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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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i 



i0ppartnt4*n t 



c_ 



bulletin 



1 ,3' 

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy /Volume 86/ Number 2109 



April 1986 




Departmpnt of State 

bulletin 



Volume 86 /Number 2109 /April 1986 



Lover: 

jtold pendant from the Ivory Coast. 

design by Sally Brennan, Publishing 
Services, Department of State. 

Photo by Musee de THomme) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
pubhc, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor I 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
pubhcation of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7t ) 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by the 
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage ic 
at Washington, D.C, and additional mailing of) s 
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govemmei 
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NOTE; Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department OF State Bulletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 




CONTENTS 

FEATURE 

1 Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States— Part 1 
(Philip R. Cook, Jr.) 



i President 

Strengthening American Security 
Visit to Grenada 
State of the Union Address 
America's Agenda for the Future 

(Message to the Congress) 
News Conference of February 11 

(Excerpts) 

» Vice President 

Visit to Guatemala and Honduras 



> Secretary 

Nicaragua: Will Democracy 

Prevail? 
Foreign Policy Challenges 
Enhancing Diplomatic Security 
International Affairs: FY 1987 

Budget 



ca 

Promoting Positive Change in 
Southern Africa (Michael H. 
Annacost) 

The U.S. and Angola (Chester A. 
Crocker) 

IS Control 

I U.S. Strategic Force Structures: 
The Challenge Ahead (Paul H. 

Nitze) 
U.S. Response to Soviet Arms 

Proposals (President Reagan) 
The Stockholm Conference and 

East-West Relations (Robert L. 

Barry) 



East Asia 

67 Election Developments in the 

Philippines (President Reagan, 
Secretai-y Shultz, White House 
Statements) 

69 After the Election in the 

Philippines (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

Economics 

71 Commodity Markets and 
Commodity Agreements 
(W. Allen Wallis) 

Europe 

75 Test Results of Soviet Chemical 
Tracking Agents (Department 
Statement) 

75 Release of Shcharanskiy From 

the Soviet Union (Joint U.S.- 
F.R.G. Statemeyit) 

Human Rights 

76 1985 Human Rights Report 

(Richard Schifter) 



Narcotics 

77 Narcotics Control in Latin 
America (Jon R. Thomas) 

80 Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report Released 



South Asia 

81 Indo-U.S. Joint Commission 
Meets (Agreed Minutes) 



Western Hemisphere 



83 


Permanent Dictatorship in 




Nicaragua? (Elliot Abrams) 


83 


Continuation of Certain 




Assistance to Haiti Authorized 




(Department A n nouncernent) 


84 


CBI and the U.S. National 




Interest (Elliott Abrams) 


85 


Secretary Meets With Contadora 




Groups 


89 


Drug Wars: The New Alliance 




Against Traffickers and 




Terrorists (Elliott Abrams) 


End Notes 


92 


February 1986 


Treaties 


92 


Current Actions 



Press Releases 

94 Department of State 

Index 




mms 



MAY 1 6 m 




(Johnson, World Bank) 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



troduction 



Sub-Saharan Africa 

and the United States 

(Part 1) 



Saharan Africa' is the ancestral 
of millions of Americans and, ac- 
ig to anthropological theory, the 
; of mankind— the birthplace of 
) sapiens. Perhaps the eariiest de- 
ment of settled agriculture began 
"ica on the banks of the lower Nile, 
ig possible the great advances in 
ology and the arts of ancient 

[rem at least the first millennium 
pnward, elements of Egyptian, 
■lician, Greek, Roman, and Arab 
e spread southward into Africa 
gh conquest, trade, and the dis- 
ation of Christianity and Islam. 
■ in slaves, gold, copper, salt, 
1, and many other items flourished 
Dy sea and, following the introduc- 
f camels in about the 3d century 
i across the Sahara. Evidence of the 
it of this trade can be found in the 
jnce of Chinese porcelain and other 
ya.\ wares at archaeological sites in 

!:cess to the cultural exchange of 
editerranean basin was impeded 
i vast expanse of desert, causing 
poples of sub-Saharan Africa to de- 
I cultures distinctly their own. 
'al great empires with large cultur- 
iters emerged but were later de- 
i,;d by war or declined following 



changes in global trade patterns. 
Although European traders had fre- 
quented the African coast since the late 
15th century, knowledge of these em- 
pires remained limited until the era of 
African exploration and colonization in 
the late 18th and 19th centuries. 

By the early 20th century, most of 
Africa had fallen under colonial domina- 
tion. In sub-Saharan Africa, only Liberia 
and Ethiopia remained independent. In 
the decades after World War II, how- 
ever, the peoples of Africa increasingly 
rejected foreign rule and demanded for 
themselves the fundamental freedoms 
for which they had fought in support of 
the Allied powers. By the mid-1960s, 
most African countries had achieved in- 
dependence. Only Namibia remained in 
a colonial status in 1985. 

There are now 46 independent coun- 
tries in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
nearby islands, and negotiations on 
Namibia's independence are underway. 
Together with the countries of North 
Africa, these states play a significant 
role in the world community through 
the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). But the process of forging cohe- 
sive national identities within bound- 
aries drawn by European powers and 
among more than 1,000 ethnic groups is 
difficult; since independence, Africa has 
experienced considerable political up- 
heaval. 



It is important to understand sub- 
Saharan Africa's potential, strengths, 
and problems because they present op- 
portunities and challenges that no world 
power can ignore. For the United 
States, Africa represents: 

• The political force of the world's 
largest regional bloc; 

• A rich source of natural resources; 

• The ancestral home of 25 million 
Americans; 

• A growing market for American 
exports; 

• An opportunity to demonstrate, 
through private enterprise and 
government-to-goveniment aid, that 
democratic institutions and individual 
initiative provide a better solution to 
the problems of the Third World than 
do totalitarianism and economic regi- 
mentation; and 

• PossibiUties for our adversaries to ex- 
ploit regional tensions and foster inse- 
curity through the indiscriminate 
provision of arms and support for vio- 
lent solutions to local conflicts. 

This Discussion Paper is designed to 
update information on developments in 
sub-Saharan Africa and to provide a ba- 
sis for understanding U.S. policy toward 
this vital region of the world. 



;ation in this two-part article is intended to provide background for study and discus- 
II is not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, except where the 
<al is specifically described as such. The publication summarizes currently available 
'ation and raises relevant questions (some of which admittedly may be unanswerable) 
'aid to public discussion of important issues in U.S. foreign policy. 



11986 




Department 



of State B jel« 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



jgional Profile 



ography 



Continent of Africa covers 
55,000 square miles— nearly one-fifth 
le world's total land surface and 
.1 to the combined area of the Unit- 
tates, Western Europe, and India. 
sub-Saharan portion of the conti- 
is 9,312,375 square miles— more 
three times the size of the con- 
ital United States. The African Con- 
it stretches 5,000 miles from north 
lUth and 4,600 miles from east to 
. Its 18,900-mile coasthne is washed 
le Atlantic and Indian Oceans and 
Mediterranean and Red Seas, 
a addition to the continent itself, a 
)er of island countries also are in- 
d in "Africa." With the e.xception 
B Canary Islands and Reunion, all 
ientified with sub-Saharan Africa. 
3 include Madagascar, Cape Verde, 
)ros, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, 
Pome and Principe, and Mauritius, 
slands of Zanzibar and Pemba are 
of the United Republic of Tanzania. 



igraphy 

y'rican Continent consists of a ser- 
■ level or slightly undulating 
lus that fall away from a central 
of high formations to low-lying 
al zones averaging only 20 miles in 
I. Many of these plateaus lie at alti- 
anywhere from 3,000 to 9,000 feet 
item and southern Africa, while in 
orth and west most of the land is 
;en 500 and 1,000 feet above sea 



Massive geologic changes in the 
plateaus have produced ridges that are 
among the most conspicuous features of 
the African landscape: the Great Rift 
Valley of East Africa, one of the 
deepest fractures in the earth's crust; 
Mt. Kilimanjaro (19,565 feet above sea 
level) and Mt. Kenya (17,058 feet) in 
East Africa are higher than any peak in 
the European Alps. These changes also 
produced Lake Chad in Central Africa; 
the lakes of East Africa, including Afri- 
ca's largest. Lake Victoria; and the con- 
tinent's four major rivers: the Nile 
(4,000 miles long), the Zaire (3,000 
miles), the Niger (2,600 miles), and the 
Zambezi (1,650 miles). 

The continent contains the world's 
largest desert, the Sahara; regions of 
heavy rainfall and lush forest vegeta- 
tion; and, between desert and rain 
forest, broad savanna grasslands and 
woodlands. Nearly one-half of Africa's 
total area is desert, while 40% is partly 
forested grasslands and 10%, dense 
forests and thickets. 



Climate 

Four-fifths of Africa lie in the tropics 
and have either a tropical or subtropical 
climate. Temperate climates are found 
in the north close to the Mediterranean, 
along the southern and southwestern 
areas of the Cape of Good Hope, and on 
the higher parts of the inland plateaus. 
Air temperatures vary from hot in most 
parts of the continent to cold in the 
deserts (at night), on the plateaus, and 
in the mountains, where some peaks are 
permanently snowcapped. 



Africa is divided into distinct climat- 
ic belts. The one bounded by the 5° line 
on either side of the Equator has a 
year-long hot-and-rainy climate, with 
some areas receiving more than 200 
inches of rain annually. From 5° - 15° 
on each side of the Equator, the climate 
is warm, with heavy rains dui-ing part 
of the year. Deserts predominate in 
areas 15°-30° from the Equator, and 
temperatures range from very hot to 
very cold. Accumulated rainfall in these 
areas is less than 10 inches annually, 
and sometimes no measurable rainfall 
occurs for years. More than 30° from 
the Equator, mild, rainy winters and 
warm, dry summers prevail. 

Africa's varied climate has affected 
vegetation, river conditions, and the in- 
cidence of disease; it also has influenced 
settlement patterns. Africans sought out 
fertile lands, water, and areas suitable 
for grazing. Europeans settled near the 
coasts on the cool eastern and southern 
plateaus and in the temperate regions of 
northern and southern Africa. Modern 
cities, often former centers of colonial 
administration and trade, usually are lo- 
cated in these areas. 



1986 



History 



Carthage 



Anthropological research and excavation 
in eastern Africa support the theory of 
the African origin of the human race. 
Remains of a forerunner of modem 
Homo sapiens, Australopithecus, and of 
other creatures with hominoid charac- 
teristics, such as Homo erectus and 
Homo habilis, have been unearthed in 
various parts of the continent. Some re- 
mains may be more than 2.5 million 
years old. Evidence of the evolution of 
primitive people throughout the 
Paleolithic Age (1 million-16,000 years 
B.C.) has been discovered, including re- 
mains of Neanderthal man dating to 
about 40,000 B.C. Some scholars believe 
that midway through this age groups of 
these African peoples migrated to other 
continents. Traces of humankind's con- 
tinued development through the 
Mesolithic, Neolithic, Bronze, and Iron 
Ages also have been found in several 
African regions. 

Three main physical types evolved 
in Africa: Negroid, Bushmanoid, and 
Pygmoid. Of these groups, the Negroid 
became dominant, learning first to hunt 
and forage, later to domesticate animals, 
and finally to plant crops. Between 1000 
B.C. and 1000 A.D., a Negroid group 
(known by the linguistic classification of 
Niger-Congo and Kordofanian or Nigrit- 
ic) exerted control over much of 
southern Africa, with a major subgroup, 
the Bantu, nearly eliminating the Pyg- 
moid and Bushmanoid people in the 
process. Caucasoid peoples from the 
Mediterranean area first migrated to 
northeast Africa near the end of the 
Paleolithic period, and subsequent 
migrations to northeast and northern 
Africa occurred in the centuries preced- 
ing and following Christ. During the 7th 
to 10th centuries, bedouin Arabs spread 
Islamic influence across north Africa, 
while from the 10th to the 18th centu- 
ries, other Muslims continued to settle 
in eastern Africa from the Horn south- 
ward to Zimbabwe. 

Sophisticated societies developed in 
early days. The Kush Kingdom (700 
B.C.-200 A.D.) formed in the area of 
present-day Sudan. The Axum Empire, 
established by 350 A.D., comprised 
much of modern Ethiopia. For more 
than 1,000 years, ancient African 
kingdoms— such as Ghana, Kanem- 




Kingdoms and Empires 
1450 B.C. - A.D. 1800 



C' National Geographic Society 

3629 12-85 STATE (I 



Bomu, Mali, Songhai, and the Hausa 
states— developed primarily in the 
savanna lands. The kingdoms of Kongo 
and Lunda may have been founded as 
early as the 14th century, while the 
city-states of the Guinea Coast— Ife, Be- 
nin, Yoruba— date at least to the 15th 
century. These states were highly or- 
ganized and engaged in long-distance 
trade in salt, gold, cattle, horses, and 
ivory. 

In the early 15th century, Por- 
tuguese explorers began a gradual buil- 
dup of African trade relations with 
Europe and the Americas, leading even- 
tually to Christian missionary contact 
with Africa. During the 16th and 17th 
centuries, the Dutch, British, French, 
Spanish, and Arabs increased their 



trade with Africa. During this peri 
Europeans established trading posi 
maritime stations on the Atlantic '■ 
Indian Ocean coasts but rarely trai 
to the interior of the continent. SU 
became an important commodity, 
although trade in slaves had existfl 
centuries. Reliable figiires concern' 
the extent of the slave trade are n 
available; estimates of the number 
people sold into slavery during the 
15th- 19th centuries range from 10 
Hon to 50 million. 



Colonial Era 

Missionaries, traders, and adventui^ 
penetrated the heart of the contin 1 1 
the 19th century. These were the ai 



Department of State 



Hi 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



ich explorers as Mungo Park, 
irgnan de Brazza, Rene Caille, H.M. 
ley, Sir Richard Burton, and David 
igstone. They were followed, espe- 
r after 1880, by government officials 
ged in extending colonial domains. 
)nce the dimensions of Africa's in- 
feography and resources were 
m, colonization proceeded rapidly, 
ough only a small part of the Afri- 
Ilontinent was under foreign rule 
■e 1880, all but 2 of the present 46 
)endent countries of sub-Sahai-an 
a were under European control by 
The two exceptions were Liberia, 
ilished by freed American slaves in 
840s, and the ancient Empire of 
)pia. The remainder of Africa was 
oiled by France, Great Britain, 
igal, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and 
I. During the next half century, Eu- 
lins settled in various areas of the 
Kent, traded, extracted minerals, 
I'Stablished governments reflecting 
lifferent policies and institutions of 
plonial powers. 



ndependence Period 

I factors helped to create a climate 
'lich most of the European-ruled 
lies in Africa eventually became in- 
iident. These included the participa- 
iif Africans in Worid Wars I and II; 
Towth of African nationalist move- 
'5; the Atlantic Charter of 1941 
iiiming the right of all peoples to 
|e the form of government under 
ii they would live; and changing Eu- 
In economic and political concerns 
respect to the efficacy and burdens 
jpire. 
le wave of African independence 

in 1957. Led by Nkrumah of the 
Coast (Ghana), Houphouet-Boigny 

Ivory Coast, and Sekou Toure of 
Ih Guinea (Guinea), a host of sub- 
lan countries in rapid succession 

ties with their colonial rulers. Oc- 
ially, the changeover was accompa- 
)y violence, as in Zaire, 
nbique, Angola, and Zimbabwe. 

1957, 42 nations have joined the 
ireviously independent countries of 
!pia, Liberia, Sudan, and South 
• South Africa became an independ- 
tiion with Dominion status within 
iritish Commonwealth in 1910, and 
|i separated from Egypt and the 




ALGERIA LIBYA 



EGYPT 



THE G*Mei<t,-"_ 



GUINEA--T6,t„u •'- 
aiSS/lU \ GUINEA 



MALI 



J- BUBKIN6 -" ' 



NIGER 



^ 



CHAD 



SUDAN 



SIERRA LEOi 



«r:E"k.>u''«o«v ",: Nigeria . 

COAST -GHANA '"^^O'o -^/ ■ CENTRAL 

--TimT^'" r AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

'";AMEROONi^ B'" 



EQUATORIAL GUINEA 



Africa 
Former Colonial Status 

Political Affiliation - 1952 

United Kingdom | Spam 

France | | | | Italy 

Belgium [^o5 P^ ^"'°"°' 
^ I -1 I.' -^H South Africa 

Portugal rrn | ['"pt^ntr""^"' 




ETHIOPIA 



~ — *.;rQl ml ifclfM > 



>^H.*h«*--_-_.-_--_-_,-^-_-_-->-^ 



TANZANIA' 



t 




United Kingdom in 1956. Namibia, un- 
der de facto South African control, re- 
mains the region's only dependent 
territory; efforts are underway to move 
from violence to negotiation toward 
Namibian independence. 

Africa's political evolution during the 
past two decades has been tumultuous, 
with nearly two-thirds of the countries 
undergoing nonconstitutional changes in 
government. Although more than half of 
the nations are led by military leaders 
or committees, some have now returned 
to constitutional civilian rule. Despite 
political trauma in many countries, ex- 
amples exist of relative tranquility and 
stable leadership. 

Secession attempts have threatened 
some nations. Eritrea has been seeking 
independence since 1962, when Ethiopia 



assumed direct control and terminated 
Eritrea's federated status. Shaba (form- 
eriy Katanga) unsuccessfully attempted 
to secede from Zaire (Belgian Congo) 
when it became independent in 1960, 
and Biafra from Nigeria in 1967. Cultur- 
al and religious differences have led to 
periodic civil wars in Sudan and Chad. 
Warfare also has erupted between 
states. Somalia and Ethiopia have been 
fighting intermittently over possession 
of the Ogaden region. Tanzania invaded 
Uganda in 1979 to oust the barbaric 
government of Idi Amin and to retaliate 
for Ugandan attacks on its territory. 
Libya forcibly annexed a portion of 
northern Chad in 1980-81 and pushed 
further south in 1983, halting only after 
regional and international pressures 
were applied. Nigeria and Cameroon 
also have had tense relations over poor- 
ly defined borders. 



1986 



People 



Africa's estimated population is more 
than 400 million, 85% of whom live 
south of the Sahara. If the current 
growth i-ate of about 3% continues, the 
continent's population may reach 800 
million by the year 2000-an increasing 
concern of many African governments. 

Because of the vastness of the conti- 
nent, population density is less than half 
that of the United States— about 30 per- 
sons per square mile. However, people 
are dispersed unevenly throughout the 
region. Large expanses of desert and 
mountains are virtually uninhabited. On 
the other hand, good climate, fertile 
land, navigable rivers, safe ports, and 
demographic movements have created 
several areas with a population density 
as high as 500 persons per square mile. 
Sub-Saharan Africa's most populated 
areas are: 

• The lands bordering the Gulf of 
Guinea in West Africa, particularly 
Nigeria and the southern parts of 
Ghana, Benin, and Togo; 

• The Nile Valley in northern Sudan; 

• The East African highlands, particu- 
larly the plateaus of Ethiopia, Kenya, 
eastern Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Tanzania; and 

• The eastern and southern coasts and 
interior High Veld of South Africa. 

Most Africans still live in small, 
rural groups. However, opportunities for 
a better standard of living have led to 
increased migration to cities, which are 
confronted with problems of overcrowd- 
ing, unemployment, and insufficient 
municipal services. Among cities with 
more than 1 million inhabitants are: Kin- 
shasa, Zaire; Lagos and Ibadan, Nigeria; 
Johannesburg and Cape Town, South 
Africa; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia; and Accra, Ghana. 

Tremendous diversity exists among 
the people of sub-Saharan Africa. This 
diversity stems from a variety of 
causes— the infusion of elements from 
outside the African Continent, migration 
to new areas in search of better liveli- 
hood, rivalries that produced factions 
and subdivisions, and tendencies to or- 
ganize into small, close-knit groups for 



I 




A Somali farmer and businessman 
check crop grown with seeds im- 
ported from US. 

B Student at the Regional Training 
Center for Plant Protection, 
Cameroon. 

C Djerma girls in traditional 
headdress, Niger. 

D Liberian training officer and 
secretary in U.S. AID mission. 



(Ministry of Information. Niger) 






i 



Department of State Bi*' 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



Algiers 



s.Tf)NISIA 

Tripoli 



Western 
Sahara 



NouakchoHL MAURITANIA^ 



\ ALGERIA 



LIBY/ 



MALI 



Dakar 
THE GAMBIA.- _ ^ 

GUINEA^Au^^ 
BISSAU ^--^^glNE, 

Conakry 
Freetown 
SIERRA LEO 

Monrovia'' 

LIBE^ 1 



NIGER 



^ — Jt-* BURKJJWi 

'r-(5^/i^'^ BEIiKN 
; ^ TS' TOGO 

VOTJY 
COAST .GHANA (^ 

ABrajan x^ci 




CHAD r "*" 

SOiar^ena ^ SUDAN 




DJIBOUTI 



/-'^'''^CENTRAL 
^' AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

BOOW Bangui 



Malabo^ V 'v-art,,nM 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA ^ ^ Taoundi 



SAO TOME. , , i_^/-«^/« 

AND PRINCIPE ) ' iCONG 

Libreville r /\' 

'^*«°'l) /-" RWAN, 

jBrazza^l.) _ZA\ HE > 

'Kinsha; 



EQUATORIAL 
GUINEA 



Africa 

Population Density 

Persons per square kilometer 

J9 193 



Uninhabited 



□ 



O 2S 

Persons per square mile 
• National Capital 

500 1000 Kilometers 



Boundary representation is 
not necessarily authoritative 

60n 12-85 STATE lINR/GE) 




SOUTH 
AFRICA 



86 



protection and mutual support. Over 
thousands of years, this process has 
produced more than 1,000 ethnic 
divisions. 



Languages 

The complexity of African society is 
graphically demonstrated by the number 
of languages. Of more than 800 lan- 
guages, fewer than 10 are spoken by 
more than 1 million people. Most lan- 
guages are native to groups of less than 
100,000. 

Of the numerous linguistic author- 
ities, the classifications of Joseph Green- 
berg represent a contemporary 
consensus (see Bibliography). His Usting 
of categories and map on this page show 
the general geographic location of 
groups.! In the brief text that follows, 
references in parentheses are alternate 
names used by George Murdock, 
another eminent scholar. 

The largest language family is the 
Niger-Congo and Kordofanian (Nigritic), 
of which the Bantu sublanguage group 
is the most important. Speakers of this 
family of languages are descendants of 
the earliest people on the continent and 
still occupy much of sub-Saharan Africa. 
The Afroasiatic (Hamitic)— including 
Semitic-, Berber-, and Cushitic-speaking 
people— stem from the early Caucasoids 
and live primarily in north and north- 
east Africa. The Sudanic can be found in 
a region stretching along the lower Nile 
and westward through the area known 
as the Sahel. The Bushmen and Hotten- 
tot peoples of southern Africa speak 
Khoisan or "click" languages. Some lan- 
guages, such as Swahili and Hausa, 
serve as linguae francae between widely 
divergent groups, especially in trade. 



African Language Groups 




B. Berber 

C. Cushitic 

D. Chad 

E- Ancient Egyptian (Coptic) 



F. Chari - Nile 

1. Central Chan - Nile 

2. Eastern Chari - Nile 

a. Nilotic 

b. Nubian and other 
Chari - Nile languages 

G. Central Saharan 
H. Ma ban 

I. Furian 
J. Songhai 
K. Koman 



NIGER - CONGO AND KORDOFANIAN 

1_ Atlantic 

M. Mandingo 

N. Voltaic 

O. Kwa 

P. Uo 

Q. Adamawa and Eastern Niger • Congo 

R. Benue ■ Niger (including Bantu) 

S. Kordofanian 



@ Macmlllan Educational Corporation, 1974. 

6012 12 85 STATE |1NR/GE| 



#^ 


CLICK 

T. KhoiSJ 

1. NOC 

2. Cer 

3. SOI 





The approximate distribution of the main native language groups of Africa is shown 
on the above map. Although the number of different languages is very high 
(perhaps more than 800), all native languages derive from four basic stocks. These 
stocks are represented by the shaded and unshaded portions of the map. Key let- 
ters indicate divisions of the main stocks and are placed in localities where inter- 
related languages are spoken. European and European colonial languages, which 
often serve as a common language between language groups, are not included in 
this presentation. The dotted line at E shows the area where ancient Egyptian was 
spoken, but the present language is Arabic. Certain other distributions, too minute 
to be shown on the map, include complex variations in the Sudanic languages; 
pockets of Fulani in the Atlantic subgroup of Niger-Congo (L) found as far east as 
Lake Chad; and Bantu (R) encroachments on the territory of the Click speakers. 



g'Macmillan Educational Corp , 1974 



Department of State Bii 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



holinguJstic Groups 

1 (li\i'rsity of ethnic groupings, which 
t'ct original racial strains and often 
:■ names similar to the languages 
E speak, is illustrated on the map. 
I map includes a portion of the 
les of well-known ethnic linguistic or 
kl gi-oups. Their inclusion does not 
issarily reflect their relative impor- 
¥, nor is their location on the map 
Saitive. 

scattered throughout the continent 
about 5 million people of predomin- 
if European descent, most of them 
•jntrated in southern Africa. There 
!ilso nearly 1 million people of Asian 
'cipally Indian or Pakistani) origin in 
l:a. 



l|Jon 

Hon traditionally has played an im- 
rnt role in African culture. There 
Many indigenous religions, but most 
"nize a supreme being who created 
iiius, gave the world its order, and 
; 'il it with energy. Many African 
ions attribute conscious life to na- 
»and natural objects, which has led 
r scholars to use the term "animist" 
I Vi- to traditional African religions. 
itiimal religions, however, have 
■ slowly giving way to Christianity 
i slam as life in the African interior 
Mies less isolated, 
hristianity was spread principally 
iropean missionaries after the 16th 
ry. With the advent of independ- 
I the foreign missionary effort 
'lally has been replaced by African 
■. . Today, some 95 milUon Chris- 
Hm' in Africa. 

;lam swept across North Africa in 
fh century and then expanded 
iward. The Sahelian countries are 
uiiinantly Muslim, as are the north- 
i coastal areas of sub-Saharan Afri- 
ith 125 million adherents, Islam is 
b's largest religion. 



Ethnolinguistic Groups 



. SererYSoninke 
of 
Ba/a\ 




Groups selected show diversity, 
not relative importance 



This Kongo (Congo) oath-taking 
figure represented a power 
figure whose importance derived 
from the special qualities that 
the Bakongo assigned to dogs. 
When activated by the driving in 
of a nail, the dog figure was pre- 
sumed to hunt malevolent spirits 
in the night. The large number 
of nails it contains is testimony 
to the confidence of the Ba- 
kongo in its force. 




(.Musee de I'Homnie) 



n986 




A Yoruba mask, Benin. 

B Zulu dancers in Swaziland. 

C Slit wooden drum, Central 
African Republic. 

D Yacouba stilt dancer in the 
Ivory Coast. 



10 



Depailment of State Buj" 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



I 



ture 

cultural richness of Africa is shown 
)ur major fonns: art, music, dance, 
literature. All uniquely interpret 
litional African values: religious be- 
; veneration of the deceased; respect 
nature; and the importance of child- 
•ing, the family, and the community 
its leaders. The arts express rever- 
t for the past, teach social roles and 
ionsibilities, and encourage the as- 
lation of traditional beliefs, 
rhanks to energetic collectors, from 
y colonial explorers to modem cura- 
and tourists, sculpture is the best 
vn African art form. Most recent 
3tures are of wood, but museums 
itain collections from Nigeria of 
i-cotta Nok statues from the second 
third centuries B.C. as well as an- 
. Benin and Ife bronzes. Other 
s of traditional graphic or plastic 
include rock paintings, decorative 
ilwork, basketry, and jewelry. 
-Yaditional dances reveal much of 
;an lore and legend, philosophy, and 
f. They may celebrate past glories 
triumphs, mark contemporary 
its and rites of passage, or make 
lication for a good harvest or the 
rity of the community. Folk dances 
markedly throughout the continent, 
lly involving group efforts with par- 
ints massed in circles or lines. 
)rums are most often identified 
African music. For thousands of 
3, however, Africans also have 
;d wind, string, and other percus- 
insti-uments, obtaining subtle and 
ilex expressions from relatively sim- 
evices. Although much of the music 
?erved as accompaniment for danc- 
soloists and ensembles perform on 
/ other occasions. The rhythmic pat- 
i of African music have influenced 
c outside the continent, most nota- 
^merican jazz. 

I rich oral tradition has existed in 
a for centuries. Experts estimate 
more than 250,000 myths, legends, 
oik tales flourish in sub-Saharan 
a. Timbuktu had a written tradition 
•e the 16th century. In the 18th 
iry other literary traditions deve- 



loped in Ethiopia and later in languages 
i-eflecting Arabic influence, such as Hau- 
sa in West Africa and Swahili in the 
east. In the past 80 years, published 
works on this subject have included 
such landmarks as Blaise Cendrars' An- 
thology Negre, Leopold Senghor's 
"Necritae" poetry, H.I.E. Dhlomo's Val- 
ley of the Thousand Hills, Chinua Ache- 
be's Things Fall Apart, and Thomas 
Mofolo's Chaka. 



Political Processes 

Political institutions and processes vary 
greatly in sub-Saharan Africa. There are 
federations, constitutional monarchies, 
military oligarchies and autocracies, 
republics with democratic parliaments, 
unicameral and bicameral houses, fully 
elected and partly appointed legisla- 
tures, and single and multiparty sys- 
tems. Most governments are strongly 
authoritarian, either single party or mili- 
tary based. 

When independence was achieved, 
the first order of business was to sur- 
vive, and sui-vival required the building 
of authority rather than its limitation as 
in democratic countries. Authority could 
not be achieved with a multiparty sys- 
tem. Julius Nyerere, former President 
of Tanzania and one of the original 
group of African independence leaders, 
rationalized that the single party system 
is more democratic, "providing it is 
identified with the nation as a whole," 
since "the people can have more oppor- 
tunity to exercise a real choice than 
where you have two or more parties, 
each representing only a section of the 
community." Party loyalties and dis- 
cipline, he maintained, limited freedom 
of expression and of choice. Unfor- 
tunately, "democratic" single party sys- 
tems largely failed to create the 
authority necessary to govern. As a 
result, most became, in fact, no-party, 
authoritarian regimes. 

The various forms of government in 
the subcontinent also reflect the herit- 
age of colonial administrative and polit- 
ical institutions as well as indigenous 
historical and social backgrounds. 



Ethiopia's former constitutional mon- 
archy, for example, was deeply rooted in 
the country's centuries-old royal history. 
Nigeria's attempt at American-style fed- 
eralism, on the other hand, represented 
an effort to maintain unity in one of 
Africa's largest states by accommodat- 
ing its ethnic, cultural, and historical 
differences in a decentralized system. 
Africa's ethnolinguistic groupings were 
characterized by strongly developed 
traditional structui-es, which often 
crossed political boundaries superim- 
posed by colonial powers with little or 
no regard for linguistic or cultural 
similarities. Despite the impact of 
modernization in urban areas, traditional 
ethnic loyalties remain strong and have 
impeded the development of national 
consciousness. Opposition often has been 
based on ethnolinguistic and regional 
special interests. 

African states probably vnll continue 
to experience change in governmental 
form and process as they experiment 
with ways to organize political power 
effectively and to devise a durable basis 
for citizen participation in the political 
system. 



Economy 



Africa's natural wealth is vast but 
unevenly distributed. The continent is a 
major exporter of minerals— such as 
diamonds, cobalt, gold, and petroleum— 
and of agricultural commodities— such as 
coffee, cocoa, and tea. Some countries- 
Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, and South 
Africa— have large mineral reserves. Yet 
other countries, such as those in the 
Sahel region, lack access to the coasts 
as well as natural resources. These con- 
trasting circumstances have been accen- 
tuated by varied colonial and cultural 
heritages and postindependence theories 
of economic development. 

Despite its natural wealth, Africa as 
a whole faces an unprecedented 
economic crisis. Falling per capita food 
production, severe drought, world reces- 
sion, mounting debt burdens, and 
mistaken government policies have 
seriously affected development pros- 



1986 



11 



pects. Widespread famine has accompa- 
nied the current drought; some 36 
countries recently have been affected by 
abnormal food shortages. Untold thou- 
sands of Africans have perished, and an 
estimated 30 million urgently require 
food, medical care, and shelter if they 
are to sui-vive. Even before the drought, 
more than 20% of Africa's population 
consumed less than the minimum num- 
ber of calories needed to sustain good 
health. Child mortality in sub-Saharan 
Africa is double the rate of all develop- 
ing countries. 



Famine and the Decline in 
Agricultural Productivity 

Although little can be done to eliminate 
drought, which occurs periodically in 
Africa, much can be done to avoid 
famine. Drought has been transformed 
into famine by high population gi-owth 
rates and the decline in farm output. 
Famine, in turn, has been aggravated 
by mistaken national policies and armed 
conflict. 

Africa is the only region in the 
world in which per capita food produc- 



tion has fallen during the past two 
decades. African dependence on outsic 
food sources is growing at an alarminj 
pace, and commercial imports of grain 
have risen at an annual rate of 9% ov 
the past 20 years. Africa normally im- 
ports more than 10 million tons of 
cereals, excluding current emergency 
needs; if trends continue, this deficit ' 
increase markedly. Per capita gross 
domestic product declined by 3%-4% 
per year from 1981 to 1983— attributa 
largely to the decline in agriculture, t 
primary component of most African 
economies. 



Drought victims in Ethiopia. 




(United Nations) 



12 



Department of State Bu'" 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



SENEGAL 




Africa 

Food Shortage Countries, 
Deserts and Arid Areas 



Selected food shortage 
countries 

True desert 

Desert margin; desertification 
in heavily grazed areas 

Semi-arid zone; extensive 
desertification due to over 
stocking or cultivation 



500 1,000 Kilometers 



Source: Climate and Desertification: A Revised 
Analysis, World Meteorological Organization, 
January 1983. 



6017 12-85 STATE (INR/GE) 



rica has serious agricultural 
aints— insufficient rainfall, fragile 
I variety of microclimates, high 
mperatures, extreme seasonabili- 
i unique insect pests. Farmers 
'een shortening the fallow periods 
ir fields, which has led to 
sed yields and increased soil ero- 
•veruse of forests for firewood and 



intensive grazing also have contributed 
to erosion. High population growth rates 
have stretched most African nations to 
the production limits of their traditional 
agricultures. 

Nonetheless, Africa does have the 
potential to produce sufficient food for 
its increasing population and thereby 
reduce its vulnerability to future 



droughts. This potential depends greatly 
upon the ability of African governments 
to implement effective national poUcies 
that support small farmers and en- 
courage the use of modem technology. 



1986 



13 




-^j/-;£":^.-'^r^^ 



A Traditional farming in Nigeria. | 

B Grain storage in Niger. 

C Many Africans, particularly in rural areas, la( 
access to sate water. In Burkina AID fias h* i 
provide improved water systems to replace i '' 
wells that are easily contaminated and spre: 
disease. 

D African researctier on AID-supported project 
dry-land farming in Cameroon. 



14 



Department of State Bui 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 




Debt Problems 

During the 1960s, African governments 
benefited from high commodity prices 
and generous foreign aid. Government 
revenue was supplemented by borrow- 
ing from private commercial banks. 
With the onset of world recession in the 
1970s, however, the prices of African 
commodities plummeted while the cost 
of imports remained high. Drought and 
declining agricultural productivity led to 
increasing commercial imports of basic 
foodstuffs. 

As African economies declined, their 
governments turned increasingly to bor- 
rowing. From 1972 to 1982, medium- 
and long-term debt increased by an an- 
nual average rate of 22%. Debt" service 
ratios (the relationship between debt 
payments due and exports of goods and 
services) worsened as well, with ratios 
of from 30% to 80% or more prevailing 
in some countries. Most African nations 
now have major debt problems. In the 
international forums where public and 
private debts are rescheduled, the 
majority of 1984 reschedulings were for 
African countries. 

Inefficient Government Policies 

Africa's economic problems are closely 
linked to the inefficient use of its 
resources. Two decades after in- 
dependence, African leaders are con- 
fronted with difficult choices and over- 
whelming economic obstacles that would 
try the patience and administrative 
capacity of more e.xperienced govern- 




ments elsewhere in the world. These 
leaders often discourage farm production 
by adopting politically expedient tax and 
pricing policies that have favored 
politically influential urban populations 
and have disadvantaged farmers, whose 
output has declined accordingly. They 
have created large bureaucracies, ig- 
nored the private sector, promoted 
state-ran industries that do not produce 
or produce only at very high cost, main- 
tained oven'alued currencies that dis- 
courage exports and lead to balance- 
of-payments crises, and allowed physical 
infrastructure to deteriorate. 

Increasingly, however, African 
governments are recognizing errors in 
past policies, and changes are occurring 
throughout the continent. In the last 
several years, attitudes have shifted 
dramatically on such issues as exchange 
rates, on measures to rehabilitate infras- 
tructure and export industries, on 
reducing government regulation and 
bureaucracy, and on assuring that 
fanners are rewarded through pricing 
and marketing reform. 

Aid donor countries and internation- 
al institutions are beginning to realize 
that some of their practices also have 
contributed unwittingly to inefficient use 
of resources. However well intentioned, 
donors have insisted on imposing their 
own requirements on recipients that 
have caused administrative problems 
and strained the absoi-ptive capacity of 
African nations-for example, 50 donors 
have contributed to 188 projects in 
Malawi, 61 donors to 321 projects in 
Lesotho, and 69 donors to 614 projects 
in Zambia. Furthermore, aid donors 
sometimes have subsidized inefficient 
state enterprises and supported the cre- 
ation of elaborate government projects 
that could not be maintained without 
continued foreign assistance. Nonethe- 
less, foreign assistance has accomplished 
much in Africa. Notably, several major 
diseases have been eradicated, and 
physical infrastracture has been created 
to market crops and minerals. Foreign 
donors also helped to establish the first 
universities and technical training 
centers on the continent. 



15 



Multilateral 
Organizations 



United Nations. Sub-Saharan African 
nations play an important role in inter- 
national and regional organizations. 
They regard the United Nations as the 
major foioim for presenting their views 
and as a useful arena for advancing 
foreign policy objectives. Because each 
country, large or small, has one vote in 
the UN General Assembly, and because 
all 46 independent sub-Saharan states 
are UN members, Africa represents 
nearly one-third of the Assembly's 159 
votes. When taking a common stance, 
African states thus can have significant, 
sometimes crucial, influence on many 
issues in the Assembly and other UN 
bodies. The African members have been 
particularly concerned about issues in- 
volving coloniaUsm, North-South eco- 
nomic issues, dependent peoples, and 
human rights. Members of the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity (OAU) have been 
prime movers in General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions dealing 
with southern African problems. Occa- 
sionally, however, many have been 
reluctant to take controversial positions 
involving other African states, prefer- 
ring to deal with such issues wdthin the 
OAU or in other African forums. 

Just as African nations participate 
actively in the General Assembly and 
Security Council, UN specialized agen- 
cies and other organizations have been 
deeply involved in Africa. Among these 
are the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD); the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD); the International 
Development Association (IDA); the In- 
ternational Finance Corporation (IFC); 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
the World Health Organization (WHO); 
the International Labor Organization 
(ILO); the UN Children's Fund 
(UNICEF); the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO); the UN High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and 
the UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many 
of these bodies participate in the UN 
Development Program (UNDP), which 
allocates a major portion of its resources 
to sub-Saharan Africa. 



Organization of African Unity. The 

Organization of African Unity is the 
most prominent and encompassing 
organization on the African Continent. 
Founded in May 1963, it includes all in- 
dependent African states except the 
Republic of South Africa and Morocco. 
South Africa never belonged to the 
organization, and Morocco withdrew in 
1985 because of the admission of the 
Saharoui Arab Democratic Republic 
(Polisario). Headquartered in Addis 
Ababa, the OAU has both political and 
economic responsibilities. The organiza- 
tion has no enforcement powers over its 
members and OAU resolutions are ad- 
visory rather than binding, although in- 
dividual OAU member states historically 
have been reluctant in other interna- 
tional forums to depart from OAU posi- 
tions adopted by resolution. An impor- 
tant OAU function is to obtain an 
African consensus on questions of in- 
terest at the United Nations, where the 
OAU maintains a pemianent office. 

The preamble of the OAU Charter 
reaffirms the principles of the United 
Nations and its Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. It also pledges to sup- 
port the aspirations of the African 
peoples and to foster African political 
and economic development. Signatories 
agree to coordinate and harmonize their 
general policies in order to promote 
African progress and unity, to defend 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of member states, and to eradicate 



OAU IVIembers 

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tan- 
zania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Western 
Sahara (Saharoui Arab Democratic 
Republic), Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 



colonialism from Africa. Signatories 
agree to adhere to the principles of no 
interference in one another's affairs, tl 
peaceful settlement of disputes, the co 
demnation of political assassination or 
subversive activity against neighborin.i 
states, respect for existing boundaries 
the liberation of remaining dependent 
areas, and nonalignment with respect 
non-African blocs. 

The work of the OAU is carried o 
through four principal institutions— thi 
Assembly of Heads of State and Gove 
ment; the Council of Ministers; the 
General Secretariat; and the Commis- 
sion of Mediation, Conciliation, and A 
bitration. Specialized and ad hoc com- 
missions deal with a variety of activit 
of common interest and attempt to in- 
still a spirit of cooperation among 
member states. 

Annual OAU summits endeavor t( 
deal with current crises, often involvi 
African interstate relations. Debates 
sometimes avoid confrontation on the 
tough issues and differences that divi 
nations, but they can be acrimonious. 
The OAU has attempted to limit exte 
nal intervention in African problems < 
to assist in such issues as the use of 
mercenaries in Zaire, the Biafran 
rebelhon, disputes between Ethiopia ! 
Somalia and between Algeria and 
Morocco, the transition to independen 
in Angola, the status of the Western 
Sahara, self-determination issues in 
southern Africa, and human rights. Ii 
1981 the OAU established its fii'st joi 
military force to help keep peace duri 
the civil war in Chad. Nigeria, Seneg. 
and Zaire contributed troops to the 
peacekeeping force during its 6 montl 
in Chad. 

A 1982 executive decision by the 
OAU Secretary General to seat the 
Polisario— a self-styled liberation mov 
ment fighting for the independence ol 
the Western Sahara— was strongly of 
posed by Morocco and many African 
states. However, because the organiz 
tion was increasingly paralyzed due t 
the controversy over this one issue, t 
Polisario finally was allowed to take : 
seat at the November 1984 OAU sun 
mit. Morocco withdrew from the OA' 
as a result. 



16 



Department of State Bu ( 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



Economic Commission for Africa. 

e Economic Commission for Africa 
'A), a UN regional body in which all 
ependent African states, except 
kth Africa, are represented, was 
jablished in 1958 for the promotion 
'i planning of African economic and 
ial development through cooperative 
i regional action. The EC A performs 
(ensive research and served as a 
alyst in the creation of the African 
yelopment Institute and the African 
jvelopment Bank. It maintains and 
ieavors to strengthen economic ties 
|h other countries of the world. The 
|dquarters of the ECA Secretariat is 
(\ddis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
i 

African Development Bank and 
lid. The purpose of the African 
• 'elopment Bank and Fund, head- 
irtered in Abidjan, is to contribute to 
'members' economic and social 
lelopment. The Bank and Fund 
ince investment projects and develop- 
«t programs. After the Bank opened 
inbership to nonregional countries, 
1 United States joined in 198.3, becom- 
I'the largest nonregional donor, with 
rinnual commitment of $18 million in 
Ei-in capital and $54 million in callable 
Ital. It has increased its contribution 
)he Fund, the Bank's soft loan win- 
c, by $50 - $75 million annually. The 
Ued States remains the largest 
cor, providing 15.4% of the total Fund 
vanishment. 



Lome Convention. The Lome III 
Convention was signed in Lome, Togo, 
in December 1984; it continues the 
special economic relations between the 
European Economic Community (EEC) 
and 67 nations of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. The 
new convention replaces Lome II, which 
expired in February 1985. Lome I was 
signed in 1975. The 5-year accord pro- 
vides ACP countries with trade 
preferences, industrial cooperation, and 
$6.3 billion in economic assistance, in- 
cluding the STABEX program, which 
helps to maintain stable export earnings 
for certain ACP commodities. Although 
similar to its predecessor conventions, 
Lome III adds provisions on private in- 
vestment, fisheries, cultural coordina- 
tion, and refugee aid. 

ACP Group. The African, Carib- 
bean and Pacific Group of States was 
convened originally to negotiate the 
Lome Convention with the EEC. 
Founded as a permanent oi'ganization in 
July 1975, the ACP Group aims to 
represent its members' views concern- 
ing the Lome Convention. It also tries 
to develop closer trade, economic, and 
cultural relations among ACP states and 
to promote effective interregional 
cooperation. ACP headquarters is in 
Brussels. 

Economic Community of West 
African States. The Economic Com- 
munity of West African States 
(ECOWAS) has 16 members, including 
nearly all the Francophone, Anglophone, 
and Lusophone countries of the West 
African region from Mauritania to 
Nigeria. Its objective is to create a com- 
mon market in which internal trade bar- 
riers will be eliminated. The Community 



promotes free movement of people, 
services, and capital; hannonization of 
agricultural policies; joint development 
of economic and industrial policies; and 
elimination of disparities in levels of 
development. Community headquarters 
is in Lagos, Nigeria. 

Inter-African Coffee Organization. 

The Inter-African Coffee Organization 
(ICAO) was founded in 1960 and now 
has 15 members. Its objective is to 
adopt a unified policy on coffee 
marketing. The organization facilitates 
contacts among member countries, 
coffee buyers, and the International 
Coffee Organization. It is headquartered 
in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. 

West African Rice Development 
Association. The West African Rice 
Development Association (WARDA) has 
14 members. Its purpose is to work 
cooperatively in the research, growing, 
and marketing of rice. It lobbies for in- 
creased quotas on the world market. 
WARDA's headquarters is located in 
Monrovia, Liberia. 



'Although the generic term "Africa" fre- 
quently is used throughout this publication, 
and some data pertain to the entire conti- 
nent, attention is focused on sub-Saharan 
Africa and the off-shore island states, which 
together include the majority of countries 
and of the continent's population. Within the 
Department of State, the Bureau of African 
Affairs is responsible for the conduct of rela- 
tions with this region. Relations with North 
Africa are conducted through the Depart- 
ment's Bureau of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs. ■ 



Part 2, discussing U.S. relations with 
sub-Saharan Africa and including data 
tables and a bibliogi-aphy, will be pub- 
lished in the May 1986 issue of the 
Bulletin. 



¥ 1986 



17 



THE PRESIDENT 



Strengthening 
American Security 



President Reagan's televised 

address to the nation on 

February 26, 1986.^ 



My fellow Americans, I want to speak 
to you this evening about my highest 
duty as President— to preserve peace 
and defend these United States. 

But before I do, let me take a mo- 
ment to speak about the situation in the 
Philippines. We've just seen a stirring 
demonstration of what men and women 
committed to democratic ideas can 
achieve. The remarkable people of those 
7,000 islands joined together with faith 
in the same principles on which America 
was founded— that men and women have 
the right to freely choose their own des- 
tiny. Despite a flawed election, the 
Filipino people were understood. They 
carried their message peacefully, and 
they were heard across their country 
and across the world. 

We salute the remarkable restraint 
shown by both sides to prevent blood- 
shed during these last tense days. Our 
hearts and hands are with President 
Aquino and her new government as 
they set out to meet the challenges 
ahead. Today, the Filipino people 
celebrate the triumph of democracy, and 
the world celebrates with them. 

One cannot sit in this office review- 
ing intelligence on the military threat 
we face, making decisions from arms 
control to Libya to the PhiUppines, 
without having that concern for 
America's security weigh constantly on 
your mind. We know that peace is the 
condition under which mankind was 
meant to flourish. Yet, peace does not 
e.xist of its own will. It depends on us— 
on our courage to build it and guard it 
and pass it on to future generations. 
George Washington's words may seem 
hard and cold today, but history has 
proven him right again and again: "To 
be prepared for war," he said, "is one 
of the most effective means of preserv- 
ing peace." Well, to those who think 
strength provokes conflict. Will Rogers 
had his own answer. He said of the 
world heavyweight champion of his day: 
"I've never seen anyone insult Jack 
Dempsey." 



Rebuilding U.S. Strength 

The past 5 years have shown that 
American strength is once again a 
sheltering arm for freedom in a danger- 
ous world. Strength is the most persua- 
sive argument we have to convince our 
adversaries to negotiate seriously and to 
cease bullying other nations. But tonight 
the security program that you and I 
launched to restore America's strength 
is in jeopardy— threatened by those who 
would quit before the job is done. Any 
slackening now would invite the very 
dangers America must avoid— and could 
fatally compromise our negotiating posi- 
tion. Our adversaries, the Soviets, we 
know from painful experience, respect 
only nations that negotiate from a posi- 
tion of strength. American power is the 
indispensable element of a peaceful 
world— it is America's last, best hope of 
negotiating real reductions in nuclear 
arms. Just as we are sitting down at the 
bargaining table with the Soviet Union, 
let's not throw America's trump card 
away. 

We need to remember where 
America was 5 years ago. We need to 
recall the atmosphere of that time— the 
an.xiety that events were out of control, 
that the West was in decline, that our 
enemies were on the march. It was not 
just the Iranian hostage crisis or the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but the 
fear, felt by many of our friends, that 
America could not, or would not, keep 
her commitments. Pakistan, the country 
most threatened by the Afghan inva- 
sion, ridiculed the first offer of Ameri- 
can aid as "peanuts." Other nations 
were saying that it was dangerous- 
deadly dangerous— to be a friend of the 
United States. 

It was not just years of declining 
defense spending but a crisis in recruit- 
ment and retention and the outright 
cancellation of programs vital to our 
security. The Pentagon horror stories at 
the time were about ships that couldn't 



sail, planes that couldn't fly for lack of 
spare parts, and army divisions unpre- 
pared to fight. 

And it was not just a one-sided arr 
agreement that made it easy for one 
side to cheat, but a treaty that actualh 
permitted increases in nuclear arsenals 
Even supporters of SALT II [strategic 
arms limitation talks] were demoralizec 
saying, well, the Soviets just won't 
agree to anything better. And when 
President Carter had to abandon the 
treaty because Senate leaders of his 
own party wouldn't support it, the J 
United States was left without a f 
national strategy for control of nuclear 
weapons. 

We knew immediate changes had t 
be made. So here's what we did: we s 
out to show that the long string of 
governments falling under communist 
domination was going to end; and we'i 
doing it. 

In the 1970s, one strategic country 
after another fell under the dominatio 
of the Soviet Union. The fall of Laos, 
Cambodia, and South Vietnam gave tl i 
Soviet Union a strategic position on tl I 
South China Sea. The invasion of 
Afghanistan cut nearly in half Soviet 
ing time to the Persian Gulf. Commur 
takeovers in South Yemen and Ethiof 
put the Soviets astride the Red Sea, 
entryway to the Suez Canal. Pro-Sovi 
regimes in Mozambique and Angola 
strengthened the Soviet position in 
southern Africa. And finally, Grenada 
and Nicaragua gave Moscow two new , 
beachheads right on the doorstep of t 
United States. , 

In these last 5 years, not one squ; 
inch of territory has been lost, and 
Grenada has been set free. 

When we arrived in 1981, guerrill 
in El Salvador had launched what the, 
called their "final offensive" to make 
that nation the second communist sta 
on the mainland of North America. 
Many people said the situation was 
hopeless; they refused to help. We 
didn't agree; we did help. And, today 
those guerrillas are in retreat. El Sal 
vador is a democracy, and freedom 
fighters are challenging communist re 
gimes in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, 
Angola, Cambodia, and Ethiopia. 

We set out to show that the Wesi 
em alliance could meet its security 
needs, despite Soviet intimidation. Ai 
we're doing it. Many said that to try 
counter the Soviet SS-20 missiles wo^- 
spUt NATO because Europe no longe 
believed in defending itseljf. Well, tha 
was nonsense. Today, Pershing and 



18 



Department of State Bull/ 



THE PRESIDENT 




ise missile deployments are on sched- 
i and our allies support the decision. 
We set out to reverse the decline in 
(ale in our Armed Forces. And we're 
•■g it. Pride in our Armed Forces has 
n restored. More qualified men and 
cien want to join— and remain in— the 
i:ary. In 1980, about half of our 
iiy's recruits were high school gradu- 
i; last year, 91% had high school 
pmas. 

Dur Armed Forces may be smaller 

ze than in the 1950s, but they're 
le of the finest young people this 
''itr>' has ever produced. And as long 

'm President, they'll get the quality 
ipment they need to carry out their 
i.ion. 

A^e set out to narrow the growing 
>■- in our strategic deterrent. And 
f e beginning to do that. Our modem- 
- on program— the MX, the Trident 
'iiarine, the B-1 and Stealth 
>bers— represents the first significant 
'"ovement in America's strategic 
' rrent in 20 years. 

Those who speak so often about the 
'■lUed arms race ignore a central fact: 

le decade before 1981, the Soviets 
f' the only ones racing. 



During my 1980 campaign, I called 
Federal waste and fraud a national scan- 
dal. We knew we could never rebuild 
America's strength without first con- 
trolling the exploding cost of defense 
programs. And we're doing it. 

When we took office in 1981, costs 
had been escalating at an annual rate of 
14%. Then we began our reforms. And 
in the last 2 years, cost increases have 
fallen to less than 1%-. 

We've made huge savings. Each 
F-18 fighter costs nearly $4 million less 
today than in 1981. One of our air-to-air 
missiles costs barely half as much. 

Getting control of the defense 
bureaucracy is no small task. Each year 
the Defense Department signs hundreds 
of thousands of contracts. So, yes, a hor- 
ror story will sometimes turn up despite 
our best efforts. That's why we ap- 
pointed the first Inspector General in 
the history of the Defense Department— 
and virtually every case of fraud or 
abuse has been uncovered by our 
Defense Department, our Inspector 
General. Secretary Weinberger should 
be praised, not pilloried, for cleaning the 
skeletons out of the closet. As for those 
few who have cheated ta.xpayers or 
have swindled our Armed Forces with 



Weapons Cost Growth (%) 

15|- 




faulty equipment, they are thieves steal- 
ing from the arsenal of democracy— and 
they will be prosecuted to the fullest 
extent of the law. 

Finally, we've set out to reduce the 
danger of nuclear war. Here, too, we're 
achieving what some said couldn't be 
done. We've put forth a plan for deep 
reductions in nuclear systems; we're 



Pi 1986 



19 



THE PRESIDENT 



I 



pushing forward our highly promising 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)— a 
security shield that may one day protect 
us and our allies from nuclear attack, 
whether launched by deliberate calcula- 
tion, freak accident, or the isolated im- 
pulse of a madman. Isn't it better to use 
our talents and technology to build sys- 
tems that destroy missiles, not people? 

Our message has gotten through. 
The Soviets used to contend that real 
reductions in nuclear missiles were out 
of the question. Now, they say they ac- 
cept the idea. Well, we shall see. Just 
this week, our negotiators presented a 
new plan for the elimination of interme- 
diate-range nuclear missiles, and we're 
pressing the Soviets for cuts in other 
offensive forces as well. One thing is 
certain: if the Soviets truly want fair 
and verifiable agreements that reduce 
nuclear forces, we will have those 
agreements. 

The Defense Debate 

Our defense problems 5 years ago were 
immense, and drastic action was re- 
quired. Even my predecessor in this 
office recognized that and projected siza- 
ble increases in defense spending— and 
I'm proud of what we've done. Now, the 
biggest increases in defense spending 
are behind us. And that's why, last sum- 
mer, I agreed with Congress to freeze 
defense funding for 1 year, and after 
that to resume a modest 3% annual 
growth. Frankly, I hesitated to reach 
this agreement on a freeze because we 
still have far too much to do. But I 
thought that congressional support for 
steady increases over several years was 
a step forward. 

But this didn't happen. Instead of a 
freeze, there was a sharp cut— a cut of 
over 5%. And some are now saying that 
we need to chop another $20, $30, or 
even $50 billion out of national defense. 

This is reckless, dangerous, and 
wrong. It's backsliding of the most ir- 
responsible kind, and you need to know 
about it. You, after all, paid the bill for 
all we've accomplished these past 5 
years. But we still have a way to go. 
Millions of Americans actually believe 
that we are now superior to the Soviet 
Union in military power. Well, I'm 
sorry, but if our country's going to have 
a useful debate on national security, we 
have to get beyond the drumbeat of 
propaganda and get the facts on the 
table. 

Over the next few months, you'll be 
hearing this debate. I'd like you to keep 
in mind the two simple reasons not to 



U.S.-Sovlet Force Comparison 



U.S. 
Soviet 



sQ ^1 




>< 



Aircraft 



Submarines 



Tanks 



Artillery 



cut defense now. One, it's not cheap. 
Two, it's not safe. If we listen to those 
who would abandon our defense pro- 
gram, we will not only jeopardize 
negotiations with the Soviet Union— we 
may put peace itself at risk. 

I said it wouldn't be cheap to cut. 
How can cutting not be cheap? Well, 
simple. We tried that in the 1970s, and 
the result was waste, enormous waste- 
hundreds of millions of dollars lost be- 
cause the cost of each plane and tank 
and ship went up, often way up. The old 
shoppers' adage proved true— they are 
cheaper by the dozen. 

Arbitrary cuts only bring phony sav- 
ings, but there's a more important rea- 
son not to abandon our defense 
program. It's not safe. Almost 25 years 
ago, when John Kennedy occupied this 
office during the Cuban missile crisis, he 
commanded the greatest military power 
on earth. Today, we Americans must 
live with a dangerous new reality. Year- 
in and year-out, at the e.xpense of its 
own people, the Soviet leadership has 
been making a relentless effort to gain 
military superiority over the United 
States. Between 1970 and 1985 alone, 
the Soviets invested $500 billion more 
than the United States in defense— and 
built nearly three times as many stra- 
tegic missiles. As a consequence of their 
enormous weapons investment, major 
military imbalances still exist between 
our two countries. 



Today, the Soviet Union has 
deployed over one-and-a-half times as | 
many combat aircraft as the United ] 
States, over two-and-a-half times as | 
many submarines, over five times as i 
many tanks, and over 11 times as mai| 
artillery pieces. i 

We have begun to close some of 
these gaps, but if we're to regain our 
margins of safety, more must be done ' 
Where the Soviets once relied on nun ; 
bers alone, they now strive for both 
quantity and quality. We anticipate tl 
over the next 5 years, they will deplo 
on the order of 40 nuclear submarines' 
500 new ballistic missiles, and 18,000 
modem tanks. My 5-year defense bud 
et maintains our commitment to 
America's rebuilding program. And I' 
grateful that Secretary Weinberger is' 
here to fight for that program with ai' 
the determination and ability he has 
shown in the past. 

But my budget does not call for 
matching these Soviet increases. So o 
question must be asked: can we reall;' 
afford to do less than what I've 
proposed? 

Today, we spend a third less of o | 
gross national product on defense tha 
under John Kennedy, yet some in Co 
gress talk of even deeper cuts. Barel; 
6% of our nation's gross national 
product— that's all we invest to keep 
America free, secure, and at peace. 1 
Soviets invest more than twice as mi ■ 



20 



Department of State Builf 



THE PRESIDENT 



I now sti-ip away spending on sala- 
3, housing, dependents, and the like 
i compare. The United States invests 
actual weapons and research only 
7c of our gross national product, 
ile the Soviet Union invests 11% on 
ipons, more than four times as much, 
s is the hard, cold reality of our 
ense deficit. 

But it's not just the immense Soviet 
enal that puts us on our guard. The 
ord of Soviet behavior, the long his- 
y of Soviet brutality toward those 
) are weaker, reminds us that the 
Y guarantee of peace and freedom is 
militai-y strength and our national 
. The peoples of Afghanistan and 
and, of Czechoslovakia and Cuba and 
nany other captive countries, they 
erstand this. 

Some argue that our dialogue with 
Soviets means we can treat defense 
•e casually. Nothing could be farther 
n the truth. It was our seriousness 
ut defense that created the climate 
vhkh serious talks could finally 
in. 

Now that the Soviets are back at 
I table, we must not undercut our 
lotiators. Unfortunately, that's exact- 
i/hat some Members of Congress 
!e done. By banning any U.S. tests of 
imtisatellite system, Congress not 
!■ protected a Soviet monopoly, it uni- 
Irally granted the Soviets a conces- 
( they could not win at the 
ijaining table. 

nciples for Defense Program 

:our defense program must rest on 
lie principles. 

• First, we must be smart about 
It we build. We don't have to copy 
"ything the Soviets do. We don't 
ij3 to compete on Soviet terms. Our 
Ks to provide for our security by us- 
jthe strengths of our free society. If 
tthink smart enough, we don't have 
hink quite so big. We don't have to 
)he job with large numbers and 
'.e force. We don't have to increase 
isize of our forces from 2 million to 
•ir 5 million— as long as our military 
! and women have the quality tools 
i' need to keep the peace. We don't 
I; to have as many tanks as the 
lets— as long as we have sophisti- 
M antitank weapons. 
Innovation is our advantage. One ex- 
fle: advances in making airplanes and 
158 missiles almost invisible to Soviet 
■r could neutralize the vast air de- 
'e systems upon which the Soviets— 



and some of their most dangerous client 
states— depend. 

But innovation is not enough. We 
have to follow through. Blueprints alone 
don't deter aggression. We have to 
translate our lead in the lab to a lead in 
the field. But when our budget is cut, 
we can't do either. 

• Second, our security assistance 
provides as much security for the dollar 
as our own defense budget. Our friends 
can perform many tasks more cheaply 
than we can. And that's why I can't 
understand proposals in Congress to 
sharply slash this vital tool. Military as- 
sistance to friends in strategic regions 
strengthens those who share our values 
and interests. And when they are 
strong, we're strengthened. It is in our 
interest to help them meet threats that 
could ultimately bring harm to us as 
well. 

• Third, where defense reform is 
needed, we will pursue it. The Packard 
commission we created will be reporting 
in 2 days. We hope they will have ideas 
for new approaches that give us even 
better ways to buy our weapons. We're 
eager for good ideas, for new ideas- 
America's special genius. Wherever the 
commission's recommendations point the 
way to greater executive effectiveness, 

I will implement them, even if they run 
counter to the will of the entrenched 
bureaucracies and special interests. I 
will also urge Congress to heed the com- 
mission's report and to remove those ob- 
stacles to good management that 
Congress itself has created over the 
years. 

• The fourth element of our strat- 
egy for the future is to reduce 
America's dependence on nuclear 
weapons. You've heard me talk about 
our Strategic Defense Initiative, the 
program that could one day free us all 
from the prison of nuclear terror. It 
would be pure folly for the United 
States not to press forward wdth SDI 
when the Soviets have already invested 
up to 20 years on their own program. 
Let us not forget that the only opera- 
tional missile defense in the world today 
guards the capital of the Soviet Union— 
not the United States. 

But while SDI offers hope for the 
future, we have to consider today's 
world. For too long, we and our allies 
have permitted nuclear weapons to be a 
crutch, a way of not having to face up 
to real defense needs. We must free 
ourselves from that crutch. Our goal 
should be to deter and, if necessary, to 
repeal any aggression vdthout a resort 
to nuclear arms. Here, again, technology 



can provide us with the means not only 
to respond to full-scale aggression but to 
strike back at terrorists without harm- 
ing innocent civilians. 

Today's technology makes it possible 
to destroy a tank column up to 120 
miles away without using atomic 
weapons. This technology may be the 
first cost-effective conventional defense 
in postwar history against the giant Red 
Army. When we fail to equip our troops 
with these modernized systems, we only 
increase the risk that we may one day 
have to resort to nuclear weapons. 

These are the practical decisions we 
make when we send a defense budget to 
Congress. Each generation has to live 
wdth the challenges history delivers. 
And we can't cope with these challenges 
by evasion. If we sustain our efforts 
now, we have the best chance in dec- 
ades of building a secure peace. That's 
why I met with General Secretary Gor- 
bachev last year, and that's why we're 
talking to the Soviets today, bargain- 
ing—if Congress will support us— from 
strength. 

We want to make this a more peace- 
ful world. We want to reduce arms. We 
want agreements that truly diminish the 
nuclear danger. We don't just want 
signing ceremonies and color photo- 
graphs of leaders toasting each other 
with champagne. We want more. We 
want real agreements— agreements that 
really work— with no cheating. We want 
an end to state policies of intimidation, 
threats, and the constant quest for 
domination. We want real peace. 

I will never ask for what isn't 
needed; I will never fight for what isn't 
necessary. But I need your help. 

We've come so far together these 
last 5 years— let's not falter now. Let's 
maintain that crucial level of national 
strength, unity, and purpose that has 
brought the Soviet Union to the nego- 
tiating table and has given us this 
historic opportunity to achieve real 
reductions in nuclear weapons and a real 
chance at lasting peace. That would be 
the finest legacy we could leave 
behind— for our children and for their 
children. 



^Text from White House press release. 



fl 1986 



21 



THE PRESIDENT 



I 



Visit to Grenada 



President Reagan visited 

St George's February 20, 1986, 

where he addressed the people of 

Grenada at Queen's Park.^ 




The President with Prime Minister Herbert Blaize (left) and Governor General Sir Paul 
Scoon (right). 



Prime Minister Blaize, Governor Gen- 
eral Scoon, distinguished Prime 
Ministers, and my dear Grenadian 
friends: I bring you the goodwill and 
affection of the people of the United 
States. It is my honor to be on this plat- 
form with these Caribbean leaders. We 
stand before you as friends who share a 
fundamental belief in democracy. Our 
commitment to humane and representa- 
tive government is stronger than any 
tyrant's chains. And I'm certain that my 
colleagues approve when I say to you, 
we are grateful to God, today, that 
Grenada is once again safely within the 
ranks of free nations. 

There is a freedom tide rising in our 
hemisphere. Your Prime Minister and 
these other elected leaders are testi- 
mony that the spirit of democracy is 
assuming its rightful role as the great 
unifier of the people. Democracy is 
based on respect for the rights and dig- 
nity of every person, whatever his or 
her station in life. In the last century, a 
champion of Grenadian independence, 
William Galway Donovan, put it well 



when he wTote, "A naked freedman is a 
nobler object than a gorgeous slave." 

Now in a sense, and I mean this in a 
kind of geographical sense, we are, in a 
way, all Americans in this hemisphere, 
from the North Slope of Alaska to the 
tip of South America— these are known 
as the Americas— and it's our birthright 
to live in freedom. It is our heritage. In 
this quest, we stand together. And w^e 
shall always stand together. 

Just in the last 5 years, Brazil, 
Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Bolivia, Uruguay, El Salvador, and, yes, 
Grenada, have returned to democracy. 
Today, 27 of 33 independent countries, 
countries with 90% of this hemisphere's 
population, are democratic or in transi- 
tion to democracy. And we won't be 
satisfied until all the people of the 
Americas have joined us in the warm 
sunshine of liberty and justice. 

In free societies, government exists 
for the sake of the people— not the other 
way around. Government is not directed 
by the whims of any dictator or the 
mandate of any clique but by the good 



sense of the people through a demo- 
cratic vote. In free societies, people do 
not live in fear. They never worry tha 
criticizing the government will lead to 
late knock on the door, an arrest by 
some goon squad. When people are fr€ 
their rights to speak and to pray are 
protected by law and the goons are nc 
running the jails: they're in the jails. ] 
a free society, neighbors don't spy on 
neighbors; neighbors help neighbors. 
And that's the way God meant it to b 

As we rejoice in your new^ renews 
freedom, let us not forget that there i 
still those who will do everything in 
their power to impose communist dic- 
tatorship on the rest of us. Castro's 
tyranny still weighs heavy on the she 
ders of his people and threatens the 
peace and freedom of this hemisphere 
Doing the bidding of his faraway 
master, he has shipped Cuba's young 
men by the thousands to fight and dif 
in faraway lands. When one recalls th 
tons of military equipment that were 
captured here, we can thank God thir 
were changed before young Grenadiai 
too were sent off to fight and die for 
alien ideology. 

From the first days of my Presidt ■ 
cy, I was aware of the growing troub ' 
here in Grenada. We w^ere worried 
about you and what appeared to be a ■ 
attempt to turn your island into a sta i 
ing area for subversion and aggressio i 

I can still remember being awake ' 
early in the morning and told that si> 
members of the Organization of Easti 
Caribbean States, joined by Jamaica i 
Barbados, had sent an urgent request 
that we join them in an effort to prot 
lives and to restore order and democ- 
racy to your country. There were son 
800 students from the United States 
whose lives were in danger. And thei 
were more than 90,000 of you— Grena 
ans, friends, and neighbors— who wer 
living in fear of never again regaining! 
your freedom. Ladies and gentlemen,' 
my dear friends, I will never be sorr; 
that I made the decision to help you, 
and I made it before the sun came up 

There is a story— perhaps it's a 
legend— that in 1938 a gi-oup of younj 
boys was in a swimming race across 
your harbor. And in the midst of the 
race, according to the stoi-y, to the h 
ror of the crowd that watched, a sha- 
appeared and sui-faced directly under 
one young swimmer. For a few terro 
ing minutes, the boy was carried on ' 
back of the shark until the shark hit 
wharf and the boy was knocked to 
safety and pulled out of the water bj 



22 



Department of State Bull" 



THE PRESIDENT 



friends and neighbors. Dear people 
Grenada, for a time it appeared that 
i were like that boy riding on the 
;k of a shark. Your friends held their 
;ath hoping and praying for you. And 
vas our honor to help you get off the 
irk. And— all of us up here— we're 
t glad we got here before it was time 

his supper. 

Today in Nicaragua, we see a chain 
events similar to what happened 
•e. We hear the same excuses made 

the communists, while the people of 
;aragua see their freedom, slowly, but 
•ely, eaten away. 

Edmund Burke, a British parliamen- 
ian who championed the cause of 
lerican independence, once wrote, 
Tien bad men combine, the good must 
ociate; else they will fall one by 

. ." Those words still ring true, 
it's w'hy we came to your aid. And 
t is why the United States must help 
se struggling for freedom in 
aragua. In the cause of liberty, all 
! people are part of the same family. 

should stand together as brothers 

sisters. And if we do, the 

araguan people will be able to free 

uselves from communist tyranny and 

the liberty that you now enjoy in 

nada. 

tiident Reagan lays a wreath at the 
norial in St. George's honoring the U.S. 
' icemen killed in Grenada in October 




There are those, of course, who 
claim we must give up freedom in ex- 
change for economic progress. Pardon 
me, but anyone trying to sell you that 
line is no better than a three-card trick 
man. One thing becoming more clear 
every day is that freedom and progress 
go hand in hand. Throughout the devel- 



oping world, people are rejecting social- 
ism because they see that it doesn't 
empower people, it impoverishes them. 
In Cuba, Castro has turned a once 
thriving economy into a basket case. 
Lately, he's taken to haranguing his 
people, blaming them for the failures of 
his dictatorship. 



Grenada— A Profile 



People 



Nationality: Xmni mnl ndji'iiirc — Crena- 
ilian(s). Population (1984 est.): 92.l)(t0. An- 
nual growth rate (1977-82): ().9'^i. Ethnic 
groups: .\lainl> lilack African (iescerit. 
Religions: Roman Catholic, Church of 
Knuland. other Protestant denominations. 
Languages: English (official), some vestigial 
French [lalois. Education: Years rom- 
luilsiirii — H. Litcnu-f/ — 8.5% of adult popula- 
tion. Health: Iiijhiil iiuirtiility rule — lti.7 
/ 1,000. Lij)' crpi'rtdiH-i/ — 69 yrs. Work force 
(3(1, (MM)): A(iricultiire—->S.5%. hulnstry— 
•Z4.\%. l'nempl(}H»ii'),l (1984 est.)— :«)%. 

Geography 

•\rea: 344 sq. km. (133 sq. mi.); al)out twice 
the size of Washington, D.C. Cities: 
Ciililtiil—St. George's (pop. 30,()(M) est ). Ter- 
rain: Volcanic island with central mountain- 
ous rain forest. Climate: Tropical. 

Government 

Type: Independent state since February 
1974; recognizes the British IVIonarch. Queen 
Elizabeth II. as chief of state. Administered 
by an interim government immediately 
following the ouster of the People's Revolu- 
tionary Government in October 1983. and 
returned to a Westminster-style parliamen- 
tary system through national elections in 
December 1984. Independence: February 7. 
1974. Constitution: December 19, 1973. 

Branches: Li'gishilire — Parliament com- 
posed of a ir>-seat directly elected House of 
Representatives and a 13-seat Senate ap- 
[lointed by governor general on the advice of 
the government and opposition. Ex- 
I'l-iitn-e — prime minister and Caliinet direct 
an apolitical career civil service in the ad- 
ministration of the government. Jtali- 
citd — Supreme Court, composed of High 
Court of .lustice anil a Court of .'\ppeals. 

.\dministrative subdivisions: Six 
parishes and one dependency (Carriacou and 
Petit Martinique in the Grenadines). 

Political parties: New National Party 
(NNI'l. Grenada I'nited Labour Party 
(td'LP). .Maurice Bishop Patriotic Move- 
ment (MKI'M). Grenada Democratic Labor 



Party ((iDLP), Christian Democratic Labor 
Party (CDLP). 

Central government budget (1985): 
$92.4 million. Rfcurrt'rit cxfienditures — 
$45.6 million. Capital expenditures— $46.9 
million. (Capital e.xpenditures financed largely 
by foreign assistance.) 

National holiday: February 7. 

Flag: Red, yellow, and green with a 
nutmeg left of center. 

Economy 

GDP (1983 at market prices): $116 million. 
Annual growth rate (1983): -1.6%. Per 
capita GDP (1983): $1,261. Avg. inflation 
rate (l!m3): (i.V^i, (1984 est.) 5%. 

Agriculture (1983. 21% of GDP): Pmd- 
iirls — fruits and vegetables, cocoa, nutmeg, 
bananas, mace. 

Industry (1983): Ti/z-c.'*— Manufactur- 
ing — 4'!'n. Tourism — 3.6%. Construction — 
8.7%, 

Trade: Exports— $1S.9 million (1983), 
$17.4 million (1984 est.): fruits and vege- 
tables, cocoa, nutmeg, bananas, garments, 
and mace. Major markets (1983)— CARICOM 
countries 38.7%, United Kingdom 25.7%, 
West Germany ll.l%i, Netherlands U.1%. 
/(HpoW.s (1983)— $64.6 million: food, 
machinery and transport, manufactured 
goods, fuel. Major suppliers (1983) — West In- 
dies 25"^i, UK 19.5%, US 17.4%. 

Official exchange rate: Eastern Carib- 
bean dollar (EC) $2.70 = US$1. Standard hank 
/■<(((-- ECS2.6882 = US$1. 

Fiscal year: Calendar year. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and some of its specialized agencies. In- 
ternational Fisheries Service, Non-Aligned 
Movement, Organization of American States 
(O.A.S), Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States (t)ECS), Latui American Economic 
System (SELA). 



Taken from the Background Notes of July 
1985, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita 
Adams. ■ 



P 1986 



23 



THE PRESIDENT 




1 



I think it's time that we— the United 
States and the Caribbean nations work- 
ing together— showed Castro and his 
gang how it's done. The foundation is al- 
ready being laid. I had a conversation 
with Prime Minister Blaize a few 
months ago, and he asked if it were pos- 
sible for the United States to extend 
more scholarships to Caribbean stu- 
dents. Prime Minister Blaize, I'm proud 
to announce today that over this year 
and the next two, we will roughly triple 
the funding for our training and educa- 
tion programs for the Caribbean. Our 
goal is to train 1,500 students from 
these islands each year. 

And when these young people finish 
their education and training, we want to 
make certain that a growing, healthy 
economy is ready for them. Two years 
ago, we put in place the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative [CBI], aimed at spurring 
growth and investment in the Caribbe- 
an. The progress resulting from our 
efforts has been slow, but steady. But 
nothing good happens fast. It takes 
patience. It takes work on everyone's 
part. 

Prime Minister Seaga has urged ex- 
panding the provisions of the CBI to 
permit greater access for Caribbean tex- 



tiles in the U.S. market. This, he has 
said, would be a giant step for job crea- 
tion through the Caribbean. I'm proud 
to announce today a special program 
that will guarantee access to the U.S. 
market for Caribbean-produced clothing 
made from cloth woven and cut in the 
United States. This will be good for the 
U.S. textile industry, but it will mean 
jobs for the people of the Caribbean. 

And there's something else brewing 
that will be a big boost to the people of 
the Caribbean. Our Congress is consid- 
ering a change in the tax code to permit 
funds in Puerto Rico's Development 
Bank to be used for investment loans 
elsewhere in the Caribbean. This 
proposal, worked out with Governor 
Hernandez Colon of Puerto Rico, has 
my endorsement and bipartisan support 
in our Congress. The Governor has 
spearheaded a drive to persuade U.S. 
firms in Puerto Rico to invest in plants 
in other parts of the Caribbean. And he 
is committed to the ambitious goal of 
$100 million in new investment into 
Caribbean Basin countries each year. 
Three major U.S. firms have already an- 
nounced plans to place projects here in 
Grenada, and other projects are moving 
forward elsewhere in the Caribbean. 



While in St. George's, the President met 
with (front row, left to right) Prime Min 
ter Eugenia Charles (Dominica), Prime 
Minister Edward Seaga (Jamaica), Presi- 
dent Reagan, Prime Minister John Comf 
ton (St. Lucia); (middle row, left to righi 
Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds (St. 
Christopher and Nevis), Prime Minister 
James Mitchell (St. Vincent and the Gre' 
dines). Prime Minister Herbert Blaize 
(Grenada); (back row, left to right) Priir 
Minister Vere C. Bird (Antigua and Bar 
buda). Prime Minister George Chambers 
(Trinidad and Tobago), and Prime Minis 
Bernard St. John (Barbados). 

The tax provisions being considered b 
Congress are tied to the success of th ^ 
investment program. We applaud Pue ■ 
Rico's contribution and urge congres- 
sional approval. , 

Finally, I would hke to announce ^ 
that the United States will be undert . 
ing, in conjunction with Caribbean j 
governments, a 5-year, $5.5 million pij 
gram to help support the free and incj 
pendent judicial systems of the 
Caribbean islands, recognized around 
the world as a pillar of your democra 
traditions. 

I'd like to take a moment to com- 
mend some people who are doing a ti 
rific job in fostering the spirit of 
freedom and opportunity that I've be 
talking about— our Peace Corps volui 
teers and our Agency for Internation , 
Development personnel. AID has bee, 
working on everything from repairini 
your roads and water system, to finif 
ing up your new aii-port. Of course, i 
will be used to bring tourists and 
businessmen, instead of bombers anci 
spy planes. Tourists are nicer, and 
they're a lot more fun. 



24 



Department of State Bulil" 



THE PRESIDENT 



The goodwill between our peoples 
I also be seen in the many pi-ivate 
tor initiatives started here since the 
oration. Having been in the film busi- 
;s, I am excited that the Discovery 
jndation has provided the equipment 
i helped you set up a new television 
tion. Thinking back to my past, I 
y have a few old movies around. Do 

I think anyone around here would 
; to see them? [Laughter and ap- 
use.] 

There are many wonderful people-to- 
iple projects that we could talk about. 
3 of the most heartwarming is 
iject HOPE. The vast majority of 
se serving ai-e volunteers, profession- 
who work hard at their regular jobs 
then, in their time off, donate medi- 
and health related services to you— 
y out of the goodness of their 
rts. These and other volunteei-s in 
Caribbean make all of us back home 
y proud. 

And a word of advice for my good 
ads. Whether the CBI succeeds and 
economies of the Caribbean nations 
iper depends as much on what you 
is on what we do. High taxes, over- 
ilation, artificially high exchange 
s, and bureaucratic red tape kill 
■rprise and hope for the future. And 
jiow that your Prime Minister feels 
Lsame way. There is much that 
nld be done in these areas by Carib- 
!i countries to put their economic 
ijie in order. 
Needless to say, what you do to re- 

II your systems and to create the en- 
itiment for jobs and progi-ess is up to 
»' That's the democratic challenge. 

t remember, whatever you do, the 
'lie of the United States are on your 

. We want you to succeed and to 
■I per. 

Personally, after talking with these 
aers and meeting you today, I am op- 
Ktic. What problems you have can 
1 will be solved. In the not too dis- 
r future, I see businessmen flocking 

le Caribbean. When they do, they 
ilfind a bounty of opportunity, they'll 
1' honest, hard-working people, happy 
I'warm people. And they will find 
' jci-atic government. That has to be 
f'Tiiula for good times. 

Vnd as I look around today, I know 
'' St. George's has been a location for 

> a "jump up." And believe me, I 
1 1 fmember this one. I also know 
i; Queen's Park was the location of a 
irnand post during the liberation 2V2 
Ks ago. The people of the United 
tE?s sent our young men, our coura- 
?<s soldiers— sailors, marines, and 



airmen— to protect our own and to save 
a neighbor in distress. Nineteen of our 
sons died here. Many were wounded. 
Our brave lads risked all because they 
believed in those ideals that we've 
spoken about today— justice, freedom, 
and opportunity. Let us pledge that 
their sacrifice was not made in vain. Let 
us recapture the joyous spirit of libeily 
that is truly the dream of all the Ameri- 
cas and spread it throughout this 
hemisphere. That is what our fallen 
heroes would have wanted. 



I can't tell you how moved I have 
been from the first of you who waved a 
greeting to me since we've been here, 
and now those of you who we see here. 
I couldn't feel closer to anyone at this 
moment than I do to you. And I'm go- 
ing to take the message back to those 
Americans back home who aren't here 
and tell them where we've got an awful 
lot of good friends. Thank you all and 
God bless you. 



'Text from White House press release. 



State of the Union Address 



Excerpts from President Reagan's 
address before a joint session of the 
Congress on February U, 1986.^ 

Thank you for allowing me to delay my 
address until this evening. We paused 
together to mourn and honor the valor 
of our seven Challenger heroes. And I 
hope that we are now ready to do what 
they would want us to do: Go foi-ward 
America and reach for the stars. We 
will never forget those brave seven, but 
we shall go forward. 

Mr. Speaker, before I begin my pre- 
pared remarks, may I point out that 
tonight marks the 10th and last State of 
the Union message that you've presided 
over. And on behalf of the American 
people, I want to salute you for your 
service to Congress and country. Here's 
to you. 

I have come to review with you the 
progress of our nation, to speak of un- 
finished work, and to set our sights on 
the future. I am pleased to report the 
state of our Union is stronger than a 
year ago and growing stronger each 
day. Tonight we look out on a rising 
America, firm of heart, united in spiiit, 
powerful in pride and patriotism. Ameri- 
ca is on the move! 

What is tnie for families in America 
is true for America in the family of free 
nations. History is no captive of some 
inevitable force. History is made by men 
and women of vision and courage. 
Tonight freedom is on the march. The 
United States is the economic miracle, 
the model to which the world once again 
turns. We stand for an idea whose time 
is now: Only by lifting the weights from 
the shoulders of all can people truly 
prosper and can peace among all nations 
be secure. 



Teddy Roosevelt said that a nation 
that does great work lives forever. We 
have done well, but we cannot stop at 
the foothills when Everest beckons. It's 
time for America to be all that we 
can be. 

We speak tonight of an "agenda for 
the future," an agenda for a safer, more 
secure world. And we speak about the 
necessity for actions to steel us for the 
challenges of growth, trade, and secu- 
rity in the next decade and the year 
2000. And we will do it— not by break- 
ing faith with bedrock principles but by 
breaking free from failed policies. 

I mentioned that we will meet our 
commitment to national defense. We 
must meet it. Defense is not just 
another budget expense. Keeping 
America strong, free, and at peace is 
solely the responsibility of the Fedei'al 
Government; it is government's prime 
responsibility. We have devoted 5 years 
trying to narrow a dangerous gap bom 
of illu.sion and neglect, and we've made 
important gains. Yet the threat from 
Soviet forces, conventional and strate- 
gic, from the Soviet drive for domina- 
tion, from the increase in espionage and 
state terror remains great. 'This is re- 
ality. Closing our eyes will not make 
reality disappear. 

We pledged together to hold real 
growth in defense spending to the bare 
minimum. My budget honors that 
pledge, and I'm now asking you, the 
Congress, to keep its end of the bar- 
gain. The Soviets must know that if 
America reduces its defenses, it will be 
because of a reduced threat, not a 
reduced resolve. 



1986 



25 



THE PRESIDENT 



As we knock down the barriers to 
growth, we must redouble our efforts 
for freer and fairer trade. We have al- 
ready taken actions to counter unfair 
trading practices and to pr>- open closed 
foreign markets. We wall continue to do 
so. We will also oppose legislation tout- 
ed as providing protection that in reality 
pits one American worker against 
another, one industry against another, 
one community against another, and 
that raises prices for us all. If the 
United States can trade with other na- 
tions on a level playing field, we can 
outproduce, outcompete, and outsell any- 
body, anywhere in the world. 

The constant expansion of our econ- 
omy and exports requires a sound and 
stalDle dollar at home and reliable ex- 
change rates around the world. We 
must never again permit wild currency 
swings to cripple our farmers and other 
exporters. Farmers, in particular, have 
suffered from past unwise government 
policies. They must not be abandoned 
with problems they did not create and 
cannot control. We've begun coordinat- 
ing economic and monetary policy 
among our major trading partners. But 
there's more to do, and tonight I am 
directing Treasury Secretary Jim Baker 
to determine if the nations of the world 
should convene to discuss the role and 
relationship of our currencies. 

And the same technology transform- 
ing our lives can solve the greatest 
problem of the 20th century. A security 
shield can one day render nuclear 
weapons obsolete and free mankind 
from the prison of nuclear terror. 
America met one historic challenge and 
went to the Moon. Now America must 
meet another: to make our strategic 
defense real for all the citizens of planet 
Earth. 

Let us speak of our deepest longing 
for the future: to leave our children a 
land that is free and just and a world at 
peace. It is my hope that our fireside 
summit in Geneva and Mr. Gorbachev's 
upcoming visit to America can lead to a 
more stable relationship. Surely no peo- 
ple on Earth hate war or love peace 
more than we Americans. 

But we cannot stroll into the future 
with childlike faith. Our differences with 
a system that openly proclaims and 
practices an alleged right to command 
people's lives and to export its ideology 
by force are deep and abiding. Logic 
and history compel us to accept that our 
relationship be guided by realism— 
rockhard, clear-eyed, steady, and sure. 



Our negotiators in Geneva have pro- 
posed a radical cut in offensive forces by 
each side with no cheating. They have 
made clear that Soviet compliance with 
the letter and spirit of agreements is es- 
sential. If the Soviet Govemment wants 
an agreement that truly reduces nuclear 
arms, there will be such an agreement. 

But arms control is no substitute for 
peace. We know that peace follows in 
freedom's path, and conflicts erupt when 
the will of the people is denied. So, we 
must prepare for peace not only by 
reducing weapons but by bolstering 
prosperity, liberty, and democracy 
however and wherever we can. 

We advance the promise of opportu- 
nity every time we speak out on behalf 
of lower tax rates, freer markets, sound 
currencies around the world. We 
strengthen the family of freedom every 
time we work with allies and come to 
the aid of friends under siege. And we 
can enlarge the family of free nations if 
we will defend the unalienable rights of 
all God's children to follow their dreams. 
To those imprisoned in regimes held 
captive, to those beaten for daring to 
fight for freedom and democracy— for 
their right to worship, to speak, to live, 
and to prosper in the family of free 
nations— we say to you tonight: You are 
not alone, freedom fighters. America 
will support you with moral and materi- 
al assistance, your right not just to fight 



and die for freedom but to fight and w 
freedom— to win freedom in Afghani- 
stan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in 
Nicaragua. 

This is a great moral challenge for 
the entire free world. Surely no issue 
more important for peace in our owti 
hemisphere, for the security of our 
frontiers, for the protection of our viti 
interests, than to achieve democracy i 
Nicaragua and to protect Nicaragua's 
democratic neighbors. 

This year I will be asking Congi-es 
for the means to do what must be dor 
for the gi-eat and good cause. As Scoo 
Jackson [the late Senator Henry M. 
Jackson], the inspiration for our Bipai 
san Commission on Central America, 
once said, "In matters of national seei 
rity, the best politics is no pohtics." 

What we accomplish this year, in 
each challenge we face, will set our 
course for the balance of the decade, 
deed, for the remainder of the centur 
After all we've done so far, let no oni 
say that this nation cannot reach the 
destiny of our dreams. America be- 
lieves, America is ready, America car 
win the race to the future— and we 
shall. 



iText from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 10, 1986. I 



America's Agenda for the Future 



Following are excerpts from Presi- 
dent Reagan's message to the Congress 
of February 6, 1986.^ 



I. Introduction 

On Tuesday night, I came personally before 
the Congi-ess to review with you the prog- 
ress of our Nation, to speak of uiifmished 
work, and to set our sights on the future. In 
that address, I spoke of an America on the 
move— stronger than a year ago and growing 
stronger evei-y day. 

Almost 5 years ago I addressed a previ- 
ous Congress and spoke of the need for poli- 
cies that would promote economic gi-owth and 
expansion, reduce the inti-usion of govem- 
ment in areas where its role had growii too 
large, and strengthen our defense capabilities 
in order to protect the peace and fully meet 
our global commitments. These goals and 
that agenda have not changed, and although 
we have made significant progress, the work 
is not vet finished. 



In addition to the proposals contained' 
my budget for FY 1987, this message-an 
Agenda for the FM(j(re— spells out in gi-ea 
detail how we as Americans can continue 
make progress in each of these areas and 
cessfuUy meet the challenges of the next 
decade," the year 2000, and beyond. 

Antitrust Reform. If America hopes t 
compete successfully abroad, we cannot bi 
the hand of American business and indust 
at home. Therefore, we are asking the Co' 
gress to remove unreasonable constraints 
U.S. competitiveness by reforming our Fi 
eral antitrust statutory framework to refl 
the global natui-e of our markets. These 
changes w^ll enhance the vigor and compt 
tiveness of American businesses, while co 
tinuing to protect American consumers ai 
businesses from adverse effects of practic 
such as monopolies, cartels, and price-fixi 



26 



Department of State Bui 



I 



THE PRESIDENT 



Free and Fair Trade. As we knock down 
riers to gi-owth, we must redouble our ef- 
;s for freer and fairer trade. We have al- 
dy taken actions to counter unfair trading 
ctices and to open closed markets abroad. 

will continue to do so. We will also op- 
e lefjislation touted as providing "pi-otec- 
i" that in reality pits one .American 
•ker against another, one industi->' against 
ther, one community against another, and 
t raises prices for us all. I believe that if 

United States can trade with other na- 
IS on a level playing field, we can out- 
duce. out-compete, and out-sell anybody, 
where in the world. 

Trade is the life blood of the global eeon- 
j. Growing world markets means greater 
sperity for America and a stronger, safer, 

more secure world for the family of free 
ons. We will continue to work to promote 
ee, fair, and expanding world trading sys- 

by continuing to seek legislation author- 
; a $300 million fund for combating 
latoi-y tied aid credits by other countries. 

ddition, we will propose legislation to 
ngthen and broaden protection of intellec- 

property. We will continue to work with 
Congi-ess to put into place other changes 

reflect the principles and policies of free 

fair trade. 

i>Ve will continue to enforce vigorously 

aws that protect against unfair ti-ade, in 

icular Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
and the anti-dumping and countervailing 
laws. The Strike Force on Trade will 

inue its efforts to identify unfair foreign 

tiees. 

Ve will aggressively renegotiate the 

i-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), currently 

duled to e.xpire July 1, 1986, on terms no 

favorable than present. We are consult- 

vith the U.S. textile and apparel indus- 
to ensure that their views will be 
fesented during these negotiations. 

Ve will continue the market-oriented 
or-selective (MOSS) talks, working with 
flapanese to identify all the trade barriers 

ecific sectors and encouraging the 
inese to remove them. The talks are mak- 
jiintn-ess and markets are opening up in 
"niimunications, phai-maceuticals, and 
n- .sectors. We will continue to press for 
eumnval of barriers in these and addi- 
'il sietors. We also welcome Prime 

;ter Xakasone's expressed determination 

ive toward the restructuring of Japan's 
frt oriented economy. 

I'ur Administration is also working 
ftously to launch a new round of mul- 
aral trade negotiations through the 
1 u-atiiry Committee established last 
I ml KM- by the GATT [General Agreement 

iiil'f.< and Trade]. Under the leadership 
'■ f.S., the Preparatory Committee is 
^ 'ipi'iK the framework for negotiations 

•M'uld strengthen the international trad- 
^ >>trm, eliminate unfair trade practices, 
' ddress major new problem areas in 
-'lational trade such as services, intellec- 
a>roperty protection, and investment. 

ur Administration hopes to begin discus- 
I' with Canada, our largest trading part- 



ner, to enhance freedom of trade between 
our two countries. We will work with the 
Congress to assure that a mutually beneficial 
agreement can be achieved. 

In addition, we will engage some of our 
major trading partners in discussing the idea 
of establishing a multinational or regional 
patent office. Such an office could provide a 
higher level of common patent protection, in- 
cluding coverage and temis, and establish a 
more efficient system for gaining patent pro- 
tection beyond United States borders. 

Fm-thei-, we will work to correct the defi- 
ciencies in the new farm bill, including: the 
provision mandating a reduction in the 
amount of sugar permitted to enter the 
United States; the 3-year payment-in-kind 
bonus export program; and the new dairy 
program, which taxes milk producers to fund 
a program that obligates the Government to 
pay fai-mers to liquidate their daii-y herds 
and to buy the meat in order to support 
prices. 

The Global Economy. Today, America is 
part of a global economy. The constant 
expansion of our economy and exports de- 
mands a sound and stable dollar at home and 
reliable exchange rates around the world. It 
also demands that our trading partners grow- 
along with us. 

We cannot race forward to the future if 
our friends and allies are lagging behind. 
Many of the trade problems we are e,xperi- 
encing today are caused by the imbalance be- 
tween our low-tax, high-gi'owth economy and 
the high-tax, low-growth economies of so 
many of our trading partners. Our dynamic, 
expanding economy is hungry for goods from 
abroad; but economies still suffering under 
excessive taxation, over-regulation, and top- 
heavy government simply cannot afford to 
buy from us. 

Our Administration is working to pro- 
mote gi-owth in the world economy by 
strengthening economic policy coordination 
among our industrialized trading partners. I 
have directed Treasury Secretarj' James A. 
Baker III to determine if the nations of the 
world should convene to discuss the role and 
relationship of our cui-rencies. 

Many of the developing countries, where 
large debts further oppress struggling econo- 
mies, are in particularly dii-e straits. Our 
Administration will vigorously pursue imple- 
mentation of oui- proposed "Program for Sus- 
tained Growth" to adcb'ess problems of debt 
and declining growth in the developing coun- 
tries. This program calls for increased lend- 
ing by commercial banks and an expansion of 
loans by multilateral development banks con- 
ditioned on structui'al refonns, including tax 
refoiTns, in the debtor countries. 

I am looking forward to meeting with the 
other leaders of the industrialized nations at 
the Economic Summit this spring in Japan to 
discuss ideas and policies that can make the 
global economy stronger. These policies in- 
clude removing structural rigidities in our 
economies that impede the capital and labor 
markets and improving the working of the 
free trade system, while resisting protec- 
tionism. 



V. Expanding the Family of Free Nations 

In the area of foreign affairs, America will 
continue to encourage democracy, freedom, 
and respect for human rights around the 
world. We will be a strong and reliable ally 
to our friends, and a fii-m but hopeful adver- 
sai-y for those who, for now, choose not to be 
our friends. With the former w-e hope for con- 
tinued hannony; witl; the latter, for progress 
toward that most elusive of goals, peace. 

A Relationship Based on Realism. Our rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union must be sup- 
ported by the twin pillars of hope and 
realism. The United States and the Soviet 
Union are not alike; we are not tw'o equal 
and competing Supeipowers divided only by 
a difference in our "systems." The United 
States is a free and open society, a democ- 
racy in which a free press and free speech 
flourish. The people of the Soviet Union live 
in a closed dictatorship in which democratic 
freedoms are denied. Their leaders do not 
respond to the will of the people; their deci- 
sions are not determined by public debate or 
dissent; they proclaim, and pursue, the goal 
of Leninist "revolution." 

And so the tensions between us reflect 
differences that cannot be wished away. But 
the future is not predetermined. Knowing 
this, and ti-uly desiring to make the differ- 
ences between us smaller and more manage- 
able, the United States continues to pursue 
progi'ess in all aspects of our relationship 
with the Soviet Union. 

Our Administration seeks to ensure that 
this relationship remains peaceful. We want 
restraint to be the Soviet leadership's most 
realistic option and will see to it that our 
freedoms and those of our Allies are 
protected. 

We seek a secure future at lower levels 
of arms, particularly nuclear forces, through 
agreements that are equitable and verifiable. 
The soundness of our proposals, our renewed 
militaiy strength, and om- bipartisan determi- 
nation to assure a strong deterrent create 
incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate 
seriously. 

We can move toward a better, more coop- 
erative working relationship with the Soviet 
Union if the Soviet leadership is willing. This 
will require full Soviet compliance with the 
letter and spirit of both past and future 
agreements. 

There is much work to be done. I will 
meet General Secretary' Gorbachev later this 
year, and in preparation my Administration 
will pursue discussions with the Soviet 
government at all levels. I also hope to see 
gi-eater communication and broader contact 
between our peoples. I am optimistic that if 
the Soviet leadership is willing to meet us 
halfway, we will be able to put our relations 
on a more cooperative footing in 1986. 

Sustaining Our Strong Commitment to 
National Defense. In spite of our current 
discussions, the Soviet leaders are continuing 
a massive military buildup that threatens the 
United States and our free world allies. Real 



3 1986 



27 



THE PRESIDENT 



arms reductions are possible only if the 
Soviets and others do not doubt our strength 
and ability to counter aggression. 

Keeping America strong, free, and at 
peace is solely the responsibility of the Fed- 
eral Government; it is Government's prime 
responsibility. We have devoted 5 years try- 
ing to narrow a dangerous gap bom of illu- 
sion and neglect. And we have made 
important gains. 

In the past 5 years, our Administration 
has reversed the decline in defense funding 
that occun-ed during the 1970s and has made 
significant progress in strengthening our mili- 
tai7 capabilities. Last year the Congi-ess and 
I reached a deficit reduction agreement. We 
pledged together to hold real growth in 
defense funding to the bare minimum. My 
1987 budget honors that pledge. It proposes 
defense levels that are essential simply to 
maintain the defense capability that we have 
achieved in the face of the continuing Soviet 
military buildup. I am now asking Congress 
to keep its end of the bargain. With the addi- 
tional cuts under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 
FY 1986 budget authority for defense cor- 
responds to more than a 5 percent real 
decline. This simply cannot continue. I am 
proposing 1987-1991 defense levels which 
provide the real progi'am growth agreed to in 
last year's Budget Resolution. It is critical 
that these levels be supported. The world 
must know that if America reduces her 
defenses, it will be because of a reduced 
threat, not a reduced resolve. 

We will continue vigorously to pursue our 
strategic modernization program in my 1987 
budget— to modernize our bomber, ICBM 
[intercontinental ballistic missile], and missile- 
submarine forces so as to assure effective 
and stable deten-ence. 

Our Administration will also actively con- 
tinue research into new technologies in 
search of secure strategic defense systems. 
The Strategic Defense Initiative offers the 
prospect of finding such systems, which 
threaten no one, to keep the peace, protect 
the United States and our allies in greater 
safety, and ultimately to eliminate the threat 
of nuclear weapons by making nuclear-armed 
missiles obsolete. We have invited allies to 
join us in this reseai'ch effort. We have al- 
ready agreed with Great Britain to undertake 
cooperative research and are laying the 
groundwork for cooperation with others. 

We have witnessed in the past 5 years a 
remarkable improvement in personnel quality 
and retention throughout all components of 
the Military Sei-vices. My 1987 budget con- 
tinues to ensure that the high quality of oui- 
forces is maintained. 

Our Administration is strongly committed 
to improving management of our defense pro- 
grams. I look forward to receiving the recom- 
mendations of my Blue Ribbon Commission, 
chaired by David Packard, which has been 
reviewing this issue. The Department of 
Defense will continue to root out waste and 
inefficiency and will aggressively initiate any 
new improvements necessaiy to assure that 
taxpayer dollars are well spent. We will also 
pursue organizational changes, where appro- 



priate, to ensure the continued effectiveness 
of our AiTned Forces. 

While acknowledging the importance of 
the free flow of knowledge and information 
for commercial puiposes, our Administration 
will not sacrifice our strategic technological 
advantages in the area of national security. 
We will forcefully administer the Export 
Administration Act. 

Our Administration has pressed the 
governments of Indochina for the fullest pos- 
sible accounting of the POW/MIA question. 
These efforts have shown significant progress 
and will continue. We will continue to pursue, 
with all resources available to us, reports of 
Americans who could still be held captive. 

We will continue to support the nearly 28 
million veterans who have given faithful serv- 
ice in defense of our Nation. We will provide 
quality medical care, fair and compassionate 
disability compensation, and other benefits 
for eligible veterans. 

Support for a World of Hope. The 

United States continues to pursue a world of 
hope where people are free to choose the 
political system by which they will be 
governed. We seek to roll back the tide of 
tyranny; we seek to increase freedom across 
the face of this planet, for serving the cause 
of freedom also serves the cause of peace. It 
is for this reason that Americans have always 
supported the struggle of freedom fighters. It 
is also why I put foi-ward my "regional initia- 
tive" at the United Nations last fall-a three- 
stage plan for ending a series of dangerous 
wars that have pitted a series of goverti- 
ments against their own people and their 
neighbors. 

As we have in the past, America must ac- 
tively wage the competition of political 
ideas— between free government and its 
opponents— and lend our support to those 
who are building the infrastructure of democ- 
racy. Failure to sustain other democracies 
will be very costly in the long run, both 
materially and spiritually. 

In Afghanistan w-e must continue to help 
the forces fighting a Soviet invasion and an 
oppressive Communist regime. As a result of 
the Soviet Union's militai-y presence and 
vicious campaign against the freedom fight- 
ers, a quarter of the Afghan population has 
been killed or has fled to refugee camps. The 
Afghan people will have our support as long 
as the Soviet Union continues its war against 
them. 

In Latin America the trend toward 
elected civilian governments continues, with 
Guatemala as the latest new entry. Over 90 
percent of the people of Latin America and 
the Caribbean now enjoy democratic rule. 
That compares to less than one-third only 5 
years ago. However, Communist subversion 
and the insidious spread of narcotics traffick- 
ing continue to menace the region. In fact, 
they sometimes work hand in hand, as in 
Colombia, where insurgents are increasingly 
linked to drag traffickers and narcotics 
growers. 

The Central American democracies need 
our help. Our assistance is crucial, as demon- 



strated by the success of El Salvador in 
preserving democratic institutions in the fac 
of a Communist insurgency. The levels of 
economic and security assistance we will re- 
quest for Central America are the absolute 
minimum needed to maintain progress 
toward the objectives set out in the report 
the Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America. 

For moral and strategic reasons, we mi 
continue to support those seeking democrat 
in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan resistance is 
fighting not only the Sandinistas, but Cuba 
armed with Soviet weapons. I will be askir 
the Congress to provide the Nicaraguan fn 
dom fighters with the moral and material 
support they require to continue and expai I 
their sti-uggle. We will continue to press tl i 
Sandinistas to negotiate with their owti pei i 
pie and to fulfill the promises made to thei 
of genuine democracy. Reconciliation in 
Nicaragua, based on democratic elections, 
remains the key to peace in Central Amer 
In Africa, many countries have experi- I 
enced deep economic distress and starvatii > 
in the past year, brought about in part by i 
the drought and in some cases— particularl i 
Ethiopia— by the bnital policies of a Com- 
munist regime. As the human cost of such 
policies mounts, we encourage African 
governments to take the lead in moving 
toward economic and political freedoms. 

We are moved by the. efforts of freeda» 
fighters such as Jonas Savimbi and the nM 
bers of UNITA [National Union for the Tl 
Independence of Angola]. They deserve ov 
support in their brave sti-uggle against 
Soviet-Cuban imperialism in Angola. We v 
work with the Congress to determine the ■ 
most effective way of providing support. 

In South Africa, we stand forthrightly 
the principle that the government must 
achieve freedom and justice for all its 
citizens. Apartheid, in our view, is doomei ' 
We have a major stake— as elsewhere, bol 
moral and strategic— in encouraging a pea 
ful transition and avoiding a tenible civil 
war. This is w^hy we reject the approach < 
those on both sides who pursue violence ; 
oppression. Our ability to affect the ultim 
outcome is limited, but we will continue t* 
employ our good offices— both official ami 
private— to pursue dialogue and negotiatii 
as the best way to change the system \vh 
protecting the future of all South African: 
In Southeast Asia, the United Static 
ports ASEAN [Association of South Ea?.i 
Asian Nations] in its efforts to aid the sti 
gle of the Cambodian people to free their 
country from foreign occupation while aiil 
Thailand, the ASEAN front-line state. A^ 
other regions, w^e are prepared to contnl 
to a negotiated settlement of this war, in 
context of the proposals I put forwai-d at 
U.N. General Assembly last year. We ar« 
implementing humanitarian measures in 
response to the refugee problems in the 
region. 

We are concerned by the developmen i» 
the Philippines, our long-time ally, and w 
work to encourage political moderation, f 
play, and the strengthening of democratii 



28 



Department of State Bui' 



THE PRESIDENT 



ititutions. Only on this basis can the people 
the Philippines cheek and ultimately defeat 

insui-gency whose goal is to end 
mocracy. 

No discussion of peace and fi-eedom can 



j complete without a reference to Eur 



ope s 



eat and just hope: an end to the artificial 
Hsion of the continent. The dividing line 
;tween freedom and oppi-ession is one 
tindary that can never be made legitimate. 
e most significant way of making all 
rope more secure is to make it more free. 
We stand for the principles of freedom, 
noeracy, the rule of law, unconditional 
■nan rights, and government with the con- 
it of the govei-ned. The cause of Poland's 
idarity continues to arouse the conscience 
mankind. Solidarity will not die because its 
krtbeat is an indestructible truth that 
ionates in e\'ery human heart. 
J We can help those seeking democracy not 
by economic and military aid. but with 
,s and the active involvement of demo- 
ic parties and institutions. The National 
lowment for Democracy has a creative 
to play in fostering the ideals that make 
ocracy work. 

Alliances and Friendships. America's 
I'ngth and staying power are the essential 
ire(|uisites for strengthening our alliances 
I friendships and for protecting the values 
1 interests that bind us together. In 

iipr we have launched, together with our 
' T( ) allies, a Conventional Defense Initia- 
to find more effective means to improve 
. conventional deterrent; we are also seek- 
I ways, with congressional support, to 
:iulate armaments cooperation. The alli- 
■-' remains firmly on course in deploying 

TO intermediate-range weapons to coun- 
sSoviet SS-20 missiles. We are also con- 
ling alliance implementation of the 
Esion to reduce by 1,400 the number of 
. ear warheads available to NATO, bring- 
lour theater-nuclear inventory to its 
■>st level in 20 years; this decision is being 
lied out despite the absence of reductions 
|(he Soviet tJnion. 

In our relations with Japan, we will ex- 
i\ our efforts to resolve bilateral trade 
Ees through trade liberalizing solutions 
I open Japanese markets to American 
vis. We continue to rely on the United 

f,< .Japanese Mutual Security treaty as a 
Ir I if Asian peace and stability. 

3ur commitment to the security of the 
e,ublic of Korea has never been stronger. 
'Ihave a number of differences on trade 
ass but believe the market-opening steps 
ig taken or under consideration by the 
jiblic of Korea will alleviate these 
ihulties. 

Elsewhere in Asia I will continue to ex- 
W and deepen cooperation with China, and 
J-ove our relationships in Southeast Asia 

;the dynamic Pacific Basin as a whole, 
nination of United States Trusteeship 
'\ the Micronesian Territories, which I 
* we can achieve this year, will be a land- 
»k in our relations with the emerging 
afic Island nations and a sjTnbol of our 



support for democracy and freedom 
everywhere. 

One of the areas most critical to our secu- 
rity is the Middle East. Security assistance 
to the countries of the region is important to 
maintaining United States influence, to pre- 
venting Soviet intimidation and exploitation, 
and to giving friendly governments the confi- 
dence to move toward peace in the face of 
often violent opposition. We are helping 
Israel and Jordan to naiTow their differences 
in the peace process. We will continue our ef- 
forts to facilitate direct negotiations between 
Israel and her Arab neighbors. We must also 
enlarge the gains already made between 
Israel and Egj-pt. 

In South Asia major strides have been 
taken in the past year to advance regional 
peace and prosperity. A new regional associa- 
tion was inaugurated to grapple with the 
twin killers of narcotics and terrorism. The 
leaders of India and Pakistan have met fre- 
quently to address outstanding differences. 
The United States stands ready to promote 
regional peace and reduce the risk of a South 
Asian nuclear arms race in any way we can. 

in terms of our legislative intentions, let 
me be clear: in all these regions of the world, 
a strong security assistance program is one 
of the most effective, and least costly, ways 
of protecting interests we share with allies 
and friends. I will work with the Congress to 
presei-ve this invaluable policy tool. I will 
also seek congressional approval of our re- 
quests to sell arms to Jordan and other pro- 
Westeni governments in the Mid-east. 

Countering Terrorism and Espionage. 

Terrorism is a gi-owing threat, as evidenced 
by the increased targeting of innocent 
civilians engaged in innocent pursuits. We 
are taking several measures to increase our 
capability to deal with this scourge. We are 
aware that it thrives with the support of 
nations such as Libya that provide funding, 
logistics, direction, and safehavens. 

The Vice President's Task Force on Com- 
bating Terrorism, formed at my direction last 
July, has submitted its report to me with a 
series of recommendations. Our Administra- 
tion has already begun to implement those 
recommendations that are within the purview 
of the Executive Branch. We will increase 
our intelligence cooperation with friendly 
nations to share information on terrorist 
plans and intentions. Our intelligence commu- 
nity will place greater emphasis on collecting 
information on terrorist groups and their 
state supporters. And we will increase our 
readiness to strike back at terrorists where 
they have been identified and their responsi- 
bility for actions against Americans has been 
determined. Those countries that support and 
direct the terrorists should know there is no 
refuge, there is no hiding place, there is no 
sanctuary that will keep them safe forever. 

Our Administration will continue, on its 
own and in cooperation with allies, with pri- 
vate sector transportation companies, and 
with international organizations, to take 
preventive and response measures to counter 
the brutal, savage terrorist attacks on inno- 



cent people. Through the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation here at home and intelligence 
services abroad, we will act to head off ter- 
rorist incidents before they can occur. Our 
tightened security measures already include 
new regulations for cheeked baggage, cargo, 
and access to aircraft. We are working with 
the International Civil Aviation Organization 
and the International Maritime Organization 
to enhance security standards worldwide. 

Our Administration will ask the Congress 
for legislation to further improve security 
measures, enhance anti-terrorism assistance 
programs, and in general enable us to meet 
our counter-terrorism responsibilities. We are 
requesting additional funds to improve the 
security of our diplomatic missions abroad 
and of foreign diplomats here in the United 
States. We are also asking the Senate to ap- 
prove the Supplementary Extradition Treaty 
with the United Kingdom to allow the retiuTi 
of inteniational terrorists for trial. This 
treaty will assure that our own courts cannot 
become a sanctuary for certain terrorists and 
will serve as a model for cooperation between 
nations. 

Our Administration will continue to coun- 
ter the threat posed by the worldwide activ- 
ity of hostile intelligence services such as the 
KGB and GRU. We will follow a realistic ap- 
proach to countering illegal technology acqui- 
sition, espionage, and the attempt to 
manipulate public opinion through active 
measures and disinfciTnation. We will en- 
hance our world effort to identify and 
neutralize the activity of intelligence services 
working against American interests or 
threatening our security. 

VI. Conclusion 

What we accomplish this year, in each 
challenge we face, will set our course for the 
balance of the decade, indeed for the re- 
mainder of the century. After all we've done 
so far, let no one say this Nation cannot 
reach the destiny of our dreams. America be- 
lieves, America is ready, America can win 
the race to the future— and we shall. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 10, 1986. 



