recently  seen  the  occurrence 
of  dialogue  with  the  armed  opposition, 
so  why  should  Nicaragua  be  a  special 
case  where  dialogue  is  inadmissible? 

We  are  told  constantly  by  the  San- 
dinistas that  the  armed  resistance  in 
Nicaragua  is  nothing  more  than  a  move- 
ment of  former  Somocistas  who  are  bat- 
tling to  return  to  power.  This  lie  has 
been  repeated  so  often  that  even  some 
of  my  own  country's  press  seems  to 
have  accepted  it  as  true. 

I  note  also  that  the  Contadora  group 
will  meet  next  month  in  the  hopes  of 
establishing  a  final  solution  to  the  Cen- 


tral American  problem.  It  is  my  hope 
that  this  process  will  finally  resolve  the 
crisis  not  only  in  Nicaragua  but  in  all  of 
Central  America.  I  would  like  to  say  at 
this  point,  however,  that  any  agreement 
is  only  so  many  pieces  of  paper  until  it  is 
put  into  practice.  Once  again,  foolproof 
measures  of  verification  must  be  in- 
cluded in  any  such  agreement  if  it  is  to 
be  effective.  I  note  the  words  of  Lenin, 
as  quoted  by  C.  L.  Sulzberger  in  the 
Neu!  York  Times  of  June  13,  1956.  Lenin 
said:  "We  must  be  ready  to  employ 
trickery,  deceit,  law  breaking, 
withholding  and  concealing  truth."  The 
Sandinista  leaders  have  proclaimed 
many  times  that  they  are  Marxist- 
Leninists.  Are  they  in  accord  with  this 
statement  by  Lenin? 

My  government  only  asks  that  the 
Sandinista  government  live  up  to  its 
solemn  commitments  to  the  OAS.  I 
would  note  that  no  government  provided 
more  aid  to  the  Sandinistas  during  its 
first  18  months  in  power  than  the 
United  States,  which  gave  $118  million 
in  aid.  The  Sandinista  government 
began  its  inordinate  military  buildup  im- 
mediately upon  taking  office,  when  the 
resistance  had  not  yet  formed.  Texts 
used  in  literacy  programs  and  elemen- 
tary education  from  the  beginning  of  the 
revolution  used  perforative  terms 
against  my  country.  Radio  Sandino, 


from  the  beginning  of  the  revolution,  at 
tacked  my  country  in  the  most  vicious 
terms.  On  15  different  occasions  over  a 
period  of  4  years.  President  Ortega 
falsely  and  irresponsibly  accused  my 
government  of  organizing  an  imminent 
invasion  of  his  country,  a  tactic  similar 
to  that  used  by  Castro  20  years  ago  in 
Cuba  to  consolidate  power.  The  record 
shows  that  militarism  and  hostility  to 
the  United  States  were  hallmarks  of  thi 
Cuban-Soviet  style  revolution  from  the 
very  beginning. 

It  is  my  hope  that  peace  will  return 
to  Nicaragua  through  one  or  another  of 
the  processes  that  I  have  mentioned 
here;  but  if  no  process  is  successful,  I 
would  remind  this  body  of  its  respon- 
sibilities. In  the  final  instance,  the 
Organization  of  American  States  has  a 
responsibility  to  assure  peace  in 
Nicaragua,  since  in  1979  it  took  the  un- 
precedented step  of  withdrawing  sup- 
port from  a  sitting  member  governmen' 
in  Nicaragua  and  replacing  it  with  the 
Sandinista  junta.  My  government  does 
not  intend  to  allow  this  organization  to 
ignore  its  responsibilities  in  this  regard 
and  reserves  the  right  at  some  future 
date  to  introduce  a  resolution  leading 
toward  the  satisfactory  resolution  of  th'i 
Nicaraguan  problem,  if  the  processes 
which  I  have  already  detailed  do  not 
bear  fruit.  ■ 


Secretary  Visits  Ecuador  and  Uruguay 


Secretary  Shultz  departed  Wash- 
ington, D.C..  February  28.  1985,  to  visit 
Ecuador  (February  28)  and  to  lead  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  the  inauguration  of 
Julio  Maria  Sanguinette  a^  President  of 
Uruguay  (March  1-2).  While  he  was  in 
Montevideo,  he  met  with  Nicaraguan 
leader  Daniel  Ortega.  The  Secreta,ry 
returned  to  Washington  on  March  3. 

Following  are  news  conferences  he 
held  in  Guayaquil  and  Montevideo  and.  a 
statement  he  made  after  meeting  with 
Mr.  (Mega. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 

GUAYAQUIL. 

FEB.  28,  1985' 

Secretary  Shultz  [after  reading  text  of 
letter  from  President  Reagan  to  Presi- 
dent Febres  Cordero  on  the  presentation 
of  the  report  of  President  Reagan's 
agricultural  task  force  to  Ecuador].  This 
is  the  report  to  the  President,  and  I 
hand  it  to  you  with  the  very  best  wishes 


of  President  Reagan,  who  remembers 
his  visit  with  you  with  great  warmth  ai  ' 
affection. 

President  Febres  Cordero  [in 

Spanish).  I  would  like  to  thank 
Secretary  of  State  Shultz  for  his  visit  ti 
Ecuador  and  also  thank  him  for  per- 
sonally bringing  this  letter  from  Presi- 
dent Reagan,  accompanied  by  the  repor 
of  the  Task  Force  on  Agricultural  Pro- 
duction in  Ecuador.  We  have  had  a  lot 
of  cooperation  from  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment, in  coming  to  our  country,  and  thi 
report  that  you  have  just  handed  us  wil 
be  very  useful  for  us  to  work  on  the 
problems  of  agriculture  in  Ecuador — 
agriculture  having  been  the  traditional 
backbone  of  the  Ecuadorean  economy. 
I  want  to  thank  you  for  your  kind- 
ness, also,  in  coming  to  visit  us  here  in 
Ecuador,  and  your  stay,  and  for  the  cor 
versations  which  you  have  had  with  us, 
and  for,  as  I  said  before,  for  this  very 
important  letter,  and  the  report  that  it 
accompanies,  from  President  Reagan.  I 
want  to  wish  you  every  success  in  your 


86 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


nure  as  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
lited  States  and  ask  you  to  transmit 
President  Reagan  all  of  our  best 
shes  for  his  own  personal  good  for- 
ne  in  his  Administration  and  through 
Ti,  our  warmest  greetings  to  our 
others,  the  people  of  the  United 
ates. 

Secretary  Shultz.  1  want  to  thank 
esident  Febres  Cordero  for  his  kind 
spitality.  I  will  carry  his  greetings 
,ck  to  President  Reagan.  Although  my 
it  here  was  short,  it  served  the  pur- 
se of  renewing  our  two  countries' 
epening  friendship.  It  also  allowed  me 
become  better  acquainted  with  the 
onomic  challenges  that  confront 
;uador  and  with  the  responsible, 
dicated  approach  the  Administration 
President  Febres  Cordero  is  taking  to 
set  those  challenges. 

As  you  know,  we  will  leave  shortly 
r  Montevideo  and  the  inauguration  of 
esident-elect  Sanguinetti.  That  event 
11  be  made  all  the  more  gratifying  for 
e  by  my  first-hand  experience  here  of 
:uador's  commitment  to  democracy.  I 
ive  Ecuador  with  the  knowledge  that 
ir  ties  are  strong  and  with  a  belief  that 
ir  relation  will  continue  to  broaden  and 
ii)  lepen,  based  upon  a  mutual  belief  in 
eedom  and  in  the  dignity  of  the  in- 
vidual. 

Q.  The  budget  deficit  of  the 
nited  States  is  one  of  the  decisive 
ctors  that  affects  the  high  interest 
ites  that  prevail  in  the  world  today, 
hat  measures  are  being  contem- 
ated  to  be  taken  during  the  course 
'  1985  to  reduce  that  deficit,  since, 
i  I  said,  it  was  responsible  for  the 
ai  igh  rates  of  interest  that  prevail 
iroughout  the  world? 

A.  President  Reagan  is  leading  a 
;ry  strong  effort  to  cut  expenditures 
I  the  Federal  Government  of  the 
nited  States.  He  is  cutting  the  level  of 
cpenditures  on  many  programs  and 
"oposing  the  elimination— total  elimina- 
on— of  many  others.  So  there  is  a  very 
rong  program  under  way  to  reduce  the 
idget  deficit  of  the  United  States. 

At  the  same  time,  I  think  you  should 
3tice  that  since  President  Reagan 
sumed  office,  key  interest  rates,  such 
what's  known  as  the  prime  rate,  have 
een  cut  about  in  half.  And  in  the  last  6 
lonths  or  so,  there  has  been  a  definite 
ecline  in  interest  rates,  so  that  we  have 
;en  a  gradual  fall  in  interest  rates  to 
•vels  that  are  still  too  high  but,  never- 
leless  have  come  down  greatly  as  a 
suit  of  the  policies  the  President  has 
allowed. 


|une1985 


Q.  Since  Nicaragua  is  one  of  the 
difficult  problems  in  the  political 
situation  in  Central  America  as  far  as 
the  United  States  is  concerned,  and 
taking  into  account  the  fact  that 
Daniel  Ortega,  the  chief  of  state  of 
that  government,  has  publicly  stated 
that  Nicaragua  is  inviting  the  United 
States  to  send  someone  to  observe 
Nicaragua's  military  arsenal,  how  is 
the  United  States  going  to  react  to 
this  public  declaration  by  Nicarag^ua 
and  how  are  they  going  to  react  to 
this  offer  of  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua's  apparent  offer  of  peace  as 
far  as  its  relationship  with  the  United 
States  is  concerned? 

