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Vol. LXVII, No. 1736 

October 2, 1972 



Address by Ambassador Gerard Smith 378 



Statement by John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser 382 

Address by Counselor Richard F. Pedersen 371 

Boston Public Library 
For index see inside back coverS^P^'nt^-ndent of D<'cium' 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1736 
October 2, 1972 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a iceekly publication issued bu the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policu, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

tCAO Special Subcommittee Meets at Washington 

Fifteen nations participated in a Special 
Subcommittee of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) which met at 
Washington September Jf-15 to consider a 
convention ivhich ivould provide for cutting 
off air services against states which do not 
punish hijackers. Folloiving are xvelcoming 
remarks made before the subcommittee on 
September U by Secretary of Transportation 
John A. Volpe; the opening statement of the 
U.S. delegation m-ade on September U by the 
chairman, Charles N. Brower, Deputy Legal 
Adviser of the Department of State; a state- 
ment made by Secretary Rogers on Septem- 
ber 6; and texts of draft articles drawn up 
at the subcommittee session and submitted 
to the ICAO Legal Committee for study. 


Department of Transportation press release dated September 4 

It is a real pleasure for me to welcome 
the members of this subcommittee to Wash- 
ington. You may have noticed that Washing- 
ton is a rather quiet city today and that the 
State Department is not as busy as usual. 
The reason, of course, is that this is a 
national holiday. Labor Day, when no work 
is done except that which is essential. And 
that summarizes precisely the work that you 
are here to do. It is essential work — vital 
work. You are facing up to a challenge that 
knows no holiday, a threat that takes no va- 

Two years ago this month I went to Mon- 
treal to ask the ICAO countries to stand to- 
gether on the hijacking issue by agreeing to 
extradite or prosecute any persons accused of 

crimes against civil aviation.* The Council 
adopted such a resolution, and a similar pro- 
vision is incorporated in the antihi jacking 
convention negotiated at The Hague in De- 
cember 1970.2 

Until now, however, the good intentions 
expressed at Montreal have been largely 
unenforceable. You are here to correct that 
situation — to begin the work that will close 
the final loophole and seal off the last avenue 
of escape left to the sky bandit. 

Over the past two years we have made it 
progressively more difl^cult for potential hi- 
jackers by intensifying screening procedures 
at the boarding gates and tightening secu- 
rity on airport property. Most airlines have 
locked the tail exits of their aircraft, mak- 
ing it all but impossible for hijackers — 
extortionists — to escape by parachute. The 
FBI and other enforcement agencies have 
proven increasingly proficient at thwarting 
hijacking attempts and in apprehending sky- 
jackers. The courts are dispensing swift jus- 
tice and handing down stiff sentences for 
convicted hijackers. Just last week one indi- 
vidual here in the United States was sent to 
prison for 30 years. 

Clearly the net is tightening, and it rests 
now in your capable hands to draft the multi- 
national enforcement convention needed to 
bring the hijacking problem under control 
internationally. Yours is a vital mission, and 
I wish you every success in the difficult task 
at hand. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1970, 
p. 449. 

' For text of the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, see Bulletin of Jan. 
11, 1971, p. 53. 

October 2, 1972 


All of you here, I am sure, are well aware 
of the stern actions President Nixon has 
taken to discourage, detect, and defeat sky- 
jackers. In 1969, the odds clearly favored 
the hijacker; 82 percent of the attempted 
piracies that year succeeded. 

Last year 12 of 27 attempts against U.S. 
aircraft succeeded, a less than 50-50 chance 
for the hijacker. Thus far this year, 21 of 
29 attempts have failed — which means that 
the odds are better than 4 to 1 that a hijacker 
will not succeed. 

In the 18 extortion attempts this year 
against U.S. airlines, all the persons involved 
have been arrested, killed, or accounted for. 
The ransoms, with one exception, have been 

The hijacker today is a man on the run. 
It remains for you, for all of us, to give him 
no place to run, no place to hide. 

We have long recognized that the elimina- 
tion of shelters is essential to the ultimate 
control of the hijacking problem. No nation 
can do that job alone. Air piracy is a crime 
that transgresses national boundaries and 
transcends national authority. That is why 
President Nixon has directed that Secretary 
Rogers and I petition ICAO to press for en- 
forcement of the obligation of all countries 
to deny hijackers sanctuary from prosecu- 
tion or refuge from extradition. 

Piracy on the high seas came to an end 
when the ports of call were closed to the 
plunderers of ships. Piracy in the skies will 
die the same death when the doors of wel- 
come are universally slammed on hijackers 
around the world. 

The United States has taken the lead in 
this crusade to rid the skies of thieves and 
terrorists not because skyjacking is unique 
to our country — in fact, of the 134 hijackings 
that have occurred since the ICAO resolution 
in Montreal, 72 involved non-U.S. airlines — 
but because anarchy in a civilized world is as 
intolerable in the skies as it is on the 

Air piracy is more than skyway robbery. 
It is a crime against society and against hu- 

manity, threatening the lives of passengers 
and crew and the very future of international 
air commerce. President Nixon and I are 
determined that the airways must be made 
secure against the threats of extortionists, 
terrorists, and fugitives from justice. We 
will not rest, and we trust you will not rest, 
until that common goal becomes an interna- 
tional reality. 


Press release 210 dated September 5 

We are at an important juncture in the 
history of efforts by governments to assure a 
secure and sound international civil aviation 

The international community has in the 
past responded with alacrity and with vigor 
to the grave threat against this international 
network posed by the ever-growing multi- 
tude of aerial pirates, saboteurs, and similar 

Under the auspices of ICAO, technical 
measures to prevent hijackings and sabotage 
have been agreed to and are being imple- 
mented at airports and on board aircraft 
at present. Efforts have been undertaken 
toward the development of formal standards 
and practices in this area which are to be- 
come a part of the Chicago Convention ^ and 
thus mandatory for all 124 contracting par- 

The rules of law regarding hijacking and 
similar criminal acts have been inscribed by 
the international community in the Tokyo,* 
Hague, and Montreal ^ Conventions: Hi- 
jacked aircraft, passengers, crew, and cargo 
are required to be released without delay; 

^Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944; 
Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1591. 

' Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963; TIAS 6768. 

° For text of the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia- 
tion adopted at Montreal on Sept. 23, 1971, see 
Bulletin of Oct. 25, 1971, p. 464. 


Department of State Bulletin 

hijackers and saboteurs are required to be 
taken into custody and extradited or pros- 
ecuted without exception whatsover. These 
conventions provide extraordinary remedies. 

It is painfully clear, however, that the 
work resulting in these measures has not of 
itself been sufficient to end the threat. Re- 
peated acts of hijacking, acts of sabotage, 
and armed attacks against passengers and 
aircraft have made it undeniably certain that 
the world's civil aviation system continues 
to be an attractive target for certain mis- 
guided individuals and groups who seek to 
accomplish any of a host of objectives; for 
example, to extort money, to give dramatic 
form to a political expression, to seek pub- 
licity. Acts range from those which are 
merely vexatious to those which are violent 
and vicious; the perpetrators range fi'om the 
disruptive vandal to the mass murderer. The 
motives are varied, but a common thread 
ties the acts together: Each entails sacrifice, 
potential or real, of the lives of innocent per- 
sons — passengers, pilots, stewardesses, air- 
port and aircraft ground personnel. No one, 
and no state, is immune from this threat. 
Increasingly, every country of the world is 
threatened, regardless of form of govern- 
ment, social system, political philosophy, or 
geographic location. As evidence one need 
only cite a few of the most recent incidents: 
In the last three months aircraft of my coun- 
try, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Argentina, and France have 
been the subject of attacks. 

How can we act decisively now to curb this 
threat? What is needed urgently is to insure 
that all the rules of law which have been laid 
down are effectively enforced. Together with 
Canada we have drafted such a convention, 
introduced a year and a half ago, which pro- 
vides for an independent commission to as- 
sess the facts with respect to any specific 
incident. When the commission determines 
that the rules set out in the Tokyo, Hague, or 
Montreal Convention have not been applied, 
the convention establishes a mechanism by 
which involved states could meet and decide 

upon the individual and collective steps they 
would take to bring about compliance. 

We do not underestimate the precedent- 
setting nature of the proposal nor the politi- 
cal controversies it engenders. We hold sim- 
ply to the belief that events of this year un- 
derscore the fragility of the civil aviation net- 
work against the conspiracies of terrorist 
groups and assaults of individual predators 
and indicate that a historic effort is needed. 

We realize there has been considerable ex- 
pert debate on the point whether there is a 
formal obligation in customary international 
law, rather than just in the conventions, for 
all states to return hijacked passengers and 
crew and to extradite or prosecute hijackers 
and saboteurs. We believe that, in any event, 
they describe a code of conduct that states 
must follow if civil aviation is to prosper in 
a secure environment. And we believe that 
states must establish formal steps — in this 
proposed convention — for individual action 
coordinated by the aviation community 
against states which do not adhere to this 
code to isolate them, if necessary, from the 
aviation community. Failure to adhere to 
this code imperils the very heart of the avia- 
tion system, its safe operation, since failure 
to punish hijackers and saboteurs stands as 
encouragement to others who contemplate 
such acts. The fundamental objective of the 
proposed convention is to protect all who 
have a stake in the safe development of 
civil aviation — passengers, pilots and crew, 
ground personnel, airline companies, states 
dependent on aviation for communication 
and economic development. Does that not 
include all of us? 

Mr. Chairman, the ICAO Council has 
asked us to produce a convention. On June 
19, by the overwhelming vote of 17 to 1, it 
called this subcommittee into being and in- 
structed it "to work on the preparation of an 
international convention to establish appi'O- 
priate multilateral procedures within the 
ICAO framework for determining whether 
there is a need for joint action if it is to be 

October 2, 1972 


The eyes of the world are now upon us. 
The alternative to action at this subcommit- 
tee is to wait — wait until the tragedy of 
events overtakes us, wait until private action 
takes over for government inaction. Let us 
do our task. 


Press release 212 dated September 6 

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: I 
thank you and the members of this confer- 
ence for the opportunity to speak to you 

I know that you share with me the deep 
sense of outrage and grief at the senseless 
and tragic events which have so marred the 
Olympic games. These murders by extremist 
terrorists are more than crimes against the 
citizens of one country. The very spirit which 
the Olympic games represent, the spirit of 
brotherhood and of friendly competition 
among people all over the world, has been 
seriously challenged by this demented action. 

In this time of sorrow all men of good will 
must ask, What can w^e do to help insure 
that such crimes do not continue? For such 
crimes certainly threaten hopes for a more 
peaceful world. At this conference we need 
to remember that the Munich attackers 
sought to commandeer, to hijack, if you will, 
an aircraft to make their escape. We need to 
remember that threats and acts against in- 
ternational air travel are one aspect, but a 
very important aspect, of the international 
terrorism that threatens the lives of innocent 
people regardless of nationality. 

The international community must take 
fiym and prompt action to effectively prevent 
air piracy. If we can do this we will have 
denied to terrorists and would-be terrorists 
one of their most effective weapons and will 
have taken a major step to subdue interna- 
tional lawlessness and terrorism. 

We in the United States are acting in these 
areas. The President has just informed me 
that he is today forwarding the Montreal 

Sabotage Convention to the Senate with an 
urgent request that it be approved for ratifi- 
cation. In addition, I am urgently appealing 
to Congress to act promptly on pending legis- 
lation to strengthen our laws against hijack- 
ing even further and to provide severe penal- 
ties for crimes against diplomats. It seems 
clear to me that, if governments fail to act, 
then by default we will encourage the very 
crimes that we have assembled here to pre- 

International air travel is an important 
element of the interdependence which is in- 
creasingly characteristic of the world in 
which we live. Only strong and concerted 
action by the states of the world will guaran- 
tee the continued safety of air travelers. I 
urge you to bear this in mind in your delib- 

It is imperative, I believe, that this confer- 
ence draft a convention which will put a stop 
to air piracy and terrorism. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you very 
much for this opportunity, brief opportunity, 
to appear here today to express the views of 
my government, the hopes of my govern- 
ment, that the international community can 
take effective action to stop these acts of 
piracy and terrorism. 

Certainly, in a world that has advanced so 
far in so many other areas, science and medi- 
cine and technology, it seems almost beyond 
our comprehension that action can't be taken 
to stop these acts, and I know that you are 
laboring here to achieve a result which we 
all would like to have achieved. But I am 
firmly convinced that we have to take de- 
cisive action, severe action, if you will, to 
make it clear throughout the world that 
criminal acts, criminal acts against innocent 
people, certainly are not an acceptable 
method of solving any of the world's prob- 
lems and certainly in the field of air travel, 
where all persons in the world are involved 
or apt to be involved, we must make a start. 

The Government of the United States is 
prepared to take the most firm, severe action 
that the international community is prepared 


Department of State Bulletin 

to join in. We think it's essential now to act, 
and we think that these tragic events that 
occurred in Munich underscore the necessity 
for action now. 


Article 1 

1. There shall be a Commission of Experts (here- 
inafter referred to as the Commission) composed of 
a body of independent members, elected regardless 
of nationality among persons of high moral charac- 
ter, recognized competence in the field of interna- 
tional civil aviation and international law and who 
may be relied upon to exercise independent judg- 

2. The Commission shall consist of nine members, 
no two of whom may be nationals of the same State. 

3. A person who for the purposes of membership 
of the Commission could be regarded as a national 
of more than one State shall be deemed to be the 
national of the one in which he ordinarily exercises 
civil and political rights. 

4. No person who is the Representative of a State 
on the Council of ICAO shall be eligible for member- 
ship of the Commission during such period as he 
continues to be such Representative. 

Article 2 

1. The following provisions of this Article shall 
govern the election of members of the Commission. 

2. Within ninety days of the entry into force of 
this Convention, the [Depositary] shall convene a 
Convocation of Parties for the purpose of determin- 
ing the membership of the Commission. Thereafter, 
a Convocation of Parties shall meet for the same 
purpose [in conjunction with] [at the same time as] 
each regular meeting of the Assembly of the Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization. 

3. At least thirty days before the meeting of any 
Convocation of Parties each Contracting State may 
designate two qualified persons to serve as members 
of the Commission of Experts. The Depositary shall 
prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons 
thus nominated and shall circulate the list of nomi- 

' Articles 1-11 are a suggested text based on the 
Report of the Working Group Relating to the Cases 
for Joint Action and the First Stage of the Proce- 
dures, which was presented by its chairman, K. O. 
Rattray, of Jamaica. Article [12] was a proposal 
sponsored by Canada, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States which the subcom- 
mittee decided was ready for presentation to the 
Legal Committee for its consideration. 

nations to the Contracting States together with any 
biographical information submitted by Contracting 
States in respect of the nominees. 

4. From the list of nominated persons mentioned 
in paragraph 3 of this Article, the Convocation of 
Parties shall elect the members of the Commission. 

5. In electing members of the Commission, the 
Convocation of Parties shall assure that, on the 
basis of paragraph (b) of Article 50 of the Chicago 
Convention, the composition of the Commission shall 
provide adequate representation for the nominees 

(a) the States of chief importance in air trans- 

(b) the States not otherwise included in sub- 
paragraph (a) of this paragraph which make the 
largest contribution to the provision of facilities for 
international civil air navigation; 

(c) the States not otherwise included in sub- 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph whose 
designation will insure that all the major geographic 
areas of the world are represented on the Com- 

6. Those candidates who obtain an absolute ma- 
jority of [all the parties to the Convention] [the 
parties present and voting] shall be considered as 
elected to the Commission. 

7. In the event of more than one national of the 
same State obtaining an absolute majority of [all 
the parties to the Convention] [the parties present 
and voting] the eldest of these only shall be con- 
sidered as elected. 

Article 3 

1. After each election of the Commission, the Con- 
vocation of Parties shall proceed to elect from the 
remaining persons on the list mentioned in para- 
graph 3 of Article 2 a Panel of Experts. 

2. The Panel of Experts shall consist of fifteen 
persons, no two of whom shall be nationals of the 
same State, and shall be elected in the same manner 
and on the same basis as provided for in paragraphs 
5 and 6 of Article 2. 

3. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 
1 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Panel of 

Article 4 

1. The members of the Commission shall be elected 
for nine years and may not be re-elected; provided, 
however, that of the members of the Commission 
elected at the first election, the terms of three Com- 
missioners shall expire at the end of three years 
and the terms of three more Commissioners shall ex- 
pire at the end of six years. 

2. The Commissioners whose terms are to expire 
at the end of the above-mentioned initial periods of 

October 2, 1972 


three years and six years shall be chosen by lot to be 
drawn by the Chairman of the Convocation of 
Parties immediately after the first election has been 

3. The members of the Commission shall continue 
to discharge their duties until their places have been 
filled. Though replaced, they shall finish any matters 
which they may have begun. 

[Article 5 

1. Vacancies arising in the membership of the 
Commission prior to the expiration of the term of 
the member involved shall be filled for the remainder 
of that term by the Chairman from among the mem- 
bers of the Panel of Experts and in the selection of 
the successor there shall be assured as far as possi- 
ble that the balance of representation prescribed by 
paragraph 5 of Article 2 is maintained.] 

Article 6 

1. Any member of the Commission who was nomi- 
nated by, or a national of 

(a) the Contracting State which has requested the 
Commission to convene; or 

(b) the State of registration or of the operator of 
the aircraft upon or in respect of which an act falling 
under paragraph 1 of Article 9 has been committed; 

(c) the State with respect to which Article 9 has 
been invoked 

shall be disqualified from taking part in the con- 
sideration of the matter upon which the Commission 
has been requested to convene. 

2. When a member of the Commission has been 
disqualified under the provisions of the preceding 
paragraph he shall be replaced on the Commission 
for the purposes of the matter under consideration 
in the manner prescribed by Article 5 for the filling 
of vacancies. 

Article 7 

The Commission shall elect from its members a 
Chairman who shall serve as such throughout his 
term as member. 

Article 8 

1. Members of the Commission, when engaged on 
the business of the Commission, shall enjoy diplo- 
matic privileges and immunities. 

2. Members of the staff of the Commission shall 
enjoy such immunities and privileges as are neces- 
sary for the performance of their functions. 

Article 9 

1. Whenever a Contracting State which is an inter- 
ested State has reason to believe that a person has 
committed any act described in paragraph 1 of 
Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, Article 1 of the 
Hague Convention or Article 1 of the Montreal 

Convention, and that [any State] has contributed to 
a threat to the safety of civil aviation by: 

(a) detaining within its territory any aircraft in- 
volved in such act, its passengers, crew or cargo, or 

(b) unjustifiably failing to take such person into 
custody or take other reasonable measures to se- 
cure his presence and thereafter to extradite him 
or submit the case to its competent authorities for 
the purpose of prosecution, or 

[(c) any other means whatsoever,] 

it may apply to the Commission for a hearing. 

2. The Commission shall not hear any application 
made in pursuance of paragraph 1 of this Article 
unless the applicant has previously requested the 
State alleged to be in default to remove the threat 
of which complaint is made and it has failed to do 

3. When the applicant alleges that a State has 
contributed to a threat to the safety of civil avia- 
tion by reason of circumstances falling under sub- 
paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article, the 
following provisions shall apply: 

(a) The applicant shall at the time of making 
application to the Commission also request the State 
alleged to be in default to permit the passengers 
and crew to continue their journey and to return the 
aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully en- 
titled to possession within 24 hours of the receipt 
of the request; 

(b) if, after the expiration of 24 hours referred 
to in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the re- 
quest has not been complied with, the Commission 
shall thereafter meet to hear the application not 
later than 72 hours fi-om the time the application 
was made and shall make its determination not 
later than 72 hours after its first meeting. 

4. In cases not falling within the preceding para- 
graph, the following provisions shall apply: 

(a) prior to any application to the Commission, 
the State alleged to be in default shall be requested 
to take the necessary measures to remove the 
threat within a period of 30 days; 

(b) if, after the expiration of the period of 30 
days referred to in subparagraph (a) of this para- 
graph, the request has not been complied with, an 
application may be made to the Commission; 

(c) the Commission shall meet not later than 7 
days after the receipt of the application referred 
to in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, and shall 
make its determination not later than 30 days after 
its first meeting. 

5. In respect of any application under this Article, 
it shall be the duty of the Commission to conduct 
such investigations as it deems appropriate, ascertain 
the facts and determine whether [a State] has con- 
tributed in any way to a threat to the safety of civil 


Department of State Bulletin 

6. Any State which submits an application to the 
Commission pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, 
the State alleged to be in default [and any other 
State which the Commission considers to be an 
interested State] shall have the right to appear be- 
fore the Commission by agents, advocates and coun- 
sel and to be heard by the Commission. 

7. At the conclusion of every hearing by the 
Commission under the provisions of this Article, 
there shall be prepared a report embodying the find- 
ings of the Commission, the facts on which such 
findings are based, and containing recommendations 
as to the measures which the Commission considers 
necessary to remove any threat which may exist to 
the safety of civil aviation. In such report, the 
Commission shall also recommend a time-limit with- 
in which the necessary measures shall be taken. 

8. All questions before the Commission shall be 
determined by a majority of the members. 

9. If the report of the Commission does not repre- 
sent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of 
all the members, any member of the Commission 
shall be entitled to submit a separate report. 

10. A copy of the report of the Commission and 
any separate report shall be transmitted to ... . 

11. Without prejudice to the procedures for the 
settlement of differences set out in Article 24 of 
the Tokyo Convention and Article 12 of the Hague 
and Montreal Conventions, there shall be no appeal 
from any determination of the Commission. 

12. An application may be made to the Commis- 
sion for a review of the findings and recommenda- 
tions contained in its report if there is discovered 
some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, 
which fact was unknown to the Commission and 
also to the party seeking a review, always provided 
that such ignorance was not due to negligence. The 
application for review must be made at latest within 
six months of the discovery of the new fact and 
shall not in any case be made after the lapse of . . . 
years from the date of the report of the Commission. 

Article 10 

The States parties to this Convention undertake 

to give the greatest measure of assistance to the 

Commission in order to enable it to carry out its 
functions effectively. 

Article 11 

Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the 
rules set forth in Annex A hereto shall govern the 
procedure of the Commission and shall remain in 
force until changed by a simple majority vote of 
the Commission. 

Article [12] 
Joint Action 

1. When pursuant to Article 1 a State has been 
determined to have contributed in any way to a 

threat to the safety of civil aviation, and prior 
to the time limit fixed by the Commission of Ex- 
perts, the complaining State may request the Presi- 
dent of the Council of the International Civil Avia- 
tion Organization to use his good offices to aid in 
the removal of such threat. 

2. If a State determined to have contributed in 
any way to a threat to the safety of civil aviation 
fails to act upon the recommendations of the Com- 
mission of Experts and remove such threat within 
the time limit fixed by the Commission of Experts, 
the rights of such State under the Chicago Conven- 
tion, under the International Air Services Transit 
Agreement, and under bilateral air services agree- 
ments or any other arrangements contemplated by 
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention shall be sus- 
pended in the territories of the States parties to this 
Convention, and shall remain suspended until the 
Commission has determined that the State has acted 
upon the recommendations of the Commission of 
Experts and has removed the threat to the safety of 
civil aviation. 

3. (a) If a State determined to have contributed 
in any way to a threat to the safety of civil aviatit-a 
fails to act upon the recommendations of the Coni- 
mission of Experts and remove such threat withn: 
ten (10) days after the time limit fixed by the Com- 
mission of Experts pursuant to Article [9(7)], or, if 
the determination relates to detention of an aircraft, 
its passengers, crew or cargo, within 72 hours after 
such time limit, the States parties to this Conven- 
tion which are interested or air service States ' shall 
meet at the request of any one of such States for the 
purpose of reaching a decision on joint action which 
they should take with respect to the State deter- 
mined by the Commission to have contributed to a 
threat to the safety of civil aviation. Such joint 
action may include any measures to preserve and 
promote the safety and security of civil aviation, 
including collective suspension of all international 
air navigation to and from such State. 

(b) Non-Contracting interested and air service 
States may be present at and participate in the 
proceedings of any meeting held pursuant to sub- 
paragraph (a) but shall not be entitled to vote. In 
order for the meeting to act there must be a quorum 
of three-fifths of the States entitled to vote at such 

' While the subcommittee did not consider the 
definition of "interested State" or "air service State," 
its report notes that such definitions were provided in 
a draft which was before the subcommittee. That 
draft provided essentially that an "interested State" 
is one in which a detained aircraft is registered or 
operated, in which an act of hijacking or sabotage 
has taken place, or whose nationals have been de- 
tained or have suffered death or physical injury as a 
result of such an act and that an "air service State" 
is one having international air service to or from an 
offending state. 

October 2, 1972 


meeting. Any decision on joint action shall be 
taken by [a majority] [two-thirds] of States pres- 
ent and voting [except that any decision involving 
the limitation or suspension of international air 
services shall also require [a majority] [two-thirds] 
of air service States present and voting.] 

(c) Any decision taken pursuant to this para- 
graph shall be * 

Alternative 1: 

binding on all States Parties to this Convention 
and recommendatory with respect to all non-Con- 
tracting States entitled to participate in the meet- 

Alternative 2: 

binding on all States Parties to this Convention 
which voted in favour of such decision and recom- 
mendatory with respect to all other Contracting 
States and to all non-Contracting States entitled 
to participate in the meeting. 

Alternative 3: 

recommendatory with respect to all States Par- 
ties and to all non-Contracting States entitled to 
participate in the meeting. 

We extend our deepest condolences to the 
families of those Israelis who have lost their 
lives in this incident. With all nations and 
peoples around the world, we fervently hope 
that no further innocent lives will be sacri- 
ficed. This assault on the Israeli Olympic 
team is offensive to men and women of good 
will everywhere for whom the Olympic 
games are a symbol of man's striving for 
reconciliation and peace. 

Second Statement 

Press release 211 dated September B 

There are no words which can fully ex- 
press our reaction to today's tragedy at the 
Olympic games. I know I speak for all Amer- 
icans in extending the deepest sympathies 
of the United States to the families of those, 
Israelis and Germans alike, who have died 
because of this appalling, senseless deed. 

U.S. Mourns Death of Members 
of Israeli Olympic Team 

Folloiving are statements by Secretary 
Rogers issued September 5, remarks by 
President Nixon made to news correspond- 
ents at San Francisco, Calif., that day, and 
the text of a message sent by President 
Nixon to Is7'aeli Prime Minister Golda Meir 
on September 6. 

First Statement 

Press release 209 dated September 5 

I have asked the Israeli Ambassador to 
convey to the Israeli Government and people 
our profound sorrow and sense of horror at 
the callous, outrageous attack this morning 
on the Israeli athletes in their quarters in 
Olympic Village in Munich. 

* The alternatives will require further study by 
the Legal Committee. 


White House press release (San Francisco) dated September B 

Gentlemen: I had the opportunity this 
morning before I left San Clemente to call 
Prime Minister Meir on the phone. I reached 
her just before we left. I talked with her 
for some eight minutes. 

I expressed sympathy on behalf of all the 
American people for the victims of this 
murderous action in Munich. I also told her 
that she could expect total cooperation from 
the Government of the United States in any 
way that would be helpful in obtaining the 
release of the hostages being held there in 

In addition to that, I raised with her the 
problem of what we could do in the future in 
this respect. I asked her whether or not 
Israeli intelligence had any information with 
regard to the possibility of this happening. 
They did not have any information. 

Incidentally, Israeli intelligence, we have 
found, is among the best in the world. She 
said the reason was that while the Olympic 
games were being held in Munich, there 
just weren't any expectations that this kind 
of a group would be able to get in and en- 


Department of State Bulletin 

gage in the kind of activity that they have 
engaged in. However, we are dealing here 
with international outlaws of the worst sort 
who will stoop to anything in order to ac- 
complish their goals and who are totally 

Under the circumstances, I said to the 
Prime Minister, looking to the future, that 
we had to anticipate that Israeli citizens 
traveling abroad would be subject to such ac- 
tivities in the future. Naturally, we cannot 
do anything with regard to what happens in 
other countries, that is their responsibility 
primarily, except we can indicate our inter- 
est. But I said in the United States that we 
would try to do everything we could with 
regard to groups of Israeli citizens traveling 
in the United States to see that where there 
is any information at all with regard to a 
possible attempt of this sort that adequate 
security measures are taken. 

Finally, as you know, the games have 
been postponed until the hostages are re- 
leased and the people who are guilty are 
apprehended, or those charged with guilt. 
There is very little words can say to indi- 
cate the concern we have for the families of 
the victims. But to have this happen in an 
international meeting with an unblemished 
record — this being the 20th Olympics, going 
back over 80 years — an unblemished record 
of no incidents of this sort, this is indeed a 
great tragedy and I know the whole world 
shares the views that I expressed to Mrs. 

Q. Are you satisfied about the security of 
American athletes, particularly American 
Jewish athletes at the Olympic games? 

The President: I am never satisfied with 
security when you see incidents like this, 
but I believe that we have adequate security 
measures, and as I have indicated or at least 
implied in my remarks here, since we are 
dealing with international outlaws who are 
unpredictable, we have to take extra security 
measures, extra security measures to protect 
those who might be targets of this kind of 
activity in the future. That might include 
Americans of Israeli background, American 
citizens. It is more likely to be directed, how- 

ever, against Israeli citizens, because what 
they want to do is get levei-age with the 
Israeli Government with regard to people 
held by the Israeli Government. However, 
we are not taking any chances in doing 
everything we can to protect our own citi- 


White House press release dated September 6 

Dear Madame Prime Minister: The heart 
of America goes out to you, to the bereaved 
families and to the Israeli people in the 
tragedy that has struck your Olympic ath- 
letes. This tragic and senseless act is a per- 
version of all the hopes and aspirations of 
mankind which the Olympic games symbol- 
ize. In a larger sense, it is a tragedy for all 
the peoples and nations of the world. W' 
mourn with you the deaths of your innocent 
and brave athletes, and we share with .you 
the determination that the spirit of brouier- 
hood and peace they represented shall in the 
end persevere. 

Richard Nixon. 

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Middle East 
Resolution in U.N. Security Council 

Folloiving are statements made in the U.N. 
Security Council on September 10 by U.S. 
Representative George Bush, together with 
the texts of a draft resolution and proposed 

First Statement 

USUN press release 91 dated September 10 

The Council is meeting today on a com- 
plaint by the Syrian Government. The Mid- 
dle East has again been the scene of violence, 
as it has so often in the past. The Council is 

October 2, 1972 


again seized of a problem with which it has 
repeatedly failed in the past to come to grips 
in an equitable way. 

We should all recall that until a few days 
ago the world had again dared to hope be- 
cause a climate of reasonableness and real- 
ism seemed to be developing in the area. 
There were grounds to hope that new oppor- 
tunities for progress toward peace in the 
Middle East were opening up before us. 
Then came "Munich" — the senseless act of 
terrorism there which cast a pall over these 
hopes. Yet we are now meeting on a com- 
plaint by Syria — a complaint that stands out 
for its unreality. It makes no reference to 
the tragic events at Munich. It gives no 
salve to the wounded conscience of an ago- 
nized world. 

There is an obvious connection between 
the actions of which the Syrian Government 
now complains and the tragic events which 
took place in Munich this past Tuesday. Did 
the Syrian Government join in complaint or 
expressions of outrage when terrorists in- 
vaded the Olympic Village, in violation not 
only of law but of the spirit of Olympic 
brotherhood, and murdered innocent ath- 
letes? Did we hear even a word of condemna- 
tion from the Government of Syria for this 
despicable act? No, quite the contrary. The 
Syrian Government continues to harbor and 
to give aid and encouragement to terrorist 
organizations which openly champion such 

And the Syrian Government is not alone in 
its encouragement of terrorism. Certain 
other governments in the area — whether by 
word and deed or by silent acquiescence and 
failure to disassociate themselves from the 
acts of a minority that preaches and prac- 
tices lawlessness and violence — cannot be 
absolved of responsibility for the cycle of 
violence and counterviolence we have again 
witnessed this past week. 

Mr. President, the ultimate root of the 
problem is, of course, the absence of peace 
in the Middle East. My government has 
labored long and hard in this cause; in the 

effort to achieve a just and durable peace the 
United States has been and will continue to 
be second to none. 

We shall continue to work toward the goal 
of peace, but the absence of peace cannot be 
exploited as a pretext for violence on any 
side. Those who preach violence and employ 
it as a matter of policy always suffer its con- 
sequences, for violence always begets vio- 
lence. The crimes that were carried out at 
Lod and at Munich cannot but breed tragedy 
for their perpetrators and for those who 
befriend them. States which harbor and 
give succor to terrorists cannot then claim 
sanctuary for themselves. The greatest 
tragedy of all is that when violence is em- 
ployed, innocent people on all sides are 
almost inevitably made to suffer. Slain 
Olympic athletes in Munich — or heartbroken 
mothers searching for dead under rubble in 
Rafid — these are some of the immediate vic- 
tims of terror. But indeed the whole civilized 
world is the real victim of terror. Mr. Presi- 
dent, we deplore the loss of lives on both 

Today the United States is engaged in a 
major effort, along with other members of 
the international community, to make our 
airways, our sports fields, and our other 
gathering places safe from terrorism and 
violence. A beginning has been made, in 
various international conventions dealing 
with aircraft hijacking and related problems, 
to establish a strong framework of law in 
these matters among the nations of our 
interdependent world. Secretary Rogers has 
urged rapid and meaningful action in the 
subcommittee of ICAO [International Civil 
Aviation Organization] now meeting in 
Washington. He has urged rapid action in 
ratifying existing conventions by govern- 
ments that have not yet done so. But recent 
events make clear that the problem is much 
broader and more pernicious in nature. My 
government urges that the issue of terrorism 
in all its aspects receive the highest priority 
when the General Assembly convenes later 
this month. The commendable initiative of 


Department of State Bulletin 

the Secretary General in placing this ques- 
tion on the Assembly's agenda insures that 
the world can no longer close its eyes to this 
pressing matter. 

Mr. President, the United States will con- 
tinue to work for a just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East. But one-sided resolutions 
of the type which this Council has so fre- 
quently adopted in recent times do not con- 
tribute to the goal of peace; indeed, they 
create an atmosphere in no way conducive to 
peace by encouraging perpetrators and sup- 
porters of acts of terrorism to believe they 
can escape the world's censure. 

Let us not put our heads in the sand and 
perpetuate the notion of "unreality" that is 
often assigned to the United Nations. 

Munich was so horrible, so vicious, so 
brutal, so detrimental to order in the world 
and to peace in the Middle East that we sim- 
ply must not act here as if it did not exist. 

We believe each member of the Council, 
indeed of the entire international community, 
should make it unmistakably clear that acts 
of terror and violence practiced against in- 
nocent people as a matter of policy are un- 
acceptable in a civilized world. Each of us 
has a responsibility to make clear that those 
who practice such acts, or aid and abet them 
in any way, are the ones deserving of censure 
and condemnation. Only then will we begin 
to eliminate this scourge from the earth and 
with it the acts of counterviolence to which 
history inevitably proves it gives rise. 

Mr. President, in closing, I would like to 
read out the text of a resolution which could 
be helpful to address itself to the thrust of 
our remarks here and which we would now 
like to introduce: 1 

The Security Council, 

Gravely concerned at the renewal of terrorist 
attacks on innocent persons, 

Deploring the loss of innocent lives on both sides 
and the outbreak of renewed violence in the Middle 

Convinced that acts of terrorism, and any en- 

'The U.S. draft resolution (S/10785) was not 
pressed to a vote. 

couragement and support for such acts, are totally 
unacceptable in a civilized society and are inimical 
to the maintenance of the cease-fire in the Middle 

1. Condemns the senseless and unprovoked ter- 
rorist attack in Munich on September 5 by terrorists 
of the so-called Black September organization which 
resulted in the loss of life of numerous innocent 

2. Calls upon those States harbouring and support- 
ing such terrorists and their activities to cease their 
encouragement and support of terrorists, and to take 
all necessary measures to bring about the immediate 
end of such senseless acts. 

Second Statement 

USUN press release 92 dated September 10 

My delegation did not lightly decide to vote 
against the three-power resolution. Our sup- 
port of Resolution 242, our abhorrence of 
violence, is a matter of record. Our support 
of this Council over the many years is also a 
matter of record. 

We, however, are deeply convinced that 
the Council would have done neither the 
parties nor itself any good by adopting a 
resolution which ignored realities, which 
spoke to one form of violence and not 
another, which looked to effect but not to 

We do not countenance violations of inter- 
national law. We do not countenance terror- 
ist acts. We seek and support a world in 
which athletes need not fear assassins and 
passengers on planes need not fear hijacking 
or assassination. We seek a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East. And we will con- 
tinue to work toward these ends. 

It was said here today that we might be 
making a constructive move if we could con- 
tain the situation by calling for cessation of 
all militai-y operations. But can anybody 
suggest that the situation today is unrelated 
to the Munich massacre? It is related. It is 
directly related. The fabric of violence in the 
Middle East is inextricably interwoven with 
the massacre in Munich. 

Is it not a double standard to suggest that 
states must control their own forces, a point 
which we readily grant, but that these states 

October 2, 1972 


need not control irregular forces in their ter- 
ritory, forces of murder, forces of terror? 

We have been walking a very dangerous 
path by our silence on terrorism. We invite 
more terrorism by our silence on the disaster 
in Munich. Are we, indeed, inviting more 

We had hoped that all nations would de- 
plore terrorism, deplore it by statement, de- 
plore it by vote as well. 

Mr. President, it is for these reasons that 
we cast a negative vote against the resolu- 


The Security Council, 

Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in 
the Middle East, 

Calls on the parties concerned to cease immedi- 
ately all military operations and to exercise the 
greatest restraint in the interest of international 
peace and security. 


1. After the first preambular paragraph insert a 
second preambular paragraph as follows: 

"Deploring deeply all acts of terrorism and vio- 
lence and all breaches of the cease-fire in the Middle 

2. In the operative paragraph : 

(a) Replace "the parties" by "all parties" 

(b) Delete "cease immediately all military opera- 
tions" and substitute "take all measures for the 
immediate cessation and prevention of all military 
operations and terrorist activities" 

"U.N. doc. S/10784; the resolution was rejected 
owing to the negative vote of a permanent member 
of the Council, the vote being 13 in favor, 1 against 
(U.S.), with 1 abstention (Panama). 

'U.N. doc. S/10786; submitted by the U.K. and 
cosponsored by Belgium, France, and Italy. Para- 
graph 1 received 8 votes in favor (U.S.), 4 against 
(China), with 3 abstentions (U.S.S.R.); paragraph 
2(a), 9 in favor (U.S.), 6 against (China, U.S.S.R.); 
paragraph 2(b), 8 in favor (U.S.) and 7 against 
(China, U.S.S.R.). 

159th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Follo7vmg are remarks made by Am,bassa- 
dor William, J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, at the 159th plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Septem,- 
ber lit. 


Press release 224 dated September 14 

Ladies and gentlemen: Today I wish to 
examine your proposal for a tripartite gov- 
ernment in South Viet-Nam, a proposal you 
have termed "flexible and realistic." I main- 
tain of course that proposals concerning fu- 
ture political arrangements in South Viet- 
Nam are the business of the South Vietnam- 
ese people, but inasmuch as you have dis- 
cussed United States "responsibilities" in 
connection with this matter, my purpose is to 
demonstrate that you have merely repeated 
proposals that are as unreasonable as they 
are unworkable, both procedurally and sub- 
stantively. My comments are based on your 
statements in this forum and recent elabora- 
tions to the press. If I do not state matters 
correctly, let me assure you we will listen 
with attention to your comments or clarifica- 
tions. But please be specific. 

You propose a government composed of 
first, the Viet Cong; second, a neutral group 
of persons who favor "peace, independence, 
neutrality, and democracy," as you have de- 
scribed them; and third, representatives of 
the Government in Saigon. Each of these 
three elements, you declare, would function 
within such a government, on what you call 
a basis of "equal strength and equal footing." 
This so-called "transitional" government 
would regulate conditions for a cease-fire and 
preparations for an election which could take 
place at some later date. 

Under your formula, the United States 
should undertake the first steps to bring 


Department of State Bulletin 

about such a government by ordaining 
changes in the political, military, and admin- 
istrative structure of South Viet-Nam. 

The changes would be those which you, the 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, might then 
deem sufficiently satisfactory to enable you to 
engage in direct negotiations with the Gov- 
ernment in Saigon concerning the formation 
of a tripartite government. Specifically, the 
changes you demand before you will agree to 
such negotiation include: the departure of 
the chief of state and his senior administra- 
tors in the army and the civil government, 
the release of all North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong prisoners of war and civilians detained 
for crimes against the state, and a total 
change of the policy of the emasculated Sai- 
gon Government thus created. 

At the same time the North Vietnamese 
army would remain in South Viet-Nam dur- 
ing and after these changes and would not 
cease military activity there until the tri- 
partite government is formed, if then. More- 
over, you furnish no plan for the North Viet- 
namese army to return to North Viet-Nam. 
You are silent as to when that would happen. 
You would release none of our men who are 
prisoners, nor would you accept any of your 
sick and wounded men whom the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam has offered 
to repatriate, until all your conditions, polit- 
ical or military, were met. 

These, let me repeat, are your precondi- 
tions for negotiation as we understand them. 
In our view they are far from "transitional" 
in nature but would determine the outcome 
not only of any negotiations on a form of 
government for South Viet-Nam but also 
of any elections which you might subse- 
quently choose to hold in South Viet-Nam. 
However, we believe both logic and justice 
require that a fair, internationally super- 
vised, and truly democratic consultation 
should precede the formation of a govern- 
ment, not follow it. 

Now let me speak to your aims, as we 
understand them, in the actual formation of 
a tripartite government if your preconditions 

were achieved. There would first be the Viet 
Cong segment, which would amount to one- 
third of the total number of participants. 
With that provision, you give yourselves a 
generous slice of the government, far in 
excess of what unprejudiced observers be- 
lieve you could achieve were you to accept the 
principle that your political status, along 
with that of other political forces in South 
Viet-Nam, should be determined through an 
election under international supervision. 

As for the neutral segment, composed of 
those you call peace loving, you say they 
would be appointed through "consultations," 
but I infer that you would expect to name 
half of them outright. Please tell me if this 
is correct. One can reasonably express a 
belief at this point that such a method of 
selection would, along with the Viet Cong ele- 
ment, raise your effective participation at 
least to the 50-percent level. What method 
of selection do you envisage for the re- 
mainder of the neutral elements who might 
be asked to join such a government? Do you 
expect to exercise a veto if you deem it 
necessary from your viewpoint to exclude 
certain persons from it? We would welcome 
clarification of that point. 

As the North Vietnamese army would, 
under your proposals, still be involved at 
that juncture in all-out military activities in 
the South, one can reasonably judge that 
your influence on the unarmed neutral ele- 
ment of your proposed government would 
indeed be considerable. 

We now come to the third segment of the 
tripartite government — the modified Saigon 
Government as adapted to your precondi- 

We bear in mind the fact that your pre- 
conditions to negotiation require the removal 
of South Vietnamese leaders in both the mili- 
tary and civil administrations, and in the 
other areas I have described, while the North 
Vietnamese army remains in full attack 
activity in the South. If your preconditions 
were met, how could any form of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam deal with 

October 2, 1972 


such a situation? The remnant of the Gov- 
ernment would have no political leadership, 
no military leadership, no effective adminis- 
tration, while all North Vietnamese pris- 
oners and others who have fought against 
the state would be released to prey on the 
public. Is this how you conceive of "equal 
strength and equal footing"? 

If my analysis is correct with regard to 
the North Vietnamese -Viet Cong representa- 
tion in the tripartite government, the North 
Vietnamese -Viet Cong control over the 
choice of neutral elements, and the situation 
which your preconditions would create for the 
Saigon administration, an interesting tableau 
emerges: With the North Vietnamese army 
operating at full force in South Viet-Nam, 
you would have the Viet Cong's one-third of 
the tripartite government, plus a very con- 
siderable influence on both the so-called "neu- 
tral" element and the Saigon Government ele- 
ment, which under your plan would have 
been deprived of its strength. 

What you are after seems clear. You are 
trying to predetermine the future of the peo- 
ple of South Viet-Nam, and you feel you 
must avoid at all costs a people's decision 
under international supervision. 

This kind of situation has been described 
before. I will read you a short passage from 
an English classic: 

"Let the jury consider their verdict," the King 
said, for about the twentieth time that day. 

"No, no!" said the Red Queen, "sentence first — 
verdict afterwards." 

This expresses, as well as one could wish, 
your feeling about an independently or- 
ganized and internationally supervised elec- 
tion which would determine the wishes of the 
people of South Viet-Nam. The United States 
has agreed to abide by such an election or 
any other political processes shaped by the 
South Vietnamese people themselves. You 

want to sentence the people of that country 
to a Communist existence before they can 
render a verdict by vote. Is this not what 
your version of "national concord" govern- 
ment really means? 

If I have not correctly analyzed the se- 
quence and substance envisaged by your pro- 
posals, let me assure you again that we would 
welcome specific comment on any or all parts 
of my statement. 


Press release 224/A dated September 14 

Today you have heard from us a detailed 
analysis of your tripartite-government pro- 
posal, and you have been offered an oppor- 
tunity to comment on any elements of that 
analysis you wish. 

I suggest you make use of this opportunity 
because, both as it stands and on the past 
record, your proposal is widely regarded as 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and unworkable. It 
is not even consistent with your professed 
adherence to the principle of self-determina- 
tion for the South Vietnamese people. Do 
you wish to try to dispel this impression by 
making specific comments addressed to the 
points we have raised? 

For the past several weeks we have been 
seeking from you, the delegate of North Viet- 
Nam, a response to the offer of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam to repatri- 
ate 600 sick and wounded North Vietnamese 
soldiers captured in South Viet-Nam. This 
would be, as you know, in keeping with the 
letter sent by President Ton Due Thang in 
July on the occasion of Wounded Combatants 
and Fallen Heroes Day. President Thang's 
letter declared it the duty of the party and 
Government of North Viet-Nam to love and 
help sick and wounded soldiers. Can you say 
something about this today ? 


Department of State Bulletin 

American Foreign Policy in a Shifting Setting 

Address by Richard F. Pedersen 
Counselor of the Department ' 

I suppose that people from most cultures 
and most periods of history, as they look at 
themselves, are impressed by the degree of 
change that is taking place around them. 
Probably this has always been true. Even 
Adam and Eve as they were leaving the 
Garden of Eden doubtless recognized that 
they were living in an age of transition. 

So it was with some hesitation that I de- 
cided to speak today about the rapidly shift- 
ing setting within which the government has 
recently made so many advances in Ameri- 
can foreign policy. Yet it is important to 
comprehend the significance of this transi- 
tion in international affairs, for it will con- 
tinue through the next decade and the next 
quarter of a century. The remolding our 
foreign policy is undergoing is designed to 
assure that American interests are well 
served in this new environment — one domi- 
nated no longer by the aftermath of the 
Second World War, but shaped by an accu- 
mulation of changing circumstances that re- 
quire fresh policies. Four factors are critical 
in this change. 

First, we are entering a world in which 
the bipolar pattern dominant in the last 
quarter century has given way to multiple 
centers of power and influence. 

Throughout the postwar period the major 
emphases of American foreign policy were 
directed toward combating expansionist tend- 
encies in the Communist world and toward 

^ Made before the Kentucky Federation of Wom- 
en's Clubs at Barren River Lake State Resort Park, 
Ky., on Sept. 7 (Department of State press release 
dated Sept. 7). 

buttressing the economies and the security 
of our allies. These were essential emphases, 
and they enjoyed the support of the Ameri- 
can people. 

Now new policy requirements are becom- 
ing clear. Soviet hegemony over the Com- 
munist world, though still pursued, has been 
irrevocably breached. Western countries, 
once weak both economically and militarily, 
have achieved high standards of living and 
renewed self-reliance. 

Growing Centers of Influence 

Power, defined in political and economic as 
well as in military terms, no longer is the 
near-exclusive province of ourselves and the 
Soviets. The dominant relationships in this 
decade will not be between two centers of in- 
fluence, but among five. Western Europe, Ja- 
pan, and China have moved to the front of 
the world stage. 

Let us look at some of the facts. The move- 
ment toward cohesion which is bringing 
western Europe back into a role of world 
leadership began in earnest when the Euro- 
pean Common Market was created in 1957. 
Ten years ago the six countries of the Euro- 
pean Economic Community (France, West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg) had a combined gross na- 
tional product of $360 billion. The continued 
successes of the Market made the values of a 
large economic area and the prospective val- 
ues of growing political cooperation increas- 
ingly clear. As a result others decided to 
join; soon the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Norway, and Ireland will also be members. 

October 2, 1972 


The total gross national product of the new 
Market will then be in the neighborhood of 
$800 billion. Thus, within a decade western 
Europe's principal economic and political en- 
tity will have more than doubled its economic 
capacity. It will have a gross national prod- 
uct fully 75 percent as large as our own 
economy. And it will have an external trade 
some $40 billion in excess of ours, making it 
easily the largest trading unit in the world. 

Political cooperation among Community 
members is still in formative stages, and eco- 
nomic cooperation among sovereign states 
does not translate directly into world influ- 
ence. But the economic weight of the Com- 
munity is already making itself felt. And 
there is little doubt that western Europe's 
collective voice will become an increasingly 
strong one in world affairs. 

In Asia the phenomenon of economic 
growth has expressed itself in national dy- 
namism rather than international cohesion. 
In the past 10 years Japan has more than 
doubled its gross national product, from $100 
billion to over $250 billion. It produces more 
than any country in the world other than the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. It has passed 
the Soviet Union in per capita production; 
indeed, in this it is now comparable to west- 
ern Europe. In its own area. East Asia, it far 
outproduces all other countries — including 
Communist China — combined. A Japanese 
research organization has only recently pre- 
dicted a total Japanese production by 1980 
of almost $1 trillion — our own current level — 
with production per person fully equal to 
that which the United States will then 

Whether this forecast will prove entirely 
accurate or not is not as important as the 
fact that the trend is clearly set. And the 
trend toward a stronger, healthier, and more 
influential Japan outlines in sharp relief the 
vital significance of the close cooperation be- 
tween Japan and the United States which 
President Nixon and Prime Minister Tanaka 
reaffirmed only last week.- 

Finally, China. Here it is not economic 

strength that makes China a force to be 
reckoned with, because it is still one of the 
poorest countries in the world. But it has 
forged a policy and an influence of its own 
within Communist societies, in Asia, and in 
some parts of the developing world. With a 
growing nuclear delivery capability, a popu- 
lation of 800 million, and an ancient culture 
which gives it sustenance, the People's Re- 
public of China clearly is a growing force 
whose influence on world events in the next 
decade will far exceed that in the past. 

Positive Elements of Five-Power Relationship 

I have spoken of the emerging five-power 
relationship as a basically positive thing. One 
might well ask why it is positive, since it 
would seem to mean a decrease in relative 
influence and power for the United States. 
To this I would make two principal re- 

The fii'st is that the emergence of a strong 
and healthy western Europe and Japan is 
the successful result of many years of United 
States policy. That policy was based on the 
concept that the strengthening of our 
friends — the equivalent of a reduction of our 
relative strength — can only strengthen us. 
An economically healthy, responsible Japan 
will be a powerful and cooperative ally in 
promoting a peaceful and increasingly pros- 
perous Asia. A western Europe less frag- 
mented and speaking with a more unified and 
confident voice will be a powerful force in 
support of our basic goals in international 
affairs. The movement of our western Euro- 
pean and Japanese friends into the center of 
the international scene therefore enhances, 
rather than weakens, our overall world posi- 

My second response would be that partici- 
pation of both the Soviet Union and China 
in this new world relationship will give fur- 
ther impetus to the growing diversity in the 

' For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 25, 1972, 
p. 329. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Coniniiinist system and at the same time 
stimulate each toward greater concourse and 
interdependence with other countries. As di- 
versity grows within the Communist system, 
its countries may be expected to become less 
rigid and more pragmatic in their dealings 
with others. And as each country's stake in 
interdependence grows, so also should its in- 
centive to avoid the damage to the interna- 
tional fabric which war causes. 

We have carefully sought not to exacerbate 
the rift between China and the Soviet Union 
or to exploit it against either country. The 
fact remains that their differences helped to 
create the unparalleled opportunity we have 
recently had to improve our relations and to 
create new patterns of working with both. 

Indeed, the overall prospect is for engage- 
ment of the two Communist powers in a 
web of relationships with leading non-Com- 
munist nations. Such increasing interdepend- 
ence should in time temper cold war enmities 
and increase chances for a more durable 
peace. In part this is what the President 
meant when he spoke of building "a structure 
of peace to which all nations contribute and 
in which all nations have a stake." ^ 

Environment of Disarmament 

A second important factor in the new set- 
ting of our diplomacy is that we are on the 
verge of moving from a period dominated by 
technological improvements and major aug- 
mentations in strategic arms into an environ- 
ment characterized by progressive measures 
of disarmament and arms control. 

Consider these two statements: 

". . . an agreement to limit strategic arms 
can be lasting only if it enhances the sense 
of security of both sides." * 

"The determining factor in the success of 
the (SALT) talks is strict adherence to the 
principle of equal security of both sides, and 
the abandonment of all efforts to gain uni- 
lateral advantage at the expense of the other 

The first quotation is from President Nix- 

on, the second from Soviet Communist Party 
General Secretary Brezhnev. Both were 
made well before any SALT [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks] agreement had been 
reached. Together they represented the nec- 
essary consensus on approach which made 
the resulting agreements possible. 

We have signed and we should soon ratify 
the first agreement ever reached to curb the 
growth of offensive and defensive strategic 
weapons. When we do we will also have un- 
dertaken a treaty commitment to continue 
negotiations on further limitations of offen- 
sive weapons. Twenty-five years of prelim- 
inary negotiations and agreements in sec- 
ondary, though important, aspects of mod- 
ern armaments have reached fruition in these 
restraints upon the continued expansion of 
nuclear arms. The turning of this corner may 
well have placed the world in a new arms 
framework, one that may be called an envi- 
ronment of disarmament. It is our hope that 
it will be an environment of growing incen- 
tives by both sides to further curb strategic 
arms and incentives to other nations to 
achieve conventional arms limitations as well. 

Little noticed in the SALT agreements has 
been a provision creating a bilateral Stand- 
ing Consultative Commission with a broad 
mandate over matters of verification, ex- 
change of information, and compliance and 
also with a mandate to examine possible 
changes in the strategic situation and to con- 
sider, as appropriate, proposals for further 
measures aimed at limiting strategic arms. 
Such an established mechanism of coopera- 
tion and consultation, augmenting our arms 
negotiations, could become an important fo- 
rum for building confidence and exchanging 
views in confidence about strategic concepts 

^The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in 
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; part I, "1971— The 
Watershed Year — An Overview," begins on p. 314. 

'The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, ap- 
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the section 
entitled "Arms Control" begins on p. 327. 

October 2, 1972 


and relationships. We thus have set in mo- 
tion a process which could sustain and under- 
score the arms control atmosphere which 
now prevails, leading not just to a limitation 
of strategic arms but to their reduction as 

With persistence we may also anticipate 
the extension of this climate into conven- 
tional areas. Except for the Chinese-Soviet 
border, for example, central Europe remains 
the scene of the greatest concentration of 
troops in the world. During the President's 
visit to Moscow we and the Soviets agreed 
that stability and security in Europe would 
be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed 
forces and armaments and that agreement 
should be reached on the procedures for ne- 
gotiating that reduction. It is our desire to 
begin such negotiations soon, and we are in 
consultation with our allies and the Soviets 
to that end. 

It would be idle to pretend that far-reach- 
ing disarmament measures will come quick- 
ly. After all, they involve the vital security of 
nations. Nevertheless, we are already in a 
better climate for such progress than at any 
time since the war. We can be hopeful that by 
the end of this decade there will be signifi- 
cantly less reliance on policies of force and 
more on the politics of negotiation. 

Greater Prominence of Economic Relations 

If our policies must be adjusted to deal 
with an environment characterized by multi- 
ple sources of authority and by more prom- 
inent attention to arms control, so must they 
also be adjusted to give greater priority to 
our international economic interests. In the 
year that has elapsed since the President ini- 
tiated our new economic policies, Americans 
have certainly become more aware of the 
connection between our economic relations 
with others and the jobs, the wages, and the 
goods we buy and sell in this country. An 
America that had grown accustomed to a 
preeminent position in world economic af- 
fairs learned that with the growing strength 

of others — a strength properly encouraged 
by our own liberal policies — serious prob- 
lems had arisen. Our trade had gone from a 
substantial surplus to an even more substan- 
tial deficit. Our balance of payments deficit 
had increased alarmingly. The exchange rate 
of the dollar was out of alignment. 

These problems developed even in a pe- 
riod when our agricultural exports were in- 
creasing to a quarter of our entire agricul- 
tural production and our manufacturing 
exports to well over 10 percent of our manu- 
facturing production. They developed partly 
because of inflationary and productivity 
problems in our economy, partly because oth- 
ers had become more efficient and more com- 

In any case, next year and in the years 
that follow we will be engaged in far-reach- 
ing trade and monetary negotiations with 
our major trading partners — the enlarged 
European Common Market, which takes a 
quarter of our trade; with Canada, an eighth; 
and with Japan, a tenth. Our principal in- 
terests will be to restore a sustainable bal- 
ance in our trading relationships with others 
while preserving, and extending, the liberal 
system which has made it possible for world 
trade to increase fivefold since 1950. We will 
expect fair access for our exports in foreign 
markets. We must in turn be prepared to 
continue to provide comparable access to for- 
eign goods in our own market. 

We estimate that for the country as a 
whole 3 million American jobs are directly 
dependent upon exports. Certainly an agri- 
cultural and mining State such as Kentucky 
has a large stake in a liberal trade policy. Of 
your $750 million production of bituminous 
coal, for example, 20 percent can be expected 
to be exported and of your major crop, to- 
bacco, well over 40 percent. 

Economic relationships will also become a 
more prominent aspect of our foreign policy 
in the future because of our constantly in- 
creasing consumption of energy and nonre- 
newable resources. Americans account for 


Department of State Bulletin 

some 40 percent of the world's nonrenewable 
resources that are consumed each year. We 
consume, for example, 42 percent of the 
world's aluminum production, 38 percent of 
its nickel, and 32 percent of its cobalt. But 
our own reserves of these important metals 
are, in each case, less than 2 percent of total 
world reserves. 

The case of petroleum is perhaps the most 
dramatic, because no American has to be re- 
minded how important petroleum is to our 
automobilized and central-heated economy. 
Oil today supplies more than two-fifths of 
our total energy demand. We are by far the 
largest consumer of oil in the world, taking 
a full third of the world's annual consump- 
tion. And yet the reserves in our own coun- 
try are relatively meager — only 7 percent of 
the world total. By contrast, tiny Kuwait, 
with an area less than one-sixth that of Ken- 
tucky and a population only twice that of 
Louisville, has over twice as much proven 
liquid oil as the entire United States. Al- 
though we now import only about 25 percent 
of our consumption, our uses are expected 
to increase so rapidly that we will probably 
be importing as much as 50 percent by 1980. 

As other consuming countries — notably 
western Europe and Japan — will be increas- 
ing their demands on world energy supplies 
at the same time, the necessity for improved 
consultation and coordination among us is 
apparent. We currently are reviewing the 
means through which such cooperation might 
best be pursued. 

The size and importance of our direct in- 
ternational investment — 60 percent of the 
world's total and now over $80 billion in 
value — likewise impels us into a more atten- 
tive foreign economic policy. Foreign invest- 
ment, the producer of our largest net inflow 
in balance of payments, makes a major con- 
tribution to the economic development of 
other countries and also to our own economic 
well-being. It is important that such invest- 
ment be made wisely and with sensitivity to 
the needs and aspirations of the recipient 
countries. It is important also that investors 

be able to rely upon the conditions under 
which they have been invited to invest their 

Nor could our economic policy be complete 
without a major component of interest in 
the economic gi'owth of the less developed 
world. For areas of poverty and underdevel- 
opment could easily become the breeding 
ground of the most serious international dis- 
turbances during the rest of this century. Our 
assistance to those countries, stretching back 
over a quarter century, stems both from the 
realization that our own interests will be bet- 
ter protected in an economically advancing 
world and from a spirit of generosity which 
has typically characterized America's in- 
volvement in the world. 

The strenuous efforts of the developing 
countries, supplemented by assistance from 
ourselves and others, have begun to have a 
tangible effect. In 1969, for example, the per 
capita growth rate in the developing world 
for the first time exceeded that in the devel- 
oped world, and the trend continued in 1970 
and 1971. But because that rate is applied to 
such disparate economic bases, the absolute 
gap between developed and developing is con- 
tinuing to increase sharply. Thus, it will re- 
main as urgent as it ever was for the United 
States to contribute generously to the proc- 
ess of development. 

Technology-Related Issues In Diplomacy 

An environment of multiple sources of 
power, of disarmament, and of a prominent 
economic policy is an environment of inter- 
national relations considerably different from 
the bipolar, armed-security-oriented, and 
highly politicized setting in which we have 
previously worked. A fourth element of the 
coming international ambience is perhaps 
more evolutionary in nature. But it is one 
which will be an increasing element in di- 
plomacy in future years. It embraces a wide 
variety of factors which Secretary of State 
Rogers called the "common concerns of di- 
plomacy" in his report to the Congress on 

October 2, 1972 


foreign policy last year. As he then expressed 
it: s 

The rapidly growing interdependence of states has 
thrust to the forefront a host of new policy issues 
with which the United States must deal during the 
rest of this century — drug abuse, pollution, popula- 
tion growth, exploitation of the deep seabed, peace- 
ful uses of nuclear energy, beneficial applications of 
space technology, and protection of man's cultural 

Most of these new issues are related in 
one way or another to recent advances in 
technology. Most of them would hardly have 
been thought about — or would have occupied 
only a tertiary place — only a decade ago. But 
today and in the future the growing require- 
ments for international cooperation and for 
agreed transnational regulation in such fields 
will be even more extensive. There is already 
a marked increase in the aspects of our di- 
plomacy which involve not bilateral but mul- 
tilateral relationships and which concern not 
geographical but functional issues. 

We are all conscious, for example, of the 
domestic priority being given to combating 
pollution and protecting the environment. In- 
ternationally the government is also giving 
these objectives major emphasis. It was at 
our proposal that the United Nations Con- 
ference on the Human Environment, meeting 
in Stockholm this June, established concrete 
goals for the international community in 
eliminating pollution and recommended es- 
tablishment of a five-year $100 million U.N. 
Fund for the Environment. We will ask Con- 
gress for appropriations to allow this country 
to contribute up to 40 percent of that fund. 

It was also our initiative that led to the es- 
tablishment two years ago of a U.N. Fund 
for Population Activities. Improved popula- 
tion control is the single element that could 
most quickly accelerate progress in improv- 
ing standards of living in many areas of the 

'"United States Foreign Policy 1971"; for sale by 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Depart- 
ment of State publication 8634; 621 pp.; $2.75). For 
Secretary Rogers' letter of transmittal and introduc- 
tory comment, see Bulletin of Mar. 27, 1972, p. 459. 

world. For the beneficial effects of substan- 
tial increases in production are currently be- 
ing diluted in many areas by birth rates well 
above those of the developed world. Popula- 
tion restraints on a worldwide basis, indeed, 
can be achieved none too soon. Even if the 
world could reduce its birth rate to the re- 
placement level — two children per family — 
by the year 2000 (a very optimistic assump- 
tion), the world's population would continue 
to grow for 70 more years and would not 
level off until it was 7.4 billion people — over 
twice today's population. The longer we wait 
the more serious this problem will become. 

Man's use and exploitation of the seas and 
the deep seabed has also become a burning 
international issue through the developing 
capability of technology to plumb the sea- 
beds for oil and other valuable resources and 
to exploit fisheries in a way unimagined only 
a few years ago. Some consequences are al- 
ready becoming apparent. In 1969, despite 
greater mechanization and intensity of fish- 
ing, for example, the total catch of the 
world's fisheries dropped for the first time 
in 20 years. 

To safeguard such vital resources of the 
seas and to provide for equitable and orderly 
utilization of the seas and seabeds, there is 
a clear need for international rules of juris- 
diction and conduct. That is the main pur- 
pose of next year's U.N. Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. Our diplomacy is already 
deeply engaged in the effort to make this 
conference a success. The subject may not 
dominate the headlines, but it is already pre- 
occupying the foreign oflfices of the entire 
world. This is as it should be when it is 
realized that the decisions reached on the 
law of the sea will aflfect over half the 
earth's surface. 

The scope of these newer issues of foreign 
policy is thus wide. We are involved simul- 
taneously in extensive efforts ranging from 
control of the international narcotics traffic 
to achieving effective international action to 
curb aircraft hijacking. Such issues are part 
of a growing need for new international law 
and for more effective international institu- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tions. They will be a large element of the 
framework within which our future diplo- 
macy will work. 

Earlier this year the authors of a new com- 
puter study on future economic and popula- 
tion trends, "The Limits to Growth," con- 

If the present growth trends in world population, 
industrialization, pollution, food production, and re- 
source depletion continue unchanged, the limits to 
growth on this planet will be reached sometime 
within the next one hundred years. The most prob- 
able result will be a rather sudden and uncontrolla- 
ble decline in both population and industrial capac- 

I might note that the approach the book's 
authors used to reach their conclusion is the 
subject of heated scholarly debate, and I do 
not intend to endorse the melancholy conclu- 
sion that the world may be heading toward a 
disaster. But the connection among the prob- 
lems of population increase, pollution, and the 
depletion of natural resources in this analy- 
sis is a real one. It is with such realities that 
much of international diplomacy, as well as 
of national policy, will be dealing in the fu- 

The advances that have been made in our 
foreign policy in recent years have been de- 
signed to prepare us to serve America well 
in this new environment in which we are 

— In a setting of varied sources of world 
influence, we are committed to the closest of 
ties and cooperation with our European al- 
lies and with Japan in working toward a 
world structure of peace. And we are com- 
mitted to continuing and expanding the im- 
provement of our relations with the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China. 

— In an atmosphere favorable to expand- 
ing control over arms, we are committed to 
pressing beyond temporary limitations on 

strategic offensive weapons toward stable 
and long-lasting measures of nuclear re- 
straint. We are committed as well to the 
achievement of wider measures of regional 
and conventional arms control. 

— In a period of increasing economic com- 
plexity, we are committed to a policy de- 
signed both to correct the disparities in our 
own economic position and to preserve and 
extend the framework of liberal interna- 
tional trade practices that has been so in- 
strumental in promoting economic growth 
and cooperation. 

— And in an era of rapidly increasing tech- 
nological developments, we are committed to 
the extension of international cooperation 
and international regulation over the many 
areas in which world interdependence links 
our destiny as Americans with that of the 
people of other countries. 

The cumulative importance of these chang- 
ing elements of diplomacy leads me to be- 
lieve that the new environment in which our 
foreign policy will function will be an. excit- 
ing and challenging one for international re- 
lations — an environment in which old pat- 
terns of conflict and suspicion can be broken 
and new patterns of cooperation created. Be- 
fore us is a period which will tax our intellec- 
tual resources, because even as we maintain 
our caution and our military and economic 
strength we may have to discard many con- 
cepts of foreign policy which no longer ap- 
In this process of understanding and 
awareness, the contribution of citizens' 
groups such as yours is very important. We 
in Washington are grateful for your interest 
and your support. We will need it all the 
more as we continue to focus our policies 
toward the opportunities afforded us in such 
a rapidly evolving environment. 

October 2, 1972 


Arms Control To Improve American Security 

Address by Gerard Smith 

I do not propose to go into specifics of the 
SALT ABM Treaty or the negotiating freeze 
on the aggregate number of ICBM's and 
SLBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles; 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles] .- They 
are probably fairly clear to you. If you have 
questions on this score, I will be glad to an- 
swer them. 

Right at the start I would like to stress the 
role in SALT played by the Department of 
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Wash- 
ington folklore usually assumes that in arms 
control matters there is an adversary rela- 
tionship between the Pentagon and the rest 
of the national security community. The 
SALT process has shown that to be a myth. 
The SALT agreements have the solid en- 
dorsement of the Joint Chiefs and the De- 
partment of Defense. SALT, at all times, has 
been a joint venture involving military and 
civilians from both sides of the Potomac. On 
this score, I would like to say how invaluable 
are the contributions of principal delegates 
Paul Nitze, who represents Mel Laird, and 
Lt. Gen. Royal Allison, United States Air 
Force, who is the personal representative of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

' Made before the National Security Industrial 
Association at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 14. Am- 
bassador Smith is Director of the U.S. Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. 
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

- For texts of the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim 
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at 
Moscow on May 26, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, 
p. 918. 

I'm glad to see them both here today. An- 
other invaluable principal delegate is Harold 
Brown, president of Cal Tech. He brings to 
SALT unique expertise in defense matters 
gained as Secretary of the Air Force, Direc- 
tor of Defense Research and Engineering, 
and director of the Lawrence Radiation Lab- 
oratory at Livermore, California. 

Security Advantages of Low ABM Level 

In the SALT debate that has followed last 
May's summit signings, there has been sur- 
prisingly little consideration given to the 
improvement in American security resulting 
from the limitation of Soviet ABM's to 200. 
Attention has fastened for the most part on 
the pros and cons of the negotiating freeze 
on offensive missile launchers. 

I would like first to consider with you to- 
day some of the security implications of the 
ABM Treaty. I am convinced that this treaty 
is a significant advance in American secu- 
rity — and that, to my mind, is a fair test of 
any arms control agreement. 

In order to maintain effectiveness as a de- 
terrent, strategic forces must have two at- 

1. A clear capability to survive a nuclear 
attack in substantial numbers; and 

2. A clear capability for the surviving 
forces to penetrate the attacker's defenses in 
retaliatory strikes. 

For some years we have been concerned 
about how to handle two potential threats to 
our strategic forces: the threat to their pre- 
launch survivability presented by offensive 


Department of State Bulletin 

weapons and the threat to their postlaunch 
penetrability presented by an attacker's de- 
fensive weapons. 

To give you a rough idea of the extent of 
this second concern, at one time in the late 
sixties a "worst case" estimate was that 
U.S. retaliatory strikes might have to pene- 
trate a Soviet defensive screen of some 8,000 
ABM's during this decade. 

One of the main reasons we set out in the 
late sixties to multiply warheads by develop- 
ing and deploying land- and sea-based 
MIRV's [multiple independently targeted re- 
entry vehicles] was to keep up our penetra- 
tion capability in the face of this prospect of 
a high level of Soviet missile defense. 

Under the ABM Treaty, we now have a 
verifiable Soviet commitment not to deploy 
more than 200 ABM's, as well as certain spe- 
cific measures to control the possible upgrad- 
ing of air defenses. The potential threat to 
the penetration capability of U.S. missiles 
has thus been radically reduced. We can with 
some confidence calculate that if ever the 
United States were attacked our surviving 
missile retaliatory forces would face minimal 
interference on their way to targets. As a re- 
sult of our programing for a much larger 
defensive threat than will have in fact de- 
veloped, and as a result of the ABM ceiling 
of 200 missiles, we now have the prospect of 
thousands of MIRV's facing at most 200 
ABM's. I think it fair to say that this should 
increase the deterrent effect of our strategic 
forces. This result constitutes arms control 
that demonstrably advances United States 

We don't get this for nothing. We give up 
much of our freedom to use ABM's to try to 
reduce the threat to that other attribute of 
an effective deterrent — its survivability in a 
first strike. We are limited to 100 defensive 
missiles to defend fixed ICBM's, which are 
one of the three components of our strategic 
retaliatory forces. However, we have limited 
the threat to our ICBM's by getting a ceiling 
on the single Soviet system of greatest con- 
cern to us, the SS-9, and at a level consider- 
ably lower than otherwise might have been 
the case. Overall, it thus appears that this 

limitation on U.S. ABM's for defense of 
ICBM's is a fair price, since with only a small 
number of Soviet ABM's to penetrate, each 
U.S. ICBM surviving a first strike would be 
substantially more valuable than if the first- 
striking nation had a large ABM defensive 
force. ICBM's are not the sole deterrent 
force; they complement, and are reinforced 
by, our very large SLBM force — which is not 
threatened by Soviet ICBM's and against 
which the Soviets have no significant de- 
fense — and by our heavy bombers. 

I believe this ABM Treaty proves that 
arms control arrangements can be effective 
measures to meet specific threats to our se- 
curity, measures to be considered as partial 
or complete alternatives to additional mili- 
tary programs to meet threats. 

There is another important advantage to 
United States security in limiting ABM's to 
a very low level. It is commonly, and I think 
correctly, assumed that any rational decision 
to make a first strike would have to be based 
on an attacker's belief that damage to it from 
strategic forces surviving the attack could 
be kept down to a tolerable level — and this 
by defensive missiles destroying most of the 
retaliatory warheads. Under the ABM Treaty 
ceiling of 200, I think any such expectation 
would be irrational and the specter of a first 
strike should in time shrink to invisibility. 
That is no small accomplishment in the nu- 
clear age — and a state of affairs much better 
than if ABM's had remained uncontrolled. 
These advantages of a low level of ABM's 
apply equally to the Soviet Union. No agree- 
ment on strategic arms would be possible un- 
less it was advantageous to both sides. 

Ceiling on Soviet Offensive Launchers 

The U.S.S.R. was willing first to make an 
ABM treaty and subsequently negotiate lim- 
itations on strategic offensive systems; the 
United States was not. We held that there 
must be concurrent constraints on both of- 
fensive and defensive systems. The Soviets 
then offered a short-term negotiating freeze 
on the existing number of ICBM launchers, 
which you recall they are still building and 

October 2, 1972 


we are not. That was not good enough. They 
finally agreed at Moscow, in effect, to freeze 
the aggregate number of their offensive mis- 
sile launchers, operational and under con- 
struction, IC's and SL's taken together, dur- 
ing a period of up to five years to permit ne- 
gotiations for an offensive limitation treaty 
to proceed in a more stable context than if 
one side was increasing its launcher numbers 
while the other side was not. 

Although this freeze affects ongoing So- 
viet launcher programs and not U.S. pro- 
grams, it does take place at a time when the 
U.S.S.R. has under construction and opera- 
tional substantially more ICBM and SLBM 
launchers than the United States. But it is 
not correct to say — as some critics do — that 
the negotiating freeze grants the Soviets 
more launchers than the United States. The 
freeze reflects the existing launcher situation 
and prevents the launcher numbers differen- 
tial from becoming worse while negotiations 
looking to an equitable offensive force limi- 
tation treaty continue. And as I noted be- 
fore, this freeze limits the single most threat- 
ening Soviet system, the SS-9 ICBM, to a 
much lower level than might otherwise have 
been the case. The United States has going 
for it a number of compensating advantages; 
for example, a large lead in the number and 
quality of strategic bombers, in numbers of 
warheads, and in strategic force technology 
in general. 

It may help one's thinking about whether 
we are safe in agreeing to this negotiating 
freeze to consider what could be done with 
only a few missiles. Take, for example, one 
submarine equipped with 16 Poseidon mis- 
siles. The explosive energy packaged in these 
16 missiles, if contained in conventional high 
explosives, would need several hundred thou- 
sand B-52 sorties for delivery on targets. 
That is many times the total explosives 
dropped on Germany and Japan during 
World War II. The nuclear warheads in these 
16 missiles could be delivered to more tar- 
gets than the total number of German and 
Japanese cities bombed by the allies. Each 
of these targets would be subjected to explo- 
sions considerably larger than the Hiroshima 

blast. Yet the nuclear megatonnage in these 
16 missiles is only a small fraction of 1 per- 
cent of that in the U.S. strategic arsenal. 

During the next several years, we will be 
finishing the conversion of 31 Polaris sub- 
marines to carry Poseidon missiles. We will 
also have 10 remaining Polaris boats, over 
1,000 ICBM's, and a strategic bomber force 
substantially larger and much more effective 
than that of the U.S.S.R. 

And under the ABM Treaty, any defense 
against missiles will be minimal. I think that 
adds up to a much better prospect than we 
faced in 1969 when SALT started. 

The central question is whether U.S. secu- 
rity is greater with than without the two 
SALT agreements. It seems to me clear that 
with the benefits resulting from the ABM 
Treaty and the plus of having a ceiling on 
the overall number of Soviet offensive 
launchers for a negotiating period — a period 
during which the United States had no 
launcher construction programed — the an- 
swer to that question can only be yes. 

Verification of Agreements 

An essential factor in judging these agree- 
ments to be in our security interest is that 
their implementation be verifiable. These 
agreements are verifiable by us, unilaterally 
by our national means of verification. All 
government agencies involved agree. We are 
not going to rely on "trust." 

In this connection, one key feature of the 
SALT agreements is an undertaking by the 
United States and U.S.S.R. not to interfere 
with the national technical means of verifi- 
cation. This would, for example, prohibit in- 
terference with a satellite in orbit used for 
verification of the agreements. The two coun- 
tries have also agreed not to use deliberate 
concealment measures to impede verification 
by national technical means. 

These undertakings are of far-reaching 
importance. They lie at the heart of our con- 
fidence in the viability of the agreements. 
They should facilitate further agreements 
which are in our national interest. Without 
our national technical means of verification, 


Department of State Bulletin 

the SALT agreements would not have been 
possible. Thanks to a great extent to efforts 
of some of you here today and to a number of 
the organizations represented here, the 
United States has the world's finest techni- 
cal verification machinery. The country owes 
a debt of gratitude for this, which has made 
the SALT achievements possible. 

Sound modernization programs will be 
continued to keep our strategic deterrent 
forces up to date. The size of such programs 
and the speed of systems development and 
construction are matters beyond the scope 
of my responsibility. I would note that not 
only military judgments are involved but 
also national security judgments in the 
broadest sense of the term — involving con- 
siderations of budgets and resource alloca- 

I am not an advocate of the bargaining- 
chip theory — if by that is meant that it is 
useful to start up new strategic programs as 
trading material to be given up in negotia- 
tions. I believe that we should get on with 
strategic programs that are judged to be 
needed for our national security. More than 
that is not only a waste of money but, I 
think, a vain hope. Great nations are not 
driven to make bargains involving their cen- 
tral security because of bargaining-chip tac- 

In closing, I'd like to stress that the SALT 
arrangements are a part — a most important 
part — of the political breakthrough which we 
hope the 1972 summit meeting registered. 
Although I believe there can be useful arms 
control cooperation between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. even when their po- 
litical relationship is not changing for the 
better, opportunities for greater arms con- 
trol security gains will develop if Soviet- 
American relations in general become bet- 
ter. What can be done in the next rounds of 
SALT will, in significant measure, depend on 
whether the general political promise of the 
1972 summit is fulfilled. 

Both nations have made an investment in 

the strategic arms limitation venture. I think 
they will not risk these investments lightly. 
The negotiations will probably start up again 
before year's end. I look forward to more 
arms control that advances our security. 

Dr. Townes Visits Turkey 
Under Lincoln Lectureships 

The Department of State announced on 
September 8 (press release 219) that 
Charles H. Townes, professor of physics. 
University of California at Berkeley, was 
visiting Turkey as the first lecturer to go 
abroad under the U.S. Government's Lincoln 
Lectureships. (For biographic data, see press 
release 219). 

The Lincoln Lectureships were announced 
by President Nixon August 2 in a letter to 
Dr. James H. Billington, Chairman of the 
Presidentially appointed Board of Foreign 
Scholarships, which marked the completion 
of 25 years of educational exchanges under 
the Fulbright-Hays Act.^ Dr. Townes, who 
received the Nobel Prize for his role in the 
invention of the maser and laser, is one of 
four Americans chosen by the Board for the 
lectureships during the 1972-73 academic 
year. The others are John Hope Franklin, 
professor of history, University of Chicago; 
Paul A. Samuelson, Nobel Prize-winning pro- 
fessor of economics, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology; and John H. Updike, author, 
Ipswich, Mass. 

Dr. Townes, whose visit to Turkey was 
sponsored by the U.S. Educational Commis- 
sion in Turkey, lectured at the Middle East 
Technical University at Ankara September 
8 and 9 and participated in a seminar at Is- 
tanbul September 11. He also plans a series 
of lectures in Europe in the spring of 1973. 

'■ For text of the letter, see Bulletin of Sept. 4, 
1972, p. 252. 

October 2, 1972 



U.S. Calls for Prompt International Action To Settle 
Problems of Law of the Sea 

The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond 
the Limits of National Jurisdiction met at 
Geneva July 17-August 18. Folloiving is a 
statement m-ade in plenary session of the 
committee on Aiigust 10 by John R. Steven- 
son, Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State and U.S. Representative to the commit- 

Mi-. Chairman [Hamilton Shii-ley Amera- 
singhe, of Sri Lanka] : In recent weeks, both 
you and your colleagues on the [Seabed Com- 
mittee] Bureau have emphasized that this is 
a critical session for the United Nations Sea- 
bed Committee. We agree. Therefore we be- 
lieve it is appropriate to consider the future 
of these negotiations and, in that context, the 
future of the law of the sea. It is over two 
years since President Nixon said : ^ 

The stark fact is that the law of the sea is inade- 
quate to meet the needs of modern technology and 
the concerns of the international community. If it is 
not modernized multilaterally, unilateral action and 
international conflict are inevitable. 

Mr. Chairman, if we are to find negotiated 
international solutions to the law of the 
sea, we must do two things promptly. 

First, we must all be prepared to accommo- 
date each other's interests and needs. We are 
preparing a comprehensive lawmaking 
treaty to govern not only the conduct of sov- 
ereign states and private persons in the 
ocean but also the natural resources of an 
area comprising two-thirds of the earth's 
surface. Its effectiveness will depend in large 

measure on the extent to which it represents 
a consensus of all, rather than a group of 
states. To achieve this, we must identify 
those national interests that are of funda- 
mental importance to each of us and avoid 
time-consuming and potentially divisive de- 
bate on less important matters. 

Second, we must achieve agreement before 
events overtake our ability to do so. I cannot 
stress too strongly that none of us can or 
should stop technology and its use. If we act 
wisely and in a timely manner, we can insure 
by agreement that the technology will be 
used in a manner that provides maximum 
benefit for all mankind. 

Our efforts here, Mr. Chairman, are known 
to many people in my country and in many 
others represented here today. The people 
who use the seas, and the people whose liveli- 
hoods either now depend or will in the future 
depend on the sea, are watching us. In the 
United States there is a growing uneasiness 
about our work. Most Americans concerned 
with the sea are dedicated to multilateral 
solutions to problems which have interna- 
tional ramifications, but they are becoming 
increasingly skeptical about the chances for 
success. Other delegations here may perceive 
similar developments taking place in their 
own countries. We must not allow confidence 
to be shaken in our ability to negotiate timely 
solutions to the problems we face. 

Against this background, I would like to 

' For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
May 23, 1970, see Bulletin of June 15, 1970, p. 737. 


Department of State Bulletin 

comment on some aspects of the substance of 
these negotiations. 

Ocean uses can be divided into two broad 
categories : resource uses and nonresource 
uses. The first group principally concerns 
fishing and seabed resources. The nonre- 
source uses include such important interests 
as navigation and overflight, scientific re- 
search, and the preservation of the ocean en- 

The view of my delegation on nonresource 
uses has been clearly stated on a number of 
occasions. It is our candid assessm.ent that 
thei'e is no possibility for agreement on a 
breadth of the territorial sea other than 12 
nautical miles. The United States and others 
have also made it clear that their vital inter- 
ests require that agreement on a 12-mile 
territorial sea be coupled with agreement on 
free transit of straits used for international 
navigation, and these remain basic elements 
of our national policy which we will not sacri- 
fice. We have, however, made clear that we 
are prepared to accommodate coastal state 
concerns regarding pollution and naviga- 
tional safety in straits and have made pro- 
posals to that effect in Subcommittee II. 

The views of my delegation on resource 
issues have also been stated on a number of 
occasions. Unfortunately, some delegations 
appear to have the impression that maritime 
countries in general, and the United States 
in particular, can be expected to sacrifice in 
these negotiations basic elements of their 
national policy on resources. This is not true. 
The reality is that every nation represented 
here has basic interests in both resource and 
nonresource uses that require accommoda- 
tion. Accordingly, we believe it is important 
to dispel any possible misconceptions that my 
government would agree to a monopoly by an 
international operating agency over deep 
seabed exploitation or to any type of eco- 
nomic zone that does not accommodate basic 
United States interests with respect to re- 
sources as well as navigation. I would like to 
amplify this point with a few remarks on 
some of these basic elements. 

Coastal Resources Generally 

Mr. Chairman, in order to achieve agree- 
ment, we are prepared to agree to broad 
coastal state economic jurisdiction in adja- 
cent waters and seabed areas beyond the 
territorial sea as part of an overall law-of- 
the-sea settlement. However, the jurisdic- 
tion of the coastal state to manage the re- 
sources in these areas must be tempered by 
international standards which will ofi'er 
reasonable prospects that the interests of 
other states and the international community 
will be protected. It is essential that coastal 
state jurisdiction over fisheries and over the 
mineral resources of the continental margins 
be subject to international standards and 
compulsory settlement of disputes. 

Seabed Resources — Coastal Areas 

We can accept virtually complete coastal 
state resource-management jurisdiction over 
resoui'ces in adjacent seabed areas if this 
jurisdiction is subject to international treaty 
limitations in five respects : 

1. International treaty standards to pre- 
vent imreasonahle interference with other 
uses of the ocean. A settlement based on com- 
bining coastal state resource-management 
jurisdiction with protection of nonresource 
uses can only be effective if the diffei'ent 
uses are accommodated. This requires inter- 
nationally agreed standards pursuant to 
which the coastal state will insure, subject 
to compulsory dispute settlement, that there 
is no unreasonable interference with naviga- 
tion, overflight, and other uses. 

2. International treaty standards to pro- 
tect the ocean from pollution. As a coastal 
state, we do not wish to suffer pollution of the 
ocean from seabed activities anywhere. We 
consider it basic that minimum internation- 
ally agreed pollution standards apply even to 
areas in which the coastal state enjoys re- 
source jurisdiction. 

3. International treaty standards to pro- 
tect the integrity of investment. When a 
coastal state permits foreign nationals to 

October 2, 1972 


make investments in areas under its resource- 
management jurisdiction, the integrity of 
such investments should be protected by the 
treaty. Security of tenure and a stable in- 
vestment climate should attract foreign in- 
vestment and technology to areas managed 
by developing coastal states. Without such 
protection in the treaty, investment may well 
go elsewhere. 

4. Sharing of revenues for international 
community purposes. We continue to believe 
that the equitable distribution of benefits 
from the seabeds can best be assured if 
treaty standards provide for sharing some of 
the revenues from continental margin min- 
erals with the international community, par- 
ticularly for the benefit of developing coun- 
tries. Coastal states in a particular region 
should not bear the entire burden of assuring 
equitable treatment for the landlocked and 
shelf-locked states in that region, nor should 
they bear the entire burden for states with 
narrow shelves and little petroleum poten- 
tial off their coasts. The problem is inter- 
national, and the best solution would be in- 
ternational. We repeat this offer as part of 
an overall settlement despite our conclusion 
from previous exploitation patterns that a 
significant portion of the total international 
revenues will come from the continental 
margin off the United States in early years. 
We are concerned about the opposition to 
this idea implicit in the position of those ad- 
vocating an exclusive economic zone. 

5. Compulsory settlement of disputes. In- 
ternational standards such as those I de- 
scribed are necessary to protect certain non- 
coastal and international interests and thus 
render agreement possible. Accordingly, 
effective assurance that the standards will be 
observed is a key element in achieving agree- 
ment. Adequate assurance can only be pro- 
vided by an impartial procedure for the 
settlement of disputes. These disputes, in 
the view of my delegation, must be settled 
ultimately by the decision of a third party. 
For us, then, the principle of compulsory 
dispute settlement is essential. 

Seabed Resources — Deep Seabeds 

In many respects, the deep seabeds pre- 
sent the newest and most exciting aspects of 
our work. Although we cannot agree that 
international law prohibits the exploitation 
of deep seabed resources in accordance with 
high seas principles, we fully share the desire 
to establish an equitable, internationally 
agreed regime for the area and its resources 
as the common heritage of mankind. The 
sooner we do so, the earlier we will termi- 
nate essentially divisive and counterproduc- 
tive disputes over the present legal status of 
deep seabed exploitation as well as over the 
position taken by some delegations, with 
which we have consistently disagreed, that 
"common heritage" means the "common 
property" of mankind. 

Our interest in the prompt establishment 
and effectiveness of an equitable interna- 
tional regime for the seabed is demonstrated 
both by the comprehensive draft treaty we 
presented two years ago and by President 
Nixon's statement that any prior exploita- 
tion of the deep seabed area must be "sub- 
ject to the international regime to be agreed 

The basic interests we seek to protect in 
an international seabed regime are reflected 
in the five points to which I referred earlier, 
coupled with our proposal for international 
machinery to authorize and regulate explora- 
tion and use of the resources of the area. An 
effective and equitable regime must protect 
not only the interests of the developing 
countries but also those of the developed 
countries by establishing reasonable and 
secure investment conditions for their na- 
tionals who will invest their capital and tech- 
nology in the deep seabeds. In order to pro- 
vide the necessary protections for all nations 
with important interests in the area, it is 
also necessary to establish a system of deci- 
sionmaking which takes this into account 
and provides for compulsory settlement of 
disputes. We do not regard these objectives 
as inconsistent with the desire of other coun- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tries for equitable participation in deep sea- 
bed exploitation and its benefits. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is our view that 
the benefits to be derived from the operation 
of this new treaty should only be made avail- 
able to those nations who are prepared to 
ratify or accede to it. Those benefits, as all 
of us in this room know, are manifold. New 
technology for mining in the seabeds is 
rapidly opening up new prospects for impor- 
tant mineral supplies. As development pro- 
ceeds, vast new knowledge will emerge as 
man begins the serious exploration of the 
ocean and its resources. Mining in the oceans 
will generate revenues as well. All these 
benefits, Mr. Chairman, should be shared. 
We are capable in this committee of making 
the decisions which will enable these benefits 
to be realized, but we must get about the busi- 
ness of making these decisions promptly or 
we will be precluded from doing so. 


With respect to fisheries, our basic interest 
is to assure rational use and conservation of 
all fish stocks. To achieve this, we believe 
coastal states should have substantial juris- 
diction over all fisheries, including anadro- 
mous species, except where the migratory 
habits of certain fish stocks dictate another 
system; for example, the highly migratory 
tuna should be managed pursuant to multi- 
lateral arrangements. In coastal areas, 
jurisdiction should be limited by such inter- 
national standards as would assure conserva- 
tion and full utilization of the living re- 

It is widely understood that the United 
States shares the interests of many other 
coastal states. However, the fact that over 
80 percent of our fisheries are off our own 
coast does not mean that we are prepared to 
abandon the remaining 20 percent, the 
distant-water segment of our industry. There 
are reasonable ways to accommodate the 
interests of both coastal and distant-water 
fishing states and to assure the kind of 

special cooperation between states in a 
region that many delegations have urged. We 
believe that a solution of the fisheries prob- 
lem should take into account the migratory 
habits of fish and the manner in which they 
are fished. Thus we can support broad 
coastal state jurisdiction over coastal and 
anadromous fisheries beyond the territorial 
sea subject to international standards de- 
signed to insure conservation, maximum uti- 
lization, and equitable allocation of fisheries, 
with compulsory dispute settlement, but with 
international regulation of highly migratory 
species such as tuna. 

Our detailed proposals on this matter have 
been elaborated further in Subcommittee II. 
The proposals reflect our continuing belief 
that both sound conservation and rational 
utilization must take into account the biology 
and distribution of living marine resources. 
But they also respond to the expressed desire 
of coastal states for direct regulatory author- 
ity and preferential rights over coastal and 
anadromous fisheries. However, it is funda- 
mental that fish stocks must be conserved 
and that there must be maximum utilization 
of stocks not fully utilized by local fisher- 
men. Moreover, account should be taken of 
traditional fishing activities of other nations, 
as well as the desire of states to enter into 
special arrangements with their neighbors. 
We remain convinced that highly migratory 
oceanic species can only be properly regu- 
lated through international organizations. It 
is our hope that our new proposals will move 
the committee closer to a solution to the 
complex fisheries problems involved. 

Need for New Political Will 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my 
statement with some general comments. 
While my delegation must confess its disap- 
pointment in our progress to date, we must 
also point out those areas where we believe 
important progress has been made. 

Looked at from a broad perspective, we see 
various signs that make us cautiously op- 

Ocfober 2, 1972 


timistic. It is clear that the negotiating posi- 
tions of various states are now substantially 
closer together than their juridical positions. 
This is particularly the case with respect to 
the width of the territorial sea and coastal 
state jurisdiction over resources beyond the 
territorial sea. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcomed the interesting 
reports of the distinguished Representatives 
of Venezuela and Kenya on the results of the 
Santo Domingo Conference of Caribbean 
States and the Yaounde Seminar of African 
countries. While applauding their contribu- 
tion to the continuing development of a gen- 
erally acceptable agreement, I should point 
out they do not fully take into account a num- 
ber of the factors I have discussed earlier in 
this statement. I note in particular the 
absence of any reference to international 
standards and dispute-settlement procedures 
applicable to coastal state resource jurisdic- 
tion and of any distinction in the treatment 
of living resources based on their migratory 
characteristics. However, these documents 
certainly provide a starting point for serious 
negotiations, and if harmonized with my own 
delegation's statement today, there might be 
a potential for merging together in a new 
treaty what are otherwise widely disparate 
positions. Perhaps then the very beginnings 
of an outline might emerge which could be- 
come the basis for a successful 1973 confer- 
ence. I hope so, Mr. Chairman. 

Another source of hope is the work of Sub- 
committee I. We have given priority to the 
negotiation of the regime, and we are be- 
ginning to see not only concrete results but 
an open and constructive negotiating atmos- 
phere. The distinguished Representative of 
the Cameroon, chairman of the First Sub- 
committee, and your distinguished colleague 
from Sri Lanka, chairman of the working 
group, have through their tireless efforts 
helped break new ground in this committee, 
which makes us believe that where there is 
political will our negotiations will bear fruit. 

This new political will, however, must in- 
fuse our work in the other subcommittees as 
well, and it must occur now. The "list" [of 
subjects and issues relating to the law of the 

sea] must be disposed of and work begun on 
the drafting of articles. We are confident, 
Mr. Chairman, that once such work begins it 
will move rapidly and a successful conference 
will be within our grasp. But if we wait 
longer, Mr. Chairman, we wonder if a suc- 
cessful conference will ever be possible. Let 
us all begin to work now to avoid such a 

Finally, in closing, Mr. Chairman, I want 
to express to you the sincere appreciation of 
my delegation for your wisdom, guidance, 
and firm leadership through what we hope 
will be one of the most important and suc- 
cessful negotiations to have taken place in 
our times. We wish you continued success at 
this endeavor and will give you all our sup- 



The Senate on September 8 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations: 

Frank T. Bow to be Ambassador to Panama. (For 
biographic data, see White House press release dated 
August 15.) 

Hermann F. Eilts to be Ambassador to the People's 
Republic of Bangladesh. (For biographic data, see 
White House press release dated August 11.) 

Frederick Irving to be Ambassador to Iceland. 
(For biographic data, see Department of State press 
release 226 dated September 15.) 

George W. Landau to be Ambassador to Paraguay. 
(For biographic data, see White House press release 
dated August 11.) 

Joseph A. Mendenhall to be Ambassador to the 
Malagasy Republic. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated August 18.) 

Adm. Horacio Rivero, U.S. Navy, retired, to be 
Ambassador to Spain. (For biographic data, see 
White House press release dated August 11.) 

Talcott W. Seelye to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Tunisia. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated August 18.) 

Viron P. Vaky to be Ambassador to Costa Rica. 
(For biographic data, see White House press release 
dated August 11.) 