•11 1986 



29 



THE PRESIDENT 



I 



News Conference of 
February 1 1 (Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan 's 
news conference of February 11, 1986.^ 



Q. The observers you sent to the 
Philippines have just returned with 
reports that they witnessed fraud and 
violence. Doesn't this undermine the 
credibility of the election and 
strengthen the hand of communist 
insurgence on the island? 

A. I am not going to comment on 
this process, just as they are not going 
to render an official report, until the 
counting has finally been finished. I 
don't think it would be proper to do so. 
Yes, they told me in just an interim few 
remarks and made it plain that they're 
not going to issue the official report yet. 
But they told me that there was the ap- 
pearance of fraud, and yet, at the same 
time, said that they didn't have any 
hard evidence beyond that general 
appearance. 

So we're going to wait. We're neu- 
tral. And then we hope to have the 
same relationship with the people of the 
Philippines that we've had for all these 
historic years. 

Q. Did what they tell you give you 
concern about the credibility there 
and what the impact will be for U.S. 
interests in the Philippines? 

A. I think that we're concerned 
about the violence that was evident 
there and the possibility of fraud, 
although it could have been that all of 
that was occurring on both sides. But at 
the same time, we're encouraged by the 
fact that it is evident that there is a 
two-party system in the Philippines and 
a pluralism that I think would benefit 
their people. And we're glad to see that 
particular thing happen and we'll wait 
until we hear the outcome. 



Q. Two weeks ago your Chief of 
Staff, Donald Regan, said that if 
Ferdinand Marcos was reelected and 
certified as such, we would have to do 
business with him even if he were re- 
elected through fraud. Is that your 
policy? 



A. What we have to say is that the 
determination of the government in the 
Philippines is going to be the business 
of the Philippine people, not the United 
States. And we are going to try and 
continue, as I said before, the relation- 
ship regardless of what government is 
instituted there by the choice of the 
people. And that is all I can answer. 

Q. It is argued that there is a 
communist insurgency there; that the 
best way to play into the hands of the 
communists is to back someone— a 
dictator— who has been reelected by 
fraud, that the best way, it is argued, 
to oppose the communist insurgency is 
to back the forces of democracy. What 
about that? 

A. We are backing the forces of 
democracy and the people there are vot- 
ing and they are holding their owti elec- 
tions. The only party in the Philippines 
that boycotted the election was the 
Communist Party. So there is very 
great evidence that whatever takes 
place— you've got two parties and the 
evidence that a sizable percentage of 
each party has voted for a different can- 
didate for the— of the two candidates. So 
there is a solid support for both candi- 
dates there. Now, as I said before, I'm 
not going to comment on any of these 
other things while this vote count is still 
going forward. 

Q. The Soviets today released dis- 
sident Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, but of 
course there are thousands of other 
Soviets who would like to leave that 
country that the Soviets won't let 
leave. Do you regard today's release 
as a propaganda move, or do you see 
any real change in the human rights 
situation in the Soviet Union? 

A. I don't have any way to deter- 
mine what their motives are in doing 
this. I only know that since the Geneva 
meeting, there have been not only this 
but others released— more so than in a 
great many years. I am encouraged by 
this because I did talk at great length 
about the matter of human rights with 
the General Secretai^. And all we can 
do is hope that this is a beginning— a 
sign for what is going to continue to 
take place. 

Q. Mr. Gorbachev says that he 
cannot release another leading dissi- 
dent, Andrey Sakharov, because of his 
knowledge of Soviet nuclear secrets. 
Do you see any legitimacy to that 
argument? 



A. It is an argument they have usee 
for a number of people— people who 
have, in their estimation, been close to 
some things that they feel are secrets 
for their own security and that they 
have said that they cannot let people gc 
that have access to those secrets. 

I have no way of judging how valid 
that is, but, as I say, they've made a 
start and I hope it is just a start and 
that they'll continue. 

Q. Did the United States play any 
role in President Duvalier's decision 
to leave Haiti? And the second ques- 
tion, do you intend to increase eco- 
nomic aid to the new government 
there? 

A. We are just faced now with wha 
we can do— I can only tell you we hope 
we can be of help as this interim 
government goes forward to try to inst 
tute democracy there in Haiti. Our par- 
ticipation in Duvalier's leaving was thavi 
of providing an airplane to fly him to 
France. 

Q. You didn't give him any sort o 
strong advice to leave, did you? 

A. No. And he never asked us for 
any. 

Q. The United States, as you 
know, is beginning to resume the 
flight operations in the Mediterranea 
near Libya. Do you believe— and it's 
also designed to reassert our rights t( 
patrol international waters. Why thei 
haven't we crossed that line that 
Qadhafi calls the death line? 

A. I don't know the nature of the 
operations that have been conducted. 
They conduct them in various parts of 
the Mediterranean. I don't know that 
they're all through yet. We have con- 
ducted operations there very early on i. 
my Administration in which I was in- 
formed, because they thought I should | 
be, that he had ordered that that was j 
their waters— which was akin to us | 
claiming all of the waters from the tip 
of Florida over to the border of Me.xicc 
and Texas— and that some of the mane 
vers would entail some planes and som 
ships in crossing that line, but not get- 
ting into what are actually their water;. 

And I gave the go-ahead on that. 
And I would again. I don't know— if 
they didn't cross it in any way this • 
time, it must have been because the 
maneuvers did not call for it. 

Q. Do you think, though, that 
resuming the operations at this time 
might be playing into Qadhafi's ham 



30 



Department of State Bull 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



elping him project the image that he 
ants to, that he's being picked on by 
le United States? 

A. It didn't add to his image the 
rst time we did it. And as I say, it 
fould be done not for any impression on 
fm; it would be done because simply 
[e believe that our squadrons which are 
lere— the Navy— is going to have to 
induct exercises and keep itself in 
jhting shape. 

Q. Your previous answer on the 
Ihilippines election left the impres- 
lon that no matter what goes on in 
ie election, the United States will 
pcept the outcome. You didn't mean 
» say that an unprecedented fraud is 
jing to be accepted by the United 
tates, did you? Is there some limit 
here we stop? 

A. No, I said that we're depending 
i|i the Filipino people to make this deci- 
ibn. This is their election, and we'll 
ait and see what the final count 
I'termines. 

Q. But once they do make the de- 
ision, if it's quite obvious— and even 
ime of the observers from your own 
I mmission are indicating that— if it's 
iiite obvious that it's been a total 
sjal, the United States isn't going to 
icept the outcome just as it is, are 
ley? 

A. You're asking me one of those 
"' i|uestions and I'm not going to an- 
:er "if' questions. I took my pattern 
[)m Franklin Delano Roosevelt when 
I was President and he held his first 
[ess conference, and he said "I will set 
cwn one ground rule. . ." which he 
tver violated. He said, "I will not 
sswer any 'if questions." 

Q. Some within your Administra- 
ttn are reported to be growing impa- 
tnt with what they see as Soviet 
bt-dragging over setting a date for 
Ms year's summit. Do you share in 
tat impatience? 

A. I'd like to have it pinned down. 
ley haven't come up with any other 
cte. They mentioned another period, 
Bd we informed them that that was 
fing to be running into our coming 
lection and we would prefer the earlier 
cte. No, we haven't seen any evidence 
I it they're trying to get out of this or 
'iything of the kind, because they've 
! eadv invited me there for one in 

:?7. 



Q. So, still in your view, there's 
no thought that possibly Mr. 
Gorbachev may be trying to win some 
concessions on arms control in 
exchange for an agreement on dates? 

A. I don't think so. That kind of 
linkage wouldn't work. 

Q. Are the two U.S. bases in the 
Philippines of paramount importance 
when you consider U.S. policy for the 
Philippines? Or would you put the fu- 
ture of those bases at some risk if it 
meant standing up for democracy? 

A. One cannot minimize the impor- 
tance of those bases, not only to us but 
to the Western world and certainly to 
the Philippines itself. If you look at the 
basing now of the Blue Ocean Navy that 
the Soviets have built, which is bigger 
than ours, and how they have placed 
themselves to be able to intercept the 
16 choke points in the world. There are 
16 passages in the world— sea 



passages— through which most of the 
supplies and the raw material and so 
forth reaches not only ourselves but our 
allies in the Western world. And obvi- 
ously the plan in case of any kind of 
hostilities calls for intercepting and clos- 
ing those 16 choke points. And we have 
to have bases that we can send forces to 
reopen those channels. And I don't 
know of any that's more important than 
the bases on the Philippines. 

Q. Has the United States given 
any consideration to other places in 
the region we might have bases, if the 
situation in the Philippines seems to 
become untenable? 

A. I have to tell you, as good mili- 
tary will always do, and not just here, 
but in anything else— I am confident 
that our Navy has sought for and is 
looking for contingency plans for any- 
thing that might happen anyplace to us. 



'Text from White House press release. 



Vice President Bush Visits 
Guatemala and Honduras 




We are committed to 
supporting the develop- 
ment of free, democratic 
governments throughout 
this hemisphere .... 



Vice President Bush headed the U.S. dele- 
gations to the inauguration ceremonies of 
two Central American Presidents: Marco 
Vinicio CEREZO Arevalo of Guatemala on 
January 14, 1986 (above) and Jose AZCONA 
del Hoyo of Honduras on January 27, 1986. 

(White House photos by Dave Valdez) 



iril 1986 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



Nicaragua: 
Will Democracy Prevail? 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on February 27, 1986.^ 



U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance is an essential ele- 
ment in our efforts to defend Central 
America from aggression, to preserve 
recent democratic gains, and to improve 
prospects for renewed economic growth 
and equitable development. It is an im- 
portant stimulus to a diplomatic solution 
to the Central American conflict. It con- 
tributes to our defense against Soviet 
and Cuban military intervention in this 
hemisphere. Finally, it can help to re- 
store to the Nicaraguan people their 
right to self-determination denied by a 
minority that seeks to perpetuate itself 
in power by force of arms and totalitar- 
ian controls. 

In short, the assistance the Presi- 
dent requested on February 25 is 
needed. It is legally, morally, and stra- 
tegically justified. And it can make a 
vital difference to the emergence of a 
democratic outcome in Nicaragua and 
throughout Central America. 



WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 

In talking with foreign leaders and 
Members of Congress, I find that just 
about everyone agrees on what the 
problem is. It is that a democratic revo- 
lution has been betrayed by a violent 
minority willing and even eager to serve 
as an instrument of Soviet and Cuban 
strategic designs on the hemisphere, in- 
cluding armed aggression in the form of 
support for terrorism and subversion. 

In 1979, Nicaraguan democrats and 
their sympathizers throughout the world 
believed that the end of the Somoza re- 
gime marked a new beginning for 
Nicaragua. Nicaraguans learned very 
quickly, however, that instead of 
democracy, they had fallen prey to what 
the Sandinistas say is "revolution by 
vanguard" and what the rest of us know 
is communist totalitarianism. The 
popularity of the overthrow of Somoza 
concealed the establishment of a new 
dictatorship that threatens the security 



of Nicaragua's neighbors and has 
brought the cold war to Central 
America. 

Intervention 

One of the most striking characteristics 
of Sandinista communism is its mes- 
sianic impulse to violence. As Congress 
has repeatedly and formally found, 
Nicaragua has since 1980 been engaged 
in unlawful intervention, serving as the 
staging ground for arms shipments to 
guerrillas in El Salvador. Because so 
much attention has been focused on this 
arms flow to El Salvador, which has 
been sustained and occasionally massive, 
it is less widely known that at one point 
or another Sandinista intervention has 
touched virtually the entire hemisphere. 

The map on page 33 depicts the 
breadth of Nicaragua's interventionist 
activities. (It also makes clear, inciden- 
tally, that the Nicaraguan communists 
are perfectly serious when they refer to 
their policy as one of "international- 
ism.") The map identifies the countries 
where the current Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment has shipped arms, to whose 
citizens it has provided military train- 
ing, or the kinds of support necessary 
for terrorist operations. Managua has 
become a gathering place for terrorists 
from all over the world, including 
Europe and the Middle East as well as 
Latin America. 

Two aspects of this pattern of inter- 
vention are worth emphasizing. 

First, the intervention is strongest 
against Nicaragua's immediate neigh- 
bors, but it is not Umited to Central 
America. 

Second, the pattern is poUtically in- 
discriminate. Violence and subversion 
have been directed against democracies 
and even against Contadora countries as 
well as against dictatorships and more 
traditional military regimes. 



Militarization 

The Sandinistas like to portray them- 
selves as nationalists, but their soldiers 
are trained and supported in combat by 
thousands of Cubans and other foreign- 
ers known as "internationalists." And 
this is why, despite its limited size and 
resources, Nicaragua is able to inter- 
vene so widely in the hemisphere: it has 
been armed by the Soviet Union and is 
manned by Cubans in key sectors from 
training and weapons use to intelligence 
and counterintelligence. j 

The first Cuban advisers entered | 
Managua with the Sandinistas and took 
up positions in Somoza's bunker less 
than a week after he left it. As soon as 
the security apparatus was in place, 
Soviet-bloc arms began to arrive to givi 
the Nicaraguan communists the capacit; 
to repress their own people and to en- 
gage in unconventional warfare against 
their neighbors without risk of a convei 
tional military response. 

Chart I depicts the militarization of 
Nicaragua by this combination of Sovie 
bloc weapons and Cuban manpower. 1\ 
total of Cuban advisers has stabilized a 
sUghtly lower levels since October 1983 
when the U.S. action in Grenada led th 
Cubans to seek a lower profile in Nica- 
ragua. Soviet arms shipments peaked ii 
the fall of 1984 with the delivery of 
HIND attack helicopters at a time wh€ 
the resistance had been cut off from 
U.S. Government assistance. The realit 
is clear: Managua's military capabilities 
are closely tied to the Soviet Union am 
Cuba. 

Cuban military and security officers 
in fact, have done everything from helj 
ing with the establishment of poMtical 
control structures in the armed forces 
and the state security apparatus to an 
active combat role with sophisticated , 
Soviet weapons systems. 

THE RISE OF THE RESISTANCE 

When Daniel Ortega spoke in Havana i 
on February 5 to the Congress of the 
Cuban Communist Party, he referred 1 
"the blood of Cuban internationalists 
fallen on Nicaraguan soil." Ortega was 
talking about Cubans killed fighting 
Nicaraguans inside Nicaragua. 

In this fact is a bitter truth: 
Nicaraguans who dissent must fight 
more than other Nicaraguans. And the 
must fight a sophisticated, heavily 
equipped, and pervasive security ap- 
paratus designed to deny power to all 
but the ruling communist vanguard. 



32 



Department of State Bullif 



THE SECRETARY 




b 



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W^ > 






*U. ^ \ ^^^^^^^^^' 


^ncEuela VN 






^^m^ 


—j /Guyana\— w^ 






/ Cdombla 


1 -^^i?^^ / 1^ 
\ t^t^*^^^ J ( SorlnameV 



Ecuador 



Sandinista 
Intervention 



Group A: 



Group B: 



pM «-"p «^' 



Countries where arms originating 
in Nicaragua have been found. 



Countries some of whose citizens 
have received military training 
in Nicaragua. 



Countries in which radicals 
have received other support 
(such as Safe Haven, Transit, 
False Documentation, etc.) 
from Nicaragua. 

Includes all of the countries 
in groups A & B. 



Peru 




Bolivia 




\Araentina 



Group D: Countries not included 
in groups A, B, or C. 



Note: Only Independent 
countries are shown 



Names and boundaries are 
not necessartly authoritative 



pril 1986 



THE SECRETARY 



need look no further than the fate of 
Solidarity in Poland over the last few 
years to realize the difficulty of taldng 
on such a formidable internal security 
apparatus. 

Chart II (see p. 35) demonstrates the 
growth of armed resistance in the face 
of the new Nicaraguan police state. The 
resistance responds to a long series of 
repressive acts, some of which are listed 
chronologically in the chart. These go 
from the arrival of the Cubans and the 
establishment of the defense committees 
in the summer of 1979 to the start of 
censorship and the postponement of 
elections, the murder of opposition 
leader Jorge Salazar, and the burning of 
Indian villages in 1981. Catholic and 
Protestant church leaders were sys- 
tematically attacked, and the Pope was 
insulted. Forced conscription came next, 
followed by stage-managed elections, 
Ortega's visit to Moscow, and finally the 
suspension of civil rights in the fall of 
1985. 

By betraying their promises of 
pluralism, the Nicaraguan communists 
have forced the citizens of Nicaragua to 
take up arms once again. Like Somoza, 
the Sandinistas don't seem to listen to 
anyone who isn't armed. And, like 
Somoza, they seek to blame outside 
forces for the resistance of their own 
people to their policies. 



The Nicaraguan communists like to 
say that covert U.S. support created the 
resistance; that their opponents are all 
agents of the CIA [Central Intelligence 
Agency] and of the heirs of Somoza. 
This is ridiculous. It was Sandinista 
repression that in 1979, 1980, and 1981 
destroyed the coalition that overthrew 
Somoza and sparked the resistance. In 
1979, 1980, and 1981, the United States 
was providing aid to the Government of 
Nicaragua, not to the resistance. 

From May of 1984 until late in 
1985-well over a year-the U.S. Gov- 
ernment provided no assistance to 
Nicaraguan resistance forces. As indi- 
cated in Chart II, the resistance grew 
by 50%, roughly from 10,000 to 15,000 
during a period when there was no U.S. 
Government assistance. 

The Sandinistas, of course, would 
like to create the impression that there 
is no viable alternative to them. Like 
Somoza before them, they have driven 
many of their opponents into exile. But 
these opposition groups represent a var- 
iety of political and programmatic view- 
points. They are committed to 
presenting those viewpoints to the 
Nicaraguan people in a competitive 
democratic process and would do so if 
given the opportunity. 

Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and 
Alfonso Robelo lead the main resistance 



Chart 



10,000- 



Cuban & Soviet 
Aid to Nicaragua 



5,000— 



Cuban Advisors 

(approximate total, 
military & civilian) 



— 



Z7 ^ 




— 250 



200 



Millions of 
U.S. Dollars 



-100 



1979 



1980 



1981 



1982 

Soviet Bloc 
Military Aid 



1983 



1984 



1985 



-0 



organization, the United Nicaraguan Op- 
position (UNO). All three actively op- 
posed Somoza while he was still in 
power. Calero was jailed by Somoza; 
first Robelo then Cruz became junta 
members with the Sandinistas until they 
could no longer accept betrayal of 
democratic principles and of Nicaraguan 
national interests. 

The largest guerrilla forces belong 
to the Nicaraguan Democratic Force 
(FDN), headed by Calero since 1983. 
Other important resistance organizations 
include ARDE [Democratic Revolution- 
ary Alliance], built by Robelo and 
former Sandinista Comandante Eden 
Pastora, and MISURASATA [MisWto, 
Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista] and 
KISAN [United Indigenous Peoples of 
Eastern Nicaragua] guerrillas active 
among the Indians of the Atlantic coast. 
Resistance fighters are overwhelm- 
ingly rural youths. Most are between 18 
and 22 years old. They are fighting to 
defend their small plots of land, their i 
churches, and in some cases their in- | 
digenous cultures. Some joined the 
resistance rather than be forced to fight 
for the Sandinistas against their friends 
and neighbors. In defending their fami- 
lies and communities, these young 
Nicaraguans are fighting for self- 
determination above all else. 

The commanders are more likely to 
come from urban areas and have more 
diverse occupations and backgrounds. 
They include both former National 
Guardsmen and former Sandinista fight-i 
ers, but most are civiUans from the very 
groups the Sandinistas claim to repre- 
sent: peasants, small farmers, urban 
professionals, and students. One was a 
primary school teacher; another, an 
evangelical pastor. 

Chart III (see p. 38) depicts the back 
grounds of the 153 most senior military 
leaders of the FDN as of last Novem- 
ber. The FDN has the largest number 
of former military professionals; 
however, less than half the commanders 
have prior military experience. And 
notice a key fact that many have tried 
to hide: a full 20% of the FDN leaders 
joined the resistance after serving in th 
Sandinista army, militia, or security 
services. 

The evidence irrefutably confirms 
that the Nicaraguan resistance is the 
product of a popular, pervasive, and 
democratic revolt. 



34 



Department of State Built' 



THE SECRETARY 



hart II 



Sandinista Repression 

& the Growth of Armed Resistance: 

1979 - 1985 



Armed Resistance 
(Estimated Totals) 



■15,000 



-10,000 



5,000 



x: 



1979 



1981 



1983 



1985 



-0 



\W?A w \\ \\ 






\'V 












•^ ■^ ^ 
%. <?.. 









As Latin Americans, however, our 
neighbors also reject Cuban-Soviet inter- 
vention. And when Cuban pilots fly 
Soviet helicopters, it is not the United 
States that is injecting the East- West 
conflict into Central America. It is the 
Soviets, and that is how it is perceived 
in Latin America. 

So Nicaragua poses a problem on 
two levels. The Latin American dimen- 
sion they feel that they can and must 
deal with themselves; the Soviet dimen- 
sion they beUeve only we are strong 
enough to deal with. This is a point they 
have made to us repeatedly. The Latin 
American foreign ministers told me 
when I met with them on February 10 
that they agreed with us that Cuban- 
Soviet intervention in Nicaragua was 
unacceptable. 

Of course, though nobody wants a 
second Cuba, most would oppose any 
direct U.S. military intervention in 
Nicaragua. But we are not making a 
case for direct U.S. military action. We 
are making a case for helping 
Nicaraguan democrats to help them- 
selves. If our policy advances democ- 
racy, we vrill always have at least tacit 
support. 

Latin American support— indeed, 
enthusiasm— for democracy is evident. I 
would hope that by now ours is, too. 



EMOCRACY AS THE 
EMISPHERIC ANSWER 

hroughout these 6% years while 
icaragua was trading one dictatorship 
r another, the rest of the hemisphere 
as making an unprecedented and 
storic turn toward democracy. 

The maps on pages 36 and 37 illus- 
ate the shift to democracy in Latin 
merica and the Caribbean over the 
ist 10 years. The map on the left 
aows the politics of the region in 1976, 
■hile the one on the right shows the sit- 
ition today. 

Largely or entirely democratic and 
)en societies are green. Dictatorships 
■ military regimes are showTi in light 
•owTi. Three countries not readily 
tegorized as either democracies or dic- 
■torships are colored gray. 

Ten countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
razil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
•liatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Uru- 



guay) joined the democratic column in 
this last decade. 

Since the fall of Duvalier in Haiti, 
Nicaragua is one of only five dictator- 
ships or miUtary regimes left in all of 
Latin America (the others being Chile, 
Cuba, Paraguay, and Suriname). 

The question is sometimes asked 
whether any Latin American country 
supports our Nicaraguan policy. But 
isn't a better question whether any 
Latin American country (other than 
Cuba) supports Nicaragua's policies? 
Differences between the United States 
and our allies, to the extent they exist 
at all, are not over policy goals but over 
how to achieve them. 

Nicaragua poses very complicated is- 
sues for Latin Americans, as it does for 
us. Latin Americans are properly con- 
cerned about the defense of sovereignty 
and the rejection of foreign intervention. 
History has focused much of that rejec- 
tion against past military interventions 
by the United States. 



WHY PRESSURE IS NECESSARY 

If democracy is our objective, why do 
we want to pressure Nicaragua? The 
answer is simple: we want a political 
solution. The Nicaraguan communists do 
not. They want a political solution only 
if they can violate it militarily. Pressure 
is the one way to bring them to the bar- 
gaining table ready to bargain. Power 
and diplomacy must go hand in hand. 

A vote for miUtary assistance to the 
democratic resistance will give Con- 
tadora a better chance to succeed, be- 
cause it will give the Sandinistas an 
incentive to negotiate seriously— 
something they have yet to do. They did 
not negotiate with the Carter Adminis- 
tration when the United States was 
Nicaragua's largest supplier of aid. And 
they did not negotiate seriously either 
with us or vdth their neighbors when 
the Congress suspended all aid to the 
resistance 2 years ago. On the contrary, 
in the fall of 1984, instead of bringing 
their political opponents back into the 
political process through competitive 
elections, the Sandinistas imported as- 
sault helicopters from the Soviet Union. 



pril 1986 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



Mexico 



1976 





-^ 




£ 


a Whe Bahamas 






° Cuba~\_?"^i_^ ^ 




f /' 


^2- — ^ ^-^,__— ^omtntcan Republic 




"^^j-n 


Jamaica 




,--V y^ iL-^~-^ 




r-. 

D 


^\{ /HondurasJ 


^ 


« 


Guatemala^ "^^^^ f^"^ 
El Salvador V 


] _^?>^^ 


' ' Barbados 
* Grenada 


NIcaraguaN. 


\ Panama J J (.} 


='r\ Trinidad and Tobago 


Cosia Rica^ 


^^^\S \y \ Venezuela 


Guyan^ ->^ 




) Colombia > Y^ 


^ 4r,n.m.l 



Ecuador 



Types of Government, 

LATIN AMERICA and 

The CARIBBEAN: 

1976 and 1986 



Peru 



Brazil 



Bolivia 



Paraguay ' 



Largely or entirely democratic 
and open societies 

Dictatorships or military regimes 



Not categorized 

Note: Haiti was a dictatorstiip 
until February 7. 1986. 



Chile; 



Uruguay i 



Argentina 



36 



THE SECRETARY 



1986 



Mexico 




Cuba 



<^^-1 — -^omtnlcan Republic 
Haltul} ^^ 



>ph« 

and Nevis 

Anttgua and Barhuda 



Guatemala 

El Salvador^ 



Nicaragua^ 

Costa Rlca^ 



SI. viMeni and .'Saml Lucia 
Ihe Grenadines / Barbados 

Grenada 
* ^ Trinidad and Tobago 



Venezuela 



Guyana > 



Colombia 



Ecuador 



Peru 



Brazil 



Bolivia 



Argentina 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



Military pressure is just as essential 
now to convince the Sandinistas to 
negotiate a political solution as it was 
critical in convincing them to agree to 
the Contadora process in the first place. 

The United States can now help the 
Contadora process by doing two things 
simultaneously: 

First, the United States must sup- 
port Contadora politically and diplo- 
matically, so as to help keep the 
negotiating process alive for the day 
when the Sandinistas finally do nego- 
tiate. This support must include cooper- 
ating in the staff work needed to ensure 
verification of any agreement. After the 
Sandinistas' record in repudiating their 
commitments to the Organization of 
American States, who would trust an 
agreement that is not enforceable? 



Second, the United States must 
support the Nicarag:uan resistance, so 

as to sustain pressure on the Sandinis- 
tas to accept meaningful negotiations 
toward a workable Contadora agree- 
ment. Why would the Sandinistas 
negotiate if there were no armed 
resistance? 



WHAT WE ARE ASKING 

Carefully thought-out and implemented 
assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance can make a difference. The 
President transmitted his proposal to 
you 2 days ago only after we had con- 
sulted widely with our friends in Cen- 
tral America and in the Contadora 



Background of 

FDN Military Leaders: 

Late 1985 




Total Civilian 53o/o 

Total National Guard 27o/o 
Total Sandinista 20% 



Group as well as with the members of 
this committee and others in the 
Congress. 

• $100 million would be made availa- 
ble to the Nicaraguan democratic J 
resistance by transfer from the FY ■ 
[fiscal year] 1986 Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act. Twenty-five percent 
would become available immediately, 
with an additional 15% released every 
90 days through the end of September 
1987, as reports are submitted to 
Congress. 

• $30 million of the total $100 mil- 
lion package would be reserved for hu- 
manitarian assistance administered by 
the existing Nicaraguan Humanitarian 
Assistance Office (including $3 million 
specifically earmarked for human rights 
programs and activities). The President 
would be free to use the remaining $70 
million for any kind of assistance he 
deems appropriate, using whatever 
agencies he desires, subject to normal 
procedures for congressional oversight. 
If properly led and trained, the armed 
resistance will be able to minimize the 
suffering of Nicaraguan noncombatants 
during military operations. The United 
States expects that the armed resist- 
ance wall follow a code of conduct on th 
battlefield that vdll protect noncombat- 
ants and prisoners. 

• In the event of a peaceful resolu- 1 
tion of the conflict in Central America, 
any remaining balance of the $100 mil- 
lion could be used (through the end of 
FY 1987) for relief, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction purposes in the countriej 
of Central America, including 
Nicaragua. 

All current statutory conditions on 
involvement by intelligence agencies j 
would be satisfied by congressional [ 
approval of the President's request. | 
At the same time, we are not breaking 
relations with the Sandinista govern- 
ment. This demonstrates our willingnei 
to keep open the lines of communicatio 
It strengthens the possibility of a peac 
ful settlement. It increases everyone's 
ability to cooperate. And it maintains 
the program's operational viability. 

We are thus asking for an overt 
vote on a program that will operate 
within clearly defined parameters. We 
see these parameters, if Congress , 
approves the President's request, as | 
follows: 

• U.S. policy toward Nicaragua wi 
be based on Nicaraguan responsivenes 
to U.S. concerns about Soviet/Cuban 
ties, military buildup, support for sub- 



38 



Department of State Bull< 



THE SECRETARY 



ersion, internal repression, and refusal 
) negotiate. 

• The United States will address 
lese concerns through economic, politi- 
il, and diplomatic measures, as well as 
ipport for the resistance. In particular: 

— We will engage in simulta- 
30US talks with Nicaragua if Nicaragua 
ill also engage in internal dialogue as 
f-oposed by UNO (the UNO proposal 
eludes a cease-fire and lifting of the 
late of emergency); and 

— We will respond positively to 
her steps by the Govemment of Nica- 
igua toward meeting our concerns. 

• Any easing of U.S. pressure on 
icai-agua will be implemented, after 
nsultation with Congress, by reference 

observable Nicaraguan conduct (e.g., 
isedom of the press, reduced arms 
[liveries or foreign military presence, 
ppect for a cease-fire). 

• The U.S. actions shall be consist- 
it with our right to defend ourselves 
d assist our allies for the purpose of 
(lieving a comprehensive, verifiable 
mtadora agreement and democratic 
;onciliation in Nicaragua, without the 
a of force by the United States. 

ii • The President will report to Con- 
jjss every 90 days on diplomatic 
brts, human rights, and use of appro- 
bated funds. This is the same as cur- 
i\t reporting requirements. 

I should note that the objectives 
•lected in these undertakings are not 
lise of the United States alone. Each 
ithem, including national reconciliation 
lough dialogue with the armed opposi- 
ii, are agreed objectives of the Conta- 
!'-a process. We are asking the Sandi- 
:tas to do no more than what they 
fmselves have ostensibly agreed are 
\ steps essential to a lasting peace in 
'itral America. 



CONCLUSION 

Either we are willing to act on a vital 
issue close to our shores at a critical 
moment when the world is watching, or 
we are not. Either we help Nicaraguans 
to gain their freedom, or we do not. In 
Europe and in the Middle East, in 
Afghanistan and in Cambodia, in South 
America and in southern Africa, our 
friends and our enemies will draw their 
own conclusions from what we decide. 
The Sandinistas' record in dealing 
with Nicaraguans and other Central 
Americans makes clear that the resist- 
ance is the only constraint they recog- 
nize. As long as the Sandinistas are free 
to try to expand their revolution, the 
killing and misery will continue in Cen- 
tral America. 

Only a democratic opening in Nica- 
ragua can alter these dim prospects. 
And the resistance is the major element 
in the present equation that can help 
create that opening. Nicaraguans are 
disenchanted with the Sandinistas; more 
Nicaraguans are likely to join the resist- 
ance if they believe the United States 
will support the restoration of the revo- 
lution's original goals. 

U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan resist- 
ance may intensify support for the San- 
dinistas among certain individuals who 
are already firmly in their camp, but we 
do not see the ranks of Sandinista sup- 
porters growing as a result of our back- 
ing of the resistance. On the contrary, 
our assistance will give heart to the 
vast majority of Nicaraguans who yearn 
for freedom. 

Opposition to U.S. aid to the resist- 
ance is greatest outside Nicaragua, 
wherever people do not appreciate that 
the Sandinistas depend on violence as a 
pohtical tool, or where they lack infor- 
mation about the extent of Sandinista 
abuses of human rights, or among those 
who do not realize that the true under- 
dogs are the Nicaraguan people and 
their neighbors who are resisting violent 
minorities backed by military aid from 
Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Reactions 
among former Sandinista sympathizers 



suggest that the reality of the new 
tyranny in Nicaragua is being increas- 
ingly understood in Europe as well as 
Latin America and the United States. 

The bottom line is this: absent a 
credible challenge to their militarized 
control of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas 
have no incentive to negotiate a lasting 
political solution to the conflict in Cen- 
tral America. The resistance can provide 
such a challenge— if we help. Without 
military aid to the resistance, the San- 
dinistas will simply monopolize power 
and continue to destabilize their neigh- 
bors. If the Central American house 
remains divided against itself, prospects 
for democracy would ultimately be 
doomed in the region as a whole as well 
as Nicaragua. 

The United States has both moral 
and strategic interests in the consolida- 
tion of democracy in this hemisphere. To 
the extent that we support Latin Ameri- 
cans who are struggling for objectives 
similar to ours, we reduce the likelihood 
of having to intervene to protect our 
interests and defend our allies. If there 
were no armed resistance, we might 
ultimately confront choices even more 
difficult than this one. 

Under the expedited procedures that 
Congress has provided, the President is 
entitled to a vote on his request. A posi- 
tive vote is essential to protect our stra- 
tegic interests, preserve opportunities 
for diplomacy, and assure that the prog- 
ress made in recent years in El Sal- 
vador, Honduras, and Guatemala will 
not be reversed and that Costa Rica will 
maintain its democracy. 

There are many uncertainties ahead 
in Nicaragua. We are fully aware of 
them. But we are also aware that there 
were many uncertainties in El Salvador, 
in Central America generally, and most 
recently in Haiti and the Philippines. 
We were right in El Salvador. Castro, 
and the Soviets, and the Libyans, and 
the Nicaraguan communists have clearly 
made their choice. Now it is up to us to 
make ours. 



'Press release 33. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from "the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govem- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. ■ 



|il 1986 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



Foreign Policy Challenges 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on February 5, 1986.^ 

This decade continues to be a time of 
turbulence in the world— but I also see 
it as a time of great promise and oppor- 
tunity for U.S. foreign policy. A year 
ago, I made a number of speeches and 
statements stressing that the world was 
changing and that our ways of thinking 
needed to keep up with new realities. 
Most of the new trends in the world 
were positive; thus, if we were imagina- 
tive and bold— and strong— we could 
help shape events in accordance with 
our vision of a better world. 

Across the globe, we saw new evi- 
dence of the powerful appeal of liberty; 
we saw democracy take root in country 
after country, demonstrating the vitality 
and relevance of our ideals. We saw a 
kind of revolution in economic thinking, 
in which old truths about economic free- 
dom and the true sources of economic 
progress were newly appreciated; with 
the dawn of a new era of technology, 
the open and free economic systems 
seemed to have an advantage. 

We also learned some lessons about 
the relation between power and diplo- 
macy and about how strength, staying 
power, and a willingness to negotiate 
were crucial if we were to help resolve 



have responded to some of these chal- 
lenges and about the challenges likely to 
confront us in the coming months. 

Democracy on the March 

1985 confirmed what we have always 
felt and increasingly known to be true: 
that the yearning for political freedom, 
far from being culture-bound, is one of 
the most powerful forces across the 
planet. The past year confirmed, too, 
that the United States, as the strongest 
free nation on Earth, is a crucial source 
of inspiration and support to peoples 
aspiring to liberty. 

The most dramatic example of this 
truth is Latin America, where Guate- 
mala is only the latest in a series of 
countries that have abandoned military 
rule for elected civiMan government. In 
the last 6 years, elected civilian leaders 
have replaced authoritarian regimes in 
Argentina, Bohvia, Brazil, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Hon- 
duras, Peru, and Uruguay. Over 90% of 
all people in Latin America and the 
Caribbean now enjoy democratic govern- 
ment, as opposed to less than one-third 
in the early 1980s. 

A few years ago, critics of Central 
America and U.S. policy toward that 
region were skeptical that democracy 
could gain support in an environment 



democratic experiment. If we truly be- 
lieve in human rights and economic and 
social progress, we must keep that les- 
son in mind as the peoples aspiring to 
freedom turn to us for support in the 
coming months. 

The most immediate danger to 
democracy in Central America, of 
course, is the assault on it from com- 
munist Nicaragua, aided by Cuba and 
the Soviet Union. Democratic El Sal- 
vador is an outstanding example of a 
country that has managed to withstand 
a communist insurgency, and we have 
been privileged to play a part by our 
encouragement and help. So our policy- 
if we keep at it— is working. All the 
democracies of Central America look to 
us for help in defending themselves. W( 
must support them. And we must sup- 
port, not abandon, the democratic 
resistance within Nicaragua, which we 
support for both moral and strategic 
reasons. We will be discussing with the 
Congress what this moral and strategic 
imperative requires. 



The most immediate danger to democracy in 
Central America ... is the assault on it from com- 
munist Nicaragua, aided by Cuba and the Soviet 
Union .... we must support, not abandon, the 
democratic resistance within Nicaragua 



political problems. On the negative side, 
we faced the continuing challenge from 
the Soviet Union, and we confronted the 
new scourge of terrorism— which re- 
quired new ways of thinking in order to 
defeat it. 

These are powerful trends. We have 
sought to meet them and shape them, 
and we have made some headway. Let 
me speak briefly today about how we 



where history and economic hardship 
seemed to impose such burdens. They 
are less skeptical now. They have seen 
the people themselves, in one free vote 
after another, demonstrate their belief 
that democracy is the road to a better 
life for themselves and their children. 
They have also seen that our moral sup- 
port and economic and security assist- 
ance can help make the difference 
between the success and failure of this 



Toward Open Markets 

The past few years have also confirmee 
the connection between freedom and 
economic progress. In the early 1980s, 
this Administration developed economic 
policies aimed at liberating the creativ- 
ity of the American people. The results 
speak for themselves: 9 milhon new jol 
in this country in the last 3 years, help 
ing pull the world economy out of recei 
sion, and inflation running at a level 
one-third of that prevailing 5 years age 

The world economy is still troubled 
But nations everywhere are rediscover 
ing the basic truth that the source of 
economic growth is individual creativity 
not the state. The same laws of eco- i 
nomics apply to developed and develop- 
ing countries alike, and the countries 
that apply its truths are reaping the 
rewards. 

Much remains to be done. The trad 
practices of our alUes and friends are 
particularly important to us. Economic i 
growth is one of the free world's great 
est strengths. It is vital not only for oi 
standard of living but also for our polit 
cal cooperation and mutual defense. TI 
Bonn economic summit last year show<i 
a convergence of views on how to pro- 
mote growth, jobs, and prosperity in t 
world economy. And the United State: 
has recently taken the lead in devel- 
oping a balanced approach to the chal- 
lenges of debt and economic adjustmei 
facing many developing nations. i 



40 



Department of State Bullci 



I cannot overemphasize the impor- 
mce of avoiding protectionism— a 
lenace not only to our foreign policy 
lartnerships but to any hopes of stimu- 
iting global growth. We continue to 
•ork vigorously to open markets 
iroughout the world to U.S. goods and 
^rvices. 



THE SECRETARY 



will pursue the Geneva negotiations 
with energy and good faith and without 
artificial deadlines. We will also pursue 
them with a sense that we may be at a 
rare moment of opportunity. 

Strength and diplomacy are not con- 
tradictory. In fact, they go hand in 



We also know that more needs to be 
done. We will continue to marshal all 
the weapons in our arsenal— nonmilitary 
and military— against the terrorist 
threat. We must continue to improve 
our intelligence capabilities and achieve 
closer cooperation and coordination with 



iOwer, Diplomacy, 
nd the Summit 

ur liberty and our economic well-being 
3th depend on our security. And our 
?curity depends on a policy of realism, 
rength, and a willingness to solve 
-oblems through diplomacy. The meet- 
g last November between President 
eagan and General Secretary Gorba- 
■lev was a good e.xample, teaching some 
ndamental lessons about the conduct 
i' diplomacy and negotiation in the 
lodem age. 

The Soviet Union continues to pose 
le most profound challenges to Ameri- 
in and free world interests and ideals. 
Iir countries are governed by irrecon- 
lable views of the world. Nevertheless, 
le realities of the nuclear age mean 
I at we must pursue constructive rela- 
Ims with the Soviets whenever we can 
: so without violating our principles. 
i; the Geneva summit showed, con- 
■•uctive negotiations are possible. 

In the 1970s, we let our defenses 
:p; for a time we seemed to shy away 
bm a strong role of leadership; and the 
orld became a more dangerous place. 
le had to make a major effort in the 
180s to rebuild our defenses, and I 
:lieve we have recovered our self- 
^-ifidence as a nation. And it stands to 
'ison that American strength and con- 
'inc.\- of purpose are a prerequisite to 
;;cessful negotiations and a more con- 
i-uctive relationship with the Soviet 
lion. Defense preparedness and main- 
lance of our strategic modernization 
•igram, including the MX [missile] and 
' Strategic Defense Initiative, remain 
icial. Now is the time to support our 
isic interests and our negotiating posi- 
ri at what could be a promising mo- 
mt in the quest for a safer world. 
! We approached the Geneva summit 
^ spirit of both aspiration and real- 
|i, and we will bring that spirit to our 
Totiations with the Soviets through 
■ coming year. Our agenda, as before, 
braces four sets of issues: arms re- 
'^tion, regional conflicts, human rights, 
i bilateral relations. We will continue 
seek agreements with the Soviets 
-enever they are in our interest. We 



Our agenda [with the Soviets], as before, embraces 
four sets of issues: arms reduction, regional 
conflicts, human rights, and bilateral relations. We 
will continue to seek agreements with the Soviets 
whenever they are in our interest. 



hand. And the same principle holds true 
in our efforts to promote political solu- 
tions to regional conflicts around the 
world, whether in southern Africa, Cen- 
tral America, Southeast Asia, or South- 
west Asia. 

Responding to Terrorist Warfare 

Another challenge— one of the most im- 
portant we face in 1986— is international 
terrorism. The December terrorist at- 
tacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, 
aided and abetted by the Libyan Gov- 
ernment, are only the most recent 
reminder of this scourge of our age. 
And yet we have made headway— both 
in understanding what terrorism is and 
in formulating our responses to it. 

We have all come to understand that 
terrorism is a form of warfare waged by 
political forces— including some sover- 
eign states— that are hostile to democ- 
racy and determined to undermine the 
position of the West. We know it is not 
random violence but violence directed 
against our values and interests and 
against our diplomatic efforts for peace- 
ful solutions to conflicts. There is a 
growing international recognition that a 
policy of appeasement of terror offers no 
protection. 

We are not without recourse. We 
intercepted the aircraft carrying the 
Achille Lauro hijackers to ensure that 
they would be brought to justice. We 
took broad economic and other measures 
against Libya. And, as the President 
has pointed out, we and our friends 
have succeeded in foiling 126 planned 
terrorist attacks last year by acting in 
advance. 



other governments. International law 
supports measures of self-defense and 
offers important avenues for effective 
international cooperation. The U.S. 
Government has strengthened itself 
organizationally. We amended our own 
criminal law in October 1984 to give us 
new tools against terrorism— an example 
of productive cooperation between Con- 
gress and the President. 

This is an area, I know, in which the 
American people will want to see their 
government acting flexibly, swiftly, and 
effectively against terrorist threats. 

No review of this subject would be 
complete without noting the six Ameri- 
cans who remain missing in Lebanon. 
Their safe return remains a priority con- 
cern for the U.S. Government. Our in- 
tensive efforts will continue until these 
missing Americans have returned home, 
safe and sound. 

Our battle against terrorism will be 
long and arduous. But if we have the 
will, we can prevail over this challenge 
as we have over so many others in our 
history. 

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 

Let me finish on a very practical note: 
the Department of State is determined 
to do its fair share, under the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings legislation, to cut the 
Federal budget deficit. Cutting that 
deficit is essential for many reasons, in- 
cluding the health of our own economy 
and the world economy. 

The Department of State is inten- 
sively reviewing the way we do business 
at home and abroad in order to reduce 
costs and operate more efficiently and 
effectively. We have a special task force 



rll 1986 



41 



THE SECRETARY 



I 



to reassess our structure and opera- 
tions. In the short run, we are reducing 
travel and stretching out equipment 
purchases; we will also review employ- 
ment and new hiring; and we will re- 
assess our number of posts abroad and 
the possibilities for streamlining their 
operations. 

We recognize we have a burden of 
proof to meet in requesting more funds. 
The increases in our FY [fiscal year] 
1987 request come mainly in improving 
protection of our diplomatic personnel 
and facilities abroad. Our security assist- 
ance request, which seems higher when 
compared to the post-Gramm-Rudman- 
HoUings levels of FY 1986, is essentially 
the same as was requested in FY 1986. 
We are not seeking large increases in 
security assistance; rather, we are con- 
tinuing to seek a level of resources ade- 
quate to meet our international commit- 
ments and to pursue aggressively our 
national security interests. The Presi- 
dent has detennined that these are 
among the government's highest priori- 
ties. The resources we are requesting 
have been accommodated vdthin the FY 
1987 budget and the deficit target con- 
tained in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
legislation. 

The dangers to our personnel and 
facilities from rising terrorism are 
known to all; the level of economic and 
security assistance requested is essential 
to our foreign policy interests. However, 
we regard the increase in security 
assistance for FY 1987 as a transition: 
we are already shifting toward increas- 
ing the proportion of grant and conces- 
sional lending in our overall program. 
By increasing the true economic value of 
our program, we have been able to 
accommodate lower funding levels. But 
I must stress that any precipitous 
reduction in current levels, wdthout 
giving time for adjustment to those 
countries which have long depended on 
us, could help our adversaries and do 
great damage to our security interests. 
I look forward to discussing these 
matters in depth with the committee in 
the future. We must work together to 
ensure that we and our aid partners 
derive the maximum economic value 
from the resources provided by 
Congress. 

Prospects 

In summary, the world remains a turbu- 
lent and sometimes dangerous place. 
But as we look ahead, we draw strength 
from our ideals, from our friends and 
the young democratic nations who have 



joined our ranks and now look to us for 
support. America remains a beacon to 
the freedom-loving peoples of the world. 
Powerful trends are on the side of free- 
dom. That is one of the lessons of 1985. 

Another major lesson is that real- 
ism, strength, and staying power are 
crucial prerequisites to meeting the 
challenges we face. History won't do our 
work for us. We have to be worthy of 
our opportunities. 

And one key to our success will be 
bipartisanship. This noble tradition, 
which brought us so many dividends in 
the postwar years, does not ask any of 
us to abandon our principles. But it does 
require all of us to recognize how much 
harder it is to meet foreign challenges if 



we are not united at home. In recent 
years, we have seen signs of a rebirth 
of the postwar bipartisan consensus- 
based on a realistic understanding of th( 
world as it is and of the need to negoti- 
ate differences where possible. I pledge 
my efforts, and those of the President, 
to work in a bipartisan spirit with all 
members of the Congress on behalf of 
the peace, freedom, and security of this 
country. 

iPress release 22. The complete Iran- -fl 
script of the hearings will be published by ' 
the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. ■ 



Enhancing Diplomatic Security 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Senate Coyyimittee on Foreign Rela- 
tions on February i, 1986.^ 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
speak in support of the Administration's 
proposals to strengthen the security of 
U. S. diplomatic operations. These 
proposals are based on the recommenda- 
tions of the Advisory Panel on Overseas 
Security [Inman panel] and much work 
and thought in the Department and 
other interested agencies. 

Over the past few years, the atten- 
tion of the world has been riveted to 
terrorist dramas unfolding around the 
globe. This is a new and chilling phe- 
nomenon, one with which civilized 
nations and civilized peoples are inade- 
quately equipped to deal. That can and 
must change. We must do everything 
we can to thwart those who seek to 
advance their ends through terror. We 
must protect official Americans and 
their dependents from these criminal 
activities. 

We in the State Department and our 
colleagues from other agencies serving 
abroad are on the front line. Our friends 
and colleagues have been victims of this 
violence. But the challenge of terrorism 
has strengthened our determination. 
The courage and patriotism of our peo- 
ple and their families in the face of 
these dangers are inspiring. 

We must spare no effort to ensure 
the safety of the people and facilities of 
all agencies abroad. In this period of 
budgetary stringency, this task must be 
a priority. Therefore, we have designed 



a program which, in our view, is pru- 
dent, thoroughly thought out. efficient 
in its commitment of resources— yet 
responsive to the inescapable necessity 
we now face. 

The United States has always built 
handsome and accessible embassies and 
consulates abroad. Our object was to bi 
easily accessible— to demonstrate to 
other peoples the openness of our soci- 
ety and the hand of friendship we 
extend to all. We wanted the local 
populace to see a "welcome" sign abovi 
our door and to feel comfortable in 
entering our buildings. This is the 
essence of the job we do overseas, and 
we have been highly successful at it. 

We are now faced with a new 
situation: the current security and 
terrorist problems have left those 
same buildings vulnerable. Our chal- 
lenge is to strengthen our security 
against the new dangers so that we ^ 
can maintain our tradition of openness . 
and accessibility. We will not let the | 
terrorists win their victory by isolating 
us, foi-cing us to close our doors, or i 
denying us our contacts with the peo- [ 
pies of the countries in which we are , 
represented. I 

The Advisory Panel 

on Overseas Security j 

With this goal in mind, I formed the 
Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, 
chaired by Admiral Inman. I asked the 
panel to take a hard look at our securil 
and counterterrorism programs. I didn 
want or need an apologia; I wanted 
ideas and recommendations. 



42 



Department of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



I am extremely pleased with the 
anol's report. The hard work and dedi- 
itioii of the panel is clearly reflected in 
le (|uality of its report. The panel 
vihaustively researched all aspects of 
jr security and counterterrorism pro- 
rams. Its recommendations have vision 
id, perhaps more importantly, are 
ractical. They are recommendations 
hich, with vour support, are achiev- 
ple. 

The panel gave us 91 recommenda- 
bns. We have implemented 45, and 
ork is underway on 20 more. An addi- 
Dnal 20 are awaiting the resources 
-•quested in this proposed legislation. 
; The recommendations focused on 
ree central points: 

• That a Bureau of Diplomatic Secu- 
;y with a Diplomatic Security Service 

f established in the Department to 
jcrease the professionalism of our secu- 
ty personnel and progi-ams; 
; • That my overall responsibility and 
,t of the Chiefs of Mission for ovei'- 
,s security programs be emphasized 
cause such supervision is fundamental 
good management; and 
[i • That significant new resources be 
Side available for a comprehensive 
firldwide security progi-am to protect 
i government employees abroad. A 
•y element here is a major multiyear 
nstruction program to rebuild or 
'Dlace embassies and consulates over- 
Hs which fall significantly below our 
:ysical and technical security stand- 
ds. Other elements are the upgrading 
Jour communications to state-of-the-art 
i'hnology so they are faster and more 
j;ure and improved intelligence-sharing 
':h host governments and within our 
)n government. 

Hions Taken 

[e Bureau of Diplomatic Security and 
;!■ Diplomatic Security Service have 
J 'II I'stablished, with your support, 
lough reprogramming of funds. In 
ilition, using existing funds and 
i.horities, we have already: 

• Started an ambitious recruitment 
inpaign to bring on board nearly 300 
1 V security agents during fiscal year 
.'-) 1986 and to more than double the 
mber of overseas security officers 
>ore the end of this fiscal year; 

• Significantly improved training for 
i'lurity agents; 

< • Streamlined threat-alert proce- 
•es; 



Increased the number of local 
irds worldwide; 



• Added more marines and marine 
guard detachments to posts; 

• Nearly doubled the size of our 
armored vehicle fleet overseas; 

• Made significant physical security 
improvements at 152 posts in 1985; and 

• Dispatched mobile training teams 
to high-threat posts to provide special- 
ized security training to U.S. Govern- 
ment personnel, dependents, and 
Foreign Service nationals. 

Administration's Proposals 

The Administration's proposals now 
before you will, in addition, do three 
things: 

First, they would authorize a 5-year 
construction progi-am to replace or 
upgrade our most vulnerable posts and 
further authorize improvements in com- 
munications and intelligence-sharing, all 
as recommended by the Inman panel. 

Second, our proposals would com- 
plete the reorganization of our security 
program, as recommended by the Inman 
panel, by providing for a new Assistant 
Secretary of State to head a Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security and for a Director 
of the Diplomatic Security Service. The 
bureau would be responsible for all 
operational aspects of our security pro- 
gi'am. We would authorize certain spe- 
cial recruitment and performance 
standards for members of the Diplo- 
matic Security Service and emphasize 
such operational matters as residential, 
perimeter, and technical security. 

In one respect, we have gone 
beyond the recommendations of the 
Inman panel. Where the panel favored 
placing the policy arm of our counter- 
terrorism effort with the Under Secre- 
tary for Political Affairs, we have, 
through reprogi'amming, created an 
Ambassador at Large for Counter- 
terrorism, reporting directly to me. 
Before this reorganization last Novem- 
ber 4, this policy function rested with an 
office reporting to the Under Secretary 
for Management. This reorganization 
demonstrates the high priority we place 
on counterterrorism; it strengthens the 
interagency role of this key office on the 
many issues on which the State Depart- 
ment is the lead agency. 

Third, our proposals would revise 
and clarify the chain of command for 
overseas security, fixing supervisory 
responsibility directly on the chief of 
mission and the Secretary of State. 
They would also formahze and expand 
the current process by which responsi- 
ble officials are held accountable for 
their actions— or inaction. We would 



now have an automatic investigation 
whenever there is a security breach that 
results in serious bodily injury, loss of 
life, or significant damage to our 
property. 

Although the draft bill requests 
"such sums as may be necessary," the 
Administration's total authorization 
funding requirement for this program is 
$4.4 billion spread over 5 years. Of this 
total, $2.7 billion is for construction, and 
the balance is for related operating 
expenses including security officers, 
residential security improvements, and 
more secure communications equipment. 
In fiscal year 1986, the Administration 
is requesting $237 million for salaries 
and expenses and $455 million for con- 
struction. In FY 1987, the Administra- 
tion is requesting $304 million for 
salaries and expenses and $1.1 billion for 
construction for this jarogram. 

The Construction Program 

The Inman panel recommended several 
new security standards— a 100-foot set- 
back, for example. I have accepted these 
standards, and the set-back shall be the 
goal for our buildings, wherever feasi- 
ble. Many posts do not meet these 
standards; thus, a new building program 
is needed. 

Many posts front onto busy streets. 
Some have extensive glass facades. 
Often we share office buildings with 
other organizations and businesses. In 
still other cases, our embassies and con- 
sulates share walls with non-U. S. Gov- 
ernment tenants. All this is clearly and 
generally undesirable and simply un- 
acceptable in a gi-eat many situations. 

The program places its highest pri- 
ority on buildings at locations where the 
security threat is greatest and which 
are substantially below the new stand- 
ards. 

Great effort has gone into creating a 
security construction program which 
would ensure that buildings are de- 
signed and built to meet stringent secu- 
rity standards, on time and within 
budget. It was clear from the outset 
that a massive expansion of the staff of 
our Foreign Buildings Office to imple- 
ment such a major program was not the 
answer. We have, instead, developed an 
implementation plan based on the fol- 
lowing policies: 

• Use of "fast track" and "design/ 
build" methods to accelerate the design 
and construction process so that proj- 
ects can be completed more quickly than 
was possible under previous programs; 



Ml 1986 



43 



THE SECRETARY 



• Use of risk analysis, construct- 
ability, and value engineering reviews to 
ensure that design requirements are 
compatible with local conditions, mate- 
rial availability, and technical capabili- 
ties and are cost-effective; 

• Upgrade of construction contractor 
tiualification requirements to ensure that 
construction awards are made to con- 
tractors with the financial, organiza- 
tional, and technical qualifications 
necessary for successful completion of a 
major overseas building program; 

• Allocation of sufficient resources 
to onsite construction oversight and 
inspection to ensure that buildings are 
constructed to required standards; and 

• Use of recommendations from a 
major research progi-am undertaken for 
our Foreign Buildings Office by the 
National Academy of Sciences; these 
provide the scientific and technical 
bases, in the form of pei-formance-based 
security design criteria, for the design 
and construction of future embassy 
buildings. 

The private sector will play a key 
role in ensuring effective management 
and implementation of the building pro- 
gram. We have published a synopsis of 
our program in the Commerce Business 
Daily with a request for particulars of 
qualification and experience from pri- 
vate sector firms interested in providing 
us with progi-am, design and engineer- 
ing, construction, and operations man- 
agement services. 

We will be ready to enter into a con- 
tract with our first private-sectoi- pro- 
gram manager immediately upon receipt 
of an authorization and appropriation 
from the Congress. 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

As I said earlier, this legislation would 
complete the reorganization of security 
responsibilties in the Department recom- 
mended by the Inman panel by: 

• Providing for an Assistant Secre- 
tary of State to head the new Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security; 

• Creating a Director of the Diplo- 
matic Security Service; 

• Establishing several special job- 
related requirements for membership in 
the Diplomatic Security Service; and 

• Increasing our emphasis on key 
operational security programs. 

The new bureau will concentrate on 
improving: 

• The security of the homes of our 
people and their families overseas; 



• Perimeter security at our facil- 
ities; 

• Technical security to update and 
improve our ability to cope with the 
unprecedented threat of sophisticated 
penetration systems used by hostile 
intelligence services against our facilities 
abroad; 

• Protection of foreign dignitaries in 
the United States; 

• Qualifications and performances of 
oui- local guards at overseas posts; 

• Professionalism and training for 
our security personnel; and 

• Security at Moscow and other 
East European posts by, among other 
things, substituting Americans for a 
substantial number of local employees 
now working in support positions. 

Diplomatic Security Service 

I envision the Diplomatic Security Serv- 
ice as a highly jji-ofessional security 
organization with the recognition and 
respect that biings. The panel called for 
increased professional training, physical 
fitness standards, and an identifiable 
career structure within the Foreign 
Service for the Department's security 
cadre. I strongly support these recom- 
mendations. 

The Diplomatic Security Service is 
to be staffed by drawing upon the exist- 
ing Foreign Service and Civil Service 
personnel systems. This proposal will 
not create a new personnel system. 
Rather it identifies a category of 
employees in the same manner as do the 
designations "political officer" or 
"economic officer." Qualifications 
required for assignment or appointment 
to positions in the Diplomatic Security 
Service will be prescribed by the Secre- 
tary of State. In the case of security 
officers, the position qualifications may 
include minimum and maximum entry- 
age limitations— perhaps 21 years mini- 
mum and 35 years maximum. Such limi- 
tations are commonly found in 
organizations having secuiity-related 
responsibilities. 

In addition, the position qualifica- 
tions for security officers will incorpo- 
rate the standards now requii-ed by law 
to carry out our security functions and 
to exercise the Department's law en- 
forcement authorities. As security offi- 
cers perform such unique functions as 
protecting lives and carrying firearms in 
certain situations, the Secretary will be 
authorized to issue regulations providing 
for special disciplinary procedures. This 
is a common practice among organiza- 
tions with security-related responsi- 
bilities. 



The Chain of Command 

The Inman panel concluded that man- 
agement of the security progi-am was 
overly fragmented and that the chain of 
command ought to be revised so that 
the resulting shai-per supervisory focus 
would encourage better management 
and protection of U.S. Government per- 
sonnel overseas. 

Therefore, the Administration's pro- 
posed legislation fixes overall responsi- 
bility and authority for the management 
and direction of the U.S. security pro- 
gram overseas on the Secretai'y of State 
and, through him, the Ambassador at 
post. 

We are working closely with other 
agencies to develop and agree upon 
appropriate security standards, proce- 
dures, and resource levels that are 
responsive to the needs of all U.S. 
Government agencies having facilities 
overseas, except for military bases. 
Physical security standards and proce- 
dures for USIA [United States Informa 
tion Agency] libraries and relay station; 
as well as AID [Agency for Inter- 
national Development] and other facili- 
ties located separately from embassies 
and consulates, may differ from those 
applied to embassies, consulates, and 
diplomatic residences. But the Ambas- 
sador at post and, through him, the 
Department will have central responsi- 
bility for security at these facilities as ^ 
well as our embassies. | 

This proposal does not affect the 
Washington-based security offices of 
other agencies. There is sound manage- ^ 
ment justification for each agency hav- ^ 
ing its own security advisers in , 

Washington. These advisers play an 
important role within their agencies, 
and we need their help in planning and 
implementing this program. 

The Administration's proposal also ^ 
does not affect the authority or respon| 
sibility of any other Federal, state, or ^ 
local agency with respect to law enforc, 
ment, domestic security operations, I 
intelligence activities as defined by f 
Executive order, or the provision of pri 
tective services by the Secret Service. , 

In reviewing the security chain of ' 
command, the Inman panel recommend** 
that we have a procedure established ij 
law to draw lessons from security dis- 
asters or to fix individual responsibilit;] 
if any, for such incidents. The Adminisf 
tration agrees, and this proposal 
expands our current procedures by 
creating Accountability Review Boards?' 
to investigate incidents involving serioj 
injury, loss of life, or significant destn 
tion of property at or related to U.S. 



44 



Department of State Bulk] 



THE SECRETARY 



loxenimi'iit missions abroad (othei- than 
lilitary installations). Such boards 
■•ould not only make findings i-elating to 
ecurity generally, but they would also 
etermine if a bi-each of duty by an indi- 
idual employee contributed to the ind- 
ent. The employing agency would 
eview and act on the findings of the 
oai'd. 

Conclusion 

'he Administration is proposing a 
lajor, national program to improve the 
hysical and technical security of all 
epartments and agencies abroad, e.\- 
?pt for military bases, as well as the 
hysical security of foreign missions and 
Ticials in this country. This proposed 
■gislation is the pi-oduct of long, hard 
ork to which many agencies have con- 
■ibuted and is intended to meet their 
>quirements. The most important con- 
ibutions have come from AID, USIA, 
I A [Central Intelligence Agency], 
,istice, Defense, 0PM [Office of'Per- 
■nncl Management], 0MB [Office of 
anagement and Budget], Commerce, 
.jficulture, and Treasury. 

Our proposal's overriding goal is to 
aintain the American tradition of over- 
las posts that extend the warm hand 
I welcome to the local population. The 
)ogram I have outlined today is in- 
Inded to ensui-e this openness in light 
I the dangers of today's world. We 
lust not forget the pui-pose of our over- 
ias presence is to spread our message 
id communicate our ideals to other 
itions, not to overwhelm our hosts 
Uh the aura of our power by erecting 
Irbidding fortresses. 

The Administration's proposed pro- 
fam will not solve all of our security 
{oblems, but we can minimize them. 
(«• jiroposal is a comprehensive— and 
hg overdue— security program which 
cdresses our most basic security con- 
t,rns. We will need to continue to 
tpplement oui- limited resources with 
^rilance and effective intelligence to 
ehance the security of our posts and 
t ■ effectiveness, as well as the safety, 
I. our missions abroad. 
; The President and his Administra- 
t"n place the highest priority on this 
pgi'am. We recommend its early 
• actment. 



International Affairs: 
FY 1 987 Budget 



'Press release 20. The complete tran- 
'■ ipt of the hearings will be published by 
■ ; committee and will be available from the 
!!perintendent of Documents, U.S. Govem- 
I'nt Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
U02. ■ 



^rjl 1986 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Senate Budget Committee on 
Feburary 19, 1986.^ 

I welcome the opportunity to speak in 
support of the President's fiscal year 
(FY) 1987 budget request for the inter- 
national affairs function— budget function 
150. Our request comes before this com- 
mittee at a time of great debate over 
how to reduce our Federal budget 
deficit. As a former budget director, I 
know from e.xperience that there are no 
easy choices. And I am determined to 
have the Department of State do its fair 
share in getting the Federal budget un- 
der control. In fact, the greatest single 
contribution the United States can make 
to the economic well-being of the de- 
veloping world is to get our own eco- 
nomic house in order. 

As recent history demonstrates, 
strong U;S. growth and lower U.S. in- 
terest rates are crucial to the rest of 
the world, and to the developing coun- 
tries, in particular. For e.xample, a fall 
of 2% in U.S. real GNP [gross national 
product] in 1982 resulted in a 13% 
decline in U.S. imports from developing 
countries, while 7% U.S. growth in 1984 
was associated with an 18% rise in U.S. 
imports from the developing world. U.S. 
interest rates are translated directly 
into interest payments required from in- 
debted nations. In 1983, the U.S. prime 
rate fell from 15% to 11%.. That year, in- 
terest payments fell by almost $9.5 bil- 
lion, while the debt outstanding from 
developing countries actually increased. 

Greater fiscal discipline in the 
United States will help the U.S. econo- 
my stay on the moderate, noninflation- 
ary growth path projected by the 
Council of Economic Advisers. This will 
be a double benefit to the developing 
countries: we will be a good market for 
their exports, and lower interest rates 
will relieve some of their daunting bur- 
den of debt. Together, a 4% growth in 
the United States and another drop in 
U.S. interest rates should improve their 
external position by approximately $10.4 
billion in 1986 alone. 

One of my responsibilities as Secre- 
tary of State is to present to you the es- 
sential costs of conducting a successful 
foreign policy. These costs cannot be 
wished away. They are required if we 
are to safeguard our national security 



and international interests. We recog- 
nize we have a burden of proof to meet 
in requesting more funds. I can assure 
you that in preparing this budget every 
attempt was made to economize. 

The increases over FY 1986 levels 
contained in our FY 1987 request come 
mainly in improving protection of our 
diplomatic personnel and facilities 
abroad. Were it not for the need to pro- 
vide greater security for them, our cur- 
rent request for function 150 would be 
lower than the amount originally re- 
quested for FY 1986. In fact, our re- 
quest is $3.9 billion less than the 
amounts actually appropriated by the 
Congress for the international affairs 
function in FY 1985. 

Our security assistance request, 
which seems higher when compared to 
the post-Gramm-Rudman-HoUings levels 
of FY 1986, is essentially the same as 
we requested in FY 1986. We are not 
seeking large increases in security as- 
sistance; rather, we are continuing to 
seek a level of resources adequate to 
meet our commitments and safeguard 
our interests. As the President has ob- 
served, national security has to be our 
government's highest priority. The 
resources we are requesting have been 
accommodated within the FY 1987 
budget and the $144 billion deficit target 
contained in the Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings legislation. 

The support that Congress has 
provided in the past has been invaluable 
in strengthening America's position in 
the world. As I shall explain later in 
greater detail, the growth and deploy- 
ment of our diplomatic and foreign as- 
sistance assets have contributed to 
major foreign policy successes. 

• The NATO alliance is strong. 

• Democratic institutions have 
emerged throughout Latin America and 
in key countries elsewhere. 

• We have an enhanced security 
posture in Central America, the Carib- 
bean, and the Pacific Basin. 

• There has been a dramatic shift 
in Third World economies away from 
statist solutions and toward free 
markets. 



45 



THE SECRETARY 



• We have maintained the peace 
process in the Middle East, by an active 
diplomacy but also by steady support 
for our friends on both sides who are 
being asked to take risks for peace. 

• We have given effective support 
to those who fight for freedom and in- 
dependence in their own countries. 



security as our defense budget." We 
must not succumb to false economiz- 
ing—leaving ourselves and our friends 
more vulnerable in areas vital to inter- 
national security. Vacuums that we 
create in countries or regions of stra- 
tegic importance will soon be filled by 
those less interested in peace and stabil- 



. . . the greatest single contribution the United 
States can make to the economic well-being of the 
developing world is to get our own economic 
house in order. 



We must consolidate and expand 
these accomplishments as we continue 
to explore new opportunities for peace 
and stability. To meet these objectives, 
we have constructed a budget which 
reflects our essential needs. 

Budget Overview 

The FY 1987 budget request for the in- 
ternational affairs functions totals $22.6 
billion: $2.1 billion above the FY 1986 
"postsequestration" levels; $1.4 billion 
above the amounts appropriated by the 
Congress for FY 1986; but $200 m"illion 
below the amounts originally requested 
by the President for FY 1986. Let me 
first speak to the two major areas of in- 
crease over the postsequestration levels. 

The largest inci-ease— $1.5 billion for 
the State Department's operating 
budget— reflects the Administration's 
proposals to protect our people and 
diplomatic posts overseas from interna- 
tional terrorism. We in the State 
Department and our colleagues from 
other agencies serving abroad are on 
the front line. The courage and patriot- 
ism of our people and their families in 
facing the dangers of terrorism are in- 
spiring. We must ensure their safety. 
The Congress urged us strongly to de- 
velop a comprehensive program. We 
have done so and are now presenting it 
to you. 

The second major area of increase is 
to restore security assistance levels 
necessary to meet our international com- 
mitments and to pursue our priority for- 
eign policy objectives. Helping our 
friends defend themselves is our first 
line of defense. As the President said 
last year: "Dollar for dollar, our security 
assistance contributes as much to global 



ity than we are. In the long run, this 
will end up costing us much more than 
the short-term investments reflected in 
this request. 

Let me address the major budget 
components and the objectives they 
serve. Our development and security as- 
sistance requests for $16.2 billion serve 
four main foreign policy objectives: 

• Supporting the Middle East peace 
process; 

• Strengthening our alliances and 
cooperative defense relationships; 

• Promoting regional stability in 
Central America and the Caribbean; and 

• Supporting economic reforms and 
democratic forces thi-oughout the world. 

These objectives are interrelated— 
and crucial. 

Nearly 34% of these resources go to 
Israel and Egypt in support of our 
search for peace in the Middle East. As- 
sistance to the base rights countries of 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and 
the Philippines and to military access 
and front-line states such as Kenya, 
Oman, Morocco, Korea, Pakistan, and 
Thailand represents another 26%. Our 
efforts to promote regional stability in 
Central America and the Caribbean take 
another 11%. 

There are other countries of impor- 
tance to us which share our democratic 
values, such as India and Colombia; or 
where new democracies have emerged, 
such as Bolivia and Uruguay; or where 
fundamental economic reforms are tak- 
ing place, such as Ecuador and Senegal; 
or that are simply strategically impor- 
tant to us, like the island states of the 
South Pacific. When these countries 
prosper and remain free, they demon- 
strate to the world that the benefits of 



open societies and open economies tran- 
scend geographic size and cultural diver 
sity. They deserve our moral and 
material support. The amount of funds 
we are seeking to support these coun- 
tries is relatively small— some 17% of 
the total foreign assistance request. The 
real and symbolic importance of these 
resources, however, is considerable. 

All other country programs account 
for only 3% of the total foreign aid re- 
quest. Some are poverty-stricken Afri- 
can states to which we are directing oui 
humanitarian and technical assistance 
programs. Others, like Mozambique, are 
moving from the Soviet bloc toward 
genuine nonalignment. Still others, such 
as Burma and Pem, are active partners 
with us in the war against international 
narcotics trafficking. 

Finally, some 9% of our assistance 
goes to AID [Agency for International 
Development] noncountry programs anc 
a number of generously beneficial ef- 
forts, including the Peace Corps, refu- 
gee assistance, and narcotics control 
efforts. 

We have done some tough pruning 
and made hard choices to come up with 
these allocations. It is a lean budget 
and, in our considered view, a minimun 
budget. Further reductions would com- 
pound our risks, weaken our friends, 
and add to our dangers. Foreign as- 
sistance is a kind of insurance, shoring 
up our security. If we try to cut corn- i 
ers, we run the lisk of greater dangers \ 
that could well exact much higher 
budgetary and foreign policy costs. If i 
the FY 1987 budget is insufficient, as ii . 
is in FY 1986, to fund country prograir i 
adequately and to provide the flexibilit;i 
necessary to meet new requirements in| 
an everchanging world, we deny our- i 
selves the opportunity to build and | 
maintain constructive relationships witlj 
dozens of countries throughout the 
world serving a multiplicity of U.S. 
interests. 

Let me now do a brief tour of the 
world to discuss the specific policy ob- 
jectives I outlined earlier. 

The Search for Peace 
in the Middle East 

Peaceful solutions in the Middle East 
will become possible when we and our : 
friends make it clear that radical solu- 
tions get nowhere. Our commitment to 
Israel and its security is rock solid, aiM 
our levels of assistance must reflect tht 
commitment. At the same time, we 
must continue to provide significant su 
port to Egypt, which had the courage 



46 



Department of State Bullej 



THE SECRETARY 



ireak ranks with the rejectionists and 
pake peace with Israel. A sound 
Egyptian-Israeli relationship remains 
ne cornerstone of our broader peace ef- 
prts and our regional security policy. 
Ve must also help our moderate friends 
1 the Arab world defend themselves 
gainst the genuine security threats 
ley face. Radical forces in the region 
re against negotiations, against peace. 
hus, they lash out not only at Israel, 
•horn they seek to destroy, but at any 
[rab country that shows the courage to 
sek peaceful solutions. 

The necessary condition for further 
rogress in the Middle East peace 
rocess is the willingness of both 
Israeli] Prime Minister Peres and 
iordan's] King Hussein to pursue ways 
I enter into direct negotiations. Both 
'aders remain fully committed to this 
jideavor. 

I Two key issues remain to be 
Jsolved: how to sti-ucture international 
iipport for direct negotiations and how 
lie Palestinian people are to be 
[[presented in those negotiations. Prime 
Sinister Peres has accepted the idea of 
i international fonim, and recent dis- 
issions with both sides have addressed 
iecific arrangements. The question of 
hlestinian representation is particularly 
iFficult, confronting King Hussein with 
le historic challenge of bringing for- 
urd Palestinians of good will who will 
spport and associate themselves with 
rorts to reach a negotiated settlement. 

Egypt is uniquely situated to inter- 
st constructively with all the parties 
id wants to help move the process for- 
Hrd. We value President Mubarak's as- 
Estance and support. At the moment, 
l?ypt is engaged in talks with Israel 
Ened at resolving the Taba border dis- 
l te and other bilateral issues including 
te return of the Egyptian ambassador 
t Tel Aviv. We are hopeful these ef- 
fts win soon bear fruit. 

Syria and Jordan have recently en- 
t-ed into a dialogue on bilateral rela- 
t ns as well as the peace process. Syria 
rmains an important factor in the equa- 
tn, and we are following the course of 
tose discussions with great interest. 
; We are seeking $5.4 billion in eco- 
rmic and military assistance for Israel, 
Irypt, and Jordan. We are in the 
fDcess of reviewing with our friends in 
t? region their needs for defensive 
ns. Meeting their legitimate defensive 
ijuirements is critically important to 
I'lintaining the credibility of our secu- 
ry role throughout the region and to 
leserving our role as mediator in the 
sirch for peace. Above all, we must 



sti'engthen our friends in order to deny 
the Soviets any opportunities to subvert 
a region crucial to our interests. 

Israel's Economic Reforms 

Last year, we sought, and Congress ap- 
propriated, $1.5 billion in supplemental 
assistance to support Israel's economic 
reform program. Buttressed by this as- 
sistance, Israel has made significant 
progress in stabilizing its economy since 
last summer. Prime Minister Peres' 
July 1, 1985, measures included a 19% 
devaluation of the shekel, cuts in 
government expenditures leading to a 
marked reduction in the budget deficit, 
a sharp decline in real wages, and a re- 
strictive monetary policy. 

The combined impact of new fiscal 
and monetary policies on inflation has 
been dramatic. The monthly rate of in- 
flation declined from 27.5% in July to 
1.3% in December. This has enabled 
the Israeli Government to keep the 
shekel/dollar exchange rate stable. 
Meanwhile, the positive trend in the 
balance of payments, which began in 
late 1983, has continued. Israel ran a 
substantial civilian current account sur- 
plus in 1985 due to continued improve- 
ment in its balance of trade and 
substantial increase in transfers from 
abroad. This improvement resulted in 
more than a billion-dollar increase in 
official reserves, from the midyear low- 
point, to about $3.2 billion at year's end. 
Israel's foreign debt stabilized and its 
maturity structure improved as short- 



problem continues to be excessive 
government spending. The new Israeli 
budget moves in the right direction, but 
additional reductions in government 
spending are necessary. Recent wage in- 
creases are also cause for concern. 
While real wages have fallen shai-ply 
since last July, they are progi-amed to 
increase in the December-March period; 
by April, real wages will be where they 
were last June. Unless offsetting meas- 
ures are taken to contain the attendant 
increase in domestic demand and 
production costs, wage increases of this 
size could result in I'enewed inflation 
and higher unemployment. Future wage 
increases need to be linked to increases 
in labor productivity. 

Over the longer term, the Govern- 
ment of Israel would do well to consider 
reforms in a number of other areas as a 
means of facilitating noninflationary 
growth. These include delinking financial 
assets from domestic price indices, labor 
market reform, and changes in invest- 
ment and tax policies. Our recent 
bilateral discussions in the Joint Eco- 
nomic Development Group have focused 
increasingly on these and other eco- 
nomic and investment issues in recogni- 
tion of their importance to Israel's 
long-term gi-owth and prosperity. Our 
discussions with Israel in this forum 
underscore our commitment and 
partnership. 

In the context of Israel's economic 
reform, we strongly endorse Operation 
Independence, a private sector effort to 
expand trade, encourage private invest- 



Foreign assistance is a kind of insurance . 
If we try to cut corners, we run the risk of 
greater dangers that could well exact much 
higher budgetary and foreign policy costs. 



term debt was repaid during 1985. U.S. 
economic support funds and disburse- 
ments from our FY 1985 supplemental 
appropriation for Israel made an impor- 
tant contribution. The remainder of our 
supplemental, which was a one-time 
emergency assistance measure, will be 
disbursed in FY 1986 in support of 
further Israeli reform efforts. 

Notwithstanding the considerable 
progress made so far, Israel's stabiliza- 
tion program remains fragile. The major 



ment, and reduce Israel's dependence on 
U.S. aid. Spearheaded by a group of dy- 
namic American businessmen, this initia- 
tive has already produced tangible 
results in expanding Israel's exports. 

Egj-ptian Economic Program 

Last year, at the Administration's re- 
quest. Congress also appropriated $500 
million in supplemental assistance for 
Egypt. These funds, along with our 
regular assistance program, were in sup- 



Airil 1986 



47 



THE SECRETARY 



port of economic reform. In 1985, the 
Egyptian Government drew up a 
13-point reform program. It raised 
prices for agricultural commodities, for 
example, and for a wide range of sensi- 
tive consumer items; it also raised elec- 
tricity rates by more than a third and 
gasoline prices by 25%. These incremen- 
tal actions, however, still fall far short 
of the comprehensive effort needed for 
long-term economic viability. 

During 1986, we wnll time our dis- 
bursement of the remaining $150 million 
of the supplemental to support further 
reform measures. Priority areas for ac- 
tion include reducing the balance-of- 
payments and budget deficits, improving 
the system of debt management, and ex- 
panding the role of the private sector. 
Rapid progress in these areas is all the 
more urgent now, given the damaging 
impact on the Egyptian economy of the 
precipitous drop in oil prices. 

The Persian Gulf 

We continue to be concerned and 
vigilant about the Persian Gulf. 
Strategically located, this region is vul- 
nerable to Soviet expansionism. It re- 
mains a major source of energy supplies 
essential to the economic health of the 
free world. Our naval force in the gulf 
expresses our interest in the security 
and stability of the region. 

We and our Arab friends agree that 
they should be the first line of defense 
of the gulf. Thus, our role— an essential 
role— is to continue reinforcing the 
defensive capabilities and security of our 
friends in the Arabian Peninsula, both 
through commercial sales and security 
assistance. The security relationship we 
have built with Oman is a vital element 
of our Central Command strategy. Our 
military assistance to the Yemen Arab 
Republic, on the other side of the penin- 
sula, is particularly important in view of 
the recent destabilizing events in South 
Yemen. 

We are troubled by Iran's intransi- 
gent prolongation of its brutal war with 
Iraq, as well as by the dangers which 
this war poses for nearby neutral coun- 
tries. We have offered vigorous support 
for all the numerous efforts, particularly 
that of the United Nations, to bring the 
war to a negotiated end with the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
both sides intact. 



Enhancing Defense and 
Security Relationships 

Around the world, America's alliances 
and security relationships are sound. We 
have had some differences with our 
European allies during the past year. 
But alliances among free nations will 
always see expressions of differing per- 
spectives. On the fundamental issues of 
our mutual security, the Atlantic alli- 
ance remains solid. In fact, we made 
gains in the past year— for example, in 
our bilateral discussions about participa- 
tion in the research program of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. 

With the Soviet military threat to 
Central Europe and Southwest Asia 
continuing to gi-ow, security assistance 
designed to improve the defense capabil- 
ities of countries on NATO's southern 
flank is of special importance. Our secu- 
rity assistance to key NATO allies also 
helps ensure continued access to stra- 
tegically important military bases and 
sustains confidence in the "best efforts" 
commitments which are the foundations 
of our base agreements. 

We cannot measure our interests in 
NATO's southern flank solely by our 
military links. The broad common com- 
mitment to Western values has a mean- 
ing that transcends these military ties. 
Spain and Portugal have now joined 
Europe, in an important symbolic sense, 
in joining the European Community. 
This is a triumph for the Western 
world. On the other side of the Mediter- 
ranean, we often hear of problems be- 
deviling our bilateral relationships with 
Greece and Turkey. Let us not forget 
the common interests and shared values 
that underlie these relations and that 
establish the basis for the resolution of 
our difficulties. I view my upcoming trip 
to these two countries as part of the 
process of building on our common 
objectives. 

On the other side of the globe, we 
continue to regard the U.S.-Japanese 
Mutual Security Treaty as the pillar of 
Asian peace and stability. Japan has be- 
come our largest market after Canada, 
and both sides are working toward 
resolving our trade differences. We are 
also working with the Republic of 
Korea, whose security has never been 
more important to us, on trade issues 
and mutual security and resolving mar- 
ket access problems in our expanding 
two-way trade. While we have some 
serious problems with New Zealand, 
Australia remains a valued ally. 

Our aid programs concentrate on the 
region's more threatened or vulnerable 



nations: the Philippines, the Republic of 
Korea, and Thailand. 

The Philippines is experiencing seri- 
ous economic and political problems. 
Ambassador Philip Habib is currently 
assessing the situation there for the 
President, and we expect his report to 
influence the course of our efforts to as- 
sist the Philippines through this 
prolonged crisis. In the meantime, we 
are taking care to ensure that our aid 
contributes to the structural reforms 
needed to put its economy back on the 
path of growth. Our military assistance 
to the Philippines remains our best and 
most useful tool to help promote the re- 
form and development of a professional 
military. Whatever the near-term 
problems of the Philippines, there is no 
doubt that the presence of a strong, 
democratically oriented military is in 
our best interests. It is also time to 
fund military assistance at a level 
necessary for the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines to fight the insurgency suc- 
cessfully. We must also fulfill the Presi- 
dent's "best efforts" commitment made 
in the context of the last 5-year review 
of the military bases agreement. The 
military facilities themselves remain vi- 
tal to protecting the sea- and airlanes o 
the region and providing logistical sup- 
port for our forces in the Indian Ocean 
and Persian Gulf. 

The Republic of Korea continues to 
confront the greatest threat to its secu 
rity from its communist neighbor to thi 
north. Tension on the peninsula remain 
high, and continued American presence 
and support are crucial, especially over- 
the next 3 years. Our Korean ally is al > 
ready devoting a large portion of its i 
GNP to defense, but continued FMS 
[foreign military sales] credits are 
needed if Korea is to meet key objec- 
tives of its Force Improvement Plan. 

Like Korea, Thailand is an ally alio 
eating substantial resources to military 
modernization and creating a credible 
deterrent to Vietnamese aggression. W 
need to support these efforts and assis 
Thailand in achieving its development 
goals so that it can maintain a healthy 
balanced economy in the face of its in- 
creasing security needs. We need to d( 
this not only because of the importanci 
of Thailand itself but because we have 
an enormous stake in the independent * 
prosperity, and integrity of the group 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] nations of which 
Thailand is a part. The ASEAN natior 
sit astride vital sealanes joining Asia 
with the Middle East and Europe. Th(' 



48 



Department of State Bullel 



THE SECRETARY 



Jnited States— indeed, most of the free 
.ations of the world— have a critical in- 
erest in keeping them peaceful and 
pen. Our assistance progi-ams in 
lalaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia help 
nsure stability and pi-omote progress. 
One very important element in our 
upport for ASEAN is the effort to find 
political solution in Cambodia. To this 
nd, we are backing the noncommunist 
Cambodian groups resisting Vietnam's 
ccupation of their country. Following 
le Vietnamese offensive a year ago 
lat di-ove their camps away from the 
hai-Cambodian border, these forces 
ave concentrated on regrouping and 
■aining for guerrilla activity inside 
ambodia. 

I Together, the Khmer People's Na- 
jonal Liberation Force (KPNLF) and 
Je Sihanoukist National Army have 
)me 9,000 ti'oops currently operating 
side the country, with more scheduled 

enter. Despite problems that include 
serious split within the KPNLF 
adership, military resistance leaders 
■e optimistic about their prospects. We 
■e now discussing with interested par- 
tis how the U.S. assistance funds for 
)incommunist groups provided in FY 
'86 can best support resistance activi- 
1'S. We do not plan to provide lethal 
(uipment, as the groups are already 
jequately supplied with weapons. 

In the Pacific, we are in the process 
( establishing a new and unique rela- 
t)nship with the Freely Associated 
btes of Micronesia. In the South 
licific we are facing, for the first time, 
te threat of increased Soviet interest 
Ed activity. The negotiation of a re- 
pnal fisheries agreement with the na- 
t ns of the South Pacific promotes U.S. 
Lerests in the area. We hope to reach 
a'lnal agreement later this year. 

Ill South Asia, the Soviet aggression 
i Afghanistan has continued for more 
tan 6 years. Pakistan's staunch opposi- 
tii to Soviet aggression and its 
S:nt'rosity to more than 2 million 
^ighan refugees pose an enormous 
f ancial burden on Pakistan, which the 
'litfd States has tried to alleviate 
tough our current 6-year economic, 
f.'ear military program of assistance. 
''is program enters its final year in FY 
37. We must maintain that support, 
ft of loyalty to a staunch ally that 
fes a direct Soviet threat and to main- 
■n the pressure on the Soviets to 
t ive toward a negotiated settlement in 
ighanistan. 

Our assistance provides vital support 
f'' Pakistan as that country enters a 



new era of democratization, which began 
with the lifting of martial law? on 
December 30, 1985. The new civilian 
government is looking to the United 
States, which has strongly encouraged a 
more representative government, to pro- 
vide continued moral and financial sup- 
port as the government copes with the 
continuing Soviet aggression in Afghan- 
istan and the burden of refugees. 
Pakistan is a poor country, and our as- 



social progress, we must keep that les- 
son in mind as the peoples aspiring to 
freedom turn to us for support in the 
coming months. 

The most immediate danger to 
democracy in Central America, of 
course, is the assault on it from com- 
munist Nicaragua, aided by Cuba and 
the Soviet Union. Democratic El Sal- 
vador is an outstanding example of a 
country that has managed to withstand 



We will not let the terrorists win their victory by 
isolating us, forcing us to close our doors, or 
denying us our contacts with the people of the 
countries in which we are represented. 



sistance also helps it pursue its eco- 
nomic development plans, even under 
the heavy burdens it bears. 

Regional Stability and Security in 
Central America and the Caribbean 

Events in Central America and the 
Caribbean over the past year have con- 
firmed the important link that exists 
between foreign assistance and U.S. na- 
tional interests. Our continuing policy of 
support to prodemocratic forces is en- 
abling democracy to take root and to be- 
come self-sustaining. 

Guatemala is the latest Central 
American country to have abandoned 
military rule for elected civilian govern- 
ment. Elected civilian leaders also have 
replaced authoritarian regimes in El Sal- 
vador and Honduras. Nicaragua is the 
only nondemocratic country remaining in 
that region. 

A few years ago, critics of Centra! 
America and U.S. policy toward that 
region were skeptical that democracy 
could gain support in an environment 
where history and economic hardship 
seemed to impose such burdens. They 
are less skeptical now. They have seen 
the people themselves, in one free vote 
after another, demonstrate their belief 
that democracy is the road to a better 
life for themselves and their children. 
They have also seen that our moral sup- 
port and economic and security assist- 
ance can help make the difference 
between the success and failure of this 
democratic experiment. If we truly be- 
lieve in human rights and economic and 



a communist insurgency, and we have 
been privileged to play a part by our 
encouragement and help. So our 
policy— if we keep at it— is working. All 
the democracies of Central America look 
to us for help in defending themselves. 
We must support them. And we must 
support, not abandon, the democratic 
resistance within Nicaragua, which we 
support for both moral and strategic 
reasons. We will be discussing with the 
Congress what this moral and strategic 
imperative requires. 

The Caribbean, too, is fertile ground 
for democracy. Cuba is the most egre- 
gious exception. In Haiti, after decades 
of autocratic government and a stagnat- 
ing economy, the people have new hope 
of seeing a government responsive to 
their needs and aspirations. Our policy 
toward Haiti is the same as our policy 
toward the rest of the hemisphere. We 
seek to promote progress toward democ- 
racy, greater respect for human rights, 
and rapid and equitable economic 
growth. We feel that the Haitian people 
should choose their own future, and we 
note that the new government has com- 
mitted itself to this objective. We hope 
to be of help as the interim government 
goes forward with this effort. 

On the economic side, the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative is succeeding in broad- 
ening and diversifying the production 
and export base of the region, laying 
the foundation for long-term recovery. 
Unfortunately, many of the gains have 
been offset by declines in the prices for 
traditional exports. In some cases, most 
notably sugar, the declines in prices are 



\-il 1986 



49 



THE SECRETARY 



aggravated by our farm bill, which will 
result in a loss of $52 million in export 
earnings by the Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries. The restructuring of economies to 
make them less vulnerable to commod- 
ity price fluctuations requires a sus- 
tained commitment from the political 
leadership of these countries. It also 
requires sustained support from the 
international development community. 
We will continue to do our share. 

Supporting Economic Reforms 
and Democratic Institutions 

Looking beyond Central America and 
the Caribbean, across the globe, we see 
further evidence of the powerful appeal 
of liberty. Democracy is taking root in 
country after country, demonstrating 
the vitality and relevance of our ideals. 

The past few years have also con- 
firmed the connection between freedom 
and economic progress. In the early 
1980s, this Administration developed 
economic policies aimed at liberating the 
creativity of the American people. The 
results speak for themselves: 9 million 
new jobs in this country in the last 3 
years, helping pull the world economy 
out of recession, with inflation now one- 
third the rate of 5 years ago. 

The world economy is still troubled. 
But nations everywhere are rediscover- 
ing the basic truth that the source of 
economic growth is individual creativity, 
not the state. The same laws of econom- 
ics apply to developed and developing 
countries alike, and those that apply its 
truths are reaping the rewards. 

India, the world's largest democracy, 
is a critical— and successful— test case 
that shows that democratic politics and 
economic development are not only com- 
patible but mutually supportive. Under 
Rajiv Ghandi's able leadership, India is 
moving into an era of advanced technol- 
ogy and rapid economic growth, spurred 
on by liberal economic policies. It is not 
only an increasingly attractive market 
for American exports but is becoming a 
major factor in such areas as computer 
software and light industrial goods. 

India has also assumed an increas- 
ingly important strategic role, as it 
takes its place as a major regional— and 
world— power. It has begun this process 
by strenghtening its ties with its re- 
gional neighbors— especially Pakistan, 
with which it has announced a major 
nuclear agreement. Our own relations 
with India have significantly improved 
this past year, and not at the cost of our 
ties to China and Pakistan. 



In Argentina, Bi-azil, Ecuador, 
Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru, democratic 
governments are faced with the daunt- 
ing challenge of restoring economic sta- 
bility and establishing the conditions for 
sustained economic growth. The task for 
the Andean countries is further compli- 
cated by narcotics trafficking and ter- 
rorism. In Colombia, one of the oldest 
democracies in South America, terror- 
ists and narcotics traffickers are 
threatening to undermine years of eco- 
nomic growth and progi'ess. We want to 
help Colombian efforts to meet these 
threats. To do so, we are seeking 
modest increases in our security 
assistance program. 

In Peni, a ruthless terrorist organi- 
zation and a well-entrenched narcotics 
industry threaten national stability. We 
applaud President Garcia's commitment 
to stamp out narcotics trafficking and 
his determination to end terrorism with- 
in the context of democracy and respect 
for human rights. A mutually construc- 
tive relationship with Peru, however, 
will require greater moderation and 
cooperation and meaningful economic re- 
form by the Peruvian Government. If 
these actions evolve as we hope, we 
would need to find increased resources 
to support the Peruvian effort. 

In Africa, young and fragile govern- 
ments are struggling with the most pro- 
found economic crisis in the continent's 
modern history. Our adversaries have 
shown themselves willing to take advan- 
tage of the continent's plight, exploiting 
political-military conditions in such dis- 
parate areas as southern Africa, Chad, 
and the Horn. It is in our own interest 
to help Africa realize its potential: to 
fuel economic growth; to monitor and 
thwart the actions of Libya, the Soviets, 
and their surrogates; and to encourage 
adherence to improving standards of 
human rights. 

Last year, the world witnessed the 
devastating effects of the drought which 
put over 30 million Africans at risk of 
starvation. The American response was 
extraordinary. Our government and pri- 
vate sector contributions provided un- 
precedented levels of food, as much as 
the rest of the world combined. The 
combined effort saved countless lives, 
and we can be justifiably proud of the 
results. 

For the long term, we must en- 
courage Africans themselves to promote 
the policies that lead to agricultural 
productivity, economic growth, and sta- 
bility. There is cause for hope. Some 
African countries are starting to reject 
the statist economic policies which 



proved so disastrous, misallocating 
scarce resources and discouraging the 
productive private sectors of the 
economy. 

Our bilateral AID programs are in- 
creasingly stressing policy reforms that 
stimulate private sector productivity. 
The African economic policy reform pro- 
gram made good progress in 1985 in 
promoting market-oriented reforms in 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, and 
Zambia. This year, we plan to start 
implementing the President's Food for 
Progress initiative, which will concen- 
trate on reforms in the agricultural sec- 
tor needed to provide farmers with 
adequate incentives. 

Diplomacy in 

Southern and South Africa 

Turning from purely economic to more 
general concerns, no region of Africa is 
the cause of more debate and concern, 
both in the United States and abroad, 
than southern Africa. We are committee 
to playing a positive role as the region 
grapples with the twin challenges of 
containing regional stiife and bringing 
the abhorrent system of apartheid to ar 
end. 

In the regional conflict, our aim is t 
show that military solutions will not 
work. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union 
and its Cuban and Angolan allies still 
have illusions on this score. Over the 
last 2 years, the Soviets have delivered 
an extraordinary $2 billion in military 
equipment to the regime in Luanda and j 
have engaged themselves directly in th«' 
fighting. The visit of Jonas Savimbi ; 
[President of the National Union for th( , 
Total Independence of Angola] to this , 
country should make clear America's dfi 
termination to ensure that no outside | 
power will be allowed the opportunity tj 
resolve on the battlefield the civil war , 
that divides Angola. At the same time, ; 
we search for a negotiated solution. As 
long as negotiations continue, the path 
lies open to a settlement which would | 
lead to the independence of Namibia an\ 
end the intervention of all foreign mill- , 
tary forces in Angola. 

We are particularly pleased by 
Mozambique's substantial move toward 
genuine nonalignment. This is reinforce 
by major new aid commitments from tl 
West, of which our own aid program is 
an integi-al part. We want to encouragt 
this favorable trend. I am concerned 
that the congressional restrictions on a 
to Mozambique threaten to undo what 
has been a significant political accom- 
plishment of U.S. foreign poUcy. 



50 



Department of State Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



In South Africa, the goal of reform 
nust be to end apartheid and to bring 
bout a political system based on the 
onsent of the governed. The Presi- 
ent's Executive order of last Septem- 
er 9 was designed to convey the united 
pposition of the American people to the 
partheid system. This is a message we 
ontinually reiterate in contacts with the 
outh African Government. It is also a 
lessage we ai'e sending in concrete 
'ays as we move to build ties wath the 
lack community in South Africa. The 
id program mandated by the Executive 
rder works through private voluntary 
rganizations to train black leaders for 
le future and to assist black entre- 
reneurs. We are also providing funds 
)r direct legal assistance to the victims 
F apartheid and their families. The 
[uman Rights Fund will provide $1.5 
lillion for these and similar projects, 
hile about $10 million will be available 
^r scholarships for those disadvantaged 
^ apartheid. 

} America continues to play a positive 
')le in South Africa, but outside coun- 
ies cannot, alone or in combination, 
solve South Africa's problems. The 
)vemment there must take the steps 
'at will make it possible for black lead- 
's to negotiate. In tum, these leaders 
ust be willing to negotiate themselves, 
le alternative is the kind of violent 
Dheaval that seldom produces just or 
I'mocratic solutions. 

lultilateral Development 
lanks and Programs 

.le multilateral development banks play 
•! important and complementary role in 
uny countries important to the United 
'ates. As developing countries seek to 
f)ve from crisis management and 
isterity to a renewal of sustained eco- 
;mic growth, they will be competing 
I' a finite supply of investment capital 
■;)m the international financial commu- 
:.y. These resources will flow where 
:3y are welcome— when conditions are 
rspitable. A true partnership based on 
rituality of interest will have to be 
:'ged between the developing countries 
^d the holders of development capital— 
■5 industrial countries, international 
•iding institutions, and the commercial 
'nks. 

Last October, at the Bank-Fund 
' orld Bank-International Monetary 
I nd] meeting in Seoul, [Treasury] 
-•cretary Baker proposed a bold, new 
JTiprehensive approach to get debtor 
entries back on the path of sustained 



growth. The proposal envisaged a more 
vigorous World Bank role in facihtating 
and promoting economic reform and ad- 
justment in debtor nations, as well as 
greater coordination between the Bank 
and the IMF in their country programs. 
The proposal also included a provision 
for enhancing Woiid Bank and IMF 
cooperation in providing concessional 
financing to the poorest developing 
countries, most of which are located in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 

When Secretary Baker outlined our 
appi-oach, he stressed that the sine qua 
non of any comprehensive strategy was 
a more focused and determined effort of 
market-oriented structural reform aimed 
at gi-eater efficiency, more domestic sav- 
ing, and a more attractive climate for 
domestic and foreign investment. And, 
in conjunction with this, he addressed 
two other key elements designed to pro- 
vide outside support and encouragement 
for structural reform: more substantial 
and better coordinated assistance from 
multilateral institutions and more sup- 
port from commercial banks. 

This was a creative effort, it seems 
to me, to bring the broader international 
community into the process of helping 
solve the debt problem. Both the World 
Bank and regional development banks 
are well placed to complement the con- 
tinued central role of the IMF by pro- 
viding financing and advice to countries 
taking the essential steps toward struc- 
tural reform. The World Bank's con- 
siderable expertise can help devise 
programs for growth through structural 
reform. It can support these programs 
through increased lending to promote 
reform in inefficient sectors of the econ- 
omy and through increases in policy- 
based lending. The Inter-American 
Development Bank is uniquely situated 
to help in this effort, as well, but im- 
provements are needed in its institution- 
al capabilities before this potential can 
be fully realized. Our participation in 
the multilateral development banks is an 
integral part of our assistance policy. 
Continued congressional support for our 
replenishment commitments will sustain 
our leadership role in these institutions. 

The new commercial bank lending 
that Secretary Baker proposed— $20 bil- 
lion over a 3-year period— is also a vital 
part of the near-term effort. Bank lend- 
ing to the principal debtor countries has 
been declining, with very little new net 
lending having taken place in 1985. In- 
creased lending can provide important 
support for policies to promote efficien- 
cy, competitiveness, and productivity— 



the true foundations of growth. Such 
lending, however, will only be forthcom- 
ing if there is a clear commitment to 
adopt and implement such growth- 
oriented policies. 

In Seoul, Secretary Baker also pro- 
posed that the Worid Bank, IMF, and 
other donors develop joint programs to 
support medium-term structural adjust- 
ment in the world's poorest countries. 
Africa will be the chief beneficiary. The 
proposal calls for the coordinated use of 
$2.7 billion in IMF Trust Fund reflows, 
Worid Bank funds, IDA [International 
Development Association] monies, and 
possible increases in bilateral contribu- 
tions for Africa to support comprehen- 
sive economic reform programs. This 
proposal merits our full support, as the 
development of consistent and coherent 
country economic reform programs is es- 
sential if we are to maximize the effi- 
cient use of scarce development capital. 
The need for increased coordination 
between the Bank and Fund has been 
genei-ally supported, and the U.S. initia- 
tive is gaining broad acceptance. We 
have addressed the concerns of Fund 
and Bank members regarding the need 
not to blur the distinctive roles of the 
two institutions while achieving closer 
cooperation and collaboration. 

I do not want to leave the subject of 
efficient use of development capital 
without commenting on the need of the 
developing countries to take full advan- 
tage of the opportunities of the world 
trading system. This is essential if they 
are to achieve their great potential for 
expansion of output and export 
earnings. 

Restrictive trade practices have only 
compounded the problems of many heav- 
ily indebted developing countries. All 
too typically, heavy foreign borrowing 
has supported fiscal deficits and over- 
valued exchange rates, putting a great 
burden on export competitiveness. Im- 
port barriers have been erected to pro- 
tect favored domestic industries from 
foreign competition. These barriers have 
severely hampered the growth of trade 
among developing nations. The develop- 
ing countries and the industrialized 
world have one thing in common: all of 
our peoples are winners if we have a 
stronger and fairer world trading sys- 
tem. We hope the developing countries 
will work with us on a new trade round 
to overcome the narrow interests that 
threaten our common progress. 



|il 1986 



51 



THE SECRETARY 



The Battle Against Terrorism 

I would like to conclude by elaborating 
on my earlier comments about the re- 
quested increase in our operating 
budget. 

Over the past few years, the world's 
attention has been riveted to terrorist 
dramas unfolding around the globe. I 
have spoken frequently on this subject. 
Civilized nations and civilized peoples 
have been inadequately prepared for it. 
That can and must change. We must do 
everything we can to thwart those who 
seek to advance their ends through ter- 
ror and to ensure the safety of our 
citizens abroad. Even in this period of 
budgetary stringency, this task must be 
a priority. We have designed a program 
which, in our view, is prudent and effi- 
cient in its commitment of resources, 
yet responsive to the inescapable neces- 
sity we now face. 

The United States has always built 
handsome and accessible embassies and 
consulates abroad. Our object was to 
demonstrate to other societies the open- 
ness of ours and the hand of friendship 
we extend to all. We wanted other soci- 
eties and their people to see a "wel- 
come" sign above our door and to feel 
comfortable in entering our buildings. 
This is the essence of the job we do 
overseas, and we have been highly suc- 
cessful at it. 

We are now faced with a new situa- 
tion: the current security and terrorist 
problems have left those same build- 
ings vulnerable. Our challenge is to 
strengthen our security against these 
new dangers so that we can maintain 
our tradition of openness and accessi- 
bility. We will not let the terrorists win 
their victory by isolating us, forcing us 
to close our doors, or denying us our 
contacts with the people of the countries 
in which we are represented. 

With this goal in mind— and knowing 
of the great concern in the Congress— I 
formed the Advisory Panel on Overseas 
Security, chaired by Admiral Inman. I 
asked the panel to take a hard look at 
our security and counterterrorism 
programs. 

The hard work and dedication of the 
panel is clearly reflected in the quality 
of its report. The panel exhaustively 
researched all aspects of our security 
and counterterrorism programs. Its 
recommendations have vision. Equally 
important, they are practical. They are 
recommendations which, with your sup- 
port, we can act on. 



The panel made 91 recommenda- 
tions. We have implemented 45, and 
work is underway on 20 more. An addi- 
tional 20 are awaiting the resources 
requested in our proposed authorization 
and appropriation legislation. 

Using existing resources and author- 
ities that the Congress has already 
provided, we have made progress in 
many areas highlighted by the panel. 
For example, we have started an ambi- 
tious recruitment campaign to bring on 
board nearly 300 new security agents 
during FY 1986 and to more than dou- 
ble the number of overseas security 
officers before the end of this fiscal 
year. In addition, we have: 

• Added more marines to posts; 

• Nearly doubled the size of our ar- 
mored vehicle fleet worldwide; 

• Made significant physical security 
improvements at 152 of our posts over- 
seas in 1985; 

• Consolidated the security functions 
of the Department into one office, the 
new Bureau of Diplomatic Security; and 

• Also created an Office of the Am- 
bassador at Large for Counterterrorism, 
which deals with policy matters and 
reports directly to me. 

There is, however, a limit to what 
we can do with existing resources. We 
need additional legislative authorities 
and resources to implement some key 
recommendations of the Inman panel. 
We are seeking a significant part of the 
total resources in FY 1987. 

The Administration's proposals will 
do three main things: 

First, launch a comprehensive 
worldwide security program, key ele- 
ments of which are improvements in 
communications and intelligence sharing 
and a 5-year construction program to 
replace or upgrade our most vulnerable 
posts; 

Second, complete the reorganiza- 
tion of our security program as recom- 
mended by the Inman panel; and 

Third, revise and clarify the chain 
of command for overseas security 
programs. 

The program places its highest 
priority on buildings at locations where 
the security threat is greatest and 
which are substantially below the new 
standards. Great effort has gone into 
creating a security construction program 
which would ensure that buildings are 
designed and built to meet stringent 
security standards, on time and within 
budget. 



But our proposals are more than a 
security construction program. We will 
also improve communications and coun- 
terintelligence. For example, we will im- 
prove security at Moscow and other 
East European posts by substituting 
Americans for a substantial number of 
local employees now working in support 
positions. Further, we are requesting 
resources to strengthen our capability t( 
protect foreign missions and dignitaries 
in the United States. 

We are working closely with other 
agencies to develop and agree upon 
appropriate security standards, pro- 
cedures, and levels of resources respon- 
sive to the needs of all U.S. Govern- 
ment agencies having facilities overseas, 
(other than military bases). 

We are requesting $4.4 billion 
spread over 5 years. Of this total, $2.7 
billion is for construction, and the ■ 
balance is for operating expenses, in- '« 
eluding security officers, residential 
security improvements, and more secui 
communications equipment. In FY 198( 
the Administration is requesting $237 
million for salaries and expenses and 
$455 million for construction. In 
FY 1987, the request is. $304 million fo 
salaries and expenses and $1.1 billion f 
construction. 

The Adminstration's proposed pro- 
gram will not solve all of our security 
problems; but we can minimize them. 
Our proposal is a comprehensive— and 
long overdue— security program which 
addresses our most basic security 
concerns. 



Conclusion 

In summary, the world remains a turb 
lent and sometimes dangerous place. 
But, as we look ahead, we draw 
strength from our ideals, from our 
friends and the young democratic na- 
tions who have joined our ranks and 
now look to us for support. America n 
mains a beacon to the freedom-loving 
peoples of the worid. Powerful trends 
are on the side of freedom. That is om 
of the lessons of 1985. 

Another major lesson of the recent 
past is that realism, strength, and sta; 
ing power are crucial prerequisites to 
meeting these international challenges 
History won't do our work for us. We 
have to be worthy of our opportunitie 



52 



Department of State Bulli| 



AFRICA 



The President has observed that the 
ssponsibihty for the economic health of 
ir country does not reside with one 
ranch of our government or with one 
Dlitical pai-ty. The partnerships that 
lUst be forged to deal with the Fedei-al 
jdget deficit are also critical to meet- 
:g the challenges we face in the inter- 
itional arena, many of which directly 
."feet our national security. 

The noble tradition of bipartisanship, 
'hich brought us so many dividends in 
iie postwar yeai-s, does not ask any of 
li to abandon our principles. But it does 
iquire all of us to recognize how much 
lirder it is to meet foreign challenges if 
'e are not united at home. In recent 
"ars, we have seen signs of a rebirth 
the postwai- national consensus— 
i.sed on a realistic understanding of the 
Drld as it is and of the need to negoti- 
■e differences where possible. The 
l-esident has asked me to reiterate his 
:mmitment to work in a bipartisan 
iirit with all members of the Congress 
; behalf of the peace, freedom, and 
::urity of this countrj'. 

'I'l-fss release 25. The complete 
.nsci-ipt of the hearing will be published by 
,■ committee and will be available from the 
berintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Ivenmient Printing Office, Washington, 
:". 20402. ■ 



Promoting Positive Change 
in Southern Africa 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Address before a convocation at 
Carleton College in Northfield, 
Minnesota, on January 2I, 1986. 
Ambassador Armacost is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 

Coming to Carleton is like coming home. 
It has been nearly 30 years since I was 
last in this chapel. In those days we 
were required to attend convocations. 
Children of the 1950s, it did not occur to 
us to protest. We heard some interest- 
ing people speak, and I have no regrets. 

I hope the topic of my remarks this 
morning will be of interest to you. In 
Washington, we are concerned about 
southern Africa at all times, but with 
Congress back, U.S. policy toward 
southern Africa has again been pushed 
to the forefront of our consciousness. 
The subject grips all Americans. The 
turmoil in South Africa's black town- 
ships and the familiar features of racial 
conflict and brutality— tear gas, rubber 
bullets, armored cars, dramatic funeral 
scenes— are regular features on the 
nightly news. 

Beyond the violence. South Africa 
has captured attention for other rea- 
sons. In 1984, the black South African 
bishop, Desmond Tutu, was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Piize for his leadership in 
the nonviolent struggle against apart- 
heid. South Africa has become an issue 
in the Congress and a matter of concern 
for a public wanting to make their 
voices heard against apartheid. Institu- 
tions around the country, including col- 
leges like Carleton, are being challenged 
to reconsider investment policy. 

U.S. Objectives in 
Southern Africa 

For all these reasons, I welcome the 
chance to share some thoughts on a cen- 
tral question we are all asking: what can 
the United States do to promote peace, 
stability, and social justice in southern 
Africa? 

I speak not only of apartheid and 
our desire to see peaceful political 
change in South Africa but also of our 
efforts to promote regional peace in 
southern Africa. Our objectives are 
clear: the independence of Namibia; the 



withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Angola; and an end to the cross-border 
violence that has compounded the hard- 
ships of the people throughout the 
region. 

The word "interdependence" might 
well have been coined to describe 
southern Africa. Countries in the region 
are linked by geography, histoi-y, eco- 
nomics, and transportation and commu- 
nications networks. What happens in 
one country in southern Africa swiftly 
affects its neighbors. 

For this reason, let me put our con- 
cerns in South Africa in perspective by 
starting with the broader regional 
picture. 

Promoting Namibian Independence 

A key objective of American diplomacy 
is independence for Namibia. Namibia is 
Africa's last colony. It cries out to be 
free, and the entire world community 
agrees. We are ready to do our part. 
For a number of years, we have been in 
the forefront of diplomatic efforts to im- 
plement UN Security Council Resolution 
435, which defines how the transition to 
Namibian independence under UN su- 
pervision should occur. 

We have coordinated our efforts 
with those of the front-line black states 
of southern Africa, SWAPO [South 
West Africa People's Organization], and 
other Namibian political entities, as well 
as with the South African Government. 
But all of us must face facts. Namibia 
will not be free unless South Africa, 
which has occupied it for 70 years and 
considers the territory important to its 
national security, agrees to implement 
UN Resolution 435. Our diplomacy over 
the past 5 years has, therefore, concen- 
trated on developing a regional consen- 
sus that will reconcile the varying 
interests involved. 

Eliminating Foreign Troops 
From Angola 

The situation in southern Africa— and, 
thus, the achievement of Namibian 
independence— was enormously compH- 
cated 10 years ago when the Soviet 
Union introduced a Cuban proxy army 
into Angola. That army, now 30',000 men 



|il 1986 



53 



AFRICA 



strong, is a threat to the security of all 
the nations of the region. 