A.  Of  course,  we're  interested  in  any 
moves  made  by  Nicaragua  that  will  ease 
tensions  in  Central  America.  And  the 
key  things  that  need  to  be  done  are 
clear;  number  one,  stop  trying  to 
subvert  other  governments  through  the 
support  of  guerrillas  in  neighboring 
states;  number  two,  reduce  the  arsenals 
of  weapons  and  people  in  military  pur- 
suits that  are  clearly  present  in 
Nicaragua  as  a  result  of  the  buildup  of 
the  military  machine;  number  three,  the 
large  presence  of  Soviet  and  Cuban  and 
eastern  bloc  forces  in  Nicaragua  is 
something  that  needs  to  be  done  away 
with;  and  fourth,  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  should  do  what  it  has  con- 
tinuously pledged  to  do,  namely, 
establish  a  genuinely  democratic  form  of 
government,  as  in  the  case  of  Ecuador, 
for  example. 

Q.  How  does  the  United  States 
look  upon  the  process  of  democratiza- 
tion that  we  see  in  Latin  America  as  a 
means  to  solving  social  conflicts  in  the 
countries  of  South  and  Latin  America 
and  to  attentuate  the  social  and 
political  tensions  that  exist  in  the 
area? 

A.  It's  one  of  the  most  dramatic  and 
important  developments  in  the  world— 
the  emergence  of  democracy  in  Latin 
America.  In  1979  only  about  one-third  of 
the  people  in  Latin  America  lived  under 
conditions  that  one  would  call 
democratic.  From  that  date,  1979— a 
date  I'm  sure  Ecuadoreans 
remember— until  through  March,  with 
the  inauguration  of  new  Presidents  in 
Brazil  and  Uruguay,  that  number  of  one- 
third  will  be  changed  to  90%.  Ninety 
percent  of  the  people  live  under  condi- 
tions of  responsive  government.  And  I 
think,  in  the  long  run,  this  will  be  a  mat- 
ter of  tremendous  importance  and  more 
a  development  toward  peace  and  a 
development  toward  creating  conditions 
in  individual  countries  that  will  benefit 
the  citizens  of  those  countries. 


Q.  Can  you  please  tell  us  if  you  have 
any  news  about  whether  you  will  be 
having  a  meeting  with  Mr.  Ortega  and 
also  how  seriously  you  think  his  pro- 
posal is  of  sending  home  100  Cuban 
advisers  and  cutting  back  on  new 
arms? 

A.  There  is  no  meeting  scheduled, 
but  I've  read  in  the  newspapers  that  he 
is  proposing  one,  and  I  certainly  am 
prepared  to  have  a  meeting.  We'll  just 
have  to  see  about  that. 

Insofar  as  the  proposals,  again, 
which  we  have  heard  only  through  the 
press,  they  represent,  certainly,  things 
that  may  have  promise.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  you  compare  100  with  the 
thousands  of  Cuban  and  Soviet  advisers, 
it's  not  a  very  big  step.  And  of  course, 
insofar  as  any  new  shipments  of  ar- 
maments are  concerned,  while  it  is 
positive  to  stop  additional  shipments,  it 
is  important  to  notice  that  there  has, 
over  the  last  6  months  or  so,  been  a  con- 
centrated effort  to  bring  in  extensive 
supplies.  By  this  time,  they  may  have 
about  as  much  in  the  way  of  equipment 
as  they  feel  they  need. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 

MONTEVIDEO, 

MAR.  2,  19852 

Mr.  Ortega  reiterated  the  points  that  he 
has  stated  publicly  before,  and  I  stated 
again  the  objectives  that  the  United 
States  and  our  friends  in  the  region  of 
Central  America  have  consistently  ad- 
vocated for  several  years.  Namely,  first 
of  all  the  importance  of  Nicaragua 
reducing  its  military  abilities  and  forces 
to  levels  that  are  consistent  with  what  is 
needed  for  defensive  purposes  in  Central 
America.  Second  of  all,  the  removal 
from  Nicaragua  of  the  evidences  of  the 
introduction  of  the  Soviet-Cuban 
presence  and  the  introduction  of  the 
East- West  conflict  into  Central  America. 
Third,  an  end  to  the  use  of  Nicaragua  as 
a  base  from  which  to  bring  about  un- 
doubted efforts  to  subvert  its  neighbors. 
And  fourth,  to  bring  about  in  Nicaragua 
progress  toward  democracy  as  has  been 
promised  on  innumerable  occasions  in- 
cluding in  the  original  presentation  of 
the  Sandinistas  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS).  These  objectives 
are  totally  consistent  with  the  21  prin- 
ciples which  were  agreed  upon  by  the 
Contadora  group. 

The  release,  or  the  expected  an- 
nounced release,  of  the  political  prisoner 
Urbina  Lara  is  long  overdue.  We  can 
hope  that  it  will  lead  to  a  resumption  of 
the  Contadora  process. 


87 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


The  Contadora  process  is  the  right 
forum  for  the  discussion  of  the  issues  as 
the  people  in  the  region  see  them,  and 
clearly  there  are  problems,  as  the  people 
in  the  region  see  them,  with  the  current 
latest  draft  of  the  acta.  We  trust  that 
there  will  be  a  meeting  and  these  issues 
will  be  resolved. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
MONTEVIDEO, 
MAR.  2,  1985^ 

I  congratulate  President  Sanguinetti  and 
the  other  democratic  leaders  of  Uruguay 
for  leading  their  country  back  to  a 
democratic  form  of  government  and  for 
making  the  most  impressive  set  of 
ceremonies  yesterday  that  marked  that 
return.  Uruguay's  return  to  democracy 
was  not  easy.  But  the  Uruguayan  people 
showed  that  negotiated  political  transla- 
tions are  not  only  desirable  but  achiev- 
able. Uruguay  has  set  an  example  of 
how  protransition  forces  in  all  sectors 
can  reach  a  consensus  on  democracy,  a 
system  that  guarantees  its  citizens  per- 
sonal and  civil  liberties. 

We  in  the  United  States  feel  united 
to  Uruguay  by  the  democratic  ideals  and 
values  that  both  our  peoples  cherish.  I 
might  say  that  it  is  notable  that  at  the 
inauguration  ceremonies,  there  were  25 
countries  represented  at  a  chief  of  state 
or  foreign  ministry  level  —  25  democratic 
countries,  5  chiefs  of  state.  It  isn't  only 
the  United  States  but  others  recognize 
the  emergence  of  true  democracy  when 
they  see  it.  We  look  forward  to  working 
closely  with  your  new  government  and 
Congress  as  we  seek  to  develop  with  you 
a  framework  and  understanding  of  each 
others'  concerns  and  needs. 

We  have  already  begun  this  process 
of  working  together  through  the 
meetings  I  have  been  able  to  have  with 
President  Sanguinetti,  with  Finance 
Minister  Zerbino,  and  Foreign  Minister 
Iglesias.  And  in  those  meetings,  we 
reviewed  a  number  of  economic  and 
political  issues  of  mutual  concern.  In  ad- 
dition, I  met  with  many  of  your  political 
party  leaders,  with  whom  we  hope  to 
continue  the  dialogue  we  undertook  dur- 
ing this  transition.  We  must  continue  to 
work  together  to  strengthen  freedom 
and  democracy  in  our  hemisphere. 

Q.  You  spoke  about  strengthening 
democracy  in  the  hemisphere,  and  in 
that  regard,  what  is  your  present  posi- 
tion vis-a-vis  Chile? 

A.  Chile  should  return  to  democracy. 
We  are  very  clear  in  our  view  about 
that,  and  we'd  like  to  see  that  happen. 


Q.  Nicaragua  has  denounced  a  plan 
of  aggression  by  the  Reagan  govern- 
ment. You,  Secretary  of  State  George 
Shultz,  can  you  deny  this  publicly? 

A.  We  have  no  aggressive  intent 
toward  the  people  of  Nicaragua.  The 
problem  with  Nicaragua  is  that  their 
government  is  conducting  itself  in  such  a 
manner  that  it  is  bringing  an  adverse 
reaction  from  their  own  people.  And  so 
there's  a  lot  of  resistance  in  Nicarag:ua. 
Furthermore,  the  pattern  in  Nicaragua 
of  overarmanent  and  subversion  of  its 
neighbors  is  disruptive  to  the  entire  Cen- 
tral American  region,  and  it's  deplor- 
able. It's  deplorable  to  have  the 
economic  infrastructure  attacked  and  to 
see  the  work  of  guerrillas,  particularly 
in  El  Salvador,  supported  by  Nicaragua. 
We  wish  to  see  this  come  to  an  end,  and 
we  believe  that  the  right  kind  of  Con- 
tadora agreement  might  very  well  bring 
that  about.  We  have  supported  the  Con- 
tadora process  from  the  beginning. 

Q.  The  Government  of  Nicaragua 
has  announced  its  willing^ness  to  sus- 
pend the  purchase  of  additional  ar- 
maments and  arrange  for  the  depar- 
ture of  100  Cubans  from  its  country. 
The  U.S.  Government  has  considered 
these  steps  to  be  insufficient,  but  I 
ask,  don't  you  believe  that  this  is  a 
good  beginning  and  on  the  road 
toward  a  better  relationship  between 
the  two  countries  — reduction  of  ar- 
maments? 

A.  Your  question  suggests  why  it  is 
that  the  statements  of  Nicaragua  raised 
more  questions  than  they  answer.  For 
example,  I  think  I'm  quoting  you  right  in 
saying  that  they  proposed  a — what  did 
you  say  on  armaments? 

Q.  Reduction  of  armaments. 

A.  That  is  not  what  they  propose,  if 
you  look  at  it  very  carefully.  Wliat  they 
proposed  is  to  have  a  moratorium  on  the 
importation  of  new  systems  of  arma- 
ments. It's  very  tricky,  though.  It  raises 
a  lot  of  questions. 

On  the  question  of  the  Cubans,  how 
many  Cubans  are  there  of  military 
sorts?  We  compute  that  if  they  have  a 
hundred  Cubans  leave  by  the  end  of 
1985,  which  was  what  they  said,  it 
would  take  until  the  middle  of  the  next 
century  for  all  the  Cubans  to  have  left  at 
that  rate.  But  the  question  is,  how  many 
Cubans  are  there,  and  at  what  rate  do 
they  intend  to  have  them  really  leave? 