Department of State Bulletin 


United States and Colombia Sign Treaty 
Concerning Certain Caribbean Reefs 

Press release 218 dated September 11 

The United States and Colombia signed a 
treaty on September 8 at Bogota in which 
the United States renounces all claims of sov- 
ereignty to three groups of small reefs in 
the Caribbean, Quita Sueno Bank and the 
cays on Roncador and Serrana Banks. Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Alfredo Vaz- 
quez Carrizosa signed for Colombia; Ambas- 
sador Leonard J. Saccio signed for the United 

Under the treaty, Colombia will guarantee 
to U.S. nationals and vessels a continuation 
of fishing in the waters adjacent to the cays 
on Roncador and Serrana, subject to reason- 
able conservation measures to be applied on 
a nondiscriminatory basis. Quita Sueno is 
submerged at high tide and thus, according to 
the U.S. view, is a part of the high seas and 
not subject to a claim of sovereignty by any 
government. U.S. and Colombian nationals 
and vessels will continue to exercise their 
rights to fish without interference in the 
waters adjacent to Quita Sueiio Bank. 

The three areas covered by the treaty are 
located between 380 and 460 miles from the 
Colombian mainland. All the cays of these 
areas are uninhabited, the largest one meas- 
uring approximately 1,000 by 3,000 yards 
(about one square mile) . The United States 
claimed them in the latter part of the 19th 
century under the terms of the Guano Is- 
lands Act of 1856. In 1890 Colombia pro- 
tested United States extraction of guano 
from these cays and claimed that upon 
achieving independence from Spain it had 
succeeded to sovereignty over them. In 1928 
the United States and Colombia recognized 
the existence of each other's claims and 
agreed to maintain the status quo. For many 

years the United States has maintained a 
lighthouse on Quita Sueno and navigational 
beacons on Roncador and Serrana, and ves- 
sels of both countries have conducted fishing 
activities in the area. 

Under the terms of the treaty and accom- 
panying notes, the U.S. Government agrees 
to grant to Colombia permanent ownership 
of the lighthouse and navigational aids, af- 
ter consultations between experts of both 
countries to assure their continued safe op- 
eration and maintenance for the benefit of 
all mariners. 

Current Actions 



International plant protection convention. Done at 
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 
3, 1952. 
Ratification deposited: United States, Au^st 18, 

Entered into force for the United States: August 

18, 1972. 


Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 
14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 

Accessions deposited: Cyprus, May 31, 1972; South 
Africa (with a reservation), May 26, 1972. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Argentina (with a state- 
ment), September 11, 1972. 

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification 
of certain rules relating to international carriage 
by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49 
Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at 
The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at Guate- 
mala City March 8, 1971.'' 
Signature: Argentina, August 28, 1972. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention 
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 
1591, 3756, 5170). Done at New York March 12, 

Ratifications deposited: Dahomey, August 15, 
1972; Federal Republic of Germany, August 25, 

' Applicable to all territories for the international 
relations of which it is responsible. 
' Not in force. 

October 2, 1972 


Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stocltpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.= 

Signature: San Marino, September 12, 1972. 
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, September 13, 


Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, as amended. 
Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered 
into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502, 5929. 
Signature and acceptance : Bahrain, September 15, 

Judicial Procedures 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and 
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial mat- 
ters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. En- 
tered into force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638. 
Ratification deposited: Israel, August 14, 1972 
(with declarations). 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 

Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, September 13, 



Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income, as amended. Signed at Washing- 
ton October 28, 1948. Entered into force September 
9, 1953. TIAS 2833, 4280, 6073, 6394. 
Terminates: October 13, 1972. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Brussels July 9, 1970. 
Ratifications exchanged: September 13, 1972. 
Enters into force: October 13, 1972. 


Agreement relating to the loan of certain vessels 
to Spain. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid 
and San Sebastian May 30, and August 28, 1972. 
Entered into force August 28, 1972. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of July 8, 1970 (TIAS 
6983). Signed at Saigon August 29, 1972. Entered 
into force August 29, 1972. 

" Not in force. 









Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to September 11 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
209, 210, and 211 of September 5, 212 of 
September 6, and 219 of September 8. 


Treaty with Colombia on sov- 
ereignty over certain reefs in 
the Caribbean. 

Volume IV of "Foreign Rela- 
tions" series for 1947 released. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee to meet Sept. 20 to con- 
sider U.S. positions on draft 
articles to revise the Regula- 
tions for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea. 

Entry into force of double taxa- 
tion convention with Belgium. 

Porter: 159th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

Porter: additional remarks. 

Study group on international 
shipping legislation of the Sec- 
retary's Advisory Committee 
on Private International Law 
to meet Sept. 15-16. 

Irving sworn in as Ambassador 
to Iceland (biographic data). 

"Foreign Relations" volume on 
1944 Quebec Conference re- 



224A 9/14 
*225 9/14 

*226 9/15 
t227 9/15 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX October 2, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1 736 

Aviation. ICAO Special Subcommittee Meets 
at Washington (Brower, Rogers, Volpe, 
draft articles) 357 

Bangladesh. Eilts confirmed as Ambassador . 386 

China. American Foreign Policy in a Shifting 

Setting (Pedersen) 371 

Colombia. United States and Colombia Sign 
Treaty Concerning Certain Caribbean Reefs . 387 

Congress. Confirmations (Bow, Eilts, Irving, 

Landau, Mendenhall, Rivero, Seelye, Vaky) . 386 

Costa Rica. Vaky confirmed as Ambassador . 386 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Bow, Eilts, Irving, Landau, Menden- 
hall, Rivero, Seelye, Vaky) 386 


American Foreign Policy in a Shifting Setting 

(Pedersen) 371 

Arms Control To Improve American Security 

(Smith) 378 

Economic Affairs. American Foreign Policy in 
a Shifting Setting (Pedersen) 371 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Dr. Townes 
Visits Turkey Under Lincoln Lectureships . 381 

Environment. American Foreign Policy in a 

Shifting Setting (Pedersen) 371 

Europe. American Foreign Policy in a Shift- 
ing Setting (Pedersen) 371 

Iceland. Irving confirm>ed as Ambassador . . 386 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

ICAO Special Subcommittee Meets at Wash- 
ington (Brower, Rogers, Volpe, draft 
articles) 357 

Israel. U.S. Mourns Death of Members of 
Israeli Olympic Team (Nixon, Rogers, mes- 
sage to Prime Minister Meir) 364 

Japan. American Foreign Policy in a Shifting 

Setting (Pedersen) 371 

Law of the Sea. U.S. Calls for Prompt Inter- 
national Action To Settle Problems of Law 
of the Sea (Stevenson) 382 

Malagasy Republic. Mendenhall confirmed as 
Ambassador 386 

Middle East. U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Middle 
East Resolution in U.N. Security Council 
(Bush, texts of draft resolution and pro- 
posed amendments) 365 

Panama. Bow confirmed as Ambassador . . 386 

Paraguay. Landau confirmed as Ambassador . 386 

Presidential Documents. U.S. Mourns Death 

of Members of Israeli Olympic Team . . . 364 

Spain. Rivero confirmed as Ambassador . . 386 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 387 

United States and Colombia Sign Treaty Con- 
cerning Certain Caribbean Reefs .... 387 

Tunisia. Seelye confirmed as Ambassador . . 386 


American Foreign Policy in a Shifting Setting 

(Pedersen) 371 

Arms Control To Improve American Security 

(Smith) 378 

United Nations 

U.S. Calls for Prompt International Action 
To Settle Problems of Law of the Sea 
(Stevenson) 382 

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Middle East Resolu- 
tion in U.N. Security Council (Bush, texts 
of draft resolution and proposed amend- 
ments) 365 

Viet-Nam. 159th Plenary Session on Vlet- 

Nam Held at Paris (Porter) 368 

Name Index 

Bow, Frank T 386 

Brower, Charles N 357 

Bush, George 365 

Eilts, Hermann F 386 

Irving, Frederick 386 

Landau, George W 386 

Mendenhall, Joseph A 386 

Nixon, President 364 

Pedersen, Richard F 371 

Porter, William J 368 

Rivero, Horacio 386 

Rogers, Secretary 357, 364 

Seelye, Talcott W 386 

Smith, Gerard 378 

Stevenson, John R 382 

Vaky, Viron P 386 

Volpe, John A 357 

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Transcript of News Conference 
and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement 389 


Statement by Nelson Gross AOl 

For index see inside back cover 

Boston Public Library 
Supe:-':i* "v' nt of Documents 

Nov 3 1972 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1737 
October 9, 1972 

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a weekly publication issued by the 
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the work of the Department of State 
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The BULLETIN includes selected 
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Dr. Kissinger Discusses His Visit to Moscow and Western Europe 

Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held at the White House on Septem- 
ber 16 by Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assist- 
ant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, together ivith the text of a U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. joint statement issued at Moscow 
and Washington September lit at the conclu- 
sion of Dr. Kissinger's visit to Moscoiv. 


White House press release dated September 16 

Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec- 
retary to Presideyit Nixo7i'\ : I think you are 
all aware of the fact that Dr. Kissinger left 
Washington Saturday morning, September 9, 
and flew to Munich, where on Sunday, Sep- 
tember 10, he met with Chancellor Willy 
Brandt and Foreign Minister of Germany 
[Walter] Scheel and also the opposition 

He left Munich on Sunday and arrived in 
Moscow Sunday night, September 10, where 
he conducted meetings with the Soviet lead- 
ers in Moscow. We have released a joint 
statement on those meetings this past Thurs- 

Dr. Kissinger then went to London and to 
Paris to meet with the leaders there and also 
during the course of his visit, as we have 
already announced, held meetings with Spe- 
cial Adviser Le Due Tho and also Minister 
Xuan Thuy of North Viet-Nam. 

So as we told you last week. Dr. Kissinger 
would be prepared to discuss his trip with 
you this morning, and that is why he is here. 
His comments, of course, are on the record, 
as has been the case in the past. 

Q. The recent past? [Laughter.] 

Dr. Kissinger: First I want to make a 
personal comment about a remark in a news- 
paper whose enthusiasm for us is occasion- 
ally limited, which referred to my German 
accent. I wanted to say that when I was in 
Germany I had occasion to make a brief 
statement on television and I thought I 
I might watch myself speak in one language 
correctly. Now I find I speak German with 
a Swedish accent. [Laughter.] 

Now, I decided I might just as well pro- 
ceed recklessly. [Laughter.] 

I thought the best way to proceed would 
be to give you a brief summary of what we 
did on this trip and how it came about and 
then to take your questions. 

The origin of the trip was during the sum- 
mit meeting when, on the last day, General 
Secretary [of the Soviet Communist Party 
Leonid I.] Brezhnev and the President 
agreed that when our bilateral discussions 
had reached a point where significant prog- 
ress could be made by high-level decisions 
they would establish direct contact with each 
other, in addition to the regular exchanges 
that are going on all the time anyway. 

That point was reached in the course of 
the commercial negotiations and the dis- 
cussions on European security and mutual 
balanced force reductions (MBFR), with re- 
spect to SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks], and it was therefore decided that I 
should go to Moscow on behalf of the Presi- 
dent to see whether these various matters 
could be brought to a further stage of nego- 

The possibility was foreseen in the summit 
communique.! In the weeks prior to my visit 

" For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow 
on May 29, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 899. 

October 9, 1972 


to Moscow, the President and the General 
Secretary exchanged communications, reac- 
tions to the ideas of both sides and primarily 
to propositions that the President made on 
how one might advance various of these 
issues, as I will explain in a minute, so that 
when the discussions actually took place in 
Moscow, they could proceed rather expedi- 
tiously, or at least one could focus on the 
issues — nothing happens expeditiously in 
these discussions. 

Let me now talk about my trip in two 
groups: one, my discussions in Moscow and, 
secondly, my discussions with the leaders of 
the Western alliance, with the German, 
French, and British leaders and, thirdly, just 
a very brief word about my meeting with 
Special Adviser Le Due Tho and Minister 
Xuan Thuy yesterday. 

First, the discussions in Moscow. You 
have the list of the people of my staff who 
wei'e accompanying me, and present also was 
Under Secretary [of Commerce] James 
Lynn. Most of the discussions took place be- 
tween General Secretary Brezhnev, on the 
Soviet side, and myself. I spent about 21 
hours with General Secretary Brezhnev and 
an additional maybe three hours with For- 
eign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko. 

On the Soviet side, the General Secretary 
was always accompanied by Foreign Minis- 
ter Gromyko, by the Ambassador to the 
United States [Anatoliy F.] Dobrynin, and 
by his personal assistant Aleksandrov [An- 
drei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov] . Then, as 
specific topics came up, such as trade, we 
would be joined by appropriate Soviet ex- 
perts. On our side, the membership was 
rotating, with the exception of my senior 
staff assistant [Helmut] Sonnenfeldt, who is 
handling the Soviet matters on my staff and 
who participated in practically all of the dis- 

Now let me discuss in general terms what 
was done. First, I would like to say that we 
were treated really with extraordinary hos- 
pitality and were very well taken care of. All 
our comforts were attended to. The discus- 

sions took place in a very frank and open 
atmosphere but with a very constructive at- 
titude on both sides, with the attitude that we 
wanted to come to agreements or to make 
progress that was in the interest of both 

We covered essentially all of the topics 
that you can find in the communique that was 
issued at the time of the summit conference. 
We reviewed the progress, as our joint state- 
ment says, of those agreements that were ! 
then made in order to see whether they had ! 
fulfilled the expectations and what further 
accomplishments could be made. It was a 
sense that we were moving in the right 
direction and that we could continue and 
even accelerate the progress in those areas 
where agreements had been achieved. 

Let me talk about those areas in which 
some new steps were either taken or were 
prepared. First, the area of lend-lease, trade, 
and the general commercial relationship be- 
tween our two countries. As you know, this 
was discussed at some length at the summit 
and some progress had been made then. 
There had been an agreement to create a 
U.S.-Soviet economic commission, the first 
meeting of which, chaired by Secretary [of 
Commerce Peter G.] Peterson, took place in 
July. When Secretary Peterson was in the 
Soviet Union there was a further advance in 
defining the issues. 

Prior to my visit to the Soviet Union, the 
President communicated directly with the 
Soviet leaders with the approach that what 
we should do is, rather than deal with each 
of these topics separately, to see whether we 
could manage a global approach that would 
tie together the issues of lend-lease, most- 
favored-nation, a trade agreement, a mari- 
time agreement, into one overall negotiation 
in which we would set ourselves an objective 
of where we wanted to be and then work to- 
ward it. 

These issues, as you all know, are tech- 
nically extremely complex. I am not the best 
qualified person, to put it mildly, to get into 
all the technical subtleties or the legal issues 


Department of State Bulletin 

that each of these issues raises. However, we 
made major progress on the lend-lease issue 
in the sense of agreeing on a method by 
which the sums could be determined in the 
negotiations that are now starting and with 
relation to a whole host of issues like post- 
ponement and rate of payment that had been 
left unsettled. A Soviet group will come 
over here next week, and we are confident 
that a satisfactory solution will be achieved. 

Concurrently with this, we discussed the 
issues of how to proceed on the trade front 
and the granting of most-favored-nation 
status to the Soviet Union. Again, this raises 
a whole host of questions, such as the defini- 
tion, how we would define most-favored- 
nation status, issues related to market dis- 
ruption, to arbitration, so that our business- 
men have assurances of some appeal mecha- 
nisms that are not dependent entirely on 
national jurisdiction, business facilities, 
trade centers, et cetera; and again, very 
major progress was made in all of these cate- 
gories, first in principle between General 
Secretary Brezhnev and myself and then in 
detail between Under Secretary Lynn and his 
Soviet counterpart. And again, a Soviet 
group will come over here next week to con- 
clude the arrangements. 

The third area was to settle some of the 
remaining issues with respect to the mari- 
time agreement; and there, too, many of the 
diflSculties were ironed out. Again, a Soviet 
group is coming here next week, and we are 
confident that we can conclude the arrange- 

Q. Three groups are coming? 

Dr. Kissinger: The essence of this ar- 
rangement is that, on the basis of the Presi- 
dent's approach, it is being handled as one 
negotiation, but it is in the Soviet bureauc- 
racy split up among three different minis- 
tries. For that reason, three different groups 
are coming, but we are working according to 
an overall concept. 

Then there were some discussions about 
the extension of credits, in which I believe we 

achieved a satisfactory meeting of the minds, 
and about the joint development of certain 
natural resources in the Soviet Union, which 
is a matter that has to be handled primarily 
by private capital but in which, as a first 
step, we are planning to set up mechanisms 
to make a systematic review of the problem 
and to permit us to make decisions on an 
overall basis, rather than on an ad hoc 
approach. Those will be announced in due 

So much for the trade issues, which was' 
the first issue discussed — I may say, because 
I always read accounts — which was discussed 
without relationship to any other topic and 
without its being made conditional on prog- 
ress in any other area. Indeed, it was essen- 
tially concluded before we turned to any 
other area. 

Now, with respect to the other issues that 
were discussed and that were covered in the 
communique, it was, first of all, the problem 
of our mutual balanced force reductions and 
the European Security Conference. You 
ladies and gentlemen are all familiar with the 
Soviet position, which has been that there 
should be a preparatory European Security 
Conference toward the end of this year. In- 
deed, the joint communique that was issued 
at the summit meeting made reference to 
preparations in that direction. 

The United States position, which was also 
provided for in the summit communique — 
to which our NATO allies agreed — was that 
there should be a relationship between that 
conference and a conference on mutual bal- 
anced force reduction which should take 
place in some related manner. 

Now, this, of course, raises the theologi- 
cal problem of "linkage," which you ladies 
and gentlemen and we have discussed at 
enormous lengths and which the Soviet Union 
has never accepted as a formal concept. 
Matters were at somewhat of a stalemate in 
this respect, but we had extensive discussions 
of this problem. 

The President, again, prior to my arrival 
there communicated again our general atti- 

Oetober 9, 1972 


tude on this issue to the General Secretary. 
As a result of it, of this and the discussions, 
the Soviet Union has now made a general 
proposal to us which we are discussing with 
our allies and other interested parties. The 
details I cannot go into until we have the re- 
action of other countries, but on the basis of 
preliminary discussions by myself with Eu- 
ropean leaders and by Mr. Sonnenfeldt at the 
NATO Council, indications are that it is at 
least worthy of very serious consideration. 
So this is a matter that will now be pursued 
in diplomatic channels, and as soon as these 
consultations are completed, we will make 
announcements; but I think it is correct to 
say that we have made significant progress 
in this area, too. 

The third area that was discussed con- 
cerned the resumption of the SALT negotia- 
tions, which was discussed on two levels: one, 
the procedural one of when these talks might 
resume; and the second in terms of a very 
general philosophical discussion of what the 
direction might be in which these talks could 
go in a very preliminary way, but still in 
order to lay the basis for working along 
parallel lines. Again, we have reason to be- 
lieve that progress has been made, and as 
soon as the precise date is fixed, we will an- 
nounce it, but we are on the approximate 
schedule that we have set for ourselves. We 
believe that the second round of SALT can 
make a major contribution to peace and sta- 
bility of the world. 

In addition to the topics that were covered 
in the communique specifically, there was the 
review of the international situation with the 
major areas being covered, but I will reserve 
that for the question period. 

Now a word about my meeting with Euro- 
pean leaders. We have, of course, always 
considered our relationships with Europe a 
cardinal aspect of American policy and the 
cornerstone of the whole structure of peace, 
which has been pointed out in each of the 
President's annual foreign policy reports. 
The President urged me to stress to all of the 
leaders, each of the leaders that I saw, that 

his conviction that whatever progress we 
were making in our dealings with other na- 
tions, similar and preferably greater prog- 
ress has to be made in European-American 

We are now at the end of the period in 
which military security alone could be the 
cement of Western relationships. Of course, 
Atlantic relationships have to be adapted to 
the circumstances of the emergence of a more 
united Europe and an economically much 
stronger Europe and also to the tendency in 
the world in which negotiation is increas- 
ingly replacing confrontation. So I was 
asked on behalf of the President to point out 
to them that as soon as his schedule would be 
less pressed by domestic exigencies, he hoped 
to resume most intense consultations with 
our European friends on how to put relation- 
ships between Europe and the United States 
on a new, even more dynamic and construc- 
tive basis, consistent with the change in the 
international situation that had occurred. 

Finally, I had, as you know, a meeting yes- 
terday with the North Vietnamese negotia- 
tors. But, as always, by mutual agreement, 
we will not discuss the substance of these dis- 
cussions, and therefore I not only cannot be 
very specific, I cannot say anything about 
the substance of those discussions at all. 

Those were the highlights of the trip. Now 
I will be delighted to answer any questions 
on anything that I may have said or any- 
thing that I should have said. 

Q. Henry, in simpler language, could you 
tell us ivhat you meant by the statement that 
the President asked you to convey to Euro- 
pean leaders? 

Dr. Kissinger: At Harvard, as you know, 
complexity is identified with profundity, or 
as Ron Ziegler says, in simpler language, 
"This is as simple as I ever get." 

What I meant was that the world in which 
Atlantic relationships were formulated was 
essentially a bipolar world which was based 
on and which grew out, at that time, of Euro- 
pean weakness, of common fears of aggres- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ion, and of American dominance in almost 

ery field. 

We now face a situation in which the Euro- 
ean Economic Community is becoming in- 

easingly strong and in which the acces- 
ion of four more countries to the Common 
larket will create an even larger grouping. 
\'e face a situation also in which the domes- 
ic stability of European countries has been 

bstantially assured and in which the bi- 
olar world in the fifties and even sixties is 
eing replaced increasingly by a more com- 
iex set of international relations. 

Therefore, it becomes important that when 

e speak about Atlantic partnership that we 
not affirm it in the abstract every six 
lonths but have nothing concrete to work on 
jgether, but to find some common task and 
) define what is needed for the solution of 
lese issues that are arising; and that will be 
lie of the principal tasks of our foreign 
olicy in the next phase. 

Q. Do you see that the Viet Cong an- 
ouncement this past week, endorsed by 
\anoi, offers any prospect at all for a widen- 
W or a progress in the negotiations ? 

Dr. Kissinger: As you can appreciate, it 
extremely difficult for me to comment 
bout any particular proposal that may have 
een made publicly without getting into the 
ibstance of the talks. Our position has been 
lis: As you know from our public state- 
lents, we are prepared to leave the future 
olitical evolution of South Viet-Nam to the 
ecision of the South Vietnamese. We do not 
isist on any particular political orientation, 
or do we insist that the government in 
outh Viet-Nam inevitably be pro- American. 

What we do reject, however, is that we, as 
result of the negotiations, impose a particu- 
ir form of government on the South Viet- 
amese or that we would accept proposals 
hose practical consequence and clearly pre- 
ictable consequence is to bring this about, 
hese are our principles in handling this 
egotiation, and we are pursuing them very 
irnestly and with every intention of bring- 

ing about a rapid conclusion of the war. 

Q. Do you think the Viet Cong's latest 
proposals do that? 

Dr. Kissinger: The latest Viet Cong pro- 
posal leaves something to be desired in that 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did you discuss with 
General Secretary Brezhnev or with any of 
the other heads of state or their assistants the 
matters of air piracy and other forms of ter- 
rorism and if it were possible for any of 
them to use their influence not to accept and 
harbor terrorists or air pirates? 

Dr. Kissinger: As you know, the issues 
which you have just mentioned are being pur- 
sued very actively in diplomatic channels. 
They require, really, for an efl^ective control, 
a global coopei'ation of at least a majority of 
countries. I know that the State Department 
is pursuing it extremely actively and the Sec- 
retary of State has made approaches to many 
leaders of the world. 

So I have confined myself on this trip to 
underlining the importance that the Presi- 
dent attaches to the solution of this problem 
without going into the details of a negotia- 
tion which is being conducted in diplomatic 
channels, but we did underline the impor- 
tance of the subject. 

Q. Do you think that after your talks in 
Moscow the "Helsinki tea party," as an 
opener for the European Security Confer- 
ence, can take place on the 22d of November 
and, secondly, in a parallel set of timing, the 
MBFR discussion can also be initiated? 

Dr. Kissinger: The question, which was 
very objectively stated, was whether the 
"Helsinki tea party" could take place on 
November 22, which for the benefit of the 
Washington Post means whether the Euro- 
pean security preparatory conference can 
take place then and whether the MBFR con- 
ference will take place at a roughly parallel 

The exact date of these conferences will 

ctober 9, 1972 


have to be established through the consulta- 
tions that are now taking place in response 
to the Soviet proposal that has been made. 

Our position is that unless these two con- 
ferences take place in some related time 
frame, it will be very difficult for us to agree 
to what you call the "Helsinki tea party." We 
think a framework for the solution of this 
problem now exists and that progress can be 
made without tying ourselves to any one 
particular date. We think that this is ap- 
proaching a solution. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said in San Cle- 
mente that you had some reason to believe 
that — 

Dr. Kissinger: 
San Clemente? 

Did I talk to the press in 

Q. Yes, you did. You said you had some 
reason to believe that North Viet-Nam would 
negotiate seriously. Has that belief been 
realized? Are they negotiating seriously? 

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I remember. That was 
in July. Isn't there a statute of limitations 
on my statements? [Laughter.] I said that 
we were entering these discussions and on 
the basis of the preparatory exchanges that 
had taken place we had made clear our view 
that we expected some serious negotiation. 
All I can say is that the fact that these talks 
are going on would indicate a certain serious- 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is your latest in- 
formation regarding the possibility that 
North Viet-Nam will launch another offen- 
sive this fall, either major or minor? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you know, the affected 
parties always have a high incentive to pre- 
dict constant offensives because that way 
they can never be accused of intelligence 
lags, so one would not be surprised if there 
were other high points and even some offen- 
sives. We do not anticipate that they will 
reach the scale, the intensity, or the duration 
of the military activities earlier this year or 
that they will not be able to be essentially 


contained without precluding a setback 
and there. 

The major point, though, now about i 
tary action is that it is essential to un 
stand that there is no purely military ! 
tion to this problem. We have recogn 
that there is no purely military solutio 
this problem; we hope that North Viet-] 
will also realize that there is no mili 
solution to this problem. 

When there is no military solution to 
problem, then the only alternative is to n 
tiate on a basis that is just to both sides 
that both sides will have an interest in n; 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, tvhat, then, would 
say has been the impact of the bombing 
the mining and the possibility that if ^ 
have not done something so far, that f 
xvould in the future? 

Dr. Kissinger: I just don't want to dis ss 
where we stand in the negotiations. 1 is 
always very dangerous to take isolated in' 11- 
gence reports or isolated excerpts from i il- 
ligence reports and build profound coi u- 
sions on them. Every report is based on ; et 
of assumptions. It depends very mucl m 
what question it is supposed to ans ft 
Therefore I really don't want to dis » 
what may or may not have happened in t M 
negotiations, to what degree what is hap ft 
ing now may or may not be affected by i > 
tary actions. I do not think it is helpful, id 
frankly I don't think that isolated rep ts 
without very careful analysis can be i id 
for definitive conclusions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, going back to the lo it 
Viet Cong proposal, do you see any diffen ;e 
in this proposal? Is there anything diffe it 
from the earlier position? 

Dr. Kissinger: Again, I don't want to > 
duct the negotiations that are going on : 
publicly. As I have said, our basic princl? 
is that we will not, as a result of a negc a- 
tion, impose a particular form of governn "it 
that guarantees predominance to one s te. 


Department of State Bul4 

ill stick to what was said at the plenary 
.^ions by Ambassador [William J.] Por- 
:, and I will not go beyond that. 

?. They said that their proposal ivas 
,ni nation by no side. 

Ir. Kissinger: The question is not what 
s said but what the actual consequence of 


?. You characterized your meetings iyi 
fi Soviet Union with words such as "major 

■firess," "significant progress." Could you 
the same adjective to describe your meet- 
>is with Le Due Tho? 

)r. Kissinger: I just wouldn't comment 
■ the substance. I would like to, but we have 

understanding that neither side will com- 
nit on the substance of the meetings, and 

lUst maintain that. 

). Why is it that you didn't see Kosygin 
. cksei N. Kosygin, Chairman, Soviet 

nicil of Miyiisters] and he didn't take pa7't 
nhese discussions? 

)r. Kissinger: I think when General Sec- 
eiry Brezhnev holds his next press confer- 
ae, that will be a very good question to put 
Biim. [Laughter.] 

). Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions in 

'<cow, did you take up the question of the 

:sian ransom on Jewish would-be emi- 


)r. Kissinger: We raised this question in 
a lamber of ways, yes. 

). At this meeting ? 

)r. Kissinger: Yes, at this meeting. 

}. In yotir opening remarks, you stig- 

'fed you might be willing to say something 

"lit your discussions on Viet-Nam in the 

St'iet Union; that is, were they productive, 

"fin you say anything about them? Before 

left, there were some reports that some 

pie in the administration, notably Secre- 

ij Rogers, held out hope for a settlement 

before or just after the election. Do you share 
this ? 

Dr. Kissinger: First, about the discussions 
on Viet-Nam in the Soviet Union, as Ron 
Ziegler has already said at his briefing, Viet- 
Nam was discussed and obviously it was dis- 
cussed at some length. Again, it is clear that 
the Soviet Union stands for certain prin- 
ciples in its international affairs and that 
they have a different perspective on Viet- 
Nam than we do. But we had a full discus- 
sion, and that is really all I want to say 
about it. 

Secondly, however, it has always been 
understood, we have always understood, that 
the issue of Viet-Nam will be settled finally 
in negotiations between us and our allies and 
the North Vietnamese and their allies, so 
that the ultimate solution of the Viet-Nam 
problem is not being sought by us in Moscow 
or Peking or any other capital, but in the 
negotiations that are now going on in Paris. 

Now, as for speculating when the war 
might end, as I understood the Secretary of 
State, he listed all the factors that might lead 
reasonable people to conclude that this was 
an opportune moment to end the war. All I 
can say, and I can only speak for us, we have 
always wanted to end the war by negotia- 
tion. We would like to end it as rapidly as 
possible through negotiations. I think it is 
better to let results speak for themselves, 
rather than to set arbitrary deadlines. 

Q. In light of your remarks about ivhat 
the President asked you to convey to Euro- 
pean leaders about more intensive considta- 
tions about the changed relations in the 
rvorld, does that indicate to us that maybe the 
President is planning a trip to Europe soon 
after the election? If so, hoiv soon? 

Dr. Kissinger: This did not refer to any 
particular trips that the President might 
take. Let me say two things. 

First of all, he was not speaking only about 
consultation; he was talking about content. 
One cannot always substitute consultation 

Oiober 9, 1972 


for policy. Our intention is to develop a pro- 
gram for an Atlantic partnership in close 
cooperation with our European friends, but 
it is reasonable to assume that one way or 
another they will expect to be in close touch 
with each other. I must say that the feeling 
that I conveyed on behalf of the President 
was strongly reciprocated by European 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said that you raised 
the question of ransom or exit fees for Soviet 
Jeivs. Can you tell us whether the Soviet 
Union indicated how seriously they are going 
to pursue this imposition? And a related 
question: How does the administration view 
the concern being expressed in Congress on 
this question of most-favored-nation for the 
Soviet Union so long as they maintain these 
exit fees ? 

Dr. Kissinger: We take congressional ex- 
pressions of respected Senators extremely 
seriously. When and if we conclude an agree- 
ment, we will submit it to the Congress for 
its approval. Then there can be a full debate 
on this particular issue. As for what may or 
may not happen in the Soviet Union with 
respect to this issue, I think I would rather 
not comment. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you amplify on 
the SALT discussions that you had? Since 
the summit meeting, there has been exten- 
sive debate about the summit, with conten- 
tions made that the United States may be put 
in an inferior position. As you know, the 
Jackson resolution insists that there must be 
equality in the further discussions. Can you 
tell us whether the prospect for the second 
round of SALT has been impaired in any 
tvay by this debate? 

Dr. Kissinger: No. We think that the pros- 
pects for the second round of SALT are good. 
I think both sides have now gained valuable 
experience in talking to each other about 
issues that great nations have never in the 
past talked to each other about. I have every 
hope that the next round of SALT may move 
even faster than the first round of SALT. 

On the other hand, the conceptual problem 


with respect to the next round of SALT 
much greater than it was with the last o 
for the following reasons. We have no dil 
culty whatever, indeed, we agree with t! 
proposition that any agreement that may 
made in the field of strategic arms limit 
tion must be based on the principle of equi 
ity, and indeed, I believe that we will ha 
no difficulty getting Soviet agreement to tl 
as an abstract proposition. The difficul 
with respect to such a proposition is to defi: 
equality. How do you relate various weapo 
systems to each other when the weapons 
both sides have been developed, at least 
some extent, according to different obje 
tives and with different technical criteria ai 
with a different mix? So this is a proble 
that will have to be carefully and though 
fully addressed. Secondly, the first round 
SALT concentrated primarily on quantitati 
limitations. It may well be that in some oft 
early phases of SALT II this will be the ca; 

Yet, as one looks ahead in the more di 
tant future, one has to recognize that t 
strategic balance now can be upset perha 
more decisively by qualitative changes th: 
by quantitative changes. 

If you look at the problem of verificatic 
you will recognize that qualitative chang 
are infinitely harder to verify and contt 
than quantitative changes. 

So I would say that we have a maji 
intellectual problem ahead of us, first, with 
our government to come up with definitioi 
to the problems which you raise. 

Therefore, it is probable that the fir 
stage of these negotiations will concei 
principles, approaches, rather than very pr 
cise negotiating positions, as indeed SALT 
did also. 

But on the other side of the ledger is th; 
one cannot help but be struck by the fa^ 
that one can now talk to Soviet leaders aboi 
weapons on which the survival of both sid( 
depends in a way that would have been ii 
conceivable in traditional diplomacy an 
would have been quite difficult to imagin 
even in the first phase of the SALT negoti: 

But we have not developed our own thinl 

Department of State Bollefii 

ing to a point where we can be concrete, and 
my impression was that the Soviet leaders 
have the same intellectual problems that we 
have; but it was interesting that both sides 
found it possible to talk even about those. 

Q. Do you expect to have this trade treaty 
ready to submit to Congress this session? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I don't want to pre- 
dict when this treaty will be finished. The 
Soviet delegations are coming over here. We 
certainly hope to have it completed before 
the end of this year. To have it ready by the 
end of this congressional session would be 
pushing it a little hard, but we expect to 
iron out many of the remaining difficulties, 
most of the remaining differences, in the 
next few weeks. How this will relate to the 
congressional session we cannot be sure. But 
this is our approximate schedule. 

Q. Do you consider the Jackson amend- 
ment to he a useful bargaining tool? 

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have pretty well 
exhausted the Jackson amendment. It has 
now been passed by the Senate, and we 
stand by what we previously said with re- 
spect to it. 

Q. Was there any discussion tvith Soviet 
leaders on the possible development of the 
Japan-China relationship ? 

Dr. Kissinger: As I pointed out, there was 
a general review of the international situa- 
tion, and this is not one of its least signifi- 
cant aspects; but most of us recognize this is 
a matter to be decided by the Government of 
Japan and by the Government of the People's 
Republic of China in which, either separately 
or jointly, it would not be pi-oper for us to 
take a position. 

Q. At the time General [John D.] Lavelle 
ivas carrying out unauthorized bombing raids 
over North Viet-Nam you were having pri- 
vate conversations ivith the North Vietnam- 
ese. Can you assess the impact of those 
unauthorized bombing raids on the conversa- 
tions ? 

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, the North Viet- 

namese would not know which raids were 
authorized and which were unauthorized. 

Secondly, as it happens, there were no pri- 
vate talks going on at the time between our 
side and the North Vietnamese. There were 
efforts to set them up, which foundered for a 
variety of reasons, including the presumed 
illness of Special Adviser Le Due Tho. This 
particular issue has never figured in them, 
but there were no actual discussions, which, 
however, is not to defend unauthorized raids. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in relation to the ran- 
som issue and ivhat you remarked about this 
morning, are you saying in effect that the 
White House is opposed to something like 
the Ribicoff amendment that would tie the 
ransom to the trade agreement? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to get into the 
particular legislative proposal that has been 
made in relation to this issue. When we have 
concluded a trade agreement, it will be put 
before the Congress and then there will be 
sufficient opportunity for congressional lead- 
ers to express their opinion. That will be the 
appropriate time for us to express our 

Q. Henry, xvhen do you anticipate the 
second round of SALT will begin? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have not set a precise 
date for it yet, but I think it is reasonable to 
assume that it will be this calendar year. 

Q. When do you expect the Soviet lead- 
ers to come over to the United States in reply 
to the invitation? 

Dr. Kissinger: Again, no precise date for 
that has been set, but there were some general 
discussions. We expect it in the not indefi- 
nite future. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did the Soviet leaders 
ask you to explain the administration's sup- 
port of the Jackson amendment, and if they 
did, hoiv did you explain it? 

Dr. Kissinger: We discussed, in a general 
way, the conditions in which our relation- 
ships can be developed on a basis of mutual 

October 9, 1972 


confidence. I believe that when I left there 
was a mutual feeling that we had made con- 
siderable progress in that direction and that 
events that had happened in the interval, 
whether or not they were liked in every detail 
by both sides, had not stood in the way of a 
further development of Soviet-American 

The press: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. 

160th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Folloiving are remarks made by Ambas- 
sador William J. Porter, head of the U.S. 
delegation, at the 160th plenary session of 
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Sep- 
tember 21. 


White House press release dated September 14 


Press release 233 dated September 21 

As previously agreed, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, 
Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, visited the 
Soviet Union from September 10 to September 14. 
During his visit to Moscow he had discussions with 
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU, and Andrei A. Gromyko, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 

There was a general review of the course of Soviet- 
American relations since the Summit meeting and 
of international problems of interest to the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The exchange of views 
was frank and constructive. 

In the course of the discussion of major interna- 
tional issues, prominent attention was given to the 
problems relating to European security, and prog- 
ress was made regarding the next steps to be taken. 

There also was a discussion of issues connected 
with the resumption at an early date of negotiations 
on the limitation of strategic arms. 

Implementation of the bilateral agreements 
reached at the Summit meeting was reviewed. It 
was agreed that there already have been substantial 
accomplishments and that further accomplishments 
can be anticipated. 

Special attention was given to the status of com- 
mercial relations. Both sides reaffirmed the impor- 
tance of these ties in strengthening mutual relations. 
Sigrnificant progress was made on several issues of 
principle in commercial relations between the two 
countries. It was agreed that in view of this prog- 
ress, negotiations on a lend-lease settlement and on 
concluding a trade agreement would be continued 
in Washington in September with the aim of com- 
pleting them in the near future. It was also agreed 
to conclude promptly the negotiations of the mari- 
time agreement between the USSR and the USA. 

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of continuing 
the practice of exchanging views on questions of 
mutual interest in various forms and at various 
levels, including the highest level. 

Ladies and gentlemen : Some interesting 
conclusions have arisen in the course of our 
analysis of your side's presentations at the 
plenary session last week and of the Sep- 
tember 11 Viet Cong statement from which 
you quoted extensively. My purpose today 
is to acquaint you with these findings and 
to invite you to comment upon them, in 
whole or in part, as you deem appropriate. 

Your own analysis of the situation, with- 
in the comprehensive solution you propose, 
classifies the problems to be resolved into 
the conventional division of military ques- 
tions and political questions. In each field 
you have provided detailed prescriptions of 
actions to be undertaken so that you may 
obtain an overall settlement of the respec- 
tive problems which you would consider 
satisfactory. After careful assessment of the 
factors you have listed as components of this 
plan for settlement, one is justified in mak- 
ing the following synthesis of it. 

You envision settlement of the military 
aspect of the Viet-Nam conflict as wholly 
contingent upon observance of certain al- 
leged responsibilities by the United States, 
and by us alone. You envision settlement of 
the political aspect of the conflict, on the 
other hand, as wholly contingent upon your 
unlimited acquisition and exercise of gov- 
ernmental authority. 

This curious disparity between unshared 
responsibilities and unhampered preroga- 
tives is clearly evidenced by the Viet Cong 

First, in the military field, the United 


Department of State Bulletin 

states alone receives mention, barring pass- 
ing reference to the administration of Presi- 
dent Thieu, which you require be deprived 
of American support. You have enumerated 
the steps which the United States must fol- 
low: cessation of all military activity, total 
withdrawal, dismantlement of bases, and so 
forth. The statement is completely mute, 
however, about the measures your side 
would undertake. 

For example, you do not offer to cease 
hostilities, to withdraw the more than 12 
regular divisions of the North Vietnamese 
army you have sent to the South, or to dis- 
mantle the base areas and stocks of war 
materiel you have covertly established. In 
short, you furnish no indication that you 
acknowledge a responsibility in assuring 
that neither a continuation nor a resump- 
tion of the warfare should occur — nothing, 
in short, to suggest that you intend to con- 
tribute anything toward achieving the "sta- 
ble" peace which you claim to advocate. 

Similarly, as Ambassador [Pham Dang] 
Lam has pointed out, in the political field, 
your formula for a so-called "tripartite gov- 
ernment of national concord" fails by its own 
test of "logic and reasonableness." Although 
your statement generalizes about "equality," 
"mutual respect," and "mutual nonelimina- 
tion" among the proposed government's 
three components, close analysis in the light 
of your doctrine and your activities makes 
the meaning of these words, as you use them, 

As to "equality," this is a strange term 
for you to use in view of the fact that your 
representivity has never been tested. Never- 
theless, under your proposal the Viet Cong 
element would automatically enjoy decisive 
preponderance of authority if only because 
it need make no prior changes in its policies 
or internal organization. 

As for "mutual respect," let me point out 
only the strikingly disrespectful manner 
your side is accustomed to adopt in this 
forum toward the representative of the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam. This 
is but one example, though a symbolic one, 
of your doctrinaire refusal to accept the 

Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as 
a legitimate entity. This attitude scarcely 
provides a reassuring precedent for the mu- 
tual respect the Viet Cong would avowedly 
manifest in the future. Nor have you helped 
your credibility by the steady stream of 
epithets which your propaganda directs 
against any Vietnamese, of whatever politi- 
cal or religious affiliation, who takes excep- 
tion to your views. 

As for "nonelimination," it is surely 
through an internationally supervised cease- 
fire and not through your implausible and 
bland assurances that this objective will be 
made a reality for the South Vietnamese. A 
quarter century of ruthless Communist frat- 
ricide has made Vietnamese political lead- 
ers and impartial foreign observers pardon- 
ably skeptical about professions of coexist- 
ence. Would the Viet Cong, for example, 
cease attempts to assassinate local officials, 
to destroy habitations and public installa- 
tions, to intimidate and silence non-Commu- 
nist political leaders, or to conscript and 
propagandize the population? Or would 
what you define as "patriotic" activities con- 
tinue at present or even higher levels of 
intensity? Your constant exhortations to 
your cadres to undertake offensive opera- 
tions, refuse any reconciliation with those 
you identify as enemies, and spare no sacri- 
fice for the total victory of the revolution 
do, you must admit, conflict rather sharply 
with the new theme of mutual nonelimina- 

Your silence about your commitments in 
the military and political spheres is paral- 
leled by your silence about the North Viet- 
namese army. That army, the world knows, 
is the instrument of aggression not only in 
South Viet-Nam but in the other countries 
of Indochina as well. It is the key to creat- 
ing or destroying the confidence that must 
prevail if a permanent peace is to be 
achieved in South Viet-Nam. 

Your current glorification of war and mili- 
tarism warrants this concern. On September 
10, the eve of the Viet Cong statement con- 
cerning equality, mutual respect, and non- 
elimination, the authoritative and official 

October 9, 1972 


Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan published an 
article entitled "Determined to Win!" 
which poured high praise upon "factors for 
success" such as the following: "our numer- 
ous combat experiences, especially our ex- 
periences in the people's war, our high of- 
fensive spirit, our strong offensive stance, 
our powerful offensive strength, and our 
myriad offensive techniques." The conclu- 
sion of this article is a battle cry: "We are 
determined to win and will win complete 
victory." Can you explain what place North 
Viet-Nam's invading divisions, sworn to vic- 
tory and imbued with the attack mystique, 
would have in relation to the Viet Cong 
proposals for military settlement? 

The same series of Nhan Dan articles, in- 
cidentally, praises "the party's line, the way 
to apply the fundamental principles of 
Marxism-Leninism to the current situation 
in Viet-Nam," and boasts that by "closely 
linking national interests with those of the 
world revolution," North Viet-Nam is "con- 
tributing toward further changing the bal- 
ance of forces in the world in a direction 
favorable for the revolution." These state- 
ments, so typical in substance and tone, 
place your talk about "nondomination" in a 
more realistic light. Completing this evi- 
dence that you implacably oppose the kind 
of balanced, representative government you 
profess to seek, Nhan Dan exhorts those who 
look to it for direction to pursue this goal, 
among others : "to consolidate our people's 
role as masters in an increasingly wider 
sphere under the flag of the National Libera- 
tion Front and Provisional Revolutionary 

Is this not tantamount to a repudiation 
of "mutual nonelimination"? 

I have tried to show that the two "re- 
quirements" of the Viet Cong would, if 
achieved, lead neither to peace nor to self- 
determination for the South Vietnamese 
population. Instead, prolonged warfare and 
Communist dictatorship by the North would 
be the clearly predictable consequence. 

At the last session you stated : "The ques- 
tion is not whether the United States under- 

stands our presentation but whether the 
United States Government has good will in 
its negotiations." 

It is not surprising that you should be 
reluctant to have us seek to understand your 
statements ; for the more we analyze them, 
the more illogical, impractical, and self- 
contradictory they appear. By contrast, the 
need for an internationally supervised cease- 
fire throughout Indochina, and the subse- 
quent resolution of political questions 
through discussions among the Vietnamese 
themselves, has become even more apparent 
than before. 


Press release 233A dated September 21 

Ladies and gentlemen : In your presenta- 
tion today you allude to some of the ques- 
tions we have posed concerning your "two 
requirements," but you make no direct re- 
sponse to the matters of substance we have 

You object that we have distorted your 
proposals, which are really of North Viet- 
namese origin, but you do not choose to 
specify how we have done so, and your con- 
tinued silence on this score is itself eloquent 
testimony to your predicament. 

Your approach to negotiations, as you pre- 
sent it here, can be quickly summarized : 
Accept our latest "requirements" at once, do 
not ask any questions or try to understand 
them, and let us be the sole judge of your 
"good will." 

I realize that such an approach is con- 
sistent with your political doctrine that per- 
mits of no dissent or opposition, but it has 
little to do with serious negotiations and will 
only weaken your case further in the eyes 
of international opinion. 

If you are serious in attributing the quali- 
ties of logic and reasonableness to your prop- 
ositions, you still have a chance to indicate 
that by responding specifically to the points 
we have raised at this and the preceding 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Collective International Effort Against Drug Abuse 

Statement by Nelson Gross 

The President called for an accelerated at- 
tack on the international aspects of the drug 
abuse problem in his message to the Con- 
gress on June 17, 1971, when he stated: ^ 

No serious attack on our national drug problem 
can ignore the international implications of such an 
effort, nor can the domestic effort succeed without 
attacking the problem on an international plane. 

The President's call resulted in the forma- 
tion of the Cabinet Committee on Interna- 
tional Narcotics Control in September 1971. 
That Committee, chaired by the Secretary of 
State, William Rogers, provides for inter- 
agency coordination of an overall program to 
strengthen narcotics control from Cabinet 
level down throughout the executive branch. 
The State Department's role has been crys- 
tallized, and there has been a sharp increase 
in activity in all of its bureaus. 

Not only was my office, that of Senior Ad- 
viser to the Secretary and Coordinator for 
International Narcotics Matters, created, but 
in addition narcotics control coordinators 
were designated for all of the Department's 
geographic and the pertinent functional bu- 
reaus. Each of the five geographic bureaus 
chairs an Interagency Narcotics Control 

' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Internal Se- 
curity of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 
Sept. 15. Mr. Gross is Senior Adviser to the Secre- 
tary and Coordinator for International Narcotics 
Matters. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

' Bulletin of July 12, 1971, p. 58. 

To complement the mobilizing of resources 
in Washington, narcotics control coordina- 
tors have been designated at virtually all for- 
eign posts. The coordinators operate within 
the framework of a Country Team which 
utilizes the expertise of all appropriate 
agencies represented at the mission. For 
those countries having a current or potential 
involvement in the production, processing, or 
transiting of illicit hard drugs, narcotics 
control action plans have been developed. 
The Ambassador has been charged with the 
ultimate responsibility of developing, imple- 
menting, and monitoring the action plans, a 
responsibility placed upon him directly by the 
President. Pertinent excerpts of a Presiden- 
tial letter sent in February to the Chiefs of 
Mission in 69 countries read as follows: 

A successful fight against drug abuse will require 
the cooperation of all nations. For this reason I have 
made effective narcotics control a primary foreign 
policy objective of the United States. 

The State Department's senior adviser and coor- 
dinator for international narcotics matters, Mr. 
Nelson Gross, and other administration officials have 
attempted to convey to foreign governments and to 
our overseas diplomatic missions the determination 
of the United States to take the necessary steps in 
cooperation with others to bring narcotics and other 
dangerous drugs under effective control. 

These efforts are beginning to bear fruit. I am 
particularly gratified by the courageous decision of 
the Turkish Government to ban opium cultivation, by 
the results of Operation Cooperation in Mexico, and 
by recent successes in narcotics enforcement in Eu- 
rope, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. 

Still, much remains to be done. In many nations 
narcotics law enforcement is still in its infancy. 
Better narcotics intelligence is required almost 

October 9, 1972 


Narcotics control action plans have now been 
drafted by 57 missions. The key to carrying out 
these plans effectively is to convince the leaders of 
countries where production and trafficking take place 
to commit their governments to attacking the nar- 
cotics problem with urgency and determination. 

Your assistance will be critical in this effort. To 
begin with, we need your advice on how best to ob- 
tain the requisite political commitment from the 
government to which you are accredited. If you 
have not already given us your vievv's, we shall ap- 
preciate receiving them promptly. 

The efforts undertaken by our Chiefs of 
Mission within the structure of the Cabinet 
Committee apparatus have been unique. By 
elevating the subject of narcotics control to 
a top foreign policy issue, the President has 
enabled the Ambassadors to deal continu- 
ously with this problem at the very highest 
levels with foreign governments. 

Charged as they have been, the Chiefs of 
Mission and all members of their Country 
Teams have performed with diligence and 
dedication. While no one can measure suc- 
cess in this field, some appreciable impact 
has already been felt, and I am certain that 
the effort expended thus far will produce 
favorable results in the succeeding months. 

Clearly this effort led by the President 
has galvanized commitments from nations 
around the world as never before. Our mis- 
sions overseas began to yield cooperative 
undertakings essential to a worldwide attack 
on illicit drugs. The United States made it 
clear that it could not do the job alone, and 
the critical necessity for drawing together 
cooperative programs for narcotics control 
became universally recognized. 

It quickly became necessary for our gov- 
ernment to help increase the capability of 
foreign governments to immobilize the traf- 
fickers and cut the supply of narcotics. The 
result was the development of the previously 
mentioned narcotics control action plans for 
key countries around the world. To seek the 
very best results, law enforcement survey 
teams have been sent to selected countries, 
regional conferences of narcotics coordina- 
tors have been held throughout the world, 
and there has been a simultaneous expansion 
of BNDD [Bureau of Narcotics and Danger- 

ous Drugs] overseas activities, foreign cus- 
toms cooperation and assistance, and estab- 
lishment of CIA responsibility for narcotics 
intelligence coordination. The increased ca- 
pability being promoted is in accordance with 
the Cabinet Committee priorities assigned to 
intelligence collection and enforcement activ- 
ities abroad. 

The attention drawn to this problem by our 
own officials, together with an increasing 
awareness of other governments of the dan- 
ger of spreading drug abuse, has unques- 
tionably led to more active international 
cooperation. The very fact that we have our 
own U.S. Government agents operating with- 
in the jurisdiction of foreign governments is 
a strong sign of cooperation. When looked at 
from that point of view, it can be recognized 
quickly that accepting our agents bespeaks 
firm and unswerving support. 

This does not mean that we can expect 
resounding results overnight. We must ac- 
knowledge that in many cases we are dealing 
with unsophisticated equipment and un- 
trained personnel. Surely if the United 
States cannot stop the trafficking at its own 
borders, we must understand that a develop- 
ing country will have even greater difficulty 
in preventing itself from becoming a point of 
transit for narcotics. Yet the beginnings 
have been made, and the results have been 

There have been seizures of greater im- 
portance and with increasing regularity 
throughout the world. Arrests of important 
figures have been made. High-level traffick- 
ers have been extradited and put in prison. 
Five heroin laboratories in the Marseille 
area of France have been seized during 1972. 
The Turkish ban on opium cultivation has 
been implemented resolutely, though Turkish 
officials have had to face continuing criti- 
cism. Thus, measurable steps have been gen- 
erated toward bilateral cooperation. 

It would be useful at this point to discuss 
the situation as we now see it in the key 
countries in illicit production and/or traflfick- 
ing. First, our two neighbors — Canada and 


Department of State Bulletin 

Canada and Mexico 

In a sense the drug abuse problem in 
Canada parallels that of the United States. 
Canadian statistics show significant in- 
creases over the past five years in the use of 
marihuana, hashish, and psychotropics. Of 
particular concern at the present time is an 
apparent substantial increase in the use of 
heroin in major cities; notably, Vancouver, 
Toronto, and Montreal. In March 1972 offi- 
cial Canadian sources estimated that there 
were 16,000 heroin addicts in Canada, ap- 
proximately five times the 3,500 addicts 
estimated in 1966. Total arrests for drug 
offenses were about 14,000 in 1970 and 
exceeded 17,000 in 1971. 

Montreal and Toronto are recognized as 
major transshipment points for drugs — par- 
ticularly heroin — destined for the larger U.S. 
market. Canadian enforcement problems are 
therefore much greater and more difficult 
than the incidence of illicit use in the country 
would indicate. The use of Montreal and 
Toronto as entrepots also illustrates the need 
for very close and forthright cooperation be- 
tween U.S. and Canadian authorities. 

As might be expected, there is close coop- 
eration at all levels between interested Cana- 
dian and U.S. agencies. The Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police maintains a three-man staflF 
attached to the Embassy to handle daily liai- 
son in Washington. Similarly, there is a 
BNDD liaison office, to which an officer of 
the Bureau of Customs is attached, for liai- 
son in Montreal. Additional BNDD liaison 
offices have recently been established in To- 
ronto and Vancouver, and the Bureau of 
Customs has recently established an addi- 
tional liaison office in Ottawa. Mention 
should also be made of the excellent working- 
level relationship between U.S. and Canadian 
officials at the border crossing points. 

High-level cooperation between the two 
countries is also good. In September 1971 a 
U.S. group headed by BNDD Director [John 
E.] Ingersoll journeyed to Ottawa for a con- 
sultative meeting with a Canadian group 
headed by Dr. R. A. Chapman, Special Ad- 
viser to the Deputy Minister, Department of 

National Health and Welfare. In October 
1971 a tripartite meeting at the Deputy At- 
torney General level considered enforce- 
ment questions of possible joint interest to 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico. A 
tripartite meeting of Attorneys General was 
held at Mexico City in March 1972, at which 
time the three governments reaffirmed their 
commitment to cooperation in antidrug 
efforts. The United States and Mexico have 
accepted a Canadian invitation to another 
meeting at the Deputy Attorney General- 
level in October 1972. Planning is now un- 
derway for increased U.S.-Canadian coop- 
eration and coordination in drug research, 
including seminars to bring together leading 
researchers of the two countries. Canada has 
participated since November 1970 with the 
United States and France in periodic meet- 
ings of the drug law enforcement agencies of 
the three countries. 

Canada worked closely with the United 
States at the United Nations conference to 
amend the Single Convention and was one of 
71 nations voting to approve the amending 
protocol. Canada has contributed $400,000 
to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control, the largest contribution after that 
of the United States. Canada is an active 
member of the United Nations Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs. 

Mexico is the source of nearly all the high- 
potency marihuana and about 10 percent of 
the heroin consumed in the United States. 
In addition, Mexico is increasingly being 
used as a transit country by international 
drug traffickers, particularly for heroin and 
cocaine. Interdiction of illicit narcotics 
traffic at the border can only control a por- 
tion of this traffic. Complementary efforts 
must be made to eradicate marihuana and 
opium poppy production at their soui'ce. 

In October 1969 the friction created by 
Operation Intercept was converted into the 
harmonious and relatively successful Opera- 
tion Cooperation. We are gratified that 
President Echeverria and other high Mexi- 
can Government officials are keenly aware of 
the narcotics problem and are expending 

October 9, 1972 


considerable human and material resources 
in a broad-scale program of cooperation with 
the United States in narcotics control. In its 
efforts to eradicate opium poppies and mari- 
huana, the Mexican Government is using 
light planes and helicopters to spot growing 
areas. Army ground troops are dispatched 
to destroy the fields and apprehend illegal 
growers. As many as 12,000 soldiers may be 
employed in this manner at any given time. 
In addition, Mexican laws concerning drug 
abuse are considerably more severe than 
those in the United States, and a recent 
change in the agrarian code has made the 
illegal growing of marihuana or opium pop- 
pies an offense punishable by fine, imprison- 
ment, or confiscation of the land involved. 
More recently still, Mexico has outlawed 
production of amphetamine drugs. 

Several examples of cooperation can be 
cited. At the beginning of Operation Coop- 
eration the United States made available to 
Mexico $1 million to be used for materiel 
assistance in narcotics control. The money 
was used to purchase helicopters and light 
aircraft. Negotiations are nearly complete 
for an agreement which will provide an addi- 
tional $1.3 million package of materiel and 
training assistance, including helicopters, 
communications equipment, and weapons. 
BNDD and U.S. customs personnel stationed 
in Mexico cooperate routinely with Mexican 
narcotics authorities in the exchange of in- 
telligence and in operations directed against 
the drug traffic ; destruction of growing areas 
and seizures of heroin, cocaine, and mari- 
huana are large and are increasing. In keep- 
ing with the agreement to maintain high- 
level consultations between the two countries, 
the Mexican and U.S. Attorneys General, 
their Deputies, and their staffs hold periodic 
narcotics talks alternately in Washington and 
Mexico City. Canada has now added her 
participation, making the consultations tri- 
partite. Two such tripartite talks have been 
held, in October 1971 and in March 1972; 
we expect another meeting before the end 
of this year. 


Because of her crossroads location, which 
provides ready access to a wide variety of air 
and sea transportation routes, and her tradi- 
tion of permitting trade to move freely in 
and out of the country, Panama's role as a 
transshipment point for international nar- 
cotics smuggling has in recent years become 
a cause of increasing U.S. concern. 

Two recent cases served to focus our at- 
tention on the need to help strengthen Pan- 
ama's efforts in controlling drug traffic. One 
of these was the arrest in the Canal Zone of 
Joaquin Him Gonzalez, a Panamanian air 
traflfic controller. He was subsequently 
charged with conspiring to smuggle heroin 
into the United States. A second case was 
the seizure of 180 pounds of heroin on July 
8, 1971, when Rafael A. Richard, Jr., son of 
the Panamanian Ambassador to Taiwan, was 
arrested at JFK Airport in New York. 

Factors which have have tended to hamper 
Panamanian efforts to control the narcotics 
traffic are: (1) Panama has not been a vic- 
tim country, and (2) an effective control and 
enforcement program would require a com- 
mitment of trained personnel and funds, both 
of which are scarce. The Panamanian Gov- 
ernment has tended to give priority to its 
socioeconomic development programs in 
using its financial and administrative re- 
sources. The Panamanian Government has, 
however, stated that it wishes to cooperate 
with the United States in eliminating the 
flow of illicit drugs through Panama. 

During the past year, the Department of 
State and the U.S. Embassy have sought to 
increase Panamanian cooperation and com- 
mitment to control the international narcot- 
ics flow. They have facilitated Panamanian 
acceptance of the assignment of BNDD and 
customs agents to work in Panama. When, 
because of a misunderstanding resulting 
from the publication in the U.S. press of 
allegations about Panamanian officials, the 
BNDD agents were expelled from Panama, 
the Embassy within a short time was able to 


Department of State Bulletin 

obtain Panamanian agreement to have them 

Some specific examples of Panamanian ac- 
tivity can be cited. In October and Novem- 
ber 1971 the Panamanian National Guard 
located and destroyed approximately 50 tons 
of marihuana in the Las Perlas Islands. 
About 75 percent of this vi^ould ordinarily 
have been destined for the U.S. market and 
would have had a street value of $10 to $15 
million. The Government of Panama intro- 
duced a crop substitution program. Accord- 
ing to eyewitness accounts by one of our own 
BNDD agents, very little marihuana is grow- 
ing in the area this year. Rice is grow- 
ing in its place. Panamanian customs 
officials have cooperated at Tocumen Air- 
port, at times assisting U.S. agents in dis- 
mantling planes suspected of carrying nar- 
cotics. Panamanian officials have provided 
information concerning shipments of nar- 
cotics. Recently they broke up a narcotics 
smuggling ring, stopped a shipment of co- 
caine from entering the United States, and 
arrested the traffickers involved. During the 
past year, Panamanian authorities arrested 
a number of narcotics offenders in Panama 
and have returned a fugitive trafficker who 
had jumped bond in the United States. They 
have participated in several narcotics control 
training courses and have increased their 
understanding of the narcotics smuggling 
problem and Panama's role in it. 


For many years the way of life in Para- 
guay has included smuggling of consumer 
goods. Smuggling of goods to Pai-aguay's 
neighboring countries has not been illegal. 
Supply and demand has been an important 
element in clandestine and illegal trafficking 
in consumer goods to and through Paraguay, 
and in this latter regard, Paraguay seems to 
have had a role similar to that of Andorra 
between Spain and France. As there has 
been a demand or "need" for narcotics by 
some members of the population in the 

United States, apparently the operational 
pattern of clandestine trade in Paraguay has 
been put to use helping supply that unfor- 
tunate need. 

Much of Paraguay's boundary areas with 
her neighbors are unprotected and unpoliced. 
Paraguay has developed into a ti'ansient 
place for heroin from Europe to the United 
States as well as for cocaine from South 
America, although drug abuse within Para- 
guay is apparently very small. 

It seems to have been difficult for some offi- 
cials of Paraguay to understand the impor- 
tance of the effort of the United States to ter- 
minate illegal drug traffic into our country, 
although this situation is improving. A key 
step in obtaining this improvement was the 
recent departure of Auguste Ricord from 
Paraguay and his safe arrival in the United 
States to face trial for alleged drug traffick- 
ing offenses. 

Based on my recent visit to Paraguay and 
personal discussions with President Stroess- 
ner, I am personally encouraged that we can 
expect an improved level of cooperation, un- 
derstanding, and mutual assistance in the 
drug suppression effort. This could include 
suppression of the manufacture of drugs in 
Paraguay and elimination of the smuggling 
of drugs through that nation. 

Paraguay has limited resources for com- 
bating drug traffic, although a new aware- 
ness of the need seems to be unfolding. The 
U.S. Government expects to be able to assist 
the Government of Paraguay in appropriate, 
practical, and useful ways related to Para- 
guay's ability to absorb and use such assist- 
ance efficiently. We also expect that improved 
legislation in the drug preparation and traf- 
ficking fields will be enacted in Paraguay. 


Most of the heroin entering the United 
States in recent years has been processed 
from Turkish opium and morphine base in 
southern France, primarily around Mar- 
seille. The southern coastal town of Mar- 

October 9, 1972 


seille, which has long been a center of French 
underwoi-ld activity, is estimated to house 
within its environs as many as 12 heroin 
laboratories. Nothing more than portable 
rudimentary workshops, these laboratories 
process morphine base into high-grade her- 

The French have expressed concern over 
their drug problem only in the last few years. 
Legal penalties were stiffened in late 1970, 
when the national legislature doubled the 
maximum penalty for trafficking to 20 years. 
In 1971 a strong publicity campaign was 
launched to educate and arouse the French 
public to the drug abuse problem. In August 

1971 President Pompidou sent a letter to the 
heads of other members of the European 
Community proposing that the organization 
develop specific areas of cooperation in at- 
tacking the drug problem. 

Furthermore, in the last several years 
France has substantially increased the 
money and manpower allocated to the drug 
problem. Since 1969 the number of agents 
assigned to narcotics duty has greatly in- 
creased. The fight against drug abuse is di- 
rected from a Central Narcotics Office in the 
Ministry of the Interior, but the Customs 
Service, which is part of the Ministry of 
Finance, has also been involved. In early 

1972 the Customs Service was responsible 
for a large seizure of heroin cached on a 
shrimp trawler. In August 1971 Interior 
Minister Marcellin upgraded the leadership 
of the antidrug efforts by appointing Fran- 
cois le Mouel to head the overall effort and 
Marcel Morin to oversee operations in Mar- 
seille. In the 10 years prior to the end of 
1971 only three heroin laboratories had been 
uncovered. Thus far in 1972 five heroin 
laboratories have been shut down. 

French-American cooperation against the 
illegal drug traffic is based on a number of 
agreements, the most important of which 
was signed in February 1971 between then- 
U.S. Attorney General Mitchell and French 
Interior Minister Marcellin. A number of 
agents from the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs are stationed in Paris and 

Marseille, and the French Judiciary Police 
has stationed agents in New York City. A 
bilateral Intergovernmental Committee on 
Drug Control meets quarterly to review the 
cooperative arrangements and to seek im- 
provements in the program. 

West Germany 

West Germany is neither a known pro- 
ducer nor processor of opiates, but is con- 
sidered an important transit country and 
storage and staging area for hard drugs. 
The narcotics problem is compounded by the 
large number (over 2 million) of foreign 
workers in West Germany, many from the 
Middle East, who have acted as a conduit for 
illegal drug traffic. Because of the signifi- 
cant amounts of morphine bases and other 
opiates thought to be in the country, Ger- 
man officials are highly alert to the fact 
that a serious hard drug problem could de- 
velop relatively rapidly in Germany. 

Reflecting growing public and official con- 
cern, the German Government (ERG) insti- 
tuted in November 1970 a comprehensive 
"Action Program Against Drug Abuse." The 
program tightened legislative control over 
legal and illegal movements of narcotics, ini- 
tiated an educational campaign on the effects 
of drug abuse, increased the institutional as- 
sistance available to addicts and users, and 
provided for enhanced international coopera- 
tion on the problem of combating the flow 
of illegal drugs across national boundaries. 

An extensive series of U.S.-ERG consulta- 
tion visits on narcotics matters has taken 
place at all levels of government. The BNDD 
staff in Germany has been expanded to five 
persons and offices opened in Munich, Bonn, 
and Frankfurt, and U.S. customs officers are 
scheduled assignment to Munich and Ham- 
burg to work with German customs on nar- 
cotics matters. Liaison has been instituted 
between the ERG and U.S. Embassies in 
Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 
The U.S. military foi'ces, in cooperation with 
the ERG, have begun a wide-ranging attack 
on drug problems affecting our troops in 


Deparfment of State Bulletin 

Germany. A joint U.S.-FRG Interministerial 
Task Force meets regularly on narcotics 
problems affecting the U.S. forces in Ger- 
many, and talks on military drug problems 
have also been instituted directly between 
the German Ministry of Defense and U.S. 
military officials. 

In addition, a comprehensive bilateral pro- 
gram for further cooperation has been 
worked out and discussed at a high level 
with German officials. This program par- 
ticularly focuses on cooperation with FRG 
narcotics enforcement officials and includes 
training and educational assistance, the 
sharing of narcotics technology and tech- 
niques, increased mutual informational ex- 
changes on narcotics, coordination of 
narcotics-connected scientific research, and 
cooperation in social policy, international 
youth activities, and drug rehabilitation ef- 

Eastern Europe 

Eastern Europe's importance in the inter- 
national narcotics problem is primarily as 
a transit region for illegal opiates smuggled 
from Turkey to western Europe. Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia are the main transit routes. 
Thus far only small quantities of illicit opi- 
ates are known to have been routed through 
Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
or East Germany. Production of opium, 
which occurs in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and 
Hungary, is minor, although poppyseed is 
often an ingredient of East European pas- 
tries. There is no significant opiate addic- 
tion in the region, but the use of other dan- 
gerous drugs is growing. 

Following a trip by the U.S. Commissioner 
of Customs to the various eastern European 
countries last December, we have been suc- 
cessful in developing on a bilateral basis 
cooperation in the field of narcotics with 
the various governments in the area. Cus- 
toms and BNDD teams have visited Sofia, 
Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, and Prague. 
Appropriate officials from each of these 
countries have either visited or been invited 

to visit the United States to tour facilities 
in this country concerned with enforcement 
and rehabilitation aspects of the narcotics 

The thrust of our efforts in the eastern 
European area has been to elicit whatever 
cooperation we can from these governments 
to deal with drug abuse on a multilateral 
basis, to devise ways for cooperating with 
them in their efforts to control the transit 
of drugs aci'oss their territories, to promote 
a full exchange of information on all aspects 
of the drug problem between ourselves and 
these governments, and to endorse the efforts 
of the Ambassadors and other Embassy per- 
sonnel to insure continuing and effective co- 
operation in this area. 


Although Turkey is not one of the world's 
largest producers of opium, it is the second 
largest legal exporter and the most impor- 
tant supplier of the raw material from which 
illicit heroin is produced for the U.S. market. 
The principal source of illicit diversion ap- 
pears to be the understatement of opium 
gum yields by some farmers in authorized 
poppy-growing Provinces. The amount 
siphoned off in this manner is sold to the 
illicit trafficking network. Most other major 
producers of opium have large numbers of 
domestic addicts to support. There is no sig- 
nificant consumption of opium in Turkey. 
Thus, the entire diversion is available to 
foreign buyers. 

In an effort to improve control over opium 
poppy cultivation in order to eliminate the 
illicit traffic, Turkey has reduced the num- 
ber of Provinces where poppy growing is le- 
gally permitted since 1967. As the number 
of Provinces has fallen, production of opium 
gum has also fallen, but not nearly as rap- 
idly. Estimates of opium gum production in 
1967 ranged from 240 to 350 tons; 1971 
estimates ranged from 180 to 210 tons. 

Events in 1971 introduced drastic changes 
in Turkish opium production. By law the 
Turkish Government must announce poppy 

October 9, 1972 


cultivation decisions one year in advance of 
their implementation. The June 30, 1971, 
decree confirmed four Provinces for cultiva- 
tion during the 1971-72 growing season but 
announced that a total ban would apply 
thereafter. This decree was the strongest 
and most direct action legally possible for 
the Turkish Government to take. 

Prior to the decree, the government had 
initiated a number of measures in the spring 
of 1971 to improve the collection of opium 
gum. These included a 66 percent increase 
in the price government purchasers paid for 
the gum, an increase in the number of col- 
lection points in the seven poppy-growing 
Provinces, cash payments when farmers 
turn in the gum, and the initiation of a 
vigorous radio and press campaign publiciz- 
ing these benefits and the penalties for non- 
compliance. It is estimated that these meas- 
ures substantially reduced the proportion of 
gum flowing into illicit channels. 

In August 1971 the Turkish Parliament 
enacted a licensing law which further 
strengthens the government's authority over 
the growing process. The law provides an 
improved basis for licensing, controlling, and 
collecting the final crop and includes stiffer 
penalties for those who fail to comply. In 
late 1971 licenses were issued to any farmer 
in the four authorized Provinces who com- 
pleted an application. Information on the 
license must include the location of the farm, 
the number of hectares to be planted, the 
amount of opium to be produced, and a sim- 
ple sketch of the opium field. The transfer 
of licenses is prohibited, and licenses may 
not be issued to persons convicted of smug- 
gling or other crimes. 

In support of the opium ban, the United 
States pledged $35 million, which is in con- 
cept divided into two parts : (a) $20 million 
is intended as a financial resource for pro- 
grams and projects which could in a reason- 
able period of time produce new sources of 
income for the poppy farmer and the region 
in which he lives; and (b) $15 million spread 
over three to four years to the Government 
of Turkey will help replace losses in foreign 

exchange the government would incur as a 
consequence of no longer being able to mar- 
ket its legitimate opium and related poppy 
product exports. 

With American technical advice and as- 
sistance, Turkey has designed a special 
regional authority for central areas afi^ected 
by the poppy ban which will put develop- 
mental funds to work on selected activities, 
most of which are outlined in a joint report 
prepared in October and November 1971 by 
a U.S.-Turkish team. The U.S. team was led 
by former Secretary of Agriculture Clifford 
Hardin. During the spring of 1972 Turkey 
established a regulatory and legislative base 
for this new regional development organi- 
zation and made appointments to its key 
positions, hoping to utilize this operation as 
a model for agricultural development per- 
haps applicable to other areas of Turkey as 

The opium poppy ban is subject to argu- 
ment and challenge from a number of sources 
in Turkey. Some maintain that Turkey 
should not accept the economic loss without 
the commitment of massive compensatory 
assistance. Clearly, farmers are concerned 
over the uncertainty involved in changing a 
centuries-old practice and wonder what will 
replace the opium gum and other byproducts 
to provide them cash and the products they 
consume for their own use. The permanency 
of the ban will depend in large measure on 
the development of new sources of income 
to make up these losses. 

There will still be a need for vigorous law 
enforcement against smugglers if the flow 
of illegal opium is to be slowed after 1972 
when production is banned. This is true be- 
cause of the likelihood that illegal stocks of 
opium and morphine base may be stored in 
Turkey. In the mid or late 1960's, Turkish 
traffickers began to convert opium to mor- 
phine base before smuggling it out of the 
country. A large network exists in Turkey to 
collect and, in some cases, process and smug- 
gle the opium out of the country. These 
activities can be expected to continue until 
opium is no longer available in Turkey. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Opium production in Afghanistan — all il- 
licit — is estimated at about 100 tons in 1971. 
Output could be higher than this; there is a 
lack of solid information on production in 
Afghanistan. Kabul is a signatory to the 
1961 Single Convention, and production and 
trafficking are proscribed by domestic stat- 
ute. However, the Royal Government of 
Afghanistan (RGA) is simply unable to pro- 
vide adequate enforcement. There is no licit 
production of opium derivatives in Afghani- 
stan nor any indication of illicit processing 
into morphine or heroin. 

The RGA in recent months has indicated a 
willingness to cooperate with other nations 
on the opium problem. Two ministerial-level 
committees were set up in January 1972 to 
formulate narcotics control programs. The 
first committee is charged with supervising 
social and economic aspects of narcotics con- 
trol (including cultivation and crop substi- 
tution), while the second committee is re- 
sponsible for combating illicit traffic and 
strengthening the police and gendarmerie by 
upgrading equipment and tightening customs 
controls. These committees also will provide 
liaison with foreign governments and ad- 
visers on specific control programs. 

The Government of Afghanistan is now 
preparing for visits by a joint UNFDAC/ 
FAO [United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control; Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion] team for a three-week study tour 
beginning September 18 and the special mis- 
sion of the members of the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs Ad Hoc Committee on Illicit 
Traffic in the Near and Middle East in early 
October. Staff members from the Division 
for Narcotic Drugs will participate in both 
visits. The Government of Afghanistan has 
decided to detail several qualified officials to 
the study tour and is delaying completion of 
the reports of its two Cabinet committees on 
narcotics until the results of the visits are 
known. The International Narcotics Control 
Board is also planning a visit to Kabul ; the 
Government of Afghanistan has reportedly 
agreed to a January schedule for this visit. 

Afghanistan faces economic and political 
constraints in instituting an effective nar- 
cotics control or eradication program. In 
some areas opium provides practically the 
only cash income to the farmer. There is no 
substitute crop, except for hashish, that can 
be grown under existing agricultural condi- 
tions and provide anywhere near an equal 
income. If cash subsidies are required to 
induce farmers to cease illicit poppy cultiva- 
tion, the RGA would expect funding for such 
a program to come from outside sources, 
given Afghanistan's slim resources. For 
Afghanistan narcotics control has not had a 
high priority because addiction is not a do- 
mestic problem. Furthermore, the droughts 
of 1970 and 1971 strained Afghanistan's 
financial and manpower resources. 

The following steps have been taken by 
the American Embassy in Kabul to secure 
Afghan cooperation in narcotics control : 

— Assignment of BNDD agent to the Em- 

— Organization of regular meeting of 
Ambassadors of concerned countries to co- 
ordinate approaches to RGA. 

— Suggestion of U.S. willingness to pro- 
vide technical assistance for enforcement and 
crop substitution projects if desired by RGA. 

— Continuing diplomatic contact with RGA 
officials at all levels. 

The major difficulties in Afghanistan have 
been the preoccupation of the government 
with an unprecedented drought and the hu- 
man, economic, and political consequences 
of the drought. Hopefully, now that the 
drought seems over, senior Afghan officials 
will be able to devote their attention to this 
problem. A major continuing problem will 
be the limited capability of enforcement 
agencies in Afghanistan. 

Clearly we need more information about 
the location, amount, and profitability of 
opium poppy production in Afghanistan and 
how it moves out of the country. We shall 
continue our efforts to convince the Govern- 
ment of Afghanistan of the seriousness of the 
problem and the importance of well-coordi- 
nated international action to overcome it. 

October 9, 1972 



Annual opium production in Pakistan is 
probably at least 32 tons, but may be 170 
tons or more. Estimates of total output are 
extremely tenuous because of the dearth of 
information on illicit output. Licit opium 
production in 1971, as reported by Islamabad 
to the United Nations, was only about 12 
tons. Opium poppy cultivation takes place 
in the Northwest Frontier Province, with 
much illicit cultivation in tribal areas outside 
of the government's control. Pakistan does 
not export licit opium; a small amount is 
used in the domestic pharmaceutical indus- 
try, but most is consumed by domestic opium 
eaters. Most illicit output, on the other hand, 
probably enters the illicit international mar- 
ket and is sold in Iran. 

The major current problem in Pakistan is 
that the country was divided by the warfare 
in December 1971 and must reconstruct it- 
self in the aftermath. The major continuing 
problem will be the lack of administrative 
and police control over tribal territories 
along the western border and, perhaps even 
more perplexing, the former princely states 
of Swat, Dir, Chitral, and Amb which are 
being transferred from tribal to settled ad- 
ministration, a process which will take years 
to complete. 

Before an effective control effort can move 
very fast, more information about the loca- 
tion, amount, and profitability of opium 
poppy production in Pakistan will be needed, 
especially concerning the tribal areas and 
the former princely states. The Embassy 
has requested a great deal of additional in- 
formation from the Government of Pakistan 
(GOP), and it is believed that much of it is 
being prepared now. 

The United States Government has taken 
the following steps to encourage the Govern- 
ment of Pakistan to improve its control of 
narcotics production and trade : 

— President Nixon sent a letter to Presi- 
dent Bhutto urging full GOP cooperation 
in the international control effort. President 
Bhutto has replied promising full coopera- 

— I have visited Pakistan for a full round 
of talks with GOP leaders. 

—Both before and since the above, the 
Embassy in Islamabad undertook diplomatic 
approaches in several ministries and at vari- 
ous levels within the GOP. 

— We have offered assistance to the GOP 
in studying the problem and in providing 
both technical assistance and equipment. 

— In the most preliminary stages are GOP 
plans to create a Narcotics Intelligence Bu- 
reau under the authority of the Narcotics 
Board and to possibly shift i-esponsibility for 
narcotics control from the provinces to the 
central authority. 

Southeast Asia 

The drug trafficking problem in Southeast 
Asia has been very much in the news during 
recent months. We have been gratified to see 
that the press has begun to take cognizance 
of the efforts our government, in cooperation 
with the governments of the area, has taken 
during the past year to head off the supply 
of Southeast Asian heroin to the United 

Let me assure you that favorable reports 
do not stimulate a sense of complacency on 
our part. We are taking the threat of South- 
east Asia's potential as a major source of 
heroin for the U.S. market very seriously. 
For this very reason we have bilateral nar- 
cotics control action plans operating in 10 
Asian nations. At the same time, we have 
serious problems, particularly in Burma, 
where the majority of illicit opium produced 
in the so-called "golden triangle" is grown. 
I shall review some of the problem areas. 


While considerable progress has been made 
in antinarcotics suppression in most of 
Southeast Asia in recent months, the intrac- 
table situation in northeastern Burma re- 
mains. Although Burma is the largest pro- 
ducer of opium in the "golden triangle," most 
of the illicit opium is grown and transported 
through remote, mountainous areas where 
the Burmese Government has little or no 


Department of State Bulletin 

control. Numerous insurgent groups, both 
Communist and tribal, have created serious 
internal security problems for the thinly 
spread Burmese military forces. Insurgency 
and illicit narcotics are closely related be- 
cause opium provides the means for various 
groups to purchase arms and supplies. 

In order to maintain what little control it 
presently has in the area, the Burmese Gov- 
ernment has had to rely upon local factions, 
primarily an ethnic self-defense militia 
known as the Khakweyei (KKY). Unable to 
provide adequate equipment, arms, and sup- 
plies to KKY units allied with it, the Bur- 
mese Government has been forced to give 
the KKY local autonomy so as to support 
themselves. This the KKY forces do through 
traditional means, such as illegal taxation, 
extortion, and most importantly, trafficking 
in opium. Government attempts to suppress 
narcotics production and trafficking must be 
weighed against the risk of alienating the 
KKY, who could readily join the insurgents 
in opposing the government. This would 
deny even larger areas to the Burmese au- 
thorities without hindering KKY opium 
trading activities. 

Unfortunately, the Burmese are unwilling 
to modify their rigid policy of nonalignment 
and neutrality and decline to accept inter- 
national assistance in combating their nar- 
cotics problem. Still, despite their wariness 
of foreign designs and their preference to 
resolve the problem themselves, Burmese 
officials have recently been more willing to 
exchange views on the international drug 
situation with the United States and inter- 
national agencies. Moreover, recent discus- 
sions between Burmese and U.N. officials 
offer some hope of United Nations anti- 
narcotics activity in Burma. As long as 
Burma's internal security is threatened, 
however, the Burmese Government will un- 
doubtedly continue to assign highest priority 
to its counterinsurgency efforts. 


Recent narcotics control actions in Laos 
have been concentrated on staffing the 

Groupe Speciale d' Investigation, or GSI, the 
Lao equivalent of the BNDD, and expanding 
its operations to key areas of the trafficking 
pipeline. GSI was created by a Cabinet de- 
cree on January 12, 1972. By mid-August, 
small but skilled GSI teams were stationed 
in Ban Houei Sai, Luang Prabang, and 
Pakse, as well as in Vientiane. 

On March 11a GSI team seized 10.7 kilos 
of opium from a civilian passenger on a 
Royal Lao Air Force plane. On March 17 
and 25, another GSI team located the sites 
of two abandoned heroin refineries near Ban 
Houei Sai and seized a large amount of re- 
finery chemicals and equipment hidden in the 
jungle. Perhaps the most significant action 
by GSI agents occurred on June 6 when the 
home of a National Assembly Deputy was 
raided and 9.5 kilos of heroin and 26 kilos of 
opium were seized. The Deputy was ar- 
rested. This action already demonstrated 
that the Royal Lao Government (RLG) is 
prepared to move against traffickers, even 
though they may occupy positions of in- 

We believe that the success of our narcotics 
control plan in Laos is due in large part to 
the power and broad jurisdiction given to 
GSI by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. 
Its chief. Brig. Gen. Khamhou Boussarath, 
reports directly to the Prime Minister. GSI 
agents are authorized to investigate and 
arrest both civilians and military personnel. 
If necessary. Brig. Gen. Khamhou can sup- 
plement his teams with personnel from the 
national police, customs, or armed forces. 

Advisers from our mission in Vientiane 
continue to work closely with their counter- 
parts in GSI, the national police, customs, 
and the military police, as they have since 
early last year. Two private American char- 
ter airlines under contract to the mission. 
Air America and Continental Air Services, 
are also cooperating with Lao authorities to 
prevent trafficking on their aircraft. During 
the first six months of this year, stringent 
searches of passengers and cargo resulted 
in 35 seizures totaling 22 kilos of opium. 
This is not a large amount, but we believe 

October 9, 1972 


that, like the overall program, the companies' 
interdiction effort has had a deterrent effect 
on trafficking which is not entirely reflected 
by the total amount of narcotics seized. 

During this same period of time, signifi- 
cant progress was made in another facet of 
the central program which so far has not 
received much attention here: addict re- 
habilitation. We know from our own experi- 
ence that an important factor in narcotics 
control is demand. The RLG faces the same 
problem, which is compounded by the fact 
that opium consumption and cultivation has 
been tolerated by Lao society for generations. 
There have been recent news reports of criti- 
cism by National Assembly Deputies that the 
narcotics control plan concentrates on law 
enforcement without regard to rehabilita- 
tion of Lao addicts whose supply of opium 
has been suddenly stopped or for small farm- 
ers whose only cash crop traditionally has 
been opium. A group of opposition Deputies 
has proposed repeal of the Lao narcotics 
control law on these grounds. 

While it is true the control plan empha- 
sizes law enforcement, we have also been 
working with the Ministries of Public Health 
and Agriculture on other programs. We are 
assisting with a pilot rehabilitation project 
in the Vientiane area where heroin addic- 
tion is increasing. We shall also attempt to 
apply crop substitution programs, like those 
developed among opium growers in northern 
Thailand, to government-controlled areas 
when the security situation permits. We 
anticipate that these measures will assist 
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma now in 
answering critics of the program and form 
a long-term basis for the program's more 
rapidly expanding law enforcement elements. 


In recent months, intensified Thai anti- 
narcotics efforts, with U.S. support and as- 
sistance, have contributed significantly to 
discouraging narcotics trafl!icking in Thai- 
land. Still, much needs to be done. 

We feel that the foundations that have 

been laid during the past year are serving 
to give the Thai an increasingly effective 
narcotics enforcement program. The Special 
Narcotics Organization (SNO) , a mobile task 
force in northern Thailand, and the police in 
Bangkok have in recent months conducted 
numerous raids on suspected narcotics 
caches. There have been significant seizures 
of opium, morphine, and heroin and the 
arrest of several important traffickers. Close 
working relations and cooperation have been 
established between Thai and U.S. officials, 
thereby facilitating stronger efforts against 
the drug traffic destined for the United 
States. A seizure on September 10 of 12 kilos 
of No. 4 heroin and arrests of two Thai 
traffickers by Thai police in Bangkok is a 
good example. Cooperation in that case in- 
volved many agencies of both the Thai and 
U.S. Governments and augurs well for the 
future of our narcotics efforts in Thailand. 

The success of our bilateral programs has 
caused disruption of established smuggling 
routes and made traffickers more cautious. 
This increased pressure on the drug mer- 
chants has forced many of them to postpone 
purchases and shipments of narcotics, re- 
sulting in a significant reduction in the price 
of opium and derivative products in the 
"golden triangle." Moreover, the recent 
agreement between the Royal Thai Govern- 
ment (RTG) and the Chinese Irregular 
Forces (CIF), under which the latter agreed 
to terminate their involvement in narcotics, 
appears to have removed a key link in the 
drug pipeline and to have forced the traffick- 
ers to seek alternate routes and personnel. 

The enforcement successes scored by SNO 
and other Thai police units underline the 
necessity of providing substitute crops for 
hill tribe opium producers. With the drop in 
opium prices and a sluggish market, hill 
tribesmen are being deprived of their major 
cash income. While SNO enforcement meas- 
ures are not directed at the grower as much 
as the trafficker, curtailment of the traffic 
affects the hill tribes directly. It is there- 
fore essential that programs designed to 


Department of State Bulletin 

show them how to grow substitute cash crops 
be accelerated. Economic necessity will, 
hopefully, encourage hill tribe receptivity to 
alternate crops, as well as RTG and private 
addict rehabilitation efforts. A joint Thai 
Government-United Nations project has been 
designed to begin what eventually must be 
an economic and social "revolution" in the 
upland areas of Thailand. By continuing to 
apply pressure against the traffickers while 
offering the growers substitute income, the 
narcotics problem thus is being attacked on 
both fronts. 

Hong Kong 

Several actions taken by the Hong Kong 
Government in recent months reflect its con- 
tinuing and increasing concern over the 
international drug problem. One significant 
step taken in June was the creation of a new 
position of Commissioner of Narcotics. The 
Commissioner serves under the Secretary for 
Home Affairs and is responsible for coordi- 
nating police, customs, prison, and medical 
programs concerned with narcotics. Thus, 
for the first time, Hong Kong has a senior 
official who devotes full time to coordinating 
efforts in the narcotics field. 

The new Commissioner, Norman Rolph, 
formerly Deputy Commissioner of Police, 
has recently made it clear that the Hong 
Kong Government intends to cooperate fully 
in the suppression of any international nar- 
cotics trafl^icking that involves Hong Kong. 
On August 31 Commissioner Rolph said in a 
statement to the press : 

There has undoubtedly been a small traffic of nar- 
cotics from Hong Kong to America over the years, 
and if the Turkish sources dry up, the illegal traffic 
through Hong Kong could expand. It is our business 
to see, as far as we possibly can, that this does not 
develop. It concerns the Americans and it concerns 
ourselves. We are going to have to watch this pos- 
sibility and we are going to do something about it. 

On the enforcement side. Hong Kong au- 
thorities have scored some notable successes 
in 1972. For instance, one drug seizure in 
June involved 1,775 pounds of raw opium and 
180 pounds of morphine base found on a car- 

go junk. In April of this year, after months 
of investigation. Hong Kong Police raided 
and closed down what was believed to be one 
of the biggest heroin factories ever found in 
Hong Kong. 

Camhodia and Viet-Nani 

Cambodia and Viet-Nam, although faced 
with serious threats to their security, are 
nevertheless engaged in the war on drugs. 
Early in 1972 the Khmer Republic estab- 
lished a Directorate of Narcotics composed 
of officers drawn from customs, public health, 
national police, military police, and Ministry 
of Defense. In Viet-Nam on August 12 Presi- 
dent Thieu promulgated a decree law on 
narcotics and dangerous drugs. In what was 
a most significant step, the law calls for the 
execution of the death penalty for those per- 
sons convicted of trafficking in hard drugs 
in an organized narcotics ring. 

The Task Ahead 

Additional information on geographic re- 
gions and individual countries is contained 
in the "World Opium Survey 1972," released 
by the Cabinet Committee on August 16. 
The survey is a frank and candid analysis of 
the problem as it now stands. Because it is 
candid, it should not be assumed that we are 
pessimistic. One of the requirements of man- 
aging an on-going program is an ability to 
manage successes and failures. Ours is not a 
program that will bring immediate relief 
from the horrendous problem, nor is it 
doomed to failure. Our program is one in 
which a substantial beginning has been 
achieved, one in which an appreciable im- 
pact has been made. If the momentum is 
sustained, we can look forward to continued 
sizable results. Some recent successes can be 
cited : In the New York City area, the Bureau 
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs reports 
that at the wholesale level the purity of 
heroin has been reduced in the last six 
months to a year from 51 pei'cent to 32 
percent. At the retail level — that is, on the 
street — quality is as low as 2 and 3 percent. 

October 9, 1972 


That is considerably less than it was a year 
ago. These figures are based on analyses of 
the significant amounts of heroin that have 
been seized by law enforcement agents and 
by purchases by undercover agents. 

As other examples, in Boston the cost of 
one gram of heroin jumped in recent months 
from $418 to $785. In Baltimore the pressure 
on supply has forced prices up from $10 to 
$15 a bag, and that bag is of lessened quality, 
the amount of pure heroin decreasing from 
6 percent to 4 percent, and in some cases 
as low as 1 percent. 

I should stress that the approach of a 
successful program cannot relate to supply 
alone. Nor is an attack on the demand side 
alone the answer. Rather a combined pro- 
gram is called for. The objective is to inter- 
dict supply to the degree that availabilities 
are sharply reduced. The shortage of drugs 
will then tend to drive addicts into treat- 
ment, as well as prevent them from addicting 
others who might be tempted to experiment 
with the drug. There are strong indications 
that progress is being made. According to 
the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse 
Prevention, there are 60,000 to 70,000 per- 
sons being treated in some 450 federally 
regulated methadone programs throughout 
the country with an estimated 30,000 on 
waiting lists. Compared with a year ago, this 
constitutes a sharp rise in both treatment 
centers and patients. 

We have confronted the problem of drug 
abuse unhesitatingly and without illusions. 
A full year of work has taken place within 
the framework of the Cabinet Committee, 
and we plan to accelerate our efforts a good 
deal more. The stepping-off point will begin 
next Monday, September 18, the first day 
of a three-day Washington Conference on 
International Narcotics Matters, a confer- 
ence to which we have summoned senior 
narcotics control coordinators from more 
than 50 U.S. missions around the world. 
The President will address the conference on 
the first morning, and a series of meetings 
will be held for three days to push our pro- 

gram into higher gear. We shall evaluate the 
progress to date and consider what must be i 
done to improve our program. 

Our goal is obviously urgent, but we must | 
be certain that our plans of attack are real- 
istic and responsible. In the forthcoming 
conference we shall reemphasize the impor- 
tance of narcotics control as a foreign policy 
issue. More eff'ective law enforcement and 
an increased exchange of information will 
continue as the top priority items in the 
U.S. international control program. At the 
same time we shall continue to recognize 
that there must be a balance between 
programs to suppress traflfic and other 
approaches, such as the development of re- 
placement crops for opium. In other words, 
our plans must be comprehensive. 

Every possible resource for making inter- 
national narcotics control more effective 
must be utilized. Every viable forum for 
focusing attention on the problem must be 
sought. National commitments are, of course, 
essential. Toward this end bilateral cooper- 
ation will sometimes be the most expeditious 
means of proceeding. But regional coopera- 
tion will also be sought, and in some cases 
the all-encompassing structure of the United 
Nations will be the most effective. 

The past year has, in fact, been marked 
by considerable activity in the field of multi- 
lateral action against narcotics traffic. Two 
major pieces of international narcotics legis- 
lation, the protocol amending the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Con- 
vention on Psychotropic Substances, are 
presently before the U.S. Senate and the 
appropriate bodies of other nations for rati- 
fication. These conventions would rationalize 
and strengthen international regulation of 
narcotics traffic and provide for the first 
international control of such substances as 
hallucinogens and amphetamines. 

The United States is also giving its full 
support to the work of the U.N. Fund for 
Drug Abuse Control, having provided $2 mil- 
lion of the $3.2 million pledged as of June 30, 
1972. We have congressional authorization 


Department of State Bulletin 

another $2 million and will seek addi- 
nal appropriations in the future depend- 
upon the Fund's performance. We find 
;-ticularly important the Fund's first ma- 
project in Thailand where more than 
million has been committed to an action 
)gram of drug abuse control involving 
»p substitution in the remote hill areas 
that country and rehabilitation and treat- 
nt of addicts. Aside from Southeast Asia, 
! Middle East is another critical area for 
rcotics production and traffic. The forth- 
ning visit of a U.N. ad hoc committee to 
1 rkey, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan 
r lid be very valuable in identifying nar- 
. ics problems and encouraging regional 
)peration in solving them. The United 
ites believes that the Ad Hoc Committee 
Illicit Traffic in the Near and Middle 
ist should be converted into a permanent 
dy, and we expect to encourage ECOSOC 
Iconomic and Social Council] to do this 
its next session. 

I conclude by stating that while the prob- 
n of drug abuse is critical for the United 
ates, heroin addiction and other forms of 
use are spreading elsewhere in this hemi- 
here, in Europe, and in other parts of the 
)rld. It is fully appreciated by most of the 
tions with which we are cooperating that 
truly collective effort against both the sup- 
Y of and demand for illicit drugs and nar- 
tics will be required to bring the problem 
drug abuse under control. 
President Nixon stated the case on March 
, 1972, as follows: 

The fight against drug abuse is complex and diffi- 
It, but there are signs that we are making prog- 
More victims are under treatment than ever 
fore. More and better ways of treatment are be- 
ming increasingly available. More illegal drugs 
3 being seized — both within this country and with- 
t. More nations around the world are joining with 
in a \'igorous effort to stop drug trafficking. More 
nericans are becoming involved in the fight in 
sir communities, their churches, their schools, and 
;ir homes. 

Now we must continue to build on this progress 
til success is assured. 

The President's message is clear. A full- 

scale, across-the-board battle against drug 
abuse is required if we are to succeed in the 
elimination of a tragic epidemic. Toward this 
end, we in the Department of State shall 
continue to strive. 