Africa was for years a continent hap- 
pily insulated from the East-West mili- 
tary competition. The presence of Cuban 
troops has destabilized Angola and com- 
pounded the difficulty of resolving 
Angola's civil war. It extended Soviet 
power into the region. It thereby 
challenges our owti strategic interests; it 
establishes an unfortunate precedent. 
The Soviet and Cuban intei-vention in 
Angola was the first in a series of 
Soviet moves in the Third World in the 
late 1970s. Angola was followed by 
Soviet interventions in Ethiopia, Cambo- 
dia, and Afghanistan— events which 
helped undermine East- West relations 
and arms control during that decade. 
So, we seek an end to the Cuban 
military presence in Angola. We have 
succeeded in securing South African 
agreement that if the Cuban problem in 
Angola can be resolved. South Africa 
will agree to carry out international 
agreements for Namibia's independence. 
We have similarly brought the Angolan 
Government to agree to the principle of 
Cuban withdrawal. We are now seeking 
agreement from both on the timing of 
these reciprocal moves. Agreement wall 
mean an end to Cuba's destabilizing 
presence in Angola and South Africa's 
threats to Angola's security and will 
help promote independence for 
Namibia— worthy objectives. 

Even though we do not maintain for- 
mal diplomatic relations with the 
Government of Angola, we have met 
regularly with Angolan representatives 
to pursue a settlement. The most recent 
meeting took place in Luanda on Janu- 
ai-y 8 when Assistant Secretary [for 
African Affairs] Chester Crocker held 
talks with Angolan leaders. 

But agreement on Namibia will not, 
by itself, bring an end to Angola's 
problems. The Angolan civil war is a 
reality. For more than a decade, the 
MPLA [Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola] government in 
Luanda and its Soviet and Cuban allies 
have faced a determined and dedicated 
indigenous opposition to Marxist rule. 
UNITA [National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola] freedom 
fighters led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi have 
carried their resistance movement 
across Angola, despite opposition from 
massive infusions of Soviet weaponry 
and Cuban assistance. 

We believe, however, that there is 
no military solution to the Angolan civil 
war at this point in history. Peace can 



Angola— A Profile 



People 

Nationality: Xouii (inil ti((y(c/i/'c— .Xnni'l^i" 
Population (1984 est.): 8 million. Annual 
growth rate (1983 est.): 2.5%. Ethnic 
groups: Ovimliundu 37%, Kimbundu 25%, 
Bakongo \3%. Chokwe and Lunda S%, 
(ianpiela S%. Haneca and Humlie 3%. Ovani- 
l)(i 2'%. mesticii and white I'^^i. (ither 3%. 
Religions: Animist or traditional. Roman 
Catholic, Protestant. Languages: Portujjuese 
(official), African (dialects). Education: Alli'ti- 
dance—"5%. Literacy— Z0%. Health: hifinil 
mortality n;/c— 147/1,000. Life expectan- 
cy— i'l yrs. Work force: Agriculture— 7ti%. 

Geography 

Area: 1.24H.70() sq. km. (481..3.'>1 sq, mi.); 
about twice the size of Texas. Cities: 
Capifd/- Luanda (pop. 1 million). Other 
f,:(,>,s_Huamho (500.000). Terrain: X'aried. 
Climate: Tropical to subtropical. 




Atlantic 
Ocean 



Government 

Type: .Marxist people's republic, one-party 
rule. Independence: November 11, 1975. 

Branches: Executive — President and 
Council of Ministers. Lry/.s/ii/irc— People's 
Assembly. Judicial— WiWV.iry and civilian 
courts. 

Administrative subdivisions: 18 pmv- 
inces. 



1 



Political party: I'opular Movement for 
the Liberatiim of Angola-Labor Party 
(MPLA). Suffrage: L'niver.sal adult (can- 
didates limiteii to those approved by 
MI'LA-PT). 

Flag: Two horizontal bars, red <iver 
black; centered, a yellow five-pointed star 
half encircleil by a machine gear crossed by . 
machete. 

Economy'* 

GDP (1982): $3.5 billion. Annual growth 
rate (1973-81): Negative. 

Natural resources: Petroleum, diamond 
iron, phosphate, copper, feldspar, gold, baus 
ite, uranium. 

Agriculture (42% of GNP): Product:^— 
cassava, maize, plantains, sweet potatoes, 
milk, millet, citrus, beans, potatoes, sugar, 
beef, [lalm oil. sisal, coffee. 

Industry (28'l'o of GNP): ri/y/cs— minings 
petroleum, food processing, beer, tires, tex- 
tiles. 

Trade (1984): Ej'/joc/.-;- petroleum, gas,' 
coffee, diamonds. PartuerK—V'&, Bahamas, 
Netherlands, Spain, Belgium. Algeria, Bi:iz 
/„jp„r(,s— foodstuffs, textiles, machinery, n 
materials, consumer goods, tools, medical 
supplies, chemicals. Major suppliers— I'S, 
France. Brazil, Portugal, Italy, FRG, .Japani 

Official exchange rate: .\pprox. 30 
k\vanzas= I'SSl. 

Economic aid received: Primarily from 
Western private and public sectors; mostly 
niilitarv but some economic aid from Easteri 
bloc. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

IN. Organization of .-\frii'an I'nily. .African 
Development Hank, Non-Aligned Movement 



•Data for the period since mdependeilCl' 
have been extri'inely limited due to the on- , 
going civil war. I 

Taken from the Background Notes of Marc! 
1985, published by the Bureau of Public I 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanili 
Adams. ■ 



r 



54 



Department of State Build 



AFRICA 



Namibia— A Profile 



'ople 

itionality: Xmin mid mljciiin- — Naniib- 
(s). Population (1984 est.): l.ODO.dllO. An- 
«l grow-th rate: 2.7%. Ethnic groups: 

Ick M5.H'^i; white 7.5%; colored (mixed), 
.•Vf. Religions: Predominantly Christian; 
h inilitjenous beliefs. Languages: 
jikaans. (Jerman. F^n^lish. and various in- 
eniius dialects. Education: Kfiir.s rdiii- 
Knr// — for whites, to age l(i; for others, 
t'. .\ tlt'nd<i rii-f (\dS3) — whites, nearly 
' , -thers, Ki'Ki. L(7('/vj<')/ (litKH)— whites, 
,rl,\ liM%; others. 28%. Work force (about 
,000 in 1981): Agri.rvlture—6Q%. In- 
try imd rommcrre — 19%. Mining — fi'^j. 
■W.s — %%. diiri'ninienl — 7%. 

tgraphy 

a: 823. H.S S(|. km. (320.827 sq. mi.); 
itly smaller than Texas and Oklahoma 
bined. Cities: Capt/a/— Windhoek (pop. 
00). Other cities— Tsumeh. Keetman- 
ip, Oranjemund, Otjiwarongo, Luderitz, 
kopmund. Terrain: Varies from coastal 
•rt to semiarid mountains and plateau. 
I late: Subtropical. 




aernment 

1: South Africa administers Namibia; 
i.nalJv under a League of Nations man- 
' ( l;i:iO-66); since 1966 illegally on a de 



Branches: Executire — Administrator 
General (appointed). Lfyi.s/o^u'p— National 
Assemlily (.SO members), not recognized by in- 
ternational community; dissolved in .Ian. 
1983. Judicial — Supreme Court, lower magi- 
strate courts, special courts. 

Subdivisions: 10 ethnic areas. 

Major political parties: The National 
Party, [)emocratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). 
South-West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO), South-West Africa National Union 
(SWANC). Suffrage: Cniversal adult. 

Central government budget (1984-8.5): 
$5.'J9 million. 

Flag: The flag of the Republic of South 
Africa is flown. It consists of three horizontal 
bar'.ds— orange, white, and blue from top to 
bottom— with the Union Jack and the flags of 
the two former Boer republics (the Orange 
Fre? State and the Transva;il Republic) re- 
produced in miniature and centered on the 
white band. 

Economy* 

GDP: $860.2 million. Annual growth rate: 
5.4%. Per capita GDP: $789. Avg. inflation 
rate (1984): 9.1'^! (Windhoek). 

Natural resources: Diamonds, copper, 
uranium, lead, tin, zinc, salt, vanadium. 

Agriculture (8.3% of GDP): Products— 
beef, karakul pelts, wool, other meat, fish. 

Industry (32.9%. of GDP): Types— mming 
27.5% of GDP; manufacturing, mainly food 
prwessing (less than 6%). 

Trade: Exports— $4(12.7 million; dia- 
monds, copper, lead, uranium, beef, cattle, 
fish, karakul (sheep) pelts. Imports— $4SS.3 
million: foodstuffs, constmction material, 
manufactures. Major /Kirtners — South 
Africa, FRG, UK, US. 

Fiscal year: April 1-March 31. 

Official exchange rate: fluctuating; 
about 2 South African rand = US$l (1984). 



"Except as noted. 1983 figures — the 
latest published figures as of March 1985 — 
are used. 

Taken from the Background Notes of June 
1985, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita 
Adams. ■ 



be achieved only through reconciliation 
among the opposing parties. This is a 
job for Angolans, but it cannot be ac- 
complished so long as Angolan territory 
is occupied by a foreign army. 

We have long recognized Dr. Savim- 
bi's struggle, which is being waged 
against increasingly heavy odds. We 
have maintained contact with UNITA 
and have recognized the legitimacy of 
its struggle. Dr. Savimbi will visit the 
United States soon. During this visit, 
we intend to discuss vdth him how the 
United States can help advance the 
process of reconciliation and Angola's 
best interests in the period ahead. 

Reducing Cross-Border Violence 

Across southern Africa the flames of 
violence are seen. We are determined to 
do what we can to diminish and end vio- 
lence between South Africa and its 
neighbors. We consider it equally unac- 
ceptable for guerrilla forces to carry out 
acts of terror across the region's bor- 
ders into South Africa as for South 
Africa to launch military actions into 
neighboring states. We have urged 
South Africa and its neighbors to ex- 
hibit restraint and to supplant force 
with dialogue. 

The results of these efforts have 
been mixed. With the signing of the 
Nkomati accord in 1984, Mozambique 
and South Africa agreed to stop sup- 
porting antigovemment elements operat- 
ing in the other's country. This was a 
positive step in the direction of their 
curtaiUng cross-border violence and 
resolving their differences through diplo- 
matic means. We also have devoted at- 
tention to reducing tensions between 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Botswana on 
the one hand and South Africa on the 
other. 

But these accords are clearly fragile. 
They have been violated not infre- 
quently. With tensions growing in South 
Africa, fresh challenges to the peace are 
occurring daily. South Africa's attack 
into Botswana last summer set our own 
peacemaking efforts back and forced us 
to recall our Ambassador from Pretoria. 
Violence along Lesotho's and Zim- 
babwe's borders in recent weeks poses 
new challenges to regional stability. 



31 1986 



55 



AFRICA 



Engaging South Africa 

Even as we have sought diplomatic and 
peaceful solutions to regional conflicts 
among the countries of southern Africa, 
we have advocated peaceful change and 
reconciliation among the communities of 
South Africa itself. 

American policy toward South Africa 
has been much maligned— and much mis- 
understood. It is taken to describe ex- 
clusively govemment-to-govemment 
relations. 

But that is wrong. Our policy is to 
establish a positive dialogue with all ele- 
ments of South Africa— its government 
and its people of all races. And, beyond 
that, we encourage American organiza- 
tions, corporations, enterprises, and in- 
stitutions of all kinds to engage 
themselves with counterpart groups in 
South Africa. I believe we have some- 
thing to offer one another across a 
broad front of relationships, and that's 
the job we are seeking to tackle. 

As you know, this is a daunting 
task. Our influence— not insignificant— is 
still limited. We possess no magic for- 
mula for setting aright past and current 
injustices in South Africa. We start, 
however, from the premise that a blue- 
print for greater racial justice and har- 
mony can only emerge out of political 
dialogue and negotiations between the 
South African authorities and the 
authentic leaders of its black commu- 
nity. We shall continue to press for the 
initiation of such a dialogue. 

For us, the question in South Africa 
is not whether we should strive to end 
apartheid. That is a given. Apartheid is 
morally wrong. It is contrary to our 
most basic principles. It violates our 
sense of fair play. Apartheid must end. 
And its end, I believe, is inevitable. The 
practical and ethical question we face is 
how we can be most effective in speed- 
ing its demise and promoting the evolu- 
tion of a more just society in South 
Africa. 

Nor is there any question that we 
must encourage an end to violence. 
Here I speak not only of repression by 
the authorities but also vicious acts by 
blacks against other blacks. I cannot see 
any American Administration welcoming 
violent upheaval or extremist solutions. 
The only course consistent with 
American values is for us to be a cham- 
pion of political solutions, negotiation, 
and peaceful change toward a more just 
system. 



Some insist that we treat South 
Africa as a pariah; just as others urge 
us not to deal with Marxist govern- 
ments in Angola or Mozambique. But ac- 
ceptance of such counsel would allow 
little scope for diplomacy. It would en- 
courage our global adversaries to exploit 
instability, racial injustice, and violence 
as a means to expand their influence in 
the region. It would obviously limit our 
ability to exert a constructive influence 
on all the parties. 

The nations of southern Africa, 
moreover, have no desire to see us dis- 
engage. They desire our involvement. 
More than any other nation, we enjoy 
the confidence of all the parties. This 
enables us to act as mediator and honest 
broker. It requires difficult decisions as 
we try to guarantee that the policy 
means we employ contribute to the poli- 
cy ends we seek. And this brings me to 
the issue of economic sanctions. 



A Growing Economy 
as a Force for Change 

Many ask why the Reagan Administra- 
tion has generally resisted punitive eco- 
nomic sanctions on South Africa. Let me 
tackle this question head-on. 

First, South Africa is the economic 
giant of southern Africa. What happens 
there is important to neighboring coun- 
tries which depend on South Africa for 
much of their food and industrial 
products, send thousands of laborers 
into South Africa to work in its mines 
and industries, and rely on South 
Africa's well-developed port and trans- 
portation network to export their 
products. Economic hardship within 
South Africa would impose even greater 
economic hardship on all the black 
states of the region. Nor is it possible 
for the United States or its allies to 
replace what the South African economy 
provides. We cannot furnish the capital, 
the markets, the transportation, the 
services, and the technology which the 
region so desperately needs. 

Second, since the main impetus for 
change in South Africa is internal— and I 
would argue that it is— the greatest 
enemy of apartheid is a modernizing 
economy and an expanding work force 
which need skilled labor, regardless of 
skin color. It is these realities that have 
prompted the South African authorities 
in recent years to increase investment 
in the education of blacks, encouraged 
them to countenance the formation of 
black labor unions, and gradually led 



them virtually to eliminate apartheid in 
the work place by lifting restrictions 
which excluded blacks from some jobs. 

Economic growth does not inevitabl; 
bring political liberalization. But it can, 
and in South Africa it has accelerated 
the pace of change in a constructive 
direction. To damage that economy 
would not only blunt economic growth 
but also complicate the situation for a 
whole generation of South African 
young people, perhaps increasing unem 
ployment and despair. Many young 
black South Africans are already edu- 
cated, politicized, and unemployed— an 
explosive combination. Indeed, we sens 
that 3 years of economic recession wit! 
in South Africa has exacerbated frustn 
tion and bitterness under apartheid. 
I would repeat, therefore, that a 
vibrant South African economy can be 
force for change. In a rapidly growing 
economy, it is increasingly difficult, if 
not impossible, for the races to contini 
to be separated under apartheid. Evi- 
dence of this is the shortage today in 
South Africa of an estimated 100,000 
skilled workers. If there is any hope fi 
peaceful political change, it almost cer 
tainly depends on a climate of continu- 
ing economic well-being. 

Thus, U.S. policy has opposed pun 
tive sanctions aimed at destabilizing tl 
economy. Other Western allies have 
come to similar conclusions and have 
kept pressure on the South African G< ■ 
emment but avoided sanctions which 
would only add to suffering, not contr 
ute to a solution. 

President Reagan's Executive Order 

In this regard, the Executive order j 
President Reagan issued on Septem- 
ber 9, 1985, was not designed to injur 
South Africa's economy or harm in- ■ 
dividual South Africans. Its aim was ti 
apply specially targeted sanctions as i 
clear signal to the South African Gov- 
ernment of U.S. dissatisfaction with ti 
pace of reform. To that extent, it 
reflected growing sentiment within th 
United States that stronger actions 
were required. The President acted t< 
help defuse the climate of polarizatioDi 
and violence inside South Africa. But 
refused to order punitive sanctions th 
would destabilize the economy and 
penalize black South Africans as well 
the surrounding black nations. 

The Executive order reflected oui 
commitment to maintain a strong 
presence in South Africa and encoura' 



56 



Department of State Bulli| 



AFRICA 



lit rican companies to be forces for 
an.ue there. It also increased U.S. 
i\ t'l-iiment funds for scholarships and 
mail rights activities. It banned bank 
ms to the South African Government 

nicist cases; computer sales to 
larUieid-enforcing agencies and secu- 
y forces; nuclear commerce; and the 
:rchase of South African arms. Its pro- 
sed ban on the sale of Krugerrands 
ithin the United States has now been 
iplemented. 

On December 19, 1985, Secretary 
■ultz announced that 12 distinguished 
'nericans would serve on the Advisory 
^mmittee on South Africa. During the 
niing months, this advisory committee, 
■haired by Bill Coleman' and Frank 
rev 2, will review with us South Afri- 
1 and U.S. policies and provide Secre- 
•y Shultz with their recommendations. 

I would repeat: most of our Western 
es have adopted a similar, careful ap- 
oach in dealing with the problems of 
1' region. 

ijuments Against Disinvestment 

'•alleling the argument that the U.S. 
r/emment should impose economic 
;ctions on South Africa is the sugges- 
. 1 that American institutions should 
invest from U.S. corporations in 
<ith Africa. For the same reasons that 

link blanket economic sanctions in 
i)th Africa would be counterproduc- 
';, I do not think blanket disinvest- 
«t would bring a beneficial result. 

Indeed, rather than disengage from 
(th Africa and the region, the United 
ttes should be seeking even more 

■s to make a positive difference. And 
te we need to distinguish between de- 
»ns made by the U.S. Government 
n those made by private entities such 
3his college. 

Contrary to conventional wisdom in 
)ie circles, U.S. business firms do not 

linate the South African economy. 
nough 300 U.S. firms operate in 
cth Africa, American direct invest- 
i«t there is worth less than $2 billion. 
*ty percent of investment in South 

ca comes from South Africa's own 

tal. The United States accounts for 

than one-fifth of the 10% derived 
foreign sources. Consequently, 
investment hardly provides the 
91 of leverage that could, by itself, 
^•g apartheid to an end. 

Second, even if American firms 
ted up stakes and left South Africa, 
tp would change so long as there 



were British, German, Japanese, or, 
more than likely. South African compa- 
nies willing and able to produce what 
American enterprises now produce. 
When companies decide to remove 
themselves, they send their personnel 
and their capital home: the plant and 
equipment stay— frequently to be 
snapped up at bargain basement prices 
by someone else. Gone as well could be 
the commitment to racial equality that 
many American firms have implemented 
in their operations and employment 
practices in South Africa. Gone will be 
the substantial investment U.S. compa- 
nies have made— over $100 million in the 
last several years-for educating and 
otherwise improving the lives of their 
black South African workers. Ex- 
perience has shown that once a company 
leaves, the decision is Ukely to be per- 
manent. But the effects are not neces- 
sarily those intended. 

A case in point is Motorola, which 
operated in South Africa for 21 years. 
When the company decided to close its 
operations in 1985, its plant and equip- 
ment were purchased by a South Afri- 
can company which today is turning out 
products not unlike those produced by 
Motorola. Whether the lives of black 
workers in that firm have been affected 
or not, we do not know. But I think the 
question is worth asking. 

U.S. firms play a constructive role in 
South Africa. In 1977, Reverend Leon 
Sullivan, a civil rights leader from 
Philadelphia, investigated conditions at 
General Motors Corporation (GM) in 
South Africa. Reverend Sullivan was 
the first black board member at GM. As 
a result of his investigation, he deter- 
mined that U.S. firms could marshal the 
resources of American companies for 
change by adopting a set of standards 
now known as the Sullivan principles. 

A Role for the 
Sullivan Principles 

The SulUvan principles call for equal pay 
for equal work, a fair minimum wage, 
increasing numbers of disadvantaged 
South Africans in administrative and 
managerial positions, and fair labor 
practices, including the right to form 
and join labor unions. 

Additional principles include the 
desegregation of all eating, comfort, 
locker room, and work facilities; the im- 
provement of quality of life for workers 
outside the workplace through subsidies 
to housing, recreation, health, and 
educational programs; and the establish- 
ment of training programs to prepare 



nonwhites for supervisory, administra- 
tive, clerical, and technical jobs. 

The Sullivan principles have been 
broadened and expanded over the years. 
In 1977, 12 U.S. companies had adopted 
the Sullivan principles. Today, 192 
companies— a majority of all U.S. firms 
in South Africa— subscribe to them. 
American firms have shown the way for 
other companies operating in that 
country. 

Reverend Sullivan himself says: 

It must be argued that the principles 
have had some influence favoring political 
change, and that they will continue to do so. 
Help a person gain economic rights and you 
will foster gains in his political rights. Equal- 
ity at the workplace and massive education 
programs for black and nonwhite workers 
ultimately will affect every aspect of their 
lives, public and private. . . . Simply put, the 
evidence reveals that the principles are a 
conduit from the workplace through which 
the workers learn to address broader societal 
issues, including political rights. 

I agree with this. I deeply believe 
that our Sullivan companies make a 
difference in South Africa and should be 
encouraged to carry on. Our collective 
ability to influence change will be 
diminished if they are pressed to leave. 
We need more creative interventions in 
South Africa, and the Sullivan compa- 
nies are among the best vehicles we 
have for promoting that kind of change. 
I would urge the trustees, faculty, and 
students at Carleton to take these con- 
siderations into account as you decide 
college policy on this important issue. 

Encouraging Dialogue 

Today, moreover, American business- 
men have joined South African com- 
panies in calling on the government 
there to sit down and negotiate with 
legitimate black leaders. 

This dialogue is not easy when the 
policies of the South African Govern- 
ment for the past 38 years have 
prevented it. Suspicion and mistrust 
abound. Black and white South Africans 
tend to look at their country and see 
two conflicting pictures. For one group, 
the glass is half full; for the other, it is 
more than half empty. 

White South Africans constantly em- 
phasize how much change has taken 
place in recent years. Some private 
schools have been desegregated; some 
sports teams have been integrated; the 
so-called immorality and mixed- 
marriages legislation has been abolished; 
job reservation which fenced off certain 
jobs for whites only has been scrapped; 



pi 1986 



57 



AFRICA 



some theaters, restaurants, and hotels 
have been desegregated; nonwhites have 
been allowed for the first time to sit in 
Parliament; black unions have been 
legalized; investment in the education of 
blacks has been expanded. 

To white South Africans these 
changes appear rapid, even revolution- 
ary. In some, such change inspires fear; 
among others, it provokes resistance. To 
still others, the changes offer the 
premise and the possibility that a more 
just society can be achieved through 
peaceful means. 

Quite clearly, black South Africans 
looking at the same events view the 
process through different eyes and see a 
different set of realities. Such changes 
as have taken place to them appear 
marginal and grudging; invariably, they 
have occurred without the black commu- 
nity being consulted. There has been 
little dialogue. Whatever other conces- 
sions have been made, blacks still lack 
citizenship; they still cannot vote. They 
still must carry on their person the 
hated passbooks. Black contract laborers 
still must leave their wives and families 
behind in the homelands when working 
in the 87% of South Africa that is 
reserved for whites. This is a time of 
rising expectations on the part of blacks 
in South Africa. It is not surprising that 
positions have been polarized by the 
nearly 2 years of violence during which 
more than 1,000 lives have been lost. 
Radicalization makes it harder and 
harder for blacks committed to negotia- 
tion to maintain their credibility, to take 
risks, and to enter into dialogue. This is 
a time for statesmanship, not only 
among white leaders but also among 
black leaders if the peace process is to 
be enhanced and the cycle of violence 
ended. Above all, the rulers of South 
Africa must communicate to all who live 
there that they are serious about ending 
apartheid. And black leaders must be 
vdlling to engage in dialogue about the 
kind of future they wish to build in 
South Africa. 

What evolves within South Africa 
must be determined by the people who 
live in the country. The United States 
has avoided being prescriptive. But cer- 
tainly a beginning must be negotiations 
with the accepted black leaders, and you 
cannot do that if those leaders are in 
jail. For this reason we have called on 
the South African Government to 
release Nelson Mandela and other long- 
held pohtical prisoners and to enter into 
meaningful talks with the genuine 
leaders of the black community. 



U.S. Efforts To Help 
the Disadvantaged 

There are other, more concrete things 
that the U.S. Government is doing, and 
will continue to do, to encourage posi- 
tive change. For example: 

• A human rights fund of more than 
$1 million, administered by the Ameri- 
can Embassy in Pretoria, helps support 
important antiapartheid groups inside 
South Africa that work for economic, so- 
cial, legal, and political change. Funds 
have been used for seminars on human 
rights, legal aid to detainees and their 
families, and to pay costs for lawyers 
challenging apartheid enforcement in the 
courts. 

• The United States currently pro- 
vides $8 million per year for scholar- 
ships for black and other nonwhite 
South Africans, enabling them to attend 
both American and South African 
universities. 

• A $1 million program administered 
through the AFL/CIO [American Feder- 
ation of Labor and Congress of Industri- 
al Organizations] trains black and other 
nonwhite labor union leaders in negotia- 
tion, organization, and other areas 
formerly prohibited by apartheid law 
but now allowed. 

• A $2 million program helps black 
high school students prepare for univer- 
sity entrance exams. 

• A $3 million program trains black 
entrepreneurs to start small businesses 
and to take advantage of recent changes 
in apartheid laws that allow nonwhites 
to open businesses in central business 
districts. 

Other programs aim at helping to 
develop black leadership as well as to 
build bridges between whites and non- 
whites in South Africa. We are expand- 
ing these programs and adding new 
ones with one goal: to equip blacks and 
other nonwhite South Africans to play a 
more effective role— politically and 
economically— in the postapartheid era. 

In this regard, we also invite South 
Africans to visit our own multiracial 
society. Each year our International 
Visitor and Fulbright programs bring 
numerous South Africans to visit or 
study in the United States. New pro- 
grams will bring black South African 
journalists to work in U.S. media or- 
ganizations and black teachers to build 
skills at U.S. educational institutions. 

In South Africa itself, we are con- 
sidering reopening a consulate in Port 
Elizabeth to improve our ability to com- 



municate with communities in that in- 
creasingly important industrial area. We 
are now conferring with Congress and 
with the South African Government on 
such a step. 

What Can American Individuals 
and Organizations Do? 

These are some of the things the U.S. 
Government is doing. You may well ask 
what American individuals and organiza 
tions can do to help promote an end to 
apartheid and stimulate reforms within 
South Africa. Certainly, one area is rek 
vant to Carleton College: black South 
Africans must overcome tremendous ob 
stacles to receive an education equal to 
that of whites. 

Education is a form of leverage. By 
offering educational opportunities to 
black university students, we actively 
help South Africa educate future lead- 
ers. Whether to overcome the effects o 
apartheid or to qualify for future leade- 
ship, they need our help. 

For some South African students, 
this could mean study in the United 
States at either the undergraduate or 
postgraduate level. Compared to our e, 
forts in Nigeria, which has roughly 
three times the population of South 
Africa and presently has an estimated I 
20,000 students enrolled in American 
universities, the number of black Soutl i 
Africans in American institutions is a i 
shocking 450. Whatever happens, Sout I 
Africa will need educated black citizen i 
trained to assume leadership positions. ' 
For other disadvantaged South Afi 
cans, it means assistance to study witl 
South Africa. There is plenty of room i 
for American private organizations to '■ 
help. Because of the depressed South I 
African rand compared to the dollar, 1 1 
tal costs for room, board, and tuition f > 
1 academic year at a South African 
university amount to less than $3,500. 
I might add that there is consider- 
able movement to enable nonwhite, es 
pecially black. South Africans to achie 
educational benefits in that country fr' 
from constraints of segregation. Recei ' 
ly, nearly all traditionally white unive 
sities announced their intention of 
making an education there available t^ 
students regardless of race. In additic' 
a number of credible private educatio 
institutions have evolved to educate s 
dents in the face of the extremely 
damaging school boycott. Radicals wh 
proclaim, "revolution now, education ^ 
later," should not discourage Americs 
from helping students whose educatio 
is itself a vehicle for black advancem( 



58 



Department of State Bull! 



AFRICA 



, What more significant contribution 
bid Americans make than to make it 
ancially possible for a disadvantaged 
(uth African student to receive an 
(ucation? And what could make us 
Ore proud as Americans than joining 
father in a positive way to make that 
(id of difference? There are a number 
(private organizations within South 
Hca that could select deserving stu- 
nts to receive these educational 
^nts. 

' Americans institutions have a long 
d positive track record in this area, 
[rough the International Institute of 
fucation's South African affiliate, non- 
ite South Africans have been directly 
I indirectly helped to overcome 
icational deficiencies. Carleton Col- 
e may wish to open direct contacts 
h organizations of that kind. 
"Hands-on" education is another 
f to help. Our summer vacation in 

United States is South Africa's 
iter. Schools are in session between 
y and July. Carleton students could 
1 contribute as tutors, particularly in 
;hematics and science, where there is 
lortage of trained teachers. Or an 
erican institution such as Carleton 
Id help staff an in-service science 
:her training program in South 
ica. 

I believe Americans want to do 
fithing positive about South Africa, 
contribute to racial tension or econo- 
hardship. That is the American 
—to give help, not to do harm; to 
note something better, not to make 
gs worse. 

This is why your government has 
i i to keep its eye on the positive goal 
i;ill seek and to demonstrate its oppo- 
t'n to apartheid by active involve- 
tt to promote change. It's not just a 
iter of striking a righteous pose. We 
I? some influence; therefore, we have 
Dral duty to exert it responsibly. 
By encouraging South Africans to 
l|e toward political dialogue, we seek 
|uild, not to destroy. By using our 
(iomic weight in the service of black 
iiimic advancement, we provide 
I irt unities and hope for black South 
[cans. 

invite you to join us in this 
11. 

William T. Coleman, Jr., former Secre- 
Sof Transportation and senior partner 
1 the law firm of O'Melveny and Myers. 
Prank P. Carey, former Chairman of the 
«d and Chief Executive Officer of IBM. ■ 



The U.S. and Angola 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Statement before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on 
February 18, 1986. Mr. Crocker is 
Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs.^ 

I welcome this opportunity to speak to 
this committee today about the comple.x 
situation in southwestern Africa. The 
Angola-Namibia negotiations form an es- 
sential part of our policy for the region. 
Our objectives are clear: to restore and 
advance U.S. influence in the region; to 
expand our cooperative relations with 
African states; and to deny to the 
Soviet Union the opportunity to use its 
influence to exacerbate already danger- 
ous situations in Angola, South Africa, 
and the other countries of the area. 

Review of Progress 

It is obvious, I believe, to all in this 
room that our interest and objectives 
are decidedly not served by a Namibia 
which is not free and by an Angola 
which is the scene of a bloody conflict 
and foreign intervention. Thus, we have 
worked hard to bring peace to Angola 
and independence to Namibia. In recent 
years we have made progress in pursuit 
of our goals. Allow me to review with 
you the path we have followed and 
where we are today. 

In 1981, at the start of this Adminis- 
tration, there was no peace process at 
all underway in southwestern Africa. 
The quest for Namibian independence 
was moribund. South Africa sat seem- 
ingly unmovable on its side of the 
Angolan-Namibian border while some 
30,000 Cubans sat across on their side of 
the same border. UNITA [National Un- 
ion for the Total Independence of Ango- 
la] was fighting an apparently endless 
civil war. No one was talking to anyone 
else. 

This blocked situation posed real 
dangers to the region and U.S. interests 
there. The absence of a viable Western 
strategy for Namibia decolonization and 
the presence of a seemingly permanent 
Soviet-Cuban military in Angola risked 
heightened polarization and open-ended 
opportunities for Moscow to exploit 
African frustration over Namibia and 
fuel internal and regional tensions. It 
was essential that we regain the ini- 
tiative. 



It took 2 years to engage Luanda 
and Pretoria in a real negotiation. It 
took another year to begin to erode the 
mutual mistrust and build confidence in 
an American role. But with the Lusaka 
accord of February 1984, the South Afri- 
cans began the process of disengage- 
ment from their military positions in 
Angola in return for restraint by 
SWAPO [South West Africa People's 
Organization]. In November of the same 
year, the Angolans said they were ready 
to commit themselves to withdraw 
20,000 Cuban troops over 3 years, start- 
ing with the beginning of implementa- 
tion of UN Security Council Resolution 
435, the internationally agreed inde- 
pendence plan for Namibia. While this 
proposal was, in itself, not sufficient to 
conclude an agreement, it was an impor- 
tant step forward in that Luanda had 
accepted the principle that the inde- 
pendence of Namibia could only take 
place in the context of the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola. 

It is, therefore, important to note 
that by early 1985, we had made real 
progress in devising and gaining accept- 
ance for a framework for resolving the 
dual question of Namibian independence 
and Cuban troop presence in Angola. I 
would emphasize that this progress in 
the years 1981-85 helped thwart Soviet 
goals of advancing its positions in 
southern Africa. Moscow did not en- 
courage our efforts on Angola and has 
clearly been placed on the defensive 
there, in Mozambique, and elsewhere. 
However, the negotiating process has 
always moved in fits and starts and has 
been characterized by mutual suspicion 
among the parties to the conflict-South 
Africa, the MPLA [Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola], UNITA, 
and SWAPO-and by continuing effort's, 
sometimes more intense than others, to 
pursue the military options. Moscow has 
fueled distrust and fear among the local 
parties. 

Thus, after we tabled fresh com- 
promise proposals-a synthesis of both 
South African and Angolan ideas on the 
timing and sequencing of Cuban troop 
withdrawal— in March 1985, each of the 
parties pulled back from taking the 
tough decisions needed to advance the 
process. In South Africa, a govern- 
ment—under heavy pressure from inter- 
nal protest and increasing international 
isolation— pursued other means to ac- 
complish its ends, including greater em- 



>l 1986 



59 



AFRICA 



phasis on military operations within 
Angola. The MPLA government in 
Luanda, buoyed by a massive infusion of 
Soviet equipment, also retreated from 
the negotiating path. The result was a 
major MPLA military thrust into 
southern Angola in late 1985 which was 
marked by greater Soviet involvement 
and South African participation in sup- 
port of UN IT A than had been witnessed 
before. 

We believe that fighting brought 
home to both sides the dangers of mili- 
tary escalation. In recent months we 
have had several important meetings 
with both the MPLA and the South 
African Government in which the 
negotiating context has been further de- 
fined. We are not yet at the point of 
success, and frankly, prospects in such a 
complex enterprise and these negotia- 
tions must always be viewed as 
problematical. 

U.S. Reception of UNITA's Leader 

These negotiations, and the continuing 
warfare inside Angola and across its 
borders into Namibia, represent the 
backdrop against which the visit of Dr. 
Jonas Savimbi of UNITA occurred. Dr. 
Savimbi's visit has generated a lot of 
public interest and some debate, much 




President Reagan met with Jonas Savimbi, 
President of the National Union for the To- 
tal Independence of Angola, on January 30, 

1986. (While House photo by Pete Sou2a) 



of it divorced from the political and mili- 
tary realities of southern Africa. Dr. 
Savimbi spoke effectively on his own be- 
half and most of you had the opportuni- 
ty to hear him directly. He told us he 
had a very useful visit and was return- 
ing to Angola with high morale and no 
doubts about the Administration's sup- 
port for his efforts. 



We do support UNITA; it has sus- 
tained a long and brave fight against 
Soviet and Cuban political and miUtary 
designs. Our reception of him here was 
an element of that support. It sent a 
strong signal to Luanda and Moscow 
that the United States views UNITA as 
a nationalist organization with legitimate 
aspirations of playing a role in the 
process of national reconciliation that 
must come about if Angola is eventually 
to achieve real peace. We intend to be 
supportive of UNITA in an effective 
and appropriate manner. As the Presi- 
dent said in his State of the Union mes- 
sage, we want to support all those 
fighting for freedom. 

And, as the President said in his im- 
portant speech to the UN General As- 
sembly in October of last year, we view 
the Soviet Union as having a responsi- 
bility to take action to defuse situations 
of regional tension which have been 
made worse by its own policies. We will 
continue to make that point to Moscow 
through direct communication and other- 
■wise as well. 

Constant U.S. Goals 

Some may perceive that the reception 
Savimbi received here signals a change 
in U.S. policy. It does not. Our strategy 
recognizes that the scene on the ground 
in Angola has changed, largely owing to 
Soviet actions, and that our ability to 
respond diplomatically and in other 
ways has been measurably increased by 
the repeal of the Clark amendment, ef- 
fective October 1, 1985. However, I 
want to categorically state here that the 
basis and goals of our policy remain un- 
changed: we seek negotiated solution 
that will bring independence to Namibia 
and withdrawal of Cuban forces from 
Angola. Such a solution opens the way 
for Angolans to reconcile and achieve 
peace. 

Allow me to say a few words about 
the broader context of our policy. First, 
we do not believe that in a contem- 
porary period, as in any other period, 
that diplomacy and pressure represent 
polar opposites or alternative strategies. 
This is also the case in southern Africa 
where virtually all parties pursue their 
interests through a wide variety of 
means. 

Inevitably, perhaps, both the South 
Africans and the Angolans are pursuing 
several tracks of policy to advance their 
interests. The same can be said about 
UNITA and the MPLA as they contend 
over the future of Angola. 



For our part, we recognize that our 
diplomacy plays out against a backdrop 
of real and tangible pressures that exisi 
on the ground. For the past several 
years, we have worked to create a polil 
ical framework for the ultimate resolu- 
tion of the intertwined problems of 
Angola and Namibia. At the level of 
general principles, we have succeeded. 
All of the parties now accept that 
there is a real connection between 
Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian 
independence. They accept that lack of 
movement on one side is an obstacle to 
the solution of other problems. But we 
have not yet been able to translate tha 
into detailed accords specifying the tiir 
ing and sequencing of Cuban troop wit 
drawal in relation to South Africa's 
commitments under Resolution 435. 

It remains our analysis that neithe 
the South African Government nor the 
Government in Angola, nor SWAPO, 
nor UNITA can accomplish their goals 
through outright military victory. The 
only ones to benefit by continued 
warfare are the Soviets and Cubans; 
hence, the continuing relevance of a p( 
litical framework. That framework off« 
a context for the multiple political, mil 
tary, and economic pressures at play. 
However, that does not mean that the 
parties will not on occasion try to solv 
their problems via the deceptively eas 
way of escalating the war. 

This past year we have seen the 
MPLA government, strongly backed b 
Moscow and Havana, pursue such an ( 
calation. They sought to reverse 2 yea 
of UNITA gains and deal a body blow 
to that movement. They failed. It is ir 
portant in our view that they continue 
to fail. Just as we are determined thai 
our diplomacy not be used by the Sou 
Africans as a cover for the pursuit of 
other objectives, we feel the same wa; 
about the government in Luanda. 

The point I am making, then, is tl 
diplomacy requires to be effective a 
degree of pressure that drives the pai 
ties toward a pohtical compromise. Bi 
pressure— pure physical power— does i 
in itself represent solutions and, in ou 
analysis, cannot be effective in the ab 
sence of a meaningful political context 
As Secretary Shultz has put it, it tak> 
both power and diplomacy. 

While here, Dr. Savimbi stated hi 
view that there is no possibility for 
either side in Angola to gain an outri, 
military victory and that national reci 
dilation will have to come about thro 



h 



60 



Department of State Bulli" 

id 



ARMS CONTROL 



process of negotiation. He emphasized 
■at UNITA does not wish to destroy 
le MPLA. UNITA, he said, seeks 
ither to convince the leaders in Luanda 
the need to compromise and reach a 
)litical settlement. We share Dr. 
ivimbi's belief that there are no mili- 
ry solutions in Angola. And he af- 
•med to us his support for our efforts, 
hich focus on the linked issues of 
esolution 435 and Cuban troop with- 
■awal, to provide the political context 
■cessary to achieve peace and reconcili- 
ion in Angola. 

ie Need for a Clear 
atement From Congress 

is appropriate that this committee 
view the situation in Angola and U.S. 
licy to that troubled part of the 
)rld. It is, of course, up to the commit- 
3 to decide what position it wishes to 
<e on this issue. I would like to sug- 
st, however, that America's best in- 
vests would be served by a clear 
itement from Congress that this coun- 
[• is committed to negotiated resolu- 
ns in southern Africa but that our 
lingness to negotiate should not be 
'd by others to pursue their owi ag- 
'ssive ends. In this regard, and keep- 
in mind the words of Dr. Savimbi 
en he visited here, I think it impor- 
t that our government, both the e.x- 
iitive and legislative branches, make 
: ir that we support those who fight 
I freedom and political solutions. How 
t support should be manifested is a 
I ic for further legislative-executive 
'peration and consultation. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
k be published by the committee and will 
available from the Superintendent of 
) uments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Uhington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S. Strategic Force Structures: 
The Challenge Ahead 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the American Insti- 
tute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Strategic Syste7ns Conference in 
Monterey, California, on February i, 
1986. Ambassador Nitze is special ad- 
viser to the President and to the Secre- 
tary of State on arms control matters. 

During President Reagan's second term, 
several factors will play a significant 
role as the Administration determines 
its security policy. The most important 
of these factors will be the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI); the develop- 
ment of U.S.-Soviet relations, including 
the arms control process as embodied in 
the Geneva negotiations and the pro- 
jected series of Reagan-Gorbachev 
summit meetings; and, finally, the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced 
budget act. In confluence, these factors 
and the policy they will shape will have 
a substantial and long-term effect on our 
strategic force structure. I propose to 
review briefly the approach taken thus 
far by this Administration in shaping 
our strategic forces and then to provide 
an assessment of how these factors of 
the President's second term may affect 
those forces. 

The Reagan Approach 

When President Reagan assumed office, 
existing U.S. deterrence policy called 
for maintenance of a range of nuclear 
response options and set the goal of 
terminating any war on terms most 
favorable for the nation. The Reagan 
Administration continued this policy but 
recognized several deficiencies in our 
strategic force structure that hampered 
its implementation. 

Among these shortcomings were a 
vulnerable command and control struc- 
ture, an increasingly vulnerable ICBM 
[intercontinental ballistic missile] force, 
U.S. inferiority in prompt hard-target- 
kill capability, and an aging bomber 
force. In response, the President ap- 
proved a comprehensive program to 
modernize our strategic forces, which in- 
cludes new deployments in all three legs 
of our strategic triad and a robust effort 
to upgrade our command, control, 
communications, and intelligence 
capabilities. 



The President also sought to engage 
the Soviet Union in arms reduction 
negotiations, determined that our ap- 
proach to arms control would not repeat 
the mistakes of the past. He realized 
that arms control should be viewed as 
an important element of our security 
policy and, as such, a complement to, 
not in opposition to, the measures we 
must take unilaterally to maintain an 
adequate deterrent. 

While arms control can potentially 
play a role in enhancing our security 
and bringing about a more stable stra- 
tegic relationship, what we are able and 
willing to do for ourselves is far more 
important; it provides the necessary 
foundation on which deterrence and 
arms control must rest. 

The President also directed that our 
arms control efforts be designed not 
merely to regulate the buildup of 
nuclear weapons, as was the case in 
SALT [strategic arms limitation talks], 
but, rather, to achieve strategically sig- 
nificant and stabilizing reductions. 

Finally, while accepting the continu- 
ing need for reliance on offensive 
weapons and the ultimate threat of 
devastating retaliation as the basis for 
deterrence, the President directed that 
the SDI research program investigate 
the possibility of increasingly shifting 
the basis of deterrence to defensive 
capability. This has been construed by 
some as a shift from deterrence exclu- 
sively by retaliation to deterrence exclu- 
sively by denial. 

Such a distinction is a theoretical 
construct which has had little bearing on 
the actual practice of deterrence. In ac- 
tuality, an adversary is deterred from 
attacking the United States and its al- 
lies by the cumulative effect of a wide 
variety of disincentives. Taken together, 
these deny a would-be attacker the 
prospective benefits of aggression. 

Our requirement to maintain a credi- 
ble ability to deny and, thereby, to 
deter is a longstanding one; it is unlike- 
ly to change in the foreseeable future. 
The task is made especially difficult by 
the Soviet Union's relentless efforts— in 
both the strategic offensive and defen- 
sive arenas— to counter and to diminish 
the deterrent effect of our disincentives. 



^H 1986 



61 



ARMS CONTROL 



We are taking those steps necessary 
to continue effective deterrence in the 
face of projected Soviet counteractions. 
In this connection, we are both pursuing 
the deployment of improved offensive 
systems and exploring technologies 
which we hope will enable us, over the 
long term, to rely more heavily on stra- 
tegic defenses to deter Soviet attack. 
We believe such an approach offers, for 
today and for the future, mankind's best 
hope to preserve the peace. 

President Reagan's Second Term 

How will President Reagan's second 
term affect our strategic force struc- 
ture? I mentioned earlier that three fac- 
tors will be particularly influential. 

• The first of these, the continuation 
of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
presents the potential of profoundly 
changing force structures, but only in 
the long term. 

• The second, developments in U.S.- 
Soviet relations, including not only the 
Geneva arms control talks but also the 
Reagan-Gorbachev summit just held and 
the two projected to come, also presents 
the potential for substantial change, 
perhaps sooner than SDI. 

• The third, the application of the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings act, will begin 
to be felt almost immediately, although 
the full extent of the impact is difficult 
to project. 

Let me address each of these in 
some detail. 

The Strategic Defense Initiative 

We are now almost 3 years into the SDI 
research program. Our scientists have 
made impressive advances in their 
investigation of the many technologies 
that would be involved in a large-scale 
strategic defense system. We continue 
to believe that these technologies hold 
the promise of resulting in survivable 
and cost-effective defenses against ballis- 
tic missile attack, thereby providing us 
with safer and more reliable means of 
assuring deterrence. 

But much more work must be done 
before we will know whether such 
defenses can meet the President's 
criteria of feasibility, survivability, and 
cost-effectiveness at the margin. It now 
appears that we will be well into the 
1990s before that determination can be 
made. In the meantime, we are examin- 
ing carefully the manner in which a 
transition to greater reliance on defen- 
sive systems might proceed. 



Our preference, of course, is for a 
cooperative transition, jointly managed 
by the United States and the Soviet 
Union. We believe such an approach can 
contribute to stability and serve to 
facilitate the reduction in offensive 
nuclear forces which remains our fore- 
most objective. 

As for the question of how a cooper- 
ative transition might be characterized, 
our research is still in too early a stage 
and the future strategic situation is too 
uncertain for any definitive judgment. 
We must yet determine which defensive 
technologies are feasible, their probable 
cost, their survivability, their effective- 
ness against countermeasures, and how 
their deployment could be most effec- 
tively and verifiably regulated. 

I have discussed SDI largely in 
terms of a cooperative transition, the 
course the Administration would much 
prefer. It should be recognized, 
however, that the Soviets have given 
absolutely no encouragement to such a 
concept. Indeed, the Soviets give every 
programmatic indication of pursuing 
their own, noncooperative transition to 
an offense-defense mix by deploying an 
illegal radar system and apparently 
developing other capabilities in violation 
of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] 
Treaty. President Reagan has deter- 
mined and reported to Congress that 
the U.S.S.R. may be preparing the base 
for a prohibited territorial defense; the 
Soviets, thus far, have failed meaning- 
fully to address our concerns about 
these activities or otherwise correct 
their noncompliance. As of now, there is 
no evidence that they v«ll do other than 
continue to acquire defensive capabili- 
ties—including those envisioned for 
SDI— on a noncooperative basis. This 
being the case, we must be ready, if 
necessary, to act on our own. Paradoxi- 
cally, our being prepared for a non- 
cooperative transition could ultimately 
provide the Soviets with a powerful 
incentive to cooperate in the future. 

Developments in 
U.S.-Soviet Relations 

As SDI research continues through the 
second term, we will be proceeding con- 
currently with our efforts to improve 
U.S.-Soviet relations. Our immediate 
goal in the Geneva talks on nuclear and 
space arms is to achieve strategically 
significant and verifiable reductions in 
offensive weapons, properly tailored so 
as to enhance strategic stability. Such 
cuts would be valuable whether or not 
we ended up deploying strategic 



defenses, and we see no reason not to 
negotiate them now. 

Last fall, we saw the effect that st 
ting a specific date for a U.S.-Soviet 
summit can have on the arms control 
talks. Where the Soviets had refused i [ 
make concrete proposals in the negoti; 
ting groups dealing with offensive 
arms— or even to disclose many detail; 
of their position— during the first two 
rounds, they took a much different 
stance in round three. In September, 
they tabled specific proposals for offei 
sive reductions, and they fleshed out ' 
these proposals with additional ideas : 
October. 

With a second summit in the Unit ; 
States looming this year, we anticipat 
that this pace will be maintained. We 
have already seen General Secretary 
Gorbachev's arms control announcemi ; 
last month, which, although largely 
designed to maximize its political and 
public relations impact, did move awE 
somewhat from previous Soviet posi- 
tions. Whether this can form the basi 
for genuine progress remains to be si i 

In the strategic offensive area, th 
two sides agree on the desirability of 
deep cuts in the size of their arsenals 
This agi-eement was codified in the j( t 
statement from the Geneva summit i 
mutual support for "the principle of ; % 
reductions in the nuclear arms of the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. appropriately 
applied." The agreement of the sides 
on this principle, however, should not 
obscure the fact that there are subst ■ 
tial differences in how each specifies 
the systems to which the 50% cuts 
would apply. As experience has show 
when evaluating Soviet proposals, it 
advisable to examine the fine print. 

The United States would apply t: 
cuts to those systems historically lim ec 
in strategic arms negotiations— ICBN 
SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles], and heavy bombers. The , 
Soviets would apply them to those s;i- 
tems "capable of reaching the territo' 
of the other side," which they interp t 
as including on the U.S. side LRINL 
Ponger range intermediate-range nu( aj 
forces] missiles in Europe, dual-capal." 
aircraft in Europe and Asia, and dusl 
capable aircraft on 14 carriers, while 
excluding 2,000 or more comparable fs- 
tems on the Soviet side. 

To accept the Soviet definition 
would require us to accept overwhelm 
ing Soviet advantages in strategic a;! 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear for s] 
systems. Therefore, there can be no ,g- 
nificant progress on reducing stratei' 
offensive arms until the Soviets folk 



62 



Department of State Bujti" 



ARMS CONTROL 



,he precedent they set in both SALT I 
.nd SALT II and di-op their insistence 
m this one-sided definition. 

With the public presentation of the 
soviet initiative of January 15, both 
ides have now advocated the complete 
'limination of nuclear weapons. Because 
if the far-reaching nature of this ulti- 
p.ate objective, the many comple.xities 
nvolved, and the many nations which 
iiust concur in their resolution, current 
legotiating efforts must focus on taking 
he first steps in actual reductions of 
J.S. and Soviet offensive nuclear arms. 
The Soviet initiative of January 15 
oes not alter theii- position on initial 
eductions of strategic offensive forces; 
heii- one-sided definition remains the 
ey element of their proposal. Accord- 
igly, early progress in this area may be 
ifficult. However, the several upcoming 
egotiating rounds in Geneva and the 
A'o planned summits will give the 
oviets plenty of opportunity during the 
resident's second term to remove this 
oulder blocking progress. 

One cannot now determine whether 
T agreement is possible and, if so, what 
s outlines would be. We, therefore, 
ive made no decisions about the pro- 
se force structure we would adopt 
ere such an accord to be reached. One 
in speculate, however, as to how our 
rces and Soviet forces would be 
fected under the U.S. approach. 

To review quickly, the United States 
•eposes reductions to a limit of 4,500 
I the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) 
rried on the ICBMs and SLBMs of 
ich side, with a sublimit of 3,000 ICBM 
Vs. We also propose a 50% reduction 

Soviet strategic ballistic missile 
row-weight, to about 6 million pounds 
ie United States currently has about 
4 miUion pounds), and a ban on new or 
odernized heavy ICBMs. Contingent 
I acceptance of these Umits, we would 
cept an equal hmit of 1,500 ALCMs 
!r-launched cruise missiles] on the 
■avy bombers of each side. 

With respect to strategic nuclear 
■liverj' vehicles, the United States pro- 
tses reductions to a limit of 1,250-1,450 
rategic ballistic missiles and, given 
at, reductions of heavy bombers to a 
lit of 350. We would also ban mobile 
'BMs, due, in part, to inherent verifi- 
lion difficulties. 

Under this approach, U.S. levels 
luld be affected primarily by the bal- 
tic missile reentrj- vehicle and ALCM 
.;lings. The bomber limit would require 
te destruction of our inactive B-52s. 



but the missile limit should not be a 
governing limitation, given the low num- 
ber to which the RV limits would, in 
any case, drive us. 

The 4,500 limit on ballistic missile 
RVs would require about a 50% reduc- 
tion from the current U.S. SALT- 
accountable total; the 3,000 sublimit on 
ICBM RVs should not be restricting. 
Clearly, a large portion of the reduc- 
tions would be absorbed by our sea- 
based leg, which currently encompasses 
substantially more than 4,500 RVs. The 
United States would, therefore, deploy a 
number of Trident missiles that would 
be substantially lower than the com- 
bined number of Trident and Poseidon 
missiles deployed today. The exact num- 
ber would be detei-mined in a tradeoff 
between the land-based and sea-based 
legs. As to the land-based leg, there 
should be plenty of room for a full com- 
plement of 100 MX missiles and a sig- 
nificant number of other ICBM forces. 
With respect to the U.S. air-based 
leg, if the Soviets were to accept our 
approach, the planned ALCM program 
would be reduced by about 50% to the 
1,500 level. This would also affect our 
mix of ALCM-carrying and penetrating 
heavy bombers. 

Similarly, we can speculate on how 
Soviet strategic force planners might 
structure their forces, were they to ac- 
cept our approach. They would likely be 
constrained primarily bv our proposed 
4.500 RV limit and the 3,000 ICBM RV 
subhmit. The 4,500 limit would require 
the Soviets to reduce their baUistic mis- 
sile RVs by a little more than 50% from 
their current SALT-accountable level of 
about 9,700. The bulk of these reduc- 
tions would necessarily come from their 
ICBM forces. The Soviet land-based leg 
would likely consist of SS-18s, SS-24s, 
and SS-25s, which would have to be 
deployed in nonmobile modes, and 
perhaps some SS-19s. This force would 
probably be at or near the 3,000 RV 
limit. 

The Soviet sea-based leg would, 
therefore, consist of about 1,500 SLBM 
RVs, likely deployed on MIRVed [multi- 
ple independently-targetable reentry 
vehicle] SS-N-20s and SS-N-23s and 
single-RV SS-N-8s. Like the United 
States, they could be expected, over 
time, to deploy 1,500 ALCMs. 

The Soviets have proposed that 
first-stage reductions occur over a 
period of 5-8 years. The United States 
has not specified a schedule for its 
proposal but probably could agree to a 
pace of reductions similar to that in the 
Soviet proposal. 



The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 

In contrast to SDI and the arms control 
process, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
act and the deficit reductions process it 
mandates will definitely have some near- 
term effect on our strategic forces, 
although this impact may not be felt in 
our force structure until some years 
hence. 

In the FY [fiscal year] 1986 budget, 
the Defense Department has been able 
to protect the SDI program from fund- 
ing cuts and to apportion the cuts 
among other strategic programs so as to 
avoid significant effects. In FY 1987 and 
beyond, however, the required deficit 
reduction will be much larger and, 
should automatic cuts be necessitated, 
the Department of Defense will have 
less flexibiUty in implementing them. 
Due to the many variables involved in 
the process— such as whether Congress 
and the Administration can agree on a 
budget or, instead, must rely on auto- 
matic cuts, and the size of the spending 
reductions necessary to meet the deficit 
target— it is impossible to arrive at 
specific predictions about the extent to 
which strategic force spending will be 
affected. 

My own belief is that the President 
and the Congi-ess will take the actions 
necessary to preclude drastic reductions 
in defense spending. The question may 
become one of projecting the effect that 
any limited cuts would have. A few 
general obsei-vations seem warranted. 

First, we can expect greater empha- 
sis than before on cost-effectiveness. I 
would expect the Pentagon to take a 
closer look at existing systems to ensure 
that their continuing contribution to our 
security is worth the cost of maintaining 
them. Similarly, in examining options 
for future systems, I would expect them 
to take extra care to define precisely 
the force structure characteristics that 
will enhance effectiveness and ensure 
that a given program option meets that 
goal in the least costly way. As a result, 
we might see some changes in program 
sizes or schedules and, perhaps, some 
eaiiy retirements. 

At the same time as we are empha- 
sizing cost-effectiveness, however, there 
are pressures for accepting higher unit 
costs in order to reduce annual expendi- 
tures while protecting overall program 
procurement levels. We may, therefore, 
see stretchouts of some strategic 
modernization programs. 

If defense spending cuts become 
more significant, such that substantial 
changes in the overall U.S. force 



»iril 1986 



63 



ARMS CONTROL 



posture become necessary, then we will 
be forced into a difficult choice between 
sustaining our current nuclear force 
modernization programs and continuing 
our present level of effort to redress the 
conventional force imbalance. 

Historically, this dilemma has been 
decided in favor of nuclear forces, due 
to their high cost-effectiveness compared 
to conventional forces. On the other 
hand, there are strong reasons for 
avoiding, if possible, increased reliance 
on nuclear weapons for deterrence. The 
fact is that President Reagan remains 
strongly committed to, and places the 
highest priority on, his strategic 
modernization program in order that we 
may maintain the credibility of our 
present deterrent posture. 

Conclusion 

One can conclude from this review that 
we are entering a dynamic period in the 



strategic force arena. The President's 
policy is clear— to move forward with 
the strategic modernization program, 
the SDI research program, and our 
arms control efforts, in accordance with 
the general objectives and guidelines 
established in the first term. But many 
questions remain to be answered, either 
during the second term or thereafter. 
When those answers are realized, they 
could profoundly affect our strategic 
force structure. 

Will our SDI research succeed? Will 
the Soviet Union be willing to negotiate 
an equitable, verifiable agreement imple- 
menting the deep reductions they claim 
to support? Will substantial cuts in 
defense spending be necessitated? In 
any case, the closest collaboration be- 
tween the services, other elements of 
the executive branch, and the defense 
industry will be necessary as we meet 
the challenge posed by this dynamic 
period. ■ 



U.S. Response to Soviet Arms Proposals 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
FEB. 24, 1986' 

On January 15, I welcomed the fact that 
the Soviet Union had put forth arms 
control proposals which we hoped would 
help to bring progress in the Geneva 
and other negotiations. I noted that 
some elements in the Soviet announce- 
ment appeared to be constructive and to 
build upon our proposals which we had 
earlier placed on the negotiating table. 
Other elements, however, reflected 
previous Soviet positions which present 
serious obstacles to progress. 

We made a detailed analysis of these 
Soviet ideas, and we consulted closely 
with our fi-iends and allies in Europe 
and Asia prior to responding to the 
Soviet Union. These consultations were 
excellent and made a significant impact 
on our 0W71 thinking. We have now com- 
pleted our review and reached our deci- 
sion. I have communicated this to allied 
leaders, and I have responded to Gener- 
al Secretary Gorbachev. 

I expressed to Mr. Gorbachev my 
desire to see progress in key arms con- 
trol fora and in the other key areas of 
the U.S.-Soviet agenda: regional issues, 
human rights, and bilateral matters. I 
reiterated the U.S. position that the 



first steps in the nuclear arms control 
area should be the deep cuts in U.S. 
and Soviet offensive weapons which are 
now under negotiation in Geneva. 

With respect to the concept ad- 
vanced publicly by the General Secre- 
tary as his "plan" for the elimination of 
all nuclear weapons by the end of the 
century, I am pleased that the Soviet 
Union appears to agree in principle vnth 
our ultimate goal of moving to the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons when 
this becomes possible. Needless to say, 
this must be done in a careful manner, 
consistent with the overall requirements 
for security and stability of the United 
States and our allies. 

As the means of accomplishing this, 
we support a process by which the Unit- 
ed States and Soviet Union would take 
the first steps by implementing the prin- 
ciple of 50% reductions in the nuclear 
offensive forces of both sides, appropri- 
ately applied, and by negotiating an 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
agreement. We believe that the immedi- 
ate focus should remain on the prompt 
accomplishment of these first necessary 
steps. 

We are also pleased that the Soviet 
Union has indicated publicly that it now 
recognizes our long-held position that 
verification of negotiated agreements is 



critical. We intend to pursue in specific 
terms at the negotiating table General 
Secretary Gorbachev's public offer to 
resolve any necessary verification 
issues. 

On the other hand, many of the 
specific details proposed in the subse- 
quent phases of the Soviet "plan" are 
clearly not appropriate for consideratio 
at this time. In our view, the total elin 
nation of nuclear weapons will requii-e, 
at the same time, the correction of the 
conventional and other force imbalance 
full compliance with existing and futur 
treaty obligations, peaceful resolution > 
regional conflicts in ways that allow fr 
choice without outside interference, an 
a demonstrated commitment by the 
Soviet Union to peaceful competition. 
Unfortunately the details of the Soviel 
"plan" do not address these equally vi 
tal requirements. I would like to makei 
progress now on all of these fronts. 

While we will strive for progress 
across the board, one area where I ho 
we may be able to make immediate 
progress is in the negotiations on inte"- 
mediate-range nuclear forces. Today o 
negotiators in Geneva have placed on 
the table a concrete plan calling for th 
elimination of U.S. Pershing II, groun 
launched cruise missiles, and Soviet 
SS-20 missiles not only in Europe but 
Asia as well, with all such missiles to 
removed from the face of the Earth b 
the end of this decade. 

I call upon the leadership of the 
Soviet Union to study carefully the de 
tails of our new proposal in the spirit 
with which it has been offered and to 
respond concretely at the negotiating 
ble. I urge the Soviet Union to respon 
as well to the concrete and comprehei 
sive proposals which the United State 
placed on the table in Geneva on 
November 1. These proposals covered 
all three areas of the nuclear and spa« 
arms negotiations. Our proposals on 
strategic nuclear arms as well as on 
defense and space arms unfortunately 
have gone unanswered. 

Let me emphasize that the place 1 
make real progress in reducing nuclea 
and other forces is at the confidentiali 
negotiating table. The United States i 
doing its part to foster in the nuclear 
and space talks and other negotiation* 
the practical give-and-take process 
which can lead to deep arms reductioi 
With an equal commitment by our 
Soviet negotiating partners, real 
progress is now within our reach. 



'Text from White House press release 



64 



Department of State Bulll" 



ARMS CONTROL 



The Stockholm Conference 
and East-West Relations 



by Robert L. Barry 

Address before the Royal Institute 
'or Intemational Affairs in London on 
'''ebruary L 1986. Ambassador Barry is 
wad of the U.S. delegation to the St'ock- 
whn Conference on Confidence- and 
)ecurity-Buildi)]g Measures and Disar- 
nament in Europe. 

Tie Stockholm Conference on Disai-ma- 
lent in Europe resumed work 1 week 
go with a meeting attended by Foreign 
linister Genscher of the Federal Re- 
ublic of Germany and Foreign Minister 
'unias of France. The remarks of the 
vo foi-eign ministers stressed the im- 
ortaiice their countries attach to the 
tockholm conference as a key instru- 
ment for enhancing European stability 
id security. They spoke as Europeans 
:id described Stockholm as a dimension 
1 a European process, the Helsinki 
l?CE [Conference on Security and Co- 
(■eration in Europe] process of coopera- 
'in and security building. 

The United States attaches equally 
eat importance to the Stockholm con- 
•ence, and we share with our allies 
? vision of a Europe of independent 
iites joined in cooperation rather than 
iiarated by mistrast and confrontation. 
'e are not geographically a European 
ition, but we are tied to Europe: 
ilitarily to the defense of Western Eu- 
tje; pohtically to the complementary 
lals of increased West European in- 
Irration and the lowering of the barri- 
:■ between East and West. Our 
•tiiipation in the Stockholm confer- 
;e is a demonstration of this commit- 
"■nt lo Europe. 

_ Just before leaving Washington for 
S)ckholm, I met with President Rea- 
ji. He issued a statement stressing 
■ two dimensions of the Stockholm 
■ifei-ence, mihtary and political, and 
i important implications success there 
\nld have for the overall East- West 
■ ttiimship. The President underlined 
contribution Stockholm could make 
Miropean security in the larger 
''■■^e. that which encompasses pohtical, 

• noniic, cultural, and humanitarian— 

• laii rights— as well as strictly mili- 
; ■■ matters. "The attainment of this 

' Hfk'i- concept of security," the Presi- 
I't .said, "is the fundamental objective 
*he United States." 



The President also expressed his be- 
lief that the Stockholm conference could 
succeed in reaching an accord this year, 
a belief echoed by Minister Genscher 
and Minister Dumas last week. There is, 
in fact, a very good chance the confer- 
ence will achieve what it was set up to 
do: establish a military confidence- 
building regime which could reduce the 
risk of military confrontation in Europe. 
In doing so, it would increase stability 
in the European military situation in "the 
near term and give a pohtical impulse to 
greater openness and cooperation be- 
tween East and West. 

Developing an Effective 
Confidence-Building Regime 

If an agreement is reached in Stock- 
holm, it will be similar in outline to the 
proposals NATO tabled at the beginning 
of the conference in January 1984. It 
will establish a mandatory confidence- 
building regime consisting of measures 
requiring exchange of information about 
military forces in Europe and requiring 
that significant movements from normal 
locations be forecast a year in advance, 
described in more detail several weeks 
in advance, and observed by teams from 
other participating states. There will be 
adequate verification measures, includ- 
ing onsite inspection. There will be lan- 
guage reaffirming, but not redefining, 
the principle of non-use of force. 
In contrast to the confidence- 
building measures in the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act, which were largely political 
in significance because they were volun- 
tary and lacked any provision for verifi- 
cation, these measures would have a 
real impact on the conduct of military 
affairs. Indeed, the broader political im- 
phcations of a Stockholm agreement 
would flow from the practical mil- 
itary significance of the measures we 
agreed on. 

In the view of the United States and 
our alHes, this confidence-building re- 
gime coming out of Stockholm should ac- 
comphsh several ends. 

Risk Reduction. An agreement 
would reduce the risk of military con- 
frontation arising from ambiguity about 
the nature of military activities and the 
intentions behind them. It would do this 
by requiring a routine exchange of infor- 
mation concerning military forces and 



their normal exercise practices which 
would, over time, develop a pattern of 
normal mihtary activity in Europe. Es- 
tablishing the data base which defined 
this pattern may take a few years, but 
once established, it could become the 
norm against which all military activity 
on the Continent would be judged. Con- 
formity with such a norm could contrib- 
ute to increased stability as well as 
greater predictability in the overall mih- 
tary situation. On tlie other hand, ex- 
traordinary military activity, determined 
by reference to the established norm, 
would become readily identifiable with 
the result that appropriate political and, 
if required, military countermeasures 
could be taken. Conformity with a pat- 
tern would serve the confidence-building 
aspect of a confidence- and security- 
building regime, while identifying devia- 
tions from the norm would be useful for 
the security-building aspect. 



Use of Military Force for Political 
Intimidation. By requiring states to 
publish a schedule of activities far in ad- 
vance, the confidence-building regime 
we are discussing would inhibit the use 
of military force for political purposes. 
Europe has seen too many examples of 
the use of so-called militarj' exercises 
for the purpose of political' intimidation, 
for example, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 
Poland in 1981. A mandatory confidence- 
building regime providing for forecast- 
ing, notification, observation, and inspec- 
tion would not prevent such events in 
the future. But it would raise the pohti- 
cal price to a threatening state and, 
thus, help to deter the threat. And in- 
spection and observation would provide 
a clearer indication of the intent behind 
such sudden, large-scale activities. Since 
uncertainty about intent is a major fac- 
tor in intimidation, an effective 
confidence-building regime would help 
counter intimidation. 

Confidence Building and Openness. 

Requiring states to announce in advance 
a schedule for the activities of their 
forces would contribute greatly to 
predictability and stabihty. Consider the 
significance of 35 countries with very 
different security requirements and ' 
pohtical ties agreeing that they would 
initiate no significant militai-y activities 
without first announcing and explaining 
them formally and in detail in advance. 
Both militarily and politically, estabhsh- 
ing the principle of openness and the 
right of states to know about the mili- 
tary' intentions and activities of others- 
East, West, and neutral and non- 
aligned— would be of precedent-setting 



^1 1986 



65 



ARMS CONTROL 



importance. Military commanders under- 
stand, I believe, the stabilizing effect 
that the correct degree of openness in 
military affairs affords. They accept the 
idea that intelligence information can in- 
dicate, with a considerable degree of 
assurance, whether their military activi- 
ties are routine and nonthreatening in 
character. The confidence-building re- 
gime which we envision would e.xpand 
openness and, thus, increase this assur- 
ance about the nature of activities 
through overt mutual cooperation. Exag- 
gerated claims for military secrecy be- 
long to the past; real confidence and 
security building requires that we put 
outmoded practices behind us. 

When we discuss openness among 
states, we touch upon the fundamental 
objective of U.S. policy which President 
Reagan emphasized: a Europe without 
barriers, where people of all countries 
can communicate with one another, 
travel freely, exchange ideas of all 
kinds, for the enrichment of all. In 
Stockholm, we deal with military ex- 
change, and the need to find an alterna- 
tive to secretiveness and confrontation 
in the military field is, perhaps, particu- 
larly evident. But relations at the 
military level are a reflection of relation- 
ships on more basic political, cultural, 
and economic levels. Stockholm can ease 
suspicion and increase openness and un- 
derstanding through a confidence- 
building regime in the military field, but 
success there will also contribute to im- 
provement between East and West across 
the spectrum of the relationship. 

The concept of openness, whether in 
military affairs or in other fields, is an 
issue of great sensitivity to some of the 
participants in the Stockholm confer- 
ence, especially to the Soviet Union. But 
my impression is that this sensitivity is 
lessening as a new generation comes to 
power in the Soviet Union. I am partic- 
ularly encouraged that the Soviet 
leadership seems to have accepted the 
principle of onsite inspection as a neces- 
sary element of verifiability, as evi- 
denced by a number of recent state- 
ments, including General Secretary 
Gorbachev's January 15 proposals. 

Although there has been no indica- 
tion yet that the principle has been ac- 
cepted for risk reduction activities as 
opposed to arms reductions activities, I 
see no reason why it should not be; 
Western inspection and observation 
proposals in the Stockholm context are 
less intrusive than elsewhere because 
they involve dynamic activities which, 
unlike static ones, do not require entry 
into sensitive uu^llatkxa. 



The Soviet attitude is evolving posi- 
tively in other areas as well. At the be- 
ginning of the conference, the East took 
a very polemical approach and advanced 
proposals not for practical, concrete 
confidence- and security-building meas- 
ures but, rather, for declaratory meas- 
ures on no-first-use of nuclear weapons, 
nuclear-weapons-free zones, reduction of 
military budgets, and the like, which 
represented their political agenda for 
Western Europe. In the past year, the 
East has gradually adopted a more prac- 
tical and constructive approach. They 
have been more forthcoming on impor- 
tant procedural and substantive issues. 
In October, they joined with the other 
participants in accepting an informal 
working arrangement which focused the 
attention of the conference on specific 
measures with real military content. 

Also in October, during his visit to 
Paris, Soviet General Secretary Gor- 
bachev accepted the idea of an exchange 
of annual schedules for military activi- 
ties—a measure which both NATO and 
the neutral and nonaligned had pro- 
posed. In Geneva last November, Mr. 
Gorbachev joined President Reagan in 
asking for an early and successful con- 
clusion of the Stockholm conference. Last 
month, in his statement of January 15, 
Mr. Gorbachev reaffirmed the commit- 
ment to progress, as President Reagan 
did on January 21. 

Areas of Difference 

In sum, the East has moved closer to 
the approach laid out in the conference 
mandate, on which the West based its 
package of proposals. One reason for the 
change is that NATO was well-prepared 
for this conference and has been patient 
and firm in the face of efforts to divert 
the agenda from military security to po- 
litical issues. The East does want an 
agreement which will allow continuation 
of some kind of European security con- 
ference, and they must realize that the 
only agreement within reach is one 
which fulfills the mandate criteria and is 
concrete, practical, militarily significant, 
and verifiable. 

I have already identified verifiability 
as the essential element of an agi'ee- 
ment and an area where East and West 
have not yet been able to establish com- 
mon ground. A second area of difference 
relates to information exchange. The 
East continues to object to a compre- 
hensive exchange, describing it as an at- 
tempt to legalize espionage. The final 
Eastern position on information, as on 
inspection, will be a good indicator of 



just how far they are prepared to accep 
the concept of openness, which is the 
underlying premise of any confidence- 
building regime. 

A third problem area has been the 
question of what types of military activ , 
ity are to be covered. In our view, the 
Madrid mandate established what we 
call the functional approach. That is, ain 
and naval activities are covered when 
they are functionally related to ground 
force activities; indeed, such combined 
arms activities are the only kind which 
have real military significance in the 
European context. The East has tried 1 
include so-called independent air and 
naval activities in the measures under 
discussion, an attempt which the West 
has rejected. Now it appears that the 
East is willing to have an agreement 
which does not include independent 
naval activities. That removes a major 
obstacle in the talks. Inherently un- 
verifiable independent air activities 
should also be set aside. 

Relation to Arms Control, 
Security, and Human Rights 

I believe that the will exists to over- 
come these obstacles. So let me try to 
relate success in Stockholm to the larg^ 
picture of arms control and East -West 
relations. The two tracks of arms redu 
tion, on the one hand, and confidence 
building leading to risk reduction, on t 
other, are mutually reinforcing. We 
hope for success in Geneva and in 
Vienna— significant reduction in nuclea 
and conventional arms. If we can accoi 
plish these reductions, they will, in 
themselves, build confidence and, thus 
result in a more stable world. In the 
meantime, successful confidence buildii 
can help to pave the way for arms 
reductions. 

The kind of regime we are trying t 
create in Stockholm would, if complied 
with, give a political impulse to other | 
negotiations. Stockholm is also breakin 
new ground in another area. It is the ^ 
only security forum which includes all 
the European states, except for Alban 
It has stimulated the first serious fom| 
exchange among the neutral and non- 
aligned states on security-related issuf 
resulting in the emergence of a comm< 
position on the issues before the confe 
ence. This, in turn, has made them sei 
more clearly some of the complexities 
and difficulties involved with the armt" 
reduction efforts, which are also impoi 
tant to them. 



66 



Department of State Bulli 



EAST ASIA 



Success in Stockholm could have a 
iositive effect on the entire range of 
'ast-West relations, as both President 
teagaii and General Secretary Gor- 
achev have independently recognized, 
'o cite just one example, it could move 
le entire Helsinki CSCE process 
head. The CSCE followup meeting, 
'hich opens in Vienna in November of 
lis year, will evaluate progress in all 
spects of the Helsinki Pinal Act. That 
leans e.xamining developments in hu- 
lan rights as well as progress in the 
'curity field. For the United States 
id its NATO allies, balance among all 
) principles of the CSCE is essential to 
le continuation of the process. 

Developments on humanitarian and 
iman rights issues in the East since 
e Madrid review meeting of 1980-83 
ve not been encouraging. Nor can we 
int to notable success at the post- 
adrid meetings such as the Ottawa 
man rights foram [Ottawa Human 
ghts Experts' Meeting] or the Buda- 
st Cultural Forum. We can hope for 
:cess at the Bern Human Contacts 
■eting later this year, but, in any 
■e, the Vienna conferees will not have 
ery' bright picture to contemplate. A 
aningful and politically binding Stock- 
m agi-eement, strictly complied with 
all participating states, will make it 
ier for Vienna to decide on continu- 
I the Stockholm security forum in 
ie form after the CSCE review con- 
ies its work. 

iclusion 

I conclusion, let me note that our work 
Stockholm lacks the drama of dealing 
'h vital nuclear issues, as the Geneva 
'otiators do. As [NATO Secretary 
■leral] Lord Carrington pointed out in 
)eech to the Swedish Institute of In- 
iiational Affairs last week, the pace 
:ur work has been something less 
n electric, although he also pointed 
-that, compared to our MBFR [mutu- 
nd balanced force reductions] col- 
■nes in Vienna, we have been almost 
■:less in our haste. So it is httle 
1 del- that our efforts have gone large- 
•nnoticed, both in the media and in 
i foreign offices. But, as the clock 
'• out on our deliberations, things are 
' lining to happen. Keep your eye on 
•r the 23 negotiating weeks remain- 
us, and you may see something 
' -esting— and important— begin to 



Election Developments 
in the Philippines 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT. 
JAN. 30. 1986' 

A special election for President and Vice 
President will take place in the Philip- 
pines on February 7. This election is of 
gi-eat importance to the future of democ- 
racy in the Philippines, a major friend 
and ally of the United States in the Pa- 
cific. It comes at a time when the 
Philippines is struggling with the urgent 
need to reestabhsh a political concensus, 
restructure the economy, and rebuild a 
sense of military professionalism. 

President Marcos has invited the 
United States to send observers to the 
election. Because of our respect for the 
Philippines and our commitment to the 
sovereign will of a democratic people as 
expressed through the electoral process, 
I have decided to send a delegation of 
official U.S. observers to the Philippines 
for the election. I would like the delega- 
tion to be composed of Members of the 
Congi-ess from both parties and of dis- 
tinguished Americans from the private 
sector. 

I also note that the party institutes 
of both the Republican and Democratic 
Parties have jointly decided to sponsor 
an international observer delegation for 
the election in the Philippines. I am con- 
fident that both of these efforts will 
make a significant contribution to this 
important event. 

The United States left a legacy of 
democratic institutions in the Philippines 
earlier in this century. Filipinos believe 
in elections, as long as they are fair, to 
resolve their political differences. To 
safeguard the process, the National 
Citizens' Movement for Free Elections, 
or NAMFREL as it is called, will field 
hundi-eds of thousands of citizen election 
observers on Febiniary 7. Such citizen 
participation makes Americans pi-oud to 
have the Republic of the Philippines as 
a friend and ally. 

A free and fair election, if also fol- 
lowed by a genuine reform effort in the 
economic and security areas, will assist 
the Philippines along a path of growth, 
prosperity, and stability that will benefit 
the entire region. 

The Communist Party of the Philip- 
pines, through its militai-y ai-m, the New- 
People's Army, and its front organiza- 
tion, the National Democratic Front, is 



pursuing a classic military and political 
strategy intended to lead eventually to a 
totalitarian takeover of the Philippines. 
The communist strategy can be defeated, 
but defeating it will require listening to 
and respecting the sovereign voice of 
the people. 

I believe this is an important time 
for America to respond to the problems 
of a friend and ally at a critical juncture 
in its history. If the will of the Filipino 
people is expressed in an election that 
Filipinos accept as credible— and if 
whoever is elected undertakes fun- 
damental economic, political, and mili- 
tary reforms— we should consider, in 
consultation with the Congress, a signifi- 
cantly larger program of economic and 
military assistance for ttjft Philippines 
for the next 5 years. This would be over 
and above the current levels of as- 
sistance we are providing. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
FEB. 11, 19862 

The Philippine elections have captured 
the attention of the American public. At 
times we need to remind ourselves that 
this is a Philippine election, not an 
American election. Yet our interests are 
deeply affected by these elections-by 
the results, by the deficiencies of the 
process, and by what all this means for 
the future. 

President Marcos invited American 
observers to witness the election; Sena- 
tor Lugar [Richard G. Lugar, Rep.-Ind.J 
and Representative Murtha [John P. 
Murtha, Dem.-Pa.j cochaired an ob- 
server delegation at my request. They 
returned last night. I have heard their 
preliminai-y report this morning. Since 
no definite judgment on the result has 
yet been rendered by either the official 
or the unofficial Filipino electoral 
bodies, it is not appropriate for the 
United States to make such a judgment 
at this time. 

Nonetheless, two points need to be 
made. 

• First, it is a disturbing fact that 
the election has been flawed by reports 
of fraud, which we take seriously, and 
by violence. This concerns us because 
we cherish commitment to free and fair 
elections, and because we beheve the 



>' 1986 



67 



EAST ASIA 



Government of the Philippines needs an 
authentic populai- mandate in order 
effectively to counter a gi'owing com- 
munist insurgency and restore health to 
its troubled economy. 

• And second, the election itself— 
the obvious enthusiasm of Filipinos for 
the democratic process and the extra- 
ordinary vigor of the campaign— also tell 
us something. They tell us of the pro- 
found yearning of the Filipino people for 
democracy and, indeed, of the vigor of 
the underlying forces of pluralism and 
democracy. Only the communists boy- 
cotted the election. 

The political process in the Philip- 
pines continues. Further it does not end 
with this election. Our task for the fu- 
ture is to help nurture the hopes and 
possibilities of democracy, to help the 
people of the Philippines overcome the 
grave problems their country faces, and 
to continue to work for essential 
refoiTns. 

To help advise me on how the 
United States can best pursue that task 
and to assess the desires and needs of 
the Filipino people, I am asking Ambas- 
sador Philip Habib to travel to the 
Philippines to meet with the leaders of 
both political parties, with church and 
government officials, and with represen- 
tatives of private sector groups. 

Americans can never be indifferent 
to events in the Philippines. Our two 
countries have too much at stake for 
that. Our national interests converge. 
Our peoples bear genuine affection 
toward each other. Most important, our 
peoples share democratic aspirations. 
Those ties between our people will 
endure. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
FEB. 15, 19863 

We have followed vrith great interest 
and concern the Presidential and Vice 
Presidential elections in the Philippines. 
As the Philippines is a close friend and 
ally, what happens to this nation and its 
people is of great importance to the 
United States. 

While maintaining strict neutrality 
in these elections, we have consistently 
urged that the process be a fair and 
credible one leading to a government 
with the strongest possible mandate. 
The elections were marked by hearten- 
ing evidence of the continuing commit- 
ment of the Filipino people to the 
democratic process and the furtherance 
of a two-party system which should 
strengthen that process in the future. 



Although our observation delegation 
has not yet completed its work, it has 
already become evident, sadly, that the 
elections were marred by widespread 
fraud and violence pei-petrated largely 
by the ruling party. It was so extreme 
that the election's credibility has been 
called into ciuestion both within the 
Philippines and in the United States. 

At this difficult juncture, it is imper- 
ative that all responsible Filipinos seek 
peaceful ways to effect stability within 
their society and to avoid violence which 
would benefit only those who wish to 
see an end to democracy. Both sides 
must work together to make those re- 
forms which are needed to ensure a sta- 
ble democracy, a truly professional 
military and a healthy economy. 

Our hearts go out to the people of 
the Philippines. They are at a major 
crossroads in their history. We are 
proud of our long association with them 
and very proud of their passionate devo- 
tion to democracy. There are no easy 
answers. And in the last analysis, they 
will have to find the solutions them- 
selves. But they will have our help— in 
any way we can. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 22, 19863 

President Marcos' Defense Minister, 
Juan Ponce Enrile, and the acting Chief 
of Staff of the Armed Forces, General 
Fidel Ramos, today announced their 
resignations from President Marcos' 
government as a result of the fraud in 
the recent elections. They called on him 
to step down because his government no 
longer has a popular mandate. 

Minister Enrile has said: "We want 
the will of the people to be respected. I 
believe that the mandate of the people 
does not belong to the regime." General 
Ramos has said: "It is my duty to see 
that the sovereign will of the people is 
respected. I am bothered by my con- 
science." Minister Enrile, one of Presi- 
dent Marcos' oldest and closest political 
associates, further reported his personal 
knowledge of vote rigging and manipula- 
tion on a massive scale. 

These statements strongly reinforce 
our concerns that the recent Presiden- 
tial elections were marred by fraud, per- 
petuated overwhelmingly by the ruling 
party, so extreme as to undermine the 
credibility and legitimacy of the election 
and impair the capacity of the Govern- 
ment of the Philippines to cope with a 
growing insurgency and a troubled 
economy. 



Many authoritative voices in the 
Philippines have been raised in support i 
of nonviolence. We support these voice: 
and e.xpect them to be respected. We 
also support resolution of the issues in- 
volved by all the people of the Philip- 
pines as quickly as possible. 

Ambassador Habib is now returnin 
from the Philippines and will report 
promptly upon his return. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 23, 19863 

The American people are watching wit 
great concern and compassion the 
events unfolding in the Philippines, a 
longtime friend and ally. The Presideii 
appealed earlier today to President M: 
cos to avoid an attack against othei- el 
ments of the Philippine Armed Forces 
Regrettably, there are now reports of 
an attack. An attempt to resolve this 
situation by foi-ce will surely result in 
bloodshed "and casualties, further polai 
ize Philippine society, and cause untol h 
damage to the relationship between oi f 
governments. 

The United States provides milita 
assistance to the Philippine Armed _ _ I* 
Forces in order to strengthen its abili '■ 
to protect the security of the Philip- 
pines, particularly against the serious jl 
threat posed by a gi-owing communist r 
insurgency. We cannot continue our el 
isting military assistance if the goven| 
ment uses that aid against other 
elements of the Philippine military _ I. 
which enjoy substantial popular backi| 

The President urges, in the strong* 
possible terms, that violence be avoid ' 
as Filipinos of good will work to reso 
the ongoing crisis. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
FEB. 24. 19863 

We have received disturbing reports 
possible attacks by forces loyal to 
General Ver against elements of Phil 
pine forces that have come to the suji 
port of General Ramos and Defense 
Minister Enrile. We urge those contt 
plating such action to stop. Marcos h: 
pledged to refrain from initiating vio 
lence, and we appeal to him and thos 
loyal to him, as well as all the oth^v 
Filipino people, to continue to do sd. 
Attempts to prolong the life of tl 
present regime by violence are futile i 
solution to this crisis can only be 
achieved by a peaceful transition to ■■ 
new government. 



68 



Department of State Bu 



I 



EAST ASIA 



ECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
EB. 25, 1986^ 

he President is pleased with the peace- 
il ti-ansition to a new Government of 
le Philippines. The United States ex- 
'nds recognition to this new govern- 
ent headed by President Aquino. We 
ly special tribute to her for her com- 
itment to nonviolence which has 
inied her the respect of all Americans. 

The new government has been 
•oduced by one of the most stirring 
id courageous e.xamples of the demo- 
atic process in modern histoi-y. We 
mor the Filipino people. The United 
ates stands ready as always to cooper- 
B and assist the Philippines as the 
ivernment of President Aquino en- 
iges the problems of economic develop- 
?nt and national security. 

We praise the decision of President 
ircos. Reason and compassion have 



prevailed in ways that best serve the 
Filipino nation and people. In his long 
term as President, Ferdinaiul Marcos 
showed himself to be a staunch friend of 
the United States. We are gratified that 
his departure fi-om office has come 
peacefully, characterized by the dignity 
and strength that have marked his 
many years of leadership. 

It is the Filipino people, of course, 
who are the true heroes today. They 
have high expectations for their country 
and for democracy, and they have 
resolved this issue nonviole'ntly in a way 
that does them honor. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 3, 1986. 

^Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 17. 

^Text from White House press release 

■■Press release 31 of Feb. 26, which also 
includes the Secretary's question-and-answei- 
session with news correspondents. ■ 



fter the Election in the Philippines 



Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
■.Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
tise Foreign Affairs Committee on 

■ ni„ry 20, 1986. Mr. Wolfowitz is As- 
•init Secretary for East Asian and 

' ific Affairs.^ 

lelcome this opportunity to renew our 
siange of views with the subcommit- 
(concerning the situation in the 
lippines and its implications for U.S. 

--■y- 

The Philippines has just held a 
oric Presidential election. The out- 
)-ing of nonpartisan citizen effort to 
tetiard the ballot process was an in- 
i.ng testimonial to the deep yearning 
ilemocratic processes to work. There 
■<few nations at any age which can 
ijonstrate such fundamental and 
fistic participation to defend 
iiDcratic principles. 
Unfortunately, however, as the 
:jident stated on Febi-uary 15: "... 

■ ■^ already become evident, sadly, 

; the elections were marred by wide- 
' I'l fraud and violence perpetrated 
' 1,\- by the ruling party. It was so 
''me that the election's credibihty 
i>ieen called into question both 
tn the Phihppines and in the United 
as." The initial findings of the 
^dential observer delegation are con- 



sistent with this conclusion. We appreci- 
ate the Congress' valuable participation 
in the observer delegation. 

The situation we addi-ess today is a 
difficult and complex one. The validity 
of the declared outcome has been seri- 
ously called into question by responsible 
observers both in the Philippines and 
abroad. The Catholic Bishops Confer- 
ence of the Philippines, after reviewing 
election developments throughout the 
archipelago, has described the elections 
as having been conducted in a fraudu- 
lent manner. The Senate, in a resolution 
passed yesterday, has stated its sense 
that "the elections in the Philippines 
were fraudulent and did not fairly 
reflect the will of the people of the 
Philippines." 

As you know, the President has sent 
Ambassador Philip Habib to Manila to 
assess the djTiamics of the situation and 
to advise on how the United States can 
"help nurture the hopes and possibilities 
of democracy . . . help the people of 
the Philippines overcome the grave 
problems their country faces; and . . . 
continue to work for essential reforms." 
The difficult situation which thus now 
pertains in the Philippines requires that 
we address our own responses with care 
and caution. While some things are clear 
now, many others are not, and we will 
await the result of Ambassador Habib's 
consultations, realizing that the situation 
will continue to be in flux for some 
time. 



This election has permitted the open 
and direct expression of deeply differing 
views within Philippine society, but un- 
fortunately it has failed to resolve them 
in a credible way. The severe damage to 
the credibihty of the election is more 
tragic because it also demonstrated, in 
so many ways, the resihence of the 
democratic tradition in the Philippines. 
The election was openly contested; 
parties were able to organize, criticize, 
and take their case to the people in 
rallies and campaign appearances 
throughout the archipelago. A new polit- 
ical coalition was able, in a short time, 
to become a major political force. 
However, now that responsible and 
moderate groups have been allowed to 
organize so openly, it will be all the 
worse if their hopes and aspirations are 
frustrated. 

The commitment of hundreds of 
thousands of NAMFREL [National 
Citizens' Movement for Free Elections] 
volunteers and others to make the sys- 
tem work was inspiring. One member of 
our team stated that he observed 
"hundreds of citizens sei-\ing as poll 
watchers and election officials to make 
the system work. The violence and 
intimidation was a real tragedy, a 
betrayal by the few of the many who 
worked so hard to make it work." Such 
comments are multipUed many times by 
the U.S. Embassy officers and interna-" 
tional observers who covered almost all 
of the 75 provinces of the country dur- 
ing the election. There are all too few 
countries in the world where such citi- 
zens' organizations could be formed and 
assist in monitoring election perform- 
ance, but that makes the exclusion of 
NAMFREL workers from many key 
areas at the last moment all the more 
deeply disappointing. 

The process was commendably open 
to the world. Hundreds of visas were 
issued to foreign observers. This is one 
of the reasons why the election was as 
free as it was and why we know it was 
as flawed as it was. But now the ex- 
pressions of concern it has aroused can- 
not be ignored. 



What Went Wrong? 

The systematic disenfranchisement of 
voters was one of the most significant 
as well as unexpected developments in 
the election. Unanticipated to a large 
degree by the opposition, NAMFREL, 
or our own observers, this disenfran- 
chisement became apparent throughout 
the country on election day, but particu- 
larly in metro Manila and other urban 



P 1986 



69 



EAST ASIA 



centers, in opposition strongholds, and 
among the middle class in general. 

The election experience was differ- 
ent from place to place. Where local 
authorities tried to carry out the law 
fairly, and NAMFREL workers were 
also "permitted to function without in- 
timidation, there are reports of almost 
model election results, sometimes favor- 
ing President Marcos, sometimes favor- 
ing Mrs. Aquino. In far too many other 
places, however, fraud intervened. Most 
serious were the many successful efforts 
to tamper with the results themselves. 
We have confirmed reports by our own 
Embassy and foreign observers of prac- 
tices ranging from substitution of bal- 
lots, simple fraudulent reporting of 
results, substitution of reporting tallies, 
discard of any Aquino votes as invalid, 
and fanciful reporting of results to the 
canvassing centers either before the 
alleged vote count had even been com- 
pleted or, in many cases, using totals far 
in excess of all registered voters in a 
disti'ict. 

The U.S. Role 

This is a Philippine problem. Every na- 
tion must address in its own way the 
challenge of developing strong and 
credible institutions. 

Nevertheless, we cannot walk away 
from our interests and responsibilities. 
Our influence is not unhmited, but we 
should use the influence we do have and 
use it wisely. We intend to be helpful in 
any way that it is appropriate. Mean- 
while, Filipinos need some time to 
search for viable solutions, but that time 
must be used well. The problems will 
not be solved by a return to business-as- 
usual or by refusing to acknowledge 
that this was a flawed election. 

Some directions are clear. The Presi- 
dent's offer in January of significantly 
increased American assistance if a free 
and fair election was conducted and the 
elected government undertook fun- 
damental needed reforms is clearly now 
in abeyance. But most specific decisions 
on U.S. policy directions must await 
Ambassador Habib's return and his 
assessment. 

Nevertheless, as we address the 
issues before us, some guiding principles 
are apparent. 

• We should make clear that we 
support the demonstrated Philippine 
faith in democracy. Americans believe in 
government by the consent of the 
governed. The American consensus on 
this point is clear and should not be dis- 
puted. While we may debate specific 



policies, this should not obscure the 
bipartisan commitment to this goal. 

• A stable and prosperous Philip- 
pines under a democratic government is 
of major importance to the United 
States. We have a large stake in the 
bases in the Philippines, but our stake 
in democracy comes first. Indeed, our 
interest in the bases and our interest in 
democracy are complementary, not 
mutually exclusive. We are convinced 
that democratic reform is the key to 
thwarting a communist victory that 
would end at one stroke both all hopes 
for democracy in the Philippines and our 
access to these important facilities. 

• We should do everything we can 
to support the moderate forces which 
are represented importantly on both 
sides of the partisan divide in the Philip- 
pines and among many nonpartisan 
gj-oups. The church, civic organizations, 
many military professionals, and others 
have demonstrated responsible commit- 
ment to viable free institutions and 
should receive our encouragement. 

• We should oppose the use of force 
and violence that in the long run will 
benefit only those who do not believe in 
democratic values. A radical communist 
insurgency is ready in the wings to take 
advantage of either a breakdown of pub- 
lic order or popular disillusionment with 
institutional avenues to achieve change 
or redress of grievances. It is incumbent 
on all those who wish a better future 
for the Philippines to encourage re- 
straint. The present problems will be 
successfully surmounted neither through 
martial law nor mob violence. 

• Solutions must be Filipino solu- 
tions, not American solutions. As Presi- 
dent Reagan said February 15: "... 
in the last analysis, they will have to 
find the solutions themselves. But they 
will have our help— in any way we can." 

Our assessment of the situation is 
continuing, and major further develop- 
ments will await decisions to be taken in 
the light of Ambassador Habib's report 
to the President. We are maintaining 
close contact with all responsible ele- 
ments of the political spectrum. 

We recognize that whoever leads the 
Philippines will need an effective and 
professional armed forces and will need 
a revitalized and dynamic economy to 
provide hope for individual betterment 
and well-being. Our existing assistance 
programs are addressed effectively to 
these objectives. Our assistance does 
not go to individuals but to support the 
economic and security needs of the 
Philippine people. No one should claim 
that U.S. assistance constitutes a per- 



sonal endorsement or is for the purpos 
of supporting any individual's claim to 
power, either in the Philippines or in 
dozens of other countries around the 
world that receive U.S. aid. 

The present situation confronts us 
with some difficult decisions, but we 
would caution against precipitous actio 
Our actions have multiple consequence 
and we want to act in a way that mov 
things forward, not in a way that lead; 
to violence and chaos. 

We should ask of proposed actions 
whether they will create incentives foi 
Filipinos to seek solutions or whether 
they will instead harden and deepen tl 
divisions? Will our actions encourage ( 
discourage the restraint that both side 
need to exercise if violence is to be 
avoided? Will they encourage businest 
as-usual attitudes, or will they go to t 
other extreme and contribute to dang' 
ous instability? There are no easy an- 
swers to such questions and no courst 
of action now that does not entail son 
risks. But we need to address these 
questions, not as an excuse for inactic 
but to avoid recklessness. 

I am aware of the significant con- 
cerns which were expressed in your 
first hearing on this subject in this su 
committee yesterday. We share many 
those concerns. However, our decisioi 
on the subject of foreign assistance ai i- 
highly consequential. We need to get |c 
better feel for the thinking of many e H 
ments in the Philippines and will awa U 
Ambassador Habib's own assessment p 
the basis of his intensive consultation; fa 
there. There are large interests at 1 1 
stake, and, therefore, I would suggesi^ 
that we pursue further consultations ■ H 
a bipartisan basis in the days ahead b ■ 
fore the committee formally proposes 
legislation regarding our Philippine ai 
program. Meanwhile, neither AmericJ 
nor Filipino should make the mistake 
claiming that any American actions c( 
stitute an endorsement of this serious 
flawed election or an American prefei 
ence for one side over the other in th 
political drama that continues to play 
self out in the Philippines. 

As that drama unfolds, it will be 
particularly important that the integl 
of the Philippine Ai-med Forces be m 
tained and, indeed, strengthened as 
much as possible through reform. If' 
Armed Forces of the Philippines disL 
grates, there is only one organized 
armed force remaining in the Philip- 
pines. That is the communist New Pi 
pie's Army. No democratic or moderi 
leader of any persuasion would survi 
under those circumstances. 



70 



Department of State Bu ''" 



ECONOMICS 



] A significant portion of our present 
distance to the Philippines is in im- 
?mentation of the President's commit- 
^nt at the time of the last U.S.- 
lilippine review of our Military Bases 
'jreement in 1983. Just as thePhilip- 
aes has honored its commitments un- 
r that agreement, they expect us to 
fill our related obligations as well. I 
il confident that we will find the 
(•ans to continue to do so in an honora- 
i manner. 

We recognize that there are no easy 
swers and that even comments which 
• perceive as neutral can be e.xploited 
cause dismay among our friends. We 
1 remain engaged, seeking to keep 
•ays in mind the principles I have 
'ed above. 

j The Philippine people and the Philip- 
je nation remain important to the 
ited States and we to them. Powerful 
.-es foi- democracy and for change 
re been unleashed. This election has 
honstrated the great strength and 
port of centrists and moderates in 
Philippines, but the pohtical center 
ireatened both by the illegality and 
;id of the election and by the forces 
iadicahsm led by the Communist 
Ity of the Philippines. 
Thus the election has at this stage 
^ially compounded the problems of 
I Philippines. As I indicated before 
subcommittee in November, an elec- 
which is not perceived by the 
■ippine people as reasonable and fair 
i lead to increased polarization of the 
■ty and a gi-owth in the communist 
i-.treiicy. We still believe this to be 
case. 

Mevertheless we do not consider the 
■ess to be over. We would like to 
' your views and hope to woi-k care- 
i with the Congi-ess in the days 
d to ensure that together we avoid 
■ 01- destabilizing action yet remain 
to our fundamental principles and 
tfi-m interests. As the situation de- 
's in the Philippines, the govem- 
! there will still need to tackle 
"i- problems in the mihtary, in the 
I'liiy, and in the society. We shall 
to determine how we can best help 
' P'llipinos of good faith and en- 
iRe them to overcome present 
s and build a future of hope and 
less for all the people of that great 
n. We will want to be part of that 
a\nr, as is appropriate for a friend 



Commodity Markets 

and Commodity Agreements 



he complete transcript of the hearings 
I e published by the committee and will 
iailable from the Superintendent of 
^nents. U.S. Government Printing Office 
Jington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the National Coffee 
Association in Boca Raton, Florida, on 
February 11, 1986. Mr. Wallis is Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

This morning I will discuss the Interna- 
tional Coffee Agreement (ICA). 

The United States has been a party 
to this agreement since 1962. We have a 
right to withdraw on 90 days notice, 
and, in fact, we cannot remain in the 
agreement after next September unless 
we obtain explicit authority from Con- 
gress to do so. 

For about a year we have been 
studying the advantages of the agree- 
ment-not only the direct advantages to 
the United States but also the indirect 
advantages through effects on friendly 
countries. The issues are complex, but 
we expect to reach a conclusion by 
spring. 

As background for discussing the 
coffee agreement, I will point out some 
general characteristics of commodity 
prices. Then I will consider efforts to 
control the movement of commodity 
prices. Finally, I will talk about the ICA 
itself. I want to emphasize that no deci- 
sion has been reached about our con- 
tinued participation and that the 
decision will not be based on economic 
considerations alone. 

Trends and Characteristics of 
Commodity Prices 

Turning fu-st, then, to trends and 
characteristics of commodity prices in 
general: we are experiencing currently 
an interesting and instructive period in 
international commodity markets. In re- 
cent years, there has been a weakening 
of the price of internationally traded oil, 
and it has fallen dramatically in the last 
few weeks. In recent years, also, there 
have been substantial drops in the 
prices of other commodities. Since 1980, 
the prices of most major commodities, 
measured in inflation-adjusted dollars, 
have declined by one-third. As a result, 
the prices paid by U.S. consumers for 
internationally traded primary commodi- 
ties other than fuel, after adjustment for 
inflation, are lower than at any time 
since the Second World War. 



Coffee provides one of the few sig- 
nificant exceptions to the downward 
trend in commodity prices. Since the 
end of 1980, the inflation-adjusted dollar 
price of coffee has risen almost 50%— or 
even more, depending on which day you 
make the calculation. 

Among the many influences on com- 
modity prices, one of special importance 
was the ending of over 15 years of high 
inflation and the attendanttemporary 
recession in economic activity. Com- 
modity prices are especially sensitive to 
these economic fundamentals. In addi- 
tion, a large part of the reason for the 
weakness of dollar prices of commodities 
has been the strength of the U.S. dollar. 
Commodity prices expressed in terms of 
other major currencies have strength- 
ened as the world economy has re- 
covered. A world index of real 
commodity prices has risen since 1982, 
along with steady, though modest, eco- 
nomic recovery outside the United 
States and strong recovery in the 
United States. 

After con-ecting for fluctuations in 
exchange rates, the major determinant 
of inflation-adjusted commodity prices 
appears to be the rate of world eco- 
nomic growth. A recent study by Data 
Resources, Inc., indicates that if in the 
24 countries of the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) economic growth is faster than 
2.6% annually, commodity prices tend to 
rise; and if the OECD countries grow 
more slowly than 2.6%, commodity 
prices tend to fall. 

Specific commodities are subject to 
their own specific influences, such as the 
powerful effect that frost and drought 
have on coffee prices. Those specific in- 
fluences temporarily obscure the longer 
term trends, which otherwise would 
have been about the same for coffee and 
other special cases as for commodities in 
general. 

These special cases, however, il- 
luminate certain features common to the 
markets for most commodities. Most 
commodities have volatile prices; they 
are highly sensitive to shortages or 
surges of supply. From a policy stand- 
point, the volatility of commodity prices 
is especially significant because it stimu- 
lates efforts to control markets in the 
hope of stabilizing them. 



1986 



ECONOMICS 



Cartels 

The reason for the volatility of the 
prices of most primary commodities is 
that they face highly inelastic demand in 
the short run. 

Demand is termed inelastic if a 
change of the quantity available by a 
given percentage results in a larger per- 
centage change of the price in the oppo- 
site direction. If demand is inelastic, 
suppliers can obtain more revenue from 
a smaller supply than they can from a 
larger supply. The increase in price will 
more than offset the decrease in sales. 
For many commodities, supply, too, 
is inelastic in that even a large increase 
in price brings forth only a small in- 
crease in quantity. Indeed, unless this is 
true, it is not possible to increase 
revenue by raising the price of a com- 
modity whose demand is inelastic. The 
increase in price will simply elicit in- 
creased supply and, thus, restrain the 
rise in price. In these circumstances, 
there is a strong incentive for the sup- 
pliers to form a cartel and agree among 
themselves to hold down supply. 

A complication to this is that elastic- 
ities of both demand and supply increase 
with time. In the very short run, con- 
sumers may face extreme difficulty in 
reducing consumption, and producers 
may find it virtually impossible to in- 
crease supply. So in the short run, car- 
tels can be effective— at least, they could 
be in theory if they could discipline 
their members, something which history 
shows they seldom can do for long. 
Each producer has a strong incentive to 
expand his output surreptitiously and, 
thus, get a free ride on the restraint of 
the others. But, in time, all things are 
possible: consumers find substitutes or 
learn to do vrithout, and suppliers find 
new mines, bring new trees to maturity, 
convert machinery, or train new work- 
ers. In the long run, both demand and 
supply become highly elastic. 

Oil is providing us with a classic ex- 
ample. In the early 1970s, as a seem- 
ingly insatiable demand for oil rapidly 
outstripped additions to reserves, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was able to triple 
prices. In 1979, after the Iranian revolu- 
tion, panic buying by consumers enabled 
OPEC to increase prices a further 160%. 
The United States assisted the cartel by 
holding domestic oil prices below inter- 
national levels and subsidizing the ex- 
cess in price of imported oil. Energy 
analysts were predicting a steady in- 
crease in the real price of oil and con- 
tinued dependence on OPEC oil. 



The reverse has happened. Why? 
First, President Reagan decontrolled 
domestic oil prices, thus halting our sub- 
sidy to OPEC. Then, the high interna- 
tional price of oil stimulated three basic 
responses by consumers and producers. 

First, they used oil more efficiently. 
The amount of oil used in relation to 
gross national product (GNP) of industri- 
alized countries has dropped 30% in the 
past 11 years. 

Second, substantial additional sup- 
plies of non-OPEC oil came on the 
market. 

Third, coal, fission, and gas were 
substituted for oil, and, to some extent, 
even wind, sunshine, waterfalls, and 
geothermal resources. 

The long-run price elasticities of de- 
mand and supply turned out to be large. 
OPEC could maintain prices only by 
reducing its production. Since 1979, de- 
mand for OPEC oil has decreased by 
about 50%. OPEC is facing the problem 
of all cartels in a falling market: how to 
share the pain of reduced production 
and revenues. 

There is a similar story for bauxite. 
For the last 30 years, bauxite has been 
a principal source of foreign exchange 
earnings for Jamaica. In the early 1970s, 
the then-socialist Government of 
Jamaica sought to draw other nations 
into a bauxite cartel. When other coun- 
tries did not join, Jamaica unilaterally 
raised its prices by imposing a steep ex- 
port levy. For a time, buyers had no 
option but to pay the price. Jamaica gar- 
nered greatly increased foreign ex- 
change revenues, and the Jamaican 
Government enjoyed greatly increased 
revenues. Higher prices, however, stim- 
ulated the development of new capacity 
to produce bauxite in Guinea, Brazil, 
and Australia. Jamaica, which produced 
15 million tons of bauxite in 1974, is 
now producing less than 6 million tons 
annually. The international bauxite 
market is awash with excess capacity, 
and prices are weak. Jamaica now con- 
fronts this weak market hampered by a 
bloated public sector that owes its exist- 
ence to tax revenues from bauxite. 

These attempts to stabilize the oil 
and bauxite markets illustrate the 
general tendency for such attempts to 
boomerang on producers who attempt 
them. They illustrate also the impor- 
tance of the special characteristics of 
commodity markets that I referred to 
earMer— inelastic demand and, conse- 
quently, volatile prices. These charac- 
teristics are a never-ending temptation 
to governments and other interested 



parties to intervene in one way or 
another to influence the course of pria 
These characteristics give rise to sedu 
tive arguments, effective even in im- 
porting countries, favoring more 
intervention. 

In commodity markets, efforts to 
control prices sometimes can succeed i? 
the short run, but they eventually fail 
Then, when the market collapses, the 
fects on producers are disastrous, and 
they last a long time because of surpli 
stocks and excess capacity hanging ov 
the market. The depth and duration o 
the hardship exceeds whatever benefi 
were achieved by the temporary redu ' 
tion in volatility. » 

International Commodity Agreemeni 

When we consider other forms of intc 
vention, such as international commoc ' 
agreements with both producers and 
consumers participating, we should b( 
in mind the infonnational function of 
free price system. Prices are a decen- 
tralized system of communication and • 
centives that makes the economy I 
efficient. f 

• Prices convey information. The; 
tell what is wanted and how much it 
is wanted in relation to the prices of 
the things that will be given up to 
provide it. 

• Prices furnish an incentive to 
adopt the least costly methods of 
production and, thereby, use resourci 
for their most highly valued purposes , 

• Prices determine how income is 
distributed. 

All these points have a bearing o , 
the arguments for and against par- 
ticipating in international commodity , 
agreements and can be used to test t. 
soundness of the arguments. 

An international commodity agi-ei 
ment usually has as its principal aim 
stabilize the prices of the commoditif t 
covers. On the surface, "stabilize" 
seems to refer only to reducing the \ ^■ 
tiUty of commodity prices that I dis- ' 
cussed a few moments ago. Commod' 
agreements do, in fact, try to do tha' 
In addition, however, the term "stat 
lize" often takes on the connotation ■ 
"support"— to hold the price higher, I 
the average, than it would be in a fr' 
market. If an agreement does that, i' 
transfers income from consumers to ' 
producers, and it obstructs the infer" 
tional function of prices. ^ 

With either meaning of the termj^ 
"stabilize," but especially with the f • 
(reducing volatility), a commodity ag ■ 



72 



Department of State BuH 



ECONOMICS 



nt attempts to support the price 
■ing a temporary downswing by ac- 
(lulating stocks, either in an official 
fer stock or in stocks of producing 
ntries. Then, when the price rises in 
ear of exceptional scarcity, these 
±s are released to the market to 
igate the scarcity and limit subse- 
nt price increases. 
There are four main arguments in 
)r of an international agreement that 
mpts to stabilize a commodity price. 

First, more stable prices smooth out 

iucer incomes and provide better 

e predictability to consumers, to the 

ual benefit of both. Businessmen 

itly prefer such predictability. 

Second, such agreements usually 

sfer income from wealthy countries 

cor countries, thus providing eco- 

ic aid that cannot be obtained 

ugh regular governmental appropri- 

,is. 

Phird, both of the first two effects 

!ase economic and political stability 

e producer countries, which is 

■ed by the U.S. Government and by 

■ governments of developed coun- 
Most small countries cannot easily 

i'sify their output or otherwise pro- 
themselves against unstable 
pts from a major export. 
'ourth, a successful commodity 
!ment protects and furthers the 
iiercial and political interests of the 
id States and other developed coun- 

■ in the producing countries and 

I achieve better relations overall. 

hese arguments are all plausible. It 
Ificult, however, to find any actual 
lience, systematic data, or valid 
jsis to support them. In fact, it 
ly turns out in practice that com- 
:y agreements have effects very 
lent from those intended and ex- 
Id. There are at least eight reasons 
e discrepancy between idealistic 
' ions and practical reality. 

The reference prices set in these 
Ements typically are too rigid and 
t adequately reflect market con- 

^s. 

' Because prices generally are sup- 
' 1 at higher than equilibrium levels, 
^ers produce more than consumers 

illing to absorb. 

ilnefficent producers are protected 
' JW entrants are attracted into the 
*t, thus creating even greater 
''■ipply. If there are quotas, new en- 
I' with lower production costs may 

difficult to enter the market. 



• Private speculators hold lower 
stocks due to the price limit defended 
by the buffer stock. Then they rush to 
sell their stocks if market trends under- 
cut the viability of the buffer stock. 
Such sales can quickly overwhelm the 
buffer stock's capacity. 

• Consumers are led by high prices 
to develop substitutes that they would 
not use at a lower price. 

• When prices are maintained at too 
high a level, the forces I have men- 
tioned will eventually exhaust the funds 
available to a buffer stock organization 
set up to defend the reference price. 

• The inevitable collapse of the com- 
modity agreement will result in a sharp 
drop in price. The large stocks that 
were accumulated will keep prices 
depressed for some time. In the long 
run, therefore, price instability may be 
even more damaging with international 
commodity agreements than without 
them. 

• The financial costs of operating 
these agreements often are substantial. 

