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ni^parintvttl 






buUetm 



The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 85 / Number 2097 



April 1985 




Mfepartmvni of Siaip 

bulletin 



Volume 85 / Number 2097 / April 1985 



Cover: 

His Majesty King Fahd of Saudi Arabia 
and Secretary Shultz. 

(Llepartnient of Slatt- photu) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN T. MCCARTHY 

Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



I 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
pubUcation of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the pubhc business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31. 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610) 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by the 
Department of State. 2201 C Street NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20.520. Second-class postage paid 
at Washington, D.C, and additional mailing offices. 
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to 
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Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 20402. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of State Bvilletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Biu.letin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 
20402 



CONTENTS 



^ 1 Visitof SAvibi Km 5 



The President 

9 State of the Union Address 

(ExceTjit) 
Nicaragua 
News Conference of February 21 

(Excerpts) 

The Secretary 

13 Economic Cooperation in the 
Pacific Basin 

6 America and the Struggle for 
Freedom 

!1 Question-and-Answer Session 

Following Commonwealth Club 
Address 

!3 The Importance of the MX Peace- 
keeper Missile 

\frica 

!5 Namihia (Chester A. Crockei') 

Arms Control 

!7 On the Road to a More Stable 

Peace (Paul H. Nitze) 
:8 MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna 

(President Reagan) 
!9 Report on Soviet Noncompliance 

With Arms Control Agreements 

(Message to the Congress. Text of 

Unclassified Report) 



Europe 



iast Asia 



, J4 
i 



The Asia-Pacific Region: A 
Forward Look (Michael H. 
Armacost) 
n The Pacific: Region of Promise 

I and Challenge (Paul D. 

Wolfowitz) 

Economics 

11 Protectionism: A Threat to Our 
Prosperity (W. Allen Wallis) 



44 The United States and Greece 
(Richard N. Haas) 

46 40th Anniversary of the Yalta 

Conference (President Reagan) 

47 Soviet Crackdown on Jewish 

Cultural Activists (Department 
of State Report) 

General 

48 Strength and Diplomacy: Toward 

A New Consensus? (Michael H. 
Armacost) 

Human Rights 

52 1984 Human Rights Report 

(Excerpts) 

55 Child Pornography: A Worldwide 

Problem (Elliott Abrams) 

Middle East 

56 Recent Developments in the 

Middle East (Richard W. 
Murphy) 

Military Affairs 

57 Continuing the Acquisition of 

the Peacekeeper Missile 
(Message to the Congress, 
Executive Summary) 

Narcotics 

59 Summary of the International 

Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report for 1985 

Pacific 

60 Visit of Australian Prime Minister 

Hawke (Robert. J.L. Hawke, 
President Reagan) 
62 Australia Reaffirms Support for 
ANZUS Alliance (Secretary 
Shultz) 



Science & Technology 

63 Protecting the Ozone Layer 

(Richard Elliot Benedick) 

Terrorism 

65 Terrorist Attacks on U.S. 

Official Personnel Abroad, 
1982-84 (Evan Duncan) 

Western Hemisphere 

67 The Need for Continuity in U.S. 
Latin American Policy 
(Langhorne A. Motley) 

End Notes 

74 February 1985 

Treaties 

75 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

77 Department of State 
77 USUN 



Publications 

78 Department of State 
78 Background Notes 



Index 




(I)i'partmfiil cif Slate photo) 



Department of State Bullet 



F€ATVRt' 
SauM Aiv\b)A 




VisH of SMii>i Kins 

bm Abb Al-Arir Al S^ut> 

of the 
Km5t)om of S^viM Ar^bi^ 

fmit>c A stAtc visit 
to the \JnHct> States 




Arrival Ccrcyy\oy\\i, 
Prcsi^c>1t RcAgAM 

It's a great privilege to welcome a world 
statesman, a leader of Arab and Muslim 
people, and a good friend of the United 
States, His Majesty King Fahd bin Abd 
al-Aziz Al-Saud. Although he is no 
stranger to our shores, it's been almost 
8 years since he has paid an official visit 
to the United States. And I'm honored 
to welcome him back again today. 

King Fahd's visit is in keeping with 
the warm personal relations enjoyed be- 
tween the leaders of our two countries, 
a tradition which began 40 years ago 
this week when King Fahd's father and 
President Franklin Roosevelt met to ex- 
change views. The good will that 
emerged from that meeting of two great 
men has enormously benefited both our 
peoples in the last four decades. 

The friendship and cooperation be- 
tween our governments and people are 
precious jewels whose value we should 
never underestimate. The positive 
nature of our relations demonstrates 
that cultural differences, as distinct as 
our own, need not separate or alienate 
peoples from one another. 

As the guardians of Mecca and the 
protectors of your faith, you rightfully 
exert a strong moral influence in the 
world of Islam. And the people of the 
United States are proud of their leader- 
ship role among the democratic nations. 

King Fahd, I hope that we can work 
together to seek a new rapprochement 
between .the Islamic world and the 
Western democracies. Destiny has given 
us different political and social systems, 
yet with respect and good will, as our 
two countries have demonstrated, so 
much can be accomplished. 

I firmly believe that in the years 
ahead, there should be and will be a 
more powerful recognition of the com- 
mon interests shared by these two 
significant world forces. Already, the 
bonds of commerce are strong, especial- 
ly between our two countries. Petroleum 



from Saudi wells helps drive the engines 
of progress in the United States, while 
at the same moment, American 
technology and know-how help in the 
construction of Saudi roads, hospitals, 
and communications systems. 

Saudi Arabia has grown into one of 
America's largest trading partners. The 
commercial and economic power that we 
exert in the world spurs enterprise and 
bolsters stability. 

I'd like to take this opportunity to 
express admiration for the responsible 
manner in which Saudi Arabia has con- 
ducted its economic affairs. King Fahd 
and other Saudi leaders, conscious of the 
global impact of their financial and 
economic decisions, have earned our 
respect and gratitude. 

Their many humanitarian contribu- 
tions touch us deeply, as well. Saudi aid 
to refugees uprooted from their homes 
in Afghanistan has not gone unnoticed 
here, Your Majesty. The people of the 
United States share with the people of 
Saudi Arabia a deep moral outrage over 
the continuing aggression and butchery 
taking place in Afghanistan. The citizens 
of the Western democracies and the 
Muslim world, by all that they believe to 
be true and just, should stand together 
in opposition to those who would impose 
dictatorship on all of mankind. 

Marxist tyranny already has its grip 
on the religious freedom of the world's 
fifth largest Muslim population. This 
same grip strangles the prayers of 
Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike. We 
all worship the same God. Standing up 
to this onslaught, the people of 
Afghanistan, with their blood, courage, 
and faith, are an inspiration to the cause 
of freedom everywhere. 

Afghanistan, of course, is not the 
only conflict in the region. We're also 
concerned about the tragic war between 
two of Saudi Arabia's neighbors — Iran 
and Iraq — a conflict that is raging only 
a few minutes by air from Saudi ter- 
ritory. This bloodshed has dragged on 
far too long and threatens peace 
throughout the region. 

The United States will do what we 
can, diplomatically, to end the fighting. 
And we will cooperate with Saudi 
Arabia to ensure the integrity of your 
borders. 



Your Majesty, I look forward to our 
discussions about these and other 
serious problems which continue to 
plague the Middle East. Together, our 
considerable influence and our moral 
suasion can, at the very least, decrease 
the threat of war. 

If the Saudi and American Govern- 
ments focus their energies, progress cai 
be made, especially in the lingering 
dispute between Israel and its 
neighbors. 

I continue to believe that a just and 
lasting settlement, based on UN Securi- 
ty Council Resolution 242, is within 
reach. The security of Israel and other 
nations of the region and the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people can and 
should be addressed in direct negotia- 
tions. It is time to put this tragedy to 
rest and turn the pages to a new and 
happier chapter. 

Bringing about a better and more 
peaceful world will require courage, in- 
tegrity, and wisdom. King Faud, and 
others in his family before him, have 
been admired for just these traits. I loo 
forward to our discussions. King Fahd, 
and welcome to the United States. 



Km5 f^ht> 



I should like to express my happiness o 
the occasion of my first meeting with 
you on the soil of the United States anc 
express my satisfaction with the steady 
growth of relations between our two 
countries. I look forward to a fruitful e 
change of views for the benefit of our 
two countries and peoples in the interest 
of peace in our region. 

Mr. President, since the historic 
meeting between His Majesty the late 
King Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud and the late 
President Franklin Roosevelt 40 years 
ago this month, the leaders of our two 
countries have continued to meet from 
time to time to discuss ways of pro- 
moting friendship and cooperation be- 
tween our two countries and to consult 
and exchange views on international 
matters of mutual interest. This visit to: 
your friendly country takes place in this 
same context. 



F€ATVR€ 
SamM ArAbLx 




Permit me to turn back the pages of 
istory to the period following the First 
v^orld War, to the time when the ma- 
)rity of the Arab countries were suffer- 
ig under the yoke of colonialism; when 
our country affirmed the principles that 
dvocated the right of peoples to 
•eedom, independence, and self- 
etermination. 

At that time, when the name of the 
nited States stood for freedom, justice, 
nd independence, the aspirations of the 
rab peoples were directed toward your 
luntry as the defender of truth and 
istice. Now we are in a new era, in 
hich the United States reaffirms those 
rinciples, this time under your leader- 
aip, Mr. President. 

The majority of the Arab countries 
ained their freedom and independence, 
ith the exception of one people — the 
alestinian people, who committed no 
rong that could justify what has 
rfallen them. The Palestinians, who 
«re never aggressors or invaders, 
und themselves, through no fault of 
<eir own, the victims of unjust aggres- 
Dn. 

The Palestinian question is the 
ngle problem that is of paramount con- 
rn to the whole Arab nation and af- 
cts the relations of its peoples and 
iuntries with the outside world. It is 
•e one problem that is the root cause of 
stability and turmoil in the region. I 
ipe that your Administration will sup- 
)rt the just cause of the Palestinian 
1; ?ople. 

li We only ask for a just position that 
■nforms with the history and ideals of 
lur great country — a position that is 
■nsonant with its role of leadership in 
•e international community. Such a 
isition will earn the United States the 
spect and appreciation not only of the 
rab and Muslim worlds but also of 
eedom-loving peoples everywhere. 

Similarly, the probierr. of Lebanon 
•eds to be addressed i:i such a way 
at would guarantee the withdrawal of 
rael from Lebanese territory and the 
hievement of Lebanon's sovereignty, 
rritorial integi-ity, and full in- 
pendence. 



f** 




1^ ;;::^NA?s}-^r» 




I share your view that Saudi Arabia, 
with its Islamic beliefs and principles, 
and the United States, with its ideals 
and values, can together find a common 
ground against aggression, injustice, and 
oppression. 

As far as the people of Afghanistan 
are concerned, these people — who want 
nothing but freedom against oppression, 
freedom from killing women and 
children — deserve our help. 

I do not wish to be long, but I would 
like to say in conclusion that it is, in- 
deed, a pleasure to have this opportunity 
to congratulate you on the full con- 
fidence that your people have placed in 
you by supporting your presidency for a 
second term. This clearly demonstrates 
the extent of the confidence your people 
have in your wise leadership and your 
farsightedness. 

And, in conclusion, I would like to 
thank you very much and to thank the 
American people and all the officials of 
the U.S. Govenment. And I wish you 
progress and good health. And I would 
like to thank God for giving us a 
beautiful sunny day today. 



Sccrct^rvf ShuUz's 

Luncheon Remarks, 
fchru3ir\\ ll, 19JJ5 

Your Majesty, we are honored to greet 
you. You have come as a friend, and we 
have talked today as only friends can do. 
We have benefited from your views. Our 
countries have traveled far together dur- 
ing the past half century. Our coopera- 
tion has taken many forms but has 
always had the same goals — the mutual 
benefit of our two nations, in the con- 
text of peace and economic progress 
throughout the region. 

You have spoken of your concern 
about the ever-present potential for 
violence and trouble in the Middle East 
if there is not movement toward peace. 
We agree. The security and well-being 
not only of your Kingdom but of all the 
states of the region require a just and 
lasting peace between Israel and all its 
Arab neighbors. 



)ril1985 




.v.u 



' 1 .- > 



f. 






\:<rT^v%«^ '- 











Madain Saleh, an ancient city of rock 
tombs and dwellings in northwestern Sam 
Arabia, was built bv the Nabataean Arabs 
2.000 years ago to prevent the Romans 
from capturing their frankincense and 
mjTrh trade routes. This site and many 
others of archaeological significance in thi 
Kingdom are protected and preserved by 
the Department of Museums and Antiq- 
uities. The government plans to build a 
museum at Madain Saleh, not only to 
display artifacts from the past but to assis 
researchers interested in the Kingdom and 
the .\rabian Peninsula. 



ii 




s^^' % 




;*';''^*1 



This fertile plain in the Asir region is one 
of several agricultural areas that has made 
the Kingdom virtually self-sufficient in 
food. Its farms produce eggs, milk, 
poultry, meat, fruits, and vegetables; 



wheat production rose from 3.000 tons in 
1976 to more than 1.2 million tons in 1981. 
To expand the arable farm land and pro- 
vide for urban needs, the Saudis have 
developed sophisticated and efficient water 



storage and irrigation systems. Innovative 
management of the Kingdom's water 
resources is probably its single most impor 
tant task. 



Department of State Bulletin 



F€ATVR€ 







iddah. on the western coast of the penin- 
tla, is the most important commercial 
inter of Saudi Arabia and a major port 
tty. A special terminal at the ultramodern 



King Abd al-Aziz International Airport 
serves as the primary reception center for 
the Muslim pilgrims en route to Makkah 
during the kajj. A modern city by any 



standard, with a population of more than 
1 million, Jeddah also boasts fine examples 
of traditional Arab architecture. 



iilconry is an ancient and honored sport in 
iiudi Arabia requiring precise coordina- 
)n between man and animal and demand- 
^ skill and concentration. Hunting 
ason usually lasts from November to 
arch, after which the falconer releases 
e bird to breed for the next season. 
?cause much of the falcon's traditional 
■ey is now endangered, falconry is limited 
id carefully regelated. 



hotos courtesy Information Office, Royal Embassy of 
ludi Arabia) 




prill 985 



,4c. 



History shows there is only one road 
to such a peace: direct negotiations be- 
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors 
based on the territory-for-peace formula 
of Security Council Resolution 242. 
Negotiations work. Permanent ar- 
rangements for peace have been 
established in one treaty of peace. And 
we will not rest until the same can be 
said for all the other areas affected by 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

President Reagan, on September 1, 
1982, proposed a set of positions that 
could point the way to an equitable set- 
tlement. He made clear that we seek a 
peace that will both satisfy the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian peo- 
ple and assure the security of the State 
of Israel. 

Our positions need not be accepted 
by any other party in advance of 
negotiations. Indeed, we would expect 
each party to bring its own preferred 
positions to the table at the outset and 
to press them vigorously. It is in this 
respect that there could be a most useful 
role for the principles endorsed by the 
Arab summit at Fez 1982. I know you 
labored long and hard for those prin- 
ciples. While they differ from our own 
ideas in a number of important respects, 
they could contribute importantly to the 
development of the position that an 
Arab negotiator brings to the table. 

Both President Reagan's initiative 
and the Fez declaration refer to the con- 
cept of a transitional period in the West 
Bank and Gaza. The President described 
the purpose of such a period as the 
peaceful and orderly transfer of authori- 
ty from Israel to the' Palestinian in- 
habitants, without interference with 
Israel's security requirements. Suc- 
cessful negotiations for a transitional 
period would be a major tangible step on 
the road to peace in the region. 

I sense the region is moving steadily 
toward a resumption of active negotia- 
tions. We have been trying to build 
toward that goal, block by block, by 
helping arrange Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanon with security for Israel's north- 
ern border, by urging continued im- 
provement in Egyptian-Israeli relations, 
and by seeking to improve the quality of 
life for the Palestinians. 



SAMt>iA ArAbJA-A Profile 



People 

Nationality: iVo?/ «—Sau(ii(s). Adjec- 
tive—Saudi Arabian or Saudi. Population 
(1984): 10.7 million. Annual growth rate: 
3.3%. Ethnic groups: Arab (90%), Afro- 
Asian (10%). Religion: Islam. Language: 
Arabic. Education: Atfi'ndan-ce—&l%. 
Literacy— b2%. Health: Infant inortaiity 
rate— 118/1,000. Life expectancy— 5&A 
years. Work force (56% Saudi, 44% foreign): 
A<iri.ndture—2i<%. Industry— 4%. Services 
and government— ii%. Construction— 21%. 
Oil and mining — 3%. 

Geography 

Area: 2,331,000 sq. km. (830,000 sq. mi.); 
about one-third the size of the continental 
U.S. Cities: Capita/ — Riyadh (population 
1,800,000). Other ci/ies— Jeddah (1,000,000), 
Makkah (463,000), Medina (322,000), Tail 
(256,000), Damman (159,000). Terrain: Main- 
ly desert. Climate: Arid with great extremes 
of temperature. 

Government 

Type: Monarchy with Council of Ministers. 
Unification: September 23, 1931. Constitu- 
tion: None; governed according to Islamic 
law (Sharia). 

Branches: Executive— k\ng (chief of state 
and head of government). Legislative— none. 
Judicial— Isls^mK courts of first instance and 
appeals. 

Administrative subdivisions: 14 prov- 
inces. 




Political parties: None. Suffrage: N 
Central government budget (1982-^ 

$75.4 billion. Defense (1982-83): 29% of 

budget. 

Economy 

GDP (FY1983 estimate): $120 billion. Annua 
growth in non-oil GDP: approximately '. 
Per capita GDP: $14,117. 

Natural resources: Hydrocarbons, Iron 
ore, gold, copper. 

Agriculture: ProdMc/.s— dates, grains, 
livestock. 

Industry (oil, 46.7% of GDP; non-oil, 
53.3%): Petroleum production, petro- 
chemicals, cement, fertilizer, light indusi 

Trade (1983): Exports— $40 billion: 
petroleum and petroleum products. Maj^ 
markets— Japan. US, Western Europe. / 
por/.s— $43 billion: manufactured goods, 
transportation equipment, construction 
materials, and processed food products. .1;' ■ 
jor sources— VS, Japan, FRG. 

Official exchange rate: 3.52 Saudi 
riyals=US$l. 

Fiscal year: Follows Islamic year. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and its specialized agencies, Arab 
League, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), In- 
ternational Wheat Council (IWC), Nonalignec 
Movement, Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC), Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPE( t. 
INTELSAT, Organization of the Islamic Con 
ference. ■ 



The Saudi flag bears the Muslim creed in 
Arabic script: "There is no God but God: 
Muhammad is the Messenger of God." 



Department of State Bulletin 



F€ATVR€ 
SamM Ai'AbiA 




SAUDI ARABIA 



International boundary 
National capital 



200 kilometers 




|)24 4-85 STATE{1NR/GE) 



Ihe Saudi symbol means that prosperity 
Bn only be had through justice. 




The problems that must be over- 
come when negotiations are joined are 
monumental in their complexity — but 
they are not insurmountable. And it is 
clear that nothing will be achieved until 
negotiations get started. 

The positions the President put forth 
on September 1 remain as important — 
and urgent — today as they were then. 
We are ready to pursue them with great 
energy and determination, whenever the 
parties in the region are prepared to 
negotiate. The risks and dangers that 
we face in the absence of progress — on 
which we and Saudi Arabia agree — lead 
us to one crucial conclusion: the sooner 
negotiations begin, the better for all con- 
cerned. 

As we work toward peace in the 
region, the security and well-being of 
Saudi Arabia remain of vital interest to 
the United States, as they have been 
since our security relationship began in 
the days of World War II. The continu- 
ing, fruitless war pursued by Iran is a 
threat to Saudi Arabia and the other 
states of the gulf. The shield held up by 
Saudi Arabia has been forged through 
the years of our effective military 
cooperation. The Kingdom's capacity to 
defend itself when challenged is proof of 
the wisdom of that cooperation. 

But our cooperation is broader than 
security — as basic as that is. The 
U.S. -Saudi Joint Economic Commission, 
now 10 years old, has grown into a 
substantial component of the Saudi 
development effort. Over 20 major proj- 
ects have been set up, ranging from 
manpower and vocational training, to a 
magnificent national park in southwest 
Saudi Arabia, to the solar energy project 
in the practical use of photovoltaics for 
agriculture and industry. From the first 
days when American oilmen stepped 
ashore in Jubayl — then a small 
village — to search for oil, until now 
when American and Saudi businessmen 
cooperate in many ventures, large and 
small, the free-enterprise philosophies of 
our two countries have produced a 
dimension of U.S. -Saudi relations that 
goes much farther and deeper than for- 
mal diplomatic contacts. 




Beyond these bilateral ties, there are 
broader areas of cooperation. The Saudi 
Government was instrumental, for ex- 
ample, in establishing the Gulf Coopera- 
tion Council (GCC) to enhance the 
political, social, and economic interests 
of its six member nations. The GCC is 
an example of regional cooperation at its 
best and is an experiment of which 
Saudi Arabia and its neighbors are 
deservedly proud. The United States re- 
mains ready to lend its support to the 
organization's goals of regional coordina- 
tion and security. 

Saudi-American friendship and 
cooperation thus have many dimensions, 
many achievements, and enormous 
potential. Today we celebrate the many 
goals we share— above all peace in the 
Middle East— and we dedicate ourselves 
to new joint efforts to turn these goals 
into realities. 



¥chru3ir\\ ^3J9»^ 

The State visit of His Majesty King Fahd bin 
Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud has reaffirmed the long- 
standing bonds of friendship and mutually 
beneficial cooperation that have existed be- 
tween the United States and Saudi Arabia 
for over fifty years. In their meetings on 
February 11 and 12, President Reagan and 
King Faud concentrated on the search for a 
just, stable and lasting solution to the Arab- 
Israel conflict, which the two leaders agreed 
was their primary concern. 

The King expressed his belief that the 
Arab consensus defined in the communique 
issued at Fez in September 1982 provided a 
just basis for negotiations leading to a com- 
prehensive peace. The President expressed 
his appreciation for the Fez consensus, 
positive elements of which have been 
recognized by the United States. He reaf- 
firmed his continuing commitment to the 
positions for peace which he announced on 
September 1, 1982, and renewed his pledge 
that the United States will support those 
positions in direct negotiations involving the 
parties most concerned 

In their discussions, the President and 
the King stressed that a stable peace must 
provide security for all states in the area and 
for the exercise of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people. Both agreed to main- 
tain their dialogue on this urgent issue. 



The two leaders discussed the situation in 
Lebanon and agreed on the need for rapid 
restoration of its sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity. 

The President and the King discussed the 
continuing war between Iran and Iraq. They 
deplored the tragic loss of life and destruc- 
tion it has brought and the threat to regional 
stability and peace which it poses. They 
pledged to continue to support efforts to 
bring the fighting to a speedy end. 

The discussions between the President 
and the King, to which cabinet members and 
ministers contributed, charted the course for 
continued development of U.S. -Saudi rela- 
tions. In this regard, Saudi Arabia's 
emergence as an exporter of industrial goods, 
as well as of crude oil, was examined in the 
light of the United States' traditional commit- 
ment to open markets for goods and invest- 
ment. The delegations of the two countries 
foresaw growth and rising mutual benefit 
from a sustained partnership in trade, 
development and regional cooperation that 
joins Saudi resources and aspirations with 
American technological leadership. 



The arrival ceremony was held on the South 
Lawn of the White House, where His Majesty 
was accorded a formal welcome with full 
military honors. He spoke in Arabic, and his 
remarks were translated by an interpreter 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Feb. 18, 1985). 

Secretary Shultz hosted the luncheon in 
honor of His' Majesty at the Department of 
State (text from press release 19 of Feb. 12). 

Text of joint communiaue from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Feb. 25. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



State of the Union Address 



Excerpt from President Reagan's ad- 
dress before a joint session of the Con- 
gress on February 6. 1985.^ 



Just as we're positioned as never before 
to secure justice in our economy, we're 
poised as never before to create a safer, 
freer, more peaceful world. Our alliances 
are stronger than ever. Our economy is 
stronger than ever. We have resumed 
our historic role as a leader of the free 
world. And all of these together are a 
great force for peace. 

Since 1981 we've been committed to 
seeking fair and verifiable arms agree- 
ments that would lower the risk of war 
and reduce the size of nuclear arsenals. 
[Now our determination to maintain a 
strong defense has influenced the Soviet 
Union to return to the bargaining table. 
lOur negotiators must be able to go to 
that table with the united support of the 
American people. All of us have no 
greater dream than to see the day when 
nuclear weapons are banned from this 
Earth forever. 

Each Member of the Congress has a 
role to play in modernizing our defenses, 
thus supporting our chances for a mean- 
ingful arms agreement. Your vote this 
spring on the Peacekeeper missile will 
be a critical test of our resolve to main- 
tain the strength we need and move 
toward mutual and verifiable arms 
reductions. 

For the past 20 years, we've be- 
lieved that no war will be launched as 
long as each side knows it can retaliate 
with a deadly counterstrike. I believe 
there's a better way of eliminating the 
threat of nuclear war. It is a Strategic 
Defense Initiative aimed ultimately at 
finding a non-nuclear defense against 
ballistic missiles. It's the most hopeful 
possibility of the nuclear age. But it's 
not very well understood. 

Some say it will bring war to the 
heavens, but its purpose is to deter war 
in the heavens and on Earth. Some say 
the research would be expensive. 
Perhaps, but it could save millions of 
lives, indeed humanity itself. And some 
say if we build such a system, the 
Soviets will build a defense system of 
their own. They already have strategic 
defenses that surpass ours, a civil 
defense system, where we have almost 
none; and a research program covering 
roughly the same areas of technology 
that we're now exploring. And finally 



some say the research will take a long 
time. The answer to that is: "Let's get 
started." 

Harry Truman once said that, 
ultimately, our security and the world's 
hopes for peace and human progress "lie 
not in measures of defense or in the con- 
trol of weapons but in the growth and 
expansion of freedom and self-govern- 
ment." 

And tonight, we declare anew to our 
fellow citizens of the world: Freedom is 
not the sole prerogative of a chosen few; 
it is the universal right of all God's 
children. Look to where peace and pros- 
perity flourish today. It is in homes that 
freedom built. Victories against poverty 
are greatest and peace most secure 
where people live by laws that ensure 
free press, free speech, and freedom to 
worship, vote, and create wealth. 

Our mission is to nourish and defend 
freedom and democracy and to com- 
municate these ideals everywhere we 
can. America's economic success is 
freedom's success; it can be repeated a 
hundred times in a hundred different na- 
tions. Many countries in East Asia and 
the Pacific have few resources other 
than the enterprise of their own people. 
But through low tax rates and free 
markets, they've soared ahead of cen- 
tralized economies. And now China is 
opening up its economy to meet its 
needs. 

We need a stronger and simpler ap- 
proach to the process of making and im- 
plementing trade policy, and we'll be 
studying potential changes in that proc- 
ess in the next few weeks. We've seen 
the benefits of free trade and lived 
through the disasters of protectionism. 
Tonight I ask all our trading part- 
ners — developed and developing 
alike — to join us in a new round of trade 
negotiations to expand trade and com- 
petition and strengthen the global 
economy— and to begin it in this next 
year. 

There are more than 3 billion human 
beings living in Third World countries 
with an average per capita income of 
$650 a year. Many are victims of dic- 
tatorships that impoverished them with 
taxation and corruption. Let us ask our 
allies to join us in a practical program of 
trade and assistance that fosters 
economic development through personal 
incentives to help those people climb 
from poverty on their own. 



We cannot play innocents abroad in 
a world that's not innocent, nor can we 
be passive when freedom is under seige. 
Without resources, diplomacy cannot 
succeed. Our security assistance pro- 
grams help friendly governments defend 
themselves and give them confidence to 
work for peace. And I hope that you in 
the Congress will understand that, 
dollar for dollar, security assistance con- 
tributes as much to global security as 
our own defense budget. 

We must stand by all our democratic 
allies. And we must not break faith with 
those who are risking their lives — on 
every continent, from Afghanistan to 
Nicaragua— to defy Soviet-supported ag- 
gression and secure rights which have 
been ours from birth. 

The Sandinista dictatorship of 
Nicaragua, with full Cuban-soviet bloc 
support, not only persecutes its people, 
the church, and denies a free press but 
arms and provides bases for communist 
terrorists attacking neighboring states. 
Support for freedom fighters is self- 
defense and totally consistent with the 
OAS and UN Charters. It is essential 
that the Congress continue all facets of 
our assistance to Central America. I 
want to work with you to support the 
democratic forces whose struggle is tied 
to our own security. 

And tonight, I've spoken of great 
plans and great dreams. They're dreams 
we can make come true. Two hundred 
years of American history should have 
taught us that nothing is impossible. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1985. 



April 1985 



THE PRESIDENT 



Nicaragua 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation on Febraary 16, 1985.^ 

One of the most inspiring developments 
of recent years is the move against com- 
munism and toward freedom that is 
sweeping the world. In the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, we see the 
dissidents; in Poland, the Solidarity 
movement. We see freedom fighters in 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and 
Angola. These brave men and women 
are fighting to undo the infamous 
Brezhnev doctrine, which says that once 
a nation falls into the darkness of com- 
munist tyranny, it can never again see 
the light of freedom. 

Nowhere do we see this more than 
in Nicaragua whose Sandinista govern- 
ment is a Marxist-Leninist clique that 
broke the hearts of the freedom-loving 
people of their country by imposing a 
brutal dictiitorship soon after taking 
control in 1979. Functioning as a 
satellite of the Soviet Union and Cuba, 
they moved quickly to suppress internal 
dissent, clamp down on a free press, 
persecute the church and labor union, 
and betray their pledge to hold free elec- 
tions. Now they're exporting drugs to 
poison our youth and linking up with the 
terrorists of Iran, Libya, the Red 
Brigades, and the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization]. The San- 
dinistas aren't democrats but com- 
munists, not lovers of freedom but of 
power, not builders of a peaceful nation 
but creators of a fortress Nicaragua that 
intends to export communism beyond its 
borders. 

The true heroes of the Nicaraguan 
struggle — noncommunist, democracy- 
loving revolutionaries — saw their revolu- 
tion betrayed and took up arms against 
the betrayer. These men and women are 
today the democratic resistance fighters 
some call the Contras. We should call 
them "freedom fighters." 

Sandinista propaganda denounces 
them as "mercenaries" and former Na- 
tional Guardsmen of the Somoza dic- 
tatorship. But this is a lie. The freedom 
fighters are led by those who opposed 
Somoza, and their soldiers are peasants, 
farmers, shopkeepers, and students — 
the people of Nicaragua. These brave 
men and women de.serve our help. They 
do not ask for troops but only for our 
technical and financial support and sup- 
plies. We caniiDl turn from Ihem in their 
moment of need. To do so would be to 
betray our centuries-old dedication to 
supporting those who struggle for 



freedom. This is not only legal, it's total- 
ly consistent with our history. 

Time and again in the course of our 
history, we've aided those around the 
world struggling for freedom, democ- 
racy, independence, and liberation from 
tyranny. In the 19th century, we sup- 
ported Simon Bolivar, the Great 
Liberator. We supported the Polish 
patriots, the French resistance, and 
others seeking freedom. We well 
remembered how other nations, like 
France, had come to our aid during our 
own Revolution. It's not an American 
tradition to turn away. And lucky for us 
that those who loved democracy 200 
years ago didn't turn away from us. 

Most of us know of the heroism of 
Lafayette, who chose to be a brother to 
those who fought for American in- 
dependence. But he did more than fight 
in the field for the Continental Army. 
He went to France during the war and 
pleaded with his government for finan- 
cial aid for the American rebels. And he 
returned to General Washington with a 
promise that France would send sup- 
port, including a large contingent of 
ti'oops to help in the crucial last cam- 
paign. It was those French troops and 
Lafayette himself who helped defeat 
General Cornwallis and assure the 
British surrender at Yorktown. 

America may never have been born 
without the help and support of the 
freedom-loving people of Europe, of 
Lafayette and Von Steuben and 
Kosciusko. And America did not forget. 
More than a century after our Revolu- 



tion, American soldiers went to France 
to help them resist tyranny in World 
War I. And they said, in words that will 
live forever in the history of gratitude, 
"Lafayette, we are here." 

This is not a story from some 
romantic past. This is how democracy 
was built, with one country, one people 
helping another in their hour of greatest 
peril. 

And now the free people of El 
Salvador, Honduras, and. yes, of 
Nicaragua ask for our help. There are 
over 1.5,000 freedom fighters struggling 
for liberty and democracy in Nicaragua 
and helping to stem subversion in El 
Salvador. They're fighting for an end to 
tyranny and its only reliable product: 
cruelty. They are our brothers. How can 
we ignore them? How can we refuse 
them assistance when we know that 
ultimately their fight is our fight'? We 
must remember that if the Sandinistas 
are not stopped now, they will, as they 
have sworn, attempt to spread com- 
munism to El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and elsewhere. 

The freedom fighters are putting 
pressure on the Sandinistas to change 
their ways and live not as communist 
puppets but as peaceful democrats. We 
must help. Congress must understand 
that the American people support the 
struggle for democracy in Central 
America. We can save them as we were 
once saved, but only if we act, and now. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Feb. 25, 1985. ■ 



News Conference of February 21 
(Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan '.s 
news conference of February 21, 198.5.'' 

Q. Jack Anderson said in his column 
today that in 1981, you passed the 
word to Moscow that even if the 
Senate ratified SALT II, you would 
not sign it; that in 1982, Moscow told 
you that they are no longer bound by 
"the SALT II" Treaty and they began "to 
build up their arsenal over the limit, is 
that true? 

A. I read that myself this morning, 
and I went into the office and I said, 
"Where is all this coming from?" I do not 
remember any statement from the 
Soviet Union of that kind. 



Both countries had been involved 
with mutual — obeying the restraints or 
staying within the restraints mainly 
because of our efforts toward what 
we're now approaching, arms reduction 
talks; that we felt that if we were going 
to engage in those talks, it would be 
even better if we did abide by an agree- 
ment that — one that had been signed, it 
had never been ratified by our govern- 
ment. 

And 1 (i<in't recall that at all. And 1 
have to say that we know that the 
Soviet Union, we're sure, has violated 
some of the restraints now. And we 
know that we're coming to a point which 
we have up until now been hiding l)y. 



10 



Denartment of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



And as we replace older weapons with 
new, we have destroyed the old ones. 

The Soviet Union — one of the viola- 
tions of theirs has been that they were 
taking nuclear missile submarines out of 
action, but they were cutting them down 
and rebuilding them as cruise missiles 
carrying submarines — 

Q. Is it your mood now to stay 
with the treaties that we have 
negotiated, like even ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missiles Treaty], while the 
new negotiations go on? 

A. We're going to stay with the 
treaties that are in effect, that have 
been ratified and are in power. We'll 
have a — 

Q. And SALT II? 

A. We'll have a decision several 
months from now to make with regard 
to whether we join them in violating the 
restraints. 



Q. This week in Vienna, American 
^and Soviet officials held 2 days of 
talks on the Middle East, apparently 
their most intensive on this issue for 7 
years. Can you tell us anything about 
them? And, also, do these talks fit 
into any other recent development 
such as King Hussein's recent move 
ind your talks with King Fahd last 
kveek? 

A. No. These talks had nothing to 
lo with negotiations or anything of that 
■;ind. We simply felt that it was time to 
exchange views with each other and 
Tiake sure that there couldn't be any 
iiiscalculations that could lead to some 
<;ind of confrontation or problem. We 
jrought them up-to-date on our own 
.'lews and what we thought and they 
A'ere talking on their own, and that's all. 

Q. Is the Soviet Government still 
pushing for a direct negotiating role 
;n Middle East diplomacy? 

A. I haven't had a full report enough 
:o say whether they mentioned some 
specific things. They have tended to sup- 
Hirt the idea of a great international 
iiffting. We don't favor that. We don't 
)elieve that there should be that many 
lands in the pot, just as we're not envi- 
^iiining any participation in negotiations. 
\\'e have said we'll stand by and we'll 
lelp in any way we can, but these 
aegotiations must be between the Arabs 
ind the Palestinians and the Israelis. 

Q. On Capitol Hill the other day. 
Secretary Shultz suggested that a goal 
of your policy now is to remove the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. 
Is that your goal? 



A. Removed in the sense of its pres- 
ent structure, in which it is a communist 
totalitarian state, and it is not a govern- 
ment chosen by the people. So, you 
wonder sometimes about those who 
make such claims as to its legitimacy. 
We believe, just as I said Saturday 
nu)rnitig, that we have an obligation to 
be of help where we can to freedom 
fighters and lovers of freedom and 
democracy, from Afghanistan to 
Nicaragua and wherever there are peo- 
ple of that kind who are striving for that 
freedom. 

And we're going to try to persuade 
the Congress that we can legitimately go 
forward and hopefully, go forward on a 
multiyear basis with the Scoop Jackson 
plan for t'-ying to bring development and 
help to all of Central America. 

Q. When you say remove it in the 
sense of its present structure, aren't 
you then saying that you advocate the 
overthrow of the present Government 
of Nicaragua? 

A. What I'm saying is that this pres- 
ent Government was one element of the 
revolution against Somoza. The freedom 
fighters are other elements of that 
revolution. And once victory was at- 
tained, the Sandinistas did what Castro 
had done, prior to their time, in Cuba. 
They ousted and managed to rid 
themselves of the other elements of the 
revolution and violated their own prom- 
ise to the Organization of American 
States, and as a result of which they had 
received support from the organization, 
that they were — their revolutionary goal 
was for democracy, free press, free 
speech, free labor unions, and elections, 
and so forth, and they have violated 
that. 

And the people who are fighting 
them, the freedom fighters opposing 
them, are Nicaraguan people who want 
the goals of the revolution restored. And 
we're going to try to help. 

Q. Is the answer yes? Is the 
answer yes, then? 

A. To what? 

Q. To the question, aren't you ad- 
vocating the overthrow of the present 
government? If — 

A. Not if the present — 

Q. — you substitute another form 
of what you say was the revolution? 

A. Not if the present government 
would turn around and say, all right, if 
they'd say, "uncle." All right, come on 
back into the revolutionary government 
and let's straighten this out and institute 
the goals. 



Q. I wonder if we might return to 
Nicaragua. In answer to Sam's ques- 
tion when he pressed you, you said 
that you — or you seemed to be saying 
that you wouldn't advocate the over- 
throw of the government, not if the 
present government would turn 
around and say, "uncle." Aren't you 
really saying that you want the pres- 
ent government out, and secondly, 
should the United States be trying to 
influence a government of another na- 
tion in this hemisphere? 

A. I think that what we're doing and 
what we have proposed doing is within 
the UN Charter and within the OAS 
Charter and the right of people to do 
what the freedom fighters are doing. It's 
like saying, "Is the glass half full or half 
empty?" You can say we're trying to 
oust the Sandinistas by what we're say- 
ing. 

We're saying we're trying to give 
those who fought a revolution to escape 
a dictatorship, to have democracy, and 
then had it taken away from them by 
some of their fellow revolutionaries — 
we're saying we want them to have a 
chance to have that democracy that they 
fought for. And I don't think the San- 
dinistas have a decent leg to stand on. 
What they have done is totalitarian. It is 
brutal, cruel. And they have no argu- 
ment against what the rest of the people 
in Nicaragua want. 

Q. What about the specific prohibi- 
tions by the U.S. Congress against the 
kind of conduct which would over- 
throw their government or provide 
money to do so? 

A. The— what? 

Q. I'm referring to the Boland 
amendment. The specific prohibitions 
of the Congress. 

A. I think that some of the pro- 
posals that have been made in Congress 
have lacked a complete understanding of 
what is at stake there and what we're 
trying to do. 

Q. You will soon be making a 
decision on how to handle the 
March 31st expiration of Japanese 
auto import quotas. If Japanese auto 
sales do increase in this country, will 
you demand that the Japanese allow 
more American-made goods to be sold 
in their country? 

A. Let me just say that — comment- 
ing on anything of that kind, we have 
been in communication with the 
Japanese, we have discussions going for- 
ward now on open markets both ways, 
in improving the situation between our 
two countries. 



April1985 



11 



THE PRESIDENT 



A great deal of progress has been 
made. We've got a long way to go yet. 
But everything that we're going to 
decide is going to be in the context of 
the two of us as trading partners having 
fair trade and free trade between us. 

Q. With no restraints, your special 
trade representative has predicted a 
sales increase of 750.000 vehicles in 
this country. Will the benefits of that 
for consumers outweigh the adverse, 
or the presumed adverse, effects on 
the U.S. auto industry? 

A. The agreement that is being 
discussed is a voluntary agreement that 
the Japanese themselves instituted. And 
we've had a Cabinet council that has— I 
know some of you've gotten information 
before I did on this— that is going to be 
coming to me with a recommendation. 
They have not done so as yet. But I will 
hear all their argimients, and I will con- 
sider them in the context of the negotia- 
tions and the discussion that is going on 
between us and the Japanese. 



Q. A number of the questions have 
been on our economic problems 
abroad. The farmers' problem, part of 
it is that they're priced out of the 
market in the international trade 
because of the over-valued dollar. I 
think that's part of our problem in the 
auto sales abroad, and in this country, 
where they're disadvantaged because 
our dollar is so valuable compared to 
other currencies. I wonder if you have 
discussed this with Mr. Baker 
(Secretary of the Treasury James A. 
Baker III) and some of your other 
economic advisers, and if you have 
studied the possibility of taking any 
action by this country to try to reduce 
the value of the dollar against other 
currencies, both in Europe and in 
Asia? 



A. I can remember when our dollar 
was devalued, and there weren't very 
many people happy about that. I think 
the problem of the dollar today is that 
our trading partners in the world have 
not caught up with us in economic 
recovery. I think they have a ways to go 
in changing some rigidities in their 
customs and their methods of doing 
business and in industry. And what we 
really need is their recovery to bring 
their money up in value comparable to 
ours. 

There are two sides to tliis problem, 
as we find with the trade deficit, for ex- 
ample, because of our inability, with the 
price of our dollar, to sell some of our 
goods abroad— they are too high priced. 

But at the same time, you turn to 
the other hand and see the people in this 
country who are benefitting by the pur- 
chase of products which are cheap by 
our standards— cheap in price, not 
quality— in our imports, and how that 
has managed to hold down inflation. 

I think if you start toying around 
with trying to reduce the value of the 
dollar without curing this other side of 
the issue, we put ourselves back into the 
inflation spiral, and that we don't want. 

Q. Do you see any weakening signs 
in the region of the southeastern flank 
of NATO in the light of the last Greek 
attitude? And according to The 
Washington Post, there was a story 
saying that the U.S. bases will be 
moved out of Athens. Do you intend to 
do so? 

A. We have no plans about any 
moves of any kind, but all I can say 
alxiut the other— and I don't think I 
should go farther than this— is to say 
that, yes, we're very concerned about 
some of the bilateral problems between 
countries there at our southern flank of 
NATO and the effect that they can have 
on the whole security of the alliance. 



Q. If you and Mrs. Thatcher are 
correct that the Soviets plan to hold 
hostage any progress on intermediate 
range and strategic weapons in the 
talks in Geneva in return for conces- 
sions on your part on your space 
defense program, how far are you 
willing to go in giving concessions to 
get an arms agreement? 

A. We believe if the Soviets are 
sincere in the statements they've made 
about actually wanting a reduction and 
even the elimination of nuclear weapons, 
they'll stay at the table and negotiate 
with us. AH that we have proposed and 
all that we're doing is engaging in 
research which is legal within the AMB 
Treaty; and we're not violating that 
treaty. 

And I have said repeatedly, and 
Prime Minister Thatcher is aware of 
this, that if our research does produce 
the possibility of such a weapon — a 
defensive weapon — that could alter the 
balance, then I would be willing to come 
forth before any deployment and 
negotiate and discuss the deployment 
and the use of that weapon in such a 
way that it would be used to rid the 
world of the nuclear threat, not to give 
us any particular advantage over anyone 
else. 

We just think that the ABM Treaty 
itself— this is one part that has been 
violated— the ABM Treaty in being 
passed, being a defensive weapon treaty, 
expressed the belief that this should 
then be accompanied by realistic reduc- 
tions of nuclear weapons. And all there 
has been since the treaty was passed 
was a tremendous increase in those 
weapons. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 198.3. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Basin 



by Secretary Sfiultz 

Address at the Asia Foundation din- 
ner in honor of the U.S. National Com- 
mittee for Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ill San Franci.'sco on Fehruanj 21. 1985.'' 

In the Pacific today there is a new reali- 
ty, though the world may not yet fully 
comprehend it. In economic develop- 
ment, in the growth of free institutions, 
and in growing global influence, the 
Pacific region has rapidly emerged as a 
leading force on the world stage. Its 
economic dynamism has become a model 
for the developing world and offers a 
unique and attractive vision of the 
future. 

Perhaps even more important, there 
is a new trend toward wider cooperation 
among many East Asian nations. A 
sense of Pacific community is emerging. 
We see an expanding practice of 
regional consultations, a developing 
sense of common interests, and a desire 
to cooperate on a widening range of 
■economic issues. 

And we in America share this new 
cooperative spirit. The United States has 
ihad a Pacific coast since 1819, and one 
■of the strongest stimulants to our 
igrowth and prosperity has been a vision 
of the West as an area of rich opportuni- 
tty, where individual enterprise and a 
commitment to freedom can accomplish 
ereat things for all mankind. Our vision 
today is no less bright and beckoning 
(than when our forefathers embarked 
uipon their manifest destiny. Pacific con- 
Bciousness is rising in the United 
"States— not just on the west coast but in 
Boston, New York, and in our nation's 
apital. 

Last spring, a major French 
newspaper noted that the American 
President had observed that "Western 
history began with a Mediterranean era, 
passed through an Atlantic era, and is 
now moving into a Pacific era." You 
might be surprised to learn that Le 
Monde was referring not to Ronald 
Reagan but to Theodore Roosevelt. But 
I can assure you that President Reagan, 
himself a Californian with a western 
perspective, fully shares Teddy 
Riiosevelt's enthusiasm about the oppor- 
tunities that abound in the Pacific. Just 
this past September at the White House, 
the President, Vice President Bush, and 
I demonstrated this Administration's 
(•(immitment to the future of Pacific 
cdojieration by joining many in this room 
t(i inaugurate this, the United States 



National Committee for Pacific 
Economic Cooperation. More and more 
Americans are becoming aware that the 
economic and social progress of this 
region presents an exciting opportunity 
for the United States and for interna- 
tional peace, security, and prosperity. 

A Region of Challenge and Diversity 

While the prospects for the nations and 
people of the Pacific Basin are bright, 
politically and economically, we must 
bear in mind that this is one of the most 
heavily armed regions in the world, and 
Asian peace is still marred by continuing 
and tragic conflicts. In Vietnam, Cam- 
bodia, and Laos, some 1.1 million men 
are now under arms, while on the 
Korean Peninsula there is a combined 
total of 1.5 million troops. In addition to 
4.4 million men in uniform in China, ap- 
proximately one-third to one-half of the 
U.S.S.R.'s ground forces— some 52 divi- 
sions—are garrisoned in the Soviet Far 
East. Soviet air power, both tactical and 
strategic, continues to grow; the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet is now their largest; and 
about one-third of the Soviet SS-20 
intermediate-range ballistic missile bat- 
talions overshadow much of the popula- 
tion of the region. This concentration of 
military forces is of considerable concern 
given the demonstrated willingness of 
the Soviet Union and its proxies — in 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Korea— to 



stability— a stability that derives from a 
number of factors independent of a sim- 
ple calculation of the balance of forces. 
Economic vitality, in particular, is an im- 
portant factor in the regional equation. 
To maintain stability, cooperation among 
like-minded states— particularly those 
that share the common goals of peace 
and regional development— is indispen- 
sable. 

The Pacific Basin is a region 
characterized by great diversity, for ex- 
ample; 

• Populations range from the 
world's smallest independent state, 
Nauru, in the South Pacific, with 8 
square miles and a population of 8,000, 
to the world's largest, China, with 
almost 4 million square miles and over 1 
billion people; 

• Economic size and influence range 
from oil-rich Brunei with a per capita 
GNP [gross national product] of nearly 
$18,000 to some of the island nations 
with per capita GNPs of less than $350; 
and 

• Cultural, religious, and philo- 
sophical traditions cover the spectrum of 
the world's heritage, ranging from Con- 
fucianism and Buddhism to Islam and 
Christianity. 

But the Pacific nations also have 
much in common. 

• With a few exceptions, countries 
in the region tend to share our interest 



There are no examples of a communist system, 
once consolidated, evolving into a democracy. 



use their military power for their 
political ends. 

Other challenges confront the 
region; the problems of the Philippines 
are serious, with potential effects on 
security throughout the region; the 
human suffering in Indochina drains the 
resources and energies of many Asian 
and Pacific nations; ethnic tensions, 
regional rivalries, and potential ter- 
ritorial disputes impede the search for 
lasting security. The slow growth of 
political liberalization could also set back 
Asia's hard-won successes. 

Despite these challenges, the Pacific 
Basin enjoys a remarkable degree of 



in peace and a stable environment for 
growth and development. 

• Most of the vibrant countries of 
the Pacific are market-oriented systems 
that recognize the vital role of individual 
entrepreneurship. 

• Human resources are abundant in 
East Asia and the Pacific. Education 
levels are relatively high, and literacy 
(estimated at 75% in the developing 
Asian countries) is well ahead of other 
regions. 

• Sound financial management has 
led to rapid economic development. East 
Asian countries owe less than 20% of 
the world's developing country debt 



April1985 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



compared with over 50% in Latin 
America. The East Asian developing 
country debt-to-service ratio is the 
lowest of any region— under 16% in 
1982. Their debt-to-export ratio, nearly 
80%, is the best in the world. 

• A strong technological base has 
been built with an extraordinary em- 
phasis on scientific and technical educa- 
tion. The transfer and practical applica- 
tion of technical know-how, coupled with 
a disciplined and skilled work force, 
have launched many of the countries of 
the region on the road to rapid and sus- 
tained development. 

• In the People's Republic of China, 
too, there has been movement toward 
greater openness. Pragmatism is now 
the watchword in China, where the 
hopes for economic modernization have 
been invested— wisely— in a bold pro- 
gram of reform. We watch with interest 
the effect of a great nation beginning 

to throw off some of its outmoded 
economic doctrines and redirecting the 
energies of a billion talented people. 

Prior to the Second World War, 
American foreign policy focused on the 
defense and economic well-being of our 
Asian possessions and our neighbors in 
the Western Hemisphere. Following the 
war, our help in the reconstruction of 
Japan and our efforts to defend freedom 
in Korea and Vietnam monopolized our 
attention in Asia and the Pacific; our 
primary interest was in supporting 
the security and political stability of 
Asian nations and the trend toward 
democracy. Since then, our interest in 
Asia has continued to broaden, with the 
emergence in the region of powerful and 
diverse economic forces that are having 
a major impact not only in the United 
States but elsewhere in the world. 

The Role of Japan 

One cannot properly contemplate the 
story of the Pacific without reflecting on 
the role of Japan as a catalyst in the 
remarkable developments of the last half 
of the 20th century. Japan has em- 
barked upon a course of technological 
and economic advance that is destined to 
leave an indelible mark on the civiliza- 
tion of this era. 

Japan's economy— literally shattered 
after the war— has, in less than 40 
years, grown to become the free world's 
second largest. In the 1970s, the 
Japanese economy grew at an average 
annual real rate of 4.9%— almost two- 
thirds greater than that of the United 
States and about twice as fast as Ger- 



many and France. Since 1951, Japan's 
GNP and its exports have both grown 
by 100%. 

Our permanent partnership with 
Japan is the keystone of American 
foreign policy in East Asia and the linch- 
pin of our relationships in the region. 
But beyond that, the strong ties that 
have developed in the past 40 years be- 
tween our two countries— in the 
political, economic, and security 
arenas— have provided the foundation 
upon which the Pacific cooperation and 
dynamism of which I speak today have 
been built. The stimulus and the role 
model that the world's two largest free 
market economies and technological 
leaders provide to the region cannot be 
denied. Official economic assistance and 
private capital flows from Japan and the 
United States have contributed to 
economic and social development in 
many Asian nations. And the close 
diplomatic relationship between the 
United States and Japan and our Treaty 
of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and 
the bases that it makes possible, have 
bolstered peace and stability in the 
region. 

If Japan's economic performance 
and the close U.S. -Japan partnership 
have been nothing short of miraculous, 
however, much remains to be done. 
There remain serious impediments in 
Japan to competitive foreign exports. 
Japan has a responsibility to take con- 
crete actions to fulfill its commitment to 
an open trade and investment system. 
The United States attaches great impor- 
tance to the understanding reached by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Nakasone in Los Angeles on January 2. 
With the full support of both leaders, we 
have begun intensive negotiations to 
identify and remove trade barriers in 
four key Japanese markets; telecom- 
munications, electronics, forest products, 
and medical equipment and pharma- 
ceuticals. Foreign Minister Abe and I 
have been directed to oversee these 
negotiations and to provide a progress 
report to Prime Minister Nakasone and 
President Reagan at the time of the 
Bonn economic summit meeting in early 
May. In the security area, the gap be- 
tween Japan's publicly stated defense 
responsibilities and its ability to fulfill 
these responsibilities must be narrowed. 
In short, Japan, like all Pacific Basin na- 
tions, must be responsive to the global 
economic and security system in which 
our well-being is collectively imbedded. 



Asia and the U.S. Economy 

Nevertheless, the growth of Japan's 
economy has been a miracle, and it has 
stimulated changes elsewhere in the 
world. Other states in the region have 
emulated the Japanese experience and 
are aggressively applying the lessons 
learned. In addition to the newly in- 
dustrialized countries, such as the 
Republic of Korea, other Pacific 
economies are growing rapidly, and 
their trade, both within the region and 
with the rest of the world, is thriving. In 
1982 well over half of the trade of the 
14 principal countries of the region (54% 
of exports and 59% of imports) was 
transacted within the Pacific Basin. And 
a remarkable 70% of all developing 
country exports are from the newly in- 
dustrialized countries of Asia. 

The six countries that constitute the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)— Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand— are of growing importance to 
the United States. Taken together, the 
ASEAN countries are now our fifth 
largest trading partner behind only the 
European Community, Canada, Japan, 
and Mexico. American trade with 
ASEAN grew 11.5% in 1984 over 1983; 
and ASEAN bought almost $10 billion 
of American goods— more than 4% of 
our total exports. ASEAN's economic 
links to the Pacific are reflected in the 
fact that almost three-fourths of its im- 
ports and more than two-thirds of its 
total trade are with countries of the 
Pacific Basin. 

The economic impact of all these 
developments on the United States is 
enormous. For the first half of this cen- 
tury, our total world trade (imports and 
exports) averaged less than 4% of our 
gross national product. By 1959, it had 
grown to somewhat less than 6%; but, in 
the past 25 years, it has almost tripled 
to 17% of our GNP. If present rates of 
growth continue, our foreign trade will, 
by the year 2000, amount to some 25% 
of the U.S. GNP— or approximately 
Japan's current percentage. By any 
measure, those are significant figures; 
and it goes without saying that as trade 
continues to grow as a component of our 
national economy, both our trade policy 
and our domestic economic policies will 
play an increasingly important role in 
LI.S. foreign policy. 

For the past 5 years, total U.S. 
trade with East Asia and the Pacific has 
surpassed U.S. trade with any other 
region of the world. Moreover, East 
Asia's and the Pacific's share of total 
U.S. trade continues to rise— and rapid- 
ly. In 1982, our trade with this region 



14 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



vas $126.5 billion or 27.7% of total U.S. 
rade. In 1984, U.S. trade with the 
egion was $169 billion— almost 31% of 
otal U.S. trade. During the recent 
ecession, our overall world trade de- 
fined more than 5%, while that with 
Cast Asia and the Pacific was off by less 
;han 1%. In 1983, total U.S. world trade 
•ose 0.5%— but trade with the Pacific 
■egion grew by 8%. 

Pacific trade is having a subtle and, 
believe, positive influence on the way 
\.mericans do business both at home and 
ibroad, and it is affecting the attitudes 
ind broadening the perspectives of 
Americans generally, many of whom are 
ust beginning to appreciate the 
ignificance of this trade. Economically 
is well as politically and strategically, 
he Pacific is crucial to America's future. 

The Framework for Pacific 
ooperation 

olitical maturation and economic ex- 
)ansion have set in motion a dynamic 
)rocess that is already transforming the 

'acific Basin into one of the most pro- 
luctive regions of the world. America 
tands ready to contribute to this proc- 
iss. In his State of the Union message, 
■"resident Reagan said: 

America's economic success is freedom's 
uccess; it can be repeated a hundred times 
n a hundred different nations. Many coun- 
rries in East Asia and the Pacific have few 
lesources other than the enterprise of their 
•wn people. But through low ta.x rates and 
ree markets, they have soared ahead of een- 
Iralized economies. And now China is opening 
ip its economy to meet its needs. 

When one looks ahead to the evolu- 
tion of the Pacific region over the next 
.0 to 15 years, the stakes are high and 
Ihe prospects exciting. Multilateral 
tooperation, built upon a sound network 
i)f bilateral relationships, is one promis- 
ing means for Asian and Pacific nations 
to promote regional peace and an endur- 
ing prosperity for their peoples. It is the 
;oal of the United States to cooperate 
with others to develop our common 
jconomic potential and to build mutually 
ijeneficial relations that strengthen all 
ountries of the region. 

The origins of the Pacific coop- 
erative movement are diffuse and spring 
:rom varying perceptions. There has 
emerged, however, a clear desire to ex- 
alore the prospects for regionwide 
cooperation. The American people view 
these prospects with an open mind and a 
ivilling spirit. 

In recognition of the growing impor- 
tance of the Pacific to American foreign 



policy, some 14 months ago I asked Am- 
bassador [at Large] Richard Fairbanks 
to begin consultations with leaders of 
the region, to get their views on how the 
United States can contrib\ate to the 
cooperative movement in the Pacific 
Basin, and to advise me on new policy 
initiatives for the United States. His " 
preliminary findings are most encourag- 
ing, and we look forward to working in 
partnership with other countries of the 
region. 

At the outset, I should point out 
that the United States has no pre- 
conceived notion as to how this process 
should continue or where it may 



spiration and progress. Governments 
respond, and then not always very well, 
to the aspirations of individuals. 

In various areas of human en- 
deavor — scientific, educational, and 
cultural— people of the Pacific are 
exchanging ideas and joining in coopera- 
tive enterprises. As economies begin to 
grow and continue to expand beyond 
their borders, and as entrepreneurs 
reach out for improved techniques and 
new opportunities, businessmen are 
forging new links with one another, 
based on human ingenuity and a deter- 
mination to succeed. 



The forces of democracy around the world merit 
our standing with them, to abandon them would be 
a shameful betrayal . . . 



ultimately lead. Indeed, it is critical that 
we join others in an open and frank 
dialogue on the multitude of economic 
issues before us. We do not wish to 
force the pace or inflate expectations in 
the region. But at the same time, we are 
eager and willing to continue the 
dialogue that Ambassador Fairbanks has 
begun and to contribute whatever we 
can to a peaceful and progressive part- 
nership in the Pacific. 

Let me also affirm that the United 
States is anxious to contribute as a col- 
legial participant. It is neither our inten- 
tion nor our desire to dominate that 
process or force it in particular direc- 
tions. Our objective is to move forward 
in a cooperative partnership with others. 
Our goal can be simply stated: peaceful 
progress for all countries in the region, 
based on a shared belief in the value of 
economic cooperation and mutual 
respect for the rights of all participants 
to freely pursue their own interests. The 
President's January 2 meeting with 
Prime Minister Nakasone reaffirmed 
that both the United States and Japan 
believe that this process can proceed 
only with the participation and consen- 
sus of the countries in the region. 

There already have been some en- 
couraging developments. Foremost 
among these has been the remarkable 
dynamism of the private sector, where 
individuals have taken the initiative to 
improve economic and commercial rela- 
tionships among peoples of the region. 
For it is people who are the source of in- 



These private trade and invest- 
ment relationships are the key to the 
remarkable economic success of the 
region. Such organizations as the Asia 
Foundation, Pacific Science Association, 
the Pacific Forum, the ASEAN-U.S. 
Center for Technology Exchange, the 
Circum-Pacific Energy Resources Coun- 
cil, and the Pacific Basin Economic 
Council provide important momentum to 
this process; they reflect the growing 
sense of common identity and shared in- 
terest. 

Another relatively recent and en- 
couraging development has been the for- 
mation of the private sector Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Conference 
(PECC), in which this United States 
Committee for Pacific Economic 
Cooperation participates. From modest 
beginnings less than 5 years ago, the 
PECC movement has captured the spirit 
and has quickened the pace of Pacific 
cooperation. With each successive 
meeting, the PECC shows greater prom- 
ise of helping to bring into focus the ma- 
jor economic issues of the region. I trust 
that the upcoming meeting in Seoul in 
April will build upon the progress made 
thus far. 

With respect to the U.S. National 
Committee on the Pacific, let me say 
that your dedication and interest con- 
tribute vitally to a strong U.S. role not 
only in the PECC but in promoting 
regional cooperation more generally. In 
his remarks to this committee at the 
Wliite House last September, President 
Reagan said: 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



I congratulate all of you on your foresight 
and commitment to recognizing the impor- 
tance of the Pacific to our nation's future and 
acting upon it. Your advice and counsel will 
be important to our continued effort. Your 
group includes four Senators, four Members 
of the House, seven members of the ex- 
ecutive, in their unofficial capacity, and I 
think this demonstrates a bipartisan commit- 
ment of both branches. All of us are in your 
debt for what you're doing and wish you well. 

I would like not only to reiterate the 
President's sentiments but also to assure 
you of this Administration's encourage- 
ment and support. While the committee 
must remain a private group, we in the 
executive branch look forward to work- 
ing with its distinguished members. As 
you proceed with your work, I would 
urge you to explore the entire range of 
possibilities for Pacific cooperation. I 
have been encouraged by the commit- 
tee's efforts on a number of critical 
issues, and I hope that the progress you 
have made so far is a harbinger of fu- 
ture achievements. 

The spirit of Pacific cooperation is 
also beginning to attract the attention of 
other governments in the region. Last 
July, in Jakarta, ASEAN foreign 
ministers initiated a multilateral 
dialogue with their Pacific part- 
ners—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
Canada, and, of course, the United 
States. In that "6-i-5" meeting, we 
discussed the prospects for Pacific 
cooperation and agreed to make a 
review of Pacific-wide developments a 
continuing feature of these annual 
ministerial deliberations. The eleven of 
us also agreed that the governments 
would work together on the first 
cooperative project— Human Resources 
Development, chosen as a focus because 
it encompasses all nations in the region, 
big and small. This theme was suggested 
by Foreign Minister Mochtar of In- 
donesia, who has spurred us and his 
ASEAN colleagues to think creatively 
about the shape of Asia yet to come and 
the human resources of the region. 

At the time, I expressed the view 
that Pacific cooperation should not be an 
exclusive process, but that all who are 
prepared to contribute to wider 
economic cooperation in the region 
should be encouraged to do so. The 
response of the foreign ministers was 
encouraging, and the progress made to 
date augurs well for future cooperation 
in other areas. 

In the 7 months since the Jakarta 
meeting, we have worked to draw 
together the resources of the U.S. 
Government to participate in an interna- 
tional inventory of existing human 



development and training programs in 
the Pacific. Three weeks ago, senior of- 
ficials of all the governments met in In- 
donesia to review the results of that in- 
ventory. Participating governments have 
now moved closer to agreeing on the 
principles that wall guide the Human 
Resources Development effort and have 
identified areas for both immediate and 
long-term cooperative projects. Over the 
next 4 months, our representatives will 
meet to work out specific steps for con- 
sideration at next July's postministerial 
Conference on Pacific Cooperation. For 
our part, we will make every effort to 
contribute to the success of this promis- 
ing undertaking. 

I am encouraged by the progress 
made to date in this field, and I look for- 
ward to meeting with the foreign 
ministers again in Kuala Lumpur this 
July to decide on further actions that all 
of the countries can take together. 

The Hopeful Prospects 

The Pacific cooperative process is still in 
its infancy, and it is too early to predict 



America and the Struggle 
for Freedom 



its ultimate form or direction. Whatever 
arrangement ultimately evolves is likely 
to be unique to the Pacific, for the diver- 
sity, culture, heritage, and traditions of 
the Pacific states constitute a unique set 
of challenges. 

As we prepare to mark the 40th an- 
niversary of the end of the Pacific war, 
it is appropriate to reflect on what we 
have accomplished and to ponder the 
future. For if there have been moments 
of darkness in the history of Asia, there 
is also light in Asia's philosophical, 
esthetic, and cultural traditions. The 
tragedy that befell Angkor Wat sym- 
bolizes the ironic juxtaposition of Asia's 
turbulent history of conflict and its rich 
heritage of civilization. When we look 
back 40 years from now, I hope we will 
see this incipient process of Pacific 
cooperation as the beginning of a new 
era— an era of reconciliation, progress, 
and peace. 



'Press release 27. 



by Secretary Shultz 

Address before the Commonwealth 
Club of California in San Francisco on 
February 22, 1985.'^ 

A revolution is sweeping the world 
today— a democratic revolution. This 
should not be a surprise. Yet it is 
noteworthy because many people in the 
West lost faith, for a time, in the 
relevance of the idea of democracy. It 
was fashionable in some quarters to 
argue that democracy was culture 
bound; that it was a luxury only in- 
dustrial societies could afford; that other 
institutional structures were needed to 
meet the challenges of development; 
that to try to encourage others to adopt 
our system was ethnocentric and ar- 
rogant. 

In fact, what began in the United 
States of America over two centuries 
ago as a bold new experiment in 
representative government has today 
captured the imagination and the pas- 
sions of peoples on every continent. The 
Solidarity movement in Poland; 
resistance forces in Afghanistan, in 
Cambodia, in Nicaragua, in Ethiopia and 



Angola; dissidents in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe; advocates of 
peaceful democratic change in South 
Africa, Chile, the Republic of Korea, and 
the Philippines— all these brave men and 
women have something in common: they 
seek independence, freedom, and human 
rights— ideals which are at the core of 
democracy and which the United States 
has always championed. 

The American Tradition 

All Americans can be proud that the ex- 
ample of our Founding Fathers has 
helped to inspire millions around the 
globe. Throughout our own history, we 
have always believed that freedom is the 
birthright of all peoples and that we 
could not be true to ourselves or our 
principles unless we stood for freedom 
and democracy not only for ourselves 
but for others. 

And so, time and again in the last 
200 years, we have lent our sup- 
port—moral and otherwise— to those 
around the world struggling for freedom 
and independence. In the 19th century 
Americans smuggled guns and powder 
to Simon Bolivar, the Great Liberator; 



16 



DeDartment of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



^e supported the Polish patriots and 
thers seeking freedom. We well 
emembered how other nations, like 
ranee, had come to our aid during our 
wn revolution. 

In the 20th century, as our power as 
nation increased, we accepted a 
reater role in protecting and promoting 
•eedom and democracy around the 
orld. Our commitment to these ideals 
as been strong and bipartisan in both 
ord and deed. During World War I, 
le Polish pianist Paderewski and the 
zech statesman Masaryk raised funds 
I the United States; then Woodrow 
/ilson led the way at war's end in 
chieving the independence of Poland, 
zechoslovakia, and other states. 

At the height of World War II, 
ranklin Roosevelt set forth a vision of 
emocracy for the postwar world in the 
tlantic Charter and Four Freedoms, 
he United States actively promoted 
scolonization. Harry Truman worked 
ard and successfully at protecting 
emocratic institutions in postwar 
'estern Europe and at helping 
jmocracy take root in West Germany 
id Japan. At the United Nations in 
948 we supported the Universal 
leclaration of Human Rights— which 
eclares the right of every nation to a 
lee press, free assembly and associa- 
on, periodic and genuine elections, and 
lee trade unions. John F. Kennedy 
-ew upon the very essence of America 
lith his call to "pay any price ... to 
Bsure the survival and success of 
»erty." 

he March of Democracy 

|he struggle for liberty is not always 

liccessful. But those who once 
?spaired, who saw democracy on the 
!cline, and who argued that we must 
wer our expectations were, at best, 
•emature. Civilizations decline when 
ey stop believing in themselves; ours 
IS thrived because we have never lost 
ir conviction that our values are worth 
'fending. 

When Indira Gandhi, the Prime 
inister of the world's largest 
>mocracy, was assassinated, we were 
locked and saddened. But our con- 
lence in the resilience of democracy 
as renewed as millions of India's peo- 
e went to the polls freely to elect her 
iccessor. As Rajiv Gandhi leads his na- 
jn to new greatness, he demonstrates 
ore clearly than any words or abstract 
■ientific models that democracy is 
either outmoded nor is it the exclusive 
jssession of a few, rich. Western na- 
ons. It has worked for decades in coun- 
ies as diverse as Costa Rica and 
ipan. 

In the Western Hemisphere, over 
)% of the population of Latin America 



and the Caribbean today live under 
governments that are either democratic 
or clearly on the road to democracy— in 
contrast to only one-third in 1979. In 
less than 6 years, popularly elected 
democrats have replaced dictators in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and 
Grenada. Brazil and Uruguay will in- 
augurate civilian presidents in March. 
After a long twilight of dictatorship, this 
hemispheric trend toward free elections 
and representative government is 
something to be applauded and sup- 
ported. 

The Challenge to the 
Brezhnev Doctrine 

Democracy is an old idea, but today we 
witness a new phenomenon. For many 
years we saw our adversaries act 
without restraint to back insurgencies 
around the world to spread communist 
dictatorships. The Soviet Union and its 
proxies, like Cuba and Vietnam, have 
consistently supplied money, arms, and 
training in efforts to destabilize or over- 
throw noncommunist governments. 
"Wars of national liberation" became the 
pretext for subverting any noncom- 
munist country in the name of so-called 
"socialist internationalism." 

At the same time, any victory of 
communism was held to be irreversible. 
This was the infamous Brezhnev doc- 
trine, first proclaimed at the time of the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Its 
meaning is simple and chilling; once 
you're in the so-called "socialist camp," 
you're not allowed to leave. Thus the 
Soviets say to the rest of the world: 
"What's mine is mine. What's yours is up 
for grabs." 

In recent years, Soviet activities and 
pretensions have run head on into the 
democratic revolution. People are in- 
sisting on their right to independence, 
on their right to choose their govern- 
ment free of outside control. Where 
once the Soviets may have thought that 
all discontent was ripe for turning into 
communist insurgencies, today we see a 
new and different kind of struggle: peo- 
ple around the world risking their lives 
against communist despotism. We see 
brave men and women fighting to 
challenge the Brezhnev doctrine. 

In December 1979, the Soviets in- 
vaded Afghanistan to preserve a com- 
munist system installed by force a year 
and a half earlier. But their invasion met 
stiff resistance, and the puppet govern- 
ment they installed has proved incapable 
of commanding popular support. Today, 
the Soviets have expanded their occupa- 
tion army and are trying to devastate 
the population and the nation they can- 
not subdue. They are demolishing entire 
Afghan villages and have driven one out 



of every four Afghans to flee the coun- 
try. They have threatened neighboring 
countries like Pakistan and have been 
unwilling to negotiate seriously for a 
political solution. 

In the face of this Soviet invasion, 
the Afghans who are fighting and dying 
for the liberation of their country have 
made a remarkable stand. Their will has 
not flagged; indeed, their capacity to 
resist has grown. The countryside is 
now largely in the hands of the popular 
resistance, and not even in the major 
cities can the Soviets claim complete 
control. Clearly, the Afghans do not 
share the belief of some in the West that 
fighting back is pointless, that the only 
option is to let one's country be "quietly 
erased," to use the memorable phrase of 
the Czech writer, Milan Kundera. 

In Cambodia, the forces open to 
democracy, once all but annihilated by 
the Khmer Rouge, are now waging a 
similar battle against occupation and a 
puppet regime imposed by a Soviet ally, 
communist Vietnam. Although Vietnam 
is too poor to feed, house, or care for 
the health of its own population ade- 
quately, the Stalinist dictators of Hanoi 
are bent on imperial domination of In- 
dochina — much as many had predicted 
before, during, and after the Vietnam 
war. But 6 years after its invasion, Viet- 
nam does not control Cambodia. 
Resistance forces total over 50,000; of 
these, noncommunist forces have grown 
from zero to over 20,000. The Viet- 
namese still need an occupation army of 
170,000 to keep order in the country; 
they even had to bring in two new divi- 
sions to mount the recent offensive. 
That offensive, while more brutal than 
previous attacks, will prove no more 
conclusive than those before. 

In Africa, as well, the Brezhnev doc- 
trine is being challenged by the drive for 
independence and freedom. In Ethiopia, 
a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist dic- 
tatorship has shown indifference to the 
desperate poverty and suffering of its 
people. The effects of a natural disaster 
have been compounded by the regime's 
obsession with ideology and power. In 
classical Stalinist fashion, it has ruined 
agricultural production through forced 
collectivization; denied food to starving 
people for political reasons; subjected 
many thousands to forced resettlement; 
and spent vast sums of money on arms 
and "revolutionary" spectacles. But the 
rulers cannot hide the dimensions of the 
tragedy from their people. Armed in- 
surgencies continue, while the regime 
persists in relying on military solutions 
and on expanding the power and scope 
of the police and security apparatus. 

In Angola, a Marxist regime came 
into power in 1975 backed and sustained 
by 30,000 Cuban troops and substantial 



prill 985 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



numbers of Soviet and East European 
"advisers." The continuation of this 
Soviet/Cuban intervention has been a 
major impediment to the achievement of 
independence for Namibia under the 
terms of UN Security Council Resolution 
435; it is also a continuing challenge to 
African independence and regional peace 
and security— thus our sustained 
diplomatic effort to achieve a regional 
settlement addressing the issues of both 
Angola and Namibia. In Angola, UNITA 
[National Union for the Total In- 
dependence of Angola] has waged an 
armed struggle against the regime's 
monopoly of power and in recent years 
has steadily expanded the territory 
under its control. Foreign forces, 
whether Cuban or South African, must 
leave. At some point there will be an in- 
ternal political settlement in Angola that 
reflects Angolan political reality, not ex- 
ternal inter\'ention. 

Finally, an important struggle is be- 
ing waged today closer to home in Cen- 
tral America. Its countries are in transi- 
tion, trying to resolve the inequities and 
tensions of the past through workable 
reforms and democratic institutions. But 
violent antidemocratic minorities, tied 
ideologically and militarily to the Soviet 
Union and Cuba, are trying to prevent 
democratic reform and to seize or hold 
power by force. The outcome of this 
struggle will affect not only the future 
of peace and democracy in this 
hemisphere but our own vital interests. 

In Nicaragua, in 1979 the Sandinista 
leaders pledged to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and to their own 
people to bring freedom to their country 
after decades of tyranny under Somoza. 
The Sandinistas have betrayed these 
pledges and the hopes of the Nicaraguan 
people; instead, they have imposed a 
new and brutal tyranny that respects no 
frontiers. Basing themselves on strong 
military ties to Cuba and the Soviet 
Union, the Sandinistas are attempting, 
as rapidly as they can, to force 
Nicaragua into a totalitarian mold whose 
pattern is all too familiar. They are sup- 
pressing internal dissent; clamping down 
on the press; persecuting the church; 
linking up with the terrorists of Iran, 
Libya, and the PLO [Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization]; and seeking to under- 
mine the legitimate and increasingly 
democratic governments of their 
neighbors. 

This betrayal has forced many 
Nicaraguans who supported the anti- 
Somoza revolution back into opposition. 
And while many resist peacefully, 
thousands now see no choice but to take 
up arms again, to risk everything so 
that their hopes for freedom and 
democracy will not once again be denied. 

The Sandinistas denounce their op- 
ponents as mercenaries or former Na- 



tional Guardsmen loyal to the memory 
of Somoza. Some in this country seem 
all too willing to take these charges at 
face value, even though they come from 
the same Sandinista leaders whose word 
has meant so little up to now. But all 
you have to do is count the numbers: 
more people have taken up arms against 
the Sandinistas than ever belonged to 
Somoza's National Guard. In fact, most 
of the leaders of the armed resistance 
fought in the revolution against Somoza; 
and some even served in the new 
government until it became clear that 
the comandantes were bent on com- 
munism, not freedom; terror, not 
reform; and aggression, not peace. The 
new fighters for freedom include 
peasants and farmers, shopkeepers and 
vendors, teachers and professionals. 
What unites them to each other and to 
the other thousands of Nicaraguans who 
resist without arms is disillusionment 
with Sandinista militarism, corruption, 
and fanaticism. 

Despite uncertain and sporadic sup- 
port from outside, the resistance in 
Nicaragua is growing. The Sandinistas 
have strengthened their Soviet and 
Cuban military ties, but their popularity 
at home has declined sharply. The sti-ug- 
gle in Nicaragua for democracy and 
freedom, and against dictatorship, is far 
from over, and right now may well be a , 
pivotal moment that decides the future. 

America's Moral Duty 

This new phenomenon we are witnessing 
around the world— popular insurgencies 
against communist domination— is not 
an American creation. In every region, 
the people have made their own decision 
to stand and fight rather than see their 
cultures and freedoms "quietly erased." 
They have made clear their readiness to 
fight with or without outside support, 
using every available means and endur- 
ing severe hardships, alone if need be. 

But America also has a moral 
responsibility. The lesson of the postwar 
era is that America must be the leader 
of the free world; there is no one else to 
take our place. The nature and extent of 
our support— whether moral support or 
something more— necessarily varies 
from case to case. But there should be 
no doubt about where our sympathies 
lie. 

It is more than mere coincidence 
that the last 4 years have been a time of 
both renewed American strength and 
leadership and a resurgence of 
democracy and freedom. As we are the 
strongest democratic nation on earth, 
the actions we take— or do not 
take— have both a direct and an indirect 
impact on those who share our ideals 
and hopes all around the globe. If we 
shrink from leadership, we create a 
vacuum into which our adversaries can 



move. Our national security suffers, our 
global interests suffer, and, yes, the 
worldwide struggle for democracy suf- 
fers. 

The Soviets are fond of talking 
about the "correlation of forces," and fo: 
a few years it may have seemed that the 
correlation of forces favored communist 
minorities backed by Soviet military 
power. Today, however, the Soviet em- 
pire is weakening under the strain of its 
own internal problems and external en- 
tanglements. And the United States has 
shown the will and the strength to de- 
fend its interests, to resist the spread ol 
Soviet influence, and to protect freedon 
Our actions, such as the rescue of 
Grenada, have again begun to offer in- 
spiration and hope to others. 

The importance of American power 
and leadership to the strength of 
democracy has not been the only lesson 
of recent history. In many ways, the 
reverse has also proven true: the spreac 
of democracy serves American interests 

Historically, there have been times 
when the failure of democracy in certah 
parts of the world did not affect our na- 
tional security. In the 18th and 19th cer 
turies, the failure of democracy to take 
root elsewhere was unfortunate and 
even troubling to us, but it did not 
necessarily pose a threat to our own 
democracy. In the second half of the 
20th century, that is less and less true. 
In almost every case in the postwar 
period, the imposition of communist 
tyrannies has led to an increase in 
Soviet global power and influence. Pro- 
moting insurgencies against noncom- 
munist governments in important 
strategic areas has become a low-cost 
way for the Soviets to extend the reach 
of their power and to weaken their 
adversaries, whether they be China or 
the democracies of the West and Japan 
This is true in Southeast Asia, 
Southwest Asia, Africa, and Central 
America. 

When the United States supports 
those resisting totalitarianism, 
therefore, we do so not only out of our 
historical sympathy for democracy and 
freedom but also, in many cases, in the 
interests of national security. As Presi- 
dent Reagan said in his second inaugur; 
address: "America must remain 
freedom's staunchest friend, for freedor 
is our best ally and it is the world's only 
hope to conquer poverty and preserve 
peace." 

In many parts of the world we have 
no choice but to act, on both moral and 
strategic grounds. ■ 

How To Respond? 

The question is: How should we act? 
What should America do t<;) further both 
its security interests and the cause of 



18 



Department of State Bulletir 



THE SECRETARY 



reedom and democracy? A prudent 
trategy must combine different 
lements, suited to different cir- 
umstances. 

First, as a matter of fundamental 
irinciple, the United States supports 
luman rights and peaceful democratic 
hange throughout the world, in- 
luding in noncommunist, pro-Western 
ountries. Democratic institutions are 
he best guarantor of stability and 
eace, as well as of human rights, 
herefore, we have an interest in seeing 
'eaceful progress toward democracy in 
riendly countries. 

Such a transition is often complex 
nd delicate, and it can only come about 
1 a way consistent with a country's 
istory, culture, and political realities, 
^e will not succeed if we fail to 
ecognize positive change when it does 
ccur— whether in South Africa, or the 
Republic of Korea, or the Philippines, 
or will we achieve our goal if we ig- 
ore the even greater threat to the 
•eedom of such countries as South 
.orea and the Philippines from external 
r internal forces of totalitarianism. We 
lust heed the cautionary lessons of both 
"an and Nicaragua, in which pressures 
gainst rightwing authoritarian regimes 
ere not well thought out and helped 
tad to even more repressive dictator- 
nip. 

Our influence with friendly govern- 
nents is a precious resource; we use it 
ir constructive ends. The President has 
■ lid that "human rights means working 
; problems, not walking away from 
lem." Therefore, we stay engaged. We 
ay in contact with all democratic 
jlitical forces, in opposition as well as 
government. The historic number of 
ansitions from authoritarian regimes 
1 democracy in the last decade, from 
)uthern Europe to Latin America, 
emonstrates the effectiveness of this 
jproach— as well as the essential dif- 
■rence between authoritarian and 
'talitarian regimes. There are no ex- 
Tiples of a communist system, once 
)nsolidated, evolving into a democracy. 
In June 1982, addressing the British 
arliament, President Reagan endorsed 
new effort— including leaders of 
isiness, labor, and both the Democratic 
id Republican Parties— to enlist the 
lergies of American private citizens in 
wiping to develop the skills, institutions, 
id practices of democracy around the 
orld. Today, the National Endowment 
ir Democracy, the concrete result of 
lat initiative, is assisting democratic 
-oups in a wide variety of countries, 
he endowment represents practical 
merican support for people abroad 
orking for our common ideals. 

Second, we have a moral obliga- 
on to support friendly democratic 



governments by providing economic 
and security assistance against a 
variety of threats. When democratic 
friends are threatened by externally sup- 
ported insurgencies, when hostile 
neighbors try to intimidate them by ac- 
quiring offensive arms or sponsor ter- 
rorism in an effort to topple their 
governments, international security is 
jeopardized. The more we can lend ap- 
propriate help to others to protect 



to broadcast the truth to people in 
closed societies. 

Fourth, and finally, our moral 
principles compel us to support those 
struggling against the imposition of 
communist tyranny. F'rom the founding 
of this nation, Americans have believed 
that a people have the right to seek 
freedom and mdependence— and that we 
have both a legal right and a moral 
obligation to help them. 



. . . today we see a new and different kind of strug- 
gle: people around the world risking their lives 
against communist despotism. 



themselves, the less need will there be 
for more direct American involvement 
to keep the peace. 

Americans have always responded 
with courage when overwhelming 
danger called for an immediate, all-out 
national effort. But the harder task is to 
recognize and meet challenges before 
they erupt into major crises, before they 
represent an immediate threat, and 
before they require an all-out effort. We 
have many possible responses that fall 
between the extremes of inaction and 
the direct use of military force— but we 
must be willing to use them, or else we 
will inevitably face the agonizing choice 
between those two extremes. 

Economic and security assistance is 
one of those crucial means of avoiding 
and deterring bigger threats. It is also 
vital support to those friendly nations on 
the front line— like Pakistan, Thailand, 
or Honduras and Costa Rica— whose 
security is threatened by Soviet and 
proxy efforts to export their system. 

Third, we should support the 
forces of freedom in communist 
totalitarian states. We must not suc- 
cumb to the fashionable thinking that 
democracy has enemies only on the 
right, that pressures and sanctions are 
fine against rightwing dictators but not 
against leftwing totalitarians. We should 
support the aspirations for freedom of 
peoples in communist states just as we 
want freedom for people anywhere else. 
For example, without raising false 
hopes, we have a duty to make it 
clear— especially on the anniversary of 
the Yalta conference— that the United 
States will never accept the artificial 
division of Europe into free and not 
free. This has nothing to do with boun- 
daries and everything to do with ideas 
and governance. Our radios will continue 



In contrast to the Soviets and their 
allies, the United States is committed to 
the principles of international law. The 
UN and OAS Charters reaffirm the in- 
herent right of individual and collective 
self-defense against aggression— aggres- 
sion of the kind committed by the 
Soviets in Afghanistan, by Nicaragua in 
Central America, and by Vietnam in 
Cambodia. Material assistance to those 
opposing such aggression can be a 
lawful form of collective self-defense. 
Moral and political support, of course, is 
a longstanding and honorable American 
tradition— as is our humanitarian 
assistance for civilians and refugees in 
war-torn areas. 

Most of what we do to promote 
freedom is, and should continue to be, 
entirely open. Equally, there are efforts 
that are most effective when handled 
quietly. Our Founding Fathers were 
sophisticated men who understood the 
necessity for discreet actions; after the 
controversies of the 1970s, we now have 
a set of procedures agreed between the 
President and Congress for overseeing 
such special programs. In a democracy, 
clearly, the people have a right to know 
and to shape the overall framework and 
objectives that guide all areas of policy. 
In those few cases where national 
security requires that the details are bet- 
ter kept confidential, Congi-ess and the 
President can work together to ensure 
that what is done remains consistent 
with basic American principles. 

Do we really have a choice? In the 
1970s, a European leader proposed to 
Brezhnev that peaceful coexistence 
should extend to the ideological sphere. 
Brezhnev responded firmly that this was 
impossible, that the ideological struggle 
continued even in an era of detente, and 



prll1985 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



that the Soviet Union would forever sup- 
port "national liberation" movements. 
The practical meaning of that is clear. 
When Soviet Politburo member Gor- 
bachev was in London recently, he af- 
firmed that Nicaragua had gained in- 
dependence only with the Sandinista 
takeover. The Soviets and their proxies 
thus proceed on the theory that any 
country not Marxist-Leninist is not truly 
independent, and, therefore, the supply 
of money, arms, and training to over- 
throw its government is legitimate. 

Again: "What's mine is mine. What's 
yours is up for grabs." This is the 
Brezhnev doctrine. 

So long as communist dictatorships 
feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in 
the name of "socialist internationalism," 
why must the democracies, the target of 
this threat, be inhibited from defending 
their own interests and the cause of 
democracy itself? 

How can we as a country say to a 
young Afghan, Nicaraguan, or Cambo- 
dian: "Learn to live with oppression; 
only those of us who already have free- 
dom deserve to pass it on to our 
children." How can we say to those 
Salvadorans who stood so bravely in line 
to vote: "We may give you some 
economic and military aid for self- 
defense, but we will also give a free 
hand to the Sandinistas who seek to 
undermine your new democratic institu- 
tions." 

Some try to evade this moral issue 
by the relativistic notion that "one man's 
freedom fighter is another man's ter- 
rorist." This is nonsense. There is a self- 
evident difference between those 
fighting to impose tyranny and those 
fighting to resist it. In El Salvador, pro- 
communist guerrillas backed by the 
Soviet bloc are waging war against a 
democratically elected government; in 
Nicaragua and elsewhere, groups seek- 
ing democracy are resisting the tighten- 
ing grip of totalitarians seeking to sup- 
press democracy. The essence of 
democracy is to offer means for peaceful 
change, legitimate political competition, 
and redress of grievances. Violence 
directed against democracy is, therefore, 
fundamentally lacking in legitimacy. 

What we should do in each situation 
must, of necessity, vary. But it must 
always be clear whose side we are 
on — the side of those who want to see a 
world based on respect for national in- 
dependence, for freedom and the rule of 
law, and for human rights. Wherever 
possible, the path to that world should 
be through peaceful and political means; 
but where dictatorships use brute power 
to oppress their own people and 
threaten their neighbors, the forces of 
freedom cannot place their trust in 
declarations alone. 



Central America 

Nowhere are both the strategic and the 
moral stakes clearer than in Central 
America. 

The Sandinista leaders in Nicaragua 
are moving quickly, with Soviet-bloc and 
Cuban help, to consolidate their 
totalitarian power. Should they achieve 
this primary goal, we could confront a 
second Cuba in this hemisphere, this 
time on the Central American main- 
land—with all the strategic dangers that 
this implies. If history is any guide, the 
Sandinistas would then intensify their 
efforts to undermine neighboring 
governments in the name of their 
revolutionary principles — principles 
which Fidel Castro himself flatly reaf- 
firmed on American television a few 
weeks ago. Needless to say, the first 
casualty of the consolidation of San- 
dinista power would be the freedom and 
hopes for democracy of the Nicaraguan 
people. The second casualty would be 
the security of Nicaragua's neighbors 
and the security of the entire region. 

I do not believe anyone in the 
United States wants to see this 
dangerous scenario unfold. Yet there are 
those who would look the other way, im- 
agining that the problem will disappear 
by itself. There are those who would 
grant the Sandinistas a peculiar kind of 
immunity in our legislation— in effect, 
enacting the Brezhnev doctrine into 
American law. 

The logic of the situation in Central 
America is inescapable. 

• The Sandinistas are committed 
Marxist-Leninists; it would be foolish of 
us and insulting to them to imagine that 
they do not believe in their proclaimed 
goals. They will not modify or bargain 
away their position unless there is com- 
pelling incentive for them to do so. 

• The only incentive that has proved 
effective thus far comes from the 
vigorous armed opposition of the many 
Nicaraguans who seek freedom and 
democratic government. 

• The pressures of the armed 
resistance have diverted Sandinista 
energies and resources away from ag- 
gression against its neighbor El 
Salvador, thus helping to disrupt guer- 
rilla plans for a major offensive there 
last fall. 

• If the pressure of the armed 
resistance is removed, the Sandinistas 
will have no reason to compromise; all 
U.S. diplomatic efforts— and those of the 
Contadora group— will be undermined. 

Central America's hopes for peace, 
security, democracy, and economic prog- 
ress will not be realized unless there is a 
fundamental change in Nicaraguan 
behavior in four areas. 



First, Nicaragua must stop playing 
the role of surrogate for the Soviet 
Union and Cuba. As long as there are 
large numbers of Soviet and Cuban 
security and military personnel in 
Nicaragua, Central America will be em- 
broiled in the East- West conflict. 

Second, Nicaragua must reduce its 
armed forces, now in excess of 100,000, 
to a level commensurate with its 
legitimate security needs— a level com- 
parable to those of its neighbors. The 
current imbalance is incompatible with 
regional stability. 

Third, Nicaragua must absolutely 
and definitively stop its support for in- 
surgents and terrorists in the region. Al 
of Nicaragua's neighbors, and particular 
ly El Salvador, have felt the brunt of 
Sandinista efforts to destabilize their 
governments. No country in Central 
America will be secure as long as this 
continues. 

And fourth, the Sandinistas must 
live up to their commitments to 
democratic pluralism made to the OAS 
in 1979. The internal Nicaraguan opposi 
tion groups, armed and unarmed, repre- 
sent a genuine political force that is en- 
titled to participate in the political proc- 
esses of the country. It is up to the 
Government of Nicaragua to provide the 
political opening that will allow their 
participation. 

We will note and welcome such a 
change in Nicaraguan behavior no mat- 
ter how it is obtained. Whether it is 
achieved through the multilateral Con- 
tadora negotiations, through unilateral I 
actions taken by the Sandinistas alone j 
or in concert with their domestic op- 
ponents, or through the collapse of the 
Sandinista regime is immaterial to us. i 
But without such a change of behavior, | 
lasting peace in Central America will be 
impossible. 

The democratic forces in Nicaragua 
are on the front line in the struggle for 
progress, security, and freedom in Cen- 
tral America. Our active help for them i; 
the best insurance that their efforts will 
be directed consistently and effectively 
toward these objectives. 

But the bottom line is this: those 
who would cut off these freedom 
fighters from the rest of the democratic 
world are, in effect, consigning 
Nicaragua to the endless darkness of 
communist tyranny. And they are 
leading the United" States down a path 
of greater danger. For if we do not takei 
the appropriate steps now to pressure 
the Sandinistas to live up to their past 
promises — to cease their arms buildup, 
to stop exporting tyranny across their 
borders, to open Nicaragua to the com- 
petition of freedom and democracy- 
then we may find later, when we can no 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



onger avoid acting, that the stakes will 
je higher and the costs greater. 

Whatever options we choose, we 
nust be true to our principles and our 
listory. As President Reagan said 
•ecently: 

It behooves all of us who believe in 
lemocratic government, in free elections, in 
he respect for human rights to stand side by 
,ide with those who share our ideals, 
ispecially in Central America. We must not 
)ermit those heavily armed by a far away 
lictatorship to undermine their neighbors and 
.0 stamp out democratic alternatives at 
lome. We must have the same solidarity with 



those who struggle for democracy, as our 
adversaries do with those who would impose 
communist dictatorship. 

We must, in short, stand firmly in 
the defense of our interests and prin- 
ciples and the rights of peoples to live in 
freedom. The forces of democracy 
around the world merit our standing 
with them, to abandon them would be a 
shameful betrayal— a betrayal not only 
of brave men and women but of our 
highest ideals. 



'Press release 29. 



3uestion-and-Answer Session Following 
Commonwealth Club Address 



Secretary Shultz held a question-and- 
mswer session with the audience at the 
oncliLsion of his address before the Com- 
nonwealth Club of California in San 
^randsco on February 22, 1985.^ 

b. In connection with support for the 
■ontras in Nicaragua, in an effort to 
lestabilize the Sandinista government 
inless it changes its present direction, 
low will this plan square with the 
Soland amendment prohibiting fund- 
ng? 

A. Of course, at the present time, 
here is no U.S. funding to support the 
>eople fighting for freedom in 
Nicaragua. It has been cut off by the 
'ongress. The Boland amendment ap- 
ilied to a continuing resolution in 1983, 
•nd the restrictions that presently apply 
re of a different sort. 

Q. Could you elaborate on the dif- 
•erence between a freedom fighter and 
terrorist, in the State Department's 
lew? [Laughter] 

A. I tried to do that, and I've tried 
do that on many occasions; and I 
ecognize that the question tantalizes 
leople and titillates them as well, I see. 
Laughter] 

If you have a country that has a 
lemocratic form of government, then 
hose who want to have change, of 
ifhatever sort, have a legitimatized and 
iroper method of trying to bring it 
.bout. So, an effort through violence to 
iring about change in another way is il- 
Bgitimate: it is terrorism. 

Terrorism is a method of seeking to 
iring about change that employs an ef- 
ort to frighten people, to cause them to 
eel that the situation is out of control. 



It attacks civilian targets. It hits people 
who have no connection, necessarily, 
with whatever it is that the terrorists 
may think is their true objective. 

People who are fighting for freedom 
are, by definition, in a situation where 
freedom doesn't exist, where there is a 
dictatorship — a dictatorship in being, or 
as in the case of Nicaragua, a dictator- 
ship seeking to impose itself more and 
more completely. And people are resist- 
ing that. 

Those are freedom fighters — 
whether they are in Afghanistan, 
resisting Soviet direct invasion; in Cam- 
bodia, where their country has been 
decimated by the Vietnamese. 
Remember in this counry those people 
who exalted Ho Chi Minh? And they can 
see what the Vietnamese are doing. The 
same in Nicaragua; the same in many 
parts of the world. 

So I think that the notion of free- 
dom fighter should be an exalted one, 
and it's a perversion of our language and 
a perversion of morality to equate them 
in any manner with the sort of terrorism 
that we see operating in many parts of 
the world. [Applause] 

Q. What are the freedom fighters 
in racist South Africa? Will this Ad- 
ministration ever recognize and aid in 
any way the victims of apartheid? [Ap- 
plause] 

A. This Administration and the 
President find apartheid abhorrent. We 
say so publicly here; we say so publicly 
in South Africa. We say so privately. 
We make no ifs, ands, and buts about it. 

We also engage with the South 
African Government on that basis to try 
to persuade them that there must be a 



better way, there must be change to a 
different system — one which recognizes 
people as people, regardless of their col- 
or. We support people in South 
Africa — the blacks in South Africa — in 
all sorts of ways. Through educational 
help, our U.S. firms, businesses, that 
operate in South Africa have provided a 
model in employment through the 
Sullivan principles, among other ways. 
And I might say the blacks in South 
Africa want American investment to 
stay there. They see the positive results 
and the jobs that it brings. 

I met with the Chief of the Zulu 
tribe, Mr. Buthelezi, the other day. 
Referring to a Senator who had been 
traveling in South Africa, he said, "Who 
is this white man who wants to tell us 
that we shouldn't have these jobs?" 
[Laughter and applause] 

So we are trying to help people. We 
recognize their plight; we recognize the 
justice of their cause. And we feel that 
the way to help them is to hang in there 
and be engaged and work at it — not to 
just throw up our hands and say, "We 
don't like the situation" and walk away. 
That's not going to do any good. 

And, as a matter of fact, over the 
past 4 or 5 years, there has been a con- 
siderable amount of change. I don't 
mean to imply at all that the situation is 
remotely satisfactory, but there has 
been movement. We welcome it, and we 
encourage it. [Applause] 

Q. When there is a changing of the 
guard at the Kremlin, do you believe it 
will remain with the older generation 
or be passed on to the next genera- 
tion? If the younger, would it be to 
our benefit? 

A. I don't know. [Laughter and ap- 
plause] 

Q. Please comment on your rela- 
tions with Mr. Gromyko. [Laughter] 

A. I've had a great number of 
meetings with Mr. Gromyko. He's an 
able, experienced person. We've had 
some very stormy meetings, particularly 
a meeting in Madrid shortly after the 
Soviet Union shot down a Korean 
airliner— not only shot it down, but Mr. 
Gromyko in Madrid said, "We'd do it 
again." They showed no remorse. And 
we had, I can assure you, one stormy 
meeting. 

We've also had many meetings that 
have been basically nonpolemical, 
straightforward, and worthwhile. In 
terms of our personal relationship, I 
consider it to be perfectly fine. 

I can remember the first meeting we 
had when I was Secretary of State. I 
had known him from the last time I was 



Vpril1985 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



in governmeni. It was in September 
1982, and we had two separate meetings 
on two separate days. And at the end of 
the first meeting, we agreed that we 
ought to set ourselves a little agenda for 
the second one, try to find a few areas 
where we thought it might be possible to 
find a common interest and work con- 
structively together. And we did that. 

One of the areas we picked out was 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapon 
capability. Both of us felt strongly about 
that. And, as it turned out, as a result of 
the push that we each gave this subject, 
there has been a series of very fruitful 
meetings on that subject between the 
two governments. I must say that I 
noticed this morning that the Soviet 
Union agreed to on-site inspection of at 
least some of their nonmilitary nuclear 
facilities, and I think that's progress. 

We have had a lot to argue about, 
and we have argued vigorously, and we 
have found some points of agreement. 

We managed to agree in Geneva on 
the resumption of negotiations that will 
start on March 12th. I believe that as we 
conduct this very important, very dif- 
ficult relationship with the U.S.S.R. that 
it's important for us to have decency in 
our behavior toward our opposite 
numbers. But it's also important for us 
always to remember this country as our 
adversary — always to remember our in- 
terests very clearly. When we talk about 
arms control, we'd like to have an agree- 
ment, but a bad agreement is not in our 
interests. We don't want a bad agree- 
ment, we want a good agreement. And 
also to remember always that our rela- 
tionship with them is not simply one in- 
volving arms control. 

We need to remind them continuous- 
ly, as we all do and I do, that their 
treatment of many human beings— par- 
ticularly, Jews in the Soviet Union— is 
entirely unacceptable to us and to keep 
probing and asking about that. 

We need to keep pointing out to 
them how detrimental their behavior in 
many parts of the world— and I've 
talked about them here today— how 
disruptive it is to world peace and 
stability. 

And we also need to be working 
with them on areas of bilateral in- 
terest—in terms of trade and space and 
one thing and another that we historical- 
ly have been able to work with them 
on— and try to develop, to the extent we 
can, a constructive relation with them. 

But I think underneath it all, we 
must remember that the keys are, first, 
let's always be realistic— never wish- 
ful—and be willing to say, squarely and 
frankly, what we believe the truth to be. 



And, second, we better be strong. Don't 
kid yourself; weakness will not get us 
anywhere with the Soviet Union — not 
with Mr. Gromyko, not with Mr. 
Gorbachev, not with Mr Romanov, not 
with Mr. Chernenko; nor did it with Mr. 
Brezhnev nor any of the predecessors. 
[Applause] 

Q. To what extent are Russia and 
its satellites supporting Sandinista 
covert action in El Salvador and Hon- 
duras? 

A. The supplies that flow into 
Nicaragua — some of which find their 
way into El Salvador and perhaps other 
countries— come from the Soviet Union 
or the Soviet bloc. We know that, could 
take pictures of the ships; we trace them 
as they go along. It's public information; 
there isn't any question about it what- 
ever. 

For some time the Soviets seemed 
to have the idea that sending these sup- 
plies in ships of other countries, such as 
Bulgaria, was the way to do it; but late- 
ly they've been sending their supplies in 
Soviet ships directly. So there isn't any 
ambiguity about the answer to the ques- 
tion. 

Q. Why doesn't the U.S. Govern- 
ment withdraw all support from the 
Government of Chile until they have 
democratic elections? 

A. I don't know exactly what sup- 
port there is to withdraw. I would say 
that Chile is being run by a dictatorship. 
It has had periods in which it seemed 
that constructive change was underway. 
It ran for a while one of the most in- 
teresting free market economies around 
that was quite successful for a time. 

Rigiit now the regime seems to have 
slipped back into a disappointingly 
repressive phase, with a state of siege 
being maintained. But we will stay 
engaged with Chile. The Chilean people 
are a wonderful people with a demo- 
cratic tradition. We can hope that, even 
as the present Constitution calls for, at 
least eventually they may return to a 
democratic form of government. In any 
case, we will keep working at that and 
trying to help bring it about. 

Q. Why are private citizens, who 
are not elected officials or appointed 
officials and do not represent the 
United States, permitted to go to 
Beirut, Cuba, et cetera, and bargain 
with those respective leaders to let 
out hostages, et cetera? And what is 
the State Department doing to get 
American hostages released in 
Lebanon? 



A. As far as the problem of 
hostages, Americans held 
anywhere — and there are now still four 
that were seized in Lebanon — we work 
tirelessly in an effort to get them re- 
leased. And we make it very clear to 
those we believe are responsible for 
holding them that if harm comes to 
them, we will hold those parties respon- 
sible, and we will do something about it. 

But our efforts, I can assure you, 
are tireless— some public, mostly 
private, diplomatic efforts — and we 
never forget those who have been seizec 
and want to help them in every way tha 
we can. 

As far as private citizens and their 
efforts are concerned, of course private 
citizens have a right to go. And I think 
Mrs. Levin, for example, did quite a lot, 
in collaboration with us, in trying to 
work for the release of her husband. 

I do think, when it comes to broadei 
efforts to represent the U.S. Govern- 
ment, that it is a bad idea for people nol 
operating under the authority of the 
President to try to represent the United 
States, because the President is elected 
to do that and you can only have one 
President at a time. 

It is a problem for us in this coun- 
try, because I think all 100 Senators, 
and most of the Congressmen, consider 
themselves to be candidates for Presi- 
dent. [Laughter] And sometimes they 
think they already are there. [Laughter] 

But, on the whole, I think people do 
understand this point. And I notice, par 
ticularly, when it comes, for example, tc 
our dealings with the Soviet Union that 
on both sides of the aisle there is a grea 
care taken, and when someone is going 
to go to Moscow, they generally let us i 
know. We tell them what we know of ' 
the situation, what we would like to see 
represented. They without fail debrief 
and tell us what took place in their con- 
versations. And I think, on the whole, 
Americans are very responsible about 
these things. 

Q. Do we have a policy that 
reflects how we want the Israeli- 
Lebanon conflict to be resolved? And, 
if so, what is it? 

A. We have had clear objectives in 
Lebanon. We want to see a sovereign, 
independent Lebanon. We'd like to see ii 
free of all foreign forces. And we would 
like to see a Lebanon constituted in sucl' 
a way that activities in southern 
Lebanon are not a threat to the peace 
and security of people living in northern 
Israel. 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Those have been our objectives. 
They've been consistent. And, of course, 
;he condition in Lebanon and the way its 
•elationships develop are part and parcel 
)f the whole Middle East puzzle. 

We worked very hard, as we all 
enow here; and we suffered some very 
leavy losses that leave us very dis- 
;ressed. But those have been our objec- 
;ives all along. 

As far as the current situation, we 
ire glad to see the Israelis withdrawing. 
\\'e would like to see that withdrawal 
:ake place through some form of 
legotiation, so that a possible role for 
JNIFIL [UN Interim Force in Lebanon] 
s defined and the stability that a 
iesignated role could add would be put 
;here — and that there would be an 
orderly process, an understood process, 
)f turning over strong points as the 
sraeli Army leaves and other forces 
;ake up key posts. 

Despite a great deal of flexibility on 
;he part of Israel in trying to work these 
■natters out, there has been, I think it's 
'air to say, great intransigence on the 
)ther side in recent weeks and months. 
i\.nd so there isn't in prospect right 
now — although this may change — any 
negotiated outcome. The Israelis are 
imply pulling back unilaterally. 

And, of course, in the end, as they. 
firaw their forces completely out of the 
lountry, if there are no negotiated ar- 
rangements to provide security for their 
northern border, they will have to figure 
>ut unilaterally what they will do about 
he attacks that have historically come 
rem southern Lebanon into northern 
I'srael. That's the reason why we think a 
legotiated withdrawal program is better 
han a unilateral one, in that arrange- 
nents having to do with security would 
)e put in place. Otherwise I'm afraid 
here will be security obtained, accom- 
)anied by a very great amount of ten- 
;ion and potential for continual out- 
)reaks on the border. 

Q. In light of the growing opposi- 
ion to the Marcos regime in the 
Philippines, will the United States 
.continue to support Marcos? 

A. Yes. Ferdinand Marcos is the 
legitimate head of the Philippine Gov- 
jrnment, and we will deal with him. 

We will also be working in every 
way that we can to build up and 
legitimatize — help the Philippines 
iegitimatize — all manner of processes 
;hat are the means of selecting leader- 
ship in a country. 

So we supported very strongly, the 
second board that investigated the 
Aquino murder, feeling that the first 



was not really an expression of a proper 
rule of law, and the second was. 

We supported the use of arrange- 
ments for the elections held some 
months ago, so that they would be as 
democratic and t)pen and free as possi- 
ble. And they turned out to be pretty 
good elections. 

We support having the army be pro- 
fessionalized, not politicized, so that, on 
the one hand, it can be an effective force 
in countering the communist insurgency 
that is gathering in the Philippines, and, 
on the other hand, as respectful of the 
democratic process and the importance 
of civilian rule. 

We're working constantly to try to 
keep these processes alive and help them 



flourish so that whenever a transition 
comes, it comes through processes of 
this kind, and people retiiin their con- 
fidence that there are democratically 
based |)rocedures through which leader- 
ship should be cho.sen. 

Q. How does a hard-working Sec- 
retary of State, such as yourself, get 
such a great tan | laughter and ap- 
plause], and why don't you have an 
ulcer? [Laughter] 

A. I don't know about the answer to 
the second, but the answer to the first 
is, that you got, to goof off once in a 
while. [Laughter and standing applause] 



'Press release 29A of Feb. 2.5, 198.5, 



The Importance of 

the MX Peacekeeper Missile 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
February 26. 1985. ' 

I welcome this opportunity to appear 
before you to speak in support of the 
President's program of strategic mod- 
ernization. 'This subject is of enormous 
importance to our diplomacy because of 
the direct impact of strategic moderniza- 
tion on our national security, our arms 
control objectives, and our most fun- 
damental foreign policy goals. 

Strategic Modernization 
and Foreign Policy 

As Secretary of State, I am acutely con- 
scious of the strength or weakness of 
American power because it directly af- 
fects our ability to achieve our most fun- 
damental goals: the defense of our 
values and our interests and the con- 
struction of a safer, freer, and more 
prosperous world. Power and diplomacy 
are not separate dimensions of policy; 
they are inextricably linked together. 

That is why I am here today to urge 
support for strategic modernization and, 
in particular, for the MX Peacekeeper 
missile program which is a central pillar 
of that modernization. 