U.S. and Canada Agree To Enhance 
Water Quality in St. John River Basin 

Department Announcement ^ 

Fitzhugh Green, Associate Administrator 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, and L. E. Edgeworth, Assistant 
Deputy Minister, Water Management, of 
Canada's Department of the Environment, 
announced on September 21 that the United 
States and Canadian Governments have 
agreed on joint measures to cooperate in 
water quality planning and to recommend 
programs to enhance water quality in the 
St. John River and its tributaries along the 
international boundary between the State of 
Maine and the Provinces of New Brunswick 
and Quebec. The agreement was announced 
at an international symposium at Fish River 
Lake, Maine, attended by members of the 
Inland Water Pollution Project of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Committee on 
the Challenges of Modern Society. Delegates 
from six alliance countries at the symposium 
are considering international institutional 
arrangements to deal with transboundary 
water pollution. 

The two governments have established 
through an exchange of notes a U.S.-Canada 
Committee on Water Quality in the St. John 
River and its international tributaries. Com- 
posed of representatives of Federal, State, 
Provincial, and local governmental agencies, 
the Joint Committee will review progress in 
conducting water quality planning in the St. 

' Issued at Washington on Sept. 21 (press release 
232). An announcement was also issued at Ottawa 
that day. 

ctober 9, 1972 


John River Basin in both countries. It will 
also exchange information on plans, pro- 
grams, and actions which would affect water 
quality in the basin; assist in coordination 
and consultation among appropriate authori- 
ties; and make recommendations to the ap- 
propriate jurisdictions on water quality in 
the basin. 

In addition, the two governments have re- 
quested, by letter of reference, the coopera- 
tion of the International Joint Commission 
(U.S. -Canada) in addressing pollution prob- 
lems of the St. John River. The Commission 
is being asked to review the work of the new 
U.S. -Canada Committee and recommend to 
the U.S. and Canadian Governments meas- 
ures the two countries should take to protect 
and enhance water quality in the river sys- 

This is a further step in U.S. -Canadian 
eft'orts to control pollution along the U.S.- 
Canadian border, since it establishes a plan- 
ning committee to prevent pollution from oc- 
curring or increasing. Most of the existing 
joint arrangements between the United 
States and Canada on this subject seek to 
enhance water quality in the boundary 
waters by monitoring or surveying the wa- 
ters after a pollution problem is identified. 
The International Joint Commission was es- 
tablished by the Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909 for this purpose; an important ex- 
ample of the work it is asked to perform can 
be noted in the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement, which was signed by President 
Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau on April 

Emphasizing local participation, member- 
ship in the new U.S. -Canada Committee will 
consist of representatives from the U.S. and 
Canadian Federal Governments, the govern- 
ments of Maine, New Brunswick, and Que- 
bec, and officials of the Northern Maine Re- 
gional Planning Commission and the St. 
John River Planning Board. 

NATO's Committee on the Challenges of 
Modern Society was created in 1969 to add 
a new dimension to the alliance's activities. 
It has undertaken a number of other collabo- 
rative environmental projects. Officials from 


Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, tl 
United Kingdom, and the United States a; 
participating in the symposium at Fish Rivi 
Lake. The U.S.-Canadian action is time 
for the NATO symposium which is conside" 
ing alternative institutional arrangemen 
for dealing with water pollution betwe( 
countries. The NATO group is expected 
make recommendations on various intern 
tional approaches for solving pollution pro 
lems in shared water resources, and it 
using the St. John River project as a ca 
study. The new U.S.-Canadian arrang 
ments will demonstrate the effect of one su( 
approach to transboundary pollution, and 
will be evaluated by various nations with 
the framework of the NATO project. Ca 
ada is the pilot country for the project; ai 
Belgium, France, and the United States a 
acting as co-pilot nations. The French ro 
in the project is concerned with indirect ec 
nomic controls on inland water pollutioi 
Belgium is studying mathematic modelii 
as applied to river basin pollution. 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. 
During 1971 

Following is the text of a message fra 
President Nixon dated September 8 transm: 
ting to the Congress the annual report i 
U.S. participation in the United Nations /i 
calendar year 1971.^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

It is a pleasure to transmit to the Congre, 
the 26th annual report on United States pa 
ticipation in the work of the United Nation 
This report covers the calendar year 1971 

During the period under review there wei 
many developments within the UN fram 
work of importance to the United States ar 
to other member states. Some of these even 

•"U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by tl 
President to the Congress for the Year 1971"; D 
partment of State publication 8675, for sale by tl 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govemme 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (238 pp., $1. 

Department of State Bullet 

were favorable; others were not. Among the 

— The General Assembly decided to seat 
the representatives of the Peoples Republic 
of China, and this was followed by corre- 
sponding action in the Security Council. 

— The United Nations established a Fund 
for Drug Abuse Control that will finance a 
concerted worldwide action program to assist 
member states in reducing both the demand 
for and the supply of dangerous drugs. 

— At a plenipotentiary conference in 
Vienna sponsored by the United Nations, a 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances was 
adopted, designed to curb the misuse of such 
substances as the hallucinogens, ampheta- 
mines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers. 

— The 26th General Assembly endorsed 
two treaties, both sponsored by the United 
States, and expressed its hope for the widest 
possible adherence to them. The first was the 
Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects; the second 
was the Convention on the Prohibition of De- 
velopment, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weap- 
ons and on Their Destruction. 

— In December the United Nations elected 
a new Secretary General, Ambassador Kurt 
Waldheim of Austria. 

— At an international conference in Mon- 
treal sponsored by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, a Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation was adopted. 

— The UN Economic and Social Council 
was strengthened by the Assembly's decision 
to adopt and submit to member states for 
ratification an amendment to the Charter 
that will double the Council's membership to 
54, thereby making it a more representative 
body. In addition the Council created two 
new standing committees, one concerned with 
review and appraisal of the progress toward 
the goals of the Second UN Development 
Decade, and the other concerned with prob- 
lems of science and technology. 

— The United Nations created the position 
of Disaster Relief Coordinator within the 

UN Secretariat to assist countries stricken 
by disasters. 

In addition to these favorable develop- 
ments there were others that were disap- 

— The Republic of China, a member in 
good standing for many years, was deprived 
of representation by the same resolution that 
gave representation to the Peoples Republic 
of China. This action was extremely regret- 
table and was strongly opposed by the United 

— Despite determined efforts by the United 
States and others, the war between India and 
Pakistan demonstrated again the severe 
limitations on the organization's ability to 
carry out its primary function, the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security. 

— No progress was made toward resolving 
the differences among UN members on the 
organization and conduct of peace-keeping 

— The General Assembly's eflfort to ration- 
alize its organization and procedures fell far 
short of our hopes. 

— The United Nations made no great prog- 
ress toward resolving its difficult financial 

During 1971 the United States Govern- 
ment announced its intention to negotiate a 
reduction in the rate of its UN assessment to 
a level no higher than 25 percent. This deci- 
sion is in line with a recommendation by the 
Commission for the Observance of the 25th 
Anniversary of the United Nations, chaired 
by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and is 
consonant with our belief that an organiza- 
tion of almost universal membership should 
not be overly dependent upon a single mem- 
ber for its financial support. 

This proposed reduction in our rate of as- 
sessment does not affect our voluntary con- 
tributions to various UN programs. Indeed, 
the Lodge Commission recommended in- 
creases of at least corresponding size in vol- 
untary contributions whose size depends on 
each nation's judgment of its own interests 
and capabilities. 

October 9, 1972 


These and many other topics are covered in 
the report. I commend to the Congress this 
record of our participation in the United Na- 
tions during 1971. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 8, 1972. 

Convention on Aviation Sabotage 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
mit herewith a copy of the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Mon- 
treal on September 23, 1971. The report of 
the Department of State with respect to the 
Convention is also transmitted for the in- 
formation of the Senate. 

The problem of sabotage, armed terrorist 
attacks, and other criminal acts against air- 
craft and air travelers poses an increasingly 
grave threat to civil aviation around the 
world. Events have shown that no country 
or area is exempt from the human tragedy 
and immense costs which result from such 
criminal acts. 

At the International Conference on Air 
Law at The Hague in December of 1970, 
the Hijacking Convention was adopted. It 
contains provisions to ensure that all hi- 
jackers, wherever found, would be subject 
to severe punishment. The United States 
and 39 other countries have now ratified 
that Convention. It is hoped that all States 

^Transmitted on Sept. 15 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. T., 92d Cong., 2d sess., 
which includes the text of the report of the Depart- 
ment of State. For text of the convention, see Bul- 
letin of Oct. 25, 1971, p. 465. 

will join in this major step to deter the peril 
of air piracy. 

The work of applying similar provisions 
to other acts difrected against the safety of 
civil aviation was completed by the Diplo- 
matic Conference at Montreal in September 
1971. The Convention which that Confer- 
ence produced and which I am transmitting 
today covers sabotage and other criminal 
acts. Like the Hijacking Convention, it re- 
quires States to extradite offenders or prose- 
cute them where they are found. It is 
designed to ensure the prosecution of sabo- 
teurs and other terrorists who attack air- 
craft, and it can help serve to quell this in- 
creasingly serious problem for civil aviation 

This Convention and the Hijacking Con- 
vention are vitally important to achieve safe 
and orderly air transportation for all peo- 
ple of the world. I hope all States will be- 
come Parties to these Conventions, and that 
they will be applied universally. I recom- 
mend, therefore, that the Senate give early 
and favorable consideration to this Conven- 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 15, 1972. 

U.S. Alternate Governor of IMF 
and International Banks Confirmed 

The Senate on September 21 confirmed the 
nomination of John N. Irwin II to be U.S. 
Alternate Governor of the International 
Monetary Fund for a term of five years and 
U.S. Alternate Governor of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
for a term of five years; U.S. Alternate Gov- 
ernor of the Inter-American Development 
Bank for a term of five years and until his 
successor has been appointed ; and U.S. Al- 
ternate Governor of the Asian Development 


Department of State Bulletin 


Calendar of International Conferences^ 

Scheduled October Through December 

CCC Permanent Technical Committee Brussels . 

WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty Interim Committees and PCT Geneva 

Finance Working Group. 

PAHO Special Meeting of Ministers of Health of the Americas Santiago . 

Hague Conference on Private International Law: 12th Session . The Hague 

OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices, Working Paris . . 

Party VII. 

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Panama 

GATT Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration . . Geneva 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 12th Meeting . . . Geneva 

IAEA Board of Governors Mexico City 

FAO: 7th World Congress on Forestry Buenos Aires 

IMCO International Conference on Revision of Regulations for London 

Preventing Collisions at Sea. 

European Community/United States Consultations: 5th Round . Washington 

FAO Indian Ocean Fishery Commission: 3d Session Colombo 

CCC Commodity Code Steering Group Brussels 

GATT Working Party on Accession of Poland Geneva 

ECE Inland Water Transport Committee Geneva 

GATT CTIP Working Parties I and II Geneva 

lOC/ICSEM/GFCM International Group for Cooperative Investi- Rome . 

gations in the Mediterranean and 12th Consultative Group for 

Technical Cooperation. 

ECE Ad Hoc Meeting on Problems Relating to Transport of Ship- Geneva 

Borne Barges. 

UNHCR Executive Committee: 23d Session Geneva 

ICAO: 4th Obstacle Clearance Panel Montreal 

UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures Geneva 

WMO Commission for Maritime Meteorology Tokyo . 

Oct. 2-6 
Oct. 2-6 

Oct. 2-9 
Oct. 2-21 
Oct. 3-4 

Oct. 3-6 

Oct. 3-13 

Oct. 3-20 

Oct. 4 

Oct. 4-18 

Oct. 4-20 

Oct. 5-6 
Oct. 5-13 
Oct. 9-11 
Oct. 9-12 
Oct. 9-13 
Oct. 9-13 
Oct. 9-13 

Oct. 9-14 









^ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on September 15, 1972, lists 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October- 
December 1972. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CCMS, Committee on the 
Challenges of Modem Society; CCP, Committee on Commodity Problems; CTIP, Committee on Trade in In- 
dustrial Products; EGA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and 
Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; GFCM, General Fisheries Council 
of the Mediterranean; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee 
for European Migration; ICIREPAT, International Cooperation for Information Retrieval Among Patent Of- 
fices; ICO, International Coffee Organization; ICSEM, International Council for the Scientific Exploration of 
the Mediterranean; IGOSS, Integrated Global Ocean Station System; ILO, International Labor Organization; 
IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com- 
mission; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health 
Organization; RID, European Convention on Transport of Dangerous Goods by Rail; UCC, Universal Copy- 
right Convention; UNCITRAL, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; UNCTAD, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul- 
tural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNIDO, United Nations In- 
dustrial Development Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property 
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

October 9, 1972 


Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 

Scheduled October Through December — Continued 

UNESCO Bureau of International Coordinating Council on Man 
and Biosphere. 

PAHO: 21st Meeting of the Directing Council; 24th Meeting of 
the Regional Committee of the Americas. 

CCC Valuation Committee: 59th Session 

ICAO: 5th Africa/Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation Meeting 

PAHO Executive Committee: 89th Meeting 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: High-Level Meeting 

WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer (lARC), 
Governing Council: 10th Session. 

ECE Group of Experts on Construction of Vehicles 

FAO/IAEA Panel on Tracer Techniques in Tropical Animal Pro- 
duction Studies. 

FAO Regional Commission on Farm Management for Asia and 
the Far East. 

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products 

UNESCO World Conference on Informatics in Government . . 

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission 

ILO Inter-American Advisory Committee 

FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East .... 

UNESCO: 17th General Conference 

OECD Consumer Policy Committee 

FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 15th Session 

GATT Committee on Trade and Development 

ICAO Forecasting Workshop: 1st Meeting 

CCC Working Party on Standard International Trade Classifica- 
tion, Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. 

Plenipotentiary Conference to Adopt an Ocean Dumping Con- 

OECD Oil Committee 

ICAO Statistical Panel 

ECE Timber Committee: 13th Session 

ECE Working Party on Road Transport 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 26th Session 

WIPO Committee of Experts on Patent Licensing Convention . 

FAO International Rice Commission 

Colombo Plan Consultative Committee: 22d Session 

3d ECA Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa .... 

FAO CCP: 47th Session 

International CoflFee Council: Special Session 

7th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 7th Meeting 

ECA Executive Committee 

ECE Steel Committee 

FAO Council: 59th Session 

International Cotton Advisory Committee 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group 

International Rubber Study Group 

UNESCO/WIPO-UCC Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 
Regular Session; Berne Copyright Convention Executive Com- 
mittee: Regular Session. 

ILO Governing Body: 188th Session 

2d ECAFE Asian Population Conference 

GATT Contracting Parties: 28th Session 

OECD Working Party on Short Term Forecasts 

1st WHO Regional Conference on National Health Planning . . 

IMCO Committee on Technical Cooperation: 7th Session . . . 

Joint RID/ECE Group of Experts on Transport of Dangerous 


. . . Oct. 



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Paris . 

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Lyon, Fra 

nee . . Oct. 



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Kandy, Ce; 

>flon . . Oct. 



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Venice . 

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San Jose 

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New Delh 

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Paris . 

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Paris . 

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Paris . 

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New Delh 

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Addis Ab 

iba . . Oct. 




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Addis Ab 

aba . . October 


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Rome . 

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Tokyo . 

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Paris . 

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Manila . 

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Department of State Bulletin 

th Inter-American Statistical Congress 

"CC Working Party of the Nomenclature Committee .... 

MCO Council: 29th Session 

"AO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 9th Session 

th ICAO Meeting of Automated Data Interchange Systems Panel 

)ECD Environment Committee 

)ECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II ... . 

MCO Legal Committee: 15th Session 

DCOSOC Statistical Commission: 17th Session 

'CC Nomenclature Committee: 29th Session 

JN/IMCO Conference on International Container Traffic . . . 

v'ATO CCMS Plenary Meeting 

!:CAFE/WMO Typhoon Committee: 5th Session 

)ECD Economic Policy Committee 

Ith Inter- American Conference of Ministers of Labor .... 

JNESCO: 91st Session of the Executive Board 

5^CE Working Party on Inland Water Transport 

MCO Preparatory Meeting on Space Requirements for Special 
Trade Passenger Ships. 

SVIPO Joint Ad Hoc Committee on International Patent Classifi- 
cation, Strasbourg Agreement. 

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: Resumed 25th 

[MCO Subcommittee on Marine Pollution: 14th Session .... 

International Wheat Council and Food Aid Committee .... 

3ATT CTIP Working Group III 

ICEM Executive Committee: 42d Session 

[QC Working Committee for IGOSS: 4th Session 

[CO Special Council 

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 

[nternational Sugar Council 

UNESCO Preparatory Meeting for the 2d Conference of Ministers 
of Education of European Member States. 

UNESCO/WIPO Committee of Experts on International Ar- 
rangements in Space Communications Field. 

ICAO: Extraordinary Session of the Assembly 

QNCTAD Committee on Commodities 

UNESCO Bureau of Coordinating Council on International Hydro- 
logical Decade: 14th Session. 

WIPO Committee of Experts for an Agreement on the Protection 
of Type Faces: Preparatory Meeting for Vienna Diplomatic 

ICEM Council: 35th Session 

[MCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment 

DECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Government Pur- 

SVIPO Committee of Experts on Revision of the Madrid Trade- 
mark Agreement: Preparatory for Vienna Diplomatic Confer- 

VATO Ministerial Meeting 

(MCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 14th Session . . 

ECAFE Conference on Social Development 

FAO Conference on Ecology in Relation to Plant Pest Control . 

UNESCO Bureau of International Coordinating Council on Man 
and Biosphere: 2d Meeting. 

WIPO ICIREPAT Technical Coordination Committee .... 

UNIDO Permanent Committee Meeting 

[MCO Legal Committee: 16th Session 

[A-ECOSOC: 8th Annual Meeting 

UNCITRAL Working Group on International Sale of Goods: 
4th Session. 

iVIPO Committee of Experts for the International Classification 
of the Figurative Elements of Marks. 

October 9, 1972 

Santiago . . 

. . Nov. 


Brussels . . 

. . Nov. 


London . . 

. . Nov. 


Rome . . . 

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Montreal . . 

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Paris . . . 

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Paris . . . 

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London . . 

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Geneva . . 

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Brussels . . 

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Geneva . . 

. . Nov. 

13-Dec. 15 

Brussels . . 

. . Nov. 


Bangkok . . 

. . Nov. 


Paris . . . 

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Buenos Aires 

. . Nov. 


Paris . . . 

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Geneva . . 

. . Nov. 


London . . 

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Geneva . . 

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Geneva . . 

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London . . 

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27-Dec. 1 

London . . 

. . Nov. 

27-Dec. 1 

Geneva . . 

. . Nov. 

28-Dec. 8 

Geneva . . 

. . Nov. 

30-Dec. 1 

Geneva . . 

. . November 

London . . 

. . November 

Madrid . . 

. . November 

London . . 

. . November 

Paris . . . 

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Geneva . . 

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Montreal . . 

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Geneva . . 

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Paris . . . 

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Geneva . . 

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Geneva . . 

. . Dec. 


London . . 

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Paris . . . 

. . Dec. 


Geneva . . 

. . Dec. 


Brussels . . 

. . Dec. 


London . . 

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Bangkok . . 

. . Dec. 


Rome . . . 

. . Dec. 


Paris . . . 

. . Dec. 


Geneva . . 

. . Dec. 


Vienna . . . 

. . Dec. 


London . . 

. . Dec. 


Indefinite . . 

. . December 

Geneva . . 

. . December 

Geneva . . 

. . December 



U.S. Government Reschedules 
Pakistan Debt 

Press release 231 dated September 20 

Government officials of the United States 
and Pakistan have signed agreements re- 
scheduling $51 million in payments owed to 
the United States by Pakistan, the State De- 
partment announced on September 20. 
These agreements implement the multilateral 
agreed minute signed in Paris on May 26 
which provided for the rescheduling of $234 
million in debts to the 11 member nations of 
the Pakistan Consortium. 

The U.S. share of $51 million consists of 
$37 million of AID dollar loans for economic 
assistance, $9 million in expert credits from 
the Export-Import Bank of the United 
States, $3 million for Food for Peace sales 
under Public Law 480, title I, and $2 mil- 
lion in commercial credits from the Com- 
modity Credit Corporation. 

The agreements were signed September 
20 by Sultan Mohammad Khan, Pakistani 
Ambassador to the United States; Willis C. 
Armstrong, Assistant Secretary, U.S. State 
Department; Donald G. MacDonald, Assist- 
ant Administrator, Agency for International 
Development; and Henry Kearns, President, 
Export-Import Bank of the United States. 

Current Actions 



International plant protection convention. Done at 
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 
3, 1952; for the United States August 18, 1972. 
Proclahned by the President : September 18, 1972. 

Atomic Energy 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 10, 
1967 (TIAS 6583), for the application of safe- 
guards by the International Atomic Energy Agen- 


cy to the bilateral agreement between the Unite 
States and Brazil of July 8, 1965 (TIAS 6126 
for cooperation concerning civil uses of atom 
energy. Signed at Vienna July 27, 1972. 
Entered into force: September 20, 1972. 
Amendment to article VI of the statute of tl 
International Atomic Energy Agency of Octob( 

26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 

Acceptances deposited: Liechtenstein, Septemb 
18, 1972; Sri Lanka (Ceylon), September 2 
1972; Zaire, September 18, 1972. 


Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 

aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 197 

Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 719 

Ratification deposited: France, September 1 


Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the developmei 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bi 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destn 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscc 
April 10, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Canada, September ! 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scic 
tific, and cultural materials, with protocol. Done 
Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered ii 
force May 21, 1952; for the United States Nove 
ber 2, 1966. TIAS 6129. 
Accession deposited: Iraq, August 11, 1972. 


Articles of agreement of the International Monets 
Fund, as amended. Done at Washington Deceml 

27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 19 
TIAS 1501, 6748. 

Signature and acceptance: United Arab Emirat 

September 22, 1972. 
Articles of agreement of the International Bank : 
Reconstruction and Development, as amend 
Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entei 
into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502, 5929. 
Signature and acceptance : United Arab Emirat 

September 22, 1972. 

Judicial Procedures 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in ci 
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Mai 
18, 1970. Enters into force October 7, 1972. 
Proclaimed by the President: September 15, 19i 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritl 
Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva Mai 
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TL 

Acceptance deposited: Equatorial Guinea, Septe 
ber 6, 1972. 

Not in force. 

Department of State Buliej 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 18, 1972. 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regula- 
tions with final protocol and annex, and the uni- 
versal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except 
for article V of the additional protocol, which 
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratifications deposited: United Kingdom,^ over- 
seas territories for the international relations 
of which the United Kingdom is responsible, 
June 30, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
Ratification deposited: France, September 18, 1972. 


International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for signa- 
ture at Washington March 29 through May 3, 
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with 
respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with 
respect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 

Ratification of the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Portugal, September 21, 1972. 
Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Nigeria, September 22, 1972. 



Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro- 
gram agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended 
(TIAS 2856, 7283). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Kabul June 26 and July 8, 1972. Entered into 
force July 8, 1972. 


Agreement relating to the payment of old-age, sur- 
vivors, and disability benefits to beneficiaries 
residing abroad. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Buenos Aires September 15, 1972. Entered into 
force September 15, 1972. 

Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the 
narcotics field. Signed at Buenos Aires September 
15, 1972. Entered into force September 15, 1972. 

Extradition convention. Signed at Buenos Aires Sep- 
tember 26, 1896. Entered into force July 2, 1900. 
31 Stat. 1883. 
Terminated: September 15, 1972. 

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington Janu- 
ary 21, 1972. 

Ratifications exchanged: September 15, 1972. 
Entered into force: September 15, 1972. 

Agreement for scientific and technical cooperation. 
Signed at Buenos Aires April 7, 1972. 
Entered into force: August 11, 1972. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
cooperative meteorological program in the Bahama 
Islands. Signed at Nassau August 14 and 29, 1972. 
Entered into force August 29, 1972. 


Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 

atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 8, 1965. 

Entered into force November 9, 1966. TIAS 6126. 

Terminated: September 20, 1972. 
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 

atomic energy, with appendix and related notes. 

Signed at Washington July 17, 1972. 

Entered into force: September 20, 1972. 

British Honduras 

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement 
between the British Honduran Ministry of Agricul- 
ture, Lands, and Cooperatives and the United 
States Department of Agriculture for the preven- 
tion of foot-and-mouth disease and rinderpest in 
British Honduras. Signed at Belize September 6 
and 12, 1972. Entered into force September 12, 

European Atomic Energy Community 

Amendment to the additional agreement of June 11, 
1960, as amended (TIAS 4650, 5104, 5444), for 
cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. Signed at Washington September 20, 
1972. Enters into force on the date on which each 
party shall have received from the other party 
written notification that it has complied with all 
statutory and constitutional requirements for the 
entry into force of such amendment. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 
7358). Eflfected by exchange of notes at Djakarta 
August 28, 1972. Entered into force August 28, 


Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. 
Chevalier to Korea. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Seoul June 26 and September 7, 1972. Entered 
into force September 7, 1972. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of payments under P.L. 480, title I, agri- 
cultural commodities agreements, with annexes. 
Signed at Washington September 20, 1972. Entered 
into force September 20, 1972. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of certain debts owed to the United States 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed 

' Not in force. 

' Applicable to the Channel Islands and the Isle of 


October 9, 1972 


at Washington September 20, 1972. Entered into 
force September 20, 1972. 
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of March 9, 1972 (TIAS 
7.301). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad 
September 1, 1972. Entered into force September 
1, 1972. 


Agreement amending the agreements for sales of 
agricultural commodities of June 28, 1971 (TIAS 
7157), and April 19, 1972 (TIAS 7322). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Saigon September 6, 
1972. Entered into force September 6, 1972. 


1947 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on Eastern Europe Released 

Press release 221 dated September 11 (for release September 17) 

The Department of State released on September 17 
the volume of documents entitled Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 191,7, Volume lY , Eastern Eu- 
rope; The Soviet Union (x, 887 pages). This volume 
includes detailed documentation on efforts by the 
United States to secure the implementation of the 
treaties of peace with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ro- 
mania; the problems of setting up a Free Territory 
of Trieste; the interest of the United States in the 
adoption or maintenance of democratic institutions 
in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania; and political 
and economic relations with Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. 

The volume was prepared by the Historical Of- 
fice, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies may be ob- 
tained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, 
for $5.25 each (Department of State publication 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
WO or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Do- 
minican Republic amending the agreement of Feb- 
ruary 14, 1972 TIAS 7320. 4 pp. 10<'. 

Military Assistance — Deposits under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Uruguay. TIAS 
7329. 4 pp. 10«f. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Lebanon 
amending the agreement of August 31, 1971, as 
amended. TIAS 7331. 3 pp. lOt}. 

Military Assistance — Deposits under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Nicaragua. TIAS 
7332. 6 pp. 10^. 

Military Assistance — Deposits under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Lebanon. TIAS 
7334. 3 pp. lOff. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Japan 
amending the arrangement of January 28, 1972. 
TIAS 7335. 7 pp. 10^. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Portugal 
amending the agreement of November 17, 1970. 
TIAS 7336. 3 pp. 10^. 

Military Assistance — Deposits under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Nigeria. TIAS 

7338. 3 pp. 10<*. ^ 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of March 9, 1972. TIAS 

7339. 3 pp. 10^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Korea amending the agreement of February 
14, 1972. TIAS 7341. 4 pp. 10«;. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet- 
Nam amending the agreement of April 19, 1972, as 
amended. TIAS 7342. 4 pp. lO;*. 

Military Assistance — Deposits under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Peru. TIAS 
7348. 4 pp. 10«(. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX October 9, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1737 

Aviation. Convention on Aviation Sabotage 

Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon) . . . 418 

Canada. U.S. and Canada Agree To Enhance 
Water Quality in St. John River Basin (De- 
partment announcement) 415 


The Collective International Effort Against 

Drug Abuse (Gross) 401 

Convention on Aviation Sabotage Transmitted 

to the Senate (Nixon) 418 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1971 

(Nixon) 416 

Disarmament. Dr. Kissinger Discusses His 
Visit to Moscow and Western Europe (news 
conference, U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement) 389 

Economic Affairs 

Dr. Kissinger Discusses His Visit to Moscow 
and Western Europe (news conference, U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. joint statement) 389 

U.S. Alternate Governor of IMF and Interna- 
tional Banks Confirmed 418 

Environment. U.S. and Canada Agree To En- 
hance Water Quality in St. John River 
Basin (Department announcement) . . . 415 

Europe. Dr. Kissinger Discusses His Visit to 
Moscow and Western Europe (news con- 
ference, U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement) . . 389 

Foreign Aid. U.S. Government Reschedules 

Pakistan Debt 422 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences . . . 419 
U.S. Alternate Governor of IMF and Inter- 
national Banks Confirmed 418 

Narcotics Control. The Collective Interna- 
tional Effort Against Drug Abuse (Gross) 401 

Pakistan. U.S. Government Reschedules Paki- 
stan Debt 422 

Presidential Documents 

Convention on Aviation Sabotage Trans- 
mitted to the Senate 418 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1971 . 416 


1947 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Eastern 

Europe Released 424 

Recent Releases 424 

Treaty Information 

Convention on Aviation Sabotage Transmitted 

to the Senate (Nixon) 418 

Current Actions 422 

U.S. Government Reschedules Pakistan Debt . 422 

U.S.S.R. Dr. Kissinger Discusses His Visit to 
Moscow and Western Europe (news con- 
ference, U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement) . . 389 

United Nations. U.S. Participation in the U.N. 

During 1971 (Nixon) 416 


Dr. Kissinger Discusses His Visit to Moscow 
and Western Europe (news conference, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement) 389 

160th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 

Paris (Porter) 398 

Name Index 

Gross, Nelson 401 

Irwin, John N., II 418 

Kissinger, Henry A 389 

Nixon, President 416, 418 

Porter, William J 398 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 18—24 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to September 18 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
221 of September 11. 

No. Date 

*228 9/18 

t229 9/19 

*230 9/19 

231 9/20 

232 9/21 

233 9/21 

233A 9/21 

*234 9/21 

*235 9/22 
t236 9/23 


Mendenhall sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to the Malagasy Republic 
(biographic data). 

U.S. delegation to Inter-Amer- 
ican Commission of Women. 

Bush: rally for Soviet Jewry, 
Washington, Sept. 17. 

U.S. Government reschedules 
Pakistan debt. 

U.S. and Canada agree on meas- 
ures to enhance St. John River 
water quality. 

Porter: 160th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

Porter: additional remarks. 

Department of State-Brookings 
Institution conference on impli- 
cations of European monetary 
unification for the United 
States, Sept. 21-22. 

Landau sworn in as Ambassador 
to Paraguay (biographic data). 

Memorandum of implementation 
of U.S.-U.S.S.R. environment 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



Subscription Renewals: To Insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive imme- 
diate attention if you write to: Director, Office of 
Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 









Vol. LXVII, No. 1738 

October 16, 1972 


Statement by Secretary Rogers Before the U.N. General Assembly 

and Texts of U.S. Draft Convention and Resolution on Terrorism Jt25 

Address by Assistant Secretary Armstrong A37 


For index see inside back cover 

Boston i >.-- -.-Jrary 
Superintendent of Documents 

OCT 2 8 1972 


Vol. LXVII, No. 1738 
October 16, 1972 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $16, foreign $23 
Single copy 30 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

A World Free of Violence 

Following is a statement by Secretary 
Rogers made before the 27th session of the 
U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 
together ivith the texts of a draft convention 
and a draft resolution on terrorism circu- 
lated by the United States that day. 


Press release 238 dated September 26 

During the past few years the world has 
made remarkable advances toward the char- 
ter goal of practicing tolerance and living 
together in peace with one another as good 
neighbors. In 1972 alone: 

— The United States and the Soviet Union 
have undertaken with each other to do "their 
utmost" to avoid military confrontations, to 
respect the sovereign equality of all coun- 
tries, and to promote conditions in which no 
country would be subject to "outside inter- 
ference in (its) internal affairs." ^ 

— The Soviet Union and the United States 
have also placed precise limitations on our 
defensive and at least for the next five years 
on our offensive strategic missile systems. 

— The United States and the People's Re- 
public of China have undertaken to broaden 
understanding between our peoples, to im- 
prove relations between us in the conviction 
that this would be "in the interests of all 
countries," and to oppose any efforts toward 
hegemony in Asia or toward divisions of the 
world "into spheres of interest." ^ 

— The United Kingdom, France, the Soviet 
Union, and the United States have agreed on 
specific provisions to insure unimpeded 
movement to and from Berlin by road, rail, 
and waterways. 

— The Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic have 
opened negotiations on a treaty to normalize 
their relations. 

— And North and South Korea have in- 
tensified their talks on the plight of divided 
families and have agreed to establish a joint 
committee to examine problems of unifica- 

There were many other accomplishments 
toward the charter's objectives in 1972. I 
mention these merely to illustrate how old 
patterns of hostility are being eroded. If 
continued, this process in time will find posi- 
tive reflection within the United Nations 

We are encouraged, too, by calls in both 
Eastern and Western capitals for a more 
secure and more open Europe. 

A step toward realizing this goal would be 
creation of a more stable military balance in 
central Europe through negotiation of mu- 
tual and balanced force reductions. We are 
currently in consultation with our allies, and 
we believe exploratory talks on this subject 
could begin within several months. We trust 
they will be productive. 

It is equally important to move toward 
more normal relationships in Europe, rela- 
tionships which have not existed since the 
end of the Second World War. 

Toward this objective a Conference on 

' For text of the Basic Principles of Relations Be- 
tween the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed at 
Moscow on May 29 during President Nixon's visit, 
see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 898. 

■ For text of a joint communique issued on Feb. 
27 during President Nixon's visit to the People's 
Republic of China, see Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, 
p. 435. 

October 16, 1972 


Security and Cooperation in Europe, if it is 
carefully and constructively prepared, could 
play a crucial role. A conference whose over- 
all effect was to put a stamp of approval 
upon the rigid divisions of Europe would only 
prolong the problems of today into yet an- 
other generation. A conference which pro- 
moted a more normal relationship among all 
of Europe's states and peoples would re- 
inforce the trend toward better relations on 
other levels. That is why we believe that the 
conference must take practical steps to pro- 
mote the freer movement of people, ideas, 
and goods across the breadth of the conti- 

We are also now studying alternative ap- 
proaches for the forthcoming SALT talks 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. The 
United States will pursue these general aims: 

— First, our endeavor will be to negotiate 
on offensive weapons. In so doing we shall 
seek to expand the scope of strategic offen- 
sive weapons included in the limitations and 
to establish an equitable balance in the major 
delivery systems. 

— Second, we will wish to examine care- 
fully qualitative limitations which could en- 
hance stability. 

— Third, we will aim to reduce levels of 
strategic arms. As President Nixon said to 
this General Assembly in 1969, our objective 
is "not only to limit the buildup of strategic 
arms but to reverse it." ^ 

Of course we also attach importance to the 
work of the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, which has now turned its at- 
tention to preventing the accumulation of 
chemical weapons for use in warfare. Work 
in the Committee has come a long way to- 
ward resolving some of the important and 
complex issues related to possible significant 
restraints in this area. The United States is 
intensifying its study of all proposals, and 
we look forward to responding to them at an 
early date. 

» Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 

It is clear from what I have said that the 
United States believes that a practical step- 
by-step approach is the best way to achieve 
genuine progress in disarmament. 

Let me take note of other areas in the 
world in which progress needs to be accel- 

In Africa, this Assembly must continue to 
champion the efforts of all people of all races 
for human dignity, self-determination, and 
social justice. The United States will con- 
tinue to lend its full support to all practical 
efforts to these ends. 

In Latin America, while growth rates in 
recent years have far exceeded Alliance for 
Progress targets, economic development is 
still a primary concern and a primary need. 
The U.S. Government remains committed to 
a substantial program of economic assist- 
ance, particularly through regional organiza- 
tions. And in recognition of the importance 
of trade to development, we are actively sup- 
porting the participation of Latin American 
and other developing countries in the coming 
negotiations on a new international trading 

In Viet-Nam the United States has re- 
duced its armed forces from about 550,000 
to 35,000. President Nixon has proposed a 
cease-fire in all of Indochina under interna- 
tional supervision, an exchange of prisoners 
of war, and a total withdrawal of all Ameri- 
can forces. Under this proposal the political 
future of Viet-Nam could be negotiated by 
the Vietnamese themselves. President Nixon 
has also pledged a major effort to assist both 
Vietnamese states in postwar reconstruction. 
In such circumstances it is hard to under- 
stand why the other side persists in believ- 
ing the war should be continued. 

Climate for Middle East Peace Settlement 

And in the Middle East, the momentum 
toward a peace settlement must be regained. 

We should take note of two positive ele- 
ments. The cease-fire is now in its 26th 
month. The climate for a settlement seemed 
to improve as 1972 progressed. 


Department of State Bulletin 

We must, however, recognize that the 
Munich killings have set off deplorable pat- 
terns of action and counteraction and have 
seriously clouded prospects of early prog- 
ress. Nevertheless, neither side has perma- 
nently closed the door to future diplomatic 
efforts. We believe that forces favoring a 
peaceful settlement still have the upper 
hand. Our task is to do everything possible 
to see that they are supported. 

The "no peace, no war" situation which 
prevails now in the Middle East does not and 
will not serve the interest of anyone in the 
area. Certainly a stable, just, and durable 
peace agreement based on Security Council 
Resolution 242 continues to be the objective 
of the United States.* 

But this cannot be achieved without the 
beginning of a genuine negotiating process 
between the parties concerned. No settle- 
ment imposed from the outside could long 
endure. Negotiation is not capitulation. Ne- 
gotiating activity among longstanding an- 
tagonists across the world is presently oc- 
curring. Why should the Middle East be an 
exception? When North Korea can talk with 
South Korea, when East Germans can talk 
with West Germans, when Indians and 
Pakistanis can meet in the immediate after- 
math of war and prior to the withdrawal of 
troops — then surely the Middle East should 
be no exception to the general rule that dif- 
ferences should be reconciled through an 
active dialogue between the parties con- 

We do not hold that the process need nec- 
essarily begin with direct negotiations. Other 
diplomatic avenues exist. Ambassador Jar- 
ring [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar 
Jarring] remains available to help the 
parties negotiate the terms of a peace settle- 
ment in accordance with Security Council 
Resolution 242. 

Another — in our view the most promising 
first step — would be proximity talks leading 

to an interim Suez Canal agreement. This 
would separate the combatants, restore to 
Egypt operation of and authority over the 
Suez Canal, involve some Israeli withdrawal, 
preserve the cease-fire, and provide momen- 
tum for further efforts toward an overall 

It is encouraging that both sides agree 
that such an interim agreement would not be 
an end in itself but rather the first step to- 
ward an overall peace settlement. Such a 
practical test of peace on the ground would 
be in the interests of both sides, and the 
United States remains prepared to assist in 
achieving it. Moreover, an overall settlement 
in accordance with Resolution 242 must meet 
the legitimate aspirations and concerns of 
governments on both sides as well as of the 
Palestinian people. 

U.N. Weaknesses and Strengths 

In considering some of the great political 
developments of the past few years, one can- 
not help but observe that the United Nations 
has not been directly involved. This fact has 
often been cited in attacks against it. 

We are all aware, of course, that the char- 
ter does not intend the United Nations to be 
the center of all diplomacy. Still, as the Sec- 
retary General puts it temperately in his an- 
nual report, "in the political sphere the Or- 
ganization's place is . . . uncertain." ^ With 
this thought most of us would agree. 

Looking to the future, it is well to keep in 
mind that it is not so much in institutional 
reforms as in national wills that the solu- 
tions to the problem must be sought. Yet to 
the extent that better work methods and 
more realistic institutional arrangements 
will help, we also must bring them about. 
For example: 

— We believe that for the Security Coun- 
cil to maintain its influence and authority, 
ways must be found to assure representation 
for states, other than the present permanent 

' For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dee. 
18, 1967, p. 843. 

= U.N. doc. A/8701/ Add. 1. 

October 16, 1972 


members, whose resources and influence are 
of major importance in world afi'airs. The 
absence of Japan, for example, is notable in 
a body designed to engage the responsibili- 
ties of the world's principal powers. 

— We believe that greater recourse to fact- 
finding commissions, to good offices, and to 
quiet preventive diplomacy should be em- 

— We believe that the increase in bloc 
voting, often without independent regard 
for the merits of the issue, is leading in- 
creasingly to unrealistic results. 

The discussion of United Nations weak- 
nesses in dealing with political problems has 
reached its peak just at a time when its con- 
tribution to economic development and scien- 
tific and technological cooperation is making 
great strides. 

Long before economic development be- 
came a major matter of international con- 
cern, the United Nations initiated eff'orts to 
reduce the economic gap between developed 
and developing countries. From the start the 
United States has supported that effort. It is 
an encouraging fact that during each of the 
last three years the per capita growth in 
production has finally achieved a higher rate 
in the less developed than in the developed 
world. Still, as the recent World Bank study 
showed, there are serious problems of in- 
come distribution, high rates of infant mor- 
tality, low rates of literacy, serious malnu- 
trition, and widespread ill health. The 
United States intends to continue to devote 
serious efforts to solving such problems — 
through the improved United Nations De- 
velopment Program and through other chan- 
nels of economic assistance. 

United Nations activities related to science 
and technology are also having an impact : 

— The landmark United Nations Confer- 
ence on the Human Environment has pro- 
posed a world monitoring of levels of pollu- 
tion in water, air, earth, and living beings, 
measuring levels of specific chemicals, such 
as the hydrocarbons which poison the air of 
the world's cities. To launch this and other 
important programs without delay, we urge 

this Assembly to establish the Secretariat 
and the proposed $100 million Fund for the 

— The United Nations can also make a 
substantial contribution in the fight against 
drug traffic, particularly heroin traffic. A re- 
vised Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
will give the Narcotics Board authority to 
reduce poppy cultivation and opium produc- 
tion in countries shown to be sources of that 
traffic. The U.N. Drug Abuse Fund is help- 
ing states to improve their drug administra- 
tions, to train police and customs officials, to 
develop other means of livelihood for opium 
farmers, and to prevent and treat drug ad- 
diction. As President Nixon said last week, 
"Every government which wants to move 
against narcotics should know that it can 
count on (the United States) for our whole- 
hearted support and assistance in doing so." 

— Just last week the Secretary General 
announced that 1974 will be the World Pop- 
ulation Year and the time of a major U.N. 
population conference. It is our hope that 
the conference will lead to the setting of 
concrete goals of reduced population growth. 

— This General Assembly will review the 
progress of its Seabed Committee in prepar- 
ing for a conference on the law of the sea. It 
is important for us to use this opportunity 
to help make the oceans an example of inter- 
national cooperation, rather than an area of 
future conflict. 

Such activities as pollution, narcotics, the 
seabeds, and population control — most of 
them connected with new applications of 
science and technology — will increase in im- 
portance in the future. We believe they must 
acquire a greater focus and priority in the 
United Nations. 

I have spoken today about some of the 
U.N.'s weaknesses as well as some of its 
strengths because I believe we must look at 
this organization realistically so that we 
may contribute to its future prospects. In 
that spirit, the United States will continue to 
support the United Nations. We remain com- 
mitted to making it stronger and more ef- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Dealing With Acts of International Terrorism 

During this session the United Nations 
will have an opportunity and an obligation 
to take action of vital importance to the in- 
ternational community. The United Nations 
must deal eifectively with criminal acts of 
international terrorism which are so tragi- 
cally touching the lives of people every- 
where, without warning, without discrim- 
ination, without regard for the sanctity of 
human life. 

Twenty-four years ago the United Na- 
tions, in its Declaration of Human Rights, 
affirmed that every human being has a right 
to life, liberty, and "security of person." Yet 
what is happening in the world today to that 
security ? 

— In Sweden, 90 people boarding an inter- 
national flight are made hostage and held 
for ransom by Croatian terrorists. 

— In London, an Israeli diplomat is killed 
by a bomb sent through the mail. In New 
York, colleagues in the United Nations nar- 
rowly avert a similar fate. 

— In Cyprus, 95 persons of many nation- 
alities narrowly escape death on a Venezu- 
elan plane when a bomb is discovered just 
in time. 

— In New York, shots are fired into the 
apartment of a member of the Soviet Mis- 
sion where children are playing. 

— In Munich, 11 Olympic athletes are kid- 
naped and murdered in a day of horror wit- 
nessed throughout the world. 

— In Czechoslovakia, a Czechoslovak pilot 
is killed and his plane hijacked and diverted 
to West Germany. 

— In Israel, 26 tourists, 16 of them Ameri- 
can citizens, are slaughtered in an insane at- 
tack at an international airport. 

In this year alone 25 airliners from 13 
countries have been successfully hijacked, 
and 26 other attempts have been frustrated. 
In this year alone 140 airplane passengers 
and crew have been killed, and 97 wounded, 
in acts of terrorism. In five years 27 diplo- 
mats from 11 countries have been kidnaped 
and three assassinated. In New York, Arab 
and other missions have been threatened. 

Is there any one of you here who has not 
had occasion, as you have journeyed by plane 
from around the globe, to be concerned about 
your own personal safety? Is there any one 
of you here who has not wondered what ter- 
rorist might strike next, or where? 

The issue is not war — war between states, 
civil war, or revolutionary war. The issue is 
not the strivings of people to achieve self- 
determination and independence. 

Rather, it is whether millions of air trav- 
elers can continue to fly in safety each year. 
It is whether a person who receives a letter 
can open it without the fear of being blown 
up. It is whether diplomats can safely carry 
out their duties. It is whether international 
meetings — like the Olympic games, like this 
Assembly — can proceed without the ever- 
present threat of violence. 

In short, the issue is whether the vulnera- 
ble lines of international communication — 
the airways and the mails, diplomatic dis- 
course and international meetings — can con- 
tinue, without disruption, to bring nations 
and peoples together. All who have a stake 
in this have a stake in decisive action to sup- 
press these demented acts of terrorism. 

We are all aware that, aside from the psy- 
chotic and the purely felonious, many crimi- 
nal acts of terrorism derive from political 
origins. We all recognize that issues such as 
self-determination must continue to be ad- 
dressed seriously by the international com- 
munity. But political passion, however 
deeply held, cannot be a justification for 
criminal violence against innocent persons. 

Certainly the terrorist acts I have cited 
are totally unacceptable attacks against the 
very fabric of international order. They must 
be universally condemned, whether we con- 
sider the cause the terrorists invoke noble or 
ignoble, legitimate or illegitimate. 

We must take efi'ective steps to prevent 
the hijacking of international civil aircraft. 

We must take effective steps to prevent 
murderous attacks and kidnaping of diplo- 

We must take effective steps to prevent 
terrorists from sending bombs through the 
mails or murdering innocent civilians. 

October 16, 1972 


The United States welcomes the initiative 
the Secretary General has taken to place 
this matter on the agenda. 

Two years ago, before the problem had 
reached its present dimensions, the General 
Assembly took the first step, the step that 
must guide us now. In the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations Among States, which so 
strongly reaffirmed the right of self-deter- 
mination, the General Assembly also unan- 
imously declared that each nation has a duty 
to refrain from assisting or in any way par- 
ticipating in "terrorist acts in another State 
or acquiescing in organized activities within 
its territory directed towards the commis- 
sion of such acts." * 

The time has come to make that obliga- 
tion, which this General Assembly solemnly 
undertook, more specific and meaningful. 

In the past two years, the international 
community has taken certain steps in the 
field of hijacking. Conventions have been con- 
cluded prescribing severe penalties for the 
hijacking and sabotage of aircraft and re- 
quiring states to extradite or prosecute hi- 
jackers and saboteurs. We urge all states 
which have not ratified these conventions to 
do so. 

We are now faced with an urgent need to 
deter and punish international crimes of 
violence not only in the air but throughout 
our societies. The United States urges that 
this Assembly act, and act at once, to meet 
this challenge. 

First, the draft treaty to prosecute or ex- 
tradite those who attack or kidnap diplomats 
or officials of foreign governments or inter- 
national organizations should be completed 
and opened for signature at this session of 
the Assembly. The draft articles are already 
before this Assembly in document A/8710. 

Second, a treaty providing for suspension 
of all air service to countries which fail to 
punish or extradite hijackers or saboteurs of 
civil aircraft should be promptly completed 

and opened for signature. A nation which 
is a haven for hijackers should be outlawed 
by the international community. A draft of a 
treaty to do this has already been consid- 
ered by a subcommittee of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization.'' To achieve 
early action the process of deliberation 
should be accelerated, and a diplomatic con- 
ference to complete the treaty should be 
called without delay. 

Third, a new treaty on the export of inter- 
national terrorism should be concluded and 
opened for signature as soon as possible. It 
should include universal condemnation of 
and require the prosecution or extradition 
of persons who kill, seriously injure, or kid- 
nap innocent civilians in a foreign state for 
the purpose of harming or forcing conces- 
sions from a state or from an international 
organization. To complete such a treaty a 
diplomatic conference should be convened as 
soon as possible. The U.S. Government is 
today circulating a first draft of a treaty. 
We urge all governments to give it their 
earnest attention. 

We have also embodied these various pro- 
posals in a draft resolution, which we sub- 
mitted to the Secretariat for distribution 
this morning. 

These actions would mark a major ad- 
vance in the struggle against international 
terrorism. Surely it is in the collective inter- 
est of every nation represented in this hall 
to arrest the growing assault on interna- 
tional order with which we are all faced. 

Let this General Assembly be the driving 
force for the specific and vigorous steps that 
are required. Let it prove that the United 
Nations can meet this test. Let it show peo- 
ple everywhere that this organization — here, 
now — is capable of the concrete action nec- 
essary to bring us closer to a world free of 
violence, the kind of a world which is the 
great goal of the U.N. Charter. 

' For text of the declaration, see Bulletin of Nov. 
16, 1970, p. 627. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 2, 1972, 
p. 357. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Press release 238A dated September 26 

Draft Convention for the Prevention and Pun- 
ishment OF Certain Acts of International 

The States Parties to This Convention — 

Recalling United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) proclaiming principles 
of international law concerning friendly relations 
and co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations; 

Considering that this Resolution provides that 
every State has the duty to refrain from or- 
ganizing, instigating, assisting or participating 
in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing 
in organized activities within its territory di- 
rected towards the commission of such acts; 

Considering the common danger posed by the 
spread of terrorist acts across national boun- 

Considering that civilians must be protected from 
terrorist acts; 

Affirming that effective measures to control in- 
ternational terrorism are urgently needed and 
require international as well as national action; 

Have Agreed as Follows: 

Article 1 

1. Any person who unlawfully kills, causes seri- 
ous bodily harm or kidnaps another person, at- 
tempts to commit any such act, or participates as 
an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts 
to commit any such act, commits an offense of in- 
ternational significance if the act: 

(a) is committed or takes effect outside the ter- 
ritory of a State of which the alleged offender is a 
national ; and 

(b) is committed or takes effect: 

(i) outside the territory of the State against 
which the act is directed, or 

(ii) within the territory of the State against 
which the act is directed and the alleged offender 

knows or has reason to know that a person against 

whom the act is directed is not a national of that 
State; and 

(c) is committed neither by nor against a mem- 
ber of the Armed Forces of a State in the course 
of military hostilities; and 

(d) is intended to damage the interests of or ob- 
tain concessions from a State or an international 

2. For the purposes of this Convention: 

(a) An "international organization" means an in- 
ternational intergovernmental organization. 

(b) An "alleged offender" means a person as to 
whom there are grounds to believe that he has 
committed one or more of the offenses of interna- 
tional significance set forth in this Article. 

(c) The "territory" of a State includes all terri- 
tory under the jurisdiction or administration of the 

Article 2 

Each State Party undertakes to make the offenses 
set forth in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties. 

Article 3 

A State Party in whose territory an alleged of- 
fender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, 
submit, without exception whatsoever and without 
undue delay, the case to its competent authorities 
for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings 
in accordance with the laws of that State. 

Article 4 

1. Each State Party shall take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offenses set forth in Article 1: 

(a) when the offense is committed in Its territory, 

(b) when the offense is committed by its national. 

2. Each State Party shall likewise take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its juris- 
diction over the offenses set forth in Article I in. the 
case where an alleged offender is present in its ter- 
ritory and the State does not extradite him to any 
of the States mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this 

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal 
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national 

Article 5 

A State Party in which one or more of the of- 
fenses set forth in Article 1 have been committed 
shall, if it has reason to believe an alleged offender 
has fled from its territory, communicate to all other 
States Parties all the pertinent facts regarding the 
offense committed and all available information re- 
garding the identity of the alleged offender. 

Article 6 

1. The State Party in whose territory an alleged 
offender is found shall take appropriate measures 
under its internal law so as to ensure his presence 
for prosecution or extradition. Such measures shall 
be immediately notified to the States mentioned in 
Article 4, Paragraph 1, and all other interested 

October 16, 1972 


2. Any person regarding whom the measures re- 
ferred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article are being 
taken shall be entitled to communicate immediately 
with the nearest appropriate representative of the 
State of which he is a national and to be visited by a 
representative of that State. 

Article 7 

1. To the extent that the offenses set forth in 
Article 1 are not listed as extraditable offenses in 
any extradition treaty existing between States Par- 
ties they shall be deemed to have been included 
as such therein. States Parties undertake to in- 
clude those offenses as extraditable offenses in every 
future extradition treaty to be concluded between 

2. If a State Party which makes extradition con- 
ditional on the existence of a treaty receives a re- 
quest for extradition from another State Party with 
which it has no extradition treaty, it may, if it de- 
cides to extradite, consider the present articles as 
the legal basis for extradition in respect of the of- 
fenses. Extradition shall be subject to the provisions 
of the law of the requested State. 

3. States Parties which do not make extradition 
conditional upon the existence of a treaty shall "rec- 
ognize the offenses as extraditable offenses between 
themselves subject to the provisions of the law of 
the requested State. 

4. Each of the offenses shall be treated, for the 
purpose of extradition between States Parties as if 
it has been committed not only in the place in which 
it occurred but also in the territories of the States 
required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance 
with Article 4, Paragraph 1(b). 

5. An extradition request from the State in which 
the offenses were committed shall have priority over 
other such requests if received by the State Party 
in whose territory the alleged offender has been 
found within thirty days after the communication 
required in Paragraph 1 of Article 6 has been made. 

Article 8 

Any person regarding whom proceedings are be- 
ing carried out in connection with any of the of- 
fenses set forth in Article 1 shall be guaranteed 
fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings. 

Article 9 

The statutory limitation as to the time within 
which prosecution may be instituted for the offenses 
set forth in Article 1 shall be, in each State Party, 
that fixed for the most serious crimes under its 
internal law. 

Article 10 

1. States Parties shall, in accordance with inter- 
national and national law, endeavor to take all prac- 
ticable measures for the purpose of preventing the 
offenses set forth in Article 1. 

2. Any State Party having reason to believe that 
one of the offenses set forth in Article 1 may be 
committed shall, in accordance with its national 
law, furnish any relevant information in its posses- 
sion to those States which it believes would be the 
States mentioned in Article 4, Paragraph 1, if any 
such offense were committed. 

Article 11 

1. States Parties shall afford one another the 
greatest measure of assistance in connection with 
criminal proceedings brought in respect of the of- 
fenses set forth in Article 1, including the supply 
of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the 

2. The provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall not affect obligations concerning mutual assist- 
ance embodied in any other treaty. 

Article 12 

States Parties shall consult together for the pur- 
pose of considering and implementing such other 
cooperative measures as may seem useful for car- 
rying out the purposes of this Convention. 

Article 13 

In any case in which one or more of the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, or any other con- 
vention concerning the law of armed conflicts is 
applicable, such conventions shall, if in conflict with 
any provision of this Convention, take precedence. 
In particular: 

(a) nothing in this Convention shall make an 
offense of any act which is permissible under the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War or any other inter- 
national law applicable in armed conflicts; and 

(b) nothing in this Convention shall deprive any 
person of prisoner of war status if entitled to such 
status under the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War or any other appli- 
cable convention concerning respect for human 
rights in armed conflicts. 

Article 14 

In any case in which the Convention on Offenses 
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air- 
craft, the Convention for the Suppression of Un- 
lawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation, the Convention to Prevent and 
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of 
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that 
Are of International Significance, or any other con- 
vention which has or may be concluded concerning 
the protection of civil aviation, diplomatic agents and 
other internationally protected persons, is applicable, 
such convention shall, if in conflict with any provi- 
sion of this Convention, take precedence. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Article 15 

Nothing in this Convention shall derogate from 
any obligations of the Parties under the United 
Nations Charter. 

Article 16 

1. Any dispute between the Parties arising out of 
the application or interpretation of the present ar- 
ticles that is not settled through negotiation may be 
brought by any State party to the dispute before a 
Conciliation Commission to be constituted in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of this Article by the 
giving of written notice to the other State or States 
party to the dispute and to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 

2. A Conciliation Commission will be composed 
of three members. One member shall be appointed 
by each party to the dispute. If there is more than 
one party on either side of the dispute they shall 
jointly appoint a member of the Conciliation Com- 
mission. These two appointments shall be made with- 
in two months of the written notice referred to in 
Paragraph 1. The third member, the Chairman, 
shall be chosen by the other two members. 

3. If either side has failed to appoint its mem- 
bers within the time limit referred to in Paragraph 
2, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
appoint such member within a further period of 
two months. If no agreement is reached on the 
choice of the Chairman within five months of the 
written notice referred to in Paragraph 1, the Sec- 
retary-General shall within the further period of 
one month appoint as the Chairman a qualified ju- 
rist who is not a national of any State party to the 

4. Any vacancy shall be filled in the same man- 
ner as the original appointment was made. 

5. The Commission shall establish its own rules 
of procedure and shall reach its decisions and rec- 
ommendations by a majority vote. It shall be com- 
petent to ask any organ that is authorized by or 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Na- 
tions to request an advisory opinion from the In- 
ternational Court of Justice to make such a request 
regarding the interpretation or application of the 
present articles. 

6. If the Commission is unable to obtain an agree- 
ment among the parties on a settlement of the dis- 
pute within six months of its initial meeting, it shall 
prepare as soon as possible a report of its proceed- 
ings and transmit it to the parties and to the deposi- 
tary. The report shall include the Commission's 
conclusions upon the facts and questions of law and 
the recommendations it has submitted to the parties 
in order to facilitate a settlement of the dispute. The 
six months time limit may be extended by decision 
of the Commission. 

7. This Article is without prejudice to provisions 
concerning the settlement of disputes contained in 
international agreements in force between States. 


Press release 238B dated September 26 

The General Assembly, 

Gravely concerned by the increasing frequency of 
serious acts of international terrorism, inflicting 
injury and death to innocent persons and inflaming 
relations between peoples and states; 

Deploring the tragic, unwarranted and unneces- 
sary loss of innocent human lives from acts of in- 
ternational terrorism; 

Recognizing that the continuation of interna- 
tional terrorism poses a grave threat to the safety 
and reliability of modem communications between 
states, including in particular international civil 
aviation and diplomatic intercourse; 

Recognizing that governments have the responsi- 
bility to take appropriate steps to assure that all 
foreign diplomats engaging in normal pursuits and 
all foreign nationals travelling, visiting or residing 
abroad are afforded full legal protection against 
bodily harm or the threat thereof; 

Noting the constructive initiative of the Secretary 
General to place an item on international terrorism 
before the General Assembly; 

Recalliyig the General Assembly's "Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" 
and in particular its statement that 

Every State has the duty to refrain from 
organizing, instigating, assisting or partici- 
pating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in 
another State or acquiescing in organized ac- 
tivities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred 
to in the present paragraph involve a threat or 
use of force. 

1. Calls upon all states as a matter of urgency to 
become parties to and implement the following in- 
ternational conventions: 

a. "Convention on Offenses and Certain Other 
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft," signed at 
Tokyo on September 14, 1963; 

b. "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft," signed at The Hague on De- 
cember 15, 1970; and 

c. "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawrful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation," signed 
at Montreal on September 23, 1971. 

2. Requests the International Civil Aviation Or- 
ganization to pursue as a matter of urgency the 
drafting of a convention on arrangements for en- 
forcement of principles and obligations embodied 
in the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions with 
a view to the calling of a plenipotentiary conference 
without delay. 

October 16, 1972 


3. Urges all states to take immediate steps to pre- 
vent the use of their territory or resources to aid, 
encourage, or give sanctuary to those persons in- 
volved in directing, supporting, or participating in 
acts of international terrorism. 

4. Calls upon all states urgently to take all nec- 
essary measures within their jurisdiction and in 
cooperation with other states to deter and prevent 
acts of international terrorism and to take effective 
measures to deal with those who perpetrate such 

5. Strongly recommends that member governments 
establish procedures for the exchange of information 
and data on the plans, activities and movements of 
terrorists, in order to strengthen the capability of 
governments to prevent and suppress acts of inter- 
national terrorism and to prosecute and punish those 
perpetrating such acts. 

6. Calls upon all states to become parties to a 
convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against diplomatic agents and other interna- 
tionally protected persons based on the draft articles 
prepared by the International Law Commission. 

7. Decides to convene a plenipotentiary confer- 
ence in early 1973 to consider the adoption of a 
convention on the prevention and punishment of 
international terrorism and requests the Secretary 
General to transmit to member states for their 
consideration the texts of proposed draft articles on 
this subject submitted to the General Assembly. 

a. Recommends urgent efforts by all members to 
address the political problems which may, in some 
instances, provide a pretext for acts of international 

President Nixon Addresses Conference 
on International Narcotics Control 

A conference on international narcotics 
control for senior U.S. narcotics control offi- 
cials was held at the Department of State 
September 18-20. Following are remarks by 
President Nixon made at the opening session 
of the conference. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Septem- 
ber 25 

Mr. Secretary and ladies and gentlemen: 
As I look over the guest list for this confer- 
ence, I realize that most of you have been 
attending conferences all of your official lives, 
and I suppose that when you come to another 
conference you wonder how this one is dif- 
ferent, whether this one is any more impor- 
tant than all the others. 

I simply want to say at the outset that I 
consider this conference to be as important 
as any that any one of you has ever attended. 
I consider it certainly as important as any I 
have ever attended since the period I have 
been in public life, because winning the bat- 
tle against drug abuse is one of the most im- 
portant, the most urgent, national priorities 
confronting the United States today. 

As President of the United States, I feel 
that I bear no more solemn trust than to 
help to win this battle, and as public officials, 
everybody in this room, people who represent 
America in this country and all over the 
world, you could not be engaged in a finer 
humanitarian cause than in winning this bat- 
tle against drug abuse. 

As we all know, the global drug problem is 
enormously difficult. It doesn't lend itself to 
immediate or simplistic solutions. Neverthe- 
less, looking back over the three years since 
I declared total war on drug abuse and la- 
beled it America's "public enemy number 
one," I think the depth of our national com- 
mitment is clear. Our total Federal funding 
for this effort has increased 11 times over 
what it was in 1969. It is up to almost three- 
quarters of a billion dollars of the budget 
currently pending in the Congress. 

From an organizational standpoint, we 
have mobilized to meet this problem on all 
fronts. We have set up a Special Action Of- 
fice for Drug Abuse Prevention to direct the 
treatment and rehabilitation work under Dr. 
[Jerome H.] Jaffe. We have also set up in 
the Department of Justice a new Office for 
Drug Abuse Law Enforcement to attack do- 
mestic distribution and pushers, and I have 
named a Cabinet Committee on International 
Narcotics Control which coordinates our 
worldwide campaign to cut off the sources of 

Here we are attacking the problem there- 
fore on all fronts in the most effective way 
that we can through our various government 

I also have assumed some personal respon- 
sibilities. I have been deliberately cracking 
the whip, as many of you in this room know, 
in my personal supervision of this program, 


Department of State Bulletin 

and I will have to admit that we have 
knocked some bureaucratic heads together 
because of my directive, which I gave in the 
East Room two years ago, that government 
agencies should quit fighting each other about 
this problem and start fighting the problem. 

I wanted to see some solid results coming 
through in terms of saving the lives of thou- 
sands of young people who otherwise would 
have become hopeless drug addicts. And now 
we can look at some of the results. We can 
view them not with complacency, but with 
some pride and also with the determination 
to go forward to get even better results in 
the future. 

Dr. Jaffe, in his field, reports that we have 
created more federally funded drug treat- 
ment capacity in the past year than in the 
50 years before that. We now have the capa- 
bility to treat over 100,000 drug addicts in 
these programs. 

If the Congress approves the pending 
drug-funding request, we should have the 
capacity, if needed, to treat a quarter of a 
million heroin addicts in America by this 
time next year. 

Now, that, of course, is a sobering num- 
ber — the fact that we might need the capac- 
ity to treat a quarter of a million indicates 
the enormity of the problem and the need to 
work on it, not only on the treatment area 
but also particularly in the source of the 
supply and in the enforcement area. 

Turning to the law enforcement area, the 
number of arrests of drug traffickei's in this 
last fiscal year was double the number in 
1969. The seizures of heroin and other il- 
licit drugs are at an alltime high. But as I 
have told those who have reported to me 
just within the last month on this, this isn't 
good enough. We have to double the number, 
triple the number, and go from there to a 
complete victory over those who are engaged 
in this illicit trade. 

Very sharp recent increases in the prices 
of heroin throughout the eastern United 
States indicate that the supply is drying up 
and that the pressure is on the criminal drug 
trade. And I can assure all of you, and I can 
assure those who may be the subject of — 

those who might be prosecuted, that we are 
going to keep the heat on until the despicable 
profiteers in human misery are driven out of 
their hiding places and are put in prison, 
where they belong. Nor will this effort stop at 
our own borders. 

The men and women who operate the glob- 
al heroin trade are a menace not to Amer- 
icans alone but to all mankind. These people 
are literally the slave traders of our time. 
They are traffickers in living death. They 
must be hunted to the end of the earth. They 
must be left no base in any nation for their 
operations. They must be permitted not a 
single hiding place or refuge from justice 
anywhere in the world, and that is why we 
have established an aggressive international 
narcotics control program in cooperation 
with the governments of more than 50 coun- 
tries around the world. That is why I have 
ordered the Central Intelligence Agency, 
early in this administration, to mobilize its 
full resources to fight the international drug 
trade, a task, incidentally, in which it has 
performed superbly. 

Let me interject here a word for that 
much-maligned agency. As I have often said, 
in the field of intelligence we always find 
that the failures are those that are publi- 
cized. Its successes, by definition, must al- 
ways be secret, and in this area there are 
many successes and particularly ones for 
which this agency can be very proud. 

The key priority here is to target on the 
traffickers wherever they are, to immobilize 
and destroy them through our law enforce- 
ment and intelligence efforts, and I commend 
all of you on the fine initial pi-ogress which 
has been made in these programs. 

France, Paraguay, Laos, Thailand, Tur- 
key, are just a few examples of the many 
countries where the work of American offi- 
cials, from the Ambassadors down, through- 
out the Embassies abroad, in partnership 
with local officials has produced important 
breakthroughs — huge heroin seizures, key 
arrests, and in the case of Turkey, the cou- 
rageous decision to eradicate the opium 
poppy itself. And that action, incidentally, 
is a great tribute not only to that govern- 

Oetober 16, 1972 


ment but to our own government and par- 
ticularly to those in the State Department 
and in the Embassy in Turkey who worked 
on this problem. 

The people of the United States, especially 
the young people, are profoundly indebted to 
you, all of you in this room, most of whom I 
will not have a chance to meet personally, to 
thank personally for what you have worked 
on and what you have done. And yet, we 
have to do a lot more, as you all know, to 
win this war, and we must do it with even 
more of a sense of urgency than in the past. 

In working on narcotics control around the 
world, I want you to convey this personal 
message from me to the foreign officials with 
whom you may be meeting: Any government 
whose leaders participate in or protect the 
activities of those who contribute to our 
drug problem should know that the Pi'esi- 
dent of the United States is required by 
statute to suspend all American economic and 
military assistance to such a regime, and I 
shall not hesitate to comply with that law 
where there are any violations. 

I consider keeping dangerous drugs out of 
the United States just as important as keep- 
ing armed enemy forces from landing in the 
United States. Dangerous drugs which come 
into the United States can endanger the lives 
of young Americans just as much as would 
an invading army landing in the United 
States. Every government which wants to 
move against narcotics should know that it 
can count on this country for our whole- 
hearted support and assistance in doing so. 

Three years ago the global heroin plague 
was raging almost completely out of control 
all over the world; time was running out 
for an entire generation of our children, the 
potential drug victims of the next few years. 

But then we launched our crusade to save 
our children, and now we can see that cru- 
sade moving off the defensive, on to the of- 
fensive, and beginning to roll up some vic- 
tories in country after country around the 

wbrld and in the United States as well. 

And what is our goal now? We are living 
in an age, as we all know, in the era of di- 
plomacy, when there are times that a great 
nation must engage in what is called a lim- 
ited war. I have rejected that principle in 
declaring total war against dangerous drugs. 

Our goal is the unconditional surrender of 
the merchants of death who traffic in heroin. 
Our goal is the total banishment of drug 
abuse from American life. Our children's 
lives are what we are fighting for. Our chil- 
dren's future is the reason we must succeed. 

We are going to fight this evil with every 
weapon at our command, and with your help 
and the support of millions of concerned 
Americans, we are going to win. 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 27th U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on September 8 confirmed the 
nominations of the following to be repre- 
sentatives of the United States to the 27th 
session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations: 

Gale W. McGee, U.S. Senator from the State of 

James B. Pearson, U.S. Senator from the State 

of Kansas 

The Senate on September 15 confirmed 
the nominations of the following to be rep- 
resentatives and alternate representatives: 


George Bush 
Christopher H. Phillips 
Jewel Lafontant 

Alternate Representatives 

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 
Julia Rivera de Vincenti 
Gordon H. Scherer 
Bernard Zagorin 
Robert Carroll Tyson 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Choice Before Us 

Address by Willis C. Armstrong 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ^ 

We are at an interesting point in the his- 
tory of our foreign economic relations. A 
year ago the international community was in 
the throes of fundamental economic change. 
Many governments saw themselves in a di- 
lemma, torn between their interest in sta- 
bility and order in international financial 
matters and their sincere desire to avoid un- 
necessary sacrifices or costs. The U.S. Gov- 
ernment was faced with the colossal task 
of convincing other governments, as well as 
its own business community, that it was es- 
sential to close the gold window, to enforce 
a wage-price freeze, and to put a temporary 
surcharge of 10 percent on imports. It 
called for an adjustment of exchange rates 
which would acknowledge economic realities 
too long hidden behind curtains of conven- 
tional conversations. 

It is now a year later. We need to take 
stock of where we are as we approach criti- 
cal World Bank-IMF [International Mone- 
tary Fund] meetings which start next week. 
What has happened in the past year to 
promote progress toward a better inter- 
national monetary and trade system? What 
further steps need to be taken? What can 
the United States do for itself? In what re- 
spects does it need the help of others ? What 
are the attitudes of other countries? Do 
we have a real chance for a world in which 
there are minimal barriers to trade and in- 
vestment, a world where the multinational 

^ Made before the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' 
Association at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., on 
Sept. 18. 

corporation can effectively perform the serv- 
ices it is so eminently qualified to offer? 

Many of you may have seen a review in a 
recent Sunday New York Times of two books 
about the administration's economic policies. 
They were critical books, and I shall refrain 
from giving their authors and publishers any 
free advertising. What I would like to men- 
tion is the review, written by Professor 
Harry Johnson, a Canadian who has had 
the best that the academic worlds of Can- 
ada, Britain, and the United States could 
offer. He is better known for the sharpness 
of his intellect, tongue, and pen than for 
the tolerance with which he views govern- 
ments' efforts to deal with the economic en- 
vironment. He starts out by calling the two 
books "the embalmed reaction of conven- 
tional wisdom." He calls the new economic 
policy "brilliantly devised" and goes on to 
say that it was most important for its inter- 
national aspects. I forbear to quote the most 
relevant paragraph, lest some European 
diplomat should be listening, but what it 
says is essentially as follows : 

The dollar had been overvalued, with 
cumulatively adverse effects on our inter- 
national position. The Europeans, busy vdth 
their own affairs, did not mind letting the 
United States suffer the consequences in 
terms of unemployment and the loss of tech- 
nological leadership in the world. By clos- 
ing the gold window and imposing the im- 
port surcharge, the U.S. Government forced 
the Europeans off their comfortable perch 
and suggested that they display some world- 
minded leadership, of which they proved in- 
capable. They now know that they have to 

October 16, 1972 


go a long way before they measure up to 
the requirements of world leadership — or as 
the author puts it, "before they can put 
their money where their mouth is." 

So much for a general assessment. The 
measures taken in 1971 were born of politi- 
cal and economic necessity. The monetary 
system needed shaking up, an awareness 
of the need for equilibrium had to be in- 
duced, and serious attention to the inter- 
national trade system had to be encouraged. 
The domestic economy needed a greater 
sense of security and a better chance for 
real growth. 

When we review the past year, let us 
recall several important accomplishments. 
In the first place, an agreement was reached 
last December on a new pattern of exchange 
rates, more realistic and reasonable and 
more equitable for the dollar.^ This agree- 
ment has not operated perfectly, but it is 
accepted by most major governments. It 
is too eai'ly to identify any spectacular re- 
sults — but a reflow of capital to the United 
States was underway before the British 
pound was floated early this summer, and 
the fundamental monetary conditions for a 
change of direction in our balance of pay- 
ments have been established. But we should 
note that the Smithsonian agreement was 
never meant to be permanent; it is not a de- 
finitive solution to the international mone- 
tary problem. It is, rather, a transitional 
arrangement designed to pave the way for 
reform. Furthermore, by now the leading 
financial powers have agreed on a forum in 
which basic international monetary reform 
will be considered, and serious work on such 
reform is underway. 

Secondly, the surcharge was withdrawn 
at the time of the Smithsonian agreement, 
fulfilling the commitment of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment to remove it as soon as possible, 
once progress in the monetary field justified 

In the third place, bilateral discussions 
with the European Community and Japan 

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1972, 
p. 32. 

have yielded significant results in increased 
export opportunities for us. Furthermore, 
and far more importantly, we have agree- 
ments with the European Community and 
Japan that we should engage in trade nego- 
tiations looking toward a mutual reduction 
in barriers, beginning in 1973. Many other 
industrialized countries, including Canada, 
have associated themselves with this en- 
deavor. We have made it clear that such 
negotiations should include expanded oppor- 
tunities for American agricultural as well 
as industrial exports. 

Fourth, our domestic measures of last 
year have been followed by excellent results 
in 1972 in the way of growth of the domestic 
economy, increased investment, improved 
productivity, and a distinct lessening in the 
rate of inflation, so that now we are well 
ahead of Europe and Japan in our struggle 
with this constant and relentless antagonist. 
Employment is at a peak, although ad- 
mittedly unemployment remains a problem 
due to a rapid increase in the labor force. 
Our efforts at greater productivity and effi- 
ciency in our own economy are essential for 
our international position. If we are not 
productive and efficient we cannot rectify 
our balance of payments deficit and reduce 
or eliminate our trade deficit. The new cur- 
rency arrangements, the detachment of the 
dollar from gold, and the plans for improved 
opportunities for our exports are worthless 
if we do not have goods to export to cus- 
tomers, goods that can be sold on a competi- 
tive price and quality basis. The Smith- 
sonian agreement is not a free lunch, but 
an opportunity. 

Finally, we have dealt with specific prob- 
lems arising from excessively rapid import 
growth. The textile problem is a familiar 
one, and agreements have been negotiated 
with major suppliers to moderate growth. 
Arrangements of a temporary and similar 
nature have been made for a few other prod- 
ucts. We obviously need better and more 
equitable adjustment mechanisms, and the 
Congress and the executive branch have 
been giving careful attention to this situa- 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Basic Question 

This is a creditable record of accomplish- 
ments. President Nixon and the executive 
branch of the government have been vi'ork- 
ing toward these ends during the past year 
and have been shaping our course for the 
future along these lines. The Council on 
International Economic Policy is the co- 
ordinating mechanism. Active contact with 
our major trading and financial partners is 
being maintained, and we are constantly 
striving for better opportunities for Ameri- 
can business and for the American worker. 
What are the prospects for the future? 

Let me begin with the topic last men- 
tioned — adjustment assistance, or an adjust- 
ment mechanism to deal with problems aris- 
ing from excessive or unusual surges in 
particular imports. Obviously an affluent 
society with a good social conscience will 
not abandon people deprived of jobs through 
little direct fault of their own. It must and 
should help them make an adjustment to a 
different line of activity. But a fine bal- 
ance is necessary. If we pay too much atten- 
tion or give too much help or protection to 
industries disadvantaged by foreign compe- 
tition, we raise costs for our economy and 
make ourselves less efficient in the export 
field. Furthermore, change is constant, and 
a decline in demand for goods is not by any 
means always attributable to foreign com- 
petition. There are changes in style, in ways 
of living, and in domestic competitive con- 
ditions. The basic question here is our 
fundamental direction : Do we want a high- 
cost economy, with contracting international 
trade? Or do we want an expanding and 
growing economy, with better opportunities 
for labor, business, and the consumer? This 
is the choice. 

The choice is an easy one for an audience 
such as this, or for any other forward- 
looking business group. But there are many 
who think otherwise. They think it possible 
to reduce imports, restrict our investments 
overseas, keep our technology at home, and 
expect other countries not to take counter- 
action against us. They also assume that 

American companies would increase invest- 
ment at home to the extent that they de- 
crease investment abroad. Many people as- 
sert that this kind of economic "fortress 
America" is feasible. To my mind there is 
not the slightest bit of evidence to support 
such a naive view — as I am sure everyone 
here would agree. Such a program would 
have severe repercussions on our exports 
and our balance of payments and would 
doubtless limit severely our individual 
choices of consumer products and services. 
This is our problem at home: to work for 
an outward-looking, competitive, and ex- 
panding economy, as against an economy 
loaded with restrictions and costs, which 
would penalize its most productive invest- 
ment sector — the foreign — without improv- 
ing the domestic economy. The inward- 
looking alternative is unthinkable for what 
is now the world's richest country with the 
greatest productive capacity, but we could 
easily slip into it by self-indulgence and by 
yielding to the importunings of the pro- 

Future International Economic Relations 

We have serious problems in our external 
economic relations. Our friends and trad- 
ing partners are also our competitors. We 
and the European Common Market protect 
our domestic markets at about the same level 
— except in the agricultural sector, where 
European protectionism is far more severe 
and economically quite unjustified. We and 
the expanded Common Market need to pro- 
ceed with confidence to reduce the barriers 
to our mutually profitable trade, and we also 
have every reason to ask that the European 
Community phase out the preferential ar- 
rangements it has made with countries in 
Europe, in the Mediterranean, and else- 

We have a diflferent set of problems with 
Japan. There our difficulties lie in the co- 
operative system operated by the Japanese 
Government and industry which has such 
protectionist effects. We have been steadily 
pressing the Japanese to give us better op- 

October 16, 1972 


portunities to sell exports and to make in- 
vestments in their economy. We are making 
some progress as a result of continual diplo- 
matic contact. The talks at Hakone in July 
and the Honolulu summit at the end of 
August helped our Japanese friends recog- 
nize that their enormous trade surplus and 
our trade deficit are common problems which 
require action by both of us. We are not 
suggesting that the Japanese make them- 
selves less efficient, but we do suggest that 
they give us a chance to sell and invest in 
Japan on competitive terms. Our friends 
in Japan now have no difficulty recognizing 
that the alternative might well be limitations 
on their access to the lucrative U.S. market. 

The quality and nature of our future 
foreign economic relations will be deter- 
mined by the response of the American 
economy to the challenge of competition 
from other industrial societies, once weak- 
ened by war but now fully mature and highly 
productive. The U.S. Government has been 
and is doing its best to improve opportuni- 
ties and to remove barriers to trade and in- 
vestment. It is also seeking through domes- 
tic policies to encourage productivity and 
efficiency. There are many social and eco- 
nomic forces at play in our country which 
would press us in an opposite direction, 
often for good social or moral reasons. We 
cannot, however, allow these forces to be- 
come so dominant that we go out of business. 
It is true that the government has great 
concern for the environment, for social wel- 
fare and education. The growth and effi- 
ciency of the American economy is, however, 
essential if social goals are to be achieved. 
We also have a determination to advance 
and promote private international trade and 
investment of the kind that confers long- 
term benefits on the American economy. 

The response of our friends in other 
countries to the problems of the future is 
just as important as the responses of busi- 
ness, workers, and consumers at home. If 
other countries restrict our investments, 
render them unprofitable by regulation, or 
nationalize them, they cannot be surprised 
if the result is a diminished flow of capital 

and reduced market access. If they decline 
to reciprocate the trade expansion measures 
we offer, or if they deny us trade oppor- 
tunities to which we have rights under 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] or other trade arrangements, they 
cannot properly expect our government to 
be successful in resisting protectionist pres- 
sures at home. If other governments take a 
narrow view of the needs of the world for 
a revised monetary system, they would only 
perpetuate the sort of conditions which make 
for a lack of mutual confidence. If other 
governments in surplus positions in inter- 
national balance of payments expect deficit 
countries to bear the full burden of adjust- 
ment, they cannot be surprised if the United 
States is not responsive or, in their judg- 
ment, not forthcoming. Furthermore, if 
other countries fail to respect the rights of 
private individuals and corporations to in- 
dustrial and intellectual property, they can- 
not expect to share in the expansion of the 
frontiers of knowledge and the benefits of 
scientific research and development under- 
taken under private enterprise in the ad- 
vanced countries. 

Apprehensions About Change 

The values of an international economic 
order with minimal restrictions on the flow 
of investment and goods are readily ap- 
parent to business groups such as yours, to 
foreign offices, and to ministries of finance, 
commerce, and economics the world around. 
We all perceive that the world's needs — 
which are enormous and growing — can best 
be met by a free, flexible, efficient economic 
system which includes the multinational cor- 
poration as a major component for its suc- 
cessful operation. People who look at the 
international economic system in this way 
are our present-day "one worlders," prag- 
matic rather than Utopian, profoundly con- 
vinced they are right, and surprised when 
they are challenged. 

The challenge comes from critics who say 
that the multinational economic system 
benefits people in some countries more than 


Department of State Bulletin 

it does people in the neighborhood of the 
critic. Since the working of the system is 
largely invisible and since there is always 
room for improvement in everyone's lot, the 
critics' views are hard to disprove, or for 
that matter, to prove. 

If these critics prevail upon governments 
to take action against multinational com- 
panies, they are in fact acting to fragment 
and render less efficient the international 
system of which the company is the agent 
and manifestation. If enough countries take 
such action, there will be no system, and we 
shall go back to a fragmented world torn 
by economic strife and less able to satisfy 
human needs. The critics of the interna- 
tional system are not limited to less devel- 
oped countries nor to the other developed 
countries; they are among us as well. 
Their attitude may in part be a natural 
human reaction against the complexity, in- 
tangibility, and anonymity of modern so- 
ciety, with a nostalgic longing for some- 
thing simple like the farm, the country store, 
the railroad station, and the friendly neigh- 
bors — all of which seem somewhat to be 
under attack by an impersonal urban mass 
society. But the problems of an interna- 
tional economic system are not susceptible 
to a cut-and-run solution. Solution by senti- 
ment is not a substitute for the application 
of the intellect. Reason tells us that a broad- 
gauged international approach is the only 
one that will really work. But it cannot 
work unless it has support. Many business 
organizations are doing an excellent job of 
explaining the international economic sys- 
tem and its benefits. Many firms and asso- 
ciations have done yeoman service in pre- 
senting the internationalist case. The mate- 
rial prepared and presented by these groups 
pleases those who are already convinced, but 
there are countless people in this country 
who are inclined to disagree and who have 
not been exposed to the internationalist case. 
Thus the critics have a very plausible line 
which touches the heartstrings of human 
sympathy and simple patriotism. 

Part of the problem is that the rate of 

change and number of changes have become 
so great in recent years, leaving many people 
baffled and confused. It is easier to blame 
some impersonal business organization, to 
demonstrate that this organization used to 
have a plant in one's town, that the plant is 
now closed, and that the organization has 
opened a plant in some foreign country 
where the wage level is lower than in the 
United States. What is not recognized is 
that the organization usually has expanded 
investment in the United States as rapidly 
as it did abroad. It may also not be recognized 
that the organization has become more prof- 
itable and hence more able to contribute to 
American growth, employment, and income 
as a result of its participation in interna- 
tional trade and investment. There are 
some fantastic ideas in the minds of people 
in many parts of the world concerning the 
rate of profit of large multinational enter- 
prises. It is seldom realized that this rate 
of profit is often very modest, despite the 
extraordinary assertions and assumptions 
which one may find among people who are 
otherwise quite sophisticated and well in- 
formed. By the same token, little credit is 
given to corporations by our social critics 
for the amount of taxes they pay and for 
the support they thus render to the general 
objectives of our society. 

This apprehension about change, and 
about the anonymity and impersonal forces 
of change, appears in other countries as 
well. Discussions of such matters occur in 
Canada, in Japanese circles, in the European 
Common Market, and notably in developing 

It is interesting and revealing to observe 
that today the Communist countries, whose 
policies have always rejected the "one- 
economy world" approach, are now casting 
envious eyes at the countries which have 
benefited tremendously from the still-imper- 
fect operation of the international economic 
system. It was a privilege for me to be with 
Secretary of Commerce Peterson on our re- 
cent visits to Moscow and Warsaw. On 
the trip we learned much of the new aspira- 

October 16, 1972 


tions of the Communist economic planners. 
What these people now want are credits to 
enable them to acquire the advanced tech- 
nology and modern managerial processes of 
the multinational business system. In their 
groping toward this goal they are rejecting, 
in part, their previous nationalistic and re- 
strictive approach, and they are recognizing 
that the world of the capitalist, or mixed, 
economy may have something they desper- 
ately need. Thus, in a gingerly way the 
Communist countries have begun to look at 
and appreciate the benefits of the interna- 
tional economic system. It is paradoxical 
that this comes at a time when serious doubt 
has arisen among us and when the critics 
and opponents of our system are at their 
most vociferous. 

This is the choice we all face. Are we to 
have a wider world with expanding econo- 
mies and better payrolls, better benefits for 
people everywhere, and minimal barriers to 
trade and investment? Or are we to retreat 
into highrcost and protected-island econo- 
mies, unable to bring about the kind of 
change we want, incapable of meeting the 
social and economic needs of our own and 
other peoples? Our own and the other peo- 
ples have to give the answers. 

A final world about foreign policy in gen- 
eral. The United States is a leading world 
power. It expects to remain so. Our policy 
is dedicated to a generation of peace, as 
President Nixon has so aptly said. Peace 
means expanded contacts with all countries 
and a policy of live-and-let-live among the 
competing economies and ideologies. It 
means a recognition of the interdependence 
of economies and countries, of the reality of 
one world in international economics, and an 
awareness of the benefits for the peoples of 
the world — especially our own — to be de- 
rived from expanded trade and investment. 
An outward-looking political foreign policy 
needs an economic policy which is equally 
outgoing and constructive. A strong foreign 
policy cannot work without a strong and 
healthy economy. We cannot have a strong 

economy except in the framework of a more 
open and independent world where our own 
capacity to produce is enhanced by our com- 
petitive opportunities. 

161st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Folloiving are remarks made by Ambassa- 
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, at the 161st 'plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Septem- 
ber 28. 


Press release 246 dated September 28 

Ladies and gentlemen: It was with gratifi- 
cation that we learned nearly a month ago 
of North Viet-Nam's intent to release three 
American prisoners of war, though our sat- 
isfaction was tempered somewhat by the 
small number of men to be released and by 
your failure to repatriate any of the sick 
and wounded Americans you hold captive. 

Those who believed this might be a good- 
will gesture, a step toward peace, were 
quickly disillusioned, for it soon became evi- 
dent that a very cynical exploitation of the 
event had been organized. 

First, the long period between the an- 
nouncement and the actual repatriation — 
nearly four weeks — caused needless addi- 
tional anxiety to the families and friends of 
the prisoners. 

Second, the stipulation that certain pre- 
scribed escorts must go to North Viet-Nam 
to accept the prisoners and accompany them 
home established a politically directed form 
of custody antithetical to the spirit of the 
Geneva Convention. 

Third, the formulation of successive pre- 
conditions and requirements by North Viet- 
Nam, as expressed through the designated 


Department of State Bulletin 

escorts, curtailed the prisoners' liberty to 
travel after their supposed "release" Sep- 
tember 17. 

Fourth, the ensuing prolonged tour of 
North Vietnamese locations, to the accom- 
paniment of intense propaganda, caused yet 
another delay in repatriation and constituted 
further exploitation of the men in clear vio- 
lation of article 13 of the Geneva Conven- 
tion, which explicitly prohibits the type of 
public exposure to which these prisoners 
have been subjected in North Viet-Nam. 

Fifth, the deliberately circuitous routing 
chosen for the released prisoners was in 
callous disregard of the former captives' 
expressed wishes to return to their homeland 
and to their families as soon as possible. 

How striking is the difference between 
your handling of this affair and that of the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, 
which recently offered a speedy repatriation 
of 600 of your sick and wounded men with- 
out exposing them to public curiosity or 
propaganda exploitation. 

The United States protests vigorously 
against your practices which have once again 
demonstrated your disregard for interna- 
tional law, human rights, and for your 
signed obligations. 

Please do not underestimate the effect of 
this kind of thing. It has had and will con- 
tinue to have an effect on negotiations for a 
peace settlement, for it affects adversely the 
confidence which provides the basis for prog- 
ress. You must understand that such fla- 
grant examples of disregard for agreements 
signed, and understandings arrived at, breed 
marked doubt and hesitation when you state 
that you would enter into future agreements 
and understandings in good faith. If that is 
so, why not give a demonstration of your 
willingness to observe one particular conven- 
tion which bears your signature already, the 
one I have referred to today, the Geneva 
Convention on Prisoners of War? You could 
do yourselves and others a great deal of good 

if you would make it known that as a token 
of good will and to demonstrate your desire 
for a reasonable settlement of the war, you 
will adhere strictly to the provisions of that 


Press release 246A dated September 29 

You have declared that I am evading the 
important matters you have raised. How- 
ever, for the past two sessions I have out- 
lined for you some of the major questions 
concerning your proposals. I requested your 
comments and clarifications, but your re- 
sponses were limited to more readings of 
your September 11 text. You will not make 
your proposals acceptable by repeating 
them. You will have to explain them. If you 
cannot do that satisfactorily they will be as 
useless as your other proposals, all to the 
same effect, that you have presented in the 

As to prisoners, we know that they are 
unimportant to you, except for propaganda 
and political purposes, whether they are 
your men or ours. We on the other hand con- 
sider them a most important human matter 
which should be dealt with on the basis of 
the Geneva Convention. They are a main 
issue, not a side issue, and we won't let you 
forget that. 

To demonstrate our continuing effort to 
extract essential detail concerning your pro- 
posals, let me ask you now to make one very 
important, indeed crucial, clarification. Will 
you tell us what you envisage the role of the 
North Vietnamese army would be during the 
various stages of your proposals and, espe- 
cially, when it would return to North Viet- 
Nam? Please don't refer me to your past 
statements. It is precisely because they are 
vague and entirely unsatisfactory that this 
all-important question must be answered 
without ambiguity. 

October 16, 1972 



Department Urges Senate Advice and Consent to Ratification 
of Montreal Convention on Aviation Sabotage 

Statement by Charles N. Brower 
Deputy Legal Adviser ^ 

A little over a year ago President Nixon 
transmitted to the Senate the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air- 
craft, the Hague Hijacking Convention, and 
urged that it be given early and favorable 
consideration in order to permit its early rati- 
fication.- Ratification by the United States on 
September 14 [1971], the 10th state to ratify 
which participated in the international con- 
ference at The Hague, brought the convention 
into force. There are now 42 parties to this 

The Hijacking Convention, you will recall, 
established a fundamental rule of law with 
respect to state responsibility for assuring 
apprehension and punishment of hijackers: 
Whenever a hijacker is found within the 
territory of a party to the convention, that 
state must take him into custody and, if it 
does not extradite him, submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution "without exception whatsoever, 
and whether or not the offence was com- 
mitted in its territory." This basic extradite- 
or-prosecute obligation, applicable to all 
parties regardless of where the offense takes 

' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on Sept. 22. The complete transcript of 
the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 

' For text of the convention, see Bulletin of Jan. 
11, 1971, p. 53. 

place, is designed to deny to hijackers sanc- 
tuary anywhere in the world. 

At the time of testifying last year we re- 
ferred to a related convention that was under 
study, a companion convention to the Hi- 
jacking Convention covering other acts of 
violence directed against international civil 
aviation — sabotage, terrorist attacks against 
passengers, destruction of aircraft. That 
convention, the Convention for the Suppres- 
sion of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, was formally adopted at an 
international conference at Montreal which 
met a year ago from September 8 to Septem- 
ber 23.3 Once again. President Nixon has 
urged that it be given early and favorable 
consideration in order to permit its early 

The Montreal Convention was conceived 
in response to two attacks on international 
air flights occurring on February 21, 1970 — 
sabotage of a SWISSAIR flight which killed 
all persons on board the aircraft and sabo- 
tage of an Austrian Airlines flight which 
seriously damaged the aircraft. The acts 
were planned and perpetrated by terrorists 
against flights to Israel. The basic purpose 
of the convention is to impose the same 
rigorous requirements upon contracting 
states as the Hijacking Convention does: 
require contracting states to take into cus- 

" For U.S. statements and text of the convention, 
see Bulletin of Oct. 25, 1971, p. 464. 


Department of State Bulletin 

tody and extradite or prosecute saboteurs and 
armed terrorists who attack passengers and 
aircraft, regardless of where the acts take 
place. The convention represents a unified 
response of the world aviation community 
and a willingness of nations to take excep- 
tional measures to deal with these acts. 

No one can pretend to claim that the Mon- 
treal Convention will by itself bring a com- 
plete end to sabotage and other acts of ter- 
rorism. It is, however, a basic step that must 
be taken by the international community to 
help cope with the wave of attacks which 
have been directed against passengers and 
aircraft: It declares that perpetrators of 
these crimes are world outlaws and, when 
the convention is widely ratified, will mean 
relentless pursuit of such criminals by the 
world community. 

Negotiation of the Convention 

The United States has spearheaded efforts 
to develop the Montreal Convention. In June 
of 1970 an Extraordinary Assembly of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) was convened to consider the prob- 
lem of aviation security, on request of 11 
European states following the sabotage of 
the SWISSAIR and Austrian Airlines air- 
craft. In advance documentation to the As- 
sembly, the United States proposed that an 
international convention be drawn up at the 
earliest possible moment to apply the Hi- 
jacking Convention rules to other criminal 
attacks against civil aircraft. The Assembly 
adopted a resolution based on a draft 
cosponsored by the United States and 11 
other countries which directed the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization's Legal 
Committee to meet and prepare as a matter 
of first priority on its work program a draft 
convention on acts of unlawful interference 
against international civil aviation other 
than hijacking, with a view to adoption at a 
diplomatic conference within a year. The 
Organization's normal rules of procedure on 
study of draft conventions were waived, and 
the Legal Committee met in late September 
1970 in London to prepare the draft conven- 

tion. At the end of the one-month meeting 
the draft was transmitted to the ICAO 
Council with a recommendation that it was 
ready for presentation to states as a final 
draft. The September 1971 diplomatic con- 
ference at Montreal was then scheduled. 

The main objective of the U.S. delegation 
at the Montreal Conference was to assure 
that the strict rules of the Hijacking Con- 
vention would be applied to the acts covered 
in the Sabotage Convention. Most impor- 
tantly, this meant application of the uni- 
versal-jurisdiction provision, in order to 
eliminate all sanctuaries for offenders. The 
delegation was successful in achieving this 
goal, for the vast majority of crimes covered 
by the convention which involve death or in- 
jury to passengers or crew, and destruction 
of aircraft, must be made punishable by all 
contracting states no matter where such acts 
take place. The universal-jurisdiction pro- 
vision does not, however, apply to the acts 
described in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of 
article 1, damage to or interference with air 
navigation facilities and communication of 
false information. 