The  statement  doesn't  address  the 
question  of  subversion  in  other  govern- 
ments and  of  their  neighbors,  and  so  on. 
As  far  as  the  release  of  Mr.  Urbina 
Lara,  that's  in  the  category,  we're  glad 
to  see  that  release.  And  perhaps  it  will 


help  the  Contadora  process  get  going 
again.  But  it  has  to  fall  in  the  categor; 
of  doing  something  very  bad  and  then 
saying  you're  gonna  stop  doing  it  and 
everybody  cheers.  I  mean,  so  that's  a 
gesture  but  it's  a  peculiar  kind  of 
gesture. 

But  I  would  like  to  emphasize  that 
we  support  the  Contadora  process.  Wi 
hope  that  the  discussion  resumes.  We 
hope  that  it  will  develop  a  worthwhile 
and  constructive  outcome.  In  order  fo 
that  to  happen,  the  process  must  ad- 
dress the  concerns  of  the  Central 
American  countries  that  are  threatens 
by  Nicaraguan  armaments  and  subver 
sion. 

Q.  Has  there  been  any  change  as 
result  of  the  meeting  with  Presideni 
Ortega? 

A.  I  don't  know  that  anything  mu( 
has  changed,  although  perhaps  there  i 
recognition  all  around  that  the  center 
negotiation  must  be  the  Contadora  pn 
ess,  and  the  sooner  everyone  gets  bac 
to  that  process,  the  better. 

Q.  The  question  is,  why  is  the  U 
Government  continuing  to  exert 
pressure  on  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment, which  is  a  result  of  the  free 
elections  that  were  held  in  that  coui 
try?  Why  don't  you  pressure  other  d  . 
tatorships  such  as  Chile  and  Para- 
guay? In  the  latter  country,  the  dic- 
tatorship has  been  in  power  for  over' 
30  years. 

A.  We  have  made  our  \'iews  abou 
countries  governed  in  an  authoritariai 
way  known  consistently,  and  I  think  i 
of  great  note  in  our  hemisphere  and  i' 
Latin  America  that  as  recently  as  197  , 
only  a  third  of  the  people  lived  under  i 
conditions  of  democracy.  By  the  end  ( 
this  month,  that  fraction  will  be  'M'Vik 
Unfortunately,  one  cannot  put  the  pec  ■■ 
pie  of  Nicaragua  in  that  category  sine  i 
the  election  there  can  hardly  be 
characterized  as  an  open,  democratic 
election.  It  is  interesting  to  contrast  t 
turn-out  of  democratic  countries  to 
celebrate  the  return  of  Uruguay  to 
democracy:  25  democratic  governmen 
represented  at  the  chief  of  state  and 
foreign  ministry  level.  If  you  leave  asi 
the  Soviet  bloc  and  contrast  that  with 
Nicaragua,  there  were  no  chiefs  of  stg 
present  and  there  were  only  five  forei 
ministers — four  of  whom  were  more  c 
less  obligatory  attendance  by  the  fore: 
ministers  of  Central  America. 

Q.  What  role  do  you  believe  that 
Europe  can  play  in  the  peace  proces; 
of  Central  America,  and  what  role  d 
vou  think  that  President  Gonzalez  isv 


88 


Department  of  State  Bulla 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


aying  in  that?  You  think  that  role  is 

0  big  or  too  little? 

A.  I  think  that  European  coun- 
ies — the  European  Community 
presentatives — met  in  San  Jose  last 
immer.  I  think  their  support  for 
mocracy,  for  the  rule  of  law,  for 
onomic  development,  can  play  a  con- 
ructive  role.  Certainly  Prime  Minister 
?lipe  Gonzalez,  as  a  person,  in  the 
luntry  that  recently  went  from 
ithoritarian  rule  to  democratic  rule  and 
ith  Spain  as  a  base,  can  be  a  very  con- 
ructive  element  in  the  picture.  I 
■lieve  that  that  is  his  wish,  and  we 
elcome  it. 

Q.  Did  you  indicate  to  President 
rtega  a  willingness  to  resume  the 
eetings  in  Mexico  or  any  place  else? 
id  President  Ortega  make  any  new 
mcessions  during  the  meeting? 

A.  Discussions  in  the  Contadora 
oup  are  the  kind  of  discussions 
?cessary  to  resolve  the  problems.  And 
,e  parties  to  the  Contadora  discussions 
ive  the  capacity  within  themselves  to 
live  those  problems.  We  believe  that 
ly  next  step  should  be  in  that  process. 
ie  Manzanillo  talks  were  undertaken  in 
der  to  support,  if  they  could,  the  Con- 
^  ,dora  process.  We  have  no  reluctance 
)out  having  additional  talks  of  that 
nd,  but  only  insofar  as  they  support 
ontadora,  not  as  an  alternative  to  Con- 
idora,  and  we  made  that  clear. 

Let  me  just  make  one  final  com- 
ent.  We  came  here  to  celebrate  the 
^  turn  of  democracy  in  Uruguay  and  the 
vreep  of  democracy  throughout  Latin 
merica.  It  is  perhaps  understandable 
it  ironic  that  questions  in  a  setting 
ich  as  this  are  dominated  by  the  prob- 
ms  created  by  an  undemocratic  coun- 
y  in  the  region,  but  let  me  just 
iderline  the  importance  of  democracy 
;  shown  by  the  return  of  democracy  in 
ruguay.  In  that  connection,  I'm  pleased 
<  say  that  I  was  authorized  yesterday 
.  extend  on  behalf  of  President  Reagan 

1  President  Sanguinetti  an  invitation  to 
sit  Washington  for  a  state  visit 
)metime  in  the  latter  half  of  the  year, 
me  to  be  worked  out  between  the  par- 
es. While  he  couldn't  very  well  respond 

sterday  before  he  was  officially  the 
resident,  he  has  let  us  know  today  that 
e  accepts  the  invitation  and  so  we  will 
e  looking  forward  to  visiting  with  him 
hen  he  comes  to  Washington. 


iPress  release  34  of  Mar.  1,  1985. 
2Press  release  37  of  Mar.  4. 
spress  release  38  of  Mar.  .5.  ■ 


Visit  of  Argentina's  President 


President  Raul  Alfonsin  of  the 
Argentine  Republic  made  a  state  visit 
to  the  United  States  March  17-25, 
1985,  While  in  Washington.  D.C., 
March  18-20,  he  met  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  mad-e  at  the 
arrival  ceremony,  the  text  of  a  joint 
declaration,  and  dinner  toasts  by  the  two 
Presidents  on  March  19.^ 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY, 
MAR.  19,  1985^ 


President  Reagan 

It  is  an  honor  today  to  welcome  you  to 
the  United  States.  It  was  26  years  ago 
when  the  last  Argentine  President  came 
to  Washington  on  a  state  visit.  I  certain- 
ly hope  that  what  we  accomplish  today 
will  clear  the  path  for  increased  good 
will  and  cooperation  between  our 
peoples  in  many  more  such  visits,  and 
let's  make  certain  it's  not  another  26 
years. 

Argentina  and  the  United  States, 
though  at  different  ends  of  the 
hemisphere,  have  much  in  common.  The 
spirit  of  freedom  and  independence  that 
freed  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
only  a  short  time  later,  spread  to  Argen- 


une1985 


tiiia.  And  your  country  is  one  of  the 
oldest  democracies  of  the  hemisphere. 
The  tlame  of  liberty  burned  red  hot  in 
Argentina.  And  your  country  was  the 
first  on  the  continent  to  ban  slavery. 
This  was  no  mere  coincidence;  the 
Argentine  people  are  the  heirs  of  a 
great  legacy.  Similar  to  our  own  ex- 
perience, Argentina  was  a  frontier  socie- 
ty, a  land  where  people  came  from  many 
parts  of  the  world  to  better  themselves 
and  to  live  in  freedom,  an  undeveloped 
land,  yet  one  blessed  by  God  with  a 
richness  of  soil  and  resources.  Our 
forefathers  here  and  in  your  country 
shared  the  challenge  of  turning  a 
wilderness  into  a  modern  nation. 

Today  we  continue  to  share  the 
challenge  of  maintaining  the  ecomonic 
growth  and  development  so  vital  to  the 
well-being  of  our  peoples.  Keeping  a  na- 
tional economy  vital  and  robust  requires 
hard  work,  vision,  and  commitment.  It 
requires  tough  decisions  today  in  order 
to  make  a  better  tomorrow.  We  ap- 
preciate here,  Mr.  President,  the  severe 
economic  problems  that  you  inherited.  A 
few  years  ago  I,  too,  assumed  the 
Presidency  during  a  time  of  great 
economic  uncertainty.  Inflation  and 
economic  decline  sapped  our  strength. 
Had  we  challenged  our  efforts  into  find- 
ing easy  and  short-term  answers,  had 
we  looked  to  redistribution  of  existing 
wealth— rather  than  creating  more— we 
would  still  be  trapped  in  a  seemingly 
endless  morass.  Instead,  by  focusing  ef- 
forts on  economic  growth,  increasing 
productivity,  creating  new  incentives 
that  encouraged  citizens  to  work  and 
save  and  invest,  we  unleashed  a  ground 
swell  of  economy-building  activity  in  the 
private  sector  that  turned  decline  into 
progress,  inflation  into  stability,  and  na- 
tional doubt  into  optimism  and  growth. 

President  Alfonsin,  every  country 
must  make  its  own  way  and  walk  its 
own  path,  yet  friends  can  and  should 
help  one  another.  The  United  States  will 
do  what  we  can  to  assist  you  in  your  ef- 
forts to  improve  the  economic  conditions 
of  your  country.  Argentina,  like  the 
United  States,  is  a  land  of  few  limits. 
Your  people,  educated  and  strong  in 
spirit,  have  enormous  potential.  I  can 
assure  you  in  the  strongest  terms  that 
the  people  of  the  United  States  want 
you  and  the  people  of  Argentina  to  suc- 
ceed and  to  prosper. 