The current crisis in the tin market 
provides an example. In this case, the 
operation of the buffer stock and favora- 
ble currency movements kept the non- 
dollar price artificially high, masking 
both the real trend and the inadequacy 
of the members' financial support. Even- 
tually, the sleight of hand was no longer 
possible. When, in 1985, the dollar 
turned down, the tin price fell, and the 
buffer stock faced heavy losses on 
futures contracts. The member countries 
were unwilling to provide further sup- 
port, the buffer stock was unable to 
cover its sudden losses, and tin trading 
on the London Metal Exchange (LME) 
was suspended. Negotiations among tin 
council members, banks, and brokers 
have not yet found a solution that will 
allow the LME tin market to reopen. 
The disadvantages of commodity 
agreements are practical and borne out 
by long experience. Nevertheless, I 
mentioned earlier the theoretical argu- 
ments presented to show that, under 
certain circumstances, commodity agree- 
ments could increase the welfare of both 
producers and consumers by reducing 
price variability. While these arguments 
often seem to be wishful thinking, ideo- 
logical, or abstract, it is important to 
take a pragmatic approach and examine 
carefully whether an actual or proposed 
commodity arrangement might be bene- 
ficial. In that spirit, let's examine the 
particular case of coffee. 



International Coffee Agreement 

The ICA differs from other commodity 
agreements in which the United States 
has participated in recent years (namely, 
sugar and rubber) in that it has no 
buffer stock and no rules governing the 
accumulation and release of official 
stocks in producer countries. If all its 
provisions were fully implemented, 
however, including the prohibition on 
sales at discounted prices to nonmember 
importing countries, it would work in a 
manner very similar to a buffer stock 
arrangement. It imposes quotas on ex- 
ports by producer countries to member 
importing countries at times of price 
downswings, but there is no provision 
for restricting production. If nonmember 
countries have to pay the same prices 
for coffee as do member countries, the 
quotas force the accumulation of stocks 
that can be sold at a time of scarcity 
and high prices, such as we have this 
year. The relaxation and subsequent 
suspension of quotas as prices rise make 
the accumulated stocks available to 
mitigate the scarcity. That is the theory 
of how it should work. 

The U.S. Government is concerned 
about income levels and income stability 
in many of the countries that depend 
heavily on coffee for their export 
revenues; in fact, most of those coun- 
tries receive various forms of aid from 
us directly and indirectly through inter- 
national organizations to which we are 
the principal contributor. These points, 
together vrith those I set out earlier on 
the arguments for commodity agree- 
ments in general, are the reasons 
why the United States joined the ICA 
and are the principal arguments for 
staying in. 

We do not believe, however, that all 
is well with the coffee agreement. Dur- 
ing some periods, the agreement has 
maintained prices above the appropriate 
level. To the extent that it supports 
prices that are above the long-run 
equilibrium level, the agreement levies a 
hidden tax on consumers and subsidizes 
production in exporting countries. There 
is no precise estimate of the excess cost 
to consumers caused by the ICA— in 
fact, the amount obviously varies from 
year to year and may even be negative 
in 1986— but some estimates for some 
years are several billion dollars. 

Some argue that we should accept 
this transfer on the grounds that it pro- 
vides aid to developing coffee-producing 
countries. Such "aid," however, is un- 
conditional and indiscriminate. Unlike 
most economic assistance, this aid can- 



il986 



73 



ECONOMICS 



not be conditioned on the adoption of 
sound economic policies or directed to 
specified purposes, so it does not 
encourage economic development and 
reform— more likely the opposite, in 
fact. Furthermore, such aid goes to all 
producers— including some countries to 
which the United States would not offer 
aid, for example, Cuba and Nicaragua. 

Finally, it is unsound public policy to 
force consumers to provide money for a 
public purpose that is not subject to 
congressional appropriation and 
oversight. 

When stocks accumulated in recent 
years, many members sold coffee at a 
discount to nonmember countries. 
Through the operation of the two-tier 
market, the Eastern bloc has received 
benefits in the form of cheaper coffee, 
estimated to average about $110 million 
per year. 

The ICA's pricing policy may well 
be contrary to the long-term interest of 
producers. Since 1962, when the United 
States joined the ICA, coffee consump- 
tion per capita in the United States has 
declined more than 40%. Tea consump- 
tion, in contrast, has not changed, and 
soft drink consumption has more than 
tripled. 

Once a commodity agreement is 
launched, it requires ever more complex 
and onerous regulatory mechanisms to 
ensure that all members abide by their 
commitments. In the coffee agreement, 
for example, the problem of "tourist 
coffee"— nonmember shipments which 
find their way into the member markets 
with windfalls to the traders involved— 
is met with Resolution 329, entailing 
elaborate control and matching of im- 
port and export certificates. Similarly, 
the response to the problem of discount 
sales to nonmembers is Resolution 
336— which, if enforced, would impose 
penalties for the practice. The possibil- 
ity of penalties has become a bone of 
contention among consuming countries, 
some of which include traders who 
profit from the business. 

From a strictly theoretical point of 
view, the ICA might be operated in a 
manner that does a minimum of violence 
to the play of market forces. For the 
past 3 years, the U.S. delegation to 
meetings of the council has tried to per- 
suade other delegations to put this ap- 
proach into operation. To that end, we 
have sought large global quotas so that 
there would be a wide range in which 
these quotas would be more than suffi- 
cient to allow prices to be set by the 
free play of market forces. At the mini- 
mum prices defended by the quota 



system— that is, at a composite indicator 
price of $1.15-$1.20 per pound— we 
advocated much more stringent quotas 
to assure that the price stabilization 
function would be served. We also advo- 
cated strict enforcement of provisions 
against discount sales to nonmember 
countries, in order to assure that the 
supplies withheld from the market at 
times of low prices would be stockpiled 
and available to cover a crop shortfall- 
such as is now impending. 

An obvious problem is the allocation 
of export quotas. To stabilize prices 
effectively, the agreement must allocate 
quotas according to an exporter's availa- 
ble supply; unfilled quotas must be 
reallocated to others quickly and effi- 
ciently. In fact, however, the rigidity of 
allocations under the ICA means that 
some members have difficulty filling 
their quotas. For others, many of them 
countries of importance to the United 
States, the quota allocation is insuffi- 
cient to market their coffee to member 
countries, so they must find nonmember 
outlets for their production. This is the 
unfortunate outcome of any system of 
allocating quotas on the basis of export 
performance of an earlier period. In 
addition, reallocations of quotas are 
subject to political bargaining in the 
producer caucus, with no regard for a 
country's competitive ability or the 
political interests of consuming coun- 
tries. This system causes overexpansion 
of coffee production in some countries 
and the languishing of the coffee sector 
in others, with very real losses of in- 
come and development potential. So far, 
we have made no headway in obtaining 
procedures for allocating quotas that are 
responsive to these considerations. 

Similarly, we have been frustrated 
in our attempts to make the operation 
of the ICA more market oriented. Our 
adherence to the International Coffee 
Agreement gives our tacit blessing to 
what was intended to be a cartel 
arrangement to control coffee prices 
worldwide. For the reasons I've out- 
lined earlier, such arrangements are 
inherently unworkable and carry the 
seeds of their own demise. In response 
to the price supports provided by the 
agreement, there have been large in- 
creases in production and reductions in 
per capita consumption. 

This year's special circumstances in 
the coffee market have eliminated, or at 
least deferred, the problems of nonmem- 
ber discount sales and "tourist coffee." 
We need the stocks which have been 
built to their present levels (whatever 



that level is) through years of encoura) 
ing production. What appeared a few 
months ago to be an excessive overhai' 
of stocks now has become a source of 
reassurance for those concerned about 
price rises. We will be interested in tl 
degree to which these stocks hold dow 
prices in the next 2 or 3 years. While 
this is a useful function, offsetting at , 
least in part the effects of excess prici 
earlier, it is a function that in free ma 
kets would be fulfilled at least as well i 
(and probably at less cost) by specula- 
tors and brokers. 

Although we have made some pro; 
ress in getting our message across to 
the other governments, we have been , 
disappointed by the overall results, ar 
we have made it clear that our con- 
tinued participation is in jeopardy. 

I want to emphasize again that th 
question of continued U.S. participatii 
in the ICA has not yet been decided. 
Both political and economic considera 
tions must be weighed. We are makir 
a comprehensive analysis, and we are 
consulting with major producing coun 
tries, the ICA, the domestic industry 
and other departments of the U.S. 
Government. 

President Reagan has worked to 
eliminate controls and regulations ths 
are needless economic constraints anc i 
create an environment conducive to p i 
vate initiative and innovation. If we 1 ! 
at the economic record of the develop { 
nations in the past several years, we . 
find that the top performers are thos' 
in which the government has provide . 
climate where the private sector coul 
prosper. These are the countries whe 
the "magic of the market" has 
worked— where resources have been 
allocated to achieve the maximum 
return. Experience shows that fewer 
controls, not more, will encourage 
healthy and viable commodity market 
economies, and societies. ■ 



74 



Department of Slate Bu 



UROPE 



est Results of 

oviet Chemical Tracking Agents 



3:partment statement. 

?:B. 14, 1986' 

-■^t Aug:ust we determined that Soviet 
rhorities were using the chemical 
;,i>nt NPPD [nitro phenyl pentadien] to 
initiir the activities of employees at 
1 U.S. Embassy in Moscow. "We have 
(ducted extensive tests on this track- 
" agent. Test results indicate that it 
: nut been used indiscriminately 
linst American personnel but has 
'11 employed by Soviet authorities 
pnst a specifically targeted, relatively 
P'.ll percentage of official American 
I )l()yees. Fortunately, the results of 
i,;e tests show that exposure to the 
untitles of NPPD found does not pose 

■alth hazard. We continue to object 
) le use of chemicals against U.S. 
i onnel. 

\ team, led by a representative of 
iiNational Institute for Envii-onmen- 
Jlealth Sciences (NIEHS) and includ- 

I -epresentatives from the Environ- 
t.a\ Protection Agency (EPA) and 
itl^enter for Disease Control (CDC), 
e to Moscow and Leningrad in 

II ist-September 1985. EPA surveyed 
rhe presence of NPPD, and CDC 

s ibuted a health questionnaire to 
■i personnel. NIEHS subsequently 
njcted a series of tests on the poten- 
ihiological effects of e.xposure to 
PD in laboratory animals. 
-'n the basis of these tests, we con- 
II d that exposure to NPPD, particu- 
•1 at the very low levels found in 
3:ow, does not carry with it any 
on health risk. In summary, the 
ri extensive series of medical tests 



we have conducted shows that NPPD is 
not a mutagen in mammalian cells. This 
fact, coupled with the extremely minute 
exposure dose when NPPD is used as a 
tracking agent, provides assurance that 
NPPD will not cause cancer in exposed 
persons and obviates the need to test 
NPPD for carcinogenicity. NPPD did 
not cause birth defects when applied to 
the skin of laboratory animals, and 
NPPD is not really absorbed through 
the skin. If it does enter the blood- 
streams, it is rapidly metabolized and 
excreted from the body. 

To determine the extent of exposure 
to NPPD, the EPA took 436 samples on 
a random basis from the apartments, au- 
tomobiles, and offices of approximately 
20% of the American community in 
Moscow and Leningrad. NPPD 'was not 
detected in any of these samplings. In 
separate samplings prior to and after 
the EPA survey, NPPD was detected in 
the automobiles or property of a limited 
number of Embassy employees, who ap- 
pear to have been specifically targeted 
by Soviet authorities. In particular, a 
followup survey, conducted in Moscow 
in January of this yeai- by the Embassy 
health unit, concentrated on vehicles of 
Embassy employees considered to be 
likely targets. These follouoip samples 
were analyzed by an EPA laboratory: 
they showed that five of the vehicles 
tested were contaminated. 

At this time, we are informing the 
American community in Moscow and 
Leningrad of test results. That has 
already been done as of now. Those em- 
ployees who appear to have been specifi- 
cally targeted have been informed. 



As we noted in August, evidence 
suggested that NPPD is only one of 
several chemicals used by the Soviets. 
In the course of our investigations into 
NPPD, we detected traces of a second 
chemical— luminol— which may be a 
tracking agent. Luminol is a widely 
used, commercially produced laboratory 
chemical. Like NPPD it has been shown 
to be a mutagen in bacteria. We have 
asked NIEHS to detennine what biolog- 
ical studies, if any, should be pursued. 
The American community in the 
U.S.S.R. will be kept advised as further 
information becomes available. 

Although it appears that the use of 
NPPD and other tracking agents was 
confined to a small percentage of Ameri- 
can personnel specifically targeted by 
Soviet authoiities, we are strongly con- 
cerned that any chemical tracking" 
agents have been used against our em- 
ployees. We will continue to monitor for 
such chemicals. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment deputy spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Release of Shcharanskiy 
From the Soviet Union 

JOINT U.S.-F.R.G. STATEMENT, 
FEB. 11. 1986' 

President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl 
welcome the fact that it has been possi- 
ble to gain the release of Anatoliy 
Shcharanskiy, a prisoner of conscience. 
This outcome is the product of close 
U.S. -German cooperation over an ex- 
tended period of time. The President 
has expressed his wai-m appreciation to 
Chancellor Kohl for the substantial con- 
tribution of the Government of the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany to bringing 
about Shcharanskiy's release. The Fed- 
eral Chancellor is pleased to contribute 
substantially to all efforts to improve 
East- West relations, particularly in the 
field of human rights. 



•Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman Bernard Kalb. ■ 






ril 986 



75 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



1985 Human Rights Report 



hy Richard Schifter 

The following introduction is 
excerpted from the Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1985. 
Mr. Schifter is Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs.^ 

INTRODUCTION 

This report is submitted to the Con- 
gress by the Department of State in 
compliance with Sections 116(ci)(l) and 
502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended. The legislation re- 
quires human rights reports on all coun- 
tries that receive aid from the United 
States and all countries that are mem- 
bers of the United Nations. In the belief 
that the information would be useful to 
the Congi-ess and other readers, we 
have also included reports on countries 
such as Switzerland, which are not tech- 
nically covered in the congressional re- 
quirement. 

In compliance with a new legislative 
requirement in Section 505(c) of the 
Trade Act of 1974, as amended by 
Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984 (Generalized System of Preferences 
Renewal Act of 1984), the 1985 reports 
include additional information on worker 
rights. While the legislation requires 
reports on worker rights in developing 
countries that are beneficiaries under 
the Generalized System of Preferences, 
in the interest of uniformity, and to pro- 
vide a ready basis for comparison, we 
have continued our practice of applying 
the same reporting standards to all 
countries on which we prepare reports. 

This year there are 164 separate 
reports. Conditions in most countries 
are described up to the end of 1985; for 
a few countries, significant develop- 
ments occurring during the first weeks 
of 1986 are also included. The guidelines 
followed in preparing the reports are ex- 
plained in detail in Appendix A. In Ap- 
pendix B is a discussion of worker 
rights reporting. Appendix C contains a 
list of 12 international human rights cov- 
enants and agreements. Appendix D is 
an explanation of the statistical tables 
follovring reports on countries which 
received United States bilateral assist- 
ance or multilateral development as- 
sistance within the last 3 fiscal years. 



Definition of Human Rights 

Human rights, as defined in Section 
116(a) of the Foreign Asistance Act, in- 
clude freedom from torture or cruel, in- 
human, or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prolonged detention with- 
out charges, disappearance due to ab- 
duction or clandestine detention, or the 
flagrant denial of the rights of life, 
liberty, and the security of person. In- 
temationally recognized worker rights, 
as defined in Section 502(a) of the Trade 
Act, include (A) the right of association; 
(B) the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; (C) a prohibition on the use 
of any form of forced or compulsory 
labor; (D) a minimum age for the em- 
ployment of children; and (E) acceptable 
conditions of work with respect to mini- 
mum wages, hours of work, and occupa- 
tional safety and health. (Categories A 
and B are covered in Section 2b of each 
report, C in Section Id, and D and E in 
the discussion of the economic, social, 
and cultural situation.) 

In addition to discussing the topics 
specified in the legislation, our reports, 
as in previous years, cover other inter- 
nationally recognized human rights and 
describethe political system and the 
economic, social, and cultural situation 
of each country. In other words, these 
reports deal with the basic standards by 
which to measure a government's rela- 
tionship to its people. In applying these 
standards, we seek to be objective. But 
the reports unashamedly reflect the 
American view that the right of self 



government is the basic political right 
that government is legitimate only \\t 
grounded on the consent of the gov- 
erned, and that government thus 
grounded should not be used to deii\ 
people life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. Individuals in a society ha' 
the inalienable right to be free from 
governmental violations of the integi-i 
of the person; to enjoy civil liberties 
such as freedom of expression, assem 
bly, religion, and movement, without 
discrimination based on race or sex; 8 
to change their government by peace: 
means. The reports also take into ac- 
count the fact that terrorist and guer 
rilla gi-oups often violate human right 
such violations are no less reprehensi 
if committed by violent opponents of 
government than if committed by the 
government itself. 

We have found that the concept { 
economic, social, and cultural rights i 
often confused, sometimes willfully, l 
repressive governments claiming tha- 
order to promote these "rights" thej 
may deny their citizens the right to i 
tegrity of the person as well as politi 
and civil rights. There exists a profoi 
connection between human rights am 
economic development; and these re- 
ports devote extensive attention to t 
economic, cultural, and social situatio 
in each counti-y in order to provide t 
full context in which human rights pi 
formance may be judged. Experieiut 
demonstrates that it is individual fre 
dom that sets the stage for economic 



Section 116(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act provides as follows: 

The Secretary of State shall transmit to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full 
and complete report regarding— 

(1) the status of inteniationally recognized 
human rights, within the meaning of subsec- 
tion (a)— 

(A) in countries that received as- 
sistance under this part, and 

(B) in all other foreign countries which 
are members of the United Nations and 
which are not otherwise the subject of a hu- 
man rights report under this Act. 



Section 502(B)(b) of the Foreign As- 
sistance Act provides as follows: 

The Secretary of State shall transmit to ( di- 
gress, as part of the presentation materia 
for security assistance progi-ams propose(ir 
each fiscaryear, a full and complete repoij 
prepared with the assistance of the Assis^t 
Secretary for Human Rights and Huniani 
tarian Affairs, with respect to praetict-s 
regarding the observance of and respert 
internationally recognized human rights i 
each country proposed as a recipient ol s 
rity assistance. 

Section 505(c) of the Trade Act 
provides as follows: 

The President shall submit an annual re) 
to the Congress on the status of inteniat • 
ally recognized worker rights within eacl 
beneficiary developing country. 



76 



Department of State Bi>" 

L 



NARCOTICS 



d social development; it is repression 
it stifles it. Those who try to justify 
Dordinating political and civil rights 
the gi-ound that they are concentrat- 
; on their economic aspirations invari- 
ly deliver on neither. That is why we 
isider it imperative to focus urgent 
ention on violations of basic political 
i civil rights, a position given re- 
f/ed emphasis in 1985 by the 1984 
igressional Joint Resolution on Tor- 
'e. If these basic rights are not se- 
•ed, experience has showai, the goals 
economic development are not 
ched either. 

ited States Human Rights Policy 

)m this premise, that basic human 
fits may not be abridged or denied, it 
Dws that our human rights policy is 
cerned with the limitations on the 
/ers of government that ai-e required 
protect the integrity and dignity of 

individual. Further, it is in our na- 

al interest to promote democratic 
!;esses in order to help build a world 
lironment more favorable to respect 
IKuman rights and hence more con- 
;ve to stability and peace. We have 
jiloped, therefore, a dual policy, reac- 

in the sense that we continue to op- 
specific human rights violations 
(rever they occur, but at the same 

active in working over the long 
li to strengthen democracy. It is in 
I context that I want to pay tribute 
jiy predecessor, Elliott Abrams, As- 
int Secretary of State for Human 
Jits and Humanitarian Affairs from 
i to 1985, who played a critical role 

'Iping define a consistent and coher- 
human rights policy that took into 
( int both our country's national in- 
lets and the altruistic sentiments of 
tVmerican people, who want their 
^mment to identify itself with decen- 
.limess, and justice throughout the 
)d. 

Ir. Abrams is also to be credited 
t helping devise a human rights 
Lv that is both realistic and effective, 
ehat seeks real progress toward our 
nn rights goals by using those 
' s that have the greatest chance of 

■ ss in a given circumstance. In 

1' of the world, the United States 
a variety of means at its disposal to 

■ till to human rights violations. We 

^ ;»■ in traditional diplomacy, particu- 
■1 with friendly governments, where 
if diplomatic exchanges are possible 
diroductive. Where we find limited 
p-tunities for the United States to 



exert significant influence in bilateral re- 
lations, we resort to public statements 
of our concerns, calling attention to 
countries where respect for human 
rights is lacking. In a number of in- 
stances, we employ a mixture of tradi- 
tional diplomacy and public affirmation 
of American interest in the issue. 

The United States also employs a 
variety of means to encourage greater 
respect for human rights over the long 
term. Since 1983, the National Endow- 
ment for Democracy has been carrying 
out programs designed to promote 
democi-atic practices abroad, involving 
the two major United States political 
parties, labor unions, business groups, 
and many private institutions. Also, 
through Section 116(e) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, funds are disbursed by 
the Agency for Intei-national Develop-" 
ment for programs designed to promote 
civil and political rights abroad. We also 
seek greater international commitment 
to the protection of human rights and 
respect for democracy through our ef- 
forts in the United Nations and other 
international organizations. 

Preparation of these annual country 
reports constitutes an important ele- 



ment of our human rights policy. The 
process, since it involves continuous and 
well-publicized attention to human 
i-ights, has contributed to the strength- 
ening of an international human rights 
agenda. Many countries that are strong 
supporters of human rights are taking 
steps of their own to engage in human 
rights reporting aiid have established 
offices specifically responsible for inter- 
national human rights policy. Even 
among countries without strong human 
rights records, sensitivity to these 
reports increasingly takes the form of 
constructive i-esponse, or at least a will- 
ingness to engage in a discussion of hu- 
man rights policy. Experience has thus 
demonstrated that Congress did indeed 
act wisely in calling upon the State 
Department to prepare these reports. 



'The complete report documents human 
rights practices in more than 160 countrie.s of 
the world. It may be purchased for $22.00 
(GPO stock no. 052-070-06081-6) from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govem- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 
(tel: 202-783-3238). Remittance must accom- 
pany order. ■ 



Narcotics Control in Latin America 



by Jon R. Thomas 

Testimony before the Task Force on 
International Narcotics of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on Novem- 
ber 12, 1985. Mr. Thomas is Assistant 
Secretary for International Narcotics 
Matters.^ 



The committee has asked my bureau to 
provide testimony on progress in nar- 
cotics control in the Andean countries, 
with an emphasis on Colombian eradica- 
tion and interdiction efforts, extradition, 
and the connection between drug traf- 
fickers and guerrilla/terrorist groups. 
Your task force has also asked that we 
expand this testimony to update the 
committee on the antinarcotics efforts in 
BeUze. I would like to add Panama to 
the scope of this hearing, and update 
you on recent developments in that 
country, which has also been of interest 
to the task force. 

As part of my submitted testimony, 
I am including the Colombian section of 
the Mid- Year Update to our Inter- 
national Narcotics Control Strategy 



Report. That report contains not only 
our country-by-country assessments, as 
of August 1, but also reports on the 
critical success of our diplomatic initia- 
tives, and I commend it to the commit- 
tee's consideration. 

Colombia 

Colombia is increasingly successful in its 
narcotics control efforts. Certainly the 
effective and comprehensive marijuana 
eradication campaign; the cross-border 
enforcement projects with Peru and 
Ecuador; the interactions with Brazil, 
Panama, and Venezuela; the developing 
intraregional narcotics enforcement com- 
munications network which is centered 
in Colombia; and the continuing search 
for an effective, comprehensive method 
of eradicating coca make Colombia not 
only the leader in South American nar- 
cotics control activities but one of the 
very real bright spots in the expanded 
international effort of the 1980s. 

During my visit to Colombia the 
week of November 14, we reported to 
President Betancur the results of the 



'ri986 



77 



NARCOTICS 



aerial survey of marijuana cultivation 
which we assisted the Colombian Na- 
tional Police in conducting in July. The 
analysis shows that, compared to an 
estimated 8,500 hectares under cultiva- 
tion in the same cycle in 1983, only 
1,300 hectares were under cultivation in 
the principal northern growing region in 
1985, a decline of 85%. 

As Colombia strives toward its goal 
of eliminating the great majority of the 
1985 crop, the eradication campaign con- 
tinues to set marks by which other 
efforts will be compared. The Special 
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Colombian 
National Police set all-time records in 
Julv and August, including spraying in 
the principal Santa Marta growing area 
and also in other areas where traffickers 
have attempted to increase cultivation. 
Using surveys, we will assist the Colom- 
bians next spring in assessing the 
degree to which cultivation may have 
spread to the Gulf of Uraba, as well as 
Bolivar Department, and other areas. 

Colombia remains the principal refin- 
ing source for cocaine, and its actions 
with its neighbors to curb trafficking in 
coca products and precursor chemicals 
are quite encouraging, as are the tests 
Colombia continues to conduct with 
herbicides which might permit aerial 
eradication of the coca bush, which is so 
frustratingly difficult to remove by 
manual labor. 

We are consulting closely with 
Colombian agencies, as well as other 
departments in our government, on how 
we might enhance Colombian interdic- 
tion capabilities, to compound the pres- 
sure on trafficking organizations. We 
are also sensitive to trafficker efforts to 
relocate in new growing sites for mari- 
juana and coca and new refinery loca- 
tions for cocaine, which is why we put 
so much emphasis on control programs 
in Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Belize, and 
elsewhere. 

In our recent communications with 
the Congress, we have emphasized the 
importance of achieving our parallel 
diplomatic goal of increasing the inter- 
nationalization of this problem. One part 
of that effort has been to encourage and 
logistically support regional enforcement 
actions. The numerous enforcement 
efforts by Colombia have been particu- 
larly encouraging. 

Within its own territory, the na- 
tional police has intensified sweep opera- 
tions, targetting traffickers, their boats 
and aircraft, as well as laboratory sites, 
which have been destroyed along with 
numerous landing fields. We are enhanc- 



ing that capability through the provision 
of additional aircraft. Colombia has 
extradited seven persons to the United 
States, a major demonstration of its 
commitment to narcotics control under 
the Betancur administration. 

And, Colombia is developing a signi- 
ficant role as a leader in regional nar- 
cotics control initiatives. The multination 
radio network among South American 
enforcement agencies will soon be opera- 
tional. Colombia has signed an extradi- 
tion agreement with Venezuela; a joint 
coca eradication campaign has been con- 
ducted with Ecuador; and, Colombia and 
Peru have engaged quite successfully in 
a cross-border operation against cocaine 
traffickers. 

While discussing regional initiatives, 
I want to note the meeting held in 
Quito last month by our Chiefs of Mis- 
sion to Andean countries. Assistant 
Secretary [Elliot] Abrams and I, and 
other Washington-based officials, value 
such opportunities for concentrated dis- 
cussion on regional and country issues, 
especially issues like narcotics which 
have such significant cross-border impli- 
cations. Our Ambassadors confirm that 
the spirit of regional cooperation which 
last year prompted Latin American 
heads of government to issue the Decla- 
ration of Quito, and to support the Latin 
initiative for a new international conven- 
tion on drug trafficking, continues to be 
reflected in cooperative enforcement 
programs such as those undertaken by 
several countries with Colombia. Unde- 
niably, we face complex, often frustrat- 
ing challenges in the Andean region, but 
I must say I was encouraged by the 
"can do" attitudes our Ambassadors dis- 
played at this meeting. 

There are still some dark spots on 
this otherwise bright Colombian picture. 
Intimidation, including the murder of 
judges, continues to challenge the 
Colombian system of justice, and arrest 
and conviction rates can be improved. 
Our concerns about this situation are 
compounded by evidence that Colombian 
traffickers are heavily involved in crimi- 
nal activities in many other countries, 
actions that range from sponsoring new 
growing fields to controlling shipments 
of chemicals to laundering of the vast 
illicit profits from narcotics trafficking. 

The readiness of Colombian traf- 
fickers, as well as insurgents with links 
to traffickers, and political terrorists in 
general, to resort to violence shocks 
even veteran observers of Latin Ameri- 
can narcotics crime. In April 1984, 
assassins paid by major traffickers killed 



the Minister of Justice, Lara Bonilla. 
Now, this past week, M-19 guerrillas 
stormed the Palace of Justice. Thank- 
fully, on both occasions, the Betancur 
government has refused to be intimi- 
dated and has responded strongly. 

The brutal attack by the M-19 "ii 
the Palace of Justice on November <i- 
resulted in the death of the President 
the Supreme Court and other jusli^•e^ 
the court. We join the government ai 
people of Colombia in shock and outi-; 
at this despicable act. Among the ea> 
ties of the case were court records ui 
extradition cases. Fortunately, the 
records can— and will— be replaced. 
Sadly, the lives of innocent officials c 
not. We are confident that the Cover 
ment of Colombia will continue its wi 
on the extradition process as the jud 1 
system resumes normal operations. 

In sum, the Colombian record nf 
past 2 years is very encouraging, am 
deserving of our congratulations. Mo 
over, the antinarcotics institutions in 
Colombia are deeply rooted and we 
expect will be continued after next 
year's change in government. 

Peru 

Our Ambassador to Peru, David Jon . 
met in September with you, Mr. Cht > 
man (Rep. [Lawrence J.] Smith) and 
Congressman [Benjamin A.] Oilman 
(ranking minority member) and I am i 
infor-med that you share our initial o ' 
mism over the early actions and stat 
ments of the Garcia administration, 
especially the new president's action o 
thwart corruption by cleaning house d 
authorizing Peru's commitment to i"- 
ation Condor. 

There are many bilateral issues 1 
resolution with President Alan Garci 
who took office in July, some of whii 
Ambassador Jordan discussed with jd 
but in the narcotics sector, the Presij 
dent has been quite adamant about i 
need to "root out and destroy" narc es 
trafficking in Peru. 

At the outset, let me dispense WJ 
one nonissue. Erroneous press repoi' 
to the contrary, the Department has^t 
linked narcotics control assistance t( 
Peru's performance or behavior on <^ 
bilateral issues. As this task force | •■ 
knows full well, the linkage runs th(! 
other direction: the provision of eco- H 
nomic and other assistance is linked 
performance on narcotics control. W 
have agi-eements providing more ih: 
$30 million in narcotics-related assis 
ance, which we continue to expend ' 
the current program, and, in accord 



78 



Department of State Bii^'^ 



NARCOTICS 



h current statutes, are awaiting 
Ti's plan for comprehensive coca con- 
: programs. We have long sought an 
lerstanding with Pei'u on expansion 
he current eradication progi-am, now 
tered in the Upper Huallaga Valley, 
ithei- growing regions. We are pre- 
ed to assist that expansion. 
Peru has increased the effectiveness 
iQth eradication and enforcement pro- 
ms. The latest cables from Lima 
jrt that 2,576 hectares of coca had 
n eradicated through the end of Sep- 
bei-. The eradication program, which 
gi-own from 200 to more than 970 
kers, is moving into the Uchiza area, 
re the flat terrain should permit a 
sr pace. Using aerial photogi-aphy 
•ided by INM [Bureau for Intema- 
il Narcotics Matters] for planning, 
Peruvians are planning an intensi- 
eradication campaign dui-ing No- 
ber and December, and say that it 
issible they will reach the 1985 goal 

000 hectares. 

.n Peru's housecleaning operation, 
iior Minister Salinas has dismissed 
i.'nerals and 131 colonels from the 
litigations pohce and the Civil 
id, as well as 40 other police offi- 
i' with promises of more dismissals, 
ihe latest reports we have on Oper- 

1 Condor, a joint effort by the Peru- 
land Colombian Govemments, with 
(assistance, are that six cocaine 
iatory complexes have been seized 
llestroyed; 11 airstrips have been 
M, including one paved landing 

over 3,000 feet in length, and 8 of 
airstrips have been destroyed, 
operation seized 1,530 kilos "of 
lie paste and base, as well as 

I gallons of precursor chemicals, and 
leized seven aircraft. An undeter- 

I I amount of potassium perman- 
ie, 1,000 gallons of diesel fuel, and 
1 ntity of generators and other 
inent were also seized. 

■lese are impressive statistics, but, 
', b of curtailing cultivation of coca 
' id stopping production of cocaine 
'u is far from complete, and the 
lice is that counterefforts may be 
* sing. 

' Guardia Civil trooper was mur- 
^on September 18 while protecting 
fetion workers near Santa Lucia. 

-tackers shouted proterrorist slo- 
gind left a small flag with hammer 
''ckle near the body; but, given 

^pcrience, we don't know whether 
i' ackers were really terrorists or 
;<ics traffickers who have shown no 
rnt in using teri-orist-style 
?'e. 



Protection measures for eradication 
workers will be increased still further as 
the government pursues its eradication 
goal. Because eradication efforts have 
resulted in intimidation efforts directed 
against the United States, we are also 
having to increase security for U.S. per- 
sonnel in Lima and in the field. 

Bolivia 

Bolivia remains our greatest current 
challenge, not only because of the sheer 
enormity of the coca cultivation, which 
was estimated at 30,000 to 45,000 hec- 
tares in 1984, but because of the long- 
term difficulty in getting an eradication 
program started. There have been sev- 
eral occasions since August 1983, when 
the United States signed an eradication 
agi-eement with Bolivia, when the politi- 
cal rhetoric was positive. 

We are still cautious in our ap- 
praisal; but, I must note we are encour- 
aged today because the new government 
of President Paz Estenssoro has begun 
to match the rhetoric of his predeces- 
sors with strong actions. 

Positive steps are being taken to 
implement the decree promulgated last 
July which at last establishes the 
needed legal basis for undertaking a 
coca control progi-am, including designa- 
tion of zones where licit production will 
be licensed and thereby declaring all 
other production to be illegal and sub- 
ject to eradication. On October 28, a 
new proposal for a comprehensive law 
on narcotics was introduced in the 
Chamber of Deputies. The proposed law 
would create a new Ministry of Nar- 
cotics Affairs which would exercise full 
authority over the police and all other 
agencies concerned with narcotics. The 
proposed law would also strengthen the 
existing decree: it would make judicial 
review of all narcotics cases mandatory, 
and it would tighten procedures while 
strengthening penalties. 

Importantly, the dialogue has also 
changed. The new government is not 
only quite sensitive to the impact that 
narcotics production has on decisions by 
the United States to provide economic 
and other assistance, but is keenly 
aware of the negative effects on its owti 
society. 

The Interior Ministry has held a 
series of promising talks with cam- 
pesino leaders from the Chapare region, 
to discuss the voluntary and involuntary 
phases of the propo.sed eradication oper- 
ation, which could start this month in 
the Chapara and Yapacani areas. We 
will advise the Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee the day that eradication actually 
begins. 



The Bolivians have also stepped up 
enforcement activities. On October 25, 
members of the UMOPAR [rural mobile 
police] detachment conducted an opera- 
tion near Cochabamba which resulted in 
the destruction of five cocaine labora- 
tories. Another five laboratories were 
destroyed 2 days later. 

Ecuador 

I want to talk about the new opportuni- 
ties in Ecuador, but also to use Ecuador 
to highlight our institutional concern. As 
I have said on other occasions, only two 
countries were eradicating narcotics 
crops in 1981, and in the 1985-86 crop 
cycles, at least 14 countries are under- 
taking eradication progi-ams (Mexico, 
Belize, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, 
Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Vene- 
zuela, Jamaica, Thailand, Burma, and 
Pakistan). In just the past few months, 
the marijuana eradication programs in 
Colombia and Jamaica have intensified; 
new spraying projects have been under- 
taken in Belize and Panama; Colombia is 
preparing for a significant test of 
methods to spray coca; Burma and Thai- 
land have shai-ply upgraded their opium 
poppy eradication programs and Paki- 
stan continues to e.xpand the scope of its 
ban on poppy production. We have 
opportunities to contain the spread of 
narcotics cultivation in South America 
through new initiatives in Brazil and 
Ecuador. New governments are giving 
strong impetus to narcotics control in 
Peru and Bolivia. 

Ecuador is a good example of the 
dynamics of the narcotics trade. For 
many years, Ecuador, sited between the 
growing fields of Peru and the labora- 
tories of Colombia, was a transit coun- 
try. Now, it has become a source 
country, and the objective we share 
with the Febres-Cordero government, 
which has been especially aggressive on 
the narcotics issue since taking office in 
1984, is to contain that production and 
trafficking at its current, relatively low 
level and then ehminate it. 

The specific ojectives are to eradi- 
cate the estimated 3,000 hectares of coca 
under cultivation, and to stop the bur- 
geoning traffic in precursor chemicals, 
which rose from 3,000 to 5,000 metric 
tons in 1984-85, compared to 10-20 tons 
in the 1980-83 period. The presence of 
these chemicals confirms earlier reports 
that traffickers were attempting to 
establish a cocaine refining capability in 
Ecuador; the estimate is that perhaps a 
dozen shipments of 500 to 1,000 kilo- 
grams of cocaine were shipped to the 



il 986 



79 



NARCOTICS 



United States from Ecuador labs in 
1984. 

I met last month with national lead- 
ers of Ecuador and we are actively con- 
sidering requests from the Embassy 
to expand shai-ply our narcotics assist- 
ance program in Ecuador. We want to 
enhance aerial surveillance capabilities 
as well as eradication resources. 

Belize 

At the task force's hearing June 27, I 
expressed my strong hope that the new 
government of Prime Minister Esquivel 
would resume aerial herbicidal eradica- 
tion of the expanding marijuana crop in 
Belize. In that regard, your (Chairman 
Smith) concerns were communicated to 
Prime Minister Esquivel in your letter 
of July 25. 

We are very pleased to report that 
the Government of Belize undertook a 
test spraying progi-am, using gly- 
phosate, which ended November 1. This 
4-day program caused the eradication of 
an estimated 1,270 acres of marijuana on 
741 cultivation sites in the northern 
area. This area is the primary marijuana 
producing zone, where an estimated 70% 
of the crop is grown. The preliminary 
assessment is that the acreage eradi- 
cated constituted the bulk of marijuana 
cultivation in the area. 

Given the success of this Belizean 
effort, we are encouraged by the indica- 
tions that the government is considering 
a further eradication campaign in Janu- 
ai-y, depending on its analysis of the 
effects of the chemical on the growing 
areas. 

Panama 

In August, staff in my bureau partici- 
pated with Panamanian officials in over- 
flights of prospective marijuana culti- 
vation zones and found that, in sharp 
contrast to the less than 100 hectares 
under cultivation reported in 1984, this 
year's harvest could be 500 to 600 hec- 
tares or even more, unless quick action 
were taken. We immediately consulted 
vrith the Panamanians on an aerial 
herbicidal eradication program, and 
offered to provide a spray aircraft and 
technical assistance. Panama was quick 
to accept this offer and extend its full 
cooperation. In October, Panama began 
herbicidal eradication of this unexpect- 
edly large crop, and reportedly eradi- 
cated more than 200 of an estimated 
500-600 hectares under cultivation. 



This action reconfirms our belief in 
crop control through aerial eradication, 
and in the use of the Thrush aircraft 
which we have now deployed to several 
countries. 

Conclusion 

This concludes my prepared remarks on 
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Belize 
and Panama. I understand that the task 
force may also ask questions about the 
mid-year report which you and your 
staff have been reviewing these past 
few weeks. Given the number of events 
which are occurring, including not just a 
few on the international front, it is 
appropriate that we take this oppor- 
tunity to update the committee on the 
broad spectrum of country and global 
issues. 

I particularly want to focus on one 
element— the new chmate in which we 
are working at the international level. I 
have seen many changes in my going on 
4 years in the INM and perhaps the 
most profound has been the realization 



by other governments that drug traf- 
ficking is a threat to their national sB' 
rity and their economic and social 
well-being. Some countries whose leau 
ers once thought they were immune ; t' 
now suffering narcotics epidemics. Thl 
realization of national risk is spurring 
efforts for more cooperative bilateral 
and multilateral enforcement and 
demand reduction progi-ams. 

I cannot over-emphasize the impo 
tance of having reached this concurre ( 
of world opinion, this community of 
interest which I beheve has great po i 
tial for progi-ess by source country 
governments. 

We have a long way to go before e 
reach the benefits inherent in these i ' 
tiatives, but, the great promise for o i 
future is that the affected members 1 1 
the world community are beginning 1 
act in concert. 



'The complete transcript of the hearii 
will be published by the committee and \' 
be available from the Superintendent o( 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing • • 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report Released 



In releasing the State Department's 
annual International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report for 1985, Assistant 
Secretary of State for International 
Narcotics Matters, Jon R. Thomas, 
stated that "1985 was a very productive 
year for program expansion and 'inter- 
nationalization' of the narcotics issue. 
We took the offensive in an increasing 
number of areas, and the programs we 
have developed will sustain this greatly 
improved effort to control production in 
the months and years to come. For the 
first time, it was clear to all nations of 
the world that there was no distinction 
among producing, consumer, or traffick- 
ing nations; all countries share the toll 
of narcotics trafficking and abuse, and 
all nations are part of the solution." 
Assistant Secretary Thomas said 
that 1985 saw the expansion of anti- 
narcotics programs around the world, 
including eradication campaigns in 
Colombia, Jamaica, Burma, Thailand, 
Panama, and Belize. "Five years ago, 
only two nations were actively engaged 
in crop eradication. In 1985, 14 countries 
launched successful eradication cam- 
paigns. Colombia, once viewed as one of 



the most difficult countries in narcotJ 
control, eradicated 85% of the marijv' 
cultivated along the north coast. Col ,- 
bia's traditional mai-ijuana gi-owing ; a, 
This past year has proven that natio 
are serious about narcotics control a 
are willing to exert the necessary p( '• 
cal will to get the job done." 

Thomas said that one of the mos 
encouraging signs during 1985 was t 
"internationalization" of the narcotic 
issue. The spirit of international coo]*- 
ation on the narcotics issue "was ev 
dent everywhere— at the United 
Nations, in the Organization of Ame 
can States (OAS), the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN; 
the European Community, at the ec 
nomic summit, and at the two histoi 
First Ladies Conferences hosted by 
Mrs. Reagan. Internationalization o<|ie 
issue has concrete results, including 
increased contributions to intematiol 
narcotics control organizations such 
the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Cont 
(UNFDAC), European involvement 
crop control projects in South Amei > 
and Asia, greater recognition of the 
threat narcotics trafficking poses to 



80 



Department of State 



Bil* 



SOUTH ASIA 



tional security, and a higher political 
jfile for the narcotics issue in the 
ernational community." 

The strategy report is a country-by- 
intry analysis of the nai-cotics situa- 
ti in pi-oducing and transiting nations 
I is prepared each year by the 
reau of International Narcotics Mal- 
s in the Department of State, in con- 
tation with other bureaus in State, 
; Drug Enforcement Administration 
pA), and others. 
!"When we look back at 1985," 
fistant Secretary Thomas said, "we 
; cite many accomplishments. But 
5 was not without drug-related 
pdies and crises: the murder of 
JA agent Camarena by narcotics traf- 
!ers in Mexico, the continuing terror- 
Wolence in Colombia, and the 
pits on coca-reduction workers in 
b gi-aphically illustrate that the 
les are very high. The violence that 
impanies narcotics ti-afficking is an 
irtunate part of gi-owing success in 

otics control. Production is declining 
|)me areas but remains intolerably 

in others. The encouraging news is 

governments are not backing down; 
!ed, despite violent assaults, their 
initment to narcotics control has 
:isified." 

Assistant Secretary Thomas noted 
following significant developments 
:ig 1985. 

"niii-teen countries are now actively 

i-atiiig drug crops, supported by 
; bureau of International Narcotics 
lei-s. Four years ago, only two coun- 
I ut'i-e eradicating narcotics crops. 

'S5, Panama and Belize began suc- 
•ul marijuana eradication programs. 

'or the first time, Burma has em- 
'id on a program of aerial eradica- 
nf opium. Thailand e.xpanded its 
'n eradication campaign. 

'uring 1985, 85% of the marijuana 
Vated in traditional Colombian 
wng areas along the north coast was 
ijoyed by aerial eradication. 

mong several promising i-egional 
Js at cooperation, Colombia joined 
'Ecuador in a joint eradication 
> and Peru on a joint coca enforce- 
1 ijrogram. 

imaica made measurable progress, 
' lating one-third of its marijuana 
I hrdugh manual eradication. 

le level of opium and marijuana 
'ation in Mexico increased during 
^While precise estimates of cultiva- 
I'nd production are not yet avail- 
sthe Mexican Government will 
cct an aerial survey to obtain accu- 
ijlata. 



The year 1985 was a critical one in 
Mexican-U.S. antinarcotics efforts. The 
kidnap and murder of U.S. DEA agent 
Camarena, and the subsequent investi- 
gation, brought to light severe problems 
in Mexico's progi-am. High-level meet- 
ings between Presidents Reagan and 
De la Madrid, Attorneys General Meese 
and Garcia, and Secretary Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Sepulveda addressed 
the narcotics issue as a critical bilateral 
foreign policy issue. By the end of 1985, 
improvements were underway, including 
steps toward an aerial survey, attempts 
to weed out police corruption, and 
increased cooperation on eradication 
vei-ification efforts. 

Bolivia remains one of the major 
producers of coca and has only begun 
steps toward narcotics control. While 
the pace of eradication progress in 
Bolivia has been slow, the adoption of 
stricter narcotics laws and a demonstra- 
tion eradication progi-am begun at 
year's end showed that the Bolivian 
Government was making attempts to 
bring coca cultivation and trafficking 
under control. 

Pei-u, meanwhile, destroyed almost 
5,000 hectares of coca, and President 
Garcia has taken important steps to root 
out corruption among Peruvian military 
and police. 

In Afghanistan opium production is 
on the upswing, and heroin is now 
refined in Afghanistan. 

In crop control, Pakistan continues 
to make progress. A slight increase in 
hectares of opium poppy under cultiva- 
tion was offset by adverse weather con- 
ditions, keeping 1985 levels of produc- 
tion comparable to last year's. 

Assistant Secretary Thomas noted 
that "1986 will be another year of 
expanded progi-am activity and inter- 
national cooperation. We will build on 
the successes of 1985 and address some 
of the frustrations that we experienced 
during the past year. Our programmatic 
tasks for the next year include the 
strengthening of effective control pro- 
grams in source countries and counter- 
ing trafficker moves to new source areas 
by establishing containment programs in 
surrounding countries." 



Press release of Feb. 21, 1986. 



Indo-U.S. Joint 
Commission IVIeets 



AGREED MINUTES, 
FEB. 6. 1986 

The sixth session of the India-United States 
Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, 
Scientific, Technological, Educational, and 
Cultural Cooperation was held in Washington 
on Febi-uary 6, 1986. 

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State of 
the United States of America, and Bali Ram 
Bhagat, Minister of E.xtemal Affairs, Goveni- 
ment of India, cochaired the meeting, in 
which they reviewed the activities of the four 
subcommissions and discussed ways the joint 
commission could contribute further to the 
sti-engthening of relations betw-een the 
United States and India. 

The two cochaii-men agreed that the 
period since the last meeting of the joint 
commission, in June 1983, was very produc- 
tive and fulfilled the goal of making 1984 and 
1985 years of special emphasis on Indo-U.S. 
collaboration. The two cochaiiTnen agi-eed 
that this achievement was due largely to the 
special attention given to joint commission 
activities by President Reagan, Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and the late Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi. 

The two cochairmen noted the important 
activities undertaken by the Subcommission 
on Science and Technology and the wide 
range of areas in which specialists from both 
sides had recommended collaborative pro- 
gi-ams. They agi-eed that the extension of the 
science and technology initiative, the ini- 
tiation of a vaccine action program, and a 
major research and technology development 
program underscored the progress being 
made in strengthening ties between the 
Indian and American scientific communities. 
The cochaii-men recognized the "Festival 
of India" in the United States, inaugurated 
during the Prime Minister's visit, as an out- 
standing success. Cultural progi-ams as a part 
of the "Festival of the United States" in 
India have also been well received. The 
cochaii-men appreciated the contribution of 
the Subcommission on Education and Culture 
to the organization and administration of this 
unprecedented exchange of cultural progi-ams 
and artistic exhibitions. The cochairmen 
emphasized the importance of building on this 
success and encouraged the Education and 
Cultural Subcommission 's plans to expand 
exchanges and to establish collaborative pro- 
gi-ams and seminars in science, education, the 
arts, and sports. In recognizing that strong 
ties between Indian and American scholars of 
the social sciences have been a continuing 
positive element in Indo-U.S. relations, the 
cochairmen called on the Subcommission for 
Education and Culture to recommend means 
of facilitating such exchanges. 

The cochauTnen agi-eed that trade and 
investment continue to be promising areas 
for strengthening bilateral relations. They 



M986 



81 



SOUTH ASIA 




Foreigrn Minister Bali Ram Bhagat call , 
on President Reagan at the White Hou 
I on February 7. 1986. Vice President Bii 
^ and Secretary Shultz also attended. 



saw the increase in technology transfer as a 
substantial opportunity for development of 
trade and technological collaboration. The 
joint commission welcomed the work of the 
Economic and Commercial Subcommission in 
increasing the number of trade missions and 
in encouraging progi-ess on the important 
issues affecting economic and commercial ties 
between the two countries. To further 
enhance collaboration between Indian and 
American firms, the cochairmen recom- 
mended continued negotiation on a conven- 
tion for the avoidance of double taxation. 
They also urged the subcommission, which is 
to meet in March 1986, to promote under- 
standing of the economic situation in each 
countiy so as to facilitate closer cooperation 
on trade and finance issues. 

Noting with satisfaction the growth in 
bilateral trade, the cochairmen felt that the 
potential for e.xpansion and diversification of 
trade needs to be fully realized. In this con- 
text, they agi-eed that the Trade Working 
Group of the Economic and Commercial Sub- 
commission should meet more frequently to 
discuss in-depth trade policy issues and meas- 
ures which would expand bilateral trade and 
investment. The cochairmen hoped also that 
promotional measures by both governments 
and increased business efforts would result in 
an expansion of bilateral trade and invest- 
ment. They reaffii-med the faith of their 
governments in the multilateral trading 
system and their resolve to strengthen and 
improve trading rules and expand trade by 
reducing barriers. 

The cochairmen agreed on the need to 
strengthen the role of multilateral develop- 
ment institutions in support of developing 
countries. In the context of India's economic 
development, they recognized the importance 
of the role of IDA [International Develop- 
ment Association] and the continuing need for 
India's access to concessional finance. 

The joint commission welcomed the prog- 
ress of the Subcommission on Agriculture. It 
noted that the subcommission had identified 
potential collaboration in the new areas of 
rainfed agriculture, biotechnology, biological 
control of pests, agrometeorology, germ 



plasm research, consei^vation and manage- 
ment, and establishment of quality standards 
for agricultural inputs. The cochainnen 
agreed that the subcommission should con- 
tinue its efforts to promote research and 
development programs in agricultm-e, with 
particular emphasis on the problems of 
rainfed agriculture. The cochainnen urged 
the subcommission to use the exchanges of 
the deans of agi'icultural universities as a 
resource of ideas for enhancing Indo-U.S. 
collaboration in agriculture. 

In view of the substantial progress in 
facilitating collaboration in advanced tech- 
nology, particularly computer technology, the 
joint commission recommended that the sub- 
commissions continue their support of 
exchanges and programs involving application 
of computer technology to education, agricul- 
ture, commerce, and the sciences. 

The cochairmen shared a deep concern 
regarding narcotics abuse and agreed that 
the joint commission should establish a Nar- 
cotics Working Group as part of the Eco- 
nomic and Commercial Subcommission. The 
purpose of the working group will be to pro- 
mote closer cooperation in the area of nar- 
cotics control, building on recent successful 
collaborative efforts in this field. 

The cochaiiTnen expressed satisfaction 
with the activities of the joint commission 
since 1983 and in particular with accomplish- 
ments of the four subcommissions. They have 
succeeded in supporting programs and 
exchanges that contributed greatly to the 
overall strengthening of relations between 
the United States and India. They reaffirmed 
the importance of regular joint commission 
meetings to evaluate the progress of the sub- 
commissions and to provide direction for 
future Indo-U.S. cooperation. 

Done in Washington on the sixth day of 
Febniary. 

For the United States of America 

George P. Shultz 

For the Republic of India 

Bali Ram Bhagat ■ 



82 



Department of State 



tSTERN HEMISPHERE 



ermanent Dictatorship 
I Nicaragua? 



\jElliott Abrams 

Taken from a statement before the 
itcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
(■irs of the House Foreign Affairs 
uiiinttee on March 5, 1986. Mr. 
inti^ is Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
rrican Affairs.^ 

iJuld like to discuss our policy toward 
iira.trua as it affects a complex of 
^•s that has been of particular con- 

I to me during much of my govei-n- 
' career— human rights. 

Ve hei-e in Washington have been 
iw pleased during the last month 
it the role our government played in 
i-Ki-ting developments that have ad- 
n-d human rights in Haiti and in the 
i)pines. Those directly involved are 
):tbly the only ones who know just 
iMiuch had to be done to help ensure 
■fible outcomes. But act they did, 
i ley and you, as Members of Con- 
■: deserve to share in the praise. It 
i luse both branches of government 
'(actively supported. 

yer the past several years, we 
'hIso heard comment, from citizens 
«11 as from Administration officials, 

II the importance of supporting 

t)i rights in Central America. Some 
Ijhistoric gains have been made in 
Svador and in Guatemala: there has 
ri lot of credit to share. And I 
'think there is a person in this 
rtwho has not applauded the prog- 
iiat has taken place in Argentina, 
i{ay, and Brazil over the past 

JiS. 

luggest that we should be no less 
irtted to human i-ights in Nicara- 
■ hat there are major human rights 
3:ms in Nicaragua is not at issue. 
ei- events in Nicaragua-including 
H committed by the .armed resist- 
i B well as those committed by the 
iista regime and its enforces— are 
Prized in the latest White House 
" 0)1 Nicaragua, dated February 

f' question is, what are we going 
ohout it? These problems are not 
'[ uo away by themselves. It is a 
I lite that, absent the pressures 
;,)ne seem to restrain them, the 
iiistas will not turn about and 
'tte away the absolute power they 
' dently gathered for the past 
'ers. 



The resistance is another fact of life: 
a fighting force some 20,000 strong- 
20,000 citizens of Nicaragua who have 
taken it upon themselves to fight the 
repressive regime in Managua. There is 
no turning back for them. It is illusory 
to assume that peace will come to 
Nicaragua if we abandon them. 

It is equally illusory to assume that 
military assistance for the democratic 
resistance will contribute only to human 
rights abuses. If properiy led", trained, 
and equipped, the armed" resistance will 
be better able to function as a disci- 
plined force during military operations. 
El Salvador's Army showed that, with 
reliable U.S. assistance, it can be done. 
The United States e.xpects the Nicara- 
guan resistance to follow a code of con- 
duct on the battlefield that will protect 
noncombatants and prisoners. 

The President has specifically desig- 
nated $3 million of the $100 million 
request for aid to the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance exclusively for the 
strengthening of the observance and 
advancement of human rights. Consist- 
ent and sustained U.S. backing, com- 
bined with strong internal monitoring 
within the resistance forces themselves, 
can improve human rights performance' 
and minimize suffering among noncom- 
batants. 

Nicaragua is a real problem for us. 
We must face it. Neither the assault on 
democracy nor the fight for freedom will 
wait for the Washington calendar. 
Neither posturing nor passivity will 
bring about a solution. 

It is never easy to bring about con- 
structive change in this world. It is 
usually a messy business, fraught with 
difficult choices. But we have been 
making the right choices— in favor of 
democracy and human rights— in the 
Philippines, in Haiti, in South America, 
in Guatemala, in El Salvador. 

We must stand by the same princi- 
ples in Nicaragua and support the resist- 
ance that is fighting for democracy and 
human rights. 

Or are we prepared to suggest that, 
unlike Marcos, Duvalier, or some Argen- 
tine generals, the Sandinistas have suc- 
ceeded in consolidating their dictator- 
ship? That they are now free to spread 
totalitarianism and terrorism to Central 
and South America from a secure base 
on the mainland? 



We have just now all agreed that 
permanent dictatorship is not inevitable 
in Haiti or the Philippines. The question 
now facing the Congress is whether we 
are to accept that communist dictator- 
ship will be permanent in Nicaragua. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington. D.C. 20402 ■ 



Continuation of 
Certain Assistance 
to Haiti Authiorized 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 
FEB. 26, 1986' 

On February 25, Secretary Shultz 
signed a determination wliich will per- 
mit the obligation of FY 1986 funds for 
certain forms of assistance to Haiti. This 
determination is required by Section 705 
of the International Security and Devel- 
opment Cooperation Act of 1985. This 
law requires a Presidential Detennina- 
tion, but authority for that determina- 
tion has been vested in the Secretary of 
State by an Executive order. 

Because of serious repressive actions 
taken by the Duvalier government in 
late 1985 and early 1986, the Secretary 
had been unable to make this detei-miiia- 
tion. The inteii-uption of U.S. aid due to 
lack of a determination and the period 
of unrest during the final months of the 
Duvaher regime have heightened the 
need for this assistance. 

The Secretary has determined that 
the National Council of Government 
(CNG), which assumed power on Feb- 
ruary 7 when Duvalier departed, has 
demonsti-ated willingness to cooperate 
on illegal emigration and with develop- 
ment programs. The Haitian Army has 
provided security for the distribution of 
aid foodstuffs, and the Ministers of 
Health and Education have indicated 
commitments to objectives shared by 
the Agency for International Develo"p- 
ment (AID) and other donors. 

The most significant changes, how- 
ever, have occurred in the area of 
human rights and democracy. The CNG 
has released all political prisoners, 
restored radio broadcast freedom, and 
disbanded the oppressive militia, the 



186 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Volunteers for National Security (VSN). 
The CNG President, Gen. Namphy, has 
pubhcly promised that the CNG will 
move quickly to draft a constitution and 
law on political parties. He has also 
pledged to organize legislative and 
presidential elections and has under- 
scored the CNG's commitment to free 
labor unions and a free press. 

Congi-essional leaders have been 
notified of the determination this morn- 
ing and have been provided with a justi- 
fication for these findings. Copies of this 
justification are available. 



This determination permits us to 
begin obligating the FY 1986 develop- 
ment assistance, economic support 
funds, and international military educa- 
tion training funds for Haiti. The 
FY 1986 operating budget for assistance 
programs to Haiti projects $22.2 million 
of development assistance and $2.9 mil- 
lion of economic support funds. An addi- 
tional $450,000 of military training is to 
be provided. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman Bernard Kalb. ■ 



CBI and the 

U.S. National Interest 



by Elliott Abrams 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Overbite of the House Ways and 
Means Committee on Febniary 25, 
1986. Mr. Abrarns is Assistant Secre- 
tary for Inter- Aynerican Affairs.^ 

I welcome this opportunity to testify 
today on the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI)— a major priority of the Depart- 
ment of State and the Administration. 
The broad bipartisan support that 
marked the passage of the Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act in 1983 
reflected the consensus of the Congress 
and of the American people that U.S. 
interests require the political and eco- 
nomic well-being of the region. The CBI 
embodies the U.S. effort to contribute 
to the region's political stability, social 
tranquility, and economic growth and 
development. The CBI is a historic pro- 
gram, central to the achievement of our 
foreign policy objectives in the region. 

Our own national self-interest gener- 
ates a natural active concern over the 
stability of a region which is an immedi- 
ate neighbor— in fact, our third border. 
Fifty percent of our trade— including 
most of our oil imports— passes through 
the Caribbean shipping lanes, including 
the Panama Canal. 

The Caribbean Basin is the second 
largest source of illegal immigration into 
this country. Lack of jobs at home is 
the principal reason. In some Caribbean 
Basin countries unemployment is as 
high as 40%. We have a mutual interest 
that the peoples of the region have the 



opportunity to find useful employment 
in their domestic economies rather than 
being forced to seek jobs elsewhere. 

We have a significant and expanding 
export interest in the region. It consti- 
tutes an important proximate market 
for our goods; last year, the CBI coun- 
tries together absorbed $6.3 billion of 
our exports, making them our seventh 
largest market. (The CBI is a larger 
market, for example, than the U.S.S.R. 
plus Eastern Europe, than all of Africa, 
than France or Italy.) Likewise, we 
have important investments in the Car- 
ibbean Basin, amounting to $5.8 billion 
in nonfinancial investment (i.e., all indus- 
tries except banking, finance, and insur- 
ance) at the end of 1984 (the latest 
available data). We share an interest 
with the people of the region in foster- 
ing and preserving a favorable climate 
for foreign investments— not only to pro- 
tect existing U.S. investment there but 
to attract new investment as well. 

The United States also has a strong 
interest in curtailing the production and 
shipment of narcotics from or through 
the region to the United States. Pros- 
perous and growing economies afford 
alternate opportunities and should 
reduce the incentives for the production 
and export of narcotics to the United 
States. Active engagement on the part 
of governments in fighting narcotics 
traffic is a disincentive to producers and 
shippers, and the CBI legislation calls 
for cooperation in this effort. 

These are specific concrete examples 
of the way in which our national inter- 
ests are served by the Caribbean Basin 



Initiative. We have a clear interest in 
preventing the emergence of a string 
hostile states in this area. 

The importance of the CBI to our 
national interest remains unchanged. 
There is a risk that, since the CBI is 
longer new and is off the front pages, 
may seem to be a passing fancy. That 
not the case. This Administration cun 
tinues to be strongly committed to pi 
moting the economic development of 
Caribbean Basin. Development serve: 
our interest in stability and democrac 
in the Americas. There can be no 
clearer sign of the Administration's 
intent and of the President's persona, 
commitment than the recent visit by 
President to Grenada and the state- 
ments which he made there. 

Moreover, the CBI goes beyond i 
particular U.S. Administration or pei 
sonal presidential commitment. It wi 
continue as an important part of U.S 
foreign policy for its full 12 years 
because it reflects the fundamental 
interests of this nation. It was becau 
of this overarching national interest t 
the program was passed by strong b 
partisan majorities and continues to 
enjoy broad support. 

State Department's Role 

As a representative of the Deparlim 
of State, let me say a few words on 
role of the Department in the progi-: 
I know that this question is of inten 
to the committee. 

The Department has a principal -' 
in both the policy formulation and ii e- 
mentation of the CBI. As the cochai, 
man of the interagency policy subco 
mittee, the Department is involveil 
aspects of the program direction ot 
initiative. Department personnel art 
also active in the subcommittee on 
implementation and in carrying out ^ i 
policies agreed upon on an interagei , 
basis. There are six priority areas fi , 
the Department's action. 

Policy Formulation. The Depai 
ment systematically analyzes the pr 
ress of the CBI and helps define on 
interagency basis what our prioritie 
should be in implementing the CBI. 
U.S. Embassies in the region provii 
regular analyses and recommendati<' 
on how to improve implementation, _ 
drawing on contacts not only with li: 
government officials but also with It: 
ness and labor leaders. In Washingi^ 
the Department organizes quarterly 
ferences with the diplomatic repres 
tives of beneficiary governments to 



i 



84 



Department of State E 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



iss CBI implementation and policy 
osals. Similarly, U.S. Government 
ementation plans are discussed with 
private sector groups representing 
United States, the CBI countries, 
Dther cooperating countries. Along 

several other U.S. agencies, the 
irtment has sponsored for the past 
irs the annual Miami conference on 
Caribbean. This conference brings 
her the private and public sectors 

thorough 3-day critical analysis of 
^BI and, thus, serves as a major 

into the policy formulation proc- 
n addition, the conference provides 
jm for traders and investors to 
re business opportunities in the 
region. 

olicy Reform. The long-term aim 
! CBI is to encourage sound eco- 
: policies that will effectively mobil- 
toestic resources to expand and 
|5ify production. At present, many 
countries still must rely to a large 
t on external support, and particu- 
)n concessional aid, to sustain their 
h and to expand their productive 
iHowever, our objectives are, first. 
Is these economies improve their 
j. performance and strengthen 
nfrastructure, private equity flows 
Isplace official aid flows as the 
7 external resource; and, second, 
rtemal flows become relatively 
iportant as the domestic private 
becomes increasingly vigorous 
novative. In its policy dialogue 
3gional leaders, the State Depart- 
itresses the importance of a vigor- 
ivate sector and the need for a 
jle environment for investors, 
Jtional and foreign. These are the 
lental preconditions for self- 
ing growth. 

:h of the 21 beneficiary countries 
own specific program for taking 
«age of the opportunities offered 
ICBI. In turn, U.S. Emba.'^sies, 
ig closely with host government 
h, fonnulate and implement an 
faction plan based on the unique 
ipns in each country. Our embas- 
evaluate beneficiary country 
ns and policies in relation to the 
ty criteria of the Caribbean 
Jconomic Recovery Act and work 
neficiary governments to avoid 
ict any potential problems in this 
Supplementing embassy activi- 
eragency teams of Washington 
a have visited beneficiary coun- 
$veral times to discuss host coun- 
n embassy CBI programs and to 
it any possible shortcomings in 



meeting the provisions of the act. These 
teams also meet with private sector 
leaders to seek to develop a coordinated 
approach involving both private and 
public sectors. The teams also meet with 
the media to explain Administration pro- 
grams to the general public. 

Economic Assistance. One of the 

U.S. Government's major efforts in 
support of the CBI has been a steadily 
increasing program of economic assist- 
ance. Overall, our economic aid to the 
CBI region has about doubled since the 
program was announced, from $695 mil- 
lion in FY [fiscal year] 1982 to the 
$1.5 billion which we are requesting for 
FY 1987. A large part of this increase is 
directed to Central American countries, 
but I emphasize that the Central Ameri- 
can program is not growing at the ex- 
pense of the Cai-ibbean. Our economic 
assistance to the Caribbean region only, 
excluding Central America, has in- 
creased from $337 million in FY 1982 to 
$385 million requested for FY 1987. 

Not only the total flow to the region 
but also our objectives, our strategy, 
and the nature of our programs have 
been changing in response to the CBI. 
My colleague from AID [Agency for 
International Development] will give a 
detailed explanation of strategy and pro- 
grams for the region, but I do want to 
emphasize three specific objectives for 



our assistance, which strongly support 
the CBI: 

• To promote short-term economic 
and financial stabilization; 

• To encourage production, trade, 
and investment in nontraditional 
exports; and 

• To enhance production, manage- 
ment, and marketing capacities of the 
private sector. 

Trade and Investment Promotion. 

The Department cooperates with other 
U.S. agencies to facilitate trade and 
investment between the United States 
and CBI beneficiary countries. This is a 
major concern for all our embassies in 
CBI countries. Each has a commercial 
section, headed either by a Department 
of Commerce or State official, to work 
closely with U.S. businesspeople and the 
host country private sector and govern- 
ment in promoting investment and 
trade. Frankly, more needs to be done 
in this area. CBI beneficiary exports to 
the United States have encountered 
some problems— as outlined in detail by 
Ambassador [and U.S. Trade Repre- 
sentative Clayton K.] Yeutter and 
Under Secretary [of Commerce for 
International Trade Bruce] Smart. In a 
related area, two specific measures 
which we are encouraging governments 
to take in order to attract additional 
economic activity (notably in the tourism 



Secretary Meets With Contadora Groups 




On February 10, 1986, at the Department 
of State, Secretary Shultz met with the 
Foreign Ministers of the Contadora coun- 
tries and the Contadora support countries. 
Left to right: Jorge Abadia (Panama), Si- 
mon Consalvi (Venezuela), Augusto Rami- 



rez (Colombia), Dante Caputo (.4rgentina), 
Olavo Setubal (Brazil), Secretary Shultz, 
Allan Wagner (Peru), Enrique Iglesias 
(Uruguay), and Bernardo Sepulveda 
(Mexico). 



86 



85 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



sector) and to improve the investment 
climate are the negotiation of tax infor- 
mation exchange agreements, so as to 
benefit from the CBI's convention tax 
deduction, and to sign bilateral invest- 
ment treaties. 

Public Diplomacy. Broad public 

understanding of the CBI's goals are 
necessary to sustain the program over 
the long tei-m. Second, potential inves- 
tors must be informed about the pro- 
gram and the economic and political 
situation of the CBI countries. The 
Department has, consequently, given 
the region and the initiative priority at- 
tention in its public diplomacy activities. 
Department officers have spoken 
throughout the country on the CBI, 
either individually or together with 
other agency representatives, and we 
expect to expand these activities. In this 
regard, these hearings, together with 
other congressional public information 
activities, are most welcome. The Presi- 
dent's recent trip to Grenada, of course, 
provided unique opportunities to explain 
to the U.S. and CBI public the purposes 
of the program and to underscore the 
U.S. commitment to the initiative. U.S. 
Embassies, including particularly USIA 
[United States Information Agency] 
representatives, reinforce this message 
by regularly meeting with the host 
country press and interested groups to 
discuss CBI implementation. 

Multilateral Support. The Depart- 
ment is actively encouraging strength- 
ened multilateral support for the CBI. 
Because of the committee's special inter- 
est in this issue, I would like to describe 
it in some detail. 

Multilateral Support 

There are four main targets of our 
efforts to encourage multilateral 
participation: 

• The countries of the Caribbean 
rim; 

• Other developed countries which 
take an active role in the region; 

• Multilateral institutions; and 

• Private sector participation from 
third countries. 

Let us consider these in turn. 

Caribbean Rim. When the Presi- 
dent announced the initiative in 1982, he 
noted that four other countries were 
each intensifying their own efforts in 
support of economic development in the 
Caribbean Basin countries through pro- 
grams which augment and complement 
the CBI. These efforts have continued. 



86 



• Canada. The Government of Can- 
ada announced its intention to double its 
bilateral aid to the Commonwealth Car- 
ibbean by 1987; it is well on its way to 
achieving this target. Canadian aid flows 
have also increased to Central America. 
Prime Minister Mulroney has also an- 
nounced plans to implement by mid- 1986 
a preferential trade arrangement similar 
to the CBI for the Commonwealth Car- 
ibbean. Thus, shortly, we expect the 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries to 
have nearly unlimited trade access to 
the entire North American market. 

• Venezuela and Mexico. Although 
these countries face considerable chal- 
lenges in promoting their own economic 
development and resolving pressing 
debt service problems, they have con- 
tinued their joint oil facility, which 
offers special credit terms to nine petro- 
leum-importing countries in the basin. 
These credits may also be converted to 
long-term development loans under cer- 
tain conditions. Venezuela has extended 
assistance to the region and has helped 
Curacao by leasing the Shell petroleum 
refinery there for a 5-year period. 

• Colombia. Colombia has offered 
special trade credits and technical assist- 
ance programs to several governments 
in the region and is exploring other 
ways to promote trade and investment. 
Although of modest scope compared to 
the U.S. and Canadian programs, the 
Colombian program is a substantial 
effort for a developing country and 
shows the interest of the Colombian 
Government in playing an active and 
constructive role in the Caribbean 
Basin. 

Developed Country Participation. 

Over the past 4 years, the Department 
has intensified its consultations with key 
allies on Caribbean Basin policies and 
programs, with specific attention to the 
CBI. Examples of expanded multilateral 
cooperation include: 

• The European Communities (EC) 
have several programs which predate 
the CBI. The most important program 
is the Lome convention, which offers 
trade preferences for imports from the 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries- 
duty-free entry into the EC market for 
most goods produced in the beneficiary 
countries, as well as specific commodity 
protocols, some of which offer guaran- 
teed prices for specified quantities of 
certain commodity exports of the bene- 
ficiary countries. The convention also 
provides for economic aid and other 
incentives for investment, tourist promo- 
tion, training, financial assistance for 



unforeseen export shortfalls of certaii 
products, and technical cooperation. 
Department officers and our mission 1 
the European Communities have con- 
sulted regularly with the EC member 
states and the European Commission 
strengthen joint activities in the basil 
In November 1985 the EC adopted a 
framework agreement with the Centi 
American countries which makes a m 
commitment to assist Central Amerie 
The EC agreed to double its financia 
resource flows to the region over the 
next 5 years. We are exploring ways 
through which the EC and the Unite 
States might work together to promc 
increased investment and trade with 
Central America and help strengther 
regional institutions. 

• The United Kingdom has orga- 
nized several investment missions to 
region, promoted the opportunities 
offered by the Lome convention and 
CBI for European businesspeople, ai 
sustained its economic development 
assistance to the region. 

• The Federal Republic of Gemu 
has increased its aid flows to the reg 
and is currently exploring ways to v 
with us to improve the investment e 
ronment in the region. It has also pJ 
ticipated in joint seminars on the CP 
several German commercial centers. 

• France has increased its aid tc 
region, especially to the east Caribb 
where it recently opened an embass,' 
St. Lucia. French authorities have c 
laborated with private sector groups i 
inform the French business commur 
about the CBI. 

• Dutch officials have urged the 
dependencies in the Netherlands 
Antilles to make full use of the CBI , 
They have collaborated in organizinj | . 
several CBI seminars in Holland. |^ 

• Japan has recently intensified ,■ , 
CBI-related activities by increasing 
trade credits and developmental ass- 
ance to the basin and by organizing \ 
joint private/public sector investmei 
mission to several beneficiary count ■ 
in March. 

Multilateral Institutions. For t 
past 8 years the U.S. Government 1 
been supporting the Caribbean Gro 
for Cooperation in Economic Devek 
ment (CGCED), a consultative gi-ou« 
by the World Bank which involves ^ 
30 donor countries and Internationa ' " 
institutions as well as some 15 Cari 
bean countries. It aims to strength' " 
international cooperation with rega; w 
economic assistance to the region a w 



Department of State Bl 



I 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



lote sound economic policies to 
ove the environment for investment 
trade expansion. The CGCED, in 
t, performs a role which comple- 
;s and supports the goals of the 
We are now exploring the organi- 
n of country-specific consultative 
ps for Central American countries 
h would hopefully have a similar 
ilementary role. 

'rivate Sector Cooperation. Private 
r groups in some developed coun- 
are active supporters of the CBI. 
British West India Committee has 
particularly active. For example, it 
lized a 50-member investment mis- 
;o the recent Miami conference on 
Jaribbean and has hosted a series of 
lars on the CBI in Great Britain, 
committee now plans to direct its 
tion to engaging other European 
ess groups in the region. Similarly, 
anadian Association- Latin America 
he Caribbean has worked closely 
U.S. agencies in promoting the 
n Canada and in promoting Cana- 
lusiness contacts wdth the region. 

•vements in the CBI 

I and other Administration wit- 
have outlined represents, in our 
some significant progress under 
31 and a major effort within this 
listration and by the other CBI 
pants to implement the program 
'ely. There are, of course, some 
ms and issues. This committee has 
for our analysis of what needs to 
nged to make the CBI more effec- 
icluding recommendations for 
tive or administrative changes, 
e problem which most concerns 
one which is not susceptible to 
i^' legislative or administrative 
'als but which I, nevertheless, 
highlight as an important issue, 
the problem of frustration based 
ealistic expectations. Because this 
Bamatic and unprecendented pro- 
ipopular expectations in the Carib- 
jlasin have been and remain high. 
i', the CBI is having an impact, 
•tre is, as yet, little visible differ- 
i. living standards in the Carib- 
■lasin. As a result, we hear a 
^ amount of impatience with the 
fn and with the economic model 
8;he CBI represents. 
■1.V do we deal with this impa- 
i We must try to channel it into 
Ictive foi-ms. There is a kind of 
tince that impels people to act— to 
Ijthe obstacles before them with 



new courage. There is another kind that 
makes people give up or pronounce their 
own and others' efforts a failure. That 
second kind is not only premature; it is 
tragic and self-fulfilling. That will cause 
investors to give up on the region also 
and not even to look at possible oppor- 
tunities there. But the first kind of 
impatience is creative and energizing. I 
hope that the frustrations which we are 
seeing expressed in the region will 
impel everyone to reexamine and 
redouble their efforts. 

On the part of the countries of the 
CBI region, that means a renewed 
determination to attack outmoded and 
distorting economic structures which 
have impeded their growth to date. 
Many governments have already under- 
taken programs to adjust their econo- 
mies. But adjustment is a dynamic, not 
a static, process; one that requires con- 
tinuing efforts and new approaches as 
opportunities develop or economic condi- 
tions change. As difficult as many of 
these adjustments have been and con- 
tinue to be, they are indispensable. And 
we are beginning to see in some coun- 
tries the first fruits of the sacrifices 
of the past few years, in terms of im- 
proved investor confidence and capital 
flows, increased exports, the restoration 
of growth, and improved job prospects. 
These countries must stick to their 
course, so that the full benefits of 
structural adjustment policies can be 
produced. 

For our part in the United States, 
we need, above all, to keep our own 
economy vibrant and open. Our market 
and our resources are vast compared to 
the small economies of the Caribbean 
Basin, even taken together. But if our 
own economy falters, our ability to help 
our neighbors will suffer as well, and, of 
course, our market will offer fewer 
opportunities. Therefore, we will con- 
tinue policies to keep our economy 
dynamic and innovative. 

Above all, we must resist the easy— 
and terribly destructive— temptation of 
protectionism. Trying to resolve our 
problems by closing markets may seem 
hke a solution, but, in fact, it only wor- 
sens the original problems by promoting 
inefficient and costly production. The 
ultimate solution to our trade problems 
is to work toward more open markets 
and more rational economic policies 
everywhere: in the United States, in the 
Caribbean Basin, and in the economies 
of our trading partners throughout the 
world. 



This Administration is committed to 
an open and fair trading regime. Demon- 
strations of this commitment include 
President Reagan's recent decisions to 
reject the use of quotas on imports of 
shoes and copper. We are also actively 
working to organize another round of 
multilateral negotiations to liberalize 
further international trade in goods and 
sei-vices. 

More specifically, we need to main- 
tain the integrity of the CBI progi-am. 
Clearly, as times change and as political 
problems develop on this or that issue, 
there will be pressures for revisions in 
the program. However, investors need a 
reasonable expectation of stability 
before they commit their capital and 
energy to a new venture. This Adminis- 
tration understands that and will defend 
the integrity of the program against 
changes that would weaken it. Let me 
emphasize that this is a commitment 
which comes from the very top. Two 
months ago, in Miami, Vice President 
Bush said that: "We in the Admin- 
istration must, and we will, fight any 
proposal in any form that would inhibit 
the free flow of trade from the Carib- 
bean." I ask this committee, which 
played an indispensable and leading role 
in securing passage of the CBI program, 
to also express its commitment to pro- 
tecting the CBI program against protec- 
tionist revisions and preserving its 
integrity for its full 12 years. 

At the same time, we must look for 
ways to enrich the initiative. And here I 
finally arrive at some specific actions 
which we can take administratively or 
through legislation. Several measures 
are already being implemented: im- 
proved opportunities for U.S. Govern- 
ment procurement and liberalized access 
for certain garments. Another measure 
will require legislation: expansion of 
investment opportunities under Section 
936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. 
Last November Vice President Bush 
announced the Administration's decision 
to waive for CBI countries certain re- 
quirements under U.S. law relating to 
the GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] Government Procure- 
ment Code. As a result, products ex- 
ported by CBI countries will have a 
chance to compete for certain U.S. 
Government purchases which had previ- 
ously been closed to them. I want to 
add today that the U.S. Government has 
developed a program to help businesses 
in CBI countries take advantage of 
these new opportunities by explaining to 
them the specific procedures and regula- 
tions governing U.S. procurement and 



)86 



87 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



offering them practical advice on how to 
enter this very complex and competitive 
market. 

The President in Grenada announced 
a program of special importance to the 
region. We will implement soon a special 
program to provide greater access to 
the U.S. market for garments sewn in 
CBI countries from fabric manufactured 
and cut to pattern in the United States. 
This comes in response to repeated re- 
quests from CBI leaders emphasizing 
the importance of the labor-intensive as- 
sembly industry to their economies. 
Further, it responds to the interest of 
many U.S. investors to locate parts of 
their textile operations in neighboring 
countries where they could take advan- 
tage of the industrial opportunities 
there. This reflects the natural economic 
complementarity of the U.S. and Carib- 
bean Basin economies; it will result in a 
product which meets consumer needs at 
an attractive price and is able to com- 
pete with products which are totally 
made outside the United States. It thus 
preserves jobs in the United States, 
even while creating jobs and promoting 
the economic development of our neigh- 
bors in the Caribbean Basin. 

Another major improvement which 
is underway is the proposal endorsed by 
the House for encouraging cooperative 
production between Puerto Rico and 
CBI countries. This is an imaginative 
proposal which originally came from 
Puerto Rican Governor Hernandez 
Colon and reflects Puerto Rico's special 
status as a bridge between the mainland 
United States and the Caribbean Basin. 
Under the proposal approved by the 
House on Section 936 of the U.S. Inter- 
nal Revenue Code, profits from U.S. 
investments in Puerto Rico can be fur- 
ther reinvested by the Puerto Rican 
Government Development Bank in ac- 
tive business assets in CBI countries 
and still receive a tax credit. This could 
provide a major boost to CBI countries, 
which remain starved for investment 
and capital. I urge the Senate to join 
the House in approving this provision. 

We need also to address the problem 
of sugar. Since the passage of the 
domestic support program for sugar, our 
imports of sugar have been declining 
and now are about half of what we im- 
ported prior to the program. The effects 
of the declining U.S. sugar quota on 
CBI countries is difficult to measure 
precisely, but it is clearly substantial in 
terms of lost foreign exchange earnings 
and employment. Sugar is a key export 
from the region; for example, it accounts 



88 



for a third of the total foreign exchange 
earnings of the Dominican Republic. 

When he signed the farm bill, the 
President made very clear his concern 
about the negative impact of our sugar 
program on CBI countries. The Admin- 
istration is now studying several dif- 
ferent approaches to mitigate these 
problems. 

I understand the committee and pos- 
sibly other interested Members may 
travel to the CBI region sometime this 
spring to take a firsthand look at what 
the CBI has accomplished and what 
needs to be done. I very much welcome 
such a firsthand exploration by the com- 
mittee and offer any assistance which 
we or our embassies could provide to 
make the trip as productive as possible. 



^^Siy^ 




Concluding Overview 

The CBI was born full of promise for 
the future for both us and for the 
region. Today, 2 years after implementa- 
tion of the program, we have lived a 
small part of that future. How far have 
we come? How far do we have to go to 
fulfill the promise of more stable and 
integrated development? 

I think the overall answer is simple: 
we have set a good course, but we have 
so far to go that the finish is not yet in 
sight. The challenge before us is great- 
self-sustaining prosperity built on a solid 
base of democratic institutions. But the 
resources which we collectively bring to 
this task are also great— the energies 
and talents of governments and private 
sector leaders in the United States, the 
Caribbean Basin, and in an impressive 
number of other countries interested in 
the region. 

Let me review quickly my first 
question— how far have we come? 
Looking back over the years since this 
Administration first proposed the CBI, I 
see some major accomplishments in 
responding to our common goals and 
interests. The most important achieve- 
ment has been the spread of democracy. 



Despite several exceptions with 
which you are all familiar, the Caril 
bean Basin is now overwhelming! \ t i 
acterized by democratic govemnuiit 
chosen as a result of orderly elect ioi 
that expressed, in their freedom am 
competitiveness, the will of their it- . 
tive peoples. There have been soiiu' 
dramatic turnarounds in favor of de n 
racy: the beginning of the democrat |. 
process in Haiti; the return of Gi'in i 
to democratic institutions; and th<' > r 
ing of the political process in El Sal 
vador, Honduras, and Guatemala to 
popular choice. There have also liee 
more "routine" elections in countrit 
where democratic practices have loi 
been honored, as in the parliaments 
systems in the Caribbean or in Cen 
America's strongest democracy, Co; 
Rica. My point is that democracy is 
stronger than ever. The majority oli 
pie in the Caribbean Basin now live 
under political systems which they 
themselves chosen. 

Self-determination and democrai 
are achievements of enormous impC" 
tance in themselves. They are also 
cial to the economic future of the rn 
As Secretary Shultz noted in a maj> 
speech to the Miami conference on 
Caribbean in December 1984, demo 
and development go hand in hand, 
spite the difficulties which democra 
sometimes have in making decision; 
over the long run a lasting and self 
sustaining process of economic dev( 
ment can best be built through a sj 
which rests on the consent of the g 
erned and gives people faith in thej 
institutions. 

People must have faith in their' 
tutions if there is to be economic 
growth. The failure of Cuba's comn fd 
economy can be traced to a failui'e 
Cuba's Marxist government to give 'c 
pie faith in Cuba's future. Cubans i 
creasingly shudder at the bleaknes; i-' 
will prevail even by the year 2000 Jk 
current regime continues. Without «■ 
dom, even Castro's call of last year r 
"10 years of austerity" will not bri > 
return to economic growth. Castro' 
eagerness to earn hard currency ai 
"normalize" his relations with the '*^' 
thereby regenerating growth, come 
from his belief that he can have bo 
growth and the command economy "l 
he is missing the point, just as the 
Soviet Union and Nicaragua have: 
growth cannot come through politii 
tyranny and total bureaucratic com '■ 
To reestablish a productive future, w' 
would, indeed, need to normalize n 
tions with the West, but that cann' 
come without freedom as well. 



^ 



Department of State E «* 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



iVe can all learn from the mistakes 
ie command economy. In simple 
IS, the lesson is that overbureau- 
zation is the death knell of initia- 

investment, and growth. 
L,et's turn now to a review of eco- 
ic progress in the Caribbean Basin, 
ough the region still faces major 
lems, some of which are beyond the 
rol of the countries themselves, 
i has been considerable progress on 
;conomic front in recent years. In 
ral America, the dramatic decline in 
•egion's GNP [g:i-oss national 
uct] has been arrested. The Carib- 

Basin as a whole (excluding 
ragua) grew l%-2% in 1984 and is 
lated to have grown modestly again 
85. We are encouraged at this eco- 
c upturn, but we also see it as in- 
dent over the longer run. Clearly, 
-er economic progress is needed, 
erhaps the most important achieve- 

of recent years has been a new 

of private enterprise shared by 
governments and the private sec- 
Vhile it is impossible to quantify 
I believe most people who know 
Jgion sense a major change in atti- 
. Increasingly, there is an aware- 
-hat it is the private sector which 
rwhelmingly the source of invest- 

jobs, innovation, and growth. In- 
ngly, the role of government is 
is providing a framework within 

the private sector can operate ef- 
ly, rather than as the engine of 
mic activity. 

lis is a crucial change. For, 
igh attitudes are unquantifiable, 
jire the basis for people's decisions 
l:tions. If these attitudinal changes 
lue and grow, then the region ulti- 
f will develop institutions which 
t capital and technology, not repel 
ich encourage innovation and risk- 
, not capital flight; which foster 
s and investment, not decay and 



e complete transcript of the hearings 
published by the committee and will 
lable from the Superintendent of 
?nt.s, U.S. Government Printing Office 
gton, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Drug Wars: The New Alliance 
Against Traffickers and Terrorists 



by Elliott Abrams 

Address before the Council on 
Foreign Relations in New York City on 
February 10. 1986. Mr. Abrams is 
Assistant Secretary for Inter- American 
Affairs. 

The Council on Foreign Relations is a 
forum foi- the discussion of weighty mat- 
ters, the serious business of foreigii pol- 
icy, global economics, military strategy, 
and national security. I would guess 
that few council meetings have been 
devoted to the subject I want to ad- 
dress today. The drug problem has long 
been thought to be a matter for the 
police or for the local TV news or 
Friday night melodramas. 

I want to change that attitude, and I 
appreciate the opportunity you have 
given me to do so. For I believe that 
few issues we face in the areas of for- 
eign policy and national security have a 
greater and more immediate relevance 
to the well-being of the American people 
than international narcotics. The sooner 
all of us who ponder foreign policy is- 
sues recognize the extreme threat posed 
by international narcotics trafficking to 
the health of our nation and its neigh- 
bors, the sooner will this danger to our 
families and our children be reduced and 
eliminated. 

Not very long ago, the discussion of 
di-ug trafficking consisted mostly of 
finger pointing. We blamed Latin Amer- 
icans for indifference to the production 
and movement of narcotics northward. 
And they pointed to the United States 
and its insatiable market as the cause of 
that traffic. Within our own govern- 
ment, different agencies belittled each 
other's efforts, and some even claimed 
that fighting narcotics would "degi-ade" 
their mission and should best be left to 
traditional local and federal law enforce- 
ment officials, the "narcs." 

There has been a dramatic change. 
There is a bit of the "narc" in all of us 
now— from presidents of Latin American 
democracies, to commanders of U.S. 
Navy destroyers in the Caribbean, to 
Assistant Secretaries of State for Inter- 
American Affairs. There is, of course, 
still plenty of blame to be laid. Before I 
finish tonight I will point my own finger 
at some specific targets, and I hope 
some of you will be uncomfortable for it. 



But a significant story of the 1980s in 
this hemisphere, ourselves very much 
included, has been the breaking down of 
old attitudes and jealousies, the upgrad- 
ing of missions, and precedent-setting 
cooperation against the traffickers and 
their guerrilla allies and protectors. 

In Washington, the level and produc- 
tivity of joint narcotics control ventures 
among government agencies is making 
bureaucratic history. In exactly the 
same way, effective cooperation among 
the Andean countries of South America 
and Brazil is confounding historical judg- 
ments about narrow nationalism and the 
"traditional" role of the military and 
police in these countries. I don't know 
which is more sui-prising— State Depart- 
ment "narcs" working closely with Drug 
Enforcement Administration" (DE A) 
"diplomats" or joint Colombian/Peruvian 
military and police antidrug actions on 
their common border. I suspect that 
neither development has been given 
sufficient public airing. 

The new antidrug alliances are a 
phenomenon almost as important in 
inter-American politics as the 
hemisphere's transition from despotism 
to democracy over the past 10 years. 
Moreover, sustaining democracy and 
combating the "narco terrorist"" threat 
are inextricably linked. That is our 
view, and it is the view of democratic 
leaders throughout the hemisphere. 

How did this come about? It did not 
stem primarily from bureaucratic imper- 
atives in Washington or diplomatic ap- 
proaches in Lima or Bogota. And it did 
not result from any particular, persua- 
sive public relations campaign. It 
happened, simply stated, when we dis- 
covered ourselves to be victims and be- 
gan to fight back in self-defense. In 
effect, we began to see that the per- 
nicious assault of drugs on society is 
deeply damaging to the security "of our 
families and communities and that 
defending our national security has to 
include defending ourselves against 
drugs. 

The Assault on Society 

The scourge takes many forms. In 
northern South America, still the main 
route of cocaine traffic to the United 
States, there is a relatively new drug 
which some call the most damaging such 



)86 



89 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



substance on earth. In Colombia it is 
called "basuco"-from "base de coca." 
Basuco is a semirefined coca paste 
which, when smoked, delivers the 
"high" of cocaine-and with it the chem- 
ical poison of an incomplete refining 
process. The result is addiction plus the 
very high risk of severe, permanent 
brain damage. In one Bogota neighbor- 
hood alone, there are an estimated 7,000 
juvenile basuco addicts. 

Insidiously, the producers of basuco 
deliberately created a demand for this 
vicious product and priced it so that 
whole new segments of society— the 
young and the poor— could become drug 
consumers. Basuco has exploded the 
myth, fostered by traffickers, that the 
supply merely follows demand; that the 
traffic only exploits the rich, idle, and 
perverse gringos and Europeans. In 
Bolivia and Peru, these same deadly 
coca-paste cigarettes are known as 
"pitillos." Bolivian experts suggest a 
higher per capita incidence of addiction 
to such drugs in their nation than in the 
United States. 

As the frightening fact emerged that 
large numbers of their own children 
were becoming regular users of this ter- 
rible and tenifyingly cheap product, 
authorities and parents in the Andes 
understood that passive acquiescence in 
a traffic destined to the distant United 
States in fact risked the health of their 
own societies. They have learned that 
drug-producing countries easily become 
drug-consuming nations. Something of 
the traffic always stays behind: this is 
not a Miami vice alone. 

The shock of basuco, and similar 
revelations about other drugs, were 
among many over the last several years. 

First, there was the economists' 
conclusion that the so-called economic 
benefits to producing and trafficking 
countries reach very few people and are 
far outweighed by the inflation and 
other distortions brought on by the 
traffickers and the money launderers. In 
Bolivia, for example, reputable, legiti- 
mate businessmen (some representing 
U.S. firms) are finding their backs to 
the wall, facing bankruptcy as a result 
of predatory pricing and marketing com- 
petition from new firms backed by 
narcodoUar capital. Meanwhile, the con- 
struction of condominiums in south 
Florida does not benefit the Bolivian 
peasant. 

Second, the enormous intimidating 
and corruptive power of the traffickers 
surfaced so blatantly that public and 
political opinion in country after country 
has recognized the direct menace to 



democracy itself. The 1984 drug mafia 
assassination of Colombian Justice 
Minister Lara and the kidnap-murder in 
1985 of DBA agent Enrique Camarena 
in Mexico were only the most arrogant 
demonstrations of this subversion of 
government institutions. 

Third, and related, is the mounting 
evidence of a deadly connection between 
narcotics traffickers and guerrilla ter- 
rorist groups. It is a link that multiplies 
the capabilities of each. Colombia pro- 
vides the best examples: guerrilla 
groups— the FARC [Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia], the M-19, 
and others— have been found protecting 
cocaine labs and landing strips and 
facilitating shipments. Last November, 
when the M-19 terrorists attacked the 
Supreme Court and murdered nearly 
half of its judges, their specific 
behavior— the judges they sought out 
first, the extradition documents they 
burned— convinced Colombian authori- 
ties that, whatever their so-called politi- 
cal goals, the guerrillas were also 
working directly for the traffickers. And 
on top of that, the fact that some of the 
weapons they used came from the San- 
dinistas highlights the immensely dan- 
gerous connection to international 
terrorism. Nor are we immune: here in 
the United States in October 1984, law 
enforcement agencies uncovered and 
foiled a rightwing Honduran coup plot 
financed by drug money. 

Changes in Attitude 

For all these reasons, the changes in 
attitude, commitment, and policy among 
Latin American countries have been 
profound. Territorial rivalries and 
nationalist tensions have not disap- 
peared, but Colombia now actively 
works vrith Peru and with Ecuador and 
Venezuela in interdiction. A new region- 
al narcotics telecommunications system 
will soon be operating in South America. 
It will connect for drug law enforcement 
pui-poses military and national police 
establishments which not long ago saw 
each other as potential enemies. 

Successful aerial spraying of mari- 
juana in Mexico, Panama, Belize, and 
Colombia has been followed by impor- 
tant experiments in aerial eradication of 
coca by the Colombian national police. 
Colombia has extradited seven individu- 
als, five of its own citizens, all accused 
of narcotics trafficking, to the United 
States. The international movement of 
chemicals used in the cocaine refining 
process has been severely restricted. 



General awareness of the benefit jj 
international cooperation to combat 
cotics production and trafficking is 
increasing. The Organization of Ame 
can States will hold a special confen 
in Rio, April 27-28. Many European 
countries are beginning to look into 
assisting eradication efforts in Latin 
America, as they realize that they, 
are targets of the traffickers. 

Developments in the United Stai 
are running a parallel course. The 
mythology of cocaine as relatively a 
the only risk being arrest, has been 
ploded. Concerned Congressmen, lit 
New York Representative Rangel, 
Chairman of the House Select Comi 
tee on Narcotics Abuse and Control 
have led a determined and dedicate 
fort to educate all of us to the dang 
of drug abuse and the necessity for 
international cooperation. First Lad 
Nancy Reagan has pitched in to hel 
carry the message to the youth of t 
country. Americans are coming, if s 
ly, to realize that cocaine does lead 
addiction: after five or so uses the 
shift heavily in that direction. The 
ruptive potential of drug trafficking 
increasingly recognized as somethiil 
more than prime time script mater 
And basuco, the deadly partially re 
coca from South America, has begu 
appear in the United States along ' 
"crack," a more refined, but nearly 
deadly, form of the drag. 

American antinarcotics activity, 
domestic and foreign, has increasec' 
rapidly. Perceived sometime rivals- 
DEA and Customs are collaboratiii) 
never before. Similarly, the extradi 
of accused drug traffickers is not a 
way transit to the United States- 
have recently extradited two Amei m 
citizens to Colombia as part of thi.'; 
effort. 

A historic example of teaming i > 
our own government is a current r ' 
sive operation off our southern wai» 
under the general direction of Vice 
President Bush, the U.S. Governm 
has undertaken interdiction operat • 
of unprecedented scope cutting aci 
traditional agency divisions. The \' 
President's office has provided cd'* 
tion to the intelligence and intenli' ' 
efforts of the Coast Guard, Navy, 
Customs with the cooperation of tl 
international community. The Stat 
Department, through our embas- 
the region, handles the involvenu i 
number of foreign governments. 

A new function has been adde( > 
the traditional tasks of Foreign SJ* 
officers. Five of our posts in Latir 



90 



Department of State 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



rica and the Caribbean have some- 
, called narcotics assistance units 
red with administering important 
;-ams of assistance and cooperation 
e countries where they operate. 
e "narcodiplomats" are on the 
) edge of this critical warfare. They 
been partly responsible for encour- 
■ and helping to channel U.S. funds 
,he successes of Latin American 
•nments I noted eaiiier. Some of 
seem to be doing better in their 
n with difficult-to-deal-with ranking 
nment officials than are their poKt- 
id economic section counterparts, 
le of my personal contributions to 
ar against illegal drugs will be to 
sure that good "narcodiplomats" 
up faster in the Foreign Service, 
rug mafia and their guerrilla 
s are shooting at these people, 
hings that the State Department 
:ontribute so directly to the U.S. 
al security and welfare than our 
nated war on the narcotics/ 
ist combine. 

ontinuing Threat 

same time, we must be honest 
urselves. What we and many 
iments in the hemisphere are now 
s significant, but it does not mean 
•ug trafficking is being defeated. 
, in the aggregate, we have not 
d the flow of cocaine to the 

States at all. The piice of the 
as gone dowTi over the past few^ 
n major American cities, indicat- 
reased movement of supplies, 
ormous profits are creating shai-p 
ves for increases in coca acreage 
• innovative production, smug- 
ind marketing. The pattern of ex- 
» cultivation is clear as one flies 
le vast eastern slope of the 

Illicit plantings are shifted as 
tion programs succeed. As 
lian interdiction, eradication, and 
tion increases, the traffickers 
heir operations to neighboring 
es. The traffickers constantly 
I lent with new chemistry and 
siuggling routes. As our and other 
)rces interdict drugs in the 
ian, the traffic flows elsewhere, 
i increasingly is being trans- 
through Me.Kico and across our 
rder. As old methods of hiding 
te powder are unearthed by Cus- 
BW, more sophisticated ways are 
ed. A recent cocaine shipment 
(lombia arrived in a case of 

plastic imitations of the ubiqui- 



Where does that place all of the in- 
creased cooperative efforts I have just 
described? It means that more, much 
more has to be done. But, at the very 
least, it also means that very few of "the 
principal actors are now attempting to 
hide their own inaction by pointing the 
finger at others. Almost everyone is 
now in the act together. The "experts in 
our agencies and in other countries are 
agreeing that interdiction, or eradica- 
tion, or extradition, or the reduction of 
demand cannot work if attempted in iso- 
lation, one tactic at a time. 

The problem is huge; it must be ad- 
dressed across the board. The resources 
arrayed against our efforts are stagger- 
ing. Cocaine is at least a $40-billion- 
doUar-a-year business. For obvious rea- 
sons, exact figures are elusive— it may 
be twice that. What is clear, is that 
everyone is affected, everyone is to 
blame, and everyone is responsible for 
action. 



Shared Responsibilities 

This brings me to some finger pointing 
of my owTi. Has the American system— 
and here I refer to more than this or 
that governmental agency— done its part 
as a whole? What of a large portion of 
the media which glamorizes succeeding 
generations of "designer drugs" (some 
might call basuco just that)? Or what 
about those who conclude, in frustration 
at the slow pace of progi-ess, that the 
task is "impossible" and therefore not 
worth attempting? 

How genuinely responsible, beyond 
the strict dictates of the law, are major 
American banks in making certain they 
are not involved in the "laundering" o"f 
drug money? How many banks repre- 
sented in this room have been cited 
recently for failure to report cash trans- 
actions of over $10,000? The last hst I 
saw included five banks just here in 
New York City. Do those bankers who 
turn a blind eye in order to turn a bet- 
ter profit have any idea what they are 
doing? To theii- country? To their com- 
munities? To their own children? 

How many communities look only 
toward the fresh tax revenues they will 
receive (maybe) when the drug barons 
build mansions or buy condominiums by 
the beach? And how many lawyers, 
executives, media stars, and athletes 
still believe a little "coke" for "recrea- 
tional use" is OK? 

I may sound a little arrogant, but I 
feel that my colleagues in the State 
Department, in the uniformed services, 
and in the drug agencies are doing their 



part. And I believe that there is a great 
deal to praise in Central and South 
America and the Caribbean, where poor 
governments have made the critical turn 
against rich, powerful forces imbedded 
in their owii histories and economies. 

This commitment is evident in 
Bolivia, where the democratic govern- 
ment of South America's poorest coun- 
try has taken initial steps to reduce the 
substantial cultivation of the coca leaf, a 
product with almost sacred dimensions 
through historic ties to the Incas. Just 
after New Year's Day, the 200 members 
of the country's only antinarcotics strike 
force were surrounded and threatened 
by as many as 17,000 angry peasants be- 
cause they represented a renewed police 
presence in Bolivia's largest coca- 
growing region. The reason? The peas- 
ants were beginning to feel the econom- 
ic effects of the government's assault on 
a crop for which there is no economic 
substitute. Incidentally, those 200 strike- 
force members are supposed to cover an 
area the size of France. 

In less than 6 months in office, the 
democratic Government of Peru has 
launched three large-scale interdiction 
operations, seizing more than 13 metric 
tons of coca paste and destroying 69 
clandestine airports. A major narcotics 
ring has been broken up and its "god- 
father" arrested, and 369 senior pohce 
officers have been forced into early 
retirement as part of a "moralization" 
campaign. Fifty-four percent more coca 
was eradicated in Peru in 1985 than in 
1984. 

Corruption and intimidation remain 
major problems. But, at the very least, 
most of these governments have 
stopped insisting that it is our problem 
and have begun to try to do something 
about this universal scourge. I believe 
they deserve more help from us and 
more private action on our own soil. 

Next Steps 

What kind of additional help do I think 
we should provide? One area which 
deserves to be considered is a major in- 
crease in the tools many of these coun- 
tries require for drug enforcement and 
interdiction. I am not talking about jet 
fighters or aircraft carriers; but I am 
talking about more armored helicopters 
and troop-can-ying aircraft. Why? Be- 
cause when the police or special military 
units go after jungle labs today, they 
are likely to ran into assault rifles and 
machine guns, not Saturday night spe- 
cials. Better targeted U.S. assistance 
would serve U.S. national security, and 



186 



91 



END NOTES 



TREATIES 



it would, at the same time, demonstrate 
that we are listening to what the new, 
democratic leaders of Latin America are 
saying— with increasing frequency— 
about their real national security needs: 
less for military competition with their 
neighbors and more for defense against 
the trafficking and terrorizing enemy 
within. 

Would this mean spending more? 
I'm not sure. American taxpayers now 
shell out over $1.5 billion a year, more 
or less evenly divided between enforce- 
ment on the one hand and treatment, 
prevention, and rehabilitation on the 
other. And of that amount, less than a 
$100 million is spent abroad. Those of 
you who are businessmen will know bet- 
ter than I the costs to your own opera- 
tions of drug-using employees. Cer- 
tainly, we could do more, much more, to 
stop the stuff before it reaches our 
shores. 

Similarly, the ongoing debate in 
Washington about the proper mix of 
civilian and military assistance related 
to the drug war should be accelerated. 
The time has come— now that Latin 
America is 90% democratic— for our sys- 
tem to recognize that certain legal 
restrictions which emerged from another 
era no longer apply across the hemi- 
spheric board. If a national police, 
responsive to an elected democratic 
civilian government, can do the job best, 
then we must be able to allow our own 
agencies, civilian and military, to assist 
the police. And if, in a specific country, 
the military— under democratic civilian 
control— has the mandate, then that is 
where our aid should be directed. 

I believe that recent history does 
justify more from us, both as a govern- 
ment and as a people. The statistics and 
the experiences of what drug abuse is 
doing to a generation and more of 
Americans (and Brazilians, Colombians, 
and Jamaicans) demands that we do 
more and that we end whatever indiffer- 
ence remains. Attacking the traffic in 
narcotics is as high a priority as we 
have in the U.S. Government. I have 
told my diplomats that, and the Navy is 
showing it by supporting the Coast 
Guard's mission. 

Now it's the tuni of the Council on 
Foreign Relations and of people like 
you. It is time to go beyond sitting in 
judgment on what bureaucrats and 
foreigners are doing. It is time to join 
the war against drugs. As Ecuador's 
president said, in somewhat more color- 
ful terms, during a recent visit to a coca 
field to observe eradication: "Let's get 
rid of this garbage." 



This is not just a health problem, 
not just a foreign aid problem, not just 
a police problem. It is a moral challenge 
and a national security matter. It 
threatens democracy in our hemisphere 
and children in our homes. Let us treat 
it with the seriousness it deserves. ■ 



February 1986 



The following are some of the signifi- 
cant official U.S. foreign policy actions 
and statements during the month that are 
not reported elsewhere in this periodical. 

February 5 

Ambassador Nitze consults with allies in 
Europe and Ambassador Rowny consults 
with allies in Asia in an effort to form a 
response to the Soviet Union's arms control 
proposal. 

February 6 

U.S. vetoes a UN Security Council resolution 
deploring Israel's interception of a Libyan 
civilian airliner. 

February 11 

Shultz meets with Mexican Foreign Minister 
Sepulveda to discuss mutual interests includ- 
ing Mexico's economic problems. 

President Reagan asks Ambassador 
Habib to go to the Philippines to "assess the 
desires and needs of the Filipino people." 

U.S. arms control adviser Nitze meets 
with Belgian Foreign Ministei- Tindeman to 
discuss Geneva arms control negotiations. 

February 12-13 

In Geneva, Assistant Secretary Crocker 
meets with South African Foreign Minister 
Botha to discuss bilateral and regional affairs. 

February 13-14 

In Washington, the U.S. and a South Pacific 
foi-um delegation hold consultations on the 
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) 
Treaty and its protocols. Subject to decision 
by the forum heads of government, the pro- 
tocols may be available for signature by out- 
side states later this year. The U.S. is 
studying the implications of the treaty and 
its protocols for the U.S. and overall regional 
and global security. 



February 13 

Acting Secretary of State Whitehead and 
Soviet Ambassador Dobryiiin exchange di 
matic notes amending the 1966 Air Trans 
Agi-eement. Under the terms of the amei 
agreement, designated carriers— Pan Am 
Aeroflot— will resume dii-ect air service b 
tween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The citi 
served are Moscow, Leningrad, Washingl 
and New York. Service will be inautnirai 
under the new agreement on April 2^, li 
The terms of the agi-eement permit each 
line to make a maximum of four flights p 
week to the other country. 

February 17 

The U.S. and Laos begin a joint excavat 
of the site of an AC- 130 au-plane which ' 
crashed on March 29, 1972 in Savannakh i 
Province in southern Laos. Fourteen ere ^ 
members are unaccounted for in connect i 
with this aircraft. | 

February 18 j 

The following newly appointed ambassac 
presented their credentials to President 
gan: Kyung Won Kim (South Korea). So 
Soedarman (Indonesia), Herman Dehenn 
(Belgium), Aniold T. Halfhide (Suriname 
and Bishwa Pradhan (Nepal). 



February 19 

Deputy Trade Representative Woods ar „| 
nounces U.S. intention to tighten enforc , 
ment of an order restricting imports of 
semifinished steel from the European C 
munity (EC) and administration of the I 
EC steel arrangement. This action is in 
response to the EC's "unjustified, unne> ^ 
sary, and unfriendly retaliation" against J 
semifinished steel; restrictions implemei'i 
Jan. 1 in accordance with the U.S.-ECii' 
rangement. On Jan. 27, the EC annoum* 
would restrict $43 million of U.S. fertiliv 
beef fat, paper, and paperboard product tj 
fective Feb. 15. ■ '' 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection conventio i^, 
Done at Rome Dec. 6, 1951. Entered in' ,• 
force Apr. 3, 1952; for the U.S. Aug. li 
1972. TIAS 7465. 
Adherence deposited: Grenada, Nov. 27* 

Commodities— Common Fund P 

Agreement establishing the Common F*^ • 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done- 
Geneva June 27, 1980.i . . 
Ratification deposited: Angola, Jan. 28, ^ ^ 

k. 

Cultural Relations flj 

Protocol to the agreement on the impo'*. 



92 



Department of State E 



i 



TREATIES 



cational, scientific, and cultural mate- 
[ Nov. 22, 1950 (TIAS 6129). Adopted 
robi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered into force 
1982.- 
ation deposited: France, Jan. 3, 1986. 

ns— Containers 

IS convention on containers, 1972, with 
s and protocol. Done at Geneva Dee. 
Entered into foi-ce Dec. 6, 1975; for 
I. May 12, 1985. 
on deposited: China, Jan. 22, 1986. 

Procedure 

ition on the taking of evidence abroad 
or commercial matters. Done at The 
Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct 
TIAS 7444. 
on d eposited: Monaco, Jan. 17, 1986.W 

tion on the civil aspects of intenia- 

hild abduction. Done at The Hague 

1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 



re: Spain, Feb. 7, 1986. 

.ional agreement on jute and jute 
), 1982, with anne.xes. Done at 
Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force 
nally Jan. 9, 1984. 
»n deposited: Austria, Nov. 13, 1985. 

Pollution 

relating to intervention on the high 
ases of pollution by substances other 
Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. En- 

force Mar. 30, 1983. TIAS 10561. 
n deposited: France, Dec. 31, 1985.3 

of 1984 to amend the international 
)n on the establishment of an 
onal fund for compensation for oil 

damage, 1971. Done at London 

1984.1 

3s: Finland, Nov. 29, 1985; Nether- 

)v. 27, 1985; Norway, Nov. 28, 1985. 

of 1984 to amend the international 
in on civil liability for oil pollution 
1969. Done at London May 25, 1984.' 
m: China, Nov. 22, 1985; Finland, 
1985; Netherlands, Nov. 27, 1985; 
Nov. 28, 1985. 

1 Matters 

)n on the intemational maritime or- 
i, as amended. Signed at Geneva 
)48. Entered into force Mar. 17 
.S 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606, 10374. 
:e deposited: Antigua and Barbuda 
986. 

inal convention on standai-ds of 
lertification. and watchkeeping for 

1978. Done at London July 7, 1978. 
nto force Apr. 28, 1984.^ 

deposited: Mozambique, 
1985. 

if 1978 relating to the intemational 
1 for the safety of life at sea, 1974 
0). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. 



Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009. 
Accessions d eposited : Brazil, Nov. 20, 1985- 
Ethiopia, Jan. 3, 1986. 

Amendments to the international convention 
for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). 
Adopted at London June 17, 1983. 
Enters into force: July 1. 1986. 

Nuclear Material-Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at Vien- 
na Oct. 26, 1979." 

Signatures: Liechtenstein, Jan. 13, 1986; 
Mongolia, Jan. 23, 1986. 

Nuclear Weapons-Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force 
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Accession deposited: Malawi, Feb. 19, 1986. 

Pollution 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1979 
(TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring and 
evaluation of the long-range transmission of 
ail- pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with annex. 
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984.' 
Ratifications deposited: Canada, Dec. 4, 1985- 
Turkey, Dec. 20, 1985. 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 

layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22 

1985.' 

Signatures: Burkina Faso, Dec. 12, 1985; 

Morocco, Feb. 7. 1986. 

Postal— Americas and Spain 

Second additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Postal Union of the Americas and 
Spain, with general regulations. Done at 
Managua Aug. 28, 1981. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1982. 
Ratification deposited: Uruguay, Dec. 16, 1985. 

Red Cross 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12. 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the 
U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362. 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship- 
wi-ecked members of armed forces at sea. 
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2 1956 
TIAS 3363. 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment 
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the 
U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364. 

Geneva convention relative to the protection 
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at 
Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956 
TIAS 3365. 
Accessions deposited: Comoros, Nov. 21, 1985. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1959 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 



tims of international armed conflicts (Protocol 
I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.' 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of noninternational armed con- 
fiicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.' 
Accessions deposited: Comoros, Nov. 21, 1985; 
Suriname, Dec. 16, 1985; Uruguay, Dec. 13 
1985. " 

Ratification deposited: Holy See, Nov 21 
1985.-I 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered 
into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov 1 
1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, 
Feb. 7, 1986. 