As leader of the democratic nations, 
we have an inescapable responsibility to 
maintain the strategic balance— and only 
we can maintain it. If our determination 
flags, we shake the confidence of our 
friends and allies around the world; we 
weaken the cohesion of our alliances. If 



we in America are strong and united in 
our commitment to peace and interna- 
tional security, then those who rely on 
us, and upon whom we rely, have the 
confidence to move together with us 
toward our shared goals. 

Modernization of our strategic forces 
is essential. The Soviet strategic buildup 
has continued relentlessly. Since we 
deployed our most modern type of 
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], 
the Minuteman III, the Soviet Union has 
deployed f/iree new types of ICBMs— the 
SS-17, -18, and -19— including 360 
SS-19s roughly comparable in size to 
the MX, each with 6 warheads, and 308 
of the much larger SS-18, each with 10 
warheads. Moreover, within the next 2 
years, the Soviets will begin deploying 
two additional new types— the SS-X-24 
and -25. This means five new Soviet 
ICBMs compared to one— the MX— for 
the United States. 

A credible, flexible American 
strategic posture is vital to the stable 
balance of power on which peace and 
security rest. And the MX is a vital ele- 
ment of that stable balance. It repre- 
.sents the response that four successive 
administrations— both Democratic and 
Republican— have believed necessary to 
offset, at least partially, the formidable 
Soviet ICBM arsenal. It was permitted 
by the SALT II Treaty, and, indeed, its 
contribution to the strategic balance was 
one of the premises on which that treaty 
was based. The bipartisan Scowcroft 
commission concluded, and I am con- 
vinced, that the MX remains an essential 



April 1985 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



component of a modernized strategic 
triad. 

If the Soviets could strike effectively 
at our land-based ICBMs, while our own 
land-based deterrent lacked any com- 
parable capability, they might believe 
that they had a significant advantage in 
a crucial dimension of the strategic 
balance; they could seek to gain political 
leverage by a threat of nuclear black- 
mail. Such a crucial imbalance in 
strategic capabilities could well make 
them bolder in a regional conflict or in a 
major crisis. As the Scowcroft commis- 
sion put it: 

A one-sided strategic condition in which 
the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the 
whole range of strategic targets in the 
United States, but we could not effectively 
destroy a similar range of targets in the 
Soviet Union, would be extremely unstable 
over the long run [and] would clearly not 
serve the cause of peace. 

We must move ahead with deploy- 
ment of the MX now because it repre- 
sents a credible deterrent today. After 
years of planning and billions of dollars 
in effort, only the MX offers a way 
toward redressing the serious strategic 
imbalance now. 

Many critics of the MX have focused 
on the issue of MX basing in relationship 
to survivability. There are three points I 
wish to make. 

First, Soviet planners, in the uncer- 
tainty of war, would have to take into 
account that some of our MX missiles 
would survive attack and would be used 
to retaliate against those targets the 
Soviets value most highly, including 
Soviet missiles held in reserve for fur- 
ther attacks against our country. 

Second, the survivability of the MX 
must be viewed in conjunction with the 
other elements of our strategic triad. 
The three legs of the triad— bombers, 
submarines, and land-based ballistic mis- 
siles—strengthen deterrence by greatly 
complicating Soviet planning. If the 
Soviets were to contemplate an all-out 
attack, they would be forced to make 
choices that would significantly reduce 
their effectiveness against one leg of the 
triad in order to attack another. For ex- 
ample, it is not possible to attack our 
bomber bases and our ICBM silos 
simult<'ineously, without allowing certain 
retaliation. Indeed, deterrence rests 
upon the Soviet planners knowing they 
cannot contemplate a successful, dis- 
arming first strike. 

Third, silo hardening can be im- 
proved significantly in the future and 
thereby increase the survivability for the 
MX force. The Scowcroft commission 



reported on this capability, and the Con- 
gress has funded its research. The pros- 
pects are firm and promising and will 
ensure the MX will remain a key ele- 
ment of the triad far into the future. 

Additionally, it is important to 
understand that the whole of our 
strategic triad is greater than the sum 
of the individual parts. Viewed in the 
full context, the MX will strengthen the 
whole of our triad, on which our security 
has rested for many years, and, in so 
doing, it will strengthen the fabric of 
deterrence and peace. 

Strategic Modernization 
and Arms Control 

At this moment, the MX program plays 
a pivotal role in advancing our arms con- 
trol goals as well. One thing we have 
learned over the years is that the 
Soviets respect strength and firmness. I 
am convinced that our firmness and th t 
of our allies in the last few years— in 
proceeding with INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] deployments and 
resisting Soviet efforts to drive a wedge 
between the allies— persuaded the 
Soviets that they could not achieve their 
objectives by political pressure, that they 
could not sit back and wait for unilateral 
concessions, but they must bargain at 
the table instead. 

Thanks to the West's cohesion and 
determination over this period— and 
thanks to Congress' bipartisan support 
for the strategic modernization program 
over the past 3 years— our negotiating 
position today is strong. The Soviets 
must realize that we have the will to 
protect our security in the absence of 
arms control agreements and that it is 
in their interest, as much as ours, to 
seek ways to reduce nuclear arsenals 
and the dangers of war. This basis of 
strength improves the prospects for suc- 
cessful negotiations. 

These new weapons are not 
"bargaining chips"; they are part of the 
very strength on which real bargaining 
rests. They represent much-needed 
modernization, consistent with existing 
arms control agreements; they are an 
essential element of our deterrent 
posture; and they are the foundation on 
which an effective and balanced arms 
control regime can be built. 



Jegotiating With Strength and Unity 

As you know, a new round of arms con- 
trol ne^'otiations is about to begin in 
Geneva. The American people and their 
government— the Congress and the 
President— all share the hope that these 
negotiations will bear fruit. We must be 
prepared to defend our ideals and in- 
terests whether negotiations are suc- 
cessful or not. The United States has, 
however, long sought a more construc- 
tive and productive relationship with the 
Soviet Union. We emphasized through- 
out 1984 the importance of resuming a 
U.S. -Soviet dialogue aimed at reductions 
in nuclear arsenals. 

The year 1985 has begun on a 
positive note. The outcome of the 
January meetings with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko marked a potentially important 
beginning. The agreement to start new 
negotiations in Geneva on March 12 
brings the resumption of the dialogue on 
the most important strategic issues now 
facing our two nations. We will use 
these negotiations to discuss fully our 
views on the evolution of strategic deter- 
rence, including our hope that the 
Strategic Defense Initiative research will 
allow us to move to a new strategic en- 
vironment, based on defense and not 
simply the prospect of mutually assured 
destruction. We are now engaged in a 
process that can produce beneficial 
results for the United States, for our 
allies, and for world peace and security. 

Success, however, will require firm- 
ness and determination, a degree of 
flexibility, and a degree of caution. It 
will also require something even more 
basic: unity at home on the importance 
of these requirements and of our fun- 
damental strength. 

As we move toward these negotia- 
tions, we must proceed as a united peo- 
ple. When we sit down at the table to 
discuss these questions with the Soviet 
Union, it is essential that we speak with 
one voice, that we not present the pic- 
ture of a nation in conflict with itself, 
giving the Soviet Union either openings 
to exploit or false hopes that we will 
make unilateral, unreciprocated conces- 
sions. The negotiations we are about to 
embark upon are between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. We cannot 
and must not allow them to deteriorate 
into negotiations among ourselves. 

The negotiators the President has 
chosen to represent us at Geneva, in- 
cluding your former colleague John 
Tower, are among the most intelligent, 
able men in the land. They are tough 
negotiators. They will represent our 



24 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



AFRICA 



country, defend our interests, and pur- 
sue our goals with skill and dedication. 
In a sense, however, these men are only 
the tip of the pyramid: their work in 
Geneva will be supported by their 
respective delegations and by the exper- 
tise and commitment of hundreds of 
people in the U.S. Government. But the 
real foundation of the whole edifice— on 
which its strength really depends— is the 
(letrree to which they are supported also 
by our Congress and public. Our arms 
control efforts cannot succeed without 
this support. 

This is no time to cast doubt on our 
national resolve. When we send our 
negotiators to the table in Geneva, we 
owe it to them and to our country to 
send thei in with the strongest possible 
negotiate ' position and with the full 
backing . the nation. And that means 
not suggesting unilateral concessions 
that might diminish the incentives the 
Soviets have to talk. That means not 
cutting programs vital to our strategic 
posture. It means coming together 
behind a solid negotiating position that 
offers the best hope for achieving the 
goals I know we all seek. 



Namibia 



'Press release 30. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on February 21, 1985. Mr. 
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs.'- 

I appi eciate this opportunity to appear 
before the subcommittee to discuss U.S. 
policy toward Namibia. Ever since the 
United Nations took up the matter after 
the Second World War, the United 
States has been deeply involved in the 
problem of Namibia, the last major item 
on the agenda of African decolonization. 
In 1966 the United Nations revoked 
South Africa's mandate over Namibia, 
originally granted by the League of Na- 
tions. In 1971 the International Court of 
Justice upheld the UN's authority, deter- 
mined that South Africa's presence in 
Namibia was illegal, and stated that 
South Africa was obligated to withdraw 
immediately. 

We continue to recognize that deci- 
sion, but, of course, the problem is not 
simply one of determining the legalities 
of the situation and issuing condemna- 
tions. Despite earlier attempts by then 
Secretary Kissinger, it was not until the 
development of a consensus on UN 
[Security Council] Resolution 43.5 in 
1978 that the international community 
began a sustained and intensive effort to 
resolve the problem through negotiation 
and diplomacy. The implementation of 
that resolution remains the goal of our 
policy. The resolution provides for free 
elections under UN supervision and 
withdrawal of South African forces from 
the territory. 

The Goal of Namibian Independence 

This Administration strongly supports 
the goal of independence for Namibia 
and has invested a major effort toward 
achieving it. Success would strengthen 
U.S. interest throughout Africa. We 
believe that such a settlement is the 
surest way to end the prolonged suffer- 
ing in Namibia, to reduce the oppor- 
tunities for outside interference, and, 
finally, to build sufficient regional 
stability to encourage South Africa to 
undertake with confidence the difficult 
political decisions it faces on the path of 
continued reform at home. 



We have made substantial progress 
toward the goal of Namibian independ- 
ence. Our efforts to resolve the remain- 
ing problems preventing a settlement 
have moved beyond a debate over princi- 
ple and into a new phase of practical 
bargaining about a potential settlement 
package. 

Picking up from the failed Geneva 
conference of January 1981, we and our 
contact group partners (the United 



Atlantic I *"'®'''* i «M9iAj 
Ocean 




Kingdom, France, West Germany, and 
Canada) obtained South Africa's recom- 
mitment to arrangements for bringing 
about Namibian independence under UN 
Resolution 435. We then achieved a sig- 
nificant further strengthening of Resolu- 
tion 435 through a series of understand- 
ings negotiated in 1981-82 concerning: 

• Constitutional principles to guide 
the transitional constituent ?embly; 
and 

• Other arrangements i ating to 
the UN role and presence during the 
transition. 

The only remaining barrier to ob- 
taining South African agreement to im- 
plement Resolution 435 is an acceptable 
agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal 
from Angola. Last year we achieved 
substantial progress toward a resolution 
of that remaining issue. 

The Lusaka Agreement 

A first step was the Lusaka agreement 
signed a year ago, in which the United 
States played a central role. We ex- 
pected that this agreement would give 
new impetus to the negotiations, stop 
the violence between Angolan and South 
African forces, and end the presence of 



April 1985 



25 



AFRICA 



outside forces in southern Angola. Those 
objectives have been essentially 
achieved, and the violence that preceded 
the agreement wras followed by 12 
months of peace and practical coopera- 
tion between Angola and South Africa. 
Last week, the South African Govern- 
ment indicated publicly that the long- 
awaited completion of the disengage- 
ment is near. 

Because the United States was m- 
timately involved in the Lusaka agree- 
ment, both sides agreed that a U.S. 
observer role would be useful. To sup- 
port that U.S. role, a liaison office was 
established on a temporary basis in 
Windhoek, the Namibian administrative 
capital. This office was established with 
the understanding of both the Angolan 
and South African Governments in order 
to support U.S. monitoring of the South 
African-Angolan Joint Military Commis- 
sion which oversees the disengagement 
and to facilitate and complement com- 
munication between the two parties. The 
office has been symbolic of our commit- 
ment to the disengagement and to peace 
in the region. It has played an indis- 
pensable role in furthering our under- 
standing of the security issues under 
consideration in the joint military com- 
mission. Last April, Foreign Service of- 
ficer Dennis Keogh and U.S. Army Lt. 
Col. Kenneth Crabtree gave their lives 
to support our commitment. With the 
disengagement effort now near comple- 
tion, there is a diminished need for U.S. 
monitoring from Windhoek, and the 
operation there has now been sus- 
pended. We are, nevertheless, maintain- 
ing the office facilities, and we are keep- 
ing open the possibility of sending U.S. 
personnel back to the office, should 
events again require us to do so. Mean- 
while, we will continue to monitor the 
disengagement closely and will, if 
necessary, travel to the area. 

The Lusaka agreement of last Feb- 
ruary built sufficient mutual confidence 
to permit the negotiations to enter into 
a new phase. Late last summer, it 
became clear that we had moved beyond 
the stage of rhetorical debate on the 
issue of "linkage"— whether Cuban troop 
withdrawal and Namibian independence 
should be related. Cuban troop with- 
drawal is— as a practical matter, and 
with the support of all concerned— being 
discussed in the context of the imple- 
mentation of Resolution 435. In October, 
the Angolan Government, for the first 
time, put a detailed and concrete 
negotiating proposal on the table. This 
major step forward was followed by a 
South African proposal a month later. 



There is agreement between South 
Africa and Angola on a number of broad 
principles. The main issue now is re- 
solving the practical question of the tim- 
ing of Cuban troop withdrawal in rela- 
tion to Resolution 435 so that the essen- 
tial requirements of both parties can be 
addressed. The United States, as 
mediator, has been conducting a quiet 
but continuous shuttle diplomacy be- 
tween the two sides, encouraging them 
to consider ways to expand the common 
ground between them. This is, by defini- 
tion, the kind of negotiation that is best 
conducted privately, but we can certain- 
ly say that we have made considerable 
headway and that both sides seem com- 
mitted to serious negotiations. We are 
determined to do our part to actively ex- 
plore ways to bring the two sides to- 
gether. 

The only acceptable basis for such a 
settlement is UN Resolution 435. We 
hear reports from time to time that 
thought is being given in South Africa 
and Namibia to exploring alternatives to 
Resolution 435 in order to accelerate the 
independence process by shelving the 
Cuban issue and changing the basic pro- 
visions of the UN plan. The U.S. 
Government does not believe there is 
substance to such reports, since it is 
most unlikely that a settlement diverg- 
ing from that plan would gain interna- 
tional acceptance. As an originator and 
sponsor of Resolution 435, the United 
States has no intention of backing away 
from it. Moreover, it is our clear impres- 
sion from our contacts with South 
Africa and the front-line states that 
their commitments to the plan remain 
valid. We maintain an active exchange 
with the UN Secretary General and his 
staff on these and other issues in the 
negotiations in order to assure that we 
are fully updated on the positions of the 
many parties involved and to encourage 
necessary planning so that implementa- 
tion can proceed when agreement is 
reached. 

Internal Problems in Namibia 

These negotiations are directly related 
to our perception of the internal prob- 
lems in Namibia. A negotiated settle- 
ment is the only way to end the continu- 
ing political frustration of the Namibian 
people, expressed openly by political par- 
ties and leaders inside Namibia as well 
as outside. It will, we hope, also end the 
frequent serious violations of human 
rights in Namibia stemming from official 
policies and from the armed contlict be- 
tween South African and SWAPO 
[South West Africa People's Organiza- 



tion] forces. We are striving for an in- 
ternationally acceptable settlement that 
will end the fighting and result in the 
termination of South Africa's occupation 
of the territory. This is not, however, to 
say that ending the violations of human 
rights in Namibia should await a 
negotiated settlement. These violations 
can and should be dealt with now. 
Namibia differs from South Africa in 
that the formal system of apartheid was 
ended in 1978, although de facto segre- 
gation persists in many areas. Charges 
that police and security forces torture 
prisoners continue to be voiced by Nami- 
bian leaders. Both government security 
units and SWAPO are reported to have 
murdered opponents. SWAPO increas- 
ingly uses bombs or mines in situations 
that result in civilian casualties. 
Curfews, humiliating searches, and 
harassment by security forces greatly af- 
fect the daily lives of individuals living in 
the north. 

The 1984 human rights report for 
Namibia shows a pattern of violations by 
the government in many categories. Ar- 
bitrary detentions without charge are a 
common problem. Numerous individuals 
have been detained, often with no of- 
ficial acknowledgment of the fact. Some 
detainees have been released— notably 
the freeing in May of 1974 of the re- 
maining 75 prisoners from the Mariental 
camp, where they had been held since 
their capture in Angola in 1978. In an 
encouraging move, the South African 
Government released Herman Toivo ja 
Toivo— a long-imprisoned founder 
member of SWAPO— last year. How- 
ever, we have been concerned by new- 
reports of a series of detentions last 
month in the north of Namibia. 

A recent development that received 
widespread attention was the announce-' 
ment of a requirement that all Namibian 
men register for military service. This 
announcement caused concern that all 
elements of the Namibian population 
would be obliged to join local military 
units fighting alongside South African 
forces to maintain South African rule. 
The registration appears to have slowed 
or stopped, but there has still been no 
official announcement that it has ended. 
Last year saw the banning of a critical 
local newspaper and the arrest of an 
outspoken former member of its staff. 
The banning was, however, subsequently 
rescinded and the charges against the 
editor dropped. We have made frequent 
representations to the South African 
Government about human rights abuses, 
and we believe this has been a factor in 
some mitigating actions that the govern- 
ment has Uiken. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



Conclusion 

The negotiations for Namibia's independ- 
ence have— like many multilateral 
negotiations, including the effort to end 
minority rule in Zimbabwe— been pro- 
tracted, and this caused some to con- 
clude that the effort is hopeless. Now, in 
recent months, talks on the remaining 
issues have moved forward. There is still 
difficult bargaining ahead, but the 
negotiations have entered a new and 
more hopeful phase as we seek a 
mutually acceptable compromise. We 
would regard a settlement as a major 
victory for peace and security in the 
region, for our diplomatic efforts, and, 
above all, for the Namibians themselves, 
who have paid a very high price in their 
struggle for self-determination and inde- 
pendence. We are sparing no effort to 
succeed. 



On the Road to 

a More Stable Peace 



'The complete transcript of the hearinjrs 
will be published by the committee and will 
be avaifeble from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
Ifice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council in Philadelphia on February 20. 
1985. Ambassador Nitze is special ad- 
viser to the President and the Secretary 
of State on arms control matters. 

Since the dawn of the nuclear age 40 
years ago, there have been countless 
proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons 
from the face of the Earth. That has 
been the professed objective of both the 
Soviet Union and the United States, but, 
until recently, it has not been a practical 
goal. 

The President is determined to do 
more, to look even now toward a world 
in which nuclear weapons have, in fact, 
been eliminated. The present situa- 
tion — in which the threat of massive 
nuclear retaliation is the ultimate sanc- 
tion, the key element of deterrence, and, 
thus, the basis for security and 
peace — is unsatisfactory. It has kept the 
peace for 40 years, but the potential 
costs of a breakdown are immense and, 
because of continuing massive Soviet 
deployments of both offensive and 
defensive weaponry, are not becoming 
less. If we can, we must find a more 
reliable basis for security and for peace. 

This concern prompted the Presi- 
dent's decision to proceed with the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He 
has directed the scientific community to 
determine if new cost-effective defensive 
technologies are feasible which could be 
introduced into force structures so as to 
produce a more stable strategic relation- 
ship. We envisage, if that search is suc- 
cessful, a cooperative effort with the 
Soviet Union, hopefully leading to an 
agreed transition toward effective non- 
nuclear defenses that might make possi- 
ble the eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons. 

The Strategic Concept 

In preparing for Secretary Shultz's 
January meeting with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, we developed a strategic con- 
cept encompassing our view of how we 
would like to see the U.S. -Soviet 
strategic relationship evolve in the 
future. That concept provides the basis 
for our approach to next month's talks 
in Geneva. It can be summarized in four 
sentences. 



During the next 10 years, the U.S. objec- 
tive is a radical reduction in the power of ex- 
isting and planned offensive nuclear arms, as 
well as the stabilization of the relationship 
between offensive and defensive nuclear 
arms, whether on earth or in space. We are 
even now looking forward to a period of tran- 
sition to a more stable world, with greatly 
reduced Ifvels of nuclear arms and an 
enhanced ability to deter war based upon an 
iticreasing contribution of non-nuclear 
defenses against (jffensive nuclear arms. This 
period of transition could lead to the eventual 
elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive 
and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms 
is an ultimate objective to which we, the 
Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree. 

It would be worthwhile to dwell on 
this concept in some detail. To begin 
with, it entails three time phases: the 
near term, a transition phase, and an 
ultimate phase. 

The Near Term 

For the immediate future— at least the 
next 10 years — we will continue to base 
deterrence on the ultimate threat of 
nuclear retaliation. We have little choice; 
today's technology provides no alter- 
native. 

That being said, we will press for 
radical reductions in the number and 
power of strategic and intermediate- 
range nuclear arms. Offensive nuclear 
arsenals on both sides are entirely too 
high and potentially destructive, par- 
ticularly in the more destabilizing 
categories such as the large MIRVed 
[multiple independently-targetable reen- 
try vehicles] Soviet ICBM [intercontinen- 
tal ballistic missile] and SS-20 forces. 

At the same time, we will seek to 
reverse the erosion that has occurred in 
the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
regime — erosion that has resulted from 
Soviet actions over the last 10 years. 
These include the construction of a large 
phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in 
central Siberia in violation of the ABM 
Treaty's provisions regarding the loca- 
tion and orientation of ballistic missile 
early warning radars. 

For the near term, we will be pur- 
suing the SDI research program— in full 
compliance with the ABM Treaty, which 
permits such research. Likewise, we ex- 
pect the Soviets will continue their in- 
vestigation of the possibilities of new 
defensive technologies, as they have for 
many years. 



iApril1985 



27 



ARMS CONTROL 



We have offered to begin discussions 
in the upcoming Geneva talks with the 
Soviets as to how we might together 
make a transition to a more stable and 
reliable relationship based on an increas- 
ing mix of defensive systems. 

The Transition Period 

Should new defensive technologies prove 
feasible, we would want at some future 
date to begin such a transition, during 
which we would place greater reliance 
on defensive systems for our protection 
and that of our allies. 

The criteria by which we will judge 
the feasibility of such technologies will 
be demanding. The technologies must 
produce defensive systems that are sur- 
vivable; if not, the defenses would 
themselves be tempting targets for a 
first strike. This would decrease rather 
than enhance stability. 

New defensive systems must also be 
cost effective at the margin— that is, 
they must be cheap enough to add addi- 
tional defensive capability so that the 
other side has no incentive to add addi- 
tional offensive capability to overcome 
the defense. If this criterion is not met, 
the defensive systems could encourage a 
proliferation of countermeasures and ad- 
ditional offensive weapons to overcome 
deployed defenses instead of a redirec- 
tion of effort from offense to defense. 

As I said, these criteria are demand- 
ing. If the new technologies cannot meet 
these standards, we are not about to 
deploy them. In the event, we would 
have to continue to base deterrence on 
the ultimate threat of nuclear retalia- 
tion. However, we hope and have expec- 



tfitions that the scientific community can 
respond to the challenge. 

We would see the transition period 
as a cooperative endeavor with the 
Soviets. Arms control would play a 
critical role. We would, for example, en- 
visage continued reductions in offensive 
nuclear arms. 

Concurrently, we would envisage the 
sides beginning to test, develop, and 
deploy survivable and cost-effective 
defenses at a measured pace, with par- 
ticular emphasis on non-nuclear 
defenses. Deterrence would thus begin 
to rely more on a mix of offensive 
nuclear and defensive systems instead of 
on offensive nuclear arms alone. 

The transition would continue for 
some time— perhaps for decades. As the 
U.S. and Soviet strategic and inter- 
mediate-range nuclear arsenals declined 
significantly, we would need to negotiate 
reductions in other types of nuclear 
weapons and involve, in some manner, 
the other nuclear powers. 

The Ultimate Period 

Given the right technical and political 
conditions, we would hope to be able to 
continue the reduction of nuclear 
weapons down to zero. 

The global elimination of nuclear 
weapons would be accompanied by 
widespread deployments of effective 
non-nuclear defenses. These defenses 
would provide assurance that, were one 
country to cheat— for example, by 
clandestinely building ICBMs or shorter 
range systems, such as SS-20s— it 
would not be able to achieve any ex- 
ploitable military advantage. To over- 



MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JAN. 31. 198.5' 

Today in Vienna, members of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact will resume their 
efforts to negotiate reductions of con- 
ventional forces in central Europe. 
These talks on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) are an integral 
and important part of our commitment 
to achieve genuine progress in arms 
reductions — conventional, chemical, and 
nuclear. 

It is clear that a militarily signifi- 
cant, verifiable MBFR agreement is 
possible. Last April the NATO par- 
ticipants tabled a major initiative de- 
signed to break the East- West deadlock. 



We remain hopeful of a constructive 
reply from the Warsaw Pact partici- 
pants. 

Last month the NATO alliance, in its 
ministerial communique, expressed the 
continuing Western commitment to do 
everything possible to achieve a 
verifiable agreement reducing conven- 
tional forces to parity at lower levels. 
Such an agreement would enhance con- 
fidence, improve military stability, and 
reduce the risk of war in Europe. 

On its return to Vienna, the U.S. dele- 
gation will continue to do its part to 
achieve such an agreement. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feh. 4, 198.^i 



come the deployed defenses, cheating 
would have to be on such a large scale 
that there would be sufficient notice so 
that countermeasures could be taken. 

Were we to reach the ultimate 
phase, deterrence would be based on the 
ability of the defense to deny success to 
a potential aggressor's attack. The 
strategic relationship could then be 
characterized as one of mutual assured 
security. 

Comments 

Having thus outlined our strategic con- 
cept, let me offer some comments and 
perhaps anticipate some of your ques- 
tions. 

First, the concept is wholly consist- 
ent with deterrence. In both the transi- 
tion and ultimate phases, deterrence 
would continue to provide the basis for 
the U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship. 

Deterrence requires that a potential 
opponent be convinced that the risks 
and costs of aggression far outweigh the 
gains he might hope to achieve. The 
popular discussion of deterrence has 
focused almost entirely on one 
element— that is. posing to an aggressor 
high potential costs through the ultimate 
threat of nuclear retaliation. 

But deterrence can also function if 
one has the ability, through defense and 
other military means, to deny the at- 
tacker the gains he might otherwise 
have hoped to realize. Our intent is to 
shift the deterrent balance from one 
which is based primarily on the ultimate 
threat of devastating nuclear retaliation 
to one in which non-nuclear defenses 
play a greater and greater role. We 
believe the latter provides a far sounder 
basis for a stable and reliable strategic 
relationship. 

My second comment is that we 
recognize that the transition period— if 
defensive technologies prove feasible 
and we decide to move in that direc- 
tion — could be tricky. We would have to 
avoid a mix of offensive and defensive 
systems that, in a crisis, would give one 
side or the other incentives to strike 
first. That is precisely why we would 
seek to make the transition a coopera- 
tive endeavor with the Soviets and have 
offered, even now, to begin talking with 
them about the issues that would have 
to be dealt with in such a transition. 

My third comment is that we realize 
that a world from which nuclear 
weapons have been eliminated would 
still present major risks. The technique 
of making nuclear weapons is well 
known; that knowledge cannot be ex- 
cised. The danger of breakout or 
cheating would continue. Moreover, 
there would also be the potential prob- 
lem of suitcase nuclear bombs and the 
like. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



But even if all risks cannot be 
jliminated, they can be greatly reduced. 
Nothing is wholly risk free; one must 
compare the alternatives. It seems to me 
:hat the risks posed by cheating or suit- 
case bombs in a world from which 
luclear arms had been eliminated from 
military arsenals would be orders of 
magnitude less than the risks and poten- 
;ial costs posed by a possible breakdown 
n the present deterrence regime based 
ipon the ultimate threat of massive 
luclear retaliation. 

The Geneva Talks 

J.S. and Soviet delegations will meet in 
jeneva in roughly 3 weeks' time to 
Degin negotiations on nuclear and space 
irms. In those talks, we will advance 
positions consistent with and designed to 
hirther the concept I have outlined. 

At the end of January, I was asked 
)y the press whether I was confident 
ibout the outcome of the upcoming 
^Iks. I replied that I was more confi- 
tient than previously— that is, before the 
Geneva meeting between Mr. Shultz and 
Air. Gromyko — but I still wasn't very 
•onfident. We must bear in mind that 
.here are profound differences of ap- 
proach between the two sides. 

In Geneva, Mr. Gromyko stated the 
soviet position clearly and unambiguous- 
ly. It has, since then, been repeated by 
nany Soviet commentators. The Soviets 
nsist on the "nonmilitarization" of space; 
ly that, they mean a ban on all arms in 
■pace that are designed to attack objects 
n space or on Earth and all systems on 
Carth that are designed to attack ob- 
ecls in space. They have expressed op- 
josition to research efforts into such 
ystems, in spite of their own sizable ef- 
orts in this field, which include the only 
■urrently operational ABM and anti- 
.atellite systems. 

As to offensive arms reductions, the 
Soviets have yet to acknowledge the 
egitimacy of our concern about the 
hreat we see in their large, highly 
vIIRVed ICBM force. They continue to 
lemand compensation for British and 
''rench nuclear forces and assert that 
J.S. Pershing II and ground-launched 
■ruise missiles somehow represent a 
nore odious threat than that posed to 
\IATO Europe by the hundreds of 
^S-20 missiles now deployed. 

In addition, the Soviets maintain 
hat the three subject areas— strategic 
mclear, intermediate-range nuclear, and 
iefense and space arms — must not only 
)e discussed in their interrelationship, 
iut that it is not possible to implement 
m agreement in one area without agree- 
nent in the others. We believe other- 
A'lso; if the sides come to agreement in 



one area, we see no sense in a self- 
denying rule that would prevent the 
sides from implementing an agreement 
that would serve the interests of both. 
There are obvious differences. We 
will present our views and listen care- 
fully to Soviet proposals. We do not ex- 
pect the Soviets to accept immediately 
our viewpoint or our concept as to how 
the future strategic relationship should 
evolve. The negotiators have their work 
cut out for them; the process will be 
complex and could well be lengthy. But 
with persistence, patience, and construc- 
tive ideas, we hope the Soviets will come 
to see the merits of our position— that it 
will serve their national interests as well 



Conclusion 

At the beginning of my remarks, I noted 
that the elimination of nuclear weapons 



has often seemed an impractical goal, 
one which has received little more than 
lip service. As you can see, the United 
States is going beyond that; the Presi- 
dent has initiated a serious effort to see 
how it can be accomplished. 

We do not underestimate the dif- 
ficulties in reaching that objective. Quite 
frankly, it may prove impossible to ob- 
tain; and, even if we do eventually reach 
it, it will not be for many, many 
years— perhaps well into the next cen- 
tury. 

But we cannot be anything but 
uneasy about the current situation, in 
which the nuclear arsenals of the world 
total tens of thousands of nuclear 
weapons. We owe it to our children, our 
grandchildren, and— in my case— to my 
great-grandchild to hold out for and to 
work toward some brighter vision for 
the future. ■ 



Report on Soviet Noncompliance 
With Arms Control Agreements 



The following is the text of President 
Reagan's message to the Congress trans- 
mitting his unclassified report on Soviet 
noncomplianee with arms control agree- 
ments a^ required by the FY 1985 
Defense Authorization Act^ 

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
FEB. 1, 1985 

During 1984, at the request of the Congress, 
I forwarded two reports to the Congress on 
arms control compliance. The first, forwarded 
last January, was an in-depth analysis of 
seven specific issues of violations or probable 
violations by the Soviet Union of arms con- 
trol obligations and commitments. The second 
report, forwarded in October, was an ad- 
visory study prepared independently by the 
General Advisory Committee on Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament. These reports indicate 
that there is cause for serious concern 
regarding the Soviet Union's conduct with 
respect to observance of arms control 
agreements. 

In the FY-1985 Defense Authorization 
Act and the Conference Report on that Act, 
the Congress called for additional classified 
and unclassified reports regarding a wide 
range of questions concerning the Soviet 
Union's compliance with arms control com- 
mitments. The Administration is responding 
to these requests by providing both classified 
and unclassified reports which update the 
seven issues initially analyzed in the January 
1984 report, and analyze a number of addi- 
tional issues. 



L„ 



In this unclassified report the United 
States Government reaffirms the conclusions 
of its January 1984 report that the USSR has 
violated the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva 
Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two pro- 
visions of SALT II [strategic arms limitation 
talks]: telemetry encryption and ICBM [inter- 
continental ballistic missile] modernization. 
The United States Government also reaffirms 
its previous conclusions that the USSR has 
probably violated the SS-16 deployment pro- 
hibition of SALT II and is likely to have 
violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, the 
Uniti 1 States Government has determined 
that the USSR has violated the ABM [Anti- 
Ballistic Missile] Treaty (through the siting, 
orientation, and capability of the Krasnoyarsk 
Radar), violated the Limited Test Ban Trea- 
ty, and violated the SALT II provision pro- 
hibiting more than one new type of ICBM, 
and probably violated the ABM Treaty 
restriction on concurrent testing of SAM 
[surface-to-air missiles] and ABM com- 
ponents. Evidence regarding the USSR's 
compliance with the ABM Treaty provision 
on component mobility was determined to be 
ambiguous. In addition, the United States 
Government is concerned about Soviet 
preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM 
defense. Further, the USSR was determined 
to be currently in compliance with those pro- 
visions of the SALT I Interim Agreement 
and its implementing procedures that deal 
with reuse of dismantled ICBM sites and 
with the reconfiguration of dismantled 
ballistic missile launching submarines. 



29 



ARMS CONTROL 



Beyond the issues that are treated in the 
unclassified report released today, there are 
other compliance issues that will not be 
publicly disclosed at this time but which re- 
main under review. As we continue to work 
on these issues, we will brief and consult with 
the Congress in detail and will, to the max- 
imum extent possible, keep the public in- 
formed on our findings. 

In order for arms control to have mean- 
ing and credibly contribute to national securi- 
ty and to global or regional stability, it is 
essential that all parties to agreements fully 
comply with them. Strict compliance with all 
provisions of arms control agreements is fun- 
damental, and this Administration will not ac- 
cept anything less. To do so would undermine 
the arms control process and damage the 
chances for establishing a more constructive 
U.S.-Soviet relationship. 

As I stated last January, Soviet n(jn- 
compliance is a serious matter. It calls into 
question important security benefits from 
arms control, and could create new security 
risks. It undermines the confidence essential 
to an effective arms control process in the 
future. With regard to the issues analyzed in 
the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union 
has thus far not provided satisfactory ex- 
planations nor undertaken corrective actions 
sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The 
United States Government has vigorously 
pressed, and will continue to press, these 
compliance issues with the Soviet Union 
through diplomatic channels. 

Our approach in pursuing these issues 
with the Soviet Union is to ensure that both 
the letter and intent of treaty obligations and 
commitments will be fulfilled. To this end the 
Administration is: analyzing further issues of 
possible non-compliance; as noted above, 
seeking from the Soviet Union through diplo- 
matic channels explanations, clarifications, 
and, where necessary, corrective actions: 
reporting on such issues to the Congress; and 
taking into account in our defense moderniza- 
tion plans the security implications of arms 
control violations. At the same time, the 
United States is continuing to carry out its 
own obligations and commitments under rele- 
vant agreements. Our objectives in the new 
negotiations which begin in March are to re- 
verse the erosion of the ABM Treaty and to 
seek equitable, effectively verifiable arms 
control agreements which will result in real 
reductions and enhanced stability. While all 
of these steps can help, however, it is funda- 
mentally important that the Soviet Union 
take a constructive attitude toward full com- 
pliance with all arms control obligations and 
commitments. 

The Administration and the Congress 
have a shared interest in supporting the arms 
control process. For this reason, increased 
understanding of Soviet violations or prob- 
able violations, and a strong Congressional 
consensus on the importance of compliance to 
achieving effective arms control, will 
strengthen our efforts both in the new 
negotiations and in seeking corrective actions 
from the Soviet Union. 



I look forward to continued close con- 
sultation with the Congress as we seek to 
make progress in resolving compliance issues 
and in negotiating sound arms control agree- 
ments. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reag.^n 



UNCLASSIFIED REPORT, 
FEB. 1, 1985 

Soviet Noncompliance With 
Arms Control Agreements 

INTRODUCTION 

In January 1984, the President, in re- 
sponse to Congressional requests, re- 
ported to the Congress on several issues 
involving violations or probable viola- 
tions by the Soviet Union of existing 
arms control agreements, including: the 
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- 
vention, the Helsinki Final Act, the 
ABM Treaty, SALT II, and the Thresh- 
old Test Ban Treaty. 

In that report the President stated: 

If the concept of arms control is to have 
meaning and credibility as a contribution to 
global or regional stability, it is essential that 
all parties to agreements comply with them. 
Because 1 seek genuine arms control, I am 
committed to ensuring that existing agree- 
ments are observed. 

The President further noted that: 

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. 
It calls into question important security bene- 
fits from arms control, and could create new 
security risks. It undermines the confidence 
e.ssential to an effective arms control process 
in the future. It increases doubts about the 
reliability of the USSR as a negotiating part- 
ner, and thus damages the chances ffir estab- 
lishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tionship. 

The current unclassified report pro- 
vides updated information on the seven 
issues previously reported and addi- 
tionally reviews six other compliance 
issues that have been intensively studied 
since the January 1984 report was com- 
pleted, for a total of thirteen issues. The 
six new cases involve questions of Soviet 
compliance with provisions of the 
SALT I Interim Agreement, the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the Anti- 
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 

• With regard to the SALT I In- 
terim Agreement, this report examines 
the evidence on two issues: (1) whether 
the USSR has made prohibited use of 
remaining facilities at dismantled former 
ICBM sites; (2) whether the USSR has 



reconfigured dismantled ballistic missile 
submarines in a manner prohibited by 
Treaty or Protocol provisions. 

• With regard to the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty (LTBT), this report ex- 
amines whether the USSR vented 
nuclear debris from underground 
nuclear tests beyond its territorial limits 
in contravention of the LTBT. 

• With regard to the ABM Treaty, 
this report examines whether the USSR 
has: concurrently tested SAM and ABM 
components; developed, tested, or de- 
ployed mobile ABM components; and/or 
has provided a base for territorial 
defense. 

In this report the United States 
Government reaffirms the conclusions of 
its January 1984 report that the USSR 
has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the 
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- 
vention, and two provisions of SALT II: 
telemetry encryption and ICBM modern- 
ization. The United States Government 
also reaffirms its previous conclusions 
that the USSR has probably violated the 
SS-16 deployment prohibition of 
SALT II and is likely to have violated 
the nuclear testing yield limit of the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, 
the United States Government has de- 
termined that the USSR has violated the 
ABM Treaty through the siting, orienta- 
tion, and capability of the Krasnoyarsk 
Radar and the Limited Test Ban Treaty; 
by testing the SS-X-25 ICBM in addi- 
tion to the SS-X-24 ICBM, violated the 
SALT II "new types" provision limiting 
each party to one new type ICBM; and 
probably violated the prohibition against 
concurrent testing of SAM and ABM 
components. Moreover, the Soviet 
Union's ABM and ABM-related actions 
suggest that the USSR may be prepar- 
ing an ABM defense of its national ter- 
ritory. Evidence regarding the USSR's 
compliance with the ABM Treaty provi- 
sion on component mobility was deter- 
mined to be ambiguous, and the USSR 
was determined to be currently in com- 
pliance with provisions of the SALT I 
Interim Agreement and its implement- 
ing procedures that deal with re-use of 
dismantled ICBM sites and the recon- 
figuration of dismantled ballistic missile 
launching submarines. 

In addition to the issues regarding 
Soviet compliance with arms control 
agreements which are addressed in this 
unclassified report, there are other com- 
pliance matters currently under review _ 
which cannot be publicly disclosed at this ' 
time and which we intend to brief to the 
Congress on a classified basis in the 
near future. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



In examining the issues in this un- 
classified report, as well as in the 
classified report to follow, we have 
focused on questions of Soviet noncom- 
pliance. Questions of Soviet noncom- 
pliance have not arisen with regard to 
several other provisions of these agree- 
ments, nor with certain other treaties, 
such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer 
Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Trea- 
ty, the Environmental Modification Con- 
vention, and others. 

The issues we have analyzed raise 
very serious concerns. The United 
States Government firmly believes that 
in order for arms control to have mean- 
ing and credibly contribute to national 
security and to global and regional 
stability, it is essential that all parties to 
agreements fully comply with them. 
Strict compliance with all provisions of 
arms control agreements is fundamen- 
tal, and the United States Government 
will not accept anything less: to do so 
would undermine the arms control proc- 
ess and damage the chances for estab- 
lishing a more constructive U.S. -Soviet 
relationship. 

THE FINDINGS 

Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol 

1. Chemical, Biological, 
and Toxin Weapons 

• Treaty Status: The 1972 Biologi- 
cal and Toxin Weapons Convention (the 
BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are 
multilateral treaties to which both the 
United States and the Soviet Union are 
parties. Soviet actions not in accord with 
these treaties and customary interna- 
tional law relating to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol are violations of legal obliga- 
tions. 

• Obligations: The BWC bans the 
development, production, stockpiling, or 
possession, and transfer of: microbial or 
other biological agents or toxins except 
for a small quantity for prophylactic, 
protective, or other peaceful purposes. It 
also bans weapons, equipment, and 
means of delivery of agents or toxins. 
The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related 
rules of customary international law pro- 
hibit the first use in war of asphyxiat- 
ing, poisonous, or other gases and of all 
analogous liquids, materials, or devices; 
and prohibits use of bacteriological 
methods of warfare. 

• Issues: The January 1984 compli- 
ance report addressed whether the 
Soviets are in violation of provisions 



that ban the development, production, 
transfer, possession, and use of biologi- 
cal and toxin weapons. Soviet compli- 
ance was reexamined for this report. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that evidence during 1984 con- 
firm and strengthen the conclusion of 
the January 1984 report that the Soviet 
Union has maintained an offensive bio- 
logical warfare program and capability 
in violation of its legal obligation under 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- 
vention of 1972. 

Although there have been no con- 
firmed chemical and toxin attacks in 
Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 
1984, there is no basis for amending the 
January 1984 conclusion that the Soviet 
Union has been involved in the produc- 
tion, transfer, and use of trichothecene 
mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, 
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in viola- 
tion of its legal obligation under interna- 
tional law as codified in the Geneva Pro- 
tocol of 1925 and the Biological and Tox- 
in Weapons Convention of 1972. 

Limited Test Ban Treaty 

2. Underground Nuclear Test Venting 

• Treaty Status: The Treaty Ban- 
ning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At- 
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty 
(LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that 
entered into force for the United States 
and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet ac- 
tions not in accord with this treaty are 
violations of a legal obligation. 

• Obligations: The LTBT specifical- 
ly prohibits nuclear explosions in the at- 
mosphere, in outer space, and under 
water. It also prohibits nuclear explo- 
sions in any other environment "if such 
explosion causes radioactive debris to be 
present outside the territorial limits of 
the State under whose jurisdiction or 
control such explosion is conducted." 

• Issue: The U.S. examined 
whether the USSR's underground 
nuclear tests have caused radioactive 
debris to be present outside of its ter- 
ritorial limits. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that the Soviet Union's under- 
ground nuclear test practices have re- 
sulted in the venting of radioactive mat- 
ter and caused radioactive matter to be 
present outside the Soviet Union's terri- 
torial limits in violations of its legal 
obligation to the Limited Test Ban Trea- 
ty. The Soviet Union has failed to take 
the precautions necessary to minimize 
the contamination of man's environment 
by radioactive substances despite U.S. 
request for corrective action. 



Threshold Test Ban Treaty 

3. Nuclear Testing and the 
150 Kiloton Limit 

• Treaty Status: The Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 
1974. The Treaty has not been ratified 
but neither party has indicated an inten- 
tion not to ratify. Therefore, both par- 
ties are subject to the obligation under 
customary international law to refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object 
and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions 
that would defeat the object and purpose 
of the TTBT are therefore violations of 
their legal obligation. The United States 
is seeking to negotiate improved 
verification measures for the Treaty. 
Both Parties have separately stated they 
would observe the 150 kiloton threshold 
of the TTBT. 

• Obligation: The Treaty prohibits 
any underground nuclear weapon test 
having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at 
any place under the jurisdiction or con- 
trol of the Parties, beginning March 31, 
1976. In view of the technical uncertain- 
ties associated with estimating the 
precise yield of nuclear weapons tests, 
the sides agreed that one or two slight 
unintended breaches per year would not 
be considered a violation. 

• Issue: The January 1984 report 
examined whether the Soviets have con- 
ducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 
kilotons. This issue was reexamined for 
this report. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that, while ambig^uities in the pat- 
tern of Soviet testing and verification 
uncertainties continued in 1984, evi- 
dence available through the year con- 
firms the January 1984 finding that 
Soviet nuclear testing activities for a 
number of tests constitute a likely viola- 
tion of legal obligations under the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, 
which banned underground nuclear tests 
with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. 
These Soviet actions continue despite 
U.S. requests for corrective measures. 

Helsinki Final Act 

4. Helsinki Final Act Notification of 
Military Exercises 

• Legal Status: The Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe was signed in 
Helsinki in 1975. This document 
represents a political commitment and 
was signed by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, along with many other 
States. Soviet actions not in accord with 



April 1985 



31 



ARMS CONTROL 



that document are violations of their 
political commitment. 

• Obligation: All signatory States 
of the Helsinki Final Act are committed 
to give prior notification of, and other 
details concerning, major military 
maneuvers, defined as those involving 
more than 25,000 ground troops. 

• Issues: The January 1984 com- 
pliance report examined whether 
notification of the Soviet military exer- 
cise Zapad-81 was inadequate and 
therefore a violation of the Soviet 
Union's political commitment under the 
Helsinki Final Act. The USSR's com- 
pliance with its notification commitment 
was reexamined for this report. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
previously judged that the Soviet Union 
violated its political commitment to 
observe the prior-notification provisions 
of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, 
which requires notification and other in- 
formation concerning exercises ex- 
ceeding 25,000 ground troops. A major 
Warsaw Pact maneuver (Zapad-81), ex- 
ceeding the 25,000 troop limit, was con- 
ducted in 1981 at a time great pressure 
was being put on Poland, and the Soviet 
Union did not provide the pre-notifi- 
cation or other information required. 
The judgment that the Soviet tfnion did 
not observe the prior notification provi- 
sions of the Helsinki Final Act is con- 
firmed. 

While the USSR and Warsaw Pact 
states have generally taken an approach 
to the confidence-building measures of 
the Final Act which minimizes the infor- 
mation they provide, Soviet compliance 
with the exercise-notification provisions 
was much improved in 1983. However, 
during 1984, the USSR returned to a 
minimalist stance, providing only the 
bare minimum required under the Final 
Act. 

SALT I Interim Agreement 

• Treaty Status: The SALT I In- 
terim Agreement entered into force for 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
in 1972. Dismantling procedures im- 
plementing the Interim Agreement were 
concluded in 1974. The Interim Agree- 
ment, by its own terms, was of limited 
duration and expired as a legally binding 
document in 19'77. The applicability of 
the Interim Agreement to the actions of 
both parties has, however, been ex- 
tended by the parties by a series of 
mutual political commitments, including 
the President's May 31, 1982 stjitement 
that the United States would refrain 
from actions which would undercut 
existing strategic arms agreements so 



long as the Soviet Union shows equal 
restraint. The Soviets have told us they 
would abide by the SALT I Interim 
Agreement and SALT II. Any actions 
by the USSR inconsistent with this com- 
mitment are violations of its political 
commitment with respect to the Interim 
Agreement and its implementing pro- 
cedures. 

Two issues were analyzed for this 
report: Soviet activities at dismantled 
ICBM sites, and reconfiguration of a 
Yankee-Class ballistic missile submarine. 

5. Mobile Missile Base Construction 
at Dismantled SS-7 ICBM Sites 

• Obligation: The SALT I Interim 
Agreement and its procedures prohibit 
the parties from using facilities remain- 
ing at dismantled or destroyed ICBM 
sites for storage, support, or launch of 
ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent 
with this commitment are violations of a 
political commitment with respect to the 
Interim Agreement and its implement- 
ing procedures. 

• Issue: The U.S. examined 
whether the USSR has used former 
ICBM sites in a manner inconsistent 
with its political commitment under the 
Interim Agreement and its implemen- 
ting procedures. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that Soviet activity apparently 
related to SS-X-25 ICBM deployments 
at two former SS-7 bases does not at 
present violate the agreed implementing 
procedures of the SALT I Interim 
Agreement. However, ongoing activities 
raise concerns about compliance for the 
future, since use of "remaining facilities" 
to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 
sites would be in violation of Soviet com- 
mitments. The U.S. will continue to 
monitor developments closely. 

6. Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class 
Ballistic Missile Submarines 

• Obligations: The SALT I Interim 
Agreement and its procedures require 
that submarines limited by the Agree- 
ment be dismantled or be reconfigured 
into submarines without ballistic missile 
capabilities. Any Soviet actions incon- 
sistent with this obligation are violations 
of a political commitment. 

• Issue: The U.S. examined 
whether the USSR's reconfiguration of a 
submarine to increase its length, and for 
use as a platform for modern long-range 
cruise missiles, is consistent with its 
political commitments under the Interim 
Agreement and its implementing pro- 
cedures. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that the Soviet Union's conver- 



sion of a dismantled SSBN into a sub- 
marine longer than the original, and 
carrying modern, long-range cruise 
missiles is not a violation of its political 
commitment under the SALT I Interim 
Agreement, but constitutes a threat to 
U.S. and Allied security similar to the 
original Yankee-Class submarine. 

SALT II Treaty 

• Treaty Status: SALT II was 
signed in June 1979 and has not been 
ratified. In 1981 the United States made 
clear to the Soviet Union its intention 
not to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Prior 
to this clarification of our position in 
1981, both nations were obligated under 
customary international law not to take 
actions which would defeat the object 
and purpose of the signed, but unrati- 
fied. Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 
1981 are violations of legal obligations. 
Since 1981, the United States has 
observed a political commitment to 
refrain from actions that undercut the 
SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet 
Union does likewise. The Soviets have 
told us they also would abide by these 
provisions. Soviet actions inconsistent 
with this commitment are violations of 
their political commitment with respect 
to the SALT II Treaty. 

Three SALT II issues are included 
in this unclassified report: encryption of 
telemetry, SS-X-25 ICBM, and SS-16 
ICBM deployment. 

7. Encryption of Ballistic Missile 
Telemetry 

• Obligation: The provisions of 
SALT II ban deliberate concealment 
measures that impede verification by na- 
tional technical means. The Treaty per- 
mits each party to use various methods 
of transmitting telemetric information 
during testing, including encryption, but 
bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such 
as through encryption, whenever such 
denial impedes verification. 

• Issue: The January 1984 com- 
pliance report examined whether the 
Soviet Union has engaged in encryption 
of missile test telemetry (radio signals) 
so as to impede verification. This issue 
was reexamined for this report. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
reaffirms the conclusion in the January 
1984 report that Soviet encryption prac- 
tices constitute a violation of a legal 
obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 
and a violation of their political commit- 
ment since 1982. The nature and extent 
of such encryption of telemetry on new 
ballistic missiles, despite U.S. request 
for corrective action, continues to be an 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



example of deliberately impeding verifi- 
cation of compliance in violation of this 
Soviet political commitment. 

8. The SS-X-25 ICBM 

• Obligation: In an attempt to con- 
strain the modernization and the pro- 
liferation of new, more capable types of 
ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II per- 
mit each side to "flight test and deploy" 
just one new type of "light" ICBM. A 
new type is defined as one that differs 
from an existing type by more than 

5 percent in length, largest diameter, 
launch-weight, and throw-weight or dif- 
fers in number of stages or propellant 
type. In addition, it was agreed that no 
single re-entry vehicle ICBM of an exist- 
ing type with a post-boost vehicle would 
be flight-tested or deployed whose reen- 
try vehicle weight is less than 50 percent 
of the throw-weight of that ICBM. This 
latter provision was intended to prohibit 
the possibility that single warhead 
ICBMs could quickly be converted to 
MIRVed [multiple independently- 
targetable reentry vehicles] systems. 

• Issues: The Soviets declared the 
SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new 
type ICBM. The January 1984 report ex- 
amined the issues: whether the Soviets 
have tested a second new type of ICBM 
(the SS-X-25) which is prohibited; 
whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that 
missile, if it is not a new type, is in com- 
pliance with the provision that for ex- 
isting types of single RV missiles, the 
weight of the RV be equal to at least 

50 percent of total throw-weight; and 
whether encryption of SS-X-25 flight 
test telemetry impedes verification. The 
U.S. reexamined these issues for this 
report. 

• Finding: 

a. Second New Type: The U.S. 
Government judges that the SS-X-25 is 
a prohibited second "new" type of ICBM 
and that its testing, in addition to the 
SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of 
the Soviet Union's political commitment 
to observe the "new" type provision of 
the SALT II Treaty. Despite U.S. re- 
quests, no corrective action has been 
taken. 

b. RV-to-Throw-Weight Ratio: 
The U.S. Government reaffirms the con- 
clusion of the January 1984 report 
regarding the SS-X-25 RV-to-throw- 
weight ratio. That is, if we were to ac- 
cept the Soviet argument that the 
SS-X-25 is not a prohibited new type of 
ICBM, it would be a violation of their 
political commitment to observe the 
SALT II provision which prohibits the 
testing of such an existing ICBM with a 



single reentry vehicle whose weight is 
less than 50 percent of the throw-weight 
of the ICBM. 

c. Encryption: The U.S. Govern- 
ment reaffirms its judgment made in the 
January 1984 report regarding telem- 
etry encryption during tests of the 
SS-X-25. Encryption during tests of 
this missile is illustrative of the delib- 
erate impeding of verification of com- 
pliance in violation of a legal obligation 
prior to 1981, and of the USSR's 
political commitment subsequent to 
1981. 

9. SS-16 Deployment 

• Obligation: The Soviet Union 
agreed in SALT II not to produce, test, 
or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, 
in particular, not to produce the SS-16 
third stage or the reentry vehicle of that 
missile. 

• Issue: The January 1984 report 
examined the evidence regarding 
whether the Soviets have deployed the 
SS-16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its 
deployment. The U.S. reexamined this 
issue for this report. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
reaffirms the judgment made in the 
January 1984 report. While the evidence 
is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot 
reach a definitive conclusion, the avail- 
able evidence indicates that the activities 
at Plesetsk are a probable violation of 
the USSR's legal obligation not to defeat 
the object and purpose of SALT II prior 
to 1981 when the Treaty was pending 
ratification, and a probable violation of a 
political commitment subsequent to 
1981. 

ABM Treaty 

• Treaty Status: The 1972 ABM 
Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment 
of ABM systems except that each party 
is permitted to deploy one ABM system 
around the national capital area or, 
alternatively, at a single ICBM deploy- 
ment area. The ABM Treaty is in force 
and is of indefinite duration. Soviet ac- 
tions not in accord with the ABM Treaty 
are, therefore, violations of a legal 
obligation. 

Four ABM issues are included in 
this unclassified report: the Krasnoyarsk 
Radar, mobile land-based ABM systems 
or components, concurrent testing of 
ABM and SAM components, and ABM 
territorial defense. 

10. The Krasnoyarsk Radar 

• Obligation: In an effort to pre- 
clude creation of a base for territorial 
ABM defense, the ABM Treaty limits 



the deployment of ballistic missile early 
warning radars, including large phased- 
array radars used for that purpose, to 
locations along the periphery of the na- 
tional territory of each party and re- 
quires that they be oriented outward. 
The Treaty permits deployment (without 
regard to location or orientation) of 
large phased-array radars for purposes 
of tracking objects in outer space or for 
use as national technical means of 
verification of compliance with arms 
control agreements. 

• Issue: The January 1984 report 
examined the evidence regarding the 
construction of a large phased-array 
radar near Krasnoyarsk in central 
Siberia. It was concluded that this radar 
was almost certainly a violation of the 
ABM Treaty. The U.S. reexamined this 
issue for this report. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges, on the basis of evidence which 
continued to be available through 1984, 
that the new large phased-array radar 
under construction at Krasnoyarsk con- 
stitutes a violation of legal obligations 
under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 
1972 in that in its associated siting, 
orientation, and capability, it is pro- 
hibited by this Treaty. Continuing con- 
struction, and the absence of credible 
alternative explanations, have reinforced 
our assessment of its purpose. Despite 
U.S. requests, no corrective action has 
been taken. 

11. Mobility of New ABM System 

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty pro- 
hibits the development, testing, or 
deployment of mobile land-based ABM 
systems or components. 

• Issue: The U.S. examined 
whether the Soviet Union has developed 
a mobile land-based ABM system, or 
components for such a system, in viola- 
tion of its legal obligation under the 
ABM Treaty. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that Soviet actions with respect 
to ABM component mobility are am- 
biguous, but the USSR's development of 
components of a new ABM system, 
which apparently are designed to be 
deployable at sites requiring relatively 
little or no preparation, represent a 
potential violation of its legal obligation 
under the ABM Treaty. This and other 
ABM-related Soviet actions suggest that 
the USSR may be preparing an ABM 
defense of its national territory. 

12. Concurrent Testing of ABM and 
SAM Components 

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty and 
its Protocol limit the parties to one 



April 1985 



33 



EAST ASIA 



ABM deployment area. In addition to 
the ABM systems and components at 
that one deployment area, the parties 
may have ABM systems and components 
for development and testing purposes so 
long as they are located at agreed test 
ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving 
components, other than ABM system 
components, the capability "to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles or their 
elements in flight trajectory" and pro- 
hibits the parties from testing them in 
"an ABM mode." The parties agreed 
that the concurrent testing of SAM and 
ABM system components is prohibited. 

• Issue: The U.S. examined 
w^hether the Soviet Union has concur- 
rently tested SAM and ABM system 
components in contravention of this 
legal obligation. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that evidence of Soviet actions 
with respect to concurrent operations is 
insufficient to assess fully compliance 
with Soviet obligations under the ABM 
Treaty, although the Soviet Union has 
conducted tests that have involved air 
defense radars in ABM-related ac- 
tivities. The number of incidents of con- 
current operation of SAM and ABM 
components indicate the USSR probably 
has violated the prohibition on testing 
SAM components in an ABM mode. In 
several cases this may be highly prob- 
able. This and other such Soviet ac- 
tivities suggest that the USSR may be 
preparing an ABM defense of its na- 
tional territory. 

13. ABM Territorial Defense 

• Obligation: The Treaty allows 
each party a single operational site, ex- 
plicitly permits modernization and 
replacement of ABM systems or their 
components, and explicitly recognizes 
the existence of ABM test ranges for 
the development and testing of ABM 
components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, 
however, the deployment of an ABM 
system for defense of the national ter- 
ritory of the parties and prohibits the 
parties from providing a base for such a 
defense. 

• Issue: The U.S. examined 
whether Soviet ABM and related ac- 
tivities provide a base for a territorial 
defense. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that the aggregates of the Soviet 
Union's ABM and ABM-related actions 
suggest that the USSR may be prepar- 
ing an ABM defense of its national ter- 
ritory. 



The Asia-Pacific Region: 
A Forward Look 



'Texts from White House press 
release. ■ 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Address before the Far East-America 
Council/Asia Society in New York City 
on January 29, 1985. Ambassador 
Armacost is Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. 

As the Reagan Administration begins its 
second term, it is a timely moment to 
take stock, to identify salient trends and 
notable developments in the Pacific, and 
to examine their implications for 
American interests. Let me begin with 
three general observations. 

First, the growing interest of the 
United States in East Asia and the 
Pacific is widely acknowledged. The 
reasons are clear. Our trade with the 
Pacific Basin exceeds our trade with 
Europe and is growing more rapidly. 
Political cooperation with Asian friends 
is growing apace. We have learned 
through bitter experience that a balance 
of forces in the region is indispensable 
to our own security and that no 
equilibrium can be achieved without our 
active participation. A growing apprecia- 
tion of the importance of Asia has been 
buttressed in recent years by the influx 
of hundreds of thousands of Asian im- 
migrants, who are making an extraor- 
dinary contribution to our national life in 
every field of human endeavor. 

Second, there is a growing national 
consensus regarding the importance of 
our ties to the Pacific and, I might add, 
the efficacy and advisability of the 
policies we are pursuing there. This con- 
sensus was evident in last year's election 
campaign which, for the first time in a 
generation, provoked no partisan debate 
or controversy over Asia policy. 

Third, the growing American in- 
terest in Asia need not come at the ex- 
pense of our interests in other regions. 
My predecessor, Larry Eagleburger, 
suggested about a year ago that the 
center of gravity in American politics 
was shifting westward and that our in- 
terests would shift increasingly toward 
the Pacific as a result of the economic 
and technological dynamism of that part 
of the world. His remarks greatly 
alarmed many Europeans, whose worst 
fears, I suspect, were confirmed by my 
appointment to succeed Larry. 

These fears are groundless. As we 
have consistently reminded our Euro- 
pean friends, a strong American 
strategic presence in East Asia con- 



tributes directly to European security by 
confronting the Soviets with the pros- 
pect of a two-front war if they under- 
take aggressive moves on the Continent. 
By the same token, our efforts to 
liberalize access to the Asian market af- 
ford European as well as American en- 
trepreneurs expanded trading oppor- 
tunities. 

But it is not my purpose to speak 
about European fears concerning a 
"Pacific era." I wish, rather, to speak of 
the policy opportunities and problems 
which face the United States in that 
region— so let me turn to recent 
developments in Asia. 

Regional Developments 

I would single out these items of major 
consequence, beginning with the good 
news. 

First, I'd mention the extraordinary 
economic dynamism of the region. 
Although America's recovery has been 
the engine of growth for the world 
economy during the last 2 years, the 
East Asia-Pacific economies have, year- 
in and year-out, displayed the greatest 
resilience and the world's highest rates 
of growth. Our trade with the region is 
immense. Preliminary data indicate that, 
in calendar year 1984, U.S. exports to 
the East Asia-Pacific region were valued 
at $54.6 billion; our imports from that 
region, $114 billion. U.S. investments in 
the Pacific are conservatively valued at 
over $30 billion. Since East Asian 
economies generally pursue export-led 
growth, periods of U.S. expansion in- 
evitably lead to large increases in our 
imports from the Pacific, and we pile up 
huge trade deficits. Asia now accounts 
for more than 50% of our global deficit. 
This pattern will presumably continue, 
though hopefully at a lower level in 
1985. 

Second, Japan continues to assume 
a political role more commensurate with 
its economic pov/er. Prime Minister 
Nakasone has continued his prede- 
cessor's search for a policy of "com- 
prehensive security"; he is associating 
Japan more closely with the West 
through his determination that Japan 
shall be seen and accepted as a "full 
partner with the West"; he is promoting 
Tokyo's accomplishment of defensive 
military roles and missions; and he is 
further expanding the scope and 
strategic importance of Japan's 
economic aid contributions. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



Third, China is redoubling its 
modernization efforts and has embarked 
on a stunning program of economic 
reform. While China remains a planned, 
socialist economy, market forces are 
playing an expanding role, and the 
Chinese— while praising Marx— are 
openly questioning his relevance. The 
most dramatic results of reform are ap- 
parent in the countryside in increased 
productivity and higher peasant in- 
comes. Reform of the industrial sector 
will be more difficult, but [Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission] Deng 
[Xiaoping] appears determined to press 
ahead. To spur technological change, 
China's policy of opening to the outside 
encourages imports of foreign products, 
capital, and management skills, and pro- 
motes investment in joint ventures. The 
Chinese are permitting localities and 
provinces broader autonomy in dealing 
with the outside world. 

We have a strong interest in a 
modernized China which is open to 
foreign trade and investment and which, 
consequently, creates economic oppor- 
tunities for the United States and other 
developed countries. This process 
strengthens China's resolve to broaden 
and deepen cooperative arrangements 
with the West, even as it gives it 
parallel incentives for reducing the risks 
of conflict with the Soviet Union. 

In the recent negotiations on the 
future of Hong Kong, both Beijing and 
London displayed an admirable combina- 
tion of pragmatism and patience in 
working toward a satisfactory agree- 
ment. The detail of the transitional ar- 
rangements plus the lengthy period of 
the post- 1997 transition should provide 
investors with ample reason for sus- 
tained confidence in the future of Hong 
Kong as an attractive and thriving com- 
mercial center. 

Fourth, there have been some hints 
of change in the relations between North 
and South Korea. One round of direct 
economic talks were held in mid- 
November, as was a preparatory round 
of North-South Red Cross talks on 
family reunification and other 
humanitarian issues. Regrettably, North 
Korea postponed scheduled talks in 
December and seized on the annual U.S. 
"Team Spirit" military exercise with the 
R.O.K. [Republic of Korea] to postpone 
economic talks that had been scheduled 
in January. We hope these discussions 
will resume in the spring. 

Other developments have a less 
sanguine appearance. 

First, the Soviet Union continues its 
military buildup in East Asia and the 
Pacific. Its Pacific fleet is now its 
largest. Its facilities in Vietnam continue 
to expand, thus extending the "reach" of 



Soviet naval forces in the west Pacific 
and Indian Oceans. It is deploying its 
most advanced equipment to forces 
along China's frontier. 

Fortunately, the Soviet Union has 
not yet been able to translate this grow- 
ing military power into effective political 
influence. Its ideological appeal in Asia 
remains negligible, its economic leverage 
limited. Territorial disputes with Japan 
and China limit prospects of accom- 
modation with its most important Asian 
neighbors, and its support for Vietnam 
fuels the suspicion with which all 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] states regard Moscow. 

Second, the Vietnamese show no 
signs of reducing their military pressure 
on Cambodia. Nor, despite more mod- 
erate rhetoric recently, do they seem 
willing to negotiate a political solution to 
the problem. The coalition embracing 
Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann as well 



Fourth, antinuclear sentiment is ris- 
ing in the South Pacific. An allergy to 
nuclear weapons has existed there for 
some time, sustained by regional con- 
cerns about current nuclear testing by 
France, along with the more general 
problem of disposing of radioactive 
wastes. The election of a Labor govern- 
ment in New Zealand committed to ban- 
ning from its ports and territorial 
waters all nuclear-powered and nuclear- 
armed ships has brought this issue to 
the fore and is imposing strains on 
ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, 
United States security treaty]— one of 
our oldest alliances. 

These then are the most salient 
developments— favorable and otherwise. 
They bring opportunities for the United 
States to: 

• Expand commercial and invest- 
ment opportunities; 



Our growing trade deficit with Asia highlights 
the need for a new trade round . . .[which] not only 
would help in checking protectionist pressures but 
could extend liberalization into the important 
fields of agricultural trade, the service sector, and 
high technology. 



as the Khmer Rouge has earned Cam- 
bodia's resistance greater international 
support. However, the sustainability of 
the coalition and its acceptability to the 
Cambodian people require that the non- 
communist factions increase their 
strength relative to the Khmer Rouge. 
Third, East Asia's relative stability 
is tempered by the reality of human 
mortality and the prospect of political 
transitions in several important coun- 
tries. Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Kuan Yew, 
Suharto, and Marcos [leaders of Taiwan, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philip- 
pines, respectively] have all exercised 
power for many years. Much attention 
has already been directed to Deng 
Xiaoping's efforts to ensure the con- 
tinuation of his policies in China. Kim 
Il-sung has groomed his son to succeed 
him in North Korea. Vietnam's collective 
leadership has seen little new blood for 
decades. As these leaders age, succes- 
sion politics becomes a source of uncer- 
tainty and potential instability in those 
countries whose political institutions are 
weak. At the same time, there is hope in 
some countries that changes could bring 
about increased popular participation in 
the political and economic process. 



• Associate Japan even more closely 
with the West; 

• Propel China toward patterns of 
closer cooperation with us; 

• Work constructively with regional 
groupings in the area, particularly 
ASEAN; and 

• Foster a North-South dialogue on 
the Korean Peninsula. 

There are also risks: 

• That burgeoning trade deficits will 
stimulate increased protectionist senti- 
ment and protectionist trade measures 
in the Congress; 

• That succession crises could lead 
to political instability adversely affecting 
our financial flows, economic develop- 
ment, and strategic interests; 

• That antinuclear sentiment could 
check our naval access to New Zealand 
and vitiate a key alliance; 

• That failure to address the im- 
balance within the Cambodian resistance 
could undermine future possibilities for a 
political solution; and 

• That the Soviet Union will con- 
tinue to build its military strength in 



April1985 



35 



EAST ASIA 



Asia while playing for any diplomatic 
and political breaks that may come 
along. 

The Major Policy Challenges 

Let me comment briefly on our major 
policy challenges in the period ahead. 

Our growing trade deficit with Asia 
highlights the need for a new trade 
round which the Administration— along 
with the Japanese— endorsed at the last 
London summit. A new round not only 
would help in checking protectionist 



urged Philippine authorities to open up 
the political process and rely more heavi- 
ly upon market forces to stimulate a 
revival of economic growth. 

During the last year, there has been 
some progress. A forthright report was 
produced by the Agrava Board; indict- 
ments have been brought against key 
military leaders for participation in a 
conspiracy to murder Aquino and cover 
up their involvement. Restrictions on 
press freedoms have been relaxed; 
political activity has been resumed by 
opposition groups; the procedures for 



We shall continue to urge Japan to assume a 
larger responsibility for its own conventional 
defense while extending the range of its 
surveillance and patrolling capabilities along its 
sealanes to the south. 



pressures but could extend liberalization 
into the important fields of agricultural 
trade, the service sector, and high 
technology. Pending the initiation of a 
general round of trade negotiations, we 
will be focusing particular attention on 
opening Japan's market further. Talks 
are now being held in Tokyo to kick off 
sectoral negotiations in the fields of elec- 
tronics, telecommunications, forest prod- 
ucts, medical equipment, and pharma- 
ceuticals. Progress in these negotiations 
will be the subject of our subcabinet con- 
sultations in March. 

In addition, we have an intensive 
round of consultations coming up with 
ASEAN. U.S. Special Trade Represen- 
tative Bill Brock will meet with the 
ASEAN trade ministers in Malaysia in 
early February. One focus of his talks 
will be proposals for a U.S. -ASEAN 
reciprocal trading arrangement, as well 
as a new multilateral trade negotiating 
round. We will meet in Washington in 
late March or early April with ASEAN 
economic and trade ministers for our 
periodic high-level dialogue covering 
both policy and practical trade and in- 
vestment matters. And Secretary Shultz 
will again lead our delegation to the 
ASEAN postministerial consultations to 
be held this year in mid-July in Kuala 
Lumpur. 

1 have mentioned the Philippines, 
where we face significant problems. 
Since the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, 
the United States has consistently 
pressed for a thorough, impartial, and 
complete investigation of the killing and 



succession have been altered; relatively 
free elections held; opposition represen- 
tation in the legislature increased; con- 
straints on the arbitrary power of the 
government multiplied; an IMF [Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund] agreement ini- 
tialed; and a restructuring of Philippine 
debt negotiated. 

We shall continue to encourage the 
further democratization of Philippine 
politics, the opening up of the Philippine 
economy to the freer interplay of 
market forces, and reform of the 
military— which requires, above all, un- 
sullied leadership— to enable the Philip- 
pine Armed Forces to counter a growing 
insurgency in rural areas. 

Much remains to be done, but we 
should neither exaggerate our capacity 
to shape internal developments in the 
Philippines nor offer gratuitous public 
criticism and counsel. Nonetheless, we 
do have significant influence and should 
continue to exercise it to promote the 
strengthening of democratic institutions. 
We shall try to be helpful both through 
the advice we extend quietly to the 
regime and through the contacts we 
maintain with the opposition. 

Vis-a-vis Japan, our policies are well 
defined. The President's meeting with 
Prime Minister Nakasone earlier this 
month resulted in a renewed commit- 
ment by both sides to work closely 
together on a variety of global issues. 
There was also agreement to address 
promptly the problems in our economic 
relationship— the urgent need for more 
balanced trade and extension of the role 
of the yen as an international currency. 



We shall continue to urge Japan to 
assume a larger responsibility for its 
own conventional defense while extend- 
ing the range of its surveillance and 
patrolling capabilities along its sealanes 
to the south. We will not, however, en- 
courage Japan's assumption of regional 
military security responsibilities. 

We will consult with the Japanese 
on how best to coordinate our growing 
foreign assistance efforts, not only in 
Asia but throughout the world. Japan is 
already a leading donor not only to East 
Asia but also countries like Pakistan, 
Turkey, Egypt, and Sudan— countries 
which the Japanese consider important 
to the security of the West. In close 
coordination with us, Japan has also pro- 
vided significant support for Afghan and 
Cambodian refugees and has responded 
generously to the emergency situation in 
Africa. 

With China, we shall continue to 
nurture an expanding economic relation- 
ship. China's economic modernization 
will contribute to regional stability and 
progress, even as it will generate new 
issues in our bilateral relationship and 
place China in competition with several 
of its Asian neighbors for access to our 
market. Care will be necessary to ensure 
that our own trade policies encourage 
the Chinese to continue to look to us for 
the technology, products, and capital 
they need. 

On the military side, our help— in 
the form of technology transfer and 
sales of equipment— can help Beijing 
bolster its defenses along the northern 
border. As we expand cooperative ar- 
rangements in the military field as in 
others, we must remain sensitive to the 
views of our other friends and allies in 
the region, and that will counsel close 
consultations and caution in helping 
China strengthen its defensive 
capabilities. 

As we continue to expand and im- 
prove our ties with the People's Republic 
of China, we will maintain our unofficial 
links with Taiwan. We have a continued 
interest in the well-being and prosperity 
of the people of Taiwan and note that 
our economic ties, though troubled by a 
large deficit, have grown dramatically in 
the past decade. 

In Korea, we should sustain close 
cooperation with the R.O.K. as it ex- 
plores the potential for direct North- 
South talks. In the past the North has 
sought to ignore the South in order to 
resolve basic issues with us. We shall 
resist being drawn into talks with 
Pyongyang at the South's expense. 
There can be no durable reduction of 
tension on the peninsula until North and 
South Korea resolve through direct 
negotiations the basic issues which 
divide them. South Korea consistently 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



has proposed that Pyongyang join in 
agreeing to various confidence-building 
measures. That is a sensible strategy 
and deserves our support. Indeed, ail 
regional powers share a responsibility to 
do whatever they can to promote stabili- 
ty and ensure peace on the peninsula. 

With regard to the other friendly na- 
tions of Southeast Asia and ASEAN col- 
lectively, we will continue our unam- 
biguous support of efforts to achieve a 
political settlement in Cambodia as part 
of our fundamental policy of upholding 
the national integrity of these peaceful 
and free countries. Thailand, as the 
"front-line" state, plays a crucial role in 
those efforts, and its security will re- 
main a paramount concern to us. We 
want to further our close economic 
cooperation with ASEAN— as typified 
by the extensive range of consultations I 
mentioned earlier— and we will do 
everything possible to combat protec- 
tionism in the interest of long-term 
mutual benefit, investment, and trade 
expansion. We will also continue to con- 
sult closely with ASEAN on other mat- 
ters of common interest. 

We must sustain our support for the 
noncommunist resistance elements in 
Cambodia. Our support is essentially 
humanitarian and political, and that 
should be increased. They need our help, 
and without it the growing Khmer 
Rouge dominance within the resistance 
will harden Vietnamese intransigence, 
undercut Sihanouk's role, and reduce 
prospects for a future political accom- 
modation. 

In addition to our objective of seek- 
ing a Cambodia free from Vietnamese 
domination, we will continue to work 
with the nations of Southeast Asia in 
our efforts to manage the human prob- 
lems created by the continuing flow of 
refugees from Indochina. On the ques- 
tion of refugees— and in the important 
effort to seek additional information on 
U.S. personnel still missing in action 
from the Vietnamese war— we will con- 
tinue to engage Hanoi, both directly and 
through appropriate international 
organizations. 

In the South Pacific, if the Lange 
government in New Zealand continues 
to challenge nuclear-powered warship 
visits or insists upon no visits by 
nuclear-armed ships, the future of our 
alliance relationship with New Zealand is 
in jeopardy. It is scarcely possible to 
maintain a defensive alliance without the 
regular interaction between military 
establishments which gives practical 
meaning to such an alliance. Thus, we 
have worked for the removal of barriers 
and efforts to discriminate among our 
forces according to their weaponry or 
propulsion. We have sought to give the 
Lange government time to alter the con- 



sensus within the governing party. But 
we have also insisted that we need con- 
crete indications that progress is being 
made and that a restoration of normal 
access is possible within a reasonable 
timeframe. 

The problem with New Zealand 
underlines the importance of our ties 
with Australia. Prime Minister Hawke 
will be visiting Washington, Febru- 
ary 5-7. The security situation in Asia 
and the Pacific, along with East-West 
issues, will be high on the agenda. We 
will be discussing with the Prime 
Minister the key contribution that 
Western strength and unity have made 
to the resumption of U.S. -Soviet arms 
control discussions. I am sui-e that we 
will also be discussing ways in which we 
can both seek to convince the Govern- 
ment of New Zealand to restore its full 
cooperation in the ANZUS alliance. 

During the months ahead, we will be 
following through in completing the 
transition to free association with the 
Federated States of Micronesia and the 
[Republic of the] Marshall Islands, and 
we will continue to work with the 
elected leadership on Palau as it likewise 
seeks to work out a future relationship 
with us under the Compact of Free 
Association. The Northern Mariana 



Islands have already opted to enter into 
a commonwealth status with us upon 
termination of the trust. 

As for Soviet ambitions in Asia and 
the Pacific, we need not be obsessed 
with their prospects in the region. They 
are playing with a weak hand politically 
and have regularly displayed the kind of 
cultural insensitivity which undercuts 
their prospects for gains. But we cannot 
ignore their growing military strength 
and must work to counteract it by main- 
taining a strong presence of our own 
and by bolstering mutual defense ar- 
rangements with our friends. 

Conclusion 

You will note that I have avoided any 
grand design for American policy in the 
next 4 years. The hallmark of our ap- 
proach is the patient tending of policy 
lines that have already been well laid. 
This is an approach more akin to 
gardening than to architecture. The 
roots of our policy, I believe, are strong. 
Our prospects are good. The current re- 
quirement is patience, attentiveness, and 
perseverance rather than dramatic new 
initiatives. ■ 



The Pacific: Region of Promise 
and Challenge 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Address before the National Defense 
University Pacific Symposium in 
Honolulu on February 22, 1985. Mr. 
Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

We hear a lot these days about the 
promise of the Pacific. What people 
speak of most often is the remarkable 
economic dynamism of the region. But 
equally remarkable, especially in light of 
recent history, is that the region — with 
the notable exception of Cambodia — is 
basically at peace. Without peace, the 
region would not have won this eco- 
nomic prosperity. 

There are many reasons for this 
stability, and it would be wrong to say 
that we brought it about by ourselves, 
but America's renewed commitment to 
the peace of the region has been impor- 
tant. That the Soviets have been unable 
to translate their increased military 



presence in the region into political or 
economic gains is in large measure 
because our military has been there, and 
they have been ready. This is a salute 
we diplomats owe to our military. 

But we can't afford to be compla- 
cent. As important as it is to maintain a 
military presence, there are challenges 
to stability that require more than just 
our strength alone to meet. 

Today, I'd like to talk briefly about 
two of these challenges and at more 
length about a third. 

Maintaining An Open Trading System: 
The Fight Against Protectionism 

A vigorous American economic recovery 
has pulled the free world out of a drain- 
ing recession, but protectionism could 
bring back recession again. America con- 
tinues to lead the fight against protec- 
tionism. Despite a few exceptions, our 
markets are among the freest in the 
world — but we cannot do it alone. 

Other nations, particularly Japan, 
must lower barriers to goods and serv- 



Aprll1985 



37 



EAST ASIA 



ices in which other nations can be com- 
petitive. During the President's trip to 
Japan in November 1983, we made prog- 
ress in one such area by getting initial 
agreement on opening Japanese finan- 
cial markets. During Prime Minister 
Nakasone's visit to Los Angeles, we set 
the stage for progress in others. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister agreed in Los Angeles to ini- 
tiate intensive discussions to identify 
and remove barriers to Japan's markets 
in four key sectors: telecommunications, 
other electronic products, forest prod- 
ucts, and medical equipment and phar- 
maceuticals. Late last month Under 
Secretary [for Economic Affairs] Allen 
Wallis led a high-level team to Tokyo to 
launch this effort, and we agreed with 
the Japanese on the program for this 
joint effort in the months ahead. We will 
have held at least one round of discus- 
sion on each of the four sectors by the 
week of March 11 when we will hold ma- 
jor economic consultations with the 
Japanese in Tokyo. We are placing a 
special priority on telecommunications 
because Japan will implement sweeping 
changes in its phone system on April 1, 
opening up major opportunities for the 
private sector. Secretary of State Shultz 
and Japanese Foreign Minister Abe are 
overseeing this process, and they are to 
give a progress report to the President 
and Prime Minister Nakasone at the 
Bonn summit in May. 

America cannot be expected to fight 
protectionism alone. The U.S. public has 
a great deal of patience, but it will not 
be willing to keep our markets open for- 
ever while others keep theirs closed. 

Maintaining Strong Alliances: 
The Threat to ANZUS 

Similarly, the U.S. public has a strong 
commitment to maintaining forces for 
peace in the Pacific, as elsewhere. But 
the American public will not long sup- 
port commitments and alliances that 
protect others if those others will not 
uphold their own responsibilities. New 
Zealand's refusal to allow access to their 
ports for our ships confronts us with 
such a situation today. 

ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, 
United States security treaty] is part of 
a system of postwar alliances in which 
the United States participates that has 
helped to keep the nuclear peace for 
four postwar decades. Our regional 
alliances are important in preventing 
small conflicts from even starting; and 
since it is from small wars that the 
greatest danger of big ones arises, these 
alliances are important for preserving 
the nuclear peace. The mutual commit- 
ments that these alliances entiiil help to 
avoid the kind of isolationism that 



brought on the last world war. Ironical- 
ly, the effect of New Zealand's action, 
small though it may be, is exactly op- 
posite to its announced purpose of 
reducing the risk of nuclear war. 

Some would say that New Zealand 
should not have to bear the risks or face 
the moral responsibilities imposed by 
modern weapons; but it is not New 
Zealanders who bear the brunt of deter- 
rence in the nuclear age. Americans are 
certainly no less concerned about the 
danger of nuclear war or the moral 
issues of defending freedom. We did not 
seek to be hostage to world peace, but 
we have accepted the role. But it is we 
who bear the major risks and burdens of 
maintaining a nuclear balance upon 
which all the free countries of the world 
depend. 

We do not ask New Zealanders to 
shoulder the burden of maintaining a 
nuclear balance. We are not pronuclear; 
we are pro-ANZUS. But without access 
to ports and the surface ship deploy- 
ments that access supports, we cannot 
maintain the naval presence in the 
Pacific that helps to deter war and 
preserve the peace. And we can't go 
around advertising which of those ships 
has nuclear weapons on board, or when 
they do and when they don't. For an ally 
to insist on that kind of disclosure as a 
condition for port access is just not 
responsible. 

With words New Zealand assures us 
that it remains committed to ANZUS; 
but by its deeds New Zealand has effec- 
tively curtailed its operational role in 
ANZUS. A military alliance has little 
meaning without military cooperation. 
New Zealand can't have it both ways. 

New Zealand, in the past, has been 
one of our staunchest allies. We hope 
that in the future New Zealand will 
shoulder again the reciprocal obligations 
of a full treaty partner, in its own na- 
tional interest and as a responsibility to 
the peace of the region and the world. 

Building Strong Political Institutions: 
Democracy in the Philippines 

The final challenge I would like to 
discuss today is the challenge of building 
strong and effective political institutions. 
We as Americans obviously favor de- 
mocracy because we believe it is the 
system that best protects the rights and 
supports the aspirations of individual 
citizens. But we also believe that history 
has shown that, over the long term, 
democracy is the most stable form of 
government and, thus, the strongest. 

The challenge of strengthening 
democratic institutions is one faced most 
acutely today by our oldest ally in the 
Pacific, the Philippines. The Philippines 
today suffers from serious economic dif- 
ficulties and considerable political uncer- 



tainty. The current crisis was precipi- 
tated by the August 1983 assassination 
of opposition leader and former Senator 
Benigno Aquino. That event on its own 
would have been a major political shock 
and a moral outrage, but it also cata- 
lyzed problems already present. It re- 
duced the credibility of the Marcos 
government among broad sectors of the 
Philippine public and unleashed political 
forces that had previously been largely 
quiescent. It also led to capital flight and 
disinvestment, aggravating already 
serious economic problems of declining 
productivity, a growing public sector 
deficit, heavy borrowing from abroad, 
excessive government interference in 
the market, and worldwide recession. 
The combined effect of these political 
and economic problems has, in turn, con- 
tributed to the growth of an armed 
communist-led insurgency which increas- 
ingly threatens the nation's future. 

These problems are profound and 
will not be resolved quickly. They are, 
moveover, interrelated. Progress in each 
area will be needed for further progress 
in the others. 

These problems did not begin just in 
the past few years, although recent 
events have made them more acute. 
Many of the political problems reflect 
decisions made years ago in times of 
domestic turmoil. Misallocations of 
economic resources reflect a period 
when the Philippines, like many Third 
World countries, was seduced by the 
idea that excessive government interven- 
tion and centralized decisionmaking 
would bring a shortcut to growth. There 
was too much reliance on debt rather 
than equity investment. At the same 
time, entrenched political factors have 
hampered the Philippine military's abili- 
ty to press reforms needed to deal with 
the insurgency. 

In hindsight, it is easy to criticize 
the erosion that brought the Philippines 
to its current problems, though at the 
time they were taken, many of these 
steps were not unpopular. For the mo- 
ment, it is enough to focus on how to 
rekindle the vitality of its institutions 
and restore the Philippines to a road of 
progress. 

U.S. Policy. The U.S. policy for 
progress is clear. It is no different from 
the policy we urge at home and in other 
countries abroad. Democratic processes 
and market mechanisms are often tur- 
bulent and lack the superficial ap- 
pearance of efficiency of highly cen- 
tralized systems. We are, nonetheless, 
convinced that countries are strongest 
and prosper best when: 

• Government is chosen by the peo- 
ple, responsive to the people, and sub- 
ject to the rule of law; 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



• The economy is open to the forces 
)f the marketplace; and 

• The mihtary is a professional in- 
stitution subject to the civilian govern- 
nent and respectful of citizens' rights. 

The appropriate U.S. role is to en- 
;ourage the revitalization of Philippine 
nstitutions. For any solution to work, it 
nust be a truly Filipino one. Nonethe- 
ess, it is appropriate for Americans to 
xpress — both publicly and privately — 
)ur support for human rights and our 
leep belief in free markets, in a profes- 
sional military, and, above all, in 
lemocratic institutions — particularly 
ree and fair elections. We must always 
emember that this is not our country, 
ind we are qot the ones who should 
letermine how to strike the delicate 
)alance between the need for change 
md the need for stability. Above all, it is 
lot our place as Americans to choose or 
moint individual leaders, be they of the 
government, the opposition, the private 
lector, or the military. It is up to the 
■"ilipinos, who know their country and 
lave to live in it, to choose their par- 
icular path and make the reforms they 
udge necessary. But it is appropriate 
or Americans to express our support 
or free and democratic institutions. 

In support of this approach, we as a 
:overnment have been making clear that 
he context in which our assistance is 
irovided is affected by the progress we 
.re able to see in Philippine effort to 
rapple with their basic problems. We 
ave also worked closely with other con- 
erned nations and with multilateral in- 
titutions to support their efforts to pro- 
lote institutional reform. 

In the final analysis, however, it is 
ur ability and willingness to speak 
rankly as friend and ally to virtually all 
lements of Philippine society, more 
han any other single factor, that 
nables us to encourage constructive 
hange in the Philippines. We find our 
oice is most effective when added 
esponsibly to a debate already under- 
.'ay in the Philippines. We are, thus, 
dirking with President Marcos and 
inny other Philippine leaders — 
epresenting government, opposition, 
iusiness, military, church, and other 
,'alks of life— who are themselves aware 
'f the need for reforms. As President 
ieagan said only 10 days ago: 

. . . we've got a good relationship with 
'rrsident Marcos. Now, we realize there is 
II opposition party that ... is also pledged to 
eniocracy. We also are aware that there is 
niither element in the Philippines that has 
onimunist support and backing. What we are 
opeful of is that the democratic processes 
,ill take place, and even if there is a change 
f ijarty there it would be that opposition fac- 
iiiii which is still democratic in its principles. 



L„ 



I think it would be a disaster for all of us if, 
out of the friction between those two parties, 
the third element, the communist element, 
should get in, because we know that their 
result is always totalitarian. 

The United States has pursued these 
policies actively since the current crisis 
came to a head in August 1983. We 
have sent to Manila to represent us dur- 
ing this period two of our most able Am- 
bassadors, Michael Armacost and 
Stephen Bosworth. Our approach, based 
on their recommendations, has included 
enhanced aid and other measures 
tailored to respond to the crisis in ways 
that have underlined U.S. resolve to be 
of assistance. We have kept in touch 
with the leadership of all democractic 
elements in the Philippines. And, 
through clear, timely political state- 
ments by our ambassadors in Manila and 
by officials in Washington, we have 
demonstrated to the Philippine public 
and national leadership that we stand 
with them in their time of trouble and 
that we encourage the basic reforms 
necessary to the survival of their 
democratic institutions. 

The Record So Far. One step 
toward progress is to recognize that 
some progress has already been made. 
In crafting a policy, it is unwise to 
minimize what remains to be done; but it 
is also unwise to ignore progress that 
has been made. 

The Philippine people and their 
leaders, with much help from their 
friends and allies in the international 
community, have made considerable 
progress since that tragic day in August. 
Perhaps most significantly, an independ- 
ent investigation of Senator Aquino's 
murder has progressed methodically. 
The Agrava board appointed by Presi- 
dent Marcos refuted the government's 
contention that Aquino's death was the 
work of a lone communist gunman and 
charged 16 military personnel with con- 
spiracy to commit murder and 8 others 
with participating in a coverup. All of 
these officials, including the Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff, General "Ver, have 
rehnquished their duties pending the 
outcome of a trial in a civilian court. 

Those who believe in the rule of law 
can only praise the courage and states- 
manship of those who have brought the 
case to this point. There are, sadly, few 
countries in the world where such 
thorough scrutiny of government actions 
would have taken place. 

There have been other significant 
political developments over the past 18 
months. 

• A constitutional mechanism for 
succession has been established that re- 
quires a prompt election in the event of 
presidential death or incapacity. This 



replaced an earlier procedure that would 
have permitted indefinite rule by an ap- 
pointed executive committee. 

• There is now a degree of press 
freedom seen in few other developing 
nations. It is hard to conceive of any 
criticism of the government or political 
rumor that does not find its way, in 
some fashion, into popular print. 

• Vigorously contested parliamen- 
tary elections in May, considered more 
open and fair than other recent polls, 
ushered in a strong and active assembly 
with an outspoken opposition. The suc- 
cess of the election was due, in large 
part, to a massive voter turnout and the 
remarkable watchdog role played by the 
200,000 citizen volunteers of the Na- 
tional Movement for Free Elections. 

On the economic front, we have seen 
acceptance of an IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] arrangement involving 
stringent austerity constraints — the 
essential first step toward resolving the 
financial crisis. In accordance with this 
program, the Marcos government has 
adopted such tough measures as budget 
cuts of roughly 30% overall, sharp limits 
on the domestic money supply, a floating 
peso, and broad new taxes. 

Initial steps have also begun toward 
the structural reforms that will be 
needed to get the economy back on a 
path of sustained growth. Unless market 
forces are free to operate, particularly in 
key sectors of the economy such as agri- 
cultural production and marketing, the 
Philippine economy will never recover 
its full health. For long-term growth, it 
is the view of virtually all economists, in- 
cluding those at the World Bank and the 
IMF, that the Filipinos must ehminate 
the barriers that currently block the full 
realization of their economy's inherent 
potential. 

Finally, the past few months have 
seen encouraging signs that the Philip- 
pine Government leadership and military 
establishment recognize the seriousness 
of the insurgency and are adopting a 
more effective, comprehensive approach 
to the challenge. Positive signs of mili- 
tary reform include: 

• A new system to police military 
abuses; 

• Some reorganization of military 
command and deployment to deal with 
the insurgency; and 

• A more realistic set of military 
procurement priorities focusing on basic 
mobility and communications items 
needed against the insurgency. 

The Tasks Ahead. If these remarks 
suggest that Filipinos have put some 
water back in the glass, it should be 
equally clear that the glass remains half 
empty. Much more has to be done. The 
challenges remain serious. 



39 



EAST ASIA 



Our current efforts to help the Fili- 
pinos meet these challenges concentrate 
on the following three general areas. 

• First, support for the growth of 
democratic institutions— the United 
States will continue to support the effort 
to guarantee free and fair local elections 
in 1986 and presidential elections in 
1987, although we must recognize that 
on such critical questions as electoral 
codes and election monitoring it is the 
Filipinos themselves who must decide 
what is necessary. 

• Second, support for efforts to 
move the Philippine economy back to a 
free market orientation— here, we will 
continue to support strongly the IMF 
reforms. Beyond that, our assistance 
will continue to aim at encouraging re- 
forms needed to establish a free market 
environment as the base for long-term 
growth. We are requesting $35 million 
from the Congress for a new PL 480 
food aid program designed specifically to 
support key reforms in the agricultural 
marketing area. We will also support 
World Bank and ADB [Asian Develop- 
ment Bank] efforts to disburse loans 
that support specific reform targets. 

• Third, we will provide enhanced 
military assistance with the full expecta- 
tion that reform programs already be- 
gun will continue and expand. The 
United States will provide badly needed 
material military assistance. Foreign ex- 
change shortages and budgetary re- 
straints have sharply reduced the re- 
sources available to the Philippine 
Armed Forces to play their role in a 
comprehensive approach to the in- 
surgency. As a percentage of GNP 
[gross national product], Philippine de- 
fense expenditures have dropped by 
almost half in the last 2 years and, at 
1.1% of GNP, are the lowest in South- 
east Asia— despite the growing threat of 
a communist insurgency. Basic short- 
comings in maintenance, logistics, trans- 
portation, communications, and training 
can only be overcome through adequate 
levels of foreign assistance. 

We are, therefore, asking Congress 
for an additional $15 million in military 
assistance in FY [fiscal year] 1986 over 
and above the annual level projected by 
understandings related to our bases 
agreement as well as for improvement 
in the terms of that assistance. At the 
same time, we have made clear to the 
Filipinos our conviction that without 
basic changes the Philippine military will 
not be able to stem the insurgency tide. 
This proposal is premised on the full ex- 
pectation that the incipient reforms we 
have seen will continue and expand. 
First and foremost, this requires an end 
to military abuse against civilians— itself 
one of the most commonly cited factors 



in explaining the alarming growth of the 
communist insurgency throughout the 
islands. 

While military reform is essential, 
the communist insurgency cannot be 
combated effectively without also ad- 
dressing the political and economic prob 
lems that the communists exploit. The 
best antidote to communism is democ- 
racy. This is not something we need to 
tell the Filipinos; indeed, it might be 
that they wrote the book on fighting 
communist insurgencies during their bat- 
tle against the Huks. [Then Secretary of 
National Defense and former Philippine 
President] Ramon Magsaysay put it elo- 
quently in a speech in 1951: 

We must deliver the substance of democ- 
racy to the people. Our military offensive is 
indispensable, since force must be met by 
force. But our social offensive is the extra 
weapon which the enemy cannot produce. 
Here the enemy meets democracy's strongest 
element in the ability to realize and satisfy 
the needs of its people without taking from 
them their freedom and dignity as human be- 
ings. 

The Stakes. In the coming years, it 
is the freedom and dignity of human be- 
ings that will be the true test of our 
policy. Philippine success in meeting its 
crisis has enormous implications for the 
United States and for all of East Asia. 
But the implications are most profound 
for the Filipinos themselves. 

True, it is in the U.S. interest for 
the Philippines to be a stable, demo- 
cratically oriented ally. A healthy Philip- 
pines within a strong ASEAN [Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations] is a 
bulwark for freedom in Southeast Asia. 
Through support for common interests 
and concern for democratic goals, the 
Philippines enhances U.S. interests and 
the chances for peace in the region. 

There is a tendency, both in the 
Philippines and in the United States, to 
focus upon our use of military facilities 
as the bottom-line U.S. interest in the 
Philippines. These facilities are, indeed, 
enormously important. They have a de- 
terrent effect, preserve the balance of 
power, and check the expanded Soviet 
and Vietnamese presence in the region. 
They are important not only to the 
United States and the Philippines, which 
by treaty enjoys protection under the 
U.S. defense umbrella, but also to the 
countries of North and Southeast Asia. 

However, the role of the military 
bases in shaping U.S. policy is far too 
often misunderstood and exaggerated. 
The bases give us one more important 
reason to be concerned for the long-term 
political and economic health of the 
Philippines; but our interest in the 
Philippines is far larger than just the 
bases, and our interest in the bases is 



long term, not short term. It is incum- 
bent upon us and upon Filipinos of all 
moderate persuasions to ensure that the 
long-term interests of both our countries 
are not threatened by short-term tactica 
considerations. 

The growth of the communist-led in 
surgency in the Philippines represents a 
threat to our interests and to the in- 
terests of other nations of the region. 
But the most serious threat is to the 
Filipinos themselves. The United States 
could find an alternative to our use of 
facilities in the Philippines. They would 
be more expensive and less effective, bui 
alternatives could be found. However, 
should the communists succeed in taking 
over the government in the Philippines, 
there would be no alternative for 50 
million Filipinos. The problems we see 
today in the Philippines, serious though 
they are, pale by comparison to those 
that every communist regime in history 
has inflicted on its people. And those 
regimes are not open to peaceful 
change. Not a single one has returned 
on its own to democracy. 

It has become almost fashionable re- 
cently to make comparisons between the 
Philippines and Iran. Most of these com- 
parisons ignore the enormous differ- 
ences between the Philippines and Iran 
in history, culture, traditions, religion, 
and political institutions. The one thing 
that is clear is that the Iranian people 
would be far better off under the former 
regime, with all its defects, than in the 
darkness they find themselves in today. 

Every country is unique, and 
analogies are, therefore, always dubious. 
But if we are looking for analogies, let 
us at least think for a moment about 
more hopeful ones, about the many 
countries that have, in the last 10 or 15 
years, restored, revitalized, or, in some 
cases, created effective democracies. 
There is no reason why Filipinos, with 
their long practical experience with 
democratic institutions, cannot move in- 
to the future with equal confidence. 

Conclusion. Change in the Philip- 
pines' economic, political, and military 
institutions is clearly underway. We are 
of the view that this process of change 
is both necessary and constructive. It is 
bringing with it a greater degree of 
pluralism in the political system; increas- 
ing transparency in public administra- 
tion; new accountability in the country's 
economic, political, and judicial institu- 
tions; and a healthy new sense of profes- 
sionalism in the military. All of these 
trends add to national strength, interna- 
tional credibility, and the reconciliation 
of national differences. 

Only the Filipinos can resolve their 
myriad problems. However, because of 
the legacy of history, the strong ties of 
our people, and the congruence of 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



security interests in the western Pacific 
and Southeast Asia, we have and will 
continue to have a natural concern for 
the health of the Philippines and its in- 
stitutions. 

As befits an old and strong ally, the 
United States is able to help influence 
developments in the Philippines. In at- 
tempting to do so, we must and do re- 
spect national sensitivities as well as 
recognize restraints. Our ability to affect 
what happens in the Philippines is not 
what it is thought to be in the coffee 
shops of Manila or, for that matter, by 
many U.S. observers. But we will not" 
underestimate our influence, and we will 
exercise it constructively. 



The problems, by any measure, are 
acute. But with political will, a spirit of 
compromise, and vigorous leadership, 
the Filipinos will win this struggle. The 
Filipinos' love for democracy has been 
manifested again and again"in their 
country's history. They are a resilient 
people. They are fighters. They know, as 
do their leaders of every democratic 
political persuasion, that they have our 
support to get the job done. They can be 
confident that we will be, to use Presi- 
dent Reagan's own words, ". . . staunch 
in our conviction that freedom is not the 
sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the 
inalienable and universal right of all 
human beings." ■ 



Protectionism: A Threat 
to Our Prosperity 



% W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the National Associ- 
ation of Business Econornists on 
'February 26, 1985. Mr. Wallis is Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

The subject I have been asked to ad- 
dress is international economic policy. 
At the outset, I want to point out that 
the term can be misleading. Interna- 
' tional economics is governed by the 
same fundamental laws as domestic 
economics. The modifier "international" 
does not mean we are dealing with 
something exotic or arcane that must be 
handled with a different set of 
rules— not at all. Economic cause and 
effect on the international scene are no 
different than on the domestic scene. 
What is different is the politics, and 
even the politics are more domestic than 
foreign. 

Trade policy, for example, seems to 
be a quintessential example of interna- 
tional economic policy. But the essence 
of trade policy was illuminated by the 
19th-century humorist, Ambrose Bierce. 
Bierce defined tariffs as devices "to pro- 
tect the domestic producer against the 
greed of his consumers." Trade policy in- 
volves diverting the income of some 
groups in a country (for example, con- 
sumers of automobiles) for the benefit of 
other groups m the same country (for 
example, producers of automobiles). The 
policy may be carried out at the border 
by limiting access to the U.S. market, 
but both its beneficiaries and its victims 
are primarily domestic and only secon- 



darily foreign. My comments on protec- 
tionism today may, therefore, be taken 
as equally applicable to the domestic and 
international economies. 



The Dangers of Protectionism 

The most serious threat to the world 
economy— and to our domestic 
economy— is the swelling tide of protec- 
tionism. People who would never con- 
done protectionism at home somehow 
accept that it should be practiced inter- 
nationally. To illustrate this point with a 
hypothetical example, suppose that the 
State of Virginia decided that North 
Carolina tobacco was making excessive 
inroads in the Virginia market, and sup- 
pose that Virginia (defying the constitu- 
tional prohibition against internal tariffs) 
managed to impose a special levy on all 
tobacco entering the state. Of course, 
North Carolina would retaliate against 
products from Virginia. Clearly, total 
economic activity — and our pros- 
perity — would be reduced. No one in 
this room would consider that trade bar- 
riers among the 50 States would be 
anything but a disaster; but many people 
(economists included) appear to assume 
that a different set of economic rules 
operates on the international scene. By 
this same logic — or lack of logic — they 
assume that with impunity we can in- 
troduce protectionist measures at our in- 
ternational borders without hurting all 
parties concerned — ourselves more than 
others. 

Protectionist measures invite a 
spiral of retaliation, and, even in the 
absence of retaliation. They foster ineffi- 
cient uses of scarce resources and raise 



the cost of living in the country in- 
troducing the protection. A favored 
group or industry may initially benefit 
from a quota, for example, but even 
greater additional costs are borne by the 
majority of the population. 

It may seem strange that in the 
United States, historically the champion 
of the free market, I should feel the 
need to make a plea for a free and open 
trading system. But, while most persons 
would readily agree that such a system 
is demonstrably superior in principle, I 
often find them advocating policies that 
would produce the opposite result. When 
individuals, industries, or even whole 
sectors perceive their economic interests 
to be threatened, they often rationalize a 
course of action that has, over and over 
again, proven to be a failure: protec- 
tionism. "We believe in free trade," they 
say, "but it must be fair trade." "Fair 
trade" is not defined, but implicitly it 
means trade in which we win. 

Protectionist measures, and trade- 
distorting measures in general, are not 
really actions taken by one country 
against another country. Instead, they 
are actions that benefit one domestic 
group at the expense of other groups in 
the same country. Producers oppose 
consumers, and industries that compete 
with imports oppose industries that ex- 
port. It is disheartening but not surpris- 
ing that protectionism's advocates are 
found in all nations, and always have 
been, but that does not validate their 
cause. Their arguments, in whatever 
language they may be phrased, are 
founded on the same fallacies, and 
neither eloquence nor vehemence will 
alter the fundamental fact that protec- 
tionism is inevitably self-defeating. Pro- 
tectionism is like a disease— not only 
pernicious but contagious. When it ap- 
pears, it spreads and leaves a trail of 
economic disability. 

By "protectionism," I mean any 
measure that gives a domestic producer 
an artificial advantage over foreign pro- 
ducers. I include tariffs, quotas, volun- 
tary export restraints, subsidies, un- 
necessary licensing, health and safety 
standards, and all other measures that 
distort trade. 

On the surface and in specific cases, 
protectionism may, at first glance, seem 
advantageous— at least to the naive. It 
is often claimed, for example, that im- 
port restrictions save jobs. It may be 
true that employment in one industry is 
higher with protection than without, but 
jobs lost in other sectors are often 
greater. 



April 1985 



41 



ECONOMICS 



Why are jobs lost in other sectors? 
In many cases, one industry's output is 
another industry's input. As a case in 
point, you will recall that last summer 
President Reagan refused to yield to 
demands for restrictions on copper im- 
ports. He recognized that the domestic 
copper industry suffered serious prob- 
lems, but he also recognized that any 
benefit that might accrue to the copper 
producers would be more than offset by 
increased costs to those industries using 
copper as a raw material. To maintain 
international competitiveness, U.S. firms 
need to have access to the highest quali- 
ty and lowest cost products available in 
the world market. 

More generally, to the extent that 
protectionism restrains imports, it will 
cause the dollar to appreciate. This, in 
turn, will encourage imports and 
discourage exports, with an adverse ef- 
fect on employment. Economists have 
long understood that, when all the inter- 
relationships within our economy are 
taken into account, an across-the-board 
import duty has the same effect as an 
across-the-board tax on exports. Unfor- 
tunately, this is not understood by those 
who argue for an import surcharge or 
other protectionist policies. Protection 
alters the distribution of employment 
among industries, but it does not affect 
the total level of employment. 

It is sometimes argued that protec- 
tion is "fairer" to low- and middle-income 
families. The opposite is more likely to 
be true, since protection raises prices in 
the protected industry — and who pays 
for that? Higher prices always impose a 
higher proportionate burden on low- 
income consumers than on high-income 
consumers. 

Finally, we cannot ignore the risk of 
retaliation. If we limit a country's ex- 
ports of a given product to us, that 
country's ability to buy from us is re- 
duced, and it may also retaliate directly 
against some of our exports. The result 
will be that a different U.S. industry will 
lose an export market and, thus, 
employment. In such a situation, our 
overall employment level could possibly 
remain the same, but, through govern- 
ment intervention in the marketplace, 
employment will have been redis- 
tributed. Furthermore, the redistribution 
will be from more efficient to less effi- 
cient industries, for which all of us will 
pay, both as consumers and as pro- 
ducers. It is far better to allow the 
market to work and to transfer employ- 
ment from an uncompetitive industry to 
one that is more efficient. 

This leads me to the often-heard 
argument that we must protect our 



"basic" industries. This argument ig- 
nores the fact that, in a dynamic 
economy such as ours, what may be a 
basic industry in one period of time may 
not be at all "basic" in another. This 
argument mistakes the prospects for 
continued vitality in our economy as a 
whole with the prospects of particular 
industries. New industries develop, and 
old ones decline. For example, would 
any of you hesitate to call computers a 
basic industry? But was it a basic in- 
dustry in, say, 1950? Obviously, the mix 
is constantly changing and will continue 
to do so. Then why should government 
intervene to decide what industry is 
"basic" and merits special protection? I 
submit that the marketplace will 
demonstrate what is "basic" and what 
isn't and that if a particular industry is 
declining, the marketplace is telling us 
something. 

Protection is often invoked to pro- 
vide an industry an "adjustment period" 
to modernize and become more com- 
petitive. The theory is that it will 
become healthy and that the protection 
can then be eliminated. Unfortunately, 
the opposite is usually the case. Not only 
does protection obviate the need for the 
protected industry to become more effi- 
cient, but the protection entices more 
resources into a sector that probably 
already has excess capacity. For exam- 
ple, for several decades textiles has been 
one of our most protected industries, yet 
a study in 1982 showed that fully one- 
third of all the clothing and textile 
establishments in the country had not 
been in the industry 6 years earlier. In 
France, one-fifth of all new manufactur- 
ing firms in recent years have been in 
the clothing and textile industry. 

Let us remember that in the 1960s 
the protection sought by industrial coun- 
tries for their textile industries was 
described as "temporary." Would we not 
all be better off if scarce resources, in- 
stead of being attracted to textiles, had 
been invested in new industries where 
we enjoy a comparative advantage? Fur- 
thermore, we would now have a serious 
problem on our hands if we were to 
remove protection for textiles except 
over a prolonged period; and the in- 
dustry has accumulated huge vested in- 
terests that lead to increasing rather 
than decreasing its protection. 