This  prospect  is  made  even  more 
likely  now  that  Argentina  has  returned 
to  the  ranks  of  democratic  nations.  As 
we've  seen  throughout  the  world,  there 
was  a  strong  relationship  between 

89 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


freedom  and  economic  development. 
Democracy  frees  the  spirit  of  man  to 
achieve,  to  build,  and  to  create.  It's  the 
only  system  consistent  with  the  decent 
and  humane  values  at  the  heart  of  our 
societies. 

Democracy  means  government 
derives  its  just  powers  from  the  consent 
of  the  governed.  It  means  freedom  of 
speech  and  religion,  the  freedom  of 
assembly,  and  the  rule  of  law.  It's  more 
than  a  form  of  government;  it's  a  way  of 
life,  an  ideal  which  seems  to  he  a  proc- 
ess yet  is  an  end  in  itself.  It's  not  the 
easiest  system,  but  it  is  the  most  just, 
and  it  brings  a  better  and  a  freer  life  for 
all.  The  spirit  of  democracy  is  not  found 
in  great  halls  or  in  marching  armies  but 
is  enshrined  in  the  hearts  of  people. 

Juan  Bautista  Alberdi,  the  father  of 
the  Argentine  Constitution,  said  it  well: 
"The  Constitution,  liberty,  authority  are 
not  written.  They  are  realized.  They  are 
not  decreed.  They  are  created.  They  are 
made  by  education.  They  are  not  made 
in  the  Congress.  They  are  made  in  the 
home.  They  don't  live  on  paper.  They 
live  in  the  man." 

Well,  today  is  an  exciting  time  to  be 
an  American — and  I  mean  all  of  us. 
From  the  North  Slope  of  Alaska  to  the 
tip  of  Tierra  del  Fuego,  more  people 
here  are  living  in  democracy  than  ever 
before.  Ninety  percent  of  this  hemi- 
sphere's population  lives  in  democracies 
or  in  countries  in  transition  to 
democracy.  This  trend,  however,  is 
threatened  by  Marxist-Leninists  who 
continue,  with  the  heavy  support  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Cuba,  to  undermine 
freely  elected  governments  and 
democratic  movements. 

In  Nicaragua,  communists,  who 
were  just  one  faction  in  the  broad  coali- 
tion that  pledged  to  replace  their  former 
dictatorship  with  democracy,  quickly 
seized  control  of  the  organs  of  power. 
The  vast  majority  of  those  fighting  for 
true  democracy  in  Nicaragua — for 
freedom  of  speech,  religion,  and 
press— actively  opposed  the  former  dic- 
tatorship. And  the  Nicaraguan  people 
are  joining  the  ranks  of  the  freedom 
fighters.  Nearly  three  times  as  many 
men  are  fighting  the  communists  right 
now  as  the  Sandinistas  had  fighting 
Somoza  before  they  seized  power. 

The  free  people  of  this  hemisphere 
must  not  stand  by  and  watch  the  com- 
munist tyranny  imposed  on  Nicaragua 
spread  to  the  free  lands  of  the 
Americas.  We,  like  you,  support  the 
search  for  peace  through  the  efforts  of 
the  Contadora  group,  strongly  believing 
that  if  all  21  objectives  were  imple- 
mented, including  the  genuine 


democratization  of  Nicaragua,  the  Cen- 
tral American  nations  could  live  in  peace 
and  democracy. 

Mr.  President,  as  leaders  of  two 
great  nations  dedicated  to  democracy 
and  committed  to  human  rights,  we  are 
concerned  not  only  with  our  own 
freedom  but  also  the  cause  of  freedom 
throughout  our  hemisphere.  San  Martin, 
a  great  freedom  fighter  of  his  day,  once 
said,  "In  the  last  corner  of  the  earth  that 
I  might  find  myself,  I  will  be  ready  to 
sacrifice  my  existence  for  lilierty." 

Today  democracy  draws  the  people 
of  the  United  States  and  Argentina,  and 
all  other  Americans,  closer  in  a  bond  of 
friendship  and  shared  ideals.  I  welcome 
you.  President  Alfonsin,  as  an  elected 
representative  of  your  people  and  as  a 
man  committed  to  the  political  liberty 
we  cherish  so  deeply. 

President  Alfonsin' 

Mr.  President,  I  wish  to  begin  my  state- 
ment by  expressing  my  gratitude  to  you 
for  the  warm  reception  you  are  granting 
to  the  President  of  all  Argentines. 

As  you  have  said,  it's  very  important 
that  we  meet  at  this  historical  time 
when  a  real  wave  of  democracy  is  going 
through  Latin  America.  This  is  our 
hope,  Mr.  President:  that  the  peoples  of 
Latin  America  actually  live  in  that 
respect  and  actually  enjoy  the  prerog- 
atives and  the  liberty  that  the  people  of 
the  Llnited  States  enjoy. 

That's,  on  the  other  hand,  what  our 
Founding  Fathers  wanted  for  us — both 
the  Founding  Fathers  of  the  United 
States  and  those  of  Argentina.  That's 
precisely  what  the  men  that  gave  us  in- 
dependence fought  for,  starting  with 
Ceneral  Washington  in  the  North  and 
General  San  Martin  in  Argentina. 

As  you  know,  as  you  said,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, it  is  necessary  that  these 
democracies  actually  achieve  tangible 
ecomonic  results,  so  necessary  to  also 
achieve  social  democracy.  That's  why 
right  next  to  hope,  fear  is  also  there  in 
Latin  America — the  fear  that  arises 
from  nonsatisfied  expectations  of  our 
peoples,  our  democracies  having  in- 
herited very  difficult  charges  in  the 
economic  order. 

It's  a  debt  that  in  my  country 
reaches  the  $40  billion  and  that  in  Latin 
America  reaches  the  $400  billion.  That, 
of  course,  conspires  against  the 
democratic  systems.  That,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, is  no  doubt  one  of  the  big  dif- 
ferences between  our  two  countries. 

For  us,  the  philosophy  you  just  men- 
tioned—the philosophy  of  the  state  of 
law,  the  respect  of  human  rights — that 
is  equal  to  both  of  us.  But  a  man.  Mr. 


President,  to  be  called  such  thing,  not 
only  has  to  have  just  the  right  to  exer- 
cise his  fundamental  liberties;  he  also 
has  to  have  the  possibility  of  living  a 
dignified  life. 

That's  why,  Mr.  President,  in  Latin 
America  we  are  ready  to  govern  with 
the  austerity  that  our  times  are  deman' 
ing.  We  are  making  the  necessary  ad- 
justments to  suppress  the  obstacles  of 
our  economy,  but  we  cannot  make  ad- 
justments that  will  actually  impose 
sacrifices  on  those  who  have  less.  It's 
different  from  those  developed  countrit 
in  which  the  entire  GNP  is  received  by 
only  50%;  in  our  countries,  it  doesn't 
reach  even  the  40%.  And  to  ask  from 
our  peoples  in  that  precise  sector  a  big- 
ger effort  is  no  doubt  to  condemn  them 
to  marginality,  to  extreme  poverty,  to 
misery. 

Of  course,  then  we  would  mean  tha 
the  demagogs,  that  are  always  there, 
would  find  in  the  arms  those  simple 
satisfactions  that  democracy  couldn't 
grant.  That's  why,  Mr.  President,  it  ha; 
been  very  important  for  me  to  listen  to 
your  welcoming  remarks,  because  you'\ 
shown  a  deep  understanding  of  our 
problems.  I  am  indeed  persuaded  that  i 
couldn't  be  otherwise. 

I  am  indeed  persuaded  that  the 
United  States  understands  the  develop- 
ment of  democracy  is,  of  course,  en- 
trenched in  our  country.  That's  why 
there's  been  great  expectations  about 
the  dialogue  that  we  will  start  today. 

We  will  talk  about  the  present,  and 
we  will  talk  about  the  future.  We,  two 
Presidents  elected  by  the  will  of  the  pe' 
pie,  will  get  together.  We  will,  of  cours 
talk  about  bilateral  subjects  and  also 
those  items  that  regard  the  continent  a 
a  whole.  And,  of  course,  in  our  dialogin 
the  subject  of  Nicaragua  and  Central 
America  will  not  be  absent. 

I  am  convinced  that  it's  through 
liialogue  that  we  will  be  able  to  reach 
peace.  And  on  the  basis  of  the  prin- 
ciple— a  longstanding  principle  of  inter- 
national law  in  Latin  America — of 
nonintervention,  that  will  give  us,  of 
course,  the  possibility  of  democracy  am 
pluralism  in  democracy  to  succeed 
without  extracontinental  interventions 
and  affirming,  of  cour.se,  the  freedom  o 
man. 

We  will  talk  about  all  this,  Mr. 
President,  and  as  I  said,  there  will  be 
two  men  freely  elected  by  the  will  of  ou 
peoples.  So,  Mr  President,  it  will  be  a 
dialogue  of  both  our  peoples.  That  way 
an(1  because  of  them  we  will  try  to  reac 
solutions.  We  will  work  for  them,  for 
our  peoples.  We  will  try  to  build  the 
future  that  our  peoples  deserve. 


90 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 


INT  DECLARATION 

DEMOCRACY, 
ftR.  19,  1985 

'sident  Alfonsiii  and  Reagan  expressed 
ir  gratification  and  support  for  the  spread 
1  strengthening  of  democracy  and  in- 
idual  freedom  in  the  western  hemisphere, 
■y  said  the  foreign  policies  of  both  coun- 
s  are  driven  by  the  goals  of  peace, 
nocracy.  individual  liberty,  and  the  rule  of 
.  They  affirmed  that  the  most  just  and 
ing  resolution  of  the  major  problems  fac- 
nations  conies  from  leadership 
nocratically  chosen  by  the  people  in 
iodic  free  and  fair  elections,  through  the 
ions  of  independent  legislatures  and 
claries  and  by  close  cooperation  among 
nocratic  countries.  Victories  against  pover- 
ire  more  certain  and  peace  most  secure 
ere  people  live  by  laws  that  ensure 
itical  and  economic  freedom.  Both 
sidents  confirmed  that  relations  are 
rmest  and  cooperation  closest  with  those 
intries  which  practice  effective  democracy 
h  full  regard  for  the  fundamental  social, 
itical,  economic  and  human  rights  for  each 
ividual.  President  Alfonsin  said  Argentina 
instituted  a  new  era  of  stable  and 
engthened  democracy  guaranteeing  full 
>tection  of  human  rights.  President  Reagan 
terated  that  the  United  States  attaches  the 
best  priority  to  sustaining  that  democracy 
Argentina. 