A second major objective of the U.S. dele- 
gation was to assure that the convention ap- 
plied to attacks against aircraft on domestic 
flights as well as aircraft on international 
flights. This issue had been resolved in the 
Hijacking Convention by simply applying 
the convention to all flights in which the 
place of takeoff or actual landing was outside 
the state of registration of the aircraft. 
Since hijackings in almost every case in- 
volve a diversion of an aircraft from one 
state to another, such a provision was suffi- 
cient to cover the cases of international sig- 
nificance. The U.S. delegation argued that 
the same provisions in a convention covering 
acts of sabotage would be inadequate: It 
would mean that the convention would apply 
to terrorist groups which entered a country 
and planted bombs on international flights 
and then escaped but would not apply if they 
selected domestic flights. This distinction, in 
the United States view, could not be justi- 
fied in any circumstance. The conference 
ultimately agreed with this analysis and ap- 

October 16, 1972 


plied the convention to any case in which 
offenders were found outside the territory 
of the state of registration of the aircraft. 

The Montreal Conference was attended by 
60 countries. There was broad representa- 
tion from all areas of the globe. The conven- 
tion was adopted by a vote of 50 votes in 
favor, none opposed, and 8 abstentions. It 
was immediately signed by 31 states includ- 
ing the United States. It has since been 
signed by 17 other countries, and 10 states 
have ratified or acceded to it. It will enter 
into force when the 10th ratification by a 
state participating in the conference is de- 
posited. At present there are six such ratifi- 

The Montreal Convention was done in 
record time — less than 18 months from its 
initial conception to formal adoption — and is 
indicative of the capability of the interna- 
tional community to respond with alacrity 
and vigor, and with a broadly acceptable so- 
lution, to an urgent need. 

Major Provisions of the Convention 

I would like to outline very briefly the 
major provisions of the convention. 

The Montreal Convention applies to a 
series of offenses described in article 1 of 
the convention. The delimiting factor of the 
convention is that all of the offenses pertain 
to acts against aircraft in use in air trans- 
portation or against passengers or crew in 
air transportation. Thus the convention de- 
rives its title, the Convention for the Sup- 
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation. 

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 covers 
acts of violence against persons on board 
aircraft in flight which are likely to endan- 
ger the safety of the aircraft. This covers, 
for example, use of firearms, but would not 
cover mere acts of disorderly conduct among 

An aircraft is defined to be in flight from 
the moment when all its external doors are 
closed following embarkation until the mo- 
ment when any door is opened for disem- 
barkation. In the event of hijacking the 

flight is deemed to be continued until the 
competent authorities where the plane lands 
assume responsibility for the aircraft and 
the persons and property on board. This 
definition is the same as found in the Hi- 
jacking Convention. 

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 covers 
destruction and serious damage of aircraft 
in service. Serious damage is damage short 
of total destruction, but so serious that the 
aircraft cannot be flown again. An aircraft 
is considered to be in service from the mo- 
ment preflight preparation begins until 24 
hours after landing and includes the entire 
period the aircraft is in flight. The subpara- 
graph does not cover aircraft which are sim- 
ply sitting at a runway and are not being 
regularly used for flights, nor aircraft being 
repaired, after the 24-hour period following 
the last landing has expired. This subpara- 
graph also covers damage to an aircraft 
which is likely to endanger its safety in 
flight. The purpose is to cover certain kinds 
of aircraft sabotage such as cutting wires 
or loosening wheel bolts. 

Subparagraph (c) of article 1 is a sym- 
bolic provision referring specifically to bomb 
sabotage. As a matter of substance the acts 
described are covered in subparagraph (b) 
and the paragraph on attempts. 

Subparagraph (d) of article 1 covers acts 
of destruction or damage of air navigation 
facilities, and interference with aeronautical 
communications, which are likely to endan- 
ger the safety of aircraft in flight. The pur- 
pose of this provision is to cover acts at air- 
ports, such as damage to runway lights or 
radar installations, which an aircraft is 
using to effect a takeoff or landing. The con- 
vention is limited to such acts against facili- 
ties which are used in international air navi- 
gation. It thus covers all major airports, but 
would not cover, for example, acts of vandal- 
ism at a small local airport servicing private 

Subparagraph (e) of article 1 is con- 
cerned primarily with bomb hoaxes. The act 
is a convention crime if, in communication 
of the false information, an aircraft is in 
fact endangered. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The convention also covers attempts and 
accomplices of persons who commit or at- 
tempt to commit the convention crimes. 

The convention does not apply to aircraft 
used in military, customs, or police services. 
This is in accordance with the usual practice 
of limiting international air law conventions 
to civil aircraft. The convention applies ir- 
respective of whether the aircraft is engaged 
in an international or domestic flight. If the 
offense is committed in the territory of a 
state other than the state of registration of 
the aircraft or if the place of takeoff or land- 
ing, actual or intended, of the aircraft is 
situated outside the territory of the state of 
registration, it is covered by the convention. 
In addition, with respect to the acts de- 
scribed in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and 
(e) of paragraph 1 of article 1, the conven- 
tion also applies whenever the offender is 
found outside the territory of the state of 
registration of the aircraft. 

The penalties and universal- jurisdiction 
provisions are among the most important in 
the convention. 

Each state undertakes to make the offenses 
punishable by severe penalties. With respect 
to the acts described in subparagraphs (a) , 
(b), and (c) of paragraph 1 of article 1, and 
for attempts and accomplices, each state is 
required to take steps to establish its crimi- 
nal jurisdiction to cover cases where an of- 
fender is present in its territory, regardless 
of where the act takes place. 

Legislation will shortly be presented by 
the Department of Justice to align our do- 
mestic law fully with the convention di- 

I have described for you basically articles 
1-5 of the convention. The convention covers 
virtually every armed terrorist attack and 
act of sabotage which is today directed 
against civil aviation and applies the uni- 
versal-jurisdiction provision to them. The 
provisions on air navigation facilities and 
bomb hoaxes, acts which have not posed the 
same degree of threat to civil aviation as the 
others, are somewhat restricted by compar- 
ison; but these restrictions were accepted in 
order to gain wide acceptance for the strong 

Hijacking Convention rules. The remaining 
articles, 6-16, for the most part find exact 
counterparts in the Hijacking Convention. 

Under article 6 each state is obliged, when 
it is "satisfied that the circumstances so 
warrant," to take an offender into immediate 
custody or to take other measures to insure 
his presence for such time as may be neces- 
sary to enable criminal or extradition pro- 
ceedings to be instituted. 

This language implies a certain flexibility 
in cases where there is little or no evidence 
to support placing a person in custody. Once 
the decision is made that the circumstances 
warrant taking the hijacker into custody, 
however, there is no exception to the obliga- 
tions on contracting states that flow from 
action under this article; namely, notifica- 
tion to the other states specified in the con- 
vention and extradition or submission to 

Article 8 amends existing extradition 
treaties, all bilaterals in the case of the 
United States, to include the offenses as ex- 
traditable offenses and also provides that the 
offenses shall be extraditable offenses be- 
tween states which do not make extradition 
conditional on an extradition treaty. The 
provisions of the convention relating to ex- 
tradition in the absence of treaty are not 
applicable to those countries, like the United 
States, which by law cannot extradite except 
pursuant to treaty. 

Since many existing extradition treaties 
are limited to offenses that occur within the 
territory of the state requesting extradition, 
the convention also, in effect, amends such 
treaties to expand what is to be considered 
"territory" for purposes of extradition. 

If a state in which an offender is found 
does not extradite him, that state is obli- 
gated, under article 7, "without exception 
whatsoever, and whether or not the offense 
was committed in its territory, to submit the 
case to its competent authorities for the pur- 
pose of prosecution." These authorities are 
required to make their decision whether or 
not to prosecute in the same manner as for 
serious ordinary offenses under their own 

October 16, 1972 


These provisions of the convention, taken 
together, provide the basic deterrent — the 
risk to any saboteur or armed terrorist who 
enters any one of the contracting states that 
he will be taken into custody and either be 
extradited to another state or prosecuted 
where he is found. 

The convention requires that, when a state 
has taken an offender into custody, it shall 
immediately notify certain states, including 
the state of registration of the aircraft and 
the state of nationality of the offender. In 
addition, each state is required to report to 
the Council of the International Civil Avia- 
tion Organization relevant information con- 
cerning an offense, the release of passengers, 
crew, cargo, and aircraft, and the results of 
any extradition or other legal proceedings. 

The final clauses, including a clause allow- 
ing ratification or accession by all States, 
exactly parallel the Hijacking Convention 

"Joint Action" Convention in Preparation 

Before concluding I will just mention one 
other related international convention in the 
process of preparation. I noted at the begin- 
ning of my statement that the Hague and 
Montreal Conventions were not complete so- 
lutions to the problem of air terrorism, but 
fundamental steps by the international com- 
munity which must be taken to deal with the 
problem. Another important step facing the 
international community is to assure that 
the extradite-or-prosecute obligation is gen- 
erally accepted by aviation states. It is only 
with such assurance that air terrorism can 
be expected to be fully deterred — when sanc- 
tuaries for terrorists are eliminated. 

Two years ago President Nixon requested 
the international community to consider a 
convention which would call for concerted 
action against states which do not act to 
punish hijackers — joint action to boycott air 
services to states which offer themselves as 
sanctuaries.* The United States presented a 
draft to the ICAO Legal Committee for 

study, and the United States and Canada 
jointly presented a draft convention to a 
subcommittee of the Legal Committee in 
April 1971 established to study the subject. 
The convention was pigeonholed by the Or- 
ganization in June 1971 at the meeting of 
the Assembly. 

This year, in June, in the presence of a 
new wave of terrorism in the skies, a U.S.- 
introduced resolution to convene a Special 
Subcommittee to begin work immediately on 
a convention on joint action was passed by 
the Council by a vote of 17-1. The subcom- 
mittee met in Washington, D.C., at the State 
Department, for the first two weeks in Sep- 
tember. A draft convention has been pre- 
pared, and the work of the subcommittee has 
been referred to the Legal Committee with 
the recommendation that the committee be 
convened as soon as possible.^ 

We believe that this recent progress on a 
"joint action" convention — a convention to 
enforce the principles of the Tokyo, Hague, 
and Montreal Conventions by boycott action 
against states which do not punish hijackers 
and air terrorists — is evidence of an increas- 
ing awareness by the international aviation 
community that extraordinary measures 
may be necessary in these times to promote 
a secure development of international civil 
aviation. We believe there is an increasing 
awareness by the international aviation com- 
munity that it may have to act as a unit — 
and isolate from its membership, if neces- 
sary, states which do not observe basic rules 
necessary for the preservation of the civil 
aviation system. 

We are hopeful that the ICAO Council, 
following up on the decision it took in June 
to convene the Special Subcommittee, will 
shortly call for consideration of the subcom- 
mittee's work on an expedited basis. 

* For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
Sept. 11, 1970, see Bulletin of Sept. 28, 1970, p. 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 2, 1972, 
p. 357. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Consular Conventions Transmitted 
to the Senate 

Following are the texts of President Nix- 
on's messages dated September 19 transmit- 
ting to the Senate the consular conventions 
between the United States and the Polish 
People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of 
Romania, and the Hungarian People's Re- 


White House press release dated September 19 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's 
advice and consent to ratification the Con- 
sular Convention between the Government 
of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Polish People's Republic, 
with Protocols, signed at Warsaw on May 
31, 1972, on the occasion of my recent visit 
there.^ The Convention was accompanied by 
two related exchanges of notes, which are 
transmitted for the information of the Sen- 

The signing of this treaty is a significant 
step in the gradual process of improving and 
broadening the relationship between the 
United States and Poland. Consular relations 
between the two countries have not previ- 
ously been subject to formal agreement. This 
Convention will establish firm obligations on 
such important matters as free communica- 
tion between a citizen and his consul, notifi- 
cation to consular offices of the arrest and 
detention of their citizens, and permission for 
visits by consuls to citizens who are under 

The people of the United States and Po- 
land enjoy a long tradition of friendship. I 
welcome the opportunity through this Con- 
sular Convention to strengthen the ties be- 
tween our two nations. I urge the Senate to 

give the Convention its prompt and favor- 
able consideration. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 19, 1972. 


white House press release dated September 19 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and 
consent to ratification, the Consular Conven- 
tion between the United States of America 
and the Socialist Republic of Romania, signed 
at Bucharest on July 5, 1972.2 

The Convention was signed by Secretary 
of State William P. Rogers, who was paying 
an official visit to Romania, and by Foreign 
Minister Corneliu Manescu. It is evidence of 
the continued improvement and expansion of 
United States-Romanian relations. 

This new Convention, replacing one con- 
cluded in 1881, will make possible improved 
consular services in both countries. It will 
ensure unhindered communication between a 
citizen and his consul and prompt visit by 
consuls to citizens who are detained. Under 
the Convention, American citizens in Ro- 
mania will have a fuller degree of consular 
assistance and protection than ever before. 

I hope that the Senate will act favorably 
on the Consular Convention with Romania at 
an early date. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 19, 1972. 


White House press release dated September 19 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am transmitting for the Senate's advice 
and consent to ratification the Consular Con- 
vention between the United States of Amer- 

' For text, see S. Ex. U., 92d Cong., 2d sess. 

' For text, see S. Ex. V., 92d Cong., 2d sess. 

October 16, 1972 


ica and the Hungarian People's Republic, 
signed at Budapest on July 7, 1972.3 

Secretary of State William P. Rogers 
signed the Convention for the United States 
during his official visit to Hungary. It is the 
first bilateral treaty concluded between the 
Governments of the United States and Hun- 
gary since World War II and reflects the in- 
creasingly warm contacts developing between 
Americans and Hungarians as well as be- 
tween their Governments. 

The Consular Convention, like others re- 
cently negotiated with Poland and Romania, 
will make possible improved consular serv- 
ices, including guaranteed communication 
between a citizen and his consul and prompt 
notification in case of detention. 

I believe that this Convention will provide 
a cornerstone for the development and main- 
tenance of friendly relations with Hungary, 
and I recommend that the Senate advise and 
consent to its ratification. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 19, 1972. 

Patent Cooperation Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
mit herewith a copy of the Patent Coopera- 
tion Treaty, signed at Washington on June 
19, 1970, together with the Regulations 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty an- 
nexed thereto. I transmit also, for the infor- 
mation of the Senate, the report from the 
Department of State with respect to the 

The Patent Cooperation Treaty offers sev- 
eral major advantages. One is to simplify 
the filing of patent applications on the same 

invention in different countries by providing, 
among other things, centralized filing pro- 
cedures and a standardized application for- 

Another advantage offered by the Treaty 
is the longer period of time available to an 
applicant before he must commit himself by 
undertaking the expenses of translation, 
national filing fees and prosecution in each 
country. Today, a twelve month priority 
period is provided by the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
while under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
an applicant will have generally twenty 
months or more. This advantage should 
permit the applicant to be more selective of 
the countries in which he ultimately decides 
to file, by giving him more time and informa- 
tion to evaluate the strength of his potential 
patent and to determine his marketing plans. 
Thus, this Treaty would serve to expand es- 
tablished programs of industry to file for- 
eign patent applications as well as to en- 
courage smaller businesses and individual 
inventors to become more actively engaged in 
seeking patent protection abroad. 

A third advantage is to facilitate the ex- 
amining process in those member countries 
which examine applications for patents. 

In order to carry out the provisions of the 
Treaty, proposed implementing legislation 
will be forwarded to the Congress in the 
near future. 

I recommend that the Senate give early 
and favorable consideration to the Treaty 
submitted herewith and give its advice and 
consent to ratification subject to three of 
the declarations for which provision is made 
in the Convention under Article 64, para- 
graphs (1) (a), (3) (a), and (4) (a), respec- 
tively, as explained in the report from the 
Department of State. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 12, 1972. 

' For text, see S. Ex. W., 92d Cong., 2d sess. 

'Transmitted on Sept. 12 (White House press re- 
lease); also printed as S. Ex. S., 92d Cong., 2d sess., 
which includes the text of the report from the 
Department of State. For text of the treaty, see 
Bulletin of July 13, 1970, p. 45. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Memorandum of Implementation 
of Environmental Agreement 

Press release 236 dated September 23 

Following is the text of the memorandum 
of impletnentation signed at Moscow Sep- 
tem.ber 21 by Russell E. Train, Chairman of 
the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, 
and E. K. Fedorov, Director of the Soviet 
Hydrometeorological Service.^ 

Memorandum of Implementation of the Agree- 
ment Between the United States of America 
AND THE Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental 
Protection of May 23, 1972 

The first meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Com- 
mittee on Cooperation in the Field of Environ- 
mental Protection was held in Moscow September 
18 to 21, 1972. The Joint Committee was established 
by the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of 
Environmental Protection, signed in Moscow by the 
President of the United States Richard Nixon and 
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
N.V. Podgorny on May 23, 1972." As provided for 
in the Agreement, the Joint Committee approved 
concrete measures and programs of cooperation, and 
designated the participating organizations responsi- 
ble for the realization of the programs. 

Agreement was reached upon specific projects in 
the eleven subject areas named in the Agreement. 
Work will begin on a number of high priority proj- 
ects during 1972-1973. For each project, responsible 
organizations were named by each side, although it 
was understood that other organizations from each 
side may participate in agreed projects, in many 
cases by working groups established in the specific 
area. It was agreed that the respective coordi- 
nators would verify the initiation of the agreed 
projects and remain in communication regarding the 
development of the program as a whole. 

Agreement was reached upon the following initial 

I. Air Pollution 

1. Air Pollution Modeling 

The metropolitan areas of St. I^ouis and Lenin- 

grad were designated as subjects for air pollution 
investigations. The methods used in the USSR and 
the U.S. to compute dispersal of pollutants from sin- 
gle and multiple sources, emission limitations and 
forecasts of hazardous conditions of air pollution will 
be compared and improved with special attention to 
meteorological techniques and topographic factors. 

2. Instrumentation and Methodology for Monitor' 
ing Major Air Pollutants 

The instruments and methods used in the USSR 
and the U.S. for measurement, data collection and 
processing, and analysis are to be compared and 

3. Technology for Preventing Air Pollution from 
Industrial Enterprises 

The two sides will exchange information and ex- 
plore opportunities for joint research on technology 
for controlling pollutants, with initial work to be 
done on major stationary sources such as power 
plants. Special emphasis will be placed on the con- 
trol of sulphur oxides and particulates. 

4. Emissions from. Transportation Sources 

The two sides will explore possibilities for co- 
operation in reducing emissions from transportation 
sources, including the improvement of engine design. 

Two working groups will be appointed. The first, 
for modeling and instrumentation, will concern itself 
with Projects 1 and 2 and will meet in St. Louis, 
Missouri, and other cities in the United States before 
the end of 1972. The lead agency for the U.S. is 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and for the 
USSR the Hydrometeorological Service. The second 
working group, for control techniques, will concern 
itself with Projects 3 and 4 and will meet in the 
USSR at the beginning of 1973. The lead agency 
for the U.S. is the Environmental Protection Agency 
and for the USSR the All-Union Association of Gas 
Purification and Dust Cleaning. 

' For names of other members of the U.S 
Soviet delegations, see press release 236. 

' For text of the agreement, see Bulletin 
June 26, 1972, p. 921. 



October 16, 1972 


II. Water Pollution 


Studies and Modeling of River Basin Pollution 

Specific river basins in each country will be select- 
ed for a joint project on water pollution river basin 
modeling techniques. The Delaware and other river 
basin models will be examined in the United States. 
Rivers in the Soviet Union will be designated later. 
Soviet specialists will visit the U.S. in early 1973. 

2. Protection and Management of Lakes and 

Both sides will designate lakes and estuaries in 
their country for joint projects on water pollution, 
including eutrophication. A Soviet Union lake will 
be Baikal; U.S. lakes to be considered include Lake 
Tahoe and one of the Great Lakes. U.S. specialists 
will visit the Soviet Union in the summer of 1973. 

3. Effects of Pollutants upon Aquatic Ecological 
Systems and Permissible Levels of Pollution 

Experts from both sides will exchange informa- 
tion and visits concerning research on the effects 
of pollutants on water systems and the development 
of water quality standards. 

4. Prevention or Treatment of Discharges 

The two sides will exchange visits and informa- 
tion on specific water pollution abatement tech- 
niques, including land disposal of both untreated 
municipal sewage and sludge from municipal treat- 
ment systems; reduction of pollution from industrial 
plants, such as manufacturers of pulp and paper; 
and reinjection of water from oil extraction activi- 
ties, including disposal of liquid wastes in perma- 
frost conditions in arctic and subarctic regions (col- 
lection, storage, treatment and final disposal). Visits 
will be made to arctic sites in both countries. 

A single working group will be appointed. This 
group will meet in the USSR in the first quarter 
of 1973. There will be an exchange of visits of 
specialists to appropriate sites in both countries 
including arctic and subarctic areas. The lead agency 
for the U.S. is the Environmental Protection Agency 
and for the USSR the Hydrometeorological Service 
and the Ministry of Amelioration and Water Man- 

III. Pollution Related to Agricultural Produc- 

1. Integrated Pest Management 

The two sides will exchange visits and informa- 
tion relating to programs of integrated pest man- 
agement. Such programs include the use of non- 
chemical methods such as pest predators and patho- 
gens, along with the limited use of pesticides. Both 
sides agreed to develop common programs, includ- 
ing the exchange of useful biological agents such as 
parasites and predators and plant species resistant 
to pests. 

2. Pollution Caused by Feedlots 

The two sides will exchange information and 
visits on management of wastes from large feed- 

3. Wind Erosion and Desiccation 

Both sides will exchange information and visits 
on research and management practices on control of 
wind erosion and desiccation. 

4. Effects of Pollutants on Forests and Plants 

Both sides will exchange visits and information 
on the effects of air pollutants on forest and crop 

A single working group will be appointed. This 
group will meet in the U.S. in early 1973. Initial 
emphasis will be on integrated pest management 
and pollution caused by feedlots. A conference on 
integrated pest management will take place in the 
USSR during 1973. The lead agency for the U.S. is 
the Department of Agriculture and for the USSR the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 

IV. Enhancement of Urban Environment 

1. Urban Environment 

Both sides will designate two metropolitan areas 
in its country, with others added as appropriate, to 
serve as a means to examine jointly methods for 
planning and assuring a desirable environment in 
urban areas, with attention to planning for appro- 
priate land use, transportation, noise abatement, 
solid waste management, water purification, recrea- 
tion and park development, tourist zones and re- 
sorts, preservation of historic sites, etc. 

The U.S. side has designated the Atlanta and San 
Francisco areas and the Soviet side has designated 
Leningrad for the initial exchange, and will desig- 
nate a second city later. 

2. New Communities 

Both sides will designate new communities in each 
country as a means of examining the environmental, 
physical, social, economic and other factors consid- 
ered in the design and development of satellite and 
free standing new communities. Among those com- 
munities to be designated are Columbia, Maryland 
and Reston, Virginia in the United States and 
Togliatti and Akademgorodok in the Soviet Union. 

3. Impact of Construction and Disposal of Wastes 
in Permafrost Areas 

The two sides will exchange visits and informa- 
tion on methods of construction in permafrost, the 
impact of construction on the environment in such 
areas and on the collection, storage and disposal of 
wastes in these areas. 

A single working group will be appointed. This 
group will meet in the U.S. in November 1972, fol- 
lowed by a spring or summer 1973 meeting in the 


Department of State Bulletin 

USSR. The lead agency for the U.S. is the Depart- 
ment of Housing and Urban Development and for the 
USSR the State Committee on Urban Construction 
and Architecture and, for noise abatement, the Min- 
istry of the Automobile Industry. 

V. Nature and Preserves 

1. Conservation of Rare and Endangered Species 
of Animals and Plants, and General Wildlife 
Conservation and Management 

Both sides will exchange visits and information 
and develop joint research for the purpose of im- 
proving understanding and protection of endangered 
species of plants and animals. A Soviet-American 
convention on conservation of rare species migrating 
between the USSR and U.S. will be prepared, and 
both sides agreed on the importance and desirability 
of concluding, as soon as possible, international 
agreements on consei'vation of wildlife in need of 
special protection, for example polar bears and 
other animals. Joint projects will also include re- 
search on preservation and management of various 
marine and other mammals, specifically polar bears 
and whales of the North Pacific, involving the bow- 
head, gray and fin whales. They will also carry 
out projects on inanagement of free-ranging wild- 
life for animal production, and research on and man- 
agement of predators and waterfowl, including 
swans and other migratory birds. 

A working group will be appointed that will meet 
initially in Moscow in December 1972. As necessary, 
appropriate subgroups will be organized (for ex- 
ample, for whales) . The lead agencies for the U.S. 
are the Department of the Interior and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the De- 
partment of Commerce, and for the USSR the So- 
viet Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Some of the indicated projects, such 
as these for the bowhead whale and migrating 
swans, may be initiated prior to the working group 

2. Tundra Ecosystems and Permafrost 

The two sides will exchange visits and informa- 
tion on permafrost regions and tundra ecosystems, 
including research on stabilization of disturbed 
areas and other ecological research. Visits will be 
made by U.S. and Soviet specialists to appropriate 
institutes and places in each country. 

3. Reserved Areas 

Each side will exchange information and visits 
and develop appropriate research projects on pre- 
serves, their classification, organization and main- 
tenance, on arid land ecology, and on parks, includ- 
ing a joint project involving the Yellowstone Na- 
tional Park (U.S.) and the Caucasian State Preserve 

A meeting of specialists in the U.S. early in 1973 
will concern itself with Projects 2 and 3. The lead 

agency for the U.S. is the Department of the In- 
terior and for the USSR the Ministry of Agricul- 

VI. Marine Pollution 

1. Prevention and Clean-up of Oil Pollution in the 
Marine Environment 

The two sides agreed to exchange visits and in- 
formation on technologies and techniques for the 
prevention and clean-up of oil discharges in the 
marine environment, including such areas as vessel 
design, traffic control, shore facilities and offshore 
oil drilling safeguards. The two sides also agreed 
to exchange visits and information on pipeline 
transport, particularly through permafrost areas. 

2. Effect of Pollutants on Marine Organisms 

The two sides will exchange visits and informa- 
tion on research on the chemical aspects of marine 
pollution and the effects of pollutants on marine 
organisms, including chemical and biological anal- 
yses of fish, monitoring of rare species, exchange 
of specimens, and rehabilitation of sea life after 
major pollution incidents. 

A working gi'oup will be appointed to deal with 
the first project. It will meet in the U.S. in early 
1973 with a visit of specialists to the USSR in the 
summer of 1S73. The lead agencies for the U.S. are 
the Department of Transportation and the Depart- 
ment of the Interior and for the USSR the Ministry 
of Merchant Marine. A first-quarter of 1973 meet- 
ing of specialists will be held in the U.S. to discuss 
the second project. The lead agencies for the U.S. are 
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Na- 
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of 
the Department of Commerce and for the USSR the 
Hydrometeorological Service. 

VII. B:olc3ical and Genetic Consequences 

1. Cotnprehensive Analysis of the Environment 

Both sides agree to hold a symposium in the 
USSR in the fall of 1973 to examine scientific 
methods of setting standards or limits on pollution 
discharges into the environment from separate 
sources and from large territories. The symposium 
would focus attention on the effect of man's activity 
on all organisms and the biosphere as a whole to 
provide guidance for protection of the environment 
and wise use of natural resources. The two sides 
will communicate with each other on the design of 
the conference, as necessary. The lead agency for 
the U.S. is the Environmental Protection Agency 
and for the USSR the Hydrometeorological Service. 

2. Biological and Genetic Effects of Pollutants 

Both sides will exchange visits and information 
and conduct joint research on the health effects of 
mutagenic compounds, radioactivity, and heavy 
metals; study extrapolation of animal toxicological 

October 16, 1972 


tests to man; and exchange visits and information on 
epidemiological studies. Both sides will exchange in- 
formation and compare technical bases for establish- 
ing air quality standards. Specialists will meet in 
the U.S. during the first quarter of 1973. The lead 
agencies for the U.S. are the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare and the Environmental Pro- 
tection Agency, and for the USSR the Ministry of 
Health and the Academy of Sciences. 

VIII. Influence of Environmental Changes on 

1. Effect of Changing Levels of Atmospheric Con- 
stituents on Climate 

The two sides will exchange information and par- 
ticipate in joint studies of the influence on climate 
of gaseous and particulate contaminants. 

2. Monitoring Atmospheric Constituents That 
Might Modify Climate 

The two sides will take steps to insure the com- 
parability of data from their respective climate 
monitoring stations and cooperate in the analysis 
and interpretation of such data. 

3. Climate Modeling 

The two sides will exchange information and co- 
operate in the development and application of math- 
ematical modeling to assess the consequences of 
atmospheric contamination on climate. 

4. Cooperation in Polar Research 

The two sides will explore possibilities of inte- 
grating such scientific programs as the U.S. Arctic 
Ice Dynamics Joint Experiment and the Soviet Polar 
Interaction Experiment so as to extend the fields 
of observation and permit more comprehensive 
analysis and modeling. 

5. Effects of Contamination of the Upper Atmos- 
phere on Climate 

The two sides will exchange information and ex- 
plore opportunities for cooperation in the study of 
the effects of perturbation of the upper atmosphere 
by propulsion eflluents from high altitude aircraft. 

A single working group will be established. It 
will meet in the U.S. late in 1972. A symposium 
will be held in the USSR in 1973. The lead agency 
for the U.S. is the National Oceanic and Atmos- 
pheric Administration of the Department of Com- 
merce and for the USSR the Hydrometeorological 

IX. Earthquake Prediction 
1. Earthquake Prediction 

The San Andreas Fault area in the U.S. and the 
Garm-Dushanbe Region in the USSR were desig- 

nated as subjects for the installation of jointly op- 
erated earthquake measurement instruments and 
detection equipment. Both sides will exchange visits 
and information with regard to earthquake predic- 
tion research, seismic risk mapping, seismicity and 
earthquake resistant design. 

2. Integration of U.S.-USSR Tsunami (Earth- 
quake-Produced Tidal Waves) Warning Sys- 

Both sides will exchange visits and information 
and will consider the possibility of the integration 
of the Tsunami warning systems currently being 
operated by the U.S. in the Hawaii area and by the 
USSR in the Kurile-Kamchatka area. The two 
systems will be integrated to provide an exchange 
of data produced from each one and to improve the 
operation of both systems. 

One working group will be established. It will 
meet on the subject of Earthquake Prediction in 
the United States in early 1973 and later in 1973 
in the USSR. The lead agencies for the United 
States will be the Department of the Interior for 
Earthquake Prediction Activities and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the 
Department of Commerce for Integration of the 
Tsunami Warning Systems, and for the USSR the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 

X. Arctic and Subarctic Ecological Systems 

The two sides agreed to undertake a cooperative 
program involving arctic and subarctic areas. The 
specific projects agreed to will be undertaken under 
other areas of the agreement as follows: 

1. Prevention or Treatment of Discharges 
This project is covered under Water Pollution. 

2. Impact of Construction and Disposal of Wastes 
in Permafrost Environmental Areas 

This project is covered under the Urban Environ- 

3. Permafrost and Arctic Ecosystems 

This project is covered under Nature and Pre- 

4. Prevention and Clean-up of Oil Pollution 
This project is covered under Marine Pollution. 

XI. Legal and Administrative 

Exchange of Information and Experience Regarding 
Legal and Administrative Measures for Pro- 
tecting Environmental Quality 

The two sides will exchange information and hold 
conferences on legal and administrative measures 
for protecting environmental quality, dealing with 


Department of State Bulletin 

questions of government organization, procedures to 
analyze environmental effects of government deci- 
sions, economic aspects of pollution and enforce- 
ment techniques among others. Specialists from 
both countries will hold a meeting in the United 
States early in 1973. The lead agency for the U.S. 
is the Council on Environmental Quality and for 
the USSR the Academy of Sciences. 

Both sides agreed that the present memorandum 
would enter into force as of thirty days from the 
date of signature, and that in the interim each side 
might propose changes of a minor character. 

Both sides agreed that the next meeting of the 
Joint Committee would be held in Washington In 
1973. At that meeting the progress of the program 
will be reviewed and plans made for further co- 
operation. The Chairman and coordinators will meet 
as necessary between sessions. 

Signed in English and in Russian, both copies 
equally authentic, in Moscow, September 21, 1972. 

E. K. Fedorov 

Chairman for the 
Soviet Union 

Russell E. Train 

Chairman for the 
United States 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
with annex. Done at New York October 26, 1956, 
as amended. Entered into force July 29, 1957. 
TIAS 3873, 5284. 
Acceptance deposited: Bangladesh, September 27, 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.* 
Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh, September 27, 

1972; Israel, September 26, 1972. 


Convention for the suppression of unlawrful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971.* 
Signature: New Zealand, September 26, 1972. 


Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, as amended. 
Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered 

' Not in force. 

into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502, 5929. 
Signature and acceptance: Qatar, September 25, 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
Ratification deposited: Israel, September 26, 1972. 



Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of June 26, 1972. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bogota August 16 and 
September 1, 1972. Entered into force September 
1, 1972. 

Treaty concerning the status of Quita Sueno, Ron- 
cador, and Serrana, with exchanges of notes. 
Signed at Bogota September 8, 1972. Enters into 
force upon the exchange of instruments of ratifi- 


Agreement on the United States-Israel Binational 
Science Foundation, with exchange of letters. 
Signed at New York September 27, 1972. Entered 
into force September 27, 1972. 


Agreement amending annex C of the mutual de- 
fense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 
(TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Oslo September 12 and 14, 1972. Entered into 
force September 14, 1972. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington June 13, 
1949. Entered into force December 11, 1951. TIAS 
Terminates: November 29, 1972. 

Convention modifying and supplementing the con- 
vention of June 13, 1949, for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal eva- 
sion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at 
Oslo July 10, 1958. Entered into force October 21, 
1959. TIAS 4360. 
Terminates: November 29, 1972. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect 
to taxes on income and property, with related 
notes. Signed at Oslo December 3, 1971. 
Ratifications exchanged: September 29, 1972. 
Enters into force: November 29, 1972. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Memorandum of implementation of the agreement 
on cooperation in the field of environmental pro- 
tection of May 23, 1972 (TIAS 7345). Signed at 
Moscow September 21, 1972. Enters into force 
October 21, 1972. 

October 16, 1972 



1947 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on China Released 

U.S. Assistance Program in Viet-Nam. This pam- 
phlet in the Current Foreign Policy series discusses 
the AID economic assistance programs in South Viet- 
Nam with particular reference to the situation just 
prior to the North Vietnamese invasion of March 30, 
1972. Pub. 8550. East Asia and Pacific Series 195. 

Economic Assistance. Agreement with Viet-Nam 
amending the agreement of April 27, 1972. TIAS 
7322. 8 pp. 10((. 

Press release 239 dated September 26 (for release October 2) 

The Department of State released on October 2 
another volume in the "Foreign Relations" series 
for the year 1947; namely, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 19i7, Volume VII, The Far East: 
China (vi, 1,477 pp). 

This volume includes previously unpublished 
documentation on the political and military situation 
in China, particularly the continuing conflict be- 
tween Kuomintang and Communist forces, the sit- 
uation in Formosa (Taiwan), American represen- 
tations regarding the port of Dairen, political prob- 
lems in Sinkiang, the status of Tibet, the mission 
to China of Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S. 
military and naval aid to China, and economic re- 
lations of the United States and China. 

This is the sixth of eight volumes to be published 
on American foreign relations in 1947, and the re- 
maining two volumes are in preparation. The vol- 
umes are prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau 
of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VII may be 
obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402, for $6.75 each (Department of State publica- 
tion 8613). 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Rem.ittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular offices, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock (at least 125) — $6; l-year subscrip- 
tion service for approximately 75 updated or new 
Notes — $3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies 
of those listed below are available at 10^ each. 

Libya Pub. 7815 4 pp. 

Kuwait Pub. 7855 4 pp. 















Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 25-Oct. 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to September 25 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
236 of September 23. 


Rivero sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Spain (biographic 

Rogers: U.N. General Assem- 
bly, Sept. 25. 

Draft convention on terrorism, 
Sept. 25. 

Draft resolution on terrorism, 
Sept. 25. 

Volume VII of "Foreign Rela- 
tions" series for 1947 re- 

Vaky sworn in as Ambassador 
to Costa Rica (biographic 

Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee to meet Oct. 20. 

Joint State-Commerce confer- 
ence on U.S. -African trade, 
Oct. 3-4. 

Foreign Service employees to 
vote on exclusive representa- 

Establishment of U.S.-Israeli 
Binational Science Founda- 

Newsom: World Affairs Coun- 
cil of Northern California, 
San Francisco. 

Porter: 161st plenary session 
on Viet-Nam at Paris. 

Porter: additional remarks. 

Entry into force of double tax- 
ation convention with Nor- 

Seel ye sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Tunisia (biographic 

Rogers: Council on Foreign Re- 
lations, New York, Sept. 28. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 





















Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX October 16, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1738 

Asia. A World Free of Violence (Rogers, 
texts of draft convention and resolution on 
terrorism) 425 

Aviation. Department Urges Senate Advice 
and Consent to Ratification of Montreal Con- 
vention on Aviation Sabotage (Brower) . . 444 


Consular Conventions Transmitted to the 

Senate (messages from President Nixon) . 449 

Department Urges Senate Advice and Consent 
to Ratification of Montreal Convention on 
Aviation Sabotage (Brower) 444 

Patent Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to the 

Senate (message from President Nixon) . . 450 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 27th U.N. 
General Assembly 436 

Consular Affairs. Consular Conventions Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (messages from Presi- 
dent Nixon) 449 

Disarmament. A World Free of Violence 
(Rogers, texts of draft convention and reso- 
lution on terrorism) 425 

Economic Affairs 

The Choice Before Us (Armstrong) .... 437 
Patent Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to the 

Senate (message from President Nixon) . . 450 

Environment. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Memo- 
randum of Implementation of Environmental 
Agreement (text) 451 

Europe. A World Free of Violence (Rogers, 
texts of draft convention and resolution on 
terrorism) 425 

Hungary. Consular Conventions Transmitted 
to the Senate (messages from President 
Nixon) 449 

Middle East. A World Free of Violence 
(Rogers, texts of draft convention and reso- 
lution on terrorism) 425 

Narcotics Control. President Nixon Addresses 
Conference on International Narcotics Con- 
trol 434 

Poland. Consular Conventions Transmitted to 
the Senate (messages from President 
Nixon) 449 

Presidential Documents 

Consular Conventions Transmitted to the 

Senate 449 

Patent Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to the 
Senate 450 

President Nixon Addresses Conference on In- 
ternational Narcotics Control 434 


1947 "Foreign Relations" Volume on China 

Released 456 

Recent Releases 456 

Romania. Consular Conventions Transmitted 
to the Senate (messages from President 
Nixon) 449 

Trade. The Choice Before Us (Armstrong) . 437 

Treaty Information 

Consular Conventions Transmitted to the 

Senate (messages from President Nixon) . 449 

Current Actions 455 

Department Urges Senate Advice and Consent 
to Ratification of Montreal Convention on 
Aviation Sabotage (Brower) 444 

Patent Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to the 

Senate (message from President Nixon) . . 450 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Memorandum of Im- 
plementation of Environmental Agreement 
(text) 451 

U.S.S.R. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Memorandum 
of Implementation of Environmental Agree- 
ment (text) 451 

United Nations 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 27th U.N. 
General Assembly 436 

A World Free of Violence (Rogers, texts of 
draft convention and resolution on terror- 
ism) 425 

Viet-Nam. 161st Plenary Session on Viet- 

Nam Held at Paris (Porter) 442 

Name Index 

Armstrong, Willis C 437 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 436 

Brower, Charles N 444 

Bush, George 436 

Lafontant, Jewel 436 

McGee, Gale W 436 

Nixon, President 434, 449, 450 

Pearson, James B 436 

Phillips, Christopher H 436 

Porter, William J 442 

Rogers, Secretary 425 

Scherer, Gordon H 436 

Tyson, Robert Carroll 436 

Vincenti, Julia Rivera de 436 

Zagorin, Bernard 436 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




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October 23, 1972 


Remarks by President Nixon 

and Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Shultz ^57 

Address by Secretary Rogers Jt.70 


For index see inside hack cover 

Superintendent ot i^ 

NOV 1 ^972 


Vol. LXVII, No. 1739 
October 23, 1972 

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th« Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of tlie Government 
with information on development* in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tlie White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
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international relations are also listed. 

Reforming the International Monetary System 

The Boards of Governors of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter- 
national Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
velopment (IBRD) and its affiliates held 
their regular annual meetings at Washington 
September 25-29. Following are remarks 
made by President Nixon before the Boards 
of Governors on September 25 and a state- 
ment made on September 26 by Secretary of 
the Treasury George P. Shultz, U.S. Gov- 
ernor of the Fund and Bank. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 2 

I have had the privilege of visiting most 
of the 124 countries represented here in this 
distinguished audience, and on this occasion 
I would like to extend my welcome to you, my 
best wishes to the heads of government that 
I have also had the privilege to meet, and 
particularly the best wishes of the American 
people to all of the people of the many coun- 
tries represented at this gathering. 

It is customary in addressing such a sig- 
nificant international gathering to say that 
we are participating in a great moment of 
history. Great moments in history are easy 
to perceive; the headlines blaze and the world 
is riveted at television screens as world lead- 
ers meet. But great movements in history are 
much harder to perceive, and particularly 
while we are living through them. The action 
is slower, it is less dramatic, it is infinitely 
more complex, as changing circumstances 
and the new needs of people alter the be- 
havior of nations. 

I am convinced, on the basis of the evi- 
dence of the past year, that we are not only 

participating today in a great moment in 
history but that we are witnessing and help- 
ing to create a profound movement in history. 

That movement is away from the resolu- 
tion of potential conflict by war and toward 
its resolution through peaceful means. The 
experienced people gathered in this room 
are not so naive as to expect the smoothing 
out of all differences between peoples and 
between nations. We anticipate that the po- 
tential for conflict will exist as long as men 
and nations have different interests, different 
approaches, different ideals. 

Therefore we must come to grips with the 
paradoxes of peace. As the danger of armed 
conflict between major powers is reduced, the 
potential for economic conflict increases. As 
the possibility of peace grows stronger, some 
of the original ties that first bound our post- 
war alliances together grow weaker. As na- 
tions around the world gain new economic 
strength, the points of commercial contact 
multiply along with the possibilities of dis- 

There is another irony that we should rec- 
ognize on this occasion. With one exception, 
the nations gathered here whose domestic 
economies are growing so strongly today 
can trace much of their postwar grovi^th to 
the expansion of international trade. The one 
exception is the United States — the industrial 
nation with by far the smallest percentage of 
its gross national product in world trade. 

Why, then, is the United States— seem- 
ingly with the least at stake — in the fore- 
front of those working for prompt and 
thoroughgoing reform of the international 
monetary system, with all that will mean for 
the expansion of trade now and in the future? 

One reason, of course, is our national self- 

October 23, 1972 


interest. We want our working men and 
women, our business men and women, to 
have a fair chance to compete for their share 
of the expanding trade between nations. A 
generation ago, at the end of World War II, 
we deliberately set out to help our former 
enemies as well as our weakened allies, so 
that they would inevitably gain the economic 
strength which would enable them to com- 
pete with us in world markets. And now we 
expect our trading partners to help bring 
about equal and fair competition. 

There is another reason, more far-reach- 
ing and fundamental, that motivates the 
United States in pressing for economic and 
monetary reform. 

Working together, we must set in place an 
economic structure that will help and not 
hinder the world's historic movement toward 

We must make certain that international 
commerce becomes a source of stability and 
harmony, rather than a cause of friction and 

Potential conflict must be channeled into 
cooperative competition. That is why the 
structure of the international monetary sys- 
tem and the future system of world trade are 
so central to our concerns today. The time 
has come for action across the entire front 
of international economic problems. Recur- 
ring monetary crises such as we have experi- 
enced all too often in the past decade, unfair 
currency alignments and trading agree- 
ments which put the workers of one nation at 
a disadvantage with workers of another na- 
tion, great disparities in development that 
breed resentment, a monetary system that 
makes no provision for the realities of the 
present and the needs of the future — all 
these not only injure our economies; they also 
create political tensions that subvert the 
cause of peace. 

There must be a thoroughgoing reform of 
the world monetary system to clear the path 
for the healthy economic competition of the 

We must see monetary reform as one part 
of a total reform of international economic 

affaii's encompassing trade and investment 
opportunity for all. 

We must create a realistic code of eco- 
nomic conduct to guide our mutual relations, 
a code which allows governments freedom to 
pursue legitimate domestic objectives but 
which also gives them good reason to abide 
by agreed principles of international be- 

Each nation must exercise the power of 
its example in the realistic and orderly con- 
duct of internal economic affairs so that each 
nation exports its products and not its prob- 

We can all agree that the health of the 
world economy and the stability of the inter- 
national economic system rests largely on the 
successful management of domestic econo- 
mies. The United States recognizes the im- 
portance of a strong, noninflationary domes- 
tic economy both in meeting the needs of our 
own citizens and in contributing to a healthy 
world economy. We are firmly committed to 
reaching our goals in this country of strong 
growth, full employment, price stability. 

We are encouraged by the record of our 
current economic performance. We are now 
experiencing one of the lowest rates of in- 
flation, one of the highest rates of real eco- 
nomic growth, of any industrial nation. 

Recent gains in the productivity and the 
real income of American workers have been 
heartening. We intend to continue the poli- 
cies that have produced those gains. 

We also recognize that over the longer 
term, domestic policies alone cannot solve 
international problems. Even if all countries 
achieved a very large measure of success in 
managing their own economies, strains and 
tensions could arise at points of contact with 
other economies. 

We cannot afi^ord a system that almost 
every year presents a new invitation to a 
monetary crisis in the world. And that is 
why we face the need to develop procedures 
for prompt and orderly adjustment. 

It is very easy for me to use the term 
"prompt and orderly adjustment." And many 
M'ould say that that is a term that only con- 


Department of State Bulletin 

cerns bankers and finance ministers and 
economists. But that phrase "prompt and 
orderly adjustment" in international mone- 
tary matters encompasses the real problems 
of working men and women, the fears and 
hopes of investors and managers of large 
and small businesses; and consequently it is 
the concern of the political leadership of 
every nation represented in this group today. 
No nation should be denied the opportunity 
to adjust nor relieved of the obligation to 

In the negotiations ahead, there will be 
differences of opinion and approaches. You 
saw some of those differences at the Smith- 
sonian not a year ago even. I had the oppor- 
tunity to see them at another level in meet- 
ings with President Pompidou in the Azores, 
with Prime Minister Heath at Bermuda, with 
Chancellor Brandt in Florida, with Prime 
Minister Sato in California, and I know how 
intricate, how difficult, the problems are that 
you will be considering at these meetings. 
Immediate interests inevitably will seem to 
be in conflict, and there will be times when 
impasses develop that may seem impossible 
to resolve. 

But the world has had some experience 
recently with long, hard negotiations, and I 
refer in another field to a long, hard nego- 
tiation — the strategic arms limitation agree- 
ments signed by the Soviet Union and the 
United States early this summer. 

Now, that was bilateral negotiation. It 
involved just two nations, not 124. But its 
complexity, when those negotiations began 
three years or so ago, seemed almost infinite; 
the obstacles had been hardening for over 
25 years; the issue of national security for 
each nation was as sensitive a matter as can 
exist in negotiations between two powers. 

We came to an agreement in Moscow, 
nevertheless, because the issue that united 
us — seeking an end to the wasteful and dan- 
gerous arms race — was greater than the is- 
sues that divided us. 

We reached agreement because we realized 
that it was impossible for either side to ne- 
gotiate an advantage over the other that 

would prevail. The only agreement worth 
making was one in which each side had a 
stake in keeping. 

Now, these two principles can guide us in 
building the monetary system of the future. 

We recognize that the issues that divide 
us are many and they are very serious and 
infinitely complex and difficult. But the im- 
petus that will make this negotiation success- 
ful is the force that unites us all, all the 124 
nations represented here today: That is a 
common need to establish a sound and abid- 
ing foundation for commerce, leading to a 
better way of life for all the citizens of all 
the nations here and all the citizens of the 

That common need — let us call it the world 
interest — demands a new fi-eedom of world 
trade, a new fairness in international eco- 
nomic conduct. 

It is a mark of our maturity that we now 
see that an unfair advantage gained in an 
agreement today only sabotages that agree- 
ment tomorrow. 

I well remember when I was a first-year 
law student, 32 years ago, what the professor 
of contracts said as he opened the course. He 
said, "A contract is only as good as the will 
of the parties to keep it." 

The only system that can work is one that 
each nation has an active interest in making 
work. The need is self-evident. The will to 
reform the monetary system is here in this 
room; and in a proverb that has its countei'- 
part in almost every language here, "Where 
there is a will there is a way." 

We are gathered to create a responsible 
monetary system, responsive to the need for 
stability and openness and responsive to the 
need of each country to reflect its unique 

In this way we bring to bear one of the 
great lessons of federalism: that often the 
best way to enforce an agreed-upon disci- 
pline is to let each member take action to 
adhere to it in the way that is best suited to 
its local character, its stage of development, 
its economic structure. 

For its part, I can assure you, the United 

October 23, 1972 


states will continue to rise to its world re- 
sponsibilities, joining with other nations to 
create and participate in a modern world 
economic order. 

We are secure enough in our independence 
to freely assert our interdependence. 

These are the principles that I profoundly 
believe should and will guide the United 
States in its international economic conduct 
now and in the years ahead. 

We shall press for a more equitable and a 
more open world of trade. We shall meet 
competition rather than run away from it. 

We shall be a stimulating trading partner, 
a straightforward bargainer. 

We shall not turn inward and isolationist. 

In turn we shall look to our friends for evi- 
dence of similar rejection of isolationism in 
economic and political affairs. 

Let us all resolve to look at the ledgers of 
international commerce today with new eyes 
— to see that there is no heroism in a tem- 
porary surplus nor villainy in a temporary 
deficit, but to see that progress is possible 
only in the framework of long-term equilib- 
rium. In this regard we must take bold action 
toward a more equitable and a more open 
world trading order. 

Like every leader of the nations repre- 
sented here, I want to see new jobs created 
all over the world; but I cannot condone the 
export of jobs out of the United States caused 
by any unfairness built into the world's trad- 
ing system. 

Let all nations in the more advanced stages 
of industrial development share the responsi- 
bility of helping those countries whose major 
development lies ahead; and let the great in- 
dustrial nations, in offering that help, in pro- 
viding it, forgo the temptation to use that 
help as an instrument of domination, dis- 
crimination, or rivalry. 

Far more is at stake here than the me- 
chanics of commerce and finance. At stake is 
the chance to add genuine opportunity to the 
lives of people, hundreds of millions of peo- 
ple in all nations, the chance to add stability 
and security to the savings and earnings of 
hundreds of millions of people in all of our 

nations, the chance to add economic muscle 
to the sinews of peace. 

I have spoken this morning in general 
terms about how we can advance our eco- 
nomic interdependence. Later this week Sec- 
retary Shultz will outline a number of pro- 
posals which represent the best thinking of 
my top economic advisers. I commend those 
proposals to you for your careful considera- 

The word "economics," traced to its Greek 
root, means "the law of the house." This 
house we live in — this community of nations 
— needs far better laws to guide our future 
economic conduct. Every nation can prosper 
and benefit working within a modern world 
economic order that it has a stake in pre- 

Now, very little of what is done in these 
negotiations will be widely understood in 
this country or in any of your countries as 
well. And very little of it will be generally 

But history will record the vital nature of 
the challenge before us. I am confident that 
the men and the nations gathered here will 
seize the opportunity to create a monetary 
and trading system that will work for the 
coming generation and will help to shape the 
years ahead into a generation of peace for 
all nations in the world. 


Department of the Treasury press release dated September 26 

The nations gathered here have it in their 
power to strike a new balance in interna- 
tional economic aflfairs. 

The new balance of which I speak does not 
confine itself to the concepts of a balance of 
trade or a balance of payments. The world 
needs a new balance between flexibility and 
stability in its basic approach to doing busi- 
ness. The world needs a new balance between 
a unity of purpose and a diversity of execu- 
tion that will permit nations to cooperate 
closely without losing their individuality or 


Department of State Bulletin 

We lack that balance today. Success in the 
negotiations in which we are engaged will 
be measured in terms of how well we are able 
to achieve that balance in the future. 

I anticipate working closely and inten- 
sively with you to that end, shaping and re- 
shaping the best of our thinking as we pro- 
ceed in full recognition that the legitimate 
requirements of each nation must be meshed 
into a harmonious whole. 

In that spirit, President Nixon has asked 
me to put certain ideas before you. 

In so doing, I must necessarily concentrate 
my remarks today on monetary matters. 
However, I am deeply conscious that in ap- 
proaching this great task of monetary re- 
form we cannot neglect the needs of economic 
development. I am also conscious that the 
success of our development efforts will ulti- 
mately rest in large measure on our ability 
to achieve and maintain a monetary and 
trading environment in which all nations can 
prosper and profit from the flows of goods, 
services, and investment among us. 

The formation of the Committee of 
Twenty, representing the entire membership 
of the Fund, properly reflects and symbolizes 
the fact that we are dealing with issues of 
deep interest to all members and in particu- 
lar that the concerns of developing countries 
will be fully reflected in discussions of the 
reform of the monetary system. 

As we enter into negotiations in that 
group, we have before us the useful report 
of the Executive Directors, identifying and 
clarifying some of the basic issues which 
need to be resolved. 

We also look forward to participation by 
other international organizations, with each 
contributing where it is most qualified to 
help. The challenge before us calls for sub- 
stantial modification of the institutions and 
practices over the entire range of interna- 
tional economic cooperation. 

There have already been stimulating con- 
tributions to our thinking from a wide vari- 
ety of other sources, public and private. I 
have examined with particular care the state- 
ments made over the past few months by 

other Governors individually and the eight 
points which emerged from the deliberations 
of the Finance Ministers of the European 

Principles Underlying Monetary Reform 

Drawing from this interchange of views, 
and building upon the Smithsonian agree- 
ment,i we can now seek a firm consensus for 
new monetary arrangements that will serve 
us all in the decades ahead. Indeed, I believe 
certain principles underlying monetary re- 
form already command widespread support. 

First is our mutual interest in encouraging 
freer trade in goods and services and the flow 
of capital to the places where it can contrib- 
ute most to economic growth. We must avoid 
a breakup of the world into antagonistic 
blocs. We must not seek a refuge from our 
problems behind walls of protectionism. 

The pursuit of the common welfare 
through more open trade is threatened by an 
ancient and recurring fallacy: Surpluses in 
payments are too often regarded as a symbol 
of success and of good management rather 
than as a measure of the goods and services 
provided from a nation's output without cur- 
rent return. 

We must recognize, of course, that freer 
trade must be reconciled with the need for 
each country to avoid abrupt change involv- 
ing serious disruptions of production and 
employment. We must aim to expand pro- 
ductive employment in all countries — and 
not at one another's expense. 

A second fundamental is the need to de- 
velop a common code of conduct to protect 
and strengthen the fabric of a free and open 
international economic order. 

Such basic rules as "no competitive de- 
valuation" and "most-favored-nation treat- 
ment" have served us well, but they and 
others need to be reaffirmed, supplemented, 
and made applicable to today's conditions. 
Without such rules to guide us, close and 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1972, 
p. 32. 

October 23, 1972 


fruitful cooperation on a day-to-day basis 
would not be possible. 

Third, in shaping these rules we must rec- 
ognize the need for clear disciplines and 
standards of behavior to guide the interna- 
tional adjustment process — a crucial gap in 
the Bretton Woods system. Amid the debate 
about the contributing causes of past imbal- 
ances and the responsibility for initiative 
toward correction, sight has too often been 
lost of the fact that adjustment is inherently 
a two-sided process — that for the world as a 
whole, every surplus is matched by a deficit. 

Resistance of surplus countries to loss of 
their surpluses defeats the objective of mone- 
tary order as surely as failure of deficit coun- 
tries to attack the source of their deficits. 
Any effort to develop a balanced and equi- 
table monetary system must recognize that 
simple fact; effective and symmetrical incen- 
tives for adjustment are essential to a lasting 

Fourth, while insisting on the need for ad- 
justment, we can and should leave consider- 
able flexibility to national governments in 
their choice among adjustment instruments. 
In a diverse world, equal responsibility and 
equal opportunity need not mean rigid uni- 
formity in particular practices. But they do 
mean a common commitment to agreed inter- 
national objectives. The belief is widespread 
— and we share it — that the exchange rate 
system must be more flexible. However, im- 
portant as they are, exchange rates are not 
the only instrument of adjustment policy 
available; nor in specific instances will they 
necessarily be the most desirable. 

Fifth, our monetary and trading systems 
are an interrelated complex. As we seek to 
reform monetary rules, we must at the same 
time seek to build in incentives for trade lib- 
eralization. Certainly, as we look ahead, ways 
must be found to integrate better the work of 
the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] and the IMF. Simultaneously we 
should insure that there are pressures which 
move us toward adequate development as- 
sistance and away from controls which stifle 
the free flow of investment. 

Finally, and perhaps most fundamental, 
any stable and well-functioning international 
monetary system must rest upon sound poli- 
cies to promote domestic growth and price 
stability in the major countries. These are 
imperative national goals for my government 
— and for yours. And no matter how well we 
design an international system, its prospects 
for survival will be doubtful without effective 
discharge of those responsibilities. 

Toward a Workable International Agreement 

Today is not the occasion for presenting a 
detailed blueprint for monetary reform. 
However, I do want to supplement these gen- 
eral principles with certain specific and 
interrelated ideas as to how to embody these 
principles in a workable international agree- 

These suggestions are designed to provide 
stability without rigidity. They take as a 
point of departure that most countries will 
want to operate within the framework of 
specified exchange rates. They would en- 
courage these rates to be maintained within 
specified ranges so long as this is accom- 
plished without distorting the fabric of trade 
and payments or domestic economic manage- 
ment. We aim to encourage freer flows of 
trade and capital while minimizing distor- 
tions from destabilizing flows of mobile capi- 
tal. We would strengthen the voice of the 
international community operating through 
the IMF. 

I shall organize these ideas under six head- 
ings, recognizing that much work remains to 
be done to determine the best techniques in 
each area: the exchange rate regime; the re- 
serve mechanism; the balance of payments 
adjustment process; capital and other bal- 
ance of payments controls; related negotia- 
tions; institutional implications. 

1. The Exchange Rate Regime 

We recognize that most countries want to 
maintain a fixed point of reference for their 
currencies; in other words, a "central" or 
"par" value. The corollary is a willingness to 


Department of State Bulletin 

maintain and support these values by assur- 
ing convertibility of their currencies into 
other international assets. 

A margin for fluctuation for market ex- 
change rates around such central values will 
need to be provided sufficiently wide to 
dampen incentives for short-term capital 
movements and, when changes in central 
values are desirable, to ease the transition. 
The Smithsonian agreement took a major 
step in that direction. Building on that ap- 
proach in the context of a symmetrical sys- 
tem, the permissible outer limits of these 
margins of fluctuation for all currencies — 
including the dollar — might be set in the 
same range as now permitted for nondollar 
currencies trading against each other. 

We also visualize, for example, that coun- 
tries in the process of forming a monetary 
union — with the higher degree of political 
and economic integration that that implies — 
may want to maintain narrower bands among 
themselves and should be allowed to do so. 
In addition, an individual nation, particu- 
larly in the developing world, may wish to 
seek the agreement of a principal trading 
partner to maintain a narrower range of 
exchange rate fluctuation between them. 

Provision needs also to be made for coun- 
tries which decide to float their currencies. 
However, a country that refrains from set- 
ting a central value, particularly beyond a 
brief transitional period, should be required 
to observe more stringent standards of be- 
havior in other respects to assure the con- 
sistency of its actions with the basic require- 
ments of a cooperative order. 

2. The Reserve Mechanism 

We contemplate that the SDR [special 
drawing rights] would increase in impor- 
tance and become the formal numeraire of 
the system. To facilitate its role, that instru- 
ment should be freed of those encumbrances 
of reconstitution obligations, designation 
procedures, and holding limits which would 
be unnecessary in a reformed system. 
Changes in the amount of SDR in the system 
as a whole will be required periodically to 

meet the aggregate need for reserves. 

A "central value system" implies some 
fluctuation in official reserve holdings of in- 
dividual countries to meet temporary dis- 
turbances in their balance of payments posi- 
tions. In addition, countries should ordinarily 
remain free to borrow or lend, bilaterally or 
multilaterally, through the IMF or otherwise. 

At the same time, official foreign currency 
holdings need be neither generally banned 
nor encouraged. Some countries may find 
holdings of foreign currencies provide a 
useful margin of flexibility in reserve man- 
agement, and fluctuations in such holdings 
can provide some elasticity for the system as 
a whole in meeting sudden flows of volatile 
capital. However, careful study should be 
given to proposals for exchanging part of 
existing reserve currency holdings into a 
special issue of SDR, at the option of the 

The suggested provisions for central val- 
ues and convertibility do not imply restoi-a- 
tion of a gold-based system. The rigidities of 
such a system, subject to the uncertainties 
of gold production, speculation, and demand 
for industrial uses, cannot meet the needs of 

I do not expect governmental holdings of 
gold to disappear overnight. I do believe 
orderly procedures are available to facilitate 
a diminishing role of gold in international 
monetary aflfairs in the future. 

3. The Balance of Payments Adjustment 

In a system of convertibility and central 
values, an effective balance of payments ad- 
justment process is inextricably linked to 
appropriate criteria for changes in central 
values and the appropriate level, trend, and 
distribution of reserves. Agreement on these 
matters, and on other elements of an effec- 
tive and timely adjustment process, is essen- 
tial to make a system both practical and 

There is, of course, usually a very close 
relationship between imbalances in payments 
and fluctuations in reserve positions. Coun- 

October 23, 1972 


tries experiencing large deterioration in 
their reserve positions generally have had to 
devalue their currencies or take other meas- 
ures to strengthen their balance of pay- 
ments. Surplus countries with dispropor- 
tionate reserve gains have, how^ever, been 
under much less pressure to revalue their 
currencies upward or to take other policy 
actions with a similar balance of payments 
effect. If the adjustment process is to be 
more effective and efficient in a reformed 
system, this asymmetry will need to be cor- 

I believe the most promising approach 
would be to insure that a surfeit of reserves 
indicates, and produces pressure for, ad- 
justment on the surplus side, as losses of re- 
serves already do for the deficit side. Sup- 
plementary guides and several technical 
approaches may be feasible and should be 
examined. Important transitional difficulties 
will need to be overcome. But, in essence, I 
believe disproportionate gains or losses in 
reserves may be the most equitable and effec- 
tive single indicator we have to guide the 
adjustment process. 

As I have already indicated, a variety of 
policy responses to affect the balance of pay- 
ments can be contemplated. An individual 
country finding its reserves falling dispro- 
portionately would be expected to initiate 
corrective actions. For example, small de- 
valuations would be freely permitted such a 
country. Under appropriate international 
surveillance, at some point a country would 
have a prima facie case for a larger devalu- 

While we must frankly face up to limita- 
tion on the use of domestic monetary, fiscal, 
or other internal policies in promoting inter- 
national adjustments in some circumstances, 
we should also recognize that the country in 
deficit might well prefer — and be in a posi- 
tion to apply — stricter internal financial dis- 
ciplines rather than devalue its currency. 
Only in exceptional circumstances, and for 
a limited period, should a country be per- 
mitted direct restraints; and these should be 
general and nondiscriminatory. Persistent 

refusal to take fundamental adjustment 
measures could result in withdrawal of bor- 
rowing, SDR allocation, or other privileges. 

Conversely, a country permitting its re- 
serves to rise disproportionately could lose 
its right to demand conversion, unless it 
undertook at least limited revaluation or 
other acceptable measures of adjustment. If 
reserves nonetheless continued to rise and 
were maintained at those higher levels over 
an extended period, then more forceful ad- 
justment measures would be indicated. 

For a surplus as for a deficit country, a 
change in the exchange rate need not be the 
only measure contemplated. Increasing the 
provision of concessionary aid on an untied 
basis, reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers, and elimination of obstacles to 
outward investment could, in specific cir- 
cumstances at the option of the nation con- 
cerned, provide supplementary or alternative 
means. But in the absence of a truly effec- 
tive combination of corrective measures, 
other countries should ultimately be free to 
protect their interests by a surcharge on the 
imports from the chronic surplus country. 

For countries moving toward a monetary 
union, the guidelines might be applied on a 
collective basis, provided the countries were 
willing to speak with one voice and to be 
treated as a unit for purposes of applying 
the basic rules of the international monetary 
and trading system. 

4. Capital and Other Balance of Payments 

It is implicit in what I have said that I 
believe that the adjustment process should 
be directed toward encouraging freer trade 
and open capital markets. If trade controls 
are permitted temporarily in extreme cases 
on balance of payments grounds, they should 
be in the form of surcharges or across-the- 
board taxes. Controls on capital flows should 
not be allowed to become a means of main- 
taining a chronically undervalued currency. 
No country should be forced to use controls 
in lieu of other, more basic, adjustment 


Department of State Bulletin 

5. Related Negotiations 

We welcome the commitments which 
major nations have already made to start 
detailed trade negotiations under the GATT 
in the coming year. These negotiations deal- 
ing with specific products and specific re- 
straints need not wait on monetary reform, 
nor need monetary reform await the results 
of specific trade negotiations. 

Those negotiations, and the development 
of rules of good behavior in the strictly 
monetary area, need to be supplemented by 
negotiations to achieve greater equity and 
uniformity with respect to the use of sub- 
sidies, and fiscal or administrative pressures 
on trade and investment transactions. Im- 
proper practices in these ai'eas distort trade 
and investment relationships as surely as do 
trade barriers and currency disequilibrium. 
In some instances, such as the use of tariff 
surcharges or capital controls for balance of 
payments purposes, the linkage is so close 
that the Committee of Twenty must deal 
with the matter directly. As a supplement 
to its work, that group can help launch 
serious efforts in other bodies to harmonize 
countries' practices with respect to the taxa- 
tion of international trade and investment, 
the granting of export credit, and the sub- 
sidization of international investment flows. 

6. Institutional Implications 

As I look to the future, it seems to me that 
there are several clear-cut institutional re- 
quirements of a sensible reform of the mone- 
tary and trading system. 

Several times today I have stressed the 
need for a comprehensive new set of mone- 
tary rules. Those rules will need to be placed 
under guardianship of the IMF, which must 
be prepared to assume an even more critical 
role in the world economy. 

Given the interrelationships between trade 
and payments, that role will not be effectively 
discharged without harmonizing the rules of 
the IMF and the GATT and achieving a 
close working relationship. 

Finally, we need to recognize that we are 
inevitably dealing with matters of essential 

and sensitive national interest to specific 
countries. International decisionmaking will 
not be credible or effective unless it is carried 
out by representatives who clearly carry a 
high stature and influence in the councils of 
their own governments. Our international 
institutions will need to reflect that reality 
so that in the years ahead national govern- 
ments will be intensively and continuously 
involved in their deliberations and processes. 
Without a commitment by national govern- 
ments to make a new system work in this 
way, all our other labors may come to 

Cooperation for Equilibrium 

I am fully aware that the United States as 
well as other countries cannot leap into new 
monetary and trading arrangements without 
a transitional period. I can state, however, 
that after such transitional period the United 
States would be prepared to undertake an 
obligation to convert official foreign dollar 
holdings into other reserve assets as a part 
of a satisfactory system such as I have sug- 
gested — a system assuring effective and 
equitable operation of the adjustment proc- 
ess. That decision will of course need to rest 
on our reaching a demonstrated capacity 
during the transitional period to meet the 
obligation in terms of our reserve and bal- 
ance of payments position. 

We fully recognize that we have not yet 
reached the strength we need in our external 
accounts. In the end, there can be no substi- 
tute for such strength in providing the 
underpinning for a stable dollar and a stable 
monetary system. 

An acceptable monetary system requires a 
willingness on the part of all of us to con- 
tribute to the common goal of full inter- 
national equilibrium. Lacking such equilib- 
rium, no system will work. The equilibrium 
cannot be achieved by any one country acting 

We engage in discussions on trade and 
financial matters with a full realization of 
the necessity to continue our own efforts on 
a broad front to restore our balance of pay- 

October 23, 1972 


ments. I must add, in all candor, that our 
efforts to improve our position have in more 
than one instance been thwarted by the re- 
luctance of others to give up an unjustified 
preferential and highly protected market po- 
sition. Yet without success in our endeavor, 
we cannot maintain our desired share in the 
provision of aid and reduce our official debt 
to foreign monetary authorities. 

We take considerable pride in our progress 
toward price stability, improved productiv- 
ity, and more rapid growth during the past 
year. Sustained into the future, as it must 
be, that record will be the best possible medi- 
cine not only for our domestic prosperity but 
for the effective functioning of the inter- 
national financial system. 

My remarks today reflect the large agenda 
before us. I have raised difficult, complicated, 
and controversial issues. I did not shrink 
from so doing, for a simple reason: I know 
that you, as we, want to move ahead on the 
great task before us. 

Let us see if, in Nairobi next year, we can 
say that a new balance is in prospect and 
that the main outlines of a new system are 
agreed. We owe ourselves and each other 
that effort. 

President Signs Joint Resolution 
on Offensive Arms Agreement 

Folloiving are remarks made by President 
Nixon on September 30 upon signing House 
Joint Resolution 1227 approving the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Interim Agreement on Certain 
Measures With Respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Arms.^ 

White House press release dated September 30 

Gentlemen: We are gathered here, as you 
know, for the signing of the executive agree- 
ment. I would like to repeat something that 
I said in the White House to this group of 
leaders when I returned from the trip to 

I pointed out both in my statement to the 

Congress and also to the Members of the 
Congress, both House and Senate, who had to 
consider this agreement, that we considered 
this a cooperative venture and we wanted the 
Congress to examine the agreement and to 
reach a conclusion, independently of the ex- 
ecutive, that they were in the interest of the 
United States. 

The Congress has now so acted. Its debate 
has, in both the Senate and the House, served 
to inform the American people of the con- 
tents of the agreement and also what its im- 
plications are. 

I think what is particularly pleasing — 
pleasing in the sense of how our system 
works — is that this agreement has had bi- 
partisan support in the fullest sense. Demo- 
crats and Republicans have joined together 
in debating it and criticizing where they felt 
there was room to criticize and finally in vot- 
ing for it in the form that it has now reached 
the desk here and as I will sign it. 

We have asked you to come to this room 
because we do feel this agreement is one 
that has a very special significance. All of 
you who have been here many times before 
know that it was the Cabinet Room from the 
period of Abraham Lincoln up until 1902, 
when the West Wing was completed. But it is 
now known as the Treaty Room because the 
war between Spain and the United States, as 
you know, was ended by a treaty signed in 
this room. 

I would simply say, in that connection, this 
is not a treaty which ends a war. This is not 
an agreement which guarantees that there 
will be no war. But what this is is the begin- 
ning of a process that is enormously impor- 
tant that will limit now and, we hope, later 
reduce the burden of arms and thereby re- 
duce the danger of war. We think, therefore, 
it deserves this kind of attendance by the 
leaders of the Congress, the administration, 
the Armed Forces, and it deserves also being 
signed in this room. 

' For text of the interim agreement, see Bulletin 
of June 26, 1972, p. 920; as enacted, the joint resolu- 
tion is Public Law 92-448. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements 
Enter Into Force 

At a White House ceremony on October 3, 
instruments of ratification of the ABM 
Treaty were exchanged as well as letters 
signed by President Nixon and Nikolai V. 
Podgorny, Chairmati of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., accepting 
the interim agreement on strategic offensive 
arms.^ Following are remarks made by Presi- 
dent Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister An- 
drei A. Gromyko at the ceremony and the 
text of President Nixon's letter dated October 
2 to Chairman Podgorny. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 9 

Foreign Minister Gromyko ^ 

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary of State, 
ladies and gentlemen: The treaty and the in- 
terim agreement on questions of strategic 
arms limitation which were signed in Moscow 
by you, Mr. President, and by the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid 
Brezhnev, and which are today coming into 
force will go down in history as a significant 
achievement in restraining the arms race. 

This is how the significance of this event 
is evaluated by world public opinion. The 
Soviet Union attaches great importance to 
these accords which are a continuation of the 
process initiated by the conclusion of the 
Moscow Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and 
other important agreements limiting the 
arms race in the world. 

The Soviet people firmly intend to go on 
implementing the peace program approved 

'For texts of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the 
Interim Agreement With Respect to the Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms, see Bulletin of June 
26, 1972, p. 918. 

^ The Foreign Minister spoke in Russian. 

by the 24th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. We are confident 
that the question on the nonuse of force in 
international relations and on the permanent 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, 
which we have submitted for consideration 
by the current session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, is also of signal impor- 
tance for the cause of peace. 

The treaty and the interim agreement en- 
tering into force today are based on recogni- 
tion of the principle of the equal security of 
the parties, and they offer no one any uni- 
lateral military advantages. At the same 
time, these accords meet not only the inter- 
ests of our two nations but also the interests 
of international security as a whole and the 
interests of all nations, because security and 
peace are their common goal. 

Practical steps to limit rocket nuclear ar- 
maments rightfully hold an important place 
among the very real political changes taking 
place in relations between our two countries, 
and this signifies a success for the policy of 
peaceful coexistence, and it has a positive 
effect on the entire international situation as 
a whole. 

For the first time since the Second World 
War, agreements are coming into force aimed 
at slowing down the race in the most destruc- 
tive types of armaments, but any treaty and 
any agreement can have a genuine historic 
significance only when the principles and the 
intentions proclaimed in them become the 
content of the practical activity of states and 
lead to further important achievements in 
that direction. 

The Soviet Union is fully resolved, for its 
part, to do all that is necessary to that end. 

Today when these important documents 
are entering into force, it should be noted 
that in accordance with the understanding 
achieved between our two countries negotia- 
tions will be continued with a view to deepen- 
ing and broadening agreements to limit stra- 
tegic arms. 

As is evidenced by the treaty and the in- 
terim agreement entering into force today, 
vigorous efforts aimed at removing the threat 

October 23, 1972 


of war and at disarmament do yield their 
concrete positive results. 

We are convinced that the interests of the 
Soviet and American peoples and the inter- 
ests of the peoples of all the countries of the 
world demand that efforts to limit the arms 
race should continue unabated. 

Thank you. 

President Nixon 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Secretary of State, members of the Cab- 
inet, Members of the Congress, and all of our 
distinguished guests: As has already been in- 
dicated, the documents we have signed today 
place into force the first limitation on offen- 
sive and defensive nuclear arms ever entered 
into, and particularly it is important that 
this limitation is entered into between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of 

On this particular occasion, I would like to 
pay a personal tribute to and express the 
thanks of the Nation to the Members of the 
House and the Senate who, in a bipartisan 
manner, gave approval and support to these 
historic agreements. 

Also, I would like to pay tribute to and 
express personal appreciation to the scores 
of people in both governments who are not 
seated here at the table but who worked with 
those at the table in working out the details 
of these agreements and their substance over 
almost three years. 

It would not be fair to mention the names 
of all of them, or even a few, but I am sure 
that everyone would appreciate the fact that 
I would say that one name particularly comes 
to mind today, a former Ambassador from 
the United States to the Soviet Union who 
also served with Ambassador [Gerard] 
Smith on the delegation to SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] from the United 
States, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson. It 
can truly be said of him, as it can be said of 
so many others who have worked in this 
field, that he gave his life to the cause of 

On this occasion we recognize that these 

agreements mean the first step in limiting the 
burden of nuclear arms as far as our two na- 
tions are concerned. Also, these agreements 
mean a first step in reducing the danger of 
war in the world and increasing the chances 
of peace. 

I have used the term "first step" quite de- 
liberately, because while these agreements 
have enormous significance in the ban on de- 
fensive nuclear weapons beyond the points 
that are covered in the agreement and in the 
treaty, an enormous significance in terms of 
the limitation of certain offensive categories, 
there remains a significant number of cate- 
gories in the nuclear field that are not cov- 
ered, and that is why I share the views that 
have been expressed by Foreign Minister 
Gromyko that we must now move from this 
first step to the vitally important next step in 
which we consider the whole range of offen- 
sive nuclear weapons and try to find agree- 
ment between our two nations in that field. 

And then beyond, after that step is taken, 
we can look to the possibility of reducing the 
burden of nuclear arms and eventually to the 
possibility of limitations and restrictions on 
the use of such arms. 

What we are in effect witnessing today 
then is, we believe, the beginning of a great 
historical process in which we have learned 
by working out these agreements, following 
as they do the Nonproliferation Treaty and 
the Test Ban Treaty, that we have found the 
way to make progress in other fields which 
can eventually lead to the goal that we all 
want: a world that is much safer and par- 
ticularly a world that may possibly be free 
from the enormous danger of a nuclear dis- 

I think all of us are quite aware of the fact 
that the signing of these documents today, 
the signing of the documents that occurred 
earlier this year in the Kremlin, raise the 
hopes of all the people of the world for a 
dream of mankind from the beginning of 
civilization: a world of peace, a world in 
which peoples with different governments 
and different philosophies could live in peace 

We believe that we have contributed to 


Department of State Bulletin 

that cause and to the reahzation of that 
dream, and as we take this first step, we look 
forward to working together in taking the 
next steps; we look forward particularly in 
being worthy of the hopes of the people of 
the world, and we can be worthy of those 
hopes if our two great nations can move 
together, not only to limit the burden of arms 
on ourselves but to lift the burden of fear of 
war from all of the people of the world. 


White House press release dated October 3 

October 2, 1972. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to in- 
form you that the United States of America 
accepts the Interim Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Meas- 
ures with Respect to the Limitation of Stra- 
tegic Offensive Arms, and the Protocol 
thereto, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972. 

Richard Nixon. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Ja- 
maica, Douglas Valmore Fletcher, presented 
his credentials to President Nixon on Oc- 
tober 2. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated October 2. 

Malagasy Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Malagasy Republic, Henri Raharijaona, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
October 2. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated Octo- 
ber 2. 

New Zealand 

The newly appointed Ambassador of New 
Zealand, Lloyd White, presented his creden- 
tials to President Nixon on October 2. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State 
press release dated October 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Niger, Abdoulaye Diallo, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
October 2. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated October 2. 

Sierra Leone 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone, Philip Jonathan 
Gbagu Palmer, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on October 2. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated October 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Paul L. 
Bomani, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Nixon on October 2. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated October 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Thai- 
land, Anand Panyarachun, presented his 
credentials to President Nixon on October 
2. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department 
of State press release dated October 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Zaire, Lombo Lo Mangamanga, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 
on October 2. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated Oc- 
tober 2. 

October 23, 1972 


From Containment to Engagement 

Address by Secretary Rogers 

When the Council on Foreign Relations 
was founded 50 years ago, the United States 
had just emerged from a World War which 
had changed the entire climate of interna- 
tional affairs. It was a time of profound 
challenge for American foreign policy. It re- 
sulted in profound failure. 

We proceeded on the premise that we had 
little at stake in international matters. We 
reduced our military strength to a minimum. 
We attempted to build a protectionist wall 
around our economy. We viewed the world 
from a distance. But in isolating ourselves 
from international responsibilities we did 
not isolate ourselves from world depression 
and world war. 

In 1947, when the Council on Foreign Re- 
lations marked its 25th anniversary, the 
United States had just emerged from the 
Second World War. That war also brought 
sweeping change. This time we were deter- 
mined to avoid the mistakes of the past. We 
were prepared to build a new international 
order based on involvement and mutual 

We accepted the role of leadership in the 
free world. We embarked on major pro- 
grams of rehabilitation and reconstruction 
of the war-damaged areas of the world, with 
former adversaries as well as with friends. 
We entered into a far-reaching alliance sys- 
tem, joining in mutual security obligations 
with 42 nations. These alliances, I firmly 
believe, have helped in preventing a third 
world war. 

' Made before the Council on Foreign Relations at 
New York, N.Y., on Sept. 28 (press release 249 
dated Sept. 29). 

On this 50th anniversary of the council, 
the United States is again emerging from a 
conflict abroad — a long and frustrating war 
in Southeast Asia. Moi'eover, we are in a 
period of transition in foreign affairs, hold- 
ing out future prospects for greater world 

This period of transition is marked by a 
new and quite different world. The United 
States, the Soviet Union, the European Com- 
munity, Japan, and the People's Republic of 
China are playing leading roles, and other 
nations are also becoming increasingly im- 
portant on the world stage. 

This multipolar world is experiencing enor- 
mous change. The enlargement of the Euro- 
pean Community, the rivalry between the 
two principal nations in the Communist 
world, the dramatic economic and social de- 
velopment of Japan and Germany, and in 
this country a tendency in some quarters to 
turn inward — these and many other factors 
contribute to a changing international pat- 

When he took office President Nixon saw 
that a policy which had evolved in a bipolar 
world had to be altered to meet the new 
conditions. A new approach was needed. It 
would require unprecedented initiatives in 
our relationships with former adversaries. 
And it would require strength and a contin- 
uing fidelity to our commitments to friends 
and allies. 

In the first months of the Nixon adminis- 
tration we set forth our general policies: to 
enter an era of negotiation, to improve our 
relations with all countries where possible, 
and to reduce our military presence in the 


Department of State Bulletin 

world without adversely affecting the secu- 
rity of any area. 

I ask you : How many of us could have 
foreseen in 1969 what would happen as a 
result of these policies? 

— An American President visited Peking 
after more than 20 years of hostility and 
separation. As a result, we have set up reg- 
ular channels of communication and ex- 
changes and are steadily improving our rela- 
tions with the People's Republic of China. 

— An American President visited Moscow 
for the first time. This resulted in an agree- 
ment on limitation of strategic arms and a 
wide range of cooperative endeavors unprec- 
edented in our relationship with the Soviet 

— In the Middle East, which v/as beset by 
violence in 1969, there is a cease-fire which 
resulted from an initiative taken by the 
United States 26 months ago. 

— In 1969 Berlin was still a flashpoint of 
East- West tensions. Today, as a result of an 
agreement in which the United States was 
actively involved, the tensions have been re- 
duced and the people of West Berlin, for the 
first time since the wall went up in 1961, can 
make regular visits to friends and relatives 
in East Berlin and East Germany. 

Since becoming Secretary of State I have 
traveled to 52 countries and conferred with 
over 300 different heads of state. Prime Min- 
isters, and Foreign Ministers. I am firmly 
convinced that America's policies in the 
world have never been better understood and 

President Nixon has brought us out of a 
period of confrontation into an era of nego- 
tiation. We are moving from a policy once 
characterized primarily by containment into 
a policy characterized by engagement. 

In achieving this fundamental transforma- 
tion of policy we have pursued several dis- 
tinct but related objectives. 

First, we have sought to encourage govern- 
ments — friendly or unfriendly, partners or 
competitors — to talk to each other. 

During the cold war period the conven- 
tional wisdom was that because of funda- 

mental differences between adversaries they 
could not talk. We have proceeded from the 
opposite belief : that because we have impor- 
tant differences we must talk. Our foreign 
policy therefore is based on the conviction 
that communication between strangers — and 
negotiation between adversaries — serves the 
cause of a more tranquil world. 

That is why we place such importance on 
our expanding relations with the Soviet 
Union and on our new relationship with 

U.S.-Chinese trade, $5 million last year, 
should exceed $100 million this year. This 
weekend a 22-man group from the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors will arrive in 
Peking. And a 15-member Chinese medical 
group will arrive in Washington in two 

Throughout the world, governments are 
talking to each other to a degree perhaps 
unknown since the war. Even in areas of 
tension or violence talks are in progress. 

— The Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic have 
opened negotiations on a treaty to normalize 
their relations. 

— North and South Korea have begun, and 
are now intensifying, talks on the plight of 
divided families and have agreed to establish 
a joint committee to examine problems of 

— Pakistan and India, in the immediate 
aftermath of their third war in a generation, 
have entered into the important Simla agree- 
ment providing for the withdrawal of mili- 
tary forces. 

— This week a Japanese Prime Minister 
has visited China; and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations seems only a matter of 

We welcome this process in all parts of the 
world and are glad to have contributed to it 
by example and encouragement. 

The Middle East, tragically, remains an 
exception. At the time of the brutal assas- 
sinations in Munich the climate for a settle- 
ment was improving. However, those kill- 
ings have set off deplorable patterns of 

October 23, 1972 


action and counteraction and have seriously 
clouded prospects of early progress. Never- 
theless, from diplomatic contacts we have 
had with both sides, we are convinced that 
the forces favoring a peaceful settlement 
still have the upper hand. 

The "no war, no peace" situation in the 
area serves nobody's interest. For this rea- 
son this administration is determined to do 
all it can to bring about the negotiations 
between the parties which are the key to 
peace — a peace based on the November 1967 
Security Council resolution. With adversar- 
ies throughout the world now talking to each 
other, there is no good reason why differ- 
ences in the Middle East should be an excep- 
tion. Momentum toward a settlement must 
be regained, and we remain available to play 
a helpful role. 

Let me say a word about Viet-Nam. Our 
resolve to end the war has been backed up by 
President Nixon's proposals for a cease-fire 
in Indochina internationally supervised; an 
exchange of all prisoners of war ; and a total 
withdrawal of American forces — leaving the 
political future of Viet-Nam to be worked 
out by the Vietnamese themselves. Such an 
approach would bring a negotiated peace fair 
to both sides. I can assure you we are pur- 
suing negotiations seriously with that end in 

A second basic objective of our policy is 
to create an international atmosphere more 
open to the free flow of peoples and ideas 
and of goods and capital. 

In a Europe which still bears the scars of 
its postwar division, the need to overcome the 
barriers that divide the continent is com- 
pelling. A Conference on Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe, drawing together Foreign 
Ministers from more than 30 countries, will 
have a unique opportunity to take concrete 
steps to promote more normal relationships 
among Europe's nations. 

There is also need for the world to move 
toward a new and freer international eco- 
nomic system as political and military com- 
petition diminish. International economic 
relations are assuming a new importance in 
the future foreign policy of the United States. 

No aspect of U.S. policy will present a 
greater challenge to our diplomatic ingenuity 
over the next decade. Because I am so firmly 
convinced of this, we have been making spe- 
cial efl'orts to insure that our diplomacy will 
be equal to that challenge. 

A third objective of our policy is to pro- 
mote a reduction in reliance on force as a 
viable instrument of national policies. 

The SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] agreements are a major step toward 
that objective. In the next round we intend 
to explore the reduction of offensive weap- 
ons and qualitative as well as more perma- 
nent quantitative limitations. Equally impor- 
tant is the opportunity the SALT framework 
provides us to conduct a regular ex- 
change of views on strategic matters. Frank 
exchanges could head oflf the action-and- 
reaction cycles which in the past have threat- 
ened the strategic equilibrium that both sides 
are now committed to seek. 

Our fourth major objective is to insure 
that the United States has adequate military 
strength. Our policy is not one of military 
supremacy, but it is one of military suffi- 
ciency. It is that sufficiency that has made it 
possible for us to negotiate in confidence. 

Our purpose is to maintain a defense pos- 
ture that is neither excessive nor provocative 
and to keep our defense budget as low as we 
can consistent with our national security. 
This I believe we have done. 

— The defense budget today consumes the 
smallest share of our gross national product 
— less than 7 percent — of any budget since 

— In 1969 there were 3.5 million in our 
armed forces; today there are 2.3 million. 
The civilian employees of the Department of 
Defense have been reduced by over 250,000. 

— In 1969 we had 900 commissioned ships; 
today we have 600. We had 23 aircraft car- 
riers; today we have 16. We had 144 tactical 
Air Force squadrons; today we have 103. 

In my opinion further major reductions 
would be dangerous to our national security 
and our national interest. 

Sharp cuts would deeply affect our general 


Department of State Bulletin 

purpose forces, whose combat size has 
ah'eady been substantially reduced. We 
would be forced back to a strategy of reliance 
on nuclear weapons. The flexibility of our 
forces to deal with smaller conflicts would be 
severely curtailed. I believe no American 
President should be put in that position. 

There have been suggestions that we could 
substantially reduce our forces in Asia even 
further and cut our forces in Europe by 
more than half. Such actions would seriously 
shake the confidence of our allies in both Asia 
and Europe. Such actions would seriously 
undermine our foreign policy and endanger 
the peace and security of the world. 

We are on the way to better relations with 
the Communist world. To weaken our de- 
fense posture now, to be forced to fall back 
on a reliance on nuclear weapons, would be a 
mistake of major proportions. 

The world we have left was a world char- 
acterized principally by containment. The 
world we are entering should be a world 
characterized more by engagement: 

— Engagement across lines of ideology to 
build a more stable international order. 

— Engagement to insure that international 
economic competition is both fair and produc- 

— Engagement for the United States, be- 
cause we must continue to play a leading role 
in international aff'airs. 

— Engagement in military strength with 
our friends and allies to continue the sta- 
bility so necessary as we negotiate to reduce 
tension in the world. 

— Engagement with other countries, de- 
veloped and less developed, to improve the 
quality of life in this interdependent world. 

This is the kind of engagement President 
Nixon had in mind when he spoke of build- 
ing "a structure of peace to which all nations 
contribute and in which all nations have a 
stake." 2 

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in 
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; part I, "1971— The 
Watershed Year — An Overview," begins on p. 314. 

The distinguished work of this council for 
a half century testifies to its conviction that 
the United States must play an impoi'tant 
role in the world. Today the character of 
that role is changing, but the need for it is 
not. I hope that during its next half century 
this organization will continue to be in the 
forefront of those who advocate a creative 
and constructive engagement of the United 
States in world affairs. 

162d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Ambassa- 
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, at the 162d plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on October 5. 

Press release 251 dated October 5 

Ladies and gentlemen: The complexity of 
the Viet-Nam conflict is recognized by most 
expert observers, however else their views 
may vary. Neither the situation nor its reso- 
lution has any need of additional complica- 
tions. Unfortunately, the September 11 dec- 
laration by your side's Viet Cong component 
does little, if anything, to facilitate matters. 
On the contrary, aside from its numerous 
objectionable features which we have dis- 
cussed in past sessions, the Viet Cong dec- 
laration compounds the difficulties by propos- 
ing an arbitrary, illogical formula and by 
failing to address some of the most important 
practical considerations. Indeed, your side 
has been unable to explain or interpret these 
proposals or to relate them to the funda- 
mental requirements of the situation. 

The restoration of peace is the most funda- 
mental of these requirements. In short, the 
killing must be brought to an end. There is 
no more eflFective, more rapid way to do so 
than through an Indochina-wide cease-fire 
under international supervision. We are 
ready to begin negotiations at once so that 
a cease-fire may be established as soon as 
possible. If you would give higher priority to 

October 23, 1972 


terminating the hostilities than to obtaining 
satisfaction of all your demands, there is no 
reason why we could not complete negotia- 
tions for a cease-fire rapidly. 

An internationally supervised cease-fire 
throughout Indochina would set in train the 
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Viet-Nam. Within four months from the date 
by which the cease-fire will have been insti- 
tuted and American prisoners of war re- 
turned, there will no longer be any American 
military presence in South Viet-Nam, and 
American air and naval actions against the 
North would have ended with the cease-fire. 

Please bear in mind that if you had re- 
sponded positively to our proposals an- 
nounced by President Nixon on May 8, the 
cease-fire, prisoner return, and complete 
American withdrawal could have taken place 
by now.i By failing to do so, you have de- 
prived yourselves of a significant and mu- 
tually advantageous opportunity to restore 
peace. That opportunity is still available to 
you, if you will undertake serious negotia- 
tions with us concerning these steps toward 

What would ensue thereafter would de- 
pend upon the free exercise of self-determi- 
nation by the South Vietnamese people, not 
upon the fortunes of war. The most appro- 
priate modalities for the expression of the 
people's will could be decided by the Viet- 
namese parties themselves, through discus- 
sions unhindered by any predetermined 

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 

solutions or outbreaks of warfare. This would 
make possible a peaceful resolution of polit- 
ical issues within South Viet-Nam, and be- 
tween North and South Viet-Nam as well. 

If you wish to deal with political realities 
instead of abstract theories, you should ac- 
cept the longstanding ofl^er of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam to discuss 
political questions with you. This is yet 
another opportunity for a peaceful settle- 
ment which you have spurned but which re- 
mains open to you. Prove your avowed "flex- 
ibility" and "good will" by what you do now, 
not by what you say you might do if all your 
preconditions were fulfilled. 

In sum, we are trying to persuade you to 
acknowledge that restoring peace in Viet- 
Nam is an inclusive effort comprising actions 
and commitments by both sides. You have 
sought to exclude yourselves from any re- 
sponsibility in solving the military problems 
you alone have created. You have sought to 
undermine the legitimate authority of the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam by 
demanding unilateral concessions before you 
will even agree to talk with it. 

Since these attempts will not succeed, you 
should adopt a course which would not do 
violence to your basic interests. Real nego- 
tiations, not mere restatement of your de- 
mands, can begin here, today, if you will ex- 
amine our side's proposals of May 8. Our 
proposals are negotiable and susceptible to 

Will you agree that seeking to end hostili- 
ties is our most urgent task in this forum? 

Will you, therefore, join with us in a com- 
mon search for peace in Indochina? 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Nixon Establishes Cabinet Committee To Combat Terrorism 

The first meeting of the Cabinet Commit- 
tee to Combat Terrorism, tvhich President 
Nixon established on September 25, ivas held 
October 2. Following are texts of a memo- 
randum from President Nixon to Secretary 
Rogers dated September 25, a statement 
by President Nixon issued at Neiv York 
on September 27, a statement by Secretary 
Rogers issued on October 2, and a summary 
of recent actions made available to the press 
by the Department on October 2. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 2 

September 25, 1972. 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State 
Subject: Action to Combat Terrorism 

Your report to me on the measures that 
are being taken to combat terrorism indi- 
cates that we are moving effectively 
against the problem of thwarting acts of 
terrorism both here and abroad. The two 
committees you have set up to cope with this 
major problem are making commendable 
progress toward this end. 

Because of the great importance and ur- 
gency I attach to dealing with the worldwide 
problem of terrorism, which encompasses 
diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforce- 
ment functions, I am hereby establishing a 
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. 

The Cabinet Committee will be chaired by 
the Secretary of State and will comprise 

The Secretary of State 

The Secretary of the Treasury 

The Secretary of Defense 

The Attorney General 

The Secretary of Transportation 

The United States Ambassador to the United Nations 

The Director of Central Intelligence 

The Assistant to the President for National Security 

The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs 

The Acting- Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves- 

and such others as the Chairman may con- 
sider necessary. 

The Cabinet Committee will be supported 
by a Working Group comprised of personally 
designated senior representatives of the 
members of the Committee, chaired by the 
designee of the Secretary of State. 

The Committee will consider the most ef- 
fective means by which to prevent terrorism 
here and abroad, and it will also take the lead 
in establishing procedures to ensure that our 
government can take appropriate action in 
response to acts of terrorism swiftly and 
effectively. The Secretary of State will be in 
touch with other governments and interna- 
tional organizations toward this goal. 

Federal officers and Federal departments 
and agencies are to cooperate fully with the 
Cabinet Committee in carrying out its func- 
tions under this directive, and they shall 
comply with the policies, guidelines, stand- 
ards, and procedures prescribed by the Cabi- 
net Committee. 

More specifically, the Cabinet Committee 

(1) Coordinate, among the government 
agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention 
of terrorism. This will include such activities 
as the collection of intelligence worldwide 
and the physical protection of U.S. personnel 
and installations abroad and foreign diplo- 
mats, and diplomatic installations in the 
United States. 

(2) Evaluate all such programs and activi- 
ties and where necessary recommend meth- 
ods for their effective implementation. 

October 23, 1972 


(3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly 
and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur. 

(4) Make recommendations to the Direc- 
tor of the Office of Management and Budget 
concerning proposed funding of such pro- 
grams; and 

(5) Report to the President, from time to 
time, concerning the foregoing. 

Richard Nixon. 


White House press release dated September 26 (for release 
September 27) 

Monday, here in New York, Secretary of 
State Rogers urged prompt action by the 
United Nations on three measures to combat 
the inhuman wave of terrorism that has been 
loosed on the world. ^ I am gratified that the 
United Nations has agreed to take up the 
urgent matter of terrorism and — in the 
strongest possible terms — I endorse the plea 
which the Secretary made on behalf of the 
United States and of human decency. 

Also Monday, in Washington, I directed 
the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to 
Combat Terrorism, to be chaired by Secre- 
tary Rogers, aimed at bringing the full re- 
sources of all appropriate U.S. agencies to 
bear effectively on the task of eliminating 
terrorism wherever it occurs. I have charged 
it to move vigorously and immediately to- 
ward this end. 