We should also note that some 
forms of protection not only reduce our 
welfare but actually help foreign pro- 
ducers by enabling them to charge 
higher prices for the restricted exports. 
This is generally true of quotas or so- 
called voluntary export restraints. U.S. 
protection of steel in the 1 970s, for ex- 



ample, is estimated to have increased 
the annual profits of Japanese steel pro- 
ducers by about $200 million, or about 
half of the Japanese expenditures on 
research and development in steel. The 
current restraints on Japanese auto- 
mobile exports to the United States are 
adding considerably to the profits of 
those Japanese automobile manufac- 
turers who are allowed to export to the 
United States, thereby generating an in- 
fluential voice in Japan for continuing 
the restraints. 

Protectionist measures can cause 
distortions without achieving their 
original intent. In 1977 we signed an 
orderly marketing agreement with 
Japan covering color television 
receivers. At that time, Japan accounted 
for 90% of our imports. Two years later, 
Japan accounted for only 50% of our im- 
ports — but the share of other Asian 
countries increased from 15% to 50%. 
Thus, we merely succeeded in changing 
the source of Imports. 

Protection at international frontiers 
is often the outgrowth of government in- 
tervention in the market. A good exam- 
ple is provided by agriculture, which is 
subsidized in most industrial countries, 
including our own. Subsidies are de- 
signed to improve the income of a privil- 
edged group at the expense of other 
citizens — in this case, consumers. Sub- 
sidies artificially stimulate the produc- 
tion of goods that are neither wanted 
nor needed. More of the subsidized 
goods are produced than would have 
been without subsidization — witness 
farm surpluses in the European Com- 
munity. As is true of all subsidies, they 
shift resources away from other sectors 
of the economy to the subsidized sector. 
The result is that resources are used less 
efficiently, total output is reduced, and 
investment in other sectors lags. Part of 
the blame for the European Economic 
Community's poor economic perform- 
ance in the past decade or two can be 
attributed to the rising burden of 
agricultural subsidies, which attract 
capital and labor into farming at the ex- 
pense of the rest of the economy. 

Having pushed commodity prices 
above market-clearing levels and having 
enticed new jiroducers into the market, 
subsidizing nations then resort to protec- 
tionism. They impose import barriers to 
keep out the cheaper products that 
would undercut the artificial price struc- 
ture that has been built up. Then, with 
excessive production and saturated 
markets, producing nations move to the 
next stage: subsidizing exports to move 
their stockpiles. 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



That protectionism is economically 
larmful, particularly to the nation that 
mposes the restrictions, is not just an 
ibstract theory. It is an observable fact 
'or which I have given a few examples 
lere and for which many more examples 
ould be readily produced. It follows 
ogically that our policies should be 
iirected toward tlie reduction of protec- 
:ionism. We need greater public 
iwareness that protection that, in the 
short run, appears to be a benefit is, in 
he long run, detrimental. Spreading 
his awareness is a task for which I 
ount on your support. 

3pening Foreigfn Markets 

3ther countries, of course, have an even 
)igger stake than we do in preserving 
md extending the open trading system, 
'or they lack our huge internal free 
narket. Japan, for example, has 
)enefited greatly from the access it has 
■njoyed to our market, as have we. But 
)arriers that Japan maintains to its 
iomestic market limit the ability of U.S. 
'irms to sell there on terms comparable 
those enjoyed by Japanese firms in 
he United States. Both countries would 
oe better off if Japan were to remove as 
nany of these obstacles as possible. 

It is for this reason that President 
lleagan and Prime Minister Nakasone 
igreed earlier this year to launch an in- 
lensive series of sectoral trade negotia- 
lions. Late in January, I led a mission to 
!'okyo to initiate the discussions, which 
will initially include telecommunications, 
lectronics, forest products, and medical 
■quipment and pharmaceuticals. High of- 
icials from the Office of the U.S. Trade 
lejjresentative, the Department of Com- 
iierce, the Department of Agriculture, 
lul the Treasury are very active in the 
legotiations, which are unique in that 
he negotiators on both sides have been 
^ven the same instructions— to identify 
larriers to Japan's markets that are 
■usceptible to corrective action by 
government. Secretary Shultz and 
'^oreign Minister Abe have been in- 
tructed to provide a progress report to 
^resident Reagan and Prime Minister 
Nakasone at the time of the Bonn 
'conomic summit in May. 

We have no illusions that success 
vill be instantaneous. The political 
orces of protectionism are stronger in 
(apan than in most countries. Never- 
heless, we seek early progress in the 
elecommunications sector and will 
persevere with our efforts. 

If we are to be successful in break- 
ng down foreign protectionist barriers 
md in opening foreign markets, we 



must ourselves avoid resorting to pro- 
tection. Just as we object to protec- 
tionism in others, we should not expect 
them to welcome it in us. Nor should we 
be surprised if they retaliate or use our 
actions as excuses to justify their own 
protectionism. The question of retalia- 
tion reminds me of one of President 
Reagan's favorite analogies. He said, if 
two people are in a boat and one of 
them shoots a hole in the bottom, it will 
not help the other person to shoot 
another hole in the bottom. Some call 
that getting tough, the President said, 
but he calls it getting wet. Our markets 
are more open than most, but we have 
our share of highly protected, inefficient 
sectors. But to halt and reverse the tide 
of protectionism, it is obviously not suffi- 
cient to practice self-discipline just at 
home. We need the cooperation of the 
international trading community. 

Forming a Coalition for Free Trade 

I have spoken a great deal of the danger 
of protectionism in terms of reaction 
and retaliation, but I do not want to 
leave you with the wrong impression. 
The main reason we should work toward 
free trade is not fear of retaliation, but 
that we gain by it, whatever other coun- 
tries do. I am advocating a hard-headed 
policy to maximize our own welfare. Of 
course, open markets here help our 
trading partners, and it helps them and 
us still further if their markets are open, 
too. The debt-ridden less developed 
countries, for example, can hardly even 
service that debt unless they, we, and 
the other developed countries keep our 
markets open to them. 

In considering policies for opening 
trade, it is necessary to consider the 
political process on which such policies 
must be based. Phrases like "political 
will" are empty rhetoric. The important 
consideration is political capacity. 

If those interested in an industry 
have an influence over the government, 
they have a chance of gaining protec- 
tion. This is strikingly true in the case of 
nationalized industries— for example, in- 
ternational airlines in most countries. 
Modern democracies increasingly have 
become fragmented. Some of this is due 
to methods of electing legislatures— for 
example, by proportional representation 
or by electing several representatives 
from a single constituency— and other 
devices which effectively prevent any 
one party from gaining a majority, so 
that coalitions have to be formed. Even 
in countries where the two-party system 
prevails, such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States, party discipline is 



weakening, and it is necessary to form 
coalitions among many special interest 
groups in order to achieve any legisla- 
tion. 

Comprehensive negotiations, such as 
would be involved in a new round of 
comprehensive trade arrangements, of- 
fer the best chance for putting together 
a coalition for free trade. Each party to 
the coalition may lose some special 
benefit. But if it can be assured that the 
special benefits lost by all of the other 
members will gain it enough to offset its 
loss, it is possible to get a working coali- 
tion for free trade. This is a case in 
which it may be easier to clean the 
whole Augean stable at once than to 
clean it one stall at a time. 

We must, therefore, push ag- 
gressively forward on a comprehensive 
multilateral trade negotiation under the 
auspices of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The object of 
such negotiations is twofold; 

First, to hold the line and eventual- 
ly reverse the global trend toward pro- 
tectionism that has already cost us dear- 
ly and, if permitted to spread, would 
eventually cause a contraction in world 
trade and a reduction in our standard of 
living; 

Second, to create new market op- 
portunities for our own (and others') 
most efficient and dynamic industries so 
that they may realize their full potential 
as engines of future growth. 

We have much to gain from a new 
round of trade negotiations, and so do 
our partners. 

But the problems are immense. The 
less developed countries have shown lit- 
tle interest in a new round of negotia- 
tions, and, in many of the industrialized 
countries, high unemployment has en- 
couraged governments to shield in- 
dustries from competition. Highly pro- 
tected industries in this country, for that 
matter, do not want import competition. 
Many people, both at home and abroad, 
have to be shown where their best in- 
terests lie. We have to persuade govern- 
ments that the best reason for them to 
reduce trade barriers is that it is in their 
best interest to do so. Despite the dif- 
ficulties, this Administration is deter- 
mined to continue its efforts to produce 
a freer and more productive trading 
system. 

In closing, I ask all of you, as pro- 
fessional economists, to contribute your 
skills and your prestige to this common 
effort to increase our prosperity— not 
only the prosperity of the United States, 
but that of the whole world. ■ 



\pril1985 



43 



EUROPE 



The United States and Greece 



by Richard N. Haas 

Address before the American 
Hellenic Educational Progressive 
Association (AHEPA) on February 8, 
1985. Mr. Haas is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for European and Canadian 
Affairs. 

The theme of this conference is "Irrecon- 
cilable Differences? American Foreign 
Policy and Greek National Interests." 
AHEPA deserves our congratulations 
for sponsoring a conference on so impor- 
tant a topic, and I will direct most of my 
remarks to this question. But I want to 
begin with a few words about the larger 
context in which relations between the 
United States and Greece occur. 

President Reagan took office at a 
time of crisis and demoralization in U.S. 
foreign policy. Twin setbacks in Iran and 
Afghanistan, a relentless Soviet 
weapons buildup, major economic prob- 
lems at home and abroad— all left the 
West relatively weaker and America's 
leadership role more in doubt than at 
any time since World War II. 

The President was highly successful 
in meeting these challenges. The election 
results of November attest to the 
widespread support for his policies and 
leadership. I understand, too, that near- 
ly two-thirds of the Greek-Americans 
voting favored President Reagan. 

What Greek-Americans and others 
endorsed was a self-confident America, 
an America of renewed economic oppor- 
tunity and growth, and an America of 
restored military might. Election results 
also revealed support for a foreign 
policy dictated by a sincere commitment 
to negotiations and arms reduction 
tempered by a realistic assessment of 
the Soviet Union. 

A key aspect of our success abroad 
was that it was shared. The United 
States has long recognized that it cannot 
go it alone if peace and freedom are to 
be preserved. Our experience in the 
alliance of democracies, NATO, has been 
a great success. Sixteen countries with 
widely different backgrounds, some 
formerly bitter enemies, belong. As 
allies they have worked together to 
preserve the peace in Europe for over 
35 years. And they have done so in the 
face of a growing threat from the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact. 



Greece and the Alliance 

Greece is one of the members of this 
successful alliance. It has enjoyed the 
peace NATO has provided. It has added 
to the strength that preserved the 
peace. Greece and the United States 
share the common benefits and respon- 
sibilities that go with membership in this 
unique association. 

Yet despite this proud and suc- 
cessful past, our differences seem to 
have increased in number and gravity. 
Are these differences irreconcilable? I 
won't keep you in suspense. My answer 
is no. Let me justify this answer with a 
few propositions. 

My first proposition is that Greece 
has long been a valued and important 
friend and ally. Just as Greek-Americans 
cannot separate themselves entirely 
from their former homeland, America 
cannot separate itself from a heritage 
which dates 'back to ancient Greece. The 
very word for our form of govern- 
ment—democracy—comes from Greek. 
Our art and architecture abound with 
the influences of Hellenic culture. 
Thousands of our citizens each year 
travel to Greece. We are bound by a net- 
work of important economic, social, and 
political ties. We fought with Greece 
against fascism and forged close bonds 
under the Truman doctrine. As two of 
that small and select group of nations 
which embrace democracy, we joined 
NATO and helped halt the spread of 
Soviet communism. 

As a second proposition, Greece is 
of major strategic importance to the 
West, the United States, and NATO as 
well. Located at the crossroads of 
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, 
Greece is in a position to help control 
the sea- and airlanes of the Mediter- 
ranean. Bordering on the Warsaw Pact, 
Greece would block any attack toward 
the Mediterranean through Thrace and 
would join Turkey and other members of 
NATO in resisting a Soviet effort to 
seize the Dardanelles. The United States 
has valuable military facilities in Greece 
which serve key alliance and mutual 
defense objectives. Without Greece, 
NATO's southern frontier would be split. 
A dangerous gap would emerge in the 
defense chain stretching from the 
Norwegian Sea to the eastern Mediter- 
ranean. 



A third proposition stems from the 
other side of the coin. I would argue 
that the United States and NATO are 
vital to Greek security. Greece enjoys 
the benefits of a world in which warfare 
has been contained due to the strong ef- 
forts of the Western alliance. While 
some in Greece see no imminent threat 
of attack from the north today, it is onlj 
the deterrence provided by a united and 
strong alliance that makes that so. As 
Prime Minister Papandreou recently 
acknowledged in an interview, had it not 
been for the approach taken by the 
United States after World War II, 
Greece would likely be in the Soviet bloc 
today. 

Beginning with the massive effort tc 
assist Greece under the Truman doc- 
trine, as it resisted Soviet and Soviet- 
supported pressures, the United States 
has provided over $6.8 billion in 
economic and military assistance to 
Greece. Our commitment continues: in 
the current fiscal year, the Reagan Ad- 
ministration has proposed that Greece 
receive $500 million in FMS [foreign 
military sales] loans, making Greece the 
fifth largest recipient of U.S. security 
assistance. Indeed, of the five major 
recipients, only Israel receives more on 
a per capita basis. 

Security against external threat, 
combined with foreign assistance, has 
greatly contributed to Greek economic 
development. Ties to the West provided 
a framework in which Greece could 
make impressive political and economic 
strides. With the tragic exception of the 
period from 1967-74, Greece since 1949 
has experienced one of its longest 
periods of political stability as a 
democracy since antiquity. Economic ac- 
complishments have been just as great. 
Greece's annual per capita income has 
increased from below $200 in 1950 to 
around $4,000 today. 

Turkey and U.S.-Greek Relations 

I suspect that many of you can agree 
with the points I have made thus far. 
What, then, underlies our topic of the 
day? If the United States and Greece 
share a mutual heritage and traditions 
and have compelling mutual security in- 
terests, then why has AHEPA through 
this conference emphasized our dif- 
ferences? Does the answer lie with those 
who believe our interests are irrecon- 
cilable because of our relations with 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



Turkey and because of Cyprus? This 
leads to my next proposition, funda- 
mental to our policy toward the eastern 
Mediterranean— namely, that good rela- 
tions between the United States and 
Turkey are consistent with Greek in- 
terests. So, too, is the approach we are 
taking to the Cyprus problem. 

There is no denying that differing 
Derspectives, mistrust, and suspicion in 
3oth Ankara and Athens complicate our 
:ies with both allies. Frankly, we some- 
;imes are tempted to conclude that if 
3oth Greece and Turkey are dissatisfied 
Afith us— as is sometimes the case— we 
Tiust be doing something right. None- 
;heless, there are a number of good 
easons why our relationship with 
Turkey serves the common interests of 
he United States and Greece. 

First, just as Greece is vital to 
MATO, so is Turkey. No military plan- 
ler would want to defend Turkey 
A'ithout Greece or Greece without 
Turkey. Turkey does not only share a 
ong border with the Warsaw Pact; it 
Drojects eastward into Southwest Asia 
ind stands squarely between the Soviet 
Union and the Middle East. In wartime, 
Turkey would be vital to us and to 
jlreece, whether the attack came in 
Thrace, Southwest Asia, or the Persian 
julf. Nor would an isolated Turkey out- 
ride NATO be in Greek interests. I 
A'ould add that U.S. security assistance 
M Turkey, although larger than for 
areece, is not excessive. Turkey's needs, 
pven the threat I have outlined, are 
lubstantial. Much of Turkey's arms are 
obsolete. Per capita GNP [gross national 
Droduct] in Turkey is only a third that of 
jreece. 

But American aid for Turkey does 
not merely help Ankara meet a common 
fhreat shared by Greece and the United 
tates. It also supports continued 
political and economic development in 
DMrkey. Turkey's steady return to 
democracy and progress toward 
iconomic and internal stability can only 
ontribute to long-term prospects for 
iresolving Greek-Turkish differences. We 
(do not minimize these problems, but we 
lio not consider them insoluble. They in- 
clude complex and important issues of 
sovereign rights relating to airspace and 
the sea and many other issues, large and 
small, which create frictions between 
these two neighbors. Such problems 
have been addressed by Greeks and 
Turks before. One need only think back 
to the period in which the Greek and 
Turkish statesmen, [Eleutherios] 
Venizelos and [Kemal] Ataturk, were 
able to establish a foundation of con- 



structive ties in difficult circumstances. 
Those of the present ought not to settle 
for less. 

Quite simply, the United States does 
not have the luxury of favoring one 
country over the other, and neither 
country would benefit if we did. We will 
continue to make clear our opposition to 
the use of force in the Aegean. Both 
allies face too many threats which are 
real and too many demands on their 
limited resources to squander them on 
needless confrontation. We will continue 
to urge both countries to make renewed 
efforts to ease tensions and to resume a 
dialogue. 

The Cyprus Problem 

Let me turn now to Cyprus. Here, too, 
we believe differences in perspective be- 
tween Greece and the United States do 
not pose intractable problems for our 
relationship. We recognize the impor- 
tance of this issue to Greek people 
everywhere and to all Greek govern- 
ments. Cyprus is a top priority for 
American foreign policy as well. We 
have made clear our willingness to assist 
the parties in the search for a settle- 
ment. We have also made clear our op- 
position to actions which forestall or 
prejudice progress. In this, we should 
find ourselves not at odds but at one 
with all Greeks. 

No one should doubt America's 
resolve to see progress toward a fair, 
negotiated settlement in Cyprus. The 
United States alone, however, cannot 
solve the Cyprus problem. Efforts to im- 
pose a settlement by outside parties 
have failed in the past. Nor can the 
United States be held responsible for the 
current situation, which developed over 
many years. Attempts to make the 
United States the scapegoat for internal 
political events in Greece or for creating 
the Cyprus problem are wrong. They ig- 
nore the long history of differences be- 
tween the two communities. They also 
detract from realistic attempts to solve 
the problem. Ultimately, the Cypriots 
themselves must decide how they will 
live together. Compromise will be 
necessary from both sides. 

Our policy has been and remains one 
of strong support for the efforts of the 
UN Secretary General and his "good 
offices" i;ole of bringing the two com- 
munities together. I am sure many of 
you followed closely UN Secretary 
General Perez de Cuellar's latest in- 
itiative on Cyprus, which culminated in 
January's meetings between President 
Kyprianou and [Turkish Cypriot leader] 
Mr. Denktash. 'This was the first summit 



EUROPE 



meeting between the Cypriot parties in 
nearly 6 years. Extensive discussion of 
the key elements of a settlement took 
place. While we were disappointed that 
the parties were unable to reach agree- 
ment, we believe that much has been ac- 
complished in the last several months. 
We should not squander the progress 
that has been made. F^ursuit of a 
negotiated solution must continue. We 
are urging all parties to renew the 
search for progress. As before, we will 
do what we can to assist this endeavor. 

In doing so, we do not believe that 
one-sided punitive approaches, such as 
cuts in military assistance to Turkey or 
conditioning Turkish assistance to 
specific actions on Cyprus, are helpful. 
In fact, they are counterproductive. On 
the other hand, in an effort to provide 
positive incentives for progress, the 
President proposed last year a $250 
million Cyprus Peace and Reconstruc- 
tion Fund for use by the Cypriots when 
a settlement is reached or significant 
steps toward one are taken. That pro- 
posal is still valid and will be im- 
plemented should circumstances permit, 
as we all hope they will. We welcome 
AHEPA's thoughtful and constructive 
proposal on how this fund might be used 
to encourage Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots to begin practical efforts at 
cooperation. 

No issue requires the attention of all 
parties in the region now more than 
Cyprus. The prospects for progress are 
greater than they have been for many 
years. And while we know movement 
toward a resolution of the Cyprus prob- 
lem will not automatically lead to im- 
provements in relations between Greece 
and Turkey, it is clear that the improved 
atmosphere that would result could 
make it easier for the two sides to ad- 
dress other areas of tension. 

Other Issues 

In our view, then, Turkey and Cyprus 
need not and should not prevent good 
U.S. -Greek relations. Our differing 
views do, of course, complicate our rela- 
tions, and it would be disingenuous to 
say otherwise. This is in itself nothing 
new. What is new, though, is the scope 
and intensity of problems that have 
characterized our relations since 1981. 

Perhaps most difficult for many 
Americans to deal with are the harsh 
and even gratuitous criticisms directed 
at the United States in recent years by 
the Government of Greece. We have our 
faults, plenty of them. Certainly, we are 
not above criticism. Furthermore, dif- 
ferences—even sharp differences— are to 



April 1985 



45 



EUROPE 



be expected between democratic allies 
with independent views. 

But there ought to be limits. As we 
see it, these differences are similar to 
those in a family. They should be kept in 
the family context. In this case, the 
family is the Western community of na- 
tions with its core of shared interests. 
We do not believe that statements by an 
ally calling the United States "the 
metropolis of imperialism" and virtually 
white-washing the Soviet Union are con- 
sistent with the spirit of the alliance. 
Nor can we understand why a friend 
would accuse the United States of put- 
ting into jeopardy the lives of hundreds 
of innocent women and children aboard 
Korean Air Lines Flight 007, shot down 
by the Soviet Union. It was and remains 
a preposterous charge that this plane 
was on a spy mission for the United 
States. Provocative Greek Government 
statements questioning U.S. and NATO 
motivation in supporting Solidarity in 
Poland only detract from goals we all 
share. So, too, does Greek refusal to 
support the alliance consensus on 
resisting the deployment of Soviet 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles 



targeted on Europe. These accusations 
go beyond routine disagreement be- 
tween allies. They draw down the large 
fund of good will for Greece here in 
America and erode support for the 
United States in Greece. 

We have other problem areas. Our 
military bases in Greece serve mutual in- 
terests, we believe, and, in fact, we con- 
cluded a new base agreement 15 months 
ago. We assume this serves Greek in- 
terests or the government would not 
have signed. Yet we continue to hear 
statements about the agreement being 
no more than a 5-year termination pact. 
Again, these are statements, not specific 
actions, but they hurt the atmosphere 
and make important military planning 
and cooperation much more difficult. 
Both parties to an alliance must be con- 
fident they can rely on each other in the 
future. We lack this when the Greek 
Government asserts that the Americans 
will be asked to leave at the end of 5 
years. 

We here in the United States were 
pleased when Greece resumed full par- 
ticipation in NATO in 1980. This re- 
mains the case. As you know, NATO is 



40th Anniversary 
of the Yalta Conference 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
FEB. 5, 1985' 

Forty years ago this week, the leaders 
of the United States, Great Britain, and 
the Soviet Union met at Yalta, to confer 
on the approaching end of World War II 
and on the outlines of the postwar 
world. The agreements they reached in- 
cluding the Declaration on Liberated 
Europe, committed all three govern- 
ments to the reconstruction of a 
democratic continent. 

Since that time, Yalta has had a 
double meaning. It recalls an episode of 
cooperation between the Soviet Union 
and free nations, in a great common 
cause. But it also recalls the reasons 
that this cooperation could not con- 
tinue — the Soviet promises that were 
not kept, the elections that were not 
held, the two halves of Europe that have 
remained apart. 

Why is Yalta important today? Not 
because we in the West want to reopen 
old disputes over boundaries; far from 
it. The reason Yalta remains important 
is that the freedom of Europe is un- 



finished business. Those who claim the 
issue is boundaries or territory are hop- 
ing that the real issues— democracy and 
independence — will somehow go away. 
They will not. 

There is one boundary which Yalta 
symbolizes that can never be made 
legitimate, and that is the dividing line 
between freedom and repression. I do 
not hesitate to say that we wish to undo 
this boundary. In so doing, we seek no 
military advantage for ourselves or for 
the Western alliance. We do not deny 
any nation's legitimate interest in securi- 
ty. But protecting the security of one 
nation by robbing another of its national 
independence and national traditions is 
not legitimate. In the long run, it is not 
even secure. 

Long after Yalta, this much remains 
clear: The most significant way of mak- 
ing all Europe more secure is to make it 
more free. Our 40-year pledge is to the 
goal of a restored community of free 
European nations. To this work we 
recommit ourselves today. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1985. 



a union of democratic states, so diversi- 
ty, not imposed unanimity, is one of its 
great strengths. Nonetheless, I think m^ 
concept of the family again comes into 
play. An overall harmony of approach 
and willingness to compromise are 
essential. We do not see such an ap- 
proach being taken by the Greek 
Government. We and other allies are 
distressed, for example, about Greek un 
willingness to participate in alliance 
military exercises. Such exercises are 
very important in strengthening and 
testing NATO defenses and benefit all o 
us. We hope that the Greek Governmen 
will agree to participate again in the 
future. 

We also have had our differences on 
specific terrorist incidents in the recent 
past and, more generally, on how best ti 
react to the growing threat that interna 
tional terrorism poses to all civilized na- 
tions. You have seen media accounts of 
the tragic bombing in Glyfada. Whateve 
the source of the outrage— and we do 
not yet have enough information to 
judge— the incident starkly reveals our 
joint vulnerability to acts of violence anc 
terrorism. We appreciate the sympathy 
and outrage expressed by the Greek 
Government and its efforts to seize the 
perpetrators. We sincerely hope that 
from this tragic incident will come an 
improved dialogue between our govern- 
ments on terrorism. Certainly, progress 
in the key area of antiterrorism would 
go a long way to improve relations be- 
tween us. 

I should point out that despite all 
these obstacles, there are accomplish- 
ments on the other side of the ledger as 
well— the conclusion of a base agree- 
ment which had not been possible under 
previous Greek governments was a 
notable achievement. Implementation of 
that agreement, despite some strong 
points of friction, continues to go well in 
many areas. Sixth Fleet vessels regular- 
ly visit Athens and other Greek ports. 
We are currently negotiating for new 
agreements regarding our VOA [Voice 
of America] transmitters in Greece and 
status of forces arrangements. Discus- 
sions to expand economic and commer- 
cial ties are also underway. It is, indeed, 
a shame that the many positive aspects 
of U.S. -Greek relations become obscured 
in the face of our differences. 

If I may conclude this last of my 
propositions, let me reiterate that I do 
not believe the differences I have out- 
lined are irreconcilable. We derive no 
satisfaction from our current difficulties. 
To the contrary, we seek to have the 
best possible relationship with Greece. 



46 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



We believe our relationship can improve. 
And we are doing our part to bring this 
about. We do not ask Greece to give up 
its independence or sovereignty. We ask 
only for a reciprocal approach on the 
part of the Greek Government. Good 
relations are a two-way street. We ask 
that our differences be handled construc- 
tively and privately, not openly and con- 
tentiously. We do not and cannot ask 
that all our differences be magically 
resolved, only that they be dealt with in 
a fashion befitting long-time friends and 
allies. 

AHEPA has a key role to play. Your 
close contact with the Greek people and 
understanding of both countries provides 
an important bond of friendship and 
trust. No gi-oup is more qualified to ex- 
plain our perspective in Greece or the 
Greek perspective here than you. None 
can doubt your sincere concern for good 
It. S. -Greek relations. You have 
represented a large segment of the 
American public's views on these issues 
responsibly and thoughtfully. 

We all' admire what your organiza- 
tion has done and continues to do to 
foster greater understanding and better 
relations. This conference is a fine exam- 
ple of your timely and perceptive ef- 
forts. I personally have appreciated 
AHEPA's dialogu.e with the Administra- 
tion. I ask for your continued help 
toward the goals we share— better rela- 
tions between the United States and 
Greece, better relations among the coun- 
tries of the region, peaceful resolution of 
differences, and a uniting of effort to 
meet our common challenges and aspira- 
tions. ■ 



Soviet Crackdown on 
Jewish Cultural Activists 



Tlie follo^ving Department uf State 
report was presented to Morris Abram, 
chair-man of the National Conference on 
Soviet Jewry, by Assistant Secretary for 
European and Canadian Affairs 
Richard R. Burt on January SO, 1985. It 
was made available to news correspond- 
ents by acting Department sp<>kesm.an 
Edward Djerejian on February 1. 

[n late July 1984, Soviet authorities 
began a major, sustained crackdown on 
Hebrew teachers and other Jewish 
cultural activists. By the end of January 
1985, eleven activists, including four 
Hebrew teachers, had been arrested and 
four sentenced to terms in Soviet labor 
camps. The arrests were accompanied 
by a series of searches, beatings, and 
threats which have sent shock waves 
through the Soviet Jewish community. 

The crackdown began with the 
July 26 arrest of Moscow Hebrew 
teacher Aleksandr Kholmianskiy in 
Estonia on hooUganism charges. Police 
reportedly located a pistol and ammuni- 
tion in a subsequent search of his 
parents' Moscow apartment. In early 
September, his fellow Moscow Hebrew 
teacher, Yuliy Edelshtein, was arrested 
after a police search of his apartment 
turned up narcotics. There is no reason 
to doubt the assertions of close relatives 
that in both cases the items were 
planted by the police. On December 19, 
Edelshtein was convicted and sentenced 
to 3 years in a labor camp. Kholmian- 
skiy," who is reportedly very weak after 
a prolonged hunger strike, is scheduled 
to come to trial on January 31 on the 
hooliganism and weapons possession 
charges. 

In addition to Moscow, the crack- 
down has focused on Jewish com- 
munities in the Ukraine. Yakov Levin, a 
Jewish cultural activist from Odessa ar- 
rested in early August, was sentenced 
on November' 19 to 3 years in prison on 
charges of anti-Soviet slander. His 
alleged crime was circulating religious 
materials. His father-in-law to be, Mark 
Nepomnyashchiy, was arrested in Oc- 
tober on' anti-Soviet slander charges and 
is scheduled for trial on January 29. 
Their friend, refusenik Yakov Mesh, was 
also arrested in October on trumped-up 
charges of resisting arrest. The 
authorities released him and dropped 



charges against him in December after 
he sustained life- threatening injuries 
from a beating administered at the time 
of his arrest. 

losif Berenshtein, a Kiev Hebrew 
teacher, was arrested in November and 
sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp on 
December 10, also for allegedly resisting 
the police. Soon after his conviction, he 
was savagely beaten and stabbed. He 
suffered deep facial wounds, lost the 
sight of one eye, and is in danger of los- 
ing sight in his second eye. Two other 
Ukrainian Jewish activists, Leonid 
Schreier and Yakov Rosenberg, both 
from Chernovtsiy, were charged in late 
October with anti-Soviet slander. 
Schreier was sentenced to 3 years in a 
labor camp on January 3, while 
Rosenberg remains imprisoned awaiting 
trial. 

Leningrad, home of one of the 
largest and most active Jewish com- 
munities in the Soviet Union, has so far 
been spared major arrests. With the ex- 
ception of Yakov Gorodetskiy, a leading 
activist who served a minor 2-month 
work release sentence in late summer, 
no one in the activist community has 
been arrested. The Leningrad communi- 
ty has not escaped major harassment, 
however. The phones of Gorodetskiy and 
several other activists have been dis- 
connected, and more than 20 non- 
activists refusenik families have been 
called in by the poUce and threatened 
with the loss of their jobs if they do not 
give up their plans to emigi-ate. There 
was also a local television program in 
November which identified several ac- 
tivists by name and accused them of 
engaging in "Zionist" subversion. Many 
local activists fear major arrests in the 
near future. One, Evgeniy Lein, has al- 
ready been threatened with arrest on 
charges of "parasitism." 

The crackdown on Hebrew teachers 
and Jewish cultural activists has been 
accompanied by a stepped-up anti- 
Semitic campaign in the Soviet media. 
In addition to the Leningrad program 
cited above, a program aired in Moscow 
in November equated Zionism with 
Nazism and accused World War II 
Jewish leaders of helping the Nazis 
round up Jews for the death camps. The 
diversionary activities of the officially 
sponsored "Anti-Zionist Committee of 
Soviet Society" have also been given ex- 
tensive coverage recently in the Soviet 
press. 



ADril1985 



47 



GENERAL 



Following a December free from ma- 
jor arrests, the crackdown regained 
momentum in January. The arrest of 
Latvian Jewish cultural activist Vladimir 
Frankel in Riga January 15 had the ef- 
fect of spreading the crackdown beyond 
Moscow and the Ukraine. Frankel was 
charged with anti-Soviet slander. 

In Moscow, meanwhile, prominent 
activist Dan Shapiro was arrested on 
January 22 and also charged with anti- 
Soviet slander. Police conducted 
numerous searches in conjunction with 
the two arrests and Moscow authorities 
are reportedly planning to arrest two 
more activists, Dmitriy Khazankin and 
Igor Kharach, who are colleagues of 
Shapiro's. 

The Department of State has been 
monitoring these disturbing 
developments with concern since the 
crackdown began in July. There can be 
no doubt that the campaign has been 
consciously directed by Soviet 
authorities to discredit and destroy the 
revival of Jewish culture in the Soviet 
Union. The methods used — arrests, 
beatings, the planting of evidence, and 
the use of the media to slander refusenik 
activists — have created a renewed at- 
mosphere of crisis in the Soviet Jewish 
community and heightened international 
concern about what may next lie in store 
for Soviet Jewry. 

The U.S. Government deplores this 
accelerating campaign in the strongest 
possible terms, calls on the Soviet 
authorities to end it immediately, and 
urges them to live up to the com- 
mitments to respect individual human 
rights that they have solemnly under- 
taken in a whole series of international 
accords, from the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights through the Helsinki 
Final Act and the concluding document 
agreed to in 1983 at Madrid. We will be 
watching with particular interest the 
results of the upcoming trials of 
Aleksandr Kholmianskiy and Mark 
Nepomnyashchiy. ■ 



Strength and Diplomacy: 
Toward A New Consensus? 



by Michael H. Armacoat 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council in Boston on January 25, 1985. 
Ambassador Armacost is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 

The United States is a very different 
country from what it was 5 or 10 years 
ago— and our allies and adversaries 
know it. Our position in the world and 
our ability to act as a force for progress 
and stability have improved signifi- 
cantly. 

We have restored the credibility of 
our deterrent forces in the face of 
Moscow's ongoing arms buildup. The 
vitality of the American economy has 
begun to lift the global economy out of 
recession. Fueled by our recovery, most 
industrialized countries have returned to 
noninflationary expansion, and there has 
been some amelioration of the Third 
World's debt crisis. 

But something more is happen- 
ing—less tangible, perhaps, than 
rebuilding our defenses or restoring 
health to our economy but which never- 
theless improves our foreign policy pros- 
pects. In the mid-1980s Americans once 
again seem comfortable with an active 
role of world leadership. For the first 
time since Vietnam and Watergate, at 
home and abroad we see renewed con- 
fidence in the United States as an in- 
strument of peace and progress. 

A New Consensus 

The recent election campaign furnished 
evidence of a growing domestic consen- 
sus on key foreign policy issues. Both 
major candidates declared their commit- 
ment to a strong defense, to the quest 
for reliable arms control agreements 
with the Soviets, to active diplomacy to 
help resolve regional conflicts, and to 
the vigorous promotion of democracy 
and human rights. To be sure, partisan 
differences persist on many policy 
issues. That is natural. But I firmly 
believe there is more evident agreement 
on shared purposes than this country 
has witnessed in more than a decade. 
This is a fact of some importance. 
To be effective, foreign policy must be 
sustainable. In a democracy, that, in 
turn, requires broad national agreement 
on basic principles and close collabora- 



tion between the executive and 
legislative branches, reinforced by a 
healthy dose of bipartisanship. The alter- 
native is paralysis and confusion, the 
erosion of our position in the world, and 
a retreat from the ideals to which we 
have traditionally adhered. 

The 20 years following World 
War II are now commonly looked upon 
as the halcyon days of consensus and 
bipartisanship in American foreign 
policy. The psychological and political 
underpiimings of that consensus were 
supplied by the shared experience of 
Munich, victory in the war against 
fascism, and the appearance of a new 
geopolitical menace from Stalin's Russia. 
To be sure, there were major controver- 
sies triggered by the "loss" of China and 
the Korean war. Nevertheless, a 
substantial unity of basic purpose 
energized a period of great creativity 
and produced some of our most endur- 
ing achievements: the United Nations; 
new international financial institutions 
and a more open global trading regime; 
the Marshall Plan; and alliances with the 
democracies in the Atlantic community, 
Japan, and ANZUS [Australia, New 
Zealand, and United States security 
treaty]. 

But we divided bitterly over In- 
dochina. Critics — among them promi- 
nent members of the foreign policy 
establishment— concluded not just that 
America had overreached itself in the 
pursuit of its goals but that the goals 
themselves were unworthy or misguided; 
not just that America no longer offered 
solutions to the world's problems but 
that America itself was part of the prob- 
lem. Shaken by Vietnam and by trau- 
matic domestic events in the 1960s and 
1970s, the postwar consensus was 
severely shaken. 

While we were examining our con- 
sciences, the Soviet Union relentlessly 
increased its military strength. It took 
advantage of our retrenchment to 
establish new beachheads in areas of 
conflict and instability — Angola, 
Ethiopia, Vietnam, Nicaragua — and to 
invade Afghanistan. Our ability and our 
determination to react was sapped by 
public diffidence, by congressional 
restrictions, and by policy initiatives to 
reduce unilaterally U.S. troop levels in 
Europe and in the Far East. Our 
humiliation in Iran sprang from in- 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



ligenous sources but became a symbol 
)f our apparent unwillingness, if not in- 
ibility, to act decisively in the interna- 
ional arena to protect our interests. By 
L980 many Americans had obviously 
;ome to the conclusion that the post- 
/ietnam pendulum had swung too far. 

Polling data and the actions of Con- 
gress — a reflection of constituency 
jressures — suggest that the majority of 
Americans support a balanced foreign 
)olicy, that they neither seek the respon- 
sibilities of a global policeman i ir favor 
•etreat from an active internal >nal role; 
;hat they believe our ideals— c nocracy, 
iberty, the rule of law — are n. e than 
;ver relevant to the rest of the \vorld 
md that the U.S. Government has a 
listoric responsibility to stand up for 
hem; that augmented military strength 
s required to deter aggression, defend 
'reedom, and provide the necessary 
inderpinnings for an active diplomacy. 
The American people are realistic about 
;he power and aims of our Soviet adver- 
;ary, yet anxious to promote a dialogue 
vith their leaders; they support an open 
rading system, assistance to developing 
lations, and magnanimous help to 
•efugees and victims of natural 
iisasters. 

In short, a consensus supporting the 
)road line of our postwar policy has 
)een substantially restored. And that is 
I good thing. 

This public support is essential to ef- 
'ective policy. But favorable opinion 
)olls are not the ultimate test of a na- 
ion's diplomacy. As Winston Churchill 
;ommented during the darkest days of 
A^orld War II: "Nothing is more 
iangerous . . . than to live in the 
emperamental atmosphere of a Gallup 
^oU, always feeling one's pulse and tak- 
ng one's temperature." The test of 
political leadership is the capacity to 
nobilize support for reasonable courses 
)f action, not the ability to trim one's 
;ails to the prevailing public mood. 

It is a characteristic of the leader- 
ship of President Reagan, I believe, that 
le has recognized that ideas count, that 
le is unafraid of unconventional ideas, 
ind that he has attempted through the 
Dolitical process to change our way of 
:hinking. Domestically, the President 
las tested the proposition that reduc- 
tions in tax rates could be associated 
with accelerated growth and reduced in- 
flation — a bold idea, which on the basis 
Df experience to date has been 
remarkably successful. And in foreign 
affairs he has reminded us of some 
timeless truths while at the same time 
provoking serious thought about new 
ideas. 



I should like to speak about several 
of these in the time remaining this after- 
noon. They relate to the balance be- 
tween defense and offense in the deter- 
rent equation, to the means by which we 
cope with the scourge of terrorism, and 
the role of power in our diplomacy in 
Central America. In each of these cases, 
we are discussing ideas that cut to the 
core of our national experience— the 
relationship between power and 
diplomacy, the role of force in protecting 
and advancing our interests in the 
world. 

The Deterrent Balance 

Let me begin with the deterrence equa- 
tion. In the talks concluded in Geneva a 
few weeks ago, the Soviets and our- 
selves concluded that the relationship 
between offensive and defensive systems 
will be a core subject when the negotia- 
tions resume. 

When we negotiated the ABM [an- 
tiballistic missile] Treaty in 1972, our 
view was that missile defenses should be 
limited to the lowest possible level, since 
deployment of defenses would simply 
stimulate offsetting expansion of offen- 
sive systems to no one's benefit. With 
defense severely limited, it was assumed 
that comparably low levels of strategic 
offensive forces would be possible and 
that this would permit the establishment 
of a reliable deterrent balance at much 
lower levels of defense expenditure and 
of strategic deployments. 

Since 1972, we have had to rethink 
the relationship between offensive and 
defensive arms. Although missile 
defenses had been sharply constrained, 
meaningful limits on the growth of of- 
fensive forces proved elusive. Indeed, 
existing agreements permitted the 
number of Soviet ballistic missile 
warheads to grow by a factor of four 
since the SALT I [strategic arms limita- 
tion talks] negotiations began in 1969. 
The Soviet Union has taken full advan- 
tage of the deployments permitted by 
the ABM Treaty. It has exploited 
technical ambiguities in the agreement. 
It has almost certainly violated the 1972 
treaty with the construction of a large 
phased-array radar system at 
Krasnoyarsk. 

At Geneva a few weeks ago, both 
we and the Soviets acknowledged the in- 
terrelationships between potential limita- 
tion on offensive and defensive arms. 
And we are prepared to explore the im- 
plications of those relationships in 
negotiations which we hope will com- 
mence within the next 2 months. 



GENERAL 



The Administration has advanced a 
related idea, relatively simple, yet pro- 
found in its implications. The proposition 
is this: if technology should permit, we 
ought to alter our concept of deterrence, 
relying more upon the capacity to de- 
fend our society and those of our allies 
and less upon cataclysmic threats of 
mutual annihilation. It is upon this pro- 
position that the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) is based. To explore the 
feasibility of this concept, the Ad- 
ministration has launched a long-term 
program of intensive research into new 
defensive technologies. 

This research effort is completely 
consistent with our obligations under the 
ABM Treaty. It is a long-term program; 
no decisions on deployment of new 
defenses are expected for a number of 
years. And even assuming that the 
technologies check out, a decision to 
deploy would rest upon other considera- 
tions, above all: 

• Whether such defensive systems 
were survivable and consequently would 
contribute to strategic stability; and 

• Whether the deployment of such 
defenses would be cost effective. 

We should remember that SDI em- 
phasizes technology that does not re- 
quire nuclear weapons. 

We cannot answer at present the 
questions I have posed and are unlikely 
to be able to for some years. Nor can we 
negotiate effective reciprocal limits on 
such research efforts, since no one has 
discovered a plausible means of effec- 
tively and verifiably constraining 
research. However, we have indicated 
we are prepared at this early stage to 
discuss with our allies and with the 
Soviet Union the consequences of 
deploying such defenses. 

We will have to live for some years 
with uncertainty about the potential ef- 
fectiveness and costs of strategic 
defenses. In the meantime, we are 
determined to pursue the negotiation of 
meaningful reductions on offensive 
nuclear arms and in a way which 
enhances strategic stability and thus 
reduces the risk of war. The U.S.S.R. 
professes to share our interest in reduc- 
ing nuclear weapons. If this is true, the 
Soviet motive is probably to slow our 
strategic and INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] programs and our ad- 
vanced technology efforts. We, too, have 
a strong incentive to slow the expansion 
of Soviet nuclear capabilities— for exam- 
ple, in the absence of arms control 
restraints, the U.S.S.R. may sharply ex- 
pand its strategic arsenal over the next 
decade. 



April 1985 



49 



GENERAL 



If we are to achieve real arms con- 
trol, we must continue the modern- 
ization of our own strategic forces, the 
preservation of unity among our NATO 
allies, and our reputation for superior 
technological innovation— all of which 
are essential to our effectiveness in 
negotiating arms control arrangements 
with the Soviet Union. 

In that connection, we shall be seek- 
ing continued public and congressional 
support for the modernization of our 
strategic deterrent, including the MX 
missile, SDl research, and the increased 
readiness and sustainability of our con- 
ventional forces. Those who applaud the 
initiative for new negotiations with the 
Soviets should recognize that support 
for those defense programs gives the 
Soviets a continuing incentive to 
negotiate seriously. A courageous con- 
gressional decision over a decacie ago 
gave the United States the effective 
leverage to negotiate the ABM Treaty. 
We should hope that Congress will pro- 
vide comparable support for our 
negotiating effort in the months ahead. 

Combating Terrorism 

Let me return to another issue on which 
there is general public agreement in 
principle, yet a lack of consensus on con- 
crete policy actions: I am referring to 
our response to international terrorism. 
While not an entirely novel international 
phenomenon, terrorism has become a 
major focus of government concern only 
in the last decade. Indeed, the scope, 
variety, and inherent dangers of contem- 
porary state-supported terrorism are 
without parallel. Terrorist assaults on 
our citizens and our official installations 
pose moral challenges and impose on us 
novel and demanding policy dilemmas. 
We do not have all the answers to this 
challenge, but we have urged the civi- 
lized world to face up to this extraor- 
dinary problem, recognizing that coping 
with it requires a new way of thinking. 

Five Americans and one Saudi 
citizen, kidnaped in Beirut, are at 
present held hostage by terrorists who 
also have claimed responsibility for as- 
sassinating two French truce observers 
in Beirut. In November, two American 
diplomats were murdered aboard a 
Kuwaiti airliner at Tehran airport by 
terrorists who appeared to enjoy the 
tacit support of Khomeini's government. 
Libyan assassination squads operate out 
of so-called "People's Bureaus"— as the 
wanton murder of a Briti.sh policewoman 
last spring in London and the attempted 
assassination in Egypt of a former 



Libyan Prime Minister have demon- 
strated. Other state-supported terrorists 
are waging a campaign of assassination 
against Jordanian officials and Pales- 
tinians who are seen as being too in- 
terested in a peaceful solution to Middle 
Eastern problems. Nor is terrorism con- 
fined only to the Middle East; Western 
Europe and South America have ex- 
perienced frequent terrorist incidents in 
recent months. 

There is no denying the operational 
difficulties of combating these attacks. 
Intelligence is often fragmentary and in- 
conclusive. Governments supporting ter- 
rorists go to considerable lengths to 
obscure or conceal their support. 
Cooperation among targeted countries 
has proven to be surprisingly elusive. All 
too often, allies — with strong economic 
links to countries like Libya and 
Iran — are hesitant to acknowledge, let 
alone confront, the problem of state- 
supported terrorism. Even our own 
citizens — and corporations — continue to 
live and operate in Libya, where they 
could become Qadhafi's hostages at 
moments of his choosing. We have 
urged Americans to leave Libya, but we 
cannot legally compel them to do so. 

The bombings of the Marine bar- 
racks and Embassy complex in Beirut 
have lent urgency to one aspect of the 
problem, and we are altering the m.odus 
operandi of many of our foreign mis- 
sions. We are taking a variety of prac- 
tical steps to enhance the security of our 
official personnel abroad. Congress has 
been supportive. We are also seeking to 
strengthen international cooperation 
against terrorism with like-minded 
governments, particularly those such as 
Britain, Italy, and West Germany, which 
have themselves been exposed to serious 
terrorist threats with the objective of 
expanding the network of cooperation 
and making it more effective. Progress 
has been slow. Yet we shall persevere. 

It is our hope that this broad pro- 
gram of actions will reduce the incidence 
of international terrorism and convince 
those who have sponsored it to withhold 
further support. But we must not harbor 
illusory hopes; nor are we unwilling or 
unable to act forcefully— unilaterally, if 
necessary — to preempt international ter- 
rorist acts. We will use force only if ab- 
solutely necessary, and any operation 
would be carefully considered and im- 
plemented in order to avoid innocent 
casualties. But if those who perpetrate 
acts of terror pay no price for their 
mendacity, what incentive have they to 
honor civilized codes of conduct? Let 
there be no mistake: we are prepared to 
act forcefully. Should innocent blood be 



shed, it will be on the heads of those ter- 
rorists who have used innocents as cover 
for their barbaric acts. 

Central America 

Too often, Americans regard power and 
diplomacy as alternatives. Contemporary 
threats to international peace and 
security are not limited to direct conflict 
between major powers or to state- 
sponsored terrorists. Regional conflicts 
also threaten our interests directly and 
provide opportunities for politically in- 
spired exploitation by the Soviet Union. 
Such conflicts can escalate into 
dangerous superpower confrontation. In 
Central America, aggression supported 
by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet 
Union threatens the peace and blocks 
the yearning of the people for freedom 
and development. Real hopes for peace 
in Central America require a steady ap- 
plication of both power and diplomacy. 
Our objectives in that region have 
been clear and, I believe, consistent: 

• To stop Nicaraguan material sup- 
port for insurgency in El Salvador; 

• To remove the Soviet and Cuban 
military presence in Central America; 

• "To reduce the size of Nicaragua's 
military forces in order to achieve a 
stable, local balance of forces and pro- 
tect the independence of its neighbors; 
and 

• To encourage democratic forces in 
all Central American countries. 

We acknowledged that many of the 
problems in the region have deeper 
economic, political, and social roots. We 
have expressed repeatedly our 
preference for diplomatic solutions. In- 
deed, we initiated last June the Man- 
zanillo talks to breathe new life into the 
Contadora process to which we have 
given our full support. 

We are doing a great deal to 
facilitate a regional settlement. 

• Over the past several years, we 
have vastly increased our assistance for 
Central American economic develop- 
ment. 

• We have encouraged the transi- 
tion toward democracy in the region. In 
1981, Central American politics were 
dominated by generals. Today, civilians 
are elected heads of state in Honduras 
and El Salvador, as well as in Costa 
Rica. Guatemala held elections for a con- 
stituent assembly last July and will elect 
a president later this year. 

• We have worked actively for the 
improvement of human rights condi- 
tions. Death squad activity in El 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



GENERAL 



Salvador has declined. The killers of the 
American nuns have been tried, con- 
victed, and jailed. For the first time, we 
have begun to cooperate with the states 
of the region to improve the administra- 
tion of justice, the key to continued im- 
provements in the protection of human 
rights. 

• To help our friends shield 
themselves from internal and external 

ubversion, and thereby promote a 
negotiated regional settlement, we have 
increased our security assistance. While 
we hope the peace process will succeed, 
we are determined to do what is 
necessary to protect our friends. 

• We have actively supported Con- 
tadora, which our own efforts comple- 
ment. 

This approach is having a major im- 
oact in the region and at home. In the 
iftermath of the election of President 
Duarte, the human rights situation in El 
Salvador has improved. While Nicaragua 
steadily drifts toward totalitarianism, a 
zlear majority of the American people 
low back both our support for El 
tSalvador in its fight against Nicaraguan- 
«upported guerrillas and our encourage- 
ment of the Contadora peace process. 
The Kissinger commission report and 
.he Jackson plan together represent a 
bipartisan approach to promoting 
lemocracy and peace in Central 
\merica. 

Unfortunately, without continued 
)ressure from those Nicaraguans who 
vant to return to the ideals and 
lemocratic spirit that led to the 1979 
•evolution against Somoza, the San- 
linistas would still be unobstructed in 
.heir consolidation of an undemocratic 
•egime with little inclination to consider 
I negotiated settlement. The fact that 
,he Nicaraguan armed resistance has 
)een able to sustain and, in some 
■espects, even increase their operations 
n recent months reflects substantial in- 
digenous and regional support. 
^Jicaragua's freedom fighters deserve 
support. Effective pressure on the San- 
iinistas — economic, political, and 
nilitary elements— is an essential com- 
ponent of a successful strategy for a 
legotiated resolution of the conflicts in 
;he region. 

In pursuing our interests in Central 
\merica, the Administration has had to 
nake some tough decisions — including 
hat of withdrawing from the Interna- 
innal Court of Justice case filed by 
^licaragua. We believe firmly in the rule 
3f law in international affairs, but armed 
. conflicts can be resolved only by political 
md diplomatic, not judicial means. We 



are addressing the broader issue of 
jurisdiction raised in this case by taking 
steps to clarify our acceptance of the 
court's compulsory jurisdiction to make 
explicit what we have understood from 
the beginning— namely that cases of this 
nature are not projjer for adjudication 
by the court. At the same time, our 
withdrawal from this case in no way 
reduces our commitment to a negotiated 
regional solution. In fact, it underscores 
our conviction that any arrangement 
that takes into account only Nicaragua's 
concerns — and not those of its neigh- 
bors — will not bring peace. 

The Congress 

With respect to Central America and 
virtually every other major area of 
foreign policy concern, it is axiomatic 
that a successful American foreign 
policy requires active congressional sup- 
port. In reaction to the popular mistrust 
and recrimination over Vietnam, Con- 
gi'ess asserted itself primarily as a critic 
of and brake on the executive in for- 
mulating and executing foreign policy 
during the Watergate era. This was the 
background to the still-controversial 
War Powers Resolution and a pervasive 
structure of legislative restrictions on 
executive authority. 

Many of these restrictions, we 
believe, are now anachronistic and un- 
constructive; they inhibit the close col- 
laboration between the executive and 
legislative branches on foreign policy 
which the emerging consensus man- 
dates. Congress has an indispensable 
role to play in foreign affairs, but the 
tenor of the times calls for more bipar- 
tisan teamwork. It also requires greater 
resistance to the blandishments of 
special interests and single-issue ad- 
vocates who may work their will 
through such procedures as the attach- 
ment of unrelated, special-interest riders 
to appropriations bills. The American 
people, in my view, want and expect an 
effective foreign policy which such ac- 
tivities inhibit. The leaders of both par- 
ties should recognize, as our experience 
so graphically demonstrated, that 
gridlock between the two branches of 
government only weakens our foreign 
policy and cannot help but raise doubts 
among both our friends and our adver- 
saries about the reliability of American 
commitments. 



President Reagan, in a speech last 
year, put it this way: 

The most far-reaching consequence of the 
past decade's congressional activism is this: 
Bipartisan consensus-building has become a 
central responsibility of the congressional 
leadership as well as of the executive leader- 
ship. If we are to have a sustainable foreign 
policy, the Congress must support the prac- 
tical details of policy, not just the general 
goals. 

A final thought. The United States 
has been through much in the last 20 
years. Vietnam tested the strength and 
the coherence of our society and forced 
us to examine what we really stood for. 
The rise of the Third World, the com- 
plexities of the international economic 
system, and the tendency to move away 
from the bipolar world of eariier years 
will challenge us in the years ahead. 
But we, with our enduring blend of 
Wilsonian optimism, Vietnam skep- 
ticism, and American common sense, 
can discover that the foreign policy 
agenda before us can build on and con- 
tribute to a new American consensus by 
inviting us once again to accomplish 
great things in the service of our highest 
ideals. ■ 



Aprll1985 



51 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



1984 Human Rights Report 



The following introduction is excerpted 
from the Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1984.' 

INTRODUCTION 

This report is submitted to the Congress 
by the Department of State in com- 
pliance with Sections 116(dXl) and 
j02B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended. The legislation re- 
quires reports on all countries which 
receive aid from the United States and 
all countries which are members of the 
United Nations. In the belief that the in- 
formation would be useful to the Con- 
gress and other readers, we have in- 
cluded, as well, reports on countries 
such as Switzerland which are not 
technically covered in the congressional 
requirement. . . . 

Each report begins with an introduc- 
tion which provides the political and 
economic background of the country, 
describes how the country is governed, 
and discusses the general trend of 
human rights in 1984. The report then 
discusses three broad categories of 
human rights, in three sections cor- 
responding to the categories: 

First, the right to be free from 
governmental violations of the integrity 
of the person— violations such as kill- 
ings; torture; cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment; ar- 
bitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of 
fair public trial; and invasion of privacy; 

Second, the right to enjoy civil 
rights without discrimination based on 
race or sex, including freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, and religion, and the 
right to travel freely within and outside 
one's own country; 

Third, political rights or the right of 
citizens to change their government. 

A fourth section in the discussion of 
human rights in each country describes 
the government's attitude toward out- 
side investigation of internal human 
rights conditions. A final section in each 
report discusses general economic and 
social conditions in the country. Each 
report is then followed by statistical 
tables, where relevant, listing the 
amounts of United States bilateral 
assistance and multilateral development 
assistance for fiscal years 1982, 1983 
and 1984 



Preparat'on of the Report 

The repo : must be submitted to Con- 
gress by January 31. To comply. United 
States diplomatic missions are given 
guidance in September concerning the 
timing of submission of draft reports, 
format, and areas of interest to be dis- 
cussed. Reports on countries in which 
there is no United States representation 
are prepared in the Department of 
State. After contributions are received 
from embassies and appropriate offices 
in the Department, a final draft is 
prepared under the coordination of the 
Bureau of Human Rights and Human- 
itarian Affairs and submitted to the 
Congress. Because of the preparatio»i 
time required, it is possible that de\ op- 
ments in the latter part of the year 
under review may not be fully reflec^d; 
every effort is made, however, to in- 
clude reference to major events or sig- 
nificant changes in trends. 

The reports are based upon all infor- 
mation available to the United States 
Government. Sources include American 
officials, officials of foreign govern- 
ments, private citizens, victims of 
human rights abuse, congressional 
studies, intelligence information, press 
reports, international organizations, and 
non-governmental organizations con- 
cerned with human rights. Much of this 
information is already public. For obvi- 
ous reasons much of our information 
cannot be attributed to specific sources. 
We are particularly appreciative of, 
and make reference in most reports to, 
the role of non-governmental human 
rights organizations, ranging from 
gioups in a single country to major 
organizations which concern themselves 
with human rights matters in larger 
geographic regions or over the entire 
world. Only two major non- 
governmental organizations, Amnesty 
International and Freedom House, at- 
tempt reports with world-wide coverage. 
References to their views and findings 
are included in most of our reports. 
Reports from some of these organiza- 
tions are for periods ending well before 
the end of 1984. In many cases the 
observations will have remained valid 
through 1984, but in others the situation 
may have changed significantly. We 
have attempted in each report to con- 
sider and reflect this. . . . 

Extreme care has been taken to 
make these country reports objective 
and as comprehensive as space will 



52 



allow . Given the reports' diverse reader- 
ship, it is also important that they be as 
consistent as possible in both scope and 
quality of coverage. Therefore, par- 
ticular attention has been paid to attain- 
ing a high standard of consistency 
despite the multiplicity of sources and 
the obvious problems related to varying 
degrees of access to information, struc- 
tural differences in political and social 
systems, and trends in world opinion 
regarding human rights practices in 
specific countries. 

Access presents the greatest 
obstacle to a consistent approach, 
especially since closed societies tend to 
have some of the worst human rights 
abuses. Our most detailed reporting 
comes from open societies, where access 
and evaluation are welcomed and 
facilitated by governments whose con- 
cern for human rights equals our own. 
Since information available from closed 
societies is more limited, the reports 
may differ markedly in terms of the 
evidence presented in discussing specific 
human rights violations. 

There is also a conceptual difficulty 
in applying a single standard of evalua- 
tion to societies with'differing cultural 
and legal traditions. Human rights 
observers tend to focus on the effec- 
tiveness of such modern, Western in- 
stitutions as trial by jury, habeas corpus, 
a free press, parliaments, and elections, 
and to ignore non- Western, traditional 
institutions. It is not easy at times to 
decide whether adherence to certain in- 
digenous traditions is a violation of 
human rights or an affirmation of them. 
This problem of perspective also ap- 
plies in discussing countries which face 
differing political and economic realities. 
A nation's stage of development or its 
geographic situation, for example, 
should never be regarded as an excuse 
for violations of human rights but must 
be taken into account in describing the 
human rights environment. Similarly, a 
particular country's human rights 
reputation, or the public scrutiny it may 
previously have received, cannot be ig- 
nored by anyone discussing its current 
human rights performance. 

Rather than viewing a country in 
isolation, then, these reports take as 
their point of departure the world as it 
is and apply a consistent approach in 
assessing each country's human rights 
situation. While we have tried to make 
each report self-contained by including 
enough background information to place 
the human rights situation in context, 
readers who need to delve more deeply 
may wish to consult other sources, in- 
cluding previous country reports. 



Deoartment of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



United States Human Rights Policy 

This Administration's human rights 
policy also faces the world as it is, not 
as we might wish or imagine it to be, 
with a commitment to active engage- 
ment as a consistent approach to a 
variety of challenging situations. As 
President Reagan has said, "human 
rights means working at problems, not 
walking away from them." This is a 
pragmatic policy which aims not at strik- 
ing poses but at having a practical effect 
on the well-being of real people. At the 
same time, it is an idealistic policy, 
which expresses the continuing commit- 
ment of the United States to the cause 
of liberty and the alleviation of suffer- 
ing. 

Since America was created in order 
to make real a specific political vision, it 
follows that "human rights" is not 
something added onto our foreign policy 
but is its ultimate purpose: the preserva- 
tion and promotion of liberty in the 
world. In his address to the U.N. 
■ General Assembly in September 1984, 
President Reagan stated that the United 
States will continue to view concern for 
human rights as the moral center of our 
foreign policy. 

Our human rights policy has two 
joals. First, we seek to improve human 
-ights practices in numerous countries— 
;o eliminate torture or brutality, to 
secure religious freedom, to promote 
'ree elections, and the like. A foreign 
policy indifferent to these issues would 
lot appeal to the idealism of Americans, 
would be amoral, and would lack public 
jupport. Moreover, these are pragmatic, 
lot Utopian, actions for the United 
States. Our most stable, reliable allies 
ire democracies. 

As the second goal of our human 
-ights policy, we seek a public associa- 
non of the United States with the cause 
)f liberty. This is an eminently practical 
joal: our ability to win international 
:ooperation and defeat anti-American 
propaganda will be harmed if we seem 
ndifferent to the fate of liberty. Friend- 
y governments are often susceptible to 
zonfidential diplomacy, and we, there- 
fore, use it rather than public denuncia- 
rfons. But if we never appear seriously 
:oncerned about human rights violations 
in friendly countries, our policy will 
seem one-sided and cynical. Thus, while 
the Soviet bloc presents the most serious 
long-term human rights problem, we 
2annot let it falsely appear that this is 
Dur only human rights concern. 

Our human rights policy also has 
two tracks or sides— the negative and 
the positive. The negative side is em- 



bodied in the way we oppose (through 
act or word) specific human rights viola- 
tions in the short term. On the positive 
side— strongly emphasized by the 
Reagan Administration— we seek, over 
the long term, to help democracy, the 
surest safeguard of human righte. It is a 
fact that most democracies have ex- 
cellent human rights records; nothing is 
as likely as democracy to produce this 
result. 

Obviously, the positive track of 
human rights policy is not a substitute 
for an immediate and active response, 
including sanctions, for human rights 
violations when they occur. But the Ad- 
ministration believes that we should 
treat not only the symptoms but the 
disease— that we should not only re- 
spond to human rights violations but 
also should work to establish democratic 
systems in which human rights viola- 
tions are less likely to occur. 

It is, therefore, encouraging to see 
real progress coming about in the 
strengthening of democratic institu- 
tions—particularly in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, to which President 
Reagan referred in his remarks com- 
memorating Human Rights Day on 
December 10, 1984. Noting that today 
more than 90 percent of the people in 
that region live in nations either 
democratically governed or moving in 
that direction, the President pledged "to 



Section 116(d)(1) provides as follows: 

The Secretary of State shall transmit to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full 
and complete report regarding — 

(1) the status of internationally recog- 
nized human rights, within the meaning of 
subsection (a) — 

(A) in countries that received assistance 
under this part, and 

(B) in all other foreign countries which 
are members of the United Nations and 
which are not otherwise the subject of a 
human rights report under this Act. 

Section 503(B)(b) provides as follows: 

The Secretary of State shall transmit to 
Congress, as part of the presentation 
materials for security assistance programs 
proposed for each fiscal year, a full and com- 
plete report, prepared with the assistance of 
the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to 
practices regarding the observance of and 
respect for internationally recognized human 
rights in each country proposed as a recipient 
of security assistance. 



our neighbors the continued support and 
assistance of the United States as they 
transform our entire hemisphere into a 
haven for democracy, peace, and human 
rights." 

Our efforts, and those of others, to 
keep human rights concerns a central 
focus of international relations face the 
continuing problem that activist human 
rights policies such as ours traditionally 
aim at affecting the domestic behavior 
of other countries, while governments 
are reluctant to alter their nation's 
political system for foreign policy 
reasons. Since the leverage that the 
United States does have is strongest in 
friendly countries, there is a danger that 
human rights policy might highlight and 
punish human rights violations in those 
countries while, in effect, giving un- 
friendly countries immunity. Moreover, 
a nation that came to display a general 
pattern of undermining or estranging 
friendly governments would obviously 
limit its future influence over them, in- 
cluding its influence over their human 
rights behavior. On the other hand, 
countries where we have little access 
and leverage include many countries 
which both restrict the human rights of 
their citizens and resist strongly any 
foreign effort to influence the situation. 
As an extreme example, a represen- 
tative of Iran at the United Nations took 
the unprecedented step in 1984 of 
declaring that the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights does not apply to Iran. 

However, there appears to be grow- 
ing acceptance, even among countries 
where human rights are not fully 
respected, of the validity of an interna- 
tional human rights agenda. Sensitivity 
to these annual country reports, for ex- 
ample, increasingly takes the form of 
constructive response, or at least a will- 
ingness on the part of the country con- 
cerned to engage in a discussion of its 
human rights image. Many countries 
which are strong supporters of human 
rights have, like us, established offices 
specifically responsible for international 
human rights policy. It is also note- 
worthy that in 1985 the thirty-five na- 
tions. East and West, who signed the 
Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe will 
gather in Ottawa for a Human Rights 
Experts Meeting in May and again in 
Budapest in October for a Cultural 
Forum which will also be devoted 
significantly to discussing human rights. 



'April 1985 



53 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



International Institutions for the 
Protection of Human Rights 

In line with the theme set early n the 
Reagan Administration, the United 
States has continued to insist in interna- 
tional forums on a policy of evenhanded- 
ness in dealing with human rights viola- 
tions throughout the world. 

The 40th session of the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission (UNHRC) met in 
Geneva to consider, among other items 
on its agenda, the problem of human 
rights violations in Poland. However, 
unlike the two previous years, the Com- 
mission failed to extend the mandate of 
the Secretary General's special represen- 
tative on Poland. It voted, instead, to 
postpone consideration of the resolution 
to continue the inquiry into the human 
rights situation in Poland until the Com- 
mission's 1985 session. 

Nevertheless, on other issues — par- 
ticularly Iran, Grenada, Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan and Cambodia— the Com- 
mission voted in ways which recognized 
the need for greater evenhandedness 
and fairness in dealing with human 
rights situations throughout the world. 
Two resolutions dealing with Grenada 
and Nicaragua which unfairly criticized 
the United States Government were 
moderated during the Commission ses- 
sion. In each case, the Commission 
members approved moderate substitute 
resolutions by consensus. 

In addition, the Commission 
adopted, over strong Soviet opposition, 
two resolutions on Afghanistan (one call- 
ing for appointment of a Rapporteur) 
and one on Cambodia. On the question 
of Iran, the Commision voted to appoint 
a Special Rapporteur to "make a 
thorough study" of allegations of human 
rights abuses in Iran, following reports 
of summary and arbitrary executions, 
torture, detention without trial, religious 
intolerance and persecution, and the lack 
of an adequate judiciary. 

The agenda for the 40th session of 
the Commission included the customary 
large number of items, most of them 
carryovers from previous sessions. 
Several of these items have been the 
subject of repetitive resolutions by the 
Commission. These included items 
relating to human rights in Israeli- 
occupied territories; human rights in 
Chile, El Salvador, Bolivia, and 
Guatemala; human rights in South 
Africa; and a general item relating to 
the realization of "economic human 
rights" and a "right to development." 
The United States Government con- 
tinues to be troubled by the Commis- 
sion's emphasis on the "right to devel- 



opment," which the United States is not 
prepared to recognize as a basic human 
right, as well as its treatment of ques- 
tions dealing with apartheid and the 
Middle East. In general, the Commission 
remained critical of human rights condi- 
tions in Latin America, criticizing Chile 
and Guatemala in the public session, in 
addition to the resolution on El 
Salvador. As had occurred during the 
39th session of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), a double 
standard, which focuses solely on certain 
countries, and a partisan treatment of 
human rights questions often charac- 
terized the Commission's deliberations. 

The General Assembly's Third Com- 
mittee (Social and Humanitarian Affairs) 
voted on issues regarding, among 
others, racial discrimination; human 
rights in El Salvador, Chile, and 
Guatemala; Middle East issues; and self- 
determination. United States efforts 
served primarily to moderate excesses 
and to provide a forum for articulating 
the beliefs of the Administration, in- 
cluding emphasis on the hypocrisy of 
current double standards, discrimination 
against Latin American countries, and 
general indifference to violations by the 
Soviet Union and its Communist allies. 

On the question of El Salvador, the 
United States was heartened by a 
resolution adopted December 7 after 
lengthy negotiations. Although it was 
not a draft we could support, because it 
interfered with the rights of sovereign 
nations regarding military assistance, 
among the positive results of this effort 
were the strong initiative in support of a 
draft resolution favorable to President 
Duarte's reform program; a considerably 
improved final text compared with past 
years; and a more balanced UNGA 
debate and outcome which should con- 
tribute toward further progress during 
the session of the UNHRC in 1985. 

Adoption of a convention against 
torture provided the highlight of the 
39th UNGA. On December 10, 1984 
(Human Rights Day), the UNGA decided 
by consensus to adopt and open for 
signature a Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. The final text 



of the convention is identical to the draft 
convention submitted by the UNHRC 
following seven years of negotiations, 
except for revisions to Articles 19 and 
20 (concerning implementation) and a 
new Article 28 which expressly provides 
that States can make reservations about 
Article 20 at the time of ratification. 
Proponents of the convention achieved a 
key objective by avoiding the creation of 
a formal UNGA working group, sought 
by convention opponents such as the 
U.S.S.R., which had the potential of 
burying the draft convention for several 
years and resulting in a significantly in- 
ferior text. Ambassador Richard 
Schifter, Alternate United States 
Representative to the 39th session of the 
UNGA, in remarks made on December 
10, 1984, expressed the pleasure of the 
United States Government in joining 
consensus. Ambassador Schifter added 
that, although the compromise text 
limits the implementation mechanism of 
the Convention: 

In the final analysis, however, it is the 
states members of the international communi- 
ty which are morally responsible for im- 
plementing the existing prohibition against 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment. We 
hope that the convention just adopted will 
help mobilize the political will of states to end 
the resort to torture as an accepted practice 
of law enforcement agencies. 

On that same day, December 10, 

1984, the United Nations General 
Assembly celebrated the 36th anniver- 
sary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and President Reagan, 
in signing his annual Human Rights Day 
Proclamation, took the opportunity to 
reaffirm American commitment to the 
international standard set by the Univer- 
sal Declaration. 



A 



ij 



I 



'The complete report documents human 
rights practices in more than 160 countries of 
the world. It may be purchased for $19.00 
(GPO stock no. 052-070-05999-1) from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 (tel: 202-783-3238). Remittance must 
accompany order. ■ 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Dhild Pornography: 
\ Worldwide Problem 



ly Elliot Abrams 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
•n InvestigatioTis of the Senate Commit- 
ee on Government Affairs on Febmiary 
'1, 1985. Mr. Abrams is Assistant 
ecretary for Human Rights and 
Jumanitarian Affairs. ' 

'he Department of State is pleased to 
^ave the occasion again to testify before 
his committee on the activities and ef- 
orts which have been taken since the 
irevious hearing, held on November 29, 
984, at which Deputy Assistant 
lecretary John Kelly, Bureau of Euro- 
■ean and Canadian Affairs, appeared. 
LS I informed Senator (William] Roth in 
ly letter to him of January 8, 1985, we 
ollowed up the November 29 hearing by 
stablishing, on December 4, an In- 
eragency Group to Combat Child Por- 
■ography. As noted by Mr. Kelly in his 
;arlier testimony, we consider child por- 
ography a worldwide problem in its 
reader aspect. For that reason, in my 
■lobal responsibilities as Assistant 
•ecretary for Human Rights and 
lumanitarian Affairs, I was chosen to 
hair the interagency group and we held 
ur first meeting on December 17, 1984. 
lembers of the group, in addition to the 
)epartment of State, are the Depart- 
lent of Justice, the Federal Bureau of 
nvestigation, the Customs Service, and 
fie Postal Service. 

Ihared Concern 

iuilding on the committee's Novem- 
er 29 hearing and other expressions of 
oncern over the offensive and insidious 
roblem of child pornography, we con- 
idered it very important to move quick- 
/ to hold intensive discussions with of- 
icials in the Netherlands and Denmark, 
ountries which have figured in the ex- 
portation and reexportation of child por- 
lography to the United States. Accord- 
ngly, an interagency team visited those 
ountries, plus Sweden, during the 
leriod January 15-18; the team was led 
>y Deputy Assistant Secretary Gary 
.latthews, my senior deputy in the 
bureau of Human Rights and Humani- 
arian Affairs. 

I would like to underscore the extent 
o which Dutch, Danish, and Swedish of- 
icials share our view of the seriousness 



of the problem posed by child por- 
nography and the role which it plays in 
the sexual abuse and exploitation of 
children. We made it clear throughout 
our discussions with these officials that 
we in the United States faced a terrible 
problem in this regard and that we first 
and foremost wanted greater and closer 
cooperation to address our problem. We 
equally indicated that the dimensions of 
this ugly problem clearly were broader 
than any one country, hence our em- 
phasis on increased measures to address 
it on a comprehensive, international 
front. 

Before providing some insights into 
the team's activities in The Hague, 
Copenhagen, and Stockholm, I would 
also like to emphasize that our American 
Ambassadors to all three countries take 
a strong personal interest in our shared 
efforts to address the problem of child 
pornography; further, each Embassy 
now has a designated officer as the 
primary point of contact both for those 
U.S. agencies, e.g.. Customs Service, 
working on aspects of the problem, as 
well as for the necessary liaison and 
followup with the respective host coun- 
try officials. 

Netherlands 

In the Netherlands, the team began its 
day of discussions by meeting with 
Justice Minister Korthals-Altes. He 
assured the U.S. side of his 
government's willingness to cooperate 
with the United States in combating 
child pornography. Minister Korthals- 
Altes stressed the importance of a bill, 
currently before the Dutch Parliament, 
whose expected passage in April or May 
of this year will considerably facilitate 
the prosecution of child pornography 
distributors. The team also discussed 
and agreed to the Dutch suggestion that 
we explore ways to utilize the 1983 
U.S.-Dutch Mutual Judicial Assistance 
Treaty in our exchanges on child por- 
nography. Finally, the United States and 
the Netherlands will set up a formal pro- 
gram of bilateral cooperation to combat 
child pornography with the designation 
of policy-level officials on both sides to 
act as central coordinators. Specifically, 
we envision prompt exchanges of infor- 
mation, including that of evidentiary 
nature with "chain of custody" materials 
and the sharing of investigative reports 



in which U.S. consumers of child por- 
nography confirm their receipt of such 
materials from a given address and 
purveyor. 

In sum, it is our belief that the 
Dutch Government has been forthright 
and responsive in regard to the concerns 
raised by this committee and by the in- 
teragency team about child pornog- 
raphy, and that it will be cooperating ac- 
tively in our continuing efforts to com- 
bat this most terrible problem. 

Denmark 

In Denmark, the team also had very 
thorough discussions with all relevant 
Danish authorities, again stressing the 
importance of interrupting the flow of 
child pornography at the distribution as 
well as the production stage. Our Danish 
interlocutors assured us of their desire 
to work closely with the United States 
and others in addressing the problem. 
Indeed, I am pleased to report that just 
recently, on February 9, it was reported 
that the Danish authorities, using the 
list of addresses to suspected distribu- 
tors of child pornography which the U.S. 
group delivered during its mission, have 
moved to prosecute three persons 
described as managers of a publishing 
firm called COQ International, charging 
them with producing and selling child 
pornography. 

Sweden 

At the team's final round of discussions, 
in Stockholm, the U.S. side again en- 
joyed a well-prepared, thorough ex- 
change of views with all relevant 
Swedish authorities. The Swedish side 
noted that it had investigated suspected 
child pornography dealers, utilizing in- 
formation provided earlier by the United 
States, but had as yet found nothing 
prosecutable as child pornography. 
Sweden wishes to receive further infor- 
mation from the United States on a 
timely and regular basis. The U.S. side 
acknowledged the considerable progress 
which Sweden has made in recent years 
in diminishing the flow of child por- 
nography within and out of Sweden. 

Conclusion 

Let me conclude by stating our belief 
that the formation of the interagency 
group and the mission of the interagen- 
cy team can be regarded as concrete 
measures which will produce concrete 
results. In addition to greater mutual 
coordination and a strengthened struc- 
ture of cooperation with the govern- 



\pril 1985 



55 



MIDDLE EAST 



ments concerned, the U.S. side has in- 
vited appropriate representatives of 
those governments' judicial and law en- 
forcement agencies to come to the 
United States to study investigative 
methods in dealing with child por- 
nography. We will also be increasing our 
information exchanges both through the 
timely pro'/ision of relevant information 
and materials (e.g., via our Customs of- 
ficials in Bonn) as well as in directed ex- 
changes between policy-level officials of 
our respective governments. 

We cannot afford the slightest pause 
in our combined efforts to get at the 
producers, purveyors, and users of child 
pornography. We must frankly 
acknowledge that success in combating 



the flow from one place may only divert 
it to another. Nonetheless, it is en- 
couraging to note that the enhanced 
cooperation and coordination on the part 
of all concerned U.S. agencies can now 
be considered as matched, in turn, by 
exactly this kind of shai-ed effort on the 
part of the Dutch, Danish, and Swedish 
Governments. We look forward to work- 
ing with this committee in addressing 
the child pornography problem on tiiis 
wide, systematic, and international 
basis. 



'The complete transcript of the liearirigs 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Recent Developments 
in the Middle East 



hy Richard W. Murphy 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
January 30, 1985. Ambassador Murphy 
is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs. * 

I welcome the opportunity to meet with 
you today to discuss recent develop- 
ments in the Middle East. Much has 
happened in the region since we met in 
September of last year, including some 
small but significant steps in the pursuit 
of peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. While it would be premature 
to judge that 1985 will be a year of 
dramatic advance in this process, we 
believe there have been positive 
developments. 

The Peace Piocess 

The first was in September, when Prime 
Minister Peres, in his inaugural address 
to the Israeli Knesset, offered to 
negotiate with Jordan without precondi- 
tions. Further, the Government of Israel 
has taken steps which reflect its 
understanding of the need to create a 
climate in the region more conducive to 
successful negotiations. 

The second was the meeting of the 
Palestine National Council (PNC) in Am- 
man in November. King Hussein's agree- 
ment to host the PNC was a bold 



demonstration of his active interest in 
seeking the conditions for a peaceful set- 
tlement which would address Palestinian 
grievances while enhancing the security 
of both Jordan and Israel. 

At that meeting. King Hussein pro- 
posed a coordinated Palestinian- 
Jordanian approach to negotiations 
based upon [UN Security Council] 
Resolution 242 and the convening of an 
international conference. We support 
Jordanian entry into negotiations with 
Israel as the essential next step in the 
peace process, and we support the 
King's desire to find a way toward 
negotiations. At the same time, we con- 
tinue to believe that a proposal for an in- 
ternational conference is neither realistic 
nor productive. 

"Third, the Arab states which sup- 
port a peaceful settlement are more 
cohesive than they have been for some 
time, as most clearly evidenced by the 
resumption of formal relations between 
Jordan and Egypt. 

The United States is ready to 
resume its role as full partner in the 
search for peace whenever the parties 
are prepared to negotiate. Those 
negotiations, in our view, will be based 
on Security Council Resolution 242, 
whose territory-for-peace formula con- 
tinues to enjoy broad acceptance by the 
international community. We ourselves 
remain committed to the positions in the 
President's September 1, 1982, ini- 
tiative, which is based on both Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338 and the Camp David 



framework and which remains a clear 
statement of the positions we will sup- 
port in the course of negotiations. It is 
not a prerequisite that the parties accep 
our positions in advance of negotiations. 
Indeed, we anticipate that the parties 
will bring their own positions to the 
bargaining table. 

Other Regional Developments 

Israel. Our relationship with Israel has 
never been stronger. In recent months 
we have intensified our already close 
and productive cooperation. A hallmark 
of this Administration's policy toward 
the region is our unwavering commit- 
ment to Israel's security and well-being. 
Israel, during this time, has been fo- 
cused on its two immediate problems of 
the economy and withdrawal from 
Lebanon. In September, Prime Minister 
Peres launched an economic stabilization 
program to restore a healthy Israeli 
economy, and further steps in this proc- 
ess continue. 

We have established with Israel a 
Joint Economic Development Group to 
review recent Israeli economic policy 
and development plans and the role of 
U.S. assistance. The group has met 
twice thus far — in November and 
December — and there were useful ex- 
changes. The United States and Israel 
accept the principle that additional ex- 
traordinary U.S. economic assistance 
would only serve a useful purpose in the 
context of a comprehensive Israeli 
economic reform program. The Govern- 
ment of Israel is working toward that 
goal. 

Lebanon. We have welcomed 
Israel's decision to withdraw its forces 
from Lebanon, with the first phase 
scheduled for completion February 18. 
This is consistent with our continued 
support for efforts to bring about the 
total withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from Lebanon. We continue to support 
UN-sponsored efforts, such as the 
Naqura talks [discussions between 
Israeli and Lebanese military officers on 
the modalities of an Israeli withdrawal 
from southern Lebanon], to achieve the 
arrangements necessary to enhance 
security in southern Lebanon. 

During the last months, our own ef- 
forts with regard to Lebanon have been 
exploratory'. At the Secretary's request, 
I made three trips to the region in the 
September-December period to deter- 
mine whether or not we could play a 
useful role in aiding negotiations. We 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



joncluded that the next steps would 
fiave to be taken by the parties 
themselves and that we should support 
the efforts of the United Nations to 
facilitate an orderly withdrawal. 

Iran and Iraq. In the gulf war, Iraq 
has prevented Iran from launching its 
planned southern offensive, and Iran has 
returned to a strategy of attrition, shift- 
ing military preparations northward 
while still maintaining a significant force 
opposite the Iraqi city of Basra. Iraq has 
recently increased its attacks on all 
kinds of gulf shipping, and both sides 
continue to exchange fire across the 
front hnes. Thus, while stalemated, the 
war continues to pose a broader danger 
to regional security. We continue to sup- 
port all efforts to achieve a cease-fire, 
and we remain neutral in the conflict, 
supplying arms to neither side, either 
directly or indirectly. We believe that 
our policy of supporting the efforts of 
Saudi Arabia and the gulf states to im- 
prove their ability to defend their ter- 
ritory has helped to contain this war. 

One of the more positive 
developments for U.S. policy in the 
region was Iraq's resumption of 
diplomatic relations with the United 
States last November. However, it 
iportends no change in our policy toward 
ithe war or toward other states. We hope 
ithis step will lead to increased coopera- 
tion in promoting regional stability. Iraq 
has stated that it normalized relations 
with the United States to "balance" its 
relations with the Soviet Union. Our 
friends in the region, including Israel, 
have also interpreted this as a positive 
move. 

U.S. -Soviet Relations and the 
Middle East. Finally, we have agreed in 
principle to discuss the Middle East with 
the Soviet Union as one of the regional 
issues in Soviet-American relations. The 
purpose of the talks, as the President 
said during his speech at the UN 
General Assembly last fall, would be to 
help avoid miscalculation and reduce the 
risk of U.S. -Soviet confrontation. These 
talks would simply be an exchange of 
views at the expert level. A number of 
Middle East regional issues could be 
raised in the course of these talks— such 
as Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and 
Arab-Israeli issues. They would not be 
negotiations, nor would they presage a 
joint U.S. -Soviet effort in the Middle 
East. 



Continuing the Acquisition 
of the Peacekeeper IVIissile 



"The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be avaikble from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Following is the text of President 
Reagan's message to the Congress and the 
executive summary of his report on the 
Peacekeeper (MX) missile. 

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 4, 1985 

The attached report on the Peacekeeper 
missile contains my assessment of the re- 
quirement for Peacekeeper and my an- 
ticipated impact of the continued procure- 
ment of Peacekeeper missiles, pursuant to 
the provisions of Public Law 98-52.5, Section 
no of October 19, 1984. 

My report concludes that the continued 
procurement and deployment of the 
Peacekeeper are essential to national securi- 
ty. The recommendations of the Scowcroft 
Commission are still valid. One hundred 
Peacekeeper missiles should be deployed in 
existing Minuteman silos as soon as possible. 

My report also concludes that 
Peacekeeper is an essential element of our 
arms control strategy. Without the 
Peacekeeper our chances of reaching an 
equitable agreement with the Soviet Union to 
reduce significantly the size of our nuclear 
arsenals are substantially lowered. Indeed, 
should Congress delay or eliminate the 
Peacekeeper program, it would send an un- 
mistakable signal to the Soviet Union that we 
do not possess the resolve required, nor the 
continuity of purpose, to maintain a viable 
strategic triad and the policy of deterrence 
the triad represents. 

The time has come to place this issue 
behind us. While we have debated the merits 
of the Peacekeeper program, the Soviets 
have deployed over 600 Peacekeeper type 
missiles. If we are to move towards an 
equitable treaty in Geneva, procurement of 
100 Peacekeeper missiles must continue. 

I urge each member of Congress to ap- 
prove the Peacekeeper and join me in a bipar- 
tisan and united effort in Geneva. With your 
support, and the support of the American 
people, our efforts at the negotiation table 
could lead to the more stable world we all 
seek, and lead to that day when mankind is 
free of the terrible threat of nuclear 
weapons. 

Ronald Reagan 



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The President's report was prepared in 
accordance with the fiscal 1985 Depart- 
ment of Defense Authorization and Ap- 
propriation Acts, Committee of Con- 
ference, Section llOe, and delivered in 
compliance with Section 110g(2). 



After thorough analysis, the Presi- 
dent has concluded that the continued 
production and deployment of 
Peacekeeper (MX) missiles in existing 
Minuteman silos is required in order to 
maintain U.S. national security in- 
terests, is consistent with U.S. arms 
control policy, and enhances the pros- 
pects for global stability. As a result, the 
President seeks to remove Congressional 
restrictions on the Fiscal Year 1985 
funds that were authorized and ap- 
propriated by the Congress for the 
Peacekeeper missile program. This 
report provides the President's reasons 
and furnishes additional information as 
required by the Congress. 

Strategic Balance and 
International Stability 

In February 1984, the President 
reported to Congress on the anticipated 
political-military impact of Peacekeeper 
procurement and concluded that such 
procurement was a necessary part of 
our efforts to strengthen deterrence and 
strategic stability as well as to enhance 
our efforts to achieve meaningful arms 
reductions. These conclusions coincided 
with those of the President's Commis- 
sion on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft 
Commission), which recognized the de- 
mand for a coherent ICBM moderniza- 
tion program to bring U.S. strategic 
forces into line with U.S. strategic 
policy and arms control initiatives. The 
President has concluded that the Com- 
mission's recommendations remain as 
valid today as when the initial report 
was issued in April, 1983. 

The military requirement for the 
Peacekeeper is now even more valid, as 
the Soviet threat has continued to in- 
crease, qualitatively and quantitatively, 
offensively and defensively. The Soviets 
have increased deployments of the latest 
variant fourth-generation ICBMs, fur- 
ther extending their prompt hard-target 
destructive advantage, and are nearing 
deployment of two new fifth-generation 
ICBMs. Two new classes of ballistic 
missile submarines are being deployed, 
with a new SLBM [submarine-launched 
ballistic missile] in flight testing. Three 
intercontinental bombers and a family of 
strategic cruise missiles are being 
developed or produced. Soviet strategic 
defensive programs include ABM [anti- 
ballistic missile] improvements and 



April1985 



57 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



research and development initiatives for 
advanced strategic defense systems. The 
key to deterring the Soviets from using 
these increasing capabilities is our ability 
to effectively hold at risk the hardened 
targets, such as command, control and 
communication facilities and other high- 
value assets, which are essential to 
Soviet execution of a nuclear war. 

This accumulation of vast conven- 
tional military power, coupled with cur- 
rent Soviet advantages in strategic 
forces, could— if unchecked— result in 
the Soviet leadership becoming far more 
confident about using its political and 
military leverage to exert influence 
against other nations around the globe. 
A perception that the United States is 
unable or unwilling to take the steps 
necessary to offset this growing Soviet 
power could further increase the Soviets' 
inclination to become involved in 
regional conflicts, even if such involve- 
ment would risk engaging U.S. in- 
terests. 

To reverse these dangerous and 
destabilizing trends, this Administration 
initiated the Strategic Modernization 
program in October 1981. This five-part 
modernization program of command, 
control, communication and intelligence 
improvements, bomber and cruise 
missile modernization, SLBM im- 
provements, ICBM modernization, and 
defensive improvements is well under- 
way and is restoring effective deter- 
rence. 

As the Administration continues to 
implement the Scowcroft strategic 
modernization recommendations, the 
President firmly believes that a credible 
Peacekeeper program remains a central 
element of a combined modernization- 
arms control strategy. 

With regard to arms control, we are 
encouraged that the prospects for 
negotiations have been improved since 
our last report. Important developments 
have occurred after the one-year hiatus 
that followed the Soviet walk-out from 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(WF) talks and concomitant refusal to 
set a date to begin new START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] negotia- 
tions. Contrasted with the prospects last 
year, we now have reason for cautious 
optimism. We and the Soviet Union are 
about to begin new negotiations in 
Geneva, in which a central objective will 
be to seek agreements on significant 
reductions of strategic arsenals. As we 
enter these talks we recognize that our 
ability to negotiate effectively— and to 
achieve our goals of deep and effectively 



58 



verifiable reductions— is heavily depen- 
dent on the Soviet leadership's view of 
our purpose, will and strength. 

Recent experience has confirmed, 

despite Soviet propaganda attempts to 
the contrary, that they have responded 
to the steady, responsible actions of the 
NATO Alliance in fulfilling missile 
deployment commitments taken under 
the December 1979 decision. They 
agreed to negotiate initially, only when 
it became clear NATO would make a 
coordinated decision to deploy. They 
agreed to resume negotiations only 
when it became clear they could not 
destroy NATO's resolve through threats 
and bluster. Likewise, if we are to suc- 
ceed similarly in our new strategic 
negotiations, we must demonstrate the 
same constancy of purpose and deter- 
mination as shown by the Alliance in 
INF. Conversely, if we fail on the eve of 
these new negotiations in Geneva to pro- 
ceed with Peacekeeper production and 
deployment, the impact could be far- 
reaching, extending not only to failure 
of the strategic negotiations, but may af- 
fect the broader East- West relationship 
as well. 

We hope these new negotiations will 
lead eventually toward agreement on 
deep reductions, but they are at a 
critical stage— the first step. That step 
must be on firm ground because it will 
set the direction for a lengthy but 
ultimately rewarding journey. Most of 
all, it is essential at this time that we 
not appear hestitant or otherwise lack- 
ing in resolve. Cancellation of, or slow- 
ing, the Peacekeeper deployment would 
unavoidably give such an appearance to 
the Soviet leadership. In fact, should the 
Congress decide to terminate the 
Peacekeeper production and deployment 
program during these early stages of 
negotiations, the Soviets would have 
every incentive not to negotiate serious- 
ly, but to anticipate that the United 
States would take additional unilateral 
actions which would further reduce U.S. 
strength without them having to make 
equitable concessions of their own. 
There would be comparatively little 
reason for the Soviets to continue 
negotiating seriously in the START 
area, because they would have achieved 
much of what they want and could be 
expected to stall to see how much addi- 
tional they could obtain without conces- 
sions. 



Effect of Peacekeeper on ICBM 
Vulnerability 

From the technical viewpoint the 
vulnerability of Peacekeeper missiles 
based in existing Minuteman silos will be 
roughly similar to the currently deployec 
Minuteman ICBMs. However, the ques- 
tion of force survivability is not the 
same as that of silo vulnerability. 
Together, the diversity of the three legs 
of the Strategic Triad provide inherent 
survivability not found in the individual 
components. Because the three legs of 
the Triad exhibit different characteris- 
tics, a Soviet planner faces significant 
obstacles which would greatly reduce tht 
effectiveness of an attack against any 
component. 

In addition, the Peacekeeper's in- 
creased military capability against even 
the hardest Soviet targets will 
significantly strengthen our ability to 
deter a wide range of possible aggres- 
sions. The deterrent value of 
Peacekeeper therefore must be viewed 
from the Soviet perspective and their 
estimate of risk to their key assets. 
Thus, Peacekeeper's, and the Triad's 
ultimate survivability resides in 
Peacekeeper's ability to deter a Soviet 
attack in the first instance with credible 
military capabilities. 

ICBM Basing 

For over 13 years, alternative basing 
modes for the Peacekeeper (MX) missile 
have been proposed and reviewed by the 
Department of Defense, four administra- 
tions and the Congress. The original ob- 
jective of these investigations had been 
to seek a single solution to the problem 
of deploying a modernized, capable 
ICBM in an independently survivable 
basing mode. 

The Scowcroft Commission took a 
different approach to ICBM moderniza- 
tion, separating the problem into its 
near-term and longer-term elements. 
The President supports the Scowcroft 
Commission finding that Peacekeeper 
deployment in Minuteman silos remains 
the best near-term ICBM deployment 
options. Current review of basing op- 
tions within this report indicates that no 
other alternative is available or cost- 
effective for a near-term Peacekeeper 
deployment. However, in the future, 
superhard silo technology for 
Peacekeeper could enhance ICBM sur- 
vivability. In the long term, deployment 
of the small, single-warhead ICBM in 
one or more promising modes, could 
enhance ICBM survivability. 



Deoartment of State Bulletin 



NARCOTICS 



^Conclusions 

'he President's report documents his 
eview of the Peacekeeper program re- 
[uested in the 1985 Department of 
)efense Authorization Act, The Presi- 
lent has concluded that further acquisi- 
ion of operational Peacekeeper missiles 
s in the national security interests of 
he United States and is consistent with 
Jnited States arms control policy. The 
^resident has reviewed the effect of the 
icquisition and deployment of Peace- 
keeper missiles on the vulnerability of 
he U.S. land-based intercontinental 
)allistic missile force and found that the 
ecommendations of the Scowcroft Com- 
nission remain valid. 

The President's review also con- 
ludes that the continued efforts of the 
Soviets to expand their strategic forces 
las heightened the military need for the 
-"eacekeeper missile. The Report also 
lotes that Peacekeeper production and 
leployment is closely related to our 
:hances of achieving significant reduc- 
ions in nuclear arsenals in Geneva. It 
lotes that should the Congress decide to 
.erminate the Peacekeeper production 
md deployment program during the 
legotiations, the Soviets' long-term ef- 
brts to reduce U.S. strength without 
meaningful negotiating and without hav- 
ing to make equitable concessions of 
IJieir own would be realized in con- 
isiderable measure. Finally, the Report 
loncludes that Peacekeeper deployment 
jn existing silos is essential to enhance 
deterrence and to maintaining crucial 
Dptions for restoring the survivability of 
land-based ICBMs in a cost-effective 
manner in the years ahead. 

In re-endorsing the Scowcroft 
"ecommendations the President strongly 
-ecommends that production and deploy- 
Tient of the Peacekeeper missile con- 
;inue as planned in parallel with develop- 
Tient of a new small ICBM. ■ 



Helicopters are used to spray illegal poppy 
crops, such as here in Mexico. This is one 
example of a worldwide eradication 
program supported by the Department of 
State. 

{Photo by Steve Raymer 
^National Geographical Society) 



Summary of the International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report for 1985 



The Department of State on Kebru 
ary 14, 1985, submitted the Interna- 
tional Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
for 1985 to Congress as required by 
PL 98-164. The report is prepared each 
year under the direction of the Depart- 
ment's Bureau of International Narcotics 
Matters and provides a country-by- 
country analysis of the narcotics situa- 
tion in producing and transit countries. 

Jon R. Thomas, Assistant Secretary 
for International Narcotics Matters, said 
the 1985 report shows that "1984 was a 
year of building bases for enhanced con- 
trol programs and creating opportunities 
for large-scale actions in 1985. Genuine 
progress is reflected in the production 
reports on several countries, but there 
were some disappointments. On balance, 
the events of 1984 put us on the thresh- 
hold of what should be oui- most produc- 
tive year ever in narcotics control." 

The report emphasizes that, more 
than perhaps at any time in recent 
memory, there are strong incentives for 
source nations to act in their own in- 
terests to control narcotics trafficking. 
The international community is affected 
by narcotics trafficking and abuse and 
the attendant violence, corruption, and 
social costs which undermine legitimate 
businesses and threaten national securi- 
ty in many parts of the world. In some 
countries, insurgents and terrorist 
organizations have established links to 



narcotics traffickers, and these groups 
are now sharing in the narcotics profits. 
Producing nations are experiencing 
abuse and addiction among their own 
youth, and the demand for treatment 
and prevention has int'reased in these 
source countries. 

"These concerns are prompting new 
opportunities," Thomas said. "Source 
and victim nations alike have a common 
interest in the success of control pro- 
grams, and source countries are realiz- 
ing that they are first beneficiaries of 
programs to curb trafficking and all of 
its related excesses. This realization is 
reflected in the program expansion of 
1984. We are seeing an emerging 
alliance in Latin America, where na- 
tional leaders are now beginning to 
work together, bilaterally and 
multilaterally, on regional approaches to 
control problems." 

The report provides the following 
observations. 

Opium production declined in Paki- 
stan and Afghanistan l)ut marginally in- 
creased in other countries. Adverse 
weather and a new eradication program 
in Thailand and continuation of the more 
effective sweep strategy in Mexico por- 
tend well for reductions in prospective 
opium poppy production in most sectors 
in 1985. 

Coca production increased in Peru 
and Bolivia as anticipated, while holding 




April 1985 



59 



PACIFIC 



about even in Colombia. But Peru began 
to eradicate coca on an appreciable scale 
in 1984, despite terrorists attacks 
against eradication workers. Colombia is 
testing aerially sprayed herbicides which 
could offer the first real means of 
eradicating coca on a major scale. While 
Bolivia's economic and political problems 
are understood, its failure to begin coca 
eradication remains a major disappoint- 
ment. 

The most important marijuana 
development in 1984 was the Colombian 
eradication program which destroyed 
4,000 hectares, including 3,000 hectares 
destroyed by an aerially applied her- 
bicidal spray. Cannabis cultivation in- 
creased in Mexico, and the increase in 
Belize confirms traffickers' efforts to 
establish new sources of supply. Produc- 
tion probably held at about the 1983 
level in Jamaica. 

Assistant Secretary Thomas noted 
the goals set forth in the strategy 
report, including continued support for 
the Upper Huallaga Valley coca control 
project in Peru; seeking agreements to 
begin coca eradication in other parts of 
Peru; the restoration of law and order in 
Bolivia and an initiation of coca eradica- 
tion; a vigorous Jamaica campaign to 
eradicate marijuana; resumption of 
aerial herbicidal eradication in Belize; 
continued efforts to increase the effec- 
tiveness of the Mexican control pro- 
grams; suppression of opium cultivation 
in Pakistan and halting the flow of 
opiates across the Afghan border, and a 
more effective interdiction effort in 
Southwest Asia including elimination of 
heroin labs. 

"International strategies must give 
top priority to crop control," Thomas 
said. He called for bans on cultivation 
and production, enforced when 
necessary by eradication. An effective 
international strategy should offer finan- 
cial and technical assistance where need- 
ed for narcotic control projects. The 
United States will continue to provide 
assistance, which should be linked to 
crop control agreements to ensure suc- 
cess in reducing production. Govern- 
ments of producing nations must 
demonstrate the political will to under- 
take effective crop control and interdic- 
tion programs. The corruption that has 
undermined control efforts in many 
source countries must be stiimped out by 
strong and determined governments. 
The international community must make 
common cause in a more vigorous, more 
widespread, and more united effort to 
control international narcotics produc- 
tion and trafficking. 



Visit of Australian 
Prime Minister Hawke 




Press release 20. 



Prime Minister Robert J.L. Hawke 
of the Commonwealth of Australia made 
an official working visit to Washington, 
D.C., February 5-7, 1985, to meet with 
President Reagan and other gox'eryiment 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Hawke after their meeting on Febru- 
ary 7.' 

President Reagan 

Prime Minister Bob Hawke, it was a 
pleasure to meet with you today, the 
first head of state to visit us since the 
inauguration. And this, I understand, is 
also your first trip abroad since your 
own reelection. We're each getting our 
new terms started by sitting down and 
talking with a good friend. 

I cannot overstate the value 
America places on our friendship with 
Australia. We share a commitment to 
democratic ideals. In fact, at the heart 
of our election process is the secret 
ballot, which, by no coincidence, was 
referred to as the Australian ballot 
when it was first introduced into our 
country. 



Australia is a reliable ally, an impor- 
tant trading partner, a trusted friend, 
and a fellow democracy. We've stood 
together through trials and tribulations. 
We've rejoiced together in triumph, and 
now, as Australia approaches its 
bicentennial in 1988, the U.S. Govern- 
ment and private sector will play an ac- 
tive part in that historic event. 

As a key ally and a vital voice in 
world affairs, Australia makes a signifi- 
cant contributon to the way that we ap- 
proach international challenges. My con- 
versations with Prime Minister Hawke 
today reflected the serious consideration 
with which we take Australia's views in 
national interest. 

Much of our consultation was fo- 
cused on arms control. Prime Minister 
Hawke made clear the importance of 
this issue to the Australian people, and 
it is no less so for us. I reiterated my 
sincere desire to achieve deep reductions 
in nuclear arms, as a giant first step 
toward eliminating them altogether. 

As allies, we've always consulted 
closely on foreign policy issues. And now 
that .Australia has been named a 
member of the UN Security Council, 
new weight will be added to our con- 
sultations. 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



PACIFIC 



Oh regional issues, we i-eaffirmed 
ir stiong belief in cooperation among 
acific states to maintain secure, pros- 
?rous, and democratic societies. Prime 
Minister Hawke and I agreed that 
rength and unity of purpose will give 
le West the leverage it needs to 
hieve effective and verifiable arms 
'ductions with the Soviet Union. 

We consider that close and com- 
rehensive interaction among ANZUS 
Australia, New Zealand, United States 
;curity treaty] members on political, 
onomic, and defense matters is central 
) the continued effectiveness of the 
NZUS alliance. In particular, con- 
nued military cooperation is essential 
) maintenance of the alliance's integrity 
nd strength. 

We deeply regret the decision by the 
ew Zealand Government to deny port 
:cess to our ships. We consider New 
ealand a friend. It's our deepest hope 
lat New Zealand will restore the tradi- 
onal cooperation that has existed be- 
veen our two countries. Allies must 
ork together as partners to meet their 
lared responsibilities. The security 
hich we derive from these ar- 
ingements is at the foundation of the 
rowing prosperity we share. 

Prime Minister Hawke and I were 
ary pleased to discuss the economic 
Dod news coming from both our coun- 
ies and many others around the world. 
Ihe global economy is picking uj) steam, 
nd we're happy to have played a part in 
nat recovery. 

This is our second meeting. Bob. It's 
;ill a long way from Australia to the 
nited States, but modern technology 
nd good old-fashioned friendship are 
ringing us closer than ever before. 

I'm grateful for your visit, and I'm 
loking forward to working together 
■ith you in the coming years to make 
le world a safer and a better place, 
.nd Godspeed now on your way home. 

■'rime Minister Hawke 

greatly appreciate the warmth and the 
fiendliness of your statement and of the 
onsultations we have just concluded 
/ith you and with the members of your 
idministration. 

But this is my first overseas visit 
ince our elections, and that we have the 
lonor to be the first official visitors here 
ince your second inauguration point up 
he prime importance of our personal 
elationship and those between our 
governments and between our coimtries. 

The timing of our talks has not just 
)een of symbolic significance but has 



Australia— A Profile 



PROFILE 

People 

Nationality: Noun ayid adjective — Aus- 
tralian(s). Population (1983): 15.3 million. 
Annual gjowth rate: 1.3%. Ethnic groups: 

European (97%), aboriginal (1%), Asian (.6%). 
Religions: Anglican 36%. Roman Catholic 
33% (1976 census). Languages: English, 
aboriginal languages. Education: Wars com- 
puhory — to age 15 in all states except 
Tasmania, where it is 16. Attendance — 94%. 
Literacy — 100%. Health: Infant mortality 
rate — 9.9/1,000 live births. Life expect 
ancy — 74 yrs. Work force (6.9 million in 
1983): Agriculture — 7%. Industry and com.- 
merce — 30%. Services — 32.6%. Govern- 
ment— 'iOA%. 




Tesmtt! 



Indian Ocean 



NEW ZEALAND CA 



Geography 

Area: 7.7 million sq. km. (2.9 million sq. mi.); 
about the size of the continental US. Cities: 
CapttoV—Canberra (pop. 222,000). Other 
cities— 'SiyAncy (3.2 million), Melbourne (2.8 
million), Brisbane (1 million). Terrain: 
Varied, but generally low lying. Climate: 
Relatively dry, ranging from temperate in 
the south to semitropical in the north. 

Government 

Type: Democratic, federal-state system 
recognizing British monarch as sovereign. 
Constitution: July 9, 1900. Independence 
(federation): January 1, 1901. 

Branches: Executive — prime minister 
and Cabinet responsible to Parliament. Leg- 
islative — bicameral Parliament (64-member 
Senate, 125-member House of Represent- 
atives) Judicial — independent judiciary. 



Administrative subdivisions: 6 states 
and 2 territories. 

Political parties: Liberal, National, 
Australian Labor, Australian Democrats. 
Suffrage: Universal over 18. 

Central government budget (FY 
1982-83): $40.9 billion. 

Defense (FY 1982-83): 2.9% of GNP or 
9.0% of government budget. 

Flag: On a blue field, UK Union Jack in 
the top left corner, a large white star directly 
beneath symbolizing federation, and five 
smaller white stars on the right half 
representing the Southern Cross constella- 
tion. 

Economy 

GDP (1983): $150.2 billion. Per capita in- 
come: $9,960. Avg. inflation rate (mid-1983): 

9.8%. 

Natural resources: Bauxite, coal, iron 
ore, copper, tin, silver, uranium, nickel, 
tungsten, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds, 
natural gas, oil. 

Agriculture (6.8% of 1980 GDP): Prod- 
ucts — livestock, wheat, wool, sugar. Arable 
land— 9%. 

Industry (36% of 1980 GDP): Mining, 
manufacturing, and transportation. 

Trade (1980): Exports— $22.5 billion: 
livestock, meat, wool, wheat, energy and 
mineral resources, manufactures. Major 
markets— i3.])&n, US ($2.6 billion), European 
Community. /mpor(,«i— $20.7 billion: con- 
sumer goods, transportation equipment, 
capital goods, industrial supplies, petroleum 
products. Major suppliers — US ($4.6 billion), 
European Community, Japan. 

Official exchange rate: The Australian 
dollar floats freely. The rate in January 1984 
was approximately US$.90 = Australian $1. 

Fiscal year: July 1-June 30. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN, OECD, Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
Economic and Social Council for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP), Australia-New Zealand-US 
Pact (ANZUS), Commonwealth of Nations, 
Colombo Plan, International Energy Agency. 



Taken from the Background Notes of May 
1984, published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita 
Adams. ■ 



t^pril1985 



61 



PACIFIC 



added greatly to their substantive value. 
We have again found an extensive coin- 
cidence of preoccupations and of priori- 
ties in managing our respective foreign 
and domestic affairs. 

You have just launched a budgetary 
process which will have great signif- 
icance for the international community. 
Both our governments face the task of 
maintaining the strong growth that both 
the United States and Australia have 
recently enjoyed. And we shall both be 
tackling this on a number of fronts dur- 
ing 1985. 

We're looking also to increasing 
trade flows to sustain economic recovery 
fully and widely. We seek to resist pro- 
tectionism and to preserve and to 
strengthen the multilateral trading 
system. And, Mr. President, we look to 
and we know we will receive from you 
strong leadership in that direction. 

One aspect — an important one — of 
the ANZUS relationship has become a 
matter of close concern to us both and 
will require continuing consultation. Let 
me say, first, that the relationship be- 
tween Australia and the United States 
under the ANZUS treaty and the rights 
and obligations assumed by us under the 
treaty are undiminished by recent 
events. Your statement accurately 
reflects the position. The ANZUS treaty 
remains; the fundamental importance of 
cooperation within it has been reaf- 
firmed here today. 