NNER  TOASTS, 
S.R.  19,  1985^ 


![,(  esident  Reagan 

esident  Alfonsin  and  distinguished 
I*  ests  and  ladies  and  gentlemen,  it's  a 
^^'  eat  pleasure  for  nie  to  welcome  you  to 
3  White  House.  And  I  thoroughly  en- 
zed  meeting  with  President  Alfonsin 
lay. 

Our  discussions  were  cordial  and 
oductive,  and  of  course  today  was  not 
e  first  meeting  that  we've  had.  Last 
ptember  we  met  just  before  attending 
e  United  Nations  General  Assembly, 
lat  was  in  the  midst  of  our  Presiden- 
il  campaign  last  September,  and  I 
member  that  you  remarked  that 
hough  being  President  is  a  hard  job, 
metimes  getting  there  is  even  harder, 
aughter] 

President  Alfonsin  and  I  have  much 
common.  We  both  have  gone  through 
any  campaigns  and  asked  for  votes 
um  many  different  kinds  of  people. 
■i  3wn  in  Texas  during  the  1976  primary, 
ey  had  me  out  knocking  on  doors.  And 
emember  one  kind  of  rural  area— I'd 
len  Governor  of  California,  but  I 
asn't  all  that  well  known  in  Texas- 
id  I  knocked  on  the  door,  and  an  old 
ow  in  his  undershirt  and  jeans  came 


to  the  door.  And  1  told  him  I  was  run- 
ning for  President.  And  having  been  in 
the  occupation  I'd  been  in  for  a  number 
of  years,  I  was  kind  of  surprised  when 
he  asked  me  what  I'd  done  for  a  living. 
[Laughter]  And  I  told  him  I'd  been  an 
actor.  AntI  then  he  asked  me  what  my 
name  was.  And  I  thought,  well,  maylie  if 
I  give  him  a  hint.  So  I  said,  "Well,  my 
initials  were  RR."  And  with  that  his  face 
lit  up,  and  he  turned,  and  he  ran  back 
into  the  house,  and  he  was  yelling,  "Ma, 
Ma,  come  on  out  here  quick— Roy 
Rogers  is  outside."  [Laughter) 

But,  seriously  though,  as  I  men- 
tioned at  our  ceremony  this  morning, 
the  people  of  our  two  countries  have  so 
much  in  common,  not  the  least  of  which 
is  the  spirit  of  the  frontier  exemplified 
by  the  gaucho  and  the  cowboy.  More 
significant,  however,  is  the  bond  of 
democracy,  the  love  of  freedom  that's 
found  in  the  hearts  of  our  people.  I'd 
like  to  take  this  opportunity  to  con- 
gratulate President  Alfonsin,  who  is,  on 
behalf  of  the  Argentine  people,  accept- 
ing the  international  democracy  prize 
from  the  Center  for  Democracy.  And  I 
can  think  of  no  finer  example  to  others 
than  Argentina's  inspiring  return  to 
democracy.  Congratulations,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent. 

This  generation  of  Argentinians  is 
laying  the  fondation  for  what  will  be  en- 
joyed by  your  countrymen  hundreds  of 
years  hence.  And  this  is  in  keeping  with 
the  tradition  of  San  Martin,  an  heroic  in- 
dividual significant  not  only  in  your 
history  but  in  that  of  the  entire 
hemisphere,  I  think  it's  interesting  to 
note  that  once  San  Martin  was  suc- 
cessful in  freeing  half  a  continent,  he 
assumed  the  title  of  protector, 

And  that,  perhaps,  captures  the 
essence  of  our  responsibility.  Those  of  us 
who  enjoy  the  freedom  and  independ- 
ence passed  to  us  by  brave  and  noble  in- 
dividuals like  San  Martin,  Washington, 
and  others,  especially  those  of  us  in 
elected  office,  must  be  the  protectors  of 
liberty.  This  is  our  trust,  our  obligation. 
San  Martin  once  said:  "You  will  be  what 
you  must  be.  If  not,  you  are  nothing." 

President  Alfonsin,  you've  already 
demonstrated  to  your  countrymen  and 
to  all  the  world  that  you're  willing  to 
live  up  to  the  enormous  trust  that  you 
hold  in  your  hands.  I  look  forward  to 
working  closely  with  you  in  the  years 
ahead.  I  salute  you.  And  I  ask  all  of  you 
to  join  me  in  a  toast  to  President 
Alfonsin,  Mrs.  Alfonsin,  and  the  free 
people  of  Argentina. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


President  Alfonsin' 

Mr.  President  and  Mrs.  Reagan,  la<lies 
and  gentlemen,  we  have  ended  a  day  of 
intense,  frank,  cordial,  and  nuitually 
enriching  consultiitions.  The  success  of 
this  day,  characterized  from  the  begin- 
ning by  exceptional  American  hospitali- 
ty, is  due  in  great  part  to  your  warmth, 
Mrs.  Reagan,  as  well  as  to  the  informal 
and  friendly  atmosphere  that  you,  Mr. 
President,  imparted  to  our  meetings.  My 
wife  and  my  friends  are  sincerely 
grateful  for  this  hospitality,  and  I 
sincerely  thank  both  of  you. 


Argentina  — 
A  Profile 

Geography 

Area:  2,771,300  sq.  km.  (1.1  million  sq.  mi.); 
about  the  size  of  the  US  east  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  Cities:  Capita/— Buenos  Aires 
(metropolitan  area  pop.  10.5  million).  Other 
major  cities— Cordoba,  Rosario,  La  Plata, 
Mendoza.  Terrain:  Varied.  Climate;  Varied, 
predominantly  temperate. 

Economy 

GDP  ( 1983  est.):  53  billion.  Annual  growth 
rate  (1983  est.);  3%.  Per  capita  GDP  (1983 
est.):  $1,800.  Avg.  inHation  rate  (1983);  434% 
(consumer  price  index). 

Natural  resources:  Fertile  plains 
(pampas);  minerals  dead,  zinc,  tin,  copper,  iron, 
manganese,  oil,  uranium). 

Agriculture  (13.7%  of  GNP):  About  75%  of 
exports  by  value.  Major  products— grains, 
oilseeds,  livestock  products. 

Industry  (35.2%  of  GNP);  Types-food 
processing,  motor  vehicles,  consumer  durables, 
textiles,  metallurgy,  chemicals. 

Trade  (1982):  EipoHs-VS  $7.6  billion; 
grains,  meats,  oilseeds  (major  items).  Im- 
ports—$5.4  billion;  machinery,  fuel  and 
lubricating  oils,  iron  and  steel  products,  wood 
and  lumber,  automotive  equipment  and  parts, 
chemicals.  Major  trading  partners— EuropeAn 
Community,  Brazil,  Chile,  US,  Japan,  USSR, 
PRC,  Iran. 

Official  exchange  rate;  60  Argentine 
pesos  =  US$l  (as  of  mid-May  1984). 

Economic  aid  received;  IBRD  $1,706 
million  (to  1983);  IFC  $183  million  (to  1983); 
IDB  $2,233  million  (to  1983);  US  ($137  million, 
loans  and  grants,  1946-71);  US  economic 
assistance  has  been  phased  out. 


Taken  from  the  Biickqrautiil  Notes  of  May 
1984,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Kditor:  .luanita 
Adams.  ■ 


line  1985 


91 


END  NOTES 


TREATIES 


In  discussing  the  different  aspects  of 
international  affairs,  we  have  discovered 
that  on  many  points  our  views  converge. 
And  if  we  also  discovered  a  few  dif- 
ferences in  our  analysis,  it  should 
neither  surprise  us  nor  alarm  us.  As  I 
imagine  it,  the  relationship  between 
Washington  and  Buenos  Aires  presup- 
poses—and 1  said  that  when  I  ar- 
rived—that we  assume  the  defense  of 
our  respective  national  interests  from  a 
perspective  of  cooperation,  foresight, 
and  mutual  sincerity. 

It  seems  to  me  that  within  this 
framework  we  should  explore  with  a 
certain  amount  of  audacity,  imagination, 
and  good  will  the  profiles  of  a  realistic 
and  enduring  relationship  between  Latin 
America  and  the  United  States. 

Mr.  President,  in  your  Inaugural  Ad- 
dress—I mean  your  last  Inaugural  Ad- 
dress—I was  moved  by  a  suggestive 
evocation  you  made  of  the  revolutionary 
past  of  the  United  States,  and  I  quote 
you:  "For  the  first  time  in  history  they 
said  government  is  not  our  master,  but 
rather  our  servant,  and  the  only  power 
of  government— the  government  will  be 
that  which  we,  the  people,  allow  it  to 
have." 

How  can  we  not  link  these  words  to 
the  basic  grounds  that  explain  what  the 
forces  of  democracy  have  achieved  in 
Argentina  to  reestablish  the  sovereignty 
of  our  people.  Why  should  two  peoples 
whose  convictions  are  nourished  by  such 
principles  not  be  able  to  understand  one 
another  in  fundamental  matters? 

And  I  am  also  aware  of  the  fact  that 
you  and  I  share  an  intense  concern 
about  peace  in  the  world.  Of  course,  no 
doubt,  our  responsibilities  are  different. 
But  in  our  area,  we've  made,  I  think,  a 
great  contribution  to  peace,  because  in 
the  southern  cone  we've  settled  peaceful- 
ly a  century-old  dispute  with  Chile. 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Reagan,  as  I 
toast  for  your  personal  well-being  and 
that  of  all  of  you  here  tonight,  I  do  so 
having  specially  in  mind  the  American 
people.  To  your  people  we  also  offer  this 
deeply  felt  tribute:  They  are  a  people 
who  are  the  architects  of  the  civilization 
where  material  achievements  have 
always  been  united  to  a  great  spiritual 
force.  Thank  vou  verv  much. 