Satellite Communications Systems 

Convention on the Intel-national Maritime 
Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with an- 
nex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered 
into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
Accession deposited: Bahrain, Jan. 8, 1986. 

Operating agreement on INMARSAT, with 
annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. En- 
tered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
Signature: Bahrain, Jan. 8, 1986. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1984, with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva July 5, 1984. Entered 
into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1985; defini- 
tively Apr. 4, 1985.5 

Accession deposited: Cameroon, Jan. 22, 1986. 
Ratification deposited: Jamaica, Jan. 16, 1986. 

Telecommunication 

Intemational telecommunication convention, 
with annexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi 
Nov. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984; 
definitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986. 
Ratifications deposited: Belize,^ Dec. 20, 1985; 
Chile,s.-i Dec. 12, 1985; Guyana, Indonesia,^ 
Monaco, Paraguay, Vatican City, Dec. 30, 
1985; Finland, New Zealand,* Jan. 3, 1986; 
Federal Republic of Germany,3.4.'' Dec. 6, 
1985; India, Iran, Jan. 8, 1986; Kenya, Nov. 
29, 1985; Republic of Korea, Nov. 26, 1985; 
Singapore, Dee. 23, 1985; Spain, Dec. 17, 
1985; Thailand, Nov. 13, 1985; U.S.S.R a'-" 
Dec. 16, 1985. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the UN Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted at 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force 
June 21, 1985 
Accession deposited: Grenada, Jan. 16, 1986. 



BILATERAL 

Antigua and Barbuda 

Agreement conceming the disposition of com- 
modities and services furnished in connection 
with peacekeeping operations for Grenada. 



;6 



93 



PRESS RELEASES 



Effected bv exchange of notes at St. Johns's 
Dec. 16, 1985. and Jan. 28, 1986. Entered into 
force Jan. 28, 1986. 

Australia 

Agi-eement conceniing trade in certain steel 
products, with arrangement and related let- 
ters. Effected by e.\change of letters at 
Washington Jan. 16, 1985. Entered into force 
Jan. 16, 1985; effective Oct. 1, 1984. 

Austria 

Agreement concerning trade in certain steel 
products, with arrangement and related let- 
ters. Effected by e.\change of letters at 
Washington Dec. 19, 1985. Entered into force 
Dec. 19, 1985; effective Oct. 1, 1984. 

Belgrium 

Agi-eement e.\tending the memorandum of 
understanding of June 2, 1980 {TIAS 9800), 
for the development of a cooperative progi-am 
in the sciences. Signed at Washington and 
Brussels Aug. 12 and 26, 1985. Entered into 
force Aug. 26, 1985: effective June 2, 1985. 

Brazil 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Nov. 17, 1977, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 8981, 10802), relating to 
equal access to ocean carriage of govemment- 
controled cargoes. Signed at Rio de Janeii-o 
Dec. 19, 1985. Entered into force Dec. 19, 
1985. 

Cameroon 

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage- 
ment and protection of investment, with an- 
nex. Signed at Washington Feb. 26, 1986. 
Enters into force 30 days following the date 
on which the parties have notified each other 
that their constitutional procedures have 
been completed. 

China 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the operation of the Landsat system, with an- 
nex. Signed at Washington and Beijing July 2 
and 8, 1985. Entered into force July 8, 1985. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at San Jose Dec. 16, 1985. Entered 
into force Jan. 29, 1986. 

Egypt 

Fourth amendment to the grant agreement of 
Aug. 29, 1979 (TIAS 9632), for the Shoubra 
El-Kheima thermal power plant. Signed at 
Cairo Dec. 31, 1985. Entered into force 
Dec. 31, 1985. 

Third amendment to the gi'ant agreement of 
Sept. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10277), for the irrigation 
management system project. Signed at Caii-o 
Dec. 31, 1985. Entered into force Dec. 31, 
1985. 



First amendment to the grant agi-eement of 
Sept. 24, 1985, for cash transfer. Signed at 
Cairo Dec. 31, 1985. Entered into force Dec. 
31, 1985. 

Ethiopia 

Compensation agreement, with agreed 
minutes. Signed at Addis Ababa Dec. 19, 
1985. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1985. 

Jamaica 

Agreement for sale of agricultural commodi- 
ties. Signed at Kingston Jan. 15, 1986. En- 
tered into force Jan. 15, 1986. 

Mexico 

Understanding regarding subsidies and coun- 
tervailing duties. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 23, 1985. Entered into force Apr. 23, 
1985. 

Panama 

Cooperative arrangement for the production 
of topogi-aphic maps of Panama, with annex- 
es. Signed at Washington and Panama Jan. 
29, 1986. Entered into force Jan. 29, 1986. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement amending the agreement for the 
sale of agi-icultural commodities of Oct. 23, 
1985. Effected by letter and concurrence at 
Colombo Jan. lo", 1986. Entered into force 
Jan. 10, 1986. 

Sudan 

Agi-eement for sales of agricultural commodi- 
ties, with annexes. Signed at Khartoum Jan. 
26, 1986. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1986. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended and extended, 
(TIAS 8528, 10531, 10532, 10696) concerning 
fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington July 29, 
and Sept. 2, 1985. 
Entered into force: Dec. 20, 1985. 

Agreement amending the air transport agree- 
ment and supplementai-y' agreement of 
Nov. 4, 1966 (TIAS 6135). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 13, 
1986. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1986. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement concerning trade in certain steel 
products, with arrangement. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Washington Jan. 14, 
1986. Entered into force Jan. 14, 1986; effec- 
tive Oct. 1, 1984. 

Zimbabwe 

Memorandum of understanding extending the 
memorandum of understanding of Sept. 25, 
1980 (TIAS 10054), on cooperation in the field 
of agricultural science and technology. Signed 
at Harare and Washington Oct. 12 and 
Nov. 30, 1985. Entered into force Nov. 30, 
1985; effective Sept. 25, 1985. 



•Not in force. 

2Not in force for the U.S. 

^With reservation(s). 

"•With declaration(s). 

^Provisionally in force for the U.S. 

^Applicable to the Cook Islands and Nl 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the > 
Office of Press Relations, Department of ' 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*19 2/3 Shultz: interview on ABC-TVll 
"Good MoiTiing. America." 
20 2/4 Shultz: statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 
*21 2/4 Shultz: opening remarks at th< 
ceremony for the observanc* 
Black History Month. 
22 2/5 Shultz: statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 
*23 2/14 Whitehead: remarks at the ^ 
ceremony of the U.S.-U.S.SI 
civil aviation agreement, 
Feb. 13. ■ 
*24 2/18 Shultz: remarks before the 

international conference on • 
privatization. 
Shultz: statement before the 
Senate Budget Committee. 
Shultz: welcoming remarks bs 
the U.S.-Asia Institute 
conference. 
Release of the International ll 
cotics Control Strategy Rep 
for 1985. 
Shultz, Casey: remarks at th« 
ceremonial unveiling of the 
Statue of Liberty centennia 
commemorative stamp. 
Progi-am for the official work 
visit of Cameroon Presiden ™ 
Biya, Feb. 25-28. 
Secretary's meeting with bki< 
American educators return 
from South Africa. 
Shultz: statement and questi> 
and-answer session on the w 
pines. White House, Feb. S 
Shultz: inten-iew on NBC-T 

"Today Show." 
Shultz: statement before thi- 
Senate Foreign Relations ( 
mittee. 
*34 2/28 U.S. and Barbados exchange 
struments of ratification ^ •: 
convention. 



25 


2/19 


*26 


2/19 


27 


2/21 


*28 


2/21 


*29 


2/24 


*30 


2/24 


31 


2/26 


*32 


2/27 


33 


2/27 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



94 



Department of State E ^ 



f 1986 

tne 86, No. 2109 



aran Africa and the United States— 

(Cool{) 1 

li. and Angola (Crocker) 59 

iin Principles. America's Agenda for the 
,ie (message to the Congress) 26 

1| 

(Jig Positive Change in Southeni Africa 

nicost) 53 

]: and Angola (Crocker) 59 

ontrol 

I the Union Address 

ain) 25 

Ifckholm Conference and East-West 

iDns (Barry) 65 

opening American Security 

*m) 18 

Esponse to Soviet Ai-ms Proposals 

lin) 64 

:jategic Force Structures: The 

ijige Ahead (Nitze) 61 

rdities. Commodity Markets and 

ndity Agreements (Wallis) 71 

r<s 

he Election in the Philippines 

bvitz) 69 

qs Agenda for the Future (message to the 

i'ss) 26 

nihe U.S. National Interest (Abrams)84 
lug Diplomatic Security (Shultz) . . .42 

r Policy Challenges (Shultz) 40 

1 ional Affairs: FY 1987 Budget 

1' 45 

t ; Control in Latin America 

IS) 77 

tji Control Strategy Report 



...80 

I! a: Will Democracy Prevail? (Shultz) ,32 
I nan Rights Report (Schifter, 

rs) 76 

int Dictatorship in Nicaragua? 

«s) 83 

Dthe Union Address (Reagan) 25 

. and Angola (Crocker) 59 

tent and Foreign Service 

eg Diplomatic Security (Shultz) . . .42 

eilts of Soviet Chemical Tracking Agents 

E.ment statement) 75 

ics 

o|ty Markets and Commodity Agree- 

;;(Wallis) 71 

I'ional Affairs: FY 1987 Budget 



.45 



I 

) he Union Address (Reagan) 25 

« The Stockholm Conference and 

■est Relations (Barry) 65 

i^ssistance 

i;the U.S. National Interest 



.84 



IS) 

»^,.ion of Certain Assistance to Haiti 
<ized (Department announcement) .a3 
ional Affairs: FY 1987 Budget 
' 45 



Germany. Release of Shcharanskiy From the 

Soviet Union (joint U.S.-F.R.G. statement) 75 

Grenada. President Reagan's Visit to Grenada 

(Reagan) 22 

Guatemala. Vice President Bush Visits 

Guatemala and Honduras 31 

Haiti 

Continuation of Certain Assistance to Haiti 

Authorized (Department announcement) .83 

President's News Conference of February 11 

(e.xcerpts) 30 

Health. Test Results of Soviet Chemical Track- 
ing Agents (Department statement) 75 

Honduras. Vice President Bush Visits 

Guatemala and Honduras 31 

Human Rights 

International Affairs: FY 1987 Budget 

(Shultz) 45 

1985 Human Rights Report (Schifter, 

excerpts) 76 

Permanent Dictatorship in Nicaragua? 

(Abrams) 83 

Promoting Positive Change in Southern Africa 

(Amiacost) 53 

Release of Shcharanskiy From the Soviet Union 

(joint U.S.-F.R.G. statement) 75 

The Stockholm Conference and East-West 

Relations (Barry) 65 

India. Indo-U.S. Joint Commission Meets 

(agreed minutes) 81 

Libya. President's News Conference of 

February 1 1 (e.xcerpts) 30 

Military Affairs 

State of the Union Address (Reagan) 25 

Strengthening American Security 

(Reagan) ." 18 

U.S. Strategic Force Structures: The Challenge 

Ahead (Nitze) 61 

Namibia 

Promoting Positive Change in Southern Africa 

(Armacost) 53 

The U.S. and Angola (Crocker) 59 

Narcotics 

Drug Wars: The New Alliance Against Ti-affick- 

ers and Terrorists (Abrams) 89 

Narcotics Control in Latin America 

(Thomas) 77 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report 

Released 80 

Nicaragua. Nicaragua: Will Democracy Prevail? 

(Shultz) 32 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 
Stockholm Conference and East-West Rela- 
tions (Barry) 65 

Philippines 

After the Election in the Philippines 

fWolfowitz) 69 

Election Developments in the Philippines 
(Reagan, Shultz, White House 

statements) 67 

President's News Conference of February 11 
(excerpts) 30 



Presidential Documents 

America's Agenda for the Future 

(message to the Congi-ess) 26 

Election Developments in the Philippines 
(Reagan, Shultz, White House 

statements) 67 

President Reagan's Visit to Grenada 22 

President's News Conference of February 11 

(e.xcerpts) 30 

State of the Union Address 25 

Strengthening American Security 18 

U.S. Response to Soviet Arms Proposals .64 

Security Assistance 

Continuation of Certain Assistance to Haiti 

Authorized (Department announcement) .83 
International Affairs: FY 1987 Budget 

(Shultz) 45 

South Africa. Promoting Positive Change in 

Southern Africa (Amiacost) 53 

Terrorism 

Drug Wars: The New Alliance Against Traffick- 
ers and Terrorists (Abrams) 89 

Enhancing Diplomatic Security (Shultz) ...42 

Foreign Policy Challenges (Shultz) 40 

International Affaii-s: FY 1987 Budget 

(Shultz) 45 

Trade. Commodity Markets and Commodity 

Agreements (Wallis) 71 

Treaties. Current Actions 92 

U.S.S.R. 

Foreign Policy Challenges (Shultz) 40 

President's News Conference of February 11 

(excerpts) 30 

Release of Shcharanskiy From the Soviet Union 

(joint U.S.-F.R.G. statement) 75 

Strengthening American Security (Reagan) 18 
Test Results of Soviet Chemical Tracking Agents 

(Department statement) 75 

U.S. Response to Soviet Arms Proposals 

(Reagan) 64 

U.S. Strategic Force Structures: The Challenge 

Ahead (Nitze) 61 

Western Hemisphere 

CBI and the U.S. National Interest 

(Abrams) 84 

Drug Wars: The New Alliance Against Traffick- 
ers and Terrorists (Abrams) 89 

Foreign Policy Challenges (Shultz) 40 

Narcotics Control in Latin America (Thomas) 77 
Secretary Meets With Contadora Groups .85 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 83, 84, 89 

Armacost, Michael H 53 

Barry, Robert L 65 

Cook, Philip R., Jr 1 

Crocker, Chester A 59 

Nitze, Paul H 61 

Reagan, President . . 18, 22, 25, 26, 30, 64, 67 

Schifter, Richard 76 

Shultz, Secretary 32, 40, 42, 45, 67 

Thomas, Jon R 77 

Wallis, W. Allen ..'ji 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 69 



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e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/Volume 86/Number 2110 



May 1986 




Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 86 / Number 21 10 / May 1986 



Cover: 

Gold pendant from the Ivory Coast. 

Design by Sally Brennan, Publishing 
Services, Department of State. 

(Photo by Musee de I'Homme) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Aff^ js 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD | 

Director, ] 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
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transaction of the pubhc business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 



M 1 2 1983 



Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States — Part 2 
{Philip R. Cook, Jr.) 



President 

Central America and U.S. Security 
Freedom, Regional Security, and 

Global Peace {Message to the 

Congress) 

Secretary 

Nicaragua and the Future of 
Central America 

The Shape, Scope, and Conse- 
quences of the Age of Informa- 
tion 



ca 

A Review of Recent Events in 

South Africa {Chester A. 

Crocker) 
I South Africa's Proposal on 

Namibia and Angola {WJiite 

House State^nent) 
Report on U.S. Actions Toward 

South Africa {Message to the 

Congress) 
U.S. -Supported Human Rights 

Program in South Africa 
I Visit of Cameroon's President 

(Paul Biija, President Reagan) 
U.S. Emergency Military 

Assistance to Chad (Depart- 
ment Statement) 

rs Control 

Negotiations on Nuclear and 
I Space Arms {Paul H. Nitze) 
I Nuclear and Space Arms Talks 
j Conclude Round 4 (Max M. 
. Kampelman) 
Nuclear Testing Limitations 
(President Reagan, Letter to 
Senate Majority Leader) 
MBFR Talks End 38th Round 

(Wiite House Statement) 
The Promise of SDI (Paul H. 
,! Nitze) 



lada 

' Visit of Canadian Prime Minister 
(Prime Minister Mulroney, 
President Reagan, White House 
Stateme7it) 



Department 

58 Diplomacy, the Foreign Service, 
and the Department of State 
(Ronald L Spiers) 

East Asia 

63 Americans Missing in Indochina 

(Johfi C. Monjo) 

Economics 

64 Trade Policy Directions foi- 1986 

(Clayton Yeutter) 

Europe 

69 The CSCE Process and East- 
West Diplomacy (Michael H. 
Artnacost) 

72 U.S. Assistance in Support of the 

Anglo-Irish Agreement on 
Northern Ireland (Rozanne L. 
Ridffivay) 

73 Northern Ireland and Ireland 

Assistance Legislation (Message 
to the Congress) 

74 St. Patrick's Day, 1986 (President 

Reagan) 

75 NATO Nuclear Planning Group 

Meets in West Germany (Final 
Communique) 
75 Response to Allegations on Case 
of Soviet Seaman Medvid 
(Rozanne L. Ridgway) 

iVIiddle East 



76 



77 



Libya Fires on U.S. Vessels in 

International Waters (White 

House Statement) 
U.S. Proposes Arms Sales to 

Saudi Arabia (Department 

Statement) 



Military Affairs 

78 U.S. -West Germany to Cooperate 
on SDI Research (Defense 
Department Statement) 

Nuclear Policy 

78 Nuclear Cooperation With 
EURATOM (Letter to the 
Congress) 



Oceans 

79 Rights and Freedoms in Interna- 
tional Waters (Department 
Statement) 

South Asia 

79 Afghanistan Day, 1986 

(Proclamation) 

United Nations 

80 U.S. Response to Libyan Attack 

(Vernon A. Walters, Letter to 
Security Council) 

Western Hemisphere 

81 Assistance for Nicaragnan 

Democratic Resistance 
(Messages to the Congress) 

85 Peace Proposal Offered to 

Nicaragua (White House 
Statement) 

86 Honduras Receives U.S. 

Assistance to Repel Sandinista 
Attacks (Department Statement) 

87 Captured Weapons Displayed at 

the State Department 
(President Reagan) 

End Notes 

88 March 1986 

Treaties 

89 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

91 Department of State 

Publications 

92 Department of State 

93 Current Documents, 1983 

Released 
93 Background Notes 
93 GPO Subscriptions 



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FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



Sub-Saharan Africa 

and the United States 

(Part 2) 



S. Relations 



igh Portuguese, French, Dutch, 
1, Belgian, and German involve- 
in Africa preceded that of the 
i States and exceeded it in scope, 
elations with Africa, influenced by 
itus as a former colony and our 
e from the ranks of colonial 

have long been affected by 
Italian considerations and cultural 
[n the 19th and early 20th cen- 
following participation in the 
rade, the United States began 
and more positively to increase 
alvement through the activities of 
lai-ies, explorers, and commercial 
lies. World War II changed 
;an perceptions and shifted U.S. 
!es and policies. Africa, the 
ng giant," was beginning to 
1, bringing the realization that 
lited States and the rest of the 
ivould soon have to consider its 

and economic potential. 
I'ing played a major role in draft- 
visions of the UN Charter, which 
!d the philosophical base for the 
colonialism, the United States 
ed African independence. Since 
le United States has actively 



cooperated to promote economic 
development through bilateral and 
multilateral programs and in supporting 
enhanced regional security. 

Africa is increasingly important to 
U.S. national interests. 

• Africa is a significant factor in 
multilateral politics. With its bloc of 
46 nations (51 with North Africa), 
Africa can play an important, often 
decisive, role in international 
organizations and multilateral 
meetings. 

• The region possesses important 
natural resources— oil, copper, iron, 
bauxite, uranium, cobalt, chromium, 
platinum, manganese, gold, and 
diamonds. 

• Africa offers a growing field for trade 
and economic cooperation with the 
United States. The United States 
needs to buy African raw materials; 
Africa requires capital investment, 
new technology, managerial skills, 
and markets to develop other 
products. 



The continent is strategically located. 
Many countries have deep-water 
ports, good ail-fields, and controlling 
positions in relation to major water- 
ways and air corridors. The oil 
tanker routes from the Persian Gulf 
to Europe and the Americas pass 
through African waters. Thus, stra- 
tegic cooperation with several 
African states is important to the ex- 
ercise of U.S. global responsibilities. 

Continuing regional conflicts make 
sub-Saharan Africa a potential arena 
for rivalry and confrontation between 
external powers. 

North-South issues— raised by less 
developed African and other Third 
World countries concerned with 
economic disadvantages— could in- 
crease hostility and resentment 
toward the industrialized democrac- 
ies; African economic stagnation 
could lead to greater instability and 
outside manipulation. 

Africa assumes particular significance 
for Americans of African descent who 
are deeply concerned about the conti- 
nent's problems. 



page: 

>d aid, Ethiopia. 

Suau : Black Star) 



:ion in this two-part article is intended to provide background for study and discus- 
s not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, except where the 
is specifically described as such. The publication summarizes currently available 
ion and raises relevant questions (some of which admittedly may be unanswerable) 
d to public discussion of important issues in U.S. foreign policy. 



^86 



Elements of 
U.S. Policy 



Elements of U.S. foreign policy toward 
Africa have shifted from time to time, 
depending on the outlook of various ad- 
ministrations, changing congi-essional at- 
titudes, and circumstances on the conti- 
nent itself. However, in the i)ast two 
decades a broad outline of U.S. policy 
has emerged that contains the following 
components. 

Maintenance of Mutually Satisfac- 
tory Bilateral Political Relations. U.S. 
interests are compatible with African 



aspirations, and the United States has 
made major contributions to African 
development and stability. A principal 
U.S. objective in Africa is to maintain a 
climate of understanding and coopera- 
tion while encouraging restraint on the 
part of outside powers so that African 
states can devise their own solutions 
and maintain their independence. An im- 
portant goal is to develop more con- 
structive relations with those few 
African countries with which the United 
States has significant problems. 

Opposition to Soviet-bloc Adven- 
turism. The United States has tried to 
keep Africa from becoming an area of 
East- West strategic competition and 
conflict. The Soviets have not been 



similarly restrained, however. Sovii 
military advisers and Soviet-suppor 
Cuban troops decisively influenced 
outcome of the internal contest for 
power in Angola. More than 37,000 
Cuban soldiers remain in Angola ai 
Ethiopia. This situation generates ; 
prehensions in neighboring countric 
and contributes to a deterioration c 
regional stability. Libya, with grea' 
quantities of Soviet arms, has supp 
subversion in many African countri 
and now occupies part of Chad. 

Security Cooperation. Althou 
most African states would prefer ti 
avoid involvement in global politica 
security issues, it is all but impossi 
for them to do so when their own 



U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 




U.S. Soviet 

vi, 1^ Use of docking facilities 

+ Uj Use of air facilities 

ii^ .JL. Naval presence 



Department of State E| 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



y is affected. Thus it is in the in- 
of the United States and several 
1 countries to cooperate in helping 
ire regional security. This 
ition may involve U.S. access to 
I strategic facilities, such as ports 
fields, to help maintain the free 
oil and other vital goods through 
irby sea routes. It also may in- 
J.S. military assistance, both 
il and training, to African forces, 
ssistance remains, nevertheless, a 
raction of our total assistance, 
s chiefly economic. 

5. Support for Civil and Human 
Throughout Africa. The U.S. 

ment supports the establishment, 
lance, and extension of full civil 
Tian rights and the rule of law to 
)les throughout the African Con- 
The United States has taken the 
working for a negotiated settle- 
ir independence in Namibia and 
Uraging the progressive disman- 
( the apartheid system in South 
The United States has adopted 
measures against governments 
ible for violations of their own 
' human rights, for e.xample, 
., South Africa, the Central 
Republic, and Equatorial 
For the most part, however, the 
States promotes human rights 
I private diplomacy, which usual- 
ves the most direct benefits for 
pie affected. 

IsolutJon of African Conflicts. 

lis between or within Africa of- 
Ksirable opportunities for foreign 
ence that may imperil regional 
and destroy the climate of con- 
necessary for economic develop- 
id international cooperation, 
is in the interest of the United 
md African nations to contribute 
leaceful resolution of disputes. 




President Reagan with President Masire of Botswana. 




Vice President Bush with Kenyan President Arap Moi. 



Economic Cooperation. U.S. 
policy maintains a twofold approach to 
the economic crisis in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The United States provides 
emergency humanitarian aid to those in 
urgent need, whether victims of the 
widespread drought or of violent con- 
flict. To promote long-term develop- 
ment, the U.S. Government seeks to en- 
courage efficient African economic 
policies and to establish programs— for 
example, in infrasti-ucture, agriculture, 
health, and education— that provide the 
basis for sound economic growth. It also 
works to e.xpand African and U.S. 
private-sector economic activities. 



Policy Issues 



The results of sub-Saharan Africa's first 
20 years of independence have been 
mixed. Some of the foi-mer colonies have 
remained politically stable and have 
enjoyed economic gi-owlh rates above 
the global average. Among these are 
Kenya, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Botswana, 
and Cameroon. Others have experienced 
coups d'etat resulting in extended 
periods of military rule. Most African 
economies, however, have stagnated or 
declined, with growth rates now far 
behind the figures for population 
increase. Long civil wars and insurgen- 
cies have plagued some countries (Ethio- 
pia, Chad) and others (Angola and 
Mozambique) still suffer from the trau- 
matic passage to independence. Many 
nations have been devastated by natural 
catastrophes such as the vridespread 
drought. All African nations— even the 
oil producers— still face a doubtful 
economic future caused not only by their 
own misguided policies but also by 
global inflation and uncertain oil and 
primary commodity markets. Clearly, 
the feeling of euphoria that seized 
Africans upon independence is past. 
Chastened by experience, sub-Saharan 
Africa today faces the future sobered by 
a realization that independence is only 
one step toward national well-being. 

Throughout this turbulent era, the 
United States, like the African nations 
themselves, has been learning the 
realities of the region. Since African 



independence, the American Govern- 
ment has sought to offer access to scien- 
tific, technological, and educational 
experience and has helped to provide 
the financial assistance necessary to 
fund development progi-ams. Although 
the United States had relatively little 
experience in Africa before the 1960s, 
the record of American policy has been 
largely positive. Africa as a whole has 
not fallen prey to communism, as some 
once feared it might. Soviet gains on the 
continent generally have proved to be 
transitory, and Soviet opportunities 
have depended on local turmoil generat- 
ing a demand for Soviet arms. 

Development and stability normally 
are the first priorities of every African 
state. African governments are well 
aware that expanded trade opportunities 
and development capital, public or 
private, will come only from the West. 
Africa has welcomed U.S. assistance, 
and the majority of African govern- 
ments have confidence in the good vrill 
and intentions of the United States. 

Politically, African nations generally 
have not adopted the Western multipar- 
ty democratic model. Only a minority 
meet U.S. criteria for democracy, and 
many do not respect the human rights 
of their citizenry to the degree that 
most Americans would find desirable. 
Yet African countries have not followed 
the Soviet example, despite the Marxist 
rhetoric of several states. Most are 
humane but authoritarian or one-party 
regimes seeking to devise their ovm 
formulas for nation-building and 
development. 

Because African nations acutely feel 
their poverty and disadvantages in the 
global economy, they differ from the 
United States on many international 
economic issues. They also desire 
greater U.S. participation in commodity 
support agreements, whereas the 
United States believes that the free 
market usually should determine prices 
and influence supply and demand. 

The United States has had a wide 
range of policy concerns regarding 
Africa. The following are the principal 
U.S. policy issues. 



The Horn of Africa 

The Horn of Africa is strategically I 
located with respect to the Persian ' I 
Southwest Asia region. This north- ' 
eastern tip, or "Horn," is comprisec 
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Kej' 
neighboring states are Kenya on th( ' 
south and Sudan on the west. The ' 
area's importance has increased as t ] 
United States strengthens its abilitj ' 
protect U.S. interests in the Indian 
Ocean in the wake of instability in t 
Middle East. The political-military s 
tion in the Horn is complicated by L 
nal and regional conflicts, instabiliti( 
and tangled external alliances. Som; 
irredentist claims to neighboring tei 
ritories inhabited by ethnic Somalia 
to an undeclared Somali-Kenyan wa 
the late 1960s and then to a Somali 
invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden regioi 
1977-78. This invasion was repulsed 
after massive infusions of Soviet aid 
Cuban troops to Ethiopia. In return 
their help, the Soviets have acquirei 
naval and air facilities in Ethiopia. T 
Ethiopian Government also continue 
rely primarily on military force to 
resolve long-festering internal unres 
other regions of the country, partici 
larly the northern province of Eritn 
A large Soviet-bloc presence, in- 
cluding Soviet advisers and some 7,( 
Cuban combat troops, remains in 
Ethiopia. With large shipments of 
Soviet arms and a major expansion • 
its military forces, Ethiopia now has 
largest standing army in sub-Sahara 
Africa. A tripartite pact concluded t 
tween Ethiopia, Libya, and South 
Yemen in August 1981 has been fol- 
lowed by terrorist and guerrilla atta 
against Sudan and Somalia. In June 
1982, Ethiopian regular troops, supp 
ing a small number of Somali dissidi 
trained and armed in Ethiopia, attac 
several points along the disputed 
Somali-Ethiopian border. Similar att 
against Somalia have occurred since 
then. At the end of 1985, Ethiopian 
forces continued to occupy two smal 
areas of Somali territory. Ethiopia i 
has provided training safehavens an^ 
supplies for Sudanese rebels fightinj 
southern Sudan. 



Department of State Bi 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



T the past year the Horn has 
'vastated by serious drought and 
More than 7 million people are 
i by this disaster in Ethiopia 
dany of them seek refuge in 
iring countries, particularly 
The international community has 
led genei'ously to emergency 

the region. The American 
;hrough private contributions, 
t reUef groups millions of dollars 

medicine, and shelter. A major 
of the U.S. Government's aid to 
3 being sent to countries in the 
laking the United States the 
single donor in the region. 
U.S. presence is not directed 
any state in the region, nor do 

to see any of these states 
D allocate additional resources to 
purposes when the economic 
■ their peoples are so great, 
r, African security is not served 

arms, Cuban forces, and Lib- 
ey are combined to destabilize 
;e govei-nments in the Horn, 
ted States will respond to such 
against friends and legitimate 

rests in the region, as 11- 
i by emergency arms shipments 
11a at the time of the Ethiopian 
IS. At the same time, the U.S. 
lent works cooperatively for 
resolution of the underlying ten- 
it have long troubled this region 
he improvement of the 
; conditions and welfare of all 
e. 

United States is pursuing 
jolicies to advance Its overall 
!s in the region. 

rovide substantial assistance to 
ates of the region (more than 
nillion in economic assistance 
lore than $100 million in securi- 
Istance in FY 1985); emergency 
ssistance in FY 1985 exceeded 
nillion. 

ive actively engaged with other 
bilateral donor states and with 

temational financial institutions 

mote more comprehensive pro- 
to meet the economic prob- 

''acing Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, 

enva. 




Eritrean rebels. 

• We work diplomatically to encourage 
better relations among those coun- 
tries in the region, such as Kenya 
and Somalia, with which we have 
close ties. 

• We have made clear that we would 
welcome signs from Ethiopia that it, 
too, seeks a better structure of rela- 
tionships in the region and an end to 
confrontational policies. We are the 
largest single donor to Ethiopian 
famine relief. 

• We fully respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all regional 
states. We support the OAU position 
on the acceptance of postcolonlal 
borders in Africa, as well as efforts 
to negotiate resolutions to specific 
regional conflicts. 

Chad 

A large, landlocked country in the 
center of Africa, Chad has often suf- 
fered from internal conflicts based on 
ethnic and religious differences— with 
factional leaders using private armies to 
compete for power— and, more recently, 
from Libyan aggression. Chad's long 
civil war began in 1965— just 5 years 
after its Independence from France— 
with an uprising of northerners against 
the southern-led government. With the 



help of France, President Tombalbaye 
initially was able to repress the in- 
surgency, but eventually the rebels 
gathered force. Gen. Felix Malloum, a 
southerner, led a successful coup d'etat 
In 1975; his government was broadened 
to include northerners in 1978. The nor- 
thern Prime Minister, Hissein Habre, 
attempted a coup in February 1979 that 
led to fighting among 11 factions. 

At this point, the civil war had 
become so intense that no effective 
government e.xisted and external 
observers were obliged to intervene. A 
series of four international conferences, 
held first under Nigerian and then 
under OAU sponsoi-ship, attempted to 
bring the 11 factions together. At the 
fourth conference, held in Lagos in 
August 1979, the Lagos accord was 
signed establishing a transitional 
government pending national elections. 
In November 1979, the National Union 
Transition Government (GUNT) was 
created with a mandate to govern for 18 
months. Goukounl Oueddei, a north- 
erner, was named President; 
Abdelkader Kamougue, a southerner, 
Vice President; and Hissein Habre, 
Defense Minister. 

This coalition proved fragile; in 
March 1980 renewed fighting broke out 
between Goukouni's and Habre's forces. 



The war dragged on inconclusively until 
Goukouni obtained the intervention of 
Libya, which sent more than 7,000 
troops to Chad and defeated Habre's 
forces. These Libyan troops then 
became an occupation force in Chad. In 
October 1981, Goukouni responded to 
regional and international concern over 
Libya's announced goal of unification 
with Chad and requested the complete 
vdthdrawal of Libyan troops. They 
pulled back to the contested Aozou Strip 
in northern Chad, which the Libyans 
have occupied since 1973, and were 
replaced by a 3,500-man OAU 
peacekeeping force from Nigeria, 
Senegal, and Zaire. The United States 
gave strong diplomatic backing to the 
creation of this force and authorized $12 
million for its support. 

A special summit of the OAU Chad 
committee in February 1982 called for a 
process of reconciliation among all the 
factions, particularly Goukouni and 
Habre, who had resumed military ac- 
tivities in eastern Chad. Although 
Habre agreed to participate, Goukouni 
refused to negotiate. Defying the OAU 
February 1982 cease-fire, Goukouni 
ordered GUNT coalition forces to attack 
Habre. Habre's troops seized the Chad- 
ian capital on June 7, 1982. The OAU 
force remained neutral during the con- 
flict. Habre then asked the peacekeep- 
ing force to stay in Chad to oversee the 
reconciliation process, but the force 
withdrew when its OAU mandate ex- 
pired on June 30. Habre established a 
government emphasizing reconciliation 
and including representatives of all ma- 
jor Chadian ethnic and regional groups. 
Goukouni, former President and Vice 
President Kamougue, and a number of 
other factional leaders fled the country. 
In late 1982 they formed a Libyan- 
supported "govemment-in-exile" in the 
Aozou Strip to overthrow the Habre 
government. 

In mid-1983, Libyan-supported rebels 
launched an offensive against President 
Habre. They were later supported by 
Libyan ground and air forces that forced 
Chadian Government troops to withdraw 
from Faya Largeau and other northern 
oases. The military situation stabilized 
following the introduction of French and 
Zairian forces. In September 1984, 
France and Libya announced their 



agreement to a mutual withdrawal of 
forces from Chad. All French troops 
were withdravwi by mid-November, but 
a substantial number of Libyans 
remained. 

The United States is seriously con- 
cerned by the continued Libyan military 
occupation of northern Chad, which 
threatens destabilization not only in 
Chad but also in the entire region. The 
United States and the majority of the 
international community— including the 
United Nations, OAU, and Nonaligned 
Movement— recognize President Habre's 
government. In response to a Chadian 
Government request in mid- 1983, Presi- 
dent Reagan authorized emergency 
military assistance amounting to $25 
million. 

Under Habre's leadership, Chad has 
achieved a significant measure of unity 
and pui-pose despite Libyan aggression. 
The United States enjoys close ties with 
the Government of Chad, and we sup- 
port peaceful efforts aimed at restoring 
the country's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. U.S. policy supplements 
the lead role assumed by France in 
assisting the Government of Chad to 
thwart Libyan aggression and to pursue 
reconstruction and internal political 
reconciliation. In FY 1985, the U.S. 
Government provided substantial 
amounts of emergency food as well as 
economic and rehabilitation grant aid to 
Chad totaling about $55 million. 



Southern Africa 

The countries of southern Africa- 
comprising South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and 
Mozambique— are closely interrelated 
through political, socioeconomic, and 
cultural ties. It is a region of great 
mineral wealth, containing several 
critical resources, and occupies a 
strategic position along the West's oil 
supply route. Unfortunately, it has 
become one of the continent's major 
areas of political crisis, a region 
characterized by confrontation, 
destabilization, and armed strife. 

One issue that motivated and united 
many sub-Saharan countries in their 
quest for independence still exists in 
southern Africa: domination by a white 



minority. For black Africans, coloni 
and racial issues are critical, while 
whites in southern Africa believe tl 
position and even their very surviv 
are threatened. In consequence, cm 
in southern Africa have been partic 
larly bitter— the wars to end coluni; 
rule in Angola and Mozambique, th 
struggle for independence and the i 
of white minority rule in Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and continuii 
efforts to end South Africa's apartl 
system and its control over Namibi 

An atmosphere of polarization 
envelops the region, providing tVrt; 
ground for exploitation by the Sovi I 
bloc. The activity of communist coi j" 
tries consists principally of supplyii 
war materiel, troops, and military ! a 
port personnel, which only exacerb %■ 
the situation. Capital, technology, 
investment, and trade— rather than * 
military assistance— are the parami . 
needs of these countries, and they 
look primarily to the West for this- 
assistance. 

African attention now focuses o 
two principal issues: terminating S( 
Africa's system of apartheid and aa 
ing independence for Namibia on tl 
basis of UN Security Council Resoi 
435. Efforts in Namibia by the Sou , 
West Africa People's Organization i 
(SWAPO) and in South Africa by tlj 
African National Congi-ess (ANC) sj 
the Pan- African Congress (PAC) to j 
achieve these goals by armed strugl 
including cross-border guerrilla attsi 
have produced violent retaliatory •, 
responses from the South African 
Government. U.S. policy aims to er 
this cycle of violence, which contrit 
to instability throughout the region 
decreases South Africa's willingnes 
negotiate. 

U.S. Policy. Through frank 
dialogue and quiet diplomacy with I 
parties, the Reagan Administration 
sought to develop an overall frame 
for regional security, to bring aboUi";, 
withdrawal of foreign troops from 'j^' 
region, to gain Namibian independf^' 
to hasten positive change in South i 
Africa, and to create an environme | 
which economic development can fl| 
ish. Our policy encourages the acti'l 
volvement of the U.S. Government" 



Department of State B 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 




rban, South Africa, an industrial 
ter. seaport, and resort. 

leral demonstration, Soutli Africa. 



e citizens or groups with all con- 
ig parties in the region. Although 

S. Government does not regard 
tuation in southern Africa as 
ictorj', the reality is that we can 

substantive role in encouraging 
ill evolution only if we are in- 
l in regional diplomacy and sup- 
lositive change in South Africa, 
lis is a role for which the United 

is uniquely suited. As leader of 
36 world, the United States has 

interests that require it to be 

concerned about peace and 
ty in southern Africa. As a society 
as moved with justice and humani- 
■esolve its own racial problems, 

ted States has earned the con- 

of many black African countries. 

the United States aims to help to 

:')ri(lges of comprehension and con- 

• lietween the races in southern 

( that will enable the region to 

' -haos and maintain stabiUty while 

' x liable process of evolution takes 



3uth Africa. The United States 
iintained official relations with 
:) Africa since the establishment of 
Palate in Cape TowTi in 1799. The 
yies between the two countries in- 
u shared language and cultural 
tje, military cooperation embracing 



two World Wars and Korea, and impor- 
tant trade and investment relations. 
Since 1948, however, when the Govern- 
ment of South Africa officially adopted 
its poUcy of apartheid, which legally 
separated the various racial groups, 
relations with the United States have 
been troubled. 

Apartheid is incompatible with 
American values and has become in- 
creasingly intolerable as our interna- 
tional human rights policy has evolved. 
President Reagan has called apartheid 
repugnant, and Vice President Bush 
said in 1982: "Apartheid is wrong. It is 
legally entrenched racism— inimical to 



the fundamental ideals of the United 
States." Apartheid also is pohtically 
disastrous, since it fosters economic, 
military, and political instability both 
within South Africa and throughout the 
region. For both moi'al and practical 
political reasons, therefore, several U.S. 
administrations have sought to move the 
South African Government away from 
apartheid and toward a system of 
government based on participation and 
consent of all governed. However, 
although U.S. policy objectives have re- 
mained fundamentally the same, the 
methods for achieving them have 
differed. 



'986 



The Reagan Administi-ation in- 
herited a relationship with South Africa 
that was at its lowest point in recent 
history. It was characterized by official 
hostility on both sides, confrontational 
rhetoric often appearing in public print, 
and severely strained diplomatic rela- 
tions. More important, a total stalemate 
existed on the key issues of a settle- 
ment in Namibia and peaceful evolution 
away from apartheid in South Africa. 
By contrast, the current policy has 
worked to reestablish and maintain a 
relationship with South Africa that will 
allow effective bilateral communication 
and thereby enhance U.S. ability to in- 
fluence South African policies and 
actions. 

The principal issues plaguing 
southern Africa— apartheid, Namibia, 
regional security, and economic 
development— are closely related, and 
progress, or the lack of it, on one issue 
affects progress on the others. South 
Africa is the strongest power in the 
region, and its cooperation wdth other 
southern African nations is essential for 
progress on any issue. Without such 
cooperation, the elements within South 
Africa favoring a more militant policy 
are strengthened; the climate in South 
Africa for positive change or for 
cooperation in economic development 
worsens in the face of cross-border 
guerrilla attacks or increased violence in 
Namibia. At the same time, South 
Africa's neighbors are less able and will- 
ing to participate in constructive 
regional diplomacy when that govern- 
ment pursues an aggressive regional 
policy and when hopes fade for sus- 
tained reform away from apartheid. 

To achieve lasting peace and 
economic development, the nations of 
the region must evolve ground rules for 
cooperation and coexistence. The United 
States serves as an important catalyst 
to bring the contending parties together 
and to reverse the deteriorating 
regional security situation. Progress has 
been achieved. We helped to arrange 
the February 1984 Lusaka accord under 
which South Africa agreed to withdraw 
its forces from Angola and the two na- 
tions established a Joint South African- 
Angolan Monitoring Commission to 
oversee the withdrawal. We also helped 
South Africa and Mozambique to 



negotiate the March 1984 nonaggression 
pact at Nkomati— further evidence of 
the increased willingness of various par- 
ties to resolve their differences through 
negotiation and to move away from 
the concept of armed struggle and 
destabilization. 

The many restrictions on trade, 
travel, and financial assistance and on 
military, scientific, and nuclear coopera- 
tion demonstrate that the United States 
does not have a normal diplomatic rela- 
tionship with South Africa. The United 
States maintains an arms embargo and 
enforces other restrictions on the sale of 
equipment to South Africa's militai-y, 
police, and other agencies enforcing 
apartheid. However, we believe that 
progress in obtaining South African 
cooperation to solve the problems in 
southern Africa cannot be achieved by 
further punitive economic actions; these 
tactics have proved unsuccessful and 
even counterproductive in the past. 

We believe that South African and 
U.S. interests are best served by en- 
couraging sustained movement away 
from apartheid. The reforms underway 
in South Africa in recent years repre- 
sent a beginning, but the most fun- 
damental aspects of apartheid have not 
been addressed. We are concentrating 
on positive steps to support constructive 
change and those who work for it. With 
the cooperation of Congress, we have 
spent more than $10 million in FY 1985 
to bring black South Africans to the 
United States for study; to train black 
trade unionists; to support the develop- 
ment and growth of small businesses in 
the black communities; and to support 
black education within South Africa. In 
addition, $1.5 million during a 2-year 
period has been allocated for specific 
human rights projects. These efforts 
supplement those of the U.S. business 
community, which, during the past 8 
years, has spent more than $130 million 
on similar programs to assist the black 
majority. More than 70% of all black 
South African employees of U.S.- 
affiliated private companies in the coun- 
try are covered by the Sullivan code of 
fair employment practices. 

The United States has been en- 
couraged by some recent evidence of 
movement away from apartheid in 
South Africa, including abolition of the 



Mixed Marriages and Immorality Ae 
an end to the Political Interference i 
which prohibited racially integrated 
political parties; legalization of black 
labor unions; granting urban residenn 
rights to more blacks; and increasing 
government spending for black educa 
tion. In particular, we believe that tl 
vote on November 2, 1983, on the ne 
constitution— in which the white elee 
torate indicated its support of chang ( 
a 2-1 margin— demonstrates the 
readiness of whites to move away ti- 
the discredited policy of apartheid. ^ 
Although the new constitution is bas 1- 
ly flawed because it grants only limi ji 
political rights to the country's color i» 
and Asian populations and none to 1 1 
black majority, we believe the vote % 
itself indicates hope for future progr » 

Unfortunately, as in the past, th 
encouraging signs have been accom- 
panied by negative actions by the Si i 
African Government, such as the de • 
tion of opposition leaders on the eve 
the August 1984 elections for the ne 
tripartite Parliament and overreactii 
to black protests by police resulting 
needless deaths, widespi-ead detentii 
and actions against labor leaders. 

Violence in South Africa's towns r 
has been at a high level since the ntf 
constitution was inaugurated in 1984 
Adding to black unrest have been scjt 
boycotts by students protesting infe * 
education; a nationwide recession, w 
skyrocketing black unemployment ai,i 
galloping inflation; imposition of in- ft 
creased rents for black housing by |] 
township councils; and killings, baa 
nings, police brutality, and the detei 
of black leaders, some of whom wen 
later charged with treason. In July 
the South African Government deck 
a state of emergency in 36 magisterjl- 
districts to stem this violence. It sul)|; 
quently announced its willingness tojli 
consider changes in laws covering ir^, 
control, the pass laws, and citizensh| 
for blacks. If enacted, these reformsi 
would constitute major changes awa,t 
from apartheid and would continue 'i^ 
liberalization process. However, the i-, 
government has yet to clarify its inl|t: 
tions or take concrete actions. 

Even with these changes, major 
grievances would remain. There ha\ 
been official hints and "trial balloon 



Department of State Bi| 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



significant change has occuri-ed 

1 "homelands" pohcy under which 
5 are deprived of South African 
iship and relegated to impover- 
"homeland" enclaves that have ht- 
any, potential for independent 
mic or political viabihty. It is also 
ir whether the centi-al issue— 

;al rights for blacks— will be re- 
1 to the satisfaction of the govern- 
and its opponents. Although the 
nment has indicated its willingness 
;otiate this issue, many black 
's are skeptical about its sincerity, 
i the pace of change increases, so 
)ectations for further modification, 
,1 as resistance from substantial 
its of the white minority. We 
3 in encouraging the reforms now 
vay and concentrating on positive 
"hat back constioictive change and 
»vorking to achieve it. In doing 
ae must keep in mind that the in- 
! of outside powers on the course 
Its in South Africa is limited; 
er, it does exist and, when used 
usly, can be successful. 

indicate America's displeasure 
18 continued high level of violence 
e slow pace of reform in South 

President Reagan announced in 
iber 1985 further restrictions on 
es with the South African 
iment. This followed nearly 5 
)f consistent, forceful ci-iticism by 
ssident, the Vice President, and 
:retary of State of South Africa's 

rights record and growing 
is in the United States from Con- 
ind the American public for 
;r measures to bring about 

in South Africa. The President 
ly tailored his actions to avoid 
e measures that would disrupt 
:ntry's economy and hurt those 
Africans disadvantaged by apart- 
d instead focused his actions on 
)aratus that enforces apartheid. 
: new measures— very similar to 
1 proposed congressional legisla- 
it had been approved by the 
of Representatives, except that 
d not contain a ban on new 
lent— included restrictions on 

and computer sales and on bank 
) the South African Government, 
n arms imports from South 

a ban on importing Kioigerrands, 



Sullivan Principles 

In 1977 Rev. Leon Sullivan— a Baptist 
minister in Philadelphia and General 
Motors Corp. director— formulated a set 
of principles for fair employment practices 
in South Africa. He encouraged U.S. 
companies with investments in South 
Africa to implement these principles in 
their South African facilities and thus 
break down the apartheid regulations 
which allow discrimination against non- 
white employees. These principles are: 

• Nonsegregation of the races in all 
eating, comfort, and work facilities; 

• Equal and fair employment practices 
for all employees; 

• Equal pay for all employees doing 
equal or comparable work for the same 
period of time; 

• Initiation and development of training 
programs that will prepare blacks, 
coloreds, and Asians in substantial 
numbers for supervisory, adminis- 
trative, clerical, and technical jobs; 

• Increasing the number of blacks, 
coloreds, and Asians in management 
and supervisory positions; and 

• Improving the quality of employees' 
lives outside the work environment in 
such areas as housing, transportation, 
schooling, recreation, and health 
facilities. 



and a requirement that U.S. firms doing 
business in South Africa adhere to the 
Sullivan principles or forfeit marketing 
assistance from the U.S. Government 
anywhere in the world. The new 
measures also provided for more official 
U.S. assistance to black education, black 
entrepreneurs, black trade unions, and 
human rights and legal assistance 
programs. 

Namibia. Following World War I, 
South Africa was given a League of Na- 
tions mandate to administer the former 
Gei-man colony of South West Africa 
(Namibia) until it was ready for in- 
dependence. After World War II, South 
Africa, which had treated Namibia as an 
integral part of its national territory, 
refused to place it under a UN 



trusteeship and continued to administer 
it under South African law, including 
the apartheid system. In 1966 the UN 
General Assemlsly revoked South 
Africa's mandate, and in 1971 the Inter- 
national Court of Justice stated that 
South Africa was obligated to terminate 
immediately its administration of 
Namibia. 

Confronted with a growing insurgen- 
cy by the South West Africa People's 
Organization and worldwide disapproval 
of its refusal to abide by the Court's 
roiling. South Africa sought to establish 
an ethnically based structure of self- 
government in Namibia. In reality, 
South Africa retained control of the 
country, and African states and the in- 
ternational community rejected the ar- 
rangement as a basis for Namibian in- 
dependence. In 1977 five Western 
members of the UN Security Council 
(the Contact Group— Canada, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) began an effort to negotiate a 
solution to the potentially explosive 
polarization of the region and thereby 
reduce the possibility for outside ex- 
ploitation. This Western Contact Group 
formulated a plan approved in 1978 as 
UN Security Council Resolution 435 
that was provisionally accepted by 
South Africa, SWAPO, and Nami'bia's 
black African neighbors— the front-line 
states of Angola, Botswana, Mozam- 
bique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 

Under the UN plan, a UN Transi- 
tional Assistance Group with civilian 
and military components would be 
established in Namibia during the tran- 
sitional period leading to independ- 
ence. South African troops would be 
restricted to base and gradually with- 
drawn. A constituent assembly would be 
elected to develop a constitution. Fol- 
lowing the election. South African mili- 
tary withdrawal would be completed. 
After the conclusion of the constituent 
assembly, independence would be pro- 
claimed. 

Although South Africa initially 
agreed to these principles, it broke off 
negotiations at Geneva in January 1981. 
The South African Government seemed 
to realize the inevitability of Namibian 
independence but feared that the ter- 
ritory's white and other minorities 



■86 



would be given insufficient opportunity 
to express their political wills in a fair 
constitutional process and that any 
preindependence agi-eement to protect 
them would be abandoned afterward. 

Recognizing that Namibian in- 
dependence was impossible without 
South Africa's cooperation, the Reagan 
Administration sought early in its first 
term to revive the Contact Group in- 
itiative, this time on a basis that 
addressed South African concerns more 
directly. In September 1981, a new, 
phased plan for the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 435 con- 
tained features designed to satisfy all 
parties, including the following ele- 
ments: 

• Agreement on "constitutional prin- 
ciples" to guide the constitution's 
drafters and to ensure that the 
interests of all Namibians were 
protected; 

• Agreement on the composition, size, 
and operation of the UN Transitional 
Assistance Group; on the disposition 
of all troops during the transition 
period; and on measures relating to 
UN impartiality; and 

• Initiation of the transition procedure 
in Resolution 435. 

Since 1981, the United States and its 
contact group partners have: 

• Obtained South Africa's recommit- 
ment to arrangements for bringing 
about Namibian independence 
through adherence to Resolution 
435— the only internationally accept- 
able basis for a solution; 

• Obtained the agreement of SWAPO, 
the United Nations, and the con- 
cerned neighboring African states to 
the arrangements negotiated with 
South Africa; and 

• Rejected South Africa's temptation 
to seek its own "internal" settlement 
in Namibia, which would have 
guaranteed many more years of 
regional turmoil. We consider the 
South African Government's 1985 
action in establishing an interim 
government for Namibia to be null 
and void and without standing. It has 



no significant bearing on our policy, 
and we have made our position quite 
clear to the South Africans. 

The presence of about 30,000 Cuban 
combat troops in Angola continues to 
complicate negotiations over Namibia 
and contribute to regional instability. 
Although the removal of these troops is 
not a requirement of the Namibian 
independence process under Resolution 
435, South Africa has made clear its 
readiness to proceed only in the context 
of a parallel commitment to resolve the 
issue of Cuban troop withdrawal. We 
believe that this issue must be dealt 
with as a practical necessity to obtain a 
durable settlement acceptable to all par- 
ties. 

Acceptance by South Africa and 
Angola of a timetable for Cuban troop 
withdrawal is thus the one remaining 
issue to be resolved in order to proceed 
vrith implementation of the resolution. 
U.S. diplomacy is actively involved in 
working out details, based on the Ango- 
lan Government's October 1984 agree- 
ment to accept Cuban troop withdrawal 
in the same context as the Namibian 
settlement. Although much hard work 
remains, the parties are negotiating, and 
the United States has been accepted as 
a mediator. We beheve that resolving 
this issue will have an important impact 
on southern African security and make a 
Namibian settlement possible. If we suc- 
ceed, Africa's last colony will achieve 
statehood. This, in turn, will help to 
foster a regional climate conducive to 
constructive change away from apart- 
heid in South Africa. 

In July 1985, the U.S. Congress 
repealed the Clark amendment which 
prohibited U.S. aid to antigovemment 
forces in Angola. Measures subsequently 
were introduced in Congress to provide 
humanitarian and military assistance to 
the antigovemment forces of the 
National Union for the Total Independ- 
ence of Angola (UNITA), headed by 
Dr. Jonas Savimbi. UNITA fought for 
Angola's independence from Portugal 
alongside the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola, which governs 
Angola today. The United States views 
UNITA as a legitimate nationalist 
organization and supports its struggle 
ao-ninst Snvipt/Ciiban adventurism in 



Angola. Although the Administratio " 
opposes legislatively mandated aid t ^ 
UNITA, it announced that it would '' 
work with the Congress to find effe ( 
ways to demonstrate support in a '• 
manner consistent with overall U.S. " 
goals in the region. " 

K 

Mozambique. Mozambique attj J 
its independence on June 25, 1975, ; I 
more than 470 years of Portuguese ' 
fluence and colonial rule. The tr:r 
was the culmination of at least a-n 
of fighting, led principally by the I 
Revolutionary Front for the Libera' '' 
of Mozambique (FRELIMO). It was 
marked by dramatic internal chaiigt i 
upheaval. A one-party socialist stati " 
with close ties to the Soviet bloc, w * 
installed, and some 180,000 out of ' 
200,000 Portuguese settlers, seeing 
privileged position undermined, aba 
doned the country and fled to SoutI 
Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), c 
back to Portugal. At the same time< 
more than 60,000 Mozambican refug 
who had fled their country returned 
Mozambique. 

Newly independent Mozambique^ 
m became increasine-lv involved ii I 



soon became increasingly involved ii I 
Zimbabwean conflict. It pledged tra j 
and transit facilities as well as logisl 



support to Zimbabwean guerrillas '' 
fighting the Rhodesian regime. Rhoi*- 
sian forces launched retaliatory and ' 
preemptive cross-border raids and a*' 
facto state of war existed between t '' 
two countries. As part of the war el^ 
the antigovemment Mozambique J' 
Resistance Movement (MRM), later J" 
known as MNR or RENAMO, was '\' 
created with Rhodesian, South Afri(f< 
and ex-Portuguese settler backing, j^' 
Postindependence Mozambique'sfu 
political, economic, and social policiel'" 
coupled with the impact of the contij^'l 
ing Rhodesian conflict and punitive ■ J 
measures taken by South Africa, hs 
devastating effect on the economy'. 
1976, the cost to Mozambique of ini 
plementing sanctions against the Rl 
sian regime was $165 million, and I'f'f 
people lost their jobs. Trade betwee )t 
Mozambique and South Africa, amoi t 
ing to 6.8 million tons in 1973, dwim « 
to 1.1 million tons by 1981. In 1975, » 
some 118,000 Mozambicans working i 
South Africa remitted most of their ' > 



10 



Department of State Bi' 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



igs in gold; by 1977 the number 
;en reduced to fewer than 45,000, 
1978 South Africa withdrew its 
)rice gold remittances. By 1983, 
ibique's trade deficit stood at $500 
I, and its external debt to noncom- 
; countries at $1.4 billion. Perhaps 
lignificant, when 90% of the Por- 
le settlers precipitously abandoned 
tintry after independence, Mozam- 
found itself bereft of private capi- 
l both skilled and managei-ial 

!S. 

llowing the end of the Rhodesian 
t and the establishment of the 
ition of Zimbabwe in April 1980, 
•t for RENAMO was taken over 
entirely by South Africa, which 
he organization as a destabilizing 

further its own national in- 

. Power lines and road and rail 
5 were cut, the oil pipeline run- 
to Zimbabwe was sabotaged, and 
st attacks were made against 
s, including foreign nationals. By 
ENAMO was operating in 7 out 
ambique's 10 provinces, and by 
s impact was being felt on the 
ts of Maputo. Meanwhile, South 

1 military forces launched direct, 
order raids against African Na- 
Hongress installations in Mozam- 
n response to actual or potential 
la attacks inside South Africa, 
offset the threat first from 

da and later from RENAMO and 
Africa, Mozambique sought and 
d Soviet aid. Following the sign- 
i Treaty of Friendship in 1977, 
nets sent advisers and materiel 
Mozambique strengthen its posi- 
ainst an increasingly aggressive 
ia. By 1981, an estimated 550 
and East European and 1,000 
military advisers were attached 
Wozambican Army. East Ger- 
irtually controlled the country's 
r forces, and a plethora of 
ic projects brought nearly 2,000 
md East German technicians to 
and the countryside. 
he early 1980s, when South 
ook over the support of 
tfO, the Soviets increased their 
' involvement, providing 
er gunships, advanced surface-to- 
iiles, tanks and armored vehicles, 
r, small arms, and ammunition. 



Soviet naval ships visited Maputo, a 
number of high-level military exchanges 
took place. President Machel visited 
Moscow, and Soviet declarations of 
military support were made. However, 
despite the rhetorical and military back- 
ing, Soviet training, tactics, and arma- 
ments often were of poor quality and 
proved inadequate to the prosecution of 
the counterinsurgency war. Mozam- 
bique's disappointment with Soviet 
assistance was heightened by Moscow's 
refusal to support President Machel's 
request in late 1980 for association with 
the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (the Warsaw Pact's economic 
community). 

It is against this background of 
military threat from inside and outside, 
economic collapse, and inadequate sup- 
port from their Soviet-bloc friends that 
Mozambique, in 1981 and 1982, began to 
signal an interest in improved relations 
with the West. It turned first to Por- 
tugal, which welcomed the approach, 
and in 1982 the United States received 
clear indications that President Machel 
wanted improved relations and hoped 
the United States could help to 
moderate the ever-increasing military 
threat from South Africa. 

The United States grasped the offer 
to end the freeze in relations. They had 
reached a particularly low point in 1981 
when Mozambique expelled four 
members of the U.S. Embassy on 
charges of spying, and the new Reagan 
Administration responded by halting the 
appointment of a new ambassador to 
Maputo and suspending food shipments. 
For some time the United States had 
been disturbed by the growing instabili- 
ty in southern Africa and South Africa's 
increasingly militant posture. It saw the 
approach from Mozambique as an oppor- 
tunity to ameliorate the security situa- 
tion in the area and to encourage 
Mozambique to move away from the 
Soviet and toward the Western camp. 
These developments paved the way for 
the March 1984 nonagression pact be- 
tween South Africa and Mozambique, 
knowTi as the Nkomati accord. Although 
the United States has not claimed credit 
for Nkomati, it is no secret that it 
helped to bring the two sides together. 



If it succeeds, the Nkomati accord, 
in addition to its specific security provi- 
sions and international political implica- 
tions, could restore the strong pre- 1975 
economic links between Mozambique and 
South Africa and, thereby, contribute 
significantly to economic gi-owth in 
Mozambique. Under the terms of the ac- 
cord, each side agreed "not to allow its 
territory to be used for acts of war, ag- 
gression, or violence against the other 
state." This meant that Mozambique 
would no longer allow ANC guerrillas to 
use its territory and that South Africa 
would expel and end its support for 
RENAMO. Whether the accord suc- 
ceeds depends on a variety of factors, 
not the least of which are South Africa's 
own internal security situation, Soviet 
interest in the area. South Africa's abili- 
ty to exercise control over RENAMO, 
Mozambique's ability to rebuild its 
economy, and the degree of interest and 
involvement by neighbors and outside 
supporters in Mozambique and 
RENAMO. 

Certainly, current closer relations 
with the West will help. By the end of 
1984, Mozambique finally subscribed to 
the Lome Convention, which opens the 
door for Common Market aid, and 
signed a modified Berlin clause, which 
permits West German assistance. Mo- 
zambique has joined the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund, which 
are preparing to make loans and provide 
technical assistance to the country. 
American aid also has increased, par- 
ticularly for emergency relief efforts in 
connection with the devastating drought 
that has embraced much of the country 
for the past several years. In 1985, U.S. 
program aid to Mozambique amounted 
to $15 million; emergency food aid to- 
taled $45.8 million. Meanwhile, Soviet- 
bloc assistance, both military and other, 
has tended to remain level. 

On the other side of the coin, post- 
Nkomati developments have showm that 
there are limits to the South African 
Government's influence over RENAMO. 
In January 1985, South Africa's Presi- 
dent Botha admitted that "elements in- 
side South Africa" were still helping 
RENAMO, and, in September 1985, 
documents captured by Mozambique 
Government forces revealed continuing 
South African assistance and contacts. 



86 



11 



Certainly, South Africa's willingness to 
improve relations with Mozambique is 
affected by conditions within South 
Africa. When relative calm prevails in- 
ternally, efforts for improved relations 
receive more support than at present or 
during the recent past, when conditions 
are unstable. Perhaps most important, 
RENAMO's leadership undoubtedly has 
objectives that are not always in har- 
mony with those of South Africa and 
may, in fact, run counter to them, 
depending on current political 
considerations. 

In any event, although the United 
States remains concerned that fighting 
between Mozambican forces and 
RENAMO has not ceased, there is 
satisfaction to be gained from increased 
interest in Mozambique during the past 
2-3 years on the part of Western 
governments and businessmen. Italian 
assistance, for example, has become 
sizable, and South Africans are once 
again exploring business opportunities in 
Maputo. This appears to be a direct 
result of Mozambique's willingness to 
move toward a more neutral position 
vis-a-vis the West, a move confirmed by 
the successful visit by President Machel 
to the United States in September 1985. 

Zimbabwe. The United States was 
actively involved with the British 
Government in achieving a settlement of 
the Rhodesian war and in establishing 
the new nation of Zimbabwe, which 
became independent on April 18, 1980. 
Since then, Zimbabwe has sought to 
improve its domestic and international 
credibility by balancing the need for 
change with that of building confidence 
in its government. The democratic in- 
stitutions established by the 1980 
constitution continue to operate, and 
parliamentary elections, generally 
peaceful and fair, were held in June-July 
1985. 

Zimbabwe inherited a strong and 
diversified economy with a significant 
private sector. Although affected by 
world recession, drought, and socialist 
rhetoric (which has discouraged new 
foreign investment), the government of 
Prime Minister Mugabe holds a respect 
for market principles and international 
economic realities. If peace and sound 
economic policies are maintained, Zim- 
babwe has the potential to help spark 



12 



development in central and southern 
Africa. A healthy and stable Zimbabwe 
also could provide a positive e.xample for 
the entire region and enhance chances 
for stability in this troubled area. 

Zimbabwe remains strongly opposed 
to South Africa's apartheid policy but 
has not allowed its territory to be used 
to launch guerrilla attacks against its 
neighbor. It has accepted responsibility 
for building peace in the area and 
approves of its neighbors' efforts to 



resolve their differences. Zimbabwe 
maintains official contacts— but not 
diplomatic representation— with Soul 
Africa and has worked for effective 
coexistence. 

The United States contributes 
substantially to Zimbabwe's econom 
growth and is, in fact, its largest aic 
donor. U.S. economic aid since in- 
dependence totals more than $300 
million. 



Foreign Assistance 
and Economic Relations 



The U.S. and African governments 
recognize that an inseparable relation- 
ship exists between economics and 
politics and that the United States and 
the West are uniquely qualified to re- 
spond to Africa's needs. The African 
nations' principal goal is development, 
and the United States cooperates with 
them in their efforts not only because 
their economic well-being is important 
to us in human terms but also because 
it is directly related to African security. 
In turn, African security and political 
stability are important to our foreign 
policy because they affect U.S. national 
interests. The economic crisis in Africa 
threatens most of our policy goals, 
including the search for peace in 
southern Africa. 

In response to the economic crisis 
and human tragedy in Africa, the 
United States is providing unprec- 
edented levels of assistance. We are at- 
tempting to alleviate the immediate 
needs of millions of starving people as 
well as to promote long-term solutions 
to Africa's economic problems. We are 
providing assistance through interna- 
tional organizations and bilateral pro- 
grams and helping private voluntary 
groups in their efforts to deliver food 
and other necessities of life. We are now 
furnishing more than half of all 
emergency food reaching African famine 
victims. The United States has not 
allowed political differences with any 
government to weaken its determination 
to provide assistance to those in need. 



Indeed, we are the largest donor to 
Ethiopia, a country whose governm* 
has been openly hostile to us for se\ 
years. 



Emergency Famine Assistance 

On July 10, 1984, President Reagan 
nounced a major initiative to respon 
more quickly and effectively to the i 
needs of the people of Africa and otl 
suffering from hunger and malnutriti 
This five-point program includes: 

• Prepositioning grain in selected 1 
World areas; 

• Creating a special $50 million 
presidential fund to allow a more' 
flexible U.S. response to food enw 
gencies; 

• Financing or paying ocean and ini 
transportation costs associated W) 
U.S. food aid in special emergenc 
cases; 

• Creating a government task force 
provide better forecasts of food 
shortages and needs; and 

• Establishing an advisory grou)) " 
business leaders to share infonn.' 
on Third World hunger and foml 
production. 

The President also announced a 
prehensive African Hunger Relief Ii 
itiative on January 3, 1985, directing 
U.S. Government to provide more tl 



Department of State Bi) 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



illion metric tons of emergency 
iuring FY 1985— three times the 
d amount from the previous year. 
[ 1984, the U.S. Govemment pro- 
$200 million of emergency 
ance— including more than 500,000 
c tons of emei-gency food aid as 
IS medicine and transport 
ance— to 26 African countries, 
food aid to Afi-ica amounted to 
I than 1.4 million metric tons in 
084. 

\ FY 1985, the U.S. Govemment 
tred 1.8 miUion metric tons of 
fency food assistance to Africa at a 
\f $770 million. When added to our 
ir PL-480 program, we provided 
in countries with more than 3 
1 metric tons of food gi'own in 
ica at a delivered cost of $1.1 
. Another $109 million of nonfood 
ince was provided during the 
period. Our entire assistance pro- 
in FY 1985-including both 
kr and emergency assistance- 
id a record $1.9 billion, with almost 
ilf provided in response to the ex- 
ilinary famine conditions that exist- 
the continent. 

S. commitment and concern were 
r highlighted by Vice President 
during his visit to Sudan, Niger, 
.ali in March 1985, his second trip 
ica since he took office in 1981. In 
to draw attention to the wide- 
l nature of the drought emergen- 

Vice President completed his 
Y representing the United States 
Decial UN conference on the crisis 
1 Geneva. His message to the in- 
ional community was that, in spite 
;hat had been done, more help 
eded— needed from all those with 
jans to assist and needed 
liatelv. 



term Assistance 

36 the roots of the economic crisis 
deep, the solution will necessarily 
B resources, time, and commit- 
The U.S. Govemment provided 
Jlion in regular assistance to sub- 
in Africa in FY 1985, over five 
that provided in FY 1974. 



U.S. Economic Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, FY 1974-85' 

Development Assistance 



1974 



1975 



1976 



1977 



1978 



1979 



1980 



1981 




Economic Support Funds 
PL 480 







■ 







H 







^B 




1982 



1983 



1984 



1985 







^B 







^^H 







^^H 




H 1 1- 



H h 



H 1 1 1 

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 

$ millions 



'Does not include refugee and emergency famine assistance whicfi i 
FY 1985 amounted to $879 million. 



986 



13 



The four major "pillars" of our 
assistance strategy are: policy reform, 
strengthening the indigenous private 
sector, institution-building, and 
technology transfer. 

Our economic policy reform pro- 
grams seek to create incentives for 
growth and to enable African farmers as 
well as businessmen to play a more 
dynamic role. At the same time, these 
programs help to develop the technolo- 
gies, institutions, and human capital re- 
quii-ed for sustained growth. We have 
placed inci-eased emphasis on promoting 
private sector activity in Africa and 
using private rather than public sector 
channels to deliver our aid resources to 
Africa. We are supporting agricultural 
pricing and marketing reforms, privatiz- 
ation of parastatals, and increased 
farmer productivity through investments 
designed to improve technologies, access 
to markets, productive infrastructure, 
and the supply of fertilizer and other 
agricultural inputs. 

In FY 1985, the United States 
launched the African Economic Policy 
RefoiTn Program, which provides addi- 
tional and more flexible assistance to 
African countries undertaking critical 
policy reforms. In the first year, pro- 
grams totaling $75 million were 
developed for Malawi, Mauritius, Mali, 
Rwanda, and Zambia. Although these 
programs are still in their initial stages, 
they already have served as a catalyst 
for action on the part of donors and the 
World Bank and moved the reform 
process more quickly and broadly than 
would have been the case without our 
presence. 

The policy reform program is a 
precursor of, and gave impetus to, the 
creation of a similar World Bank pro- 
gram, the Special African Facility— 
which, together with bilateral funds 
available for cofinancing, will have about 
$1.2 billion to finance policy reform pro- 
grams in Africa. We have been coor- 
dinating our policy reform efforts with 
the World Bank and, as the Bank's 
Facility enters an operational phase, it 
will provide stronger opportunities for 
cooperation. 

"Food for Progress," another poUcy 
reform initiative, was announced by 
President Reagan in January 1985. This 
would provide food assistance on a 



multiyear basis to countries desiring to 
undertake policy refonns in the agricul- 
tural sector. The necessary legislative 
framework and funding for this program 
are being developed. 

Support for International Efforts 

Although the United States has an in- 
fluential role in mobilizing an effective 
response to Africa's economic problems, 
the task is not solely a U.S. responsibili- 
ty and, in fact, is far too great for the 
United States to attempt alone. The 
crisis in Africa touches upon the welfare 
of the entire world and requires a sus- 
tained and coordinated international ef- 
fort to promote long-term development. 

The U.S. Government has intensified 
efforts to work with other donors and 
multilateral institutions to encourage 
African governments to implement 
policy reforms that will promote growth 
and development. Through international 
organizations and U.S. bilateral and 



U.S. Trade With Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1980-84 




regional programs, the United States 
supporting agiicultural development ] 
jects, land reclamation, and other pro 
grams to develop agricultural land an 
to train farmers in soil conservation 
techniques. The United States par- 
ticularly supports the critical role of 
International Monetary Fund in pro- 
viding assistance for stabilizing Afric 
economies and of the World Bank in 
promoting economic development. 

In the long run, however, primar 
responsibility must rest with the 
African nations themselves, whose ac 
tions and policies will largely detenu 
how much progress toward long-tenr. 
development is possible. 



1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 



Trade and Investment j 

Only a few years ago, many African jj 
regimes were either hostile or indif- g 
ferent to foreign private enterprise. ' j 
day, even countries with a Marxist I 
orientation are increasingly eager for 
trade and investment relations with I 
West. African leaders are attracted 1: 
the fact that American businesses ha 
great expertise in fields important to 
economic development, such as 
agribusiness. They also recognize tha 
U.S. private enterprise can provide 
much of the technical and managerial 
expertise required to promote econon 
growth, job creation, and improved 
standards of living. 

However, between 1980 and 1984 
sub-Saharan Africa's percentage of to 
U.S. private direct investment abroa(i 
remained constant at 2%— the level i 
prevailing for the past 20 years. Duri 
1980-84, the U.S. trade deficit with t 
region decreased by about one-half. 
Besides economic problems, other fac 
tors hinder the growth of U.S. busim 
and trade activities in Africa. Despit( 
growing African interest in trade anc' 
vestment, the investment climate in 
many countries remains uncertain. F' 
thermore, many American businesses 
are indifferent to African markets or 
assume that opportunities are monop 
olized by former colonial powers. 



14 



Department of State Bui ' 




FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



le Departments of State and Com- 
;, the Export-Import Bank, and the 
leas Private Investment Coi-poi-a- 
eek to famiHarize U.S. businesses 
:he problems of and opportunities 
ling business in Africa, as well as 
ihe available support sei-vices. The 
jovernment also encourages U.S. 
and investment abroad through 
id other incentives. At all U.S. 
ssies, assisting U.S. businesses is 
priority. The Commerce Depart- 
3 Foreign Commercial Service is 
rented in major African commer- 
nters, including Abidjan, Johan- 
[•g, Lagos, and Nairobi. And the 
y for International Development 

to enhance the role of the African 
9 sector in development activities 

build institutions that will pro- 
breign and domestic business 
1. 



Appendix 



Basic Data Tables 



Data presented in the following tables have been assembled by the 
Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, to illustrate the diversity 
and complexity of sub-Saharan Africa. Profiles Include selected informa- 
tion on the governments, people, geography, and economy of the 46 in- 
dependent countries south of the Sahara. Data vary in accuracy and 
recency, depending on method of collection as well as economic and 
political considerations. Culled from a variety of sources, the data 
should not be regarded as definitive or finite and should not be used 
for accurate country comparisons. They are intended to provide a few 
basic facts for each country and an order of magnitude by which to 
gauge demographic changes and economic development. 






vIM-- 



Dogon rock paintings, Mali. 



186 



15 



Sub-Saharan Africa^ (Numbered footnotes on p. 25) 



Country 




Population^ 






Culture 




Education 


Labor Force 


Familiar Name 

Official Name 
(Earlier Name)' 


Capital 


Est. 

Total 

Total 1985 

Sq. Ml. (mil) 


Est. 
Growth 

Rate 
1984-85 

(%) 


Life 
Expect- 
ancy 
(yrs) 


Ethnic 
Groups 

(%) 




Religion 

(%) 


Language 


Lit- 

eracy 

(%) 


Primary 
Students 

(Wof 

age 

group 


Total 
(mil) 


%in 
Agr. 


HiH 

Otim 


Angola 

People's Repub- 
lic of Angola 
(Angola) 


Luanda 


481,351 8.0 


2.7 


38 


Ovimbundu 
Kimbundu 
Bakongo 
Other 


(38) 
(23) 
(13) 
(26) 


Christian (88) 
Indigenous (12) 


Portu- 
guese 
Local 


20 


NA 


1.9 


60 


40 


Benin 

Ttie People's 
Republic 
of Benin 

(Dahomey) 


Porto-Novo 


43,483 


4.0 


3.1 


41 


Pons 

Adjas 

Baribas 

Yoruba 

European 


Indigenous (70) 
Christian (15) 
Muslim (15) 


French 
Local 


20 


43 


1.6 


70 


3( 


Botswana 

Republic of 
Botswana 
(Bechuanaland) 


Gaborone 


220,000 


1.1 


3.3 


50 


Tswana 

Bushmen 

White 


(94) 
(5) 
(1) 


Indigenous (85) 
Christian (15) 


English 
Setswana 


30 


93 


0.4 


75 


2! 


Buri<ina 

Burkina Faso 
(Upper Volta) 


Ouaga- 
dougou 


106,000 


6.9 


2.5 


42 


N/lande 

Fulani 

Lobi 

Gurunsi 

l^ossi 

Senufo 

Bobo 


Indigenous (65) 
Muslim (25) 
Christian (10) 


French 
Local 


5 


8 


2.7 


83 


r 


Burundi 

Republic of 
Burundi 


Bujumbura 


10,747 


4.8 


2.6 


42 


Hutu 
Tutsi 
Twa 


(85) 

(14) 

(1) 


Christian (67) 
Indigenous (32) 
Muslim (1) 


Kirundi 
French 
Swahili 


25 


29 


1.9 


93 




Cameroon 

United Republic 
of Cameroon 

(French and British 
Cameroons) 


Yaounde 


183,568 


9.8 


2,7 


47 


200 groups 


Indigenous (55) 
Christian (30) 
Muslim (15) 


English 
French 
Local 


65 


70 


3.0 


83 


1 


Cape Verde 

Republic of 
Cape Verde 

rCape Verde 
Islands) 


Praia 


1,557 


0.3 


2.0 


61 


Creole 
African 
European 


(71) 

(28) 

(1) 


Catholic (65) 
Indigenous (35) 


Portu- 
guese 
Crioulo 


37 


NA 


0.1 


NA 


N> 


Central African 
Republic 

Central African 

Republic 
(Central African 

Empire: 
Ubangi-Shari) 


Bangui 


247,000 


2,7 


2,8 


41 


Baya 

Banda 

Sara 

IVIandjia 

H/lboum 

M'Baka 

European 


(34) 
(28) 
(10) 
(9) 
(9) 
(7) 
(3) 


Christian (50) 
Indigenous (40) 
Muslim (10) 


French 
Sangho 


20 


64 


1.3 


88 


ti 

1 


Chad 

Republic of Chad 


N'Djamena 


496,000 


5.3 


2,5 


39 


200 groups 


Muslim 

Christian 

Indigenous 


French 
Chadian- 
Arabic 


20 


37 


2.0 


85 


1' 


Comoros 

Comoros Federal 

Islamic Republic 
(Comoros Islands) 


Moroni 


863 


0.5 


2.9 


47 


Antalote 

Cafre 

IVIakao 

Other 


Muslim (86) 

Christian (14) 


Shaafi- 
Islam 
Malagasy 
French 


15 


50 


0.2 


87 


■ 
1 



'Industry, Services, 
Commerce, and Government 



16 



Depailinent of State Bl 



lua 
bll) 


Gross Domestic Product Imports 


Exports Est. US 


Date of 
Independ- 
ence 


Government 


Country 


1 1 1.™ 

Growth Per % % o/o US 

Rale Capita From From From Total 1984 

■ (%) ($) Agr. Ind. Othert (S mil) ($ mi 

1 


1 Assist- 
ijs snce 

Total 1984 Leading FY 1985 

) ($ mil) (S mil) Exports (J niil) 


Type 


1 

Chief of 
state and/or 

Head of Familiar 
Government Name 


.2 





550 


29 


27 


44 


1500 


103 


1600 


1010 


Oil 

Coffee 
Diamonds 
Iron 


1.9 


11/11/75 People's Pres. Jose E. 
Republic Dos Santos 

1 


Angola 


.1 

7 


-4,2 


310 


35 


16 


49 


590 


13 


304 


03 


Palm 

Products 
Cotton 
Peanuts 


08 


8/1/60 Military 
(Revolu- 
tionary 
Republic) 


1 

Pres. (Col.) 
M. Kerekou 


Benin 





750 


11 


1 


88 


740 


19 


640 


57 


Diamonds 
Copper 
Nicl<el 
Beef 


11.4 


9/30/66 


I 

Republic 


Pres Dr Duett 
K. J. Masire 


Botswana 


9 
2 


-1.3 


157 


35 


20 


45 


' 230 


21 
1 1 


110 


0.1 


Livestock 
Peanuts 
Shea Butter 
Cotton 


' 15.6 


8/5/60 
i 


Military Pres. (Capt.) 
Govern- T. Sankara 
ment 

i 


Burkina 


3 


255 


51 


15 


34 


1 

198 9 


79 


2 


Coffee 
Tea 
Cotton 
Hides 


6.0 


7/1/62 


Republic 


Pres, (Col.) 
J.B. Bagaza 


Burundi 


7 


5 


734 


30 


9 


61 


1100 66 
1 


1904 


721 


Crude Oil 

Cocoa 

Coffee 

Timber 

Aluminum 


205 


1/1/60 


Republic 


Pres, P, Biya 


Cameroon 


1 





353 


NA 


NA 


NA 


68 


NA" 


2 


NA" 


Fish 

Bananas 

Salt 


2 1 


7/5/75 


Republic 


Pres A. 
Pereira 


Cape Verde 


) 


-2,3 


273 


35 


8 


57 


137 


1 


114 


3 


Diamonds 
Cotton 
Timber 
Coffee 


2.0 


8/13/60 


Republic 


Pres (Gen) 
A, Kolingba 


Central African 
Republic 


) 


0.6 


110 


52 


14 


34 


122 


16 


65 


0.1 


Cotton 
Livestock 


18.5 


8/11/60 


Republic 


Pres H, 
Habre 


Chad 




-1.0 

1 


240 


40 


34 


26 


19 


05 


18 


2 


Oils 
Vanilla 
Copra 
Cloves 


0.4 


7/6/75 


■ r 

Republic Pres Ahmed 
Abdullah 
Abderemane 

1 
1 


Comoros 



'Ce^-. Commerce, 
'd Trade 



i'1986 



17 











m^i^^T" 


















Country 




Population^ 






Culture 




Education 


Labor Force | 








Est. 














Primary 












Est. 


Growth 


Life 












Students 








Familiar Name \ 




Total 


Rate 


Expect- 


Etiinic 








Lit- 


(»/o Ol 








Official Name 1 


Total 


1985 


1984-85 


ancy 


Groups 




Religion 




eracy 


age 


Total 


'A, in 


% If 


(Earlier Name)' Capital 


Sq. Mi. 


(mil) 


m 


(yrs) 


(•/o) 




(%) 


Language 


("/») 


group 


(mil) 


Agr. 


Othei 


Congo 


Brazzaville 


132,000 


1.8 


3 


47 


Bakongo 




Indigenous (51) 


French 


50 


90-1- 


0.7 


75 


25! 


People's Republic 












Sangha 




Christian (47) 


Lingala 












of the Congo 












Bateke 




Muslim (2) 


Kikongo 












(French Congo) 












M'Bochi 
European 


















Djibouti 


Djibouti 


9.000 


0.3 


2.6 


50 


Somalis 




Muslim (94) 


French 


20 


NA 


0.1 


NA 




The Republic 












(Issas) 




Christian (6) 


Somali 










of D|ibouti 












Afars 






Afar 










(French Territory of 












French 






Arabic 












Afars and Issas) 












Arab 


















Equatorial Guinea 


Malabo 


10,820 


0.3 


2.5 


45 


Fang 


(80) 


Nominally 


Spanish 


55 


70 


0.1 


86 


14 


Republic of 












Bubi 


(15) 


Christian 


Pidgin 












Equatorial Guinea 












Other 


(5) 




English 












(Equatonal Guinea 


















Fang 












and Spanish 






























Guinea) 






























Ethiopia 


Addis 


445,000 


42.3 


0.7 


38 


Galla 


(40) 


Muslim (45) 


Amharic 


15 


23 


13.0 


90 


1C 


Socialist Ethiopia 


Ababa 










Amhara/ 




Ethiopian 


Tigrinya 












(Empire of Ethiopia) 












Tigrai 
Sidamo 
Shankella 
Somali 
Other 


(32) 
(9) 
(6) 
(6) 
(7) 


Orthodox 
Christian (40) 
Indigenous (15) 


Arabic 

Orominga 

English 












Gabon 


Libreville 


102,317 


1.0 


3.1 


44 


Fang 




Christian (60) 


French 


65 


84 


0.3 


65 


35 


Gabonese Republic 












Eshira 




Indigenous (39) 


Local 












(Gabon) 












Bapounou 
Bateke 




Muslim (1) 














Gambia, Tlie 


Banjul 


4,003 


0.8 


3.5 


33 


Mandinka 


(38) 


Muslim (85) 


English 


15 


14 


0.4 


75 


25 


Republic of 












Fula 


(16) 


Christian (14) 


Mandinka 












The Gambia 












Wolof 


(14) 


Indigenous (1) 


Wolof 












(Gambia) 












Non-Gam- 

bian 
Jola 
Serahuli 
Other 


(10) 
(9) 
(8) 
(5) 




Fula 












Ghana 


Accra 


92,100 


13.2 


3.0 


49 


Akan 




Indigenous (45) 


English 


30 


60 


3.7 


55 


45> 


Republic of 












Ewe 




Christian (43) 


Akan 












Ghana 












Ga 




Muslim (12) 


Mole- 












(Gold Coast) 


















Dagbani 
Ewe 
Ga 












Guinea 


Conakry 


246,048 


5.7 


2.7 


45 


Fulani 




Muslim (75) 


French 


48 


34 


2.4 


82 


18' 


Republic of 












Malinke 




Indigenous (24) 


Local 












Guinea 












Sousou 




Christian (1) 














(French Guinea) 












15 Smaller 
Tribes 


















Guinea-Bissau 


Bissau 


14,000 


0.9 


1.9 


35 


Balanta 




Indigenous (65) 


Portu- 


9 


NA 


0.3 


90 


10 


Republic of 












Fulani 




Muslim (30) 


guese 












Guinea-Bissau 












Manjaca 




Christian (5) 


Crioulo 












(Portuguese Guinea) 












Mandinga 







Local 










1 ^'1 



"Industry. Services. 
Commerce, and Government 



18 



Department of State Bui ' 



Gross Domestic Product 


Imports 


Exports 


Est. US 
Econ. 

Assist- 
ance 

FY 1985 

($ mil) 


Government 


Country 


ual 

bin 


Growth 
Rate 


Per 
Capita 

(S) 


From 
Agr. 


From 
Ind. 


% 
From 
Othert 


Total 
(S mil) 


From 

US 

1984 

(S mil) 


Total 

(S mil) 


To 

us 

1984 

(4 mil) 


Leading 
Exports 


Date of 
Independ- 
ence 


Type 


Chief of 
State and/or 

Head of 
Government 


Familiar 
Name 


8 


3.1 


1300 


10 


15 


75 


608 


12 


997 


1001 


Oil 

Wood 

Sugar 

Tobacco 

Coffee 


1.0 


8/15/60 


People's 
Republic 


Pres. (Col.) D 

Sassou- 

Nguesso 


Congo 


1 


NA 


400 


10 


1 


89 


152 


8 


66 


01 


Hides 
Cattle 
Coffee 


5 


6/27/77 


Republic 


Pres. H.G. 
Aptidon 


Djibouti 







417 


50 


2 


48 


37 


<0.5 


13 


0.5 


Cocoa 
Coffee 
Wood 
Bananas 


1.0 


10/12/68 


Republic 


Pres. (Lt. Col.) 
Obiang 
Nguema 
Mbasogo 


Equatorial 
Guinea 




3.7 


142 


52 


14 


34 


906 


174 


403 


82 


Coffee 
Pulse 
HiiJes 
Meat 


14 3 


Since 

Ancient 

Times 


Provi- 
sional 
Military 


Chief of 
State 

Mengistu 
Halle-Mariam 


Ethiopia 




0.7 


2742 


4 


6 


90 


700 


36 2200 


680 


Petroleum 
Wood 

Manganese 
Uranium 





8/17/60 


Republic 


Pres. El Had) 
Omar Bongo 


Gabon 




13.4 


190 


75 15 10 
1 1 


87 


14 


66 


0.6 


Peanuts 

Palm 

Fish 


4.7 


2/18/65 


Republic 


Pres. Sir 
D.K. Jawara 


The 

Gambia 




-7.2 


954 


1 f 
NA 


— 
NA 


NA 


669 


46 


857 


47 


Cocoa 

Minerals 
Wood 


7.6 


3/6/57 


Provi- 
sional 
Military 


Chairman of 
PNDC Ft- U. 
J.J. Rawlings 


Ghana 




1.3 


276 


40 


10 


50 


403 


33 


537 


110 


Bauxite 

Alumina 

Fruit 

Coffee 


8.6 


10/2/58 


Republic 


Pres. (Col.) 
L. Conte 


Guinea 




-5.1 


182 


NA 


NA 


NA 


57 


NA" 


9 


1 
NA" Peanuts 
Palm 

Products 
Fisfi 


2.5 


9/24/73 


Republic 


Pres. (Brig. 

General 
J.B. Vielria 


Guinea-Bissau 



-es. Commerce, 
, and Trade 



8 1986 



19 



Country 




P 

Est. 
Total 
1985 
(mil) 


opulatio 

Est. 
Growth 

Hate 
1984-85 

(%) 


n3 


Culture 


Education 


Labor FordH 


Familiar Name 

Official Name 
(Earlier Name)' 


Capital 


Total 

Sq. m. 


Life 
Expect- 
ancy 
(yrs) 


Ethnic 
Groups 

(%) 


Religion 
(%) 


Language 


1 

Lit- 
eracy 

(»/*,) 


Primary 
Students 

(% ol 
age 

group 


Total 
(mil) 


til in 
Agr. 


Hit 
OthM 


Ivory Coast 

Republic of 

ttie Ivory Coast 
(Ivory Coast) 


Abidjan 


124,500 


10.1 


4.0 


47 


60 Groups 


Indigenous (63) 
Muslim (25) 
Christian (12) 


French 
Local 


24 


75 


4.0 


85 


1£ 


Kenya 

Republic of Kenya 
(Kenya) 


Nairobi 


224,900 


20.2 


4.2 


53 


Kikuyu (20) 
Luhya (14) 
Luo (13) 
Other (53) 


Christian (66) 
Indigenous (28) 
Muslim (6) 


English 
Swahili 
Local 


70 


83 


5.4 


80 


2C 


Lesotho 

Kingdom of Lesotho 
(Basutoland) 


Maseru 


11,716 


1.5 


2.5 


52 


Sotho (<100) 
Other (<1) 


Christian (80) 
Indigenous (20) 


English 
Sesotho 
Xhosa 
Zulu 


55 


70 


0.4 


36 


Si 


Liberia 

Republic of 

Liberia 
(Liberia) 


Monrovia 


43.000 


2.2 


3.3 


54 


Indigenous 
Groups (95) 

American 
Descend- 
ants (5) 


Indigenous (75) 
Muslim (15) 
Christian (10) 


English 
Local 


24 


50 


0.5 


70 


3fr 


Madagascar 

Democratic Republic 

of Madagascar 
(Malagasy Republic) 


Antana- 
narivo 


228,000 


99 


28 


46 


Merina 

Betsileo 

Cotiers 

French 

Indian 


Indigenous (52) 
Christian (41) 
Muslim (7) 


Malagasy 
French 


53 


83 


3.4 


92 


( 


Malawi 

Republic of Malawi 
(Nyasaland 
Protectorate) 


Lilongwe 


45.747 


7.0 


3.3 


47 


Chewas 

Njanja 

Tumbuko 

Lomwe 

Ya 


Christian (75) 
Muslim (20) 
Indigenous (5) 


Chichewa 

English 

Tombuka 


25 


45 


2.4 


90 


1 


Mali 

Republic of Mali 
(French Soudan) 


Bamako 


464,873 


7.7 


2,3 


45 


Mande (50) 
Peul (17) 
Voltaic (12) 
Other (21) 


Muslim (90) 
Indigenous (9) 
Christian (1) 


French 
Bambara 


10 


28 


3.5 


73 


2' 


Mauritania 

Islamic Republic 

of Mauritania 
(Mauritania) 


Nouakchott 


419,229 


1.7 


2.0 


42 


Arab-Berber(33) 
Arab-Berber 

Negroid (33) 
Negroid (33) 


Muslim (100) Hasanya- 
Arabic 
French 
Toucouleur 


17 


24 


0.5 


47 


1 


Mauritius 

Mauritius 


Port Louis 


720 


1.6 


2.0 


69 


Indo- 
Mauritian (68) 

Creoles (27) 

Sino- 
Mauritian (3) 

Franco- 
Mauritian (2) 


Hindu (52) 
Christian (31) 
Muslim (17) 


English 

French 

Creole 

Hindi 

Urdu 


61 


78 


0.3 


29 


71 
15 


Mozambique 

People's Republic 
of Mozambique 
(Mozambique) 


Maputo 

1 


303,769 


13.8 


' 2.8 

1 


47 


Makua 
Tsonga 
Other Bantu 
European 


Indigenous (60) 

Christian (30) 

, Muslim (10) 


Portu- 
guese 
Local 
English 


14 


40 


3.2 


85 



'Industry. Services, 
Commerce, and Government 



20 



Department of State Bui 



Gross Domestic Product 


Imports 


Exports 


Est. US 
Econ. 

Assist- 
ance 
FY 1985 

($ mil) 


Government Country 


ual 
•II) 

6 


Growth 
Rate 


Per 

Capita 

(S) 


From 
Agr. 


% 
From 
Ind. 


"/o 
From 
Olhert 


Total 
($ mil) 


From 

US 

1984 

(S mil) 


Total 
(S mil) 


To 

US 

1984 

($mll 


Leading 
Exports 


Chief of 
Date ol stale and/or 
Independ- Head ol Familiar 
cnce Type Government Name 


1.8 


871 


25 


25 


50 


1850 


65 


2450 


469 


Coffee 
Cocoa 
Wood 





8/7/60 


Republic Pres. F. 

Houphouet- 
Boigny 


Ivory Coast 


5 


2.1 


294 


35 


15 


50 


1234 


74 


922 


64 


Coffee 
Tea 
' IVleat 
Sisal 


75.4 


12/12/63 


Republic Pres. D.T. Kenya 
Arap Moi 

1 
1 


6 


-2.0 


455 


27 


6 


67 


450 


12 


124 


0.7 


Wool 
Mohair 
Diamonds 
Labor to 
South Africa 


16.6 10/4/66 Constitu- King- 

tional Moshoeshoe II 
Monarchy PM— Dr. L, 

Jonathan" 


Lesotho 


1 


-5.0 


492 


15 


60 


25 


424 


97 


429 


98 


Iron 

Rubber 
Timber 
Diamonds 


73.1 


1847 


Republic 


Head of State 
Dr. Samuel K. 
Doe 


Liberia 


5 
3 


1.6 


260 


40 


17 


43 


356 


39 


328 


71 


Coffee 
Cloves 
Vanilla 
Sugar 


17.8 


6/29/60 


1 

Republic Pres. (Adm.) 
D. Ratsiraka 


Madagascar 


3.0 


213 


39 


9 


52 


274 


3 


204 


30 


Tobacco 
Tea 

Ground Nuts 
Sugar 


9.7 


1 
7/6/64 Republic 




Pres Dr H K 
Banda 


Malawi 


) 


4.4 


138 


42 


11 


47 


233 


15 


146 


1 


Meat 
Cotton 
Fish 
Peanuts 


23.5 


9/22/60 


Republic Pres. (B. Gen.) 
M. Traore 


Mali 


NA 


460 


22 


21 


57 


215 


26 


275 


1 


Iron 

Gypsum 

Fish 


15.8 


11/28/60 


Military Pres. (Col.) 
Republic MSA. Quid 
Taya 


Mauritania 




1.2 


1053 


17 


16 


67 


393 


9 


363 


49 


Sugar 
Tea 

Textiles 
Tourism 


5.5 


3/12/68 


Pari. Dem. Chief of 
Under State— Queen 
Const. Elizabeth II 
Monarch Governor 

General- 
Sir S. 
Ramgoolam 


Mauritius 
Mozambique 


1 


3.5 


220 


45 


35 


20 


737 


23 


385 


24 


Cashews 
Cotton 
Tea 
Shrimp 

Labor to South ' 
Africa 1 


38.7 


6/25/75 


Peoples 
Republic 


Pres S M. 
Machel 



ces. Commerce. 
ig, and Trade 



"Maj Gen Justinus Lekhanya deposed 
PM Jonathan on January 20. 1986. Lel<hanya 
heads the Governing Military Council. 



1986 



21 

































J 


Country 


Populatiort^ 


Culture 


Education 


Labor Fo 










Est. 
















Primary 














Est. 


Growth 


Life 














Students 








Familiar Name 






Total 


Rate 


Expect- 


Ethnic 










Lit- 


[Vo of 








OHicial Name 




Total 


1985 


1984-85 


ancy 


Groups 




Religior 






eracy 


age 


Total 


% in 


Hii 


(Earlier Name)^ 


Capital 


Sq. Mi. 


(mil) 


(%) 


(yrs) 


m 




m 




Language 


m 


group 


(mil) 


Agr. 


Othei 


Namibia 


Windhoek 


318,261 


1.1 


3.0 


NA 


African 


(86) 


Christian 


(60) 


Afrikaans 


39 


25 


0.5 


60 


40 


(Southwest Africa) 












European 
Mixed 


(7) 
(7) 


Indigenous 


(40) 


English 
German 
Local 












Niger 


Niamey 


490,000 


6.5 


3.3 


42 


Hausa 


(56) 


IVIuslim 


(80) 


French 


5 


15 


2.5 


90 


1 


Republic of Niger 












Djerma 


(22) 


Indigenous 




Hausa 










' 


(Niger) 












Fulani 


(9) 


and 




Djerma 
























Tuareg 


(8) 


Christian (20) 


























Other 


(5) 


















Nigeria 


Lagos 


357.000 


91.2 


3.4 


49 


Hausa- 




Muslim 


(47) 


English 


30 


42 


40 


60 


40 


Federal Republic 












Fulani 




Christian 


(34) 


Hausa 












of Nigeria 












Ibo 




Indigenous 


(19) 


Ibo 












(Nigeria) 












Yoruba 








Yoruba 












Rwanda 


Kigali 


10,169 


6.3 


3.7 


45 


Hutu 


(85) 


Christian 


(74) 


French 


37 


70 


2.7 


93 


7 


Republic of 












Tutsi 


(14) 


Indigenous 


(25) 


Kinyar- 












Rwanda 












Twa 


(1) 


Muslim 


(1) 


Wanda 
Kiswahali 












Sao Tome and 


Sao Tome 


372 


0.09 


0.8 


NA 


Portuguese 




Christian 


(80) 


Portuguese 


50 


NA 


0.02 


70 


3C 


Principe 












African 




Other 


(20) 












! 


Democratic Republic 












African 




















of S5o Tome 












Portuguese 




















and Principe 






























J 


Senegal 


Dakar 


76,000 


6.8 


3.2 


44 


Wolof 


(36) 


Muslim 


(80) 


French 


10 


53 


1.7 


70 


J 


Republic of Senegal 












Fulani 


(17) 


Christian 


(5) 


Wolof 












(Senegal) 












Sere 
Other 


(17) 
(30) 


Other 


(15) 


Pulaar 
Local 












Seychelles 


Victoria 


171 


0.07 


09 


66 


Seychellois 




Christian 


(98) 


English 


60 


95 


0.03 


19 


81 


Republic of 
















Other 


(2) 


French 












Seyctielles 




















Creole 










1 


(Seyclielles Colony) 






























J 


Sierra Leone 


Freetown 


27,925 


3.9 


2.6 


46 


Teme 




Indigenous 


(70) 


English 


15 


NA 


1.5 


75 


1 


Republic of 












IVIende 




Muslim 


(25) 


Krio 










■ 


Sierra Leone 
















Christian 


(5) 












II 


(Sierra Leone) 






























J 


Somalia 


Mogadishu 


246,155 


7.6 


3.0 


44 


Somali 


(85) 


Muslim 


(99) 


Somali 


10 


50 


2.2 


82 


18 


Somali Democratic 












Bantu 


(14) 


Other 


(1) 


Arabic 












Republic 












Other 


(1) 






English 












(British Somalia and 




















Italian 












Italian Somalia) 
































Soutli Africa 


Pretoria 


472,359 


32.5 


2.4 


66 


African 


(70) 


Christian 




English 


70 


89 


10.4 


30 


1 


Republic of 












White 


(18) 


Hindu 




Afrikaans 










m 


Soutfi Africa 












Colored 


(9) 


Muslim 




Zulu 










fl 


(Union ot South 












Asian 


(3) 


Indigenous 




Xhosa 










■ 


Attica) 




















Sotho 

Tswana 










n 



■Industry, Services. 
Commerce, and Government 



22 



Department of State Bull I 





— — __ 
































Sross Domestic P 


roduct 


Imports ^ Exports 


Est. US 


Government 


Country 


lua 

bill 

.5 


Growth 
Rate 


Per 
Capita 

(S) 


Frorr 
Agr. 


% 

From 
Ind. 


% 
From 
Other 


From 
US 
Total 1984 
f ($ mil) ($ mil) 


! 

Total 
(S mil) 


To 

US 

1984 

(S mil) 


Leading 
Exports 


Econ. 
Assist- 
ance 
FY 1985 
i ($ mil) 


Date of 
Independ- 
ence 


Type 


Chief of 
state and/or 

Head of 
Government 


Familiar 
Name 

j 


-7.0 


1429 


10 


6 


84 


988 


4 


1320 3 


Copper 
Uranium 
Diamonds 
Cattle 





Pending 


Interna- 
tional 
Territory 


— 


Namibia 


.0 


-0.8 


425 


44 


10 


46 


438 


2 


362 


05 


Uranium 
Livestock 
Covi/peas 


37.9 


8/3/60 


Republic 


Pres. (B. Gen.) 

Seyni 

Kountctie 


Niger 


.0 


-4.4 


760 


25 


10 


65 


12,100 


577 


10500 


2508 


Petroleum 
Cocoa 
Tin 
Coal 





10/1/60 


Federal 
Republic 


Pres. Ibrahim 
Babangida 


Nigeria 


5 


2,9 


270 


46 


15 


39 


182 


9 


114 


17 


Coffee 
Cassiterite 
Tea 
Pyretfirum 


11.4 


7/1/62 


Republic 


Pres. (Maj. Gen.) 
J. Habyarimana 


Rwanda 


3 


-10,0 


300 


40 


8 


52 


20 


NA" 


9 


NA" 


Cocoa 
Copra 
Palm 


0.3 


7/12/75 


Republic 


—J 

Pres. M. 
Pinto Da 
Costa 


Sao Tome 
and Prfncipe 


> 


-14.3 


400 


20 


20 


60 


820 


95 


498 


2 


Peanuts 

Pfiosphate 

Fish 


47.8 


4/4/60 


Republic 


Pres. A, Diouf 


Senegal 


> 

1 


-0.2 


2270 


7 


15 


78 


81 


0.5 


35 


0.3 


Tourism 

Copra 

Cinnamon 


2.3 


6/29/76 


Republic 


Pres F R. 
Rene 


Seychelles 


0.5 


256 


32 


23 


45 


126 


19 


104 


39 


Minerals 
Agricultural 
Products 


6.9 


4/27/61 


Republic 


Pres. Dr. S.P, 
Stevens 


Sierra Leone 




9.6 


375 


55 


7 


38 


407 


76 


101 


0,7 


Livestock 

Fruit 

Hides 


70.7 


7/1/60 


Republic 


Pres. (M. Gen.) 
Said Barre 


Somalia 


_ 


-3.0 


2500 


7 


24 


69 


4400 


2265 


8200 


2488 


Gold 

Ore 

Uranium 

Diamonds 

Wool 

Sugar 


106 


5/31/10 


Republic 


Pres, P,W. 
Botha 


South Africa 



;es. Commerce, 
g. and Trade 



Vt986 



23 































rce 

% In 
Other 


Country 


Population^ 


Culture 


Education 


Labor Fo 


Familiar Name 

Official Name 
(Earlier Name)' 


Capital 


Total 
Sq. Mi. 


Est. 
Total 
1985 
(mil) 


Est. 
Growth 

Rate 
1984-85 

(t) 


Life 
Expect- 
ancy 
(yrs) 


Ethnic 
Groups 


Religion 
(%) 


Language 


Lit- 
eracy 
(%) 


Primary 
Students 

(% of 
age 

group 


Total 
(mil) 


<X>in 
Agr. 


Sudan 

Democratic Republic 

of the Sudan 
(Anglo-Egyptian 

Sudan) 


Khartoum 


967,500 


21.8 


2.7 


47 


Black 
Arab 
Beja 
Other 


(52) 

(39) 

(6) 

(3) 


IVIuslim (70) 
Indigenous (25) 
Christian (5) 


Arabic 

English 

Local 


20 


50 


5.7 


78 


2a. 


Swaziland 

Kingdom of 

Swaziland 

(Swaziland) 


Mbabane 


6,704 


0.7 


3.0 


47 


African 
White 


(97) 
(3) 


Christian (57) 
Indigenous (43) 


English 
SiSwati 
Zulu 


65 


90 


0.4 


53 


47 


Tanzania 

United Republic 
of Tanzania 

(Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar) 


Dar es 
Salaam 


365,608 


21.7 


3.2 


52 


Over 130 
Groups 


Indigenous (34) 
Christian (33) 
Muslim (33) 


Swahili 
English 


66 


87 


7.2 


83 


17 


Togo 

Republic of Togo 
(French Togoland) 


Lome 


21,853 


3.0 


3.1 


47 


Ewe 
Mina 
Kabye 


Indigenous (60) 
Christian (20) 
Muslim (20) 


French 
Local 


18 


50 


1.2 


67 


15 


Uganda 

Republic of Uganda 
(■Uganda; 


Kampala 


91,076 


14.7 


3.2 


53 


Bantu 
Nilotic 
Sudanic 


Christian (66) 
Indigenous (18) 
Muslim (16) 


English 
Swahili 
Luganda 


52 


53 


5.8 


90 


10 


Zaire 

Republic of Zaire 
(Belgian Congo) 


Kinshasa 


905,063 


32.9 


2.9 


48 


Bantu 

80 Other Groups 


Christian (70) 
Indigenous (30) 


French 
English 
Lingala 
Other 


27 


90 


13.0 


75 


25 


Zambia 

Republic of Zambia 
(Northern Rhodesia) 
(Federation of 

Rhodesia and 

Nyasaland) 


Lusaka 


290,724 


6.8 


3.2 


47 


African 
Other 


(99) 
(1) 


Christian (51) 
Indigenous (48) 
Muslim (1) 


English 
70 Local 


54 


49 


2.7 


65 


35 
60 1 


Zimbabwe 

(Zimbabwe Rhodesia) 
(Southern Rhodesia) 


Harare 


150,333 


8.7 


3.3 


52 


African 

White 

Other 


(96) 
(3) 
(1) 


Christian (75) 
Indigenous (24) 
Other (1) 


English 
Shona 
Ndebele 


50 


90 


3.4 


35 



'Industry, Services. 
Commerce, and Governmenl 



24 



Department of State Bui ( 



Gross Domestic Product Imports Exports 


Est. US 
Econ. 

Assist- 
ance 
FY 1985 

(S mil) 


Government 


Country 


nnuai 
Sbil) 


Growtri 
Rate 

(%) 


1 

Per 

Capita 

(t) 


% 
From 
Agr. 


From 
Ind. 


1 

From 
Othert 


1 

Total 
(S mil) 


From 

US 

1984 

(S mil) 


I 

Total 
(Smil) 


I 

To 

US 

1984 

(S mil) 


1 

Leading 
Exports 


Date of 
Independ- 
ence 


Type 


Chief of 
State and/or 

Head of 
Government 


Familiar 
Name 


7.3 


-2.6 


364 


40 


6 


54 


1800 


136 


790 


20 


Cotton 

Gum Arabic 
Peanuts 


214.4 


1/1/56 


Republic 


Chairman 
(Gen.) Suwar 
el-Dahab 


Sudan 


0.6 


1.7 


900 


23 


33 


44 


464 


0.7 


330 


23 


Sugar 

Wood 

Tourism 

Iron 

Asbestos 


7.6 


9/6/68 


Monarchy 


Queen Regent 

Ntombi 

Thawala 
PM— B. DIamini 


Swaziland 


4.2 


0.6 


210 


54 


13 


33 


831 


44 


396 


12 


Coffee 
Cotton 
Sisal 
Spices 


39 


(Union) 
1964 


Republic 


Pres. All 

Hassan 

Mwinyi 


Tanzania 


1.0 


-3.2 


340 


27 


21 


52 


290 


13 


202 


35 


Phosphates 

Cocoa 

Coffee 


4.9 


4/27/60 


Republic 


Pres. (Gen.) 
G Eyadema 


Togo 


t.8 


5.0 


355 


55 


8 


37 


509 


3 


380 


93 


Coffee 

Tea 

Cotton 


7.8 


10/9/62 


Republic 


Chief of Slate 
(Gen.) T.O. 
Lutwa" 


Uganda 


1.4 


3.0 


570 


16 


30 


54 


1130 


82 


1611 


502 


Copper 
Cobalt 
Diamonds 
Coffee 


49.1 


6/30/60 


Republic 


Pres. (Marshal) 
Mobutu 
Sese Seko 


Zaire 


1.4 


1.7 


500 


14 


41 


45 


1060 


91 


1030 


124 


Copper 

Cobalt 

Zinc 

Lead 

Tobacco 


25.0 


10/24/64 


Republic 


Pres. Dr. K.D. 
Kaunda 


Zambia 


.6 


20 


870 


18 


32 


50 


1430 


63.6 


1120 


71 


Tobacco 
Chrome 
Textiles 
Grain 


37,6 


4/18/80 


Parliamen- 
tary System 


Pres, Dr, C 
Banana 

PM— Robert 
Mugabe 


Zimbabwe 



S vices. Commerce, 
Kiing, and Trade 



•■Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance 
Army seized power on January 27, 1986 Museveni 
was sworn in as President on January 29. 1986 



• sties are drawn from the latest, most reliable data available from a 

• sources, particularly from the Department of Slate's Background Notes 
Central Intelligence Agency's The World Factbook. which are periodical- 

loaied Therefore, except where indicated, no specific year can be 
mated for each category of statistics Furthermore, current figures do not 
in many cases (indicated by NA— not available), and some data are based 
S, Government estimates. 

The earlier name listing is included to identify for readers unfamiliar with 
earlier names by which some of the countnes have been known In some 
_ these names date to preindependence and in other instances relate to 
Wous postindependence regimes No political significance should be attached 
J lections, which are based largely on historical perceptions 

'Estimated and projected mid-year population and growth rates are from 
livear to mid-year. 



"Trade statistics with the United States have been combined for the Cape 
Verde Islands. Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Pnncipe Total 1984 imports 
from the United States were $29 7 million, and total 1984 exports to the United 
States were $0 9 million 

^Economic assistance includes development assistance. Economic Support 
Funds, and PL 480 Titles I, II, and III Refugee and emergency famine 
assistance, which amounted to $879 million in FY 1985, and military assistance 
are excluded Some regional funds for the African economic policy reform pro- 
gram also are not included, 

sThese funds do not go to the South African Government, AID'S program in 
South Afnca works directly with regional organizations, private voluntary 
organizations, local groups, and individuals for the improvement of educational 
and training opportunities lor South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid. 



a«1986 



25 



Bibliography 



Reference and Introductory 

African Bibliographic Center. Current 
Bibliogi-apby on African Affairs. 
New York: Greenwood Periodicals, 
quarterly editions. 

African Encylopedia. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1974. 

Africa South of the Sahara. London: 
Europa Publications, annual 
editions. 

Afiica Todav. London: Africa Journal 
Ltd., 198L 

Balandier, Georges, and Jacques Ma- 
quet. Dictionary of Black African 
Civilization. New York: Leon Amiel, 
1974. 

Bohannan, Paul and Philip Curtin. 
Africa and Africans. Garden City, 
N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1971. 

The Cambiidge Encyclopedia of Africa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. 

The Cambridge History of Africa. Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984. 

Foreign Area Studies, American Uni- 
versity. Area Handbooli Series. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, various editions. 

Legum, Colin, ed. Africa Contemporary 
Record: Annual Survey and 
Documents. New York: Holmes and 
Meier, annual editions. 

Martin, Phyllis, and Patrick O'Mara, 
eds. Africa. Bloomington, Ind.: In- 
diana University Press, 1977. 

New African Yearbook. London: LC. 
Magazines Ltd., 1983-84. 

Paden, John, and Edward Soja, eds. The 
African Experience. 3 vols. 
Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970. 




'7in 



Tobacco mortar, Zaire. 



Historical and Cultural Background , 

Bascom, William R. African Art in j 

Cultural Perspective. New York: 

W.W. Norton & Co., 1973. 
Curtin, Philip D., et al. African Histor 

Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1978. , 
Davidson, Basil. Let Freedom Come: 

Africa in Modem History. Boston: 

Little Brown & Co., 1978. 
Fage, J.D. A History of Africa. 