Similarly, we have reaffirmed the 
need for solidarity and common purpose 
in pursuit of arms reductions. I con- 
gratulate you again on reaching agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union to enter into 
the forthcoming round of negotiations 
and on the approach you have taken to 
that agreement. You will have our con- 
tinuing support in what is bound to be a 
difficult and protracted process. 

We will remain closely in touch as 
that process moves forward. And we 
will continue to offer counsel, while 
maintaining our own direct participation 
with you in multilateral disarmament 
work. 

We will continue both nationally and 
in the established pattern of partnership 
with you to make our contribution to 
Western security in every way open and 
acceptable to us. We will do so against 
the basic criteria that a stable deter- 
rence, despite its defects, is necessary in 
order to produce progress on disarma- 
ment. 

We have a fundamental interest in 
that starting point of stable deterrence, 
in the final goal of disarmament, and in 
an intermediate and, hopefully, early 
stage of substantial arms reductions. 



I said at the outset that the timing 
of our talks was important. I believe we 
have been successful in bringing steady 
consideration to the issues before us. In 
the process, we have once more tested 
and proved our ability to work closely 
together. 

One of the continuing strengths of a 
mature relationship is that neither seeks 
from the other a complete conformity of 
views and actions. But we have shown, 
once again, the capacity to respond to 
each other's needs in the pursuit of ma- 
jor objectives on which we have the 
widest measure of agreement. 



I thank you for your hospitality and 
for your warm references to our 
bicentennial celebrations, in which we 
look forward to active U.S. participa- 
tion. 

I thank you, also for the kind recep- 
tion which you and Mrs. Reagan have 
given to me and to my wife. I look for- 
ward to continued meetings with you 
and members of your Administration, 
whether up here or Down Under. 



'Made to reporters assembled at the 
South Portico oi the White House (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Feb. 11, 1984). ■ 



Australia Reaffirms Support 
for ANZUS Alliance 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
FEB. 20, 1985 ' 

I am pleased by the news that Prime 
Minister Hawke of Australia announced 
February 19, that his cabinet unanimous- 
ly reaffirmed Australia's support for the 
ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, 
United States security treaty] alliance 
and for the obligations and respon- 
sibilities that the alliance entails. We 
note that the Prime Minister described 
ship visits and the U.S. -Australian joint 
facilities as "continuing fundamentals of 
the Australian-United States alliance 
relationship." We welcome this reaffir- 
mation of Australia's commitment to its 
ties with the United States. Both the 
United States and Australia have em- 



phasized the continuing importance we 
attach to the conclusion of the 1984 
ANZUS Council communique that: "Ac- 
cess by allied aircraft and ships to the 
airfields and ports of the ANZUS 
members was reaffirmed as essential to 
the continuing effectiveness of the 
Alliance." Both President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Hawke recognized, dur- 
ing the Prime Mini-ster's recent visit, 
that solidarity among the Western 
states is critical to maintenance of globa 
and regional stability and to progress 
toward substantial nuclear arms reduc- 
tion. 



'Read to news correspondents, on behalf 
of the Secretary, by Department spokesman 
Bernard Kalb ( press release 26). ■ 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



i:iENCE& TECHNOLOGY 



rotecting the Ozone Layer 



Richard Elliot Benedick 

Statement before the UN Environ- 
11 1 Program working group of experts 
protection of the ozone layer in 
nera on January 21. 1985. Am- 
sador Benedick is Deputy Assistant 
retary for Oceans and International 
vironmeyital and Scientific Affairs. 

e issue of ozone layer depletion has 
m with us for over a decade. Not too 
g ago, it almost seemed as if this 
)blem was going away. As scientists 
oroved their models by adding in the 
ects of other ozone-modifying pertur- 
its, the net depletion estimates were 
/ered. 

Unfortunately, however, more re- 
it analysis indicates that substantial 
ks do exist, particularly when realistic 
imates of future growth in atmos- 
eric pollutants are considered. 

Our concern is based on a number of 
tors, two of which I would like par- 
alarly to call to your attention. 

One, even those models which 
jdict only a small depletion in total 
me nevertheless also show a substan- 

change in the vertical distribution of 
)ne, which could significantly affect 
Tiate patterns. 

Two, the most recent models in- 
ate a most disturbing phenomenon— 
mely, that the atmospheric response 
increasing concentrations of chlorine 
iiy not be linear. In other words, when 

chlorine concentration in the at- 

I isphere exceeds a threshold level, the 

1 :e at which ozone is depleted may in- 

i?ase dramatically. 
This nonlinear effect is discussed in 
; -ecent article in Nature magazine [Vol. 
12, November 15, 1984, pp. 227-231] 
1 scientists from Harvard University. 
' le Harvard results estimate ozone 
i pletion of 15% or more if CFC [chloro- 
! lorocarbons] use grows by as little as 
Jb annually— an estimated future 
j owth rate which is not unreasonable in 
! :ht of recent experience and prospec- 
• 'e worldwide demand. Moreover, the 
( mposition of the ozone layer appears 
i' be highly sensitive to even relatively 
vinute changes in emissions of CFCs 
^'id other gases over time— as little as 
j! le or two percentage points in annual 
\' -owth rates can make an enormous dif- 
: rence in ozone depletion. This means 



that the margin of error between com- 
placency and catastrophe is too small for 
comfort. 

Despite the complexity of the forces 
determining future changes in the ozone 
layer, one thing appears clear to a pru- 
dent and impartial observer: if CFC use 
continues to grow over time, some 
depletion of the ozone layer is likely to 
occur. 

Unlike some other more localized en- 
vironmental issues, ozone layer depletion 
is a phenomenon which affects the well- 
being of every country represented 
here — indeed, of the entire planet. If 
even one country, or a few countries, 
pursue policies which damage the ozone 
layer, we are all affected. 

We acknowledge that the scientific 
evidence concerning CFCs is not entirely 
unequivocal. But, due to the nature of 
the science and our capability for 
stratospheric measurement, the uncer- 
tainties are likely to remain for many 
years. We must soberly ask ourselves: 
what are the consequences of delay if we 
insist on 100% certainty and fail to take 
actions now? 

We do know that CFCs have a long 
lifetime in the atmosphere— unlike many 
other gases, they are not readily broken 
down and removed from the atmos- 
phere. Rather, they build up; they ac- 
cumulate. And the models indicate that, 
unlike other forms of pollution, there 
may be no early warning of serious 
damage to the ozone layer; when the 
chlorine buildup reaches a critical point, 
the ozone decline may be rapid and 
precipitous and not reversible through 
short-term human actions. 

In a real world of imperfect knowl- 
edge and uncertainty, we, as policy- 
makers, nevertheless have the respon- 
sibility to take prudent actions for the 
benefit of generations yet to come. The 
U.S. Government thus believes that, 
while cooperation on research— as pro- 
vided for in the convention^- is neces- 
sary, it is not sufficient in light of the 
potential risks we all face from ozone 
layer depletion. For this reason, the 
United States joins a number of other 
countries in urging this group to adopt a 
protocol^ to the convention which would 
effect meaningful near-term reductions 
in CFC emissions. 

We believe it is entirely feasible to 
eliminate the least essential CFC uses. 
While, admittedly, it is not always easy 
to distinguish essential from nonessen- 



tial, there is one application of CFCs 
that stands out as an obvious choice. 
The use of CFCs as propellants in 
aerosols still constitutes 30%-35% of the 
tottil CFC-11 and -12 consumed in the 
world. 

The United States and several other 
nations have already successfully limited 
the use of CFCs in such aerosols, thus 
demonstrating that it is practicable. In 
fact, by substituting hydrocarbons as the 
propellant, significant cost savings have 
been achieved without reducing con- 
sumer satisfaction. Nor have concerns 
about flammability hazards proved war- 
ranted. We recognize that some situa- 
tions will exist where CFCs are needed 
as propellants, and the text allows for 
these special situations. 

An important aspect of the protocol 
text that we support is the "multiop- 
tions" format, which should permit ac- 
ceptance of a protocol by countries with 
a wide range of differing individual cir- 
cumstances. This approach also recog- 
nizes past actions by governments to 
reduce CFC use, since these actions 
should be rewarded and not ignored. We 
are not wedded to any particular for- 
mulation of a multioptions approach and 
would be prepared to consider variations 
of the proposal now on the table, pro- 
vided that they would offer meaningful 
near-term CFC reduction. 

The United States acknowledges 
that the proposal offered by the Euro- 
pean Economic Community (EC) at the 
last working group meeting is a sincere 
attempt to confront the ozone depletion 
issue. The EC proposal, as I understand 
it, corresponds essentially to what the 
EC has already accomplished. However, 
with due respect to my EC colleagues, I 
believe that their "single option" ap- 
proach would be less practical in a global 
context, for the following reasons. 

• The production capacity cap is set 
so high relative to current production 
that it would not bind for at least 20 
years, during which time irreparable 
damages to the ozone layer may well be 
occurring. 

• When the cap is reached, coun- 
tries will have to curtail greater quan- 
tities of CFCs, including more essential 
and less easily substitutable CFC uses. 

• By allowing CFC emissions to 
continue to grow in the short run, the 
EC proposal does not take account of 
potential changes in the vertical ozone 
profile which can affect climate. 



prll1985 



63 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



• The EC proposal does not restrict 
exports or imports— unless all countries 
become party, the protocol would be in- 
effective in limiting global emissions. 

• By capping present capacity and 
locking in current production and 
market shares, the proposal is preju- 
dicial against developing countries, as 
well as certain others, which currently 
have little or no surplus production 
capacity. 

In sum, I find it difficult to envision 
how the EC proposal could effectively 
function or be enforced. In contrast, the 
multioptions approach can accommodate 
a diversity of national regulatory ap- 
proaches, thus allowing more countries 
to join in international controls. We 
believe it is a pragmatic and responsible 
proposition which in no way precludes 



future additional actions. Indeed, it buys 
time for scientific research to provide us 
better guidelines, while prudently 
safeguarding the environment for the 
near term. 

If the world can at least reduce less 
essential uses in the short run, we may 
be able to avoid much more costly meas- 
ures in the future. All that we ask is 
that interested nations be allowed to 
have this measure available in March for 
adoption at the diplomatic conference ^ 
if they desire. This would be a clear 
signal to our constituencies that, even in 
the real world of scientific uncertainties, 
we are still able to take some modest 
precautionary steps to safeguard future 
human welfare against important risks. 

In conclusion, by continuing to load 
the atmosphere with CFCs and other 
pollutants, mankind is, in effect, per- 



forming a gigantic experiment on the i 
mosphere — one that is reversible only 
over decades or centuries. Prudence di 
tates that we reduce the size of that e> 
periment until we better understand it 
results. The costs of the precautionary 
measures that we support are not high 
compared to many other environmenta 
controls. But the benefits to the fragile 
chemical balance of our atmosphere — 
and, ultimately, to human and economi 
well-being — may be great. 



'Draft Global Convention for the Prote(| 
tion of the Ozone Layer. 

-Draft Protocol To Protect the Ozone 
Layer by Controlling Certain Uses of 
Chlorofluorocarbons. 

^Conference of Plenipotentiaries on ProJ 
tection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, March 
18-22, 1985. ■ 



Annua 


1 World Emissions: CFC- 


-11 




300 


i 


i 


1^ 


Kilograms 

ro 
o 
o 


A 


1 


1 




~o 


,^^^H 








llions 

o 
o 


^^H 


1 


■ 




5 


^^^H 


1 


■ 





19 


p^^^^l^H 


1 


w 




50 I960 1970 




1980 




Because CFCs are almost indestructible in the lower atmosptiere, 
concentrations will build up even if ennissions do not increase 
yearly. Thus, although several countries reduced CFC use m 
aerosols sufficiently to level off world emissions growth temporarily, 
concentrations have continued to climb. 



Source Chemical Manutacturers Association, 198 



64 



Department of State Bulletir 



■RRORISM 



Brrorist Attacks on U.S. Official 
ersonnel Abroad, 1982-84 



This compilation identifies incidents 
olving premeditated political ter- 
ism directed against official repre- 
tatives ofthf United States. Episodes 
t occurred during irartime situations 
that resulted from random disorder 
mob action are excluded. Attacks on 
vate citizeyis are not listed. Attacks on 
iperty have been included only when 
y resulted in deaths or injunes of 
lerican personnel. 

This article is a supplement to Ter- 
ist Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 
road, which appeared i.n the April 
■1 issue of the Bulletin, and to Ter- 
ist Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 
road, 1981, which appeared in the 
y 198-2 Bulletin. 

Evan Duncan, the author of this 
dy. is a Research and Reference 
Horian in the Office of the Historian, 
reau of Public Affairs. 



. SALVADOR 

iiy 25, 1983 

idr. Albert A. Schaufelberger, deputy 
ef of the U.S. military group in El 
Ivador, was shot and killed by two 
pmen outside the University of Gen- 
ii America in San Salvador. Two days 
er, a broadcast by Radio Farabundo 
irt'i called Schaufelberger's assassina- 
n an act of "national defense" carried 
t by members of the Popular Libera- 
n Front. On June 1, the Popular 
Deration Forces claimed responsibility 
d threatened further attacks on U.S. 
litary advisers until they were 
j thdrawn from El Salvador. 



RANGE 

inuary 18, 1982 

,. Col. Charles R. Ray, assistant U.S. 
ilitary attache in Paris, was shot and 
led by a gunman outside his apart- 
(ent. A group calling itself the 
ebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction 
aimed responsibility. 



August 21, 1982 

A bomb was discovered in a parking 
space used by Roderick Grant, Commer- 
cial Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in 
Paris. The bomb was believed to have 
been attached to Grant's car. A French 
policeman was killed and two others 
were wounded, one fatally, when the 
bomb exploded while being removed. On 
August 22, a group calling itself the 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction 
claimed responsibility. 

March 26, 1984 

A gunman on a motorcycle shot and 
slightly wounded Consul General 
Robert 0. Homme outside his apartment 
in Strasbourg. The Lebanese Armed 
Revolutionary Faction claimed respon- 
sibility and accused Homme of being 
employed by the CIA. 



GREECE 

November 15, 1983 

Capt. George Tsantes, head of the naval 
section of the joint U.S. military 
assistance group in Greece, was shot 
and killed by two unidentified gunmen in 
Athens. His" Greek chauffeur was also 
killed. An anonymous caller claimed 
responsibility for the "November 17" 
group, which had also claimed to have 
killed CIA station chief Richard Welch 
in 1975. 



April 3, 1984 

Two unidentified gunmen shot and 
wounded U.S. Air Force MSgt. Robert 
H. Judd near the Athens airport. On 
April 5, the "November 17" revolu- 
tionary organization claimed responsibili- 
ty, describing the attack as a protest 
against the Greek Government's failure 
to remove American military bases from 
the country. The Greek police later 
reported that the same gun had also 
been used in the assassinations of 
Richard Welch and Capt. George 
Tsantes. 



IRAN 

December 4-9, 1984 

Four gunmen hijacked a Kuwait Air- 
ways jet during a flight from Kuwait to 
Karachi, Pakistan. Six Americans, in- 
cluding three auditors employed by AID, 
were among the 162 persons aboard. 
Shortly after the plane landed at 
Tehran, the hijackers shot and killed 
AID auditor Charles F. Hegna and 
released 44 women and children, two of 
whom were Americans. The hijackers 
threatened to blow up the plane unless 
the Government of Kuwait released 17 
persons who had lieen imprisoned for a 
series of bombings that had taken place 
on December 12, 1983. 

The Kuwaiti Government refused to 
meet the hijackers' demands. Although 
the hijackers gradually released most of 
their hostages, they killed a second 
American AID official, William L. 
Stanford, on December 6 and severely 
beat and tortured the remaining U.S. 
and Kuwaiti passengers. On December 
9, Iranian security forces stormed the 
plane, captured the hijackers, and freed 
the remaining seven hostages, including 
AID auditor Charles Kapar and 
American businessman John Costa. 
Kapar and Costa were flown to an 
American hospital in West Germany for 
medical treatment before returning to 
the United States. 

The hijackers, who did not identify 
themselves, were believed to have been 
affiliated with either Hizballah, (the 
"Party of God") a Lebanese Shiite fac- 
tion linked to attacks on U.S. facilities in 
Lebanon, or to a militant Iraqi Shiite 
group known as "Al Dawa." The Iranian 
Government refused to extradite the hi- 
jackers to Kuwait but announced on 
December 18 that they would be tried 
according to Islamic law. 



ITALY 

February 15, 1984 

Retired Foreign Service officer Leamon 
R. Hunt, Director General of the 
Multinational Force and Observers 
(MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula, was shot 
and killed by two gunmen outside his 
home in Rome. Persons claiming to 
represent both Italian and Lebanese 
radical groups claimed responsibility. 



65 



TERRORISM 



4 <^ 




December 12, 1983 

A suicide truck bomb exploded outside a 
U.S. Embassy annex in Kuwait (photo 
above) wrecking an administrative annex 
and seriously damaging the chancery. 
The terrorist and three local employees 
of the Embassy were killed, and a 
Kuwaiti visa applicant was fatally in- 
jured. The blast also wounded 20 
Foreign Service nationals and 17 visitors 
to the Embassy. Other bombs exploded 
within minutes of each other at the 
French Embassy, the airport, an 
American housing complex, a power sta- 
tion, and an oil refinery, 
responsibility for these attacks in the 
name of the "Islamic Jihad." The 
Kuwaiti Government subsequently tried 
25 persons (mostly Iraqis) before a 
special state security court. Six were 
sentenced to death (three in absentia), 
while 14 others received prison 
sentences ranging from 5 years to life. 
To date, the death sentences have not 
been carried out. 



LEBANON 



March 15, 1983 

Five U.S. Marines serving with the 
multinational force in Beirut were 
wounded in a grenade attack. A second 
attack wounded five Italian soldiers, one 
of whom later died. A group calling 
itself the "Islamic Jihad" claimed respon- 
sibility for the attacks. 

April 18, 1983 

A truck bomb wrecked the U.S. Em- 
bassy in Beirut, killing more than 50 
persons and wounding more than 100. 
The dead included 17 Americans and 21 
Lebanese employees of the Embassy, 
while 4 Americans and 16 local 
employees were hospitalized. Individuals 
purporting to represent the "Islamic 
Jihad" and other extremist groups 
claimed responsibility for the attack. 

October 23. 1983 

A truck bomb demolished the head- 
quarters of the U.S. Marines serving 
with the multinational force in Beirut, 
killing 241. A second attack on a bar- 
racks occupied by French paratroops 
killed 58. The "Free Islamic Revolu- 
tionary Movement" and the "Islamic 
Jihad" both claimed responsibility for the 
attacks. 



1 



March 16, 1984 



Political officer William Buckley was 
kidnapped by three unidentified gunme 
outside his apartment in Beirut. On 
May 9, the "Islamic Jihad" claimed to I 
holding him. On January 28, 1985, the 
NBC television network showed a 
videotape that it had obtained in which 
Buckley, holding a Beirut newspaper 
dated January 22, said that he and tw( 
other Americans who had been kid 
napped in Beirut were well. 



September 20, 1984 

A truck bomb exploded outside the U.! 
Embassy annex in the east Beirut 
suburb of Aukar, killing 14 persons an^ 
injuring 57. Army Chief Warrant Offic 
Kenneth V. Welch and Navy Petty Of- 
ficer First Class Michael R. Wagner, 
both with the Defense Attache's office 
died in the attack. Some 20 Americans 
were injured, 4 of them seriously. U.S. 
Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew ar 
British Ambassador David Miers were 
slightly injured. 

The "Islamic Jihad" claimed respon 
sibility, urging Lebanese to stay away 
from "American centers" and stating 
that they were keeping their "previous 
promise not to allow a single Americar 
to remain on Lebanese soil." 



NAMIBIA 

April 15, 1984 

A bomb explosion at a gas station in 
Oshakati killed Dennis W. Keogh, heac 
of the U.S. Liaison Office, and Lt. Col. 
Kenneth Crabtree, the Department of 
Defense representative at the office. A 
Namibian civilian was also killed. 
SWAPO denied responsibility, and Sou 
African officials stated that the bomb 
had probably not been directed at the 
two Americans. ■ 



66 



Department of State Bulleti 



'ESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Ihe Need for Continuity 

1 U-S. Latin American Policy 



Langhorne A. Motley 

Based on a statement before the Sub- 
vmittee on Western HeTnisphere Af- 
rs of the HoiLse Foreign Affairs Com- 

tee on January 29.1985. Ambassador 
tley is Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
lerican Affairs. ^ 

s renewal of cooperation between the 
lected Administration and the new 
igress is an appropriate time to look 
listically at what has been happening 
^atin America and the Caribbean 
■r the past few years. It is a moment 
ook beyond the stereotypes of the 
t: we now have the evidence of re- 
t history as a guide into the future. 

must study it carefully. 

Successful policies must be con- 
.ant both with our own interests and 
nciples and with the realities "on the 
•und." In Latin America and the 
-ibbean, I believe that the Ad- 
listration and the Congress have 
son to conclude that the policies we 
'6 been following the last 4 years are 
ceeding and that the best option for 

next 4 years is firm, bipartisan con- 
aity. 



} INCIPLES 

' lericans expect their government to 
i nd firmly on principle. And our first 
1 nciple must be the defense of U.S. na- 
; lal interests. 

The United States has many impor- 
j t interests in Latin America. They in- 
! de some of the geopolitical, security, 
1 i economic bases of our nation's 
' edom and prosperity. They also in- 
: de moral concerns rooted in our own 
; ditions of political freedom, equality 
; opportunity, and the physical security 
I i integrity of the individual. The 
; nan relationships and cultural and 
: torical experiences we have shared 
i ;h others in this New World have 
• ped to shape our national ideals and 
r ues. 

Since the earliest days of the 
! public, it has been agreed that the 
^lited States cannot be indifferent to 
. neighbors. The independence of Latin 
inerican governments from forces out- 
■ e the hemisphere— first the European 
: )narchies, then the Axis powers, and 
pre recently Soviet communism — has 
\\g been, and remains, a primary U.S. 
oerest. 



Conditions in Latin America have 
changed dramatically over the last 
quarter century. Let's look at the 
positive side. 

First, social modernization and 
cultural progress have begun to 
transform Latin American life and 
politics. Together with the independence 
of the former British colonies in the 
Caribbean, these changes are propelling 
a far-reaching trend toward democracy 
that is capturing the imagination and ad- 
miration of observers throughout the 
Western world. 

Second, Latin American and Carib- 
bean economies grew very rapidly 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In real 
terms, this expansion averaged more 
than 6% a year— more than double the 
rate of population growth — for two 
decades. 

These fundamental developments 
have strengthened the region's prosperi- 
ty, freedom, and world role. They have 
also made our neighbors better trading 
partners and even more natural allies. 

But the past quarter century has 
seen some major negative aspects as 
well. 

First, since the early 1960s, Cuba's 

military forces have quadrupled, becom- 
ing a surrogate for Soviet conventional 
military power. The Soviets and Cubans 
are now joined in a major effort to sup- 
port armed Marxist minorities seeking 
to seize power by force elsewhere in the 
hemisphere. The people of Central 
America, in particular, are suffering the 
resulting instability and violence. 

Second, though economic growth 
was impressive, it was very uneven and 
did not reach large segments of the 
population. More recently, our 
neighbors' economies have also proved 
vulnerable to worsening terms of 
trade — increased costs of oil and bor- 
rowed capital and depressed prices for 
locally produced commodities— ag- 
gravated by a world recession and 
debilitating national economic policies. 

Third, new threats to stability and 
the rule of law have emerged in the 
form of narcotics trafficking and 
political terrorism. 

The defense and advancement of 
U.S. interests must reckon with all these 
changes. They have created an increas- 
ingly complex environment in which 
there are no simple or quick solutions. 



As the National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America recognized, for ex- 
ample. Central America's problems can- 
not be resolved separately but will re- 
quire concerted and steady action on all 
fronts for many years. The same is true 
for the hemisphere as a whole. 

But if our tactics must keep pace 
with changing situations, our principles 
cannot change. We must: 

• Support democracy and the com- 
mon security — the achievement of 
democracy is now both more necessary 
and more possible than in the past. We 
must back efforts by Latin Americans to 
implement political and judicial reforms, 
to strengthen respect for human rights, 
and to provide honest and efficient con- 
stitutional government. We must help 
our friends to resist extrahemispheric 
forces, whether from the Soviet bloc or 
Libya or the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. We must support peaceful 
evolution against violence, guerrilla war- 
fare, or "power-sharing" at the point of 
a gun. 

• Facilitate equitable economic 
development — this is important to the 
health of our own economy as well as to 
the well-being and political stability of 
our neighbors and the common security. 
We must support increased social and 
economic opportunity and encourage 
free trade, private initiative, and 
economic restructuring to help renew 
our neighbors' demonstrated potential 
for growth. 

• Finally, we must help fight nar- 
cotics traffickers and terrorists. 

The shifting Latin American scene 

also has implications for the nature of 
the leadership required to turn prin- 
ciples into realities. 

First, the United States must pro- 
vide leadership. Latin America has 
grown too much for the United States to 
attempt to act unilaterally or without 
consultation. There are limits on U.S. 
power. But these limits must not be 
taken as an excuse for abdication. The 
defense of U.S. interests cannot be left 
to others; it requires an active U.S. 
diplomacy backed by power, resources, 
and imagination. If we are truly commit- 
ted to democracy, we must help to nur- 
ture and strengthen its continued 
growth not just this year and next, but 
as an integral part of our relationship. 



»ril 1985 



67 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Second, leadership must be exer- 
cised wisely. There are trwo things that 
the vast majority of the American peo- 
ple do not want in this region so close to 
home; they do not want a second Cuba, 
and they do not want a second Vietnam. 
By a second Cuba, I mean the institu- 
tionalization of another well-armed com- 
munist state, this time on the mainland, 
supported by the Soviet Union and 
working actively against U.S. interests 
and friends in the region. 

And by a second Vietnam, I mean a 
prolonged conflict involving U.S. combat 
troops with no clear goal and no end in 
sight consistent with the protection of 
strategic American interests. 

It is true that some Americans are 
concerned with one and not the other: 
some would risk another Vietnam to 
prevent another Cuba, while others are 
so concerned with any sign of a second 
Vietnam that they ignore the threat of a 
second Cuba. But the majority of our 
fellow citizens seek and will support a 
policy which serves our interests while 
preventing both a new Cuba and a new 
Vietnam. 

Third, leadership must be consist- 
ent. The many swings in the pendulums 
of the partisanship and attention that 
have taken place in the past generation 
have generated both confusion and 
cynicism. The national interest is not the 
property of any particular group or 
issue. 



STANDING BY OUR FRIENDS 

In applying these principles, Americans 
expect something fundamental of their 
government: that we stand firmly with 
our friends. 

It is in our own interest to do so, 
because our friends are people and na- 
tions who share our principles and our 
concerns. By that fundamental measure, 
the United States has many friends in 
this hemisphere. 

In recent years the sheer number of 
our friends has multiplied throughout 
the hemisphere. The people and the 
elected Government of Grenada have 
joined the family of democracies. So, 
too, have Brazil and Argentina as well 
as the economically beleaguered govern- 
ments and peoples of countries like 
Peru, Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, and 
Uruguay. All these nations are friends 
with whom we can and should stand 
proudly. 

The people of Central America are 
also our friends. They feel acutely the 
tension between their democratic aspira- 
tions and the discredited but powerful 
extremisms of left and right. And they 
share an abiding concern with what they 



68 



perceive as the ultimate extremism: the 
interference in their internal affairs by 
the Sandinistas and their Soviet and 
Cuban sponsors. 

Political polling in Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, and Honduras has consistently 
revealed a consensus: that Nicaragua is 
a direct threat, that measures against 
Nicaragua must be sustained in the 
defense of the rest of Central America, 
and that the United States is the only 
country capable of carrying off such a 
policy. 



THE LAST 5 YEARS 

How has the United States applied our 
principles? How well have we stood by 
our friends? The recent past provides 
mostly positive answers. 

The Struggle for Democracy 

When I met with you almost exactly 6 
months ago to discuss democracy in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, we 
were all struck by the hemisphere-wide 
character of progress toward 
democracy. That progress continues. 
Belize and Grenada have held 
democratic elections and installed new 
governments under their parliamentary 
systems. An elected civilian president 
has taken office in Panama. In Ecuador 
there has been a peaceful transition 
from one party to another. The March 
inaugurations in Brazil and Uruguay will 
be milestones for those nations and for 
the hemisphere. 

The democratic trend is so wide- 
spread that the list of countries that are 
democratic or clearly moving toward 
democracy is nearly four times as long 
as that of countries where its impact has 
been relatively limited— in Chile, Cuba, 
Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
and Suriname. When we look south 
after the Brazilian inauguration of 
March 15, more of our neighbors will be 
living in countries with elected, civilian 
governments than ever before. 

What is happening is not superficial, 
transitory, or externally imposed. The 
democratic surge reflects a palpable 
hemispheric determination to establish 
and protect governments responsive to 
their own peoples. The depth of par- 
ticipation in increasingly open political 
systems reflects long-term develop- 
ment—including the revolutions in com- 
munications and expectations— and a 
desire to repudiate violence and create a 
bulwark against dictatorships of both 
the left and the right. 

In Central America, our policy of 
providing political, economic, and 
military assistance to prodemocratic 
forces has proven effective. Countries 
torn by deep and longstanding political, 



social, and ethnic divisions have made 
great strides. Our assistance has helpe 
them. But the problems they face, froi 
within and without, are long term and 
systemic. No single treaty, no single 
year's economic assistance, no single 
election will bring peace and prosperit 
to Central America. We must remain " 
firm in our support until the transition 
from virtual feudalism and its 
vulnerabilities is complete. 

In 1979, four of the five Central 
American countries could crudely be 
described as largely owned and operat 
by an economic oligarchy employing a 
military caste to protect its interests 
against the majority. Six years have p: 
duced dramatic change. Today, in brog 
language, the rising democratic tide hi 
swept away the anachronistic generals 
and stopped in their tracks their wouk 
be radical successors of the extreme le 
Only Nicaragua remains under a dic- 
tatorship—having traded a tyrant of tl 
right for a tyranny of the left. Only 
Costa Rica has not changed politically: 
remains thoroughly democratic— thoug 
increasingly and justifiably concerned 
about the threat from the new and bet 
ter armed tyranny next door. 

The evolution of Central America 
can usefully be measured against bene 
marks offered 1 year ago. Events havi 
demonstrated that the report of the N 
tional Bipartisan Commission on Centi 
America was right in its analysis and 
sound in its recommendations. In so 
complex and divisive a situation, this 
record commands attention. 

El Salvador illustrates the point, i 
recently as a year ago, many in the 
United States, in Western Europe, am 
even in Latin America believed El 
Salvador was caught in an endless wai 
between guerrillas of the left and deat 
squads of the right. But Dr. Kissinger 
[chairman of the commission] and his 
colleagues insisted that electoral 
democracy and political dialogue— not 
externally imposed "power-sharing"— 
would provide a workable foundation f 
attacking the seamless web of political 
economic, social, and security problem; 
And what would give democracy, re- 
form, and economic revitalization a 
fighting chance, the commission held, 
would be the increased economic and 
security assistance. 

The year 1984 demonstrated that 
President Duarte's course was the rout 
most likely to lead to greater respect f( 
human rights and a better life. The 
Salvadorans themselves made the poini 
writ large in two rounds of national ele 
tions last year. And they did it again 
writ small when a civilian jury found 
five former National Guardsmen guilty 
of the murders of the four American 
churchwomen. Support for this 



Department of State Bullet 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



nocratic renewal was backed 
inimously by the bipartisan commis- 

, by President Reagan, and by a 
irti'san majority in the Congress, and 
iiurope by Social Democrats as well 
IJhristian Democrats. 
It would be naive to claim that all is 
\! reformed, centrist, and peaceful in 
Salvador. But the progress is 
matic and undeniable. And U.S. firm- 
s on principles and in behalf of our 
vadoran friends had a lot to do 
h it. 

The past year demonstrated the ac- 
acy of another key commission 
umption: that democratic processes in 
itral America can be nurtured and 
ported successfully by like-minded 
nds from other countries. Examples, 
ond change in El Salvador and con- 
lity in Costa Rica, include the specific 
•erience of growing democracy in 
iduras and the first steps in 
itemala. 

The recent history of Guatemala, as 
;h as that of El Salvador, exemplifies 

dangers of basing policy judgments 
stereotypes. The country which tradi- 
iial wisdom usually ranked as "the 
5t polarized" or with the "least chance 
lemocratic development" has con- 
nded the traditionalists. The Consti- 
nt Assembly elections 7 months ago 
■e not only widely accepted as honest 

open, but— to the surprise of 
iiy— revealed that centrist forces con- 
late the political majority. This 
i larkable transition in Guatemala is il- 
3 rated by the positive November 1984 
( jrt of the special rapporteur ap- 
« ited by the UN Commission on 
] nan Rights, the resumption last year 
: lipl(jmatic relations with Spain, and 
\ new, deliberately warmer personal 
< tacts between chief of state Mejia 
;i Presidents Monge of Costa Rica and 
J ancur of Colombia. 

It is encouraging that the Guate- 
r ans have moved in these directions 
I. ost exclusively on their own. A de- 
» t respect for principle should lead to 
L ;ronger link between Guatemala and 
j United States in the future. 

Honduras remains the poorest Cen- 
;i American country, but its 1982 tran- 
ii on to democratic government holds 
;i e. There is a free press. Trade unions 
1 e long been and still are an effective 
:'( je. Land distribution is relatively 
i dtable. Although still the single 
J ingest institution, the military has 
y 'er been a praetorian guard for the 
[jvileged, nor is it repressive. Presiden- 
ti elections will be held later this year. 
C spite all this, Honduras is uncertain 
Dut the continuity of the U.S. commit- 
Q nt to help Hor/duras defend itself. 



This uncertainty partly reflects debates 
in the United States, but it is tied direct- 
ly to what has been happening in 
Nicaragua. 

In Nicaragua, 1984 confirmed dif- 
ferent but equally important Jessons 
from the bipartisan commission's report. 
The key lesson: that dictatorship, no 
matter the rhetoric, leads to repression, 
civil war, and foreign entanglements. 
(That Ortega had himself "elected" in 
1984 just as Somoza had himself 
"elected" in 1974 only underscores the 
point.) 

But 1984 also confirmed another 
critical lesson: that the Sandinistas can 
change their ways if the pressure to do 
so is clear. Throughout 1983 and into 
1984, a variety of pressures— military 
exercises, naval maneuvers, internal op- 
position (both armed and unarmed), fall- 
ing international prestige— did produce 



Public reaction to our participation 
in the mission of rescue and liberation of 
Grenada showed that the American peo- 
ple understand and accept the judicious 
use of force in protecting ourselves and 
our friends. The mission itself revealed 
the "smoking gun" of Cuban and Soviet 
encroachment in the Caribbean Basin; 
the 15 months since then have shown 
that the United States and its allies are 
capable of cooperating in the construc- 
tion of democracy. 

Soviet military support for dictator- 
ship in this hemisphere is neither 
hypothetical nor limited to Cuba. 
Grenada's New JEWEL dictatorship had 
three secret military agreements with 
the U.S.S.R.— and Soviet-supplied ar- 
tillery, antiaircraft weapons, armored 
personnel carriers, and rocket launchers 
far beyond any possible defense needs. 



In 1979, four of the five Central American 
countries could crudely he described as largely 
owned and operated by an economic oligarchy 
employing a military caste to protect its interests 
against the majority. Six years have produced 
dramatic change. 



some change, at least rhetorically, in 
Sandinista behavior. There were re- 
newed promises of free elections and 
continued negotiations within the Con- 
tadora process. But then something hap- 
pened. 

By the end of 1984, the Sandinistas 
were again acting as if they had no per- 
suasive reason to compromise with their 
neighbors, with their own dissident 
political forces, or with the United 
States. It is reasonable to assume that 
the Sandinistas concluded both that 
their opponents' internal support would 
not be matched externally and that they 
themselves could propagandize their way 
to "legitimacy" through a sham election. 
If those judgments hold, it would imply 
a U.S. failure in terms of both friends 
and principles. 

In the Contadora process, the na- 
tions of Central America have agreed 
that for any regional peace agreement 
to last, open political systems must be 
not just an ideal or a legal commitment 
but a practical reality. They know that 
their future depends on working 
together and not allowing the pendulum 
to swing back— and on their not allowing 
outside powers to impose a new dic- 
tatorship in their midst. 



Between 1981 and 1984, Soviet 
military aid to Cuba alone came to more 
than $2.5 billion. After Cuba, Nicaragua 
is the principal arena of Soviet military 
expansion. That country now has over 
300 tanks and other Soviet-bloc armored 
vehicles. The latest acquisition was the 
MI-24 ground attack helicopters, the 
same weapon the Soviets have used so 
successfully in Afghanistan. 

Soviet military presence in the 
Caribbean Basin has escalated 
significantly in terms of actual military 
personnel. In Cuba the Soviets now sta- 
tion a ground forces brigade of approx- 
imately 2,800 men, almost as many 
military advisers, and additional forces 
at the intelligence collection facility at 
Lourdes in a Havana suburb. That facili- 
ty, targeted at monitoring electronic 
communications in the United States, is 
the most sophisticated Soviet in- 
telligence complex outside the Soviet 
Union itself. 

Economic Growth and Debt 

Democracy is a problem-solving 
mechanism whose fairness cannot be 
matched by dictatorships of the right or 



ril1985 



69 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



the left. But a democracy incapable of 
addressing major economic issues will be 
no more permanent than the dictators of 
the right and left that it has replaced. 

Our neighbors have in large part 
taken the often painful steps necessary 
to help end the severe contractions of 
the early 1980s. Real per capita income 
grew about 0.2% in 1984— not much, 
but better than the decline of 5.8% in 
1983 and 3.3% in 1982. Vigorous U.S. 
economic gi'owth in 1984 created new 
export opportunities. U.S. nonpetroleum 
imports from the region for the first 11 
months of 1984 were up 19% over 1983. 
The trade balance for Latin America 
with the rest of the world has improved 
significantly as well, from a negative $2 
billion in 1981 to an estimated positive 
$37.6 billion in 1984. 

Structural adjustments by debtor 
countries have lowered government ex- 
penditures, bringing them in line with 
government income; they have restricted 
imports of nonessential goods to save 
foreign exchange; they have adjusted 
their exchange rates to reflect economic 
reality and breathe new life into their 
export sectors; and they have worked 
with the international financial com- 
munity to restructure their debts and 
ensure continued orderly debt servicing. 
They have reallocated scarce resources 
even as those resources fell. 

The international financial communi- 
ty also made important contributions. 
U.S. bilateral assistance, especially to 
the Caribbean Basin and including con- 
cessional food aid, expanded significant- 
ly from roughly $1 billion in 1983 to 
about $1.4 billion in 1984, and $1.5 
billion in 1985. We remain ready to pro- 
vide official guarantees and insurance 
programs in support of commercial bank 



rescheduling; working with the Congress 
to prevent protectionist measures from 
inhibiting Latin American access to our 
markets; and encouraging Europe and 
Japan to open markets to Latin 
American goods and to provide addi- 
tional financial resources. 

The Mexican and Venezuelan 
multiyear reschedulings were a positive 
development. The second-tier, or smaller 
debtor, countries must now also deal 
with their debt burdens in ways that 
allow for both orderly servicing and 
economic growth. The recent distur- 
bances in Jamaica over price increases 
designed to limit the fiscal deficit are a 
case in point. Riots in the Dominican 
Republic in April 1984 led to 60 deaths 
after President Jorge Blanco moved to 
place the country's economy on sounder 
footing. The problems of Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Peru in dealing with the 
shifting El Nino current are additional 
examples. 

The Central American initiative,^ 
building on the recommendations of the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Cen- 
tral America, links economic aid to 
policy reform to eliminate root causes of 
poverty and political unrest. Coupled 
with improved world economic condi- 
tions and military and political progress, 
this expanded assistance is having a real 
impact. Discussions are underway with 
recipient countries concerning 
macroeconomic adjustment; regional 
technical training programs are due to 
begin in April; the revival and strength- 
ening of the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration is being studied; 
and we are working to assist in the 
revival of the Central American Com- 
mon Market. The Caribbean Basin In- 
itiative is also showing some positive 
signs. 



There is a natural marriage of convenience between 
narcotics traffickers and political terrorists. 



financing of U.S. exports. Eximbank 
special facilities for Brazil and Mexico 
are in operation. And the Congress ap- 
proved the trade credit insurance pro- 
gram to promote trade finance lines in 
Central America. 

We have also been instrumental in 
helping to manage the immediate debt 
crisis by encouraging private lenders to 
maintain prudent involvement in lending 
and rescheduling; working with multi- 
lateral lending institutions to assist with 
immediate resource needs, necessary 
economic reforms and longer term 



Narco-Terrorism 

There is a new awareness among the 
countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean that illegal drug production 
and trafficking are dangers to their own 
societies. 

Historically, some of these countries 
have been lukewarm to joint efforts to 
fight drug production and trafficking. 
They had taken a position that illegal 
drug activities were essentially a U.S. 
problem — that once our own consump- 
tion came under control, the problem 
would disappear in their countries. Some 



even saw benefits to drug trafficking ; 
a source of foreign exchange. 

This kind of thinking is changing. 
Illegal drug consumption has become ; 
serious problem in many Latin Ameri; 
societies. As in our country, the problf 
is not limited by social class or 
geography; it is pervasive and tragic. 

Although illegal drugs have been 
around for a long time, a new problen 
the mutual reinforcement between ille 
drugs and politically motivated insurgi 
cies and terrorists. There is a natural 
marriage of convenience between nar- 
cotics traffickers and political terrorist 
Both operate in a shadowy underwork 
of clandestine and criminal activities 
that leads readily to a symbiotic relatii 
ship. Terrorist groups have been knos\ 
to finance their operations through ac- 
tivities associated with drug traffickin 
as well as bank robberies and kidnap- 
ings. 

In 1982 we found that the Cubans 
had been using a Colombian narcotics 
ring to smuggle both arms and funds 1 
Colombian M-19 guerrillas. When the 
Colombian Armed Forces and Nationa 
Police entered the town of Calamar in 
February 1984, they discovered that tl 
guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces 
Colombia had campesinos cultivating 
hundreds of hectares of coca plants. 
Nicaraguan officials have been arreste 
in both the United States and Canada 
for involvement with illegal drugs. 

On November 1, 1984, Director 
William Webster announced that the 
FBI had thwarted a drug-financed ploi 
to assassinate the President of Hon- 
duras and overthrow his administratio 
The FBI confiscated 345 kilos of co- 
caine, with a wholesale value of $10.3 
million, that was to be used to finance 
this plot. 

Even when no direct links exist, n: 
cotics trafficking and political terrorist 
feed on each other and threaten U.S. 
interests and the basic fabric of demo- 
cratic societies. They promote corrupti 
through bribes and intimidation and ca 
undermine confidence in public institu- 
tions. Drug runners and terrorists stra 
the capabilities of public security agen- 
cies. They control territory and impose 
their will on an unconsenting public. 
And they are backed up by sophisticate 
international networks. 

The narcotics traffickers have 
become a terrorist threat in themselves 
They've murdered civilian drug eradica 
tion workers in Peru and public official 
from small-town judges to the Justice 
Minister in Colombia. They have 
threatened to murder five American 
diplomats for every one of their numbe 
extradited to the United States from 
Colombia. 



I 



70 



Department of State Bulletl 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



E YEARS 
MEDIATELY AHEAD 

linst this record, what should we ex- 
v:t from the future? 

I Future of Democracy 

intend to act coiifidently and pur- 
efully in this hemisphere to protect 
locracy where it already exists, to 
) consolidate it where it has emerged, 

to foster it where it is wanting, 
darity with and support for 
locracy throughout the hemisphere is 
damental to our leadership role. It is 
a glib slogan. It is sound, practical 
cy grounded in self-interest. It is 
ed on a simple premise: democracies 
't make war on each other. They are 
;er neighbors, better trading part- 



An example of the kind of support 
democracy the United States can 
vide is in strengthening systems for 
administration of justice. We are not 
(T Idling or trying to impose the 
Ifiestic system we have taken 200 
c rs to develop but are providing con- 
r e support to the efforts for Latin 
L ericans themselves to strengthen 
Y r own systems of administration of 
J ice. For instance, we are supporting 
; "iial legal reform commissions 
■: lut^-h which each nation can assess its 
' 1 needs and priorities, and we are 
U porting training of Latin Americans 
1 jatin America so as to help our 
.< ^hbors lay the foundation for long- 
5 n, stable democratic government. 

The strengthening of democracy is a 
i tral element of the Central American 
) iative, endorsed and funded by the 
! igress. We are working to help 
( elop and implement programs to 
I 'ngthen skills, infrastructure, and 
• ;ual support among democratic par- 
i , groups, and leaders in the region. 
i would propose, with congressional 
I port, to help stimulate practical and 
! cific democratic activiuies as a con- 
I ent part of our relations throughout 
hemisphere. 

To help democrats be competitive in 
political marketplace. President 
igan announced to the British Parlia- 
Qt on June 8, 1982, that the United 
tes would make a major effort to 
"foster the infrastructure of 
nocracy" around the world. Since that 
e, both governmental and nongovern- 
ntal efforts to strengthen democratic 
nds abroad have increased steadily. 
The National Endowment for 
mocracy and the four democracy in- 
utes of the U.S. Chamber of Com- 
rce, the AFL-CIO, and the 
publican and Democratic parties have 



undertaken many new Latin American 
initiatives. For example, the AFL-CIO's 
Free Trade Union Institute has assisted 
a democratic union in Chile whose 
development has been severely curbed 
by government restrictions and threat- 
ened by communist-subsidized rivals. 
The American Chamber of Commerce's 
Center for International Private Enter- 
prise has funded a project of the In- 
stituto Lihertad y Democracia in Peru to 
develop a new legal framework for the 
economic activity of those who have had 
to resort to the informal economy due to 
archaic and burdensome bureaucratic 
redtape. Such activities, like those of the 
Republican and Democratic institutes, 
dovetail with U.S. Government pro- 
grams funded through the Agency for 
International Development and the U.S. 
Information Agency. 

In Chile our objective is to work to 
promote the restoration of democracy by 
encouraging dialogue between the pro- 
transition forces within the government 
and the pronegotiation forces in the op- 
position. The question for us is how we 
can best encourage a process which 
Chileans themselves must bring to frui- 
tion. In this context we have to ask 
whether our actions retard or promote 
this process. 

The political transition in Chile faces 
several obstacles. The government has 
so far failed to follow through on its 
own transition commitments; the 
political opposition has not yet reached 
agreement between its various members 
on a clear basis for talks with the 
military; and the communists are not in- 
terested in compromise. 

The difficulties inherent in any tran- 
sition effort magnify what may sound 
like a truism— there are no single-issue 
solutions. We cannot guarantee to the 
Congress that we can ensure a neat 
transition process in Chile. We can only 
guarantee that our policy is committed 
to doing whatever is necessary to help 
the Chileans themselves take the steps 
to resolve the issues that will foster 
dialogue leading to the reestablishment 
of democracy. 

Although the changes from military 
to democratic governments get the 
headlines, the cases of renewal and con- 
solidation of democratic governments 
are just as significant. The August 1984 
inauguration of Leon Febres Cordero as 
President marked the first electoral 
transition in 24 years in Ecuador from 
one democratic government to another. 
Peru and Bolivia are preparing for elec- 
tions, in April and June, respectively, to 
continue elected democratic government, 
to face the challenges of economic 
strains, political extremism, and nar- 
cotics trafficking. We and the other 
democracies of the hemisphere will 
stand by them. 



Economic Policy 

For Central America, the remaining 
recommendations of the bipartisan com- 
mission must be heeded. Peace and 
economic development in Central 
America require both the reliability of 
multiyear funding and the confidence 
that this long-term commitment will con- 
tinue to be tied to equity, reform, and 
freedom. Bipartisan support is essential 
if the Central America initiative is to ad- 
dress the commission's call for a commit- 
ment through 1989 to provide- 
predictably— a balanced and mutually 
reinforcing mix of economic, political, 
diplomatic, and security activities. 

In the 1960s, the impetus for high 
rates of growth came from a liberaliza- 
tion and expansion of world trade and 
financial systems. Domestic savings and 
investment provided the major portion 
of total investment, but the Alliance for 
Progress also provided significant exter- 
nal resources. Official assistance from all 
sources and foreign direct investment in 
the region provided about 80% of net 
capital inflows. Commercial loans were 
not a major factor. 

In the mid-1970s, in contrast, 
private bank financing was the major 
source of external capital for develop- 
ment. Banks had cash to lend, and bor- 
rowing grew from about $75 billion in 
1974 to $336 billion in 1983-an increase 
of about 20% a year. 

The 1980s require a new formula. 
There simply are not enough funds in 
the financial system to support borrow- 
ing at these levels— even if lenders re- 
mained willing to lend and borrowers 
willing to borrow. For debt equity to 
support even 5% growth per year, 
capital inflows of some $47 billion a year 
would be required. And although we 
have increased our bilateral aid in recent 
years, it is clear that foreign assistance 
cannot be an effective basis for sus- 
tained growth. 

Investment and exports— the 
engines of growth of the modern 
economy— must drive the renewal of 
growth. Investment brings with it 
technology, training, managerial skill, 
and access to markets. As stated above, 
Latin American and Caribbean govern- 
ments are beginning to make the struc- 
tural changes needed to encourage in- 
vestment and move away from inef- 
ficient statist development models. They 
are coming to realize that inward- 
looking development strategies provide 
only limited potential for economic 
growth and that a good climate for 
domestic entrepreneurs will also attract 
foreign investment. The global 
marketplace holds the key to economic 
success, national development, and the 
basis for a better standard of living for 
all. Both domestic and foreign investors 



ril1985 



71 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



must know the rules of the game— which 
should be equitable, clear, and applied 
consistently. 

Ecuador is one country taking a 
free-market approach to encourage 
domestic entrepreneurs and foreign in- 
vestors. As a major step to attract in- 
vestment, the Febres-Cordero govern- 
ment has become the first Andean Pact 
state to reach an agreement with the 
Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion which will serve to attract the new 
capital so essential to future develop- 
ment. 

It is clearly in the interest of the 
United States that these trends con- 
tinue. We will continue to work with the 
international financial institutions in 
lending and rescheduling and with the 
multilateral lending institutions to assist 
with immediate resource needs. And we 
are growing ourselves, providing 
markets for foreign products and 
building the base for world economic 
recovery. The U.S. market remains the 
most open in the world and continues to 
offer substantial opportunities for the 
region's exports. We must remain firm 
in our commitment to keep our markets 
open, our tariff barriers modest, and our 
economic assistance flexible and 
available to those who need it most. 

We must, for example, do all we can 
to foster the entry of the small pro- 
ducers into the international market- 
place. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is 
a major step in this direction. What is 
often a marginal or incremental increase 
in import market share to us is a major 
part of their gross domestic product. 

The War Against Narco-Terrorism 

International cooperation led to the con- 
trol of air piracy; international coopera- 
tion will ultimately conquer illegal nar- 
cotics. We view the anarchy fostered by 
the narco-terrorists with the same 
seriousness as we view other interna- 
tional threats to our society and will 
react with equal vigor. Our friends are 
becoming equally resolute. We will con- 
tinue to work with them until the 
menace of illicit drug trafficking is over- 
come. 

The recent extradition by Colombia 
of suspected drug traffickers demon- 
strates courage of the kind required to 
cooperate effectively. Mexico has been 
having success in aerial spraying pro- 
grams against poppy and marijuana 
crops. Bolivia and Peru have initiated 
eradication programs in areas which 
were previously virtually controlled by 
narcotics producers, for example, the^ 
coca-producing Chapare region and the 
Upper Huailaga Valley. We expect that 
active testing in cooperation with the 
Colombian Government will lead to the 



72 



discovery of an effective and ecologically 
safe herbicide for aerial eradication of 
coca fields. 



WILL NICARAGUA CHANGE? 

The lessons from the recent past and the 
guidelines for the near future can be 
condensed into an assertion and a warn- 
ing: the skeptics were wrong about El 
Salvador, they were wrong about 
Grenada, and they are wrong about 
Nicaragua — and all for the same 
reasons. 

There is one issue, however, on 
which considerable controversy still 
reigns: Nicaragua. On that issue, as on 
others, we must be realistic. Realism 
means standing firmly on principles and 
with our friends. And it also means 
understanding how to go about it in the 
real world — where clear alternatives and 
easy choices are as rare as practicing 
democrats among the comandarttes. 

Both our committee and our in- 
terests can best be served by the conclu- 
sion of a workable, comprehensive, and 
fully verifiable regional agreement based 
solidly on the 21 objectives the Con- 
tadora process has set for itself. Our 
diplomacy must continue to support that 
outcome. 

On behalf of the Contadora coun- 
tries, Mexico suggested that we initiate 
direct talks with the Sandinistas. 
Secretary Shultz traveled to Managua 
last June to propose such talks, making 
clear publicly and privately to Daniel 
Ortega that our purpose was to support 
and facilitate the Contadora process. As 
a result of the Secretary's initiative, nine 
meetings have now been held between 
special envoy Shlaudeman and 
Nicaraguan Vice Minister Tinoco. These 
have been useful in permitting each side 
to present its concerns, hut they have 
made no substantive progress. In 
February, a new and most important 
round of negotiations is to begin in the 
Contadora process. With that in view, 
and in order to avoid any impression 
that the Manzanillo talks could in any 
way replace or interfere with those 
critical multilateral negotiations, we 
decided to hold off on any further 
bilateral meetings with the Sandinistas 
pending the results of the next Con- 
tadora session. 

There is nothing mysterious about 
diplomatic negotiations. Commonsense 
rules apply as much to the multilateral 
Contadora talks on Central America as, 
for example, to a labor-management 
dispute in the United States. But many 
have not applied common sense. When it 
comes to Central America, some take at 
face value things they would never ac- 
cept at home. 



First, in any negotiation, the agem 
has to have something in it for each 
side. Otherwise, why negotiate? Fidel 
Castro, for example, often says "let's 
negotiate," but it always turns out thai 
the only important item he wants on tl 
agenda is the U.S. economic boycott 
anything we might want— as eliminatic 
of Cuban support for guerrillas— he re- 
jects. In the first years of their rule, tl 
Sandinistas obviously saw no advantag 
in "negotiating away" their support for 
Salvadoran and other guerrillas or thei 
military buildup and ties to the U. S.S.I 
and Cuba. They took our money but 
ignored attempts to discuss our con- 
cerns. But by 1983 they had an incen- 
tive. The strength of their internal 
democratic resistance, armed and 
unarmed, their neighbors' military exei 
cises with the United States, and their 
own plummetting international prestig 
gave the Sandinistas something to 
bargain for. That's when Contadora 
started rolling. 

Second, nobody bargains for 
something he expects to get free. If th 
Nicaraguans in the armed resistance a 
abandoned, why should the Sandinistas 
negotiate with "them? If the World Cou 
makes decisions without considering t^ 
concerns of other Central Americans, 
why should Nicaragua compromise wit 
its neighbors? 

Third, pressure outside the formal 
negotiation is a normal part of the pro. 
ess. What some call "coercive diplomac 
has been part of history since the first 
diplomats and the first soldiers. Peopk 
and nations do not move to the 
negotiating table simply because it's a 
nice piece of furniture. If anyone know 
of a more effective way to create a 
bargaining situation with the San- 
dinistas, let us know. 

Fourth, it takes at least two to 
negotiate. If one side practices the 
theory that "what's mine is mine, what 
yours is negotiable," then the parties 
might as well be 1,000 miles apart 
rather than sitting around a green felt 
table— whether in Geneva, or Contador 
or Manzanillo. An announcement by or 
party that one of several contending 
texts "must" be signed immediately 
without further conversation is a 
declaration of unwillingness to negotiat 
further. 

Fifth, balance must be maintained. 
If one side gets what it wants first, it 
will lose its incentive to compromise. 
That's like a labor union agreeing to 
postpone consideration of pay raises 
without first trying to get them. Or the 
September 7 draft for a Contadora ack 
which would have satisfied Nicaragua's 
basic demands but left issues fundamen 
tal to others for "future" discussion. 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Sixth, what negotiators say publicly 
irt of the negotiating process, 
iiragua's statement that it was ready 
1 ign the September 7 draft acta "as 
vas a transparent ploy aimed at 
-:tmg the balancing changes sure to 
isisted upon by the other par- 
laiits. To see why, just carefully read 
iitiinetable and ground rules under 
li'h the draft acta was tabled. 
Seventh, an unenforceable, 
■nfiable agreement is worse than no 
"•einent at all. A mere announcement 
' uiherence" or a signature mean 
iiii<4 without a means to ensure com- 
I ii\'. And if an agreement fails, a 
utum will become even more difficult. 
Eighth, what is important is the 

• tiral end result. Not the fact of a 

• iiionial meeting or a framable docu- 
it, not self-satisfying statements to 
press, but whether or not the "deal" 
ly does bring results— whether 

ler wages for workers in the local 

t or peace to Central America. 

And, finally, if pressure and 
i jtiations fail and the problem con- 
nes— as is possible, if not necessarily 
cy, in the case of Nicaragua's San- 
1 ^t;is— then the alternatives will sure- 

' less desirable and far more expen- 
V. Let us be specific: 

• The Sandinistas have global ties 

I plans for Nicaragua and the rest of 
F tral America that are contrary to 

. interests; 

• They will not modify or bargain 

r, their position unless there is some 
( ntive for them to do so; 

• The only incentive that has proved 
: :tive thus far has been opposition 

I I other Nicaraguans (remember 

1 1 happened after the 1980 emergen- 
r applemental for Nicaraguan 
I nstruction?); 

• If pressure is taken away, the 

E Jinistas will have no reason to com- 
" nise; 

• If the Sandinistas have no reason 
I Dmpromise, Contadora will surely 

t and 

• If Contadora fails, the long-run 
) s to the United States in terms of 
1 ley and lives will be much greater. 

The perceived U.S. relationship to 
I Nicaraguans who have taken up 
r s against those who cheated them of 
I goals of their revolution against 
( loza has been controversial. 
; vever, the fact that the Nicaraguan 
r ed resistance has been able to sus- 
i , and in some respects even increase, 
1 )perations in recent months reflects 
I mbstantial indigenous as well as 
liispheric support. Realistically, part 
(he debate over the future should 
Us on what Nicaragua would be like 
nout pressure from the armed opposi- 



tion, which, short of changes in San- 
dinista behavior, is the only internal 
obstacle to consolidation of an 
undemocratic regime at home providing 
military support to Marxist revolutions 
throughout Central America. 

U.S. policies also must consider the 
consequences of any failure to induce 
the Sandinista government to allow 
political pluralism. Contrary to their 
own pronouncements, the Sandinistas 
may be content to be left alone to build 
Marxism in one country. But the burden 
of proof should lie on those who pro- 
claim that the Sandinistas are interested 
in doing their thing totally within 
Nicaragua. Neither the Cuban precedent 
nor the Sandinistas' behavior to date fit 
that proposition. And if a long-term 
policy of containment were to become 
necessary, both the United States and 
its friends in Central America would pay 
the price— in resources dearly needed 
for other purposes. 

Nicaragua's democratic resistance 
deserves the solidarity of the West no 
less— some would say more, because of 
the imperative of proximity— than the 
Afghan rebels or the Polish Solidarity 
movement. Shall we always wring our 
hands when a country suffers from 
Soviet or Marxist dictatorship but fail to 
help those who resist it? 

The identity of the resistance 
fighters has been clouded by Sandinista 
propaganda denunciations of them as 
mercenaries and mostly former National 
Guardsmen who remain loyal to Somoza. 
In fact, all you have to do is count the 
numbers; there are far more resistance 
fighters than there ever were members 
of the National Guard, even at its peak 
in Somoza's last days. The freedom 
fighters are peasants, farmers, 
shopkeepers, and vendors. Their leaders 
are without exception men who opposed 
Somoza. And what unites them to each 
other and to the thousands of Nica- 
raguans who resist without arms is 
disillusionment with Sandinista abuse, 
corruption, and fanaticism. The myth 
that if Somoza was bad the Sandinistas 
have to be good was exploded long ago 
for most Nicaraguans. 

Let us be clear: it is partly because 
our adversaries are intervening on 
behalf of totalitarianism in Central 
America that so many of our friends are 
involved in active opposition to dictator- 
ship. The Nicaraguan resistance was 
labeled "contras" by the people who 
wanted to deny them legitimacy. But the 
historical fact is that they are more "for" 
than "against": they are for democracy, 
for national independence, and for the 
original promises of the anti-Somoza 
revolution. What they are against is the 
subverters of those ideals. The 



Nicaraguan democratic resistance clearly 
has a principled claim on our support. 
These are friends who merit our stand- 
ing with them— and, indeed, can be 
frustrated if they are denied our help. 



THE BOTTOM LINE 

Throughout the hemisphere, the bottom 
line is real improvements over time 
in economic well-being and human 
freedom, not short-cut (and invariably 
short-lasting) solutions, headlines, 
dramatic pronouncements, and "single- 
issue" politics. The bottom line is effec- 
tive action against the real dangers of 
Cuban/Soviet encroachments, Nicara- 
guan regional aggression, economic col- 
lapse, and narco-terrorism, not postur- 
ing to make ourselves feel good. 

What the Administration and the 
Congress have learned together in the 
past provides a mandate for the future. 
The Administration cannot fulfill that 
mandate without the active support of 
the Congress. If you and we do not 
stand firmly on principle and with our 
friends, we will both lose. A lack of 
policy consistency would be a significant 
obstacle to achieving our national objec- 
tives in this region over the next months 
and years. 

But that is one obstacle we here 
have the power to overcome. We have a 
responsibility to stick with the poUcies 
that have worked or begun to work. 
None of the alternatives would ultimate- 
ly serve U.S. interests. Quick fixes, pull- 
ing back from the fray, or hoping for 
diplomatic miracles are not responsible 
options. And direct military action would 
be a sign of failure. But if we stand 
together, firmly, predictably, and 
realistically defending our principles and 
our friends, and do so in the steadfast 
manner the problems require, then we 
can prevail. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

'Central American Democracy, Peace, 
and Development Initiative, also known as 
the Jackson plan. ■ 



» I1 1985 



73 



END NOTES 



February 1985 



The following are some of the signifi- 
cant official U.S. foreign policy actions and 
statements during the month that are not 
reported elsewhere in this periodical. 

February 1 

President Reagan meets with Brazil's presi- 
dent-elect, Tancredo Neves. 

February 2 

A bomb explodes in an Athens bar near the 
U.S. air base at Hellenikon wounding 57 
Americans, mostly U.S. service personnel. 
Thirteen injured Americans are evacuated to 
U.S. military hospitals in West Germany. 

February 4-5 

New Zealand denies port access to the 
U.S.S. Buckanan because the U.S. will not 
say whether it carries nuclear armaments. 
The destroyer was scheduled to participate in 
the ANZUS alliance exercise Sea Eagle. On 
Feb. 5, the U.S. announces its withdrawal 
from the exercises; Australia, the host coun- 
try, cancels the exercise. 

February 4 

President Reagan meets with Chief 
Buthelezi, Chief-Minister of Kwazulu, to 
discuss the situation in South Africa. 

February 5 

U.S. and Soviet environmental scientists 
meet in Washington to sign a protocol calling 
for scientific cooperation in climate research. 

February 7 

Enrique Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforce- 
ment Administration official, is kidnapped in 
Guadalajara. 

U.S. and Laos agree to a joint excavation 
of the crash site of a C-130 aircraft shot 
down in Dec. 1972 over southern Laos. 

Vietnam offers to return to the U.S. 
what they believe to be the remains of five 
missing Americans. 

The U.S. abstains in a vote on a proposed 
$130 million industrial loan to Chile by the 
Inter-American Development Bank. 

February 8 

South Korean opposition figure Kim Dae 
Jung returns to Seoul accompanied by a U.S. 
delegation. Upon arrival, members of the 
U.S. delegation are roughed up by Korean 
security personnel and Mr. Kim is placed 
under house arrest. The U.S. makes a formal 
protest deploring the incident concerning the 
improper treatment of U.S. delegation 
members. 



February 10-22 

U.S. and Laos officials working on a joint ex- 
cavation of the C-130 aircraft crash site 
recover partial remains of bodies. The U.S. 
team returns with the remains for further 
identification on Feb. 22. 

February 11 

State Department announces the appoint- 
ment by Secretary Shultz of a reform obser- 
vation panel to assess and report on the 
UNESCO reform process and to encourage 
reform efforts that advance continuing U.S. 
interests. The 10-member panel will be head- 
ed by Leonard Marks, former director of 
USIA. 

February 13 

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin meets with 
Secretary Shultz at the State Department. 

The State Department issues its 1984 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 

LI.S. withdraws from the International 
Dairy Arrangement due to some members 
undercutting the arrangement's minimum 
prices for dairy exports. 

February 14-15 

Jeremy Levin, Beirut bureau chief for Cable 
News Network, escapes from his captors and 
is taken into custody by Syrian troops at a 
military checkpoint in Baalbek. Mr. Levin 
was kidnapped on Mar. 7, 1984, by a group 
calling itself the Islamic Jihad. 

On Feb. 15, Mr. Levin is taken to the 
U.S. Embassy in Damascus. He then flies to 
Frankfurt, West Germany, for a medical ex- 
amination and a reunion with his wife and 
family. 

February 15 

Spain expels two U.S. diplomats on charges 
of spying. 

February 16-20 

A.ssistant Secretary Motley travels to Chile 
to review the current state of L'.S. -Chilean 
relations and to convey U.S. views on a range 
of issues of mutual concern. On Feb. 18, he 
meets with President Pinochet to discuss the 
Reagan Administration's desire for a return 
to democracy in Chile. 

February 16 

U.S. cancels a second set of military exer- 
cises with New Zealand scheduled for Feb. 28 
near Hawaii. 

February 19-20 

U.S. and Soviet Union delegations meet in 
Vienna to discuss Middle East issues in- 
cluding Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, 
southern Lebanon, and Arab-Israeli relations. 
Assistant Secretary Murphy heads the U.S. 
delegation. 



February 20-22 

Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Filal 
meets with Secretary Shultz on Feb. 21 an 
President Reagan on Feb. 22 at the requesl] 
of King Hassan. 

February 20 

British Prime Minister Thatcher endorses 
President Reagan's Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative while addressing a joint meeting of 
Congress. 

February 21 

The South Korean Government, respondini 
to a U.S. diplomatic note of Feb. 8, expres 
regret over the airport incident in which 
Korean police used force against two U.S. 
Congressmen and other U.S. delegates. 

February 24-March 7 

Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz visits China 
(Feb. 24-28) to discuss bilateral relations 
with officials. Mr. Wolfowitz later visits In 
donesia (Feb. 28-Mar. 4) and Malaysia 
(Mar. 4-6) for similar talks with officials ol 
those countries. 

February 25 

Poland expels Colonel Frederick Myer (a 
military attache) and his wife for taking 
photographs in a restricted military zone. 1 
protest of reported mistreatment to the 
American couple while in custody, the I '.S 
expels Polish military attache Colonel 
Zygmunt Szymanski and postpones talks o 
science and technology agreement with 
Poland scheduled for Feb. 26-28. 

February 26 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Brown meets 
with New Zealand Prime Minister Lange ii 
Los Angeles. 

February 27 

State Department releases its Report on tl 
Situation in El Salvador for the period Det 
1, 1984-Jan. 31, 1985. 

February 28 March 3 

En route to Montevideo, Secretary Shultz 
stops in Guayaquil to meet with Ecuadorai 
President Febres-Cordero (Feb. 28). On M; 
1-2, Secretary Shultz heads the U.S. deleg 
tion to the inauguration of Julio Maria 
Sanguinette as President of Uruguay. The 
Secretary returns to Washington on 
Mar. 3. ■ 



74 



Department of State Bullet 



lEATIES 



rrent Actions 



.TILATERAL 

tion 

ention on international civil aviation. 
: at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. Protocol on 
uthentic trilinj^al text of the convention 
ternational civil aviation (TIAS 1591), 
annex. Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 
. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 

■rences deposited: Comoros, Jan. 14, 

ention on offenses and certain other acts 
nitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo 

14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 

TIAS 6768. 
ssions deposited: Haiti, Apr. 26, 1984; 
■u. May 17, 1984. 



national coffee agreement, 1983, with 
xes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
red into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
ssion deposited : Cuba, Feb. 19, 1985. 

eries 

national convention for the conservation 
.lantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro 
14, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 21, 
. TIAS 6767. 
ication deposited : Venezuela, Nov. 17, 

rences deposited : Sao Tome and 

:ipe, Sept. 15, 1983; Uruguay, Mar. 16, 



Lines 

national convention on load lines, 1966. 
at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into 
July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629. 

■ ssions deposited; Cameroon, May 14, 
Djibouti, Mar. 1, 1984. 

i torial application ; Extended by the 

•'.d Kingdom to the Isle of Man, Oct. 19, 



1 iiiments to the international convention 
:i(l lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at 

1 nn Oct. 12, 1971.' 
iii.Mic es deposited; Bulgaria, Nov. 2, 

; , Peru, June 7, 1984; United Arab 
1 ates, Mar. 15, 1984. 

1 idments to the international convention 
ad lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at 

Nov. 12, 1975.1 

I 'la nces deposited: Bulgaria, Nov. 2, 

; ; Peru, June 7, 1984; United Arab 

rates. Mar. 15, 1984. 

1 ndments to the international convention 
ail Imes, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at 

>l<iii Nov. 15, 1979.1 
ptances deposited: Brazil, Aug. 15, 
; Cyprus, Sept. 3, 1984; Peru, June 7, 
; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 15, 1984. 



Marine Pollution 

International convention on the establishment 
of an international fund for compensation for 
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 
1978.2 

Accessions deposited: Cameroon, May 14, 
1984; United Arab Emirates, Dec. 15, 1983. 
Territorial application ; Extended by the 
United Kingdom to Anguilla, Sept. 1, 1984. 

International convention on civil liability for 
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 
Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 
1975." 

Accessions deposited: Cameroon, May 14, 
1984; United Arab Emirates, Dec. 15, 1983. 
Territorial application : Extended by the 
United Kingdom to Anguilla Sept. 1, 1984. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 
1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983. 
Ratification deposited ; Spain, July 6, 
1984.3 

Accessions deposited: Belgium, Mar. 6, 
1984;^-' Bulgaria, Dec. 12. 1984;-'-'' 
Czechoslovakia, July 2, 1984; German Dem. 
Rep., Apr. 25, 1984; Hungary, Jan. 14, 1985; 
Korea, Rep. of, July 23, 1984;3 Oman, Mar. 
13, 1984;= South Africa, Nov. 28, 1984.^ 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the international Maritime 

Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6. 1948. 

Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 

4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Brunei, Dec. 31, 1984. 

International convention on standards of 
training, certification, and watchkeeping for 
seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 
1978. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.-' 
Ratifications deposited: Australia, Nov. 7, 
1983; Finland, Jan. 27, 1984; Ireland, Sept. 
11, 1984. 
Approval deposited: Yugoslavia, Nov. 5, 

1984. 

Accessions deposited: Bahamas, June 7, 1983; 
Brazil, Jan. 17, 1984; India, Nov. 16, 1984; 
Libya, Aug. 10, 1983; Nigeria, Nov. 13, 1984; 
Philippines, Feb. 22, 1984; South Africa. 
July 27, 1983; United Arab Emirates, 
Dec. 15, 1983. 

Red Cross 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct 21, 1950; for 
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362. 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship- 
wrecked members of armed forces at sea. 
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 
1956. TIAS 3363. 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment 
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for 
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364. 



Geneva convention relative to the protection 

of civilian persons in time of war. Done at 

Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force 

Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. 

TIAS 3365. 

Accessions deposited: Seychelles, Nov. 8, 

1984. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of international armed conflicts (Pro- 
tocol 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 
8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.^ 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of noninternational armed conflicts (Pro- 
tocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.= 
Accession s deposited: Kuwait, Jan. 17, 1985; 
Rwanda, Nov. 19, 1984; Seychelles, Nov. 8, 
1984. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life 
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 
1980. TIAS 9700. 

Ratification deposited : Poland, Mar. 15, 1984. 
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, May 15, 
1984; Djibouti, Mar. 1, 1984; Thailand, Dec. 
18, 1984. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. 
Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009. 
Ratification deposited; Poland, Mar. 15, 
1984. 

Accessions deposited; Barbados, May 29, 
1984; Nigeria, Nov. 13, 1984; Singapore, 
June 1, 1984. 

Satellite Communications System 

Convention on the international maritime 
satellite organization (INMARSAT), with an- 
nex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered 
into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 

Operating agreement on the international 
maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), 
with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. 
Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
Accessions deposited; Gabon, Dec. 28, 
1984; Iran, Oct. 12, 1984. 

Seals 

1984 protocol amending the interim conven- 
tion of Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and extend- 
ed, on conservation of North Pacific fur seals 
(TIAS 3948, 5558, 8368, 10020), with state- 
ment.' 

Acceptance deposited; U.S.S.R., Jan 15, 
1985. 

Slavery 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of 
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and 
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva 
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 10, 
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Feb. 5, 
1985. 



11985 



75 



TREATIES 



Sugar 

International sugar agreement, with annexes. 
Done at Geneva July 5, 1984. Entered into 
force provisionally Jan. 1, 1985. 
Notification of provisional application: Ivory 

Coast, Jan. 22, 1985. 

Ratifications deposited: Korea, Rep. of. 

Feb. 14, 1985; South Africa, Feb. 13, 1985. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at 
London June 23, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 10, 1983. 
TIAS 10490. 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, Aug. 19, 1983. 

Accession s deposited: Malaysia, Apr. 24, 
1984; Nigeria, Nov. 13, 1984; Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Oct. 28, 1983; United 
Arab Emirates, Dee. 15, 1983. 
Territorial application: Extended by the 
United Kingdom to the Isle of Man, Oct. 19, 
1984. 

Trade— Textiles 

Arrangement regarding international trade in 
textiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Dec. 20, 1973. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1974. TIAS 7840. 

Protocol extending arrangement regarding 
international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 
1973. Done at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1982. TIAS 10323. 
Acceptances deposited: Panama, Jan. 15, 
1985. 

Wheat 

1983 protocol for the further extension of the 

wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 

Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 

into force July 1, 1983. 

Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, Feb. 6, 

1985. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 

discrimination against women. Adopted at 

New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 

Sept. 3, 1981.' 

Signature: MaH, Feb. 5, 1985. 

Ratification deposited: Senegal, Feb. 5, 

1985 

BILATERALS 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 8, 1982 (TIAS 10483) for the sale of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Dhaka Dec. 20, 1984. 
Entered into force Dec. 20, 1984. 

Bolivia 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at La Paz Feb. 4, 1985. Entered 
into force Feb. 4, 1985. 



Brazil 

Master data exchange arrangement for the 
mutual development of military equipment. 
Signed at Washington Nov. 14, 1984. 
Entered into force Nov. 14, 1984. 

Memorandum of understanding regarding the 
exchange of scientists and engineers. Signed 
at Washington Nov. 14, 1984. Entered into 
force Nov. 14, 1984, 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of .July 19, 1983 (TIAS 10756), on 
cooperation in the field of control of illicit 
traffic of drugs. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Brasilia Oct. 4 and Dec. 3, 1984. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1984. 

Agreements amending the agreement of 
Mar. 31, 1982, as amended (TIAS 10369), 
relating to trade in cotton and man-made 
fiber textiles and textile products. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Washington Dec. 
21. 1984, and .Jan. 8, 1985, and .Jan. 31 and 
Feb. 5, 1985. Entered into force Jan. 8 and 
Feb. 5, 1985. 

Canada 

Agreement regarding mutual assistance and 
cooperation between customs administrations. 
Signed at Quebec June 20, 1984. 
Entered into force: Jan. 8, 1985. 

Treaty concerning Pacific salmon, with an- 
nexes and memorandum of understanding. 
Signed at Ottawa Jan. 28, 1985. Enters into 
force upon exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 

Denmark 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on estates. Signed at 
Washington Apr. 27, 1983. 
Entered into force : Nov. 7, 1984. 

Agreement concerning Faroese fishing in 
fisheries off the coasts of the United States, 
with annex and agreed minute. Signed at 
Washington June 11, 1984. 
Entered into force : Nov. 20, 1984. 

Egypt 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855), for the sale of 
agricultural commodities, with agreed 
minutes. Signed at Cairo Dec. 16, 1984. 
Entered into force : Dec. 16, 1984. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Jan. 22, 1981, as amended, for the sale of 
agricultural commodities. Signed at San 
Salvador Nov. 1, 1984. Entered into force 
Dee. 13, 1984. 

European Economic Community 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts 
of the United States, with annex and agreed 
minute. Signed at Washington Oct. 1, 1984. 
Entered into force: Nov. 14, 1984. 



Finland ^t 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Washington 
Nov. 19. 1984. Entered into force Feb. 7, ^i 
1985. 

German, Federal Republic of 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperative project of research in the field 
powder metallurgy' of titanium alloys. Signe 
at Washington Jan. 8, 1985. Entered into 
force Jan. 8, 1985. 

Hungary 

Agreement amending agreement of Feb. 15 
and 25, 1983, as amended, (TIAS 10666) 
relating to trade in wool textile products. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Budapest 
Jan. 18 and Feb. 6, 1985. Entered into fore 
Feb. 6, 1985. 

Iceland 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coa; 

of the United States, with annex and agree 

minute. Signed at Washington Sept. 21, 

1984. 

Entered into force: Nov. 16, 1984. 

Israel 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 18 and 22, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
5097, 6240), relating to financing certain 
educational exchange programs. Effected b 
exchange of notes at Jerusalem Jan. 10 and 
30, 1985. Entered into force Jan. 30, 1985. 

Jamaica 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Apr. 30, 1982 (TIAS 10495), for the sale of 
agricultural commodities. Signed at Kingstc 
Dec. 17, 1984. Entered into force Dec. 17, 
1984. 

Japan 

Agreement relating to space shuttle con- 
tingency landing sites. Effected by exchang 
of notes at Tokyo Jan. 24, 1985. Entered ir 
force Jan. 24, 1985. 

Mozambique 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Maputo Jan. 11, 1985. 
Entered into force Jan. 11, 1985. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 11, 1985, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities. Effected by exchange of lette- 
at Maputo Jan. 17 and 18, 1985. Entered ii 
force Jan. 18, 1985. 

Panama 

Grant agreement for the financial stabiliza- 
tion and economic recovery program. Signei 
at Panama City Dec. 24, 1984. Entered inti 
force Dec. 24,"l984. 

Romania 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Dec. 4, 1973, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 7901, 9431, 10703), relating to civil : 
transport. Effected by exchange of notes al 
Bucharest Jan. 25 anii 30, 1985. Entered inl: 
force Jan. 30, 1985. I 



76 



Department of State Bullelii 



PRESS RELEASES 



adi Arabia 

l.iiiiMniium lit' understanding for the ex- 
iji I'f international express mail, with 
.'f implementation. Signed at 
iL;ton Nov. 2. 1984. Entered into force 
, 1985. 



flmgement for the exchange of technical 
flrmation and cooperation in nuclear safety 

Sters, with patent addendum. Signed at 
rid Sept. 28, 1984. Entered into force 
i. 28, 1984. 



■ment regarding the consolidation and 
Iheduling of certain debts owed to, 
■anteed by. or insured by the U.S. 
ernment and its agencies, with annexes, 
led at Khartoum Dec. 22, 1984. Entered 
force Jan. 25. 1985. 

iden 

Imgement for the exchange of technical 
lij'-mation and cooperation in nuclear safety 
rcers, with patent addendum. Signed at 
b kholm Jan. 24, 1985. Entered into force 
24, 1985. 

;ed Kingdom 

eement extending memorandum of 
;rstanding of Sept. 24, 1975 (TIAS 9033), 
;ing to the principles governing coopera- 
in research and development, production, 
iprocurement of defense equipment. 
led at Washington Dec. 21, 1984. Entered 
force Dec. 21, 1984. 

eement amending the agreement of 
23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8641, 8965, 
;, 10059), concerning air services, with 
osures. Effected by exchange of notes at 
[hington Feb. 20, 1985. Entered into 
fe Feb. 20. 1985; effective Nov. 9, 1982. 

ioslavia 

I eement amending agreement of Oct. 26 
! 27, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9447), con- 
! ing trade in men's and boys' wool and 
I made fiber suits. Effected by exchange 
i 3tes at Belgrade Jan. 8 and Feb. 7, 1985. 
lered into force Feb. 7, 1985. 



'Not in force. 

'Not in force for the U.S. 

'Not a party to Optional Annexes III, IV, 

'With declaration. 
'With reservation. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

"13 2/4 Program for the official 

working visit of Australian 
Prime Minister Robert J.L. 
Hawke, Feb. 5-7. 
14 2/4 Shultz: address before the 

American Society for In- 
dustrial Security. Arling- 
ton, Va. 

*14A 2/5 Shultz: question-and-answer 

session following address 
before the American Socie- 
ty for Industrial Security. 

*15 2/11 Program for the state 

visit of His Majesty King 
Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al- 
Saud, Feb. 10-15. 

•16 2/16 Shultz: remarks on NBC- 
TV's "Today Show," Feb. 
11. 

*17 2/11 State Department Advisory 
Group on Food, Hunger, 
and Agriculture meets, 
Feb. b. 

*18 2/11 Appointment of reform 
observation panel for 
UNESCO. 

19 2/12 Shultz: remarks at a 

luncheon in honor of Saudi 
King Fahd, Feb. 11. 

20 2/14 Summary of the interna- 

tional narcotics control 
strategy report for 1985. 

"21 2/14 Shultz: interview on Voice of 
America's "Press Con- 
ference, USA," Feb. 13. 

"22 2/15 Program for the official 
working visit of British 
Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher. Feb. 19-21. 
23 2/19 Shultz: statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 

"24 2/19 Shultz: statement before the 
Senate Budget Committee. 

"25 2/19 Dam: remarks welcoming 
Jeremy Levin. Feb. 18. 

26 2/20 Shultz: Australia reaffirms 

support for ANZUS 
alliance. 

27 2/21 Shultz: address before the 

the U.S. National Commit- 
tee for Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, San Fran- 
cisco. 

28 2/22 American Foreign Policy: 

Current DoeumenU. 1981. 
supplement released. 

29 2/22 Shultz: address before the 

Commonwealth Club of 
California, San Francisco. 
29A 2/25 Shultz: question-and-answer 
session following address 
before Commonwealth 
Club. Feb. 22. 



30 



•31 



32 



2/26 



2/26 



2/27 



Shultz: statement before 
the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. 

President submits Compact 
of Free Association to the 
Congress for approval. 

Shultz: statement before the 
Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Operations of the 
House Foreign Affairs 
Committi'e. 



•Not printed in the Bullhtin. 



USUN 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York, N.Y. 10017. 

.Subject 

Kirkpatrick: Kampuchea. 
General Assembly. 

Emery: chemical weapons. 
Committee I. 

Fleming: Population 

Conference. Committee II. 

Di Martino: African relief, 
special meeting on Africa. 

Sorzano: death of Prime 
Minister Gandhi, General 
Assembly. 

Clark: reply to the Soviet 
Union, General Assembly. 

Reynolds: women. Com- 
mittee III. 

Nygard: personnel questions. 
Committee V. 

Schifter: UNRWA, Special 
Political Committee. 

Kirkpatrick: Africa, General 
Assembly. 

Fleming: economic and dis- 
aster relief assistance in 
Africa, Committee II. 

Keyes: development, 

pledging conference for 
development. 

Jones: Nicaragua, Com- 
mittee III. 

Keyes: request for a 
separate vote on a 
paragraph of a draft 
resolution. General 
Assembly. 

Blocker: information. Special 
Political Committee. 

Feldman: U.S. terrorises. 
Committee IV. 

Keyes: cooperation between 
the UN and Arab League, 
General Assembly. 

Emery: prevention of war in 
nuclear age. Committee I. 

Schifter: Grenada, Security 
Council. 

Feldman: role of specialized 
agencies in self-determin- 
ation. Committee IV. 



No. 


Dale 


106 


10/30 


107 


10/31 


108 


10/31 


109 


10/31 


110 


10/31 


111 


10/31 


112 


1 1/2 


113 


1 1/6 


114 


11/6 


115 


1 1/6 


116 


11/6 



'117 11/7 



•118 
'119 



1 1/7 
11/8 



•120 


11/8 


"121 


11/8 


♦122 


1 1/8 


•123 


1 1/8 


•124 


1 1/9 


•125 


11/12 



111985 



77 



PUBLICATIONS 



•126 


11/12 


•127 


11/12 


•128 


11/12 


•129 


11/13 


•130 


11/13 


131 


11/14 


132 


11/15 


•133 


11/15 


•134 


11/16 


•135 


11/16 


•136 


11/16 


♦137 


11/19 


♦138 


11/19 



•139 11/20 



Clark: UNRWA, Special 

Political Committee. 
Emery: chemical weapons, 

Committee 1. 
Blocker: Nicaragua, Special 

Political Committee. 
Ray: UNHCR report. Com- 
mittee III. 
Goodman: living conditions of 
the Palestinian people. 
Committee II. 
Kirkpatrick: Afghanistan, 

General Assembly. 
Thomas: narcotics, Com- 
mittee III. 
Keyes: personnel. Com- 
mittee V. 
Quintanilla: Israeli aggres- 
sion against the Iraqi 
nuclear installations, 
General Assembly. 
Herzberg: refugees, Com- 
mittee III. 
Herzberg: refugees. Ad Hoc 
Committee for Voluntary 
Contributions to UNHCR. 
Kuttner: UN pension system, 

Committee V. 
Clark: U.S. pledge to 
UNRWA, Ad Hoc Commit- 
tee on Voluntary Contribu- 
tions to UNRWA. 
Ray: development and inter- 
national economic coopera- 
tion. Committee II. 
Schifter: torture, Com- 
mittee III. 
Keyes: apartheid. General 

Assembly. 
Fleming: operational ac- 
tivities for development. 
Committee II. 
Lowitz: comprehensive 
nuclear test ban treaty. 
Committee I. 
Schifter: religious intoler- 
ance. Committee III. 
Feldman: Khmer relief, 

donors' meeting. 
President Reagan's state- 
ment on the 25th anniver- 
sary of the Antarctic Trea- 
ty, Nov. 26. 
Sorzano: outer space, Special 

Political Committee. 
Jones: women and refugees. 

Committee III. 
Flesher: Joint Inspection 

Unit, Committee V. 
Jones: narcotics, Com- 
mittee III. 
Lowell: outer space. Special 
Political Committee, 
Nov. 27. 
Schifter: investigation of 
Israeli practices. Special 
Political Committee. 
Sorzano: Antarctica, Com- 
mittee I. 



•Not printed in the Bulletin. I 



140 


11/21 


141 


11/21 


142 


11/26 



'143 11/26 



•144 


11/27 


♦145 


11/28 


♦146 


11/28 


•147 


11/28 


•148 


11/28 


•149 


11/29 


•150 


11/29 


♦151 


11/29 


♦152 


11/29 


•153 


11/29 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Secretary Shultz 

America and the Struggle for Freedom, 
Commonwealth Club of California, San 
Francisco, Feb. 22, 1985 (Current Policy 
#659). 

Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Basin, 
Asia Foundation, San Francisco, Feb. 21, 
1985 (Current Policy #658). 

Foreign Assistance Request for FY 1986, 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 19, 
1985 (Current Policy #656). 

U.S. Government and Business: Our Common 
Defense Against Terrorism, American 
Society for Industrial Security, Arlington, 
Va., Feb. 4, 1985 (Current Policy #654). 

The Future of American Foreign Policy: 
New Realities and New Ways of Thinking, 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Jan. 31, 1985 (Current Policy #650). 

Africa 

U.S. Response to Africa's Food Needs (GIST, 

Feb. 1985). 
Southern Africa: Constructive Engagement 

(GIST, Feb. 1985). 

Arms Control 

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control 
Agreements, President's message to the 
Congress and unclassified report, Feb. 1, 
1985 (Special Report #122). 

On the Road to a More Stable Peace, 
Ambassador Nitze, World Affairs Council, 
Philadelphia, Feb. 20, 1985 (Current Policy 
#657). 

Strength and Diplomacy: Toward a New 
Consensus?," Under Secretary Armacost, 
World Affairs Council, Boston, Jan. 25, 
1985 (Current Policy #652). 

Geneva Arms Control Meeting (GIST, Feb. 
1985). 

East Asia 

The Asia-Pacific Region: A Forward Look, 
Under Secretary Armacost, Far East- 
America Council/Asia Society, New York 
City, Jan. 29, 1985 (Current Policy #653). 

Economics 

U.S. Shipping Policy (GIST, Feb. 1985). 
Generalized System of Preferences 

(GIST, Feb. 1985). 
International Investment Policy (GIST, Feb. 

1985). 

Human Rights 

1984 Human Rights Report, introduction 
excerpted from "Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1984," Feb. 
1985 (Special Report #121). 



Middle East 

Recent Developments in the Middle East, 
Assistant Secretary Murphy, Subcommit 
on Europe and the Middle East, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Jan. 30, 19? 
(Current Policy #651). 

United Nations 

U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO (GIST, 
1985). 

Western Hemisphere 

The Need for Continuity in U.S. -Latin 
American Policy, Assistant Secretary 
Motley, House Foreign Affairs Committi 
Jan. 29, 1985 (Current Policy #655). 

El Salvador's Land Reform (GIST, Feb. 
1985). ■ 

Background Notes 



iiii 



II 



f 



This series provides brief, factual summari 
of the people, history, government, econon 
and foreign relations of about 170 countrie 
(excluding the LTnited States) and of select 
international organizations. Recent revisio 
are: 

Bahamas (Dec. 1984) 

Benin (Nov. 1984) 

Economic Communities (Nov. 1984) 

German Democratic Republic (Nov. 1984) 

Guatemala (Sept. 1984) 

Guyana (Jan. 1985) 

Iraq (Dec. 1984) 

Jamaica (Oct. 1984) 

Netherlands (Nov. 1984) 

Niger (Dec. 1984) 

Qatar (Jan. 1985) 

Switzerland (Jan. 1985) 

Turkey (Dec. 1984) 

A free single copy of one of the above 
(and an inde,x of the entire series) may be 
tained from the Correspondence Managem^ 
Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart 
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

For about 60 Background Notes a year 
subscription is available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents. U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, 1 
$32.00 (domestic) and $40.00 (foreign). Ch( 
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Superintendent of Documents, must accom 
pany order. ■ 



78 



Department of State Bullet 



)EX 



:il 1985 
:ume 85, No. 



2097 



inistan. America and the Struggle for 
•eedom (Shultz) 1(5 



1 

iea 



.,„ and the Struggle for Freedom 

liultz) 1^ 

ri'it Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 

broad, 1982-84 (Duncan) 65 

ican Principles , , -r, , 

iea aii.i the Struggle for Freedom 

hultz) Ih 

of the Union Address (excerpt) 9 

gth and Diplomacy; Toward A New 
onsensus? (Armacost) 48 

Control ^ ^ ^ 

nuing the Acquisition of the Peace- 

eper Missile (message to the Congress, 
<ecutive summary) 57 

Importance of the MX Peacekeeper 

issile (Shultz) 23 

R Talks Resume in Vienna (Reagan) . .28 
e Road to a More Stable Peace (Nitze) . 27 
dent's News Conference of February 21 

■xcerpts) ••••■■ :-"^ 

tion-and-Answer Session Following 
ommonwealth Club Address (Shultz) .21 
rt on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 
ontrol Agreements (message to the Con- 

ress, text of unclassified report) 29 

of tiie Union Address (excerpt) 9 

gth and Diplomacy. Toward A New 
onsensus? (Armacost) 48 

ralia . .XT-yTTC 

-alia Reaffirms Support for ANZUb 

lliance (Shultz) \-,:;- ;,■ '^ 

acific: Region of Promise and Challenge 

vVolfowitz) ;, ■ ■ P 

of Australian Prime Minister Hawk 

iawke. Reagan) ■ • 

oodia. America and the Struggle 

reedoni (Shultz) 

e. Question-and-Answer 
ollowing Commonwealth Club 

5hultz) ■ 

la. The Asia-Pacific Region; A 



60 

for 

.16 

Session 

Address 

21 

Forward 



jook (Armacost) 34 

ess 
_. Pornography; A Worldwide Problem 

A.brams) ;•,■ ■ ri ' ' i ' ' '^'^ 

inuing the Acquisition of the Peacekeeper 
dissile (message to the Congress, ex_ 
cutive summary) 57 

Importance of the MX Peacekeeper 

iVlissile (Shultz) 23 

.ibia (Crocker) .•••;,• ^- ' t' ".'^ 

Need for Continuity in U.S. Latin 

American Policy (Motley) 6 ' 

„ Human Rights Report (excerpts) . . . _. 52 
snt Developments in the Middle East 

Murphy) \W- u k 

jrt on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 
::ontrol Agreements (message to the Con- 

,^ess, text of unclassified reports) 29 

leof the Union Address (excerpt) .9 

pmary of the International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report for 1985 59 

Asia-Pacific Region; A Forward Look 

(Armacost) ■ ■ ■.•■ ■ ■ ■ • . 

nomic Cooperation in the Pacific Basin 

(Shultz) 1'^ 

inomics , „ .j- o • 

>nomic Cooperation in the Pacific Basin 

(Shultz) .■ -^-o" t'^ 

■ Need for Continuity in U.S. Latin 
American Policy (Motley) 67 



Protectionism: A Threat to Our Prosperity 

(Wallis) 41 

State of the Union Address (excerpt) 9 

Europe 

Child Pornography: A Worldwide Problem 

(Abrams) 55 

4()th Anniversary of the Yalta Conference 

(Reagan) 46 

MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna (Reagan) . .28 
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 

Abroad. 1982-84 (Duncan) 65 

Greece. The United States and Greece 

(Ha;is) 44 

Human Rights 

Child Pornography: A Worldwide Problem 

(Abrams) "^■^ 

1984 Human Rights Report (excerpts) 52 

Soviet Crackdown on Jewish Cultural 
Activists (Department of State report) .47 

Japan 

The Asia-Pacific Region; A Forward Look 

(Armacost) 34 

Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Basin 

(Shultz) 13 

President's News Conference of February 21 

(excerpts) 16 

Middle East 

President's News Conference of February 21 

(excerpts) ■■■■■■ :^^ 

Question-and-Answer Session Following 

Commonwealth Club Address (Shultz) .21 

Recent Developments in the Middle East 

(Murphy) ^"^ 

Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 

Abroad, 1982-84 (Duncan) 65 

Military Affairs 

Continuing the Acquisition of the Peace- 
keeper Missile (message to the Congress, 

executive summary) 57 

The Importance of the MX Peacekeeper 

Missile (Shultz) • ■ 23 

Monetary Affairs. President's News Con- 
ference of February 21 (excerpts) 10 

Namibia. Namibia (Crocker) 25 On 

Narcotics 

The Need for Continuity in U.S. Latin 

American Policy (Motley) 67 

Summary of the International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report for 1985 59 

New Zealand. The Pacific; Region of Prom- 
ise and Challenge (Wolfowitz) 37 

Nicaragua 

America and the Struggle lor 

(Shultz) 

Nicaragua (Reagan) • • • 

President's News Conference of February 21 

(excerpts) • ■ ■ ■. ■•■■•: ^"^ 

Question-and-Answer Session Following 
Commonwealth Club Address (Shultz) .21 

The Asia-Pacific Region; A Forward Look 

(Armacost) ; ' ' v; ' -r' ' 'n ' ■ 

Economic Cooperation in the Pacific 

(Shultz) 

Philippines 

The Asia-Pacific Region; 

(Armacost) , ^, „ 

The Pacific; Region of Promise and Challenge 

(Wolfowitz) .■•■ -•■••■;3'^ 

Question-and-Answer Session Following 

Commonwealth Club Address (Shultz) .21 

Presidential Documents ^ , „ , 

Continuing the Acquisition of the Peacekeeper 

Missile (message to the Congress, ex_ 

ecutive summary) ;•••••, .i 

40th Anniversary oi the Yalta Conference . 46 

MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna 28 

Nicaragua • ■ ■ V ^\f\ 

News Conference of February 21 (excerpts) 10 
Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 
Control Agreements (message to the Con- 
gress, text of unclassified report) 



Freedom 

16 

10 



A Forward 



Basin 
. ..13 

Look 
...34 



State of the Union Address (excerpt) 9 

Visit of Australian Prime Minister Hawke 
(Hawke, Reagan) 60 

Visit of Saudi King (King Fahd, Reagan. 
Shultz. joint communiciu) • 

Publications 

Background Notes 78 

Department of State ■, '° 

Saudi Arabia. Visit of Saudi King (King 
Fahd, Reagan. Shultz. joint commu- 
nique) •.•••;•• A' ■ ■ 

Science & Technology. Protecting the Ozone 
Layer (Benedick) .63 

South "Africa. Question-and-Answer Session 
Following Commonwealth Club Address 
(Shultz) 21 

Terrorism 

The Need for Continuity in U.S. Latin 
American Policy (Motley) \- ■■ ■„;^'' 

Strength and Diplomacy: Toward A New 
Consensus? (Armacost) 48 

Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 
Abroad. 1982-84 (Duncan) 65 

Trade ^ , t i 

The Asia-Pacific Region: A Forward Look 

(Armacost) ■■■,;• '. ;.■ ' 'd ' '^^ 

Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Basin 

(Shultz) • ■ .13 

Protectionism; A Threat to Our Prosperity 

(WalHs) 41 

Treaties 

Current Actions ■ • ■ • • ■ ■ ■ '•' 

Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 
Control Agreements (message to the Con- 
gress, text of unclassified report) 29 

United Nations. Protecting the Ozone Layer 
(Benedick) °3 

TT c C R 

America' and the Struggle for Freedom 

(Shultz) -^ ■••;••• ■''' 

The Importance of the MX Peacekeeper 

Missile (Shultz) • •••23 

MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna (Reagan) . .2» 
the Road to a More Stable Peace 

(Nitze) ^"^ 

President's News Conference of February 21 

(excerpts) „■■.•■ 'W \; ' "■ 

Question-and-Answer Session Following 
Commonwealth Club Address (Shultz) .21 

Recent Developments in the Middle East 
(Murphy) ■ ■ • ■ • \- 

Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 
Control Agreements (message to the Con- 
gress, text of unclassified report) 29 

Soviet Crackdown on Jewish Cultural Activists 
(Department of State report) 47 

Western Hemisphere 

The Need for Continuity in U.S. Latin 
American Policy (Motley) \- : ■ ^i^'^ 

Strength and Diplomacy: Toward A New 
Consensus? (Armacost) • ■ ■ 48 

Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 
Abroad. 1982-84 (Duncan) 65 



Name Index 

Abrams. Elliott •■•5^ 

Armacost. Michael H ' co 

Benedick. Richard Elliot "^ 

Crocker, Chester A j2 

Duncan, Evan ;;„■•,■ V 

King Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud .1 

Haas, Richard N 44 

Hawke, Robert J. L 60 

Motley, Langhome A 6 / 

Murphy, Richard W g" 

Nitze Paul H ^ ' 

Reagan, President.. 1,9, 10, 28 29,46,57,60 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 13, 16. 21. 16. b^ 

Wallis, W. Allen 41 

Wolfowitz, Paul D "^ ' 



.29 



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!:> 



Depnrttnvnt 



buUetBn 



'he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 85 / Number 2098 



May 1985 




Df*partmf*ni of Si ate 

bulletin 



Volume 85 / Number 2098 / May 1985 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

ROBERT M. SMALLEY 

Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
pubhcation of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.' 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 



CONTENTS 



The President 

1 Visit to Canada (Brian 

Mulroney, President Reagan, 
Dedarations. Joint Statement) 

9 News Conference of March 21 
(Excerpts) 

12 MX Missile 

The Vice President 

13 Visit to Africa 
18 Visit to Moscow 

20 Visit to Grenada, Brazil, and 

Honduras 
22 Nicaragua: A Threat to 

Democracy 



The Secretary 

24 Arms Control: Objectives and 

Prospects 
28 Science and American Foreign 

Policy: The Spirit of Progress 
32 News Conference of March 15 
36 Interview on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" 
38 News Briefing for Regional 

Media 
41 Assistance Request for FY 1986 

Africa 

49 FY 1986 Assistance Requests for 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
(Frank Wisner) 



Arms Control 



55 



57 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations on 
Nuclear and Space Arms 
(Robert C. McFarla.ne. 
President Reagan) 

The Objectives of Arms Control 
(Paul H. Nitze) 



East Asia 

63 FY 1986 Assistance Requests for 
East Asia and the Pacific 
(Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

Europe 



71 



74 



FY 1986 Assistance Requests for 
Europe (Richard R. Burt) 

Death of Soviet President 
Chernenko (President Reagan, 
"White Hoiise Statement) 



Middle East 

75 FY 1986 Assistance Requests for 
the Middle East and South Asia 
(Richard W. Murphy) 

Western Hemisphere 

81 FY 1986 Assistance Requests for 
Latin America and the Carib- 
bean (Langhome A. Motley) 

End Notes 

90 March 1985 

Treaties 

90 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 

93 USUN 

Publications 

94 Department of State 

Index 



''*''=''^i^OFOOCUt«tNTS^ 



^UN 111985 



f 



I 




President Reagan reviews the troops in Quebec City. 



(White House photd by Bill Fitz-Patrick) 



HE PRESIDENT 



President's Visit to Canada 



President Reagan ynet with Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney in Quebec City March 17-18, 1985. Following are 
•emarks the President made before and during his visit and the 
texts of two declarations and one joint statement. ^ 



RESIDENT'S RESPONSES TO 
(UESTIONS SUBMITTED BY 
lAcLEANS MAGAZINE, 
lAR. 6. 19852 

Q. Canadians long have suffered 
^ rom a national inferiority complex in 
egard to our great neighbor to the 
outh. How do you think of Canada, 
nd what do you see as Canada's im- 
ortance to the United States? 

A. No other country in the world is 
lore important to the United States 
han Canada, and we are blessed to have 
uch a nation on our northern border. 
Canada is a friend, a neighbor, and a 
rusted ally. We may have a larger 
opulation and a larger GNP, but we're 
Iso dependent on you. Canada con- 
umes a fifth of our exports, and that's 
lore than any other nation. You use 
lore of our capital than other nations, 
nd, of course, our mutual security in- 
?rests are closely intertwined. It's up to 
oth of us to make this partnership con- 
inue to work in both our interests. 

Q. How do you see Canada's 
■ole — as a smaller power — in interna- 
ional affairs? For instance, External 
iffairs Minister Joe Clark will be in 
loscow next month as arms control 
egotiations resume in Geneva. Is 
here a part we can play in conjunc- 
ion with that or with the Contadora 
Tocess in Central America? 

A. Canada has played a significant 
(lie in international affairs ever since 
V<irld War II, a role which has reflected 
he talents of Canadian statesmen and 
he democratic values of its peoples. It 
as been an activist in the United Na- 
iniis— indeed, Canadians were amongst 
he founders in San Francisco 40 years 
ii'i — and has shown time and time 
-fi-.nn that it is prepared to back up its 
iiiivictions on peaceful settlement of 
lisputes with courageous participation in 
leacekeeping operations in such 



hotspots as Cyprus and the Middle East. 
But I also note that your Prime Minister 
recently quoted Dante to the effect that 
the "hottest place in hell is reserved for 
those who in times of moral crisis strive 
to maintain their neutrality." Canadians 
are not neutral — they believe in 
democracy and work hard to protect it. 
To get down to specifics, I am con- 
vinced that the unity and solid support 
of Western leaders on arms control were 
the principal factors that brought the 
Soviets back to the negotiating table. 
Prime Minister Mulroney has been very 
helpful, and we feel certain that Mr. 
Clark will convey to the Soviet leaders 
our continuing resolve to achieve signifi- 
cant, verifiable, and equitable arms 
reductions. With regard to the Con- 
tadora process, we value Canadian 
assistance, and I would note that Cana- 
dian suggestions on the verification 
process have been most helpful. 

Q. What do you see as Canada's 
role in defense? How did you feel 
when the new government had to cut 
$154 million from military spending, 
for example, contrary to what they 
had promised during the election cam- 
paign? Is Canada doing its fair share 
in NATO, and will you be pressuring 
us to do more? 

A. When Prime Minister Mulroney 
was here last September, he expressed 
his personal commitment to enhancing 
Canada's role in the Atlantic alliance and 
to carry its full share of the allied 
defense burden. But he and I recognized 
then and now that domestic political 
pressures affect outcomes. I believe 
Brian Mulroney shares my conviction 
that there is no reasonable alternative 
but to work to protect freedom and 
democracy. 

I understand Canada is now 
conducting a major review of its defense 
policy, and I believe that the review will 
conclude that the only meaningful 



defense question facing both our nations 
is how to meet the challenge now liefore 
us. And that challenge has nothing to do 
with pressure from Canada's allies but 
rather how best to defend freedom and 
democracy. 

Q. In recent weeks, there has been 
an uproar over the news that con- 
tingency plans exist to deploy nuclear 
weapons — specifically B 57 nuclear 
depth charges — in Canada in case of 
an emergency. In your view, is Canada 
bound to accept these weapons, 
especially when the government never 
was notified of such plans? And what 
sort of emergency would prompt such 
a deployment? 

A. I know that stories have recently 
appeared concerning wartime contingen- 
cy plans. There have also been allega- 
tions that America is pressuring its 
allies to accept nuclear weapons. I have 
two comments to make on these reports. 
First, over the years NATO has worked 
out various defense plans designed to 
strengthen deterrence, but under these 
plans any deployments would be carried 
out only — let me repeat only — with the 
prior agreement of the states involved. 

Second, it is contrary to the interest 
of the alliance and to the individual 
member states to talk publicly about 
confidential contigency planning. Such 
discussion would not serve our shared 
security interests. 

Q. If Canada suddenly balked at 
going along with such contingency 
plans — or refused to allow the further 
testing of cruise missiles or barred an 
American battleship from our ports as 
New Zealand recently did — would the 
United States respond in the same 
way that it did to New Zealand, that 
is, threatening a broad range of 
countermeasures including economic 
sanctions? 

A. Let me start by stressing the 
U.S. defense cooperation with our allies 
begins with a common understanding of 
our shared security interests and a 
determination to protect those interests 
against any threat. Each of us entered 
into our alliances — whether ANZUS 
[Australia, New Zealand, United States 
security treaty] or NATO or NORAD 
[North American Aerospace Defense 
Command] — as fully sovereign nations, 
not because we were pressured to do so. 

Let me point out that we are not 
taking economic sanctions against New 
Zealand. Rather, we are reviewing our 
cooperation in security matters in light 
of New Zealand's decision to reduce 
cooperation with us in the ANZUS 
alliance. 



May 1985 



THE PRESIDENT 



Our longstanding and excellent 
defense cooperation with Canada is 
grounded in our partnership in NORAD 
and our joint membership in NATO. 
Clearly, we share common objectives: 
for example, Canada's cooperation in the 
testing of cruise missiles, which we 
greatly value and appreciate, was, I am 
sure, a recognition by the Canadian 
Government that this missile plays an 
important role in NATO's deterrent 
posture and is directly related to 
Canada's own security. 

Q. The Canadian Government has 
said it supports the Strategic Defense 
Initiative [SDI], but there has been an 
uproar each time it has been sug- 
gested that defense cooperation could 
lead to our actual involvement in the 
program. In your view, should Canada 
have a role in SDI research and why? 

A. We have absolutely no intention 
of pressing any of our allies to par- 
ticipate in this program. It will be en- 
tirely up to Canada to decide the extent 
to which, if at all, it wishes to share in 
the research efforts. Should Canada 
decide such participation is in its in- 
terests, we would be delighted to work 
with you in this important undertaking. 

But let's get this straight about the 
Strategic Defense Initiative: For more 
than a generation, we have believed that 
no war will begin as long as each side 
knows the other can retaliate with 
devastating results. I believe there could 
be a better way to keep the peace. The 
Strategic Defense Initiative is a research 
effort aimed at finding a non-nuclear 
defense against ballistic missiles. It is 
the most helpful possibility of the 
nuclear age. Nuclear weapons threaten 
entire populations; the SDI seeks to end 
that possibility forever. I was extremely 
heartened by the understanding and sup- 
port for this research effort by Prime 
Minister Mulroney and External Affairs 
Minister Clark. It may take a long time, 
but now we have started. 

Q. The Federal and Provincial 
Governments have just taken substan- 
tial measures to control the contribu- 
tions to acid rain on our side of the 
border. What is the United States 
prepared to do for its part? 