April  1985 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  25,  198,'j. 

■■^Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House. 

'President  Alfonsin  spoke  in  Spanish,  and 
Ills  remarks  were  translated  by  an  inter- 
preter. 

•'Made  in  the  Stale  Dininf;  Room  of  the 
White  House.  ■ 


The  following  are  some  of  the  siRnifi- 
cant  official  U.S.  foreign  policy  actions  and 
statements  during  the  month  that  are  not 
reported  elsewhere  in  this  periodical. 

April  1 

President  Reagan  meets  with  Sudan  I'resi- 
flent  Nimeiri. 

U.S.  releases  $67  million  in  economic  sup- 
port assistance  to  Sudan.  The  aid  had  been 
delayed  pending  the  Sudan  Govenuiient's 
enactment  of  reform  measures. 

U.S.  provides  an  additional  22.5.()()()  tons 
of  grain  to  increase  food  supplies  to  Sudan 
(luring  its  severe  drought  crisis. 

April  2-3 

Secretary  Shultz  (Apr.  2)  opens  the  sixth 
U.S. -ASEAN  economic  dialogue  at  the  State 
Department;  other  speakers  include  Under 
Secretary  Wallis  and  Philippine  Minister 
Valdepenas. 

April  2 

Appointed  Ambassador  Nubuo  Matsunaga  of 
.Japan  presents  his  credentials  to  President 
Reagan. 

U.S.  AID  provides  .'jO  self-pi'opelled  grain 
combines  to  Morocco. 

April  3 

President  Reagan  meets  with  NATO 
Secretary  General  Lord  Carrington  to  discuss 
alliance  issues.  East-West  relations,  and  arms 
control. 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Israeli 
Cabinet  Minister  Moshe  Arens  to  discuss 
Middle  East  issues. 

Commerce  Secretary  Baldrige  announces 
U.S.  action  to  reduce  the  Soviet  Union's 
allocation  of  fish  from  U.S.  waters  by  half 
because  the  Soviets  harvested  2.40.3  Southern 
Hemisphere  minke  whales  in  the  1984-8.5 
season,  exceeding  the  International  Whaling 
Commission  quota. 

April  4 

Vietnam  releases  William  Mathers,  an 
American  businessman,  who  was  detained  on 
.July  21  for  violating  Vietnamese  territorial 
waters  in  his  yacht,  the  Sn  Fong. 

April  8 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  .Japanese  .\nv 
bassador  Nobuo  Matsunaga. 

April  10 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Son  Sann.  Presi- 
dent of  the  Khmer  People's  National  Libera- 
tion Front,  and  Prince  Norodom  Ranariddh, 
Supreme  Conunander  of  the  Sihanoukist  Na- 
tional Army. 

U.S.  rejects  Nicaragua's  proposal  for 
ilirect  talks  on  Central  American  issues. 


April  13-14 

Jaijanese  Foreign  Minister  Abe  visits 
Washington,  D.C.,  to  meet  with  Secretary 
Shultz  and  other  government  officials  for 
discussions  on  U.S. -Japan  economic  relation; 
and  other  issues. 

April  15-19 

U.S.  and  Soviet  Union  hold  the  fifth  round  ( 
consultations  on  nonproliferation  matters. 
The  U.S.  delegation  is  headed  by  Ambassad 
Kennedy. 

April  16 

President  Reagan  meets  with  Senegal  Presi 
dent  Uiouf  to  discuss  progress  in  economii' 
reforms,  the  famine  situation,  and  other 
African  issues. 

U.S.  and  Poland  sign  an  agreement  to 
restore  scheduled  airline  traffic  lietween  tlit 
two  countries.  Flights  will  begin  ijy  the  end 
of  April  after  Poland's  Council  of  Ministers 
ratifies  the  agreement. 

April  22 

U.S.  and  Israel  sign  a  free  trade  area  agree > 
ment  calling  for  mutual  reduction  of  trade 
barriers. 

Soviet  Embassy  Charge  d' Affaires 
Sokolov  calls  on  Assistant  Secretaiy  Bui't  n 
present  a  statement  on  the  Soviet  Union's 
assessment  of  the  April  12  meeting  concern 
ing  the  murder  of  Major  Nicholson.  Mr.  Bur 
informs  Mr.  Sokolov  that  the  Soviet  state 
ment  is  totally  unacceptable. 

April  23 

President  Reagan  meets  with  European  Cni 
mission  President  Delors  in  advance  of  the 
Bonn  economic  summit  to  discuss  U.S. -EC 
issues  and  summit  matters. 

April  24 

The  House  of  Representatives  rejects  Presi 
dent  Reagan's  request  for  $14  million  of 
direct  military  aid  to  rebels  fighting  the 
Nicaraguan  Government.  The  vote  is  248  tC' 

180. 

April  26 

Assistant  Secretary  Burt  announces  the  U.: 
expulsion  of  a  Soviet  military  attache  "in 
response  to  the  unacceptable  Soviet  positioi 
on  the  killing  of  Major  Nicholson,  and  in 
particular,  to  the  Soviet  statement  of 
April  22."  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtheram 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antar 
tic  Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Canberr 
Sept.  27,"l98;i' 
Notification  of  approval:  Australia,  Mar.  21, 

1985. 


92 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


PRESS  RELEASES 


ation.  Civil 

ivention  on  iiilernational  civil  aviation, 
le  at  Chicago  Dec.  7.  1944.  Entered  into 
;e  Apr.  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
ession  deposited:  Solomon  Islands, 
Til,  1985. 

itoms 

ivention  establishing  a  Customs  Coopera- 
1  Council,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels 
l.T.  1950.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  4, 
for  the  U.S.  Nov.  5,  1970.  TIAS  7063. 
ession  deposited:  Guatemala,  Feb.  22, 

5. 

licial  Assistance 

ivention  abolishing  the  requirement  of 
ilization  for  foreign  public  documents, 
1  annex.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct.  5,  1961. 
ered  into  force  Jan.  24,  1965;  for  the  U.S. 
.  15,  1981.  TIAS  10072. 
ification  deposited:  Greece,  Mar.  19, 


ritime  Matters 

rnational  convention  on  maritime  search 
rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Done  at  Ham- 

g  Apr.  27,  1979.  Enters  into  force 

,e  22,  1985. 

;ession  deposited:  Belgium,  Feb.  28,  1985. 

clear  Material  —  Physical  Protection 

ivention  on  the  physical  protection  of 

lear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vien- 

Uct.  26.  1979.' 

nature:  Portugal.  Sept.  19,  1984. 

;ification  deposited:  Paraguay,  Feb.  6, 

15. 

clear  Test  Ban 

laty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the 
losphere,  in  outer  space,  and  under  water, 
le  at  Moscow  Aug.  5,  1963.  Entered  into 
ce  Oct.  10,  1963.  TIAS  5433. 
:ession  deposited:  Seychelles,  Apr.  8, 


!5. 


clear  Weapons  — Nonproliferation 

;aty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
apons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
scow  July  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
r.  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
:ession  deposited:  Seychelles,  Apr.  8, 

!5. 

Ilution 

jtocol  to  the  convention  on  long-range 
nsboundary  air  pollution  of  Nov.  13,  1979 
AS  10541),  concerning  monitoring  and 
iluation  of  the  long-range  transmission  of 
pollutants  in  Europe  (EMEP),  with  annex, 
ne  at  Geneva  Sept.  28,  1984.' 
^natures:  Bulgaria,  Ireland,  Apr.  4, 


^5;  Hungary,    Mar.  27,  1985. 


Seabed  Disarmament 

Treaty  on  the  prohiljition  on  the  emplacement 
of  nuclear  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on 
the  seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  and  in  the 
subsoil  thereof.  Done  at  Washington,  London, 
and  Moscow  Feb.  11,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  May  18,  1972.  TIAS  7337. 
Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  Apr.  8, 
1985. 

Treaties 

Vienna  convention  of  the  law  of  treaties,  with 

annex.  Done  at  Vienna  May  23,  1969. 

Entered  into  force  Jan.  27,  1980.-' 

Accession  deposited:  Netherlands. 

Apr79,  1985. 

Ratification  deposited:  Colombia,  Apr.  10, 

1985. 

UN  Industrial  Development  Organization 
(UNIDO) 

Constitution  of  the  United  Nations  Industrial 
Development  Organization,  with  annexes. 
Adopted  at  Vienna  Apr.  8,  1971.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Mar.  25,  1985. 
Signature:  Papua  New  Guinea,  Mar.  29, 
1985. 

Weapons 

Convention  on  prohibitions  or  restrictions  on 
the  use  of  certain  conventional  weapons 
which  may  be  deemed  to  be  excessively  in- 
jurious or  to  have  indiscriminate  effects,  with 
annexed  protocols.  Adopted  at  Geneva 
Oct.  10,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  2, 
1983.-' 
Ratification  and  acceptance  deposited: 

Pakistan,  Apr.  1,  1985. 

World  Health  Organization  (WHO) 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion. Done  at  New  York  July  22,  1946. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  7,  1948.  TIAS  1808. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Brunei,  Mar.  25,  1985. 


BILATERAL 

Algeria 

Agreement  establishing  the  United  States- 
Algerian  Joint  Coiiiniission  for  economic, 
technical  and  technological  cooperation. 
Signed  at  Washington  Apr.  17,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  17,  1985. 

Colombia 

Investment  incentive  agreement.  Effective  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Apr.  3, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  3,  1985. 

Denmark 

Agreement  concerning  a  Danish-American 
Fund  for  the  exchange  of  technology,  with 
appendix.  Signed  at  Copenhagen  Mar.  25, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  25,  1985. 

Germany,  Fed.  Rep.  of 

Memorandum  of  understanding  relating  to 
cooperation  in  the  development  of  national 
airspace  systems,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Bonn  Oct.  3  and  Nov.  6, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  6,  1984. 