The use of terror is indefensible. It elimi- 
nates in one stroke those safeguards of civili- 
zation which mankind has painstakingly 
erected over the centuries. 

But terror threatens more than the lives of 
the innocent. It threatens the very principles 
upon which nations are founded. In this 
sense, every nation in the United Nations, 
whatever its ideological assumptions, who- 
ever its adversaries, wherever its sympa- 
thies, is united with every other nation by the 
common danger to the sovereignty of each. 

' For a statement by Secretary Rogers made before 
the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25 and texts of 
a U.S. draft convention and resolution on terrorism, 
see Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1972, p. 425. 

If the world cannot unite in opposition to 
terror, if we cannot establish some simple 
ground rules to hold back the perimeters of 
lawlessness, if, in short, we cannot act to 
defend the basic principles of national sov- 
ereignty in our own individual interests, then 
upon what foundations can we hope to estab- 
lish international comity? 

There are those who would tell us that 
terror is the last resort of the weak and the 
oppressed, a product of despair in an age of 
indifference, and that it seeks only political 
justice. This is nonsense. The way to seek 
justice is through negotiation. We have 
sought in our own relations to turn from con- 
frontation to negotiation. We believe that 
this is the only way for grievances to be re- 
solved in a way that will contribute to peace 
and stability. 

In recent months we have seen nations 
moving to achieve accommodation and the 
resolution of differences, and we have seen 
terrorists acting to destroy those efforts. 
The time has come for civilized people to act 
in concert to remove the threat of terrorism 
from the world. 

The world is reaching out for peace. The 
way may be hard and treacherous, but men 
of reason and decency are determined today, 
as perhaps never before, to make the effort. 
Let us not be disrupted or turned away by 
those who would loose anarchy upon the 
world; let us seek no accommodations with 
savagery, but rather act to eliminate it. 


Press release 250 dated October 2 

I convened today the first meeting of the 
Cabinet Committee which President Nixon 
established on September 25 to develop and 
coordinate activities throughout the govern- 
ment to deal quickly and effectively with the 
problem of international terrorism. The fol- 
lowing members of the Committee were pres- 
ent: Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, Sec- 
retary of Transportation John Volpe, U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N. George Bush, Direc- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tor of the Central Intelligence Agency Rich- 
ard Helms, Assistant to the President for 
Domestic Affairs John Ehrlichman, Acting 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion Patrick Gray. 

This morning I asked several members of 
the Committee and officials of the Depart- 
ment of State to review the diplomatic, in- 
telligence, and enforcement initiatives we 
have already taken to attack the problem of 
terrorism. The Committee agreed that these 
are realistic ways to respond to the wide- 
spread terrorism which the world has wit- 
nessed in recent weeks. 

Following these reports, the members of 
the Committee concentrated on additional or 
possible next steps by this government. The 
Committee discussed the following among 
other steps: 

— Our delegation to ICAO [International 
Civil Aviation Organization] is receiving 
new instructions to urge the Council to com- 
plete a treaty which will carry sanctions, in- 
cluding the suspension of air service, against 
countries which fail to punish or extradite hi- 
jackers or saboteurs of civil aircraft. We 
hope ICAO will respond positively to this 
initiative, which could significantly shorten 
the time required to close one of the loopholes 
in the body of international law dealing with 
hijacking and sabotage of civil aircraft. I 
want to repeat today what I told the United 
Nations General Assembly a week ago: "A 
nation which is a haven for hijackers should 
be outlawed by the international commu- 
nity." Our Embassies will be instructed to 
develop broad international support for this 

— Representatives of this government will 
meet in Paris this month with senior officials 
of Interpol, lATA [International Criminal 
Police Organization; International Air 
Transport Association], and ICAO to maxi- 
mize the exchange of intelligence among 
member states on both hijacking and terror- 
ism. We welcome the special attention which 
Interpol is now giving to the problem of mail 

—Last week the United States circulated 

a draft convention which could make it much 
more difficult and dangerous for terrorists 
and terrorist organizations to "export" their 
activities to third countries. Ambassador 
Bush will move for the earliest possible 
action on this draft in the Legal Committee 
of the General Assembly. We also hope to 
complete work during this General Assem- 
bly on the treaty providing for prosecution 
or extradition of terrorists who commit 
crimes against diplomats and government 
officials. We urge members of the Legal Com- 
mittee to move immediately on these two 
important conventions. While these are com- 
plicated matters, and while we will welcome 
constructive debate, we will oppose any effort 
to delay serious discussion and action in 
completing these two conventions. 

— The Committee also considered further 
steps in the field of intelligence and enforce- 
ment. The Committee's Working Group will 
begin immediately to develop additional con- 
tingency plans for anticipation of further 
terrorist acts. 

The Committee approved my recommenda- 
tion that Ambassador Armin H. Meyer chair 
its Working Group. Ambassador Meyer will 
also serve as my Special Assistant and Coor- 
dinator for Combatting Terrorism. 

What we seek is broad international action 
to combat this threat to civilized society. The 
U.S. Government will spare no efforts in at- 
tempting to cope with future terrorist actions 
and to cut off avenues of escape, whether 
they be in the field of enforcement or interna- 
tional law. We welcome the eflforts which 
other governments are taking in their own 
right and in cooperation with us. 


October 2, 1972. 

Following President Nixon's directive to 
Secretary Rogers to undertake on an urgent 
basis eflforts both internationally and in this 
country to prevent terrorist acts, the Depart- 
ment of State with other executive agencies 
moved quickly on both fronts. 

October 23, 1972 


On the domestic side — 

U.S. intelligence and security agencies 
were immediately brought together to pool 
their resources and, in cooperation with local 
law enforcement authorities across the Na- 
tion, to give top priority to deterrence and 
prevention of terrorist acts. 

Visa procedures and immigration and cus- 
toms procedures were immediately tightened 
to screen more carefully potential terrorists 
seeking to enter the United States. 

The regulation allowing transit of the 
United States without a visa with a layover 
period of up to 10 days has been rescinded 
until January 1, 1973. All persons transiting 
the United States must have a visa effective 
September 27. 

The protection of foreign diplomats and 
the property of foreign governments, as well 
as other potential targets of terrorists, was 
immediately increased. All security agencies, 
including local police jurisdictions, are being 
supplied details concerning scheduled ap- 
pearances of performing arts groups in the 
United States and names of visiting digni- 
taries and missions, and appropriate security 
is being provided. 

The Department of State sought urgent 
passage of legislation for protection of for- 
eign officials and official guests to give the 
Federal Government jurisdiction concurrent 
with that of the States to prosecute and in- 
vestigate acts against these individuals. The 
bill has passed the House and Senate and 
now is in conference. Final action should 
occur during the week of October 2. 

On the international side — 

On September 6-7 the Department of 
State called in Ambassadors or Charges of 
some 50 countries to discuss what collective 
international action might be taken against 
terrorism. In response, there have been sev- 
eral concrete suggestions as to practical 
steps to halt terrorism. 

Secretary Rogers addressed the Special 
Subcommittee of ICAO on September 6 to 
present forcefully the U.S. views on the need 
for the Organization as well as the interna- 
tional community to devise more effective 

means for coping with the problem of terror- 
ism.= The subcommittee meeting succeeded 
in forwarding draft articles for a convention 
on suspension of air service to countries 
which fail to punish or extradite hijackers or 
saboteurs of civil aircraft for consideration 
at the earliest possible meeting of the full 
Legal Committee. In response to a U.S. pro- 
posal that a diplomatic conference on the new 
convention be convened as soon as possible, 
the ICAO Council on September 29 decided 
to consider the U.S. proposal in late October 
or early November after governments con- 
sider the full report of the Washington sub- 
committee meeting. 

On September 7 the Secretary asked the 
Deputy Secretary to take charge of the over- 
all coordination of the Department's activi- 
ties against terrorism. A committee to study 
and make recommendations on international 
action chaired by Assistant Secretary Sisco 
was established. A committee to study and 
make recommendations to prevent terrorist 
actions against foreigners in the United 
States was set up under Deputy Under Secre- 
tary Macomber. Both committees met on a 
frequent basis. Several dozen ideas and pro- 
posals have been studied, many adopted, and 
action programs have been implemented. 

On September 9 all diplomatic posts were 
asked to deliver a personal letter from the 
Secretary to Foreign Ministers which in- 
formed them that the United States had 
begun consultations on measures to counter 
terrorism, welcomed their suggestions, and 
urged them to aid in enlisting all countries to 
become parties to existing conventions deal- 
ing with crimes against civil aviation. The 
letter was delivered to the highest foreign 
ministry official available in each country 
and responses have been received, collated, 
and summarized. The response was over- 
whelmingly in support of international coop- 
eration and action toward ratification of the 
three major conventions on aviation offenses. 

On September 13 more than 50 U.S. Am- 
bassadors or Charges were instructed to de- 
liver a personal letter from the Secretary to 

• Bulletin of Oct. 2, 1972, p. 360. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Foreign Ministers in which it was noted that 
the Secretary intended to devote an appre- 
ciable portion of his U.N. General Assembly 
address to the need to counter international 
terrorism. Many other Foreign Ministers 
have dealt with or have indicated they will 
include reference to terrorism in their U.N. 
General Assembly addresses. 

The Secretary wrote U.N. Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim on September 14 welcoming 
the latter's initiative in requesting the inclu- 
sion in the agenda of the 27th General As- 
sembly of an item on terrorism. After con- 
siderable wrangling, this item was placed in 
sixth place on the agenda of the Sixth Com- 
mittee and is scheduled to be taken up in the 
latter part of October. 

At the United Nations, the United States 
strongly supported U.N. Secretary General 
Waldheim's initiative to include international 
terrorism on the agenda of the current ses- 
sion of the General Assembly. Speaking to 
the Assembly on September 25 Secretary 
Rogers called on the United Nations to under- 
take vigorous actions against international 
crimes of violence. Among his specific rec- 
ommendations he urged: 

— All states which have not done so to 
adhere to existing international conventions 
requiring prosecution or extradition of per- 
sons who commit offenses against the safety 
of civil aviation. 

— Early completion of an ICAO convention 
providing for the suspension of air service 
to countries not meeting their obligations 
under the conventions on aviation offenses. 

— Prompt adoption of the draft conven- 
tion to prosecute or extradite those who 
attack or kidnap diplomats or officials of for- 
eign governments or international organiza- 

— The prompt convening of a diplomatic 
conference to adopt a new convention on the 
prevention and punishment of other acts of 
international terrorism. On September 25 
the United States circulated to other nations 
a draft proposal for a convention of this kind 
and submitted to the General Assembly a 
draft resolution containing our overall rec- 
ommendations for Assembly action. 

The United States circulated to selected 
members of the Sixth Committee a draft 
resolution seeking adoption of the ILC [In- 
ternational Law Commission] draft conven- 
tion on the protection of diplomats. This 
item is now under consideration. 

The United States decided to make terror- 
ism a major issue at the Interpol General 
Assembly which met in Frankfurt Septem- 
ber 19-27 and to enlist this organization in 
the fight against international terrorism. A 
resolution was passed unanimously at the 
General Assembly which pledges the member 
countries to "utilize existing machinery and 
services of Interpol" to prevent or suppress 
terrorism. A separate resolution, adopted 
with 67 votes in favor, none against, and 
3 abstentions, recommended that affiliated 
countries which have not already done so 
adhere to the ICAO conventions on aviation 
offenses and adopt the principles and meas- 
ures recommended therein. 

The U.S. delegation to the IPU [Inter- 
parliamentary Union] meeting presently at 
Rome was contacted and briefed on current 
efforts to coordinate international action 
against terrorism. The delegation has in- 
formed us that terrorism is a major item on 
the agenda and that the U.S. delegation has 
tabled a draft resolution which calls for in- 
ternal and external measures against terror- 
ism. A resolution containing some of our 
points was passed September 29 without 
formal vote. 

The Department has energetically pressed 
for action on the 1970 Hague Hijacking Con- 
vention and the 1971 Montreal Convention on 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation. We have already ratified the 
Hague Convention, and the implementing 
legislation will be enacted if the Senate ac- 
cepts the House version. The President sub- 
mitted the Montreal Convention to the Sen- 
ate on September 15, hearings were held on 
September 22, and on September 29 the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee ordered 
it reported to the floor for advice and consent 
to ratification. 

All diplomatic and consular posts were im- 
mediately alerted to increased acts of terror- 

October 23, 1972 


ism against diplomatic personnel abroad. 
Posts were requested to review and update 
existing plans for the protection of overseas 
personnel and report. Intelligence on terror- 
ists and terrorist groups, their movements, 
and activities has been more widely dissemi- 

Details concerning letter bombs were fur- 
nished to all overseas posts. Detailed assist- 
ance and guidance was provided all posts in 
the handling of suspicious letters or pack- 

We have kept in close touch with other 
governments with regard to (a) measures we 
have undertaken in the United States and 
(b) our efforts in the international field. 

Waiver of Transit Visas Suspended 
for Remainder of 1972 

Following is the text of a notice of suspen- 
sion which was published in the Federal 
Register on September 27. 

Nonimmigrant Documentary Waiver; Suspension 

The general increased threat of terrorist activi- 
ties in the United States, together with indications 
that such activities may be planned during the cur- 
rent sessions of the United Nations General Assem- 
bly, have created an emergent situation in which it 
is necessary to screen more carefully applicants for 
entry into the United States. The provision for ad- 
mission of aliens in immediate transit without non- 
immigrant visa precludes screening of such aliens 
prior to their arrival at a port of entry in the 
United States. Therefore, Part 41, Chapter I, Title 
22 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended 
by suspending until January 1, 1973, the waiver of 
the nonimmigrant visa requirement in the case of 
aliens in immediate transit. 

Paragraph (e) of §41.6 is suspended until Janu- 
ary 1, 1973. 

Effective date. The amendments to the regulations 
contained in this order shall become effective upon 
publication in the Federal Register (9-27-72).' 

The provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (80 Stat. 383; 5 U.S.C. 553) relative to notice 
of proposed rule making are inapplicable to this 

order because the regulations contained herein in- 
volve foreign affairs functions of the United States. 

(Sec. 104, 66 Stat. 174; 8 U.S.C. 1104) 

Dated: September 22, 1972. 

William P. Rogers, 

Secretary of State. 

Concurred in : 

Richard G. Kleindienst, 
Attorney General. 

September 25, 1972. 

President Signs Bill on Transmittal 
to Congress of Executive Agreements 

Following is a notice for the press issued 
by the Western White House at San Cle- 
mente, Calif., on August 26. 

The President has signed S. 596, which 
requires that international agreements other 
than treaties hereafter entered into by the 
United States be transmitted to the Congress 
not more than 60 days after entry into 
force. 1 

The bill provides that the Secretary of 
State will transmit to Congress the text of 
any international agreement, other than a 
treaty, to which the United States is a party 
as soon as practicable after the agreement 
has entered into force but in no case more 
than 60 days thereafter. Secondly, the bill 
provides that: 

. . . any such agreement the immediate public dis- 
closure of which would, in the opinion of the Presi- 
dent, be prejudicial to the national security of the 
United States shall not be so transmitted to the 
Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Commit- 
tee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa- 
tives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to 
be removed only upon due notice from the President. 

In explaining the purposes of S. 596, the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee empha- 

' 37 Fed. Reg. 20176. 

'As enacted, the bill is Public Law 92-403, 92d 
Cong., 2d sess., signed on Aug. 22. 


Department of State Bulletin 

sized that "the right of the President to con- 
clude executive agreements is not in question 
here, or in any way affected by S. 596. Thus 
the bill in no way transgresses on the inde- 
pendent authority of the Executive in the 
area of foreign affairs." Rather, the commit- 
tee termed the bill "a step toward restoring 
a proper working relationship between the 
Congress and the executive branch in the 
area of foreign affairs. By establishing in 
law a formal procedure for the transmittal to 
Congress of all executive agreements, the bill 
would eliminate one potential source of fric- 

Petroleum Import Quotas Modified 
by President Nixon 


Modifying Proclamation 3279, Relating to 
Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products 

Pursuant to paragraph (a) of section 6 of Procla- 
mation 3279,' as amended, the Director of the Office 
of Emergency Preparedness maintains a constant 
surveillance of imports of petroleum and its primary 
derivatives and their effect on national security. 
The Director has found that changes in the supply 
of and demand for petroleum and its derivatives 
have been occurring rapidly and additional flexibility 
should be provided for the orderly administration 
of Proclamation 3279, as amended, during the 
remainder of 1972. Therefore, the Director has 
recommended, with the advice of the Oil Policy 
Committee, that additional imports of No. 2 fuel oil 
be permitted and that holders of certain allocations 
under said Proclamation should be permitted to im- 
port petroleum and its derivatives in advance of 
allocations to be made for 1973. 

I agree with the above finding and recommenda- 
tion of the Director and deem it necessary and con- 
sistent with the security objectives of Proclamation 
3279, as amended, to adjust the imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products, and to improve the admin- 
istration of the program, as hereinafter provided. 

Now, THEREFORE, I, RiCHARD NiXON, President of 
the United States of America, acting under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Consti- 

tution and laws of the United States, including sec- 
tion 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, do 
hereby proclaim that, effective as of this date. 
Proclamation 3279, as amended, is further amended 
as follows: 

1. In subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a) of sec- 
tion 2, add the following sentence after the third 
sentence, "In addition to the quantity of No. 2 fuel 
oil provided in the preceding sentence, the Secretary 
may allocate for the period January 1, 1972, through 
December 31, 1972, an additional 5,000 barrels per 
day of such fuel oil to persons who qualify for al- 
locations under the preceding sentence." 

2. Add the following subparagraph (3) in para- 
graph (a) of section 2: 

"(3) For the allocation period January 1, 1972, 
through December 31, 1972, the Secretary may make 
allocations in excess of the levels provided in sub- 
paragraph (1) of this paragraph which excess allo- 
cations may be imported at any time through 
December 31, 1973. However, no allocation under 
this subparagraph shall be made to any person to 
whom an allocation was not made prior to September 
1, 1972, and any such excess allocation shall not 
exceed 10% of the allocations made to any such 
allocation holder prior to September 1, 1972 for the 
allocation year commencing January 1, 1972. Any 
such excess allocation shall be deducted from any 
allocation which may be hereafter made to him for 
the period January 1, 1973, through December 31, 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this eighteenth day of September, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-two and of 
the Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundred ninety-seventh. 


' No. 4156; 37 Fed. Reg. 19115. 

' 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 ; 3 CFR 1959-1963 Comp., p. 11. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

International Boundary and Water Comn\ission. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 15462. H. Rept. 92-1304. 
August 3, 1972. 7 pp. 

American-Mexican Boundary Treaty Act of 1972. 
Report to accompany H.R. 15461. H. Rept. 92- 
1305. August 3, 1972. 8 pp. 

Amending Sections 101 and 902 of the Federal Avia- 
tion Act of 1958. Report to accompany S. 2280, a 

October 23, 1972 


bill to amend sections 101 and 902 of the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, to implement 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft and to amend title XI of such 
act to authorize the President to suspend air serv- 
ice to any foreign nation which he determines is 
encouraging aircraft hijacking by acting in a 
manner inconsistent with the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and 
to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to 
revoke the operating authority of foreign air car- 
riers under certain circumstances. S. Rept. 92-1012. 
August 4, 1972. 51 pp. 

Moratorium on the Killing of Polar Bears. Report to 
accompany H.J. Res. 1268. H. Rept. 92-1307. 
August 7, 1972. 3 pp. 

Authorizing an Appropriation for Annual Contribu- 
tions by the United States for the Support of the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer. 
Report to accompany H.J. Res. 1257. H. Rept. 
92-1309. August 7, 1972. 3 pp. 


Agenda of the 27th Regular Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly ' 

U.N. doc. A/8801 

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the 
delegation of Indonesia. 

2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation. 

3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty- 
seventh session of the General Assembly: 

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee; 

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee. 

4. Election of the President. 

5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election 
of officers. 

6. Election of the Vice-Presidents. 

7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Ar- 
ticle 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United 

8. Adoption of the agenda. 

9. General debate. 

10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of 
the Organization. 

11. Report of the Security Council. 

12. Report of the Economic and Social Council. 

13. Report of the Trusteeship Council. 

14. Report of the International Court of Justice. 

' Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 25. 

15. Report of the International Atomic Energy 

16. Election of five non-permanent members of the 
Security Council. 

17. Election of nine members of the Economic and 
Social Council. 

18. Election of five members of the International 
Court of Justice. 

19. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial De- 
velopment Board. 

20. Co-operation between the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity. 

21. The situation in the Middle East. 

22. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

23. Admission of new Members to the United Na- 

24. Strengthening of the role of the United Nations 
with regard to the maintenance and consolidation 
of international peace and security, the develop- 
ment of co-operation among all nations and the 
promotion of the rules of international law in re- 
lations between States. 

25. Non-use of force in International relations and 
permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear 

26. World Disarmament Conference: report of the 

27. Implementation of the results of the Conference 
of Non-Nuclear- Weapon States: report of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 

28. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space: report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

29. Preparation of an international treaty concerning 
the Moon: report of the Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space. 

30. General and complete disarmament: 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament; 

(b) Report of the International Atomic Energy 

(c) Report of the Secretary-General under Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution 2852 (XXVI), para- 
graph 5. 

31. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weap- 
ons: report of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament. 

32. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and ther- 
monuclear tests. 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

33. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 
2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and rati- 
fication of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty 


Department of State Bulletin 

for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the 

34. Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of 
peace: report of the Secretary-General. 

35. Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Strengthening of International Security: report 
of the Secretary-General. 

36. Reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of 
the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil 
thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the 
limits of present national jurisdiction and use of 
their resources in the interests of mankind, and 
convening of a conference on the law of the sea: 
report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction. 

37. Preparation of an international convention on 
principles governing the use by States of artificial 
earth satellites for direct television broadcast- 

38. The policies of apartheid of the Government of 
South Africa: 

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on Apart- 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

39. Effects of atomic radiation : report of the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Eff'ects of 
Atomic Radiation. 

40. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East: 

(a) Report of the Commissioner-General; 

(b) Report of the Working Group on the Financ- 
ing of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 

(c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine; 

(d) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

41. Comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: 
report of the Special Committee on Peace-keep- 
ing Operations. 

42. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 
the Population of the Occupied Territories. 

43. United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel- 

(a) Report of the Conference on its third session; 

(b) Report of the Trade and Development Board; 

(c) Confirmation of the appointment of the Sec- 
retary-General of the United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development. 

44. United Nations Industrial Development Organi- 

(a) Report of the Industrial Development Board; 

(b) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Co- 
operation between the United Nations Devel- 
opment Programme and the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization; 

(c) Confirmation of the appointment of the Ex- 
ecutive Director of the United Nations In- 
dustrial Development Organization. 

45. United Nations Institute for Training and Re- 
search: report of the Executive Director. 

46. Operational activities for development: reports 
of the Governing Council of the United Nations 
Development Programme: 

(a) United Nations Development Programme; 

(b) United Nations Capital Development Fund; 

(c) Technical co-operation activities undertaken 
by the Secretary-General; 

(d) United Nations Volunteers programme. 

47. United Nations Conference on the Human En- 
vironment: report of the Secretary-General. 

48. Question of the establishment of an international 

49. Human rights in armed conflicts: 

(a) Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: 
report of the Secretary-General under Gen- 
eral Assembly resolutions 2852 (XXVI), 
paragraph 8, and 2853 (XXVI); 

(b) Protection of journalists engaged in danger- 
ous missions in areas of armed conflict: re- 
port of the Secretary-General. 

50. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimina- 

(a) Reports of the Secretary-General under Gen- 
eral Assembly resolutions 2784 (XXVI) and 
2785 (XXVI); 

(b) Report of the Committee on, the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination; 

(c) Status of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim- 
ination: report of the Secretary-General; 

(d) Draft convention on the suppression and 
punishment of the crime of apartheid. 

51. Importance of the universal realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination and of the 
speedy granting of independence to colonial coun- 
tries and peoples for the effective guarantee and 
observance of human rights. 

52. Principles of international co-operation in the 
detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of 
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against 

53. Crime prevention and control. 

54. Youth, its education in the respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, its problems 
and needs, and its active participation in national 
development and international co-operation: 

(a) Channels of communication with youth and 
international youth organizations: report of 
the Secretary-General; 

(b) Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of 
Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding 
between Peoples. 

55. Status of the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Intema- 

October 23, 1972 


tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the Optional Protocol to the International Cove- 
nant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the 

56. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees: 

(a) Report of the High Commissioner; 

(b) Question of the continuation of the Office of 
the High Commissioner. 

57. Freedom of information: 

(a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Informa- 

(b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Informa- 

58. Human rights and scientific and technological de- 
velopments: report of the Secretary-General. 

59. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance: 

(a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Religious Intolerance; 

(b) Draft International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 

60. Programme for the observance of the twenty- 
fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 

61. Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other 
disaster situations: report of the Secretary-Gen- 

62. United Nations conference for a world conven- 
tion on adoption law. 

63. Information from Non-Self -Governing Territories 
transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of 
the United Nations: 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ- 
ation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independ- 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

64. Question of Namibia: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ- 
ation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- 
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; 

(b) Report of the United Nations Council for 

(c) Question of the enlargement of the United 
Nations Council for Namibia: report of the 
Secretary-General ; 

(d) United Nations Fund for Namibia: report of 
the Secretary-General; 

(e) Appointment of the United Nations Commis- 
sioner for Namibia. 

65. Question of Territories under Portuguese admin- 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ- 
ation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independ- 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

66. Question of Southern Rhodesia: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ- 
ation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independ- 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

67. Activities of foreign economic and other interests 
which are impeding the implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rho- 
desia, Namibia and Territories under Portuguese 
domination and in all other Territories under 
colonial domination and efforts to eliminate 
colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination 
in southern Africa: report of the Special Com- 
mittee on the Situation with regard to the Im- 
plementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo- 

68. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples by the specialized agencies and the inter- 
national institutions associated with the United 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ- 
ation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- 
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

69. United Nations Educational and Training Pro- 
gramme for Southern Africa: report of the Sec- 

70. Offers by Member States of study and training 
facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Goveming 
Territories: report of the Secretary-General. 

71. Financial reports and accounts for the year 1971 
and reports of the Board of Auditors: 

(a) United Nations; 

(b) United Nations Development Programme; 

(c) United Nations Children's Fund; 

(d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East; 

(e) United Nations Institute for Training and 

(f) Voluntary funds administered by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

72. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 

73. Budget estimates for the financial year 1973. 

74. Planning estimate for the financial year 1974. 

75. Pattern of conferences : report of the Secretary- 

76. Appointments to fill vacancies in the member- 
ship of subsidiary organs of the General Assem- 

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions; 

(b) Committee on Contributions; 

(c) Board of Auditors; 


Department of State Bulletin 

(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the 
appointments made by the Secretary-Gen- 

(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal. 

77. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the 
expenses of the United Nations: report of the 
Committee on Contributions. 

78. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of 
the United Nations with the specialized agencies 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency: 
reports of the Advisory Committee on Admin- 
istrative and Budgetary Questions. 

79. Joint Inspection Unit: 

(a) Reports of the Joint Inspection Unit; 

(b) Question of the continuation of the Joint In- 
spection Unit: report of the Secretary-Gen- 

80. Publications and documentation of the United Na- 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Advisory Committee on Ad- 
ministrative and Budgetary Questions. 

81. Personnel questions: 

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the 
Secretary-General ; 

(b) Other personnel questions: report of the Sec- 

82. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pen- 
sion Board. 

83. United Nations salary system: report of the Spe- 
cial Committee for the Review of the United 
Nations Salary System. 

84. United Nations International School: report of 
the Secretary-General. 

85. Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its twenty-fourth session. 

86. Report of the United Nations Commission on In- 
ternational Trade Law on the work of its fifth 

87. Representation of States in their relations with 
international organizations. 

88. Report of the Special Committee on the Question 
of Defining Aggression. 

89. Need to consider suggestions regarding the re- 
view of the Charter of the United Nations: re- 
port of the Secretary-General. 

90. Review of the role of the International Court 
of Justice. 

91. Report of the Committee on Relations with the 
Host Country. 

92. Measures to prevent international terrorism 
which endangers or takes innocent human lives 
or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study 
of the underlying causes of those forms of ter- 
rorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, 
frustration, grievance and despair and which 
cause some people to sacrifice human lives, in- 
cluding their own, in an attempt to effect radi- 
cal changes. 


United States and Israel Establish 
Binational Science Foundation 

Press release 244 dated September 27 

Secretary Rogers and Israeli Finance Min- 
ister Pinhas Sapir signed an agreement on 
September 27 at New York establishing the 
United States-Israeli Binational Science 

This agreement is a major landmark in the 
development of close cooperation between 
the scientific communities of Israel and the 
United States which has evolved over the 

The Foundation, whose base of operations 
will be in Israel, creates a permanent insti- 
tution "to promote and support cooperation 
between the United States and Israel in re- 
search in science and technology for peace- 
ful purposes on subjects of mutual interest." 
In the agreement, the two governments ex- 
press the conviction that international coop- 
eration in science and technology will 
strengthen the bonds of friendship and un- 
derstanding between their peoples and will 
advance the state of science and technology 
to the benefit of both countries, as well as 
mankind generally. 

The United States and Israel will each pro- 
vide the equivalent of $30 million in Israeli 
pounds for the Foundation's endowment. The 
U.S. contribution will consist of prepayments 
by Israel of Public Law 480 loans which 
were due in the period 1988-2001. The Gov- 
ernment of Israel will guarantee an interest 
rate of 314 percent on the endowment, which 
will provide the Foundation's basic operat- 
ing income. The Foundation is also empow- 
ered to receive contributions of funds, prop- 
erty, and services. 

A Board of Governors consisting of 10 
members, five appointed by and serving at 
the pleasure of each government, will deter- 

October 23, 1972 


mine the areas for cooperative research, the 
research programs, and the Foundation's fi- 
nancial and managerial policies. The Board 
will normally meet once a year in Israel. 
Members of the Board, who have not yet been 
named, will serve without compensation. 

Summaries of the results of the coopera- 
tive research projects sponsored by the Foun- 
dation will be made available to the public 
both in English and in Hebrew. 

Current Actions 



Recommendations, including agreed measures for 
conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted 
at Brussels June 2-13, 1964, at the Third Antarc- 
tic Treaty Consultative Meeting. Entered into 
force July 27, 1966. TIAS 6058. 
Notification of approval of recommendations III- 
VHI: France, September 20, 1972. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970." 

Acceptances deposited: Guatemala, October 3, 
1972; Philippines, October 5, 1972. 


Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971." 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 

3, 1972. 
Signature: Fiji, August 21, 1972. 
Ratifications deposited: Mongolia (with a reserva- 
tion), September 14, 1972; Yugoslavia, October 
2, 1972. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. 
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, October 2, 


Customs convention on the international transit of 
goods (ITI Convention). Done at Vienna June 7, 
Signatures: Chad (subject to ratification), June 

21, 1972; Poland (subject to ratification), June 

26, 1972. 


Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat- 
ing to amendments to the convention. Done at 
Washington October 6, 1970.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
3, 1972 (with an understanding). 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at New 
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 

13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. 
TIAS 6298. 

Ratification deposited: Iran, August 30, 1972. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Philippines, October 5, 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), genei<al regu- 
lations with final protocol and annex, and the uni- 
versal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 

14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except 
for article V of the additional protocol, which 
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratifications deposited: Italy, August 30, 1972; 

Khmer Republic, August 3, 1972; Mali; August 

18, 1972. 
Accession deposited: Fiji (with reservations), 

August 14, 1972. 
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 
Ratifications deposited: Italy, August 30, 1972; 

Khmer Republic, August 3, 1972; Mali, August 

18, 1972. 

Property — Industrial 

Locarno agreement establishing an international 
classification for industrial designs, with annex. 
Done at Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into 
force April 27, 1971; for the United States May 
25, 1972. TIAS 7420. 
Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (with a declaration), September 8, 


Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
Accession deposited: Togo, September 1, 1972. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London November 26, 1968, and October 21, 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
3, 1972. 


Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as 
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space 
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
July 17, 1971.' 

Notifications of approval: South Africa, July 11, 
1972; Sweden, July 25, 1972. 


Ratifications exchanged: October 3, 1972. 
Entered into force: October 3, 1972. 
Proclaimed by the President: October 3, 1972. 
Interim agreement on certain measures with respect 
to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, with 
protocol. Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972. 
Entered into force: October 3, 1972. 



Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed 
minute, and exchanges of notes. Signed at Brasilia 
May 9, 1972.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
3, 1972. 


Treaty on the Swan Islands, with related notes. 
Signed at San Pedro Sula November 22, 1971. 
Entered into force September 1, 1972. 
Proclaimed by the President: September 19, 1972. 


Agreement concerning reciprocity of payment of 
certain social security benefits. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Bern April 13, 1972. Entered 
into force April 13, 1972; effective July 1, 1968. 


Agreement relating to the deposit by Mexico of 10 
percent of the value of military training scholar- 
ships provided by the United States. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Mexico April 4 and July 12, 
1972. Entered into force July 12, 1972; effective 
February 7, 1972. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of May 11, 1967 (TIAS 
6258). Signed at Islamabad September 21, 1972. 
Entered into force September 21, 1972. 

Saudi Arabia 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Saudi Arabia 
of 10 percent of the value of grant military as- 
sistance furnished by the United States. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Jidda April 11 and 19 and 
May 15, 1972. Entered into force May 15, 1972. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile sys- 
tems. Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972. 
Ratified by the President: September 30, 1972. 

' Not in force. 

"Foreign Relations" Volume Released 
on 1944 Quebec Conference 

Press release 227 dated September 15 (for release Septem- 
ber 23) 

The Department of State released on Septem- 
ber 23 Foreign Relations of the United States: The 
Conference at Quebec, 19iU (Hi, 527 pp.), the last of 
the seven special volumes in the "Foreign Relations" 
series devoted to the wartime summit conferences 
attended by President Roosevelt or President Tru- 
man for the United States and by either Prime 
Minister Churchill or Marshal Stalin or both. The 
titles in the special conference subseries are as 
follows : 

The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and 

Casablanca, 1943 
The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943 
The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 
The Conference at Quebec, 1944 
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 
The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Con- 
ference), 1945 (2 volumes) 

More than a quarter of the volume on the Second 
Quebec Conference deals with the "Morgenthau 
Plan" for the postwar treatment of Germany and re- 
lated papers. Other subjects covered include the final 
planning for the war in Europe and the Far East, 
lend-lease to the United Kingdom, Italy, relations 
with the Soviet Union, aid to the Warsaw resist- 
ance, and the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations 
which took place at Hyde Park after the Quebec 
Conference had closed. 

The volume was prepared by the Historical Of- 
fice, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies may be ob- 
tained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, 
for $4.75 each (Department of State publication 

October 23, 1972 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C. 201,02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock (at least 125)— $6; 1-year subscrip- 
tion service for approximately 75 updated or new 
Notes— $3.50; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single copies 
of those listed below are available at lQ<i each. 

Algeria Pub. 7821 4 pp 

Belgium Puh. 8087 4 pp 

Chad Pub. 7669 4 pp 

Dahomey Pub. 8308 4 pp 

Lesotho Pub. 8091 4 pp 

Malta Pub. 8220 4 pp 

Monaco Pub. 8670 4 pp 

The Battle Act Report 1971. Twenty-fourth report 
by the Secretary of State to Congress on opera- 
tions under Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act 
of 1951 (Battle Act). General Foreign Policy Se- 
ries 261. Pub. 8641. 85 pp. 45tf. 

World Strength of the Communist Party Organiza- 
tions. This report is the 24th in the State Depart- 
ment's annual series of estimates of the strength of 
the Communist movement throughout the world, ex- 
cluding the United States. It presents data available 
through December 1971. Pub. 8658. 159 pp. $1.25. 

Extension of Loan of Vessel U.S.S. Benham. Agree- 
ment with Peru. TIAS 7296. 3 pp. lO;*. 

Finance — Debt Rescheduling Under Certain Agricul- 
tural Commodity and AID Loan Agreements. Mem- 
orandums of agreement with Yugoslavia. TIAS 7298. 
18 pp. 25(f. 

Treaty To Resolve Pending Boundary Differences 
and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as 
the International Boundary. Treaty with Mexico. 
TIAS 7313. 75 pp. $1.50. 

Whaling — International Observer Scheme. Agree- 
ment with Japan. TIAS 7315. 12 pp. 10^ 

Economic Assistance. Agreement with the Khmer 
Republic. TIAS 7321. 7 pp. 10«?. 

Reciprocal Fishing Privileges. Agreement with Can- 
ada extending the agreement of April 24, 1972. TIAS 
7323. 3 pp. 10^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Phil- 
ippines. TIAS 7324. 5 pp. 10«!. 

Pension Insurance for Certain United States Army 
Employees in Germany. Agreement with the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany. TIAS 7326. 8 pp. 10(*. 

Surplus Property — Off-Shore Sales Facility. Agree- 
ment with Singapore. TIAS 7327. 4 pp. lOt*. 

Fisheries — Northwestern Part of the Pacific Ocean 
off the United States Coast. Agreement with the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the 
agreement of February 12, 1971. TIAS 7328. 3 pp. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Japan. 
TIAS 7333. 10 pp. 10^. 

Seabed Arms Control. TIAS 7337. 72 pp. SO^*. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Do- 
minican Republic. TIAS 7340. 3 pp. 10('. 

Cooperation in Medical Science and Public Health. 

Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics. TIAS 7344. 9 pp. lOt". 

Cooperation in Environmental Protection. Agreement 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 

7345. 11 pp. 10^. 

Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Agreement 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 

7346. 11 pp. 10(*. 

Space Cooperation. Agreement with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7347. 10 pp. 10«!. 

Air Transport Services. Protocol with the Czechoslo- 
vak Socialist Republic modifying and extending the 
agreement of February 28, 1969, as extended. TIAS 
7356. 3 pp. 10^. 



The Senate on September 20 confirmed the nom- 
ination of Christopher Van Hollen to be Ambas- 
sador to the Republic of Sri Lanka and to serve 
concurrently as .Embassador to the Republic of Mal- 
dives. (For biographic data, see White House press 
release dated September 12.) 

The Senate on September 21 confirmed the nom- 
ination of C. Robert Moore, now serving as Am- 
bassador to the United Republic of Cameroon, to 
serve concurrently as Ambassador to the Republic 
of Equatorial Guinea. (For biographic data, see 
White House press release dated September 18.) 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX October 23, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1739 

Asia. From Containment to Engagement 

(Rogers) 470 


Confirmations (Moore, Van Hollen) .... 488 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 481 

President Signs Bill on Transmittal to Con- 
gress of Executive Agreements 480 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Moore, Van Hollen) 488 


From Containment to Engagement (Rogers) . 470 
President Signs Joint Resolution on Offensive 

Arms Agreement (Nixon) 466 

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements Enter 

Into Force (Nixon, Gromyko) 467 

Economic Affairs 

Petroleum Import Quotas Modified by Presi- 
dent Nixon (proclamation) 481 

Reforming the International Monetary System 

(Nixon, Shultz) 457 

Equatorial Guinea. Moore confirmed as Am- 
bassador 488 

Europe. From Containment to Engagement 

(Rogers) 470 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Reforming the International Monetary Sys- 
tem (Nixon, Shultz) 457 

Israel. United States and Israel Establish 
Binational Science Foundation 485 

Jamaica. Letters of Credence (Fletcher) . . 469 

Malagasy Republic Letters of Credence (Ra- 

harijaona) 469 

Maldive Republic. Van Hollen confirmed as 
Ambassador 488 

Middle East. From Containment to Engage- 
ment (Rogers) 470 

New Zealand. Letters of Credence (White) . 469 

Niger. Letters of Credence (Diallo) .... 469 

Petroleum. Petroleum Import Quotas Modified 
by President Nixon (proclamation) . . . 481 

Presidential Documents 

Petroleum Import Quotas Modified by Presi- 
dent Nixon (proclamation) 481 

President Nixon Establishes Cabinet Commit- 
tee To Combat Terrorism 475 

President Signs Joint Resolution on Offensive 

Arms Agreement 466 

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements Enter 
Into Force 467 


"Foreign Relations" Volume Released on 1944 

Quebec Conference 487 

Recent Releases 488 

Science. United States and Israel Establish 
Binational Science Foundation 485 

Sierra Leone. Letters of Credence (Palmer) . 469 

Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Van Hollen confirmed as 
Ambassador 488 

Tanzania. Letters of Credence (Bomani) . . 469 

Terrorism. President Nixon Establishes Cabi- 
net Committee To Combat Terrorism 
(Nixon, Rogers, summary of recent actions) . 475 

Thailand. Letters of Credence (Panyarachun) . 469 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 486 

President Signs Bill on Transmittal to Con- 
gress of Executive Agreements 480 

President Signs Joint Resolution on Offensive 

Arms Agreement (Nixon) 466 

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements Enter 

Into Force (Nixon, Gromyko) 467 

United States and Israel Establish Binational 

Science Foundation 485 

U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limitation Agree- 
ments Enter Into Force (Nixon, Gromyko) . 467 

United Nations. Agenda of the 27th Regular 

Session of the U.N. General Assembly . . 482 

Viet-Nam. 162d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 

Held at Paris (Porter) 473 

Visas. Waiver of Transit Visas Suspended for 
Remainder of 1972 (Federal Register 

notice) 480 

Zaire. Letters of Credence (Lombo) .... 469 

Name Index 

Bomani, Paul L 469 

Diallo, Abdoulaye 469 

Fletcher, Douglas Valmore 469 

Gromyko, Andrei A 467 

Lombo Lo Mangamanga 469 

Moore, C. Robert 488 

Nixon, President .... 457, 466, 467, 475, 481 

Palmer, Philip Jonathan Gbagu 469 

Panayarachun, Anand 469 

Porter, William J 473 

Raharijaona, Henri 469 

Rogers, Secretary 470, 475 

Shultz, George P 457 

Van Hollen, Christopher 488 

White, Lloyd 469 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 2 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
227 of September 15, 244 of September 27, 
and 249 of September 29. 

No. Date Subject 

250 10/2 Rogers: Cabinet Committee to 

Combat Terrorism. 

251 10/5 Porter: 162d plenary session on 

Viet-Nam at Paris. 

*252 10/5 USIA Foreign Service employees 
to vote on exclusive representa- 

*253 10/6 Assistant Secretary Meyer to 
sign Andean Pact loan. 

* Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




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Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
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Vol. LXVll, No. 17 AO 

October 30, 1972 



Address by Assistant Secretary Green 489 

Address by Assistant Secretary Newsom U98 

Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Macomber 505 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

NOV 2 7 1972 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXVII, No. 1740 
October 30, 1972 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued bg the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tlie White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of tlie Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
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international relations are also listed. 

Trade in the Context of United States Relations 
With the People's Republic of China 

Address by Marshall Green 

Assista7it Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ^ 

For more years than I care to count, I 
have looked to the day when China trade 
would be not just a subject of academic in- 
terest but a practical concern of practical 
men. This symposium, with its emphasis on 
the practical aspects of U.S.-China trade, is 
one more sign that that day has arrived. It is 
therefore with great personal satisfaction 
that I join your discussions. 

In the panel meetings you will be attend- 
ing today you will hear and talk with experts 
in this field, all of them men of wide experi- 
ence and deserved international reputations. 
I could not add to the knowledge they will 
present to you. 

What I would like to do instead is to place 
trade in the framework of our overall rela- 
tionship with the People's Republic of China 
and to suggest why trade figures so impor- 
tantly in the momentous changes we are wit- 

To find a reference point in tackling a sub- 
ject like this, I could go back a decade or 
more to d time when a number of us in the 
American Foreign Service, together with 
some of our colleagues in business and aca- 
deme, were recommending that tight U.S. 
restrictions on trade and travel to mainland 
China be modified and that we enter into a 

' Made before a China trade symposium sponsored 
by the University of Southern California Graduate 
School of Business Administration at Los Angeles, 
Calif., on Oct. 9 (press release 254). 

real dialogue with Peking. Or I could discuss 
the number of steps that were taken between 
1962 and 1971 in modifying those restric- 
tions, especially the rapid succession of meas- 
ures undertaken by this administration from 
1969 to 1971, to enable Americans to visit 
mainland China and to engage in trade. 
These were unilateral administrative meas- 
ures that required no U.S. legislative action 
or reciprocity from the Chinese side, and un- 
til recently they did not seem to produce 
much in the way of results. What changed 
the whole scene, of course, was the Presi- 
dent's trip to China. 

But rather than go over these events that 
are so well known to you, I would prefer to 
start with the joint communique issued at 
Shanghai on February 27 of this year.^ 

Those of you who have studied or had some 
experience in foreign affairs are well aware 
that communiques are often the least inter- 
esting or important result of diplomatic 
meetings. If that is the rule, then the joint 
communique is the exception. It is a remarka- 
ble document for several reasons. First of all, 
it is comprehensive, reflecting as it does all 
the understandings reached and all the dis- 
cussions held. It is realistic, making no ef- 
fort, either through omission or obscure 
language, to gloss over or minimize the dif- 
ferences that remain between us. On the 

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435. 

October 30, 1972 


contrary, it hits them head on. Indeed, the 
first area of common ground we found with 
the Chinese was that this is the style in 
which we both like to do business. The Chi- 
nese, no less than we, do not like to pretend 
that there are no differences when differences 
clearly exist. 

Having stated our differences, however, we 
were able to outline possible areas of com- 
mon interest and to specify ways in which 
we might proceed to work together toward 
the normalization of relations. Clearly im- 
plied in this document was the real break- 
through: that we could move forward with- 
out first resolving all those differences. Also 
clearly implied was the realization on both 
sides that whatever the broad ideological 
concerns that divide us, there should be few 
fundamental differences in practical nation- 
al-interest terms that time and mutual trust 
on both sides could not resolve. And most 
important of all, we agreed that improving 
relations was in the interest of both sides. 

You will also note that the communique 
sets forth the specifics of how we will work 
to strengthen our relationships. We agreed 
to maintain contact through various chan- 
nels, including the sending of a senior U.S. 
official to Peking from time to time. Later 
we announced that another channel or con- 
tact point had been established in Paris, 
where discussions are continuing in the same 
constructive atmosphere that marked the 
summit meetings in Peking. We also agreed 
that increasing contact between our peoples 
was at least as important as official contact 
in developing and deepening this new rela- 

Neither of us meant by this that if we 
just get to know each other better, all our 
problems will disappear. There was a more 
practical consideration. For differing rea- 
sons, both the PRC and the United States 
evidently want to provide tangible evidence 
of a warming trend in our relations. Since, 
as the communique made clear, obstacles to 
improved relations remain, areas of common 
interest for the time being must be sought 

in less politically charged fields; hence, trade 
and exchanges. 

On the specific subject of trade, the joint 
communique said: 

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area 
irom which mutual benefit can be derived, and 
agreed that economic relations based on equality 
and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples 
of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the 
progressive development of trade between their two 

Note especially in that paragraph the re- 
peated appearance of the phrase "mutual 
benefit" and its description of trade between 
our two countries as developing progressive- 
ly. In other contexts the Chinese have talked 
about our relations, including trade, develop- 
ing step by step. Implicit in this document is 
the thought that trade between our two coun- 
tries has more than just economic signifi- 
cance. Or even if the volume of trade re- 
mained statistically microscopic — which is 
not likely — there are advantages to be de- 
rived from focusing attention on it. 

Abstract and Tangible Goals 

If the public eye is drawn to a succession 
of businessmen, trade groups, and techni- 
cians going back and forth between the 
United States and the PRC — sometimes con- 
cluding sales, sometimes not — the political 
point need not be stated. This very motion 
will testify to the existence of an improved 
relationship and will help create a climate 
in which cooperation in other areas may be- 
come possible. 

There are other political advantages ac- 
cruing to both sides which one should not 
lightly dismiss. Trade negotiations by pri- 
vate American firms may prove to be an es- 
pecially significant arena for building mu- 
tual trust and confidence. Since major po- 
litical issues are not likely to enter into these 
discussions, it should be possible to set a 
positive tone for future discussion of more 
troublesome matters. By the same token, the 
acquisition of negotiating skills and tech- 


Department of State Bulletin 

niques can add to one nation's store of infor- 
mation about the other and thereby ease the 
way for later negotiations on improvement 
of political relations. 

Moving from these relatively abstract 
goals to more tangible ones, Peking has be- 
yond a doubt calculated the effect of im- 
proved trade relations with the United States 
on its chances for achieving its major policy 
goals. By trading with the PRC, the United 
States overtly demonstrates its acceptance of 
the Peking Government even if it does not 
involve formal recognition. In the speech of 
a top PRC leader, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, 
delivered on the occasion of October 1 Na- 
tional Day celebrations a week ago, this 
theme comes across loud and clear. Even 
granting some of Peking's outdated percep- 
tions of the nature of the present-day capi- 
talist mind, it is not unreasonable for Chi- 
nese leaders to believe that U.S. businessmen 
who benefit from U.S.-PRC trade might in- 
fluence American political opinion in ways 
that may be mutually beneficial. 

By facilitating trade with the United 
States, Peking also moves toward its goal of 
diversifying its markets and sources of sup- 
ply. Peking undoubtedly calculates that if it 
can develop new sources of supply for its im- 
port requirements, it will never again be so 
dependent on any single trading partner as to 
become vulnerable to eff"orts to exert political 
pressure on China through trade. Those of 
you who have read Chinese history, as well 
as the newspaper accounts of China's more 
recent national experience, will appreciate 
that the need to be economically independent 
holds a high priority in China. 

To say that political considerations are im- 
portant is not to suggest, however, that ex- 
panding PRC trade relations with the United 
States will not be of mutual economic benefit 
as well. While the U.S. economy as a whole 
may not be affected significantly by any fore- 
seeable U.S.-PRC trade which may develop, 
specific U.S. industries will benefit. We have 
already seen this in the recent deals for Boe- 

ing aircraft, RCA communications equip- 
ment, and wheat, and we may see it again in 
other industries which can derive important 
benefit — machine tools, for example, or other 
sales of aircraft and parts. 

Constraints on Rapid Expansion of Trade 

Having mentioned these advantages re- 
lated to expansion of Sino-U.S. trade, I want 
to inject a note of caution. There are definite 
constraints placed on rapid expansion of 
U.S.-PRC trade by both political and eco- 
nomic considerations. China's reputation as 
the most revolutionary of the revolutionaries 
is somewhat offset by its equal renown as one 
of the most conservative states in interna- 
tional financial dealings. Unlike many of the 
developing countries which have consciously 
borrowed heavily in order to finance eco- 
nomic development, the PRC has financed 
its imports either by immediate payment or 
on ordinary 18-month commercial terms. 
Even during the most revolutionary phases 
of its recent history, the PRC preserved its 
reputation for scrupulous financial dealings. 
Credits were and are paid off on schedule or 
even in advance. What this means, of course, 
is not that the PRC has unlimited cash re- 
serves but that it has preferred to limit its 
imports to the extent of its ability to gener- 
ate funds through export earnings. 

This does not suggest that Peking insists 
on balanced trade with each and every part- 
ner; because of its large net export earnings 
from Hong Kong, it has a certain leeway to 
accept an unfavorable balance of trade on a 
bilateral basis with such nations as Japan. 
Moreover, there have recently been some in- 
dications that in special cases the PRC may 
be willing to incur a short-term debt in order 
to acquire a high-priority item. In general, 
though, China maintains the principle that it 
will stand on its own feet. We do not antici- 
pate, therefore, that the PRC will choose to 
incur long-term debt or allow a significant 
or prolonged deficit in its balance of trade 
with another nation. 

October 30, 1972 


As long as Peking remains wedded to its 
policy of "self-sufficiency," it is difficult to 
envision a dramatic increase in the level of 
foreign trade. The "self-sufficiency" doctrine 
has a number of implications for the growth 
of foreign trade, none of them positive. This 
philosophy by definition places foreign trade 
almost in the category of a necessary evil; 
foreign trade can only be an adjunct of do- 
mestic economic development whereby China 
acquires abroad whatever technology and es- 
sential goods it cannot produce at home. Be- 
cause Peking perceives trade in this light, 
there has been a disinclination to foster the 
development of export-oriented industries, 
even if these would afford the PRC competi- 
tive advantages in the world market. In fact, 
the PRC has at times in the past turned aside 
requests to modify its products to make them 
more marketable in the West. Finally, be- 
cause the PRC remains basically a subsist- 
ence agricultural economy and because all 
imports are handled through state trading 
corporations, it is highly unlikely that con- 
sumer goods will appear for some time to 
come among the priority items in the annual 
state plan. 

American businessmen must also consider 
that the PRC has developed well-established 
trading relationships over the years with 
low-cost suppliers of its major import needs. 
Most of the PRC's grain comes from Canada 
or Australia, while capital goods, metals, and 
fertilizers have been imported from Japanese 
and western European suppliers. While it 
will not be impossible for American firms to 
break into this market — in fact, given the 
PRC's desire to diversify its sources of sup- 
ply, it is likely that some penetration will be 
accomplished — it would be unrealistic to an- 
ticipate major sales at the expense of the 
Japanese and western Europeans except in 
certain high-technology areas, particularly 
so long as the political impediments remain. 

Chinese Pragmatism and Flexibility 

As long as I am smashing misconceptions 
about the China market, I might as well 
throw some cold water on another popular 

myth. I want to emphasize that the PRC has 
established quite a record for pragmatism 
and flexibility in its business dealings, leg- 
ends about the strong ideological orientation 
of the Chinese notwithstanding. Many of you 
have probably read reports of Chinese favor- 
itism toward "ideologically correct" firms and 
refusal to deal with those firms considered 
to be "reactionary." This has occurred in 
isolated instances; the Chinese, as they them- 
selves point out, do not separate politics and 
economics. But within that principle there 
is room for a considerable degree of flexibil- 
ity and pragmatism. In most cases, then, I 
think you will find that PRC negotiators are 
more interested in the quality of your prod- 
uct and the size of your market than in your 
political opinions. What I am suggesting is 
that there is no advantage for an American 
businessman to suggest that he supports poli- 
cies popular in Peking or that he has been a 
consistent opponent of some of his own gov- 
ernment's policies. Indeed, such a bearing 
may only serve to place you at a negotiating 
disadvantage with the Chinese, who do not 
respect cheap devices for currying favor. 

Little research is necessary to unearth 
confirmation that the Chinese are indeed 
pragmatic when it comes to business. Up 
to 1970, only three of the PRC's 10 largest 
trading partners had extended diplomatic 
recognition to Peking. The PRC recently con- 
cluded a major wheat deal with the Austra- 
lians, in spite of the fact that the PRC leader- 
ship continues to differ with the foreign 
policy of the Australian Government. When 
Prime Minister Tanaka arrived in Peking at 
the end of last month to negotiate the nor- 
malization of relations between his country 
and the PRC, it was evidently made clear to 
him and other members of his party that 
continued trade ties with Taiwan would not 
constitute a barrier in PRC eyes to a Japan- 
PRC rapprochement. Price and quality, not 
politics, generally determine the decision for 
the PRC negotiators. None of this means, 
however, that you need not concern your- 
selves with Chinese sensitivities or that you 
could engage in political argument without 
affecting your business prospects. The Chi- 


Department of State Bulletin 

nese are perceptive people who appreciate 
normal courtesy; they are also quick to de- 
tect insincerity. 

Dialogue Between Nations 

It seems to me that the great changes that 
have taken place in our relations with the 
PRC could not have been achieved without 
certain changes in the attitudes prevailing 
in both Peking and Washington. For exam- 
ple, it is hardly conceivable that this evolu- 
tion in our relationship could have occurred 
at the time of the Great Leap Forward or its 
aftermath or during the period of the sub- 
sequent Cultural Revolution in China. In 
other words, it would have been very diffi- 
cult indeed for these changes to have come 
about before 1969. Similarly, I am convinced 
that this breakthrough would not have been 
possible without the leadership and the com- 
mitment that President Nixon has given to 
the task of ending the period of U.S.-PRC 

After 23 years of mutual antagonism and 
drearily sustained deadlock, the task of per- 
suading the PRC to join with us in greatly 
improving our relations seemed herculean. 
Something more than small steps was called 
for. A dramatic gesture was needed to dispel 
any suspicions in Peking that our intentions 
might be directed at short-term domestic po- 
litical gains or at giving merely the appear- 
ance of progress. Despite the risks so often 
associated with personal diplomacy, the 
President recognized that the summitry ap- 
proach would best convey to the Chinese his 
determination to stake the prestige and au- 
thority of his Presidency on the new policy. 
Moreover, personal contact at the highest 
level was necessary to overcome the misun- 
derstandings and myths which had grown up 
during decades of nondialogue. A new rela- 
tionship had to be inaugurated on the basis 
of candor, not evasiveness; on friendly dis- 
cussion, not glacial silence or steaming rhet- 
oric; and above all, on growing mutual per- 
ceptions that perhaps there was more com- 
mon ground in our national interests than 
was apparent from our wide ideological dif- 

ferences. To seize the moment, which could 
in fact be a fleeting moment, required per- 
sonal rapport between leaders. The result 
was the Peking summit meetings. 

Developing relations between the United 
States and the PRC during the past seven 
months attest to the success of the Peking 
summit. Most significantly, the leaders of 
China seem to have a clearer understanding 
of U.S. policy and objectives in East Asia. 
Implementation of the Nixon doctrine, for 
example, supplied persuasive evidence that 
the United States did not in fact have de- 
signs on China and that it was not seeking 
to isolate or contain China. On the contrary, 
it was manifestly our view that the PRC 
should be involved in the international main- 
stream and that the great problems of our 
planet could not be resolved without the par- 
ticipation of China in finding solutions and 
implementing them. 

It is not only in terms of U.S.-PRC rela- 
tions that the summit was a success, how- 
ever. As I suggested earlier, the approach to 
Peking was only a part of a coherent new 
world view. Perhaps even more significant 
than the opening of a PRC-U.S. dialogue was 
the impression made on other nations by this 
successful summitry. The U.S.-PRC prece- 
dent seemed to make all things possible. 
Longtime antagonists could approach each 
other on the basis of shared interests rather 
than abiding differences. We have recently 
seen a series of summit-type meetings be- 
tween nations, some of which had just barely 
been on speaking terms, if indeed they had 
communicated at all. On July 4 of this year, 
South and North Korea jointly announced 
that they would meet to discuss ways and 
means of attaining the mutually desired ob- 
jective of national reunification. As a direct 
consequence of the Peking summit, there 
thus seems to have emerged a new pattern 
of international relations, a new mode of in- 
ternational behavior. 

Encouraging as it may be that nations are 
now competing in image building and that 
countries which used to appear intransigent 
now worry less about appearing tough and 
more about appearing at least as flexible and 

October 30, 1972 


conciliatory as their rivals, the millennium 
is not yet upon us. Serious problems and dan- 
gers remain. Yet for the first time in this 
generation there is at least the hope that 
there can eventuate a pattern of internation- 
al relationships which can serve the legiti- 
mate interests of all nations and a climate in 
which each nation will see that it is in its in- 
terest to pursue its goals by means which do 
not undermine this new trend. 

We proceed on the assumption that no na- 
tion is abandoning its goals or what it per- 
ceives as its major interests. But there now 
seems to be a trend among at least the greater 
powers to pursue their goals through means 
less likely to involve themselves in war. In 
other words, sharp competition will continue 
to mark relations between nations, and ide- 
ologies may not change; but it is to be hoped 
that in a world of expanded dialogue, trade, 
and exchanges between nations — even be- 
tween nations of opposing ideologies — there 
can be the real beginnings of a lasting peace. 
The President's trip to Peking made a major 
contribution to that goal. 

President Nixon's News Conference 
of October 5 

Following is an excerpt from the tran- 
script of a news conference held by President 
Nixon in the Oval Office at the White House 
on October 5. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 9 

Q. Mr. President, do you see any possibil- 
ity of a negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam 
before the election? 

The President: The settlement will come 
just as soon as we can possibly get a settle- 
ment which is right, right for the South 
Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, and for 
us, one that will have in mind our goals of 

preventing the imposition by force of a Com- 
munist government on South Viet-Nam and, 
of course, a goal that is particularly close to 
our hearts in a humanitarian sense, the re- 
turn of our prisoners of war. 

I should emphasize, however, that under 
no circumstances will the timing of a settle- 
ment, for example, the possible negotiation 
of a cease-fire, the possible negotiation of or 
unilateral action with regard to a bombing 
halt, under no circumstances will such action 
be affected by the fact that there is going to 
be an election November 7. 

If we can make the right kind of a settle- 
ment before the election, we will make it. If 
we cannot, we are not going to make the 
wrong kind of a settlement before the elec- 
tion. We were around that track in 1968, 
when well-intentioned men made a very, very 
great mistake in stopping the bombing with- 
out adequate agreements from the other side. 

I do not criticize them for that as far as 
their motives are concerned. I simply say, 
having seen what happened then, we are not 
going to make that mistake now. 

The election, I repeat, will not in any way 
influence what we do at the negotiating table. 

Second, because I know this subject has 
been discussed by a number of you, as it 
should be, in your commentary and in your 
reports, the negotiations at this time. As you 
know, have been, in the private channel, very 
extensive. We have agreed that neither side 
will discuss the content of those negotiations. 
I will not discuss them one way or another. 

I will only say that the negotiations are in 
a sensitive stage. I cannot predict and will 
not predict that they will or will not succeed. 
I cannot and will not predict when they will 

But I will say that any comment on my 
part with regard to how the negotiations are 
going could only have a detrimental effect 
on the goal that we are seeking, and that is 
as early as possible a negotiated settlement 
of this long and difficult war. 

Q. Mr. President, it has been said that 


Department of State Bulletin 

Hanoi may be tvaiting until after the election 
to make a final settlement on the theory that 
if they got a Democrat elected they would get 
better terms for them. How do you answer 

The President: They could be motivated 
by that. There are those who beUeve that 
they were motivated to an extent in 1968 by 
political considerations in agreeing to a 
bombing halt before the election with the 
thought that defeating me was more in their 
interest than electing my opponent. 

I do not claim that that was the case. I 
must say that both Senator Humphrey and I, 
I think, were quite responsible in that elec- 
tion campaign in refusing to comment on 
what were then only preliminary negotia- 
tions, recognizing that any comment by one 
who might be President might jeopardize the 
success of negotiations. 

Now, as far as Hanoi's putting their eggs 
in that basket, that only indicates that the 
American political scene is one that no one 
can predict. Despite what the polls say and 
despite some indications on our side that we 
believe we have a good chance to win, there 
are many in this country and many abroad 
who think that there is a chance the other 
side might win. 

Under those circumstances, they obviously 
could conclude, with some justification, that 
my insistence that we will never agree to a 
settlement which would impose a Commu- 
nist government directly or indirectly on the 
people of South Viet-Nam, as compared with 
the statements of our opponents to the con- 
trary on this particular point, might be in- 
fluencing them. 

On the other hand, we are talking. If we 
have the opportunity, we will continue to talk 
before this election and we will try to con- 
vince them that waiting until after the elec- 
tion is not good strategy. 

Q. Mr. President, there are those of your 
critics who say that the bombing is really 
serving no useful purpose and it is needless. 
What purpose -is the bombing now serving in 

view of the fact that the negotiations have 
not resulted in a settlement and in view of 
the fact that there still seems to be a good deal 
of military activity in the South ? 

The President: Well, I think, Mr. Lisagor 
[Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], you 
could really go further. There are those who 
say that the bombing and the mining have 
served no useful purpose and are serving no 
useful purpose. Those same critics, however, 
as I pointed out in San Clemente and have 
since had an opportunity to review, on May 
1, that weekend, all had reached the conclu- 
sion that South Viet-Nam was down the tube. 
Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the three television net- 
work commentators — I am not referring, of 
course, to you ladies and gentlemen, who 
are reporters — all in varying degrees wrote 
and spoke of the specter of defeat and the 
hopelessness of the South Vietnamese cause. 

On May 8, I acted to prevent that Commu- 
nist takeover which all of these same critics 
then predicted. After I took that action of 
mining and bombing, the same critics pre- 
dicted that the summit was torpedoed. Some 
even went so far as to say we were risking 
world war HI. 

Those predictions proved to be wrong. 
Now these same critics say that the bombing 
and mining was not necessary, it has accom- 
plished no purpose and is not necessary for 
the future. Well, I would say, based on their 
track record, I would not give much credence 
to what the critics have said in this respect. 

I will only say the bombing and mining 
was essential to turn around what was a po- 
tentially disastrous situation in South Viet- 
Nam. The back of the enemy offensive has 
been broken. They hold no Provincial capi- 
tals now at all. 

This could not have been accomplished 
without the mining and the bombing, and the 
mining and the bombing will continue, of 
course, until we get some agreements on the 
negotiating front. 

October 30, 1972 


163d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Follotving are remarks made by Ambassa- 
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, at the 163d plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on October 

Press release 2B6 dated October 12 


Ladies and gentlemen: In recent years 
significant changes have taken place in the 
confrontation of opposing forces in the Viet- 
Nam conflict. Through the policy of Vietnam- 
ization the United States has withdrawn 
over a half million men from Viet-Nam, while 
the armed forces of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam have grown in number and in defensive 

On your side, however, the opposite con- 
figuration has occurred through what might 
be termed "North Vietnamization": The pro- 
portion of southern, Viet Cong forces has 
sharply declined relative to the officers and 
units of the regular North Vietnamese army 
active within South Viet-Nam. At present 
more than 12 divisions of the North Viet- 
namese army have entered the South. Other 
North Vietnamese army elements operate 
within many nominally Viet Cong units in 
order to provide encadrement and exercise 
control of these units. 

It is clear that the problem of forces orig- 
inating outside South Viet-Nam but active 
within that country far more preponderantly 
pertains to your side than to ours. Never- 
theless, we have specified that the complete 
withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of U.S. 
forces — which will number no more than 
27,000 by December 1 because of the success 
of Vietnamization — would occur no later 
than four months after establishment of an 
internationally supervised cease-fire through- 
out Indochina and the return of American 
prisoners of war. 

We have carefully studied your September 

11 declaration in order to obtain some indica- 
tion of your intentions concerning the non- 
South Vietnamese forces participating on 
your side in this conflict. While that declara- 
tion refers three times to the wartime collab- 
oration between the Viet Cong and North 
Viet-Nam and no less than four times to the 
pursuit of military victory, it is strangely 
silent about the North Vietnamese army in 
South Viet-Nam. Although your side often 
proclaims the "logic" and "good will" of your 
proposals, this latest statement, like others 
before it, evades coming to grips with the 
question of forces external to South Viet- 
Nam, forces which now are six times greater 
than the U.S. forces you demand be with- 

It would not be diflScult for you to demon- 
strate your good will, however, and remedy 
this oversight. I call upon you now to pro- 
vide us with certain clarifications of the 
statement. Please respond to the following 
questions as specifically as you can: 

1. What, under the September 11 propos- 
als, is the date specified for the complete 
withdrawal of North Vietnamese army 
forces from South Viet-Nam? 

2. What, during the various stages of 
these proposals, are the roles and activities 
which you envisage for the North Vietnam- 
ese army forces prior to their withdrawal? 

3. What assurances do you provide against 
infiltration of additional units of the North 
Vietnamese army or against reinforcement 
and replenishment of units presently within 
South Viet-Nam during various stages of 
these proposals? 

4. What forms of verification or super- 
vision of the foregoing measures by impar- 
tial authorities or otherwise do you propose? 

In considering your reply, you can spare 
us as well as yourselves needless effort by 
avoiding two kinds of ritualistic responses 
with which we are all too familiar. 

First, please do not recommend that we 
reread the September 11 statement, the so- 
called "two-point clarification," or the "seven 
points." It is precisely because these several 


Department of State Bulletin 

proposals have nothing relevant or specific 
to say about your side's share in the neces- 
sary military measures that we make these 
present inquiries. 

Second, please do not contend, as you did 
last week, that there can be no question of 
"shared responsibilities." This doctrine of 
selective responsibility does not and will not 
exonerate you from the obligations you must 
bear in the search for peaceful settlement. 

The dimensions and intensity of the pres- 
ent warfare are directly related to the inva- 
sion of the South by regular forces of North 
Viet-Nam. Instead of saying nothing about 
the return to North Viet-Nam of your forces 
— however you may prefer to describe them 
— you should make it known whether these 
forces will cease to disrupt the peace in 
Southeast Asia and, if so, what measures 
you will undertake so that these forces 
would not jeopardize the restoration of 


Ladies and gentlemen: The chiefs of 
state and heads of government of the mem- 
ber nations of the European Economic Com- 
munity will meet in these premises from 
October 19 until October 21. That important 
meeting will place extensive administrative 
and security requirements on our host gov- 
ernment. The French Government has kindly 
offered alternate facilities for our use during 
that period and has offered to provide its 
customary fine administrative support to us. 
We feel, nevertheless, that this would place a 
heavy additional strain on our hosts, which 
it would be desirable to avoid. 

Out of this consideration for the host 
government, therefore, our side believes that 
it would be preferable to await the conclu- 
sion of the European summit before meet- 
ing in our usual premises again; and we hope 
that you can agree to this slight delay. Ac- 
cordingly, our side proposes that the 164th 
plenary session of the Paris meetings on 
Viet-Nam take place on October 26 at the 
usual hour and in the usual location. 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to UNESCO General Conference 

The Senate on October 11 confirmed the 
nominations of the following-named persons 
to be Representatives and Alternate Repre- 
sentatives of the United States to the 17th 
session of the General Conference of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization: 


William B. Jones 
R. Miller Upton 
Louise Gore 
Jaquelin H. Hume 
Benjamin F. Marsh 

Alternate Representatives 

E. Dorothy Dann Bullock 
Henry David 
Pierre R. Graham 
James C. Haahr 
Chauncy D. Harris 

When the nominations were announced on 
October 5 (White House press release), Pres- 
ident Nixon indicated that Mr. Jones would 
be designated chairman of the U.S. delega- 
tion and Mr. Upton vice chairman. 

October 30, 1972 


Commodity Problems: A Key to Relations With Africa 

Address by David D. Newsom 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs * 

Diplomacy is the art of reconciling differ- 
ences. In its relations with the developing 
countries, the United States faces the increas- 
ing problem of finding a middle ground be- 
tween our interests as a consumer and their 
needs as producers. 

San Francisco, one of the foremost centers 
of world trade, seemed to me to be a natural 
forum to discuss this issue. 

I can speak primarily of the situation as 
it applies to Africa, but the problem has a 
much wider application. 

Politics may capture the headlines, but 
African leaders are becoming more and more 
preoccupied with economics. In the words of 
Tanzanian Vice President Jumbe, speaking 
at the recent Foreign Ministers meeting of 
east and central African states, "Political 
independence is meaningless without eco- 
nomic power." 

Each of you is involved. Every time you 
drink a cup of coffee or cocoa or eat a choco- 
late bar or vanilla ice cream, you are an ele- 
ment in the picture. 

To Africans, our actions on issues involv- 
ing their economic well-being mean as much 
as the more publicized political questions. It 
is impossible to divorce politics from eco- 
nomics. Ivory Coast President Houphouet- 
Boigny, long a friend of the West, has at- 
tacked with increasing bitterness what he 

' Made before the World Affairs Council of North- 
ern California at San Francisco on Sept. 28 (press 
release 245). 

labels the "insensitivity" of the industrial 
nations to the problems of the developing 
world. Ivory Coast's concern over deteriorat- 
ing terms of trade can become more impor- 
tant than any political issue in her relations 
with the United States. 

While economic assistance remains an im- 
portant factor, the developing countries are 
more concerned about securing guaranteed 
markets for their products and at satisfac- 
tory prices. They are heavily dependent on 
the industrialized states not only for the 
equipment to build a modern economic struc- 
ture but often even for food to avert famine. 
To pay for these imports, the developing 
countries must rely on their exports. About 
80 percent of their foreign exchange stems 
from exports. So you can see that although 
foreign aid is a very necessary stimulus to 
their capability for acquiring much-needed 
goods and services it has to be paid for and 
growth prospects of developing countries 
depend more on the extent to which they 
can increase their foreign exchange earnings 
through exports. 

The picture is gloomy. In spite of an ex- 
ceptional cooperative effort to promote eco- 
nomic and social progress, the gap between 
the developing countries and the developed 
nations continues to widen, thus giving sup- 
port to the contention that "While the rich 
get richer, the poor get poorer." Although 
export earnings of developing countries ex- 
panded 78 percent from 1960 to 1969, their 
external debt grew more than 150 percent in 


Department of State Bulletin 

the same period, with carrying costs and re- 
payment consuming much of current foreign 
aid receipts. Today, external debt servicing 
represents almost 20 percent of export earn- 
ings of developing countries. The developing 
countries' share of world exports dropped 
from 30 percent in 1950 to 20 percent in 1960 
to 18 percent in 1969. 

The situation is further aggravated by the 
dependence of the developing countries on 
exports of primary commodities as opposed 
to manufactured or semimanufactured goods. 
Approximately 85 percent of their export 
earnings comes from primary agricultural 
commodities, crude minerals and metals, and 
petroleum. Certain developing countries, fur- 
thermore, are forced to rely almost exclu- 
sively on exports of a single product. 

Petroleum is a special case. For the pres- 
ent at least, those countries fortunate enough 
to have it, e.g., Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria, 
need little else. These countries, working in 
concert with other oil-producing nations, 
have been successful in obtaining concessions 
from Western consumers. But oil cannot be 
depended upon forever, and even these coun- 
tries are looking ahead to diversify their 

Primary commodities such as coffee, cocoa, 
copper, or cotton account for up to 80 percent 
of total export receipts of many countries. 
In Africa, copper accounts for 96 percent of 
Zambia's exports. Coffee provides 85 percent 
of Burundi's foreign exchange, and 65 per- 
cent of Ethiopia's. Equatorial Guinea de- 
pends on cocoa for two-thirds of its exchange 
earnings; Ghana, the world's largest cocoa 
producer, obtains 55 to 60 percent of its for- 
eign exchange from the same crop. 

Problems of Trade in Primary Products 

For the foreseeable future, trade in pri- 
mary products will continue to be the devel- 
oping countries' main source of export earn- 
ings. Unfortunately, this trade is susceptible 
to a variety of ills. 

Heavy dependence on one or a few com- 

modities, particularly agricultural products 
which are produced in many parts of the 
world, makes a country especially vulnerable 
to world market developments over which 
it has little control. Market prices for such 
exports may fluctuate widely over short 
periods of time. These fluctuations in price 
can cause variations in the foreign exchange 
receipts of a poor country amounting to a 
large portion of its total earnings. 

A one-cent-a-pound change in the annual 
average price of coffee, for example, means 
$65 million a year to the exporting countries 
as a whole; the same change in the price of 
tea means $15 million; and in cocoa, $25 

Fluctuations in price and volume stem 
from many causes. On the supply side, dis- 
ease and variations in weather may cause 
severe fluctuations in output. And in the 
case of tree crops like coffee and cocoa, pro- 
duction can neither be turned off when it is 
excessive nor rapidly increased when it falls 
short. On the demand side, small changes in 
final demand can induce large changes in in- 
ventories. And this instability feeds on it- 
self. Inordinately high prices in periods of 
shortage lead to overproduction, overproduc- 
tion to glut and excessively low prices, and 
so on — with the depressed part of the cycle 
being of far longer duration. 

Even more serious than the instability of 
trade receipts is the longer range problem 
that demand for many primary products is 
not keeping pace with the increase in world 
trade generally. This sluggishness has sev- 
eral causes. Markets for natural rubber and 
some tropical fibers have been eroded by the 
development of synthetics. Technological im- 
provements have led to economies in the use 
of raw materials such as tin. Many of the 
developing countries' commodities compete 
with items produced and exported by the 
developed countries. Markets, especially for 
such products as coffee and sugar, are limited 
by an array of tariff and quota barriers put 
up by the rich countries. 

October 30, 1972 


UNCTAD Focus on Problems of Development 

Various approaches have been tried to help 
break the vicious cycle of self-perpetuating 
poverty in which developing countries find 
themselves trapped. Dissatisfied with the 
slow progress toward concrete results, in the 
early 1960's the developing countries brought 
pressure to bear that led to the convening of 
the first United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development in Geneva in 1964. UNC- 
TAD, to which all members of the U.N. and 
its specialized agencies belong (142 coun- 
tries), had no less a goal than the reshaping 
of world trade in the interests of the develop- 
ing countries. Following a second conference 
in New Delhi in 1968, the third UNCTAD 
took place last April in Santiago, Chile. The 
record is mixed. 

On the negative side, UNCTAD has raised 
hopes that have not been realized. Having 
103 of the 142 votes, the developing coun- 
tries can force through recommendations, 
but they cannot oblige the advanced coun- 
tries to implement them. It has also been 
difficult for UNCTAD to avoid stepping on 
the toes of existing organizations like FAO, 
GATT [Food and Agriculture Organization; 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], 
and specialized commodity organizations al- 
ready operating in the area of international 
trade and development. UNCTAD has fur- 
ther been hampered by the tendency of its 
membership to polarize behind fixed posi- 
tions with little objective regard for the 
merits of an issue. 

Attempts by the developing countries to 
use UNCTAD as a negotiating body to gain 
trade concessions and support for ambitious 
development programs have met with resist- 
ance from the advanced countries. 

Finally, UNCTAD has enjoyed little suc- 
cess in persuading the developing countries 
to take an objective look at their own trade 
and financial policies, which are crucial to 
the success of any development program. 

Despite these drawbacks, the organization 
has served a useful purpose in focusing world 
attention on the growth needs of the develop- 

ing countries and in bringing pressure to 
bear on the world community to act. It has 
provided a forum for airing trade and devel- 
opment problems of the poor countries and 
for presenting new ways to resolve them. It 
has identified a wide range of policy possibil- 
ities to be pursued or studied. It took the lead 
in focusing world attention on the needs of 
the least developed among the less developed 
countries. It played a key role in developing 
and winning eventual acceptance of the idea 
of a system of temporary generalized non- 
discriminatory tariff preferences. Such pref- 
erences would mean that canned fruits and 
meats exported by west African countries, 
for example, would have a duty advantage 
over the same products exported by a devel- 
oped country. The organization has also 
undertaken some useful studies on problems 
of market access, diversification, and compe- 
tition from synthetics. In the financial area 
UNCTAD maintains pressure, along with 
the Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, for the liberalization of 
the terms and conditions of aid. 

Commodity Agreements 

In their search for practical measures to 
improve their trade position, the developing 
countries have pressed for commodity agree- 
ments on products which are key to their 
economies. They argue that such agreements 
can not only reduce short-term price fluctua- 
tions but also help arrest the longer term de- 
cline in raw material prices and progressively 
increase the real income derived from export 
of these products. This is true, providing 
agreements are effectively implemented and 
the participating countries cooperate in es- 
tablishing long-term equilibrium between 
supply and demand at prices which are fair 
to both producers and consumers. 

Commodity agreements, however, have 
serious limitations. For one thing, many pri- 
mary products are not well suited to the con- 
ventional commodity agreement approach 


Department of State Bulletin 

for technical or economic reasons. This ap- 
plies to commodities such as rubber, jute, 
hard fibers, and cotton, which are subject to 
serious competition from synthetics or other 

There are today only four such interna- 
tional agreements: coffee, sugar, wheat, and 
tin. The United States is a member of the 
wheat and coffee agreements. The inability 
to reach agreement in the recent negotiations 
over quota arrangements for the Interna- 
tional Coffee Agreement (ICA) for the year 
that begins on October 1 dramatizes the diffi- 
culties inherent in negotiating or implement- 
ing broad-scale commodity agreements. 

The developing countries have frequently 
charged the importing nations with a "lack 
of political will," but the problem is much 
more complex. National interests, of course, 
come into play, not only between importing 
and exporting countries but among export- 
ing and importing countries themselves. 
Commodity agreements require some division 
of the market among competing suppliers 
and the holding back of surplus production 
when the market is glutted. Understand- 
ably there are differences among pro- 
ducing countries on how to allocate the mar- 
ket. A country which has held a given share 
of the market over a period of time may be 
unwilling to cede market shares to new- 
comers who may be expanding production. 
Conversely, newer producers will rarely con- 
cede that existing or past patterns of world 
trade should be frozen. The opposing views 
of India and Sri Lanka on the one hand, and 
Kenya and Tanzania on the other, over tea 
are a case in point. 

There is also the problem of determining 
appropriate price levels. When prices are 
low or falling sharply, producers may be will- 
ing to take the best bargain they can get; 
but when the prices are good, the incentive 
for producers to work for agreement or ac- 
cept restraints fades. 

In some cases commodity agreements can 
be designed to meet certain specific and 
limited objectives over limited periods of 

time. The International Coffee Agreement 
is a good example. Coffee is the single most 
important agricultural commodity in the 
trade of developing countries and critical to 
certain Latin American and African coun- 
tries. At the time the first ICA was nego- 
tiated, joint action was necessary to keep 
marketed supply in line with demand to pre- 
vent a disastrous collapse of prices with 
serious repercussion in the coffee-exporting 

The coffee agreement was designed to pro- 
vide a framework for joint efforts to restore 
a balance between supply and demand. It 
provided for ultimate controls over exports, 
and as a major innovation, the second ICA 
set up a Coffee Diversification Fund to help 
countries move resources away from coffee 
production into other fields and to reduce 
their unhealthy dependence on a single crop. 

Attempts, going back to 1963, to establish 
a cocoa agreement thus far have not suc- 
ceeded. Negotiations on an international 
cocoa agreement, which began in March 
under the auspices of UNCTAD, resumed 
this month in Geneva. 

Other commodities, like bananas, peanuts, 
and rubber, are not readily adapted to the 
commodity agreement approach and have 
remained uncontrolled. 

The United States has always been luke- 
warm in its enthusiasm for commodity agree- 
ments and at times even formally opposed 
their use. More recently we have come to 
accept the need to find solutions to the serious 
commodity problems of the developing coun- 
tries and have agreed to consider any reason- 
able proposals including commodity agree- 
ments to improve markets for particular 
products. With the approval of Congress, 
the United States played a leading role in 
developing the International Coffee Agree- 
ment. We have also supported, in varying de- 
grees, negotiations for agreements on other 
products. On the other hand, we have con- 
tinued to express doubts as to the effective- 
ness of commodity agreements as a panacea, 
and we oppose the French view of using them 

October 30, 1972 


to set prices at an artificially high level. We 
feel that it would be unwise and unworkable 
in the long run to extend such price supports 
internationally. Rather, we favor long-term 
measures such as reduction of trade barriers, 
expanded markets, and more efficient produc- 
tion — measures which are not trade restric- 
tive, but trade creating in nature. 

Generalized Tariff Preferences 

Aware that the expansion of world trade 
in manufactures is growing twice as fast as 
trade in agricultural and other primary 
products, the developing countries are seek- 
ing ways to expand their industrial output 
for a larger share of the market. To help 
them obtain this they want the developed 
countries to give preferred treatment to their 
manufactured and semimanufactured prod- 

Traditionally wedded to the principle of 
most-favored-nation treatment, the United 
States was reluctant at first to support a 
scheme of generalized tariff preferences. 
Three factors influenced the United States to 
revise its position: first, the recognition of 
the justice of the developing countries' claim 
for special advantages to permit them to 
speed economic development and diversifica- 
tion; second, a growing concern over the 
proliferation of special trade arrangements 
which discriminate among developing coun- 
tries and threaten to fragment world trade; 
and third, pressure from Latin American 
countries for exclusive trade arrangements. 

In the negotiations within the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment regarding the form and structure of 
generalized nonreciprocal preferences, the 
United States took the lead in pressing for a 
liberal scheme easy to administer and with 
maximum benefits for the developing coun- 
tries. The U.S. proposal provides for duty- 
free entry without quantitative restrictions 
for most manufactures and semimanufac- 
tures and, for the benefit of the least devel- 
oped states, certain primary products, in- 

cluding agricultural items. Although we are 
committed in principle to this approach, a 
proposal for generalized preferences has yet 
to be submitted to Congress. 

The United States made it clear that it is 
opposed to "reverse preferences." It would 
be difficult for us to offer our proposed 
preferences to countries which maintain re- 
verse preferences. The term refers to prefer- 
ences which have been extended by a develop- 
ing country to a developed country in reci- 
procity for preferential access to the latter's 
markets. As an example of reverse prefer- 
ences, the Ivory Coast might admit certain 
French goods — say a tractor — without im- 
posing import duty, in exchange for similar 
privileges for their own exports to France. 
The duty-free French tractor would there- 
fore enjoy a special advantage over the trac- 
tors of the United States and other third 
countries competing for the Ivory Coast 
market. Reverse preferences are not neces- 
sarily advantageous for the developing coun- 
tries according them, since they can result in 
higher prices for many imports while reduc- 
ing tariff revenues. Nevertheless a number 
of developing countries grant reverse pref- 
erences since they believe them to be a con- 
dition of aid from the Common Market 

The effect of generalized tariff preferences 
on exports of developing countries is diffi- 
cult to predict. So much depends on their 
own efforts to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunities. Because of a lack of industrializa- 
tion, the least developed states, with per 
capita incomes under $100, will find it diffi- 
cult to gain any benefit from trade prefer- 
ences which are accorded to manufactured 
and semimanufactured goods. Considering 
the demand in the developed countries for 
most manufactured goods and the limited 
capacity of the developing countries to pro- 
duce them, the developing countries will be 
able to supply only a small part of the total 
market. The developed countries in 1969 
imported $106 billion in manufactured prod- 
ucts; only $5 billion came from the develop- 


Department of State Bulletin 


ing countries. U.S. imports ran approxi- 
mately $1 billion, or less than 3 percent of 
total U.S. imports. 

The United States is committed to trade 
policies which recognize the special needs of 
the developing countries. Submitting the 
issue to Congress now might open the doors 
to restrictive legislation and do more harm 
than good to prospects for free world trade. 

In spite of current preoccupation with our 
balance of payments problem, we cannot long 
remain indifferent to the potential markets 
for U.S. goods in a growing and prosperous 
developing world. Nor can we afford to ig- 
nore the growing effort of developing coun- 
tries to market their goods and the possibili- 
ties for alienation and instability if they are 
excluded from a fair share of the world mar- 
ket. The United States stands to gain in a 
liberal trading system in which the develop- 
ing countries have full opportunity to partici- 

There is a growing recognition among the 
developing countries that internal policies 
are directly linked to export development. 
For example, they are becoming more aware 
that if they are to benefit from special trade 
measures, they must make their exports more 
competitive. A number of developing coun- 
tries have taken steps to improve their cli- 
mate for investment as a means of attracting 
foreign and domestic capital. On the other 
hand, there is wider recognition of the fact 
that the establishment of some types of 
major industry in the developing world can 
be uneconomic. 

The problem then in its simplest terms is, 
on the one hand, to find a way to insure the 
Ethiopian a stable market for his coffee or 
the Ghanaian a market for his cocoa at a 
price that will not be unacceptably burden- 
some to the U.S. housewife; on the other 
hand, there must be a recognition that the 
developing countries cannot find the means 
to develop if they are unable to earn suffi- 
cient foreign exchange through the sale of 
their basic commodities or if the prices of 
equipment from the developed world are out 

of reach. Failure to find an accommodation 
may result in a large number of developing 
countries angry and frustrated, resentful of 
a system which excludes them from prosper- 
ity, and eager to bring about major changes 
in that system. As a major part of the 
world's trading system we cannot ignore 
their plight. 

Emergency Assistance Programs 
for South Asia 

Following is an exchange of letters be- 
tween President Nixon and four members of 
his Advisory Panel on South Asian Relief 

White House press release dated October 6 


October 5, 1972. 

Dear (member's name): I deeply appre- 
ciate the time and thought that you and the 
other members of the Advisory Panel on 
South Asian Relief Assistance have devoted 
over the past year to our emergency econom- 
ic assistance programs in South Asia. The 
perspective and insight which all of you have 
brought to your continuing review of these 
programs have been of great value to us. 

Your reflections concerning your first- 
hand observations in Bangladesh are most 
gratifying. It has been my objective through- 
out this difficult period in South Asia to 
assure that, at a minimum, the absence of 
the essentials of life would not further 
heighten the tension that already existed 
there. I recognized in 1971 and I recognize 
now that making available the economic 
necessities cannot by itself assure peace or 
peaceful development. These objectives can 
ultimately be achieved only in a stable polit- 
ical environment and only when neighbors 
have enough confidence in one another so 

October 30, 1972 


that normal relationships can be established 
across their borders. 

At the same time, the United States could 
not and cannot ignore the needs and the as- 
pirations of the more than 700 million South 
Asians. Our effort to join other nations in 
meeting the most urgent needs of those who 
live in this area has reflected not only our 
compassion for them in their distress but 
also our recognition that an orderly society 
depends on the capacity of governments to 
"promote the general welfare." 

Again, my warmest thanks for your help. 

Richard Nixon. 


Dacca, Bangladesh, 

September 8, 1972. 

Dear Mr. President: The undersigned members 
of your Advisory Panel on South Asian Relief As- 
sistance have recently completed an intensive visit 
to Bangladesh. We hereby submit our views and 
conclusions derived from many visits and conversa- 
tions. We have met with Ministers, officials and 
private citizens of Bangladesh, with United Nations 
officials, with representatives of American voluntary 
agencies and with members of the U.S. Mission. 
These conversations were supplemented by field 

The emergency aid to Bangladesh since its inde- 
pendence struck us forcefully as a truly superb ex- 
ample of the traditional American response to the 
need of people in deep distress. The American peo- 
ple, in giving through the Government, the United 
Nations and voluntary agencies, one-third of a total 
world-wide relief effort of approximately $800 mil- 
lion to rescue a new country half way around the 
world — more than any other country — have once 
again been true to their inheritance. 

This humanitarian effort has contributed signifi- 
cantly toward helping this new, war-torn country 
and its Government under Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman to make the painful transition to 
independence. We believe that the Prime Minister 
and his colleagues are aware of that fact. 

We should like to record our conviction that the 
mobilized efforts and resources of the world have 
forestalled a major famine. The United Nations, 
through the Secretary General's appeals last year 

and this and through its operations in the field, has 
played a major role in this achievement. The per- 
formance of the UN has justified the United States 
in deciding, after we had seen the danger, that the 
UN could play such a role and our determination 
to help it do so effectively. 

The newly emerging nation of Bangladesh is fac- 
ing an extremely complex range of human problems. 
Certainly the potential for catastrophic suffering is 
unparalleled in modern history. But the end of the 
present crisis appears to be approaching. Unless 
another natural disaster should strike, Bangladesh 
should, by the spring of 1973, be emerging from the 
relief stage and launched upon a period of recon- 
struction and development. The United Nations 
coordinating organization, UNROD (United Nations 
Relief Operation, Dacca), is expecting to turn over 
its major responsibilities to the Government of 
Bangladesh next spring and to leave to the regular 
UN agencies tasks such as they have traditionally 
undertaken in this and other developing countries. 

Bangladesh is now turning to a new task in a new 
set of circumstances. Serious problems will un- 
questionably arise and there will be many hard de- 
cisions to make. We believe that the United States 
can contribute to this difficult — even dangerous — 
transition in a number of useful ways. We shall spell 
out our suggestions in some detail in a report to 
Mr. Maurice J. Williams, your Coordinator for U.S. 
Humanitarian Assistance for South Asia. 

Our visit has underlined for us the importance of 
your request for $100 million of grant aid for Bangla- 
desh for the current fiscal year and the necessity 
that the Congress act favorably upon that request. 
We urge that, in addition, appropriate amounts of 
PL-480 foodstuffs be earmarked for Bangladesh. 

From the observation of the performance of the 
remarkably vigorous staff — all in their early thirties 
— of the A.I.D. office in Dacca, we are confident that 
these funds will be imaginatively and effectively 

We believe on the basis of preliminary projections 
we have seen that the proposals for fiscal 1974 will 
set forth the basis for an effective development pro- 
gram for Bangladesh. 

We wish to express our appreciation of the oppor- 
tunity you have given us to serve you in an endeavor 
that reflects great credit on our country and its 
humanitarian traditions. 
Faithfully yours, 

Jeanne R. Ferst. 
Glen Haydon. 
Joseph E. Johnson. 
Maxwell Rabb, 


Department of State Bulletin 


Department Discusses Grievance Procedures for the Foreign Service 

Statement by William B. Macomber 
Deputy Under Secretary for Management * 

I welcome this opportunity to report on 
the steps the Department of State has taken 
to institute modern grievance procedures 
and to present our position with respect to 
grievance legislation. 

Let me say at the outset that we support 
the enactment of legislation embodying the 
basic principles of a sound grievance proce- 
dure as an amendment to the Foreign Service 
Act before the present Congress adjourns. 
However, we remain strongly opposed to the 
bills presently before the committee, both 
because they are too detailed and because 
they contain a number of provisions which 
we think are unsound. 

Before turning to a discussion of the legis- 
lation, I should like briefly to provide some 
background; for this has been a period of 
rapid and important change within the De- 
partment of State. 

Soon after entering my current assign- 
ment I concluded that the Department was 
faced with two serious "lags." The first was 
with respect to the modernization of the 
management of the Department; that is, the 
way we manage our substantive responsibili- 
ties. The second was with respect to devel- 

' Made before the Subcommittee on State Depart- 
ment Organization and Foreign Operations of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Sept. 28. 
The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

opment of a modern system of human rela- 

Our situation was not unique, of course, 
for most large institutions suffer from both a 
management gap and a human relations gap. 
But our situation was exacerbated by the 
fact that the nature and scope of diplomacy 
had, until World War II, been one of the most 
static and unchanging of all human endeav- 
ors for hundreds of years. Thus, while all 
institutions have had to deal with the Rapid- 
ity of change in recent times, our problem 
was compounded by the extraordinary ab- 
sence of change in the previous centuries. 

On earlier occasions I have discussed with 
this subcommittee the efforts we have made 
to close the managerial gap. Through a 
unique and far-reaching in-house reform pro- 
gram (manned not by outside experts, but 
by large numbers of our own career pro- 
fessionals) we have made major progress in 
the past two years. This has involved over 
400 reforms in our management system, in- 
cluding development of a new Department- 
wide programing system, restructuring of 
the senior echelon of the Department, crea- 
tion of a new inspection system which deals 
with policy (rather than just people and 
accounts), as well as extensive changes in 
our recruiting system, in our promotion sys- 
tem, and the like. 

Despite what we have achieved, this man- 
agerial gap will in the long run be the more 
difficult to solve, because in so many respects 

October 30, 1972 


it must be a pioneering effort. At the risk 
of being undiplomatic with my diplomatic 
colleagues from other nations, let me point 
out that there are no "modern" foreign 
offices anywhere. The truth is that all for- 
eign offices have a far better idea of what 
their job used to be than what it is today. 

In times past, governments traditionally 
dealt with each other almost exclusively 
through their respective foreign offices and 
their embassies, which were branches of 
those foreign offices. 

Now all governments not only have much 
more extensive and active contacts abroad, 
but these are carried out by almost every ele- 
ment of their respective executive branches. 
State departments and foreign offices no 
longer have the exclusive patent in this field 
they once had. This certainly does not mean 
that their job is less important; in fact it is 
undoubtedly more important. But it does 
mean the job is different and more difficult, 
and no nation has really yet sorted out in a 
final sense how to coordinate and manage its 
foreign affairs in the years ahead. This 
means that the abler foreign offices every- 
where are in a state of uncertainty and 
change as they seek to define their new role 
and gear up effectively to play this role. And 
this process is going to continue for a num- 
ber of years to come. 

Employee-Management Relations System 

In the human relations field, however, the 
situation is quite different. Whereas there 
are no modern foreign offices to pattern our 
progress on in a managerial sense, there are 
many institutions which have licked the prob- 
lem of modern and fair human relations. So 
here we do not have to pioneer. Here we can 
draw heavily on, and borrow and adopt from, 
the extensive experience and examples 
already available to us. 

With respect to the human relations gap, 
we have already made very considerable 
progress. In this effort, we are focusing pri- 
marily on two critically important steps. 

The first of these is the establishment of 

an effective employee-management relations 
system which will deal with general person- 
nel policy matters and give members of the 
Foreign Service, as a whole, real "clout" or 
voice in these matters. The second is the 
establishment of an effective and credible 
grievance system which will deal fairly with 
individual employee grievances. 