A. The United States is a world 
leader for a cleaner environment. We 
take pride that our Clean Air and Clean 
Water Acts, and our other comprehen- 
sive environmental legislation have 
helped to set international standards. 
We have invested $1.50 billion — yes, 
that's billions — under our Clean Air Act, 
and as a result the air today is cleaner 
than in many years. Emissions of 
sulphur dioxide, a major concern, are 



down nearly 30% in the last decade. 
This trend is continuing: down 10% 
since I became President, including 
2V2% in 1983. We strictly control 
nitrogen oxides, which come mainly 
from auto emissions, and their level has 
also been dropping in recent years. For 
the future, I believe it is a question of 
doing what is reasonable and responsible 
after getting all the facts. 

Q. What do you think the pros- 
pects are for negotiating a free trade 
agreement with Canada during your 
second term? Will the obstacles come 
from Congress or from Canadian na- 
tionalists? 

A. As I understand it, the Canadian 
Government is reviewing its trade policy 
right now and hasn't yet decided 
whether to propose any negotiations. In 
our Congress, I believe there is a deep- 
seated appreciation that trade between 
the United States and Canada — the 
largest trade volume between any two 
countries on Earth — is beneficial to both 
countries and should be fostered. Of 
course, there are sensitive trade areas, 
and the Congress would want to be sure 
that any new bilateral understanding is 
in the interest of the United States — so 
would I, and I'm sure Canada would do 
the same. 

What is important is that we con- 
tinue to work together to reduce trade 
barriers. Perhaps we can set an example 
for others to follow. We are not in- 
terested in building a North American 
island; rather, we would like to establish 
a trend toward trade liberalization that 
others can emulate. 

Q. Much has been made of the 
warmer relations that now exist be- 
tween Canada and the United States. 
What particularly irked you about the 
previous government's actions? Now, 
having made concessions to Canada to 
signal the warmer relationship, what 
do you expect of Canada in return? 
And what would you tell Canadian na- 
tionalists who fear that a warmer 
relationship means that we sell out 
our independence? 

A. You're right to suggest that rela- 
tions between our two countries are in 
good shape. But rather than talk about 
concessions, I believe that what has hap- 
pened is that we've come to recognize 
that warm close relations serve both our 
interests. As a result, we both have 
become a lot more attentive to each 
other's concerns; we talk with each 
other more often. And I don't believe 
that means either nation becomes less 
independent. 



Q. How important is a warm per 
sonal relationship among leaders? An( 
what aspects of Mr. Mulroney's per- 
sonality contribute to the chemistry 
reported between the two of you? 

A. People respond more warmly to 
some than to others. We're all human. 
And I confess that I like Brian Mulrone; 
a lot. He is a true Canadian patriot. He 
is honest, hardworking, intelligent, and 
articulate — in two languages at that! So 
let's just say that the chemistry is good 



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RADIO ADDRESS 
TO THE NATION, 
MAR. 16, 1985' M 

Tomorrow, in our first trip outside the lei 
States in this second term, Nancy and I 
will be heading north to visit our good 
neighbors in Canada. We're going at the 
invitation of Canada's Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney, who is an articulate 
and effective defender of Canadian in- 
terests, a strong friend of the United 
States, and the best vote-getter in his 
nation's history. 

We're delighted that Brian Mulronej^s 
has chosen Quebec City, capital of his 
home Province, as the site of our 
meeting. With its old streets and charm- 
ing ways, Quebec is one of the most in- 
triguing corners of North America, righi 
on our northeastern doorstep. Quebec is 
modern, too, supplying the United 
States with everything from electric 
power to aerospace parts for our 
defense industries. 

We're going to Canada now for one, 
simple reason — no country is more im- 
portant to the United States. Sometime; 
we overlook that fact. Sometimes our 
friendship and cooperation may not 
seem to warrant as much attention as 
the serious problems we're dealing with 
in other areas. 

But certain facts about our Canadiar 
neighbors with whom we share the 
world's longest undefended boundary 
must never be overlooked. Canada and 
the United States are each other's most 
important trading partner. There is 
greater volume of trade between our 
two countries than between any other 
two countries in the world. 

We sold $45 billion in goods to 
Canada in 1984, which supported hun- 
dreds of thousands of jobs in the United 
States. Canada is our principal foreign 
supplier of natural gas and electricity, 
and Canada is the most important locale 
for our foreign investment. Walk around 
our cities and towns today and you can 
see increased Canadian investment in 
real estate and many other parts of our 
economy. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Most important the national security 
the United States and of Canada are 
sry closely interrelated. The Com- 
ander in Chief of the North American 
erospace Defense Command in Col- 
•ado Springs is from the States; his 
iputy is Canadian, and their staff is 
vided among U.S. and Canadian of- 
;ers. 

Four years ago, some problems had 
veloped in relations between the 
Inited States and Canada. But we've 
een working hard on both sides of the 
)rder to set things right. Today 
anadian-American relations are good, 
; good as they've ever been. And dur- 
g this trip, the Prime Minister and I 
e determined to do all we can to make 
■em even better. 

We will seek to strengthen our 
onomic relations — market-oriented 
olicies without government interference 
)ld out the best opportunities for our 
/o countries to prosper as economic 
irtners. 

So we welcome Canadian investment 
the United States and the Mulroney 
Dvernment's legislation to loosen 
(strictions on foreign investment in 
anada, which is an important first step 
ward liberalizing Canada's own invest- 
lent policies. It's the firm policy of this 
(dministration to resist protectionist 
essures. So we would like Canada and 
her countries to join us in a new round 
multilateral trade talks in 1986. We 
ill encourage the sharing of our mutual 
'fense responsibilities. Canada is a 
unding member of NATO with a proud 
ilitary history stretching from Vimy 
idge in France during the First World 
'ar to the skies over Germany in the 
=cond, to the seas off Korea during 
at conflict. 

We're pleased with the commitment 
■ Brian Mulroney's government to in- 
ease significantly Canada's overall con- 
ibution to our shared defense respon- 
bilities. On the quest for arms reduc- 
3ns and on other global problems, 
anada's council will be a source of 
-eat wisdom and strength. The Prime 
inister and I will exchange views on 
?velopments throughout the world in- 
uding the Geneva arms reduction talks 
id our own efforts to protect freedom, 
?mocracy, and peace in this hemi- 
ihere. 

The United States is a pioneer in en- 
;ronmental protection, and we share 
ith Canada a special responsibility for 
rotecting our shared North American 
nvironment. The problem of acid rain 
mcerns both our countries, and I'm 
nxious to hear the Prime Minister's 
lews on that subject. 



In 1939 Winston Churchill, describ- 
ing the 5,000-mile peaceful border 
dividing Canada and the United States 
said, "That long frontier from the Atlan- 
tic to the Pacific Oceans, guarded only 
by neighborly respect and honorable 
obligations is an example to every coun- 
try and a pattern for the future of the 
world. 

Today more than ever, our progress, 
our partnership, and our friendship can 
be a model for others and a pattern for 
the future. Working together, Canada 
and the United States can accomplish 
great things for the cause of a safer, 
freer, and more prosperous world. And 
that's what our trip is all about. 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 
MAR. 17, 1985^ 

Prime Minister, Mrs. Mulroney, thank 
you very much. Premier and Mrs. 
Levesque, distinguished ladies and 
gentlemen, and my friends, the people of 
Canada, it's a great pleasure to be here, 
for to be on Canadian soil is to be 
among friends, and Nancy and I are 
happy to return here. 

Et nous sommes heureux que notre 
voyage nous permette de venir daws cette 
belle ville de Quebec. [Applause] Quebec 
is one of the most intriguing spots on 
the continent. Here, New France was 
founded. Here, French is the language 
of commerce, the arts, and everyday 
life. Here, English Canadians and 
French Canadians came together over a 
century ago to set the foundations for a 
country in whose Parliament both 
French and English would be spoken. 
And here, the Citadel and the walls of 
the old city remind us that Canadians 
and Americans long ago put aside their 
differences to become friends. In fact, 
we're more than friends and neighbors 
and allies; we are kin, who together 
have built the most productive relation- 
ship between any two countries in the 
world today. 

This is my first trip outside the 
United States since I was sworn in to a 
second term. Four years ago, I took my 
first trip as President — and then, too, I 
came to Canada. And this is not a coin- 
cidence. For the United States, there is 
no more important relationship than our 
tie with Canada. We are each other's 
most important economic partner. We 
each play an important role in world af- 
fairs. We share a responsibility for the 
protection of the continent that we 
peacefully share. We have a joint stake 
in its environment. And we are partners 
in space and in the technologies of the 
future. 



Between two such independent and 
sovereign countries, there will always be 
some differences, as there will always be 
opportunities for agreement. We can 
still use what Franklin I). Roosevelt, our 
last American President to visit Quebec 
City while serving at the White House, 
called for between us. He asked for 
"frank dealing, cooperation, and a spirit 
of give and take." 

That's precisely whal your Prime 
Minister and I will be engaged in here in 
Quebec. We will discuss many matters 
pertaining to the environment, economic 
growth, and our mutual security. We 
will discuss global affairs, including 
arms control. 

We will also be celebrating St. 
Patrick's Day. For two fellows named 
Reagan and Mulroney, this would seem 
to be appropriate. I know a number of 
people today, including myself, are 
wearing green ties. But I will really 
make my contribution this evening at 
dinner. I'm going to think of the Prime 
Minister's majority in Parliament and 
turn green with envy. [Laughter and ap- 
plause] 



ANNOUNCEMENT ON ACID RAIN, 
MAR. 17. 1985^ 

Prime Minister Mulroney 

The President and I have had what I 
believe to be a very important discussion 
on the problem of acid rain. We have 
made a significant step forward, in that 
a matter that has been on the back 
burner for the last 3 years has now been 
brought forward, and I think on both 
sides have acknowledged that our prob- 
lem is common in nature and requires a 
joint solution. The President and I will 
be talking about this again tomorrow 
and in the future. But I think that we 
have managed to break a deadlock 
which has prevented some common ac- 
tion on this. 

From the Canadian point of view, as 
you know, I've taken the position that 
it's important that we clean up our own 
act. And Canada has begun that process 
with a comprehensive national program. 
And so there will be a document re- 
leased — I suppose within the next half- 
hour or so. 

But to ensure that this matter — this 
matter that the President and I both 
agree is of such great importance to our 
respective countries — never finds its 
way again onto the back burner, we 
have agreed today to the appointment of 
two special envoys of great excellence 
and influence and uncommon access to 
us as leaders. 



lay 1985 



THE PRESIDENT 



They will carry the matters forward 
and I think help us achieve real results. 
They'll report to us on a regular basis, 
and I appreciate the President's commit- 
ment as demonstrated by the calibre of 
his appointment which he will announce 
momentarily. 

For our part, the government of 
Canada is particularly pleased to an- 
nounce the appointment of the 
Honorable William G. Davis, former 
Prime Minister of Ontario, as our special 
ambassador in this vital area. 

[The Prime Minister repeated this 
announcement in French.] 

President Reagan 

I'll only take a second here simply to en- 
dorse what the Prime Minister had told 
you. We're very pleased with the out- 
come of the discussion. We touched 
upon a number of things of interest, and 
we'll be dealing with those in the meet- 
ings to come tomorrow. 

But of particular concern to us was 
this issue of acid rain. And I'm very 
pleased with the envoys who have been 
chosen. The Prime Minister has named a 
man that — I'm sure you all know his ac- 
cess to him and has a standing that will 
make him capable of carrying what has 
to be a joint undertaking as the Prime 
Minister has said. 

And for our own part, my nom- 
inee — and he has accepted — is Drew 
Lewis, the former Secretary of 
Transportation, who has agreed to take 
on this task. 

And so together, we will find an 
answer to this problem. I couldn't be 
happier about getting this underway and 
off dead-center. 



LUNCHEON REMARKS, 
MAR. 18, 1985^ 

Nancy et moi desirous vour remercier 
dufond du coeur de voire chaleureuse 
hospitalite. [Applause] Just as 4 years 
ago, it is an honor and a privilege to 
make our first visit of the term a visit to 
Canada, our close neighbor, our strong 
ally, and, yes, our dear friend. 

To have come to the heart of old 
Quebec, to this chateau that, for us, will 
forever be a memory of beauty looking 
down on beauty all around, and still 
more, to have been joined by one who 
shares my roots on St. Patrick's Day 
[laughter], well, it's almost too much for 
this son of an Irishman to bear. 
[Laugh ter| 

As you might say in your native 
tongue, se formidable. [Laughter] And 
this might be enough to convince you 



that French is not my native tongue. 
[Laughter] Actually, I was told a long 
time ago, "Don't worry about your ac- 
cent. It's not how well you speak 
French," the gentleman said, "but how 
well you appreciate our people and 
culture." And ever since Jacques Cartier 
told me that [laughter], I've been a great 
admirer of all things French-Canadian. 
[Laughter] 

As we begin anew, we come again to 
be with friends. We come to share great 
dreams in a land where big is a word too 
small to describe the sweep of Lauren- 
tian peaks and prairie plains or the 
strength of Canadian spirit that tamed a 
giant continent and now looks to a 
future rich with promise. 

Flying over Canada yesterday after- 
noon, I thought of your Commander 
Marc Garneau. He's the first of what we 
hope will be many Canadian astronauts 
on joint space shuttle missions. And 
aboard the space shuttle Challenger, at 
a moment high above Quebec, Com- 
mander Garneau said, "My country is 
very fantastic. We are lucky to be Cana- 
dian, to have such a big and wonderful 
country." To which I would only add: 
And are we not lucky to be neighbors in 
these good, free lands that God has 
blessed as none others have ever been 
blessed? 

When we look around the world to- 
day, when we see a scar of shame 
dividing families in Europe, East from 
West, and in Korea, North from South, 
see the anguish that aggression has 
wrought upon so many innocent lives 
across our planet, then, yes, we would 
do well to give thanks for the principles 
of democracy and human dignity that 
have cradled us with peace and 
showered us with abundance since the 
birth of our two nations. 

Victor Hugo once observed, no army 
can stop an idea whose time has come. 
Today, the tide of freedom is up, lifting 
our economies ever higher on new cur- 
rents of imagination, discovery, and 
hope for our future. 

There is a leader who personifies 
this new spirit who has said, "Canadians 
in the mid-'80's have a renewed sense of 
confidence in themselves as a nation." 
There is "a role for government that is 
less interventionist," he said, "a role that 
creates a climate in which the entrepre- 
neurial genius of the private sector can 
do what it does best — namely, create 
new wealth, new possibilities of employ- 
ment." 

We take a friendly neighbor's quiet 
pride in your Canadian revival; and we 
share your great respect for the man do- 
ing so much to carry it forward, your 
Prime Minister, and my friend, Brian 
Mulroney. [Applause] 



k 



? 



Canadians live at the top of North 
America, and sometimes we think of yoi 
as fellow home-dwellers inhabiting the 
upper floors of the house. And we who 
live downstairs have heard some rum- 
bling up here, in that portion that we 
know to be Quebec. The changes in 
French Canada during the past 25 
years, your revolution tranquille, pro- 
pelled the transformation of Quebec into 
a modern community while emphasizing 
all along its French-speaking character. 

In a unique referendum, the people 
of Quebec declared themselves Canadian 
and Quebecois. Now your long history as 
a French-speaking North American com 
munity is entering an exciting pha.se — 
Quebec enterpreneurs competing across 
the continent, spreading business know- 
how with a French face. 

We see and feel your progress. And 
we value highly the friendship of a peo- 
ple unafraid to embrace the challenge of 
change, yet unwilling to forsake your 
oldest, most-trusted companions — 
Canadian traditions, values, and roots. 

There's a saying I've always liked — 
one should keep old roads and old 
friends. You have not strayed from the 
road of Canadian culture, from those 
good and graceful virtues that enrich 
your lives and keep you free to be kind 
and true, free to strive for progress and 
greatness, without surrendering your 
souls to a mad and mindless pursuit of 
the material. 

Mes amis, the eyes of all America 
are on Canada. In our universities, new 
programs for Canadian studies have 
been created; in our government, new 
importance given to the Canadian-Amer 
ican relationship; and in our economy, 
we feel Canada's heightened presence in 
our daily lives: from Quebec electrical 
power to Alberta's oil and natural gas; 
and from your help in liuilding our tele- 
communications industry to what many 
believe is the best beer in the world 
[laughter]. We're with you, Mr. Prime 
Minister, we feel mighty grateful for 
Canada, and we always will. 

At the heart of my nation's policies 
is one conviction, and please hear it well: 
No relationship is more important to the 
United States than our ties with 
Canada. We are by far each other's most 
important trading partner. Our two-way 
trade, the largest in the world, is valued 
at over $1()() billion. We're allies. In 
North America and across the North 
Atlantic, we're proud to stand watch 
with you, and, together, we shall keep 
our people free, secure, and at peace. 
Above all, we're friends, and friends we 
shall always be. [Applause| 

The question is, having righted 
ourselves and regained our optimism. 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



lere do we go from here? But I believe 
ur F'rime Minister and I agree: 
.nada and America can invest 
j;ether. grow together and lead 
j-ether — and leaders we shall be in a 
w partnership pointing toward the 
st century. That new partnership 
gins with our being more mindful of 
r need for close cooperation and con- 
int communication, each of us careful- 
respecting the other's interests and 
vereignty. 

For our part, the United States has 
gim a great change in direction — 
ay from years of creeping socialism 
i ever-greater dependency that slow- 
our progress, toward a new 
nerican revolution; a peaceful revolu- 
n to be sure, rising from our convic- 
n that successful action must begin 
th a vision of hope and opportunity 

all. 

The evidence is clear: Freedom 
rks, incentives are key, and nations 
loring these principles will lose out in 
? economic competition in the 1980s 

beyond. Japan, a devastated country 
;er World War II, cut tax rates almost 
ery year for two decades, producing 
explosive, noninflationary expansion, 
iking them a world economic power, 
d leaving Europe and North America 
ling behind. Other Pacific nations 
ve also become champions for growth. 

Let us then set our sights on a new 
ion — a renaissance of growth in a 
'jrld come alive with entrepreneurial 
:or; each nation trading freely with its 
ghbors; all of us together a mighty 
•edom tide carrying hope and oppor- 
lity to the farthest corners of the 
)be. 

We in the States have tried to learn 
)m our mistakes and show, once 
ain, that nothing succeeds like 
■edom. Since our tax rate reductions 
)k effect, we have enjoyed 27 straight 
onths of economic growth and a record 
million jobs producing a dramatic in- 
pase in our purchases from other na- 
ifns, starting with Canada. 

We know we must do much more to 
■strain the growth of government, 
eak down barriers of trade, and 
come more competitive. And, since 
K rates — functioning as prices for pro- 
cing, saving, and investing — are the 
ys to economic growth or decline, 
'Ye committed to a historic reform of 
■r tax code, making America's after- 
X rewards the brightest light for 
owth and stability in the industrialized 
)rld. 

Protecting the environment is one of 
ramount concern to us both. The 
lited States has the strictest auto 
lissions standards in the world, and 




President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney at tiie Citadel, the largest fortification in 
North America still garrisoned by regular troops. Constructed between 1820 and 1832, it 
has 25 buildings, including the Governor General's residence (under restoration). In 
August 1943, Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and MacKenzie King met at the 
Citadel for their historic Quebec conference. 



during the last decade, we spent over 
$150 billion to comply with our Clean 
Air Act. Emissions of sulpher dioxide 
are down nearly 30% and nitrogen ox- 
ides are declining as well. But we must 
make further progress and, by acting 
reasonably and responsibly, we can and 
will. Yesterday, the Prime Minister and 
I issued a statement on our agreement 
to address together the problem of acid 
rain. 

In all that we do, we seek to go for- 
ward with Canada as our partner, two 
leaders for progress through shared vi- 
sion and enlightened cooperation. This 
afternoon at the Citadel, Prime Minister 
Mulroney and I will take further steps 
together to put our new partnership to 
work. 



We will issue a declaration on inter- 
national security and sign a memoran- 
dum on the modernization of our North 
American air defense system. We will 
exchange the instruments of ratification 
that will bring the Pacific salmon treaty 
into effect, as he told you. We will sign 
a mutual legal assistance treaty which 
will aid law-enforcement authorities in 
both our countries. And, we will issue a 
declaration on trade. 

The prosperity of Canada and the 
United States depends upon freer flow- 
ing trade within this continent and 
across the seas. We stand ready to im- 
prove further the Canada-U.S. trading 
relationship and to work with you to ini- 
tiate a new multilateral trade round in 
early 1986. 



THE PRESIDENT 



I'm confident there isn't an area 
where you and I cannot reach an agree- 
ment for the good of our two countries. 
Come to think of it, maybe there is one. 
I know it's a great concern to you, but I 
don't think I have the authority to send 
Gary Carter back to the Expos. 
[Laughter] 

But more powerful in our economies, 
more powerful in our friendship, the 
United States and Canada can meet 
together the challenge of defending 
freedom and leaving a safer world for 
those who will follow. For more than 35 
years, we and our European friends 
have joined together in history's most 
successful alliance, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. The world will not 
forget that Canada was in the forefront 
of the nations that formed and armed 
NATO. 

Upgrading NATO's conventional 
forces is essential to deterrence. The 
greater our ability to resist Soviet ag- 
gression with conventional forces; the 
less likely such aggression will ever oc- 
cur. NA'TO is engaged in a rebuilding 
program, and today, I want to thank 
publicly Prime Minister Mulroney and 
the Canadian people for your commit- 
ment to enhance your contribution to 
NATO's conventional forces and our 
overall defenses. 

Your deficit as a percentage of gross 
national product is bigger than ours, but 
you understand that protecting freedom 
is government's primary responsibility. 
And we salute Canadian wisdom and 
Canadian courage. [Applause] 

The United States will continue to 
pur.sue the arms control talks in Geneva 
with determination, flexibility, and pa- 
tience. It is our deepest conviction that a 
nuclear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought. We must not rest in 
our search for a safer world dedicated to 
eliminating nuclear weapons, with 
technology providing ever greater safe- 
ty, not ever greater fear. 

We're enthusiastic about the 
research done so far on our Strategic 
Defense Initiative. The possibility of 
developing and sharing with you 
technology that could provide a security 
shield and someday eliminate the threat 
of nuclear attack. It is, for us, the most 
hopeful possibility of the nuclear age, 
and we very much appreciate Canada's 
support on SDI research. 

It puzzles me to hear the Soviets 
describe research to protect humanity as 
a threat to peace. Their protests ring a 
little hollow. I did some research of my 
own and found that in 1967, former 
Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin said, 
"The antimissile system is not a weapon 
of aggression or attack, it is a defensive 



system." And the Soviets took his words 
to heart and began investing heavily in 
strategic defense. 

Let us all acknowledge that humani- 
ty will be far better served by moving 
away from offensive nuclear systems 
that kill people to non-nuclear defensive 
systems that protect people. We will be 
consulting closely with your government 
during these negotiations. And I have 
told the Prime Minister that I'm never 
more than a phone call away. As allies, 
we must maintain our unity and insist 
on agreements that are equitable and 
verifiable. 

As much as we may hope for 
greater stability through arms control, 
we must remember that the Soviet 
record of compliance with past 
agreements has been poor. The Soviet 
Union signed the Yalta accord, pledging 
free elections, then proceeded to 
dominate Eastern Europe. They signed 
the Geneva convention banning use of 
chemical weapons; SALT II, limiting 
development of new weapons; and the 
Antiballistic Missile Treaty but are now 
violating all three. And they signed the 
Helsinki accords, solemnly pledging 
respect for human rights but then jailed 
the individuals trying to monitor it in 
the U.S.S.R. 

Arms control is not the only issue on 
the East- West agenda, and the opening 
of the Geneva talks is not the only 
development in East-West relations. In 
most of our Western countries, our 
peoples can look forward to continued 
strong, stable governments, and our 
alliances are in good shape. We have 
demonstrated unity and firmness in our 
dealings with the East. We're ready to 
work with the Soviet Union for more 
constructive relations. We all want to 
hope that last week's change of leader- 
ship in Moscow will open up new 
possibilities for doing this. 

There's plenty to talk about — in 
arms control, on regional issues, on 
human rights, and in our bilateral rela- 
tions. My representatives in Moscow had 
good talks with Mr. Gorbachev, and 
Prime Minister Mulroney has given me 
his own assessment of the new Soviet 
leadership. If the Soviets are as ready as 
we are to take the other side's concerns 
into account, it should be possible to 
resolve problems and reduce interna- 
tional tensions. 

Let us always remain idealists but 
never blind to history. I suspect that our 
lives grow richer and fuller as we help 
make our lives more secure and more 
free. We must never doubt the great 
good that Canada and the United States 
can accomplish together, never doubt for 



a moment our journey toward a world 
where someday all may live under 
freedom's star — free to worship as the; 
please, to speak their thoughts, to com' 
and go as they will, to achieve the 
fullness of their potential, and, yes, 
reach out to comfort those who have 
fallen with the Godly gift of human lov^ 

This is the idealist within us whose 
heart is pure and can power our journe 
with faith and courage. But the realist 
must be there, too — our navigator at tl 
helm whose eagle-eyes discern each 
movement of the sky above and waves 
below. We must never stop trying to 
reach a better world, but we'll never 
make it if we don't see our world as it 
truly is. 

We cannot look the other way whei 
treaties are violated, human beings 
persecuted, religions banned, and entin 
democracies crushed. We cannot ignore 
that while Canadians and Americans 
have donated nearly $100 million from 
their own pockets to help feed starving 
Ethiopians, the Soviets and all their 
satellites have given almost no aid. But 
they continue to provide more than a 
half a billion dollars a year in military 
supplies that the Ethiopian Governmen 
is using against its own people. 

These are painful realities, but 
history may well remember them as th( 
birth pangs of a new, much brighter er 
Brave men and women are challenging 
the Brezhnev doctrine that insists once 
country has been taken from the familj 
of free nations, it may never return. 

Freedom movements are rising 
up — from Afghanistan to Cambodia. 
Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. More 
than twice as many people are fighting 
in the field right now against the 
Nicaraguan communist regime as fougl 
against Somoza. The weight of the 
world is struggling to shift away from 
the dreary failures of communist oppre 
sion into the warm sunlight of genuine 
democracy and human rights. 

Will history speak of freedom vic- 
torious? May we someday salute new 
heroes from nations reborn — sons and 
daughters who might grow up to be lik< 
a Marc Garneau or Roberta Bondar, 
bringing honor to science and their na- 
tions; or, perhaps, like Andre Viger, 
who lost the use of his legs, but with hi: 
will of steel in a land of the free, could 
keep on going to open six stores emploj 
ing more than 40 people, many of them 
handicapped, and even win our Boston 
Marathon as well? 

History's verdict will depend on 
us — on our courage and our faith, on 
our wisdom and our love. It'll depend on 
what we do, or fail to do, for the cause 
of millions who carry just one dream in 



Department of State Bulletif 




heir hearts — to live lives like ours, in 
his special land between the seas, 
/here each day a new adventure begins 
1 a revolution of hope that never ends. 
Prime Minister Mulroney once sug- 
ested that Americans and their Presi- 
ent should be grateful for Canada. How 
lan we not be grateful for the greatness 
f Banting and Best, of Mike Pearson, 
f young Steve Fonyo, and of so many 
we never knew. For the inspiration you 
ive, for the success that you enjoy, and 
ar the friend of America and friend of 
freedom that you will always be, yes, we 
(ay, thank God for Canada. 



ilGNING CEREMONY, 

riAR. 18, less-! 

.^he Citadel of Quebec says so much 
.bout Canada and about the relations 
letween our two countries. On this rock 
ince flew the flag of France and then 
he flag of Britain. And today, the 
*Iaple Leaf flag symbolizes a united 
Canada. 

Over two centuries ago, Canadians 
md Americans battled one another in 
his city. But the walls surrounding us 
oday were erected later for a war 
vhich never came. Canada and the 
Jnited States put aside suspicion to 
luild not only a lasting and permanent 
'riendship but a great and productive 
-elationship. Today, the Citadel, and 
ither places like it in both our countries, 
^tand as monuments to a history of 
Deace, goodwill, and cooperation. 



Earlier today, I suggested that 
Canada and the United States are forg- 
ing a new partnership. This afternoon 
Prime Minister Mulroney and I have put 
that new partnership to work. The rela- 
tionship between our two countries is 
complex and varied. The agreements we 
announced this afternoon reflect that 
variety. 

We share the world's longest 
undefended border and the world's 
largest water boundary. Yet, more fun- 
damentally, we share Earth's most boun- 
tiful continent. We're responsible for 
managing and preserving that common 
environment. We have a long history of 
cooperating in doing so. I'm personally 
committed to continuing this proud 
tradition. I know that our two govern- 
ments share this commitment. 

And I know that the issue of acid 
rain has received a great deal of atten- 
tion in Canada. Let me simply say, 
cooperation on this issue is possible and 
the appointment by the Prime Minister 
and by me of special envoys is another 
step forward. So difficult a problem 
deserves the best talent that our two 
governments can enlist. 

For almost three decades, the dis- 
tant early warning line — known as the 
DEW line — has been the northern-most 
edge of our early warning capability. It's 
been a vital part of the deterrent system 
which protects both countries from at- 
tack, serving as a watchtower for 
NORAD. The technology of the DEW 
line is now almost obsolete. But the need 
for an early warning line remains. Ac- 
cordingly, the Prime Minister and I 



THE PRESIDENT 



issued an agreement to modernize the 
North American air defense system. 

The mutual legal assistance treaty 
which we signed will facilitiile coopera- 
tion between Canadian and American 
law enforcement officials. 

Protecting the environment, defend- 
ing our people, and ensuring that justice 
is done— these are all special roles for 
government. Economic prosperity, 
however, requires the enterprise, work, 
and investment of the private sector. As 
each other's largest trading partner, 
Canada and the United States have long 
enjoyed profitable economic and com- 
mercial ties. And today. Prime Minister 
Mulroney and I are issuing an important 
declaration which we expect will 
facilitate expanded trade. 

We also exchanged the instruments 
of ratification for a U.S. -Canada Pacific 
salmon treaty. This brings a 15-year-old 
undertaking to a successful and mutually 
beneficial conclusion, as you've been 
told. The treaty will be a boon to our 
citizens along the Pacific Coast. It sym- 
bolizes how we're able, with a combina- 
tion of hard work and high-level atten- 
tion, to turn an irritant in our relations 
into a form of cooperation. 

The poet Rupert Brooke wrote: 
"And high and grey and serene above 
the morning lay the citadel of Quebec. Is 
there any city in the world that stands 
so nobly as Quebec?" Nancy and I have 
deeply appreciated your hospitality. 
We'll always remember the beauty of 
your city. Nous garderons toujours un 
excellent souvenir de notre sejour a 
Quebec, et de vous. We will always 
remember Quebec, we will always 
remember you. 



SUMMARY 

President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Mulroney met at Quebec City on March 17 
and 18 for three sessions of talks. The prin- 
cipal achievements of the visit were: 

• A trade declaration reflecting the 
strong political commitment of the two 
leaders to create a more secure, predictable 
environment for trade. They specifically com- 
mitted themselves to halt protectionism on 
cross-border trade in goods and services, 
adopted measures to enhance access to each 
other's markets and launched a program to 
explore further means to facilitate and in- 
crease trade and investment, and reaffirmed 
their commitment to a strong multilateral 
trading system; 

• An agreement to appoint special en- 
voys on acid rain, with an agreed mandate, 
and to report to the President and Prime 
Minister by their next meeting; 



May 1985 



THE PRESIDENT 



• A declaration on international security 
reinvigorating the defense partnership be- 
tween the two countries including the 
defense development and production sharing 
arrangements and committing both sides to 
consult closely on security and arms control 
issues; 

• An agreement on modernization of 
North American air defense and the north 
warning system; 

• An exchange of instruments ratifying 
the new treaty to restore the west coast 
salmon fishery; 

• Signing of a legal assistance treaty to 
help fight international criminal activity while 
respecting each other's sovereignty. 

The Prime Minister informed the Presi- 
dent that Canada has accepted the U.S. in- 
vitation to participate in the space station 
project. 

Other bilateral subjects discussed during 
the talks included the Canada-U.S. relation- 
ship, economic issues, and improved Canadian 
access to the U.S. defense and space market. 

Their discussion also covered the crisis in 
Africa, human rights. East- West relations in- 
cluding the Prime Minister's trip to Moscow 
for President Chernenko's funeral, the 
Geneva talks, the world economic situation, 
and preparations for the Bonn summit. 



DECLARATION ON TRADE IN 
GOODS AND SERVICES 

We embark today on a joint effort to 
establish a climate of greater predictability 
and confidence for Canadians and Americans 
alike to plan, invest, grow, and compete more 
effectively with one another and in the global 
market. 

We are convinced that an improved and 
more secure climate for bilateral trade rela- 
tions will encourage market forces to achieve 
a more rational and competitive production 
and distribution of goods and services. 

We remain committed to the principles of 
the multilateral trading system embodied in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) as the cornerstone of our respective 
trade policies. We are determined to exercise 
the political will to make the open, multi- 
lateral trading system work better and to 
strengthen and extend the disciplines govern- 
ing international commerce. 

We will work jointly to strengthen the ef- 
fectiveness of GATT rules and establish new 
disciplines. We call on all nations to join with 
us in establishing a preparatory committee 
this summer for a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations to ensure that negotiations 
commence in early 1986. 

We believe that the challenge to our two 
countries is to invigorate our unique eco- 
nomic relationship. We intend to build on our 
.success in resolving a number of disputes and 
achieve .something of lasting significance to 
provide a model to other nations of the way 
in which two modern societies can work in 
harmony. 



We have today agreed to give the highest 
priority to finding mutually acceptable means 
to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to 
trade in order to secure and facilitate trade 
and investment flows. 

As a first step, we commit ourselves to 
halt protectionism in crossborder trade in 
goods and services. 

We have charged Ambassador Brock, the 
U.S. Trade Representative, and the 
Honorable James Kelleher, Minister for In- 
ternational Trade, to establish immediately a 
bilateral mechanism to chart all possible ways 
to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to 
trade and to report to us within 6 months. 

We have also directed that action be 
undertaken over the next 12 months to 
resolve specific impediments to trade in a 
manner consistent with our international 
obligations and our legislative requirements. 
Such action will proceed on the basis of full 
consultation with the private sector and other 
levels of government and will concentrate ini- 
tially on: 

• National treatment, on a contractual, 
equitable, and mutually advantageous basis, 
with respect to government procurement and 
funding programs; 

• Standardization, reduction, or simpli- 
fication of regulatory requirements which 
would facilitate trade in goods and services; 

• Improvement in the Canada-U.S. Air 
Transport Agreement aimed at facilitating 
transborder travel and commerce by expand- 
ing the number of available services and 
reducing obstacles to the introduction of in- 
novative and competitive new services; 

• Strengthening our market approach to 
Canada-U.S. energy trade by reducing 
restrictions, particularly those on petroleum 
imports and ex-ports, and by maintaining and 
extending open access to each other's energy 
markets, including oil, natural gas, electrici- 
ty, and coal; 

• Improving access for traders on both 
sides of the border through reduction in tariff 
barriers; 

• Facilitation of travel for business and 
commercial purposes; 

• Elimination or reduction of tariff and 
nontariff barriers to trade in high-technology 
goods and related services, such as com- 
puters, data flow, and computer-assisted 
design and manufacturing technology; and 

• Cooperation to protect intellectual 
property rights from trade in counterfeit 
goods and other abuses of copyright and pat- 
ent law. 

We urge our respective private sectors to 
expand their contacts and continue to provide 
advice on the future of our trading relation- 
ship. 

We are confident that these undertakings 
will facilitate trade and investment flows be- 
tween our two countries and act as catalysts 
for broader international cooperation. 



JOINT STATEMENT ON THE 
ENVIRONMENT 



To 



»tti 



Bill 

rs 
T 

sou 
ijri 
itdi 



During their tete-a-tete, the President and 
the Prime Minister discussed environmental 
matters at some length. They took note of 
the 7.5-year history of environmental cooper: 
tion between the two countries as exemplifit 
by the Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, and the re 
cent Skagit River-Ross Dam Treaty. The 
President and the Prime Minister expressed 
their determination to continue to deal with 
U.S. -Canadian environmental issues in a 
responsible and cooperative spirit. 

In the spirit of cooperation, and in 
recognition that the actions of one country 
are of concern to the other, there was agree- 
ment that a high-level special envoy would b 
appointed by each government to examine 
the acid rain issue and report to the Presi- 
dent and Prime Minister by their next 
meeting. The envoys will: 

(a) Pursue consultation on laws and 
regulations that bear on pollutants thought t 
be linked to acid rain; 

(b) Enhance cooperation in research ef- 
forts, including that for clean fuel technologj 
and smelter controls; 

(c) Pursue means to increase exchange oj 
relevant scientific information, and 

(d) Identify efforts to improve the U.S. 
and Canadian environment. 

The President announced that the U.S. 
special envoy will be Andrew L. Lewis, 
former Secretary of Transportation. 

The Prime Minister announced that his 
special envoy will be William G. Davis, 
former Premier of Ontario. 



DECLARATION ON 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

We are neighbors and allies dedicated to the 
defense and nourishment of peace and 
freedom. The security of Canada and the 
United States are inextricably linked. 

We have committed ourselves at Quebec 
to reinvigorate the defense and security part 
nership between the two countries. To rein- 
force deterrence and to reduce the risk posec 
by threat of nuclear attack, we agreed to 
strengthen continental defense, with par- 
ticular reference to our joint participation in 
the North American Aerospace Defense Com 
mand (NORAD). Accordingly, we concluded 
an agreement to modernize the North 
American air defense surveillance and warn- 
ing system. We agreed that in implementing 
this program, as in all of our defense rela- 
tions, we shall be guided by the principle of 
mutual respect for the sovereignty of our two 
countries. 

In the spirit of mutual trust and con- 
fidence between our countries, we have com 
mitted ourselves to consult fully, frankly, and 
regularly on defense and arms control mat- 
ters. 



In 



an 
ret 



;otl 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



To permit systematic consultation and 
erall review, at the most senior levels, of 
rangements bearing on the security of 
; mada and the United States, we resolved 
at the responsible ministers of our govern- 
ents will meet together on a regular basis, 
e have also agreed to make greater use of 
e Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 
tablished at the historic meeting of Prime 
inister Mackenzie King and President 
ranklin Delano Roosevelt at Ogdensburg 45 
;ars ago. 

To provide for an effective use of 
isources and to aid both of our countries in 
aring our share of the allied defense 
irden, we reaffirm the Canada-United 
ates defense development and production 
aring arrangements and agree to 
rengthen our North American defense in- 
istrial base. Recognizing the importance of 
cess to, and participation of, Canadian 
rms in the U.S. defense market, we will 
ork to reduce barriers and to stimulate the 
Dw in defense goods. We will seek to im- 
•ove our joint access to information relating 
' defense procurement; we will explore ways 
■ establish a separate designation for 
obilization base suppliers for U.S. and 
anadian firms; and we will seek to take 
-eater advantage of flexibility inherent in 
^cond source suppliers. We will also under- 
ike to establish a freer exchange between 
)th countries of technical knowledge and 
alls involved in defense production, in order 
facilitate defense economic and trade 
^operation and joint participation in major 
ifense programs. In this connection, we 
^ee to strengthen our cooperation to en- 
ure that transfers of strategic technology to 
ar potential adversaries are effectively con- 
'olled. We have directed the responsible 
linisters to give priority attention to all 
iiese issues and to provide a progress report 
lithin 4 months. 

The security of Canada and the United 
Itates is inseparable from that of the Euro- 
ean members of the North Atlantic alliance, 
(^e remain fully dedicated to preserving the 
Bcurity of the alliance as a whole through 
ne maintenance of adequate military 
irength, an effective deterrent posture, and 
stable balance of forces. We attach great 
mportance to our continuing commitment to 
;ation Canadian and U.S. forces in Europe. 
Ve think it is essential to strengthen NATO's 
Dnventional capabilities and accordingly 
literate our determination to continue 
ubstantial real growth in expenditures for 
lefense. 

We share a commitment to deepening the 
lialogue among the allies. Our alliance draws 
Itrength from the unique and individual con- 
ibutions of its sovereign members in the 
tursuit of our common goal of peace with 
reedom. The cohesion and political solidarity 
f the alliance, maintained through frequent 
i.nd timely consultations, remain the founda- 
lion for the protection of our common in- 
«rests and values. 

Significant, equitable, durable, and 
erifiable arms control measures can play a 
ole in strengthening strategic stability. 



maintaining our security at a lower level of 
force and armament, building trust and con- 
fidence between East and West, and reducing 
the risk of war. We have agreed to consider 
joint research efforts to strengthen our 
capacity to verify agreements on the control 
of armaments. We will work to gain agree- 
ment on effective measures in the interna- 
tional negotiations in Vienna, Geneva, and 
Stockholm, and we will strive, with the coun- 
tries of Europe, to progress toward the aims 
enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. 

We further agreed that we can have no 
higher goal than the reduction and eventual 
elimination of the threat of peace, whether by 
nuclear or conventional means. Our aim is 
not to achieve superiority but to enhance 
deterrence of armed aggression and bring 
about significant arms reductions between 
East and West. We seek a more stable world, 
with gi-eatly reduced levels of nuclear arms. 
The prospect of an enhanced ability to deter 
war based upon an increasing contribution of 
non-nuclear defenses against offensive 
nuclear arms has prompted the U.S. research 
effort embodied in the President's Strategic 
Defense Initiative. We are agreed that this 
effort is prudent and is in conformity with 
the ABM Treaty. In this regard, we agreed 
that steps beyond research would, in view of 
the ABM Treaty, be matters for discussion 
and negotiation. 

Dialogue and negotiation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union at 
Geneva provide a historic opportunity to set 
East-West relations on a more secure founda- 
tion. We hope that these negotiations will 
lead to major steps toward the prevention of 
an arms race in space and to terminating it 
on Earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, 
and, ultimately, eliminating them every- 
where. 

The security of Canada and the United 
States is linked increasingly with that of 
other regions in the world. We will, there- 
fore, encourage and support the strengthen- 
ing of multilateral and international 
mechanisms for the control and peaceful 
resolution of disputes. We will vigorously op- 
pose the exploitation of regional instability 
and promote, at the same time, each by our 
distinctive contributions, the social, economic, 
and political development essential to the 
achievement of a stable and enduring peace. 

Our one truly strategic aim is human 
freedom in a world at peace. 

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 25, 1985. 

-Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 18. 

^Broadcast from the Oval Office. 

■■Made at L'Ancienne Lorette Airport. 

^Made at the Chateau Frontenac Hotel. 

«Held at the Citadel. ■ 



News Conference 
of March 21 
(Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Rewjan's 
news conference of March 21, 1985 J 

Let me commend again the Senate of 
the United Sttites for having approved 
production of 21 more MX Peacekeeper 
missiles. 

The Senate has endorsed the deci- 
sion of four Presidents that the 
Peacekeeper is a vital component of the 
American deterrent. Now is the 
time — testing time for the House of 
Representatives. The votes there will 
answer the question of whether we 
stand united at Geneva or whether 
America will face the Soviet Union as a 
nation divided over the most fundamen- 
tal questions of her national security. 

For more than a decade, we've 
debated the MX. And while we were 
debating, the Soviets were deploying 
more than 600 such missiles and 
targeting them upon the United States. 
Now they're on the verge of deploying 
two new strategic land-based systems 
and we're still debating. 

Not long ago, the Parliaments of 
four NATO countries courageously voted 
to accept deployment of Pershing lis 
and cruise missiles. And these NATO 
countries are now looking to see if the 
American Congress is possessed of equal 
courage — or resolve, I should say. 

No request by an American Presi- 
dent for a major strategic system de- 
mand vital to the national security has 
ever been denied by an American Con- 
gress. It is the tradition of bipartisan 
unity on national defense that brought 
the Soviets back to Geneva. And unless 
that tradition is maintained next week in 
the House, there's little prospect of suc- 
cess at Geneva. 



Q. Can you give us your think- 
ing on the summit — why you think 
it would be good to meet with 
Gorbachev, what you think can be ac- 
complished, and why you've been 
rebuffed so far? 

A. I don't really consider it being 
rebuffed, because the man has only been 
in office for a few days and I have some 
idea of what is confronting him now. 
But I've been — I've felt the same way 
about each of the three previous leaders 
there and then things intervened that 
made it impossible — that there are a 



THE PRESIDENT 



number of things, bilateral situations 
between our two countries, other things 
to talk about that we're negotiating or 
talking to each other on a ministerial 
level, and that some of those could prob- 
ably be further advanced if we met at a 
summit. 

And so, what I always meant by an 
agenda of things they want to talk 
about, mutual problems that confront 
us, and I think it's high time that we did 
this. 

Q. What are the prospects for hav- 
ing it soon? 

A. I have to think the— that they 
should be good. I think in some of our 
people, we've had about an hour and a 
half conversation— the Vice President 
and the Secretary of State did with him 
when they were there. And so I think 
there is a good chance of that. 

The reason that I issued the invita- 
tion was because, under the kind of pro- 
tocol that exists, and you look back over 
the history of such meetings, why, it's 
our turn to be the host. So that's why I 
proposed it, that if he would, the invita- 
tion was extended for whenever he 
found it convenient. 

Q. In your first term, you proposed 
your own Middle East peace plan. You 
dispatched special envoys to the 
region to seek solutions, you even sent 
in Marines to try to stabilize Lebanon. 
These days we hardly ever even hear 
you mention the Middle East, and last 
week. President Mubarak went home 
disappointed when he asked for your 
help in getting peace talks started 
again. 

I wonder if you could tell us 
tonight, what you expect to gain from 
the new policy of disengagement, and 
what do you expect to be achieved 
over there? 

A. It isn't disengagement, and let 
me point out, I believe it's a misap- 
prehension that President Mubarak left 
disappointed. He made no requests. He 
told us what he was doing; and certainly 
we complimented him highly upon what 
he's doing — I think it's great. 

But our proposal, in the very begin- 
ning, was that we did not want to par- 
ticipate in the negotiations. It wouldn't 
be any of our business to do so, but that 
we'd do whatever we could to help bring 
the warring parties together, and, in ef- 
fect you might say, continue the Camp 
David process, and continue trying to 
find more countries that would do as 
Egypt did and make peace. 



And we haven't been idle. We not 
only have had President Mubarak here, 
but — and a short time before that we 
had King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Masri, 
the Foreign Minister [of Jordan] is now 
here. And we still feel the same way. 
We have been trying to build up a rela- 
tionship with the Arab nations, as well 
as the relationship that we've always 
had with Israel. And we discussed with 
President Mubarak the things that he 
has proposed, and the idea of the 
Palestinians — we did have to make it 
clear that we couldn't meet if it was the 
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. 
They still refuse to recognize the UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338, and they 
refuse to agree or admit that Israel has 
a right to exist as a nation. But we have 
said Palestinian representatives, yes. 
There's a large Palestinian community 
and I'm sure that there are people that 
do not consider themselves represented 
by the PLO. 

Q. Do you see a direct role for the 
United States in any talks over here? 

A. Not the direct role in sitting at 
the table and negotiating. That must be 
done in direct negotiations between the 
Arab states and Israel. And I think that 
King Hussein [of Jordan], the position 
he's taken, that was the one that we had 
hoped, and he did take 2 years ago when 
we suggested all of this, and then things 
broke down with the Lebanese conflict. 
And now, thanks to Mubarak pushing 
ahead, and Hussein, I think that there is 
a reasonable chance — and we have 
another traveling ambassador on his 
way back there in a few weeks. 

Q. You now need a new U.S. 
Representative for Trade to replace 
Ambassador Brock. Are you looking 
for someone who will more sharply 
convey to other nations, especially 
Japan, the need for fairer trading con- 
ditions between the two countries? 
And are voluntary quotas ever going 
to work on automobile sales? 

A. We're just going to have to see 
what restraint might be used by the 
Japanese in this. But I have to say I 
couldn't fault Bill Brock and what he has 
done. He's been as forceful as anyone 
could be. And we are still leaning on our 
friends and trading partners, including 
Japan, for continued lifting of restraints 
that they have, particularly with regard 
to their own markets. Ami in the talks 
in Europe that will liegin in May, I am 
going to [propose again another round of 
trade negotiations to further gel us back 
to completely free trade. 



)1 



« 



And we've made some progress. I 
have to say that Prime Minister 
Nakasone of Japan has been very forth- |ia 
coming on this. He has some political 
problems that— just like me, he can't 
just give an order and have it happen 
But he's working very hard on this. Ancjit 
Bill did a great job and I'm quite sure 
that who we'll finally get to replace him 
will be equally forceful in those negotia- 
tions. 

Q. As you know, three Leba- 
nese — working for CBS News, taking 
pictures during some hostilities, were 
shot at by the Israeli Army today. Twi 
were killed and one was critically 
wounded. I was wondering if you hav 
a reaction to the incident and if you 
plan to lodge any protests with the 
Israeli Government? 

A. First of all, I'd like to know all 
the details of this. I'm quite sure in com 
bat of that kind this was not a deliberat 
killing. They were engaged in gunfire 
with armed persons who were also — 
were in civilian, not uniformed as they 
would be in a war. So, these things can 
happen. 

And it is a tragedy. And all I can 
say is that I think all of us have a great 
feeling of sorrow about the tragedy that 
is going on there in Lebanon, and par- 
ticularly in South Lebanon now as the 
Israelis try to withdraw. And whichever 
the side, the acts of terror, the retalia 
tion — both of them are leading to trage- 
dies that just seem to be so needless. 

Q. You're saying that the Israelis 
were engaged in gunfire with other 
people at the time because one report 
said that they just opened fire on the 
newsmen who were obviously taking 
pictures and covering the story? 

A. My goodness, your own news 
program tonight showed an awful lot of 
gunfire with very sophisticated weapons 
including grenade launchers, and they 
were obviously being used by civilians, 
at least people in civilian uniform. They 
weren't Israelis. So, yes, this is one of 
the things that happens in this kind of 
warfare where you're not fighting 
another country's army. 



Q. Sir, 17 blacks were shot to 
death in South Africa today by govern 
ment authorities in what appears to be 
a continuing wave of violence by the 
white minority government against 
the black majority population. Are you 
considering changing your policy to 
put more pressure on the South 
African Government to mend its ways? 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



A. I know the pressure that we are 
itting on them and I know the gains 
at we've made. But, we know there's 
ill a long way to go. But I think to put 
that way— that they were simply 
lied and that the violence was coming 
tally from the law and order side ig- 
)res the fact that there was rioting go- 
g on in behalf of others there. And it 
tragic and again, we hope that this 
in be corrected. But I think also it is 
gnificant that on the officer's side — or 
le police side — whichever — whether 
ey were military police, I think they 
ere police — it is significant that some 
■ those enforcing the law and using the 
ms were also black — black policemen. 

Q. Sir. is it your estimate of the 
tuation that the blacks posed a 
ireat to the whites who had the guns 
hen the blacks didn't? 

A. No. I say that there has been in- 
casing violence and there is an ele- 
eiit in South Africa that does not want 
peaceful settlement of this — who want 
violent settlement, who want trouble 

the streets and this is what's going 
1. 1 (lon't hold with what has happened 
111. as I say, I think all of us find the 
stem there repugnant, but we're going 

keep on trying to contribute to a 
■aceful solution if we can. 

Q. Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir 
eoffrey Howe, has raised a long list 
concerns and questions about your 
rategic Defense Initiative which 
injured a public rebuke from Assist- 
it Secretary of Defense Richard 
jrle. Was Mr. Perle speaking for the 
dministration. and if not, how do 
lu feel about an allied official public- 
questioning SDI just as arms talks 
e starting in Geneva? 

A. I haven't seen either the speech 
at Perle was answering or his 
marks. I have simply heard that this 
ippened. I'm interested in finding out 
hat the exact words were about it. I do 
low that we have the support of Prime 
inister Thatcher and, therefore, the 
nglish Government in our research for 
le Strategic Defense Initiative and so 
Ti satisfied with that. I don't know 
hat the other critic — 

Q. Were you surprised by it? 

A. What? 



Q. Were you surprised by Sir 
Geoffrey's words? 

A. Just surprised when 1 heard 
about it, yes. But I'm going to try and 
find out exactly what was said. 

Q. At your last news conference 
you aroused the Soviet Union of 
violating SALT II limitations on 
building new missiles and you said 
you'd have to decide in the next few 
months whether to join them in 
violating the ag^reement. Since the 
Soviets are insisting that they're — all 
they're doing are making allowable 
upgn'ades of older missiles, won't an 
open violation by the United States 
run the risk of just dashing hopes for 
arms control and leading us into a real 
upward spiraling arms race? 

A. I can assure you, we're not going 
to do anything that's going to undercut 
the negotiations that are going on. 
We're hopeful that for the first time, we 
really have an opportunity to get a 
reduction of missiles. I have said 
repeatedly, and continue it, and I really 
mean it, we're going to wait and deal 
with that problem when we come to that 
point— and it has to do with some of our 
submarine missiles — as to what our con- 
duct's going to be. 

Q. But, sir, if I may follow up— 
that's this fall, and it's unlikely you're 
going to have any major arms control 
agreement before this fall. 

A. No, we— that's right, we don't 
know. But, on the other hand, our rec- 
ord as compared to theirs with regard to 
observing all the niceties of all the 
treaties is so much superior that I don't 
think we're in a position to cause any 
great trouble. 

Q. Can you tell us why your deci- 
sion not to visit a Nazi concentration 
camp site when you make your trip to 
Germany in May commemorating 
VE-Day? 

A. Yes, I'll tell you. I feel very 
strongly that this time in commem- 
orating the end of that great war, that 
instead of reawakening the memories 
and so forth, and the passions of the 
time, that maybe we should observe this 
day as the day when, 40 years ago, 
peace began and friendship; because we 
now find ourselves allied and friends of 
the countries that we once fought 
against. And that we— it being almost a 
celebration of the end of an era and the 
coming into what has now been some 40 
years of peace for us. 



And 1 felt that since the German 
people, and very few alive that remem- 
ber even the war, and certainly none of 
them who were adults and participating 
in any way, and the — they do, they have 
a feeling, and a guilt feeling that's been 
imposed upon them, and I just think it's 
unnecessary. I think they should be 
recognized for the democracy that 
they've created and the democratic prin- 
ciples they now espouse. 

Q. If I can just follow that up — 
has the West Germany Government 
asked you to take one position or 
another on it? 

A. No, but in talking just informally 
some time ago, with Chancellor Kohl 
and others, they all felt the same way, 
that if we could observe this as the 
beginning of peace and friendship be- 
tween us. 



Q. Back talking about the Middle 
East. You've been told by King 
Hussein, I believe, or at least King 
Hussein has said it publicly that his 
agreement with Yasir Arafat does in- 
clude recognition of Israel's right to 
exist and renunciation of the use of 
force. Under those conditions, would 
you, then, at least consider the 
possibility of inviting a joint 
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation for 
meetings if you thought they would 
lead to direct talks and if they did not 
include any members of the PLO? 

A. As I say, we're willing to meet 
with a joint group — Palestinian and Jor- 
danian. But at the moment, not the PLO 
because of — we have not had any state- 
ment from them that they do recognize 
Israel and that they will recognize 242 
and so forth. But there are many 
Palestinians who don't feel that they're 
represented by the PLO. And any 
delegation of them— for example, many 
of those who are living and holding local 
offices on the West Bank. 

Q. Do you think, then, that it 
would be possible? Would you con- 
sider the Mubarak approach which is 
for the United States to invite a joint 
delegation if you had an understand- 
ing about the composition of the 
Palestinians? 

A. This is what President Mubarak 
was talking about and— they're putting 
together, it's a case of their inviting us, 
not the other way around. And we've 
said that we'd be happy to discuss with 
them. But they've got to understand we 



lay 1985 



11 



THE PRESIDENT 



are not getting into the direct negotia- 
tions. That is none of our business. 
We're only to do what we can to help. 

Q. Question about Central 
America. Are you giving any thought, 
sir. to recognizing the Contras who 



are fighting the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua as a government in exile? 

A. No, we haven't thought about 
that at all and yet I must say that this 
matter that's before the Congress of 
whether it's .$14 million or whatever, 
that isn't the issue. 

The issue is the United States is try- 
ing to help people who had a communist 



MX Missile 



President Reagan's radio address 
to the nation on March 9, 1985.'^ 



I'd like to talk to you today about the 
deep desire we all share to keep 
America free, secure, and at peace. In 3 
days' time, American and Soviet 
negotiators will meet in Geneva to ex- 
plore ways to reduce nuclear arsenals 
and lower the risks of war. 

No issue concerns me more and 
none has taken up more of my time than 
our quest for a breakthrough on arms 
reduction. I do so willingly because as 
your President and as a husband, a 
father, and a grandfather, I know what's 
at stake for everyone. And I'm pleased 
that the Soviets, after staying away for 
more than a year, have agreed to return 
to the bargaining table. The renewal of 
these negotiations is an important step 
in the right direction, and America will 
be ready to move forward on all promis- 
ing avenues for progress. 

As I speak to you, our team is in 
Geneva. I cannot think of a more 
welcome message to give them than a 
strong vote of confidence from you the 
people and the Congress. I know that all 
Americans stand four-square behind our 
negotiating team and wish them every 
success. In fact, you're the reason that 
the Soviet Union returned to the 
negotiating table. The Soviet leadership 
has seen your patience and your deter- 
mination to keep America strong. 
They've seen the renewal of your spirit 
and the rebuilding of a robust and ex- 
panding American economy. They know 
we're going to continue moving forward 
to protect our freedom and our way of 
life. 



I want to believe that Congress will 
follow your lead, but that's not yet cer- 
tain, and I need your help. Each House 
of Congress will soon vote on an issue 
that will directly and, perhaps, dramat- 
ically affect the outcome at 
Geneva — that vote concerns the modern- 
ization of our strategic forces with the 
MX Peacekeeper missile. 

Let me take a moment to explain 
what that vote is all about. Nearly 2 
years ago after a decade of indecision, 
confusion, and endless debate over the 
merits of modernizing our aging land- 
based strategic missiles, our political 
process forged a bipartisan consensus 
that united us in our common search for 
ways to protect our country, reduce the 
risks of war, and work for dramatically 
reduced levels of nuclear arms. 

The MX Peacekeeper missile has 
been part of the consensus and with 
good reason: Time and again, America 
exercised unilateral restraint, good will, 
and a sincere commitment to arms 
reductions. As a result, many of the 
missiles protecting our security at this 
very moment are older than the Air 
Force men and women taking care of 
them. They're missiles of the sixties, 
originally equipped with 19.50s aero- 
technology. It's sort of like a 1963 jalopy 
with some new parts. You know as well 
as I do that in many States automobiles 
that old will soon qualify as antiques, 
hut the Soviets don't deal in antiques. 
Their response was the same as it's 
always been: no restraint, just build, 
build, and build. While we debated and 
delayed, they developed three new types 
of land-based intercontinental missiles, 
and they've added to their arsenal 800 



tyranny imposed on them by force, 
deception, and fraud and either we con 
tinue with that tradition which has 
always been ours, or we give that up en 
tirely, and I don't think we should give 
that up. I think our position is clear. 



(i 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 25, 198.5. 



new missiles with more than 5,000 
nuclear warheads. 

It took us too long to realize there i; 
no easy, cheap way to buy security. In 
1983, based on the recommendations of 
a distinguished blue ribbon panel, the 
Scowcroft commission, the Congress 
joined with us to approve the MX 
Peacekeeper program — 100 up-to-date 
missiles that will replace aging Minute- 
men missiles. Since that time, the MX 
Peacekeeper has finished seven suc- 
cessful flight tests, and the Soviets are 
back at the bargaining table. 

Well, once again, the moment of 
truth is at hand. As I mentioned a few 
minutes ago, each House of Congress 
will soon vote on whether to reduce the 
MX funds they approved last year and 
continue production of the missile. The 
Soviet leadership views the current 
debate on the MX as a key test of 
American resolve. If the Congress acts 
responsibly, our negotiators will have a 
chance to succeed, but if we don't have 
the courage to modernize our land-basec 
strategic missile systems, the Soviets 
will have little reason to negotiate mean 
ingful reductions. And why should they? 
We would he signaling to them that the; 
can gain more through propaganda and 
stonewalling than through serious 
negotiations. The time is now to send a 
signal loud and clear that a united and 
resolute America backs our negotiators 
at Geneva, and that could be the real 
key to a successful outcome. 

My fellow Americans, the stakes are 
so very high. The vote on the MX 
Peacekeeper isn't a budget issue; it's 
about our nation's security. And when it 
comes to protecting America's security, 
we can't afford to divide ourselves as 
Democrats or Republicans— we must 
stand together as Americans. It's up to 
you to let your feelings be known. Your 
voice matters; let it be heard. 



it 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 18, 1985. 



12 



Departnnent of State Bulletin' 



HE VICE PRESIDENT 



^ice President's Visit to Africa 



Vice President Bush departed 
Washington. D.C.. March 3. 1985, 
visit Sudan (March 1,-7). Niger 
(arch 7-9). and Mali (March 9-10). He 
•£n went to Geneva (March 10-12) to ad- 
ress the UN Conference on the Emergen- 
I Situation in Africa. 

Following are remarks he made dur- 
ig the trip. ' 



RRIVAL STATEMENT, 

HARTOUM, 

[AR. 4, 1985 

come to Africa as a pilgrim, on a 
airtiey of mercy and friendship. I will 
sit three countries — Sudan, Niger, and 
iali. Each is suffering a catastrophic 
rought. Each in its own way is re- 
5onding with courage to a great trial, 
ach has received the assistance and ad- 
liration of the United States and the 
merican people. 

It is important to me to start this 
urney in Sudan. The people of 
udan— even in the midst of their own 
-eat suffering — have given the world a 
sson in compassion. They have opened 
leir borders to victims of famine and 
ar. It is said that a friend in need is a 
lend indeed. The Sudanese people are, 
deed, friends to those who have come 
1 them in desperation. And I am here 
p show that the United States is a 
lend of the great-hearted people of 
udan. 

And, I should add, Sudan is an im- 
Drtant friend of the United States. We 
ive many common interests. Sudan is a 
iy country in a volatile region. Its 
jalth, its development, its stability are 
■iportant to the region and thus to us. I 
ok forward to my visit here, to learn- 
Lg first-hand of Sudan's efforts and its 
roblems, and to fruitful discussions 
ith President Nimeiri — an old 
•lend — and his colleagues. 

We are aware that Sudan faces 
roblems on several fronts. As a friend 
) the government and the people of 
.frica's largest nation, we hope to help 
'here we can. It is appropriate that this 
isit to Africa, at its time of emergency, 
egins here, in a nation born barely 30 
ears ago but in which Africa's rich 
iversity of cultures and languages, its 
)ng and proud history, is so well 
epresented. 



Sudan is also an appropriate 
jumping-off point because, like the vast 
majority of African nations, it is proud 
of its independence and its nonalignment 
and is determined to build a better 
future for its people. 

The United States is committed to 
helping. Sudan is the largest recipient of 
economic assistance from the United 
States in sub-Saharan Africa and, 
moreover, is receiving a large amount of 
food and disaster assistance. In the past 
4 years, there has been a 50% increase 
in economic assistance to Africa. This 
reflects the importance the United 
States attaches to all of Africa. In addi- 
tion, food aid reached a record level last 
year and will be over $1 billion this year. 

Throughout my visit, I will want to 
learn more about the long-range ques- 
tion — how to keep a disaster like this 
from happening again. 

Two areas in particular give reason 
for hope. The first is the advance of 
agricultural research; for example, the 



development of high-yield, drought- 
resistant sorghum hybrids. The sec- 
ond — and also of great importance — is 
that all across Africa a consensus is 
growing that the key to long-term pros- 
perity is in free and open markets, par- 
ticularly free and open agricultural 
markets. 

So I'm here on a kind of pilgrim- 
age — to see what more can be done to 
help those who suffer now, to see what 
can be done to ensure that no calamity 
like this happens again, and, on behalf of 
President Reagan and the American 
people, to show America's admiration 
and respect for the compassion and 
courage of the people of Sudan. 



STATEMENT, 
KHARTOUM. 
MAR. 7, 1985 

The last 3 days have been very moving 
for me. I've been to the Wad Sheriffe 




At the Wad Sheriffi refugee camp in Sudan, Mrs. Bush holds a 7-month-old infant: the 
day after this photograph was taken, the baby died of severe dehydration brought on by 
malnutrition. 



•■lay 1985 



13 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




camp for Ethiopian refugees and to El- 
Obeid cannp for displaced Sudanese. 

How can I express what I've seen— 
the suffering, the dignity, and the 
courage among those who have lost 
everything to the drought. And the 
courage and compassion, as well, of 
those who tend to the sick and the dying 
and who save lives. 

People ail over the world have one 
thing in common. When they hear of a 
friend in need, they open up their 
hearts. With people all over the free 
world, we Americans think of the 
Sudanese people as friends. And our 
hearts are open. 

Before the year is done, the United 
States will have provided unprecedented 
amounts of relief aid to Sudan, which is 
the largest recipient of U.S. develop- 
ment aid in sub-Saharan Africa. I was 
especially encouraged to learn of the 
American role in development of new 
grain hybrids — for example, the 
drought-resistant strain of sorghum. I've 
been told that if just one-quarter of 
Sudan's farmers were to plant with that 
hybrid, Sudan could fully feed itself, 
even in dry years like this one. So sure- 
ly, with developments like that, there's 
reason to have hope for the future. 

But let me state again my firm 
belief that developments like the grain 
hybrid are only the first step. In the 
long run, the key to prosperity in Sudan 
is — just as it is throughout the world — 
in free and open markets and trust in 
the dreams and energy and productive 
capacity of the Sudanese people. 

As I said on my arrival, Sudan is an 
important friend and partner in a 
volatile region of strategic significance. 
During my 3 days here, I have concen- 
trated on drought, famine, and refugee 
problems and the response of Sudan's 
government and people and the interna- 
tional community. I have also had most 
useful discussions with Sudan's leaders 
on other issues. 

We, like they, attach high impor- 
tance to seeing Sudan get back on its 
feet economically. These are tough times 
in many African countries, including 
Sudan. Leaders all over this continent 
are grappling with difficult decisions. I 
am hopeful that Sudan can soon turn the 
corner toward the path of economic ad- 
justment and growth. 

We also care deeply about the sta- 
bility of Sudan, Africa's largest country. 
I was impressed with President 
Nimeiri's speech last week calling for 
renewed dialogue between north and 
south. I was also impressed in my 
discussions with Second Vice President 



• 



Vice President Bush with Niger President Kountche. 



Lagu and other southern leaders yester- 
day by the importance of the issues of 
national reconciliation. 

We in America are, as a nation, 
reluctant to intervene in the internal af- 
fairs of another country. But we are also 
a nation that suffered a great conflict of 
our own between our north and south. 
We were not able to realize our full 
potential until that conflict was truly 
resolved. 

So, as an American who was born in 
our north but who first went to work in 
the oil fields of our south, I urge you to 
take up the openings for dialogue that 
are on the table, to reconcile your dif- 
ferences, to develop your oil as we did 
ours, and to allow all the people of this 
country full participation in building the 
greatness of Sudan. 

Finally, I want to thank President 
Nimeiri, First Vice President El Tayeb 
and their wives, and the people of Sudan 
for their extraordinary hospittility dur- 
ing my visit and to once more express 



the enormous admiration that the 
American people have for the compas- 
sion and courage of the people of Sudan, 

Faced with an overwhelming crisis 
of their own, the Sudanese people have, 
nevertheless, sheltered and given 
sustenance to hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from many countries. For this, 
America salutes Sudan. 



STATEMENT. 
NIAMEY. 
MAR. 9. 1985 

An American who knew much about 
pain and denial, Helen Keller, once said, 
"Although the world is full of suffering, 
it is also full of the overcoming of it." 

In the last 2 days, I have seen a 
country that is suffering a terrible 
famine and that is showing the world 
how to overcome it. Niger understood 
before many other countries how impor- 
tant it is to trust the farmer and the 



14 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



irdsman — trust their aspirations, trust 
eir resourcefulness, trust them in the 
)en and free market. And that trust 
•educed the reserves that cushioned 

Ie initial impact of the drought. 
I was involved in a very successful 
ogram of deregulation in my own 
untry. I'm proud to say it had 
mething to do with the revival of the 
merican economy these past 4 years. 
n pleased to see that deregulation — in 
is case, of agriculture — is becoming in- 
rnational. I am confident it will have 
e same beneficial effects here as it did 
America. 

The U.S. Government is proud to be 
)le to help the people of Niger with the 
ought, and we have committed 
)0,000 tons of food for that effort. This 
ill be a total of $46.1 million of food 
id other disaster assistance. This 
^re includes a total of approximately 
1 million promised during this visit to 
)ur country. 

I want to emphasize that private aid 
om the United States is very impor- 
nt. With me on this trip is C. Payne 
jcas, an old friend I much admire, 
ayne worked here in Niger in the 
eace Corps in the 1960s. After he left 
6 Peace Corps, he formed Africare, 
lie of the finest American private sec- 
ir development organizations. 

I have heard more than once from 
Ifrican leaders on this trip that to give 
man a fish will feed him for a day, but 
teach him how to fish will make him 
If-sufficient for life. Just one example 
Africare's many projects here in 
iger is an IBM-financed program that 
ains fishermen in Madarounfa in 
odern fishing techniques and provides 
em with credit. 

As I said the other night, Niger and 
merica have a longstanding friendship, 
'esident Reagan and I respect Presi- 
mt Kountche. We recognize Niger's 
■oblems, and we are determined to do 
hat we can to help Niger in its time of 
;ed. I want to thank President 
ountche for his warmth and candor 
id hospitality. My stay here one might 
rm a pilgrimage of friendship and con- 
■rn. 

As I said at the outset, Niger has 
iffered much but is moving to over- 
)me its suffering. President Kountche 
ade clear in our discussions how im- 
:)rtant it is to Niger that food commit- 
■d by donor nations be delivered on 
•hedule. I will take his message and my 
imiration of the Nigerien people with 
le to Geneva. 



DINNER TOAST, 
BAMAKO, 
MAR. 9. 1985 

I come from a very young nation. 
Americans trace their history back only 
a few hundred years. Here in Mali, there 
were great empires before the United 
States even existed. I know Malians are 
proud of their history and with good 
reason. It is truly correct to say that 
"your wealth is your civilization." The 
empire of Ghana reached its peak while 
Europe was still in the midst of the 
Dark Ages. 

The Mali Empire under the reign of 
Soundiata Keita was even more power- 
ful. The Songhai of Gao were one of the 
most powerful military forces ever 
known in West Africa. During the reign 
of the Askias, their empire spread from 
the Atlantic to Lake Tchad. 

Today Mali is creating a new his- 
tory. Significant events in recent years 
include the creation of the second 
republic, the formation of the Demo- 
cratic Union of Malian People; and local 
elections allowing average citizens' 
voices to be heard. The United States 
respects and honors Mali's history — old 
and new. 

I come to Mali as part of a pilgrim- 
age of friendship and concern that has 
taken me across the entire Sahel — from 
Sudan to Niger and now here. In this 



time of enormous trial for much of 
Africa, the United States and the 
American people have one message for 
the people of Mali — we are with you. 

We have heard the voices of the 
starving, of those who a cruel drought 
has driven from their lands. We have 
heard the voices of the farmers and the 
herdsman. We will help. 

Beyond the immediate crisis, the 
United States has heard another voice 
from Mali as well. We have heard you 
say that you are going to take a historic 
turn in agricultural policy — a historic 
turn that we trust, once the drought 
subsides and the rains return, will help 
ensure that famine of this magnitude 
never again comes to Mali. 

It is a simple but courageous turn 
that you have made, and it is summed 
up in a single word — trust. Trust the 
farmer, trust the herdsman, trust their 
aspirations and their resourcefulness, 
trust their private initiative, trust them 
with free and open markets. 

The United States fully understands 
the difficulties implicit in a turn toward 
open agricultural markets, and so here, 
too, the United States has the same 
message for the people of Mali — we are 
with you. 

Members of my party have signed 
today agreements that will assist Mali in 
making this transition. We applaud the 




Felipe Tejeda, the A.ssociate Peace Corps Director for agriculture and rural development, 
gives Vice President and Mrs. Bush a briefing on the Peace Corps activities in Mali. 



flay 1985 



15 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



courage of the Malian Government in 
starting on this difficult road. 

I am told that Bambara is a 
language of proverbs. One in particular 
caught my attention: "Dooni dooni 
kononin b'a nyaga da." ["The small bird 
builds its nest twig by twig."] I under- 
stand that this saying often describes 
Malian development efforts. I completely 
endorse the philosophy that economic 
success only comes with sustained ef- 
fort. I propose that we expand the scope 
of the proverb to include the relations 
between our two great nations. 

And so, Mr. President, I propose a 
toast to the energy and resourcefulness 
of the people of Mali and to lasting 
friendship between Mali and the United 
States. 



STATEMENT, 
BAMAKO, 
MAR. 10, 1985 

Today marks the end of a journey, a 
kind of pilgrimage of friendship and con- 
cern through Africa. My trip has taken 
me to three drought-stricken coun- 
tries—Sudan, Niger, and Mali. These 
countries face an enormous short-term 
problem — how to feed millions of starv- 
ing people. Each faces a deeper long- 
term problem — how to keep a catas- 
trophe like this from happening again, 
that is, how to increase overall 
agricultural production. 

Sudan, Niger, and Mali are not 
alone. The drought spans all across sub- 
Saharan Africa and affects more than a 
score of countries. The longer term 
crisis is that the per capita agricultural 
production in Africa has been dropping 
for 20 years. According to the World 
Bank, even without the drought, African 
per capita production would have fallen 
to its current, disastrous level by 1988. 

Time and again on my trip I've 
heard that there are three keys to re- 
versing this startling trend. 

The first is to move toward policies 
that trust the farmer, that give him ac- 
cess to free and open markets. The 
United States will help countries bring 
about these and other kinds of policy 
changes. 

I am happy to announce today that 
the U.S. Government will provide ap- 
proximately $18 million over 3 years in 
additional resources for Mali. This is 
part of our African economic policy 
reform program. This is a multiyear ef- 
fort which has the specific purposes of 
encouraging and supporting economic 
policy changes so needed for growth. 
Our commitment today is subject to dis- 
cussions now underway with the U.S. 



Congress and, of course, to discussions 
with the Government of Mali on how 
this money can support policy changes 
that the Malian Government lacks the 
resources to undertake. 

A second key is training — giving the 
African farmer access to more 
sophisticated and efficient techniques. 
Yesterday I visited some of the most 
splendid men and women I have met — 
our 80 Peace Corps volunteers here in 
Mali. They and volunteers like them 
across Africa are involved in this impor- 
tant work. 

A final key is research — for exam- 
ple, the development of more high-yield, 
drought-resistant grain hybrids. 

I am taking this message — Africa's 
message — with me to Geneva where I 
will address a UN conference dealing 
with famine in Africa. 

Barbara and I thank President 
Traore, Madame Traore, and the people 
of Mali for their marvelous hospitality. 
We hope we will have the opportunity to 
come back another time and stay longer 
in this warm and hospitable country. 



ADDRESS BEFORE THE 
UN CONFERENCE ON THE 
EMERGENCY SITUATION 
IN AFRICA, 
GENEVA, 
MAR. 11, 1985 

There are times in history when events 
in one land serve as a signal to others 
far away — a reminder of our humanity 







and of the costs if we fail to mobilize to 
meet the crisis at hand. History is full c 
sad examples when the signal was not 
heard or was ignored. Nearly 50 years 
ago — in this city, in this hall — an 
African nation, Ethiopia, called upon th 
world to resist acts of aggression that 
soon engulfed it in a cycle of death that 
struck millions of people in Africa and 
Asia, Europe and America. The toll 
need not have been nearly so high. 

When our predecessors met here 
nearly 50 years ago, they did not heed 
the signal. And, today, we can — and w( 
must — do better. Once again, the signa 
comes from Africa, but this time it is 
the voice not of one nation but of a 
score. It is the voice of millions of dyin; 
children, starving parents. 

Today, a great tragedy can be 
avoided if we listen to that voice — if wf 
put aside ideology, open our hearts, 
strengthen our vital institutions of 
cooperation, get to the root of Africa's 
crisis, and have the courage and 
perseverance to see the problem 
through. 

We just heard [Tanzanian] Presider 
Nyerere's eloquent plea, and to use his 
words: yes, it would be a miraculous 
relief, he called it, if cooperation and 
food led the world closer to peace. Let's 
go forward in that spirit. 

I come before you today as one wh( 
for the past week, has stood on the 
parched earth of Africa and seen some 
of the results of ecological disaster and 
human failure. And across thousands ol 
miles in Sudan, Niger, and Mali, I have 
seen and heard a small sample of the 
millions of Africans who are at risk in ; 
continentwide emergency. 

What Must Be Done 

I'd like now to share my thoughts abou 
what must be done to translate today's 
challenge into a better tom.orrow for 
millions of Africans. 

First, in terms of the drought and 
famine, I will not repeat the deadening 
barrage of statistics and differing 
estimates of what's needed. We must 
simply recognize that up to 30 million 
people are affected in countries across 
Africa. It is not possible to reach a 
precise definition of the food deficit. At 
best, we have a snapshot of a moving 
target whose exact shape changes daily 

What counts in the short term is 
getting food to people before they die. 
Families cannot eat ideology, and they 
cannot wait for solutions to age-old con- 
flicts. 

We cannot ignore the grim news of 
starvation and disaster in Ethiopia. 
Nearly 8 million people are affected, am 



16 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



ti) 



ny of them are beyond the reach of 
y existing feeding programs. That 
nply cannot continue. We respect the 
vereignty and the territorial integrity 
Ethiopia. That is not the issue. The 
;ue is that we cannot accept silence 
' lile perhaps 2.5 million people go 
thout relief in northern Ethiopia. All 
ncerned— all — must put aside politics 
bring relief to all in need. 

We must, in the complicated and 
manding task of feeding millions 
oughout the continent, rely on the ex- 
ing organizations which have served 
concerned so well. On behalf of Presi- 
nt Reagan and all Americans, I salute 
r Secretary General, Javier Perez de 
lellar, for calling this meeting of 
srcy. I commend Brad Morse for all 
at he is doing here at the United Na- 
ms, as well as Jim Ingram for the 
orld Food Program's important food 
1 logistics coordination. 2 And I salute 
the volunteer organizations, many of 
lich are represented here today. 

Just as threatened populations can- 
t eat ideology, they also cannot eat 
gue pledges. We need coordinated 
mmitments which encompass the task 
delivering food from where it is 
own to where it is eaten at a time cer- 
n. Because many of the hardest hit 
eas are in land-locked countries and 

ports that serve them are small, 
IS, in turn, requires priority treatment 
food ships. 

Much more needs to be done with 
spect to this key question of coordina- 
itn and timing, and the UN Office of 
mergency Operations in Africa is ideal- 
suited to play a central role. 
f We cannot fail to heed the eloquent 
I ?a, just made by President Kountche 
I ' Niger], and here's the quote: "to pay 
1 rticular attention to logistics and com- 
i jnication." 

As an American, I am proud of the 
I sponse which hunger in Africa has 
I oked from the American people. Since 
' e first television pictures appeared in 
i;tober, Americans — from their own 
ickets — have given more than $70 
: illion for African relief. I saw 
Tierican mercy planes filled with 
ivately donated relief supplies at every 
op I made in Africa. 

As we did last year, the United 
i.ates is again prepared to meet 50% of 
e emergency food need, which we 
timate to be about 3 million tons. Let 
e be clear on the central point. We are 
eking the needed funds from our Con- 
•ess, and we are committed to obtain 
em. I am pleased today that the ma- 
rity and minority leaders of the U.S. 



Senate are seated with the American 
delegation, that they have been joined 
by Senator Lugar, who is the Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, and 
also by Senator Pell and Senator 
Kennedy. 

In all, this year, we plan to provide 
3 million tons of food for emergency and 
other requirements. Our total food and 
drought assistance will come to more 
than $1 billion, in addition to the $788 
million of other previously planned 
economic assistance. 

The Search for Long-Term Solutions 

Let me turn now to the long-term 
future, because we realize that the prob- 
lem of recurring famine in Africa may 
take decades to solve. 

Along with the sadness and the 
tragedy in the relief camps, I also saw 
hope in the faces of children who had 
responded to adequate food and water 
as a withered plant responds to rain. 
And for the long term, there is 
hope— hope in the growing recognition 
by more and more governments that it 
is time to open Africa's agricultural 
markets and let its farm economies 
breathe. 

President Nimeiri in Sudan, Presi- 
dent Kountche— here with us today— in 
Niger, and President Traore in Mali all 
discussed with me enacted or planned 
reforms. Today, I was pleased to meet 
with Dr. Nyerere to further discuss the 
concerns in the overall OAU [Organiza- 
tion of African Unity] context. 

Almost half of the countries on the 
continent have started the journey to 
open and free agricultural markets. The 
removal of price controls in Somalia, I 
am told, has led to a striking 40% in- 
crease in sorghum and banana produc- 
tion. After Malawi's maize prices were 
allowed to rise, their crop doubled, and 
Malawi is now a maize exporter despite 
the drought. In Zimbabwe, price incen- 
tives to farmers have been a central 
factor in that country's impressive 
agricultural output. 

The United States is encouraging 
such progress with a 5-year, $500 
million African economic policy reform 
program and a "Food for Progress" pro- 
gram under which nondisaster food will 
be provided to countries undertaking 
reform. 

There is a second reason for grow- 
ing hope in Africa's future— that is the 
dawning of a new day in African 
agricultural practices. 



I was briefed in Kliarloum about 
a new strain of drought-resistant 
sorghum, one of the first products of 
agricultural research focused on Africa 
itself. It promises to increase yields by 
150%. If Sudanese farmers come to use 
it for just a quarter of the sorghum they 
grow, Sudan will feed itself. 

Africa needs its own green revolu- 
tion. It needs research— it needs it 
badly— to develop new seed varieties ap- 
propriate to Africa's fragile soils and its 
fickle climate. Moreover, people need to 
be trained to use the new seeds, to use 
the new techniques. 

We donors have a responsibility to 
our own citizens and to Africa alike to 
give both relief and forms of aid that do 
not perpetuate dependency. Today, 
Africans seek our help not because they 
want to depend on someone else, not 
because they wanted to depend on us, 
but because other models have failed 
and they want to get on their own feet. 
They also want changes in other areas 
that I have not touched on, such as im- 
proved training and education and sensi- 
ble family planning, which the United 
States also supports. 

Desertification 

Finally, I must speak of a daunting fac- 
tor in the African equation— that is, of 
the growing aridity in Africa called 
desertification. I felt this ecological 
disaster firsthand when swirling dust 
storms prohibited our landing at Maradi, 
in Niger, to see firsthand the ravage of 
desertification. 

In many parts of Africa today, I am 
told, farmers rise before dawn, and they 
never see the full light of day— they live 
in a half-lit world beneath the dust 
clouds of the expanding desert. 

Why is the desert growing? We 
don't know completely. But if we do not 
have all the answers right now, I 
believe, nevertheless, that here, as in so 
many other areas, we have a reason for 
hope. 

In the 1930s, in the central plains of 
the United States, my country, 
Americans experienced something we 
call the "dust bowl." It encompassed 
many, many of our states, and our ma- 
jority leader of the Senate, Senator 
Dole, comes from Kansas— a state that 
was devastated by the so-called dust 
bowl. The land became parched from an 
extended drought, and the wind kicked 
up dust as dense as it is in areas of the 
Sahel. People said that land would never 
produce crops again. 



ay 1985 



17 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



That was just in the 1930s, and, to- 
day, an important part of the food 
America ships to Africa comes from 
what once was known as the dust bowl. 
With more research, Africa, too, will 
reclaim its once-productive land. 

I have finished my brief— all too 
brief— journey to Africa, but obviously 
Africa's journey is really just beginning. 
If the land of the Sahel is to follow the 
example of America's dust bowl, Africa 
must travel a long distance— a long 
distance in agricultural policy; a long 
distance in developing the skills of its 
farmers; and a long distance in applying 
new techniques. 

And we, the humanitarian nations of 
the world, have a responsibility to Africa 
itself, a responsibility to those little 
children to join Africa in that journey. I 
can't think of any better place to make 
that commitment than right here, today, 
in this room. 



Vice President's Visit to iVIoscow 



'Texts from the Office of the Vice Presi- 
dent's Press Secretary. 

^Brad Morse, Director of the Office for 
Emergency Operations in Africa and Ad- 
ministrator of the UN Development Program; 
James C. Ingram. Executive Director of the 
World Food Program. ■ 



Vice President Bush was named by 
President Reagan to head the U.S. 
delegation to the funeral of Soviet Presi- 
dent Konstantin U. Chemenko. He was 
in Moscow March 12-13, 1985. 

Following are his departure remarks 
in Geneva and a news conference held in 
Moscow. ' 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, 

GENEVA, 

MAR. 12, 1985 

I'm leaving this morning for Moscow to 
attend the funeral of President 
Chernenko. Yesterday, as you know, I 
addressed the UN International Con- 
ference on the Emergency Situation in 
Africa. This has become a trip of con- 
trasts that will have taken me, before I 
am done, from the heat and dust of 
Africa to the cold and snow of the 
Soviet Union; and from focusing on the 
issue of famine to focusing on the broad- 
est issues of world peace. But diverse as 
these issues are, they have one thing in 
common — each deals with the broad 
aspiration of our common humanity. 

The Soviet Union has suffered an 
extraordinary loss. For the third time in 
less than 2V2 years, it has lost its leader. 
Once again I am carrying the condo- 
lences of President Reagan and the 
American people to the people of the 
Soviet Union. I look forward once again 
to meeting with the new Soviet leader- 
ship and to conveying the desire of 
President Reagan and the American 
people for a peaceful world free from 
the threat of great power conflict and 
free from the threat of nuclear weapons. 

All mankind desires peace. Today, at 
this hour, those hopes focus on the com- 
mencement of arms control talks here in 
Geneva. 

America hopes that within the 
Soviet Union, we will see another begin- 
ning — the begfinning of a new era of 
stable Soviet leadership in which we 
may progress in sustained movement 
toward arms reduction; the beginning of 
a new era leading toward lasting world 
peace. Lasting world peace — that is the 
hope and prayer of all mankind. And 
that, together with my message of con- 
dolence, is the purpose of this trip to 
Moscow. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

MOSCOW, 

MAR. 13, 1985 

Let me just say that we have come froi 
a rather extensive meeting [with 
General Secretary Gorbachev]. It lasted 
for about 1 hour and 25 minutes, I 
think. I will not go into details, specific: 
I never have, some of you may recall, 
and I won't do it here. 

I will say — and I try to be respon 
sive to questions, but we are not going 
to discuss the details of v/hat I dis- 
cussed, what the Secretary discussed — 
that the meeting was useful, and there 
was a lot of important content dis- 
cussed, a wide array of issues. 

Q. Did you bring a letter from 
President Reagan inviting Mr. 
Gorbachev to a summit meeting in 
Washington, and if so, what was his 
reaction? 

A. I brought a letter; I will not 
discuss the contents of it. But I believe 
that the President does feel a meeting 
would be useful. 

Q. There has been a spate of 
stories and suggestions that we are 
now heading for a new era of detente 
or for at least better relationships be- 
tween Washington and Moscow. Can 
you give us your assessment of any 
possible shift in atmosphere? 

A. I think we both felt that it was 
constructive and nonpolemical. If there 
ever was a time when we can move for- 
ward with progress in the last few 
years, I would say that this is a good 
time for that, and our aspirations for 
that are high. But we are not euphoric; 
we're realistic in our assessment of 
things now, and we were before this 
meeting and we are after this meeting. 
We encountered nothing there to 
discourage us in any way from these 
feelings that I think you appropriately 
say are high — high on hope, high that 
we can make progress in Geneva, high 
for an overall reduction of tensions. 
Nothing happened tonight that would 
discourage us from that. The frankness 
and the usefulness and the content of 
the meeting was such that I think that 
we have reason to be encouraged. 

Q. Did you talk about the Stra- 
tegic Defense Initiative? Was it your 
feeling that the new Soviet leader 
feels that this is an insuperable bar- 
rier to good relations? 



18 



Department of Stale Bulletin' 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




ftpr the funeral of President Chernenko 
Moscow, Vice President Bush and 
etretary Shultz met with the new Soviet 



leader Mikhail Gorbachev (second from 
left) and Foreign Minister Gromyko. 



A. You must have missed my earlier 
imment about not discussing the 
r-tails of what we did talk about. I'm 
'iTv, it makes it much less interesting, 
know, but I will stay with that and just 
■IVr on the specifics of what we talked 
tout. We don't feel from the overall 
mversation that anything is in- 
ijierable, no. 

Q. How much of the meeting was 
inducted by Mr. Gorbachev and how 
luch by Mr. Gromyko? 

A. Mr. Gorbachev conducted the 
leeting and did it with great confidence 
id assurance. When the Secretary had 
)nu'thing to say, the atmosphere was 
u li that all four of us felt inclined to 
uticipate. But clearly Mr. Gorbachev 
as the main interlocutor and self- 
infident in the statements. He made a 
ery strong impression. 

Q. You say if there ever was a 
ime for progress that this is the time, 
t'^hy does the change in leadership 
lake this such a good time at the 
resent time? Is there something 
bout the new leader, or what is — 

A. I would simply say that my view 
n that would have been enhanced by 
he meeting we have just had. I'm not 
uphoric, suggesting there are no major 
roblems. There are big problems, major 
ifferences that we've had over the 



years and probably will continue to have 
in the future. But the climate is such 
that we feel this is a good time to move 
forward, and I hope that we adequately 
conveyed our President's view on that. 
Secretary Shultz saw him more recently 
than I, in fact I haven't seen the 
President — I talked to him once — but 
the Secretary had had long talks with 
him after the change here. I think that 
George agrees that the President is 
very, very serious and, indeed, hopeful, 
and the Secretary will report back. 

Q. Without going into details, can 
you say that President Reagan wants 
an early meeting with Mr. Gorbachev 
in the next few months or is this 
something that has to be put off down 
the road to the end of the year? 

A. No I think he'd be ready as soon 
as the Soviet leadership will be, but 
that's just my speculation on that. 

Q. You met with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
this morning. Would you like to com- 
ment on your discussions with him — 
the Prime Minister of India? 

A. He accorded us a good deal of 
time. I had a chance to tell him how 
much the President was looking forward 
to receiving him in June. We discussed 
our relations with India, and we are en- 
couraged as to how they are going. 
Nothing we do with any other country is 
to be done to the detriment of India, and 
I think the Prime Minister understands 
that. 



All in all both the Secretary and I 
feel that it was a very, very useful 
meeting, and it was very frank with the 
Prime Minister, who really has won the 
respect of the people of the United 
States coming in under extraordinarily 
difficult circumstances and conducting 
himself with real leadership and 
foresight. So we are looking forward to 
his visit this June. 

Q. What impression did you have 
of Mr. Gorbachev's readiness for a 
meeting with Mr. Reagan? 

A. I really honestly can't answer; 
not to try to avoid your question, but I 
just couldn't tell you from anything 
about that. But I have the very comfort- 
able feeling knowing the President as 
well as I do— and I haven't compared 
notes with the Secretary on this — that it 
would be fruitful and be good and that 
there would be — we come away saying 
useful and we really mean it, and in im- 
portant content, we really mean that. 
We felt that we had perhaps made some 
progress and I know that the President 
would feel exactly the same way. 



'Texts from the Office of the Vice Presi- 
dent's Press Secretary. ■ 



lay 1985 



19 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President's Visit to Grenada, 
Brazil, and {Honduras 



Vice President Bush went from 
Moscow to visit Grenada (March H, 
1985), Brazil (March 14-16) to head the 
U.S. delegation at the inauguration of 
President-elect Tancredo de Almeida 
Neves, ^ and Honduras (March 16). 

Following are remarks he made dur- 
ing the trip.^ 



STATEMENT, 
ST. GEORGE'S, 
MAR. 14, 1985 

Let me begin by saying how very 
pleased I am to have this chance to visit 
Grenada. Our reception has been as 
warm as the Caribbean sun. 

I have just met with Governor 
General Sir Paul Scoon and Prime 
Minister Blaize. Among the many issues 
we discussed was the withdrawal of U.S. 
and Caribbean peace force troops and 
the worries of many on this island that 
their departure will leave Grenada 
vulnerable to the antidemocratic forces 
that have recently caused so much 
misery. 

We are confident that Grenada's 
own security forces can now take on the 
primary responsibility for Grenada's pro- 
tection. But let me just state for the 
record: Should extraordinary develop- 
ments threaten this island during the 
withdrawal period, we stand ready to 
halt and reverse, if necessary, the with- 
drawal of troops. 

Grenada is now part of the brother- 
hood of democratic nations. With able 
leaders such as Prime Minister Blaize, 
Grenada can, indeed, look forward to a 
bright future. 



REMARKS. 

TANTEEN FIELD, GRENADA, 

MAR. 14, 1985 

In the short time I have spent on your 
beautiful island, my heart has been 
warmed by the spontaneous expressions 
of friendship from the Grenadian people. 
What I have seen makes me both happy 
and proud. 

I have met with Governor General 
Scoon and your newly elected Prime 
Minister Blaize — able men dedicated to 
strengthening the democratic institu- 
tions and building the vital economy on 
which this island's future depends. And I 
have seen many of the places of battle, 




Grenada welcomes Vice President Bush. 



scenes of valor and sacrifice, where 
American servicemen distinguished 
themselves in service to their country 
and to your people — True Blue Campus, 
Grande Anse and Calivigny. 

President Reagan asked me to per- 
sonally convey to you his best wishes 
and to thank you for your hundreds of 
letters of support — especially those let- 
ters of appreciation for the soldiers who 
served here. He was deeply moved by 
your descriptions of brutality under the 
communist rule, and he — along with all 
Americans — share your joy in your new- 
ly won freedom. One man wrote that 
where there was darkness, now there is 
light. 

Our hopes and emotions were with 
you last December when such an over- 
whelming number of the people of this 
island turned out to vote and affirm, fur 
all the world to see, that Grenada would 
once again proudly take its stand among 
the ranks of free, democratic nations. 
Grenada has taken hold of its destiny, 
and together with the vast majority of 
countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, you have confidently set off 
on a journey down freedom's road. 



I want to emphasize as strongly as I 
can that President Reagan and I and th( 
people of the United States will never 
waver in our support for democracy, 
and we will always have a special in- 
terest in Grenada. We support the freelj 
elected government of Prime Minister 
Blaize, and we will continue to do all we 
can to help as you work to secure a 
l)right and prosperous future. 

I know that many on these islands 
are worried about the safety of their 
new democracies now that the United 
Sttites and the members of the Carib- 
bean peace force are withdrawing their 
troops. Many have expressed the fear 
that without our troops, the unprin- 
cipled, antidemocratic forces and their 
foreign allies in the communist bloc will 
once again work to subvert the freedoms 
(Grenada now enjoys. 

Let me assure you, we will not leave 
you unprotected. We will continue to 
support Grenada's own police and 
paramilitary. They are well trained and 
equipped, and we are confident that they 
are now prepared to take on the 
primary responsibility for Grenada's 
security. But let me state clearly: We 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



ill not sit idly by and watch Grenada's 
>curity threatened. Should a security 
ireat materialize during the withdrawal 
?riod, we stand ready to halt and, if 
ecessary, reverse the withdrawal of our 
?curity forces. 

There is a bond of friendship be- 
veen our two nations that cannot now 
? broken. We will continue to provide 
•aining and equipment and to par- 
cipate with Grenada and other demo- 
:"itic Caribbean nations in regularly 
?heduled joint military exercises. We 

support each other, and we will 
ever relax our vigilance against the 
jrces of oppression. Despots of 
'hatever stripe can forget their designs 
n this nation. Grenada has found its 
iture in freedom. 

But we know that the truly difficult 
■ork of building prosperity has only just 
egiui. Prime Minister Blaize has wisely 
iken a reform of this nation's tax 
/stem as one of his first priorities. As 
'e have found these last few years in 
le United States, and as we have seen 
I me and again around the world, only 
I'hen there are incentives and people 
Ire left free to hope, work, and produce, 
nly then is true, lasting economic 
evelopment possible. 

At the same time, I promise you 
lat President Reagan and I are doing, 
nd will continue to do, all we can to aid 
1 Grenada's development. Already $57 
lillion have gone into completion of this 
lirport, building roads, and improving 
le water supply. We have made con- 
-ibutions in education, agriculture, 
ealth, and in meeting the shortfall of 
iovernment income. Our Agency for In- 
prnational Development projects have 
Bready provided employment for more 
lan 1,000 people. 

But ultimately, jobs and opportunity 
lepend on self-sustaining economic 
evelopment— the kind Prime Minister 
lllaize is skillfully working toward. 

Under the example and the guidance 
■f Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, the 
tewardship of the interim government 
nder Mr. Nicholas Brathwaite, and now 
he leadership of your distinguished 
'rime Minister, Grenada has come a 
3ng way. You have earned the respect 
if your fellow democracies. I join Presi- 
lent Reagan and the American people in 
aluting you. 

I know I speak for all of us in the 
Jnited States when I say, God bless the 
ree people of Grenada, and God bless 
he firm and lasting friendship that con- 
inues to grow between our two nations. 




Vice President Bush with Jose Sarney, 
interim President of Brazil (above) and 
President Suazo of Honduras (right). 



REMARKS, 

COMAYAGUA, HONDURAS. 

MAR. 16. 1985 

Mr. President, it is a great personal 
pleasure to be here and be able to renew 
our friendship. You have visited the 
United States three times, and I have 
been privileged to have you as a guest in 
our home. I am honored tobe in your 
country to visit you — particularly on 
this, the eve of your birthday. I bring 
you greetings from President Reagan 
and the American people and best 
wishes for a healthy, happy birthday 
with many more to come. 

Today you and I will discuss matters 
of mutual concern to our two countries. 
We will speak as representatives of two 
nations that desire peace, respect in- 
dividual rights, and work to increase 
economic prosperity for our own people 
and for all our neighbors throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. Our talks will fur- 
ther strengthen the bonds of friendship 
and shared values between Honduras 
and the United States. 




Mr. President, thank you for the op- 
portunity to visit your beautiful country 
and to meet with you once more. 



STATEMENT. 

COMAYAGUA. HONDURAS, 
MAR. 16, 1985 

It has been a great pleasure for me to 
meet with President Suazo in his home 
town of La Paz and to visit U.S. forces 



i/lay 1985 



21 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



here. I have the utmost admiration and 
friendship for President Suazo. When he 
is succeeded next January, I know that 
he will have earned his place in the 
history of the Americas. 

My visit here today underlines, for 
all the world to see, our lasting commit- 
ment to a free and democratic Hon- 
duras. Against the communist/terrorist 
forces which seek to destabilize the 
region, the United States and Honduras 
stand firmly united in a close bond for 
friendship and mutual support. In the 
last 4 years, the United States has 
dramatically increased its annual 
economic assistance to Honduras. 

Freedom loving people everywhere 
appreciate the hardships and trials Hon- 
duras has had to endure as a nation on 
the front lines of freedom. Both of our 
governments recognize the need for 
vigilance against the threat of com- 
munist aggression. Any communist 
power with designs against Honduras 
should know that the United States 
stands foursquare behind its democratic 
partner. We will not allow the security 
of Honduras to be compromised. 

As long as the Sandinistas impose 
totalitarian rule and ally themselves with 
the communist/terrorist nations, as long 
as the Nicaraguan military buildup far 
exceeds that country's defensive needs, 
there will be instability in the region. 
Let the Sandinistas look to the example 
of their democratic neighbors, countries 
that now enjoy the hope and freedom 
that the rulers in Managua have stolen 
from their own people. 

We urge Nicaragua to cut its ties to 
hostile foreign military forces and join 
the great majority of countries in Latin 
America on their march to freedom. 

As I leave, I want to emphasize once 
again our deep commitment to Hon- 
duras' security and to its right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of the democratic 
liberties it has so proudly earned. 



Nicaragua: A Threat to Democracy 



Ik 



'Due to illness, President-elect Neves was 
unable to take the oath office; Jose Sarney 
was sworn in as Vice President and became 
Acting President. 

^Text from the Office of the Vice Presi- 
dent's Press Secretary. ■ 



by Vice President Bush 

Address before the Austin Council on 
Foreign Affairs on February 28. 1985."^ 

It's been more than 6 months since Con- 
gress voted to hold up further aid to the 
freedom fighters, battling to bring de- 
mocracy to Nicaragua. And apparently 
the communist rulers in that country 
have seen their opportunity and are now 
engaged in a major military effort to 
wipe out the armed democratic 
resistance to their regime once and for 
all. 

They're being helped by massive sup- 
plies of weapons from their friends and 
allies in the Soviet Union, East Ger- 
many, Bulgaria, North Korea, Vietnam, 
Cuba, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), Libya, and other 
radical states. These weapons included 
the ultra-sophisticated HIND heli- 
copter — the one being used by the 
Soviets with devastating effect against 
the freedom fighters in 
Afghanistan — over L50 tanks, and 200 
other armored vehicles, many of these 
mobile rocket launchers. 

Even so, the freedom fighters con- 
tinue to gain support and recruits from 
the disillusioned Nicaraguan populace. 
The democratic aspirations which fueled 
that first revolution in 1979 against 
Somoza still burn unsatisfied in the 
breasts of the Nicaraguan people. 

But the urgent question which we 
must address and address quickly is how 
long that democratic resistance can sur- 
vive the Sandinista assault if the United 
States refuses to give any aid. The long- 
suffering Nicaraguan people need our 
help. 

No one's asking for U.S. troops, only 
for technical material financial support. 
And we're only asking Congress to 
release a few dollars to a brave people 
who are striving for the same demo- 
cratic ideals and freedoms that our own 
forefathers fought for in the American 
Revolution. 

Sandinista Intentions 

When I watch the debate over Nicara- 
gua I sometimes wonder if the op- 
ponents of aid to the freedom fighters 
have been listening to what the 
rulers — the Marxist-Leninist rulers in 
Nicaragua — themselves have been say- 
ing, because the Sandinistas are often 
quite open — not when they send their 
people up here — but they're often quite 
open about the intentions and purposes. 



And they often directly contradict the 
excuses made for them by some of theii 
misguided sympathizers in this and in 
other countries. 

For instance, some still insist that 
the Marxist-Leninists in Nicaragua pose 
no threat to their democratic neighbors 
Yes, the Nicaraguan Army is stronger 
and better equipped than all the other 
armies of Central America combined. 
But, say Nicaragua's defenders, these 
Marxists have no extraterritorial ambi- 
tion. 

Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan Minister 
of the Interior, has stated from the 
beginning, "This revolution goes beyond 
our borders. Our revolution was always 
internationalist." This is a Borge quote. 

I brought with me some commemor 
ative postage stamps from Nicaragua. 
Karl Marx, the Communist Manifesto. 
These are stamps — commemorative 
stamps — of the Government of 
Nicaragua. 

Or listen to Humberto Ortega, the 
Sandinista Defense Minister, who openl; 
said. "Of course, we're not ashamed to 
be helping the guerrillas in El Salvador. 
We would like to help all revolutions." 
His own quote. 

Or Nicaragua's Foreign Minister, 
[Miguel] D'Escoto, who described how 
the Sandinistas view Central America. 
Here's the quote: "You may look at us a 
five countries, six now with Panama, bu 
we regard ourselves as six different 
states of a single nation, in the process 
of reunification." 

Tomas Borge once described the 
final process of that reunification when 
he called Costa Rica "the dessert." WTia 
he meant was that tiny Costa Rica, a 
long-standing, stable democracy with n< 
army, would be completely vulnerable ti 
armed aggression — a piece of cake, as i 
were. Nicaragua's Ambassador to Costa 
Rica spelled it out more openly, more 
clearly. He said that the Costa Ricans, 
should they call on the OAS [Organiza- 
tion of American States) to help them in 
the event of an invasion, would not have 
time to convoke an OAS meeting 
because "by that time they would have 
been occupied." 

This is the voice of bullying and in- 
timidation and blatant contempt for in- 
ternational law. And it is the voice, 
often heard before in history, of tyrants 
bent on conquest. And it's a very clear 
voice for all who choose to listen of the 
Nicaraguan Sandinista rulers. 

They came to power — the San- 
dinistas — promising to establish a 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



?mocratic government chosen by free 
ections, and we believed their prom- 
es. And so, the United States gave the 
icaraguan revolutionaries un- 
•ecedented aid. We were the largest, 
I far, supporters of the Sandinistas 
"ter the overthrow of the Somoza dic- 
.torship— $120 million from 1979 to 
)81 plus support for $240 million more 
funds from the Inter-American 
evelopment Bank. And we gave more 
d than any other nation. But even 
hile we were giving aid, the hard-line 
)mmunists there were already breaking 
leir promises. 

[oral and Strategic 
iterests at Stake 

0, in Nicaragua we see that the San- 
nistas have nearly extinguished 
eedom of the press — la prensa. In- 
jpendent labor unions have been 
arassed, their leaders beaten and ar- 
!sted. Leaders of the business com- 
unity were arrested simply because 
ley issued statements criticizing official 
jlicy. And following the Cuban model, 
18 Sandinistas set up a network of in- 
rmers and "thought" police spying on 
.milies and communities. And already 
leir jails are filled with political 
-isoners, some 3,600 by the latest 
;timate. 

But of course the biggest obstacle to 
le Sandinistas' complete domination is 
le church, which has been harassed 
ercilessly. In a country of deeply 
iligious people, the government doesn't 
jsitate to have priests beaten, arrested, 
id you saw not so many months ago, 
eked out — exiled from Nicaragua, 
oly Week services and the bishop's 
eekly homily have been censored. At 
le time they wouldn't even permit — 2 
jars ago, I believe it was — Holy Week 
-oadcasts at all. Government-inspired 
lobs even insulted and mocked the Holy 
ather when he visited that country, 
rotestant sects, including Evangelicals, 
ave been attacked. There have been an- 
semitic attacks, and the Sandinista 
lilitary has burned over 50 churches. 

Amazingly, we still hear the libel 
?peated that the Nicaraguan freedom 
ghters are made up largely of followers 
f Somoza — ex-followers of Somoza. In 
ict, ex-members of Somoza's national 
uard account for only a tiny handful of 
le 1.5,000 armed resistance fighters, 
'he entire political leadership of the 
"eedom fighters— Alfonso Robelo and 
ildolfo Colero of the FDN [Nicaraguan 
)emocratic Force] and Eden Pastora — 
/ere prominent political opponents of 
lOmoza. 



Both Robelo and Pastora, the 
famous — you know, he's the com- 
mander, Commandante Zero— par- 
ticipated in the revolution and were 
members of the original revolutionary 
government. They only took up arms 
again when it became clear to them that 
the hard-line Marxist communists had 
seized all power and were, as Eden 
Pastora says, selling their country out to 
the Soviet bloc. 

But apart from the compelling moral 
reasons for supporting fellow Americans 
struggling for their liberty, the United 
States has paramount strategic interests 
at stake. How long, I wonder, can we ig- 
nore the threat to our national security 
posed by a Soviet client stage on the 
American mainland? I don't have to tell 
you how strategically vital the Caribbean 
and gulf are, with nearly two-thirds of 
our oil and half of all foreign trade pass- 
ing through the region. Some of the 
largest oil refineries and tanker facilities 
in the world are located here, and the 
Caribbean Basin is the fourth largest 
market for U.S. products. 

In time of conflict, half of NATO's 
resupply and reinforcement would 
depart from gulf ports. And they would 
be highly vulnerable to attack — sub- 
marines or other — as we found in World 
War II, we saw what the submarines did 
when they were a mere handful of 
U-boats operating from distant bases in 
Europe, sinking 114 allied ships in 6 
months. 

Most dangerous is the momentum of 
the communist armed subversion, in 
which each new conquest becomes a 
base area to launch an attack against 
neighboring countries. 

Recently, the Soviet Ambassador to 
Brazil said of Nicaragua that the way 
things — and here's the quote — "The way 
things are going, we will have another 
Cuba there." But that might not be the 
worst of it because along with the 
Soviets came the Libyans — you heard 
[Muammer] Qadhafi the other day speak- 
ing to Farrakhan's democratic group— 
the PLO, and now we see the fanatical 
Iranian followers there of AyatoUah 
Khomeini. Worse than another Cuba, we 
run the risk of seeing another Libya— 
that kind of a real radicalism, developing 
a warehouse of subversion and terrorism 
only 2 hours by air from the Texas 
border. 

We should think hard and seriously 
about this. Do we really want to allow 
the virus of international terrorism to 
effect the American mainland? The 
tyrants aren't shy about supporting com- 
munism and subversion. Why should the 
democratic countries hesitate in their 
support of freedom? 



As we celebrate what our President 
has called a second American revolution 
of hope and opportunity abroad — at 
home, we shouldn't forget that our first 
American revolution might not have 
been successful without the aid and sup- 
port of freedom-loving people from 
around the world: Lafayette from 
France, Von Steuben from Germany, 
Kosciusko from Poland. Let's not forget 
that others must still fight for their 
freedom. 