Honduras 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  16.  1983,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at 
Tegucigalpa  .luly  26,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
July  26,  1984. 

Niger 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  an<i 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Niamey  Apr.  9,  1985.  Enters  into 
force  upon  receipt  by  Niger  of  written  notice 
from  U.S.  Government  that  all  necessary 
domestic  legal  re(iuirenu'nts  have  been  ful- 
filled. 

Norway 

Memorandum  of  understanding  regarding  the 
exchange  of  scientists  and  engineers,  with  an- 
nexes. Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  11,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  11,  1985. 

Somalia 

Agreement  concerning  mapping,  charting, 
and  geodesy  cooperation,  with  annex.  Signed 
at  Washington  and  Mogadishu  Dec.  31,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  31,  1984. 

Sri  Lanka 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  May  10, 

1983,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Colombo 
Feb.  26  and  Mar.  20,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  20,  1985. 

Switzerland 

Memorandum  of  understanding  extending  the 
memorandum  of  understanding  of  Mar.  13, 

1984,  concerning  interim  measures  on  air 
transport  services.  Signed  at  Bern  Mar.  28, 

1985,  Entered  into  force  Mar.  28,  1985. 


ne1985 


'Not  in  force. 

^With  declaration. 

■'Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*62  4/1        Program  for  the  official  work- 

ing visit  of  Colombian 
President  Belisario 
Betancur,  Apr.  2-4. 

*63  4/1        Shultz:  remarks  before  a  con- 

ference for  leaders  in 
higher  and  international 
education. 
64  4/1        Shultz:    remarks   before    the 

10th  annual  Conference  on 
Blacks  in  Higher  Educa- 
tion. 


93 


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4/18 


78  4/21 
•78  A       4/21 

79  4/22 


•80         4/22 
•81  4/24 


Shultz:    question-and-answer 
session  after  remarks 
before  Conference  on 
Blacks  in  Higher  Educa- 
tion, Apr.  1. 
Shultz:    remarks    before    the 
6th  U.S.-ASEAN  dialogue. 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Com- 
merce, Justice,  State,  the 
Judiciary,  and  Related 
Agencies,  Senate  Ap- 
propriations Committee. 

William  L.  Ball  Hi  sworn  in  as 
Assistant  Secretary  for 
Legislative  and  Intergov- 
ernmental Affairs,  Apr.  2 
(biographic  data). 

Shultz:    interview    on    ABC- 
TV's  "Good  JVlorning, 
America." 

Regional  foreign  policy  con- 
ference, Pittsburgh,  May  2. 

Shultz:    address    before    the 
Woodrow  Wilson  School  of 
Public  and  International 
Affairs,  Princeton  Univer- 
sity, Princeton. 

Shultz:    question-and-answer 
session  following  address 
in  Princeton,  Apr.  11 

Program  for  the  state  visit  of 
Algerian  President  Chadii 
Benjedid,  Apr.  16-22. 

Shultz:    welcoming    remarks 
liefore  the  Conference  on 
Religious  Liberty. 

Shultz:    address    before    the 
National  Press  Club. 

Shultz:    question-and-answer 
session  following  address 
before  National  Press  Club, 
Apr.  16. 

Shultz:    interview    on    CBS- 
TV's  morning  news. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  the  Holo- 
caust commemoration. 

Shultz:  remarks  to  the  press 
after  meeting  with 
Senators. 

Shultz;  announcement  of  res- 
ignation of  Deputy 
Secretary  Dam  and 
nomination  of  John  C. 
Whitehead. 

Shultz:  address  before  confer- 
ence of  American  Israel 
Public  Affairs  Committee. 

Shultz:    question-and-answer 
session  following  address 
before  American  Israel 
Public  Affairs  Committee. 

Shultz:    address    before    the 
Indianapolis  Economic 
Club  and  the  organizing 
committee  for  the  10th  an- 
nual Pan  American  Games, 
Indianapolis. 

Shultz:    interview    on    NBC- 
TV's  morning  news. 

Program  for  the  official  work- 
ing visit  of  Korean  Presi- 
dent Chun  Doo  Hwan, 
Apr.  25-27. 


•82 

83 

•84 

•85 


4/24 


4/25 


4/25 


4/3U 


Shultz:  remarks  and  question- 
and-answer  session  before 
senior  business  executives, 
Apr.  23. 

Shultz:  address  at  the  Depart- 
ment of  State. 

Regional  foreign  policy  con- 
ference, Sacramento,  May 
17. 

Shultz:  statement  on  resigna- 
tion of  Assistant  Secretary 
Motley  and  nomination  of 
Assistant  Secretary 
Abrams. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

The  Meaning  of  Vietnam,  Department  of 
State,  Apr.  25,  1985  (Current  Policy  #694). 

The  United  States  and  Central  America:  A 
Moment  of  Decision,  Economic  Club  and 
organizing  committee  for  the  10th  inter- 
national Pan-American  Games,  Indian- 
apolis, Apr.  22,  1985  (Current  Policy  #691). 

The  United  States  and  Israel:  Partners  for 
F'eace  and  Freedom,  conference  of  the 
American  Israel  Public  Affairs  Committee, 
Arlington,  Apr.  21.  1985  (Current  Policy 
#690). 

Southern  Africa:  Toward  an  American  Con- 
sensus, National  Press  Club,  Apr.  16,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #685). 

National  Policies  and  Global  Prosperity, 
Woodrow  Wilson  School  of  Public  and  In- 
ternational Affairs,  Princeton  University, 
Princeton,  Apr.  11,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#684). 

Foreign  Policy  and  the  Black  Community, 
10th  National  Conference  on  Blacks  in 
Higher  Education,  Apr.  1,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #680). 

Africa 

The  U.S.  Response  to  Apartheid  in  South 
Africa,  Assistant  Secretary  Crocker,  Sub- 
committee on  Africa,  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee,  Apr.  17,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #688). 

South  Africa;  The  Case  Against  Sanctions, 
Deputy  Secretary  Dam,  Senate  Committee 
on  Banking.  Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs, 
Apr.  16,  1985  (Current  Policy  #686). 

Africa:  The  Potential  for  Higher  Food  Pro- 
liuction,  Department  of  State  report,  Apr. 
1985  (Special  Report  #125). 

Arms  Control 

The  Objectives  of  Arms  Control,  Ambassador 
Nitze,  International  In.stitute  for  Strategic 
Studies,  London,  Mar.  28,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #677). 


94 


Department 

FY  1986  Budget  Request  and  Security  Is- 
sues, Under  Secretary  Spiers,  Subcommit 
tee  on  Commerce  (Mar.  20,  1985)  and  Sut 
committee  on  International  Security  and 
Scientific  Affairs  and  Subcommittee  on  Ir 
ternational  Operations  (Mar.  21,  1985), 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  (Curre' 
Policy  #678). 

East  Asia 

Vietnam:  Under  Two  Regimes,  paper  pre- 
pared by  Thomas  M.  Murphy,  Bureau  of 
Human  Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs, 
Apr.  1985  (Special  Report  #127). 

Protectionism  and  U.S. -Japan  Trade,  Assisi 
ant  Secretary  Wolfowitz,  Subcommittees 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  and  on  Inter- 
national Economic  Policy  and  Trade,  Hou 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Apr.  17,  198 
(Current  Policy  #689). 

U.S.-Japan  Trade  (GIST,  Apr.  1985). 

U.S. -China  Science  and  Technology  Ex- 
changes (GIST,  Apr.  1985). 

Economics 

Prospects  for  the  Bonn  Summit,  Under  Set 
retary  Wallis,  U.S.  Council  for  Interna- 
tional Business,  New  York  City,  Apr.  4, 
1985  (Current  Policy  #681). 

U.S.  Trade  Policy  (GIST,  Apr.  1985). 

OECD's  Arrangement  on  Export  Credits 
(GIST,  Apr.  1985). 

Controlling  Transfer  of  Strategic  Technol- 
ogy (GIST,  Apr.  1985). 

Bonn  Economic  Summit  (GIST,  Apr.  1985) 

Europe 

U.S. -Federal  Republic  of  Germany  Relatioi 

(GIST,  Apr.  1985). 
European  Parliament  (GIST,  Apr.  1985). 
U.S.-Soviet  Relations  (GIST,  Apr.  1985). 

General 

U.S.  Diplomacy  and  the  Search  for  Peace, 
Under  Secretary  Armacost,  Council  on 
Foreign  Affairs,  Baltimore,  Apr.  24,  19^ 
(Current  Policy  #696). 

Middle  East 

Developments  in  the  Middle  East:  An  Up- 
date, Assistant  Secretary  Murphy,  Subci 
mittee  on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Apr. 
1985  (Current  Policy  #683). 

Western  Hemisphere 

The  New  Opportunity  for  Peace  in 
Nicaragua,  Assistant  Secretary  Motley, 
Subcommittee  on  Western  Hemisphere  j 
fairs.  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee. 
Apr.  17,  1985  (Current  Policy  #687). 

President  Reagan  Supports  Nicaraguan 
Peace  Process,  White  House,  Apr.  4,  19; 
(Current  Policy  #682). 

The  Nicaraguan  Peace  Process:  A  Docu- 
mentary Record,  Department  of  State,  / 
1985  (Special  Report  #126). 