We have created an employee-management 
relations system specially tailored to the For- 
eign Service and built around the framework 
of Executive Order 11636.2 Two employee 
organizations, the American Foreign Service 
Association (AFSA) and the American Fed- 
eration of Government Employees, Local 
1534 (AFGE), are on the ballot for an elec- 
tion which will formally begin no later than 
October 16 and which will determine whether 
either of these organizations will be chosen 
by State Department employees of the For- 
eign Service to be their exclusive representa- 
tive in dealing with management in per- 
sonnel matters. 

Under Executive Order 11636 the person- 
nel officials of the Department are required 
to consult with the exclusive representative 
(assuming one is chosen) on personnel poli- 
cies which either the Department or the 
employees wish to change. If these consulta- 
tions do not result in agreement, the employ- 
ees' representative can appeal the decisions 
of the Department's administrative officials 
to the Board of the Foreign Service, which 
has two subgroups to help it carry out its 
responsibilities under the Executive order. 

I wish to emphasize that both of these 
groups are independent of the personnel 
management of the Department. Thus, the 
three-member Employee-Management Rela- 
tions Commission is made up of representa- 
tives of the Department of Labor, the Civil 
Service Commission, and the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget. This Commission has 
the final say with respect to the supervision 
of elections and the adjudication of unfair 
labor practice complaints. 

' For text of the Executive order, see Bulletin 
of Feb. 14, 1972, p. 213. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The second subgroup is the Disputes Panel. 
Its function is to make findings of facts and 
seek a solution through mediation when the 
administrative authorities of the Depart- 
ment are unable to reach agreement with 
the exclusive representative of the members 
of the Foreign Sei'vice. Once again, the ma- 
jority of the five-member Disputes Panel 
comes from "outside" the Department, since 
it is made up of one member from the De- 
partment of Labor, one from the Federal 
Service Impasses Panel, one from the public, 
and two from the Foreign Service. Neither 
of these latter two can be a management 
official, confidential employee, or an employee 
organization official. If the Panel fails in 
its mediation efforts, it must then recommend 
an appropriate solution to the Board of the 
Foreign Service. 

The subcommittee should note that if the 
employee representatives desire a change 
in personnel policies they themselves can take 
the initiative in calling for consultations, and 
if following these consultations personnel 
authorities remain in disagreement with the 
employee proposals, the same appeal system 

These arrangements, which we are now in 
the process of inaugurating, have a strange 
ring to diplomats of an older era — and even 
to some of the present day. But I believe the 
key to having a strong and disciplined For- 
eign Service is to have a fair Service and an 
essential ingredient to a fair Service is the 
development of the kind of an employee- 
management relations system which we are 
now inaugurating. 

Interim Grievance Procedure 

The second crucial step in developing a 
modern human relations system in the De- 
partment is the development of a sound and 
modern grievance procedure. 

Although I set up the office of ombudsman 
soon after I entered on this job, until our 
more recent changes the formal Foreign 
Service grievance system was a limited one 
and was not independent of the Depart- 

ment's personnel authorities. Nor were the 
individual's rights clearly defined and under- 
stood. As I have frequently stated, this was 
supplemented through the years by an in- 
formal system in which I believe a real effort 
was made to be fair but which was neither 
independent of the personnel authorities nor 
charactei-ized by a specific definition of the 
rights of an aggrieved employee. I do not 
myself for a moment believe that the Depart- 
ment was run over the years as unfairly as 
some of its critics have charged, but there is 
no denying that the old system was paternal- 
istic and rectification of error was often 
dependent on the good will and intervention 
of senior officials. Such a system is not ac- 
ceptable or credible for today. 

In the spring of 1971 we were working out 
with the Federal Labor Relations Council 
our new employee-management relations sys- 
tem, subsequently promulgated in Executive 
Order 11636. At the same time as we were 
consulting with AFSA and AFGE regarding 
the development of this system, we were also 
consulting with them on a new detailed griev- 
ance procedure which we wished to have in- 
cluded in the same order. However, at that 
time we were informed by the staff of the 
Federal Labor Relations Council that a de- 
tailed grievance procedure should not be 
included in the Executive order but rather 
that this was precisely the type of thing that 
should be subsequently developed by, and 
worked out under, the new employee-manage- 
ment relations system which the Executive 
order was creating. Thus, at the staff's sug- 
gestion we did not attempt to include a 
definitive grievance procedure in the Execu- 
tive order, but instead included language in 
the order which said in effect that once an 
organization had been elected to be the ex- 
clusive representative of the employees one 
of the early orders of business under the new 
order would be the working out of a defini- 
tive grievance procedure. We therefore dis- 
continued our discussions with the employee 
organizations concerning a new grievance 
procedure until an election under the new 
order could be held. 

October 30, 1972 


However, fairly soon after this we realized 
that there would be delays in the issuance of 
the Executive order and that considerable 
additional time would be needed to imple- 
ment its requirements and arrange for the 
election, due in part to the right of the par- 
ties to raise issues as to voter eligibility 
under the terms of the Executive order. This 
would mean that for at least some time there 
would be no negotiation of a permanent de- 
finitive grievance procedure. 

In view of this we unilaterally instituted, 
as an interim device, an interim grievance 
procedure designed to operate until it could 
be replaced by a definitive procedure bar- 
gained out by the management of the De- 
partment and the elected employee organi- 

The Foreign Service grievance procedure 
now in effect, while interim, is an important 
first step in the evolution of a definitive 
grievance system and is more progressive 
than that available to many others in and 
out of government. It is presided over by Mr. 
William Simkin, who was previously for eight 
years the Director of the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service. We believe that 
the record now developed under this system 
clearly establishes that these procedures pro- 
vide the four basic elements essential to 
any effective grievance system; namely, fair- 
ness, impartiality, independent decisions, and 
effective relief. 

In summary, here are the more important 
provisions of the interim grievance proce- 
dures which are now in effect: 

— With certain stated exceptions, the 
grievance regulations permit any Foreign 
Service officer or employee of any of the 
three foreign affairs agencies, in Washington 
or abroad, to file a grievance on any matter 
of concern or dissatisfaction to the employee 
which is subject to control of his agency. 
The list of matters not grievable is a short 
one, and all the matters excluded are also 
excluded in the Civil Service Commission 
grievance system. 

(Parenthetically, but of critical impor- 
tance, I can report to the subcommittee that 

the most criticized exclusions — nonselection 
for promotion and selection-out — do not de- 
serve their reputation. From the beginning 
these exclusions have themselves been subject 
to the exception that grievances concerning 
nonpromotion and selection-out may be pur- 
sued if related to "a specific inaccuracy, 
error, or falsely prejudicial statement in (a) 
performance file, including efficiency re- 
ports." As of September 1, fully 60 percent 
of all formal grievances filed with the Board 
related to selection-out or nonpromotion. Of 
the six selection-out cases decided by the 
Board, four were set aside. Of the 39 cases 
filed with the Board otherwise related to 
nonpromotion, only four have been ruled not 
in the Board's jurisdiction. Similarly, as- 
signments are grievable if the grievance 
related to an alleged violation of a specific 

— They provide guarantees of freedom 
from fear of any interference, restraint, co- 
ercion, or reprisal for grievants, their repre- 
sentatives, and any witnesses participating 
in a grievance. 

— They provide informal procedures, 
which our experience to date in Washington 
shows result in resolution some 63 percent 
of the time. But the Grievance Board can 
waive the informal stage if it determines 
that resort to it would be futile. 

— They established a Grievance Board in- 
dependent of management, with two public 
members, two members from each foreign 
affairs agency, and an outside Chairman. 
The agencies designate their members, the 
Secretary appoints the Chairman, and the 
Chairman appoints the public members. The 
Chairman and all of the members, including 
the public members, are appointed from lists 
which must first be presented to the employee 
organizations for approval or rejection of 
each name on the list. At this point I should 
emphasize the Department's strong convic- 
tion concerning the desirability of, as here, a 
judicial-type board rather than a tripartite 
board where two of the three members are 
representatives of the two parties to the 
grievance. Under that system the chairman 


Department of State Bulletin 

is the only independent judge and inevitably 
is under pressure from each of his associate 
board members to reach a decision favorable 
to the opposing interest they represent. In 
such a situation the likely result is that the 
chairman acts as a broker, seeking compro- 
mise solutions. Under our system no mem- 
ber of the Board is an advocate of either side. 
All owe their positions to the approval of 
both the employees and management, and all 
are operating in a judicial rather than a 
representative capacity. 

— The Grievance Board has independent 
staff and outside counsel. The Board is au- 
thorized to promulgate its own internal pro- 
cedures for the conduct of investigations, 
interviews, and hearings, and under this au- 
thority it has adopted a rule which not only 
guarantees freedom from agency domination 
but even the appearance of agency domina- 
tion. Agency members do not investigate or 
sit on panels which consider grievances from 
their own agency; i.e., when the Board is 
investigating or holding a panel hearing of a 
State Department grievance, only a public 
member or a member from USIA or AID 
may conduct the investigation and only a 
public member and two non-State Depart- 
ment members may sit on a hearing panel. 

— They provide for a grievant to be ac- 
companied, represented, and advised by an 
employee organization representative and up 
to two more representatives of the grievant's 
own choosing during all stages of presenta- 
tion of the grievance. 

— The grievant and his representative or 
representatives are allowed reasonable time 
in duty status to participate in, and to pre- 
pare for participation in, a formal grievance. 

— In grievance hearings the grievant may 
call witnesses and cross-examine witnesses 
called by the Board or the agency. 

— The grievant and his representative may 
have access to such official agency records as 
the Board deems necessary for an adequate 
presentation of the grievance. 

— Refusal by an agency to provide a record 
(or an appropriate summary of a classified 
or privileged document) requested by the 

Board or to make available a witness in per- 
son or, where impractical, by deposition or 
interrogatories, may be deemed by the 
Board to constitute an admission by the 
agency of the truth of the grievant's allega- 
tion concerning that record or the testimony 
of that witness. 

— They grant authority to the Board, in 
deciding grievances, to order (up to the limits 
of the agency head's authority) a wide range 
of remedies. Under this authority the Board 
has, for example, ordered the removal of 
reports from personnel files, extended an 
officer's time in class, placed its recommenda- 
tions for promotion in the files reviewed by 
selection boards, and urged special considera- 
tion of an officer in making assignments. (In 
grievances where the remedy would involve 
promotion, reassignment, or disciplinary ac- 
tion the Board may only make recommenda- 
tions to the head of the agency. The record 
discloses that to date every such recommen- 
dation has been adopted by the Secretary of 

— The record of proceedings of the* Board, 
which is available to the grievant and his 
representative at all stages of the Board's 
consideration of a formal grievance, is re- 
tained and held in confidence by the Board. 

Mr. Chairman, at the time they were 
issued, these grievance procedures were sub- 
stantially in advance of those in effect in 
most other agencies of the government. As 
Mr. [Raymond] Jacobson of the Civil Serv- 
ice Commission has testified, and subsequent 
to the institution of the interim grievance 
procedures, Executive Order 11941 (which 
governs employee-management relations for 
other than the Foreign Service) was 
amended to require agencies and unions to 
develop grievance procedures through nego- 
tiated agreement. As a result, a number of 
other agencies of the government are making 
progress in the area of grievance procedures. 
But we still believe that our interim griev- 
ance procedures remain in the forefront with 
respect to the four elements which I listed 
earlier; i.e., fairness, impartiality, independ- 
ent decisions, and effective relief. 

October 30, 1972 


Having spoken to the principles which un- 
derlie our interim system, let me turn now to 
the question of how in fact this system has 
been working. 

As of September 20 a total of 132 griev- 
ances (out of a State Department Foreign 
Service corps of approximately 7,000) have 
been received by the Director of Personnel 
of the Department for final informal review. 
This review has already been completed in 
113 of these cases. Almost two-thirds of 
these have been resolved without being ap- 
pealed to the Board. The overwhelming ma- 
jority of the informal grievances received to 
date relate to either errors, inaccuracies, or 
falsely prejudicial statements in efficiency 
reports or a technical violation in the prepa- 
ration and submission of these reports. The 
nature of the remaining grievances varies 
widely, involving such matters as denial of 
claims and allowances, discrimination be- 
cause of age, security violations, assignments 
to other agencies, et cetera. 

As to the success of the Board which con- 
siders formal grievances, the best evidence is 
the statement to this subcommittee submit- 
ted by Mr. William E. Simkin, the Chairman 
of the Foreign Service Grievance Board, and 
the additional testimony of Mr. Alexander 
Porter, a public member of the Board. As 
can be seen from that testimony, the Board is 
handling cases, is making decisions, and is 
providing redress. 

I might mention, parenthetically, that — 
perhaps not surprisingly — the most sensitive 
of the Board's decisions have been those 
recommending immediate redress promo- 
tions without further reference to a Selec- 
tion Board. Within the Foreign Service of 
the Department of State, there have been 
two of these to date. As I have mentioned, 
the Secretary accepted both of these recom- 
mendations; and on September 19 these nom- 
inations were submitted to the Senate for 
confirmation. (During this period, there 
have been two additional redress promotions, 
one growing out of an equal employment 
opportunity complaint and one from a griev- 
ance brought under the old formal grievance 

regulations.) My impression is that when 
faced with redress promotions, the leader- 
ship of the Department is more comfortable 
in accepting these recommendations than are 
many members of the Foreign Service. I my- 
self favor them because I believe that in cer- 
tain cases there is no other meaningful re- 
dress available. 

Principles for Grievance Legislation 

Mr. Chairman, as you and the other mem- 
bers of this subcommittee know, from the 
time of the introduction into the Congress 
of the first of the various bills which would 
prescribe in detail grievance procedures for 
the Foreign Service, the position of the De- 
partment of State and of the executive 
branch as a whole was that (taking a leaf 
from the private sector) a definitive griev- 
ance procedure could most appropriately be 
developed through the employee-manage- 
ment relations system; that it should be 
bargained out there rather than be unilat- 
erally imposed by legislation; that once such 
a system had been bargained out, however, 
the Department would be prepared to sup- 
port legislation in the form of an amendment 
to the Foreign Service Act incorporating the 
general principles of that grievance proce- 
dure. We stated this in the comments of the 
executive branch on S. 2023 to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in Septem- 
ber of 1971, and I reiterated this position in 
my testimony to that committee in October 
1971. As recently as February 15, 1972, 
Secretary Rogers urged the Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee not to proceed with legisla- 
tion at that time, while restating his personal 
support for later legislation incorporating 
the basic principles of the bargained-out 
definitive procedures as an amendment to the 
Foreign Service Act. 

It became increasingly clear, however, that 
certain members of Congress were anxious 
to enact legislation before the employee- 
management relations system could produce 
a definitive grievance procedure. It also be- 
came clear that, as Under Secretary for 


Department of State Bulletin 

Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson reported 
to the Secretary, a broad consensus existed 
within the Foreign Service itself favoring 
the adoption of grievance legislation at this 
time. Ambassador Johnson indicated that he 
personally also believed "that such legisla- 
tion properly drafted is desirable." 

As a result, in April of this year Secre- 
tary Rogers wrote the chairmen of both the 
Foreign Relations Committee and the For- 
eign Affairs Committee stating that we had 
"now concluded that legislation setting 
forth general principles for a grievance pro- 
cedure . . . would be desirable at this time." 
What in effect he was saying was that while 
the Department initially preferred legisla- 
tion incorporating general principles after 
the bargaining process was completed, we 
would now support general legislation before 
that process — as long as it was limited to 
general principles and still allowed the par- 
ties to work out a mutually acceptable de- 
tailed system. As you know from Mr. Jacob- 
son's testimony, while the Civil Service Com- 
mission still does not agree with our position 
and would prefer no legislation, it has been 
willing to defer to the views of the Depart- 
ment of State and the other agencies directly 

Mr. Chairman, both as the principal rep- 
resentative of the executive branch at these 
hearings and personally, I am here seeking 
legislation — and that legislation now. But I 
would be irresponsible in both capacities if I 
did not forcefully convey to the members of 
this subcommittee my own conviction, that 
of Secretary Rogers, and of the administra- 
tion that such legislation should be a state- 
ment of principles within which the proper 
parties — the representatives of the employees 
and the management of the agencies affected 
— are directed to work out detailed proce- 

The key to the development of a sound 
grievance procedure is that it should be a 
mutual product of employees and manage- 
ment and the result of a bargaining process. 
This is the traditional manner in which griev- 
ance procedures are developed in this coun- 

try; and influenced by the provisions already 
incorporated in our interim grievance pro- 
cedure, a number of progressive grievance 
procedures are being bargained out else- 
where in our government in just this manner 
and without the existence of any legislation. 

I am opposed to the legislation before you 
because it circumvents and aborts this bar- 
gaining process, because it is much too de- 
tailed to be wise legislative practice, and be- 
cause it is unsound, in my judgment, in a 
number of its provisions. 

There are some who would lead the Con- 
gress and the press to believe that our oppo- 
sition to the legislation stems from a desire 
to resist change and to preserve against all 
efforts an archaic and outmoded personnel 
system. But the record of the Department's 
leadership in the past few years belies this 
charge. We have not resisted change; we 
have sought it in the grievance area and in 
many other areas. 

With specific reference to grievance pro- 
cedures, the Department has in fact been a 
pioneer in developing the provisions of a 
modern system and in this respect is, as I 
have already stressed, in advance of many 
other elements of the executive branch. On 
the basis of this record and on the basis of 
our recent and active experience with the im- 
plementation of modern grievance proce- 
dures, I respectfully suggest that our objec- 
tions to the proposed legislation are entitled 
to careful consideration. Similarly, I would 
urge the committee to act favorably on our 
suggestions with respect to what should be 
included in any grievance legislation enacted 
at this time. 

Mr. Chairman, with respect to the latter, 
we believe the legislation in the form of an 
amendment to the Foreign Service Act should 
include the following: 

1. A statutory requirement that the Secre- 
tary of State establish a grievance system for 
the Foreign Service. 

2. That this system be established, and 
thereafter modified, through the bargaining 
process with the appropriate employee or- 
ganization under Executive Order 11636. 

October 30, 1972 


3. That this system include an impartial 
board for the consideration of formal griev- 

4. That all members of this board shall 
personally be independent of the manage- 
ment of the foreign affairs agencies involved. 

5. That all members be appointed by the 
Secretary of State with the concurrence of 
the exclusive representative (or representa- 
tives) of the officers and employees of the 
Foreign Service, if such is chosen. 

6. Among other matters, the board should 
be empowered: 

a. To have access to all materials which, 
in its judgment, are necessary to reach a 
determination on a grievance, unless the Sec- 
retary, in the case of classified, privileged, or 
otherwise sensitive matters, finds that dis- 
closure would not be in the public interest; 
in such a case, however, the board may in 
its discretion deem as admitted any allega- 
tion of the grievant concerning such mate- 

b. To hold a formal evidentiary hearing 
when the grievant has exhausted his avenues 
of informal appeal or when the board deter- 
mines that processing the grievance infor- 
mally would be fruitless; 

c. To have any hearing transcribed verba- 
tim and made a part of the record; and 

d. Under extraordinary circumstances, to 
make a preliminary recommendation, before 
final determination of a grievance, that the 
Secretary suspend an act when it determines 
that the grievant will otherwise suffer irrep- 
arable harm if his grievance should prevail 
on the merits. 

7. That the term "grievance" be defined 
broadly as any matter resulting from denial 
of due process or from an arbitrary act 
adversely affecting an employee in the Serv- 
ice, excluding substantive aspects of foreign 
policy, general management policies, matters 
for which procedures for review and redress 
are already provided by law, and any mat- 
ters specified for exclusion after consultation 
with employee organizations as required by 
Executive order. 

8. Employees should be guaranteed the 
following rights: 

a. To be free from any restraint, interfer- 
ence, coercion, discrimination, or reprisal in 
or by reason of the presentation, appearance 
as a witness, or other official involvement in 
a grievance proceeding; 

b. To have a formal evidentiary hearing in 
any major case if desired by the grievant; 

c. To present a grievance in person and to 
be accompanied by counsel or other repre- 
sentatives of the grievant's own choosing at 
every stage in the proceeding; 

d. To call and examine witnesses in the 
grievant's behalf at hearings before the 
board and to cross-examine all other wit- 

e. To have access to all evidence consid- 
ered by the board in reaching a determina- 
tion, including a verbatim transcript if there 
is one. 

9. That where the board determines that 
appropriate relief is any action other than 
promotion, reassignment, or disciplinary 
action, its decisions shall be final, conclusive, 
and binding on all parties. Where the board 
determines that promotion, reassignment, or 
disciplinary action is the proper remedy in 
any case, it shall certify to the Secretary its 
findings, recommendations, case records, and 
any transcripts of hearings. The Secretary's 
decision then becomes final, conclusive, and 
binding on the parties. 

10. That the system include informal pro- 
cedures for resolution of a grievance prior 
to submission of a grievance to the board. 

Having listed these principles, I now turn 
to our objections to the bills presently pend- 
ing before the committee. While they differ 
in some details, most attention has been 
devoted to that proposed legislation currently 
embodied in S. 3722 and H.R. 15457, so I 
shall limit my prepared observations to these, 
while being willing to respond to any ques- 
tions which members may have concerning 
the other bills where they may differ. 

Under these bills a Foreign Service em- 
ployee could bring a complaint objecting to 


Department of State Bulletin 

— almost literally — anything. According to 
the language contained in the bills' defini- 
tion of a grievance, a complainant could 
bring an action against any assignment 
which is proposed for him. He could bring 
an action against an assignment which has 
been given to another employee which the 
grievant thinks he should have had instead. 
Similarly, grievants could bring actions for 
their own failure to be promoted and also 
against the promotion of someone else. Com- 
plaints could be brought against almost any 
form of oral or written criticism of the com- 
plainant or, indeed, against oral or written 
praise of any other employee. 

Since exceptions formerly expressed in a 
similar bill, S. 2659, do not appear in the 
proposed legislation, there is a danger that 
complaints might even relate to the substan- 
tive aspects of the President's foreign policy 
and to general management policies of the 
foreign affairs agencies. Grievance proce- 
dures for individuals are singularly inappro- 
priate for both of these subjects. The con- 
sultations with recognized employee organi- 
zations required under Executive Order 
11636 are specifically designed for collective 
comment by employees on the content of per- 
sonnel policies. 

Once a complaint is filed the whole ma- 
chinery would inevitably be brought into 
play, since a formal hearing would be re- 
quired in every case. Many man-hours would 
be required for the complainant and manage- 
ment to prepare for and participate in these 
hearings. The complainant has the right of 
unlimited interrogatories and depositions of 
anyone under the control, supervision, or re- 
sponsibility of the Department, without the 
need of board approval. A multiplicity of 
departmental witnesses for both the com- 
plainant and the defendant could be expected. 

The burden on management and person- 
nel officials would be further increased by 
these bills since they would make the pro- 
cedures available to litigate alleged griev- 
ances of former Foreign Service personnel 
(or their survivors) dating back to 1946, of 
whom there are over 40,000. 

The board would be given the power to 
order the Department to suspend any action 
which is related to, or may affect, a griev- 
ance pending before the board. Under this 
authority the urgent dispatch of an officer 
abroad could be held up if another officer 
desired the assignment and filed an action 
with the board. The promotions of hundreds 
of officers could be held up on the complaint 
of a single individual. An ambassador could 
be required to retain an officer on his staff 
whom the ambassador had found completely 
unsuitable. There are no exceptions to the 
board's power in this regard. 

These bills give the board plenary author- 
ity to direct the Secretary to grant such re- 
lief as it deems proper, with the exception 
that if the relief to be granted relates directly 
to pi'omotion, assignment, or selection-out, 
the Secretary could decline to accept a recom- 
mendation of the board if — and only if — in a 
fully documented statement personally 
signed by him and furnished to the grievant, 
he determines that "the foreign policy or 
security of the United States will be ad- 
versely affected." While this language pur- 
ports to give the Secretary some discretion, 
it is in fact a serious and undesirable inva- 
sion of necessary management discretion. 

As noted earlier in my statement, we seri- 
ously disagree with the wisdom of creating 
a tripartite adversary board. In such a board, 
as I have indicated, two of the three members 
tend to represent the respective points of 
view of opposing parties, and the outcome 
may often be a compromise decision, bro- 
kered out by the third member, except where 
the grievance is one of obvious merit or 
patent frivolity. Rather, as I have stated 
earlier, we recommend a board in which each 
member acts in a judicial capacity — not as 
a representative of either of the employee or 

In addition, we have another serious ob- 
jection to a tripartite board, which is that it 
is inherently inefficient. No one member is 
likely to be designated to conduct a pre- 
hearing conference, examine evidence, or 
perform other functions on behalf of the 

October 30, 1972 


board. Virtually all activities require the 
presence of all three members. This severely 
limits the number of cases that the board will 
be able to handle or will result in the prolif- 
eration of three-man panels. 

Apart from these general considerations, 
the particular panel provided for in the bill 
is specifically objectionable. Under the em- 
ployee-management relations system, For- 
eign Service employees of each of the foreign 
affairs agencies have the right to vote for an 
organization that has qualified for a place on 
the ballot to be their exclusive representative. 
They also have the right to vote against ex- 
clusive representation by any organization. 

If different organizations were to win rep- 
resentation elections in each of the foreign 
affairs agencies it would appear that three 
different panels would be needed. This could 
be avoided only if the different organizations 
all chose the same representative on the 
panel. Thus, similar grievance complaints 
could result in widely inconsistent results. 
Considering the seemingly limitless defini- 
tion of "grievance," cumulative inconsist- 
encies among the grievance decisions of the 
three agencies might well result. 

While there are a number of technical 
deficiencies concerning which we shall be 
glad to confer with the staff of the subcom- 
mittee, I shall make one final comment. These 
bills continue to vest in grievants an im- 
proper election of remedies. The Secretary 
should be able to exclude entirely from the 
grievance procedure matters for which 
another adequate remedy exists under law or 
regulation. On the other hand, under section 
693 of these bills, an employee could inad- 
vertently lose important rights, such as 
rights of appeal under the Veterans' Prefei'- 
ence Act in separation cases, simply by filing 
a grievance. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the com- 
mittee, as you know there has been consid- 
erable public attention given to some of the 
matters that I have been discussing today; 
but rarely, if ever, have I seen an objective 
accounting of what is being accomplished. 
While much remains to be done, I hope very 

much that the controversy over the particu- 
lar issue we are discussing today has not left 
an exaggerated view in the public mind of 
the discontent in the Foreign Service. In 
this connection, I think it is worth noting 
that the voluntary attrition rate for Foreign 
Service officers in fiscal year 1972, when 
this controversy was at its height, was only 
one-third of that of the Federal Government 
as a whole, and approximately one-ninth of 
that in nongovernment manufacturing in- 
dustries. The attrition figures for the For- 
eign Service were 2.6 percent, for the Fed- 
eral Government as a whole 8 percent, and 
for nongovernment manufacturing indus- 
tries 23.9 percent. 

Against this background I can also report 
that while for the first seven months of the 
operation of our present grievance procedure 
there were some 78 formal cases filed with 
the Grievance Board (from all three foreign 
affairs agencies), in the last seven weeks 
only two additional cases have been filed. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion let me make 
this final comment. I have great respect for 
Senator Cooper and Senator Bayh, and I 
know that through their proposed legislation 
they are, in the midst of other heavy burdens, 
sincerely seeking to strengthen the Foreign 
Service. That is also this subcommittee's 
objective, and this is Secretary Rogers' and 
my objective as well. It is also the objective 
of a good many others who have been in- 
volved in this controversy. The argument 
has not been over the end, but over the means 
to that end. 

In this connection there is one final reason 
I oppose the Cooper-Bayh bill. In the long 
run the most important step we can take to 
assure a fairer Foreign Service personnel 
system is to build, as we are doing at this 
time, a meaningful employee-management 
relations system. With the development of 
such a system we will have something the 
Foreign Service has never had before — es- 
tablished institutional procedures which 
guarantee to the members of the Service a 
meaningful voice in personnel policy mat- 
ters. In this human relations area, I regard 


Department of State Bulletin 

the development of this system as poten- 
tially the single most significant accomplish- 
ment of the period during which I have 
served as Deputy Under Secretary. 

I believe that all who are interested in 
building a stronger, fairer Foreign Service 
should refrain from taking any steps which 
would undermine this system. I can think of 
few steps better calculated to do just that 
than the enactment at this time of detailed 
grievance legislation. In the months and 
years ahead, the employee-management rela- 
tions system should deal with many key 
personnel policy problems, but few if any 
will exceed in importance the joint working 
out of an acceptable and effective grievance 
procedure. That is exactly the type of prob- 
lem the system is designed for. If, however, 
right at the start either of the two parties in 
the system, the employees or management, 
finds that they can run to the Hill and uni- 
laterally impose a solution outside the sys- 
tem, then the system will have been badly 
damaged before it has really got underway. 
For this is a tactic not just open to one 
side. If certain employees are successful on 
this occasion, surely management can be so 
on others. 

All life is a balancing of priorities; and if 
the Foreign Service were currently without 
any meaningful grievance system or pros- 
pect of achieving one, then perhaps unilat- 
eral and detailed legislative action, whatever 
its cost to the new employee-management re- 
lations system, would be justified. But this 
is patently not the case. Clearly we already 
have grievance procedures which are in the 
forefront of those in the Federal Govern- 
ment. Elections have been called, and a first 
order of business after the results are known 
will be the replacement of these progressive 
but interim procedures by ones mutually de- 
veloped in this new employee-management 

Given this situation, I respectfully urge 
that Congress enact general legislation em- 
bodying the principles I have outlined. I 
urge this committee to reject detailed legisla- 
tion which would preempt decisions which 

should be made by the employee-management 
relations system and thereby undermine this 
vitally important institution just as it is 
getting underway. 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vi- 
enna September 28, 1970.' 

Acceptances deposited: Cameroon, Saudi Arabia, 
October 6, 1972. 


Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971.' 
Signature: Australia, October 12, 1972. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 
Ratification deposited: Colombia, September 6, 

Accession deposited: Portugal, September 13, 1972. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done 
at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 
21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 
Accession deposited: Austria, August 4, 1972. 
Extension by the United Kingdom to: Hong Kong, 
August 16, 1972. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pol- 
lution of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at Lon- 
don May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 
1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. 
TIAS 4900, 6109. 

Acceptance deposited: Fiji (with a declaration 
and reservations), August 15, 1972. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 

' Not in force. 

October 30, 1972 


prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Done at London Oc- 
tober 21, 1969> 

Acceptances deposited: Egypt, August 14, 1972; 
Fiji, August 15, 1972. 

International convention on civil liability for oil pol- 
lution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 
Accession deposited: Fiji, August 15, 1972. 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.' 
Accession deposited: Fiji, August 15, 1972. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 

sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into 

force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 

Acceptances deposited: Austria, August 4, 1972; 
Fiji (with a declaration), August 15, 1972. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London November 30, 1966.' 

Acceptance deposited: Fiji, August 15, 1972. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 25, 1967.' 

Acceptances deposited: Egypt, Augrust 14, 1972; 
Fiji, August 15, 1972. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London November 26, 1968.' 

Acceptances deposited: Egypt, August 14, 1972; 
Fiji, August 15, 1972. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Fiji, August 15, 1972. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement 
of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London 
June 23, 1969.' 
Accession deposited: Iraq, August 29, 1972. 

China, Republic of 

Agreement correcting the agreement of December 
30, 1971 (TIAS 7249), relating to trade in cotton 
textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington October 4, 1972. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 4, 1972. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of August 4, 1967 
(TIAS 6314). Signed at Washington October 13, 
1972. Entered into force October 13, 1972. 

Khmer Republic 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of January 13, 1972 (TIAS 
7269). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom 
Penh October 2, 1972. Entered into force October 
2, 1972. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of May 17, 1972. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Montevideo September 

25, 1972. Entered into force September 25, 1972. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of April 19, 1972 (TIAS 
7322). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon 
September 26, 1972. Entered into force September 

26, 1972. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of July 8, 1970 (TIAS 
6983). Signed at Saigon October 2, 1972. Entered 
into force October 2, 1972. 




Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Brussels July 9, 1970. 
Entered into force October 13, 1972. 
Proclaimed by the President: September 25, 1972. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Can- 
ada-United States committee on water quality in 
the St. John River and its tributary rivers and 
streams which cross the Canada-United States 
boundary, with annex. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Ottawa September 21, 1972. Entered into 
force September 21, 1972. 

' Not in force. 

Position of Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Canadian Affairs Established 

The Department of State announced on October 6 
the establishment of the new position of Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Canadian Affairs in its 
European Affairs Bureau. Rufus Z. Smith, Minister 
at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, has been named to 
assume this position. (For biographic data, see 
Department of State press release dated October 6.) 

The establishment of this new position reflects 
the importance and multiplicity of U.S. relations 
with Canada. Each country is the other's largest 
trading partner, for example, and the number of 
cross-border visits made by Americans and Canadians 
each year now exceeds 70 million. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX October 30, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 17 W 

Africa. Commodity Problems: A Key to Re- 
lations With Africa (Newsom) 498 

Asia. Emergency Assistance Programs for 
South Asia (exchange of letters between 
President Nixon and members of Advisory 
Panel) 503 

Bangladesh. Emergency Assistance Programs 
for South Asia (exchange of letters between 
President Nixon and members of Advisory 
Panel) 503 

Canada. Position of Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for Canadian Affairs Established . . 516 

China. Trade in the Context of United States 
Relations With the People's Republic of 
China (Green) 489 


Department Discusses Grievance Procedures 

for the Foreign Service (Macomber) . . 505 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to UNESCO 

General Conference 497 

Department and Foreign Service 

Department Discusses Grievance Procedures 
for the Foreign Service (Macomber) . . 505 

Position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Canadian Affairs Established 516 

Economic Affairs. Commodity Problems: A 
Key to Relations With Africa (Newsom) . 498 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Senate Con- 
firms U.S. Delegation to UNESCO General 
Conference 497 

Foreign Aid. Emergency Assistance Programs 
for South Asia (exchange of letters be- 
tween President Nixon and members of 
Advisory Panel) 503 

Presidential Documents 

Emergency Assistance Programs for South 
Asia 503 

President Nixon's News Conference of October 

5 (excerpt) 494 

Trade. Trade in the Context of United States 
Relations With the People's Republic of 
China (Green) 489 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 515 

United Nations. Senate Confirms U.S. Delega- 
tion to UNESCO General Conference . . 497 


163d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 

Paris (Porter) 496 

President Nixon's News Conference of October 

5 (excerpt) 494 

Name Index 

Green, Marshall 489 

Macomber, William B 505 

Newsom, David D 498 

Nixon, President 494, 503 

Porter, William J 496 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 9—15 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to October 9 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 245 
of September 28. 

No. Date Subject 

254 10/9 Green: China trade symposium, 
University of Southern Cali- 
fornia Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Los 

+255 10/12 IJC air pollution report received 
by U.S. and Canadian Govern- 
256 10/12 Porter: 163d plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

*257 10/12 Preconference forum to be held 
Oct. 30 for conference on in- 
ternational container traffic. 

*258 10/13 Aviation balance of payments. 

*259 10/13 Meeting of Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Oct. 19-20. 

*260 10/13 William B. Jones named chair- 
man of U.S. delegation to 
UNESCO conference. 

* Note printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




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Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
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Vol. LXVII, No. 17 U 

November 6, 1972 



Address by Assistant Secretary Abshire 525 



Address by Under Secretary of Commerce Lynn 535 


Statement by Dr. James R. Schlesinger 539 

For index see inside baok^tm&lr<^ ^'^^'*^<=n+« 




Vol. LXVII, No. 1741 
November 6, 1972 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printinu Office 
Washineton, D.C. 20402 
62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic 516. foreien $23 
Single copy 30 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage- 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides ike public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
witli information on development* in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tlie White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and tite Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Issues and Answers' 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Rogers on the American 
Broadcasting Company's television and radio 
program "Issues and A7TSioers" on October 
15. Interviewing the Secretary were Ted 
Koppel, ABC News diplomatic correspond- 
ent, and Dave Schoumacher, ABC Neics cor- 

Press release 265 dated October 19 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, ivelcome to 
"Issues and Answers." 

Dr. Kissinger's [Henry A. Kissinger, As- 
sistant to the President for National Secu- 
rity Affairs] unprecedented four days of 
talks, private talks in Paris with Le Due Tho, 
have given rise to countless rumors and coun- 
terrumors. Non\ you participated in a pri- 
vate breakfast briefing ivith Dr. Kissinger 
and the President the other morning. I won- 
der, without revealing any state secrets, 
coidd you put those talks into their proper 
perspective — or reveal some state secrets? 

Secretary Rogers: I don't want to add to 
the rumors, because the negotiations are now 
in a very serious and very sensitive stage. I 
think it is important under tliese circum- 
stances to follow the admonition that Presi- 
dent Nixon made in his recent press confer- 
ence to — not to say anytliing tliat might add 
to those rumors. 

I thinlc the American people are satisfied 
that we are doing everything we can to bring 
this war to an end through the negotiating 
process and there is a time when quiet di- 
plomacy is essential to success, and we think 
that is the time now; we think it is time for 
quiet diplomacy to be taken into account, not 

to say anything that might contribute to the 
rumors or counterrumors that are so prev- 

Mr. Koppel: Well, is it accurate to say, as 
the North Vietnamese did, as Le Due Tho did 
before he left for Hanoi again, that there are 
still serious problems remaining betiveen the 
two sides? 

Secretary Rogers: I think Mr. Ziegler 
[Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to Presi- 
dent Nixon] made comments about that 
statement, and I don't care to add to those 
comments. Obviously there are differences, 
because otherwise we would have a settle- 

Mr. Schoumacher : Administration sources 
spoke this week and said that they thought 
these talks were somehow more substantive 
and less political. Is there a difference in the 
quality of the talks? 

Secretary Rogers: As I said to Mr. Koppel, 
these talks are in a very serious stage now. 
We think it is a very sensitive period in the 
negotiations, and for that reason we don't 
want to make any comment about them. 

Mr. Koppel: Some weeks ago, Mr. Secre- 
tary, you made the suggestion that some kind 
of cease-fire or an tinderstanding or a negoti- 
ated settlement would come about either be- 
fore the American presidential elections or 
shortly thereafter. Do you still hold to that 

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Koppel, let me try 
to make it clear. We do not want to add to or 
subtract from anything that has been said. 

November 6, 1972 


We don't want to emphasize or deemphasize 
anything that has been said. We think now 
is the time for quiet diplomacy to take place, 
and we are responsible public officials that 
have a very serious duty to conduct the ne- 
gotiations in a way that we think will be most 
productive and we think it is most produc- 
tive at the present time not to make com- 
ments about them in any way. So, as much 
as I realize that you would like to have some 
comments and as much as I realize the Amer- 
ican people would like to know everything 
that is going on, I think the American pub- 
lic is quite satisfied, and I admire you for 
trying to get some comments about them, but 
I don't intend to make any. 

Mr. Schoumacher: We don't give up that 

Secretary Rogers: Go ahead and try. 

Mr. Schoiimacher : During the week of the 
negotiations that xvere going on in Paris, 
President Thieu was talking quite a bit and 
blasting the very idea of a coalition govern- 
ment. He said coalition is death. Would you 
agree tvith that? 

Secretary Rogers: I don't have any com- 
ment to make on what President Thieu said 
in that regard. I think, of course, words of 
that kind hav^e different meanings to differ- 
ent people, and I don't intend to get into a 
discussion about the meaning of those words. 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, you have re- 
ferred to ivhat you say is the satisfaction of 
the American people that the talks are mov- 
i7ig in the right direction. Yet I think many 
Americans feel that they were misled back in 
1968 when the President said that he had a 
secret plan to end the Viet-Nam war — not 
simply, I emphasize, the secret plan to reduce 
American ground combat participation in the 
tear but to end the war. Is there anything you 
can tell us noiv that might at least allay some 
of those suspicions that perhaps this is being 
used as a political means, as a campaign 
tactic to give people the impression that 
peace is around the corner when it really 

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Koppel, I think 
your premise is wrong. The American people 
in recent polls support the President's activ- 
ity and the way he has handled this situation 
in a very substantial way — I think something 
like 58 to 22, or some such. I think the public 
thinks the President is doing everything he 
can do to end this war, and I think they are 
very pleased that he has been able to get 
Americans out of combat. 

Obviously we wish the war had ended be- 
fore now, but we are doing everything we 
can to end it. 

Now secondly, he never used the words 
"secret plan." That is something that has 
been added to in the media. In fact Mr. 
[William L.] Safire from the White House 
staff wrote a letter the other day to the New 
York Times in which he outlined very care- 
fully what the President had said, and he 
never said anything like that. 

I think if you look at what the President 
said and compare it with what he has done, 
he did exactly what he said he would do. And 
I think the American people have full confi- 
dence in the President, in the way he is 
handling this very difficult situation that he 

Mr. Koppel: Perhaps we are quibbling on 
words. If it is not a "secret plan," I spent 
three months campaigning ivith the Presi- 
dent, and on several occasions he suggested 
that he had a plan to end the Viet-Nam war, 
that he didn't want to reveal the details of 
that plan because he said he didn't want to 
do anything to jeopardize the upcoming 
Paris peace talks. 

Secretary Rogers: Yes. 

Mr. Koppel: But certainly he gave no indi- 
cation as to what that plan might be, and the 
implication of ivhat he said ivas that he did 
have a plan to end the Viet-Nam war, not 
simply American ground combat participa- 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we have done that. 
We have the Americans out of the combat 
role and the Vietnamization program has 
worked and he has carried out a plan. It is 


Department of State Bulletin 

an orderly plan, an orderly withdrawal of 
our troops, and now we are in the process of 
negotiations and we hope those negotiations 
will be successful. 

Mr. Schoumacher: If we could go back for 
a moment to these talks and pick up one 
loose end, ivhen ivould you expect another 
meeting between — 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I am not sure. If 
we have another meeting, that will be an- 
nounced in due time. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Another thing that hap- 
pened during the course of the week besides 
President Thieu's statement on coalition was 
the bombing of the French Legation in 
Hanoi. Have we determined noiv that tve 
were in fact responsible for the bombing? 

Secretary Rogers: No, there has been no 
final determination. I think there will be 
some statement by the Defense Department 
on this. You know the Secretary of Defense 
did make some comments about it. It is re- 
grettable that it happened. We have ex- 
pressed our regrets to those countries whose 
embassies were involved, but faulty bomb- 
drops do occur upon occasion. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Assuming our target 
it'os not the French Legation. 

Secretary Rogers: You don't have to as- 
sume that. 

Mr. Schoumacher: The whole area was a 
civilian residential area. Does that indicate 
that we are in fact bombing civilian — 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, no. There was a 
military target not so far — 

Mr. Schoumacher : About two miles away. 

Secretary Rogers: If it is a faulty bomb- 
drop, that is a very short distance in terms of 
jet flight. 

Mr. Koppel: Yoii think, then, that the 
Canadian reporter who said he ivitnessed 
several runs across this area ivas in error? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I haven't seen ex- 
actly what he said, but he is certainly in 

error if he suggested there was a deliberate 
bombing of this target, yes. 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, the President 
has said, and you have reported again here 
today, that the negotiations are at a very 
sensitive point. With that in mind and from 
a diplomatic point of view, is it fruitful, then, 
for American planes to be bombing, as in- 
tensively as they are. North Viet-Nam and 
in particular those areas of Hayioi which 
leave open the possibility of accidents such 
as the one — 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we would cer- 
tainly hope there would be no further acci- 
dents. The President has said consistently 
that we would continue the bombing of mili- 
tary targets in the North. There is going to 
be no change of policy. We are going to do 
everything we can to avoid accidents and we 
are going to do everything we can to avoid 
or minimize any civilian damage, but we are 
going to continue to bomb military targets. 
There has been no letup by the enemy bomb- 
ing in the cities with artillery, mortar fire. 

Mr. Schoumacher: It was my understand- 
ing that a good deal of the increase in bomb- 
ing was — and mining of the harbor — ^vas 
due to the Easter offensive, tvhich has noiv 
run its course. Wouldn't this be a time to let 
our bombing run its course? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, still the military 
situation is, of course, a serious problem, and 
the Commander in Chief, the President, has 
to make these difficult decisions. He is going 
to make them consistent with what he thinks 
is in the best interests of our country. And so 
far his judgment has been excellent. I think 
that the American people realize his judg- 
ment has been excellent; and certainly in 
terms of nations around the world — I was 
very gratified to find out how much support 
that we have received around the world for 
the President's foreign policy. 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, you have been 
very forceful about your reluctance to dis- 
cuss private negotiations. Perhaps for a 
moment tve can examine the public record. 

November 6, 1972 


This admi>iistrution has indicated on numer- 
ous occasions that it will not withdraw its 
support or hand over the Saigon government 
to the North Vietnamese. It has also indi- 
cated its opposition to a coalition govern- 
ment. Do we still at this time refuse to con- 
sider the Presidency of Nguyen Van Thieu 
as negotiable, and would we not accept any 
kind of coalition government with the NLF 
[National Liberation Front] ? 

Secretar// Rogers: Mr. Koppel, I must say 
you are persistent. I am not going to com- 
ment on the latter part of your question, for 
reasons I have ah-eady stated. 

On the first part of the question, we are 
going- to make certain tliat there is not a 
Communist talceover of South Viet-Nam by 
force. That is what it is ail al:)Out. And that 
is what the President has said constantly. As 
you know, there have been recent suggestions 
that we should just quit, get out of Viet-Nam 
completely, walk away from it. In fact, the 
suggestions have been that we should take 
all of our military equipment with us, which 
in effect would deny the people in South 
Viet-Nam the rigiit to defend their own 

Now, that type of policy is totally unaccept- 
able, and it is really difficult for me to under- 
stand how it could be seriously pi'oposed. 
That is not only throwing in the towel our- 
selves, throwing in the towel by the United 
States, but insisting that the South Viet- 
namese throw in the towel — that we thi'ow in 
the towel for tiiem, that we say to them "You 
can't defend your country; we are not going 
to even let you have the military equipment 
that we have given to you to defend your 

So the answer to your question is: Yes, 
President Nixon is going to make certain 
that we do not have a Communist takeover 
of the South Vietnamese by force. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Earlier you said coali- 
tions mean different things to different peo- 
ple, and there is some room in the definition 
process, then, apparently. 

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say that. I 
just said that I didn't want to get involved in 
a definition of coalition, and I don't want to 
leave any suggestion at the moment about 
that one way or the other insofar as negotia- 
tions are concerned. 

Mr. Koppel: I am intrigiied, Mr. Secretary, 
by your apparent reluctance to repeat state- 
ments that have been made so consistently 
by the — 

Secretar 1/ Rogers: Mr. Koppel, I don't see 
why you don't understand that. We are now 
in the process of very serious negotiating, 
and we have a duty — President Nixon, all of 
us in responsible positions, have a duty to 
conduct ourselves in a way that we think 
will serve the public interest. Any statements 
now that could be taken out of context might 
be harmful to those negotiations. Therefore 
we are not going to make any comments 
about it. 

The American people are quite satisfied 
about that. They know we are doing every- 
thing we possibly can to successfully negoti- 
ate an end to this war, and they have confi- 
dence in President Nixon. All you have to do 
is look at the polls. 

Now, I know that the press would like it, 
but you are going to find out about it. Just 
wait a little while. 

Mr. Koppel: I ivonld like to put it in gen- 
eral terms if I may, Mr. Secretary. Woidd it 
be accurate to say that any statements that 
have been made in the past just have to be 
suspended for the moment, that we are not 
going to be held to any categorical statements 
that have been made over the past six 
months, over the past year, that this is an 
entirely new ball game, the negotiations are 
in process, and things may change? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say that 
either. I said we are not going to at this time 
pick out any particular statement and em- 
phasize it again or deemphasize it. There 
have been a good many statements made. All 
I am saying is that at this time we are not 


Department of State Bulletin 

going to talk about it because tliese negotia- 
tions are in a very sensitive stage. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Mr. Secretary, if ire 
could move onto another subject. 

Secretary Rogers: Good. Well, I don't mind 
if you just want me to keep saying I am not 
going to answer. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Mr. Secretary, Arab 
terrorism, which has always been something 
of an abstract concern to Americans, has 
come home in this past iceek n'ith several 
mail bombs addressed to Hadassah 7vomen. 
One blew up, injuring a postal employee. 
What are you going to do about it? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, it is not only Arab 
terrorism, but there is a good deal of terror- 
ism in the world — some related to the Middle 
East and some related to other political prob- 
lems. We have taken a number of political 
steps, as I am sure you are aware of, in the 
United Nations and other places to do what 
we can to outlaw this kind of conduct inter- 
nationally, and we are making some progress. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Well, we are in the same 
position, apparently, are we not, that Israel 
is — that, how far can you hold these other 
countries, these, say, Egypt, Syria, responsi- 
ble for these acts? Are you trying to? 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, sure. Well, we are 
trying to apply sanctions to countries that 
continue to give support to this kind of ac- 
tivity. For example, in the hijacking field, we 
are trying to get the international community 
to agree to sanctions which would in effect 
say that any nation that accepts hijackers 
without either extradition or prosecution 
would not have commercial aviation available 
to them. In other words, planes would not fly 
to that country, if that country accepted hi- 
jackers. Now, that is a very practical sugges- 
tion, and I think it has some possibilities of 

Mr. Schoumacher: Broadening this subject 
just a bit, are we noticing any improvement 

in our relations with Egypt as a result of 
the ouster of Russian advisers? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, it is difficult to 
answer that question. I had two long meet- 
ings with the Foreign Minister of Egypt in 
New York in the last two weeks, and those 
discussions I thought were very useful. I 
think we have an understanding of each 
other's position, and I think that we have 
some hope that in the next few months w^e 
may be able to start the negotiating process. 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, I am afraid 
my British heritage makes it a little tough 
for me to give up on a sjibject altogether. 
Avoiding political polemics as much as possi- 
ble, and this is slightly related to the Viet- 
Nam question, did you find anything of value 
in Senator McGovern's speech the other day 
on the Viet-Nam — his Viet-Nam peace plan? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't. I was really 
— parts of it were incredible. I couldn't be- 
lieve it. 

For example, he talked about a tiny band 
that — that we were fighting a tiny band of 
peasant guerrillas. Now, it is unbelievable 
that that could be said. I am sure no one who 
has fought in Viet-Nam thinks we are fight- 
ing a tiny band of peasant guerrillas. They 
have hundreds of related tanks; they have 
field artillery pieces with a range of 17 or 18 
miles; they have the most sophisticated SAM 
missile [surface-to-air missile] sites prob- 
ably in the world, and how he could say that 
it was a tiny band of peasant guerrillas beats 

I couldn't understand why he said w'e 
should take all the military supplies we could 
salvage out of South Viet-Nam. We have 
been fighting alongside the South Vietnamese 
since 1965. We have told them that we would 
give them an opportunity to defend their 
country. They have had a lot more casualties 
than we have had. Now for us to say that we 
are not only going to get out ourselves but 
we are going to take all the equipment that 
we can take out with us "so that you have no 
chance to defend yourself," and acknowledge 

November 6, 1972 


the fact that there would be a Communist 
takeover at this stage, I don't understand it. 

I hear people say it is surrender. It is not 
only an offer to surrender; it is a demand 
that the South Vietnamese surrender, too. 

So, when you ask me did I find anything 
about it that was good, no. It is incredible. I 
can't believe that a man who is as sophisti- 
cated in foreign affairs could possibly say 

All the nations in the area can't believe it, 
that he would say these things. 

Mr. Koppel: For example, the Thai Gov- 
ernmeyit — Senator McGovern suggested once 
the prisoners come back he would remove 
American bases from Thailand. Have yon 
gotten any communications from the Thai 
Government expressing concern over this? 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, sure. He has also 
said he wasn't sure about that. Sometimes he 
referred to maybe he would insist on with- 
drawal and at other times he wasn't sure, so 
I am not sure about the prediction on that. 
But the Thai Government said he wouldn't 
have to worry about that; they would insist 
on our leaving. 

Mr. Schoumacher: In yotir discussions 
with the various countries of the United Na- 
tions in the past iveek or so, do you find con- 
tinued understanding for the American Viet- 
Nam involvement? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I do. Three years 
ago we were under a good deal of criticism 
by many nations in the world. Now I find 
general support for the President's program, 
interestingly enough, even in other countries, 
that you wouldn't expect it to be true. 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, you are not 
only the senior member of the President's 
Cabinet, you are also a longstanding and 
close personal friend of the President, and I 
ivonder if in that second capacity you try 
to put into perspective the charges of politi- 
cal corruption, espionage, and sabotage that 
have been leveled against several former and 
present White House aides and advisers. Do 

you consider these charges to be a political 
frameup ? 

Secretary Rogers: I am not going to get 
into those charges. I am not involved in the 
political campaign. 

But let me say frankly, because I am sure 
you are not going to ask this question, I think 
President Nixon has done more to reduce the 
tensions that exist in the world, to bring 
about a more peaceful world, than any Presi- 
dent in my memory. 

Now he is recognized throughout the world 
as a world leader for peace, and we mustn't 
forget the initiatives that he has taken which 
have reduced the tensions. 

We have brought about a cease-fire in the 
Middle East. We have very good relations 
with the Soviet Union and with the People's 
Republic of China. I just completed meetings 
with 77 Foreign Ministers at the United 
Nations, separate meetings, and without ex- 
ception the programs of the President are 
applauded. Nations that were formerly our 
adversaries — Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hun- 
gary — recognize the President as a world 

And on these things that you asked, let the 
people in the campaign argue about that. I 
think it is important for the American peo- 
ple to understand what he has brought about 
and he is not interested just in what we have 
accomplished. The President is interested in 
what he can do in the next four years, how 
to build on that structure of peace. 

Mr. Koppel: Well, I think it is precisely 
because the President himself has so fre- 
quently raised the issue of morality, that this 
— you knotv, that you can't just bisect the 
international and domestic issues. And it was 
because of your longstanding relationship 
with the President that I thought you could 
therefore give us an insight on that. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, he is an idealist 
and he realizes that the most important ideal 
men can achieve is peace. And he has done 
so much in that field, and is so recognized 
throughout the world as a leader for peace, 


Department of State Bulletin 

that I think that's what we have to keep in 

Now, the other arguments — that is all 
right, that is natural politics. But just think 
of what happened when we took office. The 
campuses were in an uproar, ghettos were 
aflame. We had tremendous problems all 
over the world. There was a war of attrition 
in the Middle East. We had more than half 
a million men in combat in Viet-Nam. Now 
all these things have been either solved or 
almost solved. Our relations throughout the 
world are really surprisingly good. 

I don't suppose there has been ever a time 
in the history of our country when we have 
had more discussions going on with coun- 
tries all over the world in an attempt to im- 
prove the climate that exists in the world. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Mr. Secretary, as you 
say, you are not in politics, but one of the 
domestic issues with international ramifica- 
tions has been the grain deal tvith the Rus- 
sians, which has provoked some outrage by 
wheat farmers, from wheat farmers. The 
President denied — / believe used the word — 
we had been "snookered" in our deal with the 
Russians, and yet we have just renegotiated 
the maritime agreement to get a little more 
money out of the deal. Isn't this a sign in fact 
ice were taken by the Russians? 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, not at all. We have 
been working on the maritime agreement for 
a long time, and it's essential if we're going 
to have trade with the Soviet Union — and I 
think it is very important to have trade with 
the Soviet Union — that we have to have some 
arrangements on maritime matters. 

I think that the prospect for trade in the 
future with the Soviet Union and with other 
eastern European countries is exactly what 
we have been trying to do for a long time, 
to reduce the tensions, to make the world 
more interdependent, and to get along with 
our former adversaries, and the President 
has done a great job on that score. 

Mr. Schoumacher: But this renegotiation 
happened fairly late in the game, didn't it? 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, well, we have been 
negotiating this for a long time, as you know, 
and there were terms that we had to discuss 
at the last minute and we worked out the 
terms. I wouldn't claim it was a great victory 
for us any more than it is a great victory for 
them. I think it is to our mutual advantage 
that we work this out. 

Mr. Schoumacher: You mentioned that you 
had had discussions with 77 nations at the 
United Nations. And I noticed in the paper 
the other day that about the only country at 
the United Nations that we don't do business 
with is Cuba. We don't invite them to our 
diplomatic receptions. They are the only 
country, I guess, that ive don't. Do you think 
in the next four years we might start having 
Cuba to our parties? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, it depends on their 
attitude. I mean if their attitude is 100- 
percent anti-American and if they attempt 
to commit subversive acts in Latin America 
and if they make personal attacks on Presi- 
dent Nixon, we don't want them at our party. 

Mr. Koppel: Of course that doesn't sound 
too different from what some other Com- 
munist nations have done, making personal 
attacks on the President, encouraging sub- 
version. Why do we select out — 

Secretary Rogers: Well, because in other 
cases we have had some indication that they 
want to improve their relations with us. Why 
should the United States go to Cuba with 
our hat in our hand? If they want to improve 
their relations with us they can make it clear 
that they do. We have had no difficulty get- 
ting along with other Communist nations. 
Their attitude is what causes the trouble. 

Mr. Koppel: Let me ask you a question that 
is a little closer to home. The State Depart- 
ment has been criticized both internally and 
externally as having sagging morale, and 
one of the reasons that has been given, and 
indeed a question I 7vas asked to ask you by 
the family of a Foreign Service officer, was 
ivhy the grievance procedure at the State 

November 6, 1972 


Department can't be brought more hi line 
with what has been recommended by the U.S. 
Senate, a more liberalized — 

Secretartj Rogers: We have the best griev- 
ance procedure for employees in the govern- 
ment, and as you know, there was an attempt 
to pass some legislation tiiis session, which 
was unsuccessful. 

We are perfectly prepared to improve our 
grievance procedures. We have done it in the 
past year. On the question of sagging morale, 
though, Mr. Koppel, this is something that 
has been said as long as the State Department 
has existed. In fact, I talked to one of my 
senior assistants the other day who told me 
that the first article that he wrote when he 
came to the State Department was that the 
morale in the State Department had never 
been lower. Now, that was back in 1940 or 
something like that. 

I think the morale of the State Department 
is good. I don't think there is a foreign serv- 
ice anywhere in the world that has higher 
caliber, more capable people than the Foreign 
Service of the United States. They have con- 
tributed very substantially to the success of 
the foreign policy of President Nixon's ad- 
ministration, and I think our morale is good. 

Mr. Schoiimacher: We have read a good 
deal of speculation recently about the next 
Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger or John 
Connalhj or Elliot Richardson, and I missed 
along the ivay your announcement of resig- 
nation. Did you make that and no one 

Secretary Rogers: No, I haven't. I haven't 
made any announcement of resignation. I 
was wondering how about you two fellows, 
how long are you going to stay on this net- 
work? I have heard some comments about 
the two of you, but I don't believe it. 

Mr. Schoumacher: Those are true. Now, 
what about yours? No, is there any thought 
in your mind — 

Secretary Rogers: I just said, I haven't 
given any thought to it. I will tell you this. 
I don't think those of us in President Nixon's 
administration take the electorate for 
granted. We want to be sure that President 
Nixon is reelected; and although things look 
very good, we are not going to assume that 
he is elected until the people have spoken. 

Mr. Schoumacher : Ted mentioned the 
morale — in the minute or so we have left — 
/ thought he was going to go also to the ques- 
tion of whether the negotiations by Dr. 
Kissinger do7i't hare an wi favorable impact 
on morale there. 

Secretary Rogers: I will tell you, the im- 
portant thing for the American people is the 
success of our foreign policy, and they really 
don't care about all this stuff that happens in 
Washington, about whether the shortstop is 
better than the second baseman. What they 
are interested in is how are we doing in for- 
eign policy, and I think that this administra- 
tion has been very successful, and all the 
polls indicate that the American people sup- 
port the foreign policy of this administration, 
and I am proud to have played a part in it, 
and I think everybody in the State Depart- 
ment is proud to have played a part in it, and 
I think Dr. Kissinger's efforts are going to 
be very — well, they have been very construc- 
tive and very useful to the President, and I 
think the American people support the for- 
eign policy of this administration, and we 
don't have any problems. 

Mr. Schoumacher: And yo7i are not in poli- 
tics? Thank you very much. Secretary of 
State Rogers, for being with us today on 
"Issues and Aiisivers." 


Department of State Bulletin 

National Security in Transition— The Executive and the Congress 

Address by David M. Abshire 

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations i 

For me it is a particular honor to speak 
today to so impoi'tant a gathering of those 
professionally responsible for the security 
of our Nation and the vitality of our 
Armed Forces. We are meeting at a mo- 
ment when all of us with sentimental and 
intellectual ties to the Army need to look 
very hard at our security problem. We need 
to see this problem in the round, to under- 
stand the way the problem looks from differ- 
ent vantage points. My vantage point is that 
of an executive branch member who has 
been working very closely with the Congress 
in the field of foreign affairs and national 

Today an increasingly insistent theme in 
the Congress, as well as the executive, is 
the necessity of making better use of our 
national security resources. The cost of 
defense is on a collision course with the 
mounting claims upon the budget for social 
expenditures. And both threaten the essen- 
tial of national security — a sound economy. 
For this reason it is crucial to rethink how 
we can use to maximum advantage the re- 
sources available to us for national security 

I do not think that those most concerned 
with and dedicated to our security should 
resist or resent the problem this poses. It 
is merely the practical and contemporary 
application of the principle of strategy so 

' Made before the annual conference of the Asso- 
ciation of the United States Army at Washington 
on Oct. 10. 

closely followed by Frederick the Great and 
later defined by classical military writers 
as the "economy of force." Recognizing 
that his military assets were finite and that 
not every inch of terrain could be equally 
protected, Frederick insisted that his re- 
sources be concentrated upon the central 
objectives and not the farflung periphery. 
Napoleon identified the same essential point 
when he said the generals he defeated had 
their eyes on too many things at once. 
Marshal Foch, while still a colonel, wrote 
forcibly of it in his monumental work on 
the "Principles of War," describing the 
principle as "the art of knowing how to ex- 
pend, to expend usefully and profitably, to 
make the best possible use of all avail- 
able resources." 

This keystone in the classical art of 
strategy has new relevance in the age of the 
Nixon doctrine. The great need is to bring 
to bear upon the truly decisive tasks the full 
measure of our resources. That in turn 
demands a careful identification of priorities, 
comparative advantages, and burden shar- 

In the great realignment of forces and 
resources laid out in the Nixon doctrine, the 
role of the Army is classical. Napoleon 
always looked upon Ulm as one of his most 
brilliant campaigns ; he achieved his objec- 
tive but never had to fight a battle. The 
role of our Army in Europe is one similar 
to the concept of a fleet-in-being in Mahan's 
writing: It wields influence without firing 

November 6, 1972 


a shot. Let us be quite clear, however; 
deterrence is only achieved when backed by a 
strong fighting capability. If the Army can- 
not fight and win, it cannot deter. 

Today's policy is pitched on the twin 
pillars of detente and deterrence. The 
Armed Forces are of necessity the guard- 
ians of "realistic deterrence," as Secretary 
[of Defense Melvin R.] Laird has said so 
well. And in the same sense, it is the responsi- 
bility of the Department of State to bear the 
burden of "realistic detente." 

It is for that reason that I am particu- 
larly glad to be able to talk with you today. 
For it is essential that we share our views 
on the realities we face so that we can effec- 
tively develop our policy resources in a com- 
mon context. Deterrence and detente must 
combine to undergird our overall national 
security. Neither by itself is adequate to 
the task. Neither, standing alone, is likely 
to be acceptable to the American people 
for very long. 

Thus I do not believe that we can or 
should consider the defense of the United 
States as an exclusively military responsi- 
bility. To the contrary, the defense of the 
United States and of its interests is the 
primary purpose of foreign policy. Military 
capability is part of the projection of our na- 
tional influence abroad. We are simply not 
realizing the full benefit of our strength 
unless we coordinate it with such other 
sources of influence as foreign assistance, 
trade policy, monetary policy, arms con- 
trol, intelligence operations, foreign infor- 
mation programs, cultural relations, and 
humanitarian cooperation. 

I suggest to you that we have come to a 
point where those in industry and in the 
armed services have a special responsibility 
to look at the broader economic and political 
problems with the same degree of profes- 
sionalism and .sophistication that they have 
applied for so many years to the military 
services. And those who have been preoc- 
cupied with fostering and cultivating abroad 
the Nation's economic interests and political 
influence have a similar responsibility to 
search for the most effective way that our 

total foreign policy assets, including military 
strength, can be brought to bear during a 
period of contracting resources. 

Nowhere is the competition for our na- 
tional resources more graphic than in the 

The New Climate 

All of us are aware, I am sure, that there 
is a new climate in the 

In both Houses of Congress, among lib- 
erals and conservatives alike, there is ener- 
getic opposition to any sign of overcommit- 
ment in our foreign policy. The mainstream 
of congressional sentiment is deeply influ- 
enced by the combined effect of popular 
resentment against levels of taxation, do- 
mestic inflation, the financial crisis of our 
cities, the impact of foreign competition, 
and the resultant deficits in our budget and 
in the balance of payments. Caught in this 
vise, the executive and the Congress are 
more than ever concerned about the cost of 
our defense and more than ever determined 
to get the most out of each defense dollar. 

The growing scrutiny by the Congress 
of military spending and foreign assistance 
is seen in the continuing debate on national 
security. You will recall, I am sure, the 
protracted debate in the Senate on whether 
to construct the Safeguard ABM [anti- 
ballistic missile] system while the SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] nego- 
tiations were in progress and the more re- 
cent debate on funding for Trident. Other 
congressional attempts to reduce the size of 
the defense budget were less spectacular, 
but they have been persistent and they re- 
flect a general desire in the Congress to 
keep a tight rein on military spending. 

The critics of the size of our armed serv- 
ices and of their have varying con- 
cerns. Some believe that the size and the 
quality of our forces, particularly of our 
strategic forces, stimulates the Soviet Union 
to comparable efforts that magnify the 
threat to our own security. Others suspect 
there is a decline in the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and its allies. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Finally, there are those who believe that 
the United States cannot afford its present 
posture. They argue that we are over- 
extended in our commitments around the 
world. They assert that inflation, budget 
deficits, domestic demands, and our persist- 
ent balance of payments troubles constitute 
a more serious threat to our security than 
existing or potential weaknesses in military 
weapons or manpower. 

Be that as it may, it is a fact that infla- 
tion and rising weapons costs threaten to 
price us out of a sound national security. 
I find that members of the Armed Services 
Committees are especially concerned over 
this latter phenomenon. 

The Congress as a whole has clearly a 
strong desire to hold down our defense 
spending and to reduce the American pres- 
ence abroad. 

Yet, given its passion for economy, it is 
the same Congress that gave overwhelming 
support during the debate on the SALT 
interim agreement to the maintenance of 
American equality with the Soviet Union. 
The Congress recognized that the success of 
the interim agreement and the attainment of 
more permanent and comprehensive agree- 
ments "are dependent upon the mainte- 
nance under present world conditions of 
a vigorous research and development and 
modernization program as required by a 
prudent strategic posture." Further, in the 
crucial congressional tests of our foreign 
policy, the Congress has repeatedly supported 
the maintenance of a defense posture ade- 
quate to our worldwide responsibilities. Both 
Houses of Congress have, moreover, re- 
peatedly — and as recently as September 26 — 
turned back eflForts to legislate an end to the 
war in Viet-Nam on conditions other than 
those sought by the President. Those votes 
have been major tests of the temper of the 
Congress on a fundamental foreign policy 
issue over a period of several years. And 
their lesson to us should be that despite the 
widespread congressional support for with- 
drawal from Viet-Nam, the majority of the 
Congress supports giving the President free- 
dom of action in achieving that objective. 

Similarly, the Senate has refused on two 
occasions within a year and a half to cut 
the level of our NATO forces in western 
Europe in the face of the most persistent 
and the most energetic efforts of those 
advocating their reduction. 

It is perfectly clear that the Congress is 
not ready to abandon either our foreign in- 
terests or our foreign responsibilities. And 
despite a strong desire for a far greater 
role of the Congress in the foreign policy 
process, the Congress has shown itself un- 
willing to pass legislation that would se- 
riously undercut the President's negotiating 

Yet there is a theme that is common to 
most of our congressional critics and sup- 
porters as well; that is, that there needs 
to be ever-increased attention to better uti- 
lization of resources — a constant attack on 
waste and duplication, a search for a higher 
ratio of combat to support forces, more 
effective security assistance, and a commit- 
ment of resources only to objectives of un- 
que-stionable national interest. 

Plainly these views are not unique to the The President has taken the lead 
in defining the need for establishing new 
priorities and in balancing our foreign 
commitments with our means, which leads 
me back to my initial theme. The Nixon 
doctrine is, in fact, the key to making the 
necessary readjustments in many parts of 
the world. But precisely how this transi- 
tion takes place depends not only upon the 
President but upon the support he receives 
from the Congress and from all of us con- 
cerned with our foreign affairs. 

The External World: The New Balance of Power 

As the President's foreign policy reports 
note, the postwar period of international 
relations has ended. There has been a 
breakdown in the unity of the Communist 
bloc, a shift of resources to other purposes 
than just a challenge to the United States 
and its friends, and a higher priority in 
most Communist countries to pursue na- 
tional interests rather than world revolution. 
This new era has also seen the recovery of 

November 6, 1972 


economic strength by western Europe and 

Hence there is an opportunity for a new 
balance of power. President Wilson in 1918 
called the balance of power of the past cen- 
tury "a thing in which the balance was 
determined by the sword which was thrown 
in on one side or the other . . . the unstable 
equilibrium of competitive interests . . . 
maintained by jealous watchfulness and an 
antagonism of interests." It is e.xactly this 
disequilibrium that is to be avoided in the 
new balance of power. 

At a congressional briefing on June 15 
at the White House, Henry Kissinger said: - 

... to the extent that balance of power means 
constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an 
opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that 
the determination of national power has changed 
fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout his- 
tory, the primary concern of most national leaders 
has been to accumulate geopolitical and military 
power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a 
generation ago that such power once gained could 
not be translated directly into advantage over one's 
opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union 
have begun to find that each increment of power 
does not necessarily represent an increment of usa- 
ble political strength. 

These political and strategic events 
abroad must not be isolated from concomi- 
tant changes that are taking place in the 
global American economic position. We have 
evolved from the world's major creditor and 
owner of most of the world's gold and hard 
currency to a debtor nation running a signifi- 
cant deficit in its balance of payments. Con- 
versely, our western European trading part- 
ners and Japan have steadily improved their 
economic standing and, after many years of 
deficit, have become creditor nations with 
surpluses in their balance of payments. 

The deterioration of the Nation's inter- 
national economic position has been met by 
the Nixon administration forcefully and in 
a way that is consonant with the overall 
security requirements of the Nation. 

To mention but two examples, Secretary 

' Bulletin of July 10, 1972, p. 40. 

[of the Treasury] George Shultz has just 
proposed a major revision in the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, with additional ways 
to strengthen the dollar. 

And in the increasing stability of the 
great-power balance, the recently opened 
trade links between Americans and Rus- 
sians hold forth the possibility of a pro- 
found shift in the practical meaning of U.S.- 
Soviet relations. These changes promise to 
open enormous economic opportunities for 
the American merchant and farmer, which 
in turn will contribute to an expansion of 
the economic base to which our security 
structure is afii.xed. 

In view of the fact that I am addressing 
so many professionals in the military field, 
let me again place my point in a classical 
military framework. Those truly great cap- 
tains of history — since the days of Alex- 
ander the Great — were the ones who were 
more than military strategists but who 
knew that an effective grand strategy spans 
political, economic, and social fields as well. 
It is thus important for my colleagues in the 
diplomatic fields and in the military fields 
to comprehend the totality of the effort in- 
volved and the innovative and creative 
demands now being placed upon us. 

Arms Control 

One of these is arms control. Those of 
us with professional military experience 
should take a fresh and a constructive look 
at the role that it might play in advancing 
our total national interests. I know that 
those of us who are closely concerned with 
the armed services and with military matters 
have often been skeptical about, and even 
hostile to, various schemes to control arms 
competition. Certainly our historical ex- 
perience with such efforts has not been very 

In the past the principal danger flowing 
from arms control successes has been the un- 
justified euphoria that they have created. 
Moreover, agreements in the past depended 
in a large degree upon faith in the observ- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ance of the agreement by the parties. 
Today the President has taken the lead in 
cautioning that detente is only possible if we 
remain strong and confident of our power. 
Moreover, the technological breakthrough 
that has provided unilateral national means 
of verification has largely removed the old 
need to rely upon the pledge of an adversary. 

Therefore, if you will accept the responsi- 
bility of thinking in terms of our total na- 
tional interest and of our total foreign pol- 
icy, you will want to give some very careful 
thought and some very searching considera- 
tion to new ways in which arms control could 
be of benefit to the United States. 

The success of the first stage of the SALT 
negotiations certainly suggests that there is 
a reasonable chance to forestall further 
weapons development competition. The fact 
that the United States and the Soviet Union 
have succeeded in finding a formula that will 
obviate the need to build extensive and ex- 
traordinarily costly ABM defenses and will 
break the momentum of the Soviet ofi'ensive 
weapons buildup is clearly a step in the di- 
rection of a more productive use of our total 
foreign policy resources. 

It is entirely appropriate, therefore, to 
proceed promptly to search for longer term 
agreements to prevent, or to at least signifi- 
cantly delay, the construction of oft'ensive 
missile systems by the Soviet Union. This is 
no easy task, as Dr. Kissinger said last 
month upon returning from Moscow. '• He 
cautioned that the conceptual problem for 
the next round of SALT is much greater 
than for the first phase. He foresaw that the 
major difficulty will arise in determining 
how differing weapons systems serving dif- 
fering purposes can be measured in attempt- 
ing to arrive at equality. Despite this very 
real problem, the benefits to the Lhiited 
States are so important that successful reso- 
lution of this dilemma is worth our utmost 

' For the transcript of a news conference held by 
Dr. Kissinger at the White House on Sept. 16, see 
Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1972, p. 389. 

It is entirely logical that we should also 
study the benefits to the United States of 
agreed restraints upon conventional arma- 
ments — whether those are restraints on num- 
bei-s of men, numbers and quality of weap- 
ons, or upon their location. There would be 
evident benefits to the United States, for ex- 
ample, from a significant mutual and bal- 
anced reduction of forces in Europe. Simi- 
larly, there would be benefits to the United 
States from agreements with the Soviet Un- 
ion that would limit naval competition. 

In very simple terms, we recognize that it 
is poor strategy indeed to simply try to out- 
build, outgun, and outman our major poten- 
tial adversaries in every area of competition. 
There is a special urgency to finding effec- 
tive ways to reduce the threat that they may 

And again I return to the sound and fun- 
damental doctrine of the "economy of force." 
Throughout this discussion I have carefully 
drawn a distinction between arms control 
and disarmament. They are not the same. 
Arms control is a disciplining of force, is 
the economizing of force or, if you will, the 
fitting of force to the realities of the final 
quarter of this century. Those who fail to un- 
derstand this only blur the understanding of 
world politics. 

The Developing Nations 

Our problems with the developing nations 
are of an entirely different nature. Presi- 
dent Nixon has defined our policy with re- 
spect to these areas eloquently and precisely. 
He has strongly emphasized that the United 
States will continue to honor its treaty com- 
mitments to its allies. The Nixon doctrine 
makes clear that the United States will pro- 
vide protection against nuclear blackmail 
and provide inaterial assistance to those re- 
sisting external aggression. But the United 
States will look to our allies to take the pri- 
mary responsibility for their own security. 

The execution of that policy will require 
greater imagination and, I think, greater 

November 6, 1972 


flexibility than we have shown in the past. 
We must look upon the security of the devel- 
oping nations not only in terms of their 
armed forces but also in terms of the in- 
ternal strength of their societies and of the 
willingness of their people to maintain their 
own independence. And that is related to the 
possibilities that they can offer to their citi- 
zens of achieving reasonable standards of 
living and social justice. We shall need to 
consider very carefully the most effective 
mix of economic development and military 
assistance and in both areas insure that we 
are not distorting balanced development nor 
building dependence upon us. 

We should not encourage allies with a lim- 
ited economic base to build armed forces 
that are dependent upon a highly sophisti- 
cated economy, a highly educated popula- 
tion, and a highly developed infrastructure 
of communications. We have a responsibility 
to assure that the arms we provide and the 
counsel we give in military matters are 
scaled to the level of local development. 

Another important move in our efforts to 
seek better utilization of resources is our 
continuing pressure to shift recipient na- 
tions from grant military assistance to credit 
sales. Such a shift requires the recipient to 
establish his own order of budget priorities. 

The history of the foreign military sales 
(FMS) credit program demonstrates a con- 
sistent movement to financial self-sufficiency. 
In 1970 Iran completed the transition from 
military assistance to credit sales. The Re- 
public of China might be viewed as being in 
midtransition, its FMS credits during the 
four-year period of 1969 to 1972 having 
moved steadily from $20 million to $46 mil- 
lion; during the same period, military as- 
sistance grants were reduced progressively 
from $35 million in 1969 to $11 million in 
1972. Korea is just beginning the transition, 
receiving $15 million in foreign military 
sales credits in 1971 and $17 million in 1972. 

Given the demonstrated success of the for- 
eign military sales credit program in facili- 
tating the transition from grant assistance 
to self-help and given the interest of the 

United States in such progress toward free- 
world security being achieved without plac- 
ing any additional burden on the U.S. 
taxpayer, it is imperative that this most 
effective instrument of assistance to our 
economically developing friends and allies be 

Relations With Our NATO Allies 

Finally, at the other end of the scale, we 
must certainly do some hard thinking about 
our relations with our highly developed and 
powerful western European allies. 

We are now encouraging our allies to as- 
sume a larger share of the common defense 
burden. Ten NATO countries have launched 
a special European Defense Improvement 
Program, pledging over a five-year period 
an additional $1 billion investment in im- 
proved national forces and NATO facilities. 
In December 1971, we concluded an agree- 
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany 
which offsets all but $900 million of the bal- 
ance of payments costs of maintaining U.S. 
forces in Germany. This agreement includes 
the provision of German funds for use in di- 
rect support of American activities. 

Despite this progress, there is a group in 
the Congress which wants to reduce the size 
of our forces in Europe. Most Members feel 
that our European allies should assume a 
greater share of the burden. Those Members 
from areas affected by the keen competition 
of foreign agriculture or industry are con- 
vinced that the ratio of European defense 
costs to total GNP should be closer to ours. 

Nevertheless, almost all in the Congress 
recognize that the NATO alliance has been 
a historic success. It has provided the secu- 
rity that has been the keystone to two dec- 
ades of unprecedented prosperity in both 
Europe and the United States. Behind the 
NATO shield, we have come closer on both 
sides of the Atlantic to the ideals of economic 
and social justice. 

In short, NATO has been a precious na- 
tional asset of almost incalculable value. It is 
for that reason that the President plans soon 


Department of State Bulletin 

to resume the most intense consultation with 
our NATO allies on how to put our relation- 
ship on a new basis which safeguards for the 
future the boundless benefits we have al- 
ready realized in the past. 

Reality of Undiminished Need for Security 

I hope that I have defined the challenge 
that we all face to improve the use of our 
foreign affairs resources. 

The cost of weapons systems, of person- 
nel, is rising. The demands for spending on 
other national needs are increasing. Yet our 
need for security remains undiminished. 

It is this reality that poses the challenge 
to American industry and to the military and 
civilian professionals in the foreign affairs 
community. It is up to us to find the way to 
extract the maximum benefit from our lim- 
ited resources. The Nixon doctrine and the 
concept of a new balance of power have 
given us an overall grand design. But you 
and I must search for ways to specific imple- 
mentation. It will mean a break, perhaps a 
painful break, from what may be an old 
American tradition. The British writer D. W. 
Brogan, in his book "The American Charac- 
ter," has described the American way of 
strategy as that of exhausting its opponents 
by overwhelming them with its limitless re- 
sources. We know that has not always been 
the case, and it cannot now be our approach 
to national security. But we have indeed had 
years with the luxury of abundant military 

Now the time has come to revert to a more 
rigorous American tradition of lean, tough, 
imaginative self-reliance. The time is upon 
us ta take a hard look at our essential inter- 
ests, a hard look at all the factors that con- 
stitute our power in foreign affairs, and to 
use every asset for the objectives that really 

That is the challenge to which we are set 
by our Congress, our President, and our peo- 
ple. With the Nixon doctrine, the new bal- 
ance of power, and the new approaches to 
the People's Republic of China and the So- 

viet Union, we have entered into a period 
that I believe will be termed by historians 
as unrivaled in this century. The new era of- 
fers a keen challenge to those of us in both 
the diplomatic and military fields, to our 
creative and innovative abilities. 

The spectacular Presidential policy moves 
have been reinforced by a number of inno- 
vations by the Secretary of State. 

Secretary Rogers has established a very 
wide-reaching program for comparing our 
policy aims in various countries with the re- 
sources we have available. Meetings chaired 
by the Deputy Secretary involve the partici- 
pation of high-level representatives from 
other concerned agencies. The purpose is to 
insure that our goals are precisely under- 
stood, that U.S. Government resources are 
properly allocated to accomplish them, and 
that both are consistent with broad policy. 

A new Under Secretary of State for the 
coordination of security assistance has been 
created, to put our security assistance pro- 
grams at the heart of the Nixon doctrine. 
His job, in close liaison with the Department 
of Defense, is to maximize the contribution 
to American security of our military assist- 
ance program. 

The U.S. Army, too, is fortunate in its su- 
perb leadership — beginning with Secretary 
Laird, who has offered the framework of 
realistic deterrence and the Nixon doctrine. 
He is supported by the Army's able Secre- 
tary, Robert Froehlke, and my good friend, 
Ken BeLieu [Under Secretary of the Army] , 
a truly inspiring leader. 

I congratulate the Army for its new Chief 
of Staff, General [Creighton W.] Abrams, 
who did so much to implement Vietnamiza- 
tion. Finally, I know from intimate experi- 
ence that your new Vice Chief, Gen. Al Haig, 
is a brilliant individual with an admirable 
grasp of and a unique experience with the 
interrelationship of political and military 
factors. With such leadership, the Army and 
its community of friends represented in this 
association will meet the new challenges 
which can lead to the generation of peace 
which our President seeks. 

November 6, 1972 


President Pledges Continued Efforts 
on Behalf of POW's and MIA's 

Folloiving are remarks made by President 
Nixon 0)1 October 16 before the National 
League of Families of American Prisoners 
and Missing i)i Southeast Asia. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 23 

I learned that Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. 
Kissinger, Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs] was scheduled to 
be your speaker this morning, and I found 
that I had some time in my schedule and I 
decided to substitute for two very important 
reasons : One, of all the many groups I 
speak to, and that I have spoken to, big or 
small, across America, there isn't one that 
inspires me more than you do. Two, I am 
here to thank you for your support and to 
urge you for your continued support. 

I am not speaking of an election campaign, 
but I am speaking of support for a cause 
bigger than an election : a cause of an hon- 
orable peace, one that will contribute to peace 
in the world. And an honorable peace in 
this terribly difficult war in Viet-Nam will 
contribute to that kind of a peace that we all 

Since we last met — it is hard to realize it 
was a year ago — some very intensive nego- 
tiations have been underway. I shall not and 
cannot comment on those negotiations. One, 
I would not want to raise false hopes; and 
two, any comment when negotiations are 
taking place could jeopardize their success, 
and I know that none of you would want 
any chance for successful negotiations to be 

However, I do want to tell this group 
some conditions that I have laid down that 
we will insist upon in those negotiations in 
seeking an honorable peace in Viet-Nam. 

First, we shall not agree to any settle- 
ment which imposes a Communist govern- 
ment upon the people of South Viet-Nam. 

And second, we shall under no circum- 
stances abandon our POW's and our MIA's, 
wherever they are. 

When I use the word "abandon," I speak 
quite deliberately. That means that we can- 
not leave their fate to the good will of the 
enemy. We must have some strength in our- 
selves. And in addition to that, we shall 
not betray our allies; we shall not stain the 
honor of the United States. 

These are the conditions that we have laid 
down. They are reasonable conditions be- 
cause we seek an honorable and reasonable 
peace, and we shall continue to negotiate to 
achieve those objectives. 

Now, one other point I wish to make with 
regard to this terribly long war which has 
been a subject for discussion over recent 
weeks and months, and that is the attitude 
that I have taken with regard to amnesty 
for those who were draft dodgers or desert- 

My position is clear. It is criticized by 
some as being lacking in compassion. Let me 
tell you why I have taken the position that 
I have. 

Two and a half million young Americans, 
when faced with the necessity of serving 
their country in Viet-Nam, in war which no 
one really wants — no one wants to go to war, 
wants to risk his life if he doesn't have to — 
but two and a half million young Americans, 
when faced with that responsibility to choose, 
chose to serve their country. Thousands of 
them died for their choice. Hundreds of 
them, your loved ones, are missing in action 
or are POW's. 

And I say that when thousands of Ameri- 
cans died for their choice and hundreds are 
now POW's or missing in action for their 
choice, it would be the most immoral thing I 
could think of to give amnesty to draft 
dodgers and those who deserted the United 

Your loved ones have and are paying a 
price for their choice, and those who de- 
serted America will pay a price for their 

And now I am here also to thank you. 
The hardest decision I have made since be- 
coming President of the United States was 
made on May 8 of this year. You will recall 


Department of State Bulletin 

the circumstances. A Moscow summit was 
upcoming after having finished the Chinese 
summit. There were great hopes for an arms 
control agreement and other agreements that 
would perhaps reduce the danger of war in 
the world. 

At that time a massive Communist inva- 
sion took place of South Viet-Nam from 
North Viet-Nam. We were faced with the 
specter of defeat. And I had to make a 
choice, a choice of accepting that defeat and 
going to Moscow hat in hand or of acting to 
prevent it. I acted. 

As you recall, I made the decision to mine 
the harbors, to bomb military targets in 
North Viet-Nam. That decision was the 
right decision militarily. It has been effec- 
tive. And those who predicted that it would 
lead to the dissolution of the summit and its 
failure proved to be wrong. 

But let me tell you what happened im- 
mediately after that decision. It is often 
said that when a President makes a hard 
decision, the so-called opinion leaders of this 
country can be counted upon to stand beside 
him, regardless of party. 

Who are the opinion leaders? Well, they 
are supposed to be the leaders of the media, 
the great editors and publishers and tele- 
vision commentators and the rest. They are 
supposed to be the presidents of our univer- 
sities and the professors and the rest, those 
who have the educational background to 
understand the importance of great deci- 
sions and the necessity to stand by the 
President of the United States when he 
makes a terribly difficult and potentially un- 
popular decision. They are supposed to be 
some of our top businessmen who also have 
this kind of background. 

Let me tell you that when that decision 
was made, there was precious little support 
from any of the so-called opinion leaders of 
this country that I have just described. 

But what was the most heartwarming 
thing to me was that those who had so much 
at stake, those who had suffered so much, 
the great majority of those whose husbands 
and loved ones are POW's or MIA's, stood 

by that decision, and I thank you very much 
for that support. 

As I am sure you know, I would not have 
made that decision unless I thought it would 
contribute to our goal of achieving an hon- 
orable peace in Viet-Nam. I would not have 
made it unless I thought it would contribute 
to the goal that I have dedicated myself to, 
that I have spoken to many of you about, 
including to this group last year, of securing 
the release of our POW's and the return of 
our MIA's. 

I know that it has been a long, long vigil 
for you. I know how much you have suffered. 
And I know how much your children have 
suffered and others who are not represented 
here. And I know that it is difficult at such 
a time as this to put your trust in any person. 

But at this point let me just say in con- 
clusion, you have never been away from my 
thoughts and you have never been away 
from my prayers, and there is nothing that 
I want more than to bring your loved ones 
home, and I will never let you down. 

Thank you. 

U.S. To Provide Launch Assistance 
for Peaceful Satellite Projects 

Folloii'ing are a White House announce- 
ment and fact sheet issued October 9. 


White House press release dated October 9 

President Nixon on October 9 announced 
a policy whereby the United States will pro- 
vide launch assistance to other countries and 
international organizations for satellite proj- 
ects which are for peaceful purposes and are 
consistent with obligations under relevant 
international arrangements. Launches will 
be provided on a nondiscriminatory, reim- 
bursable basis. 

The President's decision extends to other 
countries the assurances given to the mem- 

November 6, 1972 


ber states of the European Space Conference 
in September 1971.^ These assurances recog- 
nize the legitimate interests of European 
countries in being able to place satellites into 
space under nondiscriminatory conditions. 
This action was in keeping with the Presi- 
dent's recognition of the desirability of mu- 
tually beneficial cooperation in space and the 
importance of such cooperation as a new di- 
mension in the further development of the 
Atlantic partnership. 

Addressing the United Nations General 
Assembly nearly three years ago, the Presi- 
dent noted particularly that "Of all of man's 
great enterprises, none lends itself more logi- 
cally or more compellingly to international 
cooperation than the venture into space." 2 

In establishing a global launch assur- 
ance policy, the President affirms the need 
for a dependable capability which would 
make it possible for nations to have access 
under equal conditions to the advantages 
which accrue through space applications. 
This global launch assurance policy further 
manifests U.S. faith that, in the language of 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, "The explora- 
tion and use of outer space . . . shall be car- 
ried out for the benefit and in the interests 
of all countries . . . and shall be the province 
of all mankind." 


White House press release dated October 9 

U.S. Policy Governing the Provision 
OF Launch Assistance 

I. United States launch assistance vifill be avail- 
able to interested countries and international orga- 
nizations for those satellite projects which are for 
peaceful purposes and are consistent with obliga- 
tions under relevant international agreements and 
arrangements, subject only to the following: 

A. With respect to satellites intended to provide 

' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 29, 1971, 
p. 624. 
" Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 

international public telecommunications services: 

1. The United States will provide appropriate 
launch assistance for those satellite systems on 
which Intelsat [International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization] makes a favorable recom- 
mendation in accordance with article XIV of its 
definitive arrangements. 

2. If launch assistance is requested in the absence 
of a favorable recommendation by Intelsat, the 
United States will provide launch assistance for 
those systems which the United States had sup- 
ported within Intelsat so long as the country or 
international entity requesting the assistance consid- 
ers in good faith that it has met its relevant obliga- 
tions under article XIV of the definitive arrange- 

3. In those cases where requests for launch as- 
sistance are maintained in the absence of a favor- 
able Intelsat recommendation and the United States 
had not supported the proposed system, the United 
States will reach a decision on such a request after 
taking into account the degree to which the proposed 
system would be modified in the light of the factors 
which were the basis for the lack of support within 

B. With respect to future operational satellite ap- 
plications which do not have broad international ac- 
ceptance, the United States will favorably consider 
requests for launch assistance when broad interna- 
tional acceptance has been obtained. 

II. Such launch assistance will be available, con- 
sistent with U.S. laws, either from U.S. launch sites 
(through the acquisition of U.S. launch services on 
a cooperative or reimbursable basis) or from foreign 
launch sites (by purchase of an appropriate U.S. 
launch vehicle). In the case of launchings from for- 
eign sites the United States will require assurance 
that the launch vehicles will not be made available to 
third parties without prior agreement of the United 

III. With respect to the financial conditions for 
reimbursable launch services from U.S. launch sites, 
foreign users will be charged on the same basis as 
comparable non-U. S. Government domestic users. 

IV. With respect to the priority and scheduling 
for launching foreign payloads at U.S. launch sites, 
such launchings will be dealt with on the same basis 
as U.S. launchings. Each launching will be treated 
in terms of its own requirements and as an indi- 
vidual case. When it becomes known when a payload 
will become available and what its launch window 
requirements will be, the launching will be sched- 
uled for that time. Should a conflict arise, the United 
States will consult with all interested parties in or- 
der to arrive at an equitable solution. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Opportunities for Trade and Investment 
in the Developing Countries of Africa 

A Conference on Opportunities for Trade 
and Investment in the Developing Countries 
of Africa was held at the Department Oc- 
tober 3-Jt. Following are background infor- 
mation on the conference and an address 
made by Under Secretary of Commerce 
James T. Lynn at the opening session of the 
conference on October 3. 


Secretary Rogers and Secretary of Com- 
merce Peter G. Peterson announced on Sep- 
tember 27 (press release 242) a two-day 
conference on "Opportunities for Trade and 
Investment in the Developing Countries of 
Africa" October 3-4 at the Department of 

The conference, sponsored by Secretary 
Rogers and Secretary Peterson together with 
other government agencies, brought together 
more than 200 specially invited senior ex- 
ecutives of U.S. agricultural, manufacturing, 
banking, and commercial enterprises and 
top-ranking representatives of developing 
African countries. 

In the course of the two-day conference, 
the African and U.S. business and govern- 
ment leaders explored opportunities for ex- 
panding U.S.-African commercial relations 
and practical ways of overcoming problems 
that impede these relations. 

The African countries were represented 
by Cabinet-level officials, their Ambassadors 
and other representatives in Washington, 
officials of African regional organizations, 
and African businessmen. The U.S. partici- 
pants included both business leaders and of- 
ficials of government agencies concerned 

with promoting and financing U.S. exports 
and investments in developing Africa. 

A highlight of the conference was a din- 
ner hosted by Deputy Secretary Irwin Oc- 
tober 3, with an address by Robert K. A. 
Gardiner, Executive Secretary of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 

"The conference is expected to result in 
frank exchanges of views on the interests 
and resources of American business and on 
specific African development plans and re- 
lated investment opportunities," Secretary 
Rogers and Secretary Peterson said. "This 
will be a working conference focusing on the 
practical aspects of doing business in Africa. 
Africans and Americans will have the op- 
portunity to meet on common ground under 
conditions suitable for laying the ground- 
work for future specific trade and invest- 
ment contracts." 

The conference is among the first of sev- 
eral recent steps the State and Commerce 
Departments are undertaking jointly to im- 
prove and expand the quality and quantity 
of government services to U.S. exporters 
and investors. 

"It also reflects the Nixon administration's 
conviction that expanded private trade and 
investment are indispensable components 
for achieving consistent economic growth in 
developing independent Africa," Secretary 
Rogers and Secretary Peterson said. 


I am delighted to be here this morning to 
help kick off this conference. Let me first 
convey Secretary Peterson's regrets for not 
being able to be with you today. He wanted 

November 6, 1972 


me to thank you all for participating in what 
we believe is a very important event. 

The agenda identifies my talk as a key- 
note. In reviewing the program, I have 
tried to put my finger on the integrating 
theme for this conference. Put another way : 
What do we hope to accomplish? 

In a, I would hope that we are 
able to make progress toward furthering 
Africa's economic development through busi- 
ness transactions that make sense for both 
the developing African countries and our 

We have gathered here key officials of 
African governments, representatives of 
important domestic and international organi- 
zations, U.S. Government officials, and deci- 
sionmakers from the American business 

These discussions must be frank and open. 
As in any discussions among friends, prob- 
lems must not be ignored, nor should they 
be allowed to preclude exploration of posi- 
tive opportunities. 

This conference presents an opportunity 
for American businessmen and government 
officials to learn firsthand about the needs 
and aspirations of the African nations. Most 
of these nations have taken on their present 
political identities only during the past dozen 
years. Others can trace their nationhood to 
much earlier beginnings, especially Ethiopia. 
All these nations are currently exploring op- 
tions for building economic identities that 
will assure maximum and efl:"ective develop- 
ment of their human and natural resources. 
They have devoted considerable time and ef- 
fort to economic planning. Even where no 
formal development plan has been formu- 
lated, this emphasis comes through loud and 
strong in other ways. 

Economic infrastructure receives a great 
deal of emphasis in development planning — 
especially transportation, telecommunica- 
tions, and electric power production. For 
example, Nigeria's 1970-74 development plan 
envisions nearly $700 million for transpor- 
tation, by far the largest component of the 
$4.5 billion total. Transportation also ranks 

high in the Ivory Coast development plan 
(22 percent), and some 10 percent of 
Morocco's 1973-77 $3.1 billion development 
plan expenditures are in that sector. 

Agriculture, including processing of agri- 
cultural output, is also stressed, as is expan- 
sion of manufacturing facilities. In the so- 
cial sector, education and public health have 
very exciting prospects. 