Westminster, Md.: Alfred A. Knof 

1979. 
Fanon, Franz. The Wretched of the 

Earth. New York: Grove Press, 

1965. 
Gibbs, James L., ed. Peoples of Africa 

New York: Holt, Rinehart and 

Winston, 1965. 
Greenberg, Joseph H. Essays in 

Linguistics. New York: Wenner- 

Gren Foundation for Anthropo- 
logical Research, 1957. 
. Language, Culture and 

Communications. Stanford: Stanfo 

University Press, 1971. j 

Gregersen, Edgar A. Language in 

Africa: An Introductory Survey. 

New York: Gordon and Breach. 

1977. 
Harris, Joseph E. Africans and Their 

Historv. New York: New Americi , 

Library, 1972. 
Larson, Charles R. The Emergency oi 

African Fiction. Rev. ed. New Yo 

Macmillan Press, 1978. 
; Mbiti, John S. Introduction to African 
\ Religion. New York: Praeger, 197 
: Murdoek, George P. Africa, Its Peopk 
: and Their Culture History. New 
I York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 197 
5 Posnansky, Merrick. "African Ar- 
' chaeology Comes of Age," World 

Archaeology (Feb. 1982). 
Ray, Benjamin C. African Religions: 

Symbol, Ritual and Community. 

Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1975. 
Skinner, Elliott P. Peoples and Cu/tia| 

of Africa: An Anthropological 

Reader. New York: Natural Hist. 

Press, 1973. 
Soyinka, Wole. Mydh, Literature and 
the African Woi-ld. New York: C: 

bridge University Press, 1979. 
Willet, Frank. African Art, A Concist 

History. New York: Praeger, 197 



26 



Department of State Bui j 




tt* 



FEATURE 
Sub-Saharan Africa 



ntemporary Sub-Saharan Africa 

ckffround Notes. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 
updated periodically for each 
country. 

am, Heribert, and Hei-man Giliomee. 
Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South 
Africa Change? New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979. 

)right, David E., ed. Communism in 
Africa. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1980. 

demicale, Berhanykun. The OA U and 
the UN: Relations Between the 
Organization of African Unity and 
the United Nations. New York: 
Africana Publishing Co., 1976. 

\youty, Yassin, and I. William Zart- 
man,"eds. The OAU After Twenty 
Years. New York: Praeger, 1984. 
g, Elliot, et al. Accelerated Develop- 
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1981. 

inen, Henry. Armies and Pai-ties in 
Africa. New York: Africana, 1978. 

:5ell, Richard E., and Chester A. 
Crocker, eds. South Africa into the 
1980s. Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Special Studies on Africa, 1979. 

i'ter, Gwendolyn M., and Patrick 
O'Meara, eds. International Politics 
in Southern Africa. Bloomington, 
Ind.: University Press, 1982. 



Cervenka, Zdenek. The Unfinished 
Quest for Unity: Africa and the 
OAU. London:" J. Friedman, 1977. 

Clough, Michael, ed. Changing Realities 
in Southern Afiica: Implications For 
American Policy. Berkeley: Institute 
of International Studies, University 
of California at Berkeley, 1982. 

Hance, William A. The Geography of 
Modem Africa. Rev. ed. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1975. 

Kamarck, Andrew. The Economics of 
African Development. Rev. ed. New 
York: Praeger, 1971. 

Kitchen, Helen A. Africa: From 

Mystery to Maze. Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1976. 

U.S. Interests in Africa. 

New York: Praeger, 1983. 

and Michael Clough. The 



United States and South Africa: 
Realities and Red Herrings. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 
Georgetown University, 1984. 

Kuper, Leo. The Pity of It All- 
Polarization of Racial and Ethnic 
Relations. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota, 1977. 

Lowenkopf, Martin. "Mozambique: The 
Nkomati Accord." Forthcoming, 
1986. 

Nyerere, Julius K. Freedom and Unity. 
London: Oxford University Press, 
1966. 



Rosberg, Carl G., and Thomas M. 
Callaghy, eds. Socialism in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: A New Assessment. 
Berkeley: Institute of International 
Studies, University of Califomia at 
Berkeley, 1979. 

Rotberg, Robert. Namibia: Political and 
Economic Prospects. Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983. 

Study Commission on U.S. Pohcy 

Toward South Africa. South Africa: 
Time Running Out. Berkeley: 
University of Califomia Press, 1981. 

Young, Crawford. The Politics of 

Cultural Plui-alism. Madison, Wise: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1976. 

Zolberg, Aristide R. Creating Political 
Order. Chicago: Rand McNally and 
Co., 1966. ■ 



Part 1, providing a regional profile 
of sub-Saharan Africa (geogi-aphy, 
history, people, political pi-ocesses, 
economy, and multilateral organi- 
zations) was printed in the April 
1986 Bulletin. ■ 



I 1986 



27 



THE PRESIDENT 



Central America 
and U.S. Security 



President Reagan's address 

to the nation 

of March 16, 1986 A 



My fellow Americans, I must speak to 
you tonight about a mounting danger in 
Central America that threatens the 
security of the United States. This 
danger will not go away; it will grow 
worse, much worse, if we fail to take 
action now. I am speaking of Nicaragua, 
a Soviet ally on the American mainland 
only 2 hours flying time from our own 
borders. With over a billion dollars in 
Soviet-bloc aid, the communist Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua has launched a 
campaign to subvert and topple its 
democratic neighbors. 

Using Nicaragua as a base, the 
Soviets and Cubans can become the 
dominant power in the crucial corridor 
between North and South America. Es- 
tablished there, they will be in a posi- 
tion to threaten the Panama Canal, 
interdict our vital Caribbean sealanes, 
and, ultimately, move against Mexico. 
Should that happen, desperate Latin 
peoples by the millions would begin flee- 
ing north into the cities of the southern 
United States or to wherever some hope 
of freedom remained. 

The U.S. Congress has before it a 
proposal to help stop this threat. The 
legislation is an aid package of $100 mil- 
lion for the more than 20,000 freedom 
fighters struggling to bring democracy 
to their country and eliminate this com- 
munist menace at its source. But this 
$100 million is not an additional $100 
million. We are not asking for a single 
dime in new money. We are asking only 
to be permitted to switch a small part 
of our present defense budget— to the 
defense of our own southern frontier. 

Gathered in Nicaragua already are 
thousands of Cuban military advisers, 
contingents of Soviets and East Ger- 
mans, and all the elements of interna- 
tional terror— from the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] to Italy's Red 
Brigades. Why are they there? Because, 
as Colonel Qadhafi has publicly exulted: 
"Nicaragua means a great thing, it 



means fighting America near its 
borders— fighting America at its 
doorstep." 

For our own security, the United 
States must deny the Soviet Union a 
beachhead in North America. But let me 
make one thing plain. I am not talking 
about American troops. They are not 
needed; they have not been requested. 
The democratic resistance fighting in 
Nicaragua is only asking America for 
the supplies and support to save their 
own country from communism. 

The question the Congress of the 
United States will now answer is a sim- 
ple one: vdll we give the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance the means to 
recapture their betrayed revolution, or 
vwll we turn our backs and ignore the 
malignancy in Managua until it spreads 
and becomes a mortal threat to the en- 
tire New World? Will we permit the 
Soviet Union to put a second Cuba, a 
second Libya, right on the doorstep of 
the United States? 

The Nicaraguan Threat 

How can such a small country pose such 
a great threat? Well, it is not Nicaragua 
alone that threatens us, but those using 
Nicaragua as a privileged sanctuary for 
their struggle against the United States. 

Their first target is Nicaragua's 
neighbors. With an army and militia of 
120,000 men, backed bymore than 3,000 
Cuban military advisers, Nicaragua's 
Armed Forces are the largest Central 
America has ever seen. The Nicaraguan 
military machine is more powerful than 
all its neighbors combined. 

This map [appears on TV screen] 
represents much of the Western 
Hemisphere. Now let me show you the 
countries in Central America where 
weapons supplied by Nicaraguan com- 
munists have been found: Honduras, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala. 
Radicals from Panama to the south have 
been trained in Nicaragua. But the San- 
dinista revolutionary reach extends well 



beyond their immediate neighbors. In 
South America and the Caribbean, the 
Nicaraguan communists have provided 
support in the form of military trainin 
safe haven, communications, false doci 
ments, safe transit, and sometimes 
weapons to radicals from the following: 
countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and the 
Dominican RepubUc. Even that is not 
all, for there was an old communist sk 
gan that the Sandinistas have made 
clear they honor: the road to victory 
goes through Mexico. 

If maps, statistics, and facts aren't 
persuasive enough, we have the words 
of the Sandinistas and Soviets them- 
selves. One of the highest level San- 
dinista leaders was asked by an 
American magazine whether their con 
munist revolution will— and I quote— 
"be exported to El Salvador, then 
Guatemala, then Honduras, and then 
Mexico?" He responded, "That is one 
historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan 
that is absolutely true." 

Well, the Soviets have been no les 
candid. A few years ago, then Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko noted that 
Central America was "boiling like a 
cauldron" and ripe for revolution. In i 
Moscow meeting in 1983, Soviet Chief 
Staff Marshal Ogarkov declared: "Ove 
two decades there was only Cuba in 
Latin America. Today there are 
Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious 
battle is going on in El Salvador." 

But we don't need their quotes; th 
American forces who liberated Grenad 
captured thousands of documents that 
demonstrated Soviet intent to bring 
communist revolution home to the 
Western Hemisphere. 

The Nature of the 
Sandinista Regime 

So, we're clear on the intentions of thi 
Sandinistas and those who back them. 
Let us be equally clear about the natu 
of their regime. To begin with, the Sai 
dinistas have revoked the civil libertie 
of the Nicaraguan people, depriving 
them of any legal right to speak, to pc 
lish, to assemble, or to worship freely 
Independent newspapers have been sh 
down. There is no longer any indepenc 
ent labor movement in Nicaragfua or a 
right to strike. As AFL-CIO [Americi 
Federation of Labor and Congress of 1 
dustrial Organizations] leader Lane 
Kirkland has said, "Nicaragua's head- 
long rush into the totalitarian camp ca 
not be denied— by anyone who has eye 
to see." 



n 



28 



Department of State Bull<| 



THE PRESIDENT 



Well, like communist governments 
rywhere, the Sandinistas have 
iched assaults against ethnic and 
ious groups. The capital's only syna- 
e was desecrated and firebombed— 
entire Jewish community forced to 
Nicaragua. Protestant Bible meet- 
ip have been broken up by raids, by 

violence, by machineguns. The 
holic Church has been singled out— 
sts have been expelled from the 
try. Catholics beaten in the streets 
ir attending Mass. The Catholic pri- 
i e of Nicaragua, Cardinal Obando y 
ivo, has put the matter forthrightly. 
Is want to state clearly," he says, 
tot this government is totalitarian. 
J are dealing with an enemy of the 
iirch." 

Evangelical pastor Prudencio 
^odano found out he was on a San- 
iteta hit list when an army patrol 
i?d his name. "You don't kriow what 
do to the evangelical pastors. We 



don't believe in God," they told him. 
Pastor Baltodano was tied to a tree, 
struck in the forehead with a rifle butt, 
stabbed in the neck with a bayonet- 
finally, his ears were cut off, and he was 
left for dead. "See if your God will save 
you," they mocked. Well, God did have 
other plans for Pastor Baltodano. He 
lived to tell the world his story— to tell 
it, among other places, right here in the 
White House. 

I could go on about this nightmare— 
the blacklists, the secret prisons, the 
Sandinista-directed mob violence. But, 
as if all this brutality at home were not 
enough, the Sandinistas are transform- 
ing their nation into a safe house, a 
command post for international terror. 

The Sandinistas not only sponsor 
terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and Honduras— terror that 
led last summer to the murder of four 
U.S. marines in a cafe in San Salvador— 
they provide a sanctuary for terror. 



Italy has charged Nicaragua with har- 
boring their worst terrorists, the Red 
Brigades. 

The Sandinistas have even involved 
themselves in the international drug 
trade. I know every American parent 
concerned about the drug problem will 
be outraged to learn that top 
Nicaraguan Government officials are 
deeply involved in drug trafficking. This 
picture [see below], secretly taken at a 
military airfield outside Managua, shows 
Frederico Vaughn, a top aide to one of 
the nine comandantes who rule 
Nicaragua, loading an aircraft with ille- 
gal narcotics bound for the United 
States. No, there seems to be no crime 
to which the Sandinistas will not 
stoop— this is an outlaw regime. 



"HIP 



.5e*f 




la 1986 



29 



THE PRESIDENT 



United States 




U.S. Security Interests and the 
Nicaragruan Democratic Resistance 

If we return for a moment to our map 
[see above], it becomes clear why having 
this regime in Central America imperils 
our vital security interests. 

Through this crucial part of the 
Western Hemisphere passes almost half 
our foreign trade, more than half our 
imports of crude oil, and a significant 
portion of the military supplies we 
would have to send to the NATO alli- 
ance in the event of a crisis. These are 
the chokepoints where the sealanes 
could be closed. 

Central America is strategic to our 
Western alliance, a fact always under- 
stood by foreign enemies. In World War 
II, only a few German U-boats, operat- 
ing from bases 4,000 miles away in Ger- 



many and occupied Europe, inflicted 
crippling losses on U.S. shipping right 
off our southern coast. 

Today, Warsaw Pact engineers are 
building a deep water port on Nica- 
ragua's Caribbean coast, similar to the 
naval base in Cuba for Soviet-built sub- 
marines. They are also constructing, 
outside Managua, the largest military 
airfield in Central America— similar to 
those in Cuba, from which Russian Bear 
bombers patrol the U.S. east coast from 
Maine to Florida. 

How did this menace to the peace 
and security of our Latin neighbors and, 
ultimately, ourselves suddenly emerge? 
Let me give you a brief history. 

In 1979, the people of Nicaragua 
rose up and overthrew a corrupt dic- 
tatorship. At first, the revolutionary 
leaders promised free elections and 



respect for human rights. But among | 
them was an organization called the 
Sandinistas. Theirs was a communist o' 
ganization, and their support of the I 
revolutionary goals was sheer deceit. 
Quickly and ruthlessly, they took ' 
complete control. 

Two months after the revolution, t 
Sandinista leadership met in secret an' 
in what came to be known as the I 
"72-Hour Document," described them-' 
selves as the "vanguard" of a revolutil 
that would sweep Central America, ' 
Latin America, and, finally, the world-' 
Their true enemy, they declared: the ' 
United States. 

Rather than make this document 
public, they followed the advice of Fid 
Castro, who told them to put on a 
facade of democracy. While Castro 
viewed the democratic elements in 



30 



Department of State Bulled 



THE PRESIDENT 



saragua with contempt, he urg'ed his 
:araguan friends to keep some of 
Im in their coalition, in minor posts, 
•iwindow dressing to deceive the West. 
^d that way, Castro said, you can 
ue your revolution, and the Ameri- 
iis will pay for it. 
And we did pay for it. More aid 
ved to Nicaragiia from the United 
;.tes in the first 18 months under the 
adinistas than from any other coun- 
r. Only when the mask fell, and the 
G of totalitarianism became visible to 
r world, did the aid stop. 
Confronted with this emerging 
:eat, early in our Administration I 
'it to Congress and, with bipartisan 
sport, managed to get help for the 
aons surrounding Nicaragua. Some of 
f. may remember the inspiring scene 
';n the people of El Salvador braved 
) threats and gunfire of the com- 
nist guerrillas— guerrillas directed 
• supplied from Nicaragua— and went 
ihe polls to vote decisively for 
?iocracy. For the communists in El 
i'ador it was a humiliating defeat. 
But there was another factor the 
tmunists never counted on, a factor 
1 now promises to give freedom a 
^nd chance— the freedom fighters of 
i iragua. 

You see, when the Sandinistas 
:'ayed the revolution, many who had 
ifht the old Somoza dictatorship hter- 
1 took to the hills and, like the 
inch Resistance that fought the 
iis, began fighting the Soviet-bloc 
munists and theii- Nicaraguan col- 
trators. These few have now been 
ijd by thousands. 
With their blood and courage, the 
:dom fighters of Nicaragua have 
(ed down the Sandinista army and 
i>ht the people of Central America 
•ious time. We Americans owe them 
tbt of gratitude. In helping to thwart 
iSaiidinistas and their Soviet men- 
I, the resistance has contributed 
':tly to the security of the United 
les. 

Since its inception in 1982, the 
mcratic resistance has grown dra- 
' tally in strength. Today, it numbers 
■ t han 20,000 volunteers, and more 
• i\ ery day. But now the freedom 
ei's' supplies are running short, and 
ai-e virtually defenseless against 
"lehcopter gunships Moscow has sent 
anagua. 



A Crucial Test 

Now comes the crucial test for the Con- 
gress of the United States. Will they 
provide the assistance the freedom 
fighters need to deal with Russian tanks 
and gunships, or will they abandon the 
democratic resistance to its communist 
enemy? 

In answering that question, I hope 
Congress will reflect deeply upon what 
it is the resistance is fighting against in 
Nicaragua. Ask yourselves, what in the 
world are Soviets, East Germans, Bul- 
garians, North Koreans, Cubans, and 
terrorists from the PLO and the Red 
Brigades doing in our hemisphere, 
camped on our own doorstep? Is that 
for peace? 

Why have the Soviets invested $600 
million to build Nicaragua into an armed 
force almost the size of Mexico's— a 
country 15 times as large and 25 times 
as populous. Is that for peace? 

Why did Nicaragua's dictator, Daniel 
Ortega, go to the Communist Party 
Congress in Havana and endorse 
Castro's call for the worldwide triumph 
of communism? Was that for peace? 

Some Members of Congress ask me, 
why not negotiate? That's a good ques- 
tion, and let me answer it directly. We 
have sought, and still seek, a negotiated 
peace and a democratic future in a free 
Nicaragua. Ten times we have met and 
tried to reason with the Sandinistas. 
Ten times we were rebuffed. Last year, 
we endorsed church-mediated negotia- 
tions between the regime and the 
resistance. The Soviets and the San- 
dinistas responded with a rapid anns 
buildup of mortars, tanks, artillery, and 
helicopter gimships. 

Clearly, the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact have grasped the great 
stakes involved, the strategic impor- 
tance of Nicaragua. The Soviets have 
made their decision— to support the com- 
munists. Fidel Castro has made his 
decision— to support the communists. 
Arafat, Qadhafi, and the Ayatollah 
Khomeini have made their decision— to 
support the communists. Now, we must 
make our decision. With Congress' help, 
we can prevent an outcome deeply inju- 
rious to the national security of the 
United States. If we fail, there will be 
no evading responsibility— history wil] 
hold us accountable. This is not some 
narrow partisan issue; it's a national 
security issue, an issue on which we 
must act not as Republicans, not as 
Democrats, but as Americans. 



Forty years ago. Republicans and 
Democrats joined together behind the 
Truman Doctrine. It must be our policy, 
Hai-ry Truman declared, to support peo- 
ples struggling to preserve their free- 
dom. Under that doctrine. Congress 
sent aid to Greece just in time to save 
that country from the closing grip of a 
communist tyranny. We saved freedom 
in Greece then— and with that same 
bipartisan spirit, we can save freedom in 
Nicaragua today. 

Over the coming days, I will con- 
tinue the dialogue with Members of 
Congress, talking to them, listening to 
them, hearing out their concerns. Sena- 
tor Scoop Jackson, who led the fight on 
Capitol Hill for an awareness of the 
danger in Central America, said it best: 
on matters of national security, the best 
politics is no pohtics. 

You know, recently one of our most 
distinguished Ameiicans, Clare Boothe 
Luce, had this to say about the coming 
vote. "In considering this crisis," Mrs. 
Luce said, "my mind goes back to a 
similar moment in our history— back to 
the first years after Cuba had fallen to 
Fidel. One day during those years, I 
had lunch at the White House with a 
man I had knowTi since he was a boy- 
John F. Kennedy. 'Mr. President,' I 
said, 'no matter how exalted or great a 
man may be, history vrill have time to 
give him no more than one sentence. 
George Washington— he founded our 
country. Abraham Lincoln— he freed the 
slaves and preserved the Union. 
Winston Churchill— he saved Europe.' 
'And what, Clare,' John Kennedy said, 
'did you believe— or do you beheve my 
sentence will be?' 'Mr. President,' she 
answered, 'your sentence will be that 
you stopped the communists— or that 
you did not.' " 

Well, tragically, John Kennedy never 
had the chance to decide which that 
would be. Now, leaders of our own time 
must do so. My fellow Americans, you 
know where I stand. The Soviets and 
Sandinistas must not be permitted to 
crush freedom in Central America and 
threaten our own security on our own 
doorstep. 

Now the Congress must decide 
where it stands. Mrs. Luce ended by 
saying: "Only this is certain. Through 
all time to come, this, the 99th Congress 
of the United States, will be remem- 
bered as that body of men and women 
that either stopped the communists 
before it was too late— or did not." 



I 1986 



31 



THE PRESIDENT 



So tonight I ask you to do what 
you've done so often in the past. Get in 
touch with youi" Representative and 
Senators and urge them to vote yes; tell 
them to help the freedom fighters— help 
us prevent a communist takeover of 
Central America. 

I have only 3 years left to serve my 
country, 3 years to carry out the 
responsibihties you entrusted to me, 3 
years to work for peace. Could there be 
any greater tragedy than for us to sit 
back and permit this cancer to spread, 
leaving my successor to face far more 
agonizing decisions in the years ahead? 
The freedom fighters seek a political so- 
lution. They are willing to lay down 
their arms and negotiate to restore the 
original goals of the revolution, a 



democracy in which the people of 
Nicaragua choose their own govern- 
ment. That is our goal also, but it can 
only come about if the democratic 
resistance is able to bring pressure to 
bear on those who have seized power. 

We still have time to do what must 
be done so history will say of us, we 
had the vision, the courage, and good 
sense to come together and act- 
Republicans and Democrats— when the 
price was not high and the risks were 
not great. We left America safe, we left 
America secure, we left America free- 
still a beacon of hope to mankind, still a 
light unto the nations. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 24, 1986. 



Freedom, Regional Security, 
and Global Peace 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS. 
MAR. 14, 1986' 

I. America's Stake in 
Regional Security 

For more than two generations, the 
United States has pursued a global for- 
eign policy. Both the causes and conse- 
quences of World War II made clear to 
all Americans that our participation in 
world affairs, for the rest of the century 
and beyond, would have to go beyond 
just the protection of our national terri- 
tory against direct invasion. We had 
learned the painful lessons of the 1930s, 
that there could be no safety in isolation 
from the rest of the world. Our nation 
has responsibilities and security in- 
terests beyond our borders— in the rest 
of this hemisphere, in Europe, in the 
Pacific, in the Middle East, and in other 
regions— that require strong, confident, 
and consistent American leadership. 

In the past several weeks, we have 
met these responsibilities— in difficult 
circumstances— in Haiti and in the 
Philippines. We have made important 
proposals for peace in Central America 
and southern Africa. There and else- 
where, we have acted in the belief that 
our peaceful and prosperous future can 
best be assured in a world in which 
other peoples, too, can determine their 
own destiny, free of coercion or tyranny 
from either at home or abroad. 



The prospects for such a future— to 
which America has contributed in in- 
numerable ways— seem brighter than 
they have been in many years. Yet we 
cannot ignore the obstacles that stand in 
its path. We cannot meet our responsi- 
bilities and protect our interests without 
an active diplomacy backed by American 
economic and military power. We should 
not expect to solve problems that are in- 
soluble, but we must not be half-hearted 
when there is a prospect of success. 
Wishful thinking and stop-and-go com- 
mitments will not protect America's 
interests. 

Our foreign policy in the postwar 
era has sought to enhance our nation's 
security by pursuit of four fundamental 
goals: 

• We have sought to defend and ad- 
vance the cause of democracy, freedom, 
and human rights throughout the world. 

• We have sought to promote 
prosperity and social progress through a 
free, open, and expanding market- 
oriented global economy. 

• We have worked diplomatically 
to help resolve dangerous regional 
conflicts. 

• We have worked to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the danger of 
nuclear war. 

Sustained by a strong bipartisan 
consensus, these basic principles have 
weathered contentious domestic debates 



through eight administrations, both 
Democratic and Republican. They have 
survived the gi-eat and rapid changes of 
an ever-evolving world. 

There are good reasons for this con- 
tinuity. These broad goals are linked 
together, and they, in turn, match both 
our ideals and our interests. No other 
policy could command the broad suppor 
of the American people. 

A foreign policy that ignored the 
fate of millions around the world who 
seek freedom would be a betrayal of ou 
national heritage. Our own freedom, an 
that of our allies, could never be secure 
in a world where freedom was threat- 
ened everywhere else. Our stake in the 
global economy gives us a stake in the 
well-being of others. 

A foreign policy that overlooked th( 
dangers posed by international conflicts 
that did not work to bring them to a 
peaceful resolution, would be irrespon- 
sible—especially in an age of nuclear 
weapons. These conflicts and the ten- 
sions that they generate are, in fact, a 
major spur to the continued buildup of 
nuclear arsenals. For this reason, my 
Administration has made plain that con 
tinning Soviet adventurism in the de- 
veloping world is inimical to global 
security and an obstacle to fundamenta 
improvement of Soviet-American 
relations. 

Our stake in resolving regional con- 
flicts can be simply stated: greater free i 
dom for others means greater peace an 
security for ourselves. These goals 
threaten no one, but none of them can i 
be achieved without a strong, active, 
and engaged America. 

I 

II. Regional Security in the 1980s \ 

Our efforts to promote freedom, 
prosperity, and security must take ac- i 
count of the diversity of regional con- i 
flicts and of the conditions in which the! 
arise. Most of the world's turbulence i 
has indigenous causes, and not every | 
regional conflict should be viewed as | 
part of the East- West conflict. And we< 
should be alert to historic changes in • 
the international environment, for thes': 
create both new problems and new i 
opportunities. Three such realities mus| 
define American policies in the 1980s. | 

Soviet Exploitation of Regional 
Conflicts. The first involves the naturi 
of the threat we face. The fact is in th(| 
1970s the challenge to regional securitj 
became— to a greater degree than 
before— the challenge of Soviet expan- [ 
sionism. Around the world we saw a 



32 



Department of State Bullei 



THE PRESIDENT 



IV thrust by our adversaries to spread 
nmunist dictatorships and to put our 
n security (and that of friends and al- 

at risk. The Soviet Union— and 
bts like Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya— 
Dplied enoi-mous quantities of money, 
:ns, and training in efforts to destabi- 
' and overthrow vulnerable govem- 
nts on nearly every continent. By the 
rUs the long-proclaimed Soviet doc- 

;ie of "wars of national liberation" 
B for the first time backed by a 
Ibal capability to project military 
iver. The Soviets appeared to con- 
de that the global "correlation of 
ces" was shifting inexorably in their 
or. 

The world now knows the results, 
>ve all the staggering human toll, 
rderous pohcies in Vietnam and Cam- 
■ia produced victims on a scale 
cnown since the genocides of Hitler 
Stalin. In Afghanistan, the Soviet 
ision led to the teriified flight of mil- 
s from their homes. In Ethiopia, we 
e witnessed death by famine and 
(■e recently by forced resettlement; 

1 in South Yemen this year, factional 
ng that consumed thousands of lives 

span of a few days. 
These have been only the most bor- 
ing consequences. Other outgrowths 
'Oviet policies have been the colonial 
lence of tens of thousands of Cuban 
'ps in Africa, the activities of ter- 
sts trained in facihties in the Soviet 
|, and the effort to use communist 
iiragua as a base from which to ex- 
uish democracy in El Salvador and 
ond. 

rhese are not isolated events. They 
e up the disturbing pattern of 
let conduct in the past 15 years. The 
)lems it creates are no less acute be- 
e tlie Soviet Union has had its 
i'e of disagreements with some of its 
iits or because many of these in- 
iements have proved very costly, 
t the Soviet leadership persists in 
\ policies despite the growing burden 
t impose only testifies to the 
igth of Soviet commitment. Unless 
:)uild barriers to Soviet ambitions 
jcreate incentives for Soviet re- 
int, Soviet policies will remain a 
jce of danger— and the most impor- 
I obstacle to the future spread of 
iiom. 

n my meetings and other communi- 
Ins with Soviet General Secretary 
kchev, and in my address before 
!JN General Assembly last October, 
ve made clear the importance the 
ed States attaches to the resolution 
gional conflicts that threaten world 



peace and the yearning of millions for 
freedom and independence— whether in 
Afghanistan or in southern Afiica. 

For the United States, these con- 
flicts cannot be regarded as peripheral 
to other issues on the global agenda. 
They raise fundamental issues and are a 
fundamental part of the overall U.S.- 
Soviet relationship. Their resolution 
would represent a crucial step toward 
the kind of world that all Americans 
seek and have been seeking for over 
forty years. 

Joining Others' Strength to Ours. 

The second reality that shapes Ameri- 
ca's approach to regional security is the 
need to join our own strength to" the 
efforts of others in working toward our 
common goals. 

Throughout the postwar period, our 
country has played an enormous role in 
helping other nations, in many parts of 
the world, to protect their freedom. 
Through NATO we committed ourselves 
to the defense of Europe against Soviet 
attack. Through the Marshall Plan we 
helped Western Europe to rebuild its 
economy and strengthen democratic in- 
stitutions. We sent American troops to 
Korea to repel a communist invasion. 
America was an ardent champion of 
decolonization. We provided security 
assistance to help fi-iends and allies 
around the world defend themselves. 
We extended our hand to those govern- 
ments that sought to free themselves 
from dependence on the Soviet Union; 
success in such efforts— whether by Yu- 
goslavia, Egypt, China, or others— has 
contributed significantly to international 
security. 

Despite our economic and military 
strength and our leading political role, 
the pursuit of American goals has al- 
ways required cooperation with like- 
minded partners. The problems we face 
today, however, make cooperation with 
others even more important. This is, in 
part, a result of the limits on our own 
resources, of the steady growth in the 
power of our adversaries, and of the 
American people's understandable reluc- 
tance to shoulder alone burdens that are 
properly shared with others. But most 
important, we want to cooperate with 
others because of the nature of our 
goals. Stable regional solutions depend 
over the long term on what those most 
directly affected can contribute. If inter- 
ference by outsiders can be ended, 
regional security is best protected by 
the free and independent countries of 
each region. 



The Democratic Revolution. If 

American policy can succeed only in 
cooperation with others, then the third 
critical development of the past decade 
offers special hope: it is the democratic 
revolution, a trend that has significantly 
increased the ranks of those around the 
world who share America's commitment 
to national independence and popular 
rule. 

The democracies that survived or 
emerged from the ruins of the Second 
World War— Western Europe, Japan, 
and a handful of others— have now been 
joined by many others across the globe. 
Here in the Western Hemisphere, the 
1980s have been a decade of transition 
to democracy. Today, over 90% of the 
population of Latin America and the 
Caribbean hve under governments that 
are democratic— in contrast to only one- 
third a decade ago. In less than 6* years, 
popularly elected democrats have 
replaced dictators in Argentina, Bolivia, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, and Grenada. 

In other parts of the world, we see 
friends and allies moving in the same 
direction. Eariier in this decade, the 
people of Turkey fought back a violent 
assault on democracy from both left and 
right. Similarly, since the fall of Viet- 
nam, the noncommunist nations of 
Southeast Asia have ralUed together; 
with prosperous economies and effec- 
tive, increasingly democratic national 
governments, they play an increasingly 
important role on the world stage. 

These trends are far from accidental. 
Ours is a time of enormous social and 
technological change everywhere, and 
one country after another is discovering 
that only free peoples can make the 
most of this change. Countries that 
want progress without pluraUsm, 
without freedom, are finding that it can- 
not be done. 

In this global revolution, there can 
be no doubt where America stands. The 
American people believe in human 
rights and oppose tyranny in whatever 
form, whether of the left'or the right. 
We use our influence to encourage 
democratic change, in careful ways that 
respect other countries' traditions and 
political realities as well as the security 
threats that many of them face from 
external or internal forces of totali- 
tarianism. 

The people of the Philippines are 
now revitalizing their democratic tradi- 
tions. The people of Haiti have their 
first chance in three decades to direct 
their own affairs. Advocates of peaceful 
political change in South Africa are 



1986 



33 



THE PRESIDENT 



seeking an alternative to violence as 
well as to apartheid. All these efforts 
evoke the deepest American sympathy. 
American support will be ready, in 
these countries and elsewhere, to help 
democracy succeed. 

But the democratic revolution does 
not stop here. There is another, newer 
phenomenon as well. In recent years, 
Soviet ambitions in the developing 
world have run head-on into a new form 
of resistance. Peoples on every conti- 
nent are insisting on their right to na- 
tional independence and their right to 
choose their government free of coer- 
cion. The Soviets overreached in the 
1970s, at a time when America weak- 
ened itself by its internal divisions. In 
the 1980s the Soviets and their clients 
are finding it difficult to consolidate 
these gains— in part because of the 
revival of American and Western self- 
confidence but mainly because of the 
courageous forces of indigenous resist- 
ance. Growing resistance movements 
now challenge communist regimes in- 
stalled or maintained by the military 
power of the Soviet Union and its 
colonial agents— in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. 

We did not create this historical 
phenomenon, but we must not fail to 
respond to it. 

In Afghanistan, Moscow's invasion 
to preserve the puppet government it 
installed has met stiff and growing 
resistance by Afghans who are fighting 
and dying for their country's independ- 
ence. Democratic forces in Cambodia, 
once all but annihilated by the Khmer 
Rouge, are now waging a similar battle 
against occupation and a puppet regime 
imposed by communist Vietnam. 

In Angola, Jonas Savimbi and his 
UNITA [National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola] forces have 
waged an armed struggle against the 
Soviet- and Cuban-backed Marxist re- 
gime, and in recent years UNITA has 
steadily expanded the territory under 
its control. 

In Nicaragua, the democratic resist- 
ance forces fighting against another 
Soviet- and Cuban-backed regime have 
been holding their own— despite their 
lack of significant outside help and 
despite the massive influx of the most 
sophisticated Soviet weaponry and thou- 
sands of Soviet, Cuban, and Soviet-bloc 
advisers. 

The failure of these Soviet client re- 
gimes to consolidate themselves only 
confirms the moral and political bank- 
ruptcy of the Leninist model. No one 
can be surprised by this. But it also 



reflects the dangerous and destabilizing 
international impact that even unpopular 
Leninist regimes can have. None of 
these struggles is a purely internal one. 
As I told the UN General Assembly last 
year, the assault of such regimes on 
their own people inevitably becomes a 
menace to their neighbors. Hence the 
threats to Pakistan and Thailand by the 
powerful occupying armies in Af- 
ghanistan and Cambodia. Hence the in- 
security of El Salvador, Costa Rica, and 
Honduras in the face of the Nicaraguan 
military buildup. 

Soviet-style dictatorships, in short, 
are an almost unique threat to peace, 
both before and after they consolidate 
their rule— fee/ore, because the war they 
wage against their own people does not 
always stay within their own borders, 
and after, because the elimination of 
opposition at home frees their hand for 
subversion abroad. Cuba's foreign ad- 
ventures of the past decade are a warn- 
ing to the neighbors of communist 
regimes everywhere. 

The drive for national freedom and 
popular rule takes different forms in 
different countries, for each nation is 
the authentic product of a unique his- 
tory and cultui'e. In one case, a people's 
resistance may spring from deep reli- 
gious belief; in another, from the bonds 
of ethnic or tribal solidarity; in yet 
another, from the grievances of colonial 
rule or from the failure of an alien ideol- 
ogy to contribute to national progress. 
Our traditions and the traditions of 
those whom we help can hardly be iden- 
tical. And their programs will not al- 
ways match our own experience and 
preferences. This is to be expected. The 
real question is: can our policy— of active 
American support— increase the likeli- 
hood of democratic outcomes? I believe 
it can. 

III. The Tools of American Policy 

These three realities of the 1980s-the 
new thrust of Soviet interventionism, 
the need for free nations to join 
together, the democratic revolution— are 
inseparable. Soviet power and policy 
cannot be checked vrithout the active 
commitment of the United States. And 
we cannot achieve lasting results 
without giving support to— and receiving 
support from— those whose goals co- 
incide with ours. 

These realities call for new ways of 
thinking about how to cope with the 
challenge of Soviet power. Since Harry 
Truman's day, through administrations 
of both parties, American policy toward 



the Soviet Union has consistently set it- 
self the goal of containing Soviet expan-i; 
sionism. Today, that goal is more ij 

relevant and more important than ever.ji 
But how do we achieve it in today's | 
new conditions? {'i 

First of all, we must face up to the i 
arrogant Soviet pretension known as th'i; 
Brezhnev doctrine: the claim that Sovie^, 
gains are irreversible; that once a Sovien 
client begins to oppress its people and r 
threaten its neighbors it must be al- 
lowed to oppress and threaten them 
forever. This claim has no moral or po- 
litical validity whatsoever. Regimes tha 
cannot live in peace with either their 
own people or their neighbors forfeit 
their legitimacy in world affairs. 

Second, we must take full account o 
the striking trend that I have men- 
tioned: the growing ranks of those who '' 
share our interests and values. In 1945 
so much of the burden of defending frei 
dom I'ested on our shoulders alone. In 
the 1970s some Americans were pes- 
simistic about whether our values of 
democracy and freedom were relevant r 
to the new developing nations. Now we 'J 
know the answer. The gi-owing appeal ( 
democracy, the desire of all nations for ' 
true independence, are the hopeful basi 
for a new world of peace and security 
into the next century. A world of diver- 
sity, a world in which other nations [' 
choose their own course freely, is fully 
consistent with our values— because we '■ 
know free peoples never choose 
tyranny. 

To promote these goals, America ha ' 
a range of foreign policy tools. Our in- 
volvement should always be prudent ' 
and realistic, but we should remember ''' 
that our tools work best when joined 
together in a coherent strategy consist- 
ently applied. Diplomacy unsupported j ^ 
by power is mere talk. Power that is '^ 
not guided by our political purposes can. 
create nothing of permanent value. 

The two tools of U.S. policy without 
which few American interests will be sf' 
cure are our own military strength and 
the vitality of our economy. The defens<' ' 
forces of the United States are crucial' 
to maintaining the stable environment i:| ^ 
which diplomacy can be effective, in /* 
which our friends and allies can be conf '■ 
dent of our protection, and in which oui ^ 
adversaries can be deterred. And our ]; 
economic dynamism not only provides 
the resources essential to sustain our 
policies but conveys a deeper message 
that is being better understood all the 
time, even by our adversaries: free, 
pluralist societies work. 



|i 



l(i 



34 



Department of State Bullet | 



THE PRESIDENT 



The failure to maintain our military 
^jabilities and our economic streng^th 
the 1970s was as important as any 
ler single factor in encouraging Soviet 
pansionism. By reviving both of them 
the 1980s, we deny our adversaries 
portunities and deter aggression. We 
ike it easier for other countries to 
inch sustained economic growth, to 
ild popular institutions, and to con- 
bute on their own to the cause of 
Bee. 

Security Assistance and Arms 
ansfers. When Soviet policy succeeds 
establishing a regional foothold- 
ether through invasion, as in Af- 
anistan or Cambodia, or sponsorship 
local Leninists as in Nicaragua— our 
it pi-iority must be to bolster the 
■urity of friends most directly threat- 
ed. This has been the reason for in- 
casing our security assistance for 
tdstan, Thailand, and the friendly 
;nocratic states of Central America. 
5. aid to Pakistan has been indispens- 
le in demonstrating that we will not 
imit the Soviet Union to gain hegem- 
r over all within reach of its growdng 
irer. By raising and sustaining aid to 
(Salvador after the communist guerril- 
I failed "final offensive" of 1981, we 
:wed that controversy here at home 
;ld not stop us from backing a friend- 
'ind democratic government under 
sat. 

Similarly, by providing needed 
;ipment to friends in the Middle 
;t— whether to democratic Israel or 
longstanding friends in the Arab 
•Id who face clear and present radical 
i;ats— we contribute to stability and 
:ce in a vital region of the world. 
By supporting the efforts of others 
strengthen their own defense, we fre- 
.ntly do as much for our own security 
through our own defense budget. 
furity assistance to others is a secu- 
liai-gain for us. We must, however, 
Jiember that states hostile to us seek 
t same sort of bargains at our ex- 
Ese. For this reason, we must be sure 
i. the resources we commit are ade- 
ite to the job. In the first half of this 
lide, Libyan and Iranian aid to com- 
Siist Nicaragua, for e.\ample, totaled 
'e than three times as much as U.S. 
to the democratic opposition. Soviet 
■stance to Vietnam, at nearly $2 bil- 
annually, far outstrips U.S. support 
any country save those that signed 
I' Camp David peace accords. Soviet 
nort for Cuba is larger still. 



Economic Assistance. In speaking 
of Central America in 1982, I said that 
"... economic disaster [had] provided a 
fresh opening to the enemies of free- 
dom, national independence, and peace- 
ful development." We cannot indulge 
the hope that economic responses alone 
are enough to prevent this political ex- 
ploitation, but an effective American 
policy must address both the short-term 
and long-term dimensions of economic 
distress. In the short term, our goal is 
stabilization; in the long term, sustained 
growth and progress by encouraging 
market-oriented reform. 

In Central America, for example, 
the dollar value of our economic aid has 
consistently been three, four, or five 
times as much as our security assist- 
ance. In 1985 the former totaled $975 
million; the latter, only $227 million. 

Over the long term, America's most 
effective contribution to self-sustaining 
growth is not through direct aid but 
through helping these economies to earn 
their own way. The vigorous expansion 
of our own economy has already spurred 
growth throughout the Western Hemi- 
sphere, as well as elsewhere. But this 
healthy expansion of the global econ- 
omy—which benefits us as well as 
others— depends crucially on maintaining 
a fair and open trading system. Protec- 
tionism is both dangerous and expen- 
sive. Its costs include not only the 
waste of resources and higher prices in 
our own economy but also the blow to 
poorer nations around the world that 
are struggling for democracy but vulner- 
able to antidemocratic subversion. 

Diplomatic Initiatives. Some have 
argued that the regional wars in which 
the Soviet Union is embroiled provide 
an oppoi'tunity to "bleed" the Soviets. 
This is not our policy. We consider 
these wars dangerous to U.S. -Soviet re- 
lations and tragic for the suffering peo- 
ples directly involved. 

For those reasons, military solutions 
are not the goal of American policy. In- 
ternational peace and security require 
both sides in these struggles to be pre- 
pared to lay down their aiTns and nego- 
tiate political solutions. The forms of 
such negotiations may vary, but in all of 
these conflicts, political efforts (and the 
improvement of internal political condi- 
tions) are essential to ending the vio- 
lence, promoting freedom and national 
self-determination, and bringing real 
hope for regional security. 

With these goals in mind, in my ad- 
dress to the UN General Assembly last 
fall, I put forward a plan for beginning 



to resolve a series of regional conflicts 
in which Leninist regimes have made 
war against their own peoples. My ini- 
tiative was meant to complement diplo- 
matic efforts already underway. To all 
of these efforts the United States has 
given the strongest possible support. 
We have done so despite the fact that 
the Soviet Union and its clients have 
usually resisted negotiations or have ap- 
proached the table primarily for tactical 
purjjoses. We intend, in fact, to redouble 
our effort through a series of bilateral 
discussions with the Soviets. 

In Afghanistan, we strongly support 
the diplomatic efforts conducted under 
UN auspices. We see no clear sign that 
the Soviet Union has faced up to the 
necessity of withdi'awing its troops, 
which remains the central issue of the 
negotiations. But we will persist. 

In southern Africa, the recent an- 
nouncement by the South African 
Government of a date for the creation of 
an independent Namibia provides a new 
test of its own and of the Angolan re- 
gime's interest in a settlement that 
truly begins to reduce the threats to 
security in this region. 

In Central America, President 
Duarte of El Salvador has offered a bold 
initiative that would produce three sets 
of simultaneous peace talks— his own 
with El Salvador's communist guerrillas; 
U.S. -Nicaragua bilateral discussions; and 
an internal dialogue between the com- 
munist regime in Nicaragua and the 
democratic opposition— if the Sandinistas 
will agree to the latter. My new envoy 
for Central America, Ambassador Philip 
Habib, will pursue the Duarte initiative 
as his first responsibility. 

In Cambodia, we support ASEAN— 
the Association of South East Asian 
Nations— in its intensive diplomatic ef- 
forts to promote Cambodian self-deter- 
mination and an end to Vietnam's bnital 
occupation. 

Support for Freedom Fighters. In 

all these regions, the Soviet Union and 
its clients would, of course, prefer vic- 
tory to compromise. That is why in 
Afghanistan, in Southeast Asia, in 
southern Africa, and in Central Ameri- 
ca, diplomatic hopes depend on whether 
the Soviets see that victory is excluded. 
In each case, resistance forces fighting 
against communist tyranny deserve our 
support. 

The form and extent of support we 
provide must be carefully weighed in 
each case. Because a popularly sup- 
ported insurgency enjoys some natural 
military advantages, our help need not 



IM986 



35 



THE PRESIDENT 



always be massive to make a difference. 
But it must be more than simply sym- 
bolic: our help should give freedom 
fighters the chance to rally the people 
to their side. As John Kennedy ob- 
served of another nation striving to pro- 
tect its freedom, it is ultimately their 
struggle; winning inevitably depends 
more on them than on any outsiders. 
America cannot fight everyone's battle 
for freedom. But we must not deny 
others the chance to fight their battle 
themselves. 

In some instances, American inter- 
ests will be served best if we can keep 
the details of our help— in particular, 
how it is provided— out of view. The 
Soviets will bring enormous pressure to 
bear to stop outside help to resistance 
forces; while we can well withstand the 
pressure, small friends and allies may be 
much more vulnerable. That is why pub- 
licity for such details sometimes only ex- 
poses those whom we are trying to help, 
or those who are helping us, to greater 
danger. When this is the case, a presi- 
dent must be able to work with the 
Congress to e.xtend needed support 
without publicity. Those who make it 
hard to extend support in this way 
when necessary are taking from our 
hands an important tool to protect 
American interests. Other governments 
that find they cannot work with us on a 
confidential basis will often be forced 
not to work with us at all. To hobble 
ourselves in this way makes, it harder to 
shape events while problems are still 
manageable. It means we are certain to 
face starker choices down the road. 

Nowhere is this clearer than in 
Central America. The Nicaraguan com- 
munists have actively sought to subvert 
their neighbors since the very moment 
they took power. There can be no 
regional peace in Central America— or 
wherever Soviet client regimes have 
taken power— so long as such aggressive 
policies face no resistance. Support for 
resistance forces shows those who 
threaten the peace that they have no 
military option and that negotiations 
represent the only realistic course. 

Communist rulers do not voluntarily 
or in a single step relinquish control and 
open their nations to popular rule. But 
there is no historical basis for thinking 
that Leninist regimes are the only ones 
that can indefinitely ignore armed insur- 
gencies and the disintegration of their 
own political base. The conditions that a 
growing insurgency can create— high 
military desertion rates, general strikes, 
economic shortages, infrastructural 
breakdowns, to name just a few— can, in 



turn, create policy fissures even within 
a leadership that has had no change of 
heart. 

This is the opportunity that the free- 
dom fighters of the 1980s hope to seize, 
but it will not exist forever, either in 
Central America or elsewhere. When 
the mechanisms of repression are fully 
in place and consolidated, the task of 
countering such a regime's policies— 
both internal and external— becomes 
incomparably harder. That is why the 
Nicaraguan regime is so bent on extin- 
guishing the vestiges of pluralism in 
Nicaraguan society. It is why our own 
decisions can no longer be deferred. 

IV. Regional Security and 
U.S. -Soviet Relations 

My Administration has insisted that the 
issue of regional security must have a 
prominent place on the agenda of U.S.- 
Soviet relations. 

We have heard it said, however, 
that while talking about these issues is 
a good idea, the United States should 
not be involved in other ways. Some 
people see risks of confrontation with 
the Soviet Union; others, no chance that 
the Soviets would ever reduce their 
commitment to their clients. 

I challenge both of these views. A 
policy whose only goal was to pour fuel 
on existing fires would obviously be 
irresponsible, but America's approach is 
completely different. Our policy is 
designed to keep regional conflicts from 
spreading and thereby to reduce the 
risk of superpower confrontations. Our 
aim is not to increase the dangers to 
which regional states friendly to us are 
exposed but to reduce them. We do so 
by making clear to the Soviet Union and 
its clients that we will stand behind our 
friends. Talk alone will not accomplish 
this. That is why our security assistance 
package for Pakistan— and for Thailand 
and Zaire— is so important, and why we 
have increased our help to democratic 
states of Central America. We have 
made clear that there would be no gain 
from widening these conflicts. We have 
done so without embroiling American 
forces in struggles that others are ready 
to fight on their own. 

Our goal, in short— indeed, our 
necessity— is to convince the Soviet 
Union that the policies on which it 
embarked in the 1970s cannot work. 
We cannot be completely sure how the 
Soviet leadership calculates the benefits 
of relationships with clients. No one 
should underestimate the tenacity of 
such a powerful and resilient opponent. 



Yet there are reasons to think that 
the present time is especially propitious I 
for raising doubts on the Soviet side I 
about the wisdom of its client ties. The I 
same facts about the democratic revolu- \ 
tion that we can see are visible in Mos- ' 
cow. The harmful impact that Moscow's i 
conduct in the developing world had on i 
Western readings of its intentions in th( 
last decade is also well known. There is I 
no time in which Soviet policy reviews ' 
and reassessments are more likely than i 
in a succession period, especially when i 
many problems have been accumulating i 
for some time. General Secretary Gor- i 
bachev himself made this point last yeai I 
when he asked American interviewers i 
whether it wasn't clear that the Soviet 
Union required international calm to 
deal with its internal problems. 

Our answer to this question can be i 
very simple. We desire calm, too, and— 
even more to the point— so do the 
nations now embroiled in conflict with 
regimes enjoying massive Soviet sup- 
port. Let the Soviet Union begin to con 
tribute to the peaceful resolution of 
these conflicts. 

V. Conclusion 

I have often said that the tide of the 
future is a freedom tide. If so, it is also 
a peace tide, for the surest guarantee 
we have of peace is national freedom 
and democratic government. 

In the long struggle to reach these 
goals, we are at a crossroads. A great 
deal hangs on America's staying power 
and steadfast commitment. 

• If America stays committed, we 
are more likely to have diplomatic solu- 
tions than military ones. 

• If America stays committed, we 
are more likely to have democratic out- 
comes than totalitarian ones. i 

• If America stays committed, we I 
will find that those who share our goals 
can do their part and ease burdens that 
we might otherwise bear alone. 

• If America stays committed, we 
can solve problems while they are still 
manageable and avoid harder choices 
later. 

• And if America stays committed, 
we are more likely to convince the 
Soviet Union that its competition with 
us must be peaceful. 

The American people remain com- 
mitted to a world of peace and freedom. 
They want an effective foreign policy, 
which shapes events in accordance with 



36 



Department of State Bulletii 



THE SECRETARY 



■r ideals and does not just react, pas- 
;e\y and timidly, to the actions of 
hers. Bacldng away from this chal- 
ige will not bring peace. It will only 
3an that others who are hostile to 
erything we believe in will have a 
»er hand to work their will in the 
)rld. 

Important choices now rest with the 
ingress: whether to undercut the 
esident at a moment when regional 
gotiations are underway and U.S.- 
viet diplomacy is entering a new 
ase; to betray those straggling 
ainst tyranny in different regions of 
i world, including our own neighbor- 
od; or to join in a bipartisan national 
deavor to strengthen both freedom 
d peace. 

I have no doubt which course the 

tierican people want. 

i 

! Ronald Reagan 



Nicaragua and the Future 
of Central America 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
■sidential Documents of Mar. 17, 1986. 



Secretary Skultz's address before the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars on. March 3, 
1986.^ 

In recent years, around the world, we 
have seen the yearning for freedom take 
extraordinary forms. Last week, the 
world watched as the people of the 
Philippines rose up to claim their 
democratic rights and recapture their 
democratic heritage. 

We saw in the Philippines a govern- 
ment increasingly at odds with its own 
people. We saw a Cathohc Church, a 
middle class, moderate opposition par- 
ties, the business community, the media, 
and other segments of society increas- 
ingly disaffected from their government. 
We saw an election in which the govern- 
ment was shaken by the vigor of the op- 
position's campaign and sought by fraud 
to perpetuate itself in power. We can be 
thankful that as his moral authority 
slipped away. President Marcos had the 
wisdom and courage to step down 
peacefully. 

Today, we see similar phenomena in 
a country much closer to home- 
Nicaragua. But with a striking differ- 
ence: it's far worse in Nicaragua. There, 
opposition parties have been systemati- 
cally harassed and intimidated, including 
by violence or threat of violence; inde- 
pendent media are not merely hampered 
but censored or shut down; the Catholic 
Church has been stifled or abused for 
being a voice of democratic conscience. 
The secret police have rounded up lead- 
ers of private sector, labor, and church 
organizations, subjecting them to inter- 
rogations and threats. A massive mili- 
tary buildup by the Soviet Union and 
Cuba threatens not only the regime's 
internal opponents but all neighboring 
countries as well. And the regime— after 
a manipulated election over a year 
ago— is clearly determined to maintain 
itself in power by whatever brate force 
is necessary. 

In the Philippines, the forces of 
democracy were able to rally, organize, 
compete for and, eventually, win power 
peacefully, despite the flawed election, 
because it was, at bottom, a pluralist 
democratic political system. In 
Nicaragua, once the communist regime 
consolidates its power, the forces of 
democracy will have no such hope. A 



Leninist regime seeks a monopoly of 
power and the strangulation of all inde- 
pendent institutions. The church, the 
independent media, the business commu- 
nity, the middle class, and democratic 
parties are all severely beleaguered and 
struggling for their very survival. Thou- 
sands of the regime's opponents- 
estimated at as many as 20,000— have 
been driven to take up arms to resist 
the communist attempt to consolidate a 
totalitarian system. 

For historical, moral, and strategic 
reasons, the United States took a direct 
interest in the progress of Filipino 
democracy. For similar reasons, we are 
deeply concerned with the hopes for 
democracy in Nicaragua. After 6V2 
years, it is clear that, without our help 
in strengthening the Nicaraguan demo- 
cratic opposition, hope for democracy in 
Nicaragua is doomed and progress else- 
where in Central America could be 
undone. 

Subversion Abroad 

Despite our efforts to coexist with, and 
even aid, the revolutionary leadership 
that overthi-ew the dictator Somoza in 

1979, the strategic threat posed by the 
Nicaraguan communists has grown 
steadily. Today, the country is home to 
some 200 Soviet advisers, some 7,500 
Cubans, and assorted personnel from 
East Germany, Bulgaria, Libya, and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
You can see who its friends are. 

Nicaragua's military machine has 
no parallel in the history of Central 
America. Since 1981, the country has 
received more than half a billion dollars 
in Soviet arms shipments, including 
tanks and other heavy armaments that, 
in the context of Central America, are 
clearly not defensive. By the end of 

1980, Nicaragua's Armed Forces were 
twice as large as the Somoza National 
Guard at its height. By the end of 1982, 
the army of the Nicaraguan communists 
had doubled again. Today, Nicaragua 
has some 60,000 troops on active duty 
and 60,000 more in reserves. Honduras, 
by contrast, has 21,000 troops; Costa 
Rica, the oldest democracy in Latin 
America, has no army. No other country 
in Central America has as many tanks 
and armored vehicles as Nicaragua. 



fit 1986 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



Only Nicaragua has one of the most 
sophisticated attack helicopters in the 
world, the Soviet-built Mi-24 HIND. 

Why such a formidable buildup? 
[Interior Minister] Tomas Borge gave 
the answer in 1981. "This revolution," 
he said, "goes beyond our borders." 

What do these words mean? Look at 
the record. Almost immediately, the 
communists in Nicaragua joined with 
Salvadoran communists to prevent 
democratic reforms in El Salvador. They 
armed guerrillas who maintained their 
central headquarters in Managua until 
late 1983. (Incidentally, they moved not 
long after our liberation of Grenada). 
And they still maintain radio transmit- 
ters, training facilities, R&R camps, and 
major logistics support facilities in 
Nicaragua. 

But for the Nicaraguan communists, 
subverting El Salvador has not been 
enough. Nicaragua has also been equip- 
ping, training, organizing, and infiltrat- 
ing guerrillas and agents into Honduras. 
It has launched direct attacks into that 
country using its regular armed forces. 

Costa Rica is another target. The 
Nicaraguan communists have used their 
diplomatic presence in Costa Rica to 
conduct bombings and assassinations; 
they have financed, equipped, and 
trained Costa Ricans for subversive ac- 
tivities; and they have conducted cross- 
border incursions almost at vrill. 

They are also involved in Colombia. 
Many of the arms with which the 
M-19 terrorists attacked the National 
Palace of Justice have been traced to 
Nicaragua. And what were the M-19 
terrorists after? Just those Justices try- 
ing drug traffickers. It should be no 
surprise to find that the Nicaraguan 
communists are involved in this criminal 
activity. 

Think about the pattern that 
emerges from this record. It is violent. 
It is indiscriminate, aimed at democra- 
cies and even Contadora peacemakers. 
And it is intimately tied to Cuban and 
Soviet military power. These efforts at 
subversion and infiltration are facilitated 
by the regime's close relations with ter- 
rorists from across the globe. It has 
issued Nicaraguan passports to radicals 
and terrorists from the Middle East, 
Latin America, and Europe. Groups 
with a known presence in Nicaragua in- 
clude the Basque ETA terrorists, the 
German Baader-Meinhof gang, the 
Italian Red Brigades, and the Argentine 
Montoneros. Alvaro Baldizon, a high- 
ranking Sandinista who defected in 
1985, reported that Interior Minister 
Borge is personally involved in cocaine 



smuggling from Colombia to the United 
States. Videotapes by a DEA [Drug En- 
forcement Administration] informer on 
the ground in Nicaragua show at least 
one other regime official personally 
supervising the loading of a narcotics 
shipment for the United States. 

Agents of the PLO working in Cen- 
tral America and Panama use Nicaragua 
as their base of operations. Their ties to 
the PLO are particularly strong. Some 
were trained in PLO camps in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Some have even participated 
in PLO hijackings. 

The Nicaraguan communists have 
another benefactor in the Middle East: 
Libya. By the time they took power in 
1979, they had developed a direct rela- 
tionship with Qadhafi. And Qadhafi has 
obligingly sent them arms. One ship- 
ment labeled "medicines" was inter- 
cepted by accident in Brazil in April 
1983; authorities found about 84 tons of 
arms, explosives, and other military 
equipment. 

Repression at Home 

By betraying their promises of plural- 
ism, the Nicaraguan communists have 
forced the citizens of Nicaragua to take 
up arms once again. Like Somoza, they 
don't seem to listen to anyone who isn't 
armed. And, like Somoza, they seek to 
blame outside forces for the resistance 
of their own people to their policies. 

The Nicaraguan communists like to 
say that covert U.S. support created the 
resistance; that their opponents are all 
agents of the CIA [Central Intelligence 
Agency] and heirs of Somoza. This is 
nonsense. It was their repression that in 
1979, 1980, and 1981 destroyed the coah- 
tion that overthrew Somoza and sparked 
the resistance. In 1979, 1980, and 1981, 
the United States was providing aid to 
the Government of Nicaragua, not to 
the resistance. 

From mid-1984 until late in 1985- 
well over a year— the U.S. Government 
provided no aid to Nicaraguan resist- 
ance forces. During that time, the 
resistance grew by 50%, roughly from 
10,000 to 15,000. So much for the theory 
that the resistance is a creature of U.S. 
cash. 

Who are these Nicaraguans who are 
willing to risk their lives against the 
communist security apparatus? The 
resistance fighters are overwhelmingly 
rural youths. Most are between 18 and 
22 years old. They are fighting to de- 
fend their small plots of land, their 
churches and, in some cases, their indig- 
enous cultures. Some joined the 



resistance rather than be forced by the 
Nicaraguan communists to fight against 
their friends and neighbors. In defend- 
ing their families and communities, 
these young Nicaraguans are fighting 
for self-determination above all else. 

Their leaders are more likely to 
come from urban areas and have more 
diverse occupations and backgrounds. 
They include both former National 
Guardsmen and former Sandinista fight- 
ers, but most are civilians from the verj 
groups the communists claim to repre- 
sent: peasants, small farmers, urban 
professionals, and students. One was a 
primary school teacher; another, an 
evangelical pastor. 

An analysis of the backgrounds of 
the 153 most senior miUtary leaders of 
the largest resistance group last Novem 
ber shows that 53% were civilians, 21% 
served in the National Guard, and a full 
20% were former comrades-in-arms of 
the communists themselves. 

The evidence irrefutably confirms 
that the Nicaraguan resistance is the 
product of a popular, pervasive, and 
democratic revolt. 

A Tide of Democracy 

Historians will detect an irony in the 
changing course of Latin American 
tyranny throughout these years. While 
Nicaragua was trading one dictatorship 
for another, strongmen elsewhere in the 
region were falling in rapid succession. 
In the past decade, elected civilian 
governments have replaced authori- 
tarian regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and 
Uruguay. Over 90% of the people of 
Latin America now enjoy self-govern- 
ment, as opposed to less than one-third 
10 years ago. 

The contrast between communist 
rule in Nicaragua and the political trend 
in the rest of Latin America could not 
be more dramatic. After centuries of 
struggle, self-government has taken 
root. Now, Nicaragua is not only the 
odd man out; its policies of militarism 
and subversion place all the region's 
hopes for democracy at risk. 

No one is more aware of that risk 
than the leaders of Latin America. For 
years, they have been searching for a 
way of defusing the threat from 
Nicaragua. Indeed, the central purpose 
of the Contadora negotiations is to en- 
sure that military tensions created by 
the Nicaraguan regime's behavior can 
be overcome peacefully and democrati- 
cally without the widening conflict the 
Nicaraguan communists seem bent on 
provoking. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Not surprisingly, the communists 
ive consistently torpedoed these nego- 
itions. In 1984, the United States pur- 
ed direct negotiations with Managua 
an attempt to help the Contadora 
tions negotiate a settlement. Nine 
unds of talks were held over 5 months, 
it the Nicaraguan communists proved 
linly interested in manipulating the 
ateral talks to short-circuit the 
mtadora process. 

They have also refused the proposal 
!the country's Roman Catholic 
ihops, made in their 1984 Good Friday 
storal letter, to negotiate with all 
caraguans— ai-med and unarmed, in- 
le Nicaragua and outside of it. The 
mocratic resistance called for a cease- 
s and agreed to negotiations mediated 

the Catholic Church. The regime re- 
led. So the dialogue that counts the 
ist— the intei-nal dialogue between the 
fime and its opponents— is stymied by 
s regime's intransigence. The com- 
nists know what they want and have 
intention of changing. 

Nicaragua's neighbors are well 
are of the regime's intentions. So are 
I And we are profoundly concerned 
ih the threat Nicaragua poses to the 
furity and well-being of other Latin 
i.erican nations. We have been deeply 
:olved with encouraging democracy 
:Dughout Central and South America, 
.porting free elections and giving 
i-al and economic support to demo- 
[tic govemments and democratic 
);es. And like our democratic neigh- 
is, we don't want to see these gains 
:ed back by Nicaraguan subversion. 

Just 2 weeks ago, I met with 
;resentatives from the eight nations 
olved in the Contadora negotiations. 
I'y are committed, as we are, to 
ctical solutions. But there is no mis- 
i ng their grave concern about Soviet 
' Cuban support for Nicaragua's at- 
spts to undermine regional stability. 

. Policy 

\ objectives in Nicaragua, and the 
3'ctives of our friends and alhes, 
•straightforward. We want the 
araguan regime to reverse its mill- 
s' buildup, to send its foreign advisers 
3ie, and to stop oppressing its citizens 
>■ subverting its neighbors. We want 

' keep the promises of the coalition 
! Jrnment that followed Somoza's fall: 
?ocratic pluralism at home and peace- 
i/'elations abroad. 

The United States and its friends 
1-' sought these objectives through 
pmacy. We continue to believe that a 



negotiated settlement represents the ul- 
timate hope for peaceful change in 
Nicaragua. But all serious efforts at 
negotiation have been blocked by the 
Nicaraguan communists. They believe 
that they can continue their domestic 
oppression and foreign aggression with 
impunity, and they continue to regard 
their military might as their guarantee 
of success. The United States has the 
power to help Nicaraguan freedom fight- 
ers convince the communists that their 
course is disastrous. We must give them 
help before it is too late. And when we 
do that, we increase our leverage in 
support of our diplomatic objectives. 
Our goals are limited and reason- 
able. They are also essential for our 
values and our security and those of our 
neighbors. We must consider many op- 
tions. Some are so stem that we hope 
never to resort to them. The United 
States does not want its own military 
directly involved in Nicaragua. So far, 
we have not had to consider this option, 
because we know there is another way 
of discouraging the regime from its de- 
structive course. That is why we sup- 
port the democratic resistance. 

Military help for the democratic 
resistance will give the Nicaraguan com- 
munists an incentive to negotiate 
seriously— something they have yet to 
do. They did not negotiate with the 
Carter Administration when the United 
States was Nicaragua's largest supplier 
of aid. And they did not negotiate seri- 
ously either with us or with their neigh- 
bors when the Congress suspended all 
aid to the resistance 2 years ago. On the 
contrary, in the fall of 1984, instead of 
bringing their political opponents back 
into the political process thi-ough com- 
petitive elections, they imported assault 
helicopters from the Soviet Union. 

The resistance finds itself at a criti- 
cal juncture. They have proven them- 
selves by their e.xtraordinary growth 
and by the desperate measures to which 
the regime has been driven to combat 
them. But the Soviet, Cuban, and 
Easteni-bloc military buildup confronts 
them with unfair odds. If we fail to help 
the forces of democracy, these forces 
will suffer severely— not because their 
cause lacks merit but because the com- 
munists will have shown more determi- 
nation than we. 

A strengthened democratic resist- 
ance is the only way to force the 
Nicaraguan communists to halt subver- 
sion in this hemisphere; it is the only 
way to counter their stifling tyranny at 
home. 



Power and diplomacy must go hand 
in hand. That is a lesson we should have 
learned by now. Diplomacy without 
leverage is impotent. Whether in arms 
control negotiations with the Soviet 
Union or in the resolution of regional 
conflicts, diplomacy works best when 
our opponents realize they cannot win 
military victory or unilateral advantage. 
Sometimes we have forgotten that 
lesson and paid the price. 

That is the lesson we are seeking to 
apply in Nicaragua today: we are trying 
to convince the communist regime that a 
military option does not e.xist. Only 
stout internal resistance by the 
Nicaraguan people can pressure the re- 
gime into seeking national reconciliation 
and fulfilling the democratic promise of 
1979. 

Consequences of Inaction 

If we do not strengthen the resistance, 
our worry in the future will be a very 
different one— a far more serious one. 
Our worry will then be a Soviet and 
Cuban base on the mainland of Latin 
America, a regime whose consolidated 
power will allow it to spread subver- 
sion and terrorism throughout the 
hemisphere. 

Nor is that all. If the Nicaraguan 
communists succeed in consohdating 
their power and in destroying the 
democratic resistance, their victory 
would immediately boost radical forces 
everywhere that rely on violence, 
militarism, and terrorism to achieve 
their ends— particularly in Latin 
America. Radicalism will seem irresisti- 
ble; the forces of moderation and 
democracy will be disheartened. All the 
countries in Latin America, who all face 
serious internal economic problems, will 
see radical forces emboldened to exploit 
these problems for their own destruc- 
tive ends. 

A communist victory in Nicaragua 
would also have global repercussions for 
U.S. policy. It would severely damage 
our credibility with adversaries who 
would test our mettle and with those 
around the world who rely on us for 
support in their battles against tyranny. 
If democratic aspiration is snuffed out in 
Nicaragua, then where can we claim to 
nurture it or protect it? If an armed ag- 
gressor on our own doorstep is allowed 
to have its way, despite enormous oppo- 
sition inside the country and out, then 
how can our reputation for deterring 
aggression be credible in places farther 
removed? 



1986 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



The bipartisan Kissinger commission 
put it starkly in its 1984 report, listing 
the possible consequences of a failure to 
contain the present conflict in Central 
America. The consequences included: 

• A series of developments which might 
require us to devote large resources to de- 
fend the southern approaches to the United 
States, thus reducing our capacity to defend 
our interests elsewhere .... 

• A proliferation of Marxist-Leninist 
states that would increase violence, disloca- 
tion, and political repression in the region. 

• The erosion of our power to influence 
events worldwide that would flow from the 
perception that we were unable to influence 
vital events close to home. 



Whose Vision? 

This brings me to my final point. In the 
long nm, the debate over military aid to 
the Nicaraguan resistance is no partisan 
affair. It is a debate over what moral 
and political principles shall inspire the 
future of this hemisphere, over whose 
vision will be allowed to prevail. One 
vision— the vision of democrats through- 
out the Americas— calls for economic 
progress, free institutions, and the rule 
of law. The other is a vision of two, 
three, many Nicaraguas— a hemisphere 
of burning churches, suppressed 
newspapers, and crushed opposition. 
The Nicaraguan dictatorship may 
soon have the power to dog the resist- 
ance to its death. The United States 
now has the power to prevent that 
tragic outcome. Will we allow this 
hemisphere to be taken hostage by 
totalitarians? That is the question that 
the Congress faces. For the security of 
our own country and of the young 
democracies who turn to us for support, 
we should give the Nicaraguan people 
what they need to struggle for the free- 
doms that were denied them by Somoza 
and then snatched from them by an 
armed communist minority. 



The Shape, Scope, and Consequences 
of the Age of Information 



'Press release 35. 



Secretary Shidtz's address before the 
Stanford University Alumni Associa- 
tion's first International Conference in 
Paris on March 21, 1986.^ 

I'm always pleased to be in Paris. And 
I'm especially pleased to be here when 
the centennial celebration of the Statue 
of Liberty is only a few months away. 
That engineering marvel of the 19th 
century is an apt symbol of my theme 
tonight— the relationship between the 
advance of technology and the advance 
of liberty. For 100 years, that statue 
has been a beacon to mankind and a 
testimony to the unbreakable bond be- 
tween our nations. On behalf of Ameri- 
cans everywhere, I extend our appre- 
ciation and deepest affections to France. 

I'm also pleased to be speaking as 
the Secretary of State from Washington 
to an audience of ex-Califomians, 
Parisians, and other Europeans at a 
meeting organized by Stanford Univer- 
sity. Tonight's gathering is an appropri- 
ate setting for my subject: the shape, 
scope, and consequences of the age of 
information. Geography and borders 
have always constrained everyday life. 
Today, the information revolution is un- 
dermining their ancient dictates. It is 
shifting the balance of wealth and 
strength among nations, challenging 
established institutions and values, and 
redefining the agenda of political 
discourse. 

The information revolution promises 
to change the routine of our planet as 
decisively as did the industrial revolu- 
tion of the past century. The industrial 
age is now ending. In some places, it 
has already passed. The United States 
and most of the free nations in the de- 
veloped world are already seeing how 
the age of information is transforming 
our economies. A century ago, we 
moved from an agricultural to an indus- 
trial phase in our development. Today, 
we remain agriculturally and industrially 
productive; but the basis of our economy 
is shifting rapidly from industrial 
production to information-based goods 
and services. Our economic indices— such 
as productivity and the structure of 
employment— are being decisively al- 
tered by our entry into the new age. 

Yet these changes have been so per- 
vasive, and their pace so rapid, that we 
have been unable to comprehend them 
in their full scope. We are very much 
like the leaders of the early 19th cen- 



tury as they tried to gi-asp the unfoldin ' 
consequences of industrialization. No ' 
one has taken the full measure of our ' 
own new age. But if we are to seize iht \ 
opportunities and understand the | 

problems that this new phase of tech- 
nological transformation will bring, we 
must try to grasp both its particulars 
and its broad outlines. 

Dimensions of the New Age 

What is the information age? The an- 
swers to that question are as numerous ' 
as the age itself is pervasive. There is, ' 
most obviously, a scientific dimension. '■ 
Our thinking about our physical enviroi ' 
ment is changing with unprecedented '' 
speed. That change has been reflected '' 
most dramatically in our technological '■ 
prowess— particularly in the develop- '■ 
ment, storage, processing, and transfer" 
of information. While the industrial age ' 
found its proper symbol in the factory, ' 
the symbol of the information age migl 
be the computer, which can hold all the 
information contained in the Library of I '• 
Congress in a machine the size of a ' 
refrigerator. Or its proper symbol may 
be a robot, a machine capable of sup- i ' 
piemen ting age-old manual labor and ' 
liberating human beings from the most '' 
arduous and repetitive of tasks. Or ' ' 
perhaps its symbol is the direct broad- ' 
cast satellite, which can send television! 
programs directly into homes around I' 
the globe. I' 

This list does not begin to capture '• 
the variety or capacity of these new ' 
technologies. Indeed, these are only tht 
beginnings of what will be far-reaching ' 
and profound technical developments. ' 
Two decades from now, our computers 
will be 1,000 times more powerful than| 
they are today. In a few short years, 
the most advanced technology of 1985 
will seem as obsolete to us as the 
transistor— which made its debut some 
40 years ago— seems today. Our scien- 
tific advances are affecting everything 
from the biological sciences to national 
defense. The President's Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI), with its 
promise of making deterrence more 
stable by reducing reliance on offensive 
nuclear weapons, is one dramatic exam' 
pie of the impact of intellectual and ' 
scientific change on our ways of dealing! 
with the world. SDI can well be ' 

described, in fact, as a gigantic informa'' 
tion processing system. 



40 



Department of State Bulle i 



i 



THE SECRETARY 



The economic dimension of tliis new 
e is just as revolutionary as its scien- 
ic and technological counterpai-ts. In- 
■mation, as Walter Wriston observed 
ars ago, is our new international 
mdard. Fortunes rise and fall accord- 
? to its dissemination. With the ad- 
nt of "i-eal time" transfers of 
brmation, an announcement made 
the Rose Garden can be reflected 
ninutes later in the stock market in 
pgapore. The information age is bring- 
;■ a new conception of economic effi- 
incy not just to entrepreneurs, and 
t just to corporations, but to the en- 
e global market. 
These and other economic conse- 
pnces of the new age are transform- 
l the way nations trade with one 
other. They are bringing new uncer- 
nties to the marketplace and to the 
iitics of regulation. Across the globe, 
' foreign policy agenda reflects new 
momic disputes as developing and ad- 
iced nations alike struggle to come to 
ps with transborder data flows, tech- 
ogj' transfers, satellite transmissions, 
il the crowding of the radio spectrum. 
ine of these disputes are between 
I emments. Others are between gov- 
iments and private corporations. U.S. 
;iputer manufacturers, for example, 
I now disputing with several Euro- 
in governments over the issue of 
•isborder data transfers. The U.S. 
:ipanies believe that they should be 
I wed to compile data and have mar- 
1 access rights, while some goveni- 
iits believe that the data should be 
;trally controlled. Like the technol- 
;;s themselves, the disputes created 
(the penneability of geographical 
:ders to information flows are grow- 
i at a rapid rate. 

Yet, these economic disputes are 
■■ one e.xample of the effects of infor- 
I ion technologies on international re- 
ins. The proliferation of information 
r also sparked new concerns over na- 
cal security. Information is intrinsi- 
iv' neutral. It can be used for multiple 
"x's, good and bad. Governments 

■ ■> \\ here are finding it harder to con- 

■ tile flow of sensitive information in 
1 critical areas of intelligence and na- 
tal defense. In free countries, where 
Mnoss is valued in its own right, we 

t he careful not to underestimate 
ability of others to manipulate new 

■ nologies for repressive pui-poses. In 
i»;TWA hijacking and in other such in- 
cnts, for instance, terrorists exploited 
lopen system of mass communication 

' reate a global forum for their brutal 



The social dimension of the informa- 
tion age may seem more intangible, but 
it is equally profound. More than 6 mil- 
lion American homes now have personal 
computers. By 1990, according to some 
estimates, half of all our households— 
and an untold number of our schools, 
offices, and factories— will be computer- 
ized. The impact of that change on our 
young people is already extraordinary. 
Their attachment to now commonplace 
video games and to video cassettes is a 
symbol of adaptation to the new age. 
Whole generations are now gi-owing up 
with the computer, taking it for 
gi-anted, understanding its languages, 
and using it with ease. What does their 
nonchalance imply? I was thinking of 
this recently as I watched my grand- 
daughter play with a computei-ized toy. 
To her generation, the technologies of 
tomorrow will be as integi-al to her 
lifestyle as the telephone is to ours. 

Nor is the social revolution limited 
to the most developed countries. Televi- 
sion, for example, lets people see how 
others live in distant countries and in- 
vites comparison. The information revo- 
lution is raising expectations not only in 
advanced nations but in comers of the 
world that have little experience of high 
technology itself. 

These various dimensions— techno- 
logical, economic, political, and social- 
are only a few ways of describing what 
the information revolution is about. 
Today, in the middle of the 1980s, the 
outlines of some broader implications 
are also becoming clear. I would like to 
reflect on some of the deeper economic 
and political challenges that the new age 
is bringing to us and then say a few 
words about America's response to 
them. 

The Challenge to Individuals 

First of all, any nation that wants to 
profit from the information revolution 
must understand where innovation 
comes from. In this era of rapid techno- 
logical change, the pace of obsolescence 
is accelerating as never before. Innova- 
tion—and risktaking— are more than 
ever the engines of progress and suc- 
cess. This is true both in the economic 
marketplace and in the marketplace of 
ideas. So the challenge of economic suc- 
cess in this new age is, in large part, a 
challenge to the individual entrepreneur. 

For obvious reasons, the free na- 
tions of the world are best positioned to 
meet this challenge. By their very na- 
ture, they guarantee the individual free- 
dom that is necessary to the entre- 
preneurial spirit. And they have the 



confidence in their citizenry to en- 
courage, rather than stifle, technological 
development. 

In the United States, inventors, in- 
novators, and entrepreneurs are sym- 
bols of our pioneering tradition. Our 
nation gi-ew because there were enter- 
prising Americans willing to take eco- 
nomic risks. A few statistics from our 
recent economic recovery tell the story. 
Last year over 666,000 new corporations 
were established in the United States— 
nearly 100,000 more than in 1981. Of 
these, some 50,000 failed— a dramatic 
measure of entrepreneurial spirit and 
the willingness to take risks. 

We have also generated over 9 mil- 
lion new jobs in the past 5 years, 
reflecting the commercialization of new 
technologies. Our tax system encourages 
the economic risks that lead to innova- 
tion. In 1983 alone, we committed over 
$2.8 billion in venture capital to start-up 
costs. Public and private institutions 
alike encourage us to try the untried, to 
adapt ourselves to the unaccustomed. 
And Americans as consumers are 
familiar and comfortable with technologi- 
cal innovation. Our fascination with 
gadgets and new* products is legendary. 
From the days of the first automobile, 
Americans have been willing and eager 
for the novel, the improved, the latest 
model. 

So we are disposed, as a people, to 
encoui'age entrepreneurship and to ac- 
cept innovative technologies. 

We have our qualms, of course. Like 
all other peoples, we have been sensi- 
tive to the impact of technological 
advance on the workplace— to the dis- 
locations that follow from the replace- 
ment of manual labor. But, more than 
most nations, we tend to have confi- 
dence in our ability to resolve the social 
dilemmas that changing technologies 
present. Silicon Valley is only one sym- 
bol of our dedication to risk and reward. 
To us, the information age represents a 
new avenue to economic grovvth, an op- 
portunity to do what w^e do best: to ex- 
plore, to innovate, and, ultimately, to 
succeed. 

The United States is far from alone, 
of course, in the development of new 
information technologies. France has 
pioneered the remarkable MINITEL 
system— a keyboard and TV screen 
linked to the phone system that now 
gives nearly 3 million subscribers instan- 
taneous access to more than 1,200 differ- 
ent data bases, banking and financial 
services, press hookups, and educational 
and cultural channels. Such information 
technology gives the individual enor- 



Ir 1986 



41 



THE SECRETARY 



mous personal outreach, expanding to 
global limits his access to iiiformation, 
ideas, and personal services. 

Free Trade: The Challenge 
to the Free World 

Success in the information age depends 
on more than our own innovation and 
entrepreneurship. The new age also 
presents us all with a global challenge. 
New technologies circumvent the bor- 
ders and geographical barriers that have 
always divided one people from another. 
Thus, the market for these technologies 
depends to a great extent on the open- 
ness of other countries to the free flow 
of information. 

Open markets allow comparative ad- 
vantage to express itself. The United 
States, as a country that seeks to ex- 
plore and trade in technological services, 
has always opposed international at- 
tempts to stifle the workings of the in- 
formation revolution. In our view, every 
country willing to open itself to the free 
flow of information stands to benefit. 

Some critics have charged us with 
simple self-interest. The United States, 
they say, urges open trade because it is 
so well positioned to profit from it. They 
point out that American research, de- 
velopment, and marketing can compete 
favorably with those of other countries. 

The interesting thing about this 
charge is that it captures a ti-uth, but it 
expresses that truth exactly backwards. 
The United States does not advocate 
free trade because we are adept at 
pioneering technologies; we are adept at 
them because the dedication to freedom 
is intrinsic to our political culture. By 
maintaining that dedication throughout 
our history, we have been the pioneers 
of change both at home and abroad— in 
the agricultural phase of our develop- 
ment, in our industrial phase, and now, 
in the age of information. 

Opposition to open trade is some- 
times linked to a charge of cultural im- 
perialism. The more international 
markets are open, it is said, the more 
smaller countries will be flooded with 
American movies and American televi- 
sion and radio programs— resulting in a 
kind of "cultural imperialism." I find 
this view ironic. If any nation would 
seem to be vulnerable to the widespread 
import of information and news from 
other cultures, it is the United States it- 
self. As a nation of immigrants, we are 
the most international society on earth. 
Our cultural heritage— not to mention 
our cuisine— has been shaped by Asians, 
Europeans, Africans, and Latin Ameri- 
cans; by Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 



42 



Buddhism, Hinduism; by almost every 
religious and ethnic influence imagin- 
able. We urge would-be cultural im- 
perialists to take note: the United 
States, vrith our international heritage, 
represents the largest market in the 
world for information from other 
cultures. 

That international heritage is al- 
ready encouraging foreign entre- 
preneurs. The Spanish International 
Network, for e.xample, which is pro- 
gramed outside the United States, now 
has over 200 broadcast and cable outlets 
in our country. The United States does 
not fear an influx of information from 
other countries. On the contrary, we 
welcome it. And our reasons for welcom- 
ing it go beyond any simple adherence 
to the free flow of ideas and to open 
markets, beyond even the economic 
benefits that open trade would surely 
bring us. Those reasons go to the heart 
of the broad philosophical and political 
questions that the age of information 
has raised anew for all of us. 

Fundamental Freedoms 

The information age poses profound 
political challenges to nations every- 
where. As any economist knows— or, for 
that matter, any alumnus of the Stan- 
ford Business School— the laws of eco- 
nomics do not exist in a vacuum. Even 
the most commonplace decisions— such 
as where to open a plant and when- 
must take into account social and politi- 
cal realities as well as economic con- 
siderations. Likewise, the freedom that 
makes America's economic success possi- 
ble does not stand on its own; it is an 
integi'al part of our political system. So 
is the intellectual freedom that makes 
innovation and entrepreneurship 
possible. 

The relationship between individual 
rights and economic dynamism is fun- 
damental. The United States has seen 
that truth at work in our early agricul- 
tural age, in our age of industry, and in 
today's era of information. The Model T, 
the Wright brothers' plane, the tele- 
phone, the movie reel, the transistor 
radio, the VCR [video cassette record- 
er], the personal computer— these and 
other innovations have shaped and 
revolutionized our society. They have 
spread prosperity not just to an ehte 
but to everyone. Thus, they mark the 
success of our democracy and the 
progress of our freedom. They are the 
material symbols of our dedication to in- 
dividual choice, free enterprise, open 
markets, free scientific inquiry— indeed, 
to the very idea that the freedom of the 



individual, not the power of the state, i 
the proper foundation of society. 

The same is true of free govern- i 
ments everywhere. The technological | 
and economic successes of the entire | 
free world are direct consequences and I 
incontrovertible proof of the benefits [i 
that flow from self-government. The ' 
more the West dedicates itself to its 
freedoms, the stronger it becomes— bot 
politically, as an attractive and viable , 
alternative to statism, and economicallj 
as a dynamic and expanding system of ^ 
material productivity that brings , 

benefits on a mass scale. In an era of , 
technological revolution, our rededica- | 
tion to the liberty that makes innovatic | 
possible is imperative. 

That rededication has strategic im- , 
portance as well. The information revo 
lution is already shifting the economic | 
balance between East and West. The , 
leaders of closed societies fear this shil , 
ing economic base, and for good reasor , 
First, they are afraid that infoiTnation , 
technologies will undermine the state's | 
control over its people— what they reac , 
watch, hear, and aspire to. In most of ■ 
these countries, familiar means of com 
munication like the mimeograph machi 
and photocopier are already kept unde , 
lock and key. The specter of direct i , 
broadcast satellites alarms their leader \ 
even more. In Moscow, they're paying 
up to 300 rubles-that's $450-for blacl , . 
market videotapes smuggled in from tl | . 
West. 

East-bloc leaders also fear that the 
vnll be unable to compete with the 
research, development, and marketing . 
information age technologies. Here, toi , 
they are right to be worried. The incei, 
five to improve information technology j . 
is unlikely to come from countries in | , 
which the pen is regarded as an instrU| 
ment of subversion. The science and | , 
technology of the future will be directlj , 
tied to access to information, for the ii| 
portant scientific ideas will come from , 
the accumulation and manipulation of 
data bases. 

So these regimes face an agonizingi 
choice: they can either open their so- | ,, 
cieties to the freedoms necessary for t| i. 
pursuit of technological advance, or th'| 
can risk faUing even farther behind th| " 
West. But, in reality, they may not ha| " 
a choice. The experience of the Chines 
communists, who are now trying to 
release the talents of a billion people, 
will continue to be a fascinating test o 
whether a once-closed society can be 
opened. 



Department of State 



THE SECRETARY 



That is why the promise of informa- 
bn technology is so profound. Its de- 
alopment not only strengthens the 
fonomic and political position of 
jmocracies: it provides a glimmer of 
)pe that the suppressed millions of the 
ifree world will find their leaders 
reed to expand their liberties. But 
fat is not all. If totalitarian leaders do 
osen their grip in order to compete 
ith the free countries, they may find 
lemselves, in that process, contributing 
ramatically to an improvement in rela- 
ys between East and West. That eas- 
t of tensions would benefit not only 
[e Soviet Union and the United States 
It the nations across the globe whose 
istinies are linked to the East-West 
nflict. 

The developing world, too, stands to 
■nefit from an e.xpanded flow of infor- 
ation. Some of these nations are al- 
!^dy seizing their opportunities. I 
stice that Barbados, for instance, ad- 
irtises to potential investors by em- 
lasizing that it has a sophisticated 
iecommunications system. Other coun- 
:es are using information technologies 
; enhance their agricultural oi' indus- 
: al capacities. With the aid of modem 
inmunications, Colombia now markets 
i'sh-cut flowers in New York City. De- 
I loping countries that profited from 
' "yreen revolution" know that infor- 
ition modernization offers the vast 
:Dmise of integration into the world 
nnomy. 

Nations throughout the developing 
<irld must decide how to view these 
:w international markets. If they fear 
itside influences and seek to restrain 
;!hnological trade, they will only fall 
Hher behind the developed world and 
JTease the gulf between us. If, on the 
)ier hand, they remain open, they wall 
-d themselves rewarded wdth rare op- 
Jrtunities for developing their material 
d human resources and for accelerat- 
or their movement toward modem- 
Jtion. 

i In the industrially advanced world, 
^e information revolution is already 
xnsforming the multinational corpora- 
;n. Today, sophisticated communica- 
; ns enable people from across the 
•ans to work together with the same 
Jiciency of those who work across 
: vn. In the coming years, we can ex- 

t to see new supranational corporate 
cities whose employees are drawn 
'im all comers of the world. That's one 
Jisible consequence of the shrinking 
iDortance of geography. Another is 
it the developing nations will have ac- 
J.s as never before to data and commu- 
tations in the advanced nations- 



access that could only increase the effi- 
ciency with which developing nations 
use their resources. 

A Test of Principle 

Because of the information revolution, 
all nations— free and unfree, developing 
and developed— must confront a key 
challenge that I have already men- 
tioned: the way nations trade with one 
another. None of the opportunities be- 
fore us will bear fruit unless the free 
nations can agree to open rather than 
i-estrictive trade in these revolutionary 
products and services. 

This same challenge is also affecting 
our diplomacy. Technologies are being 
transformed even as we negotiate over 
their transfer abroad. The United States 
has pressed strongly for a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations in the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] to ensure that key issues 
relating to the trade in these emerging 
technologies are taken up. Meanwhile, 
we are keeping open the possibility of 
increasing bilateral fi'ee trade arrange- 
ments, as we are pui'suing now with Is- 
rael and Canada. Our overall purpose 
remains the same: to ma.ximize the de- 
velopment of and trade in these infor- 
mation age products and sei-vices, espe- 
cially those that increase the free flow 
of data and ideas. To do otherwise 
would betray the vast promise that the 
infonnation age holds out to us. 

That betrayal would be a great mis- 
fortune for the free world— yes, because 
of the economic opportunities that would 
be lost but, more, because of the impli- 
cations for the idea of freedom. We are 
proud of our freedom, and we are right 
to be proud. But today's disputes over 
the technologies that cut across our 
borders put our dedication and commit- 
ment to a new test. Are we secure 
enough in our principles to act in ways 
that promote, rather than discourage, 
the technologies that leap across 
borders? 

The United States is confident in its 
own answer. We welcome these technol- 
ogies as we have welcomed, in times 
past, other advances whose implications 
were uncertain. In fact, we invite other 
nations to practice a little "cultural 
imperialism" of their own on us. We 
weren't shaken when Mr. Gorbachev ap- 
peared live via satellite on our televi- 
sions. And it doesn't bother us to hear 
that engineers from the Soviet Union 
have been known to amuse themselves 
by intercepting Hollywood movies from 
American satellite transmissions. We 
just hope they enjoyed Rambo. 



Approaching Horizons 

This cultural dimension leads me to my 
final point. The greatest minds of the 
past century bent their powers toward 
understanding the significance of the in- 
dustrial revolution. Theorists and in- 
tellectuals, novelists and poets alike 
devoted themselves to examining the 
dimensions of their new age. Today, 
with the passing of the industrial ei-a, a 
new consciousness is developing. Its im- 
pact on our art and literature and music 
is already apparent; its impact on our 
social behavior is already underway. In 
the long run, the most exciting 
challenge posed by the new age is not 
to nations or corporations or societies 
but to the individual human imagination. 

Meanwhile, those of us who must 
grapple with the daily realities of the in- 
formation revolution face formidable 
challenges of our own. We can learn a 
practical lesson from a wise and 
thoughtful banker. Fifteen years ago, 
when even pocket calculators were a 
novelty, Walter Wriston foresaw the im- 
plications of this new age for the field of 
finance. His vision helped to revolu- 
tionize the entire financial industry and 
turned his company, Citicorp, into a 
giant of imagination and profit. 

Wriston succeeded because he was 
able to grasp both the particular details 
of his chosen sector and the daunting 
conceptual outlines of the infonnation 
revolution at large. By never losing 
sight of either, he contributed to both. 
Those of us who confront other practical 
dimensions of our new age— in my own 
case, the political dimension— can benefit 
from his example. 

So, as we face the many challenges 
that the new age presents, we must 
never lose sight of our most fundamen- 
tal principles. We are reminded with 
every advance that in this age of revo- 
lution our commitment to freedom is our 
single greatest asset. With all the infor- 
mation we have amassed, with all the 
discoveries at the frontiers of all the 
sciences, we still find that answers bring 
with them new questions. Our policies 
must always be based on the fundamen- 
tal process of freedom— freedom of 
thought, freedom of research, and the 
free flow of ideas. If we keep that in 
mind, we will benefit from our dedica- 
tion to liberty even as we secure it. 



'Press release 53. 



// 1986 



43 



AFRICA 



A Review of Recent Events 
in South Africa 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa and on International 
Economic Policy and Trade of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 12, 1986. Mr. Crocker is Assis- 
tant Secretary for African Affairs.^ 

Thank you for this opportunity to ap- 
pear before you today on the important 
subject of U.S. policy toward South 
Africa. In my time with you today, I 
should like to review events of recent 
months in South Africa. I shall then 
describe our policy toward that unhappy 
country and conclude by venturing my 
views on the prospects for peaceful 
change. 

The Situation in South Africa 

The crisis in South Afinca, which broke 
into public visibility in the fall of 1984, 
persists. Politics remains polarized and 
shrill, making it difficult for moderates 
on both sides to meet, much less negoti- 
ate. Violence and repression occur at 
levels that disturb all of us who hope 
for peaceful change in that country. And 
the issues there continue to engage our 
sympathy as well as our national in- 
terests and to test our resolve as well 
as our patience. 

South Africa, in short, is still a 
divided land. Suspicion and mistrust 
abound. Black and white South Africans 
tend to look at their country and see 
two different realities. For one group, 
the glass is seen to be filling at an un- 
precedented pace; for the other, it re- 
mains nearly empty. 

White South Africans vrill emphasize 
how much change has taken place in re- 
cent years and how much the govern- 
ment has conceded in recent months. 
The state of emergency has at last been 
lifted; powersharing and negotiations 
are called for; apartheid is branded as 
"outdated"; the government has an- 
nounced that political domination, petty 
discrimination, economic and educational 
inequality, and the pass laws are to be 
eliminated. An undivided South Africa, 
a common citizenship, and a universal 
franchise— these are political commit- 
ments by a National Party government 
that would have been unthinkable a few 
years ago. 



To white South Africans, these 
changes appear rapid, even revolution- 
ary. In some, such change inspires fear; 
in others, it provokes resistance; and to 
many, it offers the promise that a more 
just society can be arrived at peacefully. 

Looking at these same events, many 
black South Africans see something 
quite different. Such changes as have 
taken place appear marginal and grudg- 
ing to them. Whatever concessions have 
been made or promised, blacks still lack 
citizenship; they still cannot vote for na- 
tional leaders; they still must send their 
children to inferior schools; they still are 
confined to black areas where crime, in- 
timidation, and the presence of security 
forces are too common; black contract 
laborers still must leave their spouses 
and families behind in the homelands. 

In these circumstances, after nearly 
20 months of violence, more than 11,000 
detentions, and 1,200 deaths, it is hardly 
surprising that politics has polarized. 
Nor is it surprising that the South Afri- 
can Government should find dismantling 
apartheid far more difficult than impos- 
ing it. 

A protracted economic downturn has 
produced new straiiis. High inflation, 
running at nearly 20%, and budgetary 
austerity have cut into funds available 
for social expenditures, affecting all sec- 
tors of South African society. Blacks, at 
the lowest end of the economic scale, 
are hit hardest. Higher unemployment 
and sharply increased costs for housing, 
transportation, and food have clearly 
hurt blacks much more than whites. 

External economic pressures have 
increased as well, leading to the debt 
standstill and a plummeting currency 
last fall. The South African Government 
is still negotiating with Western banks 
over suitable terms for rescheduling the 
country's external debt. This debt crisis 
is unusual in that it traces more to polit- 
ical than economic causes— yet another 
indication of the true nature of South 
Africa's problems. 

Of all these worrying trends, the 
violence and repression disturb me most 
because of their implications for human 
rights and human life and because they 
radicalize politics. As Martin Luther 
King said, violence and repression foster 
"bitterness in the survivors and brutal- 
ity in the destroyers." 



Among whites, one hears more talk 
about a siege economy and rightist par 
ties proclaim loudly their opposition to 
further reforms. Meanwhile, what is ta 
ing shape across South Africa's black 
community is a loosely organized, mass 
movement often led by youngsters whc 
operate outside any law and without 
identifiable leaders. With the govern- 
ment's decision to lift the state of emei 
gency, a move insistently advocated by 
us and many others, one must hope ths 
we will at last see violence reduced an( 
peaceful remedies pursued. 

In sum, the situation in South Afri( 
remains balanced on a knife-edge be- 
tween hope and despair. The govern- 
ment has made some political 
commitments and decisions in principle ' 
which are of undisputed importance. It 
is perhaps fair to state that, at long 
last, the many messages being sent to 
that government— primarily by the pec 
pie of South Africa themselves— are ; 
being heard. But this does not mean ' 
that a breakthrough toward peace and i 
negotiation has occurred. A number of i 
the government's own statements of in 
tent have been undercut by subsequen ' 
statements or actions that raise furthe 
questions. Positive words need to be , 
translated into unambiguous actions. |i 
The polarization and distrust continue . I f 
dangerously high levels. A climate con-|i 
ducive to dialogue is still to be created i 
The violence continues. Fragile opening 
for negotiation and for defusing the 
township crisis must be nurtured. It is 
time when people of moderation and 
courage on all sides need our encouragi 
ment to produce results for their variei I 
constituencies. 

U.S. Policy 

Through several Administrations, incluii 
ing this one, U.S. policy has sought to 
use our influence— limited as it is— 
against apartheid and for peaceful 
change, not against innocent people wh 
are the victims of apartheid. We have I i 
also recognized South Africa's pivotal | s 
role in the southern African region and ' 
the need for regional stability and secu ' 
rity. Improved relations between Soutl: 
Africa and her neighbors and internal , 
change in South Africa relate to one 
another. 

These remain the animating feature i j 
of our policy today. In South Africa, wi' 
face a moving target where events un- 
fold quickly, unpredictably, and beyond, 
our control. In a sense, there is no sto-,| 
tus quo in South Africa. Circumstances | 



44 



Department of State Bulli 



J 



AFRICA 



lange daily, putting new demands on 
11 involved. 

For this reason, our policy sets out 
eai'ly the principles I mentioned as the 
asis of our strategy and then proceeds 
ith a tactical emphasis on process and 
jsults that will promote our broader 
mg-term objectives. We do not aim to 
npose ourselves, our solutions, or our 
ivorites in South Africa; such an intru- 
on would be unwanted and unwise for 
ly outside party. 

What we seek instead is to help cre- 
,e conditions that will draw people of 
)od will— the overwhelming majority— 
)gether. Encouraging the government 
> repeal all apartheid laws and to con- 
nue with positive change, to end 
'pression, to stop removals and in- 
;pendence for so-called homelands, to 
«lease detainees and political leaders 
ich as Nelson Mandela, to take steps 
I get black children back into school, 
id to respond to calls by moderate 
UL'ks- these things we have done in- 
iteiitly, publicly and quietly, some- 
Ties with effect, in some cases, 
■successfully. By the same token, we 
!ive urged black leaders to eschew ex- 
emist solutions, give credit to the 
pvernment when it is due, and not give 
I) on negotiations and peaceful reme- 
les. Here again, our case is often com- 
I'Uing and, frankly, it is sometimes 
ijected. The important thing is that we 
ie involved, pursuing goals which I be- 
I've all Americans share. Our access to 
'.rious groups and individuals gives us 
denings for using diplomacy and politi- 
(1 and moral persuasion— the most ef- 
letive tools for us in these dangerous 
Ines. 

i In our diplomacy we are trying to 
Up an unhappy but essentially friendly 
ttion and to help lay the basis for a 
ktter future. Our moral responsibility 
Ech day must be to think through the 
r5ults of our actions. When President 
hagan signed his Executive order on 
kUth Africa in September last year, he 
s,d that he wanted to work with Con- 
fess to increase bipartisan support for 
IS. policy toward that country. He 
fded: 

I respect and share the goals that have 
Mivated many in Congress to send a mes- 
f ;e of U.S. concern about apartheid. But in 
« ng so, we must not damage the economic 
■U-being of millions of people in South and 
s ithem Africa. 

' U.S. policy toward South Africa has 
FDceeded from that premise throughout 
t s Administration. The purpose of the 
lesident's Executive order was to un- 



derscore our message to the South Afii- 
can GoveiTiment that the United 
States— its E.xecutive, its legislature, 
and, most importantly, its people— reject 
apartheid. 

Since the President announced his 
Executive order, we have moved quick- 
ly to implement its provisions. Kruger- 
rand and weapons imports have been 
banned, as have bank loans to the South 
African Government. U.S. restrictions 
on computer and nuclear exports are in 
place. The provisions regarding fair 
labor standards have been published, 
and my colleagues in the State Depart- 
ment are now registering all U.S. firms 
with more than 25 employees in South 
Africa. 

The Secretary's Advisory Committee 
on South Africa has begun its work. 
This gi-oup of 12 distinguished Ameri- 
cans already held its third set of meet- 
ings with experts on South Africa this 
week. It will travel to South Africa 
later this year and also hold a public 
hearing here in Washington. Its report 
will probably be submitted by the end 
of this year. In the meantime, the 
Secretary has made clear his support of 
the committee's work and of its inde- 
pendence. He has also indicated that he 
will seek its advice on U.S. policy 



toward South Africa, even before the 
final report. I am pleased and honored 
that these Americans are dedicating 
themselves to helping us with this 
problem. 

We have also increased the U.S. 
Government's assistance programs avail- 
able to South Africa's disadvantaged 
majority. AID [i^gency for International 
Development] is expanding existing pro- 
grams and will propose several new 
ones this fiscal year. Other U.S. agen- 
cies, particularly USIA [United States 
Information Agency] and Commerce, 
have taken steps to add to their pro- 
grams aimed at South Africa's black 
community. I should mention also the 
creation of the special working group on 
South and southern Africa under Am- 
bassador Doug HoUaday— an interagency 
office in the State Department. It has 
already undertaken several initiatives 
aimed at encouraging a wider under- 
standing of our policy goals and at in- 
creasing the flow of privately supported 
exchanges with South Africa. 

I should also mention our effort to 
open a small post in Port Elizabeth, an 
effort that has been resisted by mem- 
bers of this body. We want to open a 
post in the eastern Cape to reach out 
more effectively to the various commu- 



South Africa's Proposal 
on Namibia and Angola 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT 
MAR. 4, 1986' 

Today in Cape Town, the Government 
of South Africa proposed that August 1, 
1986, be set as the date for the begin- 
ning of implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 435. That resolution 
outlines the procedures leading to the 
independence of Namibia. The South 
Africans have made implementation of 
this date contingent on reaching prior 
agreement on a timetable for Cuban 
troop withdrawal from Angola. 

The U.S. Government welcomes 
South Africa's announcement as a sig- 
nificant and positive step in the negotia- 
tions to achieve Namibia's independence, 
the withdrawal of Cuban forces from 
Angola and, more broadly, peace in the 
region. The opportunity now exists for 
rapid movement toward a settlement 
which will bring Namibia to independ- 
ence. This opportunity should be seized. 



It is now incumbent upon all the parties 
to the negotiations to intensify their 
diplomatic efforts. The United States is 
prepared to move rapidly to encourage 
the parties in this effort. With this in 
mind, the Secretary [of State] has asked 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs Frank G. Wisner to travel im- 
mediately to southern Africa for consul- 
tation with governments in the region. 

We welcome the South African Gov- 
ernment's announcement that it would 
lift the state of emergency within the 
next few days. We have long urged that 
the state of emergency be lifted as one 
of the steps the South African Govern- 
ment must take to create conditions in 
which it will be possible to begin negoti- 
ations with credible black leaders lead- 
ing to meaningful reform and a reduction 
in violence. 



•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1986. 



^y 1986 



45 



AFRICA 



nities in that important part of South 
Africa. This, we thought, was perf'ectly 
in keeping with advice we have received 
from many places, including members of 
this House. 

I hope that you will find it possible 
to reconsider your views on this subject. 
I believe a post in Port Elizabeth will 
serve important U.S. national interests, 
particularly in light of the U.S. commer- 
cial presence there, as well as signifi- 
cantly enhancing our political reporting 
capabilities and contact wdth the eastern 
Cape black community. 

Apart from these recent initiatives, 
the point I wish to underscore with 
these committees is that President 
Reagan has directed us to be even more 
actively engaged across the political 
spectrum in South Africa during this 
painful period. While I cannot go into 
the substance of delicate diplomatic ex- 
changes, we have used these channels to 
underscore our views about what must 
be done to create a more constructive 
context. Like others, we have stressed 
the need for the government to send 
clear signals of its intent to scrap apart- 
heid and negotiate a new system based 
on democratic principles. Where there 
are openings to advance specific goals, 
to pass quiet messages from one group 
to another, or to support positive initia- 
tives already launched by others, we are 
doing so. In addition to private diplo- 
macy, we have spoken out clearly and 
forcefully against continuing abuses 
where these occur and will continue to 
make known our positions to the broad- 
est possible audience. At the same time, 
we have continued to make clear our 
strong conviction that violence— from 
whatever quarter— deserves no U.S. 
support. Similarly, we do not believe 
purposeful reform and basic change can 
be encouraged by augmenting South 
Africa's current economic difficulties. 

As I have said, the situation in 
South Africa is delicately poised. We are 
determined to act but also to act respon- 
sibly. It is far too soon, in our view, to 
draw conclusions about the impact of 
the growing crescendo of internal and 
external pressures for constructive 
change. And it would be downright dan- 
gerous for us— perhaps inadvertently— to 
take postures or adopt actions which 
could maximize intransigence or foster 
illusions on all sides. Our goal at this 
time, in short, must be to encourage the 
government and the other communities 
to open doors and to walk through 
them. 



Prospects 

As I have said. South Africa is still a 
divided country. And yet, ironically, all 
responsible parties in both the black and 
white communities wish for the support 
of the United States, perhaps more than 
any other outside nation, for their cause. 
This confers on us an inescapable 
responsibility and often pulls us in con- 
flicting directions. This is where our 
resolve and our patience are tested. 
South Africa's problems were not 
created overnight, and they will almost 
certainly be resolved more slowly than 
we would like. 

And yet, this quest for American 
support affirms that our course is the 
right one. Bishop Tutu's recent U.S. 
visit, on the one hand, and parts of 
State President Botha's January 31 
speech, on the other, show that interna- 
tional opinion counts in South Africa. I 
am not suggesting that the United 
States or any other outside nation will 
play a decisive role in sorting out the 
South Africa dilemma. Instead, I con- 
tend that a course calculated to use our 
influence for the principles I have men- 
tioned will keep us relevant. 



South Africa will come under close 
scrutiny this year. The Commonwealth': 
Eminent Persons' Group, the European 
Community, our own advisory commit- 
tee, the banks— indeed, the whole 
world— will be watching South Africa 
closely this year. Different time sched- 
ules have been set, some synchronized, 
some not. 

Forecasting the future for South 
Africa is a task full of pitfalls. There ar 
some encouraging signs, but there is 
much to be discouraged about as well. 
What we can all agree about, I am con- 
fident, is that 1986 will be a decisive 
year in that country's history. It is not 
a threat but a dispassionate prediction 
that South Africans cannot afford 
another year like the last one. Our 
hopes, our diplomacy, and our progress 
are with them as they grapple with 
dilemmas and injustices built up over 
many years to chart a way forward, 
around the abyss of violence, toward a 
democratic system. 



'The complete transcript of the hearing 
will be published by the committee and wiil' 
be available fi-om the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Pi-inting Offic 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Report on U.S. Actions 
Toward South Africa 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 17, 1986' 

On September 9, 1985, in Executive Order 
12532 (50 Fed. Reg. 36861, Sept. 10, 1985) I 
declared a national emergency to deal with 
the threat posed by the policies and actions 
of the Govei-nment of South Africa to the for- 
eign policy and economy of the United 
States. 

Pursuant to that Order, I prohibited cer- 
tain transactions, including the following: 
(1) the making or approval of bank loans to 
the South African Government, with certain 
narrow exceptions; (2) the export of com- 
puters and related goods and technology to 
certain government agencies and any apart- 
heid enforcing entity of the South African 
Government; (3) nuclear exports to South 
Africa and related transactions, with certain 
narrow exceptions; (4) the import into the 
United States of arms, ammunition, or mili- 
tary vehicles produced in South Africa; and 
(5) the extension of export marketing support 
to U.S. firms employing at least twenty-five 
persons in South Africa which do not adhere 
to certain fair labor standards. 

In addition, I directed (6) the Secretary of 
State and the United States Trade Represen- 
tative to consult with other parties to the 



General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
with a view toward adopting a prohibition oi 
the import of Krugerrands; (7) the Secretary 
of Treasury to complete a study within 60 
days regarding the feasibility of minting U.£ 
gold coins; (8) the Secretary of State to take 
the steps necessary to increase the amounts 
provided for scholarships in South Africa for 
those disadvantaged by the system of apart- 
heid and to increase the amounts allocated 
for South Africa in the Human Rights Fund; 
and (9) the Secretary of State to establish ar 
Advisory Committee to provide recommends 
tions on measures to encourage peaceful 
change in South Africa. 

The declaration of emergency was made 
pursuant to the authority vested in me as 
President by the Constitution and laws of th 
United States, including the Intei-national 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C 
1701 et seq., and the National Emergencies 
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. I submitted a 
report regarding the declaration to the Con- 
gress on September 9, 1985, pursuant to Sec 
tion 204(b) of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act. Pursuant to Section 
204(c) of that act, I am today reporting on 
the major actions taken in the exercise of th 
authorities contained in that act and Execu- 
tive Order 12532. The following actions are 



46 



Department of State Bullg 



d 



AFRICA 



isted in chronological order, and a copy of all 
mplementing niles and regulations is en- 
•losed. 

On October 1, 1985, in Executive Order 
.2535, I prohibited the importation of the 
South African Krugerrands into the United 
States effective October 11, 1985 (50 Fed. 
^eg. 40325, Oct. 3, 1985). This Order imple- 
pented the course of action contemplated in 
lection 5(a) of Executive Order 12532. 

On October 7, 1985, the Bureau of Alco- 
ol. Tobacco and Fii-eanns of the Department 
f the Treasury issued regulations on the Im- 
ortation of Articles on the United States 
lunitions Import List (50 Fed. Reg. 42157, 
)ct. 18, 1985). These regulations implemented 
he prohibition of certain arms imports con- 
ained in Section 1(d) of Executive Order 
fe532. 

] On October 9, 1985, the Office of Foreign 
issets Control of the Department of the 
treasury issued the South African Transac- 
ons Regulations (50 Fed. Reg. 41682, Oct. 

1985). These regulations implemented the 
in on the importation of the Krugeirand. 

On October 22, 1985, the Department of 
tate published a notice in the Federal 
egister regai-ding the Establishment of the 
dvisory Committee on South Africa (50 
ed. Reg. 42817, Oct. 22, 1985). The Charter 
' the Advisory Committee has been filed 
ith the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
,e, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
;d the Library of Congress. The Committee 
all render a report to the Secretary of 
ate within one year of its first meeting, 
hich was held on January 29-30. 

On November 4, 1985, the Department of 
ate issued proposed regulations for public 
imment on South Africa and Fair Labor 
landards (50 Fed. Reg. 46455, Nov. 8, 1985). 
'le draft regulations were designed to imple- 
)5nt the fair labor provisions stated in Sec- 
Dn 2 of Executive Order 12532. Final 
igulations were issued by the Department 
I State on December 23,"l985 (50 Fed. Reg. 
!308, Dec. 31, 1985). 

On November 6, 1985, the Office of For- 
(pi Assets Control of the Department of 
'easury issued the South African Transac- 
tn Regulations (50 Fed. Reg. 46726, Nov. 
'-, 1985). These regulations implemented the 
Ink loan prohibition of Section 1(a) of Ex- 
ijtive Order 12532. 

On November 8, 1985, the Secretary of 
tj Treasury submitted a report on the feasi- 
Hty of minting U.S. gold coins. On Decem- 
Ir 17, 1985, I signed the Gold Bullion Coin 
it of 1985 (Public Law 99-185), which re- 
fires the minting of such coins. 
, On November 14, 1985, the International 
'ade Administration of the Department of 
(mmerce issued regulations on Export Con- 
I Is on the Republic of South Africa (50 Fed. 
\g. 47363, Nov. 18, 1985). These regulations 
'olemented the computer export prohibition 
i'Section 1(b) and the prohibition against 
l.msing exports to nuclear production and 
ulization facihties in Section 1(c) of Execu- 
te Order 12532. 