Sustaining  a  Consistent  Policy  in  Central 
America:  One  Year  After  the  National 
Bipartisan  Commission  Ri'port,  Depai'tn 
of  Stjite,  Apr.  1985  (Special  Report  #12^ 

Nicaragua:  The  Stolen  Revolution,  Amiias: 
dor  Middendorf,  OAS  Permanent  Counc 
Mar.  27,  1985  (Current  Policy  #679).  ■ 

Department  of  State  Bulle 


, 


3  1985 

ime  85,  No.  2099 


The     Potential     for    Higher     Food 

iduction   1 

Hunger  Rehef  (Reagan) 8 

nic    Assistance    for    Sudan    (White 

use  Statement) 8 

1    Policy    and    the    Black   Community 

lultz)  ." 31 

.  Southern  Africa:  Toward  an  Ameri- 

1  Consensus  (Shultz) 22 

ina.    Visit   of    Argentina's    President 

fonsin,  Reagan,  joint  declaration)  .  .89 

'ontrol 

1    Policy   and    the    Black   Community 

mltz) 31 

ssile  and  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations 
Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  (Kampelman. 

agan)    60 

ric  Defense  Initiative  (McFarlane)  .  .  57 
dia.  ANZUS  Alliance  (Wolfowitz)  ...  65 
•ss.   South   Africa;   The  Case  Against 

nctions  (Dam) 36 

ess 

S  Alliance  (Wolfowitz) 65 

ating     International     Terrorism 

akley)    ''3 

jpments  in  the  Middle  East:  An  Update 

lurphy) 52 

186  Assistance  Requests  for  Migration 

id  Refugees  (Purcell) 67 

)86  Assistance  Requests  for  Narcotics 

ontrol  (Thomas) 62 

986    Assistance    Requests   for   Organi- 

itions  and  Programs  (Newell) 78 

986    Request    for    Foreign    Assistance 

rograms  (McPherson) 49 

1986    Security    Assistance    Requests 

Schneider) 68 

issile  and  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations 
n  Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  (Kampelman, 

.eagan)    :  •  ■  ■ 60 

Jew  Opportunity  for  Peace  in  Nicaragua 

klotley)  ^^ 

ar  Cooperation  with  EURATOM  (letter 
0  the  Congress) ■ 64 

Department    Authorization    Request 

or  FY  1986-87  (Shultz) /  ■ ,  ;-.^''^ 

Response  to  Apartheid  in  South  Africa 

Crocker)    38 

rtment  and  Foreign  Service 

f    Policy    and   the    Black    Community 
ultz) ■■■■■-■    -^ 

Department    Authorization    Request 

or  FY  1986-87  (Shultz) .  .   33 

Asia.   ASEAN-U.S.   Dialogue   Held   in 
iVashington  (Shultz,  Wallis,  joint  state- 

•nent)    41 

lomics  ,„    ,  ,     ^ 

AN-U.S.   Dialogue   Held  in  Washington 

•Shultz,  Wallis,  joint  statement) 41 

onal     Policies     and    Global     Prosperity 

(Shultz) ■ 26 

and    Israel:    Partners    for    Peace    and 

Freedom  (Shultz) , 19 

ador.     Secretary    Visits    Ecuador    and 
Uruguay  (Shultz) 86 

lopments  in  the  Middle  East:  An  Update 

(Murphy) •  ■  •  ■  •  ■  ■  °^ 

t    of    Egyptian     President    (Mubarak, 

Reagan)    ■,■■»■    ■'^^ 

Salvador.    U.S.    and    Central    America: 

A  Moment  of  Decision  (Shultz) ^16 

id.  Africa:  The  Potential  for  Higher  Food 


Production 


Economic  Assistance  for  Sudan  (White  House 

statement)    8 

FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for  Organi- 
zations and  Programs  (Newell) 78 

FY    1986    Request    for    Foreign    Assistance 

Programs  (McPherson) 49 

Human  Rijjhts 

South    Africa:   The   Case   Again.st    Sanctions 

(Dam)    36 

U.S.  and  Israel:  Partners  for  Peace  and  Free- 
dom (Shultz) 19 

U.S.  Response  to  Apartheid  in  South  Atric;i 

(Crocker)    38 

International  Organizations  and  Con- 
ferences. FY  19S(;  .Assistance  Re((uests 
for     Organizations     and     Programs 

(Newell)    78 

Iran.  Developments  in  the  Middle  East:  An 

Update  (Murphy) 52 

Iraq.   Developments  in  the  Middle  East:  An 

I'pdate  (Murphy) 52 

Israel 

Developments  in  the  Middle  East:  An  Update 

(Murphy) 52 

U  S.  and  Israel:  Partners  for  Peace  and  Free- 
dom (Shultz) 19 

U.S. -Israel     Free    Trade    Area    Agreement 

(Department  fact  sheet) 54 

Italy.  Visit  of  Italian  Prime  Minister  (Cra.xi, 

'Reagan)    47 

Jordan.   Developments  in  the  Middle  East: 

An  Update  (Murphy) 52 

Labor.    South    Africa:    The    Case    Against 

Sanctions  (Dam) 36 

Lebanon.  Developments  in  the  Middle  East: 

An  Update  (Murphy) 52 

Middle  East 

Developments  in  the  Middle  East:  An  Update 

(Murphy) ;  v; '  ^'^ 

U  S.  and  Israel:  Partners  for  Peace  and  Free- 
dom (Shultz)  ■    -19 

Military    Affairs.     MX    Missile    and    the 

U.S.-U.S.S.R.    Negotiations    on    Nuclear 

and  Space  Arms  (Kampelman,  Reagan)  60 

Mozambique.    Southern   Africa:   Toward   an 

American  Consensus  (Shultz) 22 

Narcotics.  FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 

Narcotics  Control  (Thomas) 62 

New       Zealand.       ANZUS       Alliance 

(Wolfowitz) 65 

Nicaragua  . 

The  New  Opportunity  for  Peace  in  Nicaragua 

(Motley)    , 80 

Nicaragua  Peace  Proposal  (Reagan,  letter  to 

Contadora  Presidents) ;  ■  ■ ;  •  9 

Nicaragua:     The     Stolen     Revolution 

(Middendorf)    ■  •  ■  • 83 

Secretary    Visits    Ecuador    and    Uruguay 

(Shultz) :---Viv,----;-^^f 

U.S.  and  Central  America:  A  Moment  ot 
Decision  (Shultz) 16 

Nuclear  Cooperation  with  EURATOM  (letter 
to  the  Congress) ■  •  •  ■  ■ -64 

South  Africa:  The  Case  Against  Sanctions 
(Dam)   - ■^^ 

Organization  of  American  States.  Nicaragua: 
The  Stolen  Revolution  (Middendorf)  ...  83 

Pacific.  ANZUS  Alliance  (Wolfowitz) 65 

Presidential  Documents 

African  Hunger  Relief ^8 

Central  America •  .  •  •  •  ■  •  •  ■  •  •  •  ■  •  •  -y 

MX  Missile  and  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotia- 
tions on  Nuclear  and  Space  Arms 
(Kampelman,  Reagan) ,■ ::  '  '  * 

Nicaragua  Peace  Proposal  (Reagan,  letter  to 
Contadora  Presidents) 9 

Nuclear  Cooperation  with  EURATOM  (letter 
to  the  Congress) ■  ■  • .-64 

President  Meets  With  Central  American 
Leaders    1" 


eign  Assistance  ^^      .  n 

ica:  The  Potential  for  Higher  Food  Pro- 
duction    


Visit    of    Argentina's    President    (Alfonsin, 

Reagan,  joint  declaration) 89 

Visit    of   British    Prime    Minister    Thatcher 

(Reagan,  Thatcher) 46 

Visit    of    Egyptian     President    (Mubarak, 

Reagan)    " 55 

Visit    of    Italian     Prime    Minister    (Craxi, 

Reagan)    47 

Publications.  Department  of  State 94 

Refugees.  FY  1986  Assistance  Requests  for 

Migration  and  Refugees  (Purcell) 67 

Security     Assistance.     FY     1986     Security 

Ass'lstaiici'  liequests  (Schneider) 68 

South  Africa 

South    Africa:   The   Case   Against   Sanctions 

(Dam)    36 

Southern  Africa:  Toward  an  American  Con- 
sensus (Shultz) 22 

U.S.  Regrets  South  African  Arrests  and  Trials 

(Department  statement) 39 

U.S.  Response  to  Apartheid  in  South  Africa 

(Crocker)    38 

Terrorism.  Combating  International  Terror- 
ism (Oakley) ''3 

Trade 

National     Policies     and     Global     Prosperity 

(Shultz) 26 

U.S.-Israel     Free    Trade     Area     Agreement 

(Department  fact  sheet) 54 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 92 

U.S.S.R. 

Central  America  (Reagan) H 

MX   Missile   and   the   U.S.-U.S.S.R.   Negoti- 
ations    on     Nuclear    and     Space     Arms 

(Kampelman,  Reagan) 60 

Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (McFarlane)  .  .  57 
U  S.    and    Israel:    Partners    for    Peace    and 

Freedom  (Shultz) 19 

United    Kingdom.    Visit    of    British    Prime 

Minister  Thatcher  (Reagan,  Thatcher)  .  46 

United  Nations.  FY  1986  Assistance  Requests 

for     Organizations     and     Programs 

(Newell)    '^8 

Uruguay.    Secretary    Visits    Ecuador    and 

Uruguay  (Shultz) 86 

Vietnam.  The  Meaning  of  Vietnam  (Shultz)  13 
Western  Hemisphere 

Central  America  (Reagan) .H 

Foreign    Policy   and    the    Black   Community 

(Shultz)  .: 31 

The  Meaning  of  Vietnam  (Shultz) li 

President    Meets    With    Central    American 

Leaders  (Reagan) 10 

U.S.    and    Central    America:    A    Moment   ot 
Decision  (Shultz)  16 

Nam£  Index 

Alfonsin,  Raul 89 

Craxi,  Bettino 47 

Crocker,  Chester  A 38 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 36 

Kampelman,  Max  60 

McFarlane,  Robert  C 5 ' 

McPherson,  M. 'Peter 49 

Middendorf,  J.  William  II 83 

Motley,  Langhorne  A 80 

Mubarak,  Mohamad  Hosni 55 

Murphy,  Richard  W 52 

Newell,  Gregory  J ^8 

Oakley,  Robert  B ^3 

Purcell,  James  N.  Jr "7 

Reagan,  President  ...  .8,  9,  10,  11,  46,  47,  55, 

60,  64,  89 

Schneider,  WiUiam  Jr 68 

Shultz,  Secretary 18,  16,  19,  22,  26, 

31,  33,  41,  86 

Thatcher,  Margaret 46 

Thomas,  Jon  R "2 

Wallis,  W.  Allen 41 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 65 


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