On the commercial policy side, diversifica- 
tion of trading and investment relationships 
appears high in African orders of priority. 
Despite political freedom, African economic 
options are still closely linked to former 
metropoles. New relationships are needed 
to expand markets for African products as 
well as to enable Africans to have a wider 
choice of the tools they need to build their 
economies. Greater choice is also needed to 
give them better values with respect to their 

I am happy to note the African interest 
in diversifying their trade patterns, espe- 
cially insofar as this involves expanding 
trade and investment ties with the United 
States. Such diversification will certainly 
provide greater freedom of choice for Afri- 
can buyers and improved access to the best 
available goods at the most favorable prices, 
whatever the source. It was particularly 
gratifying to see the concrete steps to this 
end taken in 1970 by the members of the 
Central African Customs and Economic Un- 
ion — Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Gabon, and the People's Republic of the 
Congo — to reduce the tariff preferences ac- 
corded the European Economic Community 
by 50 percent, 75 percent in the case of 
pharmaceuticals. The United States had 
hoped that further reductions would follow 
and continues to hope for timely elimination 
of these preferences altogether. We also 
hope that this bold step will be an example 
emulated by other countries maintaining 
discriminatory tarift' structures. 

Unfortunately, there has been a prolifera- 
tion of these discriminatory arrangements 
in Africa. It is unfortunate insofar as the 
African need to have the widest possible 


Department of State Bulletin 

choice in purchasing vital capital equipment 
and other goods is concerned. It is, of 
course, also very unfortunate for us. 

Can the United States play a more active 
role in helping Africans pursue their pri- 
orities? I think we have a great deal to 
offer the Africans — more than they are cur- 
rently receiving from us. Given an equal 
opportunity to compete, our role in African 
economic destiny will be determined by our 
response to the priorities set by these coun- 
tries; that is, the extent to which we can 
help them meet their most urgent needs. So 
at this conference we have an opportunity to 
learn more about these needs, to think hard 
about how we can respond, and to discuss 
possibilities for mutually advantageous ar- 

The African nations have an opportunity 
to use this conference to learn more about 
what motivates American firms to sell, to 
buy, to invest. We in the United States 
have heard a great deal about African 
desire for more American investment. I 
believe that this desire will not be fully real- 
ized unless Africans understand that Amer- 
ican firms — even our largest industrial 
giants — have limited budgets and virtually 
unlimited options for deploying these funds. 
It boils down to a question of competition. 
Where can a firm get a good return on its 
investments under stable and attractive con- 
ditions? These options include, of course, 
expanding facilities in the highly lucrative 
U.S. market, investing in contiguous, easily 
accessible markets such as Canada and Mex- 
ico, or entering the booming markets of 
Europe or Japan. Competing with these 
areas are scores of developing countries, 
where it is often more costly to survey the 
prospects for establishing operations, where 
the risks may be greater, and where returns 
may not be realized for many years. 

As for the American businessman, he has 
to put himself in the shoes of the Africans. 
He has to see the broad goals of individual 
African countries. He must look at the Afri- 
can development plans and other indications 
of African economic priorities. In the course 

of doing this, he may well find new insights 
in how to compete effectively with third 
countries as well as to align his company's 
activities with African priorities. 

The prospective American exporter and 
investor alike should carefully consider 
policies for greater African participation in 
the economy. The prospective investor should 
explore arrangements for both equity and 
management involvement by Africans. 
Equally important, the prospective Ameri- 
can exporter should see what can be done 
to utilize African businessmen to distribute 
his products or to train Africans to repre- 
sent him in their own countries. Considera- 
tion of such factors will not only enhance 
the prospective exporters' or investors' pros- 
pects for a successful transaction — and in- 
sui-e that it will continue successfully — it 
may well result in more effective distribu- 
tion than using the services of the long- 
entrenched and tradition-laden trading com- 
panies of our European competitors. 

As you can see from the substantial turn- 
out of leading executives at this conference, 
there is a good deal of American business in- 
terest in the developing countries of Africa. 
These businessmen are here to learn more 
about African needs, more about what Afri- 
ca holds for their firms, what the prospective 
African customer wants that they can sup- 

The emphasis here is on mutual benefit, 
especially on developing mutual understand- 
ing of how, specifically, opportunities for 
mutual benefit can be identified and realized. 

The U.S. Government is committed to do- 
ing its part in helping the developing coun- 
tries of Africa achieve their economic goals. 
We have provided economic assistance, in- 
cluding technical assistance to develop Af- 
rica's human resources which are so essen- 
tial to economic growth. This reflects our 
commitment to the basic principles of assist- 
ance to the developing nations of the world. 
It is closely related to our desire to see a 
more open world with expanded relations 
among all countries. 

There is no more important contribution 

November 6, 1972 


that any developed country government can 
make to the advancement of these objectives 
than to help make the international business 
climate more conducive to trade and invest- 
ment transactions that will open the gateway 
to broader communication as well as stimu- 
late the economic growth of developing 
countries. And so we have directed this con- 
ference at what we think are some of the 
most promising sectors for increasing com- 
mercial relations between the United States 
and the developing countries of Africa. We 
believe that Africa's development needs mesh 
very closely with the needs of the American 
business community as well as broader needs 
of the United States. 

A few words on where U.S.-African busi- 
ness stands today. As I look at the trends 
of U.S. trade with the developing African 
countries, I see no room for complacency 
by those of us who are interested in ex- 
panding these relations. Even though the 
trend in U.S.-African trade is up, Ameri- 
cans purchased only 6 percent of the $12.5 
billion that Africa exported in 1970, down 
from 8 percent five years earlier. The United 
States supplied 10 percent of the $10.6 bil- 
lion import market of the developing Afri- 
can countries in 1970, off from 11.2 percent 
in 1965. Africa's principal suppliers, 
France and the United Kingdom, also lost 
a little ground during that period, but other 
major competitors, notably Japan, West 
Germany, and Italy, increased their shares. 

There are no up-to-date figures on for- 
eign investment in Africa whereby we might 
compare the U.S. position with those of 
other third countries. However, this coun- 
try probably ranks number three, after 
France and the United Kingdom. The pre- 
ponderance of our investment is in petroleum 
and other minerals. If we are going to par- 
ticipate more effectively in the economic 
growth of Africa, we will have to give more 
attention to the manufacturing and distri- 
bution sectors. 

There are a number of recent transactions 
that clearly demonstrate the ability of Amer- 
ican firms to reverse the decline in U.S.- 
African trading trends. One example is a 

$64 million contract concluded this February 
by an American engineering-construction 
firm for a sugar growing and processing 
project in Ivory Coast. French competi- 
tors fought hard for this contract, but the 
American firm was willing to make the extra 
effort that wins in the business world. The 
result : Ivory Coast will have a sugar com- 
plex second to none in quality, and the 
American firm may find this transaction a 
springboard for substantially expanding its 
business in west Africa. 

Another example: In Nigeria, the Sea- 
board Allied Milling Co. consummated a 
flour mill investment this year costing about 
$3 million. The new subsidiary, Life Flour 
Mills, has around 40 percent private Ni- 
gerian equity participation. The initial ca- 
pacity is slated at 4,500 hundredweight of 
flour a day. Construction of the plant has 
already begun. 

No mention of American business involve- 
ment in Africa can be made without citing 
the liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in 
Algeria. The largest of these is the one in- 
volving the El Paso Natural Gas Co., but 
other substantial contracts for buying Al- 
gerian LNG are in the works. These trans- 
actions are expected to result in billions of 
dollars of revenue for Algeria. They should 
also help the serious U.S. energy situation. 

Looking into the future, I see developing 
Africa's needs and problems as promising 
opportunities for closer commercial ties with 
the United States. I say this because I be- 
lieve American firms are generally more 
adept at developing and utilizing indigenous 
personnel in the management of foreign op- 
erations than many of our competitors. I 
believe that American technology, while not 
perhaps the ultimate in all cases, generally is 
as good and in many cases better than any- 
thing else available. 

I believe that both American and African 
businessmen have the opportunity to take 
additional steps that can lead to more ex- 
tensive commercial ties. For example, the 
8,000 African students currently studying in 
the United States should provide the basis 
for a closer, solidly based relationship. Over 


Department of State Bulletin 

a thousand of these students are enrolled in 
engineering courses, and approximately the 
same number is studying management and 
business administration. 

In this conference on opportunities, the 
greatest opportunity we have is to build a 
solid foundation on which U.S. -African com- 
mercial relationships can be constructed. The 
foundation for a strong structure must be 
mutual understanding and a regard for each 
other's self-interest; it must be balanced and 
not lopsided in either direction. In the long 
run, this relationship of equitable treatment 
for both sides must prevail, or the edifice we 

seek to erect will topple on those who come 
after us. 

I am confident that those who participate 
in this conference will increase this under- 
standing of the means by which we can 
assure that mutuality of interest is a working 
program and not a catchphrase. 

Africa has contributed so richly to Amer- 
ica and her culture. I hope that out of meet- 
ings such as this Americans can find ways 
to identify and develop those practical, eco- 
nomically sound business opportunities that 
will make good sense and fulfill the aspira- 
tions of the people of Africa. 


General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
Holds 16th Session at Mexico City 

The 16th session of the General Confer- 
ence of the Interncdional Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) tvas held at Mexico City 
September 26-Octoher 3. Following is a 
statement made before the conference on 
September 27 by Dr. James R. Schlesinger, 
Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Eyiergy Com- 
mission, who was chairman of the U.S. dele- 

It is an honor for me to represent the 
United States at the General Conference of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and to address my fellow delegates. I ex- 
tend my warmest congratulations to you, 
Minister Flores [Horacio Flores de la Pena, 
of Mexico], upon your election as our presid- 
ing officer. I would like also to express our 
gratitude to the Government of Mexico for 
serving as host to the conference in this 
beautiful setting. 

It is my privilege now to read the follow- 
ing message from the President of the 
United States : 

It is a pleasure to send my warmest greetings 
through Dr. Schlesinger to those who attend the 
16th General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and to express appreciation on be- 
half of the United States delegation to our southern 
neighbor, Mexico, for hosting this important meet- 

All those who value the development and applica- 
tion of the enormous potential of the atom for im- 
proving the well-being of all mankind recognize the 
significance of this annual meeting and applaud the 
important position of leadership which your orga- 
nization has taken to facilitate international coop- 
eration in the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear en- 

The International Atomic Energy Agency has un- 
dertaken the critical responsibility of carrying out 
the safeguard provisions of the Treaty on the Non- 
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and we look for- 
ward to the early conclusion of appropriate safe- 
guard agreements. It has given positive direction to 

November 6, 1972 


environmental protection programs and especially to 
the question of management of radioactive wastes. 

In these and many other endeavors this highly 
important world body has contributed knowledge, 
guidance, and skill and provided the necessary im- 
petus to closer collaboration among the nations of 
the world. I wish you another successful and pro- 
ductive session. 

As President Nixon's message indicates, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency has 
made important contributions to the peace- 
ful uses of nuclear energy. In reviewing the 
Agency's proposed program for 1973-78 and 
budget for 1973, I was impressed by the 
range and depth of its activities and the 
relatively modest budget and staff with 
which these are carried out. Among the 
functions I particularly noted was that relat- 
ing to assistance rendered developing mem- 
ber states in the introduction of nuclear 
power and the Agency's intention to place 
more emphasis on this activity. I believe this 
to be a significant area of activity for the 
Agency, with a number of very important 

One of the principal issues we in the 
United States are beginning to come to grips 
with is the broad issue of energy and public 
policy. It is necessary to predict, to the ex- 
tent possible, anticipated energy require- 
ments over the next 30 or so years and 
specify alternative means of meeting them. 
This involves careful analysis of the avail- 
ability and costs of various energy sources, 
such as uranium, coal, oil, natural gas, and 
hydro, on the one hand and possible energy 
demands on the other. Other factors, such 
as the economic impact of alternative energy 
policies and the biomedical and environ- 
mental effects associated with the recovery, 
conversion, transport, and utilization of var- 
ious energy sources, must also be given care- 
ful consideration. From such studies, many 
of which are now underway by various or- 
ganizations, it is hoped that inci-easingly 
rational energy choices can be made in the 

It has become quite clear that nuclear 
energy must be one of the major energy 

sources in the United States in future years 
in view of the availability of nuclear fuel 
materials and the economy of size in such 
plants. While there are clear environmental 
advantages to nuclear power, there also are 
potential environmental problems associated 
with the large-scale development of this as 
well as new energy resources of any form. 
We believe nuclear electric power can be 
produced with less insult to the environ- 

On the other hand, it would be short- 
sighted of us not to recognize that some 
problems in the environmental field are un- 
avoidably linked to the use of nuclear fission 
as an energy source. We gain credibility by 
recognizing this and working toward the 
necessary solutions. This will require close 
international cooperation. 

The problem of future energy needs and 
the desirability of dealing with them system- 
atically and constructively is not, of 
course, confined to the United States. It is 
an issue that all nations, both developed and 
developing, face in varying degrees. Those 
who respond to the problem at an early stage 
and develop a coherent energy policy will 
benefit over those who wait until a crisis is 
upon them. 

Whatever help the Agency can provide to 
member states in considering the nuclear 
power alternative in national or regional 
energy studies of this type would, in my 
judgment, be a major service. In fact, the 
Agency might wish to consider ways in 
which it could make the most effective con- 
tribution to such studies. 

In this connection, it should be noted that 
the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, held in Stockholm last 
summer, adopted a resolution calling on the 
Secretary General — working with interna- 
tional bodies such as the Agency and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development — to undertake a comprehensive 
study of available energy sources, new tech- 
nology, and consumption trends. The pur- 
pose of the study will be to assist in provid- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ing a basis for the effective development of 
the world's energy resources, with due re- 
gard to the environmental eft'ects of energy 
production and use. The first report is due 
by 1975. The results of the Agency's present 
market survey of nuclear power needs in 
developing countries should provide a timely 
input to the more broadly based study called 
for by the Stockholm resolution. 

When a country has made a decision to 
move ahead seriously with the nuclear power 
alternative, there are some specific services 
the Agency should be in a position to provide 
readily. Such services could include in-depth 
reactor siting evaluations, as well as assist- 
ance in the development of appropriate 
regulatory-type licensing procedures and of 
adequate health and safety standards and 
procedures. The Agency already provides 
services in these areas to some extent. How- 
ever, with the growing number of nuclear 
powerplants on order or being installed 
around the world, the Agency will face a real 
challenge in meeting the predictable needs 
that will arise — and are already arising — for 
these services. 

As all of us are aware, increasing inter- 
national attention is being given to environ- 
mental protection and to the related areas of 
health and safety. The Agency already has a 
good start in programs in these vital fields 
through issuance of its basic health and 
safety standards, safe-transport regulations, 
and numerous codes of practice covering safe 
operating procedures, as well as management 
of radioactive wastes. Additionally, the 
Agency has made important contributions 
to the safe use of nuclear energy through its 
missions to assist member states with safety 
and environmental problems, including nu- 
clear powerplant siting as well as research 
and training programs. 

The United States fully supports the em- 
phasis the Agency is placing on research in 
health, safety, waste management, and en- 
vironmental protection. In this connection, 
you will be interested in the fact that a re- 
cent independent reexamination of the 

Agency's programs and objectives, carried 
out by a group of distinguished American 
scientists and educators, concluded that the 
Agency's work is of continuing importance 
in the interest of international scientific 

There is a distinct need for clear advance 
planning to develop the most effective means 
of tackling problems in these areas. The 
Agency's basic health and safety standards 
document should be kept under continuous 
review and updated whenever necessary. 
Also, the Agency could well undertake the 
studies and analyses that would enable it to 
forecast major problems in the broad areas 
of health and safety that will require atten- 

One of the important areas the Agency 
now is addressing is the long-term manage- 
ment of high-level radioactive wastes. The 
volume of these wastes will grow as nuclear 
energy becomes a more important source of 
electrical power in both developed and devel- 
oping nations. The Agency has an unusual 
opportunity now to help define the interna- 
tional scope of the waste-management task 
and to develop and recommend standards and 
criteria for waste management, handling, 
storage, and monitoring. The Agency's panel 
of experts, including one from the United 
States, is to meet in November to assess the 
problem. The work of this panel should pro- 
vide a basis for identifying criteria against 
which to search for possible storage sites 
and for helping nations manage high-level 
wastes effectively. This action is consistent 
with the resolution adopted at the Stockholm 
Conference which called on governments to 
support and expand, under the Agency and 
other appropriate organizations, cooperation 
on radioactive waste problems. 

With respect to safeguards, many states 
have negotiated, or are in the process of 
negotiating, appropriate safeguards agree- 
ments with the Agency pursuant to the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. It is particularly note- 
worthy that EURATOM [European Atomic 
Energy Community] and the Agency have 

November 6, 1972 


been able to negotiate a complex and im- 
portant agreement involving the atomic pro- 
grams of the European Community and its 
members. The Board's action in approving 
this agreement, hopefully, will bring about 
early ratification of the treaty by the partici- 
pating governments and active implementa- 
tion of the safeguards. Perhaps other signa- 
tories who have not done so now will both 
ratify the treaty and undertake the negotia- 
tion of safeguards agreements pursuant to 
the treaty. 

I would like to take this occasion to reiter- 
ate on behalf of my government our strong 
commitment to the objectives of the Nonpro- 
liferation Treaty. My own government, 
which for obvious reasons is not required by 
the treaty to accept nonproliferation safe- 
guards, has commenced talks with the 
Agency on an agreement pursuant to our 
offer to place U.S. nuclear activities, other 
than those of direct national security signifi- 
cance, under Agency safeguards at an appro- 
priate time. This ofl'er, you may recall, was 
made to demonstrate that we sought no com- 
mercial advantage from the treaty and that 
we were confident that the safeguards would 
not present an onerous burden. 

The responsibility which agreements 
under the treaty place on the Agency raises 
the question as to what we foresee in the 
future development of the Agency's safe- 
guards capabilities. Both records-accounta- 
bility and inspection activities will need to 
be continually reviewed and modified, and 
expanded when necessary, to enable the 
Agency to fulfill its increasing responsibili- 
ties as the use of nuclear power becomes 
more widespread. In addition, it seems es- 
sential for the Agency to have a strong in- 
house capability to use and evaluate technical 
developments resulting from safeguards re- 
search all over the world. Inspection pro- 
cedures must be kept up to date, and the 
cost efi'ectiveness of the Agency's safeguards 
must be maintained. Both the experimental 
research on safeguards techniques at the 
Seibersdorf Laboratory and the systems 
analysis research at Agency headquarters 

are important elements of the safeguards 

Turning to the proposed program for the 
Agency for 1973-78 and the budget for 1973, 
they appear to have been developed with 
care and with cost restraints in mind. They 
will have the support of the U.S. delegation. 

The operational, or technical assistance, 
program and budget, which is of direct im- 
portance to the majority of the Agency's 
members, deserves special mention. The 
United States fully supports this activity 
and believes it must remain in balance with 
other parts of the Agency's program. To do 
so, it will require adequate financial support. 
My government has clearly demonstrated its 
support by contributing to the target at our 
assessed rate and by the additional in-kind 
contributions which we have made. A num- 
ber of other governments have similarly con- 
tributed. Participation by all members at 
their assessed rate would afford equitable 
and satisfactory sharing of the re!5ponsibili- 
ties for a healthy and effective operational 

I am pleased to note that the amendment 
to article VI of the Agency's statute has been 
ratified by 46 member states, including the 
United States. We are two-thirds of the way 
toward bringing the amendment into force, 
making possible expanded representation of 
many areas of the world on the Board of 
Governors, and I urge those members that 
have not done so to ratify the amendment. 

As part of the in-kind contributions men- 
tioned earlier, the U.S. Government is 
pleased to renew its pledge, for the 14th con- 
secutive year, to donate up to $50,000 worth 
of special nuclear material for use in Agency 
projects in research and for medical therapy. 
We shall also continue to make available, on 
a cost-free basis, the services of experts, 
training opportunities, and items of equip- 
ment, as we are able to do so. 

I trust that these contributions serve fur- 
ther to underscore the continuing support 
that the United States extends to the Agency 
and to its programs. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. Abstains on Security Council 
Resolutions on Southern Rhodesia 

Folloiving are statements made in the U.N. 
Secioitij Council on Septe.mher 29 by U.S. 
Representative Christopher H. Phillips, to- 
gether ivith the text of a resolution adopted 
by the Council that day. 

First Statement 

USUN press release 109 dated September 29 

My delegation has listened with great in- 
terest to the statements of the distinguished 
Foreign Ministers who have spoken here 
thus far. 

The United States remains concerned 
about the situation in Southern Rhodesia. 
We believe, however, that the Council 
should look at the problem from a practical 
point of view and in terms of measures that 
the members of the United Nations will ac- 
tually carry out. 

The United States continues to believe 
that racial equality and self-determination 
must become the inheritance of all of the 
people of Southern Rhodesia, and we share 
the abhorrence already expressed by previ- 
ous speakers before this Council for an il- 
legal regime that has tried to perpetuate 
control by a racist minority over an area of 
Africa which it has no right to govern. The 
United States will continue to support prac- 
tical means toward achieving the realization 
of full political rights for all of the people 
of Rhodesia, but we recognize, perhaps more 
clearly now than in 1968, that the way will 
not be an easy one. 

We believe that the Council should not 
turn a deaf ear to any practical efforts to 
seek a solution and that it should not hasten 
to condemn the attempt made recently by 
the British to seek a settlement. The United 
Kingdom has acted in a wholly responsible 
manner in seeking to bring the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia under control, and we 

see no purpose in attempting to push the 
British Government into taking measures 
that would not contribute to the best inter- 
ests of the majority of the people of Rho- 
desia. Thus, we do not believe that it is 
appropriate for this Council to call upon 
the United Kingdom to take measures that 
could only become effective with the use of 

In listening to the statements so far, we 
note that there has been great emphasis 
placed on imports by the United States of 
strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia, 
although several speakers have also called 
attention to widespread violations by others. 
Mr. President, I wish briefly to set the sub- 
ject in its proper perspective. 

The sanctions program is, first of all, a 
matter which affects various states differ- 
ently. For some, sanctions have been easy 
to comply with since they had no economic 
relations with Southern Rhodesia at all. For 
others, there were difficulties and in some 
cases hardships as well-established commer- 
cial ties were broken. Still others, however, 
have found ways of keeping such links more 
or less intact, and it is because of them that 
economic sanctions against Southern Rho- 
desia have thus far not had the success we 
originally hoped for. 

The second point I wish to make is that 
the cooperation of all states is needed to 
make sanctions more effective. As you are 
well aware, the Congress of the United 
States has passed legislation which exempts 
certain strategic materials from its observ- 
ance of Rhodesian sanctions. Though the 
executive branch opposed this legislation, it 
was nevertheless adopted and became effec- 
tive as law on January 1, 1972. 

My government has been forthright in 
making full and rigorous disclosures of our 
imports of these materials to the Security 
Council's Committee on Sanctions, and we 
would wish that the many other importers 
of Rhodesian commodities would be as can- 
did about their transactions so as to enable 
the Sanctions Committee to gain a full and 
accurate picture of how Southern Rhodesia 

November 6, 1972 


has for six years been able to surmount the 
mandatory economic sanctions established 
by the Security Council. 

It has been pointed out in this session of 
the Council that sanctions have had some 
limited effect on Southern Rhodesia. The 
Smith reyime has had difficulty in finding 
investment capital. Procedures adopted by 
the Southern Rhodesians to evade sanctions 
are complex and expensive. There is no 
doubt, hov^^ever, that the program is far 
from achieving the goal set out in Security 
Council Resolution 253.' 

In considering why the program has not 
been more effective, my delegation strongly 
hopes that other delegations will not suc- 
cumb to the temptation to concentrate on 
one country, the United States, simply be- 
cause it is easy to do so since its imports 
of Southern Rhodesian products have been 
made a matter of public record. 

Our last report on our imports to the 
Sanctions Committee covered the period 
April 1 to June 30. Projecting our estimated 
annual imports against Rhodesia's estimated 
annual exports, it appears that our share 
of Rhodesia's exports will be around 2 to 3 
percent of the total. Despite the fact that 
most of Southern Rhodesia's exports are 
going to other countries, the discussion on 
sanctions in this Council has centered to an 
unwarranted degree on the comparatively 
small amount of imports by the United 

Now, let us look at the record of importa- 
tions from Rhodesia during the first half 
of 1972. A good estimate of Rhodesia's total 
exports for the first half of 1972 would be 
$200 to $220 million. Now, what was the 
total value of U.S. imports, all of which 
were reported to the Sanctions Committee 
during the same period? The answer, Mr. 
President, is $3 million, a very small frac- 
tion indeed of this total. 

This is a troubling situation to us, not be- 
cause so much time has been spent in ex- 
amining U.S. imports but because so little 

time and effort has been expended to deter- 
mine to whom Rhodesia sold the other 98.5 
percent of its exports during the first half 
of this year. 

I believe members of the Council are also 
aware of the lengths to which my govern- 
ment has gone to maintain and support the 
sanctions program. Our laws and regula- 
tions, with the excepted area of strategic 
imports, continue to reflect our determina- 
tion to do so, and so does the actual record 
of the United States in not only enacting the 
appropriate laws and regulations — although 
some governments, I would note, have not 
even done that — but also in enforcing them. 
Of the nations represented in this chamber 
today, only two have actually taken appro- 
priate enforcement measures. One of these 
two, I might add, is the United States. 

It may be argued that the nationals of 
other countries have not been prosecuted 
because they have studiously avoided deal- 
ing with Rhodesia. But I believe, and I think 
most impartial observers would agree, that 
the Sanctions Committee's own reports and 
statistics suggest an alternative explanation. 
So, I might add, does the evidence that has 
been developed as a result of recent U.S. 
court actions. We continue to regard with 
concern the very large number of cases of 
reported transactions in violation of sanc- 
tions, some 130 in all, compared to the hand- 
ful of cases in which violations have been 
confirmed or admitted. 

In examining the volume of reported vio- 
lations, which we must assume is only the 
tip of the iceberg of total Rhodesian trade, 
and Rhodesia's obvious ability to market its 
goods abroad, it is clear that some countries 
simply have not taken their responsibilities 
seriously. This is not a problem that began 
with a statute adopted by the United States 
in 1972. The problem began as soon as it 
became clear that the United Nations Se- 
curity Council Resolution 232 was being 
systematically evaded.- 

Now, I appreciate the concern, Mr. Presi- 

' For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of June 
24, 1968, p. 847. 

■ For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Jan. 
9, 1967, p. 77. 


Department of State Bulletin 

dent, of those who argue that our action, 
because of its open, official character, will 
lead others to similar actions and will under- 
mine the sanctions effort. But the logic of 
that position needs close examination. 

Those who attack us for this move are 
saying in effect, "By your actions you will 
encourage others to do likewise." Now, that 
puts it backward. No encouragement by us 
has been needed. The United States would 
not have acted as it did if it were not well 
known, widely and universally known, that 
the United States until this year was one 
of a handful of nations, along with the 
United Kingdom and a few others, who had 
taken the totality of the sanctions program 
seriously and had made it work. 

The United States did not act to create 
a new situation regarding sanctions. It is 
one thing, Mr. President, to be the first 
to pierce a hole in the dike, but in this case 
the dike has been leaking, and leaking badly, 
for a long time. 

With respect to chrome, for example, this 
Council is aware that U.S. firms have re- 
cently imported two lots of chrome ore total- 
ing about 56,000 tons. But again, according 
to the estimates of the Sanctions Committee, 
Rhodesian chrome ore production since 1966, 
most of which has been sold abroad, has 
been about 400,000 tons a year, or more than 
2 million tons since Resolution 232 was 
adopted by this Council. Obviously, singling 
out the United States will not deal respon- 
sibly or adequately with this situation. 

In this connection it is also interesting to 
note that in the fourth report of the Sanc- 
tions Committee, the single largest number 
of reported cases of sanctions violations in- 
volved chrome ore and ferrochrome, 34 such 
cases in all. Nationals of 23 nations report- 
edly were involved in this apparently 
widespread trafficking in chrome and ferro- 
chrome. The United States was not men- 
tioned in any one of these cases. 

Another important mineral export of Rho- 
desia is copper. The United States may now 
under the recent legislation import copper 
from Rhodesia, although none has in fact 
been imported into the United States from 

that territory since 1965. Nonetheless, cop- 
per since UDI [unilateral declaration of in- 
dependence] has risen from third to first 
place among Rhodesia's mineral exports, 
and there are an estimated 30 to 40 copper 
mines now operating. The report of the 
Sanctions Committee documents a sharp cur- 
tailment of Rhodesian copper exports since 
1966. At the same time, the evidence is that 
Rhodesian copper production has continued 
and even increased during the same period. 
It is, as the fourth report stated, "very dif- 
ficult to determine the true situation." But 
there can be no serious doubt that Rhodesian 
copper is going somewhere, and in very sub- 
stantial quantities. We have imported none, 
either this year or in years past. 

My delegation believes that sanctions can 
be made more effective only if this matter 
is given the further study and analysis it 

Mr. President, we should not confine our 
attention only to the area of strategic ma- 
terials. Turning for a moment to the agri- 
cultural sector, the evidence again points to 
widespread violations on a truly massive 

The United States does not, and under law 
cannot, import any of Rhodesia's tobacco, 
corn, beef, or sugar. Yet these commodities 
continue to figure prominently in Rhodesia's 

Tobacco was Rhodesia's main export be- 
fore sanctions. Although sanctions caused 
Rhodesia to lose its traditional tobacco mar- 
ket, much of the tobacco is being sold abroad. 
It is not going to the United States, but 
where is it going? 

Analysis of this question would properly 
begin with the excellent information com- 
piled by the Sanctions Committee's fourth 
report. Unfortunately, as far as we can de- 
termine, no further analysis has ever been 
attempted despite the 10 cases of suspected 
violations that have been brought to the com- 
mittee for action and despite the informa- 
tion developed by the committee which dem- 
onstrates that Rhodesia's neighbors by their 
own figures exported 87,000 metric tons of 
tobacco in the period of 1968 to 1970, yet 

November 6, 1972 


somehow trading nations elsewhere managed 
to import 142,000 tons of tobacco from the 
same countries during the same period. 

Similarly, maize has grown substantially 
in its importance to the Rhodesian econ- 
omy since UDI. No less than 11 cases of re- 
ported violations have been brought to the 
Sanctions Committee, and it is clear that 
Rhodesian exports of this commodity have 
increased. But no one seems to know where 
any of it is going, although the fourth 
report of the committee documents the 
remarkable fact that while Mozambique 
reported exports of 172,000 tons of maize in 
the period 1967 to 1969, various countries 
for the same period reported maize imports 
from Mozambique of upward of 1 million 

This kind of 600 percent discrepancy, one 
would think, would cause some serious ques- 
tions to be asked. On the contrary, however, 
it .seems to have escaped notice entirely. 

Mr. President, we are also concerned that 
those who share our desire to see a fair 
and just outcome of the Rhodesian issue have 
not always focused on broader aspects of the 
problem. We can understand concerns about 
our legislation, but we would liave hoped 
that the Council would pursue all sanctions 
violations more systematically. 

We would expect to see more interest dis- 
played in the vital question of total Rho- 
desian trade. If we have imported 56,000 
tons of chrome in the first half of 1972, we 
naturally expect to hear expressions of con- 
cern. But we would also hope to see others 
ask, To whom has Rhodesia sold over 2 mil- 
lion tons of chrome ore since sanctions went 
into effect? If the United States during 1972 
will buy 2 or 3 percent of Rhodesia's exports, 
who will buy the rest? 

Finally, Mr. President, if this Council is 
serious about making sanctions work, it will 
avoid this one-sided approach and recognize 
that the real problem is far broader in na- 
ture and cannot usefully be addressed by 
singling out the U.S. Government or any 
other individual government without refer- 
ence to the total problem. 

Second Statement 

USUN piess release 110 dated September 29 

In explanation of vote on the two draft 
resolutions upon which the Council has just 
voted, the United States abstained in the 
vote on draft resolution S 10804, and I 
should like to explain very briefly why. 

Given U.S. law, the United States could 
not vote for the call by the Security Coun- 
cil with regard to sanctions across the board. 
Moreover, I am compelled to say that we 
consider that this resolution focuses atten- 
tion unfairly on the United States, but I 
want to make clear that the United States 
intends to continue to cooperate with the 
sanctions program to the fullest extent of 
our ability. 

Mr. President, my delegation abstained on 
draft resolution S 10805.' We share the 
sentiments expressed by others that what 
is now needed and what has been needed 
since the Pearce Commission announced its 
findings is that all elements within Southern 
Rhodesia should remain in contact and 
jointly demonstrate their will to work out 
a solution to the present impasse. 

We are therefore particularly concerned 
about the trend of events in Southern Rho- 
desia in recent months and the growing evi- 
dence there of polarization. As we have 
made clear, we do not believe force is an 
appropriate or effective means of resolving 
the Rhodesian pi-oblem or the other funda- 
mental difficulties in southern Africa. But 
neither do we believe that steps taken by 
the Rhodesian regime to suppress those com- 
mitted to peaceful and constructive change 
can have any effect but to exacerbate an al- 
ready difficult situation. 

We would also hope that circumstances 
could be brought about in which a constitu- 
tional conference, including those represent- 
ing all Rhodesians, African and European, 

^ This draft resolution, dealing with political as- 
pects of the Rhodes'an question and calling' on the 
British to take certain measures with respect to 
Rhodesia, was vetoed by the United Kingdom. The 
United States, France, Belgium, and Italy abstained. 


Department of State Bulletin 

could be called. We recognize that this would 
be impractical under present conditions, but 
we call upon those who seek an orderly and 
just outcome to the present impasse to con- 
tinue to seek common ground of discussion 
and possible compromise. 


The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 
1968 and subsequent resolutions in which all States 
are required to implement and make effective the 
economic, political and other sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) decided upon by 
the Council in furtherance of the objective of end- 
ing the rebellion in that territory, 

Taking into account its I'esolutions 314 (1972) of 
28 February 1972 and 318 (1972) of 28 July 1972 
concerning the co-operation and obligations of States 
and the measures necessary to ensure the scrupulous 
observance and strict implementation of sanctions, 

Deeply conceryied that, despite their obligations 
under Article 2.5 of the Charter, several States con- 
tinue to violate sanctions covertly and overtly in 
contravention of the provisions of resolution 253 

Gravely concerned about the detrimental conse- 
quences which violations could cause to the effec- 
tiveness of sanctions and, in the wider sense, to the 
authority of the Council, 

Deeply concerned by the report of the United 
States that it has authorized the importation of 
chrome ore and other minerals from Southern Rho- 
desia (Zimbabwe), 

Condemning the refusal of South Africa and Por- 
tugal to co-operate with the United Nations in the 
observance and implementation of sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 

1. Reaffirms its decision that sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) shall remain fully 
in force until the aims and objectives set out in 
resolution 253 (1968) are completely achieved; 

2. Calls upon all States to implement fully all 
Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in accord- 
ance with Article 25 and Article 2(6) of the Char- 

3. Urges the United States to co-operate fully 
with the United Nations in the effective implementa- 
tion of sanctions; 

4. Requests the Security Council Committee es- 

tablished in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) con- 
cerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia to under- 
take, as a matter of urgency, consideration of the 
type of action which could be taken in view of the 
open and persistent refusal of South Africa and 
Portugal to implement sanctions against the illegal 
regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and to 
report to the Council not later than 31 January 

5. Further requests the Committee to examine 
and submit a report to the Security Council not 
later than 31 January 1973 on all proposals and sug- 
gestions made at the 1663rd to 1666th meetings of 
the Council for extending the scope and improving 
the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rho- 
desia (Zimbabwe). 


'U.N. doc. S/RES/320 (1972) (S/10804/Rev. 1); 
adopted by the Council on Sept. 29 by a vote of 13 in 
favor, with 2 abstentions (U.K. and U.S.). 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970." 

Acceptance deposited: Dominican Republic, Oc- 
tober 5, 1972. 

Protocol suspending the agreement of September 18 
and November 25, 1964 (TIAS 5884), between the 
United States, IAEA, and Viet-Nam for the appli- 
cation of safeguards and providing for the appli- 
cation of safeguards pursuant to the nonprolifer- 
ation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). Done at 
Mexico City October 3, 1972. Enters into force 
on the same date as the treaty safeguards agree- 

Signatiires: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
United States, and Viet-Nam. 


Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 

Accessioyi deposited: Luxembourg, September 21, 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 

Not in force. 

November 6, 1972 


of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. 
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Ratification deposited: Denmark, October 17, 

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification 
of certain rules relating to international carriage 
by air siened at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49 
Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at 
The Hague on September 28, 19.5.5. Done at Guate- 
mala City March 8, 1971.' 
Signattire : New Zealand, September 12, 1972. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention 
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 
1591, 3756, 5170). Done at New York March 12, 

Ratifications deposited: France, September 13, 
1972; Switzerland, September 28, 1972. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971.' 
Signat2irc: Denmark, October 17, 1972. 

Bills of Lading 

International convention for the unification of cer- 
tain rules relating to bills of lading and protocol 
of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. 
Entered into force June 2, 1931; for the United 
States December 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233. 
Nofificatio)i that it contiiuies to be bound: Fiji 
(with reservation), September 29, 1972. 


Customs convention on containers, with annexes 
and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva May 
18, 1956. Entered into force August 4, 1959; for 
the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6634. 
Accession deposited: Canada, September 8, 1972. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention for the unification of certain rules with 
respect to assistance and salvage at sea. Done at 
Brussels September 23, 1910. Entered into force 
March 1, 1913. 37 Stat. 16.58. 

Notification that it continues to be bound: Fiji, 
September 29, 1972. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions 
at sea. Approved by the international conference 
on safety of life at sea at London May 17 to June 
17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. 
TIAS 5813. 

Acceptances deposited: Austria, August 4, 1972; 
Cuba, August 25, 1972; Fiji, August 15, 1972. 

Weights and Measures 

Convention establishing an International Organiza- 
tion of Legal Metrology. Done at Paris October 12, 
1955, and amended January 1968. Entered into 
force May 28, 1958; for the United States October 
22, 1972. 

Accession deposited: United States, September 22, 



Amendments to paragraphs 1(c), 4(1) (a), 5, 6(1), 
8(a)-(j), 9(c), 11, and 12(a) to the schedule to 
the international whaling convention of 1946 
(TIAS 1849). Adopted at London June 26-30, 
1972, at the 24th meeting of the International 
Whaling Commission. 
Entered into force: October 5, 1972. 


Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement regarding certain maritime matters, with 
annexes and exchanges of letters. Signed at Wash- 
ington October 14, 1972. Enters into force January 
1, 1973, though this date may be accelerated by 
mutual agreement of the parties. 

Agreement regarding trade, with annexes and ex- 
changes of letters. Signed at Washington October 
18, 1972. Enters into force upon the exchange of 
written notices of acceptance. 

Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease, re- 
ciprocal aid, and claims. Signed at Washington 
October 18, 1972. Entered into force October 18, 

Agreement on financing procedures, with exhibit and 
exchange of letters. Signed at Washington Oc- 
tober 18, 1972. Entered into force October 18, 1972. 


^ Not in force. 

■ Not to be applied to Faroe Islands and Greenland. 


The Senate on October 3 confirmed the nomina- 
tion of Kenneth Franzheim II, now serving as Am- 
bassador to New Zealand, to Western Samoa, and 
to Fiji, to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the 
Kingdom of Tonga. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated September 25.) 

The Senate on October 11 confirmed the following 

William R. Crawford, Jr., to be Ambassador to 
the Yemen Arab Republic. (For biographic data, 
see White House press release dated September 25.) 

Joseph A. Greenwald to be U.S. Representative to 
the European Communities. (For biographic data, 
see White House press release dated September 12.) 

Edward W. Mulcahy to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Chad. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated September 25.) 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX November 6, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 17U 

Africa. Opportunities for Trade and Invest- 
ment in the Developiner Countries of Africa 
(background information; Lynn) .... 535 

Atomic Energy. General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency Holds 
16th Session at Mexico City (Schlesinger) . 539 

Chad. Mulcahy confirmed as Ambassador . . 548 


Confirmations (Crawford, Franzheim, Green- 
wald, Mulcahy) 548 

National Security in Transition — The Execu- 
tive and the Congress (Abshire) 525 

Cuba. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Is- 
sues and Answers" (transcript) 517 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Crawford, Franzheim, Greenwald, 
Mulcahy) 548 

Developing Countries 

National Security in Transition — ^The Execu- 
tive and the Congress (Abshire) 525 

Opportunities for Trade and Investment in the 
Developing Countries of Africa (back- 
ground information; Lynn) 535 

Disarmament. National Security in Transi- 
tion — The Executive and the Congress 
(Abshire) 525 

International Organizations and Conferences 
General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency Holds 16th Session 

at Mexico City (Schlesinger) 539 

Greenwald confirmed as U.S. Representative 
to the European Communities 548 

Middle East. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on 

"Issues and Answers" (transcript) .... 517 

Military Affairs. National Security in Transi- 
tion — The Executive and the Congress 
(Abshire) 525 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. National 
Security in Transition — The Executive and 
the Congress (Abshire) 525 

Presidential Documents. President Pledges 
Continued Efl'orts on Behalf of POW's and 
MIA's 532 

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Abstains on Security 
Council Resolutions on Southern Rhodesia 
(Phillips, text of resolution) 543 

Space. U.S. To Provide Launch Assistance for 
Peaceful Satellite Projects (White House 
announcement, fact sheet) 533 

Terrorism. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on 

"Issues and Answers" (transcript) .... 517 

Tonga. Franzheim confirmed as Ambassador . 548 

Trade. Opportunities for Trade and Invest- 
ment in the Developing Countries of Africa 
(background information; Lynn) .... 535 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 547 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on 
"Issues and Answers" (transcript) .... 517 

United Nations. U.S. Abstains on Security 
Council Resolutions on Southern Rhodesia 
(Phillips, text of resolution) 543 


President Pledges Continued Efforts on Be- 
half of POW's and MIA's (Nixon) .... 

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Issues and 
Answers" (transcript) 

Yemen Arab Republic. 

Ambassador . . . 

Crawford confirmed as 




Name Index 

Abshire, David M 525 

Crawford, William R., Jr 548 

Franzheim, Kenneth, II 548 

Greenwald, Joseph A 548 

Lynn, James T 535 

Mulcahy, Edward W 548 

Nixon, President 532 

Phillips, Christopher H 543 

Rogers, Secretary 517 

Schlesinger, James R 539 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 16-22 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to October 16 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
242 of September 25. 







t264 10/17 




*268 10/20 




U.S. -Netherlands cos t-sharing 
agreement for educational ex- 
change program. 

Regional foreign policy confer- 
ence, Boston, Nov. 17. 

Notice of public meeting on Oct. 
26 and availability of draft 
environmental impact state- 
ments on oil pollution conven- 
tions and proposed ocean 
dumping convention. 

U.S. -Belgium understanding on 
civil aviation charter service 

Rogers: "Issues and Answers," 
Oct. 15. 

Irwin; Council on Foreign Rela- 
tions, Wilmette, 111., Oct. 18. 

New U.S. law to combat illegal 
trafficking of pre-Columbian 

Hearing at Detroit on Nov. 6 on 
draft environmental impact 
statement on proposed pipe- 
line between Windsor, Ont., 
and Green Springs, Ohio. 

Meeting on Oct. 30 of Advisory 
Committee of the Foreign 
Ser^'ice Institute (rewrite). 

Rogers: Los Angeles World Af- 
fairs Council. 

"* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive imme- 
diate attention if you write to: Director, Office of 
Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 







Vol. LXVII, No. 17i2 

November 13, 1972 

Address by Secretary Rogers 561 


Transcript of Interview 566 


Nexvs Conference of Henry A. Kissinger 549 

Remarks by President Nixon 55S 

For index see inside back cover •3up°^'"- 

DEC 1 1 1972 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1742 

November 13, 1972 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documenti 
U.S. Government Printinc Office 
Washineton, D.C. 20402 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $16, foreign $23 
Single copy 30 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of tlie Government 
witfi information on development* in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
tfie work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and tlie Secretary of State and 
other officers of tlie Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of tlie Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
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international relations are also listed. 

Dr. Kissinger Discusses Status of Negotiations Toward Viet-Nam Peace 

Following is the t)auscript of a news con- 
ference by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to 
the President for National Secnrity Affairs, 
held at the White House on October 26. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 30 

Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen : We 
have now heard from both Viet-Nam's, and 
it is obvious that as a war that has been rag- 
ing for 10 years is drawing to a conckision 
that this is a traumatic esperience for all of 
the participants. The President thought that 
it might be helpful if I came out here and 
spoke to you about what we have been doing, 
where we stand, and to put the various alle- 
gations and charges into perspective. 

First, let me talk about the situation in 
three parts : Where do we stand procedurally, 
what is the substance of the negotiations, 
and where do we go from here? 

We believe that peace is at hand. We be- 
lieve that an agreement is within sight based 
on the May 8 proposals of the President and 
some adaptations of our January 25 proposal 
which is just to all parties.' It is inevitable 
that in a war of such complexity that there 
should be occasional difficulties in reaching 
a final solution, but we believe that by far 
the longest part of the road has been tra- 
versed and what stands in the way of an 
agreement now are issues that are relatively 
less important than those that have already 
been settled. 

Let me first go through the procedural 
points, the arguments with respect to par- 
ticular dates for signing the agreement. As 
you know, we have been negotiating in these 
private sessions with the North Vietnamese 
for nearly four years. We resumed the dis- 
cussions on July 19 of this year. Up to now, 
the negotiations had always foundered on 
the North Vietnamese insistence that a po- 

litical settlement be arrived at before a 
military solution be discussed and on the 
companion demand of the North Vietnamese 
that the political settlement make ari-ange- 
ments which, in our view, would have 
predetermined the political outcome. 

We had taken the view, from the earliest 
private meetings on, that rapid progress 
could be made only if the political and mili- 
tary issues were separated ; that is to say, 
if the North Vietnamese and we would 
negotiate about methods to end the war and 
if the political solution of the war were left 
to the Vietnamese parties to discuss among 
themselves. During the summer, through 
many long private meetings, these positions 
remained essentially unchanged. 

As Radio Hanoi correctly stated today, on 
October 8 the North Vietnamese for the first 
time made a proposal which enabled us to 
accelerate the negotiations. Indeed, for the 
first time they made a proposal which made 
it possible to negotiate concretely at all. This 
proposal has been correctly summarized in 
the statements from Hanoi ; that is to say, 
it proposed that the United States and Hanoi, 
in the first instance, concentrate on bringing 
an end to the military aspects of the war, 
that they agree on some very general prin- 
ciples within which the South Vietnamese 
parties could then determine the political 
evolution of South Viet-Nam — which was 
exactly the position which we had always 

They dropped their demand for a coalition 
government which would absorb all existing 
authority. They dropped their demand for a 
veto over the personalities and the structure 
of the existing government. 

• For background, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, 
p. 747, and Feb. 14, 1972, p. 185. 

November 13, 1972 


They agreed for the first time to a formula 
which permitted a simultaneous discussion 
of Laos and Cambodia. In short, we had for 
the first time a framework where, rather 
than exchange general propositions and 
measuring our progress by whether depend- 
ent clauses of particular sentences had been 
minutely altered, we could examine concrete- 
ly and precisely where we stood and what 
each side was prepared to give. 

I want to take this opportunity to point 
out that from that time on, the North Viet- 
namese negotiators behaved with good will 
and with great seriousness. And so did we. 
We have no complaint with the general de- 
scription of events as it was given by Radio 

However, there grew up the seeds of one 
particular misunderstanding. The North 
Vietnamese negotiators made their proposal 
conditional on the solution of the problem 
by October 31, and they constantly insisted 
that we give some commitment that we would 
settle the war and complete the negotiations 
by October 31. 

I want to stress that these dates were not 
dates that we invented or proposed. I would 
like to stress that my instructions from the 
President were exactly those that were stated 
by him at a press conference ; that is to say, 
that we should make a settlement that was 
right, independent of any arbitrary dead- 
lines that were established by our own do- 
mestic processes. 

In order to avoid an abstract debate on 
deadlines, which at that time still seemed 
highly theoretical, we did agree that we 
would make a major eff"ort to conclude the 
negotiations by October 31 ; and it is true 
that we did, from time to time, give sched- 
ules by which this might be accomplished. 
It was, however, always clear, at least to us 
— and we thought we made it clear in the 
records of the meetings — that obviously we 
could not sign an agreement in which details 
remained to be worked out simply because 
in good faith we had said we would make an 
effort to conclude it by a certain date. 

It was always clear that we would have to 
discuss anything that was negotiated first in 
Washington and then in Saigon. There has 

been a great deal of discussion whether 
Saigon has a veto over our negotiations, and 
I would like to explain our position with 
respect to that. 

Clearly, the people of South Viet-Nam, 
who have suff'ered so much, and the Govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam, with which we have 
been allied, who will be remaining in that 
country after we have departed, have every 
right to participate in the making of their 
own peace. They have every right to have 
their views heard and taken extremely seri- 

We of course preserve our own freedom 
of judgment, and we will make our own 
decisions as to how long we believe a war 
should be continued. But one source of mis- 
understanding has been that Hanoi seemed 
to be of the view that we could simply impose 
any solution on Saigon and that their par- 
ticipation was not required. But I also want 
to make clear that the issues that remain 
to be settled have a number of sources, and 
I will get into them in some detail. 

Saigon, as is obvious from the public rec- 
ord, has expressed its views with its custom- 
ary forcefulness both publicly and privately. 
We agreed with some of their views. We 
didn't agree with all of them, and we made 
clear which we accepted and which we could 
not join. 

In addition, while my colleagues and I were 
in Saigon, we visited other countries of 
Southeast Asia and we had extensive con- 
versations with American officials, and it 
appeared that there were certain concerns 
and certain ambiguities in the draft agree- 
ment that we believed required modification 
and improvement. But I want to stress that 
what remains to be done is the smallest part 
of what has already been accomplished, and 
as charges and countercharges fill the air, 
we must remember that, having come this 
far, we cannot fail and we will not fail over 
what still remains to be accomplished. 

Now, let me first go briefly over the main 
provisions of the agreement as we under- 
stand them, and then let me say what, in our 
view, still remains to be done. We believe, 
incidentally, what remains to be done can be 


Department of State Bulletin 

settled in one more negotiating session with 
the North Vietnamese negotiators lasting, I 
would think, no more than three or four 
days ; so we are not talking of a delay of a 
very long period of time. 

Let me, however, before I go into the 
issues that still remain, cover those that are 
contained in the draft agreement, of which, 
on the whole, a very fair account has been 
given in the radio broadcast from Hanoi. I 
don't refer to the last two pages of rhetoric ; 
I am referring to the description of the 

The principal provisions were and are that 
a cease-fire would be observed in South Viet- 
Nam at a time to be mutually agreed upon 
— it would be a cease-fire-in-place; that U.S. 
forces would be withdrawn within 60 days 
of the signing of the agreement; that there 
would be a total prohibition on the reinforce- 
ment of troops; that is to say, that infiltra- 
tion into South Viet-Nam from whatever 
area, and from whatever country, would be 
prohibited. Existing military equipment 
within South Viet-Nam could be replaced on 
a one-to-one basis by weapons of the same 
characteristics, and of similar characteristics 
and properties, under international super- 

The agreement provides that all captured 
military personnel and foreign civilians be 
repatriated within the same time period as 
the withdrawal ; that is to say, there will be 
a return of all American prisoners, military 
or civilian, within 60 days after the agree- 
ment comes into force. 

North Viet-Nam has made itself responsi- 
ble for an accounting of our prisoners and 
missing in action throughout Indochina and 
for the repatriation of American prisoners 
throughout Indochina. 

There is a separate provision that South 
Vietnamese civilians detained in South Viet- 
Nam, that their future should be determined 
through negotiation among the South Viet- 
namese parties, so that the return of our 
prisoners is not conditional on the disposition 
of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails 
on both sides of the conflict. 

With respect to the political provisions, 
there is an affirmation of general principles 

guaranteeing the right of self-determination 
of the South Vietnamese people and that the 
South Vietnamese people should decide their 
political future through free and democratic 
elections under international supervision. 

As was pointed out by Radio Hanoi, the 
existing authorities with respect to both 
internal and external policies would remain 
in office ; the two parties in Viet-Nam would 
negotiate about the timing of elections, the 
nature of the elections, and the offices for 
which these elections were to be held. 

There would be created an institution 
called the National Council of National Rec- 
onciliation and Concord whose general task 
would be to help promote the maintenance of 
the cease-fire and to supervise the elections 
on which the parties might agree. That Coun- 
cil would be formed by appointment, and it 
would operate on the basis of unanimity. We 
view it as an institutionalization of the elec- 
tion commission that we proposed on Janu- 
ary 25 in our plan. 

There are provisions that the disposition of 
Vietnamese armed forces in the South should 
also be settled through negotiation among 
the South Vietnamese parties. 

There are provisions that the unification 
of Viet-Nam also be achieved by negotiation 
among the parties without military pressure 
and without foreign interference, without 
coercion and without annexation. 

There is a very long and complex section 
on international supervision, which will no 
doubt occupy graduate students for many 
years to come and which, as far as I can tell, 
only my colleague Ambassador Sullivan 
[William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs] understands completely. 

But briefly, it provides for joint commis- 
sions of the participants, either two-party or 
four-party, for those parts of the agreement 
that are applicable either to two parties or 
to four parties ; it provides for an interna- 
tional supervisory commission to which 
disagreements of the commissions composed 
of the parties would be referred, but which 
also had a right to make independent investi- 
gations, and an international conference to 

November 13, 1972 


meet within 30 days of the signing of the 
agreement to develop the guarantees and to 
establish the relationship of the various 
parties to each other in greater detail. 

There is, finally, a section on Cambodia 
and Laos in which the parties to the agree- 
ment agree to respect and recognize the 
independence and sovereignty of Cambodia 
and Laos, in which they agree to refrain 
from using the territory of Cambodia and 
the territory of Laos to encroach on the sov- 
ereignty and security of other countries. 
There is an agreement that foreign countries 
shall withdraw their forces from Laos and 

And there is a general section about the 
future relationship between the United 
States and the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam in which both sides express their con- 
viction that this agreement will usher in a 
new period of reconciliation between the two 
countries and in which the United States 
expresses its view that it will in the postwar 
period contribute to the reconstruction of 
Lidochina and that both countries will de- 
velop their relationships on a basis of mutual 
respect and noninterference in each other's 
affairs and that they will move from hos- 
tility to normalcy. 

Now, ladies and gentlemen, in the light 
of where we are, it is obvious that most of 
the most difficult problems have been dealt 
with, that if you consider what many of you 
might have thought possible some months 
ago compared to where we are, we have to 
say that both sides have approached this 
problem with a long-term point of view, with 
the attitude that we want to have not an 
armistice, but peace; and it is this attitude 
which will govern our actions despite occa- 
sional ups and downs which are inevitable 
in a problem of this complexity. 

Now, what is it, then, that prevents the 
completion of the agreement? Why is it that 
we have asked for one more meeting with 
the North Vietnamese to work out a final 
text? The principal reason is that in a nego- 
tiation that was stalemated for five years, 
and which did not really make a break- 
through until October 8, many of the general 

principles were clearly understood before the 
breakthrough, but as one elaborated the text, 
many of the nuances on which the implemen- 
tation will ultimately depend became more 
and more apparent. 

It was obvious, it was natural, that when 
we were talking about the abstract desir- 
ability of a cease-fire that neither side was 
perhaps as precise as it had to become later 
about the timing and staging of a cease-fire 
in a country in which there are no clear 
frontlines. And also the acceptance on our 
part of the North Vietnamese insistence on 
an accelerated schedule meant that texts 
could never be conformed, that English and 
Vietnamese texts tended to lag behind each 
other, and that ambiguities in formulation 
arose that require one more meeting to 
straighten out. 

Let me give you a few examples, and I 
think you will understand that we are talking 
here of a dift'erent problem than what occu- 
pied us in the many sessions I have had with 
you ladies and gentlemen about the problem 
of peace in Viet-Nam, sessions which con- 
cerned abstract theories of what approach 
might succeed. 

We are talking here about six or seven 
very concrete issues that, with anything like 
the good will that has already been shown, 
can easily be settled. For example, it has 
become apparent to us that there will be 
great temptation for the cease-fire to be 
paralleled by a last effort to seize as much 
territory as possible and perhaps to extend 
operations for long enough to establish po- 
litical control over a given area. 

We would like to avoid the dangers of the ^ 
loss of life, perhaps in some areas even of 
the massacre that may be inherent in this, 
and we therefore want to discuss methods by 
which the international supervisory body can 
be put in place at the same time that the 
cease-fire is promulgated. 

The Secretary of State has already had 
preliminary conversations with some of the 
countries that are being asked to join this 
body in order to speed up this process. 

Secondly, because of the different political 
circumstances in each of the Indochinese 


Department of State Bulletin 

countries, the relationship of military opera- 
tions there to the end of the war in Viet- 
Nam, or cease-fires there in relation to the 
end of the war in Viet-Nam, is somewhat 
complex; and we would like to discuss more 
concretely how to compress this time as 
much as possible. 

There were certain ambiguities that were 
raised by the interview that the North Viet- 
namese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, 
gave to one of the weekly journals in which 
he seemed to be, with respect to one or two 
points, under a misapprehension as to what 
the agreement contained, and at any rate, 
we would like to have that clarified. 

There are linguistic problems. For exam- 
ple, we call the National Council of Recon- 
ciliation an administrative structure in order 
to make clear that we do not see it as any- 
thing comparable to a coalition government. 
We want to make sure that the Vietnamese 
text conveys the same meaning. 

I must add that the words "administrative 
structure" were given to us in English by 
the Vietnamese, so this is not a maneuver on 
our part. 

There are some technical problems as to 
what clauses of the Geneva accords to refer 
to in certain sections of the document, and 
there is a problem which was never settled 
in which the North Vietnamese, as they have 
pointed out in their broadcast, have proposed 
that the agreement be signed by the United 
States and North Viet-Nam — we on behalf 
of Saigon, they on behalf of their allies in 
South Viet-Nam. 

We have always held the view that we 
would leave it up to our allies whether they 
wanted a two-power document or whether 
they wanted to sign themselves a document 
that establishes peace in their country. Now, 
they prefer to participate in the signing of 
the peace, and it seems to us not an un- 
reasonable proposal that a country on whose 
territory a war has been fought and whose 
population has been uprooted and has suf- 
fered so greatly — that it should have the 
right to sign its own peace treaty. This, 
again, strikes us as a not insuperable diffi- 
culty, but its acceptance will require the 

redrafting of certain sections of the docu- 
ment, and that, again, is a job that will 
require several hours of work. 

We have asked the North Vietnamese to 
meet with us on any date of their choice. 
We have, as has been reported, restricted 
our bombing, in eff'ect, to the battle area in 
order to show our good will and to indicate 
that we are working within the framework 
of existing agreements. 

We remain convinced that the issues that I 
have mentioned are soluble in a very brief 
period of time. We have undertaken, and I 
repeat it here publicly, to settle them at one 
more meeting and to remain at that meeting 
for as long as is necessary to complete the 

So this is the situation in which we find 

With respect to Hanoi, we understand 
its disappointment that a schedule toward 
the realization of which it had made serious 
efforts could not be met for reasons beyond 
the control of any party, but they know, or 
they should know and they certainly must 
know now, that peace is within reach in a 
matter of weeks, or less, dependent on when 
the meeting takes place, and that once peace 
is achieved we will move from hostility to 
normalcy and from normalcy to cooperation 
with the same seriousness with which we 
have conducted our previous less fortunate 
relationships with them. 

As far as Saigon is concerned, it is, of 
course, entitled to participate in the settle- 
ment of a war fought on its territory. Its 
people have suffered much, and they will 
remain there after we leave. Their views 
deserve great respect. In order to accelerate 
negotiations, we had presented them with 
conclusions which obviously could not be 
fully settled in a matter of four days that I 
spent in Saigon. But we are confident that 
our consultations with Saigon will produce 
agreement within the same time frame that 
I have indicated is required to complete the 
agreement witli Hanoi and that the negotia- 
tions can continue on the schedule that I 
have outlined. 

With respect to the American people, we 

November 13, 1972 


have talked to you ladies and gentlemen here 
very often about the negotiations with re- 
spect to the peace, and we have been very 
conscious of the division and the anguish 
that the war has caused in this country. 
One reason why the President has been so 
concerned with ending the war by negotia- 
tion, and ending it in a manner that is 
consistent with our principles, is because of 
the hope that the act of making peace could 
restore the unity that had sometimes been 
lost at certain periods during the war and 
so that the agreement could be an act of 
healing rather than a source of new division. 
This remains our policy. 

We will not be stampeded into an agree- 
ment until its provisions are right. We will 
not be deflected from an agreement when its 
provisions are right. And with this attitude, 
and with some cooperation from the other 
side, we believe that we can restore both 
peace and unity to America very soon. 

Thank you. I will be glad to answer your 

Q. Do you feel that this program could 
not have been achieved four years ago? 

Dr. Kissinger: There was no possibility of 
achieving this agreement four years ago be- 
cause the other side consistently refused to 
discuss the separation of the political and 
military i.ssues, because it always insisted 
that it had to settle the political issues with 
us and that we had to predetermine the 
future of South Viet-Nam in a negotiation 
with North Viet-Nam. 

As the statement from Hanoi said, on 
October 8 Hanoi for the first time made what 
it called a very significant proposal in which 
it accepted the principles that the military 
issues should be settled first and that the 
political issues should be left essentially to a 
negotiation among the South Vietnamese 
parties, with just the most general principles 
to be settled in the private negotiations. 

As they say, "With a view to making the 
negotiations progress" — this is reading from 
the Hanoi statement — "at the private meet- 
ing on October 8, the DRV side took a new, 
extremely important initiative. It put for- 

ward a draft agreement and proposed that 
the government," and so on, "immediately 
agree upon and sign this agreement to 
rapidly restore peace in Vietnam." In that 
draft agreement, the DRV side proposed the 
cessation of the war throughout Viet-Nam, 
a cease-fire in South Viet-Nam, and a total 
withdrawal of U.S. forces. 

And then it said, "The two South Viet- 
namese parties shall settle together the in- 
ternal matters of South Vietnam within three 
months after the cease-fire comes into eflfect." 
This is not an exact description of what the 
agreement says. The agreement does not 
say it must be done within three months. 
The agreement says that the two parties will 
do their utmost to get it done within three 
months. The exact text to which I referred 
is as follows: 

"Therefore, as the U.S. side has many 
times proposed, the Vietnam problem would 
be solved in two steps. The first step is to 
end the war in Vietnam, to have a cease-fire 
in South Vietnam, to end U.S. military 
involvement in South Vietnam. In the second 
step, the South Vietnamese sides will jointly 
solve South Vietnamese internal problems." 

This has been our position since the be- 
ginning of these negotiations. It was never 
accepted four years ago, three years ago, or 
two months ago. The first time it was ac- 
cepted was on October 8. As soon as it was 
accepted, we completed within four days a 
rough draft of an agreement from which we 
have since been operating. 

Q. What is the recourse if the negotiations 
for the elections break down? That has bee7i 
a point at which North Viet-Nam has balked 
in the past. 

Dr. Kissinger: The agreement provides 
that the cease-fire is without time limit. 

Q. Does President Thieu go along with 
this IV hole deal? 

Dr. Kissinger: As I have pointed out, the 
South Vietnamese agree with many parts of 
it and disagree with some aspects of it. We 
agree with some of their disagreements and 
not with all. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. Have the South Vietnamese been in- 
formed of the negotiations? 

Dr. Kissinger: The South Vietnamese were 
informed of the negotiations as they went 
along. However, the negotiations really were 
composed of two phases. There was the ne- 
gotiation between July 19 and October 8. In 
that negotiation, the other side constantly 
proposed various formulas for the institution 
of a coalition government which would re- 
place the existing government in Saigon and 
which would assume governmental power. 
And Saigon was informed. 

I took a trip to Saigon in the middle of 
August to have a long discussion with the 
South Vietnamese Government. My deputy, 
General [Alexander M.] Haig, took another 
trip to present to them the various formula- 
tions that had been developed. 

On October 8, for the first time, Hanoi 
presented the different approach which they 
have correctly described in their statement. 
They then insisted that we, on the basis of 
this approach, begin to draft the outline of 
an agreement in order to meet their deadline 
for October 31. 

Now, if we had wanted to protract nego- 
tiations, we could easily have said that we 
have to return to Washington first or return 
to Saigon for further consultation. We be- 
lieved that this was such an important step 
on the part of the North Vietnamese that 
took into account so many of the proposals 
that we had made, and such a significant 
movement in the direction of the position 
consistently held by this administration, that 
we had an obligation, despite the risks that 
were involved, of working with them to com- 
plete at least an outline of an agreement; 
and we spent four days, sometimes working 
16 hours a day, in order to complete this 
draft agreement, or at least the outline of 
this draft agreement. 

I mention this only because if we had 
wanted to delay we had many much better 
opportunities than to raise a few objections 
of the kind that I have described at the very 
end. But we did insist — and we constantly 
emphasized it — that we could not conclude 

this agreement without a full discussion with 
our allies in Viet-Nam. 

I want to make clear another thing: that 
many of the concerns I have expressed here, 
while they are also shared by Saigon, are 
ours as well, and the particular issues that 
I raised would require resolution if the agree- 
ment is to bring a real peace and if it is not 
to lead immediately to endless disputes as 
to what its provisions mean. 

Q. Why are you waiting for Hanoi to pro- 
pose the date of the next meeting? Why don't 
you suggest that you start tomorroiv? 

Dr. Kissinger: Because we are not eager 
to score debating points. Obviously, the 
North Vietnamese negotiators have to get 
wherever we are going to meet from where 
they are. We have told them that any day 
they are ready to meet we will be there. We 
have suggested Paris, but we have also told 
them that we would meet in other locations 
that might be more convenient for them. 

Q. Would you go to Hanoi, Dr. Kissinger? 

Dr. Kissinger: I think we should complete 
the agreement elsewhere. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have, in effect, en- 
couraged the American people that you are 
on the brink of peace. By coincidence — this 
happens to come by coincidence, you say at 
any rate — this happens to come at a time 
when the American people are about to vote 
for a President. What assurayice can you 
give the American people that this will not 
somehoiv fall down, that it ivill not come 
off after the election ? 

Dr. Kissinger: We can only give the assur- 
ance of our record. We have conducted these 
negotiations for four years, and we have 
brought them to this point with considerable 
difficulty and with considerable anguish. We 
cannot control if people believe or if people 
choose to assert that this is simply some 

We have negotiated seriously and in good 
faith. We stand by what we have agreed to, 
and we give the assurance that we will stick 

November 13, 1972 


by what we have negotiated and what we 
have achieved so laboriously. 

As for the point that this is by a so-called 
coincidence, I can only repeat that the dead- 
line was established by Hanoi and not by us 
and that we were prepared to keep this 
whole agreement secret until it was consum- 
mated and we would not have revealed it if 
it had not been consummated before the 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are the main dif- 
ferences between Saigon and Washington 
noiv, and tvhat will happen if agreement is 
not reached? 

Dr. Kissinger: We are confident that 
agreement will be reached. No useful purpose 
would be served by going into the details 
of consultations that are still in process, but 
we are confident that we will reach agree- 
ment within the time frame that I have 
described to you. 

Q. Is the United States prepared to sign 
a separate agieement with North Viet-Nam 
if President Thieu refuses to sign an agree- 

Dr. Kissinger: I see no point in addressing 
a hypothetical question which, as I have said, 
we are confident will not arise; and as I have 
indicated, the particular objectives which we 
seek for ourselves in the remainder of the 
negotiations are all views which we strongly 
hold as the U.S. Government. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, yon haven't said whether 
President Thieu accepts a cease-fire. 

Dr. Kissinger: I think I have expressed my 
conviction that President Thieu will accept 
a cease-fire. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, President Thieu said in 
his speech that the Communists ivere de- 
manding a coalition government, and you did 
not mention one. Cordd this National Council 
be turned into a coalition? 

Dr. Kissinger: This settlement is a com- 
promise settlement in which neither side 
achieves everything and in which both par- 
ties have the necessity of posturing them- 
selves for their constituencies. 

We do not consider this a coalition govern- 
ment, and we believe that President Thieu 
was speaking about previous versions of a 
Communist plan and not about this version 
of the Communist plan. I think we all recog- 
nize the fact that political leaders speak to 
many audiences at the same time. 

Q. Are you going to make the text avail- 
able that you had? 

Dr. Kissinger: No. 

Q. Do you believe the North Vietnamese 
will leave on the negotiating table the pro- 
posals they have accepted thus far if you 
don't make the October 31 deadline? 

Dr. Kissinger: I cannot believe that when 
this major progress has been made that an 
arbitrary deadline should be the obstacle to 
peace, and we believe that the negotiations 
will continue. 

Q. On tlie same point, with respect to the 
8th of November deadline, tvhat is to assure 
them that our side ivill not harden our 
negotiating stance once the pressure of the 
election is off? 

Dr. Kissinger: Our negotiation has not 
been framed by the election. We have not 
revealed any of our positions throughout the 
election ; and had not Hanoi revealed the 
text or the substance of the agreement, we 
would have had no intention of disclosing it 
until or unless an agreement had been 

We have given a commitment that a text 
that will be agreed to at the next session 
will be the final text and that no new changes 
will be proposed. We will maintain this 
commitment. We are not engaged in Viet- 
Nam for the purpose of conducting a war. 

I would like to suggest to you ladies and 
gentlemen that while it is possible to dis- 
agree with provisions of an agreement, the 
implication that this is all a gigantic ma- 
neuver which we will revoke as soon as this 
period is over is unworthy of what we have 
gone through. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you say whether 
President Thieii himself would insist on sign- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ing (ui agreement or whether somebocb/ elfie 
mUjht, for his (jovernmevt? 

Dr. Kissinger: The level at which the 
agreement will be signed has not been finally 
determined, but it is almost certainly not 
the Presidential level. 

Q. Dr. Ki.isi)(ge)\ does the resiipplijiiig and 
reeqiiipment of tlie Commioiist forees applti 
oidji to those in South Viet-Nam, and if so, 
are the Nortli Vietnamese at libertij to take 
as much from the Soviet U)iion as tliey can 


Dr. Kissinger: The formal provisions ap- 
ply only to South Viet-Nam, but there is no 
question, and there can be no question, that 
the general conditions in Indochina will 
govern the actions of many of the countries, 
but I don't want to go into greater detail. 

Q. Does ijour formal e.vphi)/atio)i there 
cove)' U.S. si(ppo)i, the status of co)itiiniing 
U.S. support? 

Dr. Kissi)iger: There is no limitation of 
any kind on economic aid. Military aid is 
governed by the replacement provisions that 
I have described. There is no limitation of 
any kind on economic advisers, and the 
military presence is governed by the with- 
drawal provisions. 

Q. Is bombi)ig covered within the concept 
of a withdrawal of U.S. forces? 

Dr. Kissinger: It covers an end to all mili- 
tary activities over the territory of North 
Viet-Nam from whatever direction. 

Q. What effect does it have on Tliaihoid 
and the 7th Fleet? 

Dr. Kissingei': There are no limitations on 
American forces in Thailand nor on the fleet. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do yon think that the 
minhig of the harbor and the bombing of 
North Viet-Nam contributed to the accelera- 
tion by the North Vietnamese of negotia- 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to speculate on 
North Vietnamese motivation. 

Q. Wiiat concessions did the United States 

make to get this agreement, in your judg- 

Dr. Kissinger: The United States made the 
concessions that are described in the agree- 
ment. There are no secret side agreements of 
any kind. 

Q. Did you discuss with Le Due Tho at 
any time the deadline of October 31 to sign 
the agreement, and if he raised this question, 
wliat did you reply? 

D)-. Kissi)igei': We believe that it is quite 
possible that an honest misunderstanding 
arose. We always said that we would make 
a major effort to meet the deadline, and we 
developed various hypothetical ways by 
which this deadline could be met. We also 
said, and that is equally in the record, that 
all of this depended on a satisfactory com- 
pletion of various parts of the agreement. 
But they may have misunderstood honestly 
the conditional or hypothetical nature of 
some of the schedules. 

But the most significant aspect cannot be 
whether one signs on one date or another. 
The significant aspect is when one is so close 
to an agreement, whether one perfects it and 
then signs it regardless of the deadline. 
There is no magic about any one date. 

Q. Why did Hanoi iraiit tliat deadline? 

Dr. Kissinger: You will have to ask Hanoi. 

Q. Is it still possible to achieve that dead- 
line of October 31? 

Q. Wliat countries would participate iyi 
supervising the cease-fire and in the con- 

Dr. Kissinger: We are committed to achiev- 
ing an agreement in another session of sev- 
eral days' duration, and it is up to the other 
side to determine when they want to meet. 

Which countries participate? Until all the 
countries have been approached, it would not 
be proper for me — 

Q. Is the United States one of them? 

Dr. Kissinger: The United States is a 
party, and it cannot be part of the super- 
visory mechanism. But the United States is 

November 13, 1972 


a party to the four-power Joint Military 
Commission. That is one of the bodies that 
supsrvises those provisions that apply to 
the four parties. It is not part of the inter- 
national body, but it is part of the interna- 
tional conference. 

Q. How broad would the conference he, 
sir ? 

Dr. Kissinger: Again, it would be inap- 
propriate to list the countries until they have 
been approached. 

Q. Would yon amplify somewhat on the 
Cambodian-Laos agreeme)it? Both sides must 
loithdraw forces and cease major supplying, 
is that what you implied before? 

Dr. Kissingei-: Well, I have given the gen- 
eral outline of the agreement, but it is en- 
vis,aged that foreign forces are withdrawn 
from these countries. 

Q. When was Hanoi advised one more 
meeting would be necessary? 

Dr. Kissi)iger: I believe on Sunday morn- 
ing our time here, and we also informed 
them that we would stop military activities 
north of the 20th parallel. 

A Significant Breakthrough 
in the Viet-Nam Negotiations 

Following are excerpts from remarks made 
by President Nixon at Huntington, W. Va., 
and at Ashland, Ky., on October 26. 


White House press release (Huntington, W.Va.) dated October 26 

... I know that in our hearts tonight, 
above everything else we want a world of 
peace. As all of you have read or heard on 
your television tonight, there has been a sig- 
nificant breakthrough in the negotiations 
with regard to Viet-Nam. 

Tonight I can say to you with confidence 
that because of the progress that has been 
made, I am confident that we shall succeed in 
achieving our objective, which is peace with 
honor and not peace with surrender in Viet- 

There are still differences to be worked out. 
I believe that they can and will be worked 
out. But let me go on beyond that. America 
has been in wars and has ended wars before 
in this century, but the great tragedy is that 
we end one war and then, before a genera- 
tion is over, we are in another one. And the 
goal that I have sought — the goal that all of 
you want, that all Americans want — is not 
just a peace that is simply a period of rest 
between wars, but real peace that will last. 

Did you know that in this whole century 
we have never had a full generation, young 
people growing up for a full generation, with- 
out war? We had World War I, and then 
World War II, and then Korea, and then 
Viet-Nam. I think that is enough. What I 
want is a generation of peace and, beyond 
that, another generation of peace. That is 
why not only are we ending the war in Viet- 
Nam in a way that will promote the interest 
of lasting peace, but that is why we went to 
Peking, that is why we went to Moscow. 

The differences between the Government 
of the United States, and the philosophy that 
we hold to, and the Government of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China and the Government 
of the Soviet Union are very great. The Com- 
munist and our systems will always be differ- 
ent. But in the world in which we live it is 
essential that we build a system in which we 
can have differences between governments 
but in which the people of those nations can 
be friends. 

It is important that the Russian people 
and the American people not be enemies. It 
is important that the Chinese people — and 
this is one-fourth of all the people in this 
world — not be enemies of the United States. 
I am not suggesting tonight that in this past 
year in which these historic journeys have 
taken place that we have achieved the millen- 
nium. There is much more to be done. . . . 


Department of State Bulletin 


White House press release {Ashland. Ky.) liated October 26 

. . . When we speak of peace, I know the 
immediate thought that comes through our 
minds, and it is one that has been coming 
through our minds for many years, through 
the years that America has been engaged in 
the longest war in its history. It is a war 
that began long before I came into office in 
1969. It is one that we have wound down. 
It is one which, as you know from reading 
your newspapers this afternoon and listen- 
ing to the television and radio, in which there 
has been a significant breakthrough in the 
peace negotiations. 

Let me say to you tonight that on May the 
8th, when I made the diflUcult decision of 
mining the harbors of North Viet-Nam and 
bombing military targets, I laid out three 
goals for peace. I thought they were reason- 
able goals, and they were these : First, there 
should be a cease-fire, stop the killing; sec- 
ond, all of America's POW's should be re- 
turned and all of our missing in action should 
be accounted for; and third, the people of 
South Viet-Nam, the 17 million people who 
live in South Viet-Nam, should have the right 
to determine their own future without having 
a Communist government imposed upon them 
against their will by force. Those were the 
three goals. 

Now, based on the progress that has been 
made in the negotiations to date, I can say 
with confidence tonight that I believe that we 
can succeed in achieving those goals. I be- 
lieve that we will succeed in achieving the 
goal that I have heard from those young 
people sitting behind us: peace with honor 
and not surrender for America. The day has 
not yet come. There are still some differ- 
ences that must be resolved. I believe they 
will be resolved. 

However, let us look back for a moment 
about other times in this century. If you are 
old enough to have lived through them, as I 
was — or if you are old enough, certainly as 
all of you are, to have read about them — you 
remember with relief 1918, Armistice Day. 

I remember at that time I was only five years 
old, but I can recall the celebration in our 
little town at Yorba Linda, California. What 
a relief. The war was over. 

But it was only an interlude; it was not a 
peace that lasted. Because before the next 
generation grew up, the sons of those who 
had fought in World War I were fighting in 
World War II. 

You remember V-J Day and V-E Day. I 
recall on V-J Day I was in New York City, 
in Times Square, with my wife, and the won- 
derful elation we all felt about the war that 
was over, and then came the United Nations 
and all the hope for a new world order, and 
we thought, now we are going to have real 

And then the sons and the younger broth- 
ers of those who had fought and many had 
died— 350,000 in World War II— were fight- 
ing again in Korea. 

Then during President Eisenhower's first 
year in office, you remember the headline — 
the war was over. And all of us shed a sigh 
of relief because the young men who had died 
there, certainly their sacrifice had not been 
in vain, because South Korea retained its 
independence and its freedom from North 
Korean invading forces. 

And yet within a few years the younger 
brothers of those who had fought in Korea 
and the sons of the older ones who had fought 
in Korea were fighting in Viet-Nam. And 
now a day will come, one day, when the war 
will be over. 

Let me tell you, that of course is a great 
accomplishment. I can assure you that any- 
one who sits in that Oval Office, as I do, and 
writes the letters to the mothers, to the 
wives, to the next of kin of those who have 
died; anyone who sees the wounded, the 
others, the ones who have served so magnifi- 
cently; anyone who has talked, as I have, to 
the brave wives of POW's — what you want 
more than anything else is to get the war 

But also, what you want is to get it over 
with honor. Not simply because of some 
national ego. You want to get it over with 
honor because by ending it in an honorable 

November 13, 1972 


way, by ending it in the right way, you may 
lay the foundation for not having another 
war in that same generation. 

That is why we have insisted on these con- 
ditions that I have laid down, and that is 
why, as this war does come to a conclusion, 
it will be concluded in a way, we believe, 
that will discourage aggression in the future 
rather than encourage it. 

That is just the beginning. Let me take 
you a little further, however, on this whole 
prospect for peace in the world. 

It would have been somewhat easier, as a 
matter of fact somewhat tempting, during 
these past four years to work as we did only 
in trying to bring the war in Viet-Nam to an 
end. And it would have been some satisfac- 
tion to have brought home 500,000, as we did, 
to reduce the casualties 98 percent, as we did, 
to get to peace negotiations that now have a 
good chance for success, but we did not stop 
there. The reason we did not stop there is 
that, as I looked at the world, I saw that once 
the war was over in this small part of the 
world, there still hung over the world a 
greater danger potentially in the future. 

There was another superpower, the Soviet 
Union. At the beginning of our term in 
office we were in confrontation with that 
superpower. And then there was the huge 
People's Republic of China, where one-fourth 
of all the people in the world were living and 
with which the people of the United States 
and their government had had no communi- 
cation for a period of over 20 years. 

As I studied that situation at the begin- 
ning of my term in office, long before it 
began, I determined that it was essential that 
we build a world order in which governments 
could have their differences, in which govern- 
ments could be built on different philosophies, 
but in which the peoples of nations with dif- 
ferent philosophies and different govern- 
ments need not necessarily be enemies. 

I felt this was essential, essential particu- 
larly when what was involved was not a con- 
ventional but a nuclear war which no one 
would win, where there would be only losers, 
and so we began in January 1969 not only to 

bring an end to the war in Viet-Nam but to 
establish a new relationship with the Soviet 
Union and a beginning of a relationship with 
the People's Republic of China. The year 
1972, in this year, has perhaps seen, as his- 
torians will record, more progress toward 
true peace in the world than any year since 
the end of World War II. 

I don't mean it is here. I don't mean sim- 
ply because we went to Peking and estab- 
lished a dialogue that we are not going to 
have differences with the People's Republic 
of China. We will have. And I don't mean 
that because we have had an arms control 
agreement and trade agreements and ex- 
change agreements and health agreements 
and environmental agreements with the 
Soviet Union that we are not going to con- 
tinue to have differences with the Soviet 
Union. We will. 

Theirs are Communist governments; ours 
is a free government. And sometimes our in- 
terests will come in contradiction to each 
other. But what we have done, you see, 
what we have done is now to have replaced 
what was a hopeless situation, hopeless, with 
the great powers moving down the road to an 
inevitable collision at some time in the fu- 
ture, with now a hopeful situation in which 
the United States and the Soviet Union are 
negotiating their differences at the confer- 
ence table — we negotiate hard, but we ne- 
gotiate, and we settle them — in which the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China talk about their differences. We nego- 
tiate hard, but we have now developed at 
least a dialogue. 

Let me say in that connection then, I would 
not hold out to this audience, and particu- 
larly to these younger people behind me, the 
certainty that there will not be conflict in the 
world, the certainty that there will not be 
small wars in the world. But I do say this : 
The chance for this new generation of Ameri- 
cans to grow up in a world without a war for 
a whole generation is better than it has been, 
in my opinion, any time in this century, and 
we want to keep it that way. 


Department of State Bulletin 

A United States Foreign Policy of Engagement 

Address by Secretary Rogers ^ 

It is probable that if I had come here 31/2 
years ago to emphasize President Nixon's 
determination to fundamentally alter the 
concept of American foreign policy — to sub- 
stitute negotiation for confrontation — I 
would have encountered some considerable 
skepticism. That would have been under- 
standable. How many of us would have 
dared to predict how rapidly and how pro- 
foundly our international relations were des- 
tined to change? 

— A President of the United States has 
traveled to the People's Republic of China 
as the guest of a government with which we 
have never had diplomatic relations. 

— An American President has visited Mos- 
cow for the first time. 

— The United States and the Soviet Union 
have reached agreements on nuclear arms 
which go to the heart of our strategic ri- 
valry. And on Wednesday the United States 
settled its lend-lease debt with the Soviet 
Union and entered into a broad new trade 

— An agreement has been reached, with 
U.S. participation, to insure that Berlin will 
no longer be a chronic source of East-West 
tension in central Europe. 

— In the Middle East a U.S.-initiated 
cease-fire is now in its 27th month. 

— Important steps have been taken, at 
U.S. initiative, to make the international 
economic system more equitable. 

^ Made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Coun- 
cil at Los Angeles, Calif., on Oct. 20 (press release 

These events, and others which have re- 
cently occurred, have reduced the risk of war 
and the burden of armaments. They have 
made the world a safer place. But the sig- 
nificant result of these accomplishments in 
the past four years is what they promise for 
the next four years. 

It was clear in 1969 that policies of the 
past would not be adequate. It would be 
necessary to create new ones — policies freed 
of preoccupation with the past and animated 
by the prospects of a better future. Thus 
in four years we have replaced an approach 
motivated largely by containment of adver- 
saries with a policy of engagement — engage- 
ment with adversaries in building new ties 
and engagement with allies on a basis of con- 
fidence and commitment. 

This new policy demands a careful bal- 
ance between change and continuity. It re- 
quires flexibility and resolve. It demands 
resourcefulness in building on the initiatives 
that have been taken with former adver- 
saries. It calls for new and improved 
methods of working with our friends. 

In his inaugural address the President 
referred not just to 1969 but to the future — 
to 1976, the year of our bicentennial, and to 
the year 2000, the beginning of the third 
millennium. What kind of a nation, he asked, 
would we be on those great anniversaries? 
He said that we would seek a world open to 
ideas, open to the exchange of goods and 
people, a world in which no people, great or 
small, would live in angry isolation. It is 
that world, that vision, to which the policy 
of engagement has been dedicated. 

November 13, 1972 


New Relationships With Communist Nations 

No change has been received with such 
worldwide approval as the President's ef- 
fort to engage the countries of the Com- 
munist world in an expanding network of 
cooperative relationships. 

The Moscow summit marked the opening 
of an entirely new relationship between the 
two most productive and powerful countries 
in the world. The new relationship was 
officially described in the joint statement of 
principles as one of "peaceful coexistence." 
But I prefer to look beyond the essentially 
passive nature of the term to the concept 
of "mutually beneficial cooperation" which 
permeated the communique and the agree- 
ments we reached in Moscow and which has 
motivated our subsequent efforts to put them 
into operation. 

Because of the fundamental differences 
that exist between us we do not assume 
that our efforts will meet with easy success. 
And militarily our nation must never risk 
being second to any other nation regardless 
of detente. Nevertheless, we and the Soviet 
Union have now acknowledged that our mu- 
tual interests are engaged not only in arms 
limitations but in increased trade and cul- 
tural contact, and in fields as technical as 
cancer research, space projects, and pollution 

Early next year, for example, a team of 
Soviet specialists in river and lake pollution 
will visit Lake Tahoe and the Great Lakes, 
while an American group will visit Russia's 
Lake Baikal. They will be exchanging ideas 
and information on controlling pollution in 
these lakes, which together contain more 
than a third of the water in all the world's 
freshwater lakes and rivers. 

Next year also a group of Soviet seismol- 
ogists will journey to California on an ex- 
change which will take a comparable Amer- 
ican team to a major earthquake belt in 
central Asia. The Soviet scientists will in- 
stall instruments in the San Andreas Fault 
which could increase our ability to predict 
earthquakes, an experiment that might have 
important implications for Los Angeles. 

Already the Soviet Minister of Reclama- 
tion and Water Management has toured Cal- 
ifornia in connection with joint programs 
to study conservation of resources. Just a 
few days ago he told us in Washington how 
enormously impressed he was that Califor- 
nia has done as much as it has with a limited 
water supply, less than is available to south- 
ern Russia through the Don River alone. 

With China, too, the change in relation- 
ships has been dramatic, though the pace of 
engagement — beginning as it did with an 
almost total absence of communication — has 
naturally been slower. Nevertheless, by the 
end of this year bilateral trade should pass 
the $100 million mark, and prospects for 
1973 are considerably better. Over 100 Amer- 
ican businessmen are now attending the fall 
fair which opened in Canton five days ago; 
only 40 attended last spring. 

Exchanges are also beginning to acquire 
momentum. Earlier this month a 22-man 
group of newspaper editors visited China. 
A 15-member medical group was 
received by President Nixon last week and 
will visit California toward the end of this 
month. A 10-member group of Chinese sci- 
entists will arrive in this country in late 
November. And we hope that before the year 
is out Americans in a number of cities will 
be able to see performances by a team of 
Chinese gymnasts, whose spectacular accom- 
plishments I can recommend from my own 
experiences in Peking. 

While seeking more cooperative bonds 
with the Soviet Union and the People's Re- 
public of China we have simultaneously 
sought to improve relations with the coun- 
tries of eastern Europe. The President's 
visit to Poland in May and my own trip 
to Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia in 
July led to the negotiation of beneficial bi- 
lateral agreements. It is now clear from my 
conversations with the Czechoslovak and 
Bulgarian Foreign Ministers at the United 
Nations this month that their governments, 
too, desire to negotiate concrete improve- 
ments in our bilateral relations. We are re- 
sponding favorably. 


Department of State Bulletin 

With Czechoslovakia we will, for example, 
begin negotiations soon on a consular con- 
vention which can lead to the reopening of 
consulates in Chicago and Bratislava. We 
also look forward to an early opening of 
negotiations on an agreement to renew cul- 
tural and scientific exchanges. 

Next year we expect to receive a Deputy 
Prime Minister of Bulgaria, the highest level 
Bulgarian oflficial ever to visit the United 
States. In the meantime we will proceed 
to resolve a number of bilateral problems 
which have so long clouded the atmosphere 
of our relationship. 

Less than a decade ago American willing- 
ness to increase ties within eastern Europe 
was viewed with the deepest suspicion in 
that area. The fact that today the impulses 
for improvement can come from both sides 
is a healthy sign. We welcome the movement 
in eastern Europe toward greater engage- 
ment with the western countries. We see 
next year's Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe as a way to encourage 
that trend. 

An Environment of Disarmament 

A major objective of our efforts at engag- 
ing adversaries in more constructive rela- 
tionships has been to reduce the degree to 
which the world's nations rely on force as 
an instrument of national policy. 

Over the next few years in fact, possibly 
even over the next decade, we will be regu- 
larly engaged in some sort of strategic arms 
negotiation with the Soviet Union. In our 
international relations generally we can hope 
to move into what can be called an environ- 
ment of disarmament. Our overall aim must 
be to preserve that environment, to extend 
it to military areas beyond the strategic, and 
to engage other countries in the progress it 
can bring. 

— It should be possible, for example, to re- 
duce the level at which the troops of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact confront each other 
in central Europe. We hope that talks on 
the mutual and balanced reduction of forces 

in the area can begin early next year. 

—We will continue to seek the achieve- 
ment of an effective arms supply limitation 
in the Middle East, a step which would main- 
tain the arms balance and one which would 
contribute to an equitable and peaceful solu- 
tion of the problems of that region. 

— Finally, in the longer term, we hope 
that as relations improve agreement could 
be reached among major arms suppliers to 
exercise a far greater degree of restraint in 
the arming of developing countries. 

A More Equal Partnership With Our Allies 

If our policy of engaging adversaries in 
more peaceful relationships has been mai'ked 
with success so, too, has our policy of en- 
gaging allies in a more equal partnership. 

Among our highest priorities is a deter- 
mination to support and encourage Japan 
in its growing influence and partnership 
with us in Asia and throughout the world. 
We have demonstrated this support through 
such practical measures as the return of 
Okinawa to Japan. We have also encour- 
aged Japan's growing world role, which has 
found expression in its establishment of 
relations with Peking and in its prospective 
treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
And we have offered support of Japan's 
permanent participation in the United Na- 
tions Security Council. President Nixon's 
talks with Prime Minister Tanaka in Hono- 
lulu last month and our conversations in 
Washington with Foreign Minister Ohira 
just this week symbolize the closeness of 
our ties. 

There obviously have been, and will be, 
differences between the United States and 
Japan, notably on economic matters. But I 
am convinced that the new foundation of 
equality on which our current relations are 
based has given them as firm a footing as 
at any time since the war. It is a durable re- 
lationship upon which we both will continue 
to build. 

In response to the policies of the Nixon 
doctrine our friends and allies in East Asia 
are assuming greater responsibilities for 

November 13, 1972 


their defense. While maintaining the integ- 
rity of our commitments we have thus been 
able to withdraw about 570,000 of our own 
troops from the area. 

In Europe an economically stronger and 
politically more cohesive community also will 
bolster the values and principles for which 
we stand in world affairs. We have therefore 
steadfastly supported progress toward a 
wider Common Market even while we are 
concerned about tendencies that might harm 
our trading relations with Europe or its 
associated countries. And we have gained the 
cooperation of our European allies in assum- 
ing more of the burden of our common de- 
fense; during this year, for example, they 
have increased their defense efforts by over 
$1 billion. 

A Strong National Defense 

Our engagement with adversaries in a 
more cooperative relationship and our en- 
gagement with friends in a more equal re- 
lationship are as important for the world 
of the future as they are for the world of 

But, as I have noted, a successful policy 
of engagement depends on continuity as well 
as on change. We must not weaken ourselves 
or our allies as our relationships change. 
This requires us to remain faithful to our 
international commitments. This requires us 
to maintain a strong national defense. 

We are maintaining a strong national de- 
fense not because of any desire for militai'y 
superiority but so that our security, and that 
of our allies, may never be brought into 
question. Ultimately it is the security pro- 
vided by our defense programs that has 
given us the confidence and the ability to 
negotiate more cooperative relationships 
with adversaries. We could not, as has been 
suggested, drastically reduce our defense 
budget and our troop strength without a 
serious impact on our foreign relations. 

In this connection I want to point out that 
we already have a defense budget that con- 
sumes the smallest share of our gross na- 
tional product — less than 7 percent — of any 
budget since 1950. Already since 1969 we 

have cut our armed forces by a third — from 
3.5 million to 2.3 million. Additional large- 
scale reductions would force us back to a 
strategy of purely nuclear deterrence. To 
do this would impair the flexibility of our 
diplomacy and would create an unstable 
world situation which might jeopardize the 

In 1793 Thomas Jefferson said, "We con- 
fide in our strength, without boasting of it; 
we respect that of others, without fearing 
it." No American President should ever be 
put in the position of being unable to "con- 
fide in our strength." That is why President 
Nixon has such a deep conviction that a 
strong military posture is basic to the policy 
we are pursuing. 

For a quarter of a century the United 
States has pursued bipartisan policies based 
on a system of collective security with 42 
nations. We established alliances with our 
14 NATO partners, with nations of Latin 
America, and with many nations of Asia 
because we believed that such a collective 
security system was necessary to our own 
self-interest and to the world's stability. I 
believe it is still necessary. We must never 
forget that our continuing resolve to honor 
our alliances and obligations has been at 
the heart of the progress we have already 

Broad Respect for U.S. Foreign Policy 

Just a week ago I returned from three 
weeks of conversations at the United Na- 
tions. I had separate meetings there with 79 
Foreign Ministers. I am convinced from 
these talks that there is broad respect and 
understanding for our foreign policy. The 
overwhelming support expressed for the 
President's initiatives with the Soviet Union 
and China, the desire expressed by eastern 
European countries for improved relations 
with the United States, the practical discus- 
sions on matters of bilateral cooperation — 
with trust an essential element — were evi- 
dence of this respect. 

I was also struck by the fact that in those 
79 meetings whenever Viet-Nam was dis- 


Department of State Bulletin 

cussed there was understanding for the 
actions we have taken and support for our 
objective of ending the war. There is a 
general awareness in this nation that the 
President is doing all he can to end the war 
by negotiation. My talks at the United Na- 
tions have now convinced me that that 
awareness is shared throughout the world. 
I have no doubt that the policy of engage- 
ment I have outlined today is the right one. 
The President intends to continue on that 
course because he believes that the United 
States must play a responsible role in the 

— We will be steadily working toward 
further improvements in our relations with 
the Soviet Union and China. 

— We will start during the second round 
of strategic arms talks beginning on Novem- 
ber 21 to create an enduring pattern of 
restraint on offensive strategic weapons. 

— We will pursue during 1973 our efforts 
to promote a just and lasting peace settle- 
ment in the Middle East. 

— We will seek, in negotiations next year 
with our major trading partners in western 
Europe, Canada, and Japan, to assure inter- 
national economic conditions which will keep 
our economy strong and our ties with them 

— We will enter the two major European 
negotiations of 1973, on security and coop- 
eration and on mutual and balanced force 
reduction, with a determination to help re- 
duce tension from the Atlantic to the Urals. 

— We will encourage Latin America to play 
a more active role in world affairs, and we 
will pursue a more symmetrical relationship 
in our own continuing association with the 

— As the nation with the second largest 
black population in the world we must aug- 
ment our associations in Africa, with par- 
ticular emphasis on economic assistance and 

— We will continue in our overall develop- 
ment policy to seek a reversal of the growing 

disparity between the world's richer and 
poorer countries. 