Signs of Democracy 

Next month, I'll be flying down to Brazil 
to — after we get back from Africa, 2 
days, and then down there to celebrate 
the inauguration of Mr. [Tancredo] 
Neves as the first civilian President in 
that country in 21 years. On the same 
trip, I'll be visiting Grenada and Hon- 
duras, two other countries that are now 
going down the democratic path. In the 
last 5 years, elected — this is an in- 
teresting statistic — I don't think many 
Americans focus on it — in the last 5 
years, elected civilian presidents have 
also replaced military leaders in Argen- 
tina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Panama, Peru, and on March 1st, 
Uruguay will join the democratic club. 

Guatemala's had already constituent 
assembly elections, and later this year, 
will have general elections for a presi- 
dent. And it's clear then that when free 
to choose, the people of Latin America 
choose democracy. 

It's not over. You have Chile with a 
dictatorship, totalitarian dictatorship on 
the right, and you have countries like 
Nicaragua, from who avowedly are 
Marxist-Leninist, on the left. 

In Central America, we are engaged 
in an effort to assist the people in 
establishing democracy and free enter- 
prise, and it is working. The signs of 
success are expressed in the growing 
strength of the democracy in El 
Salvador, in the cohesion of the people, 
and the army and their successful cam- 
paign against the rebels. It's expressed 
in the elections of the past 4 years in 
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala. 
And perhaps it's expressed in the peace 
initiative announced yesterday by Daniel 
Ortega in Nicaragua. Something must be 
working when changes like this, if in- 
deed they are changes, occur. How are 
we to interpret this current series of 
statements? 

On the face of it, offering to remove 
about 1% of the Cuban presence, or to 
pause in their imports of arms which 
they acknowledge could not be absorbed 
at this time, do not appear to represent 



^au 1PRIS 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



significant moves. But it is relevant to 
ask wiiy the bother? Is it because 
Nicaraguan young men are refusing to 
serve in the army out of revulsion at 
their government's policies, and are join- 
ing the resistance? Is it because of 
outrage being expressed by the church 
in Nicaragua? Is it because of the col- 
lapse of their economy under the weight 
of Sandinista militarism and corruption? 
Is it because their people see what's go- 
ing on in neighboring countries and 
want it for themselves? 

Perhaps it is because of these 
reasons. Perhaps it is because the Scoop 
Jackson plan, our plan to support 
economic change and reform, is work- 
ing. Perhaps it's because the struggling 
freedom fighters appeal to the people of 
Nicaragua. Whatever the cause, we 
would surely welcome genuine Nica- 
raguan interest in peace. 

And all we're asking is that the San- 
dinistas commit themselves to specific, 
concrete actions that would show their 
good faith interest in peace— actions in- 
volving no more than they committed 
themselves in their own revolution 5 
years ago. 

We have consistently pursued 
negotiations with the Sandinistas. We 
supported the Contadora process from 
its conception and still do. And even 
undertook, with the Sandinistas — with 
Ambassador [Harry] Shlaudeman's 
talks— separate bilateral negotiation. 
And our Assistant Secretary of State, 
Tony Motley, has been down there 
several times — bilateral. 

We've done that with Nicaragua to 
help facilitate agreement. And, unfor- 
tunately, negotiations have stalled out 
on their intransigence. All we are asking 
is that the Sandinistas stop exporting 
subversion of their neighbors; that they 
reduce their bloated military to restore 
regional balance. And it's not just the 
United States that is asking this — it's 
many of the democratic countries in the 
hemisphere as well. Stop subversion; 
reduce the military to restore a regional 
balance; sever military ties with Cuba 
and the Soviet bloc; and begin to honor 
their promises to the Organization of 
American States to create a democratic, 
pluralistic, political system. 

That last point, establishing 
pluralism and democracy, is really the 
most fundamental. And what signs 
should we look for for the progress 
toward genuine democracy? That the 
Sandinistas bring the democratic leaders 
back into the political process; that they 
hold honest, free and fair elections; that 
they stop beating up on the church, the 
unions, and business community; stop 



censoring the press; stop going after the 
Jews in an antisemitism perhaps un- 
matched in this hemisphere; that they 
sever control of the army from the par- 
ty, from the Sandinista Party; and that 
they remove the most insidious form of 
totalitarian control, that neighborhood 
spy system known as the "Sandinista 
Defense Committees." 

Freedom can flourish in Nicaragua, 
just as it's flourishing throughout the 
rest of the continent; but it really does 
need our help. We must act now, before 
it's too late. We need your support, the 



support of the American people, to mak 
Congress understand that the struggle ? 
of the Nicaraguan people for freedom 
and democracy is not an issue that can 
be ignored. So let us extend a helping 
hand to the Nicaraguan people, just as 
others helped our forefathers in their 
time of need. Let us resolve to give 
freedom a chance in Nicaragua. 



'Text from the Vice President's Office oi 
the Press Secretary (opening remarks omit 
ted here). The question-and-answer session 
following the address is not printed here. I 



) 



1 



Arms Control: 
Objectives and Prospects 



by Secretary Shultz 

Address before the Council on 
Foreign AJfai7-s in A ustin, Texas, on 
March 28."l985.^ 

One of the most profound moral and 
political challenges facing our nation to- 
day is the effort to control and reduce 
nuclear weapons. 

In recent years, concern about the 
danger of nuclear holocaust has made 
nuclear arms control more than ever the 
focus of national debate. This is all to 
the good. In our free society, vigorous 
debate makes us stronger, not weaker, 
as we work to safeguard our security 
and protect the peace. 

But moral concern about nuclear 
weapons must be matched by an 
understanding of the underlying political 
and military complexities. If it is not, 
this moral concern can only raise false 
hopes— with consequences of the 
greatest immorality, endangering the 
prospect for peace. 

As we embark on a new round of 
arms negotiations with the Soviet 
Union— the most comprehensive and 
complex of any in history— such 
understanding is more important than 
ever. Today, I would like to discuss 
these underlying issues with you and to 
explain how your government is meeting 
this challenge. 

The Basis of Peace and Stability 

Our fundamental goal is to defend our 
freedom and that of our allies and to 
reduce the risk of war, especially 
nuclear war. 



The prerequisite of successful arms 
control— and world peace— is the deter- 
rent strength of the United States. This 
strength has been the basis of interna- 
tional stability and security for the past 
40 years. The defense policy of the 
United States and the North Atlantic 
alliance has been to have that strength 
necessary to convince any potential 
adversary that aggression will not pay. 
The democracies cherish peace; we 
would prefer to go about our lives with- 
out devoting huge effort and treasure t( 
arming ourselves. But as long as there 
are others in this world hostile to 
freedom and willing to use force to im- 
pose their own system, we must be will- 
ing to defend what we hold dear. As 
President Truman expressed it in 1946: 
"Peace has to be built on power for 
good. Justice and good will and good 
deeds are not enough." 

For a time in the 1970s, in the wakt 
of Vietnam, we tended to turn away 
from this reality, and we neglected our 
defenses. But the Soviet buildup con- 
tinued without breaking stride. The 
Soviets passed the United States in the 
number, size, and destructive power of 
offensive missiles; they proceeded to 
develop more and more modern systems 
We essentially froze the number of our 
missiles; our modernization programs 
slowed down. As this process continued, 
the improvements in the Soviet ballistic 
missile force— including the prompt 
hard-target-kill capability of its giant 
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic 
missiles]— increasingly threatened the 
survivability of our own land-based 
retaliatory forces and our national com- 
mand structure. The Soviets spent 
significant resources on passive defen- 



24 



Dpnartmpnt nf .9tatp Rnllfitin 



THE SECRETARY 



ive measures to improve the survivabili- 
y of their own forces, and they con- 
inued to develop active defenses that 
night eventually be able to counter the 
urviving U.S. retaliatory forces. These 
Soviet moves were slowly, but very 
urely, eroding our capability for swift 
ind effective retaliation — on which 
lepends our ability to deter any attack. 
)ur concern was heightened by mount- 
ng evidence of Soviet violations of 
irevious arms control agreements. 

The arms control process has always 
lad as a main goal to ensure deterrence 
ly enhancing stability and balance in the 
trategic relationship. These Soviet ac- 
ions were undermining that very goal. 
:'he United States had an inescapable 
esponsibility to work to maintain the 
)asic conditions for stability and 
lalance. 

To strengthen our deterrent and 
restore the military balance. President 
leagan has moved to modernize our 
itrategic and conventional forces across 
he board. The MX Peacekeeper missile 
3 a vital element of this policy. I cannot 
itress too much the importance of con- 
inuing on course with this program. 

But the American eagle holds ar- 
'ows in one hand and the olive branch in 
!he other — and his eyes look toward the 
live branch. Our goal is peace, and, 
herefore, we are always ready for 
erious dialogue with our adversaries on 
/ays to control and reduce weapons, 
'he Soviets have now returned to the 
argaining table for new negotiations, 
fter their failed attempts to divide us at 
ome and from our allies. Earlier this 
lonth, the President dispatched three 
istinguished Americans — Max 
Lampelman,^ Mike Glitman,^ and Texas' 
wn John Tower^ — to lead our side in 
hese crucial negotiations. With a 
trengthened deterrent, an alliance that 
as withstood Soviet pressures, and the 
-npressive vote of confidence given by 
he American people last November, we 
re now in a good position for successful 
rms control. Our steadfastness and our 
ontinuing commitment to serious 
legotiations have brought us to this 
iromising moment. This is a lesson we 
nust not forget in the arduous months 
.nd years ahead. 

)ur Objectives at Geneva 

Vhat are our objectives in these new 
legotiations? Our four basic aims are 
.tability, reductions, equality, and 
'erif lability. 

• First, we seek arms control 
neasures that enhance strategic stabili- 
y. An agreement, if it is truly to pro- 
note security, must decrease and 



minimize the incentives one side might 
have to preempt or strike first in a 
crisis. By this means, arms control can 
help reduce the danger of war. 

• Our second objective is reduc- 
tions. Our arms control proposals repre- 
sent a historic and systematic effort to 
reduce the levels of nuclear weapons 
substantially— rather than, as in the 
past, only legitimize their increase. 
When the SALT I [strategic arms limita- 
tion talks] negotiations began in 1969, 
the Soviet Union had about 1,500 
strategic nuclear weapons. Today, the 
Soviet arsenal has grown to more than 
8,000 strategic nuclear weapons, yet it 
still remains within most of the limits of 
the SALT I and SALT II Treaties. The 
radical reductions that we seek today 
would reverse the arms buildup and 
result in a more stable balance at lower 
levels of forces on both sides. 

• Our third objective is equality. 
Reductions must leave both sides with 
equal or equivalent levels of forces. An 
agreement that leaves one side with a 
unilateral advantage could only create 
instability. Soviet strategic power is 
centered in its land-based missile force; 
American strategic power is spread 
more evenly over each element of our 
triad of land-based missiles, submarines, 
and bombers. We recognize these dif- 
ferences and are prepared to be flexible 
and reasonable in taking them into ac- 
count. 

• Our fourth objective is verifiabili- 
ty. No American would favor an accord 
which lacked provision for effective 
verification of compliance by the parties. 
Questions about our ability to verify the 
SALT II Treaty were one reason it en- 
countered such opposition. All our ef- 
forts to resolve the many complicated 
issues of stability, reductions, and 
equality will come to naught in the 
absence of effective terms of verifica- 
tion. The evidence of Soviet violations or 
probable violations of existing arms con- 
trol obligations— including verification 
provisions of SALT 11— makes this an 
inescapable necessity. 

In the new Geneva talks, our 
negotiators will discuss offensive and 
defensive weaponry with the Soviets in 
three broad areas: strategic offensive 
nuclear systems, intermediate-range of- 
fensive nuclear forces, and defense and 
space arms. The President has in- 
structed our negotiators to bargain 
seriously and vigorously. We will judge 
the results by the strictest of stand- 
ards—whether they would maintain the 
security of the United States and our 
allies, ensure deterrence, enhance 
strategic stability, and reduce the risk of 



war. We are prepared to be flexible, 
however, about ways to achieve our ob- 
jectives. We will meet the Soviet Union 
halfway in finding a mutually acceptable 
approach. 

In the field of strateg^ic arms, our 
negotiators are authorized to explore 
ways of bridging differences that 
separated the two sides' positions in the 
earlier strategic arms reduction talks 
(START). In those talks, we offered to 
explore alternate ways to reduce ballistic 
missile throw-weight, in response to 
Soviet criticism that our proposals would 
require restructuring of Soviet forces. 
We were willing to consider indirect 
limits such as those we originally pro- 
posed, direct limits if the Soviets pre- 
ferred, or any other serious Soviet pro- 
posals. In response to the Soviet 
criticism that the original U.S. proposal 
was not comprehensive, we dropped our 
two-phased approach and proposed a 
draft treaty. This treaty included equal 
limits on heavy bombers and held the 
number of air-launched cruise missiles 
allowed on each bomber to a level below 
that of SALT II. 

We remain ready to explore trade- 
offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet 
advantage in order to begin the process 
of reducing overall numbers, particularly 
the numbers of the most destabilizing 
systems— highly MIRVed [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry 
vehicles] ICBMs. For our part, we are 
ready to limit the potential capabilities 
of our heavy bombers. 

With regard to intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF), we believe the 
position that we outlined in the fall of 
1983 in the earlier INF talks provides a 
framework for a fair agreement. Our 
ultimate objective has been and remains 
a zero-zero outcome— the complete, 
global elimination of this entire class of 
longer range INF missiles. The continu- 
ing Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, 
now with over 1,200 warheads, makes 
this goal all the more important. We are 
also ready to consider interim steps, 
such as a balance at equal levels of 
warheads in a global context. The 
United States is prepared to consider 
foregoing deployment of its full global 
allowance in Europe. We are ready to 
talk about possible aircraft limitations 
and to be flexible on other points as 
well. We look to the Soviets to be equal- 
ly flexible. 

There remains a third area under 
discussion at the new Geneva talks, 
namely defense and space arms. Here 
we seek a dialogue on how both sides 
together may begin to move from the 
current strategic situation toward a 
more stable framework for deterrence. 



vlav 1985 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



one relying more and more on non- 
nuclear defensive systems. In these 
discussions, we will present our concerns 
about the erosion of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty regime, including 
Soviet actions that have called that 
agreement's premises into question. In 
turn, we will provide the Soviets with a 
comprehensive rationale for our 
Strategic Defense Initiative— or SDI— 
and be prepared to address the entire 
question of defense and space weapons. 

The Strategic Defense Initiative 

For at least the past 30 years, deter- 
rence has rested on the ultimate threat 
of offensive nuclear retaliation; the 
United States and the Soviet Union have 
each been hostage to the nuclear forces 
of the other. Our retaliatory deterrent 
has enabled us to live in peace with 
freedom. We strive to deter war with 
the minimum level of military power 
consistent with that purpose. If there is 
no alternative to the threat of offensive 
nuclear retaliation, then this is the 
necessary and moral course. But if, with 
adequate defenses, we could deny the 
potential aggressor any hope of achiev- 
ing his objectives through military 
power, so that neither side's population 
was at risk to the other, then that would 
become the preferable and moral course. 

Effective defenses against ballistic 
missiles would enhance deterrence by 
reducing or eliminating the efficacy of 
the attacking weapons. Such defenses, 
with the ability to intercept first-strike 
missiles, would take away incentives for 
an aggressor to attack first in a crisis. 
They would also provide an insurance 
policy, in the remote possibility that 
deterrence failed, by shielding us and 
our allies against attack. 

In his seminal speech of March 23, 
1983, President Reagan proposed that 
we explore the possibility of countering 
the awesome Soviet missile threat with 
defensive measures. He offered a vision 
of a world in which the mutual hostage 
relationship might eventually be re- 
placed by something more secure— by 
systems that could intercept and destroy 
missiles before they strike their targets. 
Such a strategic world would be not to 
any single nation's advantage, but to the 
benefit of all. As the President asked, 
"Wouldn't it be better to save lives than 
to avenge them?" 

We recognize that deterrence will 
have to rely on the threat of offensive 
nuclear retaliation for many years to 
come— though at sharply reduced levels. 



if the Geneva talks succeed. With this 
understanding, we now begin a major 
research effort: the SDI. We believe 
that it will provide the basis for a con- 
sidered judgment, sometime in the next 
decade, on the feasibility and practicality 
of providing a shield for the United 
States and our allies against ballistic 
missiles. 

Defenses, if feasible, will also aid 
our objective of deep reductions in offen- 
sive missiles. A strategic balance at 
sharply lower levels is more vulnerable 
to the risk of cheating. The lower the 
agreed level of arms, the greater the 
danger that concealed deployments 
could be of a magnitude to threaten the 
other side's forces. But with feasible 
defenses in place, so many illegal 
missiles would be required to upset the 
balance that significant cheating could 
not be concealed. 

Indeed, this very point was made by 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, who told the 
UN General Assembly in 1962 that anti- 
missile defenses could be the key to a 
successful agreement reducing offensive 
missiles. They would, he said, "guard 
against the eventuality ... of someone 
deciding to violate the treaty and con- 
ceal missiles or combat aircraft." Mr. 
Gromyko and other Soviet leaders in the 
past have often discussed the value of 
defenses. I would hope that he and his 
colleagues would review those state- 
ments and come to acknowledge again 
the merit of our position today on the 
potential value of strategic defense. 

I have emphasized that the defenses 
would have to be feasible. Feasibility 
means, first, that any new defensive 
systems must be reasonably survivable; 
if not, they might themselves be tempt- 
ing targets for a first strike. Second, it 
means not just that the systems must 
work but that they must be cheaper to 
produce than would the new offensive 
systems needed to overcome them. In 
short, they must be cost effective; other- 
wise, it would make sense to produce of- 
fensive weapons in numbers sufficient to 
overwhelm the defenses. 

A change in the cost relationship of 
offensive to defensive forces would have 
revolutionary and potentially quite 
beneficial effects. Cost-effective defenses 
would change the marginal incentive for 
investment away from offensive to 
defensive systems. In turn, even an im 
perfect but cost-effective defense system 
would vastly complicate any aggressor's 
first-strike planning and further reduce 
his temptation to consider a preemptive 
nuclear attack. 



The Transition to a New 
Strategic Environment 

The road to this safer world would have 
to be traveled with care. In making the 
transition from today's near total 
reliance on offense, our objective would 
be to deploy defensive systems which, at 
each step of the process, make a first 
strike even more difficult. By doing so, 
we would not only enhance stability but 
also provide further incentives for re- 
ducing offensive forces. 

The feasibility criteria we have 
adopted — survivability and cost effec- 
tiveness — are designed precisely to en- 
sure that any transition period is a 
stable one. Thus, survivability means 
less temptation and incentive for either 
side to attack these new defensive 
systems at a moment of political crisis 
during the transition period. Phasing in 
of truly cost-effective defensive systems 
will mean that offensive counter- 
measures — such as piling up more 
missiles to swamp the defenses — are a 
losing game. 

SDI is not a bid for strategic 
superiority; on the contrary, it would 
maintain the balance, in light of the 
rapid Soviet progress in both offensive 
and defensive systems. Nor is SDI an 
abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Presi- 
dent Reagan has directed that the 
research program be carried out in full 
compliance with the treaty. He has also 
made clear that any future decision to 
deploy defenses that were not permitted 
by treaty would have to be a matter of 
negotiation. 

This does not mean giving the 
Soviets a veto over our defensive pro- 
grams, any more than the Soviets have 
a veto over our current strategic and 
intermediate-range programs. But our 
commitment to negotiations does reflect 
a recognition that we should seek to 
move forward in a cooperative manner 
with the Soviets. Given the early stage 
of our research, many of the details of 
such a transition are, by necessity, still 
unclear. Nonetheless, we look forward 
to discussions in Geneva with the 
Soviets on the implications of new 
defensive technologies for arms control 
and strategic stability and on how best 
we can both manage any transition to 
such defenses. 

Thus far, the Soviets have not ac- 
cepted the idea of such a cooperative 
transition. This should neither surprise 
nor particularly dismay us. At this point, 
the Soviets still are seeking to under- 
mine our domestic and allied support for 
SDI research while they proceed with 
their own efforts. They are tough- 
minded realists, however. As our 



26 



THE SECRETARY 



ssearch proceeds and both nations thus 
ain a better sense of the future pros- 
ects, the Soviets should see the advan- 
iges of agreed ground rules to ensure 
:at any phasing in of defensive systems 
all be orderly, predictable, and stabiliz- 
ig. The alternative— an unconstrained 
nvironment— would be neither in their 
iterest nor in ours. 

Our SDI program is designed to en- 
ance allied as well as U.S. security. A 
ecision to move from research to 
evelopment and deployment would, of 
ourse, be taken in close consultation 
ith our allies. As the U.S. and Soviet 
trategic and intermediate-range nuclear 
rsenals declined significantly, we would 
eek to negotiate reductions in other 
/pes of nuclear weapons. If we could 
evelop the technologies to defend 
gainst ballistic missiles, we could then 
irn our energies to the perfection of 
efensive measures against these other 
uclear weapons. Our ultimate objective 
ould be the elimination of them all. 

By necessity, this is a very long- 
3rm goal. For years to come, we will 
ave to continue to base deterrence on 
(16 ultimate threat of nuclear retalia- 
on. And that means we will continue 
ur modernization programs to keep the 
eace. 

This long-term goal also poses 
oecial challenges. Were we to move 
Dward the sharp reduction or elimina- 
(on of nuclear weapons, the need for a 
table conventional balance would come 
nee again to the fore. To maintain 
ATO's security, continued moderniza- 
*on of conventional forces will be essen- 
lal— just as it is in the present condi- 
<ons of the strategic balance. At the 
ame time, we must continue to press 
or reductions in conventional forces— in 
articular, for mutual and balanced 
eductions in troop levels in Europe. The 
'orld community should also devote 
^•gent attention to the need to limit 
hd, indeed, eliminate the menace of 
bemical weapons. We have made such a 
reposal with a draft treaty presented 
f Vice President Bush last spring in 
■eneva to the Committee on Disarma- 
iient. 

We must remember as well that 
leterrence would continue to be the 
lasis of our security, even were we to 
nake this transition to a defense- 
lominated world. The difference would 
te that, rather than resting on the 
tireat of mutual assured destruction, 
leterrence would be based on the ability 
If the defense to deny success to a 
otential aggressor's attack— whether 
iuclear or conventional. The President 
las called this strategic relationship 
nutual assured security. 



The Debate over SDI 

Some urge against SDI. They say the 
balance of terror has worked, so why 
tamper with it? They also say SDI will 
lead to an offensive arms race as the 
Soviets move to counter our defenses— 
as if the Soviets have not been engaged 
for the past 20 years in the greatest of- 
fensive buildup in history, one far 
beyond legitimate security needs. 

These critics overlook two other cen- 
tral points. 

• The first is that the pace of 
technological advance in offensive 
weapons— such as increasing missile ac- 
curacy and mobility— could, over time, 
undermine the principles on which the 
mutual hostage relationship has rested. 
SDI is a prudent and wise investment in 
our future safety. It would enhance, not 
undercut, deterrence. 

• The second point the critics 
overlook is that the Soviets have their 
own version of an SDI program and 
have had it for years, long before ours. 
Behind the propaganda about the al- 
leged "militarization of space," you will 
find the expenditures, the military and 
research personnel, the laboratories, 
testing grounds, and weapons of an am- 
bitious Soviet strategic defense pro- 
gram. 

The Soviet Union has always placed 
great reliance on strategic defense. Over 
the past 20 years, the Soviets have 
spent approximately as much on defense 
as on their massive offensive program. 
They have long made major investments 
in civil and air defense; they have the 
world's only operational antisatellite 
weapon system and the only operational 
ABM system around Moscow. The 1972 
ABM Treaty permits one such system; 
we abandoned ours, but they have main- 
tained and modernized theirs. The 
Soviet Defense Forces— one of their five 
military services— number 500,000 
strong, more than the Soviet Navy or 
Strategic Rocket Forces. 

We have persuasive evidence that 
the Soviets have long been investigating 
the defensive technologies on which our 
SDI research will focus. Their high- 
energy laser program is considerably 
bigger than ours and continues to grow. 
There is also much evidence of a major 
Soviet research effort in the develop- 
ment of particle-beam weapons. 

The ABM Treaty limits the deploy- 
ment of ballistic-missile early-warning 
radars to locations along the periphery 
of the national territory of each party 
and requires that they be oriented out- 
ward. At Krasnoyarsk, almost 400 miles 
inside the frontiers of the Soviet Union, 



a new radar, oriented across Soviet ter- 
ritory, is under construction in violation 
of the treaty. Other Soviet activities 
suggest that the Soviet Union may be 
preparing a nationwide ABM de- 
fense—an action which, of course, would 
entirely negate the ABM Treaty. 
Twenty-three Democratic members of 
the House of Representatives just sent a 
letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, 
pointing out that if the Krasnoyarsk 
matter "is not resolved in a satisfactory 
manner, it will have serious conse- 
quences for the future of the arms con- 
trol process." Halting and reversing this 
erosion of the ABM Treaty is another 
objective we have set for the Geneva 
talks. 

My point here is clear: the United 
States is not alone. We are not starting 
another arms race. We are starting a 
research program that complies with the 
ABM Treaty. Rather than asking what 
will be the Soviet response to SDI, 
critics ought to be asking: given the 
Soviet Union's major strategic defense 
effort and its huge offensive forces, 
what are the consequences for deter- 
rence, stability, and Western security if 
we do not pursue an adequate research 
effort? 

Prerequisites for Successful 
Arms Control 

These are the issues we intend to pursue 
in Geneva. They represent a full agenda. 
The United States is committed to seek 
progress; we hope the Soviets have the 
same commitment. We in the West can 
facilitate progress if we bear in mind 
what progress depends upon. History 
suggests there are three prerequisites. 

The first, which I explained earlier, 
is the need to keep up our guard and 
our strength. In the past, we have had a 
tendency to focus either on our military 
strength or on negotiations. To succeed, 
we must treat them both in tandem as 
two essential components of a sensible 
national security strategy. That is the 
plain reality of international politics. 
Talk without the strength to back it up 
is just that: talk. The Soviets must 
understand that in the absence of an 
equitable, verifiable agreement, we will 
be as strong as necessary to maintain 
our freedom and deter war. 

The other two prerequisites are pa- 
tience in seeking the agreement we 
desire and unity both at home and with 
our allies. 

We are embarked on the most com- 
plex and comprehensive negotiations to 
limit arms in the history of man. In 
these talks, we face Soviet diplomats 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



who are practiced, patient, and deter- 
mined. They will try to wear us down. 
They will also try to undermine our posi- 
tions by deceptive propaganda, by 
specious appeals to public opinion here 
and in Europe, by subtle and not so sub- 
tle threats, just as they did for 2 years 
during the START and INF talks. 

The opening of the Geneva talks a 
few weeks ago, like my meeting with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko in January, 
received much publicity and attention. 
This is understandable. It reflects the 
hopes of all people, hopes we share. But 
if we are ever to attain those hopes, we 
must be patient. We must recognize 
from experience that the talks may be 
long and arduous. Every negotiation has 
been protracted. The talks that led to 
the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty took 8 years; the 1968 Non- 
Proliferation Treaty took 4 years; SALT 
I, almost 3 years; SALT II, nearly 7 
years. Ever since bilateral nuclear arms 
control negotiations with the Soviet 
Union began some 30 years ago, the 
Soviets' rigid perception of their military 
requirements and their hostility to prop- 
er measures of verification have been 
significant obstacles. But we, for our 
part, are ready to move ahead as fast as 
possible. We will not be the obstacle. 

The third and, perhaps, most impor- 
tant prerequisite is unity, both at home 
and with our allies. 

Many of our problems in the past 15 
years have resulted from divisions here 
at home. Probably the greatest cost of 
the Vietnam war, after its terrible toll in 
lives, was the shattering of the national 
consensus on defense that was forged in 
World War II and that carried us 
through the most difficult days of the 
cold war. Today, I believe a new consen- 
sus is emerging— a growing majority 
behind the need for a strong defense 
coupled with serious and realistic efforts 
for reliable arms control agreements 
with the Soviets. And we see a new 
patriotism, a new pride in America. 

Last November, the American peo- 
ple overwhelmingly expressed their con- 
fidence in President Reagan and his 
policies. The Administration has the 
responsibility to consult with the Con- 
gress, and we are doing all we can, in a 
spirit of cooperation. Congress has the 
duty to debate and criticize, to approve 
expenditures, and to consult in the for- 
mulation of general policy. We in the ex- 
ecutive branch have the constitutional 
responsibility to conduct the negotia- 
tions. To aid Congress in its role, we 
had with our delegation at the opening 
of the Geneva talks a distinguished bi- 
partisan group from both Houses. 



Should a treaty be negotiated, it will re- 
quire the Senate's advice and consent to 
ratification. But if the Congress does not 
back us in many other ways, we may not 
have a good treaty to bring home for ad- 
vice and consent. 

The same principle applies to our 
relations with our allies. The Soviet at- 
tempt to prevent the deployment of 
Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe 
failed utterly because we allies stood 
together, as we have for decades. The 
Soviets may make this attempt again, in 
the context of the new talks. We must 
continue to stand together if we want 
these talks to succeed. The Soviets will 
be watching closely for signs of dif- 
ferences and disarray in the West. If 
they see such signs, they will only be en- 
couraged to step up their political war- 
fare while prolonging negotiations and 
waiting for unilateral concessions. But if 
they see us united, we will have hast- 
ened the day of serious negotiation and 
furthered the prospects of success. 

The Geneva talks will be of un- 
precedented complexity. We must be 



Science and American Foreign Policy: 
The Spirit of Progress 



careful not to permit our revulsion 
against war to lower our guard. We 
must not let our hopes, noble as they 
are, blind us to the daunting realities of 
the arms control process. But there are 
favorable factors at work. America is 
recovering its economic vitality, its 
military strength, and its self- 
confidence. We stand firm with our 
staunch allies. If we in the West are pa- 
tient and united, combining resolution 
with flexibility, then we have good pros- 
pects of success. We can attain the goal 
we all share: reducing the danger of wai 
and building a constructive and secure 
relationship with the Soviet Union in tlu 
nuclear age. 



'Press release 59. 

-Head of the U.S. Delegation and U.S. 
Negotiator on Space and Defensive Arms. 

'U.S. Negotiator on Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Arms. 

^U.S. Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear 
Arms. ■ 






by Secretary Shultz 

Address before a symposium on 
science and foreign -policy sponsored by 
the National Academy of Sciences on 
March 6. 1985.'' 

Soon after the dawn of the nuclear 
age, Albert Einstein observed that 
everything had changed except our 
modes of thinking. Even so dramatic a 
development as the nuclear revolution 
took a long time to be fully understood. 
In recent decades, the world has seen 
other extraordinary advances in science 
and technology — advances that may be 
of even more pervasive importance and 
that touch every aspect of our lives. In 
so many of these areas, the pace of 
change has been faster than our ability 
to grasp its ramifications. There have 
even been moments when our mood was 
more one of fear than of hope. 

In the 1970s, many were preoc- 
cupied with the idea that ours was a 
small planet and getting smaller, that 
natural resources were limited and were 
being depleted, that there were in- 
escapable limits to growth. Food would 
run out; forests would disappear; clean 
water would be scarce; energy sources 
would vanish. There was, in short, a 



deep pessimism about the future of our 
planet and of mankind itself. 

Fortunately, that spirit of pessimisn 
has been replaced in recent years by a 
new spirit of progress. More and more, 
we are returning to the belief tradi- 
tionally held by post-Enlightenment 
societies: that the advance of science is 
something to be welcomed and en- 
couraged, because it multiplies our 
possibilities faster than it adds to our 
problems. More and more, we see that 
unleashing the vast potential of human 
ingenuity, creativity, and industrious- 
ness is itself the key to a better future. 
Science and technology cannot solve all 
our problems, but the experience of re- 
cent years reminds us that they can 
alleviate wide areas of human suffering 
and make a better life possible for 
millions around the world. We can only 
imagine what they might achieve in the 
decades to come. 

When I was at MIT, I knew an 
economist at Harvard who had an un- 
canny knack for making accurate predic- 
tions. I always wondered about the 
secret of his forecasting ability, and 
when he died, someone going through 
his papers found part of the explanation 
He had written that he was more suc- 
cessful at economic predictions than 



28 



THE SECRETARY 



hers because he was "an optimist 
30ut America," a trait he attributed to 
TO things: his origins in the Midwest, 
vhere the future is more important 
lan the past," and the fact that he 
'ew up in a family of scientists and 
igineers, forever "discovering" and 
loing" new things. 

Optimism alone will not be enough 
carry us through the difficult times 
lat lie ahead, and mindless optimism 
ould be as foolish as the mindless 
jssimism of years past. The scientific 
id technological revolutions taking 
ace all around us offer many great op- 
artunities, but they also present many 
lallenges— challenges that come from 
le need to make choices, challenges 
lat lie at the intersection of science and 
Dlitics, and, perhaps most important, 
lallenges to our ways of thinking about 
irselves and our world. 

lilemmas and Choices 

he revolutions in science and 
^chnology have opened up seemingly 
"nitless possibilities for transforming 
ir world. With each new breakthrough, 
nvever, come new and difficult dilem- 
as. For while we may seek ways to 
lange the world around us, there is 
s<i much we would like to preserve, 
ur civilization is not based on material 
ings. Our culture, our moral values, 
id our political ideals are treasures 
at we would not sacrifice even for the 
ost amazing scientific miracle. 
Breakthroughs in biological 
igineering, for instance, raise funda- 
ental moral questions about man's 
•oper role in the creation and altera- 
in of life, even as they offer new hope 
■ cure diseases, produce food, and 
•oaden our understanding of the 
•igins of life. We need to be concerned 
)out the dangers to our environment 
lat may accompany some new tech- 
)logies, even while recognizing that 
her new technologies may be the 
mrce of solutions to these problems, 
'e need to ensure that the revolution in 
immunications does not infringe on our 
ght to privacy, even while recognizing 
le enormous benefits of improved com- 
lUnication for education and for bring- 
:g the world closer together. This is the 
iman condition: the creativity that is 
le part of our nature poses constant 
lallenges to the morality that is 
lother part of our nature. There is no 
nal resting place, no permanent solu- 
on— only a continuing responsibility to 
ice up to these hard dilemmas. 

We also face some difficult practical 
loices, and, as societies, we address 
lem through our political process. 



Scientific research and development, for 
example, require financial support. 
Where should that support come from? 
And what should be supported? The 
United States will invest some $110 
billion in scientific research and develop- 
ment next year— more than Japan, 
France, West Germany, and the United 
Kingdom combined. Of that amount, 
nearly half comes from the Federal 
Government. That is a large investment, 
taken by democratic process from the 
American taxpayer. But it reflects a 
choice we have all made to support 
scientific progress. It reflects our 
understanding that scientific advance 
serves everyone in our society— by im- 
proving health and the quality of life, by 
expanding our economy, by enhancing 
the competitiveness of our industries in 
the world market, by improving our 
defenses, and, perhaps most important, 
simply by pushing back the frontiers of 
knowledge. 

Yet we have also learned that 
government can become too involved, 
that government bureaucracies are not 
always the best judges of where such 
money can most usefully be spent. To- 
day, private industry, not government, 
is pushing hardest at the technological 
frontiers in many fields— in electronics 
and biotechnology, to name just two. 

The problem, then, is to discover 
how government support for science and 
technology can best serve the broad 
goals of society. In the field of basic 
research, for example, we cannot always 
count on the profit motive to foster 
progress in those areas where research 
may not lead to the development of 
marketable products for many years. 
Government support for basic research 
gives learning and the pursuit of 
knowledge a chance to proceed without 
undergoing the rigorous test of the 
marketplace. 

One particularly worthy recipient of 
government support, therefore, is the 
university. The unfettered process of 
learning and discovery that takes place 
mainly in academia is vital. From the 
university comes the fundamental 
knowledge that ultimately drives innova- 
tion. And from the university comes the 
pool of creative and technically profi- 
cient young men and women who can 
use that knowledge and apply it to prac- 
tical problems. The Reagan Administra- 
tion recognizes the importance of this; 
since 1981, support for basic research at 
universities has grown by nearly 30%. 

Even so, the government has limited 
funds, and further choices have to be 
made about which projects to support 
and which to cut back. Government, 
universities, and the private sector have 



to work together to make these difficult 
but inescapable decisions. We as a socie- 
ty cannot afford to turn away from the 
challenge of choosing. 

Science and Politics 

These are not the only hard choices that 
have to be confronted at the intersection 
of science and politics. Scientific ad- 
vances have increasingly become the 
focus of political debate. Today, scien- 
tific questions, and scientists themselves, 
play a prominent role in the political 
arena. On a wide variety of complex 
issues, the American people look to 
scientists as an important source of in- 
formation and guidance. In a nation like 
ours, where knowledge is valued and the 
search for truth is considered among the 
noblest of human endeavors, the scien- 
tist naturally and properly commands 
great respect. With that respect, 
however, comes responsibility. 

Too often in recent years, we have 
seen scientists with well-deserved 
reputations for creative achievement and 
intellectual brilliance speaking out on 
behalf of political ideas that unfortunate- 
ly are neither responsible nor particular- 
ly brilliant. 

It is not surprising that scientists 
will have strong views on such technical- 
ly complex matters as nuclear weapons, 
arms control, and national defense. But 
the core issues in dispute here are really 
not technical but political and moral. 
Scientists should not expect their words 
to have special authority in nonscientific 
areas where they are, in fact, laymen. 
Scientists are not specialists in the field 
of world politics, or history, or social 
policy, or military doctrine. As citizens 
of a free society, they have every right 
to take part in the public debate. But 
they have no special claim to infallibility. 

Challenges to Our Ways of Thinking 

The great intellectual adventure of the 
scientific revolution beckons all of us— 
scientists, government leaders, and all 
Americans— to march ahead together. In 
collaboration we can achieve a better 
and deeper understanding of these new 
developments and what they portend. 
The changes occurring all around us 
have far-reaching implications not only 
for our personal lives but also for the 
conduct of our foreign policy, for na- 
tional security, and, indeed, for the very 
structure of the international order. And 
as we confront these changes, we must 
heed Einstein's observation: perhaps the 
greatest challenges we face are to our 
ways of thinking. 



law IQR'^ 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



The Age of Information 
Technology. One of the most revolu- 
tionary recent developments is what 
Walter Wriston has called "the on- 
rushing age of information technology." 
The combination of microchip com- 
puters, advanced telecommunications, 
and a continuing process of innovation is 
not only transforming communication 
and other aspects of daily life but is also 
challenging the very concepts of national 
sovereignty and the role of government 
in society. 

The implications of this revolution 
are not only economic. First of all, the 
very existence of these new technologies 
is yet another testimony to the crucial 
importance of entrepreneurship— and 
government policies that give free rein 
to entrepreneurship— as the wellspring 
of technological creativity and economic 
growth. The closed societies of the East 
are likely to fall far behind in these 
areas— and Western societies that main- 
tain too many restrictions on economic 
activity run the same risk. 

Second, any government that 
resorts to heavyhanded measures to con- 
trol or regulate or tax the flow of elec- 
tronic information will find itself stifling 
the growth of the world economy as well 
as its own progress. This is one of the 
reasons why the United States is press- 
ing for a new round of trade negotia- 
tions in these service fields, to break 
down barriers to the free flow of 
knowledge across borders. 

For 2 years the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has been considering an 
American initiative for a common ap- 
proach to this problem. Today, we are 
very close to obtaining a joint statement 
by OECD governments pledging 
themselves to: 

• Maintain and promote unhindered 
circulation of data and information; 

• Avoid creating barriers to infor- 
mation flows; and 

• Cooperate and consult to further 
these goals. 

There are other dilemmas that must 
be confronted if we are to increase the 
flow of ideas and technologies across 
borders. One issue of particular concern 
to the United States, for instance, is the 
infringement of intellectual property 
rights. American businesses lose hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars annually due 
to the counterfeiting and piracy of 
records, tapes, and other intellectual 
property. But the even bigger losers are 
those nations who fail to offer protection 
to intellectual property. America's high- 
technology companies— for example, in 
computers and computer software— are 



not going to want to invest in countries 
where their intellectual property can be 
stolen with impunity. This will result in 
a loss to those countries of the types of 
skills needed to develop a modern in- 
dustrial sector with well-educated, high- 
paid, skilled workers. The entire free 
world has a stake in building a more 
open system that encourages the free 
exchange of new scientific advances, 
because together we can progress faster 
and farther than any of us can alone. 

This points to another advantage the 
West enjoys. The free flow of informa- 
tion is inherently compatible with our 
political system and values. The com- 
munist states, in contrast, fear this in- 
formation explosion perhaps even more 
than they fear Western military 
strength. If knowledge is power, then 
the communications revolution threatens 
to undermine their most important 
monopoly— their effort to stitle their 
people's information, thought, and in- 
dependence of judgment. We all 
remember the power of the Ayatollah's 
message disseminated on tape cassettes 
in Iran; what could have a more pro- 
found impact in the Soviet bloc than 
similar cassettes, outside radio broad- 
casting, direct broadcast satellites, per- 
sonal computers, or Xerox machines? 

Totalitarian societies face a dilem- 
ma: either they try to stifle these 
technologies and thereby fall further 
behind in the new industrial revolution, 
or else they permit these technologies 
and see their totalitarian control in- 
evitably eroded. In fact, they do not 
have a choice, because they will never be 
able entirely to block the tide of 
technological advance. 

The revolution in global communica- 
tion thus forces all nations to reconsider 
traditional ways of thinking about na- 
tional sovereignty. We are reminded 
anew of the world's interdependence, 
and we are reminded as well that only a 
world of spreading freedom is compati- 
ble with human and technological prog- 
ress. 

The Evolution of Strategic 
Defense. Another striking example of 
the impact of scientific and technological 
change is the issue of strategic defense. 
Here the great challenge to us is not 
simply to achieve scientific and engineer- 
ing breakthroughs. As real a difficulty is 
to come to grips with "our ways of 
thinking" about strategic matters in the 
face of technical change. 

For decades, sUindard strategic doc- 
trine in the West has ultimately relied 
on the balance of terror— the confronta- 
tion of offensive arsenals by which the 
two sides threaten each other with mass 
extermination. Deterrence has worked 



under these conditions, and we should 
not abandon what works until we know 
that something better is genuinely 
available. Nevertheless, for political, 
strategic, and even moral reasons, we 
owe it to ourselves and to future gener: 
tions to explore the new possibilities 
that offer hope for strategic defense, 
that could minimize the dangers and 
destructiveness of nuclear war. If such 
technologies can be discovered, and the 
promise is certainly there, then we will 
be in a position to do better than the 
conventional wisdom which holds that 
our defense strategy must rely on solely 
offensive threats and must leave our 
people and our military capability un- 
protected against attack. 

Adapting our ways of thinking is 
never an easy process. The vehemence 
of some of the criticism of the 
President's Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) seems to come less from the 
debate over technical feasibility— which 
future research will settle one way or 
another in an objective manner— than 
from the passionate defense of orthodo> 
doctrine in the face of changing 
strategic realities. We are proceeding 
with SDI research because we see a 
positive, and, indeed, revolutionary 
potential: defensive measures may 
become available that could render ob- 
solete the threat of an offensive first 
strike. A new strategic equilibrium 
based on defensive technologies and 
sharply reduced offensive deployments i 
likely to be the most stable and secure 
arrangement of all. 

Science and Foreign Policy 

These are but two examples of how 
technological advances affect our foreig 
policy. There are many others. It is in 
our national interest, for example, to 
help other countries achieve the kinds o 
technological progress that hold such 
promise for improving the quality of life 
for all the world's people. The expansior 
of the global economy and new possibili- 
ties of international cooperation are 
among the benefits that lie ahead of us 
as technical skills grow around the 
world. 

Therefore, cooperation in the fields 
of science and technology plays an in- 
creasing role in our relations with a 
range of countries. We have important 
cooperative links with China and India, 
for example, as well as with many other 
nations in the developing world. We are 
working with nations in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa to achieve 
breakthroughs in dryland agriculture 
and livestock production to help ease 
food shortages or in medicine and public 



30 



THE SECRETARY 



health to combat the scourge of disease. 
Our scientific relations with the in- 
dustrialized nations of Western Europe 
and Japan aim at breaking down bar- 
riers to the transfer of technological 
knowhow. 

Clearly, our science and technology 
relationships with other industrialized 
nations are not without problems. There 
s, in fact, a permanent tension between 
3ur desire to share technological ad- 
i^ances and our equally strong desire to 
see American products compete effec- 
tively in the international market. We 
:annot resolve this dilemma, nor should 
ive. The interplay between the advance- 
Tient of knowledge and competition is 
jroductive. Some nations may focus 
;heir efforts too heavily on competition 
it the expense of the spread of 
knowledge that can benefit everyone, 
ind certainly we in the United States 
;hould not be alone in supporting basic 
icientific research. The industrialized na- 
;ions should work together to strike a 
oalance that can promote the essential 
baring of scientific advances and at the 
same time stimulate the competitive 
;pirit which itself makes such an impor- 
tant contribution to technological 
i)rogress. 

ITechnology Transfer 

1 further dilemma arises where new 
echnologies may have military applica- 
ions. We maintain a science and 
echnology relationship with the Soviet 
Jnion, for instance, even though we 
nust work to ensure that the 
echnologies we share with the Soviets 
annot be used to threaten Western 
ecurity. 

The innovations of high technology 
re obviously a boon to all nations that 
■ut them to productive use for the 
■enefit of their peoples. But in some 
ocieties, it often seems that the people 
re the last to get these benefits. The 
loviet Union has, for decades, sought to 
:ain access, through one means or 
nother, to the technological miracles 
aking place throughout the free world, 
ind one of their goals has been to use 
hese new technologies to advance their 
'olitical aims— to build better weapons, 
lOt better health care; better means of 
urveillance, not better telephone 
ystems. 

This, of course, poses another dilem- 
;ia. We seek an open world, where 
echnological advances and knowhow 
an cross borders freely. We welcome 
ooperation with the Soviet Union in 
cience and technology. And yet in the 
^'orld as it exists today, the West has no 
hoice but to take precautions with 



,1 ay 1985 



technologies that have military applica- 
tions. Cooperation with our allies is 
essential. Countries that receive sen- 
sitive technologies from the United 
States must maintain the proper con- 
trols to prevent them from falling into 
the hands of our adversaries. 

Scientists can help us think through 
this difficult problem. What technologies 
can be safely transferred? How do we 
safeguard against the transfer of 
technologies that have dual uses? Where 
do we strike the balance? 

The Proliferation of Nuclear 
and Chemical Weapons 

And scientists can also be helpful in 
other areas where the free flow of 
technical knowledge poses dangers. One 
priority goal of our foreign policy, for in- 
stance, is to strengthen international 
controls over two of the grimmer prod- 
ucts of modern technology: weapons of 
mass destruction, both nuclear and 
chemical. 

The world community's success or 
failure in preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons will have a direct im- 
pact on the prospects for arms control 
and disarmament, on the development of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
and, indeed, on the prospects for peace 
on this planet. The United States pur- 
sues the goal of nonproliferation through 
many avenues. 

• We have long been the leader of 
an international effort to establish a 
regime of institutional arrangements, 
legal commitments, and technological 
safeguards against the spread of nuclear 
weapons capabilities. We take an active 
part in such multilateral agencies as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 
the Nuclear Energy Agency, and the In- 
ternational Energy Agency. 

• Although we have major dif- 
ferences with the Soviet Union on many 
arms control issues, we have a broad 
common interest in nuclear nonprolifera- 
tion. In the fall of 1982, Foreign 
Minister Gromyko and I agreed to ini- 
tiate bilateral consultations on this prob- 
lem; since then, several rounds of useful 
discussions have taken place, with both 
sides finding more areas of agreement 
than of disagreement. 

• This year, the United States will 
sit down with the 126 other parties to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the 
third time in a major review conference. 
We will stress the overarching signifi- 
cance of the treaty, its contribution to 
world peace and security, and the 
reasons why it is in every nation's fun- 
damental interest to work for universal 
adherence to it. 



The progress in nuclear non- 
proliferation lias, unfortunately, not 
been matched in the area of chemical 
weapons. The sad fact is that a half cen- 
tury of widely accepted international 
restraint on the use or development of 
chemical weapons is in danger of break- 
ing down. In 1963, we estimated that 
only five countries possessed these 
weapons. Now, we estimate that at least 
13 countries have them, and more are 
trying to get them. As we have seen, 
the problem has become particularly 
acute in the war in the Persian Gulf. 

We have had some marked success 
in limiting the spread of nuclear 
weapons in part because the world com- 
munity has worked together to raise 
awareness and to devise concrete 
measures for dealing with the problem. 
We must do the same in the field of 
chemical weapons. It will not be an easy 
task. Chemical industries and dual-use 
chemicals are more numerous than their 
counterparts in the nuclear field, and 
chemical weapons involve lower levels of 
technology and cost less than nuclear 
weapons. But the effort must be made. 

First, we need to raise international 
awareness that there is a growing prob- 
lem and that developed nations, in par- 
ticular, have a special obligation to help 
control the spread of chemical weapons. 

Second, we need to expand and im- 
prove our intelligence capabilities and 
provide for greater coordination be- 
tween intelligence services and 
policymakers in all countries. 

'Third, we must take both bilateral 
and multilateral actions to deal with 
problem countries and to curb exports of 
materials that can be used in the 
manufacture of chemical weapons. 

The scientific community can help in 
a variety of ways. Chemical engineers 
can help us identify those items that are 
essential to the manufacture of chemical 
weapons and then determine which 
countries possess them, so that we can 
promote more effective international 
cooperation. Scientists can help us find 
better ways to check the flow of the 
most critical items without overly in- 
hibiting the transfer of information and 
products that serve so many beneficial 
purposes around the world. 

These are difficult problems, but if 
we work together we can begin to find 
better answers. 

The Vision of a Hopeful Future 

I want to end, as I began, on a note of 
hope. If we confront these tough issues 
with wisdom and responsibility, the 
future holds great promise. President 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



Reagan, in his State of the Union 
message last month, reminded us all <if 
the important lesson we should have 
learned by now: "There are no con- 
straints on the human mind, no walls 
around the human spirit, no barriers to 
our progress except those we ourselves 
erect." Today, we see this fundamental 
truth being borne out again in China, 
where a bold new experiment in open- 
ness and individual incentives is begin- 
ning to liberate the energies of a billion 
talented people. The Chinese have real- 
ized that farm productivity is not merely 
a matter of scientific breakthroughs; it 
is also a matter of organization and 
human motivation. 

The technological revolution is 
pushing back all the frontiers on earth, 
in the oceans, and in space. While we 
cannot expect these advances to solve all 
the world's problems, neither can we 
any longer speak in Malthusian terms of 
inevitable shortages of food, energy, 
forests, or clean air and water. In the 
decades ahead, science may find new 
ways to feed the world's poor— already 
we can only look in wonder at how in- 
creased farm productivity has made it 
possible for a small percentage of 
Americans to produce enough food for a 
significant portion of the world's people. 
We may discover new sources of energy 
and learn how to use existing sources 
more effectively— already we see that 
past predictions of energy scarcity were 
greatly exaggerated. We may see new 
breakthroughs in transportation and 
communication technologies, which will 
inevitably bring the world closer 
together— think back on the state of 
these technologies 40 years ago, and 
imagine what will be possible 40 years 
hence. 

Change— and progress— will be con- 
stant so long as we maintain an open 
society where men and women are free 
to think, to explore, to dream, and to 
transform their dreams into reality. We 
would have it no other way. And in a 
society devoted to the good of all, a 
society based on the fundamental 
understanding that the free pursuit of 
individual happiness can benefit 
everyone, we can have confidence that 
the products of science will be put to 
beneficial uses, if we remain true to our 
heritage and our ideals. 

Therefore, we retain our faith in the 
promise of progress. Americans have 
always relished innovation; we have 
always embraced the future. As Presi- 
dent Reagan put it, we must have a "vi- 
sion that sees tomorrow's dreams in the 
learning and hard work we do today." 



News Conference of March 15 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the. Department of State on 
March 15. 1985.'' 

I've just met with the President and 
reported to him on the Vice President's 
and my trip to Moscow and meeting 
with General Secretary Gorbachev. 

The President sent us with a clear, 
constructive message. He believes that 
this is a potentially important moment 
for U.S. -Soviet relations. He has begun 
a new term, and his policies are firmly 
in place; we and the Soviets are back to 
the negotiating table in Geneva; and 
now there is a new leader in place in 
Moscow. So our two governments have 
an opportunity for a high-level dialogue 
to deal with specific problems and to 
achieve concrete results. The President 
remains ready to pursue this process 
with energy and realism. Toward that 
end, he directed that we provide the 
General Secretary a candid assessment 
of both the obstacles and opportunities 
before us. 

The substance of our agenda is well 
known. It involves arms reduction, 
regional disagreements, bilateral issues, 
and human rights. In each of these areas 
there are differences — objective dif- 
ferences of values and national interest 
that will be difficult to resolve. The 
President firmly intends to work toward 
a more constructive relationship across 
the board. 

In Geneva the main objective is to 
achieve agreement at the earliest possi- 
ble time on deep reductions in offensive 
nuclear arms. We also want to launch a 
longer term dialogue with the Soviets on 
the contribution that strategic defenses 
may be able to make to a more stable 
military relationship. We see no 
obstacles from either side to getting 
down to specifics in these talks. 

President Reagan also believes that 
we need better understanding with the 
Soviet Union on the necessity for each 
to contribute to peaceful solutions to the 
world's problems, particularly in regions 
of crisis and potential confrontation. 

Reflecting his own strongly held 
views and those of the American people 
and the Congress, the President would 
like to see progress on human rights 
issues. He hopes that a process of 
dialogue and confidential diplomacy and 
better Soviet undersUmding of the 
positive impact that progress in this 
field could have in other areas of the 
relationship will yield results. 



Finally, the President is prepared to 
seek an expansion of bilateral coopera- 
tion across a broad range: people-to- 
people contacts, cultural exchanges, 
airline safety, nonstrategic trade, and 
other areas of mutual interest. We are 
now in the midst of discussions with the 
Soviets in a number of these fields. 

There is a natural tendency in the 
United States to view change with op- 
timism—we are a nation of optimists 
and that is good. We also tend to give 
others the benefit of the doubt, and that 
too, is good. Indeed, it is in that spirit 
that we carry on in the several diverse 
areas of discussion with the Soviet 
Union. But we do, we carry along with 
our good faith and hope a healthy 
measure of realism— a realism based 
upon a history which has not always 
fulfilled our expectations. 

We and the Soviet Union carry an 
enormous responsibility for preserving 
peace and fostering better understand- 
ing. In the coming months, the Presi- 
dent intends to devote his fullest efforts 
to both objectives. 

Q. The Vice President came away 
from the meeting the two of you had 
saying that he had high hopes for im- 
proved Soviet-American relations. 
Could you tell us on what these high 
hopes were based? 

A. I think basically on the things 
that I've identified here, and I think this 
statement is sort of an elaboration of 
what the Vice President said. But it is 
true that we have a President starting 
his second term, his policies are in place 
and he has the perspective of the 4 
years ahead of him. We have a new 
leader in Moscow. We have arms talks 
going on; and for that matter we have 
had an array of talks on other issues, 
with some agreements here and there. 

So it is an important moment, and 
the President feels that it is important 
for us to be prepared to move forward il 
it turns out that that is also the Soviet 
Union's wish. And of course, Mr. 
Gorbachev, in his various public 
statements, has indicated that that is his 
wish. 

Q. You haven't mentioned a sum- 
mit meeting between President 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. Where 
does that stand'.' 

A. I think that the President would 
be glad to see Mr. Gorbachev here in the 
United States at his convenience; but 
where beyond that that stands, I don't 
have anything further to add. But I 



'Press release 41. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



think it would be a constructive thing 
for them to meet. 

Q. Prime Minister Thatcher said 
she believes that she can do business 
with Mr. Gorbachev. Yet he is very 
much a product of the Soviet system 
over some years. Is there any reason 
to feel that there is any sound basis 
for a change in Soviet policy because 
of the new leadership? 

A. I think you have to expect con- 
tinuity. Mr. Gorbachev gives the feeling 
of a very capable, energetic person who 
is businesslike — that is, when you go to 
a meeting, he seems to be well informed 
and well prepared and gets right at the 
issues and in a conversational kind of 
form. 

Whether it turns out that you can do 
business is another matter. It's one 
thing to be businesslike, but then we 
have to find the substance of the issues 
and see where we can go on them. And 
what I have said, with the President's 
blessing here — I went over this state- 
ment carefully with the President before 
coming here — is that he is prepared to 
work at it in a constructive vein. 

So we have two businesslike people. 
The President's prepared to work at it. 
Whether anything can come of it re- 
mains to be seen. But I think there is an 
(important responsibility on both sides to 
make every effort to take advantage of 
ithis moment of opportunity. 

Q. You've mentioned an array of 
other talks with the Soviets with some 
agreements. Can you be more specific 
in whether you mean the Middle East 
or transportation? Can you be more 
specific? 

A. The things that we have man- 
aged to agree on in the last year or 
so — the "hot line" upgrade is an exam- 
ple; the long-term grain agreement, the 
additional sales; the beginning of things 
in the nonstrategic trade area; some 
LXintacts in other fields. So there's been 
ill array like that of things where we 
iKive talked. 

Of course, I suppose the most 
momentous agreement — it's not an 
igreement in substance but an agree- 
ment in procedure — is to undertake new 
LU-ms reduction talks in Geneva. 

So there have been a number of 
things of that kind that do show that it's 
possible for these two countries to come 
t(i an agreement on certain things. And 
that I think is something to note along 
the way. But I don't put a tremendous 
amount of emphasis on it, but it's a plus. 



Q. Is there any reason now, given 
the draw-down of the U.S. Embassy in 
Beirut, to keep it open at all, given 
the difficult circumstances in working 
there? 

A. Yes. We have an important 
representational job to do in Lebanon, 
even under the current circumstances, 
and we intend to do it. Of course we 
have to size the number of people in our 
E mbassy to the task that needs to be 
performed. And, given the difficulties 
now in Lebanon, there is, in a sense, 
less to do so you don't need as many 
people. But we will continue to do what 
we feel is in our interest to do in 
Lebanon. 

Q. Has the abrogation of the 
May 17, 1983, agreement between 
Lebanon and Israel affected in any 
way the U.S. Government resolve to 
help Lebanon rid itself of occupation 
and the achievement of a free and in- 
dependent Lebanon? 

A. We continue to advocate a free 
and independent Lebanon with all 
foreign forces removed and with ar- 
rangements that will look to the security 
along Israel's northern borders, so that 
the tendency to use southern Lebanon 
as a base from which to attack northern 
Israel isn't repeated. That, of course, 
was the basis on which the Israelis pro- 
ceeded into Lebanon in the first place. 
So we continue to advocate those goals. 

The May 17 agreement was an 
agreement for Israeli complete 
withdrawal, and we believe that the 
Israelis are correct to withdraw now. 

Personally, I think it would be better 
all around for all parties in the area if 
the Lebanese and the Syrians were 
prepared to negotiate the Israeli 
withdrawal so that arrangements were 
made that would provide for the kind of 
stability that will prevent just a recur- 
rent pattern of violence. That would be 
constructive, but it isn't happening. 

Q. Your response a moment ago to 
the question on the draw-down of 
staff at the Embassy suggested that 
that was being done merely because 
there was less to do. We have been led 
to believe in Washington that there 
are many other considerations, not the 
least of which is the security of 
Americans in Lebanon. Would you 
comment on the sense of deja vu that 
certainly some of us have about the 
security situation in Lebanon and 
about the continuing reasons for U.S. 
presence in Beirut? 



A. Obviously the security situation is 
a tense one for everybody, not just 
Americans. However, we don't intend to 
be pushed out of a region by terrorist 
threats. At the same time, there is no 
point in having people in a situation 
where there is danger more than you 
need. So the two considerations combine 
to lead you to reduce the presence for 
now, And if things should stabilize — I 
hope they will, but they are far from 
that right now — but if they do, then we 
would reintroduce people who would 
have a role to play in helping Lebanon 
reconstruct itself and be the prosperous 
place that it once was but is far from 
right at this moment. 

Q. Will the Ambassador remain 
there? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Was there anything that you 
heard in Moscow from Mr. Gorbachev 
which suggested that there are par- 
ticular areas where the Soviets are 
ready to move or where you sense a 
particularly promising opening? 

A. Between his statements and the 
Vice President's statements and the 
ones that I made, we covered the 
ground broadly. But, of course, in even 
that brief time — I guess we were there 
for almost an hour and half, but still 
that's a brief time considering 2-way 
translation and the fact that, of course, 
they had the funeral and all the events 
surrounding, and so on — it wasn't possi- 
ble to get into any real detail. But I 
think it's a fair statement that the 
general tone of the discussion was a 
businesslike and constructive tone. 

Q. Did either you suggest or 
General Secretary Gorbachev suggest 
adding a special impetus or urgency to 
on-going negotiations? In other 
words, did either of you suggest that 
both sides send new instructions to 
their teams or add a special impor- 
tance to on-going negotiations? 

A. Of course, the arms control and 
reduction negotiations in (}eneva carried 
on, and our side has very strong instruc- 
tions, constructive proposals to make. 
Mr. Karpov [head of the Soviet delega- 
tion to the arms control negotiations] 
said that in the meeting in which he was 
given his instructions, that meeting was 
chaired by Mr. Gorbachev, so I assume 
that Mr. Gorbachev agreed with those 
instructions. I'm sure he did. So there's 
no reason to shift things around. 

I think we have to remember that 
this relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union is a com- 
plicated, vitally important relationship; 



■May 1985 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



and while personalities matter— and we 
do have two strong personalities at the 
heads of the two governments— never- 
theless, you have to look always at the 
interests and the values and the dif- 
ferences as well as the opportunities to 
resolve them, and bear that in mind. 

Q. Mr. Gorbachev has accepted in- 
vitations to visit France and West 
Germany. Why do you think we have 
had no public response yet to the U.S. 
overture? 

A. You have to ask him. I can't 
speculate about that. 

Q. On the ANZUS situation, will 
there be any bilateral defense rela- 
tions now with New Zealand? And 
when you meet with the Australian of- 
ficials, will you ask them for a deeper 
military commitment to the United 
States? 

A. Insofar as the ANZUS situation 
is concerned, the Government of New 
Zealand, as is its sovereign right to do, 
has decided to prohibit port calls by U.S. 
naval ships. Given that decision on their 
part, that basically breaks the military 
relationship on which the ANZUS trea- 
ty, and the relationship under the 
ANZUS treaty, is based. And so we 
have proceeded in that manner to 
reduce quite sharply the military-to- 
military relationships, although they 
don't get eliminated entirely. 

New Zealand is a friendly country 
which shares Western values. I know 
many New Zealanders, been there 
several times; it's a wonderful country. 
So they have basically broken the 
military relationship. 

As far as Australia is concerned, we 
basically retain the structure of the 
ANZUS treaty; and we will continue to 
have a strong and constructive, worth- 
while relationship with the Australians 
for our mutual defense needs in the 
region. 

Q. As you know. President 
Mubarak has been here asking the 
United States to take a step toward 
reviving the peace process in the Mid- 
dle East by being willing to have a 
dialogue, as he calls it, with a joint 
delegation of Jordan and Palestinians. 
Under what circumstances would the 
United States agree to do that? 

A. We have done quite a few things 
to advance the peace process in the Mid- 
dle East. President Mubarak's sugges- 
tion is one suggestion. There are a 
number of others. 

We have, of course, had the Prime 
Minister of Israel visiting here last fall. 



The King of Saudi Arabia has been here 
recently. President Mubarak was here. 
The Foreign Minister of Jordan will be 
here next week. So we have a very ac- 
tive diplomacy in the field. 

I think it is fair to say that there has 
been movement among the parties in the 
region which we have encouraged. And 
so it's important— and it seemed to me 
this was President Mubarak's main 
point — to try to keep this momentum 
going. He deserves credit for helping get 
it going. 

To that end, after the Jordanian 
Foreign Minister has been here. Am- 
bassador Richard Murphy [Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs] will be sent by the Presi- 
dent and myself to the region. He'll go 
to Israel, he'll go to Saudi Arabia, he'll 
visit other countries, and he will con- 
tinually assess developments. He will 
report back promptly, and we will be do- 
ing everything that we can to keep the 
momentum toward peace in the Middle 
East going. It is of vital significance not 
only to the parties in the region but to 
ourselves and other countries as well. 

Q. If there is an improvement in 
the Chinese-Soviet relationship, would 
you expect this to affect American in- 
terests? 

A. Probably in a positive way. That 
is, the Chinese have put certain condi- 
tions down for any really fundamental 
change. They have talked about the 
masses of troops— Soviet troops— along 
their borders and the deployment of the 
SS-20 missiles. They have talked about 
the Soviet sponsorship of the Viet- 
namese occupation and advance into 
Cambodia. They have talked about the 
Soviet Union's invasion and continued 
military activities now, over 5 years or 
so, in Afghanistan and have said that 
these conditions should be changed. We 
think if those conditions were changed, 
it would be positive; it would be good for 
the world. 

Q. What was Mr. Gorbachev's 
reaction when you issued the invita- 
tion to a summit, and did he give you 
any indication of how soon we might 
be able to expect one? 

A. I think I can only say that the 
President feels that this is an important 
moment, for all the reasons that I have 
specified, and believes that it would be 
good in due course to meet with Mr. 
Gorbachev, and no doubt the Soviet 
Union has this, Mr. Gorbachev has that 
possibility under consideration, but I 
can't in any way try to speak for him. 



Q. Did he give you any reaction at 
all, though, when you were there? 

A. 1 just can't try to speak for him 
in any way. I don't think that's appro- 
priate for me. I can only say what our 
views are. 

Q. Can you say whether you attach 
any particular military or political 
significance to the continuing buildup 
of SS-20s by the Soviets and whether 
you regard that as "business as 
usual"? And second, did the issue 
come up in your meeting with Mr. 
Gorbachev? 

A. Unfortunately, it is "business as 
usual" that we see continued deploy- 
ments and continued development of the 
Soviet strategic and intermediate-range 
missilery. Of course, getting control of 
this process mutually is what the Geneva 
talks are primarily about. So we will 
proceed on that basis. 

Q. Is it the Administration's view 
that the ascension of Gorbachev 
represents more than a change in 
style? 

A. It remains to be seen. I think Mr. 
Gorbachev has, understandably, made a 
point that the keynote is continuity, and 
he has been part of the group of people 
and the leadership of the Soviet Union 
who have produced the present set of 
policies, and I wouldn't expect to see it 
change sharply. But in any case, what 
we can have some control over is our 
own posture. And we don't know what 
may be on the minds and intentions of 
the Soviet Union, but we hope construc- 
tive. They have said so. 

From our standpoint, we want to 
proceed— as I said in the statement that 
I discussed with the President — with a 
sense of realism. Of course, we have to 
maintain our capability to defend our 
values and our interests, and at the 
same time we have to be ready — and 
make it clear to the Soviet Union that 
we're ready — to undertake a genuinely 
constructive dialogue with them and to 
try to work out concrete solutions to 
problems. We will hope that they will 
respond. In any case, for our part, we 
can continue to be in that stance and en- 
courage a response on their part. 

Q. In recent times, you've spoken 
about the need to support freedom 
fighters around the world. I've got 
two questions on that. Has the Ad- 
ministration decided what it's going to 
do in Congress on supporting the in- 
surgents or rebels or contras in 
Nicaragua? And secondly given the 
situation in Indochina where the anti- 
Vietnamese Cambodians were given a 



34 



Deoartment of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



pretty big beating, why doesn't the 
United States do something to help 
them out militarily? They've been ask- 
ing for it. 

A. First of all, on the latter ques- 
tion, we continue to be in close consulta- 
tion with our friends in the ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] countries, and we are basically 
supporting what they are trying to do. 
We are continually reviewing the nature 
of that support with them. 

On the former part of your question, 
we believe that the people fighting for 
freedom and independence in Nicaragua 
should be supported. If your question is 
sort of tactical— "What is our, sort of, 
legislative strategy?" — that I'm not in a 
position to go into. But as far as the im- 
portance of standing with people who 
are trying to attain freedom and a more 
open, a more pluralistic society in 
Nicaragua is concerned, we are with 
them. 

Q. As a result of your visit to 
Moscow, have you come any closer to 
making decisions on what youll do 
with regard to the SALT II Treaty 
'toward the end of this year, when you 
Ihave to make certain basic decisions 
las to whether to adhere to it or ex- 
iceed the limitations on strategic 
launchers? 

A. No there's no change in our view 
lof that between this week and last week. 

Q. The Vice President was greeted 
■with boos and shouts of "Go home" 
this morning in Brasilia. Apparently, 
the reason was the foreign debt. It 
seems to be the first time that an 
American official was blamed for that 
or was booed for that. Do you see that 
issue — the foreign debt — becoming a 
problem between the new Brazilian 
Government and the United States? 

A. The question of how to handle 
the foreign debt is a difficult one. It's 
been worked with very hard, particular- 
ly over the last 2 years. I think it came 
first to the fore with respect to the Mex- 
ican debt. 

The IMF [International Monetary 
Fund] is the international agency 
primarily dealing with it. We have 
played, I think, a very constructive 
role— Secretary Regan, when he was in 
the Treasury, and Paul Volker in the 
Federal Reserve, and now Secretary [of 
the Treasury] Baker. We've tried to 
assist from the standpoint of the State 
Department. 



But I think the United States has 
been a very helpful partner in trying to 
help countries work their way through 
the debt problem. It involves, on the one 
hand, rescheduling; on the other hand, 
undertakings by countries that have the 
debt to create more healthy conditions in 
their country economically so there is 
some chance of repaying. 

And I think, number three — and 
most important really— is the develop- 
ment of an atmosphere of expansion in 
the world economy and in the individual 
economies, because you can't work out 
of debt through austerity alone. You've 
got to have expansion. And of course, 
the contribution of the United States to 
world expansion has been critical and 
immense. So I think the U.S. contribu- 
tion to the solution to this problem has 
been a very strong and positive one and 
well-appreciated by financial people all 
over the world. 

Q. Can you please say what further 
reforms you would like to see in the 
Israeli economy before naming an 
economic aid figure? 

A. I don't want to get into the posi- 
tion of trying to prescribe for somebody 
else's economy, but I do think that, 
clearly, the things that they say and are 
trying to do are key things. The underly- 
ing things are, number one, get control 
of the budget, which means getting con- 
trol of spending, because tax rates in 
Israel are already so high that they are 
on the downward part of the Laffer 
curve — that is, if you raise taxes, you'll 
collect less money. So it's got to be done 
through controlling spending. 

Associated with that, there needs to 
be, and the Israelis are proposing, a 
budget control law which I hope will be 
passed — they have proposed it — to 
enable the Finance Ministry to have a 
better hand on the spending by the 
various ministries so that when they 
say, "We are going to spend X amount," 
they will come somewhere near control- 
ling it to that amount. 

Second is the control of the money 
supply. There is legislation to make the 
Bank of Israel a more independent 
organization so it isn't simply an agency 
that has the role of funding the deficit 
but has a more independent stance to 
get control of the money supply which is 
fueling the inflation. 

Third, to deal with the problem of 
the cross-rate of the shekel and other 



currencies. Here they have an especially 
difficult problem because they more or 
less relate themselves to the dollar, and 
even as they have gentle devaluations 
with respect to the dollar, given the 
dollar's strength, those devaluations 
don't quite take hold with respect to the 
European currencies, and most of their 
trade is with Europe. So they have 
those dilemmas to work with. They 
understand the problem well, and have 
made some headway, but it's difficult 
sledding. 

Q. We've just sent two senior of- 
ficials to Chile — two senior U.S. of- 
ficials have now been to Chile in the 
past month or so, and meanwhile, we 
have deviated from the common prac- 
tice of supporting loans to Chile in the 
multilateral banks. How do you view 
the situation in Chile now, and par- 
ticularly the impact of these recent 
steps by the United States? 

A. I don't know what impact the ac- 
tions in the bank votes will have, but 
they suggest the reservations we have 
about the current situation in Chile. 
There was a time when it seemed that 
there was movement toward what is 
called "liberalization," and I think that 
was promising; but there has been move- 
ment away from that. 

We continue to work with the people 
and Government of Chile, but we would 
like to see political reform and also to 
see Chile's economy come back. That, of 
course, is something that will derive 
from a variety of factors, not simply the 
stance of the government. 



'Press release 52. 



tiAcM -fQPK 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary's Interview on 

"This Weel^ With David Brinl^ley" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
ABC-TV's 'This Week With David 
Brinkley" on March 17, 1985. by David 
Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, ABC 
News, and George F. Will, ABC Neu>s 
analyst. ' 

Q. Have you had any response, directly 
or indirectly, from Mr. Reagan's pro- 
posal for a summit meeting with Mr. 
Gorbachev? 

A. Not really. 

Q. Why not? Why can they respond 
to the French and the Germans in 
principle but not to us? 

A. You have to ask them that ques- 
tion. 

Q. I just did, and I didn't under- 
stand the answer [given by previous 
guest, Stanislav M. Menshikov, ad- 
viser to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. 

A. The United States is different. 
It's much more powerful, and we are 
engaged with the Soviet Union in many 
ways very directly, so more has to be 
thought about, no doubt, as is true in 
our own case. 

Q. You don't read into this any at- 
tempt to rebuff or to hold us up to 
sort of public laughter for making a 
request which they don't deign to re- 
spond to immediately? 

A. We didn't make a request. We 
made a suggestion, put forward in good 
faith by the President suggesting that 
this is an important moment, and 
perhaps something more constructive 
could be worked out. However, he has 
also noted, and we have emphasized, 
that the key thing here is for us to main- 
tain our strength and our sense of pur- 
pose, and if in that environment some- 
thing more constructive can emerge, 
then that would be good. 

Q. The Administration continues 
to call this a moment of opportunity. 
Yet Mr. Gorbachev says that the 
theme of his leadership will be con- 
tinuity, which means the continuation 
of policies that this Administration 
finds highly and comprehensively un- 
satisfactory. He has begun his tenure 
by making threats against Pakistan 
and linking it in some way with 
Nicaragua. What is your conclusion to 
be drawn from that? 

A. I tend to take people at their 
word, and the statement that there will 
be continuity, I think you have to look at 




that. They did threaten the Belgians, but 
the Belgians have gone ahead and 
deployed. They have threatened the 
Pakistanis, and I think the Pakistanis 
will hold firm in their concern about 
what's going on in Afghanistan. 

Q. They did link in some way in 
the Soviet press, they're saying that 
somehow their attitude toward Paki- 
stan's involvement with the Afghan 
resistance is linked to their — Soviet 
behavior — toward Nicaragua. How do 
you see it linked? 

A. I don't see it linked. I think that 
the situation in Nicaragua is one in 
which our interests are threatened, but 
more than that, in which freedom of the 
people in Nicaragua and in Central 
America is threatened. We have to 
stand with those who are fighting for 
freedom there, just as we have to sup- 
port those who are resisting the blatant 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. 

Q. Pve heard a report that Mr. 
Karpov [head of the Soviet delegation 
to the arms control negotiations] has 
been very menacing in his perform- 
ance in Geneva so far, saying that he 
would blow up the talks unless we 
were prepared to abandon SDI 
[Strategic Defense Initiative). Is that 



a fair characterization, menacing, of 
this behavior so far? 

A. Oh, I don't know about that, Imt 
he did give a public interview that, I 
guess, played yesterday. I don't know 
just when it was recorded, but if that 
kind of performance is to mean that the 
Soviets approach those negotiations as 
propaganda opportunities, then that 
doesn't bode very well for the negotia- 
tions. The negotiations should take place 
as a private diplomatic effort in which 
the rules of confidentiality that they 
have set up are observed. 

Q. Are we prepared to say at this 
point that we're not interested in a 
cosmetic arms control agreement, that 
the only agreement we're interested in 
would have substantial force reduc- 
tions, and if not, if we can't get that 
we don't want an agreement? 

A. Sulistantial force reductions 
leading to zero is what the President 
wants, and there's just not too much 
point in ratifying what people's plans for 
the future are. 

(J. But we did that in SALT I and 
II. We essentially did ratify, it was a 
snapshot of the arms race at the mo- 
ment. Are you saying that is un- 
satisfactory? 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



A. That is the basis on which Presi- 
dent Reagan consistently criticized both 
of those agreements, and so we seel\ 
something different. I felt myself that 
one of the notable aspects of the Geneva 
agreement that we reached in January 
was that both sides said that they were 
interested in radical reductions leading 
to zero. 

Q. The Soviets are deploying these 
SS-24 and 25 heavy missiles. What's 
your view? Is the 24 in violation of 
SALT II or not? 

A. We think it raises very con- 
siderable questions about that, but 
beyond that point what it shows is the 
continuing modernization of the Soviet 
land-based weapons. In this case you 
have a heavy MIRVed [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry vehicle] 
missile that is probably mobile. I think 
the emergence of weapons of that kind 
only emphasize the importance of 
defense against them, because they are 
not in a fixed place where you know 
where they are. 

Q. There's a story this morning 
that there are two schools of thought 
within our government. One is that 
although they are destroying some of 
their old missiles to make room for 
the 24s, that that is within the treaty, 
we ought to encourage them to do it. 
And the other is, which you seem to 
have suggested, that they may be in 
violation of that treaty, and we ought 
to come out against those new 
weapons. Which is your view? 

A. There are many aspects. One 
aspect is in terms of new missiles as 
distinct from numbers of missiles, and 
it's the new systems that are brought 
into question. 

Q. What's your view on this one? 

j A. To me it is a clear new missile. 

Q. That's a violation. 

A. Exactly. There are questions 
about whether, in a purely technical 
sense, it fits within certain treaty 
language as might be interpreted by a 
lawyer. 

Q. You just mentioned the fact 
that candidate Reagan opposed 
SALT II. Now, sometime this fall 
probably, when the Trident Alaska 
goes into service, the Administration, 
in order to continue what, by the Ad- 
ministration's own position, is 
unilateral compliance with SALT II— 
unratified but we're still complying 
with it. In order to comply with the 
sublimits on MIRV missiles, we will 
have to dismantle some land-based 
R BMs [intercontinental ballistic 



missile] or chop up a Polaris sub- 
marine. How can this Administration, 
staffed almost entirely by people who 
hated SALT II, continue to comply 
with it and dismantle systems while 
asking Congress for billions more for 
an MX? 

A. We have to make that decision as 
we come to it. In the meantime, the 
President's policy is a no undercut policy 
in the interests of seeing if we can't 
bring forward from the present Geneva 
negotiations the promise of the radical 
reductions in the agreement that led to 
these negotiations. 

Q. The SALT II stipulates 2,250 
launchers for each side. We've never 
been over that; the Soviet Union's 
never been under that, have they? 

A. When you say "never," I think 
that you're wrong on that. 

Q. Not since SALT II. 

A. But it is a problem, and the 
mobility of missiles increasingly raises 
problems about verification, whether you 
can really count them and know how 
many there are and where they are. 

Q. We have all g^rown up since 
World War II being told, and I think 
believing, that a summit meeting be- 
tween the leaders of two huge nations 
raise substantial public expectations 
and so, therefore, should be carefully 
prepared so as to be sure that when 
they were over something worthwhile 
came out of them. We have been told 
that, haven't we? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And that's been our way of 
thinking. 

A. And I think it's correct. 

Q. Now we're talking about a sum- 
mit meeting with, as far as I can tell, 
no preparation at all, just a rather 
casual meeting in which to chit-chat 
or whatever. What do we have in mind 
for this meeting? 

A. We don't have in mind casual 
chit-chat. There has been implicitly quite 
a lot of preparation in the sense that the 
two sides have made their positions 
quite clear on a very wide range of 
issues. There's been a lot of discussion, 
and there's been a few agreements in 
the past year; there are a wide variety 
of things under discussion now. At a mo- 
ment when the President is starting a 
new term with his basic policies in place, 
when we do have arms talks starting in 
Geneva, when we have a new leader of 
the Soviet Union, it seems to be a mo- 
ment when it would be useful to review 
the bidding, not with no preparation and 



not on the basis of chit-chat or just get- 
ting to know you but on the basis of 
reviewing all of the various substantive 
issues which are deep and difficult. 

Q. We are hearing in Washington 
now, and I think we've heard it from 
you, that in relations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, 
we now have a window of opportunity 
which implies that something exists 
now which did not exist before and 
may not exist in the future. What is 
this? 

A. Just to go over it, there has been 
a considerable amount of discussion of 
the deep and difficult issues between the 
two countries. There is a President 
starting a second 4-year term with 
policies in place, so he has examined the 
range of these issues. There is a new 
leader of the Soviet Union who is going 
to have the opportunity to fill vacancies 
in the Politburo and thereby, no doubt, 
strengthen whatever his point of view is 
as he looks ahead in their evolution as a 
country. We do have important discus- 
sions going on now pointed toward arms 
reduction — not just control, reduction. 
At least that's the stated subject of 
these negotiations. So all of these things 
together create a moment when, at least 
the President believes, it would be 
worthwhile to review the bidding and 
see where we may go from here. 

Q. All the arguments about the 
details of Soviet-U.S. relations are 
really at bottom arguments about one 
question: What does the Soviet Union 
want? What's the goal of the regime? 
Is it, as some people say, an inherently 
militarist and expansionist regime, 
deriving its legitimacy from its role as 
the keeper of a revolutionary flame 
against the rest of the world, or is it 
just another great power that wants 
to get along with us? What's the 
Reagan Administration view? 

A. I think you have to assume the 
former, because that's basically the way 
they've always described themselves, 
and they've always behaved. 

Q. In other words, that they are an 
expansionist, militarist, ideological 
power. 

A. No, from our standpoint, we have 
to recognize that as a reality, or certain- 
ly potential reality, and generate the 
strength of purpose and ability, along 
with our allies, to protect and defend 
and enlarge the scope of freedom in the 
world. Knowing that, and knowing that 
these two ideologies are not truly com- 
patible, we have to expect competition. 
But that doesn't mean in this world that 
we have to resign ourselves to a nuclear 



Mav 1985 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



holocaust or anything of that kind; we 
need to work to prevent it. 

Q. But isn't the premise of an arms 
control process that we, by negotia- 
tion, can change the fundamental 
character and aspirations of the Soviet 
regime? I mean, after all, they've been 
saying since 1959 that they're for 
reducing weapons. 

A. I don't think that that is the 
premise. I think we have to accept that 
the kind of system they have described 
to us they have is probably the way they 
think about it. We have to position 
ourselves so that we're able to deal with 
that and under those circumstances see 
if there are some agreements that will 
reduce the level of potential outbreaks 
of nuclear or other forms of warfare. 

Q. King Hussein of Jordan has 
now said that he's gone as far as he 
can go in trying to inch back into the 
Middle East peace process, that if the 
United States will not reverse its posi- 
tion and see a joint Palestinian- 
Jordanian group, that he's going to, in 
effect, wash his hands of it. Are you 
going to reconsider? 

A. I think that first of all, it's impor- 
tant to notice that over the past 6 to 8 
months there have been a number of 
favorable developments in the direction 
of Middle East peace. There have also 
been some steps in the other direction, 
but King Hussein's recognition of Egypt, 
despite the fact that Egypt, as the con- 
dition always was, has continued its 
peaceful relationships with Israel; the 
Iraqi desire to resume diplomatic rela- 
tions with us, despite the fact that we 
have as strong or stronger relationship 
with Israel than ever; the efforts on the 
part of King Hussein to engage with 
some sort of Palestinian delegation on 
the idea of direct negotiations with 
Israel, these are all positive things. 

On the other hand, as far as dealing 
with the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] is concerned, we have set 
down certain conditions, very simple 
ones basically — that they recognize [UN 
Security Council] Resolution 242, which 
is essentially the territory for peace for- 
mula, and recognize that Israel is a state 
and exists and has a right to exist — so 
that when the negotiations take place 
they don't take place on the idea that 
somehow one party is seeking to 
eliminate the other. 

Q. Is the answer to my question 
then no? My question being, will we 
reconsider our policy and meet with a 
joint Jordanian-Palestinian group? 



A. Your question doesn't lend itself 
to yes or no. There's motion. There's 
motion there. The President is dispatch- 
ing Ambassador Murphy [Richard W. 
Murphy, Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs] to the 
area, and we'll explore these possibili- 
ties, and we will see if it isn't possible to 
construct a Palestinian delegation, for 
example. There's not a PLO delegation. 

Q. King Hussein, last week and 
again today abroad, and President 
Mubarak of Egypt are complaining of 
the U.S. policy of not getting in as a 
mediator as an on-the-table-bargainer 
until both the Arabs and the Jewish 
nation sit down together is wrong: 
just absolutely wrong, and defeatist. 
How do you answer that? 

A. I think the message that we have 
tried to give over there, namely, that if 
peace is going to come about, the parties 
out there are going to have to think it 
over and decide some things for them- 
selves. That message has gotten 
through, and I think it's a fine thing. 

Q. So you're saying, boys, you're 
on your own. 

A. No, we're not. 

Q. If you ever get together — 
A. No, we're not. 

Q. — come see us. 

A. We're saying that the United 
States is ready and has been very heavi- 
ly involved in all of this, and we're pre- 



pared to undertake further things. But 
we want to see the ante — some ante — 
put on the table by everybody, and that's 
beginning to happen. So I think it's a 
healthy process. 

Q. If the Sandinista regime is as 
wicked as the Administration says it 
is, and Nicaragua is as important as 
the Administration says it is, and our 
duty to help freedom fighters is as 
clear as you said it was in your San 
Francisco speech, isn't the Admin- 
istration program awfully small com- 
pared to the gravity it's described? I 
mean, $14 million — we have the Navy 
and the Marines and all the rest — 
shouldn't the Administration say that 
we're not going to rely just on — I 
mean, by its own terms — just on $14 
million here and there, but are going 
to take more decisive actions? 

A. We are not relying on $14 
million. We're relying first of all on the 
strength of the ideas involved, on the 
proven workability of a free and open 
society to produce a better life for peo- 
ple. We are helping the surrounding 
countries to find democracy, the rule of 
law and economic development to stand 
in contrast with what's going on in 
Nicaragua. We intend to give every sup- 
port we are able to to those within 
Nicaragua who fight for what the San- 
dinista revolution's goals were in the 
first place. 



iPress release 5.5 of Mar. 18, 1985. 



Secretary's News Briefing 
for Regional IVIedia 



Secretary Shultz's news briefing to 
regional TV, radio, and newspaper 
organizations, held in the Old Executive 
Office Building on March 11. 1985.^ 

[Inaudible] early this morning of the 
passing of General Secretary 
Chernenko. The President has sent to 
the Soviet leadership a message of con- 
dolence, and I have similarly expressed 
my condolence to Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. I think it is an occasion, par- 
ticularly since I've just been told of an 
announcement from TASS that Mr. 
Gorbachev has been elected as the 
General Secretary, or named General 
Secretary. 

It is a moment of transition in the 
Soviet Union. It is a moment when 
negotiations for arms reductions are 
about to begin in Geneva. And so it is a 
moment when we need to pause and 



reflect and position ourselves to do as 
much as we can to develop and sustain a 
constructive relationship with the Soviet 
Union — certainly in the fields of arms 
reduction, but also in the many other 
aspects of life in which these two coun- 
tries interact. I'm sure that is the Presi- 
dent's intent and certainly mine and, I 
believe, the general wish of the Ameri- 
can people. 

Part of that effort, of course, is to 
be prepared to discuss outstanding prob- 
lems and to try to resolve them in a sen- 
sible way from our standpoint; recogniz- 
ing that agreements between two par- 
ties are not agreements unless they 
reflect some give-and-take, that is, they 
have to be in the mutual interests of 
both parties. 

We also know that it is important 
always, and particularly at a moment of 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



possible transition, to remind ourselves 
that there is a reality in which we have 
two countries with different systems 
that don't see things the same way. 
There is a reality that we must keep 
before us. That reality means that the 
United States must be careful that we 
develop and maintain the strength to de- 
fend our values, to defend our interests, 
and to work successfully with our allies 
to that end. 

We will all be looking to this period 
ahead as one in which it is possible that 
a continuation of the constructive trend 
that has been in place now— perhaps 
hesitatingly, but nevertheless definitely 
in place — symbolized and made concrete 
by the agreement for the resumption of 
arms control talks. We will be working 
to pursue that possibility. Perhaps that 
effort, if matched by a similar effort 
from the Soviet side, can produce 
something that will make us all feel 
more comfortable. I hope so. Again, let 
me take this occasion to express my con- 
dolences to the people of the Soviet 
Union and particularly in my case, to my 
counterpart. Foreign Minister Gromyko, 
on the death of General Secretary 
Chernenko. 

Q. Last week Cuba published a 
statement— 14 points— saying that 
they would comply with Ortega's deci- 
sion to withdraw 100 Cubans. But if 
after May the United States will con- 
tinue to harass and fight the with- 
drawal of the Sandinista government, 
he will reserve the right to send any 
quantity or number of technicians or 
military people that Nicaragua 
chooses. Do you have any reaction to 
that? Is that a blackmail to the United 
States? 

A. I guess you can pull that into this 
prt'ss conference by the ears, as every- 
body does, and let me try to make it 
I relevant for you. I think the relevance is 
that Cuba is supported by the Soviet 
Union and Nicaragua, in its present 
regime, is supported by the Soviet 
L'nion and Cuba. 

The direction of their activity is a 
direction, we believe, of wanting to have 
a Soviet-style totalitarian state placed in 
Central America. The President and I, 
and I think an increasing number of 
Americans, don't think that's a good 
idea. So we resist. Now whether the 
Cubans take out a hundred people or 
Hdt; if they take them out, that's good. 
We estimate that there are thousands 
there, and so it's not that big a deal. 

The agreement of the Nicaraguans 
and then the delivery of the hostage that 
they took— against all diplomatic tradi- 
[ tion— from the Costa Rican Embassy in 



Managua has at least opened the way 
for the Contadora talks to resume. 
That's positive development, although 
it's one of those activities where 
somebody does something bad, and tiien 
they say it's wonderful that I've stopped 
doing something bad and you can cheer 
about it, liut it's a restrained cheer. 

We are prepared to work for peace 
in Central America but a peace that we 
think has some stability potentially in it. 
There is no stability if we have a regime 
that is bent on upsetting its neighbor- 
hood, and that's what we object to. 

Q. Will the President be going to 
Mr. Chernenko's funeral? 

A. No. It's been announced that the 
Vice President will lead the American 
delegation to the funeral. All details 
haven't been worked out, and we have 
no information from the Soviet 
authorities yet as to exactly the struc- 
ture. They have announced that the 
funeral will be at 1 o'clock in the after- 
noon in Moscow. Moscow time. 

Q. Do you see easier days ahead 
under Gorbachev than we saw under 
Chernenko or his predecessors? Do 
you see easier days ahead in U.S. rela- 
tions with the U.S.S.R.? 

A. What we can have an impact on 
is what we do and the attitudes that we 
bring to the dialogue with the Soviet 
Union. What change there may be re- 
mains to be seen. But from our stand- 
point, it's important for us to continue to 
be realistic. It's important for us to con- 
tinue to be strong, and it's important for 
us to continue to be ready for a con- 
structive dialogue. The more ready the 
Soviet Union is, the more things can 
progress. Mr. Gorbachev seems to be a 
dynamic and a strong person. If he is 
designated the leader, as he apparently 
has been, we hope that we will have a 
chance to engage with him and work 
constructively with him. 

Q. With a much younger leader 
like Mr. Gorbachev, who obviously has 
been consolidating his power for 
awhile as was read in the announce- 
ment today, does that mean we might 
finally have a sense of continuity in 
dealing with the Soviets— somebody 
who may be there awhile? 

A. From our standpoint, we regard 
the Soviet Government as having been a 
functioning government and a govern- 
ment capable of deciding things. We will 
deal with whoever the Soviet system 
produces as the leadership. I do have the 
feeling— and it certainly was said by Mr. 
Shcherbitskiy, for instance, most recent- 
ly when he was here— that decisions 
that have been made in recent times 



have been collective decisions; that is, 
the Politburo group has all weighed in 
on them. At least that's what he has told 
us, and so presumably Mr. Gorbachev 
was very much a part of that process. 
He has been designated as the second-in- 
command and agrees with the flow of 
decisions leading to the resumption of 
arms control talks that arc starting up 
in Geneva. He, so far as we know, is not 
sick. He's a vigorous, young man and so 
we except to be dealing with him as the 
future unfolds. 

Q. In light of what you've just 
described about collective decision- 
making, should we assume from that 
that there really won't be any signifi- 
cant changes early on in terms of rela- 
tions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union? 

A. I said that I assume that there 
has been collective decisionmaking. That 
is what we have been told and so that 
would presume some continuity here. 
But, as I say again, I think it is much 
more important for us to be clear in our 
analysis, in our objectives, and in our 
commitment to have a constructive 
stance and to be ready to meet and try 
to influence what comes because of that 
than it is to speculate about what may 
be happening in the Soviet Union and, in 
any way, to adjust our stance to what 
we think may be theirs, because we can 
be wrong because our knowledge is not 
as large as we might like it to be. 

I hear, for example, occasionally, an 
argument made by somebody or I read 
an article that somebody writes saying 
that the Soviet Union is obviously not 
serious about arms control negotiations. 
It is a potential propaganda battle in 
Geneva, and, therefore, we shouldn't be 
serious about it. I say that's cockeyed 
thinking. 

In the first place those who say they 
aren't serious, don't know what they're 
talking about. They may be, they may 
not be. From our standpoint, we're 
serious, and we should go there in that 
spirit. If it turns out that they're 
serious, we'll get somewhere. If it turns 
out that they're not, we won't. But we 
shouldn't make any such presumption as 
is often made in the discussions. And 
believe me, we will go at this in a con- 
structive spirit. 

Q. In the last few weeks a U.S. 
narcotics officer was abducted in a 
foreign country and killed, and 
America seemed to have little coopera- 
tion initially in getting back. What 
can the United States do in the future 
to ensure the protection of U.S. nar- 
cotics agents overseas and stem the 



May 1985 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



tide of drugs, especially from Central 
America? 

A. There are lots of things we can 
do, although our power is not infinite. 
We, first of all, can make our view clear. 
We can do everything we can to en- 
courage, assist the law enforcement ac- 
tivities of host countries. We can get 
people to see the interlocking of drug 
trafficking, terrorism, and what goes on 
in certain countries. The fact that Cuba 
and Nicaragua, to name two, have been 
involved, and there is undoubted 
evidence of that in drug trafficking. Peo- 
ple must see that. 

We need an international effort 
here, and I think gradually that is taking 
shape. It is a major problem and, as we 
all know, it is highlighted by this most 
recent tragedy in Mexico. At any rate, 
there are many things that we can do, 
and we are doing them. The one reason 
I'm a little preoccupied here, and I didn't 
mean to cut off your follow-up question; 
it was just that I was told when I came 
in that you were all grumbling because 
you didn't get enough people asking 
questions, and so I wanted to spread it 
around. But I'm a little preoccupied 
because I'm trying to think about where 
we go from here in Soviet context and 
as soon as I leave here will be meeting 
with Foreign Minister Sepulveda of 
Mexico. 

Q. President Mubarak has asked 
that the United States meet with a 
joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. 
If such a delegation were put 
together, in which the Palestinians 
might possibly be tacitly approved by 
the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) but were non-PLO members, 
would the United States be willing to 
meet with such a group? 

A. We have always had the position 
and still have the position that we are 
prepared to talk with the PLO, which 
would include representatives of the 
PLO, when they recognize Israel's right 
to exist and when they recognize UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 as a basis upon which to proceed. 

President Mubarak is here. I had a 
brief exchange with him on Saturday 
evening when he came in and I look for- 
ward to meeting with him later today. 
He will be meeting with the President, 
of course, tomorrow and with others. 
There has been a lot of activity in the 
Middle East lately on the peace process 
and a lot of attention to it. President 
Mubarak has been in the center of this, 
and we want to explore carefully with 
him how he sees things. He is a con- 
structive force, and we will want to be 
working with him. I don't want to make 



a lot of unequivocal statements here, but 
I do believe that our position as far as 
discussions with the PLO is concerned— 
I just restated it — and there's been no 
change in that position. 

Q. For some weeks now, we've 
been hearing that the President 
refuses to negotiate on the strategic 
defense and you yourself just a few 
minutes ago said that there has to be 
give and take. Can you resolve that ap- 
parent contradiction? 

A. The President's Strategic 
Defense Initiative is a research program. 
The Soviet Union is also engaged in a 
research program in this area. Foreign 
Minister Gromyko and I agreed that, 
even if you wish to make an agreement 
about research — which we don't think 
would be wise — but even if you wish to 
make one, there is no way you could 
verify it. 

I suppose in the asymmetry of the 
situation, there would be a greater abili- 
ty of the Soviet Union to know what we 
are doing because our activities all need 
to be authorized and appropriated and 
so on. We don't have any way of verify- 
ing what they're doing. And so an agree- 
ment about research just seems to be 
out of the question for that, among 
other reasons. That's what the program 
is. 

Beyond that, of course, there are 
many other issues involved in testing 
and development and so forth, let alone 
possible deployment and much of that is 
covered by existing treaties. At any 
rate, the subject will all be given very 
careful discussion in Geneva. Also, there 
will be very careful discussion, I'm sure, 
of our view of the very active measures 
the Soviet Union has taken in the field 
of antiballistic missile defense. 

Q. Would the Chernenko funeral 
have provided an opportunity for the 
President to make that positive stance 
you talked about a moment ago? Why 
did he decide not to go? 

A. I think you will probably be 
meeting with him. You might want to 
ask him if you wish to. I think that 
basically there will certainly be a point, I 
hope, where the President and a Soviet 
leader will have a chance to get together 
and talk in some detail about these 
many problems. 

'The fact is that since President 
Reagan has been in office, it is probably 
the case that there hasn't been a time 
when there was a Soviet leader who was 
in a state of health such that he could 
travel and so on. Perhaps that condition 
will be changed. The arrangements at a 
funeral are not conducive to the kind of 
exchange that I described. I don't know 



whether you're familiar with what at 
least has happened in the past, and 
which I assume will happen in the 
future, but there are many delegations 
there and the Soviet leadership naturally 
has to meet with many people. It has 
symbolic significance and perhaps a little 
content, but it simply isn't the setting in 
which you can have a good, thorough, 
and searching examination of problems. 

Q. Would you say in respect of the 
Soviets' having worked on strategic 
defense for a number of years, that 
the U.S. position is now that we 
welcome an intensified Soviet effort 
in this area? 

A. We're not asking them to do the 
research. They have been doing it. You 
don't have to ask the Soviet Union to 
get preoccupied with defense. They are 
preoccupied with defense. They have 
spent as much money on defense, we 
estimate, as they have on offense, while 
we basically checked out of the area un- 
til very recent years. We intend to pur- 
sue the Strategic Defense Initiative and 
what happens on research is something 
that one can't verify. If they said they 
were going to do less of it, we wouldn't 
know whether they did or not. If they 
said they were going to do more, we 
would have a hard time knowing 
whether they did or not. 

Q. What is your assessment going 
into the arms control talks of 
U.S. -Soviet relations, and what is your 
assessment of the chances of getting a 
concrete agreement this time around? 

A. U.S. -Soviet relations are not as 
good as we would like to see them. On 
the other hand, over the last 4 years, 
from the standpoint of our ability to sup- 
port and defend U.S. interests, I think 
that things have gone relatively well 
from our standpoint. But in any case, 
we would like to have a better relation- 
ship with the Soviet LInion. It's possible 
if they have the same wish, as they say 
they do. If that is the case, certainly 
discussions of arms control are an im- 
portant ingredient in this process. Not 
the whole thing by any means, but they 
are an important ingredient in the whole 
process. So, partly the outcome of arms 
control talks will be sort of settled in its 
own terms, in terms of what they are 
ready to agree to and what we are 
ready to agree to and so on. But partly 
also it's a reflection of the more general 
picture and how it emerges. 

Q. I want to ask you about the in- 
tensified border searches along the 
U.S. -Mexican border that ended a few 
weeks ago. Do you think they were 
necessary, first of all, and second of 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



all, do you think they were a good 
idea [inaudible], and what do you want 
Mexico to do? 

A. thirst, they took place because we 
were so concerned about the kidnapped 
drug enforcement agent. It was an ef- 
fort to search intensively, and also to 
react to some of the threats that come 
from the drug trafficking people who try 
to constitute themselves as, in a sense, a 
government-within-a-government. I 
think they were a good idea. Among 
other things they gave people the 
message that this subject is very impor- 
tant, and it just has got to get address- 
ed. 

A vigorous effort to find out who 
was responsible for this horrible death 
and more generally to build on that to 
have the ability to prevent is the sort of 
thing that we want to see happen. 

Q. Ambassador Motley [Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs] 
was talking to us earlier this morning 
and described what the U.S. Govern- 
ment wants from the Nicaraguan 
Government. The impression I got 
from that is that we simply are not 
prepared to live with a belligerent or 
semibelligerent government of that 
sort. Yet we do elsewhere in the 
5 world live with belligerent or 
semibelligerent governments, in- 
cluding Cuba on our doorstep, without 
applying the kinds of pressures we 
seem to be applying to Nicaragua. 
What is it that is so different about 
Nicaragua that makes it — what seems 
to me to be a special case? 

A. We don't want much from 
Nicaragua. All we want them to do is to 
live up to the undertakings they've con- 
tinuously made. That shouldn't be too 
much to ask. 

As far as Cuba is concerned, our 
point has been perfectly clear. We've 
had an economic boycott sustained over 
more than a decade with Cuba. Cuba is 
a problem, and we don't like Cuban 
behavior. We would like to see Cuban 
behavior change. 

Nicaragua is a problem. It is incon- 
trovertibly trying to subvert its 
neighbors. No question about that. And 
as it develops greater capacity, if it 
does, to do so, the problem will increase. 
And as it has the kind of government 
that it seems to be moving toward rap- 
idly, as distinct from the kind of govern- 
ment that it told the OAS it would 
aspire to, the problem increases. And so 
that's what we have on our minds, and 
here it is close to home. 

People sometimes say to me, "Aren't 
>cu afraid that Nicaragua will turn out 
to be another Vietnam?" And I don't 
know exactly what they have in mind 



there; we don't have any plan for 
American forces in Nicaragua. On the 
other hand, tho.se who say that ought to 
think a little bit about what's happened 
in Vietnam. The fact that Vietnam is 
now occupying Cambodia; the fact that 
there is an absolute flood of refugees 
from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos — from 
that part of Asia — a very large number 
of whom now are in the United States. I 
think it's better if conditions can be so at 
home, including at home in Central 
America, that people want to stay there. 
Those are all things that concern us 
about Nicaragua. 

Q. How much longer can we wait 
for change to come about in Nicara- 
gua, and what kind of pressures do 
you put on them to bring about more 
change? 

A. We would like to see change im- 
mediately. And we have been speaking 
out on the subject for quite some long 
time. The President set out a program 
that is — and the Kissinger commission 
came in with a set of recommendations 
that are very parallel and which we are 
trying to follow. That program is to sup- 
port, throughout Central America, 
democracy and the rule of law; to sup- 
port economic development; and to 
recognize that if these things are going 
to take place in an area where active 
subversion is taking place, then we must 
help the countries such as El Salvador 



and Honduras erect a security shield. 
Otherwise, the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan 
axis will destroy the ability of 
democracy and the rule of law and 
economic development to take place. 
Those are all things that we have been 
working toward and trying to persuade 
the American public and the American 
Congress to support and, I think, with 
increasing success. 

Let me just say one further thing as 
I close. We have some very important 
votes coming up in our Congress, and 
one of them — very much related to the 
subject that I have been talking about — 
has to do with the Peacekeeper MX 
missile. We think this is an important 
modernization of the strategic triad of 
forces that maintain the strategic 
balance and the deterrence that has kept 
the peace for many years. It's important 
in and of itself. Of course, it's also im- 
portant as the arms control negotiations 
start in Geneva not to have actions take 
place here that tend to pull the rug out 
from under our negotiators. So both on 
the count that the Peacekeeper missile is 
important in its own right and on the 
count that it's important to our stance in 
the negotiations. I think it is extremely 
important that the Congress vote to 
unfence the fence that has been erected 
before these missiles. 



'Press release 49 of Mar. 14, 1985. 



Assistance Request for FY 1986 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
February 19. 1985.'^ 

I know that we agree on the need for 
prudent investments abroad to enhance 
our national security, promote economic 
and political freedom, and reflect the 
humanitarian concerns of the American 
people. Foreign assistance is such an in- 
vestment. Yet our foreign assistance re- 
quest for fiscal year (FY) 1986 comes 
before this committee at a time when 
this Administration and the Congress 
are committed to bringing our budget 
deficits down. As a former budget direc- 
tor, perhaps I am more sympathetic 
than most to the immense challenge this 
poses and the painful choices that will 
have to be made. 

Recognizing the overriding impor- 
tance of reducing the budget deficit, we 
have carefully constructed our economic 
and military assistance programs to a 
level and mix that represent the 
minimum requirements to support our 
foreign policy objectives. 



At the same time, we must bear in 
mind that our foreign assistance pro- 
grams are vital to the achievement of 
our foreign policy goals. A world of 
peace, freedom, international stability, 
and human progress cannot be built by 
the United States alone. We need the 
support and cooperation of the many 
friends and allies around the world who 
share our hopes and dreams of a better 
world and who rely on us. And if we are 
to count on their support in facing the 
difficult and sometimes dangerous 
challenges of the modern world, we 
must ourselves be a reliable partner. We 
must be consistent in our devotion to the 
principles we cherish and proclaim: to 
promote prosperity, to defend freedom, 
to help build democracy and respect for 
human rights, to help alleviate suffering, 
and to protect our friends and allies 
against aggression. 

In his State of the Union address, 
President Reagan noted that "dollar for 
dollar, our security assistance con- 
tributes as much to global security as 
our own defense budget." Strengthening 



May 1985 



41 



THE SECRETARY 



our friends is one of the most effective 
ways of protecting our interests and fur- 
thering our goals. It gives them the 
ability and the confidence to defend 
themselves and to work for peace. If we 
are willing to pay the relatively modest 
cost and make the necessary sacrifices 
today, we can avoid far greater costs 
and sacrifices in the future. Foreign 
assistance is a prudent investment in 
our future and the world's future. 

I first appeared before this 
distinguished committee to justify our 
foreign assistance programs over 2 
years ago. I sought then, as I did last 
year, to show how closely linked our 
foreign assistance programs are to our 
most fundamental foreign policy goals. 

The events over the past 2 years 
have convinced me more than ever 
before that we are on the right track. 
We have strengthened our relationships 
with our friends in the developing world 
against Soviet expansionism. We have 
seen a number of developing countries 
move toward free and more open 
economies. Increasingly, the world 
recognizes that statist economic systems 
do not work. Free market economies do. 
And we have witnessed extraordinary 
progress in the growth of democratic in- 
stitutions and in the decline of dic- 
tatorships, particularly in our own 
hemisphere. 



and preserve peace. Every blow we inflict 
against poverty will be a blow against its 
dark allies of oppression and war. Every vic- 
tory for human freedom will be a victory for 
world peace. 

Today, we are seeing developments 
in the Third World which, if we continue 
to nurture them, will lead to a more 
secure and prosperous world. There will 
inevitably be occasional setbacks, but if 
we stay the course, I believe the emerg- 
ing pattern of stable and democratic 
governments will slowly but inexorably 
grow and be strengthened. 

Much remains to be done. The most 
effective contribution we can make to 
the developing world is to maintain a 
healthy American economy. Our 
economic growth rate in 1983 was a 
prime reason for the sharp increase in 
U.S. imports from the non-OPEC 
developing countries to $92.3 billion, 
some 24% over the previous year. The 
developing nations will reap even more 
substantial benefits from the vigorous 
growth of our economy in 1984. They 
also gain, as we do, from our commit- 
ment to restrain protectionist forces. 

More than any other factor, how- 
ever, the domestic policies of these coun- 
tries will determine the strength and 
sustainability of their economies and 
their political institutions. Our foreign 
assistance can provide those critical in- 



. . . the skeptics were wrong about El Salvador, 
they were wrong about Grenada, and they are 
wrong about Nicaragua — and all for the same 
reason. 



It is no coincidence that along with 
the emergence of freer societies, we see 
more open economies. One supports and 
reinforces the other. People, if they have 
a choice, want economic growth. They 
want prosperity. They need only the per- 
sonal security and the political and 
economic environment that allows them 
to exercise their will and use their 
talents. Our support for the security and 
territorial integrity of our friends, 
therefore, advances the most basic 
human goals of prosperity and freedom. 
But it also advances another goal, peace. 
We have seen over the years that 
economic progress, individual liberty, 
and world peace are closely related. As 
President Reagan said in his second in- 
augural address: 

America must remain freedom's staunch- 
est friend, for freedom is our best ally and it 
is the world's only hope to conquer poverty 



cremental resources to help them 
achieve these objectives. 