The policies and actions of the Govern- 
ment of South Africa continue to pose an un- 
usual and extraordinary threat to the foreign 
policy and economy of the United States. I 
shall continue to exercise the powers at my 
disposal to apply the measures contained in 
Executive Order 12532 as long as these 



measures are appropriate, and will continue 
to report periodically to the Congress on sig- 
nificant developments pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 
1703(c). 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 24, 1986. 



U.S. -Supported Human Rights Program 
in South Africa 



Background 

The South African human rights pi-o- 
gi-am was established in 1984, under the 
tj.S. Foreign Assistance Act, to pro- 
mote "political, economic, social, judicial 
and humanitai-ian efforts to foster a just 
society and to help victims of apart- 
heid." Administered at the U.S. Em- 
bassy in Pretoria by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (AID), 
the program encourages the work of 
community-based nongovernment organi- 
zations. Because most of these organiza- 
tions are small, the money granted to 
them— in amounts generally not exceed- 
ing $10,000— can help make them finan- 
cially viable and also attract other 
funcling sources. During the first 2 
years, grants were made to more than 
200 projects in South Africa. The pro- 
gram will total $1.5 million in fiscal year 
1986, targeted specifically on projects 
and institutions that address the legal 
and other constraints to full equal rights 
and protection of all South Africans' 
civil liberties. 

The program's goal is to assist those 
who aspire to the ideals of the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Methods to achieve this goal include 
supporting victims of racial discrimina- 
tion and fostering legal and social 
change by encouraging research, discus- 
sion, and awareness of human rights, 
promoting democratic principles and the 
free enterprise system, and increasing 
the openness of the judicial and legal 
systems for all. No support is provided 
under the human rights program for 
partisan political activities. 

The human rights program is only 
one part of a larger U.S. Government 
program, totaling $20 million in fiscal 
year 1986, to assist South Africa's black, 
colored, and Asian communities. Activi- 
ties under the larger program provide: 



• Scholarships to disadvantaged stu- 
dents for training in the United States 
and in South Africa; 

• Assistance to black labor unions, 
entrepreneurs, and businessmen; and 

• Help to communities in their ef- 
forts to promote local well-being through 
schools and hospitals, and other such ac- 
tivities. 

Funding Criteria 

for Human Rights Program 

Funding decisions are based on an 
evaluation of each proposed project's 
probable impact. In the short tei-m, 
projects should increase the capabilities 
of organizations working for human 
rights. In the medium tenn, they should 
demonstrate potential for influencing 
government policy in areas of due proc- 
ess, freedom of speech, equal treatment 
under law, and general tolerance of 
diversity. In the long tei-m, projects 
should lead to the recognition of full 
citizenship for all races, the improve- 
ment of human rights legislation, and 
the development of mechanisms for 
blacks to participate at all levels of 
government. 

Types of Projects 

Successful projects fall into four 
categories. 

• Grants made to organizations pro- 
viding legal assistance to members of 
the nonwhite community. Among these 
was a $10,000 grant in April 1985 to the 
Legal Education Center of the Black 
Lawyer's Association for the funding of 
a librai7 of basic legal matters. The 
center was launched in January 1985 
with grants from the Ford and Carnegie 
foundations for use in establishing pro- 
grams to facilitate placement of black 
law graduates as law clerks; fonnulating 
continuing education courses and semi- 



^y 1986 



47 



AFRICA 



nars for black lawyers; undertaking 
legal research into areas affecting black 
people; and establishing law clinics to 
provide advice to black communities. 
This is the only program of its kind un- 
dertaken by an entirely black organiza- 
tion, and the center will be greatly 
facilitated by the creation of the library. 
Grants also have been made to other 
law-related projects such as the Law- 
yers for Human Rights to set up an 
office in Pretoria and the Center for Ap- 
plied Legal Studies to fund a seminar on 
black participation in the legal pro- 
fession. 

• Grants concerned with the effects 
on blacks of the South African Govern- 
ment's educational policies. In October 
1985 a $10,000 grant for the purchase of 
data processing equipment was made to 
the Careers Research and Information 
Center (CRIC). Founded in 1977 after 
the Soweto uprising, CRIC sought to 
help scholars and young adults plan 
their futures. The project has been ad- 
ministered nonracially, although its 
prime audiences are black pupils and 
their teachers. The new data processing 
equipment will enable CRIC to expand 
its testing and career counseling serv- 
ices for black and colored students in 
the Western Cape region. Such assist- 
ance will help them overcome South 
African social barriers. Other funded 
education projects include the South 
African Committee for Higher Educa- 
tion Distance Learning Project, de- 
signed to counter obstacles to the 
upgrading of black education, and the 
Industrial Aid Center Adult Literacy 
Program, established to inform workers, 
especially the unemployed, of their legal 
rights. 

• Grants made to organizations pro- 
moting private enterprise and develop- 
ment, and organizational skills in 
black communities. The Youth Pro- 
gram of the Foundation for Social De- 
velopment awarded an $8,500 grant in 
October 1985, promotes self-reliance and 
organizational skills within educational 
and recreational programs. The National 
Build a Better Society Association, 
granted $7,000, is establishing a pro- 
gram to advise individuals and disadvan- 
taged communities on financial matters 
and personal and home management to 
help people make informed decisions, de- 
velop leadership qualities, and create 
community awareness. 



• Grants made to projects address- 
ing the problem of resolving the social 
tensions in South African society. For 

example, the Woi-kshop of Negotiation 
Techniques, sponsored by the Center for 
Intergroup Studies and funded by a 
grant of $10,000, is concerned with 



research and education in conflict resolu- 
tion and race relations. 



Taken from the GIST series of February 
1986, published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. ■ 



Visit of Cameroon's President 




President Paul Biya of the Republic 
of Cameroon tnade an official working 
visit to Washington, D.C., February 25- 
28, 1986, to meet with President Reagan 
and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
two Presidents after their meeting on 
February 27.'^ 

President Reagan 

It's been a pleasure to have as our 
guest President Biya of Cameroon. 
President Biya's visit is a milestone in 
the excellent relationship between our 
two countries. Our discussions were 
warm and frank, reflecting the good vdll 
between us and our countries as well. 

And I'm pleased to take this oppor- 
tunity to announce that yesterday a 
bilateral investment treaty was signed 
by our governments. President Biya and 
I are convinced this treaty vrill spur eco- 
nomic growth and greatly benefit our 
peoples. 

Cameroon, like the United States, is 
blessed with rich natural resources, a 
vibrant private sector, and a diverse, in- 
dustrious population. But resources 
alone do not guarantee progress, either 
in economic or political terms; it takes 
sound, dedicated leadership. President 



48 



Biya exemplifies this with his energetic 
commitment to national unity, reconcilia 
tion, and the liberalization of his coun- 
try's political institutions. 

Today it's becoming ever more clear 
to the emerging nations in Africa that 
Marxist and rigid statist models of de- 
velopment simply don't work. Instead o 
economic development, political freedom 
and national stability, Marxism, an ideol 
ogy totally alien to African aspirations, 
has produced nothing but deprivation, 
tyranny, and conflict. 

Cameroon is a shining example of 
how much can be accomplished when a 
more realistic and humane approach is , 
taken to political and economic develop-i 
ment. By allowing free rein of the entei ' 
prise and talents of the people and by 
providing incentives for them to work 
and earn, last year Cameroon's econom;:)^ 
grew at an annual rate of over 6%. Its ^ 
per capita income is among the highest ' 
in black Africa. President Biya's goverr i"* 
ment enjoys a balanced budget, and his if; 
country, thanks to the growing vigor of Jj^ 
the private sector, is essentially self- 
sufficient in food. In short. President 
Biya's wise policies have been a boon t( 
his people. 

The President is a highly respected 
leader in Africa. And today I sought hi: 



Department of State Bulleti 



AFRICA 



dvice on a wide range of issues. We 
liscussed our mutual concern about in- 
emational terrorism and about aggres- 
ion directed against some sub-Saharan 
tates, especially Chad. We agreed on 
he importance of working together and 
idth other friends countering these 
langers. 

The United States and Cameroon 
ave for several decades enjoyed a high 
;vel of cooperation. Today we have 
eaffinned our intention to continue 
einforcing our positive and constructive 
elationship. All Ameiicans wish Presi- 
ent Biya continued success in his 
fforts to build a prosperous and 
emocratic Cameroon. And we wish him 
rodspeed on his journey home. 

resident Biya^ 

resident Reagan and myself have just 
M a meeting marked by cordiality and 
jutual understanding. We have looked 
, the economic and political situation of 
ameroon. President Reagan is very 
uch aware of the progress we have 
lade. Our domestic policies are based 
Ji a free market economy and democ- 
i.cy for most personal initiative and the 
Ijeation of new businesses. Our growth 
te has increased considerably. We 
ive opened our borders to foreign in- 
tstors, and we have excellent relations 
ith the Western nations. 

The most important conclusion of 
iir meeting is that there is a strong 
inversion of views between our two 
luntries because, like you, we hold par- 
i;ularly dear ideals of peace, liberty, 
cmocracy, progress, and moral values, 
i well as social justice. 

Like you, we, too, condemn apart- 
lid and nonrespect of the freedom of 
1e Namibian people. I sincerely hope 
tat once again the influence of your na- 
\m will help resolve these problems, 
nich are a threat to human dignity, 
ke you, we condemn violence and ter- 
irism throughout the world. We have 
(ted in favor of a dialogue in peace and 
Uance. And we have strengthened our 
I ks to other African countries so that 
tjether we can make progress. 
; As I said, our ideas converge on 
i'my levels. And my presence here at- 
tits that we want to strengthen the 
I's between our two countries, and we 
Sint to strengthen bilateral coopera- 
I ns. And we already have about 100 
i_nerican firms established in our coun- 
tV. Our nation is bilingual, English and 
lench, and is, therefore, fertile ground 
f • American investors. Our two govem- 
rmts have signed an agreement on the 



reciprocal protection of investments, 
which will certainly encourage them. 
Assistance from the American Govern- 
ment has been of a great help to us, 
particularly in the fields of agriculture, 
education, and health. We do appi-eciate 
the contribution of the United States to 
our social life and hope that the number 
of cultural exchange programs will in- 
crease. Since our foreign policy is based 
on international cooperation, we count 
very much on the United States. Our 
relations are characterized by mutual 



friendship. I hope the United States will 
help defend our ideals of peace and free- 
dom, which are often threatened in 
Africa. Your nation and President have 
our total confidence. We congratulate 
President Reagan on his meeting in 
Geneva with Mr. Gorbachev. 



•Made on the South Portico of the White 
House (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents "of Mar. 3, 1986). 

^President Biya spoke in French, which 
was translated by an interpreter, and 
English. ■ 



U.S. Emergency 
Military Assistance to Chad 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 13, 1986' 

The President has determined, under 
Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act, that an unforeseen emergency 
exists in Chad which requires our im- 
mediate aid. To meet this emergency, 
the President has directed the draw- 
down of up to $10 million in Department 
of Defense equipment and services to 
provide military assistance to Chad. 
This decision is in response to the re- 
quest of the Government of Chad and is 
in accordance with Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. 

On February 10, Libyan-backed in- 
surgent forces initiated major attacks 
against Government of Chad troops 
along and south of the 16th parallel, the 
de facto line of separation since 1983 be- 
tween Libyan-occupied northern Chad 
and the territorv under Chadian 



Government control. These attacks have 
continued; the most recent engagements 
took place on March 5. In response to 
the Chadian Government's appeal for as- 
sistance against this renewed Libyan- 
backed aggression, France has sent 
troops and aircraft to aid in Chad's 
defense. 

Chadian troops have been forced to 
expend large amounts of mihtary equip- 
ment and supplies in repelling the 
Libyan-backed attacks. Our assistance, 
complementing French efforts, will pro- 
vide a resupply of critical items needed 
for Chad's defense. We are working 
with the Governments of Chad and 
France on the specific items to be 
provided in the areas of transport air- 
craft, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, 
and medical supplies. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman Bernard Kalb. ■ 



Ky 1986 



49 



ARMS CONTROL 



Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Remarks before a symposium at the 
Department of State's Foreign Service 
Institute on March 13, 1986. Ambas- 
sador Nitze is special adviser to the 
President and the Secretary of State on 
arms control matters. 

After last November's summit meeting 
between President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev, we thought that 
the summit and the events leading up to 
it might well foreshadow the possibility 
for a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tionship. We were fully aware, however, 
of the substantial barriers to agreement 
which remained to be surmounted. 

On March 4 our negotiators con- 
cluded the fourth round of the nuclear 
and space arms talks (NST) in Geneva. 
This was preceded by Gorbachev's Janu- 
ary 15 announcement of a new Soviet 
arms control proposal. In late February, 
after extensive consultations with our 
allies, the President authoi-ized our 
negotiators in Geneva to present a com- 
prehensive response to Mr. Gorbachev's 
proposal. 

It is appropriate to recall the main 
outlines of Mr. Gorbachev's proposal 
and those of the President's response, 
as well as such clarifications as our 
negotiators have been able to obtain 
from the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. 
I will first address the initial steps 
as they have been set forth by both 
sides. Agreements concerning the first 
steps and the manner in which they are 
executed will largely determine what is 
possible in subsequent stages. 

One of the features of Mr. Gor- 
bachev's proposal was his attempt to 
trump the President's emphasis on the 
goal of the eventual elimination of 
nuclear weapons by offering a staged 
timetable to achieve that goal. But the 
second and third stages of his proposal 
can only be agreed and implemented by 
a multilateral group of nations including 
the United Kingdom, France, China, 
and other industrial nations as well. 
Furthermore, for those steps to become 
practicable, with no diminution of the 
security of the United States and its 
allies, a number of changes must first 
take place in the world scene. There 
must be a correction in today's imbal- 
ances in non-nuclear capabilities; an 
elimination of chemical warfare capabili- 
ties; an improvement in the methods of 



50 



handling conditions of tension in the 
world, such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
and Angola; and a demonstration that 
the Soviet Union has reconciled itself to 
peaceful competition. 

With regard to the first steps, there 
appeared to be some new elements in 
the position of the Soviet side. On INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces], the 
Soviets appeared to have shifted some- 
what their position on British and 
French nuclear forces. Because the INF 
proposals represent the most tangible 
movement resulting from Mr. Gor- 
bachev's package, because the U.S. 
February initiative focuses on INF, and 
because these movements ultimately 
affect prospects in START [strategic 
arms reduction talks], I will later pro- 
vide some elaboration of developments 
in this area. Mr. Gorbachev also ex- 
pressed at least rhetorical support for 
more extensive verification measures 
than the Soviets have supported in the 
past. Finally, a first reading of the 
English text of Gorbachev's proposal 
indicated there might be a change in 
their position calling for a ban on stra- 
tegic defense research; this, however, 
like several other indications of change, 
later turned out to be illusory. 

START 

But before getting into such areas of 
change in the positions of the two sides, 
let me review the basic position of the 
United States in the three NST nego- 
tiating groups and the status of our dis- 
cussions with the Soviets. In START, 
the U.S. position reflects the summit 
joint statement commitment toward 
"the principle of 50 percent reductions 
in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R., appropriately applied " 

• Reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs 
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] and 
SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles] would be reduced to a limit of 
4,500— about 50% below current levels. 

• Reentry vehicles on ICBMs would 
be reduced to 3,000-about 50% below 
the current Soviet level and roughly 
halfway between our earlier proposal for 
a limit' of 2,500 and a Umit of 3,600 pro- 
posed by the Soviets. 

• The highest overall strategic bal- 
listic missile throw-weight of either side 
would be reduced by 50%, in this case, 
from the Soviet level of 11.9 million 



pounds. (By way of comparison, the 
United States has 4.4 million pounds.) 

• Contingent upon acceptance of RV 
and throw-weight limits, the United 
States would accept equal limits of 1,500 
on the number of long-range ALCMs 
[air-launched cruise missiles] carried by 
U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers— about j; 
50% below planned U.S. deployment I' 
levels. ' 

The United States cannot agree to |i 
one common limit on ballistic missile j; 
RVs and bomber weapons, as proposed | 
by the Soviets. If one counted ALCMs, |~ 
short-range attack missiles, and gravity L 
bombs as equivalent to Soviet ballistic |. 
missile RVs— despite the massive Soviet p 
air defenses faced by U.S. bombers and ^ 
the far lower readiness rate of bombers |; 
compared to ballistic missiles— the Unit j^ 
ed States would be significantly penal- 
ized. But if the Soviets were to accept 
our proposed limit of 4,500 RVs along 
with our proposed limit of 1,500 
ALCMs, it would result in reduction to 
a total of 6,000 ballistic missiles RVs 
and ALCMs on each side. This total cow 
stitutes the same number proposed by 
the Soviets for the overall limit on 
"nuclear charges" but would include a 
more appropriate definition of which 
systems reflect the strategic balance. 

With respect to strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles, the United States has- 
proposed a reduction in strategic ballis- i;, 
tic missiles to a limit of 1,250-1,450, or |j 
about 40-45% below the current higher |f 
Soviet level. In this context, the United : 
States could accept further reduction of > 
heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared t( ; 
our earlier proposal of 400)— about 40% . ■ 
below the current U.S. SALT [strategic , 
arms limitation talks]-accountable level, jj 

For reasons similar to those apply- |rf 
ing to an RV and ALCM aggregate, thek 
United States cannot agree to the g 

Soviet proposal to include in a single ;,, 
aggregate strategic ballistic missiles anq*. 
heavy bombers. However, if agreement i 
were reached on a range of 1,250-1,450 |_. 
for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy | ] 
bomber limits of 350, it would result in 1 
reduction of the total of strategic bal- 
listic missiles and heavy bombers to ig 
between 1,600 and 1,800. Ki 

"Build-down" is our suggested 
means of implementing the agreed 
reductions. We are prepared to begin 
working out details of a reductions 



Department of State Bulletii 



ARMS CONTROL 



chedule as soon as agreement can be 
thieved on the endpoints to be reached 
it the completion of the first stage. 

The U.S. pi-oposal also contains a 
'an on the development and deployment 
f all new heavy sti-ategic ballistic 
aissiles and on the modernization of 
xisting heavy missiles due to the desta- 
ilizing character of such systems. All 
lobile ICBMs would also be banned 
ecause of significant verification 
ifficulties and inherent asymmetines in 
bployment opportunities between the 
des. 

Round 4 of the NST negotiations 
as not productive with respect to 
PART. Mr. Gorbachev's January 15 
'oposal did not include any changes in 
le Soviet position regarding START, 
id the Soviet negotiators at Geneva 
jither responded adequately to the 
jissibilities raised by the U.S. initiative 
; the end of the previous round nor did 
iey introduce any new ideas of their 



A large boulder on the path to 
•ogress in START has been the con- 
:iuing Soviet insistence on defining 
I'ategic weapons as those systems 
iDable of striking the territory of the 
;ier side. In addition to those central 
■stems that the United States con- 
i'ers to be strategic, the Soviet defini- 
.n of strategic delivery vehicles would 
10 cover, on the U.S. side, all our 
iINF Ponger range intermediate- 
■ige nuclear forces] missiles, 340 
'ledium-range" dual-capable aircraft 
bloyed in Europe and Asia, and 540 
lack aircraft deployed on all 14 U.S. 
icraft carriers, while 2,000-3,000 com- 
rable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, 
tluding some 300 Backfire bombers, 
luld not be so counted. Were the 
.ited States to retain equality in stra- 
lic nuclear delivery vehicles under the 
l/iet definition, we would have to cut 
• INF missiles and dual-capable air- 
■ft at sea and on land to 430—20% of 
I current Soviet global level. If the 
/ited States were to retain LRINF 
:;siles and dual-capable aircraft at cur- 
it levels, we would have to cut stra- 
;ic nuclear delivery vehicles to less 
!m half the allowed Soviet number. 
The Soviets proposed this inequi- 
;le definition of "strategic" during the 
1\ stages of the SALT I and SALT II 
lotiations. In both cases, they even- 
'lly withdrew their definition and 
(■'■'l to a "central systems" approach 
kilning the systems subject to limi- 
jons in the agreements— that is, to 
|}Ms, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. 



We hope and expect that they will do so 
again. Until they do, prospects for 
progress on START will be severely 
encumbered. 

I have mentioned the disputed issue 
of how bomber weapons should be 
handled. Another issue between the 
sides concerns the handling of sea- 
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The 
Soviets contend that all cruise missiles 
with ranges over 600 kilometers, includ- 
ing SLCMs, should be banned. Yet the 
Soviets do not answer our questions 
about how such a ban could be verified 
and do not acknowiedge that such an 
outcome would leave the United States, 
much of whose population and industry 
is within range of shorter-range SLCMs, 
much more vulnerable to attack from 
residual systems than the Soviet Union. 
Another issue inhibiting progress in 
START is the Soviet demand for agree- 
ment to a ban on "space-strike arms" as 
a prerequisite even to serious negotia- 
tion on measures to limit strategic offen- 
sive systems. We regard such a precon- 
dition as unacceptable on its merits; we 
also believe serious negotiations in all 
three groups should proceed concurrent- 
ly. We do not dispute the interrelation- 
ship between strategic offensive and 
strategic defensive areas. In fact, it was 
the United States which first drew this 
connection during SALT I. With these 
considerations in mind, I will turn 
briefly to the defense and space 
negotiating group. 

Defense and Space 

With respect to defense and space, the 
United States has made clear that we 
are committed to the SDI [Strategic 
Defense Initiative] research program, 
which is being carried out in full compli- 
ance with the ABM [Anti-Ballistic 
Missile] Treaty. We are seeking to 
explore with the Soviets how a coopera- 
tive transition toward a more defense- 
reliant regime could be accomplished, 
should new defensive technologies prove 
feasible, but the Soviet negotiators have 
resisted even discussing the subject 
with us. We are also proposing that the 
Soviets join us even now in an "open 
laboratories" arrangement under which 
both sides would provide information on 
each other's strategic defense research 
programs and provide reciprocal oppor- 
tunities for visiting associated research 
facilities and laboratories. 

As in START, there was no tangible 
progress during round 4 in defense and 
space. We initially thought it might be 
otherwise. The English text of Mr. 



Gorbachev's proposal at the opening of 
the round made no reference to 
"research"; the word "research" did not 
appear in it. Later, however, we found 
that the Russian text uses the word 
"sozdaniye" which is generally trans- 
lated as "create" and which they claim 
includes "purposeful research." Soviet 
negotiators have explained that Mr. 
Gorbachev had intended no change 
whatsoever in the Soviet position on 
what they call "space-strike arms." 

We have had great difficulty in the 
defense and space talks in even getting 
the Soviets to acknowiedge indisputable 
facts. The Soviets refuse to admit the 
nature and extensive scope of their own 
strategic defense research and develop- 
ment activities; they deliberately distort 
the nature and scope of the U.S. SDI 
program. If there are grounds for 
encouragement in this forum, they can 
only be found in the grudging admis- 
sions occasionally made by Soviet offi- 
cials in informal discussions that the 
logic and coherence of official Soviet 
positions are flawed and/or inconsistent 
with the public statements of General 
Secretary Gorbachev. 

INF 

The commitment by both sides at the 
summit toward early progress on an in- 
terim INF agreement, the inherent 
flexibility in the INF portion of the 
American proposal of November 1, and 
the apparent movement in the Soviet 
INF negotiating position heralded by 
Gorbachev in mid-January raised expec- 
tations about the possibilities for success 
in reaching an INF agi-eement. The 
United States studied carefully the 
Soviets' January proposal and probed 
Soviet negotiators on the details behind 
this proposal. We also consulted inten- 
sively with allied governments in 
preparing an appropriate response. 
Some elements in Gorbachev's 
proposal on INF seemed to be construc- 
tive. The Soviets appeared to have 
dropped their demand that British and 
French SLBM nuclear warheads be 
counted equally and along with U.S. 
LRINF warheads. The Soviets ex- 
pressed willingness to accept an out- 
come involving reductions of all U.S. 
and Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe, 
including the SS-20s, to zero. The 
potentially positive impact of this 
proposal was negated, however, by a 
number of unacceptable conditions and 
omissions related to the offer. Among 
the conditions are: 



li' 1986 



51 



ARMS CONTROL 



• A nontransfer provision calling on 
the United States to assume an obliga- 
tion not to transfer strategic and 
medium-range missiles to third coun- 
tries. This, of course, is aimed directly 
at longstanding programs of cooperation 
the United States has with its allies and 
would signal the end of the U.K. 
Trident modernization program; and 

• A demand that the United King- 
dom and France not "build up" their 
"corresponding nuclear arms" and 
declare their intent to begin to eliminate 
those forces in stage 2. The Soviets 
know that a ban on strategic moderniza- 
tion would sooner rather than later spell 
the demise of British and French SLBM 
forces. 

Among the omissions are: 

• The absence of a provision for 
reductions in SS-20s in the eastern part 
of the U.S.S.R. until a subsequent stage 
and until after U.S. LRINF missiles in 
Europe have been reduced to zero; and 

• The absence of a provision limiting 
SRINF [shorter range intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] missiles. If 
LRINF missiles were reduced to zero, 
the effect could be circumvented by 
SRINF deployments, which can cover 
most of the important targets in NATO 
Europe when forward deployed in 
Eastern Europe. 

The consequence of accepting the 
Soviet proposal would be the elimination 
of U.S. LRINF missiles from Europe 
and the probable deterioration of U.K. 
and French nuclear deterrents, but 
without elimination of the SS-20 threat 
which our friends and allies in both 
Europe and Asia face. 

Our study of the Gorbachev proposal 
in detail and in its overall effect caused 
us to conclude, based on both the man- 
ner of presentation and the substance, 
that it had been designed primarily for 
its political and propaganda impact. We 
do not wish, however, to leave any 
stone unturned in the search for 
progress in Geneva. We take seriously 
the commitment undertaken in the sum- 
mit joint statement to accelerate efforts 
to find common ground between the 
positions of the two sides. It is for these 
reasons that the President authorized in 
late February the tabling of a new U.S. 
INF proposal. 

The United States continues to be- 
lieve that the best solution in INF re- 
mains the global elimination of the 
entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF 
missiles. When we first proposed this 
idea at the opening of the INF negotia- 



52 



Nuclear and Space Arms Talks 
Conclude Round 4 



Following is a statemeyit by Ambas- 
sador Max M. Kampelm.an, head of the 
U.S. delegation on arms control negotia- 
tions and U.S. negotiator on defense 
and space arms, in Geneva on March A, 
1986. 

On January 8, 1985, the United States 
and the Soviet Union committed them- 
selves to seek agreements aimed at 
"preventing an arms race in space and 
terminating it on Earth." 

On November 21, 1985, in this city, 
President Reagan and General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev agreed that the most ef- 
fective way to accelerate the work at 
these negotiations was to work for early 
progi'ess in those areas where there is 
common ground. The two specific areas 
referred to were the principle of 50% 
reductions in nuclear arms and the idea 
of an interim INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] agreement. 

On January 16, the United States 
returned to these negotiations deter- 
mined to carry on the program agreed 
upon by the two leaders. Our determina- 
tion, we regret to say, was not matched. 
Nevertheless, as we evaluate the fourth 
round of our work, which we completed 
this morning, our verdict is a mixed 
one. 

On the positive side, both our dele- 
gations have major proposals on the 
table. Both of us agree in principle with 
the ultimate goal of moving to the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Both 
governments seem to recognize the criti- 
cal importance of verification of 



tions in 1981, the Soviets accused us of 
wanting something for nothing, of offer- 
ing to destroy paper missiles in ex- 
change for the destruction of real 
missiles. But by the end of 1985, the 
United States had deployed 236 LRINF 
missiles in Europe. Absent an INF 
agreement, that number will continue to 
grow until the full operational capability 
of 572 missiles is reached by the end of 
1988. All five NATO basing countries 
are acting in accordance with the com- 
mitments made in the 1979 NATO dual- 
track decision. Thus, contrary to Soviet 
criticism, the plan offered by the United 
States in February 1986 to eliminate 



negotiated agreements. And we have 
both committed ourselves to the negoti- 
ation of a separate agreement on INF. 
These are positive factors. Unfortu- 
nately, these positive factors have not 
led to the degree of progress, though 
some did take place, that should have 
been achieved during this round. The 
reason, in the view of the U.S. delega- 
tion, is that the Soviet delegation has 
not acted to fulfill the commitments 
undertaken by our two leaders in the 
joint statement of November 21. 

We return to Washington in the 
hope that President Reagan's response 
to General Secretary Gorbachev's Janu- 
ary 16 proposal can bridge differences 
and help to achieve an INF agreement. 
We want the total elimination of U.S. 
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise 
missiles along with the Soviet SS-20 
missiles by the end of this decade. 

When we return to Geneva on May 
8, we also hope that the Soviet delega- 
tion will be ready to join us— they have 
not yet done so— in a genuine effort to 
build on the common ground that exists 
for 50% reductions in the offensive 
nuclear arms of both sides on the way 
toward the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons. 

"The round ended with less accom- 
plished than we had hoped. Negotiating 
vnth the Soviets is difficult. The issues 
are complex. But we are not discour- 
aged. The U.S. delegation is dedicated 
to carrying out our President's desire tc 
work for and achieve a better world, a 
world in peace, stable, and secure. 



.If 



all LRINF missiles worldwide by 
the end of the decade is both new and 
significant. 

The United States has proposed a 
detailed, phased approach for reaching 
its objective, which would achieve 
balance at the earliest possible time 
while maintaining stability throughout 
the reductions process. 

By the end of 1987, the United 
States and the Soviet Union would 
reduce their LRINF missile deploy- 
ments in Europe to 140 launchers each, 
with the Soviet Union making concur- 
rent proportionate reductions in Asia. 



t* 



Department of State Bullet' 



ARMS CONTROL 



Within the following year, both sides 
■ould further reduce the numbers of 
RINF missile launchers remaining in 
urope and Asia by an additional 50%. 
inally, both sides would move to the 
)tal elimination of this category of 
eapons by the end of 1989. 

Associated with this plan, there 
ould be a parallel series of global 
RINF missile warhead ceilings under 
hich the United States would retain 
le right to global warhead equality. As 
Dviet SS-20 launchers were reduced, 
le launchers and their associated mis- 
les and agreed support equipment 
ould be destroyed. U.S. systems in ex- 
■ss of the launcher limits cited above 
'Uld be withdrawn to the continental 
nited States unless or until they were 
so in excess of the equal global war- 
!ad ceiling associated with the 
ancher reductions then being imple- 
ented, in which case they would be 
istroyed. 

These reductions and limits would 
/olve U.S. and Soviet systems only, 
lere would be no agreed constraints 

the forces of the United Kingdom or 
ance. 

These reductions would also be 
Mmpanied by constraints on SRINF, 
her establishing a ceiling at current 
viet levels or at the levels both sides 
d on January 1, 1982. This ceiling 
■uld enter into effect by the end of 

By insisting that Soviet reductions 
140 LRINF missile launchers in Eu- 
je would have to occur before the 
lited States would reduce below that 
rel, we seek to avoid near- term mili- 
■y and political problems and to en- 
■e that at no point during the 
iuction process would the Soviets be 
..e to achieve a lasting advantage. 

I have dealt with INF issues in 
ne detail because an agreement in 
.s negotiating group could precede and 
iluence an agreement in START. Like- 
156, Soviet willingness to make arms 
'itrol progress before the next summit 
ltd fulfill their commitment toward 
■1\ progress focused on the principle 
')! •' ; reductions may be manifested 
■,it or perhaps only in INF. 

I 

'rification 

> United States continues to stress 
ci-itical importance of agreeing to 
'ctive means of verification so as to 
''able to assess with confidence compli- 
Je with provisions of any arms control 
reements which are negotiated. Thus, 
L Gorbachev's positive statements on 



verification in his January 15 article 
were welcomed throughout the West. 
However, past Soviet reluctance to 
agree on measures necessary to verify 
compliance provided gi-ounds for some 
skepticism as well. Round 4 provided lit- 
tle evidence that Soviet attitudes on 
verification have undergone fundamental 
change. The Soviets neither agreed to 
nor proposed specific verification meas- 
ures in either the START or INF 
groups. We expect that Soviet sincerity 
regarding verification will be put to a 
clear test when the negotiations resume 
in May. At that time, our INF negotia- 
toi-s will continue presentation of specif- 
ic vetification procedures tailored to the 
specific weaponry limits we seek. These 
details are being presented in the con- 
text of a comprehensive verification re- 
gime which includes the use of national 
technical means of verification and 
cooperative measures between the two 
governments, such as onsite inspection 
and data exchanges. 

Conclusion 

My remarks today have reflected the 
lack of constructive activity by the So- 
viet START delegation during round 4 
of the nuclear and space arms talks. I 
do not wish to imply by this negative 
report that I cannot imagine significant 
START progi-ess in the months to come. 
The Soviets have abandoned their cur- 
rent definition of strategic systems be- 
fore. They can do so again. 

We also believe that reductions in 
strategic offensive systems would be 
mutually advantageous whether or not 
strategic defenses are deployed and that 
there are considerable opportunities for 
equitable offense-offense tradeoffs. 
Despite the significant differences in the 
two sides' application of the 50% reduc- 
tions principle, the United States sees a 
potential for convergence on several is- 
sues, including reductions in ICBM war- 
heads, total ballistic missile warheads, 
ballistic missile throw-weight, and the 
total number of ballistic missiles and 
heavy bombers to be permitted. 

However, the Soviet side, rather 
than engaging in specific discussions of 
these issues directed toward narrowing 
remaining qualitative and numerical 
differences between us, has emphasized 
public rhetoric rather than taking con- 
crete steps at the confidential negoti- 
ating table where the Soviets have 
elected to restrict themselves to ab- 
stractions and generalities. The Soviets 
have turned aside our efforts to expand 



areas of commonality. As long as they 
remain frozen in this approach, no sig- 
nificant progress is possible. 

The primary missing element in the 
Soviet negotiating formula for START 
is a willingness to take into account 
Western interests and not just their 
own. Were that attitude to change, 
major progress toward a START agree- 
ment would not be far behind. ■ 



Nuclear Testing 
Limitations 



LETTER TO SENATE MAJORITY 

LEADER ROBERT DOLE, 
MAR. 7, 1986' 

As you know, on February 26 the House of 
Representatives passed H.J. Res. 3, "To Pre- 
vent Nuclear Testing," and this issue is now 
before the United States Senate. The resolu- 
tion calls for the immediate ratification, 
without needed verification improvements, of 
both the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) 
and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
(PNET). It also calls for the resumption of" 
negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a 
Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), despite the 
fact that the U.S. Government has made 
clear its very serious reservations in taking 
such a step under present conditions. 

Any limitations on nuclear testing must 
be compatible with our security interests and 
must be effectively verifiable. Because of the 
continuing threat that we face now and for 
the foreseeable future, the security of the 
United States, its friends and its Allies must 
rely upon a credible and effective nuclear de- 
terrent. A limited level of testing assures 
that our weapons are safe, effective, reliable 
and survivable and assures our capability to 
respond to the continued Soviet nuclear arms 
buildup. Such testing, which is conducted un- 
derground, is permitted under the existing 
agreements on nuclear test limitations, all of 
which the United States fully complies 
with-the TTBT, the PNET, and the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). 

A CTB remains a long-term goal of the 
U.S. However, it must be viewed in the con- 
text of achieving broad, deep and verifiable 
nuclear arms reductions, substantially im- 
proved verification capabilities, a greater 
balance in conventional forces and at a time 
when a nuclear deterrent is no longer as es- 
sential an element as currently for interna- 
tional security and stability. 

A first, priority step toward this goal is 
the pursuit of equitable and verifiable arms 
reductions in the current negotiations in 
Geneva on nuclear and space arms. We are, 
at the same time, seeking Soviet agreement 
to enhanced verification measures for the 
TTBT and PNET and are discussing verifica- 



f 1986 



53 



ARMS CONTROL 



tion problems of a CTB at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva. Our concerns are 
heightened by the pattern of Soviet noncom- 
pliance with its arms control obligations, in- 
cluding current agreements on limiting 
nuclear testing. 

Our efforts to achieve essential verifica- 
tion improvements include three approaches 
to the Soviets in 1983 to engage in discus- 
sion. In 1984 I proposed an exchange of 
Soviet and U.S. experts to measure directly 
the yields of tests of nuclear weapons at each 
other's test sites. In mid-1985, I uncondition- 
ally invited Soviet experts to measure such a 
test at the Nevada Test Site, bringing with 
them any instrumentation devices they 
deemed necessary. In December, 1985, I pro- 
posed to General Secretary Gorbachev that 
U.S. and Soviet experts on nuclear testing 
limitations meet in Febi-uai7, 1986, to discuss 
our respective verification approaches and to 
address initial tangible steps to resolve this 
issue. 

Regrettably, the Soviet Union has thus 
far not responded either to the serious U.S. 
concerns in this area or to any of our initia- 
tives to address these concei-ns in a construc- 
tive manner. 

The actions called for by H.J. Res. 3 do 
not serve the interests of the United States, 
our Allies and our friends. They would under- 
cut the initiatives I have proposed to make 
progi-ess on nuclear test limitations issues, 
and they would set back prospects on a broad 
range of arms control efforts, including the 
achievement of deep, stabilizing and verifia- 
ble arms reductions. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 14, 1986' 

I want to make an announcement today 
concerning the question of limitations on 
nuclear testing, an important arms con- 
trol area which has been the subject of 
special correspondence which I have had 
recently wdth Soviet General Secretary 
Gorbachev, the leaders of six nations 
knowTi as the New Delhi group, and 
Senate Majority Leader Dole. 

I have conveyed to General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev today a new, very 
specific, and far-reaching proposal con- 
cerning nuclear testing limitations, a 
proposal which could be implemented 
immediately. In this new initiative, I 
urged the Soviet Union to join us with- 
out delay in bilateral discussions on find- 
ing ways to reach agreement on 
essential verification improvements of 
the Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) and 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
(PNET). 



In the field of nuclear testing, as in 
arms control generally, effective verifi- 
cation is a central element. It has also 
long been one of the most difficult 
problems to resolve. We are seriously 
concerned about the past pattern of 
Soviet testing, as well as current verifi- 
cation uncertainties, and have deter- 
mined that a number of Soviet tests 
constitute likely violations of obligations 
under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 
1974. The inadequacy of the monitoring 
regime provided for in that agreement 
is underscored by the Soviet Union's 
own questions concerning the yields of 
particular U.S. tests, all of which in fact 
have been below the 150 kiloton 
threshold. 

The United States places the highest 
priority in the nuclear testing area on 
finding ways of ensuring effective verifi- 
cation of the TTBT and PNET. I have 
already made several specific sugges- 
tions to the Soviet Union in this regard. 
My new initiative is a further attempt 
to build the necessary basis for confi- 
dence and cooperation between our na- 
tions regarding such limitations. 

As a reflection of our resolve to 
make tangible progress, in my new 
proposal I identified to Mr. Gorbachev a 
specific new technical method— known as 
CORRTEX-which we believe will ena- 
ble both the United States and U.S.S.R. 
to improve verification and ensure com- 
pliance with these two treaties. This is a 
hydrodynamic yield measurement tech- 
nique that measures the propagation of 
the underground shock wave from a 
nuclear explosion. I provided to Mr. 
Gorbachev a technical description of 
CORRTEX designed to demonstrate 
how this method will enhance verifica- 
tion procedures. 

To allow the Soviet Union to exam- 
ine the CORRTEX system more fully, I 
further proposed that Mr. Gorbachev 
send his scientists to our Nevada test 
site during the third week of April 1986. 
At that time they could also monitor a 
planned U.S. nuclear weapons test. I 
would hope this would provide an oppor- 
tunity for our experts to discuss verifi- 
cation methods and thus pave the way 
for resolving the serious concerns which 
have arisen in this area. 

In making this offer, I made clear to 
General Secretary Gorbachev that if we 
could reach agreement on the use of an 
effective verification system incorporat- 
ing such a method to verify the TTBT, I 
would be prepared to move forward on 
ratification of both the TTBT and 
PNET. 



What is unique about this new initia- 
tive is its specificity and concreteness 
and the detailed, new technical informa- 
tion we have provided to the Soviet 
Union in trying to solve these verifica- 
tion uncertainties. It is important that 
the Soviet Union engage with us now in 
this first practical step to improve the , 
confidence we each must have in treaty 
compliance with the 150 kiloton thresh- 
old on underground tests. If this can be 
achieved, we believe we will have sig- 
nificantly improved the prospects for 
verifying other arms control agreements 
as well through improved verification 
regimes. 



54 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 17, 1986. 



MBFR Talks 
End 38th Round 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAR. 20, 1986> 

Today marked the close of the 38th 
round of the mutual and balanced force 
reductions (MBFR) negotiations in 
Vienna, where the United States and its 
NATO allies continued efforts to find 
common ground with the Warsaw Pact 
on the reduction of conventional forces 
in central Europe. Unfortunately, the 
Soviet Union and its allies have not 
responded constructively to recent 
Western initiatives that had sought to 
make substantial progi-ess in these 
negotiations. 

Last December 5, NATO introduced 
a major new MBFR initiative designed 
to bring East and West closer together 
on a number of issues. Most signifi- 
cantly, while reaffirming the importance^ 
of effective verification, the NATO par- 
ticipants set aside their longstanding in-: 
sistence that the sides come to an 
understanding on troop level data in the 
area of reductions before an agi-eement 
is signed. This was a major concession 
to the East, which had often declared 
its readiness to move forward swiftly in, 
the talks if only the so-called data bar- 
rier could be removed. 

Not only did the West decide to re- 
move this "barrier," it also adopted the 
East's own general approach— to negoti- 
ate a first-phase, time-limited agreemeni 
in which initial U.S. and U.S.S.R. reduc 
tions would be followed by a no-increas« 



Department of State Bulleti 



,ti 



ARMS CONTROL 



•mniitment in the ai-ea of reductions by 
I participating states. On these and a 
imber of other points, the United 
ates and its allies made every effort 

come to an early accord in Vienna. 

At the beginning of the round, there 
IS reason to be optimistic. General 
icretary Gorbachev had noted that, fol- 
mng the December 5 West initiative, 

outline for agreement in Vienna was 
lerging. At the same time, Mr. 
ii-bachev and many Soviet and East 
jropean spokesmen indicated that they 
ared with NATO an appreciation of 
9 vital role of verification, including 
■site inspection, in arms control. 

However, the Eastern participants 
ye not reciprocated the West's move 
'given substance to the declarations of 
;ir leaders. Indeed, on February 20, 
! Warsaw Pact tabled a draft agree- 



ment which recycled old and unaccept- 
able Eastern positions and which 
included an utterly inadequate 
verification regime. 

NATO has made it clear to the War- 
saw Pact that the East's actions during 
this negotiating round did not meet 
Western security requirements and that 
we await a response from the East as 
important as the step the West took in 
December. If the Soviet Union and its 
allies show the political will to match 
that of the West, then there is hope 
that the MBFR negotiations can result 
in an effective and fair agreement. The 
President has instructed the U.S. dele- 
gation to continue to work for such an 
outcome. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 24, 1986. 



he Promise of SDI 



I Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the American 
^ense Preparedness Association on 
\rch 18, 1986. Ambassador Nitze is 
'."iai adviser to the President and the 
iretary of State on amis control 
I'ters. 

:y 3 years into the SDI [Strategic 
'ense Initiative] research program, 
t have already made impressive ad- 
sees in your investigations of the 
imologies that might be useful for 
Ategic defense against ballistic missile 
tick. Tonight at the Strategic Defense 
(hnical Achievements Awards Dinner, 
irecognize the technical ingenuity and 
Jiributions of research teams and in- 
i' duals alike who are playing a key 
) in that innovative research effort, 
ted on the efforts of its scientific- 
i'lnical community, the United States 
a good reason to believe that SDI 
Sinologies hold the promise for feasi- 
It sui-vivable, and cost-effective 
9'nses. Should this promise become a 
'ity. the United States will look to 
:■ nsts to provide a safer and more 
i ible means of assuring deterrence 
* global security into the 21st 
eury. 

Technology innovation, such as 
Agnized here tonight, reflects the 
f, open, and competitive American 
xit. The achievement of excellence in 



science and technology, the arts, and in 
government service has long character- 
ized our efforts as a people. The com- 
bined effect of the merits of our foreign 
policy, as outlined last week by Presi- 
dent Reagan in his report to the Con- 
gress, and of our technology has made 
us a leader in the effort to create and 
sustain a just and secure world order. 
The work that we are recognizing 
tonight is one of the foundation stones 
of that leadership role in the world. The 
fundamental distinction between our 
work in the area of strategic defense 
research and similar work in the Soviet 
Union, for example, is found both in our 
historically constructive role in seeking 
peace and supporting representative in- 
stitutions throughout the world and in 
the defensive nature of our military 
posture and security arrangements. 

The Need for SDI 

Our need for the SDI research program 
can be summarized by recalling the ori- 
gins of the program. The President's 
March 1983 speech expressed his strong- 
ly held belief that we should reexamine 
the basis of our deterrent posture to see 
if we could deter aggression through a 
greater reliance on defense rather than 
so heavily on the threat of devastating 
nuclear retaliation. This belief reflects 
both our disappointment in the deterio- 
ration of the strategic balance since the 



signing of the SALT I [strategic anns 
limitations talks] agreements and our 
hope that new defensive technologies 
can mitigate adverse developments in 
the area of strategic offensive 
weaponry. 

The United States had proceeded 
from the assumption that the limitation 
of defenses in the ABM [Anti-Ballistic 
Missile] Treaty would be the basis for a 
continuation of negotiations which would 
lead to significantly reduced offensive 
weaponry. The theory was simple: if 
both sides had survivable retaliatory 
nuclear forces at about the same level of 
capability and both sides were otherwise 
defenseless against the nuclear capabil- 
ity of the other, then neither side would 
have an incentive to sti-ike first, regard- 
less of the circumstances. If one side 
were to strike first, it could never hope 
to escape the retaliation of its adver- 
sary. Therefore, stable and significant 
reductions to equal levels of capability 
would improve the security of both 
sides. 

Instead, the Soviets showed little 
readiness to agree to measures which 
would result in meaningful limits or cuts 
in offensive nuclear forces possible dur- 
ing SALT II. Within the framework of 
SALT I and SALT II, the Soviets 
deployed large numbers of MIRVed 
[multiple independently-targetable re- 
entry vehicle] ballistic missiles of suffi- 
cient throw-weight and accuracy to 
violate the basic premise of the SALT 
process by posing a real threat to the 
survivability of the entire land-based 
portion of U.S. retaliatoiy forces. The 
growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities in 
general, and in the asymmetry in coun- 
terforce capabilities in particular, are 
fundamentally inimical to the security of 
the United States and its allies. 

In addition, the Soviet Union has 
continued a robust program of research, 
development, and deployment of stra- 
tegic air defense and ballistic missile 
defense based on current technologies. 
Some of their w^ork— for example, the 
Krasnoyarsk radar— is in violation of ex- 
isting arms control obligations. They 
also have a vigorous research and de- 
velopment program for defenses against 
ballistic missiles based on advanced 
technologies. 

Significantly, the Soviets have been 
engaged for years in research and de- 
velopment efforts examining laser 
weapons, particle-beam weapons, radio 
frequency weapons, and kinetic energy 
weapons for ground-based and space- 
based strategic defenses. These are 
some of the same technology areas that 



li 1986 



55 



ARMS CONTROL 



you are investigating in the SDI 
research program and against which the 
Soviet Union has mounted a massive 
propaganda campaign. Soviet work in 
these areas is clearly in applied research 
and development, not merely in basic 
research as they would have us believe. 
The Soviets' ground-based laser at Sary 
Shagan, for example, could have poten- 
tial applications for both ballistic missile 
defense and antisatellite operations. 

We should make no mistake about 
the fact that Soviet offensive and defen- 
sive capabilities pose real threats to the 
security of the West. Our work in SDI 
is, in large part, a reaction to the un- 
abated growth of this threat, especially 
during the last 20 years. Through SDI, 
we seek both new capabilities and a new 
approach to rectify the deteriorating 
strategic balance. 

Our agreement to the ABM Treaty 
was based on the understanding that 
defenses, at the then-existing level of 
technology, could be overwhelmed by 
additional offensive systems at less cost 
than would be required to add balancing 
defenses. New technologies are now 
available that could reverse our judg- 
ments about the cost-ineffectiveness of 
strategic defenses. The Homing Overlay 
Experiment symbolizes new technologies 
appUcable to the area of strategic 
defenses. Fifteen years ago, an ABM in- 
terceptor required a nuclear warhead to 
destroy an incoming reentry vehicle. 
Just 2 years ago, the Homing Overlay 
team demonstrated the capability to 
destroy an incoming reentry vehicle by 
precision intercept and direct impact. 

If SDI research proves the feasibili- 
ty of survivable and cost-effective 
defenses, then the United States will 
have the opportunity to reexamine 
guidance for the SDI program. At that 
time, after consultation with our allies, 
we will discuss and, as appropriate, 
negotiate with the Soviet Union any 
changes in the strategic defense regime 
in accordance with Articles XIII and 
XIV of the ABM Treaty. This possibil- 
ity holds the promise that the strategic 
balance can be stabilized again in a man- 
ner that will preserve Western security 
with greater confidence into the next 
century. In addition, the possibility of a 
successful SDI research phase has 
played an important role in bringing the 
Soviet negotiators back to the table in 
Geneva where we were, and now again 
are, seeking strategically meaningful 
reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. 



SDI and the Geneva Talks 

The United States is fully committed to 
the SDI research program, which is be- 
ing carried out in full compliance with 
the ABM Treaty. In Geneva, at the nu- 
clear and space talks, the United States 
seeks to discuss the offense-defense rela- 
tionship and to explore with the Soviets 
how a cooperative transition toward a 
more defense-reliant regime could be ac- 
complished, should defensive technolo- 
gies prove feasible. 

There was little substantive move- 
ment during the fourth round of negotia- 
tions in the Soviet position on defense 
and space. The Gorbachev proposal of 
January 15 included no change in their 
insistence that SDI be banned. The 
Soviets have, through this last round of 
negotiations, not addressed the U.S. 
agenda, preferring instead to advance 
the self-serving and unacceptable con- 
cepts of "space-strike arms" and "pur- 
poseful research." They would like to 
ban U.S. capabilities and research while 
avoiding constraints on their own 
weapon systems and research through 
definitional ploys. 

The United States cannot accept the 
self-serving Soviet definition of "space- 
strike arms," which includes ground- 
based systems designed to destroy ob- 
jects in space and space-based systems 
designed to destroy targets in space or 
on earth. This definition calls for a sub- 
jective judgment as to the purpose for 
which a system has been designed. The 
Soviets have made it clear that they 
reserve to themselves alone the right to 
make such judgments. The U.S. position 
is that an agreement must address 
specific systems and that limits must be 
based on evident capabilities, not on 
subjective judgments of intentions. 

The work in Geneva on defense and 
space issues cannot move forward until 
the Soviet definition is abandoned. Fur- 
thermore, the work on START [stra- 
tegic arms reduction talks] cannot 
progress until the Soviets abandon the 
linkage they have imposed between 
progress in the START talks and prior 
U.S. agreement to a ban on "space- 
strike arms." 

The U.S. strategic defense program 
is fully compatible with the ABM 
Treaty. The Soviet concept of "purpose- 
ful research" is an artificial distinction 
designed to exploit the fact that the 
United States openly states the goals of 
its research and, therefore, that it is 
"purposeful." The Soviet claim that 
their research is "fundamental" and has 
no purpose is not credible. The Soviets 



56 



merely refuse to acknowledge what we 
know to be the nature and extensive 
scope of their own strategic defense 
activities. 

Obstacles created by the Soviets in 
Geneva will not prevent the United 
States from continuing its SDI research. 
We will continue our discussions of the 
possibilities SDI could offer for elimi- 
nating the threat of mutual annihilation. 
By making our case to the Soviets and 
to the world, we will challenge the 
Soviet propaganda campaign which is 
designed to cast doubts on U.S. inten- 
tions. It is important to note in this 
regard that allied governments support 
the President's continued dedication to 
SDI research and U.S. resistance to 
Soviet efforts in Geneva to ban the SDL 
research program as a precondition to 
progress in the offensive nuclear talks. 

The Broader Framework 
of Negotiations 

In prepaiing for the summit last 
November, the President wished to 
place arms control issues in the proper 
perspective. SDI is a part— an importan 
part— of the defense and space area. I 
have discussed the START issues and 
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] issues at other times. Together 
these constitute the nuclear and space 
talks. But other important arms control 
issues were also discussed at the sum- 
mit. The abolition of chemical weapons 
is being negotiated in the Committee on 
Disai-mament in Geneva. The limitation 
of conventional amis in Europe is being 
negotiated at the MBFR [mutual and 
balanced force reductions] talks in 
Vienna. Confidence-building measures 
are being discussed in Stockholm under 
the aegis of the Conference on Disarma- 
ment in Europe. In addition, there are i 
number of issues under discussion whicl 
relate to nuclear testing and to the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

But all the arms control issues 
together occupied about one-fourth of 
the agenda at the summit. Also dis- 
cussed were the full range of other 
bilateral issues and the important 
regional issues such as Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, and South 
Yemen. Furthermore, the issues of hu- 
man rights and terrorism could not be 
and were not ignored. It was agreed 
that there would be another meeting 
between President Reagan and Mr. 
Gorbachev in Washington this year and 
in Moscow during 1987. We suggested 
June or July or perhaps after the elec- 
tion in November. The Soviets have no' 



Department of State Bullef 



CANADA 



■plied. We hope there will be a summit 
id that the dialogue at that level can 
: continued. But one thing is obvious: 
at is, that we cannot count on the 
•viets to be billing to negotiate an 
Teement which takes account of our 
terests and not just theirs. 

The lesson is clear. The United 
ates must have a constructive and 
mprehensive foreign policy. The Presi- 
nt's statement to Congress on March 

sets forth just such a foreign pohcy. 
strongly recommend that everyone 
id it. I also recommend that you read 
3 full te.xt of Mr. Gorbachev's report 
the opening of the Soviet Party Con- 
?ss on February 26. It took 6 hours to 
(iver; there are 45,000 words. But the 
Ire one reads of these two statements, 
; clearer will become the essence of 
at drives the Soviet Communist 
rty as opposed to what drives the 
se coalition of free and democratic 
intries who are striving to maintain a 
rid in which they are free to develop 
they see fit. 

^iclusion 

; must be prepared to support the 
'dom of the United States and the in- 
:!Sts of such a coalition either through 
•otiated agreements on arms limita- 
( s that ti-uly serve a meaningful 
■ce or, in the absence of such agree- 
.its, through our own efforts should 
I Soviet Union so will it. In either 
\'., peace and deterrence will only be 
iired through what we do for our- 
! es. An important part of what we 
I do for ourselves is represented by 
ir gi-oup and, in particular, by in- 
'duals such as those we are honoring 
a tonight. 

Without the SDI research program, 
'best that the United States could 
13 for is a continuation of the current 
;e (if deterrence through primary 
mce upon the threat of devastating 
I ear retaliation. Asymmetrical Soviet 
lintages in offensive nuclear forces 
laten the stability of this form of de- 
fence. SDI provides the United 
es with an opportunity to e.xamine 
►feasibility of a more stable and reli- 
a form of deterrence which would 
le not only American but global 
'rity concerns as well. ■ 



Visit of Canadian Prime Minister 




Prime Minister Biian Mubwiey of 
Canada made an official visit to 
Washington. D.C., March 17-20, 1986, 
to meet with President Reagan and 
other government officials. 

Following are remarks by President 
Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney 
on signing an extension of the NORAD 
agreement and on endorsing the joint 
U.S. -Canada report on acid rain, and a 
Wliite House statement on the acid rain 
report.^ 



REMARKS, 
MAR. 19, 1986 



President Reagan 

I'm delighted to join with my good 
friend, the Prime Minister, in putting 
our signatures on an agi-eement to ex- 
tend the unique Canada-U.S. partner- 
ship in the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command, known as NORAD. 
The last time this agi-eement was 
renewed was during my visit to Ottawa 
in March of 1981, which was my first 
trip abroad as President. I'm sure that 
the Prime Minister would agi-ee that 
NORAD has served our mutual inter- 
ests and has been a significant factor in 
enhancing deteiTence, promoting global 
stability in the nearly 30 years of its 
e.xistence. It's, therefore, entirely ap- 
propriate that we extend this joint com- 
mand for an additional 5 years. 

Another topic of particular interest 
to the Prime Minister and me was the 
report of our special envoys on acid 



rain, Drew Lewis and Bill Davis. Drew, 

unfortunately, couldn't be here today; 
Bill Davis is. And we undertook this 
effort because we recognized that acid 
rain was a serious concern affecting 
both our countries and our relations 
with each other. The study we commis- 
sioned was in keeping with the long his- 
2 tory of U.S. -Canada cooperation in 
£ dealing with environmental issues. 
^ And today I would like to commend 
S. Bill and Drew, even though he's absent, 
s for their thorough and conscientious 
>■ work. Their joint report attests to the 
I serious and practical manner in which 
^ they discharged their duties, and I know 
I that Prime Minister Mulroney shares 
i my appreciation and admiration for their 
I balanced and well-drafted joint report. 
^ I'm pleased to say that I fully endorse 
the report and will shortly issue a press 
statement to this effect. 

I wish I could say that our action to- 
day takes the acid rain issue off our 
bilateral agenda; unfortunately, this can- 
not be. Serious scientific and economic 
problems remain to be solved. But in 
the spirit of cooperation and good will, 
which has come to characterize the way 
Canadians and Americans approach 
their common problems, I am confident 
that we have begun a pi-ocess which will 
benefit future generations in both our 
great countries. 

Prime Minister Mulroney 

I'm veiy encouraged by your statement 
and appreciate your personal commit- 
ment to resolve our common problem in 
acid rain. And your undertaking that 
you have made, in regard to your 
personal commitment, that of" your Ad- 
ministration, as well as your under- 
taking to secure appropriate funding is 
very welcome. 

Acid rain imperils the environment 
in both countries. At Quebec, we com- 
missioned two personal envoys, Drew- 
Lewis and Bill Davis, to take chai-ge of 
this issue and to break new gi-ound. 
They didn't let us down. I salute Bill 
Davis, who's here today. And I was 
honored to meet with Drew Lewis 
yesterday at a meeting with Secretary 
Shultz. 

I think they've produced a balanced 
and a realistic document. We now have 
an agi-eed foundation on which to build. 
Your full endorsement of this report, 
Mr. President, represents a significant 



B1986 



57 



DEPARTMENT 



step, in my judgment, in the right 
direction. 

We have a proud tradition of resolv- 
ing transboundary environmental prob- 
lems. We intend to carry on that 
tradition and to carry it forward. As 
neighbors and custodians of our common 
heritage, we must do no less, and much 
remains to be done. By agi-eeing to keep 
acid rain on our agenda, we signal our 
joint determination to solve this 
problem. Your Secretary of State, our 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
and other Cabinet officials will report on 
this vital effort regularly to us. 

I am confident that we can move to 
early and substantial reductions of 
damage to our environment. This re- 
mains our urgent goal, and I'm very 
grateful to you, Mr. President, for your 
personal support in meeting this 
challenge. 

On behalf of the Government of 
Canada and on behalf of my colleagues 
and friends in regard to this issue and 
so many others, we have had a very 
productive and constructive meeting 
with you, as we've had in the past. And 
I want to thank you on behalf of Cana- 
dians for your attention and your sensi- 
tivity to Canada's problems and to the 
great obligation of solving these 
problems constructively together. 

Canada wall always work with the 
United States to build new opportuni- 
ties and new prosperity for our people. 
And we thank you for the warmth of 
your welcome and the courtesies ex- 
tended to all members of our delegation. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAR. 19, 1986 

The President and Prime Minister 
Mulroney commissioned Drew Lewis 
and William Davis last year in Quebec 
City to conduct a thorough study of the 
acid rain problem and to submit their 
findings and recommendations within 1 
year. This report was presented to the 
President and the Prime Minister on 
January 8, 1986. 

After careful review, the President 
endorses fully the joint report of the 
special envoys. As stated in the report, 
acid rain is a serious environmental 
problem in both the United States and 
Canada vrith transboundary implications 
for both countries. 

The United States pioneered air pol- 
lution controls and as a nation has spent 
approximately $75 billion since the 1970 
passage of the Clean Air Act to limit 
emissions of pollutants identified as 



research recommendations of the special 
envoys: 

• Identify and assess cost-effective 
and innovative approaches leading to 
reduced emissions of pollutants linked to 
acid rain; 

• Strengthen bilateral consultation 
and information exchanges with Canada. 
To this end, the Secretary of State shall 
establish an interagency advisory and 
consultative group on transboundary air 
pollution comprised of both foreign af- 
fairs and environmental management 
officials to provide advice to the Presi- 
dent and to serve as a forum for discus- 
sion with a similarly constituted 
Canadian group; and 

• Conduct a coordinated interagency 
review of relevant research in light of 
the joint envoys' report. In this regard, 
the Administration has requested $85 
milhon for FY 1987 to assess the causes 
effects, and possible methods of mitigat- 
ing the results of acid rain. (Since 1982 
the Administration has spent $255 mil- 
lion for this pui-pose. Under current 
plans, an additional $225 million will be 
spent between now and 1989.) 

The issue of acid rain will be a con- 
tinuing item on the agenda of future 
summit meetings. 



precursors of acid rain. By 1990 approxi- 
mately $100 billion will have been spent 
for this purpose. As a result of these ac- 
tions, from 1973 to 1983 emissions of 
major precursors have dechned signifi- 
cantly. However, as the joint report 
notes, more needs to be done. This 
Administration has already provided 
substantial support for clean coal tech- 
nologies. For FY 1981 through FY 1985, 
a total of almost $2.2 billion in total 
research funds has been allocated in the 
United States to develop technologies 
for cleaner utilization of coal. 

In order to expand the control op- 
tions available to industry, as recom- 
mended in the joint report, the 
Administration will pursue a program to 
develop and demonstrate innovative con- 
trol technologies. In this year's budget 
$700 million has been earmarked for 
clean coal research between FY 1986 
and FY 1991. In addition an $800 million 
joint industry/government program 
designed to develop and demonstrate 
clean ways to burn coal will be im- 
plemented. Although it does not now 
have all of the funds, the Administration 
will seek to provide in the future the 
funding recommended in the joint 
report. We will also encourage States to 
undertake similar efforts, as several 
have already done. 

The President will also direct Fed- 
eral departments and agencies to take 
the following steps in order to imple- 
ment the cooperative activities and 



Diplomacy, the Foreign Service, 
and the Department of State 

by Ronald I. Spiers 

Address before the Boston Commit- 
tee on Foreign Relations in Boston on 
February 26, 1986. Ambassador Spiers 
is Under Secretary for Management. 

Americans with an interest in foreign 
affairs— such as the members of the 
Boston Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions—are generally familiar with the 
major foreign policy issues confronting 
the United States: the Arab-Israeli dis- 
pute, U.S. -Soviet relations, arms control, 
Nicaragua, the problems of southern 
Africa, and so on. They are less familiar 
with the workings of the institutions 
and processes by which American for- 
eign policies are developed. My assign- 
ment this evening is to talk briefly 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 24, 1986. 




about two of the principal instruments 
of American diplomacy: the Departmenl' 
of State and the U.S. "Foreign Service; 
what are their responsibilities; how do 
they work? 

My 35 years of association with 
these organizations have given me 
ample demonstrations of an information 
gap. In my native Vermont my identifi- 
cation with the Department of State 
more often than not leads to the queS' 
tion: "How are things up to Mont- 
pelier?" Frequently, the Foreign 



iH 



58 



Department of State Bullet i 



DEPARTMENT 



>rvice is vaguely confused with the 
jreigii Legion. Yet there are no other 
stitutions more central to the national 
cui-ity of the United States. 

The Department of State is the 
iest and just about the smallest of the 
ecutive departments of the govern- 
3nt, and the Secretary of State is the 
nior i-anking Cabinet member. When 
was created, in 1781, as the "Depart- 
;nt of Foreign Affairs," it had a four- 
m staff headquartered in a small 
ree-story Philadelphia house. Eight 
ars later, Congi-ess changed its name 
the Department of State in an "Act 
provide for the safe keeping of the 
:s, records and Seal of the United 
ates, and other purposes." The Great 
al of the United States is still in its 
stody and can be seen and used today, 
t it is those unidentified "other pur- 
ees" that preoccupy us now. 

inaging Diplomatic Relations 

)lomacy is essentially the craft of 
naging a nation's relations with other 
: ereign entities. For this purpose the 
bartment of State has about 24,000 
-time employees worldwide, an 
lual operating budget of just under 
r)illion, and staffs 263 embassies, con- 
ites, and missions abroad and at 
ne. Of these employees, over 14,000 
I Americans, and close to 10,000 are 
i;ign nationals who perform functions 
jging from chauffeur to political 
riser at overseas missions. 
What are the principal responsibih- 
i of the Department of State? They 
lude: 

• Managing the wide range of day- 
I'ay relations between the United 

t es and 140-odd other sovereign 
:es, l)oth bilaterally and through 
bilateral organizations ranging from 
.ro to the United Nations; 

• ( 'ollecting the information and per- 
iling the analyses necessary to 
cmmend, decide on, and carry out 
uforeign policies of the United States; 

• Providing passport, consular, and 
ten protective services to Americans 
bad; and 

' Influencing the environment in 
trh the United States acts in ways 
t'h promote the achievement of U.S. 
)y objectives. 

rill' principal arm of the Department 
atf in fulfilling these responsi- 
Les is the U.S. Foreign Service, 
f'lted in 1924 as a career service 
U'd on competitive examination and 



merit promotion, there are now 4,200 
Foreign Sei-vice officers and another 
5,000 serving as speciahsts, secretaries, 
communications technicians, etc. 

Foreign Service officers serve in 
Washington at various levels from 
assistant desk officer to under secretary 
of state. Overseas they are at all levels 
from attache or third secretary to 
ambassador. Entry is competitive. Over 
18,000 individuals took the Foreign 
Service examination last December. At 
the end of a taxing process of evalua- 
tion, 225 of these will finally enter the 
sei-vice. All of them will have their first 
assignment overseas, most of them as 
consular officers issuing visas and help- 
ing American citizens abroad. 

After this, they will go on to a fur- 
ther assignment in the "cone," or 
specialty, for which they were selected, 
as administrative, economic, political, or 
consular officer. In 4 or 5 years, 85% of 
them will be tenured as full-fledged For- 
eign Service officers and begin moving 
progressively toward more senior and 
responsible positions. Of an enti\v class 
of 50, statistically three or four of them 
will ultimately be appointed an ambas- 
sador or an assistant secretary of state. 
Half of their careers will typically be 
spent abroad, normally in 3- or 4-year 
tours of duty in foreign postings or in 
Washington. Each stage of their ad- 
vancement will be competitive. Fifty 
percent will, after a number of years of 
sei-viee, be promoted into the 670-mem- 
ber Senior Foreign Service from which 
the top positions in Washington and the 
embassies and consulates will be filled. 
There is no other career from which the 
satisfaction of contributing so much to 
the formation and execution of Ameri- 
can foreign policy can be derived. The 
Foreign Service is on the front line, 
day in and day out. Along with its col- 
leagues from the professional military 
and intelligence services, it is at the 
cutting edge of the advancement and 
protection of U.S. national security 
interests. 

Of course, there are difficulties and 
dangers along with the satisfactions. 
Terrorism and political instability are 
continuing and growing threats. There 
is a memorial plaque in the lobby of the 
Department of State dedicated to those 
members of the U.S. diplomatic missions 
who have been killed in the line of duty. 
Thiily-six names have been added just 
in the last decade. More American am- 
bassadors alone have been killed than 
generals and admirals in the Vietnam 
war. There are the difficulties of isola- 
tion, inadequate education faciUties, lack 



of opportunity for spouse employment, 
disease, family separation, cultural 
deprivation, and the rootlessness that 
can come from constant packing and 
unpacking. The old stereotype of the 
striped-pants diplomat moving from 
cocktail party to cocktail party dies 
slowly, but it is dying. 

The basic unit for the conduct of 
American diplomacy overseas is the 
American Embassy. An embassy, prop- 
erly speaking, is the staff of an ambas- 
sador who is appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate. An ambas- 
sador is the personal representative of 
the President to another head of state. 
Although he or she receives instructions 
from the Secretary of State in his role 
as principal foreign affairs adviser to the 
President, an ambassador is the symbol 
and embodiment of the United States. 
Sixty percent of U.S. ambassadors are 
currently drawn from the career serv- 
ice. The others are political appointees 
coming from other walks of life. 

The ambassador's alter ego is the 
deputy chief of mission, always an 
experienced member of the Foreign 
Service. Below that level, the embassy 
is organized into functional sections 
staffed by members of the Department 
of State or other agencies. Thei-e are 
normally political, economic, consular, 
administrative, and public affairs sec- 
tions, headed by counselors in large 
embassies. On a global basis. Depart- 
ment of State American personnel com- 
prise only 29% of embassy staffs. 
Defense, AID [Agency for International 
Development], and USIA [United States 
Information Agency] personnel also con- 
stitute large percentages, but there are 
approximately 30 agencies of govern- 
ment, ranging from the Coast Guard to 
the Library of Congress, with personnel 
assigned to U.S. missions overseas. The 
senior personnel from the agencies nor- 
mally constitute what is called the 
"country team," which is chaired by the 
ambassador or deputy chief of mission 
and acts as a principal advisory body to 
the chief of mission. 

An expensive and sophisticated com- 
munications system connects American 
embassies and consulates with Washing- 
ton and with each other. Instructions 
flow out from Washington; information, 
policy recommendations, and analyses 
flow in from the field. An average of 
5,550 messages will be received at head- 
quarters and 1,300 sent out dailv. 



te 1986 



59 



DEPARTMENT 



Role of the Ambassador 

It is a myth that an ambassador has 
been made into nothing more than a 
messenger boy by the ease and speed of 
modem transportation and communica- 
tions. An ambassador's energy, persua- 
siveness, judgment, contacts, ability to 
act cooly or improvise quickly on the 
basis of experience or good instincts, 
and intimate knowledge of U.S. goals 
and objectives can be crucial in a crisis. 
We have just seen a demonstration of 
these truths by our ambassador in the 
Philippines. There is no substitute for 
on-the-spot knowledge of other cultures, 
languages, personalities, and the right 
buttons to push to get results. Diplo- 
macy is very much a matter of inter- 
personal relationships. An ambassador 
has many roles: "mayor" of a commu- 
nity, "managing director" of a mission 
which can range in size from a small 
embassy of five or six people, such as 
in Benin or Brunei, or a large one of 
hundreds, as in Cairo or Manila. He and 
his subordinates truly represent the 
United States and can have a profound 
influence on attitudes of local officials 
and populations toward the United 
States. 

Perhaps one personal experience will 
illustrate some aspects of an ambas- 
sador's job. For almost 3 years during 
President Carter's Administration, I 
served as envoy to Turkey, a key 
NATO ally. When I went to Ankara, an 
arms embargo— imposed by the Con- 
gress of the United States— had been in 
force for some time, and our relations 
with this important country had deterio- 
rated badly. It quickly became clear to 
me that continuation of the embargo 
would have a very bad impact on signifi- 
cant U.S. interests in NATO's southern 
flank. The embargo had been imposed 
ostensibly in retaliation for Turkey's 
1974 incursion into Cyprus after the 
overthrow of Archbishop Makarios. My 
own view was that, in good part, it was 
a way of showing a Democratic Con- 
gress' frustration with Henry Kissin- 
ger's policies and resistance to congres- 
sional wishes. In any event, it was a 
costly policy for the United States in 
many ways. 

I first had to make the case for a 
reversal of the policy to Secretary of 
State Vance. Vance knew what the 
arguments against its continuation were 
but initially was loath to take on the 
burden of challenging a policy that 
apparently had strong majority support 
in Congress. Many Members of Con- 
gress had Uttle understanding of the his- 



tory of the Cyprus conflict or that the 
embargo policy was counterproductive, 
but were quite attentive to the views of 
ethnic Greek constituents. In time, I 
and others (including particularly Gen- 
eral Al Haig, who was NATO Supreme 
Commander and had a keen appreciation 
of Turkey's importance to European 
defense) prevailed on both Secretary 
Vance and President Carter to try to 
achieve a reversal of Congress' action. 
This meant several trips to Washington 
to meet with colleagues in the Depart- 
ments of State and Defense to mobilize 
help. I also made several speeches in 
Turkey outlining the antiembargo case. 
These angered a number of prominent 
Senators and Congressmen who felt I 
was stepping out of bounds in challeng- 
ing a policy approved by the Congress. 
By that time, however, there was sub- 
stantial support in the Administration 
for the position I advocated. 

During the spring of 1978, I re- 
turned to Washington to participate in 
an intensive lobbying effort in Congress. 
During the course of more than a 
month, I met with almost 100 individual 
Members of Congress, some of them 
two or three times. I believe I was able 
to prevail on a good number of members 
to revise their view on this issue. On 
the day of the vote, I sat in the gallery 
of the Senate and watched the anti- 
embargo forces win by a narrow margin. 

This anecdote illustrates several 
things: an ambassador's functions are 
not only performed in his country of 
accreditation but also on the home front. 
Ability to persuade, effectiveness in a 
highly political environment while keep- 
ing good personal relations with those of 
a different viewpoint, and wiUingness to 
challenge conventional wisdom or estab- 
lished policies are part of an ambas- 
sador's armory. Firsthand knowledge of 
a situation often makes him more effec- 
tive than Washington officials whose dis- 
tance from a problem give them a less 
nuanced feel for it. 

Organization and Functions 
of the Department of State 

The Department of State in Washington 
is, of course, the "center," the source of 
instructions, the setter of goals and 
objectives necessary to carry out the 
President's foreign poUcy. It should 
never be forgotten that the President of 
the United States is the chief foreign 
policy official of our government. Presi- 
dents vary in the degree they rely on 



the Department of State. Presidents 
Roosevelt and Nixon relied little— in 
fact, avoided reliance in important 
areas. Presidents Eisenhower and 
Reagan— and most of the others in my |: 
experience— rely more. The most impor- I! 
tant determining factor is the relation- It 
ship between the President and his II 
Secretary of State. Confidence and trust |! 
will enlarge the Department's role; sus- li 
picion will diminish it. It is particularly j; 
important for professional Foreign 
Service officers to remember they are 
servants of a democratically elected 
leadership. While they should offer ad- 
vice objectively and fearlessly, it is not 1= 
permissible to substitute their judgment |f 
when they believe pohcy directions to 
be wrong. This, however, also exposes I: 
one of the Foreign Service's biggest pit i. 
falls: a temptation to watch superiors to ' 
determine acceptable conclusions insteac ' ■ 
of interpreting facts and events on theii li. 
own merits. I' 

Every morning the Secretary of * 
State— or the Deputy Secretary, in his '^ 
absence— will meet with various groups " 
of his senior officers among the four " 
under secretaries with functional respor )!• 
sibilities and the 23 assistant secretary- ^ 
level officials who are the operating I' 
chiefs of the bureaus. Bureaus are the '■• 
basic organizational units of the Depart- '' 
ment. There are five geographic and 18 I'- 
functional bureaus with responsibiUties j' 
ranging from economic to politico- I'i 

military affairs. Before these meetings, ''■ 
the participants will have reviewed or '' 
been briefed on the principal develop- 
ments around the world since the 
preceding day. When I get to the office ' 
at about 7:30 a.m., I read the principal i- 
intelligence summaries— the National '? 
Intelligence Daily and the Secretary of |!* 
State's Morning Summary and other N 
assessments prepared by the Bureau of'n 
Intelligence and Research. I look at a I'* 
sampling of the most important messag 
"traffic" from around the world, exam- ' ' 
ine a record of the previous day's ded- jj^ 
sions by the Secretary and my senior j^ 
colleagues, and check through a selec- jn 
tion of morning press clippings. Since I,.^ 
have a particular responsibility for seci|.." 
rity of our people and missions oversea, , 
I will also review all of the information ^^ 
relating to terrorist and security threat | ; 
against our personnel from around the ^. 
world. This latter is of growing volumej^; 

At 8:45 a.m. I will join the Secre- ^^ 
tary's staff meeting for senior person- j^ 
nel, where the press spokesman will jj^^ 
summarize the day's press reporting j 
and comment and raise issues which w 



60 



Department of State Bullel 



■(•(1 to be dealt with in the Depart- 
fiit's noon press biiefing. The Assist- 
;it Secretary for Congressional 
ielations will review problems which 
live arisen or may arise on the Hill or 
lay require attention from members of 
le gi-oup. The Assistant Secretary for 
Itelligence and Research will highlight 
|>litical and other developments based 
;i intelligence channel reporting. Other 
irticipants have an opportunity to 
lise matters which the Secretary or 
ihers should know about, either for 
ineral information or to seek guidance 
i comments. Similar meetings will be 
id with groups of functional or geo- 
laphic assistant secretaries. 

The groups will then disperse for 
.e day's business, which will consist of 
i/ariety of activities: meetings with 
feign officials; meetings with staff 
embers to examine and resolve vari- 
es policy or operational issues; prepara- 
n of policy recommendations or 
lormation for the Secretary or the 
'lite House; sessions to coordinate 
I icy with other interested agencies; 
I'paration and approval of instructions, 
■ dies, analyses, and congressional tes- 
iiony; and so on. It is a varied, 
•ive— at times exciting— agenda. Fre- 
mtly, there is the satisfaction of 
ng able clearly to influence the 
1 rse of world events. During the 
( rse of the day, the Secretary or 
buty Secretary will convene meetings 
lich will be more pohcy oriented than 
: quick morning sessions. The Secre- 
iv has also held a number of "Satur- 
I' seminars" on various foreign policy 
lies ranging from Afghanistan to ter- 
ism in which outside experts will join 
ijartment of State personnel for a 
■'-flowing discussion of policy options 
: problems. Periodically, he will hold 
takfast sessions with selected Mem- 
Es of Congress for the same purpose. 

•mulating U.S. Foreign Policy 

ould like to finish with a few general 
:3rvations about the U.S. foreign pol- 
;which emerges from these processes, 
lact, I beheve "foreign policy" is a 
nomer. The United States has not 
' fnieign policy, but hundreds. Policy 
^sfiitially the attitude which we 
■3t toward individual issues: Afghan- 
is trade with Japan, aviation agree- 
ts with the U.S.S.R., and so on, 
>st into infinity. Policy has to be dis- 
■ed in specific terms. We have a 
':y planning staff, and I have always 



DEPARTMENT 



thought this also was a misnomer. Pol- 
icy is not "planned" because we cannot 
plan all the factors and actors which are 
beyond our control but have an influ- 
ence on our policies. 

As Mark Twain is alleged to have 
said about Wagner's music: "It's not as 
bad as it sounds." It has been charged 
that poHcy is not created but that it just 
happens and, to some limited extent, 
this is true. You can plan all you want, 
but if Congress does not give you the 
resources or has different views, your 
planning will be unavailing. Also, things 
will happen over which you have no con- 
trol or which you cannot predict. In this 
connection, I was once taken to task as 
a member of the Foreign Service by a 
Congressman about our failure to fore- 
tell the Iranian revolution. I asked him 
to tell me the outcome of the coming 
election at home. His answer was, "How 
am I supposed to know? It depends on 
too many things." I said I fully under- 
stood the result would be shaped by 
many factors that had yet to emerge. I 
beheve he got the message. 

Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy 
must not be inconsistent with the nature 
of our country and our people if it is to 
succeed. Henry Kissinger observed that 
public consent is the oxygen of U.S. for- 
eign poUcy, and he was entirely correct. 
There is an ethos and ethic from which 
our pohcy must not depart. We do, and 
will, make mistakes because our infor- 
mation is faulty, or incomplete, or an 
analysis flawed, or because we must act 
very quickly. Last week I was speaking 
with former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Adm. Tom Moorer, who hkened 
foreign affairs to commanding an air- 
craft carrier underway in port. It is 
moving, and you don't have the luxury 
of postponing decisions or prolonging 
discussion or waiting until every bit of 
information is in hand. Even staying on 
course is a decision. Dean Rusk used to 
characterize the difference between his 
experience in government and outside 
government by sajing that outside gov- 
ernment, you argue toward conclusions; 
inside, you have to argue toward 
decisions. 

There are some things the United 
States must stand for if it is to be true 
to its history. We cannot fail to be advo- 
cates for those human rights for others 
that we value for ourselves. We must be 
advocates not for specific forms of demo- 
cratic government but for the enlarge- 
ment of the opportunities for political 



participation for those who are deprived 
of them. And, of course, the first public 
service any government owes its people 
is to provide security. That is another 
inescapable responsibility which must 
underpin our diplomacy. 

At the same time, we must recog- 
nize that there are American charac- 
teristics which can affect our foreign 
policies in adverse ways: our history has 
given us a sense that all problems are 
resolvable with good will and effort— 
which is, unfortunately, often not the 
case— and an impatience for quick 
results. Our geographic isolation and our 
preoccupation with the task of taming a 
continent has resulted in a lack of 
historical perspective on important 
issues and a cultural absolutism that fre- 
quently leaves us to assume that the 
way we do things is the only way. The 
Foreign Service often has the role of 
guarding against the mistakes these can 
lead to. This is often unpopular, particu- 
larly with a new administration. 

I see these as the principal ends our 
pohcies must serve: to promote human 
liberty and freedom of political choice, 
economic and social development, the 
rule of law, diplomatic resolution of 
international disputes, and constructive 
change. Radicalism and violence advance 
when routes to peaceful change are 
blocked. We may not always have the 
wisdom to design and gain acceptance of 
specific pohcies to advance these goals, 
but these goals should always be our 
touchstone. 

Perhaps the best advice that Ameri- 
cans have ever received relevant to the 
conduct of our foreign relations is 
George Washington's eloquent plea: 
"Let us raise a standard to which the 
wise and honest can repair; the event is 
in the hands of God." ■ 



1986 



61 



EAST ASIA 



An Update 

Americans Missing in Indochina 



by John C. Monjo 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 12, 1986. Mr. Monjo is Acting 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs.^ 

I appreciate your invitation to appear 
before this subcommittee to discuss this 
government's activities related to the is- 
sue of Americans who are missing or 
otherwise unaccounted for in Indochina. 
A great deal has happened during the 8 
months since our report to the subcom- 
mittee in June of last year. 

Though we are by no means satis- 
fied and there may be setbacks along 
the way, I believe we can now say with 
considerable justice that the President's 
strategy to resolve this issue is begin- 
ning to bear fruit. Both the Vietnamese 
and Lao Governments are now fully 
aware of the importance of the resolu- 
tion of this issue and both have moved 
from the stage of discussion to one of 
dealing with the practical questions in- 
volved. We think they could do much 
more than they are doing now, but a 
real start has been made. 

As has been the case throughout our 
effort on this issue, our first priority is 
to try to determine if Americans are 
still alive in Indochina and, if they are, 
to bring about their release. Both Hanoi 
and Vientiane maintain that they hold 
no American prisoners and they have no 
Americans under their control. The 
Vietnamese have suggested that if there 
are any Americans on their territory 
they are there without their knowledge 
and are either infiltrators or agents who 
were left behind in remote areas in 
1975. The Vietnamese have referred to 
three instances of infiltration, by which 
they apparently meant yachtsmen, such 
as William Mathers who was arrested in 
what Vietnam claims as its territorial 
waters in 1984 and released last year. 
The Lao have indicated that communica- 
tion with remote areas is difficult, but 
they are categorical in their denial of 
the presence of any Americans on their 
territory. Both governments have inves- 
tigated live sighting reports which we 
brought to their attention and have 
reported the results to us. Hanoi has 
further indicated that it is willing to dis- 



62 



cuss the possibility of Americans par- 
ticipating in such investigations. We 
made a proposal to that effect at the 
most recent technical meeting in Hanoi 
on February 27 and 28, but have not 
yet received a substantive reply. 

We will continue vigorously to pur- 
sue this issue. I should underline, 
however, given the large amount of mis- 
understanding that can arise on the 
question of live Americans being held in 
Indochina, that we do not yet know if 
any Americans are being held. The in- 
formation we have received thus far as 
a result of our extensive investigation of 
hundreds of live sighting reports does 
not prove that there are any; neither 
does it cause us to conclude that no one 
is being held. We assume, therefore, 
that some Americans may remain in 
Indochina and act on that assumption. 

Vietnam 

In regard to Vietnam, the principal 
event of the last 8 months has been an 
apparent decision by the Hanoi authori- 
ties to move from ad hoc gestures on 
this issue to a comprehensive program 
aimed at fully resolving the question in 
Vietnam within 2 years. This proposal 
was first conveyed to us last summer 
through Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. We followed 
up with a policy level meeting in Hanoi 
at the end of August in which our dele- 
gation, led by Richard Childress of the 
National Security Council staff and in- 
cluding Ann Griffiths, the Executive 
Director of the National League of 
POW/MIA FamiUes, and Lyall Breckon, 
my Department's Director of Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia Affairs, met with 
Acting Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang 
and Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang 
Bich Son. There was a followup meeting 
by the same delegation with Mr. Giang 
in New York in September. A third 
policy level meeting took place in Hanoi 
this January when Assistance Secretary 
of Defense [Richard L.] Armitage 
headed a delegation, which included 
Assistant Secretary of State [Paul D.] 
Wolfowitz as well as Mr. Childress and 
Mrs. Griffiths, which met with Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Son. 



There have already been significant :i: 
practical results from Hanoi's decision || 
and the talks which have followed it. » 
Vietnam has investigated Uve sighting If 
reports. Vietnam modified its position 
and agreed to carry out joint excava- 
tions of crash sites. The first such exca- It 
vation in Vietnam since the end of the I' 
war took place in late November and 
early December at a B-52 crash site ir 
near Hanoi. Vietnam has agreed in prin- it 
ciple to cooperate in further excava- ji. 
tions. Vietnam has also turned over It 
more remains than during any other |i. 
similar period since the end of the war: |i: 



26 in August, 7 in December, and they 
told us at the February technical meet 
ing that we can expect 21 more in the 
near future. They have not yet, how- 
ever, set a date for this next turnover. 
Our technical meetings which took place t 
in July, September, November, and ft 
February have become much more use- D 
ful and productive than they were previ |i! 
ously with an increased amount of real fe 
exchanges of views and information. I 

The joint excavation of a crash site 
near Hanoi last November-December 
will, we hope, set a pattern for greater ii 
cooperation with Vietnam on this issue, n 
The aircraft was a B-52 that crashed in ii 
a village near Hanoi. Though the Viet- 
namese were quite cooperative during 
the excavation, the results were disap- 
pointing, and the debris found at the 
site was too limited to determine the 
particular aircraft involved. The very 
small amount of human remains discov- |i 
ered also precluded any identification, it 
In light of this experience, we and the jn 
Vietnamese have agreed to consult 1 

closely before deciding on future sites si; 
that, particularly in the beginning, we |l| 
can concentrate our efforts on those '■• 
sites which have the most promise of ■ 
yielding positive results. A site survey i;.. 
was conducted in connection with the i.^s 
latest technical meeting and we will be i ■ 
discussing future excavations with the v- 
Vietnamese. If 

We and the Vietnamese have agreeiifi 
that the present level of activity on thiil ; 
issue does not necessitate the presence-j;, 
of an American POW/MIA technical jh 
team in Hanoi on a full-time basis. If, ajl:; 
we hope, Vietnam were to move towar-). 
full implementation of their 2-year plan i 
the situation might change. Any Ameri 
can team's pui-pose would be entirely 
connected with the resolution of the 
POW/MIA issue and it would not be 
related to the question of estabhshing 
diplomatic relations. Any consideration ij', 



Department of State Bulle 



EAST ASIA 



normal diplomatic relations with 
knoi, and any steps toward them, must 
Kait a comprehensive settlement in 
imbodia which is acceptable to the 
jmbers of the Association of Southeast 
iian Nations [ASEAN] and involves 
fe withdrawal of the Vietnamese 
■my. 

I have mentioned several results 
im the February 27-28 technical meet- 
f at Hanoi. I would like to add that 
are was a serious cooperative attitude 
-oughout the meeting. In addition to 
icussing potential joint-excavation lo- 
.ions, Lieutenant Colonel Mather, who 
ided our team, asked the Vietnamese 
■:hey had a report on the live sighting 
Ses which had been raised with them 
' Senator [Frank H.] Murkowski's and 
ngressman [Gerald B.] Solomon's 
iegations. The Vietnamese indicated 
tse cases would be investigated, 
>ugh they added that some were 
yue and additional data would assist 
lir investigations. The Vietnamese 
|) passed us information on 48 
!orts; these included the 21 remains 
!ch they plan to turn over. In addi- 
li the Vietnamese announced that 
'y agreed in principle to another joint 
ih site excavation, but that the 
;cific site has not yet been selected. 
Nevertheless, even this increased 
>.'l of activity is not going to result in 
!Solution of this issue in Vietnam 
:-un the 2-year period specified by the 
loi authorities. We expect as we and 
I Vietnamese proceed with implemen- 
,on of the plan that the pace of activ- 
iwill increase. 

I would like to add in this context 
I, congressional visits such as the one 
iby Senator Murkowski, which includ- 
lw(i members of the House, in Janu- 

aiKJ that of the House POW/MIA 
>k Force led by its chairman, Con- 
'5sman Solomon, in Febmai-y serve a 
It useful purpose. They, of course, 
I'times i-esult in specific new infor- 
:ion such as Deputy Foreign Minister 
)'s telling Congressman Solomon's 
!gation that his government was will- 
Uii discuss the question of Americans 
icipating in the investigation of live 
.tiiii;- reports. We are pursuing this 

iitTer on resolving the live prisoner 

iven more important, however, 
e delegations and other similar ones 
the years have made plain to the 
'iship in Hanoi that concern for an 
luniing of our missing men is shared 
';aders of every stratum of our polit- 
isystem and, indeed, is a profound 



concern of the vast majority of Ameri- 
cans. They cannot then just out- wait 
this Administration or this set of Ameri- 
can officials. They must deal with the is- 
sue if they are to have any hope of 
improving the atmosphere between us 
so that, if a Cambodian settlement is ar- 
rived at, we can consider establishing 
normal relations. I believe the Viet- 
namese Government has come to such a 
realization due in large part to the 
President's personal commitment and in- 
terest, but also because of the unswerv- 
ing determination of the National 
League of Families and continuing 
representations by Members of 
Congress. 

Laos 

The Lao Government too realizes 
full well that if, as we both hope, our 
bilateral relations are to continue to im- 
prove there must be real progress on a 
resolution of the issue of our men who 
are missing in that country. In Laos, as 
in Vietnam, progress has increased sig- 
nificantly, but still is considerably below 
the level we desire. 

Our dii-ect liaison on this issue with 
the Lao takes place through our Art 
Embassy at Vientiane. Our Charge' 
d'Affaires there, Theresa Tull, has held 
numerous meetings with Lao Foreign 
Ministry officials in order to increase 
the rate of progress. In September, Lao 
officials, accompanied by an officer of 
our Embassy, traveled to Hawaii for 
consultations and briefings at the Joint 
Casualty Resolution Center and the 
Army's Central Identification Labora- 
tory. Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense James- Kelly participated in the 
meetings. All the participants agreed 
that it was a highly successful exercise 
which not only added to the Lao ex- 
perts' technical knowledge, but helped 
him to understand just what we were 
about in our accounting effort. Also in 
September Under Secretai-y AiTnacost 
and Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz met 
with Lao Foreign Minister Phoun 
Siprasuth to underline to a member of 
the Lao Party Politburo the seriousness 
of our resolve. Mr. Childress and 
Mrs. Griffiths had a similar meeting 
with Mr. Phoun that same month. In 
December Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Chil- 
dress visited Vientiane to continue our 
policy level dialogue on this issue. 

In these discussions, the Lao agreed 
to increase their own investigative ef- 
forts and to continue to cooperate in the 
joint excavation of crash sites. Specifi- 
cally they agreed to conduct two such 



excavations during the present dry sea- 
son. The first, of an AC- 130 aircraft in 
Savannakhet Province, was carried out 
in February and, though what we found 
is still being analyzed, appears to have 
been very successful. Certainly the Lao 
were extremely cooperative and helpful. 
At the end of the Savannakhet excava- 
tion we and the Lao surveyed a new 
site, and we hope to conduct another ex- 
cavation in the near future. In addition, 
the Lao agreed to make their own effort 
to recover information, separate from 
the joint excavations. 

One particularly important event 
which took place during this 8-month 
period was a decision by Congress, at 
the Administration's initiative, to re- 
move the specific legal ban on aid to 
Laos. This was an important symbolic 
gesture to signify to the Lao Govern- 
ment that the United States appreciated 
their decision to move toward resolution 
of this issue and the practical steps they 
had taken to begin the process. We 
hope that further steps will lead to a 
greater expansion of our i-elations, but 
this Administration has no present plans 
to propose bilateral economic assistance 
to Laos. 

Cambodia 

In regard to Cambodia, it is, of course, 
the exception in the description of quali- 
fied progress which I have just pre- 
sented to you. We in the Department of 
State are acutely aw'are of the 82 
Americans who are missing in that coun- 
try. Vietnam has made some obvious at- 
tempts of late to enhance the almost 
nonexistent stature of its Cambodian 
clients, the People's Republic of Kam- 
puchea (P.R.K.), by suggesting that we 
should deal with Phnom Penh directly 
on this issue. We prefer to continue to 
deal with the reality of the situation 
which is that Hanoi controls most of 
Cambodia's territory as well as the 
P.R.K., which it created and maintains. 
Vietnam is certainly in control of those 
areas where Americans were lost during 
the war, and for the most part, was in 
control of them at the time our people 
were lost. We, therefore, hold Vietnam 
responsible and look to Hanoi to cooper- 
ate with us as it does in the case of 
Americans missing in Vietnam. I might 
note too that in their January 1984 com- 
munique the Foreign Ministers of Viet- 
nam, Laos, and the P.R.K. stated they 
would exchange information on this 
issue. 



1986 



63 



ECONOMICS 



If the authorities in Phnom Penh 
genuinely wish to provide us POW/MIA 
information they can do so through any 
number of international organizations. 
One such organization, which has asked 
us not to name it, at our request told 
the Phnom Penh authorities it would ac- 
cept any information they have and for- 
ward it to us. Thus far the P.R.K. has 
not done so. 

Presidential Commission Proposed 

I would like to take this opportunity to 
comment on a proposal which is before 
the Congress to create a presidential 
commission to oversee this issue. Ac- 
cording to the proposed legislation, this 
commission would have three purposes: 
to investigate the status of our service- 
men who are missing or otherwise unac- 
counted for in Indochina; to recommend 
actions to secure the release of any 
Americans who are prisoners; and to ob- 
tain the repatriation of the remains of 
those who have died. 

These functions are being carried 
out aggressively by the e.xisting agen- 
cies of the government. Creating a com- 
mission would add an additional, and 
unnecessary, burden on those working 
to resolve this issue. At present my 
Department, the National Security 
Council, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agen- 
cy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all un- 
der the President's direction, work 
closely with each other in furtherance of 
this issue. These agencies maintain close 
cooperation and liaison with the Nation- 
al League of POW/MIA Families and 
with the staff of this committee and 
other concerned congressional commit- 
tees, all of which are represented on the 
interagency group which coordinates our 
nation's policy on this issue. 

In addition, congressional commit- 
tees and individual members of Con- 
gress are briefed whenever they so 
desire; and more formally, congressional 
committees hold frequent hearings such 
as today's in which the executive branch 
reports on events and its actions in con- 
nection with the POW/MIA issue. 

It is difficult to see what the addi- 
tion of a new group of people who have 
neither the Federal agencies' executive 
resources nor Congress' direct responsi- 
bility to the American people would 
bring to this effort. They would neces- 



sarily have to spend a great deal of time 
learning what the Congress and con- 
cerned agencies already know and in so 
doing would divert from this pursuit of 
this issue those who are already work- 
ing on it. There is no reason to believe 
that they would bring to the issue 
higher levels of dedication, intelligence 
expertise, diplomatic skill, and military 
ability than are already being devoted 
to it. 

In addition, the creation of a new 
public body at a time when the sus- 
tained efforts of the Administration are 
showing increased results runs the dis- 
tinct risk of sending a signal to Hanoi 
that the U.S. Government may be 
changing direction. Such a signal could 
provide the Vietnamese with an oppor- 
tunity to stall under the mistaken belief 
that they may be able to obtain lever- 
age through this issue. 

More importantly it is our belief that 
we vdll not find solutions to the 
POW/MIA issue by creating new com- 
missions, agencies, or other bodies here 
in America. The key to the problem is 
in Indochina. We must continue our in- 
creasingly successful effort to obtain 
those governments' full cooperation, not 
vitiate our energy on internecine wran- 
gling. The solutions are in Hanoi and 
Vientiane, not in Washington. 



Conclusion 

In conclusion, allow me to reaffirm to 
you the Department of State's commit- 
ment, and indeed that of all of us in the 
executive bi-anch who are working to 
resolve this issue, to obtain as full as 
possible an accounting of the Americans 
who did not return from the war in In- 
dochina. Our first priority is to deter- 
mine if any men remain alive, who they 
are, where they are held, and to get 
them back to this country by whatever 
means are necessary. Secondly, we are 
working to return the remains of the 
dead and account for the missing. Thest 
are not easy tasks, and all of us who an 
involved in them experience frustration 
in trying to carry them out. But I can 
assure you that we will persevere until 
we have exhausted every possible 
avenue to return our men— alive or 
dead— to their famihes. We owe it to ou 
men, who answered their country's call 
and who may still be serving, we owe it 
to their families who have now waited 
13 long years, and in some cases much 
longer, and we owe it to the American 
people. 



' The complete transcript of the hearings * 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of i, 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offictt 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ T 



Trade Policy Directions for 1986 



by Clayton Yeutter 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Trade of the House Ways and Means 
Committee on February 20, 1986. Am- 
bassador Yeutter is U.S. Trade 
Representative.'^ 

I am pleased to appear before you today 
to discuss U.S. trade policy and priori- 
ties for 1986. This is my first opportuni- 
ty to appear before this subcommittee 
to discuss the challenges facing U.S. 
trade internationally and our efforts to 
deal with them. I welcome the opportu- 
nity to formally open this dialogue with 
you. There are no quick-fixes to the is- 
sues we will touch on today. I look for- 
ward to working with you in the coming 
months as we explore these questions in 
greater detail. 

At the time I assumed my current 
responsibilities, the Administration was 
under attack both for not having a clear 
sense of our international trade in- 



terests and for not adequately protec^ 
ing those trade interests in individual 
situations. Our efforts, I believe, speak 
for themselves in dispelling that notion. 
Trade has consumed an enoiTnous 
amount of the Cabinet's time and ener- 
gy and has been an almost constant 
topic of discussion at the subcabinet 
level. 

I believe those efforts have started 
to pay off. 

• The President has clearly and 
boldly outlined the Administration's 
trade policy objectives and released an .. 
action plan for realizing those ob- . 
jectives. ,. 

• The Administration has asserted ^' 
to the rest of the world in unmistakabli ; 
terms that we are determined to create 

a "level playing field" for U.S. business'-' 
firms. This message has been most 
forcefully conveyed by our self-initiatior|tii 
of Section 301 cases and targeted mixeC|-^ 
credit export financing offers. j.,^ 



»J 



64 



Department of State Bullet , 



ECONOMICS 



• In conjunction with our principal 
ding partners, we have begun major 
tiatives to promote stronger and more 
anced international economic growth, 
,h much improved coordination of 
croeconomic policies. 

Before describing the elements of 
it program in more detail for the com- 
;tee, I want to emphasize a very im- 
•tant point— the Administration's 
ategy is geared to providing long- 
m solutions, not a few flashy short- 
m accomplishments which treat 
nptoms rather than causes. Progress 
I been made, but I would be the fii-st 
acknowledge that there is much yet 
.1o to alleviate our trade difficulties 
I restore a sense of fairness and equi- 
\x) the international trading system. 

e Administration's Trade Progrram 

! September 23, the President an- 
mced a comprehensive set of 
posals for dealing with America's 
le problems. The piinciples underly- 
the Administration's program are 
(Out in detail in the "Statement on 
[■mational Trade Pohcy" which I 
iiby submit for the recoi-d. 
I would only want to emphasize one 
i principle— this Administration is, 
I will remain, committed to the crea- 
; of an open and fair trading system, 
rsident Reagan is not a protectionist 
I never will be, and neither will I. 
■.ectionism will destroy the economic 
llity of America's economy. It would 
ie competition, retard innovation, 
'ard the inefficient, cost jobs, invite 
illation, and lower America's stand- 
lof living. Since the end of World 
'"II, the United States has been a 
aer in promoting a more open and 
I table trading system. With all the 
IS ill the system, the Administration 
Lctjntinue to work, singly or in con- 
1' with our trading partners, to renew 
lirestore the system. 
\s I will describe in a moment, the 
t-national trading system is not the 
le of all our trade problems, and we 
ii[ be realistic in our assessment of 
x^xtent to which the trading system 
■<ol\e our problems. Our plan is to 
sre that free trade is fair trade, to 
ftigthen and revitalize the interna- 
!'.] li-ade system, and to deal with 
. !■ l:ietors, including macroeconomic 
1 itions, affecting our trade deficit. 

[>iir Trade 

1" President initiated an aggressive 
cram in pursuit of our longstanding 



commitment to fair trade as a prerequi- 
site for free trade. Since that time, fur- 
ther actions have been taken to advance 
this principle. Among the steps which 
we have taken are: 

• The unprecedented self-initiation 
of Section 301 unfair trade cases against 
Brazil, Korea, and Japan; 

• The establishment of clear dead- 
lines in longstanding disputes with the 
European Community (EC) and Japan; 

• The submission of legislation to 
create a $300 million fund to increase 
U.S. leverage in negotiations to 
eliminate predatory tied aid credit 
financing; 

• The self-initiation of an antidump- 
ing investigation against the sale of cer- 
tain semiconductors at less than "fair 
value" based on the recommendation on 
the interagency strike foi-ce chaired by 
Commerce Secretary Baldiige; 

• The publication of our first exten- 
sive study of foreign trade barriers, in 
accordance with Section 303 of the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. This 
report goes beyond unfair trade barriers 
to cover all significant barriers to trade; 
and 

• The retaliatory imposition by the 
President of higher tariffs on EC pasta 
exports to the United States as a result 
of the unwillingness of the Eui-opean 
Community to compensate for the injury 
to U.S. citrus exports from EC prefer- 
ences to Mediterranean countries. 

These actions represent only the ini- 
tial step in our efforts to ensure that 
trade is both free and fair. We will take 
additional actions if and when conditions 
require. 

Actions taken to date have already 
yielded substantial results. However, I 
am told that some of our actions may 
have gone relatively unnoticed on 
Capitol Hill. I would therefore like to 
briefly I'eview what has occurred. 

• We reached agreement with 
Taiwan to eliminate their longstanding 
barriers to U.S. exports of beer, wine, 
and tobacco. 

• The Government of Korea has 
eliminated practices which limited the 
access of the U.S. motion picture indus- 
tiy to the Korean market. 

• We concluded long overdue dis- 
putes with the EC on canned fruit and 
with Japan on leather and leather foot- 
wear. In the former case, the EC 
agreed to eliminate its production subsi- 
dies on canned fruit. In the latter case, 
the agreement we fashioned achieved 
some improvement in our access for 
these products, Japanese concessions in 



other products, and final balance 
through the withdrawal of U.S. tariff 
concessions. 

• Eximbank has approved eight tied 
aid credit offers out of existing authori- 
ties while Congi-ess continues its con- 
sideration of the "war chest" bill. In 
addition. Control Data Corporation suc- 
ceeded in winning a transaction in India 
which may ultimately be worth $450 
million. 

• We have negotiated agreements in 
the nuclear and large and small aircraft 
sectors w^hich prohibit the use of tied 
aid credits. Negotiations on comprehen- 
sive tied aid credit discipline continue. 

• The United States has successfully 
negotiated modifications to Japanese 
practices in the medical/pharmaceutical 
industry and the telecommunications in- 
dustry as a part of the MOSS [market- 
oriented, sector selective] process. 
Several significant measures have been 
implemented as a i-esult of the MOSS 
electronics talks, but the overall out- 
come in this sector will not be clear 
until the semiconductor Section 301 case 
has been resolved. We are not com- 
pletely satisfied in the progress on 
forest products, particularly in regard to 
the depth, coverage, and timing of tariff 
reductions. We believe that the changes 
create the potential for significant op- 
portunities for U.S. business, although 
the ultimate value of the changes made 
can only be assessed in the light of 
actual sales experience. 

I would also like to dispel another 
often heard criticism of the Administra- 
tion—that it is unwilling to provide sup- 
port rehef to American industries. 
Under Section 201 of our trade law, the 
record demonstrates otherwise. Eleven 
Section 201 cases have been filed since 
the Administration took office. Of those 
11 cases, the International Trade Com- 
mission found no injury in 6. Of the five 
remaining cases, the President granted 
import relief in two— to heavyweight 
motorcycles and specialty steel. In the 
case of carbon steel, the President took 
alternative action to resolve the 
problem. Only in two cases 
—copper and footwear— did the Presi- 
dent reject import relief. In the copper 
case, many more copper fabricators' 
jobs would have been lost than miners' 
jobs saved. In the footwear decision, the 
industrj' failed to show- that relief would 
have improved their international com- 
petitiveness. This seems to me to be an 
impeccable record in administering Sec- 
tion 201, rather than one subject to 
criticism. 



8 1986 



65 



ECONOMICS 



As part of our general review of 
trade policy, we will continue to con- 
sider legislation that would help us pro- 
mote free and fair trade. In line with 
this, the Administration is reviewing 
proposals for changes in, and additions 
to, U.S. trade laws. The proposals which 
will get increasing attention during the 
year include: new trade negotiating 
authority, revisions to our laws protect- 
ing intellectual property, export promo- 
tion initiatives, and various amendments 
to our antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws. The Administration has also 
proposed significant reforms in the anti- 
trust laws that will enhance the interna- 
tional competitiveness of U.S. firms. 
The Administration will very likely sup- 
port a number of such changes. At the 
same time, we will not allow desirable 
changes to be held hostage to counter- 
productive, protectionist measures. I 
look forward to working with the com- 
mittee in a consti-uctive way on these 
delicate issues. 

A New Round of 

Multilateral Trade Negotiations 

It is imperative that we launch a new 
round of multilateral trade negotiations 
in the coming months. In our view, the 
initiation of a new GATT round is the 
best way for the 90 member countries of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade to achieve fairer trade, improve 
access for exports, provide more effec- 
tive dispute resolution, and strengthen 
the fabric of the international trading 
system. All trading countries have an 
important stake in developing a compre- 
hensive agenda to reform the GATT, 
make it relevant to the problems of 
today's trading environment, and ensure 
its capacity to deal with new problems 
as they arise. 

During the past four decades, the 
GATT has served the world well as a 
framework for international trade 
negotiations and the conduct of interna- 
tional commerce. Under GATT auspices, 
successive rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations have led to substantial 
trade liberalization and an enormous 
increase in global trade. 

In recent years, however, this dis- 
cipline has been crumbling under the 
combined pressures of global recession, 
debt crises, fluctuating energy prices, 
and volatile exchange rate movements. 
While a positive development, the non- 
tariff barrier codes agi-eed to in the 
Tokyo Round (covering government 
procurement, customs valuation, stand- 
ards, licensing, and subsidies) were only 



a first step. The Tokyo Round and 
previous trade negotiations failed to 
develop workable rules or meaningful 
discipline over such critical issues as dis- 
pute settlement, safeguards, agriculture, 
market access, and subsidies. 

The fundamental reason we need to 
launch a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in the coming months is to 
develop workable rules and restore dis- 
cipline in all these areas. 

Over the past 18 months, the U.S. 
Trade Representative has begun an 
intensive series of consultations with 
our private sector advisers to identify 
U.S. negotiating objectives and priori- 
ties. While there still remains a great 
deal of work to be done, these consulta- 
tions have identified the following key 
objectives. 

Dispute Settlement. One of the 

major functions of the GATT is to 
resolve disputes between its member 
countries. The e.xisting dispute settle- 
ment process has resolved or helped to 
resolve a large number of disputes. 
However, some conspicuous failures, 
particularly in recent years, have under- 
mined public confidence in the system. 
Any dispute settlement mechanism can- 
not substitute for a sound fi-amework of 
rules, nor can it repair a faltering inter- 
national consensus. However, a good 
dispute settlement process is a neces- 
sary element in the trading system. As 
part of the new negotiations, we will 
seek specific improvements in dispute 
settlement procedures to ensure that 
countries have every opportunity to 
resolve their differences in a timely 
manner through consultation, mediation, 
or arbitration. In those cases where the 
two countries choose a panel to help 
resolve the dispute, we want to ensure 
that nongovernmental panelists can be 
chosen, that strict time limits are set for 
each phase of the panel process, and 
that the panel reports contain clear and 
concise recommendations for action. To 
my mind, this is one of the top priorities 
for the United States in the new round. 

Safeg^uards. The term safeguards 
refers to the emergency actions taken 
by governments to protect domestic 
industries from an influx of imports, 
thereby giving them time to adjust to 
competition. This issue has been identi- 
fied as a matter for priority treatment 
in the new round, in part because it is a 
concern of developing countries and in 
part because of widespread concern that 
most current safeguard practices have 
little to do with the disciplines of the 
GATT. In fact, the GATT secretariat 



staff has identified some 94 safeguard- 
type actions taken outside the relevant 
GATT provisions. In the new negotia- 
tions, we seek to develop a comprehen- 
sive agreement over the use of all 
safeguard actions, including voluntary 
restraint agreements and orderly mar- 
keting arrangements. Our major objec- 
tives are to ensure that such measures 
are transparent, remain temporary, ano 
contribute to— not retard— adjustment, 
without shifting the burden of that 
adjustment on to other trading 
countries. 

Agriculture. It is time that we put 
an end to the chaos in trade in agiicul- 
ture. Trying to treat agriculture with s 
different set of rules from trade in in 
dustrial goods has produced nothing bi 
turmoil, inequities, and massive distrei 
for farmers in this country and around 
the world. Specifically, we have to 
eliminate export subsidies over time ai 
tear down the multiple barriers to 
agricultural import markets in both 
developed and developing countries. 

Tokyo Round Nontariff Barrier 
Codes. Not sui-piisingly, the first effor" 
to negotiate meaningful international 
disciplines over nontariff barriers was 
not totally satisfactory. What we need 
to do now is build on our experience 
with the codes over the past 6 years, 
expand participation, update certain pr ■ 
visions, and strengthen and improve 
their operation. We want to give partii i 
ular attention to the government , 

procurement, aircraft, and subsidies 
codes. 



Market Access. While the primary 
focus of the new negotiations will be oii ' 
developing new rules and disciplines V' 
over trade policies and practices, we ' 
anticipate there will also be some classM ' 
cal swapping of concessions to reduce !' 
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade. Wr 
have asked our private sector advisers '' 
to provide us with a listing of specific ' ' 
barriers that they want to see reduced - 
or eliminated. Once we receive their 
input, we will develop a strategy to ^ 
meet as many of their requests as posS| ?■ 
ble. We will not pay again for conces- itj 
sions supposedly received in previous 
rounds, and we do not intend to diston 
the overall balance of concessions we 
have with our trading partners. 

Intellectual Property Rights. Pira 

cy, misappropriation, and infringement 
of others' intellectual property is caus- 
ing severe trade distortions and is a 
growing trade problem. It is a critical 
issue for the future of world trade as ' 
the technologies and innovations these 



66 



Department of State Bulle' 



ECONOMICS 



rhts promote wall help determine 
morrow's trade patterns. The GATT 
s already undertaken work with 
spect to trademark counterfeiting. We 
11 encourage rapid completion of the 
^TT work on counterfeiting in the 
w round. Deficiencies in protection in 
; areas of patents and copyrights and 
Dtection for the new and evolving 
;hnologies such as biotechnology and 
Tiputer software must also be ad- 
3ssed. Some have criticized our ap- 
)ach to this issue because of concerns 
5Ut the competence of existing intei-- 
:ional conventions and the curi-ent ef- 
ts of the World Intellectual Property 
ganization. We are not interested in 
3licating the very important work of 
;se gi-oups. We do believe that the 
iTT can make an important contribu- 
n by developing the most effective 
1 enforceable mechanism for disciplin- 
■ government policies. 