Today major powers have the capacity to 
destroy only with the certain knowledge of 
self-destruction. Is it too much to hope, then, 
that this generation will be wise enough to 
avoid the madness of another worldwide 

The goal of the President is to build a 
structure to provide a generation of peace. 
Is this unobtainable? I think not. 

Peace cannot be imposed. Idealism does 
not induce it. And from experience we know 
we cannot find it by keeping to ourselves. 
The challenge of the future is to be fully 
and responsibly engaged in an interdepend- 
ent world with benefits that are universal, a 
tranquil world which makes war universally 
unacceptable and repugnant. 

I believe that the United States by taking 
the leadership in meeting that challenge will 
make it possible to have a generation of 
peace. A generation of peace, for ourselves 
and for our children, is worthy of our maxi- 
mum effort and dedication — and that the 
United States is prepared to give. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

To Resume November 21 at Geneva 

Jomt U.S.-U.S.S.R. Announcement ^ 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 23 

Pursuant to the agreement reached during 
the summit meeting in Moscow last May to 
continue active negotiations for the limita- 
tion of strategic offensive arms, the Govern- 
ments of the United States and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics will resume talks 
on this subject on November 21, 1972, in 
Geneva, Switzerland. 

' Read to news correspondents at Washington on 
Oct. 19 by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to 
President Nixon. The announcement was made 
simultaneously at Moscow. 

November 13, 1972 


Assistant Secretary Sisco Discusses Middle East Policy 
for Israeli Television 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
ivith Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
which roas conducted at Neiv York on Oc- 
tober 6 by Haim Yavin of the Israeli Broad- 
casting Authority and broadcast on Israeli 
television on October 9. 

Q. Mr. Sisco, terrorism is on the agenda 
of the United Nations; indeed, on the agenda 
of the ivorld. What has the United States 
done so far to fight international terrorism? 

Mr. Sisco: We've launched a very broad 
program internationally. The core of it was 
made public in Secretary Rogers' speech 
before the General Assembly a few days 
ago; ' we are trying to move on as many 
fronts as possible simply because of the fact 
that we feel that, as you've indicated, it is a 
worldwide problem, though of course many 
of the more recent manifestations emanate 
from the Middle East. It's a problem that 
concerns every country in the world, and 
that's the reason why we're in the forefront 
of trying to get the United Nations — the in- 
ternational community — to come to grips 
with this problem. 

Q. Would you specify ivhat has been done, 
especially in Europe, to start ^vith? 

Mr. Sisco: We feel there are a number 
of very important conventions which are 
already in existence on the hijacking prob- 
lem. We have been and are discussing this 
matter with countries not only in Europe but 
all over the world in hopes that international 
law can be strengthened in this field by creat- 
ing obligations on states — the kind of obli- 
gations and climate which would encourage 

countries to take actions against states who 
harbor or fail to punish hijackers as they 
should; that is, if they do not discharge their 
obligations, they do not make hijackers 
available and generally do not cooperate in 
coping with the problem. So what it really 
amounts to is that we are trying to 
strengthen the law and to give it teeth and 
to include sanctions wherever it's necessary. 
We think, obviously, Europe is an important 
area; but it's worldwide, and you really need 
cooperation from all over the world because 
nobody knows where the next target will be. 

Q. What kind of response have you got so 
far from European countries ? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think on the whole the 
response has been very good. In the Legal 
Committee of the General Assembly there is 
a current discussion in train intended to give 
added strength to the conventions on the pro- 
tection of diplomats and government officials. 
Secondly, we have inscribed on the agenda of 
the U.N. General Assembly an item on ter- 
rorism, and the United States has already 
submitted an initial draft convention which 
is designed to deal with the problem of the 
export of terrorism. 2 This draft, for exam- 
ple, covers the kind of senseless attacks that 
took place at the Lod Airport. It covers the 
kind of despicable attack that occurred at 
Munich. Our hope is that the Assembly will 
discuss terrorism in great detail, and as far 
as we're concerned, the sooner action is taken 
by the international community, the better. 

Q. But action surely is the business of 

' Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1972, p. 425. 
■ For text of the U.S. draft convention, see ibid., p. 


Department of State Bulletin 

governments, and my question referred to 
governments in Europe. Do they do some- 
thing practical about this matter right now? 

Mr. Sisco: Yes, I think that a number of 
governments have done something practical. 
Let me give you a good example. Any num- 
ber of governments in Europe and elsewhere 
have looked, for example, at their control 
measures. There's need for greater coordina- 
tion between countries. There's need for 
greater exchange of information. There's 
need for more careful scrutiny of visa 
procedures, passport procedures. Interpol 
[International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion], which met in Frankfurt recently, 
has adopted unanimously an American 
resolution. Interpol has decided to utilize 
its existing machinery to maximize the ex- 
change of information, because this is most 
helpful in identifying prospective perpetra- 
tors of terrorism. We are under no illusions; 
it is a very difficult problem because terror- 
ism can strike in many different ways — for 
example, the recent mail bombings. In this 
connection we welcome the fact that Interpol 
in recent weeks has been concentrating on 
this particular problem and is helping to cope 
with it. We in the United States, for exam- 
ple, have reviewed and tightened all kinds 
of procedures relating to people moving in 
and out of the country. 

Q. On the whole, are you happy with 
whatever has been done so far? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I'd say it's a good begin- 
ning, but again we do not underestimate the 
difficulties in achieving maximum coopera- 
tion. While this problem is worldwide, it 
really depends on the attitude and the will of 
states. This problem is being dealt with in a 
highly delicate political context, whether we 
are talking about the Middle East primarily 
or whether we are talking about other areas 
of the world. As far as we're concerned, 
we're going to stay at this problem; we are 
going to work at it not only within diplomatic 
channels but in all possible international fo- 
rums because we feel no individual is im- 
mune from terrorist attacks. 

Q. Mr. Sisco, are you happy with the re- 
sults so far? 

Mr. Sisco: I believe we have made a rea- 
sonably good beginning. We are under no 
illusions; this is something which will require 
determination and persistence. It is a diffi- 
cult problem with which to cope, largely be- 
cause it is difficult to ascertain where the 
next terrorist act will take place. But we 
will persevere; we will pursue this matter 
within diplomatic channels, we will pursue 
the inatter in all possible international fo- 
rums. The achievement, if I can use the word 
"achievement," to date is that we have a good 
many countries interested and world opinion 
is being focused on it. Obviously, strength- 
ening the law and getting teeth behind the 
law is not the only way. Obviously, one has 
also to get at problems that give rise to 
these things, but that's another part of the 

Q. What about the Arab countries that 
support and harbor terrorists? Can you do 
anything? Do you see any move on the side 
of the Arab countries so far on that prob- 
lem ? 

Mr. Sisco: We are trying to get across the 
idea to all countries — and that includes the 
Arab countries — that all countries have a re- 
sponsibility, and particularly in the context 
of the Middle East, no one can disclaim a 
responsibility. We have made it very clear 
in numerous speeches in the U.N. that we are 
against violence from whatever quarter. Our 
recent veto, for example, was based on the 
assumption and on the belief that the past 
one-sided results in the Security Council do 
not contribute to an alleviation of the situa- 
tion in the area; that to try to condemn one 
aspect of violence while disregarding the 
other contributes to the tension rather than 
reduces it. 

Q. Does the United States agree with 
Israel that international terrorism is the first 
obstacle to be removed before any negotia- 
tions in the Middle East can take place? 

Mr. Sisco: I would put it this way. Cer- 
tainly dealing with terrorism is a central 

November 13, 1972 


concern insofar as the United States is con- 
cerned; it has a very significant priority and 
it's the first step on the agenda, if I can put 
it that way. I believe this helps to explain 
why we have made the recent moves in the 
U.N. General Assembly, in Interpol, and in 
the International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion. At the same time, however, there is no 
doubt in our mind that what is needed is the 
beginning of a negotiating process, a nego- 
tiating process between the parties. We feel 
and continue to feel that the most feasible 
approach is an interim Suez Canal agree- 
ment. We have indicated a willingness to 
play a role if this is the desire of the parties 
concerned. Basically, we feel tliat the chasm 
on the question of an overall settlement is a 
very broad one and that the most feasible 
approach is the step-by-step approach; for 
this reason we believe the doors of diplomacy 
are and should remain open. We are struck 
with the fact that regardless of all of the 
difficulties in the area, the cease-fire con- 
tinues after 26 months. I believe there is 
less risk of direct confrontation in the Middle 
East today than there was some months ago. 
The doors of diplomacy are open in the sense 
that the principal parties are still committed 
to the November 1967 Security Council reso- 
lution even though the two sides have differ- 
ent interpretations of that resolution.'^ What 
this amounts to is this : If we can begin the 
process of dealing with terrorism, if we can 
regain the kind of climate which we believe 
was evolving in the period prior to Munich, 
then it ought to be possible to achieve a nego- 
tiating process looking toward a partial 

Prospects for Proximity Talks 

Q. Mr. Sisco, you had a meeting on Wed- 
nesday tvith Foreign Minister Zayyat. Do 
you see any sign on the Egyptian side that 
the Egyptians ivould be ivilling in the near 
future to get to the proximity talks? 

Mr. Sisco: There was no new ground 
broken in that meeting between Secretary 

' For text of Security Council Resolution 242 of 
Nov. 22, 1967, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 


Rogers and the Foreign Minister of Egypt. 
We continue to believe that both sides are 
keeping the doors of diplomacy open, and 
while no new ground has been broken, there's 
no reason to believe that any doors to diplo- 
macy have been closed. 

Q. Would you elaborate a little on this? 

Mr. Sisco: No, I do not think I can go be- 
yond that. I believe the positions of both 
Israel and Egypt with respect to the interim 
agreement and an overall settlement are very 
well known. Basically, what I'm saying is 
that at the moment, for the time being, there 
is no change in the position on either side. 

Q. Which means that the Egyptians will 
not for the foreseeable future get to the prox- 
imity talks? 

Mr. Sisco: What I'm saying is that the 
Egyptian position is what it has been. Inso- 
far as the proximity talks are concerned, 
Israel informed the United States last Feb- 
ruary of its willingness to engage in proxim- 
ity talks without preconditions under the 
aegis of the United States. The Egyptian 
position has been that before it is willing to 
engage in such proximity talks it wants a 
prior Israeli commitment to the Jarring 
[U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jar- 
ring] memorandum of February 1971. Israel 
has not accepted that position. Egypt has 
not changed its position in this regard, and 
therefore the likelihood, as long as these two 
positions remain the same, the likelihood of 
proximity talks in the next week or two, I 
think, is not very great. 

Q. And beyond that? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I used the words "a week 
or two"; I could have said a month or two or 
three. I'm using this very loosely; I don't 
want to put any time limit on all of these 
things. What is key is that negotiations are 
the root to a partial agreement. We believe 
there are opportunities. Regardless of all 
the difficulties in the area, the minimal con- 
ditions are prevalent for diplomacy to take 
hold. We are going to continue to work to 
this end. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Q. Yot( do not foresee a danger of war in 
the near future in the Middle East? 

Mr. Sisco: The likeliliood of war in the 
Middle East in the immediate future has 
diminished. It is significant that, as uneasy 
as it is, the cease-fire is being maintained. 
I would like to take this opportunity to say 
to my Israeli audience that I remain con- 
vinced that President Sadat needs and wants 
a political solution. I believe it is not insig- 
nificant that Egypt remains committed to 
Security Council Resolution 242, even though 
its interpretation is different from the Israeli 
interpretation. In other words, the frame- 
work is still there for further efforts toward 
a negotiated peace called for by Security 
Council Resolution 242. 

Soviet Presence in the Middle East 

Q. Mr. Sisco, Premier Sidki ivill be going 
to Moscow on the 15th, in a week or so. Do 
you foresee a return, a massive return, a 
possibility of a massive return of Russians 
to the Middle East, to Syria, Egypt perhaps? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I don't think I ought to 
speculate on that. I believe what is a fact is 
that there has been a reduction of the Soviet 
presence in Egypt, but obviously the Soviet 
Union continues to be a significant factor in 
the Middle East. You will recall that when 
President Sadat announced his decision some 
months ago, one of the points made was that 
consultations between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union would take place on the question of 
future U.S.S.R.-Egyptian relationships. I 
don't want to speculate; the decision taken by 
President Sadat was an internal decision, it 
was one taken by the Egyptian Government, 
and I would prefer to wait and see. 

Q. But is the Soviet presence in the Mid- 
dle East still a serious presence; do you re- 
gard it as serious ? 

Mr. Sisco: The Soviet presence continues 
to be a substantial one in the Middle East. I 
believe the need for a political settlement 
which results in a durable peace continues 
to be of major importance. As long as the 

"no war, no peace" situation continues in 
the Middle East, we will have instability and 
there will be risks and dangers in the situa- 
tion. The answer, of course, is a political 
answer — a peace agreement. We have 
always felt that it is important for there to 
be a strong American presence in the Medi- 
terranean, not only because this is important 
in maintaining the balance in the area but 
because if American diplomacy is to have any 
real significance in the area it has to be bul- 
warked by American strength. 

Q. Are you worried by the supplies, by 
the arms supplies that are coming into Syria 
right now? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, again, I don't want to get 
into the question of arms supplies in any spe- 
cific sort of way. I would only reiterate what 
I said a moment ago, that the Soviet pres- 
ence in the Middle East is a reality. While it 
has been reduced in Egypt, the Soviets are 
significant in the area and this is a fact of 
life, a fact of life which I think is recognized 
by countries in the area as well as the major 
powers who have an interest in the area. 

Q. Do you see in the foreseeable future 
any settlement between Israel and Jordan? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, up to now the priority 
has been to try to work out in the first in- 
stance an agreement between Egypt and 
Israel. I believe that priority continues to be 
key. Obviously, before there is durable 
peace, not only do the Egyptian-Israeli as- 
pects of the problem have to be dealt with 
but also those relating to Jordan and Syria. 
But I would say the Egyptian-Israeli aspect 
continues to be the priority item. 

U.S. Role in Middle East Settlement 

Q. Mr. Sisco, the United States has 
spoken time and again against an imposed 
settlement in the Middle East. This policy 
continues, I understand. 

Mr. Sisco: It does continue. It is unrealis- 
tic to believe that any major power can im- 
pose its will on the Middle East. The Middle 
East — Israel and the Arab states as well are 

November 13, 1972 


sovereign countries, and I don't believe any 
major power has this kind of capacity. But 
more important, I think, if the peace is going 
to be a durable peace it has to be something 
considerably more than what it was at the 
end of the Suez crisis in 1956. You will re- 
call that the United States was the third- 
power repository of the understandings 
which were achieved between Egypt and 
Israel. When we talk about a peace agree- 
ment today, we're talking about obligations 
which each state would undertake in relation- 
ship to one another rather than to a third 
party. Perhaps we can be helpful, perhaps 
we can play a role of constructive catalyst, 
but this does not mean that we believe or 
have any desire to attempt any kind of an 
imposition of a solution or that we intend to 
substitute ourselves for an agreement be- 
tween the parties. 

Q. Will this hold true after the elections 
in the United States as well? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think it will, and I 
think as far as we're concerned it's important 
that a negotiating process begin. We have an 
interest and we have a role if the parties 
want us to play a role, but the principal 
focus has to be negotiations between the 

Q. Mr. Sisco, many people in Israel are 
still haunted by the famous Rogers plan. Is 
this plan going to direct American policy in 
the future, or perhaps have things changed 
that much that you feel the plan could he 
dropped now? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I really can't add or sub- 
tract to what has been said in terms of our 
policy. We have in the past had views as to 
ideas that might meet legitimate concerns of 
both sides. But even on the basis of any sub- 
stantive ideas that we have developed over 
the last three or four years, our whole ap- 
proach was still based on the assumption that 
the key features of any agreement had to be 
negotiated between the two sides. Now, I 
think we will just have to wait and see how 
the situation evolves. I think the process of 
negotiation is the first step. As I say, if we 

can play a helpful role, we're available. But 
in terms of what the situation will be two 
months from now, five months from now, I 
think one will have to see. 

Q. Does this mean the Rogers plan still 
is the U.S. plan for the Middle East ? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I would again i-epeat 
what I said a moment ago : I'm in no position 
to either add or subtract to what has been 
said with respect to our policy. What will 
come out in the Middle East in my judgment, 
assuming a negotiating process can begin, 
will be, I hope, some understanding on the 
principal elements of the November 1967 
resolution. This means really a binding 
peace, peace commitments between the two 
sides; the question of the opening of the 
Suez Canal is one. The resolution also called 
for withdrawal. It did not call, as you know, 
for total Israeli withdrawal to the pre- 
June 5 lines. The whole assumption of Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 242 was that the final 
lines would be negotiated between the two 
sides. Moreover, the whole problem of refu- 
gees, it seems to me, has taken on a much 
more politicized context here in 1972 than 
was the case in 1967. So what I'm trying to 
say is this: There's one thing that one can 
say about the Middle East and that is it's not 
static, it's forever changing, and the situa- 
tion in 1973 will be different than what the 
situation was, say, in 1969, when our sub- 
stantive ideas were publicized for the first 
time. Nineteen seventy-three will be a period, 
for example, when the Middle East will have 
experienced almost three years of a cease- 
fire. It'll be a situation where, hopefully, 
there will be a context of less possibility of 
confrontation. And the Middle East is very 
considerably affected by what has gone on 
this past year. We've seen a remarkable 
opening at the summit level between the 
United States and Communist China. We've 
seen concrete agreements between the United 
States and the Soviet Union that obviously 
have an impact not only on the Middle East 
but elsewhere in the world. If one looks, for 
example, at the communique that was 
adopted in May in Moscow, in addition to 


Department of State Bulletin 

support and confirmation on the part of the 
major powers for a peaceful solution based 
on the November 1967 resolution, an impor- 
tant set of principles was agreed on; namely, 
that each side would try to avoid a confronta- 
tion, that each side would resort to peaceful 
means, that each side would try to resist the 
temptation to derive unilateral advantage 
from one given trouble spot as against 

Q. Mr. Sisco, I would like to go back to 
the Roger's plan if you will permit me. 
[Resolutioyi] 242 says that Israel should not 
withdraiv from all territories; the Rogers 
plan, as far as I remember it, does — regard- 
ing Egypt, I mean. 

Mr. Sisco: Well, let me first of all say 
something about 242. It contains the prin- 
ciple of withdrawal and you know this is not 
very clearly understood, strangely enough. 
It calls for the principle of withdrawal and in 
a subsequent paragraph of the Security 
Council resolution it talks in terms of so- 
called secure and recognized borders. It did 
not endorse the 1967 lines as the final lines, 
but it did not preclude those lines, either. 

Q. You're got me all mixed up. As far 
as I knoiv, the Rogers plan speaks about 
withdraival to the '67 boundaries regarding 
Egypt and Israel. 

Mr. Sisco: Well, but that is subject — it 
talks in terms of the international boundary 
that has existed, but what is normally for- 
gotten is the fact that the withdrawal to 
that boi-der is linked to negotiations between 
the two sides on three key issues : First, that 
a satisfactory agreement would be achieved 
between Israel and Egypt on the key point 
of Sharm al-Shaykh; second, that satisfac- 
tory agreement would be achieved as a result 
of negotiation with respect to demilitariza- 
tion in the Sinai; and third, Gaza, both in 
terms of what the security arrangements 
would be as well as the resolution of the 
problem of sovereignty. What's normally 
forgotten about the Rogers plan is that these 
three key points were left completely open 
for negotiation; there was no substantive 

judgment made one way or another; and 
these are really in my judgment the key 
issues of security in any peace agreement 
between Egypt and Israel. But as I say, I 
don't want to go beyond that; I'm not really 
in a position to add or subtract to policy 
statements that have been made, and I'm not 
interested in making news, as a matter of 

Q. You've never considered dropping the 
plan, scrapping it? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I don't want to say any- 
thing more now. I think I've tried to answer 
your questions to the degree to which I can. 

The Palestinian Problem 

Q. You have said a few moments ago tivo 
things. One is encoiiraging, and I find it en- 
couraging that although the Rogers plan 
exists, a solution shotcld be found — the em- 
phasis should be on negotiations between the 
sides, if I read you correctly. This is one 
thing; the other thing is that ive're going to 
face a neiv obstacle in '73: the Palestinian 

Mr. Sisco: Well, the Palestinian problem 
is not a new obstacle. There's no durable — 

Q. In sharper focus, I mean. 

Mr. Sisco: Well, yes, it's in sharp focus, 
and the Palestinian problem has been a prob- 
lem for many, many years, and there isn't 
any doubt that if you're going to get a du- 
rable peace in the area it's going to have to 
meet the legitimate concerns not only of 
Israel and the established Arab states but of 
the Palestinians. Now, I don't really think 
that the Black September group represents 
either the majority view of the Arab states 
or, for that matter, the majority view of the 
Palestinians. I'm convinced on the basis of 
the discussions that I've had over the last 
four years that the preponderant majority of 
the Palestinians want a peaceful solution, 
and I think it would be a mistake to lump 
a small group of people that are dedicated to 
the use of force and terrorism — terrorism 
largely outside the area because the guerrilla 

November 13, 1972 


movement hasn't been effective in the mili- 
tary sense in the Middle East — I think it 
would be a mistake to equate this very small 
group with the majority view on the Arab 
side. I think the majority of the Arab people 
today want a peaceful solution and are pre- 
pared to face up to the idea of coexistence 
with Israel. 

Q. Another burning issue is the economic 

fee on Soviet Je^vry — 

Mr. Sisco: Right. 

Q. — the ransom. In vietv of the action 
taken by Congress, the Jackson amend- 
ment — 

Mr. Sisco: Yes. 

Q. — and the commercial on-going talks 
with the Russians, do you believe, do you see 
in the foreseeable future, anything that the 
Soviets would cancel or eliminate this fee ? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, again, I'm not in the busi- 
ness of predicting, and I'm not about to. 
What I can say and will say is this: First, 
this is a deep emotional issue, not only with 
Israelis, but it is a matter of very deep con- 
cern for all Americans. Secondly, we have 
made clear that this matter has been taken 
up and will continue to be taken up at all 
appropriate levels. We're convinced that to 
be effective the avenue of private diplomacy 
has to be pursued. We described, for exam- 
ple, just the other day to your Foreign Min- 
ister just what we are doing privately, and I 
think there is an appreciation and under- 
standing both in your country and our own 
that we are doing everything that is possible. 
We will continue to pursue this matter 
quietly in what we consider to be the most 
effective manner. It's very easy to make a 
lot of public statements on this kind of thing 
and thereby not achieve any results. We're 
convinced that the most effective way is to 
pursue this matter privately and directly, 
which is what we are doing. I would make 
this added point : I'm also convinced that to 
the degree to which discussions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, broadly 

speaking, result in concrete understandings, 
result in a diminution of tension between the 
two major powers, this should help improve 
the atmosphere and should have a positive 
and a salutary effect on the question that you 

Q. You would not reveal to us ivhat [So- 
viet Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko 
told you in that meeting? 

Mr. Sisco: No, I don't think so. If you're 
going to pursue private diplomacy, I don't 
think you begin to reveal on television or 
anywhere else just what was said. 

Q. Let me ask you for the end of our 
short interview a few personal questions. 
After so many years of trying to get to a 
solution, aren't you a little discouraged some- 
times ? 

Mr. Sisco: Oh, no. We all get discouraged 
from time to time, but I'm basically an opti- 
mist. I'm the sort of individual who looks at 
a glass and says that it's half full of water 
rather than half empty. That's been my 
philosophy in my life, and it has been my 
approach to the Middle East problem. There 
were those who said a year and a half ago, 
for example, that a cease-fire in the area 
wasn't possible. I believe that the history of 
the Middle East in many respects has been a 
history of lost opportunities, and anybody 
who writes the history will see that there 
were important junctures at which oppor- 
tunities were lost. I think that a peace in the 
area is do-able, I think a peace is achiev- 
able. I think that the minimal conditions in 
the Middle East exist for diplomacy. Ter- 
rorism is a problem in the Middle East and 
elsewhere; the fact that the war ended in 
1967 and there's been no substantial prog- 
ress toward a peaceful settlement is also 
complicating. On the other hand, people are 
in the habit of living their lives without the 
daily incidents across the Suez Canal, and 
I think this is a positive psychological factor 
in the area. I think both sides recognize that 
the political option is much to be preferred 
to the military option. The military option 


Department of State Bulletin 

makes no sense from anybody's point of view. 

Q. And the Egyptians are — 

Mr. Sisco: Oh, I think there's greater real- 
ism in the Arab world in this regard than in 
the past. This is confirmed by the fact that 
not only has the cease-fire been maintained 
but also the framework of the November 
1967 resolution has been maintained. There 
are, of course, certain extreme elements in 
the Middle East that are not dedicated to a 
peaceful solution, but I'm convinced that the 
voices in favor of moderation, the voices in 
favor of a political solution, still have an 
upper hand, and as long as that is the case, 
I think there's opportunity. And being the 
optimist that I am, I think peace is achiev- 
able. I believe it has to be achieved pri- 
marily by the parties. I believe the United 
States can play a helpful role, but its role by 
no manner of means should become a substi- 
tute for the parties themselves. 

U.S. and Belgium Sign Understanding 
on Passenger Charter Air Services 

The Department of State announced on 
October 17 (press release 264) that repre- 
sentatives of the United States and Belgium 
had that day signed at Brussels a memo- 
randum of understanding on the regulation 
of passenger charter air services. The un- 
derstanding stabilizes an environment which 
will pei-mit U.S. and Belgian airlines to con- 
duct charter flights without arbitrary re- 
straints, including generally the need for 
prior approval, and sets forth the regulatory 
regimes which each side will apply to charter 
operations of the other's airlines. The under- 
standing is effective from January 1, 1973, 
through December 31, 1975. One effect of 
the understanding is to restore to U.S. sup- 
plemental airlines authority to operate char- 
ter flights between the northeast quadrant 
of the United States and Belgium. (For text 
of the memorandum of understanding, see 
press release 264.) 

Assistant Secretary Meyer Signs 
Andean Pact Loan 

Following are remarks made by Charles 
A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of 
the Alliance for Progress, at Caracas, Ven- 
ezuela, on October 10 on signing a $15 mil- 
lion loan to provide financial and technical 
assistance to the Andean Development Cor- 

I cannot emphasize too strongly how 
pleased I am to be here today to participate 
in the signing of this significant loan agree- 
ment between the U.S. Government and the 
Andean Development Corporation. 

This signing represents an important step 
forward in the implementation of this ad- 
ministration's policy toward Latin America, 
a policy which, as President Nixon described 
it in October 1969, is based in great part on 
a belief that the principal future pattern of 
U.S. assistance for hemisphere development 
must be U.S. support for Latin American 
initiatives and that this can be achieved on 
a multilateral basis within the inter-Amer- 
ican system. 1 I believe that the Andean inte- 
gration initiative has gained substantial mo- 
mentum, and I am convinced that the Andean 
Development Corporation will emerge a truly 
significant regional lending institution dur- 
ing the decade of the 1970's. 

U.S. participation in the loan is further 
evidence of our sincere desire to establish 
with you in Latin America a basis for a more 
dynamic and diversified export potential, an 
objective which we all recognize as a major 
prerequisite for sustained growth and for 
strengthening the private sector in the An- 
dean region. On November 18, 1969, before 
a special lA-ECOSOC [Inter-American Eco- 
nomic and Social Council] meeting, I stated 
that Latin America's ability to develop ex- 
port competence in products on world mar- 
kets was in many ways linked to the progress 

^ For President Nixon's address before the Inter 
American Press Association on Oct. 31, 1969, see 
Bulletin of Nov. 17, 1969, p. 409. 

November 13, 1972 


of its regional economic integration process.- 
I also reiterated the President's statement 
that the United States stood ready to pro- 
vide assistance to regional and subregional 
groups if our help was needed and was re- 
quested. At the time I made these statements, 
the Andean integration movement had yet to 
prove its dynamism and capacity for action. 
In October 1971, however, President Linares 
[Adolfo Linares, Executive President of the 
Andean Development Corporation] visited 
me in Washington and made a very persua- 
sive case for the future of the Andean re- 
gion. We discussed financial assistance to 
help sustain the progress and momentum al- 
ready achieved. As a result, I appointed a 
team which arrived in Caracas in January 
1972 to initiate negotiations. Based on an 
open and frank exchange of ideas and opin- 
ions between this team and Andean Develop- 
ment Corporation management, we are in a 
position today to take the final step which 
will make available $15 million to help sat- 
isfy a portion of the future demand of this 
subregion's private sector. This loan is a 
clear policy action of partnership. 

Just as importantly, this loan demonstrates 
that while we may differ from time to time 
with respect to our approaches to develop- 
ment issues and problems, it is possible to 
find ways to work together to develop a 
framework for productive and creative co- 
operation. This loan also demonstrates that 
the Andean group of countries recognizes 
the importance of a balanced approach with 
respect to private and public investment and 
that increased private investment, both do- 
mestic and foreign, will indeed be encour- 

' Bulletin of Dec. 29, 1969, p. 631. 

aged in the area as an important element in 
the region's development through the gen- 
eration of capital, modern technology, new 
trade opportunities, and employment. 

It appears that President Linares' faith 
has been well rewarded. The Andean inte- 
gration movement is attracting increased at- 
tention by the U.S. press, and indeed inter- 
nationally, as a dynamic, innovative experi- 
ment in regional cooperation. The recent 
signing of a special program for industrial 
development in the metal-working sector 
presents a significant breakthrough. I wish 
you great success in this exciting adventure 
to raise production and living standards and 
revitalize the integration movement in Latin 
America, and I call upon all other donor na- 
tions and institutions to join us in support- 
ing your creative efforts. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

Convention on Ownership of Cultural Property. Re- 
port to accompany E.\. B, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92- 
29. August 8, 1972. 34 pp. 

Tax Convention with Norway. Report to accompany 
Ex. D, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-30. August 8, 1972. 
55 pp. 

International Organization of Legal Metrology. Re- 
port to accompany Ex. I, 92d Cong., second sess. 
S. Ex. Rept. 92-31. August 8, 1972. 37 pp. 

Amending the Joint Resolution Providing for Mem- 
bership and Participation by the United States in 
the South Pacific Commission. Report to accom- 
pany H.J. Res. 1211. H. Rept. 92-1314. August 8, 
1972. 3 pp. 

Universal Copyright Convention. Report to accom- 
pany Ex. G, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-32. August 10, 
1972. 6 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Aspects of International Monetary Reform 

Address by Sidney Weintraub 

Deputy Assistatit Secretary for International Finance and Development ^ 

The general public now discusses monetary 
issues, perhaps not with precision but not 
wholly in ignoi'ance either. Professional 
economists used to feel somewhat protected 
in this arcane field since they could speak a 
language others did not understand. Presi- 
dent Nixon in his remarks on September 25 
to the annual meeting of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) dealt with this idea 
when he noted that "very little of what is 
done in these negotiations (on monetary re- 
form) will be widely understood in this 
country or in any of your countries as well." ^ 
What the President said undoubtedly is still 
true, but much less completely than it used to 
be. There is nothing like a crisis to begin a 
process of education. Our political leaders 
now talk about monetary reform; when is 
the last time any of you can remember a sim- 
ilar Presidential speech on this subject? 

All of this is by way of saying that we 
have come a long way in the last two to three 
years in both public and expert perception 
of the international monetary system. I 
would like to sketch in some of what has been 
accomplished. Following that I will discuss 
some of the future directions international 
monetary discussions might take. Finally, 
since the State Department does have some 
expertise to offer on foreign affairs, I would 
like to deal with the politics and economics 
of money — what is behind all the technical 

' Made before the Balance of Payments Group of 
the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., at New 
York, N.Y., on Oct. 5. 

' Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1972, p. 457. 

talk of the adjustment process, flexibility, 
under- and over-valuation of exchange rates, 
and the like. 

Two years ago, in time for the annual 
meeting in 1970, the Executive Directors of 
the IMF issued a report on "The Role of Ex- 
change Rates in the Adjustment of Interna- 
tional Payments." That report emphasized 
that "The par value system provides a frame- 
work for the maintenance of stability and 
order in exchange rates which is an essen- 
tial condition for the expansion and balanced 
growth of international trade." It went on 
that "It is a basic principle of the par value 
system that changes in parities must be re- 
lated to the correction of a fundamental dis- 
equilibrium." It further emphasized that "It 
is another basic principle of the par value 
system that a change in the par value of a 
member's currency be made only on the pro- 
posal of the member." The report then gin- 
gerly discussed three possible deviations 
from the par value system; namely, fluctu- 
ating exchange rates, allowing substantially 
wider margins, and adjusting parities on the 
basis of some predetermined formula which 
could be applied automatically. The report 
noted some of the benefits that these inodifi- 
cations could bring, but its emphasis was es- 
sentially on the "associated serious draw- 
backs of these regimes." 

Two years later, in time for this year's an- 
nual meeting, the Executive Directors of the 
IMF issued another report, this time entitled 
"Reform of the International Monetary Sys- 
tem." This was a more wide-ranging report, 

November 13, 1972 


and it started out with the assumption that 
reform was needed rather than the earlier 
bias that tinkering was sufficient. It then 
discussed the exchange rate mechanism more 
evenhandedly than had the report two years 
earlier. As you l<now, this latter report also 
dealt with such issues as convertibility, the 
settlement of payments imbalances, the role 
of gold, the role of other assets as reserves, 
the issue of disequilibrating capital move- 
ments, and the importance of monetary re- 
form to the developing countries. 

It is instructive to read these two reports 
side by side. The first was an important one 
in that it opened issues previously discussed 
in academic and professional circles to de- 
bate in official circles responsible for possi- 
ble reform. The second report was more 
important since it dealt with the guts of 
reform. Between the two reports, we had Au- 
gust 15, 1971, which involved the suspension 
of dollar convertibility by the United States, 
and then the Smithsonian agreem.ent of De- 
cember 18, 1971, which involved both the 
realignment of exchange rates and an under- 
taking to consider reform of the interna- 
tional monetary system.^ 

Agreement on General Principles 

To fully comprehend how far reform dis- 
cussion has come, I would commend to any- 
body interested in this subject the careful 
reading of the key speeches made at the re- 
cent annual meeting of the IMF. The key 
countries now agree to certain general prin- 
ciples. These include the following: 

The system should be symmetrical in the 
sense that both surplus and deficit countries 
have responsibilities for adjustment. The 
French Finance Minister made the word 
"symmetry" the touchstone of his address. 
His idea of symmetry included the aforemen- 
tioned thought on obligations of deficit and 
surplus countries, as well as symmetry in 
the efforts of big and small countries and of 
industrial and less developed countries, and 
in avoiding equally inflation and deflation. 

The major speakers accepted the concept 

of collective creation of liquidity; that is, ex- 
panding the role of special drawing rights 

There was general agreement that SDR's 
should become the numeraire of the system. 

There was agreement that the IMF must 
play an expanded role in the future if the 
adjustment process is to proceed smoothly. 

There was agreement that the future sys- 
tem must be more flexible. Most developed 
countries accepted the concept of wider mar- 
gins. Most accepted that parity changes 
should be made more promptly, and hence 
generally be smaller. Most now accept that 
there is a place for temporary floats. It is 
worth keeping in mind that most countries 
had not accepted these ideas a few years ear- 

On the most practical of all levels, I think 
there is now implicit international agree- 
ment that the United States must be in a po- 
sition to have better control over its exchange 

There is some quarrel over the extent of 
the balance of payments turnaround the 
United States needs to return to equilibrium, 
and whether this should be all or primarily 
in the trade account, in other elements of the 
current account, or in the capital account. 
But there is no disagreement that we need a 
substantial turnaround and that this will re- 
quire a process both of internal discipline 
and international cooperation. 

Within official U.S. Government thinking, 
we also have come a long way. Instead of 
seeking palliatives to correct persistent U.S. 
balance of payments deficits, we are trying 
to deal with root causes. 

The world's monetary leaders have ceased 
digging in to maintain every element of what 
became known as the Bretton Woods system 
and are now prepared to discuss altering this 
in some fundamental respects. And as noted, 
the world's principal countries have reached 
some degree of agreement on principles 
which should guide this reform. 

"For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 6, 1971, 
p. 253, and Jan. 10, 1972, p. 32. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Crucial Issues To Be Resolved 

What is the likely to bring? What 
are the issues? 1 would like to deal with 
these first on a general le\el before getting 
into some specifics. 

Looking at it from the viewpoint of the 
United States, an essential requirement is to 
achieve strength in our balance of payments. 
As I indicated earlier, I think others agree 
that this is necessary. When we examined 
the structure of our accounts, both capital 
and current, we concluded that the principal 
correction would have to come in the trade 
account. Others have been reluctant to ac- 
cept this, since an improvement in the U.S. 
trade account has implications for the trade 
position of others. 

Industrialists in all countries are people of 
some influence. The workers they hire are 
people who collectively have some influence. 
A declining rate of growth of exports, or an 
increasing rate of growth of imports, can af- 
fect them. Trade issues are sensitive, and 
they are at the core of many of the technical 
issues that the Committee of Twenty, which 
will examine monetary reform, will have in 

Another overall issue of significance is the 
extent to which countries are prepared to al- 
low balance of payments considerations to 
influence domestic policy. The external sec- 
tor in relation to total product is great in 
some countries and small in others. Different 
countries therefore look at the internal- 
external relationship differently. 

A slowdown in economic activity, and do- 
mestic deflation, can mean fewer jobs; and 
no country can ignore this fact. Differential 
interest rates can result in capital move- 
ments, and these in turn can affect domestic 
policies. All of these issues must be recon- 
ciled, keeping always in mind that domestic 
well-being must be at the heart of the policy 
of any political leader. 

The Bretton Woods system worked well, 
when it did, as much because of the role 
played by the United States as any other 
single reason. The United States is neither 
able nor willing to play a comparable role in 

the future. Our suspension of convertibility, 
and our clear statement that we are prepared 
to restore convertibility only as part of a 
satisfactory overall system, is one overt mon- 
etary manifestation of this changed U.S. role. 

In addition to this, the United States and 
others have advocated a monetary system in 
which adjustments are made more promptly 
than in the past. We have suggested that one 
key determinant of the need for adjustment 
is the changing level of reserves. Others pre- 
fer many more indicators or using something 
akin to the present concept of fundamental 
disequilibrium. In any event, if the United 
States does not take the same central role in 
making the system work, and if more initia- 
tive from some central source is needed to 
smooth the adjustment process, then some 
country or group of countries or some insti- 
tution must have a greater role. At the mo- 
ment the principal candidate is the IMF. 
And this in turn raises issues of philosophy 
and sovereignty. It raises questions of what 
we mean by the IMF, how much initiative it 
is to have, and how it is to exercise this ini- 

I think the foregoing three points — chang- 
ing trade positions, scope for internal eco- 
nomic policies, and the substitution for the 
United States by some collective authority 
to make the system work — are crucial ones. 
There is not necessarily international agree- 
ment on resolving these issues. 

Significant Technical Problems 

There are, in addition, many technical as- 
pects of reform on which countries disagree. 
A general principle is all well and good, and 
indeed important; but its translation into an 
operating practice may involve the well- 
being of countries and individuals, and there- 
in may lie the rub. Let me deal with some of 
the specifics. 

I noted earlier that the United States, in 
Secretary Shultz' speech to the IMF, sug- 
gested that fluctuation in reserve positions is 
the "most equitable and efl'ective single indi- 
cator we have to guide the adjustment proc- 

November 13, 1972 


ess." * Other speakers at that same meeting 
rejected this, some on the grounds that auto- 
maticity in exchange rate changes could 
not be accepted — which, incidentally, knocked 
down a proposal the United States never 
made. But more to the point, they were un- 
certain as to how this criterion would affect 
actions they might have to take. We should 
expect a good deal of international debate 
on the use of this criterion, or other criteria, 
for guiding the adjustment process. 

The United States has suggested that when 
countries in disequilibrium repeatedly refuse 
to take necessary adjustment measures — not 
just exchange rate changes, but a composite 
of measures, which could include the ex- 
change rate, domestic policy, trading prac- 
tices, and the like — there should be some 
penalties attached to this. This is a sensitive 
point. We suspect that the concept of penal- 
ties against malingerers is an essential point, 
but others disagree. As a philosophic aside, I 
believe that if penalties have to be invoked 
against major countries, this could mean 
that the cooperative system had broken down. 
Penalties are like military retaliation — they 
are good when countries know they can be 
used but when they are in fact not used. 

Our own philosophic construct is for a 
world as free as possible of restraints on 
trade, other current account items, and capi- 
tal movements. Other countries are deeply 
concerned with disequilibrating capital move- 
ments and see a role here for direct controls, 
as well as indirect measures such as wider 
bands, which we have advocated, to help 
meet this problem. Many countries tend to 
be dirigiste in outlook and also see a role for 
controls on long-term capital movements. 
This range of issues obviously must be re- 

The United States has stated that while 
neither trade nor monetary negotiations 
need be delayed because of the other, the two 
clearly are linked. Surplus countries, for 
example, can adjust by reducing import bar- 
riers, as well as by appreciation of their 
exchange rate. Countries sometimes insulate 
part of their trading structure from ex- 

change rate changes, thereby complicating 
the adjustment process. This closer link 
between trade and money has concerned 
many countries because they are not sure 
what its practical meaning will be. As a 
minimum this link will require close coor- 
dination between the IMF and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

Developing countries see another link as 
being central — that between the creation of 
SDK's and the provision of development 
finance. I will not now try to rehearse all the 
arguments for and against the SDR-aid 
link, but quite clearly this will be an im- 
portant issue in the negotiations. 

The role of gold will likely diminish in 
any future system, particularly as the world 
moves more and more to an SDR-based sys- 
tem. The role of national currencies as re- 
serves is likely to diminish, although how 
quickly this latter will take place is unclear. 

The issue of convertibility is on every- 
body's mind. One aspect of this is consolida- 
tion of what may now be excessive dollar, 
sterling, and other national currency offi- 
cial balances. 

I have not even touched on the operation 
of the intervention system, which is a tech- 
nical point of significance. Giving the dollar 
in practice the same margins as other cur- 
rencies is similarly significant, and this is 
related to the intervention system. 

I have barely skimmed the surface of 
technical points, in part because all of you 
are familiar with them and in part because 
the discussion of each would require more 
time than I am permitted. The reform nego- 
tiations will be technical negotiations. They 
will deal with convertibility and reserves and 
adjustment and intervention. But as com- 
plicated as these issues may be, they are the 
easiest aspect. The complex part is to agree 
on what we collectively want from monetary 
reform. To coin a cliche, money is a means, 
well-being is the end. 

There has been increasing internal de- 
bate in the United States regarding many of 

' For Secretary of the Treasury Shultz' statement 
on Sept. 26, see Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1972, p. 460. 


Department of State Bulletin 

our external commitments. These are re- 
flected in the annual debates on foreign 
assistance. This uncertainty arises regu- 
larly with respect to the level of troops we 
maintain in Europe. Our unease is re- 
flected in the growing strength of trade 
protectionism and criticism against foreign 
investment by U.S. companies. These issues 
— aid, military security, trade relations with 
others — are the very basis of foreign policy. 
August 15 signaled a change — that we in- 
tended in the future to behave more like a 
competitor and less like a savior. Some U.S. 
leadership is still necessary. Indeed, every- 
body waited for the speeches by the Presi- 
dent and Secretary Shultz to set the tone for 
the monetary reform negotiations. But the 
substantive content of these speeches made 
clear that we no longer seek to dominate. 

The adjustment process is a foreign rela- 
tions issue of substantial significance. Our 
weak balance of payments position already 
has had an adverse impact on our provision 
of aid and therefore on our relations with 
the developing countries. The Europeans are 
conscious of the influence our balance of pay- 
ments has on the way the Senate votes on 
the successive Mansfield amendments calling 
for a progressive reduction of the level of 
our troops in Europe. The Japanese press 
reacted sharply, and with concern, to the 
suggestion in Secretary Shultz' speech that 
surcharges might be imposed on a surplus 
country which did not adjust; they saw this 
as potentially directed against Japan. The 
Canadian press picked up that portion of 
Secretary Shultz' speech which indicated that 
a country that refrained from setting a 
central value for its currency beyond a brief 
period should be required to observe strin- 
gent standards of behavior; the Canadians 
felt this was directed at them. The Euro- 
pean Common Market countries reacted well 
to our suggestion that countries moving 
toward monetary union might wish to have 
narrower bands among themselves than 
with other countries, because they saw in 
this our understanding of their aspirations. 

The cooperative relationships that have 

grown since World War II are in great part 
a consequence of the agreements reached at 
Bretton Woods. A well-functioning mone- 
tary system, a smoothly functioning adjust- 
ment process, can foster cooperative polit- 
ical and military relations. A smoothly 
functioning adjustment process can mini- 
mize domestic unemployment problems. A 
smoothly functioning adjustment process 
can help the richer countries meet the needs 
and desires of the poorer countries for 
greater trade and greater development as- 
sistance. A smoothly functioning adjust- 
ment process can open the world to the in- 
terchange of goods and services and capital. 
These are issues all foreign ministries 
must keep in mind. It is such issues which 
explain why the technical issues, as im- 
portant as they are, are merely the means by 
which deeper issues are approached. 


Current Actions 



Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agri- 
cultural Sciences. Done at Washingrton January 
15, 1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944. 
58 Stat. 1169. 

Adherences deposited: Canada {with a reserva- 
tion), October 4, 1972; Jamaica, September 20, 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Ireland, October 27, 1972. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 

'- Not in force. 

November 13, 1972 


drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 
Ratified by the President: October 24, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 

Accession deposited: Nigeria, October 25, 1972. 
Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel- 
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 
Sigyiature: Ministry of Communications and the 

Nigerian External Telecommunications Limited 

of Nigeria, October 25, 1972. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de- 
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in 
the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force 
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Turkey, October 19, 1972. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972.= 

Senate advice and conseyit to ratification: October 
6, 1972. 



Agreement relating to the status of U.S. Navy per- 
sonnel and the establishment of a Joint Standing 
Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Athens September 1, 13, and 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 29, 1972. 


' Not in force. 

= Not in force for the United States. 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C. 20U02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc- 
nments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

The U.S. Role in African Development. The material 
in this pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series 
is derived in part from recent statements by David 
D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs. Pub. 8663. African Series 52. 8 pp. 10«». 

The United Nations in '71. This leaflet briefly outlines 
the major topics that were taken up by the U.N. 
2Gth General Assembly from September 21 to Decem- 
ber 22, 1971. Pub. 8664. International Organization 
and Conference Series 102. 10(>. 

World Data Handbook. This Current Information 
Supplement to the Issues in United States Foreign 
Policy series provides statistics on more than 160 
countries and territories of the world. Pub. 8665. 
General Foreign Policy Series 264. 19 pp. 25^. 

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Portugal. 
TIAS 7349. 5 pp. 10('. 

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Liberia. TIAS 
7350. 3 pp. lO^ 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan. 
TIAS 7357. 7 pp. lO^'. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indo- 
nesia. TIAS 7358. 3 pp. 1Q(. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX November 13, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 17 h2 

Asia. A United States Foreign Policy of En- 
gagement (Rogers) 561 

Aviation. U.S. and Belgium Sign Understand- 
ing on Passenger Charter Air Services . . 573 

Belgium. U.S. and Belgium Sign Understand- 
ing on Passenger Charter Air Services . . 573 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 574 


Strategic Arms Limitations Talks To Resume 
November 21 at Geneva (joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
announcement) 565 

A United States Foreign Policy of Engage- 
ment (Rogers) 561 

Economic Affairs 

Aspects of International Monetary Reform 

(Weintraub) 575 

Assistant Secretary Meyer Signs Andean Pact 

Loan (remarks) 573 

Europe. A United States Foreign Policy of 

Engagement (Rogers) 561 

Latin America. Assistant Secretary Meyer 

Signs Andean Pact Loan (remarks) . . . 573 

Middle East. Assistant Secretary Sisco Dis- 
cusses Middle East Policy for Israeli Tele- 
vision (transcript of interview) 566 

Presidential Documents. A Significant Break- 
through in the Viet-Nam Negotiations . . 558 

Publications. Recent Releases 580 

Terrorism. Assistant Secretary Sisco Dis- 
cusses Middle East Policy for Israeli Tele- 
vision (transcript of interview) .... 566 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 579 

U.S. and Belgium Sign Understanding on Pas- 
senger Charter Air Services 573 


Assistant Secretary Sisco Discusses Middle 
East Policy for Israeli Television (tran- 
script of interview) 566 

Strategic Arms Limitations Talks To Resume 
November 21 at Geneva (joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
announcement) 565 


Dr. Kissinger Discusses Status of Negotia- 
tions Toward Viet-Nam Peace (news con- 
ference) 549 

A Significant Breakthrough in the Viet-Nam 

Negotiations (Nixon) 558 

Name Index 

Kissinger, Henry A 549 

Meyer, Charles A 573 

Nixon, President 558 

Rogers, Secretary 561 

Sisco, Joseph J 566 

Weintraub, Sidney 575 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 23-29 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 23 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
264 of October 17 and 270 of October 20. 

No. Date Subject 

*271 10/27 Meeting on Oct. 30 of Advisory 
Committee of the Foreign 
Service Institute. 

*Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




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Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 








Vol. LXVII, No. 17J^3 

November 20, 1972 


News Conference by Secretary Rogers and Secretary Peterson 
and Texts of Agreements and Related Documents 581 


Address by Deputy Secretary Irwin 609 

For index see inside back cover 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

DEC 9 1972 


Vol. LXVII, No. 1743 
November 20, 1972 

For sale by the Superintendent of Document! 
U.S. Government Printinff Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
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Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of tlie Government 
witli information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United Slates is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of tlie Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreements on Trade and Lend-lease 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement Regarding 
Trade and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement Re- 
garding Settlement of Lend Lease, Recipro- 
cal Aid and Claims were signed at Washing- 
ton on October 18. Follonnng are the tran- 
script of a news conference held by Secre- 
tary Rogers and Secretary of Commerce 
Peter G. Peterson at the White House that 
day, a White House fact sheet, the text of the 
trade agreement and related letters from 
Secretary Peterson to Soviet Foreign Trade 
Minister Nikolai S. Patolichev, the text of 
the lend-lease agreement, and the text of a 
Presidential determination making the 
U.S.S.R. eligible for credits from the Ex- 
port-Import Bank of the United States. 


White House press release dated October 18 

Secretary Rogers 

Mr. Ziegler [Press Secretary to President 
Nixon] : The United States and the Soviet 
Union today have signed an agreement on 
trade and lend-lease. Secretary Rogers is 
here to offer some remarks on the agree- 
ments. He will do that before Secretary of 
Commerce Peterson briefs you on the agree- 
ments which have been reached and take 
your questions. 

Secretary Rogers: Thank you, Mr. Ziegler. 

Let me say, ladies and gentlemen, that we 
have just completed a meeting with Presi- 
dent Nixon and the Soviet Ministers who are 
here, about the agreements that have been 
signed today. I can say that the President 
very much welcomes these agreements as 

concrete examples of the results of the sum- 
mit meeting. 

I was interested to notice that the Soviet 
Minister said that he thought it would be 
difficult to exaggerate the importance of 
these agreements. In the discussions, it was 
also pointed out that the success that has re- 
sulted, as reflected in these agreements, to a 
considerable measure was because of the 
personal and direct involvement of President 
Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid L Brezh- 
nev, General Secretary of the Soviet Com- 
munist Party]. 

Of course. Secretary Peterson, who has 
carried the laboring oar as far as the nego- 
tiating process is concerned deserves great 
credit, as does his Under Secretary, Mr. 
[James T.] Lynn, and Assistant Secretary 
of State Bill Armstrong, who has conducted 
the negotiations on lend-lease. 

Let me say there are really three agree- 
ments here, which Mr. Peterson will explain 
in some detail. In the broad sense, they in- 
volve, first, the settlement of the lend-lease 
debts. This is a problem that has plagued 
the Soviet Union and the United States since 
World War II. It has been a serious barrier 
to better relations between our two coun- 
tries. We think that the resolution of this 
problem is a good one for both countries. We 
do not think it is to the disadvantage of 
either. It does settle this difficult problem re- 
sulting from World War II. 

Then we have signed an agreement on 
trade which we think holds great promise 
for very improved economic relations be- 
tween our two countries. 

And, of course, we have an agreement on 
credit which will permit exchange of credits 

November 20, 1972 


between the two countries, and I believe will 
benefit American working men and w^omen 
and American business both, because I think 
it will greatly increase the trade between 
our two countries. 

Now, I wanted to say, though, that we do 
not look upon these agreements as agree- 
ments which carry economic implications 
only. They are very important agreements in 
the economic field, but they have much 
greater significance. They are a natural fol- 
low-on to the summit meeting and I believe 
will improve the climate greatly, which will 
permit improved relations between our two 
countries in the political field. 

I know that although we are very happy 
that these agreements augur well for greater 
trade between our two countries and the 
elimination of some of the difficulties we 
have had, the fact is that they are very sig- 
nificant steps in the direction of better politi- 
cal relations between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. 

Of course, what that means in terms of 
the American people is that it provides a 
much better opportunity for peace in the 
world. In the final analysis, what the Presi- 
dent is working for, the reason he took the 
trips to Moscow and Peking, the reason that 
we have worked so long and diligently to 
complete these agreements, is because he is 
anxious to create a climate for peace. I think 
the agreements that we have signed today do 
exactly that. 

I hope that they will contribute, as the 
President hopes they will, to the possibility 
of a generation of peace. 

Thank you. 

Q. Mr. Secretarij, does this mean that a 
most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Rus- 
sia, that it would be submitted to Congress 
and be pushed for before any of the other 
eastern European countries are granted this? 

Secretary Rogers: I ought to let Mr. Peter- 
son answer those questions. I want to merely 
say on that point that the words are mis- 
leading. What we propose to do is to elimi- 

nate the discrimination that has been in- 
volved in our trade with the Soviet Union. 

The fact of the matter is that the present 
situation discriminates against the Soviet 
Union. One of the reasons for the discrim- 
ination is because we have had the problem 
of lend-lease since World War II that we 
have not been able to solve. Now that we 
have made an agreement, an agreement 
which provides a payment of $722 million to 
the United States over a period of years and 
settles this difficult problem, we would like 
to have the discriminatory tariffs which 
have been directed against the Soviet Union 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ttvo-thirds of the Sen- 
ate have put themselves on record as oppos- 
ing ending discrimination against Russia 
unless they end discrimination against cer- 
tain persons wishing to leave. Hoiv are you 
handling that problem? 

Secretary Rogers: We are going to handle 
that, Miss Berger [Marilyn Berger, Wash- 
ington Post], through the channels we have 
been using. We think the channels of quiet 
diplomacy hold out the greatest promise for 
success. I have had several meetings with the 
Jewish leaders in the country, and I think 
there is a general feeling that the conduct 
of the administration, what we are doing in 
the field of quiet diplomacy, holds the great- 
est promise of success; and after all, that is 
what we are all interested in, so I have 
nothing further to say on that today. 

Thank you very much. 

Secretary of Commerce Peterson 

We believe that this trade agreement and 
lend-lease agreement ends a 25-year hiatus 
in normal commercial relationships with the 
Soviet Union. We believe it begins a new era 
that not only has significant peace dividends 
but very substantial economic dividends for 
our country. 

What are these economic dividends? First 
of all, in the lend-lease settlement, our coun- 


Department of State Bulletin 

try will receive at least $722 million, perhaps 
as much as $759 million; in short, three- 
quarters of a billion dollars in lend-lease 
debt. This has been an unresolved problem 
for 25 years. 

I am pleased to tell you that by any stand- 
ard we have been measuring it, it compares 
very favorably indeed, in terms of the 
United States, with the settlement that was 
made with the British. 

A second economic dividend is several 
hundred million dollars' worth of exports 
that we believe will be forthcoming in the 
relatively near future. The trade agreement 
provides for a minimum of tripling our trade 
over the three-year period to a level of at 
least $114 billion. 

It was interesting that Minister Patoli- 
chev of the Soviet Union just told the Presi- 
dent that tomorrow they plan to place orders 
for some 60 million dollars' worth of Amer- 
ican products and equipment. 

A third economic dividend is in the field of 
the balance of trade. By all of our projec- 
tions, it should have a very positive effect 
on our balance of trade. I would project that 
over the next few years the positive effect 
should be at least a few hundred million 
dollars in our favor and the thousands of 
jobs that go with that kind of balance. 

But even beyond that, the goods that we 
are likely to export to the Soviet Union are 
products like machine tools, earthmoving 
equipment of various kinds, consumer goods, 
grain products, which are characterized by 
what the economists call high-labor-inten- 
sive products. In plainer language, jobs. 

On the import side, we plan to import 
substantial amounts of raw materials which 
we need, energy which we need; clean en- 
ergy, I might emphasize. But here, again, 
with low labor content. So I think it is safe 
to predict that in addition to having a favor- 
able balance-of-trade surplus, the evidence 
I think is very persuasive that we will have 
an even more favorable balance-of-job sur- 

Before going into the substance of the 

agreement, I would like to review very 
briefly with you a few of the principles by 
which the President had suggested that we 
conduct ourselves during these negotiations. 

First, we must remember that this is an 
economic deal between the two greatest pow- 
ers in the world, not only militarily but eco- 
nomically. Therefore, a spirit that we wanted 
to pervade these arrangements was one of 
reciprocity, one of equal treatment. There- 
fore, as you read the agreement on credit, 
on business facilities, you will see that em- 
phasis is placed on removing barriers, on 
removing discrimination. 

Secondly, we w^ere to be guided in our ne- 
gotiations by the understanding that while 
our two economies are the world's two larg- 
est economies, they are also two of the most 
different. They have different philosophies, 
different ways of doing business, and differ- 
ent degrees of political oversight. Moreover, 
our two countries are, by and large, party to 
only a very few of the same legal conven- 
tions which set the parameters for trade 
activity. Therefore, we were confronted with 
the challenge of tailoring a legal framework, 
which we tend to take for granted when we 
are trading with other countries. In short, 
we had to create some new mechanisms for 
dealing with new problems. 

A third principle by which the President 
asked us to conduct ourselves during these 
negotiations was the principle of a compre- 
hensive agreement. Frankly, it would have 
been a relatively easy matter to have signed 
a simple trade agreement that simply in- 
cluded the issues of lend-lease, Exim credit, 
and the removal of discrimination on tariffs. 
But the President's view has been and is 
that no agreement should have been entered 
until it dealt with the full range of issues, 
unless it anticipated and provided answers 
to the basic questions that might later be 

In short, we wanted to insure that today's 
commercial triumphs would not become to- 
morrow's political irritant. That is why we 
held out on the settlement of the lend-lease 

November 20, 1972 


quest'^"\ That is why we insisted on agreed 
method" of handling market disruption. 
That u why we have insisted on establishing 
rules for the establishment of business fa- 
cilities for the U.S. businessmen in the 
Soviet Union. That is why, incidentally, we 
have wanted to be sure that this agreement 
provided for acceptable methods of arbitra- 
tion of future disputes. 

We believe the agreement we have now 
signed is comprehensive enough for us to do 
some real business. We believe that most of 
the essential and fundamental problems have 
been taken care of. This is not to say that 
this is a constitution that we expect to gov- 
ern trade relations ad infinitum, but it does 
bring me really to our fourth principle, 
which is to remember that for 2[2 decades 
we have had, in efi'ect, a nonrelationship. 

This could not be replaced overnight with 
the kind of relationship that we have with 
such major trading powers as Japan, Can- 
ada, and western Europe. We see this as an 
evolutionary document, a sort of working 
prototype, as is indicated by the fact that 
there is a three-year term on the agreement. 
We expect, however, as time goes on, to make 
modifications that experience tells us are in- 
dicated. In short, this agreement is not an 
ultimate destination, but we believe it is a 
giant step on our journey. 

We believe that most of the issues that we 
have been talking about now for several 
months have been very satisfactorily re- 
solved, even in the area, for example, of 
copyrights, which we think is an important 
area since it involves the field of intellectual 
property, and it has been our position that 
as we broaden our relationships some of the 
same kinds of principles that apply to in- 
tellectual property should apply to commer- 
cial property. 

Even here I was very pleased with the 
substantial progress that our work groups 
had made, as on the question of tax treaties. 
By the time of our next meeting, I would 
expect even more progress on that score. 

I would now like to take you briefly 
through the main provisions for those of you 
who have not had an opportunity to study the 

fact sheet. Then, of course, we can take your 

On the question, first of all, of tariffs, re- 
moving the discrimination, providing equal 
treatment for the Soviet Union, the Presi- 
dent's plan is to submit legislation to the 
Congress of the United States early in next 
year's session. I might mention the meaning 
of this discrimination in tariff treatment in 
language that some of us in this room might 
understand better than the language of the 
trade economist. 

I have picked vodka as an example that I 
thought might be of interest to some of you 
in the audience. The current tariff on vodka 
is $5 a gallon. If we were to provide the 
Soviet Union with equal tariffs as other 
countries pay, it would be $1.25 a gallon, or 
one-fourth of what it is now. There may be 
a few of you who enjoy caviar. Those of you 
who do \\'ill be happy to know the tariffs 
will be reduced from 30 percent to 15 per- 

One of the very important and difficult 
aspects of this negotiation has been how to 
recognize the fact that we are dealing here 
with a state trading monopoly, a govern- 
ment that controls both the imports and ex- 
ports of products more or less absolutely. 
We are also dealing with a different econ- 
omy in the sense that pricing and cost have 
quite different meanings in their economy. 

We have felt for some time that it was 
essential, particularly in view of the fact 
that the Soviet Union does not belong to the 
same international trade organizations that 
we do, to have special provisions to handle 
problems of market disruption. We have 
provided you with a copy of the trade agree- 
ment and the letters that relate thereto, and 
you will see that the United States has the 
authority under this agreement to take nec- 
essary steps where there is evidence of situa- 
tions that will either cause or threaten or 
contribute to the disruption of our domestic 
markets. Again, in the spirit of reciprocity, 
the Soviet Union, of course, has a similar 

In the field of credit, which has been a 
very important matter of negotiation for 


Department of State Bulletin 

some time, the President just signed the de- 
termination that provides that tlie Soviet 
Union is now eligible for Exim credits. We 
have also taken the position, as some of you 
know, that this was the time to negotiate 
reciprocal credit. You will see a reciprocal 
agreement on credit where importers of 
Soviet products into the United States will 
have access to credit using a set of guidelines 
that has now been clarified. 

We have long had a very substantial inter- 
est, both the Soviet Union and the United 
States, in the whole area of expanding busi- 
ness and commercial facilities. First, at the 
government level, the Soviet Union has been 
on a quest for some 40 years to open up 
trade representation offices in the United 
States. In turn, the United States has also 
felt that in this new era our interests would 
definitely be served by having expanded com- 
mercial offices. 

We are pleased to say that a totally re- 
ciprocal arrangement has been arrived at on 
that point, and we think it will make a sig- 
nificant contribution to the expansion of 

At the private level, we have business fa- 
cilities for our private firms. There have 
been, frankly, two problems here, broadly 
speaking. The first has been the quantity of 
facilities that have been available. The short- 
age has created some tensions and frustra- 
tions from time to time, and I think we 
mutually felt that one really constructive 
step that could be taken was to expand those 
facilities in a major way. 

The Soviet Union has agreed to build a 
large trade center complex which will in- 
clude offices, hotels, apartments, and com- 
munications facilities where our business 
people can have a highly acceptable arrange- 

Now, in addition to that problem, there 
has been the question of accreditation of our 
companies. The Soviet Union has agreed not 
to discriminate, to give the United States 
equal treatment with regard to the avail- 
ability of business facilities, and perhaps as 
important, they have for the first time pro- 
vided us with very specific guidelines on 

some of those small things that, again, can 
be irritating unless they are resolved — the 
whole area of communications equipment, 
business equipment, automobiles, all kinds 
of arrangements for the conduct of business. 

Another area that was indeed one that 
challenged all of us was the subject of arbi- 
tration. Now, many of you, I know, in the 
room are experts on the Soviet Union. You 
will notice that for some 40 years the Soviet 
Union has relied very heavily on their do- 
mestic Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis- 
sion. It has been the position of the govern- 
ment, particularly given our size and our 
relationship to one another, the kinds of 
projects that we are discussing, that it would 
be extremely desirable that we encourage 
third-party arbitration. We are pleased to 
say that an arrangement has been worked 
out in that regard. We consider this unprece- 
dented step really a significant — I would 
have used the word "breakthrough" if it has 
not been overused from time to time. 

On the question of lend-lease, I think most 
of you have at least some of the background. 
I can give you the results, and then Mr. 
Armstrong and Mr. Lynn and others can 
answer detailed questions you might have. 

The agreement provides for payments of 
$722 million, ending July 1, 2001. The agree- 
ment allows the Soviet Union to take up to 
four deferments, or the word the Soviets 
use is otsrochka, as some of you may know. 
We all heard this word from time to time 
in the course of the negotiations. There are 
two conditions: First, if any postponements 
are taken, there will not be an extension of 
time offered past the year 2001; that is, re- 
gardless of the time the postponements are 
taken, and when, all the money is due by 
2001. Secondly, the interest rate will be at 
the rate of 3 percent. 

Now, if we look at this total settlement, 
and this is one of the reasons we believe it is 
a very good settlement from our standpoint 
and a fair settlement from the standpoint of 
the Soviet Union, we have in our fact sheets 
a good deal of specific material, but you will 
see in that fact sheet that the United King- 
dom had in total about $21 V2 billion of all 

November 20, 1972 


kinds of lend-lease aid and the Soviet Union 
about half that, or $11 billion. If we take the 
total payments that we expect to accrue 
from this agreement prior to the year 2001, 
you will see that the Soviet Union will pay 
slightly more than did Britain in total. 

One of the issues was whether there should 
be a grace period or not. Britain has a grace 
period. The view that we thought was a 
reasonable one was that, in effect, the last 
20 years might be considered to be a grace 
period of sorts and that there was really no 
logical rationale for extending one. 

With regard to the due date, as I have in- 
dicated, in the case of the British settlement 
it is the year 2001 plus the number of de- 
ferments. In the case of the Soviet Union, it 
is 2001 without extension. 

With regard to the interest payments, 
without deferments it is 3 percent with the 
Soviet Union, an effective 4 percent taking 
the postponements factor into account. I say 
this sympathetically; this question of inter- 
est rates has been a very sensitive one and 
it is for a variety of reasons. 

In the first place, in the Soviet economy we 
must recognize that it is an economy in 
which the interest rate on consumer credit 
items, for example, is only about 2 percent. 
Savings account rates are only about 3 per- 
cent. I need not tell some of you who are 
buying various products that under these 
circumstances, these rates are lower than 
what we are accustomed to in this country 
by a large margin. 

In addition, it is clear that the issue of the 
Second World War is undoubtedly not only 
one of historic importance but one that is 
certainly not devoid of personal and emo- 
tional content. We think that the settlement 
we have arrived at here is one that repre- 
sents a fair compromise. 

I indicated earlier the progress we are 
making on copyrights and tax treaties. A 
word about the Commission, if I may, and 
where we go from here. Incidentally, I hope 
it is something more, I believe it is, than 
bureaucratic parochialism, if that is not a 
redundancy, to say a few words about my 

It is hard for me to praise too much the 
enormous contribution of my Under Secre- 
tary, who is Vice Chairman of the Commis- 
sion. He did a superb job in every respect 
and was absolutely indispensable in these 

Also, I am very proud of the contribution 
of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, 
Mr. Andrew Gibson, who headed the trade 
group and did so much to get a satisfactory 
settlement there. 

Bill Armstrong is available for questions 
on lend-lease. Secretary Rogers referred to 
him. He played a principal role in what we 
consider to be a satisfactory settlement of 
the lend-lease arrangement. 

Mr. Jack Bennett, Deputy Under Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, who has been doing 
a good deal of the work on credit arrange- 
ments, tax treaties, and joint products. We 
are very appreciative. Jack, of your contri- 

We have with us, I believe, Mr. Jim Mitch- 
ell from my old hometown in Illinois, which 
is not an enormous distinction to many ex- 
cept to me, and Jim has played a very impor- 
tant role as General Counsel. 

Steve Lazarus is here as Executive Secre- 

Here is Charlie Brower, who headed the 
copyright and tax treaty task force and in 
general was a most valuable ally in this im- 
portant cause. 

We will now take your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Soviets at any 
time link receiving most-favored-nation 
status for their goods %vith payment of lend- 
lease debt? 

Secretary Peterson: They not only did it 
at one time; they linked it continuously 
throughout the entire negotiations. 

Q. May I folloiv that up? As the agree- 
ment stands right now, they %vill he paying 
the entire lend-lease obligation regardless of 
the disposition of Congress? 

Secretary Peterson: No, that is not the 
case. If you read the fact sheet, you will see 
that we got a $12 million check today, which 


Department of State Bulletin 

we were not displeased to accept, and there 
will be a $24 million payment and another 
$12 million payment and then the so-called 
equal annual payment, presuming the pas- 
sage of MFN, the granting of MFN. We 
have a very specific set of linkages between 
MFN and payment of lend-lease. 

Q. Early this year the administration crit- 
icized the Soviet Union for being the chief 
supplier of North Viet-Nam. The Soviet 
Union is still the chief supplier, and the war 
is still going on. Presumably the trade agree- 
ment at this time would facilitate the chief 
supplier to supply them. How do you recon- 
cile these two positions! 

Secretary Peterson: What supplies are 
you talking about? 

Q. Military hardware. 

Secretary Peterson: I know of no evidence 
at all that military products are being sup- 
plied to the Soviet Union. We have Mr. Son- 
nenfeldt here, who has been a brilliant ad- 
viser and whose foot is probably large 
enough to put in his small mouth. I would 
love to have him handle this, if he will. 

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt (National Secu- 
rity Council staff): I can only agree with 
what you said. There are no military goods 
going to the Soviet Union under any of these 
agreements. Our export controls remain in 
effect, and references to national security 
considerations are contained in the trade 

Q. We didn't say that trade went to North 
Viet-Nam. That is not the question. The 
question is, What about the military goods 
from Russia that have gone in the past? Do 
you deny that any have gone? You said 
could tve prove it. Do yoxt have any — 

Secretary Peterson: We have export con- 
trols that operate in the following way: 
Products that leave the United States in the 
first place must be accompanied by a state- 
ment that the person receiving them accepts 
that the products included there are not 
going to a list of specified countries. From 
time to time we check into these shipments 

to be sure that is the case. We are not aware 
of any such ships that have taken American 
products to the ports you mentioned. 

Q. You are not aivare of ships that take 
th em ? 

Secretary Peterson: We are not aware of 
products in ships that have left the United 
States that have gone to North Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what happens after 
three years, at the expiration of this agree- 
ment? Will negotiations continue in the 

Secretary Peterson: We will have the ex- 
citing, stimulating experience of continuing 
this process of the last six months. It is our 
expectation that the agreement will continue. 
If you will read the agreement — we are mak- 
ing it available to you — there is a specific 
provision for consultation on extending the 
agreement further. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on lend-lease, tivo ques- 
tions: Even though it does not say specifi- 
cally how much interest is being paid, can 
you say ivhat the American vietv is of the 
amount or percent of interest that is in- 
cluded in these equal annual payments; and 
secondly, on the pipeline figure, as of Decem- 
ber 31, 1971, 1 was told they paid $76 million 
so far. You have $199 million here. Have 
they paid that amount since December 31? 

Secretary Peterson: I have an indispu- 
table source. The figure I got this morning 
was $199 million. Is that right, Bill? 

Q. On the point, can ive separate princi- 
pal from interest in this final agreement? 

Secretary Peterson: It is very difficult to 
do, to separate the two. One of the reasons, 
quite frankly, is that the subject of interest 
is one that is so sensitive that I think undue 
preoccupation with that would have made 
the discussions even more protracted and 
difficult than they were. 

So, what we finally came to was the follow- 
ing formulation: From our standpoint it 
seemed to us that at least a model that we 

November 20, 1972 


wanted to compai^e this to was the British 
settlement. We looked very carefully at what 
kind of products Britain got, how many in 
various categories. We looked at the com- 
parable information with the Soviet Union, 
and from that it was possible to extract at 
least a range of what would be an appropri- 
ate principal payment, or what one might 
call a principal payment. 

I think on the question of interest we are 
not discussing a specific interest figure. 
Those of you who want to energetically go 
through the process I described can perhaps 
make your own estimates. But we have felt 
that in the interest of eliminating this par- 
ticular point of conflict and undue specula- 
tion that it was far better to deal with a 
total global sum, and that is what we have 
done in the agreement. But we are fully sat- 
isfied that the agreement, as I have indi- 
cated, is at least as favorable as the one that 
the British signed. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you ivere quoted as say- 
ing that you were under instructions not to 
refer to the Jackson amendment in regard 
to negotiations with the Soviet Union on 
trade. Is this accurate, and if so, who gave 
you the instructions? 

Secretary Peterson: I don't ever recall 
being quoted as having said that. 

Q. You are quoted in the New York Times 
the day after 76 or 7U Senators had spon- 
sored this amendment. 

Secretary Peterson : This would be a terri- 
ble forum for me to comment on the credi- 
bility of the New York Times. I don't re- 
member either having made such a state- 
ment or having been given such instructions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how many nations, and 
at least some examples, ivill now be left 
without most-favored-nation treatment after 
it is extended to the Russians? 

Secretary Peterson: Poland and Yugo- 
slavia have it. Mr. Armstrong, do you know? 

Mr. Arm,strong (Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economic and Business Affairs): 
The other eastern European countries don't 

have it, and of course, China and North 
Korea and North Viet-Nam. 

Q. What parts of the two agreements have 
to be approved by Congress, just the most- 

Secretary Peterson: The tariff arrange- 
ments that provide for removing the dis- 
crimination do require congressional ap- 
proval. It is the President's current inten- 
tion to submit that early in the year. The 
lend-lease agreement does not require that 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on the 
reference to the Jackson amendment? Was 
there at any time any discussion in any con- 
text of the question of Soviet emigy^ation 
policies in the trade negotiations? 

Secretary Peterson: It was not a subject 
of formal negotiations or formal discussion 
in that sense. We find the Soviet Union a 
careful reader of your media, and they in- 
formed us from time to time that they were 
aware of the fact that there were some views 
on this subject expressed most explicitly in 
Congress. But it was not a matter of negoti- 
ation or intensive discussion on my part at 

Q. Do you have any reaso?i to be encour- 
aged from their comments? 

Secretary Peterson: I think I should leave 
that entirely to Secretary Rogers, Mr. Kis- 
singer, and the President. I believe they be- 
lieve with good reason, I am sure, that the 
quiet diplomacy approach is the right one. 

Q. Included in the provisions that you 
Jiave to send to Congress, am I correct in as- 
suming that the fur embargo, the embargo 
we now impose against Russian fur imports 
to this country, are included? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your figure on trade 
over the three-year period of $1.5 billion, I 
assume that that is a two-way figure and 
also does not pick up and include any of the 
agricultural exports we have already sent to 
the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Peterson: I welcome the oppor- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tunity to clarify that. This particular pro- 
vision has been the subject of discussion for 
some time prior to the very large grain deal. 
You must remember that we anticipate that 
the agreement will take effect at the time 
that MFN goes into effect. By that time one 
might expect at least that this unprecedented 
volume of grain that we are now shipping 
will have been reduced to more normal levels. 
I think the answer to your question is that 
it is anticipated that that kind of extraordi- 
nary amount of grain would not be included. 

Q. Does the $1.5 billion figure refer to the 
197 If level or the aggregate? 

Secretary Peterson: No. It is an aggregate 
over three years. It is clearly a minimum. 
It is clearly a number that if we did not 
think we could exceed it we would not have 
put it in the agreement. I will remind you 
that the volume between 1969 and 1971 was 
about $525 million, roughly, over that pe- 
riod. So, we are tripling it over the three- 
year period. 

Q. How much exports, how much imports? 

Secretary Peterson: We have not made 
those projections. In the first place, we could 
not have explicit understandings on that 
score, obviously, since in our kind of econ- 
omy it is impossible to make that kind of 
projection. If you will look at our trade bal- 
ances, if you will look at the kind of prod- 
ucts we import from the Soviet Union, you 
will find that they are predominately raw- 
materials of various kinds. The very large 
projects being discussed, such as the gas 
products, will be several years if they do 
materialize. Therefore it is hard to antici- 
pate that those import numbers would jump 
precipitously. We have had a favorable trade 
balance of about a 3-to-l ratio. I would ex- 
pect to see our exports go up substantially, 
not only through grains but through large 
purchases of machinery and equipment. 

Our expectation is that we could continue 
to have a ratio on that order of magnitude 
and that the positive trade balance could 
easily be in the order of a few hundred mil- 
lion over the next several years. 

Q. Two questions based on page 3 of your 
fact sheet: First of all, do xve take it that 
you have not reached an agreement on third- 
country-supervised arbitration ? 

Secretary Peterson: No, you may take it 
we have reached an agreement. 

Q. Why do you say then, the encourage- 
ment of? 

Secretary Peterson: Well, what this pro- 
vides is that we are dealing obviously with 
private companies, some of whom may not 
want to have arbitration. All we are doing is 
setting a legal framework, an institutional 
mechanism in which the private sector can 
work by negotiating something that says 
this kind of arbitration will be encouraged. 
We are in a sense making it easy, efficient, a 
subject that will not require negotiation, in 
other words, if that is what the company 
chooses to want. I don't think we could re- 
quire arbitration here. At least it would seem 
a bit presumptuous for us to do that. 

Q. The Russians are quite willing, there- 
fore, to have third-country arbitration? 

Secretary Peterson: They have stated for- 
mally that they will encourage this kind of 
arbitration. The obvious inference from that 
is that if an American company expresses a 
wish to have arbitration and third-party ne- 
gotiations, the Government of the Soviet 
Union has said in writing that they will en- 
courage that and find it very acceptable. 

Q. Then the other agreement provides an 
exception for each side relating to national 
security interests. What does that mean? 

Secretary Peterson: We have, for exam- 
ple, at the present time, a variety of pi'o- 
visions, first administratively and then legis- 
latively, to deal with national security. We 
have export control laws that clearly limit 
proprietary products that might make a sig- 
nificant military contribution. What we are 
suggesting here, and what we wanted to 
make very clear, is that we continue to have 
that right and nothing in this agreement 
modifies that at all. 

As a matter of fact, it was not even nego- 

November 20, 1972 


tiated. There is also other legislation which 
deals with national security provisions. Inci- 
dentally, these are provisions many countries 
have. This was our way of simply making 
clear that in the event we thought our na- 
tional security interests were affected by a 
product transaction, we were free to impose 
that provision. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what about the travel 
restrictions? There is no mention at all in 
the agreement of that, yet one would assume 
that if you are going to have increased trade 
you would want to discuss the question of 
travel restrictions that now provide for 
under 25 miles outside of Moscow and 40 
kilometers. We have several restrictions. 
Were those discussed? 

Secretary Peterson: Both Mr. Brower and 
Mr. Gibson were involved in that. 

Mr. Broiver (Deputy Legal Adviser, De- 
partment of State): The existing travel re- 
strictions will continue to apply as hereto- 
fore. Since the principal officer and other 
officers, for example, of the Soviet trade 
representation to be established in Washing- 
ton will be an integral part of the Soviet 
Embassy and will have diplomatic privileges 
and immunities, they will be subject to the 
same restrictions, also. There is no change 
in that scheme. 

Q. What about our people? How can you 
do business tvhen you cannot move around 
the country? 

Mr. Brower: There is no change in the 
scheme, so far as I am aware, from either 

Q. Did you negotiate that or did that come 
tip, and if not, why didn't it? 

Mr. Gibson (Assistant Secretary of Com- 
merce for Domestic and International Busi- 
ness): Of course they can move around. 
They require permission to do so. This has 
been a matter of considerable discussion, but 
at the present moment there has been no 
change in the existing regulations. 

Q. Mr. Peterson, there was quite a bit 

made before the Republican platform at the I 
National Convention about the export of 
technology by your Department to the So- 
viets, and charges have been made by one 
of the presidential candidates that consider- 
able of this technology that we have exported 
to Russia has shown up in North Viet-Nam 
by way of military equipment captured, 
playies, tanks, and guns that had special de- 
vices on them that came from our technol- 
ogy. Does this trade agreement continue the 
export of technology? 

Secretary Peterson: I would put the an- 
swer a bit differently, if you don't mind. This 
agreement provides the United States with 
the unilateral right to continue to have ex- 
port controls of all types for the protection 
of its national security. It in no way im- 
pinges on that right to do so, and we intend 
to continue to do so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that it 
is inaccurate to say that the principal you 
worked from ivas $500 million? 

Secretary Peterson: I would say it was 
extraordinarily inaccurate to say that the 
principal was $500 million. 

Q. At the time of the grain agreement 
with the Soviet Union and subsequent there- 
to the Soviets bought an inordinately large 
amount of grain at a faster rate than ive an- 
ticipated, which led to certain domestic and 
political problems involving a grain deal, so- 
called. Are there any provisions or ivas any 
consideration given or was it necessary to 
protect American producers against that 
same sort of thing that is occurring now in 
the trade and technology field? 

Secretary Peterson: Most American man- 
ufacturers, assuming that it is not on the ex- 
port control list, are rarely troubled by the 
Soviet Union buying more product than they 
anticipate. We would not visualize putting 
any restraint on how much the Soviet Union 
can buy. 

Q. The several-million-dollar deal you just 
mentioned that you said the Soviets were 


Department of State Bulletin 

going to enter into in the next couple of days, 
which companies would benefit? 

Secretary Peterson: One of them is in the 
earthmoving equipment field. I think we 
should let the Soviet Union make their own 
announcements after they have made their 
final decision. But I understand it is earth- 
moving types of equipment. 

Q. So they have been negotiating this deal 
as it is being announced to us today? 

Secretary Peterson: I want to make some- 
thing very clear. The Soviet Union has not 
needed Exim credit to make deals. If you 
will look at the grain deal, the latest infor- 
mation I have seen is that only about 200 
million dollars' vv^orth of credit was used out 
of the $1 billion of purchases. The Soviet 
Union is quite capable of buying products 
on cash. Under those circumstances, it is not 
necessary at all for the Federal Government 
to be involved unless there are some national 
security interests that are involved. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, do you 
intend to ask for MFN for any other coun- 
tries in Europe, and also, do you intend to 
make Eximbank credit available to any of 
those countries that don't have it notv? 

Secretary Peterson: I think the Congress 
shut up its doors today. I think that was the 
case. This gives us some perhaps welcome 
time to review exactly what our legislative 
strategy will be. I cannot go beyond the 
statement I made earlier that the President 
does plan to introduce legislation that covers 
MFN for the Soviet Union, but I would not 
want you to assume from that that it could 
include only the Soviet Union. 

Q. There are already two bills in notv. 

Secretary Peterson: They are not bills 
submitted by the administration. 

Q. But for other countries. 

Secretary Peterson : I think the Council on 
International Economic Policy that Peter 
Flanigan is Executive Director of and the 
National Security Council, I am sure, will be 

conducting an intensive review of what we 
consider to be the right strategy of present- 
ing MFN legislation, and it is too early to 

Q. Was there any tacit understanding or 
any understanding tvhatsoever with relation 
to the operation of Radio Free Europe or 
Radio Liberty or the jamming of the Voice 
of America? 

Secretary Peterson: No, this subject was 
never discussed. 

Q. Let me be absolutely clear, at no time 
did you initiate any discussion of the Jackson 
amendment or any other feeling in the Con- 
gress regarding the emigration policies of 
the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Peterson: I never initiated such 
discussions. There have been occasions 
where the Soviets commented on stories they 
read, but I did not initiate it. 

Q. You said because members of the So- 
viet trade representation have diplomatic 
immunity they will not be permitted to ne- 
gotiate any trade transactions. Who is, 
th erefore ? 

Mr. Gibson: They can have members in 
their delegation who do not enjoy immunity 
who will actually execute the contracts. This 
is so that there can be proper redress in the 
event of any difficulty with the contract. 

Q. So there ivill be members of the trade 
representation who will not have diplomatic 

Secretary Peterson: Yes. You should know 
there are trade organizations that do not 
have it. 

Mr. Brower: The complete answer to that 
question is that the business will be done 
basically by civilians, nondiplomatic person- 
nel of foreign trade organizations who are 
either visiting this country for the purpose 
of making a deal or are residents, and they 
are not protected by diplomatic immunity. 
The reason is that those who engage in trade 
should be subject to the legal framework. So, 
I think that is pretty clear-cut. 

November 20, 1972 


Q. Mr. Secretary, you said the Soviets 
will invite U.S. companies to make proposals 
for their trade center. Does that mean the 
Holiday Inn deal is not closed? 

Secretary Peterson: What I have found 
out about Miss Berger is that she has such 
broad and esoteric knowledge about all kinds 
of deals that some of the rest of you may not 
appreciate the subtlety of her questions. 

Holiday Inn is one of the companies that 
has been discussing in recent weeks with the 
Soviet Union their being a participant in 
the trade center complex. The Soviets have 
told us that they expect to get many pro- 
posals in this area. I have the impression 
that no specific decisions have been made 
with any company, hotel, or contractor. 

The press: Thank you, gentlemen. 


White House press release tiated October 18 

The successful negotiation was completed today 
[October 18] of a comprehensive series of agree- 
ments and arrangements between the United States 
and the Soviet Union covering trade matters, re- 
ciprocal trade credits, expanded business facilities, 
and the settlement of outstanding lend-lease obliga- 
tions. These agreements reflect the Basic Principles 
of Relations Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed 
by the President and General Secretary Bi-ezhnev 
at last May's summit meeting.' The seventh pi'inci- 
ple provided: "The USA and the USSR regard com- 
mercial and economic ties as an important and nec- 
essary element in the strengthening of their bilateral 
relations and thus will actively promote the growth 
of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between 
the relevant organizations and enterprises of the 
two countries and the conclusion of appropriate 
agreements and contracts, including long-term 
ones." At the summit meeting, the Joint U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission was established, 
chaired by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Peter G. 
Peterson for the American side and Minister of 
Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev for the Soviet side. 
The full Commission met in Moscow in July of this 
year and again in Washington for the past week. 
Specific work groups of the Commission have been in 
specific negotiations for the past few weeks. 

The President signed today the determination 

■ For text, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 898. 

making the Soviet Union eligible for credits from 
the Export-Import Bank of the United States. Sec- 
retary Peterson and Soviet Minister Patolichev 
signed the trade agreement. Secretary William P. 
Rogers and Minister Patolichev signed the lend-lease 

Trade Agreement. Consistent with the U.S. ob- 
jective of creating a comprehensive and clear frame- 
work within which private American firms can 
participate in U.S. -Soviet trade, the trade agreement 
spells out guidelines in specified critical areas to 
facilitate the flow of trade. The agreement provides 
for reciprocal granting of trading access ec|ual to 
that granted for most of our trading partners in 
the free world; for protection against disruption of 
domestic markets; for the placement of substantial 
orders by the Soviet Union for U.S. machinery, plant 
and ec]uipment, agricultural products, industrial 
products, and consumer goods; for the availability of 
U.S. business facilities in the Soviet Union equiva- 
lent to those granted representatives of other na- 
tions; for the establishment of a U.S. commercial 
office in Moscow and a Soviet trade representation 
in Washington; and for the encouragement of third- 
country-supervised arbitration in the settlement of 
commercial disputes. The agreement provides an 
exception for each side relating to national security 
interests. U.S. export controls are not negotiable 
and were not therefore discussed. However, such 
regulations have been and will continue to be under 

Lei'el of Trade. The trade agreement contem- 
plates that total trade during its three-year period 
will at least triple over the 1969-71 period to an 
aggregate amount of at least $1.5 billion. The 
Soviet Government states that it expects substantial 
orders to be placed in the United States for "ma- 
chinery, plant and equipment, agricultural products, 
industrial products and consumer goods." For ex- 
ample, the Soviet Government has indicated a de- 
sire to purchase several million dollars' worth of 
U.S. equipment to manufacture tableware. Also, 
U.S. firms have applied for export licenses for 
equipment valued at well over .$1 billion in anticipa- 
tion of bidding successfully on contracts associated 
with the huge Kama River truck plant construction 
projects. It is estimated that U.S. companies could 
capture between 250 and 500 million dollars' worth 
of the equipment contracts for this project. Sub- 
stantial grain purchases are expected to continue 
during the period of the agreement. Machinery and 
equipment exports to the Soviet Union are expected 
to grow substantially. Currently, electrical and non- 
electrical machinery accounts for only $60 million 
(or 37 percent of our total exports to the Soviet 
Union in 1971), even though total U.S. machinery 
exports to all countries in 1971 wei-e $11.6 billion. 
Several large-scale joint projects are currently under 
di.scussion or negotiation. These include industrial 
installations for the production of polystyrene, metal 


Department of State Bulletin 

fasteners, fertilizers, metal mining, and natural gas 
extraction and transmission. The U.S. balance of 
trade with the Soviet Union has traditionally run 
heavily in favor of the United States — generally by 
a ratio of 3 to 1. This trend can be expected to con- 
tinue over the period of the trade agreement 
resulting in a favorable trade balance in the probable 
range of at least a few hundred million dollars a 
year. Furthermore, U.S. exports to the Soviet Un- 
ion traditionally have been much more job intensive 
than Soviet exports to the United States, largely 
raw materials which are much less job intensive. 

Most-Favored-Nation Provisions. The agreement 
provides that each country will reduce its tariffs 
with respect to the products of the other to the 
level generally applicable to like products of most 
other countries. This will require action by the 
U.S. Congress. The President currently plans to 
submit such legislation early in next year's session. 
It is anticipated the trade agreement will not enter 
into force, and its three-year period will not begin 
to run, until such legislation is enacted. Between 
1935 and 1951 such tariff treatment was also ac- 
corded to the Soviet Union, but it was withdrawn 
by statute in 1951 during the Korean war. Yugo- 
slavia was not affected by the 1951 statute. A sub- 
sequent amendment made possible the granting of 
this tariff treatment to Poland in 1960. The grant- 
ing of tariff treatment, at a level generally appli- 
cable to like products of most other countries, to 
the Soviet Union is fully consistent with U.S. mem- 
bership in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] . 

Market Disruption Provision. Through state 
trading monopolies, the Soviet Union controls both 
the importation and exportation of all goods. In 
the Soviet economy, costs and prices do not neces- 
sarily play the same role as they do in a market 
economy. Accordingly, the Soviets have agreed to 
a procedure under which, after consultations, they 
will not ship products to the United States which 
the U.S. Government has advised will "cause, threat- 
en or contribute to disruption of its domestic mar- 
ket." In the event the Soviets request limitation 
of U.S. exports, the U.S. Government is obliged to 
make such information available to the U.S. busi- 
ness community. 

Reciprocal Trade Credits. Each government 
agreed to make available to the other, on a recipro- 
cal basis, trade credit arrangements which are usual 
and customary in the financing of exports. The 
President has therefore determined that the Export- 
Import Bank of the United States may engage in 
transactions with the Soviet Union. The Soviets 
have given assurances that the facilities of the For- 
eign Trade Bank of the Soviet Union and the credit 
facilities of more than 40 Soviet foreign trade orga- 
nizations will be available to American importers. 

The Soviets have executed an operating agreement 
with Eximbank which provides that with respect to 

all matters — amount of credit, interest rate, repay- 
ment provisions — they will be treated in the same 
manner as any other country. Eximbank policies 
concerning private participation in credit facilita- 
tion will apply, and all credits in excess of $10 
million will be subject to the usual review by the 
National Advisory Council. 

Expanded Business and Commercial Facilities — 
Commercial Office. The trade agreement provides 
that the United States may establish a govern- 
mentally sponsored commercial office in Moscow to 
be operated through the U.S. Embassy there. The 
Soviets will be permitted to establish a trade repre- 
sentation in Washington. The U.S. commercial office 
in Moscow will provide the U.S. business commu- 
nity with up-to-date information on Soviet markets, 
facilitate introductions of U.S. businessmen to the 
appropriate Soviet ministries, provide such facilities 
as bilingual stenographers and communications, and 
provide critical expertise in advising U.S. business- 
men in making their sales and purchases. Because 
members of the Soviet trade representation will 
have diplomatic immunity, they will not be permit- 
ted to negotiate or execute any transactions. 

Business Facilities in Moscow. Like all foreign 
firms, U.S. business firms may not establish a 
permanent office in Moscow with the power to hire 
local pei'sonnel and the right to receive office space, 
facilities, and housing without accreditation by the 
Soviet Government. Until very recently, only two 
U.S. firms, both engaged in the travel and tourism 
industry, were accredited. Since negotiations were 
commenced, two industrial firms have been accred- 
ited, and the Soviets have agreed that they will 
continue to accredit U.S. firms on a basis no less 
favorable than that accorded firms of any third 
country. Any problems arising out of these accredi- 
tation procedures will be resolved thi'ough the Joint 
Commercial Commission. The Soviets have given 
written assurances that U.S. accredited companies 
will be authorized to employ Soviet personnel, ac- 
quire needed telephones, telex equipment, and other 
such communications facilities promptly, import 
promptly needed equipment such as typewriters, 
calculators, dictation and copying equipment, and 
automobiles and personal items such as furniture 
and appliances, have access to suitable housing, and 
receive prompt processing of visa requests. 

Large Trade Ceyiter Complex. The Soviets also 
have said they will construct a large office-hotel- 
apartment trade center in Moscow. It is contem- 
plated that the trade center will contain a substan- 
tial number of company offices, first-class hotel 
rooms and apartments, and related support activi- 
ties. The center will be the first of its kind in the 
Soviet Union and is expected to be in full operation 
in the next few years. The Soviets will invite U.S. 
companies to make proposals and cooperate in the 
financing and construction of the trade center. The 
Soviet Government is also planning to construct a 

November 20, 1972 


trade and economic exposition center and has offered 
to lease a pavilion to the United States for display 
of American products. The United States will as- 
sist the Soviets in establishing in New York a Soviet 
office for the purpose of purchasing American equip- 
ment for use in the Kama River truck plant. 

Arbitration. For the last 40 years the Soviets have 
had a policy of encouraging arbitration under the 
auspices of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis- 
sion in Moscow, which is composed of 15 Soviet 
nationals. Arbitration in a third country was agreed 
to by the Soviet foreign trade organizations only 
if the Western firm demanded and was able to ne- 
gotiate a third-country provision in the purchase or 
sale contract. By contrast, the rules of the Ameri- 
can Arbitration Association provide that where a 
party to an arbitration proceeding is not an Ameri- 
can, he has a right to have the controlling arbi- 
trator be from a third country. The trade agree- 
ment encourages settlement of commercial disputes 
by arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the 
Economic Commission for Europe, a United Na- 
tions agency, in a country other than the Soviet 
Union and the United States with arbitrators ap- 
pointed by an authority in a country other than 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Parties 
to contracts, however, are free to decide on any 
other means of arbitration "which they mutually 
prefer and agree best suits their particular needs." 
In addition, U.S. firms are guaranteed the right to 
use the processes of Soviet courts and comparable 
Soviet organizations are assured similar access to 
U.S. courts. 

Lend-Lease Settlement 

Background. Outstanding Soviet lend-lease obli- 
gations have been a deterrent to U.S. -Soviet com- 
mercial relations since World War II. Negotiations 
which were conducted immediately after the war, in 
1951, and in 1960 all ended in failure. The lend-lease 
statute gives the President full power to settle the 
obligation within very broad limits. The agreement 
under which lend-lease aid was extended to the 
Soviets followed other similar agreements in pro- 
viding only the most general language concerning 
how contributions to the war effort by each side 
were to be settled. Consequently, the actual 1945 
settlement with the British, the principal benefici- 
aries of lend-lease aid, provided the guidelines for 
the settlement with the Soviet Union, which re- 
ceived about half as much aid as the British but 
more than five times as much as any other country. 
The principal issues were the amount of the total 
settlement, whether and how much interest should 
be charged, the length of time for repayment, a 
grace period, and a right to postpone annual install- 
ments under certain conditions. Negotiations were 

complicated by the length of time which had elapsed 
since World War II, the difference between current 
interest rates and those prevailing at the end of 
World War II, and the fact that Soviet products 
have been subject to higher tariff levels during the 
intervening period than have been the produc