With this framework in mind, we 
have engaged in an exhaustive budget 
review process to assure that the sum of 
our resources and each individual com- 
ponent are the absolute minimum essen- 
tial to implement and support our 
foreign policy. 



OVERVIEW OF 1986 FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE BUDGET AND 1985 
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST 

The FY 1986 foreign assistance request 
totals $14.8 billion, a $300 million reduc- 
tion from the VY 198,5 continuing 
resolution level. As 1 will explain later, 
we have yet to determine the economic 
assistance level for Israel. When that 
assistance figure is eventually included, 



our request will be higher than the 
previous year. Economic assistance — 
which includes development assistance, 
PL 480, the economic support fund 
(ESF), and contributions to multilateral 
development institutions — accounts for 
$8.2 billion. Military assistance — which 
includes military grants, loans, and 
training — totals $6.6 billion. 

Our FY 1986 request contains only 
one modest new initiative — an enhanced 
economic aid package for the Andean 
democracies of Ecuador, Peru, and 
Bolivia. With that one exception, our 
1986 budget request by and large 
represents a continuity program, reflect- 
ing both the overall fiscal constraints 
under which we are operating and the 
fact that many of our earlier initia- 
tives — especially in Central America — 
are now well underway and beginning to 
show progress. 

As in the past, the largest single 
component of our foreign assistance re- 
quest is for Israel and Egypt — 28% of 
the total. (This percentage, of course, 
will be higher when we include economic 
assistance funds for Israel.) Assistance 
to base rights countries — Spain, Por- 
tugal, Greece, Turkey, and the Philip- 
pines — accounts for an additional 16%, 
while military access and front-line 
states such as Korea and Thailand take 
up another 13%. Central America and 
the Caribbean represent another 11% of 
the request. All other country programs 
account for only 12'Fo of the total 
resources requested. This 12%, however, 
is spread among more than 80 separate 
countries and regional programs. Final- 
ly, contributions to multilateral develop- 
ment institutions and voluntary con- 
tributions to international organizations 
and programs make up 10% of the re- 
quest, with the remainder of the 
amounts requested going to the Peace 
Corps, migration and refugee assistance, 
international narcotics control activities, 
and a number of smaller programs. 

Turning to the specifics of our re- 
quest, I would like to make the following 
brief observations. 

• In development assistance, we are 
requesting $2.1 billion to attack serious 
conditions of poverty in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Near East and 
to help establish the basic conditions for 
economic progress. We place heavy em- 
phasis on policy reform, greater use of 
the private sector, and on technology 
transfer to foster development break- 
throughs. These economic programs are 
a critical aspect of our overall foreign 
policy objectives. 

• Closely related to the development 
assistance request is a request for $1.3 
billion in PL 480 for food assistance and 
balance-of-paymenls support to friendly 
governments. Food aid remains the 
centerpiece of the American people's 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



humanitarian response to the tragic 
famine conditions in Africa. 

• The $2.8 billion requested for the 
economic support fund is $1 billion 
below the amount appropriated in the 
FY 1985 continuing resolution. This is 
due, in part, to the fact that we have 
deferred making any ESF request for 
Israel at this time. I will elaborate on 
the question of economic assistance to 
Israel later in my remarks. 

• Our request for military 
assistance — that is, direct foreign 
military sales (FMS) credits and grant 
MAP [military assistance program] — is 
$860 million more than was appro- 
priated in 1985. Most of this increase, 
$525 million, is accounted for by higher 
levels for Israel ($1.8 billion as opposed 
to $1.4 billion in 1985) and Egypt ($1.3 
billion as opposed to $1,175 billion). In 
addition, our military assistance request 
for Turkey has been increased from the 
1985 level of $700 million to $785 
million. For the Philippines, we are re- 
questing a $75 million increase over the 
FY 1985 level. 

In conjunction with our FY 1986 re- 
quest, we are submitting two requests 
for supplemental appropriations in FY 
1985. These include $235 million in new 
budget authority to complete our $1 
billion package of relief for the victims 
of the famine that continues to 
devastate much of sub-Saharan Africa. 
We are also requesting a $237 million 
supplemental to meet our arrearage 
payments to several multilateral 
development institutions. 



THE REGIONS 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Nowhere has the dynamic linkage be- 
tween foreign assistance and U.S. na- 
tional interests — and between 
■democracy and economic opportunity — 
'been more dramatically illustrated than 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The past year has provided strong 
evidence that democratic development 
and the rejection of the communist left 
and the far right are the keys to ensur- 
ing peace and improving standards of 
living for all. 

Our policy of lending political, 
economic, and military assistance to pro- 
democratic forces is working. In so com- 
plex a situation, we should look at the 
record. 

In 1979, four of the five Central 
American countries were undemocratic, 
but 6 years have produced dramatic 
change. Today, only Nicaragua remains 
under a dictatorship— having traded a 
tyrant of the right for the tyranny of the 
left. Only Costa Rica has not changed 
politically: it remained thoroughly 



democratic— though increasingly and 
justifiably concerned about the threat 
from the new and heavily armed com- 
munist tyranny next dt)or. 

El Salvador is the most dramatic case 
of progress. As recently as a year ago, 
many in the United States, in" Western 
Europe, and even in Latin America 
believed El Salvador was caught in an 
endless war between guerrillas of the 
left and death squads of the right. But 
the National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America insisted that electoral 
democracy and political dialogue— not 
externally imposed "power-sharing"— 
would prove a workable foundation for 
attacking the seamless web of political, 
economic, social, and security problems. 
Increased economic and security assist- 
ance was necessary to give democracy, 
reform, and economic revitalization a 
fighting chance. 



accepted as honest and open but— to the 
surprise of many— revealed that centrist 
forces constitute the political majority. 
It is encouraging that the Guatemalans 
have moved in this direction almost ex- 
clusively on their own. 

There is one issue, however, on 
which considerable controversy still 
reigns: Nicaragua. While we are pro- 
moting democratic reform throughout 
Central America, the Soviet Union and 
Cuba are abetting the establishment of a 
communist dictatorship in Nicaragua. 

If the forces of dictatorship continue 
to feel free to aid and abet insurgencies 
in the name of "proletarian interna- 
tionalism," it would be absurd if the 
democracies felt inhibited about pro- 
moting the cause of democracy. 

Peace and economic development in 
Central America require both the 



Security assistance remains essential for many 
African countries. States threatened by Libyan 
adventurism or Soviet-armed hostile neighbors 
cannot devote the energy or resources necessary to 
economic development. 



Last year demonstrated that Presi- 
dent Duarte's course was the route most 
likely to lead to greater respect for 
human rights and a better life. The 
Salvadorans themselves made the point 
in two rounds of national elections in 
1984. And they did it again in a dif- 
ferent dimension when a civilian jury 
found five former National Guardsmen 
guilty of the murders of the four 
American churchwomen. Support for 
this democratic renewal was backed 
unanimously by the national bipartisan 
commission, by President Reagan, by a 
bipartisan majority in the Congress, and 
in Europe by Social Democrats as well 
as Christian Democrats. 

It would be naive to claim that all is 
now reformed, centrist, and peaceful in 
El Salvador. But the progress is 
dramatic and undeniable. And U.S. firm- 
ness on principles and on behalf of our 
Salvadoran friends has had a lot to do 
with it. 

The recent history of Guatemala, as 
much as that of El Salvador, exemplifies 
the dangers of basing judgments on 
stereotypes. The country often ranked 
as "the most polarized" or with the 
"least chance of democratic develop- 
ment" has confounded the conventional 
wisdom. The Constituent Assembly elec- 
tions 7 months ago were not only widely 



reliability of multiyear funding and the 
confidence that this long-term commit- 
ment will continue to be tied to equity, 
reform, and freedom. Bipartisan support 
is essential if the Central America ini- 
tiative [Central America Democracy, 
Peace, and Development Initiative] is to 
address the bipartisan commission's call 
for a commitment through 1989 to pro- 
vide — in a consistent, predictable way — 
a balanced and mutually reinforcing mix 
of economic, political, diplomatic, and 
security activities. 

This initiative is designed to use 
large amounts of economic aid, coupled 
with policy reform, to eliminate root 
causes of poverty and political unrest. 
Much work is already underway. Discus- 
sions are taking place with recipient 
countries concerning macroeconomic ad- 
justment. Progress has been made 
toward economic stabilization. Regional 
technical training programs will begin in 
April. We have begun to work with 
governments and nongovernment organ- 
izations seeking to improve the ad- 
ministration of justice. A trade credit in- 
surance program has been set up 
through AID [Agency for International 
Development] and the Export-Import 
Bank. The revival and strengthening of 



May 1985 



43 



THE SECRETARY 



the Central American Bank for Eco- 
nomic Integration is being studied. And 
we are working to assist in the revival 
of the Central American Common 
Market. 

The democratic trend in the Andean 
region has been equally impressive. All 
five countries have democratically 
elected governments. But like their 
Latin neighbors to the north, many of 
their economies are being seriously 
challenged. 



created new export opportunities. There 
also has been growth in real per capita 
income of about 0.2% in 1984— not 
much, but better than the decline of 
5.8% in 1983 and 3.3% in 1982. 

The Caribbean Basin Initiative is 
showing some positive signs. U.S. 
nonpetroleum imports from the region 
for the first 11 months of 1984 were up 
19% over 1983. The open U.S. market 
continues to offer substantial oppor- 
tunities for the region's exports. 



The United States has mounted an un- 
precedented campaign to provide both economic 
and emergency food assistance to Africa . . . we 
have not allowed political or ideological differences 
with any government to weaken our determination 
to direct assistance to those in need. 



Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia have been 
particularly hard hit by the recent global 
recession. Their difficulties have been 
exacerbated by catastrophic weather 
conditions, sagging prices for their main 
exports, and, in Peru, a vicious Maoist 
guerrilla movement. These countries 
deserve our help, and it is in our interest 
to help them. We are proposing a special 
Andean program principally supported 
by $70 million in economic support funds 
to assist these countries in their 
recovery efforts. 

A democracy incapable of addressing 
major economic problems will be no 
more permanent than the dictators of 
the right or left that it has replaced. 

We are encouraged that our neigh- 
bors in Latin America, for the most 
part, are taking the necessary and often 
painful steps to ensure economic 
revitalization. They have lowered 
government expenditures, bringing them 
in line with government income. They 
have restricted imports of nonessential 
goods to save foreign exchange. They 
have adjusted their exchange rates to 
reflect economic reality and breathe new 
life into their export sectors. They have 
worked with the international financial 
community to restructure their debts 
and ensure continued orderly debt serv- 
icing. They have reallocated scarce 
resources even as those resouces fell. 

The efforts are beginning to show 
results. The trade balance for Latin 
America with the rest of the world has 
improved significantly, recovering from 
a negative $2 billion in 1981 to an 
estimated positive $37.6 billion in 1984. 
Vigorous U.S. economic growth in 1984 



44 



In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
I believe that the Administration and the 
Congress have reason to conclude that 
the policies we have been following the 
last 4 years are succeeding. The best 
option for the next 4 years is to continue 
these efforts based on firm, bipartisan 
support. 

The lessons from the recent past 
and the guidelines for the near future 
can be condensed into an assertion: the 
skeptics were wrong about El Salvador, 
they were wrong about Grenada, and 
they are wrong about Nicaragua— and 
all for the same reasons. 

What the Administration and the 
Congress have learned together in the 
past provides a mandate for the future. 
The Administration cannot fulfill that 
mandate without the active support of 
the Congress. If you and we do not 
stand firmly on principle and with our 
friends, we will both lose. A lack of 
policy consistency would be a significant 
obstacle to achieving our national objec- 
tives in this region over the next months 
and years. 

Africa 

I turn now from the promising 
developments in Latin America to a 
region where problems continue to be 
grave. Africa's desperate economic state 
is more in the public eye than it has ever 
been. I would like to devote the major 
portion of my discussion of Africa today 
to the economic crisis. In doing so, I do 
not mean to minimize the relationship 
between economic development and the 
national security of African states. 



Security assistance remains essential for 
many African countries. States threat- 
ened by Libyan adventurism or Soviet- 
armed hostile neighbors cannot devote 
the energy or resources necessary to 
economic development. And economical- 
ly fragile societies are most vulnerable 
to subversion and attack. 

Our total FY 1986 request for Africa 
is just over $1.2 billion. Of that amount, 
17% is for military-related assistance, 
roughly the same amount as in FY 1985. 
The overwhelming majority — over $1 
billion — is for economic assistance. 
While the military component is small, it 
is nevertheless extremely important if 
we are to continue the programs of 
logistics support and training that we 
have started and if we are to provide 
the bare minimum in the way of defense 
equipment for our friends facing threats. 
The proximity of the Horn of Africa to 
the Middle East and vital oil shipping 
routes in the Red Sea and the Indian 
Ocean adds a critical strategic dimension 
to our interests in creating a politically 
stable and economically viable environ- 
ment in the region. Consequently, we 
are seeking the resources necessary to 
assist Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and 
Djibouti to cope with their flat 
economies and to help Sudan and 
Somalia counter the very real threats to 
their security. 

In southern Africa we continue to 
work diligently toward a just and lasting 
settlement for Namibia based on UN 
Security Council Resolution 435, for con- 
tinued change in the repugnant system 
of apartheid in South Africa, and for the 
economic and political stability of the 
region in general. The funds that we are 
requesting for programs in southern 
African countries will enable us to strike 
directly at the causes of the economic 
difficulties of the region. In southern 
Africa, as in East Africa, we intend to 
thwart the destabilizing influence of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern bloc by pro- 
viding economic assistance and by offer- 
ing an alternative to Soviet and Eastern- 
bloc military assistance and training. 
Mozaml)ique has demonstrated a real in- 
tent to move away fr()m heavy depend- 
ence upon the Soviet Union and toward 
a position of true nonalignment. The 
small MAP and IMET [international 
military education and training] pro- 
grams for Mozambique are of particular 
importance in encouraging this process. 

In West Africa, we have recently 
seen the spread of both the effects of 
the drought and long-term economic 
stagnation and Libyan adventurism. Our 
assistance is targeted against both the 
near-term crisis and the long-range ef- 
fects of the economic crisis. 

I would like to focus specifically on 
the two most urgent crises facing Africa 
today: famine and economic stagnation. 
During recent months, untold thousands 
of Africans have perished. We estimate 

Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



that some 14 million Africans remain at 
risk. If they are to survive, they need 
urgent assistance in terms of food, 
medical care, and shelter. 

There is also the broader problem of 
malnutrition. An estimated 20% of 
Africa's population eats less than the 
minimum needed to sustain good health. 
Africa is the only region in the world 
where per capita food production has 
declined over the past two decades — a 
combination of a drop in productivity 
and rapidly growing population. Africa's 
food dependency on outside sources has 
been growing at an alarming pace, with 
African commercial imports of grain in- 
creasing at a rate of 9% per year during 
the past 20 years. 

In addition to the current severe 
food crisis, Africa's disappointing 
economic performance has made it dif- 
ficult for most African countries to serv- 
ice their debt, propeling many countries 
from one financial crisis to another. The 
economic crisis has required that 
African nations regularly seek debt 
rescheduling. Ten of the fourteen Paris 
Club reschedulings in 1984 were for 
African countries. 

The United States has mounted an 
unprecedented campaign to provide both 
gconomic and emergency food assistance 
to Africa. In this effort, we have not 
allowed political or ideological dif- 
ferences with any government to 
nveaken our determination to direct 
assistance to those in need. Since 
Dctober of last year, we have committed 
more than $400 million to send over 1 
Tiillion tons of emergency food and 
Dther types of humanitarian assistance 
to Africa. If we add our regular AID 
Ifood programs, then our total food 
assistance for Africa is even larger— 
almost $600 million thus far this fiscal 
year. Our cuirent request for $235 
million in supplemental emergency fund- 
mg for Africa will bring total food and 
emergency assistance this year to over 
$1 billion." I think we can be justifiably 
proud of what we have been able to ac- 
3omplish in such a short period of time. 
I assure you that our response will con- 
tinue to be a generous one. 

Equally impressive has been the 
direct response of the American people 
and the private sector. Through 
generous contributions to private volun- 
tary agencies, many thousands of addi- 
tional lives have been, and continue to 
be, saved. Volunteers for these agencies 
are directly involved in distributing food, 
medicines, clothing, and shelter and car- 
ing for drought victims in the most 
remote parts of Africa, enduring ex- 
treme hardships and even risking their 
own lives. Such humanitarian assistance 
is in the best tradition of America and 
the values for which America stands. 



May 1985 



Public attention has focused on the 
immediate drought crisis, but it is ap- 
parent that Africa's economic difficulties 
have a profound origin that goes back 
many years. Drought has aggravated 
the problem, but is not the principal 
cause of Africa's economic crisis. Many 
of the African governments recognize 
that past policy failures have contributed 
to the current economic crisis. While wo 
seek to address the immediate crisis, 
therefore, we must also seek more sus- 
tainable solutions to Africa's economic 
problems. The United States has been in 
the forefront of those seeking to help 
African countries move from a statist 
economic orientation to one which allows 
market forces to operate freely and 
which provides appropriate price incen- 
tives, particularly to the small farmers. 
Structural issues which are being ad- 
dressed include inefficient parastatals, 
overvalued exchange rates, negative in- 
terest rates on bank deposits, uneco- 
nomic subsidies to consumers, and 
artificially low prices to producers. In 
addition to the emergency assistance to 
meet the drought and famine needs. 
U.S. economic assistance levels for 
Africa have increased from $787 million 
in FY 1981 to over $1 billion in FY 
1985; for FY 1986 we are again asking 
for a total of $1 billion in economic aid. 
To assist reform-minded governments to 
undertake desirable reforms, the Ad- 
ministration has established two new 
programs. 



in a fundamental way their national 
economic policies. Above all, the 
relevance of free market economies as 
opposed to statist solutions has become 
clear to African leaders as never before. 
We are in the process of identifying the 
first African countries to participate in 
this special program. In addition, we are 
asking other donors and international 
financial institutions to work with us 
and to provide cofinancing for these ven- 
tures. 

I might just add that our perception 
of the roots of Africa's current economic 
crisis is widely shared by the interna- 
tional community. We are particularly 
pleased with the World Bank's latest 
report on sub-Saharan Africa and its 
stress on the need for economic reform 
to reverse Africa's economic decline. The 
World Bank recently launched its own 
special facility which will provide finan- 
cial support to reform-minded coun- 
tries — a facility which complements and 
reinforces our efforts. 

The "Food for Progress" initiative 

recently announced by the President is 
also targeted at achieving policy reform 
but exclusively in the agricultural sector. 
This initiative would use food aid in 
strategically important African countries 
to promote reform in the key agricul- 
tural sector, stressing market ap- 
proaches in agricultural pricing, market- 
ing, and the supply and distribution of 
fertilizers, seeds, and other agricultural 



There are no quick and easy solutions for 
peace in the Middle East, but our assistance plays 
a crucial role in furthering the peace process. 



The African Fund for Economic 
Policy Reform, a program funded with 
$75 million in economic support funds in 
FY 1985 has the following main objec- 
tives: 

• First, to provide additional sup- 
port for those African countries which 
are in the process of implementing 
policy changes or have indicated a will- 
ingness and ability to establish growth- 
oriented policies; and 

• Second, to strengthen the interna- 
tional assistance framework for Africa 
by improved multilateral and bilateral 
donor coordination at the country level. 

Although this policy reform program 
is still in its initial stages, preliminary 
reaction to this new initiative has been 
encouraging. An increasing number of 
African countries are beginning to alter 



inputs. One of the goals of the initiative 
is to supply American food to reform- 
minded countries on a multiyear basis. 
The sale of the commodities in the local 
economies would provide resources for 
the governments to use in supplying 
needed incentives and inputs to the 
farmers while easing the effects on ur- 
ban consumers of moving toward a 
market economy. The details of this pro- 
posal, including funding levels and 
sources, will be transmitted to the Con- 
gress shortly. 

Near East and South Asia 

One of the most important foreign policy 
goals of this Administration is to help 
achieve a lasting peace between Israel 
and its Arab neighbors. There are no 



45 



THE SECRETARY 



quick and easy solutions for peace in the 
Middle East, but our assistance plays a 
crucial role in furthering the peace proc- 
ess. Israel and Egypt remain our prin- 
cipal partners in the quest for peace, 
and these two nations would be the 
largest recipients of our proposed 
foreign assistance for FY 1986. Our 
economic and military assistance pro- 
grams are needed to strengthen 
Jordan's security and economy, both of 
which are vital to enable Jordan to con- 
front the risks involved in playing a 
significant role in the peace process. Our 
relationships with Saudi Araba and the 
Arab gulf states are important elements 
in our efforts to advance the peace proc- 
ess and. as I will mention later, to pro- 
tect our interests in the Persian Gulf. 

The United States has a commit- 
ment to Israel's security extending over 
three decades. Our security assistance 
proposal aims to ease the onerous 
burden Israel shoulders in meeting its 
defense needs. The FY 1986 foreign 
military sales program will enable Israel 
to maintain a qualitative military edge 
over potential adversaries in the region. 
Further progress toward peace depends, 
in part, on Israel having sufficient con- 
fidence in its ability to withstand exter- 
nal threats but also confidence in U.S. 
support and assistance. For these 
reasons, we are recommending a signifi- 
cant increase in foreign military sales on 
a grant basis for Israel. 

The U.S. and Israeli Governments 
agreed last October to establish a Joint 
Economic Development Group to review 
economic developments in Israel, the 
role of U.S. assistance in support of the 
Israeli adjustment program, and Israeli 
longer term development objectives. At 
a meeting in December, Israeli Govern- 
ment officials presented the annual 
white paper outlining Israeli economic 
objectives and assistance requirements 
for the remainder of this fiscal year and 
for FY 1986. 



Israeli economy. Without such a reform 
program, however, additional U.S. 
assistance would not resolve Israel's 
economic problems but merely help to 
perpetuate them. Moreover, without 
economic adjustment, Israel will become 
even more dependent on U.S. assistance 
in the future. Our objective is to seize 
the window of opportunity provided by 
greater Israeli understanding of the 
problems of their economy. 

The Israeli Government has made 
some considerable progress to date in 
developing an adjustment program. But 
further progress is necessary if their 
program is to put Israel back on the 
path of economic health and additional 
U.S. assistance is to serve a useful pur- 
pose. Accordingly, the Administration 
intends to hold open for the time being 
the amount and form of ESF which we 
will be requesting from the Congress 
pending further discussions with Israel 
and further evolution of its stabilization 
program. 

Our discussions will continue to 
focus not only on short-term stabilization 
measures but also on Israel's longer 
range development objectives so that 
Israeli citizens can have confidence in a 
brighter, more prosperous future. We 
agreed during Prime Minister Peres' 
visit last October to work together to 
promote foreign investment in Israel, 
particularly in the high-technology area 
where Israel has a comparative advan- 
tage. Both governments are examining 
existing programs and frameworks 
which might help to improve Israel's in- 
vestment climate and attract venture 
capital from abroad. It is clear that in 
Israel's case — as in other countries — 
mobilizing both domestic and foreign 
venture capital depends on an atmos- 
phere that encourages private enter- 
prise, appropriate tax structures, and 
market-pricing policies. Private sector 
initiatives hold the greatest promise for 
helping Israel to achieve its development 



We seek to prevent conflict among the major states 
[in South Asia], to help the region develop 
economically, and to foster the success of 
democratic institutions. 



Our security assistance is a reflec- 
tion of the U.S. commitment to Israel's 
security and economic well-being. In ad- 
dition, we have indicated our willingness 
to provide extraordinary assistance in 
support of a comprehensive Israeli 
economic program that deals effectively 
with the fundamental imbalances in the 



goals, and we are encouraged by the in- 
terest that has been generated in both 
countries. Our real objective is to sup- 
port Israel's own efforts to seize the op- 
portunity to establish the fundamental 
conditions for economic growth in an 
age of new technology. 



The Camp David accords and the 
Egy]5tian-Israeli Peace Treaty remain 
the cornerstone of our Middle East 
peace policy. Egypt has demonstrated 
its firm commitment to those accom- 
plishments by repeatedly refusing to 
disavow them as a price for resuming its 
historic leadership role in the Arab 
world. Our assistance helps ensure that 
EgjTJt will remain strong enough to con- 
tinue to resist the pressures of radical 
forces which seek to undo what has been 
achieved. Egypt remains an important 
force for moderation and stability not 
only in the Middle East but also in 
Africa, where it plays an important role 
in helping African states deter Libyan 
adventurism. Egypt's ability to continue 
this deterrent role depends heavily on 
our assistance. The FY 1986 foreign 
military sales program has been in- 
creased to enable Egypt to continue 
replacing obsolete Soviet equipment and 
remain a credible deterrent force in the 
region. 

Another major U.S. interest in the 
Middle East is to maintain free world 
access to the vital oil supplies of the 
Persian Gulf now and in the future. The 
Persian Gulf countries produce over 25% 
of the free world's oil supply. Through 
our assistance, we help to improve the 
security of our friends in this area. 
Oman is cooperating closely with the 
United States toward our common goal 
of maintaining security and stability in 
that vital area and freedom of naviga- 
tion through the Strait of Hormuz; 
Oman's agreement to permit access to 
its facilities represents a key asset for 
the U.S. Central Command. Although 
not recipients of U.S. financial assist- 
ance, the other gulf states and Saudi 
Arabia, as members with Oman in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, have shown 
the will and the ability to defend 
themselves against encroachment of the 
Iran-Iraq war. The Administration is 
embarking on a comprehensive review of 
our security interests and strategy' in 
the area, focusing on how our various 
programs in the security field comple- 
ment our efforts in the peace process 
and contribute to the general stability of 
the region. 

In North Africa we have longstand- 
ing and close relationships with Morocco 
and Tunisia as firm friends and 
strategically located geopolitical part- 
ners. Morocco, with which we have tran- 
sit and exercise agreements, and Tunisia 
are both in difficult economic circum- 
stances. Our assistance program in 
Morocco, in concert with other donors, 
is designed to help the Moroccan 
Government as it implements necessary 
economic reforms. We have expressed to 
the Government of Morocco our disap- 
pointment over the unwelcome develop- 
ment of the Libya-Morocco treaty of 
August 1984. Qadhafi's aggression 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



gainst neighboring states and his un- 
liminished support of terrorism and 
uliversion worldwide are continuing 
auses of concern. We have registered 
hese concerns with the Moroccans and 
old them that we discount the possihili- 
y that association with King Hassan 
ould influence Qadhafi constructively. 
)espite differing views on how to deal 
vith Qadhafi, however, the economic 
md political rationale for this assistance 
,0 Morocco remains; indeed, it is 
tronger. 

south Asia 

\ major foreign policy objective in 
south Asia is to obtain a negotiated set- 

lement to get the Soviet Union out of 
Afghanistan so that the refugees can 

eturn and Afghans can exercise their 
3wn sovereignty and independence. In 
3ur efforts to achieve this goal, it is vital 
:hat we help ensure the security of 
Pakistan in the face of Soviet intimida- 
tion. Our 6-year assistance program for 
Pakistan serves this goal. It is designed 
to support Pakistan's economy and its 
development and to help strengthen its 
defenses through provision of military 
equipment and training. 

The United States has several im- 
portant goals in South Asia. We seek to 
prevent conflict among the major states 
of the region, to help the region develop 
economically, and to foster the success 
of democratic institutions. India, the 
largest democracy in the world, plays a 
pivotal role in the peace and stability of 
(the region. Our development assistance 
program for India will concentrate on 
•more sophisticated research and higher 
technical training, building on India's 
strong scientific and technological base. 
Our assistance programs in Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, and Nepal demonstrate U.S. 
support for the moderate nonaligned 
policies and economic development of 
these countries. 



Europe 

Security assistance proposals for the 
European region are designed to redress 
the military imbalance in Europe and 
counter the increased Soviet military 
threat in central Europe and in South- 
west Asia. The assistance supports key 
NATO allies and has the dual result of 
providing the United States with con- 
tinued access to important military 
bases and helping these countries 
modernize their own military capa- 
bilities. By so doing, our security assist- 
ance sustains confidence in our best 
efforts — commitments which are the 
foundation of base agreements. 

U.S. foreign policy objectives in 
Spain are to support Spanish democ- 
racy, to encourage Spanish movement 



toward a more open economy, and to 
contribute to Western defense by assur- 
ing continued U.S. access to vital air 
and naval facilities in Spain. The securi- 
ty assistance program plays a key role 
in achieving these objectives. 

The Spanish military has assumed a 
role appropriate for armed forces in a 
democracy. Our assistance is necessary 
to help Spain meet its goal of modern- 
ization to NATO standards and to pro- 
vide tangible evidence of the benefits 
Spain receives as a partner in the 
Western alliance, as demonstrated by its 
bilateral relationship with the United 
States as well as its participation in 
NATO. Our security assistance program 
thus plays an important role in helping 
Spain to consolidate and strengthen its 
new democratic institutions. 



U.S. security assistance to Portugal, 
therefore, provides both real and sym- 
bolic support for I'ortugal's attempt to 
strengthen its democracy and free 
market economy. It provides a cor- 
nerstone for Portugal's attempts to play 
a more effective role in NATO. It also 
serves to meet the assistance goals to 
which the United States is committed 
under the 1983 agreement. 

Our security assistance to Greece 
and Turkey contributes to important 
strategic policy objectives on the 
southern flank of NATO. Turkey's posi- 
tion between the Soviet Union and the 
Middle East and proximity to Southwest 
Asia make it a natural barrier to Soviet 
expansion into the Middle East and the 
Persian Gulf. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 



Security assistance proposals for the European 
region are designed to redress the military 
imbalance in Europe and counter the increased 
Soviet military threat in central Europe and in 
Southwest Asia. 



Prime Minister Gonzalez's govern- 
ment has taken politically difficult steps 
to open Spain's traditionally protec- 
tionist economy to market forces. This 
decision was particularly courageous 
since Spain's economic austerity pro- 
gram has been accompanied by high 
unemployment. But as a result, the 
Spanish economy has shown impressive 
improvement in 1984. Its economic pro- 
gram would have placed a much more 
onerous burden on the Spanish people 
without our support. The security 
assistance program helps in modernizing 
the economy through scientific and 
technical exchanges and permits Spain 
to continue its economic recovery 
without jeopardizing its military modern- 
ization. 

Our objectives in Portugal are 
similar to those in Spain. Portugal is 
striving to consolidate its 10-year-old 
democratic institutions while it assumes 
an expanded role in Western political 
and military structures. It is also pur- 
suing a demanding economic austerity 
program in an attempt to reform its 
troubled economy, which is the second 
poorest in Western Europe. The U.S. 
security assistance program assists Por- 
tuguese economic development efforts 
and permits Portugal to continue its pro- 
gram of military modernization aimed at 
assuming expanded NATO defense 
responsibilities. 



disintegration of Lebanon highlight the 
importance of a politically stable and 
militarily credible Turkish ally in this 
disturbed region. We also benefit from 
our military relationship with Turkey by 
our use of extremely valuable military 
and intelligence facilities. The United 
States accordingly has a compelling in- 
terest in enhancing Turkey's ability to 
meet its NATO commitments and deter 
potential aggression in Southwest Asia 
through provision of security assistance. 

Our interests are not confined to 
NATO security objectives. We have 
sought the cooperation of the Turkish 
Government in promoting a settlement 
on Cyprus. The Turkish Government ac- 
cepted and supported the UN Secretary 
General's initiative. We are now working 
with all the parties to ensure that ef- 
forts in the wake of the recent summit 
in New York to reach a settlement be- 
tween the Government of Cyprus and 
the Turkish Cypriot community can 
move forward. Accordingly, we believe 
that any attempt at one-sided efforts to 
impose conditions regarding Cyprus on 
security assistance to Turkey would not 
only be unwarranted but would set back 
the prospects of a settlement on Cyprus. 

On the economic side, Turkey has 
taken far-reaching and courageous steps 
to stabilize and liberalize its economy. 



May 1985 



47 



THE SECRETARY 



U.S. concessional aid to Turkey is direct- 
ly and constructively related to Turkey's 
efforts to create a freer and more sound 
economy. 

We are also seeking a substantial 
level of security assistance for Greece. 
While we have our differences with the 
Greek Government, we see those dif- 
ferences in the context of a relationship 
between two democratic allies who share 
important interests. We recognize 
Greece's strategic importance in the 
eastern Mediterranean. We derive im- 
portant benefits fromi our military 
facilities. Our security assistance pro- 
gram is an important element in our 
relationship with Greece. It is exceeded 
only by our request for Israel, Egypt, 
Turkey, and Pakistan. 



the Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions (ASEAN)— the Philippines, In- 
donesia, and Thailand. The bulk of the 
$483 million requested for military 
assistance will go to deter direct military 
threats to Korea and Thailand and to 
enhance our close military relationship 
with the Philippines, a treaty ally. We 
also propose modest assistance pro- 
grams in other ASEAN countries; in 
Burma, a country that has ijecome in- 
creasingly important to our antinarcotics 
efforts; and in the islands of the South 
Pacific. I would like to highlight some of 
our specific concerns. 

The Philippines has passed through 
difficult times that have adversely af- 
fected the economy. The government 
has begun to take corrective measures 



Foreign assistance is an investment in the future 
that can benefit both recipient and donor. This is 
particularly evident in the East Asia and Pacific 
region. . . . 



East Asia and Pacific 

Foreign assistance is an investment in 
the future that can benefit both recipient 
and donor. This is particularly evident in 
the East Asia and Pacific region where 
the returns paid on our foreign 
assistance investment have been enor- 
mous. For some 20 years. East Asian 
countries have achieved higher economic 
growth rates than any other region of 
the world. They have achieved these 
remarkable results principally by relying 
on the dynamism of free market 
systems. As a result of this rapid 
economic growth, the region now ac- 
counts for more of our foreign trade 
than any other region of the world. 
Since former aid recipients in the region 
have reached the stage of development 
where they no longer need bilateral aid, 
and in some cases have become aid 
donors themselves, East Asia and 
Pacific countries now account for only a 
small portion of our worldwide 
assistance programs despite the vital im- 
portance of the region to the United 
States. 

In spite of this generally bright pic- 
ture, the region still has pressing 
economic and security problems that we 
must confront. The Administration's FY 
1986 foreign assistance request for East 
Asia and the Pacific that addresses 
these problems totals approximately 
$818 million. The requested economic 
assistance of $.33.5 million will be concen- 
trated in the three largest members of 



and has concluded an economic stabiliza- 
tion agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund. These actions are show- 
ing signs of progress. The Philippine 
situation is further clouded by a growing 
armed insurgency by the New People's 
Army, the military arm of the Com- 
munist Party of the Philippines which 
has been able to exploit the country's 
political, economic, and social diffi- 
culties. The revitalization of democratic 
institutions, the establishment of long- 
term growth through structural eco- 
nomic reform, the maintenance of our 
vital security relationship, and the suc- 
cessful resistance to a communist 
takeover of the Philippines are inter- 
twined. Our integrated economic and 
military assistance program is designed 
to support all of these objectives. 

Like the Philippines, Thailand is a 
treaty ally of the United States. It is 
also a front-line state that faces serious 
security challenges caused by Soviet- 
supported Vietnamese aggression in 
neighboring Cambodia. Our security as- 
sistance to Thailand supports the 
government's efforts to improve social 
and economic conditions in the war- 
affected Thai-Cambodian border areas 
that have experienced a large influx of 
refugees because of continued brutal at- 
tacks by Vietnam. Our militiiry 
assistance supports the modernization of 
Thailand's defense forces to provide a 
deterrent to further Vietnamese aggres- 
sion. 



The specific efforts of the Philip- 
pines and Thailand are reinforced by 
their membership in ASEAN, which 
represents the best hope for peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia. Consistent 
with our strong support for ASEAN anc 
in recognition of the importance of our 
relationship with Indonesia, we have 
also proposed economic and military 
assistance for that nation. Indonesia has 
continued to make good progress in its 
development program and maintaining 
sound economic policies in the face of an 
international recession. Our military 
sales to Indonesia have enhanced our 
common strategic interests in Southeast 
Asia. We also plan to continue the 
ASEAN regional technical assistance 
program. In another ASEAN member, 
Malaysia, where U.S. private investment 
continues to be a major catalyst of 
economic growth and development, the 
government has expressed interest in 
continued defense cooperation with the 
United States within the context of that 
nation's nonaligned status. Malaysia has 
played a constructive role in interna- 
tional affairs and has forcefully ad- 
vanced ASEAN's strategy to bring 
about a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces 
from Cambodia. We propose to continue 
our modest military assistance program 
in support of these efforts. 

Another important U.S. treaty ally 
is the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.). The 
prevention of North Korean aggression 
against South Korea is indispensable for 
peace and stability in the region and im- 
portant to our own security. So far, we 
have been successful in deterring ag- 
gression and preventing a recurrence 
of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. 
To maintain our support for the 
U.S.-R.O.K. alliance, we propose to con- 
tinue an FMS credit program that will 
permit the R.O.K. to improve the 
capabilities of its combat forces, many of 
which are stationed with our own forces 
along the DMZ [demilitarized zone] and 
would operate with us under a joint 
command in time of war. 

I now want to emphasize the impor- 
tance the Administration places on pro- 
posed legislative action that will require 
no additional appropriation under the 
bill you are considering. Our expanding 
economic, scientific, and cultural ties 
with China have been mutually beneficial 
and have become a very important ele- 
ment in our overall relationship. Con- 
sistent with this growing friendly rela- 
tionship, the President has sought 
changes to laws that link China with the 
Soviet bloc. I am pleased to note that, 
with your support, important progress 
was made in this effort. Last year we 
proposed the elimination of the prohibi- 
tion on assistance to China to permit us 
the flexibility to provide some assist- 
ance—such as training— if we so chose. 



[! 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



AFRICA 



his proposal was approved in both the 
iouse Foreign Affairs and Senate 
'oreign Relations Committees. The 

I verall bill was not passed, however, for 
Basons unrelated to China. To remove 

Bf. lis anachronism in our laws affecting 
Ihina, I ask you to pass this proposal 
lis year. 

■ lultilateral Development Banks 

'hus far, I have stressed the vital role 
'» American bilateral assistance plays in 
iromoting the security and stability of 
he developing world. As I am sure each 
! if you appreciates, this task is far too 
jeat for one country to attempt to do 
lone. Fortunately, we do not have to. 
)ur friends and allies in the industrial- 
zed world devote a considerable amount 
f their resources to the task of pro- 
noting the development process, which, 
n turn, yields dividends in the expansion 
)f economic trade and strengthening of 
iemocratic institutions. These resources 
ire becoming too scarce to allow for in- 
efficient use of any kind. A coordinated 
ipproach among donors has always been 
iesirable. It is now critical. 

A principal tool available for such 
;oordination is, and will continue to be, 
he pooling of a portion of our economic 
assistance through the multilateral 
development banks (MDBs). MDB lend- 
ng remains a significant and growing 
source of investment capital for develop- 
ing countries. In FY 1984, MDBs 
together committed $22 billion in new 
loans. That a lending program of this 
size was sustained with a U.S. paid-in 
ontribution of $1.3 billion testifies to 
the advantages of using the MDBs to 
share the burden of providing aid. The 
United States benefits directly from the 
MDBs' efforts to promote strong and 
sustained progress in the developing 
countries through increased sales of 
'U.S. goods and services. Indeed, a 
significant portion of the U.S. trade 
deficit can be attributed to the decline in 
purchases by debt-troubled developing 
countries, a decline which appropriate 
development assistance can help reverse. 

While valuable as a source of 
development finance, the MDBs play an 
equally critical role by providing sound 
market-oriented economic policy advice 
to their borrowers. They also impose 
financial discipline on the development 
objectives of their clients. These institu- 
tions are devoting increasing resources 
to projects and programs designed to 
support private enterprise in the 
developing world. For many years, the 
World Bank's special affiliate, the Inter- 
national Finance Corporation, has fo- 
cused on the specific needs of the pri- 
vate sector. The regional development 
banks are beginning to follow the World 
Bank's lead. The strengthened commit- 
ment on the part of these institutions to 



private enterprise may prove to be one 
of the most important factors in sup- 
porting a successful development 
process. 

We are convinced that the MDBs 
have a crucial role to play in advancing 
worldwide growth and development and 
increasing the private sector contribu- 
tion to that process. We thus consider 
our participation in them a necessary 
complement to our bilateral assistance 
policy. In recent years this Administra- 
tion, acting in close consultation with 
the Congress, has sought to reduce the 
cost to us of providing an effective level 
of support to these institutions while 
maintaining U.S. leadership. We have 
been successful in negotiating overall 
replenishment levels which we believe 
are adequate to the needs of borrowing 
members but also take into considera- 
tion our budgetary constraints. Main- 
taining U.S. leadership, however, 
depends on our meeting these obliga- 
tions in a timely manner. I, therefore, 
urge Congress to support fully both our 
FY 1986 request for $1.3 billion and our 



VY 1985 supplemental request for $237 
million. 



SUMMARY 

In closing, I would like to emphasize the 
basic theme of this year's budget presen- 
tation. We have a responsibility to stick 
with the policies that have worked or 
begun to work. Quick fixes, pulling back 
from the fray, or hoping for diplomatic 
miracles are not responsible options. But 
if we stand together— firmly, predict- 
ably, and realistically defending our 
principles and our friends— and do so in 
the steadfast manner the problems re- 
quire, then we can prevail. Our FY 1986 
budget request is designed to do just 
that. 



'Press release 23. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will lie available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. ■ 



FY 1986 Assistance Requests 
for Sub-Sahara Africa 



by Frank Wisner 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Ajfairs 
Coynmittee on March 5, 1985. Ambas- 
sador Wisner is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs. ' 

1 am happy to discuss the Administra- 
tion's fiscal year (FY) 1986 foreign 
assistance proposals. I would like to con- 
centrate my remarks on the overall 
policy setting— our goals and objectives 
in Africa and how the foreign assistance 
program fits into them. I will also in- 
clude brief statements on the situation 
as we see it in major subregions of 
Africa. 

Some observers of U.S. policy still 
seem surprised when a State Depart- 
ment official, particularly one from a 
regional bureau, discusses economics. I 
want to assure you that I feel complete- 
ly at home in this role. A major part of 
my time, and that of my colleagues, is 
spent on economic issues. These are 
paramount in our relationship with 
many African countries, important in all 
countries. 

Anyone who has followed the devel- 
opments of the past several years will 
understand why I say this. First, there 



has been the drought which has had 
such an immense tragic impact on many 
parts of Africa. We are proud that in 
the first 5 months of this fiscal year, we 
have committed $0.5 billion to supply a 
million tons of emergency food and 
other emergency supplies for 21 coun- 
tries in Africa. 

We should also acknowledge the re- 
sponse of other countries. Our prelimi- 
nary estimates are that the combined 
contributions from other countries such 
as Canada, European countries, Japan, 
and countries in the Middle East have 
nearly matched our level. The impor- 
tance of this multilateral effort will be 
underscored at the UN conference which 
will be held in Geneva beginning 
March 11. The Vice President will head 
the U.S. delegation, following the com- 
pletion of his current visit to three of 
the most seriously affected countries, 
Sudan, Niger, and Mali. The conference 
will concentrate both on assuring that 
sufficient amounts of assistance are 
available and that there is adequate 
coordination on logistics such as trans- 
portation and timing of arrivals. 

However, it is not the drought which 
I wish to discuss with you today but 
rather the relationship of U.S. foreign 
assistance to Africa's long-term eco- 
nomic difficulties, what is often called 



49 



AFRICA 



"the African economic crisis." Much time 
is often wasted on polemics as to whose 
"fault" this is. I am not very interested 
in debating the percentage of blame to 
be ascribed to drought, oil prices, terms 
of trade, faulty exchange rates, poor 
domestic pricing policies, excessive bor- 
rowing, overly centralized government 
planning, donor policies, etc., so well set 
out in the World Bank's report, Towards 
Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Joint Program of Action, as 
well as two predecessor reports on the 
same subject. Whatever the causes, the 
results are clear. Africa is the only 
region in the world where per capita 
food production has declined over the 
past two decades and where dependency 
on imports continues to rise alarmingly 
(10 million tons of cereals per year at 
present). African GDPs [gross domestic 
products] continue to decline while debt 
soars. Debt service ratios tend to aver- 
age from 30% to 80%, and the bulk of 
Paris Club debt reschedulings are now 
for African countries. 

There is no American panacea for 
this situation. There is, however, an 
American plan for action. It is based on 
the recognition that Africa needs a 
variety of forms of assistance. In some 
cases — and there are various forms of 
this — food assistance may be appropri- 
ate while in other cases it would be 
harmful. In some cases balance-of- 
payments or budgetary support is 
crucial in order to maintain a multi- 
lateral pattern of assistance. In some 
cases such assistance would be useless 
since the recipient country is not pre- 
pared to undertake policies which will 
provide economic viability over the 
longer run. In virtually all cases we need 
to undertake longer term assistance pro- 
grams — bilaterally, regionally, and 
multilaterally — to assist Africans to 
develop the human and physical infra- 
structure which will permit development 
over the coming decades. 

We are sometimes accused of not 
taking others' views into account in 
making aid decisions. Nothing could be 
further from the truth with respect to 
assistance programs in Africa. We are 
the second largest bilateral donor of aid 
to Africa but are acutely aware that this 
accounts for only roughly one-eighth of 
total assistance flows which reach 
Africa, though our role belies this small 
fraction. I shall come back to this later. 
More importantly, we are aware that we 
can only respond to and work with 
African decisions as to the types of 
assistance Africans believe are suitable 
to their needs. We must, on our part, 
decide whether our resources should be 
employed in a particular program or as 



part of an overall economic strategy. 
The dialogue on this subject is not 
always easy, but it is necessary and in- 
volves considerable diplomatic skill. 

On the multilateral side, we see a 
crucial role for the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] and World Bank. Their 
capability to discuss difficult decisions 
with other countries often exceeds any 
possible bilateral role. We work closely 
with the Bank in sector and project 
assistance. We were pleased that the 
Bank has focused its attention on sup- 
porting policy reform. We do not intend 
to contribute to the Bank's new African 
facility, not because we disagree with its 
goals but because we had developed our 
own initiative. Our initiative last year in 
seeking and securing funds to support 
policy reform was in many ways a pre- 
cursor of the Bank's new African facili- 
ty, and we intend to work closely with 
the Bank when its facility becomes 
operational later this year. In estab- 
lishing the facility, the World Bank 
looked both for direct contributions and 
cooperative bilateral financing. We and 
several other donors are in the latter 
position. 

Looking back over the past year at 
economic developments in Africa, one 
cannot help but be struck by the major 
rethinking of economic policy which has 
taken place. Country after country has 
changed economic course to devote more 
attention and resources to agriculture. 
This has sometimes involved major de- 
valuations, reduced budget deficits, the 
reduction of dysfunctional bureaucracies 
and unnecessary controls, etc. While the 
degree and effectiveness of these actions 
have varied widely, most countries are 
moving in that direction. These are 
African decisions made by governments 
which have come to recognize that major 
shifts in resources must take place to 
favor productive elements, largely the 
farming sector, in the domestic 
economy. In the longer nm this will not 
only have a major economic effect but 
also offer enhanced political stability 
since it is these elements which consti- 
tute the overwhelming majority in all 
African countries. 

Lest there be any misunderstanding, 
let me hasten to add that this does not 
reduce the need for foreign assistance. 
On the contrary, these changes necessi- 
tate and warrant our support which can 
be used to good effect. It takes political 
courage to close parastatals and de- 
crease or eliminate price subsidies for 
urban dwellers. As we know at home, 
austerity is not a popular diet. In Africa 
it is an exceedingly dangerous one. We 
need to be able to demonstrate to 



iro 



J 



[ 



Africans that economic reforms lead to 
growth. 

A good example is Zaire. In Septem 
ber 1983 Zaire devalued its currency by 
80%. Zaire has eliminated price controls 
on agricultural production, reduced its 
budget deficit, and initiated reform of 
parastatals. It has signed a bilateral in- 
vestment treaty with us and welcomes 
foreign investment. I am happy to be 
able to report that Zaire's foreign ex- 
change regime seems to be working and 
economic growth has resumed. The 
rigorous enforcement of the IMF's pro- t 
grams and the World Bank's work with n 
Zaire's mining industry has had an im- 
portant effect in reducing the misuse of 
Zaire's scarce resources. Foreign invest- 
ment has begun to flow in small quan- 
tities, but this will take time to have an 
impact. On the negative side, despite 
generous Paris and London Club debt 
reschedulings, Zaire must spend more 
than half its budget on debt repayments. 
Little is left over for economic develop- 
ment. And the situation is not very dif- 
ferent in other countries. 

I know this committee is particularly 
interested in our programs relating to 
the economic policy reform program in- 
itiated in FY 1985. I would like to take s 
moment to bring you up to date on what 
we have undertaken so far, as well as 
the implications for FY 1986. As we 
have already informally notified you, we 
have initiated discussions with four 
countries, Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, and 
Mali. We hope to have congressional 
notifications with specifics on programs 
to you shortly. As you will see, each of 
these programs has been tailored to the 
needs of the recipients, i.e., how we can 
best support their efforts to restructure 
their economies toward growth. In all 
cases we consulted with other major 
donors, including the World Bank. In 
several cases our programs were closely 
linked to others' activities for maximum 
impact and minimum bureaucratic 
burden on the recipient. WHiile the 
results are not yet in, we believe that 
our efforts will produce a significant in- 
crease in effective assistance from other 
donors as well. 

We have accepted the will of the 
Congress as reflected in the FY 1985 
continuing resolution and chosen to ask 
for ESF [economic support funds] rather 
than development assistance funds for 
this program in FY 1986. We plan to ap- 
ply the same criteria for country choice 
that were used this year, as previously 
furnished to this committee. We have 
made no decisions on countries for next 
year but expect that, as a practical mat- 
ter, there will be few repeats from FY 
1985. We shall consult with this and 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



ther appropriate committees as our 
rograms continue. 
^"^ Overall, we are proud of our record 
'■' n assistance to Africa. Economic assist- 
nce has grown from $787 million in 
981 to over $1 billion in 1985, not 
ounting emergency assistance. In a 
ear of extreme budget stringency we 
re proposing a modest increase for 
T 1986. 

In conclusion, I would just like to 
lote that Africans have long recognized 
he basic interconnection between eco- 
lomics and politics, between economic 
;Towth and political stability, and the 
everse. African governments presently 
ace an unusually large number of 
erious economic problems. Most are 
acing up to these problems, if not 
ilways at the speed that outsiders, in- 
cluding the United States, would wish. 
This situation underscores the political 
Tilnerability of many countries, which 
)thers are willing to exploit. It is essen- 
;ial that our response be as varied as the 
)roblems are diverse. I have already 
overed the economic and would now 
ike to turn to the security side. 

Security Assistance 

Dur security assistance program for 
Africa recognizes that political security 
and economic security are inextricably 
ntertwined. It is concentrated in areas 
where we have security interests and 
where the threat is tangible and clear. 
We are painfully aware from the Soviet 
practice that massive arms aid tied to 
ineager economic assistance results ulti- 
mately in structural disarmament— that 
is, the phenomena of "rusting-iron" 
monuments to military friendship found 
j in areas where the local economy simply 
I cannot support the maintenance of the 
military hardware provided. Almost 83% 
, of our total foreign assistance request 
for Africa is in the form of economic 
and food aid. The relatively small mili- 
tary assistance request is almost all 
grant in recognition of Africa's massive 
economic problems. By encouraging the 
development of an educated and profes- 
sionalized military, our security assist- 
ance program reinforces the structure 
on which the stability necessary for 
economic growth and stability depend. 
We must recognize, however, that 
Africa faces genuine security threats. 
Our security assistance is intended to 
promote stability in the face of Libyan, 
Soviet, and Cuban adventurism. States 
threatened by this adventurism or 
hostile neighbors cannot devote the 
energy or resources necessary for eco- 
nomic development. U.S. assistance per- 
mits friendly countries to acquire 



modest quantities of military equipment 
in order to improve the border patrol 
and self-defense capabilities of their 
armed forces, thereby decreasing terri- 
torial threats and enhancing regional 
stability. Transfers of sophisticated 
weapons are discouraged. 

Our request for FY 1986 is roughly 
the same as in FY 1985. Of our total 
1986 request for Africa, just over $1.2 
billion, only 17% is for military-related 
assistance. While the military component 
is small, it is, nevertheless, extremely 
important if we are to continue the pro- 
grams of logistics and training that we 
have started and if we are to provide 
the bare minimum in the way of defense 
equipment for our friends facing threats. 

In the Horn of Africa, our security 
assistance is directed toward: 

• Helping Somalia defend itself 
against attacks by Ethiopian forces and 
Ethiopian-supported rebels; 

• Assisting Sudan in protecting 
itself from Libyan incursions; and 

• Helping Kenya and Djibouti to 
modernize their forces. 

These efforts are clearly — in 
magnitude and choice of equipment — de- 
fensive, not offensive. Our assistance is 
coupled with diplomatic efforts, by our- 
selves and our allies, to reduce tensions 
in the area and to find ways to diffuse 
tense border situations that could flare 
up into major military confrontations. 

Southern Africa remains an area of 
continued effort. Aid to nations in south- 
ern Africa (Botswana, Mozambique, and 
Zimbabwe) is geared toward reducing 
tensions and encouraging the evolution 
of an internationally acceptable agree- 
ment for the independence of Namibia. 

Oiu- initiative to provide security 
assistance to Mozambique warrants 
special mention. By providing nonlethal 
items — such as uniforms, communica- 
tions equipment, trucks, and training — 
we are working in parallel with our 
allies to reinforce Mozambique's support 
of regional stability by offering an alter- 
native to total dependence on the 
Eastern bloc for military supply. At the 
same time this assistance will bring the 
Mozambican Armed Forces into contact 
with the U.S. military. 

A more detailed analysis of our re- 
quest will put it in context. The 1986 
MAP [military assistance program] re- 
quest is for $189.4 million; the 1985 re- 
quest was for $190.5 million; and the ac- 
tual allocation as a result of the continu- 
ing resolution process was $149.0 
million. You can see that our 1986 re- 
quest is virtually the same as the 1985 
request. The 1986 FMS [foreign military 



AFRICA 



sales] credit request is $18.0 million, up 
$8 million over 1985 as a result of an in- 
crease in Cameroon and the addition of 
$5.0 million for Gabon. Only three coun- 
tries in sub-Saharan Africa receive FMS 
credits: Gabon, Cameroon, and 
Botswana. Our FY 1986 IMET [interna- 
tional military education and training] 
request is for $11.5 million. The FY 
1985 request was for $11.1 million, and 
the actual allocation was $10.9 million. 
Our IMET program (request and actual) 
has remained remarkably con.stant and 
continues to be one of our most effective 
tools in Africa. 

Three new programs are contained 
in the 1986 request. We propose a small 
MAP program for Equatorial Guinea. 
This $1.0 million program would begin 
to refurbish Equatorial Guinea's patrol 
boats and hopefully provide the navy 
with at least a minimal capability. The 
Soviets provided the original equipment 
and did not support it. The patrol craft 
are currently not in seaworthy condition. 
Equatorial Guinea is another of the 
growing list of countries that are turn- 
ing to the West and the LInited States 
for assistance in the wake of Soviet mis- 
treatment. 

We also propose to begin small 
IMET programs in Sao Tome and in the 
Comoros. Both countries are well aware 
of the IMET program and are anxious 
to send a few officers to the United 
States for training. Relations have im- 
proved with both countries, and we 
would like to offer these programs as a 
demonstration of intention to continue 
the warming trend in our relationships 
as well as begin to have more contact 
with the military leadership which 
formerly had contacts only with the 
Soviet bloc. 

Refugees 

Another important element of U.S. 
policy in Africa, closely related to the 
question of the drought and the mass 
movements of people across borders 
which it has caused, is that of U.S. 
refugee assistance. Though many of 
those crossing borders in the past 6-8 
months are not refugees in the strict 
sense that they are fleeing for political 
reasons, their needs are equally impossi- 
ble to ignore. Thus, in places where 
there are already refugee assistance pro- 
grams, refugee assistance organizations 
such as the UNHCR [UN High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees], ICRC [Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross], and 
numerous other private voluntary 
organizations have taken on at least 
temporary responsibility for relief of 
these persons, and U.S. contributions in 



May 1985 



51 



AFRICA 



traditional refugee assistance channels 
have had to keep pace accordingly. 

The number of refugees in Africa, or 
people being dealt with as refugees, has 
increased by 20% since mid-1984 to 2.5 
million. About 40% of those are in 
Sudan, particularly in eastern Sudan. 
Commitments to UNHCR and ICRC to 
date in FY 1985, including drawdowns 
of the emergency refugee and migration 
assistance fund, now total $66.5 million. 
Total U.S. Government assistance to 
African refugees from all sources, in- 
cluding food and in-kind contributions, is 
expected to reach $150 million in 
FY 1985 (compared with $105 million in 
FY 1984). 

The State Department budget re- 
quest for FY 1986 includes a total of 
$48.5 million for UNHCR and ICRC 
refugee operations in Africa. Last year 
at this time, we noted that refugee 
numbers in Africa had somewhat 
stabilized and expressed our hope that 
we could, during FY 1985, turn our 
focus to longer term efforts, including 
enhanced prospects for voluntary 
repatriation and programs aimed at in- 
tegrating refugee assistance into the 
overall development schemes of the host 
countries. This is still our hope, and 
planning for U.S. support of these 
longer term projects continues in 
tandem with our emergency efforts; 
some have already been funded. The 
dire situation of even those refugees 
who have been settled in camps for 
some time serves to point up the need 
for efforts to make refugees more self- 
sufficient. We must be certain that these 
longer term efforts are not lost or 
neglected in the aftermath of the crash 
effort we are now making. 

Nevertheless, we will also have to 
keep our eye on the continuing potential 
for further emergency needs and be 
prepared to meet them. As there is no 
way of predicting such variables as rain- 
fall, we would expect to continue to 
meet these unanticipated, and "unan- 
ticipatable," needs from emergency 
funds as needs arise. We also will be 
keeping in close touch with the major 
refugee relief and assistance organiza- 
tions as they develop their appeals for 
the coming year. 

West Africa 

Turning to the regional picture. I would 
like to begin with West Africa. 

West Africa is an area of endemic 
poverty and political instability whose 
continued deterioration could have 
serious consequences for our interests. 
Major U.S. objectives in the area are to: 



• Assist in long-term development 
and the immediate crisis of hunger when 
it occurs; 

• Promote regional political stability 
by helping governments to resist exter- 
nal — mainly Libyan — adventurism and 
destabilization; 

• Foster our continued access to im- 
portant raw materials and markets (e.g., 
Nigeria, which is both an important and 
relatively secure major source of oil and 
an important locus of U.S. investments, 
and (luinea with its important bauxite 
reserves); and 

• Continue our access to important 
ports and airfields and other facilities. 

While the American presence and 
aid levels in the 16 countries of West 
Africa generally are not large, they are 
significant. In drought-affected coun- 
tries, such as Niger and Mali, our 
emergency assistance is crucial. Dealing 
with this is both a short-term human- 
itarian problem and a longer term 
developmental objective. In Senegal our 
programs are designed to bolster a 
friendly democratic government. In ad- 
dition to providing Senegal the largest 
amount of U.S. development assistance 
in F'rancophone Africa, we are using 
HISF to enable the Senegalese to under- 
take significant economic policy reforms 
under the auspices of the World Bank. 
Our assistance |)rograms have been 
coordinated with P>ance, Senegal's 
largest donor, and the international 
financial institutions. We also seek to 
continue a modest but highly valued $4 
million MAP program in FY 1986 to 
augment Senegal's capability to resist 
Libyan subversion; our highly successful 
IMET program trains about 30 officers 
of Senegal's apolitical, professional 
armed forces in the United States. We 
believe that this mix of programs in FY 
1986 will assist this friend of the United 
States to initiate policy reforms and to 
])reserve stability in this key area in 
Africa. 

In Liberia — where the United States 
is by far the largest aid donor — our 
ESF, development assistance, and MAP 
programs have enabled the government 
to withstand serious deflationary 
pressure caused by a precipitous fall in 
demand for its major exports and capital 
night in the wake of the 1980 military 
coup. Our assistance programs to 
Liberia are part of a carefully balanced 
approach aimed at promoting economic 
recovery, return to civilian rule, and 
political stability in a nation which is our 
closest ally in Africa. Our assistance 
levels are the minimum necessary to 
prevent an economic collapse which 
could destabilize the country and jeop- 
ardize subsUmtial U.S. interests, in- 



cluding three large communications jf 
facilities. 

U.S. assistance on the economic 
front has also allowed the Liberian 
Government to make progress toward 
national reconciliation and returning the 
country to civilian, constitutional 
government by January 1986. In the 
past year, Liberia held a constitutional 
referendum, lifted the ban on political 
activities, and began registering politica 
parties. Although there have been prob- 
lems, including a bloody student 
demonstration, overall progress toward 
civilian rule has been excellent. The 
United States and other Western na- 
tions are assisting this effort through 
technical and financial assistance. The 
MAP program funds housing, nation- 
building civic action programs, and a 
program which seeks to develop profes- 
sionalism in the Liberian military. These 
programs are consistent with our effort; 
to encourage the return to civilian rule. 

Our other development assistance 
programs are concentrated in food pro- 
duction programs designed to induce 
needed policy reforms and reduce the 
need for food imports. Evidence of im- 
portant policy reform can be seen in 
countries such as Senegal, Mali, and 
Niger and the beginnings of policy 
reform in such countries as Guinea, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. 

In Ghana, where strained political 
relations necessitated a suspension of 
aid programs in 1983, the government 
has now implemented difficult economic 
reforms in cooperation with the IMF. 
Our reinstated aid program is providing 
important assistance in food production, 
and U.S. emergency food aid in 1984 
played a major role in averting 
widespread, drought-induced famine. 

In all of the examples cited, there is 
a common thread — of helping poor peo- 
ple and vulnerable governments to bet- 
ter help themselves by undertaking 
needed policy reform, concentrating 
development efforts on increased food 
production, and providing, where 
needed, military assistance to help resist; 
outside efforts at destabilization. 

East Africa 

Our economic and security assistance is 
programmed to strengthen the economic 
growth and domestic stability of East 
African countries and improve their 
ability to defend themselves against ex- 
ternal aggression. A number of coun- 
tries — including Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, 
Mauritius, and Madagascar — have 
undertaken tight, much-needed economic 
adjustment programs to establish a 
stronger basis for self-sustaining 



52 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



AFRICA 



rowth. Two countries, Somalia and 
Madagascar, are in the process of cor- 
seting earlier severe economic distor- 
ons. Last month, for example, the IMF 
Dproved a standby agreement and addi- 
^ onal funding to compensate for lost ex- 
ort earnings — critical financial assist- 
nce in support of major economic 
jforms undertaken by the Somali 
overnment. Our aid programs focus in 
''jveral cases on quick-disbursing ESF 
■ rants which enable importation of 
eeded inputs to agriculture and com- 
lerce and provide the catalysts for 
nancial assistance from other donors as 
ell as assistance complementary to that 
■om international organizations such as 
le IMF and World Bank. 

In Sudan the United States has 
laved a leading role in an extraordinary 
iternational effort which has mobilized 
esources to enable Sudan to meet 
ecurring payments for imports essential 
development and other obligations, 
'hrough quick-disbursing commodity im- 
port program funds and, when 
lecessary, cash grants, we have played 
, central role in helping Sudan manage 
ts economic resources within the 
:uidelines of IMF and consultative 
:roup programs. Sudan is a case study 
if the difficulty of a sustained reform ef- 
ort, of the need for consistent but 
riendly encouragement and support, 
.nd, at the same time, firmness in seek- 
ng the changes that are absolutely 
ssential for long-term growth. 

Our ESF and PL 480 assistance has 
')een conditioned on the Sudanese under- 
aking basic economic reforms to expand 
)pportunities and competitiveness in the 
orivate sector, liberalize commodity pric- 
ing, and provide incentives for export 
Droduction. Our development assistance 
)rojects, meanwhile, have addressed the 
problem of expanding productivity, 
especially in the agricultural sector, and 
improving public sector management to 
strengthen leadership skills for longer 
;erm growth. 

In response, the Sudanese Govern- 
•nent has, over 3 years, done much to 
stimulate agricultural production 
through higher prices to farmers and to 
overcome distortions in exchange rate 
management. However, the process 
stalled seriously during 1984, and 
Sudan's standing with the international 
donors and financial community was 
damaged. In recent weeks, the Sudanese 
Government has reinvigorated its 
economic policy management and begun 
to move forward again. It has removed 
budget subsidies on consumer com-^ 
modifies that were deepening deficits; 
made further devaluations in the official 
exchange rate; agreed to liberalize the 



commercial rate, which will once again 
give producers a fairer return on their 
products; and, within the last week, pro- 
posed other measures to close the 
budget deficit. 

These are major short- and long- 
term structural reform accomplishments 
for the country which, in terms of pro- 
portional magnitude of debt, is the 
African equivalent to Brazil or Mexico in 
Latin America. We have been engaged 
in an intensive dialogue with the govern- 
ment over the delays in the implementa- 
tion of additional much-needed struc- 
tural reforms and are encouraged by re- 
cent measures announced by Sudan's 
economic leadership. Our ESF and 
PL 480 Title I food aid are linked to 
progress in Sudan's reform policies, 
leveraging Sudanese cooperation in this 
difficult recovery process, and providing 
the cushion of painful domestic ad- 
justments. 

Continual instability and external 
threats in the region increase the 
pressure on East African countries to 
develop effective defensive forces. 
Sudan continues to be threatened by 
subversion from within and without by 
forces and elements supported by Libya 
and Ethiopia. Last year the Libyans 
mounted an air attack close to the 
capital, underlining the need for more 
effective air defense systems. The grow- 
ing security problem on two borders ex- 
acerbates the internal political tasks of 
the Government of Sudan. We have 
made clear to Sudan that our military 
assistance is not for pursuit of a military 
solution to problems in the south. Presi- 
dent Nimeiri, on Sunday, March 3, took 
this position clearly, announcing an im- 
mediate unilateral cease-fire against the 
rebels and his intention to pursue a 
political solution. 

Our security assistance in 1986 is 
vital for Somalia to control its borders 
and manage its own destiny. Somalia is 
still engaged in an active border conflict 
with Ethiopia. Ethiopian troops still oc- 
cupy two Somali villages. Ethiopians 
bombed a Somali town in the north and 
have repeatedly engaged in border 
harassments. Insurgent activity has in- 
creased over the last year in the north. 
Our assistance to Somalia is no threat to 
other countries, being only a fraction of 
what is being supplied to Ethiopia, but is 
essential to the improvement of 
Somalia's limited defensive capability. 
We and our allies continue, meanwhile, 
to encourage— through every diplomatic 
way possible— a lessening of tensions in 
the region and a process for overcoming 
border and other divisive issues. We are 
pleased with the progress in better rela- 
tions between Kenya and Somalia, in 



which old enmities are being overcome 
through statesmanship and cooperation. 
Unfortunately, no such progress has 
been possible between Ethiopia and 
Somalia, but our position, we believe, 
has helped to dissuade a resort to large- 
scale military attacks across the borders, 
despite the continuation of lower level 
violence. 

Kenya occupies an important posi- 
tion on the Indian Ocean in proximity to 
Southwest Asia. Our national security 
objective is to ensure our continued ac- 
cess to the region in time of crisis. 
Kenya permits our Navy ships access to 
its port facilities, the only modern work- 
ing port between Durban and Port Said. 
This access provides our vessels with 
fuel, provisions, repair facilities, and 
crew liberty and has made a major con- 
tribution toward the continued deploy- 
ment of our naval forces in the western 
Indian Ocean. 

Kenya is struggling through a 
severe economic crisis, brought on by 
the worldwide recession coupled with its 
own serious economic structural 
weaknesses. Kenya has taken tough 
measures to limit its critical balance-of- 
payments and foreign exchange deficits 
through devaluation, import reductions, 
and budget cuts. Fortunately, assistance 
from the Worid Bank, the IMF, and the 
world donor community in support of 
Kenya's short- and long-term reform ef- 
forts is proving successful. 

Central Africa 

Our security and political objectives in 
the central African region are to: 

• Help maintain political stability 
and foster friendly relations; 

• Assist governments to resist 
Soviet and Libyan destabilization, par- 
ticularly Libyan subversion and aggres- 
sion in Chad; and 

• Provide key countries with securi- 
ty assistance needed for legitimate self- 
defense. 

Our economic objectives are to: 

• Assist governments in pursuing 
effective economic and development 
policies; 

• Encourage food production; and 

• Provide emergency food aid where 
needed. 

The United States has a major 
policy stake in ensuring an independent 
Chad in the face of direct Libyan ag- 
gression. Libyan occupation of Chad in 
1980-81 created serious fears through- 
out the region and led to strong African 
reaction. Unfortunately, Libya entered 
Chad again in force in 1983, threatening 



53 



AFRICA 



the recognized government, and its 
forces continue to occupy the country's 
north. Our security assistance support 
for Chad is designed to complement the 
efforts of France, which has the primary 
role in assisting Chad's security. 
Because of its shattered economic base, 
Chad needs fast-disbursing ESF to 
restore basic civilian services and 
development activity as well as MAP to 
strengthen its capabilities to face possi- 
ble attacks and continued subversion 
directed by Libya. Emergency aid is be- 
ing provided to prevent what could be 
major famine and malnutrition. 

Zaire has been a firm friend and has 
supported U.S. policies; it contributes 
substantially to stability in central 
Africa through its pro- Western foreign 
policy. For example, it supports the 
Chadian Government and provides train- 
ing in Zaire to Chadian troops. In addi- 
tion, Zaire has close ties with Israel, 
with which it reestablished diplomatic 
relations in 1982. A neighbor of conflict- 
ridden Angola, Zaire is equally a critical 
country in the search for peaceful 
resolution of southern African conflicts. 
Zaire's military has long been under- 
funded, and our MAP program is 
designed to get Zaire programs back on 
their feet, particularly in the key airlift 
area. The importance of this program 
was demonstrated last November when 
Zairian forces were airlifted in a 
U.S. -provided C-130 to recapture a 
town in eastern Zaire that had been 
seized by antigovernment rebels. 

Zaire has taken major steps to 
reform its economy. The marketing of 
copper and cobalt has been reorganized 
to ensure that the state mining enter- 
prise, Gecamines, receives the revenues 
from its exports so that it can rebuild its 
capital base and undertake new in- 
vestments. The Government of Zaire has 
continued, for the second full year, to 
adhere closely to an IMF-sponsored pro- 
gram of austerity and reform. The 
results have been impressive. The an- 
nual inflation rate has been reduced 
from over 100% to under 20%. A 
market-based foreign exchange system 
has been successfully introduced, and 
the black market for foreign exchange 
has virtually disappeared. The govern- 
ment payroll has been cut, IMF- 
mandated budget ceilings have been 
respected, and internal price controls 
lifted. After years of decline, the 
economy is now growing, and there are 
increasing signs of a revival in business 
confidence. 

Our FY 1986 request is designed to 
help support Zaire's efforts to continue 
along this path. By doing so, we help 



prevent the reform effort from stalling 
and lay the groundwork for longer term 
and equitable economic development. 

Cameroon provides the example of 
building on success. It is one of the few 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa which 
is normally self-sufficient in food pro- 
duction, though the current drought 
has affected the country's far north. 
Cameroon's policies, including emphasis 
on the private sector and active en- 
couragement of foreign investment, 
have been conducive to sound develop- 
ment programs. Cameroon's petroleum 
resources have contributed in large 
measure to the country's relative pros- 
perity; but, since its petroleum reserves 
are limited, Cameroon's long-term 
economic viability rests on agriculture. 

Thus, we have targeted our develop- 
ment assistance in Cameroon to ensur- 
ing continued self-sufficiency in food 
production. Projects are focused on two 
related sectors— agriculture and rural 
education. With a proposed budget of 
$20..5 million in FY 198.5 and $21.5 
million in FY 1986, our economic aid 
emphasis is on the construction of an 
agricultural university and the design of 
its programs, as well as work in primary 
education with children who will be stay- 
ing in the rural areas rather than 
migrating to the cities and seeking 
higher education there. Our FY 1986 
security assistance program is modest 
($7 milHon FMS loans; $225,000 IMET), 
aimed at technical training and ground 
transport vehicles. Cameroon borders on 
Chad and seeks to improve the mobility 
and efficiency of its modest defense 
forces. 

Southern Africa 

We are engaged in a major diplomatic 
effort in southern Africa to decrease the 
level of violence and establish more 
stable bases for regional security and to 
achieve movement of South Africa away 
from apartheid and toward a more just 
system based on the consent of all the 
governed. These objectives are inter- 
related. As long as the level of cross- 
border violence and the perception of 
threat remain high, it will be difficult to 
generate among white South Africans 
the political will necessary to move 
toward real reform. On the other hand, 
there is no question that, for as long as 
it exists, apartheid will be a source of 
conflict and instability in the region, 
creating opportunities for outside in- 
tervention. 

We have seen progress toward these 
objectives. Our agenda of diplomatic 
resolution of conflicts and of economic 
development has replaced an orientation 



toward armed conflict which favored 
only our adversaries. The Nkomati and 
Lusaka accords between, respectively. 
South Africa and Mozambique and 
South Africa and Angola have greatly 
decreased the level of cross-border 
violence and halted fighting between the 
armies of the countries concerned. Our 
effort to achieve Namibian independence 
on the basis of UN Resolution 435 has 
made important progress. We now have 
concrete proposals on the table from 
both Angola and South Africa and are 
exploring how to bring them closer 
together. 

These achievements are fragile and 
incomplete. Much remains to be done. 
The area has vast development poten- 
tial, but this potential can never be 
achieved as long as the problems of war 
economic disruption, racism, and foreigr 
intervention persist. Our assistance pro- 
grams are designed to achieve greater 
regional security, economic develop- 
ment, peaceful change, and reform in 
South Africa. They are a tangible 
demonstration that we, and not our 
adversaries, have the capacity and will- 
ingness to help the countries in the 
region achieve peace and better the lives 
of their people. 

We strongly endorse and support 
the objectives of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC), which seeks to coordinate 
development projects of the nine 
majority-ruled governments in southern 
Africa. AID [Agency for International 
Development] provides direct technical 
and financial support to the SADCC 
Secretariat and works with SADCC in 
various areas, including agricultural 
research, manpower development, food 
security, and transportation. 

In Zambia the Kaunda government 
remains committed to a difficult pro- 
gram of economic reform necessitated 
by depressed world mineral prices and 
decline in other sectors such as agri- 
culture. Because of the government's ef- 
forts, Zambia has been selected as one 
of four nations to benefit from the addi- 
tional funding the Congress has made 
available in support of African economic 
reform initiatives. In addition to this 
special funding, our proposed aid pro- 
gram for FY 1986 would continue to 
assist Zambia's economic recovery 
through the commodity import program 
and development of the agricultural 
sector. 

Malawi has also been selected for 
special funding under the economic 
reform program. This country has been 
fortunate, due to climate and sensible 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



igricultural policies, not to be so severe- 
y affected by the drought. It remains, 
lowever, extremely poor and warrants 
)ur support as it undertakes new ini- 
iatives to diversify and strengthen its 
iconomy. 

Our aid is helping Zimbabwe to stay 
)n a sound economic footing. Our efforts 
ire focused on the private sector, where 
in invaluable commodity import pro- 
p-am has alleviated foreign exchange 
imitations that otherwise would have 
stalled industrial and commercial 
•ecovery. The private agricultural sector 
laturally suffered under the region's 
evere drought, but all things con- 
sidered, coped fairly well and, with im- 
proved weather this year, now seems 
Doised for major increases in production. 

Mozambique has made major 
lesirable changes in orientation over the 
oast 18 months, and we have responded 
3y developing diplomatic relationships 
and economic assistance programs in- 
tended to show our support for the 
zhange. I have already mentioned the 
Nkomati accord, a key move away from 
armed confrontation. Mozambique has, 
since then, moved toward greater par- 
ticipation in the Western economic 
system. It has joined the IMF and World 
Bank, adhered to the Lome Convention, 
and signed an OPIC [Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation] agreement and 
a Paris Club rescheduling. It v/as one of 
the worst drought-affected countries in 
the region, and we have responded with 
'i large-scale emergency food assistance. 
Our assistance programs— including a 
proposed military assistance pro- 
gram—demonstrate tangibly our support 
for the Machel regime and the reforms 
it has undertaken. This support is par- 
ticularly timely, since the Mozambican 
Government's turn away from heavy 
reliance on the Soviet Union is being 
called into question by continued anti- 
government violence committed by 
; Renamo, a movement initially created by 
I Ian Smith's Rhodesia, nurtured prior to 
[ the Nkomati accord by the South 
African Government, and still supported 
by neocolonialist Portuguese. 

Our assistance program within 
South Africa is one of the pillars of our 
policy toward that country. It demon- 
strates clearly that our policy is not 
limited to a narrow range of issues nor 
to dialogue with the South African 
Government alone. It also encourages in- 
dividuals and groups striving for change 
in South Africa. 

Working directly with regional 
organizations, private voluntary 
organizations, local community groups, 
and individuals, our assistance program 



is aimed at improving educational and 
training opportunities for disadvantaged 
South Africans. Such training is essen- 
tial to assure that strong and responsi- 
ble leadership is available to assume in- 
creasingly greater positions of respon- 
sibility and authority in both the public 
and private sectors. 

Assistance projects address educa- 
tional and skills training through tutorial 



programs, scholarship programs, pro- 
grams for black entrepreneurs, and 
labor union leaders as well as significant 
human rights and self-help projects. 



'The complete trunscrifil of the heuriMjjs 
will he puhii.shed hy the committee and will 
he availahle from tlie Superinlendi'iit of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washint^ton, D.C. 20401^. ■ 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations 
on Nuclear and Space Arms 




President Reagan with the U.S. arms control negotiating team 
and John Tower and Maynard Glitman. 



(Whitf House photo by Mary Anne Fackelman) 

Max Kampelman (left) 



PRESIDENTS REMARKS. 
MAR. 8, 1985' 

The challenge of statesmanship is to 
have the vision to dream of a Ijetter, 
safer world and the courage, per- 
sistence, and patience to turn that 
dream into reality. Since the dawn of 
the nuclear era, all God's children have 
lived with the fear of nuclear war and 
the danger of nuclear devastation. Our 
moral imperative is to work with all our 
power for that day when the children of 
the world can grow up without the fear 
of nuclear war. 

So, today, we reaffirm that vision: a 
world dedicated to the elimination of 
nuclear weapons, a world in which tech- 
nology provides ever greater safety 
rather than greater fear. Today, we set 
out on a new path toward agreements 
which radically reduce the size and 
destructive power of existing nuclear 
missiles. 

Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko 
said last month: "Our ultimate objective 
here is the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons everywhere on this 
planet, the complete removal of the 
threat of nuclear war." Well, I welcome 
that statement and assure Mr. 
Chernenko that the elimination of 



nuclear weapons is also the ultimate ob- 
jective of the American Government and 
the American people. 

It's now our task and responsibility 
to take practical steps to turn this vision 
into reality. We should have no illusions 
that this will be easy, since any venture 
of this magnitude will take time. And 
since the most vital security interests of 
both sides are at stake, this will clearly 
be long and difficult. We're realistic 
because we know that our differences 
with the Soviet Union are great. Pa- 
tience, strength, and unity — Western 
unity — will, therefore, be required if 
we're to have a successful outcome. 

Next week, the United States and 
the Soviet Union meet in Geneva to 
begin a new dialogue on these issues. 
And above all, we seek agreement as 
soon as possible on real and verifiable 
reductions in American and Soviet offen- 
sive nuclear arms. For our part, the 
United States is ready with firmness, 
patience, and understanding to negotiate 
fair and equitable agreements reducing 
the dangers of nuclear war and enhanc- 
ing strategic stability. 

I've just concluded a very good 
meeting with our three negotiators. Am- 
bassadors Max Kampelman, John 
Tower, and Mike Glitman, which 



May 1985 



55 



ARMS CONTROL 



culminates an extensive round of 
preparations. In the meeting I gave my 
instructions for the first round of talks. 
These instructions enabled our nego- 
tiators to explore every promising 
avenue for progress. And they have my 
personal support. 

Like Americans everywhere, I want 
these negotiations to succeed and will do 
everything I can to ensure that this hap- 
pens. And I pray that the Soviet leader- 
ship is prepared to make the same com- 
mitment. 

I want to thank our team for the 
fine work that they've already done in 
getting ready for this endeavor. As all 
of you prepare to leave for Geneva, I 
can't think of a more welcome message 
than an unmistakable vote of confidence 
from the American people and the Con- 
gress. 

Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower, 
and Glitman and all the members of our 
negotiating team, I know that all of our 
fellow Americans wish you every suc- 
cess. And I know from my conversations 
with the bipartisan leadership of the 
Congress that the Congress of the 
United States joins in supporting you. 

So, to all of you — those who will be 
at Geneva and those who will be sup- 
porting this crucial effort from 
Washington — best wishes, and God bless 
you. 



NATIONAL SECURITY 
ADVISER McFARLANE'S 
STATEMENT, 
MAR. 8. 19852 

The President met this morning with the 
three negotiators leading the groups on 
strategic offensive arms, intermediate- 
range arms, and defense and space 
systems as they prepared to depart for 
Geneva this afternoon. In that meeting, 
the President expressed the hope that 
he places on these negotiations, prem- 
ised foremostly upon the declared objec- 
tive of the Soviet Union and the United 
States to agree upon reductions in offen- 
sive systems, leading ultimately to their 
total elimination. 

At the same time, the President 
stressed his concern over trends in the 
strategic balance which are worrisome 
and must be arrested, and he focused in 
particular upon the fact that the balance 
is out of kilter in offensive systems, par- 
ticularly in those which have a prompt, 
hard-target, kill capability. 

He referred, as well, to new systems 
which are in the wings which promise to 
contribute a further desUibilizing ele- 
ment, and he, mentioned in particular 
the possibility of MIRVed [multiple inde- 




Ambassador Kampelman. head of the U.S. delegation, with Ambassador Viktor P. Karpo' 
(left), head of the Soviet delegation, at the Soviet mission in Geneva. 



pendently-targetable reentry vehicle], 
mobile, land-based systems. He also re- 
ferred to the poor record of Soviet com- 
pliance with past arms control 
agreements and the importance that we 
deal forthrightly with it if we are to 
achieve agreements in which both sides 
can have some confidence in the future. 

He believed that in some, these 
several activities — the trends and the 
balance, the character of new systems, 
the history of noncompliance — 
has called into question the fundamental 
framework on which deterrence has 
rested for the past 10 years or so. At 
the same time, he said that there are 
promising elements in the mix, and, in 
particular, he said he believes that if we 
and the Soviets can come to terms, 
there is on the horizon the possibility 
that we can move away from offensive 
nuclear systems and toward defensive 
systems and that we should open 
promptly a dialogue with the Soviet 
Union in this regard. 

Turning to the specific agenda of 
these negotiations, the President 
stressed that his objective remains 
significant reductions in offensive forces; 
in addition, under terms that would be 
verifiable, that would lead to equality, 
and which would improve stability. Sec- 
ondly, he stressed that we must try to 
arrest the erosion of the ABM Treaty, 
which was treated in last month's com- 
pliance report sent to the Congress. 

Further, however, the President said 
that in our approach to how we get 
reductions in offensive forces, the 
United States need not try to dictate the 
character of the Soviet force structure 
and that we should approach that issue 
flexibly. The ultimate goal remains to 



achieve significant reductions in START 
but we are willing to meet the Soviet 
Union halfway in the approach we take 
to this. 

The Soviet Union has approached 
these talks in the past, focusing upon 
launchers as a unit of account; the 
United States, on the other hand, focus- 
ing upon ballistic missile warheads and 
throwweight. 

The President has provided guidanc 
that makes possible the bridging of 
these differences for this round. We 
have no desire to dictate the structure c 
U.S. and Soviet missile forces. We sim- 
ply want to set overall limits on them. 

In addition, because bombers and 
their weapons pose less of a threat to 
stability, they are fundamentally 
retaliatory systems that are poorly 
suited for use in a surprise attack. We 
believe that they ought to be limited 
separately from ballistic missiles and 
their warheads. Nevertheless, we are 
also proposing limits on heavy bombers 
and on the number of ALCMs [air- 
launched cruise missiles] that they carry 
below the limits that were set in SALT 
II. 

We're, therefore, ready to explore 
trade-offs between areas of U.S. and 
Soviet advantage and interest to con- 
sider provisions that would allow a 
Soviet advantage in ballistic missile 
capability in return for a U.S. advantage 
in bomber capability. We are prepared 
to recognize in our outcome and in our 
negotiating strategy that there are, ob- 
viously, significant differences between 
U.S. and Soviet force structures and 
asymmetries in them. 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



An importiint part of our proposal is 
allistio missiles and heavy bombers 
ould be limited under a common ceiling 
nd, similarly, that ballistic missile 
t'arheads and ALCMs could also be 
, imited under a common ceiling. 

With regard to INF [intermediate- 
ange nuclear forces], the U.S. position 
n the past provides, we think, a 
atisfactory framework in which a good 
.greement can be reached. You recall 
lur objective has been a zero-zero out- 
ome. 

But we've made clear that as an in- 
erim measure, we could accept a 
)alance at equal levels of warheads in a 
rlobal context and, further, in 1983 as 
he Soviets left, we made clear that we 
vere in a position to not necessarily — 
leploy our full entitlement in Europe, 
hat the number of Pershing lis would 
)e decreased accordingly in any reduc- 
ion from our intended deployment and 
;hat we were, as well, prepared to talk 
ibout aircraft limitations. 

The United States is prepared at 
,his time as well to consider various ap- 
proaches that will give us at the end of 
;he day a zero global ceiling. And the 
lexibility is at hand in this round for ex- 
Dloring any number of different ap- 
jroaches. 

The third basket of negotiations 
deals with defense and space arms. The 
President has stressed in his instructions 
of more than a dozen pages that we 
Bhould begin in this session to establish 
bhe U.S. view on the relationship be- 
tween offense and defense, to present 
ithe U.S. concerns on the erosion of the 
(ABM Treaty, to provide the Soviet 
Union with a comprehensive rationale 
Tor the U.S. strategic defense program, 
and to take up some dozen different 
issues with the Soviet Union — including 
lur view of the current strategic situa- 
tion imbalance; our strategic concept 
which was laid out at Geneva as to how 
we view the evolution in strategic forces 
in the next 10 years and the transition 
over time away from offense and toward 
defensive forces; a treatment of why 
we're concerned about the erosion of the 
ABM Treaty; a treatment, in the exten- 
sion, of our concerns over compliance 
with it; a discussion in depth of our con- 
cern about air defenses and the potential 
for upgrade and their use as antiballistic 
missile systems; a discussion of emerg- 
ing technologies, and how and why we 
believe that they can lead to a more 
stable framework for deterrence. 

As a final personal comment, I have 
to say that I know many of you have 
heard that there was a family of options 
presented to the President, particularly 
for the strategic aspect of these talks. 



and that is true, which featured a half 
dozen different options. 

The President reviewed all of these 
and, at the end of the day, believed that 
our tradition of moving incrementally by 
the adoption of a single option, sending 
a team to negotiate it, getting a reac- 
tion, then coming back — all for the pur- 
pose of changing one number or two or 
three — prevents dynamism and inhibits 
the pace of negotiation. And, conse- 
quently, the President established the 
outcomes which he believed would serve 
U.S. interests and serve as a more 
stable framework of deterrence; out- 
comes built around warheads, destruc- 
tive capacity, and delivery vehicles but 



stressed that there are many, many 
ways that you can get there. And in a 
sense, the President chose all six and 
provided the flexibility for our 
negotiators to proceed to explore a 
number of different avenues that could 
lead to this outcome. 

I have to say I have never seen in- 
structions that have provided any 
negotiators with greater latitude for 
serious give-and-take. 



'Made in the Roosevelt Room at the 
White House (text from the Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents of Mar. 1 1 , 
lilH.S). 

-Text from White House press release, 
which includes question-and-answer session 
with news correspondents. ■ 



The Objectives of Arms Control 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Addresa before the International In- 
stitute for Strategic Studies in London 
on March 28, 1985. A7nbassador Nitze is 
special adviser to the President and the 
Secretary of State on arms control mat- 
ters. 

It is a privilege for me to deliver the 
1985 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture. 

In the 1950s, during the transition 
from the Truman Administration to the 
Eisenhower Administration, Alastair 
was the Washington correspondent for 
the Observer. He had a clear, wide- 
ranging mind. He was both a skeptic 
and an idealist. He had high aims for the 
West; he was troubled by the manifest 
shortcomings of Western policy. 

At one point, it became evident that 
he was under deep intellectual strain. 
For a time he came to live with my wife 
Phyllis and me in Washington. Over 
many discussions, the nature of his 
strain became evident. 

During his youth, his father had 
been Governor General of Canada, and 
Alastair had developed a deep affection 
for Canada. However, he was English 
by ancestry and had been educated at 
Oxford. Later, he had come to the 
United States during the Truman years 
and had been deeply impressed by the 
generosity and wisdom of American 
policy of those days. 

As a result, he had difficulty making 
up his mind which was his primary loyal- 
ty and which were his secondary 
loyalties. He finally s.ettled the matter 
with a clear decision; his primary loyalty 
was to England. 



It was then that his great days as 
the first director of the International In- 
stitute for Strategic Studies began. He 
has made an immense contribution to 
the wisdom and the coherence of 
Western thought and policy, both then 
and as Montague Burton Professor of 
International Relations at Oxford. 

One of the subjects which Alastair 
and I used to discuss was the question of 
the proper aims and objectives of arms 
control. It is that subject which I pro- 
pose to address this evening. I will begin 
with a summary of my views, then at- 
tempt to illuminate the principal issues 
by reviewing my recollections of how 
they arose in the past, and conclude 
with a look toward the future. 

Arms Control Objectives 

The primary security objective of the 
United States and, I believe, of the 
Western alliance in general is to reduce 
the risk of war while maintaining our 
right to live in freedom. Consistent with 
this objective, we have long based our 
security policy on deterrence— that is, 
prevention of conflict by convincing a 
potential opponent that the problems, 
risks, and costs of aggression would far 
outweigh any possible gains he might 
hope to achieve. 

In this context, arms control should 
be viewed as one element of our security 
policy. It complements the measures 
that we must take unilaterally, such as 
maintaining weapons and forces 
necessary for an adequate deterrent. 

Arms control is not a substitute or 
replacement for adequate defenses. In- 
deed, experience indicates that, while 



May 1985 



57 



ARMS CONTROL 



arms control hopefully can play an im- 
portant role in enhancing our security 
and bringing about a more stable 
strategic relationship, what we are able 
and willing to do for ourselves is more 
important. It provides the necessary 
foundation on which effective deterrence 
and arms control must rest. I remember 
one Soviet negotiator during SALT I 
[strategic arms limitation talks] saying, 
"We will do whatever is necessary to 
deter you; whether you are able to deter 
us is up to you." 

The objective of reducing the risk of 
war is intrinsically linked to deterrence. 
Whether or not we have arms control 
agreements, it is necessary that the 
United States and its allies have suffi- 
cient military forces, both conventional 
and nuclear, to deter an armed attack 
by the Soviet Union and its associates. 

Likewise, the Soviet Union un- 
doubtedly is determined to have what 
they assess to be fully adequate military 
capabilities, whether or not there are 
arms control agreements between us. It 
has been and is our belief, however, that 
a relationship of offsetting deterrent 
capabilities can be made more secure, 
stable, and reliable— and perhaps less 
costly— if we and the Soviets can agree 
on effective, equal, and verifiable arms 
control constraints. 

There are two important corollaries 
to the objective of reducing the risk of 
war through effective deterrence. These 
are the objectives of assuring parity, or 
at least rough equivalence between the 
capabilities of the two sides, and of 
assuring crisis stability— that is, reduc- 
ing the incentives that a side might have 
in a crisis to strike first or in peacetime 
to provoke a crisis that might lead to a 
military confrontation. 

Some commentators tend to em- 
phasize one of these goals or the other. 
To my mind they are interrelated; we 
cannot tolerate either significant in- 
equality or substantial crisis instability. 

The greatest strain on deterrence 
could arise in a crisis or a series of 
crises stemming from a complex of fac- 
tors difficult to control. In such a period, 
our military forces as a whole must have 
the necessary characteristics of effec- 
tiveness, flexibility, survivability, and 
diversity to dissuade the Soviet Union 
from contemplating reckless action. 

We cannot be confident that an ar- 
ray of U.S. and allied forces manifestly 
inferior to those of the Soviet Union 
would provide an adequate deterrent to 
reckless action in such a period. Similar- 
ly, forces of roughly equal capability 
could be inadequate if a significant por- 
tion of them were vulnerable to destruc- 
tion in a surprise or preemptive attack. 



Consistent with the objectives of 
promoting stability and rough equality, 
arms control should aim to achieve 
sharp reductions in the levels of ar- 
maments. Reductions per se may not 
always be good; for example, reductions 
in the number of launchers can be 
destabilizing if they increase the ratio of 
warheads to vulnerable launchers. But 
well-conceived proposals embodying 
reductions which bring about improve- 
ments in the proper indices can do much 
to enhance stability. 

Finally, the panoply of arms control 
agreements should deal with the rela- 
tionship between offensive and defensive 
systems. I will return later to this sub- 
ject in some detail. 

For arms control agreements to be 
effective, there are a number of addi- 
tional requirements. The agreements 
should be reasonably precise and unam- 
biguous in their terms. While no agree- 
ment can be made completely unam- 
biguous, the less ambiguity, the better. 

Moreover, we should have con- 
fidence in our ability to verify adherence 
to an agreement's provisions, and the 
panoply of arms control agreements 
should be sufficiently comprehensive so 
that their constraints cannot be readily 
circumvented. And finally, we must have 
confidence that the parties will abide by 
the agreements into which they have 
entered, a requirement that has become 
increasingly important in view of find- 
ings of Soviet noncompliance with ex- 
isting arms control arrangements. 

In addition to the foregoing objec- 
tives and requirements, our arms control 
policy must merit the sustained support 
of Western publics and of Western con- 
gressional and parliamentary bodies. In 
the absence of such support, the Soviets 
will seek to drive wedges and exploit 
divisions; indeed, tough Soviet bargain- 
ing stances have always been com- 
plemented by hard-nosed propaganda 
and active measures campaigns designed 
to bring about unilateral Western con- 
cessions. Such public and legislative sup- 
port will also be essential to carrying out 
the unilateral defense programs that 
must necessarily proceed in parallel with 
arms control. 

These, then— in my view — comprise 
the basic objectives and requirements of 
arms control policy. 

History as It Illuminates the Issues 
Concerning Objectives 

Let me review the issues and conflicting 
views as to the objectives of arms con- 
trol as they have evolved over the years 
following the dawn of the nuclear age in 
1945. 



fw 
jat 
It, 
lea 
iiitl 
liai 

M 

p 

«1 

ac 



li( 



Immediately after the Japanese sur- 
render. President Truman asked some c 
us who had been engaged in the 
Strategic Bombing Survey in Europe to 
undertake a comparable mission with 
respect to the war in the Pacific. He 
asked us not only to report on the ef- 
fects of air power in the Pacific war but 
in particular, to survey in detail the ef- 
fects of the atomic weapons used at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We were also 
asked to offer recommendations for U.S 
national security in light of modern 
weapons, especially nuclear weapons. 

We recruited a distinguished team o 
physicists, engineers, and other scien 
tists who measured in minute detail the \:> 
effects of blast, radiation, heat, and 
fallout on people, buildings, and on the 
Japanese will and ability to continue the 
war. The general public reaction after 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been that 
the destructiveness of atomic weapons 
was absolute and immeasurable. We 
were, nevertheless, directed to measure 
precisely what those weapons had done 
and what they had not done. 

We were all shocked by the 
devastation of the two cities. The 
casualties and damage were immense. 
The destruction at Hiroshima was 
tremendous; part of Nagasaki survived, 
as it was shielded by a hill. Even at 
Hiroshima, however, the destruction 
was not absolute; trains were running 
through Hiroshima within 48 hours after 
the attack. Our computations, based on 
the effects of those relatively primitive 
bombs, indicated that the advent of 
atomic weapons had increased the poten 
tial power of air attack against un- 
defended cities by 100- to 200-fold. 

The policy implications we drew 
were several. Nuclear weapons provided 
an increase in the power of offensive 
weapons by more than a hundredfold, 
and future technology could be expected 
to increase it by another order of 
magnitude. In war, the temptation for 
an aggressor possessing nuclear 
weapons to employ a preemptive 
strategy could be immense. The impor- 
tance of being able to control the rele- 
vant air space, which had been of high 
importance in a war fought with conven- 
tional weapons, would be far greater in 
a world with nuclear arms. 

We were faced with a grim realiza- 
tion: even if we had very good offensive 
and defensive capabilities and a nuclear 
war were, nevertheless, to occur, we 
could not be sure that some weapons 
would not get through, and even a few 
could cause immense damage. 



58 



DeDartment of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



Therefore, our policy should be one 
'*( ' maintaining a deterrent posture ade- 
iiate to assure that no war would oc- 
ir. Since we could not guarantee the 
leans fully to protect our society from 
uclear attack, we should develop forces 
lat would make clear to a potential op- 
onent that he could not achieve military 
ains through launching an attack 
gainst us or our allies and that the con- 
equences for him of launching his at- 
ick would be so horrible that the poten- 
al gains of such aggression would not 
e worthwhile. 

One important issue remained. Some 
[lought the terror of nuclear weapons 
^as such that their very existence would 
1 itself prevent war. This view was held 
y those who considered the destruc- 
ne iveness of nuclear weapons to be ab- 
olute. Bernard Brodie was the first and 
nost eloquent proponent of this position. 
ie also argued that there was an ab- 
olute dichotomy between the view that 
he purpose of military forces was to 
leter and the view that their purpose 
vas to deny an aggressor the possibility 
f military success. 

The alternative position was that 
ieterrence would be greatly strength- 
ned by the ability to face an enemy 
vith military capabilities and a strategy 
hat would deny him the ability or 
perception that he might successfully 
prosecute a war-winning strategy and 
emerge from a war in a predominant 
nilitary position. 

This issue of what is required to 
assure deterrence— the mere existence 
jf nuclear weapons or a manifest 
■nilitary capability sufficient to deny the 
inemy any realistic prospect of achiev- 
ng his objectives— remains with us to 
this day. I believed then, and I believe 
now, that the latter position is the sensi- 
ble one. 

The question remains, now as then, 
how to maintain a sure ability to 
retaliate with devastating nuclear 
destruction but concurrently to increase 
our ability to deny an aggressor the 
possibility of military success and, thus, 
reduce our dependence on the threat of 
mutually devastating nuclear destruc- 
tion. 

The Interest in Nuclear Disarmament 

Shortly after nuclear weapons appeared, 
strong interest arose in negotiating the 
elimination of all such arms. Immediate- 
ly after the war's end, the Acheson- 
Lilienthal report proposed a world 
government restricted in its authority to 
nuclear matters but including everything 
to do with those matters. The idea was 
roughly translated into the Baruch plan 



for the international control of atomic 
weapons and technology and offered to 
the Soviets. Thev wouki have no part 
of it. 

Interest in nuclear disarmament con- 
tinued, however. Some years later, 
before the UN Committee on Disarma- 
ment, the Soviets presented a program 
for what they called "general and com- 
plete disarmament." But it soon became 
clear that their position was purely for 
progaganda purposes; they offered no 
practical way to get to their stated end. 

While "general and complete disar- 
mament" did not then appear to be a 
realistic or achievable goal, the Soviets, 
nevertheless, were reaping significant 
benefits in the propaganda field. The 
United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Canada in response 
changed their position to advocate 
"phased total disarmament," which 
meant approximately the same thing as 
"general and complete disarmament" but 
offered a somewhat more practical ap- 
proach. 

From that point on, the propaganda 
battle was a standoff. But the talks on 
the subject had little to do with actual 
steps toward the goal of eliminating 
nuclear weapons or toward reducing the 
risk of war. 

The Shift Toward Arms Control 
and Limited Measures 

When the Kennedy Administration took 
office, the debate between the West and 
the Soviet Union concerning "general 
and complete disarmament" versus 
"phased total disarmament" was 
continuing. 

Thought in the Administration 
began to turn to the possibility of 
negotiating agreements more limited in 
their scope, with the hope that success 
in these agreements would open the 
possibility of more comprehensive 
agreements later. In other words, our 
interest turned toward arms control 
rather than disarmament. 

Instead of total disarmament— in 
which security would have been en- 
trusted to something akin to a world 
government— we set our sights on a 
more realistic plane. We accepted the 
prospect of deterrence based on the 
threat of nuclear retaliation and sought 
to make the strategic balance safer, 
more stable, and perhaps less costly. 

As a result, the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty came into 
being. These agreements were impor- 
tant in their own right, but they were 



peripheral to the central issue of achiev- 
ing an agreement which would serve 
materially to reduce the risk of war. 

Up until 1963, thought on arms con- 
trol had concentrated on multilateral ar- 
rangements; it was thought that a 
bilateral agreement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union would not 
be sufficiently comprehensive and could 
lead to possible circumvention and 
undercutting by other nations. But in 
the spring of 1963, some of us in the 
Administration came to the conclusion 
that we weren't apt to get an interna- 
tional agreement on the central issues 
unless and until we could work out the 
main issues bilaterally with the Soviets. 

We prepared a paper on the issues 
involved in a bilateral agreement 
limiting strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. The analysis sug- 
gested that the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons was not the optimum 
solution. This was because nuclear 
technology had become too widely 
known; the risk of clandestine or third- 
country production of nuclear weapons 
was too great. It seemed that a level of 
perhaps 500 strategic nuclear weapons 
on each side would provide a more 
stable and predictable future than none 
at all. 

Then Secretary of Defense [Robert] 
McNamara agreed with these conclu- 
sions and took them seriously. This 
helped set the stage for his proposal to 
[Soviet Premier] Kosygin at Glassboro in 
June 1967 that we begin bilateral 
nuclear arms control negotiations. By 
1967, the Soviets had come to the con- 
clusion that such negotiations "might not 
be impossible." The invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 temporarily 
made them impossible; the SALT I 
negotiations, as such, did not begin until 
the fall of 1969. 

SALT I and SALT II 

SALT represented what we hoped 
would be a mutual effort to achieve ef- 
fective arms control constraints pro- 
viding for a stable strategic relationship 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union at lower levels of arms. 

In the late 1960s, we were com- 
pleting our intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM) deployment pro- 
grams and were pursuing an active anti- 
ballistic missile (ABM) program. The 
Soviets also had vigorous— and grow- 
ing—programs in both the offensive and 
defensive fields. With respect to ABM, 
however, we in the United States were 
coming to the conclusion that the state 



May 1985 



59 



ARMS CONTROL 



1 



of the technology at the time was such 
that ABM systems were not very 
reliable and could be overcome by 
deploying additional offensive systems at 
substantially lesser cost. 

Deployment of such ABM systems 
might thus, it was feared, encourage a 
proliferation of offensive arms. Were 
defenses limited, on the other hand, it 
might be possible to work out reductions 
and tight limitations on offensive 
nuclear weapons. We, therefore, were 
prepared stringently to limit ABM 
systems. 

SALT I produced the ABM Treaty 
and the Interim Agreement on offensive 
arms. We believed that those measures 
would be helpful to the security of both 
sides. That belief was based on three 
principal assumptions: 

First, that the constraints on 
ballistic missile defenses, particularly 
those on large phased-array radars, 
would prevent breakout or circumven- 
tion; 

Second, that both sides would 
adhere to the letter and intent of the 
agreements; and 

Third, that with defensive systems 
severely limited, it would be possible in 
the following few years to negotiate 
comprehensive limits on strategic offen- 
sive forces and to establish a reliable 
deterrent balance at reduced levels. 

We believed that those assumptions 
were shared by both sides. 

The ABM Treaty seemed to me to 
be a useful and equitable agreement. It 
constrained not only the interceptor 
launchers, which were relatively simple 
and cheap and could be easily stored and 
rapidly deployed. More significantly, the 
treaty limited large phased-array 
radars— which were expensive and took 
years to build; were one side to build 
such a radar in a manner not permitted 
by the treaty, the other side would have 
considerable warning time to challenge 
the action and, if necessary, take 
countermeasures. The ABM Treaty of- 
fered promise for enhancing stability by 
setting the stage for comprehensive 
limitations on offensive arms. 

Unfortunately, a number of Soviet 
actions since 1972— such as the construe 
tion of an early warning radar at 
Krasnoyarsk in violation of constraints 
on such radars provided by the ABM 
Treaty— have undermined the first two 
assumptions. They call into serious ques- 
tion Soviet intentions with regard to 
possible breakout as well as Soviet will- 
ingness to comply with arms control ar- 
rangements when Soviet military 
priorities are not consonant with them. 



60 



We were also disappointed with 
regard to the third assumption; we could 
not get the Soviets to agree to tight 
limitations on offensive arms comparable 
to those applied to ABM systems or 
reductions in such arms. Indeed, limiting 
defenses did not appear to have any ef- 
fect on the Soviet offensive buildup. 

Part of the problem was that the 
Soviets were doing well with respect to 
offensive systems. We had ceased 
building new ICBMs, ballistic missile 
submarines, and heavy bombers some 
years earlier; we were improving them 
through qualitative changes. The Soviet 
Union was actively deploying large 
numbers and new types of ICBMs and 
SLBMs. Momentum thus tended to 
favor the Soviets; they saw no reason to 
sign a piece of paper which would cause 
them to forgo that advantage. 

The 1972 SALT Interim Agreement 
purported to freeze the offensive balance 
at the then-existing level. In fact, it did 
no such thing. It froze the number of 
operational ballistic missile launchers 
and those the Soviets claimed were 
under construction; the levels were 
grossly unequal. Those inequalities con- 
tinue to the present day and have 
become more significant as the Soviets, 
as some then anticipated, have caught 
up to us in accuracy, MIRVing [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry 
vehicle], and other pertinent aspects of 
technology. 

Our inability to negotiate tight limits 
on offensive arms was also in part 
linked to the relationship between the 
verifiability of an agreement and its 
comprehensiveness. It was our view that 
it would be in the interest of each side 
to provide sufficient information to the 
other so that each could verify and have 
confidence in the other's adherence to 
the terms of an agreement. 

Because the Soviets refused to agree 
to such a cooperative approach to 
verification, the limitations of an agree- 
ment had to be restricted to large visible 
items such as missile silos and sub- 
marine missile tubes. They could not 
apply to smaller systems or components. 
Nor could they apply to the more 
significant— but more difficult to 
monitor— qualitative characteristics of 
weapons systems. 

The rationale for concluding such a 
modest and unequal accord as the 1972 
Interim Agreement was based upon two 
expectations, both of which subsequently 
proved to be ill-founded. 

First, we thought the two sides 
could negotiate a more comprehensive 
agreement within the next 2 or 3 years, 
surely within the .S-year duration of that 
agreement. 



heD 

'rotn 



een 
far 



low 



i 

id 
w 



\ 



Second, we underestimated the ex- 
tent to which, and how quickly, actual . 
Soviet force developments— particularly leqt 
MIRVing— would take advantage of the 0. 
loose offensive constraints of SALT I. 

Compounding these weaknesses 
SALT II incorporated many of the 
drawbacks of its predecessor. 

It is hard to make a case that the Ii 

terim Agreement or SALT II met any ( 

the principal objectives for arms contro. 

One would truly be hard pressed to 

demonstrate how they embodied rough 

equivalence, lowered armaments, 

enhanced crisis stability, or reduced the 

risk of war. 

SALT II, as its predecessor, focusei 

on the wrong indices of power- 
launchers— giving both sides incentives 
to increase the number of weapons on 
their missiles, with negative implication 
for stability. Likewise, it did not providn '■» 
for rough equivalence, allowing the 
Soviet Union unilateral rights, such as 
the right to heavy ballistic missiles. 

And by no means has SALT reduce 
armaments— the number of warheads oi 
U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles has in- 
creased since 1972; the number of 
warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles hai 
increased by more than 50% since 1979 
And taking advantage of their much 
superior throwweight, the Soviet 
capability to destroy hard targets has ir 
creased by an even greater amount. All 
of this has taken place within the limita 
tions of SALT. 