Investment. Government investment 
icies can have a dampening and dis- 
ting impact on world trade. The ad- 
se effects of these measures are 
parable to those created by tariffs 
nontai-iff barriers such as quantita- 
restrictions. When governments un- 
essarily restrict the ability of a firm 
astablish itself, they deny consumers 
benefits of services and goods that 
Id otherwise be produced. Like free 
e, foreign investment, when 
Eponding to actual market conditions 
ner than distortive government poli- 
i'i, can make the economic pie larger. 
V developing countries facing long- 
2T1 debt constraints, increased flows of 
)'ign direct investment are essential. 
i.TT procedures for addressing dis- 
les and principles such as that of non- 
i'rimination are relevant and 
rortant to disciplining the growth of 
*.le distoi-ting investment policies. The 
^JT's effectiveness in liberalizing 
'tjd trade requires the discussion of 
!■ issue with a view to developing in- 
Mational discipline in this area as a 
a; of a new round. 

Services. We also are seeking agree- 
I'lt under auspices of the GATT on a 
■:;iework of principles and procedures 
'• \Miuld make trade in services as 
■n as possible. Services is the fastest 
I ving segment of our economy and is 
l- y to continue to be so in the future. 
' iHfd to act now to develop meaning- 
1 'ulcs to discipline government ac- 
!-> that restrict or distort the 
Kement of services internationally. 

Let me say a few words about the 
Daratory process for the negotiations 



now underway in Geneva. At the annual 
meeting of the GATT contracting par- 
ties in November, the member govern- 
ments agreed to establish a preparatory 
committee to organize new negotiations. 
The preparatory committee is charged 
with determining the objectives, subject 
matter, organizational details, and par- 
ticipation in the negotiations. The com- 
mittee has met twice already and has 
set out an intensive schedule of meet- 
ings throug-h mid-July. At that time, the 
committee is to make recommendations 
on the subject matter and organizational 
details, perhaps in the form of a 
ministerial declaration, and forward 
them to a ministerial-level meeting of 
GATT members for action. It was 
agi-eed that the ministerial meeting will 
take place in September. 

We are pleased that the 90 members 
of the GATT have taken this important 
step toward strengthening the trading 
system. Although just a first, largely 
procedural step, it is an essential part of 
the process and will pave the way for 
ministers in 1986 to take a fonnal deci- 
sion on negotiations. 

While the United States worked 
very hard to ensure this outcome, the 
decision by the GATT to establish a 
preparatoi-y committee should not be 
seen as an achievement just for the 
United States. It is a victory for the 
GATT system itself, because reducing 
trade barriers and strengthening dis- 
ciplines in the GATT will benefit all 
countries. The 90 members of the GATT 
have joined together by consensus in a 
step that recognizes the need to repair 
and restore the multilateral trading 
system. 

Now the very difficult work of iden- 
tifying specific U.S. interests and objec- 
tives lies before us. The Administration 
will be intensifying consultations with 
our private sector advisers and with 
Congress as we move through the 
preparatory process over the next 
6 months. To be successful, the new 
round must strengthen and improve 
trading rules so that they work more 
efficiently and effectively for the benefit 
of all Americans and our trading 
partners. 

Before leaving this issue, I would 
like to reiterate a point I have made 
before— the United States will not be 
held hostage to the multilateral 
negotiating process. That process is but 
one way for the United Stales and other 
nations to achieve the crucial goal of in- 
creased economic growth through ex- 
panded world trade. There are other 



ways as well. The Administration is pre- 
pared to negotiate on a plurilateral or 
bilateral basis with like-minded nations. 
This path would become all the more 
important and urgent if the movement 
toward a new trade round is stalled, but 
we do not see it as a competitive exer- 
cise in any case. 

An example is the recently con- 
cluded free trade area with Israel. As 
you know, we are now in the process of 
discussing a similar arrangement with 
one of our most important trading part- 
ners, Canada. Canadian Prime Minister 
Mulroney has proposed that we consider 
bilateral trade negotiations on the 
"broadest possible package of mutually 
beneficial reductions in barriers to trade 
in goods and services." 

President Reagan has welcomed the 
Canadian proposal, and he believes it 
offers an important opportunity for both 
nations. If we can successfully conclude 
such a negotiation, it could dramatically 
enhance the growth opportunities of 
both countries as they enter the next 
century. 

We are, of course, now engaged in 
consultation with this committee and 
other interested Members of the Con- 
gress and with our private sector advi- 
sory committees. Some members have 
already suggested that we delay free 
trade negotiations until our present 
bilateral disputes are behind us. But 
with the volume of trade that flows be- 
tween the United States and Canada, 
we will always have bilateral disputes. 
We should not permit those transitory 
frustrations to blur the importance of 
improving long-term trade relationships 
and opportunities. After all, a free trade 
arrangement with Canada would proba- 
bly not be fully implemented until about 
the year 2000. That having been said, 
negotiations will only be worthwhile if 
both parties approach them in good 
faith. The prospect of negotiations can- 
not excuse othei-wise unacceptable be- 
havior on the trade front. 

The Macroeconomic Climate 
and the Trade Deficit 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the Administration has taken a number 
of steps to create an economic climate 
more favorable to U.S. trade. Chief 
among these are attempts to achieve in- 
creased and more balanced growi;h at 
home and abroad. 

Even if all the w'orld's trade barri- 
ers, unfaii- or fair, were eliminated, the 
United States would still have a large 



!;■ 1986 



67 



ECONOMICS 



trade deficit. An inordinately strong dol- 
lar has reduced American export com- 
petitiveness over the past several years 
and has severely tested our import- 
sensitive industries. This, of course, has 
provoked the political turmoil of recent 
months which has been felt by both the 
Congress and the Administration. 

We now have a $148.5 biUion trade 
deficit. While all of us should be con- 
cerned about a deficit of that magnitude, 
I beheve the linkage that some would 
make between the level of the deficit 
and the conduct of U.S. trade policy is 
fundamentally misplaced. Reducing the 
trade deficit requires macroeconomic 
policy adjustments here and abroad. 

Let me begin by drawing up a sim- 
ple balance sheet for the U.S. economy 
in 1985 based on preliminary numbers. 
Out of their 1985 income, American com- 
panies and families saved an estimated 
$700 bilhon. At 17.5% of GNP, gross pri- 
vate saving last year was about in line 
with what the private sector has usually 
saved in recent years. This $700 billion 
was an amount fully sufficient to finance 
total gross private investment in the 
U.S. economy of an estimated $670 bil- 
lion last year. There was even an extra 
$30 billion in savings left over in the 
private sector for purposes other than 
domestic investment. The government 
sector of our economy, however, needed 
not $30 billion but $140 billion to finance 
spending in excess of its revenues. This 
$140 bilhon is the sum of a $60 billion 
surplus in State and local budgets and a 
$200 billion deficit in the Federal 
budget. 

The difference between the $140 bil- 
lion that government needed to borrow 
last year and the $30 billion excess in 
private saving over investment was 
made up by a net capital inflow from 
abroad of $110 billion. 

This accounting exercise is simple 
but powerful, suggesting three possible 
paths to reduce the trade deficit. In the 
first case, a reduction in domestic in- 
vestment might reduce foreign capital 
inflows and the trade deficit despite 
large Federal budget deficits. But this is 
a "solution" no one should want because 
it eases the trade deficit at the expense 
of domestic economic growth. 

A second possibility is to increase 
private saving in the United States to 
be better able to afford both strong in- 
vestment and large budget deficits. But 
if and when Americans save more, it 
would be preferable to have those sav- 
ings contribute to a stronger economy 
rather than toward financing even 
larger Federal budget deficits. 



The third and only realistic approach 
to reducing foreign borrowing and its 
contribution to the U.S. trade deficit is 
to lower our Federal spending and 
budget deficits substantially. In fact, our 
trade deficit could be dramatically 
reduced if the Federal budget deficit 
were shced significantly. As recently as 
1980 and 1981, for example, the United 
States had small surpluses in the cui'- 
rent account while Federal budget 
deficits were slightly in excess of 2% of 
GNP as compared to the current level 
of roughly 5% of GNP. 

The large inflows of foreign capital 
which we have experienced in recent 
years are also related to the relatively 
poorer performance of foreign economies 
compared to those in the United States. 
European economic growth has been 
mediocre at best. The EC's production 
is barely 7% above the level reached in 
1979 while that of the United States is 
13% higher. The poor outlook for Euro- 
pean growth relative to the United 
States encouraged capital outflows from 
Europe to our shores after the 1982 
recession. 

Japan is another case. That country 
has recently relied inordinately on in- 
creases in its export accounts to stimu- 
late growth. In the last 3 years, more 
than one-third of the growth of the 
Japanese economy has been as a result 
of the expansion of net exports rather 
than increases in domestic demand. 
Japan's current account surplus has 
risen from 0.5% of GNP in 1981 to near- 
ly 4% last year. And the United States 
has been the principal recipient of in- 
creased Japanese exports. We want the 
Japanese to reduce their reliance on 
trade surpluses for economic growth by 
increased domestic economic opportu- 
nities. 

Further convergence of economic 
performance is the logical complement 
to our efforts at reducing Federal budg- 
et deficits. Taken together these actions 
would increase demand for our exports 
and help assure that our economy would 
continue on a steady growth path even 
as Federal budget and trade deficits 
shrink. 

Finally, management of the debt 
problems of a number of less developed 
countries (LDCs) can play a significant 
role in complementing U.S. action to 
reduce its trade deficit. Initially, many 
LDCs reacted to large foreign debt obli- 
gations and reduced foreign credit avail- 
ability by increasing protectionist and 
distortive trade pohcies. These com- 
pounded other market distortive domes- 
tic policies which were already in place 



edji 
I 



when the debt crisis arose. The result 
has been injury to the long-temi growtl 
performance of these countries and con- 
tinued reticence of private lenders and 
investors to increase their participation 
in the economies of high-debt LDCs. 

Many of the debtor nations have 
adopted measures to constrict domestic 
demand and initiate economic adjust- 
ment. Progress on the macroeconomic 
side must now be consolidated, with 
greater emphasis placed on structural 
measures to sustain growth. Some rela;. 
ation in trade restrictions has occurre 
Policies to fully implement trade and 
vestment liberalization and reform as al 
part of those programs will encourage 
growth and international trade. 

Recognizing the macroeconomic com 
tribution to our current trade deficit an 
the need for greater international coor- 
dination in correcting the global trade 
and payments imbalance, the Adminis- 
tration has taken a number of correctiv 
actions in recent months. 

First, the President's budget for F" 
1987 meets the deficit reduction target 
set out in Gramm-Rudman-HoUings. In 
doing so, it can contribute to the reduc 
tion of the U.S. trade deficit. I urge " 
your support for the President's budge H 
and final completion of work this year ■' 
on tax reform along the lines of the 
President's proposal. 

Internationally, the Administration 
has strengthened macroeconomic policy I 
coordination with other major economie 
through the September G-5 agreement ' 
The exchange rate of the dollar vis-a-vi ' 
other major currencies has been moder'' 
ating since March 1985. The September' ^ 
agreement basically fosters the adjust- '■' 
ments to domestic macroeconomic poll- 1*' 
cies which would reinforce the ''1 

strengthening of foreign currencies and ' - 
lay the groundwork for reduction of th(|' 
U.S. trade deficit. Actions taken to j^i 
stimulate the expansion of domestic de-i ' 
mand in Japan and economic growth in ' '; 
Europe are now being complemented b; I ^i 
much reduced oil-import prices. Our \'-'< 
part of that agreement is to substantial 
ly lower our Federal budget deficits. If 
the macroeconomic pieces can all be 
brought into place with the added 
benefit of lower oil prices and interest 
rates, the outlook becomes good indeed 
for lowering the U.S. trade deficit in t\ 
context of an expanding U.S. and work 
economy. 

Declining oil prices have also had a 
major impact on high-debt LDCs, help- 
ing countries like Brazil, hurting coun- 



68 



Department of State Bulleii 



EUROPE 



es like Mexico. Secretary [of the 
easury] Baker's plan for LDC debt 
justment has emphasized strength- 
ed economic growth policies in those 
antries and gi-eater public and private 
iding and investing to facilitate their 
:overy. 

Some have expressed dismay in not 
Bing a rapid improvement in the U.S. 
.de deficit following the moderation of 
! dollar's value. There is an important 
isideration to bear in mind on this 
nt. Following a currency deprecia- 
n, so-called J-curve effects result in a 
ion's trade balance temporarily wor- 
dng before substantially improving, 
e reasons are well known. The cur- 
icy depreciation quickly raises the 
ce of imports while export prices are 
. unaffected, thus increasing the del- 
value of the deficit. Over the course 
B year to a year and a half, con- 
fers and business begin to react to 
price changes. In our case, demand 
imports will moderate while foreign 
fiand for our exports will strengthen. 
;h time these real volume changes 
. overcome the original price effects 
he depreciation, and our trade 
mce will improve. Because of these 
|i, I would not expect to see improve- 
lit in the trade balance until later 
1 year, probably too late to signifi- 
Jtly change the 1986 totals from 1985. 
We in the U.S. Trade Representa- 
■■•'s office have had splendid coopera- 
(j from other government agencies in 
f trade policy endeavors and from the 
j'vant congressional committees as 
'il. The United States now has what I 
eeve to be a coherent, comprehensive 
•■le policy and trade strategy, 
kertheless, our trade problems, and 
1 political strains which accompany 
m, are by no means behind us. Presi- 
et Reagan and I look forward to 
'•king with you in our common desire 
) nsure that American and foreign 
r;is play by the same rules in interna- 
Cal trade and reap the benefits of a 
'( and fair trade policy. 

The complete transcript of the hearings 
ibe published by the committee and will 
fryailable from the Superintendent of 
iciiments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
^hington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



The CSCE Process 

and East-West Diplomacy 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Statement before the Commission on 
Security mid Cooperation in Europe on 
March 25. 1986. Ambassador Armacost 
is Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs.'^ 

I welcome this opportunity today to 
meet with the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe^ to discuss 
the Administration's approach to CSCE 
[Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe]— the "Helsinki" process. 

The hearings held by the Commis- 
sion on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe are important. They focus atten- 
tion on the contribution that improved 
respect for human rights in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe would make 
to overall East-West relations. We wel- 
come the commission's sustained work 
over the past decade— and the efforts of 
concerned private American groups- to 
promote the goals of the Helsinki Final 
Act. Through your hearings, resolutions, 
participation on U.S. delegations, and 
research and publications, the commis- 
sion and its staff have worked vigor- 
ously and served the interests of the 
United States well. We look forward to 
continuing this close and productive 
relationship as we prepare for CSCE 
meetings in Bern next month and in 
Vienna in November. 

In your letter of invitation, you 
asked that I put the CDE [Conference 
on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe] 
negotiations in Stockholm and other ele- 
ments of the CSCE process into per- 
spective and provide an assessment of 
the prospects for the Vienna review 
meeting and beyond. Let me begin with 
an overview that describes our assess- 
ment of the process, outlines our ap- 
proach, and then looks ahead, mainly to 
the Bern and Vienna meetings. [Head of 
the U.S. delegation to the CDE] Ambas- 
sador Robert Barry will address more 
specifically the prospects of the CDE. 

Assessing the CSCE Process 

The Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
represents a framework within which 
the 35 participating states can work to 



resolve the humanitarian, economic, and 
security issues that divide Europe. The 
Final Act underscores that each of these 
areas is of equal importance to genuine 
security and cooperation. The Western 
objective for the past decade has been 
to preserve and strengthen this process 
through thorough review of implementa- 
tion of the Final Act and by agreement 
on balanced and constructive steps 
forward. 

At the 10th anniversary commemo- 
ration of the Final Act, attended by 35 
foreign ministers last summer in Hel- 
sinki, Secretary Shultz assessed the 
CSCE process. Although the reality of 
Europe's division remained, he noted, 
we have seen limited progress. The 
Final Act has had some practical effect. 
For example, journalists travel more 
easily between CSCE countries. Signifi- 
cant numbers of citizens in some East 
European countries have been reunited 
with their families in the West. And tlie 
review conferences in Belgrade and 
Madrid as well as other CSCE meetings 
have kept alive the aspirations embod- 
ied in the Final Act. 

In summing up our assessment, 
however, Secretary Shultz concluded 
that: 

... 10 years after the signing of the Fi- 
nal Act, no one can deny the gap between 
hope and performance. Despite the real value 
of the Final Act as a standard of conduct, the 
most important promises of a decade ago 
have not been kept. 

There is no need to recite the basis 
for this conclusion. The record of compli- 
ance of the Warsaw Pact nations with 
their CSCE undertakings is seriously 
flawed. 

• The number of Soviet Jews per- 
mitted to emigrate fell from 51,000 in 
1979 to somewhat over 1,000 last year. 
And we have seen similar reductions in 
the number of Armenian and ethnic 
German emigrants. 

• While recent Soviet decisions to 
permit 33 families to be reunited in the 
West are welcome, we cannot forget 
that there are many others who remain 
separated from their families. 

• The Soviet Union continues to im- 
prison its citizens who speak out on hu- 
man rights. 



1i 1986 



69 



EUROPE 



• Andrei Sakhai-ov remains isolated 
in Gorkiy, although his wife has been 
permitted to travel abroad for medical 
treatment. 

• Several religious groups are per- 
secuted in Romania, religious leaders 
are imprisoned, and churches are demo- 
lished. 

• In Poland, Bogdan Lis, Adam 
Michnik, and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk have 
been sentenced to prison terms for 
championing free trade unions. 

• In Czechoslovakia, the regime se- 
verely restricts the Catholic Church and 
has been especially active in suppressing 
religious dissent within the Charter '77 
movement. 

• In Bulgaria, the government has 
attempted to deprive almost 10% of its 
people— the Turkish minority— of its eth- 
nic heritage. 

• And despite a generally favorable 
human rights record, in Hungary there 
is continued harassment of dissidents. 

This mixed record has led some to 
express understandable skepticism over 
the value of continued involvement in 
the CSCE process. We share those frus- 
trations. We believe, however, that we 
must keep faith with those who struggle 
to realize the goals of Helsinki. That is 
why, on the 10th anniversary of the 
Final Act last summer. President Rea- 
gan reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to 
the Helsinki principles and our dedica- 
tion to giving them meaning in the daily 
lives of all citizens whose governments 
signed the Final Act. 

Let me discuss the three basic con- 
siderations that lead us to view the 
CSCE process as a valuable instrument 
of Western diplomacy, despite the disap- 
pointments of its first decade. 

Supporting the Western Agenda 

First, it is clear that the Helsinki Final 
Act serves as a vehicle to marshal sup- 
port for a fundamentally Western agen- 
da. The Soviet Union sought to legalize 
the division of Europe, but the Final 
Act looks toward its peaceful unification. 
The East wanted to highlight the cen- 
tral role of the state, but the Final Act 
stresses individual rights and freedom. 
The Final Act asserted that respect for 
human rights was a fundamental ele- 
ment of genuine security and coopera- 
tion; it confirmed that a government's 
abuse of its own citizens was a legiti- 
mate subject for international discus- 
sion. Far from giving the Soviet Union 
a lever on Western Europe, the CSCE 



process confirmed the continuing 
engagement of the United States in 
Europe. 

The CSCE process has, thus, served 
to foster and reinforce alliance unity. In 
turn, alliance unity— insisting on compli- 
ance with CSCE undertakings and 
balance between security and human 
rights goals— has been essential to the 
limited progress we have made in 
CSCE. 

And I should add that the NATO al- 
liance has not stood alone in pushing for 
both balance and for progress in human 
rights. Our neutral friends have found 
that in CSCE they can play a special 
role. Their neutral credentials remain 
untarnished. But fi-om the beginning in 
CSCE they have pushed for Soviet ad- 
herence to the commitments undertaken 
in Madrid and Helsinki. 

International Conduct and 
Human Rights Standards 

The second area where the Final Act 
plays a significant role in our East- West 
diplomacy relates to the standards it set 
for the conduct of individual govern- 
ments toward each other and toward 
their ovm citizens. In Helsinki, the 
United States, Canada, and 33 Europe- 
an states agreed to observe 10 basic 
principles in their relations with one 
another, as well as with other states. 
We can cite no evidence that this has 
significantly altered Soviet behavior. 
But these principles have given a solid 
framework for Western arguments con- 
cerning that behavior. 

A number of the principles— respect 
for sovereignty, non-use of force, nonin- 
tervention in internal affairs, equal 
rights and self-determination of 
peoples— have increased the impact of 
Western condemnation of the Soviet in- 
vasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and of 
Soviet pressure on Poland in the early 
1980s. The CSCE process helped focus 
the world's outrage at the unlawful 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, partic- 
ularly during the opening weeks of the 
Madrid review conference. Similarly, the 
strong Western response in CSCE to 
the imposition of martial law in Poland 
drew international attention to Soviet 
actions that contradicted its Helsinski 
obligations. 

It is in the area of human rights 
standards that CSCE has played a par- 
ticularly significant role. The Final Act 
is based on the view that the interests 
of individual human beings are a fun- 
damental part of security and stability 
in Europe. Greater security and a more 



stable peace depend on greater freedmi 
for the people of Europe. 

At Helsinki in 1975, the Soviet 
Union and other East European couii 
tries willingly subscribed to principUs 
affirming basic human rights and to pn 
visions calling for freer flow of ideas, ii 
formation, and people. These provision; 
were strengthened in the 1983 Madiid 
Concluding Document. These two docu 
ments added legitimacy to intematiiuia 
discussion of the way a government 
treats its citizens. Coupled with a 
process of followup meetings, the Final 
Act gives the West a vehicle for keep- |: 
ing the pressure on Eastern govern- 
ments for improvements in human 
rights performance. ||i 

One can only speculate on the moti 
vations of the Soviet Union and other |( 
East European governments in signing! 
the Final Act. If they thought their 
commitments would be ignored— they 
were wrong. 

For years the Soviets sought to 
deflect human rights criticism by hidin. 
behind "noninterference in internal af- 
fairs." The hoUovraess of this defense, |t 
however, has been exposed at succes- jj 
sive CSCE meetings during which the 
Soviets have been forced to confront tl 
facts of their poor record. At the CSCl ! 
Human Rights Experts Meeting in * 
Ottawa, the Soviets changed tactics an " 
took the offensive, charging Western ■ 
abuses of social and economic rights. 
This change of tactic implicitly concede 
the legitimacy of raising human rights 
issues involving another country. And i 
testified to the growing force of intern! ' 
tional concern over human rights, a ' 
trend that the Final Act has nourished 

The Final Act has helped bring 
greater international attention to the 
cause of human rights. By signing the J 
Final Act, the Soviet Union created tb' ■ 
expectation that it would comply, mak-'' 
ing its failures to do so all the more |'' 
troubling, not only in the United Stated j 
but in Europe as well. In the United i{. 
States, the Final Act gave rise to the j>. 
CSCE Commission and provided a focui ; 
for the network of private organization j 
which have pressed for improved re- i(, 
spect for human rights. The existence (|ij 
agreed standards has also encouraged 
other Western governments to speak u 
against human rights abuses. And it ha 
provided a focal point for efforts by 
European parliaments and private 
gi'oups. 



From the 1977 Belgrade review cor| 
ference to the recent Budapest Cultura 
Forum, expressions of Western concen , 



\\ 



70 



Department of State Bulleii 



EUROPE 



er Soviet abuses have become increas- 
rly frequent and specific. During 
■neral Secretai-y Gorbachev's visit to 
ris, for example, President Mitterrand 
3orted to the French people that he 
d insisted that movement in "Basl<et 
ree" [Cooperation in Humanitarian 
id Other Fields] of the Final Act take 
Ice at the same pace as in the other 
^as of CSCE. And French journalists 
tik Gorbachev to task for Soviet 
lure to live up to the standards en- 
rined in the Final Act. 
•■ The Soviets, moreover, have shown 
^mselves sensitive to such criticism, 
kicularly when it adversely affects 
I image Moscow wants to cultivate in 
istem Europe. 

I The CSCE experts meeting in Otta- 
last year, where I had the privilege 
ieliver the opening statement for the 
ited States, illustrates well the diplo- 
ic value of the CSCE process. Soviet 
•ansigenee and refusal to commit it- 
' to any improvements in its human 
its practices blocked agreement on 
mingful, practical steps forward, 
fertheless, the meeting was worth- 
le and advanced our objectives. 

• It gave us nearly 3 weeks to de- 
i^ Soviet adherence to the commit- 
'Its in the Final Act. The West, both 
I allies and our neutral friends, put 

I Soviets and other East Europeans 
he dock for human rights abuses. 
t East was effectively isolated. 

• The West rejected initial Eastern 
ms that criticism constituted interfer- 
1' in the internal affairs of another 

ie. 

• The West held firm in rejecting 
)et efforts to distort Principle Seven 
'le Final Act dealing with human 
Jts. Instead, the Western states 

bd a set of specific proposals that 
itituted a common human rights 
;i[da for the future. 

n sum, Ottawa gave the West an 
ijirtunity to sound a united call for 
i]-oved respect for human rights in 
cEast. 

Ve regret that the Ottawa meeting, 
:ithf CSCE process as a whole, has 
' lone more to enhance the prospect 

lort-term improvement for individu- 
i 1 the Soviet Union and Eastern 
i)pe. But such meetings and the in- 
Htiiinal attention they focus on hu- 
1 ritrhts issues do advance the cause. 
I'faet that attention is paid to their 
it provides comfort, if not hope, to 
Bitizens of the Soviet Union and 
uem Europe. And most of those in 



Eastern Europe active in the struggle 
for human rights support the CSCE 
process. They welcome our emphasis on 
the commitments in the Final Act and 
our effort to bring about improved 
Eastern compliance. 

It is undeniable that the CSCE 
process, more than any other forum, has 
served to focus the world's attention on 
massive Soviet human rights violations. 
And in doing so, the CSCE process has 
sei-ved to expose the nature of Soviet 
power and promote the cause of free- 
dom around the world. 

The meeting on human contacts in 
Bern that begins in April will focus at- 
tention on such important CSCE issues 
as freedom to travel, freedom to emi- 
grate, and family reunification. As 
Michael Novak, the head of our Bem 
delegation, testified before you last 
week, it is our hope that this meeting 
will mark an advance toward lowering 
the barriers that divide the peoples and 
families of the East and West. We hope 
the spirit of cooperation on humanitari- 
an affairs which emerged from Presi- 
dent Reagan's Geneva meeting with 
General Secretary Gorbachev will be 
given a new reality through concrete 
deeds. Steps forward on such issues 
would make an important contribution 
to the Vienna foUowup meeting later 
this year. 

European Security Issues 

Security is the third area in which the 
CSCE process plays an important role 
in our overall East- West policy. Far 
from fulfilling Soviet aims to diminish 
our role in European security affairs, 
CSCE provided a forum which engaged 
the United States and Canada, together 
with European governments, in a dis- 
cussion of the basic questions of Europe- 
an security. 

At the Madrid followup meeting, the 
West secured a mandate for the Confer- 
ence on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe that serves our interests. The 
mandate recognized explicitly that the 
CDE was an integral part of the CSCE 
process, expanded the zone defined in 
the Final Act to cover the Soviet Union 
west of the Urals, and stipulated that 
the measures adopted should have mili- 
tary significance and be verifiable. 

At the CDE conference, we have an 
opportunity to find concrete ways to in- 
crease confidence and security in Eu- 
rope. NATO is pushing for adoption of 
specific confidence- and security-building 



measures that address some of the prox- 
imate causes of war. They would make 
European military activities more 
predictable and more stable. Through 
skillful negotiation over the past 2 
years, the West has prevented the 
Soviets from turning Stockholm into a 
forum for empty, propagandistic declara- 
tions that support their vision of a pan- 
European security order excluding the 
United States. 

The growing consensus in Stockholm 
is based on the Western concept of secu- 
rity. It features practical measures 
which would increase our knowledge of 
potentially threatening military activi- 
ties. And these measures would be veri- 
fiable by every state participating in the 
conference. 

With the setting of a September 19, 
1986, adjournment date and the recent 
move to drafting, the conference has 
now moved into a more intensive phase. 
President Reagan and General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev at their meeting last 
November made a political commitment 
to work with others for a successful con- 
clusion in Stockholm. The U.S. delega- 
tion has been instructed to pursue 
concrete results at the negotiating table. 

An agreement in Stockholm that 
met our objectives would sei-ve the 
West's security interests by providing a 
set of concrete rules governing military 
activities in Europe. Through the ex- 
change of information about forces in 
Europe and an annual calendar of 
planned activities, we would be able to 
increase mutual understanding about in- 
tentions behind those activities. This 
would provide greater openness and 
improved mutual understanding about 
military intentions and practices— con- 
tributing to enhanced stabiUty and secu- 
rity in Europe. 

If successful, the Stockholm confer- 
ence can help achieve the primai-y goal 
of the CSCE process— lowering the bar- 
riers that artificially divide Europe be- 
tween East and West. 

These various strands of the CSCE 
process are tied together by the concept 
of balance. This concept is founded on 
recognition, inherent in the Final Act it- 
self, of the interdependence among the 
three parts of the CSCE process— human- 
itarian, security, and economic. Military- 
security aspects cannot be dealt with 
productively if they are isolated from 
humanitarian and human rights con- 
siderations. Thus, for example, we have 
countered vigorously Eastern attempts 
to establish a military-security forum as 
an autonomous entity, overshadowing 
our efforts to improve human rights and 
human contacts. 



1986 



71 



EUROPE 



U.S. Commitment and 
the Challenge Ahead 

We are committed to balanced progress 
across the board. We insist on moving 
ahead in all areas because we believe all 
10 principles are equally important. At 
the same time, there is no ready formu- 
la for the application of balance. It is 
not a mechanical concept. It is unrealis- 
tic to posit a fixed linkage between 
security and human rights. The trade- 
offs cannot be put in such simple terms. 

And yet, it is also unrealistic to be- 
lieve that real and enduring improve- 
ment can take place in East- West 
relations without progress on humanitar- 
ian and human rights issues. 

To quote French Foreign Minister 
Dumas: "Can a state which is not at 
peace with its own citizens really gain 
the confidence of its neighbors?" Con- 
crete steps in this area would go far 
toward restoring the political confidence 
and political support for constructive 
progress in CSCE. 

Balance is the challenge for the 
Vienna followup meeting that begins 
November 4. The delegations at Vienna 
will have to weigh what has been 
achieved on human rights and human 
contacts, on cultural and economic 
cooperation, and on security. They will 
have to look at the results of the 
Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting, 
the Budapest Cultural Forum, and the 
upcoming Bern Human Contacts Meet- 
ing. The question of the future of CDE 
uill be part of this overall assessment. 
Even if the CDE is successful, we must 
be careful to ensure that the security 
component is not allowed to dominate 
other aspects of the CSCE process. 

In addition to maintaining balance, 
the West faces two other basic tasks at 
Vienna. 

• The first is to maintain Western 
unity. The Soviet Union never tires of 
seeking ways to exploit the CSCE 
process to drive wedges between us and 
our allies. If we are to make progress 
on issues of importance to us, we must 
present a united front. 

• Second, we must take stock fully 
and candidly of the extent to which com- 
mitments have been kept and the extent 
to which governments have fallen short. 
Vienna must establish a clear record. 
Governments must be made to account 
for their commitments. 

Given the Eastern record on hu- 
manitarian and human rights issues, the 
Vienna followup meeting is likely to be 
a difficult conference. Progress on hu- 



72 



manitarian and human rights issues in 
the months ahead would certainly en- 
hance the prospects for a constructive 
outcome, which we would welcome. 

We are at an early stage in our own 
planning for the Vienna meeting. We 
look forward to working closely with the 
commission in the months ahead on the 
issues we will confront in Vienna. As in 
Madrid, we will lean heavily on your 
skills, expertise, and judgment. 

The Helsinki Final Act 10 years ago 
set an agenda for progress toward 
greater security and a more stable 
peace in Europe. It evoked a vision of a 
united Europe in which barriers were 
removed and freedoms were enjoyed 
throughout the continent, a Europe in 
which dialogue rather than conflict 
resolved differences and cooperation 
benefited individuals in both the West 
and the East. 

That is the vision that will inform 
our approach to Vienna and beyond. The 
disappointments of the past decade indi- 
cate there are no easy strategies for 
achieving the ambitious goals set forth 
in the Final Act. Patience, skillful 
diplomacy, Western unity, and the 
courage of our convictions will be re- 
quired. 

In closing, let me recall President 
Reagan's statement on the close of the 
last review conference 3 years ago: 



t! 

In concluding the Madrid meeting, we 
reaffirm our commitment to the Helsinki 
process. We will not flag in our continued d« 
termination to work with all governments 
and peoples whose goal is the strengthening 
of peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, 
dialogue, when based on realistic expecta- 
tions and conducted with patience, can 
produce results. These results are often 
gradual and hard won, but they are the 
necessary building blocks for a more secure 
and stable world. . . . Giving substance to th 
promises of Madrid and Helsinki will remaii 
one of our prime objectives. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings; 
will be published by the committee and wuli 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offid 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 

'The U.S. Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe was established by 
the Congress in 1976. It is composed of nin« 
Senators, nine Congressmen, and one repra 
sentative each from the Departments of 
State, Defense, and Commerce. The commit 
sion monitors the acts of the CSCE signato 
states, with a particular emphasis on their 
compliance with the humanitarian provision 
of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid ci 
eluding document. It also seeks to encouraji 
the development of activities that expand 
East- West economic cooperation and a 
greater interchange of people and ideas be- 
tween East and West. ■ 



U.S. Assistance in Support 
of Anglo-Irish Agreement 
on Northern Ireland 



by Rozanne L. Ridgway 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 5, 1986. Ambassador Ridgway is 
Assistant Secretary for European and 
Canadian Affairs.^ 

It is a pleasure to be here to discuss the 
Administration's proposal in support of 
the British and Irish Governments' 
agreement on Northern Ireland. 

Americans have long been deeply 
concerned about the tragic situation in 
Northern Ireland. In recent years we 
have seen the people of that region 
suffering from a seemingly unbreakable 
chain of violence and economic depriva- 



i 



m 



tion, in great measure due to decades • fj 
mistrust, fear, and even outright hatre 
between members of the Nationalist ai 
Unionist traditions. 

Over the years some have said tha 
the United States should have become 
directly involved in helping to end thit 
cycle of despair. The Reagan Adminis- 
tration has taken the same position as 
previous administrations: that it is not 
for the United States to chart a coursi 
for the people of Northern Ireland. Th 
U.S. Government position has not 
reflected any lack of concern about 
Northern Ireland, but rather our belie 
that those most directly involved shou i 
decide questions which would affect thi 
future of the people in Northern 
Ireland— not the United States. 



k 



Department of State Bulle 



EUROPE 



Several years ago, the British and 
sh Governments courageously 
ibarked upon a difficult but vitally 
portant process, aimed at reducing 
Tie of the bitter divisions in Northern 
iland so that the aspiration of both 
.ditions for a future free from vio- 
ce, and economic and political 
spair, could be realized. Over several 
irs, the British and Irish Govem- 
nts have held discussions about 
rthern Ii-eland. We wei-e not involved 
any of these discussions, but as the 
le went by, we were increasingly 
ased to hear that these two friends of 

United States were making signifi- 
t progress in reaching an accommo- 
iion of views and concerns which 
Id fairly represent the best interests 
,11 the people in Northern Ireland. 

The British and Irish Governments' 

1'eement of November 15, 1985, is 
y a credit to the courage and deter- 
lation of both governments to over- 
le heavy and negative legacies of his- 
I in that region. While the road 
ad to genuine, longlasting peace in 
■them Ireland remains fi-agile and 
icult, this agreement deserves full 
J)gnition and support as a meaningful 
» toward strengthening shared 
rests of all in Northern Ireland for a 
;er future there. President Reagan 
1 the congressional leadership hailed 

I agreement as providing a "frame- 
(k for peace" and "an important step 
lard reconciliation." They also indi- 

i fl their consensus for the idea of 

■ iiliiig tangible U.S. assistance to 
:'niistrate the seriousness of our sen- 
fnls and concrete support for 

iro\ ement of social and economic con- 
t)ns which have fed the violence. 
A.S their principal new vehicle to 
r^ide for economic reconstruction of 
(jthern Ireland and affected areas of 
i^Republic of Ireland, the British and 

II propose to establish an intenia- 

- il fund to which the United States 
1' other countries might contribute, 
'•understand that others, such as the 
iiJl)ean Community (EC) and individ- 
ililC countries, as well as countries 
i' sitniificant cultural and historical 
Mil Ireland and the United Kingdom 

■ ji'in this effort. In recent discus- 
0^, i^ritish and Irish officials have 

) d that the principal objective of the 
f I'Sfd fund would be to stimulate 
iiiniic revitaUzation in order to pro- 
( ■ employment and thereby attack an 
ilTtant cause of the historic instabil- 
n Northern Ireland. The two 
Wrnments have agreed that approxi- 



mately 75% of the fund would be 
directed to Northeni Ireland, while the 
remainder would be applied to those 
areas of the Republic of Ireland most 
affected by the troubles. 

In devising our proposed tangible 
contribution to reconciliation in North- 
em Ireland, we have given a high pri- 
ority to a cash contribution to the 
"international fund" to give clear, tangi- 
ble support to this new joint undertak- 
ing of the two govemments. We hope 
that this U.S. commitment will inspire 
other friends of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom to make similar contributions 
to the fund. 

At the same time, the Administra- 
tion considered that an approach which 
would combine a direct U.S. Govem- 
ment contribution to the fund with other 
existing U.S. Government-financed 
mechanisms could have the most 
immediate and effective overall impact 
on the Northern Ireland economy. Just 
as the process of reconciliation, of heal- 
ing the social wounds caused by years of 
distrust and lack of communication, can- 
not be healed by the stroke of a pen, so, 
too, the economic stagnation of the 
Northern Ireland economy cannot be 
remedied by quick infusions of cash 
alone. Northern Ireland's need for eco- 
nomic revitalization and long-term eco- 
nomic stability requires that a process 
be set in motion to elicit and to stimu- 



late activity and commitment by the pri- 
vate sector. Existing U.S. Govemment- 
financed mechanisms can contribute to 
meeting this need through investment, 
trade promotion, and guaranty programs 
oriented toward the private sector. 
Therefore these kinds of contributions 
compiise over half of the proposed U.S. 
program. Some of these mechanisms 
would take several months to become 
operational, others would be operational 
immediately following conclusion of the 
legislative process. These investment, 
trade, and guaranty programs provide 
inherently prompt and independent 
stimulus to the Northem Ireland econ- 
omy. They are also not necessarily 
dependent on activities or contributions 
of others, as is our proposed cash contri- 
bution to the fund, whose final size and 
diversity will ultimately affect its 
effectiveness. 

My colleague, Mr. [Charles W.] 
Greenleaf [AID Assistant Administrator 
of Asia and the Near East], will be dis- 
cussing the specific objectives and 
characteristics of these programs in a 
few minutes. I would like to note, in 
concluding, a concem which faces us all, 
you as elected Members of Congress, 
ourselves as Administration officials, 
and all of us as taxpayers. As we debate 
how to best support this effort by the 
British and Irish Govemments to pro- 
mote reconciliation in Northem Ireland, 



Northern Ireland 
and Ireland Assistance Legislation 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 4, 1986' 

1 transmit herewith for the consideration of 
the Congress proposed legislation, entitled 
the "Northem Ireland and Ireland 
Assistance Act of 1986," to provide support 
of the United States to the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement on Northem Ireland. 

This legislative proposal calls for a 5-year 
program of $250 million that would be taken 
from a number of existing economic programs 
including Housing Guarantees and the Pri- 
vate Sector Revolving Fund, which are 
administered by the by the Agency for Inter- 
national Development Corporation, the 
investment insurance program of the Over- 
seas Private Investment Corporation, and the 
Trade and Development Program. 

In addition, the authorization of $20 million 
for the Economic Support Fund for 1987 is 
proposed, which will be within the total 
amount for that fund currently requested in 
the 1987 Budget. This would provide a cash 



contribution to an international economic 
development fund for Northem Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland under the auspices of 
the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. A 
supplemental appropriation request for 1986 
for an initial contribution to this Anglo-Irish 
fund is concurrently being transmitted to the 
Congress. 

I urge the Congi-ess to act without delay 
on this important legislation. 1 am confident 
our efforts, together with those of the 
Govemments of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, will help to promote economic and 
social development in Ireland, thereby con- 
structing a durable framework that would 
provide a promise of peace for the people of 
Northem Ireland. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1986. 



3 1986 



73 



EUROPE 



our concern must be how to accomplish 
as much as we can for this part of the 
world, from which the forefathers of 
over 40 million Americans came, within 
the context of present severe U.S. 
budget stringencies. Our common 
responsibilities require that we max- 
imize the results from each dollar spent. 
I think that the progi-am the Adminis- 
tration is proposing meets this objective 
by its emphasis on incentives, by its 
challenges to the private sector and by 
the probable multiplication factor for the 
amounts of U.S. Government financing 
included. Our proposed program pro- 
vides a very effective and comprehen- 
sive response to the needs of the people 
of Northern Ireland and affected areas 
of the Republic of Ireland, and to the 
joint efforts of the British and Irish 
Governments to promote reconciliation 
in part through a more stable economic 
environment in the area. 



St. Patrick's Day, 1986 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 17, 19861 

St. Patrick's Day is a time for joy and 
celebration, a day we recognize the 
many achievements, sung and unsung, 
of the Irish men and women who have 
made this a better and happier world. 
Today we remember especially the 
immigrants who came to these shores to 
make a new beginning. Some of them 
were so poor they left their homeland 
with little more than the clothes on 
their backs. But they brought with them 
something more valuable— their hopes 
and dreams, their love of liberty, and 
their unconquerable spirit. 

St. Patrick's Day is also a time for 
reflecting on life today on the Emerald 
Isle, the ancestral home of over 40 mil- 
lion Americans. In the last two decades, 
the northern part of the island has been 
wracked by senseless violence. Political 
and religious differences, exacerbated by 
unfavorable economic conditions, have 
resulted in the wanton murder of hun- 
dreds of men, women, and childi-en and 
the terrorizing of an entire population. 

But on this St. Patrick's Day, we 
can all be grateful that a ray of hope 
has begun to shine. In a courageous 
move, the Prime Ministers of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom decided the 
time had come to give new impetus to 
the search for peace in Northern Ire- 
land. Out of their discussions emerged a 
new approach in which the British and 
Irish Governments jointly committed 
themselves to reconciliation between 
Northern Ireland's two communities. 




This Anglo-Irish accord, signed by 
Prime Ministers Thatcher and Fitz- 
Gerald on November 15th last year and 
quickly ratified by their Parliaments, n 
has received an enthusiastic bipartisan r 
reception in the U.S. Congress. We are' 
now working with Congress to find waj 
in which the United States can help. ' 

In detei-mining the nature of any 
U.S. Government aid, we must bear in f 
mind that the agenda and timetable for 
progress in that troubled area are not I' 
for us to set. Those directly concerned, 
the people of both Irish traditions, will ■i 
chart the course which will, we pray, 
lead to reconciliation in that troubled 
land. 

Concerned Americans can do two 
important things to help make reconcili '^ 
ation a reality. ^ 

First, the key to progress in North ^ 
em Ireland and in the Republic is a 
strong, growing economy— and if Amer 
cans remember Ireland as we plan our ji 
travel and consider investments, we ca | 
make a contribution to Irish economic l 
growth. f 

Second, Americans should not give ' 
either financial or moral support to Irii ' 
terrorists, any Irish terrorists. Such . 
support is misguided. We cannot permi ^ 
individuals, for their own evil ends, to 
snuff out hope by the use of violence. 

On this St. Patrick's Day, let all 
Americans and people of good will 
everywhere honor the Irish by helping 
them build a peaceful and prosperous ''''■ 
future. 'J; 

The people of America and Ireland ,~! 
have long held each other in high j,; 

esteem. We hold a special place in eacl 
other's hearts. And on this very speiia 
St. Patrick's Day, we extend to all ouri', 
greetings and good will. K 



•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 24, 1986. M[\< 



While in the United States on a private 
visit. Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald o'^J 
the Republic of Ireland paid a courtesy 
on President Reagan on March 17, 1986 

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick) 



'•I 



74 



Department of State Bullej 



EUROPE 



ATO Nuclear Planning Group 
eets in West Germany 



The Nuclear Planning Group of the 
•th Atlantic Treaty Organization 
[T0> met in Wuerzburg, Federal 
mblic of Germany, March 20-21, 
5. The United States was represented 
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
nherger. Following is the final com- 
lique issued on March 21. 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
in ministerial session in Wuerzburg, Fed- 
Republic of Germanv, on 20th and 21st 
:h, 1986. 

Ve discussed a wide range of security 
ers. including briefings by the United 
3s on the status of nuclear forces and 
ed issues. We received with appreciation 
efing on the nuclear forces of the United 
dom and welcomed the contribution 
." forces make to the overall credibility of 
Mliance's deterrent capabilities. We ex- 
sed our continued support for the efforts 
B United States and the United King- 
tto maintain the effectiveness of their 
ar deterrent forces, 
^e expressed our satisfaction vrith the 
consultation on the negotiations in 
va. We welcomed the commitment by 
Jnited States and the Soviet Union to 
early progress at the Nuclear and Space 
, in particular where there is common 
id, including the principle of 50-percent 
tion in the strategic nuclear aiTns of the 
■d States and the Soviet Union appropri- 
applied, and the idea of a separate INF 
mediate-range nuclear forces] agree- 
At the same time, we strongly en- 
d the commitment made at the Geneva 
it to agree on the need for measures 
fective verification as part of any arms 
)1 agreements. We expressed strong 
rt for the United States stance concem- 
termediate-range, strategic, and defense 
jace systems. We also reviewed the 
iations on INF systems and confmned 
ill support for the United States 
sal. This proposal, developed in close 
Itation with the Allies, calls for the 
elimination of United States and 
longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles, 
panied by other appropriate provisions 
■ning rights and constraints on shorter- 
INF (SRINF) missiles. 
e United States secretary' of defense 
in updated account of evidence of con- 
X Soviet violations of arms control 
nents, including that relating to the 
iolations disclosed in the United States 
ent's December 1985 report to Con- 
in particular the deployment of the 
SS-25 intercontinental ballistic mis- 
'e expressed our continuing concern 
newed our call on the Soviet leadership 
the steps necessary to ensure full 



compliance with its commitments. We noted 
in this connection that a double standard of 
compliance with arms control agreements 
would be unacceptable and would undermine 
the security of the Alliance. In this context, 
we reaffinned the essential requirement for 
full compliance with all amis control agree- 
ments. 

We reviewed Alliance policy and planning 
related to NATO's nuclear forces and recon- 
firmed our commitment to maintain a credi- 
ble deterrent postui-e in view of the con- 
tinued qualitative and quantitiative advances 
in Soviet forces which far exceed their 
defense requirements. We remain deeply con- 
cerned about continuing Soviet efforts to 
upgrade and expand theii- nuclear capabilities 
across the board, including the deployment of 
SS-23 shorter-range INF missiles, flight- 
testing of an improved version of the SS-20, 
and the continued development of long-range 
ciniise missile systems. 

In contrast, it is NATO's policy to main- 
tain only the minimum number of nuclear 
weapons necessary for deterrence. In addi- 
tion to the 1,000 nuclear weapons withdrawn 
from NATO following the 1979 dual-track 
decision, NATO decided at Montebello in 
1983 to reduce further its nuclear stockpile in 
Europe by 1,400 warheads while taking 
appropriate measui-es to improve the respon- 
siveness, effectiveness, and sui-vivability of 



the remaining warheads and their delivery 
systems. Furthermore, we recalled that, for 
each LRINF missile deployed, one warhead 
is being removed from Europe. Altogether, 
these measures will bring the number of 
nuclear warheads in the Allied stockpile in 
Europe to the lowest point in 20 years. At 
this meeting, SACEUR [Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe] reported on the status 
of the implementation of the Montebello deci- 
sion. We noted the reductions and improve- 
ment measures which are currently being 
undertaken by the nations concerned. We 
shall continue to review the progress of fur- 
ther implementations. 

We noted the progress made on longer- 
range INF deployments by the NATO 
nations concerned, including the completion 
on schedule of Pershing II deplo.vmient at the 
end of last year and the continuing deploy- 
ment of ground-launched cruise missiles as 
planned. We reiterated our willingness to 
reverse, halt, or modify the LRINF deploy- 
ment—including the removal or dismantling 
of missiles already deployed— upon achieve- 
ment of a balanced, equitable, and verifiable 
agj-eement calling for such action. 

We accepted with pleasure an invitation 
from the Rt. Hon. George Younger, M.P., the 
United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Defence, to hold our next meeting in the 
United Kingdom in autumn 1986. 

Greece expressed its views in a statement 
included in the minutes. Denmark reserved 
its position on the INF pai-t. ■ 



Response to Allegations 

on Case of Soviet Seaman Medvid 



by Rozanne L. Ridgway 

Statement before the Subcomynittee 
on Immigration and Refugee Policy of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
March 6, 1986. Ambassador Ridgway is 
Assistant Secretary for European and 
Canadian Affairs.^ 

The case of Soviet Seaman IWiroslav 
Medvid has generated considerable in- 
terest in the Congress, in the press, and 
among the American people, as rightly 
it should. This is because it touches on 
the very fundamental question of life 
and liberty for a man who, on the basis 
of his extraordinary behavior the even- 
ing of October 24, we had every reason 
to believe was seeking political asylum 
in this counti-j'. I can assure you that 
when officials in Washington were in- 
formed about the original error which 
led to Seaman IWedvid being returned to 



his Soviet ship, we took extraordinary 
measures to ensure that he was re- 
moved from the ship to our custody and 
given evei-y opportunity to indicate 
whether he wished to remain here. 

Among the many rumors and allega- 
tions which have developed around this 
case, prominent attention has been 
given to two mutually inconsistent con- 
spiracy theories. The first alleges that 
the Administration conspired with the 
Soviets to return Seaman Medvid to the 
Soviets in order to avoid an incident 
prior to the November summit. The sec- 
ond theoi-y holds that we were duped by 
the Soviets and that the man we actual- 
ly interviewed was a "substitute." Both 
allegations are completely false. From 
the start our primary concern was the 
welfare of Seaman Medvid; considera- 
tions about Geneva or the possible im- 
pact of this case on U.S.-Soviet relations 



'986 



75 



MIDDLE EAST 



played no role in our handling of this 
case. To assert otherwise is not only 
mischievous but flatly wrong. There is 
also no doubt that the individual we in- 
terviewed on October 28 and 29 was the 
same individual interviewed by the INS 
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] 
on October 24. 

I do not intend to give a lengthy 
statement or repeat testimony already 
given. I refer you to the testimony 
given by my deputy, William M. Woess- 
ner, on November 5, 1985, and Febru- 
ary 5, 1986, before this subcommittee, 
my own testimony on November 7, 
1985, before the House Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East, and to 
an addendum I am submitting for the 
record with my testimony. However, I 
do want to set the record straight con- 
cerning sensational allegations that the 
Soviets pulled a switch. Those who 
make them ignore or do not appear to 
have all the facts. Two INS officers in- 
terviewed Seaman Medvid on shore on 
October 24 and took his photograph. 



One of those INS officers was with the 
INS party which boarded the M.V. 
Konev on October 25, and he identified 
the man he saw in the sickbay as the 
same man he interviewed on shore the 
night before. Present at this October 25 
encounter with Seaman Medvid, which 
lasted several hours, was another INS 
officer who subsequently identified Sea- 
man Medvid on October 26 in the 
presence of the Department of State 
representative. The INS officer present 
during the October 25 and 26 meetings 
identified Medvid not only by his physi- 
cal appearance but by a mark on his 
heel which he had observed on both oc- 
casions. The same Department of State 
representative who saw Seaman Medvid 
on October 26 also interviewed Seaman 
Medvid on the Coast Guard cutter 
Salvia on October 28 and at the naval 
shore facility on October 29. Alleged 
height and weight discrepancies from 
the preliminary physical examination by 
the Navy doctor aboard the M.V. Konev 
on October 26 ignore the fact that the 
man we interviewed on October 28 and 



29 fit the INS description of October 2 
matched the photograph taken by INS 
on October 24, matched the photo in 
Seaman Medvid's Soviet passport, and 
was the same man seen in the sickbay 
on October 25. Purported photographic 
"evidence" of a switch turns out to be 
poor quality photos taken surreptitious 
by a military officer which in fact close 
ly resemble the individual originally 
photographed by INS. Allegations that 
Medvid did not speak Russian are fals* 
they are apparently based on state- 
ments by individuals who do not speak 
Russian. A reported handwriting analy 
sis, which we have never seen, was api 
parently based on a comparison of 
printing done in the Roman alphabet, 
which Seaman Medvid did not know 
well, and a Cyrillic signature. To repei 
these allegations are without foundatio 
There is no doubt that the individual v 
interviewed was Seaman Medvid. 



I 



'The complete transcript of the hearing- 
will be published by the committee and \vv 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offi 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Libya Fires on U.S. Vessels in International Waters 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAR. 24, 1986> 

U.S. naval aircraft and ships carrying 
out a peaceful freedom of navigation and 
overflight exercise in international 
waters and airspace in the Gulf of Sidra 
were fu-ed on Monday by missile forces 
of Libya. 

This morning at 7:52 a.m. EST, Lib- 
yan forces, without provocation, fired 
two long-range SA-15 surface-to-air mis- 
siles from Surt on the northern coast of 
Libya at U.S. aircraft operating in inter- 
national waters in the Gulf of Sidra. 
U.S. forces had been operating in that 
area since Sunday afternoon. 

Two additional SA-5s and an SA-2 
were launched from Surt at 12:45 p.m. 
An additional SA-5 was fired at 1:14 
p.m. At this point, Libyan forces had 
fired a total of six surface-to-air missiles 
at U.S. forces. At approximately 2:00 
p.m., a U.S. aircraft fired two Harpoon 
antiship missiles at a Libyan missile 
patrol boat which was located near the 
32°30'N line and was a threat to U.S. 
naval forces. The Libyan fast attack 
craft was hit. The ship is dead in the 
water, burning, and appears to be sink- 
ing. There are no apparent survivors. 




This Libyan missile patrol boat— a Soviet-built Nanuchka-2 class vessel— bums in the Gu 
of Sidra. 



76 



Department of State Bullei 



MIDDLE EAST 



At approximately 3:00 p.m., U.S. 
jces operating south of the 32'^30'N 

responded to the missile attacks by 
Inching two HARMs [high-speed anti- 
liation missiles] at the SA-5 site at 
'ifi. At that time, the SA-5 complex 
te attempting to engage our aircraft. 
i are assessing the damage now. We 
'pe no reports of any U.S. casualties 
A no loss of U.S. aircraft or ships. 

This attack was entirely unprovoked 
il lu'\ond the bounds of normal inter- 
iii'iial conduct. U.S. forces were in- 

t only upon making the legal point 
t, beyond the internationally recog- 
i?d 12-mile limit, the Gulf of'Sidra be- 
i^s to no one and that all nations are 

• tn move through international 
u'l-s and airspace. We deny Libya's 

111, as do almost all other nations, 
«•' condemn Libya's actions. They 

It nut again for all to see the aggres- 
■' and unlawful nature of Col. 
lihafi's regime. 

It should be noted that because of 
l^e numerous Libyan missile launches 
' indications that they intended to 
) inue air and missile attacks on U.S. 
:es, we now consider all approaching 
iv'an forces to have hostile intent. 

We have taken appropriate meas- 
•: to defend ourselves in this in- 
i ce. We did not, of course, proceed 
t this area with our eyes closed. We 
'irv-e the right to take additional 
isures as events warrant. 

Tt\t from Weekly Compilation of 
■■idential Documents of Mar. 31, 1986. ■ 



U.S. Proposes Arms Sales 
to Saudi Arabia 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 11. 1986» 

On March 11, the Administration sent 
Congress informal notification for sale to 
Saudi Arabia of additional air-to-air, air- 
to-sea, and ground-to-air missiles. All 
these systems, or similar systems, are 
already in the Saudi inventory. 

These arms are needed for Saudi 
defense, can be absorbed within the 
Saudi military, and do not represent a 
threat to Israel. We have validated the 
military requirements for these missiles 
and had intended to go forward with 
them this year. 

Four new considerations prompted 
us to move immediately. 

First, Iran has succeeded in crossing 
the Shatt al Arab River and establishing 
a beachhead on the border with Kuwait. 
With their latest strike into Kurdistan, 
the Iranians may contemplate a general 
offensive along the entire front. Should 
this occur, the threat to Kuwait would 
significantly increase. These develop- 
ments threaten our interests and deeply 
worry the peninsula Arabs. They are 
seeking reassurance for their security. 
Saudi Arabia is the key to reassurance 
since it is the essential element in gulf 
collective defense. 

Second, our willingness to support 
Saudi self-defense has served as a deter- 
rent to Iran. Acting now will send a 
strong signal to Iran. It will also reduce 
the chances that we would have to take 
emergency action later to protect our 
owTi interests. 

Third, the current unstable situation 
in South Yemen, exacerbated by Soviet 
interference, raises the potential of a 
renewed threat on Saudi Arabia's 
southern border. 

Fourth, we have had several direct 
and very high-level appeals from the 
Saudis to move these notifications for- 
ward now. It is essential to the overall 
U.S. -Saudi bilateral relationship, and to 
our credibility with the rest of the gulf 
Arabs, that we meet this request. 

These arms notifications, while 
modest, support vital U.S. strategic 
interests. We are committed to main- 



taining the free flow of oil from the gulf. 
We strongly support the security and 
stability of the moderate gulf states. We 
oppose radical forces in the area and the 
expansion of Soviet influence into the 
region. The sales of missiles to Saudi 
Arabia will advance these interests. 
The Saudis have taken the lead, 
under the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) umbrella, in protecting the ship- 
ping and oil installations of the upper 
gulf. Their downing of an intruding Ira- 
nian fighter plane in 1984 was an effec- 
tive use of our equipment and has 
deterred further attacks on the gulf 
states. 

The further strengthening of Saudi 
air defense capabilities makes a major 
contribution to Saudi security and to our 
regional security objectives. It also 
reduces the probability of a need for 
any direct U.S. military involvement at 
some point in the future. 

This sale will not threaten Israel's 
qualitative edge nor change the balance 
of power in the Middle East. Moreover, 
it serves neither our interests nor 
Israel's for us to refuse such sales and 
allow others to replace us as the prin- 
cipal supplier of arms to the Arab gulf 
states. Unlike ourselves, others do not 
impose safeguards on their military 
sales to ensure that their armament 
does not pose a threat to Israel. The re- 
cent British Tornado sale lost the 
United States over $12,000 million in 
sales and support and thousands of U.S. 
jobs without advancing either our in- 
terests or Israel's security. 

The proposed notification would con- 
sist of: 

• 671 AIM-9P4 air-to-air $60 million 

missiles 

• 995 AIM-9L air-to-air $98 million 

missiles 

• 200 Stinger man-portable $89 million 

ground-to-air missile 
systems and 600 reloads 

• 100 Harpoon air-to-sea $107 million 

missiles 



Total 



$354 million 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by State Department deputy spokesman 
Charles Redman. ■ 



Pi 986 



77 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



U.S.-West Germany 
to Cooperate 
on SDI Research 



DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

STATEMENT, 
MAR. 28, 1986 

Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein- 
berger and Federal Minister for Eco- 
nomics Martin Bangemann of the 
Federal Republic of Germany today 
signed a memorandum of understanding 
concerning the participation of Gei-man 
firms, research institutions, and other 
entities in Strategic Defense Initiative 
research as well as a joint understand- 
ing of principles. The signature follows 
Secretary Weinberger's March 1985 in- 
vitation to allies to participate in SDI 
research and the December 1985 deci- 
sion of the Government of the Federal 
Republic regarding German participation 
in SDI research and bilateral discussions 
on U.S. -German technology cooperation 
issues. 

The SDI agreement is designed to 
provide a comprehensive basis for the 
participation of German industry, 
research institutions, and other entitles 
in SDI research, to the mutual benefit 
of both sides. That participation will be 
on the basis of technical merit, consist- 
ent with the firm political and legal com- 
mitment by both the United States and 
Germany to the principles of competi- 
tive procurement. We expect that par- 
ticipation in SDI research by German 
firms and other entities will contribute 
significantly to the SDI research effort, 
helping to increase the program's effec- 
tiveness, reduce its overall costs, and ac- 
celerate its schedule. 

The joint understanding of principles 
lays out general principles and guide- 
lines regarding industrial, scientific, 
technological, and security cooperation 
between the United States and Ger- 
many. It reflects the belief of both 
governments that this mutually benefi- 
cial cooperation should be encouraged 
and be secured by an effective regime 
for safeguarding strategically sensitive 
technologies. ■ 



Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOiVI 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
FEB. 28, 1986' 

The United States has been engaged 
in nuclear cooperation with the Euro- 
pean Community for many years. This 
cooperation was initiated under agree- 
ments concluded over two decades ago 
between the United States and the 
European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) which extend until 
December 31, 1995. Since the inception 
of this cooperation, the Community has 
adhered to all its obligations under 
those agreements. 

The Nuclear Non-ProUferation Act 
of 1978 amended the Atomic Energy 
Act to establish new nuclear export 
criteria, including a requirement that 
the United States have a right to con- 
sent to the reprocessing of fuel ex- 
ported from the United States. Our 
present agreements for cooperation 
with EURATOM do not contain such a 
right. To avoid disrupting cooperation 
with EURATOM, a proviso was in- 
cluded in the law to enable continued 
cooperation until March 10, 1980, if 
EURATOM agreed to negotiations 
concerning our cooperation agree- 
ments, which it did. 

The law also provides that nuclear 
cooperation with EURATOM can be 
extended on an annual basis after 
March 10, 1980, upon determination by 
the President that failure to cooperate 
would prejudice seriously the achieve- 
ment of United States non-proliferation 
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
common defense and security, and af- 
ter notification to the Congress. Presi- 
dent Carter made such a determina- 
tion six years ago and signed Execu- 
tive Order 12193, permitting continued 
nuclear cooperation with EURATOM 
until March 10, 1981. Subsequent de- 
terminations have permitted continued 
nuclear cooperation through March 10, 
1986. 



In addition to numerous informal 
contacts, the United States has en- 
gaged in nine rounds of talks with 
EURATOM regarding the renegotia- 
tion of the U.S.-EURATOM agi-ee- 
ments for cooperation. These were 
conducted in November 1978, Septem- 
ber 1979, April 1980, January 1982, 
November 1983, March 1984 and May, 
September and November 1985. The 
European Community is now consider- 
ing U.S. proposals relating to our 
cooperation agreements, and further 
progress in the talks is anticipated this 
year. 

I believe that it is essential that 
cooperation between the United States 
and the Community continue and, like- 
wise, that we work closely with our 
allies to counter the threat of nucleai- 
explosives proliferation. A disruption 
of nuclear cooperation would not only 
eliminate any chance of progi-ess in our 
talks with EURATOM related to our 
agreements, it would also cause seri- 
ous problems in our overall relation- 
ships. Accordingly, I have detemiined 
that failure to continue peaceful 
nuclear cooperation with EURATOM 
would be seriously prejudicial to the 
achievement of the United States ncni- 
proliferation objectives and would 
jeopardize the common defense and 
security of the United States. I intend 
to sign an Executive Order to extend 
the waiver of the application of the 
relevant export criterion of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act for an 
additional twelve months from March 
10, 1986. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reai;an 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas ^ 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre 
sentatives, and George Bush, President of 
the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation I 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 3, 1986). Bi 



1 

-1 



78 



Department of State Bull^' 



3EANS 



SOUTH ASIA 



ghts and Freedoms 
International 
aters 



PARTMENT STATEMENT, 
R. 26, 1986' 

United States is committed to the 
■cise and preservation of navigation 
overflight rights and freedoms 
ind the world. That is the purpose of 
freedom of navigation progi-am. In 
llment of the objectives of that pro- 
n, U.S. ships and aircraft exercise 
ts and freedoms under international 
off the coasts of numerous 
tries. 

n this regard, the United States 
in accordance with President 
fan's March 10, 1983, ocean policy 
sment, which stated U.S. willingness 
icognize the rights of other coun- 
in the waters off their coasts, as 
cted in the 1982 UN Convention on 
liaw of the Sea, so long as those 
tries respected the rights of the 
ed States and other countries in 
! waters under international law. 
I.S. ships and aircraft have exer- 
rights and freedoms off the coasts 
untries whose laws do not conform 
;emational law as reflected in the 
Law of the Sea Convention. E.xam- 
3f the types of objectionable claims 
St which the United States has ex- 
jd rights and freedoms are un- 
Tiized historic waters claims, 
orial sea claims greater than 12 
sal miles, and territorial sea claims 
mpose impermissible restrictions 
e innocent passage of any type of 
Is, such as requiring prior notifica- 
ir permission. The United States, 
irse, exercises navigation and over- 
rights and freedoms as a matter 
itine off the coasts of countries 
i maritime claims do conform to in- 
tional law. Since the policy im- 
intation in 1979, the U.S. 
■nment has exercised its rights 
list the objectionable claims of over 
cantries, including the Soviet Union, 
1^' rate of some 30-40 per year. 



:hIi' available to news correspondents 
ti- Department deputy spokesman 
^ Ut'dman. ■ 



Afghanistan Day, 1986 



PROCLAMATION 5450, 
MAR. 21, 1986' 

The people of Afghanistan celebrate 
March 21 as the beginning of their 
new year. In ordinary times, it is an 
occasion of joy, i-enewal, and hope for 
a better future. March 21, 1986, 
however, does not mark the passage of 
an ordinary year, nor does it bring 
cause to celebrate. For the heroic Af- 
ghan people it marks the beginning of 
yet another year in their struggle for 
national liberation against the ruthless 
Soviet military force that seeks to con- 
quer them. 

Over six years ago, on December 
27, 1979, the Soviet army invaded 
Afghanistan, a small, friendly, 
nonaligned, and deeply religious neigh- 
bor. For si.x long years, the Soviets 
have sought to obliterate Afghan cul- 
ture and remold that ancient nation 
into a replica of their owm system, 
causing millions of Afghan refugees to 
flee the country. To achieve their 
goals, the Soviets installed the quisling 
regime of Babrak Karmal, in which 
Soviet advisors now man the key posi- 
tions. They have transported thou- 
sands of young Afghans to the Soviet 
Union for reeducation in summer 
camps, universities, and specialized in- 
stitutions, and they have set up a 
secret police apparatus matched in 
brutality only by their own KGB. 

These tactics hardly begin to 
describe the continuing horror of the 
Soviet attempt to subjugate Afghani- 
stan, a violation of international law 
repeatedly condemned by the United 
Nations. Despite calculated destruction 
of crops, irrigation systems, and live- 
stock, indiscriminate air and artillen,' 
bombardments of civilian areas, bi-utal 
reprisals against noncombatants, and 
other unspeakable atrocities, the Af- 
ghan people remain determined to de- 
fend their liberty. The resistance has 
in fact become more effective than 
ever. 

The Soviet failure to quell the 
Afghan people is not surprising. The 
Afghans have a long histoi-y of resist- 
ing invasion and of defending their 
homes, their faith, and their culture. 
Since December 1979, resistance fight- 
ers have acquitted themselves well in 
many engagements against larger and 
better armed Soviet forces. The Af- 
ghan freedom fighters have shown 
they can render all of their country un- 
safe for the invader. After six years of 



hard, bloody fighting, the Soviets are 
far from achieving their military goals. 
Recently the Afghan resistance has 
taken major steps toward achieving 
unity and making its pi-esence felt on 
the international scene, strengthening 
its ability to publicize the Afghan 
cause. We welcome these develop- 
ments. With the support of the com- 
munity of civilized nations, the Afghan 
resistance has also increased its efforts 
to aid civilians remaining inside Af- 
ghanistan. This will improve the Af- 
ghan people's ability to carry on the 
fight and counter the deliberate Soviet 
attempt to drive the civilian population 
away from resistance-controlled areas. 
Throughout the period of their bru- 
tal occupation, the Soviets have 
tried— but failed— to divide the interna- 
tional supporter of the cause of Afghan 
freedom. They cannot be divided. The 
overwhelming votes in the United 
Nations General Assembly, yeai- after 
year, are but one expression of the 
ongoing commitment of the world com- 
munity to this cause. For our part we 
reaffirm our commitment to support 
this just struggle until the Soviets 
withdraw; until the people of 
Afghanistan regain their liberties, 
their independence, and the i-ight to 
self detei-mination; and until the refu- 
gees can return in safety to their 
native land. Only such a settlement 
can command the support of the 
Afghan people; a settlement that does 
not command their support will not 
end this war. 

Today, w-e pay tribute to the brave 
men, women, and children of Afghani- 
stan and remind them that theii- 
sacrifice is not and will not be for- 
gotten. 

The Congress, by Senate Joint 
Resolution 272, has authorized and 
requested the President to issue a 
proclamation designating March 21, 
1986, as "Afghanistan Day." 

Now. Therefore. 1, Ronald Rea- 
gan, President of the United States of 
America, do hereby proclaim March 
21, 1986, as Afghanistan Day. 

In Witness Whereof. I have 
hereunto set my hand this twenty-first 
day of March, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and 
of the Independence of the United 
States of America the two hundred 
and tenth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 24, 
1986. ■ 



»VI986 



79 



UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Response to Libyan Attack 



Following are a letter from Ambas- 
sador Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Perma- 
nent Representative to the United 
Nations, to the President of the UN 
Security Council Ambassador Ole Bier- 
ring (Denmark) of March 25, 1986, and 
Ambassador Walters ' statement in the 
Security Council on March 26. 



U.S. LETTER TO 

SECURITY COUNCIL, 
MAR. 25, 1986 

In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of 
my government, to report that United States 
forces have exercised their right of self- 
defense by responding to hostile Libyan mill- 
taiT attacks in international waters in the 
Guif of Sidra. 

U.S. forces e.xercised great restraint. It 
was only after several missiles had been 
launched by Libya that the U.S. reacted. In 
the ensuing action, two Libyan naval vessels 
were disabled in an area where the U.S. fleet 
was operating. Key components of the missile 
complex at Sirte from which SA-5 missiles 
had been fired were also damaged. 

The United States Government protests 
the unjustified attacks against American 
naval units which were operating in and/or 
above international waters in the exercise of 
the freedom of navigation under international 
law and in accordance with a standard 
"notification of intent" filed with the Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
That notification covered operations to begin 
at 0000 GMT, March 23 and to conclude at 
2359, April 1. Those operations in no way 
threatened the security of Libya. Similar 
operations have been conducted many times 
over the last few years. 

The Government of the United States of 
America views this unjustified attack with 
grave concern. Any further attacks against 
United States forces operating in and over 
international waters off Libya will also be 
resisted with force if necessary. 

In view of the gravity of Libya's action, 
and the threat that this poses to the main- 
tenance of international peace and security, I 
ask that you circulate the text of this letter 
as a document of the Security Council. 

Sincerely, 

Vernon A. Walters 



AMBASSADOR WALTERS' 

STATEMENT, 
MAR. 26, 1986" 

We ai-e here today because the Govern- 
ment of Libya has flouted international 
law and the Charter of the United 
Nations by using lethal force to assert 



80 



its claim in the Gulf of Sidra. U.S. 
forces, engaged in a i)eaceful freedom of 
navigation exercise in international 
waters, have been subjected to an 
unprovoked and unjustified attack by 
Libyan forces. The Government of 
Libya notified the Secretary General on 
March 24, 1986, that it intended to dis- 
regard the role of this Council "to 
resort to its own strengths." One day 
later, Libyan forces launched six 
surface-to-air missiles against U.S. 
vessels and aircraft exercising, after 
proper notification to Libya and all 
other concerned parties, our rights to 
navigate in international waters and fly 
over them. I should add that advance 
notice had been posted in accordance 
with international practice and that the 
exercise was publicly and widely 
recorded. 

On Monday, March 24, in daylight 
hours, U.S. Naval vessels proceeded 
south of 32°30'. They were, of course, in 
international waters. At 1252 Greenwich 
Mean Time (GMT), Libyan facilities 
launched two SA-5 missiles aimed at 
U.S. tactical naval aircraft conducting 
routine operations over international 
waters. No U.S. aircraft were hit. We 
did not respond. 

Two additional SA-5 missiles and an 
SA-2 missile were launched at 1745 
GMT. We still did not respond. Another 
SA-5 was launched at 1845 GMT. At 
this point, Libyan forces had fired a 
total of six SA missiles at U.S. forces 
operating properly in international 
waters. The United States responded to 
this unjustified attack by a proportion- 
ate exercise of its right of self-defense. 

We reject Libya's efforts to sub- 
vert—by force— the international legal 
right of freedom of navigation and the 
responsibility of this Council under the 
charter. It is simply intolerable to allow 
states to subvert international law by 
threatening and using force against 
those peacefully exercising their legal 
rights. The Libyan claim to control navi- 
gation through international waters, as 
well as flight through international air- 
space, is inconsistent with traditional 
freedoms recognized in contemporary 
state practice. It has no basis in inter- 
national law, and everyone in this cham- 
ber knows it. 

The United States of America has 
been committed to ensuring the freedom 
of the seas ever since our birth as a 
nation. Freedom of the seas is essential 
to maintaining international security and 
the flow of commerce. All nations share 



a fundamental interest in maintaining 
and defending the principles of freedor 
of navigation and overflight. As a 
matter of longstanding policy, my gov- 
ernment conducts naval and air exer- 
cises in waters and airspace in every 
part of the globe. So, too, do several 
members of this Council. As part of ot 
regular program of operations around 
the world, we have been in the area ol 
the Gulf of Sidra 16 times since 1981. ^ 
We have been below the line claimed i i, 
a boundary by Libya seven times befo ^ 
this current operation. 

Libya's claim to control navigation 
and overflight in a vast area of the 
Mediterranean Sea has no basis in cus. 
tomary practice or international law. 
The Government of Libya knows full 
w^ell that its indefensible claim in the 
Gulf of Sidra and attacks on those exe « 
cising their rights to navigate in, and ' 
over, the international waters of the f 
gulf have caused this conflict. These [ 
flagrant Libyan attacks against naval | 
units of the United States, operating i fe 
international waters of the Gulf of Sid « 
were entirely unjustified and unpro- k 
voked. In self-defense, under Article E I* 
of the Charter of the United Nations, "^ 
U.S. forces responded to these attacks '; 
I want to make clear that any further . 
attacks also will be resisted with force L 
if required. [[. 

Let us not lose sight of the criticaiit 
issue before the Council today. The |i- 
United States believes that in view of i>, 
the grave challenge to freedom of nav H' 
gation in international waters posed b; !^' 
the Libyan actions, this body should f 
reaffirm the internationally accepted .' 
freedoms of navigation and overflight j.' 
and condemn those nations that resort 
to force to violate these norms. By 
entering the Gulf of Sidra, the United \,\ 
States was defending freedom of navi|(»l 
tion for all nations. Members of the . 
Council should affirm that freedom by|', 
forthrightly condemning those seeking|.[, 
to deny it. \k\ 

In conclusion the first shots were m 
fired by the Libyans against aircraft ''ii 
operating in international air space ov *' 
the high seas. The U.S. response to tl 
hostile act was measured, appropriate 
the circumstances, and in conformity 
with Article 51 of the UN Charter, 'g 

The Secretary of Defense describej^,, 
a hostile act, and described it very |>|,| 
accurately: "When someone fires som^ 
thing at you that can kill you." Aceon 
ingly we took appropriate action to 
defend ourselves. 



'USUN press release 25. 



Department of State Bull) 



ESTERN HEMISPHERE 



ssistance for Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance 



iSSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
B. 25, 1986' 

en the Congress approved humanitarian 
stance for the Nicaraguan democratic 
stance last year, it assured the survival of 
ie fighting for democracy in Nicaragua, 
rever, this assistance has not been suffi- 
t to bring about changes in the policies of 
communist Govemment of Nicaragua that 
Id make possible a peaceful resolution of 
conflict in Central America and end 
iragua's aggression against our allies -I 

e. £ 



irmination 

Dilations based on the Contadora Docu- 
t of Objectives of September 9, 1983, 
failed to produce an agreement, and 
r trade and economic measures have 
i to resolve the conflict. At the same 
, the legislation for humanitarian as- 
nee is about to expire. If no further ac- 
is taken, it is clear that the Nicaraguan 
nunists will steadily intensify their ef- 
to crush all opposition to their tyranny, 
)lidating their ability to use Nicaragua, 
ncert with their Soviet-bloc patrons, as a 
for further intimidating the democratic 
ns of Central America and spreading 
;rsion and terrorism in our hemisphere, 
i these circumstances, the laws provid- 
)r humanitarian assistance to the 
•aguan democratic resistance pennit me 
juest authority to provide additional as- 
ice, and specify e.xpedited procedures 
lion by the Congress on my request. I 
■ansmitting herewith a formal request 
^ch additional assistance. As required by 
rl have consulted vrith the Congress in 
nlating this request. 



1 Negotiations and Other Measures 

\ Failed 

> "irts that I transmitted to the Congress 
^\..|llher 1985 and February 1986, I 
'■ lif.l the continued efforts by the United 
it; to promote a negotiated settlement in 
aal America and in Nicaragua based on 

imtadora Document of Objectives. Our 
■sttnt efforts to achieve a peaceful solu- 
lav.' failed to resolve the conflict 
vi- Nicaragua has continued to reject 
a n,t:ful negotiations. Communist attempts 
;''uinvent and subvert Contadora, appar- 
1 finni the beginning of the negotiating 
'< :s, liave left a clear trail of lost opportu- 

f ii peaceful reconciliation. In most 




On March 3, 1986, President Reagan, with Secretary Weinberger (lower left), met with 
leaders of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO): left to right are Arturo Cruz the 
President, Adolfo Calero, and Alphonso Robelo. 



recent months, Nicaragua has repeatedly 
frustrated negotiations aimed at producing a 
final, comprehensive Contadora treaty. 

Recent Contadora meetings to discuss a 
comprehensive, verifiable regional agreement 
have been inconclusive largely due to 
Nicaraguan intransigence on key issues. Fol- 
lowing two rounds of talks in October, on 
November 11, 1985, Nicaragua made public a 
letter from President Ortega to the Con- 
tadora Group and Support Group govern- 
ments setting forth objections to the Septem- 
ber 12. 1985, draft agreement tabled by the 
Contadora Group governments. Nicaragua 
argued that it could not assume the obliga- 
tions of a Contadora agi-eement unless it 
reached a prior accommodation with the 
United States. 

On December 3, President Ortega for- 
mally requested a suspension in Contadora 
negotiations until May 1986, that is until 
after the governments to be elected in Costa 
Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala will have 
been installed. Costa Rica, Honduras, and 
Guatemala, however, joined 25 other OAS 
[Organization of American States] member 
states in voting for a resolution at the OAS 
General Assembly in Cartagena that urged 
continuation of the Contadora negotiations. 
Of all OAS members, only one member- 
Nicaragua— voted against that re.solution. 
Subsequently, only Nicaragua refused to 
resume Contadora talks— a major reason why 
the United Nations General Assembly failed 
to achieve consensus on a resolution of sup- 
port for the Contadora process. 



On January 12. the Foreign Ministers of 
the Contadora Group and Support Group, 
meeting at Caraballeda, Venezuela, issued a 
joint statement intended to revitalize the 
process. The Foreign Ministers of the five 
Central American states, including 
Nicaragua, signed the "Declaration of 
Guatemala" on January 15, endorsing the 
Caraballeda message. Afterwards, the 
Govemment of Nicaragua issued a press com- 
munique which, although claiming "total 
adherence" to the Caraballeda message, 
characterized the various actions suggested 
in the Caraballeda message as prerequisites 
to resumption of Contadora negotiations. This 
communique also reaffirmed the Nicaraguan 
position of November 11 objecting to the 
Contadora draft agreement. 

On February 5, President Ortega 
repeated this position in his speech to the 
Third Cuban Communist Party Congress in 
Havana noting that "the peace document that 
the Contadora Group submitted in September 
1985 is unacceptable to Nicaragua." 

On February 10, Secretary of State 
Shultz met with the Foreign Ministers of the 
Contadora Group and Support Group. The 
Secretary welcomed the good offices of the 
two Contadora groups to promote national 
reconciliation as e.xpressed in the Caraballeda 
message, and offered to resume bilateral 
talks with Nicaragua simultaneously with the 
beginning of Sandinista dialogue with the 
democratic resistance. Secretary Shultz also 
informed the Foreign Ministers that the 



1^1986 



81 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



United States was prepared to take further 
steps in response to changes in Nicaraguan 
behavior on the four key issues of concern- 
support of subversion, the Cuban/Soviet 
presence, the military buildup, and internal 
repression. He pointed out that a dialogue 
and cease-fu-e would mean that cessation of 
the application of force and the process of 
national reconciliation would go forward at 
the same time. My Special Envoy, Ambas- 
sador Harry Shlaudeman, began consultation 
with the Contadora and Support Group 
governments the week of February 16 on 
this initiative. 

Meanwhile, the Sandinistas have rejected 
a February 6 proposal from opposition politi- 
cal parties in Nicaragua for suspension of 
hostilities, an effective general amnesty law 
for reconciliation of all Nicaraguans, a repeal 
of the state of emergency, an agreement for 
the establishment and observance of a new 
electoral process, effective fuLflllment of 
Nicaragua's commitments for democratiza- 
tion, and international assistance in the 
implementation of these demands. Also, 
another Contadora negotiating session held 
February 14-15 was inconclusive because of 
continued Nicaraguan refusal to address the 
remaining issues to be resolved in the cur- 
rent Contadora draft agreement. 

Description of Request 

The request transmitted herewith asks your 
approval for the transfer of $100,000,000 from 
funds already appropriated for the Depart- 
ment of Defense so that those funds would 
also be available for assistance to the 
Nicaraguan democratic resistance. I am 
requesting this transfer authority, in lieu of a 
supplemental appropriation, because I regard 
this request as a matter of high priority for 
the national security of the United States. 
Including a proposal for additional funds in 
this request would have diverted attention 
from the basic national security issues here 
involved. However, the resulting reduction in 
the funds available for the Department of 
Defense, if not remedied, will inevitably 
impair ongoing efforts to restore and main- 
tain the readiness of the armed forces. This 
impairment in defense readiness will be 
addressed separately. 

The $100,000,000 to be made available for 
assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance would include funds that have 
been appropriated to remain available for 
obligation beyond September 30, 1986. Obli- 
gations will be made on an incremental basis, 
with 25 percent available when the request is 
approved and an additional 15 percent to 
become available at 90-day intervals as 
reports are provided to the Congress on 
actions to achieve a resolution of the conflict 
in Central America. However, no obligations 
may be incurred after September 30, 1987. 

Of the $100,000,000, $30,000,000 will be 
for a program of humanitarian assistance 
administered by the present Nicaraguan 
Humanitarian Assistance Office, including 
$3,000,000 exclusively for strengthening the 



observance and advancement of human 
rights. This emphasis on human rights 
reflects a detennination that human rights 
must be respected. As in our support for 
democracy elsewhere, human rights training 
and assistance can be expected to achieve 
significant positive results. 

Should a peaceful settlement of the con- 
flict in Central America be achieved during 
the period these funds remain available, the 
remaining funds could then be used for 
assistance to Central American countries, 
including Nicaragua, for relief, rehabilitation, 
and reconstruction. 

Approval of this request will permit me 
to use any department or agency in the 
Executive Branch, including agencies 
involved in intelligence activities, in cari-ying 
out programs and activities to assist the 
Nicaraguan democratic resistance. The statu- 
tory requirements for congressional approval 
of the use of such agencies, as well as stat- 
utes requiring prior authorization for the use 
of appropriated funds will be satisfied by the 
approval of my request. 

Finally, the request contains a series of 
undertakings by me, which I am asking the 
Congress to accept. These undertakings, 
which were developed in consultations vrith 
the Congress, ai^e intended to assure that a 
clear and explicit understanding exists 
between the Executive and Legislative 
Branches as to the purposes of the requested 
assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance and United States objectives in 
Central America. 

In particular, I am undertaking in this 
request: 

• That United States policy toward 
Nicaragua will be based on Nicaragua's 
responsiveness to our well-known concerns 
about the Government of Nicaragua's close 
military and security ties to Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, its military buildup, its unlaw- 
ful support for subversion and terrorism, its 
internal repression, and its refusal to negoti- 
ate in good faith with its neighbors or its 
own people; 

• That, in addition to support for the 
democratic resistance, the United Stales will 
rely on economic, political, and diplomatic 
measui'es to address these concerns. In this 
regard, I am publicly affirming two offers 
that I have previously made through diplo- 
matic channels in an effort to obtain a peace- 
ful resolution of the conflict. First, we will 
engage in formal bilateral discussions with 
the Nicaraguan Government, to commence 
simMltaneousiy with a church-mediated 
national dialogue in Nicaragua, as has been 
proposed by the United Nicaraguan Opposi- 
tion. Second, we will take other positive 
actions in response to Nicaraguan steps 
toward meeting our concerns. 

In determining how to implement these 
offers, I will consult vrith the Congress and 
will be guided by the observable behavior of 
the Government of Nicaragua. We will not be 
satisfied with expressions of intent. But we 
will respond to changes of behavior in areas 
such as freedom of the press and religion, 



reductions of foreign arms and military per- < 
sonnel, respect for a cease-fire, and cessation 
of support for insurgents and terrorists. 

My request affirms that our actions are 
consistent with oui- right to defend ourselves I 
and assist our allies, and are directed to\var( | 
achieving peace based on the Contadora 
Document of Objectives and a democratic 
reconciliation in Nicaragua, all without the- 
use of force by the United States. I do not 
intend to introduce the armed forces of the | 
United States into combat against the 
Government of Nicaragua, and I affirm that i 
will not regard approval of my request for | 
assistance as authorizing any such action, i 

The final undertaking in this request 
responds to the desire of the Congress to bi | 
kept informed about efforts to achieve resol i 
tion of the conflict in Central America. I air i 
undertaking to report every ninety days on i 
progress toward a negotiated settlement, as I, 
well as on the disbursement of assistance ji 
funds and on human rights issues. The con- j: 
tinued availability of assistance funds will b' i 
contingent upon the receipt by the Congre& n 
of these periodic reports. |! 

The Need For This Assistance 

Since the beginning of my first Administra- -ji 
tion, there has been no foreign policy issue i 
more directly affecting United States natioi i 
interests than the conflict in Central 
America, for this conflict challenges not onl 
our strategic position but the verj' principle 
upon which this Nation is founded. We can i. 
be justifiably proud of progress in the regiol! 
to alleviate and ultimately eliminate the |i 
causes of that conflict. With strong support >'■ 
from the United States, freedom and •' 

democracy, the fundamental pillars of peace' 
have made dramatic gains. Guatemala, Hon 
duras, and El Salvador have held free and ' 
open elections. Costa Rica continues its trail, 
tion as a vigorous democratic example. U 
United States economic, political, and mill- It 
tary support have strengthened the modera ' ' 
center in Central America and reversed the ' 
tragic polarization on the left and right that i 
threatened to engulf the region in endless 
violence. As a result, the only president in • i 
Central America who wears a military uni- |i 
form today is Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua. II" 
presides over a repressive regime, annedtil' 
the teeth by the Soviets and Cubans, which' 
is the most immediate threat to the progren 
of its neighbors. 

Few now question that the rulers of 
Nicaragua are deeply committed communisi 
determined to consolidate their totalitarian I ■ 
communist state. Their long, documented I . 
record of brutal repression leaves no room | '■ 
for doubt. Nor can there be any dispute thil 
they seek to export their ideology through i 
terrorism and subversion to neighboring I '" 
countries. Their neighbors' success in offer) I ' 
democracy as a viable alternative for the pi ' 
pie of Central America is a major threat toll. 
the system they advocate. The Sandinistas iv 
have been constrained principally because 1 1 
they have not yet crushed opposition to thi 



82 



Department of State Bullf| 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



rime at home. The struggle of the 
:araguaii democratic resistance for 
nocracy in their own homeland has 
)vided a shield for democratic progress in 
ler Central American countries. But the 
Ministas, with massive Soviet and Cuban 
jitary assistance, have clearly made the 
imination of these freedom fighters their 
pber one priority. If they achieve that 
W, there will be no remaining obstacle to 
lir efforts to destabilize neighboring states. 
!i Despite this threat to peace, we do not 
lept that conflagration is inevitable in Cen- 
P America. The path to peace is clear. The 
Igin of the conflict in Nicaragua is the 

iolt of the Nicaraguan people themselves 
inst tyranny. A chiu-ch-mediated dialogue, 
ous negotiations between the Sandinistas, 
the external and internal opposition, 
{uding the democratic resistance, is the 
jte to begin. The United States strongly 
[iports such negotiations, and we welcome 
efforts of the Latin American nations of 
Contadora Group and Suppoi-t Group to 
mote national reconciliation talks to 
)lve the Nicaraguan conflict. We will 
idfastly support the Contadora process in 
efforts to find a solution in Central 
erica that will be the basis for lasting 
SB. We will also continue to look for flexi- 
y in the Nicaraguan position and are pre- 
;d to respond with appropriate measures 
ncourage them to come to terms with 
r own people in a democratic framework. 
At the same time, we can entertain no 
ions that the Sandinistas will enter 
)tiations on steps to allow legitimate 
ocratic dissent unless democratic forces 
'icaragua can credibly and forcefully 
rt their right to a voice in Nicaragua's 
re. The Sandinistas' record of repression 
'emocratic opposition groups leaves little 
)■ that they will willingly follow such a 
SI-. They will never embrace open, 
"'uratic norms unless confronted with 
I'liiahle demands from steadily growing 
ihei-s of Nicaraguans prepared to fight for 
>ty and for then- right to participate in 
f country's political life. 
)ur experience with the Sandinistas over 
<.nil a half years points unmistakably to 
(icmmI to accompany diplomatic policy with 
haiiiial pressure focused on the same 
■ti\cs. Without power, diplomacy lacks 

■ aL'.-. The Sandinistas will not take 
liiiul'ul steps toward national reconcilia- 

i:until they realize that opposition to the 

rjlidation of a Mar.xist-Leninist regime is 

It rung to be repressed. Approval of this 

'M will enable the United States to be in 

■It Mil to provide assistance that permits 

■ <-i-tance to conduct sustained opera- 
'111 .Nicaragua and e.xpand their area of 

iihiiLs. The resistance will be able to 

■ pMiate more of the thousands of volun- 

\\aiting to join their forces but who 
1 't I If accepted for lack of supplies. They 
Ik- able to establish a stronger presence 
1' g a larger segment of the Nicaraguan 
flation, thus increasing the pressui-e on 
slandinistas to enter into dialogue v\ith all 
pition elements, and to negotiate seri- 
s in the Contadora process. 



The cause of the United States in 
Nicaragua, as in the rest of Central America, 
is the cause of freedom and ultimately, our 
own national security. 

The Soviet Union and its satellites under- 
stand the great stakes in Nicaragua. The 
Soviets have already made their decision to 
support the Sandinistas. Cuba's Castro has 
already made his decision to support the San- 
dinistas. Libya's Qadhafi has already made 
his decision to support the Sandinistas say- 
ing, we support them, ". . . because they are 
fighting America at its doorstep. Nicaragua 
means a great thing; it means fighting 
America near its borders." 

Congi-ess must act decisively to prevent 
an outcome deeply injurious to "the security 
of our Nation. 

If the enemies of democi-acy thousands of 
miles away understand the sti-ategic impor- 
tance of Nicaragua, undei-stand that 
Nicaragua offers the possibility of destabiliz- 
ing all Central America, of sending a tidal 
wave of refugees streaming toward our 
southern border, and of tying down the 
United States and weakening our ability to 
meet our commitments overseas, then we 
Americans must undei-stand that Nicaragua 
is a foreign policy question of supreme impor- 
tance which goes to the heart of our coun- 
try's freedom and future. With its vote, Con- 
gress will make its decision. 

Those fighting for freedom in Nicaragua 
desei-ve and desperately need our help. The 
humanitarian assistance approved by the 
Congi-ess in 1985 has proven insufficient. 
Cuban and Soviet military aid in the foi-m of 
training and sophisticated hardware have 
taken their toll. If the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance is to continue its struggle, and if 
peace, democracy, and security in this 
hemisphere are to be preserved, the United 
States must provide what is necessary to 
carry on the fight. If we fail to help friends 
in need now, then the price w-e will pay later 
will be much higher. 

Your approval of the request I am trans- 
mitting to you will provide the necessary 
help. I urge the prompt enactment of a joint 
resolution expressing that approval. 

Ronald Re.'\gan 



Request for Additional Authority and 
Assistance for the Nic.\ragu.vn 
De.mocratic Resistance 

Pursuant to the provisions of section 722(p) of 
the International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 198.5 "(P.L. 99-83) and sec- 
tion 106(a) of chapter V of the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 1985 (P.L. 99-88), I 
hereby request that the Congi-ess approve 
additional authority and assistance for the 
Nicaraguan democratic resistance as follows: 

(1) That the sum of $100,000,000 appropri- 
ated by the Department of Defense Appropri- 
ations Act, 1986, as contained in P.L. 99-190, 
shall be available for transfer by the Presi- 
dent to appropriations available for assistance 



to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance and 
shall be available for that puipose, subject to 
the terms and conditions of this request. 

(2) That the funds transferred under para- 
graph (1) will include funds that have been 
made available for obligation beyond Septem- 
ber 30, 1986, as [jrovided by law": Provided, 
That not more than 25 percent shall be avail- 
able for obligation upon the enactment of a 
joint resolution approving this request, and 
an additional 15 percent shall become avail- 
able upon submission of each report to the 
Congi-ess required by paragi-aph (6XE) of this 
request, and no obligations may be incurred 
after September 30, 1987. 

(3) That, of the funds transferred under 
paragraph (1), .$30,000,000 shall be available 
during the period of availability of those 
funds for continuation of a program of 
humanitarian assistance to be administered 
by the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance 
Office established by Executive Order 12530, 
of which at least $3,000,000 will be used 
exclusively for strengthening progi-ams and 
activities of the United Nicaraguan Opposi- 
tion for the observance and advancement of 
human rights. 

(4) That, notwithstanding the proviso con- 
tained in paragraph (2) of this request, in the 
event of a peaceful settlement of the conflict 
in Central America during the period that 
the funds transferred under paragraph (1) are 
available for obligation, any remaining 
balance of such funds shall then also be avail- 
able for purposes of relief, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction in Central American countries, 
including Nicaragua, in accordance with the 
authority of chapter 4 of part II of the For- 
eign Assistance Act of 1961. 

(5) That the approval by the Congi-ess of 
this request be deemed to satisfy the require- 
ments, terms, and conditions of section 105(a) 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis- 
cal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-169) as well as statu- 
tory requirements for the authoiization of 
appropriations (including section 10 of P.L. 
91-672, section 502 of the National Security 
Act of 1947, and section 8109 of the Depart- 
ment of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986), 
subject to— 

(A) all applicable provisions of law and 
established procedui-es relating to the over- 
sight by the Congress of operations of 
departments and agencies; and 

(B) the further terms and conditions 
specified in this request. 

(6) That the approval by the Congress of 
this request be deemed to constitute the 
acceptance of the following undertakings: 

(A) United States policy toward 
Nicaragua shall be based upon Nicaragua's 
responsiveness to continuing concerns by the 
United States and Nicaragua's neighbors 
about— 

(i) Nicai-agua's close military and secu- 
rity ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and its 
Warsaw Pact allies, including the presence in 
Nicaragua of military and security personnel 
from those countries; 



J 1986 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



(ii) Nicaragua's buildup of military 
forces in numbers disproportionate to those 
of its neighbors and equipped with sophisti- 
cated weapons systems and facilities designed 
to accommodate even more advanced equip- 
ment; 

(iii) Nicaragua's unlawful support for 
armed subversion and terrorism directed 
against the democratically elected govern- 
ments of other countries; 

(iv) Nieai-agua's internal repression 
and lack of opportunity for the exercise of 
civil and political rights that would allow the 
people of Nicaragua to have a meaningful 
voice in detennining the policies of their 
government; and 

(v) Nicaragua's refusal to negotiate in 
good faith for a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict in Central America based upon the 
comprehensive implementation of the Sep- 
tember 1983 Contadora Document of Objec- 
tives and, in particular, its refusal to enter 
into a church-mediated national dialogue as 
proposed by the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance on March 1, 1985. 

(B) The United States vrill address 
these concerns through economic, political, 
and diplomatic measures, as well as through 
support for the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance. In order to assure every opportu- 
nity for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, 
the United States— 

(i) will engage in simultaneous 
bilateral discussions with the Government of 
Nicaragua with a view toward facilitating 
progress in achieving a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict if the Govemment of Nicaragua 
engages in a church-mediated national dia- 
logue, as proposed by the United Nicaraguan 
Opposition; and 

(ii) will take other positive actions in 
response to steps by the Government of 
Nicaragua toward meeting the concerns 
described in subparagraph (A). 

(C) The duration of bilateral discussions 
with the Govemment of Nicaragua and the 
implementation of additional measures under 
subparagraph (B) shall be determined, after 
consultation with the Congress, by reference 
to Nicaragua's actions in response to the con- 
cerns described in subparagraph (A). Particu- 
lar regard vrill be paid to whether— 

(i) freedom of the press, religion, and 
assembly are being respected in Nicaragua; 

(ii) additional arms and foreign mili- 
tary personnel are no longer being introduced 
into Nicaragua; 

(iii) a cease-fire with the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance is being respected; and 

(iv) Nicaragua is withholding support 
for insurgency and terrorism in other coun- 
tries. 



(D) The actions by the United States in 
response to the concerns described in sub- 
paragraph (A), authorized by the approval of 
this request, are consistent with the right of 
the United States to defend itself and to 
assist its allies in accordance with interna- 
tional law and treaties in force. Such actions 
are directed to achieving a comprehensive 
and verifiable agreement among the countries 
of Central America, based upon the 1983 
Contadora Document of Objectives and inter- 
nal reconciliation within Nicaragua, based 
upon democratic principles, without the use 
of force by the United States. The approval 
of this request shall not be construed as 
authorizing any member or unit of the armed 
forces of the United States to engage in com- 
bat against the Govemment of Nicaragua. 

(E) The President will transmit a report 
to the Congress within 90 days after the date 
of approval of this request, and every 90 
days thereafter, on actions taken to achieve a 
resolution of the conflict in Central America 
in a manner that meets the concerns 
described in subparagraph (A). Each such 
report shall include— 

(i) a detailed statement of any 
progress made in reaching a negotiated set- 
tlement, including the willingness of the 
Nicaraguan democratic resistance and the 
Government of Nicaragua to negotiate a set- 
tlement; 

(ii) a detailed accounting of the dis- 
bursements made to provide assistance with 
the funds made available pursuant to para- 
graph (1); and 

(iii) a discussion of alleged human 
rights violations by the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance and the Govemment of 
Nicaragua, including a statement of the steps 
taken by the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance to remove from their ranks any 
individuals who have engaged in human 
rights abuses. 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 19, 19862 



President Reagan and his special envoy to ^ 
Central America .'Vmbassador Philip C. ^ 

Hablb. t 



84 




Since I transmitted my message to the Con-j. 
gress on Febraary 25 requesting additional ^ 
assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance, 1 have heard from many thought 



ful Members of Congress, as well as from 
Latin American leaders and the leaders of '' 
the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Manj , 
have raised the question of how the addi- . 
tional authority I have requested could be I 
implemented so as to help persuade the 
Govemment of Nicaragua to engage in a sev 
ous effort to resolve the conflict in Central 
America through peaceful means. 

I am determined to make every effort t . 
protect our vital interests and achieve peaC' I 
without further loss of life. That is why on ^ 
Febi-uai-y 10 I proposed simultaneous talks " 
by the Govemment of Nicaragua— with thai 
opposition and with the United States. Tha 
is why on February 25 I affii-med my com- 
mitment to direct the additional assistance 
have requested toward a comprehensive an " 
verifiable agreement among the countries o 
Central America, based on the Contadora . 
Document of Objectives. And that is why o 
March 7 I appointed Ambassador Philip 
Habib as my special envoy for Central ^ 
America. L 

On Sunday night, I described to the V 
American people the threat to our security . 
that confronts us in Central America. As I 
said then, we are still willing to pursue ' 
vigorously a diplomatic effort to achieve a 
lasting peace. Approval of my request fur 
additional assistance to the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance does not mean that a |; 
military solution is inevitable. It is, howevf i> 
essential that the Congress act now to 
approve this assistance if diplomacy is to 
have a chance. Accordingly, I am providing 
in this message a further explanation of ho 
I will implement the authority I have 
requested. 




Department of State Bull' 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



If the Congress approves my request I 
send my special envoy on an urgent mis- 
I to the capitals of the Contadora and Sup- 
: Gi'oup nations. He will ask them to join 
1 us in urging the Government of 
aragua to initiate a national dialogue with 
resentatives of all elements of the 
locratic opposition, designed to achieve 
igoals set out in the widely heralded 
bosal announced by six opposition 
iraguan political parties on February 7, 
5. Their proposal, which has been 
brsed by the Nicaraguan democratic 
stance, calls for an immediate cease-fire, 
Iffective general amnesty, abolition of the 
^ of emergency, agi-eement on a new elec- 
1 process and general elections, effective 
ilment of international commitments for 
locratization, and obser\'ance of implemen- 
(n by relevant international groups and 
fes. 

'{'resident Duarte's additional proposal for 
itaneous dialogtie with the Salvadoran 
lias, a proposal endorsed by the 
icratic Presidents of Costa Rica, Hon- 
and Guatemala, reinforces the impor- 
of an international dialogue in 
agua to address the objectives of the 
y proposal of Febi-uai-y 7. 

i'l order to give the Government of 
agua every reasonable opportunity to 
nd favorably, and to provide an incen- 
ar a positive response, I will limit the 
lance to be provided to the Nicaraguan 
icratic resistance for 90 days following 
i)val of my request to the following: 

|(1) humanitarian assistance, as defined 
|tion 722(g) of P.L. 99-83, including sup- 
ror programs and activities to 
igthen respect for human rights; 

(2) logistics advice and assistance; 

(3) equipment and supplies necessary 
■fiMise against air attack; 

(4) support for democratic political and 
Inatic activities; and 

(5) training in radio communications, col- 
tii and utilization of intelligence, logistics, 
1 -nail-unit skills and tactics. 

allowing this 90-day period, additional 
« of assistance will be provided to the 
sjguan democratic resistance only if— 

1 ) I have determined, after consultation 
hhe Congress, 

(a) that the Central American coun- 
lave not concluded a comprehensive 
nent based on the Contadora Document 
ectives; 

(b) the Government of Nicaragua is 
gaged in a serious dialogue with 
entatives of all elements of the 
ratic opposition, accompanied by a 

Ire and an effective end to the existing 
lints on freedom of speech, assembly, 
ligion; and 

(c) there is no reasonable prospect of 
ng these developments through fur- 
plomatic measures, multilateral or 

al, without additional assistance to the 
guan democratic resistance; 



Peace Proposal Offered to Nicaragua 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAR. 5, 1986' 

President Duarte's proposal to Daniel 
Ortega yesterday has created a new- 
opportunity for peace in Central 
America. We applaud President 
Duarte's willingness to renew a dialogue 
with the Nicaraguan-backed guerrillas in 
El Salvador if the Nicaraguan com- 
munists are also willing to begin a dia- 
logue with the democratic resistance in 
Nicaragua. 

President Duarte's offer creates an 
opportunity to begin simultaneously 
three parallel sets of talks aimed at 
peace and national reconciliation 
throughout Central America. If the 
Nicaraguan Government responds 
favorably, we could soon see: 1) a dia- 
logue leading to intei'nal reconciliation 
and democracy in Nicai-agua; 2) talks for 
bringing an end to the conflict in El Sal- 



vador; and 3) the simultaneous resump- 
tion of talks between the United States 
and the Nicaraguan Government. 

These three sets of talks offer the 
best hope of ending the strife and the 
bloodshed in Central America and creat- 
ing new [jossibilities for peace and 
democratic progress throughout the 
region. We call upon Mr. Ortega to 
accept President Duarte's proposal and 
agree to negotiate with the democratic 
resistance now. We hope that the eight 
Contadora and support group nations 
will enthusiastically support President 
Duarte's proposal. These three sets of 
simultaneous talks would provide a 
great impetus to the Contadora group's 
efforts to mediate a comprehensive, 
negotiated settlement of the conflict in 
Central Ameiica. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1986. 



(2) I have reported my determination to 
the Congress; and 

(3) Fifteen days have elapsed following 
my report to the Congress, during which the 
Congress may take such legislative or other 
action as it deems appropriate. 

Should the conditions described in sub- 
paragraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (1) later be 
achieved, assistance to the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance will again be limited to 
the categories, described above, available 
during the initial 90 days following approval 
of my request, for so long as the Government 
of Nicaragua acts in good faith to maintain 
those conditions. 

In order to keep the Congress fully and 
currently informed of developments relating 
to diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict during the 90 days 
following approval of my request, I will 
appoint a special bipartisan commission to 
report on negotiations, whose reports will be 
made available to the Congress. This commis- 
sion shall be composed of individuals, none of 
whom shall be a Member or employee of the 
Congress or an officer or employee of the 
United States, recommended by the Speaker 
and Minority Leader of the House of 
Representatives and the Majority and 
Minority Leaders of the Senate, with a fifth 
member of the commission to be recom- 
mended by the four other commissioners. 

This approach represents a sincere effort 
to achieve peace through negotiations. In 
order to further this effort, I will make 
$2,000,000 of the funds I have requested for 
assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance available to the Central American 



democracies (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras) to facilitate their 
participation in regional meetings and negoti- 
ations. In addition, I will encourage those 
countries and the Contadora and Support 
Group nations to make regular and public 
reports on the status of negotiations, the 
likelihood of achieving a comprehensive 
agreement, progress toward national recon- 
ciliation, and the obstacles thereto. 

Moreover, the United States will assist 
all indigenous groups which are committed to 
work together for democratic national recon- 
ciliation in Nicaragua based on the six-party 
proposal. We will require only that they 
respect international standards of conduct, 
refraining from violations of human rights or 
other criminal acts, and that they work 
together toward this common goal. 

In this regard, the democratic resistance 
has been broadening its representative base. 
The United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) 
now includes the largest of the Indian/Creole 
resistance groups (KISAN), and has forged 
cooperative relationships with other 
democratic resistance elements. The UNO 
has also engaged in constructive discussions 
with the Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS). 
And UNO has further strengthened unity by 
ensuring that all its military forces are 
responsive to its civilian leadership. We 
wholeheartedly support these developments 
and will encourage the democratic opposition 
to lake fuither steps that will increase its 
unity and its appeal to the Nicaraguan peo- 
ple. Toward this end, I will reserve not less 
than $10,000,000 of the funds I have 
requested for assistance to resistance forces 
otherwise eligible and not currently included 



y986 



85 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



within UNO, one-half of which shall be for 
BOS and one-half shall be for the Indian 
resistance force Misui-asata. 

However, no group shall receive 
assistance from the United States if it retains 
in its ranks any individual who engages in— 

(1) gross violations of human rights 
(including summary executions, torture, kid- 
napping, forced recruitment, or other such 
violations of the integrity of the person); or 

(2) drug smuggling, or significant mis- 
use of public or private funds. 

There are two other issues, relating to 
funding, that I ask you to consider. 

Fii-st, there has been inaccurate public 
speculation about what additional funds for 
assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance might be available beyond the $100 
million for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 that I 
have requested be transfeiTed from amounts 
already appropriated to the Department of 
Defense. I want to state unequivocally that I 
will not augment this $100 million through 
the use of CIA or any other funds that have 
not been approved by the Congress for this 
purpose. 

Second, when I proposed to the Congress 
a Central America Democracy, Peace, and 
Development Initiative to implement the 
recommendations of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America, I included 
Nicaragua among the countries that could 
benefit from this initiative. The Congress 
accepted my recommendation in enacting a 
new chapter of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961. The Congress also authorized in that 
Act, as the Bipartisan Commission recom- 
mended and I requested, the appropriation of 
the full $1,200,000,000 in nonmilitary 
assistance for Central America for fiscal 
years 1988 and 1989. However, the current 



authorization for fiscal year 1987 falls short 
of this goal. This, combined with appropria- 
tions shortfalls from previous years, is an 
obstacle to timely progress. I will ask the 
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 
Agency for Intemational Development, and 
the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget to develop a plan to overcome the 
funding shortfalls that have occurred. In 
addition, I urge the Congress to provide the 
full amounts of economic assistance I have 
requested in my budget for fiscal year 1987 
so that the necessary long-term commitment 
urged by the Bipartisan Commission will be 
fulfilled, and so that the promises of peace 
and freedom will be realized throughout Cen- 
tral America. 

Upon the enactment of a joint resolution 
approving my request, I shall issue an 
Executive order to provide for the implemen- 
tation of the undertakings I have expressed 
in this message and in my message of Febru- 
ary 25. The Secretary of State, or his desig- 
nee, will be responsible, under my du-ection, 
for policy guidance and coordination of 
United States Government activities under 
that Executive order. 

In conclusion, I must stress that our 
diplomacy cannot succeed without the demon- 
strated resolve of the United States to pro- 
tect its own interests and those of the brave 
men and women who are fighting for 
democracy in Central America. The time for 
decision is now. Your vote on my request will 
be a fateful one. I need and urge your sup- 
port on this vital issue. 

RONALD Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 3, 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 24, 1986. 



Honduras Receives U.S. Assistance 
to Repel Sandinista Attaclts 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 25 1986' 

On March 22, wdthin 48 hours of the 
House rejection of aid to the Nicaraguan 
resistance, Sandinista military units 
crossed into Honduras in what appears 
to be a large-scale effort to locate and 
destroy resistance logistic spaces, train- 
ing centers, and medical facilities which 
they believed to be in the area. 

Contrary to some reports, this does 
not seem to be a "hot pursuit" opera- 
tion by the Sandinistas since no 
resistance units were withdravidng from 
Nicaragua at the time of the Sandinista 
attack. Early in the morning of March 
23, a large Sandinista military force 



86 



reportedly conducted four assaults in 
the vicinity of a Nicaraguan refugee 
center located more than 15 kilometers 
north of the Nicaraguan-Honduran 
border. These attacks were reportedly 
repulsed by new resistance student 
volunteers which were armed that very 
morning. 

By late in the evening on March 23, 
several Sandinista special counterinsur- 
gency battalions were heavily engaged 
in Honduras. These units normally have 
15-20 Cuban advisers integrated down 
to the company level. At that point on 
March 23, one of these battalions 
attempted to withdraw back into 
Nicaragua, but their route of exfiltration 
was evidently blocked by a large 
resistance column which had moved 



back to the border region from j 

Nicaragua. This battle apparently con-| 
tinued throughout the day on March 2^ 
with as many as 1,500 Sandinistas in |i 
two task forces participating in the V 
action deep inside Honduras. Through" 
out the battle on March 23 and 24, th( " 
Sandinistas supplied their units inside j' 
Honduras with heavy artillery fire, vo ' 
leys of rocket fire from Soviet-made '' 
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and j' 
MI-8 gunships. ' 

Last night, in response to the ami! ! 
attack into sovereign Honduran terri- J 
tory. President Azcona formally " 

requested urgent U.S. military 
assistance, to include assisting in liftii ' 
Honduran troops as necessary and otl '' 
materiel assistance in order to repel t If 
and future Sandinista attacks. In f 
response to this request, President R ^ 
gan has notified pertinent Members o - 
Congress that he intends to exercise t 
authority under Section 506(a) of the g 
Foreign Assistance Act, in order to p ; 
vide Honduras with up to $20 million i 
emergency assistance in the form of I 
materiel, services, and training. The ' 
military aid which has been requestet ■ 
includes air defense weapons, conven- 
tional ordinance, emergency spare pa 
and armament for helicopters, and 
essential training. The use of the Pre 
dent's 506(a) authority responds to th 
unforseen emergency which exists in 
Honduras and will be provided from 
Department of Defense resources sim 
these emergency requirements caniw 
be promptly met by other means. 

The Secretary of Defense has dis- 
patched Gen. John Galvin, Commandc 
in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, to 
Honduras to assess the situation and 
prov