The shortcomings of SALT II, in 
particular the fact that it would not pro 
vide for significant warhead limitations, 
came to be widely recognized. In fact, 
its proponents largely fell back on the 
rationale that SALT II was "better thai 
no agreement." For some of us who 
have worked to clarify thinking on the 
objectives of arms control agreements, 
this was a defeatist criterion; it sug- 
gested loss of confidence in our ability to 
maintain an adequate deterrent posture 
without arms control and implied that 
we must, therefore, accept more or less 
what the Soviets would agree to. 

In the START [strategic arms reduc 
tion talks] and INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] negotiations earlier in 
this decade, the United States sought to 
rectify some of the inadequacies of the 
SALT experience. For example, we 
made warheads rather than launchers 
the principal units of account and tabled 
positions embodying significant reduc- 
tions rather than merely legitimizing ex 
isting launcher levels and permitting in- 
creased warhead levels. Unfortunately, 
our efforts were largely overshadowed 
by the Soviet campaign to split NATO 
over the issue of INF. 

Department of State Bulleti 



ARMS CONTROL 



n he Debate Since the Mid-1970s 

■'' rom the mid-1970s on, the debate on 
• le question of arms control objectives 
ems to me to have been confused and 
nfusing. 

An issue raised in the 1970s has 
en the idea that the principal objective 
arms control should be to "stop the 
ifirms race." Yet from 1972, when the 
oviets passed the United States in the 
umber, size, and throwweight of offen- 
ive missile systems, they proceeded to 
evelop and deploy one generation after 
'nother of more modern systems. Mean- 
hile, we had frozen the number of our 
eapon systems and restrained our 
lodernization programs. 

It was in the Soviet interest to keep 
hings that way. Their propaganda ap- 
roach was and is keyed to the phrase 
stop the arms race." To the extent the 
oviets can use such phrases to en- 
ourage unilateral Western restraint, 
hey can avoid serious negotiations in 
/hich they might have to concede some 
f their advantages. 

To many in the United States, 
lowever, it seemed that the Soviets had 
>een merely reacting to what we had 
lone first, that they were merely catch- 
ng up; if we were to stop, they would 
itop, too. For some 10 years, this and 
Ihe trauma and aftereffects of the Viet- 
nam war combined to restrain the 
Jnited States from responding to con- 
linuing Soviet force developments. 

Over the years, however, it became 
'^ ncreasingly clear that the Soviets were 
lot merely reacting; they were execut- 
ng a deliberate long-term program to 
mprove their capabilities, regardless of 
vhat we did. As former Secretary of 
Defense [Harold] Brown put it, "When 
ve build, they build; when we don't 
:)uild, they build." 

Today, both sides express agreement 
)n "radical reductions" as being an im- 
Dortant objective. But, as I noted 
jarlier, those reductions should be such 
;hat they improve stability and result in 
■•ough equality and not the reverse. 
Reductions to low and equal levels of 
aallistic missile warheads and redressing 
the imbalance in destructive capability 
can undoubtedly enhance the strategic 
situation, particularly if such reductions 
are structured so as to encourage sur- 
vivable basing for strategic systems and 
"de-MIRVing" of forces with a danger- 
ous capability against hard targets. Such 
reductions would greatly reduce the 
value— and, therefore, the likelihood— of 
a first or preemptive strike. 

Reduction in the number of launch- 
ers alone, however— without regard to 



the number and power of warheads- 
could be grossly destabilizing. It would 
increase, not decrease, the existing in- 
equality between the capabilities of the 
two sides and could increase the incen- 
tive to go first or preempt in a crisis. 

Others began talking in the late 
1970s and early 1980s of a verifiable and 
comprehensive nuclear freeze. If a 
freeze is not comprehensive, it makes 
the situation worse, not better, and 
today's situation is not good. If a freeze 
is comprehensive, it will both freeze the 
present unequal situation into the future 
and not be verifiable. 

What has been the basic difficulty 
with the arms control situation? I believe 
it goes back to the days before SALT I. 
We were then ahead in most of the 
measures of strategic capability. But we 
came to the conclusion that enough was 
enough. It was our hope that, when the 
Soviets pulled even, they also would con- 
clude that enough is enough. The evi- 
dence indicates that we were wrong. 

Since 1972, the nuclear arms control 
problem has been one of attempting to 
square the circle. The Soviet side has 
been quite frank in saying it would not 
enter into an agreement which would 
change the correlation of strategic 
forces in a manner they deemed adverse 
to their interests. Once the Soviets 
judged the military correlation of forces 
had become favorable, they were ada- 
mant in refusing to consider any agree- 
ment which would result in rough equali- 
ty or which would improve crisis stabili- 
ty. But any agreement which would not 
lead to these results was flawed from 
the point of view of the West. 

My view is that we should get back 
to fundamentals. The issues are com- 
plex, but not too complex. Four really is 
greater than two. The Soviet leaders are 
not mad; they look to their interests 
through eyes trained in the Marxist- 
Leninist approach. Many of them are ex- 
cellent logicians, strategists, mathemati- 
cians, and physicists. Their approach is 
usually relatively understandable and 
predictable— more so, perhaps, than the 
approach of Western governments. 

What we must do is give the Soviets 
grounds for concluding that we in the 
West are prepared to maintain sufficient 
political will and military capability to 
ensure deterrence of any possible ag- 
gression, conventional or nuclear. We 
must bring them to realize that their 
buildup cannot and will not be translated 
into an exploitable military or political 
advantage. If it turns out that we have 
to go for a few more years without a 
formal agreement limiting offensive 
nuclear weapons, that is undesirable, but 



let us not panic; we have been living 
with that situation for some years. 

At the same time, we should hold 
out a better alternative, one that would 
produce a more stable and reliable rela- 
tionship from the perspective of both 
sides. To this end, let me outline the 
strategic concept that underlies the U.S. 
approach to the negotiations that began 
earlier this month in Geneva. 

The U.S. Strategic Concept 

As I have explained elsewhere, that con- 
cept can be summarized in four 
sentences: 

During the next 10 years, the U.S. objec- 
tive is a radical reduction in the power of ex- 
isting and planned offensive nuclear arms, as 
well as the stabilization of the relationship 
between offensive and defensive nuclear 
arms, whether on earth or in space. We are 
even now looking forward to a period of tran- 
sition to a more stable world, with greatly 
reduced levels of nuclear arms and an 
enhanced ability to deter war based upon an 
increasing contribution of non-nuclear de- 
fenses against offensive nuclear arms. This 
period of transition could lead to the eventual 
elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive 
and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms 
is an ultimate objective to which we, the 
Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree. 

For the immediate future, we will 
continue to base deterrence on the 
ultimate threat of devastating nuclear 
retaliation. We have little choice; today's 
technology provides no alternative. For 
now and the foreseeable future, we and 
our allies must, therefore, continue to 
maintain a modern and effective nuclear 
deterrent. 

We will continue to press for radical 
reductions in strategic and intermediate- 
range nuclear arms, with attention, of 
course, to the proper indices of limita- 
tion. Reductions can be structured so as 
to produce a more stable balance and 
reduce the risk of war. In the Geneva 
talks, we are prepared to consider 
various means of bridging differences 
between the U.S. and Soviet positions in 
an effort to achieve equitable accords 
that entail real reductions. 

We also remain committed to the 
ABM Treaty and will seek to reverse the 
erosion that has occurred in that regime 
as a result of Soviet actions such as the 
construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar. 
In the longer run, however, we want to 
consider the possibilities of a more 
defense-reliant balance. 

Fifteen years ago, we concluded that 
defenses could be overwhelmed— at 
relatively less cost— by additional offen- 
sive arms. Technology, however, has ad- 
vanced considerably since then. We now 



VI ay 1985 



61 



ARMS CONTROL 



see the possibility that new defensive 
systems might lead to a more stable and 
reliable strategic balance and, ultimate- 
ly, might provide the means by which 
we could move with confidence toward 
the complete elimination of nuclear 
arms. 

In March 1983, President Reagan 
questioned whether we should confine 
ourselves to a future in which deter- 
rence rests solely on the threat of offen- 
sive nuclear retaliation. His Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) research pro- 
gram was, therefore, given the task of 
determining the feasibility of effective 
defenses against nuclear ballistic 
missiles. This includes possible defenses 
based both on earth and in space. The 
President has directed that the program 
be carried out in full compliance with 
the ABM Treaty. Its object is to provide 
the basis for an informed decision, 
sometime in the next decade, as to the 
feasibility of providing for a defense of 
the United States and our allies against 
ballistic missile attack. 

We expect the Soviets will continue 
their investigation of new defensive 
technologies. Indeed, the debate over 
SDI has often lost sight of the fact that 
the Soviets, besides having the only 
operational ABM system, have long had 
a major research effort devoted to ad- 
vanced ballistic missile defense tech- 
nologies, including high-energy lasers 
and particle-beam weapons. 

Should new defensive technologies 
prove feasible and meet our criteria, we 
would want, at a future date, to begin a 
transition to a balance in which we 
would place greater reliance on defen- 
sive systems for our protection and that 
of our allies. Such defenses could 
enhance deterrence by creating ex- 
cessive complications for an aggressor's 
planning for a possible first strike, 
thereby lessening the chance that he 
might seriously contemplate it. 

Let me note that the criteria by 
which we will judge the feasibility of 
new technologies will be demanding. 
They must produce defensive systems 
that are reasonably survivable; if not, 
the defenses could themselves be tempt- 
ing targets for a first strike. This would 
decrease rather than enhance stability. 

New defensive systems must also be 
cost-effective at the margin — that is, it 
must be cheaper to add additional defen- 
sive capability than it is for the other 
side to add the offensive capability 
necessary to overcome the defense. If 
this criterion is not met, the defensive 
systems could encourage a proliferation 



of countermeasures and additional offen- 
sive weapons to overcome deployed 
defenses, instead of a redirection of ef- 
fort from offense to defense. 

As I have said, these criteria are 
demanding. But they are necessary if we 
are to move toward a more stable 
balance at lower levels of arms. While 
our SDI research program will seek 
technical answers to technical questions, 
we are simultaneously examining the 
broader strategic implications of moving 
toward a more defense-reliant balance. 

If the new technologies cannot meet 
the standards we have set and, thus, not 
contribute to enhancing stability, we 
would not deploy them. In that event, 
we would have to continue to base deter- 
rence largely on the ultimate threat of 
nuclear retaliation, though hopefully at 
lower levels of arms. However, we have 
high expectations that the scientific and 
technical communities can respond to 
the challenge. 

Let me be clear that SDI in not an 
attempt to achieve superiority. Through 
any transition our goal would be to 
maintain balance. President Reagan has 
made clear that any future decision to 
deploy new defenses against ballistic 
missiles would be a matter for negotia- 
tion. 

This does not mean a Soviet veto 
over our defense programs; rather, our 
commitment to negotiation reflects a 
recognition that we should seek to move 
forward in a cooperative manner with 
the Soviets. We have, thus, offered to 
begin discussions even now in Geneva 
with the Soviets as to the implications of 
new defensive technologies, whether 
developed by them or by us, and how we 
might together manage a transition to a 
more stable and reliable strategic rela- 
tionship based on an increasing contribu- 
tion of defensive systems in the mix of 
offense and defense. 

Of course, arms control would play 
an important role in such a transition. 
Properly structured cuts in offensive 
arms are not only worthwhile in their 
own right, they could also facilitate the 
shift to a more defense-reliant posture. 

Before negotiating such a coop- 
erative transition with the Soviet Union, 
and throughout the transition period, we 
would consult fully with our allies. Such 
a transition would continue for some 
time, perhaps for decades. As the U.S. 
and Soviet strategic and intermediate- 
range nuclear arsenals declined 
significantly, we would seek to negotiate 
reductions in other types of nuclear 
weapons and involve, in some manner, 
the other nuclear powers. 



Given the right technical and 
political conditions, we would hope to bi 
able to continue the reduction of all 
nuclear weapons down to zero. By 
necessity, this is a very long-term goal. 
Its realization would, of course, have 
far-reaching implications for the global 
military balance at all levels. For exam- 
ple, the deterrent effect of nuclear 
weapons has helped to prevent conven- 
tional as well as nuclear conflict. Were 
we to move to a situation in which 
nuclear weapons had been eliminated, 
the need for a stable conventional 
balance would become even more impor 
tant than today. 

We would have to devote particular 
attention and effort to how, together 
with our allies, we might counter and 
diminish the threat posed by conven- 
tional arms imbalances through both 
conventional arms improvements and 
arms control efforts. Clearly, were we 
able to move cooperatively with the 
Soviet Union toward a nuclear-free 
world, that would presuppose a more 
cooperative overall relationship than ex- 
ists at present — one in which efforts to 
establish a conventional balance at lowe 
levels should also be fruitful. 

The global elimination of nuclear 
weapons, if this were ever to become 
possible, would need to be accompanied 
by widespread deployments of effective 
non-nuclear defenses. These defenses 
would provide assurance that, were 
some country to cheat— for example, by 
clandestinely building ICBMs or shorter 
range systems, such as SS-20s— it 
would not be able to achieve an ex- 
ploitable military advantage. To over- 
come the deployed defenses, cheating 
would have to be conducted on a large 
scale— of too great a magnitude to pass 
unnoticed before appropriate counter- 
measures could be taken. 

Were we to reach the ultimate 
phase, deterrence would be based on tht 
ability of the defense to deny success to 
a potential aggressor's attack— whether 
nuclear or conventional. The strategic 
relationship could then be characterized 
as one of mutual assured security. 

Conclusion 

Having thus outlined our strategic con- 
cept for the future, let me offer some 
comments. 

In the 1950s, total nuclear disarma- 
ment was the declared objective of both 
;ides, but it was wholly impractical. 
Among other reasons, in an uncertain 
world, neither side could have the con- 
fidence necessary seriously to consider 
abandoning its nuclear weapons; de- 
fenses against them seemed impossible. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



merging defensive technologies may 
TOvide the hedge that we need to move 
A-ay from primary reUance on nuclear 
eapons. I frankly do not see any way 
1 which we could consider eventually 
lOving toward extremely deep cuts in 
ffensive nuclear arms— and their 
Itimate elimination— without some 
leans to protect against cheating and 
ther contingencies. 

Let me caution, however, that for 
he foreseeable future— that is, in the 
ear term and even in the early and in- 
prmediate stages of any possible transi 
ion— offensive nuclear arms and the 
hreat of massive destructive retaliation 
hey embody will be the key element of 
eterrence. This situation unavoidably 
/ill obtain for many, many years. 

Let me also emphasize that the con- 
ept I have outlined is wholly consistent 
/ith deterrence. Not only in the near 
erm but in both the transition and 
itimate phases as well, deterrence 
/ould continue to provide the basis for 
he U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship. 
As I said at the beginning of my 
lemarks, deterrence requires that a 
lotential opponent be convinced that the 
iroblems, risks, and costs of aggression 
ar outweigh the gains he might hope to 
chieve. A popular view of deterrence is 
hat it is almost solely a matter of 
rosing to an aggressor high potential 
osts through the ultimate threat of 
levastating nuclear retaliation. 

But deterrence can also function ef- 
ectively if one has the ability, through 
lefense and other military means, to 
leny the attacker the gains he might 
)therwise have hoped to realize. Our 
lope and intent are to shift the defer- 
ent balance from one which is based 
)rimarily on the punitive threat of 
levastating nuclear retaliation to one in 
vhich nuclear arms are greatly reduced 
)n both sides and non-nuclear defenses 
)lay a greater and greater role. We 
relieve this would provide a far sounder 
lasis for a stable and reliable strategic 
•elationship and for a real reduction in 
lie risk of war. 

The concept I have outlined em- 
.odies much that is old and some things 
:hat are new. It requires that we rethmk 
^(ime of our strategic policy, and we 
4i(iuld not shy away from doing so. 
Reducing the" risk of war is a goal of 
vital importance to both the West and 
East. We should examine all ways by 
which we can advance that goal with 
clear, objective, and open minds. This in- 
cludes frank discussion between allies. 
This is the manner in which our coalition 
(if democracies must work; 1 am confi- 
dent that together we will make the 
right choices. ■ 



FY 1986 Assistance Requests 
for East Asia and the Pacific 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statements before the Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
February 20, 1985. Mr. Wolfowitz is 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs.'^ 

The year that has passed since I last ap- 
peared before the committee on this sub- 
ject has been a generally good one for 
the region. Prosperity, political stability, 
and regional security have been 
strengthened and along with this has 
come an even stronger awareness of the 
importance of East Asia to the United 
States. There have been important ad- 
vances also in cooperation among many 
of the nations of the region. Increasing- 
ly, they are concentrating on the in- 
terests and objectives they have in com- 
mon despite their great diversity and a 
history replete with animosities and con- 
flict. 

Our policies in the region have 
sought to encourage these trends. We 
have been working with the nations of 
East Asia and the Pacific to ensure con- 
tinuing economic, political, security, and 
technological advances that serve global 
as well as regional and national in- 
terests. 

These policies and programs are ob- 
viously working, and they are paying 
substantial annual dividends in terms of 
securing our foreign policy goals. We 
are witnessing some progress toward 
political and social systems that share 
our democratic values and commitment 
to human rights. We are seeing 
dramatic success of economic systems 
that are open and market oriented and 
benefit from trade with them. Finally, 
with the tragic exception of Cambodia, 
we are sharing in the benefits of peace 
that have been secured through strength 
and deterrence, in a region that histori- 
cally has been plagued by war and 
violence. 

We can be proud of the role we have 
played and of our contributions to the 
remarkable achievements that this 
region has continued to record, and this 
is particularly true of our crucial 
economic and military assistance pro- 
grams. 

It remains true, however, that not 
all countries of the region have shared 
equally in the region's dynamism and 



economic growth. Several still have very 
low per capita incomes. Others are still 
reeling under the effects of international 
recession, experiencing declining terms 
of trade for their exports, or suffering 
from liquidity problems, inflation, or 
structural imbalances in their economy. 
These nations need and deserve our 
continued help and encouragement. 
Among them are countries that are 
menaced also by communist military 
forces either on or within their borders. 
Their critical need to divert resources to 
meet this security threat has worsened 
their economic difficulties. They 
recognize, however, that no course of 
economic restructuring or development 
can succeed where there is a climate of 
fear and weakness in the face of a 
military menace. 

An added important reason for pro- 
viding these nations with sorely needed 
economic assistance is the fact that they 
are not depending solely on outside help 
to solve their economic difficulties for 
them. Rather, they themselves have 
adopted tough austerity measures, such 
as currency devaluation, and are ad- 
dressing structural reforms designed to 
improve their economic performance and 
prospects. Such measures have been 
painful and costly politically. They are a 
sign, however, of the determination and 
realism of these governments. 

Our economic assistance proposals 
are concentrated most heavily on three 
countries— the Philippines and Thailand, 
both of which are treaty allies, and In- 
donesia. Due to budgetary constraints, 
the funds proposed for these and other 
nations of the region are unfortunately 
below the levels of last year. The largest 
amount is proposed for the Philippines, 
which is experiencing its most critical 
economic crisis since World War II. We 
are taking steps to ensure that our aid 
contributes to the structural economic 
reforms needed to put the Philippines' 
economy back on the path of growth. 

The second largest amount of 
economic assistance is proposed for In- 
donesia. Low per capita income, a cur- 
rent account deficit, a decrease in ex- 
ports, and the effects of the recession 
have left Indonesia in a difficult 
economic situation and hard pressed to 
meet the challenge of having to absorb 
the 1.8 million people who join its labor 
force each year. The Government of In- 
donesia has undertaken an austerity 



1 



63 



LUn,, 1QQC; 



EAST ASIA 



reform program and a serious develop- 
ment progam that emphasizes equity, 
growth, and stability along with private 
investment and human resources 
development. 

A smaller proportion of the eco- 
nomic assistance funds are targetted for 
Thailand, which is afflicted by declining 
terms of trade for its exports, an in- 
creasing debt burden, and other prob- 
lems associated with the international 
recession, the government, however, has 
taken prudent steps to adjust its 
economy which remains free and open 
and which has sustained impressive 
growth. 

A relatively small amount of eco- 
nomic assistance is proposed for Burma, 
one of the world's poorest nations. It 
has been hurt by the world recession 
and the depressed market for its major 
foreign exchange earner, rice. 

Modest amounts of economic 
assistance are also proposed for Fiji and 
other Pacific Island states. We are sup- 
porting a regionwide program with em- 
phasis on improving agriculture, rural 
development, and fishing techniques, 
and promoting regional cooperation in 
this area of smaller populations and 
smaller markets. 

I believe that by supplementing the 
efforts these nations are making to cope 
with their economic problems we will 
also be enhancing the conditions under 
which democratic traditions, including 
respect for human rights, take root and 
thrive. 

Threats in the Area 

However, as I mentioned previously, 
economic, social, and political develop- 
ment can be thwarted by foreign 
military attack and internal subversion. 
And unfortunately, the Asia and Pacific 
region continues to be menaced by an 
enormous concentration of military 
power in the hands of the Soviets, Viet- 
namese, and North Koreans. These are 
governments which have demonstrated a 
willingness to use such forces directly or 
as a means of intimidation to secure ob- 
jectives that they have been unable to 
obtain in other ways due to the im- 
poverishment of their economic and 
political systems. 

The U.S.S.R. continues to strength- 
en its military forces in the region and 
has recently added MiG-23 fighter air- 
craft to its already formidable military 
presence in Vietnam. Vietnam itself and 
North Korea continue to maintain enor- 
mous military forces that are far greater 
than any defensive need. North Korea 
forces remain poised in an offensive 
posture along the border of the Republic 



of Korea, and Vietnamese forces are at 
this moment bringing more tragedy and 
terror to Cambodia and to the Thai 
border area. The Philippines also faces a 
serious internal challenge — an armed, 
communist-led guerrilla movement that 
poses a growing threat to stability and 
progress toward the revitalization of 
democratic institutions. 

The nations which these communist 
forces menace are facing the threat 
realistically and staunchly. They are 
building up their own military strength 
while at the same time pursuing political 
and diplomatic efforts aimed at pro- 
moting peace, stability, and freedom 
across and within their borders. The 
United States obviously continues to 
have a very important stake in the ef- 
forts that these nations are making to 
promote peace and security in a region 
which has had a long and tragic history 
of war and violence and of conflicts in 
which the United States has become 
directly engaged. Korea, Thailand, and 
the Philippines are treaty allies of the 
United States, and the Philippines is 
also the site of military facilities that are 
vital for the protection of U.S. security 
interests and the preservation of peace 
in the region. 

Consequently, our security assist- 
ance proposals for FY 1986 are again 
concentrated on the Philippines and the 
two front-line states of Korea and 
Thailand. 

The largest share of military assist- 
ance is again proposed for Korea which 
continues to face the greatest threat 
from its communist neighbor. North 
Korea. The Government of the Republic 
of Korea already is spending a signifi- 
cant portion of its GNP on defense, but 
foreign military sales (FMS) credits are 
highly important for the implementation 
of Korea's force improvement plan. 

In the case of the Philippines, our 
request for security assistance, which in- 
cludes a substantial economic support 
fund (ESF) component, is closely linked 
to the Presidential "best-efforts" commit- 
ment made in the context of the last 
5-year review of our Military Bases 
Agreement. Proposed enhancements of 
the military component of our aid pack- 
age are aimed at helping the armed 
forces of the Philippines overcome 
serious shortcomings in maintenance, 
logistics, transportation, communica- 
tions, and training during a period of 
severe economic difficulties. This pro- 
posal is premised on the expectation 
that recent trends toward military 
reform and greater professionalism with 
the leadership and throughout the in- 
stitution will continue and strengthen. 



Thailand continues to face a large 
Vietnamese force that is trying to sub- 
jugate Cambodia and which poses a 
significant threat to Thailand's security 
The Thai Government is allocating 
substantial resources to military mod- 
ernization in order to create a credible 
deterrent to Vietnamese adventurism. 
Our support for this effort is crucial not 
only because of the importance of 
Thailand itself but because of the stake 
we have in the independence, integrity, 
and prosperity of the members of the 
Association of South East Asian Nation; 
(ASEAN), of which Thailand is a part. 
The ASEAN states are astride the im- 
portant sealanes connecting Asia and 
the Middle East and Europe; the free 
nations of the Pacific and, indeed, of the 
world have a common stake in keeping 
them peaceful and open. Indonesia is in 
a key position in this respect, and our 
common strategic interests are among 
the important reasons why we are pro- 
posing continued security assistance for 
that country. 

The security assistance levels that 
we are proposing for these and other na 
tions of the region entail only minor in- 
creases from 1985 levels and in several 
cases these amounts are still below thosi 
allocated in FY 1984. Moreover they 
make up only a modest proportion of th( 
total worldwide foreign assistance funds 
requested for FY 1986. 

Korea 

The prevention of conflict on the Korear 
Peninsula is a key component of regiona 
peace, for which the deterrence of Nortl 
Korean aggression against South Korea 
is fundamental. For over 30 years, the 
U.S.-R.O.K. alliance has been successfu 
in its central aim — preventing North 
Korean aggression leading to a recur- 
rence of hostilities on the Korean Penin- 
sula. The peace on the peninsula is at 
times an uneasy one. It has been markec 
by such incidents as the 1968 raid on the 
Blue House by North Korean comman- 
does, the seizure 2 days later of the 
U.S.S. Pueblo, tunneling under the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) by the North, 
and, more recently, the 1983 bombing in 
Rangoon, which a Burmese court deter- 
mined was planned and executed by 
Pyongyang. Yet peace has been pre- 
served, and this peace has allowed great 
economic and social progress in South 
Korea. 

In spite of this impressive develop- 
ment, however, the need for continued 
U.S. security assistance to Korea is 
strong. In the past decade. North Korea, 
which we estimate spends 20-25% of its 
GNP on armaments, has carried out a 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



lajor force buildup, and the compara- 
ive military balance continues to favor 
he North. North Korea has about 
50,000 men under arms, compared with 
bout 620,000 in the South, but these 
umbers substantially understate North 
Korea's combat superiority, because 
Jorth Korean ground forces are better 
quipped and combat-ready and rely ex- 
ensively on nonmilitary units that are 
lOt counted in this manpower total for 
upport functions. North Korean forces 
.re well equipped and have a substantial 
advantage (at least 2-1) in several key 
ategories of offensive weapons— tanks, 
3ng-range artillery, and armored per- 
onnel carriers. The North has perhaps 
he world's largest commando force, 
ome 80,000-100,000 troops, designed 
or insertion behind the lines in time of 
var. 

North Korea also has more than 
wice as many combat aircraft as the 
louth, although R.O.K.-U.S. forces 
lave the qualitative edge. North Korean 
'xercises have revealed impressive 
ophistication in terms of joint and com- 
lined forces operations. In addition to 
their size and their capabilities, the 
hallenge posed by North Korean forces 
3 compounded by factors of time and 
listance. The bulk of North Korean 
lorces are deployed well forward, along 
ihe DMZ, some 25 miles from Seoul; 
4orth Korea has recently begun to con- 
struct additional underground fortifica- 
tions near the DMZ. Warning time for 
I.O.K. and U.S. forces is, therefore, 
"ery limited, and a high state of 
readiness is required at ali times. 

To counter this threat, the R.O.K., 
ivhich is committed to spending 6% of 
Its GNP on defense, is engaged in a ma- 
tor force improvement program de- 
dgned to increase warning time, aug- 
. nent its effective fire power, and 
>nhance its air defense capability. The 
irogram, which includes coproduction of 
he F-5 and M109 A2 howitzer, acquisi- 
ion of the F-16, TOW missiles [tube 
aunched, optically tracked, wire-guided 
uititank missiles], and upgrade of the 
lawk air defense system, is projected to 
■ost over $9 billion during the 1982-86 
ici-iod, with half that amount slated for 
.mcurement in the United States. 

To assist the defense efforts of this 
IVont-line ally, with which American 
troops would fight side by side in the 
.■\ ent of North Korean aggression, we 
pi-ovided a total of $220 million in FMS 
iifdits in FY 1985 and are requesting 
^•^128 million in FY 1986. Last year, the 
Congress approved 10 years' grace on 
iH'iiayment of principle, and 20 years' 
reiiayment for Korea. This very 



welcome provision will allow Korea to 
devote a larger proportion of each year's 
allocation to actual purchases, thereby 
permitting the force improvement pro- 
gram to proceed on schedule. We are 
also requesting a slight increase in 
IMET funds, to $2.2 million, for profes- 
sional and technical military training. 

Our Korean ally is doing its utmost 
for its own security. It purchases an- 
nually from the United States about 
$500 million in military equipment over 
and above the FMS credit allocation. It 
is clearly in our interest to help Korea 
meet its force improvement goals and 
mutual security objectives. (Jiven 
Korea's impressive economic and social 
progress, I believe time is on Seoul's 
side. I believe that helping Korea main- 
tain a strong defense with adequate 
FMS credits is very much in our own in- 
terest. 

The Philippines 

Our security assistance request for the 
Philippines is designed to address the 
critical needs of a key allied nation fac- 
ing a combination of political, economic, 
and security problems, as well as to sup- 
port a vital defense relationship in- 
cluding key support facilities for U.S. 
forces. The basic framework for our re- 
quest is a Presidential "best-efforts" 
commitment made in connection with 
the 5-year review of our Military Bases 
Agreement in 1983. By letter to Presi- 
dent Marcos, the President indicated his 
intention to seek a total of $900 million 
in security assistance during the 5-year 
period beginning in FY 1985. Our securi- 
ty assistance thus relates closely to our 
ability to maintain unhampered use of 
Clark Air Force Base, Subic Naval Base, 
and related installations, facilities that 
are crucial to our capability to protect 
the sea and airlanes of the region and to 
provide logistical support for U.S. forces 
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. 

Developments since the Presidential 
commitment was made have rendered 
the need for assistance all the more 
acute. In the wake of the Aquino 
assassination in August 1983, the Philip- 
pines plunged into its most critical eco- 
nomic crisis since World War II. Conclu- 
sion of a $615 million International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) standby arrange- 
ment involving stringent austerity 
measures and successful restructurmg of 
public and private foreign debt represent 
crucial first steps toward economic 
stabilization. However, the economic 
outlook remains bleak in the short-to- 
medium term. The Philippines registered 
negative real GNP growth of around 
5.5% in 1984, with inflation of over 



.50%. Positive real GNP growth is 
unlikely to resume until 1986, and then 
only at a modest rate. The need to 
restrict government expenditures, cur- 
tail imports, and service a large external 
debt will weigh heavily on the Philip- 
pines for the remainder of this decade. 

As it seeks to cope with economic 
crisis, the Government of the Philippines 
also faces the challenge of a growing 
communist insurgency. The communist 
New People's Army (NPA) now numbers 
some 10,000-12,000 armed guerrillas 
and operates in rural areas throughout 
the country. The root causes of the in- 
surgency are political and socioeconomic 
and must be addressed as such. At the 
same time, the insurgency poses a 
military challenge requiring an effective 
military response. Exchange shortages 
and budgetary restraints— Philippine 
defense expenditures have declined by 
more than 20% in real terms since 
1978— have severely restricted re- 
sources available to the armed forces of 
the Philippines to play its role in a com- 
prehensive approach to the insurgency. 

The past year has seen important 
progress toward the revitalization of 
political institutions in the Philippines. 

• The independent Agrava board 
carried out an independent investigation 
of the tragic Aquino assassination, and 
25 military personnel, including the 
Armed Forces Chief of Staff, are now 
on trial for the crime. 

• Presidential succession rules have 
been redefined. 

• There is a broad press freedom. 

• A vigorously contested parliamen- 
tary election last May produced a strong 
and active assembly and renewed op- 
position political activity. 

On the economic front, we have seen 
acceptance of an IMF arrangement in- 
volving stringent austerity constraints, 
and beginnings have been made toward 
a program of structural reform. 

Finally, we are encouraged by signs 
over the past few months that the 
Philippine military establishment and 
government leadership accept the 
seriousness of the insurgency and are 
taking steps to deal with it more effec- 
tively. Encouraging signs of military 
reform include: 

• A new system to deal with mili- 
tary abuse cases; 

• Some reorganization to deal with 
the insurgency; and 

• A more realistic set of military 
procurement priorities. 

Our military assistance proposal is 
made in the expectation that these posi- 
tive trends will continue and strengthen. 



Mau 1C)8?i 



65 



EAST ASIA 



Our proposed assistance package for 
FY 1986 is designed both to ensure 
fulfillment of the Presidential "best- 
efforts" commitment and to address the 
seriousness of the problems now facing 
the Philippines. Including development 
assistance and PL 480, we have re- 
quested a total of $275 million in aid to 
the Philippines, $173 million of which is 
economic. We believe this balance well 
reflects current needs. 

Our request for a total of $100 
million in military assistance ($50 million 
in the military assistance program 
(MAP) and $50 million FMS) aims at 
making up some of the shortfall in mili- 
tary assistance resulting from last year's 
congressional action when $45 million in 
proposed FMS for FY 1985 was shifted 
to ESF. The Presidential letter specifies 
that a total of $425 million in military 
assistance ($125 million MAP/$300 
million FMS) will be sought during the 
5-year period. With military assistance 
reduced to $40 million in FY 1985, we 
need to begin to increase military assist- 
ance over the base-line level of $85 
million if we are to fulfill the President's 
commitment during the 5-year period. 

Equally important in determining 
the level of military aid for FY 1986 is 
the Philippine Armed Forces' concrete 
need for such assistance if it is to mount 
an effective military response to the in- 
surgency challenge. The reduced level of 
FY 1985 military assistance will be 
almost totally absorbed by operations 
and maintenance costs in support of ex- 
isting inventory. Serious shortcomings in 
maintenance, logistics, transportation, 
communications, and training can only 
be overcome through adequate levels of 
foreign assistance. Over the next few 
years, military assistance levels at least 
equal to those embodied in the 5-year 
Presidential commitment are essential. 
Our international military education and 
training (IMET) program request of 
$2.25 million, aimed at improving the 
leadership and technical skills required 
for professional military performance, 
also addresses important Philippine 
needs. 

Our proposal that military assistance 
consist of equal portions of MAP and 
concessional FMS credits flows from 
current and projected international 
payments calculations. In FY 1984 
repayments of $50.5 million on previous 
market rate FMS credits exceeded new 
credits of $50 million. In the absence of 
Paris Club debt rescheduling, repayment 
obligations resulting from FMS credits 
would have again exceeded new inflows 
of military grants and credits in FY 
1985, and projected repayments are ex- 
pected to reach $48 million in FY 1986. 



This increased debt burden comes at an 
extremely difficult time for the Philip- 
pine economy, with its overall ratio of 
debt service to exports at around 50% 
prior to debt rescheduling. In this situa- 
tion, the breakdown between grants and 
credits envisaged in the Presidential 
commitment simply is not responsive to 
current economic needs. 

The severity of the economic situa- 
tion also makes it imperative that ESF 
be maintained at the base-line level of 
$95 million. Given the Philippines' eco- 
nomic prospects for the next few years, 
it is difficult to square anything less 
with our interest in that nation's eco- 
nomic recovery. Our ESF will be pro- 
grammed in accordance with the basic 
premise that providing government serv- 
ices to address the economic and social 
conditions in rural areas which allow in- 
surgencies to prosper is at least as im- 
portant as military operations. ESF pro- 
gramming will continue to be linked 
with the overall development assistance 
strategy in the Philippines, resulting in a 
focus on agriculture and small- and 
medium-scale industrial development 
and continued support for the creation 
of rural infrastructure. Decisions will be 
made in the context of a continuing 
policy dialogue with the Philippine 
Government on economic structural 
reform in coordination with other donor 
efforts. 

In addition to security assistance 
related to our bases arrangements, we 
propose that development assistance be 
maintained at $36 million, roughly the 
same level as in previous years. We have 
also requested $7 million in PL 480 Title 
II to continue feeding programs that 
have been rendered even more impor- 
tant by the ravages of two typhoons 
that inflicted severe damage to the 
Philippines late last year. 

Last, but by no means least, we are 
proposing the institution of a new PL 
480 Title I program of $35 million which 
will be directly linked to structural 
reform in the agricultural sector. Lltiliz- 
ing funds that may be made available 
from the Title I reserve in FY 1985 and 
FY 1986, this new program will be used 
along with our development assistance 
to encourage the structural economic re- 
forms that will be needed if the Philip- 
pines is to resume a path of sustained 
economic growth. 

Our policy toward the Philippines 
rests on the premise that fundamental 
political, economic, and military reforms 
are needed if stability is to be preserved 
and economic health restored. A central 
objective of our assistance is to con- 
tribute to the needed reform. 



A lot has happened in the Philip- p 
pines in recent years. A key allied natio Ssb 
is deeply troubled on a variety of fronts 
It is incumbent upon us to do what we |«* 
can to help the Filipinos get through th 
difficult period while taking the difficult 
measures needed to lay the basis for 
future stability and prosperity. 



f 



Thailand 



* 



i 



Thailand is a close friend and treaty alh 
of the United States. The important 
relationship we have developed over the 
years is based on a shared commitment 
to the values of freedom and independ- 
ence. In the spirit of mutual respect anc B 
shared obligations which exists between lai 
our countries, we propose to continue 
our assistance to 'Thailand's programs 
for economic development and armed 
forces modernization. In a broader con- 
text, our assistance is also viewed as a 
gauge of the reliability of our commit- 
ment to Thailand and our support for 
ASEAN generally. To maintain our in- 
terests in the region, we should help to |ii 
sustain our friends. 

On its eastern border, Thailand face- 
a strong military threat from a combat- 
hardened Vietnamese Army which con- 
tinues to battle Cambodian resistance 
groups as it seeks to consolidate its grip 
on Cambodia. Vietnamese incursions 
into Thai territory occur regularly. This 
threat has prompted an overdue mod- 
ernization of Thailand's military forces. 
We support this modernization program 
which, in conjunction with other efforts, 
aims to provide a deterrent to further 
Vietnamese aggression. In order to en- 
joy a credible deterrent which will 
enable Thailand to become more self- 
reliant in an emergency, the Thai must 
be accorded continued high priority in 
the allocation of assistance. 

Our overall assistance package is 
also important for Thai economic 
management. In recent years, the Thai 
economy has demonstrated impressive 
resiliency and has continued to expand, 
although at a somewhat slower rate. In 
the last couple of years, however, it has 
seen a worrisome increase in its trade 
deficit and level of debt. These problems 
have been due in part to international 
factors. The government of Prime 
Minister Prem has taken courageous 
steps to address these problems, but 
Thailand now faces a period of painful 
adjustments. The Thai Government 
traditionally has managed to balance its 
allocation of resources, giving social and 
economic development a high priority 
while also providing for necessary 
military expenditures. Security assist- 
ance from the LInited States has helped 



66 



Denartment of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



le Royal Thai Government maintain 
lis balance in the face of growing 
jmands on limited resources. Our eco- 
3mic assistance, while not large in 
rms of total resources, has been 
rected into sensitive priority areas 
ich as the eradication of rural poverty. 

For FY 1986, we are requesting a 
ight increase in FMS funding for 
hailand to $97.5 million from $95 
lillion in 1985. In the face of the very 
^al strains on the Thai economy, how- 
i^er, we have also recommended in- 
•eased concessionality in our assistance 
ackage. We have requested that $40 
lillion in FMS be provided at conces- 
■( onal rates while the terms on the re- 
laining $57.5 million would be extended 
n terms providing 10 years' grace and 
years' repayment of principle. These 
mds will help finance a long overdue 
pgrading of equipment by all the serv- 
:es as well as purchases of necessary 
xpendable items which will enhance 
iistainability. 

Our MAP request is again for $5 
lillion and is intended to ease the cost 
3 the Thai of necessary equipment pur- 
hases. 

Our request for $5 million in ESF, 
gain straight-lined from last fiscal year, 
5 directed to the continuing need for the 
'hai to supplement their own efforts to 
ssist war-torn rural communities along 
ae Cambodian border. The spill-over of 
ghting into their homes, with the at- 
endant disruption to their lives, make 
he people in these communities deserv- 
ig of special help and compassion. The 
^SF funds also directly contribute to 
pholding Thailand's humane policy of 
ffering asylum to refugees and other 
lisplaced persons by assisting the Thai 
order villages affected by the refugee 
nflux. 

In 1986 we are requesting $2.5 
nillion in IMET funds. These training 
lunds have become all the more impor- 
lant as the Thai military absorbs more 
sophisticated systems with attendant 
'hallenges to technical competence and 
ogistics support. The Thai consistently 
)ut this training to effective use to 
ipgrade their capabilities in technical 
ind command subjects. 

Our development assistance request 
)f $22 million shows a small decrease 
:'rom last year. However, it represents 
in important contribution toward 
ichieving Thailand's development goals 
and the maintenance of a healthy, 
oalanced economy in the face of increas- 
ng security requirements. Working 
closely with the Thai Government, the 
emphasis of our program has shifted as 



the Thai economy has changed. Our pro- 
gram will now emphasize two new 
areas — the creation of jobs in rural 
areas through the promotion of small in- 
dustrial enterprises and assistance in the 
field of science and technology. 

Indonesia 

The requested FY 1986 security assist- 
ance program for Indonesia consists of 
$2.8 million in IMET funding, plus $34.5 
million FMS direct loans at concessional 
interest rates. Concessional rates are 
considered necessary to assist Indonesia 
in recovering from the effects of the 
global recession in the early 1980s and 
to overcome serious budgetary shortfalls 
due to declining oil and non-oil export 
revenues in recent years. Uncertainties 
regarding oil and natural gas revenues, 
which account for more than 60% of the 
Indonesian budget, are expected to con- 
tinue for several years, and the Indo- 
nesian Government is expected to be 
hard-pressed. At the same time, the In- 
donesian Government has responded to 
the recession and declining oil revenues 
in a most responsible way by under- 
taking self-imposed austerity and reform 
programs. The rupiah has been de- 
valued by 30%, foreign exchange ex- 
penditures for development programs 
were cut in half, and the overall budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP was also 
reduced by 50%. In addition, the govern- 
ment undertook a sweeping reform of 
the financial sector by removing interest 
rate and lending controls, increasing tax 
revenues and broadening the tax base, 
and reviewing regulations inhibiting the 
growth of the private sector. 

Development assistance of $60 
million is being requested for FY 1986, a 
decrease of $5 million from the FY 1985 
level. Our budgetary constraints also 
have dictated a $10 million reduction in 
PL 480 Title I assistance to $30 million. 
PL 480 assistance to Indonesia con- 
tinues to be a high priority because food 
stocks need to be maintained at accept- 
able levels in order to forestall hardship 
and public unrest, as well as provide for 
adequate emergency shipments of food 
to impoverished or disaster-struck areas. 
A PL 480 Title II request of $6 million 
supports voluntary agency programs 
and World Food Program operations. 

Indonesia, the world's fifth largest 
country, plays a key leadership role in 
both Southeast Asia and in the broader 
Pacific Basin. Its geostrategic impor- 
tance and hence its importance to the 
United States cannot be underrated. In- 
donesia is also an important leader in 
the Nonaligned Movement, and its role 



as a moderate in that forum is a valued 
one. Indonesia also ranks among the 
moderates in the Islamic movement and 
has played constructive roles in many in- 
ternational organizations. Development 
and security assistance to Indonesia are 
part of our strong support for ASEAN, 
which in our view represents the best 
hope for peace, stability, and economic 
and social development in Southeast 
Asia. A consistent development assist- 
ance program for Indonesia is necessary 
to increase manpower and management 
skills, to advance agricultural research, 
to expand appropriate .science and tech- 
nology programs, to continue to upgrade 
Indonesia's educational system, and to 
promote the private sector's role in 
economic development. 

Although Indonesia has wisely 
slowed the pace of its military force 
modernization in the face of recent and 
continuing economic problems, U.S. 
security assistance has helped to sustain 
a number of important programs, in- 
cluding aircraft maintenance and spare 
parts, ship overhaul and spare parts, im- 
provements in air and sea defense 
systems, the purchase of war reserve 
munitions, and, most importantly, ad- 
vanced and specialized training for com- 
manders and management personnel in 
the Indonesian Army, Navy and Air 
Force. Added emphasis this year is ex- 
pected to be given to "train-the-trainers" 
programs which would measurably im- 
prove indigenous training capabilities. 

Indonesia's military forces remain 
critically short of qualified technicians 
and program managers. U.S. training 
primarily will be in technical fields, and 
the level of IMET funding requested 
should permit approximately 250 
military officers to attend our armed 
forces schools in FY 1986. IMET 
deserves the highest priority support 
because of the important role played by 
the professional military in the Indone- 
sian society, the utility of the program 
in furthering our foreign relations objec- 
tives, and the desirability of improving 
mutually beneficial service-to-service 
contacts. 

Malaysia 

Strategically located on the Malacca 
Strait, Malaysia's continued political 
stability and economic development are 
essential to U.S. interests in the 
ASEAN region. Confronted with the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and 
the consequent threat to regional peace 
and stability, Malaysia has been in the 
forefront of ASEAN's strategy to bring 
about a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces 



67 



EAST ASIA 



from Cambodia and a negotiated settle- 
ment ensuring the rights of the Khmer 
people. Beyond Southeast Asia, Malaysia 
is a responsible member of the Islamic 
Conference and Nonaligned Movement 
and has played a constructive role in in- 
ternational affairs generally. 

U.S. -Malaysian relations, founded on 
mutual respect and common interests, 
are very good and were enhanced fur- 
ther by the visit to Washington in early 
1983 by Prime Minister Mahathir bin 
Mohamad. There have been subsequent 
exchanges of high level visitors, in- 
cluding Secretary of State Shultz in July 
and Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam 
in November of 1984. The Malaysians 
are interested in continued defense 
cooperation with the United States, tak- 
ing into account Malaysia's nonaligned 
status, and U.S. security assistance is 
designed to augment their legitimate 
self-defense capabilities, thus con- 
tributing to the security of all of the 
ASEAN countries. 

The $5 million FMS request level for 
Malaysia in FY 1986 is designed to pro- 
vide continuity in the program as Malay- 
sian military planners consider force 
restructuring away from counter- 
insurgency to a more conventional force 
posture which will create new equipment 
needs. Although Malaysia has not in the 
past made extensive use of FMS credits, 
additional purchases are likely as its 
economy improves. Possible purchases 
include surveillance equipment, antiship 
weapons, and Sidewinder and Maverick 
missiles. 

The IMET request of $1.1 million is 
a slight increase from last year and is to 
some extent based on the increased cost 
of training. The IMET program provides 
an important means for the Malaysian 
Armed Forces to meet their training 
needs as they adjust to a more conven- 
tional force structure and acquire more 
sophisticated weapon systems. The 
Malaysian Government considers ex- 
posure to U.S. defense management, 
operational doctrine, and support con- 
cepts critically important to the modern- 
ization of its armed forces. Whereas 
Malaysia in the past has not made exten- 
sive use of FMS credits, the Malaysian 
Armed Forces are increasingly utilizing 
U.S. training in all areas— equipment- 
related technological training, advanced 
combat training, management, and 
leadership development. Malaysia is ex- 
pected to look to the United States to 
fulfill its external training needs for the 
foreseeable future. 



Singapore 

Singapore plays an important role 
within ASEAN and occupies a pivotal 
strategic position in Southeast Asia by 
virtue of its location at the juncture of 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
Singapore is a valuable port of call for 
U.S. ships transiting the Malacca Strait 
and offers important ship and aircraft 
support facilities. A nonaligned nation, 
Singapore plays a significant moderating 
role with the Nonaligned Movement and 
in UN fora. Singapore has stood up 
forthrightly in opposition to Soviet ac- 
tions in South and Southeast Asia, and 
Singaporean leaders have publicly called 
for the United States to maintain a con- 
tinuing regional security role as a deter- 
rent to Soviet expansionism. Additional- 
ly Singapore has strongly supported 
ASEAN's strategy for achieving a 
political settlement of the Cambodian 
problem and an end to Vietnamese oc- 
cupation of that country. 

The purpose of the IMET program 
for Singapore is to provide this friendly 
country with access to our military 
schools system. For FY 1986, we are re- 
questing $75,000, which is an increase of 
$25,000 over FY 1985, largely because 
of increased training costs in the United 
States and because more highly tech- 
nical training may be sought, for exam- 
ple, in connection with Singapore's ac- 
quisition of the E2C surveillance air- 
craft. This modest amount of assistance 
serves to demonstrate our continuing in- 
terest in Singapore's security and in con- 
tinued development of Singapore's small 
but highly proficient armed forces. The 
United States is an important source of 
military training doctrine and expertise, 
as well as a supplier of military equip- 
ment. Singapore's participation in U.S. 
military training programs is highly 
significant in creating and sustaining 
military-to-military relationships. 

Burma 

We are pleased with the continuing up- 
ward trend in our relations with Burma. 
The Burmese Government, while firmly 
committed to nonalignment, pursues a 
foreign policy that is not incompatible 
with our own strategic interests in 
South and Southeast Asia. Moreover the 
Burmese leadership's gradual movement 
away from strict isolationism has led to 
increased contacts between our govern- 
ments and to expanded bilateral coop- 
eration in areas of mutual concern, such 
as narcotics control. 



Our principal objectives in Burma 
are to encourage the country's economi 
development and evolution into a 
politically stable society friendly to the 
West and to assist the Burmese Goven 
ment to suppress the flow of illicit 
opium and opium derivatives such as 
heroin from Burma to international 
markets. 

Despite substantial natural re- 
sources, Burma ranks among the work 
poorest countries. It has a per capita ir 
come of less than $190, estimated 
foreign currency reserves of less than 
$30 million, and a debt-service ratio of 
well over 30%. 

The $13 million in development 
assistance proposed for FY 1986 will 
enable the U.S. Agency for Internation 
Development (AID) to continue its sup 
port of Burmese efforts to improve rur 
primary health care, to increase agri- 
cultural research, and to improve oilsee 
production and processing to reduce 
Burma's dependence on rice exports to 
earn badly needed foreign exchange. 
The AID projects, tightly focused on 
specific and achievable goals, have beer 
well-received by the leadership and peo 
pie of Burma and have contributed 
measurably to a strengthening of our 
bilateral relations that has included 
much closer cooperation in antinarcotic 
activity in recent years. 

Internally the Burmese Governmen 
faces an array of insurgent and warlorc 
groups, including the Burma Communis 
Party, that control large areas of the 
hinterland and finance themselves 
through narcotics trafficking and other 
forms of smuggling. The effectiveness ( 
the Burmese military is the key to 
Burma's efforts to control these groups 
and their narcotics activities and, over 
time, to achieve stability and economic 
progress in the country. 

The $1 million MAP grant proposec 
for FY 1986 will enable the meagerly 
equipped military to strengthen its posi 
tion against the insurgents and con- 
tribute to the effectiveness of 
U.S. -Burmese narcotics control efforts. 
The proposed $300,000 for IMET will 
assist the government to develop its ow 
training capability while providing 
Burmese military officers direct ex- 
posure to American society and values. 
Because of the military's dominant role 
in Burma, this could have a favorable 
long-term effect on our bilateral rela- 
tions. 



68 



EAST ASIA 



acific Islands 

ur major concerns in the South Pacific 
lands are to support their remarkable 
hievements to date in building demo- 
atic institutions and to prevent their 
;e for strategic purposes by outside 
jstile powers. World War II demon- 
rated the necessity for the latter 
)licy. These islands lie across our lines 
' sea and air communication to 
ustralia, New Zealand, and Southeast 
sia. 

Since the war, these island states 
ive undergone great changes, and in 
le past 20 years most have become in- 
pendent states. Our relations with 
lem are friendly; we share to a re- 
arkable degree a belief in democratic 
Dvernment and devotion to individual 
Derties. It is in the U.S. interest to 
5sist island governments in their ef- 
rts to promote economic growth. 

For FY 1986, we have requested $5 
illion in development assistance to sup- 
Drt a region-wide program with em- 
lasis on improving agricultural rural 
evelopment and fishing techniques and 
promote regional cooperation in this 
-ea of small populations and small 
arkets. In addition, we are requesting 
oproval for a modest bilateral assist- 
ice program ($1 million) for Fiji using 
SF. Our military assistance would con- 
st of small IMET programs with a 
)tal dollar value of $275,000 for all of 
lie Pacific Islands, plus a small MAP 
location to Fiji of $300,000. 

liji 

Ihe $100,000 IMET program requested 
•)r FY 1986 represents a straight-lining 
cm FY 1985's funding level. The 
' loney would assist the Royal Fiji 
, [ilitary Forces in acquiring needed pro- 
■.'^sional and technical skills to better 
lerate a small, but modern defense 
ir<'o. We are requesting $300,000 in 
!AF to assist the Fiji military mod- 
rnize its small arms. 

A functioning democracy and a 
•ader in regional organizations, Fiji also 
lakes important contributions to inter- 
ational peacekeeping efforts. Fiji main- 
lins two battalions of troops with the 
inai Multilateral Force and Observers 
VIFO) and the UN Interim Force in 
,ebanon (UNIFIL), more than are on 
uty in Fiji itself. Our bilateral relations 
re excellent. In 1983, Fiji reopened its 
'orts to all our U.S. Navy ships. Fiji has 
iven the U.S. Government particularly 
trong support on a number of impor- 
ant international issues, including 
Jrenada, the Korean airline incident, 
.nd Afghanistan. 



Papua New Guinea 

The United States has enjoyed friendly 
relations with Papua New Guinea before 
and since its independence from Aus- 
tralia in 1975. The country's size, 
strategic location, and resources make it 
a major actor in the South Pacific. 

Papua New Guinea maintains the 
largest defense force in the Pacific 
Island region. The proposed FY 1986 
IMET program of $75,000 represents an 
increase of $25,000 over last year's 
allocation. Papua New Guinea is ex- 
pected to use its IMET grant to provide 
training in improving logistics, manage- 
ment, and administrative capabilities 
and search and rescue techniques. 

Tonga 

Tonga continues to be a reliable friend 
for the United States in the South 
Pacific. The Tongan Government has 
welcomed port calls by the U.S. Navy 
and has stated its willingness to host 
nuclear-powered vessels even when 
other island governments, concerned 
over an upsurge in public sensitivity to 
nuclear matters, have been reluctant to 
do so. The proposed FY 1986 IMET pro- 
gram of $50,000 is the same as FY 
1985. The funds are expected to be used 
for training in management and mainte- 
nance and repair skills. 

Solomon Islands 

The Solomon Islands, independent since 
1978, is the second largest of the Pacific 
Island states in the area and the third 
largest in population. Its foreign policy 
has been markedly pro-Western. The 
newly elected government has been 
working with us to resolve the fisheries 
problems that developed in 1984. The 
Solomon Islands continues to try to 
upgrade its rudimentary defense forces. 
The requested FY 1986 IMET level is 
$50,000 and represents a $20,000 in- 
crease over the FY 1985 allocation. Ob- 
jectives of the program remain to assist 
in creating skills necessary for effective 
control and maintenance of security and 
management of forces. 

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 

The United States has administered the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(TTPI) since World War II and since 
1947 under a trusteeship agreement 
with the United Nations. Since 1969 we 
have been negotiating with the leader- 
ship of the TTPI for new political rela- 
tionships. In 1983 two of the island 



governments — the Federated States of 
Micronesia (P'SM) and the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands— completed all the 
necessary procedures to enter into a 
new and uni(iue relationship with the 
United States, that of freely associated 
states. The Administration is resubmit- 
ting the Compact of Free Association to 
this Congress in order to complete the 
process on our side and initiate the new 
relationship with FSM and the Mar- 
shalls. The Administration's target date 
for implementation of the free associa- 
tion relationship is October 1, 1985. 

For FY 1986, we have requested 
$299.3 million for the compact upon the 
enactment of the necessary authorizing 
legislation. 

The compact will regulate the rela- 
tionships between the United States and 
the Marshall Islands and the FSM. 
Under the compact, the United States is 
granted full powers and authority for 
defense and security matters, including 
the right to establish military bases and 
support activities, throughout the freely 
associated states. The compact specifies 
the amounts and attendant objectives 
and purposes of U.S. grant and service 
assistance to each of the freely 
associated states. 

The overall policy goals of the 
United States with regard to the com- 
pact are based on a review of U.S. 
policy by the senior interagency group 
on foreign policy and were approved by 
the President on September 21, 1981. 
The compact implements long-term U.S. 
national security requirements and pro- 
vides the basis for the accomplishment 
of shorter term contingency basing and 
logistic needs. Another important policy 
goal of the United States is to see 
political stability in the freely associated 
states. The compact accomplishes the 
equally important goal of political stabili- 
ty through provision of annual grant 
assistance. 

The first year estimate exceeds by 
$153.1 million the second year estimate 
and exceeds by $143.5 million the 
average annual budget estimate. This is 
due to the inclusion of several one-time 
payments, the most significant of which 
is a one-time $150 million payment to 
establish a trust fund for the settlement 
of all claims resulting from the U.S. 
nuclear weapons testing program in the 
Marshall Islands. 

Regional Economic Assistance 

The Administration's budget proposal 
has $19.5 million for the Asian regional 
program. This program includes funds 
for South Asia and East Asia activities 
of the American Free Labor Institute 



ii/lay1985 



69 



EAST ASIA 



and a number of American private 
voluntary organizations and provides 
some support to Peace Corps projects. It 
will also provide $5.62 million in tech- 
nical assistance during FY 1986 to the 
small but significant regional assistance 
program we have established with the 
six governments of ASEAN. As a result 
of the regular high-level economic dia- 
logues we hold with the ASEAN govern- 
ments, AID has developed several high 
quality technical assistance projects that 
respond to specific regional needs. Proj- 
ects supported by past funding have 
focused on health, education, agricul- 
ture, energy, and industry. This year we 
are seeking funding for a watershed 
management project that will assist in 
checking the serious soil erosion and 
water control problems facing these na- 
tions, an energy conservation and 
management project, and a human 
resources development program that 
will provide scholarships in a number of 
technical disciplines, including agri- 
culture, health and nutrition, engineer- 
ing, and management. 

The regional program for ASEAN 
countries is part of a larger effort by 
several U.S. Government agencies and 
the U.S. business community to expand 
the areas of cooperation in culture, 
science, and technology between the 
United States and ASEAN. For exam- 
ple, the Food and Drug Administration 
has organized seminars on improving 
food quality controls for canning in- 
dustries, and the U.S. Geolog^ical Survey 
provides advice and training in the quest 
for phosphate minerals. The U.S. 
business community, with some support 
from AID last year, has sponsored a 
new U.S.-ASEAN Center for Tech- 
nology Exchange that recently began 
operations. With offices in each of the 
ASEAN countries, the Technology Ex- 
change Center will be working closely 
with ASEAN and U.S. Chambers of" 
Commerce in planning industry-specific 
seminars and field visits to the United 
States to meet the special requirements 
of small businesses in identifying the 
technology, the organizational skills, and 
the investment capital to create more 
product employment. 



I noted last year before this commit- 
tee that economic, scientific, and 
cultural ties have become an important 
and mutually beneficial aspect of the 
U.S. relationship with China. Those ties 
continue to expand, and our commercial 
relationships offer particular promise. 
Since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1979, trade with China has 
grown dramatically — last year, it 
recovered from a 2-year slump and set a 
new record of $6 billion, approximately 
balanced between the two sides. High 
technology exports to China has been a 
particularly dynamic area — we issued 
4,600 license approvals for such exports 
last year, representing a 128% increase 
in just 2 years. U.S. equity investment 
in China may now reach $100 million, 
with several hundred million more in- 
vested by U.S. firms in petroleum ex- 
ploration. Exchanges cover a broad 
range of activities — over 1.50 Chinese 
delegations visit the United States each 
month, over 10,000 Chinese students 
study in the United States, and 21 pro- 
tocols under the science and technology 
agreement promote valuable exchanges. 

Our rapprochement with China over 
the past decade has also made important 
contributions to global and regional 
peace and stability. China shares our 
deep concern about Soviet aggression in 
Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed oc- 
cupation of Cambodia. U.S. -China rela- 
tions have meshed well with our existing 
alliances and security relationships in 
Asia and Europe. The exchange of visits 
last year between Premier Zhao Ziyang 
and President Reagan reinforced the 
stability and durability of the relation- 
ship. 

In 1981 the President decided to 
seek legislative change to laws that link 
China with the Soviet bloc. The proposal 
to eliminate the prohibition against 
foreign assistance to China received 
favorable consideration by this commit- 
tee in the authorization bills for FY 
1983, FY 1984, and FY 1985, but the 
overall bill was not passed for reasons 
unrelated to China. This year we are 
again proposing legislation which would 
permit elimination of this prohibition. 



We have adopted the committee's 
language; even though it does not ex- 
plicitly remove China from the list of 
proscribed countries, the amendment 
now proposed would nevertheless meet 
our objectives. 

In seeking this amendment, our pur 
pose has been to remove the negative 
symbolism of legislative langage which 
continues to depict China as an unfrienc 
ly nation. We are not proposing a 
bilateral development assistance pro- 
gram for China. Should we decide to 
propose a program for China at any 
point in the future, it would only be 
after careful scrutiny within the ex- 
ecutive branch and would, of course, be 
subject to the authorization and ap- 
propriations process of the Congress. 

In addition to removing an 
anachronism in our laws, amendment ol 
the Foreign Assistance Act would allow 
China to participate in ongoing AID 
technical assistance programs, under 
current funding levels, in the same man 
ner as do most other countries. Chinese 
participation in these programs will not 
threaten AID programs with other cour 
tries but will contribute to China's 
development through existing AID 
research and training projects. 

Last month Secretary Shultz, in his 
testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, reviewed this 
region's excellent progress and pros- 
pects while also noting the challenges 
and problems it must face. He concludec 
by observing that "we can be proud of 
the vitality of our alliances, friendships, 
and productive ties in this promising 
region. If nations act with wisdom and 
statesmanship, we may well be at the 
threshold of a new era in international 
relations in the Pacific Basin." 

The economic and security assist- 
ance program that we are proposing, 
and for which we urge your support, is 
essential for the realization of that goal. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tine Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



China 

Since 1982 the Administration has urged 
a change in foreign assistance legislation 
as it applies to China. I want to em- 
phasize the importance that we continue 
to attach to this change, and I sincerely 
hope that action can be completed this 
year. 



70 



Dpnartmpnt nf ?;tatp REilJptin 



EUROPE 



lY 1986 Assistance Requests 
|Dr Europe 



Richard R. Burt 

Statement before the Subcommittee on 
ropean and Middle East Affaiis of the 
na<e Foreign Affairs Committee on 
bruary 21, 1985. Mr. Burt is Assistant 
vetary for European and Canadian 
fei'r,s.' 

is a pleasure tx) have this opportunity txi 
jak to you today on tehalf of security 
iistance requirements for the Eurojjean 
;^on in FY 1986. Although the countries 
the Atlantic alliance weathered in 1984 a 
ijor challenge to their unity, we must ac- 
3t the fact that 1985 and ftitiire years 
11 bring additional challenges. Fortunate- 
the vast majority of our European 
3nds and allies possess the capacity to 
fiU their responsibilities and help us meet 
ise challenges without any dii^ect U.S. 
distance; a few, however, cannot, and 
3d our help if they are to be able to do 
ir share in safeguarding U.S. and 
sstem interests. 
The four aUies which do require special 
istance are to be found along the nortli- 

I edge of the Mediterranean. These four 
les — Spain, Portugal, Greece, and 

irkey — constitute much of NATO's soutli- 

II flank. This region is critical for the 
fcense of the central front and Europe 
lire generally. At the same time, the 
ithem flank is uniquely important for 

i 3ther reason — as a bridge across Europe 
I king the Atlantic to the Middle East and 
I uthwest Asia. As NATO Foreign and 
1 'fense Ministers regularly note, Westeni 
i erests outside the fomial treaty area can 
I d do affect the well-being of every 
i ance member. The countries of the 
i ithem flank, by virtue of their location 
s mg major East-West air and sea routes, 
I ve the potential to make a special con- 
I bution to this increasingly important 
I nension of Western security. It is U.S. 
; ^i.'^ lance programs which can turn tliis 
1 teiilial into reality. 

Rut in speaking of what these countries 
I ght do in the future, we ought not over- 
1 )k the accomplishments of the recent 
jst. Each of these four countries has 
ide a difficult but crucial transition 
\vard democracy. Much as I noted last 
ar before this subcommittee, over the 
st decade several have made important 
onomic strides. Each has negotiated a 
ajor base agreement with the United 
ates. And in each and every case, I 
ilieve that U.S. security assistance pro- 



grams have constituted an integral part of 
this evolution. Our economic and military 
assistance progi-ams have proven to l)e an 
essential foreign policy instrument. 

Let me address each of the proposed 
security assistance programs in turn, I 
would then like to say a few words about 
our policy toward Cyprus. 

Portugal 

A charter member of NATO, Portugal is 
a long-time, steadfast, and reliable ally 
of the United States. The Portuguese 
Government actively supports Western 
policies in international fora and has 
been in the forefront of Western reac- 
tion to major events such as the invasion 
of Afghanistan, the proclamation of 
martial law in Poland, and the taking of 
the U.S. hostages in Iran. Portugal 
holds a strategic position of great im- 
portance for NATO reinforcement/re- 
supply and other, including non-NATO, 
contingencies. The Lajes air base is 
critical to these missions. 

Although concerned that expanded 
U.S. use of their facilities for non-NATO 
purposes could expose Portugal to in- 
creased military and economic risks, 
Portugal has been highly cooperative in 
allowing use of its bases, provided that 
its relatively modest military and eco- 
nomic needs can be taken into account. 
A new mutual defense agreement signed 
in December 1983 provides the United 
States with continued access to the 
strategic Lajes facilities and reaffirms 
the strength and vitality of our security 
relationship. The expanding nature of 
that relationship is reflected, as well, by 
Portugal's agreement in March 1984 to 
installation on the mainland of a U.S. 
satellite tracking station (GEODSS 
facility). The facility will be a key part of 
a global network designed to improve 
U.S. ability to monitor friendly, as well 
as potentially hostile, objects in space. 

Portugal has come a long way in 
establishing a working democracy since 
the 1974 revolution. Portuguese political 
parties, both in government and in op- 
position (with the exception of the com- 
munists) are pro- Western and agree that 
Portugal should make a more substan- 
tial, active military contribution to 
NATO. We support Portugal's increased 
participation in NATO along with other 
alliance partners and want to help in the 
long-range Portuguese military moderni- 
zation effort. 



Military modernization has a long 
way to go, however, since until the 1974 
revolution, the Portuguese Armed 
Forces were largely a colonial force, 
heavy on foot-soldiers and light on arms. 
The armed forces have been restruc- 
tured to more modern proportions, and 
the process of acquiring modern equip- 
ment has begun, in accordance with 
NATO force goals. It is, nevertheless, 
clear that Portugal will not be able to 
bear the burden alone. In recognition of 
this, we and other NATO partners are 
cooperating in an ad hoc committee of 
NATO to coordinate assistance efforts. 

Portugal is the least affluent NATO 
member, after Turkey, and has been ex- 
periencing serious economic difficulties. 
The government has undertaken a pain- 
ful economic austerity program and in 
1984 met or exceeded most of its targets 
under an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) standby program. This, however, 
has come at the cost of a severe reces- 
sion. In addition, the country is facing a 
major adjustment as it prepares to enter 
the European Community (EC). It is in 
our best interest to provide substantial 
levels of economic support fund (ESF) 
grants to assist the Azores and the 
mainland economies, and sufficient 
amounts of military assistance program 
(MAP) grant assistance and foreign 
military sales (FMS) to help Portugal 
achieve NATO readiness and fulfill its 
obligations in Europe and the Atlantic. 

For FY 1986, we have requested an 
ESF grant of $80 million, a MAP grant 
of $70 million, and FMS credits of $65 
million along with $3 million interna- 
tional military education and training 
(IMET) funds. In light of Portugal's 
serious economic problems and its 
substantial debt service burden, we are 
requesting that $35 million of our FMS 
credits come under the concessional 
FMS category, and we are seeking 
legislative authority to offer Portugal 
extended repayment terms for the non- 
concessional portion of FMS credits. The 
requested levels of MAP and FMS 
would help Portugal to acquire equip- 
ment to complete the NATO-dedicated 
brigade and its airlift, start up a second 
air transportable light infantry brigade, 
complete a second squadron of A- IP's, 
commence a three-ship antisubmarine 
frigate program, and acquire six used 
P-3B aircraft for Atlantic antisubmarine 
patrols. IMET will provide professional 
training for the Portuguese Armed 
Forces. ESF is intended to provide vital 
budget support for the economically 
pressed Azores as well as economic 
assistance to the mainland. 



ay 1985 



71 



EUROPE 



Spain 

Since the death of Franco in 1975, Spain 
has successfully established a fully func- 
tioning democracy, while working to 
integrate more fully with the West, in- 
cluding joining NATO and soon the EC. 
In conjunction with a democratic Por- 
tugal, Spain's remarkable progress in 
establishing a free society and in reduc- 
ing the communists to only a marginal 
political force has helped to secure 
NATO's southern flank and enhanced 
alliance strength. 

The U.S. -Spanish bilateral security 
relationship dates back to 1953 and has 
been confirmed through a series of 
agreements regarding U.S. use of 
Spanish military facilities and U.S. 
assistance for Spanish military moderni- 
zation. Since Spain's entry into NATO 
and its peaceful transition to democracy, 
it has also become an important alliance 
partner. The basis for our security 
cooperation has thus been broadened. 
Modernization of the Spanish military 
forces, which strengthens the common 
defense as well as encourages an institu- 
tional role for the military similar to 
that played by the military in other 
Western democracies, has gained new 
importance. Our security assistance rela- 
tionship has thus become even more 
significant. 

Following national elections in Spain 
in 1982, the newly elected socialist 
government, in the face of considerable 
popular sentiment against NATO, 
"froze" the process of military integra- 
tion into the alliance pending a popular 
referendum, for which no firm date has 
been set. The Spanish public clearly 
evaluates membership and military inte- 
gration partly in terms of what benefits 
they offer the Spanish military's mod- 
ernization effort. While we consider the 
ultimate decision to be a matter for 
Spain alone to decide, it is important 
that our assistance effort make clear the 
value of NATO participation. 

Under the 1983 Agreement on 
Friendship, Defense, and Cooperation, 
Spain provides the United States with 
continued access to vital air and naval 
facilities which are important to the 
maintenance of our forces in Europe and 
would be crucial in the event of a Euro- 
pean contlicl. The agreement also estab- 
lishes an institutional framework — the 
U.S. -Spanish Council and the various 
committees which operate under its 
aegis — for the development and imple- 
mentation of our broad political, eco- 
nomic, cultural, and scientific coopera- 
tion with Spain. We, in turn, are 
pledged to "best efforts" in assisting 
Spain to upgrade its military equipment, 



modernize its forces, and bring them up 
to NATO standards. 

At a minimum, it is vital that we 
maintain our current "best-efforts" com- 
mitments for FY 1986, which would be 
to continue FY 1985 assistance levels of 
$400 million in FMS credits, and $12 
million in ESF grants, and to seek $3 
million in IMET. The ESF grant would 
fund scientific/cultural exchanges and 
programs designed to counterbalance 
the large military component of our rela- 
tions. The IMET program is aimed at 
the professional development of the 
Spanish military. FMS guaranteed 
credits are scheduled to fund the pur- 
chase of F-18 aircraft, a frigate con- 
struction/purchase program, helicopters 
to upgrade military airlift and capability, 
a software test facility, torpedo improve- 
ment kits, and ground support weapons. 

Greece 

Greece is strategically important to the 
United States and NATO. It borders on 
three communist countries and would 
block any Warsaw Pact thrust south- 
ward toward the Mediterranean through 
Thrace as well as joining with Turkey to 
resist any Soviet effort to seize control 
of the Dardanelles. At the same time, 
Greece is positioned to help control the 
sea- and airlanes of the eastern Mediter- 
ranean and is one of the countries con- 
trolling access to the Middle East. With- 
out this key ally, NATO's southern flank 
would be split. 

We also consider our defense rela- 
tionship with Greece to be in the 
broader context of our traditional friend- 
ship. Greece is a friend as well as an 
ally. We are bound by a web of eco- 
nomic, social, and political ties. As two 
of a small, select group of nations em- 
bracing democracy, we share the 
defense of our common values through 
NATO. 

Our defense relationship continues 
to operate within the framework of the 
defense and economic cooperation agree- 
ment which formally came into force in 
December 1983. This accord provides for 
the continuation of the activities pre- 
viously conducted in Greece on a mutual- 
ly agreeable basis. The agreement is 
valid until terminated by written notice 
by either side, which can be given at the 
end of 5 years or thereafter. This ar- 
rangement is comparable to agreements 
we have with other allies. 

Under the new agreement, the 
operation of our bases and associated 
facilities during the past year has been 
relatively smooth. The agreement has 
eased the handling of previously difficult 
issues such as U.S. requests for waivers 



Gi 



« 



f 



\ 



of jurisdiction in cases of U.S. service- 
men charged with offenses against 
Greek civil law. Sixth Fleet ships con- 
tinue to make regular visits to Greek 
ports. We have experienced problems, 
however, when the Greek Government 
in our view, has not provided adequate 
security during strikes of Greek base 
personnel. Moreover the Greek Govern- 
ment has cast doubt over our future 
ability to use their facilities by its fre- 
quent statements to the effect that 
American access to the facilities will tei 
minate after the agreement has been in 
force for 5 years. 

Unfortunately the problems we hav ^ 
experienced regarding our facilities in 
Greece are far from unique. Greece is 
not participating in NATO exercises. 
The Greek Government regularly dis- 
associates itself from the NATO consen 
sus on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces. And the Greek Government not 
only echoed the preposterous charge 
that Korean Air Lines #007 was on an 
espionage mission for the United States 
but questioned the legitimacy of suppor 
for solidarity in Poland. 

These and other differences with th 
policy of the Government of Greece are 
serious and highly bothersome. We will 
do our best to improve relations with 
Greece, but the Greek Government mus 
do its part as well if there is to be prog 
ress. In the meantime, I can well under 
stand the frustrations in Congress and 
elsewhere and the temptation to take 
punitive measures in return against the 
current Greek Government. But commc 
interests between the United States an( 
the American people with the people of 
Greece are too important for us to adoj 
such a short-term prospective. It is for 
this reason that our security assistance 
request for FY 1986 deserves congres- 
sional support. 

The security assistance we are re- 
questing for Greece is an integral part 
of our close bilateral defense relation- 
ship which includes common membershi 
in NATO as well as U.S. use of military 
facilities in Greece. U.S. assistance is 
necessary to improve Greece's capability 
to carry out its assigned tasks under 
NATO. Recently, for example, Greece 
committed itself to purchase 40 U.S. 
F-16s to help upgrade its air defense 
system. The Greek percentage of GNP 
devoted to military expenditures re- 
mains among the highest in NATO. 
Greece, in recent years, has used its ow! 
foreign exchange resources as well as 
U.S. loan guarantees to improve its 
defense posture. However, U.S. assist- 
ance continues to be needed. Like other- 



72 



Department of State Bulletir 



ropean allies, Greece suffers from in- 
ion, unemployment, and a balance-of- 
ments problem. The repayment 
ms for our military assistance loans 
reece are the best available to any 
ion under our nonconcessional FMS 
gram. 

This year we propose to maintain 
level of FMS funds at $500 million 
was allocated for FY 1985 to permit 
tinued purchase of military equip- 
nt, including aircraft, ammunition 
i spare parts, communications and 
ar equipment, and missiles. We also 
pose $1.75 million for IMET, which 
)articularly important to the Greek 
Tied Forces at both the professional 
1 technical levels. 

rkey 

assistance program for Turkey re- 
ins the third largest in the world, 
lecting the country's strategic impor- 
ce and its contribution to the defense 
SJATO and to deterrence of potential 
p"ession in Southwest Asia. Owing to 
npeting demand on our assistance re- 
rees, we are proposing a program for 
-key which is only slightly larger than 
; year's proposal and which thus falls 
Tt of Turkish needs. Nonetheless it is 
TOgram that would permit us to con- 
ae to assist Turkey with its military 
dernization programs while it con- 
dates its democratic institutions and 
9 nomic reforms. 

Let me describe for you briefly the 
J iety of foreign policy and strategic in- 
)( ests the United States shares with 
II -key. Turkey plays a critical role as 
I anchor of the southern flank of 
[ TO. It defends one-third of the 
\ der between NATO countries and the 
\ .rsaw Pact. It controls egress from 
i Black Sea into the Mediterranean 
I \ stands between the Soviet Union 
\ 1 the Middle East and astride the 
• .te of a possible Soviet thrust into 

■ jthwest Asia. 

The United States has access to a 
/ -iety of military facilities, including air 
] ;es and other installations that con- 
; )ute directly to our national security, 
I well as to the defense of NATO. We 
] . e signed important military agree- 
- nts in the past year, including a Co- 
: lated Operating Base Agreement in- 

■ viiig improvement of bases in eastern 
rkey, where both NATO and Turkey 
ire an interest in maintaining an ef- 
tive deterrence. 

Turkey's close relations with key 
ctes in the Middle East enable it to 
ity a unique role in that troubled 
^on. We have an active and produc- 
e dialogue with Turkey on Middle 



East issues, based on our close bilateral 
relatonship and shared interest in 
regional stability. 

Over the past year, Turkey has 
made major strides in the consolidation 
of democratic institutions and in the pro- 
tection of human rights. Municipal elec- 
tions were held in March 1984, in which 
all legal political parties participated. 
Martial law has been progressively lifted 
from a majority of Turkish provinces. 
The government of Prime Minister Ozal 
has taken steps to eliminate abuses in 
Turkish prisons. Having assisted Turkey 
during the past, very difficult years, as 
it struggled to overcome political chaos 
and economic bankruptcy, it is impor- 
tant we continue to support the newly 
elected government as it makes notable 
progress. Security assistance is a funda- 
mental part of that support. 

Equally impressive has been 
Turkey's progress in the economic 
sphere. With the support of interna- 
tional institutions and Turkey's friends, 
including the United States, the Turkish 
Government has embarked on an un- 
precedented program of economic 
reform designed to increase the 
economy's productivity and competitive- 
ness. While results to date have been 
substantial, the Turkish economy re- 
mains fragile and, in the short term, the 
success of the government's economic 
policy will require continued external 
support. This year, repayment of the 
rescheduled external debt will add to the 
debt service burden. We are requesting 
less in ESF assistance to Turkey than in 
FY 1985, but Turkey's economic dif- 
ficulties and our interests in Turkey and 
in the success of the Turkish Govern- 
ment's economic program argue strongly 
for maintenance of ESF funding at this 
level. 

Turkey maintains the second largest 
standing military force in the alliance 
and devotes a higher proportion of its 
budget and GNP to defense than most 
other NATO members. However, to 
enable Turkey to meet its NATO mis- 
sions, sustained, adequate levels of 
security assistance will be needed. The 
Turkish-American defense and economic 
cooperation agreement commits the U.S. 
Government to "best efforts" to obtain 
adequate levels of security assistance for 
Turkey, a pledge that we and the 
Turkish Government take very seriously. 

Our security assistance request is 
for $230 million in MAP, $345 million in 
concessional FMS loans, $210 million in 
FMS guarantees, $150 million in ESF, 
and $4 million in IMET funds. The 
greater portion of these funds will be 
used for the modernization of the 



. 



y1985 



EUROPE 



Turkish Armed Forces. Major programs 
include the F-^16 coproduction program, 
the M-48 tank upgrade, and naval force 
modernization. These are key programs 
which will be critical in helping Turkey 
modernize its armed forces and make its 
contribution to the security of the 
alliance. They fall short, however, of 
enabling Turkey to meet fully its 
military requirements, derived from its 
extensive NATO missions. 

Security assistance, as Secretary 
Shultz has stated, is closely linked to our 
most fundamental foreign policy goals. 
In this regard, Turkey is a notable suc- 
cess story. Security assistance for 
Turkey not only furthers U.S. strategic 
defense and NATO objectives but also 
provides aid to a country striving for 
democracy, economic liberalization, and 
against terrorism. Few countries meet 
the criteria of our assistance program as 
fully as Turkey does. I urge congres- 
sional approval of the entire Administra- 
tion request and without conditioning 
our assistance on Turkish actions on 
Cyprus. I firmly believe that the prog- 
ress we have made in recent months on 
Cyprus would be jeopardized by one- 
sided, punitive measures directed 
against Turkey. Turkey played a con- 
structive role leading to the January 17 
Cyprus summit and it is important that 
it continue to do so. 

Cyprus 

The United States places high value on 
its excellent relationship with the people 
and Government of Cj^prus. This rela- 
tionship endures despite periodic dif- 
ferences between us regarding a solution 
to the continuing partition of the island 
between Greek and Turkish commu- 
nities. This Administration places top 
priority on achieving progress toward a 
just and lasting Cyprus settlement. We 
remain totally committed to that goal. A 
divided Cyprus for us involves a press- 
ing humanitarian issue, weakens allied 
defenses in a strategically important 
region, and is one of the principal causes 
of the tension between two NATO 
allies — Greece and Turkey. 

Thus we have compelling reasons to 
do all we can to promote a fair and final 
settlement for the two Cypriot com- 
munities. We also oppose measures 
which obstruct such a settlement. Ac- 
cordingly, we support UN Security 
Council Resolution 541, passed 
November 18, 1983, which calls for 
reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declara- 
tion of statehood. We also strongly op- 
posed the exchange of ambassadors be- 
tween Ankara and the self-proclaimed 



73 



EUROPE 



Turkish Cypriot state, which we do not 
recognize. Currently, we are intensively 
involved in supporting the UN Secretary 
General's ongoing efforts to find a solu- 
tion. Those efforts resulted last fall in a 
series of "proximity" meetings under the 
good offices of the UN Secretary 
General which in turn led to the first 
summit meeting between the leaders of 
the two communities in nearly 6 years. 
Unfortunately the meeting failed to 
achieve a signed agreement. It did, 
however, as the Secretary General said, 
greatly narrow the gap between the 
sides. We are doing what we can in 
coordinating with Secretary General 
Perez de Cuellar and his staff to ensure 
that the process does move forward and 
the momentum generated since last 
August when the "proximity" talks 
began is not lost. 

The $3 million in ESF we have re- 
quested for Cyprus as in the past will be 
applied to the existing Cyprus American 
scholarship program which provides 
American university educations to young 
Cypriots of both communities. Cyprus is 
without universities of its own and this 
program provides a necessary alter- 
native to Soviet bloc study. We believe 
this to be an appropriate demonstration 
of American interest in the welfare of 
the people of Cyprus. 

Finally, in an effort to provide 
positive incentives for progress toward a 
Cyprus settlement, the President pro- 
posed last year a $250 million Cyprus 
peace and reconstruction fund for use by 
the Cypriots when a settlement is 
reached or significant steps toward one 
are taken. I want to stress that this pro- 
posal is still valid, and a specific request 
for the authorization and appropriation 
of funds will be forwarded to the Con- 
gress should circumstances permit, as 
we all hope they will. 



Death of Soviet President Chernenko 



) 



PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, 
MAR. 11. 1985' 

Please accept my condolences on the 
death of the Chairman of the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet, Konstantin 
Ustinovich Chernenko. 

At this solemn time, I wish to 
reiterate the strong desire of the 
American people for world peace. 
Although the problems which divide our 
countries are many and complex, we can 
and must resolve our differences 
through dialogue and negotiation. Our 
two delegations are sitting down in 
Geneva to begin negotiation on how to 
reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. 
We must seize the opportunities for 
peace. We need to find ways to reduce 
the threat and use of force in solving in- 
ternational disputes. We must also 
establish a working relationship that 
builds greater trust and cooperation be- 
tween us. I hope that the Soviet leader- 
ship will join with me with renewed 
dedication to create a firm and durable 
basis for better relations between our 
two countries. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAR. 11. 19852 

The President has sent a message of 
condolence to Acting Head of State, 
Vasiliy Vasil'yevich Kuznetsov, on the 
death of Chairman and General 
Secretary Konstantin Ustinovich 
Chernenko. In his message the Presi- 



dent reaffirmed his commitment to 
peace and to working for a cooperative 
relationship with the peoples of the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet Govern- 
ment. The President called upon the 
Soviet leadership to seize the opportu- 
nity offered by the negotiations about t 
begin in Geneva to make progress 
toward our shared goal of eliminating 
nuclear weapons from the face of the 
Earth. 

In our relations with the Soviet 
Union, the United States has three bas 
goals: to reduce significantly the unac- 
ceptably high numbers of weapons whic 
now exist; to eliminate the use and the 
threat of force in international relation: 
and to develop greater trust and con- 
fidence in our relations with the Soviet 
Union overall. Our nations share an in- 
terest in the development of stable and 
constructive relations for the long tern- 

We believe that the problems whicl 
exist in U.S. -Soviet relations can be 
resolved and that progress is possible ii 
the near term. We cannot achieve prog 
ress singlehandedly, but we will do our 
part to bring it about. The United Stati 
hopes to work with the Soviet leadersh 
on common interests in order to help 
create a better and safer world. 



'Sent to Vaisily V. Kuznetsov, First 
Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Mar. 18, 1985). 

-Read to news correspondents by prin- 
cipal deputy press secretary to the Presider 
Larry Speakes (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents of Mar. 18). 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



74 



/iDDLE EAST 



•Y 1986 Assistance Requests 
r the Middle East and South Asia 



Richard W. Murphy 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 
'•s of the Senate Foreign Relations 
nmittee on March 21, 1985. Am- 
sador Murphy is Assistant Secretary 
Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 



elcome the opportunity to testify to- 
in support of the Administration's 
posals for FY 1986 economic and 
urity assistance for the Near East 
South Asia. 

The Administration's proposal re- 
ts our foreign policy and national 
urity objectives in this vital region. In 
h country, our assistance programs 
intended to nurture relationships of 
tual interest and trust and to assist 
se governments in strengthening 
ir security and furthering their 
nomic progress. 

Our foreign assistance programs in 
region are vital to the achievement 
)ur foreign policy goals: 

To promote stability in this 
ategically important region; 

• To ensure the security and well- 
ig of Israel and to assist other 
ndly states in the region with their 
urity needs; 

■Po foster the peaceful resolution 
'•egional conflicts; 

• To maintain free world access to 
vital oil resources of the Persian 

f; and 

• To search for peace in Afghani- 
n, including the withdrawal of Soviet 
itary forces and the restoration of 

\t ^han independence. 

Iti our efforts to advance regional 

I lility and to promote the resolution 

I oiiflicts throughout the region, we 

< luiiize that the spirit of accommoda- 

i 1 1 an grow more readily if friendly 

tes feel confident of their ability to 

vide for their own security and for 

economic and social needs of their 

'ple. 

The levels and terms of our pro- 
;ed assistance have been carefully 
'eloped within the constraints of our 
Iget stringencies and the President's 
nomic program and are the minimum 
ounts needed to meet essential re- 
rements of the countries in this 
,ion. 

Our FY 1986 foreign assistance re- 
?st for the Near East and South Asia 
1 fund six major programs: 

ay 1985 



• $3,646.3 million in foreign military 
sales (FMS) credit, including $3,100 
million in forgiven credits for Israel and 
Egypt; 

• $67 million in grant military 
assistance programs (MAP); 

• $12.32 million in international 
military education and training (IMET); 

• $1,182 million in economic support 
funds (ESF) which does not include ESF 
for Israel; 

• $287.2 million in development 
assistance; and 

• $538.7 million in PL 480 food 
assistance. 

Middle East 

As part of the general effort to promote 
regional stability, the resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be one 
of our foremost objectives. There are no 
quick and easy solutions for peace in the 
region. However, we will persevere with 
our efforts, which are based on the 
President's Middle East peace initiative 
of September 1, 1982. Our assistance 
plays an important role in furthering the 
peace process. 

Six years ago, a peace treaty ended 
30 years of war between Egypt and 
Israel. Israel and Egypt remain our 
principal partners in the quest for peace, 
and these two nations are the largest 
recipients of our proposed foreign 
assistance for FY 1986. This assistance 
is aimed at ensuring their security and 
strengthening their economies, both 
essential to their continuing on the path 
to a broader peace settlement. 

Smaller programs planned for Jor- 
dan and Lebanon can also promote 
regional stability and progress toward 
peace. Jordan requires our continued 
support to maintain its security, its role 
in facilitating the stability of the area, 
and to build the necessary confidence to 
join the peace process. Lebanon needs 
our support to help deal with the contin- 
uing problems besetting it and to pro- 
mote stability in the areas between 
Syria and Israel. Our program also 
seeks to improve the quality of Palestin- 
ian life in the West Bank and Gaza and 
to encourage economic and social 
cooperation in the region. 

IsraeL The United States has a 
historic commitment to Israel's security 
and viability extending over the past 
three decades. Our assistance provides a 



tangible demonstration of the strength 
and durability of that commitment and 
seeks to give Israel the confidence to 
take the risks necessary to pursue the 
peace process. 

To assist Israel in maintaining its 
qualiUitive edge in military capability 
over potential aggressors, a $1.8 billion 
in forgiven FMS credits is required, an 
increase of $400 million over FY 1985. 
Israel's military needs have been ana- 
lyzed by both governments during ses- 
sions of the Joint Security Assistance 
Planning Group. We each agree that the 
terms and level of the FY 1986 FMS re- 
quest for Israel will achieve our mutual 
goals. 

Israel has requested $2.64 billion in 
ESF assistance in the form of an FY 
1985 supplemental appropriation and 
$1.85 billion in ESF for FY 1986, a net 
addition in ESF of $1.44 billion over last 
year's $1.2 billion level. The United 
States has indicated its willingness to 
provide additional assistance in support 
of a comprehensive Israeli economic pro- 
gram that deals effectively with the fun- 
damental imbalances in the Israel 
economy. Without such a reform pro- 
gram, additional U.S. assistance would 
not resolve Israel's economic problems 
and would provide only temporary relief. 
Moreover, without economic adjustment, 
Israel will become even more dependent 
on U.S. assistance in the future. 

The Israeli Government has taken a 
number of difficult steps toward 
economic stability and recovery. We are 
impressed with the leadership and com- 
mitment of Prime Minister Peres in this 
effort to develop a comprehensive pro- 
gram. But further efforts are necessary 
if the program of the Government of 
Israel is to achieve its goal of putting 
Israel back on the path of self-sustaining 
economic growth and if additional U.S. 
assistance is to have a durable effect. 
During the recent visit of Israeli 
Minister of Finance Modai, we held very 
useful talks; we hope this will lead to 
agreement on an approach in which ad- 
ditional U.S. assistance can be 
associated with an effective Israeli pro- 
gram. Accordingly the Administration 
intends to defer a request for a sup- 
plemental for extraordinary assistance 
for Israel. In the meantime, the Ad- 
ministration now supports an ESF 
authorization for Israel for FY 1986 in 
the amount of $1.2 billion. 

Egypt. The Camp David accords and 
the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty re- 
main the cornerstone of our Middle East 
peace policy. Egypt has demonstrated 
its firm commitment to those ac- 
complishments by repeatedly refusing to 



75 



MIDDLE EAST 



disavow them as a price for resuming its 
historic leadership role in the Arab 
world. The Mubarak government public- 
ly and actively supports the Camp David 
accords and the President's September 
1, 1982, peace initiative. In this context, 
President Mubarak has recently em- 
phasized the importance of achieving 
peace through direct negotiations be- 
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
Egypt and Israel have intensified con- 
tacts since the beginning of 1985 to 
resolve outstanding differences and im- 
prove the atmosphere of relations be- 
tween them. 

Egypt remains an important force 
for peace and stability in the region not 
only in the Middle East but also in 
Africa, where it plays a vital role in 
helping African states deter Libyan 
adventurism. Egypt's ability to continue 
this deterrent role depends heavily on 
our assistance. Cooperating directly with 
the United States in military exercises 
has served to enhance both countries' 
ability to preserve stability in the region. 
The recent trend toward improved rela- 
tions between Egypt and moderate Arab 
states, and in particular the restoration 
of relations between Egypt and Jordan, 
is evidence of the growing strength of 
those forces which seek a more stable 
and secure Middle East and peaceful, 
negotiated solutions to its problems. 

The request for $1.3 billion in for- 
given FMS credits for FY 1986 reflects 
our commitment to a long-term military 
supply relationship with Egypt to help it 
modernize its forces and replace obsoles- 
cent Soviet-supplied equipment. Our 
military assistance relationship with 
Egypt is a key part of our efforts to 
maintain the regional balance of forces 
which has been in danger of shifting in 
favor of Soviet-supplied radicals like 
Libya and Syria. FMS for FY 1986 will 
be devoted mainly to progress payments 
on F-16 and E-2C aircraft, air defense 
system integration, and air defense 
radars as well as to follow-on support 
for U.S. equipment supplied over the 
past few years. Less than $20 million 
will be spent on new equipment (counter/ 
artillery radar) this year. 

A $2 million I MET program is pro- 
posed for FY 1986 which will finance 
training for Egyptian personnel in the 
United States. The objectives of this 
program are to assist P^gypt in develop- 
ing expertise needed to manage effec- 
tively its defense esttiblishment and to 
acquaint Egyptian offlcers with the U.S. 
military and U.S. society and values. 

Our economic assistance helps main- 
tain the continued economic growth 
which is essential to Egypt's stability. 
Our program is designed to support 



economic policies which address the ex- 
isting constraints on development. Over 
the past year, the Egyptian Government 
has moved deliberately on economic 
reform, raising prices of food and elec- 
tricity and liberalizing foreign exchange 
regulations. Our proposed economic aid 
program includes $222 million in PL 480 
food assistance and a grant ESF pro- 
gram of $185 million. The ESF program 
consists of a $200-million commodity im- 
port program, which will enable Egypt 
to import U.S. manufactured goods and 
commodities, $515 million in project and 
sector assistance, and $100 million as a 
cash transfer. The cash transfer will 
help Egypt adjust to balance-of- 
payments problems caused in part by 
declining oil prices. 

PL 480 food assistance remains an 
important part of our balance-of- 
payments support and is a tangible 
demonstration of the benefits of peace. 
A modest reduction in both PL 480 Title 
I and Title II programs for Egypt from 
$237 million in FY 1985 to $222 million 
requested for FY 1986 is being proposed 
to help meet the growing demand for 
food assistance in drought stricken 
regions of Africa. The Egyptian Govern- 
ment has made good progress in im- 
plementing measures such as increasing 
procurement prices paid to farmers, 
which should help stimulate production 
in the agricultural sector. 

Lebanon. We have welcomed 
Israel's decision to withdraw its forces 
from Lebanon, with the first stage com- 
pleted successfully on February 18. This 
is consistent with our continued support 
for efforts to bring about the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from Lebanon. We 
remain committed to the achievement of 
long-term stability and believe that U.S. 
economic and military support, properly 
channeled, can assist in the attainment 
of this goal. 

Our military assistance consists of 
FMS credits and IMET. The FY 1986 
request is for $10 million in FMS 
credits. This is a minimum level to sus- 
tain U.S. -origin equipment presently in 
the Lebanese inventory. The Lebanese 
Armed Forces, while weakened by com- 
munal dissension in 1983 and 1984, 
maintained their essential integrity as an 
institution of the central government. It 
is important that the military arm of the 
Government of Lebanon be sufficiently 
strong to discourage the use of Lebanon 
as a base for terrorist operations and to 
permit the central government to 
reestablish control over additional por- 
tions of the national territory as foreign 
forces withdraw. To provide training to 
bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces, 
$800,000 in IMET monies is required. 



The ESF request of $10 million for 
FY 1986 is also a minimum request 
which takes into consideration the ex- 
istence of about $70 million which re- 
mains unobligated from the FY 1983 
supplemental appropriation for Lebanor 
During the current fiscal year, activity 
will continue in telecommunications 
rehabilitation and in relief assistance 
working through private voluntary 
organizations. In addition we plan to im 
plement projects in health, vocational 
training, and in the repair of water 
systems as soon as security conditions 
permit resumption of economic 
reconstruction activities. 



Jordan. A stable and secure Jordan 
is essential to advance the President's 
Middle East peace initiative. Jordan is 
surrounded by larger and more powerfu 
states. It is vastly weaker militarily thai 
Israel, and its defensive capability vis-a- 
vis Syria has declined dramatically in 
relative terms over the past decade. 
Despite this difficult position, Jordan 
has recently taken some bold steps 
which demonstrate its commitment to 
modernization and progress toward 
peace. Last fall, it reestablished 
diplomatic relations with Egypt, therebj 
reducing Egypt's isolation, underscoring 
once again Jordan's moderate role and 
reinforcing the principle that no state 
should be ostracized or penalized for 
making peace. Jordan also hosted the 
Palestine National Council (PNC) 
meeting in Amman, where King Husseii 
openly challenged the Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization (PLO) to accept UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 and to 
give up the call for an independent 
Palestine state. 

Radical elements of the PLO and th 
Syrian Government, as well as the 
Soviet Union, opposed this meeting and 
disapproved of the outcome. The 
dangers of supporting the PNC meeting 
were demonstrated by the tragic 
assassination in Amman of a former 
West Bank Mayor, Fahd Qawasmeh, 
who was a moderate spokesman favor- 
ing a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement 
on an approach to peace with Israel, as 
well as violence directly against Jorda- 
nian Government installations and of- 
ficials. Jordan's security situation is 
threatened by the massive Soviet arms 
transfers to Syria. Yet this has not 
deterred the Jordanian Government, 
which continues to seek a formula for 
bringing Palestinian representatives into 
the peace process as part of a Jordanian 
delegation. 

The Jordanians play a responsible 
role in the region in other ways as well. 
Jordan's preparedness to respond to re- 
quests for assistance and support to 



76 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



lb states in the gulf continues to be a 
element of King Hussein's policy, as 
s Jordanian efforts to maintain a 
ure border between Jordan and 
lel. Jordan's influence as a force for 
urity, stability and moderation in the 
idle East has been and continues to 
a positive one, deserving of U.S. 
iport. 

The proposed FY 1986 assistance 
gram for Jordan consists of $95 
lion in FMS credits, $20 million in 
F, and $2 million in IMET. The FY 
!6 request will not be used for the 
•chase of new weapons systems but 
her for spare parts, ammunition, 
ow-on support, as well as further 
port for the I-Hawk system. In view 
Jordan's economic problems, $65 
lion of the proposed FMS credits will 
provided at concessional rates. The 
ining funds under IMET will enhance 

I professional capability of Jordan's 
S ned Forces, provide Jordanian of- 
Its with a U.S. orientation, and influ- 
' e the training the Jordanian Armed 

<" ces provide to other moderate Arab 
i ntries. 

Jtirdan's economy has slowed con- 
jjrably since 1981. Jordan is poor in 
Bural resources with limited arable 
ad and limited water. The Iran-Iraq 
»- has halted the growth of Iraq as an 
n )ortant market for Jordanian prod- 
i)S and skills. At the same time, falling 

II income in Saudi Arabia and the gulf 
.■ tes has had a three-fold influence on 
[ dan— significant reductions in Arab 

u , increasing competition in traditional 
r danian markets coupled with decreas- 
I demand, and leveling off of remit- 
■; ces from Jordanians working over- 
i s. To its credit, the Jordanian 
: i/ernment has pursued responsible 
; inomic policies in adjusting to these 
I ^erse economic developments, but it is 
1 V strapped with a very tight budget. 

The FY 1986 ESF program will con- 
; lie efforts in highland agricultural 
i /elopment to expand and modernize 
: iduction in extensive highland areas. 
i )rk in groundwater assessment will 
: Id on an ongoing project covering 
rrthern Jordan. Another continuing 
p )ject will provide short- and long-term 
b lining in economic and technical 

• jjects. 

Regional Program. The Middle 
list regional program request for FY 
186 consists of $22 miUion in ESF, 
S.17 in development assistance, and $2 
t llion in PL 480 Title II. The ESF pro- 
|sal furthers U.S. objectives of peace 
! d economic and social development for 
ie peoples of this region. This grant 

• 11 finance three major activities. 



For development projects in the 
West Bank and Gaza, $10 million will be 
used. Through these products, which are 
implemented by U.S. and local private 
voluntary organizations, the Ihiited 
States has been and continues to be ac- 
tively involved in efforts to improve the 
quality of Palestinian life in these ter- 
ritories. This involvement reflects the 
legitimate concern which we have for 
the welfare of the Palestinians living in 
the West Bank and Gaza. We intend to 
implement this program in a manner 
that will directly contribute to achieving 
the economic and social objectives of the 
people it is designed to serve. Re- 
quirements for the program have 
become greater because of the Israeli 
economic crisis which has had its impact 
on the economy of the occupied ter- 
ritories. The private voluntary organiza- 
tions projects are concentrated in the 
following areas: health and sanitation, 
agricultural development, water storage 
and supply, community development, 
and vocational and higher education. In 
addition, during the past year, we have 
inaugurated programs designed to pro- 
vide assistance directly to deserving 
Palestinian institutions in the West 
Bank and Gaza. 

We are encouraged by the stated 
commitment of Israeli Prime Minister 
Peres to support and encourage an im- 
proved quality of Palestinian life in the 
territories and the steps taken to date in 
that regard, particularly in the health 
field. We will continue to encourage this 
approach directly and through this 
assistance program. 

We are fully aware that these pro- 
grams are no substitute for a negotiated 
settlement that can give expression to 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians 
in these territories — nor are they in- 
tended to do so. We are prepared to ad- 
dress the political dimension of the 
Palestinian problem whenever the par- 
ties themselves are ready. In the mean- 
time, we are actively addressing the 
human dimension both financially and 
diplomatically. These programs have the 
full support of the highest levels of the 
U.S. Government and, as circumstances 
allow, we are prepared to do even more. 

To support the regional cooperation 
program, which consists of a variety of 
joint projects involving Israeli and Egyp- 
tian participation, we request $5.8 
million. We seek to use these funds in a 
manner that promotes contacts among 
Israeli universities, government 
ministries, and private organizations and 
their counterparts in Egypt. Cooperative 
projects help promote relationships be- 
tween Israelis and their Arab neighbors. 



thus helping to break down barriers be- 
tween people and to promote mutual 
understanding. Ongoing projects include 
arid lands agriculture, technology ex- 
change in agriculture, marine sciences, 
and research on infectious diseases. 

For the first time, $5 million in ESF 
from the Middle East regional program 
is proposed for the American University 
of Beirut. This regional program is 
recommended as a source of funding to 
avoid conflict between the needs of the 
university and the needs of Lebanon. It 
is also logical because the American 
University of Beirut is an invaluable 
regional institution serving the educa- 
tional needs of the area. These funds 
will defray operating costs of the univer- 
sity and the university hospital. Lower 
student enrollments, the added burden 
to the hospital resulting from caring for 
casualties from the fighting, and the 
weakness of the Lebanese currency have 
contributed to the university's budget 
deficits. In addition to the $5 million 
from this regional program, it is an- 
ticipated that American Schools and 
Hospitals Abroad will also assist the 
American University of Beirut with 
funding. 

To finance eight regional projects in 
such areas as population, private enter- 
prise, environment, and agriculture, as 
well as project design and evaluation, 
$4.17 million is requested. 

Persian Gulf 

The Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf region, 
a critical source of energy to the free 
world, is threatened by Soviet encroach- 
ment through Afghanistan and by 
radical forces from within the region. 
Over 25% of the free world's oil produc- 
tion originates in the Persian Gulf. 
Through our assistance, we help to im- 
prove the security of these countries and 
to maintain the availability of these vital 
oil supplies. Our programs are directed 
at supporting those countries in the 
region which provide important access 
to military facilities as well as other na- 
tions which provide transit rights into 
the region should they be required by 
U.S. forces in time of crisis. 

Oman. Strategically located at the 
entrance to the Persian Gulf, Oman 
cooperates closely with the United 
States in our common objectives of 
maintaining security and stability in that 
vital area and assuring freedom of 
navigation through the Strait of Hormuz 
and its approaches. Oman's agreement 
to permit access to its facilities 
represents a major contribution to 
American force projection capability in 
Southwest Asia. The military supply and 



ay 1985 



77 



MIDDLE EAST 



training relationship between our two 
countries contributes to Oman's con- 
tinued willingness to cooperate with the 
United States in security matters. 

In an effort to broaden our relation- 
ship with Oman beyond its security 
aspects, the Omani-American Joint Com- 
mission was established in 1980. ESF 
assistance funds the U.S. contribution to 
this joint commission which provides 
technical assistance for the development 
of the non-oil sectors of Oman's 
economy. Omani proven oil reserves are 
modest, accounting for about 0.6% of 
the free world's proven reserves. Pres- 
ent reserves will be depleted in about 20 
years at current production levels. Non- 
oil resources are very limited. 

Our FY 1986 request for Oman in- 
cludes $58.3 million in FMS credits, $20 
million in ESF, and $150,000 in IMET. 
A significant increase in FMS credits is 
requested to help Oman bear the cost of 
upgrading and modernizing its air 
defense capability as part of a collective 
effort by the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states. The continued threat of 
military attack by Iran has required 
Oman to increase defense expenditures 
in recent years to approximately 48% of 
budgeted expenditures, one of the 
highest levels in the world. The small 
IMET program will provide advanced 
training for officers in the Sultan's 
armed forces; this will help to support 
the Omani Government's goal of 
"Omanization." 

Of the $20 million in ESF, $15 
million will be used to improve and ex- 
pand the water supply system for the 
capital region; the remainder will fund 
scholarships and training as well as 
feasibility and design studies and 
technical assistance. 

Yemen. The proposed FY 1986 
assistance program for the Yemen Arab 
Republic is necessary to maintain a 
bilateral assistance program which of- 
fers a visible alternative to Yemen's 
present heavy dependence on Soviet 
assistance. The strategic location of the 
Yemen Arab Republic, its porous border 
with Saudi Arabia, and the large 
numbers of Yemenis working in the oil 
states of the peninsula underscore the 
importance of Yemen to regional stabili- 
ty and, hence, to U.S. interests in the 
area. Furthermore, the Yemen Arab 
Republic is a "buffer" between the Marx- 
ist People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia. One of the 
goals of U.S. security assistance to 
Yemen is to increase the effectiveness of 
the Yemeni Armed Forces as a deter- 
rent to potential military adventurism by 
the Marxist regime in South Yemen. 



For Yemen our FY 1986 request 
consists of $29 million in development 
assistance, $6 million in MAP, $1.55 
million in IMET, and $5 million in PL 
480 Title I. 

Yemen is one of the poorest and 
least developed nations in the Middle 
East. In the last 2 years, Yemen has 
been seriously affected by a sharp 
decline in Arab donor aid and a leveling 
off of worker remittances. The govern- 
ment also had to cope with a devasting 
earthquake in December 1982 which left 
up to 400,000 people homeless. In view 
of the severe constraints in the develop- 
ment assistance account, we are propos- 
ing a $29 million level, which is basically 
the same as the current level. However, 
this assistance request will be sup- 
plemented by $5 million in PL 480 Title 
I food aid which will help in filling a gap 
which has been created by an ongoing 
drought. 

A $1 million increase in MAP is pro- 
posed over the current FY 1985 level of 
$5 million. Our MAP assistance will be 
used to fund supplemental training, 
munitions, maintenance, and support 
equipment. The IMET program seeks to 
expose as many Yemeni military person- 
nel as possible to training in the United 
States, although some training, in par- 
ticular English-language instruction, 
takes place in country. Areas of focus in- 
clude operations, communications, 
maintenance, and logistics. 

North Atlantic 

Morocco. U.S. relations with Morocco 
are based on a long record of coopera- 
tion, shared foreign policy interests, and 
mutual respect. Despite differing views 
on how to deal with Libya's Qadhafi, 
bilateral relations remain strong, 
grounded in a firm foundation of mutual 
benefit. As chairman of the Islamic Con- 
ference and the Arab League Summit, 
King Hassan plays a leading, moderate 
role in the Arab world. 

The Treaty of Union between Moroc- 
co and Libya has been a cause of great 
concern. King Hassan affirmed that it 
would have no effect on the 
U.S. -Moroccan relationship and that 
both Morocco and Libya would remain 
totally independent and each would pur- 
sue its own foreign policy objectives. 
Our opposition to the agreement was 
made clear to Morocco. To date it ap- 
pears the agreement has been sufficient- 
ly circumscribed. We will, however, con- 
tinue to monitor its application. 

Currently, the Moroccan economy is 
beset by a combination of factors beyond 
the immediate control of the Moroccan 
Government. The country's major source 



for foreign exchange — export of 
phosphates and derivatives — suffers 
from low world prices and a flat marke 
Totally dependent on imported energy, 
Morocco has had to bear the burden of 
high cost imports denominated in U.S. 
dollars. Thus Morocco's economic plight 
has been exacerbated by the strength o 
the dollar, a factor which also has af- 
fected other imports including critical 
foodstuffs and commodities. Chronic 
unemployment and underemployment, 
along with rapid population expansion, 
further burden the Moroccan economy. 

The Moroccan 1985 debt service 
ratio, prior to rescheduling, is estimatec 
to be greater than 50%. This com- 
plicates the Moroccan Government's 
prospects for arranging necessary fi- 
nancing for government projects and 
necessary imports. 

Despite t